I Have now for some time expected an Answer from your Honorable Brother, Sir Robert Howard, to Mr. Drydens Epistle before his Indian Emperour; But I perceive that your Brother thinks it unworthy of his Thoughts; nor can any Ingenious Person blame Him, that He rather despises to give Himself the least Trouble, where nothing of any weight of Reason can justly challenge it; and besides, possibly being conscious to Himself, that he could not so well make a Return in a Billinsgate stile, which he saw so exactly performed by his Angry Opponent. But least Sir, that scold ng Text should want a Commentary, I humbly offer unto you these my Observations upon it, and will make no Excuse for my own weakness, since the Cause it self affords Abilities e­nough to any that has a just Respect to the peculiar Ho­nour of your Brother, and a General Love to Justice, and Good Manners.

But having called this Angry Author, Mr. Dryden, and He having been displeased before with that Honourable Person for calling Him an Author; I will rectifie both Er­rors, [Page 2] and try to Please him (being a wrathfull man with the Title of an Esquire, which he Bestows on Himself, or modestly endures his Bookseller to put upon him; yet withall hoping he can prove it better by the Heraulds than he has done the Rest; I proceed Sir, to take notice, that the Squire having fixed some Ironical Complements upon that Honourable Person your Brother, instead of the Cause he is to maintain, he takes notice of two verses in the beginning of the Duke of Lerma, for which he would have him lose the opinion of sober men, as it seems he has done His; not that it is a Consequence, that he should lose any worthy mans Good opinion for the Squires Ill one, who perhaps not so well able to defend his own Paradoxes, is disordered with so much passion, which so confounds his expressions, that I know not what he is most angry at. If he means the Two first Lines, and the other Twenty, (which he glances at) are Nonsense, or Ill ones; the Rea­der is the best Judge, and he only saying they are so, it is enough to say I think they are not so: But if the Squire would have it understood, that the Honourable Person used some things in the old Play, he has acknowledged it already, and professed he would have used more, had not the Alteration of the whole design deprived him of the Benefit. But the Squire having writ down the two first lynes, what ever he means, I that have read the old Play will assure him, that the Honourable Person used but the two first words of it, though he has preserved the method in the beginning. But the Squire perhaps is justly angry to see any one use the least thing of another Writer, and enter into his Jurisdiction, claiming the right of Theft per­haps by continual Custome; witness his Maiden Queen stoln out of the Queen of Corinth: a great part of his Indian Emperour, and most of his Mock Astrologer, which he means (for he is a Critick) the Feign'd Astrologer out of French Playes and Romances; from whence I cannot but observe [Page 3] that he is in danger to be thought an ill-natur'd Squire; since the Charactor of an Ingrossing Plagiary may possibly be more justly due to him than the Title of Esquire, which he has been pleased to assume.

The next thing Sir, that I shall take notice of, is his admiration, to be thought so ridiculous as to dispute whe­ther Prose or Verse be neerest to ordinary Conversation; by the Squires favour the Honourable Person never said so, but only presum'd to say, that a Play seemed to repre­sent Persons speaking Extempore, which indeed is ordina­ry Conversation, and then acknowledged that the Squire raised Arguments only unanswerable against himself, by laying down the rule for every thing, to be neerest the na­ture of what it represents: And I hope this is no fault in the Honourable Person, who never contended for the Rule; so that as to this Particular, I think there needs no more to be sayd, only adding this small observation, that the Squire cannot endure to be thought Ridiculous, though he deserves it.

The Squire is then pleased to tell us of a Gentleman, who maintained a Contradiction in the face of 300 Per­sons; when he will vouchsafe to tell us the Person and Contradiction, the Party I suppose will give an answer; which by what I have heard, I believe none can be igno­rant, that Honourable Person can as little as any be sus­pected to be the Party; and yet I dare not say so much for him, as the Squire once ventur'd to say on his own behalf to a Lady of most Eminent Quality (equall'd with a great Virtue and Parts) when he was so bold, as to tell her, a Gentleman could not erre, and then certainly a Squire is in­fallible.

After this he seems satisfied, that the Honourable Person sayes he had rather read good Verse than Prose; I believe he had and rather his, than his Prose, unless it were writ­ten with a better temper; but the Squire demands no more [Page 4] than This from all others, I am his Intercesser, he may ob­tain his desire; and leave it to them that are pleased to grant it, to judge, whether they have better'd his Argu­ments by their Affections.

Next he urges, that a Play is supposed to be the work of a Poet, imitating or representing the Conversation of several persons; the words of the Honorable Person, just be­fore, (which he quotes, and quarrels at) are, That a Play is supposed to be a Composition of several persons speaking extempore, and yet the Squire craves leave to dissent, though he sayes the same thing, all but the word Extem­pore. And if there be any otherway of Conversation, 'tis on­ly known to the Squire, who has the sharpness to see a difference in the same thing.

But now the Squire sayes he will be bolder, (truely I thought he had been bold enough before) and doubts not to make good a Paradox: for having said, that all things must be neerest the nature of what they represent; he is turn'd about now, and sayes Prose should not be used, be­cause it is too neer Converse, which is the nature of what it represents. I suppose the Squire had need of a Legion of Parts (which he speaks of) to maintain this: for some­times every thing is best, that is neerest the nature of what it represents; and presently it is the worse for being too neer it; and then as luckily proceeds to tell us, that the most skilfull Painters affirm, there may be too great a likeness, and too neer a resemblance in a Picture; I am very confident the Squire never heard an indifferent good Painter, much less an excellent one, affirme so ridiculous a thing: but to salve his credit in this, he is left to bring (if he can) such a Certificate from so excellent a Painter, whose great Au­thority may make us submit our sence so far as to believe the Paradox: But were Sir Anthony Vandyke now living (who I suppose we may allow to have been excellent in that Art) the Squire would hardly get a Certificate from [Page 5] him, whose Fame, if it be true what he sayes, he has blasted in one sentence, for he has proved him to make worse Pi­ctures than any, because he made all more exactly like, then ever any man did. But I leave the persuit of such absurdities, nor do I pretend to dwell upon his Reasons, where the honorable Person repeats his, and only fairly re­turns his own, I leave them to the Reader, who in my opi­nion will easily judge, that the honorable person could per­ceive nothing of any new weight to move him to a reply; and I am confident there had been no answer return'd, had not the Squires Passion led him to Invectives, forreigne to the Argument.

The next favour, the honorable person receives from the Esquire; is about that verse of Seneca.

And here he will neither allow Him to understand a La­tine word, nor an English word; Notwithstanding those Te­stimonies which in both kinds that honourable person hath given of himselfe: but if he had not understood the word Resero, nor could have spelt, whereby to have search't it in a Dictionary; yet since the Esquire was pleased to tell us the English of it, he might, (had he resolved to have used any modesty,) have believed it a mistake sooner then so much Ignorance in any one, as not to understand the difference of the words to open and to shut. I suppose therefore in stead of wittily Chiding the Printer, he ought to Chide Himself; But in one Case of the Squires I cannot tell, whether I may assume the Liberty to Chide the Printer for a mistake he committed in the first Edition of his In­dian Emperour, in this Excellent Verse— ‘— And follow Fate, that does too fast pursue.’ [Page 6] which in the second Edition is thus Corrected — ‘— And follow Fate, that would too fast Pursue.’

There is another Line in his Astraea Redux, which, be­cause the Squire is so severe, I will not omit.

I have not heard of the like Expression unless in a Tale of an Officer, that Commanded a Centinel not to stirr a Foot, but walk up and down, and see what he could hear. Now whether this first Non-sence be Rectified by the Printer, or by the Squires Encrease of Understanding, or, where fault the last is, I dare not Determine.

But, for all this, the Squire need not believe, that the Honourable Person can have any Apprehension of the exa­mining any faults of his, since his Passion guides him so ill, as not to distinguish between a Fault and a Mistake, if it be believed, that he understands a Word of English; and therefore he is rather Invited to use his Freedome: For, 'tis possible some may Believe in his Promise, that may find nothing in his Performance. So, leaving him to his own Liberty, I pass over his Arguments, not seeing any thing in them, that appears (to my Apprehension at least) either New or Weighty, but leave them to the Readers better Determination; and proceed to the next marke of his dis­pleasure, which is so ill placed, that the Squire is Angry with that Honourable Person for Calling the Muses his long Acquaintance; if he meanes in point of time, that Honourable Person is onely a proper Judge, whether the time seemed long to him, or noe; but if he meanes he ought to pretend no Acquaintance in the least with them; it is enough to Referr this piece of Anger to those, who have Read his Writings, and among them, the last he [Page 7] obliged the World with, the Duell of the Staggs, is a suf­ficient Testimony, that the Squire is more angry than he ought to be.

The next Charge the Squire is pleased to draw up a­gainst Him, is about Notions Politick, and Grave, tend­ing to the Instruction of Princes, and Reformation of States: I know not, that the Honourable Person seems Guilty of any such Design in the least, but if the Squire be, as he sayes he is, for Distributive Justice, we may justly presume that when his Indian Emperour was first acted, he intended to instruct and reform all Churches in Polemical Divinity, by his admirable Dispute between a Christian and a Heathen Priest; which also shows how great a loss the Church had of him, when he was divert­ed from entering into Orders.

Then he quarrels with the Style of that Honourable Person (I wish he had proposed him one fit to change for) which he says the Criticks have branded with the Name of Obscurity, and False Grammar: Who these Criticks be, he is not pleased to tell us, but writes, as he would have preacht, as a certain Author hath it; by which the Squire seems to be one of the Quidams damn'd at least in Quevedo's Visions, where I leave the Squire to read his farther Description.

But in his next scolding Paragraph, he is more unhap­py in his Anger, and quarrels with the Honourable Per­son, for saying he was now fettered in Business of more unpleasant Natures, which he will have to be State mat­ters. But the Squire was very much mistaken, for I by accident once heard that Honourable Person complain that two tedious Suits in Chancery had almost deprived him of the right use of any time; and yet I think he need not be ashamed of those Services he endeavours to do his King and Countrey; so that either way the Squires Displeasure is very unjustly applied: And above all men, this angry [Page 8] Squire ought not to be his Interpreter: But his Fortune, and that of the Honourable Persons are different; for the Squire mistakingly charges him that the corruption of a Poet, was the generation of a Statesman; but on the contrary the Squire having been imployed as a Puny Statesman under his Father a Zealous Committee-man, and Sir Gilbert Pickering a crafty Privy Councellour in the late times, it may more properly be applied to the Squire, That the corruption of a Statesman is the generation of a Poet Laureat.

Then he quarrels at the word Ubi, had that Honoura­ble Person said Where, in English, the Squire would have been angry too.

Then he is displeased and sayes that to perform the manner of a thing is New English, that cannot be helpt; but it is Old English to every one else, since, the Proverb is so common, That the manner of doing a thing, is as much as the thing it self.

Then he snaries about the word Taste, which is usual­ly applied to any kind of liking: but I should be as rude as he is, to entertain the Reader long with such Vomits of Choler.

The next Displeasure he shews, is, that the Honoura­ble Person sayes, That 'tis not necessary for Poets to study strict Reason (nor good Manners neither, if the Poet Laureat be admitted President) since they are so used to a greater Latitude than is allowed by that severe Inquisition. But he sayes Moral Truth is the Mistrisse of the Poet, as well as of the Philosopher: Poesie must resemble Natu­ral Truth, but it must be Ethical; the Poet dresses Truth, and adorns Nature, but does not alter them. These are the Squires words, but since he does not prove this in the same place, I will furnish the Reader with an exact Proof, written by himself in a wonderful Stanza, in his wonder­ful Poem of the wonderful year 1666. And withall it tells [Page 9] us how the Fire of London was put out, which few Coun­trey people knew before; the Stanza runs thus:

Now the Reader may easily judge, whether this be not Moral Truth; if this does not resemble Natural Truth, if it be not Ethical, and if the Squire has not drest Truth, and adorned Nature, but not altered them.

In the next place he sayes (with Truth still Annext to his Poetry) that the Honourable Person attaques all the Antients, and Moderns, while he fights (as he says) un­der their ample Shields, as little Teucer fought under the large Buckler of Ajax Telamon. I know not why the small Squire compares himself to little Teucer, unless it be very pleasant to him to talk of such a safe way of fighting: for I never read that the Honourable Person blamed the Antients for writing Verse, but him, or any, that lay down Rules against the writing of it. For Verse could not be thought neerest Nature by all the Antients, since Sene­ca writ all his Tragedies in Verse, and Terence all his Co­medies, which may be the Squire did not remember, or knew not. Now if Verse in Tragedy, and Verse in Co­medy be both neerest Nature, the Squire deserves his Lawrel.

But now the Squire begins to be more kind, and offers the Honourable Person his Help in a Logical way, and makes a Syllogisme for him, which is, if one Stage can­not properly present two Rooms or Houses, much less two Countreys or Kingdoms, then there can be no unity of place: but one Stage cannot properly perform this, therefore there can be no unity of place: And then he de­nies [Page 10] that which he calls his Minor Proposition. But what needs the Squire make a Syllogisme for another, who has no reason to like it. Being pleased to repeat that which is more truly the sense of the Honourable Person, which is, that a Stage being one place cannot be two, I think this is true, and therefore can as little be two Houses as two Countries. But the Squire says it may represent two Rooms successively, so it may two Kingdomes. This Bog he labours to get out of, and I appeal to the Reader, whether he sticks or no. I was going to charge this Noti­on on his Fancy, but a little after he says, that Fancy and Reason go hand in hand, the first cannot leave the last be­hind. If this be true, the Squire has salved all the Er­rors of fantastical people, together with his own. But I doubt that Fancy and Reason are not so good Friends, and if the Squire had kept them closer together, we should have believed better of their Friendships.

The Squire is then pleased to Confess that the lesser cannot Comprehend the Greater: yet in a little Glass a whole Room and many pesons may be represented, or seen: so may a Country be seen out of a little hole of a Window, but the Room cannot get into the Glass, nor the Country into the Hole. But the Honourable Person spoke not of what may seem represented, but of what really could be; and then inserted there could be no such thing as they pre­tend to imitate, which was to come neerest to the Nature of that which could not be at all.

But immediately he appears as unhappy in his Philoso­phy as in his Logick. When the Honourable Person on­ly speaks of things absolutely impossibile; the Squire talks of that which is onely so ex parte, and then would make it no Impossibility, by the help of the First mover to alter the Nature of it. When by the help of the Squire (who is the first mover of such Phylosophy) the nature of things are so altered thot two can be one, the Squire is triumphant, till then 'tis submitted to the Reader.

[Page 11]But now he sayes the Honourable Person is to be Excu­sed for declaring against the Unity of Time, being a person Interessed, for the time of the Play of the Duke of Lerma contained many years; if this be true, he is not to be bla­med; for by his favour he writ against that which is impos­sible to be made a Rule, not against any time shorter, or lon­ger used by any one. But if he had Argued according to what he writ, sure 'tis more Ingenuous, than for the Squire, who so pleads for the Unity of time to write the Indian Emperour, which contains the time of Cortez his landing to the Death of Montezuma; let him consider this, and it will appear, he ought to be more displeased with his own Disingenuity.

And now comming to assault the Honourable Person, when he sayes he grows feeble, (which is the most season­able time for the Squire to attacque any one in) he sayes according to his usual Custom, that the Honourable Person improves his observation to an Argument, that he might have the glory to Confute it. But it appears on the con­trary by his slighting of him, that the Honourable Person apprehends no glory in confuting any Argument of his: And on the other side, I believe he never thought any ob­servation of the Squires worthy to be drawn into an Argu­ment, and accordingly, the Honorable Person called it an Argument, or Observation being it seems as unable, as others are to know justly what Name or Title to fix on such a po­sitive Thesis.

But now the storm ceases, and the Illustrious Squire is pleased to shine with more gentle beams on the Honoura­ble Person; and fawningly sayes, he laies all at his feet, and Honours his Person, and Parts. The Squire must needs be believed, since he has endeavored to describe him to be the owner of such Excellent ones. He sayes, he has often im­ployed his Pen in his Commendations, I hope he means this Time for one. He Adds then, He has many particu­lar [Page 12] obligations to him. In this the Squire is like to be cre­dited, since this Return he has made, is so grateful a Testi­mony of it; yet at the last the Squire is pleased to give him the Title of a Noble opponent; and to this last I am confident he will Receive a just return from the Honourable Person, when ever the Squire pleases to give him cause to call him so. In the mean time, I believe the Squire cannot reasonably expect it from him, since I have heard from a ve­ry brave Gentleman, who was lately engaged to waite upon the Squire, that his cold Answer has discouraged the Honourable Person from such an Expectation.

Thus, Sir, I have Travelled through this foul way, and have Preserved my self as clean as possibly I could; yet it was so dirty, that some Testimony of such a Passage must needs stick to any that goes thorow it. But, Sir, if I have done like a good Scavenger, and carrried the Filth back to himself the proper Laystall I doubt not but to Receive from you and all other Just persons, the opinion that I love Ju­stice, and good manners, which, I hope, will render me not unworthy of the Title of