IT it the Case of Truth to be opposed, but to prevail; and of Error, though de­fended, to be vanquish'd. Ill Causes can­not but be Ill maintained: They may look like true, but that is Art, which cannot change Nature. An Ass can never be a Doctor, nor a Fool a Solomon: Bulk given no Weight, nor Sound, good Sense.

And to say true, it was never much better prov'd, than in the Answer of the Duke of Buck­ingham's Paper: At first it amaz'd me with a flash of Words; the second Reading I came to my self; and at the last, I saw, they came to no­thing: [Page 4] began with false Wit, and ended with Noise and Fumble. And to shew you a little the Man in his Talents, Stile, Arguments, and Hu­mour, (for his own Book does it best at large) take what follows.

I will begin with his beginning.

That I have Written this Pamphlet (says he) is plain. But who this (I) is that Writ it, is not plain; for he has not told us his Name. How­ever, 'tis plain, 'tis writ; and so it is, that his Apology is against himself; which is, That a Sore always wants a Plaister. In which we must either understand, He confesses the Wound the Duke has given Atheism and Violence, to which he Consecrates a Plaster; or that his Book is in it self a Sore, and he has a mind to cover it. If the First, he has an Ill time of it: if the Last, 'tis Non-sense. But this is but a part of his Excuse; he thinks he may Answer him, because the Duke won't Answer himself, and act both Plaintiff and Defendant; as they do, that turn with the times; shift Principles for Livings; and love to be Par­son of Bray still. But whatever that Noble Duke does, the Answerer has that faculty; for he in­veighs against Reason, pag. 12, 13. and yet p. 36. sends his Reader in a warm Fit to Reason, not only to Chuse and Establish to himself a Re­ligion, but to Convince others by.

[Page 5] And now he falls on with a Tantivy—How Pernicious an Animal (says he) this Mountain and wild Conscience hath been to England, is too well known, and how Fatal Toleration would be. What stuff is here! Could a Man fetch any thing more savage out of the Highlands of Scot­land, or from the Lakes of Canada? One would think, 'twere Writing in shamm, and a Definiti­on in Burlesque: Some Cypher, but that there is no Key to it; for that a Mountain should be an Animal, and Conscience a Mountain, has neither Matter, Figure, Rhetorick, nor common Sense in it. Which, indeed, is the pitiful end of all Quacks and Pretenders. And hence he turns Vintner too: for in a moment he reads you a Lecture of Ferments and Lees, and the best way of turning the Wine of (Mount) Hope into the Vinegar (of the Valley) of Despair.

The Gentleman, that he might Run far e­nough from the Duke's Lenity, has pass'd the Line, and talks Antipode to common Experience. For with him Toleration pricks; Persecution does not. I had thought that sweet and soft things had prevented souring; and that there­fore eager and lean Wines were fed with the richest Malagoes. But the meaning of this ad­mirable simile, is, The Gentlemen of his Clan would keep the Wine to themselves: every bo­dy [Page 6] knows they love it. But I must needs say, 'tis a Churlish and Guzling trick, to drink all: Right Good-fellows are freer of their Liquor. And besides, it shews a mighty Ill Nature, that other Folks drinking should make it taste sowre with them: 'Tis not the Liquor, but the Pa­late: The Gall overflows; the Humor vitiates the Tast. Calvin's Predestination, in his Opini­on, p. 16. is not worse natured than This. Thunder sometimes turns Liquor; but I never heard it of fair and gentle weather: Certainly, it must be an unnatural Subject, upon which the most natural Things have an ill operation. And yet in some Ill temper'd Children we have seen the seeds of this sowre Humor; who would not Eat or Wear a thing, if others must have it as well as themselves. However, this Doctrine very naturally arises from the Text, That some Men, if they may have their humor, will be as sweet as Wine; and if not, will Turn as sowre as Vinegar. The Use and Application I leave to His Majesty.

But this is not all; he explains himself upon this point pag. 33. where he dreads the Church of England's Receeding from her Active Loyalty in opposing Diffenters, and the Terrible and una­voidable consequences of their betaking themselves to a Passive Loyalty. I hope he has made more [Page 7] bold than welcome with that Venerable Name; since 'tis to say, The Church of England's Loy­alty is to serve their own Turn, and the Prince's no longer than he will Ruin others to humor Her. That she opposes Dissenters for that Rea­son: And is uncharitable to all others: That though she Asserts Free-Will, she will Force other Mens. That she is not content with her Ho­ours, Imployments and Profits, unless others are Reprobated to a Civil Damnation: That she knows not where to stop, nor where to End her Resentments and Severities: That Law only maintains her, and her Establishment takes rise from humane Institution, and by humane Force is upheld: Nay, That if she may not have her Will, let the Black Box prevail, and the Oxford­men come in if they will, Fight Dog, fight Bear, We will be Quiet; We will be Passive. These are the Consequences of such Resolves: Things too harsh and Idle to imagine of a Society of so much Wisdom and Integrity; and therefore this Gentleman to be thought officious, if not scandalous in this attempt. And I hope her best Members will think, That more Reason to the Duke, and Discretion to the Church, had done better: for Scandalum Cleri with the one, ought to sit as uneasie, as Scandalum Magnatum with the other.

[Page 8] I have done a little to snew his folly and uncharitableness; more follows: and he that ruus may almost read it▪ He wonders, his Grace the Duke of Buckingham should become a Cham­pion for Whiggism, p. 1. And indeed so do I too: for I am sure, it must be very lately; and 'tis an ill time to begin in. But is this his Discre­tion, (pag. 2.) that was to defend him from a Scandalum Magnatum? But why a Whig? It seems it is, because he is for Toleration. A fine Con­clusion: and yet he makes this, but half a Whig neither. For he tells us in his Character, That Persecution makes up t'other half: so that a Right Whig is, a Tolerating Persecuter. Upon the whole matter then, the Duke is but half a Whig; and his Answerer it t'other half, who tells us, That his opinions have ever been Diame­trically opposite to those of his Grace's Paper; and whose Book it self is Persecution. And is it not a pretty thing to consider that the Bill and An­swer, the Plaintiff and Defendant (as he calls them) should make up one Whig?

But to do it, when Whiggism is super-annitated, and looks like a cast Mistris, and is contemn'd of all, heightens the Man's Admiration: And per­haps he knew the Duke, when he did not use to make such stale choices too. But to make him amends, the Man places it to his Compassion, [Page 9] which is yet Satyr enough upon himself, that not only has none, but makes it Whiggish in that Noble Person to Pity, Age and Necessity. Mad he must be, or he would not yield away so great a Vertue to so ill a thing. But is she super-annuated and cast? pray, why then feared in one part, and loved so fondly in another, by this Knight of the Robe? She is but half Cast; the Toleration side is only super-annuated with him; t'other is not above Eighteen yet, fresh, strong, and ruddy, in his Desires at least: And that she may live longer a-that side, he is blowing Breath through his Quill, as fast as he can.

And to say true, he has Air enough, to help her: But when all is done, he will make an Ill Mistress of her; for she is to be Old and Cast (if not Dead) a one side still: This is her Palsie, and his Phrensie. I am of Opinion, when he thinks what he has done, he will (like his young Gal­lant, Pag. 6.) cry, a Pox upon Consequences, I hate Consequences. So Pragmatical so Incongru­ous, and so Indiscreet has the Gentleman been in his hasty Attaque.

But to come to the body of his pretended An­swer. After telling us, p. 6. He will not Anatomize, nor Dissect each Nerve and Muscle of His Grace 's Paper, (though else where it has neither, in his [Page 10] Opinion) and that he hates Hashing of Books, and serving them up with Limon and Anchovies, turn­ing Chryrurgeon and Cook in a breath: he says, He will deliver his thoughts in a lump; as if he had a mind to a Pudding more than a Hash. The Truth is, he has little Shape, and less Life: and therefore the Gentleman has in one word, Whig­like, turn'd Gossip to his own Chits with more propriety, than is in all his Book beside.

But let's look upon his Lump a little further. First, he says, His Grace has taken an Improper way to confute the wity Atheist, or Establish Reli­gion. (And why so?) Because the changeable­ness of the World does not disprove its Eternity, any more than the Mutations of his Grace's Body alters him from being that George D. of Buck­ingham, that he was Forty Years ago. But the D. of Buckingham does not pretend to be the same Man that he was Forty Years ago; and would give this Gentleman, Ten thousand pound to make him so. And to say true, he that says, A changing World is Eternal, is not many re­moves from that which we call a Changling. For though a Man be the same, as to his Faculties and Properties: Yet we have fresh Spirits and Flesh; and this World has its Alterations and Renewings too.

[Page 11] What the first Matter was, and how formed, and which way it subsists, are much beyond us! yet the more we look into them, the more we are led from the Regular Motions and Seasons of the Fabrick we see with the distinct kinds and species of Creatures therein, to Conclude and Admire a Prior and Superior Being. A Man that is a Creature of time, may be said to be, and in some cases not to be the same: for he is not the same in the same Being always; but an Eternal thing cannot be so varied. And 'tis fallacious to argue from a Man's being the same Man, under changes, to the World's being Eternally the same World under Changes; since it were to say, That a thing were the same in that in which It changes: for that were to be in that which is not, or is not any more that which it was; The supeamest Non-sence a Man can be guilty of.

The Duke was not strict in this matter; and his Answer is stricter with him, than wise; especially when he faults him in a thing Dispu­table, and yet promises not to disturb, but im­prove his Arguments for a God. But so un­happy is the Genius of this Gentleman, that he frequently breaks his Word, though be breaks his Head with it. There are but three of four things the Duke goes upon; That the World did [Page 12] not make it self: That he that made it is God: That he was dignified Man with something more Excellent, than what belongs to other Creatures: That this makes him look and hope beyond Death; therefore Immortality, probable: That those that do well, shall be Happy; the contrary, Miserable: That to this Choice they are free and uncompell'd. And lastly, That none should Extinguish Men's Religious Impressions, by forcing them against their Perswasion. These Sober and Worthy Thoughts might have been better treated.

'Tis true (he says, pag. 7.) his Notions are very fine, and many of them very natural and true; but not too Logical. No matter for that; he Writ like a Gentleman, and not a Pedant. But to see, how true this person is to himself, within six lines after the Character of many na­tural and true Notions; he tells us, without blushing, though not without confusion, That the Consequences which necessarily follow the Duke's Conceptions, are greatly to the disadvan­tage not only of Religion, but of the politick Frame and Government of the World. I cannot ima­gine, which way; and he has carefully avoided to inform me. But I cannot see, how the Go­vernment of the Great Turk, and the Great Mogul are concern'd in the Duke of Bucking­ham's Book? They may indeed, if they could [Page 13] read it, because he Recommends to all Men the Christian Religion, (pag. 18.) And, if I know any thing, the Consequence of his Contra­dictory Assertion, is, That the Mogul must be Infidel still, and the Great Turk must be a Ma­hometan still. For this good Christian goes up­on this Principle, That the Religion Establish'd by Law, ought therefore to be Conformed to of all; and consequently, Liberty even to Chri­stian's Consciences is dangerous to the Political Frame of that Government that is not Chri­stian.

He proceeds to oppose the Duke's Deduction, in Reference to the Worship of God, pag. 11, & 12. For in truth (says he) if his Argu­mentation be allowed, here is as fair a plea for the ALCORAN, as the NEW TESTAMENT; for PYTHAGORAS's GOLDEN VERSES, as St. PAVL's EPISTLES. For, if I be not mistaken, in what his Grace calls that Part of us, which is nearest a-kin to the Nature of God, and the In­stinct of a Deity, this must be humane Reason; not as Regulated by any Publick and Politick Rea­son of a Community, but as every private person's Reason shall dictate.

But how unjust and precarious is all this? First, Assert; and then, If he mistakes not, the Duke meant so. But if the Duke meant not so, then [Page 14] he is mistaken: and the Duke could not mean, as he states his understanding of it. For though he takes leave to mistake the Duke, the Duke does not mistake himself: There is not one Word of Humane Reason in the Question, nor is Humane Reason that Instinct of the Deity.

We have a Natural Capacity to apprehend Divine things; but 'tis that Instinct, which gives us the Religious use of it. All Men that have Eyes, have the Capacity of seeing; but without light they cannot see. Pray, who was he that said; There is a Spirit in Man, but the Inspiration of the Almighty gives Ʋnderstanding? and that, Whatsoever may be known of God, is manifested in Man? Rom. 1. By what else is it, that the Prophet declares, That God tells unto Man his thoughts? And St. Paul expresly says, That those that had not the Law, became a Law unto themselves, (By what? if not by this In­stinct, this Synteresis?) their Conscience accusing or exeusing them before God. And St. John goes farther, who says; If our Hearts condemn us, God is greater; but if our Hearts condemn us not, then have we boldness before God. And does this make as much for the Alcoran, as for the Scripture? and Pythagoras's Writings, as St. Pauls's Epistles?

[Page 15] The Duke spoke to a peculiar Rank of Men: Wits without much Religion, to give Religion the beginnings of Credit with them: He did not say, That was enough? That Scripture or other external helps were useless, or not requisite: And yet, when all is done, we must chuse for our selves, and not by the Political Reason of Com­munity; or else we shall believe upon Authority and not upon Conviction; which was not the Christian way. St. Paul bids us, Pray with un­derstanding; and if so, surly, our understand­ing ought to be satisfied, to whom, and how to pray. And this Gentleman makes it an Er­ror, not to pray knowingly; and if so, certain­ly we should have some Reason for our Hope too.

And therefore, I cannot perswade my self to believe, that Noble Peer writ like a Minor, when he proceds to this Deduction? ‘That it is one of the greatest Crimes a Man can be guilty of, to Force us to act against that Instinct of Religion; and something a kin to the Sin a­gainst the Holy Ghost.’ This Notion the Gen­tleman throws with scorn at the Quakers, (an Honest and well-meaning People;) and if this be a Kin to their Doctrine, they are sounder than he that despises them. And to say true, He does them greater Honour, than it may be, [Page 16] he is aware of. But why not believe upon Con­viction? For, Whatever is not of Faith, (St. Paul tells us) is Sin: And Force upon any Man's Conscience, must overthrow the Reason of this Fear, Faith and Hope. For how dark and fee­ble any Man's Conscience is, Force brings no Light no Knowledge: It may distract, doubt, and so damn.

But I cannot enough admire at the Conclusi­ons this Gentleman draws from this most Inof­fensive and Orthodox Expression. The First is this: That Reason is the Guide of every Man's Religion. This is spurious: For, though he that embraces a Religion without Reason, has no more Religion than my Horse; yet a Man's own Rea­son so rectified, is not the Guide of Man in his Religion: for his Reason is that which is to be Guided.

His Second is yet more Extravagant, viz. That Divine Revelation is not necessary to Salvation. In which he has bid boldly; for there is not a word in the Duke's Discourse about it. He as­serts the Divine Instinct; ‘That it inclines and disposes Men to be Religious; That they are to be commended, that beat a sincere Re­spect to it.’ But not a word, that Men should not crave further Help, or read the Holy Scri­ptures, that contain our Revealed Religion. On [Page 17] the contrary, he tells us; ‘He therefore wav'd the Ʋse of them in this Discourse, because of the Persons to whose Condition he calcula­ted it.’ Were it not a sine Conclusion in this Doctor, to say, A Man that goes to Ro­chester shall never come to Canterbury, though it be in the Way, and the better part of it? Just so Reasonable his Consequence is against the Duke.

But he advances in his Humour of perverting his Words; for the Third Consequence he draws in his Name, is this: That it is a most horrid Sin, to lead Men out of Errors, (pag. 13.) when there is not one word of Leading in the Questi­on. For the Duke says, [To Force,] and he infers, To Lead. His Words are; ‘That it is one of the greatest Crimes a Man can be guil­ty of, To Force us to act or sin against that Instinct of Religion; and something a-kin to the Sin against the Holy Ghost.’ The Duke says, To force Men to sin; he says, To lead Men out of Errors: As if Leading and Forcing were the same; when one is the way of Perswasion, and the other of Fines and Prisons. I cannot tell what this Gentleman would not say; he may as honestly apprehend a Beggar on the Road, for an High-way-Man.

[Page 18] His Fourth and last Consequence he bestows up­on this Noble Peer, is this, pag. 13. That Men, who believe a God, and follow the Dictates of Reason in his Worship, may be saved in any, in all Religions; provided they know not a better. And what, if he had said so? It had shewn his Cha­rity. Does not God wink in times of Ignorance? And what is Knowing no better, but a State of Ignorance? Is there no Allowance for Times, Places and Conditions? Certainly, this Man thinks, Aristotle and St. Paul are as much below him, as he is above the Duke of Bucking­ham. This is riding Tantivy, through thick and thin.

But to Answer his short, yet full: This Charge upon his Grace, charges himself; First, That Faith in God, and the Dictates of Reason, can swallow all sorts of Religion; for he excepts not the most Idolatrous; yet sets up Reason else­where, to judge of true Religion, (pag. 14, 36.) And Men must leave Reason, when they fall un­der Superstition and Idolatry. Secondly, That this Hero is for chusing his Religion without Rea­son: And that's not worth a Fig, (with his leave.) Thirdly, That the Duke does not prefer Christianity, by the Course of his Deductions: which he plainly does, pag. 18.

[Page 19] But after he hath shewn the Duke's Weak­ness or Mistake (in his Opinion) to make him abler than he found him, and the Book wor­thier the Reader's notice; with a Modesty, al­most equal to his Reason, he tells us: NOW, IF I WERE TO DISCOƲRSE AN ATHEIST, (pag. 9.) and: IF I HAD BEEN TO FOL­LOW HIS GRACE's BLOW. I would have urged This; and, I would have done That, &c. By which, I perceive, this Gentleman is better natur'd than Sir Jo. Falstaff, that being call'd upon for a Reason for what he said, answer'd; That if Reasons were as rife as Black-Berries, he would not give him one.

I have seen Cowards fight thus stoutly: Now, Sir, (says he) here I could have you, Sir; and there I could have you, Sir: and, if I strike you, Sir, infallibly I hit you, Sir: and, if I hit you, Sir, you'll feel it, Sir: Are not you of my mind, Sir? This Gentleman wanted some­thing; and though the Duke be no Minor, he has a mind to play the Senior upon him, and use him so: And what a fine time he would have, to be Ward to such a Jewel?

Such Coxcombs I have seen in my time; for there is not so true a Mark of that Animal, as Officiousness upon Mistake, to praeter do, or over­do a thing. Look you, Sir; upon my word, Sir; [Page 20] you are out, Sir; you mean this, Sir; I know your meaning, Sir, as well as if I were in you, Sir; alas, Sir, there is a better way far, Sir; and then, Sir, you don't hit it neither, Sir; for, Sir, if you aim at the end, Sir, you must aim at the means, Sir; and that I pretend to know, Sir, as well as any Man, Sir; and therefore, Sir, by your favor, Sir, if I had been to have follow'd your blow, Sir, I would have done no body knows what, Sir; Gramarcy Doctor. 'Tis pity to think, what pains some Men take to play the Fool.

His second great Head (and little Wit) is about the Anti-Christianism of Persecution, oppo­sing the Duke's Notion of it, thus pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. And first, he says, That though to punish Professors of the true Religion, for that on­ly, whilst inoffensive in all things to the Civil Go­vernment, is real Persecution, and truly Anti-Christi­an; as that of the Primitive Christians by the Hea­then Roman Emperors; yet to punish Dissenters, as Papists and Phanaticks, is not so; because they are in the wrong, and offensive to the Government. This in a Lump (as he calls it) and perhaps a little better collected than his was. In all which he begs the Question of the Roman Emperors for the Christians; and of the Dissenters for their Adversaries; though upon differing terms.

For the Heathen Emperors had Antient Rites [Page 21] to plead, and the Establish'd Law of the Em­pire, against the progress of Christianity; And that is all this Gentleman has said here for him­self, and against them. For he undertakes not to prove the Points Controverted true against the Dissenters; but urges the kn [...]cking Argument of the Jews, We have a Law, and by our Law he ought to die. Nay, he sends the Duke to Lewis the Fourteenth, (pag. 29.) to ask, If it be safe To­lerating another Religion than his own: By which he determines the case against the Persecuted Protestants there, lest their Indulgence should ex­emplarily make way for ours to the Dissenters here. Is not this a dainty Protestant, that can cherish Cruelty against Men of his own Religion abroad, rather than not act it at home upon Dissenters?

This is to make Religion a Politick Interest, and to Answer Worldly ends: A greater Argu­ment for Atheism, than any he has offer'd against it. The Primitive Christians had died Idolaters upon this Principle: For Authority, not Con­viction, with him all along concludes the Point.

He begs the Question of the Dissenters; for he argues nothing about the grounds of Dissent, but the Law; 'Tis the Religion by Law Establish'd: And why not by the Bible? but that it yields not to it the present Advantages of Force and Worldly Authority. Now (as he says) If I had [Page 22] been to Dispute them, and follow his blow, I would have Evinc'd their Error, before I would have pronounc'd my Judgment.

But they are Factious, Seditious, and danger­ous to the Government; therefore severe Laws were made against Papists, Priests and Jesuits on the one Hand, and Phanaticks on the other. Sup­pose this were as he frowardly Clamors; Is it to be thought, that they would be dangerous, if they were Easie, and so endanger themselves? they know better. And we see, this Gentle­man fears the Church's Receeding in her Loyalty, if there be but Indulgence to Dissenters; making her Eye evil, if the Governments be good. Pray, what then would she do, if she were Persecu­ted as they are? Can more, with Justice, be ex­pected from Hereticks and Schismaticks, than from the Orthodox? If they were more patient, I should begin to fear, they would be quickly more Orthodox too. But I cannot tell how to think that Men in their Wits would forfeit Ease when they have it; though to get it they might be Indiscreet.

And one thing I must say, Roman Catholicks have been Loyal in England and Holland, and Bresbyterians in France and the German Principa­lities. So that 'tis not necessarily true, they are not Seditious, as they are Dissenters: Men go by [Page 23] their Interests. The Gentlemen that Tore the King's Declaration of Indulgence from him, were high Church-men; and they opposed his Politi­cal Capacity to his Natural, on purpose to over­throw that Act of Grace, by which distinction the late Civil War was made; so that 41. over­took 73. or that return'd to 41. And who knows not, that they were such as hardly knew how to pray, but out of our Liturgy; that at­tempted to Exclude the Presumptive Heir to the Crown upon the score of his Religion. And though this Jehu drives so furiously upon Dissen­ters on that Account, if he will think (which I fear he seldom does) he will find that an Heir is but a Subject; and the same Law governs properly a-like in this Kingdom to all Ranks of Subjects. And that some of the same Gentle­men, that formerly shook small Folks Property for Non-Conformity, had lately a mind, to Sa­crifice the present King's for Dissent. Where­fore let us make Men easie, take Temptations out of their way, and not lay stumbling-blocks before weak or peevish people, nor pinch them with those Burdens or Yokes, that our Fathers could hardly bear, and we need not doubt a Friendly success.

It is by this Nameless Author Objected in a Career of Criminations, That this may suit a Re­publick, [Page 24] (pag. 28, & 29.) but is dangerous to a Monarchy. But not half so much in my opinion, as his Objection is. For, doubtless, Monarchy has as extended and saving a bottom to live upon, as any Republick in the World; nay, rather the Power of more Mercy, Favour and Indulgence. For the Number of Subjects is the Glory and Strength of a King; and that which makes the People easie, makes the Government so to the Monarch. 'T were lavish to prefer a Common-Wealth to make it more capable of good to the various conditions of Mankind than Monarchy. It is therefore his little skill in Po­liticks as well as Religion, that makes him quote the practice of the French King (p. 29.) for no body knows yet the consequence: His Cake is but Dough still: 'Tis early day with the Pro­ject: See if his Son, ay, if He don't feel it yet. For Uniformity is a mean Recompence for a thin and poor Country. What might not an Union of Interests and Affections, under so great a Prince as we have, recover and establish in the World? Wonders; for Miracles come from Heaven.

Instead of this, old Sores are daily rubb'd fresh; and new impressions of former Tragedies are thrown abroad to prejudice us against the means of our own Peace and Glory: God (if [Page 25] he pleases) avert the consequences of our own bitterness and Animosity.

His last Head is about Toleration, (p. 25.) though included in his second; this he labours with his usual pains; 'Tis neither (says he) good Divinity, nor good Politicks; and of this he is as certain as if he found a Mare's Nest.

The first Reason, why it is not good Divi­nity; is, That false Religions in a Christian Dress, would then be Tolerated to the injury of Christian Religion and Mens Souls, p. 26. But he does not consider, how many he will Damn by Hy­pocrisie. But in that, perhaps I am out, he may not think that a Damnable Sin; and that it is better be an Hypocrite, than a Dissenter; though One thinks he is in the right, and the Other knows he is in the wrong; and so one of St. Paul's true Hereticks, viz. self-Condemned.

Be that as it will, Jesus Christ is against his Divinity, that is Lord of the true. For he com­mands, That the Tares grow with the Wheat, till Harvest; which he interprets, the End of the world, and Great Judgment: And forbad. Fire to be so much as desired to be call'd from Hea­ven to hurt those that did not own his blessed Messengers in their great Doctrine of the King­dom he sent them to preach.

[Page 26] For Toleration' [...] being bad Politicks, let him allow me the Liberty he takes with the Noble Peer I defend, and I will send him upon an Er­rand, that shall determine the Controversie pre­sently. Let him go to the Prince of Orange, whose Ancestor begun the Glory of that Country with it, to the Princes of the Empire. And if this French King will be Impartial, ask him, If greater Feats were done without, than with a Toleration? So far is it from being dangerous to Princes.

And if Opinions were yet worse than they are, there cannot (in my judgment) accrue any dan­ger to the Government that Tolerates them. For, First, the Professors of them have, which they could be thought to Plot to get; but will never Plot to lose. And, Secondly, if any such peo­ple could be, there are or may be Laws enough to Crush and punish the least Appearance of Disorder. And under favour, Publick Assem­blies are so far from being dangerous, tha [...], truly consider'd, they are the security of the Govern­ment.

What makes Men Dangerous? First, they cann't help their Dissent; for Faith is not in a Man's own power. Next, so soon as he de­clares it, the Law cuts him off from the Favour and Protection of the Magistrate. Is it then the [Page 27] Man that makes himself dangerous, or is he made dangerous for that Dissent? And if that be it, 'twill not be hard to determine, how a Dis­senter comes to be dangerous.

Forcing Men to Religions is as if it were in a Man's power to use his Conscience as he can his Money. In that case I would be on the side of the Penal Laws. But if a Man cann't believe as he will, and less, as other Men believe, and [...] yet be safe to the Government, don't make him [...]safe under it, and I'll warrant he does no harm: And this I think may be done.

I conclude, That Toleration is so far from be­ing an Enemy to Religion and Monarchy, That it gives God his due, prevents Hypocrisie, and restores Society instead of Unity: And by an united Affection, Purse, and Hands Renders our King Great and Terrible.

I now wait upon his Three Questions: the First has Four in the belly of it, (p. 34, 35.) First: If Christ did not believe Soveraign Power might maintain the order of Society by Rewards and Panishments. Truly I don't know his Be­lief, nor how suitable it might be to him to believe, being the Object of ours. But he commanded it, though with a salvo to the Re­ligion he came to Institute. They were his Sheep, 'twas his Kingdom.

[Page 28] The next Query is to the Duke, If he ha [...] consider'd, That spiritual Punishments are far more rigorous, than Temporal ones? I believe, as much as this Gentleman has, Whether Temporal be less than Eternal? But what of all that? Why, (next to follow his blow) he asks; If Jesus Christ then has not used greater force to compel Men to his Religion, than all the Powers of the Earth have done? But if it were so, I am of the poor Welch-man's mind; Let her alone till [...] day comes: And of St. Taffy's too; I had [...]ather fall into the hands of God, than Man. But: is this proper, just, and adequate▪ Christ punishes Spiritual Faults with Spiritual Punishments, Ergo, The Powers of the Earth ought to punish the same Faults with Temporal and Corporal Punish­ments, such as Prisons, Fines, Exiles and Death?

But in the next place, I don't think he has out­done the Heathen and some Christian Persecuti­ons, the Reason of both consider'd. For he de­cides the Controversie by Good Works; They by Opinions: He cryes, Come ye well-doers; there are his Sheep: Go ye Workers of Iniquity; there be his Goats. But Conformity makes an Ill-Man Grateful, and Non-Conformity a Good-Man Hateful: here Good Works don't determine the point, as at Christ's Judgment.

[Page 29] Howbeit, it is monstrous to argue, That Men should be twice punish'd for the same Offence; by the Magistrate here, and Christ hereafter: This is held unequal among Just Men in all Go­vernments. But 'tis no matter, let Zeal or In­terest Christen it, and its well enough for a Pa­pist or a Phanatick. But if this Gentleman were as much under their power, as they are now under his Censures; and should they use him, as the provokes the Civil Magistrate to treat them, I am of the mind, he would think and call it too Anti-Christian.

To this Second main Question (in substance Answer'd before) Whether there being an hundred Monarchies happy without Toleration and Liberty of Conscience, to one Republick that allows it with Restriction, whose future Fate we are ignorant of; and whether that may not in time prove its Ruin; It be not an hundred to one, that Monarchy shall be more flourishing, safe and lasting without a Tolera­tion, than with it? To this I say; he makes the ground of it Fact; and that's false: There is not only no such thing, as an hundred Monarchies that have been happy without it: but more have been happy with, than without it, All the Eastern Monarchies, almost generally give it with success. Next, the French. Monarohy was happier in Henry the IV. than Charles the IX. [Page 30] and Ours in Queen Elizabeth, than in King Henry the VIII. for though Her's was not a Reign of Liberty, yet of less severity than His. He makes it Republican, and knows not what he says: for as his story of Monarchies is untrue, so that of Republicks, a Fiction: there being Two Monarchies to One Republick that gives it. What will be, we cann't tell: but Holland is a greater proof for the Prudence of a Toleration, than any Country that can be named on the side of Coertion; and the Effects that are, shew what the same measures will do for the time to come if kept to.

To the Third, and last Question, viz. Whe­ther it be not Cross and Pile, whether a Man, who may be of any, or all Religions, will be of any, or of none at all? I must tell him, That they that can be of all Religions, have little or none. And therefore I always thought those Clergy-men that in Henry the Eighth's time turn'd Trimmers, and Protestants in Edward the Sixth's, and Papists in Queen Mary's, and Protestants again, with a witness, in Queen Elizabeth's, had no Religion but their Benefices. And, as I take it, there were not Three Hundred, of all Qualities, out of Ten Thousand, that stood out; to say no­thing of their Fountains that ran freely through all those Rubs and Revolutions, I mean Oxford [Page 31] and Cambridge. If he please to remember what numbers turn'd Presbyterians between the years Forty and Fifty, how many in Sixty return'd; and with what Oaths, Covenants, Engagements, and Abjurations they maintain'd their Possession, will have cause to say, that it is, sometimes, hard­ly Cross and Pile with too many, what Religion they are of, and those of no small pretences too.

And since he has put it upon that game, I cami't forbear saying, That he has hit upon the aptest Allusion he could have made. For Cross and Pile in some Countries stand Pope and King, and where they meet that Game is up.

If he thinks the business yet worth his while, I should be glad to see something truly solid and Christian. In the mean time, I take the mea­sure he gives me in his Conclusion, to make my Choice by Reason and Vertue, To discourage all Se­dition and Disloyalty; to Tolerate none, that pro­fess to cut other Mens Throats for Conscience sake: Beseeching him to let me be even with him in a few Questions and a Conclusion: They will be short.

I. If any Man ought to believe without Convicti­on? If not, then

[Page 32] II. Whether Conviction be in a Man's power to give himself or any for him? If not,

III. Whether this does not of course put an end to Coertion?

I proceed to Three more upon a Christian Foot.

IV. If Christ's Law and Example are to be the Rule of Christians?

V. If by his Law and Example Christians should compel Conformity by Worldly Force to their Religion?

VI. If Liberty to Conscientious Dissenters be not Adviseable from Examples Christian and Political?

The Conclusion is first Particular then General I would beseech the Gentleman, to whom this Reply is made, to Avoid Prejudice, which is here (I fear) an Ill Habit of Education. For he says, He was always Diametrically opposite to the Duke's Opinion in the Points treated on: As if he had suck'd it with his Milk. Examination helps Judgment; it is Chewing and Digesting well; t'other is swallowing and not Concocting: and sometime a Man gets a Hook in his Throat too. Let him have a Care of Tarantula's and the Itch of Answering, before he considers well; for [Page 35] that will be as unaccountable, as, he says, his Wit is poisonous Wit, (pag. 4.)

There are Two other things that make a Man heave and throw, and disorder himself extream­ly; and that is the Fly and the Worm; especial­ly in Spring-time; and this has been unusually dry and hot. But for all this, I will end well with him; For what ever he thinks, I wish him as well as my self; and that we may both live and die happily with a Toleration.

And now, Reader, 'tis fit I say something of this undertaking. The Love and Honor I have for the Truths deliver'd by that Noble Person, and the easie, plain, short, and yet full, I and strenuous way in which he has recommended them to the World, obliged me to this Defence, such as it is. But I cannot but wish, he had met with a Man that had deserv'd his own no­tice, because no body can better Defend his Ar­guments: which the oftner I read, the Weighti­er they seem to me; and his Adversary's looser and slighter. 'Twas a Respect I owed his Per­son, and a Duty to his Essay.

And now, Reader, as Men that die, ask for­givness of all the World, so do I. It is true, it does not yet appear to me, that I have In­jur'd any person or thing; I would not do it for the World: And, therefore, am even with [Page 36] it: but I would be Modest at least. I have Writ my Heart in the main; I hate serv­ing of Turns: I love Old England as well as any Man, and I would fain see her Happy. I have long thought this the way, VERTVE OF LIFE and INDVEGENCE OF CON­SCIENCE, for the KING, for the Clergy, and for the People. And if our hopes of Im­mortality were but half as strong, as we care they should be thought, we could not use one another with so much Jealousie and Bitterness: We carry not a true Estimate of the World with us, to be so easily and so often disorder'd for it. Let us not then palliate our Fury, or Interest with the sacred Name of Religion: Let us An­swer for our own Faults; we shall, we must: and therefore let us mend them, that we may have less to Answer for, when we come to Judgment.