CHAP. I. The Question shortly stated. The terms [Conscience,] and [Opining] opened: The Various complexions of Con­science; arising from the different mediums by which light shines into a soul about a Practical Proposition. The terms of Faith, Science, Opinion, Doubting, Suspition, Scruple, opened. The true notion of a Fixed Conscience, an Opining Conscience, a doubt­ing, and a Scruputons Conscience. The Schoolmens Notion of an Opinion. The Question fully stated. The method propounded for handling it.

SECT. I.

THe question is shortly and plainly this. Whether without sinning against God, a man can act contrary to the dictate of his own Conscience, though but Opi­ning. By Conscience, not to trouble our Reader with the va­rious Notions, and Homonymies of it; which have little re­lation to our intended discourse: we mean, That Judgement in man, by which he determineth concerning good or evil, as it [Page]relateth to practice, according to the Dictate of Natural, or enlightened Reason. We think it well described by the Schoolmen, Judicium quo aliquid bonum esse vel malum judica­mus. Sanehes. in Op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 9.1. Reason is a no­ble faculty in man, by which he discourseth Conclusions from Principles; and these either Connate or Natural, or acqui­red from exercise, reading and comparing things, with things, Now the work of Reason is, when a practical Proposition is ex­hibited to it, to sit as a Judge upon it, enquiring either upon the Truth or falshod of it, by comparing it with these Principle, hence it maketh up a Judgement whether the Proposition be true or false, good or bad. This Judgment Divines call Ju­dicium singulare: or Judicium conscientiae practicum, The Judgment of Conscience, or Conscience it self.

Sect. 2. This Judgment is made up by certain Mediums, or arguments, which do not in all cases, shine with the like degree of light upon the soul: for as there is a difference in Propositions, some are True, some are false; of those which are, some are necessarily so: So as it is impossible they should be false. Some are contingently so, which are true, but it is pos­sible they may be, or might have been false; as now That God is good, is a Proposition necessarily true. That Peter was good is true, but no more than contingently so, for he was bad: So there is likewise a great difference in the minds assent to Propositions; some it agrees to, some it de­nieth. Of those to which it agreeth, There are some to which it agreeth firmly, and fixedly, without the least doubt of them. Now these are either such as are Propositions of faith, being things plainly revealed in the word of God: or, Matters evident to sense. Thus every man will agree the fire is hot, and that the Sun shines at noon day: or else such, which have a certain cause of their truth, which we can see. The Assent of the mind to the first is called Faith, which is the minds assent to the truth of a Proposition, upon the autho­rity of God revealing it. The Assent of the mind to the two latter is called Science. Now there are other Propositions, for which the soul can have no such Mediums as these to dis­cern [Page]them by, But either, some Humane Authority, or some probable Reason. The Assent which the mind giveth upon either of these accounts is called Opinion, which is but the Judgement of Conscience, from probable Arguments, usually called dialectick arguments, for there are not many things capable of demonstration.

§. 3. Hence the certainty of the Mind, as to the Truth, or Falshood of any proposition, is, 1. Either Supernatural, from Divine Revelation; or 2. Natural, from the Evidence of Sense, or Demonstration; or 3. Moral, from probable Authority or Arguments. But now in regard of the differing Force of Arguments, and the variety of them, for, or a­gainst the same proposition: This assent is capable of vari­ous degrees, and may variously be incumbred. A Christian may give some Credit to a proposition, yet have some scru­ples about it (which like little stones in the shooe, from whence the term is borrowed) may trouble his Practice: Or may have some doubts whether the thing be true or no: Or I may have an Opinion, that is, verily judge the thing to be so, or not so.

§. 4. The Philosopher tells us, that in Moral things, a Moral certainty is enough to Act upon; and indeed it must be so, for as to most things of particular practice, we can neither be Naturally nor Supernaturally ascertained. Not Naturally, because we cannot see the certain Causes. Not Supernaturally, for it had been impossible that God's Word should have set every individual Man a particular Rule for every individual Action. In these Cases therefore (as we said) a Moral certainty is ground enough for Action, which is, or may be consistent with some Scruples or Fears. For Example, suppose this the Question.

Whether a Man be sit to Receive the Supper of the Lord?

It may be he cannot fully satisfie himself, but he may have some fears, and jealousies, and Scruples, of the Reasonable­ness [Page 4]of which, he can give himself no very good Account; but yet he finds so much ground to conclude he is, that he is Morally certain. In this case he is bound not to omit it. Sup­pose one sick of a Quinsie, or Pleurisie, or some other Di­sease, usually Mortal without timely Bleeding, and applica­tion of means: He is not Mathematically, or Demonstra­tively certain, that he shall dye, if he doth not use such means, (his Natural strength may Conquer it) but he may be Moral­ly certain, and so Obliged to Act. Whether a Man may be said to know, that of which he is onely Morally certain, is a little Velitation among Critical Philosophers. Aristotle tells us, that what falleth under Science, considered as an Habit of the Mind, must be something demonstrable, but this is onely a strife about words.

§. 5. Much in the present Debate, depending upon the term Opining, the fixing of the true Notion of an Opinion, or at least, such a one as we understand in the Question is of great Consequence. It is sometimes used to signifie a sudden and rash assent of the Ʋnderstanding to a proposition. But in this sence, we have nothing to do with it. 2. It is taken for the assent of the Mind to one part of a proposition as true, yet not without fear of being mistaken. 3. But Thirdly (in which sence we use it) It is also taken to signifie the Souls assent to a proposition upon probable Arguments. That is such Argu­ments as do not demonstrate the thing to the Soul, so as to put it out of all possibility of doubting, but make it appear very like to be true. Probabile est quod quum certum non sit magis tamen videtur esse verum vel falsum, saith the Logician. Aquinas, in his Summs, Qu. 1. Art. 4. Describes an Opi­nion according to the Second Notion, thus.

It is (saith he) the Act of the Ʋnderstanding, inclining to one part of a Contradiction, not without a fear of the Truth of the other part.

Valentia (as he is quoted by Sanchez, Op. Mor. l. 1. c. 9.) will allow no Man any longer to keep within the Latitude of on Opinion, than while he perswades himself, that although he [Page 5]hath probable Reasons to judge this, or that Lawful, or un­lawful, yet they are not such; but (if he could hit on it) might be Answered by himself, or some other: But yet nei­ther Sanchez, nor Vasquez, nor Azorius will allow this streightned Notion of an Opinion, though we cannot see how they will avoid it, till they put [cum formidine alterius] out of their own Descriptions, for what should he who openeth be afraid of, but that his Arguments are Answerable? So as in effect they all agree, That a Man perswaded upon proba­ble Arguments, of the Lawfulness, or Unlawfulness of a th [...]ng, no longer Opineth, than he feareth his own Reasons may be Answered. But to us, Be it so, or so, it is all a case; we call that an Opinion, which is The Assent of the Mind to a Proposition upon Arguments, not Demonstrably, but Proba­bly certain. And we have here the Advantage; for if we prove it not Lawful to act against an Opining Conscience in their sence, they will yield it much more Unlawful to act a­gainst an Opining Conscience in this sence, which with them is a fixed Conscience, either in good or evil. And that it is unlawful to act against such a Conscience: Vasquez is so con­fident, that he Disputeth against Almainus, and Andreas de Castra, who had reserved unto God a Liberty to dispense with a Man acting against a fixed Conscience, so as that a Man may do it without guilt; and contends, That God himself can­not dispense with it, because it is an acting against the Law of Nature, Vesquez in 12. Disp. 61. Cap. 2.

§. 6. There are [besides Opinion] some other terms, Divines take Notice of: Suspition, which they make the Jealousie of the Mind, or some light Inclination to one part, yet without an Assent. Aquinas makes it the Younger Daugh­ter of an Opinion, and calls it an Opinion with a very light Evidence. Doubting is another, which they make the Pen­dulousness of the Mind, as to the Lawfulness or Unlawful­ness of a thing after Debate. Now, from this variety of Propositions, and the variety of Mediums, through which a Light comes into our Minds, discovering the Truth, or [Page 6]Falshood of them, and the variety of our assent consequent to such Mediums, arise the various Notions of a fixed Consci­ence. A Doubting Conscience. An Opining Conscience. A. Scrupulous Conscience. These are but the several Complexions of Conscience, caused from the variety or de­gree of that Light in which it seeth a Proposition as true or false.

§. 7. If the Matter in Question be of that Nature, that it thinks it can find a plain, and particular Evidence for it in Scripture, or can judge of it by the certain Evidence of sence, or see it in the certain Causes, the Conscience is fixed, either truly, or erroneously; and (as to this thing) beareth the Name of a fixed, Good, or Erroneous Conscience, as it is, or is not deceived in its apprehension of the Medium. If the Matter of the Proposition, or that part to which the Soul ad­hereth, be of that Nature, that the Soul cannot find a plain Revelation in Scripture, nor discern it by sense, nor see it in the certain necessary Causes, but hath many probable Argu­ments, rather for the one part than the other: Whether it thinks these Arguments Answerable or no, or thinks that pos­sibly they may be Answerable, but as yet it can see no Answer to them which it judgeth sussicient; this now is an Opining Conscience. If the Mind be equally ballanced on both sides with Arguments, that it hath as much to say why such a thing should be Lawful, as why it should be unlawful, or unlaw­ful, as Lawful; this is now a Doubting Conscience, and rarely happeneth to a knowing and intelligent Soul. If the Soul be afraid, that this or that is not Lawful, or fancieth that such a thing is Lawful, but hath none, or if any very light Reasons for it, possibly such or such Men say so, or such or such Men do it, or do it not; this is a Suspitious, or Scrupulous Con­science.

§. 8. In short, in Order to a Man's spotless walking. There are infinite Propositions to be weighed; God hath hung up a Beam, called Conscience, in every individual Soul, in Order to the weighing of them; upon this Beam is written, 1 Thes. [Page 7]5.21. PROVE ALL THINGS, hold fast that which is good. The Weights which God hath allowed us to weigh things by, are, Divine Revelation, Demonstrations, Evi­dence of Sence, Topicks or more probable Logical Argu­ments, made up from Logical places, and Conclusions for­med from the comparing of Rational and Spiritual things 'tis Evident, with Rational or Spiritual things more Evident; when any of these fully weigh down the Souls assent, there's a Fixed Conscience: When they equally incline the Balance one way, or another, there is a Doubting Conscience. When they strongly incline the Soul more one way than another, ther's an Opining Conscience. When they cause a very light inclination of the Soul to one part rather than to the other, there is a Suspitious, or a Scrupulous Conscience.

§. 9. Now, what the Duty of Christians is, under these various Complexions of Conscience, is a point, which hath justly exercised valuable Divines of all perswasions, for as we are capable by any of our Actions to incurr the wrath of God, so as to them generally, our Consciences are Com­plexionated, one way or another; for if we Act, we either do a thing, being fixedly perswaded, it is Lawful, or un­lawful, or doubting whether it be so, or strongly inclined to think it is so or so; or suspecting, and being scrupulous. Con­cerning a Conscience that is fixed in that which is truly good, none ever doubted of the Lawfulness of Acting according to it; or unlawfulness to Act against it: But concerning Conscience in all the other Circumstances, there have many Questions been started, as to the Truth in which the World is very far from being Universally agreed. Whether a Man may Act against a Conscience fixed in an Error, is a Question spoken to by most School-men and Casuists. It is usually said, that such a Conscience doth Ligare non Obligare. It is not our business to dispute, how well that distinction (Ordinarily Father'd upon Durandus,) is worded: but we do not re­member, we ever met with any Deliberate Divine, that would affirm. That in case a Man were fully (though falsly [Page 8]perswaded) that this or that thing was unlawful to be done, yet he might Lawfully do it. Though indeed (if the thing be a necessary Duty) he sinneth in not doing it. Vasquez saith, it is against the very Law of Nature. Sanchez saith, that although the Law of God be the primary Rule, yet every mans Conscience is the proximate Rule of his Actions, and therefore be cannot Act against it. Dr. Ames saith, That he who doth it Interpretatively, sins against God: For he must needs do contrary to what he believeth to be the will of God. Eilia­cius. tract. 21. M. Qu. c. 4. saith, That he which doth it, doth that which he thinketh to be sin: And, saith he, hoc ipso amat peccatum, by this thing he sheweth he loveth to sin, and chu­seth sin. But this is not our Question: We suppose a Man not to be fully and demonstrably perswaded, that this or that Action is unlawful, but onely upon Arguments, which seem to him very probable, verily to believe it is unlawful, and Quaery whether, while he so believeth he can do that thing. And this Question divideth it self, according to the different Notion of an Opinion which we before hinted, viz. Whether a Man thus perswaded of the unlawfulness of an Action, by Arguments indeed, not demonstrative, but such as he judgeth very probable, and which he himself cannot Answer, so neither doth he think others can: may yet, because his Principles are not Supernaturally, or Mathematically made certain to him, act against the Opinion of his own Conscience, in Obedience to the will of any Creature. 2. Whether a Man thus perswaded of the unlawfulness of any thing, by Arguments not demonstra­tive, but probable (as before said) though at present he can neither himself answer them, nor see them answered by any other; yet suspecting they may be answered, may while this is the Condition of his Conscience, act against the present judg­ment of it, though it be incumbred with such a Jealousie or Suspition.

Now, as to the first of these Questions, we find little or no­thing spoken in the Affirmative, by any Popish Casuists, or School-men. They generally making some fear of the contrary part of the Practical Proposition, to which the Person inclineth, [Page 9]and Jealousie that this part of the proposition is false, and his Arguments Answerable, essential to an Opinion, conclude, that a Soul perswaded, though but upon probable Arguments (if it hath no such fear, suspition, or Jealousie, to have a fixed Conscience, and though fixed in an Error, yet conclude it utterly unlawful for a Man to Act against it. But if there be in any Soul any fear, suspition, or Jealousie, that its Argu­ments may be Answered, then they conclude the Soul but Opining, and do indeed d [...]spute for a Lawfulness to Act a­gainst it, though under several Cautions and limitations. At this rebound therefore we will take the Question, and state it thus.

Quest. Whether, supposing a Man or Woman not Demon­strably perswaded, that this or that Action is unlawful, but from arguments, which to him or her appear very pro­bable, verily believing so, yet not without some Jealousie, Fear, or Suspition that he may be mistaken, and his ar­guments may be answered: may, whiles he thus believes, do that thing in Obedience to Men, which in this manner he judgeth sinful and unlawful to be done.

For the clearer handling of this momentous, and impor­tant Question, we shall with all Candor Examine.

• 1. What Divines of all sorts, whether Popish, or Protestant, have determined in the case, and upon what grounds?
• 2. We shall endeavour to defend the Negative part of the Question, proving it wickedness for any to act contrary to the judgment of their own Consciences, though that Judgment be onely made up from intrinsick, probable arguments.
• 3. We shall answer the Objections of those, who have spoke any thing for the affirmative, with any colour of Reason.

CHAP. II. The Opinions of Popish School-men, and Casuists in the Case particularly of Vasquez, Sanchez Medina, Fi­liucius, Azorius. Their Monstrous Assertions, what they make necessary to make an Opinion probable. The Opinion of one Doctor according to them suffi­cient to warrant Men to Act contrary to their own Opinions. Their Opinions what a Man ought to do, when Superiours Command Inferiours, what the In­feriours judge unlawful. The summe of their detesta­ble Doctrine.

§. 1. WE will begin with the Popish Authors. Vas­quez tells us, that the Question is not, Whe­ther a Man ought not to follow the Judgment of his own Con­science, or could act against it; but when it happeneth, that there are two opposite Opinions about a thing to be done: One saying, it is a sin to do it; another saith, it is not: The difficulty is, saith he, how a Man should carry, himself betwixt them, so as to form up a singular Judgment of Conscience, which without sin he may embrace. Vasquez in 12. disp. 72. cap. 2. So then the Jesuite (it seemeth) doth yield the case, viz. That if once a Man hath formed a particular Judgment of Conscience, that the thing is unlawful, though it be but from probable Arguments, he cannot do it, he onely pre­scribes in a variety of Opinions in the World, as to a singu­lar Matter, how Men should well form that Judgment. But not to wrong him in the 4. cap. of that Disputation, n. 15. he seems to be of another mind, and asserteth. That a Man in some Cases, may act contrary to his own Opinion, yea, that a Learned Man may Lawfully act contrary to his own Opinion, according to the Opinion of others, though it be less safe, and less probable than his own, provided there be any Reason and [Page 11]probability for the Opinion of those others. Yet still retaining his Opinion, as more probable, looking upon that Opinion of others; as probable by extrinsecal Arguments [that is the Authority, Judgments, and Testimony of others] though he judgeth his own Opinion more probable by intrinsick Argu­ments.

The Reasons he gives for this, are these.

1. Because we may act according to any Opinion which seem­eth probable to us. We will anon Argue that Case, whether it be possible that any thing, from meer extrinsick Argu­ments can seem probable to a reasonable Soul. The contrary to which at the same time seems probable from intrinsick Ar­guments: But we know how far the Doctrine of Probabili­ties serves the woful Interest of that Apostate Synagogue of Rome.

2. Because it seems incredible to be true, that a Man may not do what all the World judgeth Lawful, if he alone judgeth it unlawful. All the World, we confess, is a large term, and puts the Case to the highest pinch, but yet it seems not at all incredible, if that be true which the School-men Universally agree; That the particular Conscience must be the proximate Rule of action: For what shall it profit a Man, more to fol­low all the World, than to gain all the World, if be loseth his own Soul? A Man is certainly bound to follow his own Rules, not anothers. These are that Jesuites best Reasons: He confesseth that in this he followeth Medina, some of whose Reasons he yet rejects. Further, to make the Opinion of another probable to us, he requires,

• 1. That it be the Opinion of many; not one single Doctor.
• 2. That it be commonly Judged to contain no Error.
• 3. That we know that those Doctors have considered, and Examined our Reasons.

These things supposed, he thinks that although in a Mat­ter [Page 12]of Practice we have a more probable Opinion, and that from Arguments fetch'd from the Nature of the thing, and Scripture appearances, yet a Man may act contrary if others judge it is Lawful, yea, though he hath some fear, that that Opinion of others is not true: In which Case, both Cajetan and Navarrus (as he confesseth) differ from him: But he concludes it, ib. Cap. 5. n. 26. provided that this fear a­mount not to a doubt or haesitation (we wonder how that is possible to be avoyded) for in that Case, he avoweth it not Lawful to act contrary to our own Opinion, in Compli­ance with others. This is the Doctrine of Vasquez and Me­dina; and which Vasquez saith is Common in the Schools.

§. 2. Sanchez, Op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 9. n. 13. States the Question thus: Whether it be Lawful for any to act accord­ing to the Opinion of others which he judgeth probable, though in respect of the danger of sin 'tis safe, against the Opinion of his own Conscience which be judgeth more probable, and more safe. He confesseth that some deny it, because of those two Ordinary Rules.

In dubiis animae tutior pars est eligenda, and Tene certum & relinque incertum, i. e. In doubtful Cases we ought to take the more certain part, and to leave what is more uncertain, and to hold what is certain. And again, Because a Man cannot act against the dictate of his Conscience. But Sanchez is himself of another mind, as he there declareth, viz. That it is Law­ful for a Man to act contrary to the Opinion of his own Consci­ence, which he judgeth safest, according to the Opinion of o­thers which he judgeth less probably true, and less safe. Of this mind besides Vasquez and Medina (before mentioned by us) he saith are Mercado, Velentia, Julier, Suarez, Enriquez, Azorius, Bannes, Nauarrus, Arragon, Salon, Lopez, Ledes­ma, Salas, Sairus, and Leonardus. More than a full Jury, were they all good Men and true: But let us hear their strong Reasons. Sanchez gives us them thus.

• 1. Because he who thus acteth, acteth according to Reason, and therefore his action is not to be charged with rashness or im­prudence.
• [Page 13]2. Because in this case, a man may have a Moral certain­ty.
• 3. Because as that is a probable Opinion in matters of Specu­lations, which a man may embrace without danger of Error or deceit. So in Moral things, that Opinion is probable which a man may embrace without sin.
• 4. Because it is onely sinful to act doubting.

§. 3. But is it possible that a reasonable Soul should un­derstand so wild ratiocinations? Suppose a Papist, or at least, one who hath been so bred, upon the Question,

Whether there be Idolatry in the Mass or no?

Seeth very probable intrinsecal Arguments to make him conclude, That the Mass is Idolatrous, and that it is unlaw­ful for him to go to it any more. On the other side, he find­eth many Doctors of their Church, positive, that it is not Ido­latrous, and that he may be present at it (we will suppose that they urge it, not as necessary, but only plead it Lawful.) Here now the private Opinion, is both more probable, and more safe. More probable it must be, because it is a man's own Opinion, and that formed from intrinsick Arguments; so that to him it must be more probable. More safe it must be, supposing it be onely attested by others, as Lawful. We would fain know now whether under these Circumstances, this Man may Lawfully go to Mass against the dictate of his Conscience. Yes (say they) for the Opinion of the Do­ctors makes the contradictory part of the Proposition proba­ble too. Possibly something might be said for this if the Per­son had no intrinsecal Arguments to incline him to the other part. But is not this Non-sence to any Reasonable Soul? That it should judge contradictions both probably true; the one from one sort of Arguments, the other from another sort. Yet this is a Postulatum begg'd in the Case, both by Vasquez and Sanchez, and all their Brethren; That one and the same thing, at the same time, and to the same Soul, upon differing Arguments, may appear in all probability Lawful and Ʋnlawful, which we confess is a Riddle too hard for us; [Page 14]or we think any others but themselves. But suppose this were possible, as both Sanchez and Vasquez plead. Yet it is not Lawful for a Man to act according to the Opinion of ano­ther (saith Cajetan and Navarr) if he be in any fear that others are in the wrong; and though both Vasquez and San­chez reject this, yet even they are so kind, as to grant, that the Person cannot act in this case, if he doth doubt. Now, we would fain know how a Man can possibly have intrinsick Arguments against what is propounded to him for Practice, and not haesitare ac dubitare (which are their words) doubt at all, whether he may Lawfully act. Or how he can act with that Moral certainty which Sanchez speaks of. Can a Man (think we) be Morally certain of that, against which he hath pro­bable intrinsecal Arguments, meerly because others say the contrary. And this too, although what they say appear to the Person concerned both less probable, and less safe. What strange Apprehensions have these Men, both of themselves, and of God?

§. 4. Filiucius (another of the Popish Casuist [...]) telleth us. That it is Lawful to follow the more probable Opinion, lea­ving that which is less probable. Qu. mor. tr. 21. c. 4. n. 126. Compare this with what we heard Vasquez even now saying. That a man's own Opinion is more probable (and so it must be to him, or he would never hold it.) The Case by this Con­clusion seems to be granted; but in the very next Paragraph he again concludeth, That it is also Lawful to follow the less probable Opinion, though it be less safe: and this he saith, is the Common Opinion of more Modern Casuists and School-men, and quotes for it Medina, Vasquez, Bannes, and Na­varrus; his Reason is,

1. Because whoso doth so, acteth prudently, believing those that are skill'd in that Art, and submitting to their Judgment.

He saith well, if we were speaking of Actions, as to which there is no danger of immediate sinning, and running the guilt of Damnation, but he begs the Question shamefully, [Page 15]while he averreth with Sanchez, That there is no danger of sin in such Actions; and one of his Brethren (with whom he is very angry for it) calleth this Opinion of his, and San­chez his seventeen Doctors Perni ciosae inscitiae prolapsionem; a slip of perncious Ignorance: And he used him kindly too, for Prolapsio was doubtless too mild a word; it was unque­stionably a wilful Error, but such a [...]one as those Learned Men saw necessary to be maintained, or the Doctrine of Blind Obedience could not stand.

§ 5. Azorius, Institut. Moral. lib. 2. cap. 26. In this Case determines, That we may follow an Opinion that is less certainly safe, if it be more probable or certain; from which we might conclude, that in regard the Opinion of our own Consciences is always to us more probable and certain, than the Opinion of any other is, or can be, though there be a possibility of our sinning in following our own, and no pos­sibility in following of anothers, yet we may follow it.

2. He concludes, That if both Opinions be Equally safe, we are not bound to prefer that which is more probable. (Yet he confesseth, that Major, Corduba, and Medina think o­therwise) he thinks the probability of an Opinion is enough to guide our Practice, and that we are not bound to follow that which is most probably true. But besides that, some of his own Brethren tell him, and that truly, that That Opi­nion which is (though not demonstratively, yet most proba­bly true) hath least danger of sin in it. Whether an Opi­nion can to any be probably true by extrinsick Arguments, which at the same time we judge from intrinsick Arguments probably not true, as Question not yet resolved. We do not at all doubt, but the Judgment and Testimony of others may give a Proposition some shew of Probability to be true. If we have no Arguments against what they say, from some appearances (at least) of Scripture, or some Logical To­picks. But when we have such Arguments, that yet their Opinions in the contrary should seem probable to us, is a great Riddle, and seems a great baffling of a Reasonable Soul. [Page 16]Especially considering that these Forreign Arguments are but Common, and may be brought in most Cases on both sides.

§. 6. And indeed here all the Popish Doctors are at a great loss, viz. To determine what those Doctors must be; how many must concurr in an Opinion, before they may over­rule us in Practice, against the Judgment of our own Conscien­ces formed from proper intrinsecal Arguments. Sanchez saith, one Doctor is enough, and quotes on his side, Anges, Sylv. Navarrus, Valentia, and Sa; yea, and he proveth it by this Learned Argument: That is a probable Opinion which is not built upon a light Foundation. Now (saith he) the Opinion of one Doctor is not a light Foundation. Ay, but what if one Doctors Opinion be for us, another be against us? They will tell you, They are both probable. Take then the summe of the Jesuites Doctrine.

• 1. A probable Opinion is that, which is not built upon a light Foundation. (So saith Sanchez.)
• 2. Any one Doctors Opinion is a considerable, and no light Foundation. That is Sanchez his medium.
• 3. Let a man have never so many intrinsecal, proper Argu­ments, not demonstrative, to prove a thing unlawful; yet he may do it if he can but find one Doctor who judgeth it Lawful.
• 4. If one Doctor judgeth it Lawful, another judgeth it un­lawful, he may do what he pleaseth in it, for both parts are probable. Hence Sanchez raiseth these Conclusions.

1. ‘That if a Man, according to the Judgment of his own Conscience, perfectly doubteth, from intrinsecal Argu­ments, which in a practical case, he can find on the one side, or the other. Yet if he can from Extrinsecal Argu­ments, perswade himself that either part is Lawful, he may do either.’

2. ‘That he who probably judgeth it unlawful, to Act ac­cording to a less probable Opinion, may yet Act according to that which he judgeth less probable, if he judgeth, That it is probably Lawful for him to follow that which is less pro­bab [...]e.’

[Page 17]3. ‘That Learned Men may advise others to act contrary to what themselves, the Adviser [...] think Lawful, if ano­ther Doctor hath judged it Lawful.’

These, and many other damnable and absurd Opinions they most impudently conclude, from these most wretched premises. And now, let any Judge, whether according to these Principles, there be any thing Ʋnlawful or no; and one would think, that they do not judge any thing Ʋnlawful, that will but read their Escobar, Layman, Diaena, Filucius, Azorius, Sanchez. Or a breviate of some of their Proposi­tions, p. 17. in the Additionals to the Mystery of Jesuitism, where he shall be directed also to the Authors.

§. 7. But hitherto they have onely told us, what a Man May do: Let us hear shortly their Opinion of what Men Must do: and particularly, where Superiours Command us to act contrary to what we from proper intrinsecal Arguments judge Lawful. Adrianus, as he is quoted by Vasquez, positively affirmeth, That none can Lawfully Obey their Superiours, a­gainst the Opinion of his own Conscience: he tells us also, That Corduba saith the same in effect, though he would save himself from this inconvenience by asserting, That what in it self absolutely considered, is evil, may by some Circum­stances be good; as when it is necessary for us, of two evils, to chuse one; here the lesser evil is made good, comparative­ly, and that (saith he) is the Case here (Vasquez 12. disp. 62. cap. 6.) It is an evil thing for a man to act contrary to the opinion of his own Conscience. And it is an evil thing to dis­obey our Superiours, but one of these we must do; in this case, saith he, It is Lawful for a man to act against his own opinion, in obedience to his Superiours; thus far the Jesuite.

A Man might have expected such an unboyled Mess of Di­vinity from a John of Leiden, or a Knipperdolling; but is this spoken like Divine? Can there then be any necessity of sinning? (where's Man's free-will in the mean time?) doth God ever bring the Soul into such a strait? Is it not a known Rule, That of two evils of punishment, we may indeed chuse [Page 18]the least; but of two evils of sin, none? An Erroneous Con­science indeed is under a necessity of sinning, but surely he hath no choice in the case, whether he will sin this way, or that way, but must follow the dictate of his Conscience, Whether the distinction of Ligat, non obligat be worth any thing or no; surely all will say, he cannot Act against his fix­ed erring Conscience. Is it not a known Rule, That nothing can be made good by a Circumstance, though indeed Circum­stances may make a thing evil, because Bonum esse Causis integris Malum e quolibet defectu. Therefore Vasquez (who Diana saith, is instar omnium) explodes this Doctrine of Corduba, telling us truly, That the Obedience which any Man oweth to his Superiours, supposeth the matter of the Su­periors Command, not to be contrary to the Command of one who is higher than he; for in such Cases no Obedience is due, nor is it any sin to disobey, viz. where the thing required, is contrary to the Law of Nature, the Law of God, or the Law of a Superiour in an higher Order. Again, it is very possible (as Vasquez saith) that it may be a greater sin to contradict my own Conscience, than not to Obey my Superiours, sup­posing my Conscience telleth me the thing required is contra­ry to the Law of Nature.

But yet Vasquez himself thinketh, that in case the Supe­riour Commandeth, a thing otherwise probably Lawful (that is, as we before heard, which some Doctor or Doctors judge so) then it is Lawful for a Man to Obey contrary to the pri­vate Opinion of his own Conscience, because he might do it in such case, though it were not Commanded; and this is his Principle.

That when the Precept of a Superiour may Lawfully be Obeyed, he is then bound to do it, and it becomes neces­sary.

This indeed is a strong Argument, if we could yield the premises, viz.

That a Man may Lawfully contrary to the probable Opi­nion of his own Conscience, follow the Opinion of ano­ther. Quod adhuc est Demonstrandum.

[Page 19]We shall anon shew the Cursed Fruit of this Root, yet Vasquez limiteth this Doctrine a little, by telling us,

1. That the Superiour must be unquestionably our Superi­our.

2. That the Subject must know, and believe, that the Su­pirour Commandeth according to a probable Opinion, and must not think it probable, meerly because he is his Superiour; for (saith he) The Dignity of the Superiour Commanding, doth not make an Opinion probable. Thus far now we have heard the Judgment of the Popish Casuists and School-men in this Case. The Summe is this.

That it is Lawful for a Man to do, what his own Consci­ence from intrinsick, probable Arguments judgeth Ʋn­lawful, if one or more Doctors do but Judge it Lawful, and in such Cases, if the Superiour Commandeth, he is bound to do what he in his own Conscience judgeth unlawful, if it be not apparently, and demonstratively so.

How near this comes to the Sentiments of some Modern Protestant Doctors, we may enquire hereafter, but before we come to that, let us enquire what the Ancienter Prote­stants have judged in the Case.

CHAP. III. The Opinion of former Protestants, about the lawful­ness, or unlawfulness of Mens Acting contrary to the Opinion of their own Consciences. Such Acting con­demned by all former Protestant Casuists. Bald­vinus, Alstedius, Amesius, Perkins: The diffe­rence of some later Divines from their Fore-Fathers, particularly, Mr. Hooker. The Vanity of his Proof, from Deut. 17.18. Acts 15. Or from Rea­son. Bishop Sanderson agreeing with Ancient Pro­testants. So Mr. Fulwood, in his Cases. The differing Expressions of some Divines of this pre­sent Age, The tender touching of the Question, and nibbling at the Opinion of the Popish Doctors in the Case by others. The Question again stated, and made ready for Debate.

§. 1. WE will begin with Fredericus Baldvinus, Pro­fessor at Wittenbergh, he, in his Cases, l. 1. cap. 9. Professedly disputeth this great point, he takes No­tice of the two sorts of pretended probable Arguments, and determineth, in reference to both.

• 1. That an Opinion onely raised from the multitude of o­thers Testimonies in the Case, bindeth no Man.
• 2. That an Opinion taken up upon probable Reasons, doth bind, and so bind, that a man cannot Act against it.

His words in Latine are these:

‘Cùm ergo opinionem aliquam, non ob assensum aliorum, sed ob causas probabiles pro verâ habes. Obligatus es in Con­scientiâ ne contra eam agas, licet Superiores aliud a te exi­gant, donec rationes veriores audias in contrarium, ad quas tamen audiendas semper paratus esse debes: Et opinionem [Page 21]tuam auditâ meliore sententiâ deponere.’ That is,

When thou hast taken up any Opinion for true, not for the Testimony of others, but for probable Reasons, thou art bound in Conscience not to act against it; no, not though Superiours require thee to act, till thou hearest better Rea­sons to the contrary: To hear which thou oughtest to be al­ways ready, and lay down thy Opinion, hearing a better. The Opinion of this Grave and Learned Professor is what we take it, & will be found to have been the Opinion of all Prote­stants of former Ages. For, the Observing Reader will find, as to this point, the same proportionable difference betwixt Ancient Protestant Divines, and a Modern brood, as betwixt the Old Fathers and School-men, and the later Jesuites, who have traded in Scholastical, and Moral Divinity. The latter professing wholly to differ from the former: We shall, I say, find, that all former Protestants have agreed, That although he that is possessed of an opinion, that the thing which is by his Superiours required, is unlawful, out of Reverence to his Su­periours, ought throughly to Examine his Opinion, and to hear better Reasons, if they can be brought, and being by them con­vinced, to lay down his opinion: Yet while he can do that, he cannot do the thing.

§ 2. Let us, in the next place, enquire of Alstedius. He distin­guisheth concerning Opinion, as relating to a more External Court, or to the Court of Conscience: As to the former, he saith, In Disputations, &c.the Common Opinion is to be preferred before our own. But as to Conscience, he saith, Whatsoever is done against our Consciences, is sinful; whether our Consci­ence be Erring, Opining, or Rightly informed. vid. Theol. casuum, cap. 2. n. 2. Dr. Ames, cas. l. 1. c. 5. determines, That it is never Lawful for the Authority of other Men to act against our own Opinion, be it certain, or onely probable. We do not remember more than four Protestant Casuists we had, whose Writings are more than forty Years Old. These were three, the fourth was Judicious Mr. Perkins, who seems to reduce this to a doubting Conscience, and determines, [Page 22] That it is sin to act against it, because he cannot act in Faith, if his Conscience be doubting, or erring, or gain-saying.

These being all our former Divines, who wrote Treatises of Cases, further Testimony is not to be expected. It were easie to produce multitudes collaterally speaking the same things. But for them, we shall but refer the Reader to any Protestants, that have formerly wrote upon Rom. 14.23. and see what they say upon these words; Whoso doubteth, is dam­ned, if he eateth, because he eateth not of Faith: For what­soever is not of Faith, is sin. And v. 5. Let every Man be fully perswaded in his oven mind; he will find enough, we pass it over, intending our selves to make some use of that Text anon.

§. 3. But (as we said before) look as in this very point there is a very great difference, betwixt the Ancient Fathers and School-men and the Modern Jesuites, in so much, that the latter will not allow the Judgment of any of the Ancients, in these Cases; and both Vasquez and Sanchez think fit to Cau­tion their Readers against it, and both Cellot and Reginaldus expresly determine: That in Moral Questions, the Modern Casuists are to be preferred before the Ancient Fathers, though they lived nearer the times of the Apostles. So we shall Ob­serve, that some later Protestant Divines have delivered themselves, either something odly, or expresly contrary to the Sentiments of all Ancient Protestants in this case. Let us hear now what they say.

§. 4. The Learned Author of the Ecclesiastical Polity, Mr. Hooker, in his Preface to it, directed To such as seek Refor­mation, perswading those whom in that Preface he is Treat­ing, to an end of Controversie, concludeth it not possible to be obtained.

‘Without submitting to some judicial and definitive Sen­tence, whereunto neither part that contendeth may under any pretence, or colour refuse to stand: — Ways of peaceable conclusion (he saith) there are but two certain: The one a [Page 23]Sentence of Judicial decision, given to Authority there­unto appointed within our selves. The other, the like kind of Sentence, given by a more Ʋniversal Authority. The for­mer of which God himself in the Law prescribeth: And his Spirit it was which directed the first Christian Churches in the World to use the latter: this he proves by Deut. 17.8. and Acts 15. (both which we will examine anon.) Afterward he comes in with this passage. Neither wish we, that Men should do any thing which in their Hearts they are perswaded they ought not to do; but this perswasion ought, we say, to be fully settled in their Hearts. That in Litigious and controverted Cases of such Quality, The Will of God is to have them to do, whatsoever the Sentence of Judicial and final decision shall determine. Yea, though it seemeth in their private Opinion, utterly to swerve from that which is right. as no doubt many times the Sentence amongst the Jews did seem unto one part or another contending, and yet in this Case God did not then allow them to do what in their private Judgment it seemed, yea, and perhaps, truly seem­ed, that the Law did dis-allow.’ This passage must be a lit­tle examined, especially at such a time when there is such a strict scrutiny upon those who seem to have their Faces to­wards Rome; for as on the one side, if this Doctrine be not true, Mr. Hooker, neither in his Preface, nor in his bulky Book (those Oracles we are so Ordinarily sent to) hath said much to perswade those whom he treated, That it is their Duty to conform; and our late Writers have said much less, who have thought to jeer, and rail, and Hector Men out of their Religion, and have indeed all built upon this Foundati­on [If the thing be not Demonstratively evil, or as others ap­parently evil.] On the other side, if this be true, and be not very cautiously expounded, it over-throweth all Old Practical Divinity, and takes away what we doubt whether ever any considerate Learned Man ever denyed, viz. That the Practi­cal Conscience is the proximate Rule of all our Actions. It sheweth a necessity of an Infallible Judge; or if not so, most certainly establisheth Blind Obedience, the very Basis and [Page 24]Pillar of Popery; yea, of Jesuitisme (the worst of Popery. (for what is Blind Obedience, but an Obeying of Superiours contrary to the Light of our own Reason and Conscience.) Nay, more, it is a peg beyond the Doctrine of Vasquaez, Sanchez, Azorius, Layman, or the boldest Jesuite who ever wrote.

§. 5. I can see but two terms, which can be supposed to regulate this Learned Man' sence by any Sobriety. He saith, onely [in litigious and controverted Causes of such Quality] he should have done well to have told us, of what Quality, and what makes a litigious and controverted Case? Whether some few, or more mens denying, or controverting, and dis­puting a points? For else suppose that in France, the King should Command his Protestant Subjects to go to Mass; ac­cording to Mr. Hooker's Divinity, they are bound to go: why? For (saith he) It is the Will of God that they should, in litigious and controverted Causes do whatsoever the Sentence of judicial and final decision shall determine. But will some Advocate for Mr. Hooker, say, the Protestants judge going to Mass unlawful. What then? It followeth in Mr. Hooker. Though in their private Opinion it seem to swerve utterly from that which it right. Sit anima nostra cum Philosophis; Commend us to the Jesuites, for none of them speak so broad. And it in well worth the Observing, what Excellent use Serenus Cressy hath made of this very passage, in his Answer to Dr. Pierce his Sermon, and indeed it is very improveable for their turn. Shall those blind words, Of such Quality, help this Father of Conformity: The Question recurs, Of what Quality? Can any other Quality of Cases be here considerable, but either as the things appear Lawful, Ʋnlawful, or Indifferent. If he means, in Cases appearing to the Person, Lawful or Indifferent, the thing is granted: But it is impossible this should be his meaning, for he saith, Though the Command seem to him utterly to swerve from what is right, If therefore the word, Seem, will not help him, he is not to be helped, but must be affirmed to have made [Page 25]the boldest overture for Blind Obedience (the most bruitish piece of Popery) that ever Protestant made; and let our Brethren send us no more for Conscience-satisfaction to Mr. Hooker, till they can defend him in this Hypothesis; and when they have done that, they will have paved his Holiness a fairer way into all Protestant Tents, than he ever yet had. Indeed there are various degrees of Seeming. A thing may seem to us to swerve from what is right, meerly from ex­trinsick Arguments, because we Reverence the Learning, or Piety of some that say so; in this sence it may be true: But this cannot be Hookers Sence; for he saith, In his own private Opinion. But his meaning must be, ‘That we ought to be fully perswaded, that in all Litigious, and Contro­verted Cases reserring to Practice. It is the Will of God that Christians should do, whatsoever the Sentence of Ju­dicial and final decision shall determine, though that thing determined seem to the Person required to do it, and that from proper intrinsick Arguments (if not demonstrative) in the Christians private Opinion, to be quite contrary to what God's Law requireth of him.’ Which is a position so contrary. To the Law of Nature, the whole Current of Scripture, the force of Reason, the Liberty of a Christian, and the Judgment of all Protestant Divines, that it will ask very good Proof before we shall believe a tittle of it true.

§. 6. He offereth a double Proof of it. 1. Because he supposeth there must be an end of Controversie, and that can be no other way. 2. Because of the Law of God of Old, Deut. 17.8. and the determination of the Council, Acts 15. guided, no question, by the Spirit of God. We will consi­der both. As to the first; Controversies are of several Na­tures. There are Political Controversies, and Ecclesiastical Controversies; and these either relating to Matters of meer Speculation or Practice. And there are mixed Controversies, partly of a Civil, partly of a Religious concern.

1. For Civil Controversies, they are of several Natures; for many of them it is absolutely necessary, in Order to the [Page 26]consistency of Polities; there should be an end of them, with­out the end of some of them, the Order of Justice cannot bold; nor Kingdoms and States be preserved: As now, suppose a Controversie about the Title of the Supreme Magistrate, &c. There must be an end to these, and it must be by one parties submission to the final decision of some power. Men may do it without sinning against God: And it is the will of God, even written in Nature, that they should do it. Suppose there be a plea betwixt Man, and Man, concerning a right of Inheritance, and they have had a long Suit about it; there must be an end to this Controversie, and the end must be by a submission of one party to the final decision (at least) of the Su­preme Court of Justice in a Nation; Beyond which lyes no appeal. What further can be done, unless this private Per­son should take up Arms against this Court, and so disturb all Civil Orders? nor shall he who suffers in this Judgment need fear sinning against God, by parting with his Inheritance, no Law of God Obligeth him to keep it. He is before this Judg­ment, at perfect Liberty to part with it, and by this Judg­ment it becomes necessary: We fear that we shall anon find the Text, Deut. 17.8. Concerning such Controversies; and so nothing to the purpose in our Case.

2. But there are other Controversies, which are in Matters of meer Speculation, or Practice. Some things there are, which are meerly Speculative, which infer no Practice, which side soever we take; as now, Whether the Virgin Mary lived, and dyed a Virgin, &c. For these Controversies, we know no need of an end of them, nor why they should be Controver­sies; Men may Opine one thing or another in them, without hazard to their Souls. There are other Controversies in Re­ligion, which being determined, require of us, either an Act of Faith and Assent from us, as our Duty, or more, i.e. the guidance of our Conversation, according to our belief. And these again are either such as are Fundamentally necessary to Salvation, or such as are not so necessary. As now, sup­pose that, Whether Jesus Christ be the Eternal Son of God, is Matter of Controversie betwixt the Arrians, the Socinians, [Page 27]the Orthodox. Whether a Man may Lawfully adore the bread in the Eucharist, is Controverted betwixt the Papists and Protestants. It is necessary that the Magistrate or Church should put an end to these Controversies, at least, as to the evulging of them, because there is a part in them so necessary to be believed, or done, as Men's Salvation dependeth up­on it immediately; and those entrusted with the Charge of Souls, stand Obliged by the Law of Charity, as much as in them lyeth to obviate their eternal Ruine. But there are a third sort of Controversies in Religion, which relate to Pra­ctice, in those things, where Gods Word hath left nothing par­ticularly, and [...] determined. Such Controversies there ever was, and ever will be in the Church. But as it is one­ly the Pride and Corruption of Men, which makes these Controversies (for why should any Quarrel with his Bro­ther for using his own Latitude, where God hath determined nothing?) So there is no need to put an end to them, but onely to Mens Lusts and Passions in the Arguing of them. For there is no hazard of Salvation, either one way or other. We dare be bold to say, that the silly humour of some, judg­ing it necessary, that all Men should say, It is a Hen-Spar­row, when some think it a Cock-Sparrow. Or write [it] when some think it is better wrote [yt] Or that all Men should keep and Easter-day; such a day, when as others think it not the right, hath been the cause of so much sin and wick­edness, so much Blood and Cruelty, as all that these Humo­rists are worth, is no way able to recompence, either to Gods Glory, the Churches Peace, or the Profit and Advantage of Princes so infinitely hindred by it

§. 7. We suppose, Peace will be urged as necessary to put an end to Controversie. And is there no other way to obtain it, but by Mens doing quite contrary to what they Judge right? The Apostle hath shewed Men a nearer way to it, if their Lusts would let them see it, Phil. 3.15, 16. What a strange fancy it is that there should be no way to Peace, but what is impossible, viz. Mens perswading themselves, That it is [Page 28]the Will of God, that in such Cases they should do whatsoever Men determine, though in their own Opinion it seems quite to swerve from what is right: As if there were no way to keep a Man from burning his shins, but by pulling down a Chim­ney, and setting it further off. This is a sad end. His Most Excellent Majesty hath shewed them a quicker End, viz. Not Enacting the doing of such things of those who judge them Ʋnlawful; but leaving them to their Liberty; and onely re­quiring, as the Apostle, in such Cases, Rom. 14. 2. That he who eateth should not despise him that eateth not; nor he who eateth not, despise him that eateth. Could our Brethren be quiet, and not represent us to the World, as Factious Per­sons, Schismaticks; unreasonable, ungovernable, Dunces, we wonder what hindred Peace now.

§. 7. But, saith Mr. Hooker (and he is the Delphick Oracle it seems in this Case) He must needs perswade himself, That it is the Will of God, That in Litigious and Controver­ted Cases, &c. he should submit to the Decision of his Superi­our, though in his own Opinion it seems quite to swerve from that which is right. We would fain know how he should per­swade himself of this. This perswasion cannot be of Faith; for where doth the Word of God speak a tittle to this sence? It speaks the contrary, Rom. 14.5.23. How shall we know a thing to be either according contrary to the Will of God. Certainly we must know it from Nature, or from Divine Revelation. Doth the Light of Nature shew us any such thing? Indeed in Controversies of a Civil Nature, the De­termination of which the Light of Nature shews us must be by Superiours, and where a submission is necessary, and not to be avoyded, without disturbance of Polities, and all Or­der of Justicer: The Light of Nature may shew us some such thing. But certainly, where the Light of Nature sheweth us no need of a Controversie, nor of determining it, if there must be one, it can shew us nothing as to the Will of God, for a submission to such Determination. Nor indeed is it pre­tended, and it were strange if it should, when the School­men [Page 29]determine, That Acting against an erroneous Conscience (much more Opining) is against the Light of Nature. This piece of the Will of God then which we must (saith Mr. Hooker) perswade our selves of, must be from Revelation, and that is either New (some Enthusiasm) or Old, which is the Word of God. Where shall we find such a piece of the revealed Will of God in Scripture? Mr. Hooker tells us, Deut. 17.8. Acts 15. we will Examine both these Texts.

§. 8. The words in Deut. 17.8, 9, 10, 11, 12. are these.

If there arise a Matter too hard for thee in Judgment be­twixt Blood and Blood, betwixt plea and plea, betwixt stroke and stroke, being matters of Controversie within thy Gates. Then shalt thou arise, and get thee up unto the place which the Lord thy God shall chuse.

And thou shalt come unto the Priests, the Levites, and unto the Judge who shall be in those days, and enquire, and they shall shew the Sentence of Judgment.

And thou shalt do according to the Sentence which they of that place, which the Lord shall chuse, shall shew thee: and thou shalt Observe to do according to all that they shall inform thee.

According to the Sentence of the Law which they shall teach thee, and according to the Judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do, thou shalt not decline from the Sentence which they shall shew thee, to the right hand, nor to the left.

And the Man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the Priest, that standeth up to Minister before the Lord thy God, or unto the Judge, even that Man shall dye, and thou shalt put away evil from Israel. These words are fully that Text. As to which, we desire our Reader to Ob­serve,

1. That this is Bellarmines first Text to prove Blind Obedi­ence the Duty of Christians: So that we may easily judge, which way the Face of these Disputants doth stand. It might suffice but to refer our Reader to Chamer, or any that have [Page 30]Answered Bellamine, for an Answer to this Objection.

2. Secondly, In case this Text will serve the turn now, it will infallibly prove the Lawfulness of Priests and Judges put­ting to death such as shall not do what they have once determined in any case, that is indifferent of it self, and once by them made necessary. But surely this must be asserted by none that va­lue their words at any rate. But to come close to the Text; if any Argument in this case can be drawn from it, it must be this.

‘What the Israelites were bound to do, upon any deter­mination by the Priest or Judge in the place where the Lord should chuse: In hard Matters, between plea and plea, blood and blood. That Christians under the Gospel are bound to do, upon the final de­cision of the Priest or Judge, in hard matters, be­tween plea and plea, blood and blood, trespass and trespass, stroke and stroke.’

‘But the Israelites were bound to do according to the final decision of the Priest or Judge, sitting in the place which the Lord should chuse, and Judging in hard Matters, be­tween Plea and Plea, Blood and Blood, &c. — Ergo.’

If the Argument be thus laid, it concludeth nothing like the Question, but is transitus degenere in genus. Our Que­stion is not about Civil things in Controversie, where a Man may take any part, and not sin against God, and where Sub­mission onely inferreth Sussering in matters of a temporal con­cern, but about Religious Actions, where a Practice is re­quired, which the Party Commanded Judgeth sinful: And hazarding the damnation of his Soul. Whence also it may be Observed, That no Conclusion can from hence be fetched from any purity of Reason.

But if Mr. Booker intends from that Text to conclude the Question, his Argument must be laid thus.

‘What the Israelites were bound to, as to hard Case [...], in Judgment betwixt plea and plea, blood and blood, trespass and trespass, stroke and stroke. That Christians are bound to do, in all Litigious Controverted Cases of Religion; or [Page 31](at least) in such Cases where the Superiours Judge the things, by them Commanded, to be in themselves of an in­different Nature.’

But the Israelites, in hard Cases in Judgment, betwixt plea and plea, Blood and Blood, trespass and trespass, stroke and stroke, were Obliged to do according to, and not decline from the Sentence of the Law, which the Priests, the Levites, or the Judges should teach them, and according to the Judgment, which they should shew them, though in the Opinion of their own Consciences it swerved utterly from that which was right.

Ergo. Christians also under the Gospel, in all Litigiout con­troverted Cases, especially of such Quality, where the Su­periour Judgeth the things indifferent, are bound to do ac­cording to, and not to decline from the Sentence of the Law, which the Civil or Ecclesiastical Superiours, now adays shall teach them; though in the Opinion of their own Consciences it utterly swerveth from that which is right.

To which we Answer, 1. The whole concludeth nothing to the purpose, for it concludeth not that they ought to do any thing contrary to the Sentence of the Divine Law. That was of Old to the Priests a Regula Regulans; an Original Rule, and must be so, to all Superiours; and it is impossi­ble any should be Obliged to Act contrary to it. But, lest any should say, they were bound to take the Priests and Le­vites, and Judges Sentence, to be the Sentence of the Di­vine Law, we further Answer.

§. 9. By denying the Major, which is most notoriously false, and before it can be made good, those that inherit Mr. Hooker's Spirit, must make good these things.

1. That there it the same Reason, or Equity for Superi­ours final decision, and a Christians submission as to his Practice, to a final decision in things of a Religious Nature, which the Superiour Judgeth indifferent, and the Inferiour, (from Arguments which in the Judgment of his particular Conscience, seem probable) judgeth unlawful. As there was for a final [Page 32]decision amongst the Jews, and their submission to such decisi­on, in Matters between Blood and Blood, plea and plea, tres­pass and trespass, stroke and stroke; which apparently there is not, a determination in the latter being absolutely neces­sary for upholding the Beings of Polities, the Course, and Order of Justice, the preservation of Humane Society, and not making the World a Den of Thieves and Murtherers. But no such things can be pretended for things in Religion, by the Superiours owned in their own Nature, but indiffe­rent, and so left by God. Neither is there the same Equity or Reason for the Inferiours Submission. For what harm could the Inferiour have by submitting to the final decision of the Priests, Levites, and Judges, in those Civil things? He might possibly be inforced to put up a wrong, to part with a little Money, or with some part of his Inheritance, or suffer in case of Blood operatly, which was his due by a Divine Law: He was in no danger, by such submission, of damning his Soul, or wounding his Conscience by finning against God; though he might judge he were severely, or unrighteously dealt with. He might possibly think the part contrary to the decision more just and right: But what was he to do? No­thing, but part with his own Right in Temporal things for the sake of publick Justice, and Order, and Peace, which is every good Christians Duty, and Choice: But here we are required to do some things, and that in so tender a thing, as Divine Worship; which if we do, we shall wound our Consciences, run the hazard of Damnation by sinning, so far as we can apprehend it. Can any one in his wits now judge these two Cases alike? If not, the Proposition is false. There is a manifest Transition in the Argumentation from the Law­fulness of things of one kind, to prove the Lawfulness of things of a quite different Kind, Nature, and Influence.

§. 10. Further, to make good the Proposition, it must be proved, That God hath under the Gospel erected such a Court, for the final decision of all Litigious and Controverted Cases of like Quality. For certain it is that Old Court is down; [Page 33]where is the Law Erecting the New? Nay, where are the Persons so Qualified for it? Those who know any thing, know that the High-Priests amongst the Jews had any Ʋrim and Thummim, and so were hardly (in their Judicature) sub­ject to Fallibility, to be sure, less than any now under the Gospel. It was at Hierusalem, or at Siloh, at the place the Lord was to chuse, where the Ark was, and the Linnen Ephod, and the Ʋrim and Thummim, that this bending Judgment was to be made, no where else. Besides, all know that their High-Priest: was the Type of Christ, who is The Truth; and to whom alone now we reserve Infallibility.

The Papists have a better plea in this Case than any Pro­testants, because they have provided for it, by Creating to themselves an Infallible Judge, and, at least, cheating them­selves with such a previous Foundation fit to Build such a Structure upon.

§. 11, We have shewed the vanity of Mr. Hooker's plea from the Law, let us see now what he saith from the Gospel. He Observes, that under that, the Spirit of God directed a Court for Final decision, Acts 15. The Case was this, Some who came from Judea, had taught the Brethren, that unless they were Circumcised, they could not be saved; upon this, Paul and Barnabas were sent, with others, to meet and consult with the Apostles and Elders at Hierusalem about this Matter. Hear their Resolution, v. 28. It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen than these necessary things; That you abstain from Meats of­fered to Idols, and from things strangled, and from Fornica­tion, from which if you shall keep your selves, you shall do well. That in multiplying word we may not lose our Proposition from hence to be proved, it will not be amiss here to repeat it.

That it is the Will of God, that in all Litigious, and con­troverted Cases of this Quality. (Suppose where the Superiour Judgeth the thing Commanded in its own Nature, indifferent, though the Inferiour from [Page 34]Arguments which to him seem probable, judgeth them unlawful) that Inferiours should do whatsoever their Superiours Command, though in their own private O­pinion, it seemeth utterly to swerve from that which is right. This Proposition is by Mr. Hooker made a Conclusion, to be taken de fide, upon the Authority of this Text: The Assembling and determination of this first Coun­cil. The Argument must lye thus.

‘If the Spirit of God directed the Apostles and Elders at Hierusalem, in the Controverted Cases of Circumcision, Fornication, and things Offered to Idols, and things strang­led; to meet together, and to make a final determination, in reference to Christians Practice: And it were the Will of God, that all private Christians should do according to their determination, though in their own Opinions it utter­ly swerved from that which was right: Then it is the will of God, that in all other Matters of Religious Practice, that are Litigious, or Controverted, and of such Quality, as the Superiour judgeth the doing of the things in Questi­on, Matters of indifferency, though the Inferiours judge them unlawful: That Superiours should make a final deci­sion, and private Christians should do according to their de­terminations, though their determinations their private Opinions▪ seem utterly to swerve from that which is right.’

‘But the Spirit of God directed the Apostles and Elders at Hierusalem, in the Controverted Cases of Circumcision, Fornication, things Offered to Idols, and things strangled; to meet together, and to make a final decision: And it was the Will of God, that all Private Christians should Practise according to their determinations, though in their own pri­vate Opinions, they might seem utterly to swerve from that which is right — Ergo.’

Now, to this Argument, the Answer, we say, is not dif­ficult, for neither Proposition is true, or can be made good, But to speak distinclly.

[Page 35]§. 11. First, we deny the Consequence of the Major, and that for these three Reasons.

1. There is an apparent difference betwixt Apostles, Men guided by an Infallible Spirit, and any other Superiours unque­stionably more Fallible than they. They could not err, the best Councel now may err.

2. But Secondly, there is a vast difference betwixt the ca­ses mentioned in the Text, and other Litigious, Controverted Cases of such Quality, as Mr. Hooker mentioneth: So as there is no Arguing, from the one to the other. Those men­tioned, Acts 15. are by the Apostles called [...]. Things necessary; these we speak of are confessedly [...] indifferent, and not necessary; either considered in themselves, or in respect of any Circumstance abstracted from the Supe­riours Precept; if it be said, That one or two of those things mentioned, Acts 15. were but indifferent, viz. To abstain from blood, and things strangled, it is easily Answered, That a thing may be necessary, either with respect to some direct pre­cept (as Fornication, and forbearing eating things first Of­fered to Idols, was. The Apost;e, 1 Cor. 10. Judgeth it a participation at the Idolaters Altar) or with Respect to Cir­cumstances, (and those Antecedaneous to the Superiours Precept) thus abstaining from blood, and things strangled were, because of the Jews, who by the Ceremonial Law (the abolition of which they had not yet discerned) were forbidden blood, and by reason of the Converted Gentils eat­ing blood, were much estranged from, and hardened against the Doctrine of the Gospel. Therefore the Apostle calls them necessary; not made so onely by their Command, but made so by this great Circumstance, the doing of them hin­dring the Glory of God, and his great Design then on Foot. Now, to Argue from the Authority of Superiours to make a sinal decision, as to things simply necessary, as forbidden directly by a Divine Law; Or Accidentally necessary (be­ing in their own Nature indifferent) made so by some emi­ent scandal, or mischief, which would plainly follow from [Page 36]our not disceding from our Liberty in such things, especially too where the things required to be forborn, were before ex­presly forbidden by a Divine Law. We say, from hence to conclude the Authority of Superiours to make final decisions in other matters, and Command the doing of things never required by God's Law, and confessed to be, neither in them­selves necessary, nor in respect of any other Circumstance Antecedaneous to the Superiours Precept, is, (with Reve­rence to Mr. Hooker and his Friends) very wide Arguing, and shooting at a great distance from the Mark.

3. But Thirdly, What saith this Grave and Reverend Sy­nod; From which if you keep your selves, you shall do well. They do not say, These things, though indifferent in them­selves, you must do, because we have made them necessary by our command, though you in your private Opinions judge some of them utterly unlawful. But we fore-see some will say, That although this Councel used a soft Expression, yet it manifestly followeth, That if they did not abstain from these things, they should do ill. We Answer, that without Question, if they had not abstained, they had done ill, whe­ther the Synod had so determined or no. The Councel did but declare What was the Will of God, i. e. That Men must not use their Liberty in things indifferent, when the use of it will prejudice the Glory of God, in so high a concern, as that of Converting Souls. The matter of the Decree here, was not a thing in that state of the Church, in that place indifferent, An­tecedaneously to their Decree, but what was every Christi­ans Duty, precedent to the Councels determination. The Councel onely instructed them in what was the will of God, not make it necessary by their Canon.

2. Again, they were things which the Christians could not possibly judge Ʋnlawful; nothing was required but abstain­ing, either from such things as Gods word at that present Obliged them to abstain from, or had before Obliged the Jews to abstain from. If the Christians judged themselves at Li­berty to eat of things strangled, and blood, it was impos­sible yet, they should judge it sinful not to eat of them. Now, [Page 37]none of us will deny, that in Controversies of such Quality, where known necessary Duties are Controverted, or things necessary eminently with respect to some Circumstances appa­rent, and inavoidable; but it is the Will of God, that the Church should consult and declare the Will of God as to them, and Christians ought to hearken, and do according to such their Declaration.

• 1. Principally, because it is the Will of God.
• 2. Because of the Churches Authority, Advising or Com­manding from God; especially if their required Practice too reacheth no further than a restraint of their Liberty, in doing some things: not doing things, which their Consciences judge utterly unlawful. This is enough to shew the Vanity of the Proposition, or the Consequence rather of the Major Propo­sition.

§. 12. But neither is the Assumption true. No such thing appeareth from Acts 15. That the Christians were bound to do what the Synod required [though in their private Opini­ons, the things required swerved utterly from what was right.] As the things were such, concerning which we before said, the Conscience of none could so dictate. So the Bles­sed Apostles knew the mind of God too well, to engage Chri­stians to Act contrary to the Opinion of their own Conscien­ces; Nor do we Read, that ever the Authority of this Sy­nod was quoted by the Apostle, in his Epistle to the Corin­thians, where he professedly, and largely handles one of these Cases, about things Offered to Idols. Doth he tell the Corin­thians any such thing, as, It is unlawful for you now to eat such things. It is indeed in it self a thing indifferent, but your Superiours have decreed you should not eat, therefore now it is necessary for you not to eat; the Councel of Hierusalem made it necessary. No such thing, but he useth Arguments proper to Christians Consciences from the Nature of the thing; The Scandal, The Concern of Gods Glory in their forbearance.

§. 13. Thus far we have dealt with the great Champion for the Blind Obedience of Protestants, to whom those unsa­tisfied, [Page 38]as to Conformity, are sent upon all Occasions, not onely to perswade them that they may, but that they are bound to conform, and it is Sin and Schism (and any thing) if they do not; and we hope, however unanswerable, to be pro­claimed: Yet the Candid Reader will judge that he is not such a Lyon, but he may be taken by the beard, and that with­out an Inchanted Hand. Multa videntur & dicuntur quae non sunt. We have taken the more pains to Examine this New Dictate of his about The Will of God, and his Arguments for it, because so much hangs upon it, that it being proved false and absurd, and his Arguments for it invalid. His Folio is of no further use, than to inform Men, and when that is done, they still stand Obliged to Act according to the abiding Opinion of their own Consciences.

§. 24. There is yet another Father, whom they much re­lie upon, but (far more sparingly quote in this Case, and there is Reason for it) it is the Reverend Dr. Sanderson (the late Bishop of Lincoln) a Man, who though we know he differed from us, yet we must give him his Character. That we have not, nor ever had such another Adversary. He had praeparatum pectus for an Argument; and seldom determines a Question but clearly, and distinctly. So as though we find him something against us, yet we can understand him speak­ing to the point, and clearly, expressing what he saith. Let us therefore hear him, and where can we better hear him, than in his Book of Praelections, concerning the Obligation of Con­science? There he speaketh not by the by, and collaterally, but purposely to the Question, Praelect. 6. §. 16 He puts this Question, What certainty is required in the Mind of the In­feriour to secure him in Conscience, that he is not bound by the Law of his Superiour? To which he Answereth,

• 1. That if the Law be manifestly, and notoriously unjust, the Subject may be sure he is not bound by it; which is also true, if by a Moral certainty he judgeth it simply unjust, having used all diligence to find out the Truth. This is the Case, what needeth any more? But he goes on.
• [Page 39]2. If he doth but think the Command unjust, from some rooted Error in Judgment, of which he cannot easily quit himself; The Obligation of the Command abideth, notwithstanding the Er­ror of his Mind, so that he sinneth, if he doth not Obey; but he should sin in an higher degree, if he did Obey. Errore illo nondum deposito, whiles he thinks it unlawful.
• 3. If a Man doth onely from some light Scruple or Objection suspect the Law unjust, he ought to contemn that Scruple and Obey.

Here is now a Man speaks like a Divine, clearly, and di­stinctly distinguishing, betwixt a demonstrative certainty, or a certainty of Faith, and a Moral certainty; betwixt the assent of a fixed Conscience, and of an Opining Conscience, and Scruple, or Suspition, and determining Christians Duty in all Cases, and so solidly, that we believe there is no valua­ble Non-conformist in England but will subscribe what he saith: He durst not tell us, We must believe it the Will of God, we should submit to the sinal decision of Superiours, though it our private Opinion it utterly swerveth from that which i [...] right; he understood Divinity a little better. And this we think was his last Resolve in the Case. If his first Conclusion reach not an Opining Conscience, which we are sure it doth (if probable Arguments be opposed to Revelation and De­monstrations, for then a Moral certainty makes but an Opi­nion) yet we weare sure the Second doth. As to both he de­termines Acting unlawful; which is all we contend for.

§. 15. But there is another passage more usually quoted in this Case, in a Sermon which that Reverend and Learned man hath on Rom. 14.23. which we will consider, though not half so valuable as this.

1. Because but in a Sermon, where he spake to it collate­rally.

2. And in a Sermon Preached in his Younger Years: But neither can we find any thing there to their purpose, for, ha­ving there determined concerning a Conscience fully Resolved about the unlawfulness of a thing, viz. That a Man cannot [Page 40]without sin do the thing so by his Conscience judged unlawful. He cometh, in the next place, to treat of a Mans Duty un­der a doubting Conscience (where we desire the Reader to consider, that he either comprehendeth the Opining Consci­ence under the Notion of the Conscience fully Resolved, as one would think by that passage, §. 25. This is now where the Conscience apparently inclineth one way; but say the Scales hang even, &c. Or else he quite leaps over the Opining Con­science, as not so much concerned in his Text. §. 25. He manifestly speaks not of it, but of such a Conscience (as he expresseth himself) where the Scales hang even, and a Man cannot resolve which way he should take. And again, §. 29. Answering the Objection: I cannot do it, it is against my Con­science. He saith, It is not against thy Conscience, for, doubt­ing is properly an indifferent motion to either part of a Contra­diction; when the Mind is held in suspence betwixt two ways, uncertain which to take, when the Scales hang even (as I said before) in aequilibro. This manfiestly is not an Opining Conscience, but perfectè dubia, a Conscience which per­fectly doubteth. Now, under such a Complexion of Con­science as to some matter of Practice he determineth,

That if the Liberty of the Agent be determined by a Su­periour Power — A Man is bound in Conscience to do the thing Commanded.

This is a very disputable point in Matters where the Soul is concerned: but be it so or so, it nothing concerns us in the present Debate. That Conscience which we are speaking of is not a Conscience hanging betwixt the two contradictory parts of a Practical Proposition, but upon Arguments which appear to it very probable, (though not demonstrative) strongly inclining to judge one part unlawful, and that the part Commanded, and Morally certain of it. The Questi­on is, Whether this Man can do it or no, because he is not, as Hooker saith, fully and settledly perswaded, or because, as others say it is, not plainly, and demonstratively, and ap­parently evil, tending to debauch Men in their apprehensions of the God-head, &c. To this Dr. Sanderson either saith no­thing, [Page 41]or speaks quite contrary; for indeed here the Con­science is repugnant; in which Case, like a good Protestant Divine, he determines quite contrary to our Neotericks, §. 29. That no Repect nor Circumstance whatsoever can free such an Action from sin.

§. 16. We find a late Casui [...]t speaking as honestly. It is Mr. Fulwood (whom the Author of Toleration not to be abu­sed, declares himself so much pleased with, that he assures us, he is much of his Mind) and it is in one of the three Books he is in such Love with, Entituled, Some necessary and seasonable Cases, [...] 126. though he adviseth, That in such Cases where things are Commanded, which the Inferiour Judgeth unlawful, Men should suspect their private Judgments, and read, and search still yet, at last, (saith he) if the thing required appear to thee sinful still. Thou art bound to the Peace of thy own Conscience, Gods Vice-gerent within thee, and thou mayest not Obey. How come we then to be Felons de se. and Sacrilegious? Stealing our selves out of the Mi­nistry, when this is plainly the case. Nothing could be spo­ken more truly, or like a Divine; and it speaks the more honesty in Mr. Fulwood, because in saying this he spake a­gainst himself, kicking down all the good Milk, which his Conformable Brethren thought he had given in those three Books.

§. 17. We find another Recent Doctor, in a Pamphlet, called Pulpit Conceptions: Popular deceptions; nibbling, and but nibbling at this most important Question, p. 61. He forms an Objection thus.

But suppose I should Scruple my Obedience, thinking my Superiours impositions to be against the Command of God: Why, in this case I am Obliged to lay aside my Scruples, and to bring such thoughts into Captivity to the Obedience of Christ, who hath commanded me to Obey those that have the Rule over me. Pulpit Con­cept. p. 61.

[Page 42]Right. But had we been any of us at this Doctors Elbow, who thus dictates, we would have told him, Doctors, this none will deny you; but they are not Scruples that are in our way, but great Massie stones, called Dialectick Argu­ments; yea, almost Mill-stones: that is, we have not o [...] ­ly a Jealousie, or Suspition, or Fear, that the thing m [...]y [...] unlawful: But we are as sure or it as we can be of any th [...] that it is not [...] said in Scripture, nor the Object of o [...] Sense, nor demonstrable from certain and necessary causes. Good Doctor, speak to the purpose; may we Act against the Judgment of our Consciences, made up from these, or no? The Men you deal with in that Boo [...] [...]e many of them Men of great Learning and Reason, whose Arguments none in in their wits will think you have Answered in that Book. What shall be done in this case, Doctor? Speak to the point. Is there nothing to do, but up and ride your pace? Where's the Stirrup? we see the Whip, but we see not that. Scru­pulous Doctor, you know it is a little stone? a thing without the Foot (much like an Ipse dixit for an Argument to prove an action Lawful) if a Man indeed hath such a thing in his shooe vexing his Foot, it is an easie thing for him to pull it out, and case himself, and run presently. But suppose a Man hath the Gout, or some intrinsick Humour, which La­meth him; is it no more than to say, up, and Run? Good Doctor, he must be cured first, I hope. The Divines which you have to deal with, have such impediments, intrinsick, Arguments, which maketh the unlawfulness of the things re­quired very probable to them. If you will call them Scru­ples, they cannot help that, but they are no more of Kin to [...]hem, than a grain of Sand is to a Mill-stone. They are ready [...] Argue the Case with you at any fair Barr of any Reformed Church in Europe: You have their Arguments: Against Set Forms of Prayer to be imposed upon all Ministers, in Mr. Cottons Discourse against Set Forms. Against the Ceremo­nies, in Dr. Ames his Fresh Suit? In the Dispute against English Ceremonies, in Mr. Bradshaw's Books. Against Re­ [...]rdination, in R. A. his Letter to a Friend, Printed 1661. and [Page 43] A Serious Review of Presbyters Re-ordination by Bishops, Printed about the same time. As also in Altare Damasce­num, upon the two first Heads: Besides many other Books they could never yet see Answered. What shall these Men do? You hear what they say; you say nothing, but rail at them, and conclude them peevish, wilful, ungovernable, with­out Answering an Argument, but taking it for granted (as a late Triumphant Author) that they think all Lawful, onely Scruple offending their Party. Will you tell them as you do, p. 61, 62, 63. That Melior est conditio possidentis. He that is in possession hath the bettter Interest, and that he is possessed of his Right in Commanding, is unquestionable; and therefore they are bound, in Conscience, to stand to his Command, till it be evinced that his command is of a thing that is sinful, or a­bove the Sphear of his Authority. Alas! they will presently grant it you, with this difference. They will tell you, they will not say, their Superiour Commands things which are apparently, and demonstrably sinful. But the things Com­manded are to them sinful, being such as their Consciences so Judge, and that from Arguments which appear to them highly probable, enough to beget in them a Moral certainty. You gag them at the Press, what you can, but they have found times from thence to tell you what those Arguments are; what is their Answer? You are a Company of peevish, factious, Schismatical Fellows. Is this Righteous dealing? Or had not these kind of Answerers, think you, need of some more Righteousness than their own works, to justifie them? They will presently grant, That the Superiour is possessed of an unquestionable Right to Command in such things, as God by his Word hath not forbidden, either by some particular word, or by some general Law, requiring every one to use their Power derived from God, for good, for Edification, not for Destruction; to use it so, as not to destroy Souls, for whom Christ dyed. And to all such Commands, they profess themselves ready to stand.

And further, when you have proved, that either the Word of God, or right Reason hath put the Superiour in a possession [Page 44]of a larger Right than this is. They will tell you, That the King of Spain is in a possession too of a Right to Command; so was Queen Mary here in England, who Commanded ma­ny things, she, or her Bishops, or both; which Cranmer, Hooper, Ridley, Latimer, &c. in their Consciences judged unlawful; how was it Evinced (to use your term) to those and other good Men, that what these their Superiours Com­manded, was unlawful? The Bishops affirmed them Lawful, so that (according to the Modern Divinity) the unlawfulness of them could be but the Sufferers private Opinion, and that against the Church. Did these Men sin, in not doing the things required? Did they dye as Fools dye? Or did they do their Duty in chusing to Suffer rather than Act? If the lat­ter, why may not others do the same? Will you say, be­cause those things to the Martyrs were evinced unlawful. We ask, how were they evinced? Did they plead Scriptures a­gainst: those things, and do not the Non-Conformists do so now? Had they not a far greater appearance of Scripture for Transubstantiation, in that Text, This is my Body, than any can bring for a Liturgy, a Surplis, &c. Will you say, the Scriptures now pleaded, are wrested, and mis-understood? Would not Bonner and Gardiner say so then? Shall the Ma­gistrate now determine betwixt the Bishops and dissenters? And had not Queen Mary the same Right? Or (at least) she and her Parliament? See where you are, Doctor. Who shall Judge whether your opposite Objections be Scruples, Doubts, or Opinions? Shall the Supreme Magistrate or the Bishops? Had not Queen Mary and her Bishops the same Right? And then all those Holy Men dyed, as the Papists say, as Rebels and Traytors, and those things were all suffered in vain. You have no way to avoid this, unless you will say, Queen Mary and her Bishops were no Superiours; for you know, Quod convenit alicui quâ tali, convenit omni tali. But it may be when this Doctor writes next, he will think himself Obliged to speak strictly, and not confound, a Doubting, Scrupulous, an Opining Conscience. Any School-man, or Casuist will shew him the difference betwixt them.

[Page 45]§. 18. The last we shall take Notice of, speaking in this Case, is one, who calls himself Ireneus Freeman, in a Trea­tise stiled by him, The Reasonableness of Divine Service, p. 33. he telleth us right. That there are but a few Actions but are disputable; and — In disputable Actions, we must Obey our Superiours Commands. This is now right down, that is, There are very few Actions, but let our own Consciences say what they will to us against them, if our Superiours Command us to do them, we must do them: Or say what they will for them, if the Magistrate Command us to forbear them, we must forbear them. In p. 15. Those he had to deal with having said, that it was not clear to them, That it was Lawful for all Persons at all times to limit themselves in Praycr by any stinted Forms, This acute Author roundly tells them.

‘The Lawfulness of an Action is not clear to him that doubteth of its Lawfulness, not being certain that the Action is Lawful, nor yet certain that it is unlawful. But yet such a Man is bound to do the Action when Commanded by the Magistrate. The Reason is, Because it is certain the Ma­gistrate is to be Obeyed, Commanding Lawful things. But it is uncertain whether the thing be unlawful; it is safer to Obey doubtingly, than to disobey doubtingly.’

Now, in these words, there is either a Notorious Cheat, or else a Potion of Divinity, which taken down, will bring up all our Protestant Religion: If there be a Cheat, it lyes in those words, Doubting, and Certain. A Conscience may be said to be doubting, either strictly, or largely. Strictly, Bishop Sanderson tells us what a doubting Conscience is, when the Mind is pendulous, the Scales hang even: a Man hath as much to say for the Lawfulness of an Action, as for the un­lawfulness. Largely, One that is meerly Jealous, Scrupu­lous, or Suspitious of an Action, may be said to doubt.

2. One that is not fully perswaded a thing is unlawful, but upon Arguments, which he judgeth very probable, he be­lieveth it unlawful. Again, a Man may be certain of a thing, by a certainty of Faith, believing a Divine Revelation, or by a certainty of Sense, or arising from Demonstration.

[Page 46]2. A Man may be Morally certain, and of most things we have no other certainty than this latter. If this Author had not designed to cheat his Reader, he would have spoken di­stinctly (as we shewed Dr. Sanderson did) when he speak­eth of Doubting, he must either say nothing to the purpose, for he knows his Adversaries have given him Arguments, which appear to them very probable why they Judge the things required unlawful. Or else he must mean, that if a Man hath any doubt, and be not fully perswaded, that the Action is unlawful, though he hath never so many Arguments, which make it appear to him probably such: Notwithstand­ing them, he is bound to do the thing. Now, if this be his Sence, he saith that which is not to be made good by any but Mr. Hooker's Principles, before spoken to, and that which I will think never any Protestant spake before him. For his Rule of Tene certum, relinque incertum; besides that, it must be understood of the two parts of the same Proposition, not of two distinct Propositions (as he wrings it.) By his leave that is not uncertain, of which we are Morally certain.

Nor 3. Is it certain, or can be to any Soul, either by Faith, or Mathematically, or Morally. That the Superiour is in all things to be Obeyed: Nay, the contrary is certain. Nor is it certain that he is to be Obeyed in things, which the Inferiour, upon Arguments which he judgeth very probable, Judgeth unlawful for him to do. For his confounding the Notions of Disputable, and uncertain, it is ridiculous; for if all things disputable be therefore uncertain, because they are disputed, and that by some Learned Men too, whether the particular Soul, dispute them or no. There's hardly an Article of our Faith will be left us certain, or indeed any thing else but one­ly this, That we must Obey our Superiours. In the mean time, Reader, Observe whither these Modern Casuists are dri­ving.

• 1. There are few Actions (he might have added Proposi­tions too) that are not Disputable, Freeman, p. 33.
• 2. In Disputable Actions we must Obey Superiours Com­mands, ibid. p. 15.
• [Page 47]3. Yea, we must Obey, though we doubt, i. e. though upon Arguments which to us appear very probable; we think the things unlawful to be done, because it is certain (saith Freeman) That Superiours are to be Obeyed in things Lawful, and in disputable things it is uncertain that what is required is unlawful.
• 4. Ergo. There are very few Actions, but if we be Com­manded this or that part, let our Consciences say what they will, we must do as we are commanded.

§. 19. These now are Doctrines not fit to be openly, and plainly asserted in this Noon-day of Truth. Therefore the particular Judgments of Private Persons, Founded on Argu­ments, which to them seem very probable, and inferr a Mo­ral certainty, must be confounded with the Notions of Doubts, Scruples, Fears, Jealousies. Let this Doctrine obtain a lit­tle, and let the World Judge, if the exploded, brutish, odi­ous Doctrine of Blind Obedience (the Pillar, and Basis of Popery) be not by slight of hand established. The Conse­quence of this Doctrine, if true, would be this, That Men need no more look to Scripture, to see whether an Action were Lawful or no, but look upon it as the Will of God; to believe as the Church believeth, and do as their Superiours command, without any regard to the command of God. Of this, more anon.

§. 20. The Advantage of this Doctrine (pretended) is Peace, by which they can mean no more, than an outward Harmony in Action.

2. The stretching the bounds of Morality. For, if two successive Superiours Command me the two contradictory parts of the same Proposition: One Commands me to go to Church: Another, to tarry at home, and I am bound to Obey in things disputable; it must follow, that all things in the World that are disputable, are indifferent. Now, there be­ing (as Mr. Freeman saith) few actions not Disputable. It must follow, that there are few Practical Propositions, but a [Page 48]Man, as to them may do what he list, take what part he pleaseth; so all things shall become Lawful. But now the woful dis-advantage of it, is, that he who practiseth accor­ding to these Principles.

1. Shall be sure to have no Peace in his Conscience, but a continual regret within himself.

2. He will be at last damned. For (saith the Apostle) he that doubteth, is damned if he eateth, Rom. 14. Except some­body can prove what hath been impudently enough said, That Superiours must another day answer to God for all the sinful actions which their Inferiours have done at their command, (a Doctrine no Superiour hath cause to thank them for.) Nor is there any way to avoid the first, unless it were possible for Men to perswade themselves, as Mr. Hooker would have them, That it is the Will of God, that in Litigious and controver­ted cases of such Quality, Men should submit to the judgment of final decision; though in their private Opinions they Judge it ut­terly to swerve from that which is right; as to which we have said enough. We therefore stick to the Protestant Doctrine,

That it is not Lawful, under any circumstance of Com­mand, to act against an Opining Conscience.

CHAP. IV. The Question stated; It is proved, that it is not Law­ful to Act contrary to the Opinion of a Mans parti­cular Conscience, by five Arguments; because the particular Conscience is the Proximate Rule of Acti­on, granted by all Divines. Because of that Text, Rom. 14.23. Because it Subjects a Man to conti­nual Terrors of Conscience. The contrary Principle over-throws the Natural Order of the Souls Operati­on, and plucks up a great Pillar of the Protestant Religion, and would make the Scriptures and Ar­gumentative Books of little Ʋse but to Torment Men.

§. 1. WE come now to assert our Proposition, That it is not Lawful for any Person to act against an Opining Conscience, i. e. (as we have largely opened). That, supposing a Person, though he hath not demonstrative Ar­guments, to prove this or that unlawful, which he is required to do: Yet if he hath formed up a particular Judgment of Conscience, from Arguments, which seem to him very pro­bable, so as he cannot Answer them, nor rest satisfied in the Answers of others, while he so judgeth, it is sin and wicked­ness in him, especially in Matters which concern the Wor­ship of God, to do that Action, however required of him. This we shall make good by several Arguments.

§. 2.1. To swerve from what God hath made the Proxi­mate Rule of our actions, is sinful. But to act contrary to the Opi­nion of our own Consciences, is to swerve from what God bath made the Proximate Rule of our Actions — Therefore it is sinful. The Major can with no Modesty be denyed; for, what is sin, but a Transgression of, or deviation from the Rule of [Page 50]our actions? The Minor is as Evident. It is granted by all Divines we have met with, both Popish and Protestant, that the Practical Conscience is the Proximate Rule of our Actions; nor did we ever meet with it denyed by any Learned Man. And indeed it must be so; For, That Gods Word and Law is the Remote Rule, must be owned. Now, we would ask how we shall know what the Will of God in his Word is, but by the Judgment of our particular consciences at last; be the Will of God in it self what it will: The Will of God to us must be Interpreted as to Practise by our own Judgments and appre­hensions. Hence Dr. Ames saith well, that he who acteth against his Conscience, Interpretatively acts against the Will of God. And Filiucius saith right; such Actions declare, that Men chuse, and love sin: For so far as they know what is sin­ful, they do sin; and if they miss of sinning in their Actions, it is but as the blind Man hits the Crow, there's no thank to them; out of choyce they sin: It is involuntarily, if they do that which is right. No Action materially good, can possi­bly be so formally, if done contrary to the Judgment of our Conscience; because it is impossible it should have the con­currence of the Will, whiles the Practical Conscience faith it ought not be done. The Will cannot will what it judgeth evil, it may indeed be mis-guided by the Understanding, but it cannot will evil, sub ratione mali; and so consequentially cannot will what the Conscience telleth the Man he ought not to do. So as indeed it is but a Natural Principle, That the Practical Conscience is, and must be the Proximate Rule of our actions. Filiucius saith right, that the Law of God, and the Law of Nature respecteth our Actions as they are free, which they cannot be, unless they proceed a Principio cognoscente, from a knowing Principle within our selves. We proceed to a second Argument.

§. 3. That Principle, which allowed perverteth the whole Or­der of Nature in the operations of a Reasonable soul, must be false. But this opinion, That it is Lawful for us to act contra­ry to what appears to us Lawful, from probable arguments, [Page 51]perverteth the whole Order of Nature in the Operations of a Reasonable Soul—Ergo. The Major needeth no proof to any who will believe, that it is not the Will of God, a Man should be Metamorphosed into a Beast. So that all our bu­siness must be to prove the Minor. To which purpose let us but take a view of the Noblest Empire in the World, I mean, that of Reason in Man; and Observeth the Order which God hath (by the Law of Nature prescribed) by which Reason, sitting as a Queen, should Rule there.

The Will is the great Minister in this State, the great wheel, which by its imperate Acts moveth the whole Man. The Object of it is Good or Evil; about these two it is Exer­cised, chusing the former, refusing the latter, and then Com­manding all the Inferiour Faculties of the Soul, and Mem­bers of the Body, to move according to its Judgment and Choice. The Philopsoher telleth us, The Will is blind, and that its work is onely to keep its Seat, and Judge, and Com­mand. The Understanding serves it with the Notion of things that takes cognisance of them, discerns, and repre­sents them as true, or false; whether reference to Specula­tion or Practice. The Understanding in its work is served by the Interior and exterior Senses. So then this is the Or­der of the Ceasonable Soul in Man, whereas all Objects are either Sensible, Rational, or Spiritual. The exterior Sen­ses, the Eye and Ear, &c. bring Intelligence of sensible Ob­jects. The Fancy, Memory, and Imaginative Power bring Intelligence of Objects proper to their Sphear. The Under­standing takes notice of all Propositions thus brought in to it, discerneth them, and judgeth concerning them, whether they be true or false according to Principles of Sense, Reason, and Revelation, according to the variety of the Matter; upon this the Will maketh its choice. Those which the Under­standing discerneth true and good, it willeth and chuseth; what it discerns false and evil, it refuseth, nillete, and re­jecteth; and accordingly Commandeth the Soul to believe, or not believe; to love, or hate; to desire, or fl [...]e from what­soever the Understanding discerneth, and judgeth evil and [Page 52]noxious. Here now is the Government of a Reasonable Soul. Now, let us Observe how guilty the Principle we op­pose is of Treason and Sedition against this Noble Govern­ment of the Soul instituted in it by God himself. We cannot make a better Judgment, than by putting a particular case. Suppose this the Proposition.

It is, or it is not Lawful for Persons once Ordained to be re-ordained.

The Case now is to be Judged in the Court of Reason.

[...] Senses bring in this Proposition; as what they have some where seen or heard to be brought into Practice. Upon this the Court of the Reasonable Understanding taketh cog­nisance of it. The Understanding discerns it a Proposition relating to Instituted Worship, and that the Truth concerning it, is to be determined, not from Principles of Sense, or Prin­ciples of Natural Reason, but from Scripture and Reason working upon things Revealed, and comparing things Spiri­tual with Spiritual. The Eye is therefore employed to Read what can be. The Ear to hear on all sides what is spoken about it. The Fancy or Imagination is also set on work to find out Mediums to prove the one part or other, and so the thing cometh with all these helps to be Discoursed by the soul within it self. Then the Ʋnderstanding discerneth and judgeth which part of the Proposition is true, and consequently, fit to be Practised; which is false, and fit to be rejected. It either concludes one part Demonstratively, and certainly false, or probably, and in all likelihood false; or else it hangs in equilibrio, not knowing what to determine. In the present Case we suppose the Ʋnderstanding to bring in its report in this Sense.

As to this Practical Question, Whether it be Lawful for them, who by Ministers have been Ordained and made Ministers, to be re-ordained, and made, first, Deacons, then Priests, by Bishops.

I have done my best to try the Truth or Falshood of either part. The Eyes and Ears have given me an account of what they have seen in any Books, or heard from any Discourses of [Page 53]Learned Men about it. The Fancy hath also been employed to weigh, and consider Propositions to consider Arguments brought by others on one side, and the other; and devise Me­diums for one part, and for the other. Now, upon my ut­most Judgment of the thing from weighing Arguments on all sides, it is not demonstratively certain, that this Proposition is false. That Persons once Ordained, may not be re-ordained, and that a Submission to such a re-ordination would be sinful: But it doth appear to me very probably so; I cannot Answer the Arguments which I have thought on, or others have brought to prove it so; and though I dare not arrogate in­fallibility to my self, and determine the Arguments I have for the Negative unanswerable; yet I can find no Answer I can acquiesce in, and so far as I can judge, it is sinful; and will certainly issue in horror of Conscience, or Eternal Damnati­on, or both, without pardoning Mercy. Now, the business is ripe for the Will's Election. What shall the Will do? Shall it, can it (notwithstanding this) chuse the thing, and com­mand the soul, to will, desire, embrace it, or the outward Man to do it, because it is Commanded. If this be not to turn a Man into a Beast, to turn the Rational soul out of doors, and set a Man with his heels upward, and to pervert the Na­tural Order of the Souls Operations, we know not what is?

§. 4. Willany say, the Case is here partially represented, because under the Circumstance of Superiours Command. The Understanding hath also a report to bring in about that Pro­position, That it is by Divine Precept necessary to Obey Supe­riours. We Answer, if the Proposition be laid down so Uni­versal, the Understanding must either Deny it, or distinguish about it. It must therefore be onely laid down thus.

In all Lawful things it is necessary to obey Superiours.

Now, it hinders not, for this is [...] this is the Que­stion, whether the thing be Lawful or no: The Soul judgeth otherwise. Now, we would gladly know of our Modern Casuists, Whether the Law of Nature having obliged the Will [Page 54]to move According to the dictate of the Ʋnderstanding, is be possible that a rational Soul without presumptuous sinning, and offering violence to the very Law and Principles of Humane Nature, should, will, chuse, command, or allow a thing so represented to it as before, probably unlawful. What we can­not apprehend good, I hope we cannot will it, for this were to will evil under the Notion o [...] evil (a thing Naturally im­possible.) Now, how shall [...] judge that good (being to take all its Evidence from the [...]llect) which the understand­ing judgeth false, and naught? Will any one say, that it is possible that from extrinsecal Arguments (such as the Autho­rity, and Testimony of Men, the Will and Command of Superiours) &c. it may judge that true and good, which from intrinsecal Arguments, it judgeth false and naught. This is indeed the Jesuites Doctrine. (Yet they will not allow a Superiours merum imperium, a sufficient Topick in the case) but as was said before, it is justly abominated by all Prote­stants, of what sort, size, or perswasion soever.

§. 5. Exabundanti, if any will be so vain, as to say, the Soul hath warrant enough to judge the thing probably Lawful, because Superiours bave Commanded it; when in the mean time from Arguments appearing to it very probable, it judg­eth it sinful and unlawful. We would gladly know, from what Principles it should form such a Judgment; the Princi­ple must be one of these.

1. Either these Superiours are Infallible, so am not I in the Exercise of my Reason. So inded the Papists hold, as to the Pope, and so may be justified in their perverse Judgments in this case from that Maxime, [...]. Granting one absurdity, a thousand will follow: But all Pro­testants reserve Infallibility from him, who is Truth it self, and deny it to any Creature.

2. It must therefore be this Principle: Though Superiours be fallible, yet it is better their Judgments (though in fol­lowing them there be a danger of a troubled Conscience, and eternal damnation) than my own. But is it possible an inge­nuous, [Page 55]Rational Soul should so Judge? This being neither sensibly, not rationally demonstrable: It is impossible that the Soul should apprehend any such thing but upon Revelati­on. It must teerefore (as Hooker saith) appear to be The will of God; and to that (as to the highest Reason) (if it can be shewed) Reason Sanctified and Regulated by Religi­on, will submit. Aut alas! who shall shew us any such Text? Ante retro Simoeis stuet, &c. Will they urge Rom. 13. Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers, and other Texts of the like import. We allow the Scripture, we say, the matter to be our Duty, but we say, it must be in things which do not appear to us sinful and wicked (this were to set up some higher than the highest?) Otherwise the Apostles, Acts 3. much erred, not onely in their Practice, but in their Princi­ple too there laid down, It is better to obey God than Man: In vain had they said that, if every Obedience to Man as a Superiour were, co nomine, Obedience to God, will any say? But this was where a Magistrate Commanded a thing unlawful. How did that appear, but by the dictate of their Consciences? It indeed now doth otherwise appear to us, because the Scrip­ture so represents it since written; but how did it appear to them otherwise? Why might not the Magistrate have then told them, as some now Interpret that revealed will of God to us. He that doubteth, is damned, if he eateth; that is, (except his Superiour Commands [...]m to eat.) And why might not Nebuchadnezzar have told the three Children, It is true, God had forbidden them to Worship Graven Images, but it must be understood, excegt the Magistrate Commanded them so to do: But this Objection is too ridiculous to Answer further. Let this be enough for our Second Argument.

§. 5. We proceed to a Third Argument, which we form thus.

For any Person to do that in the doing of which he can ne­ver have any quiet, and peace in his own Conscience, is sinful and wicked.

But for a Man to Act (under any Circumstance) contrary [Page 56]to the Opinion of his own Conscience, is to do that, in the do­ing of which he can never have any quiet, and Peace in his own Conscience. — Ergo.

We are much at loss to fancy which Proposition any can be hardy enough to deny. Will any deny the Major? Sure­ly Charity begins at home; and every Man, in the first place, is bound to keep Quiet within himself, if he can. Thou art bound to the Peace of thy own Conscience. Thou canst not Obey (saith Mr. Fulwood, in the place before cited) a very remarkable Sentence for the Author of the Doctrine of Schism, to think upon professing so much oneness of mind with Mr. Fulwood, in that Book) and certainly, he is the greatest Self-destroyer in the World, that doth not first look in his Actions, to secure the Peace of his Conscience. Next, throwing a Man's self into Hell, the greatest mischief he can do himself, is to set his Conscience upon a continual belch­ing in his Face.

§. 6. For the Minor: It is as plain, for he must have a dull, a very dull and lazy Conscience, that will let him Act contrary to its Judgment, and yet be quiet, and not conti­nually tell him, thou subjectest thy self to the wrath of God, thou sinnest wilfully, presumptuously; and there is nothing remains for thee, but either a quick Repentance, a sorrow for what thou hast done, and a leaving off to do it any more; or a certain dreadful looking for of Divine and fiery Indigna­tion.

§. 7. Will any say, why should not a Man's Conscience be as unquiet while a man contrary to the Command of God for Obeying Superiours, doth not Obey them? The Answer is easie. No Law of God Obligeth a man to Obey Superi­ours in things which he verily believeth are unlawful; about other things we have no Dispute. This Argument is so Evi­dent, as it needeth not more words. We therefore proceed to a fourth.

[Page 57]§. 8. He that doubteth is damned, if he eateth; and what­soever is not of Faith, is sin, Rom. 14.23.

But he who doth that, which upon probable Arguments he verily believeth unlawful; doubteth, and yet actethnd acteth not of Faith. — ergo he sinneth, is damned, &c.

The Proposition is the Apostles, Rom. 14.23. therefore not to be denyed; but yet we find some, who will not allow it a Proposition of immutable Truth, but with some Circum­stances. That is (as they expound themselves) if the Per­son be sui juris, at Liberty, and Perfectly in his own Power, not required to do the thing, by the Command of his Supe­riours, of the Lawfulness of which he doubteth: But (say they) if the Superiour Commandeth, then he who doth the [...]ing, (though he doubteth of the Lawfulness of it) runneth no guilt, no hazard of Damnation. Now, we would fain believe this if we could, for it would ease us of many per­plexing thoughts, but we cannot, for these Reasons, amongst others.

§. 9. First, because what the Apostle saith, seemeth to us but to be according to the Law, and Order of Nature in a ra­tional Soul. That the Understanding should first represent that as true, and good, and therefore Eligible, which the Will should chuse.

§. 10. Because it seemeth to us possible by admitting their Interpretation to elude the whole Law of God, and make any thing Lawful. For what Reason can there be, why what God saith in one place, should be understood with that limi­tation, and not what he saith in another? Why may we not Venerate Images, Go to Mass, Pray for the Dead, Prophane the Sabbath, Ʋse Oyl, Spittle, Cream, &c. in Baptism, if the Superiour Commandeth, as well as wear a Surplis, use the Cross in Baptism, &c. Doth any one doubt whether these things be Lawful or no, or upon probable Arguments, believe the contrary? And is he restrained by this Text? Not [Page 58]at all by this Interpretation; if Superiours Command these, or any of these things, will any say, That this Text speaks of things onely in their own Nature indifferent? We ask, who shall Judge what those things are? Shall the Superiour? If so, what we said, holdeth; for it is not to be presumed, he would Command them, if he judgeth them sinful. Shall the Inferiour? He Judgeth them from probable Arguments Unlawful.

§. 11. Thirdly, Because (whatsoever some Modern Do­ctors say) We see no Scripture Translating the guilt of any Personal Action of ours to our Superiours, which in Reason we should find, if his Command would Justifie us, in doing any thing we judge wicked. Especially considering, that whether we Judge it right or no, it may in it self be sinful, and there­fore we had need have our Souls secured, as to the guilt of it. We think, with the Apostle, that Sin is an Anomie; a trans­gression of the Law, by Omission, or Commission, or Non­conformity, how we believe, that there is an inseparable guilt which he cleaves to every Omission or Oblique Action: every sin bindeth over the Doer or Omitter to an Eternal death: and want one Scripture to prove, that the sin, or Per­sonal Obliquity of an Inferiour Action, should be Translated to the Superiour, and set upon his score: Thus while some deny Christs imputed Righteousness, they have devised a new Doctrine of Imputed guilt to the Magistrate or Superiour; a Doctrine which no Superiour will thank them for, that un­derstandeth the weight of Divine wrath for sin. We have heretofore heard, that Superiours may make themselves guilty of sin, by Commanding others to sin: But that the guilt of the Inferiours Personal Action, should also be Transla­ted from him, and that not to Christ, but to the Superiour, is a Novel, idle Fancy, a brutish, and irrational, as well as unscriptural figment, and such a one, as if admitted, would make the Crowns of Kings, and Mitres of Bishops not worth taking up in the Streets. Let God therefore be true, and these New Diviners all Lyars; God hath said, That Soul that [Page 59]sins, shall dye, and that every Soul shall bear its own Iniquity; and Iniquity that must be (if St. John describes sin right) whatso­ever is a Transgression of the Divine Law.

§.12. Fourthly, We cannot admit of this Interpretation, be­cause of what followeth in the Apostle, Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. By Faith, saith Dr. Sanderson, in his Sermon on Rom. 14.23. is meant, ‘A Certain perswasion of the Mind, that what we do, may Lawfully be done; that (saith he) what­soever Action is done by us, either directly contrary to the Judg­ment and Verdict of our own Consiciences, or, at least, doubting­ly, and before we are in some competent measure assured that we may Lawfully do it; that is it which St. Paul here denyeth to be of Faith, and of which he pronounceth so peremptorily, that it is (eo nomine) sin.’ Now, we are sure, that he who doth a thing at the Command of others, which seemeth to him (from probable Arguments) unlawful, cannot, in this sence, do it of Faith, i. e. with no competent perswasion of the Lawfulness of it, with no certainty, either Supernatural, Mathematical, or Moral. The Vanity therefore of this limitation being discove­red, we hope the Proposition will stand good.

§. 13. For the Minor, he who denyeth it, must say, That he who Opineth doth not doubt, which indeed we think strictly he doth not; for he hath, as we said, a Moral certainty, but that doth but raise the Argument to à fortiori: If he, whose Consci­ence is pendulous, and who hangeth in Equilibrio, is damned if he doth the thing, of the Lawfulness of which he doubteth; then is he much more damned, who doth verily think the thing un­lawful, and yet will do it. But in the largest Notion, Opining is a Species of doubting; and if that Text of the Apostle be true, of Doubting, in any sense, it must be in that sense, which is of all, the highest. We are able to discern no chink, at which our Adversaries may creep out from the Prison of this Argument, but shall leave it, attending to any thing they shall any of them here­after offer in Answer to it.

§. 14. Our next Argument shall be this.

That Principle which destroyeth the Pillar and Foundation of the Protestant Religion, is not to be granted by those who own that Re­ligion.

But to assert it Lawful under any Circumstance, to Act contra­ry [Page 60]to the Opinion of a Mans own Conscience, destroyeth the Pillar and Foundation of the Protestant Religion— Ergo.

We confess this is but Argumentum ad homines, and concerns not those whose business is to oppose, and Root up the Religion of Protestants; but we are speaking to Protestants, who cannot deny the Proposition.

For the Assumption, all that we have to do, is to prove that the Asserting of this Principle, destroyeth, at least, one of the Foundations of the Protestant Religion, as it stands disting [...]d from Popery. This is that, which Divines call The Judgment of Private and Practical Discretion. Divines say, there is [...] [...] ­fold Judgment concerning Propositions of Truth.

1. The first is Authoritative, or Nomothetick. This belong­eth onely to God; all the Men in the World, all their Opinions and Arguments cannot add a Cubit to the stature of Truth, nor make an hair of its Head either white or black.

2. The Second is Ministerial, and Declarative. This belongs to the Church (in the Scriptural Notion of it.) The Apostle therefore calls her the Pillar and ground of Truth: She keeps the Sacred Records, and when there is a doubt about any portion of them, Ministerially declareth what is the Truth.

3. The third Divines call, The Judgment of Private and Pra­ctical Discretion. This, Protestants say, belongs to every pri­vate Christian, who, by his own Conscience, (using the best means first which he can for the Information of it) is to deter­mine (as to his own belief and Practice, what is true, and Law­ful. And indeed here lyes the great difference betwixt the Re­ligion of Papists and Protestants. The Papists will not allow the Private Christian to Judge of Truth with reference to his own Practice, but Obligeth People To believe as the Church believeth, and defendeth Blind Obedience to Superiours as Christians Duty. They make it Lawful for Men, contrary to their own Judgment, and the Dictate of their Conscience from intrinsick Arguments, to Practice according to the Opinion of one or more Doctors, and necessary to Obey all the Decrees of the Popes, and the Com­mands of Superiours, if things be not apparently and demonstra­tively unlawful. It may be one Adrianus or another, or two may enter their dissent to this Brutish Doctrine, but they do ge­nerally agree it, and this is Fons & Origo mali. The very first [Page 61]thing to be taught their Prosilytes, (as silence was in the School of Pythagoras.) Hence their vernacular Bibles are burnt, and all their other Doctrines are easily swallowed. The necessity of an Infallible Judge is Concluded, &c.

§. 15. On the other side it is essential to a Protestant to be free and in Bondage to no Man, nor as to his Practice to be guided by any but God alone, and his own Conscience, and his Superi­ours Commanding him what his own Conscience first perswades him to be necessary, or, at least, Lawful. He who denyeth this, and pretendeth to hate Popery, doth but abhor Idols, and commit Sacriledge. Nay, he doth indeed but deny that in words, which he owneth, chuseth, and preferreth; nor is it possible, there should be greater Factors for Popery in any place, than those that perswade Men, that it is Lawful for them under what Circumstances they can Imagine to Act contrary to the Opi­nion of their own Conscience, and do what (from which to them seem very probable) seems utterly to swerve from that which is right, (to use Mr. Hooker's Phrase.)

§. 16. Now, let any pluck up this Flood-gate of Private and Practical Discretion, and tell us what should hinder most of the absurd Doctrines of Popery coming in upon us like an overflow­ing Flood, if ever we should be so miserable (which is not a thing impossible) as in Future Ages, to have a Superiour that shall Command the receiving of them, or Practice according to them. As to the falshood of most of them, we have but a Mo­ral certainty, at least, our perswasion must be Judged no more according to the Modern Divinity; for how can we be Infallibly, and demonstratively certain in things, as to which so great a part of the World is of another mind, and so many such Learned Men, as Bellarmine, Stapleton, and an hundred more, who dissent from us? Besides, as we shewed before, we are told, that in Disputable things, we can have but an Opinion of one part. And this we take to be a Meditation worthy of those Honourable Per­sons amongst the Nobility and Gentry of England, who have shewed their Zeal so much of late against that Religious Pagean­try of Rome. If any doubt whether Christians have such a Pri­viledge given them by God, as this of Private and Practical Di­scretion; let them consider those Texts, 1 Thes. 5.21. 1 John 3.1. usually quoted for it; and but Read what Bishop Davenant, [Page 62]in his most Learned Treatise, De Judice & Normâ fidei, and all other Protestant Writers have said for it. Whoever plucks up this Hedge, we understand not if he doth not feel the Romish Ser­pent quickly biting him by the heel; and we cannot but think that Man will be Cursed, that goes about to remove this Land-mark of all Protestants; and cry out to our Superiours, in the words of Solomon, Prov. 22.28. Remove not the Ancient Land-mark, which our Fathers have set.

§. 17. We might further add, that the admission of this ab­surd and brutish principle, that if a thing be not apparently and demonstratively sinful, it is Lawful for Men to Act contrary to the Opinion of their own Consiciences, representing it to them (from Arguments, which seem to them very probable) unlawful: All Books of Topicks, as to Matters of practice, all Argumentative Books in Divinity would be of no Use at all, but noxious, and mischievous rather: Yea, the Holy Scriptures themselves would be of very little or no use for the use of Argumentative Dis­courses, in any Science or Discipline is to make a proposition ei­ther Demonstrative, or Probable to us. Yea, this is the use of the Holy Scriptures, as they inform us of Truth. Things are Demonstrable to us upon the Evidence of Revelation, Sense, or Reason, (indeed the first is improper, for the certainty arising from Divine Revelation, is called Faith, not Demonstration, or Demonstrative certainty, but it is quiddam majus, what is cer­tain to us upon a certainty of Faith, or Demonstrative Reason, is not so Ordinarily in a moment. This Certainty is Ordinarily hatched out of Topicks, and most Propositions even of Divine Truth usually at first appear to the Soul probable, before they appear indubitably certain. The Gray hairs of that other cer­tainty (which is distinguished from Moral Certainty) rarely grow up in a Night. This being granted, which every one expe­rienceth. Suppose but a Convocation, or a Colledge of Superi­ours, to determine de Omnibus agendis, of all things to be Reli­giously Observed, and done. To what purpose should any read, or study any Books for the disquisition of Truth, as to any part of a Proposition; for when he hath done, so long as the thing to be done appears to him but probably Lawful, or probably unlawful, which it must do before it appears to him indubitably, and out of all Question the one, or the other, he is according to this [Page 63]Opinion bound in Conscience (if he be by Superiours Command­ed) to do quite contrary to what he Judgeth Lawful, if he be not indubitably certain it is unlawful. What need he Read and study the Scriptures, as to Matter of Practice? When he hath found out the most he can there, some or other will dispute the Truth of what he thinks he hath found out; and if so, it is disputable; and if it be disputable, his Notion is not indubita­ble (according to this Novel Doctrine) and he is bound to do what he is bidden. So as his Notion shall be crush'd in the Egg, and never be suffered to hatch into a Demonstration, or indubi­table certainty, and all his Reading for the finding out of the truth, shall serve for nothing but to torture him, with a continual re­gret, and checking of Conscience, which will never let a Man be quiet whiles he Acteth in Repugnancy to it. Will any say yet, he shall do well to Read, to perswade himself of the Lawfulness of what he is Commanded. Suppose another Superiour should then come and Command him the quite contrary (as he may doubtless.) But it may be some will say, so long as he by Read­ing onely perswades himself it is Lawful; not necessary antece­daneously to the Superiours Command, he is well enough; he may first Obey the one, then the other: But how shall a Man be able so to govern himself, as by Reading to secure himself that he shall not convince himself the thing is necessary? Thus accor­ding to this absurd position, we may part with all the practical part of Scripture, and, as the Popish Proselytes use to do, burn our Bibles, onely excepting some few Precepts about Obedience to Superiours, in that will lye the whole Duty of Man, for what­ever else the Scripture saith (unless in things unlawful, accor­ding to the Law and light of Nature) must be expounded with a Salvo. This you must not do, except Superiours Command. This you must do, unless Superiours Command the contrary. If not all Scripture, we would willingly know where these Divines will set the Limits? Will they say (as indeed they do) it is onely in things in their own Nature indifferent; this looks like something, but is indeed nothing: Who shall be Judge of those things which are so? Shall the Inferiours Conscience, as to his practice, be Judge? Then the Question is granted on our side. Shall the Su­periour Judge, for the Inferiours practice? Then the Limitation signifieth nothing. How any will get out of this Noose, we can­not [Page 64]Divine; but enough is said in this case, we Conclude it An absurd, unreasonable, unscriptural, Popish, Brutish Assertion, for any to affirm it Lawful, for Christians under any Circumstances, in Matters of Worship especially, to Act contrary to what in the par­ticular Judgment of his own Conscience, formed from Arguments which to him appear very probable, he Judgeth to be Lawful from intrinsecal Nature, affections, and adjuncts of the Action Let us now shortly enquire what inconveniencies our Opinion in this case is incumbred with, or are charged upon it.

CHAP. V. The Grand Objection answered. This Principle doth not take away all Power from Magistrates, nor at all dissolve the Bonds of any due Obedience. The Magistrates Power opened, granted, limi­ted; he hath no power to Judge as to the Inferiours practice, what is, or is not indifferent. The strange variety of conformable Wri­ters, in stating, and determining the Question. The Reasonable­ness, and Necessity of Indulgence. Dr. Ashton's late Book ex­amined, his Notion of Persecution inquired into, the true No­tion of it. An Introduction to the next Case.

§. 1. THE Common and Grand, and we think, the onely valuable Objection against this Proposition, is, That this Principle taketh away all power from Superiours, and dissolves all Inferiours Obligations to Obedience; and this we hear of often enough, and it were Objection enough if it were but half true. But let us go down into this Field, and see whether the Principle be so guilty, according to the Cry against it. That which they Offer in Justification of this, is, ‘That the World is now grown so cunning, that there is hardly any thing which can be Comman­ded by Superiours, but the Wit of Man will find out some proba­ble Arguments to prove that it is unlawful, which if it be once so proved, the Inferiour is discharged from his Obedience. Again, they say, All things are either Necessary, Lawful, or Ʋnlawfull. for things Necessary, and unlawful, let Superiours Command what they please, the Inferiours must not Omit things necessary, nor do [Page 65]things unlawful. If the Superiour holds his Peace, the Inferiour must do the former, and forbear the latter; so as the Superiour hath onely a proper power as to things indifferent. Take away this, and you leave him nothing.’ This is the strength of what we find said here and there in more words.

§. 2. In Answer to both which we say, 1. That it is most cer­tain that God hath not set up Superiours for Nothings, there is in them a Power, and a great Power to Command, and Obedience to their Commands is a Duty, a great Duty. This is not Dis­puted betwixt us; now to open wherein the Power of the Magi­strate lyes, we say, 1. That the Magistrate being as a God to us, and God's Vice-gerents, his first and great work unquestionably lyeth in seeing that the Commands of God be fulfilled, both his Moral Laws, and his Positive Laws about Divine Worship; and this alone (if his Power were no more) were not onely a Noble Employment, but full, and sufficient to employ the Head and Hands of any Mortal Man in any large Jurisdiction.

2. Whereas as to the Government of Political Bodies, and Matters meerly Circumstantial concerning the Worship of God, which are yet necessary to the upholding of Polities, and the ad­ministration of Justice in them; and without which, in Matters of Religion, the Worship of God either could not at all be per­formed, or at least, not so performed, but that in the Eye of Com­mon Sense and Reason it would be Judged by the most,. disorder­ly and indecently performed. In these things Gods Word hath onely generally determined, and the Superiour hath a confessed Power in these things (which even the highest Non-Conformists will grant) to make particular Laws in these things; and indeed rightly considered, these are but Laws in things necessary, though not Originally, yet upon supposition of the general Commands of Scripture. 'Tis one thing to Create Order and Decency, ano­ther thing to Command that things be done in the Church De­cently and in Order. The Decency and Order of things in Religi­on neither must nor can arise but from the Law of Nature, the Common sense of Christians, and the particular guise and Custom of places. Now, the Magistrate hath an undoubted Power to Command Circumstantials of Order and Decency, that is, which are truly so, antecedent to his Command. Is this no Power, and proper to him, think we?

[Page 66]3. We say, that if the Superiour Judgeth a thing thus neces­sary in pursuit of the general Rules of Gods Word, if they in­deed be so, the Inferiour is bound in Conscience, to do, or to omit them. If the Superiour onely Judgeth them so, it is his Duty to Command them. If the Inferiour cannot Judge so of them, if he Judgeth them in their Circumstances, but such as he may do, or Omit, he is bound to do them, or omit them (according to the Nature of the Superiours Precept.) But if the Inferi­our Judgeth them unlawful for him to do, though this his Judg­ment be formed but from probable Arguments (that is, such as to him so appear) not from indubitably certain Arguments; he cannot Obey, but is bound patiently to submit to the penalty im­posed upon him for Disobedience. So that these Objections are perfectly vain, and no incumbrances at all upon our Proposition.

§. 3. But we say, It is one thing for us to allow a Power in Superiours to determine us, where both we and they agree the thing in its own Nature, and cloathed with such Circumstances, of a middle and indifferent Nature; And quite another thing for us, (and that as to the things of God too) and such things, where for doing, or not doing, the danger of sin and Eternal Damnation lyeth, to make him Our Judge what is, and what is not Indifferent. It is impossible any intelligent Soul should allow the latter to his Superiour without also making him a Judge both of Good and Evil. For Indifferency being a middle betwixt those two extremes, there's no possibility of his being a Judge of it without also determining concerning the extremes. And if we could allow this, we should as to private Christians use see little need of the Scriptures, for the Superiour must Interpret them too, or all will come to nothing.

§. 4. Nay, we further say, that there may be some stresses of Providence, as to which the being of Polities, and the Preservation of Justice lyes at stake, where some things may be Lawful which in Ordinary Cases God will not allow. You know (saith our Saviour) what David did when he was an hungry, how he did eat the Shew-bread, which was not Lawful for any (in Ordinary Cases) to eat, but for the Priests onely. It was a Case of real Necessity to save his Life: It would have been a sin, both in Da­vid, upon a lighter pretence to have done it, and for the Priest to have suffered it.

[Page 67]§. 5. We have been the more willing to search this business to the bottom, because of that andacious Liberty, which some have taken, either openly to assert, or cunningly to insinuate the con­trary; a thing (undoubtedly) of as i [...]l a tendency as can well be imagined, leading directly to a Blind Obedience, one of the Capital Errors of the Church of Rome, and possibly a more sot­tish, and brutish Errour, than any other which they have, as devesting Man of his Humane Nature, and that which is the Mo­ther of most other of their abominable Doctrines, any absurdi­ties, as Naturally following that first, as the Thread follows the Needle: If it can be supposed, that there may be a Superiour absurd in his Sentiments or Practice; which that it may be, we need no other Evidence than what the Infallible Choyce it self hath given the wiser part of the World often enough Evidence of.

§. 6. We have been amazed to Observe how tenderly Modern Writers have touched this Question. Mr. Hooker indeed, as we have before said, is peremptory enough against us, to that degree as we find none of his Posterity in that thing approving his saying. The Author of the Pulpit Conceptions, Popular decep­tions, fairly skips it over, telling us what should be done by us, if we scruple our Obedience; but not a word what we should do, if we from probable Arguments judge the thing unlawful. Freeman (as we shewed before) is peremptory enough beyond all Reason or Religion. But another, writing a Book professed­ly about Tenderness of Conscience, when he comes to Answer the Case of Doubting, speaks almost to every thing else, but (prudently) leaves out this Case. Others tell us, that if the thing Commanded be apparently, demonstratively, indisputably evil, if it tends to debauch us in our Sentiments concerning the God-head, &c. we must not Obey; but if otherwise, either they say nothing, or else tell us we ought to Obey. The Reve­rend Bishop Sanderson, and Mr. Fulwood, are the onely two Mo­dern Divines that we have met with, daring to state the Case di­stinctly, and speaking to it in the Dialect of Protestants. But others, in their Writings, either shew little of Divines, stating the Case falsly, and not speaking ad idem. Or little of Prote­stants, saying that which no Protestant Divines ever durst say be­fore them.

§. 6. And from hence to every considerate Reader, will be [Page 62] [...] [Page 63] [...] [Page 64] [...] [Page 65] [...] [Page 66] [...] [Page 67] [...] [Page 68]inevitably concluded the Reasonableness, if not the Necessity of an Indulgence from all Superiours, who will think themselves under any Obligation to the Royal Law of Love. For as that Law will Oblige them not to suffer sin in their Inferiours, Lev. 19.17. So. it will also Oblige them not to lay a stumbling block before them that are weak, by which they both sin against Christ, 1 Cor. 8.9, 10, 11, 12, 13. and do not walk Charitably, Rom. 14.15. Nor yet to make them to suffer, because they dare not sin: For to Act against their Conscience (though but Opining) is sin. For all this Suffering must unquestionably be a Suffering for Righte­ousness sake, for to depart from Iniquity is unquestionably a piece of Righteousness. Hence though the Superiour upon the first Account be bound to Oblige his Inferiours by his Civil San­ction, to do all that which the Law of God hath made necessary for them to do, and to forbear what the same Law hath forbid­den, otherwise he should suffer sin upon them: Yet if he thinks fit to Command other things in Religion, which (possibly) him­self, and some of his Inferiours Judge not sinful, and tendent to some State or Decency, but the want of them makes not the Ser­vite indecent or disorderly, according to any Light or Law of Nature, or the general guise and Custom of the place; and ma­ny other his Inferiours Judge so far from tendency to Order and Decency, that they from Arguments, which to them appear ve­ry probable, judge them sinful and unlawful, and so capable of no such Notion, how he can possibly exact an Obedience to any such Commands, without

1. Either putting his Inferiours upon sin, and continual distur­bance of their Consciences.

2. Or making them Sufferers, because they dare not sin against God; which is (as we said before) a species (at least) of Suf­fering for Righteousness-sake. We must confess our selves (which possibly is our weakness) not Divines sufficient to understand, and should thank any one that could inform us. Now, betwixt these there lyeth no Medium, but a Gracious Indulgence, the ve­ry Remedy, which His Most Excellent Majesty hath suited to this fore Evil.

§. 7. And here we would have finished our Discourse, but for a late Book, called, The Cases of Scandal and Persecution, which yet hath no such depths in it, as to ask us long time to sound. [Page 69]The Author spends one part of his Book, in perswading us to be­lieve what we know none ever doubted, viz. That in Case the thing Commanded us be by us Judged Lawful (for that he beggs all along) we ought not to forbear doing it, because some of our Brethren would be grieved and teachy at it, provided our doing of it laid no stumbling-block before them, to give them Occasion to sin against God. We would fain know what Non-Conformist ever said the contrary. Thus Men Exercise themselves in Com­bates with fancied Enemies, for really the Doctor hath none in this Case that ever we heard of. The Second Part of his Book comes nearer what we last said, and notwithstanding all he saith, we do think, That it is at least a Mute Case (as they say in Law) Whether the forcing any to Suffer, because he cannot, or dare not Act contrary to the Opinion of his Conscience, guided by Argu­ments, which to him appear probable, be not Persecuting. To pass by his other impertinencies, allowing him to use a very true Method to try the issue, in fixing the Notion of Persecution, we there joyn Issue with him.

§. 8. In his 44 p. he tells us, Persecution is an Inflicting of outward temporal Evils for the Exercise of true Religion. The Genus we agree, and think he might have shortned the Descrip­tion by leaving out Outward and Temporal, because no Man can Inflict any other Evils upon his Brother. The difference he makes to lye in those words [For the Exercise of the True Religion.] But why might not our Saviours terms have been taken, for Righteousness sake? Yet if Religion be taken in the larger Noti­on of it, for doing any part of our Duty, in which we bounden to towards God, we cannot fault the Description; but this De­scription makes but the Major Proposition. The Minor must be this, [But the Outward Temporal Evils.] Imprisonments, De­privation of Ecclesiastical preferments, pecuniary mulcts, Slan­derings, Revilings, Reproachful speeches.] Inflicted upon Non-Conformists are not inflicted upon them, for doing any part, of that Duty, wherein they are bounden to God. There are very many Non-Conformists will put the Doctor to prove this, and tell him, It is a piece of Righteousness, a part of true Religion, and every Mans bounden Duty toward God, not to Act contrary to what his Conscience, Gods Vice-gerent, in him, tells him, and that upon Ar­guments which appear very probable to him, is Lawful. And in [Page 70]Matters of Gods Worship also to do According to what his Con­science tells him is the Will of God he should do. And we take Notice too of an Excellent passage in the Doctors Book, p. 45. l. ult & penult.

‘That God hath as much Right to appoint the way of his Wor­ship, as to be Worshipped.’ A passage we are so much in Love with, that it is one of our greatest Topicks to prove many things Commanded us probably unlawful. Prayer is Worship: Pray­ing by Forms, or by words formed first in our own Hearts, is a way of Worship. Now, say we, God hath as much right to pre­scribe the way as the Worship, and hath done it. As every Man hath received the gift, saith the Apostle, so let him Minister, 1. Pet. 4.10. Praying and Preaching are Worship. The doing these Acts in a peculiar Habit appropriated to these Actions, is a way of Worship; And God (saith the Doctor) hath as much right to appoint the way of his Worship, as the Worship. The like might be said of the other Ceremonies.

§. 9. But suppose we allow the Doctors Description of Per­section. The next Question is, how we shall know what is True Religion: Who shall be the Judge? Shall the Scriptures ? But who shall Interpret the Scriptures as to a Christians private Pra­ctice? Shall the Superiours? Then certainly there was never any Persecution in the World: For it were very uncharitable to presume, that any Superiour should punish another for the Exer­cise of what himself owned to be the true Religion. We have more Charity for Bonner himself. Shall the Inferiour be Judge what is true Religion? Then I fear the Doctor will be cast; many of them will say, they are mischievously, and violently Prosecuted, Imprisoned, Punished, Reviled, for what they Judge the Exer­cise of the True Religion.

§. 10. The upshot of this Discourse is, that who they be, who are truly guilty of Persecuting, will not be determined till the Day of Judgment, when God shall determine, which was the True Religion; and whether Men truly ran those hazards, because they were afraid of sinning against God. In the mean time, as to us, he is Persecuted, who can truly say, That he suf­fers for doing any thing, which he thinks he should sin against God if he did not do; and for forbearing any thing, which he truly [...]n [...]s he should sin against God if he should do. And we believe, [Page 71]that those who thus Suffer, though another day they shall be ad­judged by God to have been in a mistake, and so not Persecuted, yet as to what they have done, will be Judged guilty of no more than an Humane Infirmity.

§.11. We have so much Charity, as to believe, that that Popish Priest who suffers according to the Law, for Seducing: If he can truly say, that he did believe, Gods Word Obliged him to do what he did, may properly enough say he is Persecuted; but we also believe, that God will not Judge so another day, and that the Magistrate doth but his Duty; because by Gods Law none ought to be endured that entice others to Idolatry. But whoso makes another to Suffer because he durst not sin against God, Acting contrary to what his Conscience judgeth unlawful from probable Arguments, we believe far less excusable, because there's no necessity upon him to lay any such Commands, and en­force them by any such penalties. But there does lye a necessity of suffering in this Case upon the Inferiour to avoid sinning a­gainst his Conscience: whether his Conscience be in the right or in the wrong, will be determined another day. In the mean time he should sin, if he should not hearken to it; to avoid which, he suffers, which is so far as he can possibly Judge to suffer for Righteousness sake. After the saying of which we think little more need be said to the Doctor's Book.

§. 12. To Conclude our Discourse upon this Question, we have observed in all those almost who have wrote for Conformity, great insisting upon the Authority of former, and present Church­es, and the Testimonies of many Divines, dead, or alive; some of which they tell us were Old Non-Conformists. And this hath been the general Method of all late Writers almost, to pass over all our, and our Fore-Fathers Arguments, and in Order to make us as odi­ous to the World, as they would have us; to represent us as singu­lar, and differing from the Church in all Ages, yea, from our selves, and our Fore-Fathers, &c. To what better purpose than this, these in artificial Arguments are used we cannot tell, unless those that bring them have a little tincture of the Jesuites Doctrine we before shewed at large;

That extrinsick Arguments may make an Action appear probably Lawful; though at the same time from intrinsick Arguments, we Judge it probably unlawful.

[Page 72]A Pill so nauseous, so brutish, as it is impossible we should swallow it, till we have vomited up our rational Souls. And 'tis the more odious to us because it is of such affinity to the detesta­ble Blind Obedience of the Church of Rome. But to defeat these men of any hopes of prevailing by such Mediums, we will shortly enquire into another Question, though not the same, yet of great. Cognation with this which we have now so largely discussed.

CHAP. VI. Second Quest. Whether it be Naturally possible for any Person in a Practical Proposition to judge that part probably Lawful from extrinsick. Arguments; the contrary to which he at the same time Judgeth probably unlawful from intrinsick Arguments. The Question opened. The Opinions of Vasquez, Sanchez. The Negative part of the Question maintained, because this is contrary to the Principles of a Rational Soul. The Conclusion.

§. 1. WE have had Occasions once and again to hint the known distinction between Speculative and Pra­ctical Propositions: Divines call those Propositions Speculative, whose use and advantage is onely terminated in Speculation and Knowledge, and from whence nothing in Practice is Directed. They call those Practical, whose end is the guidance and directi­on of the Practice. But Speculative Propositions must be again distinguished into such. 1. From which no Obligation ariseth to the Exercise of any rational Act of ours: Such as these. That there was such a City as Troy, such a King of France, as Pipin, &c. with a thousand such like. 2. Such, the Truth of which infer­reth the performance of some Rational Action of ours, and such as is our Duty towards God, as these. That the Scriptures are the Word of God .That Christ is the Eternally existent Son of God. But our Question relates to none of these, but to such Proposi­tions onely where the Question is, Whether it be Lawful for me to do this or that, or no: This is that we mean by a Practical Pro­position.

§. 2. In our Discourse upon the former Question we have also [Page 73]often hinted, what we mean by Extrinsecal, and Intrinscal, Ar­guments. The singular Judgment of every intelligent Person's Conscience is formed from some Arguments, drawn either from Principles of Reason, or Propositions of Scripture. These Ar­guments are either from plain letter of Scripture, or Principles of Reason accounted Infallible, which fix the Conscience. Or else they are drawn from Logical Topicks, and called Dialectick Ar­guments, or Probable: For Optimus Philosophus nondum nascitur. We say, These probable Arguments are again either Intrinsecal, called Artificial Arguments by the Logicians, fetched from the Causes, Effects, Consequents, Adjuncts, or other Affections of the Subject or predicate in the Question. 2. Such as are meerly Extrinsick. Logicians call them In-artificial, because every Dunce may bring them, they have no Art at all in them. Divines call them Extrinsecal, because they are Forreign to the in ward parts of the Question, and the Soul that brings them. These are such as are fetched from Authority and Testimony of others; Testimo­nies of Fathers, School-men, former, or Modern Divines, &c. Now, it is demonstratively Truth, That it is possible, that a soul should have a great many Arguments appearing to it very proba­ble, and such as it cannot Answer, and scarcely believes that any other can, to prove a thing unlawful; and at the same time meet with many Testimonies and sayings of Fathers, Councils, School-men, Casuists, Ancienter, or more Modern Divines, speaking the thing Lawful. It is the Case of the Non-Conformists this day. Though they meet not with any Fathers, Councils, &c. who judge the things Lawful, which they do judge unlawful; yet ma­ny present Divines they do meet with, yet they cannot but from Intrinsick, Dialectick Arguments think the things utterly unlaw­ful.

§. 3. Now, the Question is, in this Case, what they shall do ? They do not deny but it is their Duty, upon the Testimonies of Superiours, and their Commands; or hearing the Judgment of so many Learned Men of another Mind, to examine again their own Arguments, and to try them to the utmost: But supposing at last (which is the Case) the things yet seem to them from very probable Arguments unlawful, what shall they do? They may (say the Jesuites) do such things, or not do them; For this is the Je­suites help against the abominable absurdity of Acting contrary to [Page 74]an Opining Conscience. They say, While it it but an Opinion, a Man may Opine both contradictory parts of the same Question; the one upon Intrinsick, the other upon Extrinsick Arguments; and al­though (as we shewed before) the Opinion which is formed upon Artificial, proper, intrinsick Arguments must needs be more probable; Yet they say, a man is not tyed up to magis and minus in the Case. It is ground enough (say they) for any man to act Conscientiously, if the thing appear any way probable, he is not bound to act accor­ding to that which he judgeth more probable. So that, say they, if a thing appear probably Lawful, by Extrinsick Arguments the Opinion of some Doctors, &c. we may do it, though at the same time we judge it never so unlawful from Intrinsick, Artificial Arguments, fetched from all the Topicks in Logick, and affecti­ons of the subject, and Praedictate of the Question.

§. 9. The Case is so weighty, and this Opinion so unmanly, and Brutish, that it is reasonable we should bring forth one or two, who shall vouch for themselves and their Brethren, that this is what they say and hold. Let Vasquez (a Man of no small repute amongst them) speak first, out of his Disput. in 12 ae. disput. 62. Cap. 3.n. 11.

‘Tertio Observandum est, eum qui habet assensum unius partis propositionis, per propria & intrinseca principia etiamsi assensus ille tantum sit probabilis, non posse habere assensum alterius pactis per intrinseca, & propria principia: bene tamen posse per externa principia existimari oppositam partem esse probabilem. v. plura ibid. & cap. 40. n. 15.’

Sanchez sings the same Song, Op. Moral. l. 1. cap. 9. n. 12. ‘Ʋltimum fundamentum est ut duas Opiniones ediametro sibi con­tradicentes idem intellectus judicet probabiles, aut aequè, aut alte­ram probabiliorem;’ he shews this is according to the Opinion of Azorius and Vasquez (before quoted.) And then goeth on, telling us, that he seeth no Reason, but the same Understanding may judge the contradictory parts of the same Proposition both probably true, or false; lawful, or unlawful; and that Experience proves it. But this is surely a Note above Ela, and a Riddle in Philosophy. The Jesuites being pinched with that obvious Ar­gument, That then the same Soul, and at the same time, and the same thing may assent to contradictions; and blow hot and cold, bless and curse, with the same breath: They think to avoid it by [Page 75]telling us, that the Understanding affirmeth neither part, we won­der how it should Opine then?

§. 10. This is a great point in Popery (Jesuitisme especially) and of no small gain to them, for by this mea [...] they can resolve Cases as they list, absolve Mens Consciences as they please, and Interpret the Law of God into a very pleasing consi [...]tency with the Lusts, and Passions of all Men: If it were admitted for true, it would open a wide door for Men to do what they listed, with­out any check or controul of Conscience. There being but few things in practice, which one Doctor or other, under one Circum­stance or other, hath not judged Lawful. There are few actions but are disputable, saith Mr. Freeman, in his Reasonableness of Divine Service, p. 33. And if one or more Doctors affirm it law­ful (say the Popish Casuists) the private Christian may assent to it as probably Lawful, though at the same time, from Artificial Intrinsick Arguments, formed in his own Breast, he judgeth it pro­bably unlawful. And we wish, some professing themselves Pro­testant Divines, did not cant after this Tune (though it may be they will not as the Papists) rest it upon the Opinion of one Do­ctor, but many Learned Men; if they did not a little linger after this, we cannot tell what means their constant choaking of us, with the bare Opinions of others contrary to ours, in which surely we are no further concerned, than as quickned by them to re-examine our own Intrinsecal Arguments more strictly.

§. 11. We must declare our selves in the Negative of this Question, and do affirm, ‘That it is Naturally impossible for a Rational Soul, in a practical proposition, to Judge that part from Extrinsecal in-artificial Arguments Probably Lawful, which, at the same time, from Intrinsecal artificial Arguments, formed in its own Breast, it judgeth Probably Ʋnlawful; and in this Judg­ment we are confirmed.’

§. 12. Because it is contrary to the innate Principles of a reasona­ble Soul. 1. We suppose every one will without difficulty grant it a Principle of a Reasonble Soul, To Conclude nothing but from Rational Foundations: Reason is a Power within us, Discour­sing Conclusions from Principles. It acknowledged there is a God, and that he hath revealed his will in those Books which we call The Holy Scriptures, and must acknowledge it the most reasonable thing imaginable, that he should be acknowledged true in his word. [Page 76]Hence it concludes many Propositions of Faith, upon the bare Authority of God revealing them, and exerciseth it self no fur­ther, than to compare Spiritual things with Spiritual. But having not that Evidence for other things, it maketh use of inbred Noti­ons, and from those Principles raiseth Conclusions. Now, let us consider from what Principle it is possible; that Reason should in­fer such a Conclusion as this.

That is probably Lawful for me to do, which such or such Divines (be they more or fewer, more or less Learned) think is Lawful; or which Superiours require (under that Notion) notwithstanding any Artificial, Intrinsick Arguments which make my own Conscience Judge it very probably unlawful.

It must be this: Those Doctors, or those Superiours, know bet­ter than I. Doth Reason in a man allow any such conclusion? Modesty indeed upon such an Account, may make a reasonable Soul Jealous, and Suspitious, and to issue out a Writ for a better enquiry upon its Arguments, but it is impossible that it should rest in such a Conclusion to guide its Practice, where the hazard of the Eternal Felicity of a Soul is concerned. Reason speaketh in the Language of Job to his Friends, Job 12.3. I have Ʋnderstand­ing as well as you; and be it what it will, gradually compared with all the Doctors reason, it is the Candle of the Lord set up in my Soul, according to the Light of which I must walk. Or in the words of Elihu, Job 32.8. There is a Spirit in Man, and the Inspiration of the Almighty gives him Ʋnderstanding: Reason saith, Bring forth your strong arguments, and I will answer them; or hear mine, and do you answer me.

§. 13. Besides, Reason saith, If this were belonging to all Doctors, or all Superiours, that Wisdom (as Job saith) must dye with them, how is it they are not agreed amongst themselves? Such, and such are on my side; if it doth not agree to all Superiours, and all Doctors, how shall I be assured, that it more agrees to those on the adverse side, than to those on my fide; to Dr. Vasquez more than to Pope Adrian?

S. 14 Further, (saith Reason) do not know and see, that there are many Doctores, who are not Docti, and that many Learned men in all Ages have been in Factions? doth not Dr. Vasquez himself tell me, in 12. disp. 62. Cap. 4. That he cannot deny but a whole rout of Doctors may embrace an Opinion without any Reason, against [Page 77]whom (saith he) another Doctor of great Authority may bring in­to the Schools, an Opinion maturely deliberated? Vasquez need not be Credited, if we did not upon Experience find daily, that not one of many Doctors examines things, but follows some Leader, as diligently as Sheep do one another over an Hedge; that many either understand not the true Question, about which they will be Writing in this Age, or of choice mistake it, & write far more pas­sion than Divinity, or Reason, which made Vasquez, & some others of his Brethren deliver their Opinion, That a Learned Man may act according to his own Opinion, though contrary to the Opinions of other Doctors.

§.15. Reason tells a Man, that Reason is not entailed to the Relation of a Superiour, or the Degree of a Doctor. Animae rati­onales sunt aequales in perfectione Substantiali, and Superiority or Doctorship make no difference. Experience teacheth us, that improvement by Study, makes not a difference, as to the Exercise of Reason, between all Superiours and Inferiours; nor between all those who are Doctors and no Doctors. It remaineth there­fore, that the particular Reason of every Soul must stand up in de­fence of it self, especially in matters of Practice, as to which Eternal Salvation or Damnation are concerned; so as it is not Naturally possible, that a Reasonable Soul should from Forreign Authority conclude a thing probably Lawful, which from its own Rational conclusions it judgeth probably Ʋnlawful.

§. 16, But further yet, certainly it is repugnant to the connate Principles of Reasonable Souls, to assert contraries, both at the same time to be true, because it is of the Nature of contraries to destroy one another. Now, the Understanding which shall thus assert, must at the same time speak these two things, which are manifest contradictions: This is Lawful. This is not Lawful. I think and Judge it Lawful, because A, B, C, D, &c. say so. I think it Ʋnlawful, because my own Reason, comparing things Spiritual with Spiritual, or concluding from confessed Principles, tells me it is so. Must not this be a very odd Soul, that can Discourse after this rate? Vasquez was aware of this, and thought to avoid it, by denying these two Propositions to be Contradictory, viz. 1. This is probably Lawful. 2. This is probably unlawful. But he deludeth, and his fallacy lyes in the word probably, which in the Question signifieth not the Affection of the proposition, but the Nature of [Page 78]the Arguments, or Complexion of the Conscience. The Under­standing (let the Jesuite say what he will) must say, This is Law­ful, and This is unlawful, of the same thing, and at the same time' and these are perfect contradictions. The Notion of Probable re­ferreth to the Understanding, not to the Nature of the Opinion, and must in the Question be Interpreted by Opinor, or Credo, or some such like word; not by probari potest (which is the Jesuites cheat) that is, something may be said, in Argument to prove this thing Lawful, and something may also be said to prove it unlawful. These two Propositions are not indeed Contradictions; but to say, I think this Lawful, and at the same time to say, I also think this is unlawful, Can be no Language of any Mans Soul, till the Phi­listines have got it, and put out its Eyes, on purpose to make them­selves sport with it.

§. 11. Finally, Is it not the Principle of a Reasonable Soul, to embrace that which it Judgeth Best, either upon the Account of Truth or Righteousness? Now, where both parts of a Proposi­tion appear but probable. i. e. Such as something in Argument may be said for either; but one (in appearance to the particular Soul) far more probable, both as to Truth and Righteousness, than the other. Is it not contrary to its principles to own and embrace that which it Judgeth less true in it self, and consequently, less Righteous to be done? even the Popish School-men and Casuists will confess our own Opinion to be more probable, though in­deed they most absurdly say, That a man is not bound to follow that which probably is more True and Righteous, (so great a Power hath Corrupt Interest) we conclude therefore,

‘That it being Naturally impossible for a Reasonable Soul to act Reasonably contrary to Naturally Rational Principles, it is also na­turally impossible for it to Judge at the same time, the same thing, probably Lawful, from in-artificial and Extrinsick Arguments, which it Judgeth probably, and more probably unlawful from Artificial intrinsick Arguments.’

§. 12. By this time, we hope we have gained one Post (and that not inconsiderable) which we doubt not to make good against all the Attaques of Popish, or Protestant Divines, but such as are onely made from-their Bitter words, which wound onely (by re­coiling) the malitious hearts of those that cast them: We have shewen that there is (as Job saith) a Spirit in every Man, and the [Page 79]Almighty hath given to every one, a peculiar practick Ʋnderstan­ding, which mu [...]t to him be Gods Interpreter, and the proximate Rule and Guide of all his Actions; which particular Conscience acknowledgeth God onely as its immediate Superiour, and where the Eternal welfare of the soul is concerned in the Action, can neither bow down to the New Erected Idol of the Publick Con­science, and much less, to the private Consciences and Judgments of any, to do things which they Judge Lawful, meerly because They say they are Lawful, and so will the Practice of them as law­ful, because their Superiours, or such Doctors say so; when as it judgeth the thing wicked and unlawful, from Arguments, which though it cannot call Demonstrative, and indubitable, yet it self cannot Answer, nor see Answered by any other, so as it can ac­quiesce in the Answer as sufficient, and therefore seem to it very probably concluding the thing unlawful. We have (as we hope) also gained this. That it is Naturally impossible for a reasonable Soul, at the same time, to Judge the same thing Lawful, from in­artificial extrinsick Arguments; which from intrinsick Arguments formed within it self, or accepted by it, though formed by others, it Judgeth probably unlawful.

§. 13. It is therefore the business of those who think themselves conc [...]rned to make all the World in Practice uniform, even to a Letter and a Syllable, and a rite, and posture, not to tell them, that in case the thing be disputable, or doubtful, or not apparently and demonstratively evil, it is their Duty, if Commanded, to do it. For this we have shewed to be the very Foundation of Popery, and a perfect Innovation in Protestant Doctrine, and can be no other than a Blind Obedience. But (as we said before) they will be concer­ned to call to Dissenters for their Arguments, upon the probabi­lity of which to them, the things required seem to them unlawful; and (if they can) to destroy that appearance which they have of probability, which done, they will attain their end, and not before.

§. 14. The things are many which are required of us, in Order to our having a station in the publick Ministry of England, some of which are questioned by some, others of them by others; in short, from them these Questions arise.

• 1. Whether the Non-Conformists have not probable Arguments to induce their Consciences to judge it unlawful to perform their Mi­nisterial Office in publick Prayer, by the prescribed forms of other Men.
• [Page 80]2. Whether they have not probable Arguments to judge it unlaw­ful, to Minister before the Lord in a Surplis, or any Habit peculiar­ly appropriated to the Worship of God, to sign with the sign of the cross in Baptism, and to Kneel in the Act of Receiving the Lords Supper.
• 3. Whether those of them who have been solemnly set apart to the Ministry by Fasting and Prayer, and laying on of hands of a Pres­bytery, can without sin, submit to a re-ordination by Bishops, and there be not, at least, very probable Arguments to the contrary.
• 4. Whether they have not probable Arguments to induce them to judge it unlawful for them to subscribe, That the Oath, commonly cal­led, The Solemn League and Covenant, obligeth neither them nor any others, and that it is in it self an unlawful Oath.
• 5. Whether they have not probable Arguments to induce them to judge it unlawful for them to declare and subscribe, That they do assent and consent to all and every thing, or to the use of all and every thing contained in the Common-Prayer.
• 6. Whether they have not probable Arguments to induce them to judge it unlawful for them to subscribe the Second and Third Ar­ticle in the 36 Canon.
• 7. Whether they have not probable Arguments to induce them to judge it unlawful to take the Oath, Ordinarily called, the Oath of Canonical Obedience.

Those who know any thing of the State of Ecclesiastical affairs in England this day, know, that those who will conform, must do all these things; and the Non-Conformists are so far from judging all these things Lawful, that they think they have very probable Arguments, why (many of them at least) cannot judge any one of them Lawful; and while they so judge, act they cannot contra­ry to the Opinion of their own Consciences, as we have before proved.

§. 15. Neither do they desire to talk of Arguments onely in Justification of their own Sullenness, or Peevishness, as they are maliciously represented by some Modern Doctors (far better at Reviling than Disputing.) Their Arguments, in the first Case, are many of them in Print, as in Mr. Cotton's Discourse against Set-forms (many years since Printed, but that we know of, never Answered) as also in Mr. Calderwood's Altare Damas. never Answered neither, and in divers other Books. In the Second Case, their Arguments never yet Answered, are to be found, In [Page 81]Mr. Bradshaw's Discourses about things Indifferent, and about Worship and Cere­monies. In Dr. Ames his Irish Suit against the Ceremonies. In Mr. Calderwood's Altare Damasceum. In Mr. Gillespie's. Disp. against the Engl [...]sh Ceremonies. Upon the 3d. Case, divers of their Arguments are in R.A. his Letter to a Friend, Printed 1661. And The Serious Review of Presbyters Ordination by Bishops, Printed about the same time; and in all the other Cases, Our Brethren know, that Arguments are in Print to prove them unlawful, which never yet received any Answer. Besides, as there is a variety of Mediums, so the same sute not every Fancy, nor are all produced, and the work of them who should undertake to shew the Arguments of all not probable, would be almost infinite.

Sect. 16. What shall be done in this Case by those Superiours who will be­lieve themselves, as well as their Inferiours, obliged, recording to the Apostles Precept, To Walk Charitably, not laying a stumbling-block, before others, nor doing, as much as in them lyeth, to destroy poor Souls, for whom Christ dyed. We say, what can be done by such Superiours in these Cases? unless this: Either that in the things of God, they be very tender, and enjoyn no such things, as any considerable Number of their Inferiours thus Judge un­lawful, (at least, if they Judge them not by God Commanded to be done, or to be avoided,) Or if they Judge it expedient to Command some other things for Splendor, or (as they Judge) Decency which the Inseriours cannot Judge Lawful; Indulge them, who so cannot Judge of them, as themselves do, but verily believing them, from Arguments which appear to them probable, un­lawful for them to do; which is our present Case. For whiles the Superi­our in such things as these, insisteth upon his Authority, he unavoidably for­ceth them to sin against God, who so Judge them unlawful, yet through some Fear, or out of some Temptation of want, or the like, will adventure to do them. Now, no Soul can Justifie it self before God, in Commanding ano­ther to do what he knows would be sin to him, unless it would also be sin in him, not to Command or force him. And for others who dare Act, he for­ceth them to suffer, in which Case, because (their Consciences so Judging of the things) they should sin in doing of them, they must suffer to avoid sin­ning, which we are sure is, (in one sence at least) to suffer for Righteousness sake; and for what they Judge (to use Dr. Ashton's phrase) the Exercise of the True Religion; and all Sober Persons will so judge in the first sence: and whether it be so or no, The great day of the Lord must Evidence. Both which certainly are Rocks, which all Superiours ought to avoid, and all Wise Ma­sters, and Masters Mates, in the great Ships of Kingdoms, and Common­wealths will avoid, though some less advised Boat-swains, passionate Chaplains, or ignorant Mariners in those Ships, may clamour, to take the Advantage of the Wind of Passion and Revenge, which blows (they think) in these Cases fair for the Advantage of their private Lucre, but must certainly drive them, either upon this Seylla, or that Charibdis. Every considerate Superiour will Judge the price of Souls purchased with the Blood of him who was the Son of God, at another rate. Indeed if the Superiour judgeth the things which he Commandeth, in their own Nature necessary, and what it is the Will of God (antecedaneous to his Command) that all Men should do, whether in­deed they be so or no. He is also tyed to the Peace of his own Conscience; he is Gods Vice-gerent, he must Command, and inforce them; and the doing of what is plain to him, to be the great Creators Will, in his place, must be at­tended before the danger of any Creatures Souls; and this alone (where [Page 82]the Superiours Conscience is fixed in an Error) necessarily causeth a Perse­cution.

Sect. 17. This appeareth to us so clear, both from Scripture, and the Concur­rent Judgment of all Protestant Divines, for a Mans not Acting contrary to the Opinion of his own Conscience; that we cannot be so Charitable, but we must think, that those Divines who indeed are Protestants, and are for the up­holding these impositions, and against any Indulgence to those that dissent because of them, and are Authors to Magistrates, to inforce the things by Penalties; are [...] Condemned by their own Consciences. For they cannot but know, that the Dissenters, thus Opining, must sin, should they do the things: and if they Suffer, they must Suffer that they might avoid sinning. And for the Interpretation of that, ‘What it is for a Superiour, not contrained in his own Conscience from the express revealed Will of God, to make his Inferiours Suffer, because they will not do what they cannot do, without running the hazard of their Souls by wilful sinning: We shall onely say, Let the Interpretation be to them that hate our King, and to the Enemies of all English Nobility or Gentry.’

Sect. 18. To Conclude then, this we Judge enough to demonstrate the exceeding Reasonableness, and great Religion of a Gracious Liberty; to which His most Sacred Majesty hath Declared his Willingness, and the Per­fecting of which hath once and again been under the Deliberation of the High and Honourable Assembly of Parliament: as to those, whose Suffering by it is obviated, because they cannot do what they Charitably believe their Superi­ours would not have willed them to do, had they not Judged them in them­selves Lawful; But yet themselves will not say are necessary (otherwise than as they are pleaded to be so made by their Command) but they who are their Inferiours, do bonâ fide and ex animo, Judge them Unlawful; and that from Arguments, which they will not call necessary, indubitable, and de­monstrative (for they confess themselves not Infallible) but which appear to them very highly probable, such as they cannot Answer, nor find Answered by others, so as to give them any Satisfaction.