DE CAƲSA DEI: OR, A VINDICATION Of the Common Doctrine of Protestant DIVINES, Concerning Predetermination: (i. e. The Interest of God as the first Cause, in all the Actions, as such, of all Ra­tional Creatures:)

From the invidious Consequences with which it is burdened by Mr. JOHN HOWE, In a late Letter and Postscript, of GOD'S PRESCIENCE.

By T. D.

LONDON, Printed for R. Roberts, and are to be sold by Walter Davis at his House in Amen-Corner, 1678.

To the Reverend Mr. JOHN HOWE, Author of the late Letter and Post­script of God's Prescience.

SIR,

WHen I had read the Title-page of your late Letter to the Honoura­ble Mr. Boyle, and thereby un­derstood its design, and withal ob­served the smallness of the Bulk, I promised my self that it would be Pagella, hoc solo nomine redarguenda, quod sit tota Gemmea. For else I thought it would not be worthy of so great a Moecenas, a Master of all sort of Learning; and [so] whose nobility is not on­ly in Parchment, (as Charron speaks): nor of the Author, (for I was aware of him, though he had concealed his name) whose parts I well knew (and have always had the candor upon all fit occasions to acknowledge) were not of the lower size: nor yet of so excellent a sub­ject, and so needful in these dregs of time, which verge so much toward Socinianism. And in the perusal of the Letter it self, for some time I pleased my self with an apprehension that I had not imposed upon my self; nor had my affection to the Author seduced my judg­ment. Fancy and Reason were in so happy a [Page]conjunction, that I hoped they would never be parted thoroughout the whole Discourse. But alas! too soon I found my hopes shamefully baf­fled. For (beside a corrupt gloss upon Act. 4.28. pag. 28. which I could not digest, and di­vers passages in the process of your after-Dis­course not unexceptionable) from pag. 32, to 50, to speak my sense freely, I found pro thesauro carbones, i.e. Coals instead of Trea­sure, shining indeed, but black and smutty; politeness of stile, I mean, continued, but the series of well-digested thoughts broken and dis­severed; jejune Answers to Arguments full of sense; old Popish Arguments dressed up A-la-mode, and many of which militate as much against your assertions as ours; and a great deal of good eloquence put to a very ill use, and a far worse than it would be to play at Duck and Drake with broad pieces in the Thames; and sometimes degenerate eloquence, which (like painted glass) though it was an or­nament, yet impeded the transmission of the light: and (which is worst of all) the whole design of those Pages I found to be an averment of the old Popish Calumny, that by the Prote­stant Doctrine God is made the Author of sin; which I must needs profess was a strange sur­prisal to me; and so much the more, because I could not conceive what should induce you a [...] Protestant Divine, to make affidavit of a Pon­tificial accusation, nor why in this Discourse. For if the end you assigned your self in doing [Page]it was the vindication of the blessed God from the imputation of being the cause of moral evil, you have certainly lurcht the Reader of his expectation, by offering nothing toward it but what he can easily see through, (viz.) that God is not the cause [universally] of natural good; or at least as remote as the Grand-fa­ther is of the Grand-child. [See your own words, Let. p. 36.] Two causes which might seem probable of your doing it in this Discourse, your self has removed out of your Readers way. It was not the request of the Honourable Per­son to whom your Letter is directed, but (for ought I can collect) as the defending God's Predeterminative concourse unto sinful acti­ons was an unenjoined task, Let. p. 150. So was the overthrowing it too. Nor was it the connexion between Prescience and Predetermi­nation (as it lies in the Divine Decree, and is the only true ground of the certainty of Divine Prescience) for that was not your design to demonstrate Gods Prescience of all whatso­ever futurities, and consequently of the sins of men; but supposing it to shew its recon­cileableness with what it seemed not so well to agree, (as you since tell us) Postsc. p. 4. which I did easily apprehend before. For all the mediums you use for the eviction of this recon­cileableness, borrow no strength from the deni­al of Predetermination. Sometime after your Letter succeeded a Postscript, in the view of which I was more astonished than before: ob­stupui [Page]steteruntque comae. For whereas I might have hoped that your second thoughts would be better, they proved a great deal worse. I had such an opinion of your modesty, that at least you would recall the hard words you gave the Arguments urged for Predetermi­nation to sinful actions, Thin Sophistry, Collusive ambiguity, Let. p. 41. Vain at­tempts, 38. Dismal conclusions, 36. the ef­fects of a Sophistical wit against sense, and more against the sense of our souls, and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all Morality and Religion at once, p. 39, 40. and overturning and mingling heaven and earth, p. 50. And that reflexi­on you make upon those who have used the distinction of voluntas signi & Be­neplaciti, that they have only rather concealed a good meaning, than expres­ed by it a bad one, p. 106. For take all together, and I see not that they amount to a less guilt, than of [...]rampling upon that venerable dust, which was sometimes anima­ted by truly Heroick Souls, and bore the names of Zuinglius, Calvin, B [...]za, Perkins, Pemble, Davenant, Twisse, Ames, &c. than which no cause hath had, nor needs greater Patrons. But instead of recalling, you have avowed them, by the addition of others of the same sort, a contagion, a deadly thing, Postsc. p. 15. An ill coloured opinion, Postsc. p. 51. Fearful consequences of that rejected [Page]opinion; vanity of the subterfuges where­by its assertors think to hide the malig­nity of it, p. 50. Nor was this enough, but as if you were Animal gloriae, (as was said of the Philosophers) an animal that lived by the air of vain glory and applause, and thought your self another Goliah, you cry out, I de­fie the armies of Israel this day; give me a man that we may fight together. What other interpretation are these words capable of? Now I perceive that some persons, who had formerly entertained that strange opinion of Gods Predeterminative concur­rence to the wickedest actions, and not purged their minds of it, have been offen­ded with that Letter, for not expressing more respect unto it; and yet offered nothing themselves (which to me seems ex­ceeding strange) for the solving of that great difficulty and incumbrance, which it infers upon our Religion, Postsc. p. 7. Or these, If I find my self obliged any way further to intermeddle in this matter, I reckon the time I have to spend in this world can never be spent to better pur­pose, than in discovering, &c. the inefficacy of the Arguments brought for it, p. 50. but most immodest is your threatning those that assert the contradictory to your Pro­position, with your preparations for the defence of it, and plain intimation of the value you put upon them, as sufficient to si­lence [Page]all opposers, p. 51, 52. And for ought I can judg to the contrary, if contempt of your Antagonists will dash them out of coun­tenance, and so silence them, you are likely enough to obtain the victory you assure your self beforehand. An instance whereof you have given us in your ill treatment of Mr. Gale, a most pious, modest, and learned man, and our common friend, and one who like a friend touched your sore so gently, that one would have thought you should hardly have cried Oh! much less have cried out of Vin­dictive Hostility, p. 16. and that he was the man that might be instanced in, that had ma­naged a publick contest with that candour and fairness, as not at all to intrench up­on friendship, which you did well know was possible to be done, (as you express your self, ibid.) And yet how many holes do you pick in his coat? one while you in­sinuate that he is of those mens humours who take an unaccountable pleasure, in de­praving what is done by others, p. 12. where­as I who have known him about 25 years, and was of the same Academical Soci­ety with you both, have never observed any such misbehaviour of his. An­other while, that he had a concealed end of his own glory, viz. [in attacking you], (as if the good man had coveted that inscription upon his Tombstone,—Magnis tamen excidit ausis). And again, assert [Page]that he had a mighty strong and irresisti­ble inclination to squabble a little with your Letter, p. 13. And that this inclinati­on cannot but owe it self to some peculi­ar aspect and reference he had to the Au­thor, p. 14. (whereas I dare be his vouch­er, that all the harm he wishes you is but an increase of humility). And this guilt you make account is fastened upon him, be­cause he hath not attempted sundry others of former and latter days, which have said much to the purpose which your Letter does but touch on the by, p. 13. which is a strange accusation, and will appear such to those who shall upon perusal find, that he hath run the hazard of his safety in medling with those Giants you point at, Postsc. p. 14. But if he had not, I think he might apologize for himself, that your tract being concise, and adorned with good language, might invite more buyers and readers. Ratsbane capt in fine sugar, may well be judged likely to entice some liquorish appetite to taste of it, to their own hurt. But the greatest provocation not to let you [whoever be let] pass, is that intolera­ble reflection upon the Asserters of Predeter­mination; upon their Arguments, and the na­tural consequences of them, all at once in these words. But the effects of a Sophisti­cal wit against sense, and more against the sense of our souls, and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all Morality [Page]and Religion at once, are but like the attempt to batter a wall of brass with straws and feathers, Let. p. 39, 40. This passage alone were enough to raise indignati­on, sufficient to make a disputant (at least if that passion be as effectual to that purpose as the old shred,—facit indignatio ver­sum, intimates it is to make a Poet). And this was it that made me inquisitive after an answer to your Letter, and Postscript, as to which, when after many rumours of Answers preparing, I found my hopes frustrated, I resolved (though almost too late) to attempt one my self, for my resolution was his in Terence, a quoquam alio quam a me, a me autem potius quam a nemine; that I had rather your answer should come from any one than me, but from me rather than no body. I met with many discouragements in the last clause of my resolution, in general from a consciousness of my own disabilities, and par­ticularly from the hard measure your other Antagonist Mr. Gale hath met with, as in the instances above-mentioned, so in some other. The one, your carping at words, that you make so severe Ani [...]nadversion upon him for an innocent Pleonasm, The Divine In­dependent will of God, which meant you no harm, nor was more guilty of any de­sign to rob your Essay of any part of its eloquence, than that was to pilfer from him any part of his collections, Postsc. p. 13. [Page]And I was not without some apprehensions that I might fall under your lash my self, who am not curious in the choice of words, or composure of periods. But against this fear I was somewhat relieved, as against the sorrow I had conceived for Mr. Gales affront, (as if it had fell out for that end, and al­so to justifie the old saw, aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus) by an happy accident that I have taken you tardy twice in that kind your self: For what else but a Pleonasm is that Phrase, The rectitude of Gods holy nature, Let. p. 42. and the rectitude of Gods own most holy will and way, p 59. in the excess of your caution, lest any should think the holy nature, the most holy will and way of God were void of rectitude, Postsc. p. 22. And elsewhere actions malignantly wicked, p. 32. i. e. wickedly wicked. But these are childish criminations, unfit to be bandied from hand to hand by sober persons. The other discouragement was the difficult in­vestigation of your sense, which I take to be a far harder task than to confute it; of which, that I may not be thought to complain without cause, I have collected some instances of repugnant and self-contradicting Proposi­tions, in your Discourses.

1. Mediate con­currence.
  • 1. It sufficiently salves the rights of the first cause, to as­sert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it, which in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent creatures may use or not use as they please, Let. p. 36.
  • 2. All actions good to Mr. Gales Quest. Is there any action so sinful that hath not some natural good as the substrate matter thereof? you Answ. True, Postsc. p. 36.
  • 3. Predetermina­tion denied as to some actions, (viz.) evil.

    This is the design of all your Letter, from p. 32. to 50. and of the Postscript.

2. Immediate con­currence.
  • 1. I do really be­lieve Gods immedi­ate concourse to all the actions of his creatures, Post. p. 28.
  • 2. Some actions in themselves evil.

    Some actions of the creatures are in themselves most ma­lignantly wicked, Le. p. 32. and intrinse­cally evil, p. 46.

  • 3. Predetermina­tion to all actions granted.

    The active provi­dence of God about all the actions of men consists not meerly in giving them natural powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real influence upon those powers, Postsc. p. 39. n. 5.

By which last clause, a real influence up­on those powers, if you mean (as I cannot [Page]divine what else you can) a reducing those powers into act, (as your phrase is, Ib. n. 6.) you come over to our Camp, and we will give good entertainment to so serviceable a De­serter.

  • 4. Predeterminati­on forces the will.

    Nothing is more apparently a simple and most strictly na­tural impossibility than not to do an action whereto the Agent is determined by an infinite power, Let. p. 33.

  • 4. Predetermina­tion forces not the Will.

    It is unreasonable to imagine that God cannot in any case de­termine the will of a rational creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, Let. p. 141.

    Men are inabled by an internal infusi­on of power and vi­tal influence to do much good, to which they are not impelled by it, p. 145.

non est ingenii mei hosce nodos dissolvere, i.e. I have not wit enough to untie these knots. The consideration of these repugnan­cies, fills me with wonder at your exclama­tion against Mr. Gale, for finding no fault with your Pamphlet but what he makes, Postsc. p. 11. and particularly for suggesting [Page]that your opinion falls in with the sentiments of Durandus, which many think not well of, Postsc. p. 9. For I must needs profess, that as far as I can judg, he hath but slandered you with a word of truth. For in your Letter, by which Mr. Gale did, and only could take his measures of your sense, there's not the most implicite intimation of any other in­tendment, than to close with Durandus. And though you do explicitely disown it in your Postsc. yet you instruct not you Reader, how the Grammatical construction of these words above cited, p. 36. of your Let. will yield any other meaning, than what Mr. Gale pitches upon. And the foresight of the pro­bability of being cried out upon for want of candour, in the same respects, did not a little deter me from the undertakement.

A third, the necessity of making a Pa­rallel between your and the Papists Argu­ments against Predetermination, which I fore­saw would give you occasion to fault me, (as you do Mr. Gale), for parallelling your con­ceptions with theirs, the reason whereof must needs be because I take a Papist for an ill-favoured name, Postsc. p. 27. yet here they are.

  • 1. Some actions are intrinsecally evil, and in themselves wicked, Let. p. 33, 32.
  • 2. God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions, as the best, Post. p. 25. [viz. by the Doctrine of Predetermination of sinful actions.]
  • 3. For God to de­termine men to the worst of actions, can mean no less thing than to impel them to do them, Let. p. 37. which impelling you call an ineluctable fate, p. 33. [and so in­tend compelling.]
  • 4. God hath more influence and concur­rence to the worst a­ctions than the sinner or tempter, Post. pag. 25. and in more words, Let. pag. 32. [viz. by our Doctrine.]
  • 1. There are ma­ny actions so intrin­secally and in them­selves evil, that they always are repug­nant to the eternal Law, and Right Rea­son. Bell. de Am. c. 18.
  • 2. Calvin was blas­phemous against God in affirming, That God works evil works in us, so as he works good, Alvarez de Aux. Gr. l. 4.
  • 3. God, according to our Adversaries opinion [viz. the Protestants] impells men, and so compells them to sin, Bell. c. 5.
  • 4. God according to the opinion of Calvin and Beza is the primary Author of all sins. Bell. c. 4. de Amiss. Gr.

But pass upon this parallel what judgment you please, I am at a point. I have proposed to my self a good end in the exhibition of it, viz. to mind my Readers that the point under de­bate between you and me is a stated controver­sie between the Papists and Protestants, and therefore the affirmative not lightly to be rece­ded from; and in drawing it up I gave my self a little pleasure mixed with disdain; that be­cause there was no Smith found through­out all the land of Israel, you were sain to go down to the Philistines to sharpen your axe and your mattock, 1 Sam. 13.19, 20. And I admired that you could not excogitate one new Argument, but present us with all old, and strangely unfortu­nate, which have been bafled as often as urged. I have i [...]titled my Answer De Causa Dei, rather than De causa Deo; which latter might be proper enough for the subject, a De­fence of Gods interest as the first cause in all the actions of his Creatures. But herein I have imitated Bradwardine's Piety, who would sig­nifie thereby that it was the Cause of God he de­signed to secure from the impetuous assaults of its Adversaries, among whom I am heartily sorry you should be numbred, as to this in­stance. I know you will not own the charge, but pretend that you are on Gods side, but if so, you have neglected an opportunity of shew­ing your self, by not reconciling Gods pre­ventive methods of sin with immediate con­course, [Page]which is at least as hard as with Pre­determinative concourse: and to be sure, any one may see it was very idle and ludicrous trifling, to offer at reconciling those methods with God's Prescience, and to wave that (manifestly) greater difficulty of reconciling them with his immediate concourse, if you think there is such a thing, (to use your own words with but the variation that a disserent instance requires) Postsc. pag. 3, 4. I have been as brief as I could in my Answer, without prejudice to our cause; and have come (as Caesar Borgia said of the French in their Expedition into Italy) rather with Chalk in my hands to mark out the Inns, than with Arms to break through and take possession. It will be time enough to arm when your Preparations shall rise out of that dust and silence in which they are buri­ed, Post. p. 51. In the mean time I have but pointed out the Fontes solutionum, the general grounds upon which our Answers depend, to all Arguments that can be produced. To con­clude, I could heartily wish you would serionsly reflect upon your Letter and Postscript, and consider how many passages you are obliged to repent of and retract. Shall I [...]ind you of that notable saying of Austin, Illius scripta summa authoritate dignissima, &c. i.e. his writings deserve to be of the greatest authority, who hath let slip never a word, not that he would, but that he ought to recall. He that hath [Page]not attained so much wisdom as to be able to say nothing not to be repented of, may yet attain so much modesty as to repent of what he knows he has said amiss, Aug. Ep. 17. And for your encouragement, it may not be unsea­sonable to mind you, of what you cannot but know, that Austin who gave this good coun­sel, did take it himself, and left upon record re­tractation of his Errors, wherein he was a singular instance of humility, and was rewar­ded by God with a greater esteem in the Church than any one man since his time. Which is all, besides that I am

Octob. 31. 1677.
Your true Friend and Brother T. D.

De Causa Dei.

IT has been always judged very need­ful in Polemicks to state the Question, and explain the terms, when they la­bour under any ambiguity, or how­ever fall not under the apprehension of those who are to be instructed, for want of skill in that art or science to which they belong, or language from which they are borrowed. In neither of these respects will it be needless in the Controversie now to be agitated; not as to the first, because Mr. Howe gives us his sense in various terms, and such as seem repugnant to each other: one while that which he denies is, a Prede­terminative concurrence to all actions of the Creatures, Let. p. 32. and Postsc. p. 3. and Predeterminative concourse, Post. p. 19. another while 'tis Predetermining Influence, Post. p. 19. and a Determinative influence, Let. p. 36. and Efficacious influence, Post. p. 52. As for the two former phrases (which are of the same im­port) they are in effect contradictio in adjecto in their conjunction. I appeal to Strangius, Mr. H.'s friend, but my Adversary in the main Question under consideration, Hujus­modi [Page 2]Predeterminationem nonnulli confundunt cum concursu Dei generali quem concursum praevium appellant, &c. i.e. Some confound this kind of Predetermination with the gene­ral concourse of God. But they speak very improperly who call Predetermination a pre­vious [or Predeterminative] concourse, or say that God does by concourse determine se­cond causes: and he quotes Twisse with ap­probation, saying, Concurrere cum agente aliquo modo, &c. i.e. To concur with an agent some way to the production of an effect, is not to determine that agent. For the Creature also concurs with God to the production of an effect, and yet it does not determine God: therefore nor does God concurring with the Creature de­termine it to act. Strang. de Vol. Dei, Lib. 2. Cap. 4. p. 161. Strangius does not call the terms a contradiction, I confess, but the rea­son out of Twisse gave him as just ground (as it does me) so to call them. As for the latter phrase, influence, which he makes equi­pollent with the former concourse, in these words, I here affect not the curiosity to distin­guish these two terms as some do, Post. p. 29. I had rather he should hear Strangius again, than me blaming his not affecting that curi­osity of distinction: Caeterum nobis operae­pretium videtur distinguere inter ista duo voca­bula concursum & influxum, &c. i.e. But it seems worth our labour to distinguish between [Page 3]those two words Concourse and Influence, which in this matter are often conjoined and confounded. For first, Influence is of a larger extent than Concourse. For the causality of every Cause, especially the Efficient, is called Influence. And therefore in many instances there may be observed an Influence of God, when yet there is no concourse, as when he acts, not making use of any second cause. Again, although in the concourse of two Causes each of them are considered as having their Influence, yet the word Influence is absolute, and noting a respect to another cause; but the word Con­course is relative to another cause. Strang. de Vol. Deil. 1. c. 11. p. 59. As for the term Efficacious, it suits us well enough, if Mr. H. intends by it an Infallibility of the event, or the certain production of those actions which God hath an Influence upon. The ambiguity of Mr. H. phrases removed, and the sense of them brought to a certainty, I assert the contradictory to his Proposition, That God doth not by an Efficacious influence universally move and determine men to all their actions, even those that are most wicked, Post. p. 52. Which if we might be allowed the liberty of our own terms, we would thus lay down, That God does determine, or prede­termine, or move all Creatures to all and each of their actions. Strangius fairly enough cites our Thesis, lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 155. The Que­stion [Page 4]then to be discussed is, Whether God does determine or predetermine all Creatures to all and each of their actions? So Strang. fairly, l. 2 c. 4. p. 155. Unless it may seem meet to add that reduplicative particle, as such, be­cause of Mr. Howe's addition, even those that are most wicked, Post. p. 52. As to which it is to be noted, that we who assert Predeter­mination of all actions of the Creatures, do limit it to the actions considered abstractly from the moral good or evil adhering to them: as for instance, we hold Gods Prede­termination of the natural act whereby Da­vid begat a child in Adultery, as well as of those whereby he begat children in lawful Matrimony; and of the use of his tongue in telling a lie to Abimelech the Priest, as well as in praising God. Whereas Mr. Howe li­mits Gods Predetermination only to morally [or spiritually] good actions as such, Posts. p. 39. n. 6. Which Predeter nation special, we grant; but withal assert a general, which extends to evil actions. In which we con­sider,

1. The subject; and as to this we say that sin is in that which is good, the nature of man and his faculties and actions, and these God excites and guides efficaciously. And this subject is called the materiale or substrate matter of sin.

2. The end; and thus though not the na­ture, [Page 5]yet the existence of sin is good, or it is good that sin should be, because God draws good out of it; and hence God predeter­mines to the natural actions, though he knows sin will adhere to them. The grand term then to be explained is Predeterminati­on, or (as some Divines and Metaphysicians sometimes call it) Praecurse and Praemotion, of which terms the former which signifies a fore appointment, is either from eternity, or in time. The latter two, only in time. The former (viz.) Predetermination, is either from eternity, and so is an immanent act of Gods, that is, of his will to produce in time all the actions of his Creatures; or in time, which is the actual production of all those actions which he had decreed to produce. And of this latter only is the Question to be discussed understood; and this act of Gods is called Predetermination, because it limits the creature to this action rather than to that; and 'tis called a Precourse, or Pre­motion, i.e. a running before, or fore motion, (as I may so speak), because in order of nature it is before the action of the crea­ture. Again, Predetermination [or Pre­course, or Premotion], is distinguished into Physical or Moral. The latter, I grant may be ascribed to God with reference to good actions as such, but not with respect to evil actions, unless the proposing objects [Page 6]and occasions of sin may (as some learned men judg) be reduced to the actions of a moral cause. But whether the moral acts of God in commanding, threatning, pro­mising, &c. may be justly denominated Pre­determination, will remain dubitable till another doubt be resolved, (viz.) Whether the will do always follow the last practical dictate of the understanding. Against the affirmative of which Question (to note that obiter) the most acute and learned Wallis seems to oppose an irrefragable Argument, viz. that the Will then is not disabled by the fall more than the will of the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven. Wallis Truth tried against the Lord Brook, p. 55. But let Predetermination Moral fall or stand, our Question is not of that, but of Phy­sical Predetermination, as appears in that we make it common to all creatures, some whereof are not capable of a Moral Pre­determination, (supposing that to be) which yet is not intended to be agitated at present, but only that which is exercised about free agents, that is, rational creatures. Which that it may be done with more clearness, and may in part obviate some of our learned Antagonist's objections, we shall endeavour, with as much accuracy as is needful to a discourse that will fall into other than learned mens hands, to [Page 7]consider Predetermination as contradistin­guished, or opposed rather to two things, which are acknowledged by him as Gods Acts respecting the actions of free agents, (not excluding natural), (viz.) Conserva­tion and immediate Concourse, or Concurrence; the concession of the former of which two, will not be sound sufficient to entitle God to the honour of the first cause of his creatures actions; and of the latter will (unless we take our measures amiss) in­force him to grant that Predetermination which now he denies. First as to Conser­vation, we must observe, that as Creation stands opposed to nothing; so Conservati­tion to Annihilation, i. e. making that cease to be something which was so; and it dif­fers from Creation only in this, that it notes a continuation of that being, and its powers and faculties, which were given by creation, as being a continuation of that action by which it was produced; and therefore is commonly stiled continua creatio, and not unfitly termed by the School-men manutenentia Dei, i. e. Gods hand-hold, because by it God holds up all things, as it were, with an hand from fal­ling into nothing; by the withdrawing of which, Divines generally think the world would be annihilated.

Secondly, As to concourse or concurrence, [Page 8]it may be thus defined; It is an extrinsick­action of God, by which he does with se­cond causes, [or the creatures] immediately produce all their natural actions and effects. 1. It is an action of God to distinguish it from the power communicated and conser­ved to second causes, (by which they per­form their several operations) by creation and conservation. 2. Extrinsick to distin­guish it from his Decree of this action cal­led concourse, which decree is an intrinsick action. 3. With second causes, or the crea­tures, because it is such an action as joins with the creature; as when the Writing-Master and the Scholar shape the same letter by the Masters guiding the Scholars hand. 4. I add, all their actions, and what is produced by action or the effects, as when the Master and Scholar write, not only is the action the same, but the effect; the letters are the same which are done by both together. 5. Natural actions and effects, to exclude what by accident ad­heres to the actions and effects; which seeing they are defects, cannot be produ­ced by a proper efficiency, and so nor God concur to the production of them by such efficiency. 6. Immediately produce, to note the intimacy of the conjunction of God with the creature in the production of natural actions; which is such, that one [Page 9]and the same action is the action of God and of the creature.

3. As to Predetermination, it is thus de­fined. It is a transient action of God which excites every creature to act. It is called a transient action of God, in opposition to Immanent, or the Will and Decree of God that the creature should act. That is di­stinguished from Concourse or Concurrence thus. 1. The very difference of the par­ticles, Prae and Con, i. e. Before and with, notes that the former is in order of na­ture (though not of time), before the crea­tures action, the latter with it. 2. That the former notes the reduction of the creatures powers into act: the latter notes Gods acting with the creature. 3. The former is to be conceived of per modum principii, under the notion of a principle, or cause of the creatures acting: the latter only, per modum actionis, i. e. as im­porting Gods acting with the creature. 4. The Terminus or object of that action of Gods, which we call Predetermination, is the second cause it self, the reasonable creature: but the Terminus or object of that action of Gods, called concourse or concur­rence, is the action of the second cause, and effect produced by that action. So that the Question in plain words is, Whether God does move men to all their natural actions, [Page 10]and so to one rather than another. The Protestants generally maintain the affirma­tive, and how forcibly Mr. Howe oppo­ses it, remains now to be considered.

The terms explained, we shall endeavour a defence of our Arguments, which Mr. Howe hath thought meet to single out.

The first of the two Arguments of ours; which seeming most importunate and enfor­cing, he hath attempted to enervate, is.

Arg. 1. That it necessarily belongs to the Original and Fountain-Being to be the first Causc of whatsoever Being; and consequent­ly, that what there is of positive Being in any the most wicked action, must principally owe it self to the determinative productive in­fluence of this first and Soveraign Cause: Otherwise, it would seem that there were some Being that were neither primum, nor a pri­mo, [i. e. neither the first Being, nor from the first Being], Let. p. 35.

Answ. To which he Answers, It may well be thought sufficiently to salve the rights and priviledges of the first Cause, to assert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it; which in reference to for­bidden actions, intelligent Creatures may use or not use as they please, without over-as­serting, that they must be irresistibly deter­mined also, even to the worst of actions done by them, Let. p. 36.

Reply. For the better understanding of our Argument, and the proof thereto an­nexed; together with Mr Howes Answer thereunto, it will not be unneedful to re­duce them to Syllogisms: the Argument thus,

All positive Being are effects of the first Cause. All sinful actions, as actions, [for that is our limitation], are positive Beings. Ergo, All sinful actions [as actions] are effects of the first Cause, [viz. God].

The Major [or first proposition] is proved by an Hypothetical Syllogism, thus: If all positive Beings are not effects of the first Cause, then there is some positive Be­ing which is neither primum [ens] nor a primo, [i. e.] neither the first Being, nor from the first Being, [or which is neither God nor a Creature]. But there is no positive Being which is neither the first Being, nor from the first Being. Ergo, All positive Beings are effects of the first Cause. To the Argument it self Mr. Howe replies nothing, nor yet to the proof, in form (as by the Laws of Argumentation he was obliged). But seems to distinguish in the Major between a double dependance, which positive Beings have upon God as the first Cause; one, that they have no power but from God; the other, that the exercise or use of that power is from [Page 12]God. The former he grants; the latter he denies, but with a limitation as to for­bidden actions.

To which we Reply,

1. That this Answer is fatal to his own Concession of Gods immediate concurrence to all the actions of his Creatures, Postsc. p. 28. For it amounts to as much, as if in terminis, he had asserted a mediate concurrence only to some actions, (viz. forbidden actions; and this was the passage I presume that gave Mr. Gale oc­casion to charge Mr. Howe with Durandus his Opinion, which was, That God con­curs remotely and mediately with se­cond Causes, (viz.) no otherwise than as he confers and conserves their Essence and Power of action, by which they themselves act nextly and immediately. And for ought I can yet understand a very just occasion; for though Mr. Howe in the place above­cited acknowledges immediate concurrence; yet in the Letter it self, by which Mr. Gale was to make an estimate of his judg­ment, there was ne gru quidem, not a Syl­lable of any such thing.

2. It is hard to conceive the reason of Mr. Howe's limitation; why forbidden actions should be only by power derived from God; and good actions or indifferent, require also an irresistible determination; [Page 13]when the material of the actions morally diversified is often the very same. For in­stance, In the motion of my hand to kill another out of spleen and private revenge, or to kill my enemy in a lawful self-defence, or to strike my friend in merriment. I am aware that he attempts to wipe off the a­spersion of symbolizing with Durandus, be­cause he denies immediate concourse uni­versally, whereas himself denies only de­terminative concourse to wicked actions, Postsc. p. 28, 29. And be it so, that his at­tempt hath been successful, yet I must give Durandus the precedence of Mr. Howe for sagacity in this point; and do judg that he spake more consonantly to himself, and the truth, when he affirmed that the inde­termination of the power given to the creature, was so universal, as to extend equally to evil actions and to good. For it seems evident enough that all natural actions, as such, [the Subjects of moral good and evil] must either have, or want immediate concurrence.

3. This Answer runs counter to Mr. Howe's assertion elsewhere, That in reference to sinful actions by this influence [determi­native] God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers whereby they are done, [which is all Mr. Howe hath granted us [Page 14]hitherto in his Answer to our Argument, from the dependance of the second Cause upon the first]; but also as the first mover, so far excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any conge­nerous action, &c. Postsc. p. 41. For if by ex­citing and actuating the powers, he means that God reduces them to act, he hath taken a large jump from Durandus to Twisse: for the latter (nor we who follow him) neither says nor means any more by Predeterminati­on. And we cannot tell what other meaning to affix to his words, without upbraiding him with strange inadvertency in his choice of them. For else he consounds Concurrence either with Conservation; which latter keeps the powers apt and habile [as they are made] or with Predetermination, whereas this goes before, that goes along with the Creatures act.

But now I attend to the proof of his strange Assertion, for a proof I understand it to be) though he introduces it with a Be­sides; (a particle which commonly is a sign of an additional Argument) which thus pre­sents it self.

Ans. It seems infinitely to detract from the perfection of the ever blessed God, to affirm he was not able to make a creature of such a na­ture as being continually sustained by him, and supplied with power every moment suitable to [Page 15]its nature, should be capable of acting, unless whatsoever he thus enables, he determine [th [...] is, for it can mean no less thing, impel] it to do it also. Let. p. 36, 37.

Rep. 1. If we should take liberty of judg­ing things by their appearance at first sight, without giving our selves the trouble of a strict disquisition, we might easily be sedu­ced into an imagination, that it does no less infinitely detract from the Divine Perfecti­on, to affirm. That God was not able to make a Creature of such a nature, as that it might continually sustain it self, without a supply of power every moment from God; for that opinion seems to tye God to a shorter tedder, than an ingenuous Artificer, who can raise an Edifice that shall last many years, without any need of his help for re­parations.

And this I the rather take notice of, because I find it the sentiment of the most acute Suarez, That they who deny Gods immediate Operation in every action of the Creature, [which Mr. H. seems to do in his Answer now under discussion] will doubtless be compelled to deny that the Crea­ture does depend immediately upon the actual influence of God. For (which is his reason) that which depends not upon God in acting, nor does it depend upon him in its being. Met. Disp. 20.

2. This confirmation of Mr. H. Asserti­on is guilty of two unpardonable faults in a man of Learning and Ingenuity, (viz.) a too early anticipation, and immodest begging of the main Question. An anticipation, in al­ledging the impelling, i. e. compelling (for that is his sense of the term, as will appear e're long) men to act, as the import of Pre­determining; whereas there is no necessity of hooking in such an import of it: for sup­pose it no way to abridg the liberty of the Will, yet by Mr. H's Argumentation, it is eo nomine to be rejected, because the sustai­ning the Creature and supplying it with power every moment suitable to its nature, [that is, in Durandus stile, mediate concur­rence] is to be judged sufficient to enable the Creature to act, without determining it to action; upon no less peril to them that shall dare to judg it insufficient, than to be reputed detracters from the Perfection of the ever-blessed God. And a begging of the Que­stion 'tis, which I may well call immodest, because he knows we neither can nor will grant it, without ruining our Hypothesis; nor need we do it, because he elsewhere owns it unreasonable to imagine that God can­not in any case determine the will of a rational Creature, in a way agreeable enough to its na­ture. Let. p. 141.

I confess he gives us here but an inch, but [Page 17]we will venture to take an ell; I mean, to extend his concession of some cases to every case, and particularly to our case of sinful actions. For let our sentiment be burdened with what other load Mr. H. shall please (as the truth is he is not over merciful to the Predeterminants) I think he hath discharged it of forcing the will, till he hath evinced a specialty in our case, which will be somewhat an uneasie task, though we should grant him his own option, that God predetermines to sinful actions in concreto, i.e. to the acti­ons and sinfulness of them too; for upon that supposition there is less necessity to ima­gine that God cannot determine the will in a way agreeable enough to mans [corrupt] nature; because he does but determine it to what it hath an innate propension to of it self; and so Gods determination is but as the wind in a mans back, which puts him on a little faster in the way he was going be­fore.

3. We are at a great loss as to Mr. H's meaning, whether it be that it is a detracti­on from Gods perfection, to affirm, God was not able to make a Creature that could not act universally without determination, or particularly as to forbidden actions; the ge­nerality of the terms calls for the former sense, the conclusion he was to prove, for the latter.

1. If the former sense be that he will own, I seem to my self fairly allowed to infer, that then man in his primitive state had not, nor have the good. Angels at present, any Di­vine determination to good actions, because to both unnecessary; and unnecessary it must be presumed, because it is a detraction from Gods Perfection to conceive he could not make them of such a nature, as that they should not need it, and because they had no disinclination to be overcome by an efficaciously determinative influence, (which is the reason Mr. H. gives of the necessity of Predeter­mination to holy actions in the lapsed state. Post. p. 35. Which if it be of any force makes it unnecessary to a state of Integrity.) And if this inference be natural, I wonder not that Man fell, but that he fell not as soon as he was set upon his legs; nor that some of the good Angels turned Rebels so soon to their Soveraign Lord, but how the rest per­severe in their Loyalty. I have hitherto swom with the stream of Protestant Divines, (not because it was easie, but in my appre­hension safe) who have conceived the good Angels security an effect of a greater degree of determinative influence, (to borrow Mr. H's Phrase) or corroborating grace, that is, in the terms of the Question now agitated, Predetermination, than was afforded to the [now] bad Angels; or to speak more strict­ly [Page 19]of the continuance of that Predetermina­tion to the one, which was suspended as to the other: which conception of Divines (to note that in passage) may be easily freed from the imputation of reflecting either up­on Gods Holiness, Justice, or Truth; upon the first, because God by the suspension of Predetermination was no more the Efficient of the Angels sin, than the Sun of the dark­ness that overspreads the air, when it hath withdrawn its rays; upon the second, for it is a ruled case in the Schools, Non datur ju­stitia proprie dicta inter Deum & Creatu­ras; i. e. God cannot be properly said to be a debtor to his Creatures; no not when he hath passed a promise to them, for even then, (if we will speak strictly) he is a debtor to him­self, namely to his own truth and fidelity, not to them; and if he should (to suppose an impossibility for illustration-sake) break his word, he would be but Mendax, non in­jurius, a Lyar, not unjust. Not upon his Truth, for he was not under the bond of a promise, (as he is to the part of repaired Mankind, whom we denominate Saints) to preserve the Angels from Apostacy. As for those who take this Doctrine for a blemish upon Gods goodness, I turn them over to God himself, for a reconciliation of these two seemingly contradictory Propositions, con­tained in his Word, and within the verge of [Page 20]our own experience, that God is good, and [yet] that he hath permitted a passage for sin, which he could have impeded.—If the latter sense be avowed, as a genuine in­terpretation of Mr. H's mind; I know not how it will be able to save its credit, if I should charge it with being guilty of this gross absurdity, viz. a supposal that God made Man with an ability to do sinful acti­ons in concreto, i. e. the natural actions, and sin that adheres to them. 'Tis true, God made Man mutable, and how could he do o­therwise? (unless he should have made him a God) which very terms involve an insuf­ferable contradiction) and so in a remote ca­pacity of sinning. But Mr. H's words im­port a next or immediate capacity of acting, which the Creature is capable of, as soon as it starts out of nothing into something, with­out the intervenient aid of Predeterminati­on. I am very averse from thinking this to be Mr. H's meaning; and I would offer him a friendly hand (if he would accept of it) to help him out of the pit he is fallen into, by minding him of our distinction between the materiale and formale of sin, the natural acti­on that is the subject, and the sin that is the [inseparable] adjunct, in our temporary estate: which distinction supposed, in con­j [...]nction with Mr. H's Hypothesis, Mr. H's meaning will be freed from the encumbrance [Page 21]now inferred upon it; and it will amount to no more than that the power of acting God gave to man, suffices to the natural actions, since sin adhered to them, as well as before, without the help of Predetermination. But then this friendly hand will prove unfriendly in the issue; for though it may clear him of one, yet it will entangle him in many absur­dities, or (at least self-contradictions: For then,

1. How shall he quit himself from the blame of being a Favourer of Durandus Hy­pothesis? for the sense is the same, and the words not much different. And yet why should he once attempt it, seeing that Hypo­thesis serves his professed design of quitting God of the blame of being the Author of Sin, with much officiousness: and that he may accept this suggestion the more kindly, a most Learned hand shall tender it to him: Some are of opinion that God hath no immedi­ate influence, but mediate only, in respect of voluntary agents. And according to this opini­on it is easie to clear God from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to ac­knowledg his concurrence with second Causes, in producing their defective effects. If the will of the Creature, saith Scotus, C. 2. Dist. 37. Q. 1. were the total and immediate cause of her action, and that God had no immediate effi­ciency, but mediate only in respect thereof, as [Page 22]some think: It were easie according to that opi­nion to shew how God may be freed from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with second Causes, for the producing of their effects: for whether we speak of that which is material or formal in sin, the will only should be the total cause of it, and God should no way be a cause of it but mediately, in that he caused and produ­ced such a will, that might at her pleasure do what she would. Durandus seemeth to incline to this opinion, supposing that second Causes do bring forth their actions and operations by and of themselves, and that God no otherwise con­curreth actually to the production of the same, but in that he preserveth the second Causes in that being and power of working, which first he gave them. Thus far the most Learned Dr. Field, of the Church, B. 3. Ch. 23. pag. 121, 122. And yet he adds his dislike of Du­randus opinion in these words: But they that are of sounder judgment resolve, that as the light enlightneth the air, and with the air all other inferiour things: so God not only giveth being and power of working to the second Cau­ses, and preserveth them in the same, but to­gether with them hath an immediate influence into the things that are to be effected by them, &c. Ibid. p. 122.

3. What account can be given of his ex­ploding our distinction between the material [Page 23]and formal part of sin? [approved of above by Dr. Field]. Most of his way, (viz. Mr. Gales) mince the business, and say, the con­currence is only to the action, which is sin­ful; not as sinful, so Mr. Howe's Postsc. p. 33.

Answ. Except it were affirmed, that it implied a contradiction for God to make such a creature, there is no imaginable pretence, why it should not be admitted he hath done it, Let. p. 37. and subjoins soon after, I must confess a greater disposition to wonder that ever such a thing should be disputed, than dispute so plain a case, p. 38.

Reply. That it is affirmed, Mr. Howe cannot surely be ignorant; nay, he frees himself from that blame. I am not alto­gether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impossible, p. 38. but in the interim he incurs another of contradict­ing himself.

This Argument, ab absurdo, from the im­plication of Gods making a creature inde­pendent upon himself, is urged against those that deny immediate concurrence (and so by just consequence conservation) and Pre­determination.

1. As to mediate concurrence, 'tis urged for it by Durandus, That there is no repug­nuncy nor contradiction for God to make a creature that should be able to act without [Page 24]his help [otherwise, that is, than by conserv­ing its being and powers]. To this is An­swered, Involvere repugnantiam quod creaturae sit potens, &c. That it involves a repugnan­cy and contradiction, that the creature should be able to act independently upon the Creator, as well in respect of the created cause it self, which hath necessarily a power of acting com­mensurate and proportionable to its own be­ing, as in respect of the action or effect flow­ing from it; for seeing they are Beings by participation, they essentially depend upon the first Being. Wherefore, as the Divine power cannot produce a Being independent upon him in its Being, so nor produce an Agent in­dependent upon him in acting. Suarez. Met. T. 1. D. 22. n. 16. One egg is not more like another, than Durandus Argument to Mr. Howe's; nor can a more solid Answer be given thereto, no, though Mr. Howe should acknowledg immediate concurrence, (as in his Postsc. he does) of which, in his whole Letter there is altum silentium, and deny on­ly Predetermination: for this Answer is a shoo that will fit either foot (as will ap­pear in its place).

2. As to conservation, the no necessity of Gods continual influx to that end seems colourably affirmed upon this ground too, That it is not repugnant to Omnipotency to produce such creatures, as when once made, [Page 25]may continue their Being; though the ope­ration of the Agent cease, by which they were produced. To this Argument Suarez also fits a rational reply; Ad amplitudinem di­vinae potentiae spectat, &c. It belongs to the amplitude of the Divine Power, that nothing is, nor can be a moment after its production without its influence; and also that it have full dominion over all his creatures, and an intrinsick power of annihilating them, by the suspension or withholding of his influence, Suarez. Met. T. 1. D. 21. n. 2, 17.

3. Which is directly to our case upon Mr. Howe's explication of his mind, that he does really believe Gods immediate con­course to all actions of his creatures, both immediatione virtutis & suppositi, yet not determinative to wicked actions, Postsc. p. 28. we shall adventure a demonstration, that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature that can act without Predeter­mination, i. e. applying it to action, and to one rather than another action; and 'tis this, that such a creature would be but ens secun­darium, a second being; not causa secunda, a second cause, or (which is all one) God should be but ens primum, not causa prima, the first Being, not the first Cause; which I prove thus.

Arg. 1. If God does concur only by simultaneous concourse, and not by Predeter­mination, [Page 26]or previous motion, then God can­not be the cause of the actions of the creatures as they proceed from them. But the consequent is absurd; and Mr. Howe, I presume, will not own it. Therefore so is the Antecedent. The Consequence is pro­ved thus: God is not by concourse the cause of the actions of the creatures, as those actions proceed from them, because then concourse must be before the action of the creature (for every Physical cause is before the effect), but the very name concourse, imports a joyning together in the same action, as the Master and Scholar, whose hand is guided in shaping the same letter. And all consent, in concourse, nei­ther does God act before the creature, nor the creature before God, but both together, and at once.

Arg. 2. To make good the English Pro­verb, He is twice killed, that is killed with his own weapon. I shall retort, Mr. Howe's two concessions upon him.

1. If there be an immediate concourse, then there is a Predetermination, or putting the creature upon action before it acts; or else the creature is the first mover of it self to action. The consequence is plausible enough, as depending on this ground, that by con­course alone we have no account given us how God and the creature join in one in­dividual [Page 27]action rather than another. As for instance, in the state of innocency, when man was incircled with a variety of trees of the Garden, all good and fit for food, whence was it that he will'd to eat of one rather than another. The concourse of God with Adam's will in the election of one (suppose that in the midst of the Gar­den, before the prohibition passed upon it) could not determine it to that rather than to any of the rest, as is plain in external acti­ons. Two men lanching a wherry-boat con­cur to the same effect; but the one does not determine the other, by lending com­mon assistance to that act. There must be therefore a Predetermination in order of nature, though not of time, to that act of Adam's will [supposed] of eating that tree instanced in, to which God concurred. This may be illustrated by the example of a Writing-Master and his Scholar, wherein there is a concurrence to the action of writing, and its effect the letter written; and also a Predetermination, a putting the Scholar upon the action of writing, (not morally, for that influence is discerned in commanding a Scholar to write by him­self; but Physically, by putting his hand on the Scholars to write, and to write one letter rather than another. An account how the particular action of any rational [Page 28]creatures will, comes to be determined up­on the exclusion of Predetermination, I know none can be given. Not by chance, upon the occasional sudden presentation of an object; because the action is Gods (who is not liable to any such impressions) as well as the creatures; not by the creatures self-determining power, for that, as such, is indeterminate as to the acts to which we conceive it must be some way or other determined. And these two Propositions are so evident, that concurrence immediate does not determine the will, and that yet it must be determined, that Baronius himself, who is an Antipredeterminant, does acknowledg both, Met. 7, 8. Disp. 3. n. 66. and he does suggest a reason against any necessity laid upon a thing by Divine Prescience, which we will accept of for a necessity of Divine Predetermination to the acts of the will. Illud solum imponit necessitatem alicui rei, quod est prima ratio cur illa res non potuit non evenire, i. e. That alone imposes necessity upon any thing which is the first reason or cause why that thing could not but fall out. Baron. Met. 7, 12. D. 2. n. 59. [which ne­cessity, that it excludes not the liberty of mans will, shall be cleared in due time].

2. Again, from the necessity conceded by Mr. Howe, of immediate concourse and Pre­determination to the production of good acti­ons, [Page 29]we shall infer the necessity of both to all actions: This necessity must take its rise either from something common to all acti­ons, or peculiar to good actions. The re­moving the latter, will be the fixing the former in its due place. In order hereun­to, we must consider that grace is an habit seated in the natural faculties, and fitting them for good actions; which as it was concreated with them in innocency; so in the lapsed estate it is re-created, or created again by infusion: which infusion is not Pre­determination: for this latter still presup­poses the former. There must be grace in habit before it can be acted. Now then the Query is, whether the terminus of Pre­determination be the habit or the faculties; not the habit, for that is a Quality that meliorates the faculties, and so the acti­ons, in genere morali, and cannot be put upon action, or one rather than another, but mediante potentia, by the intervention of the power or faculty in which the gra­cious habit resides. It must then be the faculties; the will for instance (for of that is the grand inquiry), for otherwise (sup­posing what has been owned, that holy ha­bits fit the will for holy volitions and no­litions) in what degree the habits are con­firmed, in that the will may act without Predetermination, and produce sincerely [Page 30]good actions as it please, as long as these good actions are done by a power derived originally from it, [which is Mr. Howe's Hypothesis, and judged by him sufficient to salve the rights and priviledge of the first cause, with reference to forbidden actions, Let. p. 36. [and I see not, why not as well with reference to commanded actions]. The result of this ratiocination will be, that if it be the indetermination of the powers to individual actions that makes an excitation of them to one rather than an­other necessary; and the possibility of acti­on contained in the powers, that makes the reducing of that possibility to action no less necessary to good actions, then the consequence seems immovable, that Pre­determination in its two Branches is alike necessary to all actions, even when they flow from a will tainted with vicious ha­bits and inclinations. Quod erat demon­strandum And to me this Argument seems to carry along with it triumphant evidence, (to borrow one of Mr. Howe's lofty Epithetes, Let. p. 62.) my fancy labours under so de­spicable poverty as to be unable to supply me with any evasion.

As for Mr. Howe's phrase of impelling, by which he intends compelling, we shall refer the word and thing to the Head, where it will most properly fall under ex­amination. [Page 31]In the interim, let us attend to what he subjoins.

Answ. I confess a disposition to wonder that a matter whereupon all moral Government de­pends, both humane and divine, should not have been determined at the first sight, Let. p. 38.

Reply. These words imply, that all moral Government, &c. is rendred ludicrous, and a meer Pageantry by the Doctrine of Pre­determination; but upon what Mr. Howe, magisterially enough, takes for granted, but does not once make an offer of proving, that the will is hindered by Gods own ir­resistible counter-action, p. 37. from yield­ing obedience to such Government: But if I live till that be proved, my age will cer­tainly exceed Methuselahs.

Answ. But Mr. Howe adds, The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God, methinks should stick so close to our minds, and create such a sense in our souls, as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers. And that we should rather chuse to have our sight, hearing, and motive pow­er, and what not besides disputed, or even torn from us, than ever suffer our selves to be di­sputed into a belief, that the Holy and Good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to, and punish the same thing, Let. p. 19.

Reply. The sum of the Argument, though accompanied with a long train of fine words, is, that Predetermination to sinful actions crosses the natural notions of mankind concerning Gods Goodness and Holiness. To which we return.

1. That there is not the least colour for any such consequence from our Doctrine, but upon supposition of two things; which Mr. Howe would fasten upon us, but we disown.

1. That God predetermines to sinful acti­ons, in concreto, i e. to the natural action, and the sinfulness of it: which we constant­ly deny: for though we own it a h [...]rd province to answer all objections that may be started against this partition made be­tween the one and the other, as to Gods influence, which we affirm as to the for­mer, the action, and deny, as to the latter, the sinfulness of it: yet 'we doubt not (in its season) to evince these two things, that God is the Author, and consequently the Predeterminer of all the actions of rational creatures, (for as to irrational, though we include them, yet the Question not being of them, we shall not intermeddle with them); and that God is not the Author of the sinfulness, and so not the Predeter­miner thereof. And then as to the modus, or manner of Gods influence, so as to se­parate [Page 33]these that are so neerly conjoined in sinful creatures, we shall be less solici­tous, at least with respect to Mr. Howe's satisfaction, who has professed that he can more easily be satisfied, to be ignorant of the modus, [i. e. manner], or medium, [i. e. the mean] of Gods knowledg, whilest he is sure of the thing; and he knows not why any sober minded man might not be so too, while we must all be content to be ignorant of the manner, yea, of the nature too of a thou­sand things besides, when, that such things there are, we have no doubt. And when there are few things about which we can with less disadvantage suffer our being ignorant, or with less disreputation profess to be so, Let. p. 49, 50. And if this Argumentation be true, in reference to Divine acts in ge­neral (as there is no reason why it should be limited to Gods knowledg only, and himself extends it beyond that); I con­ceive Mr. Howe has against his will given us the cause; for that God is not the Author of sin (our last proposition) he every where affirms as well as we. That God is the Au­thor of all the actions of rational creatures, he grants too; or else his words are un­intelligible, and we have cause to quarrel with him, (as he did with Persius, a crab­bed Poet), si non vult intelligi, cur vult legi, i. e. If he would not be understood, [Page 34]why would he be read, (an end that eve­ry man is presumed to intend that writes), these words, I mean, This active providence of God about all the actions of men, consists not meerly in giving them the natural pow­ers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real influence upon those powers, Postsc. p. 39. By which last clause, if he intends reducing them to act (as his phrase is, ibid.) we are perfectly agreed so far; and the remaining disagreement will be but about the modus or manner, how God affords a real influence upon the powers defiled with sin, and yet none upon the sin it self. And of [...]his he and I being both (I hope) so­ber minded men, may well be content to be ignorant, as long as we are sure of the thing. But I fear I reckon without my Host, and so must reckon again; I mean, that Mr. Howe will not stand to my com­primize of the difference between us, though I see not why he should not, if he will be but a man of his word, stand, that is, to his own Assertions.

2. Our Doctrine cannot be accused of a confederacy, to raze out the impressions of Gods Holiness upon humane nature; but upon this supposition also, That God does irresistibly determine the wills of men to that which he punishes men for, viz. to sin, which is a brat we are not bound to fa­ther. [Page 35]For we neither own irresistible nor resistible determination of mans will to sin, as such; nor do we acknowledg any deter­mination of the will at all to be irresistible, if he takes that term for equivalent to compulsory; which if he do not, it will be neither a friend to him, nor foe to us.

We might also observe upon his Rhe­torical amplifications of his Argument, that he seems to be no ill-willer to Transubstan­tiation. For if the natural notions of Gods goodness should be infinitely dearer to us than our senses, I see not why the notion of Gods sincerity, that he means as he speaks, should not challenge a share in our indear­ments; and so why, Hoc est corpus meum, should not assure us, that the bread is tran­substantiated, though our senses, sight, taste, feeling, join in a common testimony, that it remains bread after consecration, as well as before: not that I charge him with that Popish ridicule, but I would have him take notice how dangerous sometimes an affecta­tion of embellishments of speech may prove, by leaving him that is guilty of it, at the mercy of his Antagonist, in deducing such inferences from them, as can neither be safely admitted, nor creditably turned off.

Answ. Mr. Howe complains of the fee­bleness [Page 36]and impotency of our defence against the forenamed charge, that God makes a Law, and necessitates the violation of it; when it is no more than, That man is under the Law, and God above it, Let. p. 40, 41. and he affirms, that a tender spirit, &c. will not be relieved or eased by the thin Sophistry of only a collusive ambiguity in the word Law, &c. ibid.

Reply. If Mr. Howe's candour did but bear any tolerable proportion to his Elo­quence, he would never have thus repre­sented our Answer. For the truth is, this Answer is not given by the Predeterminants to that objection to which he applies it (as is plain enough, because we always e­steem our selves unconcerned in the charge of representing God as necessitating the vi­olation of his own Law), but to another, (viz.) that God sins when he produces that action with man, which to man is sin, (which Mr. Howe, who in words at least owns immediate concurrence to all actions as well we, is therefore equally concerned to an­swer). For the proof of this, I shall al­ledg Bellarmine, who (after he had told us, it was only Zuinglius's Answer to the same Objection that Mr. H. fits it to; adds with the peril of his reputation), Senten­tiam tamen aliorum quorundam, &c. i. e. That it was the opinion of others also, who [Page 37]though they agreed not with Zuinglius, in teaching that God impels men to sin, yet they use no other medium to evince how God does not sin, when he produces that action with man, which to man is sin, than that God is bound by no Law, and nothing is sin but a transgression of a Law, Bell de Amiss. Gr. l. 2. c. 18. Yet withal I deny not, but 'tis also applied to that Objection, that God sins, if he does determine to that action, to which sin inseparably cleaves. But yet the necessitation of the violation of the Law, is no way concerned in the objection.

What now is become of Mr. Howe's charge of thin Sophistry, and collusive am­biguity, when we deny God to be under a Law, in the same signification of the word, wherein we affirm it of man, (viz. as Mr. Howe expresses it), For the decla­red pleasure of a Ruler to a Subject, p. 41. This charge disproved, we yet grant what Mr. Howe objects; that the term Law, as noting an habitual principle, and rule of act­ing after one steady tenour, in which sense the perfect rectitude of Gods nature is an eternal Law to him, &c. Let. p. 41, 42, is yet an Argument against our opinion upon Mr. Howe's Hypothesis, that thereby the creature is necessitated to sin: but that he hath neither attempted, nor ever will be able to prove. If proof could be made [Page 38]that the consequence were natural, we should not know how to decline the force of Bel­larmine's grave Argumentation upon Mr. Howe's ground, Licet deo non sit posita Lex ab aliquo superiore Legislatore, tamen sua sa­pientia est ipsi Lex, &c. i. e. Though God be not under a Law given him by a superiour Legislatour, yet his own wisdom is a Law to him; and as Zuinglius himself teaches us, That what a Law is to us, that is Gods own nature to him. God is therefore no less bound, not to act repugnantly to his own wisdom and nature, than men are bound not to act re­pugnantly to the Law of God. Wherefore, if God should impel [Mr. Howe's phrase], men to these things, which are contrary to the Eternal Law, and to his own nature and wisdom, as to Adultery, his will were evil, because repugnant to the right rule of divine wisdom, and God should deny himself, which cannot be (as the Apostle says). Thus far Bellarmine, ubi supra.

Answ. Mr. Howe concludes, What re­lief is there in that dream, [of the suppo­sed possibility of Gods making a reasonable creature with an innocent aversion to himself]. For what can be supposed more repugnant? or what more impertinent? If innocent, how were it punishable? A Law already made in the case, how can it be innocent? Let. p. 42.

Reply. Mr. Howe leaves us wholly at a loss, who it is, that with this dream hath attempted to relieve a pious and sober mind, closely urged with the horrour of so black a conception of God, that he does first irresisti­bly determine mens will to, and then punish them for the hatred of his blessed self, (as he tragically, but falsely represents our o­pinion), p. 40. I say falsely, for God does not punish that natural passion we call ha­tred, which himself, as first Cause, applies the second to the production of; nor does God determine the will to that natural passion, its elicite act, irresistibly, in his sense forcibly. But as Austin long ago, of Gods influence upon good actions; [so say we of bad] God acts Omnipotenter pro te, suaviter pro me, Omnipotently according to his own nature, but sweetly according to ours, (as shall be fully cleared in its place). If any particular person of our judgment in the main, shall propose an argument li­able to exception, I see not that we are obliged to defend it. But as Mr. Howe introduces it, it seems to be represented as a common extravagancy of the Predeter­minants, which I am sure it is not; nor does Mr. Howe labour under a surguedry of candour, in a bare presentation of this supposition, without its application to the Question. Both which, because Mr. Howe hath [Page 40]neglected, I think not my self obliged to give the Reader an account of, but shall dismiss it without any adoe.

Arg. 2. The second pressing and impor­tunate Argument of ours which Mr. H. re­peats, That God does predetermine sinful acti­ons as actions, otherwise it were impossible for God to foreknow the sinful actions of men (ma­ny whereof he hath foretold) if their futuriti­on were a meer contingency, and depended on the uncertain will of the subordinate agent, not determined by the supream agent [God.] Let. p. 35, 36.

Ans. To which Argument, this is the sum of his Answer, That this supposed inde­termination of the Will in reference to wick [...]d actions, is far from being capable of inferring any thing more than that we are left ignorant of the way how he foreknows them, which is a small inconvenience, and manifest absurdity not to ac [...]nowledg the like in many cases, seeing God does many things, whereof the manner how he does them we can neither explicate nor understand. Let. p. 47, 48.

Rep. 1. To which I reply, That the way how God foreknows future contingencies, is in his own Decree, at least as to such which he hath decreed. For I cannot divine what can be opposed to this Proposition, That what God hath decreed he foreknows in his own Decree, (though it should be granted [Page 41]that he foreknows them also antecedently to his own Decree in some manner, which we can neither explicate nor understand.) Ta­king that then for granted till it be denied, I think Mr. H. hath much overshot himself in denying universally our knowledg of the way how God foreknows future contingen­cies. For either he must exclude the good acti­ons, which he grants God predetermines men to, Postsc. p. 39. yea, and all actions of free agents to which he acknowledges God af­fords immediate concourse, p. 28. from being Contingencies; (which himself as well as we, suppose in the whole controversie now agita­ted) Or deny that they fall under Gods De­cree; (which is too absurd, because there's nothing more evident than that what God does in time, he decreed to do from Eterni­ty) Or if he grants both, then it roundly fol­lows, that God foreknew those acts of the Creatures which in time he did either pre­determine to, or concur with; and such are all the actions of men disjunctively.

Rep. 2. We shall prove that God fore­knows all future contingencies in his own Decree, and consequently the sinful actions of men.

1. By Scripture, Isa. 46.9, 10, I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my [Page 42]counsel shall stand, and I will do all my plea­sure. Upon which Scripture the Incomparable Calvin, (so I call him in compliance with the very Learned Andrews, (sometime Bishop of Winchester's admonition), that he was a man never to be named without the addition of some title of Honour) thus glosses, Neque solum ejus praescientiam hic commendat, &c. i.e. Neither does God only here commend his own Prescience, but he affirms that he had te­stified by the Prophets what he had decreed. For there were no certainty, nor firmness in the Predictions, or Prophesies, unless the same God who foretells this or that thing would come to pass, had the event of things in his own hand. As to which words we may fur­ther observe:

1. The form of the expression: two Attri­butes are here applied by God to himself, Wisdom and Soveraignty or liberty of Will, and a common adjunct of both, Immutability, [or we may call it a common effect, the cer­tainty of the event] that what God does wisely and freely determine or decree within himself, shall certainly come to pass.

2. The extent of it, that it refers to all those things which it was Gods peculiar certainly to foreknow, viz. all that should certainly come to pass. For as Judicious Cal­vin observes upon vers. 11. Posteaquam Pro­pheta, &c. After that the Prophet had spoken [Page 43]of the Prescience of God, he accommodates the general expression he had used to his present purpose, to comfort the Jews in hopes of the re­turn of their Captivity by Cyrus, &c.

3. The argument which is couched in them, to evince the certainty of Gods foreknow­ledg of what he did predict, viz. because the events predicted were the result of his Wisdom and Pleasure, or of his own wise Decrees.

And now to draw down this General to the particular in question, Whether God fore­knows sinful actions in his own Decree. And for the proof of the affirmative I shall quote but that place, Act. 4.28, compared with Chap. 2.23, For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done. So the former place, Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledg of God, ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and slain. So the latter; both speaking of the most wicked action that ever was done in the world, the putting the Lord of Life to death. To the former place the Learned Calvin says, They who acknowledg only the Prescience of God, but do not confess that all things are managed by Gods will, are easily convinced by these words, that God hath foreordained that to be done which is done. To the latter place the Learned Dr. Manton (now newly deceased, to the great grief of [Page 44]Pious & Learned Men) affords a notable gloss, (which I especially recommend to Mr H. for the friendship sake between the Doctor and him, in his Comment on Jam. 1.13. p. 101. Many who grant Prescience, deny Preordination, [viz. the Decree, whereof Predeterminati­on is the execution; So I understand him] lest they should make God the Author of Sin: but these fear where no fear is. The Scripture speaketh roundly, ascribing both to God, Act. 2.23. [N. B.] Peter saith not only [...], by the foreknowledg; but [...], determinate counsel; which implieth a positive Decree. So far he: and for ought I know consonantly to the constant sense of Prote­stantism, till now of late that it grows weary of it self, if we may judg of its present humour by Mr H. and Mr. B.) And by these sound Interpretations we may easi­ly judg, whether Mr. H.'s gloss upon Act. 4.28. doth not corrupt the Text. Let us hear it, if our patience can bear such an exercise. That is, God foreseeing wicked hands would be prompt and read for this tragick enterprise, his Soveraign power and wise counsel concur­red with his foreknowledg, so only, and not with less latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignity, than to let it proceed unto this execution, Let. p. 29. And soon after, Which purpose (viz.) of Christs to give himself to be a propitiation [Page 45]for the sins of men by dying, it was determi­ned [by God] not to hinder prepared hands to execute in this way, p. 30. These words plainly imply a denial of Gods foreknowledg of the Death of Christ, as consequent to his Decree of that event, (which is sufficiently confirmed by the Scriptures now quoted a­gainst that denial) and they imply an affirma­tion of a foreknowledg of Christs Death an­tecedent to Gods Decree; and so make a confusion (where a distinction ought to be kept) between Gods foreknowledg of pos­sibles and futures; or of what may, and of what shall come to pass; and run Mr. H. into this absurdity, to deny that any De­cree passed upon the Death of Christ at all. For to what end should he pass a Decree, if he foreknew it would come to pass with­out it? I cannot conceive how Mr. H. can rid his hands of this absurdity, unless he shall affirm, the passion, but not the action, the death of Christ, but not their agency who put him to death was the object of Gods De­cree. But then Austin will correct him by his gloss upon that Text, 1 Pet. 3.17, For it is better, if the will of God be so, that ye suffer for well-doing than for evil doing. Sancti affliguntur secundum Dei voluntatem, &c. i.e. The Saints are afflicted according to the will of God, but they cannot suffer un­less wicked men act. He that wills the pas­sion, [Page 46]wills the action. Aug. in Enchir. c. 100. And the Philosopher will fall foul upon him with his naxim, Actio & Passio sunt idem motus. i.e. Action and Passion are one and the same motion. And differ but as the way from London to York, and from York to London; and but as the ascent and descent of the same Hill. And so it cannot be preten­ded with any colour, that the Decree of God includes the Passion of Christ, and excludes the Jews and Gentiles action about it. I will dismiss Mr. H. as to this Text without fur­ther exagitation, when I have but minded him of a passage of the acute Twisse, (who I presume, is one of those pious and learned men, to whom his reverence is not extinguished, notwithstanding the badness of their opinion about Predetermination, Post. p. 49.) Dictata ista Jesuitica, &c. Those Jesuitical dictates of the foreseen determination of the humane will before Gods Decree, are not the dictates disse­rentium Theologorum, sed somniantium. i.e. Of Divines disputing, but dreaming. Twiss. Vind. Gr. L. 2. p. 1. Digr. 2. c. 1. p. 31. And so I have cried you quittance, one dream for an­other. [Let. p. 42.]

2. By reason we shall demonstrate, that Gods foreknowledg of all future contingen­cies depend upon his Decree. And I shall chuse to borrow (because I have none of my own better) that of Dr. Twisse, which hath [Page 47]been esteemed irrefragable, says the Learned Strangius, who yet opposes it, but not with strength enough to overthrow it; and hath done us the favour to reduce the whole process of the Argumentation into form. De Vol. Dei, &c. l. 3. c. 9. p. 626.

Arg. 1. What is future only by the Decree of God, that God necessarily foreknew by his Decree. But every future contingent is future only by the Decree of God. Ergo, every fu­ture contingent did God necessarily foreknow by his Decree.

2. The Minor proved. That which is fu­ture from Eternity, that is not future but by Gods Decree. But every future contingent is future from Eternity. Ergo, every future contingent is future only by the Decree of God.

3. The Major of the last Syllogism proved. That which from Eternity passed out of the con­dition of a thing possible, into the condition of a thing future, that is not future but by Gods Decree. But that which is future from Eter­nity did pass from Eternity out of the con­dition of a thing possible into the condition of a thing future. Ergo, That which is future from Eternity is not future but by Gods De­cree.

4. The Major of the last Syllogism pro­ved. That which from Eternity passed out of the condition of a thing possible into the con­dition [Page 48]of a thing future, had for the cause of that passage the Decree of God, or no cause at all. But it cannot be said it had no cause at all. Ergo, only the Decree of God was the cause of that passage out of the condition of a thing possible into the condition of a thing future.

5. The Minor of the last Syllogism pro­ved. Future contingents are either future in their own nature, or not future but by some cause determining their indifferent nature. But future contingents are not future in their own nature; else it would follow, that they should be always future, and never become present. For what agrees to any thing of its own nature, agrees to it inseparably. Ergo, future con­tingents must needs be future from some cause.

6. The Major of the same fourth Syllo­gism proved. If there be any cause why any thing passeth from Eternity out of the condi­tion of a possible thing into the condition of a future, that cause must be either something without God, or in God; and if in God, either that cause shall be the essence of God, or the knowledg of God, or the will and decree of God. But the cause of any thing becoming of possible future, is neither any thing without God, nor the essence or the knowledg of God. Ergo, it is only the will or decree of God.

7. The Minor of the last Syllogism pro­ved [Page 49]by parts. For first, nothing out of God could be the cause, because that passage (which they call futurition) was made from eternity, and therefore the cause thereof must be from eternity. But nothing is eternal besides God. Nor can the knowledg of God be the cause; for that severed from his will, doth rather sup­pose, than make things future. Moreover, if the Essence of God were the cause of this pas­sage of things from possibility to futurity, it must either be said to be the cause as acting ne­cessarily or freely. Not the former, for then all future things would fall out necessarily, and none would fall out contingently and free­ly. But God in things to be created, or created, hath done, nor doth any thing by necessity of na­ture, but freely. If the Essence of God be said to be the cause of the passage of things from possibility into futurity, as acting freely, this is to grant, that the will of God and the deter­mination thereof is the cause why any contin­gent from eternity passeth out of the condition of an indifferent thing to be or not to be, into the condition of a thing future, or to deter­mine the futurition of it. It remains therefore that the Decree of God, or the Decreeing will of God, be alone the cause of futurition (if you will admit the phrase) and of its effect. Thus far Dr. Twisse.

I desire the Reader to take notice, That though I have a great reverence for Dr. [Page 50] Twisse, and do judg the process of the above­cited Argument invincible as to the main; yet I am not clear in my apprehension, that the third Syllogism is in sense different from the second, (as Strangius objects against it with some probability.) Nor yet do I whol­ly dislike Strangius his alteration of the terms of both the Majors of the second and third Syllogism, thus: That which from eter­nity was possible so, as that it also had the condition of a thing future, its futurition is from the Decree of God. But every future con­tingent was from eternity possible so, as that it also had the condition of a thing future. Ergo, the futurition of every future contin­gent is from the Decree of God. And then the fourth Syllogism will be the proof of the Major of the second, (leaving out the third) and the words must be the same; and so the argument runs on without any further rub, unless perhaps the reason gi­ven in the fifth Syllogism, Why contingent things are not future in their own nature, be­cause then it would follow, that they should be always future, and never become present.

For I confess ingenuously, that I cannot answer Strangius contrary consequent from that antecedent; That if future contingents were necessarily future, whether in their own nature, or in respect of any other cause, as the [...] of God, they must necessarily be pre­sent [Page 51]some time or other. For to be future is nothing else than that a thing should some­time be present. Strang. p. 630.

And these alterations (though I will not positively assert to be needful, as not having had time to examine Strangius throughly since he came to my hands, (which was long after Mr. H's Letter and Postscript came out,) yet I am the more willing to admit, that I may in part wipe off the aspersion Mr. H. casts upon many of us, who hold Prede­termination, That whatsoever strength there may be in arguments and replys to and fro in this matter, that which hath too apparently had greatest actual efficacy with many, hath been the authority and name of this and that man of reputation. Let. p. 42.

As to all the rest of the Doctor's Argu­ments, (if I be not a partial judg of my own abilities, an infirmity of lapsed humane nature, which I cannot challenge an exemp­tion from,) I seem to my self able to answer Strangius's subtil evasions, and should will­ingly have done it, but that I doubt not but I shall meet with them in Mr. H's threatened Rejoinder, in which I expect Mr. H. should answer distinctly, by denial or distinction, to some Proposition in these Syllogisms; and then let him rhetoricate as he pleases in the amplification.

We have now dispatched the two Argu­ments [Page 52]in the Letter, there remain three in the Postscript cited out of Mr. Gale's Anim­adversions upon the Letter; which, though modestly proposed by way of Question, will constringe our Learned Adversary.

Arg. 3. Whether there be any action of man on earth so good, which hath not some mix­ture of sin in it? And if God concur to the substrate matter of it as good, must he not ne­cessarily concur to the substrate matter as sin­ful? for is not the substrate matter of the act, both as good and sinful the same? Postscr. p. 32.

Mr. H's Answ. 1. It seems then that God doth concur to the matter of an action as sinful; which is honestly acknowledged, since by his principles it cannot be denied: though most of his way mince the business, and say, the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful, not as sinful. Ibid. & pag. 33. So Mr. H.

Reply. Mr. H. misrepresents Mr. Gale's meaning: for it is not, that God concurs to the sinfulness of the action, but to the action; which though physically one indivi­dual action, yet is morally diversified in re­spect of its conformity and difformity to the Law of God: so that considering the natu­ral action in concreto, with the good or evil adhering to it, it is no less true, that God concurs to the action that hath evil adhering [Page 53]to it, than that he concurs to the action that hath good adhering to it. This premised, to the fault he finds with the distinction, I answer, that I doubt he must recur to it himself, when he is pres­sed, to know how Gods concurrence immedi­ate to actions sinful will free him from the imputation of being the Author of Sin: yea, worse than so, I cannot imagine, but that as to those actions, which he calls in themselves sinful, he must own what he would fasten upon Mr. Gale, that God doth immediately concur to the matter of an action as sinful; for 'tis impossible to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsecally evil action, (as he tells us) Let. p. 33. [of which hereafter.)

Mr. H's Answ. 2. This I am to consider as an argument for Gods Predeterminative con­currence to wicked actions. And thus it must be conceived, that if God concur by determina­tive influence to the imperfectly good actions of faith, love, &c. therefore to the acts of enmity against himself, cursing, idolatry, &c. To which (besides an unseemly scoff, is it not a mighty consequence?) Mr. H. answers divers things, as reasons for the denial of the consequence.

1. That it is infirm, because the actions in the antecedent are good, quoad substantiam, but these in the consequent are in the substance of them evil. Post. p. 33.

Reply 1. Mr. Gale doth not limit wicked [Page 54]actions to those that are in the substance of them evil, but ampliates the term to all whatsoever so that supposing the conse­quence were not good to such actions as Mr. H. instanceth in; yet it may be good to those actions that are evil, quoad finem & circumstantias, as to the end and circumstan­ces. For instance, to be hospitable, or chari­table out of vain-glory, to be reading the Scriptures at home, when we should attend upon publick worship, &c. and Mr. H. seems to yield it.

2. I am not yet convinced that there are any actions evil, quoad substantiam. And it is a wonder to me, that our Learned Anta­gonist should exact of us an implicite faith of that Position. It ill becomes his generosi­ty so basely to beg the question. Let him prove that, and I will be his Proselyte as to antipredetermination of such actions. But because he neglecteth the duty he owes to his Hypothesis, I will perform mine to my own anon.

2. Mr. H. denies the consequence by an argument a pari; That we our selves can in a remoter kind concur to the actions of others, yet it doth not follow, that because we may assord our leading concurrence to actions im­perfectly good, that therefore we may afford it to those that are down right evil; because to prayer, therefore to cursing and swearing, [Page 55]and then ruin men for the actions we have induced them unto. I [...]d. & p. 34.

Repl. 1. In general 'tis unsafe arguing a pari, from the creature to God; that what the former may not do, neither may the lat­ter. The creature is bound to hinder all the sin that he can; but if God were under such an obligation, there would not only have been so much sin as the world affords, but in­deed none at all. And you your self discourse at large of the incongruity of an universal de­terminative influence to good actions; which yet would have made an admirable Meta­morphosis of all the Sinners in the world into Saints; (at least if in those expressions you include, infusion of grace, which divine Predetermination of good actions presuppo­ses, as I have proved before.)

2. If your arguing be forcible as to this instance, I see not, but you reflect as high­ly upon God by the immediate concurrence you grant to all actions of the Creatures, Post. p. 28. For will it not follow, that God af­fords men a leading concurrence to actions down-right evil, and then ruins them for those actions, which were as much his as theirs? I am too dull to imagine how you can extricate your self, but by eating your words, and distinguishing of concurrence, as you do of Predetermination; that God concurs to actions that are imperfectly [Page 56]good, but not to those that are down-right evil.

3. Mr. H's answer touches not the intend­ment of Mr. Gale's argument, which is to e­vince upon Mr. H's own assertion, that as God predetermines to actions imperfectly good; so by the like reason he may predetermine to actions that are perfectly evil. And the ground of the consequence is this, that if in actions imperfectly good, the evil and the good of the actions are so divided between the creature and God, that only the former is the Creatures, and the latter Gods; whilst yet the natural actions themselves are common to both, to God as the first, to the Creature as the second cause; why may not we infer that in actions perfectly evil, the action is common to God and the Creature, but the evil of it, the Creatures peculiar, and no more chargeable upon God, than in the other instance. And this I take for an irrefragable Argument, ad hominem, which if Mr. H. can satisfie, I am silenced.

4. It is an unaccountable inadvertency, (for to salve his honour, so I will call it, rather than a slip of Judgment) to pro­duce cursing and swearing for instances of actions down-right, or for the substance of them evil. I thought that Davids frequent cursing of wicked men in the Psalms, and [Page 57] Pauls swearing, Before God I lye not, Gal. 1.20. had not passed under so bad a cha­racter; but did rest assured, that (as the actions in themselves are capable, so in them) they were hallowed by their man­ner and end.

5. To what end Mr. Howe closes with this clause, And then ruine men for the actions we have induced them to, is not hard to conjecture (viz.) to insinuate, that our Do­ctrine represents God under the same cha­racter with the Devil, who induces men to sin, and then torments them for it. But what is said untruly (as well as Prophane­ly) of the Devil, is verified of our Do­ctrine, That it is not so black as it is paint­ed. Mr. Howe indeed tells Mr. Gale, you'l say God may rather, and adds as his own sense, But sure he can do so much less than you, p. 34. This suggestion deserves a seve­rer animadversion than I shall make upon it. In general, I say 'tis an odious slander. For we in no sense assert that God indu­ces men to wicked actions, not morally, for we constantly affirm, that his commands, threats, are all against it; not Physically, for so he determines men to actions, not to the wickedness of them, nor does he ruine men for what he contributes by Pre­determination, or immediate concurrence to the Production of (viz.) the natural [Page 58]actions he moves to and joins in.

Answ. 3. Mr. Howe denies the conse­quence from the evidence of two Scrip­tures compared, Luk. 6.9. Hos. 13.6. p. 35. but (which is strange) hath not directed us how he infers from them the denial of Mr. Gale's consequence, or how they shew a difference between the warrantableness of Gods concurring to the substrate matter of an action as good, which tends to mans sal­vation and blessedness, and to the substrate matter of all their evil actions [which tend to their ruine and misery]; we must there­fore guess at it as well as we can.

Reply. The former Scripture hath these words, Is it lawful on the sabbath days to do good or to do evil, to save life or to de­stroy? The latter these, O Israel, thou hast destroyed thy self, but in me is thine help: From the former Scripture, I presume, thus he argues: If it be unlawful to man to de­stroy life, then it is unlawful to God. But the antecedent is true, therefore the con­sequent. And he proves the consequence by the latter Scripture, by this Enthymeme; Gods word is to help man. Ergo, it is unlawful for him to destroy. And this, viz. that man destroys himself. Ergo, 'tis un­lawful for God to destroy him. To which, I return,

1. That the antecedent or minor of the [Page 59]first Syllogism, is not true universally, for for it is not unlawful for man to destroy life, se defendendo, i.e. in self-defence; but it must be limited to Homicide or mur­ther, which notes not barely the act of destroying life, but involves with it a vi­tiosity, or that act done in cases prohibi­ted by the divine Law.

2. Suppose it were, yet I deny the con­sequence, and you cannot be any whit-a­sed or relieved by the thin Sophistry, of on­ly a collusive ambiguity in the word [Lawful,] which you must have recourse to. For sup­pose you take it in the antecedent strictly, and in the consequent analogically, in the former, for the declared pleasure of a ruler to his Subject; in the latter, for an habi­tual fixed principle and rule of acting after one steady tenour, (which are both your own distinctions and explications of the word Law), Let. p. 41. yet the conse­quence is utterly false, because depending upon this false ground; that whatever man may not do in regard of Gods Law, God himself may not do, because of his own na­ture, or habitual fixed Principle and Rule of acting after one steady nature, (as you something odly describe it). In this sense the subtil Twisse rejects Zuinglius maxim, Quod nobis est Lex, Deo est ingenium & [Page 60]is Gods nature to himself. Though in another sense he admits it, That such obligation, as the divine Law lays upon us to do nothing repugnant to it, that Gods nature lays upon him to do nothing repugnant to it. Now then, though it be unlawful to man to kill in such cases as the Law exempts, yet it is not contrary to Gods nature to kill, and so not unlaw­ful to him.

3. To the Enthymeme, we deny the con­nexion, that because in [or from] God is mans help, that therefore it is unlawful for him to destroy, for how then does God own himself the author of all evils of suf­fering, Amos 3.6, Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it? And besides, we see not, such is the dimness of our sight, how the consequence would be proved thereby, were the connexion granted.

The proofs subjoined hang together so loosly, that I cannot make sense of them, and therefore will dismiss them.

Your general drift I am aware of, that you deny Predestination to evil actions, though you concede it to good, because it seems more congruous to the divine goodness to con­cur (a term that you will still use, though improper enough, to signifie that divine action, we call Predetermination, as hath been shewn once and again) to actions that [Page 61]have good in them, rather than to these that have evil in them, because the one tends to the salvation, the other to the destruction of man. To which I answer: This Argument, if it hath any weight will bear as hard upon immediate concurrence, which you grant to all actions, and so to sinful, as upon Predetermination; and whatever answer will relieve you, will with the same hand ease us. I will pause a little with the Rea­ders leave, and try my skill what answer I can excogitate for Mr. Howe, which will not be a common friend to us both, (as we have been hitherto one to another, and I hope shall remain notwithstanding this publick contest): I have thought out my thoughts, and they afford me but three Answers.

1. That immediate concurrence, as to sinful actions, divides between the action and the sinfulness; so that 'tis only the action as such, which is Gods and mans at once: the sinfulness of it is to be attribu­ted to man only. And this distinction is an open friend to us, and to which there­fore upon all fit occasions we pay our re­spects.

2. That if it be granted divine concur­rence is as immediate to evil, as to good actions, (so as hath been explained); yet that does not necessitate or compel the will [Page 62]to any elicite act, [i. e. inward acts of willing or nilling]: neither does Predeter­mination judg it self guilty, as to any such crime; for that does but put the crea­ture upon that action, which is produced by Gods immediate concurrence with it. And but that it waits a fitter time to speak out her mind, she could say, That she conceives not how she can compel the will to any act, without compelling God him­self: seeing one and the same act thereof, is as truly Gods as the creatures.

3. If immediate concurrence thinks her self disobliged to satisfie an inquisitive cu­riosity, as to the modus or manner how she joines with the creature in an action, to which sin does necessarily adhere, see­ing the thing it self is plain, that so strict is the dependance of the creature upon the Creator, that it cannot act without Gods immediate concurrence: Predetermination claims the same priviledg upon the like ground, that the creature cannot exert its natural powers, till they be applied to acti­on, nor determine it self to action, till it be determined; which determination can­not include a compulsion of the will, (which is the main, if not the only con­troversie), for if the will act spontaneous­ly, and from precedent deliberation, how is it forced? if it do not, how is it a will, i. e. a rational appetite?

Arg. 4. (which is Mr. Gale's second), is, There is no action so sinful, that it hath not some natural good as the substrate of it, Postsc. p. 36.

Answ. 1. To which Argument, proposed by way of Question, Mr. Howe answers, True.

Reply. But then, if that be true, your former position, that some actions are evil in the substance of them, p. 33. must needs be false. Let us but formalize the Oppo­sition thus: some actions are so sinful that they have no natural good, as the substrate matter of them; [which is the sense of the words just now quoted] no actions are so sinful that they have not some natural good, as the substrate matter of them; and it will appear, that they are propositions contra­dictory, and consequently, that they can­not both be true. They are two known Rules in Logick, contradictio est oppositio in­ter universalem & particularem Enunciati­onem [aut propositionem] And, Harum al­terutra semper vera, & altera semper falsa.

Answ. 2. Mr. Howe presently flinches, and Sophister-like, puts more into the con­clusion, than was in the premises. And what must be inferr'd (says he) viz. from his own concession, That therefore God must by a determinative influence produce every such action [what-ever reason there be against it].

Reply. Those words included in the se­miquadrates are injuriously foisted in. For Mr. Gale's Argument entirely is thus, If there be no action so sinful, that it hath not some natural good as the substrate of it, then God is the cause, (viz. by Predeterminati­on) of that natural good that is in every acti­on, sed verum prius; Ergo & Posterius. And indeed the Argument it self excludes any such addition. For there can be no reason against Gods production of what is good in any action, unless it be (what Mr. Howe objects) the accidental adherence of evil thereunto; which, if it be of any moment, militates as much against immedi­ate concurrence, (as hath been shown but now). That passage of Austins, oppor­tunely offers its service to us, as to the force of Mr. Gale's Argument, Deus boni tantummodo causa est, &c. i. e. God is only the cause of good, therefore he is not the An­thor of evil; because he is the Author of all things that are, which are so far good as they are. 'Tis indeed Mr. Gale's Argument in other terms.

Answ. 3. Mr. Howe pretends, Mr. Gale might better argue from his premises, The necessity of his producing every hour a new world; in which, there would be a great deal more of positive entity and natural goodness, Postsc. p. 36.

Reply. This is too great a scorn to be cast upon so learned a man, as Mr. Gale is well known to be. For there is no me­dium that can, with the least probability, be judged likely to be able to tack Mr. Gales Antecedent, and Mr. Howes conse­quent together. To be sure, not that which he suggests; for that is false and unwor­thy of a Philosopher, at least if these max­imes be true, substantia non recipit magis & minus; ens & bonum convertibile; though 'tis easie to conceive there would be more positive Beings in number, upon Mr. Howe's supposition, yet 'tis hard to conceive there would be a great deal more of positive en­tity, and so of natural goodness in the new world, than is already in the old one.

Answ. 4. The natural goodness that is in the Entity of an action, is no such invi­tation to the Holy God, by determinative in­fluence to produce it, as that he should offer violence to his own nature, and stain the justice and honour of his government, by ma­king it to be done, and then punish it, being done, p. 36.

Reply. 1. The natural goodness of an action, hath invitation enough in it to in­duce God to produce it, both because it is good, and because it cannot be done with­out him.

2. By Mr. Howe's own concession, some­thing or other does induce God to produce it, by giving and conserving the powers, and immediate concurrence to the act of those powers.

3. It remains upon Mr. Howe to prove, that the producing of an action by deter­minative influence, is more liable to those absurdities he names, than the producing it any other way, (except what Duran­dus pitches upon; which if he will also own, then I know what I have to rejoyn). In the interim, I am ashamed he should clog his Reader with, crambe bis cocta, coleworts twice sod; I mean, an odious consequence imposed upon predeterminative influence, that it offers violence to Gods nature, and stains the justice and honour of his Government; which we shall deny, till he hath pro­ved, that by it God makes an action to be done, i. e. in his sense necessitates it to be done, and then punishes it being done; which last clause is very absurd in its con­nexion, for it supposes a contradiction, viz. that the action is naturally good, and yet, that God punishes the natural goodness in it.

Arg. 5. (which is Mr. Gale's third and last). The denial of Predetermination, even of sinful actions as such, cuts off the most illustrious part of divine providence in [Page 67]governing the lower world, Postsc. p. 33.

Answ. I am ashamed to answer it. Name any act of providence, I hereby deny, if you can, ibid. So Mr. Howe.

Reply. 1. This act of providence thereby you deny, which in words you own, to li­mit and moderate sinful actions, Postsc. p. 45. This will appear by considering what in­fluence your mediate or immediate concur­rence (for you do so fluctuate, that I know not which of the two you will abide by), can have upon this effect. The mediate can have none, for that is nothing else but a conservation of the being, with its powers and faculties, and so but abusively called concurrence or concourse; and so does but keep the powers indeterminate, not deter­mine, nor limit their acts: nor yet can im­mediate limit any action, because as such, it is neither before nor after the creatures action, but with it. The withdrawing of concourse immediate, may hinder, I grant, the creatures action: but whether God does ever withdraw it or no, Strangius. L. 1. c. 11. p. 65. doubts, and so may you, perhaps, upon his ground. Let us, for the exem­plification of this limitation, consider it, with respect to those things which it is conversant about.

1. As to the objects of its acts; as, that Absaloms Adultery with Davids wifes, ra­ther [Page 68]than any other women. This is plain, by comparing 2 Sam. 12.11. with Chap. 16.22. In the former place, the words are, Thus saith the Lord, Behold, I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house: and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour; and he shall lye with thy wives in the sight of the Sun. In the latter place the event answers the threat. And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of all Israel.

2. As to the time, when, or how long the sinful acts shall be exercised about their ob­jects. When, Gen. 45.5, God did send me before you to preserve life, says Joseph to his Brethren; whereas, they might not have sold him, till the famine came. How long; That is intimated in Psal. 125.3, The rod of the wicked shall not rest upon the lot of the Righteous.

3. As to the event, or issue of the acti­ons. That an oppressour shall impove­rish, not utterly undo him he does op­press: that he who strikes his neighbour with an intent to kill him, shall yet but wound him.

4. As to the decree of the act, Psal. 76.10, Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath thou shalt re­strain, [...], cinges, ligabis; which I un­derstand [Page 69]of binding up the faculty, that it put not forth its utmost force in the act issuing from it: as when a man is but in a pet, as we say, not outragiously angry. Thus God makes as great a difference be­tween the same man and himself, as a Ri­der does when he uses a strait rein, or lays the bridle on his Horses neck.

2. The over-ruling and disposing of a sinful action to good, against the design and inclination of the sinful Agent, Postsc. p. 45. n. 10. is an act of Providence, which Mr Howe denies, in the denial of Prede­termination. For immediate concurrence is all that Mr. Howe allows of; which, be­ing but Gods action with the creature, and not existent before nor after it, can­not therefore direct the action to any end. And particularly in punishing one sin with another. As in the instance of Absalom; his Adultery with his Fathers Concubines, was a punishment of Davids Adultery with Ʋriah's Wife. In this and such like in­stances, God is the Author, ordinis in ma­lo, though not mali, as the most learned Dr. Field, Dean of of Gloucester, expresses it, of the Church, p. 131, 132). i. e. God is the Author of the order of consequence, that one evil shall follow another, and have the reason of a punishment thereof; which how he can be, is no way explicable, but [Page 70]by the Doctrine of Predetermination which, importing an application of the creature to action, and to one rather than another, and at one time rather than ano­ther, &c. (as hath been shown) gives an easie account, how God may dispose of sin­ful actions to good ends, and particularly to this, to be punishments of preceding sins.

And now, it is high time that we take a view of Mr. Howe's Arguments, for the negative of the Question hitherto discussed, for which we must return to his Letter again, where he states the Thesis he op­poses, as importing an irresistble predeter­minative concurrence to all actions of the creature, even to those that are in them­selves most malignantly wicked, Let. p. 32.

Reply. Here are divers ambiguities in the terms (besides that of predeterminative con­currence, which hath been faulted already, as not very proper).

1. The term irresistible; which may ei­ther import, a necessity of infallibility, as to the event, or a necessity of coaction or compulsion. If he takes it in the former sense, 'tis altogether improperly. For ir­resistible, imports a relation of the action of the agent, to some resistance or coun­teraction of the patient; as when the wa­ter endeavours to put out the fire, which [Page 71]would lick it up; or in free agents, when a man with all his strength resists him that by force would carry him away Prisoner. If he understands the term in the latter and proper sense, I understand not why he im­poses the term upon our Thesis; for we do not assert any compulsion in Predeterminati­on of the will, nor can we conceive it pos­sible in any case; not if we should suppose per impossibile, a rational creature made un­der no Law at all; for then as it would have a power, and also an inclination to use it, so there would be no need of any force to re­duce it to act; not supposing it (as it is) under a Law, would there be any need of compulsion, not as to good actions, be­cause there are gracious habits to dispose the will to actions congenerous; not as to evil actions, (no not if God did predeter­mine to them as such) for the will in re­gard of sinful habits is of it self inclined enough to any evil actions.

2. The term, in themselves most malignant­ly wicked. To which I say, that it may be understood in a double sense, either with re­spect, to the different kind of Laws that pro­hibit actions, thus; Those actions are said to be in themselves evil which are a breach of the Law of nature, and so are opposed to those which are evil only by a positive law; or else with reference to the degrees of recti­tude [Page 72]in one and the same Law; thus some a­ctions are said to be in themselves evil, when they are evil in regard of their object, as that is opposed to the end and circumstances. Thus the hatred of God, and Adultery, are in themselves evil, because no end or circum­stance can make them good; but giving Alms out of vain glory is not in it self evil, because changing the end, the action is good, that before was bad.

But Mr. H. understands the term in ano­ther sense, and overlooks the genuine signifi­cation of it; viz. thus, that wickedness is of the essence of some actions. This I collect from that clause, Nothing is more apparent­ly a simple and most strictly natural impossi­bility, than to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsecally evil action, Let. p. 33. Now 'tis plain enough, if we take the hatred of God, which is Mr. H's instance of an a­ction in it self evil, that the evil of that a­ction is separable from it, for the same pas­sion, if the Devil be the object of it, is good. And the evil of this action is as separable from it, as in actions that are evil, as to their circumstances. As to read the Scriptures, when it is our present duty to hearken to the Sermon. The reason is the same in both, the action of hatred is evil only in regard of the undue object, and the action of reading the Scriptures only in regard of the undue cir­cumstance [Page 73]of time. And if Mr. H. under­stands actions in themselves evil, of actions es­sentially evil, let him enjoy his own satisfa­ction, but let him not impose it upon us, who look upon it as one of the greatest absurdi­ties a learned man can be guilty of belie­ving. To state the Question therefore aright (though we have done it before) we say, that we reject the term irresistible, as not being in the Question, but being a begging of the Question, because it supposes some force on Gods part the Agent, which the Creature as far as it can resists. And we dis­own the distinction of actions, which Mr. H. introduces into the Question, for we know of none that are in themselves malignantly wicked; that is (in his sense) essentially evil. But that which we assert is, That God does predetermine the Creature as well to the a­ctions that are evil, as to those that are good. Let us now hear his Arguments against our Assertion.

Arg. 1. If there be an irresistible deter­minative concurrence to all, and so to wicked actions of the Creature, then the matter of all Gods Laws in reference to all wicked actions was a simple and most strictly natural im­possibility. But the Antecedent is, Therefore we must own the consequent, Let. p. 32.

Ans. 1. In general, If we take his words simply as they found, we see not but we may [Page 74]grant the whole, with as little inconvenience to our assertion as to his. For the conse­quence will be the same, if some of his asser­tions be placed for an Antecedent in the room of ours. If God does certainly fore­know all, and so all wicked actions of the Creature, then for the Creature not to do those wicked actions, was a simple and most strictly natural impossibility. For 'tis as truly impossible that ev [...]ts should not be such as God fore [...]ows they will be; as that men should yield obedience to the Laws of God, when God hinders them thorugh his own irresistible counteraction, Mr. H's phrase p. 37. Again, we may argue thus, If there be an irresistible determinative concurrence to all good actions of the Creature, then the matter of all Gods Laws in reference to all good actions was a simple and most strict­ly natural impossibility; i.e. it is simply im­possible, that good men should not do those good actions, exacted of them by the Law. As to this last, I cannot apprehend any reason why Predeterminative concur­rence to evil actions should make the avoi­ding of them impossible; and the like con­currence to good actions should leave the neglect of them possible.

2. But because Mr. H. intends more by Impossibility than the Predeterminants can allow him, we shall borrow a little learning [Page 75]from the Schools for the explication of it. It is a Question in Metaphysicks, An possibile & contingens a parte rei aequipolleant; i.e. Whether for a thing to be possible and con­tingent, [...] of the same signification or im­port? To which it is answered affirmative­ly, Si possibile accipiatur pro eo quod sese ha­bet indifferenter ut sit; i. e. If for a thing to be possible be taken for an indifferency to be or not to be. And by the like reason im­possible and necessary must be terms equipol­lent, if impossible be taken for that which is not indifferent to be, and not to be; or, which as it is not, so nor can it be. 'Tis true in­deed, that Impossible is [...]ontrary to Necessa­ry; as Necessary is taken generally for that which cannot but be, and Impossible for that which cannot be: yet these two are equipollent, if the one be affirmed, the o­ther denied; for that which is necessary to be, is impossible not to be; and that which is necessary not to be, is impossible to be; and on the other hand, That which is im­possible to be, is necessary not to be; and that which is impossible not to be, is ne­cessary to be. We must therefore make a little enquiry into the kinds of necessity, which as to things is either simple, or com­pound. The latter (for the former is irrela­tive to our business) agrees to things in their cohesion or connexion each with other; this [Page 76]is divided into a necessity of the consequent, and of consequence, or absolute, and respective. The former is a connexion of those things which cannot be sever'd without a contra­diction; i.e. destroying the nature of their subject. So justice to God, reason to man, agree so necessarily to their subjects, that if you deny either, you do in effect deny them to be what they are, The latter, a necessity whereby those things that are not in their own nature conjoined, are yet upon supposi­tion of something antecedent conjoined for this or that time. Whence Baronius calls the former, a necessity of nature; the latter, an accidental necessity. Of this latter sort is this example, If Islanders will export Goods out of their own Country, they must make use of Ships. And from these modes of necessi­ty it is easie to collect the modes of Impossi­bility, That something is, said to be impossi­ble, either absolutely, which involves a con­tradiction, as for a stone to be a man; or respectively, as if a man will fly that he should have wings. And here we may stop a while and observe how Mr. H. hath gratified his own unscholastick humour, in neglecting the strictness of Scholastick terms, to the over­throw of his own assertion. For I am much mistaken if it is not plain enough that Mr. H. confounds the distinction of necessity or im­possibility, into absolute and respective; and [Page 77]makes the matter of Gods Laws, &c. upon supposition of Gods irresistible determinati­on to wicked actions, to be an impossibility of both kinds, and so of neither. For if it be an impossibility only upon Hypothesis of Determinative influence, how is it a simple and strictly natural impossibility? If it be a simple, &c. impossibility, how is it an impossibility only upon an Hypothesis? [viz. that now mentioned.]

Way being thus made by explication of the Terms, to the antecedent or minor, I answer by denial, That the Determinative Influence to all wicked actions we assert, does infer any coaction on the Will.

Arg. If Determination of the Will im­ports Coaction, or is inconsistent with the freedom of the Will; then it is either from some general reason agreeing to all Deter­mination, or from some special reason agree­ing only to this Determination, viz. to sin­ful actions; but neither of these: Ergo, it does not import any such thing at all; no Determination of the Will in general does import Coaction, or destroy its liberty.

1. Upon Mr. H's own concession of a Predetermination of good actions, Post. p. 39. which I presume he will not assirm to be compulsory; yet because I cannot see a rea­son why he should not, (as well as of evil actions) I will suppose him to acknowledg [Page 78]it. And then I would demand whether God compels men to the natural actions as such, or to them as morally good. Not to the natu­ral actions as such, but to them there is no need of it, for the powers that produce them, are apt and habile for any congenerous acti­on, by Mr. H's confession, Post. p. 45. Not to the actions as good, for the powers be­ing renewed by Grace, (so far as they are such) need but an excitation, not a com­pulsion.

2. It appears from the general principle of Divines, Libertas a coactione est essenti­alis voluntatis proprietas; i. e. That liberty from force and compulsion is an essential pro­perty of the will. Which may be thus evin­ced. 1. By the nature of the wills liberty, that it is [...], spontaneum in­tellectuale; i.e. spontaneum praeeunte intelle­ctus lumine vel judicio, as Strang. acknow­ledges, De Vol. Dei, p. 686. That is, an In­tellectual spontaneity. A spontaneity in op­position to the acting of necessary agents, such as the Sun in shining; and Intellectual, to distinguish it from that spontaneity which agrees to brutes, or to mankind, who are acted by fancy, without previous judg­ment, as Infants, Fools, Mad-men, who whilest they remain such, are brutes in the shape of men and women.

2. It appears by the repugnancy of the [Page 79]terms in conjunction. For the Will to be for­ced is but invita aliquid velle, i. e. to will any thing unwillingly; which were to will and not will the same object at the same time, which is an implicit contradiction.

2. 'Tis not from any peculiar reason a­greeing to sinful actions. If there be any, Mr. H. would befriend the world to bring it to light. Which will appear,

1. Upon Mr. H's grounds, if Coaction be inseparable from compulsion, upon any special reason agreeing to one sort of acti­ons, rather than another, it must be with respect to good actions, not to evil. For God determines the Will by irresistible grace, to such actions as by nature since the fall it is averse unto; and remains so in a degree after the blessed change it hath un­dergone: whereas the Will having a natu­ral Bias to evil, [as it is not, so nor] does it need to be predetermined, i.e. forced, [if Mr. Howe be a faithful interpreter of the word.]

2. There are manifest indications of li­berty in sinful actions, pregnant proofs that man hath not only potentiam in se liberam, but liberum usum potentiae; i.e. a power in it self free, but as to them a free use of his power. An instance of his own, hatred of God, will serve our turn. This act must be sponta­neous, or 'tis not the act of an humane will, [Page 80]which is an [intellectual] appetite; no, nor of a sensitive appetite, for to this last spon­taneity is essential, and intellectual too: and so it is, for it proceeds from, and is guided by a precedent [though mistaken] judgment of the understanding, which represents God to him as a Tyrant, that abuses his authority by needless restraints upon mans natural in­clinations. Suppose to unchastity with any woman whose skin and features attract his liking. Joseph's Brethrens hatred of him, was determined by God to the selling, rather than killing of him; yet as they acted spon­taneously, so upon precedent consideration. Two Reasons determined their choice of the milder course of the two they had in view, He is our Brother, and our Flesh, and what profit is it if we slay him, and conceal his blood? Gen. 37.26.

3. If there be any reason to infer Coaction from Predetermination, it must be the incon­sistency of necessity on Gods part, and con­tingency on mans: Which if it be universal­ly affirmed,

1. Then I know not how Mr. Howe will salve the objection against immediate concur­rence, [which he seems to grant,] that there­by the liberty of the will seems to be lost, both as to the exercise and specification of the act. Unless as Burgesdicius does, (whose solution offers it service, he being the first Metaphy­sick [Page 81]Author that ever I read,) That the con­course of God takes not away the contingen­cy of voluntary actions, because it does not precede the action of the second cause. Burg. Met. l. 2. c. 11. n. 9. But then that reason (if assented to) will give a mortal wound to the Predestination (which certainly precedes them) of good actions, which Mr. H. ac­knowledges: or if he will loose the knot artificially, he must say that the concourse of God is so accommodated to the nature and manner of the creatures acting, that notwithstanding it, natural causes act neces­sarily, and voluntary causes contingently, or freely; and then the same answer will fit Predetermination of free agents to all their actions.

2. The denial of the consistency between liberty and necessity in general, will bear as hard upon (what we grant, and Mr. H. cannot deny) actions in themselves good, as Amor Dei, the love of God; as it can do upon (what we deny, and you assert) actions in themselves evil, as odium Dei, the hatred of God. And harder, for the Will is but in part free to good actions, when as 'tis wholly free, I mean disposed and inclined to evil actions. We are now the better prepa­red by way thus made, to answer Mr. H's proofs of his consequence. Which are,

1. Not to do an action whereto the agent [Page 82]is determined by an infinite power is impossi­ble, Let. p. 33. Ergo, not to do wicked acti­ons, [for that's the sum of his consequent, in his Hyp. Syll. whereof this Enthymeme is a proof] to which the creature is deter­mined is impossible.

Rep. 1. In general, that [supposing his Antecedent true, as 'tis in the sense before given] yet the impossibility he speaks of is not a simple and most strictly natural impos­sibility, which he before asserted; but an impossibility respective, to the determination of an infinite power, (as hath been pro­ved.)

R. 2. That if he intends a respective or con­ditional impossibility, I grant his Enthymeme, for it hurts our Hypothesis no more than his, viz. of determination to good actions. For all determination does infer a necessity, that the thing determined should be, as it is deter­mined to be; or an impossibility, that the thing determined should not be, as it is de­termined to be.

Rep. 3. If we must supply from the Hy­poth. major, the term irresistibly to mo­difie the determination he opposes, and we must understand by it compulsion or force, we again concede the whole without any disadvantage to us. And so we may rid our hands of it, as an ignoble begging of the Question, for that was incumbent on [Page 83]him to prove, not to take for granted, that our Predetermination imports a Co­action.

Mr. H's second Enthymeme is this, To separate the malignity of an action intrinse­cally evil is impossible, p. 33. Ergo, not to do such wicked actions to which the crea­ture is determined, is impossible.

Rep. 1. Granting his Antecedent for Ar­guments sake, I cannot imagine how he will defend the immediate concurrence of God to all the actions of his creatures; and so to sinful actions, and so to those (if there be any such) as are in themselves evil, against the charge of involving God in the pro­duction of sinful actions, as such, seeing by Divine immediate concurrence the intrin­secally evil action is as much Gods as mans action. Baronius and Strangius (who are as Heterodox as Mr. H.) do both confess, that it is very hard to shew how God may be freed from that charge, when-as he co-ope­rates with the creature to every sinful action. Bar. Met. 98. D. 3. n. 72. Strang. de Vol. Dei. p. 344, 372. Though Mr. H. would lay the great difficulty and encumbrance infer'd up­on our Religion, only upon Predetermina­tive concourse to wicked actions. Yet, the Learned Amesius, a Predeterminant, tells us not without reason, Deformitas moralis ma­gis annexa videtur actui in exercito, quam [Page 84]in applicatione ad agendum. Cont. Grev. p. 189. i.e. Moral deformity seems more closely joined to action, than to application unto action. For an object may be inno­cently presented to the eye, which may put a man upon action, viz. unchast de­sires.

Rep. 2. We will grant the Antecedent, ex animo, because it does implicate, that there should be any such action. 'Tis a received maxim, Malum est in bono, tan­quam in subjecto, i.e. Evil is in good, as in its subject. And Augustine's saying is well known, and as well approved, Ipsum quan­tulum-cunque esse bonum est, quia summum esse bonum est. De vera Rel. c. 34. i.e. Be­ing it self how inconsiderable soever is good, because the chiefest Being is good.

R. 3. We deny that there cannot be a separation of an action, from the evil of it. Of this separation there are many in­stances: supposing Usury lawful, (which I will not now dispute) I may lawfully take up money at use at Ten pounds per Cent. (if my necessity require it) when the Interest allowed by Law (which to break in matters of publick benefit is sinful) is but 6 l. A Christian Prince may urge the great Turk to swear to Articles of Peace, though the former knows the latter will swear by his Mahomet. These are instan­ces [Page 85]of our concurrence to the actions of o­thers in a remoter kind, [than God does concur to the actions of his creature] as Mr. H. speaks in another case, Post. p. 33. And by the like reason may God Prede­terminatively concur (as Mr. H. delights to speak, though not accurately) to an acti­on that is evil, and yet not to the evil of it; which the Learned Twisse illustrates by divers pretty similitudes. An Horseman that puts on a lame horse to go, is the cause of his motion, not of his halting, that pro­ceeds from some hurt in his leg, the instru­ment of motion. The Sun by his warmth makes the dunghill stink, of which stink that that warmth is not the cause appears, in that the very same influence draws forth a fra­grant savour from a bed of Roses. That the dunghill smells is from the Suns drawing forth the vapour [...], but that it smells ill is from the condition of the matter. The up­per-wheel of a Clock, though by its motion it draws along with it an under-wheel, that is irregular in its motion, yet it is not the cause of that irregularity. When a dexterous Pen­man writes upon sinking paper he makes [pothooks, as we say of children that be­gin to learn the art of writing] blots ra­ther than letters, which yet is not his fault, but the Papers. Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 2. p. 1 a. p. 26.

Reply. 4. There must needs be a separa­tion [and therefore 'tis possible to be] between actions, and the evil of them up­on Mr. Howe's own Hypothesis (viz.) That God does predetermine to all good acti­ons, which in the present state are but im­perfectly good. Here he must distinguish between the efficiency of God and man, as to the same action, and ascribe the action and grace of it to God, and the evil that ad­heres to that action to man, unless he will ascribe all to God. Absit blasphemia verbo! If Mr. Howe can extricate himself, and not us with the same Answer; or rather, if he can excogitate any other Answer, than by this exsibilated distinction—erit mihi magnus Apollo, and without an Irony, sa­pientum octavus.

Reply. 2. To the connexion. I Answer, That it infolds a twofold contradiction.

1. For it supposes some actions to be in­trinsecally evil, and yet (by our Hypothe­sis), to be determined, i. e. compell'd, (if Mr. Howe may be admitted our Interpre­ter); whereas, that is not sin which is not spontaneous, neither is that spontaneous which is necessary, i. e. violent [or compell'd]. For violence is a Physical action upon the Patient; in which sort of actions vertue or vice hath no place: for the will is the prin­ciple of moral actions. So the learned Came­ro [Page 87]de Scand. p. 98. [where note, that I presume Camero denies not original sin im­puted, to be suo modo, i. e. in its kind vo­luntary, [and so truly sin], according to St. Austins sentiments, nos omnes eramus ille unus homo, i.e. we were all that one man, [Adam], and so sinned in him. This to prevent any misapprehension].

2. It supposes sin to have an efficient cause, whereas 'tis a known Rule in Di­vinity, Peccatum qua tale & essentialiter est effectus moralis, & non habet causam Physi­cam, i. e. Sin as such, and essentially is a moral effect, and hath no Physical cause.

Reply 3. Having given an Answer to Mr. Howe's Antecedent, and Connexion, we shall now proceed to raze the foundation of his Hypothesis, by proving, that there are no actions of free agents evil in themselves; or that no moral evil is positive, but only privative, (which latter are the common terms of Philosophers and Divines, in en­quiring into the nature of moral evil). And I shall borrow one Argument, which will be instead of all, from the most learn­ed Dr. Barlow, the now Renowned Bishop of Lincoln.

Arg. Every real and positive Being is from God the author and first cause of all Being. But moral evil [formally] taken, is not from God the author and first cause of all Being. [Page 88]Ergo, moral evil [formally taken] is not a real and positive Being.

The Minor is evident, and acknowledged by the very Heathens, in the appellation of Optimus, the Best, which they apply to their Jupiter, together with Maximus the Greatest: [And will no doubt be owned by Mr. Howe; who, eo nomine, for that very rea­son, rejects Predestination of evil actions, because, in his apprehension, it makes God the author of moral evil].

The Major, let us hear the learned Bi­shop prove, [and the rather, because it will much confirm our first Argument for Predetermination of all actions as such].

Proof. Because it is impossible that there should be any finite and created Being, which does not depend, and hath its Being from an infinite and uncreated Being, [viz. God]; for it must needs be, if there be any Being not caused by God, that that Being be in­dependent upon God as the first cause; and consequently, God shall not be the first cause in respect of that Being, whence follow many absurdities, &c. [whereof I shall only take the sum, as himself hath given it us, with an application to moral evil]. If moral evil, [i.e. any sin or breach of Divine Law], be a real Being; then, 1. God shall not be the cause of that Being; for of so deformed a birth, divine goodness cannot be the Pa­rent. [Page 89]2. This granted, it will follow, 1. That there is a secondary Being, and a Being by participation, [such as every finite Being is supposed to be]; which does not partake of [or receive its] being from the first Being. 2. That there is a finite Being independent upon God, both as to production and conser­vation. All which things we know, and be­lieve are contrary, not only to Philosophy, but Divinity. Thus far the most acute Phi­losopher and Divine, Exercit. metaph. 2 a. de natura mali, ad calcem Scheib. met. p. 32, 33.

Let us take notice of the instances of those sins, which are supposed to be evil in them­selves, [or positive].

Obj. 1. Sins of commission which are evil, ex genere & objecto; (whereof two are spe­cially insisted on: Adams eating of the for­bidden fruit, and [by Mr. Howe] the ha­tred of God) are in themselves evil.

Answ. 1. In general. If all sins subsist in some actual motion of the soul, body, or both, and this motion abstractively considered, be the material part of every actual sin, and hath God for the prime cause, in whom we live, and move, and have our being; then no sin can be assigned, wherein this material part may not be found. So the Learned Dave­vant, sometime Bishop of Sarisbury, Ani­madv. on Hoard, p. 174, 175.

Answ. 2. As to the instances. The first, in eating the forbidden fruit, the material part of the sin, in regard of the Soul was the appetition thereof; in regard of the body, the mastication [chewing] and manducation [eating], and other bodily acts. Separate these from the formal part, which is modus appetendi, the manner of desiring, and con­taineth a repugnancy to Gods command, and God was the prime author thereof. The act of desiring and eating must of necessity be re­duced to God, without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or soul: but the disorderly manner of desiring and eating contrary to the Law of God, this is reducible (as being a defect) only to the de­fective will of man, Davenant. ibid. p. 175. As to the second instance, hatred of God; That the act terminated upon that object, in complexo, is evil, and cannot be other­wise, we deny not; but then, that is true of acts and undue ends, as Hospitali­ty out of vain-glory; of acts and undue circumstances, as walking in the Fields, when we should be at Church; as of acts and undue objects, whereof this is an in­stance. And so all sinful actions are evil, as to their substance, which Mr. Howe hath not affirmed. That hatred of God is not evil in it self, because the act invaried, the object but changed, that act which was evil, [Page 91]is become morally good. So our Learned Bishop of Lincoln, again, Exerc. met. p. 41. which he illustrates and proves by the in­stance of Adultery, where the act being the same for the substance, is altered in its mo­ral respect, by making the woman, with whom I committed Adultery, my wife, Id. ibid. Which instance of our Learned Bishop is plain, in the case of David and Bathsheba, whose society together was unlawful before, but lawful after their marriage. They that de­sire further satisfaction in this point, may do well to have recourse to a learned Di­scourse in our native Language, of Mr. H. Hickman, of the positivity of sin.

Obj. 2. One sin is the cause of another, as original sin inherent [as that stands op­posed to original sin imputed] is the cause of actual sins; therefore sin is not meerly privative.

Sol. The privation which is in the natu­ral propension of the will to sin, [in which natural propension original sin consiste], is not the real efficient of evil actions; but the will, in regard of that propension, is the real and true cause of evil actions. So Baron. wet. §. 5. n. 30. & 33.

Obj. 3. Our Divines do make a positive part in original sin.

Sol. Yet they hold sin to be only Priva­tive. But then it will be demanded how [Page 92]their assertions will agree together.

I Answer, In inherent sin there is said to be a positive and a negative Qua­lity. This latter Divines call a want of o­riginal righteousness, or not to be able to do good. The former, they call a pravity of nature, or to be able to do evil only, which is called Positive Legice, because 'tis expressed affirmatively; whereas the latter is expres­sed negatively: so Maccov. op. Post. p. 83. [r. fuse de hac re disserentem Gisb. Voet. Disp. Theol. p. 1. p. 1084

Arg. 2. If God hath a prede erminative concurrence to the most wicked actions, it is then no way explicable how the influence and concurrence the holy God hath to the worst of actions, is to be distinguished from that which he affords to the best; wherein such in­herently evil actions are less to be imputed to him who forbids them, than to the mali­cious Tempter, who prompts to them, or to the actor that doth them, or wherein not a great deal more? Let. p. 32, 33. which Argument Mr. Howe gives us more concisely after­ward, That God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions, as to the best; as much or more than the sinner or the Tempter, Postsc. p. 25. [viz. according to our Doctrine].

Answ. 1. If our learned Adversary un­derstands the antecedent, as we do whom [Page 93]he opposes, of the materiale of wicked acti­ons, we grant his consequence: for we can­not yet see the inconvenience of owning, that there is an universal or indifferent influence upon the actions of free Agents, as such, ab­stracted from their morality. The actions of the understanding and will Physically consi­dered, are neither holy nor sinful; those de­nominations being taken from the relation of the actions to the Law prescribed, as a com­pliance with, or deviation from it: and there­fore, in linea Physica, Gods influence and con­currence is the same, when they are the substrate matter of moral evil, and moral good.

2. If he intends the formale, or rather, the most wicked actions, in concreto, we disown the antecedent as none of ours, and complain of his disingenuity in pin­ning such an assertion upon our sleeve.

3. Yet however, for his satisfaction, I shall let him know, That (besides the influ­ence upon good and bad actions in what degree soever, which we acknowledg com­mon to both) there are divers differences of the influence we own for distinguishing of good actions from bad.

1. That as to good actions God does, in genere physico, re create those internal ha­bits, which he did concreate in the state of innocency, with the several faculties, in which they were respectively seated, (as [Page 94]knowledg in the understanding; a rectitude of the will, consisting in a compliance with the last dictates of the practical understand­ing); that they might be [actus primi, or] principles of [the actus secundi, or] operations of the faculties, [in vertue of those habits], which [faculties] he in­fluences to reduce them to act, by that in­fluence which we call Predetermination. But as to evil actions, God insuses no evil, neither indeed can he (besides the repug­nancy such an action would carry to his holiness); because, though sin be some­times conceived by us, per modum habitus positivi, under the notion of a positive ha­bit, yet it is not properly so, and so is not capable of production by that immediate ef­ficiency, (which we call infusion), as hath been, in part, demonstrated before.

2. As to good actions God does in the Pre­determination to them, so excite to the acti­on, as that withal he adds new strength to the habits given, whence those acts imme­diately proceed; which he does not neither as to evil actions.

3. We have a third difference from Mr. H's own concession: The ordinary appoin­ted way for the communication of this determi­native influence is by our intervening conside­ration of the inducements which God repre­sents to us in his Word, viz. The Precepts, [Page 95]Promises, and Comminations, which are th. moral instruments of his Government. Postsc p. 40. The meaning of which words, is, that God is not only a Physical, but also a moral cause of good actions: whereas 'tis our sen­timent, that God is only a Physical cause of the actions to which sin inheres, but not a moral cause of the sin adhering to them. And (if I do not too much trust my own judgment) this observation is not contempti­ble for the evincing of it; that the indif­ferency of the will to chuse or refuse the Object proposed by the understanding, is not so natural to the will, but that it may be inclined by an inherent quality to chuse or refuse one object rather than another.

As for the comparison which he makes between God, the sinner and the Tempter, (upon our grounds), and gives God the precedency of them both in his influence upon wicked actions, 'tis an odious and hor­rible calumny, not backed with any proof; as he intends it of such actions in the con­crete, i. e. as including with the action the sinfulness of it too.

Reply. To it I reply, That a short Horse is soon curried. This slight objection is easily answered.

1. Either Mr. Howe means as much phy­sical influence, or moral: If the former, we say God and the sinner have both a phy­sical [Page 96]influence, upon the action that is evil, but the Tempter none at all; and that, as to the evil of it, their physical influence is alike, i. e. they have none at all; for sin not being a physical effect, cannot have a physical cause. If the latter, (besides that that influence is not in the Question), the Sinner and the Tempter have influence and concurrence to wicked actions, and God not at all: for neither by Commands, Counsels, Threats, nor Promises, does he in­duce men to sin.

2. Were it so; yet the immediate con­currence, which he acknowledges to all ac­tions, and so to sinful actions; in conjun­ction with the notion he entertains with self-applause, of the inseparableness of the evil of some actions from the actions them­selves, makes himself obnoxious to the same charge of making Gods concurrence with sinful actions, to be as much or more than the Sinners, or the Tempters.

Arg. 3. Lastly, he charges the Prede­termination of sinful actions with irrecon­cilableness with Gods wisdom and sinceri­ty, &c. Postsc. p. 25. by which, &c. I pre­sume he intends, in his Counsels, Exhorta­tions, and what-ever means he uses to pre­vent them, (which are the expressions he uses in the Title-Page of his Letter, in reference to Prescience).

Reply. As to both of these perfecti­ons of God, I am not aware of any thing well said by Mr. Howe, for the reconcile­ableness of Gods Prescience with them, which may not by a just proportion be ap­plied to Gods Predetermination. For the evincing whereof, we will cast his Discourse into Paragraphs.

1. To speak particularly of Gods wis­dom.

1. That there should be a direct and ex­plicit contradiction between fore-knowing and dehorting, we may at first sight perceive the terms cannot admit, Let. p. 51.

Reply. The same may be said of Predeter­mining, and dehorting, though not simply as to the terms, yet as to the things signified by them; for the elicite acts of the will, being the Object of Predetermination, [contested for], we may at first sight perceive it can­not be compell'd; and so as to the event, infers but a necessity of infallibility, as to the sinners doing what he is dehorted from, (which also Prescience does).

2. Mr. Howe goes on, Let it be suppo­sed only, that the blessed God hath belong­ing to his nature universal Prescience, we will surely, upon that supposition, acknowledg it to belong to him as a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfe­ction he is disabled for Government? or wer [Page 98]it a good consequence, he foreknows all things, he is therefore unfit to govern the world? Let. p. 54.

Reply. And why may not we as well ar­gue thus, Let it be but supposed only, that universal Predetermination belongs to Gods nature, we will upon that supposition ac­knowledg it a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm, that by a perfection [that he not only conserves the powers of his creatures, but reduces them to act] he is disabled for government; or were it a good consequence, He is the first cause, [not only of all beings], but of all actions as such, therefore he is unfit to govern the world? And I will add; nay surely, but the more fit in the present state of man­kind, [not to intermeddle now with An­gels], because all the actions of men, be­ing either in whole or in part sinful, he would have nothing to govern, if he had not the government of all their actions; and govern them he could not, nor limit them, nor turn them to good, if he did not Predetermine them, (as hath been, I trust, clearly evinced).

3. Would the supposition of such foreknow­ledg in God make that cease to be mans duty, which had otherwise been so? Let. p. 54. for what influence can foreknowledg have to al­ter or affect any way, either the nature of [Page 99]the thing foreknown, or the Temper of the per­son that shall do it, any more than the present knowledg of the same thing now in doing? p. 55.

Reply. And can Predetermination make that cease to be mans duty, which other­wise had been so? seeing that it alters not the nature of the thing: [the will of man], nor the Temper of the person [Predetermin'd]; but as it finds the will free, so it leaves it; and as it finds the person disposed by ha­bitual inclinations, so works upon him; which is confirmed, by that grave obser­vation of his, which we embrace as our cor­dial friend, and confederate. It were very unreasonable to imagine, that God cannot in any case, extraordinarily oversway the incli­nations, and determine the will of such a cre­ture, as over whom Gods general course of Government is by moral instruments, [viz. Man], in a way agreeable enough to its na­ture, Let. p. 141. Only we extend it further, That supposing, (what hath been before proved), that Predetermination includes a Perfection, God can in all cases determine the will, without forcing it to actions to which it hath a renitency; for that were to alter the nature of the will, and the temper of the person whose will it is. And I add, what influence can fore-determining have to alter the nature of the thing, or [Page 100]person fore-determined, more than immedi­ate concurrence to the same action, of the same person, now in doing?

4. But if what was otherwise mans duty, be still his duty, what can make it unfit, that it be made known and declared to him to be so? and how is that otherwise to be done, than by these disputed means? yea, (for this is the case), what can make it less fit, than that God should quit the right of his Government to his re­volted creatures, upon no other reason, than only that he foresees they have a mind to in­vade it? Let. p. 56.

Reply. All this Argumentation fits our Predetermination as well as Prescience, (wherein Mr. Howe and we agree): what can make it unfit that God should acquaint man with his duty, by proper means, see­ing Predetermination supposes such a fore­knowledg (as Mr. Howe supposes, antece­dent to Gods decree) of the creatures ha­ving a mind to invade Gods right of Go­vernment, if put under such and such cir­cumstances; or rather, (because we under­stand not any foreknowledg, but of Possi­bilium, things possible, not Futurorum, of things future, antecedent to Gods decree) seeing Gods determination of the Creatures will to invade his right, without which he could not will so to do, leaves the Crea­tures will as truly free from Co-action, as [Page 101]if it exerted all its elicite acts, only by a power derived from God, and preserved apt and habile for action.

4. But it may now be said, All this rea­soning, (says Mr. Howe), tends but to esta­blish this assertion; that notwithstanding God did foreknow mans sin, it is however neces­sary he forewarn him of it: but it answers not the objected difficulty, (viz.) How rea­sonably any such means are used for an un­attainable end: as it manifests the end, mans obedience cannot be attained, when it is fore­known he will not obey, Let. p. 57.

To this difficulty Mr. Howe answers, That there is this noble and important end, which Gods Edicts aim at, (viz.) the Digni­ty and Decorum of his Government it self. And that he may be found in every thing to have done as became him, and most wor­thy of himself. And what could be more so, than to testifie his aversion to whatsoever is unholy, his love of righteousness, and compla­cency to be imitated herein, together with his propension to make them happy, who do imi­tate him, p. 61. [I take here but the sum of Mr. Howe's words, because they contain nothing controversal].

Reply. Whether this Discourse affords us any new consideration or no, yet we can claim the benefit of it in the fullest ex­tent of it to Prescience, as to Predetermi­nation also.

2. As to Gods sincerity, the difficulty may still urge, how it can stand with sincerity; whereas that end also which fails, [viz. mans obedient compliance with Gods Declarations of his will, p. 60.] seems to have been most directly intended, &c. p. 65. To which Mr. Howe answers.

1. That the publick Declarations of the Divine will do attain that very end in great part, and as to many, and are the successful means of obtaining it, p. 66.

Reply. And so they do upon our Hy­pothesis, who acknowledg God first infuses gracious habits into some, and then deter­mines the powers in which these habits re­side, to congenerous actions; which yet ex­cludes not the use of Gods Edicts, as means of educing those actions: which because they are vital and free passing from the Will, up­on a comparison made in the Ʋnderstanding between the Goodness of the Objects proposed to it, do require a moral cause, whereby the Agent may both understand the Object, and by Arguments be induced to imbrace it, (as the Learned Parker observes, Thes. de Trad. Pecc. ad vitam Th. 27.)

2. Nor was it necessary that those who would obey should be sever'd from the rest, and be dealt withal apart, &c. p. 67.

Rep. This we also assent heartily unto.

3. Nor was it necessary, that effectual [Page 103]care should be taken that they should actually reach all, and be applied to every individual person, p. 67.

Rep. Here is a strange loss we are put to for an Antecedent to the Relative, They. The only one that I can meet with is, pub­lick declarations of the Divine will touching mans duty, p. 66. and Divine Edicts, p. 67. and I cannot fathom the reason of the de­nial of their necessity to their two ends by himself assigned, Mans Obedience, and the Decorum of the Divine Government; at least if he means by them the Gospel, (as I gather from his after-discourse.) If he in­tends by his Relative They, determinative influences to holy actions, to which the nature of man is now viciously inclined, (as he else­where speaks, Post. p. 40, & 35, compar'd) I cannot find that Antecedent in his whole Discourse foregoing: yet the following passages might give a suspicious person some ground to pitch upon this latter for Mr. H's meaning. And thus [by messengers running from Nation to Nation, some to communicate, others to inquire after the tydings of the Go­spel] how easily, and even naturally would the Gospel soon have spread it self through the world? Let. p. 69. I confess that term natu­rally will not down with me: for I have al­ways seen cause to own Dr. Sibs's weighty ob­servation, in his Souls Conflict, That though [Page 104]there are seeds of the Law, yet there are none of the Gospel in man by nature. But upon second thoughts to do Mr. H. all the right I can, out of love to his person, and the truth, I find, That the They refers to the Divine Edicts of the Gospel, which he supposes not needful to be immediately by the Ministry; but the transmission of it from those that have heard it published by them, may suf­fice to others. But to what end he expati­ates upon this I do not know; though I do what ill use Mr. John Goodwin in his Pa­gans debt and dowry, makes of this very notion. Sed meliora spero.

4. Nor was it incongruous that God should provide by some extraordinary means that his gracious tenders might not finally be reje­cted by all. Let. p. 74.

Rep. Yet it seems not of such absolute necessity (as I always conceived it to be) if by the dispensations of God towards the whole community of mankind, [whereof he reckons instances, and addes] they might understand God to have favourable propensi­ons towards them, and that though they have offended him, he is not their implacable ene­my; and might by his goodness be led to re­pentance. Let. p. 75, 77, compar'd. For thus Mr. John Goodwin argues against the abso­lute necessity of the Gospel strictly taken. And in Phrases so near, that my fancy is [Page 105]ready to abuse me with a mistake, that not J. H. but J. G. is now discoursing. Rom. 2.4, The long-suffering of God and goodness of God are said to lead men to Re­pentance, because they testifie according to a rational and clear interpretation, a willing­ness and readiness in God to receive all such into grace and favour with himself, who shall unfeignedly repent of their sins. So Mr. Good­win, Pagans debt and dowry, pag. 13. And he adds, There is no other consideration but this, (at least none without this) in respect whereof the patience and bountifulness of God can be said to lead, i.e. to perswade or invite to repentance. There is no motive or perswa­sive, whereof sinners are capable unto repen­tance, without hope of pardon upon repentance. Id. Ib. And concludes you see it clear from the Scripture, that even Heathen men, and those that want the History of the Gospel have yet a sufficiency of means whereby to believe, and so to prevent the wrath and indignati­on which is to come. Mr. Goodwin, Ib. p. 14. I must profess I am none of Mr. J. G's Pro­selytes, who ever be; nor was Mr. Obadiah Howe, a most worthy person, and kinsman of our Learned Antagonist, who hath lear­nedly and largely confuted him, in a Tract intituled significantly, The Pagan Preacher silenced, out of whom I shall transcribe his Answer to Mr. J. G's Explication of Rom. [Page 106]2.4. of Heathens. This second Chapter relates to the Jews, whom he reprehends be­cause by their Law they would condemn the Gentiles as sinners, when they committed the same things. But that the patience [and good­ness of God] afforded to the Jews was without the word, I think Mr. G. will not affirm, which is the cause why the Apostle concludes the Jews under a great inexcusability, because the ministry of the word superadded to the light of nature, became not efficacious to re­strain them from sin; and from this very Ar­gument he argues against the Jews, v. 17, 18. still supposing that these persons enjoying the patience of God, v. 4. had the letter of the Go­spel. So far Mr. Ob. Howe, p. 52.

5. As to those with whom Gods Me­thods succeed not well, it is to be considered, that he doth not apply himself to every (or to any person) immediately, and severally, after some such tenour of speech as this; I know thee to be a profligate, hopeless wretch, and that thou wilt finally disregard whatso­ever I say to thee, and consequently perish, and become miserable. But however (though I foresee most certainly thou wilt not, yet I entreat thee to hear and obey, and live. Let. p. 79. And afterwards, What is endea­voured for the reducement of such—is by substituted Ministers, that know no more of the event than they do themselves, p. 81.

Rep. Nor doth God apply himself to sin­ners in such a tenour of speech with refer­ence to Predetermination of those natural actions; which because such need a cause acting efficiently for the production of them: though he knows (without special grace which to them he affords not) a moral ob­liquity will adhere to them. And it is as true, that what God does for the reduce­ment of them is by Ministers, who know as little who are Predetermined to good, and who to sinful actions, as the Saints or Sinners so Predetermined.

Having discoursed thus more laxely, Mr. H. proceeds to a more strict disquisiti­on of two things.

1. What may be alledged out of Gods word in reference to them that finally perish in their wickedness, which can be thought not consistent with sincerity to have inserted, up­on the supposed foresight of so dismal an is­sue? Let. p. 82. And he instances in Gods professing to will the salvation of all, 1 Tim. 2.4, Not to desire the death of him that dieth, Ezek. 18.32; Yea, and professeth him­self grieved that any perish, Psalm 81.12, 13. Ib.

In answer to which Scripture in general (besides many things said well): he says, That which Gods declarations do amount un­to is, &c. That if they neglect to attend to [Page 108]these external discoveries of the word, &c. they are not to expect he should over-power them by a strong hand, and save them against the continual disinclination of their own wills. p. 89, 90.

Reply. I am not able to make sense of the last words: For I understand not what over­coming by a strong hand (in a sinners case) God can make use of, that leaves the will un­der disinclination to salvation; And they seem to be repugnant to another Clause referring to the same persons: that they cannot pro­mise themselves such power shall be used with them, as shall finally overcome their averse disaffected hearts. p. 90.

2. Mr. H. adds, Whatsover extraordi­nary Acts, God may do upon some to make them willing. p. 90.

Reply. I am not well satisfied (because I am not ignorant of the Arminians appre­hension about Pauls Conversion) that Mr. H. calls those Acts by which God makes some men willing, extraordinary: for though they are supernatural, yet they are ordi­nary to all that are willing. It seems to im­ply, that some are made willing by ordina­ry acts, and others by extraordinary: And so it is an ill-sounding word.

3. Mr. H. at last gives us the import of the above-cited Scripture, That they really signifie the obedience and blessedness [Page 109]of those his Creatures that are capable there­of, to be more pleasing and agreeable to his nature and will, than that they should diso­bey and perish, which is the utmost can be meant [particularly] by those words, God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledg of the truth. p. 93, 94.

Reply. As these words sound they do not gratify my ear: For I cannot understand, that the Connexion of Disobedience and Destruction, should not be as agreeable to Gods Will and Nature, as the Connexion of Obedience and Salvation. I take the im­port of 2 Cor. 2.15, We [Apostles] are unto God a sweet savour of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them that perish: that God takes pleasure in the perishing of un­believers, as well as in the saving of believers.

2. Yet in sano sensu, I admit them as the most learned and pious Davenant, some­time Bishop of Salisbury, explains the mat­ter: When God commandeth any thing which is good, he unfeignedly liketh and loveth such actions, and can do no other; his own natu­ral goodness, and holiness terminating, Vo­luntatem divinae complacentiae [i. e. the will of divine Complacence] unto all holy actions by whomsoever performed, Animadv. on Hoard, p. 350. And Gods meaning when he offereth any grace to men, is, that they should perform such actions whereunto such [Page 110]grace conduceth; and his meaning when he promiseth glory to any man if he believeth and perseveres, is truly to perform it if he do so. Id. pag. 353. And not to sever the learned Bishops sentiments: To Mr. Hoards notion [the same with Mr. Howes], that mercy is more natural and pleasing to God than Vindicative Justice, which is his strange work; He doth not willingly afflict, &c. [for which are quoted, Mich. 7.18. Isa. 28.21. Lam. 3.33]. The Bishop replyes, That is said to be natural and pleasing to God, which comes originally from himself, and is not an act depending upon the misdeserts of the Creature. p. 206. As for Vindicative Justice it may be called a strange work, be­cause it is opus occasionatum [i. e. a work occasioned] by mans transgression. p. 287.

And once more to cite this eminent Di­vine; The absolute liberty and supreme do­minion, which God hath in the preparing, or not preparing of effectual grace, wherein the absolute decrees of Election and non-Election do shew themselves, is a thing as natural and pleasing to God as his mercy. p. 287.

4. Mr. H. asserts, That God doth so far really will the salvation of all, as not to o­mit the doing that which may effect it, if they be not neglectful of themselves, but not so as to effect it by that extraordinary ex­ertion of power, which he thinks fit to employ upon some others. Let. p. 105.

Reply. This must be mixed with a grain of salt: If this omission of Gods refer only to the use of means for effecting mens sal­vation, we grant, that in genere medio­rum, God is not wanting to them that live under the Gospel-dispensations. And in this sense God representing himself under the similitude of an Husbandman, truly says of Israel, What could have been done more to my Vineyard, that I have not done in it? Isa. 5.4. But if Mr. H. intends (as the words seem to sound) that salvation may be obtained by the use of means, without that exertion of power (which he calls ex­traordinary) whereby that end is obtained in some, I cannot take such an assertion up­on his bare word. I have been taught from my Childhood (and see no cause to suspect the credulity of that age abused to draw me into a misbelief) that such an exertion of power, as whereby God raised Christ from the dead, is universally necessary to make the means of salvation effectual to their end.

5. Mr. H. professes his dislike of the common distinction of Voluntas beneplaciti & signi, in this present case [viz. to explain how God wills the salvation of all, and yet only of some] under which such as coyned, and those that have much used it, have only rather I doubt not, conceal'd a good meaning [Page 112]than expressed by it a bad one. p. 106.

Reply. And whoever coined it (which I take it was Hugo de S. Victore) few of our Divines but have used it, that have dealt in any Controversie which gave an occasion for it. And why should Mr. H. charge them with a concealment of a good meaning, which they have so often discovered? If Mr. H. only dislkes the terms, I should not contend with him, for I can give him their sense in others from the learned Davenant; The will of God termed voluntas simplicis complacentiae, i. e. the will of simple compla­cency [which is the same with vol. signi] and that which is termed voluntas absoluta or essicax i. e. an absolute or efficacious will [which is the same with vol. beneplaciti] may well stand together. God wills that all men believe and be saved with the will of compla­cence; God wills and decrees to permit that some continue in unbelief, and be not saved but perish, with the Absolute will. The former will in effect is but a conditional will; As if the Apostle had said, God will have all men to be saved, if all men shall believe in Christ; and to believe in Christ is an act so well pleas­ing and so agreeable unto Gods will, that wheresoever it is found it shall be rewarded. But notwithstanding the extent of this will un­to all men, there is in God an absolute will of permitting some to continue in their unbelief, [Page 113]and so perish, Dav. ag. Hoard, p. 220.

But it must be observed, that whereas the most learned Bishop seems to attribute a Conditional will to God above; he afterwards explains himself, Meer or purely conditional Decrees agree not with the perfection of the Divine Nature. The speeches therefore ci­ted out of Scripture [He that believes shall be saved, &c.] do not imply a Conditional Will in God suspended for any moment of time, and then post purificatam conditio­nem, i. e. after the Condition performed] becoming an absolute and effectual will, &c. But these conditional Decrees are grounded on some absolute revealed Decree of God, to the Performance whereof he hath tied himself. For example, it is an absolute De­cree of the Divine Will published in the Go­spel, that whosoever believeth, &c. shall be saved. From hence is derived that mixt con­ditional Decree; If Cain, Judas, or any other believe, they shall be saved. Now such mixt conditional Decrees carry no contradi­ction to the absolute, &c. who seeth not these Propositions may well stand together? I will that if Judas repent and believe, he shall have remission and salvation. I will not to give to Judas the gift of re­pentance, of faith and of eternal life, Id. p. 225, 226, 227. I have said enough to ob­viate M. H's exagitation of the terms Vol. [Page 114]signi & beneplaciti, which are not worth the trouble of transcribing.

6. But M. H. adds, And of these faults the application of the distinction of Gods secret and revealed Will unto this case, though it be useful in many, is as guilty. Let. p. 108.

Rep. 1. As to this I say (as the aforesaid Bishop Davenant of M. Hoard); Mr. H. should first have rightly set it down, and then have tried his strength in confuting it, and I shall add his explication of it: We say that there is in God a true will revealed in the Gospel of saving all men that shall be­lieve; and a true will liking, embracing, re­warding faith, holiness, perseverance in all men whomsoever without distinction of per­sons: And this is the Will call'd Voluntas simplicis complacentiae [or signi] which nei­ther decreeth nor determineth any thing infallibly concerning the being or not be­ing of such good acts in this or that singu­lar person. This Will we know, and there­fore we call it his revealed will. There is also in God a secret will of bringing some men to faith, perseverance, and the King­dom of heaven, and of not bringing others to any of these: this Will we know not, and therefore we call it, the secret Will, Dav. ag. Hoard, p. 221: only 'tis to be noted, that when the Reverend Bishop says, This secret will of God we know not; it must be un­derstood, [Page 115]with reference to the particular persons whom God intends to work faith, &c. in; for we know in general, that there are some persons whom God will be thus good unto. I add this to prevent a Cavil, which may seem very acute to them that use it: If God's will of good pleasure [or abso­lute will] be secret, how come we to know it? or if it be revealed, how is it secret? And then the members of the distinction are confounded (as Mr. H. objects, p. 107.) who should have done well to have told us, in what cases it is useful (though not in the present case). For I dare offer my self to dis­prove the use of it in any case, upon the same grounds that Mr. H. can the use of it in this.

Rep. 2. And yet when Mr. H. hath so solemnly declared his dislike of our distin­ction, he owns it himself, but in other words, which are the explication of our terms: And whereas it may be thought to fol­low hence, that hereby we ascribe to God a liableness to frustration and disappointment, that is without pretence: The resolve of the Divine will in this matter [viz. the holiness and salvation of all men] being not concern­ing the event what man shall do, but concerning his duty what he should, and con­cerning the connexion between his duty and his happiness, Let. p. 112.

Now to leave Mr. H. inexcusable for the impertinency of his exception against our Distinction; let us see how Dr Twisse (a man that much used this distinction, and therefore blamed by Mr. H.) explains it. There is no contradiction, says he, between these two wills Divine: For Voluntas signi is impro­perly called a Will, for it signifies only mans duty, or what he should do, as what will be pleasing to God if it be done. But Volun­tas beneplaciti is properly and simply a will, (viz. whereby is decreed whatsoever shall come to pass, by Gods either efficiency, or permission) Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 1. p. 1. §. 12. p. 140. It is evident to any intelligent Col­lator, that M H's and Dr. Twisse's sense is the same, and so Mr H. hath blamed him­self in blaming Twisse.

7. And if it should be insisted, that in as­serting God to will what by his Laws he hath made become mans duty, even where it is not done, we shall herein ascribe to him, at least an ineffectual and imperfect will, as that which doth not bring to pass the thing willed: It is answer'd, that Imperfection were with no pre­tence imputable to the Divine will, meerly for not effecting every thing whereto it may have a real propension, Let. p. 115, 116.

Reply. We had need tread warily here, for our way is strewed with Daggers, I mean, with terms repugnant to each o­ther.

1. If God be understood but to will mans duty, not the event [his obedience to it] there's no colour for the Objection, that the will of God is ineffectual; for it is effectual (when declared) to make mans duty what it pleases.

2. If by willing mans duty, he means the event [the performance of it], then is there an Objection indeed, but without solution, and not capable of any.

3. Take it how you will, there's no an­swer to the Objection. For this is, That Gods will is ineffectual if that come not to pass which is willed: and that is, That God hath no will at all of that which comes not to pass [which yet the Objection supposes] for what else is the meaning of a real Pro­pension, which differs as much from willing as an habit from an act, or as the power of seeing when my eyes are shut, from my actual seeing when they are open?

8. Nor could any course have been taken that was fit in himself, and more agreeable to sincerity [viz. than counsels, and exhortati­ons, and whatsoever means God uses to pre­vent mens sins]. There are only two ways to be thought on besides, either that God should wholly have forborn to make overtures to man in common, or that he should efficaciously have overpowr'd all into a compliance with them. And there is little doubt, but upon sober con­sideration [Page 118]both of these will be judged altoge­ther unfit, Let. p. 121.

Reply. As to the former of these two ways, I have nothing to oppose; As to the Latter, there is a great deal of doubt; and Mr. H. implies so much when he says, it is loss obvious.

9. Mr. Howe proceeds to shew the unfit­ness of Gods efficacious overpowring all men into a compliance with his Overtures to them, because of two congruities in the course taken for the Government of the World.

1. That it be steady and uniform; not in­terrupted by frequent, extraordinary and a­nomalous actions.

2. That he use a royal Liberty, of stepping out of his usual course sometimes, as he sees meet, p. 131, 132; and adds, If we apply them to the affairs of Grace, there is some­thing correspondent. That ordinarily [grace] be sought and expected, in the use of ordinary means. And that sometimes its Sovereign­ty shew it self in preventive exertions; and in working so Heroically, as none have be­for [...]hand, in the neglect of its ordinary me­thods, any reason to expect, p. 138.

Repl. 1. This Answer is not fitted to the Question. The Question is, Whether it be fit­ting for God efficaciously to overpower all men into a compliance with the overtures he makes [Page 119]to them in common? The Answer is, It is not fit for God to overpower m [...]n, without making any overtures to them at all: or to alter the terms and keep the sense, the Question is, Whether it be fitting, that God should give all men special grace, in the use of means? And the Answer is, It is not fit­ting, that God should give all men special grace, without the use of means. An admi­rable incogitancy in a man of parts. If the Question had been about the fitness of Gods converting all men (whom he thinks meet to convert) as he did Saul, by a voice from Heaven; the Answer had been a-kin to the Question: (though even Saul was not con­verted without means, but without ordinary means).

2. I am at a loss for a Reason, why it should be unfit for God efficaciously to o­verpower all men into a compliance with the means (supposing what I hope Mr. H. will not deny, I am sure will never be able to disprove; that no man will ever comply with the means, that is not overpowr'd thereunto) unless it be this, that it is unfit for God to bestow grace, and salvation up­on all men (which would be a very hard say­ing).

Reply. 2. As to his second Thesis, if it be (as 'tis pretended) an Answer to the Question proposed. I Answer, That though [Page 120]it be fitting enough for God to use a Roy­al liberty in giving grace to some, and not to others; yet I understand not that the suspension of his Liberty, and binding up himself to give grace to all, had been any way unfit. We poor Mortals, I am cer­tain, are very unfit to judg what is fit or unfit for God to do. We may rest satis­fied that God does nothing but what be­comes him: but we shall intermeddle in things too high for us, if we pass sentence, that for God to do otherwise in many in­stances than he hath done, would unbecome him. God hath permitted the whole race of mankind to turn Rebels to his Soveraign Majesty, and but some part of the Angelical nature. This became him to do, because he hath done it. But suppose he had preven­ted the Rebellion of all his rational Crea­tures; or mans, and not the Angels; or the Angels, and not mans; or permitted the Rebellion of all the Angels, (as he hath of all mankind); or restored the Angels, and left man in his own ruins: would Mr. Howe adventure to say, that upon sober consideration any of these ways would have been judged altogether unfit for God to have taken?

10. Mr. How proceeds, and acquaints us, that it were incongruous that a whole order of Intelligent creatures should be moved only by [Page 121]inward impulses: — And that the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral Govern­ment, should be rendered to this purpose [viz. the Improvement of means] useless and vain. And that they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed as meer Ma­chines, that know not their own use, Let. pag. 142, 143.

Reply. Either this Harangue is imperti­nent, or it borders as near upon Arminia­nism as Scotland does upon England. If Mr. H's meaning be, that it is incongruous for God to overpower men, that neglect the means [as his words p. 142, imply] where­as the Question he undertook to Answer is, Whether it be congruous for God to overpower all (as he does some) that use the means, then his Discourse is besides the business; or if he would insinuate, that the course which God takes with some [though not with all] in overpowring them, is to manage them as Machines, and render their natural facul­ties vain and useless; This is Arminius's Charge upon the Protestant Doctrines of the irresistible operation of special grace.

To draw now to a close, after too long a Discourse, (that I may not tire my Reader) I shall only request him, that he would duly consider, that of Mr. H's Principles there are these desperate consequences, (which I have so much charity as to believe he does [Page 122]not see, and (so) nor own,) That God is justled out of his proper place; I mean, of being the first cause of all the Creatures actions, and the Creature put in his stead, as being represented able to use its powers, as it pleases. That one great Perfection of the Divine Nature, viz. Foreknowledg of future Contingencies, is separated from it, by denying the only true ground of such Foreknowledg, the Divine Decrees. And hence, the Providence of God in governing the actions of his Creatures is left in great danger of falling, because a Superstructure raised without a foundation. For how can God govern those actions which depend not immediately upon him in their production; nor are foreknown in his Eternal Decree, wherein lies the model of all he intends to exercise his Government upon, in time?

In sum, his Doctrine opens a wide door for Atheism, and deserves as sharp a censure as one gave of Epicurus's denial of Providence, Verbis Deum posuit, re su [...]tulit; i.e. He ac­knowledged God in words, but denied him in deed. For as all Arguments proving any of the Divine Attributes, do prove a God, be­cause those terms are essentially convertible: so those Arguments which deny any Divine Attributes, do also deny a God upon the same ground.

I shall give the Reader no further [Page 123]trouble but what (if he be conscientious) he will willingly give himself of examining what he hath read, and judging according to the evidence of Truth; for which in this momentous Controversie, and not for victory I have entred into this publick con­test with my ancient and learned Friend, Mr. Howe, which I take to be sufficiently warranted by that passage of holy Writ: But when Peter was come to Antioch I with­stood him to the face, because he was to be blamed, Gal. 2.11. Whence it may be duly collected, that the reverence or esti­mation of any mans person ought not to hinder a publick reproof, when he is guilty of a publick scandal.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

EPist. P. 4. l. 9. r. efforts. l. 14. r. an. p. 6. l. ult. r. you. p. 7. l. 21. r. lapt. l. 29. r. efforts.

Book, p. 3. l. 30. r. in these terms. p. 4. blot out the three first lines, and an half. p. 13. l. 1. r. materiale. p. 20. l. 3. after impe­ded r. 2ly. p. 22. l. 3. for 3. r. 2. p. 58. l. 26. for word r. work. p. 73. l. 28. after is r. true. p. 87. l. 26. r. reverend.

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Text Creation Partnership. Searching, reading, printing, or downloading EEBO-TCP texts is reserved for the authorized users of these project partner institutions. Permission must be granted for subsequent distribution, in print or electronically, of this EEBO-TCP Phase II text, in whole or in part.