AN ANSWER TO A BOOK INTITLED, Tractatus Theologico Politicus.

LONDON: Printed for Charles Brome, at the Gun, at the West End of St. Pauls. 1697.

To the Right Honourable, Charles Earl of Winchelsea, Viscount Maidstone, Baron Fitz-Herbert of Eastwell, &c.

My Lord,

THIS Treatise be­ing by me design'd, for the Vindication of Reveal'd Religion, against those Deistical and Sceptical Notions which are too fre­quent in this Age, had there been no singular obligations to induce me, yet cou'd I not [Page] have found a more proper Pa­tron than your Lordship; whom all must acknowledge to be a Favourer and Prote­ctor of Religion, Virtue, and whatsoever is Praise-worthy a­mongst men. I am very sensi­ble, that my small Station in the Church, might very well have excus'd me, from engag­ing in an argument which may justly require a Person of more Dignity, Learning, and Lei­sure, but I am at the same time very well satisfy'd, that your Lordship and all good men will not expect much, where but little is given; and therefore in the same plainness [Page] and sincerity wherein I at first wrote it, I presume to dedicate it to your Lordship, as a small token, how much, I am,

Your Lordship's most Humble, and Obliged Servant, Matthias Earbery.

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.

Courteous Reader,

THough I am not of the Opini­on, That whosoever writes a Book, ought to write a Preface (for some are so good that they need none, and some so bad that they don't deserve one) yet I think my self to lye under an obligation, to [Page] give the World an Account of those Reasons, which induced me to An­swer a Book, which if it had its due deserts, ought to be confined to silence and darkness for ever. 1. I might here alledge in the first Place, that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, has not as yet the hon­our, to receive an intire confutati­on, from any one Learned Hand, that I know in Europe. Bishop Boyl in his little Body of Divinity, and almost all our Moderns, who have wrote in Vindication of the Scrip­tures, have taken notice of Divers of its dangerous positions, as they lye scattering up and down, in al­most every page of it, from whence I might have leave to conclude, that if those Learned men did think, that it was necessary to Answer the chief Objections, against the Autho­rity of the Scriptures one by one; a Collective Answer to the whole Book, [Page] would be more satisfactory to the world, and more beneficial to the publick Good. And therefore I was not induced to undertake this task, because I thought none could do it better, but because none before me had began so useful a work. I consider'd also in the se­cond place, that most who have wrote upon this Subject, have either done it in such a Philosophical manner, as is not easily intelligible by the Vulgar, or have proceeded against him, and his Party, by such Philolo­gical Arguments, as tho very Lear­ned, yet at most are but Conjectural, and therefore never can convince a stubborn Sceptist, tho they are very pleasing to Ingenious Men. Now tho this way of Writing, is very tak­ing, whilst the Argument is only toss'd too and fro amongst Learned Men, yet it is not sufficient, when such Deistical Principles begin to be Popular, and seize upon the minds [Page] of those, who though they want Reason, yet stand in need of no Obstinacy to defend the same. And therefore since this Book has, as I am informed, received lately some im­pressions in our own Language; I thought it might not be amiss to ad­minister the antidote, in the same vehicle, in which the Party has pre­sented the Poyson; and waving all Conjectural Arguments that are drawn from humane Authority, or whose force depends upon the knowledge of Books, or are too remote from com­mon Sense, to be understood by all Men; I have laid down chiefly such Principles, as all may under­stand, and all who understand them must needs admit to be true: And I hope that it will be apparent from thence, That they who Renounce their Religion, into which they are Baptized, must Renounce their Rea­son too, which they boast to be [Page] their only guide. Nor am I igno­rant, that the Author of this Book, was very well versed (pardon so favourable an expression) in the Writings of Moses and the Prophets; understood the Original Language, and had made a diligent search, to find all weak places, wherein he might Assault and Ruine the im­pregnable Fortress of Reveal'd Re­ligion. Mr. Hobbs had another way of trifling with those Books of Scrip­ture, and wresting some particular places to his odd Opinions: But this Author begins at the very Root and Foundation, by taking away all Divine Authority, from Prophecy, Miracles, or Inspiration, and making all the sacred Pen-men, to be no o­ther than either Mad-men, or Impo­stors. Now tho such sentiments, ought rather to be punished by the Judge, than refuted by the Divine, yet since too much liberty has relax­ed [Page] the Reins, both of Civil and Ecclesiastick Power, it is necessary that such Weapons should be used, as are therefore left us, because they could not easily be taken away. And I thought it would be at least some punishment, as it were, to the very Sbades and Manes of this Au­thor, to shew the world, that he, who so long has found a place in the Libraries and Hands of very Learned Men, does scarce for his stupidity, and trifling way of arguing, merit to obtain a place amongst the lowest forms of inferiour Animals: And I am sure if he could say no­thing to the purpose against Re­veal'd Religion, his little Disciples of the Town, can say a great deal less. But indeed the greatest motive of all, was the general disposition of men of all Degrees and Capacities in this Age, to ridicule our Religion as much as they can, nay, a great deal [Page] farther than their own Abilities will give them leave. How will some Little People vent a Jest upon the Bible, or argue against Moses, who never read a Chapter in it, with that Attention which is due to those Sacred Writ­ings; And never, even in their Younger Days, knew any thing beyond a Play or a Romance. I will not say, That too much Li­berty has given Opportunity to Deism, to grow up with those other Weeds that infest this Na­tion: Though if I should, it might be found to appear not very unlibe­ly to those who consider, that Mr. Hobbs's Leviathan, was brought forth in the like times of Liber­ty, and that this Author pleads for nothing more than Liberty to Exclude the Conscientious Fear of God out of the World: But certain it is, That the Ge­neral [Page] Corruption of Manners, Contempt of the Clergy, Bold Agitation of the Socinian Con­troversy, amongst the Greatest Men of the same Church, do render discourses of this Nature very necessary, to stop the Mouths of those Mockers, whom St. Pe­ter long since Prophecy'd should come in the last days, saying, Where is the promise of his Com­ing?

For since the Fathers fell asleep, All things continue as they were, from the beginning of the Crea­tion. I will add but one word more, and that is, To acquaint thee, that my design being only to Answer this Author, I have fol­lowed him exactly ( [...]) to the End of the 7th Chapter, and there left him, as being weary of going further after a false light to no purpose. For [Page] having consider'd all his Cavils, a­gainst the Prophets, Prophecy, Di­vine Law, Miracles, and Interpretation of Scripture, I thought it altogether needless to proceed any further.

And thus having given thee an Account of my design, I must leave the performance to thy favourable censure, and wish thee a hearty Fare­well.

AN ANSWER TO THE PREFACE OF Tractatus Theologico Politicus.

THere was not long since a young Gentleman, whose Name was Scepticus, who was pleased to retire from the noise of the Town, into the more refreshing Solitude of the healthful Country. He was of a fiery Genius, always eager after new things, and most pleased with those Thoughts, which he thought were farthest removed out of the Road of the Vulgar. He had began his Studies with a diligent Perusal of the Clas­sick Authors, from whom he received a deep [Page 2] impression of all those Beauties, both of Thought and of Expression, which are so visibly Eminent in those Antient Writers; from thence he proceeded to the Perusal of the Moral VVritings of the Antient Philosophers, but presently taking a dis­gust at Notions he thought too obvious and common, he flew from thence to the Atomical Philosophy, as it stands revived by Des Cartes, Gassendus and others. This pleased him for a season extreamly, because it gave no deference to Authority, but let loose the mind of man, to enjoy its primitive liberty of Thinking, and gave him vast Ideas of what mighty things might be done by mere Matter and Motion. But coming a­broad into the VVorld, and finding that Religion was the grand Theme of all Mens discourse, as well those who lived according to its Rules, as those who did not, he resolved to apply his mind to search into its abstrusest Misteries. And it happening at that time the Socinian Controversie was revived with a great deal of heat, he applied his mind very diligently to read all the So­cinian Authors. He was a long time much pleased with their VVritings, because they seemed to Interpret Scripture with an ayre and freedom, which he of all things most affected, and extoll▪d Human Reason to [Page 3] such a height, as was most agreeable to the Towring thoughts of his own Ambition. But finding at last, that those VVriters had an excellent knack of making the Scriptures speak whatsoever was agreeable to their own Sentiments; It bred in him an Admi­ration of the Ingenuity of those VVriters, but a contempt of the Scriptures them­selves, which he easily perceived, had no command over these Authors, whom he most admired. It was his misfortune at the same time to light upon the Tractatus Theologico Politicus, of Spinosa. This turn'd him a perfect Deist, he threw away his Bible, and set up this Book in the room of it. He now thought himself to be set at liberty above the slavish condition of those, who thought they were to be rul'd by their Bibles; and so fond was he of this Author, that every Summer, he carried him into the Fields with him in his hands, and each Winter he wore him in his Muff. There liv'd in the Neighbourhood an Old Grave Divine, who, in compassion to his Youth, did often pay this Young Man a Visit; and had often been laugh'd at by him in the Pulpit, for his Zeal for Religion. He came to him one day in his Garden, as he was reading in this Author, and seem'd altoge­ther ravish'd with the Entertainment; and [Page 4] being well acquainted with him, was thus familiarly pleased to accost him.

Logic. Sir, you seem mightily pleased; Pray what Book is that you hug, with so much Extacy and Rapture?

Scept. It is a Book so agreeable to my Reason, which ever since my Childhood, struggled fot Freedom from Popular Er­rors, that I embrace it as my Deliverer from the Darkness, under which I was bred, by ignorant Nurses, Tutors and Ma­sters; and as such I recommend it, to the perusal of all those, who rather desire to be Men betimes, than live long, till they are over-grown Children, with long Beards and shallow Brains, trembling at the Thoughts of Invisible Powers.

Logic. I suppose then you are feeding upon a Limb of Hobbs's Leviathan, and are just now returning Thanks (to the Lord knows what) for the plentiful Colla­tion.

Scept. Hobbs was indeed a very pretty Fellow, and not easily scared with Religi­ous Bugbears. But this Author deserves ra­ther to be esteemed his Tutor than his Scho­lar; He has such a Knack of Exposing all the Defects of those Books you call the Scriptures, with that Strength of Reason, and Solidity of Judgment, that apparent­ly [Page 5] shews it to be the Work of the Incom­parable Spinosa.

Logic. I suppose it is then his Tractatus Theologico Politicus. Pray what is the De­sign of that Celebrated Book?

Scept. That is best known by the Pre­face, See the Pref. of this Au­thor. where he first shews, That if Men lived always in Prosperity, and by their own good Conduct could become Masters of their most desired Events, they would never be en­tangled with the vanity of Superstition. But when they are driven into those Straits, from which they cannot expedite themselves, they are apt to believe any thing; the Mind is tumbled up and down between Hope and Fear, and not knowing where to rest on Earth, looks up for a support from Heaven; Implores the Deity with Tears disgraceful to any Woman; runs after Augurs, South-sayers, and Conjurers, and hunts for inspiration, in Fools and Mad-men. An example of which he gives us in Alexander, who had in any difficulty re­course to his Prophers, as Servants of his Gods, but in prosperity forgot both them and their Masters.

Logic. And what does he infer from hence?

Scept. That Men are prone to Superstiti­on by Fear only, and not by any Innate Sense of a Deity, as you Divines would make us believe.

Logic. But what if this Grand Supposi­tion, That Men are only Superstitious in Ad­versity, is altogether false, and to be refu­ted by Ten Thousand Instances, both Na­tional and Personal, Ancient and Modern? The Jews were never more superstitious, (if the Idolatrous Worship of the Sun, Moon and Stars, is Superstition) than in their Highest Prosperity: For then they became ashamed as it were of the Rites and Ceremonie: taught by Moses, and grew ambitious of ri­valling their Neighbouring Nations, in all the Gallantry and Pageantry of their super­stitious Worship. So that your admired Au­thor, by poring upon Quintus Curtius, for one single Instance, has quite forgot the nu­merous Examples to the contrary, which he might have found in almost every Leaf of the Bible, or Page of Livy's History.

Scept. Don't tell me of Jews; I believe we know little of them, but what some Modern Impostors have convey'd to us; it is apparent to me, that all the rest of Man­kind, are driven to superstition by Fear only.

Logic. Not so neither. Pray what Na­tion shew'd less Fear, and more Superstition than the Ancient Romans? And what Na­tion had ever more Victories, and more Al­tars than that Famous Monarchy? Who were ever more punctual in returning [Page 7] Thanks to their supposed Deities, than their Senate and Generals? And yet I am inclin'd to think, that they did not much fear their Enemies, when they returned Thanks to their Gods that they had beat 'em, and that it was rather a sense of Gratitude than of Fear, which was the Mother of that Pom­pous Devotion.

Scept. You talk of whole Nations by the Lump; can you give any Instance to the contrary in a single Person?

Log. Yes, Sir, that I can, without tumb­ling over any large Volumes of History: Nebuchadnezzar was a Fortunate Prince, and Great Conqueror; nor did I ever hear that he was very much a Coward; and yet he kept (see Dan. 2. 2.) several Nurseries of Ma­gicians, Astrologers and Sorcerers, to inter­pret Dreams, predict Futurities, and instruct his Court and People in the superstitious Cu­stoms of that Age and Nation.

Scept. But tho he was secure for the pre­sent, yet perhaps his fear of future Evils in­clin'd him to so much Superstition.

Log. What then do you think of his Gra­titude to Heaven, when he was returned to his Reason and his Throne (Dan. 4. 27.) and no Passion but Joy could find room in his Breast, was that also the Effect of Fear?

Scept. I am not in love with Scripture-Ex­amples: Let us have One out of some honest Pagan Author.

Log. Then your own admired Curtius, shall be my next Witness, even in that very Alexander, whom with equal front and ig­norance, cites to the contrary; for no man was ever more superstitious than that Gre­cian Conqueror, when he was in the midst of all his Triumphs, and as far from Fear as from Adversity; it was then that he fanci­ed himself to be the Son of Jupiter, an En­thusiasm not easy to be parallell'd, and im­possible to be exceeded by any) and the joy of this, joyned with his other good fortune, so far transported him, that it quite exclu­ded all that superstitious Fear, which his Southsayers endeavoured to raise, by forbid­ding his entrance into the fatal City of Ba­bylon.

Scept. Alexander, tho a Great Man, yet was but One Man: You cannot deny, that Fear, by its natural Energy, is the only cause of Superstition, nor can you assign a­ny other.

Log. Yes, Hope and Love are as certain Motives to what you call Superstition, as Fear or Sorrow. For have not Men Worshipped a Wrong Deity, or the True God the Wrong Way, (which is the Whole of Superstition) out of hopes of being made more Happy? Else how came the most Ancient Pagans to Deify the most benign of their Friends and Benefactors?

Scept. I hope you will at least grant, that Superstition arises from the Passions of Mankind, as may sufficiently be seen by its mutable Nature, and not from any Idea of a God, that is obvious to the Reason of all Men.

Log. All Religion (which your A—calls Superstition) does not take its Original from the Passions, but from the Reason of Man­kind. No man that is not perfectly mad, would Love, or Fear, or Worship a God, or any Invisible Power, unless he was first fully persuaded of the real Existence of such a Being or Beings, that can hurt, or else re­lieve him: For the Passions, tho never so vi­olent, could never hurry on a Man to Wor­ship a What he thought to be a Non-ens, that had no Existence but in his own Fancy. And this is the Reason, Why Beasts, that are capable of Hope, and Fear, and Love, (or at least something very like those Passions) are yet strangers to all manner of Religion, viz. because they have no praevious Notion of a Deity, to stir up those Passions in them: Otherwise an Hare, that flies from all things, would be as superstitious as the A­lexander the Great, who made all to fly be­fore him.

Scept. My Notion is, That it is the Fear of Mankind, vvorking violently upon the Understanding, that created all Notion of Invisible Povvers.

Log. And my Notion is, That it is the Reason of Mankind, that could not solve the Creation of the World, and the Origi­nal of Man, but by having Recourse to some First Cause, vvhich [...]xcited the Passions of Man to adore their C [...]tor, and those other Invisible Powers, vvhich they presumed did govern the World under him.

Scept. I do not speak of Natural, but that which you Divines do call Revealed Reli­gion. This is that Grand Cheat that the Priests in all Ages have dress'd up in Vari­ous Habits to please the Vulgar, who are al­ways of a mutable Temper, and to keep them in subjection to those Monarchs who want a Bridle to restrain unruly Subjects. But nothing is more fatal to a Commonwealth than too much of what you call Revealed Religion, which is the Mother of Seditions and Tumults, and a great Enemy to a free Trade. And truly, this (I hope I speak to a Friend) makes me very much wish we could see a Commonwealth in England, that we might enjoy the liberty of thinking and speaking of Religion as we pleas'd, which now is too much restrain'd. And my Au­thor tells you, That the Grand Design of his Book was to plead for such a liberty.

Log. I can see no Reason, why Religion should not be as necessary to support a Commonwealth as a Monarchy: For do not [Page 11] Commonwealths call in the help of Oaths, to bind their Subjects to Allegiance, as well as Monarchs? And may not Divisions about Religion, that cause Seditions, as well arise where this Liberty is, as where there is none? For suppose One Numerous Party, not contented with Liberty, will aim at Do­minion over the other, may not Civil Wars on this account as well rise up in a Common­wealth as in a Monarchy? In all the Species of Government, there is some Supreme Pow­er, either in One, or in a few, or in a great many, which (as the Apostle teaches) ought not to be resisted, not only for Wrath; but Con­science-sake: And if you take away Consci­ence from the Subject, and leave nothing but Wrath to restrain his Rebellion, there will be no One Form of Government in the World, that can be much more secure than another, from private Plots and Contrivances of re­volting Subjects. Besides, your Author seems to me to be very ignorant in History, when he would confine Religion to Monarchy, as Storks are said by Nature to be confin'd to a Commonwealth. For never did Superstition flourish more than in the City of Rome and others, whilst they were under a Republican Government; which gave occasion to S. Pauls Reproof to the Athenians; I perceive that in all things you are too superstitious. And yet the Subjects of both, were as glorious for Arms [Page 12] and Learning, as any of our Modern Repub­licks. I must confess, as for what you say, that Religion is an Enemy to Free Trade, is part­ly true, because it takes away from Trade, the freedom of lying, and cheating, and de­frauding, which some perhaps think essen­tial to it: But if you Gentlemen desire a Commonwealth, that you may barter away our Religion for a Free Trade, I say, pray God bless the Monarchy of England.

Scep. Prithee don't think we desire to take away your Religion: Your Reason ought to be your Only Religion, and that I am sure no man desires to take from you. My Au­thor's Design is only to take off those Preju­dices which the Vulgar entertain of the Scriptures, who despise Reason, and think that the Scriptures are the Only Oracles of Truth—In order to this my Author promises to demonstrate, That Prophecy, or Revelation, is nothing else but strength of Fancy. That the Ancient Prophets were only Men of a strong I­magination, and of a weak Reason. That the Divine Law is nothing else but fatal Necessity. That Miracles are only those Works of Nature of whose Cause we are ignorant. That the true way of interpreting those Books you call Scrip­tures, does shew that they are of Humane In­vention, and that every individual man has a Right and Authority to interpret Scripture as he pleases. And that—

Log. No farther, I beseech you; this is Task enough for one time. Let us therefore leave his Preface, and proceed to the Book it self, that we may see,

Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu.

Scep. With all my heart: And first let's begin with his Definition of Prophecy, and so orderly examine the strength of all his In­vincible Arguments.

Log. I am content; and also further pro­mise, That if he brings any Objections a­gainst Revealed Religion, which I cannot answer; I will then become of his Opinion, and subscribe to whatsoever you will have me.

Scep. It is as fair as I can wish it to be—Thus therefore he begins:

Explicit Praefatio, & incipit hoc loco pri­mum.

DE PROPHETIA.

A. PRophecy, or Revelation, is the certain Knowledge of something (or Things) revealed unto Men by God: How do you like this Definition?

The. Very well, provided the Author thinks as he speaks; and does not impose upon us (as his Custom is) by ambiguous Terms.

A. Well then: Mind the Consequence: All Natural Knowledge may properly be called Prophesie; for those things which we know by Natural Light, depend upon the sole knowledge of God, and his Eternal De­crees: But our Mob-Divines, that stand ga­zing with their Mouths open to Heaven, to catch Wonders, exclude Natural Reason from Prophecy; as if the one descended from Heaven, and the other sprang from Earth onely: And yet humane reason is Divine, [Page 15] in as much as the very faculties were by God Created; and it is only excelled by Prophesie in two things; First, that Pro­phesie extends its bounds further: And Secondly, it cannot be caused by the Laws of Nature.

The. And Pray Sir, what Charms can you see in such a Jargon of Discourse, as should draw your minds away one step from reveal'd Religion? For here is a very absurd confusion of Natural Knowledge, and that which proceeds from Divine Re­velation. No Man that apprehends the necessary Connexion of two Terms, was ever yet call'd a Prophet, by any but this A.—If Natural Knowledge might proper­ly be called Prophesy, then every Man that by his Natural Reason, could comprehend all the necessary Properties of a Triangle, or the undoubted certainty of Mathematical Axioms; or those self-evident Propositions, which are known by a bare perception of the Terms, would be a Prophet; and so not only () all the Lord's People would be Prophets, but all the Devil's People too; for as much as some Propositions, by the sole Light of Reason, are evident to all Man­kind.

A. You mistake my Author; for he tells you, page 2. That tho Natural Knowledge is Divine, yet the Teachers of it cannot be called [Page 16] Prophets: Because whatever they Teach, others (without the help of Faith or Credulity) may know as well as themselves.

T. This only shews with how much Confidence and Stupidity your Infallible Author contradicts himself; for p. 1. he as­serts, Ex traditâ definitione sequitur cogniti­onem naturalem Prophetiam vocari posse—What more evident, than that he may be called a Prophet, who is endowed with na­tural Knowledge, if natural Knowledge may be called Prophecy?

A. That is but a small mistake: His true meaning is, That Reason is not less certain and Divine than Revelation its self.

T. Natural Things are called Divine up­on a Threefold Account; as they are the Workmanship of God; and in this sense all things that have a real Subsistance, may be called Divine, as they are the Works of God: But the word (Divine) is not frequently u­sed in this signification, because it is too ge­neral, and comprehends so much, that it determines too little. Or, 2. Things are more frequently called Divine, that for their Excellence seem to have some resem­blance of the very Nature and Perfections of God: This Homer stiles his Hero, [...]. and [...]: and Grace is called [...], by the Apostle: And in­deed in this Sense, the rational Faculties of [Page 17] the Soul may not be improperly called Di­vine, forasmuch as they were not only gi­ven us by God, but do still bear his Image and Inscription upon them. But (3dly, and lastly), Those things are most properly sti­led Divine, which are immediately produ­ced by the Power of God, not according to the regular Laws of Nature, but in a manner altogether superior to them: And in this most proper signification, Creation, Prophecy and Miracles are the Works of God, and bear all the Characters of Di­vinity upon them; because the First Cause is only concerned in the Production of them, without the Concurrent Efficacy of Inferior Agents. Hence it is that the Evan­gelist, reckoning up the Genealogy of our Blessed Saviour, names the other Patriarchs as Sons of Men, because they came into the World, according to the usual manner of Generation; But Adam he calls the Son of God; for tho his Body was out of preceed­ing matter, yet it was formed by the im­mediate Power of God, without Observa­tion of the regular Course of Nature. The very Magicians could say, when they saw Lice miraculously produced by Aaron's Rod, That this was the very Finger of God; because they knew it was not within the Bounds of the Power of Nature, and that it could not be done by those Inferior In­visible [Page 18] Powers, which they invoked. And the Prophets call their inspired Writings, The Word of the Lord, because not deduced from the setled Course and Order of things, but delivered to them immediately by God himself; in respect to which it is called by St. Peter, the Sure Word of Prophecy.

A. What do you infer from hence?

T. That your Author trifles, when he e­quals Humane Reason to Divine Inspirati­on, saying very boldly, That (Aequali jure, ac alia (cognitio) quaecunque illa sit, divina vo­cari potest) when it is evident, That the one is founded on the Natural Order of things, and therefore subject to those Imperfecti­ons, which are common to all the Works of Nature: The other comes immediately from God, and has no imperfection in it. Our Reason, tho first given us by God, yet is corrupted by our selves: The Idolatry and Superstition of the first Ages of the World, do abundantly shew how much Natural Reason is subject to be led aside into Error, by Sense, Passion, Interest and Example, in the things that belong unto God: There is a Light of Nature, but it is no more than a glimmering Light, which discovers some, but not all things, that are necessary to be known, so clearly and di­stinctly as may make it compleatly benefici­al to Mankind. Besides, it is often darkned [Page 19] by Inadvertency, Lust, and Male-Organi­zation of the Body, and a thousand other Impediments: But Revelation is such an impression upon the Mind of the Prophets, as gives a discovery of something unknown before; for to reveal, is to detect something that before was cover'd, and always creates a threefold certainty in all inspired Authors: 1. It renders them sure that it is God who speaks to them; 2dly, That they rightly apprehend what he means: 3dly, That whatever he reveals, is infallibly sure; For that God will not deceive, is the very Basis of all Humane, and of all Divine Knowledg. Your Author therefore very truly asserts, That Revelation exceeds the Bounds of Hu­mane Reason, because it extends it self to the hidden things of God, viz. The Know­ledge of a future Happiness, and the ways and means by which we may gain the same; as also, because it cannot be caused by the regular Order of Nature, but must proceed immediately from God; but then he very absurdly endeavours to equal Hu­mane Reason to it, when in the same breath he confessed, that it is exceeded by Divine Revelation.

A. You talk of Certainty in Divine Re­velation; but for my part, I have no Idea, how a Mortal Man can be certain what or when God speaks to him.

T. Prophecy being [...] complex Idea, as signifying the discovery of something made unto Man, by the immediate Power of God, we can have no distinct Knowledge of its manner of producing Certainty in the Mind of Man, unless all the simple I­dea's, which compound the same, extend into our Understanding, by our Senses, or were obvious to it by a simple intuition: But the Manner of God's speaking to Man by Revelation, being altogether Supernatu­ral, it cannot be compleatly understood by those, who have had only Experience of the use of Natural Faculties. Suppose a Man born into the World with a Sixth Sense, whereby he could discern the Pro­perties and Differences of External things, it would not follow, that because other men had not a compleat Idea, how he per­ceiv'd the differences of things, that there­fore he had no perception at all. A man so framed by God, might have clear and di­stinct perception, and yet not be able by any force of Words, to make his Neigh­bours understand the manner of it. For the Words that now are, do signifie some I­dea's which have already been common to Mankind; but where the thing it self was always unknown, there Words, whose sig­nification extends no further than to things that are already known, can never explain [Page 21] them to us. A man that never had the Expe­rience of the Illumination of a Prophetick Spirit, can no more have a compleat Idea of what it is, than a blind man can have of Colours; he may be taught by rote to give definitions, but all the definitions that can be given, will never give him the true Idea of Light or Colour.

A. Then Prophetical Light is something, but you don't know what.

T. Yes, We know as much of the Na­ture of Divine Revelation, as is necessary for us to know; and he that enquires after more, ought not to be gratify'd in his need­less curiosity. We know from the Nature of God, and the Constitutiou of our own Souls, that it is not impossible for God to communicate his Will and Pleasure to whomsoever he pleases; for it would be strange indeed, if God, who made the Soul capable of understanding every thing else, should not be able to make it capable of understanding himself, whenever he should vouchsase to speak to it. For why should not Man be as capable of knowing when God speaks to him in a supernatural way, as when his Neighbour speaks to him, ac­cording to the usual course of Custom and Nature. All things are possible with God, that do not imply a contradiction in the Terms, or are not directly repugnant to [Page 22] the essential Purity of the Divine Nature; but it is no more a contradiction (tho more unusual) for God to speak to Man, than it is for one Man to speak to another; nor is it repugnant to the Divine Purity, to teach Man his Will, to obey which is Man's ut­most perfection. We also know, from as Authentick Records of Antiquity, as any are now extant, That some Men, Eminent for Wisdom, Learning and Vertue, have affirmed, That God has spoken to them; and we have Reason enough to believe that they were certain of it, because they expo­sed their Lives and Fortunes, and all that is dear to Flesh and Blood, in compliance to the Doctrines they receiv'd from God: and that no room might be left for doubt, the same God that thus spake to them, gave them power to do such things, as quite sur­passed the power of Nature, and to foretel such Events, as were not possible to be guess'd at by any humane Understanding. If therefore we, who by Faith believe the Doctrines taught by these inspired Authors, are deceived, we are deceived by God him­self, who alone could give such Gifts of Prophecy and Miracles to the Sons of Men: And if our Faith is deceived by God, we know not but that our Reason is deceived too: For if God can deceive in one, why may we not think he may do it in the other? [Page 23] And then our A—is so far from being cer­tain to get the Victory, by such Disputes, o­ver Revealed Religion, that he cannot be certain that he disputes at all.

A. What Mathematical Certainty have you, that the Records of these mens Pro­phesies are true?

T. Matters of Fact are never the less true, for not being capable of Mathemati­cal Demonstration. It is as true, that Ju­lius Caesar came into England, as it is that the whole is equal to all its parts, tho the Truth of his coming hither, cannot be de­monstrated by any Problem in Euclid.

A. I have heard, with great patience, your long discourse of God's speaking unto Men, and the wonderful and unintelligible Certainty from thence arising. But what (as our Author tells you) if this Notion of God's speaking unto Men, prove a meer Fancy, proceeding from a mistaken Hebra­ism; I hope you will be judg'd by the Scriptures themselves.

T. Yes, upon these Conditions: 1. That the Authority of Scriptures may be as well urg'd for as against themselves. 2. That e­very difficulty in those Sacred Writings, shall not presently be judged a Falshood, till there be some further demonstration of its absurdity. 3. That you allow the same liberty of deducing Consequences from [Page 24] Texts of Scripture, a [...] you take to your selves. 4. Then that due regard be had to the Writings of the New, as well as of the Old.

A. With all my heart. 1st. Then God revealed the Law to Moses by a true Voice, as we are told, Exod. 25. 22. but this was the only true Voice from God that ever was heard. The words of the Decalogue, accor­ding to some Men, were not spoken; they only heard a confused Noise, and so per­ceiv'd the Law as then written in their Hearts; tho, in truth, those Notions of Good and Evil were engrafted there long before. Nay, it is evident, that what you call Revelation, was only the Appearance of some Images to the sight, or Phantacy of the Prophet. See Chron. 22. how God shewed David his Anger, by an Angel hol­ding a Sword in his hand; and the same hapned to Balaam. By Images not real, but depending upon the Phantacy of the Pro­phet, God revealed to Joseph, that he should have the Dominion over all his Brethren. Observe Numb. 12. 6, 7. and you will see what slight assurance was given to the other Prophets—If there be a Prophet amongst you, I the Lord will make my self known unto him in a Vision, and will speak unto him in a Dream.

T. Confident Assertions, without Equi­valent [Page 25] Strength of Reason, impose upon none but those that are willing to be chea­ted. It is spoken without Authority of Scripture, that God pronounced the Law only with a true and real Voice; All that we can learn from Exod. 25. 22. is, That God promised to be ready to communicate his Will to Moses, from above the Mercy-seat, and from between the two Cherubims: But that place of Scripture does not explain the manner of that Communication, so as to determine it to a real Voice; much less does it exclude all former Revelations from that priviledg. Nay, nothing is more evi­dent, than that other Revelations were made by a real Voice, before the delivery of the Law of Moses. Immediately after the Fall (Gen. 9. 10.) we read, that God called unto Adam, and said unto him, Where art thou? And he said, I heard thy Voice in the Garden, and I was afraid. Or if our bold Au­thor will turn this into Figure (as indeed he ventures to turn so whatsoever he plea­ses) yet in the 18th of Genesis, we read of a Revelation made by a real Voice, or there is no description of a real Voice in rerum natur [...]; For the three Angels that appeared as Men to Abraham, and eat as Men, with­out doubt spake as Men, when the promise was made to Abraham, that Sarah should bring forth a Son. When God was about to [Page 26] destroy the Old World, Gen. 6. he foretold that dismal Execution of Vengeance to his Servant Noah; and if you will stick to the Words of the Scripture, according to our first agreement, gave him a punctual description of the Ark he should make, and the Persons and Living Creatures, that should enter into it, which it is hard to imagine could be done without a real Voice; Or at least, it is as rational to sup­pose one here, as in the place cited out of Gen. 25. 22. But your Author is still more Quod Re­velatioper solas ima­gines con­tinget pa­tet ex pri­mo para­lip. Ch. 22. v. p. 5. v. p. 3. impudent or unwary, when he tells us it is evident from Chron. 22. that Revelation is sometimes made by Images only, and that none are capable of receiving the revealed Will of God, but only by the help of Ima­gination; and that the Words or Figures were sometimes real, that is, existing with­out the mind of the Prophet; and some­times imaginary, that is, framed by the mind of the Prophet himself. From whence he infers, That the Certainty of Prophecy is not Mathematical, but only Moral; or ra­ther, according to those Principles, nothing but a Fanciful Whimsey, that may as well be false or true. Now by this Author's leave, no such conclusion; nor indeed can any conclusion at all be drawn from the Mediums of Divine Revelation, that con­cern the Certainty or Fallibility of it: For [Page 27] all the Mediums of Revelation being su­pernatural, we may call 'em by what Names we please; yet still we must bor­row those Names from some Natural Things, because of those only we have compleat Idea's. He that is a Prophet, must be certain it is God who speaks to him, but the bare hearing of a Voice, or the seeing of an Image, will not create this Certain­ty, according to the Laws of Nature: For Voices and Words may be framed by other invisible Powers; and therefore we are not so foolish as to conclude that Moses was a Prophet of God, because he heard a Voice, or saw a Figure, but because he was enabled to shew forth sensible Demonstra­tions, that the power of God was with him. But tho we do not conclude the certainty of Revelation from the Mediums of Reve­lation, so is it the greatest madness in the World, to infer from thence the Uncertainty of it: For we who have not seen those Fi­gures, nor heard those Words, nor felt those Divine Impressions, can frame no compleat Idea's of them. And your bold Author draws Conclusions from such Premises, which 'tis plain he could never understand, unless he can pretend that himself has been inspired. Supposing it therefore true, that Preter haec nulla alia sin­genda, &c. p. 7. the Scripture made mention of no other Mediums of Revelation than Signs, or Fi­gures, [Page 28] and Words, yet cannot he from thence infer any Necessity of the Uncer­tainty of Divine Revelation, unless he could give us compleat Idea's of what manner of Impressions those Words, or Signs, made upon the Minds of the Pro­phets; Which is a matter impossible for him to teach, or us to learn. One Man can inform another of his Mind, by Words and Figures, and why must God be exclu­ded from that power which he gives his Creature? But after all, it is not true, that Words and Figures are the only Mediums of Divine Revelation, which the Scrip­tures mention. There is a Communication of the Spirit of God, immediately infusing Knowledge into the Mind, without any Organs of Speech, or Corporeal Represen­tations; which yet is as infallible as the other. Joh. 16. 17. Our Saviour promises his Disciples, That the Spirit of Truth should lead them into all Truth: And this Commu­nication of the Spirit we call Inspiration, using a Metaphorical Word to express a Notion, which we cannot possibly receive from the bare knowledge of Nature. And tho this Spirit appear'd to the Apostles, (Acts 2.) in the shape of Cloven Tongues, yet we read it bestowed upon them, and upon others in the Primitive Times, the Gift of Drivers Languages, before utterly [Page 29] unknown unto them, by a secret and invi­sible Operation. If therefore the Spirit of God can reveal to the Mind of Man, with­out the help of those Mediums, the signi­fication of Words; why may it not also, after the same, or any other manner, com­municate the certain knowledge of Things, which is all we contend for.

A. I wonder you will mention the Spirit of God, which our Author shews, is a Word of Various, and consequently dubi­ous signification. The Scripture-Phrase, That the Spirit of God is in the Prophets; That Men are filled with the Spirit of God; and the like, does signifie no more, than that the Prophets were good Men, and that they perceiv'd the Will of God, as all Men (tho perhaps in a less degree, must needs do by the Light of Nature.) But all this is but the Imagination of the Prophet, consi­dered with relation to the Apprehensions of the Vulgar: And pray, Sir, what cer­tainty is there in bare Imagination?

T. If by Imagination you understand the Power of the Mind, to receive, retain, or frame the Images of External Objects, it may be considered with relation to things present, past, or to come. External Objects, when present, impress such Vivid Images upon the Brain, as will not suffer the Mind to doubt of their real Existence. The same [Page 30] Certainty (tho something short of Infalli­bility,) is left upon the Mind, by Objects represented to the Senses, when the Objects themselves are past and gone. He that sees an Horse or Elephant present, by the Ima­ges impressed on the Brain, knows that they are present, and by reflecting on the same Images the next day, he knows that they were present: And thus far Imagina­tion is a certain Repository of Knowledge; though not altogether infallible, because through defect of the Organs, (as in Mad Men) the Images framed by the Mind it self, are apprehended as existing without it; but those who are in their Wits, are never impos'd upon by their Imaginations after that manner, as to think they hear Voices, when they hear none; or see Ima­ges of things, that are not near them. Men thus deluded by Imagination, always shew signs of the Distemper, in inconsistency of Thought, and wild Rovings of Expression, which I defie any man to observe in the Writings of Moses and the Prophets, tho some things therein are hard to be under­stood, and may seem uncouth to us, by reason of long distance of Times, Ignorance of the Customs, Histories and Language of those Times, and many other Reasons, which I forbear to mention, as obvious e­nough without it. In short, either God did [Page 31] send Messages to his Servants the Prophets, by the visible appearance of Angels, and spake to them in Voices, or their Imagina­tions fram'd all these Appearances to it self, from the shatter'd Images of other Exter­nal Objects. If the first of these is true, your Author very impertinently concludes the Uncertainty of Prophecy from the Uncer­tainty of Imagination; for that Faculty does faithfully enough receive and preserve the Images of things really presented to it; and herein the Certainty of Imagination differs not from the Certainty of our Senses. If he means the latter, the Prophets then were no better than Pious Mad Men, and all the Sacred Writings are mere Fictions of the Mind, which owe all the little Truth that is in them, to meer Chance, which I perceive, however disguised, is the genuine meaning of your admired Au­thor. But if Moses and the other Prophets, were distemper'd by a less Imagination, how comes it to pass, that they are all so constant in the Doctrine of Piety? For I am sure our Modern Mad Men (who are never consistent with themselves, or one another,) are very much different from his description of the Ancients: Or how come their Predictions to be verified by the E­vent? Or how come the whole Nation of the Jews to be such Fools as to follow Mad [Page 32] Men? Or how did such a Mad Man as Moses, attain the power of working Mira­cles, and of leading the Children of Israel through the Wilderness, and governing them with Prudence and Moderation? But if God himself made these Revelations to them, it is nonsense to infer any uncertainty for the Mediums God uses for the Work; For it is in his Power to create Certainty of Divine Revelation, without the help of Mediums, as in the case of Inspiration, or by whatsoever means he pleases, as those of Words of Figures.

A. You know very well, that the Mind can compound various Images, and thence conclude more Propositions than can be known by deductions from the sole Light of Reason; and thence it is the Prophets teach more of Religion than can be known by Nature only.

T. The true Reason is this: God knows more than Man, what is necessary to make him happy; and therefore those who are taught by God, can declare more concern­ing the means of Salvation, than those who are guided by the sole Light of Nature.

A. Well, still I have some Reason to think, that Prophecy was the pure Work of the Imagination. 1. The Prophets per­ceived and uttered all things by Parables and Riddles, expressing Spiritual things af­ter [Page 33] a Corporal manner. 2. It was, as Ima­gination always is, very inconstant, not adhering to the Prophet, but coming by fits and starts, according to the unsteddy leaps of Fancy.

T. But I have better Reasons to per­swade me, that your Author is in a most egregious error for futurities; i. e. things which neither are, nor have been, cannot make impression upon the Fancy, accord­ing to the Laws of Nature, which may produce any tolerable degree of Certainty; and therefore when Futurities are foretold, which depend not upon any necessary con­nexion of natural causes, it must be asserted by the supernatural Power of God. The Mind may indeed be impos'd upon by help of the Imagination, several ways, in respect to things to come; as when from the re­membrance of what is past, it concludes that the same will happen again, tho there be no necessary connexion between the Cause and the Effect: Or, (2.) When from its vast Magazine of Images, it chuses out, and joyns those together, which ought not to be joyned, and concludes their future Existence, from an ill conceived Notion of their bare possibility of Being. And herein the Mind frequently imposes upon its self, by its own Passions and Desires, concluding such things will be, which it most desires [Page 34] should come to pass hereafter. But such possible and impossible compositions of the Fancy, or conclusion of the deluded Reason of Mankind, are of so vast a number, that it is impossible all, or any great number of them should prove true, without the Pre­dictions were made by God himself. How could Imagination, out of thousands of pos­sible Circumstances of our Saviour's Birth, pick out all those by the Prophets, which would certainly come to pass, as we can easily prove from the holy Scriptures? or how could it avoid predicting something that was false, if it had only probability to work upon, which is the only Object of Fancy, in regard to future Events, which never made any impression upon it? We there­fore conclude the certainty of Prophecy, not from the Nature of Imagination, but from the knowledg and power that God has, to make whatsoever impressions he pleases upon it. And tho the Prophets frequently did per­ceive and speak by corporal representations of spiritual matters, that might very well be presum'd to be done, in compliance to the apprehensions of the people, who at that time were very ignorant, standing more in need of Milk than of robuster diet. And tho God did declare his mind, as one man may to another, by Hieroglyphick Representations, yet those never disturb'd the Reason of the [Page 35] Prophet, nor caused him to entertain gross conceptions of God. Fancy let loose, makes such a Medly of Religion, as may be found in the Metamorphosis of Ovid, or the Iliads of Homer, or the Remains of Orpheus; but it cannor produce such a regular Structure of Divine Doctrine, and so agreeable to Na­tural Religion, as is contain'd in the Law of Moses, and the Gospel of our blessed Sa­viour.

A. But why did they not prophecy al­ways?

T. Why does not one man always speak to another?

A. Because Man is a free Agent, and can speak to his Neighbour when he pleases, or can let it alone.

T. And so is God, who does not send all men to be Messengers of his Will, but some only, chosen out of Mankind for so great a work. Nor does he chuse to speak always to them, but at such times and seasons as pleases him.

A. What then do you conclude from this long discourse?

T. I conclude, that since no Man can frame a compleat Idea of Prophetic Dream, or Vision, or Inspiration, who is not him­self a Prophet, no Man can conclude any incertainty in Prophecy, from the mention the Scripture makes of those Mediums of Divine Revelation.

A. I will consider what you say, and tell you my Opinion at our next meeting. Farewell.

Conference II.

T. SIR, You seem very much pleased: I hope you receiv'd some satisfaction by my last discourse.

A. It bore some Face of Reason at first appearance, but my Author has furnished me with some New Objections, which I fear, with all your Priest-craft, you will never be able to answer. You talk of Prophets, as p. 15. Great Men inspired by God, when it is e­vident, that their Minds were as far inferior to other Mens, as Reason is superior to Fancy. Solomon was a wise man, but no Prophet. We must not therefore seek the knowledge either of human or divine things from the Writings of Prophets, i. e. of Men led by Fancy, but Philosophers, who are guided by Reason.

T. That is, from Men taught by them­selves, and not taught by God.

A. If a man was sure that these Prophets were taught by God, he would desire to have [Page 37] no better Masters: But alas! they were not certain of their own Inspiration, by the Re­velation it self, but some other little sign, a­dapted to their human Education, Opinion, or pre-conceiv'd knowledg.

T. If they perceiv'd the Will of God by Imagination (which are the words of your Author), and yet remain'd doubt­ful of it, then it follows either that God was not willing, or not able to give them assu­rance that himself spake to them. If you say, he was not willing, you contradict the Testimonies of Scripture, by which you pre­tend at first you would be judged, and you subvert all Fundamentals of Natural Reli­gion, which teaches nothing more plainly, than that God cannot deceive. If you say, he was willing, but not able, you must deny him to have that power, which is not only contain'd in the Idea of a Deity, but mani­fested in the other works of his hands. The Prophets therefore doubted not but it was God who spake to them, tho they sometimes required a sign, to confirm the truth of some Promise made to their Posterity; as Gen. 15. 8. where Abraham required not a sign, that he might be certain it was God that spake to him (for if he had not been well assured Act. 7. 3. of that, we cannot think he would have left his Father's house, to sojourn in Canaan, in Obedience to a Divine Command, as we [Page 38] read in the 12th Chap.) but that he might thereby assure his Posterity of the Promise, to engage them to a nearer and stricter Co­venant with their God. Or perhaps Abraham was desirous by some farther Revelation, accompany'd by a sign, to know something more particular concerning the Time, and other Circumstances, of his Posterity's Con­quest of the Land of Canaan, which God vouchsafed to give him, as we read in the latter part of the same chap. But your Au­thor trifles, when he infers from this 15th ch. of Gen. that the Patriarch required a sign, that he might be certain the Promise was made by God himself; since it is evident from v. 6. that he believed in God, and it was accounted unto him for righteousness, before the sign there mentioned was given to him. As for Judges 6. we read, that Gideon was inform'd by an Angel, in the shape of a Man, that he should free Israel from the Midianitish slavery, of which at first he doubted; but after the con­sumption of the food he brought by fire, and the disappearance of the heavenly Minister, he per­ceived it was an Angel of God. But what is this to your Author's purpose? Suppose the certainty of one or two Revelations depen­ded upon a sign, does it thence follow, as he wildly concludes, that no Prophet could he sure of a Divine Revelation without a sign? Do we not read of many Divine Revelations, [Page 39] of the truth of which the Prophets never doubted, wherein there was no sign given, but the certainty arose from the perspicui­ty of the Revelation it self. God does not confine himself to any one way of speaking to Mankind, but (Heb. 1. 1.) in diverse man­ners spake in time past unto the Fathers by the Prophets. Sometimes indeed, as in this in­stance of Gideon, the person to whom God by his Angel appeared, was not at first cer­tain that it was God, till by further illumi­nation, and repeated signs and wonders, he was suffered no longer to doubt of it. When Numb. 3. Act. 7. 30. Moses first saw the Bush burning with fire, and the Bush not consumed, he turned aside to behold it, as a strange sight; and when God sent his Angels to Abraham, he took them at first sight for Men, and made accordingly provision for their reception; and when God called twice unto Samuel, he supposed it was the voice of Ely: And yet he made afterwards such ma­nifestation of himself, to Moses, and those See Exod. 4. 2, 8, 9, 14. ver. other good men, that they wanted no sign to be themselves assured of his presence, but rather to convict others, that they were sent by God. We don't say, that God, by every appearance of an Angel to the Sons of Men, darted an infallible certainty into their Minds, that left no room for suspicion, but that he could do so whensoever he pleased, as is evident by Reason; and that [Page 40] he did frequently do so, as is no less plain from the Scriptures; and that he added sometimes Signs, for the satisfaction of those to whom the Revelations were made, (for, with the Jews, we will not call them all Prophets), and sometimes he added none, when the perception was clear enough without it.

A. Is not Natural Reason superior then to Revelation, since that is supported by Signs, and the other perspicuous enough without it?

T. The consequence is vain and fallaci­ous. The substance of the Decalogue is plain­ly true by the light of Nature, yet it was confirmed to the Jews by Signs and Won­ders, at its most remarkable promulgation, Exod. 20. God therefore by confirming Na­tural Light by Signs and Wonders, accord­ing to your Author, did that which was su­perfluous, As if the unlearned, obstinate, or unthinking part of the people of Israel, stood in no need of being rous'd up as it were to Natural Duties, by Supernatural Signs and Wonders: Or as if the Decalogue, by addition of Miracles, became inferior to the very same Laws, without any such ad­dition, which is altogether as true as that 4 and 2 is less than 4. As for Duties which are known by Revelation only, (such as Circum­cision, Baptism and Supper of our Lord) when [Page 41] once they are made known, by supernatural methods, they no ways give place to the un­written Law of Nature, because they be­come branches of that general Obedience to God, which is the adequate Law of human Nature. When God bid Abraham sacrifice his Son, he was as much obliged to kill him, as he was obliged before that Command to preserve his Life.

S. I won't dispute with you about small matters, but this is evident, that Signs were p. 18. given to the Prophets, according to their pre-conceiv'd Opinions, and their different Capacities: so that the same sign which render'd one Prophet certain of divine Re­velation, would have wrought no such effect upon another. If their Temper was sanguine, they fancied nothing but Tri­umphs, Victories, Messiahs, Peace and Plenty: If their blood was vitiated with melan­choly humors, they dream'd of Wars, Tu­mults, Blood and Devastations.

L. The sign was, for the most part, the power of working some supernatural effect, given to the Prophet, to convince rather others, than himself, that he was sent by God, and delivered his Message to the peo­ple; and because all Mankind have not the same temperature of body, nor labour un­der the same prejudices of Education, nothing can be a sufficient sign, but what is so far [Page 42] above the ordinary works of Nature, that Men of all Temperatures, and all Opinions too, if they are in their Senses, must needs confess, that it is the immediate work of a su­perior invisible power. Upon this Founda­tion we raise the certainty of the Mosaick, and of the Christian Religion; Let any man, of what Temperature, and possess'd with what Prejudices you please, provided he be not stark mad, (for Bethlem is to be exclu­ded from all Disputations) consider what Moses did in the sight of all the Egyptians, and the people of Israel, and what our Sa­viour did in all parts of Judea, and let him then perswade himself, or others, that all this was done, or possible to be done, by the ordinary course and power of Nature. If he can do that, we will yeild our Cause, and confess our Religion was never confirmed by Signs from Heaven; for Effects that may be, or may not be Natural, may be some Indications, but no Demonstrations of a superior invisible power. The truth is, the Sparks of your Principles, were never, I be­lieve, so mad as to confess the truth of all those mighty works, recorded to have been done by Moses and the Prophets, or our Sa­viour himself, and yet doubt of their divine Mission; for I presume every man who believes our Saviour to have raised himself, or others from the Grave, must necessarily [Page 43] believe his divine Mission: And as for the minor Prophets, their Messages being of less extent, and less consequence to mankind, there was no necessity that all of them should have their Commission sign'd from Heaven, and recorded to posterity, by the same number and perspicuity of supernatural Wonders, as was that of Moses, and of our blessed Sa­viour. Your Author therefore very impu­dently, and ignorantly too, asserts, that the Sign was adapted to the Temperature, or Opi­nion, or Imagination of the Prophet; when it was always some supernatural work, adap­ted to convince the Reason of all Mankind, and impossible to be gain-say'd by any.

S. Did not Elisha call for a Musical In­strument, p. 19. before he could foretel joyful things to Jehoram, and his two Confede­rates? which he could not do before, be­cause he was angry at him, 2 King. 3. 15. Eze­kiel being impatient of Life, was enabled to foretel dreadful tidings to the Jewish Na­tion, Ez. 3. 14. Jeremiah was a melancholy, and consequently a continual Messenger of Evil to his brethren: Micah troubled with the same disease, always prophesied dreadful Events to Ahab; which plainly shews, that Prophecy did much depend upon the natural Temperature of the body.

L. No more than my sending a merrily dispos'd Servant upon an Errand, does shew [Page 44] that my Errand was an effect of the san­guine complexion of my Servant's Body. God, who knows the Disposition and Tem­perature of all human Bodies, may chuse those that are best adapted for each parti­cular Message he sends to Mankind; but that is no Argument, that the Message it self is any effect of their natural disposition. For we are not so mad as to believe these Men were inspired, because they spake of things agreeable to their own humours, but things above the reach of humane knowledge. Elisha might dispel some melancholy Fumes, by the harmony of Musick, but I would feign know the Name of that Mu­sical Instrument, which could inspire his mind with the knowledge of those two futurities. 1. That the ditches should be filled with water, without any preceeding rain. 2. That Vid. ver. 17, 18. the Israelites should overcome their Enemies. Moses was angry with Pharaoh, when he foretold the destruction of all the first born of Egypt, but it was not his Anger, but God himself, or one of his Angels, that at midnight smote all the first born of the land of Egypt, Ex. 12. 20. Micah always prophesied Evil to Ahab, because Ahab always was an ill man, and there was evil decreed against him by God, which accordingly came to pass, not by Micah's indignation, but by the just Judg­ment of God. If these mens predictions had [Page 45] been an effect of bodily temper, (and if your Author says not that, he says not one word to the purpose) they must frequently have been proved false by the Event: For Truth is seldom seen, much less foreseen, by those who speak and act according to the unsteady motions of bodily temper. Be­sides, it is clearer than the Light, that these inspired Authors did not prophesie, as your Author insinuates, according to their own In­clinations, but according to what they re­ceived from the Spirit of God. The Scrip­tures bear witness, that Moses was a very meek man; and therefore, according to your Author's silly Hypothesis, all Revelations proceeding through him, should have been full of nothing but Meekness and Gentleness, and the Sanctions should have consisted chiefly of alluring promises; and yet we Read in Exod. 20. That the Law of Moses was delivered in a terrible manner, by Thunder and Lightning in the Mount. And Deut. 28. 15. Moses utters so many Curses against the transgressor of the Law, as must needs proceed from something ve­ry much different from the description he gives of his own meek and gentle Spirit. E­lijah will be allowed by your Author, to have been a person of a fierce disposition, as may be seen by his calling for Fire down from Heaven, upon the Captains of Fifties, [Page 46] and killing the Worshippers of Baal; and from our Saviour's rebuke to his Disciples, when they would have had him call down for Fire from Heaven, after Elijah's Example, Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of: and yet not onely so, but he was incensed against Ahab, by provocations of the high­est Nature, because by his and Jezebels command, (1 King. 19. 14.) The Chil­dren of Israel had forsaken the Covenant of his God, thrown down his Altars, and Slain his Prophets with the Sword, and he onely was left, and they sought his Life also. Nay, Ahab had made up the measure of his ini­quity, by depriving Naboth of his Vine­yard, and his Life, yet when the word of the Lord came to Elijah the Tishbite, he became the Messenger of good News to Ahab, 1 King. 21. 29. Seest thou how Ahab humbleth himself before me? because he hum­bleth himself before me, I will not bring the Evil in his Days. Isaiah was undoubtedly a Person of a very Sweet and Aimable temper, of a Noble Family, and well practised in all the Arts and Language of a flourishing Court, as this A—well enough observes from that flowing vein of Elo­quence which runs through all his Writ­ings; and his Prophecy is so full of Promises of good things to the Church, that he is sti­led, the Evangelical Prophet; and yet he was [Page 47] sent by God as a Messenger of ill News, e­ven to the good Hezekiah. Is. 39. 6. Behold the days come, when all that is in thy house, and that which thy Fathers laid up in store until this day, shall be carry'd to Babylon, nothing shall be left, saith the Lord. And if any man read ch. 53. of his Prophecy, he will find such a de­scription Isa. 53. of a suffering Messiah, as could not have enter'd into the Head of such an accomplish'd Courtier, without the assist­ance of divine Inspiration. Jeremiah was a man of sorrow, and yet your Author can­not say, that none but Revelation of sor­rowful things were made to him, for he foretold the Restauration of the Jews, and the precise time of it, which certainly was no very sorrowful matter. I could heap up innumerable instances of the same Nature, to shew your Authors Foundation he would build upon, (Viz. That Prophesie was adapted, to the Natural temper of the Prophet, from whence he would undoubt­edly insinuate, it was onely an effect of it) is false, and repugnant to the United Te­stimonies of the Holy Scriptures. Besides, who could inform this Temerarious Au­thor of the Natural Constitution of the Bodies of the Ancient Prophets? Who knows not that the humours of the Body, are much alter'd, both for the better and the worse, by External accidents, whether [Page 48] sad, or joyful. What wonder then that those Prophets who liv'd in the Peacea­ble and Flourishing State of the Church, as Isaiah did for some time, and to whom joyful things were for the most part revea­led, should be of a joyful Spirit, and the contrary be recorded of these, who were sent upon sad and mournful Messages? Which is most likely, that the message should be cause of the Joy? Or the Joy be the cause of the message?

S. To me, the Scales seem to hang even.

L. But then, are those predictions, whe­ther Joyous, or Mournful, Prov'd always to be true by the event? I hope that is enough to turn the Scale on the Prophets side.

S. You may say what you please, but still you shall never make me believe, but that if God spake to Man, he would al­ways speak in the same Style, and that Style would be the most elegant and florid of any other. But if you compare the first of Isaiah from Ver. 11. to 20. with the 5th of Amos, from 21 to 24 ver. &c. You will find that the Style of the Prophets is not always the same, but according to their several capacities; it is sometimes brief, and sometimes long; sometimes elegant, and sometimes rude; in some places very plain, and in others full of obscurity.

L. Difference of Stile is no Argument of difference in things, nor is the Elegance, or Rudeness of a Language, essential to the con­veyance of Truth. The History of Salust is as true as that of Livy; for he wrote of things done in his own time; whereas Livy is full of fabulous Relations; and yet I never p. 20. heard any Critick affirm, That his Stile is as compleat and elegant. It is enough for us to believe, that God revealed his Will to the Pro­phets, and other inspired Authors, but left the Narration to the natural Abilities of the Pro­phets, whose Stile might vary, but not their conceptions of the will of God.

S. But why then did he not always chuse Men of the most elegant Stile to be his Pro­phets.

L. Because it being intended for the good of all Mankind, it ought to be adapted to the meanest Capacities. As men of great, natural and acquired Abilities, were fittest to stand before Kings and Princes, so were Rusticks and illiterate persons most fit to speak to the capacity of the Vulgar.

S. Well, I will grant, that difference of Stile is no very material Objection; but what if the Hierogliphicks, and Prophetical Representations were various also? Did not Isaiah see God sitting upon a Throne high and lifted up, and his Train filled the Temple, Is. 6. But Ezekiel beheld him as a fire, of the colour [Page 50] of Amber. Is it not plain, that both saw God in the same manner, as their respective imagi­nation did before the Vision represent him to them?

L. Not in the least: All that the Scrip­ture says, is, That God made himself known by those different Representations to Isaiah and Ezekiel; does it therefore follow, that they made these Representations to themselves, out of their own Fancy? If these Hieroglyphicks were really represented to them by God, what necessity was there, that they should be adapted to erroneous prejudices of the Prophet? Such Revelations would be pro­ductive of Error, and God would thereby become the Author, Abetter, and Confirmer of Falshood in the World; which none will af­firm, but those who think God to be nothing else but the setled course of dull and stupid matter. If the heat of their own Imagina­tion coined these Images to its self, then I­saiah and Ezekiel were perfectly mad men, and their writings no more worthy to be preserv'd, than the rambling discourses of the Inhabitants of Bedlam. Nay, admitting this, they must be presum'd to have been the greatest Fools of all the Jewish Nation. For, how could men instructed in the Mosaick Law, which forbids all corporal Representa­tions of God, because they saw no similitude of him in the Mount, frame such gross conce­ptions [Page 51] of God, as of a King sitting upon a Throne, or a flaming fire? Or if they used to fancy God after that manner, how does it come to pass their writings are not tarnish­ed by such gross conceptions, but that in them we find clear Notions of his spiritual and incomprehensible Nature?

S. Ay, but the Revelations to the Prophets did vary not only in the manner, but in the perspicuity of the Revelation its self. Those made to Zachariah were so obscure, that without an Explication they could not be understood by that very Prophet. And Da­niel could not understand his, when they were explained by an Angel to him. Why there­fore should we trouble our Heads with the Writings of those Men, who scarce knew what they wrote themselves?

L. He is a Prophet that certainly knows that God speaks to him in a supernatural manner: of this Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, nor any of those doubted, whom the Jewish Church receiv'd as Prophets. As for the Sub­ject-matter of their Prophecy, it was not ne­cessary p 20. that the Prophet should understand all that was inclosed in that, much less that he should perceive it by the first View of the Hieroglyphical Representations, till in­form'd of the matter by an Angel sent from God: For he being only a Messenger from God, it is necessary he should be certain [Page 52] that it is God that sends him; but 'tis not equally necessary that he should always un­derstand the whole Subject-matter of his Mes­sage. For even Temporal Monarchs send in­clos'd Instructions by their Ambassadors; and since the Message it self did not so much concern the Prophet, as some part or Age of the Catholick Church; and therefore it was enough for him to deliver the Message faith­fully, as he receiv'd it, without Explaining all that is hard to be understood therein: And yet after all, the Scripture only says, That the Angel explained the Hieroglyphicks to Daniel, and that Daniel fainted and was sick, Dan. 7. 28. and 8. 27. and his thoughts much troubled him, perhaps by contemplation of those many Evils that were to befall his people.

S. O you mistake the matter; for we read, ch. 11. 14. That the Angel came on pur­pose to make Daniel understand what should befall his people in the latter days—And the matter still remained obscure, because none at Chap. 21. that time had strength enough to imagine such a wonderful business.

L. This seems to me to be one of the most absurdest assertions that ever dropt from the Pen of an Author pretending to Reason. For, 1. It sets bounds to the power of God, as if he was willing, but not able to declare his mind to Daniel, nor to any of that are, with plainness and perspicuity suitable to the Subject. 2. It [Page 53] supposes strength of Imagination to hear a real voice, which is a new stroke of Philosophy. 3. It supposes Daniel able to hear some words of the Angel, but not all that concern'd his people, as if the Angel was so short-breath'd, as not to be able to tell out all the story, or Daniel so weak in his capacity, that it was beyond the power of God himself to enable him to understand the matter.

S. I cannot conceive, but that if the Pro­phets had been taught of God, they must have known all things; but we see the Author of Joshua's History Erroneously apprehended the Sun to turn round the Earth; whereas all modern Virtuoso's agree, that the Earth turns round the Sun. Solomon understood not the true proportion between the Periphery, and Di­ametre of the Circle. Nay, I can shew you, from the testimonies of the very Scriptures, That the Prophets had very vulgar and erro­neous Apprehensions of God himself.

L. If you can make out that last thing, I will acknowledge you speak much to the purpose.

S. Adam apprehended God as ignorant of what he had done, and hid himself from him; which shews, he had no other Notion of him, than his being the Creator of the World. In the same manner was God revealed to Cain and Lamech, as ignorant of Humane Affairs. And it appears from Gen. 18. 4. A­braham [Page 54] knew not that God was an Omnipresent and Omniscient Being.

L. Did God tell Adam, or Cain, or La­mech, that he was only the Maker of the World, but ignorant of Humane Affairs.

S. No.

L. How then can God be said to be re­vealed as thus ignorant, unto them, when it is Evident their ignorance preceeded the Di­vine Revelation, and was not occasion'd by it? We do not say, that inspired Authors knew all things; for Omniscience is an incom­municable Attribute of God; much less, that they knew all things before God was pleased to reveal his mind unto them; but, that they had an infallible certainty, that God did speak to 'em, and that whatsoever he said was true. As for your Supposition, That Adam knew God only as the Creator of the World; it is almost as much as to say, Adam knew God only, as he knew all that is to be known of him. For the visible things of the Creation, make known an invisible power of Godhead. We cannot suppose Adam could know, that himself and the whole world was made by a supe­rior Being, and yet at the same time not know, that this superiour Being was endued with Wisdom, Goodness and Power. Nay, so far is it from Truth, that Adam, when he hid himself in the Garden, only knew God as Maker of the World; that he had received a [Page 55] Command from him as Lawgiuer, at the ve­ry moment, for ought we know, of his Creation, Gen. 2. 16, 17. And the Lord com­manded the man, saying, Of every Tree of the Garden thou mayest freely eat—But of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, tho [...] shalt not eat of it; for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die. If therefore A­dam apprehended not God as Omniscient and Omnipresent, he needed not have hid himself from him; for he was pretty sure, that God did not with bodily Eyes behold him taking the Forbidden Fruit; but his Fear, Amazement and Confession, without doubt, arose from the Notion he had of his invisible Power and Godhead. For Omniscience and Om­nipresence are inseperably intervoven into the very Notion of a God, as he is Creator of the World. For the First Cause must be united to every Effect; otherwise there would be an Effect without a Cause; and this First Cause must know this Ʋnion; o­therwise it would act by chance; from whence it unavoidably follows, That if the first Cause know any thing, it must know all things, since all things have a like dependance upon it. Tho the Scripture therefore repre­sents God, as walking in the Garden, &c. Yet this may well be understood of some Angel sent by God upon that message, it being familiar with the Scriptures to a­scribe [Page 56] some things to God, which were apparently done by the Ministry of his Holy Angels—Nor does it follow, that Adam thought God to be ignorant of hu­mane Affairs, because he endeavoured to hide himself from him; For all Fear, and es­pecially that which has Guilt for its Parent, is apt in its own Nature, to disorder Mens Reason, and to make them do absurd things, for which no sufficient Reason can be giv­en. If a man for Fear, whether real or ima­ginary, should, to avoid the Sword of his E­nemy, throw himself down a precipitating Rock, into the Waves of the Sea, or run into the Flames of a devouring Fire, it does not follow, that this man thought that the Wa­ter could not drown, nor the Fire burn, nor the Rock dash him to peices; but we may rather conclude, that the imagination of some im­pending danger, made such violent impressions upon his Brain, as for the present drove thence the use of clear and impartial Reason. Adam was sensible of Guilt, and the Fear of Pu­nishment threw him into absurd and ridicu­lous measures to escape it; but we must not ascribe that to his Reason, which was mani­festly an Effect of his Fear and Terror. Besides, whatever your Author observes of the Igno­rance of Adam, or Cain, &c. reflects nor Di­minution upon revealed Light, but rather upon his adored Light of Nature. For if A­dam [Page 57] thought God was not Omniscient or Omnipresent, it was because the Light of Reason gave him no truer a Notion of a God. Your Author indeed would insinuate, That God was revealed to him as ignorant of Humane Affairs; but then it must be in some Bible that lies under the Author's sole possessi­on; for no such thing is mentioned in any of those which I have hitherto seen in the World.

S. But was not God revealed as ignorant of Humane Affairs to Cain, when he ask'd him, (Gen. 10. 8.) Where is Abel thy brother?

L. No: the direct contrary is more appa­rent: for when Cain deny'd the Murther, in a very surly Dialect, viz. Am I my Bro­ther's Keeper? He was made to understand, that tho his Murther was hid perhaps from Man, it was open to the sight of God.

S. But does not his Question suppose he thought otherwise?

L. Wicked Men may think as they please; but their thoughts throw less As­persion upon revealed Light, than they do upon the Light of Nature. Cain committed Murther upon Abel, will your Author there­fore conclude, that God was revealed to Cain as approving Murther? or that Murther is agreeable to the Light of Nature? And yet Cain's speaking against Natural Light, in seeming to disown the Omniscience of God, is [Page 58] no more an Argument, that he thought God not to be Omniscient, than the killing his bro­ther, was an Argument, that he thought God to be a lover of Injustice, or an approver of the shedding of innocent blood. Wicked men will corrupt their natural Notions of moral good and evil, as well as the more speculative Idea's of the Attributes of God; but all that we can conclude from thence, is the necessity of Di­vine Revelation, to prevent Atheism, Deism and Idolatry, or Polytheism; and to ensure the most binding Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments, upon the immutable Laws of Nature.

S. Some Men will deny Motion, when their Tongues are running so fast, that no Man can be heard but themselves. Was not Abraham ignorant, that God was Omnipre­sent and Omniscient, when he begg'd of him not to execute his Sentence of Vengeance, till he knew whether all were worthy of that pu­nishment, or no? And does not God himself speak thus (at least in the Imagination of Abraham,) Gen. 18. 20. Because the Cry of So­dom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous, I will go down and see whether they have done altogether according to the Cry of it, which is come unto me; and if not, I shall know.

L. Abraham's words to God, viz. Perad­venture there be Fifty righteous in the City, [Page 59] contain no more than a Petition, that God would spare a great number of wicked persons, for the sake of a few righteous therein; He does not presume that God did not know how many righteous there were there, but he prays, that if Fifty were found, all the wic­ked might for their sakes escape their intended destruction. In v. 20. we have an Assertion, That God had knowledge of the sin of Sodom, for the Cry was great before him. And what we read, v. 20. of God's descending to know whether it was so or no, is but the continua­tion of a Metaphor drawn from the like A­ctions in Men; a Figure us'd in most Authors, and not unfrequent in the holy Scriptures; where we often read of his Hand, his Arm, or his Eyes; and yet the Jews were never so stupid as to worship God under the Sculpture of any such Corporeal Representa­tions.

S. If you would read the 3d and 4th Chapters of Exodus impartially, you would find, that Moses himself had no a­dequate Notion of a God: For God was reveal'd to him, as ignorant of humane Actions. For tho God told him, Chap. 3. v. 28. That the People of Israel would hear­ken to his Voice; Moses, Chap. 4. v. 1. An­swer'd, Behold they will not believe me, nor hearken to my Voice, for they will say, the Lord hath not appeared unto thee.

L. Believing, being an Act of the un­derstanding and the will, jointly co-ope­rating together, none but God can foresee, which way the will of Man, when left to its Native liberty, will incline it self. As for Men, they can onely make probable Conjectures of it, from reason and expe­rience in humane Affairs: But Moses could not conceive from either of these, how it was likely, or possible, that the children of Israel should believe him upon his bare word, that he was sent by God to deliver them from Egyptian Slavery; his assertion therefore, Behold they will not believe me, proceeded not from his igno­rance of the Nature of God, but from his knowledge of the manners of Men, and especially the children of Israel, who, he easily conjectur'd, would not believe him, without a Miracle, nor indeed, was it at all reasonable that they should have been so Prodigal of their assent, to one that had no Commission sign'd from Heaven, by the Power of working Signs and Won­ders. But how does his suing for the Power of Miracles, at all argue that he had no true Notion of God? Or how do errors (provided they were such, tho in­deed they were not) occasioned by the deficiency of Natural Light, reflect any Aspersion upon the plenitude of Divine [Page 61] Revelation? For whatever Moses might say to God, we don't read that God ever said unto Moses, that he was ignorant of humane Actions. Some Divines indeed, who with your Author pretend to the highest adoration of humane reason, have asserted, that God is ignorant of those fu­ture contingents, which depend upon the free will of Man, and if this be true, Moses, interpreted by your Author, had as true a Notion of God, as many of the Ancient Philosophers, or some of the Modern Arminians, Socinians, and Preists themselves, tho it is clear by the Holy Scriptures, that God by his Prophets has foretold those Actions, which depend up­on the free will of Man.

S. And is this all you have to say?

L. No, I will add, that tho God had told Moses, ver. 18. of the 3d Chapter, That the Children of Israel would hearken to his Voice, Yet at the same time, he in­form'd him, ver. 20. That he would stretch out his Arm, and Smite Egypt with all his Wonders. The Words therefore of Moses, Behold they will not believe me, nor hearken to my Voice, imply no contradiction to those words of God himself, v. 18. Chap. 3. Be­cause they relate to a different time. It was true, what God told Moses, that the children of Israel would hearken to his [Page 62] Voice, when it was confirm'd by Signs and Wonders, which were wrought in the Land of Egypt, and it was true, what Moses said to God, that they would not believe him, nor hearken to his Voice, before those Signs and Wonders were wrought before them. It does not appear from hence, that Moses doubted of the Knowledge of God, but only longed for that assistance of his Power, by which God had told him, he would free the Israelites from the slavery of Bondage and Error. Besides, (Ex. 4. 8.) God was revealed to Moses, as fore­knowing, that tho the Israelites might at first despise, yet at last they would hearken to the voice of Moses.

S. All this seems to me to be nothing but Evasion Moses himself had wrong Notions of the Nature of God. He look'd upon him as a Being, that always was, is, and ever shall be, and for that reason call'd him Jehovah, but he taught nothing of his Nature, but that he was Merciful, Living, and very Jealous of Tranferring his Ho­nour p. 24. to another.

L. If Moses conceived no right notion of a God, Pray let us know your Authors Opinion upon that Subject.

S. My Author gives no Definitions, but it is plain from the 26th page, that he looks upon Moses Conceptions of Love, and [Page 63] Mercy, and Jealousy, (which are humane passions) when ascribed to God, to be ve­ry erroneous, mean, and vulgar.

L. They cannot be conceived errone­ous, unless you can prove, that Moses thereby ascribes something to God, that is imperfect, or vicious in its own Nature, which I presume you will never be able to do. Love, as it is a humane passion, may be vicious when placed upon a wrong ob­ject, as when we love those things which are forbidden, or when it is too remiss, or too vehement, in respect of those ob­jects upon which it is placed: But as it is a Principle of doing Good, and Fruitful of Beneficial Emanations to Men and Angels, it is the Perfection and Glory of the Divine Nature, in so much that the Apostle is not affraid to say, that God is Love it self.

S. But what think you of Pity, Mercy, Jealousy, are those passions worthily a­scribed unto God?

L. Yes, very worthily, provided you remove from thence those imperfections, which unavoidably arise from the Nature of a humane Soul, and the contexture of a humane body. All our Affections are ac­company'd with some violent perturbation of the body, which cannot be in God, who is an incorporeal Being. Wherefore [Page 64] tho Pity, Jealousy and Anger be attributed to God, for want of proper and intelligible Names to express something that is like them in the Divine Nature; yet we can­not conceive Moses so stupid, as to think that God felt the same perturbations that Men are sensible of in their afflictions. The Scripture represents God as resolved to pu­nish unrepenting sinners; and this Resolu­tion it calls his Anger; and it shews us, that God is ready to succour the afflicted, and to extend his Pardon to some, who accor­ding to strict Justice are unworthy of it; and his Propensity to those voluntary Fa­vours Moses calls by the Name of Mercy: and his Eternal Decree, That his Honour should not be given to his Creatures, by an easy Metaphor is stiled Jealousy. But all this includes no Erroneous Apprehensi­ons of God, it onely expresses these attri­butes which are known by the light of Nature, in such words as are most intelli­gible to all the different Degrees of Men in the World.

S. You may fancy what Figures you please, but can you shew any good rea­son, why Moses must be understood to speak in a Figurative sense?

L. Because in this Life we all see God, darkly, as through a glass, and therefore cannot in all things speak properly of him [Page 65] as he is, but must be compelled by neces­sity to transfer some words from those things we more perfectly understand, to signfie those Perfections in God, which are less perfectly understood by us.

S. I wonder you will deny, That the Revelation was adapted to the Capacity of the Prophet, when so many Instances of it are brought by this Author, extract­ed from your very Bibles. Moses thought God was in a peculiar manner, Governour of the Jews, but that the Government of other Countries was left to inferiour Deities, who were called, the Gods of o­ther Nations. See for this, Exod. 15. 11. and 2 Chron. 32. 19. He also absurd­ly dreamed, That God, who is every where, was confined to live in Heaven. For this, see Deut. 33. 27. Jonas pre­sumed himself able to fly from the very presence of God. Solomon dispis'd all the Laws prescrib'd to a King, tho he was esteemed the wisest of all the Jewish Na­tion. The Doctrin of Ezekiel, is directly opposite to the Doctrin taught by Moses; as you will find, if you compare his 18 Chap. with the 7th. Ver. of the 31 of Exod. or the 18th. of the 22d. of Jeremiah. Sa­muel believed, that God never repented of his Decree, See 15. Sam. ver. 29. Je­remiah taught, that God, upon condition [Page 66] of Repentance, did reverse his Decree of Judgment against notorious Sinners. It appears from Gen. 4. v. 7. That Man has power to resist Temptation; but St. Paul teaches, That Man has no Government over his own Thoughts, or Actions, but by the singular Calling and Grace of God. See the 9th. to the Romans. And when he ascribes Justice to God, he Corrects himself, by saying, He spoke after the man­ner of Men. From whence it is as clear to me as the Sun, that what you call Divine Revelation, or Divine Inspiration, never made any man wiser than he was before, but either left him, or confirm'd him, in those very Prejudices of Opinion, in which at first it found him: Unless in matters of Morality, for therein the Prophets were guided by known, and undeniable Max­ims.

L. You muster up the whole strength of your Author's Forces, which consists more in number, than in true Worth and Dignity. We do not deny that God con­descends in the manifestations of his Will, to accommodate himself to the weak ca­pacities of his Creature Man, but that does no ways incline us to believe, that he ever reveals to Man any thing that is false, or that he confirms him in his preconceived Errors, or that whensoever he is pleased [Page 67] to reveal himself in a Supernatural man­ner, he cannot, or does not do it with the same degree of Perspicuity, as one man can tell his Thoughts to another. God in­deed, has declared more to one Prophet than to another, but since he never speaks any thing but truth to any, this is so sar from being an Argument against reading any of the Prophets, (for so I call all In­spired Authors) that it is a strong induce­ment to peruse them all, that so what we miss in one, we may readily find in ano­ther. If Revelation discovered nothing new to Mankind, nor confirm'd truths of an eternal verity, it would be altogether needless, and if it by being adapted to Men's erroneous Prejudices, confirm them in the same, it would be pernicious, and God himself would be the Author, Abet­tor, and Divulger of Falshood in the world, which I would have all young Men seri­ously to consider, who are addicted to these Deistical Notions. Epicurus, who removed the Deity from all thoughts of humane Affairs, pays more honour to the Divine Nature, than those who with your Author, suppose him to meddle therein, only to confound natural Light, and to contradict himself, and to send his Servants to plant, and propagate Falshood in the World.

S. You seem now to be very hot, but▪ can you disprove the Author, whom you rashly Condemn, because he speaks truth more freely than is consistent with the In­terest, or Humour of the Clergy?

L. I desire to be believed no farther than as you find what I say is agreeable to the Testimony of Scriptures, by which it will appear, that God has Revealed no­thing to Inspir'd Authors, that any man can condemn of Error. Secondly, That he has declared to them such truths, as were directly repugnant to their Precon­ceived, Erroneous Opinions. And Thirdly, I will shew you, that the places of Scrip­ture used by your A—, are no ways Sub­servient to his present design, and purpose. If your Author would Argue fairly against the Authority of the Holy Scriptures, he should have produced such places in them, which he could easily and plainly convince of Error in matters that belong to the Happiness of Mankind. But how much he fails in this, will appear by a Discussion of these Instances, which are alledged by him. Moses taught the Jews, that that very God, who made the Heaven and the Earth, was their God, who was revealed to Abra­ham, Isaac, and Jacob, and who then by Signs and Wonders, had brought them out of the Land of Egypt; which plainly shews [Page 69] that he had right Conceptions of the Ʋnity of the Divine Nature, as the first, and only cause of all things. But at the same time he knew, that the Heathens worshipped other created, invisible Powers, which they called Gods, tho unlike unto the true God, in all the Glorious Attributes of the Divine Nature; and this is all that can be gathered from the 11th. ver. of the 15th. Chap. of Exodus, Who is like unto thee, O Lord, amongst the Gods? Moses does not here assert, that there are more Gods than one, but only intimates, that there were more Beings than one, which were (tho falsely and equivocally) called Gods by the deluded Pagans. But why do we wonder, that invisible Powers in compli­ance to the common Dialect at that time in the World, are stiled Gods, when Ma­gistrates themselves, by no improper Figure are dignified with the same honourable Appellation, Ps. 6th. and 7th. I have said you are Gods, and all of you the Children of the most High, but ye shall dye like men, and fall like one of the Princes. Will any be so absurd to conclude from hence, that the Psalmist thought, that there was little or no difference between God and Man? Nor does it at all appear from the 19th. ver. of the 32d. Chap. of the Chron. That the Jews thought, that God left other Na­tions, [Page 70] to the Government of other Gods, substituted by him; the words are these, And they spake against the God of Jerusalem, as against the Gods of the People of the Earth, which were the work of the hands of men. It was not the Besieged Jews, but the Besieg­ing Pagans, who called those inferior Be­ings, by the name of Gods, which were worshipped by the deluded Pagans; the Jews acknowledged them only as the work of the hands of men. In the 17 Chap. of the 2d. of Kings, gives only an Historical Account of the Sentiments of those Pagans, who were translated into the Regions of Israel, from remoter Nations; they indeed had the same Apprehensions of the God of Jerusalem, as others had of their Topical Deitys, who were confined to the Government of certain Places, Persons, Arts, or Sciences, according to the Opini­on of the Ancients, and therefore mingled some Ceremonies of the true, with all the Superstitions of a false Religion. But the Author of this History, is so far from ap­proving, that he utterly condemns, as well their Notions, as their Practices. In the 23d. ver.—They fear not the Lord, neither do they after his Statutes, or after their Or­dinances, or after the Law and Commandment, which the Lord commanded the Children of Jacob, whom he named Israel.

S. Why then does the Scriptures call them Gods?

L. Because an Historian relating what others have said, or are wont to say, must speak in the same Dialect, if he will keep exactly to the truth; nor is any Author obliged to speak always properly, when he may be better understood by a Figure.—The Apostle speaks of some, whose God was their Belly, and tells us, that Covetousness is Idolatry, and yet I never read of the God [...] or Venter, that were worshipped by the Ancient Greeks, or Romans. Persius makes him at most but a Master of Arts.—

Magister Artium ingeniique;
Largitur Venter.

And Money it self was not Invested with Divine Honours in Juvenals time, if you will believe the Poet.

—Nullas numorum ereximus aras.

I wonder your A—should forget one place of Scripture more conduceing to his purpose than any he has hitherto Cited, in the 4th. ver. of the 4th. Chap. of the 2d. to the Corinthians; Satan is stiled, the God of this World, how plainly might he infer from thence, that Satan was revealed to [Page 72] the Apostle, as the God of this World.

S. But what say you to Moses's Opini­on, That God lived in Heaven, is not that an Error unworthy of a Philosopher? And altogether Pagan?

L. If Moses had taught, that God was so confined to Heaven, as to be excluded from the Earth, or from any part of the Universe or from the Knowledge and Government of Humane Affairs, it might have given this A—some very speci­ous pretence to cavil; but all that Moses says, in the 26th. ver. of the 33d. of Deut. is,—viz. There is none like unto the God of Jesurun, who rideth on the Heavens in thy help, and in his excellency on the Sky.—God is every where, but his goodness, and power streams forth more upon one place of the Universe, than another, for even as the Apostle observes in inanimate Beings, There is one Glory of the Sun, and another Glory of the Moon, another of the Stars, for one Star differeth from another Star in Glo­ry. So much more may we apprehend that God bestows a greater Degree of his Glory upon those places that are receptacles of the blessed Saints and Angels, than upon those which are designed to the use of sinful men. And God is said, Emphatically, to be there, where he displays the strongest Influences of his Grace and Glory! Your [Page 73] Author therefore very absurdly endeavours to disparage Revelation, as adapted to Erroneous Opinions of the Prophet, when hitherto he has given no Instance of one Error in them.

S. What do you think of Moses's desire to see God?

L. I think seeing God in Scripture lan­guage, implys no more than a mere exact knowledge of him, than we usually have in this present Life; for so speaks our Savi­our, Blessed are the pure in Spirit, for they shall see God. And the Apostles speaking of a future State, assures us, That then we shall see him as he is.

S. But Moses, Exod. 33d. 18th. desired to see God with his Bodily Eyes.

L. Then God should have been reveal­ed unto him under a Bodily Shape, if your Author's Hypothesis was true, that God was always revealed to his Prophets, according to their Conceptions of him. But your A—confesses that Moses, nullam Dei, imagi­nemi n cerebro Formaverat, had formed no Image of God in his Brain, and therefore that God appeared under no Image to him. If therefore Moses had formed no Image of God in his Brain, he did not apprehend him as Corporeal; for we always think of Bodies under some Image or another, framing, or compounding Images of Bo­dies [Page 74] that we have not seen, from the Images of those Bodies which have been seen by us; nor could he desire, that God should appear in any Corporeal shape to him; and then his desire of seeing God, can signifie no more, than knowing something more exactly of his Spiritual Nature.

S. My Author says plainly, it implys a contradiction, for a man to see God; but because Moses believed God to be visible, God gave this Reason as consentaneous to Moses erroneous Opinion,—There shall no man see me and live.

L. And yet the true meaning of those words, according to a known Hebraism, is no more than this, That no living man shall see God, which is a Revelation directly contrary to the Apprehensions of Moses, as he is represented by your A—

S. My Author tells me, that that sig­nifies no more than, that God is not to be seen, by reason of Humane imbecility, and that God would not add the other Reason, viz. That it was repugnant to the very Essence of God to be visible, because that was above the Apprehensions of his Ser­vant Moses.

L. Your A—makes Moses think whatever he pleases; in the 24th. Page, he will have him think that God could not be expressed by the Image of any thing [Page 75] that has been seen, tho he was visible, in the Apprehension of Moses; but in the 26th. Page, he asserts, That Moses formed no Image of God in his Brain, and that there­fore God appeared not in any Image to him, tho other Prophets affirm they saw God: But if Moses thought God to be visible, he must needs form some Image, tho per­haps no true one, of God in his mind, be­cause we think of all Corporeal Beings un­der some Figure or another, and if so, your A—most grossly contradicts himself; and if you consult the Text it self, you will see nothing in it, from whence you can conclude, that Moses thought God to be visible.—For we read ver. 18. that he said, Shew me, I beseech thee, thy Glory; which implys no more than a desire to see, not the Divine Majesty its self, but some Crea­ted Being, that might sustain some very visible Signatures of the Glory of God—for whatever Glory God communicates to any Creature, as representative as it were of himself, may very properly be called the Glory of God. What is Recorded of Moses's seeing the back parts of God, im­plys no more than this, viz. That God is seen in the Effects of Revealed Beings, but is not visible to us in the Act of Con­versation.

S. I cannot deny, but that seeing in Scripture, signifies no more than knowing, or perceiving, and therefore I am not un­willing to understand this place, as speak­ing only of a clear and distinct percep­tion.

L. I will not stand to confute some other ridiculous questions of your Author, Viz. Where he says, That God threatned (Exod. 33. 2, 3.) to send his Angel onely to drive off the Hittites, &c. In complyance to Moses Erroneous Opinion, that other Nations were Governed by other Deities: When himself before had owned, that Moses taught, that God whom the Jews Worshipped, was the same that was from all Eternity, and made both the Heaven and the Earth: And therefore it could not be an Error in Moses, to think, that God made use of Angels in Governing the World, when at the same time, he taught, that no other Being was to be Worshipped, but the Lord Jehovah. His Observation, that Moses ascended the Mount to speak with God, because, con­ceiving God to dwell in Heaven, he could not so well imagine him (as he terms it) in any other place, is ridiculous to the highest Degree of Extravagance. What is more unphilosophical, than to confine [Page 77] imagination to a Mounr, which runs be­yond the very bounds of the Universe, into imaginary Spaces, as far as it can have any Notion of possible existence. As if a Man could never Pray to God whom he believes to be in Heaven, unless he raised his imagination, by ascending into the upper Room of his House, or clam­ber'd up all the Stairs of the Monument. Nor is he much more successful in his other instances, upon which he endeavours to lay his rotten and deceitful Foundation. He tells us, That Jonas thought he could fly from the presence of God, and go into Regi­ons, subjected to other Powers, which were created by the supream God: But if this Jonas 1. was so, Jonas must have very odd Noti­ons, of those Beings, who were substituted by God to govern other Nations; he must think that they were blind, and socould not see him come into their Territories, (and yet Angels are stiled Watchmen in the Holy Scriptures) or that they were negli­gent, and would give no Account of him, to their supreme Lord and Master, and that reflects much upon Him, who made, or employ'd them, or as Traytors to their Lord, who would willingly conceal a Rebel, which is altogether as absurd, as any of the preceeding suppositions. But Pray, why does flying from the presence [Page 78] of God, necessarily imply a design to avoid his knowledge, as confined to the Land of Canaan? Is not Cain (Gen. 4. 16.) said to have gone out from the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the band of Nob, before ever God had given the Land of Canaan to the Children of Israel. From whence it is to me evident, that to go from the presence of the Lord, signifies no more than removing from that place, where the Revelation of the presence of God is made, to some re­moter Region. And Jonas fled to Tar­shish, not thinking to avoid the sight of God, but rather fearing Man, more than God; he would not by proclaiming De­struction to Nineveh, draw upon himself the rage and tumult of a Popular Fury. Solomon acted contrary to the Law pre­scribed by Moses to a King of Israel, by multiplying Horses, and Wives, and Cha­riots, but it does not follow, that there­fore God was revealed to him, as approv­ing that in one place, which he condemned in another: For Transgression of a Law, does not argue Error in Judgment, but ra­ther strength of Appetite in most Crimi­nals, few of which there are but can say,

—Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor.

[Page 79] The same Solomon, perswaded by his Wives in his latter Days, went to the Temples of strange Gods, (I presume ra­ther in compliance to their desires, than to any inclination of his own.) Will your A—hence conclude, according to his way of Arguing, that Solomon was taught by Inspiration, the Adoration of a plurali­ty of Deitys, when it is as contrary to Scrip­tures, as it is to Reason it self. As for his imagination, that the 18th. Chap. of Eze­kiel, is repugnant to the 7th. ver. of the 34th. of Exod. and to the 18th. ver. of the 32d. of Jeremiah, it is not much more hard to be confuted than any of the other. God is declared in the 7th. of the 34th. As visit­ing the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Chil­dren, unto the third and fourth Generation. And this is a truth, which all Men must observe, whether they will or no, it being interwoven into that constant order of things, which God has settled in the World. If God takes away an Estate from a wick­ed Father, the Son, tho pious, becomes the poorer for it, and the innocent Babe often expires by a Disease, that is gotten by the vicious Intemperance of a guilty Parent. For God, as Soveraign of the World, may by vertue of his indisputable Prerogative, inflict whatever temporal Evils he pleases, upon the most innocent Person, without In­justice, [Page 80] either by his Fathers Sins, or any other means whatsoever, because he can recompence his light sufferings here with an eternal weight of Glory hereafter. Nor does Ezekiel deny this truth, in the 18th. of Ezekiel, but only affirms, That the Son shall not be punished eternally for the sin of his Father: For that Ezekiel speaks of eter­nal Punishments, which are always afflict­ed according to Merit, seems to me evident from the 26th. ver. When the Righteous Man turneth away from his Righteousness, and committeth Iniquity, and dieth in them; for the Iniquity that he hath done, shall he dye. Where a distinction is manifestly made between Dying in Iniquity, which is the case of every Sinner, who dyes without Repentance; and dying for Ini­quity, which must note futute Punish­ments in the World to come, which are called in Scriptures a second Death.

S. Ezekiel seems to me rather in this Chap. to speak of God's distribution of Temporal Punishments. For the Jews had taken up the Proverb, The Fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the Childrens teeth are set on edge. Because the Fathers had comitted many grand Transgressions, and the Children were led into Captivity for them.

L. And no doubt, but the Children also had filled up the measure of their Fa­thers Iniquity; but admitting even this, which yet ought not to be admitted, there is nothing like a contradiction in these two places, when the Son does suffer for the Father, if he himself is innocent, it is not to him a Punishment, nor always a misfortune, and God does not visit his Trangressions upon him, because nothing but wilful Sin is the Object of the Divine Anger. For external Evils, they may be turned to our Spiritual advantage, and therefore Ezekiel truly affirms, That the Son shall not dye (i. e. be punished in anger with an utter excision) for the sin of the Father. And yet the Son, by the vice and folly of the Father, may fall into very great poverty and afflictions, and by aiding, assisting, and consenting to his Fathers Crimes, may make himself partaker of the guilt, and then is as obvious to Experience, as to Reason, that God does visit the Iniquity of the Fathers, upon the Children, to the third and fourth Generation. His other instance of Samuel's telling Saul, (1 Sam. 15. 29.) The strength of Israel will not lye, nor repent; for he is not a Man, that he should repent; is no contradiction to what Jeremiah says, 18. 7. At what Instant I shall speak concerning a Nation, and concern­ing [Page 82] a Kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it: If that Nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil, which I thought to do unto them. Repentance in God can signifie no more than his not inflicting those punishments, which he has threat­ned by his Prophets: But it does not fol­low, because God would not release the punishment of Saul, (which is all that can be gathered from the words of Samuel,) that therefore God would not avert his threatned punishment from any other re­penting Sinner: For God is not a Man, (as the Text says,) that he should mi­stake feigned, for a real repentance. There are some appearances of contradiction in the most elaborate Authors, that ever yet wrote in this World, and the Commen­tators upon Aristotle himself, are as hard put to it to reconcile some places that look like contradiction, as any of those who have wrote upon the Text of the Old and the New Testament.

S. Whatever you may say to the con­trary, Revelation was always adapted to the capacity of those to whom it was made; which makes me think there was nothing Supernatural in that which is so called.

L. I will then desire you to tell me, what you think of the Revelation made to [Page 83] Noah, that the World should be drown'd with water. What natural capacity was there in Noah to conceive a thing so im­probable, as such a Deluge, when the greatest Wits in these days, who believe it was done, are so much puzled to find out the manner of its doing.

S. Perhaps being well skilled in Astro­nomy, he might from the Stars be inform'd of some strange alteration in the Weather.

L. And perhaps he might not, nay, it is certain he could not, nor are there any natural means to be conceived, whereby he could be informed of that impending danger; and unless you can conceive that Noah was so stark mad as to build an Ark, and take all manner of Beasts and Fouls into it, out of a fantastical Fear, that he should be drowned upon the dry-land; you must confess, he did it by virtue of a Supernatural Revelation,

S. Have you any other instance of the like nature?

L. Yes, more than I shall at present take pains to enumerate; but however, I will gratifie your curiosity with two or three, which will abundantly shew the falsity of your A—s so much boasted Proposition. We read in the 18th. Chap. of Gen. that Sarah was informed by the Angels, (10th. ver.) That she should have a [Page 84] Son. But who, except Spinosa will say, that this Prediction was accomodated to the capacity of Sarah, (or her Lord Abra­ham) when Moses tells us in the 11th. and 12th. ver. That Abraham and Sarah were old, and well stricken in age, and it ceased to be with Sarah after the manner of Women. Therefore Sarah laughed within herself, say­ing, After I am waxed old, shall I have plea­sure, my Lord being old also.

S. A Woman might easily imagin what she earnestly desired.

L. If you except against a Woman, let us consider the Revelation made unto Moses, which you will find to be directly contrary to the Apprehensions, and above the Natural Conceptions of that mighty Prophet. I would feign learn how it was at all agreeable to the natural Conception of Moses, that the lifting up his Rod should be able to work all those Signs, and Won­ders, which it did in the Land of Egypt.

S. Tho it was not a Conception agree­able to reason, yet it might be to his Fancy, and we all know the strength of Fancy in producing wonders.

L. Imagination, without doubt, has very great force upon the imagining Per­son, but that it should be able to have force upon Objects placed without him, so as to work any visible effect upon them, [Page 85] is to me, till I am better inform'd, a very absurd supposition. I know some of the Ancients have been possessed with an Opinion, that the very Eyes of an Envi­ous Person, do dart a Kind of Poyson up­on those who are in a Great Station. And the Poets presum'd they had the same, or like effect upon other Animals.

Nescio quis Teneros oculus mihi fascinat agnos.

And my Lord Bacon says something to solve this Phaenomenon, by the Effluviums of the Animal Spirits: And if the matter of it were true, which I do very much question, his Lordships solution of it, would be the best that could be given. But supposing it true yet such weak Effluvia's as are engendered by the strength of imagination, whatever im­pression they can make on the tender parts of humane Bodies, yet you cannot with­out Madness suppose them able to turn Aarons Rod into a Serpent, (or to make it more like a Living Creature) or turn a whole River into Blood, to divide the Red Sea, slay all the first Born of Egypt, and do works of the like stupendious Na­ture.

S. Did not Pharaohs Magicians do something very like it?

L. All you can infer from thence is only this, viz. that they were assisted by some invisible Powers, which is more than Men of your Principles are willing to grant, who deny their existence, or at least their intermedling with humane Af­fairs.

S. But suppose, such things done (as you Divines call it) by invisible Powers, how shall a Man know whether those Powers are Good, or Evil.

L. God being the Fountain of all Good­ness, no Revelation is made, or confirmed by him, that is repugnant to the immuta­ble Law of Nature, which consists in unfeigned Love to God, and to our Neigh­bour. The Pagan Priests made great pretences to Prophesie and Miracles, but it was to confirm a superstition, contrary to Natural Light, and therefore those seem­ing Signs and Wonders, are justly ascribed to the Operation of Lying and Deceitful Spirits. For these are known Maxims, that Good cannot proceed from Evil, and that a Kingdom divided against it self cannot stand, and we may as well con­ceive that light can be the Fruitful Mother of Darkness, as that Satan can be the Author, Abetter, or Confirmer, of the [Page 87] Precepts of the Decalogue, or the most Holy Rules of Practice deliver'd by our Blessed Saviour.

S. Does not your own Apostle say, that Satan can transform himself into an Angel of Light?

L. We don't say, that Evil Spirits do never Encourage a seeming Sanctity, that is gross Wickedness in a Religious dress, but that they can't be Abetters, or Pro­mulgers, of that real and genuine Sancti­ty, which is prescribed by the Mosaick and Christian Religion, and of the excel­lence of which we have as clear Percepti­on, as we have of the Truth of any Mathematical Proposition. But to pass by Moses, and descend to the other Pro­phets. What Pre-conception by Nature could Isaiah have, that Cyrus should be King of Persia, that Jerusalem should be destroyed by the Chaldeans, and that that very Cyrus, (See Isa. 44. 28.) Should re­build the Temple, saying to Jerusalem, thou shalt be built, and to the Temple, thy Foundation shall be laid. If Revelation was adapted only to the Capacity of the Prophet, certainly, Isaiah was a Person of the largest Natural Capacity, that ever yet was Born into the World, or, as I be­lieve, ever will be Born hereafter.

S. You keep to instances in the Old Testament, it would be more to my sa­tisfaction, to hear something of this Na­ture to be alledged out of the New.

L. What think you of the Doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God; and of the Holy Trinity, which are founded upon Divine Revelation? These could not be adapted to the Capacity, or Opinions of any one inspired Author, since they are above the conception of all Mankind.

S. I fear you mistake this Author. His meaning is not, that nothing is taught in Scripture, which exceeds humane con­ception, for (as he shews, p. 28.) The Prophets were ignorant of speculative things, and were of contrary Opinions amongst themselves, and therefore they might give Vent to some odd Opini­ons, which are altogether irreconcilable to the reasonable conceptions of other Men.

L. I have already examined all those places of Scripture, upon which he would ground this wild assertion, and I hope, have plainly shewed, that no such thing can be deduced from them. But to come closer to the purpose. Your Author must Acknowledge, either that the Pro­phets (as he calls all Divinely inspired [Page 89] Authors) were assisted and taught by God, or that they were guided by their Natu­ral Fancy, Reason, and Judgment. If Prophecy does come from God, and if it be according to his own Definition, in the very first Words of his Book, the certain Knowledge of some things reveal'd to Men by God, he cannot overthrow the certainty of it, in Speculations as well as Practicks, untill he can destroy the very Idea, which all rational Men do entertain of God. He must suppose him either to be nothing else, but the settled course and order of Nature, and then he, and his Disciples must quit the Name of Deists, and set up in the open Defence of Atheism: Or, he must bring upon the Stage an un­thinking, ignorant, or deceitful Deity, that told his Servants a parcel of Idle, Contradictory, and Lying Stories, to amuse the world with a Noise of Divine Truths, whereas they were in reality nothing else, but the Erroneous concepti­ons of fanciful Men. But if on the other hand, he Acknowledge nothing at all of Divinity, in those whom we receive as inspired Authors, he must then shew his Reader, how the Prophesies and Miracles of those Men, are reconcilable with the ordinary Course and Power of Nature.

S. He does shew you, in his 4th Chap­ter, that there neither is, nor can be any such thing as a Miracle.

L. We will discourse that point more narrowly some other time, but at present, I will onely urge one instance more, that utterly overthrows your Authors sandy Foundation. We read, in the 2d Chapter of the Acts, that when the Apostles were all with one accord in one place, there appeared unto them Cloven Tongues, and sate upon each of them, and they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other Tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance. Now I would feign learn from your Author, who some say was a School Master, and therefore ought to be well versed in the Didacticks, whether there be any way in Nature, to teach any one Man, much less a Number of Men, the Words, and Idioms of many Foreign and unknown Languages, in a moment, or instant of time?

S. I must confess, I cannot well con­ceive how such a thing could be done, without the assistance of some invisible Power; but still this only proves an infu­sed knowledge of words, but not of things.

L. If you grant an infused knowledge of words, it is the greatest Folly in the [Page 91] World to deny the possibility of an in­fused knowledge of things. For it is much more easy to conceive, that God can de­clare his will to some chosen Persons, and leave the manner of expressing it to their natural and acquired Abilities; than that he should infuse, simul & semel, in one in­stant of time, the knowledge of several Languages into the minds of unlearned Men.

S. I for my part, am resolved never to be a Bigot in speculative Matters, and since he speaks so much for Morality in all parts of his Book, I cannot choose but have a good Opinion of him.

L. Morality, and Mathematical De­monstration, serve many times for canting terms, to be specious covers to Wicked­ness and Non-sense. He grants, the Pro­phets had clear Perceptions of Morality, for so may all Mankind besides, but that we are not bound to believe them in any thing that is speculative; that is, we may Lawfully reject all the Credenda of the Mosaick, or the Christian Religion. As for Example, according to his way of arguing, when the Scripture tells, You must Love the Lord your God, with all your Heart, with all your Soul, It onely teaches you, that you should be Pious; but you are not bound to believe from thence, [Page 92] that there is a God, or that he Governs the World, or that he alone is to be Wor­shipped, for these, according to his Hypo­thesis, are speculative Opinions, concer­ning which the Prophets had contrary and repugnant Notions: And thus your Author would plant abundance of Piety, but not one grain of the Knowledge of God in the World. After the same man­ner, when the Apostle says, 2 Thes. 1. 7. That the Lord Jesus Christ shall be reveal'd from Heaven, with his mighty Angels, v. 8. in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, v. 9. Who shall be punished with Everlasting Destru­ction, from the presence of the Lord, and from the Glory of his Power. We are to Learn, that we are to obey the Gospel in being Just and Charitable, but we must not thence, infer, that those who are un­just and uncharitable, Shall certainly be Punished with Flaming Fire, or with an Everlasting Destruction from the Face of the Lord; And I will now leave it to your Judgment what Friend he can be to Piety, Justice, or Charity, who divests them of the certainty of a future re­ward, and leaves them no other Encou­ragement, than what arises from the Go­vernment of the passions in this Life, [Page 93] which tho it be a considerable part, yet it cannot be the whole of humane Happi­ness. Or, whether he is not an Encou­rager of Impiety, Injustice, and Oppressi­on, and all manner of known and un­known Vices, who takes away from wicked Men, the Terror of being tor­mented with the Devil and his Angels. For tho our Saviour says, Mat. 12. 16. If Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself, his Kingdom cannot stand. He will have this Argument only adapted to the Opinion of the Pharisees, but no proof that there is a Devil, or any Kingdom of malicious Spirits, and so good night to your Author's Morality.

S. When you read his 4th. Chap. you will see how earnestly he Pleads for Virtue.

L. If you will bring me what he says, another time, I will gladly admit all that is true, and oppose nothing but notori­ous Falshoods.

Conference III.

S. WEll, Sir, according to my pro­mise, I have read over the 4th. Chap. of my Author, (passing by his third, because it chiefly concerns the Jews,) wherein, I find him to be a very zealous Advocate of true Virtue and Goodness, which I value more than any Speculative Opinion, so much contended for by the Sons of the Clergy.

L. If obedience and submission to God, is the principal Law of Nature, then it is as much our Duty, to believe a Truth when revealed, as it is to obey a Com­mandment when it is promulged, and then it follows, that what he calls Spe­culation, is neither more nor less than a practical, necessary Duty.

S. Your error proceeds from your false Apprehensions of a true notion of a Law. He shews you in his 43d. Page, that the word Law, absolutely taken, signifies that, according to which every individual, or some of the same species, do all, or some one thing, by a certain and determinate Reason; and that it depends either upon [Page 95] the necessity of Nature, or the consent, or authority of Men.

L. Then farewel at once to all Divine Laws, but those which he fancys depend upon the necessary motions of matter, or are confined by the Authority of the Civil Magistrate, or receive their strength from the mutual consent of some determinate Society of Men.

S. I hope you will not deny, that Cor­poreal Necessity is a Law, when all Au­thors speak in the same Dialect; does not Cartes make mention of the Laws of Mo­tion?

L. Cartes, and other Philosophers, have the liberty to Transfer words from their proper Signification, to denote such things as are best understood by a metaphorical Expression. And hence it is, that those Observations, which ingenious Men make of the necessary rest of motion of matter, are called (but figuratively) by the name of Laws; but your A— shews no Legis no­men abso­lute sump­tum, &c. small plenty of ignorance, when he would have the word Law, to signifie, absolutely, corporeal necessity of Nature, which properly speaking is not capable of receiv­ing Nomen Le­gis per Tran­slationemad­res Natu­rales ap­plicatum­videtur. a Law. Nay, he seems to contradict himself, for he says in the 44th. Page, that the word Law, seems to be applyed to natural things, by Translation, and if [Page 96] by Translation, then not absolutely, or properly, as in this place he so boldly affirmeth.

S. But what need this strife about words, if we are agreed upon the thing it self? Why may not my Author claim the same liberty of Speech, as is allowed to Des Cartes, Gassendus, or others of our modern Virtuoso's?

L. Because he designs thereby to esta­blish a fatal necessity in the very minds of Men, which renders them uncapable of receiving a Law, properly so called, which always supposes a liberty of choice, and is attended with the Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments; for tho in the 44th. Page he tells us, That some Laws depend upon the free Arbitration of Men, yet he adds, That he must needs grant, that all things are determined by the universal Laws of Nature, both to Operate, and to Exist, in a certain, and unavoidably manner; and indeed if all things that are, are material, and the Soul its self nothing but a particle of rarefied matter, and all matter is bound by the necessity of nature, to such and such par­ticular Rules; it follows, those Laws of Men which seem most Arbitrary, are as much subject to fatal necessity, as any other operation of dull, and unthinking matter. All the difference is, that in the [Page 97] descending of a Stone, or the ascending of the Fire, we can see and understand the Concatenation, and Co-ordination of ne­cessary causes, but this Chain is less visible in the determinations of the Will, to what we call Moral Good or Evil. But still there is a Chain, that binds a Man as strongly, as if its invincibility was mani­fest to the Eyes of all Men: and if so, then he that kills his Father, or Mother, acts by the same necessary Laws of Na­ture, as he that Honours and Obeys them. And this is the best, and truest account, that I can give of your Author's Scheme of Morality.

S. You must needs mistake him, for he has these words,

Dico tamen has leges, ex placito Ho­minum pendere.

L. That is, because your A—would Monopolize the liberty of contradicting his own Assertions, but observe his cau­tion, he does not say absolutely, that these, or any Laws do depend upon the free will of Man, but that they may be said to do so. First, Because Man being a part of Nature, whatsoever is done by the ne­cessity of Humane Nature, tho it be done by the general, and irresistable force of Nature, [Page 98] yet because they proceed immediately from Hu­mane Power, therefore the Sanctions of those Laws may be said to proceed from the will of Man. But what is this to the purpose? If there be a general force of Nature, which determines all things even the very Soul and Will of Man, to make Laws whether it will or no, then the making these Laws, or the paying Obedience to them, are no free, but necessary Acts, and Men are morally good or evil, not by free choice, but by a necessary compulsion: And this he plainly acknowledges in his second reason, and onely adds, that the Universal considera­tion of fate, and concatenation of causes, cannot serve us, to form right conceptions of Law, and that therefore tho all Acti­ons are predetermin'd by fate, yet it is better to talk of them as Free and Arbi­trary.

S. Let us not quarrel about words, but come to the Definition of the thing, he tells you, that a Law is a Manner of Liv­ing, which a Man prescribes to himself, or to others, for some End, best known to himself. How do you like this Defi­nition? p. 44.

L. I should rather have approved of it, if he had defin'd it a Manner of Living, prescribed by a Superior to an Inferior, and always attended with the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments.

S. Every Man Loves the Product of his own Brains; but Pray, why is your Definition to be preferr'd before my Au­thor's?

L. For several Reasons. First, be­cause it does not exclude God from the Legislative Power, which is most slily done in your Author's Definition. A Law is a Rule, or Manner of Living, or Acting, that is supposed to proceed from some Rational, Intelligent, or thinking Being. And if your Author believes that any such Being, is really existant, why must he be excluded from the Legislative Power, and his Creature, Man, onely Intitled to it?

S. Does not my Author expressly say, (p. 45.) That the Law is to be Distin­guished into Divine and Humane?

L. Yes: But he tells you, that by a humane Law, he means such a manner of Living, as is conducive to preserve our lives, or the common wealth, and by a Divine Law he intends no more than a Law made, that has respect to the true Knowledge and Love of God. So that a Law made by God, to preserve a Com­mon-wealth, or the Life of Man, accor­ding to his Notion, is a humane Law, and a Law made by Man, which is referred to the Love and Knowledge of God, be­comes [Page 100] a Divine Law. God is therefore absolutely excluded by him, from any, so much as Vote, or share of the Legislative Power.

S. Well, what is your next Excep­tion?

L. I think in the 2d place, that he does not accurately enough define a Law, by a manner of Living prescribed by a Man to himself. For Law implies Superiority in the very essential Notion of it. If a Man prescribes a certain way of Living, or Acting to himself, it is at most but a re­solution, which may, upon alteration of circumstances, be revoked without a Sin. If indeed, he calls God as a Witness to such a resolution, it becomes a Vow, and has in Lawful matters, all the Force and Virtue of a Law; but that force arises from the Superiority of the Person, Viz. God himself, unto whom that Vow is made.

S. Do not Senators make Laws, that bind themselves?

L. Yes, and very justly too. For the Authority of a Collective Body of Men, is Superior to the Authority of any one Member of it, and he, or they that of­fend against it, in all Democratick Go­vernments, are to be look'd upon, out of the Senate, but as Subjects to that Supe­rior Power which is in the collected Body.

S. This at most, is but a vain Logoma­chy; Pray, what have you more than this, to object against this Definition?

L. I say, Thirdly, that he very un­skilfully leaves out the Sanction of Re­wards and Punishments, which are essen­tial to a Law.

S. Cannot a Superior prescribe a Rule to an Inferior, without adding threats, or promises?

L. Yes, he may: But then the obliga­tion to obedience arises from the Good, that may be gained by that Obedience, or by the Evil, that may be avoided by it. If a Superior, by which I understand one that has Power and Right over me, command me to do a thing, it follows, that my disobedience must needs expose me to the dire Effects of his Displeasure, and that is a sufficient Sanction to con­stitute a Law, without any express threat­ning of any one particular punishment, the Power of Inflicting, which is supposed as essentially inherent in the Superior Per­son. And the same is to be said of pro­mises.

S. I think my Author shews very well, that cunning Lawgivers allure the vulgar to obedience, to wholesome Laws, by propounding to them a quite different end, from that which is essential to the [Page 102] Law its self. For my part, I am willing to be Virtuous, for the reward, that by the necessity of Nature, must needs Spring from Virtue its self; but I have no great Opinion of other Allurements, by which you Divines would intice Men to follow your own Direction.

L. I easily grant you, that there is a pleasure of mind, arising from all Acts of Genuine Virtue, as there is a regret and torment, that attends upon Vice: And that the certain pain, or pleasure, which Accompanies these, with the addition of what probably may be farther expected from God, are the very Sanctions of the Law of Nature. But if there were no pain, or pleasure, that followed any Acti­on, either by necessity of Nature, or free will of God, I cannot conceive how there could be any such thing as a Law. For to what purpose is a Law, when the Transgression brings no Inconvenience, nor the performance of any pleasure, or profit to the Subject?

S. How many Laws are daily Trans­gressed, and yet no Punishment inflicted on the offenders? Do they therefore cease to be Laws?

L. No. Because tho punishment is not a­ctually inflicted upon all that offend, yet it is threatned to all, and the very danger of [Page 103] incurring the penalty, is a sufficient Sancti­on. But in a penal Law, if all possibility of offending God, or Man, or our selves, were taken away, it would then lose the very Nature of Law, and revolt again into its first State of Indi [...]erency. To gain therefore Good, and to avoid Evil, is the true Ends of all Laws; and your Au­thor very much mistakes the point, when he represents rewards and punishments, as adapted onely to govern the vulgar, who know not the true End of Laws, and have not Learned the great Art of be­ing Virtuous for Virtues sake. For re­wards and punishments, are adapted to work upon the will and affections of all mankind, even the Author himself, who would not have ventur'd to write such a Book, if he had liv'd in a Countrey, where he had been sure to have been pun­ished as he deserves for it. He that Loves Virtue, or hates vice, must do it either for some Good, or Evil, essentially inherent, or accidentally annexed to them, and if God by Moses and our Saviour did ex­plain, confirm and enlarge these Sanctions, or adapt them in some cases to the appre­hensions of the vulgar, it does not follow, that obedience to these Laws is servile, but rather that it is a reasonable service.

S. Is he a just Man, that forbears to steal for fear of hanging?

L. No: but yet he may be a just Man, who forbears to steal, for fear of running into that Evil, which reason shews is in­trinsically inherent in it, or which God by his Prophets has threatned, as conse­quential to it. And therefore to disswade Men from having any regard to rewards, or punishments, is the same thing as to disswade them from Acting like Men, or choosing what is best, like unto rational Creatures.

S. Notwithstanding your Pulpit-Cants, my Author gives you a more noble Scheme of Virtue. He shews you, that our understanding being our best part, our chiefest happiness consists in the perfecti­on of that most excellent faculty. That all certain knowledge we can have, de­pends upon the knowledge which we have of God, because nothing can exist, or be conceived without God, as also be­cause we may doubt of all things, whilst we have no clear conception of God: Hence he tells you it follows, that all things which are in Nature, according to the manner of their Existence, or Per­fection, do involve, or express our con­ception of God, and that therefore by how much the more we know Natural [Page 105] things, so much the more we acquire a more perfect conception of God, or may be said to know the very essence of God. And he is most happy, who loves the in­tellectual Knowledge of God above all things, and is most delighted with it. And these mediums of this knowledge, as far as conducive to this End, may be called the Laws of God.

L. Perfection of the understanding, cannot render a Man compleatly happy, unless he can prove that there is no other faculty in the mind of Man, but that of understanding only. For suppose, a Man has a good understanding, but an irregu­lar Will and Affections, that Man cannot be said to be compleatly happy. For happiness being a full Enjoyment of all good things, it must be equally extended to all the faculties of the mind, or it ceases to be true happiness. Our Saviour speaks more emphatically to the purpose, Ye know these things, happy are ye, if ye do them. His Reason, why all the cer­tainty can be had by Man, depends upon his right Knowledge of God, is very false and deceitful, Viz. Because nothing can be, or be conceived without God. By which obscure Circumlocution he means no more, in plain terms, than that there is no other God than the Universe, and that all [Page 106] things that are in Nature, as he says, do involve a conception of God, and that by knowing natural things, we know the very Essence of God. For if God himself is not matter, an accurate knowledge of matter, cannot give us entrance into a more accurate Knowledge of God. The Rom. 1. 20. Invisible things of God from the Creation of the World, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his Eter­nal Power and Godhead; says the Apostle St. Paul. That is, Our Knowledge, that some visible things are made, which could not make themselves, leads Man to an Acknowledg­ment, that they were made by the Eternal, In­visible Power of the Godhead. But this Knowledge arises not from an accurate discussion of all the properties of matter, since it may be deduced from the know­ledge of its bare Existence. For the very Creation of Matter, shews the Invisible Power of God, tho his wisdom is more visibly seen in the various Modification of it. But still it does not follow, that they who best know Natural things, do best know the very Essence of God, unless God himself be nothing else but the mat­ter of the Universe. Suppose, a Man should be a great Virtuoso, and very inge­nious in rendring an Account of the con­catenation of secondary causes, and yet [Page 107] should deny the invisible Power of God, would you say, that by how much the more perfectly he knew natural things▪ so much more perfectly, he knew the very Essence of God.

S. Will you deny what he so zealously asserts, That the knowledge and love of God is the happiness of Man, the very end and scope of all humane Actions, and the chiefest Good that can be attained by us. Is it not no­bly said by him, That we are to love God as our chiefest Good, not for fear of any punish­ment, nor for love of any thing with which we are delighted, but meerly for himself.

L. If your Author, who so often makes mention of the word God, would have told us distinctly what he meant by it, this 46th page would have seem'd to have had something like Natural Religion in it. But if you reflect upon the preceeding words, and the whole scope of his book, you will find, that God signifies no more in him, than the whole Compages of Na­ture, and that he who knows Natural Things, knows the very Essence of God; and then to know God, and to love God, tho splendid Terms, yet in reality signifie no more than to turn Virtuoso, and study the Works of Nature, and to love the World, and hug its Enjoyments as your whole happiness, without troubling your [Page 108] head with the thoughts of the Joys of Hea­ven, or the fear of Hell, which your Au­thor rejects, as conceptions unworthy of a true Philosopher.

S. I, for my part, own an incorporeal Deity, tho I don't believe all the Stories you Parsons tell us of him; and I believe my Author is of the same mind.

L. I do not find it appear in any part of his Writings But this I observe, that by God he understands a Being, that cannot speak intelligibly to mankind, but by the fixed course of Nature, and that suffers us to be abused by Jugling Tricks and Impostures, that Vaunt themselves as Divine Revelations, and that cannot work a miracle, unless your Author gives him leave, and from whom you are to expect no Good, and to fear no Evil. So that all his morality, is reduced to the Love and Knowledge of God, and that is ei­ther the Universe, or an otiose, unactive Being, which is next to nothing.

S. Some men are resolved to approve of nothing. Pray, what can you say, concerning those consequences, which he draws from his Notion of the Law of Nature?

L. If you tell me what they are, I will give you my impartial opinion of them.

S. He says, reason is universal, Reve­lation limited.

L. That the Law of Nature, rightly understood, is Universal; will easily be granted by those who understand what humane Nature is. But your Author cannot infer from hence, that it is a grea­ter Good to mankind than Divine Reve­lation, because it is a more general good. For tho a diffusive Good in respect of its diffusive Nature, is to be preferred before that which is restrained and confined, coeteris paribus, yet it is not to be so abso­lutely, or without exception. Virtue is a greater Good than the light of the Sun, even in your Authors Opinion, who calls it the chiefest Good of man, and yet more men receive benefit from the Light of the Sun, than from Genuine Virtue, if you will believe the Greek Proverb,

[...].

S. Ay, but this is the great advantage of reason above Revelation, that it does not require an Historical belief, which can never work in us the Love of God; for that is onely to be deduced from such common Notions, as carry their own certainty along with them.

L. The great defects of History, are uncertainty, deficiency, superfluity and im­pertinency; when these are absent, Histo­ry is very completive of the intellectual faculties of man. For History is nothing else, as my Lord Bacon well observes, but a Narration of the various Operations of Individuals circumscribed to Time and Place, and its chief end is to advance memory, which is as it were the great Store-House, or Magazine of Knowledge. Uncertain History is a Narration of such things, as either never were done, or have not been well attested, so as to leave no room for doubt. And this defect in Histo­ry destroys the very end of it, which is to give us a certain account of what has been done already, that so we may know how to Act our selves for the future. Deficient History, is an imperfect collection of re­markable Occurrences, wherein many things are omitted, which are worthy a wise Mans observation. And tho this destroys not the End of History, which is certainty of knowledge, yet it Answers not the Expectations of a Thirsty Soul. Impertinent, or Superfluous Hi­story, is a Narration of such Actions, or Circumstances of Action, as for their turpitude, or meaness, deserve not to be recorded. And this is a defect, [Page 111] which can no other ways be supplied, than by a total abolition of those trifling Authors.

S. What is it you would infer from hence?

L. That Faith grounded upon true and useful History, may give us a right know­ledge, and due love of God.

S. How can Faith, that rests upon hu­mane Authority, contend for certainty with Reason, that proceeds by such common Notions, which are admitted as true by all men.

L. Natural Reason does enable men to understand, that God ought to be loved, as the first cause of all those good things, which his Creature Man does enjoy. But then there is a certainty in Sense, as well as in Reason, tho after another manner: And therefore, if the Senses of some Men have been rationally convinced, that God has bestowed other Benefits upon them, than those that were bestowed at their Creati­on, or conveyed by the invisible Hand of his Providence: Why should not such a knowledge excite them to all imaginable Love, and Gratitude to their great Bene­factor? The certainty of a Benefit recei­ved, is all that every good Man requires, in order to be Grateful; and whether that certainty is grounded upon abstracted Rea­son, [Page 112] or a true, faithful Narrative of a mattter of Fact, is not much to the pur­pose—So absurdly does your A— asserts, Nec fides Historiarum quantumvis certa, Dei cognitionem, & consequenter, nec eti­am Dei amorem vobis da [...]e potest.

S. He does not deny that it can't give us Motives to love God, but it can't work in us the love of God, whether we will or no.

L. No more can his adored Reason; for many of the greatest pretenders to Rea­son, have been the most impious Men in the World.

S. You Divines represent God to the Vulgar, as a Law-giver, and his Com­mands you call his Laws; but alas, you mistake the point. For Eternal Verities are the only Laws of God, who Acts by the necessity of his own Nature: For the Affirmations, and Negations of God, do always involve an Eternal verity and ne­cessity in themselves. If God had said to Adam, Thou shalt not Eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, it would imply a contradiction to say, that he did Eat of it.

L. Does not your Author in some places say, That to know and to Love God is the Divine Law?

S. Yet I think, he does.

L. Then according to his way of argu­ing, all men (even the Author himself) do know and Love God, and must do so whether they will or no, to the End of the World: And then there is no differ­ence between Virtue and Vice, for both are done according to God's Will, accor­ding to your Authors sentiments, for both are the Effects of an Eternal necessity, of causes linkt together. The Apostle says, This is the Will of God, even your Sanctifica­tion: Therefore all men are actually sancti­fy'd, God bid Abraham Sacrifice his Son, therefore he was Sacrificed; is not this a pretty way of arguing, to make sport for Children and Fools?

S. Moral Propositions in themselves, are nothing but Eternal Verities, and it was the Prophets only, who were led by fancy, and the Vulgar who are guided by sense, who apprehend them as Laws given by God, The Law-giver, whom they look upon as a just and merciful Prince, setting upon a Throne, and distributing rewards and pun­ishments, to all his Subjects.

L. Your Author must either grant, that God is a wise and understanding Be­ing, and a free Agent, or nothing else but the Mass of Dull and unthinking matter. If he embrace the latter, he should be Master of so much courage as to tell us, [Page 114] and not to play always in the dark, with his two ambiguous Terms of God and Nature. If he will allow, that God is a wise Being, and a free Agent, I cannot conceive any reason, why he should deny him to be a Law-giver, since Wisdom, Power, and Authority, are inseparably interwoven into the very Notion of a God, without any gross conceptions of his setting upon a Throne, like an Earthly Monarch. And if there is an Eternal reason, why God should be Loved, and In­nocence Protected, &c. Which every Man is conscious to himself, that he can do, or let it alone; and besides, If God shews Man by Divine Revelation, what he would have done, and promises Rewards and Pun­ishments, why must these Dictates of God and Nature be denied to be Laws, and I know not what Eternal Verities shuffled into their Room?

S. Because my Author shews, that all Moral Propositions are so.

L. Your Author shews nothing but meer Leger-de-main. It is an Eternal Ve­rity that God is to be Worshipped, but it is no Eternal Verity that he is so. A Moral Proposition is a Divine Law, and an Eter­nal Verity in respect to that Goodness, which is Essential to it; but not for any Active necessity that attends the fame. [Page 115] For if the Will and Understanding be the same Thing in God, Then God Wills all the Treasons, Marthers, and Adulteries, which he understands have been committed in the World.

S. Since you despise my Author's Scheme of Morality, Pray, let us hear one of your own drawing up.

L. I will refer that to Dr. Cumberland's excellent Treatise of the Law of Nature, where he proves by reason equivalent un­to, if not surpassing Mathematical De­monstration, that the Law of God, and the whole rational universe, is the whole of the Law of Nature, and attended with sufficient Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments, that are by God insepara­bly interwoven into the Nature of things.

S. You do not hear me speak against the Natural Law.

L. But by embracing unsound Princi­ples, you utterly destroy the whole Force and Efficacy of it. Your Piety termi­nates in the adoration of such a Piety, as tamely suffers the World to be abused in­to a belief of Miracles and Prophesie, and Inspiration, without any rational possibility of a redress, and Acts by the inflexible necessity of his own Nature, so that all our Prayers, can make no more an impression upon him, than upon a [Page 116] Stone-Wall. Your Justice has no Pros­pect of a future reward, and so in private is left at liberty, to Act what is most con­ducive to the preservation of life and limb. And your Temperance has no other re­straint, nor so much neither, than what Nature has given to those Beasts that Perish. Thus your Deism begins with a fair pretence to Moral Philosophy, but the End thereof is nothing else but a li­centious Liberty and Corruption of Man­ners.

S. I must confess, If there were rewards in Heaven, and Punishments in Hell, they would be great Encouragements to Virtue, and Suitable determents from Vice. But you ground your hopes upon inspired Au­thors, and they pretend to prove their Divine Mission by Miracles, whereas my Author proves, that there never was, nor can be such a thing as a true Miracle, wrought in the Universe.

L. Then I will Discourse that point with you, at our next Meeting, for I am loth to tire you with too long a Dis­course.

S. With all my Heart. For if I was well satisfy'd in that point, I should be better affected to the Christian Religion.

Conference IV. OF MIRACLES.

S. SIR, you are well met: I remember, at our last Conference, you often appealed to Miracles, as the greatest Con­firmations of reveal'd Religion. But I have since that time carefully perused the Sixth Chapter of my very Ingenious Au­thor, wherein I find such Arguments against Miracles, as make me very much doubt, whether there ever was, or can be such a thing as a Miracle, done in the World.

L. I desire not to hear your Opinions, but would gladly be a Partaker of your Reasons.

S. My Author very Judiciously ob­serves, p. 67. that it is, and always was the Mob of mankind, that are and were the great Miracle-Hunters, and Miracle-Makers. It is they, who think nothing to be the Work of God, that is done ac­cording to the usual Course of Nature, but feign and believe Wonders, on purpose, that they may be thought the very Dar­lings [Page 118] of Heaven, And that the Ʋniverse was made for the sake of Man, one of the most inconsiderable Creatures in it.

L. Our belief of Miracles, is groun­ded upon that reason, which is common unto all Mankind, not only the Unlear­ned Vulgar, but also the most sublime Philosophers, who must needs Acknow­ledge, that if matter was at first Created by a Spiritual Being out of nothing, and received from it those Determinations of rest, or motion, which we call its Laws, it may be again produc'd, or alter'd by the very self same Power, which is all that is necessary to constitute a Miracle. The possibility therefore of a Miracle, is as evident to all Learned men, who have not said in their Hearts, that there is no God, as any one proposition in Enclid, and is as deducible from the true Idea of a God, as any of the most Legitimate Con­clusions, that can be deduced from clear and undoubted premises. Your Author therefore with as much Haughtiness as Falsehood, pretends to throw the belief of Miracles upon the Vulgar only; as if all the Jewish and Christian Kings and Emperors; all the Greek and Roman Phi­losphers, by Miracles converted to the Christian Faith; all the Bishops, Priests, and Deacons, that were, or ever shall be [Page 119] in the Church of God; were no better than an ignorant and unlearned Mob, in respect to himself, and two or three up­start Philosophers, who value themselves upon the opposition they endeavour to make, against the most common Notions of all mankind.

S. You begin to be too warm; Pray, let us debate this matter; with more Reason and less Passion. My Author re­refers you to his Fourth Chapter of the Divine Law, where he has largely prov'd, That whatsoever God determines, does in­volve p. 68. an Eternal necessity, because the under­standing of God, is not really distinguished from his Will. And since nothing is ne­cessarily done, but by Virtue of a Divine decree, it clearly follows, That the Ʋni­versal Laws of Nature, are the only Decrees of God. If therefore any thing should happen in Nature, that is repugnant to her Universal Laws, the same thing would be repugnant to the Divine Nature, de­cree, and understanding.

L. Your Authors affected obscurity in this Paragraph, is a sign of want of Judg­ment, or else want of Courage, to speak what he really thinks. He that would destroy the possibility of Miracles, must prove that there is no God, who has the same liberty of will, which we experi­ence [Page 120] to be in our selves. And then in­deed it would clearly follow, that if there was no God, nor no free Invisible Agents, there could be no such thing as a Mira­cle performed in the World. But Pray, how does your Author prove this Grand Assertion?

S. Oh, Sir, very Mathematically. He See p. 49. does it by the properties of a Triangle. For it is the same thing to say, that God un­derstands that the 3 Angles of a Triangle are equal to 2 Right ones, as it is to say, that he wills it should be so. For the truth of that proposition, depends not up­on the Nature of a Triangle, but the very Nature of God, in whom will and under­standing are the same things.

L. That a Triangle must needs have 3 Angles, equal to two Right ones, depends upon that Eternal truth in things, which is antecedent even to the Divine voliti­on. Because it implies a contradiction in the very Terms, to deny the same; and it is no limitation of the Power, or Will of God, to say he cannot will, or do these things, which imply a Contradiction in the very Terms. Gods understanding, or will, no more alters the essential Pro­perties of a Triangle, than the under­standing of a man, because they flow from the very Idea of it. But is there [Page 121] the same necessity, that matter should be always ty'd to the same Rules of Moti­on, as there is, that the 3 Angles of a Trian­gle, should be equal to two Right ones? Does it imply a contradiction in the very Terms, that matter should be created by a Spiritual Being, or receive its Laws of Motion from him, or have those Laws controlled, or suspended by the same Power that made them. If Nature be nothing indeed but matter and motion, and God be nothing else but Nature, then there can be no Miracles; not because the understanding, or Will of God are the same, but because, according to this Hypothesis, there can be no such thing as Will, or Understanding in God. Your Author in his Annotations tells us, that by Nature he understands not only matter, but alia infinita; but Pray, what alia in­finita are these, that are comprehended under the word Nature? If a Spiritual and Intelligent Being, let him shew rea­son, why he cannot as well alter the course of the World, as he could at first Create it?

S. Because it would argue mutability in God, which all sound Philosophers do acknowledge to be an Imperfection, that is unworthy of the Divine Nature.

L. This cannot be owned by those Philosophers, who believe that the world was not ab aeterno, but Created by God. For there is more of Mutability in Crea­tion of the whole Universe, than in the additional Creation of some parts of it only, which is all that we can understand by the word Miracle. I grant, indeed, that the Universal Laws of Motion, which God has given to the Universe, are sufficient, to preserve the World in that Beauty and Order, wherein we now both see and enjoy it; and that we may from thence Learn the great Wisdom of our Heavenly Father, who could settle such a course and order of things, by Chaining each effect to its most immediate cause, as might be sufficient to support the World to all Ages, without the frequent interposition of a Miraculous Power, to alter, or to amend, as it were, the work of his Hands. For if this settled course and order of things, did not give us a right Notion of the Wisdom, Goodness, Power, and other Glorious Attributes of our great Creator, the Love of God could not be any Branch of the Law of Na­ture, which yet in words, at least is more than once acknowledged by your own Author. Miracles, therefore, as your Au­thor well enough observes, are not at all [Page 123] necessary to sustain, or preserve the Uni­verse, since that may be, and is done by the settled and ordinary course of Nature. But yet there are other reasons, which render Miracles highly necessary to man­kind, at some times, and upon some sig­nal occasions, so that without them, we should be the most miserable Creatures of the whole Universe.

S. I would gladly hear what those reasons are.

L. When Revelation is necessary to shew men the way to Happiness, then Miracles are equally necessary to shew men, that such Beneficial Revelations do come from God. All men desire Happi­ness, and are conscious to themselves, that it is not in their own Power, but in the Gift of God. But they never can come to a certainty, either what Degree of Happiness God will bestow, nor up­on what conditions, nor what Attone­ment will be accepted for Sin, without the Benefit of Divine Revelation, and such Revelation cannot be made evident, without the rational Demonstration of a Miraculous Power. For either God must make this Revelation to all mankind, which would disorder, in a manner, the whole Course of Nature, by changing the Natural Faculties of the mind, into [Page 124] Supernatural Endowments, or he must bestow a Divine Power upon those few, to whom he immediately reveals his Will, whereby they may be known to be sent by God.

S. Will you pretend then, that Gods readiness to confer Happiness, and to forgive Sins, are not known by the Light of Nature?

L. I grant, that the Great Benignity of the Divine Nature, is easily deducible from all the Works of his Hands, by all the Rules of unerring Reason: And if we were Conscious to our selves of no Sin, we might be certain that we should receive no Evil from him. But supposing our selves innocent (which yet is a very wild sup­position) we cannot from the good things we enjoy by the Divine Bounty in this Life, absolutely conclude what Good Things we shall enjoy in a futute State. And much less, since we are guilty of known Breaches of the Divine Laws, can we be sure of the Remission of Sins, and the Donation of Eternal Happiness, since it depends upon the free Goodness of God, which is not determined by any necessary Rule of Action. A Deist therefore ex­pects Pardon from God, just so as a Con­demn'd Criminal hopes Forgiveness, from a mild and gracious Prince. He has some [Page 125] General Notion, of the Good-Nature of his Soveraign, and therefore has some hopes it may be extended to him, as well as to others. But a Christian has the same assurance of a conditional Forgiveness of Sins, as a Malefactor has, that Sees and Reads a Proclamation of Pardon, under the broad Seal of his offended Prince. Tho Miracles therefore are not necessary to support material Beings, yet they are to assure mankind, of its Happiness, and which do you think is of greatest mo­ment? The Stateliness of the Habitation, or the felicity of those Rational Creatures that inhabit in it?

S. If Miracles were necessary to pro­mote the Happiness of all mankind, why are not all men made Partakers of their Beneficial influence? Why must Mira­cles be wrought only in some Ages of the World, and in the sight too of only one Nation, not very Famous for War, or Learning? Why must all the Gentiles Perish, because they knew not a matter of Fact, that never was made known un­to them? These are prejudices against your reveal'd Religion, which I can never conquer, and am therefore forc'd to fly from that confined Light, to the more diffusive Light of Nature.

L. Whilst man kept that integrity, wherein he was at first Created, there was no absolute necessity of Miracles to make him happy, who was happy enough before in the Enjoyment of his own In­nocence. Nor was there any great need of Miracles, whilst a traditionary know­ledge of the Decree of God, to save man­kind, was kept alive in the World, by the long Lives of the Ante-diluvian Patriarchs. But when all Flesh had Corrupted their ways before God, and the Knowledge of one supreme Deity, which some will have to be a Connate Notion, was almost to­tally eraced out of the minds of all man­kind, as is evident from humane, as well as Divine Historians, then it was very ex­pedient that God should make a farther Revelation of himself, confirmed by Mi­racles, without which it could not have had the force of a rational Evidence, To save mankind from utter perdition. And therefore, God first called upon the World by Noah, the 8th Preacher of Righteous­ness, and then called Abraham out of his Fathers Idolatrous House, and made a Cove­nant with him, that he and his Seed, should serve him. And when the State of the World required, that a manner of ador­ing God should be settled in it, tho not absolutely best in its own Nature, yet [Page 127] most suitable to the Genius of the Jews, and that posture of affairs, which was then Predominant in the World; the Wickedness and Folly of Man, in abu­sing the Light of Nature, render'd it ne­cessary, That Moses should be sent to the Israelites, to bring them out of the Land of Egypt, with Signs, and Wonders, and shew them after what manner God would then be Worshipped. So that Miracles are necessary, first, when a new manner of Worship is to be planted in the World: And there­fore Moses was endued with the Power of Working Miracles, to convince the Israe­lites, that the Ceremonial Law was Di­vine, tho additional to the Law of Na­ture. Or Secondly, When the true man­ner of worship is in danger of being lost, And therefore Elijah and Elisha in the Time of Ahab, when Idolatry made its greatest en­croachment upon the true Religion, by Di­vers Signs and Wonders from Heaven, cal­led back the Israelites, to the true Worship of the only God. Or Thirdly, When a man­ner of worship, that is of Divine institu­tion is to be alter'd, or disannull'd, as was the Ceremonial Law by the coming of our Saviour.

S. But what must become of those, who never saw nor heard of these Mira­culous Revelations?

L. They have the Light of Nature, Let them use that well, and leave themselves to the Mercy of God. The Scriptures no where say, That all those who have not seen nor heard of a Miracle, shall be Damn'd, tho it teaches, that if they be sav'd, it must be by Virtue of the Name of Jesus. And therefore the strength of your argument is quite lost, unless you can prove that wild assertion. Besides, the knowledge of reveal'd Religion, is not put up in so narrow a corner of the World, as men of your perswasion do seem to imagine. For there is no Nation, but what may em­brace the Gospel, if they please to listen to its rational evidence, and I would feign know what injustice it is in God, to suffer them to Perish, who either knowing no­thing of the Miraculous Demonstration of the Gospel, make an ill use of the Light of Nature, or those who hearing its rati­onal evidence, abuse their reason in not consenting to it?

S. But still you do not clear the main difficulty, objected by my Author, that the Power of Nature, is the very Power of God. How then can a Miracle be done by Natural Power?

S. Your Author first begs his Question, and then very boldly Triumphs in the Victory, as if extorted by force of reason. [Page 129] He presumes it granted as a first Princi­ple, That there is no other God but Nature, and that this Nature is fixed and immuta­ble, not a free Agent, but a perpetual slave to fatal necessity. And thence strongly concludes, That if there be no Power but that of Nature, then there can be (oh, won­derful demonstration!) no supernatural Power. But we, on the other hand, pro­ceed by a more plain and intelligible way of reasoning. We suppose, That since Matter is a dull, unactive Principle, it could not make it self, nor reduce it self into that decent and useful order, in which now we see it. 2d. That it was created by a Superiour Being: That that Superior Be­ing must be endued with all manner of Perfections, as being the first Cause of all Perfections in the Creature. 3. That Wisdom, Ʋnderstanding and Liberty are Perfections, and therefore consequently must be in the highest degree in him, who is the first Cause of them. And Lastly, That his Wisdom is seen in all the works of his hands. If therefore your Author would argue fairly against us, let him attack boldly any one of these Propositions, con­cerning the Nature of God; and if we cannot defend them, we will become Worshippers of the great Goddess Nature—But if God is an Understanding Being, he [Page 130] must be a free Agent: And if he be a pow­erful and free Agent, what should hinder his stopping, or disordering the regular course of Nature, when the doing so is conducive to his own Glory, and the gene­ral Benefit of all Mankind? Unless you can prove by Scripture, that he has sworn by himself, he would never do it.

S. Does not my Author tell you, That it is a foolish thing to limit the power of Nature, and to say, her Laws extend to some things on­ly, and not to all?

L. Your Author speaks herein, as little like a good Philosopher, as a good Jew, or a good Christian. If the Laws of Nature are fix'd and immovable, they may be ob­serv'd; and the Observation of them, we call, the study of Natural Philosophy. To say therefore with your Author, That the Course of Nature is fixed and immutable, and yet that her power extends to all things; Potentiam Naturae in­finitam esse omnino cre­dendum est. is a contradiction in the very Terms: for if she could do all things, she could alter her setled Course, and move in an Order quite contrary to what now she steers. Nor does he mend the matter, by asserting in the same page, That the (fixed) Laws of Nature, extend to all things that are compre­hended in the Divine Ʋnderstanding. For the Divine Understanding must needs comprehend as well what is impossible as [Page 131] what is possible to be done; and the Mutabi­lity, as well as the Fixation of the Rules of Motion in material Bodies: into such notori­ous Absurdities does your Author run, whilst he endeavours to destroy the credibility of Miracles, by jumbling together the Names of God and Nature.

S. If there be a fixed Course of Nature, how can there be a Miracle, which is nei­ther more nor less than an interruption of it?

L. Because it is fixed by a Superior In­telligent Being, who can unfix the same, when it is for his own Glory, or the Gene­ral Benefit of Mankind. If Nature did not keep, for the most part, a setled Course, we could have no distinct Notion of a Miracle; but she is so steady, that she gives us time to view her, and from that view to frame such Axioms of Possibility and Impossibility, as are as evident to our Reason, as any of those principles, which some (tho I fear not truly) do stile Innate Notions.

S. I am still of my Author's mind, That we call those works Miracles, whose natural Causes we do not understand.

L. No: We rather call that work a Mi­racle, which we know is done, not by a Na­tural, but by the immediate Energy of some Supernatural Power. For the Course of Nature being steady, nothing is more [Page 132] easie than to observe, when her Course is broken; i. e. when something is done, that we are sure is repugnant to those fixed Rules which she is bound to observe in all other cases.

S. Prithee what are those Rules? How do you know that they have ever been bro­ken?

L. The first Rule, Ex nihilo, nihil fit; Out of nothing, there can come nothing; is as clear by its own light, as any One Propo­sition we can easily frame unto our selves. Either therefore Matter made it self; that is, it was a Cause before it did exist, which is a Wild Absurdity, or it was made by a Superior Being, and its very Production the beginning of Miracles. We all know that mutations of bodies may be made by the regular Laws of motion; but that Matter should make it self, or be produced out of nothing by her own Laws of motion, is re­pugnant to the common sense of mankind. If Matter therefore was made, there was a time when it did not exist, and therefore its motion from non existence to existence, could not be according to any fixed Rule of Na­ture, which had then no being, and conse­quently God did not always work by fix­ed and unalterable Rules, to which the very Notion of Creation is directly repug­nant.

S. You ramble too wide from our pre­sent purpose: Can you prove that any thing yet was ever done, since the Creation, that was certainly repugnant to any One fixed Law of Nature? which may be a sufficient Testimonial to a man, that he is sent from God.

L. It is a Maxim in Reason, That one body acts upon another by Contaction or Pro­trusion only. If two bodies were placed never so near, and no contiguous body between, they might remain to all Eternity in that po­sture, without affecting each other, or pro­ducing any alteration in them. If therefore any man can produce an alteration in bo­dies, by the sole word of his mouth, all men will conclude this man does act by virtue of a Supernatural Power. When there­fore the Children of Israel saw Moses turn­ing water into blood, or bringing Lice and Frogs, &c. upon the Land of Egypt, by the lifting up his Rod; or our Saviour curing diseases by the word of his mouth, or raising men from the dead, &c. they must conclude that this was done by a spiritual, and not by a material power, which can cause no altera­tion on another body, but by Contraction, or Emission of minute Particles, the secret O­perations of which, do constitute the whole body of Natural Magick. Now if the mov­ing of the Wand, or speaking a few words, [Page 134] did produce the wondrous Effects but now mentioned, in the production, or alteration of bodies, by the sole force of Nature, they would do it always, when utter'd or ap­ply'd after the same manner; because the Laws of Nature are fixed and immovable. But since we see they have done it, but cannot do the same thing again, we very rationally conclude, that these alterations were made in Bodies by a Spiritual and a Su­perior Power. Your Author therefore must not think to sham us off with a Wild Pre­tence, That what we call Miracles, were some strange works of Nature, so called with respect to the ignorance of the Vulgar: For we are willing the Miracles upon which our Re­ligion is grounded, should be tryed by the most known Axioms of Natural Philosophy, and challenge the whole Race of Epicurean Atomists, to shew how they could be done, according to any Hypothesis that ever yet was framed, of the Mechanical Laws of Mo­tion.

S. Does not my Author clearly demon­strate, That the Sun's stopping his course, of which we read in the Book of Joshua, was nothing else but a refraction of Light, the Sky being then full of Hail? And the like may be said of the Dial of Ahaz.

L. Your Author boldly says much; but he proves nothing. The standing still of the [Page 135] Sun, or the prolongation of Light by any other means, whether Natural or Miracu lous, would have been equally beneficial to the Israelites, in affording them time to slay their Enemies. But because it would be greater Encouragements to the Israelites, to see God himself assisting them in a miracu­lous manner, and the Scriptures do relate this as a Miracle; and since no sufficient Reason can be given, why the Sun should stop his Course, (or the Earth stand still, which in the Effects is the same thing) unless by the immediate Power of God, we have more Reason to believe the Scripture-Narrative, than the improbable Conjecture of your daring Author. For why must we needs conclude, That because it was possible the Children of Is­rael might be deceived, that therefore they certainly were so? Or how is it probable, that the Air being full of Hail, should make a whole Nation believe that the day was longer than it ought to be?

S. Supp [...]se the Earth did stand still, does it therefore follow it must be a Miracle? Might there not be a Concourse of grosser Particles of Matter, in the Liquid Ether, that might stop its Course for a Season, without the interposition of a miraculous Power?

L. Since we have no infallible Knowledg of all the possible motions that may hap­pen [Page 136] in the Celestial matter, we cannot conclude that New alterations therein, are the immediate effects of a supernatu­ral Power. But since we are sure, that one body works upon another, by con­taction only we are sure that Joshua's Prayer could by no force of Nature, cause the continuance of the Sun upon the Ho­rizon, beyond the usual time. But alas, we do not seek for Miracles in the Hea­vens above, nor in the Seas beneath, most Fruitful of amazing Prodigies. We ap­peal to the most approved Axioms of Na­tural Philosophy, as the Tests of the truth of those Miracles, upon which our Reli­gion is grounded. He that admits the Historical part of Revealed Religion to be true, as your Author does more than once, can never pretend to solve all that is therein recorded, by Natural causes, with­out running into absurdities of the grossest Nature. In complyance to his own Hy­pothesis, he must believe that the Course of Nature is settled▪ and yet in comply­ance to the Historical Account of the Scrip­tures, he must believe that words can cure Diseases, and raise the Dead, &c. And yet that the same words, spoken by another Person, cannot do it, i. e. That the Course of Nature is settled, and that it is not settled, but moves at random. He [Page 137] must admit that one inanimate Body, Acts upon another only by contaction; And he must admit, that words have made alte­ration in inanimate Bodys, which yet can cause no other contaction, than what arises from the modulation of the Air. He must believe it to be a Law of Nature, That the Dead cannot be raised up to Life, because that is known to be above her usual Course, and he must believe that the Dead have been restored to Life, by Virtue of a Divine Com­mand. In short, your Authors endeavour to solve Miracles by Natural causes, is ri­diculous to the highest Degree, for he at­tacks reveal'd Religion in that place, which is of all others most impregnable; if the Sparks of your Principles, did believe that Moses and the Prophets, and our Saviour, did really do all those mighty things re­corded of them, by a due application of Natural causes, why do not they attempt to do the same? Or why do they laugh at all others who do attempt it, as Fools and Madmen? And how does it happen, that no such things were ever well attested to have been done by other Persons, who have made Experimental Philosophy their study, with good success? And how comes it to pass, that they are repugnant and ir­reconcilable to all the Axioms of Philoso­phy, that hitherto have been Written, [Page 138] that the more any Learned Man considers them, the more he finds of a Natural im­possibility in them? And why can't your Author find out as easy and probable a so­lution, of all the Signs and Wonders, wrought by our Saviour, as of the standing still of the Sun, or the Passage of the Children of Israel over the Red Sea?

S. My Author is a wiser Man, than to believe all the strange Stories to be literal­ly true, which you read in your Bibles. He tells you, that whatsoever is there re­ported to be done, which cannot possibly be ascribed to Natural causes, is to be pre­sumed as thrust in by malicious designing men. And that in telling Wonders, the Scriptures speak to the Fancy, but not to the Reason of mankind.

L. Nothing speaks less to the fancy, than the Christian Religion, which in its Doctrines and Precepts too, is altogether perfective of humane reason. But if your Author denies his assent to the Historical part of the Bible, and only in some places pretends to give it, to please the States of Holland, why does he give no reason for his dissent? For one substantial reason, would be sufficient in this case, to over­throw the whole bulk of reveal'd Religi­on? Why does he not shew, that no man can have any certainty of any matter of [Page 139] Fact, unless he see it done with his own Eyes? Why does he not prove that Num­ber, and probity of Witnesses are no suf­ficient motives to assent? VVhy does he not produce some Testimonies of Witnes­ses, that may invalidate the credit of these, who have recorded the Miracles of our B. S. or of his Apostles? There is cer­tainly no more obvious way of ruining re­veal'd Religion, than the disproving those relations of Miracles, upon which its ra­tional Evidence, is most strongly groun­ded. Either therefore your Author could find nothing to say on this topick, or else through inadvertency, he has omitted those Arguments, which are most condu­cive to support so bad a cause.

S. It is enough that he demonstrated before, that the Power of God and Na­ture being the same, there can be no such thing as a Miracle.

L. An Historical Account, is to be re­futed in an Historical manner, not by Fo­reign Arguments, which have no force to refute a matter of Fact. We urge the Testimony of a sufficient Number of highly creditable Witnesses, that Miracles have been done; your Author denys all, because according to his reason, it is im­possible any such thing should be. This is just as if a blind man should endeavour [Page 140] to confute all those who testify there is such a thing as light, by giving his reasons that oblige him to think, that there can be no such thing. VVhen a thing is well at­tested to have been done, it is a vain at­tempt to make men Renounce their senses, in complyance to his reason.

S. You think you have gained a great point, when you have brought a man to acknowledge, the reality of your boasted Miracles; But alas, you fight for that which can do you no good when you have gain'd it. For Miracles can never make us understand, either the Essence or Existence, or Providence of God.

L. According to my Notion of a Mi­racle, it is a work that is done by the im­mediate Finger of God, and that a work we know to be done by God alone, should not so much as render us certain of the Existence of a God, is to me an unaccoun­table Riddle. Again, a Miracle is a work that we know cannot be done, according to the Mechanical Laws of matter and motion, but is therefore ascribed to a free, Spiritual and Powerful Agent, and yet that all this should be no demonstration of the Spirituality, Freedom, and Power of the Divine Nature, is to me the 2d part of the same Riddle. Again, a miracle is a work that is wrought, to give some men [Page 141] a Testimonial, that they are sent on some errand by God, to his Creature man, and yet that this should be no Argument of Gods Providence, nor at all prove that he takes any care of mankind, is the third and last part of the Riddle, which I hum­bly beg you would be pleased to unfold to me.

S. That I will, and very briefly too. We gather the Existence of God, from known and received Notions, but if there were any superiour Power, that could alter these Notions, it must necessarily destroy the very knowledge of a God, or at least compel us to doubt of his Existence.

L. It is not by Miracles, but by the very light of Nature that we understand, that there is a Being, superiour to our Fa­culties, who can alter them for the better or the worse, according as he pleases. But then the same reason tells us, that Truth is one of his most adorable perfections, and from thence we conclude, that he has gi­ven us right Faculties, and will not become the Author of deceit. But it seems, your Author thinks, that he can never be secure of the Truth of his Faculties, if he should once believe that there is a God, who is a Powerful and Voluntary Agent.

S. No, there is a further reason, for if any thing be repugnant to Nature, it is [Page 142] repugnant to those first Principles, from whence we conclude the Existence of Na­ture it self. And what certainty is there, if you destroy first Principles?

L. A Miracle is so far from being re­pugnant to first Principles, that it is alto­gether declarative of them. Is it not to be admitted as a first Principle in reason, That there is a God who made the World?

S. Heavens forbid I should deny it.

L. And that can annihilate the World?

S. I see no reason to deny it.

L. If then alteration of some part of the Universe, be less than annihilation, you must grant it possible, and what then is there in a Miracle, that is repugnant to the first and most obvious Principles of Reason?

S. But he tells you, that whether a Mi­racle be a work, either which proceeds from Natural causes, which cannot be ex­plained, or has no other cause than the immediate Will of God, yet still it exceeds the reach of humane understanding, and we can understand nothing from that, which exceeds the very Standard of our Faculties.

L. There is nothing in a Miracle, that exceeds the bounds of humane understan­ding, but only the manner of the Divine Operation in the Production of it. Our [Page 143] senses bear Witness that the work is done, and our reason concludes, that none but God could do it. But we do not know the manner of the Divine Operation: Nor no more do we comprehend the manner of the Divine Operation in the Creation of the World; but does it therefore follow, that Creation, because it exceeds the bounds of humane understanding, can give us no true knowledge of the Essence, Existence, or Providence of God?

S. I cannot well answer your last Argu­ment; but in the 72d page, I think my Author argues very well; viz. That if any thing was done, above the power of Nature, or contrary to Nature, it would be repugnant to that Order, which God has appointed by uni­versal Laws to be eternal; and the belief of such a thing would make us doubt of all things, and bring us at last to Atheism.

L. And pray why so? What do you understand by Nature, but those Laws of Motion by which God does preserve the Ʋni­verse in that Beauty and Order wherein we now enjoy it? These we acknowledge to be sufficient to give us knowledge of the Exi­stence and Wisdom of God, vvhich vvould be knovvn by the Work of his hands, tho there vvere no such thing as a Miracle. Nor do vve say, That a Miracle is absolutely necessary to punish ill men, or to reward the [Page 144] good; God can do that by his Providence, and the setled Course and Order of things: And though God does it by Miracles some­times, yet that is not for want of Power to do it otherwise, but only that these Miracles may the more be considered as Testimonials of a Divine Mission. Tho therefore the frequent interruption of the setled Course of Nature, would render the Endeavours of those Vain, who gave their minds to the study of Natural Philosophy; yet the interruption of it at some certain Times and Seasons, when God is pleased to communi­cate some particular message to mankind, is no obstruction to the study of Nature, and is a great and necessary introduction to a compleater knowledge of the Will of God. For what proportion of time is there between the Miraculous Ages of Moses and our Saviour, and the duration of the VVorld? And how small is the Number of well attested Miracles, in respect to all the other works of Na­ture?

S. Suppose there were real Miracles, yet my Author proves from Scripture, that they can lead us into no true Knowledge of God. For a Prophet of the false Gods, might work Signs, and Wonders, and yet de­serve to be Stoned for his pains. See Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3. Verses.

L. A Miracle is an appeal to our senses, that what is done, is not done by any Vi­sible or Material Being. But because there are Bad, as well as Good Invisible Agents, we are to Judge of the reality of a Mira­cle, by the Good or ill Doctrines, which it is alledged to support. The Magicians of Pharaoh, and the Pagan Priests in all Ages, alledged Miracles, to destroy the true Notion of a God, and to loosen all the sacred Bonds of Morality, but neither were these Miracles well attested, nor were they to be regarded, because they tended only to destroy and corrupt Natu­ral Religion, and Natural honesty too. And indeed the Pagan Superstition, seems to me to have been nothing else but a Di­abolical Revelation of certain Names of Deities, Rites, and Ceremonies, as might keep men furthest from God, and corrupt that Idea of him, which is easy enough to be deduced from the Light of Nature. It is very plain, that they knew not the Ori­ginal of their own Religious Rites and Ceremonies, for so says Antigone in So­phocles.

[...].
[...].
[...]
Sophoc in Antigone.
[...].
Why should a Mortal break immortal Laws,
Not made by Man, but by the Gods them­selves?
That ever must remain, tho none can know
The Fountain whence those lasting Rivu­lets flow.

Nor indeed, is it any wonder that they should not know the Original of those Rites and Ceremonies; which have no Foundation in Nature, nor were so much as of humane institution, but shuffled into the world by the Tricks and Impostures of Evil Spirits. But tho Evil Spirits may be Authors of some things that look like Prophesies, Miracle, or Inspiration, yet they never can nor will do any thing to establish a Religion, that gives a true No­tion of God, and Teaches a rational wor­ship of him, and tends to the good and benefit of mankind. If therefore we have distinct Notions of Moral Good and Evil, and of Natural Religion, we must have distinct Notions of the usual Effects of Good and of Evil Spirits. The Jews were very sensible, that one Evil Spirit might by Collusion give place, or at least seem to give place to another; and thence maliciously concluded, That our Saviour cast out De­vils [Page 147] by Belzebub, the Prince of Devils. But our Saviours Answer is sufficient, Viz. If Satan be divided against himself, how shall Mat. 4. his Kingdom stand, because ye say, that I cast out Devils by Belzebub? i. e. If I, who teach the true Worship of the true God, cast out Devils by Satan, then Satan is his own Enemy, and Industriously de­stroys his own Idolatrous Kingdom, which with so much pains he has planted in the World.

S. If there was so much force in Mira­cles, p. 73. as you do pretend, methinks, the Miraculous Age of Moses, should have been most Religious of all others, but your own Bibles shew, That the Israelites fell immediately into the Idolatrous Worship of the Golden Calf, Notwithstanding the Number of Moses's pretended Miracles.

L. The Jews living in the midst of Ido­latrous Nations, and Newly Emancipa­ted from Egyptian Slavery, might be temp­ted to Act contrary to their reason, in complyance to the corrupt customes of those who liv'd round about them. But I do not think, that thereby they thought to relinquish the Worship of the true God, but rather to change the manner of it: Or if they did, yet they were quickly recal­led by Moses to the true Worship of God. And this must be granted by your Author, [Page 148] to be very much for the honour of Re­veal'd Religion, That the Worship of one God, was not the Legal Religion of any one Nation, but that of the Jews only.

S. I still fear, that the Scriptures, by Gods doing a thing, do mean no more, than his permitting it to be done by the ordinary Course of Nature. For (Sam. 1. 9. Chap. 15. 16. verses). God is said to tell Samuel in his Ear, that he would send Saul unto him, and yet it appears, that Saul came to him, as led by Natural Motives, Viz. to seek his Fathers Asses. In the 105 Ps. 24th Verse. It is said, God turned the hearts of the Egyptians, to hate his People; in the first of Exodus, a Natural cause is render'd of that aversion. p. 75.

L. Suppose you should hear a poor man, that has receiv'd an Alms of a stranger, say to himself, God has sent me relief; Could you from hence conclude, that this Poor Man believ'd, That God never was the Au­thor of a Miracle, but always wrought by Natural causes?

S. I must confess, I see no reason for such a conclusion.

L. No more ought your Author ridicu­lously to conclude, that because the Scrip­ture speaks of some Natural things, as done by God, therefore God never works in a Supernatural manner. For tho Saul [Page 149] seems to be led to Samuel by Natural causes, yet the prediction to Samuel, that Saul should certainly come to him, that he should be King of Israel, must needs be ascribed to a Super­natural Power. The Heart of the Egypti­ans was turned against the Children of Isra­el, because they feared their Numbers; But Exod. 1. what natural reason can be given of all those other Signs and Wonders, which are reckoned up in the same Psalm?

S. I must confess ingenuously, that if all things were done by Moses and our Savi­our, in that exact manner, according to which they are related, it is impossible to give a solution of them by Natural causes, especially, if Natural causes do always work in a fixt and unmoveable order. But my Author very judiciously shews, that there are many Circumstances in a Mira­cle, which the Scriptures do omit, espe­cially, when they are Sung in a Poetic Stile, which if they were expressed, would plainly shew, that what we now admire as Supernatural, was only an effect of Natural causes: And not only so, but many Circumstances of the Miracles re­corded, do shew that they required Na­tural causes, to bring them to perfection. See Exod. 9. v. 10. Moses could not bring boyls upon the Egyptians, without first throw­ing up Ashes in the Air. And Exod. 14. [Page 150] 21. We read, That the Red Sea was divi­ded by a strong East Wind. Elisha lay upon the Child, that was supposed to be Dead, and so reviv'd him by the heat of his Body. In short, if any thing is reported in Scripture, that is directly repugnant to the Laws of Nature, or cannot follow from them, my Authors opinion is, that it is added by some Sacrilegious Persons, who design'd to impose a Fable upon the World.

L. A tedious relation of impertinent Circumstances, is avoided by all Judicious, and Faithful Historians. But to omit Cir­cumstances that are material, and the Knowledge of which alters the very Na­ture and Denomination of an Action, is a Trick only of knaves and impostors. If therefore Moses and the Evangelists, in those Books which are plainly Historical, did designedly omit those Circumstan­ces of Action, which would have con­vinced the world, that those were only the Works of Nature, which they would make the world believe were the very immediate Works of God, whatever cre­dit their Writings might have met with in After-Ages, they could have found none in their own. For the Jews that saw what was done by Moses, would have known by the Circumstances of the Acti­ons, [Page 151] that were designedly omitted, that whatever he might pretend, there was no­thing in them, but what was effected by the sole Power of Nature: And how then could he have perswaded the Jews of his own Age, that he was sent from God? Or how could he have made so many false Revelations publick, in the sight of the whole Nation? And why should they be such Fools, as to erect a Government in Church and State, upon a Foundation, which they of that Age must needs have known to be too weak to support it? With what Face could our Saviour, tell the Jews of his Age, that his works testify'd of him, if there was nothing in them Miraculous, but what was made so to appear by the partial and the unfaithful Relation of his own Friends and Disciples. It is a false Insinuation of your Author, that Miracles are for the most part Sung in a Poetick manner; for they are historically related, as motives to the credibility of reveal'd Religion; and tho some of them are re­cited in the Psalms, yet the very Poetick Stile of David, does not render them more wonderful, than the plain Historical Ac­count of Moses. But with what impudence, if not affected ignorance, does your Author Affirm, that the Circumstances of some Actions, recorded as Miracles in Scripture, [Page 152] do shew that they were effected by Natu­ral Causes. When Moses brought a Boyl upon the Egyptians, by throwing up Ashes into the Air, the Action was as Miraculous, as if without throwing up the Ashes, he had only in the Name of God, commanded the Boyl to seize upon the Bodies of the Egypti­ans. Exod. 9. 10. v. Unless your Author can Philosophi­cally prove, that according to the setled Course and Order of Nature, of which he prates so much, one man by scattering a little Dust or Ashes in the Air, might bring Scabs and Boyls to infest a whole Nation, We read, That the Locusts came upon the Land of Egypt with a strong East­wind, and were driven away with a West­wind, Exod. 10. v. 14. v. 19. both were done at the lifting up of the Rod, and the intreaty of Moses, which we all know, are no Natural means of bringing up, or driving away the Locusts, but such as render'd the Action as Miraculous, as if God had Created Locusts, in the sight of the Egyp­tians to plague them. The like is to be said of our Saviours curing the blind man, by anointing his Eye [...] with Clay made of his Spit­tle, which the Jews acknowledged to be a Mi­racle, and so must your Author too, unless he will undertake to cure blindness by applicati­on of the same remedy. But your Author is now come to his last remedy, Viz. To deny the whole History of Moses and the [Page 153] Prophets, and our S. where it does at all oppose his Doctrine of Material, or Cor­poreal necessity; and therefore since he al­ledges no reasons for his dissent, I shall al­ledge none to refute him, but refer you for satisfaction to those many Excellent Trea­tises, that have been wrote upon that Sub­ject.

S. My Author shews, that your own Bibles do assert, that the Course of Nature is fixed and immutable. So you read in the 148th Psalm. He hath also Established them, (i. e. the heavens) for ever and ever; he hath made a decree which shall not pass.

L. All that you can infer from hence, is this, Viz. That the Heavens are of a long duration the Hebrews making no dif­ference between Eternity and a very long Continuation of Time. Or at most, that some of the Coelestial Bodys, will not be dissolved and that the very Heavens are so Subject to the Decrees and Laws of God, that no casual Concourse of Atoms, shall be able to resist his will.

S. But Pray observe the Words of So­lomon, the greatest Philosopher of the Jewish Nation, Eccles. 1. 9, and 10. verses. The thing which hath been, it is that which shall be, and that which is done, is that which shall be done, and there is no new thing under the Sun. 10. Is there any thing whereof it [Page 154] may be said, this is new? it hath been already of old time, which hath been before us, &c.

L. If you would be pleased to cast your Eye upon the 8th verse of that Chapter, you will find that Solomon is there speaking of the toyl, labour, and satiety of all Worldly Enjoyments, in which nothing is New, but the old Vexations of Humane Life, return continually upon us—as Virgil not unaptly expresses it,

—Redit labor actus in Orbem.

But here is not one word, that has any relation to Miracles, nor can by any force of reason be distorted to that sense. For suppose Solomons meaning is, that nothing was New in his Time, nor would be for the future, what is this to the Doctrine of Miracles? for Miracles were no New Things in the Time of Solomon, for they commenced almost with the beginning of the World, and therefore they might hap­pen again and again, and yet no new thing be done in the World.

S. But what think you, of the 14th verse of the third Chapter of Eccles. I know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever, nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it, and God doeth it, that men should fear before him.

L. I think thereby Solomon declares what we all acknowledge, viz. The Per­fection and Stability of all the Works of Na­ture, which nothing can alter but the imme­diate Power of God, by whom all things were at first Created. But I can never think, that Solomon, who had right conceptions of God, could mean thereby, that God had divested himself of the Power of Acting contrary to the Laws of Motion of his own making. But only that he does it seldom, and not to support the Universe, which might continue as it is without it, but to transfer some part of his Authori­ty, to those who are Commissioned by him.

S. I must Ingenuously confess, you have removed several of those prejudices, which I have imbibed from this Au­thor, and I begin to see more of the reasonableness of assenting to reveal'd Reli­gion, than I had before considered. But still I would beg your assistance, to dispel two doubts, which do much per­plex me.

1. The first is, since Natural Religi­on is grounded upon Reason, why is it not a better guide to Happiness than reveal'd Religion, which stands altoge­ther upon an Historical basis?

[Page 156]2. If the way to happiness is contain­ed in the Scriptures, which is the best way to come to a right understanding of them?

L. You impose a greater task upon me, than I am able to undergo, after so long a fatigue. But if you think it worthy your labour, to meet me at any other convenient Time, I will deliver my Thoughts upon those Subjects, with all the brevity and perspicuity, that you can expect from me.

S. Your proposal is fair and generous; I will wait your leisure to morrow Morning; in the mean time all Happiness attend you.

Conference V.

S. WEll Sir, have you consider'd of what last Night I propounded to you?

L. Yes, I have, and hope to make it evident unto you, that without Divine Revelation, we had been involved in ig­norance, and misery, and that the Light of Nature, could not have shew'd us the way to true Happiness.

S. That is the thing I desire to hear from you.

L. I hope, you will grant, that the Soul is immortal, and at least capable of a lasting Happiness or Misery.

S. I was always one of those Deists, which never did deny it; altho I know there are some who very confidently do.

L. And that the mind of Man cannot be very happy, till it be pretty secure of lasting Joys in a future State, or at least freed from the danger of Living in perpe­tual torments.

S. I must confess this to be true, of all those who give themselves any tolerable liberty of thinking.

L. Then you will grant also, that the greater certainty men have, both of what true Happiness is, and how it may be obtained, so much the better it is for them.

S. None can doubt it.

L. Then it follows, that the Confir­mation of Natural Light, by Revelation, is one of the greatest Benefits that God can in this World bestow upon Man­kind.

S. But what Confirmation can reason receive from History? This seems to me, to be like the Suns receiving Light from a farthing Candle.

L. To understand this well, we must consider, that there are as it were 3 Me­diums of certainty, by which the mind of Man arrives to the Knowledge of Truth. The first is Reason, which apprehends common, plain, and universal Notions, and draws right conclusions from them. The second is Sense, by which we Judge of the Truth of Matters of Fact, and are certain of what Impressions External objects do make upon our Organs, tho it does dis­cover to us, the true Nature of things, and the third is Revelation, to which we assent, because we are assured it comes from God, the Fountain of Truth: Now tho Reason and Sense, are the only Me­diums of certainty in the works of Nature, with which the Scriptures do not directly meddle, yet Reason is defective in shewing us the way to supernatural Happiness in two respects. First, because many things belonging thereunto, are not deducible from reason alone. And Secondly, because many things that are deducible from thence, in their own Nature, yet are not Actually deduced by the Generality of Mankind.

S. Pray, Sir, a little Explanation: You seem now like Socrates in Aristophanes, to walk upon the Clouds.

L. It is not deducible from reason alone, that God will never annihilate the Soul; Or what will be its future State, or that he will forgive great Sins, upon condition of Repentance; or that there are 3 Per­sons in the Trinity; or that the Son of God would be Incarnate in the Flesh; or make satisfaction for Sins; with other Ar­ticles of the like Nature.

S. But it is deducible, that there is a God, and that he is to be lov'd, and fear'd, and that our Neighbour is not to be injur'd, and that temperance is conducive to pre­serve health, wealth, and reputation.

L. But you must observe, that not one half of Natural Religion, or Morality, that is deducible from reason, was ever actually thence deduced by one half of mankind. What is more obvious to rea­son, than the Unity and Spirituality of the Godhead, and what was more com­mon all over the World, than the worship of many Deities and Corporeal Represen­tations of the Gods? What attribute in the Divine Nature shines more illustriously to the Eye of Reason, than Universal Love and Benignity? And yet that hin­dred not the Pagans from burning their Children to Moloch, and giving the Fruit of their Bodys, for the Sins of their Souls. How few were there amongst their very Philo­sophers, [Page 160] who believed the immortality of the Soul? and some of them deny'd the difference between Moral Good and Evil.

Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum.

S. Prethee add no more, I am satisfy'd that the greatest part of mankind, live more by sense than by reason; and that they never use their reason any further, than just to serve the uses of the Animal Life.

L. Tho therefore reason is Natural to all Men, yet it does not follow, that all men are endued with all possible degrees of Natural knowledge in Morality, any more than in Mathematicks, where all is deducible from plain and obvious Princi­ples, and yet very few are well versed in that Noble Science.

S. Why, will you say, that there is a greater certainty in Revelation, than in Reason?

L. Yes, there is: For Miracles are as so many Appeals, both to sense and to rea­son too. The senses hear, or see some­thing done, which reason tells 'em, is done by the invisible Power of God, and if by God, then Signs of a Divine Mission, in the Person that performs them, and if the Mission be Divine, the same reason tells us, [Page 161] that the message must needs be true. So that Miracles give Testimony to Divine Mission. 1. If they be wrought openly, and the effects permanent, to distinguish them from jugling Tricks and Impostures. 2. If they are directly repugnant to some known and universal Law of Nature, to distinguish them from mere Natural Won­ders. 3. If they are brought to give Te­stimony to such Doctrines, as are not re­pugnant to Natural Religion, or good manners, to distinguish them from the de­lusions of Evil and Malicious Spirits. And 4ly, When they are agreeable to Prophe­sies, which like so many lines, tho drawn at several times, tend to one center, as it hapned in the Person of our B. S. now it is evident, that when sense and reason both conspire together, and Act as it were in consort, it forces the assent of all sorts and degrees of men, more strongly than dry speculation: And therefore since it is necessary for the Good of Man, that the Will of God should be known, it was convenient it should be made known in such a manner, as would convince the rea­son of the Learned, and the very senses of the less thinking part of mankind, and this could be done no other way so commodi­ously, as by Prophesie and Miracles.

S. Your reason, good Sir, for that?

L. If some things necessary to be known, are not deducible from reason, as it is now, would you have thought it bet­ter, that God should have quite alter'd the frame of humane Nature, and given new faculties to discern his Will?

S. No, that would have been too vio­lent a force upon the mind—I do not like that.

L. Would you have had him spoken in a supernatural way to all mankind? By an immediate voice from Heaven?

S. I cannot but see many absurdities in that wild supposition.

L. Would you have had him spoken to some select Persons, without any Corpo­real representations, by the sole operation of his Spirit?

S. I cannot see how that could have mended the matter; for I can no more frame a Notion of certainty in bare Inspi­ration, than in the Hieroglyphical re­presentations made to the Ancient Pro­phets.

L. Would you have had him sent his Messengers on his Errands, without any visible Power of Prophesie or Mi­racles, to be believ'd upon their bare word?

S. He might, if it had pleas'd him; but then I do believe very few would have given them credit.

L. Would you have Miracles wrought every day?

S. I should be glad to see a Miracle, or two, for my own satisfaction: But I must confess, if they were very frequent, they would not in a short time be distinguisha­ble from the Works of Nature.

L. Then I perceive you Sceptists desire something, but you know not what. For, give your thoughts the utmost liberty of ranging, yet you will never find a more commodious way of Gods speaking to mankind, than that which is recorded in the Scriptures; because it is fuited to all the faculties of the Soul, and is apt conse­quently to force the assent of all mankind: And if we consider the subject matter of it, we shall find, that it reveals to man all those necessary Truths, which are no ways deducible from reason alone; and Secondly, it gives light, perspicuity and luster, to all those Moral Duties, which are indeed deducible by operose deducti­ons from reason, but have not been thence Actually deduced by the less thinking part of mankind.

S. I should have a better Opinion of Scripture, if you could give me some [Page 164] rules, of interpreting those Ancient Wri­tings; for I had rather go to no Oracle, than to an Oracle that has a double mean­ing.

L. The obscurity of the Scriptures, is very much insisted upon by the Romanists, to make room for an infallible guide and interpreter; and from them taken up by the Deists, to destroy all the whole frame of reveal'd Religion. But the Scripture is neither so obscure, as the Romanists pre­tend, nor so absurd as you Deists do make it. And First, I think it would be very much to the purpose, to reduce Scripture to those several heads of the Subject mat­ter, that is contained in them. For,

First, For some things are the pure and proper objects of humane reason, in which Natural Religion and Revelation, are not at all concerned; such as are the motion of the Earth or Heavens, and other Phae­nomena's of the works of Nature. Of these it is not necessary, that the Scripture should speak in the most proper, and the most Phi­losophical terms. It is enough that it excites us to our duty, by the contemplation of their Beauty and Order; and therefore your Author's Observation of the Errors of the Author of Joshua's History, concern­ing the motion of the Sun, is little to the purpose, unless he can prove, it was the [Page 165] design of that book, to give us a system of Astronomy.

Secondly, Other things in the Scripture deliver'd, are matters of pure Revelation, which reason could never discover, but receives them as additions to it. Such as are the Doctrine of the Trinity, Incarna­tion, Sacraments, and the like, which my Lord Bacon in his Book, de augmentis scien­tiarum, wishes reduced into one Body, that so we might distinctly view, what know­ledge is altogether supported by Divine Revelation, and what is owing to the un­erring rules of humane reason: For what­soever is deliver'd by Revelation, is to be received with the same firmness of assent, as a first Principle, but with this differ­ence, that we may safely venture to draw legitimate conclusions, from first Principles of reason; but we must be more modest in matters of mere Revelation, lest other­wise we wade beyond our depth. For here we must acquiesce in nothing but the Scriptures.

Thirdly, Other matters are intelligible, by Reason and by Revelation too, as visible by a double Light. Thus the whole sub­stance of the Decalogue, excepting only the Circumstantial part, of the precise time of worship in the Sabbath, and our Saviour's Divine Sermon in the Mount, and other [Page 166] precepts of morality, are so many bran­ches of Natural Religion. Revelation only confirms, what reason, as it were, guessed at before, and makes that obvious to the meanest capacity, which before was known to the more thinking part of man­kind, and adds the certainty of future re­wards and punishments, which alone can engage a man to act with vigour. And therefore we rightly enough interpret mo­ral duties, by known Principles of humane reason. For otherwise, we should run in­to many absurdities, by adhering to the very Letter of the Decalogue its self. If we do not interpret the 2d Command­ment in this manner, every Picture in our Houses, every Sign in our Streets, would be so many breaches of the Divine Com­mandment; Thou shalt not make to thy self any Graven Image, nor the Likeness of any thing, &c. All Executions of Crimi­nals, and slaying of men in a just War, would be downright Murthers, if the Commandment, Thou shalt not kill, was to be taken in a strict and literal sense, nay, the Scriptures would contradict them­selves, when in some cases, they command Criminals to be put to Death.

Fourthly, Other things are Matters of History. Such as are the Narrations of what hapned to the Jews, and what Pro­phesies [Page 167] and Miracles were wrought a­mongst them. And of these we Judge, as of other Matters of Fact, Viz. By the Number and Credibility of Witnesses. And here we appeal to the common sense of mankind, for these Miracles which are History to us, to those who saw them, were matters of sense. The Wisdom of God, is wrapt up in the Scriptures, as it is in the works of Nature, and is thence to be deduced, by observing Method and Order, without which all things appear to the understanding, without shape, or beauty.

S. Is this all you would advise?

L. No. I would be glad to see, if the work were possible, an Authentick Histo­ry, Synchronical, with all parts of those sacred Writings. For want of this, ma­ny have carp'd at Moses's History, who yet can find out nothing so Ancient, nor so agreeable to all the remnants of past events, that were preserved in the Fables or Histories of Pagan Writers. Where we have a Synchronical History, it agrees very well with the Prophesies of Daniel, and no doubt, but if an Account could be found, of whatever hapned to the Neigh­bouring Nations about Palestine, it would clear many Passages in the other Prophets, which now seem triffling, absurd, or un­intelligible.

S. What do you think, of an exact Knowledge of the Hebrew words, and all the Idioms of that Language?

L. I think it very useful, but that de­fect is sufficiently supplied to the Vulgar, by faithful Translations of Learned Men. I therefore in the last place would recom­mend, what is touched upon by your Author, an exact History of the Books of the Scripture, viz. By whom written, for what end, at what time, what was the Natural disposition, abilities, and qualities of the respective Pen-Men (for Authors I must not call them) with other Circum­stances of the like Nature.

S. Then I perceive you will agree with my Author in the manner of interpreting, tho not in the Divine Authority, of those sacred Writings.

L. So far as it agrees with truth and no farther. I approve of a Collection of those places that seem to agree, and of those which seem to be most repugnant. But Vid p. 86. then I do not infer from thence, that the Opinions of the sacred Writers were really repugnant; because then some of them must have been false, and to ascribe false­hood to inspired Writers, is the same thing as to ascribe it to God himself: And be­cause I find no seeming opposition in those Writings, which may not be reconciled, [Page 169] by an exact knowledge of the Language, comparison with the Context, and Atten­tion to the true Scope and Design of Holy Persons. As for what your Author says, that we are not to reject the literal sense of any inspired Pen Men, because it is absurd, since in speculative matters they are guilty of great absurdities, it is not to be admit­ted by a rational Man. In those things indeed, which are intelligible from Prin­ciples of reason as well as Revelation, if any thing is plainly absurd and impossible to reason, we may and ought to fly to a Metaphorical sense and meaning. But we must not do so in matters of mere Revela­tion, because they being deducible from no Principle of Reason, we are not compe­tent Judges of what is absurd or possible in them, but we give assent to them, for no other cause, than because they are de­livered by God. Nor do I wish for an Historical Account, of the Lives and Dispositions of the Ancient Prophets, that from thence, like your Author, I may ascribe what I think to be erroneous, to the Education, Ignorance, or Stupidity of the Prophet, because Inspiration equals the understandings of Men, and leaves no­thing to Natural abilities, but only the manner of expression; And that I must confess, might be guessed at from such an [Page 170] Historical Account of the Books, and the respective Pen-Men.

S. I have heard you hitherto, with some delight and satisfaction, but I fear you will not be able, to assign any better method of interpreting Scripture, than that which is propounded by my judicious Author. For as nothing unfolds Nature better than a Natural-History, so is Scripture best inter­preted by a History of the Scripture it self. And this History must not only con­tain the Properties and Idioms of the O­riginal Languages, in which they were at first Written, (of which we have discour­sed something already) but secondly, a Collection of the sentences of each Book, which are reducible to the same General Head; that so Scripture may not be ex­pounded by any Notions of reason, but by sentences Collected from its self.

L. I cannot see how this can at all ad­vance the design of the Author.

S. Then I will open your understan­ding with a clear instance. Moses says in p. 86. one place, that God is a fire, and in another, that he is a Jealous God. Now you Di­vines, would presently conclude, that fire was to be taken in a Metaphorical sense, because it is contrary to Natural reason, to think, That an immaterial God, should be a material fire: Not considering, that Moses [Page 171] might teach, that God is a fire, tho that Do­ctrine p. 87. is absurd, and contrary to reason. And unless the word fire, in the 31st of Job and the 12th verse, had been put to signify wrath or Jealousy, nothing had been more plain, Than that Moses had taught the Isra­elites, that God was a fire, i. e. the refined part of the most sublimated Aether. Now since Moses teaches that God is Jealous, and the Scripture no where says, That he is void of Passions, thence we may conclude, that Moses did believe, or at least was willing to make the simple Israelites believe, that there Vid. sig. are the same Passions in God as there are in Man. And pray consider, how many Ab­surdities there would be in the Christian Religion, if you Divines, in Propositions repugnant to common Sense, did not (to save the Credit of your own Profession) fly from a Literal to a Metaphorical Sense and Meaning.

L. That Scripture is very well expoun­ded by Scripture, in most Cases, is a Pro­position which we are more fond to defend than your very Author; but yet we are unwilling to exclude that use of common Sense and Reason, without which it is im­possible to understand the meanest Author. When we read any Historian, Orator, or Poet, we readily guess what words are used in a proper, and what in a Translated [Page 172] sense, by the very contexture and position of the words, without turning over the whole History, Poem, or Oration, to find out a Metaphor, or Catacresis, that lies open to the first view of the Reader. And let any Man read the 23d of Deuteronomy, and the 23d and 24th verses, and Judge whether Moses therein could be conceived as teaching the Israelites, That God is a real fire, tho Job had never spake one word of the matter. 23. Take heed to your selves, lest you forget the Covenant of the Lord your God, which he made with you, and make you a Graven Image, or the likeness of any thing, which the Lord thy God hath forbidden thee. 24. For the Lord thy God is a Consuming Fire, even a Jealous God. How is it possi­ble, That Moses should be conceived as teach­ing the Israelites, that God is real Fire, when in the same breath he forbids them to make any likeness of him; which the Israe­lites must needs have done, every time they struck a light, or went to Oven, if God had been a real fire. Suppose Job had never us'd the word fire in all his complaints, could not the Israelites have understood Moses, when he expresses the Activity, and Vehemence of Gods Indignation against Idolatry, in such plain words? Viz. Thy God is a Consuming Fire, even a Jealous God. Besides, with what impudence, does your [Page 173] Author, expound Moses by Job, when ac­cording p. 9. to his Canons of Interpretation, Non licet mentem unius Prophetae, ex locis clarioribus alterius concludere neque explicare, nisi evident issime constet, eos unam eandemque fovisse sententiam—We must not conclude the mind of one Prophet, from the more express places of another, unless we are certain that both were of the same Opinion. And again he tells us, in the 95th page, that we must not hope to solve all repugnancies in the scriptures, by comparing one place with another, since that only can illustrate some few places by chance, Quando quidem nullus propheta eo fine scripsit ut verba alterius aut sua ipsa ex professo explicaret. No Prophet wrote on purpose to explain his own, or another Prophets meaning.

S. Methinks it is something odd, to say, That no Prophet wrote any thing to explain his own meaning.

L. It is no other than your Author ob­trudes upon you, under the name of solid Reason, whereas he is full of Inconsisten­cies, and seems never to know his own mind. In the 87th. Pag. notwithstand­ing the illogical deduction of a universal Proposition, from a single instance, he con­cludes from this passage of Moses, That the knowledge of the Scriptures is to be Deduced only from themselves; but from the very [Page 174] next Line, to the end of the Chap. he con­tends earnestly to prove, That the knowledge of the true Sence of the Scriptures, is to be gained not from the Books themselves, but from an History of the Books, and the various chances that have hapned to them, viz. a Narration of the Lives, Manners, and Af­fections of the respective Pen-Men, who they were, at what time, to whom, and upon what occasion they wrote each Book; so that according to your Author, the Interpretation of Scripture is to be taken ex solis biblii. from the Scriptures alone, and yet without such an extrinsick History, which him­self confesses to be wanting, it is impossi­ble to know the true sense of them.

S. I must confess, that my Author is a little too guilty of contradicting himself, for great wits have short memories: But still you do not shew any Reason, why we should not believe that God, in the Opi­nion of Moses, was subject to Humane Pas­sions, since it is no where contradicted in the Scriptures themselves,

L. Because the Scriptures themselves do teach, That God is a Spirit, John 4. 24. and that consequently, he cannot be sub­ject to Passions, which are always accom­panied with some Perturbations of the Bo­dy; and since by Nature we have no di­stinct, and Adaequate Comprehension of [Page 175] the Principles, and manner of Operation of the Divine Nature, in distributing Re­wards, and Punishments, it was impossi­ble for Moses to express God's first Reso­lution of rewarding the Good, and punishing the Bad, in more proper terms than those of Love and Anger, &c. Tho therefore those Expressions are Figurative, when applied to God, yet since they are the most proper that we can find, for what we can­not fully understand, it is plain that Moses had right Conceptions of God, when in words, he ascrib'd those Passions to him.

S. Then you interpret Scripture by Reason.

L. I do not make my Reason, the Standard of Divine Revelation, but I hope, that I may make the same use of my Rea­son, in Interpreting Scripture, as you, or any sensible Man would do, in Reading any Humane Author.

S. It would be hard to deny you that liberty; besides I am so much a Friend to Truth, that I must ingenuously confess, that it is not plain to me, that Job in that place by Fire, does either understand Jea­lousy Vid. Job 31. or Anger, but rather the crime of Adultery, or Fornication, for thus he speaks, v. 9. If my heart hath been deceived by a Woman, or if I have laid wait at my Neigh­hours door; Then let my Wife grind unto an [Page 176] other, and let others bow down upon her. For this is an Heinous Crime, yea it is an Ini­quity to be punished by the Judges. For it is a Fire that consumeth to Destruction, and would root out all mine Increase. Now it seems to me, that it is not Jealousie, which is no very expensive passion, but the being deceived by a Woman, and the guilt of lying in wait at his Neighbours Door, which Job calls here a Consuming Fire, that would soon bring Destrustion upon his Body and Estate.

L. And yet your admired Author, makes use of such forc't Interpretations of Scripture, to affix absurdities of his own Invention, to those Sacred Writings, and thereby to destroy their Divine Autho­rity. For indeed the whole contexture of the Scriptures, both of the Old and the New Testament, do give us such clear No­tions of the Ʋnity and Spirituality of the Divine Nature, that they cannot be distorted, to savour any Opinion that is contrary to Na­tural Religion, without open violence, as well as secret Art and Cunning: Tho it must be confessed at the same time, that they teach some things above our Reason, be cause they came from an Author who knows more than in this Life can be un­derstood by us.

S. If you rightly understand the Ambi­guities of the Hebrew Language, which my Author very learnedly reckons up, in the 93. Pag. and the great want we have of a certain History of the Books themselves, and the Lives of the Authors, you would easily perceive that we know little or no­thing of the true sence of Scriptures, un­less it be in those places which treat of Moral Precepts, for they are so plainly In­telligible, that they retain the same perspi­cuity in all Languages.

L. We know that the Hebrew, as well as all other Languages, is subject to some Ambiguities, which may create Error, but we do not see that these Ambiguities are so frequent, or of such consequence, as to shake our Belief of any one Fundamen­tal Article of Revealed Religion. But with what Gygantick confidence, would your Aurhor raise a Stupendious structure, upon this narrow and rotten Foundation? There are some ambiguities, in some places, that may sometimes arise, concer­ning the true meaning of some few Texts of Scripture—Therefore we can never be certain of the true meaning of any one Text therein, those only excepted, which contain Moral Precepts, for of those we were certain before hand. But we can never understand, from thence, that there [Page 178] was such a People as the Jews, or such a man as Moses, or such a Person as our Sa­viour, who did wonderful things in Judea, nor any Apostles sent out by him, for these are all speculative matters, which (tho the New Testament was wrote in Greek, yet) are altogether obscured by the ambiguities of the Hebrew Language. Can you think your Author would have descended to this absurd way of arguing, if his cause would have bore a better? Is not our Faith on our Saviour, grounded upon plain Narra­tions of such Matters of Fact, as are as easily intelligible in one Language as ano­ther, and will not History as well bear a Translation as the Problems of Euclid? Does not he pretend to expound Scripture by some Hebrew History, (if he could get one for his purpose) and yet is all History so obscure, that it is impossible to be ex­pounded?

S. You cannot deny, but that a History of the Lives of the Prophets, would much conduce towards the better understanding of Prophetical Writings.

L. It might give light to some few pla­ces, but is far from being absolutely ne­cessary to expound all. Why may we not as well understand the Scriptures, without such a History, as the works of Plato, or Cicero, or Levy? Besides, in what Lan­guage [Page 179] must this Expounding History be wrote? Not in Hebrew, for then it must be subject to the same ambiguities, as the Bible it self—Nor in any of the Eastern Tongues, for then the matter would not be much mended; Nor in any Foreign dialect, for then it would not pass for Au­thentick, as wrote by one not skill'd in the Jewish Affairs. Then by whom must this History be wrote? By an Author that pretends to be inspired, then Spinosa will have the same prejudice against him, as a­gainst the other Prophets, and Pen-men of the Holy Scripture, whom he exposes as Mad-Men, and will not allow them to say one thing, (unless in Morals) that can be understood, or that ought to be believed by us: If this History is wrote by an Au­thor that pretends to no Inspiration, tho that one thing might recommend him to Spinosa, yet it will give all thinking men just cause of caution, that they be not im­pos'd upon, by a man whom they know to be as fallible as themselves: And there­fore unless they can be well satisfied, that his integrity is greater, his understanding clearer, and his opportunities of knowing all the important Matters of Fact, of those Ages, more advantagious, than those of the Holy Pen-men, they will see no reason, why they should rather Correct [Page 180] Scripture by the Historian, than the Histo­rian by Scripture.

S. Ay, but my Author gives you such a History of Scripture, as makes all the Pentateuch, Books of Joshua, Judges, &c. To appear to be a Novel Invention, most likely to be jumbled together by Esdras, as he well Conjectures, and that the other Books of the Old Testament, received as Canonical, are not of that Antiquity which you Divines ascribe to them.

L. But then you should consider, that your Author is a Person upon whose Judg­ment we cannot rely, since we can have no reason to be satisfy'd with the integri­ty, or Authority of such an Historian. How little his integrity is, we have al­ready seen, by his pretending to be a Deist, and to advance the Law of Nature, which consists chiefly in Loving God; when it is plain from his Chapter of Mi­racles, that he is really an Atheist, as eve­ry man must needs be, that holds the infi­nity, and immutability of the Power of Nature: As also by his partial Distorture of Scripture, by denying it the same liber­ty of using words in a Translated sense, which is given to all other Writings. As for clearness of Judgment, which is the second Commendation of an Historian, I cannot see how your Author can pretend [Page 181] to that, whom I have shew'd, to have laid down so many false propositions, drawn so many false conclusions, and so frequent­ly to have contradicted himself. And as for his opportunities of knowing the Mat­ters of Fact, of the most grand importance of those Ages, we all know, that he is as ignorant of them as our selves, and there­fore we had rather believe those who liv'd in Ancient times, and were Eye-Witnes­ses of what our Saviour did, or suffered for our sakes, than a Modern upstart, whom we are sure can understand, at most, no more than our selves of the matter?

S. But tho you slight his Authority, yet if he can prove by solid reasons, as he at­tempts in his 8th Chapter, That the Pen­tateuch was not wrote by Moses, &c. You are bound to yield to them, and to deny its Divine Authority.

L. But if his Reasons, are fallacious, and Conjectural (as I could easily demon­strate, had we Books and leisure in this place, to go through the Argument, which yet at best would be but loss of time) then you cannot blame me, if I withdraw my assent from his Pernicious Doctrines. But to bring matters to a short issue. Do you believe, that the Account the Evangelists give of the Life of our Saviour, and the Acts of his Apostles, is altogether unintel­ligible [Page 182] by the Hebriasms, and various Lections?

S. No, I think no man of common sense or modesty, will pretend to say so.

L. Do you think, that all therein re­corded of them, could be done by any Natural, or Diabolical Power?

S. You have already demonstrated the impossibility of the first, and the absurdi­ty of the second assertion.

L. Then if our S. and his Apostles, who prov'd their own Divine Mission, did bear Testimony to the Writings of Moses, and the other Prophets, all your Authors Cri­ticisms, or Conjectural fancies of Esaras, Vanish into nothing. For with what truth could our Saviour have said, Mat. the 19th and the 7th. That Moses Commanded to give a Bill of Divorcement, and that Moses, for the hardness of their Hearts, suf­fer'd them to put away their Wives? or St. John 19. 17. That the Law was given by Moses, if the whole Pentateuch had been a Fiction of Esdras? Our Saviour therefore has confirm'd the Law of Moses, and the Divine Authority of the Old Testament, by a new addition of Signs and Wonders, impossible to be gainsaid by the Cunning, or Malice of Man.

S. You have now given me full satis­faction, concerning the Divine Authority [Page 183] of the Scriptures, into a dislike of which I was led by the Sophistry of this intriegu­ing Author. For it mightily pleas'd me, to hear his project, to deduce all know­ledge from Natural reason, which as he teaches, p. 98. Proceeds from plain and obvious Notions, to the most obscure and remotest objects.

L. Let Natural reason proceed never so cautiously, yet she can never ascend so high, as to understand clearly those super­natural things which concern a future State, of which she has here, no compleat Ideas. And besides, if God is a free Agent, it follows, he can prescribe what conditi­ons of salvation do best please him: And Natural reason can never ascend to the knowledge of what a free Agent will have done, from any known or obvious Max­ims in Nature.

S. No more than one man, by reason alone, can tell what is the will and plea­sure of another—But I will ask you one Question more, Viz. Who ought to be the Interpreter of Scripture? P. 103. penes u­numquem­que snm­mum jus, summaque authori­tas, de re­ligione li­bere judi­candi, &c. for Spinosa gives away that Authority to every pri­vate Man.

L. The ambiguous use of the word In­terpretation, has been the cause of much Error, and much Mischief in the World, it is a Multiplied Idea, which will breed [Page 184] confusion in the understanding, if it be not carefully resolved into its first Princi­ples. For first, sometimes to interpret Scripture, is put to signify only, a right apprehension of what is the true sense of Scripture, and an expression of that true sense, in plain and proper terms: And this belongs to every individual Man, to whom the Gospel is Preached. For every man has a right to understand those truths that are a-like beneficial to all mankind, and which are therefore promulged, that they may be made known unto all: And as every man has a right to understand as much as he can of Divine truths, so also may be Communicate that knowledge by Speech to others, tho the publick Exercise of that Office, do most properly belong to the Ministers of God. But others, by the word Interpret, do understand, the Pow­er of affixing what sense they please upon the Scriptures, and constraining others to admit the same, be it what it will, as true and genuine. But such an Authority as this, can neither belong to every Private man, nor to any humane Power whatsoe­ver. For no man can have Authority from the God of Truth, to oppose truth it self, and it is gross non-sense, to call Contra­diction of Scripture, an Interpretation of it. There is no room for Interpretation, [Page 185] but in places that are obscure and dubious, but plain Texts expound themselves, and to pretend that every man has a right▪ of affixing a contradictory sense, to the most easy, express, and intelligible Texts of Scripture, is as much as to say, Every Man Summum jus. sum­ma autho­ritas. has a right to be a Fool, and to deceive him­self, and to live in Error, and be nurst up in the ignorance of those things, that most con­cern his Happiness, and to give the Lye to his great Creator. Instead of believing the Scriptures, to be the Word of God, every private man, according to your Authors Hypothesis, may believe them lawfully to be the invention of Sathan, or the dictates of Mad-men, or the invention of some cunning Politicians. What is more plain than our Saviours words, Mat. 16. 17. Verses. Go you into all the World, and Preach the Gospel unto every Creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned.

Suppose a man discoursing upon these words, should pretend to teach from hence, that no Gospel either was, is, or ever ought to be Preached to the World; That no man ought to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, and that there is no Condemnation to unbelievers either in this World, or in the World to come. Would you call this an Interpretation of that Text of Scripture?

S. Not if I was in my right Senses.

L. And yet your prodigal Author gives this large Authority to every private Man, of Interpreting Scripture after this absurd, and erroneous manner.

S. Perhaps, he only means, it is in every Man's Power to Interpret Scripture as he pleases.

L. So it is in every Man's power to be Erroneous, and to Act contrary to the Law of Nature; but has he therefore a right to Murder, Steal, or commit Adultery? But he does not only say, Summum jus libere sen­tiendi de Religione penes unumquemque esse, but, Summam Authoritatem Scripturam p. 103. Interpretandi, apud unumquemque esse.

S. Methinks the right of Interpreting Scripture, ought rather to be given to some Body of Men, who are most likely to pre­serve it.

L. I have already shew'd you, That Contradiction is no Interpretation, and, that no Humane power, can have Authority to op­pose Divine Revelation, unless you could prove, That Man is more Omniscient than God.

S. God forbid, that I should attempt that; for now I begin to hate the very name of Deism, as it stands Opposed to the Belief of Revealed Religion.

L. And you would hate it more, if you considered, from the Dregs of how many Sects and Factions this Poyson is Extracted, and how much it tends to destroy all Mo­rality, and use of right reason in the World. From the Papists, it takes the Doctrine Deficiency, and Obscurity of the Scriptures, and the necessity of a Living Interpreter. From the Quakers, it take the Doctrine of See chap. 12. p. 144, 145 of the Light within, as sufficient to Salvati­on, (which he calls, The Law of Nature, and they term, the Spirit,) and of villifying the Scriptures, as meer Paper, and Ink, as he expresly calls 'em, Chap. 12. Pag. 145. Vereor ne nimis sancti; &c. Simulachra et ima­gines, hoc est Chartam et atramentum pro Scriptura adorent. In which words, he makes Reverencing the Scriptures, to be a kind of Idolatry. From the Independent, it takes the Renunciation of Catholick Communi­on, and makes every Man, as they do every Congregation, to be a Church as it were to himself, and it borrows something of the Doctrine of Fatal Necessity from the rigid Preshyterian. Then as to its tendency to Immorality, it takes from us all certainty of the means of Grace, and hope of Glory, through the Mediation of our Blessed Saviour, and leaves us nothing to Adore, but a care­less, deceitful, and inflexible Deity, and whilst it pretends to leave us Piety, it really [Page 188] robs us of the true Ided of God: It leaves Ju­stice and Charity, no other encouragement than they can find in this world, and God knows that is often little enough; and it gives the full Reins to Lust, and Appetite, to Eat, Drink, and be Merry, for all beyond the Grave, is but Conjecture, or idle Spe­culation: Nay, it drives the mind unto an assent to so many Absurdities, and Con­tradictions, as must at last center in down­right Atheism; for a Man may as well believe, that there is no God at all, as be­lieve that there is a God, who has exerted his own power to abuse the World; and Atheism in a few Years would run up a­gain into the old Pagan Idolatry, (since Humane Nature cannot be long without Religion,) or some Superstition of (if pos­sible) a more ridiculous, and pernicious Nature.

S. Sir, you need add no more, I am ful­ly satisfied of the necessity of Revealed Re­ligion, and only beg your Prayers to Almighty God, that I may increase in all useful Knowledge, and Walk worthy of so Heavenly a Vocation.

L. I am glad if any weak endeavours of mine, can contribute any thing to the Vindication of that Religion, into which I was at first Baptized, and which is now so much opposed by the Fraud, and Ma­lice [Page 189] both of Men, and Deviss; And may God, who has began this Conversion in your heart, assist you, always with his Grace, and make you perfect in every good Work, thro' Jesus Christ our Lord.

S. I thank you for your Christian endea­vours, and wish you an hearty farewel.

FINIS.

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