EVery Free-holder that hath a Voice in the Election of Knights, Citizens, or Burgeſſes for the Parliament, ought to know with what Power he truſts thoſe whom he chooſeth, becauſe ſuch Truſt is the Foundation of the Power of the Houſe of Commons.

A Writ from the King to the Sheriff of the County, is that which gives Authority and Commiſſion for the Free-holders to make their Election, at the next County-Court-day after the Receipt of the Writ; and in the Writ there is alſo expreſſed the Duty and Power of the Knights, Citizens and Burgeſſes that are there elected.

The means to know what Truſt or Authority the Countrey or Free-holders confer, or beſtow by their Election, is in this, as in other like Caſes, to have an eye to the words of the Commiſſion, or Writ it ſelf: thereby it may be ſeen whether that which the Houſe of Commons doth act be within the Limit of their Commiſſion: greater or other Truſt than is compriſed in the Body of the Writ, the Free-holders do not, or cannot give if they obey the Writ: the Writ being Latine, and not extant in Engliſh, few Free-holders underſtand it, and fewer obſerve it; I have rendred it in Latine and Engliſh.

By this Writ we do not find that the Commons are called to be any part of the Common Councel of the Kingdom, or of the Supream Court of Judicature, or to have any part of the Legiſlative Power, or to Conſult de arduis regni negotiis, of the Difficult Buſineſſes of the Kingdom. The Writ only ſays, the King would have Conference, and Treat with the Prelates, Great men, and Peers: but not a Word of Treating or Conference with the Commons; The Houſe of Commons, which doth not miniſter an Oath, nor fine, nor impriſon any, but their own Members (and that but of late in ſome Caſes) cannot properly be ſaid to be a Court at all; much leſs to be a part of the Supream Court, or higheſt Judicature of the Kingdom. The conſtant Cuſtom, even to this day, for the Members of the Houſe of Commons to ſtand bare, with their Hats in their Hands in the Preſence of the Lords, while the Lords ſit covered at all Conferences, is a viſible Argument, that the Lords and Commons are not fellow-Commiſſioners, or fellow-Counſellors of the Kingdom.

The Duty of Knights, Citizens, and Burgeſſes, mentioned in the Writ, is only ad Faciendum, & Conſentiendum, to Perform and to Conſent to ſuch things as ſhould be ordained by the Common Councel of the Kingdom; there is not ſo much mentioned in the Writ as a Power in the Commons to diſſent. When a man is bound to appear in a Court of Juſtice, the words are, ad Faciendum & Recipiendum quod ei per curiam injungetur: which ſhews, that this Word Faciendum is uſed as a Term in Law, to ſignifie to give Obedience: For this, we meet with a Precedent even as ancient as the Parliament-Writ it ſelf, and it is concerning Proceedings in Parliament 33 Ed. 1. Dominus Rex mandavit vicecom' quod, &c. ſummon' Nicolaum de Segrave, & ex parte Domini Regis firmiter ei injungeret, quod eſſet coram Domino Rege in proximo Parl. &c. ad audiendum voluntatem ipſius Domini Regis, &c. Et ad faciendum & recipiendum ulterius quod curia Domini Regis conſideraret in Praemiſſis. Our Lord the King commands the Sheriff to ſummon Nicholas Segrave to appear before our Lord the King in the next Parliament, to hear the Will of the Lord our King himſelf, and to perform and receive what the Kings Court ſhall further conſider of the Premiſes.

Sir Edw. Coke, to prove the Clergy hath no Voice in Parliament, ſaith, that by the Words of their Writ, their Conſent was only to ſuch things as were ordained by the Common Councel of the Realm. If this Argument of his be good, it will deny alſo Voices to the Commons in Parliament; for in their Writ are the ſelf-ſame Words, viz. to conſent to ſuch things as were ordained by the Common Councel of the Kingdom. Sir Edw. Coke concludes, that the Procuratores Cleri, have many times appeared in Parliament, as Spiritual Aſſiſtants, to Conſider, Conſult, and to Conſent; but never had Voice there; how they could Conſult and Conſent without Voices he doth not ſhew: Though the Clergy (as he ſaith) oft appeared in Parliament, yet was it only ad conſentiendum, as I take it, and not ad faciendum, for the Word Faciendum is omitted in their Writ; the cauſe, as I conceive, is, the Clergy, though they were to aſſent, yet by reaſon of Clerical Exemptions, they were not required to Perform all the Ordinances or Acts of Parliament.

But ſome may think, though the Writ doth not expreſs a Calling of the Knights, Citizens, and Burgeſſes to be part of the Common Councel of the Kingdom; yet it ſuppoſeth it a thing granted, and not to be queſtioned, but that they are a part of the Common Councel.

Indeed if their Writ had not mentioned the Calling of Prelates, Great men, and Peers to Councel, there might have been a little better colour for ſuch a Suppoſition: but the truth is, ſuch a Suppoſition doth make the Writ it ſelf vain and idle; for it is a ſenſeleſs thing to bid men aſſent to that which they have already ordained: ſince Ordaining is an Aſſenting, and more than an Aſſenting.

For clearing the meaning and ſenſe of the Writ, and Satisfaction of ſuch as think it impoſſible, but that the Commons of England have always been a part of the Common Councel of the Kingdom, I ſhall inſiſt upon theſe Points: 1. That anciently the Barons of England were the Common Councel of the Kingdom. 2. That untill the time of Hen. 1. the Commons were not called to Parliament. 3. Though the Commons were called by Hen. 1. yet they were not conſtantly called, nor yet regularly elected by Writ until Hen. 3. time.

For the firſt point, Mr. Cambden in his Britannia, doth teach us, that in the time of the Engliſh Saxons, and in the enſuing Age, a Parliament was called Commune Concilium, which was (ſaith he) Praeſentia Regis, Praelatorum, Procerumque collectorum, the Preſence of the King, Prelates, and Peers aſſembled; No mention of the Commons: the Prelates and Peers were all Barons.

The Author of the Chronicle of the Church of Lichfield, cited by M. Selden, Apud Selden. ſaith, Poſtquam Rex Edvardus, &c. Concilio Baronum Angliae, &c. After King Edward was King; by the Councel of the Barons of England, he revived a Law which had lain aſleep three ſcore & ſeven years: and this Law was called the Law of St. Edward the King.

In the ſame Chronicle it is ſaid, that Will. the Conquerour, anno regni ſui quarto apud Londin', had Concilium Baronum ſuorum, a Councel of his Barons. And of this Parliament it is, that his Son Hen. 1. ſpeaks, ſaving, I reſtore you the Laws of King Edward the Confeſſor, with thoſe amendments wherewith my Father amended them by the Councel of his Barons.

In the fifth year, as Mr. Selden thinks, of the Conquerour, was a Parliament, or Principum conventus, an Aſſembly of Earls and Barons at Pinenden Heath in Kent, in the Cauſe between Lanfranke the Arch-biſhop of Canterbury, and Odo Earl of Kent. The King gave Commiſſion to Godfrid, then Biſhop of Conſtance in Normandy, to repreſent His own Perſon for Hearing the Controverſie (as ſaith M. Lambard;) and cauſed Egelrick the Biſhop of Chicheſter, (an aged man, ſingularly commended for Skill in the Laws and Cuſtomes of the Realm) to be brought thither in a Wagon for his Aſſiſtance in Councel: Commanded Haymo the Sheriff of Kent, to ſummon the whole County to give in Evidence: three whole days ſpent in Debate: in the End Lanfrank and the Biſhop of Rocheſter were reſtored to the Poſſeſſion of Detling and other Lands which Odo had withholden.

21 Edw. 3. fol. 60.There is mention of a Parliament held under the ſame King William the Conquerour,Apud Selden. wherein all the Biſhops of the Land, Earls and Barons, made an Ordinance touching the Exemption of the Abby of Bury from the Biſhops of Norwich.

In the tenth year of the Conquerour, Epiſcopi, Comites, & Barones regni regià poteſtate ad univerſalem Synodum pro cauſis audiendis & tractandis convocati, ſaith the Book of Weſtminſter.

In the 2 year of William 2. there was a Parliament de cunctis regni Principibus; another wch had quoſ que regni Proceres: All the Peers of the Kingdom. Selden.

In the ſeventh year was a Parliament at Rockingham-Caſtle in Northamptonſhire. Epiſcopis, Abbatibus cunctiſque regni Principibus una coeuntibus.

A year or two after, the ſame King, de ſtatu regni acturus, &c. called thither, by the Command of his Writ, the Biſhops, Abbots, Selden. and all the Peers of the Kingdom.

At the Coronation of Hen. 1. All the People of the Kingdom of England were called,Selden. and Laws were then made; but it was Per Commune Concilium Baronum meorum, by the Common Councel of my Barons.

In his 3 d. year, the Peers of the Kingdom were called without any mention of the Commons:Selden. and another, a while after, conſenſu Comitum & Baronum, by the conſent of Earls and Barons.

Florentius Wigornienſis ſaith, theſe are Statutes which Anſelme and all the other Biſhops in the Preſence of King Henry, by the aſſent of his Barons ordained: and in his tenth year, of Earls and Peers; and in his 23. of Earls and Barons. In the year following, the ſame King held a Parliament, or great Councel, with His Barons Spiritual and Temporal.

King Hen. 2. in his tenth year, had a great Councel or Parliament at Clarendon, which was an Aſſembly of Prelates and Peers.

22 Hen. 2. ſaith Hovenden, was a great Councel at Nottingham, and by the Common Councel of the Arch-biſhops, Biſhops, Earls and Barons, the Kingdom was divided into ſix parts. And again, Hovenden ſaith, that the ſame King at Windſor (apud Windeſhores) Communi Concilio of Biſhops, Earls, and Barons, divided England into four Parts. And in his 21 Year a Parliament at Windſor of Biſhops, Earls, and Barons. And another of like Perſons at Northampton.

King Richard 1. had a Parliament at Nottingham, in his fifth year, of Biſhops, Earls, and Barons: This Parliament laſted but four days, yet much was done in it: the firſt day the King diſſeiſeth Gerard de Canvil of the Sherifwick of Lincoln, and Hugh Bardolph of the Caſtle and Sherifwick of York. The ſecond day he required Judgment againſt his Brother John, who was afterwards King: and Hugh de Novant Biſhop of Coventry. The third day was granted to the King of every Plow-land in England 2 s. He required alſo the third part of the Service of every Knights Fee for his Attendance into Normandy, and all the Wool that year of the Monks Ciſteaux, which, for that it was grievous and unſupportable, they ſine for Money. The laſt day was for Hearing of Grievances: and ſo the Parliament brake up; And the ſame year held another at Northampton of the Nobles of the Realm.

King John, in his fifth year, He and his Great men met, Selden. Rex & Magnates convenerunt: and the Roll of that year hath Commune Concilium Baronum Meorum, the Common Councel of my Barons at Winchester.

In the ſixth year of King Henry 3. the Nobles granted to the King, of every Knights Fee, two Marks in Silver.

In the ſeventh year he had a Parliament at London, an Aſſembly of Barons. In his thirteenth year an Aſſembly of the Lords at Weſtminſter. In his fifteenth year, of Nobles, both Spiritual and Temporal.

M. Par. ſaith, that 20 H. 3. Congregati ſunt Magnates ad colloquium de negotiis regni tractaturi, the Great men were called to confer and treat of the Buſineſs of the Kingdom. And at Merton, Our Lord the King granted, by the Conſent of his Great men, That hereafter Ʋſury ſhould not run againſt a Ward from the Death of his Ancestor.

21 Hen. 3. The King ſent his Royal Writs, commanding all belonging to His Kingdom, that is to ſay, Arch-biſhops, Biſhops, Abbots, and Priors installed, Earls and Barons, that they ſhould all meet at London, to treat of the King's Buſineſs touching the whole Kingdom: and at the day prefixed, the whole multitude of the Nobles of the Kingdom met at London, ſaith Matt. Weſtminſter.

In his 21 year, At the Requeſt, and by the Councel of the Lords, the Charters were confirmed.

22 Hen. 3. At Wincheſter, the King ſent his Royal Writs to Arch-biſhops, Biſhops, Priors, Earls and Barons, to treat of Buſineſs concerning the whole Kingdom.

32 Hen. 3. The King commanded all the Nobility of the whole Kingdom to be called to treat of the State of His Kingdom. Matt. Weſtm'.

49 Hen. 3. The King had a Treaty at Oxford with the Peers of the Kingdom. Matt. Weſtminſter.

At a Parliament at Marlborough 55. Hen. 3. Statutes were made by the Aſſent of Earls and Barons.

Here the Place of Bracton, Chief Juſtice in this Kings time, is worth the obſerving; and the rather for that it is much inſiſted on of late, to make for Parliaments being above the King. The words in Bracton are, The King hath a Superiour, God; alſo the Law by which he is made King; alſo his Court, viz. the Earls and Barons. The Court that was ſaid in thoſe days to be above the King, was a Court of Earls and Barons, not a word of the Commons, or the repreſentative Body of the Kingdom being any part of the Superiour Court. Now for the true Senſe of Bractons words, how the Law, and the Court of Earls and Barons, are the Kings Superiours; they muſt of Neceſſity be underſtood to be Superiours, ſo far only as to adviſe, and direct the King out of his own Grace and Good Will only: which appears plainly by the Words of Bracton himſelf, where, ſpeaking of the King, he reſolves thus, Nec poteſt ei neceſſitatem aliquis imponere quod injuriam ſuam corrigat & emendat, cum ſuperiorem non habeat niſi Deum; & ſatis ei erat ad poenam, quod Dominum expectat ultorem. Nor can any man put a neceſſity upon him to correct and amend his Injury unleſs he will himſelf, ſince he hath no Superiour but God; it will be ſufficient Puniſhment for him, to expect the Lord an Avenger. Here the ſame man, who ſpeaking according to ſome mens Opinion, ſaith, the Law and Court of Earls and Barons are ſuperiour to the King; in this place tells us himſelf, the King hath no Superiour but God: the Difference is eaſily reconciled; according to the Diſtinction of the School-men, the King is free from the Coactive Power of Laws or Counſellors: but may be ſubject to their Directive Power, according to his own Will: that is, God can only compel, but the Law and his Courts may adviſe Him.

Rot. Parliament. 1 Hen. 4. nu. 79. the Commons expreſly affirm, Judgment in Parliament belongs to the King and Lords.

Theſe Precedents ſhew, that from the Conqueſt until a great part of Henry the Third's Reign (in whoſe days it is thought the Writ for Election of Knights was framed) which is about two hundred years, and above a third part of the time ſince the Conqueſt, to our days, the Barons made the Parliament or Common Councel of the Kingdom; under the name of Barons, not only the Earls, but the Biſhops alſo were Comprehended, for the Conquerour made the Biſhops Barons. Therefore it is no ſuch great Wonder, that in the Writ we find the Lords only to be the Counſellors, and the Commons Called only to perform and conſent to the Ordinances.

Thoſe there be who ſeem to believe, that under the word Barons anciently the Lords of Court-Barons were comprehended, and that they were Called to Parliament as Barons; but if this could be proved to have been at any time true, yet thoſe Lords of Court-Barons were not the repreſentative Body of the Commons of England, except it can be alſo proved, that the Commons, or Free-holders of the Kingdom, choſe ſuch Lords of Court-Barons to be preſent in Parliament. The Lords of Manors came not at firſt by Election of the People, as Sir Edw. Coke, treating of the Inſtitution of Court-Barons, reſolves us in theſe words: By the Laws and Ordinances of ancient Kings, and eſpecially of King Alfred, it appeareth, that the firſt Kings of this Realm had all the Lands of England in Demean; and les grand Manors and Royalties they reſerved to themſelves, and of the remnant they, for the Defence of the Realm, enfeoffed the Barons of the Realm with ſuch Juriſdiction as the Court-Baron now hath. Coke's Inſtitutes, Firſt part, Fol. 58.

Here, by the way, I cannot but note, that if the firſt Kings had all the Lands of England in Demean, as Sir Edw. Coke ſaith they had; And if the firſt Kings were choſen by the People (as many think they were) then ſurely our Fore-fathers were a very bountiful (if not a prodigal) People, to give all the Lands of the whole Kingdom to their Kings, with Liberty for them to keep what they pleaſed, and to give the Remainder to their Subjects, clogg'd and encumbred with a Condition to defend the Realm: This is but an ill ſign of a limited Monarchy by original Conſtitution or Contract. But, to conclude the former point, Sir Edward Coke's Opinion is, that in the ancient Laws, under the name of Barons, were compriſed all the Nobility.

This Doctrine of the Barons being the Common Councel doth diſpleaſe many, and is denied, as tending to the Diſparagement of the Commons, and to the Diſcredit and Confutation of their Opinion, who teach, that the Commons are aſſigned Councellors to the King by the People; therefore I will call in Mr. Pryn to help us with his Teſtimony: He in his Book of Treachery & Diſloyalty, &c. proves, that before the Conqueſt, by the Laws of Edward the Confeſſor, cap. 17. The King by his Oaths was to do Juſtice by the Councel of the Nobles of his Realm. He alſo reſolves, that the Earls and Barons in Parliament are above the King, and ought to bridle him, when he exorbitates from the Laws. He further tells us, the Peers & Prelates have oft tranſlated the Crown from the right Heir,

1. Electing and Crowning Edward, who was illegitimate; and putting by Ethelred, the right Heir, after Edgars deceaſe.

2. Electing and Crowning Canutus, a meer Foreigner, in oppoſition to Edmund, the right Heir to King Ethelred.

3. Harold and Hardiknute, both elected Kings ſucceſſively without title; Edmund and Alfred the right Heirs being diſpoſſeſſed.

4. The Engliſh Nobility, upon the Death of Harold, enacted, that none of the Daniſh bloud ſhould any more reign over them.

5. Edgar Etheling, who had beſt Title, was rejected; and Harold elected and crowned King.

6. In the ſecond and third year of Edw. 2. the Peers and Nobles of the Land, ſeeing themſelves contemned, entreated the King to manage the Affairs of the Kingdom by the Councel of his Barons. He gave his Aſſent, and ſware to ratifie what the Nobles ordained; and one of their Articles was, that He would thenceforward order all the Affairs of the Kingdom by the Councel of his Clergy and Lords.

7. William Rufus, finding the greatest part of the Nobles againſt him, ſware to Lanfranke, that if they would chooſe him for King, he would abrogate their overhard Laws.

8. The Beginning, ſaith Mr. Pryn, of the Charter of Hen. 1. is obſervable; Henry by the Grace of God, of England, &c. Know ye, That by the Mercy of God and Common Councel of the Barons of the Kingdom, I am Crowned King.

9. Maud the Empreſs, the right Heir, was put-by the Crown, by the Prelates and Barons, and Stephen Earl of Mortain, who had no good Title, aſſembling the Biſhop and Peers, promiſing the amendment of the Laws according to all their Pleaſures and Liking, was by them all proclaimed King.

10 Lewis of France Crowned King by the Barons, inſtead of King John.

All theſe Teſtimonies from Mr. Pryn may ſatisfie, that anciently the Barons were the Common Councel, or Parliament of England. And if Mr. Pryn could have found ſo much Antiquity, and Proof for the Knights, Citizens, and Burgeſſes, being of the Common Councel: I make no doubt but we ſhould have heard from him in Capital Characters; but alas! he meets not with ſo much as theſe Names in thoſe elder Ages. He dares not ſay, the Barons were aſſigned by the People, Councellors to the King; for he tells us, every Baron in Parliament doth repreſent his own Perſon, and ſpeaketh in behalf of himſelf alone; but in the Knights, Citizens, and Burgeſſes, are repreſented the Commons of the whole Realm: therefore every one of the Commons hath a greater voice in Parliament than the greateſt Earl in England. Nevertheleſs Maſter Pryn will be very well content if we will admit and ſwallow theſe Parliaments of Barons, for the repreſentative Body of the Kingdom; and to that Purpoſe he cites them, or to no Purpoſe at all. But to prove the Treachery and Diſloyalty of Popiſh Parliaments, Prelates, and Peers, to their Kings: which is the main Point, that Maſter Pryn, by the Title of his Book is to make good, and to prove.

As to the ſecond Point; which is, That until the time of Hen. 1. the Commons were not called to Parliament: beſides, the general Silence of Antiquity which never makes mention of the Commons Coming to Parliament until that time; our Hiſtories ſay, before his time only certain of the Nobility were called to Conſultation about the most important affairs of the State: He cauſed the Commons alſo to be aſſembled by Knights, Citizens, and Burgeſſes of their own Appointment: much to the ſame purpoſe writes Sir Walter Raleigh, ſaying, it is held that the Kings of England had no formal Parliaments till about the 18th year of King Hen. 1. For in his Third year, for the Marriage of his Daughter, the King raiſed a Tax upon every Hide of Land, by the Advice of his Privy Councel alone. And the Subjects (ſaith he) ſoon after this Parliament was eſtabliſhed, began to stand upon Terms with their King, and drew from him by strong hand, and their Swords, their Great Charter; it was after the eſtabliſhment of the Parliament, by colour of it, that they had ſo great Daring. If any deſire to know the cauſe why Hen. 1. called the People to Parliament, it was upon no very good Occaſion, if we believe Sir Walter Raleigh; The Grand Charter (ſaith he) was not originally granted Regally and freely, for King Hen. 1. did but uſurp the Kingdom, and therefore the better to ſecure himſelf againſt Robert his elder Brother, he flattered the People with thoſe Charters: yea, King John that confirmed them, had the like Reſpect: for Arthur D. of Britain was the undoubted Heir of the Crown, upon whom John uſurped: ſo theſe Charters had their original from Kings, de facto, but not de jure: and then afterwards his Concluſion is, that the Great Charter had firſt an obſcure Birth by Ʋſurpation, & was foſtered, and ſhewed to the World by Rebellion: in brief, the King called the People to Parliament, and granted them Magna Charta, that they might confirm to him the Crown.

The third Point conſiſts of two parts; Firſt, that the Commons were not called to Parliament until Hen. 3. days, this appears by divers of the Precedents formerly cited, to prove that the Barons were the Common Councel. For though Hen. 1. called all the People of the Land to his Coronation, and again in the 15. or 18. year of his Reign; yet always he did not ſo; neither many of thoſe Kings that did ſucceed him, as appeareth before.

Secondly, For calling the Commons by Writ, I find it acknowledged in a Book, intituled, The Privilege and Practice of Parliaments, in theſe words; In ancient times, after the King had ſummoned His Parliament, innumerable multitudes of People did make their Acceſs thereunto, pretending that Privilege of Right to belong to them. But King Hen. 3. having Experience of the Miſchief, and inconveniences by occaſion of ſuch popular Confuſion, did take order that none might come to His Parliament but thoſe who were specially ſummoned. To this purpoſe it is obſerved by Maſter Selden, that the firſt Writs we find accompanied with other Circumstances of a Summons to Parliament, as well for the Commons as Lords, is in the 49 of Hen. 3. In the like manner Maſter Cambden ſpeaking of the Dignity of Barons, hath theſe words: King Hen. 3. out of a great Multitude which were ſeditious and turbulent, called the very beſt by Writ or Summons to Parliament; for he, after many Troubles and Vexations between the King himſelf, and Simon de Monefort, with other Barons; and after appeaſed: did decree and ordain, That all thoſe Earls and Barons unto whom the King himſelf vouchſafed to direct His Writs of Summons ſhould come to his Parliament, and no others: but that which he began a little before his Death, Edward 1. and his Succeſſors constantly obſerved and continued. The ſaid prudent King Edward ſummoned always thoſe of ancient Families, that were moſt wiſe, to His Parliament; and omitted their Sons after their Death, if they were not anſwerable to their Parents in Ʋnderſtanding. Cambden. Alſo Mr. Cambden in another place ſaith, that in the time of Edw 1. ſelect men for Wiſdom and Worth among the Gentry were called to Parliament, and their Posterity omitted, if they were defective therein.

As the power of ſending Writs of Summons for Elections, was firſt exerciſed by Hen. 3. ſo ſucceeding Kings did regulate the Elections upon ſuch Writs, as doth appear by ſeveral Statutes, which all ſpeak in the Name and Power of the Kings themſelves; for ſuch was the Language of our Fore-fathers.

In 5 Ric. 2. c. 4. theſe be the words, The King Willeth and Commandeth all Perſons which ſhall have Summons to come to Parliament: and every Perſon that doth abſent himſelf (except he may reaſonably and honeſtly excuſe him to Our Lord the King) ſhall be amerced, and otherwiſe puniſhed.

7 Hen. 4. c. 15. Our Lord the King, at the grievous complaint of his Commons, of the undue Election of the Knights of Counties, ſometimes made of affection of Sheriffs, and otherwiſe againſt the Form of the Writs, to the great ſlander of the Counties, &c. Our Lord the King, willing therein to provide Remedy, by the Aſſent of the Lords and Commons, Hath Ordained, That Election ſhall be made in the full County-Court, and that all that be there preſent, as well-Suitors as others, ſhall proceed to the Election freely, notwithſtanding any Requeſt, or Command to the contrary.

11 Hen. 4. c. 1. Our Lord the King Ordained, that a Sheriff that maketh an undue Return, &c. ſhall incur the Penalty of a 100 l. to be paid to Our Lord the King.

1 H. 5. c. 1. Our Lord the King, by the Advice and Aſſent of the Lords, and the ſpecial Inſtance and Requeſt of the Commons, Ordained, that the Knights of the Shire be not choſen, unleſs they be reſiant within the Shire the day of the date of the Writ: and that Citizens and Burgeſſes be reſiant, dwelling, and free in the ſame Cities and Burroughs, and no others, in any wiſe.

6 Hen. 6. c. 4. Our Lord the King, willing to provide remedy for Knights choſen for Parliament, and Sheriffs, Hath Ordained, that they ſhall have their Anſwer, and traverſe to Inqueſt of Office found againſt them.

8 Hen. 6. c. 7. Where as Elections of Knights have been made by great Out-rages, and exceſſive number of People, of which moſt part was of People of no value, whereof every of them pretend a Voice equivalent to Wortby Knights and Eſquires, whereby Man-ſlaughters, Riots, and Diviſions among Gentlemen ſhall likely be: Our Lord the King hath ordained, That Knights of Shires be choſen by People dwelling in the Counties, every of them having Lands or Tenements to the value of 2 l. the year at the leaſt, and that he that ſhall be choſen, ſhall be dwelling and reſiant within the Counties.

10 H. 6. Our Lord the King ordained, that Knights be choſen by People dwelling, and having 2 l. by the year within the ſame County.

11 H. 6. c. 11. The King, willing to provide for the Eaſe of them that come to the Parliaments and Councels of the King by his commandment, hath ordained, that if any Aſſault or Fray be made on them that come to Parliament, or other Councel of the King; the Party which made any ſuch Affray or Aſſault, ſhall pay double Damages, and make Fine and Ranſom at the Kings Will.

23 H. 6. c. 15. The King, conſidering the Statutes of 1 H. 5. c. 1. & 8 Hen. 6. c. 7. and the Defaults of Sheriffs in returning Knights, Citizens, and Burgeſſes, ordained;

1. That the ſaid Statutes ſhould be duly kept.

2. That the Sheriffs ſhall deliver Precepts to Mayors and Bailiffs to chuſe Citizens and Burgeſſes.

3. The Penalty of 100 l. for a Sheriff making an untrue Return concerning the election of Knights, Citizens and Burgeſſes.

4. The Penalty of 40 l. for Mayors or Bailiffs, making untrue Returns.

5. Due Election of Knights muſt be in the full County-Court, between the Hours of Eight and Eleven before noon.

6. The Party muſt begin his Suit within 3 Moneths after the Parliament began.

7. Knights of the Shire ſhall be notable Knights of the County, or ſuch notable Eſquires, or Gentlemen born, of the ſaid Counties, as ſhall be able to be Knights, and no man to be ſuch Knight which ſtandeth in the Degree of a Yeoman, and under.

The laſt thing I obſerve in the Writ for Election of Members for Parliament, is, That by the expreſs words of the Writ, Citizens and Burgeſſes for the Parliament were eligible at the County-Court, as well as Knights of the Shire; and that not only Freeholders, but all others, whoſoever were preſent at the County-Court, had Voices in ſuch Elections: See the Stat. 7 Hen. 4. cap. 15.

I have the longer inſiſted on the Examination of the Writ, being the Power & Actions of the Houſe of Commons are principally juſtified by the Truſt which the Free-holders commit unto them by virtue of this Writ.

I would not be underſtood to determine what Power the Houſe of Commons doth; or may exerciſe if the King pleaſe: I confine my ſelf only to the Power in the Writ. I am not ignorant that King Hen. 7. in the Cauſe of the Duke of Britain, and King James in the Buſineſs of the Palatinate, asked the Councel of the Houſe of Commons; and not only the Houſe of Commons, but every Subject in particular by Duty and Allegiance, is bound to give his beſt Advice to his Sovereign, when he is thought worthy to have his Councel asked.

13 Edw. 3. nu. 10. All the Merchants of England were ſummoned by Writ to appear at Weſtminſter, in proper Perſon, to confer upon great buſineſs concerning the King's Honour, the Salvation of the Realm, and of themſelves.

In Paſſages of publick Councel it is obſervable (ſaith Sir Rob. Cotton) that in ancient times the Kings of England,Cotton. did entertain the Commons with weighty Cauſes, thereby to apt and bind them to a readineſs of Charge; and the Commons to ſhun Expence have warily avoided to give Advice.

13 Edw. 3. The Lords and Commons were called to conſult how the domeſtick Quiet may be preſerved, the Marches of Scotland defended, and the Sea ſecured from Enemies. The Peers and Commons having apart conſulted, the Commons deſired Not to be charged to Councel of things of which they had no Cogniſance; de queux ils n' ont pas de Cogniſance.

21 Edw. 3. Juſtice Thorp declaring to the Peers and Commons, that the French War began by their Advice; the Truce after by their Aſſent accepted, and now ended: the Kings Pleaſure was, to have their Counſel in the Proſecution: the Commons, being commanded to aſſemble themſelves, and when they were agreed, to give notice to the King, and the Lords of the Councel; after four days Conſultation, Humbly deſire of the King that he would be adviſed therein by the Lords and others of more Experience than themſelves in ſuch Affairs.

6 Ric. 2. The Parliament was called to conſult whether the King ſhould go in Perſon to reſcue Gaunt, or ſend an Army. The Commons, after two days Debate, crave a Conference with the Lords, and Sir Thomas Puckering (their Speaker) proteſts, that Councels for War did aptly belong to the King and His Lords; yet ſince the Commons were commanded to give their Advice, they humbly wiſhed a Voyage by the King.

7 Ric. 2. At the ſecond Seſſion, the Commons are willed to Adviſe upon View of Articles of Peace with the French; whether War or ſuch Amity ſhould be accepted; they modeſtly excuſe themſelves, as too weak to Counſel in ſo weighty Cauſes. But charged again, as they did tender their Honour and the Right of the King; they make their Anſwer, giving their Opinions, rather for Peace than War.

For fuller Manifeſtation of what hath been ſaid touching the Calling, Election, and Power of the Commons in Parliament, it is behooveful to obſerve ſome Points delivered by Sir Edw. Coke in his Treatiſe of the Juriſdiction of Parliaments; where,

Firſt, he fairly begins, and lays his Foundation, that the High Court of Parliament conſiſteth of the Kings Majeſty ſitting there, and of the three Eſtates; 1. The Lords Spiritual. 2. The Lords Temporal. 3. And the Commons. Hence it is to be gathered, that truly and properly it cannot be called the High Court of Parliament, but whilſt the King is ſitting there in Perſon: ſo that the Queſtion now a-days, whether the Parliament be above the King, is either falſe or idle: falſe, if you exclude, and idle if you include the King's Perſon in the word Parliament: The caſe truly put, and as it is meant, is, whether the three Eſtates, (or, which is all one, the Lords and Commons) aſſembled in Parliament be above the King: and not whether the King with the three Eſtates be above the King: It appears alſo that they are much miſtaken, who reckon the King one of the three Eſtates, as Mr. Pryn, pag. 20. and many others do; for the three Eſtates make the Body, and the King is Caput, Principium, & Finis Parliamentor', as confeſſeth Sir Edw. Coke.

Secondly, Sir Edw. Coke delivers, That certain it is, both Houſes at firſt ſate togther, and that it appears in Edward the Third's time, the Lords and Commons ſate together, and the Commons had no continual Speaker. If he mean, the Lords and Commons did ſit, and Vote together in one Body, few there be that will believe it; becauſe the Commons never were wont to loſe, or forego any of their Liberties, or Privileges; and for them to ſtand now with their Hats in their hands (which is no Magiſtratical Poſture) there, where they were wont to ſit and Vote, is an alteration not imaginable to be endured by the Commons. It may be, in former times, when the Commons had no conſtant Speaker, they were oft, and perhaps for the moſt part, in the ſame Chamber, and in the preſence of the Lords, to hear the Debates and Conſultations of the Great Councel, but not to ſit and Vote with them: for when the Commons were to Adviſe among themſelves, the Chapter-houſe of the Abby of Weſtminſter was oft-times their place to meet in, before they had a ſetled Houſe, and their meetings not being very frequent, may be the reaſon, I conceive, why the name of the Houſe of Commons is not of ſuch great Antiquity, or taken notice of; but the Houſe of Lords was only called the Parliament-Houſe: and the Treatiſe called, Modus tenendi Parliamentum, ſpeaks of the Parliament as but of one Houſe only. The Houſe, where now the Commons ſit in Weſtminſter, is but of late Uſe, or Inſtitution: for in Edward the Sixth's days it was a Chappel of the Colledge of St. Stephen, Stow. and had a Dean, Secular Canons, and Choriſts, who were the Kings Quire at his Palace at Weſtminster, and at the diſſolution were tranſlated to the Kings Chappel at White-hall.

Alſo I read, that Weſtminſter-hall being out of Repair, Ric. 2. cauſed a large Houſe to be builded betwixt the Clock-tower and the Gate of the great old Hall in the midſt of the Palace Court: the Houſe was long and large, made of Timber, covered with Tiles, open on both ſides, that all might ſee and hear what was both ſaid and done: four thouſand Archers of Cheſhire, which were the Kings own Guard, attended on that Houſe, and had bouche a Court, and 6 d. by the day.

Thirdly, he ſaith, The Commons are to chuſe their Speaker, but ſeeing after their Choice the King may refuſe him, the Ʋſe is (as in the conge d' eſlire of a Biſhop) that the King doth name a Diſcreet, Learned man, whom the Commons Elect: when the Commons have choſen, the King may allow of his Excuſe, and Diſallow him, as Sir John Popham was, (ſaith his Margin.)

Fourthly, he informs us, That the firſt day of the Parliament four Juſtices aſſiſtants, and two Civilians, (Maſters of the Chancery) are appointed Receivers of Petitions, which are to be delivered within ſix days following: and ſix of the Nobility, and two Biſhops, calling to them the Kings Learned Councel, when need ſhould be, to be Tryers of the ſaid Petitions, whether they were reaſonable, good, and neceſſary to be offered and propounded to the Lords. He doth not ſay, that any of the Commons were either Receivers, or Tryers of Petitions: nor that the Petitions were to be propounded to Them, but to the Lords.

Fifthly, he teacheth us, that a Knight, Citizen, or Burgeſs, cannot make a Proxy, becauſe he is Elected, and Truſted by multitudes of People: here a Queſtion may be, whether a Committee, if it be Truſted to act any thing, be not a Proxy? ſince he ſaith, the High Power of Parliament to be committed to a few, is holden to be againſt the Dignity of Parliaments; and that no ſuch Commiſſion ought to be granted.

Sixthly, he ſaith, The King cannot take notice of any thing ſaid, or done in the Houſe of Commons, but by the Report of the Houſe. Surely, if the Commons ſate with the Lords, and the King were preſent, He might take notice of what was done in His Preſence. And I read in Vowel, that the old Ʋſage was, that all the Degrees of Parliament ſate together, and every man that had there to ſpeak, did it openly, before the King and his whole Parliament.

In the 35 Eliz. there was a Report, that the Commons were againſt the Subſidies, which was told the Queen: whereupon, Sir Henry Knivet ſaid, It ſhould be a thing anſwerable at the Bar for any man to report any thing of Speeches, or Matters done in the Houſe. Sir John Woolley liked the Motion of Secrecy; except only the Queen, from whom, he ſaid, there is no reaſon to keep any thing: And Sir Robert Cecil did allow, that the Councel of the Houſe ſhould be ſecretly kept, and nothing reported in malam partem. But, if the meaning be, that they might not report any thing done here to the Queen, he was altogether againſt it.

Seventhly, He voucheth an Inditement or Information in the Kings Bench againſt 39 of the Commons, for departing without Licence from Parliament, contrary to the Kings Inhibition: whereof ſix ſubmitted to their Fines, and Edmund Ployden pleaded, he remained continually from the beginning to the end of the Parliament: Note, he did not plead to the Juriſdiction of the Court of Kings Bench, but pleaded his conſtant Attendance in Parliament, which was an acknowledgment, and ſubmitting to the Juriſdiction of that Court: and had been an unpardonable betraying of the Privileges of Parliament by ſo learned a Lawyer, if his Caſe ought only to be tryed in Parliament.

Eighthly, he reſolves, that the Houſe of Lords in their Houſe have Power of Judicature, and the Commons in their Houſe: and both Houſes together. He brings Records to prove the Power of Judicature of both Houſes together, but not of either of them by it ſelf. He cites the 33 Edw. 1. for the Judicature of both Houſes together: where Nicholas de Segrave was adjudged per Praelatos, Comites, & Barones, & alios de Concilio, by the Prelates, Earls and Barons, and others of the Councel. Here is no mention of the Judgment of the Commons. Others of the Councel, may mean, the Kings Privy Councel, or his Councel Learned in the Laws, which are called by their Writs to give Counſel; but ſo are not the Commons. The Judgment it ſelf ſaith, Nicholas de Segrave confeſſed his fault in Parliament, and ſubmitted himſelf to the Kings Will: thereupon the King, willing to have the Advice of the Earls, Barons, Great men, and others of his Councel, enjoyned them by the Homage, Fealty, and Allegiance which they owed, that they ſhould faithfully counſel Him what Puniſhment ſhould be inflicted for ſuch a Fact: who all, adviſing diligently, ſay, That ſuch a Fact deſerves loſs of Life and Members. Thus the Lords (we ſee) did but Adviſe the King what Judgment to give againſt him that deſerted the Kings Camp, to fight a Duel in France.

Ninthly, he ſaith, Of later times, ſee divers notable Judgments at the Proſecution of the Commons, by the Lords: where the Commons were Proſecutors, they were no Judges, but (as he terms them) general Inquiſitors, or the Grand Inqueſt of the Kingdom. The Judgments he cites are but in King James his days, and no elder.

Tenthly, alſo he tells us, of the Judicature in the Houſe of Commons alone; his moſt ancient precedent is but in Queen Elizabeths Reign, of one Tho. Long, who gave the Mayor of Weſtbury 10 l. to be elected Burgeſs.

Eleventhly, he hath a Section, entitled, The Houſe of Commons (to many Purpoſes) a diſtinct Court: and ſaith, Not a, the Houſe of Commons to many Purpoſes, a diſtinct Court: of thoſe many Purpoſes he tells but one, that is, it uſes to adjourn it ſelf. Commiſſioners that be but to examine Witneſſes, may Adjourn themſelves, yet are no Court.

Twelfthly, he handles the Privileges of Parliament, where the great Wonder is, that this great Maſter of the Law, who hath been oft a Parliament-man, could find no other, nor more Privileges of Parliament but one, and that is, Freedom from Arreſts: which, he ſaith, holds, unleſs in three caſes, Treaſon, Felony, and the Peace. And for this freedom from Arreſts, he cites Ancient Precedents for all thoſe in the Houſe of Lords, but he brings not one Precedent at all for the Commons Freedom from Arreſts.

WHAT cannot be found in Scripture, many do look for in Ariſtotle; for if there be any other Form of Government beſides Monarchy, he is the man beſt able to tell what it is, and to let us know by what name to call it, ſince the Greek Tongue is moſt happy in compounding Names, moſt ſignificant to expreſs the nature of moſt things: The uſual Terms in this Age of Ariſtocraty and Democraty are taken up from him to expreſs Forms of Government moſt different from Monarchy: We muſt therefore make inquiry into Ariſtotle touching theſe two Terms.

True it is, Ariſtotle ſeems to make three ſorts of Government, which he diſtinguiſheth by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , l. 3. c. 7. the Sovereignty of one man, or of a few, or of many, for the common Good.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Theſe (he ſaith) are right or perfect Governments, but thoſe that are for the private Good of one, or of a few, or of a Multitude, are Tranſgreſſions. The Government of a Monarchy for the Common Good, he calls a Kingdom. The Government of a few more than one, an Ariſtocraty; either becauſe the beſt men govern, or becauſe it is for the best of the governed: when a Multitude governs for the Common Good, it is called by the common name of all Governments, a POLITY. It is poſſible that one or a few may excel in Vertue, but it is difficult for many to excel in all Vertue, except in warlike Affairs, for this is natural in a Multitude, therefore, in this ſort of Government their principal Ʋſe is to war one for another, and to poſſeſs the Arms or Ammunition. The Tranſgreſſions of Government before spoken of, are theſe: Tyranny is the Tranſgreſſion of the Kingdom; and Democraty is the Tranſgreſſion of the Polity. For Tyranny is a Monarchy for the Benefit of the Monarch, the Oligarchy, for the Profit of the Rich; the Democraty for the Benefit of the Poor. None of theſe are for the Common Good.

Here Ariſtotle, if he had ſtood to his own Principles, ſhould have ſaid an Oligarchy ſhould be for the Benefit of a few, and thoſe the beſt; and not for the Benefit of the Rich: and a Democraty for the Benefit of many, and not of the Poor only; for ſo the Oppoſition •• eth; but then Ariſtotle ſaw his Democraty would prove to be no Tranſgreſſion, but a perfect Polity, and his Oligarchy would not be for the Benefit of a few, and thoſe the beſt men; for they cannot be the beſt men, that ſeek only their private Profit. In this Chapter, the mind of Ariſtotle about the ſeveral kinds of Government, is clearlieſt delivered, as being the Foundation of all his Books of Politicks, it is the more neceſſary to make a curious Obſervation of theſe his Doctrines. In the firſt place, he acknowledgeth the Government of one man, or of a Monarchy, and that is a perfect Form of Government.

Concerning Monarchy, Aristotle teacheth us the beginning of it; for, ſaith he, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . l. 1. c. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . first Society made of many Houſes is a Colony, which ſeems moſt naturally to be a Colony of Families, or Foster-brethren of Children and Childrens children. And therefore at the beginning Cities were, and now Nations, under the Government of Kings; the Eldeſt in every houſe is King, and ſo for Kindred ſake it is in Colonies.

Thus he deduced the Original of Government from the Power of the Fatherhood, not from the Election of the People. This it ſeems he learnt of his Maſter Plato, who in his third Book of Laws affirms, that the true and firſt Reaſon of Authority is, that the Father and Mother, and ſimply thoſe that beget and ingender, do command and rule over all their Children. Aristotle alſo tells us from Homer, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . that every man gives Laws to his Wife and Children.

In the fourth Book of his Politicks, cap. 2. he gives to Monarchy the Title of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . firſt and divineſt ſort of Government, defining Tyranny to be a Tranſgreſſion from the firſt, and divineſt.

Again, Ariſtotle in the eighth Book of his Ethicks, in the 12 Chapter, ſaith. That of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . the right Kinds of Government, a Monarchy was the best, and a popular Eſtate the worſt.

Laſtly, in the third Book of his Politicks, and the ſixteenth Chapter concerning Monarchy, he ſaith, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . A perfect Kingdom is that wherein the King rules all things according to his own Will; for he that is called a King according to the Law makes no kind of Government.

Secondly, he ſaith there is a Government of a few men, but doth not tell us how many thoſe few men may, or muſt be, only he ſaith they muſt be more than one man, but how many, that he leaves uncertain.

This perfect Government of a few, any man would think Ariſtotle ſhould have called an Oligarchy, for that this word properly ſignifies ſo much; but in ſtead of the Government of a few, Ariſtotle gives it a quite other name, and terms it an Ariſtocraty, which ſignifies the Power of the beſt; the reaſon why it is called an Ariſtocraty, ſaid Ariſtotle, is for that there the beſt men govern, or (becauſe that is not always true) for that it is for the best of the governed; by this latter reaſon any Government, and moſt eſpecially a Monarchy, may be called an Ariſtocraty, becauſe the End of Monarchy is for the beſt of the governed, as well as the End of an Ariſtocraty; ſo that of theſe two Reaſons for calling the Government of a few an Ariſtocraty, the firſt is ſeldom true; and the latter is never ſufficient to frame a diſtinction. This Ariſtotle himſelf confeſſeth in his next Chapter, ſaying 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. lib. 3. c. 8. that the Cauſes aforeſaid do not make a Difference, and that it is Poverty and Riches, and not Few, and Many, that make the Difference between an Oligarchy and Democraty; there muſt be an Oligarchy where rich men rule, whether they be few or many: and whereſoever the Poor have the Sovereignty, there muſt be a Democraty.

Now if Ariſtotle will allow Riches and Poverty to make a Difference between an Oligarchy and a Democraty: theſe two muſt likewiſe make the Difference between an Ariſtocraty and a Polity: for the only Difference Ariſtotle makes between them, is, in their Ends, and not in their Matter; for the ſame few men may make an Ariſtocraty, if their End be the Common Good; and they may be an Oligarchy, if they aim only at their private Benefit.

Thus is Aristotle diſtracted and perplexed how to diſtinguiſh his Aristocraty, whether by the ſmallneſs of their Number, or by the Greatneſs of their Eſtates. Nay if we look into Ariſtotle's Rhetoricks we ſhall find a new Conceit,Lib. 2. c. 8. not only about Ariſtocraty, but alſo about the ſorts of Government: for whereas he has taught us in his Politicks, that there be three ſorts of Right or perfect Government, and as many ſorts of wrong, which he calls Tranſgreſſions or Corruptions, he comes in his Rhetoricks, and teacheth us that there be four ſorts of Government.

Here we ſee Ariſtocraty is not diſtinguiſhed by ſmalneſs of Number, nor by Riches, but by Skill in the Laws; for he ſaith thoſe that are inſtructed in the Laws govern in an Ariſtocraty: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 · a Point not dreamt of in his Politicks; by which it ſeems Ariſtotle himſelf did not know well what he would have to be an Ariſtocraty. And as he cannot teach us truly what an Ariſtocraty is, ſo he is to ſeek to tell us where any Ariſtocraty ever was; even himſelf ſeems to doubt, whether there be any ſuch Form of Government, where he ſaith in his third Book of Politicks, cap. 5.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . It is impoſſible for any Mechanical man to be a Citizen in an Ariſtocraty, if there be any ſuch Government as they call Ariſtocratical.

His [if] makes him ſeem to doubt of it: yet I find him affirm that the Commonwealth of Carthage was Ariſtocratical; he doth not ſay it was an Ariſtocraty, for he confeſſeth it had many of the Tranſgreſſions which other Commonwealths had, and did incline either to a Democraty or an Oligarchy.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . L. 2. c. 11. The Government of Carthage did tranſgreſs from an Ariſtocraty to an Oligarchy.

And he concludes, that if by Misfortune there ſhould happen any Diſcord among the Carthaginians themſelves, there would be no Medicine by Law found out to give it Reſt; wherein me-thinks Ariſtotle was a kind of Prophet, for the Diſcords between the Citizens of Carthage, were the main Cauſe that Hannibal loſt not only Italy, but Carthage it ſelf.

By theſe few Collections we may find how uncertain Ariſtotle is in determining what an Ariſtocraty is, or where, or when any ſuch Government was; it may juſtly be doubted whether there ever was, or can be any ſuch Government.

Let us paſs from his Ariſtocraty, to his third ſort of perfect or right Government; for which he finds no particular Name, but only the common Name of all Government, Politia: It ſeems the Greeks were wonderfully to ſeek, that they of all men ſhould not be able to compound a name for ſuch a perfect Form of Government; unleſs we ſhould believe that they eſteemed this kind of Commonwealth ſo ſuperlatively excellent, as to be called, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Government of all Governments, or Polity of Polities.

But howſoever Ariſtotle in his Books of Politicks vouchſafe us not a Name, yet in his Books of Ethicks he affirmeth it may very properly be called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . L. 8. c. 12. a Timocratical Government, where Magiſtrates are choſen by their Wealth: But why Ariſtotle ſhould give it ſuch a Name I can find no Reaſon; for a Polity by his Doctrine is the Government of many, or of a Multitude, and the Multitude he will have to be the poorer ſort, inſomuch that except they be poor, he will not allow it to be the Government of a Multitude, though they be never ſo many; for he makes Poverty the trueſt Note of a popular Eſtate; and as if to be Poor and to be Free were all one, he makes Liberty likewiſe to be a Mark of popular Eſtate, for in his 4th. Book, and 4th. Chapter, he reſolves, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . a popular State is where Freemen govern, and an Oligarchy where rich men rule; as if rich men could not be Free-men: Now how Magiſtrates ſhould be choſen for their Wealth, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , among all poor men is to me a Riddle.

Here I cannot but wonder why all our Modern Politicians, who pretend themſelves Ariſtotelians, ſhould forſake their great Maſter, and account a Democraty a right or perfect Form of Government, when Ariſtotle brands it for a Tranſgreſſion, or a depraved, or corrupted manner of Government. They had done better to have followed Ariſtotle, who (though other Grecians could not, yet he) could find out the name of a Timocraty for a right popular Government: But, it may be, our Politicians forbear to uſe the word Timocraty, becauſe he affords an ill Character of it, ſaying, That of all the right Kinds of Government a Monarchy was the best, and a Timocraty the worst; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Yet afterwards Ariſtotle in the ſame Chapter makes amends for it, in ſaying, a Democraty is the leaſt vicious, becauſe it doth but a little Tranſgreſs from a Timocraty.

But not to inſiſt longer on the name of this nameleſs Form of Government, let Inquiry be made into the thing it ſelf, that we may know what Ariſtotle ſaith is the Government of many, or of a Multitude, for the Common Good.

This Many, or Multitude is not the whole People, nor the major part of the People, or any choſen by the People to be their Repreſentors. No, Ariſtotle never ſaith, or meaneth any ſuch thing; for he tells us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . L. 31.5. the best City doth not make any Artificer, or Handicraftſman a Citizen.

And if theſe be excluded out of the Number of Citizens, there will be but a few leſt in every City to make his Timocratical Government, ſince Artificers or Mercenary men make far the greateſt part of a City; or to ſay 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . l. 3. c. 7 a City is a Community of Free-men, and yet to exclude the greateſt part of the Inhabitants from being Citizens, is but a Mockery of Freedom; for any man would think that a City being a Society of men aſſembled to the End to live well, that ſuch men without whom a City cannot ſubſiſt, and who perform neceſſary Works, and miniſter to all in Publick, ſhould not be barred from being Citizens, yet ſays Ariſtotle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 L. 3. c. 5. all thoſe are not to be deemed Citizens without whom a City cannot ſubſiſt, except they abſtain from neceſſary Works; for he reſolves it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . impoſſible for him to exerciſe the Work of Vertue, that uſeth a Mechanical or Mercenary Trade.

And he makes it one of his Concluſions, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . L. 3. c. 4. in ancient times among ſome men, no publick Workman did partake of the Government, until the worst of Democraties were brought in.

Again, Ariſtotle will have his beſt Popular Government conſiſt of Free-men, and accounts the poorer ſort of People to be Free-men; how then will he exclude poor Artificers, who work for the Publick, from participating of the Government?

Further, it is obſervable in Ariſtotle, That, quite contrary to the Signification of the Greek names, the Government of a Multitude may be termed an Oligarchy if they be rich, and the Rule of a few a Democraty if they be poor and free.

After much Incertainty of the Nature of this Politick Government, which wants a name; Ariſtotle at laſt reſolves that this general Commonweal, or Politia is compounded of a Democraty and Oligarchy; for, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . L. 4. c. 8. to ſpeak plainly, a Polity is a mixture of a Democraty and an Oligarchy.

That is, one perfect Form is made of two imperfect ones; this is rather a confounding than compounding of Government, to patch it up of two corrupt ones, by appointing an Oligarchical Penalty for the rich Magiſtrates that are choſen by Election, and a Democratical Fee for the poor Magiſtrates that are choſen by Lot.

Laſtly, it is to be noted, That Ariſtotle doth not offer to name any one City or Commonweal in the World, where ever there was any ſuch Government as he calls a Polity: for him to reckon it for a perfect Form of Government, and of ſuch Excellency as to carry the Name from all other, and yet never to have been extant in the World, may ſeem a Wonder, and a man may be excuſed for doubting, or for denying any ſuch Form to be poſſible in Nature, if it cannot be made manifeſt what it is, nor when, nor where it ever was.

In Concluſion, ſince Ariſtotle reckons but three kinds of perfect Government, which are; Firſt, a Monarchy of one; Secondly, an Ariſtocraty of a few; Thirdly, a Polity of a Multitude; and if theſe two latter cannot be made good by him: there will remain but one right Form of Government only, which is Monarchy: And it ſeems to me, that Ariſtotle in a manner doth confeſs as much, where he informs us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . L. c. c. 13. that the firſt Commonweal among the Grecians, after Kingdoms, was made of thoſe that waged War: meaning that the Grecians, when they left to be governed by Kings, fell to be governed by an Army: their Monarchy was changed into a Stratocraty, and not into an Ariſtocraty or Democraty: for if Unity in Government, which is only found in Monarchy, be once broken, there is no Stay or Bound, until it come to a conſtant ſtanding Army, for the People or Multitude, as Ariſtotle teacheth us, can excel in no Vertue but Military, and that That is natural to them, and therefore in a popular Eſtate, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . L. 3. c. 7. The Sovereign Power is in the Sword, and thoſe that are poſſeſſed of the Arms. So that any Nation or Kingdom that is not charged with the keeping of a King, muſt perpetually be at the Charge of paying and keeping of an Army.

Theſe brief Obſervations upon Ariſtotle's perfect Forms of Government, may direct what to judge of thoſe corrupted or imperfect Forms which he mentions; for rectum est index ſui & obliqui, and he reckons them to be all one in Matter and Form, and to differ only in their End: the end of the Perfect Forms being for the Good of the Governed; and of the Imperfect, for the benefit only of the Governours. Now ſince Ariſtotle could not tell how to define or deſcribe his Right or Perfect Forms of Government, it cannot be expected he can ſatisfie us concerning thoſe he calls Imperfect: yet he labours and beſtirs himſelf mainly in the buſineſs, though to little purpoſe; for howſoever the Title of his Book be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of Politicks, and that he mentions 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for a ſpecial Form of Government, which hath the common name of a Policy: yet when he comes to diſpute in particular of Government, he argues only about Democracies and Oligarchies, and therein he is copious, becauſe only thoſe which he calls corrupt Forms of Governments were common in Greece in his days. As for an Ariſtocracy, or a Policy which he mentions, they are only Speculative Notions, or Airy Names, invented to delude the World, and to perſwade the People, that under thoſe quaint Terms, there might be found ſome ſubtile Government, which might at leaſt equal, if not excel Monarchy: And the Inventers of thoſe fine Names were all but Rebels to Monarchy, by Ariſtotle's confeſſion, where he ſaith, the firſt Commonweals of Greece after Kings were left, were made of thoſe that waged War. lib. 4. c. 13.

As Ariſtotle is irreſolute to determine what are truly Perfect Ariſtocracies and Policies, ſo he is to ſeek in deſcribing his imperfect Forms of Government, as well Oligarchies as Democracies, and therefore he is driven to invent ſeveral ſorts of them, and to confound himſelf with Subdiviſions: we will alledge ſome of his words. The cauſe why there be many kinds of Commonweals is, for that there are many parts of every City. Sometimes all theſe parts are in a Commonweal, ſometimes more of them, ſometimes fewer: whence it is manifeſt, that there are many Commonweals differing from each other in kind: becauſe the parts of them differ after the ſame manner. For a Commonweal is the Order of Magiſtrates diſtributed, either according to the Power of them that are partakers of it, or according to ſome other common equality belonging to Poor and Rich, or ſome other thing common to both. It is therefore neceſſary, that there be ſo many Commonweals as there are Orders, according to the excellencies and differences of Parts. But it ſeemeth principally there are but two chief kinds of Commonweals; the Democracy and the Oligarchy: for they make the Ariſtocracy a branch of Oligarchy, as if it were a kind of Oligarchy; and that other which is properly a Policy, to be a branch of Democracy. So they are wont to esteem of Commonweals; but it is both truer and better; that there being two right Forms, or one, that all the other be tranſgreſſions. Here we find Ariſtotle of ſeveral minds, ſometimes he is for many Commonweals, ſometimes for two, or ſometimes for one. As for his many Commonweals, if he allow them according to the ſeveral parts of a City, he may as well make three thouſand kinds of Commonweals, as three: if two Artificers and three Souldiers ſhould govern, that ſhould be one kind of Commonweal: if four Huſbandmen, and five Merchants, that would be a ſecond ſort; or ſix Taylors, and ten Carpenters, a third ſort; or a dozen Saylors, and a dozen Porters, a fourth; and ſo in infinitum, for Aristotle is not reſolved how many parts to make of a City, or how many Combinations of thoſe Parts; and therefore in his Reckoning of them, he differs from himſelf, ſometimes makes more, ſometimes fewer Parts: and oft concluding at the end of his Accompt with & caetera's: and confeſſing that one and the ſame man may act ſeveral Parts; as he that is a Souldier, may be a Husbandman and an Artificer, and in his fourth Book and fourth Chapter, he ſeems to reckon up eight Parts of a City, but in the Tail of them, he miſſes or forgets the ſixth. 1. He names the Plowman. 2. The Artificer. 3. The Tradeſman, or Merchant. 4. The mercenary Hireling. 5. The Souldier, (here Ariſtotle falls foul upon Plato, for making but four Parts of a City. 1. The Weaver. 2. The Plowman. 3. The Taylor. 4. The Carpenter. Afterwards, as if theſe were not ſufficient, he addeth the Smith, and the Feeder of neceſſary Cattle, the Merchant, and the Ingroſſer or Retailer) whileſt Ariſtotle was buſie in this Reprehenſion of Plato, he forgets himſelf, and skips over his ſixth Part of a City, and names the 7. rich men, 8. the Magiſtrates. In the ſame Chapter, he offers at another Diviſion of the Parts of a City or Commonweal, firſt dividing it into a Populacy, and Nobility. The People he divides firſt into Husbandmen. 2. Into Artificers. 3. Into Merchants, or thoſe that uſe Buying or Selling. 4. Into thoſe that frequent the Seas, of whom ſome follow the War, others ſeek for Gain, ſome are Carriers or Tranſporters, others Fiſhermen. 3. Handicraftſmen that poſſeſs ſo little goods, that they cannot be idle. 6. Thoſe that are not free on both ſides, and any other ſuch like Multitude of People. The kinds of Noblemen are diſtinguiſhed by Riches, by Lineage, by Vertue, by Learning, and other ſuch like things.

That there may be more Parts of a Commonweal than are here numbred, Ariſtotle confeſſeth or ſuppoſeth; and of a Multitude of Parts, and of a Multitude of Mixtures of ſuch Parts may be made a World of Forms of Oligarchies and Democraties.

This Confuſion of the Parts and Kinds of Commonweals drove Ariſtotle rather to reſt upon the Diviſion of Rich and Poor, for the main parts of a Commonweal, than any other. The diſtinction of a Few and of a Multitude, or the whole People, might ſeem more proper to diſtinguiſh between an Oligarchy and a Democraty; but the Truth is, Ariſtotle looking upon the Cities of Greece, and finding that in every of them, even in Athens it ſelf, there were many of the People that were not allowed to be Citizens, and to participate in the Government, and that many times He was a Citizen in one ſort of Government, who was not a Citizen in another, and that Citizens differed according to every Commonweal; he conſidered that if he ſhould place a Right in the whole People, either to govern, or to chuſe their Form of Government, or the Parties that ſhould govern: he ſhould hereby condemn the Government of all the Cities in Greece, and eſpecially of Ariſtocraty, which, as he ſaith, allows no Artificer to be a Citizen, and beſides, he ſhould thereby confute a main Principle of his own Politicks, which is, that ſome men are born ſlaves by Nature; which quite contradicts the Poſition, that all men are born equal and free; and therefore Ariſtotle thought it fitter to allow all imaginable Forms of Government, that ſo he might not diſparage any one City, than to propound ſuch a Form as might condemn and deſtroy all the reſt.

Though Ariſtotle allow ſo many ſeveral Forms of corrupted Governments; yet he inſiſts upon no one Form of all thoſe that he can define or deſcribe, in ſuch ſort, that he is able to ſay that any one City in all Greece was governed juſt according to ſuch a Form; his diligence is only to make as many Forms as the giddy or inconſtant Humour of a City could happen upon; he freely gives the People Liberty to invent as many Kinds of Government as they pleaſe, provided he may have Liberty to find fault with every one of them; it proved an eaſier Work for him to find Fault with every Form, than to tell how to amend any one of them; he found ſo many Imperfections in all ſorts of Commonweals, that he could not hold from reproving them before ever he tells us what a Commonweal is, or how many ſorts there are, and to this Purpoſe he ſpends his whole ſecond Book in ſetting out, and correcting the chief Commonweals of Greece, and among others the Lacedemonian, the Cretan, and Carthaginian Commonweals; which three he eſteems to be much alike, and better than any other, yet he ſpares not to lay open their imperfections, and doth the like to the Athenian; wherein he breaks the Rule of Method, by delivering the Faults of Commonweals, before he teach us what a Commonweal is; for in his firſt Book, he ſpeaks only of the Parts, of which a City, or a Commonweal is made, but tells us not what a City or Commonweal is, until he come to his Third Book, and there in handling the ſorts of Government, he obſerves no Method at all, but in a diſorderly way, flies backward and forward from one ſort to another: and howſoever there may be obſerved in him many Rules of Policy touching Government in general, yet without doubt where he comes to diſcourſe of particular Forms, he is full of Contradiction, or Confuſion, or both: it is true, he is brief and difficult, the beſt Right a man can do him, is to confeſs he underſtands him not; yet a diligent Reader may readily diſcern ſo many Irregularities and Breaches in Ariſtotle's Books of Politicks, as tend to ſuch Diſtraction or Confuſion, that none of our new Politicians can make advantage of his Principles, for the Confirmation of an original Power by Nature in the People, which is the only Theme now in Faſhion: For Ariſtotle's Diſcourſe is of ſuch Commonweals as were founded by particular Perſons, as the Chalcedonian by Phaleas, the Mileſian by Hippodamas, the Lacedemonian by Lycurgus, the Cretan by Minos, the Athenian by Solon, and the like: but the natural Right of the People to found, or elect their Kind of Government is not once diſputed by him: It ſeems the underived Majeſty of the People, was ſuch a Metaphyſical Piece of Speculation as our grand Philoſopher was not acquainted with; he ſpeaks very contemptuouſly of the Multitude in ſeveral Places, he affirms that the People are baſe or wicked Judges in their own Caſes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ·Lib. 3. c. 9. and that many of them differ nothing from beaſts; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ;Lib. 3. c. 11. and again he ſaith, The Common People or Freemen are ſuch as are neither Rich, nor in Reputation for Virtue; and it is not ſafe to commit to them great Governments; for, by reaſon of their Injuſtice and Ʋnskilfulneſs, they would do much Injuſtice, and commit many Errours; and it is pleaſanter to the multitude to live Diſorderly, than Soberly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .Lib. 6. c. 4. If Aristotle had believed a Publick Intereſt to have been in the People, to the enabling them to be their own carvers in point of Government, he would never have entangled himſelf with ſuch intricate and ambiguous Forms of Commonweals, as himſelf cannot tell how to explain, nor any of his Commentators how to underſtand, or make Uſe of.

This one Benefit I have found by Reading Ariſtotle, that his Books of Politicks ſerve for an admirable Commentary upon that Text of Scripture, which ſaith, In thoſe days there was no King in Iſrael; every man did that which was right in his own eyes. For he grants a liberty in every City, for any man, or multitude of men, either by Cunning, or Force, to ſet up what Government they pleaſe; and he will allow ſome name or other of a Commonweal, which in effect is to allow every man to do what he liſts, if he be able; hence it is, that by the Confeſſion of Ariſtotle, the firſt Commonweals in Greece, after Kings were given over, were made of thoſe that waged War; thoſe ſeveral kinds of Commonweals, were all ſummed up into the Government of an Army; for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . L. 7. c. 9. it is, ſaith Ariſtotle, in their power, who manage Arms to continue, or not continue the Form of Government, whereby the Estate is Governed, which is nothing elſe but a Stratocratie, or Military Government. We cannot much blame Aristotle for the Incertainty, and Contrariety in him about the ſorts of Government, if we conſider him as a Heathen; for it is not poſſible for the Wit of man to ſearch out the firſt Grounds or Principles of Government, (which neceſſarily depend upon the original of Property) except he know that at the Creation one man alone was made, to whom the Dominion of all things was given, and from whom all men derive their Title. This Point can be learnt only from the Scriptures: as for the imaginary Contract of People, it is a Fancy not improbable only, but impoſſible, except a multitude of men at first had sprung out, Lib. 2. c. 8. and were engendred of the Earth, which Ariſtotle knows not whether he may believe, or no: If Juſtice (which is to give every man his Due) be the End of Government, there muſt Neceſſarily be a Rule to know how any man at firſt came to have a Right to any thing to have it truly called his. This is a Point Ariſtotle diſputes not; nor ſo much as ever dreamt of an original Contract among People: he looked no farther in every City, then to a Scambling among the Citizens, whereby every one ſnatcht what he could get: ſo that a violent Poſſeſſion was the firſt, and beſt Title that he knew.

The main Diſtinction of Ariſtotle touching perfect or Right Forms of Government from thoſe that are imperfect or corrupt, conſiſts ſolely in this Point, that where the profit of the governed is reſpected, there is a right Government, but where the Profit of the Governours is regarded, there is a Corruption or Tranſgreſſion of Government. By this it is ſuppoſed by Ariſtole, that there may be a Government only for the Benefit of the Governours; this Suppoſition to be falſe, may be proved from Ariſtotle himſelf; I will Inſtance about the Point of Tyranny.

Tyranny, ſaith Ariſtotle, L. 3. c. 7. is a deſpotical or maſterly Monarchy; now he confeſſeth, that L. 4. c. 10. in truth the maſterly Government is profitable both to the Servant by Nature, and the Maſter by Nature, and he yields a ſolid reaſon for it, ſaying, L. 3. c. 6. It is not poſſible, if the Servant be destroyed, that the Maſterſhip can be ſaved; whence it may be inferred, That if the Maſterly Government of Tyrants cannot be ſafe without the Preſervation of them whom they govern, it will follow that a Tyrant cannot govern for his own Profit only: and thus his main Definition of Tyranny fails, as being grounded upon an impoſſible Suppoſition by his own Confeſſion. No Example can be ſhewed of any ſuch Government that ever was in the World, as Ariſtotle deſcribes a Tyranny to be; for under the worſt of Kings, though many particular men have unjuſtly ſuffered, yet the Multitude, or the People in general have found Benefit and Profit by the Government.

It being apparent that the different kinds of Government in Aristotle, ariſe only from the difference of the number of Governours, whether one, a few, or many, there may be as many ſeveral Forms of Governments as there be ſeveral Numbers, which are infinite; ſo that not only the ſeveral Parts of a City or Commonweal, but alſo the ſeveral Numbers of ſuch Parts may cauſe multiplicity of Forms of Government by Ariſtotle's Principles.

It is further obſervable in Aſſemblies, that it is not the whole Aſſembly, but the major part only of the Aſſembly that hath the Government; for that which pleaſeth the moſt, is always ratified, ſaith Ariſtotle, lib. 4. c. 4. by this means one and the ſame Aſſembly may make, at one Sitting, ſeveral Forms of Commonweals, for in ſeveral Debates and Votes the ſame number of men, or all the ſelf-ſame men do not ordinarily agree in their Votes; and the leaſt Diſagreement, either in the Perſons of the men, or in their number, alters the Form of Government. Thus in a Commonweal, one part of the Publick Affairs ſhall be ordered by one Form of Government, and another part by another Form, and a third part by a third Form, and ſo in infinitum. How can that have the Denomination of a Form of Government, which laſts but for a moment only, about one fraction of Buſineſs? for in the very inſtant, as it were in the Twinkling of an eye, while their Vote laſteth, the Government muſt begin and end.

To be governed, is nothing elſe but to be obedient and ſubject to the Will or Command of another; it is the Will in a man that governs; ordinarily mens Wills are divided according to their ſeveral Ends or Intereſts; which moſt times are different, and many times contrary the one to the other, and in ſuch caſes where the Wills of the major part of the Aſſembly do unite and agree in one Will, there is a Monarchy of many Wills in one, though it be called an Ariſtocracy or Democracy, in regard of the ſeveral Perſons; it is not the many Bodies, but the one Will or Soul of the Multitude that governs. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Where one is ſet up out of many, the People becometh a Monarch, becauſe many are Lords, not ſeparately, but altogether as one; therefore ſuch a People as if it were a Monarch, ſeeks to bear Rule alone. Lib. 4. c. 4.

It is a falſe and improper Speech to ſay that a whole Multitude, Senate, Council, or any Multitude whatſoever doth govern where the major part only rules; becauſe many of the Multitude that are ſo aſſembled, are ſo far from having any part in the Government, that they themſelves are governed againſt and contrary to their Wills; there being in all Government various and different Debates and Conſultations, it comes to paſs oft-times, that the major part in every Aſſembly, differs according to the ſeveral Humours or Fancies of men; thoſe who agree in one Mind, in one Point, are of different Opinions in another; every Change of Buſineſs, or new Matter begets a new major part, and is a Change both of the Government and Governours; the Difference in the Number, or in the Qualities of the Perſons that govern, is the only thing that cauſes different Governments, according to Ariſtotle, who divides his Kinds of Government to the Number of one, a few, or many. As amongſt the Romans their Tribunitial Laws had ſeveral Titles, according to the Names of thoſe Tribunes of the People, that preferr'd and made them. So in other Governments, the Body of their Acts and Ordinances, is compoſed of a Multitude of momentary Monarchs, who by the Strength and Power of their Parties or Factions are ſtill under a kind of a civil War, fighting and ſcratching for the Legiſlative Miſcellany, or medly of ſeveral Governments. If we conſider each Government according to the Nobler Part of which it is compoſed, it is nothing elſe but a Monarchy of Monothelites, or of many men of one Will, moſt commonly in one Point only: but if we regard only the baſer part, or Bodies of ſuch Perſons as govern, there is an interrupted Succeſſion of a Multitude of ſhort-lived Governments, with as many Intervals of Anarchy; ſo that no man can ſay at any time, that he is under any Form of Government; for in a ſhorter time than the word can be ſpoken, every Government is begun and ended. Furthermore in all Aſſemblies, of what Quality ſoever they be, whether Ariſtocratical or Democratical, as they call them, they all agree in this one Point, to give that honourable Regard to Monarchy, that they do interpret the major, or prevailing part in every Aſſembly to be but as one man, and ſo do feign to themſelves a kind of Monarchy.

Though there be neither Precept nor Practice in Scripture, nor yet any Reaſon alledged by Ariſtotle for any Form of Government, but only Monarchy; yet it is ſaid that it is evident to common Senſe, that of old time Rome, and in this preſent Age Venice, and the Low-Countries, enjoy a Form of Government different from Monarchy: Hereunto it may be anſwered, That a People may live together in Society, and help one another; and yet not be under any Form of Government; as we ſee Herds of Cattel do, and yet we may not ſay they live under Government. For Government is not a Society only to live, but to live well and vertuouſly. This is acknowledged by Ariſtotle, who teacheth that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . the End of a City, is to live bleſſedly and honeſtly. Political Communities are ordained for honeſt Actions, but not for living together only.

Now there be two things principally required to a bleſſed and honeſt life: Religion towards God, and Peace towards men: that is, a quiet and peaceable Life in all Godlineſs and Honeſty, 1 Tim. 2.2. Here then will be the Queſtion; Whether Godlineſs and Peace can be found under any Government but Monarchy, or whether Rome, Venice, or the Low Countries did enjoy theſe under any popular Government. In theſe two Points, let us firſt briefly examine the Roman Government, which is thought to have been the moſt glorious.

For Religion, we find preſently after the Building of the City by Romulus, the next King, Numa moſt devoutly eſtabliſhed a Religion, and began his Kingdom with the Service of the Gods; he forbad the Romans to make any Images of God, which Law laſted and was obſerved 170 Years, there being in all that time no Image or Picture of God, in any Temple or Chappel of Rome; alſo he erected the Pontifical Colledge, and was himſelf the firſt Biſhop or Pontifex; Theſe Biſhops were to render no Account either to the Senate or Commonalty. They determined all Queſtions concerning Religion, as well between Prieſts as between private men: They puniſhed inferiour Prieſts, if they either added or detracted from the eſtabliſhed Rites, or Ceremonies, or brought in any new thing into Religion. The chief Biſhop, Pontifex Maximus, taught every man how to honour and ſerve the Gods. This Care had Monarchy of Religion.

But after the Expulſion of Kings, we do not find during the Power of the People, any one Law made for the Benefit or Exerciſe of Religion: there be two Tribunitian Laws concerning Religion, but they are meerly for the Benefit of the Power of the People, and not of Religion. L. Papirius, a Tribune, made a Law, called Lex Papiria, that it ſhould not belawful for any to conſecrate either Houſes, Grounds, Altars, or any other things without the Determination of the People. Domitius Aenobarbus another Tribune Enacted a Law called Domitia Lex, that the Pontifical Colledge ſhould not, as they were wont, admit whom they would into the Order of Prieſthood, but it ſhould be in the Power of the People; and becauſe it was contrary to their Religion, that Church-Dignities ſhould be beſtowed by the Common People; hence for very Shame he ordained, that the leſſer part of the People, namely ſeventeen Tribes, ſhould elect whom they thought fit, and afterwards the Party elected ſhould have his Confirmation or Admiſſion from the Colledge: Thus by a Committee of Seven Tribes taken out of Thirtyfive, the Ancient Form of Religion was altered and reduced to the Power of the leſſer part of the People. This was the great Care of the People to bring Ordination and Conſecration to the Laity.

The Religion in Venice, and the Low-Countries is ſufficiently known, much need not be ſaid of them: they admirably agree under a ſeeming contrariety; it is commonly ſaid, that one of them hath all Religions, and the other no Religion; the Atheiſt of Venice may ſhake hands with the Sectary of Amſterdam. This is the Liberty that a Popular Eſtate can brag of, every man may be of any Religion, or no Religion, if he pleaſe; their main Devotion is exerciſed only in oppoſing and ſuppreſſing Monarchy. They both agree to exclude the Clergy from medling in Government, whereas in all Monarchies both before the Law of Moſes, and under it, and ever ſince; all Barbarians, Graecians, Romans, Infidels, Turks, and Indians, have with one Conſent given ſuch Reſpect and Reverence to their Prieſts, as to truſt them with their Laws; and in this our Nation, the firſt Prieſts we read of before Chriſtianity, were the Druides, who, as Caeſar ſaith, decided and determined Controverſies, in Murder, in Caſe of Inheritance, of Bounds of Lands, as they in their Diſcretion judged meet; they grant Rewards and Puniſhments. It is a Wonder to ſee what high Reſpect even the great Turk giveth to his Mufti, or Chief Biſhop, ſo neceſſary is Religion to ſtrengthen and direct Laws.

To conſider of the Point of Peace: It is well known, that no People ever enjoyed it without Monarchy. Ariſtotle ſaith, the Lacedemonians preſerved themſelves by Warring; and after they had gotten to themſelves the Empire, then were they preſently undone, for that they could not live at Rest, nor do any better Exerciſe, than the Exerciſe of War, lib. 2. c. 7. After Rome had expelled Kings, it was in perpetual War, till the time of the Emperours: once only was the Temple of Janus ſhut, after the end of the firſt Punick War, but not ſo long as for one year, but for ſome Months. It is true, as Oroſius ſaith, that for almoſt 700 years, that is, from Tullus Hoſtilius to Auguſtus Caeſar, only for one Summer, the Bowels of Rome did not ſweat Blood. On the Behalf of the Romans it may be ſaid, that though the Bowels of Rome did always ſweat Blood, yet they did obtain moſt glorious Victories abroad. But it may be truly anſwered, if all the Roman Conqueſts had no other Foundation but Injuſtice; this alone foils all the Glory of her warlike Actions. The moſt glorious War that ever Rome had, was with Carthage; the Beginning of which War, Sir Walter Raleigh proves to have been moſt unjuſtly undertaken by the Romans, in confederating with the Mamertines, and Aiding of Rebels, under the Title of protecting their Confederates; whereas Kings many times may have juſt Cauſe of War, for recovering and preſerving their Rights to ſuch Dominions as fall to them by Inheritance or Marriage, a Popular Eſtate, that can neither marry, nor be Heir to another, can have no ſuch Title to a War in a Foreign Kingdom; and to ſpeak the Truth, if it be rightly conſidered; the whole time of the Popularity of Rome, the Romans were no other than the only proſperous and glorious Thieves, and Robbers of the World.

If we look more narrowly into the Roman Government, it will appear, that in that very Age, wherein Rome was moſt victorious, and ſeemed to be moſt popular; ſhe owed moſt of her Glory to an apparent kind of Monarchy. For it was the Kingly Power of the Conſuls, who (as Livy ſaith) had the ſame Royal Juriſdiction, or abſolute Power that the Kings had, not any whit diminiſhed or abated, and held all the ſame Regal Enſigns of ſupreme Dignity, which helpt Rome to all her Conqueſts: whiles the Tribunes of the People were ſtrugling at home with the Senate about Election of Magiſtrates, enacting of Laws, and calling to Account, or ſuch other popular Affairs, the Kingly Conſuls gained all the Victories abroad: Thus Rome at one and the ſame time was broken and diſtracted into two Shews of Government; the Popular, which ſerved only to raiſe Seditions and Diſcords within the Walls, whilſt the Regal atchieved the Conqueſts of Foreign Nations and Kingdoms. Rome was ſo ſenſible of the Benefit and Neceſſity of Monarchy, that in her moſt deſperate Condition and Danger, when all other Hopes failed her, ſhe had ſtill reſort to the Creation of a Dictator, who for the time was an Abſolute King; and from whom no Appeal to the People was granted, which is the royalleſt Evidence for Monarchy in the World; for they who were drawn to ſwear, they would ſuffer no King of Rome, found no ſecurity but in Perjury, and breaking their Oath by admitting the Kingly Power in ſpight of their Teeth, under a new name of a Dictator or Conſul: a juſt Reward for their wanton expelling their King for no other Crime they could pretend but Pride, which is moſt tolerable in a King of all men: and yet we find no particular Point of Pride charged upon him, but that he enjoyned the Romans to labour in cleanſing, and caſting of Ditches, and paving their Sinks: an Act both for the Benefit and Ornament of the City, and therefore commendable in the King: But the Citizens of Rome, who had been Conquerours of all Nations round about them, could not endure of Warriers to become Quarriers, and Day-labourers. Whereas it is ſaid, that Tarquin was expelled for the Rape committed by his Son on Lucrece; it is unjuſt to condemn the Father for the Crime of his Son; it had been fit to have petitioned the Father for the Puniſhment of the Offender: The Fact of young Tarquin cannot be excuſed, yet without wrong to the Reputation of ſo chaſte a Lady as Lucrece is reputed to be, it may be ſaid, ſhe had a greater Deſire to be thought chaſte, than to be chaſte; ſhe might have died untouched, and unſpotted in her Body, if ſhe had not been afraid to be ſlandered for Inchaſtity; both Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus, and Livie, who both are her Friends, ſo tell the Tale of her, as if ſhe had choſen rather to be a Whore, than to be thought a Whore. To ſay Truth, we find no other Cauſe of the Expulſion of Tarquin, than the Wantonneſs, and Licentiouſneſs of the People of Rome.

This is further to be conſidered in the Roman Government, that all the time between their Kings, and their Emperours, there laſted a continued ſtrife, between the Nobility and Commons, wherein by Degrees the Commons prevailed at laſt, ſo to weaken the Authority of the Conſuls and Senate, that even the laſt ſparks of Monarchy were in a manner extinguiſhed, and then inſtantly began the Civil War, which laſted till the Regal Power was quickly brought home, and ſetled in Monarchy. So long as the Power of the Senate ſtood good for the Election of Conſuls, the Regal Power was preſerved in them, for the Senate had their firſt Inſtitution from Monarchy: It is worth the noting, that in all thoſe places that have ſeemed to be moſt popular, that weak Degree of Government, that hath been exerciſed among them, hath been founded upon, and been beholden unto Monarchical Principles, both for the Power of aſſembling, and manner of conſulting: for the entire and groſs Body of any People, is ſuch an unweildy and diffuſed thing as is not capable of uniting, or congregating, or deliberating in an entire Lump, but in broken Parts, which at firſt were regulated by Monarchy.

Furthermore it is obſervable, that Rome in her chief Popularity, was oft beholden for her Preſervation to the Monarchical Power of the Father over the Children: by means of this Fatherly Power, ſaith Bodin, the Romans flouriſhed in all Honour and Vertue, and oftentimes was their Commonweal thereby delivered from moſt imminent Deſtruction, when the Fathers drew out of the Conſiſtory, their Sons being Tribunes publiſhing Laws tending to Sedition. Amongſt others Caſſius threw his Son headlong out of the Conſiſtory, publiſhing the Law Agraria (for the Diviſion of Lands) in the Behoof of the People, and after by his own private Judgment put him to Death, the Magiſtrates, Serjeants, and People ſtanding thereat aſtonied, and not daring to withſtand his Fatherly Authority, although they would with all their Power have had that Law for Diviſion of Lands; which is ſufficient Proof, this Power of the Father not only to have been ſacred and inviolable, but alſo to have been lawful for him, either by Right or Wrong to diſpoſe of the Life and Death of his Children, even contrary to the Will of the Magiſtrates and People.

It is generally believed that the Government of Rome, after the Expulſion of Kings, was popular; Bodin endeavours to prove it, but I am not ſatisfied with his Arguments, and though it will be thought a Paradox, yet I muſt maintain, it was never truly popular.

Firſt, it is difficult to agree, what a popular Government is, Ariſtotle ſaith, it is where Many or a Multitude do rule; he doth not ſay where the People, or the major part of the People, or the Repreſentors of the People govern.

Bodin affirms, if all the People be intereſſed in the Government, it is a Popular Estate, Lib. 2. c. 1. but after in the ſame Chapter he reſolves, that it is a Popular Estate, when all the People, or the greater part thereof hath the Sovereignty, and he puts the Caſe, that if there be threeſcore thouſand Citizens, and forty thouſand of them have the Sovereignty, and twenty thouſand be excluded, it ſhall be called a popular Eſtate: But I muſt tell him, though fifty nine thouſand, nine hundred, ninety nine of them govern, yet it is no popular Eſtate; for if but one man be excluded, the ſame reaſon that excludes that one man, may exclude many hundreds, and many thouſands, yea, and the major part it ſelf; if it be admitted, that the People are or ever were free by Nature, and not to be governed, but by their own Conſent, it is moſt unjuſt to exclude any one man from his Right in Government; and to ſuppoſe the People ſo unnatural, as at the firſt to have all conſented to give away their Right to a major part, (as if they had Liberty given them only to give away, and not to uſe it themſelves) is not only improbable, but impoſſible; for the whole People is a thing ſo uncertain and changeable, that it alters every moment, ſo that it is neceſſary to ask of every Infant ſo ſoon as it is born its Conſent to Government, if you will ever have the Conſent of the whole People.

Moreover, if the Arbitrary Tryal by a Jury of Twelve men, be a thing of that admirable Perfection and Juſtice, as is commonly believed, wherein the Negative Voice of every ſingle Perſon is preſerved, ſo that the diſſent of any of the Twelve fruſtrates the whole Judgment: How much more ought the natural freedom of each man be preſerved, by allowing him his Negative Voice, which is but a continuing him in that Eſtate, wherein, it is confeſſed, Nature at firſt placed him? Juſtice requires that no one Law ſhould bind all, except all conſent to it, there is nothing more violent and contrary to Nature, than to allow a major part, or any other greater part leſs than the whole to bind all the People.

The next difficulty to diſcovering what a Popular Eſtate is, is to find out where the Supreme Power in the Roman Government reſted; it is Bodin's Opinion, that in the Roman State the Government was in the Magiſtrates, the Authority and Council in the Senate, but the Sovereign Power and Majeſty in the People, Lib. 2. c. 1. So in his firſt Book his Doctrine is, that the ancient Romans ſaid, Imperium in Magiſtratibus, Authoritatem in Senatu, Poteſtatem in plebe, Majeſtatem in Populo jure eſſe dicebant. Theſe four words Command, Authority, Power, and Majeſty ſignifie ordinarily, one and the ſame thing, to wit, the Sovereignty, or ſupreme Power, I cannot find that Bodin knows how to diſtinguiſh them; for they were not diſtinct Faculties placed in ſeveral Subjects, but one and the ſame thing diverſly qualified, for Imperium, Authoritas, Potestas, and Majeſtas were all originally in the Conſuls; although for the greater ſhew the Conſuls would have the Opinion, and Conſent of the Senate who were never called together, nor had their Advice asked, but when and in what Points only it pleaſed the Conſuls to propound: ſo that properly Senatuſconſultum was only a Decree of the Conſuls, with the Advice of the Senators: And ſo likewiſe the Conſuls, when they had a mind to have the Countenance of an ampler Council, they aſſembled the Centuries, who were reckoned as the whole People, and were never to be aſſembled, but when the Conſuls thought fit to propound ſome Buſineſs of great weight unto them; ſo that juſſus populi, the Command of the People which Bodin ſo much magnifies, was properly juſſus Conſulum, the Command of the Conſuls, by the Advice or Conſent of the Aſſembly of the Centuries, who were a Body compoſed of the Senators, and the reſt of the Patritians, Knights, and Gentlemen, or whole Nobility together with the Commons: for the ſame men who had Voices in Senate, had alſo their Votes allowed in the Aſſembly of the Centuries, according to their ſeveral Capacities.

It may further appear, that the Roman Government was never truly popular, for that in her greateſt Show of Popularity, there were to be found above ten Servants for every Citizen or Freeman, and of thoſe Servants, not one of them was allowed any Place, or Voice in Government: If it be ſaid that the Roman Servants were Slaves taken in War, and therefore not fit to be Freemen; to this it may be anſwered, that if the Opinion of our Modern Politicians be good, which holds that all men are born Free by Nature, or if but the Opinion of Ariſtotle be ſound, who ſaith that by Nature ſome men are Servants, and ſome are Masters, then it may be unnatural, or unjuſt to make all Priſoners in War Servants, or (as they are now called) Slaves, a Term not uſed in the Popular Governments, either of Rome or Greece; for in both Languages, the uſual word that doth anſwer to our late Term of Slave, is but Servus in Latin, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Greek. Beſides, if the Wars of the Romans, by which they gained ſo many Servants were unjuſt, as I take all offenſive War to be without a ſpecial Commiſſion from God, and as I believe all the Roman Wars were, that were made for the Enlargement of their Empire, then we may conclude, that the Romans were the notableſt Plagiaries, or Men-ſtealers in the World.

But to allow the leſſer part of the People of Rome, who called themſelves Citizens, to have had a juſt Right to exclude all Servants from being a part of the People of Rome, let us enquire whether the major part of thoſe, whom they allowed to be Citizens, had the Government of Rome; whereby we may diſcover eaſily how notoriouſly the poorer and greater part of the Citizens were gull'd of their Share in Government; There were two famous manners of their aſſembling the People of Rome: the firſt was by Claſſes, as they called them, which were divided into Centuries; the ſecond was by Tribes, or Wards; the former of theſe was a Ranking of the People, according to their Abilities or Wealth; the latter according to the Place or Ward, wherein every Citizen dwelt: In the Aſſemblies of neither of theſe, had the major part of the People the Power of Government, as may thus be made appear.

Firſt, for the Aſſembly of the Centuries, there were ſix Degrees or Claſſes of men according to their Wealths; the firſt Claſſis was of the richeſt men in Rome, none whereof were under 200 l. in Value: The Valuation of the ſecond Claſſis was not under fourſcore Pounds; and ſo the third, the fourth, and the fifth Claſſis were each a Degree one under another. The ſixth Claſſis contained the poorer ſort, and all the Rabble. Theſe ſix Claſſes were ſubdivided into Hundreds, or Centuries.

The Claſſes, and Centuries being thus ordered, when the Aſſembly came to give their Votes, they did not give their Voices by the Poll, which is the true popular way: but each Century Voted by it ſelf, each Century having one Voice, the major part of the Centuries carried the Buſineſs: Now there being fourſcore and eighteen Centuries in the firſt Claſſis, in which all the Patricians, Senators, Noblemen, Knights, and Gentlemen of Rome, were inrolled, being more in Number, and above half the Centuries, muſt needs have the Government, if they agreed all together in their Votes, becauſe they Voted firſt, for when 97 Centuries had agreed in their Votes, the other Centuries of the inferiour Claſſis, were never called to Vote; thus the Nobles, and richer men who were but few in Compariſon of the Common People did bear the chief Sway, becauſe all the poorer ſort, or Proletarian Rabble, were clap'd into the ſixth Claſſis, which in reckoning were allowed but the ſingle Voice of one Century, which never came to Voting: whereas in Number they did far exceed all the five other Claſſes or Centuries, and if they had been allowed the Liberty of other Citizens, they might have been juſtly numbred for a thouſand Centuries, or Voices in the Aſſembly; This Device of packing ſo many thouſands into one Century, did exclude far the greateſt part of the People from having a part in the Government.

Next, for the Aſſembly of the People of Rome by Tribes, it muſt be conſidered, that the Tribes did not give their Voices by the Poll alltogether, which is the true way of popular Voting, but each Tribe or Ward did Vote by it ſelf, and the Votes of the major part (not of the People but) of the Tribes did ſway the Government, the Tribes being unequal, as all Diviſions by Wards uſually are, becauſe the Number of the People of one Tribe, is not juſt the ſame with the Number of the People of each other Tribe; whence it followed, that the major number of the Tribes might poſſibly be the minor Number of the People, which is a deſtroying of the Power of the major Part of the People.

Add hereunto, that the Nobility of Rome were excluded from being preſent at the Aſſembly of the Tribes; and ſo the moſt conſiderable part of the People was wanting, therefore it could not be the Voices of the major part of the People, where a great Part of the People were allowed no Voices at all, for it muſt be the major part of the whole, and not of a Part of the People, that muſt denominate a popular Government.

Moreover it muſt be noted, that the Aſſembly of the Tribes was not originally the Power of the People of Rome, for it was almoſt forty years after the Rejection of Kings before an Aſſembly of Tribes were thought on, or ſpoken of; for it was the Aſſembly of the People by Centuries, that agreed to the Expulſion of Kings, and creating of Conſuls in their Room, alſo the Famous Laws of the twelve Tables were ratified by the Aſſembly of the Centuries. This Aſſembly by Centuries, as it was more Ancient, than that by Tribes; ſo it was more truly popular, becauſe all the Nobility, as well as the Commons, had Voices in it: The Aſſembly by Tribes, was pretended at firſt, only to elect Tribunes of the People, and other inferiour Magiſtrates; to determine of leſſer Crimes that were not Capital, but only finable; and to decree that Peace ſhould be made; but they did not meddle with denouncing War to be made, for that high Point did belong only to the Aſſembly of the Centuries; and ſo alſo did the judging of Treaſon, and other Capital Crimes. The difference between the Aſſembly of the Tribes, and of the Centuries, is very material; for though it be commonly thought, that either of theſe two Aſſemblies were eſteemed to be the People, yet in Reality it was not ſo, for the Aſſembly of the Centuries only could be ſaid to be the People, becauſe all the Nobility were included in it as well as the Commons, whereas they were excluded out of the Aſſembly of the Tribes; and yet in Effect, the Aſſembly of the Centuries was but as the Aſſembly of the Lords, or Nobles only, becauſe the leſſer, and richer part of the People had the Sovereignty, as the Aſſembly of the Tribes was, but the Commons only.

In maintenance of the popular Government of Rome, Bodin objects, that there could be no Regal Power in the two Conſuls, who could neither make Law, nor Peace, nor War. The Anſwer is, though there were two Conſuls, yet but one of them had the Regality; for they governed by Turns, one Conſul one Month, and the other Conſul another Month; or the firſt one day, and the ſecond another day. That the Conſuls could make no Laws is falſe, it is plain by Livy, that they had the Power to make Laws, or War, and did execute that Power, though they were often hindered by the Tribunes of the People; not for that the Power of making Laws or War, was ever taken away from the Conſuls, or communicated to the Tribunes, but only the Exerciſe of the Conſular Power was ſuſpended by a ſeeming humble way of interceſſion of the Tribunes; The Conſuls by their firſt Inſtitution had a lawful Right to do thoſe things, which yet they would not do by reaſon of the ſhortneſs of their Reigns, but choſe rather to countenance their Actions with the Title of a Decree of the Senate (who were their private Council) yea, and ſometimes with the Decree of the Aſſembly of the Centuries (who were their Publick Council) for both the Aſſembling of the Senate, and of the Centuries, was at the Pleaſure of the Conſuls, and nothing was to be propounded in either of them, but at the Will of the Conſuls: which argues a Sovereignty in them over the Senate and Centuries; the Senate of Rome was like the Houſe of Lords, the Aſſembly of the Tribes reſembled the Houſe of Commons, but the Aſſembling of the Centuries, was a Body compoſed of Lords and Commons united to Vote together.

The Tribunes of the People bore all the Sway among the Tribes, they called them together when they pleaſed, without any Order, whereas the Centuries were never Aſſembled without Ceremony, and Religious Obſervation of the Birds by the Augurs, and by the Approbation of the Senate, and therefore were ſaid to be auſpicata, and ex authoritate Patrum.

Theſe things conſidered, it appears, that the Aſſembly of the Centuries was the only legitimate, and great Meeting of the People of Rome: as for any Aſſembling, or Electing of any Truſtees, or Repreſentors of the People of Rome, in nature of the Modern Parliaments, it was not in Uſe, or ever known in Rome.

Above two hundred and twenty years after the Expulſion of Kings, a ſullen humour took the Commons of Rome, that they would needs depart the City to Janiculum, on the other ſide of Tybur, they would not be brought back into the City, until a Law was made, That a Plebiſcitum, or a Decree of the Commons might be obſerved for a Law; this Law was made by the Dictator Hortenſius, to quiet the Sedition, by giving a part of the Legiſlative Power to the Commons, in ſuch inferiour matters only, as by Toleration and Uſurpation had been practiſed by the Commons. I find not that they deſired an Enlargement of the Points which were the Object of their Power, but of the Perſons, or Nobility that ſhould be ſubject to their Decrees: the great Power of making War, of creating the greater Magiſtrates, of judging in Capital Crimes, remained in the Conſuls, with the Senate, and Aſſembly of the Centuries.

For further manifeſtation of the broken and diſtracted Government of Rome, it is fit to conſider the Original Power of the Conſuls, and of the Tribunes of the Commons, who are ordinarily called the Tribunes of the People.

Firſt, it is undeniable, that upon the expulſion of Kings, Kingly Power was not taken away, but only made Annual and changeable between two Conſuls; who in their Turns, and by courſe had the Sovereignty, and all Regal Power; this appears plainly in Livy, who tells us, that Valerius Publicola being Conſul, he himſelf alone ordained a Law, and then aſſembled a General Seſſion.

Turentillus Arſa inveyed and complained againſt the Conſul's Government, as being ſo abſolute, and in Name only leſs odious than that of Kings, but in Fact more cruel; for inſtead of one Lord the City had received twain, having Authority beyond all Meaſure, unlimited and infinite. Sextius and Licinus complain, that there would never be any indifferent Courſe, ſo long as the Nobles kept the Sovereign Place of Command, and the Sword to strike, whilſt the poor Commons have only the Buckler; their Concluſion was, that it remains, that the Commons bear the Office of Conſuls too, for that were a Fortreſs of their Liberty; from that day forward, ſhall the Commons be Partakers of thoſe things, wherein the Nobles now ſurpaſs them, namely Sovereign Rule and Authority.

The Law of the twelve Tribes affirm, Regio imperio duo ſunto, iique Conſules appellantur. Let two have Regal Power, and let them be called Conſuls: alſo the Judgment of Livy is, that the Sovereign Power was tranſlated from Conſuls to Decemvirs, as before from Kings to Conſuls. Theſe are proofs ſufficient to ſhew the Royal Power of the Conſuls.

About ſixteen years after the firſt Creation of Conſuls, the Commons finding themſelves much run into Debt, by waſting their Eſtates in following the Wars; and ſo becoming, as they thought, oppreſſed by Uſury, and caſt into Priſon by the Judgment, and Sentence of the Conſuls, they grievouſly complained of Uſury, and of the Power of the Conſuls, and by Sedition prevailed, and obtained Leave to chooſe among themſelves Magiſtrates called Tribunes of the People, who by their Interceſſion might preſerve the Commons from being oppreſſed, and ſuffering Wrong from the Conſuls: and it was further agreed, that the Perſons of thoſe Tribunes ſhould be ſacred, and not to be touched by any. By means of this Immunity of the Bodies of the Tribunes from all Arreſts or other Violence, they grew in time by Degrees to ſuch Boldneſs, that by ſtopping the Legal Proceedings of the Conſuls (when they pleaſed to intercede) they raiſed ſuch an Anarchy oft-times in Government, that they themſelves might act, and take upon them, what Power ſoever they pleaſed (though it belonged not to them.) This Gallantry of the Tribunes was the Cauſe, that the Commons of Rome, who were diligent Pretenders to Liberty, and the great Maſters of this part of Politicks, were thought the only famous Preſervers, and Keepers of the Liberty of Rome. And to do them right, it muſt be confeſſed, they were the only men that truly underſtood the Rights of a Negative Voice; if we will allow every man to be naturally free till they give their Conſent to be bound, we muſt allow every particular Perſon a Negative Voice; ſo that when as all have equal Power, and are as it were Fellow-Magiſtrates or Officers, each man may impeach, or ſtop his Fellow-Officers in their Proceedings, this is grounded upon the general Reaſon of all them, which have any thing in Common, where he which forbiddeth, or denieth, hath moſt Right; becauſe his Condition in that Caſe is better than his which commandeth, or moveth to proceed; for every Law or Command, is in it ſelf an Innovation, and a Diminution of ſome part of popular Liberty; for it is no Law except it reſtrain Liberty; he that by his Negative Voice doth forbid or hinder the Proceeding of a new Law, doth but preſerve himſelf in that Condition of Liberty, wherein Nature hath placed him, and whereof he is in preſent Poſſeſſion; the Condition of him thus in Poſſeſſion being the better, the ſtronger is his Prohibition, any ſingle man hath a juſter Title to his Negative Voice, than any Multitude can have to their Affirmative; to ſay the People are free, and not to be governed, but by their own Conſent, and yet to allow a major part to rule the whole, is a plain Contradiction, or a deſtruction of natural Freedom. This the Commons of Rome rightly underſtood, and therefore the tranſcendent Power of the Negative Voice of any one Tribune, being able of it ſelf to ſtay all the Proceedings, not of the Conſuls and Senate only, and other Magiſtrates, but alſo of the reſt of his Fellow-Tribunes, made them ſeem the powerfulleſt men in all Rome; and yet in Truth they had no Power or Juriſdiction at all, nor were they any Magiſtrates, nor could they lawfully call any man before them, for they were not appointed for Adminiſtration of Juſtice, but only to oppoſe the Violence, and Abuſe of Magiſtrates, by interceding for ſuch as appealed, being unjuſtly oppreſſed; for which Purpoſe at firſt they ſate only without the Door of the Senate, and were not permitted to come within the Doors: this Negative Power of theirs was of force only to hinder, but not to help the Proceedings in Courts of Juſtice; to govern, and not to govern the People. And though they had no Power to make Laws, yet they took upon them to propound Laws, and flattered and humoured the Commons by the Agrarian and Frumentarian Laws, by the firſt they divided the Common Fields, and conquered Lands among the Common People; and by the latter, they afforded them Corn at a cheaper or lower price: by theſe means theſe Demagogues or Tribunes of the Commons led the Vulgar by the Noſes, to allow whatſoever Uſurpations they pleaſed to make in Government.

The Royal Power of the Conſuls was never taken away from them by any Law that I hear of, but continued in them all the time of their pretended popular Government, to the very laſt, though repined at, and oppoſed in ſome particulars by the Commons.

The No-Power, or Negative Power of the Tribunes, did not long give content to the Commons, and therefore they deſired, that one of the Conſuls might be choſen out of the Commonalty: the eager propounding of this Point for the Commons, and the diligent oppoſing of it by the Nobility or Senate, argues how much both Parties regarded the Sovereign Power of a Conſul; the Diſpute laſted fourſcore years within two: the Tribunes preſſing it upon all advantages of opportunity, never gave over till they carried it by ſtrong hand, or ſtubbornneſs, hindering all Elections of the Curule, or greater Magiſtrates, for five years together, whereby the Nobles were forced to yield the Commons a Conſul's Place, or elſe an Anarchy was ready to deſtroy them all, and yet the Nobility had for a good while allowed the Commons Military Tribunes with Conſular Power, which, in effect or ſubſtance, was all one with having one of the Conſuls a Commoner, ſo that it was the bare Name of a Conſul which the Commons ſo long ſtrived for with the Nobility: In this contention, ſome Years Conſuls were choſen, ſome years Military Tribunes in ſuch Confuſion, that the Roman Hiſtorians cannot agree among themſelves, what Conſuls to aſſign, or name for each Year, although they have Capitoline Tables, Sicilian and Greek Regiſters, and Kalenders, Fragments of Capitoline Marbles, linen Books or Records to help them: a good while the Commons were content with the Liberty of having one of the Conſuls a Commoner; but about fourſcore years after they enjoyed this Privilege, a Deſire took them to have it Enacted, that a Decree of the Commons called a Plebiſcitum might be obſerved for a Law, Hortenſius the Dictator yielded to enact it, thereby to bring back the Seditious Commons, who departed to Janiculum on the other ſide of Tybur, becauſe they were deeply engaged in Debt in regard of long Seditions and Diſſenſions. The Eleventh Book of Livy, where this Sedition is ſet down, is loſt; we have only a touch of it in Florus his Epitome, and Saint Auguſtine mentions the Plundering of many Houſes by the Commons at their departing: this Sedition was above 220 years after the Expulſion of Kings, in all which time, the People of Rome got the Spoyl of almoſt all Italy, and the wealth of very many rich Cities: and yet the Commons were in ſo great Penury, and over-whelmed with Debts, that they fell to plunder the rich Houſes of the Citizens, which ſounds not much for the Honour of a popular Government. This communicating of a Legiſlative Power to the Commons, touching Power of enfranchiſing Allies, Judgments Penal, and Fines, and thoſe Ordinances that concerned the Good of the Commons called Plebiſcita, was a dividing of the Supreme Power, and the giving a Share of it to others, as well as to the Conſuls, and was in effect to deſtroy the Legiſlative Power, for to have two Supremes is to have none, becauſe the one may deſtroy the other, and is quite contrary to the indiviſible nature of Sovereignty. The Truth is, the Conſuls, having but annual Sovereignty, were glad for their own Safety, and Eaſe in Matters of great Importance, and Weight, to call together ſometimes the Senate, who were their ordinary Council, and many times the Centuries of the People, who were their Council extraordinary, that by their Advice they might countenance, and ſtrengthen ſuch Actions as were full of Danger and Envy: and thus the Conſuls by weakening their Original Power brought the Government to Confuſion, Civil Diſſenſion, and utter Ruine: ſo dangerous a thing it is to ſhew Favour to Common People, who interpret all Graces and Favours for their Rights, and juſt Liberties: the Conſuls following the Advice of the Senate or People, did not take away their Right of Governing no more than Kings loſe their Supremacy by taking Advice in Parliaments.

Not only the Conſuls, but alſo the Pretors and Cenſors (two great Offices, ordained only for the eaſe of the Conſuls, from whom an Appeal lay to the Conſuls) did in many things exerciſe an Arbitrary or Legiſlative power in the Abſence of the Conſuls, they had no Laws to limit them: for many Years after the Creation of Conſuls, ten men were ſent into Greece to chooſe Laws; and after the twelve Tables were confirmed, whatſoever the Pretors, who were but the Conſuls Subſtitutes, did command, was called jus honorarium; and they were wont at the Entrance into their Office to collect and hang up for Publick View, a Form of Adminiſtration of Juſtice which they would obſerve, and though the edictum Praetoris, expired with the Pretors Office, yet it was called Edictum perpetuum.

What Peace the Low-Countries have found ſince their Revolt is viſible; it is near about an hundred Years ſince they ſet up for themſelves, of all which time only twelve years they had a Truce with the Spaniard, yet in the next year, after the Truce was agreed upon, the War of Juliers brake forth, which engaged both Parties; ſo that upon the matter, they have lived in a continual War, for almoſt an hundred years; had it not been for the Aid of their Neighbours, they had been long ago ſwallowed up, when they were glad humbly to offer their new hatch'd Commonweal, and themſelves Vaſſals to the Queen of England, after that the French King Henry the Third had refuſed to accept them as his Subjects; That little Truce they had, was almoſt as coſtly as a War; they being forced to keep about thirty thouſand Souldiers continually in Garriſon. Two things they ſay they firſt fought about, Religion and Taxes, and they have prevailed it ſeems in both, for they have gotten all the Religions in Chriſtendom, and pay the greateſt Taxes in the World; they pay Tribute half in half for Food, and moſt neceſſary things, paying as much for Tribute as the price of the thing ſold; Exciſe is paid by all Retailers of Wine, and other Commodities; for each Tun of Beer ſix Shillings, for each Cow for the Pail two Stivers every Week: for Oxen, Horſes, Sheep, and other Beaſts ſold in the Market the twelfth part at leaſt; be they never ſo oft ſold by the year to and fro, the new Maſter ſtill pays as much: they pay five Stivers for every Buſhel of their own Wheat, which they uſe to grind in Publick Mills: Theſe are the Fruits of the Low-Country War.

It will be ſaid that Venice is a Commonwealth that enjoys Peace. She indeed of all other States hath enjoyed of late the greateſt Peace; but ſhe owes it not to her kind of Government, but to the natural Situation of the City, having ſuch a Bank in the Sea of near threeſcore Miles, and ſuch Marſhes towards the Land, as make her unapproachable by Land, or Sea; to theſe ſhe is indebted for her Peace at home, and what Peace ſhe hath abroad ſhe buys at a dear Rate; and yet her Peace is little better than a continued War; The City always is in ſuch perpetual Fears, that many beſieged Cities are in more Security; a Senator or Gentleman dares not converſe with any Stranger in Venice, ſhuns Acquaintance, or dares not own it: they are no better than Bandito's to all humane Society. Nay, no People in the World live in ſuch Jealouſie one of another; hence are their intricate Solemnities, or rather Lotteries in Election of their Magiſtrates, which in any other Place, would be ridiculous and uſeleſs. The Senators or Gentlemen are not only jealous of the Common People, whom they keep diſarmed, but of one another, they dare not truſt any of their own Citizens to be a Leader of their Army, but are forced to hire, and entertain Foreign Princes for their Generals, excepting their Citizens from their Wars, and hiring others in their Places; it cannot be ſaid, that People live in Peace, which are in ſuch miſerable Fears continually.

The Venetians at firſt were ſubject to the Roman Emperour; and for fear of the Invaſion of the Hunnes forſook Padua, and other Places in Italy; and retired with all their Subſtance to thoſe Iſlands where now Venice ſtands: I do not read they had any Leave to deſert the defence of their Prince and Country, where they had got their Wealth, much leſs to ſet up a Government of their own; it was no better than a Rebellion, or Revolting from the Roman Empire. At firſt they lived under a kind of Oligarchy; for ſeveral Iſlands had each a Tribune, who all met, and governed in common: but the dangerous Seditions of their Tribunes, put a neceſſity upon them to chooſe a Duke for Life, who, for many hundreds of years, had an Abſolute Power; under whoſe Government Venice flouriſhed moſt, and got great Victories, and rich Poſſeſſions. But by inſenſible degrees, the Great Council of the Gentlemen have for many years been leſſening the Power of their Dukes, and have at laſt quite taken it away. It is a ſtrange Errour for any man to believe, that the Government of Venice hath been always the ſame that it is now: he that reads but the Hiſtory of Venice, may find for a long time a Sovereign Power in their Dukes: and that for theſe laſt two hundred years, ſince the diminiſhing of that Power, there have been no great Victories and Conqueſts obtained by that Eſtate.

That which exceeds admiration, is, that Contarene hath the confidence to affirm the preſent Government of Venice to be a mixed Form of Monarchy, Democraty, and Ariſtocraty: For, whereas he makes the Duke to have the Perſon and Shew of a King; he after confeſſeth, that the Duke can do nothing at all alone, and being joyned with other Magiſtrates, he hath no more Authority than any of them: alſo the Power of the Magiſtrates is ſo ſmall, that no one of them, how great ſoever he be, can determine of any thing of moment, without the allowance of the Council. So that this Duke is but a man dreſſed up in Purple, a King only in Pomp and Ornament, in Power but a Senator, within the City a Captive, without a Traytor, if he go without Leave. As little reaſon is there to think a Popular Eſtate is to be found in the great Council of Venice, or S. P. Q. Ʋ. for it doth not conſiſt of the fortieth part of the People, but only of thoſe they call Patritians or Gentlemen; for the Commons, neither by themſelves, nor by any choſen by them for their Repreſentors, are admitted to be any part of the Great Council: and if the Gentlemen of Venice have any Right to keep the Government in their own hands, and to exclude the Commons, they never had it given them by the People, but at firſt were beholding to Monarchy for their Nobility. This may further be noted, that though Venice of late enjoyed Peace abroad, yet it had been with that Charge, either for Fortification and Defence, or in Bribery ſo exceſſive, whereby of late upon any terms they purchaſed their Peace, that it is ſaid their Taxes are ſuch, that Chriſtians generally live better under the Turk, than under the Venetians, for there is not a grain of Corn, a ſpoonful of Wine, Salt, Eggs, Birds, Beaſts, Fowl, or Fiſh ſold, that payeth not a certain Cuſtom: upon occaſions the Labourers and Crafts-men pay a Rate by the Poll monthly, they receive incredible Gains by Uſury of the Jews; for in every City they keep open Shops of Intereſt, taking Pawns after fifteen in the hundred, and if at the years end it be not redeemed, it is forfeited, or at the leaſt, ſold at great loſs. The Revenues which the very Courtezans pay for Toleration, maintains no leſs than a dozen of Gallies.

By what hath been ſaid, it may be judged how unagreeable the Popular Government of Rome heretofore, and of Venice, and the Ʋnited Provinces at preſent, are, either for Religion or Peace (which two are principal Ingredients of Government) and ſo conſequently not fit to be reckoned for Forms, ſince whatſoever is either good or tolerable in either of their Governments, is borrowed or patched up of a broken, and diſtracted Monarchy. Laſtly, though Venice and the Low Countries are the only remarkable Places in this Age that reject Monarchy; yet neither of them pretend their Government to be founded upon any Original Right of the People, or have the Common People any Power amongſt them, or any choſen by them. Never was any Popular Eſtate in the World famous for keeping themſelves in peace; all their glory hath been for Quarrelling and Fighting.

Thoſe that are willing to be perſwaded, that the Power of Government is originally in the People, finding how impoſſible it is for any People to exerciſe ſuch Power, do ſurmiſe, that though the People cannot Govern, yet they may chooſe Repreſentors or Truſtees, that may manage this Power for the People, and ſuch Repreſentors muſt be ſurmiſed to be the People. And ſince ſuch Repreſentors cannot truly be choſen by the People, they are fain to divide the People into ſeveral Parts, as of Provinces, Cities, and Burrough-Towns, and to allow to every one of thoſe Parts to chooſe one Repreſentor or more of their own: and ſuch Repreſentors, though not any of them be choſen by the whole, or major part of the People, yet ſtill muſt be ſurmiſed to be the People; nay, though not one of them be choſen either by the People, or the major part of the People of any Province, City, or Burrough, for which they ſerve, but only a ſmaller part, ſtill it muſt be ſaid to be the People. Now when ſuch Repreſentors of the People do Aſſemble or meet, it is never ſeen that all of them can at one time meet together; and ſo there never appears a true, or full Repreſentation of the whole People of the Nation, the Repreſentors of one part or other being abſent, but ſtill they muſt be imagined to be the People. And when ſuch imperfect Aſſemblies be met, though not half be preſent, they proceed: and though their number be never ſo ſmall, yet it is ſo big, that in the debate of any buſineſs of moment, they know not how to handle it, without referring it to a fewer number than themſelves, though themſelves are not ſo many as they ſhould be. Thus thoſe that are choſen to repreſent the People, are neceſſitated to chooſe others, to repreſent the Repreſentors themſelves; a Truſtee of the North doth delegate his Power to a Truſtee of the South; and one of the Eaſt may ſubſtitute one of the Weſt for his Proxy: hereby it comes to paſs, that Publick Debates which are imagined to be referred to a General Aſſembly of a Kingdom, are contracted into a particular or private Aſſembly, than which nothing can be more deſtructive, or contrary to the nature of Publick Aſſemblies. Each Company of ſuch Truſtees hath a Prolocutor, or Speaker; who, by the help of three or four of his Fellows that are moſt active, may eaſily comply in gratifying one the other, ſo that each of them in their turns may ſway the Truſtees, whilſt one man, for himſelf or his Friend, may rule in one Buſineſs, and another man for himſelf or his Friend prevail in another cauſe, till ſuch a number of Truſtees be reduced to ſo many petty Monarchs as there be men of it. So in all Popularities, where a General Council, or great Aſſembly of the People meet, they find it impoſſible to diſpatch any great Action, either with Expedition or Secrecy, if a publick free Debate be admitted; and therefore are conſtrained to Epitomize, and ſub-epitomize themſelves ſo long, till at laſt they crumble away into the Atomes of Monarchy, which is the next degree to Anarchy; for Anarchy is nothing elſe but a broken Monarchy, where every man is his own Monarch, or Governour.

Whereas the Power of the People in chooſing both their Government and Governours is of late highly magnified, as if they were able to chooſe the beſt and excellenteſt men for that purpoſe. We ſhall find it true what Aristotle hath affirmed, that to chooſe well is the office of him that hath Knowledge; none can chooſe a Geometrician but he that hath skill in Geometry, l. 3. c. 11. for, ſaith he, All men eſteem not Excellency to be one and the ſame, l. 3. c. 17.

A great deal of talk there is in the World of the Freedom and Liberty that they ſay is to be found in Popular Commonweals; it is worth the enquiry how far, and in what ſence this Speech of Liberty is true. True Liberty is for every man to do what he list, or to live as he pleaſe, and not to be tied to any Laws. But ſuch Liberty is not to be found in any Commonweal; for there are more Laws in Popular Eſtates than any where elſe; and ſo conſequently leſs Liberty: and Government many ſay was invented to take away Liberty, and not to give it to every man; ſuch Liberty cannot be; if it ſhould, there would be no Government at all: therefore Aristotle, lib. 6. cap. 4. It is profitable not to be lawful to do every thing that we will, for power to do what one will, cannot reſtrain that Evil that is in every man; ſo that true Liberty cannot, nor ſhould not be in any Eſtate. But the only Liberty that the talkers of Liberty can mean, is a Liberty for ſome men to Rule and to be Ruled, for ſo Ariſtotle expounds it; one while to Govern, another while to be Governed; to be a King in the Forenoon, and a Subject in the Afternoon; this is the only Liberty that a Popular Eſtate can brag of, that where a Monarchy hath but one King, their Government hath the Liberty to have many Kings by turns. If the Common People look for any other Liberty, either of their Perſons or their Purſes, they are pitifully deceived, for a perpetual Army and Taxes are the principal materials of all Popular Regiments: never yet any ſtood without them, and very ſeldom continued with them; many Popular Eſtates have ſtarted up, but few have laſted; It is no hard matter for any kind of Government to last one, or two, or three days, l. 6. c. 5. For all ſuch as out of hope of Liberty, attempt to erect new Forms of Government, he gives this prudent Leſſon. We must look well into the continuance of Time, and remembrance of many Years, wherein the means tending to eſtabliſh Community had not lain hid, if they had been good and uſeful; for almost all things have been found out, albeit ſome have not been received, and other ſome have been rejected, after men have had experience of them; L. 2. c. 5.

It is believed by many, that at the very firſt Aſſembling of the People, it was unanimouſly agreed in the firſt place, that the Conſent of the major part ſhould bind the whole; and that though this firſt Agreement cannot poſſibly be proved, either how, or by whom it ſhould be made; yet it muſt neceſſarily be believed or ſuppoſed, becauſe otherwiſe there could be no lawful Government at all. That there could be no lawful Government, except a General Conſent of the whole People be firſt ſurmiſed, is no ſound Propoſition; yet true it is, that there could be no Popular Government without it. But if there were at firſt a Government without being beholden to the People for their Conſent, as all men confeſs there was, I find no reaſon but that there may be ſo ſtill, without asking Leave of the Multitude.

If it be true, that men are by nature free-born, and not to be governed without their own Conſents, and that Self-preſervation is to be regarded in the firſt place, it is not lawful for any Government but Self-Government to be in the World, it were ſin in the People to Deſire, or attempt to Conſent to any other Government: if the Fathers will promiſe for themſelves to be Slaves, yet for their Children they cannot, who have always the ſame Right to ſet themſelves at Liberty, which their Fathers had to Enſlave themſelves.

To pretend that a major part, or the ſilent Conſent of any part, may be interpreted to bind the whole People, is both unreaſonable and unnatural; it is againſt all Reaſon for men to bind others, where it is againſt Nature for men to bind themſelves. Men that boaſt ſo much of natural Freedom, are not willing to conſider how contradictory and deſtructive the power of a major part is to the natural Liberty of the whole People; the two grand Favourites of the Subjects, Liberty and Property (for which moſt men pretend to ſtrive) are as contrary as Fire to Water, and cannot ſtand together. Though by Humane Laws in Voluntary Actions, a major part may be tolerated to bind the whole Multitude, yet in Neceſſary Actions, ſuch as thoſe of Nature are, it cannot be ſo. Beſides, if it were poſſible for the whole People to chooſe their Repreſentors, then either every, each one of theſe Repreſentors ought to be particularly choſen by the whole People, and not one Repreſentor by one part, and another Repreſentor by another part of the People, or elſe it is neceſſary, that continually the entire Number of the Repreſentors be preſent, becauſe otherwiſe the whole People is never repreſented.

Again, it is impoſſible for the People, though they might and would chooſe a Government, or Governours, ever to be able to do it: for the People, to ſpeak truly and properly, is a thing or Body in continual Alteration and Change, it never continues one Minute the ſame, being compoſed of a Multitude of Parts, whereof divers continually decay and periſh, and others renew and ſucceed in their places, they which are the People this Minute, are not the People the next Minute. If it be anſwered, that it is impoſſible to ſtand ſo ſtrictly, as to have the Conſent of the whole People; and therefore that which cannot be, muſt be ſuppoſed to be the Act of the whole People: This is a ſtrange Anſwer, firſt to affirm a Neceſſity of having the Peoples Conſent, then to confeſs an Impoſſibility of having it. If but once that Liberty, which is eſteemed ſo ſacred, be broken, or taken away but from one of the meaneſt or baſeſt of all the People; a wide Gap is thereby opened for any Multitude whatſoever, that is able to call themſelves, or whomſoever they pleaſe, the People.

Howſoever men are naturally willing to be perſwaded, that all Sovereignty flows from the Conſent of the People, and that without it no true Title can be made to any Supremacy; and that it is ſo currant an Axiom of late, that it will certainly paſs without Contradiction as a late Exercitator tells us: yet there are many and great Difficulties in the Point never yet determined, not ſo much as diſputed, all which the Exercitator waves and declines, profeſſing he will not inſiſt upon the Diſtinctions, touching the manner of the Peoples paſſing their Conſent, nor determine which of them is ſufficient, and which not to make the Right or Title; whether it muſt be Antecedent to Poſſeſſion, or may be conſequent: Expreſs, or Tacite: Collective, or Repreſentative: Abſolute, or conditionated: Free, or Inforced: Revocable, or Irrevocable. All theſe are material Doubts concerning the Peoples Title, and though the Exercitator will not himſelf determine what conſent is ſufficient, and what not, to make a Right or Title, yet he might have been ſo courteous, as to have directed us, to whom we might go for Reſolution in theſe Caſes. But the Truth is, that amongſt all them that plead the Neceſſity of the Conſent of the People, none of them hath ever toucht upon theſe ſo neceſſary Doctrines; it is a Task it ſeems too difficult, otherwiſe ſurely it would not have been neglected, conſidering how neceſſary it is to reſolve the Conſcience, touching the manner of the Peoples paſſing their Conſent; and what is ſufficient, and what not, to make, or derive a Right, or Title from the People.

No Multitude or great Aſſembly of any Nation, though they be all of them never ſo good and vertuous, can poſſibly govern; this may be evidently diſcovered by conſidering the Actions of great and numerous Aſſemblies, how they are neceſſitated to relinquiſh that Supreme Power, which they think they exerciſe, and to delegate it to a few. There are two Parts of the Supreme Power, the Legiſlative, and the Executive, neither of theſe can a great Aſſembly truly act. If a new Law be to be made it may in the General receive the Propoſal of it from one or more of the General Aſſembly, but the forming, penning, or framing it into a Law, is committed to a few, becauſe a great number of Perſons cannot without tedious, and dilatory Debates, examine the Benefits and Miſchiefs of a Law. Thus in the very firſt Beginning the Intention of a General Aſſembly is fruſtrated; then after a Law is penned or framed, when it comes to be queſtioned, whether it ſhall paſs or nay; though it be Voted in a full Aſſembly, yet by the Rules of the Aſſembly, they are all ſo tied up, and barred from a free and full Debate; that when any man hath given the Reaſons of his Opinion; if thoſe Reaſons be argued againſt, he is not permitted to reply in Juſtification or Explanation of them, but when he hath once ſpoken, he muſt be heard no more: which is a main Denial of that Freedom of Debate, for which the great Aſſembly is alledged to be ordained in the high Point of Legiſlative Power.

The ſame may be ſaid, touching the Executive Power, if a cauſe be brought before a great Aſſembly, the firſt thing done, is to refer, or commit it to ſome few of the Aſſembly, who are truſted with the examining the Proofs, and Witneſſes, and to make Report to the General Aſſembly; who upon the Report proceed to give their Judgments without any publick hearing, or interrogating the Witneſſes, upon whoſe Teſtimonies diligently examined every man that will paſs a conſcientious Judgment is to rely. Thus the Legiſlative and Executive Power are never truly practiſed in a great Aſſembly; the true Reaſon whereof is, if Freedom be given to Debate, never any thing could be agreed upon without endleſs Diſputes; meer Neceſſity compels to refer main Tranſactions of Buſineſs to particular Congregations and Committees.

Thoſe Governments that ſeem to be popular are kinds of petty Monarchies, which may thus appear: Government is a Relation between the Governours, and the governed, the one cannot be without the other, mutuò ſe ponunt & auferunt; where a Command or Law proceeds from a major part, there thoſe individual Perſons that concurred in the Vote, are the Governours, becauſe the Law is only their Will in particular: the Power of a major Part being a contingent, or caſual thing, expires in the very Act it ſelf of Voting, which Power of a major Part is grounded upon a Suppoſition, that they are the ſtronger Part; when the Vote is paſt, theſe Votes, which are the major Part, return again, and are incorporated into the whole Aſſembly, and are buried as it were in that Lump, and no otherwiſe conſidered; the Act or Law ordained by ſuch a Vote, loſeth the Makers of it, before it comes to be obeyed; for when it comes to be put in Execution, it becomes the Will of thoſe who enjoyn it, and force Obedience to it, not by Virtue of any Power derived from the Makers of the Law. No man can ſay, that during the Reign of the late Queen Elizabeth, that King Henry the Eighth, or Edward the Sixth did govern, although that many of the Laws that were made in thoſe two former Princes times, were obſerved, and executed under her Government; but thoſe Laws, though made by her Predeceſſours, yet became the Laws of her preſent Government; who willed and commanded the Execution of them, and had the ſame Power to correct, interpret, or mitigate them, which the firſt Makers of them had; every Law muſt always have ſome preſent known Perſon in Being, whoſe Will it muſt be to make it a Law for the Preſent; this cannot be ſaid of the major Part of any Aſſembly, becauſe that major part inſtantly ceaſeth, as ſoon as ever it hath voted: an infallible Argument whereof is this, that the ſame major part after the Vote given, hath no Power to correct, alter, or mitigate it, or to Cauſe it to be put in Execution; ſo that he that ſhall act, or cauſe that Law to be executed, makes himſelf the Commander, or willer of it, which was originally the Will of others: It is ſaid by Mr. Hobs in his Leviathan, page 141. Nothing is Law, where the Legiſlator cannot be known, for there muſt be manifeſt Signs, that it proceedeth from the Will of the Sovereign; there is requiſite, not only a Declaration of the Law, but alſo ſufficient Signs of the Author and the Authority.

That Senate or great Council, wherein it is conceived the Supreme, or Legiſlative Power doth reſt, conſiſts of thoſe Perſons who are actually Subjects at the very ſame time, wherein they exerciſe their Legiſlative Power, and at the ſame inſtant may be guilty of breaking one Law, whilſt they are making another Law; for it is not the whole and entire Will of every particular Perſon in the Aſſembly, but that part only of his Will, which accidentally falls out to concur with the Will of the greater part: So that the Sharers of the Legiſlative Power have each of them, perhaps not a hundredth part of the Legiſlative Power (which in it ſelf is indiviſible) and that not in Act, but in Poſſibility, only in one particular Point for that Moment, whilſt they give their Vote. To cloſe this Point which may ſeem ſtrange and new to ſome, I will produce the Judgment of Bodin, in his ſixth Book of a Commonweal, and the fourth Chapter; his words are, The chief Point of a Commonweal, which is the Right of Sovereignty, cannot be, nor inſiſt, to speak properly, but in Monarchy; for none can be Sovereign in a Commonweal, but one alone; if they be two, or three, or more, no one is Sovereign, for that no one of them can give or take a Law from his Companion: and although we imagine a Body of many Lords; or of a whole People to hold the Sovereignty, yet hath it no true Ground nor Support, if there be not a Head with abſolute Power to unite them together, which a ſimple Magistrate without Sovereign Authority cannot do. And if it chance that the Lords, or Tribes of the People be divided (as it often falls out) then must they fall to Arms one againſt another: and although the greateſt part be of one Opinion, yet may it ſo happen, as the leſſer part, having many Legions, and making a Head, may oppoſe it ſelf againſt the greater Number, and get the Victory. We ſee the Difficulties which are, and always have been in popular Eſtates, whereas they hold contrary Parts, and for divers Magiſtrates, ſome demand Peace, others War; ſome will have this Law, others that; ſome will have one Commander, others another; ſome will treat a League with the King of France, others with the King of Spain, corrupted or drawn, ſome one Way, ſome another, making open War, as hath been ſeen in our Age amongst the Griſons, &c.

Upon theſe Texts of Aristotle fore-cited, and from the Mutability of the Roman Popularity, which Ariſtotle lived not to ſee, I leave the Learned to conſider, whether it be not probable that theſe, or the like Paradoxes may be inferred to be the plain Mind of Ariſtotle, viz. 1. That there is no Form of Government, but Monarchy only. 2. That there is no Monarchy, but Paternal. 3. That there is no Paternal Monarchy, but Abſolute, or Arbitrary. 4. That there is no ſuch thing as an Aristocraty or Democraty. 5. That there is no ſuch Form of Government as a Tyranny. 6. That the People are not born Free by Nature.

ALL thoſe who ſo eagerly ſtrive for an Original Power to be in the People, do with one Conſent acknowledge, that Originally the Supreme Power was in the Fatherhood; and that the firſt Kings were Fathers of Families: This is not only evident, and affirmed by Ariſtotle; but yielded unto by Grotius, Mr. Selden, Mr. Hobbs, Mr. Aſcam; and all others of that Party, not one excepted, that I know of.

Now for thoſe that confeſs an original Subjection in Children, to be governed by their Parents, to dream of an original Freedom in Mankind, is to contradict themſelves; and to make Subjects to be Free, and Kings to be Limited; to imagine ſuch Pactions and Contracts between Kings and People, as cannot be proved ever to have been made, or can ever be deſcribed or fancied, how it is poſſible for ſuch Contracts ever to have been, is a boldneſs to be wondred at.

Mr. Selden confeſſeth, that Adam, by donation from God, was made the general Lord of all things, not without ſuch a private Dominion to himſelf, as (without his Grant) did exclude his Children. And by Donation, or Aſſignation, or ſome kind of Conceſſion (before he was dead, or left any Heir to ſucceed him) his Children had their diſtinct Territories, by Right of Private Dominion. Abel had his Flocks, and Paſtures for them, Cain had his Fields for Corn, and the Land of Nod, where he built himſelf a City.

It is confeſſed, that in the Infancy of the World, the Paternal Government was Monarchical; but when the World was repleniſhed with multitude of People, then the Paternal Government ceaſed, and was loſt; and an Elective kind of Government by the People, was brought into the World. To this it may be anſwered, That the Paternal Power cannot be loſt; it may either be transferr'd or uſurped; but never loſt, or ceaſeth. God, who is the giver of Power, may transfer it from the Father to ſome other; he gave to Saul a Fatherly Power over his Father Kiſh, God alſo hath given to the Father a Right or Liberty to alien his Power over his Children, to any other; whence we find the Sale and Gift of Children, to have been much in Uſe in the beginning of the World, when men had their Servants for a Poſſeſſion and an Inheritance as well as other Goods: whereupon we find the Power of Caſtrating, and making Eunuchs much in Uſe in Old Times. As the Power of the Father may be lawfully transferr'd or aliened, ſo it may be unjuſtly uſurped: And in Uſurpation, the Title of an Uſurper is before, and better than the Title of any other than of him that had a former Right: for he hath a Poſſeſſion by the permiſſive Will of God, which Permiſſion, how long it may endure, no man ordinarily knows. Every man is to preſerve his own Life for the Service of God, and of his King or Father, and is ſo far to obey an Uſurper, as may tend not only to the preſervation of his King and Father, but ſometimes even to the preſervation of the Uſurper himſelf, when probably he may thereby be reſerved to the Correction, or Mercy of his true Superiour; though by Humane Laws, a long Preſcription may take away Right, yet Divine Right never dies, nor can be loſt, or taken away.

Every man that is born, is ſo far from being Free-born, that by his very Birth he becomes a Subject to him that begets him: under which Subjection he is always to live, unleſs by immediate Appointment from God, or by the Grant or Death of his Father, he become poſſeſſed of that Power to which he was ſubject.

The Right of Fatherly Government was ordained by God, for the preſervation of Mankind; if it be uſurped, the Uſurper may be ſo far obeyed, as may tend to the preſervation of the Subjects, who may thereby be enabled to perform their Duty to their true and right Sovereign, when time ſhall ſerve: in ſuch Caſes to obey an Uſurper, is properly to obey the firſt and right Governour, who muſt be preſumed to deſire the ſafety of his Subjects: the Command of an Uſurper is not to be obeyed in any thing tending to the deſtruction of the Perſon of the Governour; whoſe Being in the firſt place is to be looked after.

It hath been ſaid, that there have been ſo many Uſurpations by Conqueſt in all Kingdoms, that all Kings are Uſurpers, or the Heirs or Succeſſors of Uſurpers; and therefore any Uſurper, if he can but get the poſſeſſion of a Kingdom, hath as good a Title as any other.

Anſwer. The firſt Uſurper hath the beſt Title, being, as was ſaid, in poſſeſſion by the Permiſſion of God; and where an Uſurper hath continued ſo long, that the knowledge of the Right Heir be loſt by all the Subjects, in ſuch a Caſe an Uſurper in poſſeſſion is to be taken and reputed by ſuch Subjects for the true Heir, and is to be obeyed by them as their Father. As no man hath an infallible Certitude, but only a moral Knowledge, which is no other than a probable perſwaſion grounded upon a peaceable poſſeſſion, which is a warrant for Subjection to Parents and Governours; for we may not ſay, becauſe Children have no infallible, or neceſſary certainty who are their true Parents, that therefore they need not obey, becauſe they are uncertain: it is ſufficient, and as much as Humane Nature is capable of, for Children to rely upon a credible perſwaſion; for otherwiſe the Commandment of Honour thy Father, would be a vain Commandment, and not poſſible to be obſerved.

By Humane poſitive Laws, a Poſſeſſion time out of mind takes away, or barrs a former Right, to avoid a general Miſchief, of bringing all Right into a Diſputation not decideable by proof, and conſequently to the overthrow of all Civil Government, in Grants, Gifts, and Contracts, between man and man: But in Grants and Gifts that have their Original from God or Nature, as the Power of the Father hath, no Inferiour Power of man can limit, nor make any Law of Preſcription againſt them: upon this ground is built that Common Maxim, that Nullum tempus occurrit regi, No time bars a King.

All Power on Earth is either derived or uſurped from the Fatherly Power, there being no other Original to be found of any Power whatſoever; for if there ſhould be granted two ſorts of Power without any Subordination of one to the other, they would be in perpetual ſtrife which ſhould be Supreme, for two Supremes cannot agree; if the Fatherly Power be Supreme, then the Power of the People muſt be ſubordinate, and depend on it; if the Power of the People be Supreme, then the Fatherly Power muſt ſubmit to it, and cannot be exerciſed without the Licence of the People, which muſt quite deſtroy the Frame and courſe of Nature. Even the Power which God himſelf exerciſeth over Mankind is by Right of Fatherhood; he is both the King and Father of us all; as God hath exalted the Dignity of Earthly Kings, by communicating to them his own Title, by ſaying they are gods; ſo on the other ſide, he hath been pleaſed as it were to humble himſelf, by aſſuming the Title of a King to expreſs his Power, and not the Title of any popular Government; we find it is a puniſhment to have no King, Hoſea, ch. 3.4. and promiſed, as a Bleſſing to Abraham, Gen. 17.6. that Kings ſhall come out of thee.

Every man hath a part or ſhare in the preſervation of Mankind in General, he that uſurps the Power of a Superiour, thereby puts upon himſelf a Neceſſity of acting the Duty of a Superiour in the Preſervation of them over whom he hath uſurped, unleſs he will aggravate one heinous Crime, by committing another more horrid; he that takes upon him the Power of a Superiour ſins ſufficiently, and to the Purpoſe: but he that proceeds to deſtroy both his Superiour, and thoſe under the Superiours Protection, goeth a Strain higher, by adding Murther to Robbery; if Government be hindered, mankind periſheth, an Uſurper by hindering the Government of another, brings a Neceſſity upon himſelf to govern, his Duty before Uſurpation was only to be miniſterial, or inſtrumental in the preſervation of others by his Obedience; but when he denies his own, and hinders the Obedience of others, he doth not only not help, but is the Cauſe of the Diſtraction in hindering his Superiour to perform his Duty, he makes the Duty his own: if a Superiour cannot protract, it is his part to deſire to be able to do it, which he cannot do in the Future if in the preſent they be deſtroyed for want of Government: therefore it is to be preſumed, that the Superiour deſires the preſervation of them that ſhould be ſubject to him; and ſo likewiſe it may be preſumed, that an Uſurper in general doth the Will of his Superiour, by preſerving the People by Government, and it is not improper to ſay, that in obeying an Uſurper, we may obey primarily the true Superiour, ſo long as our Obedience aims at the preſervation of thoſe in Subjection, and not at the Deſtruction of the true Governour. Not only the Uſurper, but thoſe alſo over whom Power is uſurped, may joyn in the preſervation of themſelves, yea, and in the preſervation ſometimes of the Uſurper himſelf.

Thus there may be a conditional Duty, or Right in an Uſurper to govern; that is to ſay, ſuppoſing him to be ſo wicked as to uſurp, and not willing to ſurrender or forgo his Uſurpation, he is then bound to protect by Government, or elſe he encreaſeth, and multiplieth his Sin.

Though an Uſurper can never gain a Right from the true Superiour, yet from thoſe that are Subjects he may; for if they know no other that hath a better Title than the Uſurper, then as to them the Uſurper in Poſſeſſion hath a true Right.

Such a qualified Right is found at firſt in all Uſurpers, as is in Thieves who have ſtolen Goods, and during the time they are poſſeſſed of them, have a Title in Law againſt all others but the true Owners, and ſuch Uſurpers to divers Intents and Purpoſes may be obeyed.

Neither is he only an Uſurper who obtains the Government, but all they are Partakers in the Uſurpation, who have either failed to give Aſſiſtance to their lawful Sovereign, or have given Aid either by their Perſons, Eſtates or Counſels for the Deſtroying of that Governour, under whoſe Protection they have been born and preſerved; for although it ſhould be granted, that Protection and Subjection are reciprocal, ſo that where the firſt fails, the latter ceaſeth; yet it muſt be remembred, that where a man hath been born under the Protection of a long and peaceable Government, he owes an Aſſiſtance for the preſervation of that Government that hath protected him, and is the Author of his own Diſobedience.

It is ſaid by ſome, that an uſurped Power may be obeyed in things that are lawful: but it may not be obeyed not only in lawful things, but alſo in things indifferent: Obedience in things indifferent, is neceſſary; not indifferent. For in things neceſſarily good God is immediately obeyed, Superiours only by Conſequence: If men command things evil, Obedience is due only by tolerating what they inflict: not by performing what they require: in the firſt they declare what God commands to be done, in the latter what to be ſuffered, ſo it remains, that things indifferent only are the proper Object of Humane Laws. Actions are to be conſidered ſimply and alone, and ſo are good as being Motions depending on the firſt Mover; or joyntly with Circumſtances: And that in a double Manner. 1. In Regard of the Ability or Poſſibility whileſt they may be done. 2. In the Act when they be performed: Before they be done they be indifferent; but once breaking out into Act, they become diſtinctly Good or Evil according to the Circumſtances which determine the ſame. Now an Action commanded, is ſuppoſed as not yet done (whereupon the Hebrews call the Imperative Mood the firſt Future) and ſo remaineth many times indifferent.

Some may be of Opinion, that if Obedience may be given to an Uſurper in things indifferent, as well as to a lawful Power; that then there is as much Obedience due to an uſurped Power, as to a lawful. But it is a Miſtake; for though it be granted that in things indifferent, an Uſurper may be obeyed, as well as a lawful Governour; yet herein lieth a main Difference, that ſome things are indifferent for a lawful Superiour, which are not indifferent, but unlawful to an Uſurper to enjoyn. Uſurpation is the reſiſting, and taking away the Power from him, who hath ſuch a former Right to govern the Uſurper, as cannot be lawfully taken away: ſo that it cannot be juſt for an Uſurper, to take Advantage of his own unlawful Act, or create himſelf a Title by continuation of his own Injuſtice, which aggravates, and never extenuates his Crime: and if it never can be an Act indifferent for the Uſurper himſelf to diſobey his Lawful Sovereign, much leſs can it be indifferent for him to command another to do that to which he hath no Right himſelf. It is only then a matter indifferent for an Uſurper to command, when the Actions enjoyned are ſuch; as the lawful Superiour is commanded by the Law of God, to provide for the benefit of his Subjects, by the ſame, or other like Reſtriction of ſuch indifferent things; and it is to be preſumed, if he had not been hindered, would have commanded the ſame, or the like Laws.

IN moſt Queſtions of Weight and Difficulty concerning the Right of War, or Peace, or Supreme Power, Grotius hath Recourſe to the Law of Nature or of Nations, or to the Primitive Will of thoſe men who firſt joyned in Society. It is neceſſary therefore a little to lay open the Variety or Contrariety in the Civil and Canon Law, and in Grotius himſelf, about the Law of Nature and Nations, not with a Purpoſe to raiſe any Contention about Words or Phraſes, but with a Deſire to reconcile or expound the Senſe of different Terms.

Civilians, Canoniſts, Politicians and Divines, are not a little perplexed in diſtinguiſhing between the Law of Nature, and the Law of Nations; about Jus Naturae, and Jus Gentium, there is much Diſpute by ſuch as handle the Original of Government, and of Property and Community.

The Civil Law in one Text allows a threefold Diviſion of Law, into Jus Naturae, Jus Gentium, and Jus Civile. But in another Text of the ſame Law, we find only a twofold Diviſion, into Jus Civile, and Jus Gentium. This latter Diviſion the Law takes from Gaius, the former from Ʋlpian, who will have Jus Naturale to be that which Nature hath taught all Creatures, quod Natura omnia animalia docuit, but for this he is confuted by Grotius, Salmaſius, and others, who reſtrain the Law of Nature only to men uſing Reaſon; which makes it all one with the Law of Nations; to which the Canon Law conſents, and ſaith, That Jus Naturale eſt commune omnium Nationum: That which Natural Reaſon appoints all men to uſe, is the Law of Nations, ſaith Theophilus in the Text of the Civil Law: and in the ſecond Book of the Inſtit. cap. 1. Jus Naturae is confounded with Jus Gentium.

As the Civilians ſometimes confound, and ſometimes ſeparate the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations, ſo other-whiles they make them alſo contrary one to the other. By the Law of Nature all men are born free; Jure naturali omnes liberi naſcuntur. But Servitude is by the Law of Nations: Jure Gentium Servitus invaſit, ſaith Ʋlpian.

And the Civil Law not only makes the Law of Nature and of Nations contrary, but alſo will have the Law of Nations contrary to it ſelf. War, ſaith the Law, was brought in by the Law of Nations, Ex jure gentium introducta bella, and yet the Law of Nations ſaith, Since Nature hath made us all of one Kindred, it follows it is not lawful for one man to lye in wait for another. Cùm inter nos cognitionem quandam natura conſtituit, conſequens est hominem homini inſidiari nefas eſſe, ſaith Florentinus.

Again, the Civil Law teacheth, that from the Law of Nature proceeds the Conjunction of man and woman, the Procreation and Education of Children. But as for Religion to God, and Obedience to Parents it makes it to be by the Law of Nations.

To touch now the Canon Law, we may find in one place that men are governed either by the Law of Nature, or by Cuſtoms. Homines reguntur Naturali jure, aut moribus. The Law of Nations they call a Divine Law, the Cuſtoms a humane Law; Leges aut divinae ſunt aut humanae; divinae naturâ, humanae moribus conſtant. But in the next place the Canon Law makes Jus to be either Naturale, aut Civile, aut Gentium. Though this Diviſion agree in Terms with that of Ʋlpian in the Civil Law, yet in the Explication of the Terms there is Diverſity; for what one Law makes to belong to the Law of Nature, the other refers to the Law of Nations, as may eaſily appear to him that will take the Pains to compare the Civil and Canon Law in theſe Points.

A principal Ground of theſe Diverſities and Contrarieties of Diviſions, was an Error which the Heathens taught, that all things at firſt were common, and that all men were equal. This miſtake was not ſo heinous in thoſe Ethnick Authors of the Civil Laws, who wanting the Guide of the Hiſtory of Moſes, were fain to follow Poets and Fables for their Leaders. But for Chriſtians, who have read the Scriptures, to dream either of a Community of all things, or an Equality of all Perſons, is a Fault ſcarce pardonable.

To ſalve theſe apparent Contrarieties of Community and Property, or Equality and Subjection: the Law of Jus Gentium was firſt invented; when that could not ſatisfie, to mend the matter, this Jus Gentium, was divided into a Natural Law of Nations, and an Humane Law of Nations; and the Law of Nature into a Primary and a Secondary Law of Nature; Diſtinctions which make a great ſound, but edifie not at all if they come under Examination.

If there hath been a time when all things were common, and all men equal, and that it be otherwiſe now; we muſt needs conclude that the Law by which all things were common, and men equal, was contrary to the Law by which now things are proper, and men ſubject.

If we will allow Adam to have been Lord of the World and of his Children, there will need no ſuch Diſtinctions of the Law of Nature and of Nations: For the Truth will be, that whatſoever the Heathens comprehended under theſe two Laws, is compriſed in the Moral Law.

That the Law of Nature is one and the ſame with the Moral, may appear by a Definition given by Grotius. The Law of Nature (ſaith he) is the Dictate of Reaſon, ſhewing that in every Action by the agreeing or diſagreeing of it with natural Reaſon, there is a moral Honeſty or Diſhoneſty, and conſequently that ſuch an Action is commanded or forbidden by God the Author of Nature. I cannot tell how Grotius would otherwiſe have defined the Moral Law. And the Canon Law grants as much; teaching that the Law of Nature is contained in the Law and the Gospel: Whatſoever ye will that men do, &c. Mat. 7.

The Term of Jus Naturae is not originally to be found in Scripture, for though T. Aquinas takes upon him to prove out of the 2. to the Romans, that there is a Jus Naturae, yet St. Paul doth not uſe thoſe expreſs Terms; his words are, The Gentiles which have not the Law, do by Nature the things contained in the Law, theſe having not the Law are a Law unto themſelves: He doth not ſay, Nature is a Law unto them, but they are a Law unto themſelves. As for that which they call the Law of Nations, it is not a Law diſtinct, much leſs oppoſite to the Law of Nature, but it is a ſmall Branch or Parcel of that great Law; for it is nothing but the Law of Nature, or the moral Law between Nations. The ſame Commandment that forbids one Private man to rob another, or one Corporation to hurt another Corporation, obliges alſo one King not to rob another King, and one Commonwealth not to ſpoil another: the ſame Law that enjoyns Charity to all men, even to Enemies, binds Princes and States to ſhew Charity to one another, as well as private Perſons.

And as the Common, or Civil Laws of each Kingdom which are made againſt Treaſon, Theft, Murder, Adultery, or the like, are all and every one of them grounded upon ſome particular Commandment of the moral Law; ſo all the Laws of Nations muſt be ſubordinate and reducible to the moral Law.

The Law of Nature, or the moral Law is like the main Ocean, which though it be one entire Body, yet ſeveral Parts of it have diſtinct Names, according to the diverſity of the Coaſts on which they border. So it comes to paſs that the Law of Nations, which is but a part of the Law of Nature, may be ſub-divided almoſt in infinitum, according to the Variety of the Perſons, or Matters about which it is converſant.

The Law of Nature or the divine Law is general, and doth only comprehend ſome Principles of Morality notoriouſly known of themſelves, or at the moſt is extended to thoſe things which by neceſſary and evident Inference are conſequent to thoſe Principles. Beſides theſe, many other things are neceſſary to the well governing of a Commonwealth: and therefore it was neceſſary that by Humane Reaſon ſomething more in particular ſhould be determined concerning thoſe things which could not be defined by Natural Reaſon alone; hence it is that Humane Laws be neceſſary, as Comments upon the Text of the Moral Law: and of this Judgment is Aquinas, who teacheth, that neceſſitas legis humanae manat ex eo, quod Lex naturalis, vel Divina, generalis eſt, & ſolum complectitur quaedam principia morum per ſe nota, & ad ſummum extenditur ad ea quae neceſſaria & evidenti elatione ex illis principiis conſequuntur: praeter illa verò multa alia ſunt neceſſaria in republica ad ejus rectam Gubernationem: & ideo neceſſarium fuit ut per humanam rationem aliqua magis in particulari determinarentur circa ea quae per ſolam rationem naturalem definiri non poſſunt. Ludo. Molin. de Just. Thus much may ſuffice to ſhew the Diſtractions in and between the Civil and Common Laws about the Law of Nature and Nations. In the next place we are to conſider how Grotius diſtinguiſheth theſe Laws.

To maintain the Community of things to be Natural, Grotius hath framed new Diviſions of the Law of Nature. Firſt, in his Preface to his Books De Jure Belli & Pacis, he produceth a Definition of the Law of Nature, in ſuch doubtful, obſcure and reſerved Terms, as if he were diffident of his Undertaking: Next in his firſt Book and firſt Chapter he gives us another Diſtribution, which differs from his Doctrine in his Preface.

In his Preface his Principle is, that the Appetite of Society, that is to ſay, of Community, is an Action proper to man. Here he preſently corrects himſelf with an Exception, that ſome other Creatures are found to deſire Society; and withal he anſwers the Objections thus, that this Deſire of Society in brute Beasts, comes from ſome external Principle. What he means by Principium intelligens extrinſecum, I underſtand not, nor doth he explain, nor is it material, nor is the Argument he uſeth to any purpoſe; for, admitting all he ſaith to be true, yet his Principle fails; for the Queſtion is not, from what Principle this Deſire of Society proceeds in Beaſts, but whether there be ſuch a Deſire or no. Beſides, here he takes the Appetite of Society and Community to be all one, whereas many live in Society, which live not in Community.

Next he teacheth, that the keeping of Society (cuſtodia Societatis) which in a rude manner (ſaith he) we have now expreſſed, is the fountain of that Law which is properly ſo called. I conceive by the Law properly ſo called, he intends the Law of Nature, though he expreſs not ſo much: And to this appetite of Sociable Community he refers Alieni Abſtinentia; but herein it may be he forgets himſelf, for where there is Community there is neither meum nor tuum, nor yet alienum; and if there be no alienum, there can be no alieni abſtinentia. To the ſame purpoſe he ſaith, that by the Law of Nature men muſt ſtand to bargains, Juris naturae ſit ſtare pactis. But if all things were common by Nature, how could there be any bargain?

Again, Grotius tells us, that from this ſignification of the Law there hath flowed another larger, which conſiſts (ſaith he) in Diſcerning what delights us or hurts us, and in judging how things ſhould be wiſely diſtributed to each one. This latter he calls the looſer Law of Nature; the former Jus Sociale, the Law of Nature, ſtrictly, or properly taken. And theſe two Laws of Nature ſhould have place (ſaith he) though men ſhould deny there were a a God. But to them that believe there is a God, there is another Original of Law, beſide the Natural, coming from the free Will of God, to the which our own Ʋnderſtanding tells us we muſt be ſubject.

Thus have I gathered the Subſtance of what is moſt material concerning the Law of Nature, in his Preface.

If we turn to the Book it ſelf, we have a diviſion of the Law into Jus Naturale. Voluntarium Divinum. Humanum. Civile. Latiùs patens, Seu Jus Gentium. Arctiùs patens, Seu Paternum, Seu Herile.

In the Definition of Jus Naturale he omits thoſe Subtleties of Jus Naturae propriè dictum, and quod laxius ita dicitur, which we find in his Preface, and gives ſuch a plain Definition, as may fitly agree to the Moral Law. By this it ſeems the Law of Nature and the Moral Law are one and the ſame.

Whereas he affirmeth, That the Actions about which the Law of Nature is converſant, are lawful or unlawful of themſelves, and therefore are neceſſarily commanded or forbidden by God: by which mark this Law of Nature doth not only differ from humane Law, but from the Divine voluntary Law, which doth not command or forbid thoſe things, which of themſelves, and by their own nature are lawful or unlawful, but makes them unlawful by forbidding them, and due by commanding them: In this he ſeems to make the Law of Nature to differ from Gods Voluntary Law; whereas, in God, Neceſſary and Voluntary are all one. Salmaſius de Ʋſuris, in the twentieth Chapter, condemns this Opinion of Grotius; though he name him not, yet he means him, if I miſtake not.

In the next place, I obſerve his ſaying, That ſome things are by the Law of Nature, not propriè, but reductivè; and that the Law of Nature deals not only with thoſe things which are beſide the Will of Man, but alſo with many things which follow the act of Man's Will: ſo Dominion, ſuch as is now in Ʋſe, mans Will brought in; but now that it is brought in, it is againſt the Law of Nature, to take that from thee againſt thy will, which is in thy Dominion.

Yet for all this Grotius maintains, That the Law of Nature is ſo immutable, that it cannot be changed by God himſelf. He means to make it good with a Diſtinction: Some things (ſaith he) are by the Law of Nature, but not ſimply, but according to the certain ſtate of things; ſo the common uſe of things was natural as long as Dominion was not brought in; and Right for every man to take his own by Force, before Laws were made. Here if Grotius would have ſpoken plain, inſtead of but not ſimply, but according to the certain State of Things, he would have ſaid, but not immutably, but for a certain Time. And then this Diſtinction would have run thus; Some things are by the Law of Nature, but not immutably, but for a certain time. This muſt needs be the naked Senſe of his Diſtinction, as appears by his Explication in the Words following, where he ſaith, That the common Ʋſe of Things was natural ſo long as Dominion was not brought in: Dominion, he ſaith, was brought in by the will of man, whom by this Doctrine Grotius makes to be able to change that Law which God himſelf cannot change, as he ſaith. He gives a double ability to man; firſt, to make that no Law of Nature, which God made to be the Law of Nature: And next, to make that a Law of Nature which God made not; for now that Dominion is brought in, he maintains, it is againſt the Law of Nature to take that which is in another man's dominion.

Beſides, I find no Coherence in theſe Words, By the Law of Nature it was right for every man to take his own by force, before Laws made, ſince by the Law of Nature no man had any thing of his own; and until Laws were made, there was no Propriety, according to his Doctrine.

Jus Humanum voluntarium latius patens, he makes to be the Law of Nations, which (ſaith he) by the Will of All, or Many Nations, hath received a power to bind, he adds, of Many, becauſe there is, as he grants, ſcarce any Law to be found common to all Nations, beſides the Law of Nature; which alſo is wont to be called the Law of Nations, being common to all Nations. Nay, as he confeſſeth often, That is the Law in one part of the World, which in another part of the World is not the Law of Nations.

By theſe Sentences, it ſeems Grotius can ſcarce tell what to make to be the Law of Nations, or where to find it.

Whereas he makes the Law of Nations to have a binding Power from the Will of men, it muſt be remembred, That it is not ſufficient for men to have a Will to bind, but it is neceſſary alſo to have a Power to bind: Though ſeveral Nations have one and the ſame Law.

For inſtance: Let it be granted that Theft is puniſhed by Death in many Countries, yet this doth not make it to be a Law of Nations, becauſe each Nation hath it but as a Natural, or Civil Law of their own Country; and though it have a binding Power from the Will of many Nations, yet becauſe each Nation hath but a Will and Power to bind themſelves, and may without prejudice, conſent, or conſulting of any Neighbour-Nation, alter this Law, if they find Cauſe, it cannot properly be called the Law of Nations. That which is the foundation of the Law of Nations, is, to have it concern ſuch things as belong to the mutual Society of Nations among themſelves, Lib. 4. c. 8. as Grotius confeſſeth; and not of ſuch things as have no further relation than to the particular Benefit of each Kingdom: For, as private men muſt neglect their own Profit for the Good of their Country; ſo particular Nations muſt ſometimes remit part of their Benefit, for the Good of many Nations.

True it is, that in particular Kingdoms and Commonwealths there be Civil and National Laws, and alſo Cuſtoms that obtain the Force of Laws: But yet ſuch Laws are ordained by ſome ſupreme Power, and the Cuſtoms are examined, judged, and allowed by the ſame ſupreme Power. Where there is no Supreme Power that extends over all or many Nations, but only God himſelf, there can be no Laws made to bind Nations, but ſuch as are made by God himſelf: we cannot find that God made any Laws to bind Nations, but only the Moral Law; as for the Judicial Law, though it were ordained by God, yet it was not the Law of Nations, but of one Nation only, and fitted to that Commonwealth.

If any think that the Cuſtoms wherein many Nations do conſent, may be called the Law of Nations, as well as the Cuſtoms of any one Nation may be eſteemed for National Laws: They are to conſider, That it is not the being of a Cuſtom that makes it lawful, for then all Cuſtoms, even evil Cuſtoms, would be lawful; but it is the Approbation of the ſupreme Power that gives a legality to the Cuſtom: where there is no Supreme Power over many Nations, their Cuſtoms cannot be made legal.

The Doctrine of Grotius is, That God immediately after the Creation did beſtow upon Mankind in general a Right over things of inferiour Nature — From whence it came to paſs, that preſently every man might ſnatch what he would for his own Ʋſe, and ſpend what he could, and ſuch an Ʋniverſal Right was then inſtead of Property; for what every one ſo ſnatched, another could not take from him but by Injury.

How repugnant this Aſſertion of Grotius is to the Truth of Holy Scripture, Mr. Selden teacheth us in his Mare Clauſum, Lib. 1. c. 4. ſaying, That Adam by Donation from God, Gen. 1.28. was made the general Lord of all things, not without ſuch a private Dominion to himſelf, as (without his Grant) did exclude his Children: and by Donation and Aſſignation, or ſome kind of Ceſſion (before he was dead, or left any Heir to ſucceed him) his Children had their diſtinct Territories by Right of private Dominion: Abel had his Flocks and Paſtures for them; Cain had his Fields for Corn, and the Land of Nod where he built himſelf a City.

This Determination of Mr. Selden's being conſonant to the Hiſtory of the Bible, and to natural Reaſon, doth contradict the Doctrine of Grotius: I cannot conceive why Mr. Selden ſhould afterwards affirm, That neither the Law of Nature, nor the Divine Law, do command or forbid either Communion of all things or private Dominion, but permitteth both.

As for the general Community between Noah and his Sons, which Mr. Selden will have to be granted to them, Gen. 9.2. the Text doth not warrant it; for although the Sons are there mentioned with Noah in the Bleſſing, yet it may beſt be underſtood with a Subordination or a Benediction in Succeſſion, the Bleſſing might truly be fulfilled, if the Sons either under, or after their Father enjoyed a Private Dominion: it is not probable that the private Dominion which God gave to Adam, and by his Donation, Aſſignation, or Ceſſion to his Children was abrogated, and a Community of all things inſtituted between Noah and his Sons, at the time of the Flood: Noah was left the ſole Heir of the World, why ſhould it be thought that God would diſ-inherit him of his Birth-right, and make him of all the men in the World, the only Tenant in Common with his Children? If the Bleſſing given to Adam, Gen. 1.28. be compared to that given to Noah and his Sons, Gen. 9.2. there will be found a conſiderable Difference between thoſe two Texts: In the Benediction of Adam, we find expreſſed a ſubduing of the Earth, and a Dominion over the Creatures, neither of which are expreſſed in the Bleſſing of Noah, nor the Earth there once named, it is only ſaid, The fear of you ſhall be upon the creatures, and into your hands are they delivered; then immediately it follows, Every moving thing ſhall be meat for you, as the green herb. The firſt Bleſſing gave Adam Dominion over the Earth and all Creatures, the latter allows Noah liberty to uſe the living Creatures for food: here is no alteration or diminiſhing of his Title to a Propriety of all things, but an Enlargement only of his Commons.

But whether, with Grotius, Community came in at the Creation, or, with Mr. Selden, at the Flood, they both agree it did not long continue; Sed veri non eſt ſimile hujuſmodi communionem diu obtinuiſſe, is the confeſſion of Mr. Selden. It ſeems ſtrange that Grotius ſhould maintain, that Community of all things ſhould be by the Law of Nature, of which God is the Author; and yet ſuch Community ſhould not be able to continue: Doth it not derogate from the Providence of God Almighty, to ordain a Community which could not continue? Or doth it make the Act of our Fore-fathers, in abrogating the natural Law of Community, by introducing that of Propriety, to be a ſin of a high preſumption?

The prime Duties of the Second Table are converſant about the Right of Propriety: but if Propriety be brought in by a Humane Law (as Grotius teacheth) then the Moral Law depends upon the Will of man. There could be no Law againſt Adultery or Theft, if Women and all things were common.

Mr. Selden ſaith, That the Law of Nature, or of God, nec vetuit, nec jubebat, ſed permiſit utrumque, tam nempe rerum communionem quàm privatum Dominium. And yet for Propriety (which he terms primaeva rerum Dominia) he teacheth, That Adam received it from God, à Numine acceperat: And for Community, he ſaith, We meet with evident footſteps of the Community of things in that donation of God, by which Noah and his three Sons are made Domini pro indiviſo rerum omnium. Thus he makes the private Dominion of Adam, as well as the common Dominion of Noah and his Sons, to be both by the Will of God. Nor doth he ſhew how Noah, or his Sons, or their Poſterity, had any Authority to alter the Law of Community which was given them by God.

In diſtributing Territories (Mr. Selden ſaith) the conſent, as it were, of Mankind (paſſing their promiſe, which ſhould alſo bind their Poſterity) did intervene, ſo that men departed from their common Right of Communion of thoſe things which were ſo diſtributed to particular Lords or Maſters. This Diſtribution by Conſent of Mankind, we muſt take upon Credit; for there is not the leaſt proof offered for it out of Antiquity.

How the Conſent of Mankind could bind Poſterity when all things were common, is a Point not ſo evident: where Children take nothing by Gift or by Deſcent from their Parents, but have an equal and common Intereſt with them, there is no reaſon in ſuch caſes, that the Acts of the Fathers ſhould bind the Sons.

I find no cauſe why Mr. Selden ſhould call Community a priſtine Right; ſince he makes it but to begin in Noah, and to end in Noah's Children, or Grand children at the moſt; for he confeſſeth the Earth, à Noachidis ſeculis aliquot poſt diluvium eſſe diviſam.

That ancient Tradition, which by Mr. Selden's acknowledgment hath obtained Reputation every where, ſeems moſt reaſonable, in that he tells us, That Noah himſelf, as Lord of all, was Author of the Diſtribution of the World, and of private Dominion, and that by the appointment of an Oracle from God, he did confirm this Diſtribution by his laſt Will and Teſtament, which at his Death he left in the hands of his eldeſt Son Sem, and alſo warned all his Sons, that none of them ſhould invade any of their Brothers Dominions, or injure one another, becauſe from thence Diſcord and Civil War would neceſſarily follow.

Many Concluſions in Grotius his Book de Jure Belli & Pacis, are built upon the foundation of theſe two Principles.

Upon theſe two Propoſitions of natural Community and voluntary Propriety, depend divers dangerous and ſeditious Concluſions, which are diſperſed in ſeveral places. In the fourth Chapter of the firſt Book, the Title of which Chapter is, Of the War of Subjects againſt Superiours; Grotius handleth the Queſtion, Whether the Law of not reſiſting Superiours, do bind us in moſt grievous and moſt certain danger? And his Determination is, That this Law of not reſiſting Superiours, ſeems to depend upon the Will of thoſe men who at firſt joyned themſelves in a Civil Society, from whom the Right of Government doth come to them that govern; if thoſe had been at firſt asked, if their Will were to impoſe this burthen upon all, that they ſhould chuſe rather to dye, than in any caſe by Arms to repel the Force of Superiours; I know not whether they would anſwer, That it was their Will, unleſs perhaps with this addition, if Reſiſtance cannot be made but with the great diſturbance of the Common-wealth, and deſtruction of many Innocents. Here we have his Reſolution, that in great and certain danger, men may reſiſt their Governours, if it may be without diſturbance of the Common-wealth: if you would know who ſhould be Judge of the greatneſs and certainty of the Danger, or how we may know it, Grotius hath not one word of it, ſo that for ought appears to the contrary, his mind may be, that every private man may be Judge of the Danger, for other Judge he appoints none; it had been a foul Fault in ſo deſperate a piece of Service, as the reſiſting of Superiours, to have concealed the lawful Means, by which we may judge of the Greatneſs or Certainty of publick Danger, before we lift up our hands againſt Authority, conſidering how prone moſt of us are, to cenſure and miſtake thoſe things for great and certain Dangers, which in truth many times are no dangers at all, or at the moſt but very ſmall ones; and ſo flatter our ſelves, that by reſiſting our Superiours, we may do our Country laudable Service, without Diſturbance of the Common-wealth, ſince the Effects of Sedition cannot be certainly judged of but by the Events only.

Grotius proceeds to anſwer an Objection againſt this Doctrine of reſiſting Superiours. If (ſaith he) any man ſhall ſay, that this rigid Doctrine of dying, rather than reſiſting any Injuries of Superiours, is no humane, but a Divine Law: It is to be noted, that men at firſt, not by any Precept of God, but of their own Accord, led by Experience of the Infirmities of ſeparated Families againſt Violence, did meet together in Civil Society, from whence Civil Power took beginning, which therefore St. Peter calls an humane Ordinance, although elſewhere it be called a divine Ordinance, becauſe God approveth the wholeſom Inſtitutions of men; God in approving a humane Law is to be thought to approve it as humane, and in a humane manner.

And again in another place he goeth further, and teacheth us, That if the Queſtion happen to be concerning the primitive Will of the People, it will not be amiſs for the People that now are, and which are accounted the ſame with them that were long ago, to expreſs their meaning, in this matter, which is to be followed, unleſs it certainly appear, that the People long ago willed otherwiſe. lib. 2. cap. 2.

For fuller Explication of his Judgment about reſiſting Superiors, he concludes thus: The greater the thing is which is to be preſerved, the greater is the Equity which reacheth forth an Exception againſt the words of the Law: yet I dare not (ſaith Grotius) without Difference condemn either ſimple men or a leſſer part of the People, who in the laſt Refuge of Neceſſity, do ſo uſe this Equity, as that in the mean time, they do not forſake the Reſpect of the common Good.

Another Doctrine of Grotius is, That the Empire which is exerciſed by Kings, doth not ceaſe to be the Empire of the People; that Kings who in a lawful Order ſucceed thoſe who were elected, have the ſupreme Power by an uſufructuary Right only, and no Propriety.

Furthermore he teacheth, That the People may chuſe what Form of Government they pleaſe, and their Will is the Rule of Right. Populus eligere poteſt qualem vult gubernationis formam, neque ex praeſtantia formae, ſed ex voluntate jus metiendum eſt. lib. 1. cap. 3.

Alſo, That the People chuſing a King may reſerve ſome Acts to themſelves, and may bestow others upon the King, with full Authority, if either an expreſs Partition be appointed, or if the People being yet free, do command their future King, by way of a ſtanding Command, or if any thing be added by which it may be underſtood, that the King may be compelled or elſe puniſhed.

In theſe Paſſages of Grotius which I have cited, we find evidently theſe Doctrines.

No doubt but Grotius foreſaw what Uſes the People might make of theſe Doctrines, by concluding, if the chief Power be in the People, that then it is lawful for them to compel and puniſh Kings as oft as they miſuſe their Power: Therefore he tells us, He rejects the Opinion of them, who every where and without Exception will have the chief Power to be ſo the Peoples, that it is lawful for them to compel and puniſh Kings as oft as they miſuſe their Power; and this Opinion he confeſſeth, if it be altogether received, hath been and may be the cauſe of many Evils. This cautelous Rejection qualified with theſe Terms of every where without Exception, and altogether, makes but a mixt Negation, partly negative, and partly affirmative (which our Lawyers call a negative Repugnant) which brings forth this modal Propoſition, That in ſome places with Exception, and in ſome ſort the People may compel and puniſh their Kings.

But let us ſee how Grotius doth refute the general Opinion, That People may correct Kings. He frames his Argument in theſe words: It is lawful for every man to yield himſelf to be a private Servant to whom he pleaſe. What ſhould hinder, but that alſo it may be lawful for a free People ſo to yield themſelves to one or more, that the Right of governing them be fully ſet over without retaining any part of the Right? And you muſt not ſay, That this may not be preſumed; for we do not now ſeek, what in a doubtful caſe may be preſumed, but what by Right may be done. Thus far is the Argument, in which the moſt that is proved (if we gratifie him, and yield his whole Argument for good) is this, That the People may grant away their Power without retaining any part. But what is this to what the People have done? For though the People may give away their Power without reſervation of any part to themſelves; yet if they have not ſo done, but have reſerved a part, Grotius muſt confeſs, that the People may compel and puniſh their Kings, if they tranſgreſs: ſo that by his favour, the point will be, not what by Right may be done, but what in this doubtful caſe hath been done, ſince by his own Rule it is the Will and Meaning of the firſt People that joyned in Society, that muſt regulate the Power of their Succeſſours.

But on Grotius ſide it may be urged, That in all preſumption the People have given away their whole Power to Kings, unleſs they can prove they have reſerved a part; for if they will have any benefit of a Reſervation or Exception, it lies on their part to prove their Exception, and not on the Kings part who are in poſſeſſion.

This Anſwer, though in it ſelf it be moſt juſt and good; yet of all men Grotius may not uſe it. For he ſaves the Peoples labour of proving the primitive Reſervation of their Forefathers, by making the People that now are competent Expoſitors of the meaning of thoſe firſt Anceſtors, who may juſtly be preſumed, not to have been either ſo improvident for themſelves, or ſo negligent of all their Poſterity, when by the Law of Nature they were free, and had all things common, at an inſtant without any Condition or Limitation to give away that Liberty and Right of Community, and to make themſelves and their Children eternally ſubject to the Will of ſuch Governours as might miſuſe them without Controul.

On the behalf of the People, it may be further anſwered to Grotius, That although our Anceſtors had made an abſolute Grant of their Liberty, without any Condition expreſſed; yet it muſt be neceſſarily implied, that it was upon condition to be well governed, and that the Non-performance of that implied Condition, makes the Grant void; Or, if we will not allow an implicit Condition, then it may be ſaid, That the Grant in it ſelf was a void Grant, for being unreaſonable, and a violation of the Law of Nature, without any valuable Conſideration. What ſound Reply Grotius can return to ſuch Anſwers, I cannot conceive, if he keep himſelf to his firſt Principle of natural Community. As Grotius's Argument againſt the People is not ſound, ſo his Anſwer to the Argument that is made for the People, is not ſatisfactory. It is objected, That he that ordains, is above him that is ordained. Grotius anſwers, Verum duntaxat est in ea conſtitutione cujus effectus perpetuò pendet à voluntate conſtituentis, non etiam in ea quae ab initio eſt voluntatis, poſtea verò effectum habet neceſſitatis, quomodo mulier virum ſibi conſtituit, cui parere ſemper habet neceſſe. The Reply may be, That by Grotius's former Doctrine the very Effect of the Conſtitution of Kings by the People, depends perpetually upon the Will of them that Conſtitute, and upon no other Neceſſity: he will not ſay, That it is by any neceſſity of the Law of Nature, or by any poſitive Law of God; he teacheth, That non Dei praecepto, ſed ſponte, men entred into Civil Society, that it is an Humane Ordinance, that God doth only approve it ut humanum, and humano modo. He tells us further, That Populus poteſt eligere qualem vult gubernationis formam, & ex voluntate jus metiendum eſt; that the People may give the King as little Power as they will, and for as little time as they pleaſe, that they may make temporary Kings, as Directors and Protectors: jus quovis tempore revocabile, id eſt, precarium; as the Vandals in Africa, and the Goths in Spain, would depoſe their Kings as oft as they diſpleaſed them, horum enim actus irriti poſſunt reddi ab his qui poteſtatem revocabiliter dederunt, ac proinde non idem eſt effectus nec jus idem. Here he doth teach in plain words, the Effect doth depend upon the Will of the People. By this we may judge how improperly he uſeth the inſtance of a Woman, that appoints her ſelf a Husband, whom ſhe muſt always neceſſarily obey, ſince the neceſſity of the continuance of the VVife's obedience depends upon the Law of God, which hath made the Bond of Matrimony indiſſolvable. Grotius will not ſay the like for the continuance of the Subjects obedience to the Prince, neither will they ſay that VVomen may chuſe Husbands, as he tells us the People may chuſe Kings, by giving their Husbands as little power, and for as little a time as they pleaſe.

Next it is objected, That Tutors who are ſet over Pupils may be removed, if they abuſe their power. Grotius anſwers, In Tutore hoc procedit qui ſuperiorem habet, at in Imperiis quia progreſſus non datur in infinitum, omnino in aliqua perſona aut coetu conſiſtendum eſt: We must stay in ſome one Perſon, or in a Multitude, whoſe faults (becauſe they have no ſuperiour Judge above them) God hath witneſſed that he will have a particular care of, either to revenge them, if he judge it needful, or to tolerate them, either for Puniſhment, or Tryal of the People. It is true, in Kingdoms we cannot proceed in infinitum, yet we may, and muſt go to the higheſt, which by Grotius his Rule is the People, becauſe they firſt made Kings, ſo that there is no need to ſtay in aliqua perſona, but in coetu, in the People, ſo that by his Doctrine Kings may be puniſhed by the People, but the faults of the People muſt be left to the Judgment of God.

I have briefly preſented here the deſperate Inconveniences which attend upon the Doctrine of the natural freedom and community of all things; theſe and many more Abſurdities are eaſily removed, if on the contrary we maintain the natural and private Dominion of Adam, to be the fountain of all Government and Propriety: And if we mark it well, we ſhall find that Grotius doth in part grant as much; The ground why thoſe that now live do obey their Governours, is the Will of their Forefathers, who at the firſt ordained Princes, and, in obedience to that Will, the Children continue in ſubjection; this is according to the mind of Grotius: ſo that the Queſtion is not, Whether Kings have a fatherly Power over their Subjects, but how Kings came firſt by it. Grotius will have it, that our Forefathers being all free, made an Aſſignment of their Power to Kings; the other Opinion denies any ſuch general freedom of our Forefathers, but derives the Power of Kings from the Original Dominion of Adam.

This natural Dominion of Adam may be proved out of Grotius himſelf, who teacheth, That generatione jus acquiritur Parentibus in Liberos, and that naturally no other can be found, but the Parents to whom the Government ſhould belong, and the Right of Ruling and Compelling them doth belong to Parents. And in another place he hath theſe words, ſpeaking of the fifth Commandment, Parentum nomine, qui naturales ſunt Magiſtratus, etiam alios Rectores par est intelligi, quorum authoritas Societatem humanam continet: and if Parents be natural Magiſtrates, Children muſt needs be born natural Subjects.

But although Grotius acknowledge Parents to be natural Magiſtrates, yet he will have it, that Children, when they come to full age, and are ſeparated from their Parents, are free from natural Subjection. For this he offers proof out of Ariſtotle, and out of Scripture. Firſt, for Ariſtotle; we muſt note, he doth not teach, that every ſeparation of Children of full age, is an Obtaining of liberty, as if that men when they come to years, might voluntarily ſeparate themſelves, and caſt off their natural Obedience; but Ariſtotle ſpeaks only of a paſſive Separation; for he doth not ſay, that Children are ſubject to Parents until they do ſeparate, but, he ſaith, until they be ſeparated, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in the Verb of the Paſſive Voice. That is, until by Law they be ſeparated: for the Law (which is nothing elſe but the Will of him that hath the Power of the Supreme Father) doth in many caſes, for the publick Benefit of Society, free Children from ſubjection to the ſubordinate Parent, ſo that the natural Subjection by ſuch Emancipation of Children, is not extinguiſhed, but only aſſumed and regulated by the Parent paramount.

Secondly, Grotius cites Numb. 30. to prove that the power of the Fathers over the Sons and Daughters, to diſſolve their Vows, was not perpetual, but during the time only whilſt the Children were part of the Fathers Family. But if we turn to the Chapter, we may find that Grotius either deceives himſelf or us; for there is not one word in that Chapter concerning the Vows of Sons, but of Daughters only, being in their Father's Family; and the being of the Daughter in the Father's Houſe, meaneth only the Daughter's being a Virgin, and not married, which may be gathered by the Argument of the whole Chapter, which taketh particular order for the Vows of VVomen of all eſtates. Firſt, for Virgins, in the third Verſe. Secondly, for VVives in general, in the ſixth Verſe. Thirdly, for VVidows, and VVomen divorced, in the ninth Verſe. There is no Law for Virgins out of their Father's Houſes; we may not think they would have been omitted, if they had been free from their Fathers; we find no freedom in the Text for VVomen, till after Marriage: And if they were married, though they were in their Father's Houſes, yet the Fathers had no power of their Vows, but their Husbands.

If, by the Law of Nature, departure from the Father's Houſe had emancipated Children, why doth the Civil Law, contrary to the Law of Nature, give power and remedy to Fathers for to recover by Action of Law their Children that depart, or are taken away from them without their conſent? Without the conſent of Parents the Civil Law allows no emancipation.

Concerning Subjection of Children to Parents, Grotius diſtinguiſheth three ſeveral times.

The firſt is the time of Imperfect Judgment.

The ſecond is the time of Perfect Judgment: but whilſt the Son remains part of the Father's Family.

The third is, the time after he hath departed out of his Father's Family.

In the firſt time he ſaith. All the actions of Children are under the dominion of the Parents.

During the ſecond time, when they are of the age of mature Judgment, they are under their Father's command in thoſe actions only, which are of moment for their Parents Family. In other actions the Children have a power or moral faculty of doing, but they are bound in thoſe alſo to ſtudy always to pleaſe their Parents. But ſince this Duty is not by force of any moral faculty, as thoſe former are, but only of Piety, Obſervance, and Duty of repaying Thanks; it doth not make any thing void which is done againſt it, as neither a gift of any thing is void, being made by any Owner whatſoever, againſt the rules of Parſimony.

In both theſe times, the Right of Ruling and Compelling is (as Grotius acknowledgeth) comprehended ſo far forth as Children are to be compelled to their Duty, or amended; although the power of a Parent doth ſo follow the perſon of a Father, that it cannot be pulled away, and transferred upon another, yet the Father may naturally pawn, or alſo ſell his Son, if there be need.

In the third time he ſaith, The Son is in all things Free, and of his own Authority: always that Duty remaining of Piety and Obſervance, the cauſe of which is perpetual. In this triple diſtinction, though Grotius allow Children in ſome caſes during the ſecond, and in all caſes during the third time to be free, and of their own Power, by a moral Faculty: yet, in that he confeſſeth, in all caſes Children are bound to ſtudy always to pleaſe their Parents out of Piety and Duty, the cauſe of which, as he ſaith, is perpetual: I cannot conceive, how in any caſe Children can naturally have any Power or moral Faculty of doing what they pleaſe without their Parents leave, ſince they are always bound to ſtudy to pleaſe their Parents. And though by the Laws of ſome Nations, Children, when they attain to years of Diſcretion, have Power and Liberty in many actions; yet this Liberty is granted them by Poſitive and Humane Laws only, which are made by the Supreme Fatherly Power of Princes, who Regulate, Limit, or Aſſume the Authority of inferiour Fathers, for the publick Benefit of the Commonwealth: ſo that naturally the Power of Parents over their Children never ceaſeth by any Separation, but only by the permiſſion of the tranſcendent Fatherly Power of the Supreme Prince, Children may be diſpenſed with, or priviledged in ſome caſes, from obedience to ſubordinate Parents.

Touching the Point of diſſolving the Vows of Children, Grotius in his laſt Edition of his Book hath corrected his firſt: for in the firſt he teacheth, That the power of the Father was greater over the Daughter dwelling with him, than over the Son; for her Vow he might make void, but not his: But inſtead of theſe words, in his laſt Edition, he ſaith, That the power over the Son or Daughter to diſſolve Vows, was not perpetual, but did endure as long as the Children were a part of their Fathers Family. About the meaning of the Text out of which he draws this Concluſion, I have already ſpoken.

Three ways Grotius propoundeth, whereby Supreme Power may be had.

Firſt, By full Right of Propriety.

Secondly, By an Ʋſufructuary Right.

Thirdly, By a Temporary Right.

The Roman Dictators, ſaith he, had Supreme Power by a Temporary Right; as well thoſe Kings who are firſt Elected, as thoſe that in a lawful Right ſucceed to Kings elected, have Supreme Power by an uſufructuary Right: ſome Kings that have got Supreme Power by a juſt War, or into whoſe Power ſome People, for avoiding a greater Evil, have ſo yielded themſelves, as that they have excepted nothing, have a full Right of Propriety.

Thus we find but two means acknowledged by Grotius, whereby a King may obtain a full Right of Propriety in a Kingdom: That is, either by a juſt War, or by Donation of the People.

How a War can be juſt without a precedent Title in the Conquerour, Grotius doth not ſhew; and if the Title only make the War juſt, then no other Right can be obtained by War, than what the Title bringeth; for a juſt War doth only put the Conquerour in poſſeſſion of his old Right, but not create a new. The like which Grotius ſaith of Succeſſion, may be ſaid of War. Succeſſion (ſaith he) is no Title of a Kingdom, which gives a Form to the Kingdom, but a Continuation of the old; for the Right which began by the Election of the Family, is continued by Succeſſion; wherefore, ſo much as the firſt Election gave, ſo much the Succeſſion brings. So to a Conquerour that hath a Title, War doth not give, but put him in poſſeſſion of a Right: and except the Conquerour had a full Right of Propriety at firſt, his Conqueſt cannot give it him: for if originally he and his Anceſtors had but an uſufructuary Right, and were outed of the poſſeſſion of the Kingdom by an Uſurper: here, though the Re-conqueſt be a moſt juſt War, yet ſhall not the Conquerour in this caſe gain any full Right of Propriety, but muſt be remitted to his uſufructuary Right only: for what Juſtice can it be, that the Injuſtice of a third Perſon, an Uſurper, ſhould prejudice the People, to the deveſting of them of that Right of Propriety, which was reſerved in their firſt Donation to their Elected King, to whom they gave but an uſufructuary Right, as Grotius conceiveth? Wherefore it ſeems impoſſible, that there can be a juſt War, whereby a full Right of Propriety may be gained, according to Grotius's Principles. For if a King come in by Conqueſt, he muſt either conquer them that have a Governour, or thoſe People that have none: if they have no Governour, then they are a free People, and ſo the War will be unjuſt to conquer thoſe that are free, eſpecially if the Freedom of the People be by the primary Law of Nature, as Grotius teacheth: But if the People conquered have a Governour, that Governour hath either a Title or not: If he hath a Title, it is an unjuſt War that takes the Kingdom from him: If he hath no Title, but only the Poſſeſſion of a Kingdom, yet it is unjuſt for any other man, that wants a Title alſo, to conquer him that is but in poſſeſſion: for it is a juſt Rule, That where the Caſes are alike, he that is in Poſſeſſion is in the better condition; In pari cauſa poſſidentis melior conditio. Lib. 2. c. 23. And this by the Law of Nature, even in the Judgment of Grotius. But if it be admitted, that he that attempts to conquer hath a Title, and he that is in poſſeſſion hath none: here the Conqueſt is but in nature of a poſſeſſory Action, to put the Conquerour in poſſeſſion of a primer Right, and not to raiſe a new Title; for War begins where the Law fails: Ʋbi Judicia deficiunt incipit Bellum. Lib. 2. cap. 1. And thus, upon the matter, I cannot find in Grotius's Book De Jure Belli, how that any Caſe can be put wherein by a juſt War a man may become a King, pleno Jure Proprietatis.

All Government and Supreme Power is founded upon publick Subjection, which is thus defined by Grotius. Publica Subjectio eſt, quâ ſe Populus homini alicui, aut pluribus hominibus, aut etiam populo alteri in ditionem dat. Lib. 2. cap. 5. If Subjection be the Gift of the People, how can Supreme Power, pleno Jure, in full Right, be got by a juſt War?

As to the other means whereby Kings may get Supreme Power in full Right of Propriety, Grotius will have it to be, when ſome People, for avoiding a greater Evil, do ſo yield themſelves into anothers Power, as that they do except nothing. It would be conſidered how, without War, any People can be brought into ſuch danger of life, as that becauſe they can find no other ways to defend themſelves, or becauſe they are ſo preſſed with poverty, as they cannot otherwiſe have means to ſuſtain themſelves, they are forced to renounce all Right of Governing themſelves, and deliver it to a King.

But if ſuch a Caſe cannot happen, but by a War only, which reduceth a People to ſuch terms of extremity, as compels them to an abſolute Abrenunciation of all Sovereignty: then War, which cauſeth that neceſſity, is the prime means of extorting ſuch Soveraignty, and not the free Gift of the People, who cannot otherwiſe chuſe but give away that Power which they cannot keep.

Thus, upon the reckoning, the two ways propounded by Grotius, are but one way; and that one way, in concluſion, is no way whereby Supreme Power may be had in full Right of Propriety. His two ways are, a Juſt War, or a Donation of the People; a juſt War cannot be without a Title, no Title without the Donation of the People, no Donation without ſuch a Neceſſity as nothing can bring upon the Donors but a War. So that howſoever Grotius in words acknowledges that Kings may have a full Right of Propriety, yet by conſequence he denies it, by ſuch circular Suppoſitions, as by coincidence deſtroy each other, and in effect he leaves all People a Right to plead in Bar againſt the Right of Propriety of any Prince, either per minas, or per dures.

Many times, ſaith Grotius, it happens, that War is grounded upon Expletive Juſtice, Juſtitiam Expletricem, which is, when a man cannot obtain what he ought, he takes that which is as much in value, which in moral Eſtimation is the ſame. For in War, when the ſame Province cannot be recovered, to the which a man hath a Title, he recovers another of the like value. This recovery cannot give a full Right of Propriety: becauſe the Juſtice of ſuch a War reacheth no farther than to a compenſation for a former Right to another thing, and therefore can give no new Right.

I am bound to take notice of a Caſe put by Grotius, amongſt thoſe Cauſes which he thinks ſhould move the People to renounce all their Right of Governing, and give it to another. It may alſo happen (ſaith he) that a Father of a Family poſſeſſing large Territories, will not receive any man to dwell within his Land upon any other condition. And in another place, he ſaith, That all Kings are not made by the People, which may be ſufficiently underſtood by the Example of a Father of a Family receiving Strangers under the Law of Obedience. In both theſe paſſages we have a cloſe and curt acknowledgment, That a Father of a Family may be an abſolute King over Strangers, without Choice of the People; now I would know whether ſuch Fathers of Families have not the ſame abſolute Power over their own Children, without the Peoples Choice, which he allows them over Strangers: if they have, I cannot but call them Abſolute proprietary Kings, though Grotius be not willing to give them that Title in plain terms: for indeed to allow ſuch Kings, were to condemn his own Principle, That Dominion came in by the Will of the People; and ſo conſequently to overthrow his Ʋſufructuary Kings, of whom I am next to ſpeak.

Grotius ſaith, That the Law of Obeying, or Reſiſting Princes, depends upon the Will of them who firſt met in Civil Society, from whom Power doth flow to Kings. And, That men of their own accord came together into Civil Society, from whence ſprings Civil Power, and the People may chuſe what Form of Government they pleaſe. Upon theſe Suppoſitions, he concludes, That Kings, elected by the People, have but an Ʋſufructuary Right; that is, a Right to take the profit or fruit of the Kingdom, but not a Right of Propriety or Power to alienate it. But why doth he call it an Ʋſufructuary Right? It ſeems to me a term too mean or baſe to expreſs the Right of any King, and is derogatory to the Dignity of Supreme Majeſty. The word Ʋſufructuary is uſed by the Lawyers, to ſignifie him that hath the Uſe, Profit, or Fruit of ſome Corporal thing, that may be uſed without the Property; for of fungible things (res fungibles, the Civilians call them) that are ſpent or conſumed in the Uſe, as Corn, Wine, Oyl, Money, there cannot be an Ʋſufructuary Right.

It is to make a Kingdom all one with a Farm, as if it had no other Uſe but to be let out to him that can make moſt of it: whereas, in truth, it is the part and Duty of a King to govern, and he hath a Right ſo to do, and to that end Supreme Power is given unto him; the taking of the profit, or making uſe of the Patrimony of the Crown, is but as a means only to enable him to perform that work of Government.

Beſides, Grotius will not only have an elected King, but alſo his lawful Succeſſors, to have but an Ʋſufructuary Right, ſo that though a King hath a Crown to him and to his Heirs, yet he will allow him no Propriety, becauſe he hath no power to alienate it; for he ſuppoſeth the primary VVill of the People to have been to beſtow Supreme Power to go in Succeſſion, and not to be alienable; but for this he hath no better proof than a naked preſumption: In Regnis quae Populi voluntate delatâ ſunt, concedo non eſſe praeſumendum eam fuiſſe Populi voluntatem, aut alienatio Imperii ſui Regi permitteretur.

But though he will not allow Kings a Right of Propriety in their Kingdoms, yet a Right of Propriety there muſt be in ſome body, and in whom but in the People? For he ſaith, The Empire which is exerciſed by Kings, doth not ceaſe to be the Empire of the People. His meaning is, the Uſe is the King's, but the Property is the Peoples.

But if the Power to alienate the Kingdom be in him that hath the Property, this may prove a comfortable Doctrine to the People: but yet to allow a Right of Succeſſion in Kings, and ſtill to reſerve a Right of Property in the People, may make ſome contradiction: for the Succeſſion muſt either hinder the Right of Alienation which is in the People, or the Alienation muſt deſtroy that Right of Succeſſion, which, by Grotius's confeſſion, may attend upon elected Kings.

Though Grotius confeſs, that Supreme Power be Ʋnum quiddam, and in it ſelf indiviſible, ye he bſaith, Sometimes it may be divided either by parts potential, or ſubjunctive. I take his meaning to be, that the Government or the Governed may be divided: an Example he gives of the Roman Empire, which was divided into the East and West: but whereas he ſaith, Fieri potest, &c. It may be, the People chuſing a King, may reſerve ſome Actions to themſelves, and in others they may give full power to the King. The Example he brings out of Plato of the Heraclides doth not prove it, and it is to dream of ſuch a Form of Government as never yet had name, nor was ever found in any ſetled Kingdom, nor cannot poſſibly be without ſtrange Confuſion.

If it were a thing ſo voluntary, and at the pleaſure of men, when they were free, to put themſelves under Subjection, why may they not as voluntarily leave Subjection when they pleaſe, and be free again? If they had a liberty to change their Natural Freedom into a voluntary Subjection, there is ſtronger reaſon that they may change their voluntary Subjection into natural Freedom, ſince it is as lawful for men to alter their Wills as their Judgments.

Certainly it was a rare felicity, that all the men in the World at one inſtant of time ſhould agree together in one mind, to change the Natural Community of all things into private Dominion: for without ſuch an unanimous Conſent, it was not poſſible for Community to be altered: for if but one man in the World had diſſented, the Alteration had been unjuſt, becauſe that Man by the Law of Nature had a Right to the common Uſe of all things in the World; ſo that to have given a propriety of any one thing to any other, had been to have robbed him of his Right to the common Uſe of all things. And of this Judgment the Jeſuit Lud. Molina ſeems to be in his Book De Juſtitia, where he ſaith, Si aliquis de cohabitantibus, &c. If one of the Neighbours will not give his Conſent to it, the Commonwealth ſhould have no Authority over him, becauſe then every other man hath no Right or Authority over him, and therefore can they not give Authority to the Commonwealth over him.

If our firſt Parents, or ſome other of our Forefathers did voluntarily bring in Propriety of Goods, and Subjection to Governours, and it were in their power either to bring them in or not, or having brought them in, to alter their minds, and reſtore them to their firſt condition of Community and Liberty; what reaſon can there be alledged that men that now live ſhould not have the ſame power? So that if any one man in the World, be he never ſo mean or baſe, will but alter his Will, and ſay, he will reſume his Natural Right to Community, and be reſtored unto his Natural Liberty, and conſequently take what he pleaſe, and do what he liſt; who can ſay that ſuch a man doth more than by Right he may? And then it will be lawful for every man, when he pleaſe, to diſſolve all Government, and deſtroy all Property.

VVhereas Grotius ſaith, That by the Law of Nature all things were at firſt Common; and yet teacheth, That after Propriety was brought in, it was againſt the Law of Nature to uſe Community; he doth thereby not only make the Law of Nature changeable, which he ſaith God cannot do, but he alſo makes the Law of Nature contrary to it ſelf.

THeſe Obſervations on the Treatiſe of Monarchy written by Mr. Hunton, being of like Argument with the former, are here annexed, with this Advertiſement, That the Treatiſe it ſelf conſiſts of two Parts: the firſt concerning Monarchy in general; the latter concerning this particular Monarchy, and is ſeconded with a Vindication, which alledgeth new matter about the nature, kinds, cauſes, and means of Limitation in Government; intimating a mistruſt that the Treatiſe had not fully or ſufficiently diſcovered theſe Points.

Theſe Obſervations reach only to the first Part of the Treatiſe, concerning Monarchy in general, Whether it can poſſibly be Limited or Mixed? If this be not made good, it is but vain labour to trouble the Reader with the diſpute about the nature, kinds, and cauſes of that which is not, nor cannot at all be; or to handle the Hypotheſis about this particular Monarchy, for which the prime and chief Arguments are of no greater Antiquity than ſome Conceſſions ſince theſe preſent Troubles.

The ancient Doctrine of Government in theſe later days hath been ſtrangely refined by the Romaniſts, and wonderfully improved ſince the Reformation, eſpecially in point of Monarchy, by an Opinion, That the People have Originally a power to create ſeveral ſorts of Monarchy, and to limit and compound them at their pleaſure. The conſideration hereof cauſed me to ſcruple the modern Piece of Politicks touching Limited and Mixed Monarchy; and finding it only preſented us by this Author, I have drawn theſe few Obſervations upon the moſt conſiderable part of his Treatiſe, deſiring to receive ſatisfaction from the Author, or any other for him.

The Novelty of this Point challengeth a modeſt Debate; the rather, for that the Treatiſe acknowledgeth, that not only Monarchy, but alſo Ariſtocracy, and Democracy, may be either Simple, or Mixed of two or all three together, though it do not determine whether they can be Abſolute or Limited.

WE do but flatter our ſelves, if we hope ever to be governed without an Arbitrary Power. No: we miſtake, the Queſtion is not, Whether there ſhall be an Arbitrary Power; but the only point is, Who ſhall have that Arbitrary Power, whether one man or many? There never was, nor ever can be any People governed without a Power of making Laws, and every Power of making Laws must be Arbitrary: For to make a Law according to Law, is Contradictio in adjecto. It is generally confeſſed, That in a Democracy the Supreme or Arbitrary Power of making Laws is in a Multitude; and ſo in an Ariſtocracy the like Legiſlative or Arbitrary Power is in a few, or in the Nobility. And therefore by a neceſſary Conſequence, in a Monarchy the ſame Legiſlative Power muſt be in one; according to the Rule of Ariſtotle, who ſaith, Government is in One, or in a Few, or in Many.

This ancient Doctrine of Government, in theſe latter days, hath been ſtrangely refined by the Romaniſts, and wonderfully improved ſince the Reformation, eſpecially in point of Monarchy, by an Opinion, That the People have Originally a Power to create ſeveral ſorts of Monarchy, to limit and compound them with other Forms of Government, at their pleaſure.

As for this natural Power of the People, they find neither Scripture, Reaſon, or Practice to juſtifie it: For though ſeveral Kingdoms have ſeveral and diſtinct Laws one from another; yet that doth not make ſeveral ſorts of Monarchy: Nor doth the difference of obtaining the Supreme Power, whether by Conqueſt, Election, Succeſſion, or by any other way, make different ſorts of Government. It is the difference only of the Authors of the Laws, and not of the Laws themſelves, that alters the Form of Government; that is, whether one man, or more than one, make the Laws.

Since the growth of this new Doctrine, Of the Limitation and Mixture of Monarchy, it is moſt apparent, that Monarchy hath been crucified (as it were) between two Thieves, the Pope and the People; for what Principles the Papiſts make uſe of for the Power of the Pope above Kings, the very ſame, by blotting out the word Pope, and putting in the word People, the Plebiſts take up to uſe againſt their Soveraigns.

If we would truly know what Popery is, we ſhall find by the Laws and Statutes of the Realm, that the main, and indeed the only Point of Popery, is the alienating and withdrawing of Subjects from their Obedience to their Prince, to raiſe Sedition and Rebellion: If Popery and Popularity agree in this point, the Kings of Chriſtendom, that have ſhaken off the Power of the Pope, have made no great bargain of it, if in place of one Lord abroad, they get many Lords at home within their own Kingdoms.

I cannot but reverence that Form of Government which was allowed and made uſe of for God's own People, and for all other Nations. It were impiety, to think that God, who was careful to appoint Judicial Laws for his choſen People, would not furniſh them with the best Form of Government: or to imagine, that the Rules given in divers places in the Goſpel, by our bleſſed Saviour and his Apoſtles, for Obedience to Kings, ſhould now, like Almanacks out of date, be of no uſe to us; becauſe it is pretended, We have a Form of Government now, not once thought of in thoſe days. It is a ſhame and ſcandal for us Christians, to ſeek the Original of Government from the Inventions or Fictions of Poets, Orators, Philoſophers, and Heathen Historians, who all lived thouſands of years after the Creation, and were (in a manner) ignorant of it: and to neglect the Scriptures, which have with more Authority most particularly given us the true Grounds and Principles of Government.

Theſe Conſiderations cauſed me to ſcruple this Modern piece of Politicks, touching Limited and Mixed Monarchy: and finding no other that preſented us with the nature and means of Limitation and Mixture, but an Anonymous Author; I have drawn a few brief Obſervations upon the most conſiderable part of his Treatiſe, in which I deſire to receive ſatisfaction from the Author himſelf, if it may be, according to his promiſe in his Preface; or if not from him, from any other for him.

THere is ſcarce the meaneſt man of the multitude, but can now in theſe days tell us, That the Government of the Kingdom of England is a LIMITED and MIXED Monarchy: And it is no marvel, ſince all the Diſputes and Arguments of theſe diſtracted Times both from the Pulpit and Preſs do tend and end in this Concluſion.

The Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy hath copiouſly handled the nature and manner of Limited and Mixed Monarchy, and is the firſt and only man (that I know) hath undertaken the task of deſcribing it; others only mention it, as taking it for granted.

Doctor Ferne gives the Author of this Treatiſe of Monarchy this teſtimony, P. 3. That the Mixture of Government is more accurately delivered and urged by this Treatiſe than by the Author of the Fuller Anſwer. And in another place Doctor Ferne ſaith, He allows his diſtinction of Monarchy into Limited and Mixed. P. 13.

I have with ſome diligence looked over this Treatiſe, but cannot approve of theſe diſtinctions which he propounds; I ſubmit the reaſons of my diſlike to others judgments. I am ſomewhat confident that his Doctrine of Limited and Mixed Monarchy is an opinion but of yeſterday, and of no antiquity, a me •• innovation in Policy, not ſo old as New England, though calculated properly for that Meridian. For in his firſt part of the Treatiſe which concerns Monarchy in general, there is not one proof, text, or example in Scripture that he hath produced to juſtifie his conceit of Limited and Mixed Monarchy. Neither doth he afford us ſo much as one paſſage or reaſon out of Ariſtole, whoſe Books of Politicks, and whoſe natural reaſons are of greateſt authority and credit with all rational men, next to the ſacred Scripture: Nay, I hope I may affirm, and be able to prove, that Ariſtotle doth confute both limited and mixed Monarchy, P. 6. howſoever Doctor Ferne think theſe new opinions to be raiſed upon Ariſtotles Principles. As for other Politicians or Hiſtorians, either divine or humane, ancient or modern, our Author brings not one to confirm his opinions; nor doth he, nor can he ſhew that ever any Nation or People were governed by a limited or mixed Monarchy.

Machiavel is the firſt in Chriſtendom that I can find that writ of a Mixed Government, but not one ſyllable of a Mixed Monarchy: he, in his diſcourſes or diſputations upon the Decades of Livy, falls ſo enamored with the Roman Commonwealth, that he thought he could never ſufficiently grace that popular Government, unleſs he ſaid, there was ſomething of Monarchy in it: yet he was never ſo impudent as to ſay, it was a mixed Monarchy. And what Machiavel hath ſaid for Rome, the like hath Contarene for Venice. But Bodin hath laid open the errours of both theſe, as alſo of Polybius, and ſome few others that held the like opinions. As for the Kingdom of England, if it hath found out a Form of Government (as the Treatiſe layeth it down) of ſuch perfection as never any people could; it is both a glory to the Nation, and alſo to this Author, who hath firſt decipher'd it.

I now make my approach to the Book it ſelf: The Title is, A Treatiſe of Monarchy. The firſt part of it is, Of Monarchy in general: Where firſt, I charge the Author, that he hath not given us any definition or deſcription of Monarchy in general: for by the rules of method he ſhould have firſt defined, and then divided: for if there be ſeveral ſorts of Monarchy, then in ſomething they muſt agree, which makes them to be Monarchies; and in ſomething they muſt diſagree and differ, which makes them to be ſeveral ſorts of Monarchies. In the firſt place he ſhould have ſhewed us in what they all agreed, which muſt have been a definition of Monarchy in general, which is the foundation of the Treatiſe; and except that be agreed upon, we ſhall argue upon we know not what. I preſs not this main omiſſion of our Author out of any humour of wrangling; but becauſe I am confident that had he pitched upon any definition of Monarchy in general, his own definition would have confuted his whole Treatiſe. Beſides, I find him pleaſed to give us a handſom definition of Abſolute Monarchy, from whence I may infer, that he knew no other definition that would have fitted all his other ſorts of Monarchy; it concerned him to have produced it, leſt it might be thought there could be no Monarchy but Abſolute.

What our Author hath omitted, I ſhall attempt to ſupply, and leave to the ſcanning. And it ſhall be a real as well as nominal definition of Monarchy. A Monarchy is the Government of one alone. For the better credit of this definition, though it be able to maintain it ſelf, yet I ſhall deduce it from the Principles of our Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy.

We all know that this word Monarch is compounded of two Greek words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is imperare to govern and rule; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ſignifies one alone. The underſtanding of theſe two words may be picked out of our Author. Firſt, for Government he teacheth us, It is poteſtatis exercitium, P. 1. the exerciſe of a moral power; next he grants us, That every Monarch (even his limited Monarch) muſt have the ſupreme Power of the State in him, ſo that his Power muſt no way be limited by any power above his; P. 12. for then he were not a Monarch, but a ſubordinate Magiſtrate. Here we have a fair confeſſion of a ſupreme unlimited Power in his limited Monarch: if you will know what he means by theſe words ſupreme Power, turn to his 26. page, there you will find, Supreme Power is either Legiſlative, or Gubernative, and that the Legiſlative power is the chief of the two; he makes both ſupreme, and yet one chief: the like diſtinction he hath before, where he ſaith, The power of Magiſtracy, in reſpect of its degrees, P. 5. is Nomothetical or Architectonical; and Gubernative or Executive: by theſe words of Legiſlative, Nomothetical, and Architectonical Power, in plain Engliſh, he underſtands a power of making Laws; and by Gubernative and Executive, a power of putting thoſe Laws in execution, by judging and puniſhing offenders.

The reſult we have from hence is, That by the Authors acknowledgment, every Monarch muſt have the ſupreme Power, and that ſupreme Power is, a power to make Laws: and howſoever the Author makes the Gubernative and Executive power a part of the ſupreme Power; yet he confeſſeth the Legiſlative to be chief, or the higheſt degree of power, for he doth acknowledge degrees of ſupreme Power; nay, he afterwards teacheth us, That the Legiſlative power is the height of power, P. 40. to which the other parts are ſubſequent and ſubſervient: if Gubernative be ſubſervient to Legiſlative, how can Gubernative power be ſupreme?

Now let us examine the Authors Limited Monarch by theſe his own rules; he tells us, That in a moderated, limited, stinted, P. 12. conditionate, legal or allayed Monarchy (for all theſe terms he hath for it) the ſupreme Power must be restrained by ſome Law according to which this power was given, and by direction of which this power must act; when in a line before he ſaid, That the Monarchs power must not be limited by any power above his: yet here he will have his ſupreme Power reſtrained; not limited, and yet reſtrained: is not a reſtraint, a limitation? And if reſtrained, how is it ſupreme? And if reſtrained by ſome Law, is not the power of that Law, and of them that made that Law, above his ſupreme Power? And if by the direction of ſuch Law only he muſt govern, where is the Legiſlative power, which is the chief of ſupreme Power? When the Law muſt rule and govern the Monarch, and not the Monarch the Law, he hath at the moſt but a Gubernative or Executive power: P. 14. If his Authority tranſcends its bounds, if it command beyond the Law, the Subject is not bound legally to ſubjection in ſuch caſes, and if the utmoſt extent of the Law of the Land be the meaſure of the limited Monarchs power, P. 16. and Subjects duty, where ſhall we find the ſupreme Power, that Culmen or Apex potestatis, that prime 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which our Author ſaith, must be in every Monarch? The word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , which ſignifies principality and power, doth alſo ſignifie principium, beginning; which doth teach us, that by the word Prince, or Principality, the principium or beginning of Government is meant; this, if it be given to the Law, it robs the Monarch, and makes the Law the primum mobile; and ſo that which is but the inſtrument, or ſervant to the Monarch, becomes the maſter. Thus much of the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

The other word is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſolus, one alone: the Monarch muſt not only have the ſupreme Power unlimited, but he muſt have it alone (without any companions. P. 15.) Our Author teacheth us, He is no Monarch, if the ſupreme Power be not in one. P. 17. And again he ſaith, If you put the Apex poteſtatis, or ſupreme Power in the whole body, or a part of it, you deſtroy the being of Monarchy.

Now let us ſee if his mixed Monarchy be framed according to theſe his own Principles. Firſt, he ſaith, In a mixed Monarchy the Soveraign power must be originally in all three Eſtates. And again his words are, The three Eſtates are all ſharers in the ſupreme Power— the primity of ſhare in the ſupreme Power is in One. Here we find, that he that told us the ſupreme Power muſt be in one, will now allow his mixed Monarch but one ſhare only of the ſupreme Power, and gives other ſhares to the Eſtates: thus he deſtroys the being of Monarchy, by putting the ſupreme Power, or Culmen poteſtatis, or a part of it, in the whole body, or a part thereof; and yet formerly he confeſſeth, That the power of Magiſtracy cannot well be divided, P. 5. for it is one ſimple thing, or indiviſible beam of Divine perfection: but he can make this indiviſible beam to be diviſible into three ſhares. I have done with the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſolus, alone.

I have dwelt the longer upon this definition of Monarchy, becauſe the apprehending of it out of the Authors own grounds quite overthrows both his Monarch limited by Law, and his Monarch mixed with the States. For to Govern, is to give a Law to others, and not to have a Law given to govern and limit him that governs: And to govern alone, is not to have ſharers or Companions mixed with the Governour. Thus the two words of which Monarchy is compounded, contradict the two ſorts of Monarchy which he pleads for, and by conſequence his whole Treatiſe: for theſe two ſorts of limited and mixed Monarchy take up (in a manner) his whole Book.

I will now touch ſome few particular paſſages in the Treatiſe.

P. 2.Our Author firſt confeſſeth, It is Gods expreſs Ordinance there ſhould be Government, and he proves it by Gen. 3.16. where God ordained Adam to rule over his wife, and her deſires were to be ſubject to his; and as hers, ſo all theirs that ſhould come of her. Here we have the original grant of Government, and the fountain of all power placed in the Father of all Mankind; accordingly we find the Law for obedience to Government given in the terms of honour thy Father: not only the conſtitution of Power in general, but the limitation of it to one kind (that is, to Monarchy, or the Government of one alone) and the determination of it to the individual perſon and line of Adam, are all three Ordinances of God. Neither Eve nor her Children could either limit Adams power, or joyn others with him in the Government; and what was given unto Adam, was given in his perſon to his poſterity. This paternal Power continued Monarchical to the Flood, and after the Flood to the confuſion of Babel: when Kingdoms were firſt erected, planted, or ſcattered over the face of the World, we find Gen. 10.11. it was done by Colonies of whole Families, over which the prime Fathers had ſupreme power, and were Kings, who were all the Sons or Grand-children of Noah, from whom they derived a fatherly and regal Power over their Families. Now if this ſupreme Power was ſetled and founded by God himſelf in the Fatherhood, how is it poſſible for the people to have any right or title to alter and diſpoſe of it otherwiſe? What Commiſſion can they ſhew that gives them power either of Limitation or Mixture? It was God's Ordinance, that Supremacy ſhould be unlimited in Adam, and as large as all the acts of his will: and as in him, ſo in all others that have ſupreme Power, as appears by the judgment and ſpeech of the people to Joſhuah when he was ſupreme Governour, theſe are their words to him, All that thou commandeſt us we will do; whoſoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandment, and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandeſt him, he ſhall be put to death: We may not ſay, that theſe were evil Councellours or flattering Courtiers of Joſhuah, or that he himſelf was a Tyrant for having ſuch arbitrary power. Our Author, and all thoſe who affirm, that power is conveyed to perſons by publick conſent, are forced to confeſs, that it is the fatherly power that firſt enables a people to make ſuch conveyance; ſo that admitting (as they hold) that our Anceſtors did at firſt convey power, yet the reaſon why we now living do ſubmit to ſuch power, is, for that our Forefathers every one for himſelf, his family, and poſterity, had a power of reſigning up themſelves and us to a ſupreme Power. As the Scripture teacheth us, That ſupreme Power was originally in the Fatherhood without any limitation, ſo likewiſe Reaſon doth evince it, that if God ordained that Supremacy ſhould be, that then Supremacy muſt of neceſſity be unlimited: for the power that limits muſt be above that power which is limited; if it be limited, it cannot be ſupreme: ſo that if our Author will grant ſupreme Power to be the Ordinance of God, the ſupreme Power will prove it ſelf to be unlimited by the ſame Ordinance, becauſe a ſupreme limited Power is a contradiction.

The Monarchical Power of Adam the Father of all fleſh, being by a general binding Ordinance ſetled by God in him and his poſterity by right of fatherhood, the form of Monarchy muſt be preferred above other forms, except the like Ordinance for other forms can be ſhewed: neither may men according to their relations to the form they live under, to their affections and judgments in divers reſpects, prefer or compare any other form with Monarchy. The point that moſt perplexeth our Author and many others, is, that if Monarchy be allowed to be the Ordinance of God, an abſurdity would follow, that we ſhould uncharitably condemn all the Communities which have not that form, for violation of Gods Ordinance, and pronounce thoſe other Powers unlawful. If thoſe who live under a Monarchy can juſtifie the form they live under to be Gods Ordinance, they are not bound to forbear their own juſtification, becauſe others cannot do the like for the form they live under; let others look to the defence of their own Government: if it cannot be proved or ſhewed that any other form of Government had ever any lawful beginning, but was brought in or erected by Rebellion, muſt therefore the lawful and juſt obedience to Monarchy be denied to be the Ordinance of God?

To proceed with our Author; in the 3d. page he ſaith, The Higher Power is Gods Ordinance: That it reſideth in One or more, in ſuch or ſuch a way, is from humane deſignment; God by no word binds any people to this or that form, till they by their own act bind themſelves. Becauſe the power and conſent of the People in Government is the burden of the whole Book, and our Author expects it ſhould be admitted as a magiſterial poſtulation, without any other proof than a naked ſuppoſition; and ſince others alſo maintain that originally Power was, or now is in the People, and that the firſt Kings were choſen by the People: they may not be offended, if they be asked in what ſence they underſtand the word [People] becauſe this, as many other words, hath different acceptions, being ſometimes taken in a larger, otherwhile in a ſtricter ſence. Literally, and in the largeſt ſence, the word People ſignifies the whole multitude of mankind; but figuratively and ſynecdochically, it notes many times the major part of a multitude, or ſometimes the better, or the richer, or the wiſer, or ſome other part; and oftentimes a very ſmall part of the People, if there be no other apparent oppoſite party, hath the name of the People by preſumption.

If they underſtand that the entire multitude or whole People have originally by nature Power to chuſe a King, they muſt remember, that by their own principles and rules, by nature all mankind in the World makes but one People, who they ſuppoſe to be born alike to an equal freedom from Subjection; and where ſuch freedom is, there all things muſt of neceſſity be common: and therefore without a joynt conſent of the whole People of the World, no one thing can be made proper to any one man, but it will be an injury, and an uſurpation upon the Common right of all others. From whence it follows, that natural freedom being once granted, there cannot be any one man choſen a King without the univerſal conſent of all the People of the world at one inſtant, nemine contradicente. Nay, if it be true that nature hath made all men free; though all mankind ſhould concur in one vote, yet it cannot ſeem reaſonable, that they ſhould have power to alter the law of nature; for if no man have power to take away his own life without the guilt of being a murtherer of himſelf, how can any people confer ſuch a power as they have not themſelves upon any one man, without being acceſſories to their own deaths, and every particular man become guilty of being felo de ſe?

If this general ſignification of the word People be diſavowed, and men will ſuppoſe that the People of particular Regions or Countries have power and freedom to chuſe unto themſelves Kings; then let them but obſerve the conſequence: Since nature hath not diſtinguiſhed the habitable World into Kingdoms, nor determined what part of a People ſhall belong to one Kingdom, and what to another, it follows, that the original freedom of mankind being ſuppoſed, every man is at liberty to be of what Kingdom he pleaſe, and ſo every petty company hath a Right to make a Kingdom by it ſelf; and not only every City, but every Village, and every Family, nay and every particular man, a liberty to chuſe himſelf to be his own King if he pleaſe; and he were a madman that being by nature free, would chuſe any man but himſelf to be his own Governour. Thus to avoid the having but of one King of the whole world, we ſhall run into a liberty of having as many Kings as there be men in the world, which upon the matter, is to have no King at all, but to leave all men to their natural liberty, which is the miſchief the Pleaders for natural liberty do pretend they would moſt avoid.

But if neither the whole people of the world, nor the whole people of any part of the world be meant, but only the major part, or ſome other part of a part of the world; yet ſtill the objection will be the ſtronger. For beſides that nature hath made no partition of the world, or of the people into diſtinct Kingdoms, and that without an univerſal conſent at one and the ſame inſtant no partition can be made: yet if it were lawful for particular parts of the world by conſent to chuſe their Kings, nevertheleſs their elections would bind none to ſubjection but only ſuch as conſented; for the major part never binds, but where men at firſt either agree to be ſo bound, or where a higher power ſo commands: Now there being no higher power than nature, but God himſelf; where neither nature nor God appoints the major part to bind, there conſent is not binding to any but only to themſelves who conſent.

Yet, for the preſent to gratifie them ſo far as to admit that either by nature, or by a general conſent of all mankind, the world at firſt was divided into particular Kingdoms, and the major part of the people of each Kingdom aſſembled, allowed to chuſe their King: yet it cannot truly be ſaid that ever the whole people, or the major part, or indeed any conſiderable part of the whole people of any Nation ever aſſembled to any ſuch purpoſe. For except by ſome ſecret miraculous inſtinct they ſhould all meet at one time, and place, what one man, or company of men leſs than the whole people hath power to appoint either time or place of elections, where all be alike free by nature? and without a lawful ſummons, it is moſt unjuſt to bind thoſe that be abſent. The whole People cannot ſummon it ſelf; one man is ſick, another is lame, a third is aged, and a fourth is under age of diſcretion: all theſe at ſome time or other, or at ſome place or other, might be able to meet, if they might chuſe their own time and place, as men naturally free ſhould.

In Aſſemblies that are by humane politique conſtitution, the ſuperior power that ordains ſuch aſſemblies, can regulate and confine them, both for time, place, perſons, and other circumſtances: but where there is an equality by nature, there can be no ſuperior power; there every Infant at the hour it is born in, hath a like intereſt with the greateſt and wiſeſt man in the World. Mankind is like the ſea, ever ebbing or flowing, every minute one is born, another dies; thoſe that are the People this minute, are not the People the next minute, in every inſtant and point of time there is a variation: no one time can be indifferent for all mankind to aſſemble; it cannot but be miſchievous always at the leaſt to all Infants, and others under age of diſcretion; not to ſpeak of Women, eſpecially Virgins, who by birth have as much natural freedom as any other, and therefore ought not to loſe their liberty without their own conſent.

But in part to ſalve this, it will be ſaid that Infants and Children may be concluded by the votes of their Parents. This remedy may cure ſome part of the miſchief, but it deſtroys the whole cauſe, and at laſt ſtumbles upon the true original of Government. For if it be allowed, that the acts of Parents bind the Children, then farewel the Doctrine of the natural freedom of mankind; where Subjection of Children to Parents is natural, there can be no natural freedom. If any reply, that not all Children ſhall be bound by their Parents conſent, but only thoſe that are under age: It muſt be conſidered, that in nature there is no nonage; if a man be not born free, ſhe doth not aſſign him any other time when he ſhall attain his freedom: or if ſhe did, then Children attaining that age, ſhould be diſcharged of their Parents contract. So that in concluſion, if it be imagined that the People were ever but once free from Subjection by nature, it will prove a meer impoſſibility ever lawfully to introduce any kind of government whatſoever, without apparent wrong to a multitude of People.

It is further obſervable, that ordinarily Children and Servants are far a greater number than Parents and Maſters; and for the major part of theſe to be able to vote and appoint what Government or Governours their Fathers and Maſters ſhall be ſubject unto, is moſt unnatural, and in effect to give the Children the government over their Parents.

To all this it may be oppoſed, What need diſpute how a People can chuſe a King, ſince there be multitude of examples that Kings have been, and are now adays choſen by their People? The anſwer is, 1. The queſtion is not of the fact, but of the right, whether it have been done by a natural, or by an uſurped right. 2. Many Kings are, and have been choſen by ſome ſmall part of a people; but by the whole, or major part of a Kingdom not any at all. Moſt have been elected by the Nobility, Great men, and Princes of the blood, as in Poland, Denmark, and in Sweden; not by any collective or repreſentative body of any Nation: ſometimes a factious or ſeditious City, or a mutinous Army hath ſet up a King, but none of all thoſe could ever prove they had Right or juſt title either by Nature, or any otherwiſe, for ſuch elections. We may reſolve upon theſe two propoſitions: 1. That the people have no power or right of themſelves to chuſe Kings. 2. If they had any ſuch right, it is not poſſible for them any way lawfully to exerciſe it.

You will ſay, There muſt neceſſarily be a right in ſome body to elect, in caſe a King die without an Heir. I anſwer, No King can die without an Heir, as long as there is any one man living in the world. It may be the Heir may be unknown to the people; but that is no fault in nature, but the negligence or ignorance of thoſe whom it concerns. But if a King could die without an Heir, yet the Kingly power in that caſe ſhall not eſcheat to the whole people, but to the ſupream Heads and Fathers of Families; not as they are the people, but quatenus they are Fathers of people, over whom they have a ſupream power devolved unto them after the death of their ſoveraign Anceſtor: and if any can have a right to chuſe a King, it muſt be theſe Fathers, by conferring their diſtinct fatherly powers upon one man alone. Chief Fathers in Scripture are accounted as all the people, as all the Children of Iſrael, as all the Congregation, as the Text plainly expounds it ſelf, 2 Chr. 1.2. where Solomon ſpeaks to All Iſrael, that is, to the Captains, the Judges, and to every Governour, the CHIEF OF THE FATHERS: and ſo the Elders of Iſrael are expounded to be the chief of the Fathers of the Children of Iſrael, 1 King. 8.1. and the 2 Chr. 5.2.

If it be objected, That Kings are not now (as they were at the firſt planting or peopling of the world) the Fathers of their People or Kingdoms, and that the fatherhood hath loſt the right of governing; An anſwer is, That all Kings that now are, or ever were, are, or were either Fathers of their People, or the Heirs of ſuch Fathers, or Uſurpers of the right of ſuch Fathers. It is a truth undeniable, that there cannot be any multitude of men whatſoever, either great, or ſmall, though gathered together from the ſeveral corners and remoteſt regions of the world, but that in the ſame multitude, conſidered by it ſelf, there is one man amongſt them that in nature hath a right to be the King of all the reſt, as being the next Heir to Adam, and all the other ſubject unto him: every man by nature is a King, or a Subject: the obedience which all Subjects yield to Kings, is but the paying of that duty which is due to the ſupream fatherhood: Many times by the act either of an Uſurper himſelf, or of thoſe that ſet him up, the true Heir of a Crown is diſpoſſeſſed, God uſing the miniſtry of the wickedeſt men for the removing and ſetting up of Kings: in ſuch caſes the Subjects obedience to the fatherly power muſt go along and wait upon God's providence, who only hath right to give and take away Kingdoms, and thereby to adopt Subjects into the obedience of another fatherly power: according to that of Ariſt. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . A Monarchy or Kingdom will be a fatherly government. Ethic. l. 8. c. 12.

However the natural freedom of the People be cried us as the ſole means to determine the kind of Government and the Governours: yet in the cloſe, all the favourers of this opinion are conſtrained to grant that the obedience which is due to the fatherly Power is the true only cauſe of the Subjection which we that are now living give to Kings, ſince none of us gave conſent to Government, but only our Fore-fathers act and conſent hath concluded us.

Whereas many confeſs that Government only in the abstract is the ordinance of God, they are not able to prove any ſuch ordinance in the Scripture, but only in the fatherly power, and therefore we find the Commandment that enjoyns obedience to Superiours, given in the terms of Honour thy Father: ſo that not only the Power or right of Government, but the form of the power of governing, and the perſon having that power, are all the ordinance of God: the firſt Father had not only ſimply power, but power Monarchical, as he was a Father, immediately from God. For by the appointment of God, as ſoon as Adam was created he was Monarch of the World, though he had no Subjects; for though there could not be actual Government until there were Subjects, yet by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be Governour of his poſterity: though not in Act, yet at leaſt in habit. Adam was a King from his Creation: And in the ſtate of innocency he had been Governour of his Children; for the integrity or excellency of the Subjects doth not take away the order or eminency of the Governour. Eve was ſubject to Adam before he ſinned; the Angels, who are of a pure nature, are ſubject to God: which confutes their ſaying who in diſgrace of civil Government or power ſay it was brought in by ſin: Government as to coactive power was after ſin, becauſe coaction ſuppoſeth ſome diſorder, which was not in the ſtate of innocency: But as for directive power, the condition of humane nature requires it, ſince civil Society cannot be imagined without power of Government: for although as long as men continued in the ſtate of innocency they might not need the direction of Adam in thoſe things which were neceſſarily and morally to be done; yet things indifferent, that depended meerly on their free will, might be directed by the power of Adam's command.

If we conſider the firſt plantations of the world which were after the building of Babel when the confuſion of tongues was, we may find the diviſion of the Earth into diſtinct Kingdoms and Countries, by ſeveral families, whereof the Sons or Grand-children of Noah were the Kings or Governours by a fatherly right; and for the preſervation of this power and right in the Fathers, God was pleaſed upon ſeveral Families to beſtow a Language on each by it ſelf, the better to unite it into a Nation or Kingdom; as appears by the words of the Text, Gen. 10. Theſe are the Families of the Sons of Noah, after their generations in their Nations, and by theſe were the Nations divided in the Earth after the floud: Every one after HIS TONGUE, AFTER THEIR FAMILIES in their Nations.

The Kings of England have been graciouſly pleaſed to admit and accept the Commons in Parliament as the Repreſentees of the Kingdom, yet really and truly they are not the repreſentative body of the whole Kingdom.

The Commons in Parliament are not the repreſentative body of the whole Kingdom: they do not repreſent the King, who is the head and principal member of the Kingdom; nor do they repreſent the Lords, who are the nobler and higher part of the body of the Realm, and are perſonally preſent in Parliament, and therefore need no repreſentation. The Commons only repreſent a part of the lower or inferior part of the body of the People, which are the Free-holders worth 40 s. by the year, and the Commons or Free-men of Cities and Burroughs, or the major part of them. All which are not one quarter, nay, not a tenth part of the Commons of the Kingdom; for in every Pariſh, for one Free-holder there may be found ten that are no Freeholders: and anciently before Rents were improved, there were nothing near ſo many Free-holders of 40 s. by the year as now are to be found.

The ſcope and Concluſion of this diſcourſe and Argument is, that the people taken in what notion or ſenſe ſoever, either diffuſively, collectively, or repreſentatively, have not, nor cannot exerciſe any right or power of their own by nature, either in chuſing or in regulating Kings. But whatſoever power any people doth lawfully exerciſe, it muſt receive it from a ſupream power on earth, and practiſe it with ſuch limitations as that ſuperior power ſhall appoint. To return to our Author.

He divides Monarchy into Abſolute, Limited.

Abſolute Monarchy (ſaith he) is, P. 6. when the Sovereignty is ſo fully in one, that it hath no limits or bounds under God but his own will. This definition of his I embrace. And as before I charged our Author for not giving us a definition of Monarchy in general, ſo I now note him for not affording us any definition of any other particular kind of Monarchy but only of abſolute: it may peradventure make ſome doubt that there is no other ſort but only that which he calls abſolute.

Concerning abſolute Monarchy, he grants, that ſuch were the ancient Eastern Monarchies, and that of the Turk and Perſian at this day. Herein he ſaith very true. And we muſt remember him, though he do not mention them, that the Monarchs of Judah and Iſrael muſt be comprehended under the number of thoſe he calls the Eaſtern Monarchies: and truly if he had ſaid that all the ancient Monarchies of the World had been abſolute, I ſhould not have quarrel'd at him, nor do I know who could have diſproved him.

Next it follows, that Abſolute Monarchy is, when a people are abſolutely reſigned up, or reſign up themſelves to be governed by the will of One man. Where men put themſelves into this utmoſt degree of ſubjection by oath and contract, or are born and brought unto it by Gods providence. In both theſe places he acknowledgeth there may be other means of obtaining a Monarchy, beſides the contract of a Nation or peoples reſigning up themſelves to be governed, which is contrary to what he after ſays, that the ſole mean or root of all Sovereignty, P. 12. is the conſent and fundamental contract of a Nation of men.

Moreover, the Author determines, that Abſolute Monarchy is a lawful Government, and that men may be born and brought unto it by Gods providence; it binds them, and they muſt abide it, becauſe an Oath to a lawful thing is obligatory. This Poſition of his I approve, but his Reaſon doth not ſatisfie: for men are bound to obey a lawful Governour, though neither they nor their Anceſtors ever took oath.

Then he proceeds, and confeſſeth that in Rom. 13.P. 7. the power which then was, was Abſolute: yet the Apoſtle not excluding it, calls it Gods ordinance, and commands Subjection to it. So Chriſt commands Tribute to be paid, and pays it himſelf; yet it was an arbitrary tax, the production of an abſolute power. Theſe are the loyal expreſſions of our Author touching abſolute or arbitrary Monarchy. I do the rather mention theſe paſſages of our Author, becauſe very many in theſe days do not ſtick to maintain, that an arbitrary or Abſolute Monarch not limited by Law, is all one with a Tyrant; and to be governed by one man's will, is to be made a ſlave. It is a queſtion whether our Author be not of that mind, when he ſaith, abſolute ſubjection is ſervitude: and thereupon a late friend to limited Monarchy affirms in a diſcourſe upon the queſtion in debate between the King and Parliament, P. 54. That to make a King by the ſtandard of Gods word, is to make the Subjects ſlaves for conſcience ſake. A hard ſaying, and I doubt whether he that gives this cenſure can be excuſed from blaſphemy. It is a bold ſpeech, to condemn all the Kings of Judah for Tyrants, or to ſay all their Subjects were ſlaves. But certainly the man doth not know either what a Tyrant is, or what a Slave is: indeed the words are frequent enough in every mans mouth, and our old Engliſh Tranſlation of the Bible uſeth ſometimes the word Tyrant; but the Authors of our new Tranſlation have been ſo careful, as not once to uſe the word, but only for the proper name of a man, Act. 19.9. becauſe they find no Hebrew word in the Scripture to ſignifie a Tyrant or a Slave. Neither Ariſtotle, Bodin, nor Sir Walter Raleigh, (who were all men of deep judgment) can agree in a definition or deſcription of Tyranny, though they have all three laboured in the point. And I make ſome queſtion whether any man can poſſibly deſcribe what a Tyrant is, and then tell me any one man that ever was in the World that was a Tyrant according to that deſcription.

I return again to our Treatiſe of Monarchy, where I find three DEGREES of abſolute Monarchy.

For the firſt of theſe three, there is no queſtion but it is a pure abſolute Monarchy; but as for the other two, though he ſay they be abſolute, yet in regard they ſet themſelves limits or Laws to govern by, if it pleaſe our Author to term them limited Monarchs, I will not oppoſe him; yet I muſt tell him, that his third degree of abſolute Monarchy is ſuch a kind, as I believe, never hath been, nor ever can be in the world. For a Monarch to promiſe and engage in many caſes not to alter a Law, it is moſt neceſſary that thoſe many caſes ſhould be particularly expreſſed at the bargain-making. Now he that underſtands the nature and condition of all humane Laws, knows that particular caſes are infinite, and not comprehenſible within any rules or Laws: and if many caſes ſhould be comprehended, and many omitted, yet even thoſe that were comprehended would admit of variety of interpretations and diſputations; therefore our Author doth not, nor can tell us of any ſuch reſerved caſes promiſed by any Monarch.

Again, where he ſaith, An after-condeſcent or Act of grace doth not diſſolve the abſolute Oath of ſubjection which went before it; though in this he ſpeak true, yet ſtill he ſeems to inſinuate, that an Oath only binds to ſubjection, which Oath, as he would have us believe, was at firſt arbitrary: whereas Subjects are bound to obey Monarchs though they never take oath of ſubjection, as well as children are bound to obey their Parents, though they never ſwear to do it.

Next, his diſtinction between the rule of power, P. 7. P. 1. and the exerciſe of it, is vain; for to rule, is to exerciſe power: for himſelf ſaith, that Government is poteſtatis exercitium, the exerciſe of a moral power.

Laſtly, whereas our Author ſaith, a Monarch cannot break his promiſe without ſin; let me add, that if the ſafety of the people, ſalus populi, require a breach of the Monarchs promiſe, then the ſin, if there be any, is rather in the making, than breaking of the promiſe; the ſafety of the People is an exception implied in every Monarchical promiſe.

But it ſeems theſe three degrees of Monarchy do not ſatisfie our Author; he is not content to have a Monarch, have a Law or rule to govern by, P. 12. but he muſt have this limitation or Law to be ab externo, from ſome body elſe, and not from the determination of the Monarchs own will; and therefore he ſaith, By original conſtitution the Society publick confers on one man a power by limited contract, reſigning themſelves to be governed by ſuch a Law: alſo before he told us, P. 13. the ſole means of Soveraignty is the conſent and fundamental contract; which conſent puts them in their power, which can be no more nor other than is conveyed to them by ſuch contract of ſubjection. If the ſole means of a limited Monarchy be the conſent and fundamental contract of a Nation, how is it that he ſaith, A Monarch may be limited by after-condeſcent? is an after-condeſcent all one with a fundamental contract, with original and radical conſtitution? why yea: he tells us it is a ſecondary original conſtitution; a ſecondary original, that is, a ſecond firſt: And if that condeſcent be an act of grace, doth not this condeſcent to a limitation come from the free determination of the Monarchs will? If he either formally, or virtually (as our Author ſuppoſeth) deſert his abſolute or arbitrary power which he hath by conqueſt, or other right.

And if it be from the free will of the Monarch, why doth he ſay the limitation muſt be ab externo? P. 8. He told us before, that Subjection cannot be diſſolved or leſſen'd by an Act of grace coming afterwards: but he hath better bethought himſelf, and now he will have Acts of grace to be of two kinds, and the latter kind may amount (as he ſaith) to a reſignation of abſolute Monarchy. But can any man believe that a Monarch who by conqueſt or other right hath an abſolute arbitrary power, will voluntarily reſign that abſoluteneſs, and accept ſo much power only as the People ſhall pleaſe to give him, and ſuch Laws to govern by as they ſhall make choice of? can he ſhew that ever any Monarch was ſo gracious or kind-hearted as to lay down his lawful power freely at his Subjects feet? Is it not ſufficient grace if ſuch an abſolute Monarch be content to ſet down a Law to himſelf by which he will ordinarily govern, but he muſt needs relinquiſh his old independent commiſſion, and take a new one from his Subjects, clog'd with limitations?

Finally, I obſerve, that howſoever our Author ſpeak big of the radical, fundamental, and original power of the People as the root of all Soveraignty: yet in a better mood he will take up, and be contented with a Monarchy limited by an after-condeſcent and act of grace from the Monarch himſelf.

Thus I have briefly touched his grounds of Limited Monarchy; if now we ſhall ask, what proof or examples he hath to juſtifie his Doctrine, he is as mute as a fiſh: only Pythagoras hath ſaid it, and we muſt believe him; for though our Author would have Monarchy to be limited, yet he could be content his opinion ſhould be abſolute, and not limited to any rule or example.

The main Charge I have againſt our Author now remains to be diſcuſſed; and it is this, That inſtead of a Treatiſe of Monarchy, he hath brought forth a Treatiſe of Anarchy, and that by his own confeſſions ſhall be made good.

Firſt, he holds, A limited Monarch tranſcends his bounds, if he commands beyond the Law; and the Subject legally is not bound to ſubjection in ſuch caſes.

Now if you ask the Author who ſhall be Judge, whether the Monarch tranſcend his bounds, and of the exceſſes of the Soveraign Power; His anſwer is, P. 16. There is an impoſſibility of conſtituting a Judge to determine this laſt Controverſie— I conceive in a limited legal Monarchy there can be no ſtated internal Judge of the Monarchs actions, P. 17. if there grow a fundamental variance between him and the Community. There can be no Judge legal and conſtituted within that form of Government. In theſe anſwers it appears, there is no Judge to determine the Soveraigns or the Monarchs tranſgreſſing his fundamental limits: yet our Author is very cautelous, and ſuppoſeth only a fundamental variance betwixt the Monarch and the Community; he is aſhamed to put the queſtion home. I demand of him if there be a variance betwixt the Monarch and any of the meaneſt perſons of the Community, who ſhall be the Judge? For inſtance, The King commands me, or gives judgment againſt me: I reply, His commands are illegal, and his judgment not according to Law: Who muſt judge? If the Monarch himſelf judge, then you deſtroy the frame of the State, and make it abſolute, ſaith our Author; and he gives his reaſon: for, to confine a Monarch to a Law, and then to make him judge of his own deviaions from that Law, is to abſolve him from all Law. On the other ſide, if any, or all the people may judge, then you put the Soveraignty in the whole body, or part of it, and deſtroy the being of Monarchy. Thus our Author hath caught himſelf in a plain Dilemma: If the King be Judge, then he is no limited Monarch; If the People be Judge, then he is no Monarch at all. So farewel limited Monarchy, nay farewel all Government, if there be no Judge.

Would you know what help our Author hath found out for this miſchief? Firſt, he ſaith, That a Subject is bound to yield to a Magiſtrate, P. 14. when he cannot, de jure, challenge obedience, if it be in a thing in which he can poſſibly without ſubverſion, and in which his act may not be made a leading caſe, and ſo bring on a preſcription against publick liberty. P. 17. Again he ſaith, If the act in which the exorbitance or tranſgreſſion of the Monarch is ſuppoſed to be, be of leſſer moment, and not ſtriking at the very being of that Government, it ought to be born by publick patience, rather than to endanger the being of the State. The like words he uſes in another place, P. 49. ſaying, If the will of the Monarch exceed the limits of the Law, it ought to be ſubmitted to, ſo it be not contrary to God's Law, nor bring with it ſuch an evil to our ſelves, or the publick, that we cannot be acceſſory to it by obeying. Theſe are but fig-leaves to cover the nakedneſs of our Authors limited Monarch, formed upon weak ſuppoſals in caſes of leſſer moment. For if the Monarch be to govern only according to Law, no tranſgreſſion of his can be of ſo ſmall moment, if he break the bounds of Law, but it is a ſubverſion of the Government it ſelf, and may be made a leading caſe, and ſo bring on a preſcription againſt publick liberty; it ſtrikes at the very being of the Government, and brings with it ſuch an evil, as the party that ſuffers, or the publick cannot be acceſſory to: let the caſe be never ſo ſmall, yet if there be illegality in the act, it ſtrikes at the very being of limited Monarchy, which is to be legal: unleſs our Author will ſay, as in effect he doth, That his limited Monarch muſt govern according to Law in great and publick matters only, and that in ſmaller matters which concern private men, or poor perſons, he may rule according to his own will.

Secondly, our Author tells us,P. 17. If the Monarchs act of exorbitancy or tranſgreſſion be mortal, and ſuch as ſuffered diſſolves the frame of Government and publick liberty, then the illegality is to be ſet open, and redreſment ſought by petition; which if failing, prevention by reſiſtance ought to be: and if it be apparent, and appeal be made to the conſciences of mankind, then the fundamental Laws of that Monarchy muſt judge and pronounce the ſentence in every mans conſcience, and every man (ſo far as concerns him) muſt follow the evidence of Truth in his own ſoul to oppoſe or not to oppoſe, according as he can in conſcience acquit or condemn the act of the Governour or Monarch.

Whereas my Author requires, that the destructive nature of illegal commands ſhall be ſet open: Surely his mind is, That each private man in his particular caſe ſhould make a publick remonſtrance to the World of the illegal act of the Monarch; and then if upon his Petition he cannot be relieved according to his deſire, he ought, or it is his duty to make reſiſtance. Here I would know, who can be the Judge whether the illegality be made apparent? It is a main point, ſince every man is prone to flatter himſelf in his own cauſe, and to think it good, and that the wrong or injuſtice he ſuffers is apparent, when other moderate and indifferent men can diſcover no ſuch thing: and in this caſe the judgment of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any poſſible means; or if it could, it were like to be various and erroneous.

Yet our Author will have an Appeal made to the Conſcience of all Mankind, and that being made, he concludes, The Fundamental Laws must judge, and pronounce Sentence in every mans Conſcience. Whereas he ſaith, P. 18. The Fundamental Laws must judge; I would very gladly learn of him, or of any other for him, what a Fundamental Law is, or elſe have but any one Law named me that any man can ſay is a Fundamental Law of the Monarchy. I confeſs he tells us, That the Common Laws are the foundation, P. 38. and the Statute Laws are ſuperſtructive; yet I think he dares not ſay that there is any one branch or part of the Common Law, but that it may be taken away by an Act of Parliament: for many points of the Common Law (de facto) have, and (de jure) any point may be taken away. How can that be called Fundamental, which hath and may be removed, and yet the Statute-Laws ſtand firm and ſtable? It is contrary to the nature of Fundamental, for the building to ſtand when the foundation is taken away.

Beſides, the Common Law is generally acknowledged to be nothing elſe but common uſage or cuſtom, which by length of time only obtains authority: So that it follows in time after Government, but cannot go before it, and be the rule to Government, by any original or radical Conſtitution.

Alſo the Common Law being unwritten, doubtful, and difficult, cannot but be an uncertain rule to govern by; which is againſt the nature of a Rule, which is and ought to be certain.

Laſtly, by making the Common Law only to be the foundation, Magna Charta is excluded from being a Fundamental Law, and alſo all other Statutes from being limitations to Monarchy, ſince the Fundamental Laws only are to be Judge.

Truly the Conſcience of all mankind is a pretty large Tribunal for the Fundamental Laws to pronounce Sentence in. It is very much that Laws which in their own nature are dumb, and always need a Judge to pronounce Sentence, ſhould now be able to ſpeak, and pronounce Sentence themſelves: Such a Sentence ſurely muſt be upon the hearing of one party only; for it is impoſſible for a Monarch to make his defence and anſwer, and produce his Witneſſes, in every mans conſcience, in each mans Cauſe, who will but queſtion the legality of the Monarchs Government. Certainly the ſentence cannot but be unjuſt, where but one mans tale is heard. For all this, the concluſion is, Every man must oppoſe or not oppoſe the Monarch according to his own conſcience. Thus at the laſt, every man is brought, by this Doctrine of our Authors, to be his own Judge. And I alſo appeal to the conſciences of all mankind, whether the end of this be not utter confuſion, and Anarchy.

Yet after all this, the Author ſaith, This power of every mans judging the illegal acts of the Monarch, P. 18. argues not a Superiority of thoſe who judge over him who is judged; and he gives a profound reaſon for it: his words are, It is not authoritative and civil, but moral, reſiding in reaſonable creatures, and lawful for them to execute. What our Author means by theſe words, (not authoritative and civil, but moral) perhaps I underſtand not, though I think I do; yet it ſerves my turn that he ſaith, That reſiſtance ought to be made, and every man must oppoſe or not oppoſe, according as in conſcience he can acquit or condemn the acts of his Governour; for if it enable a man to reſiſt and oppoſe his Governour, without queſtion, 'tis authoritative and civil. Whereas he adds, That moral judgment is reſiding in reaſonable creatures, and lawful for them to execute; he ſeems to imply, that authoritative and civil Judgment doth not reſide in reaſonable creatures, nor can be lawfully executed. Such a Concluſion fits well with Anarchy; for he that takes away all Government, and leaves every man to his own conſcience, and ſo makes him an independent in State, may well teach that authority reſides not in reaſonable creatures, nor can be lawfully executed.

I paſs from his abſolute and limited Monarchy, to his diviſion or partition (for he allows no diviſion) of Monarchy into ſimple and mixed, viz. of a Monarch, the Nobility, and Community.

Where firſt, obſerve a doubt of our Authors, P. 25. Whether a firm union can be in a mixture of equality; he rather thinks there muſt be a priority of order in one of the three, or elſe there can be no unity. He muſt know, that priority of order doth not hinder, but that there may be an equality of mixture, if the ſhares be equal; for he that hath the firſt ſhare may have no more than the others: ſo that if he will have an inequality of mixture, a primity of ſhare will not ſerve the turn: the firſt ſhare muſt be greater or better than the others, or elſe they will be equal, and then he cannot call it a mixed Monarchy, where only a primity of ſhare in the ſupreme Power is in one: but by his own confeſſion he may better call it a mixed Ariſtocracy or mixed Democracy, than a mixed Monarchy, ſince he tells us, P. 56. The Houſes of Parliament ſure have two parts of the greateſt legiſlative Authority; and if the King have but a third part, ſure their ſhares are equal.

The firſt ſtep our Author makes, is this, The Soveraign power muſt be originally in all three; next he finds, that if there be an equality of ſhares in three Estates, there can be no ground to denominate a Monarch; and then his mixed Monarch might be thought but an empty Title: Therefore in the third place he reſolves us, That to ſalve all, P. 25. a power must be ſought out wherewith the Monarch muſt be inveſted, which is not ſo great as to deſtroy the mixture, nor ſo titular as to deſtroy the Monarchy; and therefore he conceives it may be in theſe particulars.

P. 26.Firſt, A Monarch in a mixed Monarchy may be ſaid to be a Monarch (as he conceives) if he be the head and fountain of the power which governs and executes the eſtabliſhed Laws; that is, a man may be a Monarch, though he do but give power to others to govern and execute the eſtabliſhed Laws: thus he brings his Monarch one ſtep or peg lower ſtill than he was before: at firſt he made us believe his Monarch ſhould have the ſupreme Power, which is the legiſlative; then he falls from that, and tells us, A limited Monarch muſt govern according to Law only; thus he is brought from the legiſlative to the gubernative or executive Power only; nor doth he ſtay here, but is taken a hole lower, for now he muſt not govern, but he must constitute Officers to govern by Laws; if chuſing Officers to govern be governing, then our Author will allow his Monarch to be a Governour, not elſe: and therefore he that divided Supreme power into Legiſlative and Gubernative, doth now divide it into Legiſlative, and power of conſtituting Officers for governing by Laws; and this, he ſaith, is left to the Monarch. Indeed you have left him a fair portion of Power; but are we ſure he may enjoy this? It ſeems our Author is not confident in this neither, and ſome others do deny it him: our Author ſpeaking of the Government of this Kingdom,P. 38. ſaith, The choice of the Officers is intruſted to the judgment of the Monarch for ought I know: he is not reſolute in the point; but for ought he knows, and for ought I know, his Monarch is but titular, an empty Title, certain of no Power at all.

The power of chuſing Officers only, is the baſeſt of all powers. Ariſtotle (as I remember) ſaith, The common people are fit for nothing but to chuſe Officers, and to take Accompts: and indeed, in all popular Governments the multitude perform this work: and this work in a King puts him below all his Subjects, and makes him the only Subject in a Kingdom, or the only man that cannot Govern: there is not the pooreſt man of the multitude but is capable of ſome Office or other, and by that means may ſome time or other perhaps govern according to the Laws; only the King can be no Officer, but to chuſe Officers; his Subjects may all govern, but he may not.

Next, I cannot ſee how in true ſenſe our Author can ſay, his Monarch is the head and fountain of Power, ſince his Doctrine is, That in a limited Monarchy, the publick Society by original Conſtitution confer on one man power: is not then the publick Society the head and fountain of Power, and not the King?

Again, when he tells us of his Monarch, That both the other States, as well conjunctim as diviſim, be his ſworn Subjects, and owe obedience to his commands: he doth but flout his poor Monarch; for why are they called his Subjects and his Commons? He (without any complement) is their Subject; for they, as Officers, may govern and command according to Law: but he may not, for he muſt judge by his Judges in Courts of Juſtice only: that is, he may not judge or govern at all.

2. As for the ſecond particular, The ſole or chief power in capacitating perſons for the ſupreme Power. And

3. As to this third particular, The power of Convocating ſuch perſons, they are both ſo far from making a Monarch, that they are the only way to make him none, by chuſing and calling others to ſhare in the ſupreme Power.

4. Laſtly, concerning his Authority being the laſt and greateſt in the eſtabliſhing every Act, it makes him no Monarch, except he be ſole that hath that Authority; neither his primity of ſhare in the ſupreme Power, nor his Authority being laſt, no, nor his having the greateſt Authority, doth make him a Monarch, unleſs he have that Authority alone.

Beſides, how can he ſhew that in his mixed Monarchy the Monarchs power is the greateſt? The greateſt ſhare that our Author allows him in the Legiſlative power, is a Negative voice, and the like is allowed to the Nobility and Commons: And truly, a Negative voice is but a baſe term to expreſs a Legiſlative power; a Negative voice is but a privative power, or indeed, no power at all to do any thing, only a power to hinder an Act from being done.

Wherefore I conclude, not any of his four, P. 26. nor all of them put into one perſon, make the State Monarchical.

This mixed Monarchy, juſt like the limited, ends in confuſion and deſtruction of all Government: you ſhall hear the Authors confeſſion, That one inconvenience muſt neceſſarily be in all mixed Governments, P. 28. which I ſhewed to be in limited Governments; there can be no conſtituted legal Authoritative Judge of the Fundamental Controverſies ariſing between the three Eſtates: If ſuch do riſe, it is the fatal diſeaſe of thoſe Governments, for which no ſalve can be applied. It is a caſe beyond the poſſible proviſion of ſuch a Government; of this queſtion there is no legal Judge. The accuſing ſide muſt make it evident to every mans Conſcience.— The Appeal muſt be to the Community, as if there were no Government; and as by evidence Conſciences are convinced, they are bound to give their aſſiſtance. The wit of man cannot ſay more for Anarchy.

Thus have I picked out the flowers out of his Doctrine about limited Monarchy, and preſented them with ſome brief Annotations; it were a tedious work to collect all the learned contradictions, and ambiguous expreſſions that occur in every page of his Platonick Monarchy; the Book hath ſo much of fancy, that it is a better piece of Poetry than Policy.

Becauſe many may think, that the main Doctrine of limited and mixed Monarchy may in it ſelf be moſt authentical, and grounded upon ſtrong and evident reaſon, although our Author perhaps have failed in ſome of his expreſſions, and be liable to exceptions: Therefore I will be bold to inquire, whether Ariſtotle could find either reaſon or example of a limited or mixed Monarchy; and the rather, becauſe I find our Author altogether inſiſts upon a rational way of juſtifying his opinion. No man I think will deny, but that Ariſtotle was ſufficiently curious in ſearching out the ſeveral forms of Commonwealths and Kingdoms; yet I do not find, that he ever ſo much as dreamed of either a limited or mixed Monarchy. Several other ſorts of Monarchies he reckons up: in the Third Book of his Politicks, he ſpends three whole Chapters together, upon the ſeveral kinds of Monarchy.

Firſt, in his fourteenth Chapter he mentions four kinds of Monarchy.

The Laconick or Lacedemonian King (ſaith he) had only Supreme Power when he was out of the bounds of the Lacedemonian Territories; then he had abſolute Power, his Kingdom was like to a perpetual Lord General of an Army.

The Barbarick King (ſaith Ariſtotle) had a Power very near to Tyranny; yet they were lawful and Paternal, becauſe the Barbarians are of a more ſervile nature than the Grecians, and the Aſiaticks than the Europeans; they do willingly, without repining, live under a Maſterly Government; yet their Government is ſtable and ſafe, becauſe they are Paternal and lawful Kingdoms, and their Guards are Royal and not Tyrannical: for Kings are guarded by their own Subjects, and Tyrants are guarded by Strangers.

The Aeſymnetical King (ſaith Ariſtotle) in old time in Greece, was an Elective Tyrant, and differed only from the Barbarian Kings, in that he was Elective, and not Paternal: theſe ſorts of Kings, becauſe they were Tyrannical, were Maſterly; but becauſe they were over ſuch as voluntarily Elected them, they were Regal.

The Heroick were thoſe (ſaith Ariſtotle) which flouriſhed in the Heroical times, to whom the People did willingly obey; and they were Paternal and lawful, becauſe theſe Kings did deſerve well of the multitude, either by teaching them Arts, or by Warring for them, or by gathering them together when they were diſperſed, or by dividing Lands amongſt them: theſe Kings had ſupreme Power in War, in Sacrifices, in Judicature.

Theſe four ſorts of Monarchy hath Ariſtotle thus diſtinguiſhed, and after ſums them up together, and concludes his Chapter as if he had forgot himſelf, and reckons up a fifth kind of Monarchy; which is, ſaith he, When one alone hath Supreme power of all the rest: for as there is a domeſtical Kingdom of one Houſe, ſo the Kingdom of a City, or of one or many Nations, is a Family.

Theſe are all the ſorts of Monarchy that Ariſtotle hath found out, and he hath ſtrained hard to make them ſo many: firſt, for his Lacedemonian King, himſelf confeſſeth that he was but a kind of Military Commander in War, and ſo in effect no more a King than all Generals of Armies: And yet this No-king of his was not limited by any Law, nor mixed with any Companions of his Government: when he was in the Wars out of the Confines of Lacedaemon, he was, as Ariſtotle ſtiles him, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of full and abſolute Command, no Law, no Companion to govern his Army but his own will.

Next, for Ariſtotle's Aeſymnetical King, it appears, he was out of date in Ariſtotle's time; for he ſaith, he was amongſt the ancient Greeks 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Ariſtotle might well have ſpared the naming him (if he had not wanted other ſorts) for the honour of his own Nation: for he that but now told us the Barbarians were of a more ſervile nature than the Grecians, comes here, and tells us, That theſe old Greek Kings were Elective Tyrants. The Barbarians did but ſuffer Tyrants in ſhew, but the old Grecians choſe Tyrants indeed; which then muſt we think were the greater ſlaves, the Greeks or the Barbarians? Now if theſe ſorts of Kings were Tyrants, we cannot ſuppoſe they were limited either by Law, or joyned with Companions: Indeed Ariſtotle ſaith, ſome of theſe Tyrants were limited to certain times and actions, for they had not all their Power for term of life, nor could meddle but in certain buſineſſes; yet during the time they were Tyrants, and in the actions whereto they were limited, they had abſolute Power to do what they liſt according to their own will, or elſe they could not have been ſaid to be Tyrants.

As for Ariſtotle's Heroick King, he gives the like note upon him, that he did upon the Aeſymnet, that he was in old time 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , in the Heroick times. The thing that made theſe Heroical Kingdoms differ from other ſorts of Kingdoms, was only the means by which the firſt Kings obtained their Kingdoms, and not the manner of Government, for in that they were as abſolute as other Kings were, without either limitation by Law, or mixture of Companions.

Laſtly, as for Ariſtotle's Barbarick ſort of Kings, ſince he reckoned all the World Barbarians, except the Grecians, his Barbarick King muſt extend to all other ſorts of Kings in the World, beſides thoſe of Greece, and ſo may go under Ariſtotle's fifth ſort of Kings, which in general comprehends all other ſorts, and is no ſpecial form of Monarchy.

Thus upon a true account it is evident, that the five ſeveral ſorts of Kings mentioned by Ariſtotle, are at the moſt but different and accidental means of the firſt obtaining or holding of Monarchies, and not real or eſſential differences of the manner of Government, which was always abſolute, without either limitation or mixture.

I may be thought perhaps to miſtake, or wrong Ariſtotle, in queſtioning his diverſities of Kings; but it ſeems Ariſtotle himſelf was partly of the ſame mind; for in the very next Chapter, when he had better conſidered of the point, he confeſſed, That to ſpeak the truth, there were almoſt but two ſorts of Monarchies worth the conſidering, that is, his firſt or Laconick ſort, and his fifth or laſt ſort, where one alone hath ſupreme Power over all the reſt: thus he hath brought his five ſorts to two. Now for the firſt of theſe two, his Lacedemonian King, he hath confeſſed before, that he was no more than a Generaliſſimo of an Army, and ſo upon the matter no King at all: and then there remains only his laſt ſort of Kings, where one alone hath the ſupreme Power. And this in ſubſtance is the final reſolution of Ariſtotle himſelf: for in his ſixteenth Chapter, where he delivers his laſt thoughts touching the kinds of Monarchy, he firſt diſchargeth his Laconick King from being any ſort of Monarchy, and then gives us two exact rules about Monarchy; and both theſe are point blank againſt limited and mixed Monarchy; therefore I ſhall propoſe them to be conſidered of, as concluding all Monarchy to be abſolute and arbitrary.

1. The one Rule is, Arist. Pol. l. 3. c. 16. That he that is ſaid to be a King according to Law, is no ſort of Government or Kingdom at all: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

2. The ſecond Rule is, That a true King is he that ruled all according to his own will, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

This latter frees a Monarch from the mixture of partners or ſharers in Government, as the former rule doth from limitation by Laws.

Thus in brief I have traced Ariſtotle in his crabbed and broken paſſages, touching diverſities of Kings; where he firſt finds but four ſorts, and then he ſtumbles upon a fifth; and in the next Chapter contents himſelf only with two ſorts of Kings, but in the Chapter following concludes with one, which is the true perfect Monarch, who rules all by his own will: in all this we find nothing for a regulated or mixed Monarchy, but againſt it.

Moreover, whereas the Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy affirms it as a prime Principle, That all Monarchies (except that of the Jews) depend upon humane deſignment, when the conſent of a Society of men, and a fundamental Contract of a Nation, by original or radical Conſtitution confers Power: he muſt know, that Ariſtotle ſearching into the Original of Government, ſhews himſelf in this point a better Divine than our Author; and as if he had ſtudied the Book of Geneſis, teacheth, That Monarchies fetch their Pedigree from the Right of Fathers, and not from the Gift or Contract of People; his words may thus be Engliſhed. At the first, Cities were governed by Kings, and ſo even to this day are Nations alſo: for ſuch as were under Kingly Government did come together; for every Houſe is governed by a King, who is the eldeſt; and ſo alſo Colonies are governed for kindred ſake. And immediately before, he tells us, That the firſt Society made of many Houſes is a Village, which naturally ſeems to be a Colony of a Houſe, which ſome call Foſter-brethren, or Children, and Childrens Children.

So in concluſion we have gained Ariſtotle's judgment in three main and eſſential points.

What Ariſtotle's judgment was two thouſand years ſince, is agreeable to the Doctrine of the great modern Politician Bodin: Hear him touching limited Monarchy: Ʋnto Majeſty or Soveraignty (ſaith he) belongeth an abſolute power, not ſubject to any Law—Chief power given unto a Prince with condition, is not properly Soveraignty, or power abſolute, except ſuch conditions annexed to the Soveraignty, be directly comprehended within the Laws of God and Nature.— Albeit by the ſufferance of the King of England, controverſies between the King and his People are ſometimes determined by the high Court of Parliament, and ſometimes by the Lord Chief Juſtice of England; yet all the Eſtates remain in full ſubjection to the King, who is no ways bound to follow their advice, neither to conſent to their requeſts.—It is certain, that the Laws, Priviledges, and Grants of Princes, have no force but during their life, if they be not ratified by the expreſs conſent, or by ſufferance of the Prince following, especially Privileges.— Much leſs ſhould a Prince be bound unto the Laws he maketh himſelf; for a man may well receive a Law from another man, but impoſſible it is in nature for to give a Law unto himſelf, no more than it is to command a mans ſelf in a matter depending of his own will. The Law ſaith, Nulla obligatio conſiſtere poteſt, quae à voluntate promittentis statum capit. The Soveraign Prince may derogate unto the Laws that he hath promiſed and ſworn to keep, if the equity thereof be ceaſed; and that of himſelf, without the conſent of his Subjects.—The Majeſty of a true Soveraign Prince is to be known, when the Eſtates of all the People aſſembled, in all humility preſent their requeſts and ſupplications to their Prince, without having power in any thing, to command, determine, or give voice, but that that which it pleaſeth the King to like or diſlike, to command or bid, is holden for Law: wherein they which have written of the duty of Magiſtrates have deceived themſelves, in maintaining that the power of the People is greater than the Prince; a thing which cauſeth oft true Subjects to revolt from their obedience to their Prince, and miniſtreth matter of great troubles in Commonwealths; of which their opinion there is neither reaſon nor ground: for if the King be ſubject unto the aſſemblies and Decrees of the people, he ſhould neither be King nor Soveraign, and the Commonwealth neither Realm nor Monarchy, but a meer Ariſtocracy.—So we ſee the principal point of Soveraign Majeſty, and abſolute power, to conſiſt principally in giving Laws unto the Subjects in general without their conſent. Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8.

To confound the state of Monarchy with the Popular or Ariſtocratical eſtate, is a thing impoſſible, and in effect incompatible, and ſuch as cannot be imagined: for Soveraignty being of it ſelf indiviſible, how can it at one and the ſame time be divided betwixt one Prince, the Nobility, and the people in common? The firſt mark of Soveraign Majeſty, is to be of power to give Laws, and to command over them unto the Subjects; and who ſhould thoſe Subjects be that ſhould yield their obedience to the Law, if they ſhould have alſo power to make the Laws? who ſhould he be that could give the Law? being himſelf conſtrained to receive it of them, unto whom himſelf gave it? ſo that of neceſſity we muſt conclude, That as no one in particular hath the power to make the Law in ſuch a State, that then the State muſt needs be a State popular.—Never any Commonwealth hath been made of an Ariſtocracy and popular Eſtate, much leſs of the three Eſtates of a Commonweal.—Such ſtates wherein the rights of Soveraignty are divided, are not rightly to be called Commonweals, but rather the corruption of Commonweals, as Herodotus has moſt briefly but truly written.—Commonweals which change their ſtate, the Sovereign right & power of them being divided, find no reſt from Civil wars and broils, till they again recover ſome one of the three Forms, and the Soveraignty be wholly in one of the ſtates or other. Where the rights of the Soveraignty are divided betwixt the Prince & his Subjects, in that confuſion of ſtate there is ſtill endleſs ſtirs and quarrels for the ſuperiority, until that ſome one, ſome few, or all together, have got the Soveraignty. Id. lib. 2. c. 1.

This Judgment of Bodin's touching Limited and Mixed Monarchy, is not according to the mind of our Author, nor yet of the Obſervator, who uſeth the ſtrength of his Wit to overthrow Abſolute and Arbitrary Government in this Kingdom; and yet in the main body of his diſcourſe, lets fall ſuch Truths from his Pen, as give a deadly wound to the Cauſe he pleads for, if they be indifferently weighed and conſidered. I will not pick a line or two here and there to wreſt againſt him, but will preſent a whole Page of his Book, or more together, that ſo we may have an entire proſpect upon the Obſervators mind: Without Society (ſaith the Obſervator) men could not live; without Laws men could not be ſociable; and without Authority ſomewhere to judge according to Law, Law were vain: It was ſoon therefore provided, that Laws according to the dictate of Reaſon, ſhould be ratified by common conſent; when it afterward appeared, that man was yet ſubject to unnatural deſtruction, by the Tyranny of entruſted Magiſtrates, a miſchief almoſt as fatal as to be without all Magiſtracy. How to provide a wholeſome remedy therefore, was not ſo eaſie to be invented: it was not difficult to invent Laws for the limiting of Supream Governours; but to invent how thoſe Laws ſhould be executed, or by whom interpreted, was almoſt impoſſible, Nam quis cuſtodiet ipſos Cuſtodes? to place a Superiour above a Supream, was held unnatural; yet what a lifeleſs thing would Law be without any Judge to determine and force it? If it be agreed upon, that limits ſhould be prefixed to Princes and Judges to decree according to thoſe limits, yet another inconvenience will preſently affront us: for we cannot reſtrain Princes too far, but we ſhall diſable them from ſome good: long it was ere the world could extricate it ſelf out of all theſe extremities, or find out an orderly means whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded Prerogative on this hand, and of exceſſive liberty on the other; and ſcarce has long experience yet fully ſatisfied the minds of all men in it. In the Infancy of the world, when man was not ſo artificial and obdurate in cruelty and oppreſſion as now, and Policy most rude, moſt Nations did chooſe rather to ſubject themſelves to the meer diſcretion of their Lords, than rely upon any limits; and ſo be ruled by Arbitrary Edicts, than written Statutes. But ſince Tyranny being more exquiſite, and Policy more perfect, eſpecially where learning and Religion flouriſh, few Nations will endure the thraldome which uſually accompanies unbounded and unconditionate Royalty; Yet long it was ere the bounds and conditions of Supream Lords was ſo wiſely determined, or quietly conſerved as now they are: for at firſt, when as Ephori, Tribuni, Curatores, &c. were erected to poiſe againſt the ſcale of Soveraignty, much blood was ſhed about them, and States were put into new broils by them, and in ſome places the remedy proved worſe than the diſeaſe. In all great diſtreſſes, the body of the people were ever conſtrained to riſe, and by force of the major party to put an end to all inteſtine ſtrifes, and make a redreſs of all publick grievances: But many times calamities grew to a ſtrange height, before ſo cumberſome a body could be raiſed; and when it was raiſed, the motions of it were ſo distracted and irregular, that after much ſpoil and effuſion of blood, ſometimes only one Tyranny was exchanged for another, till ſome was invented to regulate the motions of the Peoples moliminous body. I think Arbitrary rule was moſt ſafe for the World: but Now, ſince moſt Countries have found an art and peaceable order for publick Aſſemblies, whereby the people may aſſume its own power to do it ſelf right, without diſturbance to it ſelf or injury to Princes; he is very unjuſt that will oppoſe this art or order. That Princes may not be Now beyond all limits and Laws, nor yet be tyed upon thoſe limits by any private parties; the whole Community, in its underived Majeſty, ſhall convene to do juſtice; and that the Convention may not be without intelligence, certain times, and places, and forms, ſhall be appointed for its reglement; and that the vaſtneſs of its own bulk may not breed confuſion, by vertue of election and repreſentation, a few ſhall act for many, the wiſe, ſhall conſent for the ſimple, the vertue of all ſhall redound to ſome, and the prudence of ſome ſhall redound to all; and ſurely as this admirably-compoſed Court, which is now called a Parliament, is more regularly and orderly formed, than when it was called mickle Synod of Wittenagemot, or when this real body of the People did throng together at it: ſo it is not yet perhaps without ſome defects, which by art & policy might receive farther amendment: ſome diviſions have ſprung up of late between both Houſes, and ſome between the King and both Houſes, by reaſon of incertainty of Juriſdiction; and ſome Lawyers doubt how far the Parliament is able to create new forms and preſidents, and has a Juriſdiction over it ſelf; all theſe doubts would be ſolemnly ſolved: but in the firſt place, the true priviledges of Parliament belonging not only to the being and efficacy of it, but to the honour and complement of it, would be clearly declared: for the very naming of priviledges of Parliament, as if they were chimera's to the ignorant ſort, and utterly unknown unto the Learned, hath been entertained with ſcorn ſince the beginning of this Parliament.

In this large paſſage taken out of the Obſervator which concerns the original of all Government, two notable Propoſitions may be principally obſerved.

Firſt, our Obſervator confeſſeth arbitrary or abſolute government to be the firſt, and the ſafeſt government for the world.

Secondly, he acknowledgeth that the Juriſdiction is uncertain, and the priviledges not clearly declared of limited Monarchy.

Theſe two evident truths delivered by him, he labours mainly to diſguiſe. He ſeems to inſinuate that Arbitrary Government was but in the infancy of the World, for ſo he terms it; but if we enquire of him, how long he will have this infancy of the World to laſt, he grants it continued above three thouſand years, which is an unreaſonable time for the World to continue under-age: for the firſt oppoſers he doth find of Arbitrary power, were the Ephori, Tribuni, Curatores, &c. The Ephori were above three thouſand years after the Creation, and the Tribuni were later; as for his Curatores, I know not whom he means, except the Maſter of the Court of Wards, I cannot Engliſh the word Curator better. I do not believe that he can ſhew that any Curatores or & caetera's which he mentions were ſo ancient as the Ephori. As for the Tribuni, he miſtakes much if he thinks they were erected to limit and bound Monarchy; for the State of Rome was at the leaſt Ariſtocratical (as they call it) if not popular, when Tribunes of the People were firſt hatched. And for the Ephori, their power did not limit or regulate Monarchy, but quite take it away; for a Lacedemonian King in the judgment of Ariſtotle was no King indeed, but in name only, as Generaliſſimo of an Army; and the beſt Politicians reckon the Spartan Commonwealth to have been Ariſtocratical, and not Monarchical; and if a limited Monarchy cannot be found in Lacedemon, I doubt our Obſervator will hardly find it any where elſe in the whole World; and in ſubſtance he confeſſeth as much, when he ſaith, Now moſt Countries have found out an art and peaceable order for publick aſſemblies; as if it were a thing but new done, and not before; for ſo the word Now doth import.

The Obſervator in confeſſing the Juriſdiction to be incertain, and the priviledges undetermined of that Court that ſhould bound and limit Monarchy, doth in effect acknowledge there is no ſuch Court at all: for every Court conſiſts of Juriſdictions & Priviledges ▪ it is theſe two that create a Court, and are the eſſentials of it: If the admirably compoſed Court of Parliament have ſome defects which may receive amendment, as he ſaith, and if thoſe defects be ſuch as cauſe diviſions both between the Houſes, and between the King and both Houſes, and theſe diviſions be about ſo main a matter as Juriſdictions and Priviledges, and power to create new Priviledges, all which are the Fundamentals of every Court, (for until they be agreed upon, the act of every Court may not only be uncertain, but invalid, and cauſe of tumults and ſedition:) And if all theſe doubts and diviſions have need to be ſolemnly ſolved, as our Obſervator confeſſeth: Then he hath no reaſon at all to ſay, that Now the conditions of Supream Lords are wiſely determined and quietly conſerved, or that Now most Countries have found out an art, and peaceable order for publick affairs, whereby the People may reſume its own power to do it ſelf right without injury unto Princes: for how can the underived Majeſty of the people by aſſuming its own power, tell how to do her ſelf right, or how to avoid doing injury to the Prince, if her Juriſdiction be uncertain, and Priviledges undetermined?

He tells us Now most Countries have found an art, and peaceable order for publick Aſſemblies: and to the intent that Princes may not be Now beyond all limits and Laws, the whole community in its underived Majeſty ſhall convene to do Juſtice. But he doth not name ſo much as one Country or Kingdom that hath found out this art, where the whole Community in its underived Majeſty did ever convene to do Juſtice. I challenge him, or any other for him, to name but one Kingdom that hath either Now or heretofore found out this art or peaceable order. We do hear a great rumor in this age, of moderated and limited Kings; Poland, Sweden, and Denmark, are talked of for ſuch; and in theſe Kingdoms, or no where, is ſuch a moderated Government, as our Obſervator means, to be found. A little enquiry would be made into the manner of the Government of theſe Kingdoms: for theſe Northern People, as Bodin obſerveth, breath after liberty.

Firſt for Poland, Boterus ſaith, that the Government of it is elective altogether, and repreſenteth rather an Ariſtocracie than a Kingdom: the Nobility, who have great Authority in the Diets, chuſing the King, and limiting his Authority, making his Soveraignty but a ſlaviſh Royalty: theſe diminutions of Regality began first by default of King Lewis, and Jagello, who to gain the ſucceſſion in the Kingdom contrary to the Laws, one for his Daughter, and the other for his Son, departed with many of his Royalties and Prerogatives, to buy the voices of the Nobility. The French Author of the Book called the Eſtates of the World, doth inform us that the Princes Authority was more free, not being ſubject to any Laws, and having abſolute power, not only of their eſtates, but alſo of Life and Death. Since Chriſtian Religion was received, it began to be moderated, firſt by holy admonitions of the Biſhops and Clergy, and then by ſervices of the Nobility in War: Religious Princes gave many Honours, and many liberties to the Clergy and Nobility, and quit much of their Rights, the which their ſucceſſors have continued. The ſuperiour dignity is reduced to two degrees, that is, the Palatinate and the Chaſtelleine, for that Kings in former times did by little and little call theſe men to publick conſultations, notwithſtanding that they had Abſolute power to do all things of themſelves, to command, diſpoſe, recompence, and puniſh, of their own motions: ſince they have ordained that theſe Dignities ſhould make the body of a Senate, the King doth not challenge much right and power over his Nobility, nor over their estates, neither hath he any over the Clergy. And though the Kings Authority depends on the Nobility for his election, yet in many things it is Abſolute after he is choſen: He appoints the Diets at what time and place he pleaſeth; he chooſeth Lay-Councellers, and nominates the Biſhops, and whom he will have to be his Privy Council: He is abſolute diſpoſer of the Revenues of the Crown: He is abſolute eſtabliſher of the Decrees of the Diets: It is in his power to advance and reward whom he pleaſeth. He is Lord immediate of his Subjects, but not of his Nobility: He is Soveraign Judge of his Nobility in criminal cauſes. The power of the Nobility daily increaſeth, for that in reſpect of the Kings election, they neither have Law, rule, nor form to do it, neither by writing nor tradition. As the King governs his Subjects which are immediately his, with abſolute Authority; ſo the Nobility diſpoſe immediately of their vaſſals, over whom every one hath more than a Regal power, ſo as they intreat them like ſlaves. There be certain men in Poland who are called EARTHLY MESSENGERS or Nuntio's, they are as it were Agents of Juriſdictions or Circles of the Nobility: theſe have a certain Authority, and, as Boterus ſaith, in the time of their Diets theſe men aſſemble in a place near to the Senate-Houſe, where they chuſe two Marſhals, by whom (but with a Tribune-like authority) they ſignifie unto the Council what their requeſts are. Not long ſince, their Authority and reputation grew ſo mightily, that they now carry themſelves as Heads and Governours, rather than officers and miniſters of the publick decrees of the State: One of the Council refuſed his Senators place, to become one of theſe Officers. Every Palatine, the King requiring it, calls together all the Nobility of his Palatinate; where having propounded unto them the matters whereon they are to treat, and their will being known, they chuſe four or ſix out of the company of the EARTHLY MESSENGERS; theſe Deputies meet and make one body, which they call the order of Knights.

This being of late years the manner and order of the government of Poland, it is not poſſible for the Obſervator to find among them that the whole Community in its underived Majeſty doth ever convene to do Juſtice: nor any election or repreſentation of the Community, or that the People aſſume its own power to do it ſelf right. The EARTHLY MESSENGERS, though they may be thought to repreſent the Commons, and of late take much upon them, yet they are elected and choſen by the Nobility, as their agents and officers. The Community are either vaſſals to the King, or to the Nobility, and enjoy as little freedom or liberty as any Nation. But it may be ſaid perhaps, that though the Community do not limit the King, yet the Nobility do, and ſo he is a limited Monarch. The Anſwer is, that in truth, though the Nobility at the chuſing of their King do limit his power, and do give him an Oath; yet afterwards they have always a deſire to pleaſe him, and to ſecond his will; and this they are forced to do, to avoid diſcord: for by reaſon of their great power, they are ſubject to great diſſentions, not only among themſelves, but between them and the order of Knights, which are the Earthly Meſſengers: yea, the Provinces are at diſcord one with another: and as for Religion, the diverſity of Sects in Poland breed perpetual jars and hatred among the People, there being as many Sects as in Amſterdam it ſelf, or any popular government can deſire. The danger of ſedition is the cauſe, that though the Crown depends on the election of the Nobility; yet they have never rejected the Kings ſucceſſour, or transferred the Realm to any other family, but once, when depoſing Ladiſlaus for his idleneſs (whom yet afterward they reſtored) they elected Wenceſlaus King of Bohemia. But if the Nobility do agree to hold their King to his conditions, which is, not to conclude any thing but by the advice of his Council of Nobles, nor to chooſe any Wife without their leaves, then it muſt be ſaid to be a Commonweal, not a Royalty; and the King but only the mouth of the Kingdom, or as Queen Chriſtina complained, that Her Husband was but the ſhadow of a Soveraign.

Next, if it be conſidered how the Nobility of Poland came to this great power; it was not by any original contract, or popular convention: for it is ſaid they have neither Law, Rule, nor Form written or unwritten, for the election of their King, they may thank the Biſhops and Clergy: for by their holy admonitions and advice, good and Religious Princes, to ſhew their piety, were firſt brought to give much of their Rights and Priviledges to their Subjects, devout Kings were meerly cheated of ſome of their Royalties. What power ſoever general Aſſemblies of the Eſtates claim or exerciſe over and above the bare naked act of Counſelling, they were firſt beholding to the Popiſh Clergy for it: it is they firſt brought Parliaments into requeſt and power: I cannot find in any Kingdom, but only where Popery hath been, that Parliaments have been of reputation: and in the greateſt times of Superſtition they are firſt mentioned.

As for the Kingdom of Denmark, I read that the Senators, who are all choſen out of the Nobility, and ſeldom exceed the number of 28, with the chief of the Realm, do chuſe their King. They have always in a manner ſet the Kings eldeſt Son upon the Royal Throne. The Nobility of Denmark withſtood the Coronation of Frederick 1559, till he ſware not to put any Noble-man to death until he were judged of the Senate; and that all Noble-men ſhould have power of Life and Death over their Subjects without appeal; and the King to give no Office without conſent of the Council. There is a Chancellour of the Realm, before whom they do appeal from all the Provinces and Iſlands, and from him to the King himſelf. I hear of nothing in this Kingdom that tends to Popularity; no Aſſembly of the Commons, no elections, or repreſentation of them.

Sweden is governed by a King heretofore elective, but now made hereditary in Guſtavus time: it is divided into Provinces: an appeal lieth from the Vicount of every territory to a Soveraign Judge called a Lamen; from the Lamens, to the Kings Council; and from this Council, to the King himſelf.

Now let the Obſervator bethink himſelf, whether all, or any of theſe three Countries have found out any art at all whereby the People or community may aſſume its own Power: if neither of theſe Kingdoms have, moſt Countries have not, nay none have. The People or Community in theſe three Realms are as abſolute Vaſſals as any in the World; the regulating power, if any be, is in the Nobility: Nor is it ſuch in the Nobility as it makes ſhew for. The Election of Kings is rather a Formality, than any real power: for they dare hardly chuſe any but the Heir, or one of the blood Royal: if they ſhould chuſe one among the Nobility, it would prove very factious; if a ſtranger, odious, neither ſafe. For the Government, though the Kings be ſworn to raign according to the Laws, and are not to do any thing without the conſent of their Council in publick affairs: yet in regard they have power both to advance and reward whom they pleaſe, the Nobility and Senators do comply with their Kings. And Boterus concludes of the Kings of Poland, who ſeem to be moſt moderated, that ſuch as is their valour, dexterity, and wiſdom, ſuch is their Power, Authority, and Government. Alſo Bodin ſaith, that theſe three Kingdoms are States changeable and uncertain, as the Nobility is ſtronger than the Prince, or the Prince than the Nobility; and the People are ſo far from liberty, that he ſaith, Divers particular Lords exact not only Cuſtoms, but Tributes alſo; which are confirmed and grow ſtronger, both by long preſcription of time, and uſe of Judgments.

THE late Execution of Witches at the Summer Aſſiſes in Kent, occaſioned this brief Exercitation, which addreſſes it ſelf to ſuch as have not deliberately thought upon the great difficulty in diſcovering, what, or who a Witch is. To have nothing but the publick Faith of the preſent Age, is none of the beſt Evidence, unleſs the univerſality of elder Times do concur with theſe Doctrines, which ignorance in the times of darkneſs brought forth, and credulity in theſe days of light hath continued.

Such as ſhall not be pleaſed with this Tractate, are left to their liberty to conſider, whether all thoſe Proofs and Preſumptions numbered up by Mr. Perkins, for the Conviction of a Witch, be not all condemned, or confeſſed by himſelf to be unſufficient or uncertain.

He brings no leſs than eighteen Signs or Proofs, whereby a Witch may be diſcovered, which are too many to be all true: his ſeven firſt he himſelf confeſſeth to be inſufficient for Conviction of a Witch; His eight next Proofs (which he ſaith men in place have uſed) he acknowledgeth to be falſe or inſufficient. Thus of his eighteen Proofs, which made a great ſhow, fifteen of them are cast off by himſelf; there remains then his ſixteenth, which is the Confeſſion of a Witch; yet preſently he is forced to yield, That a bare Confeſſion is not a ſufficient proof, and ſo he cometh to his ſeventeenth proof, which is, two credible Witneſſes; and he here grants, That the League between the Devil and the Witch is cloſely made, and the Practices of Witches be very ſecret, that hardly a man can be brought, which upon his own knowledge can averr ſuch things. Therefore at last, when all other proofs fail, he is forced to fly to his eighteenth proof, and tells us, that yet there is a way to come to the knowledge of a Witch, which is, that Satan uſeth all means to diſcover a Witch; which how it can be well done, except the Devil be bound over to give in Evidence againſt the Witch, cannot be underſtood.

And as Mr. Perkins weakens and diſcredits all his own Proofs, ſo he doth the like for all thoſe of King James, who, as I remember, hath but Three Arguments for the diſcovery of a Witch. First, the ſecret Mark of a Witch, of which Mr. Perkins ſaith, it hath no power by Gods Ordinance. Secondly, The diſcovery by a fellow-Witch; this Mr. Perkins by no means will allow to be a good proof. Thirdly, The ſwimming of a Witch, who is to be flung croſs-ways into the water, that is, as Wierus interprets it, when the Thumb of the right Hand is bound to the great Toe of the left Foot, and the Thumb of the left Hand to the great Toe of the right Foot. Against this Tryal by water, together with a diſability in a Witch to ſhed Tears, (which King James mentions) Delrio and Mr. Perkins both argue; for it ſeems they both writ after King James, who put forth his Book of Daemonologie in his youth, being in Scotland, about his age of thirty years.

It concerns the People of this Nation to be more diligently inſtructed in the Doctrine of Witchcraft, than thoſe of Foreign Countries, becauſe here they are tyed to a ſtricter or exacter Rule in giving their Sentence than others are: for all of them muſt agree in their Verdict, which in a caſe of extreme difficulty is very dangerous; and it is a ſad thing for men to be reduced to that extremity, that they must hazard their Conſciences or their Lives.

THE Point in Queſtion is briefly this; Whether ſuch a Witch as is Condemned by the Laws and Statutes of this Land, be one and the ſame with the Witch forbidden by the Law of Moſes.

The Witch Condemned by our Statute-Law is, 1 Jacob. Cap. 12.

One that ſhall uſe, practiſe, or exerciſe any Invocation or Conjuration of any evil or wicked Spirit, or conſult, covenant with, entertain or employ, féed or reward any evil or wicked Spirit, to or for any intent or purpoſe; or take up any dead man, woman, or child, out of his, her, or their grave, or any other place, where the dead body reſteth; or the skin, bone, or other part of any dead perſon, to be employed or uſed in any manner of Witchcraft, Sorcery, Charm or Enchantment; or ſhall uſe, practiſe, or exerciſe any Witchcraft, Enchantment, Charm, or Sorcery, whereby any Perſon ſhall be killed, deſtroyed, waſted, conſumed, pined, or lamed in his or her Body, or any part thereof: ſuch Offenders duly and lawfully Convicted and Attainted, ſhall ſuffer death.

If any Perſon ſhall take upon him by Witchcraft▪ Inchantment, Charm or Sorcery, to tell or declare in what place any Treaſure of Gold or Silver ſhould or might be found or had in the Earth, or other ſecret places, or where Goods, or things loſt or ſtoln ſhould be found or become: Or to the intent to provoke any Perſon to unlawful love, or whereby any Cattle or Goods of any Perſon ſhall be deſtroyed, waſted, or impaired; or to deſtroy or hurt any Perſon, in his, or her Body, though the ſame be not effected, &c. a years Impriſonment, and Pillory, &c. and the ſecond Conviction Death.