IT it the Caſe of Truth to be oppoſed, but to prevail; and of Error, though defended, to be vanquiſh'd. Ill Cauſes cannot but be Ill maintained: They may look like true, but that is Art, which cannot change Nature. An Aſs can never be a Doctor, nor a Fool a Solomon: Bulk given no Weight, nor Sound, good Senſe.

And to ſay true, it was never much better prov'd, than in the Anſwer of the Duke of Buckingham's Paper: At firſt it amaz'd me with a flaſh of Words; the ſecond Reading I came to my ſelf; and at the laſt, I ſaw, they came to nothing: began with falſe Wit, and ended with Noiſe and Fumble. And to ſhew you a little the Man in his Talents, Stile, Arguments, and Humour, (for his own Book does it beſt at large) take what follows.

I will begin with his beginning.

That I have Written this Pamphlet (ſays he) is plain. But who this (I) is that Writ it, is not plain; for he has not told us his Name. However, 'tis plain, 'tis writ; and ſo it is, that his Apology is againſt himſelf; which is, That a Sore always wants a Plaiſter. In which we muſt either underſtand, He confeſſes the Wound the Duke has given Atheiſm and Violence, to which he Conſecrates a Plaſter; or that his Book is in it ſelf a Sore, and he has a mind to cover it. If the Firſt, he has an Ill time of it: if the Laſt, 'tis Non-ſenſe. But this is but a part of his Excuſe; he thinks he may Anſwer him, becauſe the Duke won't Anſwer himſelf, and act both Plaintiff and Defendant; as they do, that turn with the times; ſhift Principles for Livings; and love to be Parſon of Bray ſtill. But whatever that Noble Duke does, the Anſwerer has that faculty; for he inveighs againſt Reaſon, pag. 12, 13. and yet p. 36. ſends his Reader in a warm Fit to Reaſon, not only to Chuſe and Eſtabliſh to himſelf a Religion, but to Convince others by.

And now he falls on with a Tantivy—How Pernicious an Animal (ſays he) this Mountain and wild Conſcience hath been to England, is too well known, and how Fatal Toleration would be. What ſtuff is here! Could a Man fetch any thing more ſavage out of the Highlands of Scotland, or from the Lakes of Canada? One would think, 'twere Writing in ſhamm, and a Definition in Burleſque: Some Cypher, but that there is no Key to it; for that a Mountain ſhould be an Animal, and Conſcience a Mountain, has neither Matter, Figure, Rhetorick, nor common Senſe in it. Which, indeed, is the pitiful end of all Quacks and Pretenders. And hence he turns Vintner too: for in a moment he reads you a Lecture of Ferments and Lees, and the beſt way of turning the Wine of (Mount) Hope into the Vinegar (of the Valley) of Deſpair.

The Gentleman, that he might Run far enough from the Duke's Lenity, has paſs'd the Line, and talks Antipode to common Experience. For with him Toleration pricks; Perſecution does not. I had thought that ſweet and ſoft things had prevented ſouring; and that therefore eager and lean Wines were fed with the richeſt Malagoes. But the meaning of this admirable ſimile, is, The Gentlemen of his Clan would keep the Wine to themſelves: every body knows they love it. But I muſt needs ſay, 'tis a Churliſh and Guzling trick, to drink all: Right Good-fellows are freer of their Liquor. And beſides, it ſhews a mighty Ill Nature, that other Folks drinking ſhould make it taſte ſowre with them: 'Tis not the Liquor, but the Palate: The Gall overflows; the Humor vitiates the Taſt. Calvin's Predeſtination, in his Opinion, p. 16. is not worſe natured than This. Thunder ſometimes turns Liquor; but I never heard it of fair and gentle weather: Certainly, it muſt be an unnatural Subject, upon which the moſt natural Things have an ill operation. And yet in ſome Ill temper'd Children we have ſeen the ſeeds of this ſowre Humor; who would not Eat or Wear a thing, if others muſt have it as well as themſelves. However, this Doctrine very naturally ariſes from the Text, That ſome Men, if they may have their humor, will be as ſweet as Wine; and if not, will Turn as ſowre as Vinegar. The Uſe and Application I leave to His Majeſty.

But this is not all; he explains himſelf upon this point pag. 33. where he dreads the Church of England's Receeding from her Active Loyalty in oppoſing Diffenters, and the Terrible and unavoidable conſequences of their betaking themſelves to a Paſſive Loyalty. I hope he has made more bold than welcome with that Venerable Name; ſince 'tis to ſay, The Church of England's Loyalty is to ſerve their own Turn, and the Prince's no longer than he will Ruin others to humor Her. That ſhe oppoſes Diſſenters for that Reaſon: And is uncharitable to all others: That though ſhe Aſſerts Free-Will, ſhe will Force other Mens. That ſhe is not content with her Hoours, Imployments and Profits, unleſs others are Reprobated to a Civil Damnation: That ſhe knows not where to ſtop, nor where to End her Reſentments and Severities: That Law only maintains her, and her Eſtabliſhment takes riſe from humane Inſtitution, and by humane Force is upheld: Nay, That if ſhe may not have her Will, let the Black Box prevail, and the Oxfordmen come in if they will, Fight Dog, fight Bear, We will be Quiet; We will be Paſſive. Theſe are the Conſequences of ſuch Reſolves: Things too harſh and Idle to imagine of a Society of ſo much Wiſdom and Integrity; and therefore this Gentleman to be thought officious, if not ſcandalous in this attempt. And I hope her beſt Members will think, That more Reaſon to the Duke, and Diſcretion to the Church, had done better: for Scandalum Cleri with the one, ought to ſit as uneaſie, as Scandalum Magnatum with the other.

I have done a little to ſnew his folly and uncharitableneſs; more follows: and he that ruus may almoſt read it▪ He wonders, his Grace the Duke of Buckingham ſhould become a Champion for Whiggiſm, p. 1. And indeed ſo do I too: for I am ſure, it muſt be very lately; and 'tis an ill time to begin in. But is this his Diſcretion, (pag. 2.) that was to defend him from a Scandalum Magnatum? But why a Whig? It ſeems it is, becauſe he is for Toleration. A fine Concluſion: and yet he makes this, but half a Whig neither. For he tells us in his Character, That Perſecution makes up t'other half: ſo that a Right Whig is, a Tolerating Perſecuter. Upon the whole matter then, the Duke is but half a Whig; and his Anſwerer it t'other half, who tells us, That his opinions have ever been Diametrically oppoſite to thoſe of his Grace's Paper; and whoſe Book it ſelf is Perſecution. And is it not a pretty thing to conſider that the Bill and Anſwer, the Plaintiff and Defendant (as he calls them) ſhould make up one Whig?

But to do it, when Whiggiſm is ſuper-annitated, and looks like a caſt Miſtris, and is contemn'd of all, heightens the Man's Admiration: And perhaps he knew the Duke, when he did not uſe to make ſuch ſtale choices too. But to make him amends, the Man places it to his Compaſſion, which is yet Satyr enough upon himſelf, that not only has none, but makes it Whiggiſh in that Noble Perſon to Pity, Age and Neceſſity. Mad he muſt be, or he would not yield away ſo great a Vertue to ſo ill a thing. But is ſhe ſuper-annuated and caſt? pray, why then feared in one part, and loved ſo fondly in another, by this Knight of the Robe? She is but half Caſt; the Toleration ſide is only ſuper-annuated with him; t'other is not above Eighteen yet, freſh, ſtrong, and ruddy, in his Deſires at leaſt: And that ſhe may live longer a-that ſide, he is blowing Breath through his Quill, as faſt as he can.

And to ſay true, he has Air enough, to help her: But when all is done, he will make an Ill Miſtreſs of her; for ſhe is to be Old and Caſt (if not Dead) a one ſide ſtill: This is her Palſie, and his Phrenſie. I am of Opinion, when he thinks what he has done, he will (like his young Gallant, Pag. 6.) cry, a Pox upon Conſequences, I hate Conſequences. So Pragmatical ſo Incongruous, and ſo Indiſcreet has the Gentleman been in his haſty Attaque.

But to come to the body of his pretended Anſwer. After telling us, p. 6. He will not Anatomize, nor Diſſect each Nerve and Muſcle of His Grace 's Paper, (though elſe where it has neither, in his Opinion) and that he hates Haſhing of Books, and ſerving them up with Limon and Anchovies, turning Chryrurgeon and Cook in a breath: he ſays, He will deliver his thoughts in a lump; as if he had a mind to a Pudding more than a Haſh. The Truth is, he has little Shape, and leſs Life: and therefore the Gentleman has in one word, Whiglike, turn'd Goſſip to his own Chits with more propriety, than is in all his Book beſide.

But let's look upon his Lump a little further. Firſt, he ſays, His Grace has taken an Improper way to confute the wity Atheiſt, or Eſtabliſh Religion. (And why ſo?) Becauſe the changeableneſs of the World does not diſprove its Eternity, any more than the Mutations of his Grace's Body alters him from being that George D. of Buckingham, that he was Forty Years ago. But the D. of Buckingham does not pretend to be the ſame Man that he was Forty Years ago; and would give this Gentleman, Ten thouſand pound to make him ſo. And to ſay true, he that ſays, A changing World is Eternal, is not many removes from that which we call a Changling. For though a Man be the ſame, as to his Faculties and Properties: Yet we have freſh Spirits and Fleſh; and this World has its Alterations and Renewings too.

What the firſt Matter was, and how formed, and which way it ſubſiſts, are much beyond us! yet the more we look into them, the more we are led from the Regular Motions and Seaſons of the Fabrick we ſee with the diſtinct kinds and ſpecies of Creatures therein, to Conclude and Admire a Prior and Superior Being. A Man that is a Creature of time, may be ſaid to be, and in ſome caſes not to be the ſame: for he is not the ſame in the ſame Being always; but an Eternal thing cannot be ſo varied. And 'tis fallacious to argue from a Man's being the ſame Man, under changes, to the World's being Eternally the ſame World under Changes; ſince it were to ſay, That a thing were the ſame in that in which It changes: for that were to be in that which is not, or is not any more that which it was; The ſupeameſt Non-ſence a Man can be guilty of.

The Duke was not ſtrict in this matter; and his Anſwer is ſtricter with him, than wiſe; eſpecially when he faults him in a thing Diſputable, and yet promiſes not to diſturb, but improve his Arguments for a God. But ſo unhappy is the Genius of this Gentleman, that he frequently breaks his Word, though be breaks his Head with it. There are but three of four things the Duke goes upon; That the World did not make it ſelf: That he that made it is God: That he was dignified Man with ſomething more Excellent, than what belongs to other Creatures: That this makes him look and hope beyond Death; therefore Immortality, probable: That thoſe that do well, ſhall be Happy; the contrary, Miſerable: That to this Choice they are free and uncompell'd. And laſtly, That none ſhould Extinguiſh Men's Religious Impreſſions, by forcing them againſt their Perſwaſion. Theſe Sober and Worthy Thoughts might have been better treated.

'Tis true (he ſays, pag. 7.) his Notions are very fine, and many of them very natural and true; but not too Logical. No matter for that; he Writ like a Gentleman, and not a Pedant. But to ſee, how true this perſon is to himſelf, within ſix lines after the Character of many natural and true Notions; he tells us, without bluſhing, though not without confuſion, That the Conſequences which neceſſarily follow the Duke's Conceptions, are greatly to the diſadvantage not only of Religion, but of the politick Frame and Government of the World. I cannot imagine, which way; and he has carefully avoided to inform me. But I cannot ſee, how the Government of the Great Turk, and the Great Mogul are concern'd in the Duke of Buckingham's Book? They may indeed, if they could read it, becauſe he Recommends to all Men the Chriſtian Religion, (pag. 18.) And, if I know any thing, the Conſequence of his Contradictory Aſſertion, is, That the Mogul muſt be Infidel ſtill, and the Great Turk muſt be a Mahometan ſtill. For this good Chriſtian goes upon this Principle, That the Religion Eſtabliſh'd by Law, ought therefore to be Conformed to of all; and conſequently, Liberty even to Chriſtian's Conſciences is dangerous to the Political Frame of that Government that is not Chriſtian.

He proceeds to oppoſe the Duke's Deduction, in Reference to the Worſhip of God, pag. 11, & 12. For in truth (ſays he) if his Argumentation be allowed, here is as fair a plea for the ALCORAN, as the NEW TESTAMENT; for PYTHAGORAS's GOLDEN VERSES, as St. PAVL's EPISTLES. For, if I be not miſtaken, in what his Grace calls that Part of us, which is neareſt a-kin to the Nature of God, and the Inſtinct of a Deity, this muſt be humane Reaſon; not as Regulated by any Publick and Politick Reaſon of a Community, but as every private perſon's Reaſon ſhall dictate.

But how unjuſt and precarious is all this? Firſt, Aſſert; and then, If he miſtakes not, the Duke meant ſo. But if the Duke meant not ſo, then he is miſtaken: and the Duke could not mean, as he ſtates his underſtanding of it. For though he takes leave to miſtake the Duke, the Duke does not miſtake himſelf: There is not one Word of Humane Reaſon in the Queſtion, nor is Humane Reaſon that Inſtinct of the Deity.

We have a Natural Capacity to apprehend Divine things; but 'tis that Inſtinct, which gives us the Religious uſe of it. All Men that have Eyes, have the Capacity of ſeeing; but without light they cannot ſee. Pray, who was he that ſaid; There is a Spirit in Man, but the Inſpiration of the Almighty gives Ʋnderſtanding? and that, Whatſoever may be known of God, is manifeſted in Man? Rom. 1. By what elſe is it, that the Prophet declares, That God tells unto Man his thoughts? And St. Paul expreſly ſays, That thoſe that had not the Law, became a Law unto themſelves, (By what? if not by this Inſtinct, this Syntereſis?) their Conſcience accuſing or exeuſing them before God. And St. John goes farther, who ſays; If our Hearts condemn us, God is greater; but if our Hearts condemn us not, then have we boldneſs before God. And does this make as much for the Alcoran, as for the Scripture? and Pythagoras's Writings, as St. Pauls's Epiſtles?

The Duke ſpoke to a peculiar Rank of Men: Wits without much Religion, to give Religion the beginnings of Credit with them: He did not ſay, That was enough? That Scripture or other external helps were uſeleſs, or not requiſite: And yet, when all is done, we muſt chuſe for our ſelves, and not by the Political Reaſon of Community; or elſe we ſhall believe upon Authority and not upon Conviction; which was not the Chriſtian way. St. Paul bids us, Pray with underſtanding; and if ſo, ſurly, our underſtanding ought to be ſatisfied, to whom, and how to pray. And this Gentleman makes it an Error, not to pray knowingly; and if ſo, certainly we ſhould have ſome Reaſon for our Hope too.

And therefore, I cannot perſwade my ſelf to believe, that Noble Peer writ like a Minor, when he proceds to this Deduction? That it is one of the greateſt Crimes a Man can be guilty of, to Force us to act againſt that Inſtinct of Religion; and ſomething a kin to the Sin againſt the Holy Ghoſt. This Notion the Gentleman throws with ſcorn at the Quakers, (an Honeſt and well-meaning People;) and if this be a Kin to their Doctrine, they are ſounder than he that deſpiſes them. And to ſay true, He does them greater Honour, than it may be, he is aware of. But why not believe upon Conviction? For, Whatever is not of Faith, (St. Paul tells us) is Sin: And Force upon any Man's Conſcience, muſt overthrow the Reaſon of this Fear, Faith and Hope. For how dark and feeble any Man's Conſcience is, Force brings no Light no Knowledge: It may diſtract, doubt, and ſo damn.

But I cannot enough admire at the Concluſions this Gentleman draws from this moſt Inoffenſive and Orthodox Expreſſion. The Firſt is this: That Reaſon is the Guide of every Man's Religion. This is ſpurious: For, though he that embraces a Religion without Reaſon, has no more Religion than my Horſe; yet a Man's own Reaſon ſo rectified, is not the Guide of Man in his Religion: for his Reaſon is that which is to be Guided.

His Second is yet more Extravagant, viz. That Divine Revelation is not neceſſary to Salvation. In which he has bid boldly; for there is not a word in the Duke's Diſcourſe about it. He aſſerts the Divine Inſtinct; That it inclines and diſpoſes Men to be Religious; That they are to be commended, that beat a ſincere Reſpect to it. But not a word, that Men ſhould not crave further Help, or read the Holy Scriptures, that contain our Revealed Religion. On the contrary, he tells us; He therefore wav'd the Ʋſe of them in this Diſcourſe, becauſe of the Perſons to whoſe Condition he calculated it. Were it not a ſine Concluſion in this Doctor, to ſay, A Man that goes to Rocheſter ſhall never come to Canterbury, though it be in the Way, and the better part of it? Juſt ſo Reaſonable his Conſequence is againſt the Duke.

But he advances in his Humour of perverting his Words; for the Third Conſequence he draws in his Name, is this: That it is a moſt horrid Sin, to lead Men out of Errors, (pag. 13.) when there is not one word of Leading in the Queſtion. For the Duke ſays, [To Force,] and he infers, To Lead. His Words are; That it is one of the greateſt Crimes a Man can be guilty of, To Force us to act or ſin againſt that Inſtinct of Religion; and ſomething a-kin to the Sin againſt the Holy Ghoſt. The Duke ſays, To force Men to ſin; he ſays, To lead Men out of Errors: As if Leading and Forcing were the ſame; when one is the way of Perſwaſion, and the other of Fines and Priſons. I cannot tell what this Gentleman would not ſay; he may as honeſtly apprehend a Beggar on the Road, for an High-way-Man.

His Fourth and laſt Conſequence he beſtows upon this Noble Peer, is this, pag. 13. That Men, who believe a God, and follow the Dictates of Reaſon in his Worſhip, may be ſaved in any, in all Religions; provided they know not a better. And what, if he had ſaid ſo? It had ſhewn his Charity. Does not God wink in times of Ignorance? And what is Knowing no better, but a State of Ignorance? Is there no Allowance for Times, Places and Conditions? Certainly, this Man thinks, Ariſtotle and St. Paul are as much below him, as he is above the Duke of Buckingham. This is riding Tantivy, through thick and thin.

But to Anſwer his ſhort, yet full: This Charge upon his Grace, charges himſelf; Firſt, That Faith in God, and the Dictates of Reaſon, can ſwallow all ſorts of Religion; for he excepts not the moſt Idolatrous; yet ſets up Reaſon elſewhere, to judge of true Religion, (pag. 14, 36.) And Men muſt leave Reaſon, when they fall under Superſtition and Idolatry. Secondly, That this Hero is for chuſing his Religion without Reaſon: And that's not worth a Fig, (with his leave.) Thirdly, That the Duke does not prefer Chriſtianity, by the Courſe of his Deductions: which he plainly does, pag. 18.

But after he hath ſhewn the Duke's Weakneſs or Miſtake (in his Opinion) to make him abler than he found him, and the Book worthier the Reader's notice; with a Modeſty, almoſt equal to his Reaſon, he tells us: NOW, IF I WERE TO DISCOƲRSE AN ATHEIST, (pag. 9.) and: IF I HAD BEEN TO FOLLOW HIS GRACE's BLOW. I would have urged This; and, I would have done That, &c. By which, I perceive, this Gentleman is better natur'd than Sir Jo. Falſtaff, that being call'd upon for a Reaſon for what he ſaid, anſwer'd; That if Reaſons were as rife as Black-Berries, he would not give him one.

I have ſeen Cowards fight thus ſtoutly: Now, Sir, (ſays he) here I could have you, Sir; and there I could have you, Sir: and, if I ſtrike you, Sir, infallibly I hit you, Sir: and, if I hit you, Sir, you'll feel it, Sir: Are not you of my mind, Sir? This Gentleman wanted ſomething; and though the Duke be no Minor, he has a mind to play the Senior upon him, and uſe him ſo: And what a fine time he would have, to be Ward to ſuch a Jewel?

Such Coxcombs I have ſeen in my time; for there is not ſo true a Mark of that Animal, as Officiouſneſs upon Miſtake, to praeter do, or overdo a thing. Look you, Sir; upon my word, Sir; you are out, Sir; you mean this, Sir; I know your meaning, Sir, as well as if I were in you, Sir; alas, Sir, there is a better way far, Sir; and then, Sir, you don't hit it neither, Sir; for, Sir, if you aim at the end, Sir, you muſt aim at the means, Sir; and that I pretend to know, Sir, as well as any Man, Sir; and therefore, Sir, by your favor, Sir, if I had been to have follow'd your blow, Sir, I would have done no body knows what, Sir; Gramarcy Doctor. 'Tis pity to think, what pains ſome Men take to play the Fool.

His ſecond great Head (and little Wit) is about the Anti-Chriſtianiſm of Perſecution, oppoſing the Duke's Notion of it, thus pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. And firſt, he ſays, That though to puniſh Profeſſors of the true Religion, for that only, whilſt inoffenſive in all things to the Civil Government, is real Perſecution, and truly Anti-Chriſtian; as that of the Primitive Chriſtians by the Heathen Roman Emperors; yet to puniſh Diſſenters, as Papiſts and Phanaticks, is not ſo; becauſe they are in the wrong, and offenſive to the Government. This in a Lump (as he calls it) and perhaps a little better collected than his was. In all which he begs the Queſtion of the Roman Emperors for the Chriſtians; and of the Diſſenters for their Adverſaries; though upon differing terms.

For the Heathen Emperors had Antient Rites to plead, and the Eſtabliſh'd Law of the Empire, againſt the progreſs of Chriſtianity; And that is all this Gentleman has ſaid here for himſelf, and againſt them. For he undertakes not to prove the Points Controverted true againſt the Diſſenters; but urges the kn • cking Argument of the Jews, We have a Law, and by our Law he ought to die. Nay, he ſends the Duke to Lewis the Fourteenth, (pag. 29.) to ask, If it be ſafe Tolerating another Religion than his own: By which he determines the caſe againſt the Perſecuted Proteſtants there, leſt their Indulgence ſhould exemplarily make way for ours to the Diſſenters here. Is not this a dainty Proteſtant, that can cheriſh Cruelty againſt Men of his own Religion abroad, rather than not act it at home upon Diſſenters?

This is to make Religion a Politick Intereſt, and to Anſwer Worldly ends: A greater Argument for Atheiſm, than any he has offer'd againſt it. The Primitive Chriſtians had died Idolaters upon this Principle: For Authority, not Conviction, with him all along concludes the Point.

He begs the Queſtion of the Diſſenters; for he argues nothing about the grounds of Diſſent, but the Law; 'Tis the Religion by Law Eſtabliſh'd: And why not by the Bible? but that it yields not to it the preſent Advantages of Force and Worldly Authority. Now (as he ſays) If I had been to Diſpute them, and follow his blow, I would have Evinc'd their Error, before I would have pronounc'd my Judgment.

But they are Factious, Seditious, and dangerous to the Government; therefore ſevere Laws were made againſt Papiſts, Prieſts and Jeſuits on the one Hand, and Phanaticks on the other. Suppoſe this were as he frowardly Clamors; Is it to be thought, that they would be dangerous, if they were Eaſie, and ſo endanger themſelves? they know better. And we ſee, this Gentleman fears the Church's Receeding in her Loyalty, if there be but Indulgence to Diſſenters; making her Eye evil, if the Governments be good. Pray, what then would ſhe do, if ſhe were Perſecuted as they are? Can more, with Juſtice, be expected from Hereticks and Schiſmaticks, than from the Orthodox? If they were more patient, I ſhould begin to fear, they would be quickly more Orthodox too. But I cannot tell how to think that Men in their Wits would forfeit Eaſe when they have it; though to get it they might be Indiſcreet.

And one thing I muſt ſay, Roman Catholicks have been Loyal in England and Holland, and Bresbyterians in France and the German Principalities. So that 'tis not neceſſarily true, they are not Seditious, as they are Diſſenters: Men go by their Intereſts. The Gentlemen that Tore the King's Declaration of Indulgence from him, were high Church-men; and they oppoſed his Political Capacity to his Natural, on purpoſe to overthrow that Act of Grace, by which diſtinction the late Civil War was made; ſo that 41. overtook 73. or that return'd to 41. And who knows not, that they were ſuch as hardly knew how to pray, but out of our Liturgy; that attempted to Exclude the Preſumptive Heir to the Crown upon the ſcore of his Religion. And though this Jehu drives ſo furiouſly upon Diſſenters on that Account, if he will think (which I fear he ſeldom does) he will find that an Heir is but a Subject; and the ſame Law governs properly a-like in this Kingdom to all Ranks of Subjects. And that ſome of the ſame Gentlemen, that formerly ſhook ſmall Folks Property for Non-Conformity, had lately a mind, to Sacrifice the preſent King's for Diſſent. Wherefore let us make Men eaſie, take Temptations out of their way, and not lay ſtumbling-blocks before weak or peeviſh people, nor pinch them with thoſe Burdens or Yokes, that our Fathers could hardly bear, and we need not doubt a Friendly ſucceſs.

It is by this Nameleſs Author Objected in a Career of Criminations, That this may ſuit a Republick, (pag. 28, & 29.) but is dangerous to a Monarchy. But not half ſo much in my opinion, as his Objection is. For, doubtleſs, Monarchy has as extended and ſaving a bottom to live upon, as any Republick in the World; nay, rather the Power of more Mercy, Favour and Indulgence. For the Number of Subjects is the Glory and Strength of a King; and that which makes the People eaſie, makes the Government ſo to the Monarch. 'T were laviſh to prefer a Common-Wealth to make it more capable of good to the various conditions of Mankind than Monarchy. It is therefore his little skill in Politicks as well as Religion, that makes him quote the practice of the French King (p. 29.) for no body knows yet the conſequence: His Cake is but Dough ſtill: 'Tis early day with the Project: See if his Son, ay, if He don't feel it yet. For Uniformity is a mean Recompence for a thin and poor Country. What might not an Union of Intereſts and Affections, under ſo great a Prince as we have, recover and eſtabliſh in the World? Wonders; for Miracles come from Heaven.

Inſtead of this, old Sores are daily rubb'd freſh; and new impreſſions of former Tragedies are thrown abroad to prejudice us againſt the means of our own Peace and Glory: God (if he pleaſes) avert the conſequences of our own bitterneſs and Animoſity.

His laſt Head is about Toleration, (p. 25.) though included in his ſecond; this he labours with his uſual pains; 'Tis neither (ſays he) good Divinity, nor good Politicks; and of this he is as certain as if he found a Mare's Neſt.

The firſt Reaſon, why it is not good Divinity; is, That falſe Religions in a Chriſtian Dreſs, would then be Tolerated to the injury of Chriſtian Religion and Mens Souls, p. 26. But he does not conſider, how many he will Damn by Hypocriſie. But in that, perhaps I am out, he may not think that a Damnable Sin; and that it is better be an Hypocrite, than a Diſſenter; though One thinks he is in the right, and the Other knows he is in the wrong; and ſo one of St. Paul's true Hereticks, viz. ſelf-Condemned.

Be that as it will, Jeſus Chriſt is againſt his Divinity, that is Lord of the true. For he commands, That the Tares grow with the Wheat, till Harveſt; which he interprets, the End of the world, and Great Judgment: And forbad. Fire to be ſo much as deſired to be call'd from Heaven to hurt thoſe that did not own his bleſſed Meſſengers in their great Doctrine of the Kingdom he ſent them to preach.

For Toleration' • being bad Politicks, let him allow me the Liberty he takes with the Noble Peer I defend, and I will ſend him upon an Errand, that ſhall determine the Controverſie preſently. Let him go to the Prince of Orange, whoſe Anceſtor begun the Glory of that Country with it, to the Princes of the Empire. And if this French King will be Impartial, ask him, If greater Feats were done without, than with a Toleration? So far is it from being dangerous to Princes.

And if Opinions were yet worſe than they are, there cannot (in my judgment) accrue any danger to the Government that Tolerates them. For, Firſt, the Profeſſors of them have, which they could be thought to Plot to get; but will never Plot to loſe. And, Secondly, if any ſuch people could be, there are or may be Laws enough to Cruſh and puniſh the leaſt Appearance of Diſorder. And under favour, Publick Aſſemblies are ſo far from being dangerous, tha • , truly conſider'd, they are the ſecurity of the Government.

What makes Men Dangerous? Firſt, they cann't help their Diſſent; for Faith is not in a Man's own power. Next, ſo ſoon as he declares it, the Law cuts him off from the Favour and Protection of the Magiſtrate. Is it then the Man that makes himſelf dangerous, or is he made dangerous for that Diſſent? And if that be it, 'twill not be hard to determine, how a Diſſenter comes to be dangerous.

Forcing Men to Religions is as if it were in a Man's power to uſe his Conſcience as he can his Money. In that caſe I would be on the ſide of the Penal Laws. But if a Man cann't believe as he will, and leſs, as other Men believe, and 〈◊〉 yet be ſafe to the Government, don't make him •• ſafe under it, and I'll warrant he does no harm: And this I think may be done.

I conclude, That Toleration is ſo far from being an Enemy to Religion and Monarchy, That it gives God his due, prevents Hypocriſie, and reſtores Society inſtead of Unity: And by an united Affection, Purſe, and Hands Renders our King Great and Terrible.

I now wait upon his Three Queſtions: the Firſt has Four in the belly of it, (p. 34, 35.) Firſt: If Chriſt did not believe Soveraign Power might maintain the order of Society by Rewards and Paniſhments. Truly I don't know his Belief, nor how ſuitable it might be to him to believe, being the Object of ours. But he commanded it, though with a ſalvo to the Religion he came to Inſtitute. They were his Sheep, 'twas his Kingdom.

The next Query is to the Duke, If he ha • conſider'd, That ſpiritual Puniſhments are far more rigorous, than Temporal ones? I believe, as much as this Gentleman has, Whether Temporal be leſs than Eternal? But what of all that? Why, (next to follow his blow) he asks; If Jeſus Chriſt then has not uſed greater force to compel Men to his Religion, than all the Powers of the Earth have done? But if it were ſo, I am of the poor Welch-man's mind; Let her alone till 〈◊〉 day comes: And of St. Taffy's too; I had • ather fall into the hands of God, than Man. But: is this proper, juſt, and adequate▪ Chriſt puniſhes Spiritual Faults with Spiritual Puniſhments, Ergo, The Powers of the Earth ought to puniſh the ſame Faults with Temporal and Corporal Puniſhments, ſuch as Priſons, Fines, Exiles and Death?

But in the next place, I don't think he has outdone the Heathen and ſome Chriſtian Perſecutions, the Reaſon of both conſider'd. For he decides the Controverſie by Good Works; They by Opinions: He cryes, Come ye well-doers; there are his Sheep: Go ye Workers of Iniquity; there be his Goats. But Conformity makes an Ill-Man Grateful, and Non-Conformity a Good-Man Hateful: here Good Works don't determine the point, as at Chriſt's Judgment.

Howbeit, it is monſtrous to argue, That Men ſhould be twice puniſh'd for the ſame Offence; by the Magiſtrate here, and Chriſt hereafter: This is held unequal among Juſt Men in all Governments. But 'tis no matter, let Zeal or Intereſt Chriſten it, and its well enough for a Papiſt or a Phanatick. But if this Gentleman were as much under their power, as they are now under his Cenſures; and ſhould they uſe him, as the provokes the Civil Magiſtrate to treat them, I am of the mind, he would think and call it too Anti-Chriſtian.

To this Second main Queſtion (in ſubſtance Anſwer'd before) Whether there being an hundred Monarchies happy without Toleration and Liberty of Conſcience, to one Republick that allows it with Reſtriction, whoſe future Fate we are ignorant of; and whether that may not in time prove its Ruin; It be not an hundred to one, that Monarchy ſhall be more flouriſhing, ſafe and laſting without a Toleration, than with it? To this I ſay; he makes the ground of it Fact; and that's falſe: There is not only no ſuch thing, as an hundred Monarchies that have been happy without it: but more have been happy with, than without it, All the Eaſtern Monarchies, almoſt generally give it with ſucceſs. Next, the French. Monarohy was happier in Henry the IV. than Charles the IX. and Ours in Queen Elizabeth, than in King Henry the VIII. for though Her's was not a Reign of Liberty, yet of leſs ſeverity than His. He makes it Republican, and knows not what he ſays: for as his ſtory of Monarchies is untrue, ſo that of Republicks, a Fiction: there being Two Monarchies to One Republick that gives it. What will be, we cann't tell: but Holland is a greater proof for the Prudence of a Toleration, than any Country that can be named on the ſide of Coertion; and the Effects that are, ſhew what the ſame meaſures will do for the time to come if kept to.

To the Third, and laſt Queſtion, viz. Whether it be not Croſs and Pile, whether a Man, who may be of any, or all Religions, will be of any, or of none at all? I muſt tell him, That they that can be of all Religions, have little or none. And therefore I always thought thoſe Clergy-men that in Henry the Eighth's time turn'd Trimmers, and Proteſtants in Edward the Sixth's, and Papiſts in Queen Mary's, and Proteſtants again, with a witneſs, in Queen Elizabeth's, had no Religion but their Benefices. And, as I take it, there were not Three Hundred, of all Qualities, out of Ten Thouſand, that ſtood out; to ſay nothing of their Fountains that ran freely through all thoſe Rubs and Revolutions, I mean Oxford and Cambridge. If he pleaſe to remember what numbers turn'd Presbyterians between the years Forty and Fifty, how many in Sixty return'd; and with what Oaths, Covenants, Engagements, and Abjurations they maintain'd their Poſſeſſion, will have cauſe to ſay, that it is, ſometimes, hardly Croſs and Pile with too many, what Religion they are of, and thoſe of no ſmall pretences too.

And ſince he has put it upon that game, I cami't forbear ſaying, That he has hit upon the apteſt Alluſion he could have made. For Croſs and Pile in ſome Countries ſtand Pope and King, and where they meet that Game is up.

If he thinks the buſineſs yet worth his while, I ſhould be glad to ſee ſomething truly ſolid and Chriſtian. In the mean time, I take the meaſure he gives me in his Concluſion, to make my Choice by Reaſon and Vertue, To diſcourage all Sedition and Diſloyalty; to Tolerate none, that profeſs to cut other Mens Throats for Conſcience ſake: Beſeeching him to let me be even with him in a few Queſtions and a Concluſion: They will be ſhort.

I. If any Man ought to believe without Conviction? If not, then

II. Whether Conviction be in a Man's power to give himſelf or any for him? If not,

III. Whether this does not of courſe put an end to Coertion?

I proceed to Three more upon a Chriſtian Foot.

IV. If Chriſt's Law and Example are to be the Rule of Chriſtians?

V. If by his Law and Example Chriſtians ſhould compel Conformity by Worldly Force to their Religion?

VI. If Liberty to Conſcientious Diſſenters be not Adviſeable from Examples Chriſtian and Political?

The Concluſion is firſt Particular then General I would beſeech the Gentleman, to whom this Reply is made, to Avoid Prejudice, which is here (I fear) an Ill Habit of Education. For he ſays, He was always Diametrically oppoſite to the Duke's Opinion in the Points treated on: As if he had ſuck'd it with his Milk. Examination helps Judgment; it is Chewing and Digeſting well; t'other is ſwallowing and not Concocting: and ſometime a Man gets a Hook in his Throat too. Let him have a Care of Tarantula's and the Itch of Anſwering, before he conſiders well; for that will be as unaccountable, as, he ſays, his Wit is poiſonous Wit, (pag. 4.)

There are Two other things that make a Man heave and throw, and diſorder himſelf extreamly; and that is the Fly and the Worm; eſpecially in Spring-time; and this has been unuſually dry and hot. But for all this, I will end well with him; For what ever he thinks, I wiſh him as well as my ſelf; and that we may both live and die happily with a Toleration.

And now, Reader, 'tis fit I ſay ſomething of this undertaking. The Love and Honor I have for the Truths deliver'd by that Noble Perſon, and the eaſie, plain, ſhort, and yet full, I and ſtrenuous way in which he has recommended them to the World, obliged me to this Defence, ſuch as it is. But I cannot but wiſh, he had met with a Man that had deſerv'd his own notice, becauſe no body can better Defend his Arguments: which the oftner I read, the Weightier they ſeem to me; and his Adverſary's looſer and ſlighter. 'Twas a Reſpect I owed his Perſon, and a Duty to his Eſſay.

And now, Reader, as Men that die, ask forgivneſs of all the World, ſo do I. It is true, it does not yet appear to me, that I have Injur'd any perſon or thing; I would not do it for the World: And, therefore, am even with it: but I would be Modeſt at leaſt. I have Writ my Heart in the main; I hate ſerving of Turns: I love Old England as well as any Man, and I would fain ſee her Happy. I have long thought this the way, VERTVE OF LIFE and INDVEGENCE OF CONSCIENCE, for the KING, for the Clergy, and for the People. And if our hopes of Immortality were but half as ſtrong, as we care they ſhould be thought, we could not uſe one another with ſo much Jealouſie and Bitterneſs: We carry not a true Eſtimate of the World with us, to be ſo eaſily and ſo often diſorder'd for it. Let us not then palliate our Fury, or Intereſt with the ſacred Name of Religion: Let us Anſwer for our own Faults; we ſhall, we muſt: and therefore let us mend them, that we may have leſs to Anſwer for, when we come to Judgment.