IT was the opinion of Varro, that learned and voluminous Roman, (to whom whether S. Augustine were more beholding for that use he made of his writings, or he to S. Au­gustine for preserving so much of him, which other­wise would have been lost, I know not:) but his opi­nion, I say, recorded by S. Augustine in his third de Civ. Dei, ch. 4. That it was expedient for the publick good, [Page 2] that gallant Heroick men should believe themselves, though falsely, (ex Diis genitos) to be issued of the Gods, that upon that confidence they might attempt great mat­ters with more courage; prosecute them with more fervency; and accomplish them more luckily: as deeming such confi­dence and security, though but upon imaginary grounds, a great advantage to good successe. I will not enquire into the reasons of the opinion. There is enough to be said against it, I am sure, (the latter part of it especially, which commends security, as probable means to successe;) from reason, if we will go by reason: and there is enough al­ready said against it by best Authors, Historiographers especially, if we will go by authority. I think it very pro­bable that Varro when he delivered it, had Alexander the Great in his mind, of whom indeed some such thing is written by some that have written of him; who impute no small portion of his great acts, to his fond belief con­cerning himself, that he was begotten by Jupiter. For that he was in very deed besotted through excesse of self-love, and high conceit of his parts and performances, into that opinion; and that it was not mere policy, to beget him­self the more authority and obedience from others; is most probable. And yet in this very case of Alexander the Great, both by examination of particulars, and by testimony of good Authors, it might be maintained against Varro, that it would have advantaged him more to the accomplish­ment of his purposes and designes, to have contented himself with the title of the Son and Successor of Philip, a mortal King, but of immortal memory for divers excellent and princely parts: then to have assumed that unto himself, by which, even among the vulgar, prone enough of themselves to adore a visible Greatnesse, more then any invisible De­ity, he got but little; but unto the better sort he made himself, to some, (who though they made no scruple to give him what titles himself desired, yet could not but scorn [Page 3] him in their hearts, whiles they now looked upon him rather as a juggler, or a mad man,Note: See Quintus Curtius and others. then a Prince,) ridiculous; and to others, (whose fidelity he most wanted, because the most generous of his Subjects) more grievous; whilest he compelled them against their wills and consciences to do that, which some chose rather to die, then to do: and that himself for this very occasion came to a vi­olent untimely death, is the opinion of best Histo­rians.

But of this assertion of Varro, I will leave every man free to judge as they please. It came in my way casually, and I thought fit to take notice of it, because of the affinity; but it is no part of my businesse. That which I have here to shew, and to maintain, is, that the opinion of divine In­spiration, which in all ages, and among all men of all professions, Heathens and Christians, hath been a very common opinion in the world; as it hath been common, so the occasion of so many evils and mischiefs among men, as no other errour, or delusion of what kind soever, hath ever been of either more, or greater.

By the opinion of divine Inspiration, I mean a real, though but imaginary, apprehension of it in the parties, upon some ground of nature; a real, not barely pretended, counterfeit, and simulatory, for politick ends. For that hath ever been one of the main crafts and mysteries of go­vernment, which the best of heathens sometimes (as well as the worst, more frequently,) the most commended Heroes, in ancient times, upon great attempts and designes, have been glad to use; as anciently, Minos, Theseus, Lycurgus, founders of Common-Weales, and others, for the publick good; the nature of the common people being such, that neither force, nor reason, nor any other means, or consi­derations whatsoever, have that power with them to make them plyable and obedient, as holy pretensions and inte­rests, [Page 4] though grounded (to more discerning eyes) upon very little probability.

But here I meddle not with policy, but nature; nor with evil men so much, as the evil consequence of the ignorance of natural causes, which both good and evil are subject unto. My businesse therefore shall be▪ as by examples of all professions in all ages, to shew how men have been very prone upon some grounds of nature, producing some extraordinary though not supernaturall effects; really, not hypocritically, but yet falsely and erroniously, to deem themselves divinely inspired: so secondly to dig and dive (so farre as may be done with warrantable sobriety) into the deep and dark mysteries of nature, for some reasons, and probable confirmations of such natural operations, falsely deemed supernatural. Now what hath been the fruit of mistaken inspirations through ignorance of natural causes, what evils and mischiefs have ensued upon it, what corruptions, confusions, alterations in point of good manners and sound Knowledge, whether naturall or re­vealed; although it will appear more particularly by several examples and instances upon several heads, to which we have allowed so many several chapters: yet I think it will not be amiss to say somewhat of it here before­hand in general, whereby the Reader may be the better satisfied, that this is no idle philosophical specu­lation, but of main consequence both to truth in high­est points, and publick welfare; besides the contentment of private satisfaction in a subject so remote from vulgar cognisance.

It is observed by divers Ancients, but more largely in­sisted upon by Plutarch, then any other that I know,Note: Plut. [...] &c. alibique. that for divers Ages before So­crates, the natural temper of men was somewhat ecstaticall: in their actions, most of them tumid and high; in their expressions, very [Page 5] Poetical and allegorical;Note: Hence it is that ancient authors, as Aristotle, Strabo, and some others, affirme that Poetrie, in matter of writing and com­position, was in use long before prose: which might seem strange, if not incredible, if we judge by the dispositions of later times; but of those times and tempers, not less probable, then certain. in all things very apt to be led by phansie and external ap­pearances; very devout in their kind, but rather supersti­tious: In most things that they did, more guided by cer­tain suddain instincts and rap­tures, then by reason; not out of any contempt of it, but because they had it not. In those dayes there was no moral Philosophy: and they were accounted worthy of highest honours, that could ut­ter most sentences that had somewhat of reason in them; which by other men were generally received as Oracles be­cause they seemed to surpasse the wisdome of ordinary men.

There were as many Religions almost as men; for every mans religion was his phansy; and they had most credit and authority that could best invent, and make best shew. Among so many religions, there were no controversies, but very good agreement and concord; because no reason used either to examine, or to disprove. There was no talk among men, but of dreams, revelations, and apparitions: and they that could so easily phansy God in whatsoever they did phansy, had no reason to mistrust or to question the relations of others, though never so strange, which were so agreable to their humors and dispositions; and by which themselves were confirmed in their own supposed Enthu­siasms. That was the condition of those dayes, (in Greece at least, and those parts,) as it is set out by ancient Historio­graphers, and others; until the dayes of Socrates, who for his innocent heroick life (commended and admired by Christi­ans as well as by Heathens) and his unjust death, (to which he was chiefly condemned for speaking against the Idolatry of his times) might be thought in some measure (as a­mongst Heathens) to have born the Image of Christ: but [Page 6] certainly not without some mystery, and some preparation of men to Christianity, was so magnified by all men, for being the founder of moral Philosophy, and for bringing the use of Reason into request: by which he would have all things tryed, nor any thing believed, or received upon a­ny private account or authority, that should be against Reason.

[...] was the word which he had so frequent in his mouth, and which he so much commended to his auditors and disciples: and [...], though in a far different sense I know, is the word by which Christ is styled in the Gospel. And as it is commonly observed, and true, that at the coming of Christ or thereabouts, all Oracles in all parts of the world began to cease; so may we say that even of this somewhat might be thought to be prefigured in Socrates, by whose doctrine, as it did increase in the world, (as we know it did in a little time very mightily,) so private inspirations and Enthusiasms began to be out of request, and men be­came, as more rational every where in their discourse, so more civil and sober in their conversations.

Now those were the times and tempers, that did pro­duce those horrid rites and mysteries, the Dionysiaca, Cy­beliaca, Isiaca, Eleusiniaca, and the like: in the description whereof many ancient Fathers have been very exact and accurate; it being an argument that did afford matter enough to any mans wit or rhetorick; the sensles­nesse on the one side, and the beastlinesse, wickednesse in the other, of those things that were there performed and observed under the name of Religion, being beyond any exaggeration, nay, beyond any sober mans imagination. Had we not seen the like in these latter dayes upon the same ground of enthusiasms and divine revelations acted and revived, it cannot almost be expected that any man should have belief enough to credit such relations. I shall my self willingly forbear particulars, which no modest rea­der [Page 7] can read without some reluctancy. There is enough, and more then enough of that stuffe, in those Authors I have already mentioned. But I had rather appeal to hea­thens themselves herein, for the truth of such things, of themselves so incredible, then to Christians; who might be thought partiall. Seneca hath done pretty well upon this argument, in setting out the horror of these mysteries, in those fragments of his Contra superstitiones, preserved by S. Augustine in his books De Civ. Dei [l. 6. c. 10.] But Livie the Roman Historian, farre more particularly, in his twenty ninth Book; who although he speak onely of the Dionysiaca, or Bacchanalia, as they were clancularly kept at Rome; yet what he writes of them, is for the most part generally true of all those hidden mysteries, well called Opertanea. They were not instituted all at one time, nor by one man: they differed in some certain rites and cere­monies: but in point of brutishnesse and licentiousnesse otherwise, so like, that though we distinguish the founders by names, yet we must needs acknowledge them all guided by one Spirit, stiled in the Gospel an unclean Spirit: not as unclean by nature, which we know he is not; but as the au­thor of all uncleannesse among men; as an enemy, since his fall, both to God and man. Now that these mysteries were devised at first by men, who professed themselves, and were generally supposed by others, to be inspired, is most certain. Whether they themselves did really believe it, is not easie to determine. But by that time we have gone through what we purpose here upon this subject, of the several kinds and cau­ses of Enthusiasms, we may speak of it perchance with more confidence, and not fear to offend any judicious Reader.

The first institutor of mysteries among heathens, accor­ding to some, (but indeed rather propagator and improver, then first author) was one Orpheus, a mere fanatick, as in our Chapter of Corybantical Enthusiasme shall be more fully declared: and Diog. Laertius judgeth of him rightly, that [Page 8] he did not deserve the name of a Philosopher, that had made the Gods (by his strange Fictions and relations of them) more vile then the vilest of men. Yet many others for his great antiquity, and because they were glad to entertain any traditions, upon which they might ground a divine worship, which must presuppose the being of a God, and immortality of the soul, both which might be proved by Orpheus; speak of him with great respect. Plato plainly of him, and some other ancient Theologues, that they were progenies Deorum, (as he is interpreted by Tullie,) and that men were bound to believe them whatsoever they said, upon that score, without asking any further reason. A man would wonder that so wise a Philosopher as Plato, whose discourses otherwise, where he treateth of virtue and godlinesse, relish so much of sound reason, and have had such influence upon rational men in all ages; should ad­scribe so much to the authors of such abominable supersti­tions. But besides what hath already been said, that out of his good will to Religion, he was loth to question his authority, upon which, as divine, many of his dayes grounded their belief of a God, a judgement, and the like; and that himself neverthelesse in some places, doth not stick to shew his dislike of some main points of Orpheus his Divinity: after all this I must acknowledge, which no man that hath read him can deny, that Plato himself naturally, had much in him of an Enthusiast. His writings, I am sure, have really made many so, as we shall after­wards in due place declare.

Now for Poets in generall, it clearly appeares by ancient authors, that unto the common people at least, if not unto the wiser, (though unto them too for the most part, by their own testimonies,) they were as it were their sacred Writ and records, from which they did derive their Divinity, and their belief concerning the Gods; as who, and how to be worshipped, how pleased and pacified, by what prayers [Page 9] and ceremonies; and whatsoever doth come within the compasse of Religion. All which was upon this ground, that there could be no true Poet, but must be divinely inspi­red; and if divinely inspired, certainly to be believed. This we find even by Philosophers of best account in those dayes largely disputed and maintained. The two main arguments to induce them to that belief, were, That extra­ordinary motion of the mind, wherewith all good Poets in all ages have been possest and agitated; and the testi­monie of Poets themselves, who did professe of themselves, that they were inspired, and made particular relations of strange Visions, Raptures, and apparitions to that purpose: as shall be shewed in its proper place and chapter. So that as the beginning, growth and confirmation of Idolatry may be adscribed, as by many it is, unto Poets, and their authority; so to supposed Enthusiasms and Inspirations also, upon which that authority was chiefly grounded.

I know that what is here delivered concerning those ancient Poets and Philosophers, of greatest antiquity, as of Orpheus particularly, is subject to much opposition, be­cause of that respect, and Veneration almost, that both his name, and some fragments of his have found with many, whose names ought to be venerable unto all. I said, frag­ments; for as for those entire pieces that go under his name, his Hymns or Prayers, his Argonauts, his Treatise of the vertue of Stones, &c. as full of superstition and gros­sest idolatry as may be; it is generally agreed upon, that they are falsely adscribed unto him. I will not here take the advantage of Aristotle's opinion, as it is affirmed by Tully, that there never was any such man really as Or­pheus: though it appear clearly by Plato, which would make a man the more suspicious, that there were many in his time who made great profit of that common errour, that Orpheus and his mates, Linus and Museus, were descended of the Gods: whereof the poor ignorant multi­tude [Page 10] being throughly possessed, they were the more incli­nable to purchase those pretended Orphical charms and ex­piations, by which the guilt of any sin might be taken a­way. For such they carried with them up and down the countrey, as things of that nature use to be carried: and so made a great prey of the peoples credulity. But granting that such a man hath been (whether Poet or Theologue) it will concern me, that it may be known, that I am not the first, or onely that have so judged of him. Let the Reader therefore if he please,Note: Primi ergo inter Graecos super­stitionū magistri illi, Theologi ab his dicti, Poetae (que), qui Deorum ge­nealogias decantaverūt, mysteria (que) & numinum cultum tradiderunt, sapientiae nomine celebrantur, cum hi in nulla sapientiae parte operam posuisse sint dicendi: fucatè vero personateque illam quae politica di­citur, coluisse videantur, &c. Petrus Valentia in De judicio er­ga verum ex ipsis primis fontibus: Antuerpiae, 1596. read in the note somewhat that may satisfie him that it is not so. I content my self with the judgement of one: but if the Reader can weigh that one with good judge­ment, he may think per­chance the judgment of that one as considerable as the authoritie of many others.

¶ Of detestable Sects and Heresies, upon this very ground of Divine Inspiration, by which Christianity hath been divided, defamed, impaired, and stopt in his course, Ecclesiastical Histories are full: they especially that have written of Heresies, as Epiphanius, Augustine, and the like, will afford examples of all kind. But that which is much to be wondered at and lamented, is, that some men, otherwise of great worth and ability, through mere igno­rance of natural causes have been seduced by supposed raptures and Enthusiasms, and made shipwrack of the true faith, which before they professed. I dare say, and I hope it will not seem strange to them that shall well pon­der what we have to say of natural raptures and visions, (where also Tertullian shall be mentioned again,) that Tertullian had never been an Heretick, had he been a [Page 11] better Naturalist: and yet Tertullian such a man for life and learning otherwise, as can hardly be paralleld by any one of those times; in whom the Church had as great losse, and lamented it as much, (see but Vincentius Ly­rinensis of him;) as almost it ever had in any one man.

I never affected to be the Author of Paradoxes and strange Tenents: this age, I know, gives liberty enough and encouragement to any that is so minded; when nothing almost is accounted true, but what is new, and in opposition to antiquity. However, as I do not affect Paradoxes; so would I not be afraid to say somewhat (if upon probable grounds) that perchance hath not yet been said, or thought upon: especially, when more Academico, that is, by way of proposal unto further consideration; not of perem­ptory affirmation, or determination. What progresse Mahometisme hath made in the world, cannot be un­known to any that know any thing of the world, beyond the very place of their own birth and abode. Certain enough it is, that the best and greatest part of the world (America being laid aside) is now possessed by it. What the first occasion and beginning of it was, is not so certainly known perchance. We are commonly told that Mahomet did assume to himself divine authority by feigned Enthusi­asmes. by false, we are sure enough, as to Divine Au­thority: but whether feigned, I make some question; and whether himself, and those about him, that helped to pro­mote his phrensies, were not at first really beguiled themselves, before they began to seduce others. It shall be mentioned again, when we speak of raptures and extasies from natural causes, and bring examples, which will be in the Chapter of Contemplative or Philosophical Enthu­siasmes.

So much here in general, that the Reader may the better understand my aim, which is the first thing in every [Page 12] work to be considered of, and so may the better know what to expect, if he shall think it worth his pains to read unto the end; untill which done, it is but reason that I should desire him to suspend his judgement. It may be thought a curious argument; which I cannot deny, and might well deserve greater abilities. Yet I my self thought it not so curious, as profitable, which made me to adventure upon it. And that our proceedings may be the more clear and methodical, I shall begin with the consideration of the word it self, and in the multiplicity of different uses and acceptions, (as in most others) pitch up­on one that may fit our purpose, and may be a good help also to keep us within our bounds, in case the affinity of the matter, or ambiguity of the word and title, should tempt us to digresse, or lead us out unawares.

Enthusiasme; In Greek (from whence we have the English) [...]. Now as [...] is that which is replenished with wind; and [...], with wisdome: so, saith Plutarch, must [...] in the subject where it is,Note: Plut. [...]. import a [full] participa­tion and communion of Divine power. We must not expect from Philosophers, that they should be very exact Grammarians; for it will not hold in all words that are of that forme▪ as for example, [...]; it im­plies an effect of the thunder indeed, but not a participa­tion (at least not active, but passive) of the power: in [...], it is a mere relation; but in [...], I confesse, and many others, it doth imply both participation and ple­nitude.

But besides; [...] doth not so properly answer to [...] and [...], as [...], or [...] rather. But this is not a thing long to be stood upon. It will be more to our purpose to take notice of Plato's distinction of [...], or [...] Enthusiasme, (for in Plato's language they are all one, and he hath a long dispute about it, to prove [Page 13] that it must be so:) by the same Plutarch mentioned in the same place. It is in Plato's Dialogue which is called Phadrus, where he doth constitute four species of Enthu­siasms: [...], (as himself doth afterwards in the same Dialogue briefly rehearse them,) [...], and [...]. Plato's words are so obscure, that it would take us much time to make him intelligible: which I doubt to most that will read this, will neither be pleasing nor profi­table. If any studious of Plato, shall desire private satis­faction, I shall hope that it may be given to their own good liking. I shall therefore spare that labour, and con­tent my self with Plutarchs division; which, although he mention Plato, yet I am sure is not the same, neither for the number, nor definition of particulars. I will therefore take it as from Plutarch, rather then from Plato, whom he quotes. According to Plutarch then, there be five kinds of Enthusiasms: Divinatory, Bacchical, (or Cory­bantical,) Poetical, (under which he comprehends Musi­cal also,) Martial, and Eroticall, or amatorie. All these, besides that kinde of Enthusiasme which proceeds from distemper of body, which both by Plato and Plutarch is particularly mentioned and excluded. Plutarch gives us no other definition of Enthusiasme in general, but this, That it is a participation of an extrinsecal and divine power: which is very light and superficial. He saith all those kinds have one common name, [...]. which whe­ther so generally true, (except I my self mistake him, which I think I do not,) I doubt. For I finde that some Greek Physicians challenge unto themselves that expressi­on, [...], (except we could make a difference of [...] and [...],) as proper to themselves: and they make it a disease of the body, which we said before was excluded by Plutarch, and no such thing as Plutarch would have; but merely imaginary, through the distemper of the phansy. Actuarius (not very ancient I confesse) [Page 14] makes it a kind of melancholy, which begins in imaginary Enthusiasms; but commonly ends, he saith, in real mad­nesse. [...] &c. as I find him set out by Hen. Stephen.

But here I must crave, though it will not much conduce to that we mainly drive at, the benefit of all indifferently, that I may for Physicians sakes, being bound to honour the profession for the benefit I have received thereby, insist a while upon that definition of Enthusiasme which I find in those [...], or Collection of Medicinal Definitions, which hath been received among many for Galens, but disclaim­ed by the greater part to be his; however by some adscribed to a much more ancient Author. His words, whoever he be, be these: [...]. So are the words set out by Hen. Ste­phen in his collections of physical words and Definitions. In my edition of those definitions, which is the Basil edition in 8^o. 1537. instead of [...], it is printed [...]: which is all the difference. Most it seems have stumbled at this word. For though I finde the place quoted by more then one Physician; yet not in any have I found the word rendred, but fairly passed over. Which is not much to be wondred at in them that make no profession of extraor­dinary knowledge of the Tongues; when Hen. Stephen himself, to whose learned and Herculean labours the Greek tongue hath been so much beholding, he also doth passe it over in his translation of the words; which is this: Enthusi­asmus, est velut cum quidam de statu mentis dejiciuntur in Sacris, si quid intueantur: aut si tympanorum, aut tibiarum sonum, aut signa quaedam auribus percipiant.

Of the word [...] or [...], by it self, what it signifieth; as particularly, and most properly to burn, or offer incense, or more generally to smoke, &c. there is no question to be made: but what it should do here in matter [Page 15] of divination or enthusiasme is all the question. But for the first, it will easily be resolved: For Eustathius (not to mention others) upon the last of Homers Iliads, doth plainly resolve us, that there was a kind of divination, very frequent amongst the ancients, by burning or offering up of incense: and he hath the very word here in question. [...] (saith he) [...]. But nei­ther in him nor any other do I find the particulars of this divination, as it was used in those ancient times: onely that the same were also called [...], and [...]. Dio Cassius, an ancient grave Historian, once a Consul him­self, of great command and authority, in his 41 Book, in the description of Apollonia a city of Macedonia, de­scribes the Oracle, or manner of divination then used in the Nymphaeum of it. The manner of it was, to observe the time of the casting of the incense into the fire, and to accompany it with earnest prayers and supplications, or vows: and in case it took fire well, the request, (if it were a matter of request) or question was resolved in the affirmative, that it should come to passe: If on the contrary, it neither would take fire of it self, nor endure it, but start back when it was cast into it; (as they write, it would,) it was a cer­tain token that the matter was not feasable. It was open to all manner of questions (saith Dio;) but of death onely, and of marriage, it was not to be consulted. Here is no En­thusiasme at all in this. But that there were divers kinds of this [...], or incense-divination, is sure enough: and the word [...] in the definition we are upon, is a clear indication, that this here spoken of was attended, if not altogether atchieved, with strange sights and visions, which for the time did alienate the mind of the beholder. [...] and [...], are proper words to that purpose, as by Ma­crobius and divers others may appear. As for the follow­ing words in the definition, [...], &c. as no man [Page 16] I think will make any question but that the furor Cory­banticus, or Bacchical Enthusiasms are thereby intended: so upon some further consideration I think it will be grant­ed, that instead of [...] (as I find it every where print­ed) it should be read [...] cymbals; those three words, [...] ▪ being often joyned together not upon this occasion only: but upon this occasion, and this particular subject of Corybantical Enthusiasms, no word being more frequent or proper in ancient Authors, Poets, and others, then this very word cymbalum. Apuleius speak­ing of these barbara sacra, saith that they most consisted of Cymbalistis, Tympanistis, and Choraulis: (De Deo So­cratis, p. 49.) where we have them all three; and the Cymbals in the first place. Ovid calleth them tinnula aera Metam. lib. 4.

Where we have them all, in the same order as we find them in the Definitions; tympana, tibia, and tinnula aera or cymbala. That the Heathens otherwaies in their myste­ries had their symbola properly so called, and how much they adscribed unto them, we know well enough: divers have written of them; but not any thing that I know of, that can be pertinent to this place. Of musical Enthusiasme in general we shall treat in its proper place, and there again give some further light perchance to these words. So much shall serve concerning this definition, whoever be the author of it: whose purpose onely was certainly to define Enthusiasme, not in its full latitude, but as incidentall to corporall diseases, or a disease it self, as it falls out some times: as will appear, when we treat of musical Enthusiasms.

I would not be too long upon this general Protheoria, [Page 17] by heaping multitude of places out of ancient Authors, to shew the use of the word; which places, many of them at least, I shall afterwards have occasion to produce under their proper heads, to which I purposely reserve them. To hasten therefore to some conclusion. Upon this foun­dation of Plato, and Plutarch's observations, and that use of the word Enthusiasme, very frequent in ancient Authors, I shall thus briefly and plainly endeavour to state this bu­sinesse. Enthusiasme, say I, is either naturall, or su­pernaturall. By supernatural, I understand a true and reall possession of some extrinsecal superior power, whe­ther divine, or diabolical, producing effects and operati­ons altogether supernatural: as some kind of divination, (what I mean, will appear under its proper head,) speak­ing of strange languages, temporary learning, and the like. By natural Enthusiasme, I understand and extraordinary, transcendent, but natural fervency, or pregnancy of the soul, spirits, or brain, producing strange effects, apt to be mis­taken for supernatural. I call it a fervency; First, because it is the very word (ardor) whereby Latin Authors do very frequently expresse the Greek Enthusiasme. Secondly, because when we come to consider of the natural cau­ses of Enthusiasme, we shall find that it is indeed (in di­vers kinds of it) a very ardor, and nothing else, where­of all men are naturally capable; but whether to be adscribed to a mixture of the elements, and first qualities, in the composition of man, or to some more hidden and remote cause, shall be disputed. Of natural Enthusi­asme, (having nothing here to do with supernatural, but casually for distinction sake, or when the case is doubt­full and disputable,) I shall constitute and consider these several kinds. First, Contemplative and philosophical: which as I conceive most natural unto man; so because of the strange effects, of most consequence to be known. It may seem of a different nature from other kinds, & therefore not [Page 18] put into the number, neither by Plato, nor by Plutarch. But we shall find it otherways, when we treat of the causes of it; and if there be any difference, it shall be shewed. A second species shall be Rhetoricall: A third, Poeticall Enthusiasme. Of that which Plato calls [...], and Plutarch [...], we shall make two species, [...], (the word [...] is in Plato's description,) that is Precatorie, or Supplicatory; and Musical, as we use the word in ordinary English, for mere Melody, whether of Voice or Instruments. Martial Enthusiasme shall be my sixth species. Erotical, or amatory the seventh. Where I would not be mistaken, as though I intended a discourse, (though proper enough to the subject,) or dis­quisition concerning the nature of Love, as the word is commonly used and understood. Divers have done it; I shall content my self with what hath been done by others, Ancients especially: I shall find enough besides to make up a chapter, which may be more fit for me to enquire into. Mechanical Enthusiasme shall be my eighth and last species. Though neither Plato nor Plutarch mention any such, yet others do expresly; and there is ground e­nough in the nature of the thing, to give it a particular head and consideration. Among all these species, I have not as yet spoken of Divinatory Enthusiasme, [...]one: nei­ther is it altogether the same case. For all the rest, though somewhat divine or diabolicall may interpose in particular cases, to make a mixt business, as before intimated; yet generally that they are reducible to nature, there is no que­stion to be made. but of Divinatory Enthusiasme some question may be, whether there be any such merely natural.

Yet because some have taken upon them to shew some natural causes of all such Divination as hath been heretofore in use among ancient Heathens, I did think fit to take it into consideration, though I doubt when I have said all that I can, I shall leave the case very doubt­full; [Page 19] and though my self may be inclinable to some opi­nion, yet shall think it fittest and safest to avoid perem­ptorie Determination. Of Religious Enthusiasme, truly and really religious, nothing will be found here; nor any thing, I hope, expected by them that consider my Title, and can make a difference betwixt natural, and supernatural; which I shall endeavour as much as I can not to confound.

This is my Division; and according to my division, the Order that I propose to my self. But that I shall go through all these kinds, at this time especially, is more then I can promise my self. Through all that have any relation unto speech (the greater part,) I shall endeavour, God willing: which if I can compass, I have my chiefest end, as the Reader may understand by that account I give him in my Epistle. Though indeed I think I need not go so far for that, since that (as I take it) I may well reduce to Contem­plative Enthusiasme all that I have to say to that book, that was the chief occasion of this undertaking. How­ever the work will be the more compleat, if I can take all those species together, that have a common relation.

I thought I had done: but there is somewhat yet I must give an account of in this general view. Any either anci­ent or later, which hath written of this argument purpose­ly and by it self, I faithfully professe that I know none but one; and he indeed a principal man, Aristotles fellow-disci­ple, and not unworthy of that society; even Theophrastus the Philosopher. That he did write a Treatise [...], it is sure enough: it is mentioned by divers Ancients, and some passages out of it are in Athenaeus and Apollonius. But whether the book at this day be extant, is not in my power, the more is my grief, to give a certain account. When I did read him quoted by Scaliger against Cardan, Ex­ercit. 348. without mention of any other author (The­ophrastus, in libro [...], it a demum evenire dicit, &c.) to whom beholding for his quotation, I thought it [Page 20] probable that he might have it out of some Librarie in Manuscript, as there be many such books of Ancients, as yet not published, only so to be found. But when I con­sidered what a diligent ransacker of all such books Meursi­us had been, and that in his Catalogue of Theophrastus his works, collected out of divers Authors, he made no mention of it as yet extant any where; it made me doubt­full. Neither can I yet say that I am out of all doubt, or hope. However upon further search, finding that what Scaliger doth there alledge as out of Theophrastus, is no other then what is produced by Athenaeus; I thought it more probable that Scaliger also had it out of Athenaeus. If any body can give me a further account of it, I shall think my self much beholding to him. But whereas Meursius in his notes upon Apollonius would correct in Apollonius, [...] ▪ for [...], as it is printed; I think it not needfull. It is very likely that Theophrastus did inscribe his book [...], in the singular, as it is cited by some Ancients; and as likely, that Apollonius or a­ny other might quote it in the plural, because of the different kinds of Enthusiasme, of which Theophrastus, in all pro­bability, had treated under that Title: as many, I believe, and more too perchance, then these we have proposed here.

IT is acknowledged, as well by Heathens as by Christians, that absolutely & infallibly to fore­tell things future, doth belong unto Him only, to whom all things passed, present and future are equally present. Men therefore, as many as have taken upon themselves, or have been believed to prophesy (a word used as ordinarily by Heathen as by Christian Authors,) or to foretell, they have been generally deemed and termed [...], and the like: all which signifie men inspired by God. And although [...] (Enthusiasme) be used to many purposes, as will appear throughout this whole Discourse; yet it is most properly used to imply Divination, such as is by inspiration. And because such Divination among Heathens was not usually without a temporary alienation of the mind, and distraction of the senses; hence it is that both [...] in Greek, and Vaticinari in Latin, is taken sometimes for deliration and idle speaking.

Of the causes of Divination many Ancients have writ­ten very largely and variously. All make [...], or di­vine inspiration, to be the chief and principal. Tullie's first Book De Divinatione is altogether of that Subject. But that is not my businesse here. Neverthelesse, for their sakes that love and read Greek books, (which in very deed, if any, after the Sacred, are best able to make a man wise and learned,) I will produce a place of Plutarch to this purpose: not only because it conteineth much in few words; but also because in all editions of Plutarch which I have seen; as that of H. Stephen in 6 vol. in 8^o. which I account the best, and that of Paris, in Greek and Latine, of later [Page 23] yeares; it is corruptly exhibited, and marvelously both by the French and Latin interpreters mistaken, who hard­ly make sense of those which they have, and leave out part of Plutarch's words and sense.Note: Plutarch. de placit. phil. l. 5. c. Plato (saith Plutarch) and the Stoicks bring in (or as­sert) Divination either as from God, im­mediately, ordinarily called a [...]. enthusiastick; or from the Divinity (or divine nature) of the Soul, which Plato calleth b [...]. ecthu­siastick; or by dreams. I will forbear to say more of it.

Of Divination in general (that is, as the word, though not so properly, is often taken, for any foretelling of things fu­ture,) that there be many kinds which are merely natural and physical, some usual and ordinary, some more rare, and remote from vulgar knowledge, some proceeding from hid­den, though naturall causes, and grounded upon experi­ence only, others known (to the learned at least) by their causes, as well as by experience; they that have written De Divinatione, as Cicero anciently, Peucérus lately, (besides divers others,) will afford store of examples and arguments, if any desire further satisfaction in that point. That which doth here lie upon me to enquire into is, whether any kind of enthusiastical Divination, properly called [...], and by Tully, furor, either now known, or formerly practi­ced, may be accounted natural. Of such kind of Divination there were among ancient Heathens many sorts, cum furore and alienation of mind, all; (such as I intend here at least;) but in other circumstances, as in the carriage of the party possest, in the manner of the utterance, in the Place, Rites, and Ceremonies belonging to it, very different.

But here I must stop a while, to remove an Objection. For what if all these pretended enthusiastical Divinations, by Oracles, or otherwayes, were but mere Gulleries and Impostures to get money; (as is daily practised to this day, though not in the same kind, in all parts of the world,) & to [Page 24] amaze credulous and superstitious people? Or at the best, the subtle devices and artifices of well-meaning Politicians, to compasse great matters for the good of the people, (as must alwaies be presupposed,) and their own good con­tent? That this hath been the opinion of some Ancients, (even Heathens) and is at this day of many learned Chri­stians, it cannot be denied. But upon some further en­quiry into the businesse, I hope I shall be allowed to deliver mine own opinion without offence; which is this: I take it to be a very partial, or very illiterate account or come off, in a matter (as to the cause) of such both consequence, and obscurity. First, I call it a partial account. Amongst Heathens there were divers Sects, for which there was as much strife and emulation, as is now amongst Christians of different opinions. The two grand Sects, were of those that maintained the being of a God, (whether one or more,) and his Providence over the world, on the one side; on the o­ther, those that either absolutely denied the very being of any Deity, (which few durst;) or granting that there is a God, yet denied his Providence, or that he intermedled in humane affairs. Now it was taken for granted on all parts that, si Divinatio sit, Dii sunt; if any true (en­thusiastical) Divination, then Gods also: if no Gods, no Divination. It is Tullies word, that ista reciprocantur; that they are termini convertibiles, as we say commonly. What ground there is in nature it self for this supposed re­ciprocation, would be an unnecessary digression: my matter will not oblige me to warrant it true: it is enough for me, if it be granted, as I know it must, by them that have read the writings of ancient Heathens of either side, that it was so generally believed. Now as men that are once inga­ged both in inward affection, and in outward professi­on (which commonly go together) unto a party, are very apt to credit any thing for truth that makes for them; and on the contrary; nay some though they themselves know [Page 25] it to be otherwayes, yet will do what they can, that what is advantagious for their side may be believed by others; such is the wretchednesse of most men, where their affecti­ons, or interests are once engaged: so doth it manifestly ap­pear to have happened in this particular businesse. If there­fore Lucian, a profest Atheist or Epicure, who employed what he had of wit and eloquence in deriding all manner of Religions, scoffe and jeare at all miraculous relations, which he hath made the subject of one of his Dialogues, entitled Philopseudes; if he will not admit of any Divi­nation, or Oracles, as proceeding from any kind of enthu­siasme; it is not much to be wondred at. If others besides Lucian and such profest Epicures have done the like in an­cient times, somewhat might be said to them too; but that we will not be too long upon it. As for late Authors, I would rather blame their negligence in this point, then suspect their partiality. Certainly, except all ancient Au­thors both Greek and Latin did conspire together to make themselves a scorn to their own time, by writing such things as generally known and received, which neverthe­lesse were but either their own phansies, or the slights of some cunning merchants; and to make a scorn of after times, who upon the warrant of such witnesses, accounted grave and sober, might easily be induced to believe such things, though strange enough otherwaies, when it should be too late to disprove them by any visible search and tri­all: except, I say, they did of purpose so conspire, so ma­ny Authors, of so many different ages, and different countries, Poets, Philosophers, Historians, and others; it must needs be, that such Enthusiasms were very frequent in ancient times. Neither was it a jesting matter to some of them, that did offer themselves, or were chosen by others to that ministry, according to the several rites, ceremonies, and conditions of several places. Lucan perchance, as a Poet, may be thought to de­liver [Page 26] it more generally, then truly, when he saith;

He seems to make it a general case, as though all so inspi­red (in that particular place at least,) did die soon after. But in his time that Oracle was almost expired; and therefore he might the easier mistake, because so little used. That some died in the fit, or presently after, is not to be doubted; and Plutarch in his book De Def. Ora­culorum writeth very particularly of one of his time that did so. But that which is more strange is, that gra­vest authors of those times stick not to adscribe a great part of that worldly greatnesse and prosperity, unto which the affairs of Greece did once arrive, when several Common­wealths among them, some together, some successively, as that of the Athenians, the Lacedemonians, and the like, did flourish; to the Oracles, and other kind of di­vinations of those times. So Plato in his Phaedrus, where he disputes that divine madnesse is to be preferred before humane sobriety and wisdome: [...], &c. Plutarch, though upon another occasion, hath the same observation, of the many benefits that did accre [...] to the Grecians by the Oracle at Delphos. [...], &c▪ Whence it is that even Socrates, the author of the rational sect of Philosophers, because he would have all things as well in matter of belief as practice brought to the trial of [Page 27] reason; yet even he did allow of the use of Oracles, nay commend it, and thought it necessary [...], &c. and judged them no lesse then mad, or strangely besotted, that maintained the contrary. [...]: as is recorded by one of his disciples, *Xenoph. [...]. lib. 1. Xenophon, a famous both Philosopher and Historian. And I pray what were the Pythones, or Pythonici, so called because of the supposed spirit of Divination in them, but Enthusiasts; but that the fit or faculty, because more ha­bitual, was not so strong and visible? They were for the most part of the meanest sort of men, women often, neither so experienced in the world, or so perfected by study, as that any could suspect them to deal cunningly.

Such a one we read of Acts 16.16. and such a one is Alexander said by some to have had with him in his expe­dition for the conquest of the East; as is recorded by Ar­rianus: and such another Marius, in his expeditions a­gainst the Cimbri, so terrible unto the Romans: Syrian women both. Martha was her name whom Plutarch speaks of.

Yet for all this, and what else might be added to the same purpose, (if it concerned us, and our purpose here to be long upon it,) it is farre from me to deny or to doubt, that in the carriage of these things, in all places there was much cunning and juggling, much error and deceit; and perchance some particular places and Oracles, where all that outwardly had a shew of Enthusiasme, was nothing but Art and Imposture. But that all was therefore, is as good as to say, that there is no truth in the world, be­cause nothing in the world that is not lyable to the impo­sture of men.

But now to the proper businesse of this chapter; Whe­ther any enthusiastical Divination might be accounted [Page 28] merely natural, or whether altogether either divine or dia­bolicall; that is it we are now to consider of. I shall not here referre my Reader to such as either Pomponatius, or Leonicus: the first whereof doth not allow of any miracles at all as supernatural but takes upon him (blasphemously) to give natural reasons for all, even for those that were done by Christ; the other, if not in all points of Pompo­natius his faith, yet in this of Divination and some others, a mere Peripatetick, without any mixture of Christianity. I have nothing to do with such; and I think their grounds, for the most part, as contrary to sense and reason, as they are to faith. I would not be so mistaken. Here is no que­stion made of Enthusiastick Divination, either divine or diabolical: but whether any such, as may be thought to proceed from natural causes. Again, by Enthusiastick Divination we do not here understand a pretended, ima­ginary, though not hypocritical divination, which hath nothing of truth or reality in it, (except by some chance, among many false sometimes,) saving the boldnesse of the parties who are deluded. That such confidence and delusion is incidental to some kind of distempers of the brains, is certainly known; and we shall meet with some examples, where we shall have occasion to treat of such distempers. We intend such Enthusiastical Divination, as by several Events, and by due observation of all Cir­cumstances, hath been observed to be true. It is a very ob­scure point that we are upon, and therefore the Reader must not wonder if I lead him about before I come to any determination. If we had to do with them that are Scholars only, we should be shorter.

First then we shall observe a concurrence of Natural Causes. This is granted by all Physicians and Natural­lists. Melancholici, maniaci, ecstatici, phrenetici, epi­leptici, hystericae mulieres: All these be diseases naturally incidental to all both men and women; the last only pro­per [Page 29] to women. as naturally incidental all, so curable by na­tural means and remedies. No body doubts of that. To all these natural diseases and distempers, enthusiastick di­vinatory fits are incidental. I do not say that it doth hap­pen very often: that is not materiall, whether often or sel­dome. but when it doth happen, as the disease is cured by natural means, so the Enthusiasms go away, I will not say by the same means, but at the same time. That is certain by frequent experience, and by the acknowledgement of best Physicians, Sennertus, Peucerus, and divers others whom I could name. Those men and women, which, when they were sick of those diseases, did foretel divers things which came to passe accordingly, and some of them (which I think more wonderfull, as more remote from natural causes,) had spoken some Latin, some Greek, some He­brew, or any other language, whereof before they had no use, nor skill; when once cured of these Diseases, they re­turn to their former simplicity and ignorance.Note: Lev. Lemn. de occul. nat. mir. l. 2. c. 2. this is granted by all. Whereupon some, as Le­vinus Lemnius particularly, do perempto­rily conclude that no other cause of such acci­dents is to be sought, but natural. Quos ego pronuncio, saith he, non à malo infestoque Genio divexari, nec Daemonis instinctu impulsuve, sed vi morbi, humo­rumque ferocia, &c.

And he doth endeavour to give some reason from the nature of the Soul, &c. how such a thing might happen naturally. But his reasons are no wayes satisfactory. And that these extraordinary operations do rather proceed from the Devil, to me is a great argument, (besides other rea­sons,) because the very self-same things are known to hap­pen to divers that are immediately possest, without any bodily distemper, other then the very possession, which must needs affect the body more or lesse. Besides what hath been observed out of ancient Fathers, as S. Jerome [Page 30] and others;Note: Lucian. Philops. Ald. ed. p. 318. [...], &c. An id potius vult Lucianus, pro daemo­niaci cujusque loco patriave, ita daemonem vel Graece, vel alia qua­vis linguâ, quae propria fit illius loci, respendere? Lucian hath a relation to that purpose in his Philopseudes, or [...] which although (as all other things of that nature as is before observed,) he seem to reject as a Fable yet by many probable cir­cumstances might be commended, if not concluded, an History: though not with all those circumstances per­chance, wherewith, the better to serve his purpose, he doth endeavour to make it as ridiculous and improbable as he can.

But to passe by divers relations of later times, upon the credit (some of them at least) of very creditable Authors and witnesses; I shall content my self with the testimony of one, a man of exquisite learning, and a curious sister of the truth in doubtfull points; and a man of that integrity, that having got great credit in the world for his skill (a­mong other things) in Judicial Astrology, being convict­ed in his Conscience, as himself relateth, that it was but men Couzenage and Imposture, he made no scruple to make o­pen recantation, and wrote against it very learnedly. Geor­gius Raguseius is the man: whose words in his second book De Divinatione, Epist. 11. De Oraculis, are; N [...] ego Venetiis pauperem quandam mulierem, &c. that is, I have known at Venice a certain poor woman, which we possest: sometimes she would be stupid and sottish; some­times she did speak with divers tongues, and discourse of things belonging to the Mathematicks, and Philosophy, yea and to Divinity. I do not write here what I have heard from others, but my self have disputed with her more than once. Thus he.

However, though we do not adscribe such wonderful [...] effects to nature; yet it is somewhat, that best Physicians ac­knowledge [Page 31] such a preparation and disposition of the body, through distemper of humors, which giveth great advan­tage to the Devil to work upon; which distemper being cured by physical drugs and potions, the Devil is driven away, and hath no more power over the same bodies. Nei­ther do I think Divination, in some kind at least, (as by and by shall be shewed) so supernatural an operation, as the speaking of Languages, (without any teaching,) and use of Sciences is. If a man examine all those wayes of enthusiastick Divination that have been heretofore in use, which were not a few in number, and in many cir­cumstances very different; he may observe in some of the chiefest, a manifest concurrence of some natural causes preparing or disposing the bodies for such impressions and operations; if no more. I would insist in some particulars, but that I would not be too long upon this point, as of least consideration to our main scope and argument. The Rea­der (if a Scholar, and acquainted with books,) may satisfie himself if he please, reading but Iamblichus De mysteriis Aegypt. where he describes (in one of those chapters) ve­ry particularly the manner of three Oracles, the Colopho­nian, Delphick, and Branchidicum. Iamblichus himself, I know, is much against it, that any natural thing should be conceived as a partial or concurrent cause. but the under­standing Reader may make his own observations upon di­vers particulars neverthelesse. However, our disquisition is not of Oracles in particular, wherein I should easily grant other causes then natural; but of enthusiastick Divi­nation, of what kind soever, in general; whether any such, &c. Well, so much we have got by this first observation, that natural causes may contribute very much towards it, if not wholly sufficient to produce this effect.

Secondly, because the question is not (so properly) whether any manifest, or very probable natural cause can be shewed; but whether it be against all reason, whether ma­nifest [Page 32] or probable, to believe that some kind of enthusiastick Divination may proceed from causes that are natural, though it be beyond the reach of man to find them, as in many other things whereof no question is; this, I say, being the true state of the Question, before we come to the consideration of particular reasons and causes, I think it necessary for their sakes that are not used to the specu­lation of Nature and her secrets, to insist a while upon some such things as are certainly known (though from causes to most men unknown and incomprehensible,) to be natural: and some such things also which in themselves, if well con­sidered, deserve no lesse admiration, though the causes be not unknown. This will be a very good way, as I conceive, to prepare men not versed in such speculations, not to cast off presently for ridiculous or impossible, all things the reason whereof they cannot understand.

I will not take the advantage of Natures amplitude in this kind, as full of wonders, as it is of objects, if rati­onally and philosophically looked upon. It is sure enough, that there is not any one of Natures works, how mean soe­ver and ordinary to vulgar sight and eyes, but may afford somewhat in the cause whereof the reason of the most rati­onal and understanding may be posed. I will confine my self to such things, generally known, and such as may have some reference to our present occasion. That which I shall first propose to be considered is, that quicknesse and exactnesse of some senses in some dumb creatures, so far exceeding that proportion wherewith nature hath en­dowed Man. As for example; Who knows not that Hounds and Dogs excell in smell beyond all comparison? Hunters, they that have written of it, as some Ancients, and they that practice it daily, tell of strange things in that kind; but who doth not daily observe it in every ordinary Curre? Who knows not, that by their bare smell they can discern their Master among thousands, (an argument [Page 33] of their exactnesse in dijudicating of different smels, among so many of one kind,) and how they will trace their steps throughout a whole Country, and find their own way home at a vast distance, by the same faculty? Naturalists tell us, that the reason of their excellency in that sense is, because the nervus odoris is very great: greater (they say) in a Dog, then it is in an Ox. Whether that be it or no, I shall not here dispute. But suppose that a man, (as many things happen to men naturally, contrary to the common course of nature,) suppose, I say, that a man, unknown to others, should be born to such a perfection of sense; might not he, by the advantage of reason to boot, do strange things, think we, to the admiration of all men that should not know the cause? As for example, disclose Se­crets, which no man would think possible, except he were a Witch; to tell who came to his house, though he saw them not, and from whence; and in a good measure, what should be done in it, by day or by night, though he stirred not from one place? All this, and many such things, by the advantage of that one sense heightned to that perfection, joyned with humane ratiocination and wit, he might do; for which I believe be would be no lesse admired, (and even in that kind he might do much too, by the said ad­vantage,) then if he did foretell many things future. But this is but a supposition: It is true: but such a supposition, as shews a possibility in nature, of things that would gene­rally be deemed supernaturall. And there be some ex­amples of men that have excelled, if not in this one, yet in some other sense, far beyond the ordinary proportion of men.Note: Jo. Leo Afric. Descr. Afr. lib. 6. p. 246. Joannes Leo of Africa, a man for his fidelitie, amongst the learned in the Eastern Languages and Histories of very good esteem, hath a strange relation, of a blind man that was a guide to certain Merchants travelling through the Deserts of Arabia. The man road upon a [Page 34] Camel, and led his company, not by his Eyes, which he had not; but by his Smell, which was so exquisite, that having been acquainted with those wayes before, he could find by the sent of the very earth, nay, of the sand, (which was reached unto him at every mile,) where he was, and would describe the places unto them as they went along: yea, told them long before (which proved true, though not believed then,) when they drew near to inhabited places.

But we will consider something more common, and more generally known in man. Wherein if we look upon the Body, or the Soul, but especially upon some Faculties of the Soul, and their several functions in the bodie, we have matter of admiration enough. It is well known, how Galen in the consideration of these things was often posed in the cause, and doth ingenuously acknowledge his igno­rance. Fernelius, who was accounted the Galen of his time, hath collected many passages out of him to that purpose; and is so far from pretending to give us light him­self in those things where Galen wanted eyes, that he makes it his task, to shew us onely that they are things to men incomprehensible. I will insist upon somewhat that may be thought to have some affinity with possession and En­thusiasme. And what more to be wondred at in this kind, then the power of the Phansy, which is able to carry a man out of his bed in his sleep; to make him walk up and down; to lead him over bridges; and to set his hands at work sometimes (all this in his dead sleep) to the accom­plishment of such things, as no man otherwayes would have thought could have been done without the use of open eyes, and perfect reason? Examples of this distemper of body (for it is but a distemper of body,) there be so many and so strange, both in the writings of Physicians, and other Histories, besides what daily experience doth afford, that I shall willingly spare them here.

I will insist upon another thing, of it self more wonder­full [Page 35] by far, though commonly lesse wondered at, (as the fashion is amongst the vulgar of men,) because more ordi­nary. and that is, the power of Memory in man. I know no man that hath done upon that subject better then S. Augustine in his Confessions. he hath bestowed several chapters upon it, not to find out the natural cause, which he professeth to be far above his reach; but to set out (which he doth very pithily and copiously) to the view and con­sideration of other men the wonderfull effects of it. Magna ista vis est Memoriae, magna nimis, Note: Aug. Confess. lib. 10. c. 8. &c. Deus meus, penetrale amplum, &c. c. 8. Et hoc quis tandem indagabit? Quis comprehendat quomodo sit? Ego certe, Domine, laboro hic, & laboro in meipso; factus sum mihi terra difficulta­tis; &c. ch. 16. and again ch. 17. Magna ista vis est memoriae. Nescio quid horrendum, Deus meus, profunda & infinita multiplicitas, &c. Aboali (to whom Ju­lius Scaliger gives this testimony,Note: Exercit. contra Card. 307.28. that he is omnium philosophorum acutissimus atque cordatissimus, that is, the wisest and acu­test of all Philosophers,) after he had turned himself all the ways that he could to make somewhat of it, that might sound of natural reason, was at last, by the many inextri­cable difficulties that he met with, driven to this, to make a God or a Daemon of it. For he doth plainly deny that there is any such thing in the natural constitution of man, as Memory; but that it is resident in an extrinsecal intelli­gentia; and that what we call Memory, is nothing but a natural power of the intellectus to reflect upon that in­telligentia, and to dispose it self for the influence of it. Scaliger having spoken of this Philosopher and his opini­on with great respect, as though he intended to maintain it against all gainsayers, is content at the last, for Aristotles sake, to bring many arguments against it; which was no very hard thing to do: But as for those difficulties and per­plexities, [Page 36] by himself acknowledged, that drove that opti­mum virum, as he calls him, into this opinion, I do not find that he takes away any, or so much as goes about it.

I shall insist but upon one thing more, which is of another nature indeed, because the cause of it is not hidden, but known unto all men: but yet such a thing in my judge­ment, as deserveth no lesse admiration, and hath as much affinity in its effects with Enthusiastick Divination as any thing that bath been spoken of. There was a time, it is well known, when none of those things that we call letters, which children are taught when first sent to school, were known or heard of. It is so yet, I believe, in some parts of the world: but in all parts time was when no such thing was known. If no letters, then no reading, no writing. This might very well be, when men in other things were wise and rational enough; and perchance had some inven­tions of good use, which we have not. But I would have any man to consider with himself, if at such a time, some two or three that had been acquainted with the use of read­ing and writing had appeared, and made publick shew (yet concealing purposely the mystery of it, to beget admirati­on,) of their Art, by communicating with one another at a great distance (as now is ordinary) by the mediation of written papers, which should contain particulars of the present condition of each place, what is done, what hath happened, &c. who can think otherwise, but that either the men would have been judged more then men, that could see and know at such a distance; or at least, the papers that brought intelligence unto them, to be some kind of Angel or Devils? But we need not go by conjectures; for it is cetain enough, by the experience we have had of it in these later times, that it would have been so: witnesse dive [...] that have written of the Indies, and of America: who also relate what use the Spaniards made of it, to beget to [Page 37] themselves, for this very thing, an opinion of divine and supernatural abilities. You may read of it, if you please, and be not better furnisht, in Herm. Hugo, De prima scri­bendi origine, printed at Antwerp, 1617. in his Preface. And if any man think that I make too great a wonder of it, as I know there be many (never born to be Philoso­phers) who can hardly be brought to admire any thing that is known and ordinary: I could appeal to many both ancient and late, men of great reputation and learning, that have been of the same judgement, who have given it place (and some, preeminence,) among the greatest miracles in the world. You may find many of them quoted by the said Author. For my part, I professe to admire nothing more. I should not think it so much, to see a dead body made to walk by some Necromancer for a time, as I do to hear a man, that hath been dead some hundred, or thousand of years perchance, to speak to me so audibly and plainly by this Art. Neither do I think it a greater wonder, that some men have spoken without a tongue, (whereof I reade a ve­ry late example in Nicol. Tulpius his Observ. Medicae lib. 1. c. 41. Mutus loquens.) then that men should be able so familiarly and readily to communicate with one another at a distance, by the onely help of their hands. We may give men the praise, to have been the instruments and secon­dary cause; as some, we know, are commonly named to have invented some letters, and some others: but he is much to blame, in my judgement, that looks upon any other then God himself as the author of so great and so inestimable a benefit.

Were we to treat of the causes of Divination in general, and of the several opinions about it, we should think it ne­cessary to begin with a consideration of that, which is com­monly called among Philosophers Intellectus agens; what it is according to Aristotle, what according to Averroes and other Arabs; whether a particular existence in every [Page 38] man, or whether universal in all men; whether part of the soul of man, or whether extrinsecal and adventitious; whe­ther eternal à priore & posteriore, or whether à posteriore only, or not so much as à posteriore; and the like. From the nature of which intellectus agens, most Arabs and many Jews fetch Divination; yea and some Christians too, not of them only who had the bare name, as Pomponatius and the like; but some also that seem to adscribe very much to the Scriptures,Note: Bod. Theat. Nat. p. 529, &c. as Bodinus particularly; whose opinion of an extrinsecal intelle­ctus agens in every man, seems not much repugnant to Aboali's in point of memory, before spo­ken of. He is copious enough upon that argument, if a­ny desire to know his opinion. There is no question but if these opinions were true, or fit for our consideration in this place, we might conclude rightly enough, that enthu­siastick Divination is no supernatural thing, but natural unto man as he is a man, endowed with such and such pro­perties. For as in case of the pestilence incidental unto men, we do not say that it is supernatural, but natural unto man to be infected; though the immediate cause (sometimes at least,) be not in man, but from such and such a constitu­tion of the skies, and such a temper of the aire, to which such a constitution, and such a temper at some times is natu­ral, or doth happen by course of nature: So though this intellectus agens, as many teach, be a thing extrinsecal, yet as (according to their opinion) it is natural unto all men, that are right men, to have such a one; so both it and the effects of it, (Divination among the rest,) may be thought natural unto men. But for my part, as I do not embrace the opinion my self, so do I think the disquisition too ab­struse for ordinary men: and perchance more abstruse then profitable, for any.

Aristotles opinion is that which I shall chiefly pitch upon; and if he do not help us, I see but little hopes from [Page 39] any other. Aristotle then in his Problems, sect. 30.1. hath a long discourse of the several effects of the atra bilis, according to its different [...] or temperature; that is, as it is mixed either with heat, or cold. Among other things, he hath these words: [...], &c. that is; They to whom this [melancholick] tempe­rament is natural, it presently shews it self in the varietie of their nature and dispositions, according to the diversity of the temperament or mixture. They that have superfluity of it, and cold, they are [naturally] sluggish and stupid. but they that abound with it joyned with heat, they are wildish, good natur'd, [or witty] prone to love, quickly mo­ved to passions and concupiscences; and some also very talk­ative, [or discoursive.] And some again, because of the nearnesse of this heat to the seat of reason, are liable to distempers of madnesse, and enthusiasticknesse. Hence also are proceeded the Sibyls, and the Bacchicks, and all that are truly [...], [so called and accounted, that is, divine­ly possessed, and inspired,] when it doth not happen through sicknesse, but by natural temper. Aristotle doth seem to contradict himself in those last words, in that having made enthusiasticknesse a [...], that is, a distemper, or sick­nesse, he doth afterwards affirm, that the [true] [...] must be so by their natural temper. which perchance made Budeus to leave out those last words in the Greek, Note: Bud. Annot. in Pand. ed. Lug. 1562. p. 698. where he cites them in his Annota­tions upon the Pandects. But it must be remembred, which was noted before, that [...], or [...] is sometimes taken for a bodily disease; and so [...] and [...] (commonly confounded) are distinct: Aristotles purpose being to say, that both the [...], through disease, and the [...], naturally, proceed from this kind of mixture of the atra bi­lis. But again, If [...], may some say, so really, how na­turally? Except we shall say, that Aristotle intended to [Page 40] assign a double cause: the one natural in preparing the bo­die, without which preparation nothing would be done; the other supernatural, the formal and immediate cause of the operation. And if this were his meaning, then he is much wronged by them who lay to his charge, as though he made Melancholy the only cause; whereas themselves also allow of some previous preparation and disposition (in such cases) as necessary.

I have heard some learned men make a question whe­ther those Problems were truly Aristotles, because they have observed some things in them not worthy (they think) so grave and solid a Philosopher. I have thought so my self sometimes, I must confesse; and it is not impossible but that something might be foysted in here and there, that is of another stamp. But for the generality of the book, there is authority enough from ancient Authors by whom it is often quoted: and for this part and parcel of it we are now upon, there is too much of Aristotles stile and genius in it, to leave it doubtful and questionable. And besides that, we have Cicero's testimony, in his first of Divination: Aristoteles quidem eos etiam qui valetudinis vitio fure­rent, & melancholici dicerentur, censebat habere aliquid in animis praesagiens atque divinum. Except Aristotle should treat of it somewhere else too, as I think he doth; though this be the place most taken notice of. For my part, I confesse that I adscribe much to this discourse of the Philosopher concerning the effects of atra bilis. I wish some few lines had been left out, that the whole might have been read or interpreted in offensively. However, because I would not be over-long upon this subject, I shall content my self with what hath been said upon it, hastening to the con­sideration of another opinion of the same Aristotle, which few take notice of that have written of this subject, concern­ing the causes of Divination; upon which I purpose to ground my conclusion. But first of all to make it the more [Page 41] intelligible to all men, I must begin with some general grounds.

First, That there is nothing without a cause, but God.

Secondly, That some things are by Gods immediate will, without any subordination of secondary means; and some things though by the will of God, yet through means which he hath appointed, known to us under the name and notion of natural causes.

Thirdly, Of things that happen by natural causes, some things happen according to the ordinary course of nature, having their limited times and seasons, &c. other things extraordinarily, (as to the ordinary course of nature) though not lesse naturally.

Fourthly, Nothing that happens according to the or­dinary course of nature, whereof the cause is known, though it be foretold long before, comes within the compasse of true Divination.

For example; An Astrologer can foretel what Eclipses of either Sun or Moon will be a hundred or two hundred years hence; at what Day of the Moneth, and what Hour of the Day they will happen. I know what can be said a­gainst it, that some have been deceived in the hour, as in the Eclipse that happened 1605. April 3. about which some very able Artists are noted to have mistaken; and the rea­son is given by Astronomers how such a mistake might happen: However it is very seldome that such a chance doth happen, and when it doth, it is but a mistake of the hour, not of the day. In such predictions, though won­derful to ignorant people, and to some that make a trade of cheating people that are ignorant, there is nothing superna­tural, nothing that really can be accounted Divination.

Fifthly, That many things happen according to the con­stant course of nature, the causes whereof are not known: For example; the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, the inunda­tion of the river Nilus; and the like.

[Page 42]Sixthly, That many natural things before they come to that passe, as to be generally known or visible, have some kind of obscure beginnings, by which they be known by some long before. Or thus; That many natural things, by some natural foregoing signes, may be known, felt or dis­cerned by those men or creatures, that have a natural dis­position or sympathy, whether constant or temporary, to those things or their signes, though unto others that have not they be altogether unknown.

So, for example, many dumb creatures are sensible of fu­ture changes and alterations of air, of imminent storms and tempests. They foresee them not by any ratiocination, or consideration of the causes, but feel some effects of the agi­tation of causes, and foregoing symptomes, which in very truth are part of the being of the things themselves, not yet so discernable as afterwards. And not dumb creatures on­ly, but men also, by the natural temper of their heads, or by some accidental distemper in some member, can foretel, some times a long time before, such alterations and Tempests, Frost or Snow, wet or drie weather, and the like; not by the help of their reason, but by some proper antecedent ef­fects of such changes and chances, which they feel in them­selves.

And this hath brought us to the main businesse which we are to consider of, and so to come to a conclusion. The ancient Stoick Philosophers, who did adscribe all things un­to Fate or Destiny, did enlarge themselves very much upon this subject; alledging, first, that as nothing did happen in the world, but by an eternal concatenation of causes; so secondly, that there is such dependance of these causes, of the one upon the other, that nothing can truly be said to happen suddenly, because nothing but had in, and of it self an aptitude to be foreseen long before in its Causes. Nay, some went further, that all things that should be, had a kind of present being in the generality of nature, though no [Page 43] actual visible existence. Upon all which they inferred the possibility of Divination by the knowledge of nature. But leaving them to their opinions as too general and re­mote, Democritus will bring us nearer to our aim; who maintained that out of all things that happened by natural causes, there proceeded certain species ( [...] he cal­led them) and emanations; not from the things them­selves only when actually existent, (though then indeed most strong and apparent,) but from their Causes also. It will be hard to make them that have no philosophical knowledge of nature at all to comprehend this: I do not say to believe it, that is another thing; but to comprehend what is intended, whether true or false. But they that have so much philosophy in them, as to be able to give some account more then every child can, (because he hath eyes,) how they see, especially if ever they have been spe­ctators of the species of objects, gathered through a little hole and piece of glasse before it in a dark chamber, upon a white wall, or sheet of paper; as most (I sup­pose) that have any curiosity, have seen at some time or other: such may the better conceive what is intended. Not that I make those species that issue out of objects, by the intromission whereof the sight is accomplished, to be the very same as those emanations he maintained; but only to have some kind of resemblance, whereby those may the better be understood.

Now this was Aristotles opinion, and the opinion of Synesius too, a very learned Philosopher of later times, that these emanations were the natural cause of Divination by Dreams, when and where there was a disposition in the subject for reception or impression: which was, when and where reason had least force, as in Sleep, and Trances; and in such persons where reason naturally was weakest, and the phansie strongest, as in Women, weak men, Idiots, and the like. Aristotle indeed doth not there mention (neither [Page 44] doth Synesius) other Divination, then that which is by Dreams: but there being the same reason, I take it as ge­nerally intended by him; or at least appliable to any other kind, whereof question may be made, whether natural or supernatural. I make the more of this opinion, though I propose it but as an opinion, because I am very confident that greatest secrets of nature do depend from such kind of natural unsensible emanations; as might appear by the con­sideration of many particulars, and the examination of se­veral opinions, if it were part of my task. Now from all that hath been said and observed hitherto, that which I would inferre, is;

First from those general instances, not lesse to be won­dered at, though certainly known and acknowledged to proceed from causes that are natural, whether known or un­known, That it is possible, if not probable, that some Enthusiastick Divination may proceed from naturall causes.

Secondly, That such Divination as is concerning natural events, grounded upon natural causes, whether known or unknown, may possibly proceed from some such unsensible emanations as have been spoken of: those emanations at least as probable a cause of Divination in Fools and Idiots, as any other that hath been given; as Melancholy may be of some kind of Divination in a different temper and disposition.

What else may be said in this point agreeable to Ari­stotles doctrine, delivered by him in many places, shall be shewed when we shall treat of the causes of Enthusiasme in general.

Most that have written of Divination, to prove that it proceeds of natural causes, insist upon the divination of some dying men, upon which they inferre a natural aptitude of the Soul to it when loose and free from the body. That holy men when near to death, have often prophesied by im­mediate [Page 45] divine Inspiration, is not a thing to be disputed a­mong Christians. But what should make some, ordinary men, sometimes, to foresee, not the day and hour of their own Departure only, but to foretel the period of some other mens lives also, whereof there be divers examples both ancient and late: and not to foretell things only that belong to life and death; but sometimes more generally, many future things, which have proved true by the event: of this, question may be made without offence, whether natural, or supernatural. First for emanations; it cannot be doubted, but that long sicknesse in general, but especially such and such as may have more particular operation and sympathy, may so affect the body, as to dispose it for the reception or dijudication of such emanations, if the thing foreseen and foretold be such as may be adscribed to natural causes. But secondly, I remember an observation in the Author of the History of the Council of Trent, that it is natural unto many, dying, out of some hidden and supernatural cause, to fall into a great contempt and loathing of all worldly things and humane affairs. But I know not how far I may trust my memory. For I have not the book at this time. The words (the best satisfaction I can give to the Reader,) in which I have entred it many yeares ago, when I first read it, into my Adversaria, are these; [P. 758. that refers to the Latin Translation, printed in Germany in 4^o.] [...] solemne in confinio mortis positis, res humanas ex ignota quadam & supernaturali causa fastidire. Now such a fastidium we know, is an effect, as of greatest wis­dome and religion often; so sometimes of pure melancholy, which would bring us to Aristotles opinion of the effects of atra bilis before spoken of. But I have met with an observation of Aretaeus, an ancient Physician long before Galen, which I think very considerable in this place. Aretae­us doth affirme, that they that are sick in the heart ( [...], which is a very general word, but more particu­larly [Page 46] intended of those that labour of a syncope,) have their external senses more quick; that they see better, and hear better; that their mind is better settled, and their hearts more pure. and not only so, but that the same do foretell many future things also with great certainty. It is much against my will, that I must take any thing upon trust; I see very learned men so often deceived by it; but this I do: Hieron. Mercurialis is my Author, in his Variae Lecti­ones; where you may find it, and the Authors own words. I would not give any occasion of offence, by mixing imper­tinently and unseasonably things natural and supernatural, that is, heaven and earth: But who can read those words of that ancient Author, (especially if compared with Galens, who hath almost the same of the vulnerati corde, but that he doth not go so far as Divination,) but will think of E­says words 57. v. 15. For thus saith the high and lofty One, &c.Note: Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. 7. c. 52. But this by the way only. Plinie in his Natural Historie witnesseth of his time, that Plena vita est his vaticiniis; that is, that such Prophesies of dying men happened very frequently: which neverthelesse he professeth to make no great reconing of, because for the most part false. Where­of he doth give a very notable instance of one Gabienus, in the time of the Civil warres. It may be read in him: and I am confident that he made choice of that instance among many, as of a thing that was generally known, and in­doubtable.

Note: Cicero 1. De Divin. Multos nemora sylvaeque, multos amnes aut maria commovent; quorum furibunda mens videt ante multo quae futura sunt; saith Tully. That the sight of vast objects, as rocks and mountains, and wild prospects, and the attent consideration of some natural object in a solitary place, doth dispose some men to Ecstasie, that is, transport their thoughts beyond their ordinary limits, and doth raise strange affections in [Page 47] them, I know to be most true: and if any should affect ecstatical raptures, or alienation of mind, it is like enough that by the use of such means, with the concurrence of some others, as some kind of Musick, (to such as are of that tem­per,) they might be procured. But that any true Divina­tion, or foretelling of things future, would follow upon it, I am not very apt to believe, neither do I know any reason for it.

However, I think that man that can enjoy his natu­ral wit and reason with sobriety, and doth affect such rap­tures and alienations of mind, hath attained to a good de­gree of Madnesse, without rapture, which makes him so much to undervalue the highest gift of God, (Grace except­ed, which is but a perfection of Reason, or a reformation of corrupt Reason;) sound Reason. It made Aristotle de­ny that any Divination, either by Dreams or otherwise, was from God, because not Ignorant only, but Wicked men also were observed to have a greater share in such, then those that were noted for either Learning or Piety. And truly, I think it is not without some providence of God that it should be so; that those whom God hath blessed with wisdome, and a discerning spirit, might the better con­tent themselves with their share, and be the more heartily thankfull. And in very deed, sound Reason and a dis­cerning spirit is a perpetual kind of Divination: as also it is somewhere called in the Scriptures. I could say much more: but it is not my Theme here, and I shall have a better opportunity, in the next Chapter, to say somewhat of the excellency of Reason in matter of True Prophesie.

THe word in Greek for Contemplation is [...]. the reason of which word may be, either be­cause the highest object of mans Contempla­tion is God; ( [...] in Greek;) or because as perfect happinesse doth most properly belong unto God, so doth Contemplation, wherein his happinesse doth chiefly consist; as by Aristotle is excellently well, to the utmost of what could come from mere man, in his E­thicks and elsewhere, disputed and declared. Who also doth thereupon well inferre, that as that man must needs be ac­counted most happy that is likest unto God, so the chiefest happinesse of man also must needs consist in Contempla­tion. Hence it is (for I go no further then humane reason here, I determine nothing my self,) that your refined Epi­cures, [Page 50] in profession Epicures, because they maintained that pleasure was the end (or summum bonum) of man; but in their particular tenets, and in their lives too, some of them, upon this ground, that there was not any true lasting pleasure but in the exercise of vertue, and peace of Consci­ence, (of which argument you may read an epistle of one of that profession, among Cicero's ad Familiares, lib. 15.19.) not inferior to the best of Philosophers; these refined Epicures, that proposed unto themselves no other end but their own pleasure and contentment of mind, divers of them, willingly bereaved themselves of all other sensual plea­sures, contemned the pomp and glory of all worldly wealth and greatnesse, that they might enjoy the pleasure of Contemplation. It may seem strange to some; but it must be to them that never had any experience in themselves of this noblest operation of the soul, and will believe nothing▪ though attested by never so many credible witnesses, that is not suitable to their own disposition. I know not in what rank of Epicures I should place Lucrece the Poet: but sure I am, (and I doubt not but it hath happened unto o­thers as well as unto me;) that some of his verses, setting out the happinesse of some kind of contemplation, have had that operation upon me (as often almost as I have had oc­casion to ride, and wanted other company, till of la [...] years,) as I thought might compare with the highest con­tentments they can brag of, that have no other aim or end in this world, then present pleasure and contentment. The verses I mean (if any shall be so curious as to desi [...] to know,) are those at the beginning of his second book, Suave mari magno, &c. to, Nunc age quo [...] tu, &c. I wish some good English Poet would take them to task; though I doubt much whether it be possible for any traduction to reach the excellen [...] and the elegancie of the original, when the original ha [...] so much of both: and better they should not be [Page 51] meddled with at all, then spoiled in the translation.

But to leave these Epicureans, whose very name, because of the major part of that name, (those of later ages especi­ally,) ought to be in detestation to all that love vertue and goodnesse: what man so dull and stupid, that can read Hippocrates upon this subject of philosophical contempla­tion, without being affected himself, yea transported be­sides himself in some measure? His whole Epistle to Dema­getus, conteining his relation and judgement concerning De­mocritus, who by others generally was conceived mad or phrantick; and his conference with him, wherein the vanity of all humane affairs is set out to the life; is in my judge­ment a very divine piece to that purpose. The oftener I read it, the more I am affected with it: but that it is still with some suspicion, that the Author of it (no Christian I know) should be later then Hippocrates. But since that by very learned men, and best versed in Greek Authors, Physicians and others, it is acknowledged a genuine piece, I rather submit to better judgements. In one of his Epistles to Philopoemen, having first treated of melancholy as the ef­fect of a bodily disease, he proceeds to melancholy as an effect of learning. Not only (saith he) mad men covet Caves and Solitudes; but they also that have attained to that sublimity of mind, as to be above all worldly cares, that they may not be subject to any disturbance. For as often as the mind, interrupted in its operation by external objects, would have the body to be still, presently it betakes it self unto retirednesse. There rising betimes in the morning, as it were, [the morning being the most advantagious time for contēplation; whence also it is, that the Hebrew word which signifieth to seek diligently, is taken from the aurora and day-break:] it beholds round about in it self the region of [so­lid] Truth; where neither wife, nor children, nor mother, nor any cousins, or kindred, or servants, or any thing else of what nature soever it be, that can make any trouble are to be seen. [Page 52] All things are excluded that can disturb: neither dare they attempt to come, for reverence of those that inhabit there. For there inhabit the Arts and the Vertues: there Gods and * [...]. The word An­gel, for a good Spirit, is used by divers hea­thens. Angels: there Counsels and Decrees: yea the wide and ample Firmament it self, with all its variety of Starres and Planets of several motions, by which it is so beauti­fully decked and adorned, is there also. I do not expect that all men should be af­fected with these things. I will forbear to enquire into the reason, which it may be would be more unpleasing. They may make a vertue of a defect, that will forbear to read, so they forbear to censure. As for them that have any curiosity at all for the speculation of Nature, and her wonderfull works; I dare promise them that they shall find some­what before they come to the end of this Chapter, that may give them better content. But I must take my liber­tie to proceed by degrees; and I am sure I do not digresse from my subject.

I have said somewhat of Hippocrates: how much more may we of Plato the Philosopher! whom no man (in some principal passages) can read in his own language, without some passion tending to Enthusiasme: much lesse can we think that he could so write himself, had not he been carried by some excesse of natural wit and vigor, beyond ordinary men. Certain enough it is, that the sublimity both of his mat­ter and language, hath been the infatuation of many, who being but weak, adspired high. It hath happened so unto ma­ny, not Heathens only, but some also that made profession of Christianity. And if his Philosophy hath been a great advantage to Christianity, as some ancient Fathers have judged: yet of Christians it hath many Hereticks; and is to this day the common refuge of contemplative men, whe­ther Christians, or others, that have run themselves besides their wits: who also have not wanted Disciples, stu­dious [Page 53] and ambitious to vent and propagate the abortive fruits of such depraved phansies, unto others. Not to speak (as not needful here) of some of his expressions in his subli­mest contemplations: wherein though I can be perswaded my self, that he intended well; yet it cannot be denied, that he hath given just offence to them that are not so perswa­ded; seeming thereby to countenance some vices, no lesse brutish and unnatural, then his best vertues and abilities have exceeded, or have been thought to exceed ordinary nature. Plato may be read with lesse danger, and no lesse pleasure perchance, in Philo Judaeus; a natural Jew, but a better Platonist by far, both for his Stile and his Tenets, then he was a Jew, in point of Faith and Religion. For a taste of his enthusiastick expressions, in imitation of Plato, the Reader that is not better acquainted with him of him­self, may take, if he please, his interpretation of those words of Scripture, [...]; in his Treatise Of the Creation; [...], &c. But I would have him read in his own lan­guage, or not at all. For besides that most Translations lose the native grace of the original expressions: in such passages, (as almost all Plato over,) no translation can be made without great obscuritie; wherewith the understand­ing being perplexed and intangled, the matter must needs have lesse influence (if any at all) upon the heart and af­fections. Now when the mind is fixed upon any such contemplation, it is frequently said by Greek Authors, [...], that is, to be agitated by a divine power, or spirit. It is in that place of Philo but now spoken of: and it is in Plato too, with some others equivalent to that, in his Phaedrus, and elsewhere.

All this while we have insisted but upon one effect of Philosophical Contemplation, intellectual pleasures and contentments, proceeding from the elevation of the mind above ordinary worldly objects, and fixed upon the con­templation [Page 54] of things natural, and supernatural: which Operation of the mind, as we said but now, is by some cal­led Enthusiasme.

We proceed now to the consideration of other effects of Contemplation, which by degrees will bring us to the main Controversie, beyond which nothing (as to this world) can go, concerning the real and actual separation of the soul from the body by it: and to somewhat above that too, the absolute transformation of man into God. To make our way more plain to all readers, we shall first o­pen some points, which may be perchance out of the know­ledge and consideration of not a few.

It is a common speech, That our eyes see; our ears hear; and the like. There is no need to except against it in com­mon use: yet Philosophers and Physicians that have look­ed more nearly into the nature of things, except against the propriety of the speech, teaching that, not the eye, but the soul through the eye; nor the ear, but the soul through the ear; and so of other senses. Aristotle in his Problems, where he inquireth why the sense of hearing is quicker in the night, among other things, hath somewhat to this pur­pose, and alledgeth those words, [...], (the mind seeth, the mind heareth;) as a common speech. Of the Author of those words, and of his meaning, I have had occasion to treat elsewhere, which is not needfull here. I shall content my self with with two ancient Latin Au­thors. The first here, though later in time, shall be Pliny: Animo autem videmus, ammo cernimus; oculi ceu vasa quaedam, visibilem ejus partem accipiunt, atque transmit­tunt. Sic magna cogitatio obcaecat, abducto intus visu. Sic in morbo comitiali, aperti nihil cernunt, animo caligante. The second, Cicero: whom because some­what more large,Note: Cic. 1 Tuscul. though to the same ef­fect, I will set down in English. Ne­que enim est ullus sensus in corpore, &c. that is; Neither [Page 55] is any sense, truly and really, resident in the bodie it self: but as not only Naturallists, but Physicians also, who have looked into those places by [anatomical] dissection, teach; from [the brain] the seat of the Soul, there be cer­tain passages and conveyances, contrived into several pipes and chanels, unto the eyes, ears and nostrils; so that sometimes, either through intention of the mind in a deep study, or through some distemper of the body, the influence being stopped, though our ears and eyes be both sound and open, we neither see nor hear. Whence is easie to be gather­ed, that it is the mind, or soul, that seeth and heareth: not those parts of the body, which are but the windowes, as it were, of the soul. Lucrece the Poet, opposeth this very much, (Dicere porro oculos nullam rem cernere posse; Sed per eos animum ut foribus spectare reclusis, &c. lib. 3.) but like himself; that is, a brutish Epicure, who would not have us to believe either Sun or Moon to be bigger then they appear to our eyes, lest we should in any thing adscribe more to reason, then to sense: and yet elsewhere denieth that the eye was made to see, or the ear to hear, &c. (Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer; & illum Effugere erro­rem, &c. li. 4.) lest he might seem to adscribe somewhat unto providence. Now whether the faculty only, or some spirits with it, be conveyed into the organs; and why, if the facul­ty be resident in the brain, some parts of the body that are furthest off, are more quick of sense then those nearest unto the fountain; & other like questions, or objections that may be made: I must referre to Philosopers and Anatomists.

One question we must not omit, because it will concern us. If it be so as we have said, that not the eye properly, but the soul through the eye seeth, heareth, &c. why may not the soul, at any time, though the eye be open, forbear to see; and the ear open, by inhibiting her influence, hinder her hearing? Such an objection is made by Philo Judaeus: [...], &c. Though [Page 56] the mind (or soul) saith he, lay its command upon the sight, (or sense of seeing) that it should not see, it will have its operation neverthelesse upon its object: and so the hearing, though the soul interdict it never so strictly, it will hear, if any voice be within the compasse of it: so the smelling, &c. But the matter will easily be answered. For though it be the same soul in man, that willeth, and seeth; yet the one being a faculty of the soul as it is rational, the other, an operation of it as it is sensitive; that there should be such a subordination, or necessary dependance of the sensitive fa­culties, as there is of the loco-motiva (as commonly called,) upon the will, it doth not follow. It is enough, that the opening or shutting of the eye dependeth on the imme­diate command of the will: but for the influence of sense, the same Providence that took order for the one, that it should be arbitrary, saw not the like reason for the other, and therefore took no order for it; which should be reason enough to us, why it is not so. But if the soul intend it purposely, and shall use Art to withdraw its influence, which it cannot by command; as by intent meditation, or the like; if then it may be done, (as we shall shew it may:) that is enough to prove, that the power of sense is resident in the soul.

But yet let us consider a while; if it will be worth the while, as I think it will. I find it in Cicero too: Ʋt facile intelligi possit, animum & videre & audire, non eas partes quae quasi sunt fenestrae animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil que at mēs, (which is quite contrary to Philo's assertion:) nisi id agat & adsit. He seemeth to say, that except the mind intend it, though the organs themselves do their parts, the sense is not accomplished. It is not so ordinarily, we know: but whether by long use and custome, some such thing in some senses may not be brought to passe, I cannot tell. For what shall we think of those Lacedemonian boys and girls, (a thing so generally attested by so many Christians, as [Page 57] well as Heathens:) that would not onely play, prattle, and quarrel with one another in their play, but also keep their countenances without any the least appearance of change; whilst their backs were torn with unmercifull whips and scourges? Which were used so long sometimes, and so cru­elly, that some were known to die in the exercise (for it was accounted no other:) very really, before it could be discerned that they smarted. Which made the Stoick Philosophers to maintain, (which also some of them con­firmed by experience made upon their own bodies,) that pain was but opinion: and Galen also to maintain against Aristotle, (I shall name my Author by and by:) that sensus non est mutatio quae fit in instrumento, sed à mutationis cognitione provenire.

I am very well pleased with the occasion that offers it self, that the Reader may the better be satisfied, how neces­sary the knowledge of these things is, not for the satisfacti­on of curiosity only, but even for the maintenance of pub­lick peace. In the year of the Lord 1599. was brought to Paris in France a certain maid named Martha, (we had one before of that very name, and not unlike profession, out of Plutarch:) which was supposed to be possessed. She did many things to make the world think so. Strange gestures and convulsions, or convulsive motions rather, she had at command, and sometimes she was heard to speak strange Languages: but that was but sometimes and spa­ringly; which gave occasion of suspicion that she was a counterfeit. One thing she was very perfect at: She would endure pins and needles to be thrust in at the fleshy parts of her neck, or arms, and never seem to feel it. All the Phy­sicians in Town, that were accounted of any ability, were imployed about it, to find out the truth. but being much divided in their judgements themselves, how should others be certainly resolved? The Monks and Friers were very zealous that she might be accounted possest, as thinking [Page 58] thereby to get great honour to their Exorcisms, and to give a great blow (their own profession: I have a good Author for it:) to the Hereticks, who despised them: by which Exorcisms though they could not, (having often tried,) dispossesse her; yet because the supposed Devil shew­ed himself very impatient at the hearing of them, they thought that conviction enough, untill more could be done; which certainly would have been the end, if things had been carried with more moderation. But the whole City being so divided about it, that a dangerous uprore was dai­ly expected, and a worse consequent upon that feared; so that the King and his Councel were glad to interpose with all their power, and all little enough to prevent it: the con­clusion was, that Martha was found to be a mere coun­terfeit. Yet herein the Pope must have his due commen­dation. For to Rome she was had by no mean persons, that intended notable feats with her, and perchance no lesse (so much was feared at least; and a lesse thing hath done it, we know, in some Kingdomes:) then the subversion of a whole Kingdome. But the Popes impartiall carriage in the businesse brake the neck of the plot, for which some of the chief contrivers, though they escaped the justice of men, yet soon incurred the just vengeance of God, and through shame and vexation of spirit came to a speedy death. But before things came to this light, whilest the Physicians at Paris were divided about it into Parties; one Morescot did set out a book about it, by which he did endeavour to prove that she was a counterfeit, & among other things did very particularly insist upon that point of the Needles, shewing that it was not without either president in History, (by the example of the Lacedemonian boys;) or without grounds of possibility in nature; by unfolding the nature of sense, with many curious observations upon it. I never saw the book.Note: Thuanus, Hist. sui temp. tom. 5. lib. 123. what I have of it, I have it out of Thuanus, that faithfull and [Page 59] noble Historian, where also the whole story is more parti­cularly to be found. But for that particular of the Lacede­monians, I have had occasion to treat of it, and of divers other examples of the same kind, in another place; from which I think so much may very probably be inferred, that where the will is obstinately bent, (to which kind of *See more be­low, in the First question: in S. Augustin's words, concern­ing Restitutus. obstinacy, besides the advantage of a na­tural temper in some, long use is much a­vailable;) the sense, if not altogether ta­ken away, yet is nothing near so great, or so sharp, as it is in others, where no such preparation is made.

However, in the order that I propose unto my self, we are not yet come to that: we shall have another place for it afterwards. In the mean time I require no more here, but that intent Contemplation may stop the influence, and so hinder the operation of some one sense. Who is it al­most, especially if, naturally, in prosecutions sad and serious, that hath not made trial of it in himself? As for the sense of Feeling, Erasmus (whose credit, I believe, will hold with most for a greater matter,) speaketh of himself: Et ipse sum expertus in cruciatu dentium aut calculi, Note: Eras. Ad. Chil. 4. Cent. 5. multo leviorem reddi doloris sensum, si possis animum in aliquam cogita­tionem alienam intendere. Might we believe Epicurus of himself, he tells us very strange things of his Patience, shall I say? or unsensiblenesse in greatest extremity of bodily pains. He would make us believe, that he was at the height of his Contemplation, when his Disease was come to its height. Were it another, that had more credit with me then Epicurus, I should believe that the intention of his Con­templation, (as in Erasmus his case) might take off the edge of his pains: But Cicero long ago hath well argued it with him,Note: Cic. 5. Tuscul. Quaest. or against him rather; whether it were possible that [Page 60] a man of such principles, could afford an example of such patience: to whose judgement and determination in this particular, (though I make a great difference between pa­tience, as a vertue, and such resolution and obstinacy, which the most wicked, yea most brutish are capable of:) I do adscribe much more, then to Epicurus his testimony concerning himself.

This concerning a partial deprivation of sense through natural causes, as subject to lesse difficulty, may serve: but a total, commonly called Ecstasie, or Trance, as liable to more both opposition and difficulty; so shall we more largely and punctually insist upon it, both by reasons, and by ex­amples. But before we enter upon it, I must premit some cautions, to prevent offence upon mistake.

First, whereas by our inscription or indication at the beginning, we professe to treat in this Chapter of Contem­plative philosophical Enthusiasme; by Philosophical we do not intend such as is proper to contemplative Philosophers only; of which kind somewhat hath already, and much more remaineth in the conclusion of all to be spoken: but all kind of Enthusiasme having any dependance from the intention, or contemplation of the mind: which because most proper unto Philosophers, is therefore designed by that name; though incidental unto some, who never had to do with any, (more then natural unto all, that are naturally rational,) Philosophy. If this do not satisfie, I desire that my general title, Of Enthusiasme proceeding from natural causes, &c. may be remembred: beyond which not to ex­curre, but where I give an account in some petty digression, is my chiefest care.

Secondly, whilst we endeavour to reduce divers ecsta­sies to natural causes, the ignorance of which causes we shall shew to have been the cause of many evils; we would not be suspected by any, to question the truth and reality of su­pernatural: not only of such, for which having the autho­rity [Page 61] of the Holy Scriptures, no man can denie or question them, except he first deny or question the truth and reality of these as divine; but also of many others, which either good, though not infallible authority, or sound reason, upon due examination of circumstances, hath commended unto us for such. Except a man will argue, because we do not believe all dreams that are dreamed by all manner of people in any part of the world, (which some have main­tained,) to be prophetical, that therefore none are from God: or, because precious stones may be counterfeited, so that the most skilfull (*See Abrah. Ecchel. in Habdarrhamāum, De proprietat. &c. Not. p. 155.160. as is noted by some,) may sometimes be decei­ved, therefore there is no such thing in the world as true Sapphires, or Di­amonds.

Thirdly and lastly, when in matter of diseases, we op­pose natural causes to supernatural, whether divine or dia­bolical; as we do not exclude the general will of God, without which nothing can be; so neither the general mi­nisterie and intervention of the Devil, who, for ought I know, may have a hand in all, or most diseases, to which mortal man (through sin) is naturally liable. But whe­ther it be so or no, and by what kind of operation, is a spe­culation not proper to us here. No man doth sin, but he is possest in some degree; it is good Divinity: and best Philosophers have maintained, that there was no vice, but was the fruit of madnesse; and I believe that too to be good Philosophy; especially since I have Hippocrates too his authority for it. However, we make a difference be­tween personal immediate possession, or operation, which we oppose to natural causes; and that general concur­rence, or intervention of the Devil, which may be supposed in all that is evil, whether in a moral or natural sense. So much to prevent mistakes. Now we proceed.

Not to insist upon the several acceptions of the word [Page 62] ecstasis, which are not to our purpose; I shall only observe, that it is used by ancient Greek Physicians and others, in a much different from the now common use and notion. As used by ancient Authors, it doth import a distraction of the senses, a violent alienation of the mind, nay, violent, but not fixed or settled, madnesse; by which onely it doth dif­fer from it. Such distraction of the senses, and such alie­nation of mind, as may be seen in some passionate men in a fit of Anger. As we read *Baron. tom. 12. a. d. 1163. § 21. of one of the Kings of England, a Prince otherwise of excellent parts, and in his ordinary conver­sation very meek; but in his anger so furious, that he would not onely fling and tear whatsoever was in his way, as ma­ny others; but sit upon the ground, pick straws, and do o­ther such acts of a perfect Bedlam. As therefore of An­ger it hath been said anciently, that Ira furor brevis est: so do I find [...] in the Author of the [...], or Physical Definitions, (supposed by many to be Galen's,) defined, [...]. However, that the word is alwaies so taken by ancient Heathens for a violent Distraction, is more then I can say. For where Aristotle, in De Divin. por insomnia, upon his former position of unsensible emana­tions from natural objects, (of which in the former Cha­pter,) gives a reason why † [...], &c. some that fall into Ecstasies do prophesie; to wit, because their senses being discharged from their own proper operations, they are the more exposed to external impressions: I do not see how he could mean it of any such extasie, where there is a violent distra­ction, such as was in the Pythiae, and other, whether men or women, by whom Oracles anciently were issued; as he is interpreted by some Latin Commentators: neither was it so agreeable to his subject, of divination by dreams, to treat of alienation of mind incidental unto men perfectly waking: but very proper and pertinent, to say somewhat [Page 63] of Ecstasies, as the word is now taken commonly; which have great affinity with Sleep, though from causes very different.

I take notice of it the rather, to vindicate a place of Scripture from a wrong interpretation, at which many godly men being scandalized, some have studied evasions, for which their good will hath been commended by others, more then their good luck, or judgement. It is Mark 3.21. where the Greek, [...], is translated in our En­glish, For they said; he is besides himself. Neither is it in the vulgar Latin better: rather worse. The Syriack, doubtful. What interpretations, or evasions rather have been devised, may be found in Maldonat and others. The Arabick translation of all others, hath been thought by many learned men to have lighted upon the right sense. For which also it hath found great commendations among Translations. It interprets the word [...], or [...] rather, not of madnesse, but of fainting: which as it is most proper to the Story, so not improper to the word. For first, it appears by the ninth verse, that Christ himself, as man, feared that he should suffer by excessive throng: and by verse 20. that they had not time to eat. And what more likely in a hot Countrey to cause fainting, then a great crowd, and an empty stomach? And besides, that it was ordinary enough in those Countreys for people when they travailed fasting, to faint ( [...], used of trances and ecstasies sometimes,) by the way, may pro­bably be gathered by Matth. 15.32. except we shall conceit with some, that the people there spoken of, had been three dayes without eating: (enough to cause faintnesse in any place:) which as of it self it is improbable; so neither can it be collected by any necessary consequence (such as we must have, before we come to miracles,) from the words of the Text: but this rather, (as by learned Maldonat is well observed,) that having been three dayes already with [Page 64] Christ, and spent what small provision they had brought with them, or could procure in that place, they must have gone away fasting; which, unto them especially that had far to go, (which therefore as a considerable circumstance is well supplied by S. Mark, ch. 8. v. 3. for divers of them came from far:) would have been of dangerous conse­quence. And as for the word [...], from whence the word ecstasis is taken; if ecstasis be commonly taken (as at this day,) for a Trance, and was so anciently too; I pray what is the difference between a Trance, and a faint­ing or swooning, otherwise called [...], or deliquium, or syncope? I do not say that there is no difference: but that there is so much affinity, that the words may probably be confounded sometimes, as divers are upon lesse. I omit what is added by Grotius, and some others. I should have thought that lesse would have served, to have perswaded them that are not very contentious. But I will judge no man. I wish heartily that that Translation were corrected in all Bibles. I would not have it believed, since there is no need, that Christs kindred did believe, or suspect at any time, that he was ecstatical. They might, I know, believe it, or make as though they believed it, and yet upon no real ground. But why should we give ground to any man (in these Anabaptistical times especially,) to dispute it, where the Scripture doth not? If it be objected that the word [...] is not found in this sense elsewhere, in the Old or New Testament; the weaknesse of this objection may appear, if it be remem­bred, as by divers upon several occasions is observed, that even in the New Testament (not to speak of other ancient Authors and writers of all kind:) there be divers words found, which in some one place, and but one, are taken, and so commonly expounded, in a very different sense from the more known and usual. We could shew divers examples, if need were.

[Page 65]As for those words, [...] I wonder any man should find ground of an argument upon an Ac­cusative, and not a Genitive, here used: whereas it is well known, that the construction is promiscuous enough: whereof we have an example, Mark 7.3. and Hebr. 4.14. [...], in the one; [...], in the other: as by learned men hath been observed. The words therefore will afford either: but I make no great matter of it, whether we translate, they went out to hold him up; or, they went out to lay hold on him. They that are in a swoon, or ready to drop down through faintnesse, had need both of outward and inward support: to either of which the word [...] is very proper. But again 2 Kings, chap. 4. v. 8. we have this very phrase and construction: [...]: and she laid hold on him to eat bread. There, Elisha resisted, till the woman used some kind of force to make him eat: here, the pressing multitude (verse 20.) hindred; some force must be used, to get him out of it, that he might be at liberty to eat. It is not improbable: but neither is it necessary that we should fly to this. I have been the longer upon it, because of the consequence, as I appre­hended it; and that I thought this a very proper place.

Scaliger's definition of an Ecstasie, as we take it com­monly, allowed by Sennertus, is; Privatio officiorum a­nimae sentientis, moventis & intelligentis. very different from the true supernatural and divine, properly called [...]. which they define; Animae abstractionem à po­tentiis sensitivis, & aliquando etiam intellectualibus, &c. Such ecstasies (defined by Scaliger) to be incidentall to natural diseases of the bodie, as Epilepsies and the like, is generally granted by all Physicians. As this also: That they are commonly accompanied (in the fit) with strange sights and visions: sometimes, without any further effect; which, for distinctions sake, we may call ordinary: but sometimes leaving impressions in the brain, which have their operation [Page 66] out of the fit; so that the partie, after he is come to himself a­gain, as to his senses and other natural functions, yet is fully perswaded that his visions which he had in the fit, were not the natural effects of a bodily disease, but true and real. By which impressions, if strong and fixed, as in some, the party becomes often subject unto relapses into ecstasies, or ecstati­cal fits; though the original cause, the epilepsie, or whatever it was, be either cured, or for the present, at least, removed: So that what before was the symptome of a more general di­stēper, becomes now the proper distemper of the brain: which kind we shall call, as well we may, extraordinary ecstasies. Besides, a man through mere melancholy may become ecsta­tical; and without any direct ecstasie, yet liable to the effects of it, ecstatical impressions, and illusions in the brain. And Physicians and Philosophers observe, that there is a double Melancholy: the one that proceeds originally from general diseases; (vitio corporis;) the other, vitio solius animi, ut fit in iis qui ex nimia devotione, studio, aut amore melancholici evadunt, to use learned Fyenus his words. Now whether with ecstasies, or without them; as many as are subject to visions, whether internal or *See below 3. question, at the beginning. external, pro­ceeding from natural causes, with a real ap­prehēsion of certainty & reality, where there is no real ground for either, but mere imagi­nation; so many we take into the number of ecstatical men.

But I will come now to particular examples, by which all that I have said will better be understood. I will be­gin with an example out of Tertullian. There is a sister with us, Note: Tertul. de A­nima, c. 9. saith he (that is, in that particular Church and Congregati­on which he used, whether at Carthage, his own Countrey; or rather at Rome, where he was made priest, lived and wrote a long time, till his errors drove him out of it:) at this day, which hath obteined the gift, (or grace) of reve­lations; which in ecstasies of the spirit happen unto herin [Page 67] the Church, at the ordinary time of divine Service. She doth (in her fits) converse with Angels: sometimes with the Lord himself. She doth both hear and see things secret and mystical: beholds the hearts of some: (or, discovers the se­crets of some mens hearts:) & doth some cures also upon some that come to her. Now according as either Scriptures are read, or Psalms sung, or Exhortations made, or Prayers ut­tered; so do different visions offer themselves unto her. It happened at a time, that I had discoursed of the soul when this our sister was in the spirit. After publick Service, the people being dismissed, when she is wont to relate unto us what she hath seen; (for an account of it is diligently kept, and registred, that proof may be made upon occasion:) Among other things, said she, the substance of a Soul was shewed unto me, and it seemed unto me like a spirit, &c.

Here we must observe, that when Tertullian wrote this, he lived yet in the communion of the Catholick Church: and that this particular Congregation he speaks of, is meant of a reputed Catholick and orthodox Congregation. It is true he became a Montanist afterwards; or was account­ed so at least: though in very deed, he never was of his Congregation or belief, generally; but in matter of private revelations only; which he maintained (though not those which Montanus boasted of,) very fervently: and for it being more roughly then discreetly (as S. Jerom judged) dealt with by some at Rome, he left them, and set up a Congregation of his own, which were called Tertullia­nistae: as S. Augustine in his book Of Hereticks doth de­clare. Neither was he questioned about private Reve­lations, untill Montanus an Arch-villain, with his two Queans that he carried about with him as Prophetesses, had given so much offence. He was not accounted an Here­tick for his opinion here maintained in this book De Anima, of the Corporeity of the Soul, in that sense he maintained it: as by S. August. in more then one place is largely treated.

[Page 68]What made so learned a man otherwise, to adscribe so much to private revelations, was certainly an excesse of Zeal, which he shews in all his works, ignorance of natural causes, and the opinion he had of the holinesse and sinceritie (true enough in some perchance, as shall be shewed afterwards:) of some of them, known unto him, that had such visions, which were taken for divine revelati­ons. We must also, if we will judge of this example right­ly, distinguish between that which Tertullian upon his own certain knowledge, which no man probably can doubt or question, doth witnesse; to wit, that such a sister there was, which had strange raptures or trances, a thing so pub­lickly done, and so often, yea allowed of in a Catholick Church: and that which he writeth upon the credit of o­thers; as that she disclosed some secrets, or did some strange cures; which no man is bound to believe, though it might be granted that somewhat, either casually, or by the power of the phansie, (as afterwards will be shewed,) might happen in that kind, without any miracle. It is ordinary: when any thing that is accounted strange, doth happen, and is become the subject of publick discourse and inquisition, there will be some found that will adde unto it, to make it more wonderfull, though they have no other end in it but to please their humour; most men naturally, and more wo­men, being pleased with nothing more (it is a common ob­servation in best Historiographers,) then with the report of strange things, whether false or true. Now for the ecsta­sies and visions of this Soror in Tertullian; I am clearly of opinion, and perchance my reader will be, by that time he hath done with this Chapter, that it was nothing else but an effect of devout melancholy: but not without the concurrence perchance of a natural disposition; as a strong phansie, tender brain; yea and some casual contracted disposition (or indisposition) of the body too, perchance: especially if it were an ancient maid, as that maid is report­ed [Page 69] by some to have been, (virgo vetula, in Thuanus,) by whom learned Postellus was infatuated in his old age. However, that it was an effect of melancholy, was the opi­nion of Franc. Junius, an orthodox Divine of high account among Protestants. Fuit autem hoc (in his Annotations up­on Tertullian) phantasma laborantis melancholia, non in­dita è coelis revelatio. I must also warn the Reader before I proceed,Note: Baronius a. d. 173.31.70. & 201.7. &c. that wherein I differ from Baroni­us in those things I have written of Tertul­lian upon this occasion, as I do in some, I do it not altogether upon mine own judge­ment, (though chiefly grounded upon S. Jerom, and S. Augustine;) but have also the same Franc. Junius his authority to oppose against Baronius, and some others. But this is not a place to dispute it: let this warning serve.

I am much deceived, if that fam'd Galinducha in Mau­ritius the Emperour his time, was not such another as this of Tertullian. Strange things have been written of her. No part of Aesops, Fables, had it been written for an Hi­story, can seem so strange. But neither indeed do those that write of her agree among themselves; nay, manifestly contradict one another. Nicephorus doth exceed all, even the Greek Menologies, in his relation; Simocata, more modest; Euagrius, very short: but all agree, (the last excepted, who doth only mention her,) in her ecstasies: which I believe might be true enough, and that in her fits she might see such strange things of heaven and hell, as is usual unto most in those fits. The Reader, if he be so curi­ous, may find them that I have named, put together by Raderus the Jesuite, in his Viridarium Sanctorum ex Me­naeis Graec. &c. Aug. Vindelic. 1607. first part, or tome, p. 264. &c. One observation only I shall make upon some words of Nicephorus, which perchance were taken, part of them at least, out of some truer relation: Haec sane cum gra­viter à martyrii aerumnis afficeretur, (I take the words as I [Page 70] find them in Raderus;) urbes circuibat, angelo duce pro­grediente, neque quicquam medicinae doloribus adhibuit, (these be the words) nativis tantum thermarum lavacris usa. From which words we may very probably collect, that she was much troubled with melancholy; since that not only dulcis aquae balnea tepida are commended by physicians against maniam, uterinam melancholiam, (pro­per to women;) but the acidulae and thermae, in all hypo­chondriacal distempers: though Sennertus indeed doth not hold the external use of the thermae so proper, if the distem­pered be lean and exhausted, (as commonly they are,) as the internal.

Many such we might find perchance in the lives of re­puted Saints: but I will insist in such especially, where there is more certainty, and will be lesse offence.

About the year of the Lord 1581. in Germany, at a place called Aldenburgh, it happened that a Baker, the ma­ster of a very untoward Boy, upon some great provocation, fell upon him with his fists, without mercy; upon his head especially; so that the Boy fell sick upon it of an Epilepsie: whereof he had divers terrible fits, and was twelve dayes speechlesse. Yet after a while those fits abated, and by de­grees vanished quite away. But then instead of them, he fell into ecstasies, in which he would continue two, three, four hours, without either sense or motion. Assoon as he was out of a fit, the first thing he would do, was to sing di­vers songs and hymns, (though it was not known that he had ever learned any,) very melodiously. From this sing­ing he would now and then passe abruptly to some strange relations, but especially of such and such, lately dead, whom he had seen in Paradise: and then fall to singing again. But when he was perfectly come to himself, and had left singing, then would he sadly and with much confidence maintain. That he had been, not upon his bed, as they that were pre­sent would make him believe; but in heaven with his Hea­venly [Page 17] Father, having been carried thither by Angels, and placed in a most pleasant green, where he had enjoyed ex­cessive happinesse, and had seen things that he could not expresse; &c. The same Boy when he foresaw his fit coming upon him, he would say, that now the Angels were ready to carry him away. There were divers relations made of him at that time: but that which I have here, I have it from Joh. Coboldus, a Doctor of Physick of the same Town: Divers Epistles of whom, both of his judgement, and of the particulars in point of relation, are to be seen in a book inti­tuled Historia admiranda & prodigiosa Apolloniae Schrierae &c. containing several relations concerning certain persons, maids especially, in several ages and places, but of late years & in Germany chiefly; which after diligent observation made by learned Divines and Physicians, and long custody in the hands, or by the appointment of Magistrates, have been known, & approved to live divers years without either eat­ing or drinking; set out by one Paul. Lentulus, a Doctor of Physick, printed Bernae Helvetiorū, an. dō. 1604. Thuanus also in his History, hath most of them, with some notable particulars, not found in this Collection: not to mention Physicians, as Sennertus, Quereetanus, and others, who write of the same. But to return to the Boy: That learned Doctor his opinion there is, that they were symptomata morbi melancholici, occasioned by the Epilepsie. For that it is natural to those that have been epileptical, to fall into melancholy, besides his own experience, he proves out of Hippocrates. But because this Boy besides his visions, was also reported, and believed commonly, to prophesie many things: the Doctor doth acknowledge himself posed in that, and professeth to doubt, that besides Nature, there might be some operation of the Devil concurring. Where­in neverthelesse he seemeth afterwards to have altered his opinion, and to adscribe all partly to Nature, (Ecstasies and Visions,) and partly (Prophesies,) to Art and Im­posture: [Page 72] not only because the Boy had alwaies been an arrant Rogue, (for his age,) and very subtle and cunning; but also because when he was removed to another house, and more carefully watched, his prophesies did vanish; yea and his ecstasies too, (after a while) as he seemeth to in­timate.

In the same book there is another relation of an ecstati­call Maid in Friburg (in Misnia; for there is another Fri­burg in Helvetia, and a third too, elsewhere;) with the judgement of Paulus Eberus, a Lutheran Divine, a man of great fame in those dayes. It doth not appear that this maid had any discoverable epilepsie at all, but began at the very first with ecstasies and visions. After her fits, she was ful of religious discourse, most in the nature of Sermons, and godly Exhortations: so that she was generally appre­hended to be inspired, and her speeches were published in print, under the name of divine Prophesies and Warnings. Paulus Eberus was much against it: and though he durst not, against the publick voice, affirm that there was no­thing of Gods spirit in all that she said; yet in effect, he doth plainly enough declare his judgement to be, that the maid did laborare epilepsia, &c. that her ecstasies were epi­leptical fits, but of a more gentle and remiss kind of Epile­psie then is ordinary: and as for her godly speeches, that they were the effects of a godly education, frequent hearing of the Word, intent and assiduous meditation, and the like. which it seems, upon diligent enquirie, he had found to be her case. This happened in the year of the Lord 1560.

Before I proceed further, I will here insert somewhat, that happened among us here very lately. In September last, on the fifteenth day, there was a Court kept at a place called Bosam, not above one mile or two from Chichester in Sussex: where a worthy Gentleman, and my very good friend, is Steward to the right Honourable (to whom I wish all increase of Honour, that his noble [Page 73] and vertuous mind, whereof my self have had some expe­rience, doth deserve:) GEORGE BERKLEY. I happened to be there: and saw there, before I went away, and spake with him, one John Carpenter, of the same pa­rish and tything, where I now dwell and write, between a Yeoman and a Labourer. I observed no alteration at all in the man, having had in the Sommer moneths often occasion to speak with him, about some commodities which he sold, and I wanted, for winter provision. The very next day in the morning a daughter of his was at my door; though not to speak with me, but with some others in the house. I happened to open her the door, and observing by her eyes and speech, that she was troubled, I inquired and under­stood by her, that she was sent to procure some body to go to the Minister of the Parish; her father (she said) not being sick bodily, but talking very strangely of strange things that he had seen so that they could not tell what to make of it. After that the maid had done her errand, & was gone; although I have been very carefull ever since I came hither, not to meddle with any businesses of the Parish; but especially not with any thing that belongeth to a spiritual charge, wherein I know how much it concerned my peace and quietnesse not to intermeddle: yet partly charity, (be­cause the Minister lived in another Parish, at some di­stance:) & partly curiosity, led me towards the house. When I was come near, before I would go further, I sent one of purpose to know who were there, and whether my coming would be well taken. Whereupon some coming out to me, and desiring me, I went with them, and found the man in a low room walking. I observed nothing, not even then, either in his eyes, or voice, or motion, either so quick, or so loud, that seemed extraordinary. Assoon as I was come in, after some expressions of his good acceptation of my pre­sence, he began a relation of visions and raptures, to this effect: That in the night, God had taken him under the [Page 74] arm, (wherein he was very punctual in all the particulars:) and first had lift him to heaven, where he had seen the joys of Paradise, the glory of God, &c. then carried him to hell, where he had seen such and such things. He was very plentifull of discourse to that purpose: but my mind was so intent upon the general, that I did not much heed parti­culars: neither indeed did I then think that I should ever have this occasion, to remember any thing that he had said. And it is observable, that even the night before, by his rela­tion to his wife and children in the morning, he had had the same phansies, or very like. He expressed much sense of his former errours of his life, and as much joy that God had been so gracious unto him; not for himself only, but for others also; not doubting but many thousands (those very words he used,) would be converted unto God by his ministery and revelations. This he spake so zealously, that he fell upon his knees in the middle of the room, to give God thanks, but rose again very soon of his own accord. I commended his zeal and good intentions for others, congra­tulated unto him the good use that he had made of what had happened unto him for the comfort of his own soul. But when I endeavoured, as gently as I could, to make him understand that he was in some distemper of body, which would require some help; he had not patience to hear me; wondred at my incredulity, if I mistrusted the truth of his relations, or the power of God; and began by degrees to be so hot and earnest, that I judged it altogether imper­tinent to reason with him any longer. And because I knew the man was no contemplative man, by his profession, nor observed so zealous in point of religion, above others, in his life, that this could probably happen unto him (in which case, though his melancholy would have been more incurable, yet his life in lesse danger:) through pure contemplative melancholy: I concluded with my self, that it was an effect of some great bodily distemper, which [Page 75] would in time shew it self. To that purpose I spake with his wife by her self, (out of his sight, I mean, but in the presence of some others,) and earnestly advised her speedi­ly to repair to some Physician: for that her husband, I thought, though little sign of it yet, would be very sick; and that I feared he would before long be very outragious, and would want good keeping, both for his own, and their safety that should be about him. This is all the sight I had of the man since his distemper, whilest he was yet to be seen. Only the next day I met his wife in the street ca­sually, very sad: and was again very earnest with her, that she would do somewhat speedily, and lose no time. What she did, or any others that had to do with him, I cannot give an account. It was reported, that they had given him some strong water, to comfort his heart and strengthen his brain: but I have heard it denied. On the third day, be­ing a Sunday, or Lords day, a woman was sent for, which was reported to have good skill, and to have done some cures upon some, committed unto her in the like case. She would speedily have let him bloud, as I have heard, (for by this he was grown very outragious and violent,) and plyed him with other things which she judged proper to his case, to allay his heat, procure sleep, &c. But some of the good women of the Parish, that were there met together, (of the inferior sort,) had, according to their learning and wis­dome, concluded among themselves, that the poor man was possest; and consequently, that if the woman did take upon her to drive out Devils, she must be a witch: that they must not lose a soul (O wisdomes!) to save a body. Cer­tain it is, that the woman was driven out of the house, (though she lay in the Parish that night,) by their insolent language and carriage: and as certain, that the poor man, being in a high fever, and having spent himself in such vio­lent actions and speeches, as are usual to men in that case, having none about him but those that were imployed to [Page 76] hold him, and to give him drink as often as he called for it, died that very night.

But for ignorant people to be bold and confident, and in their confidence to deceive themselves and others, is no wonder at all, a man had need but open his eyes, to see such sights at every door. That which I (not without some indignation sometimes) have wondered at, is; that even learned men, yea men of great fame and credit in the world for their parts and performances in other kinds, have in this particular of Ecstasies and Raptures, been so apt in all ages to be gulled. We had an example before in Ter­tullian, in whom it might seem the more wonderfull, be­cause himself had observed it of some others (lapsed into heresie by it) before him, and condemned them for it. We might find divers instances, with little seeking, if need were. but of all that I have read or known in that kind, I shall pitch upon one above the rest, and make some obser­vations upon it, which may be of some use. That con­templative men, wise and sober otherwise, should become ecstatical themselves, being subject to all infirmities inci­dental to flesh and bloud, as well as others; and by their authority (though in that case, not to be accounted the same men as before,) should deceive others of lesse learning and judgement, is no strange thing: but that any sober, wise, and learned, whilst sober, wise, and learned, should at any time be liable to the delusions of ignorant and silly people, is not so easie to be believed by them that do not know, that all sciences have their bounds; and that it is very possible, that a man should excel in some one, or more faculties, who yet may be very defective in some other knowledge, not lesse necessary perchance, though lesse regarded, or known. I shall be beholding to a Jesuit for the relation, to whom we are beholding for many other relations, wherein he hath approved his fidelity unto many. But however, there is no ground of suspicion [Page 77] in this relation, why we should like it the worse because it comes from a Jesuite. Josephus Acosta is the man; a Spaniard by birth: among whom I believe, if not such ex­amples, yet raptures and ecstasies in general, because na­turally devout and contemplative, to be frequent enough. I shall set down his words at large, partly because of the observation I intend upon them, to give the Reader the better satisfaction; and partly because I doubt that the book is not so ordinarily known among us.

In this relation, the first thing I shall take notice of, which to me seemeth very strange, is, that neither Acosta himself, nor any of those grave men and Judges by him mentioned, did seem to know, that there is a sober kind of distraction or melancholy: not such only wherein the brain is generally affected to all objects equally; never outragious, nor out of reason, as it were, to outward appearance; but also where the distemper is confined to some one object or o­ther, the brain being otherwise very sound and sober upon all other objects and occasions. I need not go so farre as Aristotle for an instance, though to be found in him, or at least, in that book that beareth his name, [...]. which by Horace,

is very elegantly rendered in Latin verses. We need not [Page 81] go so farre, either for an instance, or for his authority: there is not any Physician, either ancient or late, that treateth of Melancholy, but doth both acknowledge it, and hath several examples. Laurentius in his treatise of melancho­lick diseases, hath one whole Chapter of examples, where­of some were of his owne time and knowledge. As that of a Noble-man, that otherwise had his senses very perfect, and would discourse (as Laurentius observeth) of any subject very rationally; but that he was perswaded that he was glasse; would keep himself still in a chair: and though he loved to be visited, yet was very much afraid of his friends, when they came to him, lest they should come too near him. And of another, a Poet, yet then alive when he wrote, and not yet cured, who was perswaded that all men that came near him, smelt of a certain ointment that had been used about him in a fever, to make him sleep; which he did ever since extremely detest and abhorre: insomuch that no man might speak to him, but at a distance: and if any man had touched him, he would cast away his cloaths, and never wear them again. Yet in all other things, saith my Author, very rational, and as good a Poet as ever. Fyenus also out of divers Authors, hath divers examples in his Treatise De viribus imaginationis. Sennertus treats of it, lib. 1. part. 2. c. 8. de melancholia in genere: wherein Aretaeus, an ancient Physician, his words are, In melan­cholia, in una re aliqua est lapsus; constante in reliquis judicio. He hath a merry example out of Huartus his Ex­amen de Ingen. of one, a noble mans foot-boy in Italy, that thought himself a Monarch. But Laurentius, in the fore­named Treatise and Chapter, professeth to forbear of pur­pose such instances, because so common and obvious. In­deed, I remember to have read in Antony du Verdier his Divers Readings, two notable examples: the one of an ordinary serving-man, that thought himself Pope; the other of a Groom, that belonged to an Italian Noble-man, who [Page 82] thought himself Emperour, and at a certain hour of the day would lock himself in a chamber privately, there place himself in a chair of State, such as himself had erected to that purpose, give answers to Embassadours of several Nations, make speeches upon divers subjects, (some of which speeches were taken clancularly, there inserted;) and perform many other acts to the same purpose. I my self in my life time, have known one, (yet alive for ought I know,) who upon apprehension of great wrong done unto him by some in Authority, fell into some hypochondriacal conceits much of that nature. sober and discreet otherwise, in all his conversation: only upon that subject he would be very earnest; and if opposed, grow fierce. A man might have conversed with him long enough, before he should have discovered any thing; for he was purposely very reserved▪ and except a man had been acquainted with his case by o­thers, not apt of himself to fall upon it: so much command he had of himself, notwithstanding his melancholy. But I knew him very familiarly, and therefore can speak of him with more confidence. I mentioned Aristotle, at the be­ginning, concerning Melancholy confined to a particular Object. Though I did not think it needfull to make use of his instance; yet that instance of his puts me in mind of a strange case, not unworthy to be related: of a kind of tra­gical, or poetical Melancholy, that is reported to have hap­pened unto many together, almost to a whole town, at one time. Lucian is my Author, a man otherwise not very apt to believe strange things: a right Infidel in most things▪ as well to all Natures wonders, as to supernatural and di­vine. And he tells it in good earnest, in a very serious discourse of his, Of the conditions of a true History, at the very beginning of it. Most of the town Abdera (in Greece) in such a mans reign, as is there expressed, fell into a kind of Fevers at one time. At the seventh day, some bleeding at the nose, some sweating in their bodies very plentifully▪ [Page 83] were quitted of their agues: but became (in a degree) mad­dish of the stage, and were perpetually acting some part of a Tragedy. Lucians opinion upon it (if it were his own, and not part of his History;) is very probable. There was an excellent Tragedian in the Town, who had lately represented a play called Andromede. It was in the very middle of Sommer; and it happened to be an extraordi­nary hot day. So that partly with hearing with great in­tention of mind, and thronged besides in their bodies, most of them probably, at such a concourse of the whole town, it is no wonder if they fell into fevers: and in their fevers, (as it is very natural,) what they had so lately heard with great admiration, occurring to their minds, and ma­king (as at such a time, when the spirits are quickened by the heat of the fever, is most natural too,) great impressi­on; no wonder if the effects of that impression continued, even after the fever, for a long time: till the winter time, and a very great frost that happened, wiped it away. I cannot warrant the truth of this relation, otherwise then as I have said. but other things of the same nature I can, and shall impart to the Reader, which will be warranted by good authority; which I my self wonder at much more, and yet can give some reasons to my self, why I can believe them possible and true. It seemeth strange unto me, that this conceited Melancholy, being nothing else but mere conceit, (in common opinion,) should have so real an o­peration upon the senses, as in some cases it hath. Zacu­thus Lusitanus, for example, tells of one, that phansied unto himself that he was very cold; bemoned himself both night and day, and would have cast himself into the fire many times, had not he been bound with chains to keep him from it: being perswaded except his body were burnt, he should never be warm. At last he was cured (Zacuthus himself did the cure:) by an excessive artificial heat, which would have made another roar, but made him leap and [Page 84] dance for joy, and in time, acknowledge that he was warm, and after that acknowledgement, sound. It is not impro­bable that he had felt some great cold, either waking or sleeping, by which he was much affected, the species whereof might remain in his memory; which being stirred up and quickened by his imagination, might cause some reality of sense. So they, not all, but some, as is ob­served by that Treasurer of rare Observations, Ambrosius Pareus, (I have met with the observation, out of him in Sennertus: but long before, when but a Boy, I remember well that I heard a very learned Physician, a man of excel­lent parts in some other faculties, Raphael Thorius, discourse upon that subject from his own experience: not upon his own body, I do not mean; but upon some that had been his Patients:) some then, I say, that have had a Foot, or a Leg, or any other member cut off, have complained long after of the very pains that they suffered in that very part, before it was cut off. So that I conceive that there may be some reality of sense, where there is no reality of hurt: except a man may dy also without any reality of sense; it being a case tried and granted, that some men have been put to death by the conceit of death, being struck only with a little wand, or a wet role of cloath, when they expected they should have been struck with a naked sword. So we read of one that phansied unto himself, that he was so big of body,Note: Fyenus, de vi­rib. imagin. that no door was wide enough for him. He was forced violently, that is, a­gainst his will, (for many are often cured by such experi­ments;) through a door, wide enough for a greater body: but he was not cured of his conceit; but conceiting that his body had been by that violence extremely squeezed and bruised, complained much of pain, and dyed. I believe that there is more then bare imagination in such cases, to cause such effects; though imagination be the original cause. But the further consideration of this I will leave to learned Phy­sicians: [Page 85] somewhat I will add of mine own experience, which may contribute somewhat to their speculations. When a young Scholar in the University, I used swings often. they are prescribed for health; but I used them as much for plea­sure: and I remember I have read somewhere, that Asclepi­ades, who prescribed nothing but pleasing remedies, did cure many diseases by such jactations. I have dreamed often that I was swinging; or without swings, floating, as it were, in the aire. I am certain that I have found in my sleep that very ease, or pleasingnesse (if I may so call it,) of the whole body, that I did when I was really swinging: and I have thought after I was awaked, (a good while after,) that my body was the better for it. Again, I have been in the cold water against my will twice, in boats that sunk to the ground: (whereof in due time, as of some other things in point of nature strange, if not miraculous, that have happened unto me in my life, I may perchāce give some accoūt to the world:) I have dream­ed that I was in the water, & thought I felt cold. but of this I cānot speak so much, because not often, as of my nocturnal imaginary swinging or flying, which doth happen very often.

I hope the Reader will not be offended with this digres­sion: which in very deed is no digression; such distempers of the brain, as we have hitherto spoken of, falling very na­turally within the consideration of enthusiasme: and be­sides, as they conferre to the clearing of other obscure mat­ters, that have or shal be treated of, not impertinent, even so.

Now to return to Acosta and his example: When that poor man so confidently averred himself as destinated to be a King or a Pope, or when he confidently bragged of his miracles, and wondred at the perversnesse of his Judges for not acknowledging the truth of that which seemed unto him, though not unto any other but himself, so truly visible and palpable; as that of his resurrection, of John Duke of Austria, of the king of Spain, and the like: whether in such a case and condition, he might as truly be conceived, as is [Page 86] confidently affirmed, in his right witts, since Acosta thought fit to make the case publick, he must give every man leave, if not to judge, yet to consider. Though it can do him no good whom he writes of; yet it may concern divers others, who in their melancholy (as many have done, and do daily, if we may credit Laurentius;) may conceit themselves Popes and Emperours, and perchance assume the Titles too, and yet no dangerous men, nor liable, if they meet not with very severe Judges, to any other judge­ment, then to be laughed at by some, (which is unchari­table enough, since it is a common chance,) and to be piti­ed by others. But if a man should be found and convicted, whilst in his right wits, through excesse of ambition to have tampered (which is done sometimes) with either men or Devils, by secret unlawfull plots and projects, to compasse a Crown, or a Mitre: though that man after­wards, by continual and vehement intention of his mind upon the same subject, should crack his brain, and believe himself really, what he had long endeavoured wickedly; I doubt whether the innocency of his belief (as a distra­cted man,) would acquit him from the unlawfulnesse of his attempts, when a sound man, which brought him to that distraction. So if a man, neither factious in his life, nor a­bettor of strange Opinions, when himself, in a fit of a burn­ing fever, or through some proper distemper of the brain, occasioned by a melancholick constitution of bodie or o­therwise, should fall into a conceit, and speak accordingly, that he is Christ, or God, or the like; I think he should have hard measure, if he should be punished as a Blasphe­mer. But if he bring himself to this through excesse of spirituall pride, and self-conceit, but especially, by using such indirect courses, little better then witchcraft, as private Revelations and Enthusiasms; as I desire not to be judge in such cases, so I think it may be spoken by any man with­out presumption, that they that are condemned to suffer [Page 87] for it by others, do not suffer innocent. For truly my opi­nion is, that it is no lesse then absolute renunciation of the Gospel, and Faith of Christ; and the ready way, I am sure, to bring in Mahometisme, or if any thing can be worse; after the Gospel, and faith of Christ once delivered, to pretend to new Lights, and to seek after Revelations in matters of Faith and Doctrine. God make me constant to that pro­fession of Tertullian, falling from which himself, he became an Heretick, and a persecutor of the Catholick Church by his writings: Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum Jesum; Note: Tertul. advers. haer. cap. 4. nec inquisitione post Evangelium. Cum credimus, nihil deside­ramus ultra credere: hoc enim prius credimus, non esse quod ultra credere debeamus. There can be nothing plainer: yet for their sakes that understand nothing but English, I will English the words. There is no need of curiosity [af­ter Oracles, or Prophets, or Philosophers, to teach the way to happinesse;] after Christ Jesus: nor of inquisition, after his Gospel. When we professe our selves to believe, [being well grounded by good Catechizing, &c. in the Christian faith,] all our desires, and all our endea­vours in point of believing, are at end. For even that we believed, before we professed, that nothing more was to be believed, then barely that which we should professe.

But this is somewhat besides my subject, and purpose too, however I am fallen upon it. What Courts of Justice have determined in these cases, doth not concern us; but what learned Naturalists. And here I meet with an ob­jection, which I must remove, or recant part of what I have said. Some Physicians in their Con­sultations and Resolutions seem to say,Note: Jul. Caes. Clau­dini, Consultat. medic. Resp. 21. as Acosta doth in his relation, that in such distempers the intellectus is integer, that is, the understanding sound. That some Physicians say so, I should make no great matter of it: they may have their [Page 88] opinions as well as other men; and there be of all professi­ons that affect it. But it troubles me, that Galen should be named for one of that opinion. The case related out of him, is of one Theophilus, who did phansie to himself, that he both saw and heard some Minstrels in a corner of his Chamber, and could not rest for them: otherwise it seems, both before and after his recovery, very rational in all other things. Hereupon it is determined, that it was an error of his imagination only, and not of his understanding. I would not contend about words. If their meaning be, that the Imagination and the Intellect being different faculties, really different by place and proprieties, and liable to particular symptomes and distempers; that in such cases the distem­per originally and inherently is in the imaginative, not intellective faculty, though the error by reason of that re­lation, or subordination which is between the two, be com­municated to the understanding: though I know there is matter enough of dispute about the differences and propri­eties of each faculty, yet I shall not oppose any thing. To some other purposes, the difference may be very obser­vable. It may satisfie a man, how it comes to passe that the understanding should be so right in all others, though so wrong in one particular object: whereas if the distemper were in the ratiocinative it self, the distraction would be general. Neither is every error of the imagination an error of the understanding. For we phansie many things awaked, as in the water, or in the clouds, which our reason doth op­pose, & therefore we believe not. Nay sometimes in our ve­ry dreams, reason doth oppose phansy, and informes us, that what we wonder at, or fear, is but a dream, because impossi­ble or absurd; when yet that very information is part of our dream. But if once any particular imagination be so strong & violent as to force assent from the understanding, so that no power of ratiocination that is left in us, is strong enough to make us believe that it is otherwise then we imagine: is [Page 89] not this a depravation of the Understanding, as well as of the Imagination? Or what if the Imagination be altogether depraved, and a man, not out of any proper distemper of un­derstanding, (for that is as possible as the other,) but of the imagination, in every thing that he saith or doth▪ both speak and do like a mad man; shall not he be accounted mad? I will believe that Galen intended it not otherwise then as I have explained it untill I have better cōsidered of his words in himself, which now I have not the opportunity to do; or that I meet with further reason, to satisfie me that it is so as some make him to say, then any I have yet met with.

As for the muliercula, or simple woman, the cause of this mans infatuation; whether she were really possest, or a counterfeit, or whether ecstatical from some natural cause; because we find so little of her in the relation to help our inquisition, I must let her alone. It is certain, that many that fall into those fits, naturally, or, to speak more plainly, from natural causes, phansie to themselves heavens, and angels, and revelations of mysteries, very really; and are in a better capacity, through the agitation of the brain and purest spirits, (as in Fevers, many,) after their fits, to speak and discourse of many things, then they were before. It is not so in all, I know: some become more stupid: but in some it is so; and whether it were this womans case par­ticularly, I know not. But I leave her: and before I pro­ceed to new matter, I must insert a caveat. In the case of Witches in general there is much dispute among learned men, (as, whether corporally transported from place to place, &c.) of the power of the imagination. I would not have any thing that hath been said by me, to be drawn to that case, which I apprehend to be a quite different case. For it is certain, (if any thing be certain in the world,) that most Witches, though they may suffer depravation, or illusion rather of phansie, in some other things; wittingly and willingly, in perfect use of sense and reason, and upon [Page 90] apparent grounds of envie, malice, revenge, and the like, do many mischiefs. But if any supposed Witch, being accused by others, or any that should acknowledge her self to be such, should not or cannot be convicted legally, to do, or to have done any thing worthy of death; such a one though she should tell many strange things of her self, which may be thought to deserve death, yet I should not think it very safe to condemn her, without better evidence then her own confession, or testimony.

After so much of Ecstasies, which are the proper passion of the Mind or Understanding, and so most naturally the effects of Contemplation, which is the proper and supreme operation of the understanding: we shall now proceed to the consideration of two notable controversies, which will much conduce to the further clearing of these hidden my­steries, and lead us to the main businesse of this Cha­pter.

The first is, Whether it may be conceived possible in nature, for any man, whether by the advantage of some idi­osyncrisia, (more commonly, but not so truly written, idio­syncratia,) that is, some peculiar natural property, some secret sympathy or antipathy, or the like; of which kind of idiosyncrisiae there be so many rare examples in Physi­cians and Philosophers, as may seem in point of credible­nesse to surpasse the greatest wonders in the world; whether then, by some such help or advantage (if it may be so called,) of nature, or by some contracted propriety by long use and endeavour, it may be thought possible in nature, without the concurrence of any supernatural cause, for any one man or woman to put themselves into a Trance, or Ec­stasie, when they will.

The second, Whether in any Trance or Ecstasie of the mind, whether voluntary or involuntary, a true and real se­paration of the Soul from the Body for a time, be a thing possible in nature.

[Page 91]For the first question; I find Avicenne, (an ancient Arab, of great credit among all; by some preferred above all other Philosophers, or Physicians;) quoted by some, concerning one, who besides some other extraordinary pro­perties, nothing to our purpose, could put himself into a fit of Palsie when he would. And if that were granted, there would be no great question of the possibility of vo­luntary Trances: it being a thing (in ordinary judgement) of equall facility in point of nature, to fill the Ventricles of the Brain with pituitous (or whatever Physicians will make them,) humours, and to empty them at pleasure; and to command certain humours into the chine of the back, and nerves, to be recalled again at will. So that if the one may be arbitrary in some one or other by some propriety of temper &c. the other may as probably. But I will not much insist upon this example, because of the uncer­tainty. I think there is no body almost, that pretends to learning or curiosity in any kind of nature and Philosophy, but hath heard, or read of Restitutus, an African Priest, in S. Augustine; who with the help of a mournfull tone, or lamenting voice, whether real or counterfeit, would present­ly fall into a perfect ecstasie, so that he would not stirre at all for any punching or pricking, though to a considerable wound: no, nor at the applying of fire; except perchance a man had applied so much, as to have endangered his life. So much perchance might be thought somewhat, to make faith of a real Trance. We heard before out of Thuanus, what a mighty matter was made of it, that a Maid should endure patiently (without any sign of sense, I mean,) the driving of pins or needles into some fleshy parts. But S. Augustine had more experience in the world then so. Be­sides that common president of the Lacedemonian Boys and Girls, he had observed with many Philosophers, (yea and Civilians,) how far man or womans resolute obstina­cy could go in point of suffering. That his reader there­fore [Page 92] might be fully satisfied, that it was no juggling busi­nesse, but a true, real, perfect ecstasie, he addeth; Non autem obnitendo sed non sentiendo, non movere corpus eo probatur, quod tanquam in defuncto nullus inveniebatur anhelitus; hominum tamen voces, si clarius loquerentur, &c. that is, (but I must let the Reader know by the way, that the Edition of S. Augustine, the onely I have at this time, is very ancient; almost as ancient as printing is; being the Venice edition of Petrus de Tarvisio, 1475. for which I like it not the worse, I confesse: yet thought good to give the Reader notice, in case, as oftentimes, there should be found any thing different in later Editions, though com­monly for the worst:Note: August. De Civ. Dei: l. 14. c. 24.) Now that this his not stirring of his body at all those things, happened not through a resolute obstinacy, (such as by ancient Heathens was commonly objected to Christian Martyrs; but very impertinently, it being both in regard of the number, and divers other circumstan­ces, a quite different case:) or opposition of the mind; but merely because he did not feel; was certainly known, be­cause all this while no breath was found in him, no more then if he had been quite dead. Yet the same man, if any body with a very loud voice had spoken or called unto him, he would acknowledge afterwards, when come to him­self, that he had heard some kind of noise, as if it were afar off. But this indeed S. Augustine doth not relate as a thing that himself had seen: no; but yet as a thing of very fresh memory, a verred unto him by many that had seen it, and whom he doth professe (experti sunt: as of a thing that he made no question:) to believe. And truly I for my part must acknowledge, that I give more credit to this relation of S. Augustine, then to Cardan his testimony concerning ei­ther himself, or his Father: though Bodinus is well content to believe it,Note: Bodin. Theat. Nat. p. 503. and partly grounds upon it as un­questionable. It was in their power, he saith, [Page 93] to abstract their souls from their bodies, when they would. The possibility whereof, except he meant it of an absolute separation, although I do not absolutely deny: yet that such a thing should be believed upon his bare testimony, hominis ventosi ingenii, as Scaliger of him somewhere, a man ever ambitious to tell strange things, to be admired by others; I see no just ground.

Well, but experientia fallax. Note: The words I know may have another meaning, as com­monly interpreted▪ but this too may be right enough, and is warrantable by other places in Hippocrates. It is his caveat, who of a wise man (and much the wiser for it, certainly,) adscribed as much to experience as ever man did: and therefore so earnestly exhorteth all young Physicians, not to neglect the experiments, & ad­vises grounded upon experiments, even of the most illiterate of the world. I doubt therefore, whether we may build so much upon two or three examples, though attested by very good authority, as to make an absolute inference, without some further reasoning. I find that Tho. Fyenus, a very learned Physician, who hath published a very rational and scholastical Treatise, Concerning the power of the Imagina­tion, doth expresse himself peremptorily upon the point, on the negative: Ea (of this very instance out of S. Aug.) vel ar­te Diabolica, vel fallacia aliqua cōtigisse; vel alias impossi­bilia esse. But I profess to wonder much at this his determi­nation; and whether without cause, I shall make the reader judge. For first, the question is not whether the bare Imagi­nation can do it immediately, which is contrary to the course of nature; as is well shewed by him throughout his Treatise: but whether the Imagination, or any other Power depen­ding on the Will, by the subordination of other Faculties; as by stirring up some Passion, and the like. And so himself doth grant, that many Diseases be caused by the Imaginati­on; as particularly the Plague: which though it be particu­larly acknowledged by him, yet for the Readers further sa­tisfaction, [Page 94] I will here adde another learned Physician his words, who is generally thought to have written of all conta­gious diseases, as learnedly & solidly as any man. His words are very expresse. Ex animi perturbationibus iracundia, Note: Palmar. de morbis contag. p. 311. &c. that is; As we have said, that among the Passions of the mind, Anger, Ter­ror and Grief are not without danger: so do we now declare, that fear of the Plague, and intent cogita­tion about it, do often bring it; and bear witnesse, that many perfectly sound before, being struck with a suddain fright and fear of it, were presently taken, and little after died; upon no other ground or cause as my opinion is, but this, that vehement and intent cogitation of the mind, and continued imagination, whilst they do strongly af­fect the heart, they do at the same time imprint and in­grave in it that very thing, which is so much feared and thought upon. And to this purpose I remember very well, that I did once, when very young, hear that wor­thy Raphael Thorius, mentioned before, who continu­ed in London all the Plague-time 1603. hear him, I say, with great admiration, tell of many particulars; of men and women to his knowledge, and in his sight walking, sitting, talking in perfect health; at some outward sight, or unseasonable relation, or the like, suddainly taken. Some might except, that their fear was not the cause of the Plague; but the unsensible grudgings or beginnings of the Plague in their bodies, rather cause of their fear: as when a man dreameth of some smart pain; not the dream, often, is the cause of the pain, but the pain of the dream. No; that cannot be, by divers instances which he did alledge. For then, their fear proceeding from an inward cause, would have been without any externall pro­vocation: whereas in all those examples, some external pro­vocations were the first, and only apparent cause. Yet I will not deny, but that probably there might be a concur­rence [Page 95] of both in some of those many instances. But now to Fyenus again. Some can weep when they will: that he doth not deny; no man indeed can deny it. I know what Poets and Comicks do write of all women in gene­ral; but I will not make use of their authority, nei­ther do I believe it true. But they that have read of Burials and Funerals in ancient Authors, cannot but take some notice of the mulieres praeficae among the Romans, (and such there were among other nations; as among the Jews particularly:) who though they were but hired with money to weep, and did without all doubt rejoyce, more or lesse, in their hearts for the occa­sion, it being their profession, by which they maintained their own life: would neverthelesse so mightily and so na­turally weep, that many that saw them, though they knew well enough that they did it merely for their hire, and for­cedly, and had otherwise no mind nor occasion themselves; yet could not forbear to do as they did. Now were it so as Fyenus seems elsewhere to determine, that a voluntary ec­stasie were nothing else but humoris pituitosi in cerebri ventriculos & substantiam intromissio & inductio; as he defineth arbitrary weeping by Seri pro imperio motio: tru­ly I should think it might easily be inferred, that the one (as to natural possibility) might be as well as the other; so that the one being granted by him, the other could not in reason be affirmed impossible. But I will dispute against my self in this, for the truth, as I apprehend it. For as I con­ceive every true, natural, and perfect ecstasie, to be a degree or species of epilepsie: so I subscribe to Sennertus, and other Physicians, who besides ordinarily known humors, main­tain that there is a different specifick epileptical humor, or quality, as yet unknown unto men, which is the im­mediate cause of Epilepsies.

But lastly, Fyenus seemes to me in some degree, if not to contradict, yet to be inconstant unto himself. For whereas he [Page 96] doth there so peremptorily determine it as impossible: in this his second Question, Concl. 11. where he hath the same instances at large, he proposeth them there as things that might happen indeed, but (praeter communem cursum na­turae,) besides the ordinary course of nature; not as super­natural, (lest any should mistake) but ex particulari ali­quorum hominum proprietate, & singulari corporis confor­matione: though indeed, even there at the last he concludes with a doubt; sed forte etiam aliqua corum arte magica &c. aliqua forte etiam non sunt vera. which I take to be a farre more discreet and judicious determination, then his impossible afterwards. Which to make yet more probable unto my Reader, since it is granted that strange things may be done by some, through peculiar natural properties, my course would be, as I take it, to look into those many ex­amples of idiosyncrisiae, which I find in good Authors: whe­ther among them we might not find divers things, which might seem every whit as strange as those controverted Ec­stasies. But because I desire not to be over-long, and that I would not glut the Reader with strange stories; among whom some will be found, perchance, of Lucian's temper, who not valuing the authority of most credible Authors, will account all fabulous that themselves have not seen or known; I shall forbear. Yet for their sakes that may be more candid and curious, I shall mention two books which I read but lately, (for which I was beholding, as for divers others, to a worthy Friend, a Doctor and Professor of Physick, in Chichester:) the one, Henrici à Heers his Observationes medicae; the other, Dan. Sennerti lib. 6. de morbis à fascino, incantatione, &c. published long after his other works: which two books, if my memory deceive me not, will competently furnish them with such examples. But to let that passe, and the advantage that we might make of it. That some can bring themselves to that, as to weep when they will, as we said before, is granted: and [Page 97] S. Augustine in the same chapter professeth himself to have seen one▪ that could sweat (without any motion, or any other ordinary means,) when he would: and this also by Fyenus is granted as possible: and Julius Scaliger in his Exercitations against Cardan, writes of one, as very well known unto him, that could not hold his water, if he heard any play upon a Lute or Harp: and I have it from persons of credit, that professed to have seen a woman, that could make her self blush when she would. That a man may by intent imagination or cogitation, bring him­self to a vertigo, as will make him fall to the ground, and trouble his brain very much, best Physicians do affirm: nay, that a great fright in tender bodies, (as women with child,) and intent imagination, is enough to beget [...] Epilepticam, is observed by Guil. Fabricius, Cent. 3. Ob­serv. 3. to whom Sennertus doth assent. Have there not been men or women, boys or girls, & children in the world, who at the very remembrance of some very sad or ter­rible thing, that had happened unto them in their life, would fall into a swoon, whether they would or no? How much more if they affected it, and after some two or three unvo­luntary fits, finding some disposition in themselves to it, and aiming at some advantage by it, or proposing to themselves some other end, used means by intent cogitation or otherwise, to bring themselves into a habit of it? Is there any thing in this impossible? If I should rub up mine own memory, I could tell of many things that I have known in my time in that kind. But why should not I (in things so ordinary) leave all men to their own experience? This is somewhat rare, that I remember to have read in Be­nevenius, De abditis morborum causis, &c. (a book for the bignesse, as full of choice Observations, as any I have seen; of whom and of his Observations, we shall have oc­casion to say more in some other Chapter:) of a Boy, who having been frighted by some strange apparition, whether [Page 98] real, or cōceited, was wont from that very day, & almost hour, every 8^th day to fall into the same horrors & outcries, which he had then suffered and used; from which he could never be cured, as long as he lived: but it seems it brought him into a speedy consumption, so that he did not live very long after it.

More I know may be found to the same purpose: but I think I have said enough to conclude, that granting what must be granted, and doth often happen in the world, be­sides the ordinary course of nature, yet by causes that are na­tural, as such and such an idiosyncrisia, and the like; a vo­luntary ecstasie is not a thing impossible in nature.

But I have not yet done. There is somewhat else to be said, that may seem to conduce very much to this our pre­sent inquiry: and though I my self shall make no great matter of it, yet some body else may; and think, it would have stood me in great stead. Giraldus Cambrensis, a Briton by birth, though by descent rather an English-man, or Nor-man, as he makes himself, but a very learned man for those times, in his Description of Wales, chapter 16. tels us of a certain company, frequent in those dayes, in Wales, com­monly called awenyd hion; that is, ecstatical, or mente ducti, according to Giraldus his interpretation. These men, it seems, according to his relation, could put themselves into a trance when they would: that is, as often as any came to them to consult them as Prophets. Two things especi­ally Giraldus would have us to take notice of: the one, that they did not use to come to themselves again, except some kind of violence were used, to recall and awaken them, as it were: and then secondly, that after they were come to themselves, they remembred nothing at all they had ei­ther said or done in their fits. He makes them to have been a race of the Trojan Soothsayers, among whom and their posterity, the Britons, only, he would have us to believe such Prophets have been. Yet again he doth argue, and would have us to believe that they prophesied by the spirit [Page 99] too, and to that end instances in divers, who though In­fidels, though lewd in their conversations, have had the gift of prophesie. And such also he maketh the Merlins to have been. I can easily be perswaded▪ that Giraldus wrote as himself believed; not out of any designe, as ma­ny have done, to abuse his Reader. It appeareth by the many Miracles wherewith he hath stuffed his Itinerarium, that he was a man of very easie belief: which was the epidemical disease of those times of Ignorance, when all Piety almost consisted in telling and making of Miracles. And what might not he believe, who did believe that A­lexander of Macedon, though long before those miracu­lous times, had removed the Caspian mountains, and in­closed within them, as within walls, the ten tribes of Israel; not to be removed from thence till the coming of Enoch and Elias? I do not say that he was the Author of this pretty Fable: but that he had credulity enough to believe it; and by consequent not to be wondered at, if he believed many other things, that may probably be supposed as true. But truly I think we are much beholding to his fi­delity. For had he been of the temper of some others, he would have added somewhat of his own, to make his story more strange; which might have troubled us. But now as he describeth them, we may believe him, so farre as he speaks of himself; and yet know them (be it spoken without any disparagement to that ancient noble people; since there is no nation in the world but hath store of such:) know them, I say, for arrant Jugglers and Impostors. For there is not any thing in the whole relation, but might easily be performed by any ordinary Gypsie. And the like we may as probably conclude of those dancing Enthusiasts, by him elsewhere mentioned and described in his Itinerariū. As for his Merlins, if they were no others then the Merlins of our dayes, it will require no long deliberation to deter­mine what they were. But we know ours, that now are, well [Page 100] enough: but as for them that were, I leave them to them that know more of them then I do, to judge of them.

Neither shall I need to say any thing of the Tur­kish Enthusiasts, the Darvisei, or Torlaces, who, as I find them described in some Turkish Histories, have (some of them) much resemblance with those in Gi­raldus, as to their pretended Fits and Raptures: but such lewd abominable Rascals otherwise, that were it not that we see among Christians also how inclinable the common sort of people are to be carried with any pretence of Religion, though the actions be never so irreligious and contrarie to that which is pretended; it would be incredible that such monsters should be suffer­ed in a Commonwealth: much more incredible, that with so much zeal and devotion, as men of God and holy Prophets, they should be worshipped and adored, as they are there by many. Strange stories may be read in Leo Africanus, in his 3. book of the Descri­ption of Africk; Diversae regulae ac sectae, &c. p. 135. to this purpose; whereof he professeth himself to have been eye-witnesse: but nothing more strange, then what Germany hath seen, and any other Countrey may, where Anabaptisticall Enthusiasts are tolerated, and from toleration come in time to prevail and rule.

I will not make a question of it to dispute it; for I have but little to say for it: but I desire only to propose it, that learned Naturalists and Physicians may (if they please) consider of it; Whether it be probable or possible, that naturall Ecstasies and Enthusiasms, such as proceed from naturall causes merely, should be contagious: though not contagious in the same manner as the Plague, or the Pox is; yet contagious in their kind. Neither indeed are all contagious diseases, contagious in one kind. A mad Dogge is not contagious with his Breath: Fra [...]a­storius, that hath written of that subject, saith with his [Page 101] Teeth only; and not except some bloud be drawn. But it is not my purpose to inquire into the truth of that now: I would only suppose, that all diseases that are contagi­ous, are not contagious in the same manner. The chiefest ground of my suspicion is, the history of those ancient He­reticks, who were commonly known under the name (for they had many others besides, as Enthusiasts, &c.) of Messaliani, a Syriack word; that is, Euchites, or Pray­ers: because they were wont to pray themselves into ra­ptures and ecstasies, of which we shall speak more in its proper place. But that I have here to say of them is, that whereas this strange Sect (as most others) began by a few; it did in time so spread and prevail, that whole Mo­nasteries, whole Townes, and almost Countries were in­fected with it. Neither could any other cure be found, but absolute destruction. Which may seem strange, that that wherein the happinesse and perfection of a Christian, being well used, doth chiefly consist; as being that which bringeth man nearest unto God; through abuse and excesse, should become liable to the punishment of highest crimes. But in this quaere we go upon a wrong ground, I know, if it be conceived that those men were really possest, as some have thought anciently. For my part, I see no cause to be­lieve it; but I leave every man free. I propose it to them that shall be of my opinion, as I doubt not but some will be: and we shall say more afterwards of it, in due place.

II. Our second question which we proposed, is, Whe­ther through any Naturall Ecstasie, the Soul may really quit the Bodie, and then return. I shall begin with the consideration of what some Ancients have thought and written. But before that, I must professe that I do not, in such high points, adscribe so much unto ancient Heathens, except it be some of the most solid and rationall among them, as to think their opinion in a serious discourse, a suf­ficient [Page 102] ground for a Quaere; much lesse, for a Conclusion. But since that I find that some Christians, men of good lear­ning and great fame, have not only largely disputed, but in conclusion affirmed it; I think I should not give my Reader that satisfaction that he might expect from me, if before I come to them and their Arguments, I should not tell him, who before them, whether heathen or others, that are come to my knowledge, or present remembrance, have concurred with them in their opinion: and the rather, because it is not unlikely that themselves might be the bolder to publish what they maintained, because they found they were not the first that had been of that opinion. Ancient Heathens, whether Philosophers or others, that did believe such a se­paration possible, seem to ground especially upon a storie, that passed among them for very current and true; of one Hermotimus Clazomenius, whose soul, they say, was wont to wander into farre places, the body, mean while, being as still and senselesse as if it had been a dead body. The matter, it seemeth, when ever it happened, was very publick; and therefore passed to posterity with lesse controll. There is nothing in Plinies relation of it, (for the matter of fact,) but is possible enough, and might well be conceived to have proceeded from some natural cause. Physicians are agreed upon it; and they ground it upon certain experience, that a man in ecstasi melancholica, or a woman in hysterica passione, may be gone three dayes, and come to themselves again. Therefore they strictly forbid in such cases to burie ante bi­duum exactum; quod quosdam ferè triduo elapso revixisse observatum sit: as Sennertus of women particularly. Ter­tullian De anima cap. 51. hath a storie of a Woman that stirred her armes when she was carried to be buried. It seemeth by him, that he was present when it happened: but it was looked upon as a thing merely supernaturall and mi­raculous; and so the woman was buried nevertheless; which, perchance, if then taken up and well tended, might have re­covered [Page 103] to perfect life, without a miracle. Now that a man or woman after such a fit, in course of nature, should tell strange things, which he hath seen, yea and foretell (though this be rare;) some things to come; is not so much to be won­dred at, that it should be thought incredible. I find the re­lation concerning this Hermotimus, in Apollonius, [...]. cap. .. .. more full: but there indeed much improved, as such things use to be by time; and alto­gether incredible. There dayes, (as probably in the first re­lation,) are made yeares: two or three dayes perchance, ma­ny yeares, beyond all sense and reason. For though I will not dispute it here, whether it may not fall out in nature, that a man may sleep some moneths, (which is written of a whole Countrey in the North, as naturall unto the people of that countrey, and is not contradicted by some eminent Physicians:) or yeares; for which I know much may be said, as well as for living divers yeares without any food, which of the two, in point of reason might seem more im­possible; and yet is certainly known to have happened, e­ven of late yeares, unto many: Yet for a Bodie to lie so long destitute of a Soul and of all naturall functions, and not to be dead, is not conceivable in nature. As for those par­ticulars of his predictions in the said Apollonius, [...]: all these things proceeding from natural causes, which have operations long before upon some creatures; from the diligent observation of which operations, skilfull Naturalists also sometimes foresee and foretell them; (of which we have spoken in the former Chapter;) I would not stick much at that, as is intimated before. But as my purpose is only for the truth, so I must remove one objection, that may be made from the Author I have named. His very ti­tle ( [...].) promises only Fables. Yet it is cer­tain that he hath inserted divers things, which are asserted by best Historians; as Meursius himself in his Preface to the [Page 104] reader, out of Phlegon, doth observe. But besides, that bare alteration of dayes into yeares, was enough and more then enough, to turn a Truth into a Fable. Tertullian De an. c. 44. hath some conjectures about this Hermotimus; but not any either in themselves very probable, or to us here▪ at all considerable.

Plutarch in his Treatise of the Slacknesse of Gods judg­ments, hath a relation too of one Thespesius, who fell down from a high place (drunk perchance; for he was a lewd Companion:) without any externall wound or bleeding; upon which he grew immediately senselesse, and after a while was supposed dead: but came to himself a­gain after the third day, and then told strange things that he had seen; some things also (of which Plutarch speaketh very sparingly,) he foretold: and then was his Soul also supposed to have wandered out of the Body all that while I think it very probable, though I have nothing but Plutarch's authoritie for it, that such a thing (lay­ing aside the main controversie of reall separation, till we come to some determination about it,) might happen. First, such a fall as he describeth, might pro­bably be the occasion (as we had before in the ecstati­call Boy, whom his master had so grievously beaten a­bout the head:) of such an Ecstasie. Secondly, three dayes, the very proportion of time which Physicians have pitched upon, during which they teach that an ecstasie may last. And though Plutarch say after three dayes; it is like enough they would speak so, though some houres, amount­ing perchance to half a day and better, to make three dayes, were wanting. But then lastly, the substance of his Visions, and places of his wandrings, do just agree with the relations of other ecstaticall persons, that have been at severall times and places. It may be comprehend­ed in few words: Heaven, Hell, and Purgatorie. The phrases indeed, and expressions, proper to Heathens, as [Page 105] must needs be. but the substance of the matter, the very same for all the world as we find in others, that were of another faith and profession. And yet it must be supposed, that this storie having passed through severall hands, be­fore it came to Plutarch, had suffered some alterations ac­cording to different humours of men, and perchance me­mories, before: and what end soever any other might pro­pose unto himself in it, apparent enough it is, that Plutarch, as may be seen in the end, where he speaks of Nero's soul, did aim at some use, for the credit and benefit of his own Countrey. So much for Heathens. I have not met with any professing Christianity, either ancient, (that I remember at least,) or late, that have maintained this separation possi­ble upon grounds of reason; or de facto, reall and credible; but Joh. Bodinus and Cardanus. Of Cardanus I can say lit­tle more, then what I find in Bodinus of him, because I have not his books. Why I do not value much his testimonie in these things, I have given some reason before. And if his ar­guments be not better, (in case he have any to prove it pos­sible; which is more then I know:) we should make no great reckoning of them. As for Bodinus, he was a man fa­mous enough for other learning too; but especially well ver­sed in such arguments and speculations, as appeareth by his book of Daemonologia. The elogium of the man and his writings, is in Thuanus at large. He plainly maintains it in that choice piece of his, his Theatrum Naturae: a book full of naturall Curiosities; whether as solid as curious, I cannot tell. But he speaks not of it as of a thing feasible by nature, but by power either divine, or diabolicall. And what is that to us? Yes, even unto us, as I conceive, that otherwise desire not to meddle with any thing that is super­naturall. For as to divine; as I should hold it a mad thing, from the power of God, which even heathens (though not Galen, who quarrels with Moses for making it so) have ac­knowledged infinite, to argue to the power of nature, which [Page 106] God (the author) from the first creation hath bounded within certain limits: so on the other side, if it were granted that ordinary Witches and Magicians, can at pleasure by power given them from the Devil, separate their souls from their bodies for certain houres, or dayes, and then resume their bodies again, and be as before; which by the said Bo­dinus is disputed and maintained; truely I should think, it might without impietie or improbabilitie be inferred from thence, that this kind of separation is a thing possible in, and by nature also. But I will not engage my self here upon that argument of Witches, of which I once purposed to treat more at large, and by it self: it is yet possible that I may be­fore I die, if God please. Somewhat Bodinus hath from some presidents in nature, that we might not too much won­der at that which he doth averre and maintain, though not by naturall causes, so often to come to pass. Nec debet illud mirum videri, si quis meminerit ex electro, &c. I did expect he would have told somewhat of divers creatures, which some for a longer, some for a shorter time, as Flyes in the winter, lie quite senselesse, and seem to be dead: and yet af­terwards are known to revive, and to be as active and bu­sie as ever they were. Such arguments I remember, and in­stances we had many, when young Sophisters in the Uni­versity, upon occasion of severall disputes. But this example taken from the separation of Gold and Silver, informing the true Electrum; or of the separation of Oyl & Water, af­ter mixture, by such & such means; seemeth to me so remote, that I do not see how a rational man can inferre any thing out of it pertinent to this purpose. Again; had Bodinus gone that way to work, to prove, or make it probable at least, that the rationall soul or spirit of man is really distinct and separable from the vegetative & sensitive; though contrary to the common opinion of best philosophers; yet so he might have laid a plausible foundation to his opinion of separa­tion in ecstasies. But that he doth not; but plainly main­taineth the contrary.

[Page 107]I shall not absolutely determine any thing: but I shall give some reason why I do not, which will be a kind of determination of the businesse. S. Paul speaking of his own divine raptures, professeth not to know whether they hap­pened unto him in the body, or out of the body. He is earnest in that profession, and repeats it twice. I am not of their opi­nion, though it be the opinion of no lesse a man then Hugo Grotius, among others, that make S. Paul's meaning to be, that he did not know whether he were carried in body to heaven, or heavenly things represented unto his mind. I should account that, but for the respect I bear to some that embrace it, somewhat a course interpretation. Now if S. Paul, according to that interpretation of his words which is more commonly received, though he knew the power of God very well, and that what had hapned unto him, what­ever it was, was not from any naturall cause, but altogether supernaturall; would not, or could not neverthelesse, abso­lutely determine, whether that in his divine rapture there were any reall separation of his soul from his body: I must think it somewhat bold for any man to maintain, that such a separation, either by diabolicall power, or by causes that are naturall, is possible; much lesse, as Bodinus, ordinary. Besides, in that case of Witches, which is the main ar­gument; except we can tell of Witches and Sorcerers that are in trances for some weeks, moneths, or years together, what need? May not the Devil as easily, yea and farre more easily to our apprehension in point of possibilitie, represent such things unto their phansie, and make them believe, (which many do without any Devil, upon such impressions, occasioned by some distemper of the brain, or otherwise, as in former ex­amples:) that they saw or did such and such things really, in such and such places? But they are carried to farre places, and give a true account of what they have seen, it may be a hundred, or a thousand miles off. This I [Page 108] believe to be true enough, that many Witches & Sorcerers in divers places in the world, by severall kinds of Witchcraft do it. But if a Sorcerer, or a Witch shew in a glass what is now done upon the Exchange at Antwerp, or at the Louvre in Paris; which certainly some have done, or somewhat equivalent to that; must we therefore conclude that he that hath seen it, hath been at either? But lastly; though the Soul, in man, be it that seeth properly, not the Eyes; yet as the Soul is fitted by God to informe a Body, it can­not see without Eyes. When once, as to nature, it hath lost its relation to the body; it then becomes (though the very same substance still,) a new creature as it were, to all man­ner of operations. It seeth, it speaketh, or to speak more properly, communicateth: but not either with Eyes, or Tongue; but as Spirits or Angels do. of the par­ticular manner whereof, both ancient Philosophers and Schoole-men have disputed and treated at large. If there­fore the soul separated from the body can return into it a­gain, and remember what it hath seen; it would also re­member as well, that it was not with bodily eyes that it saw or knew, but in such a manner as is proper and natural (if we may so speak) to a spirit: which is contrarie to the account that is given by Witches, and other of like trade. If any man should say, though separated for a season, it might carry with it some species, that it had received in the body through the ministery of the Eyes, and so of other senses: though that be absurd, because all such spe­cies are imprinted in the brain, disposed by the presence of the soul to receive them; or if we fly to the intelligibiles, abstracted out of the materials by vertue of the intellectus agens: yet even so, though it might see (were it granted) by that means, some things, even after its separation, that it had seen before, whilest in the body; yet other things, whether present or future, by vertue of those species, more then it had seen or known before, it could not.

[Page 109]III. I have done with the two questions which I pro­posed: I shall now passe to a third, which I did not menti­on, to prevent prejudice, lest by the very termes, it might be thought frivolous and fruitlesse; which neverthelesse in the end, before we have done with it, will appear of great consequence and reality. But before I come to that new question, I will conclude this discourse concerning Ecstasies, with somewhat that may do them perchance some plea­sure, who are not much conversant in Philosophy. We had somewhat of Visions, whether internal or external, before. It may be, that expression will not be understood by some. It is true that ordinarily, as all object of sight is out­ward; so all sight or vision, properly inward. Animus videt, &c. as before, at the beginning, disputed. But Laurentius in his Treatise of melancholie, delivers it as a secret, that e­ven without outward objects we may see things inwardly; and thereupon defendeth Galen against Averroes, affirm­ing that the darknesse of melancholick spirits, is a great occasion of melancholy mens continual fearfulnesse. He handleth it also in his Anatomy, lib. 11. q. 2. The species, he saith, (which must be understood of some extraordinary cases; else the sight would be a very un­certain sense:) with such and such impressions, may be sent unto the eyes from the brain, and from the eyes returned unto the place from whence they came, and the brain receive them (for which see his reasons in his Anatomy:) as things outward. I leave it to the fur­ther consideration of learned Physicians and Anatomists. Certain it is, that upon some distempers of the brain, a man shall think, even awaking, that he seeth those things which he doth not see: things which are not, nor per­chance can be. Aristotle in his Treatise of Dreams, gives an instance of it in children and young boyes; who after some terrible dream, though they be out of their dream, and their eyes full open, (and light brought in [Page 110] sometimes: which I adde, because I know it to be true:) think neverthelesse for a while after, that they see with their eyes, what they saw in their dream. And Vitus Amerbachius, a learned man, in his book De anima, lib. 4. confirms it to be true by his own experience, even when he was a man, if I mistake him not. But whatever be the cause, the effect is certain; confirm­ed also by learned Fracastorius in these words: Ni­hil enim refert ad apparentiam faciendam, &c. that is, Whether the species comes to the eyes from with­out, or from within, is not material at all, in point of apparition: for they believe they see, and are asto­nished, and grow besides themselves, &c. De Sym­path. c. 20.

Our third question or consideration is, whether a man by Philosophy, or philosophical contemplation, may attain to an Angelical transformation: or to go higher, to such a degree of union with God, that he shall neither by the help of any sense, or phansie, understand as other men; but by a kind of contactus, or union of substance with the Supreme Cause of all things. If any man think this too curious a question, or too high for ordinary capacities, he will be (as is already intimated,) much deceived. For it is for their sakes especially that are the weaker sex, that I propose it; as he will find it, if he have but the patience to read unto the end. This marvellous transmutation of man by philosophy, is asserted by men that call them­selves Platonicks. Julius Caesar Vaninius describeth it in this manner: Ejus causa, continua sublimiorum con­templatio, quae à sensibilibus & à corporis penso animum sevocat, & profundissima mentis intentione incorporeae sapientiae conjungit: cumque ad illum gradum pervenerit, qui est contemplativae perfectionis supremus, tunc rapitur ab omnibus creatis speciebus, & intelligit non per spe­cies acquisitas, sed per inspectionem ad Ideas, in quarum lu­mine [Page 111] omnia agnoscit. Ideo ecstatici multa vera praedicunt. They that can come at Ficinus, De philosoph. Platon. and other works of his, may expect a more perfect account. But for my part, by what I can find in Plato, or other ancient Pla­tonists, I doubt that Plato is wrongfully quoted. I deny not but that he might be some foundation: but they that raised it to this height, were no others as I take it, then the enthusi­astick Arabs, the very same that bred us Mahomet; whe­ther before, or afterwards. I have a good Author for it. Learned Montecatenus (an exquisite Aristotelian) in his Commentaries upon the third of Aristotle De Anima, speaking there of Averroes, hath these words: Hic enim est qui opinatur, et si eam opinionem non usquequaque pro­bemus, (I wonder so sober a man would say so much:) per eas species [intellectiles] tanquam per sui partes, per­fecte demum nobiscum copulari effectricem mentem: in quam illae ubi numerum expleverint, repentina quadam lu­ce effulgentes, quasi abeant & convertantur; imaginatione etiam totoque homine secum attractis: adeo ut exinde, non per species, ut antea, non ope imaginationis intelligamus; sed per illius mentis essentiam, in quam nos pene ista mu­tavit copulatio. It were no hard thing to put this into English: but how to make it intelligible English to them that know nothing of the intellectus agens, and patiens, and other mysteries of the nature of understanding, I know not. However, the summe is already in the question, as I proposed it. And in the application that we shall make, every thing will be clearer.

Let the Arabs therefore have the honour of it; if not of the first invention, yet of the perfection: yea and practice too, for which they are better fitted by their natural tem­per, then many other nations. However, that they had it in part, as almost all other things, from the Grecians, is most certain; as is elsewhere treated more at large in a Dis­course De cultu Dei spirituali, sive per intellectum, not yet [Page 112] printed. Among the works of Dionysius Areopagita, as commonly called, there is a little Treatise De mystica Theologia. Were it possible to hope, that men would judge without prejudice or partiality, I think it might be pro­ved, partly by what hath already been done by others, partly by what might yet be added to that purpose, as clear as the light of the Sun it self is, that the Author of the book cannot be that Dionysius, whom he counterfeits himself, and many gladly believe. But it is, and would be but labour lost. So farre hath that pompous dresse of words, joyned with the sublimity of the subject, be­witched many: besides what advantage is made by some, of this pretended antiquity, in some controverted points of religion. However, the Author is ancient, we grant, and good enough too for some uses, to deserve respect at the hands of all learned men. In the Treatise De my­stica Theologia, he teacheth a new kind of practical Di­vinity, by renouncing not to the Senses only, but to the Understanding also, and to all intellectual powers, facul­ties, and operations that are natural: by which in time we may attain [through elevation of mind] to an union not expressible, nor understood, yet felt, and in an hid­den manner operative, with God: in this union, as the perfection of man, and the height of mortal exaltation, to rest, when attained, without passion, without affection, without knowledge. I will give a short description of this mystery, in the words of *Since this written, I have seen one Sandaeus, of the same argument: but have not yet found in him any thing much material, that is not in Hersentius: though I do not find that be maketh any mention of him any where. Ca­rolus Hersentius, one that hath commented upon that book, and hath collected out of other Au­thors, men and women, whatever he could meet with, to commend it and the doctrine of it unto the world: Cum ad hunc amoris & contemplationis gradum per venit, [Page 113] saith he, ut nihil eorum qua intellectu, &c. miro & in­cognito modo à Deo rapitur; à Deo, & in Deo suscipitur; tota Deo plena fit; tota in Deum transfunditur: ita ut essentia Dei ejus essentiae & substantiae intime & absque ullo modo creato uniatur. Deus autem in raptu hujus­modi, adventu suo seu illapsu, rationem & mentem obscu­rat, stupefac [...] suspenditque: ita ut pro eo temporis inter­vallo nullius a [...]onis capax sit. We shall have the En­glish of all this also, (the substance of it at least,) when I come to that application of it which I aim at. But I would gladly know, of whom this Dionysius learned this strange Divinity. It is somewhat, that Hersentius doth acknow­ledge Dionysius in this his doctrine, Platonicorum dogma­tum sectatorem, p. 101. and Platonis sectatorem accu­ratissimum, p. 91. And p. 93. &c. he bringeth passages out of Iamblichus, Porphyrius, Proclus, noted Platonists; teaching in a manner the same thing. Insomuch that p. 43. he dares adventure upon so much truth, as to say, E­go equidem dum Procli philosophi Platonici in Theologiam Platonis axiomata animadverto, firmiter mihi persuadeo out Dionysium Procli scripta legisse; (a terrible businesse to be supposed, which would prove no lesse then heresie, and losse of goods and life. For then what must this Dio­nysius prove, but an impostor, seeing Proclus lived, all men know, some centuries of yeares since the true Dionysius?) aut quod vero similius, (yea by all means it concerns him to say so;) Proclum libris Dionysii operam navasse. But let the sober Reader consider: Here is a strange kind of Divinity, as some call it, or Philosophy; of which much hath been written (in many volumes by some of them,) by Platonick Philosophers, grounding all upon expresse pas­sages, (though drawn much further, by the Arabs espe­cially, then he ever intended perchance,) of their master Plato: insomuch that Hersentius himself, as observed be­fore, is forced to call Dionysius, a Platonist, for teaching [Page 114] this doctrine. We find nothing of it (except we draw things obtorto collo, as we say;) in the Gospel of Christ; nothing in ancient Fathers of greatest antiquity: and yet likely after all this, that Proclus learned it from Dionysius. But what if we find other Philosophers also, besides Plato, that lived some hundred of years before the true Dionysius, teach the same doctrine more clearly then Plato himself; as clearly almost, as either Proclus, or Dionysius? It cannot be unpleasing to them that are Scholars, if I take some pains to discover some mysteries of this mystery of dark­nesse, which for ought I know, have not yet been brought to light by any man. Who is the true Author of those Metaphysicks, or rather fragments of Metaphysicks, that go under Theophrastus his name, certainly I cannot tell. We find them adscribed to divers Authors by ancient Greek Philosophers: yet by some very ancient (though not found in the Catalogue of his books set out by Dioge­nes Laertius, where divers books of his are missing as well as this;) to Theophrastus himself. learned Sylburgius leaves it doubtfull. Theophrastus was one of Aristotles own disciples, and succeeded him in his School; much commended by him: an excellent Philosopher certainly by those works of his (not the twentieth part of what he had written,) that remain unto this day. Those Fragments of Metaphysicks, whoever be the Author, who must have lived long before Christ, are a choice piece; but very imper­fect, end therefore the more obscure. In the eighth Chapter of these Fragments, (as divided in Sylburgius his edition: for in Aldus, long before that, I find none:) after a long discourse of the speculation of principles, we find these words; [...], [Page 115] [...]. All that know any thing of Philosophy, be it never so little, cannot but have heard of Aristotles opinion, so much disputed in the schools of Philosophers: that the un­derstanding, whilst joyned with the body, can do nothing without the senses. of which we also have had occasion to consider at large in another work, (De origine Idolotriae) not yet printed. Theophrastus therefore here saith; That to some degree or measure, we may contemplate and know the first causes scientifically, that is, by their causes, from things sensible: (or, by the help of the same senses:) But when once ascended to the Summities, or Original Firsts, we can go no further: either because they have no cause; or partly because of our weaknesse, as in matter of sight, (he had this similitude, upon the like occasion, from his master Aristotle;) when we would look upon that (to wit the Sun,) which is most bright and splendid. And in this case, it may be true indeed, (by which words Theophrastus doth seem to referre to the speech of some former noted Philosopher, whether Aristotle or Plato:) that all knowledge and con­templation [of the first causes] must be by very touching, and feeling (that is, union, or conjunction, as in the former testimonies:) of the mind, or intellect. Whence it is that such knowledge (grounded upon a kind of feeling, of all senses the most certain in man; by which also he doth some­times correct the errors of his eyes; or rather, because im­mediately from God:) is not liable to error; however the comprehension of this very thing, and the certainty of it, (or, though that degree of knowledge, necessary before a man can attain to this; as of *See Chap. 6. confidence also;) be a thing of great difficulty. So Theophra­stus there. And now I would desire the Reader, that hath so much curiosity for the truth, to read over that Discourse (it is very short, and will take but little [Page 116] time:) of this pretended Dionysius, and tell himself, when he hath done, (some common things concerning the in­comprehensiblenesse of God, laid aside,) whether the very pith and marrow of it, be not in those few lines. I will appeal unto Hersentius, who in his paraphrase at the end, summs up all in these words: Fatendum igitur, si Deus à nobis aliqua ratione agnosci potest, sola ignoratione, silentio, conjunctione supra sensum & mentem, per ipsam anime unionem agnosci. As for that [...], that divine cloud, which the Author proposeth at the first, as his chief­est argument; I know there is ground enough for it, as in the nature, so in the Word of God: as by the Greek Commentators upon this Dionysius is well shewed. But of this [...] of Gods nature, how to extract a [...], a mist of *Some may make a difference between ignoratio and igno­rantia. But I know not how to do it in English: except I may be allowed to say unknowingness: or the like. ignorance in man, (as the Author elsewhere speaketh,) as the readiest way to the knowledge of God, so much pressed by this Author, and so much commended unto others by the abettors of this strange doctrine; I know no ground at all for it either in reason, or Scripture. However, I am much beholding to that phrase. It hath put me in mind of somewhat that may serve very well fur­ther to discover this imposture. Synesius is a man well known among Scholars: he was made Bishop against his will, for his great fame and worth. He did oppose it ve­ry much: and in very truth, in some of his writings, even since a Bishop, as I take it, he sheweth himself a bet­ter Platonist, then sound Christian. It seems that even in his dayes this new Divinity began to be in request among Christians, and some illiterate Monks and others took hold of this magnified [...] or absolute ignorance, to bring themselves into reputation, as though they had been the only wise and godly men of the world, because the most [Page 117] ignorant; but pretending by that ignorance, to have near­est accesse unto God, and most of God in themselves. Hereupon Synesius wrote that exquisite piece, which he in­scribed Dio; (because in very deed, Dio Chrysostomus a great part of his subject;) to prove the necessity of humane Learning and Philosophy, to all that will contemplate of high things with sobriety and good successe. He doth not deny but that some such transcendent witts and natures have been, (but Phoenix-like, scarce one in an Age,) who without any such preparation, have been able by the subli­mity of their natural parts and excellencies, to ascend with­out steps to the highest that man can reach, but that any of those professors of ignorance, that pretended to that happy condition, were such, he doth very peremptorily de­ny. He tells them of their fopperies and manifold extra­vagancies in their language, and writings; by which a man might sooner guesse them to be sunk much lower then ordinary nature, then to have attained to any supernatu­ral sublimity. I would have the Reader observe those words, [...], and the like; which be terms of Art, and much used in this mystical science: by which it doth plainly appear, that he meant those very men, whom I speak of God forbid, saith he there in a place, that we should think that if God dwell in us, he should dwell in any other part of us, then that which is rational: which is his proper Temple. It can­not be certainly, that Truth should be found in Ignorance; or that he should be wise truly, which is irrational: with many such things to that purpose. Yea he tells them also of their affected silence and taciturnity. [...], &c. He would not believe that they were Mysteries indeed, that made them dumb, because inexpres­sible: not but that it is the nature of things really sublime, to be so; but because he saw nothing in them or from them, that argued either knowledge, or capacity of things farre [Page 118] under Mysteries. But the Reader must not expect that satisfaction from me, which he may give himself, if he will read Synesius himself. There is nothing of Synesius, but is very good in his kind, and well worth any mans reading: this, both good and usefull, more then any other part of him, if I be not mistaken. It is pity, it is no better transla­ted. but indeed more pity, that he should be read in any other language then his own; it is so very good, and elegant.

Now to come to that use of this last question and consi­deration, which at the first I aimed at: I shall not here dispute, how farre a well-grounded intelligent Philosopher may adventure in this kind of mystical Theology (a word common to heathens, it is well known, as well as to Christi­ans;) for the discovery of any truth, above ordinary humane ratiocination; nor whether the most illiterate among Chri­stians, whether men or women, may not attain sometimes by Gods special favour, and real holinesse and sanctity, to the highest mysteries of Christian religion; which as we deny not, so we are sure, is nothing at all to this purpose; nor lastly, whether the true knowledge and love of Christ, joyned with a holy life, have not in many, or most, (in some more, in some lesse,) a ravishing power, set out al­legorically in the book of Canticles, and other Scriptures: All these as altogether impertinent to the question and case we are upon, I shall passe by. That which we are to con­sider, is, whether this Mysticall Theology, as they call it, by renouncing to all senses, to all knowledge, and intelle­ctual operation, that is, in effect, by affected Ecstasies and Enthusiasms, be a probable way, to compasse a more per­fect, real and substantial union with God, or Christ, then otherwise is to be compassed: whether the writings of some ancient and later Platonists, Greeks and Arabs, Heathens and Mahometans, be a sufficient ground and warrant for it, to them that professe to adscribe more to the Scriptures, received among Christians for divine, by which sobriety of [Page 119] sense is so much commended unto us; then to the opinions of heathen Philosophers. but more particularly, whether allowable or commendable in women, whom all men know to be naturally weaker of brain, and easiest to be in­fatuated and deluded. But this last is the thing I intend specially to insist upon, by reason of that example mentio­ned in the Epistle to the Reader; by consideration of which (finding it backed with so much authority,) I was first provoked to undertake this whole Discourse: having also some respect to some very near unto me by kindred, of the same, or like profession.

This supposed holy Maid,Note: The life of sister Ca­tharine of Jesus, &c. at Paris: 1628. See the Epistle to the Rea­der. whom we are now to consider of, was from her infancy, according to the relation, which we must trust to, very devout: and, as averse from any worldly pomp and pleasure; so, strangely addicted to bodily pen­nances and voluntary chastisements. We will conclude no­thing of this. We know well enough what the Apostle writeth of himself, and what hath been the practice of some truly devout, in times of purest devotion and piety. How­ever, it is sure enough, that such immoderate castigations and vexations, may be an effect of melancholy, as well as religion; and had not that famous, shall I say, or infamous Porphyrius, lighted upon a better friend, to take him off in time, he had never lived to plot and write so much against Christians and Christ himself, as he did. Zeno the Philoso­pher was wont to say, Let me be mad, rather then in plea­sure: not considering that even in pain there is pleasure, if a man thereby please his own mind, and think highly of himself, (wherein the height of humane contentment and ambition often lieth,) because he can endure much. Cer­tainly, there would never have been so many Stoicks and Cynicks in the world, who when they might have lived otherwise, (and some of them of their own accord parted [Page 120] with good means and temporal estates for it,) chose to beg, and to be trampled upon by every idle Rascall that met them, to make good their profession of unpassionatenesse; had it not been so, that pain and pleasure are things which oftentimes depend more on phansie, then realitie; and that pleasure may be found, where others feel pain. When I lived in Somerset-shire, (where first called to the discharge of holy Duties,) there was in a Gentlewomans house (a woman of good estate and reputation, much given to hospi­tality; where I my self have been often kindly entertain­ed;) a natural Fool, but useful enough in a great house for some services; who took a singular pleasure in being whipped, even unto bloud: and it was one or two lusty Maids (for it must be done by Maids, to give him content,) their task every morning▪ when they could intend it. He was not pleased, nor would follow his businesse so well all the day after, if it were not done. But what do I talk of one fool? whereas we find it recorded by good Historians, that whole nations at once, have been possest, shall I say, or infected, with this phrensie? Were I in a place where books are to be had, I should be able perchance to give a better account of what I say to the Reader. I am very con­fident I have read it in more then one, with observations made upon it, as an epidemical disease or distemper; though by more I know adscribed to mere devotion. But to supply that defect as well as I can, I will here impart un­to the Reader what▪ find of it in my Father, of B. M. his Adversaria.

And who hath not heard of the Milesian Virgins; a thing so generally attested by all Ancients, that no man can reasonably make a question of the truth of it? A humor took them to make themselves away. no perswasions of friends, or parents, or any thing else that was most dear unto them, nor any other means that could be thought of, were effectual to perswade them to live. There was scarce any house left in the Town, that mourned not for some of these self-executioners. Untill at last a simple device (as it commonly falls out with them that labour of a limited me­lancholy to some one object; of which we had examples be­fore:) did that which no obligation, either civil or natural, could do before: to make them fear that, which of all fears otherwise, is generally accounted, and by some Philoso­phers absolutely determined, to be most naturall unto all.

At what age of her life this Maid began to fall into Trances and Ecstasies, I cannot find by the Storie, which is not digested into yeares. But from her first generall confession, which she made but 9. yeares old, [p. 6.20.] she began to talk much of Gods presence; and phansie to her self, that she saw God visibly, every time she went to Church. And being asked whether she suffered any distra­ction of senses; she said, no; (I wonder who doth in that case:) and was believed. The first visible fit, it seems, began in the Church, [p. 33.] with a trembling: so that she let her Wax-candle, (which by the proper ceremonie of the day, she held in her hand,) fall to the ground, and could not take it up. From that time, her visions, it seems, began to be very frequent. and I find it observed, [p. 31.33.45.50.] that she could seldome speak, or expresse her self, when she had seen any thing; so that she only reap­ed [Page 122] the benefit of those great secrets and mysteries, which God is said to have revealed unto her.

But from 21. of her life, [p. 38.54.] her ecstasies be­gan to be very strong, and would last three or four houres in a day so that she did verily think her self to be in hea­ven, sometimes, [p. 39.] when she was upon earth, at her ordinarie (as is noted) employment.

Pag. 34. (and 61.63.64.65.) of the Storie, Christ is said to have drawn her soul into his. Pag. 45.46.47. to have taken possession of her: and more particularly, (which the author of the relation professeth not to under­stand,) to have marked her with a mark: and afterwards to have abided in her, by presence, and by operation, to her last day.

Pag. 47. It is directly affirmed, that she was for the most part, deprived of her naturall wit and understanding.

Pag. 52. She was one day transported besides her self in a Garden, and for the space of an hour (which by the Relation is called, a strong operation of God,) continued saying over and over, God doth put his Power in me, God doth put his Wisdome in me, and his Knowledge.

Pag. 54. &c. She often saw, and in some degree suf­fered (through fright, &c.) the pains of Hell. I know not at what time of her age; but it might be the first di­rect ecstasie she had, for ought I can gather by the rela­tion. She was, according to her own relation, [p. 59.] in a Cave, called S. Denys his Cave, because by tradition, S. Denys, with divers other Martyrs, had inhabited it by the space of two yeares; and therefore had in great reve­rence by the whole Convent. In that Cave being alone, (and let the Reader judge, whether that holy Cave alone, with the opinion they had of it, was not enough to put any melancholick maid, devoutly given, into an ecstasie:) she saw Heaven and Hell, and the Soul of Christ in its purity.

[Page 123]Pag. 75. She is yet reported to have been exalted higher: for that the Soul of Christ (who was said before to have drawn her Soul into his,) did draw her into an operation of the Holy Trinitie: in which operation she is said to have continued unto the end of her life. How this to be understood, must not be expected from me. All my care is, not to misrelate any thing, or to make it worse, by my translation, then I find it.

Pag. 91. God puts upon her, (as our Storie tells us,) the care of the affairs of France: which she did accept, and commend her self unto God at the same time.

Pag. 101. She foretold somewhat of her death, that it should not be a naturall death, nor by ordinary means. But it fell out otherwise, though the Storie doth endeavour to make it good: but in vain. For she died of a generall Consumption of the body, (the most naturall death that could happen to such a life,) which ended in a continuall Fever, with a kind of Lethargie, or caros: very violent at the last; and so made an end of her. It seems she did not think to die, when she did, as our Storie tells us, [p. 115.117.] which I suppose would tell us no more of that, then it must needs.

She had some strange sights before her death. As for example; that there is a plenitude of God in all things, even to the least Ant. which is very philosophicall; but not very easie to be understood by ordinary people, and more apt to be mistaken to some hereticall sense; as some­what was by the Manicheans, not much different.

These, (not to speak of her spirituall temptations, which were frequent and terrible, and some obscure inti­mations of Miracles; for which we will rather commend the ingenuity of the Relator, considering what is ordina­rily done by others, upon such occasions, then find fault:) these, I say, be the chief particulars, which her Storie doth afford: which as I propose to the learned Readers con­sideration; [Page 124] so shall I not, submitting to better judgements, stick in the mean time to declare mine own. Truely I do not see any cause to believe that in any of these many Vi­sions or Ecstasies, there was any thing at all supernaturall, either divine or diabolicall, more then is in every common disease: wherein we acknowledge as the hand of God al­wayes; so the ministrie of the Devil, if not alwayes, very often, as was before declared. I conceive them all, both Visions and Ecstasies, to have been the effect of pure me­lancholie; very agreeable to what hath happened unto o­ther melancholick persons, in other places. Whether I should blame the ignorance, or the superstition of them that had to do with her, or both, I know not: but I think they were to blame, and that she had ill luck to fall in­to such hands. They do well to make her amends what they can, after her death: but I think it had been more charitable, to have used some means for the cure of her melancholy, by which (with Gods blessing upon the means alwayes to be presupposed,) she might have been preserved in life. As for her expressions, of Christs draw­ing her soul into his, and the like; so agreeable, in effect, to those of the Platonists, and Arab Philosophers, the tearms only (Christ for God) changed: I have no suspi­cion for all that, that she was acquainted with them, nor with any secrets of that mysticall Theologie that came from them; but that naturally, according to the condition of her temper, she fell into those phansies, which some en­thusiastick Philosophers before, not by vertue of their Philosophy, but through distemper of their enthusiastick brains, had lighted upon.

I have expressed my self the more freely in this busi­nesse, not that I take any pleasure, or have any ambition at all, to oppose the judgement of others: which if I were ambitious to do, I could have found matter enough to bu­sie my self, long before this: but because I judged it a [Page 125] matter of great consequence, not only for the preservation of some lives, but of Truth, (more precious then many lives,) which hath in all Ages suffered by nothing more, then by pretended Enthusiasms; and of publick Peace, which hath often been disturbed by such, whether artifices, or mere mistakes.

But I have not yet done with my Theologia mystica: which being so proper to my subject, I must not passe it over superficially. The Reader that is not learned, will have patience if I desire to gratify them that are. Her­sentius his authorities for this kind of Divinitie, so much magnified by him, are all either Heathen Philo­sophers, (greatest opposers of Christianitie,) Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyrius, Iamblichus; or very late and in­considerable writers, Johannes Rusbrocius, Henricus Har­phius, Ludovicus Blosius, (or rather Thalerus,) and one Woman, Sancta Teresia: not one word out of any an­cient Father, (in that Chapter) Greek or Latine; not so much as out of S. Augustine, or Gregory the Great, or S. Bernard: who otherwise, of true Christian Raptures, proceeding from intent love and admiration, grounded not upon Ignorance and self-conceitednesse, but sound Knowledge and Pietie; might have afforded matter for a bigger volume, then that whole Discourse, with all that hath been written either by Dionysius (so called,) or any other of that Sect, comes too. But I will deal very inge­nuously with the Reader. There was one Maximus, in the dayes of Heraclius Emperour of Constantinople: of whom we are bound to speak with honour, because he suffered for the true Faith. Whether it were he, whose Greek Scholias are extant upon this Dionysius, is doubt­ed by some: but more probable that it is. This Maximus (besides other works of his, some extant, some not,) hath written a Mystagogia: which I suppose to be altogether of the same argument as this Mystica Theologia of Dio­nysius. [Page 126] It was published by David Hoeschelius, a lear­ned man, to whom we ow many other good books, but it hath not been my luck ever to see it. But though not that, yet I have seen and often read, sometimes with admira­tion, sometimes with indignation, another work of his, (not much known, I believe,) which he calleth his [...]: printed at Paris, be­sides later editions, very elegantly, by Guiliel. Morellius, an. Dom. 1560. fitted by remote allegoricall interpreta­tions of Scripture, for Christians; but written by him in imitation of Porphyrius, and other Heathens, their [...], as they call them; from whom also he hath taken some things verbatim. These indeed we shall find this mysti­call Theologie in its height, in divers places. I can easily believe that so holy a man, in his ordinary conversation, and so profound a Philosopher, as he shews himself by his writings, might make good use of such meditations, and elevations of thoughts; and yet keep himself within sobrietie. but that it is a dangerous book otherwise for ordinary capaci­ties, apt to turn all Religion and all Scripture (in weaker brains) into mere phansie, and *Wigelius, Stifelius, Jac. Behmius; and di­vers others of that countrie, mere Fana­ticks; as unto any sober man may appear by their Writings: some of which have been translated into English. But of them and their phrenfies, see more, if you desire it, in Christ. Becmanus (not to men­tion others,) his Exer­ercitationes Theologi­cae. Teutonick Chi­mericall extravagancies, I do, upon grounds of reason, as verily believe, as I do the former, charitably. I know not whether it be for the better, or for the worse: but sure I am, that his meaning is often mista­ken by the Latine Interpreter; where­of I shall give but one instance, be­cause of some further use that may be made of it. Centur. 2. [...]. [Page 127] His meaning is, according to the principles of this Divi­nitie, by him more at large explained in some former Aphorisms, that by this immediate, intimate Union with God, by which he sticks not to say, that the soul is actually Deified, all operations of the understanding do cease. The Interpreter quite contrarie: Mens immedia­tam erga Deum unionem adepta, totis viribus in id in­cumbit, ut intelligat & intelligatur. That which decei­ved him, are the words, [...] and [...], which so joyn­ed, he did not understand to be put, as often, figuratively, to intimate an absolute cessation of all understanding. So Gen. 31.29. either good or evil: where evil only was intended, properly. And Numb. 23.25. neither curse them at all, nor bless them at all: where cursing was extremely de­sired and endeavoured; and blessing only properly intended to be forbidden, And so I believe Matth. 12.14. three dayes and three nights, which hath so much troubled Ex­positors, should be understood: three nights added on­ly for the more emphaticall expression of three dayes. Three dayes, really and truly; (though not three full dayes;) as men are wont to understand dayes ordinarily, not figu­ratively; and therefore set out by their contraries also, the nights. But in Eunapius certainly, [...], is no more then, omnia humana contemnebat: whereas learned Hadr. Junius, translating, Delicias suas, & excruciantem se aegritudinem exuit, makes Eunapius clearly to contradict himself, who both before and afterwards, sets out Porphyrius, as plunged in deepest melancholie, and not likely to hold out much lon­ger, had not Plotinus come to his succour in time.

This mention of Eunapius puts me in mind of A­lypius that Pygmie Philosopher, who through continu­all contemplation (if we may believe the storie,) having reduced his bodie to almost nothing; Eunapius saith, (but there too mistaken by the Latine Interpreter,) that the [Page 128] saying of Plato was verified in him, That whereas the souls of ordinary men were placed in their bodies; the bo­dies of holy men and Philosophers were placed in their souls. But this is nothing to what we read of Ignatius Loyola, whose body was so transformed into soul, that he could lift and bear himself up in the air to a good height, without wings; as we shall find perchance in its proper place. For it was at his prayers only that he could do it, when he was at the height of the spi­rit, as my Author tells me.

But to return to Maximus, and what I intended of him. Although I honour his Sufferings, yet I do not think my self bound by that to approve his Doctrine. Neither do I think that Photius had much better opinion of that work, then I have; who plainly censureth it, as an abor­tive, or adulterinum foetum. (wherein the Latine Inter­preter, apparently swarving from the originall Greek, makes him say the contrary.) not that he doubted Maximus to be the Author; no more then he did of those [...]: concerning which he gives the Reader a large account before: but because he judged neither the one nor the other, (being both of a strain; those Aporemata and these [...]:) worthy of that Maximus, the Au­thor of those Centuriae, De Charitate: which he much commends, and deservedly. And why should not the au­thoritie of so many ancient Fathers, and many of them Martyrs too, as well as he; who because they neither practised it (though not unknown unto them, as excellent Philosophers, some of them,) themselves, this Mysticall Theologie I mean, nor any where in their writings com­mend it unto others, must needs be supposed to have con­demned it; why not their authoritie, say I, more conside­rable, then the authoritie of one or two, so long after, and so much inferiour unto them? But besides, how contrarie to the doctrine of best Shoolmen, I appeal to Thom. A­quinas, [Page 129] 2.2. quaestione 174. who there very solidly pro­veth and asserteth the excellencie of rationall intellectuall Christian knowledge, above all prophesy: to whom also that excellent Rabbi Ben Maimon, the Aquinas of the Rabbins, doth agree in divers places of his More Nevo­chim, making it (rationall intellectuall Divinitie) the highest degree of prophesie: who also hath a Chapter there (of very good use, to keep men from running themselves out of their right wits,) of moderation to be observed in Contemplation. I shall therefore conclude concerning this way of Theologie;

First, that as it hath its origine from heathen Philoso­phers, and by them recommended unto us, as the highest and most perfect way: so it is extremely derogatory to the Scriptures, and to the Doctrine of Christ, where no foot­step of it is to be seen; but contrarily, much against it, as it deprives a man of the use of Reason.

Secondly, that although it be granted, that some pro­found Philosophers, by the advantage of such and such a naturall Disposition, of a strong, well-settled and tem­per'd brain, &c. may make some use of it to their own content: yet to commend it to ordinary people, and to women especially, is to perswade them to madnesse; and to expose them to the illusions of the Devil, alwayes rea­die to take such advantages.

Thirdly, that the use of this Theologie, doth most pro­perly belong unto Jesuits, (which I would not have un­derstood of any truly pious and peaceable amongst them:) and Jesuited Politicians, whether they call themselves Lutherans, or Calvinists, or otherwise; who having de­signes pro re nata upon the lives of Kings and Princes, (or whoever else they be, whom they would have out of the way,) have no better way, when open force doth fail, to bring their designes to passe, then by the hands of such, whom they have brought up to this mysticall art. For [Page 130] what will not even a sober man do, upon a strong, whe­ther right or wrong, apprehension of Heaven or Hell? How much more those, who besides their common obli­gation of blind obedience, by long, forced, wild contem­plation▪ are become ecstaticall, that is, fitted for any de­sperate attempt?

Neither can I have any better opinion (in point of Sci­ences) of that Method, which of late years hath been proposed by some, and by many (whom Plutarch would not have thought very wise, for looking with more admi­ration upon fiery Meteors, and other apparitions of the Air, then ever they did upon the Sun, by whom we enjoy all that is comfortable in this World;) gladly entertain­ed. For my part, I never looked upon it as a New Me­thod, as to the main end of it: knowing that Numa Pom­pilius long before, to make his Lawes received as Oracles, did his best to perswade, that he did not come by them as other men did by theirs; but that they were the fruits of Caves, and retirednesse: not to speak of what hath been devised by severall Poets in that kind, to inhaunce their reputation. And it seems the Author did not altogether misse of his aim in that. But for the pretended end of it, to direct others; if he would have dealt ingenuously, he might in two or three lines, that had contained the names but of three or four herbs, have prescribed a farre shorter way. I meddle not with his abilities, what ever they were. I believe he saw much in the Mathematicks; and he might, in divers other things: though I would not have any man to rely upon his demonstrations, concerning either the being of a God, or the Immortalitie of the Soul. But his abilities I question not: his Method, having so much af­finitie with this Mysticall Theologie, against which I think too much cannot be said, I could not passe it without some censure. I am one, I confesse, that think reason should be highly valued by all creatures, that are natu­rally [Page 131] rationall. Neither do I think we need to seek the I­mage of God in man elsewhere, then in perfect Reason; such as he was created in. Holinesse and Righteousnesse were but fruits of it. Let others admire Witches and Ma­gicians, as much as they will; who by their art can bring them their lost precious things, and Jewels: I honour and admire a good Physician much more, who can (as Gods instrument) by the knowledge of nature, bring a man to his right wits again, when he hath lost them: and I tremble (homo sum, & humani à me nihil alienum puto:) when I think that one Mad man is enough to infect a whole Province. Somewhat to that purpose we have had alrea­dy: and I doubt, whether by this there would have been one sober man left in all Spain, had not the Alumbrados, or Illuminated sect, which also pretended much to Con­templation, and thereby to Ecstasies and mysticall unions, been suppressed in time.

Here I should have ended this Chapter, which hath ta­ken up, I believe, the greatest part of this whole Discourse. But I promised somewhat of Mahomet: I must acquit my self of that before. I have perused severall relations of Greek Authors, set out by Sylburgius, an. Dom. 1595, concerning the beginning of Mahomet. They all agree, that a naturall disease was his first inducement. Some call it a Palsie; but more, and, I believe, more truly, [...], that is, an epilepsie, or epilepticall distemper: of which he made that advantage, as to beget himself Di­vine authority. Now to such a disease, how naturally incidentall strange Visions and Apparitions are, by which the parties themselves, deeming their phansies and visi­ons, realities and truths, are often deceived; I appeal to former examples. I could have told of them too, that have thought books brought unto them by Angels, in their Ecstasies; and some such other things, which may come somewhat near to Mahomet's case. Now whether [Page 132] he might not be deceived at first, before he used other Arts and Impostures, the better to countenance his Phrensies, I propose it as a disputable matter. In point of Mahome­tisme, as to the horridnesse of the delusion, whether so or no, it is all one, I know. It makes it neither greater, nor lesse. Neither do I make any question, but that the Devil was a chief actor in the progresse of it. But when we shall consider with our selves seriously, what these begin­nings, that began with epilepticall Raptures and Ecstasies, and supposed revelations of Angels, and the like, came to afterwards; it would, it should, I am sure, (and to that end I mention him here,) make men the more warie, either how they give credit to such fits and revelations of others; or how themselves, by their ignorance or indiscretion, ex­pose themselves to delusion.

IN this Chapter we are to consider of the strange, but natural effects of Speech; and of the causes of such effects, both in them that speak, and in them that hear: such effects and such causes, as come within the compasse of Enthusiasme, according to the apprehensions and expressions of anci­ent Authors; which is the businesse of this Treatise. But I will begin with some observations concerning Speech in general: which though they belong not to Enthusiasme properly; yet may prove not altogether impertinent to our further enquiries, that may have more immediate relation unto it; and otherwise too not unacceptable, perchance, to the curious and philosophical Reader.

Few men, even they that consider of many other things, take notice what a rare Art speaking is; or so much as think of it, under the notion of an Art. The reason is, because they were very little when they learned it: and [Page 136] though it were not without much labour and striving; yet they had scarce wit enough to be sensible of it then, or at least, not memory enough now, to remember what they thought of it when so young. It is a curious speculation, to consider what instruments nature hath provided for that use; what is the proper use of every instrument; what resemblance those instruments have to some *See more be­low, in the 4. Particular: where, of Greg. Nyssen, Casse­rius, &c. musical instruments; what letters are formed by the tongue especially, which by the teeth, which by the roof of the mouth, nose, throat, lips, or otherwise; and by what concurrence, motions, flections and reflections, of such and such of those instru­ments, inwardly; and by what shapes, signes, and postures of the mouth, lips, and chinne, out­wardly, the whole businesse is managed.

There be many mysteries and secrets of nature belonging to this Art, very worthy to be known. But the use of this knowledge, is farre greater then the curiosity. For by the perfect knowledge of these things, those that are born deaf, and by consequent, naturally dumb, are taught to speak. Whereof a rare example, in the person of a Noble-man, was lately seen in Spain: of which many living in England, persons of worth and eminency, have been both eye and ear-witnesses. And for the better satisfaction, and benefit withall of posterity, a book was set out by him that was his master, under this title; Arte para ensennar de hablar los mudos: whereof some copies have been in En­gland. Neither could this dumb person only speak himself, but was able also to understand what was said by others, in such a language, and at such a distance. The like where­of (as to this last) hath been seen in England also, if I may credit the relation of two grave Divines: whereof the one affirmed concerning a man, the other concerning a woman, both, deaf and dumb; which neverthelesse at a certain di­stance, [Page 137] and by diligent observation of the motions of the mouth and face, could tell (and would readily answer to it by signs,) what was spoken unto them. But of the wo­man I was told particularly, that she could understand them only that were beardlesse: which is a very probable circumstance; as they can best judge, who not onely have studied the inward fabrick of the mouth, by which words, with aire, are immediately formed; but also the outward constitution of the mouth and face in general, consisting of so many several muscles, nerves, and what else ( [...], &c.) best known unto exact Anatomists: as I find them curiously set out and described by Galen in his books [...], in the fourth book, and elsewhere.

But that Spaniard, the Author of that book, was not the first that taught the deaf and dumb to speak: as may appear by these words of Franciscus Valesius, De sacra philosophia, cap. 3. Petrus Pontius monachus Sancti Bene­dicti, amicus meus, natos surdos (res mirabilis) docebat loqui, non alia arte, quam docens primum scribere, res ipsas digito primum indicando, quae characteribus illis signi­ficarentur; deinde ad motus linguae qui characteribus re­sponderent, provocando: that is, Petrus Pontius, a Benedi­ctine Monk, a friend of mine, was wont (a wonderful thing!) to teach men that were born dumb, to speak: which he did by no other Art, then first teaching them to write, first pointing at the things themselves with his fin­ger, that were expressed by such and such letters or characters; then using them to such motions of the tongue, which were answerable to those characters. Which words, though not many, may satisfie any man that hath judge­ment, concerning the possibility of the thing. Rodolphus Agricola, a man well known, and yet for the good use that may be made of his writings, well deserving to be yet better known unto all Scholars, affords unto us this notable ex­ample: [Page 138] Surdum vidi, Note: Rodolp. Agric. lib. 3. De In­ventione. saith he, &c. I my self have seen one deaf from his infancy, and consequently dumb, to have attained unto this by art, that whatsoever another did write, he was able to read and understand; and himself also, even as any other that can speak, whatsoever was in his mind, he could perfectly expresse by writing. So he. I believe this is he whom Ludovicus Vives, in his book De Anima, did intend: where, upon occasion of Aristotles noted axiome, that they that want the sense of hearing, are not capable of discipline, he hath these words: Quo magis miror, fuisse mutum & surdum natum, qui literas di­dicerit. Fides sit penes Rodolphum Agricolam, qui id memoriae prodidit, & se illum vidisse affirmat. though the expression (qui literas didicerit) be somewhat ambi­guous, and more likely to be construed of one that had at­tained to some learning, as learning is taken commonly for University learning, then of one that had learned to read and write only. However it is unquestionable, that he that had attained to that faculty of writing, to understand, and to be understood generally, as Agricola describeth this man, was very capable of further progresse; and not inca­pable I think, of any liberall Art, or Science, if further pains had been taken with him. But this is another way, by writing; not by bare observation of the instruments of speech, whether internal or external; concerning which our observation began. However this sheweth a possibility of the thing, by natural means: which granted, any other cause no lesse natural and probable may the sooner be believed.

But there is yet another use to be made of this know­ledge, which to some persons and occasions may be very considerable. It is not for the dumb, this that I mean: but for them that can speak; yet would be glad sometimes perchance, upon some speciall occasions, to know how [Page 139] they might speak, and be spoken unto at a convenient di­stance, without a tongue, or noise, or almost sign discern­able unto others. But this perchance may be but my phan­sie, and I shall not adventure many words upon it. But certainly the consideration of speech in generall (which I began with,) doth afford many both curious and usefull speculations; and is a speculation, which once so much pleased me, that I had begun a Diatriba, De ortu & natu­ra sermonis: which also, though not ended, was once half written out for the presse; but for want of an amanuensis, it went not further; and is not very likely now, so long after, ever to come to any thing. Yet I have been the more willing to mention these particulars, to excite some body else to undertake so plausible an argument, which may to many be both pleasing in the speculation, and profitable to many purposes. I have done with my Prologue, and shall now proceed to the main businesse.

There is not any thing more natural unto man, as he is a man, (that is a rational creature,) then Reason. Whatso­ever may seem natural unto man besides, (in this life,) some one or two not very considerable things, as laughing perchance, or weeping, excepted, belongeth unto brutes as well as unto man; and no part of man therefore, as man, properly. Speech is the interpreter, or minister of reason, that is, of rationall thoughts, or thoughts ingendred in and by a rational soul. Which according to their ob­ject may be distinguished into sensuall, civile, and intel­lectuall: but alwayes rationall, as they flow from a rationall cause or principle, which is the soul. Whence it is that brute beasts, though some may be taught to utter many words, and lines perchance; yet cannot be said, pro­perly, to speak, because they understand not, truly and re­ally, any thing that they say. Though some may be brought to some kind of practical, or experimental apprehension of what is spoken unto them; as a Horse, or a Dog may [Page 140] be ruled by some words, which (by common use of mans first institution,) shall be proper to the actions which they perform: yet even then they understand not those words, as words, but sounds only. From that subordination of speech unto reason it is, that the Grecians comprehend both (which neverthelesse doth cause ambiguity sometimes,) in one word, [...]. If therefore Reason be so natural unto man, and Speech unto Reason; it is no wonder, if as Rea­son is the inward principle, by which the actions of men are guided; so Speech be the most powerfull external instru­ment to the same end, in reference to others.

Rhetorick (or rhetorical speech,) is a speech dressed with certain devices and allurements, proper to please and to perswade. The use of such devices and allurements, is some­times good, by the advantage of some sensual delight, the more powerfull to inforce, or to insinuate somewhat that of it self is true, right, or reasonable. However, it is a very disputable point, whether bare speech, if well hand­led, be not sufficient, nay most available to perswade, in things of most weight. For those actions are best ground­ed, that are grounded upon judgement, upon which bare Speech hath most direct influence; as Rhetorick hath upon the Affections: and the fruits of a convicted judgement by calm reason, are likely to be more durable then those that are the effects of any passions, or affections, stirred up by rhetorical powers. But it is an ample subject, upon which Seneca is very copious, and in my judgement hath done very well; though judicious Ari­stotle in his Rhetoricks, Note: [...]. A [...]ist. Rhet. lib. 3. c. 1. in two words hath comprehended all that needeth to be said in that argument. But this yet, before I leave it; That the providence of God, for the pre­vention of all doubts and scruples, was great, in that he would not lay the foundation of the Christian Faith, as not in the force of armes, so neither of eloquence, and artificial [Page 141] speech; which is often insisted upon by S. Paul: as 1 Cor. Not with wisdome ( [...]: those men that were most ad­mired for their eloquence, whom we are to speak of, were anciently called [...].) of words or speech: ch. 7.17. Not with excellency of speech or of wisdome: ch. 11.1. Not with enticing words of mans wisdome: v. 4. Not in the words which mans wisdome teacheth: v. 13. of the same chapter, and elsewhere. All which, though most true, as would easily be demonstrated, if need were: yet it cannot be denyed, that S. Paul in some kind and upon some subjects, is as eloquent as ever man was; not inferior to Demosthenes (whom I have some reason to believe, that he had read very well:) or Aeschines, or any other anci­ently most admired. But this is by the way onely.

The chief things I propose to my self, as was before intimated, in this Chapter, and which I conceive most per­tinent to my undertaking, are these:

First, That divers ancient Orators did apprehend them­selves, and were so apprehended by divers others, to be inspired, or agitated by some higher power then bare nature could pretend unto.

Secondly, That the power of Oratory hath been such in many Ancients, as that it hath had enthusiastick operation upon others.

Thirdly, Whence that apprehension of inspiration might probably proceed.

But fourthly, and lastly, What causes truly natural, can be given of those wonderfull operations of Rhe­torick, which have been mistaken by many for super­natural.

I. I will not take advantage of the words, [...], or any other equivalent unto them: because often by Greek Authors used figuratively, where no real Enthu­siasme or supernaturall agitation, so farre at least as can be collected from the words, is intended. Aristotle in his [Page 142] Rhetoricks, hath the word [...], upon this argument, in one Chapter twice. Dionysius Longinus, a very great master of Rhetorick, (of whom Christians are bound to think the better, for his candid and ingenuous judgement of Moses his expressions about the Creation of the World; so contrary, and therefore the more considerable, to Galen his impertinent exceptions:) this Longinus, in that small book of his, as now extant, inscribed [...], hath many words to that purpose. As when he saith speaking of that kind of language, which when I was a Boy in the University,Note: Longinus [...]. ed. in quarto, Bafil. p. 7. Oxon. in octavo, cum Notis viri Cl. Guil. L. p. 11. was called strong lines; [...]. Many, men, saith he, whilst they strain their wits to find somewhat that is very extraordinary, and may relish of some rapture, or Enthusi­asme; they plainly rave, [or, play the fools,] and not ravish. The same Longinus again, speaking of the power of Rhetorick, in rhetoricall expressions: [...].Note: The English of these passages is not mate­rial; because tending only to shew the use of the word. See also at the end of 4. Particu­lar: of [...] &c. And again, p. 61. [...], &c. And again, pag. 69. [...]. And of Plato, p. 113. [...]: &c. It appears by those qualifications, [...] and [...], that he intended it only after a sort, as things may be compared, not really. Indeed Longinus, though a heathen by profession, yet was not very super­stitious; as may appear by this, that he durst challenge Homer, (upon whom especially all heathenish Theology was grounded,) though but a Poet, of Atheisme and grosse absurdity, for making his Gods to fight with men; and not only to fight, but receive wounds also. But Aristides [Page 143] on the other side, an excellent Orator, it cannot be denied, and rational enough in other things, but as very a bigot, as ever was, of a heathen; who phansied Gods in every dream, and tells us of so many wonderfull cures by noctur­nal sights and revelations; who gave credit to the very Gypsies, in telling of fortunes: he not only of himself parti­cularly, in his [...], speaks very posi­tively and peremptorily, as inspired by God, in his Ora­tions; (of which more afterwards:) but of Rhetorick in general, in his 1^a. contra Platonem, as positively and con­fidently maintaineth, not only that it is the gift of God, (which might very well be allowed;) as all other good and usefull things are; but also, if right and excellent, that it comes by immediate inspiration, as Oracles and Pro­phesies; without Study or Learning, or so much as Nature. Though indeed afterwards in the same long Oration, be­cause he would not be wanting to his profession in any kind, he takes in both Nature, and Art, or Learning too; and would have them to belong to Rhetorick, though not to all Orators, as he maintaineth of immediate inspiration. Such another as Aristides, for matter of superstition, but more dangerous for craft and subtilty, and a great Magi­cian too, if all be true which even by ancient Christians is recorded of him, was Apollonius, that wandring Philoso­pher; (opposed by ancient Heathens, who adscribed De­ity unto him, to Christ:) who being asked by the Gover­nor of Rome under Nero, [...], what was his profession;Note: Philostr. in vi­ta Apol. lib. 4. edit. Ald. qua­tern. d. 4. ini­tio pag. gave him this bold an­swer; [...], that is, Inspiration (by inspiration un­derstanding chiefly, as in all likelyhood, his perswasive and bewitching rhetorick, whereof he gave such proof in all places:) and how men should pray, and sacrifice unto the Gods; or, by what pray­ers and sacrifices the Gods are best served and pleased. But [Page 144] Apollonius was an extraordinary man, that cannot be de­nied: and it is not impossible but that he might be inspired indeed; but by what power, may appear by all his deeds and endeavours: of which Eusebius in his Treatise against Hierocles, that had written of him of purpose to preferre him before Christ, hath taken a brief survey, shewing great moderation (which is not ordinary,) in his Censures. Not to meddle then with such extraordinary men and examples: That it was a common opinion among the Scholars of his time, that Rhetorick and good lines came more by Enthu­siasme then otherwise, may appear by Quintilian; who having elsewhere described the phantastick, or rather phre­netick gesture and behaviour of divers, when they were to compose; in his tenth book and twelfth chapter, he hath these words: Ʋt possimus autem scribere etiam plura cele­rius, non exercitatio modo praestabit, in qua sine dubio multum est; sed etiam ratio: si non resupini spectantesque lectum, & cogitationem murmure agitantes, exspectave­rimus quid obveniat; sed quid res poscat, quid personam deceat, quod sit tempus, qui judicis animus, intuiti, hu­mano quodam modo accesserimus. This, I think, is the reading of most editions: which I will not warrant to be perfect; though more perfect, I believe, and correct, then that of Aldus his edition, which in this place, certainly, goes furthest from the true. A little labour perchance might help the businesse. My opinion is, that one, and but one word is wanting, which by reason of the affinity with the former, might very well excidere, or be passed over: as is very frequent in all Manuscripts. But since he may be understood without it, I will spare my further labour.

But it is well worthy our observation, that Seneca the Philosopher,Note: Senec. de tran­quil. cap. ult. so learned a man, doth seem to have been of that opinion too: Ne potest grande aliquid, & supra caeteros lo­qui, [Page 145] nisi mota mens. Cum vulgaria & solita contempsit, instinctuque sacro surrexit excelsior; tunc demum aliquid cociuit grandius ore mortali. Non potest sublime quicquam & in arduo positum contingere, quamdiu apud se est. De­sciscat oportet à solito, & efferatur, & mordeat fraenos, & rectorem rapiat suum, eoque ferat, quo per se timuisset *It is so in best edit. not, ascend. lest any should think it a mistake. escendere. Here is perfect Enthusiasme, with allusion to the Sibylls, and such others as were generally conceived to be possest. Yet, whether Seneca himself did believe so much, as his words seem to import, is a question: it being his manner, to be very high and tumid in his expressions; which neverthelesse a so­ber reader will not allwayes take to the utmost of what they will bear. But to his reasons and arguments. I be­lieve Aristotle, here quoted by Seneca, that all transcendent wits are subject to some mixture: neither do I believe that ever any great work, that was a fruit of the brain, and that begot admiration, was atchieved, but was also the fruit of some natural enthusiasme; if all elevation of the mind above ordinary thoughts and conceptions, (to which, among other helps, a generous contempt of the world doth much conduce;) must be so called. But if Seneca thought really, as Aristides did; what he chiefly grounded upon, shall be examined in due place. In the mean time, before I leave Seneca, the Reader may take notice of his incon­stancy; who, what he doth here so gloriously set out, doth not stick elsewhere to adscribe unto savagenesse and imma­nity: the proper temper of Tyrants, and bloud-thirsty men. Ac nescio quomodo, saith he, inge­ma immania & invisa, Note: Sen. 2. de Clem. c. 2. materia foecundio­ri, expresserunt sensus vehemontes & con­citatos. Nullam adhuc vocem audivi ex bono lenique animosam. For his Sensus vehementes & [...]ncitati, to be natural enough to such a disposition, we [Page 146] would not quarrel with him. But that no man, naturally good and mild, ever spake couragiously, or never was the author of any apophthegme, that resented of a gallant spi­rit: which is in effect as much as to say, that goodnesse or meeknesse, and a gallant spirit, are things incompatible: is a speech that resenteth little of either a Philosopher, or a sober man. The contrary, quite contrary to this, is divinely asserted, and proved by the Prince of Philosophers, divine Aristotle, both in *Arist. 3. Ethic. c. 8. Polit. lib. 9. c. 4. [...], &c. his Ethicks and Po­liticks. But we need not, in this, appeal to any other then Seneca himself, Epist. 85. Non est enim fortitudo &c. and else­where. We must therefore conclude, that Seneca in this place was, against reason, overswayed by his own genius, being a man of a violent spirit naturally, as appears by him in ma­ny places; and would have appeared much more, had not Reason and Philosophy moderated it: and that by ani­mosam vocem we must understand, rather violent and furious, such as he hath sometimes, then truly magnani­mous.

I think this is enough to my first point, to satisfie the reader not versed in ancient Authors, that it is so as I have said. Yet I must crave the liberty to consider of a notable passage in Plato. Not that I think it very needfull; nor perchance, if well understood, very pertinent: but because it may seem, by reason of the words, so pertinent unto some others that shall light upon it, that I may be blamed, for the considerablenesse of the Author, if I should leave it out. In a Dialogue of his, inscribed Menon, wherein he treateth of vertue, whether it may be taught, &c. in the end of it he hath these words: [...]. [Page 147] that is, As we rightly call all Oracle-Priests, Prophets, and Poets, divine; so may we as rightly style divine and di­vinely-agitated, all civil Orators: these also, whensoever they speak publickly, as they ought to speak, of great matters and with like eloquence, being certainly inspired by God, and plainly possest [at all such times,] as not understanding any thing themselves, of those things which they speak and deliver. Here first of all I will suppose, that the Reader not read in Plato, will stick at those words, as not understanding any thing, &c. It is true indeed, that as he compares them to Oracle-Priests and Prophets, who for the most part un­derstood not what they said themselves, the words may be thought pertinent enough: but how truly either Poets or Orators may be compared unto such, (if the comparison be so strictly pressed,) will be the question. Yes, rightly enough, according to Plato's doctrine; who distinguisheth (in that very Dialogue) between [...], right opinions, and [...], that is, the science or knowledge of right opinions, grounded upon cleare demonstrations of sound reason. Which untill a man have attained unto, Plato's opinion is, that whatsoever he doth, though right and just, according as his present opinion and apprehension leads him, yet he doth it ignorantly; and is still liable to do the contrary at another time, and to think that just and right, untill his opinion be turned into science. Though therefore, if things be strictly examined, there is great difference be­tween Poets, or Orators, and those Oracle-Priests and Prophets, in point of knowledge, generally; because these did not so much as grammatically understand, what they did utter: yet in point of true knowledge, which presup­poseth the consideration of causes, &c. they are said by Plato to know nothing, no more then those. But now to the point of Inspiration. Had not Plato so joyned Poets and civil Orators together; though it may be he did not intend an absolute conjunction of these neither, in all [Page 148] respects, no more then his similitude of Poets and Orators, with Oracle-Priests and Prophets, will hold in all respects; but had not he so joyned them, I should have made no question, but that his assertion herein had been very sound and orthodox: to wit, that when great States-men, Princes and Senators make publick speeches unto the people about great matters, as peace or warre, (for of such men and matters especially his words are to be understood, as ap­peareth by the persons by him mentioned before, Themi­stocles, Aristides and the like;) and such other things; that God, whose providence hath an influence, more or lesse, upon all events, doth move them to speak those things, which may conduce to those ends Himself hath forecast, or condescended unto: whether by permission only, or by approbation; to punish, or to blesse; or any other way, best known unto himself. Which is no more, I believe, then was intended by Solomon, when he saith, The preparations of the heart are in man: but the answer of the tongue is from the Lord: Proverb. 16. ver. 1. I vary somewhat from our English Translation, which herein varies much in sense (though the words seem to be the same,) from the best, both Translators and Expositors. But we have warrant enough from the ninth verse, where the same thing in other words is repeated, and well expres­sed, there, in our English; A mans heart deviseth his way: but the Lord directeth his steps. But I have done with Plato.

II. Our second point is, a consideration of the efficacy of ancient Rhetorick. I will not insist upon Demagogie, so called anciently, though it be the chiefest, and almost only Oratory in most places, either used or desired. But I will not meddle with it, because it may be conceived, that divers other things, in such matters of State and Govern­ment, might concurre to produce those bewitching effects, for which it became so infamous, where most used. I [Page 149] remember a witty passage (if I may so farre digresse,) in Thucydides, where an ancient Orator gives this character of the Athenians, Note: Thucyd. Hist. lib. 3. (Athens being the place where Rhetorick had its first birth, and was brought to an height greater then it ever had in any other place,) that they were a people, that did hear with their eyes, and see with their ears: meaning thereby, that they gave ordinarily, in matters of greatest concernment, more credit to the smooth bewitching language of their Orators and Demagogues, being led by them to many actions contrary to all sense and reason, yea and their own proper interest; then they gave to their own eyes, which otherwise, if not so mightily overswayed and clouded by their eares, would easily have discerned the truth of things, and their own folly. But if that were not worth a digression, this now to be added may, perchance: that the Greek Scholiast, upon that very place, (who by some learned men is thought very ancient:) hath a character of the Athenians, which agrees ver­batim with that of S. Luke's, Acts 17. ver. 21. [...].

I will confine my self, as near as I can, to such examples and instances, where nothing but bare language, all other interests laid aside, (nay sometimes bare language, against all other interests,) can be suspected to have been operative. Neither shall I, for the same reason, insist upon some notable effects of some philosophical Discourses, by which some extremely vicious in their lives, were suddenly reclaimed, and so much changed, as that they became great examples of vertue to all after-ages. We could produce the testi­monies of ancient Fathers of the Church, as well as of hea­then Writers for it, if need were. But I should do true Philosophy much wrong, to adscribe that unto Rhe­torick, which was her proper work, though not with­out some Rhetorick perchance. I shall rather say with [Page 150] Seneca, Note: Sen. Epist. 108. Rapuit illos, instigavitque re­rum pulchritudo, non verborum inanium sonitus; that is, Not the sound of vain [or empty] words, but the excellency of the matter delivered by those words, was it that wrought upon them so powerfully. who never­thelesse shews very well afterwards the good use of skil­full composure, as we shall in the progresse of this Dis­course, have occasion to shew more at large. That we may keep our selves therefore within the bounds of Rheto­rick, and yet not such Rhetorick neither, that should be verborum inanium sonitus; but such, wherein all artificiall ornaments of good language are most eminent; we will pitch upon them especially, whose very profession and pro­per character, by which they were known from others, whether Philosophers or Orators, was [...], that is, ostentation; and their end, (as themselves professed,) and work, in reference to others, [...], amazement. And these were the [...], or Sophists, then called, as by others commonly, so by themselves; who thought that title more honorable, then that of either Orator, or Philosopher: and in very deed, raised it to that height of estimation, under some Emperours, that even Princes and Noble-men were ambi­tious of it themselves; and thought it no disparagement to their greatnesse, to seek unto them that were such really, for their friendship, and to repair to their Schools and O­ratories, to be their Auditors.

But before I speak of them, because my subject is Rhe­torical Enthusiasme in general, I must not do those fa­mous, and truly incomparable Orators (for no Age we know of, ever brought forth the like, or will in haste, pro­bably:) Demosthenes and Cicero, that wrong, as to passe them in silence. For Demosthenes, I shall say no more of him, neither need I am sure, then this, that Dionysius Habicarnasseus, a man of great abilities himself in point of eloquence, and of great judgement (his chiefest praise, [Page 151] and profession) to judge of the abilities of others, rather severe, then favorable in most of his Censures, doth very so­berly deliver and protest of himself, that when he did set himself to read any of Demosthenes his Orations, he did plainly [...]: that is,Note: Dion. Halicarn. [...]. that he was really besides himself, being filled with strange passions, and a­mazement, not able to keep one place, nor knowing what he did, or how to expresse himself. Whereby, saith he, we may guesse how those of his time, that heard him, and were interested themselves in those businesses, (the subject of those Orations,) were affected: when the bare reading hath such operation upon us, so little concerned in them, and so long after. But may my Reader ask, perchance, Will the reading of Demosthenes work the like now, upon e­very one that reads him, in his own language; or did then, in those dayes, when this Dionysius wrote, as it did upon him? No; it did not, I believe, not even then; nor will now, certainly. For I have been present at admirable ra­vishing musick, as I have thought, and most others that were there; and yet have heard some then and there also present professe, that they were not at all affected with it: who neverthelesse, did also professe to be much delighted with some other kind. And he that should set a three-peny Bauble, in comparison, varnished with many curious colours, set out with gold and silver; and some old de­cayed piece, of some ancient Carver, Painter, or Statuary, of great fame and reputation; both these before some Country-man, or any other not skilfull: it is a great chance, if the Bauble be not preferred before the other, though per­chance by men of judgement deemed invaluable; and de facto purchased at a great rate. This may be one reason why all men are not equally affected with such incompa­rable pieces: but we shall have more of that, before we have done with this Chapter. However, though not all [Page 152] equally that heard him, neither, I believe; yet certain it is by the testimony of all Histories, that most that heard him when he lived, after they had heard him a while, would be so affected with it, that they had not power of themselves, but were carried by him whether he would, and forced to do many things against their own judgements and resolu­tions: as Aeschynes, his great enemy and profest antago­nist, doth himself acknowledge; who therefore doth plain­ly charge him of no lesse then [...], that is, Sorcery, or Enchantment, but yet such Enchantment, as he doth ac­knowledge merely to proceed from the excellency of his Language, and artificial Composure. As for Cicero, of whom judicious Quintilian doth passe this judgement,Note: Quintil. lib. 10. c. 1. (which was Pliny the later his judgement also, and of all the learned Ancients:) that he may think well of his own proficiency, who begins to relish Cicero above all other Authors; yet for all that, is very fearfull to equal him to Demosthenes: of him, besides what he writes of himself, that not only the parties themselves accused by him, when they should have spoken for themselves, but even their Ad­vocates, though bold enough, as approved and exercised O­rators otherwise, have been struck by his Oratory into such amazement,Note: Cic. in Oratore. that they could not speak one word; in so much, that some complained openly, venenis ereptam sibi memo­riam, that they were really bewitched: I shall content my self, and my reader, I hope, with a relation that I find in Plutarch, (though not upon his own credit,Note: Plut. in vita Cic. but upon common fame,) which is this. In the Civil warres between Caesar and Pompeius, among many others of the better sort that had followed Pompey, one was Ligarius: who not only had followed Pompey, but stuck to his party after his death, to the very last. In so much that Caesar, though [Page 153] (as naturally very clement) he had pardoned and restored many others, yet was resolved concerning Ligarius, and had already been heard to speak of him, as of a condemned man, before ever Cicero appeared to his defence. However, partly out of respect to his person, and partly good opinion of his parts, he was willing to hear what Cicero could say. But when he had begun, and was now pretty well entered in the businesse, using his best art, as, by pathetical ex­pressions, and commemorations of those sad times, and doubtfull events of fiercest encounters, and otherwise, to move; so, to insinuate, by graceful words: Caesar was so affected, that his very face suffering many changes in a little time, sufficiently bewrayed the inward commotion of his soul: untill at last, passion and amazement had so wholly possest him, that his whole body began to tremble; so that he let some papers fall to the ground out of his hands, because he was not able to hold them. and in con­clusion, Cicero had no sooner done speaking, then Caesar, without any further deliberation, acquitted him for whom he had spoken.

Well; of Demosthenes and Cicero, so famous in all Ages, and so much admired by all the best Wits of all A­ges, happily so much as we have said, may passe without any great difficultie: but now we come to the Sophistae; of whose profession generally, (having no other end, most of them, but the praise and admiration of the people;) I professe my self to have little better opinion, then of or­dinary Jugglers and Mountebanks. Of such to tell the world in what admiration they have been anciently, and what wonders they did among men, with their smooth and voluble tongues; although I shall tell nothing but upon good ground, and what I my self believe to be true; yet I do not almost know how to expect from others, not versed in ancient Authors, that I should be believed: neither in­deed can I write my self such things, without some indigna­tion [Page 154] and reluctancy, out of a deep sense and commiseration of the vanity of man: whether we consider the Sophistae themselves and their performances; or those that were so readily bewitched by their rhetorick, and so set upon their admiration, for what they performed. But I hope, and upon that hope I take these paines, that the benefit unto the Reader may be considerable, when we come to the consideration of the causes, by the understanding whereof much error and delusion, very frequent in the world, may be prevented.

The first of the profession was one Gorgias, who lived when Plato lived. We shall begin with him, and end with him too, as to particular instances, for ought I know: since that by him, (who as he was first in time, so in credit, in all after-Ages;) may all the rest of that sect be sufficiently known. This Gorgias, being a man of excellent naturall parts him­self, observing how much credit one Prodicus, of his time, had got with his tongue, going up and down the countrey, from town to town, and from village to village, with no other passe, nor ware, then somewhat (whether in paper, or memorie,) he had devised and composed at home by way of exhortation to men, to embrace vertue rather then pleasure, by the example of Hercules, (the common talk of all men and women in those dayes,) somewhat drama­tically and pithily set out; which although it were alwayes, and every where, but one and the same subject, yet was entertained every where with great concourse of people, and begot him great love and fame, both farre and near: this Gorgias observing, was thereby much incouraged to apply himself to the study of eloquent and readie language; and besides continual exercises, which much improved his naturall abilities, was very happy in devising severall schemes and figures of Rhetorick, that had not been thought of before: though later ages, whether more exact, or more nice, did not approve of all his inventions; as by Longinus, [Page 155] Hermogenes, and other masters of that Art, may appear. But whatever later Ages thought of him, he sped so well in his own, that incouraged by former successe, he adven­tured at last to shew himself in the greatest set, or solemn assembly of people, that I think ever was in any part of the world; and that was at the Olympick Games, solem­nized by concourse of almost all Nations, in a place of Greece, every fifth year: from whence also the noblest Com­putation of time, (among heathens,) commonly called the Olympiads, had its origine. There Gorgias appeared among others, that came to make themselves known, and to get immortall honour by their unmatchable performan­ces. And he appeared not only in, and with set and pre­meditated speeches; for which neverthelesse, he got such applause, as if he had been the God of Eloquence himself, rather then an eloquent man: but also, which had never been known before, offered himself publickly to speak rea­dily, without any preparation or meditation at all, of any subject, or argument, that should be proposed unto him by any man. From that place and time, Gorgias departed so glorious, that it might have been thought altogether impos­sible to make his fame greater in the world, then it was. Yet he got some increase of honour afterwards, when his Statue was made, and erected in Apollo's Temple, of pure gold, for a Speech that he had made at one of the Pythian Solemnities: and again, when the Athenians, for a reward of divers Speeches which he had uttered there, whether by Decree, or a voluntary concurrence of affections, all such dayes wherein he had spoken publickly, they called them holy dayes; and all Speeches by him uttered, they called [...], that is, Tapers or Torches: burning Torches being a thing sacred among them in those dayes, and used (though at noon-day) in some of their greatest festivalls; which from that use, as Harpocration in his Dictionarie, and others teach, were called [...]. I do not ex­pect [Page 156] it should be believed that all Sophists since Gorgias, were men of such either merits, or fame, as he was. I have already given him the preeminence, as of time, so of repu­tation. I know not any after him, that came to that height of fame: though I know of some, men of great fame too, since him, and of the same profession as he was, that imputed his fame to his luck, (which wise *Ecclesiast. ch. 9. v. 11. but time and chance: by which words what is to be understood, hath been shew­ed elsewhere. Solomon tells us, hath more power in the world, then merit:) more then to his worth. So Aelianus, a man of elaborate eloquence, in that Sophisticall way, doth somewhere judge of him, I am sure. However, there were Sophists since that first, many, that attained to so much reputation by their Eloquence, as to be admired every where for it, and to draw men after them, even great ones, by it; and by their favour, to be admitted into places of great trust and authoritie. But I shall avoid to be longer upon this particular, then I must needs: I have given some reason for it already; and another reason is, because one Cresollius, a Jesuite, hath taken great pains upon that sub­ject, in a book entituled, Theatrum veterum Rhetorum, &c. printed at Paris, 1620. wherein he doth prosecute that argument of the Sophists, and all things belonging un­to them; their beginning, their credit, their wayes, their faults, and the like, out of ancient Greek and Latine Au­thors, with great diligence. Some of those particulars, that may be most considerable to our purpose, we shall further insist upon; but no further then to make use of them, either now, or afterwards.

First, for the subject of their speeches; it was various and voluntarie. Sometimes the praises of Gods, or Men; and sometimes of Townes, or Countries; yea of Birds, as of a Parrot, or a Peacock. Sometimes, exhortations to Vertue; the commendation of Temperance, Justice, Sobri­etie, [Page 157] and the like. Sometimes pleasant tales, or fables: any thing, wherein they might shew their wit and eloquence; their end, (I speak of the generality,) being nothing else, but to gain credit unto themselves: as the end of their Au­ditors, what ever was the subject, was delight and plea­sure.

Now for that facultie of theirs of extemporary speaking upon any subject, it was their common profession, that is most certain: and it was accordingly performed by many of them, with singular dexterity, to the great amazement of all their Auditors. There be in ancient Authors many proofs and examples of it. I remember I have read some­where, that Callisthenes, whom some call Sophist, some, Philosopher, being invited at a great Feast made by Alex­ander the Great, to say somewhat in the commendation of the Macedonians; performed it so gallantly, that he got great praise from all the company. But Alexander, who it seems was willing to try him further, and bare him no very good will; and perchance, suspected withall, that he came prepared; excepting, that it was no very hard task for any ordinary Orator to be fluent upon such a subject; if therefore he would give certain proofs of his abilities in that kind, his way would be, to dispraise the said Macedonians as fluently: Callisthenes undertook it, and performed it so effectually, (for which his discretion was not commend­ed by all men;) that though his abilities were admired, yet his person grew hatefull among the Macedonians for it, and the more he was admired, the lesse thanks he got for his pains. The Tarsenses of Asia, among the rest, as they are by Ancients for their love to learning in generall, so, particularly noted to have excelled in this facultie: [...], that they could extend themselves without bounds upon a suddain, upon any subject that was given them: as Stra­bo, that faithfull Historian and Geographer, witnesseth. [Page 158] And that, not in prose only, but in verse also, [...], as the same Author speaketh; that is, as men speaking by divine instinct, or, inspired by the God of Poe­trie. Strabo, Geograph. lib. 14. In Aulus Gellius also (lib. 9. cap. 15.) we have an example of a confident youth, (as indeed it is most given to such to be confident:) who not content with the applause of his ordinary light Auditorie, would needs make shew of his abilities in point of extemporary speaking upon any controverted point that should be proposed, before some that were well able to dis­cern between matter and words, shadow and substance: a thing, even in those dayes, rare enough. Whereupon a con­troversie (as they called them) being proposed, he present­ly fell to work with great volubilitie of tongue: for which as he was much applauded and admired by his common Auditours; so from them that could judge he got this te­stimony, that without controversie (adolescens sine contro­versia disertus, in my Author:) he was an able and elo­quent speaker: that is, one that could say much, very rea­dily and fluently; but pertinently, and to the purpose, not at all.

But that which moveth me more then all this, to believe that great matters in this kind were performed by many Sophists of old, according to their profession, is, that I find even Quintilian, Note: Quintilian. See more below, to­wards the end of this Chapter. a sober, solid man, to make this a chief end and fruit of long pains and exercises in the art of Rhetorick; to attain to such a facultie, as to be able upon any suddain occasion to speak pertinently, with­out any premeditation. Which being so rare a thing in our dayes, that a man, if he can utter any thing, which may seem to be extempore; though perchance it do but seem so, and that it be performed but very meanly; is by many, (who therefore upon that account, swallow down pure non-sense sometimes, with better content, then they will [Page 159] hear much better and more profitable matter, that is deli­vered with some studie and premeditation:) by many deemed, I say, no lesse then inspired: this would make a man suspect, that as a decay of bodies is maintained by many in this elder age of the world; so, probably, of wits must be granted. But if the matter be well consider'd of, I think it may be granted that the Ancients farre ex­ceeded us in this facultie; but yet not so much through any excesse of Wit, as of Industrie. Who is it of a thousand, or a million, that could take the pains, or scarce believe the relation of the pains that Demosthenes took, before he came to that perfection, that made him so famous? Or who would believe, were it not so certainly attested, that Noble-men and Senators of Rome, in the greatest heat of the Civill warres, could be at leisure to declame by turnes (for want of reall opportunities in that confusion of time,) in their Halls, as Boyes do in Schools and Universities; for fear that through the discontinuance of some months or years, they should loose that facultie, of speaking rea­dily, which long studie (for the most of them,) and con­stant practise, had made them masters of? But besides all this, it may be considered, (is very considerable, I am sure;) that these eloquent men had no strange tongue to learn; or if any, not above one at most: but only, to perfect themselves in the use of their mother-tongue. Whereas now no man can pretend to learning, or very difficultly, that doth not understand two or three tongues, besides that which is naturall unto him: not because learning it self doth consist in the knowledge of tongues more now, then it did in those dayes; but because neither of those tongues, then in common use, are naturall now unto any people: the one whereof is now become the common tongue of all Na­tions, (for this part of the world,) unto such as are Scho­lars; the other, though not so common, yet not lesse, or more necessary, to make a Scholar, as the proper tongue, by [Page 160] reason of the Authors that have written in it, of all Arts and Sciences; and without which best books cannot be read, if not translated; (as to this day very many are not:) or if translated, few so translated, as to afford the tenth part of that either pleasure, or profit, which they will in their own language. Besides that some are bound by their profession to endeavour the knowledge of some tongues; as all Divines, of the Greek and Hebrew, because of the Bible, or Rule of Faith, written in those two languages: for the reading of which in its proper language, there is the same reason, as for the reading of other books in their own, as to matter of content, or benefit; but much more reason in point of conscience, if a man shall think himself bound, as some may, to make use of his own eyes, that God hath given him, the better to satisfie himself and o­thers, in matters of such trust and consequence; then for want of willingnesse to take pains, to depend altogether on the skill and fidelitie of others.

With this facultie of extemporary speaking, I find some­what in Synesius, that hath great affinitie, and deserveth no lesse admiration. In his Dio, that excellent piece, once be­fore commended, but well deserving to be commended more then once, he tells us, at the later end of it, of a way that he had, to exercise his wit and invention, often by him practised. He would take a book; some rhetoricall piece, philosophicall discourse, or the like; read in it a pretty while; then upon a suddain shut his eyes, or turn them another way, and yet still continue his reading: that is, at the same instant invent and utter somewhat, that might be proper to the subject, and so coherent to that which he had read, that no bodie (by the style, or matter) could judge other­wise, but that he was still reading. It is likely that he often practised it by himself, before he adventured to do it be­fore others: but he saith he did it often before others; and that his extemporary conceptions were often applauded, [Page 161] and preferred by his Auditors, who knew nothing of it, be­fore that which he had really read. Nay more then that, (which indeed may very properly be referred to some kind of enthusiasme:) that what he so supplied by his extempo­rary wit, did sometimes prove to be the very same that he found afterwards in the book. I know, no man is bound to believe him, upon his own testimony concerning himself; neither shall I easily charge any man of infidelity, that pro­fesseth he doth not. However, I have that opinion of the man, of his uprightnesse and sincerity, besides his learning, and that apprehension, upon some grounds, of the possibi­lity of the thing; that I shall not be affraid to professe my opinion to the contrary, that I do believe him. But here a­gain, not to upbraid any man for his good will, but to warn the Reader, that may be the better for it; I must wish that Synesius were generally, but in this his Dio especi­ally, better translated into Latine, (though I could almost wish, that there had never been any translations made of any such Greek book:) then it is by Petavius the Jesuite. At the very entrance of this discourse of Synesius of this his kind of reading, he translates [...], probationes rationis expertes: which is very absurd. For by it Greek Authors understand such external proofs or evidences, whe­ther divine, as Oracles, or civile, as Witnesses, as admit of no Rhetorick, or reasoning: by Aristotle, Quintilian, and o­ther masters of that Art, called [...]. Which may be rendred (as by Tully somewhere) artis expertes, well enough; because easily understood, as opposed to artificiall: but not [...], in this sense, rationis expertes; which is commonly understood of brutes, in opposition to those creatures which are rationall, or ratione utentes, as Cicero speaketh. However, I like better, even here, Quintilian's expression, inartificiales; not so elegant perchance, but more clear. So before, in this very book, [...], &c. [...], is not, cujus nulla ratio adferri [Page 162] queat; but a Law set out without any ratiocination, to in­duce men from the reasonablenesse or equity of it, to obe­dience; but by way of bare command, and authoritie, though never so just, and reasonable otherwise: by Seneca, Plutarch, and other Ancients observed to be the proper style of Laws, and which doth best become them. And therefore, where few lines after that first passage, Synesius faith, [...] ▪ it should not have been translated, ut lex in orationem, but, in rationem mutetur. But here again, when Synesius saith, [...]: how absurdly is [...] translated calamitas? Besides what learned men have noted of the originall use of the word, it is so obvious in the contrary sense, (I will appeal but to Isocrates, a very plain Author, in his Oration to Philip:) and the coherence in this place, so contrary to that other; as a man would admire how any man could so mistake. And this I speak of the use and signification of the word, which is obvious and known. But there is some­what more proper & particular, in the use of it in this place, as it is applied unto books by Synesius, which I shall not now insist upon. Yet I would not be so unkind to Petavius, as he hath been to some, that deserved better respect at his hands. His translation of Synesius, for the most part, is ele­gant and good enough. I wish there were none worse. But I would have no man to trust to it in obscure places; seeing that in clear and plain he doth often mistake. But I am out of my generall subject and scope, to which I must return: though I cannot call that a digression properly, to which the prosecution of my first subject hath so naturally led me.

III. We are now to consider of the cause, or causes, first of the opinion, these, whether Orators or Sophists, had of themselves, as inspired: then, of the effects their Rhe­torick did produce upon others. In the first point I shall [Page 163] not be long, because, I shall therein but anticipate the consi­deration of the causes of Enthusiasme in generall, for which we reserve a particular chapter at the end, where this par­ticular cause shall come in again among others: though here so farre anticipated of purpose, (and care shall be ta­ken, that we shall repeat as little as may be:) to give the more light to the things here to be handled and delivered. Briefly then: A Heat, a fervent Heat, a Fire; which pow­erfull Orators found in themselves, not at the uttering, though then greatest, but upon another consideration; but in conceiving and composing their speeches; so gene­rally observed and acknowledged, that some have thought, that no other art or thing was necessary to make a perfect Orator: that Heat, that fervent Heat, that Fire, hath been the ignis fatuus, we say, that hath infatuated many Speak­ers into that opinion of divine Inspiration. Ardor and Impetus, are the words used by Latine Authors to this purpose. Nulla me ingenii, sed magna vis animi inflam­mat, ut me ipse non teneam; saith Cicero of himself. But this indeed he speaks not of all composition in generall, but of such as is intended properly to move compassion. How­ever, he hath the word ardor elsewhere, upon other occasi­ons, often enough. Aristides calls it [...], a fire: [...]; He compares it to that heat, by which Souldiers at the first joyning of the battel, are usually car­ried, and inflamed, beyond all sense of death and danger: of which in its proper place. And few lines after: [...]. Here we have two words: [...], heat; and [...], fire. Now according to Hippocrates, to whose wri­tings Aristotle was much beholding,Note: Hippocr. [...]: or as others more probably, [...]: initio libri. not only whatsoever doth rule and govern in man, called Wit, Judgement, Wisdome, or whatever else, is a heat, or fire: ( [...] [Page 164] [...] &c.) but even God himself is [...], heat: [...]. It is not therefore so much to be wondered, that heathens should mistake herein; as that such a one as Ben Maimon, a man so skilfull in the Law of God, and so profound a Philosopher, should not distinguish between that influen­tia divina, or that ignis ardens, that burning fire, that in­spired, or inflamed, if you will, holy Prophets, as Jeremie and others; and that partly naturall, and partly supernatu­rall (we shall explain our selves more fully afterwards, in some other chapter:) heat, or fire, common, or incidental at least, unto all men by nature, by which Arts and Scien­ces have been brought forth to light and perfection; nay all Books in generall▪ Note: More Nev. lib. 2. c. 37. (for so he teacheth,) by all men written and composed. Just so Philo Judaeus, a man of the same race, (but much more ancient,Note: Phil. Jud. De migrat. Abrah.) and worth, in his kind; because sometimes when he purposed to compose somewhat, though he earnestly (he saith) endeavoured it, and thought himself suffci­ently prepared, nothing would come; and at other times he found himself so full and fluent, that he could not hold himself, but was as it were transported by the vehe­mencie of his operative wit and phansie, so that he would even forget himself, and the place where he was: he deem­ed this a sufficient ground, to think himself immediately in­spired by a higher power.

I have met with an observation in Ribera the Jesuite; as considerable a man, for what he hath done upon the Scri­ptures, as most of that profession. I do not like his words, though I believe his meaning is right enough. His words are:Note: Ribera in Com. in Hos. cap. 5. Ita et aliarum, rerum, sive bonarum, sive malarum, spiritus dicuntur; ut spiri­tus [Page 165] zelotypiae, avaritiae, superbiae: qui solet Latinorum con­suetudine, ardor animi dici, &c. That the word spirit in the Scripture is adscribed to divers evils, as his effects, (whe­ther by immediate operation, suggestion, ministerie, or otherwise,) who amongst other names, is styled sometimes, the Evil Spirit, I know: but that when any good things are adscribed to the spirit, the same is meant, which by La­tine Poets (for out of them doth Ribera produce his ex­amples;) is designed by this word ardor, or ardor animi, I do not know how it can be made good; is somewhat am­biguous, I am sure. Neither indeed do I mention it as an error in the man; but of his expression only, which by some other may be mistaken for his meaning. But if a man will make an observation upon words and language, he might further observe, that Heathens did not only use the word ardor, to expresse their heat in this kind; but even the word Spirit. So Ovid: At sacri vates, &c. Sedibus aetheriis spiritus ille venit. And again; Sic ubi mota calent sacro mea pectora thyrso; Altior humano spiritus ille malo est. And this spirit is no lesse then a very God unto him, else­where. Est Deus in nobis &c. as afterwards, in its proper place, out of him, or some other of greater authoritie then he, shall be declared. But we give it place here, be­cause this ardor, heat, or spirit, that possesseth Orators and Poets, yea Souldiers and others, was by divers heathens deemed but one and the same, in its nature, though work­ing so differently, as hereafter shall be shewed. Now on the other side, that ardor mentis is sometimes used by Chri­stian Writers for spiritus sanctus, is observable too: but we keep it for another place. However, I think that ex­pression very improper, and dangerous. And whereas the word [...], or zeal, according to the Scriptures, is often­times an effect of the holy Spirit; but often too, according to the same Scriptures, of the evil: as for example, 1 Cor. 3.3. 2 Cor. 12.20. and elsewhere, frequently: In all [Page 166] such places, I wish the word zeal had been left in the translations, as well as in other places, where used in the best sense; that every reader might have understood that [...], zeal, or fervent heat, in desires and prosecutions, is of it self no more to true godlinesse and religion, then a good voice, or an eloquent tongue, or any thing else of the same kind; which being natural, if it be sanctified by Grace, or some degrees of Grace, and good intentions, may be called [...], (as Rom. 10.2. the Apostle speaketh;) that is, a zeal of God, or rather, for God, as [...] (John 2.17,) zeal for the house: but not absolutely good and godly, for all that; yea sometimes very pernicious, (Philip. 3.6. and John 16.2.) untill it be guided by a true light, that is, by sound and orthodox principles: but if, as very commonly, the instrument of carnal ends and affections, and misguided withall by false doctrine, then [...], or [...], a devillish zeal, as S. James teacheth chapter 3.14, 15. Now for the spirit of God, or true godlinesse, what be the effects and properties of it; no man needs to mistake, that will, and can read the Scriptures, without either prejudice, or partiality. S. James is plain enough in that very place: but S. Paul more copious and emphatical, upon the same subject, 1 Cor. 13. and elsewhere. So much here of this ardor, or heat, as the cause of Rhetori­cal Enthusiasme. But being a generall cause, we shall have occasion to speak of it again, which makes us here shorter upon it.

IV. Now for the causes of those wonderfull effects of Rhetorick, (our fourth and last particular,) such as can be given, that are merely natural; before we enter into that enquiry, we must lay down by way of foundation, or ne­cessary supposition, that that which so much affected the generality, or greater part of Auditors, when those Ora­tors and Sophists shewed themselves publickly, was not the matter it self, that was treated of, or rerum ipsarum pul­chritudo, [Page 167] as we had it before out of Seneca: but somewhat else, whatsoever it was. I said the generality, or greater part, in that state of corruption, as hath been in all places, ever since Adam's fall. For otherwise, why [...], that is, sound reason, well delivered, should be powerfull with all, or most men, no further reason need to be given, (as at the beginning of this Chaper was observed,) then this, That man is a creature naturally rational. But it is very absurd, in my judgement, that is, much against reason, to believe that such a one as Nero, living as he did, and doing what he did; after he had killed his own Mother, in omnes libi­dines effusus, saith Tacitus of him; (I forbear more par­ticulars, because his name is sufficiently known:) should relish any sober discourse, as either of Justice, Temperance, or Clemency, or the like, for the matter it self: who never­thelesse in the heat and height of all his Cruelties, and Vil­lanies, sapientiae doctoribus tempus impartiebat post epulas, as the same Tacitus doth record; that is, was wont after meals, to spend some of his time, to hear the exhortations of Philosophers. Or that such a one as Dionysius the Ty­rant, as of him by Plutarch in the life of Timoleon, ( [...], &c.) is recorded, should do the same. Or in case it should be supposed of Nero, and such as he, that he had some politick end in it; (which neverthelesse of either of these two, all circumstan­ces well weighed, I think more plausible, then true:) yet, that either the great ones of Rome, rich Citizens, who had the estates of Princes, and their Ladies, in the corruptest time of that Commonweal, should be so studious to get to themselves some domestick Philosopher, one or more, that had fluent tongues, and hear their [...] or Discourses, so willingly, which were almost nothing else but of vertue, and the commendations of a sober life: or that the meanest of Rome, poor Shop-keepers, and Tradesmen, that lived by their dayly labour, should leave their Shops and their [Page 168] work, by which they hardly subsisted, and flock together by multitudes to a Sophists, or Philosophers auditory, to hear the praises of Hector, or of Hercules, or the commen­dation of some particular vertue, or of some brute beast perchance, or of Rhetorick it self, or of Philosophy, or the like: if there were not somewhat else that did draw them, besides the matter it self, I think it were much against reason to believe it. Which neverthelesse by the attestati­on of truest histories, and other ancient Authors of those times, we know to be so certainly true, as no rationall man, that hath been acquainted with them, can make any que­stion of it. Seneca the Philosopher, he alone would afford us store of passages to that purpose: but I shall content my self with one, because we shall meet with divers from other Authors, as we go on, which may give further light and satisfaction, if need be. Quid ergo, saith he, in one of his epistles; (having before insisted upon this, that much benefit, in point of life, might accrue unto men, by their daily con­versation in the Schools of Philosophers;) non novimus quosdam, &c. But what? Do not we know some, that for many years together, have been very diligent Auditors, without any the least tincture; or, as it were, so much as alteration of colour? Yes, I know there be; not diligent only, but even assiduous and indefatigable: whom we may call ra­ther domesticks, for their assiduity, then Auditors. [But then you must know, that all come not for one end.] Some come, that they may hear, not learn; as men are drawn unto publick Theatres, to please their eares, whether with good language, or sweet voices and melody, or to see playes. And of this rank be the greater number, to whom a Philosophers school is as it were a place of entertainment, for their pas­time, and leasure houres. It is no part of their thoughts or aime to grow better there, or to learn some good rule, or pre­cept of life, to which they may conforme themselves for the time to come: but only & barely this, to meet with somewhat [Page 169] that may please their eares. Yea and some come with Table­books too, not so much for the matters sake, as for the words, that they may repeat them unto others, with as little profit, as themselves did hear them. So far Seneca: & then proceeds to another kind, who are marvellously affected (at least, as Seneca would have it,) with the very matter and excellency of the things spoken and delivered: and for the present, are even ravished, and become quite new creatures, as it were, in their purposes and intentions; but are no sooner out of the School, then they are out of their fit, & still come home the same men as they went. For which he doth give some rea­sons; both how they come to be so affected, and how so soon changed. But these be not the men that we have here to do with.Note: Epist. lib. 1. epist. 22. Plinius se­cundus, where he sets out a friend of his, for many excellent parts; In summa, saith he, non facile quis quemquam ex istis, qui sapientiae studium prae se ferunt, &c. that is, In conclusion, even amongst those that openly professe wisdome, (that is, chastity, piety, justice, magnanimity, &c. as himself afterwards expresses himself:) by their habits, take whom you will, you will hardly match him. It is true, that he doth not frequent publick schools and cloisters, (porticus) and there with long discourses (disputationibus; and so is the word often used by Latine Authors of best note:) entertain himself and others that have nothing else to do: (or, are disposed to be idle:) No, &c. These two passages give light the one to the other: and I make choice of these Authors, who, both, were grave sober men, of great authority, and vertuous in their conversation; that by their testimony may the better appear, what use ordinary men made of their hearing in those dayes, when hearing was in such high request, amongst all sorts of people: and not only what use, (which may sometimes prove contrary to the proposed end;) but what end they proposed unto themselves, which was merely the [Page 170] pleasure of their eares. Ancient books are full of such com­plaints & observations: I shall therefore be the more sparing.

Two things I have to shew: what pleasure the eare, first, and then the eyes, find in words and language. Both, I know, contrary enough to the common profession; it may be, and belief, of most men: who not used to search into the nature of things, are carried in most things, more by appearance and conceit, then by any reality of judgement. Who is it that thinks so meanly of himself, but if he pleased with a sober moral discourse, be it more or lesse rhetorical; will not rather adscribe it to his reason and judgement, but especially goodnesse, then to his senses? But our businesse is not to enquire what most men think; but what most true and real: and we shall go on the more boldly, because besides manifest reason, we shall not want good authority for what we are to say. Two things then there be, which I am now principally to consider of: Musick, and Picture: the one, (to say somewhat of them more generally, be­fore we come to particular observation;) the proper object and pleasure of the Eare, the other, of the Eyes; and so, opposed to purely rational, and intellectual: yet so sensual, as that both presuppose reason and understanding, without which they are not pleasures. Brute beasts take no pleasure in Musick, except it be some great chance, (as in the case of Dolphins, and the like,) and upon some parti­cular consideration: much lesse in Pictures, and curious i­magery. And again, as we say commonly that the eye seeth, & the eare heareth, (of which in the former chapter:) so we say, that the eye is delighted, and the eare pleased; though in very truth, neither eie, nor eare properly know what belongs unto pleasure, but the soul only. The consideration of this hath bred many doubts, and curious speculations amongst Philosophers: and learned Fracastorius, (himself profes­seth it,) is much put to it, to find out what it is that makes good musick and harmony to please. Nothing easier to [Page 171] be understood, till a man think of it rationally: nothing that affords more doubts and scruples, if you come to treat of it philosophically.

We shall begin with musick, and shew how it is apply­able, or incidental unto speech; and that by authority first, before we come to reason. And though we meddle not here with any thing that is properly called a Scripture busi­nesse; y [...] why may not we make use of the Scriptures, from which some would have us to fetch all good Arts and Sciences, as well as all sound Divinity. I am not of their opinion, I confesse, nor any sober man, I hope. yet that many things in all Arts and Sciences, by sober and well-grounded men in humane literature, may be learned; and some deep questions of philosophy resolved by the Scriptures, though given us for a greater good, and a more sublime use; I my self make no question. I shall therefore here set down the words of the Prophet Ezekiel, observable unto many uses, but not intending to presse their Autho­rity, as Sacred, as to this particular use and purpose, fur­ther then any man shall think fit in his own reason and judgement. I called them the words of Ezekiel: but indeed, they are the immediate words of God himself, by the Pro­phet Ezekiel: Also thou, son of man, &c. And they come unto thee, as the people cometh, &c. And so thou art unto them as a very lovely song, of one that hath a pleasant voice, and can play well on an instrument: for they hear thy words, but they do them not. Ezek. 33.31, 32, and 33 verses. I question nothing in the translation of the words, but that in the first verse, where it is here, the chil­dren of thy people still are talking against thee: not only Junius, but other Interpreters of best account, translate, of thee, not against thee; by way of commendation, not of crimination: vicatim & ostiatim, &c. that is, at every door and in every street, every where, commending thee: as Junius there in his Notes. This similitude of the power [Page 172] of Speech, to please the eare with Musick, whether vocal or instrumental is very frequent in ancient Authors, upon divers occasions. It is in Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Dio Chrys. and divers others: and much to the same purpose, as here in Ezekiel, in some of them; as in Musonius the Greek Philosopher. whose words,Note: A. Gellius Noct. Attic. l. 5. c. 1. as translated by Aulius Gellius, were; Cum philosophus hortatur, monet, [...]adet, ob­jurgat, &c. that is, When a Philosopher doth exhort, admonish, advise, reprove, or any thing in that kind, tending to reformation or instruction; if they that hear him, out of their open and superficial breasts, bring forth obvious and vulgar praises; nay if they break out into loud acclama­tions; if with his choice language, sweet cadency and col­location of words, and his warbling voice, [frequentamen­tis; of which learned Budeus, and others:] they be af­fected, inflamed, and even transported: then may we cer­tainly know, that both speaker and hearer have lost their labour, and that he was not heard as a Philosopher; but as a skilful Harper, [or, player on the Lute.] Musonius goes on in his discourse, how a true hearer, that hath a right aime, should be affected. I wish there were no worse Doctrine ever heard out of our Pulpits: but it is out of our purpose here, and therefore I leave him there.

But from these bare similitudes, we can inferre no great matter to our present aime and businesse; because there may be a likenesse of effects, upon which a comparison may be grounded; though not affinity of nature, or per­chance a direct contrariety, (as for example, extreme cold and extreme heat sometimes produce the same effects:) in the causes. To proceed therefore to some more direct proofs. Amongst other secrets, and mysteries of the art of good speaking, one is, that which is commonly called [...], that is, the placing or collocation of words in a sentence, or period. There is not any part of Rhetorick more subject to scorn and contempt, and not without cause. [Page 173] For what (apparently) can be more contrary, either to solidity of reason, or sharpnesse of wit, or vigour of spirit; then for a man to busie himself about the placing and order­ing of words, and syllables, when, in a serious matter, either to write, or to speak? And in very deed, as the matter is cōmon­ly handled both by ignorant practitioners, and by unskilfull masters of that Art, it proveth but a ridiculous businesse: far more likely to bring all Rhetorick out of request, then to gain that credit to that one part, at the hands of any truly sober and wise, to which some Ancients of best ac­count have endeavoured to raise it, to be accounted the choicest and most usefull part of all Rhetorick. Not with­out great cause therefore some Ancients, that have written of it, with equal both diligence, and dexterity, make this profession about it; [...]: and that, [...]: that as these things must needs sound unto many, as mere mysteries, or incre­dible paradoxes; so, neither are they for the knowledge of many: and that it cannot be expected otherwise, but that they that have no experience in such things, should judge otherwise of them, then as ridiculous trifles. But however men may judge, before they understand, because they will not take pains, as most; or because they have ta­ken pains, and cannot understand, because non omnia possu­mus omnes, and that, non ex quovis ligno &c. as many: yet certain it is, that not only the most famous Artists and O­rators, that ancient times have produced, as Demosthenes, Aeschines, Cicero, Dion. Halicarn. Quintilian, Longinus and the like, have adscribed unto it as much as unto any other power or faculty, which belongeth unto Rhetorick, and accordingly treated of it (some of them) with all exactnesse and diligence; but also divers Philosophers, as Aristotle, Theophrastus and others, have taken it into their consideration, and said enough of it, they that say least of it, [Page 174] (as Aristotle) to make it considerable unto all, unto whom his judgement is considerable. Cicero in his eldest dayes, and in that book of his, which he confesseth to con­tain the pith and marrow of all his former labours in that kind, grounded upon so many years continual experience, treateth of it very largely. Longinus, not inferiour to him in point of judgement and reputation, had written two large [...], or volumes about it: which though not extant now; yet what reckoning he made of it, if that be not proof of it, that he wrote of it so largely, may appear by what he saith of it, in that Treatise of his, [...], yet extant; in few words, as to any direction or instruction; but so full in point of commendation, as may seem rather exuberant, then otherwise. He compares it to divers kinds of musick, as others before, but disputes it in point of reason and na­ture, that words well ordered, well chosen, and otherwise qualified, as they ought in a speech, must of necessity, and that by reason of their good ordering especially, be more powerfull, either to ravish or to amaze, then any musick can be. Quintilian saith not much lesse of it. I omit divers others, whom I could name. But of all men, whether Ro­mans or Grecians, now extant, none hath taken more pains, either to set out the worth of it, or to search the secrets, and to make them plain unto others, then Dionysius Halicar­nasseus hath done. There is a good large Treatise of his extant, among his other Works, [...], in the second Tome, but there in Greek only; since that, set out both in Greek and Latin, by a learned man, one Si­mon Bircovius, who also hath illustrated it with very use­full Annotations; all printed Samosci (in Polonia) anno dom. 1604. He gives him, and this his Treatise, high commendations in his Preface, and is very angry with the Rhetoricians of later ages, for abusing the world with such frivolous impertinent trifles, as have passed amongst men for books of Rhetorick; whenas such incomparable pieces [Page 175] (in his judgement, wherein I think he is not altogether out;) have been neglected. This Dionysius, in that Trea­tise, (as Demetrius Phalereus, and some others: but none so copiously:) doth produce divers choise passages out of best Authors, both Poets, Orators and others: puts the words (still keeping the same sense,) in severall formes; endeavouring thereby, as the most plain and convincing way to shew to the eye, what the power is of this mystical, or artificiall collocation. I do not expect that all men should be of his judgement, in every particular: but I think they may yield themselves to have no very judicious eare, in point of Rhetorick and good language, that are not convicted by the generality both of his reasons and ex­amples, that there is such an art indeed, and such a mystery, in point of Eloquence and Rhetorick: which is as much as we need here. Neither would I have any to mistake, as though it were intended by any, that none have ever been eloquent or powerfull in speech, that have not either studied, or understood these mysteries:Note: Quintil. lib. 9. c. 4. Quintilian may sufficiently satisfie for that. Certainly, whatsoever it be that is so called, it is as natural (though not so common,) as speech it self: and comes as naturally to some without any study, as other parts of eloquence, which are the common subject of all written Rhetorick. Neither is it necessary, that men most powerfull in language, should understand (philo­sophically) the nature of language, more then they that feel the effects, should be able to give a true account, what it is that worketh upon them so mightily: wherein, I believe, it is as ordinary for men to mistake, as it is not ordinary for them to enter into such doubts or speculations. Neither will it follow (to prevent another mistake,) that if right colloca­tion of words be an Art, or a great secret of nature, which hath been reduced by some to some kind of precepts; that therefore there is no right or powerfull collocation, but [Page 176] such as is according to those precepts: since it is granted, that naturally some Tunes are very sweet and musicall unto some eares, which are not unto others; and though some musick every where, yet not the same, in request a­mongst all nations. Wherein besides the consideration of the diversity of particular natures, and of different cli­mates; use and education also (which in time becomes nature;) is very considerable. Nay it shall be granted too, that contrary faculties, as in divers other things, so in this art or craft also, may have sometimes the same operation; not only upon different men, but even the same:Note: Cicero, in Bruto. as Cicero observes in two fa­mous Orators of his time, Catulus and Cotta. In the first whereof, Suavitas vocis & lenis appellatio literarum (that is, a smooth pronunciation,) bene loquendi famam confecerat, (that is, had gotten him the reputation of an eloquent man.) Cotta, quia valde se di­latandis literis à similitudine Graecae locutionis abstraxe­rat, sonabatque contrarium Catulo, subagreste quiddam planeque subrusticum, alia quidem quasi inculta & syl­vestri via, ad eandem laudem pervenerat; that is, in few words, that this Cotta, quite contrary to Catulus, got himself the same reputation by a kind of broad, neglected, rustick pronunciation. But this doth not belong to the collocation of words, of which we have spo­ken. It doth not, I confesse; but to the musick of words (our chief subject and aime at this time,) it doth. For he plainly adscribeth the eloquence of both (that part of it at least which made it popular,) to their pronunciation; as broad in the one, as it was smooth in the other; and yet both equally sweet. We need not make a miracle of it: we shall sooner shew a reason for this, how it may ve­ry well be naturally; then we can give a reason, or un­derstand the nature (as already observed) of musick in ge­nerall. But I may not stand so curiously upon the exami­nation [Page 177] of all particulars: which as it would not be for the content of all readers; so neither am I provided at this time with all necessaries for such a task. However, I cannot but take some notice of those Philosophers mentioned by Plu­rarch, in the first of his Problems, and the first chapter; who contrary to what we have said, maintained, [...]: that is, That neither the pleasure of curious sights, nor of pleasant sounds, (or voices,) doth properly belong unto the senses, but unto the mind or understanding. I will not meddle with his instances, upon which he chiefly grounds; some of which, though he doth not name him, he had out of A­ristotle. As for this particular of eloquent language, enough hath been said already, to prevent that cavil or mistake, as though it were intended by any, that bare words or bare collocation, without any respect to the sense or signification, did affect any, be they never so sen­sual. For so, if generally true I mean, (for I believe that even so it is not without some truth,) then a man, though he understood not a word of Greek or Latin, would equally be affected, if he heard them read, acted or repeated: which for any man to imagine, is too ridiculous. And then again, if it be remembred, that when we say the plea­sure of the eyes, or eares, we mean such as through the eyes or eares doth passe unto the soul: we may grant it the pleasure of a rational soul, properly, which only is capable of it; and yet as properly sensual, as it recei­veth its first birth, and breeding as it were, from those senses.

Though I do not propose to my self (as I have already said,) to go further into the search of these things, then I must needs, to avoid too much exactnesse, for which all men I know are not fitted: yet for their sakes that are more curious and capable, I will adde here some further directions, as they offer themselves to me by the way, [Page 178] how they may come to the perfect knowledge of Words and Speech, and so may give their reason (if they please) more full satisfaction, concerning these effects which we speak of, when they understand their causes. They must begin first of all with the consideration of single Letters, and enquire, not from Grammarians only, but from best and choicest Philosophers, what is their natural power and property; which letters are naturally smooth; which are rough, or sharp; what Vowels grave and stately, what quick and nimble; what effects and operations to the conjunction of such with reference either to the Eare, and the nature of it, or to the instruments, the Teeth, Tongue, Nose, Throat, &c. by which they are formed, and to their motions in forming, are naturall. Aristotle hath done somewhat in this speculation here and there, in his Rhetoricks: but Plato in his Cratylus, much more; more copiously and more profoundly, tracing nature to her very cradle, as it were, then any that I have seen. Many have laboured in it; all almost that have written of Rhetorick, either anci­ent or late: but among the Ancients now extant, Dionys. Halicarn. with more exactnesse then any other of that profession. There is no part of Nature more obscure, where there is so little suspicion of obscurity: no wonder therefore, if they that have laboured in this search, are not alwayes of one judgement. It is enough, that by clear demonstration of unquestionable presidents and instances, (except a man be valde agresti & hispida aure, as Aulus Gellius in a place; or somewhat else, that is not ordinary, doth alter the case:) out of Homer especially, who of all men that have been known unto the world, whether by art, as some have thought, or by nature, and by the advantage of a judicious eare, and plentifull wit, as most likely, made use in his writings of this craft; but by clear demon­stration of unquestionable presidents, whether out of Ho­mer, or any other, most certain, that all letters, both Con­sonants [Page 179] and Vowels, have some natural and distinct pro­priety in speech, if thus and thus used, towards such and such effects and operations.

Next unto Letters, if we consider Words, there is no word that consists of Syllables, but is measurable; it hath some [...], or dimension: and there is no [...] or di­mension, but hath some natural property, or influence (e­specially when many together artificially joined,) upon the soul of man, towards such and such operations. I may be thought to speak Riddles by some: and I know very well, that not only they that never read of such things, may think so; but even some that have taken great pains and read much, to satisfie themselves, have found this speculation more intricate and curious, then usefull and necessary. This very word Rhythmus in matter of speech, what it is, how it differs from [...]; the one numerus properly, the other (though I made bold to confound them for want of a proper English word;) dimensio; what is the nature, and what are the properties of each; though so many have written of it, would be neverthelesse a long and difficult businesse to make it plain. Without some skill in Musick, if not practicall, yet speculative, I think it is not to be done. But it is enough for my purpose, by such hints as these to let the Reader know, that as in all Poetry there is some­what of Musick; so in ordinary language too, (though not so apparent,) let it be never so ordinary; much more in that which is elegant, and (whether by art, or by nature only: for so in this subject we must be allowed to speak:) artificiall.

Then for the Organs of Speech, what analogy they have with divers instruments of musick, there is much to be said, if a man go about it, rationally and philosophically. Gre­gory Nyssen, for so much as he hath done, not of set purpose, but occasionally only, both in his book De Opificio, and Contra Eunomium, hath done it very well. We have his words at large, in a more proper place and task, but not [Page 180] ended, nor very likely to be. They that have Casserius De vocis & auditus organis, may finde somewhat there about it, if I be not mistaken: but whether out of Nyssen any thing, who well deserveth a place in that argument, I know not. And whereas I said but now, that the word [...], was a hard word to be explained, I meant it of the natu­rall speculation of the thing signified by the word; not of the Grammatical exposition of it: in which sense neverthe­lesse, it seemeth that it hath proved a hard and difficult word to some. Nyssen useth it in this rhetorical sense, in his first [...] (that is, book; not as some translate it, Ora­tion:) contra Eunomium: [...], &c. where the Jesuite that translateth him, be­cause he understood it not, hath perverted the whole pas­sage, and hath not one word of the Fathers meaning. I believe they that read Greek Authors, will find this word elsewhere too misinterpreted, and therefore I thought this caution would not be unseasonable.

Now for the pleasure of the Eyes in good language, our next consideration, though it may seem more remote (at first hearing,) from probability; yet that we have to say will be much plainer, and, as I apprehend it, with no lesse reality of truth. I will not insist upon Plato's reasoning in his Cratylus, that words rightly imposed, are and must be [...], that is, artificial and picture-like imi­tations: nor upon Aristotle his comparing of speeches made to a multitude, unto Landscaps, which shew best afar off; and being looked upon near, are little regarded. Though both have good reason for what they say; yet as not before, so neither here, do we hold bare similitudes a sufficient ground for us. Many such we may find in divers Authors, used by them, to set out the excellent beauty and amiablenesse of an eloquent piece. But for the reality of the thing, which is our businesse; The first thing I shall take into consideration is, the use of those Figures of [Page 181] Speech, by which Speech is adorned as much as by any other kind of ornament, which we call Metaphors, and Similitudes, and Allogories. Of their use and excellency in point of Eloquence if well used, of the right use of them, no man need to read any other then Aristotle, who as in all other points of humane learning, so in this particular, hath behaved himself, not as an excellent Orator only, but as a Philosopher, that is, as one that had the perfect know­ledge of Nature; without which knowledge, nothing else, though it seemeth never so remote, can rightly be ūderstood. Now what it is that maketh such Figures & Ornaments of Speech so pleasant, and so taking; I shall answer in the words of one, who could both judge and speak very well himself; but it is the sense of all that have written of that argument: Quod omnis translatio, quae quidem ratione sūpta est, ad sensus ipsos admovetur, Note: Cic. 3. De Orat▪ maxime oculorum, qui est sensus acerrimus: that is, Because every Metaphor, (and so of the rest,) that is proper and natu­ral, exposeth the things that are spoken of to the senses; especially to that of the eyes, which of all senses is the quick­est sense. Which makes me wonder that S. Augustine in his book De Doctrina Christiana, should make it such a difficult businesse to be resolved; why the same thing de­livered in plain and perspicuous language, should not be so pleasing, as when it is set out with Metaphors and Allegories: whereof he gives some examples there; diffi­cile est dicere, saith he, & alia est quaestio. But I know that S. Augustine was so good a Naturalist, and an Ora­tor too, (which he once professed;) that he could easily have found the reason of it himself, though none had found it before him: but difficile est dicere, in reference to his reason he might say: such speculations of nature are not for every capacity; nor that perchance so seasonable a place, (in his judgement) for such a speculation. But this very reason that makes them so pleasing in ordinary lan­guage, [Page 182] hath brought Metaphors out of credit with Philo­sophers that seek not the pleasures of the senses, but the naked truth of things. Aristotle, in his Topicks, con­demneth them: Plutarch saith they are children,Note: Plutarch. [...] &c. for the most part, or sensually given, that are so taken with such Fi­gures of Rhetorick. I would produce his words, but that there is somewhat to be amended in them, ( [...] for [...], as in all editions I have seen; a vast difference:) which I have done elsewhere in another work, which may one day see light perchance, and therefore will spare that labour here. Seneca allowes them to Philosophers,Note: Seneca, Epist. 59. not as commen­dable of themselves, nor as Poets use them, for a shew, and to delight; sed ut imbecillitatis no­strae adminicula sint: & ut discentem & audientem in rem praesentem adducant. that is, because of humane infir­mity, that by the help of such figures, the teacher may bring his hearers to the knowledge of those things, by a kind of present sight, which otherwise they cannot understand. S. Chrysostome hath the same thing, and is very large upon it, upon the seventh Psalm: [...]. Therefore, saith he, (speak­ing of Metaphors and Allegories▪) the Scripture doth use such grosse (or course) expressions, that it may fit the coursenesse (or dulnesse) of our understandings.

But besides such Figures, as Metaphors, Allegories, and the like, there is a certain propriety of speech, which they commonly call, [...] (some [...], though there be that make a difference:) or lively representation: others, [...], and [...]; that is, a phantasie or a repre­sentation of shapes and images. It is so called saith Lon­g [...]nus, [...]: that is, When by a kind of Enthusiasme, and strong apprehension of the mind, you think [Page 183] you see what you speak of, and so set it out by words to those that hear you, that you make it in a manner visible. Of this property or faculty, common Rhetoricians treat largely, and bring divers examples out of best Authors. Many excellent places out of Homer and Virgil (the two Poets that have been the admiration of all Ages, which have afforded men of judgement,) compared together may be found in Macrobius his Saturnalia, and Julius Caes. Scaliger, in the fifth of his Poetices. I have read somewhere, that Phidias, an ancient famous Statuary, ad­scribed, especially, that so much renowned, and almost adored piece of his, Jupiter Olympius, to the reading of Homer. How farre the reading of excellent Poets or Orators, may conduce to painting or carving, I know not: it is out of my profession to judge. This I can speak of my self: that when I read any such passage, in any of those principal Poets or Orators, I do not only phansy to my self, that I see those things that they describe; but also find in my self (as I phansy) the very same content and pleasure, that I should, if my eyes beheld them in some whether coloured, or carved representation of some excel­lent Artist. As for example; when I read Laocoon his tragical end and story, set out by Virgilius in the second book of his Aeneids, I do not think I read it with much less admiration or pleasure, then they receive, that go a hun­dred or a thousand miles perchance, to behold that incom­parable Laocoon now at Rome to be seen; which was an admiration to the beholders, even when Artists were at the highest of esteem and perfection, (as by Pliny, and others that write of it may appear;) so many hundred of yeares above a thousand since: how much more now, to all that can judge, since that noble Art hath suffered so notable declination? Not with much lesse admiration, I say: saving that (which much derogates from admiration,) I have a Virgil alwaies at command, and can turn to it when I [Page 184] please; the other I never saw, (but in paper picture, and even so, not without some admiration;) nor can hope ever to see for many reasons. But there is more in Virgil, then in that carved piece: the description of the two Serpents, (which I most admire;) their gliding pace and motions (or what should I call it?) upon the Seas, towards the place of execution. Now if any body shall think much of this, that a man should be made to see without eyes, and should by the benefit of his eares, really compasse pleasures that properly belong unto the eyes; I would have him to remember what he hath read before, if he have read from the beginning, that a man may see inwardly, as well as outwardly: without eyes, though not without visible species, (whether materiall or spirituall, we will not dispute:) and that those pleasures we commonly ad­scribe to the eyes, or eares, are properly the pleasures of a rationall soul.

There was a way of painting, or rather imagerie, very curious and costly, but very frequent among ancient Ro­mans, who stood not upon any cost, either for pomp or pleasure; which was by inlaying variety of small stones, or small chips of severall kinds of wood; of both kinds the beautifullest that could be gotten for such a purpose; in such order and coherence, that they might represent to the life severall shapes of Flowers, or Birds, or any other thing that was a fit object for the pleasure of the eyes. I believe it is used to this day in some Churches: but then, very or­dinary for Sielings and Pavements, in great Houses. Any man may imagine, what care must be taken in such work, to bring it to any perfection, in setting and ordering every lit­tle scrap or parcell in its right place: and how quickly the eye of any Spectator would find it out, if any thing were misplaced. It was called opus emblematicum, vermicula­tum, musivum, asarotum, besides divers other names. An­swerable for all the world (in point of ordering or placing,) [Page 185] to this artifice, was some kind of style, devised by the an­cient Sophistae, and very exactly observed by some of them, for which they have been much admired. It is a very plea­sing kind of language, it cannot be denied, to any that have either ears, or eyes, or souls sensible of any kind of harmony or symmetrie; whether in point of Sounds, or of Structures: better (if exquisite indeed) to be read, then to be heard: be­cause the current of speech doth not give leisure to either eares, or eyes, to take notice of the art or care, where not a word is, or a syllable, but hath, as it were, its naturall or­der, to compleat the harmonie. Of this kind of speech, or style, rather in derision of it, then in commendation, were those verses in an ancient Poet, mentioned by Cicero:

I know it is the course of the world, and it is the occasion of much wrangling among men. Homine imperito nihil ini­quius: Most judge of things, not out of any knowledge, or consideration of the things in themselves; but by their own temper and disposition, whether altogether naturall, or partly contracted by long use and custome: without any regard to other men (who probably may as much differ from them in temper of soul, as they do in feature of body,) their different genius and inclination. If therefore any give lesse credit to these things, because they find not a dispositi­on in themselves to be taken, or affected with such compo­sition; nor any other perchance, that is extraordinary: that they may the better know how to value their own judge­ment, or experience in such speculations, I shall first pro­pose to their consideration the words of Dion. Halicar­nasseus, of whom we may very probably suppose, that he might have as much experience in the world, and as much insight in the tempers of men, as themselves. In the very [Page 186] beginning of his Treatise [...], &c. or Colloca­tion of words, he layeth down for a ground, or grounds upon it, as a common principle, That all that is considera­ble in good language, is either [...] or [...]: that is, either Words, or Conceptions. As for Conceptions, he saith they require great maturitie of judgement, especi­ally in politick Speeches. but of Words his assertion is; that [...]: that is, That every younger man, or youth his soul, by some kind of naturall, or enthusiastick instinct, is ravished with the beauty of well-framed elocution. This may be thought by some, a bold speech: and by some, perchance, not so bold as absurd. But what will they say to Hadrianus the Cardinall, a man, besides his age, and dignitie, of very profound learning, as appeareth by what he hath written of the fundamentals of Christian Religion? who in his book De sermone Latino, in a place where he treateth of the pro­per and elegant use of the Latine word alius, is not asha­med to professe of himself, that he valued such Observati­ons more then (Ʋniones) choicest Pearles and Jewels; and that he had received such contentment in his own soul, when ever he met with such in good Authors, as no words of his could expresse: and doth not stick to adscribe some kind of Divinitie or Deitie to those men, that were able to expresse themselves in that kind. Yet it is farre from me to believe, that solid learning doth consist in such things: but much lesse do I think, that the contempt of those things to which our selves have no genius, though highly esteemed of by others, is an argument of much solid learning, as some would gladly perswade themselves and others; nor yet of much wit, or judgement.

I have done with all those particulars that I proposed to my Reader, at the beginning of this Chapter: and yet I shall not end it here. There is somewhat else, which I find, by some [Page 187] referred to Rhetoricall Enthusiasme, and doth indeed, in some particulars, very properly belong unto it. But we must take the liberty (for methods sake,) to consider of all that is reducible under one head, though not altogether of one nature, as to matter of Rhetorick. Quintilian (as was before observed,Note: Quintil. Institut. lib. 10. c. 7.) was of opinion clearly, and his reasons for it are very considerable, that no man should take upon him the profession of an Orator, that is not able to speak as an Orator, upon any emergent occa­sion, without any premeditation. But the same Quintilian is as much against them, that do adventure upon extempo­rary speaking, as it were by Enthusiasme; that is, without a good foundation laid, able to beget such a facultie: which he will not allow to be called speaking, but twatling, or prating, or any thing else, that doth not pretend unto Rea­son. Against this his opinion, he doth object, that there have been some sometimes, who without any such founda­tion or premeditation, have been known to speak very well; yea so well, that their crude extemporarinesse hath been thought by men able to judge, to surpasse the care and premeditation of others. For which, those crude and rude Orators of the old time, when any such thing did happen unto them, were wont to say (he quotes Tullie's authori­tie for it:) Deum tunc affuisse; that is, that God had assisted them. Quintilian doth not deny, but that such a thing may happen sometimes, that some may happen to speak as well, or better, extempore, without any such foun­dation as we have spoken, as others, upon premeditation, &c. and he gives a good reason for it, which he fetcheth not from the heavens, (to make a miracle of it,) but from nature: but still keeps to his conclusion, upon this ground, (though he doth not expresse himself so plainly:) that that which happeneth but sometimes, uncertainly, cannot be called a faculty; nor that man be reputed very rationall [Page 188] or wise, that makes profession of that which he hath not at command; and hath so little ground to presume upon, that himself makes a miracle of it, when it doth happen, adscri­bing it unto God: so that nothing lesse then a miracle can save him from shame and confusion, except he have the good luck (which indeed might happen without a miracle: stultorum plena, &c.) to speak unto such, or before such, who are as ignorant, as himself is impudent. Of their o­pinion that adscribed all Eloquence, in generall, to Enthu­siasme, I have considered before: but this is quite another thing; when not the facultie it self, but some extraordinary successe, upon some distresse of time, or suddain danger, is adscribed unto God; which makes me to consider here of it by it self.

Now this will bring me upon a more generall considera­tion of this Deus; this un-named God; more commonly styled, Aliquis Deus, or, Nescio quis Deus, by ancient Heathens: more generall, I mean, then to belong to this particular chapter of Rhetoricall Enthusiasme; but not so generall, as to carry me out of my generall subject, which is Enthusiasme. I will call it, for distinction sake, a tem­porary Enthusiasme; when a man, whether in matter of speech, or answer, or any other occasion, being put to it, more or lesse, meets with some suddain help, or evasion; or hints of direction, for the time to come, to avoid dan­gers, or to compasse deliverances: whether by inward sug­gestions, as it were, or by some outward signes and encou­ragements, or the like. In all which cases we shall find this formula of Aliquis Deus or, Nescio quis Deus, frequently enough used by ancient Heathens. Before I come to some in­stances, whether ancient or late, I must professe, that even a­mong & to heathens, my belief is, that many things, in point of deliverances and otherwise, did happen by the immediate hand of God. I have ground enough to say so, from the [Page 189] 107 Psalm: as we have shewed at large, against some sot­tish and phanaticall Expositions, upon that very Psalm. I believe there is no part of the world, where any creatures be, that can be called Gods creatures, from which Gods providence, not generall only, but even particular, upon some extraordinary occasions, is excluded: But neverthe­lesse, as better understood, so, much more to be seen, where God is worshipped as he ought to be. Farre be it therefore from me to doubt, much more to deny, but that some things in that kind among Christians may happen extraordinarily: though I am very confident, that as among Heathens, so among Christians, the matter is often mistaken, through grosse ignorance or superstition. But that is not it which we are now upon, how imposture in that kind may be prevent­ed: how to prevent offence by being mistaken, was my bu­sinesse here, and no other. And so we go on.

First then, in matter of speech, ancient Heathens had their warrant from Homer, to whom, for the most part, as well Philosophers as others, adscribed little lesse then divine authoritie: who in his 3. Odysseie, maketh the Goddesse Minerva, President of Wit and Counsell, to appear (though in the shape of a man well known unto him,) to Telemachus, and to advise him to repair unto Nestor, set out by Homer as a Prince of great renown for his wisdome and long experience: and upon Telemachus his reply and exception, that being yet so young and raw in the world, he should be ashamed to speak to so reverend a person; Mi­nerva doth encourage him, with these words;

I am not so good a Poet as to render him in verse: nei­ther do I hope to live to see either him or Virgil so transla­ted, that a man may truly say, translated. It is well, if the [Page 190] sense be fully and faithfully expressed. Their other *See more in the Chapter of Poeticall En­thusiasme. perfections, for which most admired anciently, imitated they may be perchance by some rare Wit, so farre as the language will bear; equalled they can never be, in a­ny translation. But the effect of the words is this: That upon such an occasion, to enquire of his Father, who had been so long expected, &c. he should not be affraid to speak. That his own wit perchance, might serve him be­yond his expectation: and what he wanted himself, he might hope that God ( [...], of which word we have treated elsewhere very copiously;) would suggest unto him: for that it was not likely (by what might already be observed of his carriage in those yeares,) that he was either born, or brought up, even to that age, without a particular pro­vidence.

Of these words of the Poet, superstitious Aristides treateth at large in his Oration against Plato. And Cice­ro, in his Epistles ad Atticum, applyeth them very per­tinently to his case: being then in great perplexitie, how he should carry himself towards Julius Caesar, so that he might not wrong his conscience or credit; himself being a grave Senator, who had alwaies stood for the common libertie; nor yet offend him by his libertie, who had inva­ded the Empire by his power, and was now coming to­wards him, having sent him word before-hand, that he should shortly come that way, and would visit him at his house, making great reckoning of him, (as he professed, and I verily believe he did;) because of his approved integritie; besides wisdome, moderation, and other good qualities. Cicero being then in that strait, writeth to his friend:Note: Cic. Epist. ad Att. lib. 9. Ita subito occurrit, ut ne Trebatium quidem, &c. omnia nobis imparatis agenda: sed tamen [...] &c. What event that meeting had, himself relates in another Epistle to the same Atticus, [Page 191] which may be seen there; because it is not to our purpose here. Just such another case as this, between Conscience on the one side, and present Danger of no lesse then Life it self, doth Plinius secundus relate of himself in his Epistles. It was upon a question,Note: Plin. Epist. lib. 1. that was put to him of purpose to catch him. It was a good while before he could tell what to say: which is some argument, that nothing else (though that too, in a more generall consideration, reducible to providence;) but his own good wit and discretion freed him. Yet at last he lighted upon such an answer, as avoided both those precipices, and confounded his malicious enemies. Plinie according to his Religion, thanks his Gods for it: Non pos­sum dicere aliud tunc mihi quam Deos affuisse. And I think it were want of Religion in any man, not to thank God in such a case: though it be liable to much inconveni­ence in point of Providence in generall, to make a particu­lar providence of all such cases, without any regard to per­sons, or circumstances. Plutarch in his Co­riolanus, takes it into his consideration,Note: Plut. in vita Coriol. and doth endeavour, grounding upon Homer especially, to set down some rules, whereby, in such cases, we may discern between humane providence, and immedi­ate divine suggestions. But if according to his rule, we shall adscribe all ungrounded, and seemingly rash attempts and resolutions, that produce unexpected successfull events, to immediate inspiration: though it may be plausible e­nough in the case of good men, and good ends; yet gene­rally received and applyed, it will prove such a stumbling-block, that it is farre more likely to produce Atheisme, then any true sense of Godlinesse. Besides daily experience of such cunning foxes, as Phormio is set out by the Comoedian, who have nothing to trust to in all the world, but their craf­tinesse and their wit, and go further with that, to bring their ambitious ends about, and to get themselves credit and re­putation [Page 192] in the world, then many honester men, with the advantage of a farre better Purse, and greater relations can do: what Age of the World, what People, or Nation, that hath been made known unto the world by any Histo­rie, doth not afford store of examples of successfull Wic­kednesse; not only to the amazement of weaker worldlings, (if I may so call them, that have yet seen but little of the world, or have not yet profited so much by what they have seen, as they ought have done;) but even beyond the actors and adventurers their own expectation? Which things, though we acknowledge upon such and such grounds and foundations, necessary to be laid by every man that under­takes that subject, easily to be reconcileable with provi­dence: yet according to Plutarch's rule, must of necessitie prove destructive unto it. Aristotle in his Rhetoricks hath an observation, that great men that have good luck, a­mongst many bad, have one good qualitie, that they are commonly [...]. They love God, he saith, (after a sort;) and seem to be religious: as supposing their good luck to be an effect of Providence, and by consequent, an argument of Gods love and favour towards them. Whe­ther it be so or no, that such, ordinarily, love God and Re­ligion, after a sort; I will not here argue: but of many bad, I should think it the very worst of their qualities, (if Aristotle meant it of such, as became great by unlawfull means; which I think he doth:) that they should love God and Religion upon such an account. For so to be re­ligious, is to make God the author of Wickednesse, that our selves may be thought good: and whilst we affect to be religious, after a sort, to undermine (to our power) all true Religion; a main fundamentall whereof is, that God is not pleased with any Wickednesse, neither doth suffer it at any time to prevail, but as a means either of greater Judgement, to them that are past Correction; or of ad­vantagious suffering, to them, to whom he intends greater [Page 193] Blessings. We might be much larger upon this arguments but it shall suffice to say here, that in such a case, as either Cicero's or Plinie's, who were men of singular naturall parts, and through long experience much improved; though they did very well to be thankfull, and all men should, though upon lesse occasions: yet there is no need at all, that we should go further then humane wit and wisdome, for a reason of their wise & successfull answers. Surely, Wisdome had not been so much commended unto us by all sorts of Authors; nor so much paines taken by our Forefathers, for attainment of it; nor men that have been thought wise, so much admired; had it not been a thing of very good use in the world. It is the priviledge of God, that he can infa­tuate and confound the highest wisdome of man, when he pleaseth: but if God doth not interpose, we need go no further then our first creation, if strange things sometimes be brought to passe by the wisdome of man, (though much impaired, we know, by his Fall,) who was created after the Image of God. And if wicked men bring strange things to passe too, in that kind; it may be a question, whether a wicked man may be a wise man, properly so called: (Aristotle saith no; and there is good reason for it, if it be well understood:) but that one that is wicked, if wise, should have good successe (in point of humane reason and judgement,) in the world, is neither to be doubted, nor wondred at: nay, reasons are given by good Authors, why unconscionable Craftinesse, oftentimes, in the prosecution of worldly businesses, hath had great advantages above wisest Integrity.

It would trouble a man more, to find a reason for those many Cures, whereof so frequent mention is made in an­cient Authors, supposed to have happened by particular Revelations in Dreams of the night. Their manner was, (they that wanted help, and had any confidence in those things,) after some preparations, to go to a Temple; there, [Page 194] some Rites and Ceremonies performed, to lye and expect some Revelation. Pellibus incubuit stratis, somnosque pe­tivit, &c. Virgil, and they that have written upon him, will inform them concerning many particulars, that have not taken notice of it elsewhere. Aristides the Orator re­lates strange things of himself, which I neither know how to believe, as whom I find every where so blindly supersti­tious; nor how to disprove, writing with so much confi­dence, and appealing to the testimony of so many others, as he doth. Insomuch, that grounding upon this pretended common Experience; both of Medicine it self, as an Art, (by others accounted of all others the most necessary;) and of them that professed it, he speaketh in a place as of things, in his judgement, not very needfull in the world. But a Greater man, and a Wiser man, and which is above all,Note: M. Aurel. An­ton. Meditat. lib. 1.5. & 9. a farre better man then Aristides, An­toninus the Roman Emperour; so wise, as not easie to be cheated by any others; and so good, (I think I have said enough of him elsewhere, to make good all I say here:) that I am perswaded he would as soon have parted with his Empire, as to have been the author of any Cheat towards others: he also in his divine Meditations, mentioneth those Cures by Dreams and Revelations; not only as approved unto himself, by his own, but unto others also, by frequent ex­perience. It is not improbable, that conceit might do much in this businesse of Cures. It is granted by Physicians, that bare Conceit sometimes, as it may cause Diseases, so reall Cures also. But to adscribe all to Conceit, that happened in that kind, I cannot. I will further grant, as very proba­ble, that among some such reall Cures, whether by Conceit or otherwise, many more, through juggling and devised impostures, were talked of, then were true and reall. But then supposing withall, that some happened very really; of such as Antoninus, I should make no great question, but [Page 195] the same God, who sent to Naaman the Syrian an Hebrew Maid, to tell of the Prophet in Israel, that would cure him, might send them Dreams, (in their Houses, not in their Temples,) that might help them. As for others, that received reall help in the Temples of Idols, and with the solemnitie of such and such rites; I am most inclinable to believe, that such Cures were done by Evil Spirits, the fur­ther to engage men in that Idolatrous kind of Worship. And not only in the veneration of Heathenish Gods in ge­nerall, but in the veneration of those Temples also, where they were worshipped, and of those [...], or sacred (as supposed) obdormitions of men and women in Tem­ples: by the means whereof, what horrid pranks were sometimes brought to passe, we have a notable instance in Josephus; and of the execution, just and due, upon the actors and contrivers of it.Note: Joseph. lib. 18. As for other Dreams, upon other occasions, whereof the books and relations of Ancients are so full, im­puted by them to Revelations; I see not any thing, in most of them, but may very well be adscribed unto mere Con­ceit and Superstition. It is the more to be wondered at, I confesse, that not ordinary men only, as divers Poets, and some Orators, and Philosophers, should tell us of such: but that even learned Physicians▪ should adscribe so much unto such phansies. Hippocrates in his Epistles (if genui­nus Hippocrates, which I can scarce believe;) hath a large relation of the God Aesculapius, how he appeared unto him about Democritus his businesse: Galen often, how that he had a Dream, to write such and such a book; to go, or to forbear such a journey. If men give their minds unto such things, there is no question but they shall phan­sie sometimes, nay often, much more then there is just ground for; & sometimes it may be, somewhat may happen extraordinarily: but men (I think) were better want it by farre, if it come by Superstition, and not by immediate [Page 196] Providence; as out of doubt, unto some sometimes, that are not superstitious.

The ancient Heathens had their sortes Homericae: and even Christians, anciently, some, their Observations not much unlike unto them: Observations, I say, upon the first words that should offer themselves unto them, at the first opening of some part of the Bible; but of the Psalms especially. What S. Augustine his judgement is of such, what is the determination of some Councills, hath been ob­served by them that have written of that subject: we shall but touch upon it here. It is a common storie that Franciscus Junius, that translated the Old Testament (with Tremel­lius) out of the Hebrew, and lived to be a great Writer in these later times, was not a Christian heartily, untill the first words of S. John's Gospell were offered unto him by a strange providence, as he apprehended. I have read some­what of Ignatius Loyola too, the founder of the Jesuites, not much unlike. Suspicius Severus, in the life of Marti­nus, that holy Bishop, hath some observations upon the Psalms, that were read in course when he was consecra­ted: He makes a particular providence of it, as I re­member. A thousand such relations a man shall meet with in all kind of books, if he think them worth his observation. But as in Dreams, so in this, I make great difference, between those things that offer them­selves without any seeking, and those which upon desti­nated seeking and curiosity. In the first kind, there is no question, but God, if he please, may use that way some­times, as well as any other, to reveal some things extraor­dinarily. But for the other, as it is a mere tempting of God, and little differing (as is disputed at large by learn­ed Peucerus, in his books De Divinatione:) from di­rect Witchcraft; so if any thing happen in that way, that is extraordinary, and may resent of some kind of revela­tion or prediction; I should much suspect the author, and [Page 197] be more affraid of the end, as rather tending to draw a man to further mischief, by degrees; then out of any good will, or for any present advantage, to be reaped thereby.

I know one very well, (I mean it in a vulgar, not phi­losophicall sense, which would be too much presumption:) who from his child-hood having alwayes been (though stai­ed and sober enough in his ordinary conversation,) somewhat boisterous and violent in his play, and ordinary recreation, for which he had suffered many times, and sometimes had been in danger of his life, and yet could not leave it in his elder yeares; at a certain time, when he was playing with a child of his, (which he loved very well,) it was his luck, to run his forehead against a plain pillar: but with such vehe­mencie, that he was almost felled with the blow, and was stupid for a while. As the place began to swell, (the skin being broken in divers places, but without bleeding;) and to grow blue; whilst his forehead was a binding, somewhat having been applied unto it, as soon as it could be made readie; he was carried by a strange instinct, up many staires, to his Studie, making them that were about him, much against their wills, to follow him, and not without some wonder. In his Studie (a long room,) at the farthest end, out of a case of shelves, that contained above 5 or 600 small books, he took down one, himself not knowing to what end; which happened to be Lactantius: and at the very first opening, cast his eyes upon these words, (which he did not remember ever to have read in him before, nor any like in any other Author:) Summa er­go prudentia est, pedetentim incedere. Note: Lact. De Opif. D. c. 1. ed. Crisp. in 16. p. 672. He read no further: and it made so much im­pression in him, (when he remembred what he had partly escaped, and partly suffered,) that he could think of little else all the day: and he did think (especially when he had heard what had happened unto a very good friend of his,) that he had fared the better afterwards, for [Page 198] that warning; and perchance escaped somewhat, that might have been his death, not long after.

I make no question but many such things do happen unto many, both good and bad: but either not observed, (and better not observed, then turned into superstition:) or soon forgotten. Wherein there may be some danger of Unthankfulnesse, I confesse, as well as Superstition in the excesse: that is; when either we think too much of such things, before they happen of themselves; or too well of our selves, when they have happened.

OF Poeticall Enthusiasme, (the subject of this Chapter) there is so little to be said particular­ly, besides what hath been of Rhetoricall; that I needed not to have made a distinct head of it, but that it hath been a common Maxime in most Ages, approved by sundrie pregnant instances, That a good Ora­tor and a good Poet, are things, if not altogether incompa­tible, yet seldome or never meeting in one: how then should [Page 200] they be led and agitated by one spirit, or enthusi­asme? Yet certain it is, and it is the opinion of best Ora­tors, and Masters of Rhetorick, Cicero, Dionysius Hali­carnasseus, and others, that Oratory and Poetry, though so seldome concurring in the Professors of each, are very little different in their causes and nature. It might prove a long businesse, if I should take upon me to examine all reasons, and all instances, on both sides, for, or against this common Maxime. For the difference of their style and language, Aristotle may satisfie any man, in his [...], and Books of Rhetorick: though even in that difference so much affinity perchance might be found, as might argue rather different wayes, or effects of the same faculty, then different Faculties: but that it is not our task here to examine particulars. However, there is no questi­on, but in divers respects, their parts may be as different as their style: and where the end in general, (the one to please, the other to perswade,) is not the same; how should particular endeavours, which produce abilities, be? And yet after all this, though we allow some difference in their parts and proprieties, such as are more common and ordi­nary, which may make the difference between ordinary Poets and Orators the greater: my opinion is, that scarce ever was (so I speak, because some accidental circumstance may alter the case in some particulars:) that scarce ever was any excellent Poet, but might have been (which in Virgil's case we know to be most true:) as excellent an Orator; or excellent Orator, but might have attained to equall excel­lency in Poetry; had they applied themselves to the means in time, and external provocations and encouragements equally concurred for the one, as for the other. But how the same Enthusiasme (originally and in its nature,) may bo­the cause of very different effects and faculties; we shall have a more proper place to consider and examine.

Julius Caesar Scaliger, whose authority is such with [Page 201] most men, that whatsoever he saith, passeth for current with them without any further consideration; in that work of his, where he treats of all things belonging unto Poetrie, and of all Poets, whether ancient or late, that he thought worthy the mention; in the first book of it, and second chapter, reduceth all Poets into three several divisions, as it were: from their Spirit, their Age (or time when they lived,) and their Argument. For their Spirit; he delivers it at first as out of Plato and Aristotle, that some are born Poets; by Nature, without Art or Study, endowed with all parts and faculties necessary to that profession. Others, though born simple and ignorant, yea dull and stupid; to become Poets by immediate inspiration. As for matter of inspiration, it is Plato's doctrine, I confesse, in more then one place; but disputed and maintained at large in a pe­culiar Dialogue, inscribed by him, Ion, [...]. where he doth not onely dispute, that all true Poetrie is by immediate inspiration; immediate divine inspiration, in the most proper and literal sense; using all the words that the Greek tongue could afford, to expresse inspirati­on, and repeating them often: but that the [...] also, that is, actors or representators of Poets, so reciting their words, that they imitated the nature of the things by their pronunciation, and action of body, (an art in those dayes in great request,) yea and the Auditors, all, or most, were inspired in some degree. which he doth endeavour to illu­strate by the example of the Load-stone, which infuseth vertue, first upon one ring, and from that upon another, and so to many iron rings: though still with some a­batement; yet so neverthelesse, that as long as there is any vertue to draw, it must be acknowledged to have proceed­ed from the same beginning. So that Plato, nay God him­self, he saith, would not have us to doubt, but that it is ( [...]. and again, [...] [Page 202] [...] &c.) God himself, (not they,) that speaketh unto us in, and by Poets. But that any are borne Poets, distinct from those that are inspired, I do not find in that Dialogue; nor remember any where else in Plato.

As for Aristotle, I wish Scaliger had quoted the place. I know more then one place, where Aristotle likewise upon the by, doth affirm that [...], Poetry comes by inspiration; or rather, is not without inspiration: but where he doth so positively avouch it, as that a man may call it his doctrine, or a resolved case of his upon debate, I know not any place. Indeed I am not at this time (the more is my grief,) master of all Aristotles Works: and thereby of necessity am eased of the labour of seeking it in him. But even of Plato, though we find it in that one Dialogue so positively maintained; yet whether we may call it absolutely Plato's Doctrine, I make some question, when I remember (as is observed by many) what he writes elsewhere of Poets, and of Homer particularly, whom he would not allow to be read in a well-governed Common­weal, (which I would not have any ignorant Zelot take any advantage of, as though it concerned us Christians as much, or rather, at all: for they had no other Bible, then Homer, in those dayes, such was the common opinion of him; and the reading of him with such an opinion, must needs be very dangerous:) because of so many false, absurd, yea impious Fictions, concerning the Gods. However, I cannot excuse Plato for that Dialogue; a most irrational piece, I think, as ever was written by any Philosopher.

But neither can I well brook Scaliger his words, (for I would not question his meaning; God forbid:) which I take notice of, of purpose to prevent, that I say not to re­prove, the mistake of some others. After he hath spoken of Plato and Aristotle their opinion, he seemeth to deliver his own in these words: Horum autem [...] duo ad­huc [Page 203] genera animadverti: unum cui coelitus advenit divina illa vis; aut ultro, nec opinanti; aut simpliciter invocanti. Quo in numero seipsum ponit Hesiodus: Homerus au­tem ponitur ab omnibus. Alterum acuit meri exha­latio, &c. They do him great wrong cer­tainly,Note: Joan. Fabricii Specimen A­ [...]ab. pag. 174. Statuis idem Scal. &c. that make this to be his opinion. No man pretending to Christianity, can en­tertain such sottishnesse. However, so cen­sorious a man (witness his bitter invectives against Erasmus, for lesse matters;) should have written more warily. That some became Poets by immediate inspiration, without any thought, or seeking; o­thers, upon immediate request and prayer, without any further endeavours: what more can be said of the truest, and most holy Prophets? But if all this were intended by him (as most probable,) in reference to those Philoso­phers their opinion: Yet he should have used some of their termes rather, (whereof Plato afforded him so much choice;) then that Scripture word [...]: though not proper to the Scripture perchance, yet seldome used by any profane Author.

As for Homer, (the chiefest subject of those extrava­gancies,) there is no commendation can be given unto man, as to point of nature, but I should be more ready to adde to it, then to detract. Neither do I wonder, if Heathens, that had so many Gods, when they found themselves so transported above their ordinary temper by his verses, when either judiciously read, or skilfully acted; did really per­swade themselves, that he must be somewhat above a man, that was the author of such ravishing language. I have alwaies thought of Aristotle, in point of humane wisdome and sound reason, rather as of a Miracle, then a man: yet when I consider how much he was beholding to Homer, and how much he doth in all his writings adscribe to the wit and wisdome of that one Poet; I must needs think [Page 204] very highly of him, that was so much admired by such a one as Aristotle. And though I do easily grant that his lan­guage, of the two, is the more ravishing; as may easily ap­pear by such translations as have been made of him in any language, wherein so little of that charming power is to be found, that the reading of them is rather a task of pati­ence, then an object of any admiration: yet allowing him to be a Poet, that is, one whose chief end (and probably his best subsistence,) was to please; and a very ancient Poet, that is, one that was to fit himself and his expressions for such as then lived, when such a religion, such opinions, such fashions, were in use; these things taken into considera­tion, which I doubt many that read him little think of, his matter, in my judgement, for the most part, doth deserve no lesse admiration.

Of the mysteries of bare language, that it may ravish, and what it is that makes it so, hath sufficiently been dis­coursed in the former chapter. And if Rhetorical, how much more (in all sense and reason) Poetical? And if good language may ravish, how much more excellent mat­ter, delivered in ravishing language? But as every eare is not fitted for all ravishing language, when barely read, espe­cially, not acted; so neither is every capacity, for excellent matter. Though in this particular of Homer's case, it is not so much want of wit and capacity, that maketh so few in these dayes to admire his wisdome; as ignorance of former times. Who would not at a Market, or Fair, if suddainly such a sight should offer it self, look upon either man or woman, though very beautifull otherwise, if dressed in old apparell, such as was worn but two or three ages agoe; rather as a Monster, or a ghost, then such creatures as they would have appeared, when such apparel was in use? An old Hat will alter a mans countenance: and many both men and women, whose onely ambition and employment in this world is, so to dresse themselves, that they may be [Page 205] thought fair or proper, would think themselves undone (so ridiculous would they appear,) if they were seen in those fashions, which but ten or twenty yeares ago were their chiefest both pride and beauty? No wonder therefore if so ancient a Poet as Homer, appear ridiculous unto many, who are better skilled in the fashions of the times, then they are read in ancient books; which by long use of reading▪ would make the fashions of those times to which they are strangers, not only known, but comely; and so lead them to somewhat else, more observable then the fashions of the times. However, this use (to a learned and hearty Chri­stian not inconsiderable,) any man may make of Homer and his antiquity, that by reading of him, many passages of the Old Testament relating to certain fashions and cu­stomes of those ancient times may the better be understood, and the antiquity of those books, among many other argu­ments, by the antiquity of such whether expressions (which we may call, the fashions of language,) or manners, both publick and private, the better asserted. Somewhat hath been done, I know, by some learned men, to that purpose, by collation of some passages: but not the tenth part of what may be done, I dare say: not by any, at least, that I have yet seen. But now I am gone from my Text.

So much for the first kind of inspired Poets, whom Scaliger doth call [...]. Though he name Hesiod too, from Hesiods own testimony of himself; (quo in nu­mero &c.) yet he passeth no judgement on him: Homer is his only instance; and Homer the occasion and only subject, almost, of that Dialogue in Plato, of this argu­ment. I thought it therefore necessary that somewhat should be said of him: but that he should be thought in­spired, truly and really, or otherwise supernaturally agita­ted, then as of Orators was determined; notwithstanding all that hath been, or might yet be said of his so much ad­mired excellency, I see no necessity at all.

[Page 206]The second kind, according to the same Scaliger, are those, quos acuit meri exhalatio, educens animae instru­menta, spiritus ipsos, à partibus corporis materialibus: that is, whom the vapours of wine, freeing the spirits of the body from all material entanglements, and bodily function̄s, to serve the soul, do quicken and stirre up. No wonder indeed, if such be styled [...], by those by whom Bacchus was worshipped for a God. But where Bac­chus is not a God, but a fruit of the Vine, of the earth, and no more; how can they think it reasonable, to adscribe divinity unto Poets, for those effects, which not real inspi­ration only, as they seem to say, but even the vapours of wine, as themselves acknowledge, can produce? But let us consider of it soberly, and philosophically. It may be, we may find in this, though lesse danger of Blasphemy, yet as little reality of truth, as we have found in the former. Can the vapours of Wine make Poets? Truly I think not: I see no ground at all for it in nature. I have read what A­ristotle doth write of Wine, where he compares the several effects of it with the effects of Melancholy. I think he hath said as much of it, as can be said by any man, with any probability of reason. Yet I find not any thing in him, to perswade me that any Poets are made by Wine. I easily believe that the vapours of wine may dispose a man to make somewhat, that may be called a verse, or a rime, or a strong line: but that every one that makes verses, or rimes, or strong lines, is a Poet, I believe no more, then that an Ape is a man, because of some likenesse in out­ward shape; or a Parrot, a man, because of some words of mans language, which he is taught to utter. To make a Poet, that may deserve that title, is, as I take it, a work both of Art and Nature; but more of Nature then of Art. A divine wit, naturally, is the first ingredient in that rare piece. and though I allow not any real inspiration to any Poet (as a Poet,) more then to an Orator: yet of all kinds [Page 207] of natural Enthusiasme, I allow to Poets that which is the purest, and hath most of heaven in it. An Orator must not alwaies ravish. If he affect it in every part, it is likely he doth it in no part: he is a Fool, or a Child; not an Orator. But if through exuberance of wit and good language, he happen, without affectation, to ravish every where; he is not an Orator, but a Poet. We admire Plato, as a Phi­losopher: but they that read him with the same judgement, as many Ancients did, will finde that it is his Poetry, that he professeth not, that is admired; more then that Philo­sophy, that he professeth.

But is Wine nothing then towards the making of a Poet? Not toward the making, as to the faculty it self: but to­ward the making of a Poem, I think it may conduce not a little. It may lighten the heart, as of sorrow, so of care, the bane of all sublime thoughts: it may raise the spirits, when they want to be stirred up; and those spirits may work upon the faculty, which oftentimes is more at the command of such helps, (by a secret sympathy,) then it is of the will, though never so much endeavour be used. They are sel­dome good Poets, that can be Poets when they will. But all that are good, are not of one temper of body: & as they vary in temper of body, so may these accidental external helps be more or lesse requisite. I do not think it impossible, though it be much against the authority of some, and pra­ctise, I believe, of most Poets, that one that drinketh wa­ter, (the ordinary drink of many nations,) should be a good Poet. But he had need to have good store of good bloud, or a very strong phansie; which alone is able to raise spirits, and of all spirits, those especially, that have most power of the wit; that is, the purest, and most abstract from materiality.

That Wine doth not work upon the wit, by any parti­cular property or sympathy, but only by heating, or raising the spirits, I am the more apt to believe, because there be [Page 208] other things besides Wine, that have no lesse operation up­on the wit and invention. (the fountains of all good lan­guage,) of which no such suspicion can be, that they can adde or increase, but only stirre up and quicken. There be strange things written of the effects of Feavers, in that kind: few men, I think, that have been acquainted with feavers, or feaverish fits, not very violent, but can speak somewhat of their own experience. But this will have a more proper place, where we shall consider of the causes of Enthusiasme in general; and among other things, of that ardor parti­cularly, as one of the chief: of which somewhat already hath been anticipated in the former chapter; which makes me the more willing to forbear any further prosecution of it here. I believe Musick, some kind of it, may have the same operation in some tempers, upon the wit and phansie, as Wine hath: not by heating, or infusing any spirits, that can have any such operation of themselves; but by stirring up by a secret sympathy. But of that also, more in its proper place.

THis Title perchance of Precatory Enthusiasme, may seem unto some inconsistent with what we have professed more then once, and our general title doth bear; that we meddle not in this Discourse, with any thing that is truly religious. It is possible it may seem so to some: but unto such, I doubt, as in matters of truth, are better acquainted with things that seem, then with things real. Such may be jealous, without cause: and yet may have cause enough too, perchance, to be jealous, if they would not have any thing meddled with, that themselves phansie to be Religi­on. Of all duties of Religion, I easily grant Prayer to be as the chiefest in necessitie of performance, so the highest in point of accesse to God. If we may believe S. Basil, our prayer is not right, or we not right in our prayer, un­til the intention of our mind so farre carry us out of our bodies, that God (after a more then ordinary manner) possesse our souls: and if we cannot so much as say, Abbae, Father, without the Spirit; how much lesse can we pour out our Souls or spirits unto God in prayer, but by the spirit of God? But yet for all this, Christ himself hath taught us, that Heathens were wont to pray too: not by the spirit of God certainly, when they prayed unto Idols; nor yet with a right faith, without any warrant from Scripture; though with a strong confidence, upon their own presumptions, that they should be heard, because of their long prayers: (Matth. 6.7.)

But we may go farther, though this be enough to justi­fie our title. Not Heathens only, but Christians also may [Page 211] erre in their Prayers, unto the true God, (else not Chri­stians;) but by a false spirit, an erroneous Zeal; as Christs own disciples were once about to do: (Luke 9.54, 55.) As therefore there is a true, religious, supernatural Enthu­siasme, that belongeth unto Prayers; and a false, diabo­lical, supernatural, (directly opposite unto the former;) neither of which we desire to meddle with, more then of necessity, for distinction sake, and where the matter is doubt­full, which in so abstruse a businesse cannot be avoided: so there is a natural, between both, and different from both these, the proper subject of this Chapter. I know there is no errour in matter of Religion; no false Worship and Idolatry, I am sure, without some intervention of the De­vil. But if our distinction which we have in the Chapter of Contemplative Enthusiasme, between a general concur­rence, and immediate inspiration or possession, be remem­bred; we shall be the better understood.

The cause of natural Enthusiasme in point of Prayer, may be referred either to a vehement and continued inten­tion of the mind, or to the power of the language, or to the natural temper of the person.

For the first; that vehement intention of the mind, is naturally apt to breed an ecstatical passion, that is, trans­port a man besides himself; to make him believe that he either heareth, or seeth things, which no man else can either hear or see; and upon this illusion of the imagination, to frame in his understanding strange opinions, and strange confidences; both by reason, and by Examples, in the chapter of Philosophical Enthusiasme, hath been treated of, and fully discussed.

Of the power of Language in general, we have treated in the chapter of Rhetorical Enthusiasme. And that it hath the same power, to raise the same passions and affections upon the speakers, or bare utterers, as it hath upon the Au­ditors, as there is the same reason, so there be so many in­stances [Page 212] and testimonies out of ancient Authors, that no question of it can be made. All writers of Rhetorick insist upon it largely, and conclude generally, that he can never be a perfect Orator, whose speech hath not the same, or greater power upon himself, as he would have it to have upon others. Ipsa enim natura orationis ejus quae susci­pitur ad aliorum animos permovendos, oratorem ipsum magis etiam, quam quenquam corum qui audiunt, per­movet. that is, Such is the nature of speech, that though it be intended and undertaken to move others; yet it work­eth upon the speaker himself no lesse, (if not more) then it doth upon any that hear it: as a grand master of that Art, in point of speculation, and no lesse a practitioner, (both concurring to make him a perfect Orator,) delivers it. It was very good counsel that the same Ci­cero gave his brother,Note: Cicer. 2. De Orat. when Governor of Greece, a man naturally passionate; that when he was provoked to anger, he would forbear to speak, lest his words should be a farther incen­tive. Ancient heathens in their solemn prayers affected a dithyrambical composition, as we learn by those colle­ctions out of Proclus his Chrestomathia, made by Photius in his Bibliotheca: set out also by learned Sylburgius, at the end of Apollonius [...]: the propriety of that composition, as is observed by the said Proclus, being to stirre up enthusiasticall passions. Even a man that is not very fluent or rhetorical, in his ordinary discourse, may by long practice attain to a great facility, in point of prayer: which though it be a subject of so much latitude, as will admit of good variety of Rhetorick; yet is not so ample, but that a very ordinary man, with some labour, and a good measure of confidence, may attain to an extemporary faculty. He that believeth what hath been written in the former chapter, of the extemporary faculty of the ancient Sophistae and Orators, (which he that believeth not upon [Page 213] those evidences, may as well question whether ever any such men were truly, as Demosthenes and Cicero:) will make no great wonder of it.

But that which giveth most advantage, as to all Rhe­torick in general, so to prayer particularly, is, that natural ardor or fervency, wherewith nature hath endowed some men above others. I said, endowed. Some may quarrel at the word. my meaning is, where it is poised with equal discretion, then it is a gift; not otherwise. What that ardor is, besides what hath been already said of it, (where­of see in the Chapter of Rhetorical Enthusiasme:) shall be further enquired in its proper place. It comes often to be mentioned; which we cannot avoid, having so near relation unto all kinds (almost) of Enthusiasme.

The ignorance of this advantage of nature, being un­happily mistaken for true Christian Zeal, hath been the occasion of much mischief in the world, and a great stum­bling-block to simple people, to draw them into the con­tagion of pernicious Heresies. Swenckfield, a notorious arch-Heretick in Germany, the father of many Sects; who among other extravagancies, held blasphemous opinions concerning the Scriptures: Abraham Scultetus, (a man of precious memory among all Protestants,) in his Annales Ecclesiasticae, recordeth of him, that he was wont ardentes ad Deum preces creberrime fundere. But of blasphe­mous Hacket, who was executed in Queen Elizabeth her dayes, it is observed by many, that he was so ardent in his devotions, that he would ravish all that heard him: whereof some also he infected with the venome of his opi­nions, with no other engine, but that very charm of his ar­dent praying. I have read it in more then one, if I be not mistaken. I must now content my self with a passage out of the writings of a learned man, who though dead many years ago, yet was the memory of his exemplary piety very fresh among many, when I lived at Canter­bury; [Page 214] Hadrianus Saravia: whose words are; Fertur hic Hacketus in concipiendis extempore precibus adeo excel­luisse, ut Det spiritu eum totum ardere, & ab eo ipsius regi linguam, isti duo crederent: & adeo in sui rapuit ad­mirationem, ut nihil eum precibus non posse crederent à Deo obtinere; proinde quidvis ab eo posse perfici. that is: This Hacket is reported to have excelled so much in praying ex tempore, that those two (his disciples) did verily believe him altogether to have been inflamed, (or, wholly possest) by the spirit of God, and that his tongue was governed by Him: and such admirers were they of him, that as they believed there was nothing but he might obtain by his pray­ers from God; so consequently nothing that he desired, but he might effect.

But of all things that I have read in that kind, there is not any thing that would more scandalize a man not versed in naturall speculations, then what is written of that horrid Hell-hound, that incarnate Devil,Note: Nam quae de Nerone, Caligula, Domitiano, & reliquis pesti­bus humani generis scripta le­guntur, ludum jocumque dixeris, prae insana hujus rabie. Pau­lus Oderbornius in vita: qua­tern. L. 2. Witebergae: an. Dom. 1585. to whom Nero, Cali­gula & the fiercest Tyrants of ancient times compared, may be thought Saints, or merci­full men; (it is not mine, but their expression that have written his life, or of him; and he lived but in Queen E­lizabeth her dayes:) John Basilides, Duke, or King of Moscovia: of his carriage at his solemn devotions; how he prayed, how he fasted, how severe towards others, his soul­diers and Courtiers, that did not, at those times, conform themselves to his example: I leave it to every man to read,Note: Ibid. quatern. X 5. & N 6. b. In arce Alexandrovia, &c. & V 2. b. Sed tyrannum fera ra­bie, &c. in those that have written his life. Who would not admire the providence of God, who [Page 215] hath left us so many warnings in the Scriptures, (in the Gospels, and the writings of the Apostles of Christ, espe­cially;) that we should not be deluded by such outward appearances: and so many signes and evidences, how true Pietie might be discerned from false and counterfeit? so that no man that can but read and consider, can have any colour of excuse for his ignorance, if he be deceived. And where­as the same that have written the life of the said Basili­des, tell us of his feigned Visions and Revelations, by which he deluded the people: that they were feigned and imagi­narie, mere delusions and impostures, as to that which they pretended unto, God and Heaven, we are sure enough, and should think them mad, that should make any que­stion: but whether altogether feigned and imaginarie, as to Basilides himself; that is, whether the Devil, after God for his incredible wickednesse had once quite given him over, might not take the advantage of his enthusiastick devotions, to represent himself unto him in the shape of an Angel of light, to incourage him the better in those inhu­mane courses, the very relation whereof is so full of horror, as is able to amaze the most resolute, and to draw tears from them who delight in bloud and crueltie; some questi­on, I think, may be made.

But we have other Euchites, or Prayers, to speak of, that will trouble us more then these, in the inquisition of the cause. But before I go from this ardor, the Reader will give me leave to acquaint him with what I have met with concerning Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuites. He had need to have been a very fiery man, that hath been the founder of such Incendiaries, as they have proved (for the most part) in most Nations. But there be many that practise their tenets, yet rail at them: I know not how to call them. But to my sto­rie. I will not bind my Reader to believe it: but he may make very good use of it, if he believe it not; and therefore I am the more willing to acquaint him with it. In the life of the [Page 216] said Ignatius Loyola, written by a very eloquent man, (whe­ther as faithfull as eloquent, I know not:) Joannes Petrus Maffeius, we are told, that he was seen at his devotions (elevante spiritu sarcinam corporis, quatuor fere cubitis à terra sublimem: that is in English; four cubits almost a­bove the earth; the weight of his bodily lump being eleva­ted by the strength of the spirit. Here we may take notice of the prudence of the Jesuite, if he had ever read Philostra­tus, Of the life of Apollonius; whether to be styled the Philosopher, or Magician, I know not; but one that was worshipped (in opposition to Christ) by divers ancient Heathens, for a very God: (we have had him once before already, in the chapter of Rhetoricall Enthusiasme:) Or in case he had never read him, admire the providence of chance, that two good wits should so punctually jump, not in the substance only of the thing, but in the very name, though not quantitie, of the measure, at such a distance, not of places only, (as probably,) but of yeares, I am sure, more then a thousand by many hundreds. The matter is this: Philostratus (accounted by some a very fabulous Author, but justifiable enough, in comparison of that liber­tie some have taken since him, to forge miracles:) in his third book of Apollonius his life, relating there his peregri­nation to India, and his encounter with the Brachmannes, (who to this day retain the name, and no little portion of their ancient Philosophie:) their entertainment of him, their manner of living in their ordinary conversation among themselves, but particularly, what wonderfull things they did in his sight; among others, one is, their sacred Dances at their Devotions. the manner whereof was; They strook the ground with a mysticall rod; upon which, the ground under them did arise in waves, by which they were carried up in height above all ground (I should make some que­stion whether he meant above the plain ground, or above those mounting surges, but that I find in Eusebius, by way [Page 217] of explication; [...]:) just two cubits. [...], both in Philostratus and Eusebius: which I know not why the Latine Interpreter, in Aldus his edition would rather ex­presse by duos ferme passus, (though passus I know, there be minores, and majores;) then as the Interpreter of Euse­bius, altitudine bicubita. Now if the Jesuite had read Apollonius, there was all the reason in the world that he should double the measure; lest it should be objected, that Ignatius Loyola, had not he gone above two cubits, did no more, then what by Idolatrous Pagans and Philo­sophers had been done so long before: which would not have been so much to his praise. But if he happened up­on that measure by mere chance, without any regard to those heathen Philosophers; I will not repeat what I have said of it already: but it may seem so strange unto some, perchance, as to breed a doubt, whether it be not more probable, that both the one and the other, both Philostra­tus and Maffeius, when they wrote these pretty things, were not inspired by one and the same spirit, then to cast it upon mere chance.

But now to somewhat that may be more serious, if not more pleasant. There be many things written of the Mes­saliani, I know; and I believe nothing written, but may be true of some of them. It is seldome seen otherwise, but that they that take the libertie to leave the Common Rule, to follow some broacher of new doctrine; will also take the libertie to invent somewhat of themselves, besides what was thought upon by their Leader. But that which was gene­rall unto all that went under that Name, from which also they took their names of Messaliani, and Euchitae; what that was, S. Augustine tells us in these words: Messaliani,—En­chitae, ab orando sic appellati, &c.Note: August. de Hares. cap. 57. that is, The Messalians, or, Euchites, so cal­led from praying; wherein they are so as­siduous, [Page 218] that it seemeth incredible unto most that hear of it. For whereas our Saviour hath said, that we must alwaies pray, and not faint; and his Apostle, Pray without cea­sing: (which rightly understood imports, that our set times of prayer should be neglected upon no day:) these men do it so over-much, that for their very excesse herein, they are reckoned among the Hereticks. Other things are said of them, &c. The same is more fully related by Theodoret in his Ecclesiasticall History: where we read how Fla­vianus Bishop of Antiochia, desirous to know the certainty of those things that were spoken of them, found a way to insinuate himself into the good opinion of one of the chief for yeares and authority; who informed him to this effect: That all men brought with them into the world an evil spirit, by which they were possest, untill by earnest prayer (the only means effectuall, and available for such a pur­pose,) the evil being driven away, the good spirit of God did take possession of their souls: who also would testifie his presence unto them by certain visible signes and evi­dences. After which, they needed no more; no Sacra­ments, no Sermons, no Scripture, to make them perfect. That they could also see the holy Trinitie visibly, and fore­tell things to come.

This is the summe of the account given to Flavianus by old Adelphius, a grand veterane professor of that Sect. That the same did apply themselves, as to prayer, so to re­velations, from whence also they got the name of Enthusi­asts, is the observation not of Theodoret only, but of all that write of them. Although I will not take upon me to determine, whether all, or how many, in progresse of time, of these Enthusiasts, became really possest by the Devil; and in case it be supposed that all, or most, in progresse of time, were; yet then to determine the moment of time, or particular manner, be as much beyond my abilitie, as it is besides my task: we may neverthelesse safely and proba­bly [Page 219] enough conclude, that there is not much in either of those relations, that doth evince more, then may well be referred to Naturall Enthusiasme. For first of all, I will suppose, which I think will easily be granted, that every young novice, after he had once entred his name into that family, or sect, was prepared, partly by strange relations of Devils and Angels; and partly by the wild and stern coun­tenance of his Instructors, and all their ghastly crew; and partly by some other mysticall wayes, practised at this day among the Jesuites in some places; prepared, I say, for some time, before he betook himself to those exercises, that were to be the means of his transformation. This very pre­paration, if we reflect upon naturall causes and considera­tions, was enough to crack the brains of them that were not extraordinarilie sound. But afterwards, when fully per­swaded that the Devil was in them, which must be driven out by earnest, assiduous praying; and that the expelling of an evil, would be the bringing in of a blessed spirit, who would manifest himself by heavenly soul-ravishing visions and revelations; what might not this belief, this expecta­tion, this intention of the mind, and obstinate assiduity of endeavours, upon the most sound and sober? And if once ecstaticall, that is, out of their right wits, they needed no other enchantment for visions and revelations: it is very likely, except there were somewhat in their naturall temper that hindred, that they would offer themselves in course of nature. I appeal (if any make a question) to those many instances, that have been treated of in the chapter of Philo­sophicall Enthusiasme. But if they came once to foretell things future, as it often happens in such cases: though I allow of some kind of divinatorie naturall Enthusiasme, as hath been discussed in its proper place; yet withall be­lieving with the best and most experienced Physicians and Naturalists, that it is very ordinary for the Devil, (accor­ding to his nature and mischievous ends, to draw men from [Page 220] the worship of the true God, to the observation of such va­nities and curiosities; little better in the eyes of God then direct Apostacie, or Idolatrie;) to take the advantage of such naturall distemper, to produce supernaturall effects: upon this ground, I should be more apt to referre such di­vination to supernaturall, then naturall causes. As for the wonderfull increase and propagation of these praying En­thusiasts, in those dayes, which occasioned the destruction of many Convents and Monasteries, in divers places; as we find in ancient Histories: I have a consideration, or ra­ther a quaere upon it alreadie in the fore-quoted chapter; neither am I provided at this time, to say more upon it (which perchance I may, at another time:) then I have done there.

I have done with the Messaliani: who, as hath al­ready been said, had their name from their assiduous affe­cted praying. But the greatest Euchite that ever I read of, was one Haron, a Mahometan Prince, a Chaliph of Ae­gypt; who a hundred times every day (whether of his reign, or pilgrimages, which were many, is doubtfull to some by the words; but I think of his reign:) was upon his knees,Note: Hist. Arab. ab Erpenio publi­cata. (Erpenius, in his translation, in­geniculationibus; that is, according to the proprietie of the Arabick word, and the cu­stome of many in the Orient, when the bo­dy is bowed so low, that the hands rest upon the knees:) at his devotions. He was a very valiant Prince, and migh­tily prevailed against Christians. But this by the way only.

There is somewhat else here to be considered of: where­in as I shall not peremptorily determine, so I shall desire the Reader not to condemn before he have read and well considered. That there is a faith of Miracles distinct from a true, that is, a sanctifying, and justifying faith: that not unsanctified Christians only, (which of the two sorts, are [Page 221] the worst men;) but professed Infidels also may do some Miracles; as it may easily be proved by Scriptures, so is acknowledged as well by Papists, (who stand upon mira­cles more then we do,) as by Protestants. Whether there be not some kind of faith, or trust in God, whereof unsan­ctified Christians, and many that have not the knowledge of the true God, are capable; which in the course of Gods generall providence, according to his will and appointment from the beginning, may sometimes (with the concurrence of other causes, best known unto God,) produce great deliverances to the parties, and other strange, and little lesse then miraculous effects; is that I would now consider of, or rather propose to the consideration of others. What may be objected out of Scripture, we shall see by and by. I will first shew what grounds I have to move this que­stion. First for Scripture; that God doth hear sometimes the prayers of all men promiscuously, who fervently call upon him in their necessitie, we have the whole 107 Psalm to trust to, and Calvin's authoritie (which with some men will go much further then sound reason;) to oppose, if any should studie evasions from such manifest and expresse determination. Heraclitus, a Philosopher of great antiqui­tie, highly magnified by Hippocrates, was wont to say; [...]: that is, (ac­cording to Plutarch's interpretation and application,Note: Plut. in Coriolano. The words are quoted by some other; as by Clem. Alex. for one: but, nei­ther written (as I re­member,) nor interpret­ed by him, as by Plut.) that the greatest of Gods miraculous works were not known unto men, because of their un­belief.; which Plutarch himself else­where calleth, [...], the e­vil, or infirmitie of unbelief. Cer­tainly they that spake so, had in their time observed some­what in the course of the world, which led them to this ob­servation, by way of Maxime, or speculation. We read in the Gospel, that Christ did not (that he could not; [Page 222] Mark 6.5, 6.) many mighty works in his own countrey, because of their unbelief: (Matth. 13.5, 8.) And Acts 14.9. S. Peter before he did a miracle upon the lame man, looked upon him first whether he had faith to be heal­ed. The poor Cananitish woman her faith is highly com­mended by Christ, & her request therefore granted unto her; who by her profession was yet a mere Pagan, and there­fore resembled unto a dogge by Christ himself, in opposi­tion to them that did worship the true God, the God of Israel. I mention these places; but whether any thing to be concluded out of them to our purpose, rather then I will stand to dispute it, if any body be peremptory against it, let them go for nothing. Especially, (though I deny the necessitie of the consequence:) if any shall attempt from hence to argue against the miraculousnesse of those cures, or extraordinary supernaturall power of the parties, by whom they were done.

S. Chrysostome doth seem to ground it upon Scriptures but his own experience and authoritie, who was a man for his zeal and pietie (besides much other worth) not inferior unto any of those whom we call Fathers; may be as consi­derable to us, as that Scripture, which he seemeth to ground upon.Note: Chrysost. in Psal. 10. In his Commentaries upon the Psalms, in a place, he earnestly perswades all men, as well sinners▪ great sinners, as others, to rid them­selves of all care and distraction, and to put their trust in God alone, for safety and protection: [...]: that is, yea though thou be as great a sinner, as great can be. Note: Eccles. 2.10. He quotes the words of Ecclesi­asticus for it. Look at the generations of old▪ and see: Did ever any trust in the Lord, and was confounded? He saith not, (they are Chrysostom's words;) Did ever any just, (or, good:) but any: that is, whether good or bad. [...], &c. that is; For this is marvellous indeed, that even sinners, if [Page 223] they once take hold of this anchor, ( [...],) no man can hurt them; (or, they become unconquerable.) But S. Chrysostome might have added out of the same, upon whom he seemeth to ground, as Scripture; that it is not a light trust, or confidence that will do it: Wo be to fearfull hearts, and faint hands, and the sinner (the craftie Poli­tician, as I take it, that would seem to do all by God; and yet doth work more by cunning, then by confidence:) that goeth two wayes: Wo unto him that is faint-hearted; for he believeth not: for he shall not be defended. But then it may be objected, that the same Author hath other words; as, Order thy way aright: and, Did ever any abide in his fear &c. which seem to restrain it unto such, who though they have been great sinners, perchance, formerly; yet for the time to come, propose to themselves to lead a new life. This may be objected: and somewhat as easily, perchance, (as to the drift of that Author) answered. But I have said as much as I mean, because whatsoever his meaning be, I cannot ground much upon it. If other known and cer­tain Scriptures be objected; as particularly, John ch. 9.21, 22, 23. Now we know that God heareth not sinners, &c. it is answered by some, That that is no Scripture; but a simple report, or testimony of the common opinion: by others, That the words are not intended as an absolute maxime, or proposition extending unto all generally; but unto such only as take upon them (without a right com­mission,) the office of Prophets, and would do Miracles, for a confirmation of their vocation: that in such a case, God will not hear, &c. I will not warrant either of these answers to be satisfactory: I need not: I will make use of neither, but take the words as Scripture, as knowing, that there be other Scriptures enough to make that sense very Ca­nonicall. But is there any Scripture almost, so absolutely intended, but is liable to some limitations? God will hear them that are godly, even when he doth not hear them. If [Page 224] he do not sometimes grant unto them what they earnestly pray for, it is for their greater good, that he doth not. He is not a Christian, not so sound a Christian, I am sure, as he should be, that doth not believe this as verily, as he doth believe that there is a God. If God doth hear such sinners sometimes; (as such a faith, I believe, though merely naturall, is a very rare thing; especially, if the con­currence of some other cause, as we said before, be requisite:) though he grant them what they desire, as the avoiding of some present great evil, or the atchieving of some great ex­ploit, or the like: yet it may be doubted, whether alwayes for their good; who perchance are thereby the more con­firmed in their wickednesse, which will bring them in the end, to eternall misery. Sonne, thou art ever with me, &c. Luke 15.31, 32. though it be not altogether the same case; yet are the words so appliable to this, as able, in my judgement, if well thought upon, to take away all scruples and risings of thoughts in that kind.

But what (if any man object) is this to Precatory En­thusiasme? Yes: For I conceive that where-ever this natural confidence is found, there is that natural ardor; which is a principall thing in the causes of natural Enthu­siasme, as already more then once hath been observed. S. Jerome upon those words of the Gospel, The spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak; (but upon which of the Gospels, that hath the words, I cannot tell, except I had the book:) hath these words: Hoc adversus temerarios, &c. that is, This is to be noted against some rash men, (or, Christians▪) who perswade themselves that whatever they believe, they shall obtain. But let us consider, that as we have confidence from the fervency of our spirits: so have we as much occasion to fear, because of the weaknesse of our flesh. Whether he intended this ardor mentis, of a natu­ral, or supernatural zeal, for want of other circumstances, is not easie to judge. For as among them that professe [Page 225] Christianity, and seem to be zealous, as zealous as can be, there be many that are nothing lesse then Christians: So amongst them that are true, sanctified, orthodox Christians, some may be found, that have more zeal then they have discretion, to discern between time and time, persons and persons, and other circumstances, by which they that in­tend to do good, ought, as by the word of God they are directed, to guide their zeal. But it is more likely that he intends it of true zeal: for not long after he useth the same words of S. Peter; (eodem mentis ardore, quo caetera:) whose zeal though it were not alwaies seasonable, and therefore sharply reproved by Christ in a place; yet al­wayes true and sincere. God forbid that we should make any question.

I had rather be silent, then not to speak well. But because my silence may be misconstrued, where so much opportu­nity doth invite, as well as my judgement: I will rather expose my self to censure, then to disappoint my reader of his expectation. There is one that calls himself Nico­laus Leonicus Thomaeus, an Italian of no small credit in his dayes, (and I wish no man had done worse upon Aristotle, then he hath done:) who hath set out some philosophical Discourses, or Dialogues, as he calls them; the title of one of which is, Sadoletus, five De Precibus. The subject of the Dialogue is, what it is that maketh Prayers available. I have read it more then once: I am sorry I can make no­thing of it, whether I consider him as a Christian, (espe­cially having interessed two Cardinals and one Bishop in the businesse; the one by his Dedication, the two other, as Interlocutors;) or as a mere Philosoper, his chiefest undertaking. The Reader may quickly satisfie himself: It is no long discourse. And when he hath done, if he judge otherwise, let him condemne my dulnesse, not my malignity: I shall think my self much beholding to him for it.

[Page 226]I shall conclude this Chapter with a relation. I have read some things, and heard of many, that I have thought strange, in that kind; but never met with any thing of that nature, that I took more notice of. My Author is one that I have named already more then once, as I take it: Anto­nius Benivenius: whom I find often quoted by learned Physicians, without any exception: which makes me to give him the more credit, though I find my self often posed with his relations. However, the very circumstances of this relation, if judiciously considered, are such, as can ad­mit of no suspicion. But the Reader may believe as much, or as little, as he pleaseth. It may be some ease to him, (Quanto expeditius est dicere, Mendacium, & fabula est? as Seneca somewhere: just as he that confuted Bellarmine with three words, in the Pulpit:) if he be resolved to be­lieve nothing, that he cannot understand: it shall not trouble me, who undertake not for the truth of it. I trust him, whom many before me (men of good judgement,) have trusted: more then which, no ingenuous Reader will require of me. And as I undertake not for the truth, so I will passe no further judgement upon the cause. The case out of his Latine, in my English, is this:

‘Note: Anton. Benivenius, de abd. n. ac mir. morb. ac san. causis: ed. Bas. an. D. 1529. c. 10. p. 215. &c.A certain Florentine, whose name was Gaspar, having received a wound in the Breast; (or about the Heart;) whilest he endeavors to pull out the dart, pulls out the arrow, but leaves the point behinde. When the Chirurgions had done all that could be done by art and skill, to get it out, and all in vain, because it stuck so fast in one of the inmost Ribbs, that it was impossible to draw it without a lar­ger wound, and some danger of breaking the said Ribb: (or, without taking away part of the Ribb with it:) he resolved to undergo any death, though never so painfull, rather then to submit to such a cure. But at last being [Page 227] grown desperate, he attempted to hang himself, or to cast himself into the next River (Arnus,) or into some deep Well; and had done it, had not his friends that were about him, watched him with great care and dili­gence. Among them there was one, Marioctus by name; a man of approved piety and integrity; who besought him with great importunity, that giving over despera­tion, he would endeavour to commit so incurable an evil into the hands of God, the author of all salvation. Ga­spar being at last perswaded by him, betakes himself to God; and ceased not, both night and day, to pray; till at last he was taken with a spirit of divination: (or, fell into fits of divination:) so that he would tell who were coming to him to visit him, even when they were yet farre off. Besides that, he would name all men, though never seen before, by their right names; and exhort all that came to him, to fear God, and to be confident of his help in time of need. That himself was now not only assured of his recovery, and of the day and hour, parti­cularly; but by the same light (that assured him,) he also foresaw many other things that should happen: as, that he was to go to Rome, and dy there: the banishment of Pe­trus Medicis, and his flight: the distresses & Calamities of Florence: the ruine of Italy; and divers other things, which for brevity we omit: the fulfilling whereof (for the most part) we have already seen. As for the point, it came out of the wound of its own accord, the very day & hour that he had foretold: and when it was come out, he ceased to pro­phesy; and after a while, being gone to Rome, he died there.’

I said I would passe no judgement upon the cause: nei­ther shall I. However, did not I believe, that it had some relation to the contents of this Chapter, the Reader may be sure it should not be here. But though here, yet not any thing from thence to be concluded of the cause, if he remember what hath been said of some cases: some [Page 228] mixed cases: of others, so uncertain and obscure, as not (by me at least,) at all determinable. My Author makes it a Miracle: Miraculo liberatus, is his argument, pre­fixed before the Chapter. I oppose it not: and I like it the better; First, because in such an extremity, that seemed as much above the patience, as help of man, there was no other way, that either piety or discretion could suggest, but to be importunate with God. And secondly, because addresse was made unto God immediately. This may relish of Lutheranisme, with them that have more zeal for Saints, then they have for God: or at the best, think they serve God best, when they pray to them, who but lately (as to God, and Eternity,) were their fellow-servants. But Nicolaus Remigius, I hope, Privy Counseller to the Duke of Lorrein, (as a Duke, so a Cardinal too:) and a great Judge in capital causes, within his Dominions; was no Lutheran. Let any man read the first, and the fourth Chapter of his third book of Daemonolatry: and let him judge, whether there be not cause to suspect such addresses, as are made unto Saints in such cases. But this is more then I intended: I leave the rest to the Reader; and so conclude this Chapter.