THough our Gentlemen of the Revolution seem well satisfied with their new Allegiance, yet the Reasons (if not the De­grees) of their Compliance are very dif­ferent. 'Tis true, there are some few fur­nished with that variety of Demonstra­tion as to be able to make out the Ju­stice of the late Proceedings from no less than Four infallible Topicks, Abdica­tion, Forfeiture, &c. but Men of this Com­pass of Thought are not commonly met with. The more moderate Undertakers are content to maintain a single Post, and think themselves well if the Cause will af­ford them one good Reason for what they do. Now in this their Vindication they are no less divided from themselves than from their Neighbours of the old Government. Some Men affirm, That the Crown was lapsed to the People, and that their Representatives have given it to the Prince of Orange, by way of Gra­titude. Others thinking their Consciences not safe in this Bottom, tell us, That they are either Conquered or Undone; and seem Uneasy, because they don't argue in Chains. In earnest, our Circum­stances must needs be hard, when our best Friends, who were so nicely Appre­hensive of the least Incroachment, desert us at this surprising Rate. Who would have thought that these Keepers of the Liberties of England, who declaim'd so heartily against Arbitrary Power, and gave God solemn Thanks for their Deliverance, should reverse their Devotions thus soon, plead against Magna Charta, and set all their Wits on work to make us as great Slaves as those in Turkey? For that this glorious Condition is the Consequence of Conquest, is a Truth so obvious to collect, that a very little Reasoning will make it undeniable. And as if Disputing and Prin­ting against the freedom of their Country were not enough; to make all sure, they are pleased to ratify their Slavery with an Oath. That they do no less is apparent; for those that Swear to the new Establish­ment, upon the Principle of Conquest, Swear that the Laws of the Old Consti­tution are no longer in force. And that the present Possessors may turn them out of their Freeholds, and sell them to the West Indies without any Legal In­justice. For when a People are Conquered their Lives and Fortunes lye at the Mercy of the Conquerour. This Title makes his Sovereignty absolute, and his Will a Law. But I shall take leave of these Submissive Gentlemen, and proceed to consider the Arguments for a King de Facto.

Now it is asserted by some of the Long Robe, That Possession of the Throne, abstracted from any other Title, is suffi­cient to challenge a full Obedience from the Subject; and that the Right of a Lawful Prince expires upon his Dispos­session: This Opinion is founded upon Sir Ed. Coke's Authority, who in his In­stitutes Part 3. Ch. High Treason, main­tains, That the Word Roi, mentioned 25 Ed. 3. is to be understood of a King in Possession (though unjustly) of the Crown [Page 2] and Kingdom. The Grounds of this Con­clusion are taken from 11 H 7. c. 1. Now supposing this Act did resolve all Right into Force, and was as Extraordinary as some People would make it, yet it could secure no more than thē Dominion of England to the present Possessors. For First, It cannot reach Scotland because it is an independent Kingdom; and it has lately declared in Parliament (when Duke Lauderdale was High Commissioner) that the Prosperity of that Nation has been chiefly owing, next under God, to the absolute Power, and uninterrupted Suc­cession of their Kings. So that it is plain, a King de Facto has nothing to do there; neither has he any better Colour of pre­tence to the Government of Ireland. First, For the Reason above-mentioned, viz. because Ireland is a separate and distinct Dominion from England, as Sir Ed. Coke undeniably proves, Calvin's Case, p. 22, 23. Secondly, If it be Ob­jected, That the Irish obliged themselves by Poyning's Act to be governed by the Laws of England. To this I answer, That the Irish bound themselves only to receive those Laws which were then made, not such as should be made, for the future; and therefore that Kingdom is unconcerned with 11 H. 7. in regard it was Enacted a Year after the Statute of Poynings. Besides in that Island, the King de Iure, and de Facto, is the same person. To return therefore to Eng­land, I observe First, That Sir Ed. Coke, in his Notion of the Prerogatives of a King de Facto, contradicts himself: For, in Calvin's Case, he tell us, That Allegiance and Faith are due to a King by the Law of Nature. He must mean a Rightful King; for the Law of Nature doth not incourage Injustice and Usurpation. Se­condly, He affirms, That the Law of Nature is part of the Law of England, and cites Bracton, Fortescue, &c. for this Point. And Thirdly, That the Law of Nature is immutable, Calvin's Case, p. 12. From hence I infer, That if Allegiance is due to a Rightful King, by the Law of Nature; if this Law is incorporated into our English Constitution, and of an im­mutable Obligation, then it necessarily follows, That as long as we have a King de Iure, we must be de Iure his Subjects: So that by Sir Ed. Coke's Argument, It must be unlawful to assign over our Obedience to a Prince de Facto, who hath nothing but meer[?] Power to prove his Authority. Farther he tells us, That Rex de Facto & non de Iure, is Seignieur le Roi, within the Purvieu of the Statutes, sc. 25 Ed. 3. which he pretends to prove from 11 H. 7. c. 1. which being the First Authority he cites in confirmation of his Opinion, he owns by Consequence, That before the making this Statute, a King de Facto was not within the Purvieu of 25 Ed. 3. And therefore, upon his own Grounds, the King for the time being, mentioned 11 H. 7. c. 1. must be a King de Iure, at least one that was presumed such; because at that time the Consti­tution knew no other: For that Pos­session was not a sufficient Title before 11 H. 7. will evidently appear from these following Remarks.

First, Because we don't find so much as the Name of a King de Facto in our Statutes till▪ 1 Ed. 4. c. 1. where all the Lancastrian Line are declared Kings▪ de Facto, but not de Iure; in Deed, but not in Right; pretensed (or pretended) Kings. 1 Ed. 4. c. 1.

Secondly, Henry the Sixth is said to be rightfully amoved from the Govern­ment: And his Reign affirmed to be Intrusion and Usurpation; and himself attainted for being in Arms against Ed­ward the Fourth. Cotton's Abridg. fol. 670, 671. Baggot's Case, 9 Ed. 4.

Thirdly, All Patents of Honour, Char­ters and Priviledges, which were granted by the House of Lancaster; all Acts of Royal Authority, which the Kings of England have a Right to execute by vertue of their sole Prerogative; (nay Acts of Parliament themselves, parti­cularly those relating to Shrewsbury, and some others, which by parity of Reason supposes the rest in the same Condition;) all Acts of this Nature were confirmed by the first of Edw. the Fourth, which is a good Argument that this Parliament believed the Authority by which they were performed to be [Page 3] Defective and Illegal: For we never find any such general Confirmations as these pass upon the Grants of Kings de Iure.

Fourthly, In the First Year of Hen. 7. Ric. 3. was attainted of High Treason in Parliament, under the Name of Duke of Glocester; (Lord Bacon, vit. H. 7. p. 1004.) from whence its plain, That as there was no Statute, so neither was there any Common Law to support the Title of a King de Facto; for Treason is an Attempt against the King's Person, his Crown and Dignity, but no Man can commit Treason against himself: Therefore if Ric. 3. had been a King in the Sense of the Law, we may be sure he would not have had such an infamous Censure past upon him after his Death. Bradshaw, and his High Court of Justice, were the First that were so hardy as to pronounce a King of England guilty of Treason.

Fifthly, if this Notion of a King de Facto had been allowed in the 1 H. 7. the Principal Assistants of Ric. 3. would not have been attainted, (Lord Bacon ibid.) for Richard being actually in the Seat of the Government, he was, accor­ding to our modern way of arguing, Rightful King; and consequently the People ought to own him as such, and defend him against all Opposers: And if so, certainly they ought not to be con­demned as Traytors for doing their Duty, as we find many of those were who fought for King Richard.

Sixthly; At the end of this Parliament Hen. 7. granted a General Pardon to the common People, who had appeared against him in the behalf of Ric. 3. Now Pardon supposes a Fault, and the Breach of a Law; which they could not have been charged with, if the Plea of a King de Facto had been warranted by the Constitution.

The Consideration of these Things is sufficient to confute that new Notion, which is advanced in a late Book (The unreasonableness of a Separation, &c. p. 30.) viz. That a King de Facto is in the Sense of our Law no Usurper. The Instances of proof are made in the Three succes­sive Henrys. Thus this Author: But we see unrepealed and unexceptionable Acts of Parliament say the contrary. For, not to sum up the whole Evidence, are not these Lancastrian Princes called pre­tensed Kings, Kings in Deed but not in Right? Now what are pretended Kings, who have no Right, but are rightfully amoved from the Government, what are[?] such Kings but Usurpers? If the de­taining and exercising that Power or Property, which by evident Declarations of Law belongs to another, be not Usur­pation; then no Man can be an Usurper, but all Titles are alike, and there is no such thing as Right and Wrong. But possibly this Author thinks the Crown to be Ferae Naturae, and that its every Ones that can catch it. If so, the Parliament 1 Ed 4. was not of his Opinion. For they condemn the Proceedings of Henry Earl of Darby (as they call Hen. 4.) in very sharp Expressions; they affirm the Reign of Hen. 6. to be Intrusion and Usurpation.

They are very positive, That he who is an Intruder at First, must (provided the Right Owners are known) be an Usurper ever after; and that the Conti­nuation of an Injury cannot alter the Nature of it, except it be to heighten the Crime. Indeed it would go hard with honest Men if Dominion might be acquired by Injustice, and Right depen­ded upon Wrong.

This Parliament, Rot. Parl. 1 E. 4. n. 9 10.. &c. and that of 1 Iac. 1. (though possibly this Author may not think it material) fix the Crown upon the Point of Proximity and declare, That Ed. 4. and Iac. 1. are rightful Kings of England by virtue of their Lineal De­scent, by the Laws of God, of Nature, and those of the Land; and that they will repute them, and their Heirs, for true Kings of England, and no other, in virtue of their said Right and Title, and spend the last drop of their Blood in defence of it. This one would imagine is sticking upon the point of Proximity to purpose: And yet our Author is pleased to say, That a King of England may challenge Obe­dience though he does not claim by an im­mediate Hereditary Right, pag. 30.

Now he that has Allegiance due to him must have the Prerogatives of So­vereignty: [Page 4] For the Word Allegiance, applied to Kings, imports thus much in the Sense of our Laws, 11 H. 7. &c. So that by Consequence he may be King to all Intents and Purposes without an imme­diate Hereditary Right, i. e. without any Hereditary Right at all: For Hereditary Right is nothing but a Lineal Succession to the last Lawful Possessor, and there­fore it must be immediate in the very Notion of it. For where the next in Blood may be Lawfully pretermitted, the whole Family may be served so too; and consequently can lay no claim to an Hereditary Right. But as far as our Au­thor can see, our Laws require Allegiance to be paid to a King, without such He­reditary Right. I am sorry he could not see these Acts of Parliament, nor the Oaths of Allegiance and Suprema­cy; for then possibly he would have been of another Opinion. There is an excellent Book, called The Grand Que­stion, which, had it lain in this Gentle­man's way, I believe the Authority and Reason of it would have inlightned him upon this Point: For that Great Author proves, That an Act made 1 Ed. 3. was not barely Repealed, but declared in Par­liament to be Unlawful; because Ed. 2. was then Living, and true King. Rot. Parl. 64. 21 Rich. 2. Grand Quest. p. 80, 81.

Secondly, He takes it for granted be­tween himself and his Adversary, That Hen. 4. was an Usurper, and consequently that the Repeal of 21 Rich. 2. was not Legally made; especially considering Rich. 2. was then Living, Id. p. 83.

Thirdly, He avers, That Ed. 3. was an Usurper as long as his Father was Living, and the Proceedings of the Parliament under him, during that time, null and void. p. 85, 86.

And yet it must be granted, That Ed. 3. had several Advantages which some Kings de Facto cannot pretend to. For 1. He was Heir apparent to Ed. 2. 2. His Father had resigned the Crown, though by constraint. 3. The Parlia­ment which adhered to him was sum­moned in Edw. 2. Name. 4. There was no Oaths of Allegiance and Supre­macy enjoyned the Members of both Houses, under the Penalty of nulling every Thing they did, by omitting to Swear; as there are since by express Statutes▪ 7 Iac. 1. 30 Car. 2.

Farther I desire to know of our Au­thor, Whether the English of a King de Iure is not one to whom the Govern­ment belongs, according to the Consti­tution? He grants thus much, and af­firms, That he who succeeds by proxi­mity of Blood is such a King de Iure. Now if a Prince who claims by Descent comes in by the Constitution, then he who founds himself upon the Peoples Consent (the Author's King de Facto) must cross upon the same Constitution, and consequently be an Unlawful King. For if the Laws tye the Crown to Suc­cession, as they evidently do; then a Title drawn from the Peoples Consent is against Law: Unless a Kingdom can be Elective and Hereditary at the same time; i. e. unless the People may have a Liberty, and no Liberty, to chuse their King. Now if a King de Facto be neither de Iure nor a Usurper, neither a Lawful nor (as our Author affirms) an Unlaw­ful King, then certainly he is no King at all. For to aver, That there is a Medium between these Two, is to say, That a Man may have a Title which is neither Right nor Wrong: And then sure Aristotle is much to blame for exposing those Philo­sophers who asserted, A Thing might be, and not be, at the same time. For the one is not a greater contradiction in Nature than the other is in Morality.

Farther, this 11 H. 7. though never so loosely Interpreted, can do no Ser­vice to the present Settlement; because it's vertually repealed by 1 Eliz. by which we are obliged to Swear to be true to the King, His Heirs and Lawful Succes­sors, i. e. those who have a Right to the Crown by Proximity of Blood.

From whence I argue, First, That if we are Sworn by Act of Parliament to pay Allegiance to the Heirs of a King de Iure, who never were in Possession, then a Fortiori to a King de Iure; who be­sides the Legality of his Title, has been actually recognized as Sovereign, and enjoy'd an uncontested Administration of the Regal Power.

[Page 5]Secondly, If our Laws oblige us to Swear subjection to the Heirs, &c. of a Rightful Prince, then by undeniable Con­sequence we are bound not to translate our Allegiance to those who are unjustly set up by the People. For without all Question the Words Heirs and Lawful Successors were made use of on purpose to secure the Hereditary Rights of the Monarchy, and to prevent all Usurpa­tions upon the direct Line. And since by virtue of the Statute which framed the Oath of Supremacy, we are not to acknowledge any pretended Governors to the Prejudice or Disinhersion of the Heirs of the King de Iure, then most cer­tainly we ought not to do this in Oppo­sition to the King de Iure himself. So that now we have no Pretence to make Right the consequence of Possession in the Crown, any more than in other pri­vate Cases.

But supposing this Statute of H. 7. was in full force, it cannot be applied to the present Case. First, Because the Title to the Crown was then somewhat doubtful and intangled, at least, in the opinion of the People: For notwith­standing the Right lay in the House of York, yet that of Lancaster had possessed the Throne for Three Decents successive­ly, and pretended that Edmund Crouch­back, under whom they claimed, was elder Brother to Ed. 1. The Case there­fore being thus disputable and perplex'd with respect to the Multitude; this Act (as my Lord Bacon observes) was made to indemnify the Subject, who out of a principle of Integrity had serv'd the Crown; it being thought unreasonable that the common People should suffer for their Loyalty.

They had not an Opportunity of ex­amining Pedigrees, and searching Re­cords, and therefore it would have been hard, if they had been obliged to forfeit their Lives and their Estates, only for their being so unfortunate as to pay a well meant Allegiance to a wrong Person: And since at that time they were not so well qualified to find out the Right of their Prince, it was thought sufficient for them to follow the Solemnities of Pomp and Power, and to be exempt from Punishment, provided they adher'd to him, who was in present Possession: But to apply this Statute to a Case where the Title is clear and uncontested, is a very Illogical and Dangerous way of Ar­guing, and has as little Warrant from the reason of the Act, as from Equity it self. It appears sufficiently from the History of those Times, that this Act was only intended for the security of H. 7. who had a very lame Title, and therefore be­ing made upon a particular and singular occasion, it ought not to be extended farther to the prejudice of Equity and Common-Law, nor be interpreted in such an extravagant Sence, as encoura­ges Treason and Ambition to scramble for the Crown as often as they have any prospect of Succeeding in their Wicked­ness. But,

Secondly, To put the matter out of all doubt, I shall prove from the very Words of the Act, that it was no more then a Temporary Law, and expir'd with the Life of the Prince who made it. The Statute begins thus, The King our Sove­reign Lord calling to remembrance the Du­ty of Allegiance of his Subjects of this Realm. Afterwards the Enacting part follows, sc. Those who attend upon the King for the time being, and do him true and lawful Service of Allegiance, &c. shall be secur'd from all manner of Forfeitures and Mole­stations relating to their Persons or Estates, provided always that no Person or Persons, shall take any benefit or advantage by this Act, which shall hereafter decline from his or their said Allegiance. Now we know a Proviso is an Exception or Restraint upon the Latitude, and Comprehensive­ness of the Law, and that all Statutes are perfectly Null so far as the Proviso reaches. Having premised this, I shall endeavour to prove that this Act was de­signed only for the security of that Reign in which it was made, and cannot be stretch'd any farther. To make this ap­pear, Let us suppose a Competition be­tween a Prince de Iure, and H. 7. i. e. an other de Facto, and that the Subject in­gages [Page 6] for the latter. In this Case if the King de Facto prevails, there is no need of the assistance of this Statute; for we cannot imagine any Prince could be so Impolitick as to punish those who have ventur'd their All to maintain him in his Government. This, besides the ingrati­tude of the Action, proclaims the In­justice of his Cause, and is the way to ruin his Interest. If it be Objected, That if it had not been for the Indemnity of this Statute, he would have been oblig'd to have punish'd them for opposing their lawful Prince. To this I Answer, First, Do Kings de Facto always perform that which the Laws require? If so, they would never have been Kings de Facto; since they could not make themselves Masters of the Sovereign Power, with­out dispossessing those who are supposed the right Owners of it. Secondly, The Possessour would not so much as seem obliged to punish his Adherents upon a Competition, except he own'd himself to be no more then a King de Facto, that is, unless he acknowledg'd the Acquisi­tions of his Victory Unjust, and himself an Usurper; but we have neither Example nor Reason, to expect such singular Con­fessions as these; For no Usurper will own himself in the Wrong so long as he intends to enjoy the Advantages of his Injustice: Upon supposition therefore that the Victory had fallen on the side of a King de Facto, the Act would be wholly superfluous.

But Secondly, If the King de Iure had prevailed, the matter is not mended; For now, though those that stood by the King de Facto will have great occasions for an Indemnity, yet this Act will be as helpless to them now, as it was needless before: For either they must submit to the King de Iure or not; if they do not submit, it's easie to imagine the conse­quences, how a Victorious and Irresistable Prince will treat the Obstinate and Rebel­lious Opposers of his Just Title; if they do submit, as of necessity they must, then they can claim no manner of Privi­ledge and Indemnity from this Act, for they cannot come into the side de Iure without deserting that de Facto, i. e. with­out declining their Allegiance to him, who was King when this Statute was made. By declining which Allegiance, the Pro­viso expressly excludes them from all manner of Benefit or Advantage by this Act. In this condition the Law would have left the de Facto Party. If the So­vereignty had been disputed between H. 7. and the House of York, and the Prince de Iure, or House of York had been Successful: From whence it's undeniably plain, that neither the Design nor Words of this Statute can be drawn to such a monstrous Construction, as to Enact bare Possession a good Title, and make Might and Right the same thing. The only de­sign of this Parliament was to continue the Crown to H. 7. during his Life; which both by the Body and Proviso of the Act, was as effectually done as in them lay. Now the reasons that prevailed with the Two Houses to consent to a Temporary alteration of the Constitution with respect to the Crown, were probably these.

1. Because H. 7. did not openly disavow his Reigning in his Wifes Right, who was Queen de Iure, for the Act of Parliament by which he was recognized King of En­gland, was Interpretable in this Sence, (Lord Bacon, ibid. p. 1003.) and with this Construction there was no injury done to the Hereditary Right of the Crown.

2. Elizabeth, the Queen de Iure, by her subsequent Marriage and acquiescence, seem'd contented with this Settlement. So that her forbearing to claim, or in the least to insist upon her Right, was a tacit resignation of it to King Henry, which seem'd to make him not only de Facto, but during her Life de Iure too.

3. When this Parliament was called, Perken Warbeck had lately made a Des­cent upon Kent, and threatned the King­dom with a more formidable Invasion (Lord Bacon, p. 1075, 1076.) Now though the Two Houses might see through the Imposture; yet it's plain many of the People did not. Nay some Persons of great Quality, who had bet­ter Opportunities for Enquiry, believed [Page 7] Perkin to be the true Plantagenet, Son to Ed 4. The Parliament therefore, who knew him to be no more than a Counterfeit Prince, must conclude that the best way to secure the Suc­cession of the Crown, was to support the Go­vernment of H. 7. which (considering the present Scruples and Uncertainties of Right) could not be more effectually done, than by Indemnifying all those who should afterwards appear for him.

4. We are to consider that at this juncture H. 7. had several Children by his Queen, viz. Arthur, Henry, &c. So that now the contend­ing Families of York and Lancaster, being thus happily United, there was no reason to fear, That a Security, though an unusual one, to the present Possessor, could be prejudicial to the right Line; especially since the force of that Act was confined to the Reign of that Prince, as has been already prov'd.

5. That this Act was no more than Tem­porary may be made good from the Practice, as well as the Reason, of that Law; I shall cite the Duke of Northumberland's Case, who, when he was tryed for Treason for leading an Army against Q. Mary, desired to be infor­med by the Judges, Whether a Man acting by the Authority of the Great Seal, and the Order of the Privy Council, (or Prince's Council, as Stow and Heylin word it) could become thereby Guilty of Treason? To which the Judges an­swered, That the Great Seal of one that was not Lawful Queen could give no Authority, or Indemnity, to those that acted by such a War­rant. Burnet's Hist. Reform. p. 2. p. 243. Upon which the Duke submitted; though without Question he did not want Lawyers to reinforce his Plea, if his Case would have born it. From whence

1. I infer, against Sir. Edw. Coke, That Treason lyes against a King de Iure, though out of Possession: For its plain, by all our Historians, that Q. Mary was far from being possessed of the Crown, when the Duke of Northumberland acted against Her. So far was she from being Regnant that, its pretty plain, she had no great hopes of Succeeding. For when she understood Q. Iane had taken the Government upon her, she retired with only a few Suffolk Gentlemen to Framingham Castle, near the Sea, that she might be ready to embarque for the Security of her Person. But I shall insist upon this Corolary no farther though were it necessary it might be proved by other unquestionable Authorities.

2. I infer, That any Commission or Autho­rity granted by a King de Facto, against one de Iure, is null and insignificant; though it has all other Advantages and Forms which the Law prescribes. The only Objection against this Inference is, That the Lady Iane was not a Queen de Facto. But why not a Queen de Facto? Had she not the Colour of K. Edward's Letters Patents, and the Concur­rence of all the Judges save one, to support her Claim? Did not a numerous Privy Coun­cil, several of which were Persons of the first Quality, and highest Offices of the Kingdom, swear Allegiance to her? Heylin's Ref. p. 160. Was she not proclaimed in London, and in most of the chief Cities, Towns and Places, of greatest Concourse? Heyl. Ibid. p. 237. Burn. p. 237. Were not the Tower of London, and the Land and Naval Forces, under her command? 'Tis true, some of them deserted her soon after; but this proves they were with her before. Did she not assume the Name and State of a Queen, and were not the Seals those Dead Springs of the Government in her Custody? I grant our Historians agree, That her Queen­ship lasted but Nine or Ten Days; but if she had Reigned but so many Hours, it had been sufficient to prove the Point in hand: For the Essence of a King de Facto consists in Possession, and extent of Power; not in the length of his Government. Besides, when the Duke pleaded the Warrant of the Privy Council, and the Great Seal; the Judges an­swered, That his Authority was invalid, be­cause granted by one who was not Lawful Queen. Where we may observe, They don't deny her the Name of a Queen; but allow it by implication in their Answer. And since she was a Queen, and not de Iure, she must be one de Facto: For I have already proved, That our Laws take no Notice of any Third Chimerical Monarch, distinguished from these Two. We see therefore, in the Opinion of the Judges and Court in Q. Marys Reign, That the 11 H. 7. cannot indemnify the Subjects for bearing Arms against a Prince de Iure: For if it could have been serviceable to the Duke, its unima­ginable to suppose his Counsel should forget such a remarkable Defence.

[Page 8]But to bring the Dispute nearer Home, and to make the Case more plain, if possible. Let us suppose 11 H. 7. still in Force; and upon this supposition I argue, That this Act must necessarily give the same Advantages to the Lawful Successors of H. 7. which it gave to him­self: For if Allegiance is due to a King de Facto, then certainly it is equally due to him, who is King both de Facto and de Iure. Therefore those who decline from their Allegiance to such a Rightful Possessour (as they certainly do who depose him or swear Allegiance to another) are expresly bar'd from receiving any Benefit or Ad­vantage by this Act. So that now they must lye under the lash of those antecedent Laws, which punish all Disloyal practices against a Rightful Prince, whether in or out of Possession; and if they are punishable by a King de Iure, than undoubtedly they are his Subjects and conse­quently not at Liberty to translate their Alle­giance to another.

If it is Objected, That the Penalty of this Proviso affects the Subject no longer than the King is in Possession. To this (besides what has been said already) I Answer, That this Constru­ction makes the sence of the Act Insignificant and Ridiculous. For then the meaning of the Law runs thus, viz. Those who adhere to the King in Possession shall be Indemnified, but those who fight against him shall have none of this Favour; that is they shall be punished. Be punished by whom? Why by the King they Opposed, if he happens to sit sure and gets the better of them; otherwise it seems they are safe enough. Now this is profound Discourse, and very suitable to the Wisdom of a Parlia­ment, to tell us, That Rebels when they are Routed and Subdued, may be Lawfully puni­shed. Had we not Statutes, Common Law, and Common Sence enough, to acquaint us with this before? What need this admirable Discovery have been thus carefully drawn up into a Proviso, as if there had been something in the body of the Act, which made it Un­lawful for a Conquering Prince to chastise Re­bellion? If it be farther replied, that this Proviso was intended for a Recaption. For though it does not tye the Subjects Allegiance to an ejected Prince, yet upon the recovery of his Crown, it gives him Authority to punish those who dethroned him; and with this Interpretation the Law appears intel­ligible.

In Answer to this, I desire to know which way a Prince dispossessed can recover his Right, according to the modern Construction of this Act? For if the whole Kingdom be bound to assist the King de Facto against the King de Iure, how is it possible for the latter to re-en­ter upon his Dominions? And since by the sup­position, his Right to punish doth not com­mence till he has Power to execute; this Pro­viso will have little Terror in it, and prove a very slender Preservative against Treason. And besides, if it ever happens to come into play, 'twill be perfectly useless; for this Expedient cannot take place unless the King de Iure makes his way back to the Throne by Con­quest, and Foreign Force. And if he returns with this Advantage, there are old Laws enough to punish Traytors, (25 Ed. 3. &c.) which we may imagine he would venture to make use of, whether this Clause had given him such a Li­berty or not.

In short, This Act, as it is now the Fashion to understand it, is such a monstrous and un­accountable piece of Legislation, as I believe the most Barbarous and Unpolished Nation was never guilty of. For it leaves the Kingdom Hereditary, and yet obliges the Subject to obey the Possessor, though never so obscure and remote from the Royal Line. It resolves all Title into Force and Success, and puts no difference between a good Cause and a bad one. It sets the best Princes aside only for be­ing Unfortunate; encourages the Ambition of Enterprizing, and unreasonable Men; and gives the Rights of Sovereignty to those who have done the greatest Wrong. It overthrows the most Sacred and Established Maxims of Ju­stice; repeals, in effect, almost half the Com­mandments; and makes the Devil, if he should prevail, the Lord's Anointed. Besides, its not only Unnatural and Unrighteous in the Body, but Useless and Impertinent in the Proviso. In earnest, I am afraid those Lawyers who debauch Mens Understandings with such sin­gular Absurdities as these, will have a great deal to answer for. God grant they may consider before its too late.