His ſeventh way of arguing, § 21. is to as little purpoſe; If the Perſons (ſaith he) are really diſtinct, and each is God, must not each be God diſtinct from the other? For nothing can be diſtinctly predicated of three diſtinct Perſons, if it do not diſtinctly belong to each. As to the phraſe of real Diſtinction, we refer the Reader to what hath been ſaid upon §. 8. But as to what follows, we ſay, That altho God be predicated of three diſtinct Perſons, yet not diſtinctly, or after a diſtinct manner, but one and the ſame God is after one and the ſame manner equally predicated of three, therefore it follows (quite contrary to what he would infer) that there's but one ever bleſſed God, tho three diſtinct Perſons. His 22d. Section hath been anſwered over and over.

All that which he adds, §. 23, 24, 27, 28. is wholly founded upon his own groſs Miſtakes, as if it muſt needs follow from a Multiplication of Perſons that there muſt be a Multiplication of Infinities and All-ſufficiencies in God; for ſuppoſe he may find ſome Aſſertors of the Trinity to allow ſuch a manner of ſpeaking, as to call the three Perſons, three Infinite Perſons, or three All-ſufficient Perſons, yet he knows well enough, in his own Conſcience, that they mean no more than three Perſons, with one and the ſame Numerical Infinity and All-ſufficiency; or which is the ſame, tres perſonas habentes eandem ſingularem infinitatem & omni-ſufficientiam: And that they do account it the vileſt Hereſy, yea, even Blaſphemy, to aſſert a Plurality of Infinities and All-ſufficiencies in God; and does it not argue then the Author to be guilty of the vileſt Sophiſm and Deceit; yea, ſuch as is more ſuitable for the Devil, the Father of Lyes, than for any fair Diſputant, from an Homonymous Phraſe that may be taken in different, yea, contrary Senſes, to infer, from ſuch a Senſe or Interpretation as he puts on the Phraſe, Heretical and Blaſphemous Concluſions, as the Concluſions of ſuch Authors, as he knows do take and interpret the ſame Phraſe in a quite contrary Senſe? Let him but take the Phraſe in the Senſe of theſe Authors, and all his monſtrous Concluſions will vaniſh. He can neither infer, that there are three Infinites, or Infinities, or three Infinite Spaces, or three Gods, or that the Trinitarians muſt be Idolaters, either in worſhipping ſomething as God which is not God, or in ſetting up a Plurality of Gods, as he would perſwade §. 30. Theſe will be found to be Brats of his own luxuriant Brain, not to be laid at the Trinitarians Door. As to what he adds, §. 31. That whatever Name we give the three, yea, tho we only ſay three, yet ſo long as we pay Divine Worſhip to each, we own three Gods, becauſe the three are three Objects of Divine Worſhip, and whilſt the one is worſhipped, the other is not worſhipped, &c. We ſhall anſwer this hereafter, viz. P. 24. when we come to confute this falſe and frivolous Charge more largely elſewhere inſiſted on by the Author: Becauſe we do not love, with him, to multiply Tautologies.

Object. There's only one thing more I would take into Conſideration before I leave this Chapter, that I may leave this Author the more inexcuſable in his perverſe Reaſoning ſuch as he makes uſe of, Section 25, 26. His Words are theſe (viz.) There cannot be ſuppoſed in God more Perſons than one, without ſuppoſing an infinite Number; for what Reaſon ſoever moved the firſt Perſon to beget two Perſons equal to himſelf, the ſame Reaſon (becauſe their Nature is the ſame) muſt move the other to beget their Equals, and ſo on to Infinity; for (ſaith he) if the firſt Perſon produced two equal to himſelf, it was no doubt an eſſential Perfection of his Nature, otherwiſe he might have choſen whether he would have produced them, and they, when produced, would have had but a precarious dependent Being, ſince they muſt depend on his Pleaſure for their Continuance in Being, as well as for their Being. And he does further infer, that if no more Perſons can now be produced, then an Eſſential Property is loſt.

Anſw. The whole of his Diſcourſe do's clearly evince, that the Author had blind and groſs Conceptions about the Eternal Generation of the Son, and Miſſion or Emiſſion of the Bleſſed Spirit, and therefore it's no wonder to find his whole Diſcourſe made up of thoſe two grand Ingredients, Impudence and Ignorance. For,

1. How ſhamefully does he contradict himſelf, when he tells us, that if the firſt Perſon produced two equal to himſelf. it was no doubt an Eſſential Perfection of his Nature, and yet (as §. 25.) that it was for ſome Reaſon that moved him to it: How can both theſe hold? If the Act was an Eſſential Perfection, then it was no arbitrary Act; but if it was an Act, to which the Agent was moved by ſome Reaſon, then it was arbitrary and not eſſential: If his Adverſaries ſpoke Contradictions at ſuch a rate as this, he might then have had Ground to have charged theſe on them.

2. What a begetting Act muſt that be, which may, or rather muſt (according to him) be multiplyed into infinite begetting Acts? But had he framed no other Ideas of Eternal Generation, and Eternal Miſſion, but ſuch as might have ſuited with the Nature of the moſt perfect eternal Spirit, he would then have ſeen, that that moſt ſublime and ſcriptural Revelation of three Perſons in the God-head, is not only ſweetly conſiſtent with the higheſt Reaſon, but likewiſe, that it's impoſſible that there ſhould be more than three Perſons in the God-head.

Had the Author but peruſed, and ſeriouſly weighed what is ſaid as to this, by the learned and accurate Doctor Ames, in his Medulla Theologiae, ch. 5 §. 16. (and which is agreeable to what hath been ſaid before by ancient Fathers, Schoolmen, and modern Divines) ſure he would not have talked at ſuch a rate as he doth; the Doctor here ſpeaking of a Trinity of Perſons in God. hath theſe Words, viz. poteſt tamen (aliqua ex parte) ſimilitudine adumbrari; Pater nempe est quaſi Deus intelligens; Filius Imago Patris expreſſa, eſt quaſi Deus intellectus; Spiritus ſanctus emanans, a Patre per Filium & ſpiratus eſt quaſi Deus dilectus; Filius producitur quaſi per actum intelligendi ex intellectu vel memoriâ faecundâ Patris; Spiritus ſanctus producitur per actum amandi vel ſpirandi ex voluntate faecunda Patris & Filii. What I pray will the Author ſay to ſuch a Diſcourſe as this? (1.) Will he ſay that God doth not know himſelf by a reflex Act of eternal Intellection terminated on himſelf? Surely this he neither can nor dare do. 2. Will he ſay, that God doth not, after a like manner, terminate an eternal Act of Dilection on himſelf? He cannot ſay this. (3.) Can he aſſure us that Perſonalities in God cannot flow from ſuch reflex Acts? I am ſure he cannot. (4.) Are there any moreinternal and eternal reflex Acts in God, beſides the two before mentioned, from which Perſonalities can flow, and can there any more than three Perſonalities flow from theſe in manner aforeſaid, ſuppoſing theſe to emane from the Divine Eſſence, by Mediation of the ſaid Acts? I ſhall freely confeſs here, we could not at all have gone thus far by the dim Light of our own Reaſon, nor could ſo much as have thought no, much leſs, have aſſerted a Trinity of Perſons in the Unity of Divine Eſſence; but when we have the great and everbleſſed God going before us in the infallible Revelation of ſacred Scripture, and aſſuring us, that there be Three that bear Witneſs in Heaven, and that theſe Three are One; that himſelf as Father, did, before the World was, and from Eternity, beget the Son, in the Form of God, and equal to himſelf; that the Holy Ghoſt, in like manner, is God, proceeding and ſent from the Father and Son; we can now ſafely follow God, and improve ſanctified Reaſon to the getting of true and right Notions about this ſublime Myſtery, and for Defence and Vindication of it, and diſpelling the Miſts of thoſe vile Aſperſions and ſeigned Contradictions, black-mouth'd Hereticks would faſten on it; and we can as truly tell the Author, that however this Myſtery be a very high Myſtery, yet it is not (as he would perſwade) wholly unintelligible, but that we may have true Ideas of the Father begetting, and of the Son's being begotten, and of the Holy Ghoſt's proceeding from Eternity; and that this was not after ſome groſs manner as the Author ſeems to ſuppoſe, but in ſuch a way, as might agree to the moſt pure and ſimple Spirit; yea, we may tell him, that from one and the ſame numerical eternal Eſſence acting upon its ſelf by its internal Acts, and likewiſe terminating thoſe Acts, and ſo laying the Foundations of relative Properties, Three relative perſonal Properties, with the Three bleſſed eternal Perſons, do neceſſarily emane, without the leaſt Appearance of a Contradiction; the divine Eſſence ſo acting or reflecting on its ſelf by eternal Intellection with the relative Property of Generation, as flowing from it, being God the Father: The divine Eſſence as reflected on by, and terminating the ſaid Intellection with its relative Property (of being begotten) being God the Son, the Splendor of the Father's Glory, the 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 eternal 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or the expreſs Image of the Father's Perſon, making a full and entire Repreſentation thereof: (And how agreeable is this to many Scripture Phraſes, relating to the the Perſon of the Son?) And the ſame divine Eſſence, as reflected on or terminated by that other Act of the ſame Eſſence, and which may be ſtil'd the Love or Dilection of the Father and Son, with its relative Property of being ſent or proceding, being the third Perſon, or Holy Ghoſt, the amiable Spring-head and Fountain of all that good which God communicates to his Creatures, the all-ſearching, quickning Spirit, Deus ſpiratus miſſus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

And give me leave to ask the Author, our high pretended Rationaliſt (who dares, with his dark and glimmering Light, ſo boldly contradict divine Revelation; telling us, that for the Father to beget, the Son to be begotten, the Holy Ghoſt to proceed; and that theſe Three ſhould be One, and the Son to be equal to God the Father; that ſuch Language is nothing but mere Contradictions, tho the expreſs Language of the written Word.) Let me ask him, I ſay; according to the preceding Interpretation of the Words, what Shew or leaſt Appearance of a Contradiction can he find in them? For the Divine Eſſence, by an eternal reflex Act to know its ſelf; and ſo, by a like act, to love it ſelf, and for the ſame Eſſence to terminate each act, is that which he neither can nor dare deny; becauſe that theſe are eſſential divine Perfections falling under our diſtinct inadequate Notions of the ſame glorious Being, and which can no more ceaſe to be, than God can ceaſe to be God; where then comes in his Contradiction?

Object. Will he ſay, that according to theſe our Notions of a Trinity, it follows that there are but three Perſons, and yet nine Perſons? That they cannot be multiplyed beyond three, and yet may be multiplyed in infinitum?

Anſw. The quite contrary follows: For, according to theſe our Notions of the divine Eſſence ſo acting upon it ſelf, as aforeſaid, and ſo terminating the ſaid two internal eſſential acts, (viz.) of Intellect and Will; it's impoſſible the Perſons in the divine Eſſence, as flowing from them, ſhould either fall ſhort or exceed the Number Three; becauſe, according to theſe. theſe, we have (to come up to his own Terms) diſtinct Ideas of ſo many, and neither fewer nor more, (viz.) of a Perſon acting or begetting, of a Perſon conceived or begotten, and of a Perſon beloved or proceeding. But will he ſay (as he doth expreſly) §. 26. That,

Obj. If it be not eſſential to the Nature of the Son and Spirit, ſo to produce more Perſons equal to themſelves, their Nature is not the ſame with the Father's, and they want Perfections which he hath?

Anſw. It's eſſential to the Nature of Son and Spirit, as well as of the Father, abſolutely conſidered to be productive of more equal Perſons, tho it be not eſſential to the Nature of the Son and Spirit as limited by perſonal Property; becauſe, by theſe, it's rendred incommunicable, and cannot be ſo productive. Therefore it's very idle what he would infer, that the Nature of the Son and Spirit, is not the ſame with the Father's, becauſe they want Perfections which he has, becauſe the Nature ſtill, whether of Father, Son, or Spirit, abſolutely conſidered as ſuch, hath the very ſame eſſential Perfections, tho, as this is limited by perſonal Properties, importing three Perſons actually to exiſt in it from Eternity, it cannot be ſaid to produce them de novo, and to be ſtill productive of them; ſo that we may juſtly ſay here, that whoſoever ſhall affirm, that Eſſence, as common to Father, Son, and Spirit, is not productive of Three Perſons, let him be Anathema; and whoever ſhall affirm, that Eſſence, as limited to Father, Son and Spirit, by perſonal Properties, is ſtill productive of Three Perſons de novo, let him be Anathema; for Eſſence ſo limited, the Three Perſons exiſt as actually produced, and therefore cannot remain to be produced.

Again, will the Author ſay, that the Father now producing no Perſons equal to himſelf, has loſt a Perfection that's eſſential to his Nature, and conſequently ceaſeth to be all perfect, as §. 26? How vain and idle is all this? When the act of begetting, or producing in God, is eſſential to the divine Nature, and ſo can no more ceaſe to be, than the Nature it ſelf, it being an eternal act identified with the Nature, and an eternal Foundation of ſuch Relation as that of Son to Father, which muſt there. therefore be continued for ever, the Foundation being continued otherwiſe than in the Creatures.

Having premiſed thus much for Explication of a Myſtery, which the Author moſt blaſphemouſly pretends to be a Myſtery of Anti-Chriſt, wholly inexplicabable and unintelligible; and having ſhewed that however it be a moſt ſublime Myſtery, much tranſcending Reaſon and the Light of Nature, yet being once fully reveal'd in the Word, that it's ſo far from ſtanding in flat Contradiction, to Reaſon and natural Light, that it's found to have a ſweet Conſiſtency with Reaſon and Light of Nature.

Having, I ſay, permiſed thus much, I proceed now to his 〈…〉 3. third Chapter of the Nominal Trinitarians, as the Author thinks meet (tho without juſt Ground) to ſtile theſe Aſſertors of the Trinity, whom he doth diſtinguiſh from ſuch as he doth after call Real Trinitarians

Here, before I paſs on, give me leave to obſerve, that however moſt orthodox Divines tell us (ſee Polan. Syntag. p. 226.) That the Diſtinction of the divine Perſons ought to be the leaſt Diſtinction: Therefore Counſels and Fathers generally ſay, that it's Relation only that makes Diſtinction and Number in God; yet, however, they all agree in Oppoſition to Sabellius, that this is not meer nominal, but a true Diſtinction; which will hereafter be further evidenced.

Obj. And, now to come to the Chapter it ſelf; where, firſt, I ſhall take notice of that Paſſage of the Author, §. 35. becauſe that being anſwered, the Solution of his other Objections will be very Facile, or rather, the Objections will vaniſh of themſelves: His Words are theſe; It contradicts our cleareſt Ideas, to ſuppoſe the ſame numerical Subſtance that is in one Perſon, to be at the ſame time in another; and we can as little apprehend what we mean when we ſay the ſame numerical Subſtance conſtitutes three infinite Perſons, as when we ſay, the ſame Subſtance conſtitutes three finite Perſons. Is not the reaſon the ſame between an infinite Perſon and an infinite Subſtance, and between a finite Perſon and a finite Subſtance?

Anſw. As to that Homonymous Phraſe (three infinite Perſons) I have ſhewn before in what Senſe it may be allowed, and and in what Senſe it may not, and therefore ſhall not here trouble my ſelf or the Reader with it again; but as to the Remainder of his Diſcourſe, I muſt tell him, that altho it contradicts our cleareſt Ideas, to ſuppoſe the ſame numerical finite Subſtance that is in one finite Perſon, to be at the ſame time in another; yet it no way contradicts our cleareſt Ideas, that the ſame numerical infinite Subſtance that is in one Perſon, with one Mode of Subſiſtence, ſhould be at the ſame time in another Perſon, with a different Mode of Subſiſtence. Neither is the reaſon the ſame between an infinite Perſon and infinite Subſtance, and between a finite Perſon and a finite Subſtance. And his Miſtake about this is the Foundation of all his other Miſtakes, and Soul-ruining Errors. That the Reaſon is not the ſame between infinite Subſtance and infinite Perſon, as it is between finite Subſtance and finite Perſon, is evident; becauſe finite Subſtance does propagate modal Subſiſtence (which in rational Nature we call Perſonality) as it's finite and terminated; yea, and where it hath its Terms; but infinite Subſtance, not being ſo terminated, but infinitely excluding all Terms and Bounds, cannot therefore propagate Perſonality in like manner as the finite doth; for that would be to make it imperfect; and if it doth not propagate this after the ſame manner, then it follows undeniably, that the Reaſon is not the ſame betwixt infinite Subſtance and infinite Perſon or Perſonality, as between finite Subſtance and finite Perſon or Perſonality: So that this Author's ſelf-evident Propoſitions will be found to be ſelf-evident Untruths; and his Reaſoning is no better when he would infer, that becauſe the ſame numerical finite Subſtance is but in one Perſon, therefore infinite muſt be ſo too.

Obj. But he would perſwade, that if, by reaſon of the Difference between finite and infinite, there is a Difference between the Number of Perſons, that the Subſtance is in; it would follow, that the Difference of Number is infinite, becauſe the infinite Diſtance betwixt theſe would ſuppoſe this.

Anſw. This Reaſoning of his is vain and falſe as the former, for as Scripture is expreſs in it, that there's Three, and no greater Number of Perſons in God, than three, viz. Father, Son, and Spirit; ſo we have ſhewn how ſanctified Reaſon ſweetly complies with with divine Revelation in giving us clear Ideas of it, how Three and no more than Three perſonal Properties may emane or flow from divine Eſſence, as terminating it ſelf by eſſential internal Acts upon it ſelf.

Obj. But ſuppoſe the Author ſhould here object, if three relative Properties or Perſonalities flow from divine Eſſence by means of reflex acts of Eſſence; how comes it to paſs that theſe do not in like manner flow from angelical or humane Eſſence, reflecting on it ſelf after a like manner by the like Acts?

Anſw. There's not the like Reaſon for it. 1. Becauſe theſe internal reflex Acts of Intellection and Dilection in the angelical and humane Nature, are but accidental acts, and moſt frequently intermitted, and therefore cannot propagate Perſonalities; but in the Divine Nature theſe are eſſential eternal acts, and therefore may (I had almoſt ſaid muſt) propagate ſomething (viz.) in that Nature whence they emane, and whereon they terminate. 2. Theſe reflex acts in the Creatures, at leaſt in our ſelves, are very imperfect, and cannot produce an expreſs Image of that which reflects, on the Nature as reflected on, and conſequently not a Perſon: But in God theſe are moſt perfect, and therefore produce that expreſs Image which is a Perſon, and ſo the Son is ſtiled, Heb. 1. 3. The expreſs Image of the Father's Perſon. 3. We have ſhew'd before, that angelical or humane Eſſence being finite, and having Terms, muſt therefore, where-ever it terminates, or where the utmoſt Bounds of its Extenſion are, propagate Modal Subſiſtence or Perſonality for to terminate ſuch Eſſence; but the divine Eſſence, infinitely exceeding all ſuch Bounds and Limits, cannot in this way (ſuited only to a finite Creature) propagate the ſame; but doth it after an higher way, ſuited to infinite immenſe Being. And here I would demand of the Author, either to ſhew us the way wherein infinite eſſence doth this, ſeeing it's undenyable that it muſt be different from this of finite Beings; or elſe give us ſome pregnant Reaſons, why it may not do it by terminating it ſelf upon it ſelf, with the aforeſaid reflex acts, or elſe ingenuouſly confeſs, that a Trinity of Perſons, or which is the ſame, Father, Son, and Spirit in one and the ſame ſingular divine Eſſence is not only clearly reveal'd in the written Word, but is likewiſe very fully conſiſtent with true Reaſon and the Light of Nature, as elevated and improved by divine Revelation; and that he hath greateſt Cauſe to be humbled, for his bold blaſphemous Oppoſitions to ſo great and clear a Truth.

Obj. And thus, having diſcovered the Falſehood of his grand Concluſion, §. 35. I proceed to take notice of ſome few things more in this Chapter, eſpecially in §. 33. where we find him thus reaſoning.—If a Perſon be a Subſtance, there must be three Subſtances, becauſe Subſtance is contained in the Idea of Perſon, and conſequently, as many Subſtances as Perſons; all that we apprehend of a divine Subſtance is, that he is a Subject, in which all the divine Attributes exiſt; that Perſon is the very ſame, and theſe are only different Words to expreſs the divine Being by, whence he would infer (moſt blaſphemouſly) §. 34. That a Trinity of Perſons in one Subſtance, is nothing leſs than a Trinity of Contradictions.

Anſw. But I muſt tell the Author, that the whole of this his Diſcourſe and Reaſoning, is full of Confuſion, Deceit, and Error, and might, at leaſt, in Part, have been rectified by himſelf, had he been well vers'd in ſound Philoſophy, and if he had but aſſented to ſome common Maxims granted by learned Men; for, 1. He confounds Subſtance and ſubſtantial Nature or Eſſence, as when he makes it to be the proper Subject of eſſential Attributes: So p. 28. of his Book, §. 85. he tells us, If the Father communicated his Eſſence to the Son, he communicated himſelf, who is no way diſtinct from the Eſſence; but Philoſophers tell him (ſee Gliſſon de Nat. Subſt. p. 6.) that Subſtance is made up of two Principles, which they call Rudimenta Subſtantialia (viz.) ſubſtantial Eſſence, and modal Subſiſtence, which, in Rational Nature, is call'd Perſonality, and ſo would have taught, that he ought not to confound theſe, viz. the Part with the Whole, or Principium cum Principiato, which none but a Novice in Philoſophy would have done. 2. Having (as before) confounded or identified compleat Subſtance or ſubſtantial Eſſence, he confounds again this his Subſtance and ſubſtantial Eſſence, with Perſon or Perſonality, contrary to the Rules of all Philoſophy, yea, even of ſuch as relate to created Subſtances (about which he takes his Ideas to be moſt clear, and boaſts of them as common Ideas of all Mankind,) for might he not have found Philoſophers not concern'd about the Trinity, from meer Dictates of Reaſon and natural Light, telling him (viz.) that eſſentia ſubſtantialis eſt ſingularis ſubſtantia continens integram individui entitatem. Or, abſtracto ſumptam, ſeu totum id quod abſtrahiturè ſuppoſito: And that Modal Subſiſtence, Suppoſitality,, or (which in Rational Nature is the ſame) Perſonality, is Modus ab eſſentia ſubſtantiali reſultans, eam que quod ammodo terminans; and that it is, To • um id post abſtractionem minutilum in ſuppoſito reſiduum, quod eſſentiae additum eam concertioni reſtituit. All which is ſo clear, that if he dare yet venture to deny any Part of it, I hope he may, by one familiar Inſtance, be forc't to confeſs the Truth, and correct his Error, or elſe expoſe himſelf to the general Scorn of Manking: We ſay that Homo habet Humanitatem, or which is the ſame, eſſentiam humanam ſubſtantialem: It is the common Language of Men, that Man is that Perſon, who hath ſubſtantial humane Eſſence: But ſhould the Author ſay, that Homo habet hominem, that Man hath Man, or that humane Perſon, which is himſelf, would he not render himſelf too apertly ridiculous to all Manking? And doth not this undenyably evince, that there is more in the Perſon of a Man as being the totum cotinens, than there is in ſubſtantial humane Eſſence, which is but pars contenta; for ſubſtantial humane Eſſence can be nothing but Eſſence; but Man beſides that Eſſence hath Perſonality, and is made up of both, as conſtituent Principles; and this is ſtill further evinced, both by the the vulgar Definition that is given of a Perſon, viz. that he is, ſubſtantia intellectualis naturae ſingularis incommunicabilis, and alſo by that which Writers in Theology generally give of a divine Perſon, viz. that he is, eſſentia Dei prout eſt cum proprietate hypoſtatica, or to that purpoſe; and theſe I was more willing to lay down here, not only for fuller Explication of the matter in hand, but alſo becauſe the Author ſeems to call for them, in the Concluſion of his Letter, §. 36. telling us, that according to theſe Ideas we have of Subſtance, or (as he means) ſubſtantial Eſſence and Perſon, it is a flat Contradiction to ſay there are three of the one, and but one of the other; and that if we have no Ideas, we talk like Parrots, when we affirm or deny any thing concerning any thing we have no Ideas of: Therefore, 1. I would, by theſe Definitions, let the Author ſee (tho he cannot here pretend Ignorance, becauſe they are the vulgar Definitions) that we have Ideas of Subſtance and Perſon; yea, clear Ideas, tho not ſuch as his.

2. Whereas he ſaith, according to thoſe Ideas we have of Subſtance and Perſon; • e ſhould have ſaid from thoſe groſs Ideas▪ which my ſelf and the Anti-trinitarian Faction have of Subſtance and Perſon, ſuch a Concluſion as that before (ſo blaſphemous that I tremble to write it) may be inferred; no wonder, when theſe ſay that the Idea of ſubſtantial Eſſence, Subſtance and Perſon, is entirely one and the ſame, and confound one of theſe with another, contrary to common Senſe and Reaſon, as we have ſhewn; but for him to ſay, that according to thoſe Ideas which we have of Subſtance, Perſon, &c. If he mean the vulgar Ideas of the beſt and moſt acurate Divines and Philoſophers, as he ſeems to do; then I muſt tell him, 1. That it is but one of his cunning falſe Tricks, by ranking himſelf in the Number of theſe, to inſinuate into his incautious Reader, that his Idea of Subſtance and Perſon are the ſame with the vulgar Ideas of the beſt Divines and Philoſophers; when it's evident, from the aforeſaid Definitions, they are not the ſame; for his Idea of Perſon is no way diſtinct from that of ſubſtantial Eſſence, as he doth expreſly acknowledge, when he tells us, p. 23. §. 85. That God the Father is no ways diſtinct from his Eſſence; but now the Idea of Philoſophers as well as Divines, according to the ſaid vulgar Definitions, is diſtinct, becauſe their Idea of ſubſtantial Eſſence, being but one (tho the chief) Rudiment of a Perſon, doth exclude the Idea of Modal Subſiſtence or Perſonality; the other Rudiment, as hath been ſhewn, when yet the Idea of Perſon (as is granted) does include both. And I pray then, how are theſe the ſame? 2. Having thus declard what our true Ideas are of ſubſtanti • l Eſſence, Subſtance, Perſon, and differenc'd them from his falſe Ideas; I would now know of him, what flat Contradiction there is in our affirming Three Perſons, and yet but one ſubſtantial Eſſence or Subſtance in God; and we ſhall ſee how he makes this out, §. 37. He reaſons thus. If the Perſons are the ſame Subſtance, or (which is the ſame in his Senſe) ſubſtantial Eſſence, then the ſame Subſtance or ſubſtantial Eſſence, is begotten and unbegotten, and yet neither of theſe, but proceeding, ſelf-exiſtent, and not ſelf-exiſtent, incarnate and not incarnate; is this his flat Contradiction? A very Smatterer in Logick would ſoon tell him, that however it be a Contradiction to ſay that ſuch oppoſite predicates' poſſunt attribui eidem, ſecundum idem, ad idem, eodem modo, & tempore, yet to ſay, they may be attributed to the ſame Subject, provided it be not ſecundum idem, or ad idem, eodem modo, is no Contradiction at all, as is granted by all, and as may be evinced by thouſands of Inſtances; why then may not the divine Eſſence, as it is with the perſonal Property of Father, be ſaid to be unbegotten, as it is with the perſonal Property of Son, be ſaid to be begotten, or conceived (and if he mean no more by his ſelf-exiſtent and not ſelf-exiſtent, then the Caſe is alike: But if he take them in a different Senſe, they will not be found to be the diſtinct Predicates of the divine Perſons) and ſo, why may not the ſame divine Eſſence, under a different Mode or perſonal Property, or as belov'd with a Love of infinite Delight and Complacency, be ſtill the ſame Eſſence, but neither as unbegotten, nor as begotten, but as proceeding? And ſo in like manner, may not the divine Eſſence, as it is with the perſonal Property of the Son, be incarnate, yet the ſame divine Eſſence, as it is with the perſonal Property of Father and Holy Ghoſt be not incarnate? Is there any thing of Contradiction in all this? No Man that knows what a Contradiction is, unleſs a deceitful Sophiſter, who would impoſe on others his own Sophiſms, would aſſert it; when theſe contrary Predicates are predicated of the ſame Subject; not in one and the ſame reſpect, but under ſuch different Reſpects as that Subject hath to different Perſons. Are not theſe very Predicates, viz. to be begotten, and not begotten; to beget, and not to beget (to uſe a familiar Inſtance) in like manner, truly attributed to the Nature of Iſaac? Do we not truly ſay, that as it related to Abraham, it was begotten, but did not beget, and as it related to Jacob, that it did beget, but was not begotten.—As to what he adds, that there could not any Attributes or Modes, or anything that inheres in a Subſtance be begot, becauſe they cannot ſubſiſt by themſelves: How falſe this is, and contrary to all ſound Reaſon, may appear, even from phyſical Generations, which are no other than ſeveral progreſſive Motions from one eſſential Mode to another; for the Matter it ſelf is not generated, but only the eſſential Mode or Form, which being educed out of the Power of the Matter, does not ſubſiſt of it ſelf, but inheres in the Matter, by Vertue whereof the Compound itſelf is ſaid to be generated, as being ſpecificated by it. His Diſcourſe in the laſt §. of this Chapter, viz. 38. is as vain as the former, yea, it is ſuch as is grounded on a meer Sophiſm, viz. that there's no Diſtinction of Perſons in God, becauſe every Perſon is the divine Subſtance, which is three different ways the ſame, that is, three different ways one; whereas if he would have reaſoned fairly, he ſhould have ſaid, that every Perſon is the divine Subſtance, as it three different ways the ſame or one; but then this Concluſion, as hath been ſhewn, being falſe, which ſhould be the Foundation of all that follows, the whole Superſtructure built on it, as his Multiplication without Addition, and his Subſtraction without Diminution, muſt fall with it, and ſo the Falſehood and Sophiſtry of his other Reaſoning would clearly have been detected as now it is, there being a vaſt Difference betwixt thoſe two ways and Modes of ſpeaking, viz. every Perſon is that divine Subſtance which is three different ways the ſame (which imports no more, than that it is that divine Subſtance which ſubſiſts in three Perſons, and which is common to three) which is a manifeſt Truth; and that every Perſon is the divine Subſtance Subſtance, as it is three different ways the ſame (which imports that every Perſon being the ſame with the divine Subſtance, as ſubſiſting in one way, as for example, with that Mode of Subſiſtance which is peculiar to the Son, is the ſame with that divine Subſtance, as ſubſiſting in another way, as for example, with that Mode of Subſiſtence which is peculiar to the Father) which is a manifeſt Untruth: And ſo to father Contradictions on us, he'll ſpeak them himſelf, and then make us ſpeak them whether we will or no.

Obj. Thus, having done with his third Chapter, we proceed to his Reflections on the Adimadverter's Hypotheſis, chap. 4. p. 12. where I ſhall briefly take notice of his trifling Diſcourſe, without taking on me to defend the Animadverter's Hypotheſis, which I have not ſeen, ſave only ſo far as to vindicate it, as here repreſented by the Author, from ſome unjuſt Aſperſions which he ſeeks to caſt upon it; and whereas, §. 39. he tells us, the common Opinion of the Trinitarians, even from the Beginning (if we may believe the Animadverter) has been, that the three Perſons are not three Subſtances, Attributes, Properties, or any real but incompleat Beings, viz. three Modes, and if the Perſons are no more than three Modes, then the Difference is but a trifling Difference.

Anſw. But doth not this Author ſhamefully wrong the Animadverter, in making him ſay, that the three Perſons are no more than three Modes? Did ever any Trinicarian or Man of common Senſe talk at that rate? But as if he were afraid of being call'd to account for ſuch falſe Aſperſions, he tells us afterward in the ſame Section, viz. But it's ſaid, a Perſon is not a meer Mode, but the divine Subſtance with a peculiar Mode. It's well he's brought at laſt to make a true Repreſentation of the Trinitarians Doctrine, and thereby to confute his own Calumny: And what hath he now to ſay againſt this, that a Perſon is not a meer Mode, but the divine Subſtance, with a peculiar Mode? He ſaith, that if each Perſon is the divine Subſtance, he muſt have in him all the Modes; an admirable Inference, If Perſon be divine Subſtance with one Mode, then he's divine Subſtance, as with all Modes. If this be not to ſpeak Contradictions, I know not what is; but he would back his abſurd Inference with a Reaſon, That Perſon muſt have all the Modes, becauſe he is the divine Subſtance in which the Modes ſubſiſt; this Reaſon is juſt like the former, as if Perſon, who is the divine Subſtance, as limited with one Mode or relative Property, is the divine Subſtance, not as limited with one, but three relative Modes or Properties: A downright Contradiction. One ſhould think this Man, who is ſo ready to charge others with flat Contradictions, ſhould better have ſenced himſelf againſt venting Contradictions at this rate; but before I paſs on, I would take notice of another Paſſage of his in this Section, not much ſhort of the former for Abſurdity, wherein, ſpeaking of theſe relative Modes, he ſaith, two of which may be abſent without the leaſt Alteration in the divine Subſtance or Properties: He might as well have ſaid, that where there is the Foundation of Sonſhip, yet the relative Property of Son doth not reſult or flow from it; which, according to the Senſe of all Mankind, is impoſſible.

Obj. What the Author ſaith, §. 40. I ſhall take up when I come to the following Chapter, and ſo ſhall next conſider what he ſaith, §. 41. where he reaſons thus. If there be any Thought, Word, or any of thoſe Actions that are proper to intelligent Beings, that belongs to the one and not to the other, it ſhews that they are more than diſtinct Modes, they are diſtinct intelligent ſubſtantial Beings; and are not the Father and Son in Scripture frequently oppoſed to one another, as intelligent Beings? The Father's knowing and loving the Son, is not the Son's knowing and loving the Father; but each has a numerical diſtinct Knowledge, and conſequently, diſtinct Eſſence.

Anſw. The whole of this his reaſoning is idle and perverſe like the former, and is grounded on either a groſly ignorant, or a wilful Miſtake of the Trinitarians Doctrine: The divine Acts or Operations, according to theſe, are either ad intra or ad extra; the Author's Diſcourſe, in the Beginning of the following Chapter, relates to thoſe ad extra, where we ſhall conſider them; but his Diſcourſe here, to thoſe ad intra, as the Father's knowing and loving the Son, the Son's knowing and loving the Father: Now theſe are acts of the divine Nature or Eſſence as reflecting on it ſelf, and lay the Foundations of relative Properties never to be altered, becauſe from theſe acts and their terms the perſonal Properties reſult, as hath been ſhewn before; therefore, according to his Doctrine, theſe internal acts, are in Nature before the perſonal Properties, or Perſonality: And yet (according to Scripture Phraſe) they are attributed to each Perſon with reſpect to another, in as much as each Perſon hath the divine Eſſence, with its Acts and Operations, under a relative Mode appropriated to him; and ſo the Father is ſaid to love the Son, and the Son to love the Father: How, I pray? What, as this Author would have it, with two acts of Love really and numerically diſtinct, and theſe as flowing either from two meer Modes, or if not ſo, from two really and numerically diſtinct Eſſences? How abſurd is all this, when it's evident to any Smatterer in Theology, that the internal acts thenſelves are of the divine Eſſence, and only their Diſtinction from relative Modes; ſo that there's no need either of more numerically diſtinct Eſſences for Performance of theſe acts, or to have them attributed to meer Modes, or to have the divine Perſon ungodded, and their true Subject deſtroyed, as this Author does vainly and idly pretend. What he adds, § 42. is to no more purpoſe, unleſs he could prove that we make the divine Acts, Titles, Attributes, of one Perſon really diſtinct from the Acts, Titles, Attributes, of another, which he can never do. The Author, in his following §. viz. 43. would make the World believe that the Orthodox were forced to this way of explicating themſelves about the Trinity, becauſe they had no other way to keep up the Face of a Trinity, and avoid profeſſing the apparent Tritheiſm of the Nicene Fathers, who held the Three Almighty ſubſtantial Perſons, were no otherwiſe one God, than becauſe they had the ſame common Nature, even as Three Men having the ſame Humane Nature, are but one Man.

Anſw. Not to mention here the old falſe Trick of ſeeking from the multiplying of Perſons in God to multiply Subſtances, and Almighties: As to that open Tritheiſm of the Nicene Fathers, as holding the Three Perſons, no otherwiſe one God, than as Three Men partaking of one common Humane Nature, are one Man, it is ſuch an impudent ſhameleſs Calumny, that it can deſerve no other Anſwer, than to have the Brand of a notorious Lye ſet upon it; ſuch a falſe and blaſphemous Notion, as that God ſhould be a Genus to more divine Perſons, ſo as Man is a Genus to ſingular Men, I know not whether it ever entred into the Heart of any; but that it ſhould be the Notion of the Nicene Fathers, and entertain'd by them, is ſo expreſly contrary to their Canons, and the Orthodox Doctrine of the Fathers at that time, that it needs no further Confutation.

Obj. As to what is added by the Author, §. 44. (beſides his Reproaches which will light on himſelf) there's nothing but what we have had before over and over, and hath been ſo fully anſwered, in our having ſhewn that the glorious Almithty Being, doth not propagate Perſonality, by Termination of Extenſion, ſo as a finite rational Being doth, and that it's highly conſiſtent both with Scripture and Reaſon, and that he doth this by the aforeſaid reflex Acts, terminated on himſelf, that no more needs be added here. But, §. 45. he tells us, that granting there are never ſo many Modes, yet if each Perſon has the divine Subſtance, he muſt neceſſarily have all the Modes, becauſe they are Modes of the divine Subſtance; each Perſon has the divine Subſtance as limited by a peculiar Mode, or relative Property, and therefore cannot poſſibly have all the Modes, quite contrary to what is abſurdly inferred by this Author.

Anſ. I come now to Chapter 5. to weigh the Author's ReflectionsOn Ch. 5. on the Hypotheſis of Dr. W. S. of the Author of the Trinity placed in its due Light, and the reſt of the Nominal Trinitarians.

In this Chapter the Author tells us, that beſides the Abettors of this Opinion, there are a great many Trinitarians, who no otherwiſe differ from the Ʋnitarians but in Name, whoſe Trinities they not only allow, but contend for: ſome of them ſay (and Dr. Wallis hath writ in Defence of it) That the three Perſons are only three external Denominations of God, according to the three different Operations of his Goodneſs towards his Creatures, in creating, redeeming, and ſanctifying them; a little after he ſaith, Others ſay, that the three Perſons are the ſame in God as Faculties in Man (viz.) Ʋnderſtanding, Will, and Memory: Others, that the three Perſons are the three Attributes of God, Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs: Here you have his Charge. But,

Anſw. 1. I ſhall believe it to be a falſe Charge, ſo prone I find him to charge things on the Trinitarians, till ſuch time as he doth quote the Author, at leaſt his Book and Page where the Mattter charged is expreſly contained. (2.) Tho I readily grant that thoſe three Denominations of Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, are three external Denominations of God, according to the different Operations of his Goodneſs towards his Creatures, in creating, redeeming, and ſanctifying them; yea, and that theſe three different Operations, Imo omnes operationes ad extra (according to Scripture, Joh. 13. chap. chap. 5. 17. and the granted Maxim) ſunt trium perſonarum communes, yet withal I affirm, that in reſpect of the Order that is amongſt the three Perſons, the Holy Scriptures do in a more ſpecial manner appropriate the firſt kind of theſe Actions, as the Acts of Creation to God the Father, as firſt Perſon; and thoſe which in Nature are next to theſe, as of Preſervation and Redemption, to God the Son; and thoſe which come laſt in Order, as the ultimate compleating Acts, to God the Holy Ghoſt; and accordingly do appropriate the external Denominations of Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifyer, as reſulting from the ſaid Acts. But that any Man of common Senſe holding the Doctrine of the Trinity, ſhould affirm, that the Three Perſons are only three external Denominations of God, according to his ſaid different Operations, I am far from believing. (3.) Tho I grant, that ſome, who aſſert a Trinity of Perſons in God, may tell us, that theſe Three glorious Perſons in God, are repreſented by thoſe three Faculties in Man, viz. Underſtanding, Will, and Memory, or theſe three Attributes of God, Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, but that theſe ſhould ſay, that the Three Perſons are the ſame as Faculties in Man, viz. Underſtanding, Will, and Memory; or that they are thoſe three Attributes of God, Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, I cannot believe; but ſhall rather account, that he ſaith (till he make it good) a meer Calumny. And now being ſo perſwaded as I am, I might juſtly deſiſt from giving my ſelf any further Trouble in this Place, ſave for ſome few Paſſages in this Chapter, which I may not wholly paſs over: One is in §. 46. A Queſtion grounded on his own falſe Hypotheſis (viz.) of there being no other Trinity but of infinite Goodneſs, Wiſdom, and Power, in one divine Being; Hence he puts the Queſtion, Is it not Idolatry to pay divine Worſhip to three Beings, each of which (ſince each is God) has infinite Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs?

It's granted, that to pay divine Worſhip to Three Beings, whatever Attributes we cloath them with, is Idolatry; but to pay divine Worſhip to Three glorious Perſons, Father, Son, and Spirit, who are one and the ſame divine Being, and ſo equally ſhare in all the glorious Attributes, and infinite Perfections of that Being, is that true Worſhip, which the Holy Scriptures, and the infallibly inſpired Pen-men of it, have preſcribed to us; and to call this Idolatry, is the higheſt Blaſphemy, tending to overthrow the very Foundations of the Chriſtian Religion, and of the Chriſtian Faith.

Obj. But this Author propounds another Queſtion, viz. If there be but one Being with infinite Ʋunderſtanding, is it not unlawful to adore three ſuch Beings, each of which has an unlimited Ʋnderſtanding?

Anſw. If this Author had propounded this Queſtion to Dr. Sherlock, or ſome, whom he ſtiles real Trinitarians, he might perhaps have had ſome Grounds for it; but to propound it to thoſe, with whom he hath to do in this Place (when he knows they grant as fully as himſelf, or any Unitarian can do, that it's unlawful to adore Three Beings, each of which has an unlimited Underſtanding) is not only a frivolous idle Queſtion, but on his part very malicious, as importing that thoſe, whom he ſtiles nominal Trinitarians, do this, when he knows the contrary; that he knows the contrary, is evident from his own following Words, wherein he tells us, that the Trinitarians are really as zealous as they pretend to be, to defend the ſacred Truth of only one divine Being: Well then, if theſe Trinitarians be zealous Aſſerters of only one divine Being, as well as his Unitarians, how comes he to ask them, if it be not unlawful to adore three ſuch Beings? As if they did this, when he knows they abhor it. But this Author will tell us here,

Object. 1. That it's not in Sincerity, but only in Pretence, that theſe Trinitarians ſeem zealous in Defence of one Being.

Anſ. If he could make the World believe, that theſe mean the ſame by Being, as they do by Perſon, which in this very Place he does cunningly, but moſt falſly inſinuate in his Jumbling thoſe two Terms together, Being or Perſon, as if they were the ſame in the Language of Trinitarians as well as Unitarians: Then he might well perſwade, that their Zeal, for Defence of one Being, whilſt they aſſert Three Perſons in God, was but a pretended Zeal; But when he knows that all theſe do aſſert Three Perſons in God, yet but one Being, then what leſs can his charging theſe with want of Sincerity in their Defence of one Being, be, but meer Calumny? His other railing Language in this §. hath, for its Foundation, not the true Doctrine of the Trinitarians, but his own ignorant or wilful Miſtakes about that Doctrine. But, 2. I proceed to conſider, what this Author lays down i • the two laſt Sections of this Chapter, §. 47, 48. One while he repreſents theſe Trinitarians as ſuch, to whom the Unitarians owe their utmoſt Acknowledgment for vindicating their way of Worſhip, and for joyning with them againſt the Politheiſts, and diſguiſed Pagans (as Dr. Sherlock) Another while as the ſame with Polytheiſts or diſguiſed Pagans, or as he means, with the real Trinitarians. Again, he tells us, he knows not under what Head to rank theſe who will be thought to be neither real nor nominal Trinitarians; he thinks they believe no Trinity at all, that they are forced, in adoring the Trinity, to confeſs they adore an unconceivable Myſtery, which is only worſhiping of Words and Sounds, or a Trinity of Cyphers; that if they declare what the Three are, they muſt inevitably run into Polytheiſm or Unitarianiſm; that in ſaying the firſt of the Three is God the Father, the ſecond God the Son, the third is God the Spirit, they make them Three Gods, whom they equally adore: And p. 16. he aske what theſe Three are, Father, Son, and Spirit; Are they three Gods, three Parts of God, three Properties, three Names? And concludes in a ſcoffing way, that it ſeems, the whole Myſtery of the Trinity lyeth in this, tho' every one can tell what each of the three is, yet none can tell what three they are, or how they are three.

You ſee how this Author runs on in his old Cant, refuſing to take in any Satisfaction as to his Doubts and Queries abou the Trinity, which he might have done a thouſand times from the Writings of eminent Divines on this Subject, had he been deſirous to be informed, or to have had his Doubts ſatisfied, as he pretends to be. For,

1. Do they not tell him, that the Three, who bear Record in Heaven, viz. the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghoſt, are Three Perſons in one God-head? And does he not know that they ſay ſo? Why then does he propoſe thoſe idle Queſtions, Are they three Gods, three Parts of God, three Properties or Powers of God, three Names; and why does he bely them, when in Anſwer to that Queſtion, What Sort of three are they, He makes them ſay that's impoſſible to be known?

2. Do they not tell him likewiſe, that theſe Three Perſons are one and the ſame great and bleſſed God, and yet diſtinguiſhed from each other by perſonal Properties? that the firſt Perſon or Father is God, as limited with the perſonal Property of begetting or conceiving; that the ſecond is God, as limited with the perſonal Property of being begotten; that the third is God, as limited with the perſonal Property of proceeding from Father and Son, and of being ſent as Comforter; ſo that one Perſon cannot be another Perſon, and yet all the Three are one and the ſame bleſſed God?

Object. 3. Let me add, Is it only theſe Divines that ſpeak thus, or is it not the divinely inſpired Pen-men of the Holy Scripture, who ſpeak the ſame? The Author of the Epiſtle to the Hebrews, doth he not tell chap. 1. v. 3. That the Son is the expreſs Image of his Father's Perſon; and can he be a Son, repreſenting as a lively Image, the Perſon of his Father, and yet not a diſtinct Perſon? Doth not St. John, chap. 1. expreſly tell us, that the Word was made Fleſh, and was this the Father, or the only begotten of the Father? See v. 14. This only begotten of the Father, when in the Humane Nature he was baptized, was he not a diſtinct Perſon from the Perſon of the Father, teſtifying of him by a Voice from Heaven, This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleaſed? And was he not a diſtinct Perſon from the Holy Ghoſt, who deſcended in a bodily Shape like a Dove upon him? Luke 3. 21, 22. And does not our Lord Chriſt himſelf, when ſpeaking of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, clearly diſtinguiſh theſe as Three Perſons, in telling us, John 14. 26. But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will ſend in my Name, he ſhall teach you all things; have we not here the Perſon ſending, the Perſon ſent, and the Perſon in whoſe Name he's ſent? But what need I thus argue for a Diſtinction of Perſons? I don't at all queſtion here, but this Author will readily grant, that the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghoſt, as ſet forth in Scripture, are three different Perſons, for he tells us, P. 32. §. 94. It is evident that in Scripture, God the Father is as much diſtinguiſh'd from the Son as two Men or Angels can be; and Mankind that are incapable of apprehending Metaphyſical Niceties, cannot but conceive them ſo; and hence it is (as we have ſhewn before) that he makes God and the Father, or Perſon of the Father, equivalent Terms, ſo excluding the Son and bleſſed Spirit from being God, or equal to the Father, ſo that he owns them no otherwiſe to be Three Perſons, than as three Beings or Subſtances, which do really differ one from another.

Anſw. You will thus ſee at length, what this Author is, and how his ſometimes ſeemingly applauded Unitarianiſm ends in Arianiſm; and the Truth is, the very worſt Dregs of the Poyſon of his Doctrine lye here, not in his denying any Trinity of Perſons, but his denying a Trinity of Perſons in the Unity of the divine Eſſence; he can be well enough content that the Word be the Perſon incarnate, the Holy▪ Ghoſt the Comforter, or Perſon ſent, ſo he can but ſtrip them of their Divinity, or make that Divinity, which the Scripture ſeems (as he grants) to aſcribe to them, to agree to them only in a tropical or figurative Senſe; but to aſcribe this truly to them, together with proper divine Worſhip, this he makes to be Idolatry. Here,

1. I would have it noted (that I may meet with and refute his Railery, which hath diffuſed it ſelf through a great Part of his Pamphlet) that when this Author ſpeaks of the Trinitarian's worſhiping the Three Perſons, as Three diſtinct Almighty Beings, as Three Gods, as Three compleat diſtinct Objects of Worſhip, and as paying at other times divine Worſhip to one of them, and at the ſame time not paying it to another, that all this is meer Calumny, and hath not a Word of Truth in it; they worſhip indeed Three Perſons as they are one and the ſame Almighty Being or God, but not as Three Almighty Beings or Gods, ſuch Tritheiſm they abhor as much as himſelf or any other. They worſhip Three Perſons, what, as three diſtinct Objects of Worſhip? No, but as all three in Conjunction, making up the one great compleat and adequate Object of our Worſhip; they worſhip the Son and bleſſed Spirit as well as Father; but do they, when they worſhip the Son, not worſhip the Father and bleſſed Spirit at the ſame time? Or when they worſhip the bleſſed Spirit, do they not worſhip the Father and the Son at the ſame time, as this Author would Perſuade? That's falſe; yea, it's impoſſible that divine Worſhip ſhould be paid to one of theſe, and not to another, when the Three are but one and the ſame God, bleſſed for ever.

Obj. Here I would ask this Author, when he does in Worſhip apply himſelf to God as our great Redeemer, does he in his ſo doing exclude God our Creator from ſharing in that Worſhip? Or when he doth in a more ſpecial manner apply himſelf to God as our Sanctifier, doth he by ſo doing exclude God our Creator and Redeemer from ſharing in that Worſtip? And muſt he, for this his applying himſelf unto God under theſe different Reſpects, needs be a Polytheiſt and an Idolater? If not, why then muſt Trinitarians be ſuch for applying themſelves in divine Worſhip to the Perſon of the Son, or of the bleſſed Spirit? If he ſay it is becauſe three divine Perſons are three Gods,

Anſw. This is moſt falſe▪ moſt repugnant to Deſcriptions given by all ſound Trinitarians of divine Perſons, and hath fully been anſwered, and therefore I ſhall here paſs it over as a meer Calumny.

2. I would have it noted, that when the Author tells us, §. 47, that the Notions of the Trinitarians, when apply'd to the Incarnation and Satisfaction, must be very uncouth; and further, that when they ſpeak of theſe, and when they endeavour to prove the Spirit and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to be Perſons, that then they are real Trinitarians; that is, ſuch (in his Language) as ſet up three Gods; and further adds, §. 48. that theſe, who will be thought to be neither real nor nominal Trinitarians, cannot properly be ſaid to believe any Trinity, except at the moſt a Trinity of Cyphers, and that (as he thinks) it cannot be preſumed that Men of ſo great Senſe (to mention no other than Sarum and Worceſter) would aſſert ſo abſurd a thing, but that they knew, if they declared what they ſuppoſe the three to be, they muſt inevitably run into Polytheiſm or Ʋnitarianiſm.