I Have frequently heard much talk of the Magnificence of this City of Brussels, but whatsoever Idea I formed of it, I confess it was not equal either to the Grandeur or Beauty of what I see

By your Accent, 'tis no hard matter to guess you are a Frenchman.

'Tis very true Sir, I am so.

I wish you may find wherewith to satisfie your Curiosity; I should think my self happy, could I contribute any thing to­wards it.

That you may easily do Sir, in help­ing me into the Palace, where the Courts of Justice usually sit, which is the only thing con­siderable in the City that I have not seen.

I am the more willing to undertake to conduct you thither, because I have as much freedom there as you can desire.

I am infinitely pleased with the fa­vour you do me, but yet I fear I shall be troublesom to you.

Fear not that, for who can be fitter to do this small kindness for you, than an Ad­vocate in a time of Vacation.

You are then an Advocate, Sir?

That's my Profession.

You cannot tell me any thing that pleases me better, since 'tis mine also.

I am much pleased with this our happy meeting; but may I take the boldness to ask you in what Court you practise?

I cannot but satisfie your Curiosity; 'Tis in the Parliament of Paris.

After this Declaration, I am almost ashamed to lead you where you desire: For (I am told) nothing can compare with the [Page 9]Dignity and Majesty of that August Parlia­ment.

Every place has its particular Beau­ties and Rarities: but, pray Sir, be pleased to do me the favour you promis'd me.

Enter then, since you will have it so; for we are come insensibly to the Door.

In truth I should have had reason to complain of you, had you concealed from me a place where I discover so much beauty. This Tribunal is very Magnificent, the place it self, methinks, has much of Greatness in it; and I doubt not, but it appears much another thing, when animated with yours and your Brethrens Eloquence.

'Tis your Bar, Sir, that is the true Field of Eloquence, and not this place, where 'tis confin'd to too narrow limits; for all Causes here are discussed by writing, the Ad­vocates never plead: yet I confess, since the Establishment of Peace between the Two Crowns, the Sciences begin to take their pla­ces: But of late, there is a flying Rumor of War, that somewhat troubles us, you may probably better inform us of it, since you come from Paris, from whence we have also this News.

You surprize me much; for when I came from thence, which was about a Fort­night [Page 10]since, I can assure you, They were then intent upon nothing but Peace. Arts, which are the most noble Ornaments of a Peace, flourish there more than ever: The Sciences are cultivated with singular application. They are there reforming Abuses crept into Justice, correcting the Disorders in the Finan­ces, establishing an excellent Politie. Now Manufactures take up and employ whatever Idleness before corrupted. Trade is encoura­ged, to take off the Superfluities of our own, and to supply us with the Abundances of For­reign Countries. Vertue is now perfecting her Conquest over Fortune, and Honours begin to be distributed only at the rate of Merit. In a word, The most Christian King purifies all things by the rayes of a Wisdom wholly Divine, and recalls the happiness of the first Age of the World, which we had no knowledge of, but only in the Idea. Judge then, Sir, what foundation this noise of War can have, in the midst of so many Employ­ments of Peace; but do me the favour, to tell me what Pretext they give out here for this War.

They say, The King of France would re-enter upon some Dominions, that he pretends are fallen to the Queen his Wife; by the Decease of their Catholique Majesties, [Page 11]her Father and Mother, and of the Prince Don Baltazar, her onely Brother by the first Venter.

I do not understand that this can be the ground of a War; for if the Queen be well founded in Law as to her Titles and pre­tensions, 'tis not to be presumed that his Ca­tholick Majesty will refuse his Sister that Ju­stice which her Blood will require of him; or that the Estates that belong to this Princess, would forfeit their Allegiance to their natu­ral Soveraign, to support the Ambition of a Stranger.

But who shall be judge whether the pretentions of the Queen be well founded or not?

Let the Law, let Reason, let the Cu­stoms of Places, let Examples and Practices observed in those Countreys.

In truth nothing can be more just than what you say, since no person will re­fuse to a Sovereign, what Nature and the Law gives him; for my part, I have a great desire to be so thorowly informed in this business, that I may not do any thing that might be charged upon my honour and conscience. Do you know any thing, Sir, of these pretensi­ons?

I have seen in Manuscript a large [Page 12]Treatise upon that subject, composed at the most Christian Kings Command, by an inti­mate friend of mine, who shewed it me.

I much fear this Treatise finds no free passage in these quarters, but probably you remember the substance of it.

I read it with so much pleasure and application, that I remember it as well as if I had been the Author of it.

Pray do me the favour to impart some light to me, into an affair of such con­cernment to my duty and fidelity.

Possibly, Prudence might incline me to pray your excuse, for matters of this na­ture are very tender, and are not to be dis­coursed of in all places and before all per­sons.

Let me desire you, that this honest Gentleman in my company may not occasion your suspition; when you know him, you will not repent of any discourse made in his presence; he is one of the best Civilians of Germany, who understands and speaks your Language very well.

This will much add to my joy, to give you satisfaction in presence of so worthy a person; but the clearing of this point which you desire, will require some time.

You may be as brief as you please, [Page 13]for amongst persons of our Profession, you need onely touch upon the reasons, leaving the proof of them to be supplied and justified by farther Argument.

Let us seat our selves then, if you please, this matter deserves to be treated on at our ease; and since you desire it, and here is none to over-hear us, we will rip up the whole business from the bottom. The Title of the Queen, as I have found by this Trea­tise, consists either in Money, or Lands and Dominions.

What does she claim by?

The Contract of Marriage between Elizabeth of France her Mother, with the late Catholick King, and the Customs of the place.

To me it appears not that she is sole Inheretrix by the first Venter to the Catho­lick King.

'Tis true, there remained two Chil­dren, this Queen, and the Prince Don Balta­zar, but that Prince dying under age after his Mother, she then remained sole Inhere­trix.

Is there much due to her in Money?

At the least Eleven hundred thousand Crowns of Gold.

'Tis a vast sum.

'Tis easily computed there are due Five hundred thousand Crowns of Gold for the restitution of the Portion, One hundred sixty six thousand six hundred sixty six Crowns of Gold for the Augmentation of the Portion, One hundred thousand Crowns in Jewels gi­ven and brought along with her; besides the interest of all these sums for many years.

Your computation may be good, but the Infanta could have but the moiety of this sum, the other belonged to the Catholick King, as heir to the Prince Don Baltazar his Son, to whom it fell in right of inheritance, from Elizabeth of France his Mother.

You know Sir, that in Spain the Por­tion and the Augmentation are so peculiar to Children, that they mutually succeed one another, excluding Father and MotheraL. 1. tit. 11. de las Dotes, 4 Part. l. 23. & 31. ibi­dem. l. 15. Torre. So that the Catholick King has no pre­tension to Don Baltazar's part, to the Queens preju­dice, no more than he has to the value of the Jewels, because it was agreed they should be her own by the late Queen Elizabeths con­tract of Marriage. Besides, supposing farther that he had a right to succeed Don Baltazar, yet had he lost it by his second Marriage, ac­cording to the Law 15 de Torre, which sayes, [Page 15]That the Survivor of the Man and Wife that Marries again, shall be obliged to restore to the Children of the former Marriage, all such Goods and Estates inheritable as shall have faln to such person by the decease of any of the Children of the former Marriage.

There is nothing to be replyed to what this Gentleman has said; for, besides the Common Law of Spain, and the Law 15. de Torre, cited by him, the Civil Law disposes in the same manner against the Father and Mother in case of a second marriageL. Foe­minae, Cod. de sec. Nupt. L. Edict. Cod. eod.

Let us come then to the Estate in Lands, and examine where they lye.

Those Lands to which a Right is pretended, comprehend the Dutchy of Bra­bant, and its annexes; the Seigniory of Ma­lines, Antwerp, Ʋpper-Gelderland, Namures, Limburg, and the places united on the other side the Meuse; Hainault, Artois, Cambray, the County of Bourgogne, and the Dutchy of Luxembourg.

What ground is there for all these high pretensions?

The Queen affirms, that by the de­cease of Queen Elizabeth her Mother, and the Prince Don Baltazar her Brother, the property of all these Estates is faln to her.

'Tis hard to comprehend how these [Page 16]Estates which belonged to the late Catholique King, should fall to the Infanta by the decease of her Mother and Brother, who were neither in Reversion or Possession.

Wonder not at it; this happens by vertue of a certain Right of Devolution, which is inviolably observed by the greatest part of those Estates.

This Right is not altogether un­known to me, for we have some Provinces in Germany that use it; but be pleased, Sir, to let me know after what manner it is observed and what effects it has amongst you?

Very willingly; yet I ought first to let you know, that there is a clause in the Con­tract of the Queens marriage, by which shee is made to renounce all her present or future Right or Title, which I therefore tell you, that you may judg whether I have done well to entertain you with the mention of this Clause, before we enter upon the Title, or whether we should not rather proceed in the clearing of that.

The observation is good and sincere, for my part I think it not amiss to begin with the Renunciation, for 'tis to no purpose to goe about to prove a Title, where a Man can pre­tend to nothing.

I am of the same Opinion; but be­sides, [Page 17]think it necessary that this Gentleman take the pains to recite exactly the Clause of the Contract.

'Tis true, things will be the clear­er after the examination of that Clause, of which these are exactly the Terms; [That upon the effectual Payment made to his most Christian Majesty of sive hundred thousand Crowns of Gold of the Sun, or their just va­lue at the several times above-mentioned, the Serenissima Infanta shall rest satisfied, and content her self with the said Portion, without pleading hereafter any other Right or Title on her own behalf, or commencing any Suit or De­mand, upon pretence, that any other greater Estate or other Inheritance, Accounts or Acti­ons by reason of any Inheritances or greater Suc­cessions from their Catholick Majesties, her Father or mother, do or may belong to ber, ei­ther in consideration of their persons, upon any other Account, Cause, er Title what­soever.

Can there be any thing of greater force than this Clause?

A little patience, & you shall see that nothing can be more weak, not to say more unjust than this. The Catholick King gives nothing at all in Portion to the Queen, and yet he makes her renounce her Inheritance. [Page 18]Which cannot hold good: A Renuntiation doth necessarily imply that a Daughter hath her Portion; for when she hath it not, she is not to be said to renounce, but to be disinhe­rited: So the Decretal of Pope Boniface the 8th, which introduced the practise of Renuntiations, contrary to the Tenor of the Civil Law, which condemnes them, requires that a Daughter that renounces, shall so­lemnly declare that she is content with the portion which her Father gives her in order thereuntoQuam­vis pactum patris fa­ctum à fi­lia, dum nuptui tra­d [...]batur, ut dote con­tenta nul­lum ad bo­na paterna regressum haberet, improbet Lex Civilis: Si tamen juramento, nec dolo, nec vi prae­stito firmatum fuerit, ab eadem omnino servari debebit, cum nec vergat in salutis aeternae dispendium, nec redundet in alterius de­trimen [...]um. Sex decret. lib. 1. tit. de Pact.. So true it is that a Portion is the sole ground for a Renuntiation, which in Spain is so much the more out of doubt, as they have an expresse Law in the case, by which, if the Father gives lesse with his Daughter than the portion that the Law allots her out of his Estate, the Renuntiati­on is voidL. 11. tis. e [...]. de la sexta partida.. and the Doctors of that Coun­try who have written upon that Subject, add, that it is so necessary that a Portion be [Page 19]made out of the Fathers Estate, that though the Daughter become by some other means extremely rich, yet unless the Father give her a portion out of his own Estate, he cannot cause her to renounce; because the Portion being a burden, which Nature imposes upon the Estate of the Father, it is necessary that this Portion be a part as really of his Fortune, as his Daughter is of himselfFilia e­nim major renuntians haereditati parernae & futurae recepta dote ex bonis maternis, li­cet juramentum praestiterit, poterit ex causâ gravissimae laesionis agere ad pactl rescissionem, etenim nemo negare potest, quin in hoc casu gravissima & admodum inormis laesio contigerit, nec in hac specie locus est decisioni hujus capitis, cum in eo tractetur de filia renuntiante haereditati paternae recepta dote à patre ex bonis ipsius patris. Cou ar. sup. cap. quamvis in sex. de pact. L. 1. Relect. part. 3. Sect. 4..

This is a Principle, which to me seems well founded; to which I am the more easily perswaded, since the Emperor Justinian himself hath made an expresse constitution, importing that the Obligation of giving a Portion doth so naturally affect the Fathers Estate, that he can never acquit himself of it out of the Estate of any other person, much lesse can he excuse himself, whensoever he is of ability to perform that Office, or rather Duty of his Bloud.

This Maxim is not (possibly) so unquestionable as you imagine; but what­soever it be, I doubt whether it can be here apply'd to the case in hand. I alwaies took it for granted that the Catholick King gave 500 thousand Crowns of Gold in Portion to the Infanta.

Pardon me Sir, if I tell you that he never gave her any thing: I grant you that the Catholick King who owed his Daughter eleven hundred thousand Crowns of Gold, made a promise to her of five hundred thousand; but in the Contract he agreed with her, that upon payment of that Sum he would be quitted for all that was due to her in right of her Mother; now he that pays only five hundred thousand in lieu of eleven hundred thousand, is so far from giving the five, that he indeed retains six.

Is not the Sum of five hundred thousand Crowns of Gold, a very honoura­ble Portion? what matter is it from whence it proceeds? since 'tis a suteable one, and 'tis the Father that undertakes to pay it.

Is it just, Sir, that a Father who is obliged to give a Portion out of his own Estate, should acquit himself by giving it [Page 21]out of anothers, or out of the Daughters own? Pray tell me, do you believe that any Creditor can be legally satisfyed for a just Debt, in paying him out of his own Estate? We know that the Law which ob­liges the Father to give a Portion, men­tions an effectual one, rais'd, and levy'd out of his own EstateCaput [quamvis] loquitur derenunti­atione fa­cta illi à quo filia dotemcon­gruam ac­cepit, cum renuntiati­onis funda­mentum potissi­mum est ex recepti­one porti­onis con­gruae. Berugarius Fernandes. Lib. de renunt. Pater dotavit filiam de bonis uxoris: nunquid ista filia hibebit regressum ad bona paterna? Respondeo quod sic, quia ista cum ef­fectu non est à patre dotata. Bald. in l. neque mater. Cod. de jure Dot.. For the payment of a Debt to a Daughter is not to give her a Portion: and generally where there is no gift there can be no Portion, and con­sequently no ground for a renunciation. For this reason, all the Doctors that have wrote upon the Decretal of Boniface VIII. agree that no renunciation doth lye but where the person, in favour of whom the renunciation is made, have a Portion out of his own Estate; because the Portion be­ing the price, or rather the compensation of this renunciation, 'twould be unjust that a person should agree to a renunciation, that pays neither the price nor the compensa­tion. [Page 22] Non ex cluditur per renuniati­onem, nisi à successi­one dotan­tis; unde side propri­is bonis filia fuerit dotata, non est excluss. Benedict. in Cap. Raynut. in Verb. Duas habens ux­ores. Caput [quamvis] debet in­telligi qu [...]ndo filia renun­tians recepit in bonis patris vel matris, illud quod succedit in loco legitimae, id est Dotem. Nam nihilo percepto esset inhumanum, quod per meram renuntiationem spoliaretur haereditate paterns, ex cujus bonis nihil percepit, & [...]ss [...].t dolus reipsa. Ancharanu [...] in Dict. Cap. Quamvis.. Couvaruvias puts the case of a Father that makes his Daughter renounce, though he gives no more in Contemplation of the Marriage than was already fallen to her in right of her Mother; and he resolves that this renunciation is so unjust, that it neither can nor ought to be put in Exe­cution, of what Age soever the Daughter be, or what Oath soever she take at the renunciation. Montalua a Spanish Minister of State, and Berengarius Fernandes putting the same case, condemn this renunciation as unjustSi filia habens penes patrem bon [...] matern [...] renuntiet haereditati p [...]ternae cum juramento, hâc appositâ pactione, ut pater ei det mille aureos pro do [...]e, erit intelligenda haec conventio in hunc modum, quod mille [...]urei sunt dandi ex bonis paternis, non ex maternis. Couar. loco sup. cit. Montal. Comment. in leg. fori. lib. 1. tit. 2 l. 28. Berengarius Fernandes dict. loco.. And truely if it be clear upon all our Principles that an enormous, wrong and mischief does pleno [...]ure annul all con­tracts wherein it is found, because it dif­fers not from or amounts to a real fraud which the Laws do abhor. What then shall we think of that extream mischief and [Page 23]wrong which a Daughter receives from her Father when he shall cause her to renounce without giving her a Portion, since by so do­ing he unjustly strips her of all her Birth­right, and without giving her any thing of his own, deprives her for ever of all the hopes of a future inheritance; which if I may so term it, is the chief or first Appanage that Children are legally born toLimita hanc D [...] ­cretalem non habe­re locum ubi puella renuncia­vit haeredi­tati pater­nae cum juramento, si inter­veniat deceptio ultra Dimidium: nam ibi cessat Justitia cum sit evidens iniquitas, & dolus reipsa ita rescindit contractum sicut do­lus ex proposito. Georg. Nat. in Cap. Quamvis de pact. in Sex. Tam gravis laesio non potest abs (que) dolo vero alterius contrahen­tium contingere, qui rescindit omnino pactum. Couvar. dict. loco. Sect. 3.? And truely Sir, I dare say 'tis almost as hard a matter to excuse the rigour of a Father who makes his Child renounce without giving her a Portion, upon pretence that she has an Estate by some other means, as it is absurd to au­thorize an outragious Cheat in favour of him that did it, because the person that complains has Estate enough to bear it.

This is a greater proof then needs amongst persons of our Profession. I think we need no farther trouble our selves about [Page 24]the Renunciation, but proceed forwards to prove the Title.

I will Sir, if you command me; but this I dare assure you that this first Ar­gument against the Renunciation is the weakest of 8 or 10. which are to be seen in the Treatise made by the most Christian Kings command.

Let us then run through them briefly, that I may be a little acquainted with them all.

A second Nullity is this; the 500 thousand Crowns which were promised are not yet paid, though they ought to have been within 18 months after the Date of the Contract. viz. One 3d part on the day of Marriage, another within 6 moneths next af­ter, and the remainder within a year after the end of the six moneths.

Is it possible that this Portion should never have been paid?

I grant it still remains due.

This only Argument is enough to destroy the Renunciation; for you know Sirs, that in all our Laws whensoever in any Contract there is any term prefix'd, the very day of payment is a sufficient de­mand it self, and without any other if he make not payment, the Bargain or Con­tract [Page 25]is pleno jure dissolved; for there is this difference between a day prefixt by Law, and that which is agreed on by a Contract, that the first is only comminatory, but the last alwaies fatal to the DebtorTrajecti­tiae pecu­niae, ff. de oblig. & act. L. ad diem. ff. de Verb. oblig.L. 9. sect. vel. ff. de Usur.L. 13. ff. de Fidei C. Lib.L. Magnam.L. 8. tit. 14. partid. 5.C. de Com. & cont. Empt.. Spain it self hath found this to be so just, that it hath made it into an expresse Law, which Montalua high­ly extols the justice of in his Commentaries: and the Civil Law hath so confirmed this Practise by a great number of Texts, that it absolutely rejects all offers that the Deb­tors should make after the Term is lap­sedDict L Trajectitiae, &c. leg sup. Cit..

This Principle needs no confirma­tion by citations of Law.

It ought to be the more carefully observed in matter of Renuntiations, be­cause when the Father dies without paying the Portion, the Daughter runs a great ha­zard in her Fortunes, contrary to the intent [Page 26]and end of Renuntiations, which were there­fore only tolerated, because what the Father gives in money in lieu of a Portion, is ascer­tained and independent on any of those ac­cidents that may disturb the Estate. You know likewise, that by another maxim in Law, if a Clause happen before its consum­mation to fall into such a state in which it could not have taken a beginning, it neither can or ought to be put in executionL. 4. de de Donat. ante Nupt. ff.. So that the same reason which would have ren­dred the Queen uncapable of making a Re­nuntiation of the Catholick Kings Inheri­tance, had it been in view at the time of her Marriage, makes it now impossible to put it in execution, since our case is wholly the same by the non-payment of the Moneys: Besides, the Portion not being paid during the life of the late Catholick King, by his death the Queen is reduced only to a bare promise of a Portion. But we well know, according to all our Rules, that actual payment and delivery only makes a Portion; the telling of the Money gives form to the Portion, saies the Law, and not the promiseDotem Numeratio non scri­ptura dota­lis instrumenti facit. L. 1. ff. de Dot. Caut. non Num. In fructibus à Viro retinendis neque dies dotis constitu [...]ae, ne (que) nuptiarum observabitur, led quo primum dotale praedium constitu­tum est, id est tradita poffessione. L Dotale. ff. de fundo Dot. 1. And in [Page 27]another place, it formally decides the point, That he who hath not paid, hath not given a Portion, what Writing or Promise soever he hath made for that purpose, because a Portion consists only in the actual payment and delivery thereof. Gregory Lopez who hath commented upon the Laws of Spain, affirms, That only by the delivery of the por­tion a Daughter can be said to have one gi­ven herDos inci­pit à tradi­tione, non à promissi­one. in L. 22.4 part. de tit. 11. gl. 2.. In which point his opinion is conformable to all the Doctors: And a­mongst them Bartholus hath observed, that two things ought necessarily to concur to the validity of a Renuntiation; one, that the Daughter be married; the other, that her Portion be actually paidEt sic re­quiritur quod fuerit dotata & dotem re­cepisset. in L. non sinc Cod. quae liberis. And Baldus sutable to the same Principles, hath said ve­ry pertinently, That a Portion, a Loan, and a Depositum are Contracts, whose Essence wholly consists in their execution, in that differing from others that are perfected by the bare agreement only of the parties; for as it were absurd to say that a bare promise to lend, or to deposite, were a Loan, or a Depositum; so it were as unjust to pretend, that a promise of a Portion were really a PortionIdem in contra [...]u dotis, & ideo traditione secuta perfici [...]batur contractus. in L. Juris Gen­tium..

Had I the liberty to add any thing to these Reasons, I suppose it might be said, according to the opinion of one of the great­est Civilians of our time, That a Daughter which hath not her Portion paid at the de­cease of her Father, hath no more a Portion, than if she had never been promised any; her birth alone being a sufficient Title to make her hope for a portion: the Contract of Marriage cannot give her more than hopes, especially when she is obliged to dis­own all her Fathers Estate for the payment of the Portion promisedNon est igitur Dos si cam pro­misero vel pollicitus fuero, sed si tradidero. Dos sola traditione constitultur, non promissione. Cujat. in L. ult. God. de Rei uxor. act. Sect. accedis..

Without doubt these Nullities o­verthrow the very foundation of the Renun­tiation, since they are drawn from the de­fault of payment of the Portion, which is the Basis, and only necessary pretence for all Renuntiations. But if you consider that the In­heritances which the Council of Spain obliged the Queen to renounce, were fallen to her at the time of her Marriage, you will be ea­sily convinced, that such a Renuntiation must needs be void of all appearance of rea­son; [Page 29]since there is not any Maxim more constantly and universally received in things of this nature than this, that Renuntiations are inconsistent with Estates already fallen, as being absolutely opposite to the very nature of them: for if it be true (as is before said) that nothing hath authorized them but only the consideration of a present and certain portion in lieu of an expectation on­ly of an Estate, which the variable Revoluti­ons of Fortune may defeat; how is that possibly applicable where an Estate is actual­ly fallen? it consists no more now in expe­ctation, but in an actual enjoyment and pos­session, which is no longer to be lookt upon, as a reversion after the death of another, and so renounceable, but as the proper estate of the heir, who cannot alienate it but by sale, exchange, or donation. So also the Decre­tal of Bonifac [...] the 8th. speaks only of E­states that may fall; And because 'tis a Law directly opposite to common Right, we are by no means to extend it beyond the words thereof, but rather according to all the Do­ctors to limit and restrain itAdde Decretelem ipsam ef­froenem esse, & exo [...]bitantem ut [...]â de causa exténdi extra propriamfacti spo­ciem non debeat. Raph. ad L. 38. ff. de Verb. oblig.. Hence it is [Page 30]that by an unalter'd practice where a Re­nunciation is made to two inheritances, whereof one is already fallen, the other not; the last of them which only could have been lawful, is made null by a kind of infection from the other; so odious have Renuncia­tions of Estates already fallen been alwaies accountedQuando agitur de Renunti­atione suc­cessionis sedulò di­stingui de­bent futura & jam de­lata. Valet renuntia­tio succes­sioni futu­rae secus in jam delatâ. Mol. sup. Concil. 29.3. Vol. Alex.. But more especially ought they to be so esteemed in this conjuncture, where they would apply it to Estates and Sove­raignties which were already fallen to the Queen at the time when they made her Renounce them; as if things of this kind could become a matter of humane com­merce, in prejudice of that right which God has only reserved to himself, to distri­bute by the waies of blood and nature, of which he is the Author. And this is pro­bably the reason which induced the Doctors, Palaes Falfissimum est quod Reges possent haeredem & successorem in regno ellgere quem volunt, omisso filio primogenito velalio legitimo successore, quod est contra omnia jura & consuetudines omnium na­tionum involabiliter observatas. Par. 2. q. 1. Num. 57. & 58., Couvaruvias Rex non potest variare leges & conditiones primogeniturae in prejudicium successorum, nec facere quod alius pro alio succedat., and Kinscot to [Page 31]affirm, that there cannot be a greater ab­surdity then to presume, that by private Contracts the order of succession to Sove­raignties can be changed; both because it being a matter of Publique right, no par­ticular Agreements can infringe itLjura sanguinis dereg. juris. L. jus Ag­nationis ff. de pactis.; as also because such power is only in trust commit­ted into the hands of Soveraigns, who ought necessarily to restore it to such a person as the Laws of State shall call to the Govern­ment. In short, if a Soveraign be permit­ted to make his Children Renounce, with how much more truth may it be said that he may in his Family change the Order of succession to his Dominions, by preferring the Younger before the Elder, or the Daugh­ter before the Son; since much more power is required to make them Renounce the In­heritance, then only to change the Order of inheriting in his Family?

Let us proceed, Sir, let us pro­ceed.

Hitherto Gentlemen, we have shewed you several Nullities against Law: but now you shall see in two Clauses of the Renunciation, Errors against nature, which I am confident will a little surprize you.

I impatiently expect these Clauses: for I do not remember that I ever read any [Page 32]such strange passages in the Contract.

One of those Clauses import, that the Queen and her Posterity shall be for ever excluded from all the Estates which either are or shall ever be under the Domi­nion of Spain; so that if the Race of his Catholick Majesty should fail, Strangers are to be preferred before her and her Issue. The other imports, that this Princess shall not be excluded from all those rights, but only in case that she have Children by this Marriage with his most Christian Majesty: But in case she have none, her right shall be intirely preserved. I dare once more, Gentlemen, challenge you in all your Readings by any instances in former Ages, to parallel these two Clauses, if not to say Prodigies.

What is it that you find so strange in them?

Renunciations were not introdu­ced but for the preservation of Families; and yet by the first of these Clauses, the Father makes use of it only to the destructi­on of his Family, in preferring Strangers before his own Blood. Renunciations were never authorized but in favour to the Male-children, and yet by this clause 'tis exten­ded not only in favour to the Daughters, [Page 33]but to the younger ones in prejudice to the Queen who is the Eldest. Pray tell me, can a Father more abuse a Renunciation then by making it an instrument to destroy his own Family contrary to the obligation and nature of all Renunciations, which are never permitted him but only to preserve it? But again, what is the meaning of the latter Clause which dis-inherits the Queen in case she have no Children: but that Spain would turn the blessing which Heaven might bestow upon this Glorious Marriage into a curse? Certainly Nature which always tends to the Conservation of the species, can­not without a blush behold so Exorbitant a Clause, which would prefer barrenness be­fore fruitfulness. Marriage, which only proposes to its self the birth of Children, cannot endure the scandal of dis-inheriting a Mother for having Sons and Daughters, which are the blessings of Heaven. The Canon and Civil Laws, which are so severe against whatsoever shall touch upon the li­berty, honour or fruitfulness of Marriage; cannot without horrour behold a Clause so injurious to the intention and dignity of Marriages, especially this which is one of the most August and Renowned under Hea­ver. Methinks such policy cannot expect [Page 34]other then the disdain of all the World, which reduces the Illustrious Princess to the hard choice of mourning all her days a Bar­renness, that would hinder her from being Mother to a King of France, or a fruitful­ness by Marriage which would cut her off from being Queen of Spain: But this also exposes the whole Monarchy of Castile to Civil and Intestine Wars, which are not like to end but by the ruine and destruction of that Crown: For supposing the Catho­lick King should dye in his minority, at a time when the Queen should have Children by the most Christian King, and that after­wards these Children dye; shall the Queen by vertue of this Clause go and dis-inherit her younger Sister who shall have taken possession of the Crown and received their Homages accordingly?

This Clause does infinitely sur­prize me.

Yet 'tis not without president, since in the year 1615. Anne of Austria In­fanta of Spain made the like Renunciation, by her contract of Marriage with Lewis the 13. King of France.

This example reaches not at all our Case. For Anne of Austria had 4 Brothers of the whole blood, at the time of [Page 35]her Renunciation, viz. Philip, Charles, Ferdi­nand, and Alphonso; whereas Maria Theresa our Princess had none, she being the sole remainder of that bed. Anne of Austria had no estate fallen to her. Maria Theresa had the inheritance of her Mother, & Don Balthazar her Brother, which then became hers. Anne of Austria received of the pure bounty of her Father, the five hundred thousand Crowns of Gold given her for her Portion. Maria Theresa had due to her in a debt upon ac­count the sum of 500000 Crowns of Gold promis'd to her in satisfaction for the Marri­age Portion of Queen Elizabeth her Mother. Anne of Austria received her Portion by way of exchange for another of the same value made to Elizabeth of France, who was the same day Married to the Prince of Spain, since King Philip the 4^th. Maria Theresa never received any part of what was promis'd her. In fine, Anne of Austria re­nounced upon a pretention which cannot be found in this case, for there being then a double Marriage made between France and Spain; the Spaniards who affected much to have an equality observed between both parties, agreed that Anne of Austria might be excluded from the Crown of Castile, as Elizabeth of France was from that of France [Page 36]by the Salique Law, which admits of none but Males. You see then how much these Instances differ: besides, this example stands alone against the practice of all former A­ges, and against the Fundamental Laws of State; for it cannot be found either in Spain, England, Scotland, Swedland, or any other Soveraignties that are inheritable by Females, that any of their Daughters were ever obliged by their Marriage to re­nounce their hopes of succession to the Crown in the Order it should fall to them. Louis VII. and Louis VIII Kings of France Married with Infantas of Spain, and no such Renunciation ever required. The 3 Daugh­ters of Ferdinand King of Spain, the 4 Daughters of Philip the I. the 2 Daughters of Charles the V. the 2 Daughters of Philip II. the 6 Danghters of Ferdinand I. all of them Infantas of Spain, and Married to For­raign Princes, never made any Renunci­ation: so that this one only example is so far from authorizing this procedure of Spain, that on the other side this particular instance of a double Marriage then contra­cted, and the want of an actual Estate fallen to the person of Anne of Austria, carries with it such an exception as confirms the justice of all ancient example: besides, [Page 37]that which was never, but once done, is not to be drawn in to president, especially on this occasion, where the Renuntiation made by Anne of Austria, being essentially null, can give them but little advantage, be­cause an Act passed contrary to publick Right, and the Fundamental Maximes of a State, ought not to be drawn into an Ex­ample or Consequence.

I confesse the Example is rare; but is not the happinesse of a publick peace, and the Ratification of the Clause by the King of France sufficient enough to cover the faults that may be found in the Ratification?

Such kind of Agreements will ra­ther violate, than establish a peace: and I may say further, that 'tis a prophanation of it, to make it instrumental to destroy the Rights of Bloud, which are the strongest bonds of Peace and Union among Sove­raigns; But can any thing seem stranger, than to say, that in favour of a Peace, the Queen and her posterity are to be deprived of all their Birthrights? And that the Catholick King her Father and Tutor may retain all that he enjoys of her Estate to bestow it up­on his Children by a second Venter? Pray, be pleased to tell me, what affinity there is [Page 38]between the Peace and Renuntiation. The Treaty of Peace speaks not one word of it; and the powers given to the Pleni-Potentia­ries for concluding it, speak not in any wise whatsoever either of the Renuntiation or Marriage. As to the most Christian Kings Ratification, that might have some conse­quence, had there been no other Nullity in the Queens Renuntiation, but only the want of the King her husbands Authorization of itconfirma­tur res in­valids si e­jus perfe­ctioni ob­ject solum dissensus habencium ratum, ali­oqui si alia obstarent non confir maretur ra­tihabitio­ne. Da­masc. tr. De Broc. membr. 3. Nu 7 Ra­tihabitio­ne non valid [...]ur id quod nu lum est. Az lib. 15. tit. 21.. But can any one think that a Re­nuntiation made by a Minor, to the advan­tage of the Father and his other Children by a second Venier, without any Portion paid, without liberty, without knowledge, and without Authorization, in the case of an E­state already fallen to her, which in its own nature is inalienable, can be made good by the Husbands Ratification? This supposed, the Decretal hath little reason to say that a Renuntiation is voyd, where the Daughter hath no portion given her. For since every Woman is authorized by her Husband, by the Contract of Marriage for all the Articles therein contained; Never any of that Sex can complain of any Renuntiation that can be exacted, because of the obvious objection of a fo [...]mal Authorization and Approbation of the Husband, by the Contract of Marri­age. [Page 39]But on the other side, if it be plain, that an Husband cannot in any manner alie­nate the Right or Estate of his Wife, how then can it be possible that the most Christian King can by his Ratification make the Queen his Wife lose those Estates and Soveraignties which she her self had not power to alienate? Give me leave to say, that it cannot be be­lieved without a manifest violence to Rea­son, that a Ratification of the Husband is of greater force and efficacy than the Wives personal Renuntiation, to deprive her of her Rights. But after all this, Spain having since the marriage of the Infanta obtained that Renuntiation by some private Acts, which they never yet durst shew, who can imagine that his most Christian Majesty hath legally ratified, without seeing them, since according to all our Principles, and ac­cording to the very Essence of a Ratification, such an Act requires a perfect knowledgeAd hoc ut ratifica­tio sibi vindi­cet locum, oporter, ut ille qui vult hab [...]re ratum, sciat & cognoseat, & comprober quod factum est aliàs. Nemo quod ignorat approbat & ratum hab [...]t. Lancel. tract. de attent. cap. 1. Num. 72.. and that the Act so ratified be presented in a good and sufficient Form.

I alwaies conceived that the Infan­ta had made her Renuntiation by her Con­tract of marriage: was it not so?

Indeed those Ministers that treated of this Marriage in absence of the parties a­greed amongst themselves, that the Infanta should make a Renuntiation, but it was not drawn till afterwards, and in Instruments which France never saw.

Pray Sir let us stay no longer upon this Renuntiation, but return to the Title and Pretensions of the Infanta.

I am content, though there are several other Arguments behind; but the minority of the Infanta, the quality of the Father, being the person of his Catholick Majesty, the agreement made in favour of his Children by his second Wife; want of power in the Ministers that made that Agree­ment, and consented to the Renuntiation, and the nullity of the Ratifications made by the Queen since her Marriage without the authorization of his most Christian Majesty, are all of them powerful Arguments, and fully handled in the Manuscript that I have seen.

What need have we to insist any longer upon the Renuntiation? This Gen­tleman hath sufficiently assured you that he [Page 41]rests satisfied, when he desired you to go on to the Rights themselves: And for my part, I assure you I have nothing to object, after so many Reasons which you have taken the pains to shew us.

Upon your desires I return to the Rights themselves; which consist, as I told you, in the Dutchy of Brabant, with its Annexes, the Seigneury of Malines, Ant­werp, upper Guilderland, Limbourg, and its united places, Namur, Haynault, Artois, Cambray, Burgundy, and Luxenburg.

You told us, that the greatest part of these Pretensions were founded upon a Right of Devolution practised in several of these Dominions: Be pleased to tell us the nature of it, and what effect it hath amongst you, for the better handling and clearing of this Subject.

By this Right of Devolution, if one of the married persons die, the Chil­dren issuing from that Marriage are seized in property of all the Fiefs that belong to the Survivor. So that if the Husband survives, he becomes only Tenant for life to his own Lands, the Property belongs to the Chil­dren, though the Mother had no Title at all.

Is there no particular Law at all in [Page 42]force concerning this Custom? or doth this Right spring meerly from usage?

In their Customs or Common Law there are express Texts for it.

Let us if you please, particularly examine them, and begin with Brabant, which is the noblest, and most important of all the Dominions.

These are the words of the Cu­stom as far as my memory will give me leave, and as near as I can translate them out of Latine.Si Vir vel Uxor quibus li­beri super­sunt, mo­ritur, ad prolem u­nam vel plures per separatio­nem thori proprietas feudorum provenentium ex latere Supersti­tis, devolvitur, servato superstiti solummodo feudorum usufructu hereditario. Cap. 1. Art. 2. If a man or woman die, leaving Children behind them, by this separa­tion of Marriage, the property of the Fiefs, though they come by the Survivor, doth devolve, or [pass to the Child, or Children born by that Marriage] the Survivor becoming only Tenant for Life.

Lunderstand it well. But as there are many Laws which have been abrogated by some contrary Custom, may not this be so too?

'Tis so far from that, that no Custom is more carefully observed than this. [Page 43] Kingscot, Chancellor of Brabant, who died in the year 1608. whom we may justly stile the Oracle of his Country, writes, that by the Custom of that Dutchy the property of Fiefs whether patrimonial, or otherwise ac­quired, do at the very instant of the dissolu­tion of Marriage, pass to the Children of the first bed, leaving no manner of pretence to those that shall be born of the secondConsue­tudine ge­nerali Bra­bantiae, proprietas bonorum seudallum devolvitur ad prolem, dis­soluto eo Matrimonio, quo stante bons ejusmodi suere unius vel alterius conjugum, five sint patrimonialia, five acquisits, its ut proles secundi Matrimonii in successione Parentis, qui Superstes fuit, nihilex talibus bonis consequatur. Resp. 65. Nu. 1..

Christineus, a famous Doctor of that Nation, affirms, that a devolution made by the death of one of the married persons, doth (as it were) anticipate the succession in favour of the Children by the first Venter, abso­lutely excluding those of the secondNotan­dum hic est quod devo­lutio bonorum quae sit per mortem alterius conjugum fieri censetur quasi per anticipationem successionis, quoad proprietatem tantum. In Concil. Meklin. tit. 16. Art. 4. in addit..

Frederick de Saude, in a Chapter which he expressely made upon the chief Customs of Brabant, tells us, that in respect to the first [Page 44]Marriage, and in favour to the Children begotten in it, this Right of Devolution hath been introduced and observed in that Dut­chy with more than ordinary Religion and exactnessOb ho­norem pri­marum Nuptiarum, & favorem priorum liberorum, Brabantiae moribus introductum esse, ut matrimonio post morcem alterius Conjugum soluto, tam Superstitis quam defuncti feuda deferantur communi­bus liberis, salvo tamen Superstiti usu fruct. feudorum ab ipso pro­fectorum, sive ex haereditate sibi obvenerint, sive ex industriâ quaesiverit. In Cons. Feud. Gueldriae & Zutphanioe tit. 1. Numb. 1. Sect. 9..

The Judgment lately given at the great Council of Malines, in the Count de Bergues case; and that latter one concerning the Mar­quisate of Berg. of som adjudg'd to the Coun­tess D'Auvergn upon the death of her Father, though the Marquisate came by her Mother, are unquestionable proofes of the practise of this Right of Devolution: And his most Christian Majesty putting this Case to one of the most famous persons of your Brethren, but under borrowed names, he gave his Judgment in favour of the Daughter of the first Bed, against the Son and all the Chil­dren of the second.

It being so, where lies the diffi­culty, since that custom is conformable to Law, and the 'tis manifest His Catholick Majesty was in possession of Brabant, at the time of the Dissolution of his first Mar­riage?

The difficulty lies in 4 principal points which it will concerns us to clear, before we proceed further to the business of the Title.

What, Sir, are these 4. Diffi­culties?

The first is, that the Local Cu­stoms cannot be a rule to the Inheritances of Soveraignties. The second, that the Devo­lution being not an actual and effective right, but only a bare expectancy which could not be compleated till the death of the Survivor; the Infanta might make a good Renunciation. The third, that the Estates of the Low Countries were re-united into one body by the Pragmatick [or so­lemn Constitution] of Charles the 5th in the year 1549. and cannot be enjoy'd but by one person, and he a Soveraign. The 4th is, that the Catholick King leaving behind him a Son, though by a second Venter, he ex­cludes the Daughter of the first from the inheritance in question.

I confess I did not foresee these Objections, which notwithstanding appear to be very Solid and Essential.

I must give you satisfaction in them, but I believe in truth, they are rather proposed to try my skill in their solution, then that there is really any difficulty in them. For I am perswaded, that this Gen­tleman is better versed in the Histories of his Country, and a person of greater judgement then to propose them seriously. The very Records of Brabant inform me, that the right of Devolution establish'd by the Custom of Brabant, is so exactly obser­ved in the succession of the Soveraign, and even in regard of the Soveraignty it self, that about the year 1230. a dispute arising between the Duke on one side, and his Son on the other; and the question being put whether the Duke possessing that Dutchy in his own right, had not lost the property of it upon the Decease of the Dutchess his Wife, by Vertue of the Devolution; The Empe­rour Henry assembled all the Princes of his Court, and after a charge given in as ample a manner, as a cause so famous could require; at length by the advice of his Council gave sentence, that the property belonged to the Son upon the decease of his Mother, [Page 47]although she had no manner of right whatsoever upon her own account, pro­hibiting the Duke from proceeding further in it to the prejudice of his ChildrenHenricus Dei Gra­tia Rom. Rex semper Augustus: omnibus ad quos praesens scriptum pervenerit gratiam suam & omne bo­num. No­tum faci­mus, quod cum Hen­ricus ma­jot filius Illustris principis Ducis Lo­ther. ma­tram habu­erit & illa sit mortua, per sententiam principum in Curia nostra est judicatum, quod si idem Dux, de bonis quae possider, aliquid alienaret, vel in manus vellet transferre alienas, dictus Henricus se de iisdem bonis posset intromittere & occupare licenter ad usus suos & tenere. Da­tum Fridbergae an. gratiae 1230. ptox. Dom. post Festum Paschae. 4. Cal. Maii. Indict 3. Bukenheph. de Brahant.. I have read also in the same Records a let­ter of 1273▪ written by the Emperour Ro­dolph I. to John Duke of Brabant, in which he strongly confirms the Vertue of this right of Devolution in the succession of the Dukes; and it cannot be denyed but that the Emperour Charles the Fifth, after the death of the Empress his Wife, so fully ac­knowledged, that the property of Brabant was passed into the person of Philip his Son by this right of Devolution that he publickly protested, he could neither con­firm the Customs nor meddle with the Priviledges of the Country, but jointly with his Son. But if from examples we proceed to argument in the examination of the power of Local Customs, in relation to the inheritance of Soveraignties, nothing [Page 48]can be more easily proved; for there are only three sorts of Laws that can be of use to regulate Soveraignties. That of a So­veraignty it self, if it have any particular Law to guide it; The Laws of the Neigh­bouring Kingdoms, or those of the Coun­try. As to the particular Laws of each Crown, 'tis certain that where any such are, they are necessarily obliged to follow them; as in France, the Salique Law; in Poland, and several States in the Northern parts, their form of Election: But where no particular Law can be found, I affirm that 'tis the worst of errors to pretend, that the succession to a Soveraignty ought not to be regulated by the custom of the Coun­try, because in such a case they would be obliged to regulate themselves by the Law and Customs of their Neighbours, which were to offer a great injury to the Sove­raignty; or to affirm that it ought not to have either Rules or Principles to deter­mine to whom it of right belongs, which would be the most strange absurdity in the World. For never yet did any Doctors either of Spain or any other Nation whatso­ever, make a doubt of the force and power of Custom, in regulating the succession of such Soveraignties as have no particular Law to [Page 49]direct them: Witness Molina. Gatieres and Couvaruvias who unanimously assure us that the Crown of Spain being the chiefest Majorasque of the Kingdom, it ought in­dispensably to conform to the Laws intro­duced by the Customs of the County, for the Majorasques Ipsum Hispania­rum reg­num veris­simum Ma­joratum esse ad prae­cisum or­dinem pri­mogenitu­rae; hoc autem a­deo verum est, ut se­cure & confiden­ter dici possit non solùm Hispaniarum regnum, verum majoratum esse, imo regnum ipsum esse caput omnium Hispaniorum primogeniorum, ab eo (que) caetera primogenia tanquam à capite derivari, succedendi (que) ratio­nem accipere, adeo ut si de succedendi ordine in Hispaniae majorati­bus contendatur, ea lis fit secundum leges ad regni successionem insti­tutas decidenda. L. 16. cap. 20. Nu. 10. Joan. Gat. cap. 4. lib. 10. cap. 14. Nu. 58. & 59. [...]ouuar. Var. resol. lib. 3. cap 5. Nu. 8.. But that which may deceive the common people in things of this nature, is the confounding the person of the Soveraign, with the Laws of his Soveraign­ty; though they are two things infinitely different. For as to the Soveraign himself, so long as he lives, his Reason is the very Soul of the Customs; but as to the Laws belonging to the Soveraignty, vacated by the death of the Prince, the Custom is then the soul and lise, and that which gives it motion, by which it passes into the hands of him that is legally to receive it, at a time when there is no particular Law that can [Page 50]convey it. In a word, you are to consider that we treat not here of a Soveraignty, as such, but as an inheritance; not of a Roy­alty living, but of one dead and without life; which is not in this case an active po­wer to make Laws, but a Fief, an Inheri­tance, a Right, a Succession which ought to have its certain Rules, but cannot have any other then the general Custom of the Country, where it hath no particular Law of its own.

They have the same practice in the Estates of Germany.

You may say, Sir, if you please, in all the Nations of the world that are go­verned by reason. To go on, I doubt not but you were as much surprized as I was, to hear it objected, that the Queen might make a firm Renunciation of that which was fallen to her by right of Devolution, it being (as 'twas said) but a bare expectan­cy and not a real right fallen to her. For besides that the Renunciation which she was made to make cannot be justify'd, as appears by all the reasons formerly exami­ned; you know that according to the 2d Article of this Custom which introduces Devolution, the Children that issue from the Marriage are seized of the property, in [Page 51]the very instant of the decease of either Man or Wife, and from that very mo­ment the Survivor becomes only a Tenant for life; so that he cannot have any thing to do with the property, as was decided by that famous judgement of the Emperour and all the Princes of his Court in the case above-mentioned. And you know too, that all the Doctors that have writ of it, call this Title, a succession anticipated; which is very opposite to a simple and bare ex­pectancy.

'Tis a strange thing that you should dispute this point with me, for it is a certain truth that Children cannot thus dis­pose of an Estate, nor enjoy it unless they survive their Father and Mother, and conse­quently all the right they have is only a bare expectancy of the thing, in case they are heirs to the survivour of man or wife.

Sir, if you please let us use less partiality and more freedom, your Cu­stom says, that after the decease of one of the Married persons, their common Chil­dren are made proprietors of the Fiefs of the survivor; It orders further, that if the Children themselves dye before such survi­vor, the property of the Fiefs, that was before lost by right of Devolution, reverts [Page 52]to the said survivor. All your Doctors agree that by vertue of this Right the Children are so effectually seized of the inheritance, that the surviving Parent cannot in any manner dispose of it, no not so much as al­ter or lessen it: To conclude, it hath been judged in the Imperial Chamber at Spire, that a Father who gave no other Portion to his Daughter but out of an Estate that was devolved by the death of his Wife, should not be held to have given her a Portion, because the Estate did not belong to him, but to the Daughter; and yet in despight of all these Authorities, you would make us believe that this right of devolution transfers neither the property of the Fiefs or any thing at all that is real to the Children by such Marriage. If it be so, you ought to abolish your Customs, con­demn your Doctors, and overthrow all Usage; For though the Children cannot dispose of, nor enjoy the Estate during the life of the survivor; this does not make them to be the less proprietors. As 'tis in matter of Dower or Donation, made in case the Donee survive; The Children of the Wife endowed and the Donees are the true proprietors although they cannot enjoy [Page 53]nor dispose of what is given them, till after the death of the Father or Donor.

I deny not but Custom, the Do­ctors and Decree of the Imperial Chamber of Spire, give the property to the Children of the Survivor. But have you not seen a Trea­tise of the Right of Devolution, printed not long since at Brussels?

Is it not that which was composed by an Officer of his Catholick Majesty in the Council of Brabant?

The very same.

I have read it.

You have seen then how he proves that the Custom is ill expounded, that the Doctors are deceived, and that the Imperi­al Chamber of Spire understood not the na­ture and the effects of the Right of De­volution. Do ye not allow him to be an able man?

Not only that he is very able, but I add, that he appears to be a very honest man, for one may discover throughout his work a kind of sincerity, which is better than all the Learning in the world. Have you observed with what Ingenuity this Au­thor, who hath no small Talent, in avoid­ing and putting by difficulties, hath spoken of the Devoltuion? He grant 'tis a Privi­ledge [Page 54]of the first Marriage against the secondApud omnes qui­dem Gentes cultiores, est aliquis honos & praerogativa primârum Nupriarum & liberorum qui ex iis geniti sunt: Sed nusquam tan­ta quam apud Brabantos & Vicinas aliquot Nationes, apud quos dissoluto primo Matrimonio, five secundum sequatur, five non, libe­ris ipsius thori obveniunt bone omnia immobilia utrius (que) Parentis, &c. Stockm. cap. 1. fol. 1. He agrees that the Effect of this Right is to seize the Children from the very mo­ment of the Dissolution of MarriageDevolu­tio Ratim à soluto matrimonio bona Superstitis parentis liberis addicit. Stockm cap. 4. fol. 31. He confesses, that the Children by the second Bed can pretend to nothing in pre­judice of those by the formerLiberi primi con­jugii excludunt liberos secundi ab eorundem bonorum successione, &c. Stockm. cap. 1. fol 7. And he acknowledges also, that a daughter by the first Venter excludes a son by the secondJus devo­lutionis quod viget inter privatos adeo benignum est liberis primi thori, & ita alienum à liberis secundi thori, ut si contingat unicam superesse filiam ex primo, & masculum ex secundo, filia masculum omnino excludat à boni [...] devolutis, &c. Stockm. cap. 18 fol. 126. [Page 55]For my part, I see nothing that is more ho­nest than the sincerity and plain dealing of this man. 'Tis true, he accuses the Cu­stoms, the Doctors, and the Imperial Cham­ber of Spire, to be all in an errorFol. 9 12, 13.44.47. & 121. Annal. lib. 1. fol. 6. But how could he say less in the necessity impo­sed on him to speak somewhat in behalf of the Cause which he was to defend? Or ra­ther how could he more clearly condemn it, than by confessing that it was manifestly contrary to the words of their Custom, to the Opinion of their Doctors, and to the Decrees of the most principal Assemblies of Germany?

I should much desire to see this Book: for I confess these Acknowledgments may have some Force.

If this Gentleman pleases to take the pains to send for it, I will shew you all these places.

Do you thus take your advan­vantages? You say you think him sincere, and yet you will not believe him when he tells you that the Custom and the Doctors were mistaken.

Give me leave to tell you again, that I believe he is sincere, it doth not hence follow that he is infallible; or that I ought [Page 56]to prefer his particular Opinion before the Suffrages and general Opinion of all the States together assembled: Had he proved by his Book, That the Laws, the Doctors, the Practice and the Decrees ought to give place to his Judgment, I should have been far from opposing it; but that he had forgot to do

Let us go on Sir, what do you an­swer to the Pragmatick in 1549. which re­duced all the Estates of the Low Countreys into one Mass and Body, not to be possest but by one person, and that a Soveraign?

Excuse me if I tell you that if you had made this Proposition in publick, you would have been disown'd by all the States. Since nothing is more contrary to the H [...]sto­ry, or to the desires of those Provinces. In sum, have you forgotten that which is so frequently repeated in your Annals? That this Emperor had indeed a design to reunite into one only Body of a Monarchy all these Soveraignties, which he intended for the Prince Don Ferdinand, one of his Sons; but he found such a publick and invincible op­position in the spirits of the people; and on the other side, the diversity of their Laws and Customs seemed an obstacle of such dif­ficulty to be passed over, that he presently [Page 57]gave it over. The words in which I read it in the learned and judicious Grotius are still in my memory, and I believe may be of much use to disabuse you. Charles the fifth, (says he) resolved formerly to change the state of the Government of the Country, entertaining the design at that time, when (as the fruits of his Victory at Pavia) he saw Flanders and Artois freed from the Soveraignty of the Kings of France; but he found their Manners, Laws, and Ʋsages so very contrary to his De­sign, that he despaired of success, and quitted the thoughts of it, scarce adventuring to pro­pose it. If you have any scruple remaining after this Authority, be pleased to remem­ber, That Philip the second, Son to Charles the Fifth, in the confirmation made by him, of the Priviledges of Brabant, sayes, That the only Estates which should for ever be united with Brabant, were Limbourgh, Ant­werp, and those beyond the Meuse; and that the same Prince giving a Portion to the Infanta Isabella of all the Soveraignties which he possessed in the Low Countries, forbid her to divide or separate them without his consent; which he would not have done, had they been all united and incorporated by the Pragmatick of Charles the fifth, in the year 1549. Besides this Pragmatick speaks [Page 58]not one word in the Enactive part of it, of this Union, nor is there any Author that ever spoke of it: but on the contrary, we see that his Catholick Majesty puts all these Titles se­parately into his own, & hath a peculiar seal for every one of these Estates in particular. So true it is that he enjoyes them divisively. But whosoever shall read the Pragmatick, will clearly find that it was made only for the introducing the Jus Representationis in­to the Inheritance of the Soveraign, to hin­der those States, which for want of this way of succeding were exposed to frequent chan­ges, from being easily divided by the diffe­rence of their Customs, of which some ad­mitted, but others rejected this Jus Repre­sentationis, which is directly opposite to the Union alledged; for had there been an U­nion, it had been to no purpose to intro­duce the Jus Representationis to hinder them from the frequent Alterations into which they might fall should this Jus Representati­onis cease, whose effect or consequent can­not be said to be that of collecting and limit­ing things separated; Otherwise since the general way of succession in the world is by this Jus Representationis, all Inheritances would become inseparable. That which may then most rationally be gathered from [Page 59]this Pragmatick, is that the succession to Soveraignties is regulated by Custom, where there is no other particular Law to guide it, since the Emperor Charles the Fifth, to put an end to the power of Custom in his House, as to the point of Representation, was forced to assemble all the Estates of the Country, and to make a solemn Pragma­tick for it. I come now to the last Objecti­on, which concerns the preferring of the Son by the second Bed, before the Daughter by the first; and since I perceive you hold it for the most specious of all, I intend in few words to let you see, that in point of Argument, it is of all others, the most unjust: that in the order of Succession in Brabant it is impossible. And lastly, that the Custom contradicts and condemns it by most expresse Arti­cles.

If you prove all these things, I shall willingly come over to your side, but I very much doubt you cannot do it.

You will not deny, but that the Right of Devolution is a Favour which the Customs bestow upon the first Marriage, a­gainst the second. Doctor Sandeus hath wrote, that this Law was made in respect to the first Marriages, and in favour to the [Page 60]Children issuing from themIn Con­suetud. Feud. Gueldriae & Zul­phan. tr. 1. tit. 1. Sect. 9.. Christineus In Con­suetud. Meklin. tit. 16. art. 4. in addit. says, that second Marriages do so much change and lessen the advantages and affe­ctions of the former, that Custom thought it justice to allow them a Compensation, by introducing the Right of Devolution: And Kinscot affirms, that this Compensation is a thing so sacred, and so carefully reserved for the Children by the first Bed, that there­by the second can have no pretentions to it, so long as there remains any one person of the firstResp. 65. Num. 1.. This then being so, can it be thought, that a Right only established in favour to the first Marriages, in opposition to the second, may be forced away from the Children of the first Bed, who are seized by Custom, to be bestowed upon those of the second, against whom it was founded? You must not, by your Favour, take the advantage here of the Prerogative of Sex; for in matter of Devolution there is no com­paring of Sexes, so as to give the advan­tages to the more Noble of them; but the Order of Marriages is there considered; where the Prerogative is given to the first, a­gainst the latter. pray tell me to what purpose would it have been to grant the Children by the first bed a right to defend themselves from any prejudice they might receive from [Page 61]a second, if they should be obliged to ren­der and give it up to the Children by the second? In fine take this one reason for all, that Devolution being a kind of penalty and a fence against the second Mar­riages in favour to the first, it can never be that the first should be deprived of it in favour of the second, because that would contrary to Nature turn reward into pu­nishment, and punishment into reward. I say then that your preference, upon debate, is very unjust. But to go on, I adde that 'tis morally impossible in the Order of Suc­cession in Brabant: my reason is, because the Children by the first bed being seised at the very instant of the Dissolution of Marriage, of the property of all the Fiefs of the Survivor, the Father is not in pos­session of the property at his second Mar­riage, nor of the Succession at his death, and consequently 'tis impossible that a Child by the second bed should succeed him in it. For if we would prefer the Son by the second bed, before the Daughter by the first, 'twould be necessary that the Fief were at the Fathers disposal at the time of his death, because none can succeed to that which belonged not to the deceased: so that being stript of the whole property, and [Page 62]becoming only Tenant for life, 'tis abso­lutely impossible that he should leave that to the Children by the second Marriage, which he was out of the possession of at the time when he contracted the Marriage from which they issue. But for the better clear­ing of this Argument, let us say (if you please) that the Custom having by the right of Devolution seised the Children of the first Marriage of the property of the Fiefs which were the Survivors; if we would have the Son by the second bed succeed, 'twere necessary that the property should a­gain revert to the Father, and that the Child by the first bed should be disseised; which can only be done these three ways; Either by the rule of Custom, or by the will of the Survivor, or by Common Right. But you will not say that the Cu­stom which has given this Right to the first bed, does deprive it of it to bestow it on the second Marriage, from which its only meaning and intent was to take it a­way. It cannot also be said that the Sur­vivor who was disseised of it, had a power to recall it from the first bed, and to pass it over to the second; and as to Common Right we know that all its inclination, as well as all its rules and ordinances, [Page 63]tend to the favour of first Marriage against the second. Conclude we then, that your preference is impossible in the order of Suc­cession in Brabant, and give me leave for a close to shew you, that 'tis condemned by an express Ordinance of the Custom of the Country. This Custom distinguishing be­tween Fiefs which belonged to the Survi­vor at the instant of the dissolution of the first Marriage, and those which fell to him, or were acquired by him since his second Marriage; declares by its second and third Articles, that the Children by the first bed shall leave the property of all Fiefs pos­sessed by the Survivor at the time of the decease of the other person that was joy­ned in Marriage; and expressely orders that the Brethren and Sisters of this Marri­age succeed one another therein. This be­ing pre-supposed, is not your preference directly contrary to this Law? since by it the Son by the second bed, against the very words of this Text, would hinder the Sister from succeeding her Brother by the first bed; and you say Kinscot that Great Chancellour of Brabant hath very precisely said, that never any Children by the se­cond bed could make any demand of the Fiefs whilst any one of the first was living, [Page 64]which is also confirmed by Christineus and Sandeus, when they tell us, that this right of Devolution is not to be applyed but to such Children as were in common between the Deceased and the Survivor: But you have the less reason to deny these truths, since being of that Country, you know that 'tis the General rule of all these Cu­stoms to prefer the Daughter of the first bed before the Son of the second; and that in­deed that of Haynault, Malines, Namur, and divers others have made several ex­press Articles of it.

It will follow then, that against the order of Nature, as well as against that of the General Polity of all the world, the Brother must obey the Sister.

Pardon me, for the Catholick King will command in his own Estates, and the most Christian Queen in hers, and neither of them have Dominion over the other. I adde too, that by your own ac­knowledgement, this is always the practice in Brabant, for the Daughter of the first bed by vertue of the right of Devolution, carrying the Fiefs of the Survivor from the Son of the second; it often happens that a Brother is possest of an Estate which holds of his Sister: But after all, what can you [Page 65]reply to your Histories which tell us that Isabella of Austria, Daughter by the first bed to Philip the second, enjoyed all the Estates of the Low Countries, excluding Philip the third, her half Brother, Son by a second Marriage to the same Kiag Philip the second?

You cannot find any other Presi­dent besides this, to justifie that ever any Daughter by the first bed excluded a Son by the second in the possession of this Dutchy.

Neither can you find any one that proves that ever any Son by the second bed was preferred before a Daughter by the first; for never since this was a Dutchy, was there ever but only that one time such a concurrence of a Daughter by the first bed, with a Son by the second, where you see the Daughter was preferred.

The Dutchess Isabella was not pre­ferred by right of Devolution, but she re­ceived those Estates from King Philip her Father, who freely gave them to her in fa­vour of her Marriage.

Consult your Annals, and they will tell you that 'tis true, Philip the se­cond to give himself the honour of an ima­ginary bounty, gave to Isabella all those [Page 66]Estates which belonged to her by the right of Devolution; You will see also in your Re­cords that all the Orders of the Dutchy protested, that this Donation should not, prejudice their Rights, Customs, and Pri­viledges; and that notwithstanding this contract, they should look upon Isabella as their natural and lawful SoveraignScripto Ordinibus caveat duodecimum cessionis articulum Belgicarum provinclarum liber­tati & privilegiis nihil derogatum aut dettimento fore. Ordines Brabantiae per suum Grapharium sententiam protule­runt, quae palam pronunclavit Ordines ita censuisse, se Alberto Archiduci serenissimae Insantis nomine, tanquam Principis legiti­mae harum provinci [...]rum jusjurandum praestituros, si vicissim els jusjurandum praestetur de observandis patriae privilegiis, & de lis sarciendis quae contra majorum instituta & auspicia innovata aut abrogata sunt.. And if your curiosity leads you any fur­ther, you may entirely satisfie it in the Hi­story of the Low Countries, written by Grotius; where we read that Philip II. was willing to give these Provinces to Isabella, not only for the reduction of the Rebels to their duty; but also by this division to assure them to her against those troubles, which her half brother might some time or other have given her, notwithstanding that she was the lawful inheretrix to [Page 67]themDotem Philippus Burgundi­am cum Belgica dixerat, ut legitimae haeredi ad­versus fra­trem mi­norem di­visionecon­suleretur. lib. 6. An. 1597.. Which made such an impression upon all the hearts and spirits of the Coun­try, that it was at that time that Christine­us, Kinscot, Buken, and those other famous Doctors of the Country enlarged themselves upon the business of the Right of Devo­lution, to make it known to their Prin­cess, that it was this Title of the Law, and not the Kings her Fathers Donation which made her Soveraign of Brabant.

This example and these prote­stations seem to me to be of great strength to support the right of the Daughters by the first bed, against the Sons of the se­cond in Brabant: but it may be, Sir, he will tell you of some presidents to the con­trary.

That will be an hard matter for him to do, for all the Dukes of Brabant that had more Wives then one before Phi­lip the second, are Geoffrey the third, Henry the first, Henry the second, John the first, Anthony of Burgundy and Philip le Bon: Now 'tis certain that after the death of these Dukes, either a Son by the first bed alwaies succeeded in the Dutchy, or a Son by the second, where there were no Chil­dren by the first, as was John the second; or a Son by the third bed, where there [Page 68]were none by the first and second, as was Charles le Hardi, Son by a third Marriage to Philip le Bon, who left no Children by the two former.

I am extreamly satisfyed as to the Dutchy of Brabant in favour of the Queen, and if her right be as well founded to the other Estates, I think a man must be very obstinate to deny it.

The rest of her Titles are as easily justifyed, and made out in very few words, for the Objections and Answers which you now hear are applicable to all the rest of them.

Let us proceed then, if you please.

The Seigneury of Malines be­longs to the Infanta by the same right of Devolution; The 15. Article of the 10. Title of the Custom is precise in it.Si vir aut mulier quibus li­beri supersunt, relictis feudis diem suum obeat, tum ex maritis, is qui in vitâ manet usum fructum habebit in omnia commoda acci­dentaris, Patronatus feudales, & in arces feudales, nec non semissem in obventiones cettas, proprietas corundem feudorum tamen statim ad liberos devolvitur. And Christineus in the Learned Commen­tary which he has publish'd upon it, for­mally avouches, that all the Fiefs of the Survivor, whether acquired or Patrimonial, [Page 69]belong by right of Devolution to the Chil­dren by the first bed, from the moment of the Dissolution of the fi [...]st Marriage. He adds also, that this Custom is in this par­ticular more severe then that of Brabant, in that it gives the Children by the first bed all those Fiefs which fall to the Survivor by inheritance during his second Marriage, to the prejudice and exclusion of the Chil­dren he has by it, which is not the Custom in Brabant Etiam notandum venit quod secundum antiquam Mecklin. Constitu­tionem, & ferè per u­niversam Brabanti am super­stes altero conjugum mortuo usufructuarius redditur suorum bonorum, sive industriâ quaesita sunt, sive haereditate obvenerunt, corum propri­etate statim ad liberos per [...]inente, qui haeredes futuri sunt, devolutâ; qui si ante eum moriantur, proprietas denuo ipsi cum usu fr. conso­lidatur, & id propter spem rediturae haereditatis, haereditarius ille usufructuarius appellatur; at (que) hinc est, quod proprietariis non liceat, quamdiu in vita est usufructuarius eam proprietatem vel ven­dere vel oppignera [...]e, vel ullo deni (que) colore onerate, uti colligi po­test ex generali statuto & consuetudine Brabantiae & particularibus &c. In Consuetud. Mecklin. Tit. 16. Art. 24. Num. 25. As to Antwerp, which is one of the chief Fiefs of Brabant, the Infanta has a claim by 3 Titles. The first is that by the Custom which introduces the Devolu­tion. The second is the Union of that Mar­quisate, with the Dutchy of Brabant, made by Philip le Hardi Duke of Burgundy, and some time since renewed by a Solemn Act of the Emperour Charles the Fifth, where he declares it to be inseparable from [Page 70] Brabant In per­pe [...] Antuerpia & quic­quid ad eam pe [...]ti nere often di poterit, civitatibus communi (que) Brabantiae provinclae conjuncta man [...]b [...]t, &c. En. 1549. Dans la reception de Philippes If. pour prince de Brabant cap. 40. And the third is an usage which has inviolably establishe, That all the Fiefs holding of Brabant in what part soever scituated, either within or without the. Dutchy, be regalated as to their succession by the s [...]u [...]al Custom of the Dutchy.

Upper Guelderland does by an express Article admit of the right of Devolution, and after the example of Malines, pre­fers the Children by the first bed, before those of the second, even in such Fiefs as were not fallen till after the second Mar­riageQuorun­dam loco­rum usu, apud Bra­bantos videlicet superiori Gueldriâ at (que) alibi ex primo matrimonio suscepti liberi, posterioribus, tam in feudo, quam in al­lodiis immobilibus praeferuntur. Fredericus Sandé in Gall. Cons. fond. tr. 1. tit. 3. Sect. Num. 3. We see in Sandeus's Commentaries upon this Custom, a solemn Decree of the Imperial Council, which judged it thus on the Baron de Tantaimbourg's side, against the Children by the second bed, who sued for Fiefs which were fallen in their time.

The Queens Title to the County of Namur is so clear, that it will be proof suf­ficient [Page 71]to give you two Articles of the Cu­stom, which establish it. The 79th. in­troduceth the Devolution in favour of the Children by the first BedQuand deux Con­joints ap­poricront biens [...]eels en marri­age, & l'une des dicts Conjoints termine Vie par la mort, delaissant enfans procre [...] d'eux, la proprieté des biens succeders & se devoluërs par & in­conrinent apres ledit trespas advenu ausdirs enfans, sauf au fur­vivant son usufruit en iceux. and the 82 or­ders, That the same Children shall succeed in all Immoveables that are enjoyed in time of Marriage, whether descending, or acqui­red during its continuance, excluding the Children by other subsequent MarriagesLes enfans dupremier lit suc­cederont aux biens immcubles apport z [...]en marriage E'cheus ou ac­quis pendent iceluy Marriage par Pere & Mere a l'exclusion de enfans d' [...]utres Marriage subsequens, & semblablement les enfans du second lit, succederont és biens escheus, acquis ou appr [...]éz comme dessus, audit seconde Marriage l'exclusion des premiers.. I suppose there is not any one but will easily draw the Consequences from these two Ar­ticles, and judge that the County of Namurs, having formerly belonged to the late Ca­tholick King during his first Marriage, is now by an entire Right fallen to the Infanta who is issued from that Marriage. Come we to the Dutchy of Limbourg, which is joyned to that of Brabant by so ancient and straight an Union, that in the opinion of all [Page 72]the Country they make but only one Sove­raignty, and have only one Seal, and one and the same Chancellor, notwithstanding the other Estates have each their particular ones; and in truth the Emperor Charles the Fifth, and the Prince Philip his Son, in imi­tation of their Predecessors, solemnly prote­sted in the year 1549. that the Dutchy of Limbourg, and the places beyond the Meuse, should for ever remain inseparably united to the Dutchy of Brabant Provin­ciae nostrae Limbur­gensis & Transmosanae in perpetuum conjunctae manebunt cum P [...]ovinc [...]â nostrâ Brabantiâ, neque unqu [...]m [...]b ea divelli poterunt, &c. En l² Acte de reception de Philippes II. Chapitre 12..

For this cause the Title and the Pretension of the Queen upon that Dutchy, doth neces­sarily draw in that of Limbourg, which can­not be separated from it. As to Haynault, most assuredly it is a Soveraignty indepen­dent, or in Free-hold, which according to the voyce of the People, and all the Re­cords of that Estate, acknowledges no Supream Lord but only God and the SunComes Annoniae vulgo [...]ici­tur [...]nere suam ditionem à Deo & Sole, id est, à nemine Mor­taliam, Cap. 3. Nu. 9. Fol. 12. lib. de feud. [Page 73]And 'tis upon this account that the Queen founds her Title to this County; for by an expresse Article of the Custom 'tis said, that Patrimonial Free-holds shall belong to the Children of the first Marriage, and not to those of a subsequent one.Les al­leux patri­moniaux appartiendront aux enfans du premier marriage, si'z ou filles, & non aux enfans du mariage subs quent, mais s'ils esch [...]o [...]ent col [...]aceralle­ment durant un seconde ou troifi [...]sme Mariage, ils appar [...]iendront aux ensans desdits marisges respectivement, le mes [...] e [...]' observera a l'esgard des alleux aquis, les quels [...]ppatiendront aussiaux filz & filles de Chacun Mariage ou vidui [...]é d'iceluy auqu [...]l [...]s [...]its acquests seront saits, ou a leur generation, Art. 4. Chap. 105..

If neverthelesse Spain should contend against the credit of all History, as well as a [...]ainst the certainty of proofs, that it i [...] a Fief, and not a Soveraignty independent, or in Freehold, the Queens Right would not be lessened or weakned by it; because every Fief that is ac­quired, doth by the disposition of the same Custom belong to the Children issuing from that Marriage in which it is acquired, though they be Daughters to the exclusion of those Children which issue from other Marriages, though SonsTous Fiefs ac­quis par pere ou mere, con­stant chacun Marriage ou V [...]du [...]ré d'iceluy ap­partien­dront & escheront aux enfans du Mariage ou Vidui [...]é en tel ordre que cy devant a esté dit. Art. 3. Chap. 91. [Page 74] Quant aux fiefs escheus en ligne collaterale, ou acquis en premier Mariage, encores que filles dudit premier Mariage le pere n'en pourra faire l' Allienation de tant d'enfans, que fils, que filles duront succeder es fiefs acquis ou escheus collater allement constant chacun Mariage. Act. 9. Chapitre 92.

But granting that the late Catholick King came by that County in the time of his first Marriage, as being Heir to the Infanta Isa­bella his Aunt, or as a Doneé from Philip the II. his Grandfather, who had given it to Isabella upon her Marriage, on condition that if she died without Issue, it should return to the King of Spain then living. It is certain that both in one and the other case, it was truly an Acquest made by his own person: For presupposing it came to him as being Heir to his Aunt, the Custom declares all collateral Successions to be AcquestsArt. 7. Chap. 92.. And if it be his as Doneé of Philip his Grand­father, the same Custom says that all Dona­tions in directo are Acquests, unlesse they are made to the Child as to the rightful & next heir, & that neither the Father nor Mo­ther were in their life time possessed of themArt. 1, & 2. Ch. 93. which cannot be said of the late Catholick King, who was so far from being possest by that Donatary, or from being considered as the rightful and next Heir, that he was not [Page 75]born in a long time after, since Philip the Third his Father was not so much as mar­ried at the time of this Donation, and con­sequently you see that every way the Coun­ty of Haynault belongs to the Queen. That of Artois cannot be disputed with her without manifest injustice against the rule of the Custom of the place; which imports that if the Survivor marry again, the Children by the first Marriage shall carry all the inheritances which were possest by Parents, during that first Marriage, the Exclusion of those by the secondQuesile Survivant des deux Con­joynts ay­ant enfans de son Marriage ait convolé en d'autres Nopces, dont seroient issus, d'autres enfans, iceux enfans d'icedluy dernier mar­riage ne peuvent demander aucun droit par le trespas dudit survivant des heritages dont il a post é durant son premier Marriage.. But of all other Customs, that of Combray is favourable to the Infanta, which for­mally orders that the Children by the first bed are so fully seised of the property of all fiefs, from the instant of the Dissolution of Marriage, that the Survivor cannot do any act of a proprietor without the free and express consent of all the Children togetherHomme ou femme ayant en­fant, ou enfansvivans du premier marriage brisé & sepa [...]é ne peut valablement vendre, changer, donner, ni autrement aliener ses heri­tages tant fiefs que main fermes, ni autrement disposer, si non du libre consentement, competence & Devoir de Loix actuelles & perso­nelles de tous lesdicts enfants, &c.. [Page 76]As to the County of Burgundy, the males and females sharing equally without any distinction of the nature of the Estate, or of the Order of the Marriages; the three Children left of both Beds by his Catho­lick Majesty, ought to divide it equally, every one taking their third part. And for the Dutchy of Luxemburg, the Son by the second bed is to have an entire Moiety, and the Queen with her half Sister the other half, that is, either of them a fourth part of the whole, because the Custom gives the Son a portion double to that of the DaughterQuand des filles ont freres ou soeurs, chacune fille n'a que la moitlé autant quel'un des freres. Art. 9. This, Sir, is an Abridgement as far as I can remember of the Treatise, which was shewn to me upon the rights of the Queen: If any thing has escaped me, or the proof be not strong enough, you are not (if you please) to blame any thing but by memory or weakness.

We are so far from believing that you have forgotten any thing, that by the manner of your discourse I should rather think you to be the Author of that Trea­tise; for 'tis a very hard thing for any one to be so full and knowing in another mans work.

I would to Heaven all the City had heard as much as we have now done upon this subject, which is of such impor­tance to its peace, honour, and fidelity.

I could wish it with all my heart, for to speak truly, I find my self extreamly disabused, and am troubled that others are not so too.

I hope that will be so shortly, by the Treatise which the most Christian King ordered to be composed, only out of an intent to instruct and draw them out of their Error.

In what language is it written?

The Original is in French, but the most Christian King has ordered it to be translated into Latine, for the farther spreading of it; and I can assure you the translation is excellent.

I much fear that this work will not pass so far as us; but I am resolved not to leave you till you have promised me one favour.

If it lies in my power, you may be assured of it. What is it?

'Tis Sir, that you will order this Conversation of ours to be printed with all the Texts of the Customs, and Authori­ties in the Margent. You ought to do this for truths sake, and if I durst whisper it in your Ear, you ought to do it for our August Princesses sake.

How am I ravisht with this your Declaration! 'tis true, I owe much to that sacred name, and I promise you, that from this very evening I will so order my affairs as to give you satisfaction.

So sweet and worthy a Conver­sation cannot have a more pleasing End. We hope, Sir, in a little time to see the effects of your promise, and at parting we conjure you to advance the work with a diligence suitable to the merits of the sub­ject, and the warmth of our zeal.