Epicurus's morals collected partly out of his owne Greek text, in Diogenes Laertius, and partly out of the rhapsodies of Marcus Antoninus, Plutarch, Cicero, & Seneca ; and faithfully Englished. — Selections. English

Epicurus's morals collected partly out of his owne Greek text, in Diogenes Laertius, and partly out of the rhapsodies of Marcus Antoninus, Plutarch, Cicero, & Seneca ; and faithfully Englished. — Selections. English

Table of contents

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Title page

AN APOLOGIE FOR EPICVRVS, As to the three Capitall Crimes whereof he is accused. Written in a Letter, to a Person of Honour.

The Contents.

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EPICVRVS'S MORALS.

CHAPTER 1.

Introduction.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

CHAP. II.

Of Felicity, or the Supreme Good; as far as Man is capable thereof.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

CHAP. III. That pleasure (without which there is no Notion of Felicity) is a Good, of its own Nature.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

CHAP. IV. That Felicity doth consist Generally in Pleasure.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

CHAP. V. That Pleasure, wherein Felicity doth consist, is the Indolency of the Body, and Tranquillity of Mind.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

CHAP. VI. Of the means to procure this Felicity.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

CHAP. VII. Of Right Reason, and Free will, from whence is all the praise of the Virtues.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Virtues, Generally.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

CHAP. IX. Of Prudence Generall.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

CHAP. X. Of Prudence Private.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

CHAP. XI. Of Prudence Domestick.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

CHAP. XII. Of Prudence Civill.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

CHAP. XIII. Of Temperance in Generall.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

CHAP. XIV. Of Sobriety opposed to Gluttony.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

CHAP. XV. Of Continence, opposed to Lust.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

CHAP. XII. Of Lenity, opposed to Anger.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

CHAP. XVII. Of Modesty, opposed to Ambition.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

CHAP. XVIII. Of Moderation, opposed to Avarice.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

CHAP. XIX. Of Mediocrity betwixt Hope and Despair of the Future.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

CHAP. XX. Of Fortitude, in Generall.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

CHAP. XXI. Of Fortitude, opposed to the Fear of the Gods.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

CHAP. XXII. Of Fortitude, opposed to the Fear of Death.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

CHAP. XXIII. Of Fortitude against Pain of the Body.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

CHAP. XXIV. Of Fortitude, against Discontent of Mind.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

CHAP. XXV. Of Iustice, in Generall.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

CHAP. XXVI. Of Right, or Iust; from whence Iustice is named.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

CHAP. XXVII. Of the Originall of Right and Iustice.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

XIII.

CHAP. XXVIII. Between whom Right and Instice is to be exercised.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

CHAP. XXIX. With what right Iustice is to be exercised.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

CHAP. XXX. Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Observance.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

CHAP. XXXI. Of Friendship.

1

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX

CONCLVSION.

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[Page]

EPICVRI EFFIGIES.

Ex Cimel. Cl. Vivi Eviel Putearij.

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[Page]

EPICVRVS's MORALS, Collected Partly out of his owne Greek Text, in DIOGENES LAERTIVS, And Partly out of the Rhapsodies of MARCVS ANTONINVS, PLVTARCH, CICERO, & SENECA. And faithfully Englished.

Mea quidem ista sententia est (invitis hoc nostris popularibus dicam) Epicurum, & recta praecipere, &, si propiùs accesseris, tristia.

[figure]

Seneca lib. de vita beata cap. 13.

LONDON, Printed by W. Wilson, for Henry Herringman, and are to be sold at his shop, at the Anchor in the Lower walke in the New Exchange. 1656.

AN APOLOGIE FOR EPICVRVS, As to the three Capitall Crimes whereof he is accused.
Written in a Letter, to a Person of Honour.

[Page]

[Page]

SIR,

YOur beloved EPICVRVS, having lately learn'd English, on purpose to converse more familiarly with you; comes now at length to waite upon you, and at your vacant houres to entertaine you with grave discourses, touching the Happinesse of Man's life, and the right meanes of attaining it, Wisdome, I have no reason to doubt of his welcome & kind reception [Page] by you, considering that he comes not, but upon your frequent, and (I am confident) hearty invitations of him; your owne ingenious and commendable desire to be intimately acquainted with his Principles, and Doctrine of Morality, and to heare him speake his owne Thoughts purely and sincerely, having beene the only occasion and motive to my assistance of him in his Travells from Greece into this Country, and my accommodation of him with such an equipage, as might be exactly sutable as well to your wishes, as to his owne minde. Nay more, I have reason to presume, that a few dayes conversation will create in you a very great dearenesse towards him, as well because I am assur'd you will soone finde him what you expect, a sublime Witt, a profound Iudgement, and a great Master of Temperance, Sobriety, Continence, Fortitude and all other Vertues, not a Patron of Impiety, Gluttony, Drunkennesse, Luxury and all kinds of Intemperance, as the common people (being mis-informed by such learned men as either did not rightly understand, or would not rightly represent his opinions) generally [Page] conceive him to be; as because I have perceived him not only to give strong and lively hints to sundry of those sublime speculations, wherewith your thoughts are sometimes delightfully imployed; but also solidly to assert many of those Tenents, which I have often heard you defend, with the like Reasons, and which indeed nothing but the voluntary and affected Ignorance of Superstition will deny. So that, if the Rule hold, that Similitude of Opinions, is an argument of Similitude in Affectons, and Similitude of Affections the ground of Love and friendship, certainely I am not altogether destitute of support for my conjecture, and consequently that you will soone admitt him into your bosome, and treat him withall the demonstrations of respect due to so excellent a Companion.

But, as there is no Beauty without some moles, no Chrystall without some specks; so is not our EPICVRVS without his imperfections, and you will discover in him some things which cannot escape your reprehension; and yet I expect, that your censure of him should be much more moderate and charitable, [Page] then that of the ignorant and scarce humane Multitude hath been for many ages together. And therefore I aske leave to state the Nature of his guilt unto you, and afterwards to give you my Iudgement thereupon; in the meane time humbly leaving you to the Liberty of your owne more judicious sentiments of both the one and the other. For, my designe therein, is not to possesse your brest with my thoughts concerning the crimes usually charged upon this Philosopher, but to dispossesse it of an opinion that I might have the same indignation against him in respect of some unjustifiable positions of his, as not only the common people, but even the greatest number of Schollers, have for many hundred of years, entertain'd. And what I shall say to that purpose I humbly desire you will be pleas'd to understand to be intended as an Exercitation, to take off from his memory the greatest part of that unjust Odium, and Infamy which envy and Malice on one hand, and Ignorance and Inhumanity on the other, have cast upon it, to the eclipsing even of all his excellent meritts from the Commonwealth of Philosophy, [Page] and not as a defence of any unreasonable or dangerous Errour, whereof he is found really guilty. Which was more perhaps then was needfull for me to advertise you of, who wel understand the difference betwixt a Vindication and an Excusation; that it is one thing to mitigate a too severe and rash sentence, and another to justifie the Offendour. And therefore without any further Apologizing for my short Apologie for EPICVRVS, I directly addresse to my Province.

The Opinions, which, being asserted by him in this Treatise concerning Ethicks, have so much incens'd the world against him, are principally these three. (1) That the Souls of Men are mortall, & so uncapable of all either happiness or misery after death. (2) That Man is not obliged to honour, revere, and worship God, in respect of his beneficence, or out of the hope of any Good or feare of any evill at his hands, but meerely in respect of the transcendent Excellencies of his Nature, Immortality, and Beatitude. (3) That Selfe-homicide is an Act of[Page]Heroick Fortitude in case of intollerable or otherwise inevitable Calamity. These, I confesse, are Positions to be rather wholly condemned and abominated, then in the least measure patroniz'd by us Christians, whose understandings (thanks be to the mercy of the fountaine of Wisdome) are illuminated by a brighter light then that of Nature; and yet notwithstanding when I remember, that our Philosopher was a meere naturalist, borne and educated in times of no small Pagan darkenesse, and consider that neither of these Tenents will be found upon due Examination so destitute of all support of Reason, as rash and unexamining heads have apprehended, I professe I cannot but thinke it an argument of much more inhumanity then judicious zeale in any man, upon this accompt alone, to invade him with the crimination of superlative Impiety, Blasphemy, and absolute Atheisme. For.

As to the FIRST, viz. That the humane soule doth not survive the funerals of the body, but absolutely perish in the instant of death, as I need not tell you, how uncomfortable [Page] an Opinion it is to all Vertuous persons, and how manifestly repugnant to Christianisme, and indeed to the fundamentall Reason of all Religions beside (if I may be admitted to use that improper phrase of the vulgar, while I well know that there can be but one Religion truely so called, and that all the rest are more properly called Superstitions) so I neede not advertise you how highly difficult it is to refute it, by satisfactory and convincing Arguments defumable from meer reason. For, to suspect the light of Nature, is scarce strong enough by its own single force, to dispell all those thick mists of difficulties, that hinder our discernment of the full nature of the human soul, and scarce bright enough clearly to demonstrate the immortality of that noble Essence, so, as to leave no room for diffidence or contradiction▪ I hope it can be no Heresie in any man, because no disparagement to either his Faith or Reason. You have, Sir, I presume, attentively perused that so worthily commended discourse of Plato, touching the immortality of mans soul, and acquainted [Page] your selfe moreover with all those mighty Arguments, alledged by Saint Thomas, Pomponatius (who will hardly be out-done in subtlety, touching the same Theam, by any that comes after him, and yet he was forc'd to conclude himselfe a Sceptick, and leave the Question to the decision of some other bolder Pen) Des Cartes, our noble friend Sir Kenelme Digby, and divers other great Clerks, to prove the Soul of Man to be a substance distinct from, and independent upon that of the body, and to have eternall existence à parte post; and yet if I were not assured, that your perswasion of its immortality is founded upon a much more firm basis, then that of the most seemingly apodicticall of all their Reasons, I might well doubt of the impregnability thereof▪ And this I may say somewhat the more freely and boldly, both because I my selfe, having with all possible attention, and equity of minde, examined the validity of most of those Arguments, for the immortality of mens souls, which their Authors have presented as perfect Demonstrations thereof, cannot [Page] finde any of them to make good that glorious Title, or satisfie expectation to the full; and because I have observed many learned men, Divines, and others, who have long laboured their thoughts in the same Disquisition, to concurre with me in opinion, That to believe the soul of Man to be immortall, upon Principles supernaturall, is much more easie, then to demonstrate the same by Reasons purely Naturall. Now, if for the most sublime witts, even of our times (wherein the Metaphysicks have, doubtlesse, received a very great encrease of clearnesse, and mens speculations seem to be highly refined, in regard of sundry lively and fruitfull hints, that are inspersed upon the leaves of sacred writt, concerning as well the Originall and Nature of the Soul, as the state of it after death) it be so hard a task to erect a firme perswasion of the immortality of the human soul, upon a foundation of Naturall Reason alone; I appeal to every imprejudicate man, with what justice our EPICVRVS is so highly condemned, for being ignorant of that unattainable [Page] Truth, when he could steer the course of his judgment and beliefe by no other Starre, but that remote and pale one of the Light of Nature; that bright North-Starre of Holy Scripture appearing not at all to the Horizon of Greece, till many Ages after his death.

Again, EPICVRVS is not the only man amongst the Antients that is to be accused, for entertaining and divulging erroneous conceptions of the nature and condition of the reasonable soul after death, it being well known, that most of the Grecian Philosophers did indubitate the incorruptibility thereof, either implicitely and upon consequence, or immediately, and in direct terms. This perhaps may seem a Parodox to you, and therefore I ask leave to make it good. The Grecian Scholiarchs may all be divided into two Classes, in reference to this subject; the first consisting of those who asserted, the other of such as expresly denied the Immortality of Man's Soule, the former containing the greater, the latter the lesser number. And among all those that are [Page] on the affirmative part, you shall not finde one that is not (more or lesse) tainted with that so common Errour, of the Refusion of all mens souls after death, into the Anima Mundi, or generall Soul of the Universe, which is upon consequence, That, they cease to exist, per se, or to be what they were before, so soon as they are separated from the body. For your further satisfaction of this unfrequent Truth, be pleased to observe, that, as they generally conceived the soul of every individuall man, to be a certain particle of the Mundan, or universall soul, immitted into the body at its conception, and therein contained, during life, as a drop of water is contained in a glasse Phiall; so did they also conceive, that the same soul, upon the breaking of the glasse, or dissolution of the body, doth flow forth, and again return and unite it selfe to the universall soul, front whence it was at first desumed. Thus Plutarch (4 Placit. 9.) expresly tells us, that Pythagoras and Plato maintained, that Mans soul having taken its farewell of the body [ [...]] [Page] in congeniam sibi animam Mundi concedere, doth return to the soul of the world, which is of the same substance and nature with it. Now by this common soul of the world, it is manifest, that they sometimes meant God, in respect they acknowledged him to be the supream Intelligence, or Minde, which disposeth and ordereth all parts of the body; and sometimes the Heavens, because as Heaven is the most pure and noble part of the Vniverse, so is the soul the most pure and noble part of Man.

This considered, you have here an opportunity (at least, if a short and pertinent digression may be opportune) of taking notice in what sence we are to understand some remarkable passages in their writings, touching the buman soul, which are often mentioned, but seldome rightly interpreted.

First, we may hence collect what their true meaning was, when they said, Animam esse divinae aurae Particulam, that the Soul is a particle of Divine breath, or as Cicero speaks (in Cato Major) Ex [Page]Divina mente universa delibutos animos habemus: We have our soules derived from the universall divine minde; And again, when they affirmed, that our Soules were taken from Heaven, and to return thither again after their emancipation from the body: All which the Prince of Poets elegantly insinuateth in these Verses

—Deum nam (que) ire per omnes

Terrasque tractusque maris, coelumque profundum;

Heinc homines, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,

Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas,

Scilicer huc reddi deinde ae resoluta referri

Omnia, nec morti esse locum; sed viva evolare

Sideris in numerum, at (que) alto succedere coelo.

Secondly, we may hence learn the sence of Empedocles, as well in that saying quoted by Plutarch (de exilio) Praesentem vitam esse exilium, è quo tandem animus sit in pristinam sedem demigraturus, That this present li [...]e is a banishment of the soul, [Page] from which it is at length to be recall'd to its primitive place; as in that mentioned by Clem. Alexandrinus (Lib. 4. Stromat. 2. hypotypos. 24.) Animos sapientum Deos fieri, That the soules of Wise-men become Gods.

Thirdly, we may hence know how to understand the true sence of Plato's opinion, that all learning is only Reminiscence. For supposing the Soul of the Vniverse to be omniscient, and each particle thereof to be of the same nature and faculties with the whole; he thereupon inferrs, that the soul of each man being a particle of that universall and omniscient soul, must be likewise omniscient, though in the moment, when it is immers'd into the body, it becomes dim and beclouded, so that as if it had been made drunk with Lethe, or the Waters of Oblivion, it forgets all its Originall knowledge, and must recollect and call to minde the notions of particular things, by the help and mediation of the senses.

Lastly, why Pythagoras and Plato, to this opinion of the soules Remigration to [Page] the Vniversall Soul, connected that their other so famous one of the Transmigration of soules from body to body successively. For, having imbibed this latter errour of the souls transmigration, in their conversation with some Egyptian Priests, as Stobaeus informs us (in Eccl. Physic.) they strived to accomodate the same to their own former opinion, of the souls being a particle of the Anima mundi; insomuch as it might thence follow, that the soul being exhal'd from its first body, and wandring up and down in quest of its fountain, the universall soul, might probably enough light upon some other body then in the act of Conception, and being united thereunto, animate it; or, being by inspiration attracted into some living creature, unite it selfe to the soul praeexistent therein, and so become one with it, especially if the body it meet with be of the same, or like conditions and affections with the former, which it hath so lately forsaken. True it is, neverthelesse, that they delivered this Doctriue of the Transmigration of soules, very obscurely, and wrapt up in Fables and Allegories, [Page] but their design herein was to make men more mansuete and milde in their dispositions, by bringing them to put a greater value upon the lives of Animals (for, according to this Doctrine, who would kill a Beast, when for ought he knew, his Fathers Soul might animate that Beast) and a greater degree of horrour against shedding of Blood, that so having devested them of all savagenesse and cruelty, they might have a greater detestation against Homicide, and preserving the peace and safety of Societies.

Nor can the Stoicks be exempted from the same Errour, of the Refusion of all soules into the universall one; insomuch as it was their constant tenent, that the world was animated by a certain fire, which they call'd Jupiter; that mens soules were particles derived from that fire, and should again be reunited thereunto, some sooner, others latter, but all in that generall Conflagration of the Vniverse, when all things shall be (as they dreamt) sublimed into Jove again.

Now if we look narrowly into the businesse, [Page] we shall discover even Aristotle himselfe to be in some measure guilty of the very same delusion, as well in respect of his Animall Heat, which, discoursing of the Generation of Animals (Lib. 2 Cap. 3.) he affirms to be respondent in some proportion to the Element of Celestiall bodies, and wherewith all things in the world are impraegnated; as of his Intellectus Agens, which he teacheth to be diffused through the whole world, after the same manner as the light of the Sun is diffus'd through the Aire, and so apply'd and conjoyned to the Intellectus Patiens, or proper soule of every man, as the externall light is applyed and conjoyned to the eye, and as the eye by the conjunction of externall light comes to see visible objects, so doth the proper passive Intellect of every man, by the illustration of the generall active Intellect, come to understand intelligible Objects. Adding thereunto, that the Intellect passive is separable, corruptible, and capable of utter dissolution; but the Active, inseparable, incorruptible, immortall. For, thus much may be collected from severall [Page] places of his Books de Anima, and thus are those places explained by the best of his Greek interpreters, Alexander, and the best of the Arabians, Averrhoes, whose opinion of the Unity of the Intellect in all the world, is sufficiently known.

And thus much of the Philosophers of the former Classis, who though they seem to affirm, do yet in reality, upon naturall consequence, deny the Immortality of the Humane Soul, in that they all concur in that contradictory Errour of the Refusion thereof into the Anima mundi. For, the proper Notion of Immortality, is, the eternall existence of a thing in the selfe same nature, and perse; and therefore, if a thing be devested of its own proper nature, so, as to become invested with that of another, and to have no existence or subsistence, but what is dependent upon its union with that other, to which it is assimilated and indentified; for my part, truly, I cannot understand how it can be said to be immortall without manifest contradiction. And whether it be not as grosse an absurdity to say, that the soul of a man [Page] shall be for ever the same (i. e.) the soul of a man, and yet that it shall be identified, or made the same with the soul of the world; as to say, that such a thing shall before ever the same, and not the same, is no hard matter to determine.

As for those of the latter, who in down right termes denyed the Immortality of the soul, they subdivide themselves into two different Sects, some having contended for the totall destruction, or absolute Annihilation, and others for only the exsolution and dispersion of it into the matter or principles of which it was composed.

To the former of these Sects we may justly annumerate all such, who conceived the soule of man to be only a certain harmony, not of Musicall sounds, but a contemperation of parts, humours, and qualities, and consequently, that as of Musicall Harmony, nothing can remain after the sounds are vanished, so of the soul nothing can remain, after death hath once destroyed that harmonious Contemperation of parts, hunours, and qualities, from whence it did result. And this [Page] purely was the opinion of not only those antienter Greeks, Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus, Andraeas, and Asclepiades, all which are thereof strongly accused by Plato (in Phaed) and Aristotle (Lib. 1. de Anima Cap. 5.) but also our Master Galen, who was positive and plain in his definition of the soul, to be a certain Temperament of Elementary Qualities. In the same list may we also inscribe the names of all those, who imagining the soul to be nothing else but a certain Act, or Form, or Quality inseparable (i. e.) a certain speciall Modification of Matter, have accordingly concluded, that as the Figure, or speciall Mode of a thing must inevitably vanish, immediately upon the immutation or change of the thing figurate, so must the soul, being only a speciall Mode of the Matter, necessarily vanish immediately upon the immutation of that Mode by death. Which Origen, Iustine, Theodoret, and some other Fathers, understanding to have been the Tenent of Aristotle, have written sharp invectives against him, as an assertor of the soules mortality, and this so [Page] justly, that if his Zealous Disciple, honest Mr. Alexander Rosse, were alive again, he would never be able to discredit that their charge.

To the latter we are to refer all such, as held the soul to be Corporeall. For, as they would have it to be composed of materiall principles, so would they also have it to be, by death, again resolved into the same materiall principles; so that in their sence, the extinction of the soul is no other, but the dissipation thereof into those very corporeall particles, of which it was composed. And this seemes to be the true meaning of Demonax in Lucian, when being interrogated whether he thought the soul to be immortall, he answered, mihi videtur, sed ut omnia; it seemes to me to be immortall, but no otherwise than all things are immortall, (i. e.) as to the matter only, or component Principles of it, which are incapable of Annihilation. In this Catalogue we may worthily place Marcus Antoninus, in regard of his saying (Lib. 4.) Animas hominm dispergi in auras, that mens souls are dispersed into [Page] Aer: and Seneca, for his Animam hominis magno pondere extriti permeare non posse, et statim dispergi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber; as also Democritus and Epicurus, who equally contested, that the soul was nothing but very Atoms, in such a speciall order, in such a speciall position, &c. contemperated, and Death nothing but a discomposure of that determinate Contexture, and a Resolution of the soul into separated Atoms again; and therefore are they alwaies conjoyned by the good Lactantius (Lib. 3. cap. 7. & lib. 9. cap. 8. & 13.) as confederates in the Doctrine of the Dissolution of soules.

And thus, Sir, you may at once plainly perceive the justice of my Attainder of the most, and most eniment of the antient Grecian Philosophers, with the guilt of having been (either obliquely or directly) Impugners of the Soules Immortality; and the great Injustice of their Sentence, who more particularly condemne Epicurus for the same Error, when so many others were equally culpable with him therein.

[Page] As to the SECOND, viz. That man is not obliged to honour, revere, and worship God upon the motive of his Beneficence, or upon the accompt of either Good of Evill expected from him; but only out of a sentiment of the superlative Excellencies of his Nature, and chiefly of his Immortality and Beatitude. I might well plead for him, that living in a time, when there was scarce any Religion, but sottish Idolatry, when there were more Gods then Nations, yea, then Temples; and when all Devotion was absurd and ridiculous Superstition: He seems rather to be honour'd, for that he came so neer to the knowledge of the true God, then condemned for comming no neerer; rather to be admir'd for having so clear and genuine an apprehension of some of the Divine Attributes, then reproached for not comprehending them all. Especially, when I should not infringe the Law of charity, to doubt, that among us Christians, and even such as think themselves not a little vers'd in Theologie, there may be some, who, if they were [Page] put to give but an Adumbration of that mysterious piece, the Divine Nature, would discover themselves to have as imperfect an Idaea thereof, as EPICVRVS had. But this excuse would be too generall for his particular vindication, from the imputed crime of perfect Atheisme, and therefore we shall fix only on such Reasons as are more properly accomodate to that purpose.

First, I dare say, his Piety, in deriding the incompetency of those Conceptions, that men in his time commonly entertained of the supream Essence (for they ascribed generally unto it, all the selfe same passions and affections, which they perceived to be in themselves, and so copied out an imperfect Divinity, by the infinitely disproportionate Originall of Humanity) was much greater then his Impiety could be, in teaching, that the Deity was of so transcendently excellent a nature, as to be wholly unconcern'd in any thing but it selfe, and far above all sentiments whatever, besides those of its own eternall and compleat Felicity; and consequently, that it was to be reverenc'd and [Page] worshiped solely and purely for its own sake, without the least mixture of selfe-Reflections. For, as by the one, he judiciously attempted to subvert the false and unreasonable Religion, or (rather) Superstition, in the worship of Bacchus, and other the Imaginary Deities, wherewith his Country swarmed in his daies (there being no better way to alienate mens minds from the Veneration of False Gods, then to acquaint them with notions comprehending the Essentiall and Incommunicable attributes of the true God) so by the other, he seems to have laid a very firm foundation for the true Religion, in that he would have the Right or Iustice of all Divine worship to be founded wholly and entirely upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature. How far therefore he was from being a Professor and Seminary of down-right Atheisme, as some (whose zeal may well be thought to have been much greater then their knowledge, as to that particular) have represented him to the World; every man, who hath but so much reason, as to understand, that Polytheisme is the greatest [Page] Atheisme, may easily judge.

In the next place, I can hardly allow him to deserve the odious Epithete of, most highly Impious, which most men brand him withall, upon the account of this latter Doctrine only, because I meet with not a few, nor contemptible Reasons, that encline my judgment to more moderation. In particular, you well know, Sir, how highly unreasonable it is, for any man to expect, from EPICVRVS, the knowledge of the true and legitimate worship of God, when that was by God himselfe praescribed only to the antient Hebrewes, and professed only by their Posterity, and no other Nation in the World; if so, why should more be expected from Him, then from Plato, Zeno, Socrates, Aristotle, or any other of the elder Graecian Philosophers, they being all equally benighted with Paganisme? Why should he be so severely sentenc'd, and all the rest passe unquestioned, one and the same charge of invincible Ignorance of the true Religion lying against each of them? Besides, Human Iustice will hardly permit, that any [Page] man should suffer meerly for wanting that, which, without supernaturall means, was impossible for him to obtain; and he that will adventure to determine, whether or no, at the Tribunall of Divine Iustice, any one shall be condemned simply upon that score, must have dived very deep into that fathomlesse gulfe of Praedestination.

You likewise know, that our Christian Doctors assigne only Two causes, or Fundamentall Consideration, why men should worship God: The one they teach to be the transcendent Excellency of the Nature of God, which singly, and without any respect to our own Vtility or Advantage, doth justly claim the highest veneration of our minds. The other, they admit to be the benefits, we either have received, or (which is the stronger motive of the two) hope to receive at his hands. Hereupon, if any man be induced to revere and worship the Divine Majesty solely and simply upon the former motive, they say that he bears a Filiall respect and affection to God; and if only by the latter, a meer servile or mercenary. [Page] Now though the servile or mercenary love of God, be not altogether to be disliked, in regard it is a kind of gratitude due to him as a Benefactor; yet I conceive no man will gainsay, but the filiall and free love is much the nobler and more acceptable, insomuch as it hath no other then the noblest of Objects, God Himselfe. And sure I am (however) that the most Learned, most Pious, and most Religious of our School Divines, have been earnest in their advisoes to us, to extract all selfenesse from our love of God, and (as much as our frailties will admit of) to fix all our affections entirely upon Him, as he is infinitely Good, and Amiable in Himselfe.

Moreover, you may remember, Sir, that Cicero in his Book touching the nature of the Gods, hath these very words, Quid est cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum dii ipsi non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent? Et quae porrò Pietas ei debetur, à quo nihil acceperis? Aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum fit, ei deberi potest? By which [Page] it is evident, that he would exclude all other inducements to Religion, besides a meer mercenary and servile respect: And yet I dare say, that you do not remember, that ever you heard him accounted Impious for that opinion. Why therefore should EPICVRVS have such hard measure, as to be stigmatiz'd with the name of Atheist, Impious wretch, Secretary of Hell, Enemy to all Religion, &c? and all for asserting, that man ought to be induc'd to a reverence and veneration of the Divine Majesty, only by the Sentiments of a Filiall Piety (not supernaturall Piety, arising from Grace justifying, and by which we are made the Sons of God, but a pure Naturall one) such as Right Reason had suggested unto him? Certainly, of the two opinions, Epicurus's will appear much more veniall, to an Equitable Arbiter. Sundry other arguments there are, which might be advantagiously-alledged on our Authors behalfe, in this case. But, considering that these few already urged, are of importance enough, to evince the temerity of his Accusers [Page] judgment, and that the prolixity of this discourse, hath long since, given you just occasion to question, by what right I call it a Letter; I perceive my selfe obliged in good manners, no longer to exercise your patience, then, while I briefly expresse my sentiments of the LAST Article of his Charge.

Which is, His asserting of Selfe-Homicide, in case of intolerable, and otherwise inevitable Calamity. This, as a Christian, I hold to be a bloody and detestable opinion, because expresly repugnant to the Law of God; and yet in the person of a meer Philosopher, I might, without being unreasonably Paradoxicall, adventure to dispute, whether it be so highly repugnant to the Law of Nature, as men have generally conceived. For

First, if all the praecepts of the Law of Nature concenter in this one point; Flie Evill, pursue Good; as those who have most labour'd to conduct our understanding out of that intricate Labyrinth, the ambiguous Sence of the word, Law of Nature, [Page] have unanimously determined; certainly, that man assumes no very easie task, who undertakes to prove, that in case of insupportable distresse, and where all other hopes of evading, or ending that misery (then which there can be no greater Evill) for a man to free himselfe from that extremity of Evill, and seek the Good of ease and quiet, by taking away his own life, which chiefly makes him subject to, and only sensible of that misery, is an infringment of the Law of Nature.

Again, if we understand Selfe-praeservation (which all men allow to be the foundation of Naturall Law in Generall) to be no other, but an innate Love, or Naturall affection to Life, as a Good, when life ceaseth to be a Good, & degenerates into an Evill, as commonly it doth to men, in cruell torments of the body, or high discontent of minde, (the more desperate affliction of the two by much) & when all the Stars of hope and comfort are set in the West of black desperation, why should not the force or obligation of that Law also, cease at the same [Page] time? Or rather, why should not self-homicid, in such cases, be an absolute accomplishment of the Law of Self-praeservation, it being manifest, that we are by the tenour of that Law, obliged to use such means, as conduce to our praeservation from the greatest Evill; and as manifest, that to free onesselfe from misery, which cannot otherwise be avoided, but by breaking as under the Ligaments of Life, is a pursuance of the only means we can discover, to beconducible to our end: that is, to preservation from more sufferings, and to Indolency, which in Death we propose to our selves as a Good?

But lest we seem to give any encouragement to that, which God, the Church, and the Civill Power so highly condemn; let us grant, that Selfe-murther, in whatsoever case, is a violation of the Law of Nature, and yet we shall have one consideration left, that seemes strong enought to refract the violence of their malice, who exclaim against EPICVRVS, as the grand abettor of selfe-assasination; and that [Page] is, that he was not single, nor most vehement in the justification of it. For, if we look upon the Doctrine of other Philosophers, we shall soon perceive, that the Stoicks generally, not only approved thereof, but strictly enjoyned men to embrace death voluntarily, and from their own hands; That Cicero doth (Lib. de Legibus) implicitely allow of it in these words, Eum damnandum esse censeo qui seipsum interficit, si neque ex decreto Civitatis fecerit, ne (que) ullo Fortunae casu intolerabili inevitabili (que) coactus, neque obrutus ullâ pauperis, miserae (que) vitae ignominiâ; and expresly confirms it (in 2 Tusculan.) in these, Eam in vita servandam Legem quae in Graecorum conviviis obtinet, Aut bibat, aut abeat; quoniam ut oportet aliquis fruatur pariter cum aliis voluptate potandi, aut ne sobrius in violentiam vinolentorum incidat, ante discedat; sic injurias Fortunae quas ferre nequeas, defugiendo relinquas. And if their Practise, we [Page] shall assoon finde many of them to have laid violent hands upon themselves, and that in cases offar lesse moment, then that of insupportable and inevitable Calamity, to which only Epicurus's praecept is limited; while He, leaving others to become examples of that Rule, with admirable patience, and invincible magnanimity, endured the tortures of the Stone in the Bladder, and other most excruciating Diseases, for mamy years together, and awaited, till extream old age gently put out the Taper of his life. Thus Zeno, a man of the most spotlesse fame of any Philosopher among the antients, having by a fall bruised one of his fingers against the ground, and interpreting that to be a summons of him to the earth, went presently home and hang'd himselfe, and was therefore by Diogenes Laertius honour'd with this Elogie; Mirâ felicitate vir, qui incolumis, integer, sine morbo è vivis excessit. Thus Demosthenes, you know, to prevent his being beholding to any man but himselfe [Page] either for his life or death, drank mortall poison out of his own quill, which had given him immortality long before. Thus also Democles, to praevent his pollution, by the unnaturall heat of a certain lustfull Greek Tyrant, who attempted to force him, leaped into a Furnace of boyling Water. And thus Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Empedocles, all brake open the gates of death, and forc'd themselves into the other world. To these you may please to add the memorable Examples of that Prince of Romane wisdome (as Lactanrius calls him) Cato, who with his own hands and sword, opened a flood-gate in his bowells, to let his life flow forth, having all the night before prepar'd himselfe to fall boldly, with the Lecture of Plato's discourse, of the Immortality of the Soul; and of the famous Cleombrotus, who, upon no other incitement, but Plato's reasons in the same discourse, threw himselfe from a precipice, as if he [Page] went instantly to experiment the truth of what he had newly read; and though Aristotle would not admit, that he did it upon any other account, but that of Pusillanimity and Fear, yet Saint Augustine (De Civit. Dei. Lib. 1. cap. 22.) ascribes it altogether unto Greatnesse of minde, his words being these; When no Calamity urged him, no Crime, either true or imputed, nothing but greatnesse of minde moved him to embrace death, and dissolve the sweet bonds of life. And Lactantius, who was severe enough in his censure, both of the Act, and the Book that occasion'd it, sayes of him; Praecipitem se dedit nullam aliam ob causam nisi quod Platoni credidit.

SIR, By this time you are satisfied, both of the injuries done to the memory of the Temperate, Good, and Pious EPICVRVS, and of my willingnesse and devoir to redresse them. And my dull and [Page] unequall Apologie for him being now ended, I should begin another for my selfe, in that I have rather disturbed, then either delighted or informed you. But this being much the greater difficulty of the two, I think it safer for me, to put my selfe upon your mercy for an absolute forgivenesse, then to trust to my own wit, to make excuses for my failings herein; especially, since your patience cannot but be already overcome by the Tediousnesse of

Your very Humble Servant, W. CHARLETON.

The Contents.

[Page]

Chap. 1. INtroduction. Fol. 1.

Chap. 2. Of Felicity, or the Supream Good, so far forth, as Man is capable thereof. Fol. 7.

Chap. 3. That pleasure (without which, there can be no Notion of Felicity) is a reall Good, in it selfe. Fol. 12.

Chap. 4. That Felicity doth consist generally in Pleasure Fol. 17.

Chap. 5. That the Pleasure wherein Felicity doth consist, is the Indolency of the Body, and Tranquillity of the Minde. Fol. 22.

Chap. 6. Of the Means to attain this Felicity. Fol. 29.

Chap. 7. Of Right Reason, and Free Will; from whence all the Praise of the Vertues is derived. Fol. 33.

Chap. 8. Of the Vertues in Generall. Fol. 38.

Chap. 9. Of Prudence Generall. Fol. 44.

Chap. 10. Of Prudence Private. Fol. 48.

Chap. 11. Of Prudence Domestick. Fol. 55.

Chap. 12. Of Prudence Civill. Fol. 60.

Chap. 13. Of Temperance in Generall. Fol. 66.

Chap. 14. Of Sobriety, opposed to Gluttony. Fol. 71.

Chap. 15. Of Continence, opposed to Lust. Fol. 79.

Chap. 16. Of Lenity, opposed to Anger. Fol. 86.

Chap. 17. Of Modesty, opposed to Ambition. Fol. 92.

Chap. 18. Of Moderation, opposed to Avarice. Fol. 97.

[Page]Chap. 19. Of Mediocrity, betwixt Hope and Despair of the Future. Fol. 104.

Chap. 20. Of Fortitude, in Generall. Fol. 109.

Chap. 21. Of Fortitude, opposed to the Fear of the Gods. Fol. 114.

Chap. 22. Of Fortitude, opposed to the Fear of Death. Fol. 118.

Chap. 23. Of Fortitude, against Pain of the Body Fol. 128.

Chap. 24. Of Fortitude, against Discontent of Minde. Fol. 133.

Chap. 25. Of Iustice, in Generall. Fol. 139.

Chap. 26. Of Right, or Iust; from whence Iustice is denominated. Fol. 143.

Chap. 27. Of the Originall of Right and Iustice Fol. 149.

Chap. 28. Between whom Iustice is to be exercised. Fol. 159.

Chap. 29. How rightfully Iustice is to be exercised. Fol. 167.

Chap. 30. Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Observance. Fol. 172.

Chap. 31. Of Friendship. Fol. 178.

§

§

[Page]

EPICURVS in this Treatise discourseth of the

1. Summum Bonum of mans life, which is PLEASVRE, consisting in the Indolency of the Body, & Tranquillity of the Mind.

2. Means to attain it, viz. Honesty, which comprehends all the Virtues, namely,

1. Prudence or the Dictamen of right Reason; and that

1. Generall, which teacheth to order all ones Actions and desires to the attainement of Pleasure.

2. Particular, which divides it selfe into

1. Prudence Private, which admonisheth us to elect (if it be in our own choyce) that course of life, which is most agreeable to the inclination of our Genius, and such as may make our Condition rather Mean, then either High, or Lowe.

2. Prudence Domestick which concernes a man as a

Husband.

Father.

Master of Servants.

Possessor of Goods & estate

3. Prudence Civill, which concerns a man as he is the Member of a Society: which adviseth to Affect privacy, and yet not to decline publick imployments, in case the present Necessity of the Cōmon Wealth, or the Command of Superiors shall call thereunto.

2. Temperance

1. General, consisting in the Moderation of all Cupidities.

2. Particular which is either

1. Sobriety

2, Continence

3. Lenity

4. Modesty

5. Moderation

6. Mediocrity betwixt Hope and despaire of the Future.

opposed to

Gluttony.

Lust.

Anger.

Ambition.

Avarice.

3. Fortitude

1. General, consisting in the prevention of all Fear.

2. Particular against

The Fear of the Gods.

The Feare of Death.

Paines of the Body.

Discontent of Mind.

4. Iustice, whereof there are five. branches, viz.

1. Beneficence to All.

2. Gratitude to Benefactors.

Piety towards

Parents.

Kinsfolks.

Country.

Governours.

Observance of

All Superiors in (1) Nature, as the Gods. (2) Power, as Princes and Magistrates. (3) Learning. (4) Uirtue. (5) Obligations.

5. Frendship, which extends to the mutuall Participation, not Community of Saints, and to Death it self.

EPICVRVS'S MORALS.

[Page]

CHAPTER 1.

Introduction.

IF Action be the end of Speculalation, and the knowledge of Nature, but the way that leads Man to the knowledge of himself; and the best of mans knowledge bee that which teacheth him how to order his Mind, and regulate his Actions,Esse illius Philosophi orationem prorsus inanem, quae Affectum nullum in Homine curat; quia, ut Medicinae usus nullus est, nisi à Corpore morbos abigat: sic nec Philosophiae, nisi malum ex Animo pellat; inquit Stobaeus in Sermon. 8. so as that he may assuredly attain to the highest degree of Happinesse, of which his Nature is capable, during life: then, certainly, must ETHICKS or MORAL PHILOSOPHY be the noblest part of all Human Learning, the Crown and perfection of all our studies; insomuch as it is that alone, [Page] which both gives us the infallible Tokens, by which we may know what is truly the summum Bonum of life, and prescribes us most plain and certain Rules for the Acquisition of it.

II.

By Ethicks, or Morals, we understand that part of Philosophy, which hath for its proper Object the End, or Finall and main scope of Mans Life; containing certain Directions and Precepts, for the right information of his Understanding, and (consequently) the conduct of his Will, in the Election of real Good, and Avoidance of Evill, in order to his attaining the true End of his life, the Supream Good, or Felicity.

III.

That the End of Man's Life is Felicity; all men most readily allow: and, if you ask him, no man will deny, that he aimes at that End. But, seeing it is too certain, that most men miss of that end; it cannot be doubted, that the Frustration of their Hopes and Endeavours doth of necessity proceed from hence: either that they doe not propose to themselves that Felicity, which they ought; or doe not use such Means, or pursue such Courses, as to conduce thereunto.

IV.

We cannot but observe, that there are Myriads of men, who though their propitious Fortunes have abundantly accommodated them with all things necessary for the uses of life, [Page] (for, their exchequers overflow with treasure, their bodies enjoy perfect health and vigour, their titles swell with attributes of honour, their fair, chast and fruitfull Wiues furnish them with troops of beautiful and ingenious Children, in a word, they possesse all things, that all that are below them usually measure happiness by:) do yet live full of Anxiety and Complainings, having their minds perpetually on the rack of cares, sollicitude, and fears: so as they cannot but confesse, that they lead lives truly miserable. Considering this, we may from thence safely conclude, that these men are wholly ignorant wherein true Felicity doth consist, and whence or how it is to be attained: and therefore, that the Heart of every such person may be fitly compared to a vessel, which being in some part full of holes, can never be filled; and in other parts deeply imbued with some evil tincture, doth deprave and corrupt the most wholsom and cordiall Liquor that is poured into it.

V.

Well worth our labour, therefore, is it, by the help of this Philosophy (which teacheth the nature of, and way unto Felicity) to cleanse and make sound that Vessell, the Heart of man; that so it may be easily filled with a few things, and find a sweetnesse and comfort in every the smallest thing that ocurrs unto it. And to [Page] thisAtqui, non cum vacaveris, Philosophandum est: omnia alia negligenda sunt, ut huic assideamus; cui nullum tempus satis magnum est, etiamsi à pueritia usque ad longissimos humani aevi terminos vita protenditur. Seneca, Epist. 59. vide etiam Galenum de affect dignoscend. & vitand. cap. 3. itemque, Epictetum, in Enchir. lib. 3. cap. 15. Philosophy we are to addict our selves betimes, as soon as possible, even this very day; not to defer it so much as till to morrow: because it highly concerns us to liue happily to day; and Folly hath this evil alwaies annexed unto it, that it doth alwaies begin to live, or purpose to begin to live, but in the mean time never doth live.

VI.

Once we were, twice we cannot be born: and our Age must have a period; but when we know not. If so, is it prudence, or folly in thee, O man! when thou hast not To morrow in thy power, toMarcus Antoninus [ [...]] notans procrastinationem studii & conatus ad optima enitendi, inquit: [...]. De seipso lib. 3. Sect. 4. procrastinate thy making thy self happy till the Future, and in the mean time lose the opportunity of the present, of which onely thou art certain? By such delay is it, that the Lives of most men are lost: and hence comes it, that every oneIlle potens sui Laetus (que) viget, cui licet in diem dixisse, Vixi. Flaccus Carmin. lib. 3. ad. 29. dies in the Immaturity, if not the Beginning of his Designes. Every man so goes out of the World, as if he had but newly entred into it: and thereforeMaxima jactura vitae dilatio est. Illa primum quemque extrahit diem: illa cripit praesentia, dum ulteriora promittit; &c. Senec. de brevit. vit. cap. 9. old men may justly be affirmed, not to have survived the rawness and folly [Page] of their Infancy: because trifling away their years in business that concerns them not, they have scarce known that they have lived at all, and in the chief Harvest of life, they have never reaped the Fruits of it.

VII.

Let us, therefore, endeavour so to live, as that we need not repent us of our time past: and so enjoy the present day, as if we were nothing concerned in To-morrow.Omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum; Graca superveniet, quae non sperabitur hora. Hor. lib. 1. Epist. 4. For, He ariues most sweetly at To-morrow, who doth, the least need, or desire it: and an hour comes most grateful to him, who had the least expectation of it. Since it is troublesome, alwaies to begin to live: let us make every moment, the Total snmme of life; as if no part of it remained behind. The life of a fool is unpleasant, and full of Fears, and depends wholly upon the Future: but it become's us so to order our Minds and Actions, as that Ours may be pleasant, secure, and sixt in the safety of the present.

VIII.

Certainly, the way, at length, to avoid Foolishness, is for a man to advance himself into the Arsenall, or Fortress of Wise men, from whence, as from a Watch-Tower, hee may look down upon the swarms of other men, led, by their passions, wandring up and down in a Wilderness of Errors; and uncessantly afflicting themselves in the pursuit of such things, which, being found, encrease [Page] their miserable Deviations. If you account it a pleasure, to stand upon a safe Rock, and behold Mariners at Sea distractedly striving with a Tempest; or, from a secure Castle to look upon two Armies maintaining a long and fierce Battail: assuredly, it must be much more delightful, from the serene Tower of Wisdom, to contemplate the Tumults, Hurries, and Contentions of the foolish Multitude below. Not that it is delightful, to see others afflicted with Evils; but, to see our selves not to be involved in those Evills.

IX.

Now that we may, to the utmost of our power, afford assistance to those, who desire to arive at this height of Wisdom; we conceive our selves obliged, in humanity, so to collect and compile such Notions, concerning these things, which our frequent Meditations have brought unto our mind: that we may discourse first of Felicity, which is Mans Chiefest Good; and afterward, of such Means, as certainly conduce to the Creation and Conservation thereof, and which, indeed, are no other but the Vertues themselves.

[Page]

CHAP. II.

Of Felicity, or the Supreme Good; as far as Man is capable thereof.

FElicity is therefore called the End, Extreme, and Heighest of Goods, because there are some things named Goods, which invite the Appetite to prosecute them immediately for themselves; and others againe which are desireable mediately or in relation to others, that are Superior: but, as for Felicity, it is that Good, to which all other Goods ought to be referred, and cannot it self be referred to any thing.

II.

Nor doth it hinder, since felicity and Beatitude, or a Blisful Life,Eadem prorsus ratione Cicero (de finib. bonorum) finem boni appellat, bonum omnibus numeris absolutum, quod qui sit assequutus, praeterea nihil desideret. are one and the same; that it is sometimes stiled the End of a blisfull life: for in that we speak the phrase of the Gentiles, which accept the End of a blisful life, and a blisfull life it self, for the very same thing; not that we thereby intend, that there is any further End, to which a blisfull life may be conceived referrible.

III.

This premised, it behoves us to Distinguish Felicity into Supreme, viz. that which is incapable of intention and remission, or Flouds and Ebbs of pleasure: and Subalterne or Graduall, [Page] viz. such as is subject to Addition and Detraction, or Encrease and Decrease of pleasures.

IV.

The Former, we conceive to be a certain State, than which none can be thought more sweet, more desireable, more perfect; wherein there is no Evil to be feared, no Good, which is not fully enjoyed; wherein is nothing to which the Will can have an inclination, and may not possess it; finally, which is more Constant than ever to be lost.

V.

The Later, we understand to be a certain state, in which a man may be as Happy as the Frailty of his Nature will permit; or such, wherein he may enjoy very much of necessary Goods, and suffer very little of Evils: and consequently, wherein He may spend his daies pleasantly, calmly, and permanently, so far forth as the Condition of his Country, Society, Course of life, Constitution, Age, and other Circumstances shall give leave.

VI.

Nor is it without good reason, that we thus Distinguish, and define Felicity. Because, though it be manifest, that the Former, or Supream Felicity is competent only to the Divine Nature: yet there have bin some,The Stoicks who thinking overhighly of themselves, and speaking magnificently of their own Wisdom, have so far dared to promise and arrogate to themselves [Page] this perfect Felicity, as to affirm themselves to be, in that respect, equall to God, and account the expression modest, when they said they were inferior onely to Iupiter himself.

VII.

These, truly, may be judged to have been forgetfull both of the Mortality and Imbecility of their Nature; when all that are conscious or mindfull of either, must soon acknowledge, that Men are capable onely of the Latter, or imperfect Felicity: and that Wisdom doth perform a very high work upon a man, if, while most others remain surrounded with diverse Miseries, it advance him to such a condition, as renders him the least miserable of all men; or, if, among those various Degrees of miseries, to which his Birth hath made him obnoxious, it place him in such a state, wherein hee may have the least share of those miseries. For, to be happy, in this life, it is sufficient to be exempted from those miseries, by which one might have been afflicted: and in the mean time, to enjoy such Goods, as that the condition of our Nature is not capable of greater.

VIII.

And this, seriously, is the Reason, why we conceive; that a Wise man, though he be deprived of the two best of his Sences, his Sight and Hearing, may yet partake of a happy life: forasmuch as he may neverthelesse continue in [Page] the fruition of such and so many Goods, as his maimed nature is capable of; and want those Evills, if not of his Body, yet at least of his mind, which might otherwise have vexed him.

IX.

Nay upon the same ground we further profess, that a Wise man may be Tormented most cruelly, and yet continue the possession of his Happiness. For, still he may enjoy, not that Divine, but this Human Felicity; since in a Wiseman it is alwaies as Great, as the Condition of the present time wil permit him to make it.

X.

We confess, that in the midst of his torments, he cannot but be sensible of pains; and may somtimes, by the violence of them, be forced to groan and roar out: but, in the mean while, because calmly submitting to the necessity of his suffering them, he doth not exasperate or encrease his pains, either by his Impatience, or Desperation, but rather mitigates and lessens them, by as great Constancy of mind, as his generous resolutions can fortifie him withall: in that respect, doubtless, he must be much more happy, than if he had, with pusillanimity, fear, reluctancy, and despair, entertained them; or than another man, who being under the same torments, doth not endure them with equall courage and constancy, as not having the like encouragements and supplies [Page] from Wisdom: (which adfers, at least, Innocence of life, and security of Conscience) by which those torments might be lightned.

XI.

Wherefore, there is no reason neither, why any man should, by way of Cavill, object unto us; that according to this Assertion, Phalaris Bul, and a bed of Roses must be all one to us; and consequently, that a Wise man ought, while he is in the flames of that Brazen Engine of torture, to smile, and cry out, O how pleasant this is! O how much am I above these torments! how little do I fear or care for them! Forasmuch as we do not gainsay, but there are some things, which a wise man had rather should happen to him, as the health of his Body, exemption from all incommodity, and freedom of his Mind, that so he might solace himself in the contemplation of his Goods: and other things, which though he would not, they should befall him; yet when they do befall him, he doth not only constantly and bravely endure, but also welcoms and commends them, insomuch as they give him an opportunity to experiment and gratulate his Virtue, and with internall alacrity, to exclame, I am burned, but not overcome; why should it not be more desirable, not to have the fire overcome my Constancy, than not to have it consume my Body? And this we say, in regard it is not to be expected, but that a Wise man may also be obnoxious, as to the pains of Diseases, so also to [Page] the tortures of Tyrants: though he neither incurre those, nor provoke these willingly, so far forth as he can, with safety of his Virtues, avoid it.

CHAP. III.
That pleasure (without which there is no Notion of Felicity) is a Good, of its own Nature.

1

FOrasmuch as it's sweet, or pleasant, for a man to live without pain; and sweet, or pleasant likewise, to enjoy Good things, and be recreated by them: it is an evident truth, that without both these sweetnesses or Pleasures, or one of them at least, Felicity cannot be understood (for, we accept Pleasure, Suavity, Jucundity, and other Terms of the like importance, for one and the same thing:) though there have not wanted some, who with great pomp and ostentation, have so discoursed of Pleasure, as if it were a certain Evill, in its own nature; and upon consequence, concluded it to be not onely inconsistent with, but wholly Alien from wisdom and Happiness. And therefore, before we come to enquire, whether Felicity doth consist in Pleasure, or not; requisite it is, that we remonstrate, that Pleasure is a reall good, in it self; and that its Contrary, Pain, is a reall Evill, in it self.

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II.

Since that is Good, which helpeth, which pleaseth, which is amiable and inviting to the Appetite; and on the contrary, that is Evill, which harmeth, which displeaseth, which is ungratefull, and so inciteth the Appetite to an odium and aversion: certainly there is nothing, which doth more please, more delight, is more amiable, more desiderable, than Pleasure; and on the contrary, nothing that doth more incommode, more offend, is more to be abhorred and avoided, than pain: Wherefore, Pleasure seems to be not onely a Good, but also the Essentiall Reason, or very Root of Good; insomuch as it is that very and onely thing, for whose sake, or in respect whereof an object is Good or Desirable: as on the reverse; pain seems to be not only an Evil in it self, but also the Formall Reason, or very Root of Evill; insomuch as it is that alone, in respect whereof any thing is Evill or Hatefull. For, though we somtimes avoid Pleasure; yet is it not the pleasure it self which we avoid, but some pain that is annexed unto it, or impendent on it: as likewise if we somtimes court and pursue a pain, it is not the pain it self, that wee pursue, but some pleasure that is conjoyned unto it.

III.

To speak more expressly; No man doth [Page] neglect, hate, or decline pleasure, as it is pleasure, but, because usually very great pains follow and overtake such, who know not to follow Pleasure with Reason and Moderation; nor is there any man, that loves, desires, and pursues Pain, simply as it is pain; but because he expects some very great pleasure to accrew to him thereupon; and such frequently may be the constitution of the time, as that he hath no other way that leads him to the pleasure he aims at, but what lies in the rough tract of Labour and Pain.

IV.

To instance in very small things; who is there among us, that undertakes and endures any laborious exercise of the body, unlesse to the end, that he may thereby acquire some commodity or benefit? And who can justly reprehend him who desires and endeavours to enjoy that pleasure, upon which nothing of trouble or discommodity doth attend? Or him, who endeavours to eschew that Paine, by which no pleasure can be procured? But, we may justly accuse, and esteem those persons worthy of contempt, who being intricated and corrupted with the blandishments of present pleasures, do not foresee nor provide against those pains and troubles, that must ensue, as being inevitably impendent upon all heads that are blinded with cupidities. The like blame is due also to those who forsake [Page] their stations, and desert the duties of their places and offices, out of a certain softnesse and weaknesse of Minde, i. e. of Fear, of Labour, and Pains.

V.

Now, of these things, the Distinction is easie and expedite. For, in times of freedome, when all lies open to the arbitrary disposition of our own choice, so that there is no impediment, but we may do that which is most pleasing to us; in such case, it is lawfull for us to pursue and embrace all pleasure, and avoid all pain. But, such frequently may be the constitution of the times, as that pleasures are rather to be repudiated, and labours and troubles not to be refused.

VI.

So, though we esteem all pleasures to be a reall good, and all pain to be a reall evill; yet we do not therefore affirm, that we ought, at all times, to pursue that, and avoid this. For, it is good for us, to sustain some pains, that we may afterward enjoy more abundant pleasures; and expedient to abstain from some pleasures, that we may not by them incurre more grievous pains.

VII.

Hence, as from a fountain, was it, that discoursing of the true Criteria, or judges of good [Page] and evill, we deduced severall Canons, or Rules, for the guidance and regulation of our Affections, or Passions: accounting Pleasure and Pain, for the most certain Criterion of Election and Aversion. And this upon very good reason; seeing that from the Benefit or Harm that redounds unto us from the fruition of them; all the Objects of our Affections or Passions ought to be judged Good or Evill; and that we somtimes use Good as Evill, and other times Evill as Good.

VIII.

From these Considerations, therefore (that we may inculcate the matter) we conclude, that no pleasure is of it self Evill; but some things there are, which albeit they afford some pleasures, yet they are such, as occasion and induce pains much greater than themselves. Whereto, by way of Consequence, we superadd this; if any one pleasure could be so collected into it self, or sequestred from all dross, as that it should neither comprehend in it, nor leave behind it any the least measure of pain: assuredly, by that Collection and simplicity, it would become no less perfect and absolute, than are the chiefest Works of Nature; and so pleasures could have no Difference either of Qualities or Degrees among themselves, but would all be equally desireable.

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IX.

Further, if those very things, which are the Efficients of Pleasures to Luxurious men, were such, as that they could render them superior to the terrors of Meteors, Earthquakes, Thunder and Lightning, Eclipses, and other the like accidents, caused by bodies superterrestriall; and free them from the base fears of pains and Death: truly, we could find nothing in them to be reprehended; insomuch as they would be wholly filled with Pleasures, and could not, in the least, know any thing of Pain, of Trouble, of Sickness, i. e. of Evill.

CHAP. IV.
That Felicity doth consist Generally in Pleasure.

1

WE are now come to our main purpose, viz, That Felicity is rooted in Pleasure; and therefore; we are first to demonstrate it to be so in the Generall, that we may afterward the more securely determine in what Pleasure it doth consist in Speciall.

II.

In the Generall, pleasure seems to be as the beginning, so also the end of happy life; forasmuch as we deprehend it to be the first Good, and Congenite to our Nature, and to [Page] all other Animals whatever; and that very and onely thing, according to which we direct our selves, in the Election and Rejection of any Object whatever, and define it to be Good or Evill.

III.

That Pleasure is the First Good, and Congeniall, or, as Philosophers speak, the First Aptum and Accommodatum to Nature, may be demonstrated from hence; that every Animal, as soon as born, doth affect, pursue, and delight in Pleasure, as its chiefest Good: and on the contrary, doth hate, avoid, and to the utmost of its power, repel Pain, as its Chiefest Evill; provided that the sense of the Animal be not depraved, but its Nature remain in its primitive perfection, so as to enable it to judge truly.

IV.

This considered, there is no further need of any Reasoning, or Disputation to evince, why Pleasure is to be desired, and pain to be avoided; since the sence alone doth evidently demonstrate it, no lesse than it doth that Fire is hot, that snow is white, that Hony is sweet: and sufficient it is for us onely to observe it. For, if when we have taken away from man all his senses, the Remainder must be nothing; necessary it is, that what is according to Nature, what against Nature, must be judged by Nature [Page] it self: and consequently, that Pleasure is to be desired for it self, and pain to be avoided for it self. For, what perceives, or what judges, that it may either pursue, or avoid any thing, beside pleasure and pain?

V.

That Pleasure is also the Last or Highest of Goods, or the end of all desiderable things, may be soon understood even from hence; that it is Pleasure alone, for which we desire all other things: and never desire Pleasure for any thing but it self. For, other things we may desire, to the end we may be affected or delighted with Pleasure: but no man did ever require a reason, why we would be affected and delighted therewith; truly, no more, than for what Cause, or to what End we should desire to be happy. Seeing that Pleasure and Felicity ought to be reputed as in the same degree, so also for one and the same thing: and consequently, for the end, Extreme, or Supreme of Goods, to which all other things subordinately conduce, and which is it self subordinate or referrible to nothing.

VI.

The same may be Confirmed from hence; that (as wee have praemonished) Felicity cannot be understood, unlesse it be conceived to be a certain state wherein a man may live most sweetly, most pleasantly, i. e. in [Page] the greatest Pleasure, of which his Nature is capable. For, but take away from life that sweetnesse, that jucundity; and pray, what Notion of Felicity can remain? wee say of Felicity; not onely such as we termed Divine, but also that, which we account Human, and which is not otherwise capable of more and lesse, or of Intension and Remission, than onely as it may admit of more and lesse of Pleasure.

VII.

That we may further manifest this Truth, by a Comparation of Pleasure with pain; let us suppose a man to enjoy many, great, and lasting pleasures both in mind and body; no pain molesting him in the present, nor threatning him in the future: and then what state can bee imagined more desireable, more happy than this? For, in him, who is thus affected, there must be a Constancy or firmnesse of Mind, fearing neither Death, nor Pain; because Death is insensible of any pain, and in life, if pain be long, it must be light, if great, it cannot be long; so that the Brevity is a comfort against the violence thereof, and the Levity against Diuturnity. When a man arrives at such a Condition, as that he doth not tremble at the thought of Divinity, nor suffer the present pleasures to slip away unenjoyd, while his mind is taken up either with the memory of past Goods, or expectation of future; and doth every day solace himself with the assiduous recordation of [Page] them: what greater Good is there, that can be added to encrease the Happiness of this mans Condition?

VIII.

Suppose again, on the other side, that a man is afflicted with as great anguish of Mind, and violent pains of Body, as his nature can receive; that he hath lost all probability, all hopes of any the least Extenuation of his Miseries; and that his tempestuous thoughts cannot lay hold of any comfort in the apprehension of any pleasure, past, present, or expected: and what can be imagined more wretched, more miserable than this man?

IX.

If, therefore, a life surrounded with pains, be most chiefly to be avoided: seriously, the Highest Evill, is to live in pain; and of necessary consequence, The Highest Good is to live in Pleasure. Nor, indeed, hath the mind of Man any other point, wherein, as in the Centre and Period of all his hopes and desires, he may consist, but only Pleasure. And all Diseases, Languors and Distempers are referred to pain, nor is there any thing beside pain, that can invade Naturein her Throne, eject her from it, or dissolve her.

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CHAP. V.
That Pleasure, wherein Felicity doth consist, is the Indolency of the Body, and Tranquillity of Mind.

1

FOrasmuch as there are Two kinds of Pleasures, viz. One, that may be considered as dependent upon, or radicated in Quiet; and so is nothing else but a constant placability, Calmnesse, and Vacuity or Immunity from all perturbation and dolour: and Another, that may be considered as resident in Motion; and so consisteth only in a certain sweet affectation, or pleasant titillation of the sense, as may be exemplified in joy, hilarity, eating and drinking when we are hungry and thirsty, the pleasure of all which doth arise only from a pleasant motion in the Organs: therefore is it necessary for us to determine, Whether Felicity doth consist in both these Kinds of Pleasures conjoyned; or in one of them alone; and in which of the Two.

II.

Accordingly, therefore, we affirm; that the Pleasure, wherein Felicity doth consist, is only the Former, i. e. in the stable kind of pleasure: and so can be no other, but the Indolency of Body, and Tranquillity of the Mind.

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III.

And, therefore, when we say; that Pleasure in the Generall is the end of a happy life, or the Chiefest Good; we are very far from understanding those Pleasures, which are so much admired, courted and pursued by men wallowing in Luxury, or any other pleasures that are placed in the meer motion or action of Fruition, wereby, the sense is pleasantly tickled; as some, either out of Ignorance of the right, or dissent of opinion, or praejudice and Evill will against us, have wrongfully expounded our words: but onely this (the importance of the matter will excuse our repetition of it.) Not to be pained in Body, nor perturbed in Mind.

IV.

For, it is not perpetuall Feastings and Drinkings; it is not the love of, and Familiarity with beautifull boyes and women; it is not the Delicacies of rare Fishes, sweet meats, rich Wines, nor any other Dainties of the Table, that can make a Happy life: But, it is Reason, with Sobriety, and consequently a serene Mind; investigating the Causes, why this Object is to be Elected, and that to be Rejected; and chasing away those vain, superstitious and deluding opinions, which would occasion very great disquiet in the mind.

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V.

Now, that you may the more clearely understand, why we affirme this kind of pleasure alone to be the end of life, or chiefest good; be pleased to observe, that Nature doth not tend to any other pleasure, primarily, or as to her principal scope, but only to what is stable; which followes upon the remove of all paine and Molestation. For she doth not propose to her self the Moveable pleasure, as the end at which she aimes; but hath provided it only as the meanes conducible to that end, that it might be as it were a Condiment to sweeten that Naturall operation which is necessary to the Eradication of all Pain and Molestation. For instance; seeing that Hunger and Thirst are things troublesome and incommodious, in the present, to an Animal; the Primary End of Nature, is to constitute the Animal in that state, in which it may be free from that trouble and offence: and because that cannot be effected, but by Eating and Drinking; therefore hath she wisely provided, that the Action of Eating and Drinking should be accompanied with a certain pleasantness and jucundity, that so the Animal might be thereby invited the more willingly and readily to performe that necessary Action.

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VI.

Most men, indeed, living praeposterously, and being carried away with inconsideration and intemperance, propose to themselves, as the summary of their desires, and accomplishment of all their Hopes, that meaner Pleasure, which depends upon Motion: but, Wisdom being called to our assistance, doth soon reduceall Pleasures to order and Decorum; and teacheth us that we are not to look upon any pleasure, as the perfection and End of our lives, but what Nature her self hath ordained for that End, and which can be no other, but what we have declared. For▪ while Nature is our guide, whatever we do, must conduce only to this; that we may not be pained in body nor perturbed in mind: and when we have once attained to that state, all the Tempests of our mind cease, and all our Hopes and Desires are lost in Fruition, and there can be nothing beyond it, to which to aspire, in order to the Complement of our Happinesse. For, we then want Pleasure, when the absence of it doth produce pain in us: but, when wee are not pained, then doe we want no pleasure.

VII.

Hence comes it, that the Sum or Height of all Pleasures, doth consist only in the Amotion of all pains, or in that state which followes upon [Page] that Amotion: for, wherever Pleasure is, there can be nothing of pain, of Anxiety. And hereupon it follows also, that the highest Pleasure terminated in the privation of pain, may indeed be varied and distinguished; but can never be Augmented or Amplified; for, Nature so long as she hath taken away all pain, doth encrease pleasure; but, all pain being removed, she suffers not pleasure to be encreased in Magnitude, but only admits some certain Varieties thereof, that are not then at all necessary, as being such, that are not comparated to this, that we may not be pained.

VIII.

Moreover, from hence it appears, that those men insult without cause, who accuse us, not to account this, To want all Pain, to be somthing consisting in the middle betwixt pain and pleasure: but, so to confound it with the other member of the Division, as to make it not only a Pleasure, but even the Highest of all Pleasures. For, because, when we are Exempted from pain, we join in that very Exemption and Vacuity from all molestation, and every thing wherein we joy, is a pleasure; as every thing wherewith we are offended, is a pain: therefore is the privation of all pain, by us, rightly named a Pleasure. For, as when Hunger and Thirst are expelled with meat and drink; that very Expulsion of the trouble of them doth adferr the Consequution of a pleasure: so, in [Page] every thing else, the very Amotion of pain causeth the succession of pleasure.

IX.

Hence also may we desume a convincing reply to those, who urge against us, that there is no Reason, why this Middle state of Indolency should be esteemed rather a pleasure than a pain. For, upon the detraction of pleasure, discontent doth not presently ensue, unlesse perhaps some pain immediately succeed into the room of that former pleasure: but, on the contrary, we alwaies conceive a joy upon the losse of any pain, though none of those pleasures succeed, which consist in the delightfull affection of the Sense. By which we may clearly understand, how great a pleasure it is, Not to be in Pain: whereof if any man doubt, let him ask of those, who are infested with those sharp pains of the Gout, Toothach, or any other Acute disease.

X.

There are also, who deride this our opinion, Objecting, that this pleasure of Indolency, is like the condition of a sleeping man, and fit only for Slothfull and Unactive Demetrius Cydonius, sermonem de Epicuri Commisitonibus instituens, homines notat [...], Fatiscenteis Socordeis, enerveis. spirits. But, these consider not, that this Indolent constitution is so far from being a meer Torpor, or sluggishness, as that it is the only state, wherein we can perform all the actions of life vigorously and cheerfully. And, as we would not have the [Page] life of a wise man to be like a Torrent or rapid River; so would we not have it to be like a standing and dead Pool: but rather as a cleare stream sliding on in a constant silence and gentlenesse. Wherefore we contend; that a Wise mans pleasure is not that, which is Dul, Heavy, and Unactive; but that which Reason makes Constant, Firm and Sprightfull unto him.

XI.

But, to leave these our Opponents, and return to our Theme; there are two good things, of which our Highest Good, or chiefest Felicity doth consist; viz. To have the Mind free from pertubation, and the Body free from pain; and so, that these goods be ful, and above the capacity of Encrease. For, how can that which is full, be encreased? If the Body be immune from all pain, what addition can be made to that Indolency? If the Mind be constantly serene and Impertubed, what Addition can be made to that Tranquillity? Nor do those Externall Blandishments of the Sense, in any measure augment; but only serve to condite and sweeten this state of Highest Felicity: for, that Consummate Good of Human Nature, is contented with only the peace of mind, and quiet of body.

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CHAP. VI.
Of the means to procure this Felicity.

1

NOw seeing that this Tranquillity of mind, and Indolency of Body, do constitute the chief Felicity of man; nothing can more concern us, than to consider those things, which conduce to the attainment and conservation thereof: insomuch as while we have that, we have all things; and while we want it, all we do is to attain it, though (for the Causes aforesaid) we seldom do attain it.

II.

In the first place, therefore, we are to reason of Felicity, no otherwise than of Health; it being manifest, that that state, in which the mind is free from perturrbation, and the body from pain, is nothing else, but the perfect Health of the whole man: and naturally consequent thereupon, that as in the body, so also in the mind, those things which produce and conserve Health, are the very same with those, which either prevent the Generation of Diseases, or cure and expell them when they are generated.

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III.

As for the Diseases of the Body; since the excellent Art of Medicine is ordained as well for the prevention, as Cure of them; leaving the praescription of both praeservative and Curative remedies to the learned professors of that Art, we shall sufficiently discharge our present duty, if we admonish you of only two things. The one is, that we alwaies observe Temperance, and live soberly and Continently, to the end that we may avert all diseases, or at least make them more gentle and more easily curable; since for the most part, the Harvest of Diseases doth arise from the seeds of Intemperance and Incontinence. The other, that when we are invaded with Diseases, we instantly have recourse to Fortitude; that so we may both endure them with Constancy of Mind, and not exasperate them by impatience, and comfort our selves with this, that if our pain be great, it must be short; if long, light.

IV.

And as for the Diseases of the Mind, against them Philosophy is provided of Remedies; being, in that respect, justly accounted the Physick of the Mind: but it is not with equall facility consulted, nor applied by those who are sick in Mind. And this, because we judge of the Diseases of the body, by the Mind: but the diseases of the Mind we neither feel in the body, [Page] nor know or judge of them as we ought; because that, wherby we should judge, is distempered.

V.

Hence it appears, that the Diseases of the mind are more grievous and dangerous than those of the body: as among diseases Corporeall, those are most dangerous, which deprive us of our senses; such are the Apoplexy, Lethargy, Phrensie, &c. Again, that the Diseases of the Mind are more pernicious than those of the Body, is manifest from the same reason, which demonstrateth that the Pleasures of the mind are much better than those of the Body, which is this, that wefeel in the body nothing but what is present, bnt in our mind we are sensible of also what is past, and what's to come. For, as the Anxiety of the mind, arising by consent from the pains of the body, may be very much aggravated, if we have possessed our selves with a conceipt, that some Eternall and Infinite Evill is impendent over us: so may it be very much mitigated, if we fear no such Evill. And this likewise is manifest; that the greatest Pleasure, or Trouble of the mind, doth more conduce to an happy, or miserable life; than either of the other two, though it should be equally lasting in the body.

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VI.

Now, because there are two Capitall diseases of the Mind, namely Cupidity and Fear, with their severall branches, and with discontent or trouble conjoyned, after the same manner as pain is adjoyned to the diseases of the body; therefore is it the part of Philosophy to apply such Remedies, as may prevent them from invading the mind; or at least overcome and expell them, when they have invaded it. Such chiefly are the vain Desires of Wealth, of Honours, of Dominion, &c. and the Fear of Coelestiall Powers, of Death, &c. which having once assaulted and taken possession of the mind, they leave no part thereof sound or unshaken.

VII.

Now the Remedies, which Philosophy doth apply, are the Vertues, which being derived from Reason, or more General Prudence, easily drive away and expell those Desires and Fears. We say, from Reason, or more Generall Prudence; because, as there is a more Speciall Prudence, inservient to the direction of all the particular actions of our lives: so also is there a more Generall Prudence, which is nothing else but very Reason it self, or the Dictamen of Reason, and is, by most, accounted the same with Sapience or Wisdom: and Virtue is onely a certain perfect Disposition of the Mind, [Page] which Reason, or prudence doth create, and oppose to the Diseases of the Mind, i. e. to the Vices.

CHAP. VII.
Of Right Reason, and Free will, from whence is all the praise of the Virtues.

1

HEnce, we are to advance to the consideration of Virtue, and the severall Species thereof; but, not without Praemising a few Observables, touching Reason it self, and that which doth consist therein, viz Free-will: forasmuch as all the praise belonging to Virtue, doth derive its right only from thence; as likewise doth its Opposite, Blame, which is due to Vice.

II.

Since Reason, in the Generall, is nothing else but the Faculty of Ratiocinating, or judging, or inferring one thing from another; we do here understand that Reason, in Speciall, which discourseth, judgeth and determineth of such things, as fall under the power of mans Election, or Refusall.

III.

But, because this Reasoning or judgement may be as well False, as True, Wrong as Right; [Page] therefore can we not well allow that Reason, which makes a false judgement, to be called Reason, but rather Opinion: however, if you please to keep constant to the vulgar phrase, let it still be called Reason, provided it be understood to be Wrong; as on the other side, Right Reason may also be called Opinion, provided we understand it to be Right.

IV.

As for Right Reason; that ariseth to us both from the Goodnesse of our Nature, or Ingenuity, and from the sedulous Observation or frequent Experience of things: whence it comes, that being grounded upon firm and corrected principles, our Reasoning comes at length to be solid; and we, of right, appeal to the judgement of him, who is Expert and Prudent in the things, of which judgement is to be given.

V.

In the mean while, when we say, of things which fall under our power of Election or Refusall; we suppose, that there is in us also a Free or Arbitrary power of Reason, i. e. a Faculty of Electing and Prosecuting what Reason it self hath judged to be Good; and of Refusing and Avoiding what it hath judged to be Evill.

VI.

Now, that this Arbitrary Freedom of our Will, is the congeniall praerogative of our Nature; [Page] is Demonstrated unto us not only by our own Experience, but also by Common Sense: which manifesteth, that nothing is worthy of Commendation or Vituperation, of Praise or Blame, but what is done Freely, Voluntarily, deliberately, and of Election; and therefore must depend upon somthing within us, which is above all Compulsion, superintendency, command, or controllment, and in respect whereunto all Rewards and Punishments are rightfully ordained by the Lawes: Then which Laws nothing can be more unjust, if the actions of men were to be imputed to that rigid Necessity, which some have derived from Fate, as the sole Commandresse of all things; declaring, that what event soever comes to pass, or whatever action is done, doth inevitably flow from an Eternall Decree, and the succession of connected Causes.

VII.

Truly, it is much better, to be addicted to that false Opinion, which vulgar heads entertain, of the Government of the Universe, and all things in it, by the Gods; than to be slaves to the belief of the Fate of some Naturalists, imposing the same upon our necks, as a Sempiternall Lord, or Tyrant, of whom we are to be afraid night and day. For, that opinion, that the Gods are to be Revered and Entreated, hath the Comfort of Hope annexed unto it: but, the other of Fate, imports an inexorable [Page] Decree, and indeclinable Necessity, and consequently the highest of miseries, Despair.

VIII.

Most true it is indeed, that in things void of Reason some Effects are Necessary (though not so necessary, as not to have been prevented, as we have declared in our Philosopy) but in Man, endowed with Reason, and especially so far forth as he makes use of that reason, there can be no Necessity at all: and therefore was it, that we endeavoured to assert the Declination of motions in Atoms, to the end we might from thence deduce, how Fortune might somtimes intervene and put in for a share in the successe of Human affairs, and yet the Freedom of mans Will remain absolute and Entire.

IX.

And requisite it is for us, to turn the edge of our Wit wholly against Fate or Necessity; that we may by all means possible conserve our Will free from that Sempiternall Motion imagined by the Fatist; and so not permit Pravity or Wickedness to escape inculpable.

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X.

But, what we here say of Fortune, doth not in the least import, that we ought to ascribe any Divinity thereunto; not only as the Vulgar, but those Philosophers also, who accounting Fortune as some instable Cause, though they do not conceive, that she doth distribute to men any thing of Good or Evill, that may conduce to an happy life; do yet think, that she doth give occasions of very considerable Goods and Evils. All that our words of Fortune imply, is only this; that as many things are effected by Necessity, and Counsell, so also by Fortune: and therefore, that it is the Duty of a Wise man, to arm and provide himself against Fortune.

XI.

Now, seeing that whatever of Goodnesse, or Malice there is in Human actions, hath dependence upon no other foundation, but only this; that a man doth those Actions Knowingly and Willingly, or Freely: therefore is the Mind to be accustomed to this, that it may know truly, i. e. use Right Reason; and Will truly, i. e. that the Will be bent to that, which is truly Good, and averted from what is truly Evill. Forasmuch as this Assuefaction doth beget that Disposition in the mind, which we have defined Virtue to be: as the Assuefaction [Page] of it to the Contrary, doth beget that disposion, which we may justly define Vice to be.

XII.

We insist not upon this; that that is truly Good, which produceth Pleasure, as sincere, so also without any pain, trouble, or repentance attending and ensuing thereupon: and that truly Evill, which produceth pain, as sincere, so also without any Pleasure or Allubescence to succeed upon it. Only we touch upon both, that we may discriminate either from what is onely Apparent and Dissembled; such as that Good, which creating present Pleasure, introduceth future pain and trouble: and that Evill, which procuring pain or trouble in the present, drawes on pleasure and content in the future.

CHAP. VIII.
Of the Virtues, Generally.

1

FOrasmuch as Virtue is either Prudence it self, or the very Dictamen of Right Reason, as we accustom our minds to the constant exercise thereof; or is, at least, regulated by, and dependent upon Prudence, or the Dictamen [Page] of Right Reason: from thence it is manifest, that to this Latter Kind belongs both that Virtue, whereby a man stands affected toward himself; and that, whereby he is affected toward others; since Prudence is that, whereby a man is comparated and enabled to Govern not only himself, but others also.

II.

That Virtue, which relates to Others, is commonly called by the name Iustice: and that, which concerns only a mans-self, is vulgarly Distinguished into two branches, viz. Temperance and Fortitude. But, we use to comprehend both under the simple terme of Honesty; as when we say, that to do an act out of Virtue, is no more nor lesse than to do Prudently, Honestly, Justly: and this, because they, who live soberly and Continently, are said to live honestly, according to Decorum, or as becomes them; as they, who behave themselves Magnanimously, or Bravely, are reputed to behave themselves honestly or Becomingly.

III.

Hereupon, we (as others) make Virtue Fourfold, viz. Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Iustice. But so, as that we oppose not Prudence so much to any affection, as to Incogitancy, Ignorance, Foolishnesse; unlesse it be by accident only, as any perturbation doth eclipse Reason, and make a man do imprudently: nor Iustice so [Page] much to any Affection, as to Malice, whereby a man is inclined to Frauds; unlesse by accident only, in as much as Anger, Hate, Avarice, or some other passion may cause a man to do unjustly: aud Temperance we oppose to Cupidity, and Fortitude to Fear.

IV.

It appears from hence, that what we formerly said [viz. that it is sober and well ordered Reason, which procures a pleasant or happy life] aimed at this; that Right Reason doth produce a pleasant or happy life, by the means of those Vertues, which it ingenerateth and maintaineth. Likewise, that what we subjoyned, as the Reason thereof. [viz. that Reason doth investigate the true Causes, why things are to be elected, or Rejected, or chaseth away such opinions, as might occasion very great Perturbations of mind] was intended only to teach, that Right Reason is the very same with more Generall Prudence, the Principle upon which we ground all our Elections and Avoydances, and so a very great Good; because the Virtues, arising from that Reason or Prudence, are able to appease and prevent all Perturbations, and this by convincing, that no man can live pleasantly or happily, but he that lives Prudently, Honestly, Justly; as (è converso) that to live Prudently, Honestly, Justly, is to live pleasantly or happily.

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V.

By this you may perceive the Ground of our Assertion, That Happiness and Virtue are Convertible; or, that the Virtues are Congenite and Essentiall to a happy life, so as it is impossible to separate these from that. For, all other things, as being caduce and mortall, may be abstracted from germane and constant pleasure: but, Virtue alone, being a perpetuall and immortall Good, can never be separated from it.

VI.

From these things we may further understand, that all the Virtues are connected together; and that by a twofold relation: the First, because all the other Virtues are conjoyned to, and dependent upon their Princess, Prudence, as the members of the body are conjoyned to the Head; or as the streams are conjoyned to the Fountain, from which they flow; the other, because as well Prudence, as all the others concurr and unite in the point of a happy life; being that a happy life cannot consist without the Virtues, nor the Virtues without a happy life.

VII.

However, though the Virtues be all Connected thus together; yet are not they therefore all Equall; as someThe Stoicks. have conceived, who [Page] contend that all Vices and Faults, or Crimes are also Equall. For, a man may be comparated more to Justice than to Temperance; and Temperance may be more perfect in one man, than in another: as may be exemplified in My self (without envy be it spoken) who have attained to so high a degree of sobriety, that I make a sufficient meal usually for lesse then an half-penny; and Metrodorus, Metrodorus Lampsacenus, qui ex quo tempore primùm Epicurùm novit, nunquam ab codem discessit, nisi sex tantum menses; quibus cùm domi abfuisset, ad Epicurum reversus est, & per totam deinceps vitam, illi arctiss. necessitudine conjunctus, in iisdem & hortis & studiis convixit. Legendus est Gassend. cap. 8. lib. 1. de vita Epicuri. my Friend and Companion, who cannot satisfie himself with altogether so course and spare a diet. Besides, experience assures, that one man is Wiser than another: and all that walk in the waies of Virtue, have not the like Rewards alottetd to them; nor all Delinquents the like Punishments. Lastly, we appeal to Common sense, whether or no they are in the right, who make all Virtues, and all Vices Equall; that he offends as highly, who beats his servant without Cause, as he who beats his Father; that it is all one, for to eate a Bean, or ones Fathers Head.

VIII.

Others there are, who condemn and bitterly inveigh against us, for affirming, that the End of all the Virtues is Pleasure; as if we meant that kind of Pleasure, which is obscaene and infamous: but, let these men rail upon us as they please, we are wholly unconcerned in [Page] their malice. For, as they, so likewise do wee make Virtue the Summum Bonum; at least, if the discourse be touching the Means that conduce to an happy life: nor is there ought doth so much conduce thereunto, as Virtue: but, if the discourse be touching Happinesse it self, why should not Happinesse or Pleasure be a greater Good than Virtue, since it is the End, to the attainment whereof Virtue is but inservient?

IX.

They cry out upon us again, for making Virtue Enervous and Ineffectuall, while we seem not to allow it to have so much power, as to render a Wise man Superior to all Passion or affection whatever, but leave him obnoxious to sundry vexations, as (for instance) to lament, weep, sigh, and with all the expressions of sorrow to deplore the death of a friend: but, seeing we put a very high value upon Virtue, in that it is able to exempt us from vain Terrors, and superfluous desires, which are the Heads or Fountains of all Grievous Percurbations; manifest it is, that we grant it to be of such excellent use, as to moderate all subordinate affections, insomuch as it refracts and reduceth them all to such a mediocrity, in which there remains some sense of Humanity.

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X.

Certainly, that Totall Exemption from Grief and sorrow, which these men so much boast of; must proceed from some Greater Evill, viz. from Immanity, immoderate ambition of vain Glory, and in a manner down-right madnesse. So that it seems much better, to feel some Passion, to be affected with some Griefe, to shed such tears, as are to distill from their eyes, who professe Love and tender affection: than to Grinn, and declare a Brutish insensibility, according to the rigid rules of that inhuman Wisdom, to which these so much pretend.

CHAP. IX.
Of Prudence Generall.

1

THus far of the Virtues in Generall; we now come to treat briefly of Each in Particular. Which that we may do the more methodically, let us begin at Prudence: whose office being to Govern a mans life, and so to provide, as that all Occurrents may be directed only to Happinesse; well may we allow it to comprehend the offices, or Duties of all the other Virtues.

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II.

And, that it is the Office, or Duty of Prudence, to order and compose all the accidents and actions of a mans life, so as that they may conduce only to Felicity, or the Pleasure formerly described: is more than manifest. For, as we esteem the Knowledg of Physicians, not for the art of Physick it self, but the End of it, Health; and as the skill of a Pilot is not liked of and commended for the ingenuity, but Utility of it: even so Prudence, which is the art of Living well, would never be considered nor desired, if it were of no use or benefit in a mans life; and it is studied and desired, as the sole art, by which Happinesse, or pleasure is to be acquired.

III.

For, it is Prudence (or if you please Sapience) alone, which doth not only prevent the incidence of any thing, that may cause Pain in the Body; but also above all things doth expell sadnesse from the mind, and suffers us not to startle at those things, at the very mention whereof the multitude usually trembles with fear: and which being our Directresse, conducts us to tranquillity, by extinguishing the arder of all cupidities. For, cupidities are insatiable, subverting not only single persons, but also numerous and opulent Families; yea somtimes the [Page] most potent and flourishing Common-wealths. From Cupidities arise Hatred, Dissentions, Seditions, Warrs; nor do they only diffuse themselves abroad, or invade others with blind fury: but being included in private breasts, they cause intestine mutinies therein, and totally evert the oeconomy and peace thereof. So that it follows, that they must of necessity make life most irksom and bitter; and that none but the Wise, or Prudent man, who have cut off all Inanity and Error, and circumscribed his desires with the modest boundaries of Nature; can live without sollicitude, without Discontent, without Fears.

IV.

It being evident, therefore, that all the Perturbations of our life arise originally from Error and Indiscretion; and that it is Prudence alone, which vindicates us from the violence of Lusts and Fears, and teacheth us gently to bear the injuries of Fortune, and pointeth out unto us all the waies, that lead to Quiet and Tranquillity: pray what reason is there to discourage us from affirming, that Prudence is to be sought after, in respect of Pleasure; and Imprudence to be avoided, for the prevention of Troubles?

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V.

Now the Reason, why we say, that a Prudent man doth temperately bear the injuries of Fortune, is this; that albeit he doth not previse and provide against any injurie in particular, yet doth he foresee and provide against all in Generall. Nor doth he, if any infortune intervene crosse to his Hopes, or Councells, therefore afflict himself: because he well knows it not to be in the power of Human Reason, Sagacity, or Policy, either to praevise, or praevent the intervention of every adverse and troublesome Accident. Yea, he holds it much better, to be Infortunate with Reason and sage advice (such as Human frailty will admit) than to be Fortunate with Inconsideration and Temerity: and thinks nothing more gratefull, than, if Fortune bring about any thing fairly and prosperously unto him, that he did not enterprise it without judgement and deliberation.

VI.

He moreover so deports himself, as that cutting off all vain Cupidities, he contracts his desires to only Necessaries; which are indeed, so few and small,Occupavite, Fortuna, at (que) cepi, omnes (que) aditus tuos interclusi, ut ad me adspirare non posses: fidentèr excl. masse legitur Metrodorus, Epicuri amicus & discipulus, apud Ciceronem, Tuscul. 5. as scarce any unkindnesse of Fortune can rob him of them: so that since very little of Fortune can intervene to a wise man; he may well say to her, I have prevented [Page]thee, O Fortune, and so barrocadoed all thy waies of accesse, as that thou canst not approachme!

VII.

But, concerning the way of Cutting off all Cupidities, hereafter; in present, forasmuch as Prudence may be considered, either as a man doth thereby govern himself, or order his Family, or govern a City or a Common-wealth; and so as it is distinguished into Private, Domestique, Civile: it is convenient, that we speak somwhat of each.

CHAP. X.
Of Prudence Private.

1

OF Private Prudence the whole sum consisteth in no more but this, that a man well understand his own Genius, and enterprising nothing, to which Nature hath a repugnancy, he looks well into the conditions of that state, in which he is to spend his whole life, and to which he is so to accommodate all his actions, as that, as much as possible, he may live in Indolency and Tranquillity.

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II.

For, it behoves him to have the eye of his mind constantly and immoveably fixt upon this end, or scope of his life; and consulting with right reason, to proceede according to the evidence of those Criteria, by which we are wont, when we perpend the Good or Evill of objects, to erect our determinations. Since otherwise, all things will be full of indiscreet temerity and confusion, and late Repentance will attend upon all his undertakings.

III.

Moreover, in case you doe not direct every one of your Actions, upon what occasion soever, as to this grand scope, so also to that very end of Nature which you proposed to your self in the designment of it: but turn aside to any other sinister purpose, either in the prosecution or avoidance of any Object whatsoeever: then, certainly, shall not the Actions of your life be consentaneous to your discourses; but extolling Tranquillity (for instance) in your words, you shall betray your self to be really addicted to multiplicity of business, and obnoxious to very much trouble.

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IV.

Now, that man doth clearly understand the Ends prescribed by Nature, in the course of life to be instituted and undertaken; who well knows, how easily that is procurable, which is necessary to life, or what is sufficient to the detraction of all, that can, by indigence, cause pain in the Body. For, from thence he so well knows how to order the whole series of his life, as alwaies to be above the want of such things, as are full of businesse, and Contention, and consequently of Chance and Danger.

V.

Hereupon a Wise man hath no reason to be much afraid of Poverty; because it is very rare to find a man so poor, as to be in want of those things, which are necessary to life. But in case our Wise man should be reduced to such a low ebb of Fortune, as to want things necessary to the sustenance of his life: yet will he not, with the Cynicks, betake himself to the shamefull refuge of Begging;Tu poscisvilia; verùm es dante minor, quávisfers te nullius egentem. Horat. Epist. 17. lib. 1. but, rather undertake the Erudition of some others in Wisdom, that so he may both take a course beseeming the dignity of his Prudence, and at the same time deservedly accommodate himself with necessaries, from those, who have abundance.

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VI.

And while he is constrained, to take this, or some other honest and beseeming course, that by an acquired confidence of mind, he may generously receive those things, which happen to him for the instant day, he is to have recourse to the Oracle of his own Wisdom, and call Philosophy to his relief: for we then resign the arbitration of those things, that so neerly concern us, to an Evill Councellour; when we measure and provide against indigence, by any other proportion but the simple necessities of Nature, and the rules of Philosophy.

VII.

Wherefore, it behoves a Philosopher to provide for such competent means, as may supply his necessities; and so long to apply himself to that provision, as till his diligent care hath furnished him: but, so long as any part of them may be spared, and his confidence yet remain perfect; he is in no case to addict himself to the getting of riches, and storing up of provisions.

VIII.

In the provision of these things, therefore our care is to be proportioned by Philosophy; and so, [Page] in a short time, we shall come to know, what a Virtue, and how great a Good it is, to require only what is simple, light, and very small: because, what is most sweet, and free from trouble in all a mans life, depends wholly upon this; to be contented with the least, i. e. onely so much, as sufficeth nature. And, as for those impediments, which the sollicitous hunting after more doth draw upon us; when they once discover themselves (as soon they must) either by the great labour of the body, or the difficulty in the very procuring-them, or the abduction of the mind from more worthy and advantageous speculations (which we ought evermore highly to esteem) or the insatisfaction resulting from the fruition of them: certainly, we shall clearly perceive the same to be altogether fruitless, and insufficient to compensate the consequent perturbations.

IX.

And, whereas we praemonished, that every man should, before he determines, upon what course of life to put himself, strictly examine his own Genius, and advise with himself concerning the inclination thereof; that so he may at length happily devote himself to that, which he finds most agreeable to the Destination of it: our purpose therein was, to intimate, that nothing can be more miserable and more inconsistent with tranquillity, than for a man to be engaged in that course of life, to which Nature made him unfit:

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X.

It follows from hence, that an Active life is not fit for a slothfull and heavy person; nor a slothfull lazy kind of life fit for an active: for as idlenesse is quiet, and action labour to the one; so to the other idlenesse is a labour, and action quiet. Thus, a Souldiers life is unfit for a Timorous and softly man; and an umbratile life odious to an impatient and bold man: for one cannot endure the heat of War; nor the other the cool shadow of peace. So that nothing can be more safe or hopefull, than for a man to devote himself to that, to which he finds no adversnesse or repugnancy in his nature.

XI.

Whereunto you may please to add this one rule; that every man, to the end the state of life which he chooseth, may be the more secure and tranquill, ought to choose a mean state, or such as is neither very eminent, nor very abject; at least if it be in his own power. Because, it behoves him to live in a Civill society, neither as a Lyon, nor as a Gnat: lest he be exterminated, as the one; or ensnared and crushed, as the other.

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CHAP. XI.
Of Prudence Domestick.

1

THis sort of Prudence divides it self into Two branches; the First concerns a man in the capacity of a Husband, and a Father; the other, as he is a Master of Servants, and Possessor of House, Goods, Lands, &c.

II.

Concerning the Former, viz. Conjugall and Paternall Prudence, let us observe onely what may be inferred from the Praemises, touching the Directions of a man, in the Election of his course of life. Thus if you find your Constitution to be such, as that you cannot, without the ardors of the flesh, live single; that you can with patience endure a morose and unquiet Wife, and untoward and undutifull Children; that you shall not be subject and apt to vex, repine and grieve, when you shall hear your Children crying and bawling, see them groning on the bed of sicknesse, or snatcht away by death before you; and that you shall not be perplexed and distracted with those Cares and sollicitudes, that accompany the provision of all things necessary to a Conjugall state: why then, indeed, it may be convenient for you, to [Page] take a Wife, and beget Children; for which you may provide by a Conjugall and Paternall Prudence.

III.

You may presume, indeed, that your Wife will be sweet and Complacent; that your Children will be of ingenious and tractable dispositions; that your cares for them will not be great, nor many; that you have so laid your designs, as that you cannot expect any thing but prosperity and good successe: and yet you can but presume all this, nor do I know any God, who will oblige himself, that your affairs shal succeed according to this your presumption. Wherefore, seeing the businesse is very doubtfull; it is far below the part of a Wise man, willingly to put himself upon Chance, to undergo the hazard, and engage himself in that condition, from whence, in case he should afterward repent, he cannot withdraw himself.

IV.

We say, Willingly; because there may be some such Circumstance, as may require a man, though much against his will, to marry and generate Children; as, for instance, in case he live in a Country but thinly peopled, and where he is to be serviceable to the Common-wealth by encreasing the members of it. Some, we [Page] know, pretend the propagation of their species, to which Nature seems to oblige all; but, certainly, there is no fear that mankind should fail, there being in all times and places enough that give themselves to Marriage and Procreation: so that some few Wise men may well be permitted to abstain, and leave the businesse of Propagation to be performed by others.

V.

Now if any such Case, or certain Councell, or any Necessity shall constrain you to marry; then are you so to dispose your Wife, as that she may be loving and complacent to you, and a partner in your Cares: and to take such care for your Children as is prescribed to you partly by Nature, which by strong instinct obligeth us to love and cherish them as soon as they are born (and so much even Wolves, Tygers, and all other wild Beasts alwaies do) and partly by Prudence, which admonisheth so us to educate and instruct them in the rudiments of Morality, as that they may be obedient to the Laws of the Country, and desire nothing so much, as to be made Wise themselves.

VI.

Nor are we to take this care onely for our own Children; but also for those of our friends, and especially if they be our Pupills. For, nothing [Page] is more beseeming the Dignity of Friendship, than for a man to become a Tutor, and supply the place of a Parent to those, whom his deceased Friend both dearly loved, and left as Orphans, and so in need of Protection and Tuition.

VII.

And as for the other branch of Domestick Prudence, which teacheth a man how to deport himself in the Capacity of a Master, or as he hath Servants at his Command, and Possessions at his Dispose; both which though necessary, are yet, for the most part, not very pleasant: the sum of it consists in this. Let him endeavour to prevent the sawcinesse, morosity, and insolence of his Servants; deport himself with mildnesse and gentlenesse toward them, so far as may stand with his superiority, and their obedience; with a kind ofQui placidus delicta domat; nec dentibus unquam, Instrepet horrendum, fremitunec verbera poscit. Claudian. de Macil. unwillingnesse Chastise and Correct even the perverse and disobedient, as remembring that they also are men; Connive at some involuntary faults, and forgive some others, especially if they be diligent, and not of an evill disposition. Nor this only, but, if he find them to be capable of, and inclined to the study of Wisdom (such we have sometimes met with, and chiefly my servant Mus Hunc servum Epicuri, Murem inter Philosophantes clarissimum [...] evasisse testatur Laertius, lib. 1. cap. 12. neque Macrobius (Saturnal. cap. 11.) oblivioni dat inter eos, qui Philosophis exservis non incelebres evaserunt.) it is his duty to encourage and [Page] assist them therein, to allow them the Familiarity of Friends, and account it pleasant or good to permit them to Philosophize together with himself.

VIII.

In the matter of his Estate, he is not onely to live within compasse, but so to proportion his Expences, as still to be laying up somwhat for the Future; yet without Avarice, and the sordid desire of heaping up Wealth. For, it is not the part of a Wise man to neglect his houshold Affairs; insomuch as his livelyhood depends thereupon, and if he through negligence permit all to run to ruine, so that he come at length to want Necessaries; he must very much obstruct his progresse in Philosophy: being that then he must either addict himself to the laborious Getting of what might have been kept with little Care; or to the importunate Begging of that at the Charitable hands of Others, which his own easie Providence might have furnished him with all; or grow old, crazy, diseased, and die in such want, as must be no small hindrance to the Tranquillity of his mind.

IX.

And besides such things as are absolutely necessary [Page] to the uses of life; there are also others, that may be accounted necessary Respectively, or according to the Condition of the Person, Place, Time, and other Circumstances, and therefore they ought not to be neglected. But the chiefest of our Familiar Care must be for those things, without which, Nature her self must suffer and decay, and such is chiefly the provision of Grain and other lasting Fruits of the Earth; and for that reason, we more commend those, who have their Granaries well stored with Corn, than those who have their Houses adorned with gawdy and rich Furniture. It much delights me to remember, that not long since, when, in our City long and streightly besieged, many perished by Famine;Quum Demetrius obsedit Athenas, circa annum Epicuri, 44. we were able to preserve our selves and divers Ftiends in good plight: not with delicate Cates, but good plenty of Beans, whereof each person had a certain number allowed him daily.Quanta autem fames civitatem oppresserit eadem obsidione, describit Plutarchus [in vita Demetri;] ubi inter caetera inquit: Ferunt etiam Epic urum Philosophum familiares suos sustentasse, partitum cum ipsis ad manerum fabas.

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CHAP. XII.
Of Prudence Civill.

1

LAstly, as for the concern of Civill Prudence; we are likewise to deduce the summe of it, from what we have insinuated touching the Course of life to be elected.

II.

Thus, if there be any, who are by Nature Ambitious, desirous of Glory, Active and fit for the manage of Publick Affairs; and have besides the advantages of Birth, Fortune, and opportunity that seem not only to invite, but also to open them an easie and safe way thereunto: for these men it may be convenient to obey the inclination of their Genius, by addicting themselves to Action, and the administration of affairs, wherein the Republique is concerned; because, They are so disposed by their Constitution, as that they cannot but suffer perturbations and disquiets in an obscure and unactive life, while they labour with a restlesse desire of what they do not obtain.

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III.

But, as for those, who are not by Nature Comparated to much imployment, but to Quiet and Eases or have by force of Reason repressed their Natural Ambition and vain Affectation of Popularity; or having learned, by their own costly Experience, the certain troubles, and uncertain duration of Grandure, have withdrawn themselves from the storm, that frequently threaten men of Publick Charges; or have been made wary and cautelous by the sad Examples of other Statesmen, whose aspiring humours occasioned their praecipitous Downfalls: good reason is there, that these should esteem the quiet of a Private condition, much better than the disquiet and dangers of a Popular; unlesse, perhaps, some accident intervene on the part of the Common-wealth, that doth require their industry. And hereup| on we conclude, that a Wise man is not to engage himself in the administration of Publick Affairs, unless some intervening Necessity call him thereunto.

IV.

And why should we not thus conclude, since to a Wise-man, addicting himself to Leasure and Quiet, it may be both much more easie, and safe to attain to that End, which ambitious men propose to themselves to be acquired by Dangers and restlesse Labours?

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V.

For, that we may speak of the scope, or end, at which the Ambitious aime, there never wanted some, who, to the end they might attain security from others (and according to the condition of Principality and Dominion, by which they conceived that security chiefly acquirable) have affected to render themselves illustrious with Glory and Renown: thinking by that means to advance themselves to a state of security and tranquillity. But, if the lives of these proved really secure and tranquill (as, in truth, it could hardly be) then did they indeed, attain that very thing, which, to Nature is so good and pleasant: and if they were not, then did they fall from their hopes, and wholy misse their aime, insomuch, as they in vain sought after what is congruous to Nature, in Greatnesse and Dominion.

VI.

Now, seeing the scope of a Wise-man is the very same, namely, Security and Tranquillity of life; pray, by how much nearer a way doth he arrive at that end, when avoiding the tumults of a civill life, he directly and immediately placeth himselfe in a most profound quiet, and a state of highest silence and tranquillity? Truly happy is that man, who knowes, that the chiefest good, or a happy life, doth not consist in power and Soveraignty; not in a [Page] full Exchequer, nor in ample possessions: but, in freedome from pain, a calm of all affections, and that disposition of minde, which circumscribing all his desires by the simple boundaries of Nature, makes him content with a few things, and so to be Master of that, which the ambitious despair to obtain, unlesse they could bear rule over all others, and heap up treasures inexhaustible.

VII.

Certainly, if it be fit for me to speak of my selfe, I account it for a very great Felicity, that I never yet enterposed my selfe in the Factions of our City, nor ever sought to flatter, please, and endear the people. And what Reason, why I should; since the people doth not approve what I know,Scribit Plinius [lib. 19. cap. 4.] Epicurum primum instituisie Athenis agrorum, villarumque delicias, nomine Hortorum in ipsa Urbe possidere; cùm ad usque eum mos non fuisset in oppidis habitari rura. Hinc accipi solet pro ipsa secta, seudoctrina, quae ab Epicuro, sectatoribusque in horto ejus tradita est: unde & Epicurei dicuntur esse [...] ex Hortis Philosophi; sicut [...] intelliguntur Stoici; apud Empirium [i. advers Physic.] nor I know what the people approve? Besides, how far was it from Harm, that I and my familiar friend Metrodorus have lived together, not only privately, but in a manner concealed: when among so great Goods, as we were capable of enjoying in my narrow Gardens, and in obscure Melite, we were not only unknown, but almost unheard of in our own noble Country of Graece.

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VIII.

We said, Unlesse somthing intervene on the Commonweals part: because, if the Republique call a Wise man to the Helm, and really stand in need of his advice and assistance: in such a case, it would be downright inhumanity in him, not to do a Publique Good, when it lies in his Power; nay, he would be injurious even to himself, because unless the Common-wealth be in safety, he can very hardly obtain what he chiefly desires, Leasure and Quiet.

IX.

Let not a Wise man, therefore, behave himself, as we have observed some to do; who professing Wisdom, have, through excessive pride, had so high a conceit of their own judgment and abilities in the Politiques, as that they were confident they could rivall, if not outdo even Lycurgus and Solon, in the Art of Ruling.

X.

But, in case he be desired to make Laws, and to prescibe both a Form of Government, and Charges for the severall Magistrates: He is in no wise to decline it; as well knowing, that those, who first made Lawes, and Ordinances of Justice, and constituted Government and Magistracy in Cities, did principally aim at, and prudently provide for Tranquillity and [Page] Security of life; forasmuch as if those Laws and Constitutions be once taken away, we should lead the life of Wild Beasts, and the stronger would at least despoil, if not devour weaker.

XI.

Again, if he shall be Elected to the Highest Soveraignty, and to rule according to the Laws formerly made, and the Government already established; neither will he refuse that: as well knowing, that though the condition of a Prince be for the most part full of incertitude, and above all others open to sinister Chance; yet a Wise man may look so prosoundly into all Affairs, and so provide against Casualities, as that while Fortune intervenes in somelesse important Occurrences, the Greatest and most weighty Affairs of state are happily managed by his Councell and Reason. His chief and first Endeavours will be, to provide, that the weaker, while they do their duties toward the stronger, be neither oppressed by them, nor live in want of those necessaries to life, wherewith the others superabound. For, the End of every Society of men, or Commonwealth, is only the Common Good, or that all conspiring and cooperating to the Publick interest, the life of every man may be safe, and (as far as may be) Happy.

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XII.

Finally, in case his Prince, upon some urgent occasion, summon him to come and afford him his Councell, or Assistance; neither will he refuse that: as knowing, that, since it is not only more honourable, but also more pleasant to give, than to receive a Benefit, it must be an Act as most honourable, so also most pleasant, to confer a benefit upon a Prince, from whom it is to redound to Millions of others. And thus much of the Principall, and Sourse of all the Virtues, Prudence.

CHAP. XIII.
Of Temperance in Generall.

1

THe next place belongs to Temperance, which is the first part of Honesty, and that which seems to comprehend the chief Reason of what is Honest, or Beseeming. For, since it is the office of Temperance to repress a Desiring, so is it of Fortitude to erect a Fearing mind; it is justly accounted a lesse Indecorum to be let down by Pusillanimlty, than to be wound up by Cupidity: and, therefore, it is a greater Decorum to resist Cupidity, than to strive against Fear.

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II.

Concerning Temperance, this is first to be observed; that it is not to be affected and pursued for its own sake, but for the Pleasure it brings with it, that is, because it adfers peace to a mans mind, and pleasantly affect it with a certain Concord. For, its proper operation is the Moderation of our Cupidities; and therefore, that we may follow the conduct of Reason, in the Election or avoydance of Objects, it admonisheth us, that it is not sufficient for us to judge rightly what is to be done, or not to be done: but it behoves us also to stand to and execute that judgement.

III.

Most men, being not able to hold and keep to what they have resolved upon, as overcome and enfeebled by the apparence of a present Pleasure; resigne up themselves to the fetters of Lusts, and never foresee what is to follow thereupon: and, for the same cause, inconsiderately pursuing a small, transitory, and unnecessary pleasure, and such as they might have otherwise enjoyed, or wholly wanted. without any offence to Nature; they precipitate themselves into grievous diseases, into losses, into disgrace, and many times into the penalties decreed by the Laws.

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IV.

But, they who would so enjoy pleasures, as that no pains shall ensue thereupon; and constantly retain their judgement, not to be overcome by Pleasure, to the doing of what they know ought not to be done: these men acquire the greatest Pleasure, by pretermitting Pleasure; and frequently suffer some pain, to prevent their falling into greater.

V.

And hence is it understood, that Temperance is to be desired, not because it avoids some Pleasures, but because by restraining a man from them, it declines Troubles, which being avoided, he afterwards obtains Greater Pleasures. And this in the mean time it so doth, as that the action becomes Honest and Decent: and we may clearly understand, that the same men are Lovers as of Pleasure, so also of Decorum; yea, and that such, who esteem and pursue all Virtues, do for the most part perform those actions, and attain to those Ends, as that by them it is made manifest, how odious to all men Cruely is, and how amiable Goodnesse and Clemency; and that those very Pleasures, which Evill men most eagerly desire and hunt after, do fall into the lapps of onely good men.

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VI.

Moreover, for as much as among Cupidities, about the restraint and Moderation of which Temperance is imployed, some are Naturall, others vain or meerly opinionative; and of the Naturall ones some are Necessary, other Not-necessary (we omit, that of the Necessary ones, some pertain simply to Life; such is the appetite of meat and drink, together with the Pleasure, which consists only in Motion: and others absolutely to Felicity it self; such as that of Indolency and Tranquillity, or the stable Pleasure) manifest it is, that not without good cause we have, in our Physiology, made Three kinds of Cupidities, viz. (1.) some that are both Naturall and Necessary: (2.) others that are Naturall, but Not-necessary: and (3.) others that are neither Naturall nor Necessary, but meerly Vain, or arising from vain Opinion.

VII.

And because we said, that those are Naturall and Necessary, which cause damage and pain in the body, if they be not satisfied; it is evident, that such Cupidities, which inferr no damage nor pain, if not satisfied, and yet are joyned with earnest and vehement instigations, do become such, not by any Necessity, but by Opinion: and though they have their seeds [Page] from Nature, yet when they run up to Excesse, their growth is caused only by the evill, but powerfull influence of Opinion; which makes men far worse then Beasts, since they are not obnoxious to any such diffusion, or Excesse; and again, that such Cupidities may be proved to be not only Not-necessary, but also Not-naturall, only by this, that they import an appetence in Excesse, and very hardly or never to be satisfied, and are, for the most part, worthily accounted the Causes of some Harm or other even to Nature.

VIII.

Now, that we may discourse of the chief sorts of Temperance, respectively to the Chief sorts of Cupidities; we are to pitch upon (1.) Sobriety, which stands opposed to Gluttony, or the excessive desire of meat and drink: (2.) Continence, which confronts Lust, or the unbridled desire of Venus: (3.) Lenity, the adversary to Anger, or the desire of Revenge: (4.) Modesty, the contrary to Ambition, or the affectation of Honour: (5.) Moderation, the antagonist to Avarice, or the Cupidity of Riches: and (6.) in respect of the affinity betwixt Desire and Hope, Mediocrity, the mean betwixt Hope and Desperation of the Future.

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CHAP. XIV.
Of Sobriety opposed to Gluttony.

1

IT can hardly be expressed, how great Good redounds from Sobriety; which reducing a man to a thin, simple, and spare Diet, by happy experience teacheth, how little that is, which Nature requires, and that her Necessities may be abundantly satisfied with slender and easily-provided Aliment, such as decocted Barly, Fruits, Herbs, and Fountain-Water.

II.

For, these things sufficiently remove the trouble of the body arising from want of sustenance; are every where to be had, in good plenty; and contain the Faculties of dry and moist Aliments. Whatever is more than this, amounts to Luxury, and concerns only the satisfaction of a Cupidity, which is neither Necessary, nor occasioned by any thing, whose defect doth necessarily inferr any the least offence or detriment to Nature: but ariseth partly from hence, that the want of somwhat, after which the exorbitant appetite longeth, is imagined reall, and born with impatience; partly from hence, that an absolute Delight, or such as is entire and neither accompanied with, nor [Page] attended on by any trouble, is presumed from the satisfaction thereof.

III.

And forasmuch as such things, as are commonly provided to our hands, abundantly suffice to supply all Natures wants; and these Aliments are such, as partly for their simplicity, partly for their Exiguity, are easily providible: hence it follows, that he, who feeds upon flesh, hath need of other things to eat with it; when he, who is satisfied only with Inanimates, hath need of but half so much as the other, and sustains himself with what is easie in the provision, and of small cost and pains in the preparation.

IV.

Now, as for the Commodities, which redound from Sobriety, they are principally Four. The First is, that it brings and conserves Health, by accustoming the body to simple, course, and spare Diet. For, sumptuous Feasts, and full meals, and various dishes, are they which generate, exasperate, and prolong Crudities, Head-aches, Rheumes, Gouts, Fevers, and other Diseases: not that plain and simple fare, which Nature affordeth both as Necessary and wholsom, and this not only to other Animals, but also to man, who yet depraves them by his exorbitancy, and corrupts them by such Delilicates [Page] as which while he affects, he affects only his own Destruction.

V.

Who so is Wise, therefore, let him alwaies beware of that Dish, which his irregular Appetite earnestly covets and pursues; and upon which he cannot feed, without being afterward convinced, that it was gratefull to him only to his own harm. Of this sort are all costly, fat, and luscious meats; and therefore the use of Flesh must be rather Hurtfull, than Beneficiall to Health; of which this may be a very good Argument: that since Health is preserved by the same means, which restore it, when lost; and abstinence from flesh is generally prescribed by learned Physicians, in most diseases, especially acute ones; certainly, the best way of conserving health, must be a spare diet, and no Flesh.

VI.

It is no wonder, that the People commonly cry up the use of Flesh, as an Aliment highly conducing to Health; for, they magnifie all things that please the Gust, and think that the direct way to Health lies in the wallowing in Pleasures, nay, even of Venereall pleasures; whereof, notwithstanding there is none, which is beneficiall to any man, and that constitution is very rare, to which it is not hurtfull at all time.

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VII.

The Second is this; that it makes men ready, vivacious, and quick, in the doing of all actions necessary to life. For, if you regard the Functions of the Mind, it conserves the same in serenity, acutenesse, and vigour: if the offices of the Body; it conserves it in health, and so in strength, agility, and hardinesse. Whereas, on the other side, Repletion, overmuch satiety, surfetting, beclouds the mind, dulls the edge of it, and brings it to an unmanly languor and stupidity: and the body it makes as diseased, so feeble, unactive and burdensom. Now I beseech you, what great matters can you expect from that man, whose members are oppressed, joynts enfeebled, sinews relaxed, head beclouded, tongue heavy and paralyticall, eys floating in rheums, veins glowing with heat and Choler, mouth full of brawling and clamours, and all by reason of Wine drunk in excesse.

VIII.

Verily, a Wise man, who ought to content his stomack either with lesse then a pint of small Wine, or with Water from the Fountain, the most not only wholsom, but sweet of all Drinks; will be very farre from spending the night in Compotations and Drunkennesse: and [Page] as far from gorging it, and oppressing Nature with meats fat, sweet and gustfull, and of heavy and slow digestion; since he well knowes, that the most simple Cates, such as only Nature gives and cooks, will equally satisfie the stomach, and better preserve Health.

IX.

And, what though such simple and slender Diet will not make a man as strong as Milo was, not pamper the flesh and corroborate the sinews? yet this doth no way disparage the use of it to a Wise man, who hath no need of such Robustnesse of body, and intension of strength, the businesse of his life being chiefly Contemplation, not Activity and Petulancy.

X.

A Third advantage accrewing from Sobriety, is this; that a sober man, coming to a Feast, eats his meat with ten times more delight than another, because he brings an exact palate to tast, and a clean and sharp stomach, to entertain it. Not that course and homly Cates do not afford as much delight both to the Gust and stomach, as the most sumptuous Banquets, when a man brings with him the best of sawces, hunger (for, every man knows, that in case of perfect hunger and thirst, decocted Barly and clean Water are highly gratefull, and supply that defect of nourishment, from [Page] whence the trouble of hunger and thirst arise) but because those, who are daily used to more sumptuous entertainments, have their palates so furred and imbued, and their stomachs so oppressed and weakned by the continuall use and ingurgitation of them, that they neither relish nor swallow their meats and drinks with pleasure comparable to that, which a sober man receives, whose Gusto is sincere, and Appetite strong. Thus also a Wise man, who comes but now and then to publick shews and spectacles, is sensible of far more pleasure than those, who daily frequent them.

XI.

Nor can what we say, concerning the resultance of as much pleasure from the coursest food, as from dishes of the greatest cost and most exquisite Cookery; be contradicted by any, but him, who exposeth himself to the Tyranny of vain opinions; who doth not observe, that those only enjoy magnificence with greatest pleasure, who do the least need or care for it; and who never tasted the pleasure of Bread and Water, when pressed with pure hunger and thirst. For mine own part, seriously, when I feed upon simple Bread and Water, and somtimes (when I would entertaine my selfe somwhat more splendidly) mend my chear with a little Cheese; I apprehend abundant satisfaction therein, and bid defiance to those pleasures, which the ignorant [Page] and sensuall Vulgar so much like and cry up in the magnificence of great Entertainments: and hereupon, if I have no more than brown Bread, Decocted Barly, and clean Water; I think my Table so well furnished, as that I dare dispute Felicity even with Iove himself.

XII.

We farther affirm, that the magnificence of Feasts, and variety of Dishes, do not only not exempt the mind from Perturbations; but not so much as heighten the pleasure of the Body: forasmuch as the end of Nature in Eating, is the remover of Hunger. For Example; the use of Flesh doth neither more especially take away any thing, that is a trouble to Nature; nor perform any thing, which might occasion or convert to a trouble, if not performed. But, in the mean time it doth affect nature with a certain violent Gratefulnesse, and such as perhaps may be contrary to it, insomuch as we observe, that it doth the least of all meats conduce to the prolongation of life: and all that it serveth to, is the Variation of Imaginary Pleasures, like the blandishments of Venus, and the drinking of Exotique wines, without which Nature, or Life might very wel last; since those things, without which nature cannot subsist, are altogether compendious, and may with great ease, and with the safety of Justice, Liberality, and Tranquillity, be obtained.

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XIII.

Finally, the Fourth advantage of Sobriety is this; that it makes us superior to the threats of Fortune. For, they only are afraid of the frowns of Fortune, who being accustomed to live delicately and sumptuously, conceive that their lives must be most miserable, unlesse they can have wherewith to spend pounds and Talents every day. And hence comes it, that such, for the most part, become obnoxious to various and great troubles; and frequently commit Rapines, Murders, and the like horrid and detestable Villanies, and all to foment their Luxury, and maintain their Profusenesse. But, as for that sober person, who contents himself with course and cheap food, such as Fruites and Sallets, Bread and Water; who hath bounded his desires with only the Necessaries of Nature; what reason is there, why this man should stand in fear of Fortune? For, who is there in the whole World so poor, as to want these things? and what malignity of Fortune hath ever reduced a man to a lower ebb, than Bread and Water?

XIV.

As for my self, truly (I speak modestly, and therefore may be permitted) I am not only well content, but highly pleased with the [Page]Plants and Fruits growing in these my own little Gardens; and have this Inscription over the door: Stranger, Here, if you please, you may abide in a good condition; Here, the Supreme Good is Pleasure; the Steward of this homely Cottage is hospitable, humane, and ready to receive you; He shall afford you Barly broth, and pure Water of the spring, and say Friend, are you not well entertained? For, these Gardens do not invite Hunger, but satisfie it; nor encrease your thirst with drinks, while they should extinguish it, but wholly overcome it with a Naturall and Gratefull Liquor.

XV.

And in this Pleasure have I grown old; finding upon my accounts, that my expences do not amount to quite a Halfpenny a day: and yet, in some certain daies, I abate somwhat of that too, and fare harder; and this, that I may observe, whether that could detract awhit from my full pleasure, or whether more then that were worth my labour of seeking after.

CHAP. XV.
Of Continence, opposed to Lust.

1

THE next species of Temperance, is Continence or Abstinence from the sensuall delights of Venus; which being never beneficiall [Page] to any, and pernicious to most (as we have already hinted) the forbearance of them must be an Eminent Virtue.

II.

For a man to abuse venereall delights with intemperance, is, in brief, to make his life void of vigour, [...] Totus in estraenem ne abeas mulieris amorem; Quippe Amor haud Deus est; tacita est Affectio cuique. Phocylid. anxious with Cares, painfull with Diseases, short in Duration: and therefore a wise man ought not to suffer himself to be Captivated by the Charms of Love, nor to conceive it to be a Divine Passion, and so to be indulged.

III.

And that he may be the lesse prone to be ensnared by the specious allurements thereof, and want the chief Incentives and Fewell to the flames of Venus; let him be punctuall in the observance of a spare diet, than which nothing can be more available to Continency, in as much as the plenty and turgescence of seed, which arise from a too liberall diet, are both sparks and fewell to the fire of Love. The Praeservatives next to this, are constant imployment, especially about the study and practice of Wisdom; and Meditation of those many and great Incommodities, to which they are obnoxious, who suffer themselves to be carried away by the violence of Love.

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IV.

For, as to the Incommodities in the General of the immoderate courtship of either Women or Boyes; they are, Consumption of strength, decay of industry, unfitnesse for businesse and labour, neglect of Domestick Prudence, impairment of Estate,Pythagoras, interrogatus quando ad mulierem foret accedendum; quando voles, inquit, fieri imbecillior. Ex Laertio, lib. 8. Mortgages and Forfeitures, ruine of reputation and fame: and while the pamperd Body shines again with jewells and other precious Ornaments, the poor neglected Mind, as conscious to it self of its own Guilt, and wretchednesse, becomes its own continuall Tormentor, for that it hath spent the flower of life in dull and slothfull effeminacy,Res essesaluberrimas [ [...]] citra saturitatem vesci, ad laborem impigrum esse, & substantiam seminis conservare dixit Hippocrat. 6. Epidem. Sect. 4. and sufferd so many good years to be lost in that Nothing of Dalliance.

V.

And, as to the Speciall Incommodities; what Evill doth it not draw upon a man, to desire to have to do with that woman, whose company the Laws interdict him? Doubtlesse a Wise man will be very farre from admitting such a design into the company of his thoughts; since he must be deterred from it even by that great sollicitude, that is necessary to the very praecaution of those many and great Dangers, which threaten him therein: it being observable, [Page] that such as attempt to enjoy forbidden women, are frequently rewarded with wounds, death, imprisonment, banishment, and other grievous punishments. Whence it comes, that (as we said afore) for a Pleasure, which is but short, little, and not-necessary, and which might have been either otherwise enjoyed, or wholly omitted, men frequently expose themselves to very great pain, or most tedious and fore repentance.

VI.

Besides, to be Incontinent, to resign up ones self to this one kind of Pleasure, is it not in the mean time to defraud himself of other pleasures many and great? which that man enjoyes, who living Continently and according to the Lawes, so applies himself to Wisdom, as that he doth neither blunt the edge of his mind, nor excruciate it with cares, nor perturb it with extravagant Affections; and for his Body, he doth neither enfeeble it with excessive venery, nor vex and macerate it with Diseases, nor torment it with pains. And so he comes to attain the summum Bonum, which (as we formerly insinuated) doth not result from the familiarity and embraces of Boyes or Women, nor from the tast of rare and delicious fishes, or other blandishments of a Table richly furnished.

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VII.

We need not to insist upon this; that there is no reason why any man should, from this our Commendation of Generall abstinence from Venereal Embraces, infer, that therefore a man ought to abstain from the legitimate and moderate pleasures of the marriage bed: since, what our judgement is of that particular, we have formerly declared. What is more necessary here to be added, is this; that what we said, of Loves being no Divinely-immitted Affection, hath this importance, that if a man have no issue by his Wife, he is not to ascribe it to the anger of those Imaginary Deities, Cupid and Venus, but onely to some Naturall Defect, on his own or his Wifes side: and consequently that he is not to hope to become a Father by Vows, Prayers, and solemn Sacrifices, rather than by Naturall Remedies.

VIII.

We superadd this also; that a wise man ought not to live after the beastly manner of the Cynicks, or to deport himself with that Immodesty and Impudence, which they not only shew but boast of in publick. For, when they plead, that they therein follow the directions of Nature, and reprehend and deride us, for calling such things Flagitious, Filthy, or shamefull, which have no Turpitude really, or in themselves; and calling by their names such [Page] things, as are full of reall Turpitude (for, to rob, defraud, commit adultery, is filthy in reality, but named without obscoenity: and to beget a Child, is an act honest and decent in it self, but obscoene in the name) and allegde divers other arguments against shamefastnesse: They seem not sufficiently to consider, that they live in a Civill Society, and not single, and at random abroad in the Fields, and after the manner of Wild Beasts.

IX.

For, from the time we have given up our names to a Society, Nature it self commands us to observe the Laws and Customs of that Society; to the end, that participating of the Common Goods, we draw no Evill upon our selves, such as is the Infamy at least, or Ignominy, which follows upon that Impudence, or the want of such shamefastnesse, as the Customs and Manners of the Society, wherein we live, commonly praescribe, and from the observance of which in voice, aspect, and other seemly gestures, that Verecundity, which all Virtuous persons so worthily commend, is derived and denominated.

X.

Finally, we add, that it doth not a little conduce, as to Verecundity in speciall, so also to Continency in Generall, to abstain from Musick and Pöetry; insomuch as they conjunctively [Page] afford those amorous songs, and passionate streins of the voice, which diffusing themselves with a certain sweet violence upon the sense, prove very strong Allurements and Incentives to Lust.

XI.

And this is the ground of our Opinion, that a Wise man ought to have no more to do with either Musick or Poetry, than what may consist with right Reason, and the severe rules of Virtue. Because, while others being most easily taken with the flattering temptations of each, indulgently devote themselves to both; the Wise man duly perpending and foreseeing the Evill consequent upon them, doth wholly repudiate them: declaring, that Musick is an allurement to drink, an exhauster of moneys, a friend to Idlenesse, an impediment to every good, honest and generous work; and that its sister Poetry is that, which hath in all ages corrupted mens manners, made them prone to all sorts of Vices, and chiefly to Lust, and this by the Examples of even the Gods themselves. Whom the Poets have feigned and frequently introduced as inflamed with Anger, so furiously enraged with Lust: and in their Fables we read of not only their Divisions, Animosities, Discords, Warrs, Conflicts, Wounds, Deaths, but also their Complaints, Laments, Imprisonments, Coition with Mortalls, and [Page] Mortall Births of Immortall Parents; and other the like Wildnesses, from which every man, in his right mind, doth abhor.

CHAP. XII.
Of Lenity, opposed to Anger.

1

ANother species of Temperance is Lenity, Mansuetude or Mildnesse; comprehending also Clemency and Pitty, or Commiseration. This is so excellent an Antidote against the malignity of Anger, or the Desire of Revenge; that it is worthily esteemed a most laudable Virtue: forasmuch as Anger, if high and excessive, is a perfect Madnesse, for the time. For, in a fit of anger, the mind is inflamed, the light of reason eclipsed, the blood boyls with choler, the eyes sparkle with fire, the breast distended and ready to burst with rage, the teeth gnasht, the voice interrupted, the hairs stand on end, the face glowing with heat, and distorted with menacing postures, becoms horrid, truculent, and frightfull; so that all the frame or oeconomy of Nature seems wholly subverted, and the mind as well to have lost the command of it self, as to have forgotten all decency and Decorum: but then comes Lenity, and that recomposeth all again, becalms the mind, and [Page] keeps it in such a becoming temper, as that it is neither moved in it self, nor suffers any passionate eruption or salley of the spirits and blood forth into the members, that may cause any the least indecorum.

II.

But, forasmuch as anger is commonly kindled and blown into a flame by the opinion of some injury received; and no man doth an injury to an other, but upon the score of either Hatred, or Envy, or Despite and Contempt: how can it be, that a Wise man should so bear an injury, as to deport himself with Lenity and sweetnesse toward him, who offer'd him that injury? Why, truly, only by committing himself to the Government of right Reason,Velle, improbi ne peccent, insaniae est: id enim, quod fieri non potest, appetit. Tum concedere, ut adversus alios tales sint: sed ne in re peccent postulate, & stolidum est & tyrannicum etiam. Marcus Antonin. de seipso, lib. 2 [...] Sect. 18. by which we have already declared he is to fortifie himself against the blows of Fortune. For, he accounts an injury among Casualties, or things of meer Chance; and well knows, that it is not in his power, to make other men just, honest, and superior to the transports of unruly passions: and therefore he is as little moved by wrongs done him by men, as by the incommodities or losses sustained by misfortune,Quando alterius cujuspiam impudentia offenderis, statim sic percontare teipsum; Fierinè ergo potest, ut impudentes in mundo ne sint? non potest; tu itaque quod non potest, ne poscas. Idem eodem lib. Sect. 42. and generally by any other event occasioned by things beyond his power of ordering & controlment.

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III.

He is not moved (for example) by those extream Heats and Colds of different seasons or tempests; because he knows the Nature of such seasons to be such, as he cannot alter. Nor is he moved by injuries, which petulant, dishonest and malevolent men do him, because it is from the depravity of their nature that they do them: and it is not in his power to amend that depravity, and make them do otherwise. Again, he conceives it not to be Congruous to Reason and Wisdom, to adde one Evill to another (i. e. to the harme arising to him from Causes without him, to superadd a greater harm from Causes within him,Optimus injuriam ulciscendi modus est, inferenti ne sis similis: Marcus Antoninus, in de seipso lib. 6. S. 6. namely, to raise a perturbation in his mind, by opinion) or because an other man would afflict his mind with vexation and anxiety, thereupon to be so foolish, as by admitting and fomenting that vexation, to prosper that design, and gratifie the evill intention of his Enemy.

IV.

Fit it is, we confesse, that a Wise man should so far look to his Good Name, and be carefull of his Reputation, as not to lye open to Contempt and Scorn; seeing there are some Pleasures that arise to a man from a Good Fame, and the esteem from thence resulting; as on the [Page] contrary there are some Troubles, that arise from Contempt, and the Consequents thereof: but yet is he not to be tender of his Good Name so much for the Revenging of injuries, or offending of those that do them; as for living well and innocently, and giving no man a just cause or occasion of Contumely and Malediction. For, thus to do, is wholly in his own power: not to hinder an other from discharging the malignity of his Nature upon him.

V.

Hereupon, in case a person, who hath, though without cause, conceived an anger against you, and declared himself your Adversary, shall demand any thing of you, upon praetext of expiation or satisfaction; you are not to refuse to give it him: provided, what he demand be Lawfull,Minuti semper & infirmi est animi, exiguique voluptas. Ultio; continuò sic collige, quod vindicta Honourable, and conducible to your certain security from his rage; because he differs not from an angry & invading Dog, and so is to be appeased with a morsell. Neverthelesse nothing is either more honourable, or more safe, than to confront his malice with Innocence of life,Nemo magis gaudet, jam foemina. Iuvenal Sat. 13 and the security of your own Conscience, and for the rest, to declare your self to be above his injuries.

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VI.

Moreover, it may come to passe, that a wise man may be sued at Law, brought to the Bar, and there in the face of the whole Court suffer not only injuries, but grosse calumnies, false accusations, yea, and receive condemnation: and yet he ought stil to remember, that though it be in his power to live uprightly and Virtuously, yet it is not in his power not to fall into the hands of such, as may shew themselves Envious, malignant and unjust toward him; nor to hinder them from accusing him contrary to all right and equity, or himself from receiving a sentence from unrighteous Judges. It becomes him not therefore to be angry with either his Accusers, or the Witnesses, or the Judges; but trusting in a good Conscience, still to keep up his Lenity and Tranquillity at the highest: and accounting himself far above this infortune, to entertain it without fear or trouble, and deport himself toward his Iudges with constant courage and serene boldnesse.

VII.

Now, there is not why any man should Object, that what we here advise concerning Lenity, is repugnant to what we formerly said of the Wise mans Chastising of his offending Servants: Because we there limited this Castigation [Page] only to Refractary, obstinately Perverse and disobedient Servants: and manifest it is, that punishment ought to be inflicted as wel upon the delinquents in a private Family, as in a State or Common-wealth; and as the Prince, or Magistrate doth punish the Crimes of Subjects without anger at their Persons; so likewise may the Master of a Family punish the offences of his Servants, not only with Lenity, but Good will also to their persons.

VIII.

We add, that a Wise man is not only to bear injuries from others, with Lenity; nor only to pardon the faults of his Servants, with mildnesse and sweetnesse: but even with kindness to encourage and gratulate such as Repent of, and resolve to reform their evill waies. For, since the first degree of Reformation, is the Knowledge of ones Fault; therefore is this Gratulation and Encouragement to be given to the penitent Delinquent, that as he is affected with contrition and horror at the apprehension of the foulnesse of his offence, so he may be reanimated by the pulchritude of what he ought to have done formerly, or is to do in the future.

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CHAP. XVII.
Of Modesty, opposed to Ambition.

1

COncerning this great Virtue, which is the Fourth branch of Temperance, there is very little need of saying more, than what we have formerly intimated, when we declared it not to be the part of a Wise man, to affect Greatnesse, or Power, or Honours in a Commonwealth; but so to contain himself, as rather to live not only privately, but even obscurely and concealed in some secure corner. And therefore the advise we shall chiefly inculcat in this place, shall be the very same we usually give to our best friends. Live private and concealed (unlesse some circumstance of state call you forth to the assistance of the Publick) insomuch as Experience frequently confirms the truth of that proverbiall saying, He hath well lived, who hath well concealed himself.

II.

Certainly, it hath been too familiarly observed, that many, who had mounted up to the highest pinacle of Honour, have been on a suddain, [Page] and as it were with a Thunder-bolt, thrown down to the bottom of Misery and Contempt: and so been brought, though too late, to acknowledge, that it is much better for a man quietly and peaceably to obey; than by laborious Climbing up the craggy Rocks of Ambition, to aspire to Command and Soveraignty; and to set his foot rather upon the plain and humble ground, than upon that slippery height, from which all that can be with reason expected, is a praecipitous and ruinous Downfall. Besides, are not those Grandees, upon whom the admiring multitude gaze, as upon refulgent Comets and Prodigies of Glory and Honour; are they not, we say, of all men the most unhappy, in this one respect, that their breasts swarm with most weighty and troublesom Cares, that uncessantly gall and corrode their very Hearts? Beware, therefore, how you believe that such live securely and tranquilly: since it is impossible but those, who are feared by many, should themselves be in continuall fear of some.

III.

Though you see them to be in a manner environed with Power, to have Navies numerous enough to send abroad into all Seas, to be in the heads of mighty and victorious Armies, to be guarded with well armed and faithfull Legions; yet for all this take heed you do not conceive [Page] them to be the only Happy men, nay, that they partake so much as of one sincere Pleasure: for all these things are meer pageantry, shadows gilded, and ridiculous Dreams; insomuch as Fear and Care are not things that are afraid of the noyse of Arms, or regard the brightnesse of Gold, or the splendor of Purple, but boldly intrude themselves even into the Hearts of Princes and Potentates, and like the Poets Vultur, daily gnaw and consume them.

IV.

Beware likewise, that you do not conceive, that the Body is made one whit the more strong, or healthy, by the Glory, Greatnesse and Treasures of Monarchy; especially when you may dayly observe, that a Fever doth as violently and long hold him, who lies upon a bed of Tissue, under a Covering of Tyrian Scarlet, as him that lies upon a Mattress, & hath no Covering but Raggs; and that we have no reason to complain of the want of Scarlet Robes, of Golden Embroideries, jewells, and ropes of Pearl, while we have a Course and easie Garment to keep away the Cold. And what if you, lying cheerfully and serenely upon a truss of clean straw, covered with raggs, should gravely instruct men, how vain those are, who with astonisht and turbulent minds gape and thirst after the Trifles of Magnificence, [Page] not understanding how few and small those things are, which are requisite to an happy life? believe me, your Discourse would be truly magnificent and High; because delivered by one, whose own happy Experience confirms it.

V.

What though your House do not shine with silver and gold Hatchments; nor your arched roofs resound with the multiplied Echoes of loud Musick; nor your walls be not thickly beset with golden Figures of beautifull youths holding great lamps in their extended arms, to give light to your nightly Revels and sumptuous Banquets: why yet, truly, it is not awhit lesse (if not much more) pleasant, to repose your wearied limbs, upon the Green Grasse, to sit by some cleanly and purling stream, under the refreshing shade of some well-branched Tree, especially in the Spring time, when the head of every Plant is crowned with beautifull and fragrant Flowers, the merry Birds entertaining you with the musick of their Wild notes, the fresh Western Winds continually fanning your heats, and all Nature smiling upon you.

VI.

Wherefore, when any man may, if he please, thus live at peace and liberty abroad in the [Page] open Fields, or his own Gardens; what reason is there, why he should affect and pursue Honours, and not rather modestly bound his Desires with the Calmnesse and security of that Condition? For, to hunt after Glory, by the ostentation of Virtue, of Science, of Eloquence, of Nobility, of Wealth, of Attendants, of rich Cloths, of Beauty, of Garb, and the like: seriously, it is altogether the Fame of ridiculous Vanity; and in all things Modesty exacts no more then this, that we do not, through Rusticity, want of a decent Garb, or too much Negligence, do any thing, that doth not correspond with Civility and Decorum. For, it is equally vile, and doth as much denote a Base or Ahject mind, to grow insolent and Lofty upon the possession of these adjuncts of Magnificence: as to become Dejected, or sink in Spirit, at the Losse or want of them.

VII.

Now, according to this rule, if a Wise man chance to have the Statues, or Images of his Ancestors, or other Renowned Persons of Former Ages; he will be very far from being proud of them, from shewing them as Badges of Honour, from affecting a Glory from the Generosity of their Actions and Atchievements: and as far from wholly neglecting them, but will place them (as Memorialls of Virtue) indifferently either in his Porch, or Gallery, or elsewhere.

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VIII.

Now wil he be sollicitous about the manner,Nec tu mulum curo; sepelit Natura relictos. or place of his Sepulture; or command his Executors to bestow any great Cost, or Pomp and Ceremony,Nil agis hac ira; tabesne Cadavera solvar, an rogus, haud refert; placido Natura receptat cuncta sinu. Lucan. lib. 7. at his Funerall. The chief subject of his care will be, what may be beneficiall and pleasant to his successors: being well assured, that as for his dead Corps, it will little concern him, what becoms of it. For▪ to propagate Vanity even beyond Death, is the highest madnesse: and not much inferior thereto is the Fancy of some, who in their lives are afraid to have their Carcasses torn by the teeth of Wild Beasts, after their death. For, if that be an Evill; why is it not likewise an Evill, to have the Dead Corps burned, Embalmed and immersed in Honey,Mel enim tanta adversus putredinem facultate in signitum est, ut Babylonii nebilium Cadavera eadem sepelirent; ut Herodotus, in Thalia, testis est. to grow cold and stiff under a ponderous Marble, to be pressed down by the weight of Earth and passengers.

CHAP. XVIII.
Of Moderation, opposed to Avarice.

1

NOw comes Moderation, or that Disposition of the Mind, which makes a man contented with a little, and than which he can hardly [Page] possesse a greater Good. For, to be content with little, is the highest preferment, the greatest wealth in the world: as on the other side, great riches without moderation, are but great poverty. Thus, to have wherewithall to prevent Hunger, Thirst, and Cold; is a Felicity not much inferior to that of Divintiy: and who so possesses so much, and desires no more, however the world may account him poor, he really is the Richest man alive.

II.

And how honest a thing is this Poverty, when it is Cheerfull, serene and Contented with only what is sufficient, i. e. with those riches of Nature, which suffice to preserve from Hunger, from Thirst, from Cold? Truly, seeing that these riches of Nature are Terminated and easily acquirable; but those, that are coveted out of vain opinions, are difficult in the acquisition, and have no measure, no end: we ought to be highly thankfull to the Wisdom and Bounty of Nature, which made those things easily procurable, that are Necessary; and those Unnecessary, that are hard to come by.

III.

Again, since it behoves a Wise man to be alwaies Confident, that in the whole course of his life he shall never want Necessaries, doth [Page] not the very easie parability of such few, small, cheap and common things, as are Necessary, abundantly cherish that Confidence in him? when, on the other side, the Difficulty of acquiring those many, great, sumptuous and rare things, that belong to superfluity and magnificence, cannot but very much stagger and weaken it. And this clearly is the Reason, why the vulgar, though they have great possessions, do yet uncessantly toyl and afflict themselves in the acquisition of more: as if they feared to outlive their riches, and come to want, what, if they used with Moderation, they could never live to spend.

IV.

This considered, let us endeavour to Content our selves with what is most simple and most easily procurable; remembring, that not all the wealth of the world, congested into one heap, can avail in the least measure to cure the least disease, or perturbation of the Mind: whereas mean Riches, such as Nature offers to us, and are most usefull to remove thar indigence, which is incommodious to the Body; as they are the occasion of no Care or other passion, during life; so will it not be grievous to us to part with them, when we think of Death.

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V.

Miserable truly, are the Minds of men, and their Hearts surrounded with blindness; in that they will not see, that Nature doth dictate nothing more to them than this: that they should supply the wants of the Body, and for the rest, enjoy a wel pleased mind, without care, without Fear; not that they should spend their daies in scraping together more than Nature knows how to make use of, and that with greedinesse, as if they meant to outlive Death, to prevent want in their graves, or never bethought themselves of the uncertainty of life, and how deadly a Potion we all drink at our very entrance into the World.

VI.

What though those things, which are purely Necessary, and in respect whereunto no man can be poor, do not afford those Delights, which Vulgar minds so much love and court; yet Nature doth not want them, nor doth she in the mean time cease to afford reall and sincere Pleasures in the fruition of meer Necessaries, as we abundantly declared. Hereupon the Wise man stands not only so indifferently affected toward those things, in relation whereunto money is desired (such are Love, Ambitition, Luxury, &c. all which require expences to maintain them) but so far above them, [Page] as that he hath no reason either to desire or care for money.

VII.

Now, as for what we said, of the Immensity of such Riches, as are coveted upon the suggestion of vain Opinions; the Reason of it is this, that when Nature is satisfied with Little, vain Opinion ushering in Desire, alwaies engageth the mind to think of somthing, which it doth not possesse, and, as if it were really needfull, converts and fixeth the Desire wholly and entirely upon it. Whence it comes, that to him, who is not satisfied with a little, nothing can ever be enough: but still the more wealth he possesseth, the more he conceives himself to want.

VIII.

Wherefore, seeing there can never be want of a Little, the Wise man, doubtlesse, while he possesseth that little, ought to account it very great Riches: because therein is no want, whereas other riches, though great in esteem, are really very small, because they want multiplication to infinity. Whence it follows, that he who thinks not his own Estate, how small soever, sufficiently ample; though he should become Lord of the whole World, will ever be miserable. For, Misery is the companion of Want; and the same vain opinion, which first [Page] perswaded him that his own Estate was not sufficient, will continue to perswade him that one World is not sufficient, but that he wants more and more to infinity.

IX.

Have you, then, a design to make any one Rich indeed? Know, that the way is not by adding to his Riches, but by Detracting from his desires. For, when having cut off all vain and superfluous desires from his breast, he shall so compose himself to the praescripts of Nature, as to covet no more than she needs and requires: then at length shall he find himself to be a Rich man in reality, because he shall then find that Nothing is wanting to him. Hereupon may you also inculcate this maxim to him; If you live according to Nature, you shall never be poor: but if according to Opinion, you shall nover be rich. Nature desires little, Opinion infinite.

X.

Truly, this Disposition, or (if you please) Faculty of the mind, whereby a man moderating himself, cuts off the desire of whatsoever is not Necessary to Nature, and contents himself with provisions the most simple and most easily procurable; this Disposition, we say, is that, which begets that Security, that is perceived in a pleasant Retirement, and Avoidance [Page] of the Multitude; forasmuch as by the benefit thereof, when a man converseth with crouds of people, he shall want no more, than when he lives sequestred.

XI.

Finally, when a man wants this Faculty of Detracting or Abdicating from his Desires, whatever is not purely Necessary; how great is the Misery, to which he is continually subject? his mind being, like a vessell full of holes, alwaies in filling, but never full. And certainly (that we may not insist upon this, that most, who have heaped up vast masses of Wealth, have therein found only a Change, not an End of their misery; either because they loaded themselves with new Cares, to which they were not subject before; or because they gave them occasion to fall into new Vices, from the snares whereof they had formerly escaped) this alone is a very high misery; for a man to have his Appetite Encreased by the satisfaction of it, i. e. the more plentifully he feeds, the more to be tormented with hunger.

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CHAP. XIX.
Of Mediocrity betwixt Hope and Despair of the Future.

1

FInally, since all Cupldity, or Desire whatever is carried to that, which is not possessed, but proposed as possible to be attained, and accompanied with some Hope of obtaining it; and that Hope, as it were nursing and cherishing that Desire, is accompanied with a certain pleasure; as the opposite to Hope, Desperation, creating and fomenting Fear, that what is desired may not be obtained, is accompanied with a certain Trouble: upon these considerations, it seems necessary for us to bring up the rear of this File of Virtues, with the discourse of Mediocrity; which is of very great use, as well in respect of objects in the Generall, either hoped for, or despaired of, in the Future; as in particular of the Duration, or rather perpetuity of life, whereof as there is a Desire kindled in the breasts of most men, so doth the Despair of it torment them.

II.

In the first place, therefore, we are to adhaere to this, as a Generall Rule; that what is to [Page]come, if it be in the number of simple Contingents, is neither absolutely ours, nor absolutely Not ours. More plainly; we are neither so to hope for a thing that is Contingent, as if it were certainly to come; because it may be prevented or diverted by some crosse accident intervenient: Nor so to despair of it, as if it were certainly not to come; because it may fall out, that no Accident may intervene to prevent or divert it. For, by the observation of this maxime, we shall reap the benefit of Moderation; so as not being destitute of all Hope, we shall not be without some Pleasure: and being altogether frustrated of our hopes, we shall be affected with no trouble.

III.

For, herein consists the Difference betwixt the Wise man and the Fool; that the Wise doth, indeed, expect things Future, but not depend upon them, and in the mean time enjoyes the Goods that are present (by considering how great and pleasant they are) and gratefully remembers what are past: but the fool, fixing all his thoughts and dependance upon the Future; makes (as we said in the beginning) his whole life unpleasant and full of fears.

IV.

And how many may we dayly see, who [Page] neither remember goods past, nor enjoy present? They are wholly taken up with Expectation of Future things, and those being uncertain, they are perpetually afflicted with anguish of mind, with fear, and at length become most grievously perplexed, when they too late perceive, that they have in vain addicted themselves to the getting of Riches, or Honours, or Power, or Glory: in respect they fail of obtaining those Pleasures, with the hopes whereof being enflamed, they had undergone many and great Difficulties and Labours. That we may not say any thing of that other sort of fools, who being abject and narrow-hearted, despair of all things, and are for the most part, Malevolent, Envious, Morose, Shunners of the light, Evill-speakers, Monsters.

V.

Now the Reason, why we say, that the wise man doth gratefully remember Goods Past, is, because we are generally too ungrateful toward the time Praeterite, and do not call to mind, nor account among Pleasures, the Good things we have formerly received: forasmuch as no Pleasure is more certain, than what cannot now be taken from us. For, present Goods are not yet Consummate and wholly solid; some chance or other may intervene and cut them off in half; Future things hang upon the pin of uncertainty, what is already Past, is only safe and inamissible.

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VI.

And among Past Goods we account not only such as we have enjoyed; but also our Avoidance of all those Evills, that might have fallen upon us; and our Liberation or Deliverance from such other Evills as did fall upon us, and might have lasted much longer; as also the Recordation, Reputation, Gratulation, that we sustained them Constantly and Bravely.

VII.

As for the Desire of Prolonging life to Eternity (the speciall Evill to be prevented by Mediocrity) we have already hinted, that a Wise man is to entertain no such desire: because thereupon instantly succeeds Desperation, wich is alwaies accompanied with Trouble and Anguish. And this Cogitation imports thus much, that the greater Pleasure cannot be received from an Age of infinite Duration, than may be received from this, which we know to be finite; provided a man measure the Ends of it by Right Reason.

VIII.

For, seeing that to measure the Ends of Pleasure by right reason, is only to conceive, that the Supreme pleasure is no other but an [Page] Exemption from Pain and Perturbation; it is a manifest Consequence, that the Supreme Pleasure of man cannot be encreased by the Length, nor Diminished by the shortnesse of Time.

IX.

The Hopes of a more prolonged Pleasure, or of a longer Age, we confesse, may seem to render the present Pleasure more Intense; but, it can seem so only to such, who measure the Ends of Pleasure not by right Reason, but by vain opinion, and the Consequent thereof, Desire; and who look upon themselves so, as if, when they shall cease to be, they should be sensible of some trouble from the privation of Pleasure, as they might in case they should survive. And hence it comes, that perfectly to understand, that Death doth nothing concern us; makes us fully to enjoy this Mortall Life, not by adding thereunto any thing of uncertain Time, but by Cutting off all Desires of Immortality.

X.

Wherefore, since Nature hath prescribed certain bounds or Ends to the Pleasures of the Body; and the Desire of Eternall Duration takes them wholly away: necessary it is, that the mind, or Reason supervene, so as by ratiocinating upon those ends, and expunging all [Page] desires of Sempiternity, to make life in all points perfect and consummate, and us so fully content therewith, as not to want any longer Duration.

XI.

And this Reasoning moreover, causeth, that we shall not be frustrated of Pleasure even then, when Death shall take us by the hand, and shew us the period of all these mortall things, insomuch as we shal therby attain to the perfect, and so delectable End of a very Good Life, rising from the table of the World as Guests well satisfied with the Good Entertainments of life, and having duly performed all those Duties, which to perform, we received life.

CHAP. XX.
Of Fortitude, in Generall.

1

HItherto of Temperance, and the Chief sorts of it, respective to the Chief Objects of our Cupidities. We are now come to a new Lesson, FORTITUDE; which we called the other part of Honesty, in respect that the use of it is against Fear, and all its Causes, and that those, who behave themselves, in any Difficulty [Page] or Dangerous Enterprise, as especially in War (from which the Vulgar seem to have transferred the word to all Generous actions) not timidly and unmanly, but Couragiously and valiantly, are generally said to behave themselves Honestly and Becomingly.

II.

That this Virtue also is to be embraced, in order to Pleasure, may be inferred from hence; that neither the undergoing of great labours, nor the suffering of great pains, are things inviting and desireable in themselves; as likewise is not Patience, nor Assiduity, nor Watchings, nor Industry it self, which is so highly commended; nay, nor Fortitude: but the reason why we commend, and pursue them, is to the End we may live without Care and Fear, and so free both body and mind (as much as possible) from all molestation.

III.

For, as by the Fear of Death (for example) the quiet of life is wholly perturbed; and as to yeeld to pains, and endure them with a dejected and weak mind, is a great misery, and by that basenesse and weaknesse of Spirit, many have uttterly lost their Parents, Friends, Country, and most themselves: so, on the other side, doth a strong and sublime mind make a man free from all Care and Anguish, insomuch as it contemns Death, upon this account, that all [Page] who suffer it, are in the same case, as before they were in being; and is fortified against all Pains, as being assured, that the greatest pains are soon determined by Death, that small pains have many intervalls of quiet, that mean pains are not above our patience; that if they be tolerable, they are to be endured with constancy, which much mitigates them; and if intolerable, he is quietly to depart the world, as a Theatre that doth not please him.

IV.

Now, from these considerations it is plain, that Timidity and unmanlinesse are not to be dispraised, nor Fortitude and Patience to be praised, for their own sakes: but those are Rejected, because they induce Pain; and these Embraced, because they produce Pleasure.

V.

And, as for what we said of the Efficacy of Fortitude both against Fear, and all things that are wont to cause it; the intent of it is, that we may understand, that they are the very same Evills, which torment when they are present, and are feared, when expected as future: and consequently that we learn not to fear those Evills, which we either feign to our selves, or any waies apprehend as to come; and with Constancy and Patience to endure those that are present.

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VI.

Now, among such Evills, as we Imagine to our selves but are not really Future, the chiefest are those which we fear either from the Gods, as if they were Evill themselves, or could be the Authors of any Evill to us; or from Death, as if that were evill in it self, or brought us to some eternall Evill after it: and among such Evills, as are in possibility, and may come, and do somtimes come and affect us with pain and trouble; they are all such, as inferr either Pain upon the Body, or Discontent upon the Mind.

VII.

Those which produce Pain, are Diseases, Scourgings, Fire; Sword, &c. and those which induce Discontent, are External Evills, and either Publique, of which sort are Tyranny, Warrs, destruction of ones Country, Pestilence, Famine, and the like; or Private, of which sort are Servitude, Banishment, Imprisonment, Infamy, Losse of Friends, Wife, Children, Estate, &c.

VIII.

Now, the difference betwixt all these things, on the one part, and pain and discontent on [Page] the other, is this; that Pain and Discontent are absolute evills in themselves: the others are evills onely Respectively, or as they may be the Causes of pain and discontent; nor is there any reason, why they should be avoided, unlesse in that respect only.

IX.

Upon the Chief of these Causes of fear we shall touch, and in order as they are here enumerated. In the mean time be pleased to observe, that Fortitude is a Disposition of the mind, not ingenerate by Nature, but acquired by long consulting with Reason. For, Fortitude is very much different from Audacity, Ferocity, inconsiderate Temerity, which is found even in the Bruit Animals: and being proper to man, and to such men onely as act according to Prudence, and the advice of right Reason; is not to be measured by the hot Temperament aud strength of the Body, but by the firmnesse of the Mind, constantly adhaering to an honest intention or purpose.

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CHAP. XXI.
Of Fortitude, opposed to the Fear of the Gods.

1

IN the first place it seems convenient, that we discusse a certain Twofold Fear, much transcending all others; forasmuch as if any thing hath produced the Supreme Pleasure, and that which is proper to the Mind; doubtlesse, it hath been the Expunction of all such Opinions, as have impressed the greatest Fears upon the Mind. For, such is the condition of miserable Mortalls, that they are generally led, not by sound opinions, but by some certain Affection void of Reason: and so, not defining Evill by reality, but imagination, they render themselves obnoxious to, and frequently suffer as high perturbations from such things, as they only Imagine to themselves, as if they were Reall.

II.

And that, which is the Ground of the Greatest Fear, and consequently of the Greatest Perturbation to men, is this; that conceiving there are certain Blissfull and Immortall Natures (which they call Gods) in the World, they do [Page] yet think them to have such Wills, such Passions, such Operations, as are plainly repugnant to those Attributes of Beatitude and Immortality; such are perpetuall sollicitude, Imployments, Fits of Anger and Kindnesse: and hereupon they infer, that Losses and Afflictions are by way of punishment, derived to Evill men, and Protection and Benefits, by way of reward and encouragement, derived to Good men, from the Gods. For, Men, being nursed up in their own, i. e. Human affections, imagine and admit Gods in most things like themselves: and what they find incorrespondent to their own inclinations and passions; the very same they conclude to be incompetent to the Deities.

III.

Hereupon it cannot be exprest, how great unhappinesse Mankind hath drawn upon it self, by ascribing such attributes to the Gods, as resemble those of Human nature, and especially those of Anger and Vindictivenesse; in respect whereof mens minds being made low and abject, as if the Gods perpetually threatned to call them to a severe account for their actions, and to inflict punishment upon them: you shal scarcely find a man, who is not appaled and strook with terror, at every clap of Thunder, at every Earth-quake, at every high wind, at every storm at Sea, and the like naturall occurrents.

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IV.

But, so are not Those, who being educated in the school of Reason, have learned, that the Gods live in perptuall security and Tranquillity; and that their Blisfull Nature is so far removed from us and our Affairs, as that they can neither be Pleased, nor Displeased at our actions. And, unfeignedly, if they were touched with Anger at our misdeeds, or heard the prayers of men: the whole race of man would soon be destroyed; there being not an hour, wherein Millions of men do not imprecate mischief and destruction each to other.

V.

Be very Cautious, therefore, that when you have conceived God to be an Immortall and Blissfull Nature (or Animal, as the common Notion, concerning God, doth suggest) you do not destroy that Conception, by giving any other Attribute to him, which may be either inconsistent with, or repugnant to those of his Beatitude and Immortality.

VI.

Gods, in truth, there are; for the Knowledge of them is evident, as we have elsewhere declared: but, they are not such as men commonly conceive and describe them to be. For, when they have described them to be Immormortall [Page] and Blissfull, they contradict themselves, by affixing other Repugnant Attributes upon them; as that they are alwaies taken up with businesse themselves, and create business for others; that they are affected with pleasure or displeasure at the good or bad Actions of men; that they are delighted with human adoration and sacrifices, &c. all which presuppose great Disquiet, Imbecillity, Fear, and the want of externall assistance.

VII.

Nor need you fear, that this Tenent should subject you to the censure of being Impious; because, in truth, He is not Impious, who denies and casheirs the Vulgar Gods of the multitude: but he who ascribes to the Gods the opions of the multitude. For, those are not Genuine Praenotions, but False Opinions, which are commonly delivered by men, concerning the Gods.

VIII.

By the same reason likewise, he is not the truly Pious man, who bows down upon every stone, sacrificeth upon every Altar, and besprinkles the doors of every Temple with the blood of victims: but, He, who contemplating all things with a serene and quiet mind, frames to himself, out of a genuine Praenotions, true and correspondent conceptions concerning [Page] the Divine Nature; and being thereunto induced, not by hope or reward, but meerly by apprehension of the Majesty and Supreme Excellency of its essence, doth love it, and worship it with the highest Reverence and Veneration of his mind; and admitting no such Cogitations, as may suggest any Opinion repugnant to its Attributes, and destructive to the Veneration due unto it, doth thereby exempt himself from that base fear, which others suffer, in whose minds that Contrariety of Attributes doth beget the highest and most lasting of all Perturbations.

CHAP. XXII.
Of Fortitude, opposed to the Fear of Death.

1

THE other thing which invades, and strikes the Minds of men with extream Fear and Terror, is Death; and this, because of we know not what Everlasting Evills, that are expected, immediately to ensue thereupon (and that's very strange, you'l say, that men should fear to suffer Evill, then when they shall be deprived of all sense, and utterly cease to be) they being ignorant, that all those solemn stories, that are commonly told of Hell, Rhadamanth, the Furies, &c. are the meer Fictions of [Page] Poets: and that if they contain any thing of truth in them, they are but cunning allusions to the miseries, which many men suffer during life, since those, who are uncessantly vexed with vain Fears, superfluous Cares, insatiable Desires, and other violent Passions, lead lives so truly miserable, as that they may well be said, to suffer the torments of Hell.

II.

That you may exempt your self,Nil igitur mors est, ad nos neque pertinet hilum. & mox; Multò igitur mortem minus ad nos esse putandum, si minus esse potest, quàm quod nihil esse videmus; Lucret. lib. 3. therefore, from these Terrors; accustom your mind to this thought, That Death doth nothing concern us; and upon this Argument: whatever of Good or Evill we are capable of in life, we are capapable thereof onely in respect of our Sense; but, Death is a Privation of all Sense, therefore, &c. That Death is a Privation of all Sense, is consequent from hence, that it is a Dissolution; and what is once dissolved, must henceforth remain without all Sense. So that Death seems a thing most easily Contemptible; insomuch as it is an ineffectuall Agent, and in vain threatens pain, where the Patient is destroyed, and so ceaseth to be capable of pain.

III.

True it is, indeed, and too true, that men generally abhor Death, somtimes because they look upon it as the Greatest of Pains, somtimes [Page] because they apprehend it as the Cessation of all their Enjoyments, or Privation of all things that are Dear to them in life; but in both these Respects, altogether without Cause: since this thing, Not-to-live, or Not-to-be, ought to be no occasion of Terror; because when once we come to that, we shall have no faculty left whereby to know, that Not-to-live hath any thing of Evill in it.

IV.

Hereupon we may conclude that those are great Fooles who abhorre to think, that after Death their Bodies should be torne by wild beasts, burned in the flame of the funerall pile, devoured by wormes, &c. for, they doe not consider, that then they shall not be, and so not feele, nor complaine, that they are torne, burned, devoured by corruption or wormes. And that those are Greater Fooles, who take it grievously, that they shall no longer enjoy the conversation of their Wives, Children, Friends, no longer doe them good offices, nor afford them their assistance; for these doe not consider, that then they shall have no longer Relation to, nor Desire of Wife, Children, Friends, or any thing else.

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V.

We said,Natura sic se habet, ut quomodo initium rerum omnium ortus noster afferat; sic exitum Mors; quae ut nihil pertinuit ad nos ante ortum, sic nihil post mortem pertinebit. In quo quid potest esse mali, cum mors nec ad vivos pertineat, nec ad mortuos? Alteri nulli sunt; alteros non attingit. Cicero, Tuscul. lib. 1. that Death (accounted the King of Terrors, and most horrid of all Evills) doth nothing concerne us, because, while we are, Death is not; and when Death is, we are not; so that he, who profoundly considers the matter, will soone conclude that Death doth concerne neithe Living, nor the Dead; not the living, because it yet toucheth them not, not the Dead, because they are not.

VI.

And,Paratus exire sum; & ideo fruor vita, quia quamdiu futurum hoc sit, non nimis pendeo. Seneca Epist. 61. as the assurance of this that Death nothing concernes us, doth exempt us from the greatest of Terrors, so also doth it make us to enjoy life to the most advantage of pleasure, not by adding thereunto any thing of uncertaine Time, but by Detracting all desire of Immortality. For, in life there can be nothing of Evil to him, who doth perfectly understand, that there can be nothing of Evill in the privation of life.

VII.

Againe, He cannot be excused of Folly, who saith, that He feares Death, not because of any Trouble or Anguish that it can bring, when it comes; but because of the perpetuall Griefe, [Page] and Horror, wherewith it afflicts the minde, till it comes, or while it is expected: forasmuch as that, which can bring no trouble or anguish with it, when it comes, ought not to make us sad before it comes. Certainely, if therebe any thing of Incommodity, or Feare in the businesse of Death, it is the fault of him that is Dying, not of Death it selfe: nor is there any trouble in Death, more than there is after it, and it is no lesse folly to feare Death, than to feare old Age, since as old Age followes close upon the heeles of youth, so doth Death upon the heeles of old Age.

VIII.

Further, we are to hope at least, that when we come to the point of Death, and are even at the last gaspe, either we shall feele no pain, or such as will be very short; for as much as no pain that is Great, can be Long; and so every man ought to be confident, that though the dissolution of his Soul and Body be accompanied with some torment; yet after that's once past, he shall never feel more.

IX.

That Philosopher was very ridiculous, who admonisheth the young man to live Honestly, and the old bodie Honestly; because a Good Life and a Good Death are not things to [Page] be parted, and the Meditation of living honestly and dying honestly, is one and the same: and this in respect that a young man may die Immaturely; and to an old man something of life is remaining, and the last act of his life is a part, yea, and the Crown of his whole life.

X.

And both young and old are to consider this, that though man may provide for his Security, as to other things; yet against Death there is no security, the youngest nor strongest cannot promise themselves immunity from it, for so much as one hour; all men living as it were in a City without Walls, without Gates, to keep out that common Enemy.

XI.

Moreover a young man may die Happy, who considers with himself, that should he live a thousand years, yet he could but see and act over the same things again: and an old man may live Unhappy, who, like a vessell full of holes, receives the Goods of life only to let them run through him,Cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis? Iucret. lib. 3. Rarus, qui exacto contentus tempore vitae. Cedit, uti conviva satur. Flaccus, Satyr. 1. and so is never full of them, nor as a sober Guest of Nature, after a plentifull meal of all her best dishes, willing to rise and go take his rest.

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XII.

This considered, we are not to account an old man Happy, in that he died full of years, but in that he dyed full of Goods, and sated with the World.

XIII.

Finally, most of all foolish and ridiculous is he, who saith, it is good either not to be born at all, or to die as soon as born. For, if he speak this in Earnest, why doth he not presently rid himself of life, it being very easie for him so to do, in case he hath well deliberated upon the matter beforehand? And, if in jest; he is perfectly mad, because these are things that admit not of jesting. Again, in life there is somthing Amiable in it self; and therefore he is as much to be reprehended, who desires Death, as he that is afraid of it. For, what can be so ridiculous, as for a man to desire Death, when himself makes his life unquiet by the fear of Death? or out of a wearinesse of life, to fly to the Sanctuary of Death, when his own Imprudence and Irregular course of life, is the only cause of that wearinesse?

XIV.

Every man, therefore, ought to make it his care, so to live, as that life may not be ingrate or taedious to him; & not to be willing to part with life, till either Nature, or some intolerable [Page] Case call upon him to surrender it. And in that respect, we are seriously to perpend whether is the more Commodious, for us to stay till death come to us, or to go and meet it. For, though it be an Evill, indeed, to live in Necessity; yet is there no Necessity for us to live in Necessity: since Nature hath been so Kind as to give us, though but one door into the World, yet many doors out of it.

XV.

But, albeit, therebe some Cases so extream, as that in respect of them we are to hasten and fly to the Sanctuary of Death, lest some power intervene and rob us of that liberty of quitting life: yet neverthelesse are we not to attempt any thing in that kind, but when it may be attempted conveniently, and opportunely; and when that time comes, then are we to dispatch and leap over the battlements of life bravely. For, neither is it fit for him, who thinks of flight, to sleep: nor are we to despair of a happy Exit even from the greatest Difficulties, in case we neither hasten before our time, nor let it slip wh [...]n it comes.

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CHAP. XXIII.
Of Fortitude against Pain of the Body.

1

COrporall Pain is that alone, which deserves the name of Evill in it self, and which indeed would carry the Reason of the Greatest of Evills, if so be our own delusive Opinions had not created and pulled upon our heads another sort of pain, called the pain of the Mind; which many times becoms more grievous and intollerable than any pain of the Body whatever, as we have formerly deduced. For, Discontent of mind, conceived upon the losse of Riches, Honours, Friends, Wife, Children, and the like; doth frequently grow to that height, that it exceeds the sharpest pains of the body: but still that which gives it both being and growth, is our own Opinion, which if right and sound, we should never be moved by any such Losse whatever; in regard that all such things are without the circle of our selves, and so cannot touch us but by the intervention of Opinion, which we coin to our selves. And thereupon we may infer, that we are not subject to any other reall Evill, but only the Pain of the Body: and that the mind ought to complain of nothing, which is not conjoyned to some pain of the body, either present, or to come,

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II.

The Wise man, therefore, will be very cautious, that he do not wittingly draw upon himself any Corporall pain; nor do any action, whereupon any such pain may be likely to ensue: unlesse it be in order either to the Avoydance of some Greater pain, that would otherwise certainly invade him; or the Comparation of some Greater Pleasure dependent thereupon; as we have formerly inculcated. This considered, we may very well wonder at Those [Philosophers] who accounting Health, which is a state of Indolency, a very great Good, as to all other respects; do yet, as to this respect, hold it to be a thing meerly Indifferent: as if it were not an indecent playing with words, or rather a high piece of Folly, to affirm▪ that to be in pain, and to be free from pain, is one and the same thing.

III.

But, in case any Necessity either of his native Constitution, in respect whereof his body is infirm and obnoxious to Diseases; or of any Externall violence done him, which (so subject to Casualties and the injuries of others, is the condition of frail man) he could not prevent or avoid; (for experience attesteth) that a Wise and Innocent person may be wounded by his malicious Enemies; or called to the [Page] bar, impleaded, condemned, and beaten with rodds, or otherwise cruelly tormented by Tyrants) we say, in case either of these shall have brought pain upon him: then is it his part, to endure that pain with Constancy and Bravery of mind, and patiently to expect either the Solution, or Relaxation of it.

IV.

For, certainly, Pain doth never continue long in the Body; but, if it be Great and highly intense, it ceaseth in a short time, because either it is determined of its self, and suceeded if not by absolute Indolency, yet by very great Mitigation; or is determined by Death, in which there can be no pain. And as for that pain, which is Lasting; it is not only gentle and remisse in it self, but also admits many lucid intervalls, so that there are not many daies, nay, not hours, in which the body may enjoy not only ease, but very much Pleasure also.

V.

And may we not observe, that all long or Chronique Diseases have many more hours of Ease and quiet, than of Pain and trouble? For, (to omit this, that if a Disease encrease our Thirst, it doth as much encrease our pleasure in Drinking) they give us time for our Refection, [Page] frequent respits to hold comfortable Conferences with our Friends, leasure to recreate our selves with some gentle Game, and admit many & long intervalls of ease, in which we may apply our selves to our studies and any other necessary affairs. Whereupon it is most evident, that Great pain cannot be Long; nor Long pain Great: and so, we may consolate our selves against the Violence of pain, by an assurance of the shortnesse of it; and with the Remissnesse against the Diuturnity of it.

VI.

Let this, therefore, be our frequent succour, that No pain is either Intollerable, De jiciat miseram tibi nulla molestia vitā; Si longa est, levis est: si gravis est, brevis est. Morus noster. or Perpetuall; because, if it be long, it must be light; if great, short. Provided alwaies, that we remember the Ends or bounds prescribed to things by Nature; and do not by our own opinion add any thing thereunto, which may make our pain greater, or us to apprehend it to be greater, than really it is. For, the only way to heighten pain to the degree of intollerable, is to exasperate it by impatience, and oppresse and wear out nature by effeminate Complainings: wheras, on the other side, nothing doth so much alleviate, mitigate and blunt the edge of any pain, as Constancy, and Custom of suffering; since thence it comes, that a Wise man, who hath been used to Diseases and Pains, doth very often rejoyce and smile even in the highest fury of his sicknesse.

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VII.

Thus much we can testifie of our Friend Metrodorus; who hath at all times born himself undauntedly, and with exemplary Constancy▪ as against Death, so against all Pain. For concerning our selves, we need not say much; it being very familiar to us, to suffer such tortures of the Bladder & Bowels, as none can be greater: and yet, as we find them fully compensated with that Alacrity of mind, which redounds to us from the remembrance of our Philosophy and former Inventions; so do we entertain them with that Constancy and Patience, as that we are not destitute of very great delights even in those very daies, wherein we are most tormented with those sharp Fits of the Stone and Colick.

VIII.

And indeed, this is the very Reason, why we formerly said, that a wise man, though invaded and surrounded with the cruellest of Torments, may yet keep possession of his happiness: because he doth both by his Patience soften that Necessity, which he cannot break; and as much as possible, withdraw his mind from being concerned in the sufferings of his body, conversing no more with it, than as with a fragil and complaining part. He reflects the eye of his mind [Page] backward, and considers what Honest, what Generous and Magnanimous Actions he hath at any time done; and fixing his cogitations upon those things, which he hath most admired, and which have most delighted him: he recreates his mind with the Remembrance of Past Goods, for which he is very far from shewing himself Ungratefull, as Unwise men usually are.

IX.

He considers, that he can do nothing more worthy that Virtue and Wisdom, which he professeth, than not to yeeld the victory to Pain, the most hard to be susteined of all things; than to hold up his head nobly in so difficult a conflict; to vanquish so potent and malicious an Enemy, and at length to make so perfect a Conquest thereof, as that the very Remembrance of it will be at all times delightfull, and especially in the time of absolute Indolency; which will be so much the more Gratefull, by how much the greater pains shall have praeceded, as a Calm, or Haven is alwaies most welcome after a tempest.

X.

Now, if a wise man is not without his Alleviations and Comforts even in the most Grievous pain; what shall we say of him in Remiss and Gentle pains, or in the loss of some Member, or Privation of some one of his Senses? [Page] Truly, it was not without good reason, that we formerly said, that a Wise man might still be Happy, though deprived of the best of his Senses, his Sight: for, if the Night doth not diminish the Happinesse of life; why should Blindnesse, that so neerly resembles Night, do it? and however he may want some pleasures, that depend upon the light: yet are there many others that lie open to his enjoyment, and what is much above all others, the pleasure of Contemplation.

XI.

For, seeing that to a wise man, to live, is to Think, certainly his Thoughts are not beholding to the assistance of his Eyes, in the businesse of investigating Truth. And that man, to whose Doctrine we somtimes gave up our Name, did live long and Happy, without being able to distinguish of Colours: but, without the Notion of Things, he could not have lived happy. Nay, that Great man was of opinion, that the Perspicacity of the Mind was very much dimmed by the sight of the eyes: and while others could scarcely be said, to see the things, that were before them; the opticks of his reason flew abroad into all Infinity, nor could the acies of his mind be terminated by the Extreams of the Universe.

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CHAP. XXIV.
Of Fortitude, against Discontent of Mind.

1

YOU may remember, we said even now, that all Discontent of Mind is conceived for such things, that are Externall Evills, and the Contraries to those Goods that we most love and desire. For, men usually call some things Adverse, and others Prosperous: and we may generally observe, that the Mind, which is elevated and insolent with Prosperity, and dejected with Adversity; is low, abject and base. This considered, you may easily collect, that all we should in this place say, concerning Evills inducing Discontent, and in respect whereof, we have need of Fortitude; may be sufficiently inferred from what we formerly said, concerning those Goods, that are the General objects of our Desires or Cupidities, and in respect whereof we have need of Temperance.

II.

Let this Generall Axiome, therefore, suffice; that Discontent of Mind is not grounded upon Nature, but upon meer Opinion of Evill; and in respect [Page] respect thereof it becomes necessary, that every man be in Discontent, who conceives himself to be under some Evill, whether only praevised and expected, or already come upon him. For, how comes it, that a Father, whose Son is killed, is not a whit lesse cheerfull or merry, if he know not of the death of his Son, than if he were yet alive and in health? or, that he, who hath lost much of his good fame abroad, or all his goods and Cattell by robbery at home; is not at all sensible of either losse, till he hears of it? Is it not Opinion alone, which makes him sad and discontented thereupon? Certainly, if Nature it self were the Author of that sadnesse, the Fathers mind would be strook with a sense of the losse of his Son, in the same moment wherein he was slain: and in like manner, he that hath suffered Detraction from his honour, or been robbed of his Goods and Cattell, would in the same instant receive intelligence of his losse, from the secret Regret impressed upon his mind.

III.

To the production of Discontent, therefore, in the mind, it is absolutely necessary, that Opinion (not Nature) intervene betwixt the supposed Evill and the Mind. However, that you may be the more confirmed in this truth, be pleased to observe this; If a man have an opinion, that such a one is his true Son, who was indeed begotten by another man; and again, [Page] believe, that such a one is not his Son, though himself be the right Father of him: let it be told him, that He, whom he accounts not to be his true Son, but really is so, is Dead; and he shall never be moved at the sad tidings: but let him hear of the death of the other, whom he took for his true Son, but really was not so; and he shall instantly be moved at the news, and suddainly break forth into sorrow and laments. And this, not from any Naturall Instinct, or Sentiments Paternall: but only from the delusive suggestions of Opinion, that the one, who was his Son, was not so; and that the other, who was not his Son, was so.

IV.

Hence is it a perspicuous Truth, that those things, for which the mind becomes male-content and contristate, are not Real Evills to us; forasmuch as they are without the orbe of our Nature,Nihil quicquam ad mentem faciunt, quae extra mentem sita sunt. and can never touch us immediatly or of themselves, but by the mediation of our own Opinion. And this was the ground of our former Assertion,Marc. Antonin. in lib. de seipso 7. Sect. 2. that it is Reason alone which makes life happy and pleasant, by expelling all such false Conceptions or Opinions, as may any way occasion perturbation of mind. For, it is Discontent alone, that perturbs the mind, and wholly subverts the Tranquillity, and so the jucundity thereof.

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V.

But,Non possidemus propria mòrtales bona, Sed jus Deorum, nostra dispensatio est. Et commodata, cùm volunt, repetunt Dii. Euripid. Phaeniss. [...]. Marc. Anton. lib. 12. how can Reason expell all such erroneous Opinions, after they have once taken possession of the Mind? Why, truly, only by teaching, the Wise man to arm his mind against the blows of Fortune. For those very Externall things, which perswaded by opinion, we conceive to be Good, and for the losse of which we conceive such Discontent of mind; are also justly called the Goods of Fortune; because they are not reeally our own, but may be possessed, or taken away, as Fortnue pleaseth.

VI.

This the Wise man well knowing,Quicquid est hoc, quod circa nos ex adventitio fulget, liberi, honores, opes, ampla atria, nobisis aut formosa conjux, caetera (que) ex incerta mobilique sorte pendentia; alieni commodati (que) apparatus sunt. Nihil horum dono datur: collatitiis & ad dominos redituris scena adornatur. Alia ex his primo die, alia secundo referentur. &c. Grotius in cap. 10. Marc. Sic accipe, ne fastuosus fias; sic posside, ut dimittere proclivis sis. Marc. Antonin. de seipso lib. 8. Sect. 33. in codice Gatakeriano. accounts such Goods no more his own, than other mens, and doth never so possesse them, as not to be willing and ready at any time to part with them. For, he hath divested his mind of that opinion, which would perswade him, that they are reall Goods, that they are his own, that they are permanent and inamissible: and put on that right opinion, which assures him, that they are neither really Good, nor absolutely his own, nor inamissible, but transitory and subject to be blown away from him by [Page] every gust of adverse Fortune. And hereupon He foresees what to do, in case he should be deprived of them; that is, not to cruciate himself with vain sorrow and fruitless Discontent; but to take it quietly and contentedly, that Fortune ha [...]h redemanded what she did not give, but only lend him.

VII.

Certainly, to those, who account it an Evill to be deprived of these Externall Goods, it cannot but prove of grievous consequence, that Praemeditation should encrease those Evils which it might very much have diminished at least, if not wholly praevented. For by this they come to be discontented not only at present infortunes, but also at such as they apprehend are likely to befall them but perhaps may never befall them: and so every Evill is troub [...]esom, not only when it comes, but when it is only expected, though it never come. Doubtlesse, it is most vain and foolish in a man, to run in [...]o a voluntary misery; and he that doth so, shall alwaies be Discontented, either by receiving, or thinking of Evill: for, who so alwaies thinks, that some Evill or Adversity may befall him; this very thought doth prove an Eternall Evill to him.

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VIII.

And, as for the Wise man, in case it happen, that by being long accustomed to the possession and use of the Goods of Fortune, he hath not totally expunged out of his Mind that Opinion, that they are reall Goods, and wholly his own; and so some little of Fortune intervene, and give him a blow, that may put him to some small Regret and Discontent: in this case, he is for the Alleviation of that his Discontent, to have recourse to those two things formerly prescribed by us, as the most potent remedies for the mitigation of Pain in the body; viz. Avocation of his thoughts from his losse and the Causes of it; and Revocation of them to those things, which he knows to be Gratefull and Pleasant to his Mind.

IX.

For, the Mind, of a Wise man is instructed to conform to the Laws of Reason, and precisely follow the conduct thereof; and Reason forbids him to fix his cogitations upon those things, which may advance and foment his discontent, & by that means helps him to abstract his thoughts from all regret, and convert them upon Goods either to come, or formerly enjoyed, and especially such as he hath frequently found to be delightfull.

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X.

And, what though sad and importune thoughts are apt frequently to recurre; yet is he still to insist upon that Avocation and Revocation of his Mind: because the mind, by continuall Diversion to other objects, is, brought by little and little to wear out and deface the Characters of sorrow imprinted upon it by a misfortune; nor, indeed, doth Time conduce to the cure of Discontent, by any other way, but ony by exhibiting various occasions of Divertisement, by which the mind being by degrees taken off from the Cause of its trouble, is brought at length to almost an absolute forgetfullnesse thereof.

CHAP. XXV.
Of Iustice, in Generall.

1

THus far of that part of Honesty, which concerns Ones-self: we are now come to the other, that relates also to others, and belongs to a man as living in a Civill Society; and that is Iustice. For most certain it is, tha [...] Justice is as it were the common Tye, or Ligament, which ho [...]ds men together in peace, and without which no Society can subsist: insomuch [Page] as it is a Virtue, which gives to every one his Due, and provides that Injury be done to none.

II.

What we have formerly said, of the Foundation and Benefits of the other Virtues, hitherto handled; doth exactly correspond also to this Virtue: for as we have taught, that Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude are inseparably conjoyned to Pleasure; so may wee affirm the very same of Justice, which doth not only never cause Harm to any man, but on the contrary, alwaies preserve and nourish somthing, that may calm and quiet the minds of men; and this as well by its own and Natures power, as by a constant Hope, that none shall ever want any of those things, which pure and depraved Nature can desire.

III.

And, as Temerity, Lust, and Cowardise do alwaies excruciate the mind, and stir up troubles: so is it impossible, that a mind, which lodgeth Injustice, should at any time be quiet and at peace either with it self, or others; because though such a mind should attempt any unjust action, with the greatest secrecy imaginable; yet can it not perswade it self, that the Injustice thereof shall never be brought to light, And though some may think themselves [Page] so great, as to be walled in and fortifyed against all revenge of their injustice, by their riches, honours, power, &c. yet do they still lye open to the revenge of an Evill Conscience, which whispers them in the ear, every moment, that all those solicitudes and perturbations, wherewith their minds are uncessantly tormented, are inflicted upon them, by the Immortall Gods, by way of punishment for their improbity.

IV.

There is no man can propose to himself a Diminution of the troubles of life, by any unjust way; but he must be sure to find them to be highly Encreased and Aggravated by the remorse of Conscience, the penalties of the Laws, and the Odium of all his fellow-Citizens. And yet notwithstanding there are Millions of men, who never think they have enough of Riches, or Honours, or Power, or Lusts, of Riotings, and the like exorbitant Cupidities; which no wealth unjustly gotten can diminish, but doth rather encrease and enflame: so that such men seem fitter to be Restrained by severe Laws, than to be instructed by the mild precepts of Reason.

V.

All sound judicious men, therefore, & are by Right Reason invited to Justice Equity, Faith; [Page] and as for Impotent persons, and such as in their Non-age, neither can unjust actions any way avail them, who can neither easily effect, what they endeavour, nor obtain their Ends, when they have effected it: and Riches are more convenient to Fortune, or Liberality of ingeny; which whoever use, thereby procure to themselves the Respect and Good-will of others, and (what is most conducible to quiet living) render themselves Dear and Beloved; especially when there is no cause of offending.

VI.

For, those Desires that arise from simple Nature are easily satisfied: and all others, that are derived from vain Opinions, are not to be obeyed, but suppressed; because they incite us to the fruition of nothing that is truly Desiderable, and alwaies there is more of Detriment accrewing from the injury its self, than there is of Emolument or advantage from those things, that are gotten by that injury.

VII.

Neverthelesse, no man can say rightly, that Justice is a Virtue to be wished for, embraced, and pursued, immediately for it self; but mediate [...]y, or for the great Pleasure it brings with it. For, to be beloved by, and to be Dear to oothers [Page] is very Pleasant; why? only because it conduceth to the greater Safety, Peace and Pleasure of a mans life. This considered, we infer, that Improbity is to be avoided, not only in respect of those many and great externall Incommodities, which happen to Unjust persons; but also, and much more, in respect of those internall Disquiets and Perplexities of mind, which it alwaies causeth.

VIII.

Now, though these Considerations seem sufficient to the Endearment of this excellent Virtue, Justice; yet we are concerned to enlarge our Discourse, partly touching Right: or what is Just, that so we may come the better to understand the Original of Justice, among whom it is to be practised, and with what Advantages: and partly touching some other Virtues, that are nearly allied to Justice, as Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Observance, and Friendship.

CHAP. XXVI.
Of Right, or Iust; from whence Iustice is named.

1

IN the first place, therefore, forasmuch as it is evident, that Iustice is denominated from hence, that the Right of another man is conconserved, [Page] or that what is Right or Iust, is performed: it is worth our knowing what that is, which ought to be accounted Right or Just.

II.

Since Justice was excogitated and instituted in order to the Common Good; necessary it is, that that Right or Iust, to which Justice hath respect, should be such a certain Good, as may be in Common to all and every sing [...]e member of the Society. And, because every one, by the direction of Nature, desires what is Good for H [...]mself: it is also necessary, that what is Right, or Just be somthing of Natures owne institution, and so may be called Naturall.

III.

Nor is it for nothing that we touch upon this particular; because it somtimes comes to pass, that in a Society that may be prescribed for Right and Just, which is not really Good for the Society: and so being not Naturall, or according to the dictates of Nature, it cannot, but by abuse, be reputed Right or Just; since that, which hath the true reason of Right or Just Naturall, is such, as that it is not only prescribed as Profitable and Good, but is also Really so.

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IV.

To speak plainly and properly, therefore; Right or Just Naturall, is nothing else but Tessera Utilitatis, the Symboll of Utility, proposed and agreed upon by the concurrent votes of all in the Society, to the end, that they may be kept from mutually harming each other, and that each one may live securely; which as it is a Good, so doth every man, by the direction of Nature, desire it.

V.

Here we take Profitable and Good, for the same thing; and judge that there are two Reasons, that require the preservation of Right: the one, that it may be Profitable, or respect the Common Utility, i. e. the Common Security; the other, that it be Prescribed by the Common Consent of the Society, for nothing is compleatly Just, but what the Society hath, by common Consent, or common Pact, decreed to be observed and kept inviolate.

VI.

And hence it, that the name of Right or Iust is usually given to each of these Two; since not only what is profitable is said to be Just, but also the very Paction, or Agreement, or Prescription of the Society; which is also [Page] called Law, as being that, which expressly prescribes to every one what is Profitable or Just.

VII.

Some there are, we know, who conceive and affirm, that all things, that can be said to be Iust, are so of their own proper and invariate Nature; and that Lawes do not make them to be just, but only declare and prescribe them to be so, in respect of their own Nature: but truly the matter is farre otherwise, the case in this point being as in most other things that are Usefull and Profitable, as in those which concern Health, & many others of the like nature; of which some may be beneficiall to one man, and hurtfull to another, and so being oftentimes misapplyed, they fail of the end proposed, as well in common, as in private.

VIII.

And, certainly, since every thing is every where, alwaies, and by all men, deprehended to be such, as really it is in its own Nature; because that Nature is invariate: we may justly demand of the Authors of that opinion, whether or no such things as are accounted just at some times, in some places, by some men, are so at all times, in all places, and to all men? Ought not such to have observed, that many of those things, that are constituted by Laws, [Page] and so accounted Lawfull and Just; are not so constituted, nor accounted among all Nations: but are partly negected as things Indifferent, by many; and partly rejected as Hurtfull, and condemned as absolutely Unjust, by as many others? And are there not some, who accept some things as Universally Profitable, which really are rather universally Destructive; and accordingly embrace and enact them to be Universally accommodate, in case they judge them to be Accommodate, and to promise some Generall Emolument to that particular Society, in which they live?

IX.

This duly considered, the most that can be said, in favour of that Opinion, it only this; that that is Universally Iust, which is Profitable, or conform to the Notion of Right or Iust, even now described: for, in speciall, indeed, as Utility is varied among various Nations, so also is Right or Iust; so as what may be accounted and really is Iust in respect of one Nation, may be Unjust in respect of another. And, therefore, if it be demanded, Whether or no the same thing be Right or Iust among all men? our answer must be, that as to the Generall, it is the same, as being somwhat that is profitable in mutuall Society; but as to particulars, it may come not to be the same among all men, particular Countries, and particular Causes in severall Nations considered.

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X.

And (that we may deduce a few observations from hence) whatever is by Experience found to be Profitable to mutuall Society, or the Common participation of such things, as are reputed Iust; that, certainly, hath truly and fully the nature of Iust, in case it be such, as that the Utility thereof may be extended to all: but, if any man shall determine and establish such a thing for Iust, and the same shall notwithstanding happen not to be Profitable to mutually Society; in that case, it doth not fulfill the nature of Just.

XI.

Again, and though the Utility of that, which was accounted Iust, and so embraced, doth sometimes fail; yet neverthelesse, if therebe some Utility therein somtimes, so that it respond to the Notion, which we have given of what is Iust; it is truly Iust, for that time: especially with those, who do not confound themselves with vain loquacity, and look into Human Affairs with the eye of more Generall observation.

XII.

Finally, where, no new Circumstance of Affairs intervening, those very things, that [Page] were accounted and decreed to be Iust, concerning the actions of men, are found by experience, not to be fully correspondent or congruous to the Notion of Iust: there are they in no sort just. But, where, upon the innovation or change of affairs, those things, which were formerly decreed to be just, have ceased to be Profitable: there also do they cease to be just; because, when they cease to be Profitable to mutuall Society, they at the same time cease to be congruous to the Notion of Iust.

CHAP. XXVII.
Of the Originall of Right and Iustice.

1

BUt, that we may go much higher, and derive Right or Iust from its first Fountain or Originall; it appears that Right and Iustice are as antient as Societies of men.

II.

For, in the Beginning or first age of the World, men lived wandering up and down, like wild Beasts, and suffered many incommodities both from the fury of Wild Beasts, and the inclemency of the Aër; till, Reason advising them theunto, they convened and conjoyned [Page] themselves in certain Companies or Societies, that so they might the better provide against those incommodities, by Building themselves Huts or Cottages, and furnishing themselves with other Defensatives against the fury of Wild beasts, and against the injuries of weather. But, in this state every one being desirous to have his particular condition better than another, and striving to make it so; there arose various Contentions and Clashings among them, about Food, Women, and other Commodities, which the stronger alwaies took from the weaker: untill at length they found, that they could not live secure and commodiously together; unlesse they made a Common Agreement, and entred into mutuall obligations not to do Harm or Injury each to other; and that in case any one did harme or injure another, the rest would punish him for it accordingly.

III.

And this was the first Tye, or Bond of Society; which, as it supposed, that every one might have somthing peculiar and Proper to himself, or that might be called his own, as being his either by primire usurpation, or by gift, or by purchase, or by invention, or by acquisition of his own industry, or otherwise: so did it provide, decree and enact, that the same should continue entirely his Own, till he should willingly and freely alienate his propriety therein, [Page] by disposing of it to another. And this Bond, or Generall Paction among them, was nothing else but a Common Law, which all were equally bound to observe, and which did confirm to every man a certain Right or Faculty of Using and Disposing of whatever was his own, according as himself thought meet. Whereupon that very Law also came to be (as we formerly intimated) as it were the Common Right of the Society.

IV.

We need not commemorate, how the whole Society, by Common Consent, transferred their Power of Coercing or Punishing Delinquents, upon some few Wise and Good men; or upon One single person, who had the reputation of being the Wisest and best among them all. That which will be more pertinent and useful for us to observe, is this; that in a Society those only were accounted Iust, or Favourers and Maintainers of Iustice, who being content with their own Rights, did not invade the Rights of any other man, and so did injury to none: and those Unjust, or Doers of Injustice, who being not content with heir own Rights, did fly out and invade those of others; and so doing them harm either by rapine, or personall violence, or some other way, were the Authors of an Injury.

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V.

And thus, truly, for some time, men lived Peaceably and Happily, and especially under either many Wise and Good Governours, or one only Wise and Good Prince or King; who being wholly intent upon the conservation of the publique Utility, made, and by the Consent of the People, established divers Laws, by which they might either prevent Dissentions among the People, or, compose them, if any did arise. But, (such was the Corruption of mens manners) in processe of time; it came to passe, that the Government delapsed into the hands of Princes, or Kings that were not Good, but Vicious and Tyrannicall: and they being either Deposed, or killed, the whole returned again upon the People, who instantly destroying each other, by reason of Tumults and the Factions of those who affected superiority and aspired to Empire; and being at length weary of living by force and hostility, and exhausted by Enmities and Dissentions, they became willing again to submit to the Government of Magistrates, Princes, or Kings. But, having by sad experience found, that the Wills and mandates of Princes had formerly passed for absolute Laws; the People enter into certain Compacts, or Covenants with their Governours, about those Lawes, according to which they desired [Page] to be Governed: and thus they again brought themselves under Laws, i. e. under strict Rights.

VI.

But, not to descend to Latter times; and that we may touch upon only that Chief Head, which regards the preservation of mans Life, (as the Dearest of things) whereof speciall Care was had from the beginning, that every mans security might be established by Common Pactions and Laws: it appears that those most Wise and Good Founders of Laws, fixing their eye of Providence upon the Society of life, and those things, which men usually do each to other; did not only declare that it was a wicked act and hainous Crime, to kill a man, but also decree that the Murderer should be punished with more than common Ignominy, and the losse of his Head. And to this they seem to have been induced, partly by considering the Conciliation of men among themselves (of which we hinted somwhat even now) in respect whereof men ought not to be as forward to destroy an Animal of the same species with themselves, as to destroy one of another species, over whose life they have a power granted them by Nature: and partly by the consideration of this, that men ought to abhor, that from which no emolument or advantage toward the quiet and happy spending of their daies can accrew, but on the contrary, must be wholly destructive thereunto.

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VII.

For, indeed, from the Beginning, to those, who fully understood and attended to the Utility of that Constitution; there was no need of any other Cause or Respect, to make them contain themselves from doing any act toward the Violation thereof: but, as for those, who could not sufficiently comprehend of what high moment or Concern that Cause, the common Utility, was; these absteined from committing mutuall slaughters, only upon the account of Fear of those sharp Punishments, which the Laws, in that case made, threaten to inflict upon those who break them. And this we may observe to be frequently Exemplified even in our own dayes. And, truly, who so well consider, how great the Utility of such a Constitution is; they are sufficiently instructed and comparated to the constant observance thereof, without any other sinister respect: but, such as are not capable of understanding that grand and fundamentall respect, the Utility of it, do conform themselves thereunto only out of Fear of those Punishments, that the Lawes threaten them, and which were, by the more prudent sort of men, invented and made against such, as had no regard to the Utility of the Constitution, the Major part of the multitude admitting them as Legitimate.

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VIII.

For, at first, no one of those Laws, which have been either in Writing, or by Tradition, derived to us, and are to descend down to our posterity, did subsist or depend upon any Force or Violence whatsoever; but (as we touch't before) upon the meer Consent of the People that used it. For, it was not by strength of Body, or imperious sway, but only Prudence of mind, whereby those transcended the Vulgar, who proposed those Laws to the suffrage of the People; and this by inducing some men to consider what would be profitable (especially, when they did not before so well understand it, as they ought) and by terrifying others meerly with the greatnesse of the punishments annexed. Nor could they, indeed, make use of any other remedy for the Cure of the peoples ignorance of the Utility of those Laws, than that of their own Fear of the Punishments prescribed by the Lawes: because even in our daies, it is Fear alone which contains Vulgar men within the bounds of their duty, and hinders them from committing any thing against either the publick or private Commodity.

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IX.

And, assuredly, if all men could equally both understand, and bear in mind, what is truly Profitable; they would need no Lawes at all, but would of their own accord beware of doing such things, as the Laws forbid, and do such as the Laws prescribe and injoin: since, only to know what is profitable, and what hurtfull, would be more than sufficient to induce them to avoid this, and pursue that. But, as for those, who do not discern what is Beneficiall, what Hurtfull; doubtlesse, the Commination of Punishments against them, is highly necessary: insomuch as the very Fear of the Punishment impendent doth cause them to suppresse and bridle those heats of their passions, which instigate them to unjust actions; and in a manner compell them, though against their Wills, to do what is right and consentaneous to Reason.

X.

Hereupon was it, that the Antient Law-makers ordained, that even the Involuntary and meerly Casuall slaughter of a man, should not be free from all Mulct, or punishment. Not that they might not, to such as affected Voluntary manslaughter, give any occasion of praetext or excuse for what they should do of set purpose in that kind: but that they might not seem not to have used sufficient Caution and [Page] Diligence, as to that Difficult particular. Nor could this course but prove Beneficiall, for the same Causes, for which men were expresly prohibited to kill each other. So that considering, that of those actions of this kind that are done involuntarily, some happen to Human Nature from Causes that could not be foreseen, nor any waies prevented; and others again happen meerly through our Negligence, want of circumspection, and incogitancy of the danger imminent: therefore, that they might, as much as possible, prevent our negligence and heedfulnesse, that may conduce to the destruction of our Neighbours; they provided, that even an involuntary slaughter of a man should not passe altogether unpunished, and by the very fear of that punishment or Mulct, making men more heedfull and circumspect, they most happily diminished the Frequency of this Crime of Homicide.

XI.

Nay, we farther conceive, that even those slaughters of men which were permitted by the Law, were made lyable to those accustomed Expiations by publique Lustrations, for no other cause but only this; that those, who first introduced the use of those solemn Expiations of Human blood, had it in their thoughts, to deterre men from involuntary slaughter, which was too too frequent.

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XII.

For the Vulgar sort of men stood in need of somthing to restrain even their Heedlessnesse, that so they might be kept from doing, out of rashnesse, any action, that should not conduce to the Publique Utility, or Security which the Antient Sages and first Law-makers well understanding, did not only decree severe Punishments, but strook also a certain grievous Fear into their Minds, the Reason of which was not equally manifest to common heads, with that of the punishments expressed: and this chiefly by declaring, that such, who had killed a man, by what means or Accident soever, should remain Impure and Polluted, till they had purged themselves of that blood by solemn Lustrations.

XIII.

For, the Brutall part of the Soul, or that wherein the Affections and Passions have their residence, being by wholsom Laws as it were new moulded & framed, came at length to that Mansuetude and Gentlenesse, which now adaies so much flourisheth in the World: those Arts of Taming and Civilizing mens minds, which were from the beginning invented and practised by those Sages, who first ruled the rash multitude, being applyed as Soveraign [Page] and effectuall Remedies against the violence of their Wild and furious Affections; of which this is one chief act among the rest, that men should not indiscriminately destroy each other.

CHAP. XXVIII.
Between whom Right and Instice is to be exercised.

1

THe premisses considered, it may with good reason be enquired of us, between whom aswell Right & the violation of it, which is Injury, as Iustice and what is opposed unto it, Injustice, doth properly consist, or is to be found? and therefore we are to state and explicate the matter, by a comparison betwixt Men and other Animals.

II.

As therefore,Omnia, quae in hoc capite tradita invenies, verbatim desumpta fuerunt, ex Porphyrii libro [ [...]] de Abstinentia primo. there is no Reason of Right or Injury, or Just and Unjust, betwixt Animals that could not make a common Agreement, not to hurt, nor be hurt by mutuall invasion: so neither is there between those Nations which either would not, or could not enter into a Common Pact and reciprocall Engagement, not to hurt each other, or to suffer hurt each from other.

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III.

For, Just or Right, the conservation whereof is Justice, hath no being at all, but in mutuall Society, and so Justice is a Good of a Society, insomuch as the effect of it is, that every single person of the Society may live in security, and voyd of that anxiety, which the continuall Feare of harm doth create. Whence it evidently followes that whatever Animals, or whatever men either cannot or wil not make an Association among themselves, upon the condition of mutuall safety, must want that Good, or be reciprocally obliged by no bond of Right or Justice, in oder to their living securely: and so to them there can remaine no other Reason of security, but only this, to doe harme to others, that they be not harmed themselves.

IV.

As, therefore, when one of those Bruit Animals, among which there hath past no such Agreement or Pact, doth hurt another; though it may be said that he doth harme or hurt to the other, yet it cannot be said, that he doth an Injury to the other, because he was not bound by any Right, Compact, or Law, not to hurt him: exactly so, if one man of that Nation, among which is no Paction or Society, doth hurt another man; though it may be said, that [Page] he doth hurt him, yet not that he is Injurious to him; or doth him an Injury, because he was not obliged by any Compact or Law, not to hurt him.

V.

We here speak of Bruit Animals, not as if there were any even of those, who live in Heards or Companies, that are capable of entring into Agreements or Pacts not to harme each other; and so might be conceived to be Just, if they do not hurt each other, and Unjust, if they do: but only to the end, that from thence it may be the better understood, that even among Men Justice of it self is nothing, insomuch as it is found only in the mutuall Societies, according to the amplitude of every Country, in which the Inhabitants may conveniently euter into Agreements and Covenants of doing nor receiving any hurt; since otherwise, and in a man considered as Solitary, or out of all Society, there can be no Justice at all; and what is Justice in one Society of men, may be, and frequently is, in respect of Contrary Pactions and Covenants, downright injustice in another.

VI.

But can Iustice intervene betwixt Men and any other Animals? Certainly, not. For, if men could make a Covenant with Bruit Animals, [Page] as they can with other men, that they should not Kill, nor be indiscreetly Killed by them; then, indeed, might the Reason of Just or Right be founded betwixt them and us, insomuch as the end of that covenant would be the Security of both Parties: but, because it is impossible, that Animals void of Reason should be obliged by a Law common betwixt them and us, who are endowed with Reason; it must also be impossible for us to obtein more assurance of Security from Animals, than from things Inanimat; so that there is no other way for us to secure our selves from Bruits, but only to execute that power of Destroying them, which Nature hath given us.

VII.

And here, perhaps you'l ask us, by the way; Why is it that we usually Kill even such Auimals, as are weak and innoxious, and so ought not to be feared? Whereto we answer, that most men destroy such Animals, out of Intemperance and a certain Savagenesse or Cruelty in their nature; as many do, out of Immanity or Cruelty, commit outrages also upon men living out of their Society, though there be no reason why they should fear any harm from them. But, still it is one thing, to offend against the rules of Temperance, or any of its subordinate Virtues, as Sobriety, Lenity or Mansuetude, or (if you please) meer Humanity, or Goodnesse of Nature: and another thing to violate Iustice, which presupposeth certain Laws and Pacts established by mutuall Consent and Obligation.

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VIII.

Nor can it be truly said (what some affirme) that we have a power granted to us by Law, to destroy any such Animals, as can be no way offensive or destructive to Man-kind: though, to speak freely, there is scarce any kind of Living Creatures, among all those, which we have a power granted us to destroy, but, being permitted to encrease to infinite multitudes, would prove permicious to Mankind; however, being preserved alive in Competent numbers, they are many waies very usefull to our lives.

IX.

This may be exemplified in sheep, Kine and Bulls, Horses, &c. which being kept alive in a Competent number, afford as many necessaries for life; but, if they were let alone to multiply to excessive numbers, certainly they could not but prove very hurtfull, if not altogether destructive to us; and this partly in respect of their strength, partly in respect of their Consuming or Devouring the fruits of the Earth, that should serve for our subsistence; And, for this very cause is it, that we are not prohibited to destroy such Animals: and reason adviseth us to preserve so many of them alive, as may be both usefull to us, and easily ruled by us,

X.

For, as to Lions, Bears, Wolves, and other [Page] Beasts called Wild (whether little or great) we cannot take such a certain number of them, as being preserved may afford us any necessary relief, or be of use to us in our lives; as we may of Kine, Sheep, Horses and the rest that are called Tame and Gentle Animals: and thence is it, that we endeavour wholly to exterminate and destroy those; & of these to cut off only so many, as are over & above a competent stock.

XI.

Hereupon (that we may highly touch upon that also) we may conceive, that even among those Nations, who make their choice of certain sorts of Animals for their food, the matter was determined and prescribed by certain Laws, grounded upon Reasons correspondent to those, we have now given: and as for those Animals, that were not to be eaten; there was respect had to their Utility, and Inutility in other other respects, and for some reason peculiar to each Country; to the Constitutions whereof there is no necessity for us to adhere who live not in any of those places.

XII.

Now from these Considerations we come to understand, that from the very Beginning a Difference was put betwixt the Killing of Men and the Killing of all other Animals. For, as to other Animals, it is manifest, that no one of those antient Sages, who have expresly prescribed what we should, and what we should not do, did forbid us to kill them: because that Utiity, [Page] which is perceived in respect of them, arose from a custom of acting, contrary to that, which we have mentioned concerning men; nor could it be, that men, living promiscuously among Beasts, could preserve themselves in safety otherwise than by expelling, or destroying them.

XIII.

But, as concerning Mankind; when among those, who lived in the daies of old, there were some more Comely and Gracefull than the rest (and likely enough it is, that such were the First Perswaders of men to enter into Pact, for the Common safety) who remembring how they had somtimes absteined from slaughter, in respect of that Utility, which concerned their safety; had also, when they were congregated into one Company, put others in mind of what had then hapned, when they lived promiscuously; that by absteining from the slaughter of an Animal of their own species, they might defend the Society of life, which is Generally the cause of his proper safety, to every single person; and that it had been formerly profitable to go apart from the Society of other Animals, or men flocking together, that so they might not provoke or incense them, that were ready enough of themselves to do harm: Hereupon, we say, men came to restrain themselves from laying hands upon an Animal of their own species, that came and offered himself into the Communion of things necessary to safety of life.

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XIV.

But, in processe of time, their Progenies multiplying on each part, and Animals of different species being depulsed and kept apart; men began to make use of their Reason (whereas before that time, they had trusted altogether to Memory) and to enter into Consultation, about what was to be done in order to their safety, when they should come together and conjoyn their habitations. For, they mainly endeavoured to coerce those, who rashly and impudently cut each others throats, and thereby made the mutuall assistance, that men were able to afford each other, dayly the weaker; and this, chiefly because those great incommodities, which had frequently fallen upon their Predecessors, in the like cases, were utterly forgotten. And earnestly striving to bring matters to that good passet, hey at length made and introduced those very Laws and Constitutions, which continue in all Cities and Nations even to this very day: the multitude of their own accord consenting to them; forasmuch as the Major part were already very sensible, how much greater Utility would from thence accrew unto them living in mutuall Society. In like manner, it conduceth also to Common security, as to destroy whatever is pernicious: so also to preserve whatever is useful to the extermination of what is pernicious.

XV.

And thus is it profitable; that upon these conconsiderations, [Page] the slaughter of all other Animals came to be permitted, and that of Men, expresly prohibited, by the Law: but we have stay'd too long upon this argument.

CHAP. XXIX.
With what right Iustice is to be exercised.

1

IT being Certain, then, that Justice is founded upon the mutuall agreement, and Common Paction of men living in Society; it remains that every man, whether Native, or Stranger admitted, ought, from the time he hath given up his name to a Society, to account himself to be a Member of that Society, upon this Condition, either expressly, or tacitly, that he hurt none of his Fellow Members, nor be hurt by any other. Wherefore, let him either stand to this Condition of the Common Paction; or depart out of the Society: because he is not to be tollerated to live in the Society, upon any other Condition, but the very same, upon which he was incorporated into it. Whereupon it necessarily follows, that since, by Nature, no man is willing either to receive harm from, or to do ham to another: therefore ought no man to do that to another, which he would not another should do to him.

II.

This considered, it may well be thought, that [Page] the Laws of all Societies were made principally, if not solely for the sake of Wise men; though not that Wise men should not do unjustly by others: but that others should not do unjustly by them; who are so well prepared and disposed of themselves, as to need no Laws to restrain them from doing harm to any man. For, they have prescribed bounds to their Cupidities, and composed their desires to the simple rules of Nature, which requires nothing that cannot be obteined but by waies of injustice: nor indeed, is there any of Natures Pleasures, that doth induce a man to do injury to another; but that which doth induce him thereunto, must be some such exorbitant Cupidity, as is created by vain and unbridled Opinion.

III.

For, Nature having (for example) in abundance produced Herbs, Corn, Fruits, for food competent and usefull, and Water for Drink pleasant and wholsom; it cannot be the pleasure of satisfying pure Hunger and Thirst, that should cause a man to robb, spoil, defraud or murder his neighbour, or do any of those Injuries to others, which men usually do: but it must be the vain desire of living more opulently, splendidly and wantonly, that so he may acquire wealth enough to discharge the expences of his Luxury. The same may be said also of those, who not being content with simple [Page] Cloaths, simple Houses, simple Wives, &c. and carried away by Ambition, Pride, Lust and the like enormous passions, desire imfinitely more than what sober and temperate Nature either wants or knows how to use.

IV.

Furthermore, seeing that the Wise man doth all things for his own sake, or with reflection upon himself; nothing, certainly can more conduce to his own advantage, than strictly to celebrate and constantly uphold Justice. For, in giving to every one his Due, and harming no man; he, to the most of his power, doth keep the Society whole and sound, and consequently preserve himself in peace and safety: forasmuch as he cannot be safe, when the peace of the Society is disturbed and endangered, nor doth he provoke any man to avenge an injury suffered at his hands, or fear any Mulct or punishment to be inflicted upon him by publick decree; and so, being Conscious to himselfe of no Evill by him done, he remains free from all Perturbations; from which to be free, is the Chiefest of all the fruits of Justice, and while he reaps that, what can he do, that should more conduce to his own advantage.

V.

Nor is there why you should conceive, that He, who violates the Right of another, though secretly and without the Knowledge of any man, can live in the same security and freedom from Perturbation, as the Just man doth, because as we said afore) he cannot assure himself, that his Injustice [Page] shall never be brought to light; for, Crimes, though they may be secret, yet can they never be secure; nor do [...]h it avail an Offendor, to be concealed from others, while he can never be concealed from himself.

VI.

And, truly, though his offence be never so much concealed in the present; yet is it very uncertain, whether or no it will remain so concealed till his death. For, first, there is a Kind of Jealousie and Suspition that alwaies follows close at the heels of Improbity: and again, there have been many, who have detected themselves, some in dreams, others in fits of Deliriums in Fevers, others in their Wine, others out of forgetfulnesse for the time. So that a Wicked man, though he may for a time deceive even the Gods and men (as they say) yet ought he not to be confident, that his Deceits shall alwaies continue undiscovered.

VII.

Upon these grounds, it is manifest, that notwithstanding Injustice be not Evill absolutely, or in it self, because, what is reputed Injust in one place, may be very Just, & Legal in another: yet nevertheless it is alwaies an vil in respect of that fear which arising from, & fomented by the horror and stings of an evill Conscience, createth a continuall suspect in him, that some time or other his unjust deeds may come to rhe ears of the Avengers of Unjustice, and so he be called to a severe account for them. And so there is nothing that more conduceth, as to Security, so likewise to a quiet and pleasant life, than to live Innocently, i. e. upon no occasion to Violate [Page] the Common Covenant of Peace.

VIII.

Wherefore, since the Just and Unjust have this Contrariety between them; that the Just of all men are most free from Perturbations, and the Unjust, of all men, most obnoxious to Perturbations: what can be more profitable than Iustice to those; what more hurtful than Injustice to these? For, can Anguish of mind, Sollicitudes, and continuall Fears be profitable to any man?

IX.

Iustice, therefore, being so great a Good, and Injustice so great an Evill; let us alwaies embrace the one,In scriptis Epicureis praecipitur, ut in mente ac memoria semper habeamus Antiquorum aliquem eorum, qui Virtutem coluerint. and abhor the other. And if at any time our mind seem to stagger, and incline toward Injustice; let us think upon some Grave, Wise and Good man, and supposing him to be alwaies present with us, and overlooking all our actions: that so we may do nothing, which we would not do,Marc. Antonin lib. de Seipso. 12. Sect. 26. if he were really present.

X.

Hereby we shall not only avoid the doing of any thing openly against Iustice, but also of offending in secret against the rules and principles of Honesty. For, this Wise and Good man will be to us instead of a Guardian or Tutor, whom because we revere, we shall be afraid to offend. Following this Counsell therefore, thus argue [Page] with your self; if this Reverend Person were present,Consonum plane monito illi Pythagorico, in aureis carmi: I would not do this: why therefore shall I do it in his absence? He doubtlesse, would check me for doing this, because it is Unjust: why therefore shall I not check my self, [...]. and not do it? And if you do all things so, as if some Reverend Person saw all you did;Tu plus quam cunctos alios te disce reveri. you shall soon learn to do nothing amiss: for, if you so fear another man, you wil quickly come to fear your self.

CHAP. XXX.
Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Observance.

1

HAving done with the consideratiō of Iustice, we come to those Virtues that are Cousin-Germans thereunto, as we formerly intimated; in that each of them also doth concern others directly, and our selves but by reflection: and though they be not, as Iustice is, prescribed by Laws and Covenants; yet do they import a certain obligation like that of Iustice, and that from Decorum, Office and Use.

II.

Of these, the first is Beneficence, or the doing of Good turns to others; to which all are obliged, who are able either by their assistance, or purse, to help, such as stand in need of their help. Forasmuch as if they refuse to afford [Page] the needy their assistance,Diis acceptum tulit optimus & Imperatorum & Hominum ille vir, Marcus Antoninus; quod, quotiescun (que) illi animus fuit pauperi alicui, aut aliàs indigo, opem ferre, numquā responderit, non suppetere illi nummos, unde id fieret; quod (que) nulla illi unquam talis necessitas obtigerit, ut ab alio sumere cogereti 1. in de seipso lib. 1. sub calcem. then do they inevitably incur the censure of being Barbarous, Cruell, Inhuman: and if to relieve their wants with their purse, then cannot they escape the opprobrious terms of Sordid, Tenacious, Avaricious persons. Whereas, on the contrary, if they assist them in one kind; then shall they be reputed Benigne, Officious, Good natur'd: and if they relieve them in the other, presently they are cryed up for Liberall, Munificent, Magnificent, and Noble-minded persons. So that hence it appears, that all men, who are able, in respect either of Power or Estate, to assist and relieve others of the Society; are obliged thereunto, (provided it extend not to Prodigence, or the impairing of their own Fortunes) upon the Consideration of their own Good or Utility.

III.

For, those, who practise this Virtue of Beneficence, thereby certainly procure to themselves Respect, Good-will, and (what very much conduceth to their quiet living) a Dearnesse or tender Estimation from those, upon whom they practise it: as, on the other side, who neglect the exercise of it, gain to themselves the Disrespect, Ill-will, and (what very much conduceth to their troublesom living) the odium and Contempt of others. Take speciall heed, therefore, that you do not omit to be Beneficent at least in small matters; that so you may not lose the advantage of being accounted ready to gratifie others even in Great:

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IV.

It was not without good Consideration wee formerly said, [...]. Pluttarch. 2. advers Coloten. Conforme plane est sacrae illi Sententiae: [...], beatum magis est Dare, quàm Accipere. Act. 20. that it was not only more Honourable, but also more Delightfull, to Give, than to receive a benefit: because, the Giver thereby makes himself Superior to the Receiver, and reaps moreover the interest of Thanks; and nothing adferrs more joy to a man, than to be heartily thanked for a favour. For, a Beneficent person is like a Fountain; to which if you but grant a Reasonable Soul, or Mind: what joy will it not be possessed of, when it shall see how many spacious Corn-fields and Pastures do flourish and even smile again with plenty and verdure, and all by the Diffusion of its streams upon them?

V.

The second is Gratitude, to which every man is reciprocally obliged, who receives a benefit: at least, unlesse he hath a mind to expose himself to common Hatred and the greatest of shames. For ingratitude is worthily hatefull in the eyes of all men; because seeing nothing can be more according to Nature, than to be propense to receive a Good; it must be highly Contrary to Nature not to be propense to return the tribute of Thankfulnesse to the Author of that Good.

VI.

But, seeing that no man stands more gratefully affected toward his Benefactors,Solum Sapientem scire Gratiam, qualem oportet, referre, affirmat Seneca, Epist. 81 than the Wise man; it may be lawfull for us to assert, that it is the Wise man only, who knows how to fulfill, and doth fulfill the duty of Gratitude: because [Page] he alone stands ready, upon all occasions, to expresse his thankfulnesse to his Friends both present and absent; yea, though they are extinct.

VII.

Others, indeed, many times pay the debt of thanks to their present friends, & this perhaps for their own farther ends, & to encite & encourage them to some new favour: but, how few are there, who gratefully commemorate the beneficence and liberality of their absent Benefactors? Where shall we finde him, that honours the memory of his deceased Patron? that doth not in his heart rejoyce, that his Benefactor is dead; as if death had cut off all the bonds of his Gratitude, and cancelled all the obligations of his Good turns? that studies all waies of Retribution Kindnesse, Respect, and Assistance to the Wife, Children, Friends, Family, and Kindred of his Dead Reliever?

VIII.

The third is Piety, the most sacred species of Gratitude. This Vertue we are to exercise primarily toward our Parents, to whom we are more obliged, than to all the World beside: for, we may owe our education, fortune, erudition, &c. to others; but to our Parents we owe even our selves: and therefore if ingratitude to others be hatefull, that which is shewn to our Parents must certainly be most hatefull and detestable.

IX.

We say, Primarily to our Parents; because Piety [Page] is secondarily, and as it were upon consequence, extended to our Kindred, and chiefly to our Brothers and Sisters, to whom we are obliged by the bond of Consanguinity, and the intervening interest of our Parents: so that we cannot shew our selves disrespectfull and unkinde to any of our blood, but we must be, at the same time, highly ungratefull to our Parents, Grand-Parents, and all the line of our Progenitors; who in the circle of their love and benevolence, comprehended all that were, and should be derived from their loynes.

X.

Nor is this Piety distinguishable from that Charity or Dearnesse, we are to conceive, and constantly bear toward our Native Country, which comprehends our Parents and all our Kindred, and doth both receive us when we are born, and nourish and protect us afterward. Wherefore, as we are, by the relation of our blood, obliged to bear Respect and Kindnesse toward those of our Kindred; so are we by the more Generall interest of our Country, obliged to respect and tender the good of all those of our Society; but more especially the Magistrates and Princes, or Monarch thereof, who by defending our Country, and the Lawes of it in Generall, conferre this benefit upon us in particular; that under the protection of their Care and Power, our Rights are so preserved, as that we may live securely and peaceably.

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XI.

The fourth is Observance, or that Veneration we owe to all persons of Eminency, in any kind. And this affection af Awe and Reverence is accompanied partly with Gratitude and Piety; insomuch as we cannot any way better expresse the Gratefulnesse of our minds, than by giving due Veneration and Worship to our Benefactors, Parents, Governors, Princes, and all men of Dignity and Power: and partly with Honour and Respect; insomuch as it is the best testimony we can give of our internall sentiments of their deservings, who excell in Age, Wisdome, Learning, and especially Virtue; which is the most Honourable of all Human Excellencies.

XII.

To this Observance belongs also that, which men call Religion and Sanctity toward the Gods, whom we ate bound to Revere and Honour no otherwise than we are our Parents; yet, not in respect to any Good either received, or expected at their hands; but (as we formerly intimated) only in respect of the transcendent Excellency, Majesty, and Supremacy of their Nature. Because, whatever is Excellent deserves a just Veneration; and no Excellence can equall that of the Divine Nature, it being Immortall and and most Blisfull. And thus, understanding that theDum plus aequo Pius in Deum esse vult, Impius & Blasphemus deprehenditur. Gods do neither create troubles to themselves, nor give any occasion of troubles to us; we shall come to be truly Religious, i. e. piously [Page] and holily to Revere and admire their most Excellent Nature, without all Hope or Reward.

CHAP. XXXI.
Of Friendship.

1

TO the exercise of this Virtue (the last of all those, that retain to Iustice) all are obliged, who Love, and are beloved again by the same persons. And well may we make it the Crown of this our Discourse upon the Virtues, or means to make life happy; when nothing that lies in the power of Wisdom to obtein, doth afford more Comfort, more Delight, than true Friendship: and the same Reason that confirms the mind not to fear any lasting or eternall Evill; doth also assure, that during life there is no Sanctuary so safe, no protection so secure, as that of true Friendship, which together with that Security, doth adferr also very great pleasures.

II.

For, as Enmity, Hate, Envy, Despite, are adverse to, and inconsistent with Pleasures; so are Friendships, and Amities not only the most faithfull Conservers, but also the most effectuall and certain Causers of Pleasures, and that as wel to ones Friend, as to one self: in that thereby men do not only enjoy the Good things of the present more fully; but are erected and animated with hope of such as as are to succeed in the future. And, since Solitude and want of Friends [Page] exposeth a man to dangers and fears; certainly it must be very highly rationall in us, to procure Friendships, whereby the mind may be confirmed in the present, and possessed with lively hopes of enjoing very great Pleasures in the future.

III.

But, in the choice of our Friends, we are to be exceeding cautious and prudent: for, it concerns us to bee more circumspect with whom wee eate; than about what wee eate: To eat ones meat alone, and spend ones daies in Solitude; indeed, is to live the life of a Lion or a Woolf: and yet no Friend is better than such a one, that is not as well pleasant, as faithfull, so that his Conversation may be the best sawce to our meat. Such a Friend, therefore, is to be sought for, to whom nothing is more in esteem, than Candor, Simplicity and Verity; and who is not morose, querulous and murmuring at all things, but full of Complacency, Alacrity, and pleasant hopes, that so his conversation may not sowre; but sweeten the occurrences of life.

IV.

Friendship, we acknowledge, doth consist in, and is kept alive by the mutuall participation of Pleasures, or Goods; and yet we cannot admit it to be therefore necessary, that betwixt friends there should be a Community of the Goods of Fortune: as that Philosopher conceived, who was the Author of that saying, that among Friends all things are Common. And our Reason is, [Page] that Community of Estates implies mutuall diffidence or distruct of each others Constancy, in case of Adversity or Poverty on one part: and Distrust is wholly inconsistent with Friendship. Then only are friends, who can with full Confidence and freedom take and make use of so much of their friends Goods or Estate, as the necessity of their present condition doth require; and this no otherwise, than as if it were absolutely their own, though each partly still reserves a propriety in the full of his own Estate.

V.

This, we are assured, will sound strange in the ears of the Vulgar; but, what are the Common People to us, seeing that no Faith or Constancy is to be found in their Kindness and Friendship? For, being wholly uncapable of any part of wisdom, that might render their Conversation commendable and gratefull; and as uncapable of either understanding what is privately, what publickly profitable, or what's the difference betwixt Good Manners and Bad: it is impossible they should have any Sentiments of the Goods of Amity and Friendship; and consequently that they should in any measure fulfill the duties thereof.

VI.

We speak, therefore, of Wise men only, among whom there is as it were a firm Covenant and League, not to love their Friends lesse than themselves. Reason dictating, that it may, and should be so; and Experience assuring that it [Page] frequently hath been so. So that it is most evident, as well that such a perfect Conjunction (you may call it Union) may be made betwixt Wise men; as that nothing doth more conduce to the Quiet and Pleasure of life; than such a Conjunction once made and conserved.

VII.

For, as it is impossible for us, to conserve the sweetnesse and security of our lives firm and lasting, without the influence of Friendship: so is it equally impossible to conserve Friendship firm and lasting, without that Cement of Loving our Friends, at the same rate, as we do our selves. This, therefore, and Pleasure are the inseparable Adjuncts of Friendship: and who so doth not hold so full a sympathy with his Friend, as to rejoyce at his joy, and condole with him in his sorrow; doth but pretend to the noble title of a Friend.

VIII.

Considering this, the Wise man will be sure, to stand equally affected toward himself, and his Friend; what labours and pains he undergoes for his own Security and Pleasures, the same will he undergo for the Security and Pleasures of hls Friend: and as he rejoyceth to think, that he hath one, with whom he may sit, and to whom he may administer in his sicknesse, whom he may visit and assist in case of imprisonment, and whom he may relieve in case of want; so will it rejoyce him to be confident that he hath one, who will stick close to him, in sicknesse, imprisonment; [Page] want and all other Calamities. And not only this; but his love will be so great to him, as to oblige him to suffer the greatest of torments, nay, if occasion be, even Death it self for his Friends sake.

IX

We have known, Certainly (and from our Fathers, in whose memories it was fresh) that many of those Wise and Good men, who had the happinesse of procuring to themselves full Confidence and Security in the Society of men, living in one and the same opinon, and the selfsame affections with themselves; have lived in a most pleasant and mutually comfortable League of Friendship, and been conjoyned with so absolute a Neernesse each to other, as that they could heartily, and without the least of reluctancy, wish to suffer death in the place of their friend destined to die.

CONCLVSION.

AND this is the sum of all we had to say, concerning ETHICKS or MORALS, which from the very beginning we asserted to be the Noblest and most Usefull part of Philosophy. We now, therefore, Conclude with this Admonition to you, whoever you are that aspire to true Wisdom (for, our Designe herein was to do a piece of acceptable service to all such) that you both meditate upon, and earnestly endeavour to put in practise each one of those many Rules and Axioms of Prudence, that we have [Page] here laid down: assuring your self, that they are the very Elements or Fundamentals of the art of Living Honestly or Virtuously, and (upon consequence) peaceably and Happily.

We say, to Meditate upon them night and day; and as well when you are alone, as when you are in company of some faithfull Friend, such to whom you may safely and comfortably say: We are (indeed) Alone: but so much the better, insomuch as we have the greater opportunity of discoursing things sincerely, and making the stricter inquisition for Truth: I speak not to many, but to you alone; and and you speak not to many but to me alone, and that's enough, since we are an ample Theatre each to other.

By this time, we presume, you are fully convinced, that he is the only Brave and Happy man, who hath his mind possessed with true and correspondent Conceptions of the Nature of the Gods: who is at all times prepared to bid death welcom, without the least of Fear: who hath so reasoned concerning the end of Nature, or the highest of Goods, as fully to understand, that it may be attained with the greatest facility imaginable: who stands confirmed, that whatever of Evill is to be endured by him, must, if Vehement, be short in duration; if not Vehement, easie in tolleration: who doth not emasculate and soften himself with the Childish apprehension of any such thing as inevitable Necessity, or the vulgar belief of Fate; but well understands, that he hath an absolute Freedom of Will, in all his actions, and is not subject to the Controll of any [Page] influence, besides that of his own Reason; and knows also that nothing at all, or (at most) very little of Fortune can at any time intervene to crosse his designes, defeat his hopes, interrupt his Felicity: and, finally, who hath composed all his Desires to the sober modell of Nature, and the Rules of Wisdom, by us prescribed in this small Treatise.

And,Sapiens uno minor est love. Horat. lib. 1. Epist. 1. Sapiens ille, plenus gaudio, hilaris, & placidus, inconcussus, cum Diis ex pari vivit. Ac rursus: Hoc est summum bonum, quod si accupas incipis Deorum socius esse, non suppiex. Seneca. Epist. 21. assuredly, when you shall come to be such a Man as this; you shall never know a Perturbation, day nor night, waking nor sleeping (for, a well composed Mind keeps the same constant tenour of Serenity as well in sleep, as waking: and unquiet Dreams are but the effects of Sollicitude and unquiet thoughts in the day) and shall live like some Diety among men. For, that man hath sublimed himself to a whole Sphear above the common condition of Mortality, Cum Diis vivendum. Hoc autem faciet, qui animum exhibuerit ita jugitèr affectum, ut rebus sibi destinatis acquiescat; faciatq (que) quaecun (que) Genius ille voluerit; quem sui particulam à seavulsam Jupiter cuique attribuet, praesidem ducemque eidem futurum. Hic autem cujusque mens est & ratio. Marc. An [...]onin. de seipso lib. 5. Sect. 27. who spends his daies in the possession of Immortall Goods.

FINIS.

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Epicurus's morals collected partly out of his owne Greek text, in Diogenes Laertius, and partly out of the rhapsodies of Marcus Antoninus, Plutarch, Cicero, & Seneca ; and faithfully Englished.Selections. English

Epicurus.

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1656

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A38506

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— Epicurus's morals collected partly out of his owne Greek text, in Diogenes Laertius, and partly out of the rhapsodies of Marcus Antoninus, Plutarch, Cicero, & Seneca ; and faithfully Englished., Selections. English, Epicurus., Charleton, Walter, 1619-1707..

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[43], 184 p. : port.

Printed by W. Wilson for Henry Herringman, and are to be sold at his shop ...,. London :: 1656.. ("An apology for Epicurus" (p. [4]-[40]) is written by Walter Charleton who was also the translator.) (Reproduction of original in Huntington Library.)

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