IN the beginning of the Introduction, p. 3. § 1, 2. theOn Ch. 1. Author would make the World believe that his design in this Letter is to get the best Light and Information he can to promote his Eternal Happiness; and to engage the Learned Persons to whom he Writes, to comply with his desires in ta­king opportunity to satisfy him, and a great number of Pious Men who are affected with the same doubts, occasioned by Di­visions amongst the Clergy about the Doctrine of the Trinity.

Answ. Had the Author acted with like Modesty in other parts of his Letter as he does here, there might have been some ground to hope, that he had truly desired for to get his doubts satisfied; but when he dares be so bold as to Assert frequent­ly, that the Doctrine of the Trinity is no better than a bundle of flat Contradictions, Who can believe that he had any other design in Writing, than to vent his blasphemous Invectives against the Ever-blessed God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost?

His Discourse §. 3. is idle vain Discourse; for where will he find any Persons who pretend to believe they know not what, (i. e.) empty sounds, or words that have no Ideas fixed to them? If he have met with any such Asses, he should tell us who they are, and not cast false Reflections upon all those Learned Writers who have writ upon, and by undeniable Proofs from Holy Scripture defended the Churches received Doctrine about the Trinity.

His Discourse p. 4. § 4, 5. is to the like purpose, and such wherein he shews himself a false Calumniator; for whereas he would perswade, that new and wrong Trinities are dayly encreasing, Authors having such different Ideas of them, that there are almost as many Trinities as Writers; and so would make it be believ'd, that they do but ridicule the Christian Religion and render it most absurd and irrational, in obliging People to put their trust in Three they know not what, and to pay Di­vine Worship to each of them, when the meer Light of Na­ture obligeth Man not to Adore for God any thing but what he believes to be an Omniscient and an Omnipotent Being, able to Know and Relieve his Wants; and that to pay Worship to any thing else, is Idolatry.

Ans. 1 It's a gross and abominable untruth, that there are almost as many Trinities as Writers about them; I could easily shew that Learned and Orthodox Divines generally do sweetly ac­cord in their Judgments about the Trinity; and what if some few be found who differ from these, must therefore the Ortho­dox Doctrine be rejected? Where will he find that Christian Doctrine which hath not been depraved and corrupted by some or others?

Ans. 2 But Secondly, Where will he find such Writers about the Trinity, who would oblige People to put their Trust in Three they know not what; and to Adore any for God but an Om­nipotent Omniscient Being? As I do believe he cannot find one Writer about the Trinity who doth this, therefore must it not be gross Calumny to Charge all with this?

What follows in p. 4. N. 6, 7. (viz.) That the Trinitarians only agree in the same words, that scarce three of these venture to explain themselves being of the same Mind, and they that have [Page 3] published what they supposed the Three are, have faln into gross Contradictions, plain Polytheism, or Sabellianism, that they destroy one anothers Hypotheses, but raise none; needs no other Answer than to tell the Author, all such Assertions are meer Falshoods, and such as the greatest part of his Book is stuffed with, as will hereafter be more fully evidenced.

We proceed then to Chapter II. and the Author's Reason­ingsOn Ch. [...]. upon the Athanasian Creed. And here we must tell the Author, that if there be any Jangling amongst late Writers about the meaning of the word (Person) it is to be lamented; yet is this no great Argument that they do not believe the Athanasian Creed, Which saith, We are compell'd by the Christian Verity to acknowledge every Person to be by himself God; because doubtless all the said Writers whatever else they may differ in, yet do acknowledge the same Christian Verity; yea, we do humbly conceive that there is not any Writer about the Holy Trinity worthy to be taken notice of, but he do's ac­knowledge a Divine Person to be an Uncreate, Eternal, In­comprehensible, Almighty Being, yea God Blessed for ever: And that it would be Idolatry to Worship him if he were not such; but the Author in asking, Is it not a Demonstration, that those that pay the highest Adoration to a Person, have no different Ideas of God and a Divine Person? speaks not so right and ac­curately; because altho these by Adoring a Divine Person do acknowledge him to be God, yet they do not say that he is God, as absolutely considered, but as limited by a Relative Property, and so the Ideas may differ: Therefore his follow­ing Discourse, that we cannot have an higher Idea of God than that he is such a Person, and to frame any other, it must be one that is lower, and consequently Blasphemy against God; is but vain, and idle Discourse; for neither the one nor the other of these Ideas is either higher or lower, but equal; the one being of God as absolutely considered, the other of him as limited by a Personal Property; and this he must be ei­ther forced to confess, or deny that Scripture Phil. 2. 6. who being in the form of God thought it no robbery to be equal with God; for Ideas of Equals must be Equal.

Obj. As to what he adds—If a Person be God there can be no real difference between them; for which he quotes Heb. 1. 3. Col. 1. 15.

Answ. That Phrase (Real difference) is Homonymous; for if by real difference be meant such, as that which is Rei a Re, we grant there is no real difference, because God and a Divine Person, or first and second Person, are not different Things or Beings; but if by real difference he mean no more than a true modal distinction, in opposition to feign'd and imaginary, then we do assert such a difference or distinction; and the Scriptures by him quoted are so far from opposing this, that they do clearly evince it, as we shall see afterwards.

What is contain'd in § 9. is as idle and impertinent; for granting that if a Man be an Animal, all that is contain'd in the Idea of Animal, must be contain'd in that of Man; what is this to the purpose? But as if he would correct his own Im­pertinency, he pretends afterwards to speak properly, truly, naturally, (viz.) Man is a Rational Animal, and a Rational Animal is a Man; They are only different words to express the same Being; so (saith he) a Divine Person and God are convertible Terms; how absurd this Discourse is will easily appear, if the Dissimilitude of the things compared, be considered; Man is defin'd by Rational Animal; Man is the thing defined, Ratio­nal Animal the Definition; therefore these must needs be con­vertible Terms: But it is not so here, for neither is God the Thing defined, and Divine Person the Definition, nor is Divine Person the Thing defined, and God the Definition; So that its clear they are not in like manner convertible as Man and Ra­tional Animal. Surely the Author for all his pretending to Reason, might have been more Logical: But he tells us that

Obj. Nothing is contain'd in the Idea of God, but what is con­tain'd in the Idea of a Divine Person; and so on the contrary: And therefore the Terms are convertible.

Answ. The Author is bold and forward in Asserting, but as slow in Proving what he do's assert: Where will he find one who asserts the Trinity but he will tell him, That the Es­sence of God as absolutely considered is communicable to three Persons; but the Divine Essence as limited by a personal Pro­perty [Page 5] is Incommunicable; and is there then no difference in the Ideas of these? He may as well tell us that Communica­bility and Incommunicability are the same, which sure is a downright contradiction. He might do well to give over such bold Assertions, till he can make better proof of them; or free them from most gross absurdity.

Obj. But the Author would perswade, That Person being a Term which we give to all Intelligent Beings, either Man, Angel, or God, as we have no different Ideas of Man, and a humane Person, or of Angel, and Angelical Person, so we have the same Idea of God, and a Divine Person.

Answ. This will not at all follow, except he could make it out, that Personality does flow from the Divine Essence after the same manner as it doth from the Angelical or Humane Es­sence, which he can never do; for it flows from Angelical or Humane Essence, as Finite and Terminated in it self, but so it cannot flow from the Divine Essence, it being Infinite and Unterminated: Therefore tho Essence or Fundamental Subsi­stence in an Angel or Man, being Finite and Terminated in it self, can propagate only one modal Subsistence or Personality, yet it will not follow by any Rational Consequence, That the Divine Essence or Fundamental Subsistence which is Infinite and Unterminated, must do the like. Thus you see this high pretended Rationalist, how weak and vain his Reasoning is. But you will see more of the Poyson of this Doctrine in that which follows, (viz.) God (saith he) is in holy Writ descri­bed as a Person; and as the Father, who is a Person, is God, so God (as appears by a great number of Texis) is a Person, viz. the Father: So that it is evident there is nothing more in the Idea of one, than of the other, and are convertible Terms, and only diffe­rent words which signifie the self same All. perfect Being. Compare this passage with what we find p 32. in his close of the 9th Chapter, viz. That it is evident, that in Scripture God the Fa­ther is as much distinguished from the Son, as two Men or Angels can be: So you see its clear, the Author's mischievous design in denying the Blessed Trinity, is to overthrow and destroy (so far as in him lies) The Divinity of Christ and of the Bles­sed Spirit: for in making the Person of the Father and God [Page 6] convertible Terms, he excludes the Son and blessed Spirit from being God, yea he makes God and the Son to differ as really, as two Men or Angels. So that you see his Work is to revive again the long since confu [...]ed and condemned Heresies and Blasphemies wherewith Arius did so much infest the ancient Church, raising a dreadful Storm in it. One would think that those many Scripture Texts, which, with greatest Plain­ness, do hold forth the Divinity of Christ and of the Holy Ghost, such as Isa. 9. 6. Joh 1. 1, 2, 3, 10. Joh. 17. 5. Heb. 1. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. Psal. 139. 7. Act. 5. 3, 4. I Cor. 2. 10, 11. with abundance more, should have kept him from so daring an At­tempt as to vent himself in downright Opposition to so many sacred Testimonies.

As to what follows, p. 6. §. 10. he tells us (1.) That he hath, according to his weak Ability, uindicated the Honour of a Divine Person, and clear'd the Athanasian Creed from speaking so con­temptibly of him.

Answ. The Author's running into gross Mistakes about God and Divine Person, argues indeed but weak Ability; but it were well if Weakness were the worst; surely his excluding the Son, as well as Spirit, from being God or Divine Person, is so far from vindicating the Honour of Divine Person, that it casts the vilest Aspersions, not only on the ever-blessed God, but also on holy Scripture, which testifies, that Father, Word, and Holy Ghost, are one, 1 Joh. 5. 7. But when he tells us, he hath cleared the Athanasian Creed from speaking so contemptibly of him, (viz. Divine Person) It's strange if he can believe himself, when a little after he tells us, that this good charitable Creed only damns all those that cannot believe a Di­vine Person is and is not the same with God: And that it makes it Damnation not to believe a Difference.

Is it not evident here, that his Design, in Reference to this Creed, is only to ridicule it, and so set it off, as made up of Contradictions (when yet the Contradictions are not found in the Creed, but only floating in his own Brain) yea, and to make the Compiler of it (the worthy Athanasius) fall under the Fate of Damnation, if he believe his own Creed, as Sect. 1? And what is this but to damn all the Christian [Page 7] World from the Time that the Arian Heresy was exploded in it, till such time as it was reviv'd again by Socinus; yea, and to rob God of a Church during those many hundred Years?

But how comes this great Master of Reason to be so highly conceited of himself, as to account all the ancient Fathers, in and since the Time of Athanasius, all the learned School-men and reformed Divines, to be a Pack of such silly Fools, as to contradict themselves, to say a thing and unsay it again, which is saying nothing at all, and to teach the People like Parrots, Propositions without apprehending them, and such as are wholly unintelligible, and the last of which is a Negation of the first? See N. 11. How comes, I say, this Man to have this Confidence, or rather, bold Impudence? Is it from the Strength of his Reason, or rather, of his Folly? I would wil­lingly reduce his Reasonings (if they will bear it) to some Heads, and then severally consider the Strength of each of them, for they are but a few, the far greatest Part of his Book being made up of meer Tautologies.

His first Reasoning P. 6. §. 10. is grounded on his own grand Mistake, viz. That God (absolutely considered) and Per­son, are convertible Terms, so that there must be as many Gods as Persons. How false this is, hath been before declared and evidenced, so that I shall not trouble my Reader with it again.

Object. His second Reasoning immediately follows in the same Page, and it seems to be to this purpose; If there are Three, each of whom is God, or each of whom is Infinite, Almigh­ty, Incomprehensible, then there are three Gods, three Almighties, three Infinites, &c. His Consequence is most absurd and false, because all the three Persons have but one and the same singu­lar or numerical God-head, Infinity, Omnipotency, &c. for neither is the divine Essence, or any Essential Attribute of God multiply'd as Personality is. But the Author asks, How do you prove that there are three Almighties, three Incomprehensible Persons?

Answ. We affirm no such thing, let such prove it as do as­firm it; for tho three may be affirmed of Persons, because mul­tiplicable, [Page 8] yet not of infinite or eternal, which cannot be multiplied; so that his Argument is a meer Sophism (viz.) such as ariseth e Conjunctione eorum quae dividenda sunt, and may be answered thus, God is three Persons, but not three In­finites or Eternals; neither will he ever be able, if he had more Skill than he hath, from a Trinity of Persons in God, if rightly understood, to infer Polytheism, or a Plurality of Gods.

Object. His third way of Reasoning (if we may call it such) is P. 7. §. 13. The former Part of the Section is a meer Repetition of what went before, and hath been fully answer­ed. But in the latter Part of it, he tells us, That God and Man (he means according to the Trinitarian Doctrine) are Ʋniver­sals, and so predicated of more Persons than one, and each Di­vine Person is as much of himself God (he means a distinct God) as each Human Person is Man (i. e. distinct Man.)

Answ. Never any Trinitarian yet did assume God to be an Universal, or to be predicated of Father, Son, and Spirit, per Modum Generis seu Ʋniversalis. We say, as in the Creed, The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; that is, the Father is Eternal God, as with the Perso­nal Property of Father, the Son is the same Eternal God, but with a distinct Personal Property (viz.) that of Son, the like we say of the Holy Spirit: Therefore his Inference, That Di­vine Persons must be as much distinct as Humane Persons, is idle and vain; and it stands firm (for all he hath said) that there are not three Gods, but one God.

As to what he adds, §. 15. That Father, and Son, being Rela­tives, cannot subsist in the same Subject, I must tell him, that, had he learned his Logick better, he would have found they may, provided they be not predicated de eodem respectu ejus­dem, which these are not.

Object. His fourth way of arguing is, §. 16. If the Son is the same God, as he is that begat a Son, he must beget a Son too, except the same God did and did not beget a Son.

Answ. Although the Son be the same as he is that begot, yet he does not beget, because God, as begetting, is God, as cloathed with the Relative Property of Father; now the [Page 9] Son not being cloathed with that Property, doth not be­get.

His fifth way of Reasoning, §. 18. is as foolish and absurd viz. That if God be three Persons, and each Person God, there must be nine Persons, because each single Person must be three Per­sons. Had the Author but known and weighed the Descrip­tion given of a Divine Person, viz. that he is—essentia Dei prout est cum Proprietate Hypostatica, he would not have trou­bled us with such a trifling Argument. For altho God abso­lutely considered, and not limited by a Personal Property, may, by Addition of those Properties, be Three Persons; yet a Divine Person, being God limited by Personal Property, cannot be Three Persons.

His sixth way of arguing is §. 20. Those things, according to the common Sense of Mankind, are the same with themselves that are the same with a third, and all Knowledge but Intuitive, de­pends upon the Truth of it. We grant him all this: But what is it he would infer? It's this, that if three Persons and one Per­son, first, second, and third, are the same with God, they are the same with one another: Is this his Demonstration? I must tell him, that through Abuse of a good Rule, there's no­thing but Confusion and Deceit in it. For 1. He confounds three Persons and one, as if they were the very same. 2. He would make us believe, that they do both alike agree in a third, which is absurd and false, because that Notion we have of the three Persons jointly considered, is adequate to the Notion we have of God, because the Divine Essence is not communicable to more than three Persons: But the Notion we have of a single Person is not adequate to the Notion we have of God, who is communicable to more than a single Per­son. Do these then agree entirely in a third, when this third hath it self, after a different manner, with respect to them? It cannot be: So that the Argument may be retorted upon himself, and the quite contrary Conclusion inferred from the foresaid Rule. Thus, if one Person and three Persons do not agree in a third, then they do not agree between themselves, but they do not agree in a third (as hath been shewn) there­fore not between themselves.

His seventh way of arguing, § 21. is to as little purpose; If the Persons (saith he) are really distinct, and each is God, must not each be God distinct from the other? For nothing can be distinctly predicated of three distinct Persons, if it do not distinctly belong to each. As to the phrase of real Distinction, we refer the Rea­der to what hath been said upon §. 8. But as to what follows, we say, That altho God be predicated of three distinct Per­sons, yet not distinctly, or after a distinct manner, but one and the same God is after one and the same manner equally predicated of three, therefore it follows (quite contrary to what he would infer) that there's but one ever blessed God, tho three distinct Persons. His 22d. Section hath been an­swered over and over.

All that which he adds, §. 23, 24, 27, 28. is wholly founded upon his own gross Mistakes, as if it must needs follow from a Multiplication of Persons that there must be a Multi­plication of Infinities and All-sufficiencies in God; for suppose he may find some Assertors of the Trinity to al­low such a manner of speaking, as to call the three Persons, three Infinite Persons, or three All-sufficient Persons, yet he knows well enough, in his own Conscience, that they mean no more than three Persons, with one and the same Numeri­cal Infinity and All-sufficiency; or which is the same, tres personas habentes eandem singularem infinitatem & omni-sufficienti­am: And that they do account it the vilest Heresy, yea, even Blasphemy, to assert a Plurality of Infinities and All-suf­ficiencies in God; and does it not argue then the Author to be guilty of the vilest Sophism and Deceit; yea, such as is more suitable for the Devil, the Father of Lyes, than for any fair Disputant, from an Homonymous Phrase that may be taken in different, yea, contrary Senses, to infer, from such a Sense or Interpretation as he puts on the Phrase, Heretical and Blasphemous Conclusions, as the Conclusions of such Au­thors, as he knows do take and interpret the same Phrase in a quite contrary Sense? Let him but take the Phrase in the Sense of these Authors, and all his monstrous Conclusions will va­nish. He can neither infer, that there are three Infinites, or Infinities, or three Infinite Spaces, or three Gods, or that the [Page 11] Trinitarians must be Idolaters, either in worshipping some­thing as God which is not God, or in setting up a Plurality of Gods, as he would perswade §. 30. These will be found to be Brats of his own luxuriant Brain, not to be laid at the Trini­tarians Door. As to what he adds, §. 31. That whatever Name we give the three, yea, tho we only say three, yet so long as we pay Divine Worship to each, we own three Gods, because the three are three Objects of Divine Worship, and whilst the one is worshipped, the other is not worshipped, &c. We shall answer this hereafter, viz. P. 24. when we come to confute this false and frivolous Charge more largely elsewhere insisted on by the Author: Because we do not love, with him, to multi­ply Tautologies.

Object. There's only one thing more I would take into Consideration before I leave this Chapter, that I may leave this Author the more inexcusable in his perverse Reasoning such as he makes use of, Section 25, 26. His Words are these (viz.) There cannot be supposed in God more Persons than one, without supposing an infinite Number; for what Reason soever moved the first Person to beget two Persons equal to himself, the same Reason (because their Nature is the same) must move the other to beget their Equals, and so on to Infinity; for (saith he) if the first Person produced two equal to himself, it was no doubt an essential Perfection of his Nature, otherwise he might have chosen whether he would have produced them, and they, when produced, would have had but a precarious dependent Being, since they must depend on his Pleasure for their Continuance in Being, as well as for their Being. And he does further infer, that if no more Per­sons can now be produced, then an Essential Property is lost.

Answ. The whole of his Discourse do's clearly evince, that the Author had blind and gross Conceptions about the Eter­nal Generation of the Son, and Mission or Emission of the Blessed Spirit, and therefore it's no wonder to find his whole Discourse made up of those two grand Ingredients, Impu­dence and Ignorance. For,

1. How shamefully does he contradict himself, when he tells us, that if the first Person produced two equal to himself. it was no doubt an Essential Perfection of his Nature, and yet [Page 12] (as §. 25.) that it was for some Reason that moved him to it: How can both these hold? If the Act was an Essential Perfection, then it was no arbitrary Act; but if it was an Act, to which the Agent was moved by some Reason, then it was arbitrary and not essential: If his Adversaries spoke Contra­dictions at such a rate as this, he might then have had Ground to have charged these on them.

2. What a begetting Act must that be, which may, or rather must (according to him) be multiplyed into infinite begetting Acts? But had he framed no other Ideas of Eternal Generati­on, and Eternal Mission, but such as might have suited with the Nature of the most perfect eternal Spirit, he would then have seen, that that most sublime and scriptural Revelation of three Persons in the God-head, is not only sweetly consistent with the highest Reason, but likewise, that it's impossible that there should be more than three Persons in the God-head.

Had the Author but perused, and seriously weighed what is said as to this, by the learned and accurate Doctor Ames, in his Medulla Theologiae, ch. 5 §. 16. (and which is agreeable to what hath been said before by ancient Fathers, School­men, and modern Divines) sure he would not have talked at such a rate as he doth; the Doctor here speaking of a Trinity of Persons in God. hath these Words, viz. potest tamen (ali­qua ex parte) similitudine adumbrari; Pater nempe est quasi Deus intelligens; Filius Imago Patris expressa, est quasi Deus intel­lectus; Spiritus sanctus emanans, a Patre per Filium & spiratus est quasi Deus dilectus; Filius producitur quasi per actum intelli­gendi ex intellectu vel memoriâ faecundâ Patris; Spiritus sanctus producitur per actum amandi vel spirandi ex voluntate faecunda Pa­tris & Filii. What I pray will the Author say to such a Dis­course as this? (1.) Will he say that God doth not know himself by a reflex Act of eternal Intellection terminated on himself? Surely this he neither can nor dare do. 2. Will he say, that God doth not, after a like manner, terminate an eternal Act of Dilection on himself? He cannot say this. (3.) Can he assure us that Personalities in God cannot flow from such reflex Acts? I am sure he cannot. (4.) Are there any moreinternal and eternal reflex Acts in God, besides the two [Page 13] before mentioned, from which Personalities can flow, and can there any more than three Personalities flow from these in manner aforesaid, supposing these to emane from the Di­vine Essence, by Mediation of the said Acts? I shall freely con­fess here, we could not at all have gone thus far by the dim Light of our own Reason, nor could so much as have thought no, much less, have asserted a Trinity of Persons in the Uni­ty of Divine Essence; but when we have the great and ever­blessed God going before us in the infallible Revelation of sa­cred Scripture, and assuring us, that there be Three that bear Witness in Heaven, and that these Three are One; that him­self as Father, did, before the World was, and from Eterni­ty, beget the Son, in the Form of God, and equal to himself; that the Holy Ghost, in like manner, is God, proceeding and sent from the Father and Son; we can now safely follow God, and improve sanctified Reason to the getting of true and right Notions about this sublime Mystery, and for Defence and Vindication of it, and dispelling the Mists of those vile Aspersi­ons and seigned Contradictions, black-mouth'd Hereticks would fasten on it; and we can as truly tell the Author, that however this Mystery be a very high Mystery, yet it is not (as he would perswade) wholly unintelligible, but that we may have true Ideas of the Father begetting, and of the Son's being begotten, and of the Holy Ghost's proceeding from Eternity; and that this was not after some gross manner as the Author seems to suppose, but in such a way, as might agree to the most pure and simple Spirit; yea, we may tell him, that from one and the same numerical eternal Essence acting upon its self by its internal Acts, and likewise terminating those Acts, and so laying the Foundations of relative Properties, Three rela­tive personal Properties, with the Three blessed eternal Per­sons, do necessarily emane, without the least Appearance of a Contradiction; the divine Essence so acting or reflecting on its self by eternal Intellection with the relative Property of Generation, as flowing from it, being God the Father: The divine Essence as reflected on by, and terminating the said In­tellection with its relative Property (of being begotten) be­ing God the Son, the Splendor of the Father's Glory, the [Page 12] [...] [Page 13] [...] [Page 14] eternal [...], or the express Image of the Father's Person, making a full and entire Representation thereof: (And how agreeable is this to many Scripture Phrases, relating to the the Person of the Son?) And the same divine Essence, as re­flected on or terminated by that other Act of the same Es­sence, and which may be stil'd the Love or Dilection of the Father and Son, with its relative Property of being sent or proceding, being the third Person, or Holy Ghost, the amiable Spring-head and Fountain of all that good which God com­municates to his Creatures, the all-searching, quickning Spi­rit, Deus spiratus missus, [...].

And give me leave to ask the Author, our high pretended Rationalist (who dares, with his dark and glimmering Light, so boldly contradict divine Revelation; telling us, that for the Father to beget, the Son to be begotten, the Holy Ghost to proceed; and that these Three should be One, and the Son to be equal to God the Father; that such Language is nothing but mere Contradictions, tho the express Language of the written Word.) Let me ask him, I say; according to the preceding Interpretation of the Words, what Shew or least Appearance of a Contradiction can he find in them? For the Divine Essence, by an eternal reflex Act to know its self; and so, by a like act, to love it self, and for the same Essence to terminate each act, is that which he neither can nor dare de­ny; because that these are essential divine Perfections falling under our distinct inadequate Notions of the same glorious Be­ing, and which can no more cease to be, than God can cease to be God; where then comes in his Contradiction?

Object. Will he say, that according to these our Notions of a Trinity, it follows that there are but three Persons, and yet nine Persons? That they cannot be multiplyed beyond three, and yet may be multiplyed in infinitum?

Answ. The quite contrary follows: For, according to these our Notions of the divine Essence so acting upon it self, as aforesaid, and so terminating the said two internal essential acts, (viz.) of Intellect and Will; it's impossible the Persons in the divine Essence, as flowing from them, should either fall short or exceed the Number Three; because, according to these. [Page 15] these, we have (to come up to his own Terms) distinct Ideas of so many, and neither fewer nor more, (viz.) of a Person acting or begetting, of a Person conceived or begotten, and of a Person beloved or proceeding. But will he say (as he doth expresly) §. 26. That,

Obj. If it be not essential to the Nature of the Son and Spirit, so to produce more Persons equal to themselves, their Nature is not the same with the Father's, and they want Perfections which he hath?

Answ. It's essential to the Nature of Son and Spirit, as well as of the Father, absolutely considered to be productive of more equal Persons, tho it be not essential to the Nature of the Son and Spirit as limited by personal Property; because, by these, it's rendred incommunicable, and cannot be so pro­ductive. Therefore it's very idle what he would infer, that the Nature of the Son and Spirit, is not the same with the Fa­ther's, because they want Perfections which he has, because the Nature still, whether of Father, Son, or Spirit, absolutely considered as such, hath the very same essential Perfections, tho, as this is limited by personal Properties, importing three Persons actually to exist in it from Eternity, it cannot be said to produce them de novo, and to be still productive of them; so that we may justly say here, that whosoever shall affirm, that Essence, as common to Father, Son, and Spirit, is not pro­ductive of Three Persons, let him be Anathema; and whoever shall affirm, that Essence, as limited to Father, Son and Spi­rit, by personal Properties, is still productive of Three Persons de novo, let him be Anathema; for Essence so limited, the Three Persons exist as actually produced, and therefore cannot re­main to be produced.

Again, will the Author say, that the Father now producing no Persons equal to himself, has lost a Perfection that's essenti­al to his Nature, and consequently ceaseth to be all perfect, as §. 26? How vain and idle is all this? When the act of beget­ting, or producing in God, is essential to the divine Nature, and so can no more cease to be, than the Nature it self, it being an eternal act identified with the Nature, and an eternal Founda­tion of such Relation as that of Son to Father, which must there. [Page 16] therefore be continued for ever, the Foundation being continu­ed otherwise than in the Creatures.

Having premised thus much for Explication of a Mystery, which the Author most blasphemously pretends to be a Myste­ry of Anti-Christ, wholly inexplicabable and unintelligible; and having shewed that however it be a most sublime Mystery, much transcending Reason and the Light of Nature, yet be­ing once fully reveal'd in the Word, that it's so far from standing in flat Contradiction, to Reason and natural Light, that it's found to have a sweet Consistency with Reason and Light of Nature.

Having, I say, permised thus much, I proceed now to his [...] 3. third Chapter of the Nominal Trinitarians, as the Author thinks meet (tho without just Ground) to stile these Asser­tors of the Trinity, whom he doth distinguish from such as he doth after call Real Trinitarians

Here, before I pass on, give me leave to observe, that how­ever most orthodox Divines tell us (see Polan. Syntag. p. 226.) That the Distinction of the divine Persons ought to be the least Distinction: Therefore Counsels and Fathers generally say, that it's Relation only that makes Distinction and Number in God; yet, however, they all agree in Opposition to Sabelli­us, that this is not meer nominal, but a true Distinction; which will hereafter be further evidenced.

Obj. And, now to come to the Chapter it self; where, first, I shall take notice of that Passage of the Author, §. 35. be­cause that being answered, the Solution of his other Objecti­ons will be very Facile, or rather, the Objections will vanish of themselves: His Words are these; It contradicts our clearest Ideas, to suppose the same numerical Substance that is in one Per­son, to be at the same time in another; and we can as little appre­hend what we mean when we say the same numerical Substance con­stitutes three infinite Persons, as when we say, the same Substance constitutes three finite Persons. Is not the reason the same between an infinite Person and an infinite Substance, and between a finite Person and a finite Substance?

Answ. As to that Homonymous Phrase (three infinite Per­sons) I have shewn before in what Sense it may be allowed, and [Page 17] and in what Sense it may not, and therefore shall not here trouble my self or the Reader with it again; but as to the Re­mainder of his Discourse, I must tell him, that altho it con­tradicts our clearest Ideas, to suppose the same numerical finite Substance that is in one finite Person, to be at the same time in another; yet it no way contradicts our clearest Ideas, that the same numerical infinite Substance that is in one Person, with one Mode of Subsistence, should be at the same time in another Per­son, with a different Mode of Subsistence. Neither is the reason the same between an infinite Person and infinite Substance, and between a finite Person and a finite Substance. And his Mi­stake about this is the Foundation of all his other Mistakes, and Soul-ruining Errors. That the Reason is not the same be­tween infinite Substance and infinite Person, as it is between fi­nite Substance and finite Person, is evident; because finite Substance does propagate modal Subsistence (which in ratio­nal Nature we call Personality) as it's finite and terminated; yea, and where it hath its Terms; but infinite Substance, not being so terminated, but infinitely excluding all Terms and Bounds, cannot therefore propagate Personality in like man­ner as the finite doth; for that would be to make it imper­fect; and if it doth not propagate this after the same manner, then it follows undeniably, that the Reason is not the same be­twixt infinite Substance and infinite Person or Personality, as between finite Substance and finite Person or Personality: So that this Author's self-evident Propositions will be found to be self-evident Untruths; and his Reasoning is no better when he would infer, that because the same numerical finite Substance is but in one Person, therefore infinite must be so too.

Obj. But he would perswade, that if, by reason of the Difference between finite and infinite, there is a Difference be­tween the Number of Persons, that the Substance is in; it would follow, that the Difference of Number is infinite, be­cause the infinite Distance betwixt these would suppose this.

Answ. This Reasoning of his is vain and false as the former, for as Scripture is express in it, that there's Three, and no greater Number of Persons in God, than three, viz. Father, Son, and Spi­rit; so we have shewn how sanctified Reason sweetly complies with [Page 18] with divine Revelation in giving us clear Ideas of it, how Three and no more than Three personal Properties may emane or flow from divine Essence, as terminating it self by essential internal Acts upon it self.

Obj. But suppose the Author should here object, if three re­lative Properties or Personalities flow from divine Essence by means of reflex acts of Essence; how comes it to pass that these do not in like manner flow from angelical or humane Essence, reflecting on it self after a like manner by the like Acts?

Answ. There's not the like Reason for it. 1. Because these internal reflex Acts of Intellection and Dilection in the angeli­cal and humane Nature, are but accidental acts, and most fre­quently intermitted, and therefore cannot propagate Persona­lities; but in the Divine Nature these are essential eternal acts, and therefore may (I had almost said must) propagate something (viz.) in that Nature whence they emane, and whereon they terminate. 2. These reflex acts in the Crea­tures, at least in our selves, are very imperfect, and cannot produce an express Image of that which reflects, on the Na­ture as reflected on, and consequently not a Person: But in God these are most perfect, and therefore produce that ex­press Image which is a Person, and so the Son is stiled, Heb. 1. 3. The express Image of the Father's Person. 3. We have shew'd before, that angelical or humane Essence being finite, and having Terms, must therefore, where-ever it terminates, or where the utmost Bounds of its Extension are, propagate Modal Subsistence or Personality for to terminate such Es­sence; but the divine Essence, infinitely exceeding all such Bounds and Limits, cannot in this way (suited only to a fi­nite Creature) propagate the same; but doth it after an high­er way, suited to infinite immense Being. And here I would demand of the Author, either to shew us the way wherein in­finite essence doth this, seeing it's undenyable that it must be different from this of finite Beings; or else give us some preg­nant Reasons, why it may not do it by terminating it self up­on it self, with the aforesaid reflex acts, or else ingenuously confess, that a Trinity of Persons, or which is the same, Fa­ther, Son, and Spirit in one and the same singular divine Es­sence [Page 19] is not only clearly reveal'd in the written Word, but is likewise very fully consistent with true Reason and the Light of Nature, as elevated and improved by divine Revelation; and that he hath greatest Cause to be humbled, for his bold blasphemous Oppositions to so great and clear a Truth.

Obj. And thus, having discovered the Falsehood of his grand Conclusion, §. 35. I proceed to take notice of some few things more in this Chapter, especially in §. 33. where we find him thus reasoning.—If a Person be a Substance, there must be three Substan­ces, because Substance is contained in the Idea of Person, and conse­quently, as many Substances as Persons; all that we apprehend of a divine Substance is, that he is a Subject, in which all the divine At­tributes exist; that Person is the very same, and these are only dif­ferent Words to express the divine Being by, whence he would infer (most blasphemously) §. 34. That a Trinity of Persons in one Substance, is nothing less than a Trinity of Contradictions.

Answ. But I must tell the Author, that the whole of this his Discourse and Reasoning, is full of Confusion, Deceit, and Error, and might, at least, in Part, have been rectified by himself, had he been well vers'd in sound Philosophy, and if he had but assented to some common Maxims granted by learned Men; for, 1. He confounds Substance and substanti­al Nature or Essence, as when he makes it to be the proper Subject of essential Attributes: So p. 28. of his Book, §. 85. he tells us, If the Father communicated his Essence to the Son, he communicated himself, who is no way distinct from the Essence; but Philosophers tell him (see Glisson de Nat. Subst. p. 6.) that Substance is made up of two Principles, which they call Rudi­menta Substantialia (viz.) substantial Essence, and modal Sub­sistence, which, in Rational Nature, is call'd Personality, and so would have taught, that he ought not to confound these, viz. the Part with the Whole, or Principium cum Principiato, which none but a Novice in Philosophy would have done. 2. Having (as before) confounded or identified compleat Substance or substantial Essence, he confounds again this his Substance and substantial Essence, with Person or Personality, contrary to the Rules of all Philosophy, yea, even of such as relate to created Substances (about which he takes his Ideas to [Page 20] be most clear, and boasts of them as common Ideas of all Mankind,) for might he not have found Philosophers not con­cern'd about the Trinity, from meer Dictates of Reason and natural Light, telling him (viz.) that essentia substantialis est singularis substantia continens integram individui entitatem. Or, abstracto sumptam, seu totum id quod abstrahiturè supposito: And that Modal Subsistence, Suppositality,, or (which in Ratio­nal Nature is the same) Personality, is Modus ab essentia sub­stantiali resultans, eam (que) quod ammodo terminans; and that it is, To [...]um id post abstractionem minutilum in supposito residuum, quod essentiae additum eam concertioni restituit. All which is so clear, that if he dare yet venture to deny any Part of it, I hope he may, by one familiar Instance, be forc't to confess the Truth, and correct his Error, or else expose himself to the ge­neral Scorn of Manking: We say that Homo habet Humanita­tem, or which is the same, essentiam humanam substantialem: It is the common Language of Men, that Man is that Person, who hath substantial humane Essence: But should the Author say, that Homo habet hominem, that Man hath Man, or that hu­mane Person, which is himself, would he not render himself too apertly ridiculous to all Manking? And doth not this undeny­ably evince, that there is more in the Person of a Man as being the totum cotinens, than there is in substantial humane Essence, which is but pars contenta; for substantial humane Essence can be nothing but Essence; but Man besides that Essence hath Per­sonality, and is made up of both, as constituent Principles; and this is still further evinced, both by the the vulgar Defini­tion that is given of a Person, viz. that he is, substantia intel­lectualis naturae singularis incommunicabilis, and also by that which Writers in Theology generally give of a divine Person, viz. that he is, essentia Dei prout est cum proprietate hypostatica, or to that purpose; and these I was more willing to lay down here, not only for fuller Explication of the matter in hand, but also because the Author seems to call for them, in the Con­clusion of his Letter, §. 36. telling us, that according to these Ideas we have of Substance, or (as he means) substantial Es­sence and Person, it is a flat Contradiction to say there are three of the one, and but one of the other; and that if we [Page 21] have no Ideas, we talk like Parrots, when we affirm or deny any thing concerning any thing we have no Ideas of: There­fore, 1. I would, by these Definitions, let the Author see (tho he cannot here pretend Ignorance, because they are the vulgar Definitions) that we have Ideas of Substance and Per­son; yea, clear Ideas, tho not such as his.

2. Whereas he saith, according to those Ideas we have of Substance and Person; [...]e should have said from those gross Ideas▪ which my self and the Anti-trinitarian Faction have of Substance and Person, such a Conclusion as that before (so blasphemous that I tremble to write it) may be inferred; no wonder, when these say that the Idea of substantial Essence, Substance and Person, is entirely one and the same, and con­found one of these with another, contrary to common Sense and Reason, as we have shewn; but for him to say, that ac­cording to those Ideas which we have of Substance, Person, &c. If he mean the vulgar Ideas of the best and most acurate Di­vines and Philosophers, as he seems to do; then I must tell him, 1. That it is but one of his cunning false Tricks, by ranking himself in the Number of these, to insinuate into his incautious Reader, that his Idea of Substance and Person are the same with the vulgar Ideas of the best Divines and Philo­sophers; when it's evident, from the aforesaid Definitions, they are not the same; for his Idea of Person is no way di­stinct from that of substantial Essence, as he doth expresly ac­knowledge, when he tells us, p. 23. §. 85. That God the Father is no ways distinct from his Essence; but now the Idea of Philosophers as well as Divines, according to the said vulgar Definitions, is distinct, because their Idea of substantial Essence, being but one (tho the chief) Rudiment of a Person, doth exclude the Idea of Modal Subsistence or Personality; the other Rudi­ment, as hath been shewn, when yet the Idea of Person (as is granted) does include both. And I pray then, how are these the same? 2. Having thus declard what our true Ideas are of sub­stanti [...]l Essence, Substance, Person, and differenc'd them from his false Ideas; I would now know of him, what flat Contra­diction there is in our affirming Three Persons, and yet but one substantial Essence or Substance in God; and we shall see how [Page 22] he makes this out, §. 37. He reasons thus. If the Persons are the same Substance, or (which is the same in his Sense) substantial Essence, then the same Substance or substantial Essence, is begotten and unbe­gotten, and yet neither of these, but proceeding, self-existent, and not self-existent, incarnate and not incarnate; is this his flat Contra­diction? A very Smatterer in Logick would soon tell him, that however it be a Contradiction to say that such opposite predica­tes' possunt attribui eidem, secundum idem, ad idem, eodem modo, & tempore, yet to say, they may be attributed to the same Sub­ject, provided it be not secundum idem, or ad idem, eodem modo, is no Contradiction at all, as is granted by all, and as may be evinced by thousands of Instances; why then may not the di­vine Essence, as it is with the personal Property of Father, be said to be unbegotten, as it is with the personal Property of Son, be said to be begotten, or conceived (and if he mean no more by his self-existent and not self-existent, then the Case is alike: But if he take them in a different Sense, they will not be found to be the distinct Predicates of the divine Persons) and so, why may not the same divine Essence, under a different Mode or personal Property, or as belov'd with a Love of infinite Delight and Complacency, be still the same Essence, but neither as unbe­gotten, nor as begotten, but as proceeding? And so in like manner, may not the divine Essence, as it is with the perso­nal Property of the Son, be incarnate, yet the same di­vine Essence, as it is with the personal Property of Father and Holy Ghost be not incarnate? Is there any thing of Contra­diction in all this? No Man that knows what a Contradicti­on is, unless a deceitful Sophister, who would impose on others his own Sophisms, would assert it; when these contrary Pre­dicates are predicated of the same Subject; not in one and the same respect, but under such different Respects as that Subject hath to different Persons. Are not these very Predicates, viz. to be begotten, and not begotten; to beget, and not to beget (to use a familiar Instance) in like manner, truly attributed to the Nature of Isaac? Do we not truly say, that as it related to Abraham, it was begotten, but did not beget, and as it re­lated to Jacob, that it did beget, but was not begotten.—As to what he adds, that there could not any Attributes or Modes, [Page 23] or anything that inheres in a Substance be begot, because they cannot subsist by themselves: How false this is, and contrary to all sound Reason, may appear, even from physical Generations, which are no other than several progressive Motions from one essential Mode to another; for the Matter it self is not genera­ted, but only the essential Mode or Form, which being edu­ced out of the Power of the Matter, does not subsist of it self, but inheres in the Matter, by Vertue whereof the Compound itself is said to be generated, as being specificated by it. His Discourse in the last §. of this Chapter, viz. 38. is as vain as the former, yea, it is such as is grounded on a meer Sophism, viz. that there's no Distinction of Persons in God, because every Person is the divine Substance, which is three different ways the same, that is, three different ways one; whereas if he would have reasoned fairly, he should have said, that eve­ry Person is the divine Substance, as it three different ways the same or one; but then this Conclusion, as hath been shewn, being false, which should be the Foundation of all that follows, the whole Superstructure built on it, as his Multiplication without Addition, and his Substraction without Diminution, must fall with it, and so the Falsehood and Sophistry of his other Reasoning would clearly have been detected as now it is, there being a vast Difference betwixt those two ways and Modes of speaking, viz. every Person is that divine Substance which is three different ways the same (which imports no more, than that it is that divine Substance which subsists in three Persons, and which is common to three) which is a manifest Truth; and that every Person is the divine Substance Substance, as it is three different ways the same (which imports that every Person being the same with the divine Substance, as subsisting in one way, as for example, with that Mode of Subsistance which is peculiar to the Son, is the same with that divine Substance, as subsisting in another way, as for example, with that Mode of Subsistence which is peculiar to the Father) which is a ma­nifest Untruth: And so to father Contradictions on us, he'll speak them himself, and then make us speak them whether we will or no.

Obj. Thus, having done with his third Chapter, we proceed to his Reflections on the Adimadverter's Hypothesis, chap. 4. [Page 24] p. 12. where I shall briefly take notice of his trifling Discourse, without taking on me to defend the Animadverter's Hypothe­sis, which I have not seen, save only so far as to vindicate it, as here represented by the Author, from some unjust Aspersi­ons which he seeks to cast upon it; and whereas, §. 39. he tells us, the common Opinion of the Trinitarians, even from the Beginning (if we may believe the Animadverter) has been, that the three Persons are not three Substances, Attributes, Pro­perties, or any real but incompleat Beings, viz. three Modes, and if the Persons are no more than three Modes, then the Difference is but a trifling Difference.

Answ. But doth not this Author shamefully wrong the Ani­madverter, in making him say, that the three Persons are no more than three Modes? Did ever any Trinicarian or Man of common Sense talk at that rate? But as if he were afraid of being call'd to account for such false Aspersions, he tells us af­terward in the same Section, viz. But it's said, a Person is not a meer Mode, but the divine Substance with a peculiar Mode. It's well he's brought at last to make a true Representation of the Trinitarians Doctrine, and thereby to confute his own Ca­lumny: And what hath he now to say against this, that a Person is not a meer Mode, but the divine Substance, with a peculiar Mode? He saith, that if each Person is the divine Sub­stance, he must have in him all the Modes; an admirable Infe­rence, If Person be divine Substance with one Mode, then he's di­vine Substance, as with all Modes. If this be not to speak Contradictions, I know not what is; but he would back his absurd Inference with a Reason, That Person must have all the Modes, because he is the divine Substance in which the Modes sub­sist; this Reason is just like the former, as if Person, who is the divine Substance, as limited with one Mode or relative Property, is the divine Substance, not as limited with one, but three relative Modes or Properties: A downright Contra­diction. One should think this Man, who is so ready to charge others with flat Contradictions, should better have senced himself against venting Contradictions at this rate; but be­fore I pass on, I would take notice of another Passage of his in this Section, not much short of the former for Absurdity, [Page 25] wherein, speaking of these relative Modes, he saith, two of which may be absent without the least Alteration in the divine Sub­stance or Properties: He might as well have said, that where there is the Foundation of Sonship, yet the relative Property of Son doth not result or flow from it; which, according to the Sense of all Mankind, is impossible.

Obj. What the Author saith, §. 40. I shall take up when I come to the following Chapter, and so shall next consider what he saith, §. 41. where he reasons thus. If there be any Thought, Word, or any of those Actions that are proper to intelligent Beings, that belongs to the one and not to the other, it shews that they are more than distinct Modes, they are distinct intelligent substantial Beings; and are not the Father and Son in Scripture frequently op­posed to one another, as intelligent Beings? The Father's knowing and loving the Son, is not the Son's knowing and loving the Fa­ther; but each has a numerical distinct Knowledge, and conse­quently, distinct Essence.

Answ. The whole of this his reasoning is idle and perverse like the former, and is grounded on either a grosly ignorant, or a wilful Mistake of the Trinitarians Doctrine: The divine Acts or Operations, according to these, are either ad intra or ad extra; the Author's Discourse, in the Beginning of the fol­lowing Chapter, relates to those ad extra, where we shall con­sider them; but his Discourse here, to those ad intra, as the Fa­ther's knowing and loving the Son, the Son's knowing and loving the Father: Now these are acts of the divine Nature or Essence as reflecting on it self, and lay the Foundations of rela­tive Properties never to be altered, because from these acts and their terms the personal Properties result, as hath been shewn before; therefore, according to his Doctrine, these internal acts, are in Nature before the personal Properties, or Persona­lity: And yet (according to Scripture Phrase) they are attri­buted to each Person with respect to another, in as much as each Person hath the divine Essence, with its Acts and Opera­tions, under a relative Mode appropriated to him; and so the Father is said to love the Son, and the Son to love the Father: How, I pray? What, as this Author would have it, with two acts of Love really and numerically distinct, and these as flowing [Page 26] either from two meer Modes, or if not so, from two really and numerically distinct Essences? How absurd is all this, when it's evident to any Smatterer in Theology, that the internal acts thenselves are of the divine Essence, and only their Di­stinction from relative Modes; so that there's no need either of more numerically distinct Essences for Performance of these acts, or to have them attributed to meer Modes, or to have the divine Person ungodded, and their true Subject destroy­ed, as this Author does vainly and idly pretend. What he adds, § 42. is to no more purpose, unless he could prove that we make the divine Acts, Titles, Attributes, of one Per­son really distinct from the Acts, Titles, Attributes, of another, which he can never do. The Author, in his following §. viz. 43. would make the World believe that the Orthodox were forced to this way of explicating themselves about the Trinity, because they had no other way to keep up the Face of a Trini­ty, and avoid professing the apparent Tritheism of the Nicene Fathers, who held the Three Almighty substantial Persons, were no otherwise one God, than because they had the same common Nature, even as Three Men having the same Humane Nature, are but one Man.

Answ. Not to mention here the old false Trick of seeking from the multiplying of Persons in God to multiply Substan­ces, and Almighties: As to that open Tritheism of the Nicene Fathers, as holding the Three Persons, no otherwise one God, than as Three Men partaking of one common Humane Nature, are one Man, it is such an impudent shameless Calumny, that it can deserve no other Answer, than to have the Brand of a no­torious Lye set upon it; such a false and blasphemous Notion, as that God should be a Genus to more divine Persons, so as Man is a Genus to singular Men, I know not whether it ever en­tred into the Heart of any; but that it should be the Notion of the Nicene Fathers, and entertain'd by them, is so expresly contrary to their Canons, and the Orthodox Doctrine of the Fathers at that time, that it needs no further Confutation.

Obj. As to what is added by the Author, §. 44. (besides his Reproaches which will light on himself) there's nothing but what we have had before over and over, and hath been so [Page 27] fully answered, in our having shewn that the glorious Almith­ty Being, doth not propagate Personality, by Termination of Extension, so as a finite rational Being doth, and that it's highly consistent both with Scripture and Reason, and that he doth this by the aforesaid reflex Acts, terminated on him­self, that no more needs be added here. But, §. 45. he tells us, that granting there are never so many Modes, yet if each Per­son has the divine Substance, he must necessarily have all the Modes, because they are Modes of the divine Substance; each Per­son has the divine Substance as limited by a peculiar Mode, or re­lative Property, and therefore cannot possibly have all the Modes, quite contrary to what is absurdly inferred by this Author.

Ans. I come now to Chapter 5. to weigh the Author's Re­flectionsOn Ch. 5. on the Hypothesis of Dr. W. S. of the Author of the Trinity placed in its due Light, and the rest of the Nominal Trinitarians.

In this Chapter the Author tells us, that besides the Abettors of this Opinion, there are a great many Trinitarians, who no other­wise differ from the Ʋnitarians but in Name, whose Trinities they not only allow, but contend for: some of them say (and Dr. Wallis hath writ in Defence of it) That the three Persons are only three external Denominations of God, according to the three different Operations of his Goodness towards his Creatures, in cre­ating, redeeming, and sanctifying them; a little after he saith, Others say, that the three Persons are the same in God as Faculties in Man (viz.) Ʋnderstanding, Will, and Memory: Others, that the three Persons are the three Attributes of God, Power, Wisdom and Goodness: Here you have his Charge. But,

Answ. 1. I shall believe it to be a false Charge, so prone I find him to charge things on the Trinitarians, till such time as he doth quote the Author, at least his Book and Page where the Mattter charged is expresly contained. (2.) Tho I rea­dily grant that those three Denominations of Creator, Re­deemer, Sanctifier, are three external Denominations of God, according to the different Operations of his Goodness towards his Creatures, in creating, redeeming, and sanctify­ing them; yea, and that these three different Operations, Imo omnes operationes ad extra (according to Scripture, Joh. 13. chap. [Page 28] chap. 5. 17. and the granted Maxim) sunt trium personarum communes, yet withal I affirm, that in respect of the Order that is amongst the three Persons, the Holy Scriptures do in a more special manner appropriate the first kind of these Acti­ons, as the Acts of Creation to God the Father, as first Per­son; and those which in Nature are next to these, as of Pre­servation and Redemption, to God the Son; and those which come last in Order, as the ultimate compleating Acts, to God the Holy Ghost; and accordingly do appropriate the exter­nal Denominations of Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifyer, as re­sulting from the said Acts. But that any Man of common Sense holding the Doctrine of the Trinity, should affirm, that the Three Persons are only three external Denominations of God, according to his said different Operations, I am far from believing. (3.) Tho I grant, that some, who assert a Trinity of Persons in God, may tell us, that these Three glori­ous Persons in God, are represented by those three Faculties in Man, viz. Understanding, Will, and Memory, or these three Attributes of God, Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, but that these should say, that the Three Persons are the same as Faculties in Man, viz. Understanding, Will, and Memo­ry; or that they are those three Attributes of God, Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, I cannot believe; but shall rather account, that he saith (till he make it good) a meer Calum­ny. And now being so perswaded as I am, I might justly de­sist from giving my self any further Trouble in this Place, save for some few Passages in this Chapter, which I may not whol­ly pass over: One is in §. 46. A Question grounded on his own false Hypothesis (viz.) of there being no other Trinity but of infinite Goodness, Wisdom, and Power, in one divine Being; Hence he puts the Question, Is it not Idolatry to pay divine Worship to three Beings, each of which (since each is God) has in­finite Wisdom, Power, and Goodness?

It's granted, that to pay divine Worship to Three Beings, whatever Attributes we cloath them with, is Idolatry; but to pay divine Worship to Three glorious Persons, Father, Son, and Spirit, who are one and the same divine Being, and so [Page 29] equally share in all the glorious Attributes, and infinite Per­fections of that Being, is that true Worship, which the Holy Scriptures, and the infallibly inspired Pen-men of it, have prescribed to us; and to call this Idolatry, is the highest Blas­phemy, tending to overthrow the very Foundations of the Christian Religion, and of the Christian Faith.

Obj. But this Author propounds another Question, viz. If there be but one Being with infinite Ʋunderstanding, is it not un­lawful to adore three such Beings, each of which has an unlimited Ʋnderstanding?

Answ. If this Author had propounded this Question to Dr. Sher­lock, or some, whom he stiles real Trinitarians, he might per­haps have had some Grounds for it; but to propound it to those, with whom he hath to do in this Place (when he knows they grant as fully as himself, or any Unitarian can do, that it's unlawful to adore Three Beings, each of which has an unlimited Understanding) is not only a frivolous idle Questi­on, but on his part very malicious, as importing that those, whom he stiles nominal Trinitarians, do this, when he knows the contrary; that he knows the contrary, is evident from his own fol­lowing Words, wherein he tells us, that the Trinitarians are really as zealous as they pretend to be, to defend the sacred Truth of only one divine Being: Well then, if these Trinitarians be zealous Asserters of only one divine Being, as well as his Unitarians, how comes he to ask them, if it be not unlawful to adore three such Beings? As if they did this, when he knows they abhor it. But this Author will tell us here,

Object. 1. That it's not in Sincerity, but only in Pretence, that these Trinitarians seem zealous in Defence of one Being.

Ans. If he could make the World believe, that these mean the same by Being, as they do by Person, which in this very Place he does cunningly, but most falsly insinuate in his Jumb­ling those two Terms together, Being or Person, as if they were the same in the Language of Trinitarians as well as Uni­tarians: Then he might well perswade, that their Zeal, for Defence of one Being, whilst they assert Three Persons in God, was but a pretended Zeal; But when he knows that all [Page 30] these do assert Three Persons in God, yet but one Being, then what less can his charging these with want of Sincerity in their Defence of one Being, be, but meer Calumny? His other rail­ing Language in this §. hath, for its Foundation, not the true Doctrine of the Trinitarians, but his own ignorant or wilful Mistakes about that Doctrine. But, 2. I proceed to consider, what this Author lays down i [...] the two last Sections of this Chapter, §. 47, 48. One while he represents these Trinitarians as such, to whom the Unitarians owe their utmost Acknow­ledgment for vindicating their way of Worship, and for joyn­ing with them against the Politheists, and disguised Pagans (as Dr. Sherlock) Another while as the same with Polytheists or disguised Pagans, or as he means, with the real Trinitari­ans. Again, he tells us, he knows not under what Head to rank these who will be thought to be neither real nor nominal Trinitarians; he thinks they believe no Trinity at all, that they are forced, in adoring the Trinity, to confess they adore an unconceivable Mystery, which is only worshiping of Words and Sounds, or a Trinity of Cyphers; that if they declare what the Three are, they must inevitably run into Po­lytheism or Unitarianism; that in saying the first of the Three is God the Father, the second God the Son, the third is God the Spirit, they make them Three Gods, whom they equally adore: And p. 16. he aske what these Three are, Father, Son, and Spirit; Are they three Gods, three Parts of God, three Pro­perties, three Names? And concludes in a scoffing way, that it seems, the whole Mystery of the Trinity lyeth in this, tho' every one can tell what each of the three is, yet none can tell what three they are, or how they are three.

You see how this Author runs on in his old Cant, refusing to take in any Satisfaction as to his Doubts and Queries abou the Trinity, which he might have done a thousand times from the Writings of eminent Divines on this Subject, had he been de­sirous to be informed, or to have had his Doubts satisfied, as he pretends to be. For,

1. Do they not tell him, that the Three, who bear Record in Heaven, viz. the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, are Three Persons in one God-head? And does he not know [Page 31] that they say so? Why then does he propose those idle Questi­ons, Are they three Gods, three Parts of God, three Properties or Powers of God, three Names; and why does he bely them, when in Answer to that Question, What Sort of three are they, He makes them say that's impossible to be known?

2. Do they not tell him likewise, that these Three Persons are one and the same great and blessed God, and yet distin­guished from each other by personal Properties? that the first Person or Father is God, as limited with the personal Proper­ty of begetting or conceiving; that the second is God, as li­mited with the personal Property of being begotten; that the third is God, as limited with the personal Property of pro­ceeding from Father and Son, and of being sent as Comforter; so that one Person cannot be another Person, and yet all the Three are one and the same blessed God?

Object. 3. Let me add, Is it only these Divines that speak thus, or is it not the divinely inspired Pen-men of the Holy Scripture, who speak the same? The Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, doth he not tell chap. 1. v. 3. That the Son is the express Image of his Father's Person; and can he be a Son, re­presenting as a lively Image, the Person of his Father, and yet not a distinct Person? Doth not St. John, chap. 1. expresly tell us, that the Word was made Flesh, and was this the Father, or the only begotten of the Father? See v. 14. This only begot­ten of the Father, when in the Humane Nature he was bap­tized, was he not a distinct Person from the Person of the Fa­ther, testifying of him by a Voice from Heaven, This is my be­loved Son in whom I am well pleased? And was he not a distinct Person from the Holy Ghost, who descended in a bodily Shape like a Dove upon him? Luke 3. 21, 22. And does not our Lord Christ himself, when speaking of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, clearly distinguish these as Three Persons, in tel­ling us, John 14. 26. But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my Name, he shall teach you all things; have we not here the Person sending, the Person sent, and the Person in whose Name he's sent? But what need I thus argue for a Distinction of Persons? I don't at all question here, but this Author will readily grant, that the Father, the [Page 32] Word, and the Holy Ghost, as set forth in Scripture, are three different Persons, for he tells us, P. 32. §. 94. It is evi­dent that in Scripture, God the Father is as much distinguish'd from the Son as two Men or Angels can be; and Mankind that are incapable of apprehending Metaphysical Niceties, cannot but con­ceive them so; and hence it is (as we have shewn before) that he makes God and the Father, or Person of the Father, equi­valent Terms, so excluding the Son and blessed Spirit from being God, or equal to the Father, so that he owns them no otherwise to be Three Persons, than as three Beings or Sub­stances, which do really differ one from another.

Answ. You will thus see at length, what this Author is, and how his sometimes seemingly applauded Unitarianism ends in Arianism; and the Truth is, the very worst Dregs of the Poy­son of his Doctrine lye here, not in his denying any Trinity of Persons, but his denying a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the divine Essence; he can be well enough content that the Word be the Person incarnate, the Holy▪ Ghost the Comforter, or Person sent, so he can but strip them of their Divinity, or make that Divinity, which the Scripture seems (as he grants) to ascribe to them, to agree to them only in a tropical or figu­rative Sense; but to ascribe this truly to them, together with proper divine Worship, this he makes to be Idolatry. Here,

1. I would have it noted (that I may meet with and refute his Railery, which hath diffused it self through a great Part of his Pamphlet) that when this Author speaks of the Trinitari­an's worshiping the Three Persons, as Three distinct Almighty Beings, as Three Gods, as Three compleat distinct Objects of Worship, and as paying at other times divine Worship to one of them, and at the same time not paying it to another, that all this is meer Calumny, and hath not a Word of Truth in it; they worship indeed Three Persons as they are one and the same Almighty Being or God, but not as Three Almighty Beings or Gods, such Tritheism they abhor as much as himself or any other. They worship Three Persons, what, as three distinct Objects of Worship? No, but as all three in Con­junction, making up the one great compleat and adequate Object of our Worship; they worship the Son and blessed [Page 33] Spirit as well as Father; but do they, when they worship the Son, not worship the Father and blessed Spirit at the same time? Or when they worship the blessed Spirit, do they not worship the Father and the Son at the same time, as this Au­thor would Persuade? That's false; yea, it's impossible that divine Worship should be paid to one of these, and not to an­other, when the Three are but one and the same God, blessed for ever.

Obj. Here I would ask this Author, when he does in Wor­ship apply himself to God as our great Redeemer, does he in his so doing exclude God our Creator from sharing in that Worship? Or when he doth in a more special manner apply himself to God as our Sanctifier, doth he by so doing exclude God our Creator and Redeemer from sharing in that Wor­stip? And must he, for this his applying himself unto God un­der these different Respects, needs be a Polytheist and an Ido­later? If not, why then must Trinitarians be such for applying themselves in divine Worship to the Person of the Son, or of the blessed Spirit? If he say it is because three divine Persons are three Gods,

Answ. This is most false▪ most repugnant to Descriptions given by all sound Trinitarians of divine Persons, and hath fully been answered, and therefore I shall here pass it over as a meer Calumny.

2. I would have it noted, that when the Author tells us, §. 47, that the Notions of the Trinitarians, when apply'd to the Incarnation and Satisfaction, must be very uncouth; and further, that when they speak of these, and when they endeavour to prove the Spirit and [...] to be Persons, that then they are real Trinitarians; that is, such (in his Language) as set up three Gods; and fur­ther adds, §. 48. that these, who will be thought to be neither re­al nor nominal Trinitarians, cannot properly be said to believe any Trinity, except at the most a Trinity of Cyphers, and that (as he thinks) it cannot be presumed that Men of so great Sense (to men­tion no other than Sarum and Worcester) would assert so absurd a thing, but that they knew, if they declared what they suppose the three to be, they must inevitably run into Polytheism or Ʋnitaria­nism.

Answ. 1. And is there then no Medium betwixt these two Extreams? One would have thought that the Writings of so many learned Men as have writ on this Subject, if he had not resolved to have shut his Eyes against clearest Light, should have convinced him that there is. Do not these expresly tell (if we must repeat things again) that these three are three Per­sons; that however three Persons cannot exist in one singular finite Essence, where Personality flows from the Termination of Essence, yet three Persons may exist in one singular, infi­nite, immense Essence, where Personality flows from Essence after a different manner (which the boldest Arians and Sacini­ans dare not deny.) And if Personality does not result from divine Essence, as it does from created Essence, why there may not exist three Persons in the one, when yet there can but one exist in the other, it's neither this Author nor any other Man living (how big soever these may swell with Pride) that can shew any solid Reason to the contrary; and when once divine Revelation hath assured us it is so, who is this Man that dare fight against God? Will he tell us, that he hath been in Heaven, or beheld from all Eternity, what God, by eternal Acts, terminated on himself, can do or not do? To hear a vile Worm so talk as he doth, what horrid Boldness is it? Were I minded to do it, I could easily instance in several things about the divine Attributes, as difficult to be explicated and fully re­solved as any he can propose to Trinitarians about the Existence of three Persons in the God-head, and what then must we, because of this, call those divine Attributes into Question? And rather not cry out with the great Apostle, Oh the Depth!

2. How uncouth then must the Notions of these Trinitari­ans be, when applyed to the Incarnation and Satisfaction, or to the Spirit or [...] as Persons? Ichallenge him or any of his Par­ty, how highly soever pretending to Reason, to shew the Incon­sistency of these Notions, when so applyed, with true and right Reason; or that any such thing as Polytheism (as he vainly pretends) can be inserred from them. Indeed, if one should grant him, that one so often begged absurd Principle of his (viz.) That if God the Son be the same God with the Father, then he must be the same Person with the Father; or if he be God, [Page 35] and yet a distinct Person, that he must be a distinct God; Then it were no wonder, if uno absurdo concesso mille sequerentur. But when he's told by Trinitarians a thousand times over, that the Son, altho' he be the same God with the Father, or the same with the Father as to God-head, Nature, Essence, Substance, yet he's not the same with the Father as to personal Property; that, altho there be three different Personal Properties in one and the same God-head, yet that same God-head, as limited by one Perso­nal Property, cannot be the same, as limited by a different Perso­nal Property, that is, cannot be the same Person, however it be in it self the same God head still. And now I pray, why may not one and the same God-head or divine Essence, as it is with one personal Property, be not incarnate, as it is with another, be incarnate; as it is with one be unbegotten, as with another begotten; as it is with one, receive Satisfaction, as with ano­ther make Satisfaction; as it is with one send, as with another be sent? He must be quicker sighted than I, that can see any thing like a Contradiction here; as if contrary Predicates were here affirmed, de eodem, secundum idem, ad idem, &c. when it's clear they are not: So that his loud Clamour, Chap. 6. P. 17. §. 50. That this Supposition, That On Ch. 6. Of real Trinitarians. Note, here I shall not concern my self with these, and consequent­ly, not with this or the Author's follow­ing Chapters, further ther than I find him inveighing against the Orthodox Trinitari­ans each Person is the same God, carries with it an innu­merable Company of most obvious Contradictions, such as he tells us he will instance in §. 50, 51. will be found to be but a meer empty Sound, without any thing of Sense or Reason, and all his pretended most obvious Contradictions vanish into Smoak, as any Smatterer in Logick might easily shew him. That which hath been said, might, I hope, satisfie a judicious Reader, and serve for Answer to such fur­ther Cavils and blasphemous Invectives as this Author hath, P. 24, 25, 26, 27. and P. 31. §. 93, 94. of his Letter, not so much against the Trinitarians, as against the sacred Scriptures and the blessed God, Father, Son, and Spirit, as revealed in Scripture, but I fear his glorying, if I should so much as seem to pass them over. Therefore,

Obj. 1. As to what he saith, chap. 8. p. 24 §. 74. That none of the Trinitarians besides the Author of the 38 Propositions, can say, [Page 36] that any of their Persons is a most perfect God, or a most high God, or the only true God, or supream God, because there are two others as perfect, as high, as true, &c. will be found to be very idle and trifling, if it be but considered, that each Person in the most blessed Trinity, is the most perfect, high, wise, supream God; because the same most high God with the other two Persons, and neither a distinct God from them, nor they distinct Gods from him, as this Author doth falsly suppose; and if each one be the same God with the other, then each must be the most perfect, high, true, supream God.

Object. 2. As to what he saith, §. 76. of the same Page, That Trinitarians do imagine, that when Man was made, there was a Consult of the whole Trinity about that weighty Affair, and that one said to the others, Let us make Man.

Answ. The Author might do well to speak out plainly, and tell us, that his Design is to quarrel not so much with Trinitari­ans, as with the Holy Scriptures themselves, for the Words he quotes to quarrel with, Let us make Man, &c. whose Words are they? Are they the Words of any other Trinitarian, save of Moses, Gen. 1. 26. the infallibly inspired Penman of that Book, or rather of the blessed Spirit himself, as speaking by Mojes? Our Divines, I confess, make use of this Scripture for proving a Plurality of Persons in the Unity of the God-head, and it's a full and clear Scripture for that purpose; but I can­not wonder at this Author, if after his bold Attempt of strip­ping the blessed Spirit of his Divinity, he proceed to that Height of Blasphemy, as to make him speak falsly or ridicu­lously in Scripture.

Obj. 3. As to what he adds in the same § that according to the Trinitarians, the Son, as God, really wanted Glory, and pray­ed to the Father, John 17. 5. to give it him, telling us (in a scof­fing way) it is strange that a most high God should want and beg of another to supply him.

Answ. 1. It's false, that the Trinitarians suppose, that the Son, as God, really wanted Glory; they do indeed suppose, that the Son, as God, being made Flesh, or taking our Na­ture on him, by his dwelling in a poor humane Nature, du­ring the State of his Humiliation, had the Glory of his Divini­ty [Page 37] much obscured and eclipsed, so that it did not shine forth with that Lustre as before; otherwise the essential Glory was still the same, and there was no want as to this, but only as to its Manifestation, which may very well agree to the most high God, as this Author himself must be forced to grant, if he will grant such a Variety of divine Providences towards the Sons of Men, as make his Glory to shine forth brightly at some times, but suffer it to be eclipsed and not manifested to these at other times. But,

2. Seeing the Author would seem so quick-sighted as to find an Argument in this Scripture, John 17. 5. against the Divini­ty of Jesus Christ, but so stark blind as to find none in the same Scripture for it; I would therefore improve it a little, for getting the Scales of his Blindness removed; and whereas our Lord Christ prays, Glorify me with thine own self, with that Glo­ry which I had with thee before the World was: Hence I argue; if the Glory that Christ the Son had with the Father before the World was, was not the increated Glory of the Son as most high God (which this Author does ridicule) then it was but the Glory of a created Being. But that could not be: For,

1. If it was but the Glory of a created Being, then there was a created Being, before Creation, yea, before the first Moment of Creation: But that's impossible, and the Author himself who is so good in finding out Contradiction (where there's none) will sure see a Contradiction in this.

The Consequence is undeniable, for the very first Moment of Creation God gave Being or Existence to the Heaven and Earth, as the Phrase in Gen. 11. clearly imports, and yet the Son had his Glory with the Father before this, (i. e.) through the boundless Tracts of Eternity. Let the Author answer this Argument if he can. But (2.) If the Glory which the Son had with the Father before the World, was no other than of a created Being, then it highly concerns this Author to de­clare what created Being he means; for (1.) it could not be that of his Humane created Being, for Christ had no such Be­ing before he was born of the Virgin Mary: If then the Glory which the Son had with the Father, before the World was, was the Glory of such Being, it must then be the Glory of such [Page 38] Being, when there was no such Being▪ if this be not down­right Contradiction, I know not what is.

2. It could not be the Glory of Angelick created Nature, for Scripture is express, that Christ took not on him the Nature of Angels, Heb. 2. 16. Besides, Scripture sets him above all Angels, making him the Object of their Worship, Heb. 1. 6. yea, in the very same Place, where it mentions them as ministring created Spirits, it mentions the Son as God having an eternal Throne, and as the great unchangeable Creator of this great World, Heb. 1. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12. Now if the Son did exist before the World, and yet neither as God, Angel, or Man, I wonder what Species of Beings this Author will reduce him to: He who in Scorn so often asks the Trini­tarians what a something they mean by a second or third Per­son in the Trinity; may well be asked what a something he means by the Son of God, as having Glory with his Father be­fore the World was, and what a Compound he will make the Person of our Redeemer, as consisting of an Humane Nature, and of some other (yet never before heard of) pre-existing Nature? I doubt, before he have done, he'll turn that great Mystery of God, manifested in the Flesh, into a meer Chi­maera; but I tremble to mention such Blasphemies.

4. As to what this Author adds, P. 25, 26, 27. of his Let­ter, §. 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83. tho I find little besides idle Repetitions of former Matter which hath already been fully answered; yet some few Remarks I shall make, and 1. Whereas he tells us, P. 25. That it is impossible that the same numerical Act of Creation could be done by three Persons, because the self same Act could not be done three times, and if one Person does an Act, no other can do the sels same. Answ. Such Stuff as this and that which follows, argues the Author's gross Igno­rance about the divine Persons, whom he supposeth to be se­parate divided Beings like Humane Persons acting divisim & separatim; were this so, his arguing would be to purpose: But he knows well enough (and so his Ignorance will be found to be wilful Ignorance) that the Three Divine Persons, according to the Doctrine of all Orthodox Trinitarians, are not divided Beings, Minds, Natures, Essences, but one and the [...]ame most pure and simple divine Beings, Minds, Natures, Essences, [Page 39] with three distinct relative Properties, which do not so much as make any real Composition in that one glorious Be­ing, and yet are true Relations arising from their proper Foun­dations in that one most simple immense Being, as he may ea­sily understand, from what hath been said, if he have a Mind to be informed; and so he might have satisfied himself, that it contradicts no Idea of ours at all, that one divine Person does the very same numerical Action another does.

2. Whereas in the same Page he does insinuate, That infi­nite Divine Wisdom teacheth Men (he means according to the same Doctrine of the Trinitarians) that there are two needless and useless Persons in God himself, whose Actions are to no man­ner of purpose, only to do what the first Person is not only all suffi­cient to do, but actually and wholly does; that if the Son and Spirit must necessarily do the same Act, they are no other than necessary Agents, and all the Power must be in him with whom they cannot help doing the same Acts he wholly does. Answ. This whole Discourse is false and impious, and not without greatest Ca­lumny fixed on Orthodox Trinitarians. For may he not find (if he will but take notice of it) generally averring,

1. That the Second and Third Persons are so far from being needless and useless, that they do as necessarily subsist in the divine Essence as the first Person? 2. That altho the Father has a free Will and Power to do or not do (viz. ad extra) whatever he pleaseth, yet this must be so understood, that he hath this in Union and Conjunction with the Son and Spirit, and not as divided or separated from them? Therefore, what he would infer, that the Son and Spirit must necessarily do the same Act the Father doth; consequently, that they are no other than necessary Agents; that all the Power must be in him, with whom they cannot help doing what he wholly does; is idle and blasphemous, as if the Power of doing, a [...]d Will for doing, were the sole Power and Will of the Father, and not the joint Power and Will of Father, Son, and Spirit; or as if the Son and Spirit did not in entire Conjunction with the Father perform the same Act ad extra, and with the same Freedom, when the Act is the Joynt Act of all Three? And I pray, is that we say here the Language only of some late Tri­tarians, [Page 40] and not the Language of sacred Scriptures, yea, and of Christ himself? What else do those Words of our Lord im­port, John 5. 17. My Father worketh hitherto, and I work, did not the Father work Miracles? Did not Christ work the same in Conjunction with him? And does not that Scripture, John 1. 1, 2, 3, 14. expresly affirm, that the Word (stiled the only be­gotten of the Father) was in the Beginning, was with God, was God, the great Creator and Maker of all things, that without him was not any thing made that was made? It's a Wonder this Au­thor, when he reads such a Scripture as this, can forbear for to cast forth Reproaches on the divinely inspired Evangelist him­self? for could any Trinitarian have, with greater Evidence set forth, That, 1. this Word was from the Beginning, and before the Beginning of all created Beings, and there­fore from Eternity? 2. That in this Beginning he was with God, and therefore a distinct Person from God the Fa­ther? 3. That he was God, viz. the same blessed God with the Father as to Essence? 4. That all things were made by him, and that without him was not any thing made that was made, that therefore the Father did make nothing but in Conjunction with the Word or Son, not in Separation from him, as this Author would have it? And as nothing that was made, was made without this Word, so this Word himself was not made, except he make himself, but is the eternal in­created Being: Let this Author shew now if he can, what he hath to charge Trinitarians with, which he may not as well charge on this blessed Apostle.

Obj. But this Author is so far from granting the Concurrence of the Son or Spirit to the doing of the same Actions with the Father, notwithstanding Scripture does most clearly testi­fie it (as in the Texts before cited) that he does boldly aver, That this is apparently false, the Scripture being f [...]ll of Acti­ons, especially those they do to one another, as one being sent by an­other, their going from, and returning to one another, which is impossible to suppose they all equally concurr'd in; a little after he adds, That they (viz. Trinitarians) cannot deny, but Father, Son, and Spirit act separately ad extra, even with respect to the Creatures; and to prove this, he asks, Did not God the Son take the Man Christ into his God-head, when neither of the other took [Page 41] him into theirs, or were limited to him? He further adds,—They are so far from being one in a natural Sense, that there is not so much as a moral Ʋnion between them; they have different Wills and Inclinations; for instance, the first Person will not forgive Mankind, without having Satisfaction given him by a divine Per­son, nay, they say his Justice could not be satisfied without it; the Son is so far from being of the same Mind, that he freely offer'd himself, to suffer to appease the Wrath of the first Person, and still intercedes to the Father. The third Person neither gives nor receives Satis­faction.

Answ. 1. I know no divine Actions, ad extra, which are ex­pressed in Scripture, whether in a proper and literal, or in a tropical and improper Sense, but they may well enough agree to Father, Son, and Spirit, and they may equally concur in them: It's true, our Lord saith, Joh. 16. 25. I came forth from the Father, and am come into the World. Again, I leave the World, and go to the Father: But these Words do import no more, than that the Word being made Flesh, and dwelling in that Humane Tabernacle, did for such time as that Humane Na­ture was upon the Earth, manifest the divine Glory in it, and so his leaving the World, and going to the Father, imports no more than his ceasing from such a Way for Manifestation of the divine Glory, and from thenceforth reserving such Mani­festation for Heaven, stiled God's Throne; so this makes no­thing at all to the Author's purpose, only imports God's mak­ing in the Person of the Son, Manifestations of his Glory after different ways, sometimes in the Humane Nature on Earth, which is his Footstool, sometimes in Heaven, which is his Throne; so Joh. 14. 26. our Lord saith, but the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my Name, he shall teach you all things: What Action is there, the Words being rightly understood, wherein one Person may not concur as well as another? If the Author say, the Father's sending the Spirit to teach the Church, is such an Action: I answer, The Father's sending here imports no more than the Father's wil­ling that the Church be taught, and illuminated by the blessed Spirit; this being a Benefit which Christ hath pur­chased for it, and this teaching, such as in respect of Order in [Page 42] operating, is more especially appropriated to the Third Per­son; but dare this Author therefore say, that the Father does therefore exclude himself, either from willing, that the Church be taught, or from teaching it himself, when the teach­ing the Church all things, is such a peculiar Work of God, that as it does infallibly evidence the true Divinity of the Holy Spirit, so the joynt Concurrence of Father, Son, and Spirit, in it: So we see the grand Arguments of this Author against the Trinity, which he thinks to be invincible, are no other than such as do arise from his own Misunderstanding or per­verting the Sense of Holy Scriptures. 2 As to that Query of his, wherewith he thinks doubtless to silence all Trinitarians, viz. Did not God the Son take the Man Christ into his God-head, when neither of the others took him into their's, or were united to him? Answ. The Author in this, labours under a double gross Mistake of the Doctrine, both of sacred Scripture, and of Trinitarians.

1. In his confounding God-head with Personality: For doubtless the Humane Nature of Christ is truly united to that God-head which is common to the Three Persons; as divina charismatum communicatis, and as that Name, Immanuel, God with us, or God in our Nature, do clearly import: And as that Scripture, Act. 20. 28. To feed the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own Blood, does evince; tho at the same time, it be but united to the Personality of one of these, viz. the Son, and (through the Contrivement of eternal Wis­dom) be made to subsist wholly, Substantiâ [...], or in the God-head, as limited by personal Property, that so this glori­ous [...] might become a meet Representative or Sponsor for us.

2. Tho it be granted (for the Reason aforesaid) that only the Person of the Son, did take the Human Nature into his Subsistence; yet this imports no more than passive Reception of that Humane Nature into his Subsistence, which was ad­ded or united to it by the real joynt Action of the Three bles­sed Persons, and wherein they did equally concur, like as they do in other Actions relating to the Humane Nature, See Psal. 16. 10. compared with Acts 2. 24. Yea, do act joyntly, as well [Page 43] in preparing a Body or Humane Nature, for the Person of the Son (compare Heb. 10. 5. with Luke 1. 35.) as they do in uniting that Person with the Humane Nature, John 1. 14. The Word was made Flesh. So that you see from the undoubted Testi­mony of the Word, into what a second gross Mistake this Au­thor is fallen, when he affirms, that the Three Persons do act sepa­rately, ad extra, as I have now made appear in that very In­stance by himself, given of the Son's Incarnation.

3. As to what is further objected by him, viz. That these Per­sons are so far from being one in a Natural Sense, that there is not so much as a Moral Ʋnion between them, that they have different Wills, &c. Answ. This whole Discourse, upon due Search, will be found to be false and idle; for whereas he tells us, that the first Person, viz. (according to Trinitarians) will not forgive Mankind, without having Satisfaction given him by a divine Per­son, and that his Justice could not be satisfied without it, when yet the Justice of the Second Person can be satisfied without it. How false is this? Where will he find any such Trinitarians as say, That the Justice of the Second Person can any more be satisfied than the Justice of the First without Satisfaction? nay, do they not tell him, that the Justice of the First and Second Person is one and the same Justice? Should they talk as he makes them, they would be as ridiculous as he could wish them. I must tell him therefore, that the Act of being offended with the Sins of Mankind, as well as the Works of Creation and Pro­vidence, may as truly be attributed to one as to another Person, and alike to all; notwithstanding that in respect of Order, in operating, some of these are more frequently at­tributed to one, and some to another: Nor do we matter for his bold and impudent Scoff, of the Persons being a Committee of Gods, where sometimes one is President, and sometimes another is in the Chair, and that accordingly things run in each of their Names, being well assured, that the one great and blessed God subsisting according to his infinite Per­fection in Three Persons, viz. as Father, Son, and Spirit, may and doth (as Scripture teacheth) for the Manifestation of divine Order, in the Operations of the Three Persons, and for the Consolation of his People, appropriate in more speci­al [Page 44] manner, some of his great Works, ad extra, to himself as Father, some to himself as Son, some to himself as Spirit, tho all the Three do joyntly and equally concur in all, and this without giving the least Colour for Polytheism, or Multiplica­tion of Gods. But he adds, That the Son, viz. (according to us) is so far from being of the same Mind with the Father in re­quiring Satisfaction, that he freely offered himself to suffer, even to Death, to appease the Wrath of the First Person, and still inter­cedes.—Answ. We have shewn that the Son is of the same Mind with the Father, in requiring Satisfaction, and we shall now shew that he is of the same Mind, as to the giving of it; for when he comes to give Satisfaction, does he not expresly tell us, Psal. 40. 7, 8 Heb. 10. 7, 9, 10. I delight, or I come to do thy Will O God, yea, thy Law is within my Heart? Can any thing be more evident, than that it was the Father's Will, as well as Christ's that he should make Satisfaction? And did Christ freely offer himself to suffer even unto Death, before the Hands and Counsel of God the Creator of Heaven and Earth had determined this way of Satisfaction by the Death of Christ? See what Scripture saith, Acts 4. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28. And do not all sound Trinitarians say the same? But this Author should consider what Trinitarians tell him, that our Lord Christ hath an Humane as well as a Divine Nature; that to suffer Death and to intercede, are Idioms of the Humane Nature, and must not be attributed to the divine Nature of the Son, and therefore he should be cau­tious how he fathers his own false Notions on these. And what if Trinitarians set forth God as offended with fallen Man, by the Person of the Father; God as willing to recover and redeem saln Man, by the Person of the Son, for Reasons be­fore mentioned? Must therefore God the Father and Son have different Sentiments about Man's Fall, different Minds and Wills about Satisfaction and Redemption? Nothing more false; I hope it's cleared fully, that the Three Persons in these, as in all other real Acts, ad extra, do joyntly and equal­ly concur

Obj. But it's yet hoped, by this Author, that he can baffle Trinitarians by their own Concessions: For do not these grant (saith he) That opera Trinitatis ad intra sunt divisa? And he [Page 45] does instance in the Father's Act of Generation, whereby he gave Being to Son and Spirit, wherein they did not, nor could not act, And what greater Argument (saith he) can there be that they are separate Gods, than that they act separately?

Answ. Suppose that Maxim, Opera Trinitatis ad intrasunt di­visa, such, that taken in a right Sense, it may be granted; yet that wicked Conclusion he would draw from it, That the Three Persons act separately, and so are separate Gods, does no way follow from it; which himself, if he would but weigh the Matter well, would be forced to acknowledge; for what if these Acts be divided, this (in a sound Sense) im­ports no more, than that the Divine Essence, by its two great Faculties of Intellect and Will, doth exert those two great Acts ad intra, one of eternal Intellection of its self, another of eternal Dilection, which Acts yet are so divided, that neither the one can formally be said to be the other, nor the Essence, as with the one, the Essence as with the other; nor the Es­sence as with the Act, the Essence as terminating the Act; this is so clear, that no rational Man can deny it, and I question not but the Author himself will acknowledge it: And yet, these Acts, tho thus divided, do not so much as imply (as he must needs confess) any real Composition in God, much less separate Agents, or separate Gods: Now, if we bring what hath been said, to the Persons in the Trinity, we shall find, that however these Acts, ad intra, absolutely consi­dered, be those essential Properties or Perfections which are as communicable as the divine Essence it self, yet if we consider them as Foundations of relative personal Properties flowing and resulting from these Acts, as for example, of that perso­nal relative Property of Generation (to instance in that which this Author doth instance in) and which Generation doth in­clude both the foresaid internal Act of the divine Essence, and also the relative Property of God the Father resulting from it, and giving Denomination to it; then this Act, ad intra, so li­mited by relative Property, is the peculiar Act of God as Fa­ther, and not of God as Son or Holy Spirit; even as the di­vine Essence it self, absolutely considered, is common to Three Person, but as limited by personal Property, is pecu­liar [Page 46] to one; and now I pray, where's our Author's separate Agents, or separate Gods, necessary for Performance of these Acts ad intra, when it's clear that these Acts, with the Terms of these Acts, are only distinguished and divided as before, amongst the Three Persons by relative Properties; and where's that Polytheism or Multiplication of Gods, which he would so gladly charge on Trinitarians? Doth his arguing here flow genuinely from the Doctrine of Trinitarians, or only from the false Notions and Dreams of his own Brain? Is there any thing in all this Discourse, affirmed of God, but what may be affirmed, and what himself cannot but affirm of every Angel, and of every Humane Soul; save with this Diffe­rence, that these Acts, ad intra, in the blessed God, being infi­nite and essential, are therefore generative and productive of Persons in the God-head; when in Angels and Humane Souls, where they are but finite and accidental, they are not pro­ductive in like manner: After all this, when it is so evident from divine Revelation (without which we should for ever have been silent) that the Acts, ad intra, as they are in the infi­nite eternal God, do differ in their Products, so as Trinita­rians affirm from those Acts, ad intra, which are but the Acts of finite Creatures, and when this stands in no real Con­tradiction to Reason or the Light of Nature, but, tho transcen­dent to it, yet, when once revealed, is found to stand in sweet Consistency with it; I wonder what it is this Author would be at, unless it be, instead of subjecting himself to the written Word and divine Revelation, to take on him to be a Controu­ler, or rather scornful Gain-sayer of it?

As to his 79. §. we have shewn before, that Creation is the Work, tho of one glorious Being, yet as subsisting in three Persons; and here, tho we readily grant, that there is but one supream Preserver and Governour of all things, yet we must tell, or rather let the Scripture tell him, That this supream Upholder and Governour of the World, is the great God, Father, Son, and Spirit; Son and blessed Spirit, joyntly and equally concurring with the Father in this great Work, and not the Father as separated from them; for this see Heb. 1. 3. Is not the Son expresly said here to uphold all things by the Word of his Power? Andis not the Saints new Birth, Illu­mination, [Page 47] Instruction, or Direction, attributed to the Holy Spirit? Can any thing be more evident than that these glorious Persons do act joyntly with the Father in the Preservation of the Creatures, as well as in their Creation? How falsly then does he conclude, §. 80. That Creation, Pre­servation, and supream Government of the Ʋniverse, demonstrate that there is but one Divine Person? And that the same Con­clusion, in his said §. 80. drawn from Adoration, Love, and Gratitude due to God, is as false as the former, I have fully before evidenced, P. 24. As to his 81. §. I must tell him, 1. That all sound Trinitarians do acknowledge as fully as himself or any other, that there is but one divine Being or God, with a Power to know and do all things. 2. That the Heathens were without Excuse for worshipping several. 3. That for him to say, that these Trinitarians do pay divine Worship to more than one necessary spiritual Being, is a Charge so notori­ously false, that Satan himself could not have acted the Part of a more false Accuser.

But he tells us, §. 80. That it can no way allay our Crime to call them Persons instead of Gods, since paying divine Worship to them does as much rob the only one of his due, as if we called them so many Gods. Answ. Do we in worshiping Three Persons, rob the only one of his Due, when in express Scripture Lan­guage, 1 John 5. 7. we profess that these Three are the only One, and the only One is these Three, viz. Father, Son, and Spirit? If in that Adoration we pay to the Son, and blessed Spirit, we should pay it to them as separated from the Father, excluding the Father from sharing in it, he might have had some Colour for what he says; but when the Father is not excluded, but does equally share in it; nay, when we do pro­fess, that in all that Adoration we do direct to One of the Three, yet we as truly include all the Three, viz. Father, Son, and Spirit, as making up the only one compleat and ad­equate Object of Worship, the blessed God; even as he who does sincerely direct his Worship to God as Redeemer, does yet truly include God our Creator and Sanctifier; will not his whole Charge be found to be false and blasphemous Calumny? In his 82. §. he tells us, that not only Ʋnitarians, but all Mankind that worship but one divine Being, are greatly [Page 48] scandalized at those Christians that pay divine Worship to several; and he beseecheth these to let him understand how the Heathens, in their Devotions did or could do more to distinguish their divine Be­ings, than these do by praying to each by himself, and terminating their Devotion on each? Answ. If this Author have a Mind to be satisfied, I hope I have said enough to satisfie him in this, and to let him see, that these Christians are so far from imita­ting the Heathen in their idolatrous Worship of more Gods, that none but a Person grosly blinded with Heathenish Malice, taking almost everywhere his own silly and false Hypotheses for granted Maxims, and inferring his Conclusions from such Prin­ciples, durst have ventured to have charged them with it.

Obj. But it is objected, Do we not in our Creed expresly say, The Son is very God of very God? and how can we, after that, pre­tend they are the same God?

Answ. Well enough, for the Creed imports no more than that the Son is the very same God with the Father, tho as cloathed with a different relative Property through eternal Generation, he be God of God, in such manner as is largely before declared.

Obj. But he tells us here, there are a hundred Actions which Scripture relates of one God, and denies of the other two Gods; as God the Spirit descending in a Bodily Shape, the Father and Son not descending.

Answ. 1 Tho that Scripture, Mat. 3. 16, 17. does signally evi­dence the Truth of Three Persons, who in Christ's Baptism did differently represent themselves, viz. Voce Pater, Natus corpore, flamen Ave, which made one of the Fathers say to one doubting of the Trinity, Abi ad Jordanem & videbis; yet no such thing as a Plurality of Gods, can be inferred from any Actions here performed. To mention that which himself does instance in, viz. God the Spirit's descending in a Bodily Shape; I suppose he must needs grant here, that Action of descending cannot be attributed to God in a proper Sense, and therefore supposing the Spirit to be God, as Trinitarians say, can only be attribu­ted to him in a tropical Sense, suited to any manner of con­ceiving, which is ordinary in Scripture; and whatever of Action [Page 49] it may import appropriated here to the Holy Spirit, yet it is but like all other Actions ad extra, common to the Three, as we have before fully evidenced, P. 30. where he may find what is here or elsewhere by him objected in reference to these Acts fully answered. But.

Quest. 2. What then does this Author mean in telling of an hundred Actions which the Scripture relates of one God, and denies of the other two Gods? Does he charge Scripture and the divinely inspired Penman of it with Polytheism, or as­serting a Plurality of Gods?

Answ. To do him Right, I think this is not his Meaning; but that by one God, he means the true God, and by the other two Gods, two made Gods, such as truly are not God, but only have such a Name, and are falsly advanced to divine Dignity by Trinitarians, whom therefore he charges as Idola­ters, yea, as bad or worse than Pagans. More Stuff of like Nature he hath in his 9th. Chapter, which, tho chiefly intend­ed against Dr. Sherlock and his Party, yet towards the Close of it, as §. 93, 94. he does bitterly inveigh against the others as Polytheists and Idolaters, having a Creed not stuffed with so many Lines as Contradictions; yea, and when it's evident (as he tells us) that in Scripture God the Father is as much di­stinguished from the Son, as two Men or Angels can be. In his 83. §. he adds, these things are so frequently objected, and so little Care taken to answer them be our Writers, that I thought I could not do better than to represent those to you, that we may (if it be possible) receive a full and satisfactory Answer.

And now I hope the Christian Reader may fully see what this Author would be at; and I should not thus far have raked into the filthy Dunghil of his Blasphemies, but to make a full Discovery of him, and that even the weaker and more incau­tious Readers may now see him in his perfect Colours. For such Conclusions as these are clearly deducible from his own Words, and the most candid Construction that can be put on them. viz. 1. That God the Son, and God the Spirit, when worshipped by Christians with Divine Worship, become meer Idols. 2. That those Christians who adore these, or ei­ther of these, as true God, are as gross Idolaters as Pagans, [Page 50] who worship Stocks and Stones, and in some respects, more vile than they. 3. That all such as write in Defence of a Trinity of Persons, in the Unity of divine Essence, are simple Persons, fond of venting absurd and silly Hypotheses, and Books and Creeds stuff [...]d with nothing but flat Contradictions; and what I pray will follow from these Conclusions, but that, 1. All Christians in the World, for many hundred Years together, were meer Idolaters, yea, as bad, or worse than Pagan Ido­laters? 2. That Idolatry destroying the very Essence of a true Church, Christ therefore, for about a thousand Years, i. e. from the Time that Arianism was exploded by the Christian World, till the time that it was broached anew by Socinus, had no true Church? Could any Pagan or Mahometan have disgorged the Poyson of a bitter Spirit against Christ and his Members, at an higher rate than this? But this Man pretends to believe Divine Revelation; let me then expostulate the Matter a little with him. Can he cast all this Dirt on Trinita­rians, and not on Scripture and the sacred Writers of it, yea, on Christ himself? Is it only Trinitarians that say, Christ is God equal with the Father; and doth not blessed Paul say the same, Phil. 2. 6? Is it these only that say, that we must ho­nour the Son as we honour the Father, and doth not Christ himself say the very same, Joh. 5. 23? Do these only tell us that Christ the Son is the great Maker, Preserver, and Up­holder of all things, and doth not the great Apostle St. John, in the first Chapter of his Gospel, and Paul, in the first Chap­ter to the Hebrews say the very same? Is it these only that say, that the Son is the mighty eternal God, and doth not the great Prophet Isaiah say as much, Chap. 9. Vers. 6. stiling him the mighty God, the everlasting Father, or Father of Eterni­ty? Or is it only these who pay that same Divine Worship to the Son, become our Redeemer, which they pay to the Fa­ther in Conjunction with him, and do not the innumerable Companies of blessed Angels and Saints, yea, ten thousand times ten thousand of these, with every other Creature in his Kind, pay the very same? Let him consult Rev. 5. 11, 12, 13. and he'll find they do; and must all these therefore be Idola­ters? Oh Blasphemy! And as to the blessed Spirit, is it only [Page 51] the late Trinitarians who acknowledge his Infinity and Om­niscience, did not the Royal Prophet David do the same? See Psal. 139. 7, 8, &c. Is it only these that declare him to be the true God, the great Searcher of Hearts, and did not the great Apostle Peter, in the Case of Ananias, who lyed to the Holy Ghost, declare as much, when he told him, Act. 5. 3, 4. Thou hast not lyed unto Men but unto God? And did not Ana­nias to his Cost find it so? The Author might do well to con­sider, who it is he casts his blasphemous Reproaches on; were it only upon a Company of poor frail Men, who possibly may err, this were not so much, but to cast these on sacred Scrip­ture, on the infallibly inspired Pen-men of it, and on glorify­ed Angels, who say, and do as much as Trinitarians do; yea, and on Jesus Christ himself, and on the Holy Spirit; this is dreadful. Before he had gone thus far, he might well have considered what our Lord saith, Mat. 12. 31. All manner of Sin and Blasphemy shall be forgiven unto Men, but the Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto Men; or, if it be not too late, I wish he might yet consider it and repent. He pretends, §. 83. that his End in writing was to receive (if possible) a full and satisfactory Answer from those learn­ed Persons, to whom he writes; and what if such an Answer come from one, sometimes Member of one of those famous Universities, to whom he makes his Address? Is not this as much as may suffice both for detecting and confuting his falla­cious arguing, and for giving ample Satisfaction, if he have an Heart prepared for Reception of it? However this be, thus much I can sincerely profess, that for so much of his Letter as relates to those Trinitarians, whom he doth abusively stile No­minal, and who indeed are the sound and Orthodox Trinitari­ans, I have been so far from overlooking any thing that might seem to have any Weight, or to carry any Colour of Reason with it, that I have chosen, rather as to some of his Objecti­ons repeated again and again in different Places, under some­what different Terms, to give Answer again and again, rather than suffer the incautious Reader to be deluded with them; only thus much I must mind the Reader of, that in the whole of this Discourse, I have not medled at all with Dr. Sherlock, or those [Page 52] of his Party who assert that the Persons in the Trinity are Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits, and Three individu­al Substances: And whom this Author stiles real Trinitarians: These I confess have given too just Occasion of Offence and Scandal to all sober Christians, who do not stand in need of such Weapons for Defence of the Trinity against the Ex­treams, either of Arius on the one hand, or of Sabellius or the Unitarians on the other; for seeing, I find, these justly censured by those learned and worthy Persons—The Vice-Chancellor, and Heads of the Colleges and Halls in Oxford, in their Decree of Novemb. 25. A. D. 1695. I do fully acqui­esce therein. But as to the Author, with whom I have to do, when I came to that Part of his Letter, viz. Chap. 6, 7, 8, 9. which seems only to refer to these, and so had thought to have rid my Hands of him, yet perusing these Chapters, I found so many things interwoven relating to the former, whose De­fence I had undertaken (as if his Arrows were chiefly level­led at these) that I did plainly see, either I must do more, or leave this Author to glory, as if I had left some of his chief Arguments unanswered; which now I hope he will not so much as pretend.

And now I would shut up my whole Discourse, but that his last Chapter about Mystery, may call for these few brief Notes on it, viz. 1. That it argues intolerable Pride and Folly in him to prefer Reason as in fal'n Man, yea, his own magnifyed Ideas (of things which we have found already to be so false) to the most undoubted Traditions and Revelations of God in the Word, and to make those the Rule and Touchstone for trying these by, as it's clear he doth, §. 11.

2. That it argues highest Impudence, and Impiety for him to make, as §. 103. 104. Mystery, no mark of Christ or true Religion, but only of Antichrist and Irreligion, when yet sa­cred Scripture tells him, 1 Tim. 3. 16. that great is the Myste­ry of Godliness, God manifest in the Flesh, which clearly shews, that there's as well a Mystery of Godliness relating to Christ, as a Mystery of Iniquity relating to Antichrist.

3. Whereas he rails against the Mystery of the Trinity as a cunningly devised Fable, for to keep People in Darkness, and make such as were Children, be as Children still, §. 95. I must tell him, this is no better than false and lying Slander; for he sees how ready we are to enter the List with him, and to vindicate our Doctrine both by Scripture and Reason from all his black Calumnies.

Obj. 4. Whereas he pretends, that there's no Mystery in Religion, as to the things themselves, which are revealed, but only as to the manner of them (I suppose he means not as to their [...], but [...]) see his §. 96, 97, 98. and then tells us, that the Mystery of the Trinity is a Mystery as to the things themselves, i. e. such wherein we have no Ideas of the things at all, or but such as are contradictory to the true, and con­tain an Affirmation and Negation of the same thing; which he would more fully evidence §. 102. telling us, that to say, Three Persons and one Person are the same God, is as great a Con­tradiction as to say, Three Persons and One are the same; and that we may as soon apprehend a Round Square, or a Moun­tain without a Valley; which yet Trinitarians would maintain under Pretence of Mystery; and this when not only Unitari­ans, but all Mankind that worship but one Divine Being, are greatly scandalized at them for it is, as §. 82.

Answ. The whole of what is here objected, hath in the pre­ceding Discourse, been so fully answered; the Definitions of Person in general, and of divine Person, so clearly laid down; the Difference there is betwixt Substance, substantial Essence, and Person, so fully cleared; His pretended Contradictions (not resulting from Trinitarian Doctrine (as he would have it (but from his own false Ideas about these things) so clearly refuted and confuted; that I would perswade my self, would he and those of his Party betake themselves to an impartial and unprejudiced Consideration of what hath been said, this, if it had no further Effect, yet would make both him and them for ever hereafter to desist from these their loud and ly­ing Clamours against Christ's Church and faithful Servants; and make them grant, that these, by the true Doctrine of the Trinity, are so far from multiplying Gods, or Objects of [Page 54] Worship, that they do not so much as attribute to our great and blessed God, any Properties, whether absolute or rela­tive, but what are revealed in the Word, and which being so revealed, Reason it self, and the Light of Nature, must grant to be such, as may flow from the Divine Essence, and its eter­nal intrinsick Acts, if the Perfection of these and their infinite Distance from finite Essence and Acts, be but duly known and considered.