TULLY's MORALS.

TULLY's Three Books OF OFFICES, In ENGLISH.

With NOTES Explaining the Method and Meaning of the AUTHOR.

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LONDON: Printed for SAM. BUCKLEY, at the Dolphin, in St Paul's Church-yard. M DC XC IX.

TO Mr. Will. Bedingfield, AND Mr. John Wallis.

I Beg leave, Gentlemen, to prefix your Names to this little Treatise about Moral Duties, which the wise Author of it thought fit to recommend to his own Son, and which has usually been look'd upon as one of the per­fectest and compleatest in its kind. It has alter'd its Dress indeed since it came under my Hands, and I am afraid, may-have suffer'd very much by the Alteration: however, as to the Body and more substantial Parts of it, I hope 'tis still the same, and worthy of that Opinion, which the Author himself had of it, That 'twas a very good Present, if made such Use of, as the Nature and Importance of its Argument requir'd. 'Twas at first design'd for a Person in your Circumstances, a Student in an U­niversity, a young Gentleman of great Hopes, one from whom his Country did expect to receive Be­nefit, and his Friends no small Comfort and Sa­tisfaction: I thought I could not do better there­fore, after once I had resolv'd to Translate it into English, than Dedicate it to You, who have so good [Page ii] a Title to it, as well upon this as upon some other Accounts. The Honour and Happiness I have in being appointed the Director of your Studies, the many Favours and Obligations I have receiv'd up­on that account, together with a great many other Inducements arising from so close and endearing a Relation, almost forc'd me to make this publick Acknowledgment. And I confess I was desirous my self of doing it, both that it might serve for a Testimony of that Value and Esteem which I have for you; and that I might oblige you by it, in some measure, to read these Precepts, when you are gone from under my Care, which most People in those Circumstances are but too ready to forget. You will find here all the more useful Parts of Virtue so clearly set before you; the Excellence and Im­portance of it so judiciously enlarg'd upon; the Necessity of it toward the procuring a Reputation, toward the meeting with Encouragement and Suc­cess in our Undertakings: and, in a word, toward the obtaining any tolerable degree of Happiness, in whatever State of Life, so abundantly made out; that I hardly know of any thing (relating to meer Morality) that could more fitly be recom­mended to Persons in Your Circumstances, by one in Mine, than this excellent Treatise. 'Tis true you have read it in its Original Language, and my Request to you is, that you would continue to do so; the Design of this Translation being not to exclude, but to assist the Latin: which if it may but do in any tolerable manner, so as to help toward the Understanding of such excellent Rules of Living, I have obtain'd my End.

Such as it is, Gentlemen, I heartily present it to you; wishing that it may be in some measure ser­viceable [Page iii] to those Ends, for which it was at first design'd; and that all, but especially Men of E­state and Fortune, and such as are likely to make some Figure in the World, would be persuaded to learn ev'n from an Heathen Writer, That there is no true Profit or Advantage, no solid Reputation or Honour, and, in short, no real Happiness any where to be found, except in the Practice of Vir­tue and Honesty. I am,

GENTLEMEN,
Your most affectionate humble Servant, T. C.

ERRATA.

P. 129. l. 23. r. any by-ends. p. 161. l. 22. r. filed off. p. 204. Note h. r. six Books. p. 281. l. 14. for now living, r. lately dead.

THE PREFACE.

THE turning into English so excellent a Discourse as this is, I suppose, will hard­ly stand in need of an Apology: But the attempting it after so eminent a Person as Sir R. L' Estrange, perhaps will hardly admit of a­ny. I do not design to spin out a long Preface, in making Excuses for so bold an Undertaking; much less in finding fault with the Performance of that Gentleman: I have more regard to the Reader's Pati­ence than to do the former; and am too sensible of His great Worth and my own Miscarriages, to be guilty of the latter. I shall only beg leave to assure the Reader, That this Translation was well-nigh finish'd, before I saw the last Edition of Sir Roger's, in which he hath corrected some very notorious and pal­pable Faults, that were in all the former. I hope therefore it could be no Presumption in me to think his Translation faulty, since he himself by this late Alteration, has in effect acknowleg'd it. I might, 'tis true, have suppress'd my own Work, when I saw he had corrected those Mistakes and Oversights I had formerly found in his, and which first put me upon making this new Attempt: But beside that all Men, when once they are pretty far advanc'd in any Busi­ness, (as I then was) are naturally unwilling to have it taken out of their Hands, and desirous of going [Page ii] on to see an end of it; and beside that, I think there are still some places, in which he hath mista­ken, or not clearly enough explain'd, the Meaning of the Author: I was always of Opinion, That there would be something further necessary, before Tully's Offices could be throughly understood; and that a bare Translation, and especially so close an one as Sir Roger's is, could never give the Reader a View of the deep Sence, and sometimes intricate Method of that Book. I resolv'd therefore to go on with my design'd Translation of it, and to add such things to it by way of Explication, as seem'd necessary or convenient for the better understanding the Design, Meaning and Method of the Author. Those People therefore, that can understand Cicero by Sir Roger's Translation, may still make use of it if they please, notwithstanding any thing I have said to the con­trary, and I hope there's no harm done: and for those that cannot, I have attempted this new one, which I hope may be in some measure serviceable to that End.

The Author of this Book is so well known, that 'twould be altogether needless to give any Account of him in this place: As for the Book it self, it has always been look'd upon as one of the perfectest Pie­ces of his Writings, and one of the noblest Systems of Moral Precepts, that have ever been left us by the ancient Heathens; and not without reason: There appears all along in it so great a Love and Concern for Virtue, which he recommends to his Son with all imaginable Earnestness; so deep a Sence of the Obli­gations to Honesty, and Aversion for every thing that's contrary to it; such an admirable Inclination for the Virtues of Plainness, Truth and Sincerity, and such a generous Contempt of all shuffling, mean and un­der-hand Dealings; such Piety toward his Native Country, and hearty Concern for the Calamities it [Page iii] groan'd under, and withal so much Hatred and De­testation for those Men, who had been the Causes of its Misfortunes; and, in a word, so many excellent Rules of Life, with reference to our Duty either to God or Men, and to those in their several Capaci­ties and Relations, whether of Kindred, Friends or Benefactors, as have justly recommended it to the E­steem of all the World, and given it the first place among the eminent and most celebrated Writings of this kind. The Scope and Design of it in his own words is, To lay down some Directions and Precepts of good Living, according to which upon all occasi­ons Men ought to govern their Lives and Actions; so that whatever State of Life a Man is in, whether Publick or Private, of Governour or Governed, of Pro­sperity or Adversity, old Age or Youth, he will here find Rules how he ought to demean himself in any of those Capacities; and will be told what that is, which the Dignity and Excellence of his own Nature requires in regard to himself; and what the several sorts of Alliance or Society among Men demand, in relation to other People: So that while other parts of Learning and Knowledge are most times confin'd either to certain Ages, certain Times, or certain Places, this is of ge­neral and universal Use; 'tis (as our Author says up­on another Subject) necessary for Youth as well as old Age; it directs in Prosperity as well as in Adversity; 'tis a Delight to us at home, and a Companion for us a­broad; Pernoctat nobiscum, peregrinatur, rustica­tur.

'Twas principally design'd for the Use of his own Son, whom he had sent to Athens for the benefit of Study, while all things were in Disorder and Confu­sion at Rome, after Pompey's Defeat in the Phar­salian Field: But he tells us he has purposely fram'd it in such a manner, as that it might be equally ser­viceable to all other People. The time of its writing [Page iv] was after Caesar's Murther, when Mark Anthony and his Adherents had got the Power into their Hands, and Cicero (as he complains at the begin­ning of the third Book) was by wicked Arms driven away from the City, and forc'd to betake himself to his private Retirements. At this time he thought to have gone to Athens to his Son, and was accordingly on his Journey, when he was call'd back again by the loud Cries of his Country, as he intimates in the con­clusion of this Discourse, and explains more at large in the beginning of his first Philippick. He return'd to Rome upon this Recal, but found things very dif­ferent from what he expected, when he came thither: Hereupon he withdrew himself to his Houses in the Country, resolving to wait for some fitter Opportunity of being serviceable to the Republick. From this Re­tirement he sent these Precepts in writing to his Son, which he design'd to have given him by word of Mouth, had he arriv'd at Athens. The Method he proceeds in is this which follows: After a short Discourse by way of Preface to his Son, and fixing the right Notion of the Subject he is to treat about, he endeavours to beget in him a Love of Honesty, by representing it as amiable and commendable in it self, and agreeable to the Nature and Reason of Mankind. He divides it into four Parts or general Heads, Pru­dence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance, which are usûally call'd the four Cardinal Virtues, and Dis­courses in order upon every one of 'em, with all their several Species or Branches, and the Vices that stand in opposition to 'em. And this he does, not in a dry and scholastical Manner, by enquiring nicely wherein the strict Nature of the several Virtues consists, and which of their opposite Vices they are nearest to, (which my Lord Bacon somewhere very ingeniously observes, is like a Master's setting a Boy a Copy to write after, without ever shewing him how he should make his Let­ters) [Page v] but by laying down such Rules under each of these Heads, as may direct Men in the Practice of the Duties requir'd of 'em. Afterwards he compares them with one another, and shews in what Order they are to be perform'd by us: As, Justice, for Example, before Knowledge, Fortitude, &c. All these Virtues, when taken together, make up the general Notion of Honestum; and when taken separately, are so many Branches or distinct Members of it.

But seeing something else beside Virtue or Honesty is necessarily requisite, or at least useful and conveni­ent, for our well-being here; such as are the Com­forts and Conveniences of Life, viz. Riches, Glory, Ho­nours, Success in Business, &c. which are all comprehend­ed under the Notion of the word Profit: therefore in the second Book he endeavours to shew how these are to be obtain'd: And having made it appear, That all the Advantages Men enjoy, and the Evils they endure, are principally owing to Men themselves: From thence he infers, That the Way whereby we may obtain the former, and avoid the latter, is to procure the En­deavours of Men on our side, so as to have them ready to assist us upon occasion. This he shews can be done no other way, than by performing those Duties which Honesty requires of us: viz. by Prudence and Wisdom, by Justice and Integrity in our Words and Actions, whereby Men are drawn to place their Trust and Con­fidence in us; (where also he particularly shews, that Pretending and Hypocrisie can never get a Man any lasting Honour) by Kindness and Beneficence, Cour­tesie and Affability, which beget in Men a Love and Affection toward us: and lastly, by Fortitude, Con­tempt of Money, &c. which are Virtues that draw Men to Wonder and Admiration, and make 'em think us Persons that really deserve to be promoted.

But because Riches, Honours, Power and the like, which seem to be a Profit and Advantage to us, may often [Page vi] interfere with Virtue and Duty, which really are such; therefore in the third Book he endeavours to shew, How a good Man ought to carry himself in such a Case; and makes it appear, That Riches, Honours, Kingdoms and Empires are far from being truly an Advantage to any Man, whenever they are gotten by unlawful means; and that no Honest Man would do any thing that's contrary to Conscience or Honesty, tho' sure to obtain even the whole World by it. All which he builds up­on this Foundation, That the Goods of the Soul, viz. Virtue and Honesty, are, if not the only, yet infinitely the greatest Goods; (which is a Principle allow'd of by all the wiser Philosophers) from whence it must follow, That whoever parts with these upon the account of any Riches, or other seeming Advan­tage, be it never so great, must needs be a Looser; for he forfeits a greater for the sake of a less Good, and in hopes of getting a seeming, deprives himself of a real Interest. Here he goes over each of the Virtues mention'd in the first Book, and proves that nothing can be a Man's true Profit, tho' it should bring him all the appearing Advantages in the World, and tho' he were sure to keep it secret from the Eyes of all Men, and even the Gods themselves, that is contrary to the Duties of Prudence and Justice, of Fortitude and Moderation. In a word, Here are Rules for the Government of our Lives in relation to God, our Neighbours and Ourselves, such as are deservedly admired in a Heathen, and might have well become even a Christian Writer: He tells us, That to procure the Favour of the Former, we must live a religious and holy Life: That, as to the Second, there's an Alliance or Society between all Mankind, whereby each Parti­cular is oblig'd to do his best, toward promoting the Happiness and Welfare of the whole Body, and rather to die than do another any Injury: That, as to Our­selves, we should always consider the Dignity and Ex­cellence [Page vii] of our Reasonable Nature, and take care that we never be guilty of any Action, that may any wise stain or unbecome its Honour: This, as he goes on, will quickly teach us, how base a thing it is to dissolve in Luxury, Softness, &c.—Thus have I endeavour'd to present the Reader with a general View of this in­comparable Treatise: should I proceed to tell him, That some of the most eminent Writers in the World have ow'd great part of their Credit to it: That the Sandersons, Grotiuses, Pufendorfs, &c. are particu­larly oblig'd to it for their Skill in determining Mo­ral Cases, perhaps he might think me rather zea­lous, than impartial, in my Account of it: Tho' I can assure him 'tis no more than what is strictly true. The first of those great Persons (as the Writer of his Life tells us) had it all by heart; and how much Use the two latter have made of it, I leave those to judge who have been conversant with their Wri­tings—. But the Book can much better recommend it self by its own true Value, than I can do by any thing I am able to say of it: thither therefore I shall refer the Reader for his further Satisfaction, after I have told him, in a few words; what has been attempt­ed in this new Translation.

I have endeavour'd to express what I conceiv'd to be the Sence and Meaning of the Author, in as full and comprehensive words as I was able, attending all along to the principal Scope and Design of his Dis­course, rather than to the particular Words and Ex­pressions. I have taken care however to let none of his Words escape, without giving the Sence of 'em in our own Language: So far from that, that I rather expect to be condemn'd, on the other hand, for ex­plaining some of 'em a great deal too much, and spending a Line perhaps, or more, in that, which the Author express'd in but one single Word: But whoever considers the Nature of the Latin Tongue, and our [Page viii] Author's Way of Writing, especially in this Book, will easily perceive that 'twas necessary for me to do so, otherwise the English would have been almost as hard to be understood, as the Latin: For the Truth of which I refer the Reader to Chap. 35, 36, 37. Book 1. not to name innumerable other places. I have had a pe­culiar Eye all along to the Method of the Discourse, and the Connexion or Dependance of one part of it upon another; which because it is oftentimes very obscure, I have generally added the distinguishing Terms of first, second, &c. and where that could not be done, have sometimes added a Line perhaps, to shew how he passes from one thing to another: But this I have generally told the Reader of, or else have printed what is so added in a different Letter; as may be seen at the beginning of Chap. 6, and the end of Chap. 7. Book 1. As to some things, that are of little or no consequence toward understanding the Author, as if I have tran­slated Caena Dinner; Hominis honorati & principis, a Gentleman, or a Person of Honour; Convivium, sitting at a Table, and over a Glass of Wine, &c. or if in a philosophical Discourse as this is, I have some­times made use of an unusual Word; I suppose they'll be counted not unwarrantable Liberties, but such as are commonly taken by Translators. If in the main I have hit upon the true Sence and Meaning of my Author, and express'd it in such clear and intelligible Terms, as may make the Reader see what is the Force of his Argu­ments, the Reasonableness of his Precepts, the Fitness of his several Illustrations and Examples, with those other Virtues which have rendred this Book so deser­vedly Famous; I have obtain'd what I principally de­sign'd by this Attempt.

The Design of the Notes is chiefly to point out the Author's Method, and explain some Passages in him that seem'd more obscure than the rest: If the Reader find fault, that some of 'em regard rather the Latin [Page ix] than the English; and others seem trivial and in­considerable: I desire he would take notice, that I would not have the English thrust out the Latin, but rather promote and facilitate the Reading of it; and that I did not design to make Notes for Men of Learn­ing, (by whom I am fitter to be taught my self) but rather for the Young and Less-knowing sort of People.

I have gone according to that Division of Chapters, which is usually receiv'd, because the Book has been quoted according to it, and to have made any Alte­ration would but have bred Confusion; tho' otherwise I think 'tis the most ignorant and ridiculous one that was ever made, except in some other of our Author's Writings. I have put before each Chapter a Sum­mary of what is contain'd in it: and to the whole have subjoyn'd an Index, referring to all the principal Matters that are mention'd in the Book. In a word, I have not wilfully omitted any thing, as far as was possible in so small a Volume, (for I did not design to write a large Commentary, or play the Critick upon my Author) that seem'd necessary or useful toward a full Explication of this excellent Discourse. I have made some use of Sir R. L'Estrange's English, and especially Mr. Du B.'s French Translation; which I gratefully acknowledge. I have follow'd that Sence which to me seem'd most agreeable to the Author's Design, without finding fault with the Interpretations of other People, or speaking Ill of those who have not been of my Mind; and if I have been mistaken my self in any thing (as I don't question but I many times have) I de­sire the Reader to use the same Candor and Forgiveness to­ward me: that as, I think, I have giv'n no body any just Cause of Complaint, so I may not have any my self from other People. In fine, I am sure my Design was com­mendable; the Success of it I must leave to the Reader's Judgment: I shall only say, That as I look for no Honour from any thing I can do, more especially of this nature; so I hope that however I may expect a Pardon.

TuLLY'S OFFICES.
The First Book.

CHAP. I.

Cicero exhorts his Son, a young Student at Athens, not to forget his Latin, tho' he was in a Greek Uni­versity: but to mix the Studies of both those Lan­guages, and also learn to Write both as a Philosopher and an Orator. To this purpose he advises him to read his Works, as having equally written in each of those kinds, which none of the Grecians had ever done. But he modestly adds, That he thinks they could have done it, but that they apply'd themselves wholly to one of them.

Dear Son MARCUS,

THo' after a Year's Study under a Cratippus, and that at such a Place as b Athens, you can't but have abundantly furnish'd your self with Knowledge in the Doctrins and Rules of Philosophy; having had the Advantage of so eminent [Page 2] a Master to supply you with Learning, and a Ci­ty that affords you such excellent c Examples: Yet I should think it convenient for you (which is a Method I took for my own profit) always to mingle some Latin with your Greek, in the Stu­dy of Eloquence as well as Philosophy; that you may be equally perfect in both d those ways of Wri­ting, and make your self Master of either Lan­guage. For the furtherance of which, I am apt to imagin, I have done no inconsiderable Service to our Country-men; so that not only those who don't understand Greek, but even the Learn­ed themselves will confess, that, by reading my Works, they have mended their Stiles, and some­what improv'd their Reason and Judgments. Where­fore I am willing, 'tis true, you should learn of your present Master, the greatest Philosopher of this Age, and learn of him too as long as you de­sire it; and so long I think 'tis your Duty to desire it, as you find your self sufficiently benefited by it: But withal, I would have you to read my Writings, which very little differ from those of the Peripa­teticks; [Page 3] for e both we and they profess our selves Followers, not of Socrates only, but of Plato like­wise. As for the Matters contain'd in them, use your own Judgment with Freedom and Impartia­lity, for I lay no manner of Restraint upon you: your Improvement in the Latin is what I chiefly desire, which I am confident must follow from a careful Perusal of 'em. Nor let any one think that I am Vain or Pretending when I speak thus: For, allowing some others the precedence in Philosophy, should I assume to my self what's the Part of an Ora­tor, viz. to speak f suitably, methodically and hand­somely upon any Subject, seeing I have spent my whole Life in that Study, I think 'tis no more than what I might reasonably and fairly lay claim to. I can't but very earnestly desire you therefore, my dear Cicero, to read my Books with care and dili­gence; not my Orations only, but these Pieces also that concern Philosophy, which are now of a bulk almost equal to them: For tho' in the for­mer [Page 4] there is more of the force and power of Elo­quence, yet is the smooth and even Stile of the lat­ter by no means to be neglected. And of all the Grecians I find not one, that has employ'd his Pen in both these kinds; and been at once successful in the Language of the Bar, and this other more gen­tle and easie Stile of Philosophical Discourses: Un­less g Demetrius Phalereus may be reckon'd for one, who is subtle enough in his Disputes of Philosophy, but methinks in his Oratory, wants that Spirit and Vehemence that is requisite; however, has so much of Sweetness in him, that one might know he had been h Theophrastus's Scholar. Whether I have had any better Success in both these ways, must be left [Page 5] to the Judgment of others to determin: I can only say that I have attempted 'em both. And 'tis my Opinion, That if ever i Plato had undertaken to plead, he'd have been a most copious and pow­erful Orator; and if k Demosthenes had studied and discours'd of those things, which he learnt of Plato, he'd have done it with a great deal of Orna­ment and Majesty. The same I think true of l Iso­crates and Aristotle; each of which, pleas'd with his own way of Writing, m neglected to cultivate and improve the other.

CHAP. II.

The Reasons why he Writes upon this Subject. The ge­neral Use and Importance of it. All Philosophers have handled it; tho' some, by their false Notions of Happiness and Misery, utterly pervert it. What Sects they are, that have a Right to lay down any Rules or Precepts concerning it. He designs in this Work to follow the Stoicks principally. The Subject of a Discourse ought first to be defin'd, before we be­gin to say any thing upon it.

BUt having resolv'd to write some thing at pre­sent, and a great many others hereafter to you, I thought I could begin upon no better Argument, than that which is fittest for your Age, and most becoming my Authority as a Father: For, of all those useful and important Subjects, which Philo­sophers have handled so largely and accurately, the Precepts they have deliver'd about a Offices or Du­ties, seem of the largest extent and comprehension: For they take in every part of our Lives, so that whatever we go about, whether of publick or pri­vate Affairs, whether at home or abroad, whether consider'd barely by our selves, or as we stand in relation to other People, we lye constantly under an Obligation to some Duties; and, as all the Vir­tue [Page 7] and Credit of our Lives proceeds from the due Discharge of This, so all the Baseness and Turpi­tude of 'em results from the Non-observance of It. Now, tho' this be a Subject which all Philosophers have busied themselves about, (for, who ever dar'd to assume that Name without laying down some Instructions about Duty?) yet have some b Sects of 'em given such accounts of Man's Happiness and Misery, as destroy the very Being of Virtue and Honesty. For he that makes any thing his chiefest Good, wherein Justice or Virtue does not bear a part, and sets up Profit, not Honesty for the Mea­sure of his Happiness; as long as he acts in con­formity with his own Principles, and is not over­rul'd by meer Dictates of Reason and Humanity, can never do the Offices of Friendship, Justice or Liberality. Nor can he be ever a Man of Courage, who thinks that Pain is the greatest Evil; or he of Temperance, who imagins Pleasure to be the Sovereign Good. Which things are all so obvious and plain, that one would think they could never stand in need of a Dispute: however, I have large­ly [Page 8] discours'd upon them in c another Work. These Sects therefore, unless they are resolv'd to be in­consistent with themselves, ought wholly to abstain from speaking any thing about Duties: Nor in­deed can any constant, unalterable, d rational Rules of them at all be given, unless it be by those who go upon this Principle, e That 'tis Virtue a­lone, or at least That chiefly, which ought to be de­sir'd for its own sake. So that only the f Stoicks, g Academicks and h Peripateticks, have a Right to lay down any Rules upon this Subject: For as to the Opinion of i Aristo, Pyrrho and Herillus, that has been exploded a good while ago; who might have claim'd a Priviledge to treat about Duties, as well as the former three, had they but left a possibility [Page 9] of Chusing, and allow'd at least so much Difference between things, as to put us into a capacity of find­ing out our Duty, and distinguishing it from that, which is not so. I shall k follow therefore at this time, and on this Subject more especially the Sto­icks; not as a bare Translator of them, but (accor­ding to my usual Custom) shall take out of their Stores so much, and after such a manner, as in my own Judgment I shall think most convenient. See­ing then the whole of our following Discourse is design'd to be about Offices or Duties, I think 'twill be necessary for me in the first place, to l determin and fix the Signification of the word Office, which I [Page 10] can't but admire to find omitted by m Panaetius: for every clear and rational Discourse upon any Sub­ject, ought first to begin with an Explication of that Subject, that so we may have a distinct Con­ception of what we are afterwards to discourse a­bout.

CHAP. III.

The whole Subject of Duties consists of two Parts. Ordinary and perfect Duties, and what they are. Panaetius made but three general Heads of De­liberation, to which Cicero adds two more. The general Method he designs to take in the whole Work.

a THe whole subject of Duties then, in its great­est Latitude, comprehends under it these two Parts: The first is taken up in explaining what is Good, and what our greatest Good. The second in certain Directions and Precepts, according to which, upon all occasions, 'tis our Duty to govern our Lives and Actions. To the first Part belong such Questions as these, Wnether all Duties are perfect, or [Page 11] not? And, Whether one can be greater or less than ano­ther? With several others to the same purpose. Not but that b the Duties of this second Part, the Rules and Precepts of which are laid down, have some tendency and relation to our chiefest Good; but only it does not so plainly appear, because they seem to concern more immediately the Govern­ment of our Lives, and Regulation of our Manners: and these are they I design to explain in the fol­lowing Treatise. There is also another c Distri­bution of Duties, some of 'em being call'd Middle or Ordinary, and others Perfect or Compleat. To the latter, I think, we may give the name of Right or Strait, which sort by the Greeks is call'd [...]; as the former ordinary one [...]. By that which we have call'd Right or Strait, as they ex­plain it, is meant a Virtue, That is wholly Compleat in all its Parts, without any manner of Flaw or [Page 12] Imperfection; and by that, which we have call'd Ordinary, such a one, as, A fair and reasonable Ac­count may be given for the doing of it. d Now these fair and reasonable Accounts are all to be drawn from several Heads, which are by Panaetius reduc'd to three, and may be call'd general Heads of Delibera­ting or Doubting concerning any Action, whether it should, or should not be done. The first is when 'tis consulted or doubted, Whether the Action, that's under Consideration, be Honest or Dishonest; in which Enquiry Men are often divided between se­veral Opinions. The second is, when 'tis enquired and consulted, Whether the Action, that's under Deliberation, will supply us with the Pleasures and Conveniencies of Life, furnish us with Plenty of out­ward things, such as Riches, Honors, Power, &c. which may put us into a capacity of doing good to our selves, and to all those for whom we are more nearly concern'd; all which Enquiry comes under the general Head of e Profit. The third Ground or Reason of Doubting is, When that thing, which f seems to be profitable for us, comes into competi­tion with that which is Honest: For then our Inte­rest drawing us one way, and Honesty pulling us [Page 13] back another, the wavering Mind is, as 'twere, toru in sunder between the two, and is rack'd with doubting and anxious Thoughts. There's no great­er fault in any Division, than not to take in all the se­veral parts of the Matter to be divided; and yet two are omitted in the now mention'd one of Panaetius. For Men not only consult and deliberate, whether such an Action be Honest or Dishonest; but also, Of two Honests, that are both propos'd to 'em, which is the most so; and, in like manner, Of two Profitables, which is the most profitable. From whence it appears, That what he thought was con­tain'd in three, ought rather to be divided into five Heads. g We must then, in the first place, dis­course about Honesty, and this we shall do under these two Enquiries; Whether the thing propos'd be Honest or Dishonest? And, Of two that are Honest, which is the most so? which will make up the Sub­ject of our First Book. We shall treat in our Second of Profit or Interest under the same Heads. And lastly, in our Third, we shall endeavour to shew, When a seeming Advantage and Honesty come into competition, how a good Man should determin his Judgment.

CHAP. IV.

The Excellence of the Nature of Man, above that of Brutes. How the several Virtues, Prudence, Ju­stice, &c. are agreeable to its Dictates, and result from 'em. Wherein Honestum in general consists.

a THe first thing then to be taken notice of is this, That every Creature doth by Nature endeavour to preserve its own self, its Life and Bo­dy; and to shun and avoid those things which ap­pear prejudicial and hurtful to it; but to seek and procure whatever is necessary for the support of its Being, and advancement of its Happiness, such as Food, Shelter, and the like. There is likewise common to all sorts of Animals, a Desire of Copula­tion, for the continuance and propagation of their several Species; together with a Love and Concern for their young Ones. Now there's this special Dif­ference between Men and Brutes; that the latter are govern'd by nothing but their Sences, never look any farther than just to what strikes and affects 'em at present, and have a very little, if any Concern for what is past or to come: But the former are Creatures endow'd with Reason, which gives 'em a power to carry their Thoughts to the Consequen­ces of Things; to discover Causes before they have yet produc'd their Effects; to see the whole Pro­gress, [Page 15] and even the first Seeds, (as it were) and Appearances of 'em; to compare like Occurrences with like; and by joyning what is past, and what is to come together, to make a just Estimate of the one from the other; whereby they are able at once to take a View of their whole Lives, and accor­dingly make provision for the Necessities of 'em. b And the same force of Reason makes all Men by nature to Love one another, and desire an Enter­course of Words and Actions. It begets in 'em likewise c a somewhat extraordinary Love and Af­fection for their own Children, and strongly en­clines 'em to frequent Publick Meetings, and keep up Societies one amongst another. For the same Reason also they are very industrious, to provide for the Necessaries and Conveniencies of Life; and that not only for themselves in particular, but for their Wives, their Children, and others, whom they have a Kindness for, and are oblig'd to take Care of; which Concern is very proper to rouse up the Spirits, and make 'em more vigorous and a­ctive [Page 16] in Business. d But of all the Properties and In­clinations of Men, there is none more natural and peculiar to 'em, than an earnest Desire and Search after Truth. Hence 'tis our Minds are no sooner free, from the Thoughts and Engagements of ne­cessary Business, but we presently long to be either seeing, or hearing, or learning of something; and e­steem the Knowledge of things secret and wonderful, as a necessary Ingredient of a happy Life. From whence it appears, That nothing is more agreeable and suited to the Nature and Minds of Men, than undisguis'd Openness, Truth and Sincerity. Next to this Love and Affection for Truth e, there follows in the Soul an impatient Desire and Inclination to Rule; so that whoever has the genuin Nature of a Man in him, will never endure to be subject to another, unless he be one that instructs, or advises, or is invested with a just and lawful Authority, for the Benefit of the Publick. From whence there arises a Greatness of Soul, f which sets it above all the petty Concerns, and trifling Enjoyments of this present World. 'Tis another, and that too no mean Prerogative of our reasonable Nature, g That Man alone can discern all the Beauties of Order and Decency, and knows how to govern his Words and Actions in conformity to them. 'Tis he alone, that of all the Creatures, observes and is pleas'd with the Beauty, Gracefulness and Symmetry of [Page 17] Parts in the Objects of Sense; which Nature and Reason observing in them, from thence take occa­sion to apply the same also to those of the Mind; and conclude that Beauty, Consistency, and Regu­larity, should be much more kept up in our Words and Actions; and therefore command us, That nothing be done that is effeminate or unbecom­ing; and, That so strict a Guard be kept over e­very Thought and Action, as that no Lust or Fil­thiness be either conceiv'd or practis'd by us. From these Inclinations and Instincts of Nature, arises and results that h Honestum we're seeking for; which however little valu'd and esteem'd it may be, is nevertheless virtuous and aimiable in it self; and which we may justly say, tho' 'twere commended by no one, is yet in its own Nature truly Com­mendable.

CHAP. V.

The admirable Beauty of Honesty. Four general Heads of It, from which all the several Duties arise; and what the Object of each of 'em is, about which 'tis employ'd.

THus, Son Marcus, have I giv'n you a rough Draught, and just the Outlines, as it were, of Honesty; which could she be seen in her full Beau­ty with mortal Eye, would make the whole World (as Plato has said) be in love with a Wisdom. Now whatever's contain'd under the Notion of Honesty, arises from one of these four Heads; First, A sa­gacious Enquiry and Observation for the finding out of Truth; which may be called by the general name of Prudence. Secondly, A Care to maintain that Society and mutual Entercourse, which is between Men; to render to every Man what is his due; and to stand to one's Words in all Promises and Bargains; which we call Justice. Thirdly, The Great­ness and unshaken Resolution of a truely brave and invincible Mind; which goes by the name of Magna­nimity or Fortitude. And, Lastly, A Keeping of our Words and Actions within the due Limits of Or­der and Decency; under which are comprehended b Temperance and Moderation. Now every one of [Page 19] these several Heads, tho' they c all have a mutu­al Connexion and Dependance on one another, has yet its particular Classis (as it were) and respective Set of Duties arising from it. From that, for ex­ample, which is mention'd first, and under which Prudence and Wisdom are contain'd, arises the Du­ty of Seeking, Contemplating and Finding out of Truth, which is the proper and peculiar Business of those Virtues: For 'tis then, and then alone, that we justly esteem a Man prudent and wise, when we find that he's able to see and discover the Truth of things; and of an active, vigorous and piercing Mind, to give an account of the Reasons of 'em; so that 'tis Truth that is the proper Object of both these Virtues, and that about which they are d on­ly concern'd. The other three Heads more pecu­liarly belong to the active Life, and their Business lies in procuring and maintaning what is useful and necessary for the preservation of it; as in keeping up mutual Love and Correspondence among Man­kind; in an elevated greatness and strength of [Page 20] Mind; which appears, as in getting things profit­able and pleasant for our selves and Dependants; so more especially in despising and being above 'em. Then as for the last, viz. Order, Uniformity, Mo­deration and the like, 'tis plain they belong not on­ly e to Contemplation, but have also a respect to our outward Actions; since from keeping of these within the bounds and limits of Order and Mode­ration, we are said to observe what is virtuous and becoming.

CHAP. VI.

Prudence or Contemplation of Truth, the first of the general Virtues, is the nearest ally'd to the Nature of Man. Two Cautions concerning it. It ought to give place to the Duties of the Active Life. What it ought especially to be employ'd about.

a HAving thus explain'd how the whole Nature, and Power of Honesty, is deduc'd from some one of these four Parts, we are now to discourse of 'em each in particular. And, first, Of Prudence, which is wholly taken up in the knowledge of Truth, and has the nearest Affinity of any with the reasonable Nature of Man. For how are we all of us drawn and entic'd with the Desire of Wisdom? How noble and glorious a thing do we imagin it [Page 21] to excel in Knowledge? And how mean and re­proachful do we count it on the other hand, to slip, to be in an Error, to be Ignorant, or to be impos'd upon? In gratifying this so natural and virtuous Inclination in the Mind of Man, there are two grand Faults to be carefully avoided: The first is an over-great Hastiness and Rashness in giving up our Assent, presuming that we know things before we really do so. Whoever desires (as I am sure all ought) to avoid this Error, must in all his Enqui­ries allow himself time, and diligently consider the Matter with himself, before he proceeds to pass his Judgment upon it. The second Fault is, That a great many Men bestow abundance of Study, and a world of Pains, upon very difficult and obscure Subjects; and such as perhaps, when they are found out, are of but very little, or no Concern­ment. Would Men but be careful to shun these two Mistakes, whatsoever Study or Pains they might spend upon virtuous, worthy, or profitable Sub­jects, 'twould not without Reason be highly com­mended. Thus b Caius Sulpicius was heretofore prais'd for his Skill in Astronomy: c Sext. Pompei­us, since my memory, for his in Geometry: Ma­ny have been famous in the Study of Logick, and more in that of the Civil Laws: the d more pecu­liar [Page 22] Business, of all which parts of Learning, is the finding out of Truth. No Man however should be so taken up in the Search of Truth, as thereby to neglect the more necessary Duties of the Active Life: For, after all is done, 'tis Action only that gives a true Value and Commendation to Virtue. Not that we are able to be always a doing without intermission, but often retire from Business to Stu­dy; beside that the Mind, e which is in perpetual motion and agitation, of it self will supply us with Study and Thinking, whether we set our selves to it, or not. In a word, The general aim and de­sign of our Thought, and application of Mind, f is either the attainment of such things as are Honest, and tend to a virtuous and happy way of Life; or else the improvement of our Reason and Under­standing in Wisdom and Knowledge. And this may suffice for the first of our general Heads of Duty.

CHAP. VII.

The second general Virtue, which consists in maintain­ing of Human Society. Two Parts of it, Justice and Liberality. The first Duty of Justice. All things at first common. The Original of Property. Men are born for the Good, &c. of one another: whence arises the second Duty of Justice. Two sorts of In­justice, the one of Commission; the other of O­mission. The Causes of the first sort of Injustice; First, Fear: Secondly, Desire.

OF the other remaining three, a that which con­sists in upholding Society, and keeping up mutual Love and good Nature amongst Mankind, seems of the largest and most diffusive Extent. It comprehends under it these two Parts: First, Ju­stice, which is much the most glorious and splendid of all Virtues, and alone entitles us to the Name and Appellation of Good Men. And, Secondly, Benefi­cence, which may also be call'd either Bounty or Li­berality. Now the first thing that Justice requires of us is this, That no one should do any Hurt to ano­ther, unless he be necessarily driven upon it for his own Security: b and whatever belongs either to all in common, or to particular Persons as their own Proprie­ty, should not be alter'd, but made use of accord­ingly. Now no Man can say that he has any thing [Page 24] c his own by a Right of Nature; but either by an ancient immemorial Seizure, as those who first planted uninhabited Countries: Or, secondly, by Conquest, as those who have got things by the Right of the Sword; or else by some Law, Com­pact, Agreement, or Lot. 'Tis by some of these means, that the People inhabiting d Arpinum and Tusculum came to have those Lands, which are now call'd theirs; and e the same may be said as to private Mens Estates. However, since at pre­sent, by some of these ways, each particular Man has his personal Possessions, out of that which by Nature was common to all, 'tis but reason that each should hold what is now his own; which if any one endeavour to take away from him, [Page 25] f he directly breaks in upon common Justice, and violates the Rights of Human Society. But see­ing (as is excellently said by Plato) we are not Born for our selves alone; but that our native Country, our Friends and Relations, have a just Claim and Title to some part of us; and seeing whatsoever is created on Earth, was meerly design'd (as the Sto­icks will have it) for the Service of Men; and Men themselves for the Service, Good and Assistance of one another: We g certainly in this should be Fol­lowers of Nature, and second her Intentions; and by producing all that lies within the reach of our Power for the general Interest, by mutually giving and receiving good Turns, by our Knowledge, In­dustry, Riches, or other means, should endeavour to keep up that Love and Society, that should be amongst Men. Now the great Foundation of Ju­stice is h Faithfulness, which consists in being con­stantly firm to your Word, and a conscientious per­formance of all Compacts and Bargains; where­upon for this once, let us venture to follow the O­pinion of the Stoicks, those mighty Admirers of De­rivations, and believe that Fides [Faithfulness] is [Page 26] so call'd, (tho' perhaps it may seem a little too far fetcht) quia fiat quod dictum est, because what was promis'd is perform'd. The i Vice that is opposite to Justice is Injustice, of which there are two sorts; the first consists in the actual doing an Injury to ano­ther; the second in tamely looking on while he is In­jur'd, and not helping and defending him, tho' we are able. For he that injuriously falls upon ano­ther, whether prompted by Rage or other violent Passion, does as 'twere leap at the throat of his Companion; and he that refuses to help him when Injur'd, and to ward off the Wrong, if it lies in his power, is as plainly guilty of Baseness and Injustice, as tho' he had deserted his Father, his Friends, or his native Country. k Now that former Injustice, which consists in the wilful and actual Wronging ano­ther, has oftentimes no other cause but Fear; when he, who designedly does a Man an Injury, is afraid least himself should be forc'd to undergo one, if he does not secure himself by doing it before-hand. But generally speaking, the great source and foun­tain of all such Injustice is l the satisfying some ir­regular and exorbitant Appetite; and in a more especial manner, the desire of Riches: of which we shall therefore say something in particular.

CHAP. VIII.

The Desire of Riches, which is one Cause of Injustice, whence it proceeds. 'Tis allowable enough so long as it does not draw Men to the Injuring of others. The Desire of Honours, &c. another Cause of Inju­stice. It usually is found in Men of the greatest Minds. There's a difference to be made between those Injuries, that are done hastily and in a Pas­sion, and those that proceed from premeditated Ma­lice.

RIches then are most commonly desir'd, either to supply us with the Necessaries of Life, or fur­nish us with the Pleasures and Conveniences of it or else, as it often is observ'd to happen in Persons of great and aspiring Minds, as a means of obtain­ing an Interest in the Publick, and a Power of O­bliging and Gratifying one's Friends: to which pur­pose was that Saying of the late a Marcus Crassus, That whoever design'd to be a leading Man in the Commonwealth, ought never to think he had Estate enough, till he could maintain b an Army with its yearly Revenue. Others take pleasure in Splendor [Page 28] and Magnificence; in a handsom, noble and plen­tiful way of Living; All which things have begot an insatiable Greediness after Money, without which they can never be supported and maintain'd. Not but that a moderate Desire of Riches, and better­ing a Man's Estate, so long as it abstains from op­pressing of others, is allowable enough; but a ve­ry great care ought always to be taken, that we ben't drawn to any Injustice by it. There's another c Desire that makes Men as apt to be forgetful of Justice, as that after Ricfies; the Thirst, I mean, of Empire, Glory, Honours, &c. For that Saying of d Ennius, There's no inviolable Faith or Friend­ship in the Matter of a Kingdom, tho' apply'd by him to that one case only, is yet full out as true in a great many others; for where-ever the Subject of Contention is such, as that only one Party can meet with Success, and the rest must fall short of what they desire; things are usually carry'd to so great a height, as that 'tis very difficult not to break in up­on Faith and Friendship. This hath appear'd but too manifestly of late, in that rash and most impudent Attempt of e Caesar's; who has broke thro' all those Ties and Obligations, that either by Gods or Men could be laid upon him; for the compassing and get­ting [Page 29] of that Empire to himself, which he vainly propos'd in his deprav'd Imagination. But in this case, 'tis one very great unhappiness, that the Thirst after Honour, Empire, Power &c. falls most upon Men of the greatest Souls, and most exalted Na­tures; wherefore the f greater care ought to be ta­ken, that nothing of Offence be committed in this kind. Now it makes a great difference in all Acts of Injustice, whether they proceed from some vio­lent Passion, (which is for the most part of short continuance) or are done with Design and previous Deliberation: For those that are the Effects of a sudden gust of Passion, ought not to be esteem'd of so heinous a Nature, as those that proceed from premeditated Malice. And this may suffice for the first sort of Injustice, which consists in The actual doing of Wrong; and the Causes of it.

CHAP. IX.

Injustice of Omission, and the Caused of it Those: are guilty of it, who spend their whole Lives in Stu­dy and Contemplation; as some Philosophors have done. Justice ought to proceed from Choice. Those who mind nothing but their own Business are guilty of this Injustice. Self-love hinders Men from seeing their Duty. An excellent Rule for the avoiding of all Injustice.

AS for the a second, which only consists in seeing another Injur'd, and being wanting to our Duty, by not defending him; the Causes of that are wont to be several. For some are afraid of offending o­thers, or of bringing a trouble and charge upon them­selves: Others are negligent, idle, or mean-spirited: And a third sort there is, who are so taken up with their own Concerns, that they have no time left to regard the Oppress'd, whom yet 'tis their Duty to save and protect. I am therefore of Opinion, that Plato's Consequence will hardly hold good, where speaking about the Philosophers, he says, ‘They are wholly taken up in the seeking out of Truth, and perfectly neglect and make light of those things, which the rest of the World are so ea­ger after, and so contend about; and that there­fore they are just.’ This, I say, I am afraid is a bad Consequence; for tho', 'tis true, b they keep the first sort of Justice, inasmuch as they actually do no [Page 31] Wrong; yet they run perfectly counter to the o­ther: for being engag'd in their Learning and Stu­dies, they abandon their Friends to be injur'd by o­thers, whom in Justice they ought to have pro­tected and defended. So that 'tis believ'd, they'd hardly ever trouble 'emselves so far, as at all to in­ter-meddle with the Business of the Publick, if it was not altogether, as it were, forc'd upon them. But 'twere a great deal better would they do it vo­luntarily; for an c Action, tho' Honest, is not there­fore truly virtuous, unless it be done out of Choice, and with a Good-will. There are d others yet, who out of a Desire of improving their own Estates, or else a morose and unsociable sort of Temper, cry, They meddle with Nobody's Business but their own, that so they may seem to be Men of strict Honesty, and to Injure Nobody: and they do indeed avoid the one sort of Injustice, but directly run themselves into the other; for they desert the common Good and Society of Mankind, while they bestow neither Stu­dy, Pains, nor Money toward the Preservation of it. Thus have I laid down the two sorts of Inju­stice, and pointed out to you the Causes of each; and have also endeavour'd to explain the true Na­ture and Extent of Justice; from all which Account 'twill be easie to judge, unless we are extreamly fond of our own Ease, what those several Duties are, which at several times are required of us. I [Page 32] say, Unless we are fond of our own Ease; for the truth on't is, 'tis a troublesome thing to be con­cern'd in the Business of other People; however old e Chremes in Terence thinks, That he ought to be concern'd for the Good of all Men. But be that as it will, forasmuch as the Success of our own Affairs, whether Good or Ill, more nearly concerns us, and makes us more sensible, than that of another's; (which appears to us small, as a thing at a great di­stance) therefore we pass a quite different Judg­ment upon the one and the other. And, upon this account, 'tis a very good Rule that is given by some Men, That we should never venture upon any Acti­on, of which we doubt whether 'tis Honest or Disho­nest. For Honesty quickly would shew it self by its own native Brightness; and the Doubting about it is a plain Intimation, that at least we suspected some Injustice when we did it.

CHAP. X.

Justice is alter'd upon an Alteration of Circumstances; and what was our Duty in one Case to do, in o­ther Circumstances 'tis our Duty to avoid. Promi­ses are not to be stood to in several Cases, as, If they are Prejudicial: If made thro' Fear, &c. A close adhering to the words of a Law, or Bargain, is a means of being Unjust; Craft in such cases to be diligently avoided.

BUt here 'tis observable, a That the Limits of Justice are not so fixt, but that they may be alter'd upon an alteration of the Circumstances; so that what at one time appears to be the Duty of an honest and good Man, at another is alter'd and becomes the quite contrary: To deliver up a Trust, for example, or perform a Promise, and other things relating to Truth and Faithfulness, are Duties which Justice it self will allow us, in several Cases, to b neglect or omit: For respect must be had to those general Rules we before laid down, as the Ground and Foundation of all Justice, First, That no Injury be done to any other. And, Secondly, [Page 34] That we make it our earnest Endeavour to pro­mote the Good and Interest of all Mankind: So that our Duty is not always the same, but vari­ous c according to the variety of Circumstances. There may be a Contract or Promise, for instance, the performance of which would bring very great Damage, either to the Person himself that made it, or the other Party whom it was made to. Thus, had d Naptune not granted what he promis'd to The­seus, Theseus had not suffered the loss of his Son Hip­polytus. For (as the Story goes) Neptune having grant­ed him any three Wishes, for the third, he once in a very great passion, desired the Death of his own Son; by obtaining of which, he was afterwards brought into the greatest Afflictions. Such Promises therefore are e not to be kept, as will but bring a Mischief on him they were made to; f no more are those, which tend to the Damage of the Promiser himself, more than to the Profit of him they were [Page 35] promis'd to. Again, g even Justice it self requires us to perform a greater before a lesser Duty: You promise, for example, a Friend of yours, to assist him in a Cause that he has depending, but your Son grows dangerously sick in the mean time; here 'twould be no h breach of Duty in you, if you should not make good what you promis'd to your Friend; and he himself rather would be much to blame, should he complain of being disappointed by you. Further, i 'tis plain to any one's Sence, that such sort of Promises can never be binding, as are made by People over-aw'd by Fear, or over­reach'd by Deceit; most of which are void by the k Praetor's Edicts, and some of 'em even by the Laws themselves. But another great Spring from which Injuries arise, is some Quirk or Cavil, and an over-subtle and malicious Interpretation of the Laws; from whence that Saying, Summum jus sum­ma Injuria, The height of Justice is the height of Ro­guery, [Page 36] is now become a daily and common Pro­verb among us. There are frequent Examples of this to be met with in our Publick Transactions; as that of Him, for Example, who concluding a Truce with the Enemy for thirty Days, made continual Incursions into their Territory by Night; because, forsooth, the Truce was not made for so many Nights, but only so many Days. Just such a craf­ty and pittiful Trick (if the Story be true) was that notable Cunning of Quintus Fabius Labeo's; (or whoever the Man was, for I have it only by hear-say) who being by the Senate appointed Ar­bitrator, in a Difference between those of l Nola and Naples about their Bounds; when he came to the place that was appointed for the Treaty, took aside the Commissioners of either Party, and exhor­ted 'em privately, Not to be too eager and greedy in their Demands, but rather to take up and content 'emselves with less, than pretend to any more than what was honestly their Due. Both Parties did so according to his desire, so that a good quantity of Ground was left between them; this he e'en goes and adjudges to the Romans, leaving that to each Party, which they 'emselves had demanded. And is not this now to Deceive and Cheat, rather than to Judge? In all cases therefore such subtle kind of Tricks should be diligently avoided.

CHAP. XI.

Justice to be kept towards all sorts of Men. Bounds to be observ'd in Punishing those that have Injur'd us. Laws of War to be strictly observ'd. Two sorts of Di­sputing, by Reason and by the Sword: The lat­ter is allowable, when we can't obtain what's our Right by the former. What ought to be the End of making War. How it should be carry'd on. The Strictness of the old Romans in observing the Laws of War. A Story of the Elder Cato to that purpose.

THere are certain a Duties or Offices also, to be strictly observ'd, even towards those that have injur'd us; for we ought not to go beyond such and such Bounds, in exacting Revenge and Punish­ment of another: in which particular it may per­haps be enough, to make him that has wrong'd us repent of the Wrong done; so that he himself may abstain from the like, and others take warning from his Example, for the future. There are cer­tain peculiar Laws of b War also, which are of all things most strictly to be observ'd in the Common­wealth: For there being two sorts of Disputing in the World, the one by Reason, and the other by o­pen Force; and the former of these being that which [Page 38] is agreeable to the Nature of Man, and the latter to that of Brutes; when we can't obtain what is our Right by the one, we muste'en of necessity have recourse to the other. 'Tis allowable therefore to undertake Wars, but it must always be with design of obtaining a secure Peace. And when we have gotten the better of our Enemies, we should rest content with the Victory alone, and shew our selves merciful and kind to 'em afterwards; unless they are such as have been very Cruel, and committed inhuman Barbarities in the War. Thus our Fore­fathers took into their City the c Aequians, Volsci­ans, Sabines, and others, whom they had subdu'd; whereas d Carthage and Numantia they entirely destroy'd. I could wish I might not add e Co­rinth too; but I believe they had something in their Eye when they did it, and that more espe­cially the Situation of the Place; which being so very convenient as it was, they were afraid least it might be, at one time or other, an Encourage­ment to a Revolt. In my Opinion 'tis always our Duty, to do what we can for a fair and safe Peace: in which thing if People would have f hearkned to me, [Page 39] we might at this time have seen the Republick, tho', 'tis true, I can't say in a flourishing Condition; yet certainly not, as at present we perceive it, en­tirely subverted and fal'n into Ruins. And as we are bound to be merciful to those we have actually conquer'd; so should those also be receiv'd into Fa­vour, who have laid down their Arms, and thrown 'emselves wholly upon the General's Mercy; and that even tho' the Breach be made in their City Walls. Our good Fore-fathers were most strictly just as to this particular; the Custom of those Times making him the Patron of a conquer'd Ci­ty or People, who first receiv'd 'em into the Faith and Allegiance of the People of Rome. In short, The whole Right, and all the Duties of War are most religiously set down in the g Fecial Laws; out of which it is manifest, that never any War can be justly undertaken, unless Satisfaction have been first demanded, and Proclamation of it made publickly before-hand. Poppilius was Commander in one of the Provinces, and Cato's Son a young Soldier under him; and Poppilius thinking fit to disband one of his Legions, it happen'd to be the same in which the young Man was, who therefore was dismiss'd among the rest of the Soldiers: But having a mind to see more of the War; he not­withstanding this, continu'd still in the Army. Hereupon old Cato writes a Letter to Poppilius, and therein desires him, That if he suffer'd his Son [Page 40] to remain in the Army, he would give him his h Mi­litary Oath again; for as much the former being void by his Disbanding, he could not any longer fight law­fully with an Enemy: So religiously careful they were in those Days, of doing nothing that's contra­ry to the Laws of War. There is extant still an Epistle of Cato the Father's to his Son, in which he tells him, That he had heard of his being Disbanded by the Consul, when he was a Soldier in Macedonia, in the War with i Perseus: and therefore he advises him not, by any means to intermeddle in a Battle; because, he says, 'tis unlawful for one, that is no lon­ger a Soldier, to engage with the Enemy.

CHAP. XII.

The Civility of the old Romans towards their Ene­mies, in giving 'em the mildest Names: Some Wars are only for Empire, others for Safety: Dif­ference of Conduct to be observ'd in each. A noble and generous Saying of King Pyrrhus.

ANd here I can't but observe moreover, That he who is properly call'd Perduellis, [a stub­born Enemy] had by our Ancestors the name of Hostis giv'n him; the gentleness of the Word some­what lessening the foulness and odium of the Thing: for Hostis [an Enemy] among them signify'd the same thing, that Peregrinus [a Stranger] does now [Page 41] amongst us; as appears from the a Laws of the XII Tables, and therein such sort of Expressions as these, b Status dies cum hoste; and, Adversus hostem aeterna auctoritas. What greater Courtesie could be shewn than this, to call even an Enemy by only the soft­est and most obliging Names? Tho' the Word is now alter'd, I confess, from that mild to an harsher Sence, Custom having chang'd it from what it first properly signified, a Stranger, to denote such a one as bears Arms against us. We have told you c already what previous Causes and Conditions there should be, before any War can be lawful and just; the same are requir'd even in those Wars also, which are undertaken meerly for Glory and Em­pire: But then all Contests of this latter sort, should be carried on with less Heat and Animosities; for as in the Differences that happen among Citi­zens, we make a distinction between a violent E­nemy, and a generous Rival; (in one case nothing but a Title of Honour, in the other our Lives and Reputations being concern'd) so did our Ancestors do in their Wars. That which they waged with [Page 42] the d Cimbers and e Celtibers, was manag'd as with hateful and implacable Enemies; the Question then being, not whether of the two should remain a Conquerour, but whether should remain a People at all: Whereas those with the Latins, Carthagini­ans; f Pyrrhus, &c. were only Quarrels about Ho­nour and Dominion. The Carthaginians were per­fidious and treacherous; Hannibal their great Com­mander Cruel; but all the rest more Faithful and Merciful. That Speech of Pyrrhus is indeed very extraordinary upon restoring the Captives, when he says,

g I neither Gold of you nor Price demand:
Nor will I chaffer, but fight out the War:
Let Steel, not Gold to each their Fate decide.
Whether to you, or me Dame Fortune will
The Vict'ry grant; or what the Chance of War,
Shall Courage try. And this I add withal,
That freely I their Liberties restore
To these brave Men, whose Lives the War has spar'd.
Freely I give; do you as freely take,
I'th' name of th' mighty Gods.

A truly Royal and Princely Saying, and worthy of the glorious Family of the h Aeacidae.

CHAP. XIII.

Particular Persons bound in Justice to keep the Promi­ses made to an Enemy. The Example of Regulus. The Story of ten who did the contrary: How pu­nish'd by the Romans; particularly one, who thought to have escap'd by a Quirk. A noble Instance of the Roman Justice to King Pyrrhus. Justice to be kept towards the meanest Slaves. Two Ways whereby In­juries are done, Fraud and Force. Fraud the more odious. To be a Rogue under the Mask of Honesty, the greatest of Villanies.

'TIs also the Duty of a particular Persons, if at any time, forc'd by the necessity of their Cir­cumstances, they have made any Promise or Oath to an Enemy; afterwards to see that they perform it faithfully. Thus b Regulus was taken in the first Punick War by the Carthaginians, and sent by them to Rome, about an Exchange of Prisoners, upon so­lemn Oath given that he would return to 'em again: as soon then as he was come to Rome, he first advis'd the Senate against making such a Change, and when he had done it (tho' beg'd on to stay by his Friends and Relations) rather return'd to a cer­tain Punishment, than his Oath should be broken, tho' made to an Enemy. But Hannibal in the se­cond Carthaginian War, after our fatal Defeat at c Cannae, sent ten to Rome under the same Obliga­tion [Page 44] of returning again, unless by their Interest they could prevail with the Senate to redeem their Pri­soners; who were all by the Censors depriv'd of their Priviledges as Free-men, and ty'd to pay such and such Duties to the Publick as long as they liv'd, for not being true to their Oaths and Obligations. There was one of 'em thought by a Trick to have eluded the force of his Oath, but was nevertheless punish'd for all that: His Shift was this; Hannibal had let 'em depart his Camp upon the Condition afore-mention'd; when therefore they had gotten a little way out of it, what does he do but come back to it again, under colour of having forgot to take something (I know not what) with him: And then away he goes out again, discharg'd (as he thought) from his Obligation of Returning. And so, 'tis very true, he was in Word, but not in Rea­lity; for in all such Oaths we aren't to attend to the meer Form of Words, but the true Design and In­tention of 'em. But the greatest Example of Ju­stice to an Enemy, was shewn by our Ancestors to­wards King Pyrrhus: d There came a Deserter out of Pyrrhus's Camp, and offer'd the Senate to di­spatch him with Poyson; which they and Fabrici­us were so far from accepting of, that they gave him up again as a Traitor to his Master. Thus we may see, that they would not allow of any unjust way of Dealing, tho for the Death of a powerful and invading Adversary: And so much for the Duties required in War. There is one part of e Justice remaining behind, and which ought by no means to be forgotten by us; I mean that to­wards [Page 45] the lowest and meanest sort of People: And these are more especially those we call our Slaves; in relation to whom, 'tis a very good Rule that is given by some Men, That we should use 'em no otherwise than we do our Day-labourers, Make 'em first do their Work, and then pay 'em honestly what they have earn'd. In fine, To close up this Discourse of Justice, There are two Ways or Methods, where­by one Man may Injure or Oppress another; the one is Eraud and Subtlety, the other open Force and Violence; the former of which is held the part of a Fox, and the latter of a Lyon: Both of 'em cer­tainly very unworthy of a reasonable Creature; tho' Fraud, I think, is the more odious of the two. But of all Injustice, theirs is certainly of the deep­est Dye; who make it their Business to appear honest Men, even whilst they are practising the greatest of Villanies.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Liberality, the second part of general Justice. Three Cautions to be observ'd concerning it. 'Tis not Li­berality, to bestow upon one, what is wrongfully ta­ken from another; nor what ought to have rather been given to our Relations; nor to give out of Vain­glory. Bounty should be proportion'd to the Merit of the Receiver, which is of several sorts.

WE have now gone thro' with the Subject of Ju­stice, it a remains in the next place (to go on according to our Method propos'd) that we say some­thing likewise of Bounty and Liberality, than which [Page 46] there is nothing more nearly ally'd to the Nature of Man. But then we must observe these following Cautions: First, That we take care in all Acts of Bounty, that they ben't b prejudicial to those we would oblige by 'em, nor to any other Body. Se­condly, That we don't in our Bounty and Liberali­ty go beyond our Estates. And, Thirdly, That we duely proportion our Kindness, according to eve­ry Man's Merit and Deserts. c And first of the former, which is grounded upon the great and fun­damental Principle of all Justice, to which this Du­ty in all its particular Instances should be referr'd. For he who pretending to do one a Kindness, does that which is really a Prejudice to him, is indeed so far from being Kind and Obliging, as that he ought to be counted a most pernicious Flatterer: and to do any manner of Injury to one, that you may shew your Generosity and Bounty to another, is just one and the same sort of Roguery and Injustice, as to Enrich your self by the Spoils of your Neigh­bour. Yet this is the Fault of a great many People, and especially those who are desirous of Glory, to take away from some that which justly belongs to 'em, that so they may have to bestow upon o­thers; and they're apt to think 'emselves extream­ly [Page 47] bountiful, if they Enrich their Adherents by any manner of means. But this is so far from being a Duty of Liberality, that nothing in the World can be more contrary to it. It ought to be therefore our first care in Giving, That what we bestow be a real Advantage and Kindness to our Friend, and no ways an Injury to any third Person. That Action therefore of d Caesar and Sylla's, in taking away E­states from the rightful Proprietors, and giving 'em to others who had nothing to do with 'em, ought by no means to be accounted Liberal; for nothing can ever be truly such, that is not at the same time Just and Honest. A e second Caution to be observ'd was this, That our Bounty ben't suffer'd to exceed our Abilities; for they who give more than their Estates will allow of, are, in the first place, f injurious to their own Relations, by spending that Wealth up­on other People, which should rather have been given, or left to them. Beside that this over-great Bounty in Giving, is usually accompany'd with an answerable Desire and Greediness of Getting; which often proceeds even to down-right Oppression, that so Men may have wherewithal to supply this extra­vagant Humor. One may also observe in a great many People, that they take a sort of Pride in be­ing counted Magnificent, and give very plentifully, not from any generous Principle in their Natures, but only to appear Great in the Eye of the World; [Page 48] so that all their Bounty is resolv'd into nothing but meer Outside and Pretence, and is nearer of kin to Vanity and Folly, that 'tis to either Liberality or Honesty. g The third Caution was, That our Bounty should be proportion'd to the Merits of the Receiver: In judging of which, we are first to con­fider the Man's Honesty or Manners; secondly, the Good-will he bears towards us; thirdly, the nearness of Relation, or Society that is between us; and, lastly, the Benefits we have formerly re­ceiv'd from him. 'Tis desirable that all these In­ducements might concur in the same Person; but when they do not, we should bestow our Kind­ness more especially on him, in whom we find the most, and weightiest of 'em.

CHAP. XV.

Honesty, the first sort of Merit. We aren't to expect we shall find perfectly good Men. Modesty, Tempe­rance, &c. more especially to be regarded. How we should judge of Men's Good-will towards us. Gra­titude a most necessary Duty: We should imitate fruitful Fields, by returning more than we have re­ceiv'd. How to judge of the Value of any Kindness: Those to be least esteem'd that are done rashly and in­considerately. We should do most for those that stand in greatest need, if they are otherwise deserving.

a NOw seeing we don't live amongst such as, are perfectly and fully Wise, but such as are thought to have done very well, if they are but, as 'twere, the rough Draughts of Virtue; we ought to consider, I think, in the first place, That no one should wholly be neglected in this case, in whom there appears any shadow or resemblance of real Ho­nesty; but that those Men ought to be principally re­garded, who excel in the quiet and more peaceable Virtues of Modesty, Temperance, and especially this b Justice, of which I have now been discoursing a great while. c For most times Greatness of Spi­rit and Courage, unless it be in those who are perfectly Wise and Virtuous, is something too hot and apt to boil over; the others are the Virtues, which seem more peculiarly to constitute a Good [Page 50] Man. And so much for the first sort of Merit to be consider'd, viz. The Manners or Honesty of the Person we would be Kind to. The d second was, The Good-will which he bears towards us; as to which it should always be our principal care, to do most for him, by whom we are most belov'd: Now in judging of the Good-will that any one bears us, we are not to consider (like Boys and Children) a­ny sudden flashes and heats of Passion, but rather a constant and well-setled Affection. But if a Man, e in the next place, has done us any real Service, so that our part is to make a Requital, and not first to lay an Obligation upon him, 'tis then our Duty to take some greater care; for of all the Virtues, there's none we are more necessarily oblig'd to, than Grati­tude. If then, according to f Hesiod's Rule, even that which was nothing but barely lent us, is, if possible, to be return'd back with Interest again; what abun­dant Returns should we make to those, by whom we have been freely and generously Oblig'd? What less can we do than be like fruitful Fields, which pro­duce, beyond comparison more than was thrown in­to 'em? And if we do Services even to those Men, from whom we hope afterwards to receive any Favours; ought we not much more to do the same to those, from whose forward Kindness we have already receiv'd 'em? For the Virtue of Libera­lity [Page 51] containing under it these two Parts; in the first place, The doing a Kindness to any one; and, secondly, The requiting it when done to us; whe­ther we'll perform the former or not, is altogether left to our own Choice; but every Good g Man's oblig'd to the latter, when e're he can do it h with­out Injustice. But then we're to make a distin­ction between Benefits, and are there bound to make the most ample Returns, where the Obliga­tions we have receiv'd are the greatest. And to judge of the Merits of any Kindness, we are chiefly to consider in what manner it was done; as whether freely, considerately and from a Prin­ciple of Good-nature. For several People do ma­ny things Rashly,. and with a blind sort of Im­pulse; throwing away their Favours upon all with­out distinction; being hurried about, as it were with a Tempest, by every mad and frolicksome Humour, and every sudden or impetuous Passion. A Benefit therefore, when receiv'd from such a one, is not to be esteem'd of an equal Value, with those that proceed from a setled Judgment and due Consideration. But our principal Duty both in do­ing of Kindnesses and making Requitals, is, To do most for those that stand in greatest need of it, suppo­sing all Circumstances else to be equal: the contrary to which appears plainly in the Practice and Acti­ons of the most part of Men; for, People choose to bestow their Favours, upon those from whom they expect to receive the most Benefits, tho' the Persons perhaps don't at all stand in need of 'em.

CHAP. XVI.

We should be most ready to give to those, who are most nearly ally'd to us. The first sort of Alliance is that between all Men in general. The Bond of it, and Duties resulting from it. We're bound to do for any Man what will be a Kindness to him, and no Prejudice to our selves; but with this Cau­tion, That we don't thereby make our selves unable to assist those, who are more nearly ally'd to us.

THe a fourth Inducement remaining to be spoke to, is, The nearness of Relation, or Society that is amongst Men; for the maintenance of which, we can't do better, than to give most to those, that stand nearest related to us. But that we may consider, with greater distinctness, the natural Prin­ciples of Human Society, we shall here trace it down from the Fountain head. The first thing then to be taken notice of is this, b That there is such a thing as a Fellowship or Society between all Men in general: The Bond or Cement that holds this together, is Reason and Discourse, which by Teaching, Learning, Communicating one with another, &c. easily make Men agree together, and unite 'em all in one na­tural sort of Conjunction and Community. Nor [Page 53] does any thing set us at a greater distance from the Nature of Beasts: for we oftentimes talk of the Courage of them, such as Lyons and Horses; but never a word of their Equity, Justice or Goodness; And why is this; but c because they are destitute of Reason and Discourse? This is then the largest and most comprehensive of all Societies, being made up of Men consider'd barely as such, and so taking in even the whole Race and Kind of 'em one with another: the d Duties of which are, To let every one have a share in those things, which by Nature were pro­duc'd for the common Advantage and Benefit of all; To let what's already determin'd by Laws, and civil Constitutions, remain as it is, without breaking in upon any Man's Right; as to which things however we should remember a Rule, which is now among the Greeks become an usual Proverb, All things in common amongst Friends. But perhaps you may ask, what kind of things we suppose them to be, which ought to be common to all Mankind: Ennius has given us one Instance of 'em, which may easily be apply'd to a great many o­thers:

[Page 54] He who directs the wandring Traveller,
Doth, as 'twere, light another's Torch by his own;
Which gives him ne're the less of Light, for that
It gave another.

By this one Case he sufficiently teaches us, That whatever Kindness can be done for another, with­out any Damage or Loss to our selves, 'tis our Duty to do it, tho' to never so much a Stranger. From hence have arisen those general Maxims and Prin­ciples of Humanity, Not to deny one a little Run­ning-water; or, The lighting his Fire by ours, if he has occasion: To give the best Counsel we are able to one who is in Doubt or Distress; which are things that do Good to the Person that receives them, and are no Loss or Trouble to him that confers them. Such things therefore, being by Nature common, should ac­cordingly be kept open for the free use of all Men: And of those which are our own we should always be giving something, that may contribute to the Benefit and Welfare of the whole. e But because the Revenues of Particulars are small, and there are infinite numbers of those that Want, therefore is f this universal Bounty to be kept within the Li­mits [Page 55] prescrib'd by Ennius, It gives him ne'r the less of Light; that so we may have it within our Pow­er, to be Liberal to those that are more nearly al­ly'd to us.

CHAP. XVII.

Several other Degrees of Relation, less extensive than that mention'd in the former Chapter. That of Friendship the most closely knit. The Ground and Foundation of true Friendship. The Relation ari­sing from doing Kindnesses to one another. The Love a Man has for his Native Country swallows up all other Loves whatever. Which of the several Re­latives we ought to prefer, in our Liberality and doing Kindnesses. A Description of Friendship; and of all Friendships, which is most pleasant.

a BUt there are several Degrees of Society and Fellowship amongst Mankind; for to take now our leave of that general and universal one already mention'd, there's a nearer among those who are all of the same Country, Nation or Lan­guage; than which, nothing more knits and u­nites Men to one another. There is a closer yet among those, who are all of the same City; for a great many things are in common to Fel­low-citizens, such as Markets, Temples, Walks, Ways, Laws, Privileges, Courts of Justice, Freedom of Votes, besides common Meetings and Familia­rities, and abundance of Business and Entercourse [Page 56] with one another. But there's a stricter Bond of Alliance still, between those who belong to the same Family, as taking into it but a very small part of that vast and immense one of all Mankind. For there being by Nature implanted in all things a certain Desire of Begetting their Like, the clo­sest and nearest of all Societies is between Man and Wife; then follows that between them and their Children▪ and afterwards that of the whole Family, who inhabit together, and have all things in common; which is, as it were, the first beginning of a City, and Ground or Seed-plot of a whole Common­wealth. Next to this comes the Bond of Relation between Brothers; as also between first and second Cosins; who growing too numerous to live in the same House, are sent out to others, as it were into new Colonies. Next after this follow Marriages and Alliances, and so a new Stock of Relations that way; from whence comes a new Propagation and Off-spring, which serves to give rise, as was said, to Commonwealths. Now that nearness of Blood, and the natural Love which arises from it, can't but endear Men to one another, is past all doubt; 'tis a very great matter to have the same b Relicks and Monuments of our Ancestors; to make use of the same c religious Ceremonies, and be laid after death in the same place of Burial: But of all the Societies and Unions amongst Men, there is none more excel­lent or more closely knit, than when such as are Men [Page 57] of real Virtue and Honesty, from a certain agreement and likeness of their Manners, contract a Familia­rity and Friendship one with another. For Virtue and Goodness (as we often observe) of necessity moves us where-ever we see it; and makes us all have a Love and Respect for that Person, in whom we discover it. And as every Virtue thus wins upon our Hearts, and even forces us to Love those we take to possess it; so more especially do Justice and Beneficence. But when d several Persons are all like one another in Honesty and good Manners, then no Society can ever be more loving, or more closely united. For where there are many of the same Humour, and same Inclinations; every one sees, in some measure, his own self, and is accordingly de­lighted, in the Person of another; and that's brought about, which Pythagoras thought the Perfection of all Friendship, That a great many Severals are made into One. There's another remarkable Fellowship or Community, arising from an Entercourse of do­ing and receiving Benefits; which while 'tis kept up by a mutual Gratitude and Kindness of all the Par­ties, can't but occasion a firm and very lasting A­greement between 'em. But when we have gone over all the Relations that are in the World, and thro'ly consider'd the Nature of each, we shall find that there's no one of greater Obligation, no one that's dearer and nearer to us, than that which we [Page 58] all of us bear to the Publick. We have a tender Concern and Regard for our Parents, for our Chil­dren, our Kindred and Acquaintance; but the Love which we have for our Native Country swal­lows up all other Loves whatever; for which there is no honest Man but would Die, if by his Death he could do it any necessary Service. How detest­able e then must the Wickedness and Barbarity of those People be, who have mangled and rent this their Native Country by all manner of Villanies; and f have made it their Business (nay, and g still do so) to bring it to Ruine and utter Desolation? h Now if there should happen any Contest or Com­petition between these Relations, which of 'em should have the greatest share of our Duty; we should pay the first Regard to our i Country and Parents, from whom we have receiv'd the most endearing Obligations; the next to our Children and Family, who all have their Eyes upon us alone, and have no Body else they can depend upon; next in order to these come our Kindred and Relations, whose Fortune is generally the same with our own. To each of these therefore, whom I have just now men­tion'd, we most of all owe what is necessary for [Page 59] their subsistence: But then, as for Living and Eat­ing together, for mutual Advising, Discourse, Ex­hortation, Comforting, and sometimes (if occasion serves) k Rebuking, Friendship is the properest Soil for them; and of all kinds of Friendship, there is none so pleasant, as that which is cemented by a Likeness of Manners.

CHAP. XVIII.

In Liberality the Necessity of the Person is especially to be consider'd. Some Kindnesses due to some Rela­tives more than to others. Rules signifie but little of themselves, unless they are confirm'd by Practice and Exercise. Greatness of Soul, the third general Virtue, most glorious and splendid of 'em all. Is most of all prais'd, and its contrary disprais'd among Men.

a BUt in all these Duties of Beneficence and Libe­rality, one principal thing to be taken notice of is, What Necessity the Person we would be Kind to lies under, and what he is able or not able to do, without our Assistance: So that in some cases, the present Posture and Circumstances of a Man's Condition, ought more to prevail with us, than the Degrees of Relation. Again, There are certain par­ticular Offices, which are more peculiarly owing to [Page 60] some one sort of Relatives, than they are to ano­ther: In the Business (for Example) of getting in his Corn, 'tis our Duty rather to assist a b next Negh­bour, than either a Brother or familiar Friend: but if the Business be a Case at Law, then a Kins­man or Friend must rather be defended, than only a next Neighbour. These things therefore, and such like Circumstances, should be well consider'd, in the Practice and Exercise of every Virtue; and our Minds should be brought to a kind of Acquain­tance and Familiarity with them; that so we may be quick at the Accounts of our Duty, and able by casting up all things together, to see at last what the Remainder is, and know what we owe to the several sorts and conditions of Men. For as a Ge­neral, Orator or Physician, however well skill'd in the Rules of his Art, can never be perfect without the assistance of Practice and Experience; just so it is in the Case now before us: Many have laid down the Rules and Precepts of Virtue and Good-living; (as I my self am doing at this very time) but there's moreover requir'd to a due degree of Height and Per­fection in it, that one accustom himself to the Ex­ercise of 'em. And thus have I shewn how Virtue and Honesty (from which all our Duty does im­mediately flow) are deduc'd from those things, which concern the Society and Good of Mankind; which was the second General I propos'd to dis­course of.

c It is to be observ'd, that whereas there were laid down four general Heads, from which all Vir­tue [Page 61] and Honesty is deriv'd; whatever proceeds from a brave and exalted Mind, that's rais'd above For­tune, and all the little Chances and Accidents of the World, is usually made most account of amongst Men. Hence in Reproaches we find there's no­thing more common, than such things as these:

For shame! young Men, and yet have Womens Hearts!
While this brave Woman plays the Man—

Or something like this, ‘Dear d Salmacis give Spoils, that cost no Sweat or [Blood!’ Whereas on the contrary in Praises or Panegyricks, those things that are done with a bravery of Mind, and have something of extraordinary Courage in 'em, (I know not how) we commend in a nobler and loftier Strain, than we do any thing else. Hence e Marathon, Salamis, Plateae, &c. are so com­mon a Field for all the Rhetoricians: Hence our f Cocles; hence the Decii, the Scipio's, Marcellus, and a great many others; and especially the People of Rome it self is particularly famous for Greatness of Courage. But the Value that is set upon Military Glory appears from this, that almost all Statues are done in the Habit and Garb of a Soldier.

CHAP. XIX.

Courage is not truely a Virtue, unless it be accompany'd with Justice, Truth, &c. An excellent Definition of it giv'n by the Stoicks. An admirable Saying of Plato to the same purpose. Men of great Souls are apt to be Ungovernable and Ambitious; which prompts 'em to Injustice. A Man of a truly noble Spirit never Injures another, but Protects from In­juries; scorns Applause, and the Voice of the igno­rant Multitude.

BUt that sort of a Courage which is seen in the Dangers and Fatigues of War, unless a Man be govern'd by the Rules of Justice, and fight for the Safety and Good of the Publick, and not for particular Ends of his own, is altogether blamable; and so far from being a part of true Virtue, that 'tis indeed a piece of the most barbarous Inhuma­nity. Fortitude therefore is very well defin'd by the Stoick Philosophers, when they call it, b A Vir­tue contending for Justice and Honesty. No man therefore by Baseness and Treachery has ever got the Name and Reputation of true Courage; for no­thing can ever be Virtuous or Credible, that is not Just. To which purpose, that of Plato was admi­rably well said, ‘As that sort of Knowledge, which is not directed by the Rules of Justice, [Page 63] ought rather to have the Name of Design and Subtilty, than Wisdom and Prudence; just so that bold and adventurous Mind, which is hurried by the Stream of its own Passions, and not for the Good and Advantage of the Publick, should ra­ther have the Name of Fool-hardy and Daring, than Valiant and Couragious.’ The first thing therefore I'd have in a truely couragious Man, is, c That he be a Follower of Goodness and fair Dealing, of Truth and Sincerity; which are principal and constituent parts of Justice. But here 'tis one very unhappy thing, that most times these great and exalted Minds are naturally ungovernable and de­sirous of Rule: So that what Plato observ'd of the Spartans, That all their Customs had no other Aim, but to get the Superiority, may fitly enough be ap­ply'd to these Persons: for the more any Man has of this Greatness of Soul, the more eager he is of being a Sharer in the Government, or rather of obtaining it wholly to himself: And 'tis no easie matter to be fair and equitable in all one's Actions, (which is the proper and peculiar Office of Justice) while one is en­deavouring to make himself uppermost. From hence it comes to pass, that they'll never be conquer'd in any Debates, or over-rul'd by the Laws and Con­stitutions [Page 64] of the Publick; but make it their busi­ness by Factions and Bribery to get a strong Party and Interest in the Republick; and rather choose to be Uppermost by Force and Injustice, than E­qual to others by fair and upright Dealing. But the difficulty of it can only serve to make it more Honourable, d but never its contrary more Excusa­ble: For no sort of Case or Circumstance whatever, can excuse any Man for being guilty of Injustice. Those are therefore your truly brave and couragi­ous Men, not who Rob, Plunder and Injure others, but those who Secure and Protect 'em from Injuries. But that Greatness of Mind, which is truly such, and under the direction of Wisdom and Prudence, makes that Honour and Credit, which we natural­ly desire, not consist in the outward imaginary Ap­plause, but in the real intrinsick Goodness of its Actions; and is not so eager of appearing to be greater and better than others, as of really being so. For he that is so mean as to depend upon the giddy and ignorant Multitude, ought never to be account­ed of a truly great and exalted Spirit: Besides that, there's nothing so easily draws Men to Acts of In­justice, as a Loftiness of Mind, when joyn'd with this foolish Desire of Applause. e This is indeed a [Page 65] very dangerous Place, and requires our greatest Concern and Watchfulness; because you shall hard­ly find any Man, that, when he has gone thro' La­bours and Difficulties, does not expect this Ho­nour and Applause, as a kind of Reward for his Courage and Atchievements.

CHAP. XX.

Wherein true Greatness of Soul consists. An excellent Description of it. 'Tis an Enemy to Covetousness, to the Desire of Applause, and of Power. Produces a calm and unpassionate Mind. The Desire of this Calm and Tranqullity of Mind, has made some Men retire, and separate 'emselves from publick Business. In what a perfect Freedom consists.

NOw all true Courage and Greatness of Mind a is more especially seen in these two things: The first is a generous Contempt or Disregard of all b outward Goods, proceeding from an Opinion, That 'tis unworthy of a Man to admire, or wish for, or [Page 66] endeavour after any thing, unless it be that which is Honest and Becoming; to make himself subject to any one's Will; to be a Slave to his own irregu­lar Passions; or any ways depend upon the Capri­cio's of Fortune. When he has gotten such a Tem­per of Mind as I have now been describing, then the second thing is, That he c perform such Actions as are glorious and profitable, but withal very full both of Labour and Difficulty; and extreamly dan­gerous to his Life it self, as well as to those things that are requisite for its Preservation. Now d all the Lu­stre and Dignity of these two parts, nay and I add all their Usefulness too, is lodg'd only in the latter; but the Ground-work, as 'twere, and Foundation of all true Greatness, is laid in the former. For in that are contain'd those generous Principles which exalt Mens Minds, and raise 'em to a Contempt of all worldly things. But that former it self is made up of two parts, The first is an Opinion that [Page 67] nothing is truely and really Good, but only what is Honest: The second a Freedom from all sort of Passion or Disturbance of Mind. For what can more discover a Man of a brave and heroick Spi­rit, than to make no account in the World of those things, which seem so glorious and dazling to the generality of Mankind; but wholly to despise 'em, not from any vain and fantastick Humour, but from solid and firm Principles of Reason and Judg­ment? Or what can more shew a robust Mind and unshaken Constancy, than to bear those hea­vy and numerous Calamities, which are incident to Mankind in this Life, with such a firm Temper and Fixedness of Soul, as never to offend against Nature and Right Reason, or do any thing that's unworthy the Dignity and Character of a Wise Man? Now 'twould not at all be consistent or agreeable, that he who bore up so couragiously a­gainst Fear, should be afterwards unable to resist Desire; or that he who could never be conquer'd by Pain, should suffer himself to be captivated by Pleasure. These things therefore should well be con­sider'd, and of all e Desires, that of Money should be avoided; for nothing's a greater Sign of a nar­row, mean and sordid Spirit, than to dote upon Ri­ches; nor is any thing on the contrary more Credi­table and Magnificent, than to contemn Wealth, if you have it not; and if you have it, to lay it out freely in Acts of Bounty and Liberality. The De­sire of Glory (as I before observ'd) ought also to [Page 68] be avoided: for it f robs a Man wholly of his Freedom and Liberty, which generous Spirits ought of all things in the World to maintain and defend. Neither ought Places of Power to be sought after; but at some times rather to be refus'd when offer'd, at others, be laid down if they can conveniently. We should free our selves, in short, from all vehe­ment Passions and Disorders of Mind, not only those of Desire and Fear, but also of Sorrow, of Joy and Anger; that so the State of the Mind may be calm and undisturb'd, which will make the whole Life become graceful and g uniform. Now there both are and have been many, who to gain this Re­pose of which I am speaking, h have betaken 'em­selves to a Life of Retirement, and wholly with­drawn from all Business of the Publick. Among these the noblest and most eminent of the Philoso­phers; [Page 69] and some Men of rigid and severe Lives, who misliking the Manners of the People or Go­vernours, have gone and withdrawn 'emselves into the Country, pleas'd with the Management of their private Fortunes. These Men propos'd the same End to themselves that Kings and Princes do, viz. The Living so as to Want for nothing, to be under the Power and Controul of none, but to enjoy a full and perfect Freedom; which consists in living so, as one's i self best pleases.

CHAP. XXI.

Those who live a Publick and a Private Life aim both at Freedom. Their Lives compar'd: the former more useful, the latter more safe. In what Cases a Man may be excus'd from serving the Publick. Those ought to serve it who are qualify'd for the Service. Greatness of Soul more necessary for those in a publick, than retir'd Life. Two or three Rules to be obser'd before a Man enters upon Business.

THis then being the common Design and End of 'em both, those who're ambitious of Power and Authority, think to obtain it by enlarging their [Page 70] Fortunes and Interests in the World; but these whom I have mention'd as Men of Repose, by contenting themselves with their own Condition, tho' but humble and mean. In which they are nei­ther of 'em wholly in the wrong; but the Life of the latter, I mean the retir'd, is both easier and sa­fer, and begets less of Trouble and Disturbance to others; whereas that of the former, who give 'em­selves up to Affairs of State, and the Management of great and important Concerns, is more adapt­ed to the Benefit and Good of Mankind, and the getting of Credit and Reputation in the World. a Those People therefore are perhaps excusable, who being of Parts and Capacities for Learning, give 'emselves wholly to the Study of it, and never at all meddle with Publick Business: and so are those also, who being disabled by Sickness and Infirmi­ties, or on any other good and allowable Account, have separated 'emselves from the Administration of Affairs, leaving the Power and Reputation of it in the hands of others. But as for those People, who have none of these Reasons, and pretend to despise those Commands and Honours, which most Men admire; I am so far from thinking it a Virtue in 'em, that I rather esteem it a very great Fault: Thus far, 'tis true, one can hardly condemn them, in that they despise, and make little account of Glo­ry and Applause; but their true Reason seems to be rather this, That they don't care to suffer the Labour and Fatigue of 'em, and are afraid of en­countring with Rubs and Repulses, as things that [Page 71] are attended with some Shame and Dishonour. b For you shall often find there's a great many Men, who are very inconsistent with 'emselves in things of a contrary Nature: as for Pleasure, they despise it with all the Severity of a Stoick; but yet are so effeminate, as not to be able to bear the least Trouble; are mighty Contemners of Fame and Applause; but ex­treamly concern'd at any thing of Disgrace: c which are things that don't very well agree together. Those People then, whom Nature has endow'd with Abi­lities for that purpose, d should forthwith endea­vour to procure 'emselves Places, and manage the Business of the Commonwealth: Otherwise how should the City be well govern'd, or the Greatness of their Endowments be made known to the World? e But that Greatness of Soul, and Con­tempt of all Human things, (which we have often mention'd) together with that Calmness and Sereni­ty of Mind, is requisite in those of a publick Sta­tion, as much, if not more than 'tis in Philosophers, [Page 72] if ever they hope to be free from Anxieties, and ar­rive at any Steadiness or Uniformity in their Lives. Now these things are easier to Philosophers, than to them; for as much as their Lives, being led in private, require for their support a less number of things, and have fewer within the power and reach of Fortune: and if any ill Accident should befal 'em, 'tis impossible their Sufferings can be very considerable. Those Men therefore that are in Pub­lick Stations, f having things of more weight and im­portance to be taken care of, must in reason be sup­pos'd to lye much more open to the Assaults of the Passions, than those who spend their Days in Priva­cy and Retirement. Upon which account they should take the more care, to fortifie themselves with this Greatness of Spirit, and to free their Minds from the grievous Torments and Disturban­ces of 'em. But he who takes upon him a Publick Trust, should not only look that the Business be Ho­nest, but that he himself be qualified for the Ma­nagement of it. In considering of which there's a double Extream to be carefully avoided, That he neither Despair thro' a mean Cowheartedness; nor yet be over Confident thro' Eagerness of Desire. And lastly, in whatever he sets about, let all things be diligently and carefully put in order, before he goes on to the execution of it.

CHAP. XXII.

'Tis no less great and commendable to Manage Affairs of Peace, than of War. Several Examples to prove this. Arms useless abroad, without Civil Prudence at home. Cicero's eminent Services to the Repub­lick: A Saying of Pompey the Great's to him up­on that Subject.

BUt seeing most People are apt to imagin, that 'tis greater and more glorious to Manage Af­fairs of War, than Peace; a I shall endeavour to les­sen this general Opinion. For the Greatness of that Glory, which is given to Warriors, has made ma­ny People, for no other reason, desirous of Quarrels; especially Men of the greatest Parts and most aspi­ring Minds; particularly if they are qualify'd for a Soldier's Life, and their Disposition carry 'em to the Profession of Arms. But if we would make a just Estimate of the case, we should find both greater and more glorious Actions done by Wis­dom at home, than by Arms abroad. For what tho' b Themistocles be deservedly Commended, and his Name more Illustrious than that of c Solon? [Page 74] And tho' Salamis be brought for the proof of a Vi­ctory, which is far to be prefer'd to the Wisdom of Solon, in constituting and setling the Senate of Areopagus? Yet in truth ought this to be judg'd no less great and extraodinary than that: for Themisto­cles's Victory was only a Kindness to the Common­wealth once; but Solon's Counsel will be so for ever: Seeing 'tis by this that the Laws of the Athenians, and Constitutions of their Ancestors are kept up and maintain'd. Beside, Themistocles can name nothing in the World, wherein he assisted the Areopagus: but Solon on his part may truly say, That he, by his Wisdom, was assisting to Themistocles; for the War was carried on by the Directions of that Se­nate, which he by his Prudence at first appointed. The same may be said of d Pausanias and Lysander; for tho' by their Valour they are thought to have enlarg'd the Dominion of the Spartans, yet 'tis by no means at all to be compar'd with the Laws and Discipline of the wise e Lycurgus: beside that to no­thing but these Laws, and this Discipline, they ow'd all the Courage and Obedience of their Ar­mies. I, for my own part, was always of Opinion, That f Marcus Scaurus, when I was a Boy, was by [Page 75] no means inferior to g Caius Marius; nor h Quintus Ca­tulus, since I meddled with the Republick, to i Cneus Pompeius; for Armies can signifie but little abroad, un­less there be Counsel and wise Management at home. Neither was the Rasing and Destroying of Numan­tia, by that incomparable Person, and brave Com­mander the Second Africanus, a greater and more signal piece of Service to the Republick, than the Murther of Tiberius Gracchus by k Nasica, tho' a meer private Citizen at the same time. 'Tis true, this Action had something of the Soldier in it, as being done by Force and down-right Violence, and so does not wholly come under the Notion of Civil Con­cerns: however, I have brought it as an Instance of these, because 'twas effected by this Civil sort of Prudence, and without the Assistance of a Military Power. I can't but therefore still extreamly ap­prove of that Saying of mine, which I'm told some malicious and envious Fellows most mightily carp at,

[Page 76] Let warlike Arms give place to th' peaceful Gown,
And to the Statesman's Praise the Victor yeild his Crown.

For not to say any thing of other People, when I my own self sat at the Helm of the Government, did not Arms then give place to the Gown? l Never was the State in more imminent Danger, and yet never were things better and more happily quieted. Thus by my Prudence and careful Management, the most impudent and audacious of all the Citi­zens let, as 'twere, their Arms fall out of their Hands. What Action then was there ever perform'd in War like this? Or where's the Triumph that can be compar'd to it? For I think I may venture a little to boast before you, Son Mark, whose Hap­piness it is to succeed in the Glory, and whose Du­ty to imitate the Excellence of my Actions: This I am sure of, even Pompey himself (a Man the most famous for Martial Atchievements) did me that Ju­stice in the hearing of several, as to say, ‘That his returning home with his third Triumph, had been to but little or no purpose, unless my En­deavours and Services to the Republick had pre­serv'd the City for him to Triumph in.’ I con­clude therefore, from what has been observ'd, That [Page 77] that sort of Courage which is seen in the Manage­ment of Civil Affairs, is no less deserving than that which consists in the Business of Fighting; and the former requires more Pains and Application to be perfect in it, than the latter doth.

CHAP. XXIII.

The Body ought to be so far taken Care of, as that it may be able to bear Fatigues. But 'tis the Mind that truly makes Great Men. War should be under­taken only for the sake of Peace. The Difference be­tween a Great Soul and a Great Understanding; and the Duties of each. Fighting one of the least parts of Courage.

NOw 'tis certain that Virtue, which consists in Greatness and Elevation of Soul, and makes up the Subject of our present Enquiry, is obtain'd by the Strength of the Mind, not the Body. How­ever the Body ought not to be neglected; but by Exercise brought to such a Frame and Condition, as that it may obey the Prescriptions of the Mind, in performing that Business and bearing those Fa­tigues, which are requir'd of it. But still the Na­ture of the Virtue we are seeking for, consists in due care and application of Mind; in which particular, the Publick receives as much Benefit from Gowns­men, who manage and take care of its Civil Con­cerns; as it doth from Soldiers, who are Generals of its Armies. For they by their Prudence have often either hindred the breaking out of Wars, or else have occasion'd their speedy Conclusion; and sometimes too have been the cause of their being Undertaken: as the third with Carthage was entred into upon the [Page 78] Advice of a Cato, whose Credit and Authority pre­vail'd in that Case, even after he was dead. Wis­dom therefore, and Skill in determining Civil Af­fairs, is more to be desir'd than Courage in Fight­ing: But then we must always be careful in this Case, that our Design be not the avoiding of War, but the being more useful and serviceable to the Publick. b And as for War, it should never be undertaken with any other Aim, but only that of obtaining an honourable Peace. 'Tis the part of a brave and unshaken Spirit, not to be disturb'd un­der any Misfortune, or suffer it self in disorder and tumult to be thrown off the Saddle (as we usually speak;) but always to keep such a Presence of Mind, as to be able to consult upon every Occasion, and be hurry'd on to nothing, but what is agreeable to Reason and Discretion. And as this is the part of an exalted Spirit, so is what follows of an elevated Understanding; to discover Effects even while they are yet in the Wombs of their Causes, and con­sider before-hand whatever may happen on either side, and accordingly what's to be done when it does happen; that so he may never be taken una­wares, and brought to that lamentable shift of cry­ing out, I never once thought of it. These are the Duties, as of a truly Courageous and Lofty, so of a Wise and Judicious Mind; but rashly to run and lay about one in Battel, and come to Wounds and [Page 79] down-right Blows with an Enemy, is but a savage and brutish kind of Business: However, Necessity so requiring, a Man should Fight, and choose ra­ther to part with his Life than his Liberty, or be guilty of any base or dishonourable Action.

CHAP. XXIV.

The Duty of a truly Couragious Man, after he has conquer'd his Enemies. Cool and Deliberate Coun­sels to be prefer'd before Heat and Boldness. No­thing more foolish, than to expose one's self to unne­cessary Dangers. 'Tis a Duty rather to expose one's self, than the Publick Affairs. They are to blame, who rather venture the loss of their Armies, than their own Reputation. The Folly of Callicratidas and Cleombrotus in this. The Wisdom of Fabius Max­imus in doing the contrary. Men should speak what they think for the Good of the Publick, without re­garding what Offence it may give to others.

IN the Business of a Razing and Plundring Cities, there ought to be taken a very especial Care, that nothing of Rashness or Cruelty be shewn; and all true Greatness of Spirit obliges us, having first consider'd things calmly and maturely, to Par­don the Multitude, and Punish those only that were principally Faulty; and in every State and Condi­tion of Fortune, to observe the just Medium of Vir­tue and Honesty. For as we've already observ'd [Page 80] of some, that they count it more noble to manage Af­fairs of War, than of Peace; so you shall find there are a great many others, who imagine, that hot and adventurous Undertakings have something that's greater and more glorious in 'em, than wisely cool and deliberate Counsels. Now as no Man ought, by too warily avoiding of Dangers and Labours, to get himself the name of a Faint-heart and Cow­ard; so, on the other hand, Care should be taken, that we thrust not our selves into Hazards and Dif­ficulties, where there's no manner of occasion for it; than which there is no greater Folly upon Earth. 'Tis a Duty therefore, in Attempts of any Danger, to imitate the Practice of skilful Physicians, who always to light and inconsiderable Diseases, ap­ply none but easie and gentle Remedies; but in de­sperate Cases are forc'd to have recourse to despe­rate Cures. 'Tis a madness therefore, while all things are calm and in a peaceful State, to desire a Storm; but to keep off the Mischiefs of it when it does happen, is the part of a Wise and a Prudent Man; and so much the more, if the Good to be ob­tain'd by getting well rid of it, out-balance the Evils you may be brought into by the Attempt. b The Danger of some Actions only relates to the Person that undertakes 'em, but that of others to the whole Republick: And again, A Man's Life is endanger'd in some, in others his Reputation and the Good-will of his Citizens. 'Tis our Duty then, c in the [Page 81] former Case, more willingly to expose and endan­ger our selves, than the whole State; and d in the latter, to fight for our Glory and Reputation, more readily than any other Conveniencies whatever. Yet the e contrary to this appears plainly in the Practice of a great many Men, who are willing to spend their Estates and Lives for the good of their Country; but won't bear the least Diminution of their Honour, tho' the present Occasions of the Re­publick require it. Thus Callicratidas, Admiral of Sparta, in the Peloponnesian War, after he had done many signal Services, at last was the occasion of Ruining all; for when he was advis'd to Retreat with his Navy from f Arginussae, and not venture giving the Athenians Battel, he utterly refus'd it; and told his Advisers, That if this whole Navy should chance to be lost, the Lacedaemonians could rig out another; but that he for his part could never fly, without an irreparable loss of his Ho­nour. And here the Lacedaemonians had tho' a great, yet a tolerable Blow; but that g other was Mortal, and put a full period to the Spartan Great­ness, [Page 82] when their Leader Cleombrotus, only for fear of being somewhat Ill-spoken of, unadvisedly ven­tur'd to fight Epaminondas. How much better did h Fabius Maximus do? Concerning whom Ennius has these Words:

One Man our State has sav'd by wise Delays:
For he regarded not the foolish Prate
Of idle People; but the City's Good.
Therefore his growing Fame now flourishes
More, when his Deeds are past.

i The same kind of Fault should also be avoided in Civil Administrations; for a great many Men are afraid to speak out what they really think, tho' perhaps 'tis for the best, for fear it should give any Offence to others.

CHAP. XXV.

Two Rules of Plato's to be observ'd by those who Go­vern the State. The Good of the Govern'd ought to be their sole Aim. An excellent Description of a good Minister of State. Ambition very destructive in a Government. A good Saying of Plato's to that purpose. Men should carry themselves civilly towards those, who are of an opposite Party in the State; and not count 'em their Enemies. The Example of Sci­pio and Metellus. Anger towards an Adversary no part of Courage. Affability, &c. requisite in a Statesman. Severity and Chastisements sometimes necessary; and Rules to be observ'd about 'em. No­thing can be well done, that's done in a Passion, Ru­lers should be like the Laws themselves.

THose who design to be Partakers in the Govern­ment should be sure to remember these two Precepts of Plato: First, To make the Safety and Interest of their Citizens, the great Aim and Design of all their Thoughts and Endeavours; without e­ver considering their own personal Advantage. And, Secondly, so to take care of the whole collective Body of the Republick, as not to serve the Interest of any one Party, to the Prejudice or Neglecting of all the rest. For the Government of a State is much like the Office of a Guardian or Trustee; which should always be manag'd for the good of the Pu­pil, and not of the Persons to whom he is entrusted. And those Men, who, whilst they take care of one, neglect or disregard another part of the Citizens, do but occasion Sedition and Discord, the most destructive things in the World to a State: From whence it comes to pass, that, while some take part with the Popular Faction, and others make their Court to every Great One, there's but very [Page 84] few left, who are concern'd for the Benefit and Good of the whole. From this Root have sprung many grievous Dissentions amongst the Athe­nians; and not only Tumults, but even deadly Civil Wars in our own Republick: things which a worthy and truly brave Citizen, and one who deserves to hold the Reins of the Govenment, will shun and detest; and will give himself so to the Service of the Publick, as to aim at no Riches or Power for himself; and will so take care of the whole Community, as not to pass over any one part of it: Such a one will scorn, by the mean Arts of Calumny and a false Accusation, to bring others into Hatred and Disrepute with the People; but will always adhere to what is Just and Honest, and ne'r be drawn from it, whatever Offence may be taken by others; nay, will rather part with his Life it self, than do any thing that is contrary to the Virtues I have mention'd. Eager Ambition, and contending for Honours, is, of all things, most rui­nous and destructive to a State; concerning which, Plato has said admirably well, ‘That for Men to contend and fall out with one another, about which should be Chief in the Management of the State, is just as if the Ship's Crew should go to­ther by the ears, about who should be Master or Pilot of the Vessel.’ And the same Philosopher has given us this for a Rule, ‘That only those Men should be reckon'd as Enemies, who have taken up Arms in opposition to the Republick; not those who would govern it after their own Schemes.’ a Such was the Dissention between [Page 85] b P. Africanus and Q. Metellus, without any great Bitterness or Animosities between 'em. Some Peo­ple think it the part of a brave and heroick Spirit, to shew heat of Anger and Passion against an Ad­versary; but what they say is by no means to be regarded: for it's certain on the other hand, no­thing's more laudable, nothing more worthy of a great and brave Person, than Clemency, Meekness and Gentleness of Spirit. In Cities that are Free, and where all Men in common enjoy the same Privileges, Courtesie and Affability, and that which they call altitudo animi, a calm and undisturbed Temper of Mind, are peculiarly requisite: For to fret upon every unseasonable Visit, or at every im­pertinent and troublesom Petitioner, makes a Man sowre and morose in his Humour; which as it brings no kind of Good to himself, so it gets him the Hatred and Ill-will of others. But tho' Meek­ness and Clemency be laudable Virtues, yet no fur­ther, than as they leave room for a just Severity, whenever the Occasions of the Publick require it; without which a City can never be well govern'd. Now c every Reproof and Chastisement, in the first place, should be always free from contumelious Language, and not inflicted for the sake of the Per­son chastizing or reproving another, but the good and advantage of the whole Republick. Diligent care should be taken, in the next place, that the [Page 86] Penalty be proportion'd to the nature of the Crime, and that some don't pass without ever being que­stion'd, while others are punish'd for the same Misdemeanours. But of all things, Anger should be excluded in Punishing; for whoever comes to this Work in a Passion, will never observe that due Mediocrity, which equally abstains from too much and too little, so strictly requir'd by the d Peripatetick Schools: And they have very good reason indeed to require it; but then I can't but wonder they should commend Anger, and say, Na­ture has giv'n it us to good Ends and Purposes: For that in truth ought in no case to be allow'd of; and 'twere heartily to be wish'd that the Gover­nours of a State, would, in this particular, be like the Laws themselves, which punish Offenders ac­cording to Justice, without being any ways guided by Passion.

CHAP. XXVI.

Greatness of Soul commands an even Temper, free from Haughtiness in Prosperity, and Dejectedness in Adversity. Phillip greater than Alexander, in bearing his good Fortune with an even Mind. The Higher Men are, the more care they should take of being Humble and Moderate. An admirable Say­ing of Scipio to this purpose. In Prosperity we should especially consult our Friends; and have a care of Flatterers. Greatness of Soul seen often among the Philosophers, and those who in private manage their own Estates. How an Estate should be got, im­prov'd and us'd.

ANother great Duty of a Fortitude is, not to be Haughty, Disdainful and Arrogant when For­tune favours us, and all things go forward according to our Wishes: for it shews as much Meanness and Poorness of Spirit, to be transported with good, as it does with ill Fortune: whereas, on the other hand, nothing's more brave, than an Evenness of Temper in every Condition, and (as is reported of Socrates and Lelius) a constant retaining the same Air in one's Countenance, without ever seeming puff'd up or de­jected. I find that b Philip; the King of Macedonia, was inferiour to his Son in the outward Glory and [Page 88] Splendor of his Atchievements, but very far above him in good Nature and Condescension; there­fore the Father kept always the Character of a Great Person, whereas the Son often was c guilty of base and dishonourable Actions. 'Tis a good Rule therefore, I think, which is given by some Men, That the higher our Station in the World is, the more care we should take of our Lives and Actions, that they be kept within the compass of Lowliness and Humility. Panaetius tells us 'twas an usual Saying with his Schollar and familiar Friend Africanus, ‘That Men who give the Reins to their vitious Appetites, and are high and presuming upon the Greatness of their Fortunes, should be dealt with like Hor­ses, when grown fierce and unruly by frequent Engagements: for as these are deliver'd to Brea­kers to tame and be made fit for riding; so those should be brought within the barriers and limits of Reason and Philosophy, to teach 'em the Un­certainty of all Human Things, and the great Volubility and Changeableness of Fortune.’ We should also in Prosperity more especially make use of the Counsel of our Friends, and pay more Re­spect and Deference to their Advices, than we were wont to do. At the same time also we should take a great care, that we don't give over-much ear to Flatterers, nor suffer our selves to be wheedled and impos'd upon by their deceitful Words. For there's nothing wherein we're more apt to be mistaken, than in this particular; every one having such a fond Conceit and Opinion of himself, as to think he deserves those Applauses which they give him. Hence spring innumerable Errors in our Lives; whilst Men, puff'd up with a vain Imagination, and [Page 89] mistaken Notions of their own great Merit, are ex­pos'd to the Railery of all the World besides. And so much may suffice upon this Head. From what has been said we may easily gather, That those who are over Affairs of the Publick, do the great­est Actions, and such as express the most Bravery of Mind; their Business affording 'em more Oppor­tunities, and there being more Men who are con­cern'd in this, than in any other Method of Living whatever. d But after all, we can't but acknow­ledge there are, and have been a great many noble Spirits, even in a Life of Retirement and Privacy; who being sequestred from the Business of the World, have given up 'emselves to Enquiries after Truth, and the great Concernment of the Practice of Virtue: Or else leading a Life in the middle, as it were, between the Statesman and Philosopher, have been delighted with the Management of their own private Fortunes; not scraping up Money by all manner of ways, or hoarding it so as to make no Body the better for it; but parting with it free­ly for the sake of their Friends, or to serve the Re­publick, when occasion required it. Now this pri­vate Estate I would have, in the first place, to be honestly come by, not by any base, scandalous or invidious way of Gaining: then let it be distributed to the Uses and Necessities of as many as is possi­ble, provided they are worthy and deserving Peo­ple; and let it be encreas'd by such ordinary Me­thods of Saving and good Husbandry, as are agree­able to the Dictates of Reason and Prudence: and lastly, let none of it be spent in Debauchery and lux­urious [Page 90] Living, but in Acts of Munificence and Li­berality towards others. Whoever observes these Measures laid down (let his way of Life be either publick or private) may perform all the Duties of Magnanimity, Constancy and Greatness of Soul, as well as of Sincerity, Fidelity, and doing Good to Mankind:

CHAP. XXVII.

The Virtues contain'd under the fourth Head of Ho­nesty. Whatever is Honest, and nothing else but that, is becoming a Man; Honesty and Decency being really the same thing, and distinguish'd on­ly by an Act of the Mind. Two sorts of Decorum, and what the Nature of each of 'em is.

WE are now in the next place to speak of the fourth, and only remaining part of Virtue or Honesty, under which are comprehended Bash­fulness, Temperance, Modesty, Government of the Passions, and the observing a just Order as to time and place in our Words and Actions; from all which arises a a certain engaging kind of Beauty and Gracefulness, which serves to set off and adorn our Lives. Under this Head is contain'd that Be­comingness [Decorum, as we call it in Latin] which among the Greeks has the name of [...]; which [Page 91] is in its Nature so closely united and riveted to Honesty, that there's no way left of pulling 'em a sunder: for whatever is Becoming is likewise Ho­nest, and whatever is Honest is likewise Becoming. The Difference between 'em is so very small, that we may better conceive what it is, than explain it; for b whatever Becomingness there is in any Action, it immediately arises from the Honesty of it. From hence it appears, that Becomingness does not pecu­liarly belong to this one part of Honesty, whereof we are now undertaking to Discourse; but shews it self also in each of the three former. c To Rea­son, for instance, and Discourse according to the Rules of Prudence; to go about nothing but after [Page 92] due Consideration; and on every occasion to be quick at espying and defending the Truth, are things that are Becoming: whereas to be deceiv'd, to be in an Errour or Mistake, and to be impos'd upon, are very Unbecoming, as well as to be mad or be­side one's self. So again, all Actions of Justice are Becoming, but those of Injustice are both Scanda­lous and Unbecoming. The same may be said as to the Actions of Fortitude; whatever is done with a manful Courage and bravery of Mind, as 'tis wor­thy of, so it becomes a Man; but whatever on the other hand shews any Cowardice or Meanness of Spirit, is as contrary to Becomingness, as it is to true Virtue. I conclude therefore, That the Decency whereof I am now discoursing, appertaineth to each of the four parts of Honesty; and so apper­taineth, as not to stand in need of any mighty reach of Understanding to perceive it; but is easily dis­coverable at the first view: for there's something of Becoming contain'd in the very Notion and Idea of all Virtue, from which 'tis distinguish'd by the Mind alone, and not by the Nature of the thing it self. Just as the Beauty and good Colour of the Countenance, can never be separate from the Health of the Body; so this Becomingness, of which we are speaking, in it self is all one, and, as it were, incor­porate with Virtue and Honesty; but may be di­stinguish'd from it by Thought and Imagination. Now there are two kinds or sorts of it; the one d Universal, which belongs to the Nature of Honesty in general; the other particular and contain'd un­der this, which belongs to the several parts of it. The former is us'd to be thus defin'd, Decorum or [Page 93] Becoming is that, which is congruous or agreeable to e that excellent part of the Nature of Man, by which he is distinguish'd from the rest of the Creation. As for the latter, which is contain'd under this, 'tis most commonly made to consist in that, which is so agreeable to the Nature of Man, as f withal to shew something of Temper and Moderation, with a certain sweet Air of Gentility and good Manners.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Poetical Decorum what it is, and how differing from that we here speak of. Nature has given us a Cha­racter of Reason, &c. which we ought to live up to. Nature teaches us to have a Respect for other Men. Proportion, Regularity, &c. please, where-ever they are found. We ought to be concern'd about other Peo­ple's Opinion of us. How the Duties of Justice, and those of Modesty, Decency, &c. differ. We should live agreeably to Nature, which will always lead us right. Decency relates both to the Actions of the Body and Mind. The Nature or Mind of Man consists of Sence and Reason. The former of these ought to o­bey the latter.

THat this is so, will more plainly appear, if we con­sider that Decorum or Convenience of Manners, [Page 94] which the Poets aim at in all their Writings; con­cerning which were it anywise necessary to my pre­sent Purpose, I might largely discourse. Suffice it at present for me only to observe, That the Poets are then said to keep this Decorum, when each of their Persons is brought in saying and doing those things, which are suitable to the Character he bears in the World: Should a Aeacus, for Example, or Mi­nos say ‘b E'en let 'em hate me, whilst they dread me too:’ Or, ‘c The Child's entomb'd in its own Parent's Bowels.’ 'twould be an Offence against the Rules of De­cency; because they pass in the World for Men of Justice and Honesty: But let the same be said by a cruel Atreus, and the whole Theatre shall clap and applaud it; because 'tis a Saying very agreeable to his Character. d Now the Poet can judge what is becoming and convenient for every Person, accord­ing to the Character he himself has fix'd on him; but Nature has fix'd one on every one of us, by gi­ving us that Nobleness and Excellence of Being, whereby we are set above all other Creatures. [Page 95] The Poets then, there being so great a variety of Characters, can see what's becoming and conveni­ent for all, even the most Vitious: but we have got only one Character to live up to, I mean that which is assign'd us by Nature herself; a Character of Temperance and Modesty, of Constancy and Moderation. And the same Nature having also taught us, That we ought to be careful of our Car­riage and Demeanour towards the rest of Men; from hence it appears of how large an Extent that Becomingness is, which belongs to the Nature of e Honesty in general; and also that other, which is seen in the Exercise of the f several kinds of it. For, as the Beauty and Comliness of the Body draws the Eyes to it by the fit Composure of all its Members, and pleases us only upon this account, because all its Parts correspond with a kind of Pro­portion and Harmony: So this Decorum, which gives a sort of Lustre and Grace to our Lives, en­gages the Approbation and Esteem of all we live with, by that just and due Order, Consistency, and Regularity, which it keeps and maintains in our Words and Actions. g We ought to have therefore a certain Respect and Reverence for all Men, and desire to be approv'd not only by the best, but by all [Page 96] the World: For not to care a farthing what 'tis Peo­ple think of One, is a sign not only of Pride and Con­ceitedness, but indeed of having perfectly abandon'd all Modesty. h But here we must observe, there's a great deal of difference between that which Justice, and that which this Modesty, Respect or Reverence demands, in relation to other People: 'Tis the Duty of Justice, not to injure or wrong any Man; of Re­spect or Reverence, not to do any thing that may of­fend or displease him; wherein more especially the Nature of that Decorum we are speaking of consists. These things then being thus explain'd, I suppose it may clearly enough appear, what that is which we mean by Becoming. As for the Duties prescrib'd by it, the first thing to which it conducts us is, To demean our selves suitably and agreeably to our Nature, and do nothing that may any ways stain or deface it: for whilst we take this for our Guide and Conductress, i 'tis impossible we should ever go out of the way; but by her shall be led thorough all the Paths of Wisdom, Truth and Understand­ing; of Justice and Benificence toward the Socie­ty of Mankind; and of true Magnanimity and [Page 97] Greatness of Soul. But the Nature of Decency is more peculiarly seen in the fourth part of Honesty, concerning which we are now discoursing; and relates not only to the Motions of the Body, but more especially to those of the Mind also; each of which are approv'd and becoming, when they are such as are suitable to Nature. k Now the whole of the Nature or Mind of Man, is made up of only these two Parts: The first consists in the sen­sitive Appetite, which by the Greeks is call'd [...], by the blind and extravagant Impulse of which, he is hurried and transported from one thing to a­nother. The second in Reason, which shews and in­structs him in the way of his Duty, telling him what he should do, and what not do: From whence it follows, That 'tis Reason which ought to be the governing Faculty; and the Appetite subject to the Commands of it.

CHAP. XXIX.

Our Actions should neither be Rash nor Careless, &c. How the Sensitive Part should be subject to the Rea­sonable. Passion disorders the Body, as well as Mind. Watchfulness and Consideration necessary for the sub­duing of the Passions. Men were not design'd by Nature for Jesting, &c. but serious Studies. Several sorts of Jests and Diversions. Measures to be ob­serv'd about 'em.

EVery Action therefore should be free, as from Precipitancy and Rashness on the one hand, so [Page 98] from all Carelesness and Negligence on the other; nor should any thing be done, for which we can't give a sufficient Reason, which is almost the very Definition of Duty. In order to this a the Passi­ons must be brought under the power of Reason, so as neither thro' Hastiness to run before its Or­ders, nor thro' Coldness and Heaviness to disregard 'em when given; but all their Motions must be so quieted and so restrain'd, as to bring no Uneasiness or Disturbance to the Mind. And from this calm and peaceable State of the Soul arises that Constan­cy and Moderation we have mention'd: For when once the Passions grow unruly and extravagant, and refuse to be guided in their Desires and Aversi­ons by the Rules of Prudence, b they'll run with­out question beyond all Bounds and Measure; for they abandon and cast off their Allegiance to Rea­son, which they ought to obey by the Constitution of Nature. By this means are all things turn'd topsie-turvy, and not the Mind only, but even the Body also, put very much into Disorder and Con­fusion. Do but mark those, who'r enflam'd with a vehement Anger or Desire; who'r transported with Fear, or an over-great Joy; and you'll see an alte­ration [Page 99] in their Countenances, Voices, Gestures, and all their Actions; which sufficiently gives us to un­derstand (that we may return again to the Duty now before us) how necessary 'tis to restrain and give check to the Movements of the Appetite, and to be always Watchful and standing upon our Guard, that so we may neither be Careless and In­considerate, nor do any thing Rashly and at all Ad­ventures. c For Mankind were never design'd by Nature, meerly to sport and idle away their Time; but to follow after grave and serious Studies, and Business of greater importance than Play is. Not but that Jesting and Diversion are allowable, provi­ded we use 'em but only as Sleep, and other such ne­cessary Refreshments of Nature, viz. after the dis­charge of our serious and more important Duties. And even then we must see, that our Jesting be neither excessive nor immodest, but such as is handsom and becoming a Gentleman. For as Boys are allow'd, not all kinds of Sports, but only such as have nothing that is vicious or ill in them; so in this Jesting we should allow our selves nothing, but only what is agreeable to Honesty and Good-manners. We may therefore observe, that Jesting or Merriment is of two sorts, the one clownish, abusive, scandalous and [Page 100] obscene; the other handsom, gentile, ingenious and truly pleasant. Of this kind are several Instances to be met with, as in our d Plautus, and the Old e Greek Comedians; so in the Writings of the So­cratick Philosophers; to which we may add the ingenious Sayings of several Men, such as are col­lected by the Senior Cato, and usually go by the Name of Apothegms. There is no great difficulty then to distinguish between a gentile and a clow­nish Jest; the one, if brought in at a seasonable time, and when a Man's Mind's disengaged from Busi­ness, is becoming for a Gentleman; the other, for no Man at all indeed, when base and unhandsom things are dress'd up in filthy and obscene Expressi­ons. f Our Plays and Recreations must also be kept within their due Bounds; and care should be taken that we don't run out into great Excesses, and suffer the Pleasure, which we take in them, to carry us into any thing that's Base or Unbecoming. Hunting, and the Exercises of the g Campus Mar­tius, [Page 101] supply us with Examples enough of credita­ble and manly Recreations.

CHAP. XXX.

The Excellence of Man's Nature above that of Brutes, necessary to be consider'd. Wherein it consists. Some are really Beasts under the shape of Men. Sensual Pleasures, Effeminacy, &c. unbecoming Man's Na­ture. Beside Reason, which is the common Nature of all Men, each Man has his particular Nature or Genius. The difference of Mens particular Natures or Dispositions, shewn by a large number of Exam­ples.

BUt in all Enquiries concerning what becomes us, 'tis of very great moment to be a constantly reflecting, How much Man's Nature excels that of Beasts and inferior Annimals. These have no tast or relish for any thing, but the Pleasures of the Bo­dy, towards which they are carry'd with a great deal of Eagerness: whereas nothing's more agree­able and nourishing, as it were, to the Mind of Man, than Learning and Contemplation. Hence he is always a-seeking or contriving of something that's new, and is greatly delighted with seeing and hearing, for the increase of his Knowledge. And if there is any one too much addicted to sensual Pleasures, unless he's transform'd into a meer Brute; (for some such there are, who are Men in Name, [Page 102] and not in Reality) but if, I say, any one is too much addicted, and suffers himself to be conquer'd by Plea­sure; yet, for very shame, he will hide and con­ceal his Propensions towards it, as much as is possi­ble. And what is this now but b a plain Indication, That sensual Pleasures are unbecoming the Digni­ty of a reasonable Creature, and ought to be de­spis'd and rejected by it? And whoever sets any Value upon them, should be sure to take care, that he keep within the Limits of Reason and Moderati­on? From hence it follows, that we should not have any respect to Pleasure, but only to the preser­vation of our Health and Strength, in our Victuals, Cloaths, and other Conveniencies belonging to the Body. And does not the Consideration of the same Dignity and Excellence of our Natures, plainly in­form us, how base and unworthy a thing it is, to dissolve in Luxury, Softness, and Effeminacy? And how brave and becoming it is, on the other hand; for a Man to lead a Life of Frugality and Tempe­rance, of Strictness and Sobriety? c And here we must observe, that Nature has given us, as it were, a double Part to be acted in the World: The first is extended to all Men in common, forasmuch as we are all Partakers of Reason, and that Preroga­tive [Page 103] of our Nature, whereby we are exalted above other Animals; 'tis this that conducts us in the find­ing out our Duty, and from it all Honesty and Be­comingness arises: The second is appropriate to each in particular; for as there's a great deal of difference in Bodies, (some being nimble, and pro­per for Running, others more lufty, and fitter for Wrestling; some of a noble and majestick Air, o­thers of a sweet and engaging kind of Beauty;) so there's no less, or rather a far greater Variety in Humours. Thus d Lucius Crassus and e Lucius Phi­lippus were Men of a great deal of Wit and Plea­santry: f Caius, the Son of Lucius Caesar of more than they, and a great deal more studied. Where­as the young g Drusus and h Scaurus at the same time, [Page 104] were Men of extraordinary Gravity and Severity i Laelius had abundance of Mirth and Gaity; his Familiar k Scipio much more Ambition, and great­er Austerity and Strictness of Living. Amongst the Greeks, Socrates is said to have been one, that was of a very easie and facetious Humour; that always loved to be Merry and Jesting, and was a mighty Artist at hiding his Meaning under witty Ironies and drolling Expressions (which sort of Men are by the Grecians call'd l [...];) whereas m Pericles and Pythagoras got 'emselves Credit, by being of exact­ly the contrary Temper. Hannibal among the Car­thaginian Generals, and amongst our own Fabius, was Crafty and Subtle; one that knew how to disguise his Intentions and keep his Counsel; that could make shew of one thing, whilst he was re­ally designing another; of exquisite Skill for con­triving of Stratagems, and preventing those laid by the Enemy against himself. In this kind, the Grecians give Jason n the Pheraean, and Themistocles the Preference before any others; and there's one thing of Solon's which shews he had his share of this Cunning and Subtilty, o when he feigned himself [Page 105] Distracted to save his own Life, and withal to do a good piece of Service to the Publick. There are others to be found of just an opposite Humour, who think it unlawful to do any thing by Stratagem and under-hand Dealing, but are all for Simplicity and Plainness in their Actions; Lovers of open and undisguis'd Truth, but Haters of any thing that looks like a Trick. There are some that will un­dergo any thing in the World, fawn and crouch to any manner of Person, if they can but obtain their own Ends and Designs by it; as Marcus Crassus we know did to Sylla. Of which sort of crafty and complying kind of People, Lysander the Lacedaemonian is said to have been Chief: whereas Callicratidas, who was Admiral of the Navy next after Lysander, was quite the contrary. Again, There's as great a variety in Men's Ways of Discourse as in their Humours and Complexions; some, who are able to speak very nobly, can yet suit their Language to the Humours and Capacities of the ignorant Vulgar; as I remember Catulus, Father and Son, as also Mutius Mancia could do; and I have heard old People relate the same of Scipio Nasica: But his Father, on the contrary, he who, by slay­ing Tiberius Gracchus, put a full end to his ruinous Attempts, had none of that affable, familiar way of speaking. No more had p Xenecrates, the most [Page 106] rigid and severe of all the Philosophers; and for that very reason was Noted and Eminent. In short, There's almost an infinite number of these different Natures and Characters in Men, not one of which is q in it self to be condemn'd.

CHAP. XXXI.

Every one should follow his own Genius, so far as 'tis innocent. Uniformity or Consistency most becoming a Man, which can't be kept if we run counter to our own Natures. The great force of this Difference in Mens Natures. Custom of the Actors on the Stage. Several other Rules relating to the same.

THe more easily then to arrive at that Decorum, of which we are speaking, let every one stick to his own peculiar Character and Humour, provi­ded it has nothing that's Vicious in it. I say provi­ded it has nothing that's Vicious in it; for we should always take a particular care to do nothing that is contrary to that a universal Character, which Na­ture has imprinted on every one of us: but, saving the Reverence we owe to that, then to live accord­ing to our own particular one; so as to follow after that kind of Study, and apply our selves to that course of Life, which is most suitable and agreea­ble to our own Inclinations, tho' others perhaps may be more useful and important: For 'tis in vain to struggle against the Bias of your Nature; or at first to set upon that sort of Business, which you can never arrive at any perfection in. From what has [Page 107] been said it more fully appears, what that is which we call b Becoming; since nothing can be such, that is done (as we say) in despite of Nature, i. e. con­trary to the bent and tendency of a Man's Genius. Now it's certain if any thing in the World is Be­coming, 'tis a constant Uniformity in our whole Lives, and particular Actions; c which 'tis utterly impossible we should ever maintain, so long as we run counter to our own Inclinations, and foolishly follow after those of other People: for as we should use our own Native Language, which all are suppos'd to understand best, and not lard our Talk (as a great many do) with Expressions out of Greek, who are therefore deservedly laugh'd at by others: So we should keep to one constant Tenour, and regular Conduct in our Lives and Actions; so that nothing may be in them, which is not well suited and of a piece with the rest. And this difference in the Cha­racters or Natures of Men is of so great moment, as that in consequence of it, one Man may be oblig'd to make away with himself; whilst another, tho' like him as to all other Circumstances, may be o­blig'd to the contrary. d Cato, for instance, and those e who in Africk surrendred 'emselves to Caesar, were all of 'em under the same Condition; and [Page 108] yet any of the rest might perhaps have been blam'd for't, had they murder'd themselves so as Cato did; because they were Men of less strictness in their Lives, and less severity in their Manners. But Ca­to was a Person, whom Nature had endow'd with incredible Firmness and Strength of Soul, which he had augmented by perpetual Constancy, and un­alterably adhering to his once undertaken Designs and Resolutions: f It became his Character there­fore to Die, rather than to see the Face of the Ty­rant. How many things did Ulysses undergo in his tedious Wandrings, when he was forc'd to be at the Pleasure of Women, (if g Circe and h Calypso may be call'd Women) and by fawning Words, and fair complaisant Speeches, wheedle himself into the Favour of all he met with? How did he bear the contemptuous Usage of his Servants and Maids, e­ven in his own Palace, that at last he might arrive i [Page 109] at his wish'd-for End? Whereas k Ajax, according to the Character we have of him, would rather have died you a thousand Deaths, than ever have sub­mitted to such mean Compliances. These Obser­vations should teach us all, to look carefully every one into himself, and consider well what is his pecu­liar Genius, and endeavour to make the best use of it he is able; and not to be foolishly trying Experi­ments, to see how he can succeed in what's another Body's Talent: For 'tis certain that nothing be­comes a Man so well, as that which is best suited to his own Inclinations. Every one therefore should in­form himself thorowly which way his Humour and Genius lies; and be severe in examining what he's well fitted, or not fitted for; otherwise the Players may seem to be wiser than we are; for they, when they pitch upon what they'll Act, don't always choose those Parts that are best, but those that are best suited to their Humours and Abilities. They that have the ablest Voices, for instance, l Epigo­ni or m Medus; they that have most Action, n Me­nalippa or o Clytemnestra; Rupilius, whom I re­member, [Page 110] always had p Antiopa, and q Aesop very rarely Ajax. And shall Actors observe this in choo­sing their Parts, and Wise Men not do it in choosing their Business and way of Living in the World? We should therefore apply our selves especially to that, which we find most agreeable to the Bent of our Natures; but if we should chance to be driven up­on any thing, which is not so proper for our Parts and Talents; we should make it our Business, by Care and Application, if not to go thro' with it, the most perfectly that is possible, yet at least with as few Faults as ever we are able. And let us rather labour to avoid those Vices, which we are naturally inclin'd to, than try to arrive at those Excellencies and Perfections, which we were never made for.

CHAP. XXXII.

Duties arising from Men's several Stations, and Pro­fessions in the World. They whose Fathers have been Famous, imitate their Virtues, or add to 'em. The Choice of a Profession very difficult. Prodicus's Story of Hercules. What usually determines Men in their Choice of a Way of Life.

BUt beside those two Parts, which I have alrea­dy mention'd, a there are still two others re­maining behind: The one is allotted us by Time and Chance: The other we our selves choose vo­luntarily to our selves. To the first appertain one's being a King, a General, or a Magistrate; coming of a great Family; having Riches and Power, to­gether with the Contraries of all these: which are all of 'em things that depend upon Fortune, and alter according to the difference of Times. As for the second, 'tis altogether left to our own Choice, what sort of Calling we have a Mind to be of: ac­cordingly some chuse to study Philosophy, others the Civil Law, and a third sort Eloquence: and of the Virtues themselves, some are desirous of being Eminent in one kind, and some in another. [Page 112] b Now those Men, whose Fathers or Ancestors have been eminent in any one kind, for the most part en­deavour to excel in the same: as c Quintus the Son of Publius Mucius did in the Civil Law; d Africanus the Son of Paullus in Martial Atchievements. And some, not content with the Glory of their Ancest­ors, have added something else of their own to it: as that Africanus, whom I just now mention'd; who beside his great Fame for Military Exploits, made himself noted for his Learning and Elo­quence. The same did e Timotheus the Son of Co­non, who was equal to his Father in the Glory of War, and obtain'd that of Learning and Ingenui­ty besides. But it happens sometimes, that, omit­ting to tread in the Steps of their Fathers, some take new Methods and Designs of their own; which, generally speaking, is the case with those, who are born of mean Parents, and propose to Rise, and make their Fortunes in the World. Each of these things should be thro'ly consider'd and revolv'd in our Minds, when e'er we deliberate about what will become us. The first thing then to be deter­min'd is, what sort of Men we design to be, and what course of Living to take to in the World; [Page 113] which is a case of all others the most hazardous and difficult. For when People are young, and conse­quently most foolish, they generally pitch upon that way of Life, which then best pleases their unexpe­rienc'd Fancies; so that they are fix'd and engag'd in a certain Course, before they have the Judgment to discern what is best. f Prodicus indeed (as I find it in Xenophon) tells us this Story concerning Hercules; ‘That when he was a Youth, (which is the proper Season allotted by Nature for chu­sing a Way of Life) he withdrew himself into a solitary Place, and there having found out a cou­ple of Ways, the one of Pleasure, and the other of Virtue, he sat musing and consider'd a while with himself, which of these two he had best to follow:’ Such a thing as this might happen to Hercules, a Son of Jupiter; but 'tis not for us to ex­pect the same, who each of us take whom we please for our Patterns, and suffer ourselves to be drawn any whither, according as they lead us. We have most of us Principles instill'd by our Parents, and follow their Customs and Manners of Living: o­thers are guided by popular Opinion, and like that best, which takes with the most. However there are some, whether it be out of mere good Fortune, or an happy Temper and Disposition of Soul; or lastly, by the Care and Instuctions of their Parents, that pursue right Methods and Ways of Living.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Few so happy, as to consider thro'ly what Way of Life they should choose. The principal thing to be regar­ded in Choosing, is one's own Genius: Next to that one's Fortune in the World. After a Man has chose, he should stick to his Choice, without great Reasons to the contrary. How a Change should be made. Two Cautions to be observ'd about Imitating our Ancestors. Those Men whose Nature is not capable of some, should take the more care that they have o­ther Virtues. The best Inheritance a Father can leave his Son, is the Fame of his Virtues. 'Tis a mighty Shame for a Son to be unworthy of the Fame of his Ancestors.

BUt those of all are the most difficult to be found, who having sufficient natural Parts, or suffici­ent Improvements of Learning and Education, or both these together, have withal had due time to consider with themselves, what's the best Course of Life they can follow in the World. a Now in this Deliberation, the principal thing which we ought to regard, is each Man's peculiar Nature and Genius. For since the Decorum of each particular Action, as before was observ'd, is taken from the Disposition of the Person that does it; sure that Disposition should be carefully consulted, before we determine upon our whole Way of Living; b 'tis otherwise im­possible we should keep a due Tenour and Consisten­cy in our Lives, and not sometimes faulter in the [Page 115] Performance of our Duty. But tho' Nature in this case has much the greater sway, yet Fortune comes in for a share next after her: both of 'em there­fore should be duly consulted in making choice of a Calling, but more especially Nature: For Fortune's unconstant and often changing, but Nature is firm, and will always abide by us; so that for the former to oppose this latter, is like a mortal Power's con­tending with an immortal. c That Man then, who has chose a Way of Living that's suitable to his d Nature, (provided that Nature be no ways vitious) should make it his next care never to alter it; for nothing's less becoming than a Humour of Chang­ing. But if upon tryal he should find that he was mi­staken in the choice of his Method, (as 'tis possible such a thing sometime may happen) there's no way left but to unravel again what is already done. If the Times themselves favour the making such a Change, it may be the more easily and convenient­ly done; but if not, it must be brought about gra­dually and insensibly: according to that Rule which is given by Wise Men, When e'er you design to break off any Friendship or displeasing Acquain­tance, you should loosen the Knot by little and little, and not try to cut it asunder all at once. And when by this means we have chang'd our course of Life, great care should be taken that we may seem to have done it upon very good Reasons. But having before recommended the Imitation of our Fathers and Ancestors, I must here interpose an Exception or two: In the first place then, we should take great care, not to follow 'em in any [Page 116] thing that is vitious or blamable. Nor, secondly, should we attempt it, when we find our Constitution wont carry us thro' with it: Thus, for instance, the Son of the former Africanus, (who adopted this latter being Son to Paullus) by reason of the weak­ness and indisposition of his Body, could not so well tread in the steps of his Father, as his Father had done in those of his e Grandfather. But then if a Man be in such a condition, as that he's unable to plead at the Bar, to harangue the People, or con­duct an Army; f he should take the more care that he do those things, which are in his Power; such are the Duties of Justice and Fidelity, of Mo­desty, Temperance and Liberality; the performance of which may serve to make amends for his want of the others. Now the noblest Inheritance that can be left by a Father to his Son, and far exceed­ing that of Houses and Lands, is the Fame of his Virtues and glorious Actions: and for a Son to live fo as is unworthy of the Name and Reputation of his Ancestors, is the basest and most abominable thing in the World.

CHAP. XXXIV.

The respective Duties belonging to each Age. Old Men should have an Eye upon Youth. Vice is doubly Evil in Old Men, because of the ill Example given to the Young. The Duties of Magistrates, private Ci­tizens, and Strangers. Nothing more becoming in all sorts of People, than Consistency and Regularity.

ANd since each Age has its respective Duties be­longing to it, and the same things become not both Young and Old, a I must add something also upon this Distinction: 'Tis required then of the younger sort of People, that they pay due Reve­rence to those that are Old, and choose out the best and most approved among 'em, by whose Counsel and Direction they may steer their Lives. For in­deed the Unskilfulness and Ignorance of Youth, does stand in some need of the Prudence of Old Age, to be its Guide and Director. This Age especially should be kept from all loose and effemi­nate Living, and be enur'd to Labour, and endu­ring. Hardships both of Body and Mind: that so they may be able to bear with the Toils and Fa­tigues of Business, whether in Peace or War. And if they do at any time slacken their Minds, and give 'emselves up to their Pleasures and Refresh­ments, great care should be taken that they ex­ceed not the Limits of Temperance and Modesty: And in order to this, 'twould be very convenient, if some aged People would keep a constant Eye up­on their Sports and Recreations. b As for old [Page 118] Men, 'tis their Duty to lessen the Labours of the Body, and employ more frequently those of the Mind; and make it their Business, by prudent and wise Counsels, to do what Good they can to the younger sort of People, to their Friends and Depen­dants, and more especially to the Republick. And Old Men of all things should especially be careful, not to languish out their Days in unprofitable Idleness. Luxury and Riot is unbecoming in all, but is per­fectly scandalous and intolerable in Old Age: but should Lust and Wantonness come into the bargain, those who are guilty of it are doubly faulty; For, first, they bring a Shame and Disgrace upon them­selves, and withal make the young Men more shamelesly Wicked. Beside these Duties already mention'd, it mayn't be amiss to say something of those, which peculiarly belong either to c Magi­strates, private Citizens, or Strangers. First then a Magistrate ought to consider, that he does in his Person represent the whole City, and accordingly's bound to maintain the Credit and Dignity of it: that he's to preserve the Laws, and see that all Peo­ple have their due Rights; remembring that these things are committed to his Trust, which he's bound to render up faithfully and honestly. 'T [...] the Duty of those in a private Capacity, to live a [...] the rest of their Citizens do; neither debafing them­selves below their just Height, nor endeavouring [...] raise 'emselves up above it; and to follow those things which are honest and peaceable in the Com­monwealth: these are they, whom we usully call and account Good Citizens. And lastly, for Stran­gers and Sojourners in a place, 'tis their Duty to [Page 119] follow their own Business, and not intermeddle with any Body's else; not to take upon 'em in what no way concerns 'em, or be curious in pry­ing into the Secrets of a State, which they have nothing to do with. By observing these Rules we may, generally speaking, be sure to find our Duty; whenever 'tis enquir'd what's suitable and becom­ing for such a Person, such a Time, or such an Age: I shall only add, that in all our Designs and all our Undertakings, nothing's more becoming than Con­stancy and Regularity.

CHAP. XXXV.

Decorum shews it self outwardly in three things. Rules of Modesty, taken from Nature in the Frame of our Bodies. Obscene Talk discovers ill Inclinations. The false Reasoning of the Cynicks, and some Stoicks upon this Subject. Rules of exterior Decency in our Carriage, Postures, &c. The great Care the old Romans took of Modesty.

BUt seeing this Decorum, of which we are speak­ing, is seen more especially, and discovers it self, in our a Actions, our Words, and our Carri­age and exterior Ornaments of the Body; and con­sists in one of these three things, b in a certain kind of natural Beauty and Comliness; in Pertinence [Page 120] and Well-timing our Words and Actions; and such other kind of Ornaments and outward Embel­lishments, as are proper for the Business one is go­ing about; (things which 'tis no easie matter to ex­press, but I hope I am understood, and that is suf­ficient;) and seeing that c Care which we ought to take, of making our selves agreeable to those we converse with, consists in a due Regulation of d these; I shall proceed to discourse of 'em each in particular. e In the first place then it may be worth our observing, how much Care and Concern has been shewn by Nature, in ordering the Frame and Constitution of our Bodies: Those Parts, which were handsom and agreeable to the sight, she has plac'd in view; but those which could not be so handsomly shewn, and were only given to serve certain Ends and Necessities of Nature, these she has been careful to conceal and cover. A Sence of Shame and Modesty in Men has seconded this her Diligence in framing their Bodies; for all, that aren't wholly bereav'd of their Reason, keep those Parts hidden, which she has conceal'd; and are al­ways as secret as they can in those Actions, which natural Necessity forces 'em upon: Neither do they call by their proper, and broad Names, the Parts that are given to serve such Necessity, nor the Uses of 'em; and Modesty forbids us to mention those [Page 121] things, which may be done very honestly, provi­ded it be in secret. Therefore the plain and open f Talking of those things, as well as the plain and open Acting of 'em, discovers immodest and wan­ton Inclinations. The g Cynicks therefore are whol­ly to be rejected, and some of the Stoicks little bet­ter than Cynicks; who laugh at, and blame us for calling those things by their proper Names, which are really dishonest and scandalous in themselves; while we count it a shame to speak plainly of those, in the doing of which there's no manner of Dishonesty. To Rob, for Example, to Cheat and Whore, are Actions in themselves the most shameful and scanda­lous, and yet it is not counted immodest to name 'em; whereas to make one's self a Father of Children, is an Action that is honest and creditable in it self, and yet, forsooth, must not be plainly mention'd, for fear of its giving Offence to chast Ears. This, and much more to the same purpose, they com­monly urge against Modesty and Bashfulness: But let us follow where Nature has shew'd us the way, and whatever may offend either the Eyes or Ears, that let us shun in our Carriage and Conversation. In all our Postures and Gestures of Body, such as [Page 122] standing, walking, sitting and h leaning; nay, in our very Countenance, in the cast of our Eyes, and motions of our Hands, we should be careful to keep and observe what's Becoming: in which there's a double Extream to be avoided, that of too much Niceness and Effeminacy on the one hand, and that of meer Clownishness and want of Breeding on the other. Nor let any one imagin, That these things do well in an Actor or Orator; but that we are left free to observe, or not observe them. The Actors indeed have had always so much regard for Modesty, as that, time out of mind, it has been their Custom, never to appear upon the Stage in publick, without something on to conceal those Parts, which ought to be kept secret; for fear least their Cloaths being open'd by any Accident, something might be seen, which Modesty bids 'em hide. And our common Custom forbids the Son, when grown to­ward Man's Estate, to Bathe with his Father; and likewise the Son-in-law with his Father-in-law. We should therefore take care to be strict Obser­vers of these Rules of Modesty, especially being such as even Nature herself has directed us to.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Two sorts of Beauty, one proper for Men, t'other for Women. Men should avoid Niceness, &c. No­thing affected can Become. Rules about Cloaths, Walking, and outward Ornaments. Outward Car­riage discovers the inward Dispositions of the Mind. More Care should be taken to keep Decency in the Motions of the Soul. How this may be done. Two sorts of Motions in the Soul, the sensitive Appetite and Reason. How each shou'd be manag'd.

BUt since there are two sorts of Beauty in the World, to the one of which belongs Prettiness or Neatness, to the other Comliness and Majesty; the former of these should be left to the Women, and the latter only be thought proper for the Men. From hence it follows, that these should avoid all unman­like Ornaments and Niceness in their Habits, and the same in the Motions and Gestures of their Bo­dies. For all People hate the a affected Motions and Carriage of those, who would be taken for Masters of a gentile Air; and your Actors on the Stage have a great many foolish impertinent Ge­stures, which are very displeasing and offensive to the Spectators: and in each of these kinds what is simple and unaffected, is always best lik'd of and approv'd by the World. If you would have a true Comliness, you must endeavour to keep a good [Page 124] Colour in your Face, and the way to do that, is to use frequent Exercise. Nor do we forbid Men the use of all Ornaments and Graces to recommend 'em, but only of those that are too exquisite and affected: so far they are allowable, as they are necessary to keep a Man from being thought a Clown, and from shewing a Disrespect for the Persons he has to do with. And the same Rule may serve very well for our Cloaths; in which to be moderate, as in most other cases, is certainly the best way. We should also avoid an effeminate softness and slow­ness in our Gate, like those that are marching along in Procession; and no less an over-great hastiness and speed, which only begets a deep panting and breathing, distorts the Face, and perfectly changes the whole Air of the Countenance, which dis­covers a lightness and inconstancy of Humour. Now if the Motions of the Body deserve all this Pains and Concern about 'em; how much Care should we take b to keep those of the Mind, within the Limits prescrib'd 'em by Nature and Right Reason? which ne'r can be done any other way, than by keeping the Soul in such an even Tem­per, as not to be concern'd or dejected at any thing; and by a constant care and application of Thought, so as to nothing but what is Honest and Becoming. Now the Motions of the Soul are of two sorts, some of 'em proceeding from the Reasonable or Thinking, others from the Sensitive and Passionate part: The former is busied in nothing but searching and find­ing [Page 125] out of Truth; by the latter we are push'd and driven forward to Action 'Tis our Duty therefore to employ our Thoughts about laudable Objects; and so to reduce and over-rule the Passions, as that they may ebb and flow in obedience to Reason.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Decorum shews it self in Speaking. Two sorts of Speech. There might Rules be given about our or­dinary Discourse. Two things requir'd in the Voice and Pronunciation. How each of 'em may be gotten. Several Examples of good Speakers. Rules about the Manner, Subjects and Measure of our common Talk.

ANother a great Instance in which this Becom­ingness shews it self, is our Speech and Dis­course. But whereas of this there are two sorts, the one proper only for Argument and Contention, the other for common and ordinary Talk; we should make use of that, when we plead at the Bar, or speak in the Senate and Publick Assemblies; of this when we meet and discourse with our Friends; when we walk in any of the publick Places; or are sitting at Table, and over a Glass of Wine. There are Teachers of Rhetorick who give Rules about the former; but there are no Rules to be given a­bout the latter. Not but that I think there might some be invented; but the Business is, there's no body to be found that would study 'em, if they were; [Page 126] otherwise Masters would never be wanting, if there were but Learners that would study, and employ 'em. Hence we are almost over-run with Rheto­ricians; tho' no small part of the Rules which they give, viz. those that concern either the Words or the Sence, may be very well applied to our ordi­nary Discourse. 'Tis the b Voice is that, whereby we can Talk, and convey our inward Thoughts from one another; in which there are two things chiefly required: First, That it be Clear. And, Se­condly, Harmonious. Each of these must be the Gift of Nature, and is not attainable any other way; but where they are naturally, Practice and Exer­cise will encrease the one, and Imitation of those, who speak sweetly and agreeably, better the other. This was the principal thing in the c Catuli, which made 'em be counted Men of Judgment and Learn­ing: tho' they had some Skill in the matter 'tis true; and so had some others as well as they; but this one thing recommended 'em so much that they were esteemed the most perfect Masters of the Roman Language. The sound of their Voices was plea­sing and harmonious; they neither slurr'd over things negligently in their Pronunciation, nor yet were too exact in expressing every Letter: the former of which would have made their Speech obscure, and the latter affected. They never spoke so as to strain their Voices, but equally avoided the double Ex­tream, that of Faintness and Sickliness (as it were) on the one hand, and of too much Loudness and Elevation on the other. Crassus's Discourse was full out as witty, and not near so barren as that of the [Page 127] Catuli; yet these had as great a Reputation as he, upon the score of good Speaking. Caesar, who was Brother to the Elder Catulus, was far more faceti­ous and witty than any of 'em; so that in Court, when before the Judges, he'd do more by his easie, familiar way of Talking, than others could do by all the Powers of their Eloquence. Each of these things should be diligently taken care of, if we desire to Act decently on all Occasions. Our c common Discourse then I'd have to be such, as that wherein the Followers of Socrates excel; easie and good-natur'd, without any stubbornness or stiffness in Opinion: Let it be season'd with mirth and pleasantness; and not be too tedious, pert, and assuming, as tho' it had a Right to the Attention of the Hearers, and no body else had a­ny thing to do with it: but think it reasonable, as in all other cases, so in this of Discourse, to let e­very Man fairly take his own turn. But especially in the first place it ought to be consider'd, what is the Nature of the Subject we are discoursing upon: if it be serious, we should handle it with serious­ness; but if it be merry, with gaiety and briskness. But the most important thing to be taken care of, is, That our Talk don't discover any Viciousness in our Manners; which is apt to appear by nothing so much, as by falling too foul upon those that are absent, either by turning 'em into Ridicule, or misrepresenting 'em by malicious, reproachful Lan­guage. Now the Subject of Discourse in common [Page 128] Conversation is usually one of these three things; either our own private Domestick Concerns; or those that relate to the Commonwealth in general; or lastly, some matter of Study and Learning; there­fore when our Talk begins to ramble from these, we should always be careful to fetch it back to 'em again. But whatever Subjects present 'emselves (for we aren't all pleas'd with the same things, nor with any thing equally at all times;) but whatever Subject, I say, we are upon, we should consider how far our Discourse may be entertaining, and as we could find a time when to begin, so we should learn when to make an end.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Discourse should be free both from Passion, and Heavi­ness; and shew a Respect for those we converse with. Chiding and Correction sometimes necessary: Rules to be observ'd in it. In Quarrels with Adversaries we should avoid flying out into Passion. To talk Great of one's self very Unbecoming.

'TIs a general Rule for the Conduct of our Lives, That we make it our Business to be free from Passion; that is, from all violent Motions of the Soul, which reject and cast off their Allegi­ance to Reason. This should be apply'd to the Matter now before us, and all our Discourse should be Calm and Unpassionate, without any Transports of Anger or Desire; as also on the other hand, with­out Deadness, and Heaviness, or any such Vice: And in every Company we should carefully endea­vour, to shew a sort of Kindness and Respect for those Persons, with whom we converse. It some­times [Page 129] comes to pass, that a Chiding is necessary; in which we may be allow'd a little to raise our Voices, and to use more Sharpness and Authority in our Ex­pressions: However we must be careful that we do not discover any Passion; but let it rather be seen that we come to such Corrections, as Physitians do to cutting and scarifying Wounds, but seldom, and with a great deal of Regret and Unwillingness. And indeed we should never come to 'em at all, un­less it be necessary, and when no other Methods will do any good. And even then, when we're forc'd to't, we must be sure (as was said) to avoid all Anger; for whatsoever is guided by its Influ­ence and Directions, can never be done with any Prudence or Moderation. Our Rebukes should be generally mild and gentle; but nevertheless such, as may carry some Weight and Authority along with 'em; observing a Mean betwixt too great Easiness, and breaking out into angry and contumelious Lan­guage. And whatsoever Sharpness we may express in our Reproofs, we should let the Person so correct­ed know, that we do it altogether for his Good, and not for any Ends or Self-designs. b In the Quarrels we have even with our greatest Ad­versaries, whatever dirty Language may be thrown at us, 'tis the best way to keep our Minds calm and sedate, and never let Anger break in upon them: For whatever is spoken or done in a Passi­on, can neither be consistent with the Rules of [Page 130] Gravity, nor be approv'd of by those who are pre­sent in the Company. Lastly, c 'Tis a very unbe­coming thing for a Man to Talk great of himself in Discourse, and especially when that which he says is false: which is but to imitate Braggadocchio in the Comedy, and make himself the Laughing-stock and Jest of the Hearers.

CHAP. XXXIX.

What sort of House is fitting for a Person of Honour. What should be the End of Building. The Exam­ples of Octavius and Scaurus. A great House brings a Reproach on its Master, if his Worth be not answerable to it; and if he don't keep up the Laws of Hospitality. Measures to be observ'd in Building. Three Rules to be observ'd for the keep­ing a Decorum in our Actions.

ANd since a we take in (or desire at least to take in) all the several Branches of Duty, we must not forget to add a word or two, about what sort of House is becoming a Gentleman, or a Person of Honour. Now the main End of Building is Lodg­ing, and the necessary Uses of an House, and there­fore the Draught, or Contrivance of it, should be [Page 131] suited accordingly. But we should not so much re­gard bare Necessities, as not to have an eye to Conve­nience and Magnificence. b Cneius Octavius, the first of that Family that was ever Consul, built himself a noble and magnificent House upon the Palatin Hill, which is said to have gain'd him a great deal of Reputation; insomuch that the People coming usu­ally to see it, the very House was suppos'd to have gone a great way toward advancing its Owner (tho' a kind of c an Upstart) to the Dignity of Consul. This some time after was pull'd down by d Scaurus, that so he might make his own somewhat the big­ger by it: But whereas e Octavius, by Building his House, had made himself Consul; this Man, on the contrary, by enlarging of his, (tho' the Son of a great and most eminent Citizen) not only caus'd himself to be put by that Office, but f was moreover brought into Shame and Dishonour, and at last ut­terly Ruin'd. 'Tis well if a Man can enhance that Credit and Reputation he has got, by the Splendor of his House; but he must not depend upon his House alone for it: For the Master ought to bring Honour to his fine Seat, and not the fine Seat bring Honour to its Master. But as, in all other cases, a Man should not have Respect to himself alone, but to other People also; so 'tis in this of a Noble [Page 132] Man's House, which ought to be made very large and capacious, because he must keep up the Laws of Hospitality, and entertain multitudes of all sorts of Persons in it. For a fine and large House that gives Entertainment to no body, serves but to re­proach and upbraid its Owner; and especially if 'twere us'd to be frequently visited under its former Master: for 'tis an odious thing to have Passengers cry, as they go along,

Ah! good old House, alas thy present Lord
Isn't like thy former one!

which may g justly be said of but too too many in our own Days. Care should be taken, especial­ly when a Man Builds himself, that he ben't too extravagant in his Magnificence and Expences: which is a very ill thing tho' it had no other harm in it, but only that one of giving a bad Example: For most Men are apt, more than in any thing else, to imitate the Great Ones as to this Particular. Where, for Example, shall we find the Man, that Rivals the famous h Lucullus in his Virtues? Where­as how many have done it in the Stateliness and Magnificence of his Country-houses? But there cer­tainly ought to be some Bounds fix'd and prescrib'd to these things, and those to be according to the Rules of Moderation: But the Measure whereby we are to judge of their being Moderate, is their Subserviency to the Ornaments and Conveniencies of Life: And so much may suffice upon this Head. [Page 133] As for our i Actions, the way to maintain this De­corum in them, is constantly to observe these three following Precepts: First, That we keep all our Pas­sions and Appetites under the Government and Directi­on of Reason, than which there is nothing of greater Efficacy toward the constant Preservation of our Duty. Secondly, That we consider the Quality and Moment of the thing, which we go about; that so we may proportion our Endeavours accordingly, and take neither more nor less Pains about it, than it really deserves. And lastly, That in all those exte­rior Circumstances, which are only design'd for a gen­tile Show and Grace of the Action, we should keep within the Measures of Prudence and Moderation. Now the best Measure we can observe is this, To keep our Eyes fix'd on those Rules of Decorum I've before laid down, and never to transgress 'em. But of these three Rules the first is the most important, That the Sensitive Part be kept obedient to the Rea­sonable.

CHAP. XL.

Order to be observ'd in our Words and Actions. Wherein it consists. The Duties arising from it. An excellent Saying of Pericles to that purpose. Of how great moment the due Timing a thing is. We shou'd be particularly careful to avoid little Indecencies. Harmony and Agreement more neces­sary in our Lives, than our Musick.

IT remains in the next place that we should speak of a that Order, which is to be observ'd in our Words and Actions; and of the proper Seasons and Oppor­tunities of 'em. And here will fall under our Consi­deration, that which by the Greeks is call'd, [...]; by which I don't mean that b [...], which by us is most commonly render'd Moderation, and signifies the keeping within due Bounds: but that which contains in the Notion of it, The Preservation of Order. We shall crave leave, however, to call even this latter by the Name of Moderation, which is thus defin'd by the Stoick Philosophers, Moderation is the Knowledge of putting whatever we say, or do, in its proper place. From whence it appears, That Order and the Well-placing of things are but diffe­rent Words to express the same Notion, For Order is defin'd by the same Sect of Men, to be the rang­ing of things in their fitting and proper places. [Page 135] Now the place of an Action they tells us is, The Season of Time for doing it; and by the Season of Time they mean nothing else, than that which the Greeks call [...], and which we express by the word Occasio: So that, in short, by Moderation here (in the Sence of the Word which I have just now given) we mean no more than the Knowledge of Well-timing whatever we do. Prudence may be de­fin'd the same way too, about which we have spoken at the entrance of this Work: but now we're dis­coursing of Temperance, Moderation, and such like Virtues. What the Duties of Prudence are, is sufficiently explain'd in its proper place; what those of Modesty and such other Virtues, as serve to re­commend us to those we converse with, and make up the Subject of our present Enquiry, remains now to be consider'd. In the first place then, We ought to observe a due Regularity and Order in our Actions, as that the several parts of our whole Lives, like those of a regular and coherent Dis­course, may agree and be suitable one with another. For what is more Unseemly, and contrary to good Manners, than when we're engag'd about serious Business, to bring in some pleasant and merry Dis­course, that's proper for a Feast or over a Glass of Wine? 'Twas a very good Answer to the present Purpose, which Pericles once gave to c Sophocles the Tragedian: They were both of 'em Praetors of A­thens together, and meeting one Day about some Business of their Office, it happen'd a beautiful Boy pass'd by; whom Sophocles espying, Heavens! said he, Pericles, What a delicate Youth is there! To [Page 136] which he reply'd, A Magistrate, Sophocles, should d keep a strict Guard, not over his Hands only, but his Eyes too. Now had Sophocles happen'd to say the same Words, at a time when they were choosing of Wrestlers or Racers, such a Rebuke had been wholly undeserved: So much may the Merit, or Demerit of an Action, depend upon the Circum­stances of Time and Place. Suppose, for Example, a Man had some considerable Cause upon his Hands, or Business that requir'd attentive Thinking: Could any one blame him for being very thought­ful as he walk'd or rid? But should he shew him­self so at a Feast among Company, it would be counted a great piece of Rudeness and Ill-breeding, and this for not observing the Difference of Seasons. Now as for those things, which notoriously offend against the Rules of Good Manners, such as for a Man to Sing openly in the Streets, or any other gross and apparent Absurdity, these are so easie to be observ'd by all, that we need give no Rules or Directions about 'em; but we ought more especi­ally to employ our Care, in avoiding those little unheeded Indecencies, which are hardly understood by the generality of Mankind. And as the least fault or disagreement in the Notes, is immediately perceiv'd by a skilful Musician; so we should take all imaginable Care, that there be no Disagreement in our Lives and Actions: and that so much the more, as the Harmony in our Lives is of much greater Consequence, than that in our Musick.

CHAP. XLI.

Decency to be kept even in the least things, as the moving of the Eyes, &c. We should observe what's unhandsom in others, and correct it in our selves. We should ask the Advice of experienc'd Persons. Cautions in taking this Advice. We should follow Custom and Civil Constitutions. Some things al­lowable in some great Men, which aren't so in o­thers. Nothing immodest is Becoming. Some par­ticular Duties to be observ'd by all good Men.

AS therefore the delicate Ear of the Artist can quickly discover the least fault in his Musick; so would we take as much care in detecting and cen­suring our Vices, we might from the least and most trivial Matters, make several Observations that would be much to our advantage. From the mo­ving of our Eyes, for Example; from our way of smoothing or wrinkling our Brows; from the mer­ry or sorrowful Air of our Countenances; from our Laughter, freedom or reservedness in Discourse; from the raising or falling the Tone of our Voices, and a great many other such little kind of Circum­stances, we might easily judge what is Handsom and Becoming us, and what is repugnant to the Rules of our Duty, and to that which our Nature or Charact­er requires. Now in this Particular 'tis a very good way, To observe first in others how each of these suits, that so we may avoid and correct in our selves, whatever we see bad and misbecoming in them. For, I know not how, we can sooner 'spy Faults out in other People, than we can in our selves; upon which account there's no better way to cor­rect any Learner, than for the Master to mimick his Faults before him; that so he, perceiving their Deformity in another, may the sooner be brought [Page 138] to amend 'em in himself. Another good way is, Whenever we are in doubt and suspence about a Duty, to go to some learned or experienc'd Person, and ask his Advice upon the Matter in question, before we resolve and determin with our selves: Because, generally speaking, when left to them­selves, Men are apt to be guided too much by their own Inclinations and Natures. And in asking this Advice we should diligently observe, a not only what every one tells us in Words, but what his real inward Opinion is, and what Reasons and Grounds he may have for such Opinions. For as your Statuaries, Painters and Poets, use to set their Works out to be publickly view'd; that so they may be able to correct such Faults, as are ge­nerally found by Spectators in 'em: and as they consider with themselves and their Friends, what Oversights or Mistakes they have been guilty of in 'em; so should we make use of other People's Judgments as well as our own, and do or not do, correct or alter a great many things upon their Advice. As for those things that are settled by Custom and Civil Constitutions, I shall give no Di­rections at all concerning 'em; for they are suffi­cient Directions of themselves: I shall only observe, That 'tis a great Mistake in any one to think, be­cause such Men as b Aristippus, and Socrates, have ventur'd to say, or do a great many things, which are contrary to Rule and receiv'd Custom, that therefore he may be allow'd the same: For these [Page 139] are Persons of extraordinary Merits, and almost more than Human Perfections; and on that ac­count might demand some Privileges, which aren't to be granted to the rest of the World. But as for the Practice and manner of the Cynicks, 'tis wholly to be discarded; for 'tis a plain Offence against the Rules of Modesty, without which nothing can be Virtuous and Becoming. 'Tis our Duty to pay a Respect and Deference, as to all those that are Virtuous and Couragious, who design for the Good and Advantage of the Republick, and serve or have serv'd her in any of her Interests; so to those also, who bear any Office or Command in the State. We should pay in like manner a peculiar Regard and Reverence to old Age: never resist any publick Magistrate: make a Distinction between Citizens and Strangers; and of Strangers 'emselves, between those in a private and publick Capacity. In fine, Not to mention any more Particulars, we ought in all cases both to keep our selves, and endeavour to uphold and maintain among others, that common Correspondence and universal Society, that's a­mong all Mankind.

CHAP. XLII.

Of the several sorts of Trade which are Creditable, and which not. All those that administer to Vice and Debauchery, scandalous. Lying in Tradesmen abominable. How far Merchandise is Creditable, Husbandry particularly commended.

AS for a Trades and the Ways of getting Money, which of 'em are creditable, and which other­wise, I have only these very few things to observe: First, All those are unworthy Ways of Gaining, which procure one a general Hatred and Ill-will; as that of the Userers and Tax-gatherers, for In­stance. Secondly, Those Arts are mean and ungen­tile, in which a Man is paid for his Work not his Skill; for the very receiving a Reward for one's Labour, is like taking of Earnest to bind himself a Slave. Nor are they to be esteem'd as better than mean and ordinary People, that buy things up by the lump of Merchants, to sell 'em out a­gain by little and little; for what they gain is but a very poor Business, unless they are guilty of abo­minable Lying; than which there is nothing in the World more scandalous. Again, All Handicrafts-Men have but a mean sort of Calling, and 'tis im­possible that a Work-house should have any thing that's gentile in it. Further yet, All those Trades are pitiful and low, that Purvey and Cater for the satisfying Mens Pleasures; b Fishmongers, Butchers, [Page 141] Cooks, Poulterers, &c. as Terence reckons 'em up; to which we may add, if you please, Perfumers, Dancing-masters, and those who supply us with Dice or Cards. But Arts that have something of Knowledge and Skill in 'em, or those that are useful and necessary for the Publick; such as Physick, for Instance, or Architecture, or the Instruction and Edu­cation of Youth in Good-manners, these are very cre­ditable and commendable in those, whose Rank and Condition is suited for such Employments. As for Merchandise, 'tis sordid and mean, when the Trade that is driven is little and inconsiderable: but when it takes in a great quantity of Business, and bring­ing home Goods from every Country, sells 'em out again without Lying or Deceiving, we can hardly say but that 'tis creditable enough: Nay, 'tis most certainly very commendable, when those who're concern'd in it only design (after they are sated, or rather consented, with what they have gain'd) to betake themselves wholly from the Haven to the Country, as before they have done from the Sea to the Haven, and there enjoy quietly their private Possessions. But among all the Methods of Enrich­ing one's self, there's no one better; no one more profitable, pleasant and agreeable; no one more worthy of a Man and a Gentleman, than that of Manuring and Tilling the Ground: concerning which I have spoken at large in my Cato Major, from whence you may borrow what's necessary to be said upon this Subject.

CHAP. XLIII.

The comparing of two Parts of Honesty one with ano­ther. The Duties of Prudence or finding out Truth, and those of Justice or maintaining Human Society compar'd; and the Preference given to the latter.

ANd thus a have I finish'd what I had to say up­on the first Question, and, I think, sufficiently made it appear, how the particular Instances of Du­ty are to be drawn from the several Heads of Ho­nesty. But it often comes to pass, that those very things 'emselves which are Honest, Rival as it were, and come into Competition with one another, so as to make it be another Question, Of two that are Honest, which is the most so? which is a Point not mention'd at all by Panaetius. For the whole of Virtue receiving its Rise from those four Foun­tains: First, Prudence, or the Knowledge of Truth. Secondly, Justice, or or doing Good to the Com­munity and Society of Mankind. Thirdly, Forti­tude, or Greatness of Soul. And, Lastly, Tempe­rance, or Moderation; it can't but happen, that se­veral of these must be compar'd together, before we can be able to satisfie our selves, which 'tis our Duty to prefer before which. First then, b If [Page 143] the Duties of Justice, or preserving the Commu­nity, and those of Prudence, or the Knowledge of Truth, should come into Competition one with another; the former, I think, should take place of the latter, as being more Consonant to the Dictates of Nature, which may easily be prov'd by this fol­lowing Argument: Suppose a Wise Man to be in such a place, as afforded him all the Conveniencies of Life, and all the Opportunities of Leisure in a­bundance, so that he might Study and Contem­plate every thing, that was any ways worthy his Knowledge or Contemplation; yet were he wholly depriv'd of all Company, and had no body ever come near him to be seen, he'd quickly be tired and grow weary of his Life. Again, The Princi­pal of all the Virtues is that sort of Wisdom which the Greeks call [...]; (for as for that which they call [...], and we Prudentia, 'tis a thing of a perfectly different Nature, as being no more than The Skill of discerning what 'tis that we ought, or ought not, to do:) but that sort of Wisdom which I said was the Principal, is, c The Knowledge of things both Divine and Human; and so comprehends the Society and Relation of Men with the Gods, and with one another. If then this, as most certainly 'tis, be the greatest Virtue; it follows that the Du­ties, which flow from Society, must as certainly be the greatest: For the deepest Knowledge and Contemplation of Nature, is but a very lame and imperfect Business, unless it proceed and tend for­ward to Action: Now the Occasions wherein it can shew it self best, consist in maintaining the In­terests [Page 144] of Men, and of consequence belong to the Society of Mankind: from whence it follows, That the Maintaining of this should in reason take place before Learning and Knowledge. d Nor is this a­ny more, than what all good Men shew they judge to be true, by their Actions and Practices: For who's there so wholly addicted to Contemplation and the Study of Nature, as that, if his Country should fall into Danger, while he was in one of his noblest Researches, he would immediately throw all aside, and run to its Relief with all possible speed; nay, tho' he thought he might number the Stars, or take the just Dimensions of the whole World? And the same would he do in case of any Danger to a Friend or a Parent. From all which things it undeniably appears, That the Duties of Knowledge and Searching for Truth, are oblig'd to give way to the Duties of Justice, which consist in upholding Society among Men; than which there is nothing we should be more concern'd for.

CHAP. XLIV.

Even those, whose Business is the Search after Truth, are serviceable to the Society of Mankind, and how. Speaking well preferable to the highest Speculations, and why. Man by Nature a sociable Creature. Knowledge of little Use, unless it tend to Action, and do some Good to the World. Necessity not the Reason of Men's joyning into Societies.

NAy those very Men, who have spent their whole Lives in Philosophy and Learning, have yet always endeavour'd, as much as they could, to be serviceable to the Interest and Good of Mankind. For many brave Men, and very useful Members of their several States, have in great part been made such by their Institutions. Thus a Epaminondas, the famous Theban, was indebted for his Education to b Lysis, the Pythagorean: c Dion of Siracuse, for his to Plato; and the same may be said of a great many others; Even I my self, whatever Service I have done the Republick (if at least it may be said I have done it any Service) must wholly ascribe it to [Page 146] that Learning, and those Instructions I receiv'd from my Masters. Neither is their Teaching, and In­structing others, determin'd to the time of their li­ving here; but they continue to do it even after they are dead, by the learned Discourses which they leave behind them: For there's no one Point they have left unhandled, relating either to the Laws, Cu­stoms, or Discipline of the Commonwealth: So that they seem to have sacrific'd their leisure and oppor­tunities of Study, to the Benefit of those who are engag'd in Business. And thus we see how those Men themselves, whose Lives have been spent in the pursuit of Wisdom, have nevertheless endeavour'd by their Learning and Prudence, to be some way profitable to the Community of Mankind. And for this one Reason, perswasive Speaking, if joyn'd with Prudence, is a greater Accomplishment than the acutest Thinking, if destitute of Eloquence: for Thinking is terminated in it self alone, but Speak­ing reaches out to the Benefit of those, with whom we are joyn'd in the same Society. Now as Bees don't therefore unite themselves together, that so they may the better prepare their Combs; but therefore prepare their Combs, because they do by Nature unite themselves together: So Men, and much more, being Creatures that naturally love So­ciety; in consequence of that, seek how they may find Methods of living happily in it. From hence it follows, That the Knowledge of things, unless 'tis accompany'd with that sort of Virtue, which consists in defending and preserving of Men, i. e. in the Maintenance of Human Society, is but a barren and fruitless Accomplishment; and even Greatness of Soul, without a regard to this Society and Conjunction, is very little better than Savage­ness and Barbarity. Thus we may see, that the getting of Knowledge is a Duty of much less Con­cern [Page 147] and Moment, than the preserving this Society and Union amongst Men. 'Tis a very false Notion that hath been advanc'd by some People, That Ne­cessity alone was the Motive to this Society, which we have so often mention'd; and that Men would never have associated together, but that they weren't able, in a solitary Life, to furnish them­selves with the Necessaries of Nature; and that every great and exalted Genius, would Providence supply him with Food and the other Conveni­encies of Life, would withdraw from all Business and Entercourse with Men, and give himself wholly to Study and Contemplation. This is not so; for he would avoid Solitude, endeavour to find a Companion in his Studies, and always be desirous of Teaching and Learning, of Hearing and Speak­ing. From all which things 'tis abundantly evi­dent, That the Duties belonging to Human Society, should in reason take place before those which relate to unactive Knowledge.

CHAP. XLV.

The Duties of Maintaining Society not always preferable to those of Temperance, Modesty, &c. What Du­ties of Justice ought to take place of Others.

PErhaps it may be ask'd, a Whether the Duties of this Society, which is thus agreeable to the Di­ctates and Principles of Nature, ought always to be prefer'd before the Duties of Temperance, De­cency and Moderation? Indeed I think not: For [Page 148] some things there are so highly scandalous and a­bominably wicked, that a wise Man would hardly be guilty of 'em, supposing he could bring Safe­ty to his Country by it. a Pesidonius has heap'd up a great many Instances of things of this nature; some of which are so very filthy, and intolerably obscene, that 'tis a shame ev'n so much as to re­peat 'em after him. These then must never be done for one's Country; nor will one's Country e­ver desire that they should; for the best on't is, 'tis impossible such a Conjuncture should happen, as that it should be profitable for any Republick, to have wise Men be guilty of such abominable Actions. We may lay down this then for a cer­tain Conclusion, That when several Duties come into competition, those should take place before a­ny others, which relate to the Maintenance of Hu­man Society. For wise and considerate Acting is the End of all Knowledge and prudent Thinking; and c by consequence that is more valuable than this. And so much may suffice upon this Subject; for, I think, I have sufficiently clear'd the way, so that hereafter there will be no difficulty, to know which Duties are to be preferr'd before which. But those very Duties which relate to Society, are of different Rates and Degrees among themselves; but 'tis no hard matter to see in what Order they b [Page 149] ought to be perform'd: as in the first place, Those to the Immortal Gods. Secondly, To our Native Country. Thirdly, To our Parents; and so on to all others in their respective places. What has been said in a few Words on this last Head, I hope, is sufficient to make it appear, that 'tis usual for Men not only to doubt, Whether such and such an Action be Honest or Dishonest; but also, Of two, that are both of 'em Honest, which is the most so. This is one of those two Heads, which I at first observ'd were omitted by Panaetius: Let us now pass on to the remaining part of our propos'd Division.

The End of the First Book.

TULLY's OFFICES.
The Second Book.

CHAP. I.

What will be the Subject of this Second Book. He ap­plies himself to the Study of Philosophy, as his great­est Consolation in the midst of the Publick Cala­mities of his Country.

WHat those Duties are, Son Mark, which Honesty and Virtue require of us, and how they arise from their several Fountains, is, I think, plain enough from the former Book. I am now in the next place to speak of those others, which wholly regard the Convenience of Life, and are requisite for the Getting and Enjoyment of those things, which serve for our comfortable Sub­sistence here; such as Interest, Riches, &c. And here I told you, the common Heads of Deliberati­on were, What is Profitable, and what Unprofitable? And, Of several Profitables, which is more, and which most of all such? a Concerning which I shall begin to speak, after I have premis'd but a Word or two, [Page 151] in Vindication of my self, and my present Under­taking. For tho' my Books have excited several both to the Reading, and even Writing of Philoso­phy; b yet I am now-and-then apt to be afraid, least some, who are otherwise very Good Men, should hate and despise the very Name of that Stu­dy; and wonder at me, for bestowing such Por­tions of my Time and Pains, in so very fruitless and insignificant a manner. To whom I answer, c That so long as the Republick was govern'd by those, to whose Care and Management she had intrusted her self, I was ever diligent and employ'd all my Thoughts, for her Good and Preservation. But when d one Man had seiz'd of her wholly to him­self, and there was no place left for my Counsel or Authority: and when I had lost those extraordina­ry Persons, who had been my Companions in la­bouring for her Interest: I resolv'd not to sink in­to Anguish and Despair, which had wholly over-whelm'd me, if I had not resisted 'em; nor to fol­low such Pleasures or idle Ways of Living, as were improper and unbecoming a Man of Learning. I could heartily wish, had it so pleas'd the Gods, that the Republick had continu'd in its ancient [Page 152] Condition, and never fall'n into the Hands of e those Men, who aren't so much for Changing, as Overturning every thing! I should then, as I did in its flourishing Circumstances, spend my Time ra­ther in Business, than Writing; and what I did write, would not be things of this Moral Nature, but my Publick Orations, as I have often done. But when the poor State, which had taken up all my Care and Thoughts, and for which I had la­bour'd with all my Power, was utterly ruin'd and sunk into Nothing, there was quickly no room left for such Orations, either at the Bar, or in the Senate-house: And my active Mind, which had always been employ'd in that kind of Studies, now not being able to lye wholly idle; I thought I could not find out a better way to get rid of those Trou­bles which oppress'd my Mind, than by return­ing again to the Studies of Philosophy. I had spent a good part of my time in these, whilst I was young, for the improvement of my Reason: But when I came once to be a Candidate for Places, and devoted my self to the Service of the Publick; I had little time left for Philosophical Enquiries; only so much, as could be spar'd from the Business of my Friends and the State; which was wholly taken up in nothing but Reading, without any Leisure at all for Writing.

CHAP. II.

Some Advantage to be drawn out of Evils. The Com­mendation and Definitions of Wisdom and Philoso­phy. 'Tis the only way of obtaining Virtue and Happiness. The Opinion of the Academicks, and why they Dispute against every thing.

HOwever then we have this Advantage, in the midst of all our Miseries and Calamities, that by them we are brought to the Writing of those things, a which were not sufficiently known amongst us, tho' nothing in the World more deserves our Knowledge. For what is there, O ye Gods! more desi­rable than Wisdom? What more excellent and love­ly in it self? What more useful and becoming for a Man? Or what more worthy of his reasonable Nature? Now those who are busied in the pur­suit of this, are call'd Philosophers; and the Word Philosophy signifies no more, if you'd take it literally, than a certain Desire and Love for Wisdom: And Wisdom's defin'd by the old Philosophers, The Knowledge of things both b Divine and Humane, to­gether with the Causes upon which they depend: the Study of which whosoever finds fault with, I confess I can't perceive what 'tis he would commend. For what Study is there, that brings so much Quiet and [Page 154] tisfaction to the Mind, (if these are the things which we long after) as theirs who are always a-search­ing out something, which may contribute to the Welfare and Happiness of their Lives? Or if it be Virtue and Constancy that we desire, either 'tis this is the Method of obtaining 'em, or else there is not any to be found in the World. To say there's no Art of those weightier Concerns, when none of the most trivial Matters is without Art, becomes only those who Talk without Thinking, and de­ceive 'emselves in their most important Business: But if there is an Art of attaining Virtue, in what other way we do hope to find it, if this be forsaken, of which I am now speaking. But these things use to be more fully handled, when we excite and per­suade Men to cultivate Philosophy: which I have endeavour'd to do in another c Work. My De­sign at present was only to shew, why I particular­ly chose this Study, being thrust from all Business and Concern in the Government. d There are o­thers, and those Men of no small Learning, who object against me, and ask, If I am not inconsistent with my self, who affirm that nothing at all can be known, and yet have discours'd upon several Subjects, and at this very time am laying down Rules and Di­rections about Duty: I could wish these Persons had understood our Opinions a little more throughly; [Page 155] e for we are not of those, whose Minds are perpe­tually wandring in Uncertainties, and have nothing whereby to determin their Assents; (for what sort of Mind must a Man needs have, or rather what Life must he needs lead, f when he's utterly debar'd from all liberty of Disputing, and observing any re­gular Conduct in his Actions?) nor yet of those o­thers, who call some things certain and others un­certain: but rejecting both these, we say some things are probable and others improbable. Is there any thing then that should hinder me, from approving of that, which I think most probable; and laying aside that, which I think the contrary? Or where's the Inconsistency, if leaving that arrogant Pretence of Demonstrating, I am neither too rash, nor pre­sumptuous in my Opinions, which of all things in the World are the farthest from Wisdom? Now this is the reason why we Academicks Dispute a­gainst every thing, because what is probable could not appear, without comparing the Arguments up­on either side of the Question. But these things are clear'd, I think, accurately enough, in my Books entitled Academical Questions. But you, my Son, [Page 156] are already engag'd in the Study of g a most noble and ancient Philosophy; and have gotten Cratippus for your Master and Instructor, who is hardly in­ferior to its most glorious Founders: However, I would have you acquainted with h our Doctrins, which are very little different from those of your own Sect. But it's high time now to return to our Purpose. i

CHAP. III.

The Knowledge of Honesty is of greatest Moment. Pro­fit and Honesty really the same, and distinguisht on­ly by an Act of the Mind. The customary Opinion to the contrary very pernicious. The Division of things that are profitable, and hurtful to Men. The Good we receive from inanimate Beings owing to Man's Industry.

THere being then, as a was before observ'd, five general Heads of Deliberating and Consulting for the finding out our Duty; two of which relate [Page 157] to what is Honest and Becoming; two to the Uses and Conveniencies of Life, such as Plenty, Power, Riches, &c. and the fifth to the teaching us how we ought to Choose, if any of the former should seem to contradict and run counter to one another: we have gone thro' with that, wherein Honesty is the Question; with which I desire you'd be more especially acquainted. The Point which now comes under Consideration, is what usually goes by the name of Profitable; b concerning which, Custom is mightily in the wrong, and by little and little has brought it to such a pass, as to make a Distinction between Profit and Honesty; and settle it as a constant and receiv'd Maxim, That a thing may be Honest with­out being Profitable; and again may be Profitable with­out being Honest: the most pernicious Errour, and most destructive of all Goodness, that ever could have crept into the Minds of Men. The greatest however, and most eminent Philosophers, have been always so strict and severe in their Writings, as to make the three Natures of Justice, Profit, and Ho­nesty, be blended and interwoven together in Reali­ty, and distinguishable only by an Act of the Mind. For whatever is Just, say they, the same is also Pro­fitable; and whatever is Honest, the same is also Just; from whence it follows, That whatever is Honest, the same must be also Profitable. Did Peo­ple but consider this Matter as they ought, they would not, as now they commonly do, admire a crafty and subtle sort of Fellows, and esteem that [Page 158] Wisdom, which in truth is Roguery. This Errour therefore should wholly be rooted out of the Minds of Men, and all should be taught, That if ever they hope to obtain their Ends, they should not set about it by the ways of Knavery and under­hand Dealings, but by Justice and Integrity in their Designs and Actions. c Now all things that tend to the Good and Preservation of the Life of Man, are either Inanimate, such as Gold, Silver, the Pro­ductions of the Earth, and other such like; or Ani­mals, which have natural Powers, Inclinations and Appetites. Of these some are unreasonable and o­thers reasonable: The unreasonable are Horses, Ox­en, and other sorts of Cattel; to which we may add Bees, which produce and make something, that contributes to the Convenience of the Life of Men: the reasonable are Gods and Men. The means for procuring the Favour of the Gods, is to live a religious and holy Life: Next to the Gods, there's nothing so capable of contributing to the Happiness and Welfare of Men, as Men themselves. The same Distribution may serve for those things, which tend to the Hurt and Inconvenience of Men. But because 'tis believ'd, That d to hurt is incom­patible with the Divine Nature, the Gods for that reason are excepted here, so that Men are suppos'd, of all things in Nature, to do both the most e Ser­vice [Page 159] and Disservice to one another. For First, f Those things which are call'd Inanimate, are most of 'em owing to the Industry of Men; which we neither could get, if it weren't for their Labour and Art in procuring 'em; nor afterwards use without their Assistance. For where should we have such a Science as Physick; as Navigation or Agricul­ture? How should we gather and preserve our Corn, and the rest of our Fruits, if it were not for Men? And then how should those Commodi­ties, which we want, be imported; or those, with which we abound, be exported, if there were not Men to do each of these Works? In like manner, how could Stones be fetch'd out of the Quarries for our necessary Uses? How could Iron, Brass, Gold and Silver, be dug and drawn out from the Bow­els of the Earth, did not Men set their Hands to work for these Purposes?

CHAP. IV.

Other Conveniencies from inanimate Beings, and un­reasonable Animals, receiv'd by Mens Industry. The Advantages arising from Mens joyning in Society.

SO Houses, which serve to defend us from the ex­tremities of Heat and Cold, could neither at first have been made by Mankind; nor afterwards, if by Earth-quake, Tempest, or length of Days, they had fall'n to decay, have been repair'd or re­built; had not Men, joyn'd together in one com­mon Society, learnt to beg Help and Assistance of one another. To this Industry of Men we are also indebted for Conveyances of Water, for making new Channels and Arms to Rivers, and for turning the Streams after such a manner, as thereby to water and fatten our Grounds; for throwing up Banks to defend us from the Waves, and making of new Harbors in convenient Places. From all which In­stances, and a great many others that might easily be produc'd, 'tis abundantly manifest, That the Fruits and Advantages reap'd from those things, which are call'd Inanimate, are entirely owing to Mens Labour and Industry. Secondly, a Those we receive from unreasonable Animals, how very little and inconsiderable would they be, if they were not augmented by the same Peoples Industry? For who was it but Men that first discover'd the Uses, to which Beasts in their several kinds might be ser­viceable? And how at this time could we feed or break them? How could we keep 'em, and get [Page 161] the most Profit and Advantage by 'em, without the Endeavours and Assistance of the same Men? 'Tis they that destroy us those Creatures which are hurt­ful, and procure for us those which may be service­able to us. Why need I mention a b multitude of Arts, which are absolutely necessary to our Well­being here? For what Help or Succour could those that are sick, or what Pleasure those that are heal­thy find? How could Mankind be supply'd with Victuals, and other Conveniencies or Comforts of Life; if it weren't for that number of Callings in the World, which are wholly design'd to provide 'em of such things? By which Men are brought to live better and more handsomly, and are rais'd to a condition so far above that of unreasonable Animals. Again, Cities could neither have been built nor frequented, without a Community and Society of Men: From hence have arisen all Laws and Customs; the Bounds of Equity and Justice have been settled; and a certain and regular Me­thod laid down for the Conduct of Mens Lives. This has brought Modesty into request, and fill'd off the natural Roughness of Mens Tempers; has contributed to the greater Security of their Lives, and establish'd such a Commerce and Correspon­dence among 'em, as by mutual giving and recei­ving of Benefits, by bartering and changing one Commodity for another, one Convenience for ano­ther, supplies 'em to the full with whatever they stand in need of.

CHAP. V.

Nothing extraordinary either in War, or Peace, can be done without the help of Men. Nothing the Cause of so much Evil to Men, as they themselves are to one another. What is the Office of Virtue. The whole Business of it consists in three things.

WE dwell much longer, than we needed to do, upon this Subject: For who does not set, which Panaetius has spent many Pages to make out, that neither a General in War, nor a Statesman in Peace, could ever perform any glorious Exploits, or do any notable Service to the Publick, without the concurrence of other Mens Endeavours? To confirm this Assertion, he brings a Themistocles, Pe­ricles, Agesilaus and Alexander; and tells us, that no one of all these, without the assistance of others to support 'em, could ever have atchiev'd such glo­rious Actions. What he tells us is undoubtedly true, and such a number of Witnesses altogether superfluous. b And as Men thus receive most ex­traordinary Benefits, from agreeing and conspiring to lend mutual Assistance; so we shall find, upon changing the Scene, that there are no Misfortunes or Calamities so great, as those which they bring upon one another. c Dicaearchus, a learned and e­loquent Peripatetick, has written a whole Book [Page 163] concerning the Destruction of Men; where first having reckon'd up all other Causes of it, such as Inundations, Pestilences, and Famines, and even sudden Incur­sions of furious wild Beasts, (by which he assures us some whole Nations have been devour'd;) and then placing on the other side Wars, Seditions, and such-like Misfortunes, which Men were the Occa­sions of; he endeavours to shew at the foot of the Account, that a great many more have been de­stroy'd by these, than by all other Accidents or Ca­lamities whatever. This then being indisputably true, That the Goods Men enjoy, and the Evils they suffer, proceed for the most part from Men themselves; I say 'tis the principal Office of Virtue, to procure the Good-liking and Favour of Men, and so to engage their Endeavours and Affections, as to make 'em still ready to do us any Kindness. 'Tis the Business therefore of laborious Callings, to supply us with all the Conveniencies of Life, which may be had from the Use of inanimate Beings, and unreasonable Animals: But to gain the Affections of Men on our side, and beget in them always a readiness and desire to advance our Interest, is a Work that requires the Wisdom and Virtue of the greatest Men. d For the whole Work and Exercise of Vir­tue in general, consists in some one of these three things: The first is a Knowledge, in all we under­take, of what is agreeable to Truth and Sincerity; what's becoming and suitable to every one's Cha­racter; what will be the Consequence of such or [Page 164] such Actions; what are the Materials out of which things are made, and what the Causes that first brought 'em into Being. The second, A restraining the violent Motions and Passions of the Soul, which by the Grecians are termed [...]; and bringing the irregular Inclinations of the Appetite, which by the same are call'd [...], under the Power and Govern­ment of Reason. The third is a Skilfulness of Ad­dress in our Carriage, and a winning Demeanour toward the rest of Men, with whom we are joyn'd in one common Society; that so by their help we may be supply'd in abundance, with all those things which our Natures stand in need of; and by the same may be enabled, should any Injury be offer'd us, to keep our selves secure from the Violences of it; and not only so, but to revenge our selves also upon the guilty Person, and inflict such Punishments, as are according to the Rules of Humanity and Ju­stice.

CHAP. VI.

How far the Power of Fortune over Men reaches. The several Reasons why Men favour any one; or submit to his Authority.

WHat a Means should be us'd for the gaining, and securing Men firm to our Interests, we shall mention immediately; but we have one Ob­servation to make before-hand. b There's no one but knows that the Power of Fortune is very great, both as to the good, and ill Success of our Actions: for when she favours us, we quickly arrive at our desired Haven; but when she turns against us, we as quickly are Shipwreckt and run A-ground. Now of those Events which depend upon Fortune, there are some which come to pass but extraordinary sel­dom; such as Storms, Tempests, Shipwrecks, Ru­ins, Fires, &c. which proceed from inanimate Be­ings; and from brutish Animals kicks, bites, pushes, &c. all which, as I said, do but rarely happen: But the Overthrows of Armies, as of c three but a [Page 166] while ago, and a great many others at several times; the Deaths of Commanders, as lately of d a great and extraordinary Person; the Hatred and Violence of the enrag'd Multitude, and, as a Conse­quence of that, the Banishments, Flights and utter Undoings of well-deserving Citizens: as also on the other [...] prosperous Successes, such as Honours, Commands, Victories, &c. tho' they are all truly fortuitous things, yet they can't succeed either the one way or t'other, without the Assistance and En­deavours of Men. This being noted, we are now to discourse of those Ways and Methods, whereby Men are drawn and enclin'd to be for us, and to endeavour all they can for our Interest and Advan­tage: Upon which if we seem to dwell longer than we should do, I desire the Usefulness of the Subject may be consider'd, and then we may possi­bly be thought too short. e Whatsoever then is contributed by Men, toward any one's advancement in Riches, Honours, Power, &c. is always done up­on some of these Motives: First, That of Kindness, Benevolence, or Good-will; when for some reasons they love any Person. Secondly, Honour or Admi­ration; when they respect any one for his Virtues, and think he deserves to be highly promoted. Thirdly, Confidence, Trust, or Reliance; when they think they may safely confide in a Man, as one that will certainly take care of their Affairs. Fourth­ly, Fear, when they stand in any Aw of his Power [Page 167] and Authority. Fifthly, Hope, when they expect to get something from him; as when Princes or popular Men promise great Donations. And, last of all, Hire, when they are drawn to't by Money or Presents; which is much the most pitiful and sordid Way, as for those on the one hand that are taken by it, so likewise for those that endeavour to make use of it: For 'tis never well when People shall attempt to get that by Money, which ought to be the Reward of Virtue and Merit. However seeing sometimes one must have recourse to this Method as a Refuge, I shall give some Rules for our Direction in the Use of it; but first speak of those, that are more near­ly related to Virtue and Honesty. f In much the same manner, and for several such Reasons, Men submit to the Power and Authority of another: Either because they have a Kindness for him; or have formerly receiv'd some Obligations from him; or respect him for his Worth; or hope they shall get something by it; or fear they shall be forc'd to it, if they don't do it voluntarily; or are drawn by fair Promises and large Donations; or, lastly, (as we see it too often practis'd in our own Republick) are downright hired to it.

CHAP. VII.

A Governour should endeavour to make himself lov'd, and not fear'd. The Fates of several, who have taken the contrary Method.

NOw of all a those Methods, which tend to the advancement and maintenance of our Interest, there is none more proper and convenient than Love, and none more improper and inconvenient than Fear. For, as 'tis very well observ'd by Ennius, Whom Men fear, they also hate; and whom they hate, they wish out of the World. But that no force of Power or Greatness whatever, can bear up long a­gainst a Stream of publick Hate, if it were not suf­ficiently known before, was of late made appear by an Instance of our own. And not the Murther of that b Tyrant only, who by force of Arms op­pres'd the City, which now most c obeys him, when taken out of the World; but the like untimely Ends of most other Tyrants, who have generally been attended by the same ill Fate, is a manifest Token that the Hatred of People is able to min the most absolute Authority: For Obedience proceed­ing from Fear can't possibly be lasting; whereas that which is the Effect of Love, will be faithful for ever. 'Tis well enough in those, who by open [Page 169] force have reduc'd any Nation, and accordingly Rule it with an high Hand, if they do sometimes use Rigour and Severity, like Masters towards their Slaves, when there's no other way of holding 'em in Subjection: But for those who are Magi­strates in a free City, to endeavour to make them­selves fear'd by the People, is one of the maddest, and most desperate Attempts upon the face of the Earth. For tho' a Man should by his Power and Greatness oppress the Laws, and over-awe Liberty by Terrour and Threatnings, yet still they will find time to recover again, first by the private Resent­ments of the Citizens, and afterwards by their choo­sing in secret Consults, some worthier Person to free 'em from the Oppressour. And Liberty, after she has been chain'd up a while, is always more Curst, and bites deeper, than she would otherwise have done if she had never been restrain'd. Let us therefore embrace and adhere to that Method, which is of the most universal Influence, and serves not only to secure us what we have, but moreover to enlarge our Power and Authority: That is in short, Let us rather endeavour to be Lov'd than Fear'd; which is certainly the best way to make us successful as well in our private, as our publick Bu­siness. For those who desire to have others be afraid of 'em, must needs be afraid of those others in their turns: What, for Instance, shall we imagin of d the Elder Dionysius? With what eternal Fears and Apprehensions must he needs be rack'd, when e da­ring [Page 170] not to venture his Throat to any Razor, he was forc'd even to singe off his Beard with Coals? Or what of f Alexander, who was sirnam'd the Phe­raean? In what Torment, think we, must he per­petually live? When (as 'tis usually reported of him) he dar'd not so much as to rise from Table, and go to his own Wife Thebe's Chamber, one whom he lov'd with an entire Affection, without a Barbarian, and him (as 'tis said) too a g brand­ed Thracian, to lead the way with his naked Sword? And would always dispatch some of his Guards before him, to search all the Cloaths and Coffers of the Women, for fear least any Weapon might be conceal'd within 'em. O miserable and unhappy Man! who could think a Barbarian, one that carried the Marks of his Condition in his Forehead, would be faithfuller to him than his own Wife. Neither, it seems, was he mistaken in it; for he was afterwards Murther'd h by her Procure­ment, upon suspicion of having to do with someo­ther Woman. Nor indeed can any Authority, how absolute soever, subsist very long when 'tis [Page 171] thus generally fear'd: i Phalaris himself, who is particularly remarkable for his barbarous Cruelties, may serve for a Witness to this Truth; who was not destroy'd by domestick Treacheries, like that Alexander, whom I just now mention'd; nor yet by some few Men conspiring his Death, like our late Tyrant; but by a general Insurrection of all the Agrigentines falling upon him at once. Again, Did not the Macedonians revolt from k Demetrius, and all with one consent march over to Pyrrhus? And when the Lacedaemonians grew Insolent and Tyrannical, did not their Allies upon a suddain forsake 'em, and shew 'emselves idle and uncon­cern'd Spectators of their Ruin at l Leuctra, with­out ever stirring one Foot to their Assistance?

CHAP. VIII.

The just and gentle Government of the old Romans: When chang'd, and the fatal Consequences of that Change. Caesar and Sylla's unjust Cruelties. One Cause of Civil Wars is Mens hoping to raise 'em­selves by them. All have occasion for some Friends, tho' not for general Love.

I Much rather choose, upon such a Subject, to bring Instances from Forreign, than our own Nation. However, I can't but observe thus much, That so long as our Empire supported it self, not by Ways of Injustice and Violence, but rather by Actions of Kindness and Gentleness; Wars were un­dertaken to Protect its Allies or Defend its Honour, and accordingly their Issues were attended with Mercy, or at least no more Rigour than was ab­solutely necessary. The Senate then was a kind of Port or Refuge, for Princes and Nations to have recouse to in their need; and our Officers and Commanders made it their greatest Glory, to De­fend their Provinces, and Assist their Allies, with Justice and Fidelity. This City therefore was not then the a Empress, so properly as the Protectress of all the World. This Conduct and Method of mana­ging the State, began by little and little to wear off [Page 173] before, but utterly vanish'd immediately after the Victory of b Sylla; for People began to think nothing could be unjust to their Confederates and Allies, when once they had seen so great Cruelties exercis'd even upon their very Citizens. This Man therefore was in a just Cause, but which was follow'd by a cruel and most unjust Victory: he having had the Boldness and Impudence to say, when in full Mar­ket he was selling the Goods of some honest and wealthy Men, and whom he himself knew to be Roman Citizens, That he was going to make sale of his own Booty. But there has come c one after him, whose Cause was impious, and his Victory yet more scandalous and inhuman: who did not stop at selling of private Mens Estates, but involv'd all our Countries and Provinces together in one com­mon Calamity. Hence we have seen, after Havock and Devastation made in other Countries, as it were by way of Praelude to the Loss of our own Empire, the City d Marseilles drawn along in Triumph; and that very place, without whose Assistance our former Generals never brought Triumph from beyond the Alpes, has now found one that could have so much Impudence, as to Triumph over its own Destruction. I might bring a great many other Examples, of most impious Treatment that hath been shewn towards our Allies; but this single Instance is abundant­ly sufficient, being one of the basest that was ever [Page 174] committed before the face of the Sun. The truth on't is we have deserv'd these Misfortunes; for if others had not 'scap'd without Punishment for their Wickedness, this Man could never have arriv'd at that Insolence; who tho' he has left but few Heirs of his Estate, I am afraid will have a great many wicked ones of his Ambition. For as long as some dissolute and profligate Fellows remember that e former inhuman Auction, and are in hopes one day of seeing the same again, they'll always be for propagating Civil Dissentions. Thus Publius Sylla, who was so busie in that mention'd, when his Kins­man was Dictator, was never contented till he had manag'd f a worse and more inhuman Auction six and thirty Years after: and g another, who was Scribe in that former Dictatorship, in this latter was advanc'd to be Treasurer of the City. By all which 'tis easie enough to perceive, that we are never to hope we shall be free from Civil Wars, when People expect to make their Fortunes by 'em. We have therefore only the Walls of our City re­maining entire, and even they, as 'twere, expect­ing to feel the Effects of their abominable Wicked­ness; but as for the Republick 'tis absolutely sunk into Ruins and Nothing. And all these Misfortunes have fall'n upon us (that I may return to the Sub­ject which occasion'd this Digression) by our choo­sing to Govern rather by Fear than Love. What then ought particular Persons to expect, when Ty­ranny and Oppression could bring all these Evils upon the whole Roman Empire? h This then being [Page 175] so manifestly plain, That Love's a most powerful Mo­tive to Obedience, but Fear a most weak and dange­rous one; it follows in the next place that we should discourse of those Means, whereby such a Love, joyn'd with Honour and Confidence, may most easi­ly be gotten. i Now this is what all Men don't equally stand in need of; but each should consider his own way of living, and accordingly judge what's convenientest for him; whether to be belov'd by the generality of Men, or only by some few and select Persons. This however we may lay down for cer­tain, as a first and most necessary Rule in this case, to procure at least some faithful and sincere Friends, who may have a true Kindness and Esteem for us. k As far as this reaches, there's very little difference between even the greatest and meanest of People, and all sorts of 'em are almost equally con­cern'd to endeavour after it. As for Honour, Glo­ry, and the general Good-will of all the Citizens, these indeed are things, which aren't alike useful and necessary for all. However for those that have [Page 176] been able to get 'em, they are very good Helps, as for most other Purposes, so for the obtaining of faithful Friends: But of Friendship I have treated in another Work, which is entitled Laelius.

CHAP. IX.

What the Ingredients of true Glory are. By what Means the Love of the People may be obtain'd. How Men may be brought to place a Confidence in us. Ju­stice more powerful than Cunning to this End.

LEt us now proceed to discourse of Glory; tho' that too is a Subject, upon which I have a two Books already extant; however I shall touch upon it here in short, because 'tis a thing of such Weight and Moment toward the successful Management of the most important Affairs. True and perfect Glory then is always made up of these three In­gredients: First, The Love and Good-will of the Multitude. Secondly, Their Trusting and Reliance upon a Man. And, Lastly, Their Valuing and Admiring him so, as to think him a Person that really deserves Honour. The Means of getting these three from the Multitude, (to give one short and easie Rule) are very much the same as from particular Persons. However there's another pecu­liar Way of approaching the People, and gaining Admittance into the Hearts and Affections of all Men in general. b Of those three then, which I [Page 177] just now mention'd, let us first see the Ways of obtaining Love. Now the Love of the People is mov'd by nothing so much, as by Bounty and do­ing Kindnesses: Next they are pleas'd with an hearty Desire and Inclination toward it, tho' a Man have not wherewithal to exercise it. Thirdly, The very Name and Reputation of having Beneficence and Liberality, Justice and Fidelity, with the rest of those Virtues, which give a kind of Smoothness and Agreeableness to our Conversation, is of very great Efficacy in getting us the Favour and Love of the Multitude: and the reason of it is, because Ho­nesty and Decorum delight us of themselves, and by their own native Beauties and Excellencies move, and engage the Hearts of all Men: which seeing they appear with more Lustre in the Vir­tues, which I just now mention'd; it follows that by Nature we must Love those People, in whom we suppose such Virtues to reside. And these are the principal Causes of Men's Loving us: there might, I confess, be some others given, but not of e­qual Weight and Importance with these. c We are to speak in the next place of their Trusting or Confi­ding in us; for the compassing of which, 'tis necessa­ry we should be suppos'd to have two Qualifications, viz. Prudence and Justice. d For we trust those Men, whom we believe, to understand Matters better than we do; to be wise enough to see things before they are arriv'd, and in the Management of 'em, if any Danger should happen, to be ready at finding out Ways and Expedients, to disentangle 'emselves from the Perplexities of it: in which [Page 178] Men imagin that all true and profitable Wisdom consists. e But when a Man is found really Just and Faithful, that is Good, we place so much Trust and Confidence in such a one, as not to entertain any the least suspicion of Deceit or Injury. To such a Man therefore we think we may wisely, and with a secure Confidence, entrust our Safeties, our Children and our Fortunes. Justice therefore, of these two Virtues, has much the more strong and effectual Tendency, to procure this Credit and Con­fidence from the People. For that, even without Wisdom, can go a great way toward the obtaining of this End; whereas Wisdom, without that, is unable to do any thing: For the more Shrew'd and Cunning any Person is, the more he's Suspect­ed and Hated by the World, if he ben't counted Honest and Upright withal. Justice therefore, in conjunction with Wisdom, can make a Man be trusted as far as he pleases: Justice without the o­ther can do a great deal; but the other without that is of no Force at all.

CHAP. X.

Why he talks of Wisdom and Justice as separate from one another, tho' really there's a mutual Connexion between 'em. What will make Men admire any one. The difference between Despising and having an Ill Opinion of a Man.

a SOme Men perhaps will be ready to admire, since 'tis so generally agreed on by Philoso­phers, and has been so often asserted by me my self, That whoever has one must have all the Virtues; why I should speak of 'em separately now, as tho' it were possible for a Man to have Prudence, with­out having Justice at the same time. I answer, That the Way of Expression is highly different, ac­cording to the difference of the Subjects we are treating of; whether they are such as require a Niceness and Subtilty in handling, or be suited to the Capacities of ordinary People. I do but speak here with the Vulgar therefore, when I call one Man Couragious, another Just, and a third Prudent; for in treating upon a Subject which concerns the Peo­ple, we must make use of common and ordinary Expressions; which is what has been done by Pa­naetius himself—. But to return to our Purpose: b Of the three Ingredients, which we said were re­quir'd [Page 180] to the making up of Glory; the third was this, That Men should Admire and Value us so, as to think we are Persons that really deserve Honour. c Now generally speaking they are apt to Admire what­ever they see Great, and beyond their Apprehensi­ons; and likewise in particulars, if they discover a­ny Excellency, which they never expected. They Admire those therefore, and extol 'em ev'n to the Skies, in whom (as they think) they have found a­ny rare and extraodinary Qualities: But as for those others, who have neither Virtue, Spirit, nor Courage in them, these Men they wholly despise and set light by. For they can't be said to despise all those, of whom they entertain but an Ill Opinion. They're far from thinking well of your roguish backbi­ting, cozening sort of Fellows, who are never unpre­par'd for the doing Man an Injury: but by no means d despise 'em for all that; their Contempt (as was said) lighting only upon those, who neither do Good to themselves, nor others (as we commonly speak;) that is, who spend all their Lives in meer Idleness and Sloth, without ever minding or taking care of any thing. e Those, who are esteem'd to excel in Vir­tue, more especially draw Men to Wonder and Ad­miration; who keep themselves free, as from all other things that are Base and Unbecoming, so more especially from those sorts of Vices, which the rest of Mankind can't so easily stand against. Pleasures, for instance, are very alluring. and charming Mi­stresses, which are apt to ensnare the better part of [Page 181] the Soul, and entice it aside from the Paths of Virtue; and Pain on the contrary racks and tor­ments us, so that the dread of it carries most Men beyond the Bounds of Reason. Thus again, when Life and Death, Riches and Poverty, are the things in question, there are very few Men but are wholly transported with desire of the one, and abhorrence of the other. When a Man therefore has got such a great and exalted Soul, as that he can look up­on all these with Indifference; and closely pursues and adheres to Honesty, in whatever Shape she pre­sents her self; then 'tis that Virtue appears with such a Brightness, as that all the whole World must admire her Beauties.

CHAP. XI.

Justice, and a Contempt of Riches, are especially Cau­ses of Mens Admiration. Justice alone procures all the three things, which make up Glory; and how. 'Tis a necessary Virtue for all sorts of People. Even Robbers and Pyrates can't subsist without it. Some Examples to this Purpose.

SUch a Constitution of Soul therefore, as can make a Man despise all a these Goods or Evils, begets him a mighty Esteem and Admiration: But especially Justice (which single Virtue serves to give Men the Name and Denomination of Good) seems much the most admirable to the generality of People. And not without Reason; it being b im­possible [Page 182] for any one to be Just, who is afraid at the approaches of Death, of Pain, of Banishment or Poverty; or prefers c those things, which are contrary to these, before the great Duties of Ju­stice and Honesty. And more particularly yet, Men admire those, whom they find unconcern'd as to the matter of Money; and count them try'd, as it were like Gold in the Fire, who have been able to withstand the Temptations of it. Justice there­fore of it self is sufficient to procure those three things that are requisite to Glory: In the first place, The Love and Good-will of the People; because of the d Kindnesses it shews to very many. Second­ly, Their Confidence. And Thirdly, Their Admi­ration, both for the same Reason, viz. Because it neglects and despises those things, which the rest of Men pursue with such Eagerness and Passion. e Now, in my Opinion, not only the being in a publick Station, but every Method of Living what­ever, requires the Helps and Assistances of Men; as for other Designs, so particularly for this, that we may have some familiar Friends to converse with; which 'tis no easie matter for a Man to ob­tain, without at least the Shew and Reputation of Honesty. From hence it follows, That 'tis necessa­ry even for those Men themselves, who have with­drawn [Page 183] from the World, and chosen the Quiet and Retirements of the Country, to be reputed at least Men of Honesty and Integrity: and that so much the more, because otherwise they'll certainly be counted Dishonest; and then, having nothing of Guard or Defence, they must needs be expos'd to perpetual Injuries. The same Justice also is neces­sary for those (if ever they hope to succeed in their Business) who Buy, Sell, Lett, Hire, and are con­cern'd in the Commerce and Affairs of the World: Nay 'tis a thing of such powerful Moment and u­niversal Influence, as that those who live only up­on Villanies and Wickedness, can never subsist with­out something of Justice: For should any Thief steal from another that belong'd to the same Confedera­cy, he'd immediately be expell'd, as unfit to be a Member even of a Society of Robbers; and should the Leader himself not distribute their Booty, ac­cording to the Measures of Justice and Honesty, he'd either be murther'd or deserted by his Com­pany: Nay 'tis said that your Robbers have some certain Statutes, which they are all of 'em bound to observe amongst themselves. f Theopompus tells us of a certain Rogue, one g Bardylis and Illyrian, that got a great Power by the fame of his Justice in divi­ding the Prey: and h Viriatus the Lusitanian, got a much greater, to whom even some of our Armies [Page 184] and i Generals were forc'd to yield; till at last he was conquer'd by that k Caius Laelius, who was sir­nam'd the Wise, in the time of his Praetorship; who brought down his Courage and Fierceness so low, as to render the War easie for those that came after him. If Justice then be of so great Efficacy, as that it can raise and support even Pirates; of what mighty Force must we suppose it to be, in the midst of Laws, and in a well-constituted Republick?

CHAP. XII.

What made Men at first choose Kings, and make Laws. The justest Men usually made Kings; and why. How to make use of the Glory he hath been discour­sing of. An excellent Rule of Socrates's. Glory must be founded upon solid Virtue. Whatever is Counterfeit will sometime be discover'd.

a 'TWas for the sake of enjoying the Benefits of this Justice (the great Use of which we have now been discoursing of) that the Medes heretofore, as we are told by b Herodotus, and I am apt to imagin our own Ancestors too, chose always the honestest [Page 185] Persons for their Kings. For the poorer sort of People, being oppress'd by the richer, had recourse to some one of remakable Virtue, to save and protect 'em from Violence and Injuries: who constituting Measures of Equity and Justice, bound the great­est to observe 'em as well as the meanest. And that which was the reason for their choosing Kings, in like manner put them upon enacting Laws: For Men have always desired to enjoy such a Right, as all sorts of 'em might have an equal Share in (for otherwise indeed 'twould be no Right at all) which when they could get by the Justice and Honesty of some one Person, they were contented with him, and never look'd any further; but when they could not, they were put upon a necessity of inventing Laws, which could never be partial, but use the same Language to all Ranks and Conditi­ons. 'Tis very plain therefore, that those Men were usually chosen to be Kings, who were count­ed by the People Men of Honesty and Integrity: but if they were held Prudent and Wise withal, the People thought there was nothing they might not obtain by their Conduct and Management. By all means therefore let us constantly follow, and stick close to Justice; as for its own sake, (for o­therwise indeed 'twill not be properly Justice) so for the increase of our Honour and Reputation. c Now as 'tis not sufficient for a Man to get Rich­es, unless he has the Wisdom to dispose of 'em so, [Page 186] as thereby to furnish out all his Expences; not on­ly those of his bare Necessities, but those of his Bounty and Liberality too: So neither is it enough for a Man to get d Glory, unless he knows how to make Use of it with discretion: Tho' what Socrates says is very excellent to this purpose, That the rea­diest Way, and, as it were, shortest Cut, to arrive at e Glory, is really to be, what one desires to be account­ed. Those People therefore are highly mistaken, who think of obtaining a solid Reputation, by vain Shews and hypocritical Pretences; by compos'd Countenances and studied Forms of Words: for true Glory takes deep rooting, and grows and flou­rishes more and more; but that which is only in Shew and meer Outside, quickly decays and withers like Flowers; nor can any thing be lasting that is only Counterfeit. I might bring a great many preg­nant Examples for the proof of these Assertions; but, for brevity sake, I shall content my self with those of but one single Family. f Tiberius Gracchus, the Son of Publius, will always be Prais'd and had in Admiration, as long as there shall any Memori­als [Page 187] remain of the Roman Atchievements: But his g Sons, on the contrary, were not in their Lives-time approv'd of by good Men; and since their Decease have been number'd among those, who were justly Slain.

CHAP. XIII.

What young Men should do to make 'emselves Known, and taken Notice of in the World. Courage in War the first thing that sets off young Men. Ano­ther, Temperance, Sobriety, &c. Keeping often Com­pany with Wise and Good Men another thing that very much Recommends them.

'TIs the Business therefore of those, who desire to get true Glory, strictly to discharge all the Duties of Justice: what those are we have shewn already in the former Book. I shall now proceed to lay down some Directions, a How a Man should do to appear before the World what he is in him­self; tho' that of Socrates is certainly the wisest that can possibly be given, To make sure in the first place, [Page 188] that he really be in himself, that which he desires to appear before the World. For when a young Gen­tleman is just come into the Publick, and is already known and remarkable in it; either by the Fame of his Father's Actions (which I think, Son Marcus, may be your Case;) or by any other Means or Ac­cident whatever; the Eyes of all are immediately upon him, and every one's enquiring after what he does, and how he steers his Life; and, as tho' he were set in the publick View, so none of his Acti­ons, or so much as his Words can be long kept in secret. But those, who at the beginning and en­trance of their Lives, by reason of their Meanness, are unknown to the World; as soon as ever they come up to years of Discretion, should set before their Eyes the most honourable Places, and bend all their Studies and honest Endeavours toward the obtaining of 'em: which they ought to do with so much the more boldness, because Men are so far from envying Youth, that they rather encourage and forward 'em in their Progress. The b first thing then, that sets a young Man off, and recommends him to the Publick, is Courage and Bravery in Mar­tial Affairs; by which a great many amongst our Forefathers, who were scarce ever wholly disen­gag'd from Wars, very nobly distinguish'd and sig­naliz'd themselves. But you, my Son, have had the misfortune to light upon the times of a Civil War, wherein the c one Party was wicked and de­testable, and the d other unfortunate and unsuccess­ful: [Page 189] In which however, when Pompey had giv'n you the Command of e one Wing, you got much Praise from that great Commander and all his Ar­my, by your riding, darting and patiently abiding all the Fatigues of War. But as for this piece of your rising Glory, that, and the whole Constitution of the Republick, are both of 'em fall'n to the ground together. But I never design'd so to model this Discourse, as that it should be proper for none but you; but as that it might be applicable to all Men in general: I shall go on therefore to the re­maining part of it. As then in all things the Fun­ctions of the Soul are more noble and excellent than those of the Body; so the Effects of our Reason and Understanding are greater, and more powerful as to this Particular, than those of meer Strength. f Now of these there is none that can more recom­mend and adorn a young Man, than Temperance and Sobriety, Duty and Respect to his natural Pa­rents, Love and Good-nature towards his Friends and Relations. g Another good Way for young People to get Known, and have a good Reputati­on, is often to attend on some Great and Wise Men, who are thought to design for the Good of the Publick: For when they're observ'd to be fre­quently with such, the People are presently apt to imagin, that they'll be like those Men, whom they choose for their Patterns Thus h Pub. Rutilius, when [Page 190] he was young, had the general Vogue of a very honest Man, and an able Lawyer, because he fre­quented the House of i Mutius. As for k Crassus, whilst he was very young, he was not beholden to any one else, but obtain'd of himself everlasting Ho­nour, by undertaking that l noble and glorious Ac­cusation: when at that term of Years, wherein o­thers are commended if they begin but to Study and Exercise the Art; (as we have it recorded of the famous Demosthenes) at that Age, I say, did Cras­sus make it appear, that he could perform that laudably in the open Courts of Justice, which he might without disparagement have been Studying at home.

CHAP. XIV.

Discourse of two sorts. Affability very powerful to ob­tain Mens Love, &c. But Eloquence much more. Several Occasions of shewing a Man's Eloquence. To Defend more Laudable than to Accuse; but the latter in some cases Honourable enough. Several Ex­amples of brave Accusations. 'Tis lawful in some cases to Defend the really Guilty; but never to Ac­cuse the Innocent. The Judges and Advocates Du­ties. Defending the Accus'd, especially honourable, when 'tis against some powerful Oppressor.

BUt a of Speaking or Discourse there are two sorts; the one proper only for common Conversation, the other for Pleadings and Debates in the Publick. Of these two the latter, which is what we call Elo­quence, is apparently most powerful towards the procurement of Glory; b but yet 'tis unexpressible of what Influence Courtesie and Affability are, in the business of obtaining Mens Love and Affections. There are extant Letters of c Philip to Alexander, d Antipater to Cassander, and e Antigonus to Philip; [Page 192] in which these most Wise and Prudent Princes (for such we are told they really were) advise each his Son to speak kindly to the Multitude, and try to win the Hearts of both them, and the Soldiers, by gentle Words and familiar Appellations. f But that other Discourse, which is proper for Pleadings and Harangues in Publick, does oftentimes more and transport the whole Multitude: For when a Man speaks to 'em plausibly and fluently, they are present­ly rapt in a strange Admiration▪ and can't but con­clude, as soon as ever they hear him, that he's wi­ser and more knowing than the rest of Men are. But if there be Modesty joyn'd with the Power and Weight of his Eloquence, there's nothing in the World can more raise their Admiration; and espe­cially too, if he be a young Man that speaks. Now the Subjects and Occasions, that stand in need of Eloquence, are more than one; and several young Gentlemen, in our own Republick, have made 'emselves eminent in several of 'em: some, for Example, by speaking in the Senate-house, and others by pleading in the Courts of Justice. Of these Ways the latter is most fruitful of Admiration, the Duties of which are only two, Defending and Accusing. 'Tis much more commendable to Defend than to Accuse; however this latter has oftentimes brought Men a considerable Reputation. We men­tion'd the Example of Crassus but just now, g Mar­cus Antonius, when he was a young Man, did the [Page 193] same; and nothing got h Sulpitius so much Credit for his Eloquence, as his brave Accusation of Caius Norbanus, a very seditious and troublesome Citizen. This nevertheless must be done but seldom, or in­deed never, unless it be undertaken on the behalf of the Republick, as 'twas by those three whom I just now mention'd: Or secondly, upon the account of some Injury receiv'd, as by the two i Luculluses; or else for the sake of those under our Protection, as was formerly done by k my self for the Sicilians; and by l Julius for the Sardians against Marcus Al­butius: in like manner m Fusius made his Industry be taken notice of, by his accusing of Aquilius. Once then or so, 'tis allowable enough; but by no means often. However, should the Commonwealth call a Man to it, he may do it oftner upon her ac­count; it being no Disgrace to be often employ'd in taking Vengeance on her Enemies. Yet, even in this Case, 'tis still the best way to be Moderate and Cautious: For he shews himself a Man of a very unnatural and merciless Temper (or rather indeed not a Man at all, but a Savage Monster) who can endure to make it his Business and Employment, to [Page 194] bring many People into danger of their Lives: Be­side that 'tis dangerous to the Person himself too; and not only so, but ev'n scandalous and shameful, to get himself the odious Name of An Accuser: which of late was the Fortune n of Marcus Brutus, a Per­son that was sprung of a noble Family, and Son of that Brutus, who was so particularly fam'd for his Skill in the Civil Laws. 'Tis another Rule of Du­ty more especially to be taken notice of, and which can't be broken without manifest Villany, Never to bring an innocent Person into Danger. For since kind Nature has given us Eloquence, to serve for the Good and Preservation of all Men; what can be more, either Wicked, or Inhuman, than to turn it to the Ruin and Destruction of the o best of 'em? 'Tis our Duty then, never to accuse the Innocent: but we need not, on the other hand, make any Con­science, of speaking sometimes in behalf of the Guil­ty, provided he ben't wholly Villanous and Abomi­nable. For this is no more, than what the People desires, than what Custom authorizes, and the com­mon Bowels of Humanity encline us to. 'Tis the Duty of a Judge, to endeavour after nothing but the real Truth; but an Advocate sometimes may speak up for that, which carries no more than an outward Appearance of it: Which, I think, I should hardly have ventur'd to say, (especially in Writing a Philosophical Discourse) but that I perceive 'twas [Page 195] the Opinion of Panetius, a Person of as great and considerable Authority, as any among the Stoicks. But Defending is that, which brings the largest Re­turns both of Glory and Interest; especially if one happen to be Assistant to those, who seem Injur'd and Oppress'd by the Power of some Great One. This was my Fortune, as a great many times, so more especially in my younger Days; when I stood in Defence of Roscius Amerinus, against all the Greatness and Authority of Sylla: and you know the Oration, which I then spoke, is p at this time extant.

CHAP. XV.

Two sorts of Liberality. Better to help Men by our Labour and Industry, than by our Money. Phillip's Reproof to his Son Alexander to this purpose. The Inconveniencies of the second sort of Liberality. Measures to be observed in it.

a HAving given this Account of the particular Duties, which young Men must do for the attainment of Glory; we are next to discourse of Beneficence or Liberality. Of this there are two sorts; the one of which consists in obliging those, [Page 196] who need it by our Labour and Industry; the other, by our Money. The latter of these two is much the more easie, especially for those who have plentiful Fortunes; but the former, on the other hand, more glorious and magnificent, and more suitable to the Character of a brave and exalted Soul. For tho' there's a Good-will, and generous Readiness to oblige shewn in either; yet in the one Case we are behol­den to the Chest, in the other to the Virtues and A­bilities of the Person. Besides, those sort of Kind­nesses, which are done by the Assistance of Money or the like, within a short space of time, draw their own Fountain dry; so that this Liberality doth, as 'twere, eat out its own Bowels, and the more you have formerly oblig'd in this kind, the fewer you'll be able to oblige for the future. But now, on the other hand, he whose Generosity shews it self in La­bour, that is, in Virtue and being Active for ano­ther's good, the more Men he hath formerly shewn himself kind to, the more he'll have ready to assist him ever after: beside that by the Custom of doing good Offices, he gets a kind of Habit, and grows much more expert in the Art of Obliging. Philip the Father of Alexander the Great, reproves his Son sharply in one of his Epistles, for endeavouring to purchase the Good-will of the Macedonians, by gi­ving 'em Donations; In the name of Wonder, says he, what reason could you have, to hope that those People would ever be faithful to you, whom you your self had Corrupted with Money? ‘What! do you design to be thought not the King, but only the Steward and Purse-bearer of the Macedonians?’ [Page 197] That Steward and Purse-bearer is admirably well said; because 'tis so scandalous a Business for a Prince; and that calling Donations a Corrupting the People, is better yet; for those that receive 'em are perpetually the worse for it, and only made readier to expect the same again. Philip writ this to his Son alone, but it may serve for a Direction to all Men in general I think we may take it for granted there­fore, that that sort of Bounty, which consists in do­ing Kindnesses by our Labour and Industry, is more Virtuous and Creditable, can oblige more People, and has more ways of doing it, than that other has. Not but that sometimes a Man should give, nor is this sort of Bounty to be wholly rejected; nay, one ought oftentimes to distribute some part of one's Money to those, who are well-deserving Persons, and stand in need of such Assistance: But still it must be done with b great Prudence and Moderation. For some Men have squandered away whole Estates by inconsiderately Giving; which is certainly the foo­lishest thing in the World; for so a Man disables himself ever after, from doing of that, c which he takes most delight in. But the worst thing is this, that Profuseness in Giving is usually accompany'd by unjust Ways of Getting: For when by this means Men have parted with what's their own, they are forc'd to lay hands upon that which is another's. And by this means they miss what is their principal Design, viz. The obtaining Men's Love, by their Bounty and Generosity; for they get more Hatred from those whom they Injure, than Good-will from those whom they hop'd to Oblige by it. We ought not therefore so to Lock up our Riches, as that e­ven [Page 198] Liberality it self can't open 'em; nor so to keep 'em open, as if they were common to all Men in general: The best way is, always to observe a due Medium, and give more or less in proportion to our Estates. In fine, we'd do well to remember a Saying, which is now grown so common as to be a Proverb amongst us, Bounty has got no Bottom: For how indeed is it possible, there should ever be any end on't, when those, who are us'd to it, look to receive again; and others, from seeing them, are taught to expect the same?

CHAP. XVI.

Two sorts of Givers. How Liberality and Prodigality differ. What the chief Advantage of Riches. Pub­lick Shews to the People very foolish. Several Ex­amples of magnificent Aediles among the Romans.

a OF those who give largely, there are two sorts, the one of which are Prodigal, and the other Liberal. The Prodigal are those who consume vast Sums in making publick Feasts, and distributing Portions of Meat to the People: or in providing Gladiators to Fight with one another; or with wild Beasts in the Theatres; or in making Preparation for other such Sports, and Recreations of the Mul­titude: things that are forgotten in a very short time, [Page 199] if ever at all thought on, after once they are over. But the Liberal are those, who dispose of their Mo­ney in Redeeming poor Prisoners; in helping their Friends and Acquaintance out of Debt; in assisting 'em toward the Marrying their Daughters; or put­ting 'em into some Method of Making, or Encrea­sing their Fortunes. I admire therefore, what should come into b Theophrastus's Head, who in a Book of his, which he wrote concerning Riches, amongst se­veral noble and excellent things, has been guilty of one very greivous Absurdity: for he runs out migh­tily in Commendation of Magnificence, and giving publick Shews or Donations to the People; and thinks the Supplying of such Expences as these, the very principal Fruit and Advantage of Riches: But in my Opinion 'tis both a much greater, and more durable Advantage, to be furnish'd with Mo­ney for these Acts of Bounty, of which I have just now been giving some Instances. But c Aristotle, with much more Reason and Judgment, reproves us for not being amaz'd at those Sums, which are daily thrown away to Caress the People: ‘Should any one (says he) when a City's besieg'd and re­duc'd to great Streights, give a large Sum of Mo­ney for a little Cup of Water; People would won­der and admire at it strangely, and hardly be per­suaded to believe it at first: but afterwards possibly, upon farther Consideration, would be ready to par­don it, because 'twas a Case of meer Exigence and [Page 200] Necessity: But yet we can see, without any thing of Admiration, those vast Charges and infinite Ex­pences, which Men put themselves to for no Rea­son in the World; neither for the Relief of any Want or Necessity, nor yet for the Encrease of their Glory and Dignity: And that Pleasure of the Mul­titude which is principally aim'd at, is of short Continuance; and only tickles and sooths up the Meanest of the People, who themselves will for­get the Satisfaction they receiv'd, as soon as ever the Shew and Recreation's at an end.’ He adds moreover with a great deal of Reason, ‘That Children indeed and some trifling Women, toge­ther with Slaves, and the more servile Part of those who are free, might perhaps take a Pleasure in such foolish kind of Pastimes: but that Men of true Prudence, and those who judge of things by the Rules of Reason, can by no means either commend or approve of 'em.’ I know 'tis a Cu­stom in our Republick, and has been from the time of our good Fore-fathers, to expect and demand, even from the soberest Citizens, something that is splendid and magnificent in their d Aedileships. Hence e Publius Crassus, who was sirnam'd The Weal­thy, and really was such, in his Office of Aedile was very magnificent and noble in his Entertain­ments: and f Lucius Crassus, a little while after, [Page 201] was full-out as generous, tho' Collegue of g Mucius the most moderate Man living. Next after these came h Caius Claudius, the Son of Appius; and a great many others, viz. the i Luculli, k Hortensius and l Silanus. But m Publius Lentulus, when I was Cos. exceeded all others that ever went before him: who was afterwards follow'd and copy'd by n Scaurus. But of all these Shews, that have been given to please and entertain the People, those of my Friend Pompey were the greatest and most magnificent, o exhibited when he was the second time Consul. p In all which Cases 'tis easie to see what is my Opinion.

CHAP. XVII.

Expences to please the People allowable in some Cases; and what they are. Some Examples of laudable ones. Upon what one may best lay out his Money in this kind.

NO Man however should be so far moderate, as to draw upon himself the Suspicion of Ava­rice. a Mamercus, a Person of very great Riches, was put by the Consulship for no other Reason, but because he refus'd to be Aedile first. b If such things therefore are demanded by the People, and allow'd of, tho' perhaps not desir'd, by good Men, they must ev'n be perform'd; but so as to keep within the compass of your Estate, as I my self did. Nay, tho' they should not be demanded by the People, yet they might wisely enough be presented 'em, upon a Prospect of gaining some more con­siderable Advantage by it. Thus c Orestes of late got a great deal of Credit, by Giving the People a Dinner in the Streets, under the Notion of d Pay­ing his Tenths to Hercules. Nor did any one ever find fault with M. Seius, for selling out Corn [Page 203] at an easie Rate, in the time of a very great Dearth and Scarcity: for he got himself free from a great and inveterate Hatred of the People, by a Cost, which (considering he was at that time Aedile) was neither dishonest, nor yet extraordinary great: But of all my Friend Milo got the greatest Honour, by purchasing Gladiators for the Defence of the Publick, which was wholly included in my single Safety, and thereby de­feating the mad and pernicious Attempts of e Clodius. Such Charges therefore are not to be shun'd, when ei­ther they are necessary or very advantagious: but even when they are so, we must still not exceed the due Limits of Mediocrity. Luc. Philippus, the Son of Quin­tus, an extraordinary ingenious and eminent Man, was wont, I confess, to be making his Brags, That he got all the Honours the Republick could give him, with­out ever spending one Farthing that way: f Caius Curio us'd to say the same: and even I my self have some reason to boast upon this account: for considering the Greatness of the Honours I got, and that too by e­very one of the Votes, and the very first Years I was [Page 204] capable of 'em, (which is more then can be said by any one of those two whom I just now mention'd) the Charge of my Aedileship was very inconsiderable. But the best way of laying out Money in this kind, is to repair the City-walls, make Docks, Havens, Aquaeducts and the like; things that may serve to the general Use, and Advantage of the Publick. For tho' things which are present, and given down upon the nail, are more acceptable for a Time; yet the Memory of these will be more lasting, and con­tinu'd even down to Posterity. I forbear to speak much against Theatres, Portico's, new Temples and the like, out of Respect to my old Friend Pompey: but I find 'em not approv'd of by the famousest Men; particularly not by Panaetius himself, whom I have very much follow'd, but not quite translated in this Work. Neither are they lik'd by Demetrius Phalereus, who blames Pericles, one of the greatest Men amongst all the Grecians, for squandring away such g a vast Sum of Money, upon that noble Stru­cture at the entrance of the Acropolis. But I have spo­ken sufficiently upon all this Subject, in those Books I have written h concerning the Republick. To con­clude therefore, all such Profusions are generally speaking (I think) to be blam'd; but yet at some­times, and upon certain Occasions, may be rendred necessary: However even then they must be propor­tion'd to one's Estate, and kept within the Limits of Reason and Moderation.

CHAP. XVIII.

Liberality to be varied according to the Variety of Circumstances. The Merits of the Receiver especi­ally to be consider'd. What Acts of Bounty we should more particularly exercise. Measures to be observ'd in Receiving Money. 'Tis profitable sometimes to part with one's Right. When a Man uses an E­state as he ought. Hospitality deservedly com­mended.

IN that a other sort of Giving, which proceeds from Liberality, we should not keep constantly to one certain Measure; but vary according to the Variety of Circumstances in the Persons that re­ceive. His Case (for instance) who struggles at present under some pressing Necessity, is different from his, who is well enough to pass, and only de­sires to improve his Fortune. We should lend our Assistance in the first place to those, who are under the Burden and Weight of some Misfortune; unless they are such as deserve to be miserable: We should be ready however to forward those likewise, who desire only our Helping-hand, not so much to save 'em from being Unfortunate, as to raise 'em to some higher Degrees of Fortune. b But here we must [Page 206] be careful to acquaint our selves thro'ly with the Fitness of the Persons: for that of Ennius is admira­bly well said, ‘I take good Actions, when ill apply'd, to become ill ones.’ Now that which is given to a truly honest and grateful Person, is paid us in the Acknowledg­ment he himself makes, and in the Good-will that's got by't from the rest of the World. For nothing's more pleasing to all Mankind, than Bounty bestow'd without Rashness and Precipitancy: and the gene­rality of Men praise it so much the more, because the Liberality of every great Man, is a common kind of Sanctuary for all that are Needy. We should endeavour therefore, as far as we are able, to oblige many Men by such Acts of Generosity, as may not be forgotten as soon as ever they are over; but be remember'd by the Children and Po­sterity of the Receivers, in such manner as to lay a Necessity upon 'em of shewing their Gratitude: I say Necessity; for all People hate one, that takes no care of being grateful to his Benefactors, and count him that is such Injurious to themselves; because he discourages Bounty and Liberality, and so is a common Enemy to all the poorer Sort. Be­sides, this way of Giving, whereby Captives are ransom'd, and the meaner Folk enrich'd, is useful and advantagious to the Publick it self; and has frequently been practic'd by those of our Order, as appears very fully from the Oration of Crassus. That other way therefore of expending Money, which consists in making Shews for the Entertain­ment of the Vulgar, ought (I think) by no means to be compar'd with this: The one comports well with the Character of a great, and a prudent Person; the other of such as Cajole the People, and look out for [Page 207] Pleasures to tickle the Fancies of the unstable Multitude. c And as 'tis a Duty to be generous in Giving, so is it not to be too rigorous in Demand­ing; but in every Transaction of Buying, Selling, Letting and Hiring, to behave our selves towards our Neighbours and Chapmen, with all the Fairness and Courtesie imaginable; to let go something of our strict and just Rights, upon certain Occasions; to avoid all Suits and Contentions at Law, as far as can reasonably and fairly be expected; perhaps I might add, And even something farther; for in seve­ral Cases to deliver up one's Right, is not only generous, but d advantagious too. However a Man should have a decent Regard to his Estate and For­tune; for 'tis not over-reputable to let that be ruin'd by his Easiness and Neglect; and yet on the other hand should carry himself so, as to avoid all Su­spition of a sordid, mean or avaritious Temper. For 'tis then a Man uses his Money as he ought to do, when he shews himself liberal, without ruin­ing his Fortune. e Theophrastus commends, and with very good Reason, another sort of Bounty, which we call Hospitality: For there's nothing, in my mind, more handsom and becoming, than con­stantly to have the Houses of Noble Men open, and ready to entertain all Strangers of Fashion; and 'tis no small Credit and Reputation to the Publick, [Page 208] that Strangers ne're fail to meet with that sort of Bounty, and Liberality in our City. Beside that there's nothing can be more useful for those, who design by honest Means to get an Interest in the World, than to recommend themselves to the E­steem and Good-liking of foreign Nations, by the help of those People whom they thus entertain. Theophrastus tells us of f Cimon the Athenian, that he shew'd his Hospitality even to all his Brethren of the g Lacian Tribe; and not only made it his own constant Custom, but also commanded his Bayliffs the same, to keep open House for any one of the Laciadae, that should pass that way.

CHAP. XIX.

The Liberality which consists in doing good Offices for others: Two sorts of it. What sorts of Study afford most Opportunities of it. The Ruin of Civil Law and Eloquence. All Men may do Kindnesses of this Nature if they please. We should be careful of not Offending some, by Obliging others.

a I Come now to speak of that other sort of Boun­ty, which consists not in Giving, but in Labou­ring for another's Good; and extends it self as to the Republick in general, so to each Member of the City in particular. b The Civil Law principally gives us Opportunities of exercising this: For there's nothing more proper to get a Man Interest and Credit in the World, than the Managing the Law-suits of a great many Persons, the assisting 'em with his Advice, and doing for 'em all that he can by his Knowledge, and Skill in that Learning. And therefore I admire the Wisdom of our Ancestors, as for several Reasons, so particularly for this, that the Knowledge and Interpretation of their excellent Civil Law, was counted a matter of the highest Cre­dit and Reputation among them. This the greatest Men have kept constantly among themselves, till this late sad Disorder and Confusion of every thing: But now the Glory of this sort of Learning, toge­ther with all Honours and Degrees of Dignity, is utterly ruin'd and fall'n to just Nothing. And to [Page 210] make the matter still so much the worse; all this has happen'd in the Days of c One, who, as he equall'd in Dignity all that have gone before him, so was he far above 'em in the Knowledge of the Laws. This Study then is approv'd of by most People, and puts it in one's power to assist a great many and oblige them by Kindnesses. d There's another sort of Knowledge near related to this, the Art, I mean, of Perswasive Speaking, which carries more Majesty and Ornament along with it, and is more pleasing and lik'd of, by the generality of Men. For what is there in the World more ex­traordinary than Eloquence, whether we consider the Admiration of its Hearers, the Reliance of those who stand in need of its Assistance, or the Good-will procur'd by it from those whom it defends? Our Ancestors therefore held this among the chief of their Civil Professions. Any one then must oblige a great many, and have a large number of Clients and Dependants, who is able to speak well, and willing to take pains, and (as e 'twas the Custom of our good Fore-fathers) is ready to undertake many Mens Causes, without ever expecting to be reward­ed for his Trouble. And here I have a fair Oppor­tunity offer'd me, to bemoan the great Downfal, that I mayn't say the utter Extinction of Eloquence; but that I am afraid I shall seem to complain for my own sake only. However I can't but with some Concern take notice, what a great many excellent Orators we have lost; how few there are arising, whom we can expect any thing from; and how much fewer who are able to perform and do any thing; [Page 211] and for all that, how many, who are brim full of Im­pudence and vain Presumption. f Now it is not for all, nor indeed very many, to be either skilful Law­yers, or eloquent Pleaders: However there's no one, if he'd make it his Business, but may do friendly Offices to several People; either by begging some Kindnesses for 'em; or by recommending their Cases to the Judges and Officers; or by being Industrious in promoting their Interests; or lastly, by using his Endeavours with those, who either are able Law­yers, or eloquent Orators: which whoever shall do, will make a great many be beholden to him, and get himself a general Interest in the World. g There is one thing however I would advertise him of, (tho' I think 'tis so obvious, that I hardly need do it) which is to have a care of offending some, whilst he's endeavouring to be serviceable to others. For it often comes to pass, that such do a Diskindness, either to those whom they ought to have oblig'd; or to those who are able to make 'em suffer for it af­terwards: Which shews Carelesness and Negligence, if done undesignedly; but if designedly, Rashness and Imprudence. And if it should happen that we are forc'd, tho' unwillingly, to disoblige any Person, we must endeavour to excuse it as well as we are able; by shewing the Necessity we lay under of do­ing so, and how 'twas utterly impossible for us to avoid it: and must be careful and industrious to repair the Injury, by making some reasonable A­mends for it afterwards.

CHAP. XX.

Men are readier to assist one that's Wealthy and Great than one that is Poor and Honest. Reasons why they ought to do the contrary. The Evil Effects of Mens Love of Riches. Never to do an Injury to one, for the sake of Obliging another.

NOw a whenever we do a Kindness or Friendly Office to another, we usually regard one of these two Things, viz. Either the Honesty, or the Greatness of the Person. 'Tis easily said, and eve­ry one's ready enough to profess, That in placing their Favours, they have much more Respect to the Merits of the Person, than to his Fortune in the World. This is very fairly and honestly spoken: but yet I'd be glad to be shewn that Man, who is more willing to Help one that's Honest and Poor, than to get the Favour of one that is Wealthy and Powerful. For who is not readiest to be service­able to those, from whom he expects the most speedy Requital? But People would do well to con­sider more throughly the Natures of things: For tho' a poor Man, 'tis true, can't make a Requital, yet if he's honest, he will acknowledge the Obliga­tion: And 'twas no unhandsom Saying, whoever was the Author of it, ‘That in Case of a Debt, the Man who acknowledges it doth not thereby pay it; and the Man who pays it does no longer acknow­ledge [Page 213] it: But in Case of an Obligation, both he who returns it still continues to acknowledge it, and he who acknowledges it thereby sufficiently returns it.’ But now those, on the contrary, who value themselves upon their Riches, Honours and flourish­ing Condition, will scorn to acknowledge they're oblig'd for any Kindness; nay, will think they vouchsafe you a signal Favour, even whilst you are doing 'em some considerable Service; and will always be jealous and suspicious over you, as tho' you demanded and expected something from 'em: But to have it ever said they were defended by you, or to be number'd among your Dependants or Cli­ents, is as insupportable to 'em as even Death it self. Whereas your mean Person, when any one does him a friendly Office, considers 'twas done out of Res­pect to himself, and not out of Regard to his For­tune or Condition; and endeavours to shew him­self sensible of the Obligation, not to him only who has done him the Kindness, but (as standing in need of some other Mens Assistance) to those others also, from whom he hopes for the like. And if he should chance to do another any Service, he does not en­deavour to cry up and magnifie it, but rather to lessen it as much as he is able. Another thing worth the considering is this, That if you defend one that's wealthy and powerful, the Obligation remains in the Person himself, or perhaps just his Children; but if you protect one that's needy and forsaken, provided withal he be virtuous and mo­dest, all the lower sort of People immediately that aren't wicked (which is no inconsiderable part of the Multitude) will look upon you as their Safe-guard and Protection. Upon all which Accounts I am wholly of Opinion, That a Kindness is better be­stow'd upon an honest, than 'tis upon a wealthy and fortunate Person. We should endeavour, 'tis true, [Page 214] to the utmost of our power, to be serviceable to all Men of whatsoever Condition: But if their should happen a Competition between 'em, I am clearly for following Themistocles's Advice, who being once ask'd, How he'd Marry his Daughter, whether to one that was Poor, but Honest; or to one that was Rich, but of an ill Reputation? made Answer, I'd rather have a Man without an Estate, than have an Estate with­out a Man. But the mighty Respect, which is paid to Riches, has wholly deprav'd and corrupted our Manners. And yet what does it signifie to any one of us, that such or such a Person has got a plenti­ful Fortune? Perhaps it may be useful to him that has it; tho' not so neither always: But allowing it to be so: Suppose he has got the World more at his Command; yet how (I'd fain know) is he ever the honester for it? b But and if a Man be Honest, as well as Wealthy, tho' I would not have him helpt for the sake of his Riches, yet I would not have him hindred upon their account neither: But in every case have it fairly consider'd, not how Wealthy and Great, but how Good and Deserving a Person he is. c I shall conclude this Head with only one Rule more, which is, Never for the sake of doing any one a Kindness, to venture upon that which is unjust in it self, or injurious to a third Person. For no Cre­dit or Esteem can be solid and durable, unless built upon the Foundations of Justice and Honesty; with­out which nothing can be virtuous or commend­able.

CHAP. XXI.

Two sorts of that Bounty, which relates to the Publick. Nothing to be done for the sake of the Members in particular, which may any ways damage the Publick in general. The first Duty of the Governours of a State, to secure each Particular in the Possession of his own. Levelling all Estates very destructive. Why Men first built Cities. Not to burden the Peo­ple with Taxes, a second Duty. A third, To fur­nish the People with Necessaries. Covetousness in a Governour pernicious to any State. The unhappy Effects of it in the Roman Empire.

a HAving thus discours'd of the one sort of Kind­nesses, which are done to particular Members of the City; we are now in the next place to speak of those others, which are done to them all, and to the Commonwealth in general. Now these again are of two sorts, The one more immediate­ly relating to the Community; the other reaching down to each Member in particular; which latter, of the two is more grateful and acceptable. We should shew our Beneficence, as far as we are able, in both these Ways; but especially in this latter, which relates to each one of the particular Members: [Page 216] In which however one Caution must be observ'd, That nothing be done in behalf of Particulars, but that which is useful, or at least not prejudicial, to the Commonwealth in general. b C. Gracchus, for Instance, made a large Distribution of Corn to the People; and the Effect of it was, that the Treasury was exhausted by it. c Marcus Octavius made one that was moderate, which was a Kindness to the Multitude, and no ways a Burthen or Grievance to the State; and accordingly both the Publick, and all the Members of the City receiv'd Benefit from it. d But the principal thing for a Governour to take care of, is, That each Individual be kept in the quiet Possession of his own, and That private Men ben't e dispossessed of their Lands, under a Pretence of taking Care of the Publick. For No­thing's more destructive to the Peace of any King­dom, than to bring in a new Distribution of Estates, which was attempted by f Philip, in the Time of his Tribuneship: However he quickly gave over his Design, and did not persist stubbornly in Defence of it, as soon as he found it was so vigorously op­pos'd: But in his publick Speeches and Haran­gues to the People, among a great many things to obtain their Favour, he was heard to say one of very dangerous Consequence, That the whole City had not Two Thousand Men in it, that were Masters of Estates: A very pernicious [Page 217] and desperate Saying, directly tending to bring all things to a Level; which is the greatest Misfortune that can befal any People. For to what end were Cities and Commonwealths establish'd, but that e­very one might be safer and securer, in the Enjoy­ment of his own? For tho' Men by Nature are sociable Creatures, yet 'twas the Desire of Preser­ving what they had, that first put 'em upon build­ing of Cities for a Refuge. g 'Tis a Second Duty of the Governours of a State, to see that the Peo­ple ben't forc'd to pay Taxes; as they often were in our Fore-fathers time, partly because they were always in War, and partly by reason of the Low­ness of the Treasury. This is an Inconvenience, which ought, as far as possible, to be provided a­gainst before-hand: But if any State should be un­der such Circumstances, as that it must be forc'd to make use of this Expedient, (I say any State, be­cause I'm unwilling to suppose so unhappy a thing of our own; beside that I speak here of all of 'em in general) but if, I say, any State should be brought to such a Pinch, due Care must be taken to let the People know, That 'tis absolutely necessary as Affairs now stand, and that otherwise they must needs be inevita­bly ruin'd. h Again, 'Tis yet further requir'd of those Men, who Govern and Preside in a Commonwealth, to see that it be furnish'd with all the Conveniencies and Necessaries of Life. To tell what these are, and how to be provided, would be altogether needless in this place, since 'tis sufficiently known already; I only thought fit just to touch upon it by the Bye. i But in all kinds of Business, and managing Affairs [Page 218] of a publick Nature, there's nothing more necessa­ry, than always to keep one's self clear and untaint­ed, so as not to lye under the least suspicion of Ava­rice. I could heartily wish, (said k Caius Pontius the Samnite) that Fortune had reserv'd me to those Times, and that it had been my fate to be then born, whenever the Romans shall begin to take Bribes; I should quickly have put an end to their flourishing Empire. Truly he must have waited a pretty ma­ny Ages; for that's a kind of Evil, which but late­ly has begun to infest this Republick. If Pontius therefore were so great a Man as he pretended to be, I am very well satisfy'd with his being born when he was; and not in those times, which have lately happen'd. 'Tis not yet an Hundred and Ten Years ago, since l Lucius Piso got a Law to be en­acted against the Corruption of Magistrates, where­as there had never been any one before. But since that time there have been so m many Laws, and still ev'ry new one more severe than the for­mer; so many Persons accus'd and condemn'd; such n a War stirr'd up in the Bowels of Italy, by those who were afraid of being brought to Punish­ment; [Page 219] such shameful Extortion and Pillaging our Allies, by those who have defied all Laws and Courts of Justice; that we're rather beholden to the Weakness of others, than our own Strength or Virtues, that we are not utterly ruin'd.

CHAP. XXII.

Examples of Contempt of Money among the ancient Romans. The Danger, &c. of the opposite Vice. The Honour gotten by this Virtue. The Danger, Folly, &c. of the Project of Levelling Estates.

PAnaetius highly commends a Africanus, for his be­ing uncorrupt as to the matter of Money. 'Tis a Virtue that very well deserv'd his Commendation: but I think there were others in that great Person, which deserv'd it much more: to be untainted with Money being not so properly a Virtue of that Man, as of those Times in general. b Paulus Aemilius had all the Wealth of Macedonia in his Power, which amounted to almost an infinite Value: so that he brought such a Sum into the Treasury, as that the single Booty of that one General superseded the Necessity of all Taxes for the future: and yet he brought nothing into his own House, but the eter­nal [Page 220] Memory of his Name and Atchievements. c Africanus follow'd the Example of his Father, and return'd nothing richer from the Overthrow of Car­thage. So Mummius, who was afterwards his Part­ner in the Censorship; did he make himself ever a far­thing the Wealthier, by razing d one of the wealthi­est Cities in the World? No; he rather chose to make Italy fine with the Spoils of his Enemies, than his own House; tho' in my Opinion the Fineness of Italy reflects a bright Lustre upon his own House too. There is no Vice then (that I may return to the Subject, from which I have digress'd) more detestable than Avarice; more especially in Great Men, and such as bear Sway in the Government of a State. For 'tis not only mean for a Man to make a Prey and Advantage of the Commonwealth, but even impious and abominable. That Oracle therefore of the Pythian Apollo's, That nothing but Avarice should be the Ruine of Sparta, doth not seem design'd for the Lacedaemonians only, but for every wealthy and flourishing Nation. e And as Avarice is thus very destructive to a State; so to appear Up­right and Regardless of Money, is the certainest Me­thod those in Power can make use of, for procuring the Love and Good-liking of the People. But those, who, designing to curry their Favour, attempt new Laws about the Levelling Estates, so as to force [Page 221] the right Owners from their lawful Possessions; or propose to make Creditors remit all the Debts, which in Justice are due to 'em; f plainly undermine the two principal Pillars and Supports of the Go­vernment: In the first place, Concord and Unity among the Citizens, which can never be kept up, whilst some are depriv'd of what is justly their Due, and others discharg'd from the necessity of Payment. Secondly, Justice, which immediately must sink in­to Ruins and Nothing, if Men can't be secur'd in the Possession of what's their own: For that (as we before remark d) is the chief End and Aim of Men's gathering into Societies, and building of Ci­ties, that each one might freely enjoy what's his Right, without any danger or fear of being de­priv'd on't. g Beside this, the Authors of these per­nicious Designs never get that Good-will, which they propose, from their Citizens: For, as for those Men, who are Losers by the Bargain, 'tis certain that they'll be their Enemies for it; and those, who are Gainers, will besure to pretend that they never desir'd it: especially in the Business of having Debts forgiven; there ev'ry one dissembles how glad he is of it, for fear it should be thought that he was not able to pay 'em. But those Men, to whom such Designs are prejudicial, will hardly forget 'em, but shew a perpetual Grudge and Resentment. And tho' the number of those, who are thus wickedly Befriended, be greater than of those, who are in­juriously [Page 222] Rob'd; yet it doth not follow, that there­fore they are more Powerful: for 'tis not the Num­ber, but the Quality of the Persons, that must car­ry it in this Case. h Besides, what Reason or E­quity is there, when Estates have been held for a great many Years, or perhaps Ages, that the right­ful Owners should be thrust out from 'em, and o­thers, that never had any, should come and possess them?

CHAP. XXIII.

Several Examples of the unhappy Effects of taking a­way Mens Estates, in order to bring things to a Level. The wise Conduct of Aratus the Sicyoni­an in doing the contrary. What a Magistrate's Duty in such Cases is.

FOr such kind of partial, injurious Proceedings, a the Spartans once banish'd b Lysander, one of their c Ephori; and put to Death d Agis their [Page 223] King for the same Reason: an Action unheard of before in that City. This was succeeded by such grievous Contentions and Discords in the State, as that Tyranny and Oppression got the upper-hand a­mongst 'em; the Nobles were banish'd from their Native Country; and the best constituted Repub­lick upon the face of the Earth was utterly dissolv'd, and brought into Confusion. Nor did this Mischief end with the Spartans only, but, like a Contagion, spreading it self farther, involv'd all Greece in the same Miseries and Calamities. Pray what was it ruin'd our own two Gracchi, Sons of the famous Tiberius Gracchus, and Grandsons of e Africanus, but only these Controversies about Levelling Estates? f Ara­tus the Sicyonian is deservedly commended as much on the other hand: He, when his County, for fif­ty Years together, had been greatly oppress'd and over-run by Tyrants, went secretly one Night from Argos to Sicyon, and made himself Master of the City by Surpize; and unexpectedly falling upon Nicocles the then Tyrant, he put him to flight. This being done, he recall'd six Hundred of the wealthi­est Citizens, who had all been formerly banish'd by the Tyrants, and by this his arrival delivered the City from Slavery and Oppression. But he after­wards found 'twould be a great deal of trouble, to settle the Business of their Estates and Possessions; for he thought on the one hand 'twas very unrea­sonable, that those Men, whom he had restor'd, [Page 224] should Want, whilst others enjoy'd what in Equity was theirs: and yet it seem'd hard on t'other side, that Men should be thrust out of those Possessions, which now they had held for these fifty Years: if more especially 'twere withal consider'd, That it could not but happen in so long a time, that they must have gone, a great part of 'em, from one to another, either by Inheritance, Purchase, Dowry, or the like; and therefore were possest by the present Incumbents, without their having injur'd the rightful Proprietors. Upon these Considerations he judg'd it necessary, both to bear with the latter in the Enjoyment of what they had, and yet to Satisfie the former, whom it justly belong'd to. And finding a large Sum of Money was requisite, to settle this Business as it ought to be; he told 'em he had occasions to go to g Alexandria, and order'd they should not con­cern 'emselves about it, till his return. He goes accordingly with all possible speed to his old Friend h Ptolomy, who at that time was reigning in Alex­andria, being second King after the Founding of that City. Having told him his Design of settling Li­berty in his Country, and the Reasons that put him upon undertaking of that Voyage, he quickly ob­tain'd of that wealthy Prince, to supply him with a quantity of Money for his Assistance. With this he immediately returns to Sicyon, and choosing out fifteen o'th' principal Citizens, to help him with their Counsel upon this occasion; he heard both [Page 225] the Causes of those who possess'd what had belong'd to others, and of those who had lost what had been formerly their own. At last he so manag'd the whole Business, as that, the Estates being set at their true Values, i some were persuaded to part with what they had, and take an Equivalent in Money for it: and k others to neglect the Recovery of their own, and rest themselves content with be­ing pay'd its full Value. By this means the Con­troversie was fairly determin'd, and all went Home satisfy'd without Grudging or Complaining. Here was a great and extraordinary Man now! Here was one, that deserv'd to have been born in our Republick! This is the true way of Dealing with Citizens; and not (as hath been practis'd amongst us l twice) to make sale of their Goods in the pub­lick Markets, and have them cry'd by the Voice of the Common Cryer. But this famous Grecian (as was the Duty of a wise and extraordinary Person) thought it became him to provide alike for all: And indeed every Magistrate, who proceeds upon Prin­ciples of Reason and Prudence, will always take care not to make any Difference between the Interests of his People; but will govern them all by the same Rule and Standard of Justice and Equity. Here's one Man shall dwell in what belongs to another: What Reason is there, I beseech you, for this; that when I have bought, built, repair'd, and laid out a great deal of Money, another should come and injoy all the Fruits of it, in spite of my Teeth? [Page 226] Is not this plainly to take away from one that which justly belongs to him, and give to another what he has nothing of Right to? As for the Pro­ject of Forgiving Debts, I can see no Reason in the World for it, unless it be Reason, that another should buy Land with my Money, and that he should have the Land, but I never have my Mo­ney.

CHAP. XXIV.

Care should be taken to prevent Peoples running too much into Debt. Faith the Cement of Publick So­ciety. Cicero's Conduct in his Consulship about the matter of Debts. The Duties of a good Magistrate. How one's Health and Estate are to be taken care of.

a CAre ought therefore to be taken before-hand (which 'tis easie to do by a great many ways) to keep People from running so much into Debt, as may bring any Damage or Inconvenience to the Publick: and not, when they are in, to make the Creditors lose what's their own, and let the Debtors gain what in Justice is another's: For no­thing so cements, and holds together in Union all the parts of a Society, as Faith or Credit; which can never be kept up, unless Men are under some force and necessity of honestly Paying what they owe to one another. This Design of having Debt­ors excus'd from Payment, b was never attempted [Page 227] with greater eagerness, than whilst I was Consul: Men of all Ranks and Degrees in the State, took up Arms and form'd Camps for the bringing it about; whose Endeavours I resisted with so much vigour, as that the Republick was quickly deliver'd from so per­nicious an Evil. There never were known greater Debts in the City, nor ever more easily and faithful­ly paid: and pray what was the Reason of all this? Why because when their Hopes of Defrauding were cut off, they found 'emselves under a Necessity of Payment. 'Tis true there is c one, who has since been a Conquerer, (tho' then he was conquer'd by my Vigilance) that has d found out Means to effect these Designs, at a time when they'd bring him e no manner of Advantage; but such an Inclination had that Man to Villany, that the bare Doing of it was a Pleasure to him, without any other Invitation in the World. The Sum then of what has been said is this, That such as design for the good of the Re­publick, must be sure to avoid this sort of Libera­lity, which takes away from one what it gives to a­nother; and must constantly make it their principal Care, to uphold each Member in his proper Rights, according to the Principles of Justice and Equity; so as neither to suffer the poorer sort of People to be wrong'd or oppress'd, by reason of their Pover­ty; nor the richer to be hindred from keeping or demanding what's justly their own, by the Envy of the others: and in fine must apply their most [Page 228] earnest Endeavours, whether in War or Peace, to encrease the Power, and enlarge the Bounds and Revenues of the Republick. These are the Duties and Exercises of great Men: These are the things which were practic'd by our Ancestors; and who­ever goes on to perform the same, will not only bring great Advantage to the Republick, but gain a mighty Interest and Reputation to himself. f In these Rules of Duty relating to things profitable, g Antipater the Tyrian, a Stoick Philosopher, who lately dy'd at Athens, thinks that two things have been omitted by Panaetius: First, The care of get­ting or preserving one's Health. And, Secondly, Of an Estate. I believe that great Philosopher might omit 'em on purpose, because they are so easie and obvious to every one: however 'tis certain they [Page 229] are both of 'em profitable. h Now Health is pre­serv'd by considering the peculiar Temper of one's Body, and observing what agrees or does not agree with it; by Temperance and Moderation in Meats and Drinks, and other things relating to the wel­fare of the Body; by forbearance and abstinence as to the matter of Pleasures; and lastly, by the Skill of Physicians, and the like. i An Estate should be gotten by nothing that's any ways Scandalous or Dishonest; preserv'd by Diligence and prudent Ma­nagement; and lastly, by the same means better'd and augmented. But this whole Subject is excellent­ly handled by k Xenophon the Socratick, in his Book of O Economicks; which I formerly translated from the Greek into Latin, when much about as old as you are at present.

CHAP. XXV.

The Comparing of things Profitable one with another. An Answer of Cato's upon this Head. Who are best able to teach how to get Estates.

THe a fourth chief Head we propos'd to speak of, was the Comparing things Profitable one with [Page 230] another; which is oftentimes necessary, however neglected or forgotten by Panaetius. For we use to compare either the Goods of the Body with those of Fortune; or these back again with those of the Bo­dy; or lastly, those both of the one and the other a­mongst 'emselves. First, The Goods of the Body are compar'd with those of Fortune, as, 'Tis more eligible, suppose, to be Healthy than Rich. Secondly, These back again with those of the Body, as, 'Tis better to be Rich, than of a robust Constitution. Thirdly, Those of the Body with one another, as Health is preferable to Pleasure, or Strength to Activity. And Lastly, Those of Fortune with one another, as if Glory should be preferr'd before Riches, or an Estate in the City before another in the Country. To this latter sort of Comparing may be referr'd that An­swer of the Senior Cato's, who being once ask'd, What he conceiv'd most Profitable in the Manage­ment of an Estate? said, To Feed Cattle well. And what the second? To Feed Cattle pretty well. And what the third? To Feed Cattle, tho' but ill. And what the fourth? To Till the Ground. And then the Enquirer proceeding still to ask, Pray what do you think of letting Money out to Usury? Pray what do I think, replies Cato, of killing a Man? From what has been said, and a great deal more, that might easily be added, 'tis sufficiently manifest, That Profits are often compar'd with one another; and that we had Reason sufficient on our side, in making this a fourth Head for the finding out our Duty. But as for the Business of getting an Estate, and placing out Money to the best Advantage, and I wish I might add of applying to the best Uses, there are certain b honest Men who attend at the [Page 231] Exchange, that can better inform you than any of the Philosophers, that dispute in the Schools. 'Tis worth while however to know these things, because they relate to the Business of Profit, which has made up the Subject of all this Book. Let us now pass on to what remains behind.

The End of the Second Book.

TULLY's OFFICES.
The Third Book.

CHAP. I.

An excellent Saying of the Elder Scipio Africanus. Cicero betakes himself to a Life of Leisure and Retirement, the Republick being quite ruin'd. The Difference between his Retirement, and Africanus's. Some Good to be drawn out of Evils.

a CAto, Son Mark, who was near of the same Age with Publius Scipio, the first that had the Sir­name of b Africanus giv'n him, tells us 'twas an usual Saying of his, That he never was less idle, than when he was idle; nor ever less alone, than when he was alone. A noble and excellent Sentence indeed, and worthy of so great and so wise a Person; by which it appears, that in the midst of Leisure he could think of Business, and was us'd when alone to converse with his own Thoughts: so that he never was properly Idle, and needed no Company to entertain him in his Solitude. The two things [Page 233] therefore, which bring a kind of Dullness and Hea­viness upon others, serv'd but to sharpen and invigo­rate his Mind, viz. Solitude and Leisure. I wish I could truly say the same of my self! But tho' I'm not able to arrive at that inimitable Temper of Soul, I desire at least to come as near it as is possi­ble; and being excluded by open Violence, and c impious Arms, from having ought to do with Af­fairs of the Senate, or Business of the Bar, I whol­ly betake my self to a Life of Retirement; and for that very reason have abandon'd the City, and am often alone, only going from one Seat to another in the Country. But alas! my Leisure is not to be com­par'd with that of Africanus, nor my Solitude with his Solitude! For he was employ'd, at that very time, in Places of the greatest Reputation in the Publick; and his Leisure was only a voluntary Retirement, to give himself Respite from Business for a season; and his Solitude only a kind of Port or Haven, into whcih he withdrew himself from the Disturbances of Com­pany. Whereas my Leisure proceeds not from a­ny desire of Respite, but from a want of Business to Employ my self about; for what proper Work can I find to do, when there's no more d a Senate, nor a­ny Courts of Justice remaining e entire, in which I might honourably shew my self? Therefore, whereas 'twas my former Custom to appear much in Publick, and in the Eye of my Citizens; I now on the contrary hide my self from 'em, to avoid the very sight of such Packs of Villains, as are every­where abroad; and as much as is possible confine my self to Solitude. But since this is given us for [Page 234] a Rule by the Learned, That when several Evils are threatning us at once, we should not only choose to un­dergo the least, but extract some Advantage out of 'em if 'tis possible: I therefore, in the midst of all these present Misfortunes, gain the small Advantage of Quiet and Retirement, (tho' not such a Quiet as he might have expected, whose Wisdom had for­merly f procur'd the Peace of the Publick) and endeavour not wholly to languish out that Solitude, which not Choice, but Necessity has laid upon me. Tho' Africanus indeed, I my self must confess, has got much greater Glory by his Solitude and Re­tirement: For none of his Thoughts are committed to Writing, nor any Monuments remain of what he did in his Leisure, and when he was alone; whereby we are given to understand, That he ne­ver was idle, nor ever properly alone; because he was always employ'd in Meditation, and in search­ing out those things, which by Thinking he be­came Master of. But I, who han't got such a strength of Genius, as to be content, when alone, with the company of my bare Thoughts, am forc'd to apply all my Studies and Endeavours to the drudgery of Writing: I have written more there­fore within a very short time, since the Ruin of the State, than I did for some Years, while 'twas in its flourishing Condition.

CHAP. II.

The Subject of Duties the most useful part of all Phi­losophy. An Exhortation to his Son to be diligent in his Studies. The Subject of this Third Book. Pa­naetius neglected to treat of it, tho' he did at first design it. A Saying of Rutilius Rufus.

NOw tho' all Philosophy (my dear Cicero) be a rich, as it were, and plentiful Soil, which has not any part of it wast and uncultivate: yet there's no place that's more fruitful in it, or from which more Advantage accrues to the Husband­man, than that which is employ'd about Offices or Duties; from whence those Precepts and Directi­ons are drawn, which lead toward a steddy and virtuous Way of Living. Wherefore tho' I doubt not but that Cratippus, the greatest Philosopher of our Age, is daily inculcating these things to you, and you are receiving them with that Atten­tion they deserve; yet I have thought it not whol­ly unnecessary, my self to remind you of so impor­tant a Matter; and could wish that your Ears might continually ring, as it were, with such Pre­cepts, and not hear (as far as possible) any thing else. And as this is a Method which is useful for all Men, who design to lead virtuous and credita­ble Lives; so for no one living, perhaps, more than your self. For consider you're the Son of an industrious Father, one who has born the greatest Honours in the Republick, and has gotten himself some Credit and Reputation in the World; People therefore will expect that you should follow my Steps, and 'tis your part to see that you answer their Expectation. Beside 'tis no small thing you have taken upon you, by being at Athens, and un­der the Great Cratippus; whither since you are [Page 236] gone as it were to a Staple and Mart of good Litera­ture, 'twill be scandalous for you to return again empty, and bring a Reproach both upon the Place and your Master. Wherefore, dear Son, be Indu­strious and Diligent, and spare no manner of Pains and Labour (if I may call it a Labour, and not ra­ther a Pleasure, to Study and Learn) that you may make a good Use of these Advantages before you; and when all things are thus plentifully supply'd on my part, let it never be said, That you your self are wanting to your own greatest Interest. But I shall say no more upon this at present, having heretofore written again and again to you, by way of Exhor­tation. Let us now proceed to the fifth and last Part of our propos'd Division. a Panaetius then, who without all controversie has written most ac­curately upon the Subject of Duties, and whom in this Work, with a little Alteration, I have hitherto follow'd, lays down (as was said) three general Heads, which Men use in Consulting or Delibera­ting concerning their Duty: In the first 'tis questi­on'd, Whether the Action they are going about be Ho­nest or Dishonest. In the second, Whether it be Profit­able or Unprofitable. In the third, How a good Man ought to determin the Case, if that which seems Honest should come into competition with that which seems Profitable. Of the two former Heads he has given us an account in his three first Books, and therein has promis'd to go on with the third of 'em; but has fail'd, it should seem, of being so good as his Word. Which I wonder at the more upon this ac­count, [Page 237] because we are told by his Scholar Possido­nius, That he liv'd thirty Years after those Books were publish'd. And I can't but admire at the same Possidonius, that having an occasion, in some of his Writings, to discourse upon this Argument, he should do no more than just touch upon it in short; especially seeing he himself has observ'd, That in all Philosophy there's no one Subject more necessa­ry and important. Some indeed think, whom I cannot agree with, that Panaetius did not forget this Part, but omitted it on purpose; and that in plain truth, it ought to be omitted, since Profit can never be really contrary to Honesty. Whether it ought to be omitted or not, may perhaps be a Que­stion; but whether Panaetius design'd it or no, and afterwards neglected it, I think can be none: For a Writer certainly, that proposes three Heads, and goes thro' with but two of 'em, must needs design to discourse upon the third; nay he tells us himself in the close of his third Book, That he'd afterwards proceed to this remaining Part. Beside we have the Authority of Possidonius to vouch it, who in one of his Letters has given us a Saying of Rutilius Rufus, who was Scholar to Panaetius as well as himself; That as never any Painter had been yet so bold, as to venture upon finishing that Piece of Venus, which b Apelles left imperfect at the Island Cos; (the Beau­ty of the Face making all Men despair, ever to paint a Body that should be answerable to it) so the Excel­lency of that, which Panaetius had writ upon this Sub­ject, made others afraid of attempting to add that which he had omitted.

CHAP. III.

Whether Panaetius did well in making this third Head. Reasons why he did not. The Danger of separating Profit from Honesty. What the Stoicks mean by Living according to Nature. Two sorts of Virtue, the Perfect and Ordinary. The former belongs to the Wise only; the latter is common to all. The most perfect Virtue (as 'tis counted by the Multi­tude) is really imperfect.

a THat Panaetius therefore did think he was ob­liged to Discourse upon this Part, is beyond all Question: But whether he was mistaken in his Judgment or not, when he laid down this Head, as the third of deliberating for the finding out our Du­ty, may perhaps be disputed. b For whether ac­cording to the Opinion of the Stoicks, we take Vir­tue or Honesty to be the only Good; or, according to that of your Peripateticks, acknowledge it so to be the chiefest Good, as that all things else are just no­thing against it; 'tis certain, upon either of these Suppositions, That Profit can't be put in the Bal­lance against Honesty. We are therefore told, That Socrates us'd even to curse those People, who disjoyn'd these things in Thought and Conception, which are one and the same in Nature and Reality. And c the Stoicks are so far of his Opinion, as con­stantly [Page 239] to maintain, That whatever is Honest must be also Profitable, and whatever is Profitable must be also Honest. 'Tis true had Panaetius been one of those, who assert that Virtue is therefore only desirable, because it brings something of Profit a­long with it; like d some, who think nothing any further worth a-seeking for, than as it begets Plea­sure, or Exemption from Pain; we could then have allow'd him the liberty of saying, That Profit is sometimes repugnant to Honesty. But seeing he was one of e a different Sect, and thinks nothing to be Good except that which is Honest; and avows that whatever is contrary to Honesty, and appears to us under the Notion of Profit, can neither, if we have it, make Life ever the better; nor, if we have it not, ever the worse; he should not, me­thinks, have brought in such a Deliberation, where­in that, which seems Profitable, comes into Com­petition with that, which is Honest. For that, which f the Stoicks call their Sovereign Good [to live in Conformity with the Dictates of Nature] means, I suppose, no more than this, That we should al­ways live agreeably to the Rules of Virtue; and should use other things, which are suited and adapt­ed to our natural Inclinations, no further than Vir­tue permits and allows 'em. Now this being so, [Page 240] there are several of opinion, That this general Head, wherein Profit and Honesty are compar'd with one another, was improperly brought in; and that there ought not to have been given any Rules or Di­rections upon this Subject. g Now your Perfect Honesty, which is truly and properly call'd by that Name, is only to be found in your perfectly Wise Men, and can never be possibly separated from Virtue: But those Men, who have not this Perfect Wisdom, must by no means pretend to such a Per­fect Honesty, tho' they may have some Shadows and Resemblances of it. For all those Duties, of which we are treating in these Books, have the name of Middle ones given 'em by the Stoicks, which are common indifferently to all Men in general, and are not confin'd to any particular number of them. But several get 'em either by the peculiar Happiness of their Natures, or by a constant progress in Study and Learning. Whereas those others, which they call Right ones, are perfect and consummate, or (as they 'emselves express it) have all their Numbers, which none can attain to, but the perfectly Wise. 'Tis true that the Vulgar, as soon as they see any Action of such a nature, as indeed is no more than a Middle kind of Duty, are immediately thinking it a Perfect and Compleat one: h For the common [Page 241] sort of People can't tell what is Perfect, and by consequence don't know how much any Virtue or Excellency comes short of it: but finding it answer the highest of their Conceptions, they imagin it wants nothing of being as perfect as can be. Just as it happens in judging of Poems or Pieces of Paint­ing, and other such like; those who aren't Judges, are generally pleas'd with and praise those things, which by no means deserve any Praise or Commen­dation: Because, I suppose, there may be some­thing that's Good in 'em, which serves well enough to take with those that are ignorant, and who han't so much skill as to be able to discover their several Imperfections: Therefore when they are instructed by those who understand it, they are brought with no great difficulty to forsake their Opinions.

CHAP. IV.

The greatest Men that have been in the World, were not perfectly Wise. Profit ought not to be compar'd with the Middle, any more than with the Perfect Honesty. How Men come to compare 'em together, or to doubt upon this Subject. This illustrated by an Example. One certain Rule necessary for our Guidance in this case. The Doctrin of the Stoicks preferable to that of the Peripateticks.

THose Duties therefore, which make up the Sub­ject of this Enquiry, by the Stoicks are counted a kind of second-rate Honesty, which is not confin'd to their Wise Men only, but is common and open to all Mankind: and therefore all those, who have any kind of Sence or Inclination for Virtue, are very sensibly touch'd and affected with it. For you aren't to imagin, when we call the two a Decii's or b Scipio's Magnanimous, and give c Fabricius and d Aristides the Appellation of Just, that we set them for Patterns of such Justice and Magnanimity, as [Page 243] we suppose to be in those who are perfectly Wise. For they were none of them Wise in that exalted Sence, which we would here be understood to mean by that Word. Nay those who were count­ed and sirnam'd the Wise, such as Cato, for Instance, and Laelius, and particularly the e famous Seven; yet in Truth and Reality were not such: but by frequently practising that middle sort of Duties, had gotten a sort of Shew and Resemblance of true Wisdom. As no Profit therefore ought ever to be put in opposition to that, which is truely and perfectly Virtuous and Honest; so neither should a­ny Interest, or Convenience of Life, be set up a­gainst that, which is ordinarily call'd so, and which is follow'd by those, who desire to be counted Men of Honesty and Integrity: And we should be as careful of living up to that Honesty, whereof we are capable; as the perfectly Wise are of keeping close to that, which is truly such, and may in strictness of Speech be call'd by that Name. For whatever Attainments we have made in Virtue, they will ne­ver stand us in any mighty stead, if we ben't thus careful of holding constantly to our Duty—. What has hitherto been said can be apply'd to those only, who make Goodness consist in living according to their Duty: But f those Men, who measure the Good­ness of things by some g Profit or Advantage they [Page 244] bring along with them, and who let these prevail more with them than Virtue and Honesty; fre­quently in deliberating use to put that, which they take to be Profitable, into the Ballance against Justice and Honesty; but good and wise Men ne­ver offer to do it. h I'm therefore of opinion, when Panaetius tells us, That Men use to deliberate, in con­sidering which of these two they should chuse; that he meant no more than what his Words strictly signi­fie, viz. That they use to do this, and not that re­ally they ought to do it. For 'tis infinitely scanda­lous, not only to prefer a pretended Advantage be­fore Duty and Conscience; but so much as to bring 'em to the Contest and Competition, and to doubt whether the one of 'em should be chosen before the other. If this be so, you'll be ready to ask me, How then comes there to be any Doubt at all? And what is it that requires Consideration upon this Sub­ject? I suppose 'tis this, That it sometimes hap­pens i Men are not so very certain, Whether the Acti­on deliberated upon be Honest, or not Honest: For that which is usually counted a piece of Villany, is fre­quently chang'd by the Times or Circumstances, and is found to be the contrary. To lay down one In­stance, [Page 245] which may serve to give some Light to a great many others: Pray what greater Wickedness can there be upon Earth (if we speak in general) than for any one to Murder, not only a Man, but a fa­miliar Friend? And shall we therefore affirm that he's chargeable with a Crime, who has murder'd a Tyrant, tho' he were his Familiar? k The People of Rome I am sure won't say so, who count it one of the gloriousest Actions in the World. You'll say then, Does not Interst here carry it against Honesty? No, l but rather Honesty voluntarily follows Inte­rest. m If therefore we would, upon all Emergen­cies, be sure to determin our selves aright, when that which we call our Advantage or Interest, seems to be repugnant to that which is Honest; we must lay down some general Rule or Measure, which if we will make use of in judging about things, we shall never be mistaken as to point of Duty. Now this Measure I would have to be conformable to the Doctrin and Principles of the Stoicks, which I principally follow throughout this Work. For tho' [Page 246] I confess that the ancient Academicks, and your Peri­pateticks, n which were formerly the same, make Honesty far preferable to that which seems one's In­terest: yet o those who assert, That whatever is Ho­nest must be also Profitable, and Nothing is Profitable but what is Honest, talk much more bravely and heroically upon this Subject, than p those who al­low, That there are some things Honest, which are not Profitable; and some things Profitable, which are not Honest. And we have very great Liberty gi­ven us by our Academy, so as never to be ty'd up to such and such Tenets, but are left free to defend what we think most probable.

CHAP. V.

The Rule or Measure mention'd in the former Chap­ter. The ill Effects of Mens Injuring others for their own Advantage. Every one allow'd to take Care of himself in the first place; but not so as to Injure any other, tho' to save his own Life. Two Errors, that occasion Mens Acting contrarywise, and the Absurdity of 'em.

BUt to return to our General Rule or Measure: a There's nothing upon Earth then so contrary to Nature, neither Death, nor Poverty, nor Pain, [Page 247] nor whatever other Evil can befal a Man either in his Body or Fortune, as to take away any thing wrongfully from another, and do one's self a Kind­ness by injuring one's Neighbour. For, in the first place, it ruins all manner of Society and Entercourse amongst Men; since 'tis plain, that if once Men ar­rive at such a pass, as to Plunder and Injure the rest of their Neighbours, out of hopes to procure some Advantage to themselves, there must follow of course a Dissolution of that Society, which of all things in the World is most agreeable to Nature. Should we suppose, for Example, that the bodily Members had, every one of 'em, gotten an Opinion, that to draw to its self all the Vigour of its Neighbours, would very much serve to encrease its own; 'tis certain the whole Body must decay and perish: And just so, should every one amongst us deprive other People of their Profits and Advantages, and take away all he could get from them, with de­sign of applying it only to his own Use; the ge­neral Society and Fellowship of Mankind must of necessity be broken. For tho' 'tis no more than what Nature will allow of, That each Man should look after himself in the first place, and furnish him­self with the Necessaries of Life, before he takes care to provide for other People; yet the same Na­ture will by no means permit, that any one should rise by his thrusting down another, and encrease his own Fortune by the Spoils of his Neighbours. And not only Nature, that is the universal Law or [Page 248] Consent of Nations; but particular Laws, by which several Countries and Commonwealths are govern'd, have commanded likewise, That no one be suffer'd to do an Injury to another, for the sake of procuring any Advantage to himself. For the very Design and End of Laws is to keep up Agreement and Union amongst Citizens; which whoever destroys is by them punish'd, not with the loss of his Goods alone, but with Prisons, Banishment, or even Death it self. But Nature and Right Reason, as being at once both an b Human and Divine Law too, com­mand this Duty with much greater Authority; and whoever obeys them (as all Men must, who pro­pose to live according to the Rules of Nature) will never be guilty of coveting what's another's, or ap­plying to his own Use what had first been injuri­ously taken from his Neighbour. For certainly Greatness and Elevation of Soul; as also the Vir­tues of Courtesie, Justice and Liberality, are much more agreeable to Nature and Right Reason, than Pleasure, than Riches, than even Life it self; to despise all which, and regard 'em as just nothing, when they come to be compar'd with the Publick Interest, is the Duty of a brave and exalted Spirit: whereas to rob another for one's own Advantage is (as has been shewn) more contrary to Nature, than Death, than Pain, or any other Evil whatever of that kind. Again, Those Men live much more ac­cording to Nature, who suffer perpetual Troubles and Labours, for the Good and Preservation, were it possible, of all Men; (like Hercules of old, whom Men, as a grateful Requital for his Benefits, report to be plac'd among the number of the Gods) than [Page 249] those who consume all their Lives in Retirement, where they're not only free from Disturbances and Vexations, but are furnished with all the Pleasures and Conveniencies of Life; and have moreover the advantages of Strength and Comliness superadded to them. And accordingly we find it to be so in ef­fect, that all the most great and extraordinary Ge­niuses, have prefer'd all the Troubles and Difficul­ties of the former, before the Quiet and Ease of this latter way of Living. From all which laid together it unanswerably follows, That whoever lives agree­ably to the Dictates of Nature, can never be guil­ty of Injuring another. c In fine, He that Injures another to do himself a Kindness, either thinks he does nothing that's contrary to Nature; or that the doing an Injury is a less degree of Evil, than Death, or Poverty, or Pain, or loss of Children, Friends, or Relations. If he thinks that in Wronging and Abusing of others, he doth not do any thing that is contrary to Nature; 'tis in vain to dispute any longer with such a one, who takes away from Man the distinguishing Part, and very Characteri­stick (as it were) of his Nature: But if he allows that 'tis indeed an Evil, only thinks that some o­thers, such as Poverty, Pain, or Death, may be worse; he's grosly mistaken in being of Opinion, That the Ills which touch nothing but the Body or Fortune, can be greater than those which affect the Soul.

CHAP. VI.

The Interest of Particulars inseparable from that of the whole Community. The Rule of not Wronging another for our own Advantage, extends not only to Relations, or Fellow-Citizens, but to all Man­kind. The breaking of it, ruins all Justice, Libe­rality, &c. Several Cases about it, put and re­solv'd. Tyrants no Members of Human Society.

a WE should all of us therefore propose the same End, and every one think his own Interest in particular, to be the same with that of the Repub­lick in general: which if each one endeavour to draw solely to himself, all Union and Agreement amongst Men will be dissolv'd. b And if Nature enjoyn us, That every Man should desire and pro­cure the Advantage of another, whoever he be, tho' for no other reason than because he is a Man; it necessarily follows, That all Men are joyn'd, by the self-same Nature, in one common Interest: which if it be true, then all Men are subject, and live equally under the same Law of Nature: and if this be true too, then certainly they're forbid by that same Law of Nature, any ways to In­jure or Wrong one another: But the first of these is undoubtedly certain, therefore the last must [Page 251] needs be so likewise. For as to what is usually said by some Men, That they would not take any thing away from a Father, or Brother, for their own Advantage; but there is not the same reason for their ordinary Citizens; 'tis foolish and absurd: For they thrust 'emselves out from parta­king of any Priviledges, and from joyning in com­mon with the rest of their Citizens, for the Publick Good: An Opinion that strikes at the very Root and Foundation of all Civil Societies. Others there are, who are ready to confess, That they ought to bear such a Regard to Fellow-Citizens; but by no means allow of it in relation to Strangers: Now these Men destroy that universal Society of all Man­kind; which if once taken away, Kindness, Libe­rality, Justice and Humanity must utterly perish; which excellent Virtues whoever makes void, is chargeable with Impiety towards the immortal c Gods: For he breaks that Society, which they have establish'd and settled amongst Men; the closest Cement or Bond of which, is the being of Opinion, That for Men to Injure and Wrong one another for their private Interests, is an Evil that Nature is much more a verse from, than all those which hap­pen either to the Body or Fortune; d nay, and I might add to the Mind also, provided only they ben't contrary to Justice; for that one Virtue is as 'twere, a kind Mistress and Queen of all the rest. [Page 252] But what? (perhaps some Men will be apt to say) if a Wise Man be ready to perish for Hunger, must not he take away Victuals from another; tho' a perfectly useless and insignificant Fellow? Not at all; for Life it self is not so dear to me, as a setled Resolution of doing no Wrong for my private Ad­vantage. But suppose this good Man, almost dead with Cold, should have it in his power to take Phalaris's Cloaths away, one of the most savage and inhuman of Tyrants; would not you have him to do it? There's no great difficulty in deter­mining such Cases: For 'tis certain if you take a­way any thing from another, tho' never so useless and insignificant a Creature, for no other End but to Benefit your self by it; 'tis an inhuman Action, and plainly contrary to the Laws of Nature: But if you are one, who by Living will do very great Service to the Republick, or perhaps to the Society of Mankind in general, and for that only reason take something from another; 'tis an Action that is not to be found much fault with. But in all other Cases, every Man's bound to bear his own Misfortunes, rather than to get quit of 'em by Wronging his Neighbour. You'll say then, Is not it more con­trary to Nature, To Covet or Seize what belongs to a­nother, than to be in Sickness, or Want, or any such Evil? Yes; but withal 'tis as contrary to Nature, to a­bandon all Care of the publick Interest; for 'tis a piece of Injustice: e From whence it follows, That an honest, prudent and valiant Person, whose Death would bring a great Disadvantage on the Publick, [Page 253] may take from an idle and useless Citizen, such things as are necessary for the Maintenance of Life, without any Offence against the Laws of Nature; which aim at the Preservation and Interest of the Publick: provided that he don't make the Love of himself, and Conceit of his own more than ordina­ry Merits, an occasion of Injuring and Oppressing others. For he'll perform but the Duties which Ju­stice require of him, by thus taking care to be ser­viceable to the Publick, and upholding that (which I am often forc'd to mention) universal Society be­tween all Mankind. As for the Question propos'd about Phalaris, 'tis easily answer'd: For Tyrants aren't Members of Human Society; but rather its greatest and most pestilent Enemies; nor is it un­natural, if it lie in one's power, to Rob that Man, whom 'tis even a Virtue and a Glory to Murder. And 'twere heartily to be wish'd, That this whole destructive and impious Race, were utterly banish'd and excluded from amongst Men. Just as we cut off those Members of the Body, which have got no longer either Bloud or Spirits in 'em, and serve but to infect and corrupt the rest; so should those Mon­sters, which under the Shape and Outside of Men, conceal all the Savageness and Cruelty of Beasts, be cut off, as it were, and separated from the Body and Society of Mankind. f Of much the same Na­ture [Page 254] are all those Questions, in which the Know­ledge and Understanding of our Duty, depends up­on the Knowledge of Times and Circumstances.

CHAP. VII.

Cicero will finish what Panaetius left imperfect. All his Decisions taken from this Principle, That Ho­nesty alone, or at least chiefly, is desireable for its own sake. The true Meaning of Panaetius, in making Profit and Honesty be compar'd with one a­nother.

I Believe then Panaetius would have discours'd up­on such things as these, but that some Accident, or perhaps other Business, put a stop to his Designs. However there are Precepts enough laid down in his former Books, to resolve all Scruples and Doubts concerning 'em; from which we may learn, What that is which is Wicked, and therefore to be avoided; and what that, which therefore is not to be avoided, because not at such Times, and in such Cases wick­ed. But since I am going (as it were) to crown a a Work, which was left imperfect by the Author of it, tho' wanting but little of being brought to Per­fection; I shall follow the Method of the Geometri­cians: And as they don't use to demonstrate every thing, but demand to have some things allow'd 'em before-hand, by the help of which they more easily explain and demonstrate their Designs: so I de­mand of you, Son Mark, if you can, to grant me this following Postulatum, That nothing is desirable [Page 255] for it self alone, but that which is Honest: Or however, if b Cratippus won't permit you to do that; yet at least, I am sure, you must grant me this which fol­lows, That Honesty is desirable for its own sake, above all things in the World: Either of the two is sufficient for my Purpose, and the one is probable as well as the other, and c nothing else beside them is so upon this Subject. And here in the first place we must do Right to Panaetius: who does not say, (as indeed he ought not) That that, which is Profitable, could ever be contrary to that, which is Honest; but on­ly that, which has the appearance of such. And he often avows, That nothing is Profitable, but that which is Honest; and, That whatever is Honest is at the same time Profitable: and declares their O­pinion, who first made a difference between those two, to be the greatest Evil that ever yet spread it self abroad amongst Men. Therefore when he speaks of a Contrariety between them, he means an appearing, and not a real one; which he there­fore laid down for one of the Heads of his Dis­course, not as tho' 'twere lawful for Men ever to give Profit the Preference before Honesty; but only that they might be able to determin themselves aright, if these two at any time should seem to in­terfere and be inconsistent with one another. This Part therefore, which he has omitted, I shall now supply; not with any borrow'd Assistance from o­thers, but purely (as we say) by my own Strength. For I never had any thing come to my Hands up­on this Subject, that I could any ways approve of, since the time of Panaetius.

CHAP. VIII.

What we ought to do, when any thing presents it self under the appearance of Profit. Proof that what­ever is Profitable must also be Honest, and whatever is Honest must also be Profitable. The contrary O­pinion the great Source of all Wickedness. Infamy a certain Punishment of Villany. 'Tis a Wickedness even to deliberate whether Profit should be preferr'd before Honesty, or not. Nothing to be done out of hopes of being conceal'd.

WHenever a therefore any thing comes in our View, which carries the appearance of Profit along with it, we can't but immediately be some­what affected with it: But if, upon taking a nearer View, we find there is any thing Base and Disho­nest, in that which appear'd to be Profitable at first, 'tis our Duty to reject it: Which is not to deprive us of what is really Profitable, but only to let us un­derstand, That nothing Dishonest can possibly be such. Now if nothing b be so contrary to Nature as Baseness, and nothing so agreeable to Nature as true Profit, (which is certainly so; for she always [Page 257] desires what is Right, and Becoming, and Consi­stent with it self, and abhors the contrary) then it necessarily follows, That whatever is Profitable can ne're have any Baseness, or Dishonesty annex'd to it. Again, c If we were born for Virtue or Honesty, and this be the only desirable Good; (as d Zeno would have it) or at least so much more, so, than ey'ry thing else, as to outweigh all that can be put in the Scale against it; (which was Aristotle's Opi­nion) it must certainly follow, That Honesty's the only, or however the greatest Good: Now whate­ver is Good must certainly be Profitable; from whence it follows, That whatever is Honest must al­so certainly be Profitable. 'Tis a villanous Error of some naughty Men therefore, when any thing strikes 'em with an appearance of Profit, to seize it imme­diately and enjoy it as such, without ever consider­ing its relation to Honesty. Hence come Assassi­nations, Poysonings, and making of false Wills: Hence Stealing, Embezling the Publick Monies, Plun­dring and Oppressing both Citizens and Confede­rates: Hence the unsufferable Power and Insolence, which some Men exercise, who are grown too great for the rest of their Citizens: In fine, Hence Ambition, and the Desire of Rule, have produc'd their most cursed and deplorable Effects, even in free Commonwealths; than which nothing can be thought of more odious and detestable. For Men look upon the fancied Advantages of things [Page 258] thro' a false Perspective; but as for the Punishment appendant to 'em, (I don't mean of the Laws, which they frequently break thro'; but of Base­ness and Dishonesty, which is much the more grie­vous) that, I say, they never so much as think up­on at all. Such People therefore are impious and abominable, and deserve to be excluded from all Society, who deliberate with themselves, and make it Matter of Doubt, Whether they should choose what they see to be Honest, or wilfully commit what they know to be a Villany. For the very making a Question of such a thing is Criminal, tho' one should not proceed so far as to Execution. Those things therefore ought not to be deliberated at all upon, where the very Deliberation is Scan­dalous and Dishonest. e And whene're we do de­liberate upon any kind of Subject, we should never do any thing out of Hope, and Expectation, that our Actions will be conceal'd: For we ought to take this as a constant Maxim, if we pretend to have made any progress in Philosophy, That tho' we could hide from the Eyes of all Men, and even of the Gods themselves, whatever we go about; yet we should be careful to abstain from the Vices of Covetous­ness and Injustice, of Lasciviousness and Incontinency.

CHAP. IX.

He illustrates his Rule laid down in the former Chapter with the Story of Gyges, taken out of Plato. He shews himself a Villain, who acknowledges he would do wickedly, if he could with Secrecy.

TO this purpose Plato brings in that remarkable Story of a Gyges: A Gaping in the Earth being made by reason of some violent Showers, as the Story tells us, Gyges went down into the hollow of it, and found there lying a brazen Horse, with a Door in his side. This he open'd, and looking in, discover'd a dead Man's Body, of an unusual bulk, with a Ring of Gold upon one of its Fingers. This he pulls off, and puts it upon his own Finger; and then coming up, goes and joyns himself to the rest of the Shepherds; (for he was Shepherd to the King at that time.) Here he observ'd, That upon turning the Stone to­ward the Palm of his Hand, he became invisible to every body else, tho' others did not become so to him; and that upon turning it to its proper place, he immediatly became visible again, as before. Making use therefore of this lucky Opportunity, he found out a way to enjoy the Queen, and by her assistance to Murder the King, his Lord and Ma­ster, and to make away those, who might prove any hindrance or stop to his Designs; nor could a­ny one possibly see or discover him in any of these [Page 260] Villanies; so that he quickly, by the help of this Ring, from a simple Shepherd became King of Lydia. Now had a truly Wise Man had the keep­ing of this Ring, he would not have thought him­self ever the more priviledg'd to be guilty of any Action that is wicked or detestable: For good Men desire to be Virtuous and Honest, and not to be Secret, that so they may Sin without Danger. And here some Philosophers, Men of more Honesty, than Acuteness or Subtilty, cry out, That this Story of Plato's is a meer Fiction: As tho' he had said either that it really was, or indeed could be done. No; the Meaning and Design of this Example of Gyges, and the Ring, is this: Suppose you could do any dishonest Action, for the gratifying a lustful, co­vetous or ambitious Desire, so as that no one living could either know or suspect it, but both Gods and Men must be kept perfectly in Ignorance; whe­ther in such case, would you do it, or no? Ay, but, say they, this is an impossible Case: tho' 'tis not perhaps so impossible neither: But that which I ask 'em is, What they would do, supposing that possible, which they deny now to be so? The manner of their Arguing is somewhat odd and illiterate; for they still deny the Possibility of it, and that they will stand to; not it seems, understanding what the Force and true Import of this Supposition is. For when we put the Question to 'em, Whether they would do such an Action, or not, supposing they could conceal it? we don't ask 'em, Whether they can conceal it, or not? but put 'em, as 'twere, to the Rack or Inquisition; that so, if they say they would gratifie such Desires upon assurance of Impu­nity, we may know 'em to be Villains by their own Confession: But if they deny it, they may be forc'd to grant, that every base and dishonest Action, is, barely as such, to be shun'd and detested. But to [Page 261] return to our Purpose, from which we have di­gressed.

CHAP. X.

Several Cases, wherein Men doubt, whether that which appears to be Profitable be not Honest. The Case of Brutus banishing Collatinus; of Romulus mur­dering his Brother Remus. Men may do what's for their own Advantage, provided they do no Inju­ry to another. An excellent Saying of Chrysippus to that purpose. How far a Man may honestly, and ought to go, upon a Friend's Account: Illustrated by the Example of Damon and Pinthias, two lo­ving Friends.

a THere frequently happen a great many Cases, which disturb Mens Minds, and put 'em in­to suspence, by the shew of some Profit which they seem to contain in 'em. Not when Men deliberate, Whether they should leave and abandon their Ho­nesty, for the sake of any Profit, be it never so great; (for that's a peice of Wickedness, as was be­fore observ'd) but, Whether that Action, which ap­pears to be Profitable, mayn't safely be done with­out transgressing against Honesty. It might not [Page 262] seem honest in b Brutus, for Example, to depose Collatinus his Brother-Consul from his Office; whose Wisdom and Conduct he himself had made use of in Expelling the Kings. But since the chief Men in the Government had so order'd, That the Kin­dred of c Superbus, and very Name of the Tarquins, should be banish'd the City, and no Marks or Foot­steps be suffer'd to remain of Monarchical Govern­ment; 'twas not only Profitable, thus to consult for the Safety of his Country, but so Honest too, as that Collatinus himself ought joyfully to have ac­quiesc'd in it. That which was Profitable there­fore prevail'd, because 'twas Honest withal; which had it not been, it could never have been Profitable. I can't say the same in relation to d that King, by whom this City was first founded: For a bare shew of Profit got the better over him, when he imbrew'd his Hands in the Blood of his own Bro­ther, because it seem'd more Profitable to Reign by himself, than in Conjunction with another: He broke all the Ties both of brotherly Affection and common Humanity, for the obtaining of an End, [Page 263] which appear'd to be Profitable, and yet really was not so. He pretended however, for a shew of Ho­nesty, that 'twas done to revenge an Affront of his Brother's, who leapt with Contempt over his new­rais'd Wall; a frivolous Excuse, and if true, not sufficient to serve his turn: By his Favour there­fore, whether e Quirinus or Romulus, I can't but think he did a very ill Action. Not that Men are bound to be careless of their own Interests, or to part with that to others, which themselves stand in need of; but ev'ry one may do what he thinks for his own Advantage, provided it be no Injury or Prejudice to another Person. f Chrysippus, amongst a great many very good Sayings, has this one in particular: ‘He that's running a Race ought to strive and endea­vour, says he, as much as he is able, to get be­fore his Antagonist; but must not trip his Heels up, or thrust him aside with his Hands: So in Life 'tis allowable, that every one should get what is useful and convenient for his comfortable Sub­sistence, but 'tis not so to take it away from other People.’ g But 'tis no where more difficult to keep to one's Duty, than in the Affair of Friendship: For [Page 264] as not to do every thing that one handsomly can, for the sake of a Friend; so to do any thing that's Base or Dishonest, are both of 'em equally contrary to one's Duty. But there's one very short and yet easie Rule, which may serve to direct us in all Cases of this nature; and 'tis this, Never to prefer that which only seems Profitable, such as Honours, Riches, Plea­sures, and the like, before a Kindness to a Friend: but never to do any thing for the sake of a Friend, that's an Injury to the Publick, or a Breach of one's Oath, or other solemn Engagement: For whoever does this, 'tis impossible he should ever be a good Man. Should such a one therefore be Judge in his Friend's Case, he would not by any means be bi­ass'd in his Favour, but would wholly lay aside the Person of a Friend, as soon as he took upon him that of a Judge. Perhaps he might do so much for Friendship sake, as to wish that his Friend may have the juster Cause; and allow him as long time to speak for himself, as h the Laws will permit of: but when he's to give in his Sentence i upon Oath, he'll then remember that he calls God to Witness, that is, (I conceive) his own k Soul and Conscience, the divinest thing that God has granted to Man. 'Tis a good Custom therefore we have receiv'd from our Ancestors, if we did but observe it, of Desiring the Judge to be as favourable to us, as his Oath will permit him. The meaning of which Request is no [Page 265] more than this, That he'd do so much for us, as I just now said might very honestly be done by a Judge for his Friend. For if Men were oblig'd to do eve­ry thing presently, that their Friends should desire of 'em; such Agreements as these ought to be count­ed not Friendships, but dangerous Conspiracies. I speak here only of the ordinary sort of Friendships; for l in those which are found between perfectly Wise Men, there can be no danger of any such thing. m Damon and Pinthias, two of Pythagoras's Followers, were so closely united to one another in their Affections, that when Dicnysius the Sicilian Tyrant had appointed a time wherein one of 'em should die, and the Party condemn'd had beg'd a few Days respite, wherein he might provide for his Children and Family, and recommend 'em to Some­body, who would take care of 'em after his Death; the other deliver'd up himself in his stead, volun­tarily to die in the room of his Friend, if he did not accordingly make his Appearance. The Prisoner came back at the Day appointed, in order to his Execution: which the Tyrant perceiving, was so greatly amaz'd at their extraordinary Faithfulness, as to desire he might be admitted a third Man in their Friendship. In Friendship therefore, when that which seems Pro­fitable comes into competition with that which is Ho­nest, the latter should always be preferr'd before the former: but Faith and Religion should be preferr'd before Friendship, whenever it demands any thing that is not reconcilable with Virtue and Honesty. Which one Rule, if but carefully attended to, is sufficient for the Purpose we are now upon; which is to discover, upon every occasion, what are those Duties which Friendship requires of us.

CHAP. XI.

In the Management of Publick Affairs, the appearance of Profit makes Men relinquish Honesty. Several Examples of it. Examples of the contrary, when the appearance of Profit is rejected for the sake of Honesty.

a THe appearance of Profit is also an occasion, in publick Affairs, of making false Steps, and doing several things that are contrary to Duty. Thus our Fathers, for Instance, did ill in destroy­ing and razing of Corinth. The Athenians yet worse in making an Order, That the People of b Aegina should all have their Thumbs cut off, because they were powerful with their Navies at Sea. This, no question, was thought a profitable Decree; for Aegina seem'd to threaten their Port Piraeum, by reason of its nearness: But nothing can truely be Profitable, that's Cruel; for the Nature of Man, which we ought to follow as the Guide of our Actions, of all things in the World is most oppo­site to Cruelty. Those do ill likewise, who ba­nish all Strangers, and forbid 'em the City; as c Pennus did in the preceeding Age, and d Papius but [Page 267] lately. For tho' 'tis but fair, that he who's no Ci­tizen should not have the Priviledges of those who are; (which was made into a e Law by two ve­ry wise Consuls, viz. Crassus and S [...]aevola) yet wholly to exclude 'em from having any thing to do there, f is plainly against the Dictates and Laws of Humanity. And as these things are bad in the Government of a State, so nothing's more splendid and glorious on the other hand, than for that, which appears to be the Interest of the Publick, to be rejected in the comparison with Justice and Ho­nesty. Our own Commonwealth can abundantly supply us with g Examples of this nature, as on o­ther occasions, so more especially in the second Pu­nick War: when after the loss of that fatal Day at Cannae, it shew'd more courage and bravery of Resolution, than ever it had done upon the great­est Successes. There was not any sign of Faint­heartedness seen, nor ever any mention of Peace once heard of: so great is the glory and brightness of Honesty, as that it utterly overwhelms the ap­pearance of Interest. h The Athenians knowing they should never be able to resist the Persians, re­solv'd by consent to abandon their City, and car­rying their Wives and their Children to i Troezene, to defend by Sea the Liberties of Greece: and when one Cyrsilus try'd to persuade 'em not to leave their [Page 268] City, but receive Xerxes into it, they took him and ston'd him. Not but that the Man would have drawn 'em to a thing, which was seemingly Profita­ble: but that seeming Profit was really none at all, being contrary to Honesty. Themistocles, k after that notable Victory in the Persian War, told all the People in a general Assembly, That he had thought of a thing, which might prove of great Use and Advantage to the Publick, but which 'twas not con­venient that every body should know of: where­upon he desir'd they'd appoint him some Person, to whom he might safely communicate it in se­cret. Aristides was immediately appointed accor­dingly: Themistocles told him, 'Twould be no hard matter to fire in private the Spartan Fleet, which was laid up at l Gytheum; whereby the whole Power of that Republick must necessarily be ruin'd. Aristides, as soon as he knew the Business, went back into the Assembly, (which was big with Expectation of what he had to say) and let 'em all know, That Themistocles's Counsel indeed was Advantagious, but by no means Honest or Creditable for the City. The Athenians therefore, thinking what was Dishonest not to be truly Profitable, rejected immediately the whole Proposal, without having heard so much as what it was, upon nothing else but this Report of Aristides. How much better and more honestly did they do, than we; who can suffer even Pirates to live free from Molestation, and yet demand Tri­bute of our m Confederates and Allies?

CHAP. XII.

The Opinion, that a thing may be Profitable, tho' 'tis not Honest, very pernicious. A Case put, wherein 'tis doubted, Whether that, which seems to be Profitable, be Honest or no. The Arguments on either side, of two Philosophers, differing in their Opinions. The Difference between to Conceal, and not to Tell. The Society of Mankind, how far it obliges.

LEt us lay down this therefore as a standing Max­im, That whatever is Dishonest can never be Pro­fitable: no, not tho' we should arrive at the full posses­sion of all those Advantages, which we propos'd to ob­tain by it. Nay, this very Persuasion, That a thing may be Profitable, tho' 'tis Base and Dishonest, is one of the greatest Misfortunes and Calamities, that could ever have happen'd to the Life of Man. a But there often fall out (as was before observ'd) some peculiar Cases, wherein that which is Honest has a seeming Repugnance with that which is Pro­fitable; so that it requires some farther Considera­tion, to know whether this Repugnance be certain and real, or whether they mayn't be brought to a fair Agreement. To this Head belong such Exam­ples as these: Suppose we, for Instance, an honest Merchant, when Corn was scarce and extreamly dear at Rhodes, to bring a large quantity thither from Alexandria; and withal to know, That a great many Ships, well laden with Corn, were in their way thither from the same City: Should he tell this now to the People of Rhodes, or say nothing [Page 270] of it, but sell his own Corn at the best Rates he could? We suppose him a Virtuous and Honest Man, and don't here discourse of the Deliberation of one, that would hold his peace if he thought 'twere Dishonest; but of one, that doubts whether it be Dishonest, or not. In such sort of Cases b Di­ogenes the Babylonian, a Man of great Credit and Note among the Stoicks, is of one Opinion; and Antipater his Scholar, an extraordinary smart and ingenious Man, of just the contrary. Antipater would have every thing be plainly told, that so the Buyer might be ignorant of nothing in what he buys, that the Seller himself knows of: Diogenes thinks it enough in the Seller, to tell the Faults of his Goods as far as the Laws require it; and, as for the rest, tho' to use no Cozening, yet, since he's come with design to sell 'em, to get as much Mo­ney for 'em as ever he can. Here, may the Mer­chant say, I have brought my Corn; I have expos'd it to sale; and sell it no dearer than other People do; (nay perhaps he'll say cheaper, there being now a great­er quantity, than there was before) and pray where is now the Wrong I have done to any Body? Antipater argues upon a different Principle: What say you, (quoth he) are not you oblig'd to do Good to Man­kind; and be serviceable to the Society of all Men in general? c Were not you born under such an Obligati­on? And had not you such Principles ingrafted into you by Nature, which 'tis always your Duty to follow and [Page 271] obey, that your single Interest should be the same with that of all Men; and again that of all Men should be the same with yours? And will you, this notwith­standing, conceal from the People what Plenty there is a-coming, the knowledge of which might be of so great Use and Advantage to 'em? Diogenes perhaps will reply upon him thus: 'Tis one thing to conceal, and another not to tell; nor can I be said to conceal from you now, tho' I don't tell you, what the Nature and Essence of the Gods is, and what the Happiness or chief Good of Men; things which 'twould do one much more Kindness to know, than that Quantities of Corn are like to be here shortly. But if any thing be Profitable for you to hear, 'tis none of my Duty to come and tell it you immediately. Nay but you'll find that it is your Duty, (may the other reply) if you'll piease but to remember, That there's such a kind of thing, as a mu­tual Relation, and Society amongst all Men. Well, I do remember it; (may the other reply again) but, I pray you, is that Society of such a Nature, as that no Man, who lives in it, must have any thing that's his own? If this be so, then there's no more selling, but we must e'en give every thing away that we have.

CHAP. XIII.

Another Case put, Whether he that sells a bad House, be oblig'd to tell the Purchaser 'tis so? The Ar­guments pro and con of Antipater and Diogenes. Cicero's Determination of it, as also of that in the foregoing Chapter. What 'tis properly to Conceal.

YOu plainly perceive, that 'tis never once said in all this Dispute, Tho' such a thing's not Honest, yet I'll do it because 'tis Profitable: but the a one side [Page 272] defends the Expediency of it, no farther than 'tis Honest; and the b other denies that it ought to be done, because 'tis not Honest. Again, Suppose a good Man were to sell an House, because of some Defects which he himself knows of, tho' others do not: Suppose it to be unhealthy, for Example, but esteem'd quite the contrary; Serpents to annoy all the Chambers of it, but no body to know this; made of bad Materials, and ready to fall, but no one to discern this except the Owner only: I demand, if he sells this for more than he expected, and don't tell the Buyer of these several Faults, whether he don't act like a Knave and a Villain? Yes undoubt­edly, answers Antipater: For what is this better, than not to set a Man right, when he is out of his Way, (which at Athens was punish'd with publick c Execrati­ons) thus to suffer the Buyer, as it were, to fall headlong, and run thro' a Mistake into very great Mischiefs. Nay, 'tis something worse yet than not to shew a Man his Way; for 'tis wilfully and designedly to draw him into Mischief. Diogenes on the contrary vindicates the Seller: Pray did he force you (says he) to buy his House, when did he so much as advise you to it? He set a thing to sale, which he did not like; and here you have bought a thing, which you did like. For if those Men, who make it be publish'd to the World, Here's a very good House, and very well built, to be sold; are not counted Deceivers, tho' the House be not good, nor at all well built; how much less should those who don't commend their House at all? For where-ever the Buyer has the free use of his Judgment, what Fraud can there be upon the Seller's part? d And if a Man is not bound to make good all he said, would you [Page 273] have him make good what he did not say? Beside; What, I beseech you, could be more odd and foolish, than for the Seller to tell the Faults of his own Wares? Or what more ridiculous, than for the Cryer to pro­claim by the Proprietor's Order, An infectious, pesti­lential House to be sold? And thus you see there are some doubtful Cases, in which on the one hand Men argue for Honesty, and on the other are Ad­vocates for Profit; so far as to shew, that 'tis not only Honest to do that which is Profitable, but e­ven Dishonest to neglect and omit it: And this is that seeming Opposition we spoke of, which often falls out between Profit and Honesty. e But let us now proceed to determin these Cases; for we did not propose 'em for meer Question sake, but that we might give 'em a fair Decision. I am then of Opinion, That the Corn-Merchant ought not to have conceal'd from the Rhodians, nor this Seller of his House from the Purchasers of it, the several things that are mention'd in their Cases. 'Tis true not to tell a thing, is not properly to conceal it; but not to tell that, which People are concern'd to know, meerly for the sake of some Advantage to your self, I think is: And there's no body but knows what concealing this is, and who they are that make a Custom of it: I am sure not your plain, sincere, ingenuous, honest and good sort of People; but ra­ther your shifting, sly, cunning, deceitful, roguish, crafty, foxish, jugling kind of Fellows. And must it not necessarily be Unprofitable for any Man, to lye under this, and a much longer Catalogue, of such black and most odious Names of Vices?

CHAP. XIV.

Of those, who are so far from telling the Faults of their Wares, as that they invent Lies to make 'em ap­pear the better. An Example of this kind. A­quilius's Definition of Knavery, or Dolus malus.

ANd a if those Men are thus blamable, who keep the Faults of their things secret; what shall we think of those, who add down-right Lying to it? C. Canius, a Roman Knight, one that lov'd to be pleasant, and a pretty good Scholar, removing to b Siracuse for the sake of Retirement and not of Employment, (as he was us'd to say) gave out he had a great mind to buy some Gardens, whither he might invite his Friends and Acquaintance, and enjoy their Conversation without being interrupt­ed. This coming abroad, there was one Pythius, a Goldsmith or Banker at Siracuse, who told him, Indeed he had no Gardens to sell, but such as he had were at Canius's Service, if he pleas'd to make use of 'em, as much as tho' they were his own: And withal he desir'd him to come next day, and take a Dinner with him there. When Canius had promis'd him to come accordingly, what does he do but send immediately for some Fishermen, (having Interest enough, by reason of his Calling, with all sorts of People) and desires 'em the next day to fish before his Gardens; giving 'em their In­structions [Page 275] about what he'd have 'em do. Canius came at the time appointed, and Pythius had pro­vided a very splendid Entertainment for him: Just before the Garden, where he could not but take notice of it, was a company of Fisher-boats; and every one of the Men in particular brought the Fish he had caught, and laid 'em down before Pythius. How now Pythius! (says Canius to him) what all these Fish here? All these Boats? O lack, Sir, (says t'other) that's no great Wonder; all the Fish that supply the City must be taken here: this is their common Water; none of these People could ever live, if it were not for my House. Canius immediately was all on fire, and beg'd of Pythius that he would sell him the Place. He pretended abundance of Unwillingness at first; but at length (to make short of it) was brought to a Compliance. Canius buys it, together with all that belong'd to it; and being very Rich, and desirous of the Purchase, gives as much for it as Pythius demanded. Security's given and taken for the Money, and the whole Bargain finally brought to a conclusion. The next Day Canius invites some Acquaintance thither, and he comes himself somewhat earlier than ordinary; but sees not one of the Fishermens Boats there. Hereupon he enquires of one of the next Neighbours, whether or no that were any Holiday with the Fishermen; because he saw none of 'em thereabouts. Not that I know of, replies the other; but they none of 'em ever use to fish here, and therefore I wonder'd what the matter was Yesterday. This put Canius into a lamentable Fret; but how could he remedy him­self? c For Aquillius, my Collegue and familiar [Page 276] Friend, had not then publish'd his Court-forms a­bout Knavery; upon which when he was ask'd what he meant by the word Knavery, he answer'd, d The making shew of one thing, while one's doing another: a very perspicuous and plain Definition▪ as indeed he was a Man very happy at Defining. Pythius then, and all others whatever, that make shew of one thing, and yet do the contrary, are per­fidious, wicked and knavish Rascals. 'Tis impossi­ble therefore that any of their Actions should ever be Profitable, when they're under the scandal of such a number of filthy and detestable Vices.

CHAP. XV.

All Hypocrisie and Dissimulation to be taken away. Knavery, or Dolus malus punish'd by the Roman Laws; and Judgments of Equity. A remarkable Action of Scaevola's. He is not a Wise Man, who is not Wise for his own Advantage; in what Sence true. A truly Good Man is not content with being as Just, as the Laws require. A Definition of such a One. He's very hard to be found.

IF then this Definition of Aquillius be good, all Hypocrisie and Dissimulation must be banish'd from amongst Men; so that no honest Man will be guilty of either of 'em, for the sake of buying or [Page 277] selling to his greater Advantage. a Nay this Kna­very or Cozenage has always been punish'd by the Laws of the City: witness the XII Tables about the Case of Guardianship; and Laetorius's Law about the Over-reaching of Minors. Nay where there was nothing of a Law against it, 'twas nevertheless pu­nishable in those Judgments of Equity, the Form of which was, Ex fide bona agitur, That all things be done faithfully and honestly. And the same sort of words are in all other Judgments; as when a Wife, for Example, enters an Action for her Dowry, up­on a Divorce from her Husband, Melius Aequius, That things be settled better and more equitably: when any thing had been mortgag'd and pawn'd to another, Ut inter bonos bene agier, That among honest Men there be nothing done, but only that which is Honest. And could there possibly be any Knave­ry allow'd of in that, where the very Court-form was, Melius Aequius, For the better and more equita­ble setling of things? Or any thing done thro' De­ceit and Roguery, where these words are publickly read in Court, Inter bonos bene agier, That amongst honest Men there may be nothing done, except that which is Honest? Now there's something of this Knavery, as Aquillus says, in all false Shews and hy­pocritical Pretences: Lying therefore should whol­ly be banish'd from all sorts of Business, and Com­merce in the World: Nor should Sellers bring Peo­ple to bid high for their Goods, and enhance their Prizes; nor Purchasers others to bid under-value, and so beat 'em down lower: but each of 'em, if they come to speak about a Bargain, should say at [Page 278] a word what he'll give and take. b Quintus Scaevo­la, the Son of Publius, going to buy an Estate, desir'd the Owner to tell him at one word, what 'twas he must have for it: the Seller did so; and Scaevola told him, He thought 'twas worth more than what he had demanded for it; and accordingly gave him a thousand Crowns over. Now there's no one but will grant this was done like an Honest, but they will not allow 'twas like a Prudent Man; any more, than if he had sold a thing for less, than he might have had for it. Here now, you may see, is that pernicious Opinion, thus to make a Distinction be­tween Prudence and Honesty. Ennius has a Saying to this purpose, That he would not give a Farthing for a Prudent Man, that could not be prudent for his own Advantage; to which I am ready to set my Hand; if he and I can agree upon one and the same Meaning of the word Advantage. I find that c He­caton, a Rhodian Philosopher, and Scholar of Panae­tius, in his Book about Offices, which he wrote to d Q. Tubero, hath laid this down as a Wise Man's Duty, First to conform to the Laws, and Customs, and Practises of his Country; and, when he hath done that, to make the best Improvement he can of his Estate: since we ought to seek Riches not only for our selves, but our Children, Friends, Re­lations and especially the Commonwealth; whose publick Riches must principally consist in the [Page 279] Wealth and Stock of its particular Members. This Man can by no means approve of that Action, which I just now mention'd of Quintus Scaevola; and there's nothing, he tells us, that he'd scruple to do for his own Advantage, if it be but permit­ted and allow'd of by the Law; e for which I think he does not much deserve to be thank'd or commended. If then to make pretence of that which never was, and cunningly to dissemble the real Truth, be pieces of Knavery; there are but very few Actions that are altogether free from it: And if he alone be an honest Man, Who does all the Good he can, and does no Injury to any body; 'twill be no easie matter to find one in the World. The Result of what has been said is this, To be Knavish and Wicked can never be Profitable, because 'tis attended with Baseness and f Dishonour; and it always must be Profitable to be Virtuous and Good, because it always is Honest and Creditable.

CHAP. XVI.

The Care taken by the Romans, to make the Seller tell the Faults of the thing to be sold. An Example or two of Cases of this nature.

a IN the Matter of buying and selling Estates, 'tis provided amongst us by the Civil Constituti­ons, That he who's the Seller should tell all the Faults, that he knows of, to the Purchaser. For the XII Tables ordering no more than this, That the Seller should be bound to make good those Faults, which were expresly mention'd by word of Mouth in the Bargain; and which whoever deny'd was to pay double Damages: The b Lawyers have appointed a Punishment for those, who themselves don't discover the Defects of what they sell. For they so decreed, That if the Seller of an Estate, when he made the Bargain, did not tell all the Faults in particular, that he knew of it; he should after­wards be bound to make 'em good to the Purchaser. Titus Claudius Centumalus (to give an Example) had a House that stood upon the Coelian Hill, and hin­dred the Augurs as they made their Observations from the c Capitoline Mount: who therefore gave [Page 281] him orders to pull that down, which was such an hindrance to their Business. Instead of this Claudi­us puts a Bill over the Door, That the House was to be sold; and quickly put it off, P. Calpurnius Lana­rius being the Man that bought it. The Augurs in a short time sent him the same Orders, and he accordingly took care to perform them. But after­wards coming to understand, That Claudius had not set the House to sale, till after he had been or­der'd by the Augurs to demolish it; he brought in against him an Action at Law, To receive such Satisfaction, as in Conscience and Equity he was bound to make him. Marcus Cato, the Father of him that is now living (for as others are distinguish'd by the Names of their Fathers, so he that begot this in­comparable Person should be nam'd from his Son) sat as Judge in the Case; and gave this Sentence upon the whole matter, That since Claudius knew this Inconvenience before-hand, and did not disco­ver it when he sold the Estate, he was oblig'd in Equity to make it good to the Purchaser. He judg'd it therefore to be a part of Honesty, That the Seller should fairly declare to the Buyer, all the Faults which he knows in the thing to be sold. If then this Judgment were just and equitable, nei­ther the Merchant that brought the Corn, nor the supposed Seller of the infectious House did well in concealing what either of 'em knew. But all the particular sorts of Concealing could never be taken notice of by the Laws of the City; however such as could were very carefully provided against. M. Marius Gratidianus, a d Kinsman of mine, had sold [Page 282] an House to Sergius Orata, which he had bought of the same not many Years before. The House, it seems, e paid a Duty to Sergius, which Marius never once mention'd in the Bargain. The Business came at last to a Suit in Law, where f Lucius Cras­sus took part with Orata, and f Anthony with Gra­tidianus. Crassus insisted very much upon the Law, which says, That the Seller shall make good those Faults, which he himself knew of, and yet con­ceal'd 'em from the Buyer: Anthony on the other side argu'd for Equity, That Sergius could not but know that Incumbrance, who had sold the House himself but a little while before; and therefore what need was there of telling him of it? That he could not complain of being any ways trick'd upon, since he knew very well the condition of what he bought. I have brought you these In­stances only to let you see, That these cunning sort of Men were ne're approv'd of by our Ancest­ours.

CHAP. XVII.

The different Methods us'd by Law and Philosophy, for the rooting out of Knavery. Treachery to set up Traps, tho' one don't drive the Beasts into 'em. How the Law of Nature differs from the Civil. The Excellence of the Roman Civil Laws. The Extent of that Expression, Ex fide bona. Knavish Cunning very different from true Prudence. How the Laws provide against Fraud in Selling of Slaves. Nature forbids one Man to make his Gain of ano­ther's Ignorance. The ill Effects of false Prudence.

BUt a the Laws take one way to root these Frauds out, and Philosophers another; the former med­ling no further with them, than as they break out into open Acts, and may (as 'twere) be laid hold on by the Hands of Justice: the latter endeavouring to hinder their breaking out, and to prevent them by Precepts of Wisdom and Reason. Reason therefore requires of us, That we do nothing Treacherously, nothing Deceitfully, nothing meerly by outward Shews and false Pretences. Now is it not Trea­chery to set up a Trap, tho' one does not raise and pursue the Beasts into it; for the simple Creatures of themselves will run into it, without being dri­ven? Just so you offer an House to be sold, be­cause of some Faults which you know to be in it; [Page 284] and put up your Bill, as it were like a Trap, in which some unwary sort of Body will be taken. I know that, at present, the depravation of Man­ners, and prevalence of evil Custom, have made this be counted neither Base nor Dishonourable; and that 'tis tolerated by the Laws and Constituti­ons of the Publick, but I am sure 'tis not tolerated by the Laws of Nature. For 'tis to be consider'd (I must repeat it again, tho' I have already men­tion'd it a great many times) that there is such a thing as Natural Society, which comprehends all Men, and ties and unites 'em to one another: There's a nearer between those of the same Nati­on; and a nearer yet, between those of the same City. Therefore our Fore-fathers made a distin­ction, between b that Law which is common to Nations, and that which belongs to each City in particular. Whatever we are bound, by the Civil Constitutions, to do to our Citizens; we are c not oblig'd, by the Law of Nations, to do the same to Strangers: but d whatever we are bound by this latter to do to others, the same we ought to do to our Citizens also: But e the Law, which at present we [Page 285] use amongst us, is far from being an original Piece, immediately taken from genuin Right and true per­fect Justice; 'tis only a Copy and faint Represen­tation of it. However I could wish we liv'd up e­ven to this; for 'tis copy'd at least from some of the best Originals, which were drawn from the Truth and Nature of the thing. For how excellent is that Form in judicial Proceedings, Uti ne, &c. That I mayn't be Defrauded or brought to an Inconveni­ence, by trusting to you, and your Honesty! And how incomparable that other, That Honest Men do no­thing, but that which is Honest and without Design. But the great Question is, Who they are that are Honest Men; and what 'tis to do nothing, but that which is Honest! f Q. Scaevola, I remember, the High-Priest, was us'd to say, That all those Judgments which had Ex fide bona, Faithfully and honestly, put into their Forms, were of marvellous Force; and that Faithfully and Honestly were of very large Ex­tent, and belong'd not only to Wardships, Societies, Trusts and Commissions, but to Buyings, Sollings, Let­tings and Hirings, which relate to the Society and [Page 286] Entercourse of Mankind; and that 'twas the part of an extraordinary Judge, to determin exactly, all these Cases, what one Man ought to make good to another, upon only the bare Principles of Consci­ence and Honesty; especially seeing Men differ in their Judgments about the greatest part of 'em. All Craft therefore should utterly be banish'd, and that knavish sort of Cunning, which would fain indeed be counted, but is the farthest from Prudence, of any thing in the World: For Prudence consists in the making a right Distinction between Good and Evil, but this kind of Cunning gives the preference to Evil; if, at least, it be true (as most certainly 'tis) that every thing is Evil, which is contrary to Ho­nesty. Neither is it only in Farms and Houses, that the Laws of the City, which are copied from Nature, take care to have Cheating and Knavery punish'd; but in Slaves they exclude all Fraud in the Seller: For he that's presum'd to know what the Slave was, if he does not declare whether he be Healthy, a Runagate, or apt to Steal, is answerable to the Buy­er, by an Order of the Aediles: But this does not hold in the Case of g an Heir. From what has been said, it apparently follows, h since Nature is the Fountain from whence Law is deriv'd, that 'tis a­greeable to the Dictates and Rules of Nature, that [Page 287] no one should endeavour to make his own Advan­tage from the Ignorance of another. i And indeed there is no greater Mischief in the World, than this Wisdom, falsly so nam'd, joyn'd with Baseness and Knavery. From this have arisen innumerable Ca­ses, wherein Profit is set up in opposition to Honesty: For where almost is there a Man to be found, that would scruple to Injure and Wrong any other, if he could do it with secresie, and without fear of being punish'd?

CHAP. XVIII.

An Example of a Wickedness committed, when there was no Fear of Punishment. 'Tis a Wickedness to be a Receiver of ill-gotten Goods, tho' you have no hand in the getting 'em. 'Tis Dishonest to get E­states by servile Flattery. Separating Profit from Honesty the Cause of all Mischiefs.

LEt us try, if you please, by some Examples of that nature, wherein the common sort of Peo­ple, perhaps, think there is no Crime: For we don't speak here of such as cut Throats, Poyson, make false Wills, Rob or Embezzle the publick Trea­sures; who aren't to be repress'd with nothing but Words and philosophical Discourses, but must be vex'd and wearied out with Chains and Impri­sonment: But let us consider here what is done by those, who pass in the World for Men of Ho­nesty [Page 288] and Integrity. A Will that was forg'd, of one Minutius Basilus, a wealthy Person, was brought by some People out of Greece into Italy; who, to make it the more easily pass for good, made a Marcus Crassus and Lucius Hortensius, the two greatest Men at that time in the City, Joint-Heirs with themselves: who, tho' they suspected the whole to be a Forgery, yet having nothing of hand in't themselves, they made little scruple of getting an Advantage by other Peoples Villany. And what then? was that sufficient to excuse 'em from Fault, That they themselves had no hand in't? Truly I am fully persuaded not; tho' I always lov'd b one of 'em while he was alive, and don't hate the c other since he is dead and gone. But when Basilus had desir'd that Marcus Satrius, his Sister's Son, should bear his Name, and had appointed him his Heir; (I nominate him, says he, Lord of my Sa­bine and Picenian Mannors) was it any ways a just and reasonable Thing, and not rather an eternal Blot upon those times, that some principal Citizens should have a Man's Estate, and Satrius the Heir be put off barely with his Name? For if he be unjust, that don't keep off Injuries from any of his Neighbours, and defend and protect 'em as far as he's able, (as I've shewn already in the d first Book) what sort of Man shall we take him to be, who not only does not keep off an Injury, but ra­ther on the contrary helps to promote it? Nay I, for my part, am wholly of Opinion, That Estates which are left Men by true Wills, if gotten by [Page 289] knavish and servile Flatteries, not by a real, but pretended Friendship, are Scandalous and Dishonest. But in such kind of Cases it often comes to pass, that one thing seems Profitable, and another Ho­nest: undoubtedly by a Mistake; for the same e thing is the Measure both of the one and the other; which whoever perceives not, will easily be led in­to all sorts of Roguery. For he that begins thus to argue with himself, That indeed is Honest, but this is Advantagious; impudently divides, by this gross Mistake, those things which by Nature are coupled and united: which is the deadly Root, from which all Frauds, Wickednesses and Villanies spring.

CHAP. XIX.

The Carriage of a truly Honest Man, when 'tis in his power to be Dishonest, so as not to be discover'd. The true Notion of a Good Man. A Saying of Fim­bria's in the Case of Lutatius Pinthia, to this pur­pose. A Proverb borrow'd from the Country, shew­ing, That nothing Dishonest how secret soever can be Profitable.

IF a Good Man therefore should have such a po­wer, as that by snapping of his Fingers he could slip his Name cunningly into rich Peoples Wills, he'd never make use of it: no, not altho' he were fully assur'd, that no one living could either know or suspect it: But give such a power to Marcus Crassus, that by doing the same thing he should make him­self Heir, where he really was not so, and he'd [Page 290] a Dance, I dare warrant you, publickly in the Mar­ket-place. But he that is Honest, and answers to our Notion of a Good Man, will never take any thing a­way from another for the enriching himself, and fil­ling his own Coffers; which whoever admires at, let him e'en confess at the same time, that he does not understand what a Good Man is. For if any one will thro'ly examin his own Thoughts, and clear up a little his obscure Conceptions, he'll quickly be able to tell himself, that a Good Man is one, Who does all the Good that he can to others, but never any Harm; unless necessarily forc'd upon't for his own Security. I desire to know then; is not that Man guilty of Harming another, that outs the rightful Heirs, as it were, by a Spell, and procures himself to be put into their Rooms? How then! (will some Men say) what, would not you have People consult their own Interest? Yes; but withal I would have 'em un­derstand, That nothing can be so, that's Base or Dishonest: which is a necessary Maxim for all those to learn, who ever design to be Good Men. I remember I heard my own Father tell, as long ago as when I was a Boy, That Fimbria, one who had formerly been b Consul, was Judge in a case of Lutatius Pinthia's, a Roman Knight, and a very Honest Man; who, c upon pain of losing a cer­tain [Page 291] Sum of Money, was to prove himself to be a Good Man. Hereupon Fimbria plainly told him, that he'd never pass Judgment upon such a matter; least either, by giving the Cause against him, he should spoil the Credit of a well-approv'd Citizen; or else should be forc'd, by giving it for him, to pronounce that any one was a Good Man: which he could not do, considering the infinite Virtues and Duties, that are requisite to the completing any Person of that Character. This Good Man then, of whom Fimbria had a Notion, as well as Socrates, will never judge any thing Profitable, that's Disho­nest: From whence it follows, That such a one will always be so far from doing, as that he will never so much as think of any thing, which he's afraid should be laid open to the rest of the World. And is it not a shame that Philosophers should doubt of this, when there is not e'er a Peasant in the Coun­try but assents to it? For from them we have got­ten that common Saying, which is now by long U­sage become a Proverb among us, which they bring in to signifie the faithful Dealing and Ho­nesty of a Man, He's one (say they) that you may venture d to play with at Even and Odd in the dark. The meaning of which, what can it be but this, That nothing can be Profitable, which is not Ho­nest and Becoming, tho' a Man could be certain of being never found out in it? You see then accord­ing [Page 292] to this Proverb, that neither that Gyges, whom we mention'd above; nor that other, whom we just now suppos'd to have a power, by the snap­ping of his Fingers to become all Peoples Heir, can by any means be excus'd. For as that, which is Scandalous and Dishonest in it self, however it may be hid from the Eye of the World, can never be brought to be Honest and Creditable; so also that, which is not Honest and Creditable, can never be brought to be Profitable and Advantagious; the ve­ry e Nature of the things resisting and opposing it.

CHAP. XX.

Great Rewards are very apt to make Men forgetful of Honesty. Examples concerning this. An excellent Rule for our Direction in this case. A Man loses more by doing an unjust Action, than ever he can gain by it, be the Reward what it will.

BUt a when People expect great Advantages from their Roguery, 'tis a mighty Temptation for 'em to be guilty of it. Thus, for Instance, when b Marius was far from any hopes of obtaining the [Page 293] Consulship, and had lain seven Years from the time of his being Praetor, so that no one suspected his standing for that Honour; being dispatch'd to Rome by c Q. Metellus, whose Lieutenant he was, an ex­traordinary Man, and a brave Member of the Re­publick; he accus'd his General to the People of Rome for protracting the War; and told 'em, That if they would but choose him Consul, they should soon have Jugurtha, either dead or alive, deliver'd into their power. 'Tis true by this Artifice he got to be chosen Consul, but he pay'd for't the price of his Honesty and Fidelity; who could thus bring an useful and excellent Citizen, whose Lieutenant he was, and by whom he was sent, into Hatred and Ill-will by false Accusations? Nor did my d Kins­man Gratidianus act the part of an Honest and Fair-dealing Man, in the time of his Praetorship: The Tribunes of the People held a common Con­sultation with the Company of Praetors, about set­ling the Value and Rate of Money; which at those times was grown to be so very Unconstant, as that no body could be certain how much he was Worth. They made an Edict by common Consent, allow­ing an Action against those who transgress'd it, and appointing a Penalty for those who were con­victed. This being order'd, they agreed to meet again in the Assembly after Noon, and all of 'em together tell the People what they had done. The Meeting broke up, and the rest all departed some one way, and some another: Marius only directly [Page 294] from the Court went down to the Assembly, and by himself alone declar'd that to the People, which all of 'em had agreed upon by general Consent. If you ask now what was the Event of this; no­thing in the World could have got him greater Ho­nour; Statues erected for him about the Streets; Frankinsence and Tapers burnt at every one of 'em; and, in short, never was any Man more ador'd by the Multitude. These are the things, which do sometimes mislead Men in deliberating about their Duty; when the Offence against Honesty seems ve­ry trivial, but the Advantage that's gain'd by it very considerable. Thus Marius thought it but a little piece of Knavery, to steal the Peoples Love from the Tribunes and his Collegues; but a mighty Advan­tage to be made Consul by it, which was what he at that time propos'd to himself. But in all these Cases there's only one Rule, which I desire you'd constantly take along with you: Be sure in the first place, that what you count Profitable be no way Disho­nest; and if it be Dishonest, then assure your self that 'tis not truly Profitable. And can we then esteem either the one or the other of these Mariuses Good Men? Consider a little and examin your own Thoughts, that you may see what Idea, what Notion or Con­ception you have of a Good Man. Is it reconcila­ble then with the Character of such a one, e to Lie for the sake of his own Advantage; to De­ceive, to raise false Reports and Misrepresentations of others; f to Seize that before-hand, which others have a Right to as well as himself? Certainly nothing less. And is there any thing then of such excellent Worth? any Profit or Interest so very desirable, for the gaining of which one would forfeit the Glo­ry [Page 295] and Reputation of a Good Man? Can that, which we call by the name of Profitable, bring us any thing so good as what it takes away from us, if it spoil our being counted Men of Honesty and Integrity? if it occasion the loss of our Justice and Faithfulness; that is, in plain truth, if it change us into Brutes? For where's the great difference between altering our Shapes and becoming real Beasts; and carrying the Nature and Fierceness of Beasts, tho' under the Outsides and Figures of Men?

CHAP. XXI.

To do any thing Dishonest for the sake of Power and Authority, not Profitable. A most detestable Max­im of Caesar's. Not Profitable to make himself King in a Free City. The Unhappiness of a Ty­rant's Life.

AGain, a Those who contemn all Justice and Ho­nesty for the sake of Power, don't they do the same thing that b a certain Man did, when he chose to be Son-in-law to none but one, by whose daring Boldness he might encrease his own Authority? He thought it a very great Advantage no question, to en­large his own Greatness, by drawing Hatred upon a­nother; but he never consider'd how great a Disservice he did to his Country, and how much Scandal and Discredit he brought upon himself. As for the Father, [Page 296] he had always a couple of Greek Verses in his Mouth, taken out of c Euripides's Tragedy of Phae­nissae; which I'll endeavour to translate as well as I am able, perhaps it may be aukwardly, but how­ever so as to make their Sence appear,

If ever we may break the Ties of Right,
'Tis when a Kingdom is the glorious Prize:
In other things be strictly Just—

'Twas a villanous thing in d Eteocles, or rather in Eu­ripides indeed, to exempt e that one Breach of Right from being criminal, which is certainly of all others the most wicked and detestable. Why do we stop then at Examples of lesser Rogueries, such as ma­king one's self Heir by Cunning and Spells; Cheats about Buying, Selling, &c? Here's f a Man for you, that has made no scruple of desiring to make himself King of the Roman People, and Lord and Governour of the whole Earth; nay, and which is worse, hath accomplish'd his Desire. If any Man call this an honest Ambition, he must be out of his Wits; for he justifies the Subversion of our Laws and Liberties, and counts the most base and detest­able Oppression of 'em, a virtuous, laudable and glorious Action: But if any Man, confessing that [Page 297] 'tis not Honest, to get the Dominion in that Repub­lick, which has been and ought to be always free, will yet say, 'Tis Profitable for him that can do it; what Reproofs shall I use, or what Reproaches ra­ther, to recal such a one from so dangerous an Er­ror? Good Gods! Can it be suppos'd then ever to be any Man's Interest, by the heinousest and most un­natural Wickedness upon Earth, to ruin and de­stroy his own Native Country; tho' perhaps the Man, who is guilty of it, may afterwards be stil'd by his poor oppress'd Citizens, g The Father of it? Interest therefore should always be measur'd by Ju­stice and Honesty, so that these two Words, tho' of different Sounds, should yet be understood to mean one and the same Thing. I know the common People are apt to imagin, that nothing in the World can be better than to Govern; but when I consider the real Truth and Reason of the thing it self, I find on the contrary that nothing can be worse, when People arrive at it by unlawful Means. Can it possibly be Profitable for any Man then, to live in perpetual Cares and Anxieties? to be Day and Night rack'd and tormented with Fears, in a Life full of nothing but Treacheries and Dangers? Ma­ny are Treacherous and Unfaithful to Kings, says Ac­cius, and but few are Faithful. But of what sort of Kings did he speak this? Was it not of those, who by lawful Succession had receiv'd the Royal Scepter from h Tantalus and Pelops? How many more then must we suppose to be unfaithful to that King, who with an Army of Romans had oppress'd and [Page 298] enslav'd the Roman People it self? and had forc'd that City, which was not only Free, but even Em­press of the whole World, to submit her Neck to his tyrannical Yoke? What Uneasiness of Mind must such a one, think you, be continually under? What Wounds and Twitches of Conscience must he needs feel? How, in short, can that Life be an Advantage to any Man, which has this Inconveni­ence inseparably annex'd to it, that whoever is so happy as to take it away, will obtain the greatest Glory and Good-will from all the World? And if these things, which seem most of all to be Profita­ble, yet are found to be the contrary when Un­worthy and Dishonest; this certainly ought to con­vince us all, That nothing can be Profitable, which is not Honest.

CHAP. XXII.

A brave Example of the Romans preferring Justice before a seeming Profit. Glory can never be gotten by Wickedness. Riches Unprofitable, if accompa­ny'd with Infamy. Example of Injustice in the Ro­mans. How an Empire ought to be supported. Cato too severe in exacting the Tributes. An un­just Saying of Curio's.

BUt this has been determin'd, as at many other times by our wise Fore-fathers, so a particular­ly [Page 299] by Fabricius, then a second time Consul, and the whole Roman Senate, in the War with Pyrrhus. For when Pyrrhus had voluntarily made War upon the Romans, and the Contention was held about Empire and Mastery, with a no less powerful than generous Adversary; a Deserter came secretly into Fabricius's Camp, and offer'd, upon condition he might be well Rewarded, to return back again with the same secresie that he came, and to Poyson Pyr­rhus. But instead of Encouragement, Fabricius or­der'd him to be sent back to Pyrrhus, and was af­terwards commended by the Senate for so doing. If we look no further now than the outward ap­pearance of what seems to be Profitable, here's a dangerous War, and a powerful Adversary of the growing Empire, might soon have been remov'd by the single assistance of this one Deserter: But then it would have been an eternal Scandal, not to mention the Villany and Wickedness of it, in an honourable War, which was manag'd with a fair and generous Enemy, not to get the Victory by Vir­tue and Courage, but only by base and treacherous Practises. Whether was more Profitable then for Fabricius, who was such in this City as Aristides was at Athens; or for the Roman Senate, which never thought any thing dishonourable their Inte­rest; to contend with an Enemy by Valour or by Poyson? If Empire be desirable for the sake of Glory, why is not Wickedness altogether banish'd, in which 'tis impossible there should ever be any Glory? But if we're for Riches at any rate, we'd do well to consider, that they can never be Profit­able when accompany'd with Infamy. That Coun­sel therefore of Lucius Philippus, the Son of Quin­tus, was far from being Profitable, That those very Cities, which Sylla had freed for a set Sum of Money by the Senate's Order, should again be brought under their former Contributions; and yet not the Money, [Page 300] which they had pay'd, be return'd 'em. This Advice of his was follow'd by the Senate, to the great Di­sparagement and Shame of the Empire; for even Pirates at this rate will sooner be trusted, than the Roman Senate. Well, but the publick Revenues were encreas'd by it, and therefore 'twas Profitable: Heavens! How long will Men dare to call any thing Profitable, which is not Honest! Can Hatred then and Infamy be Profitable to a State, which ought to be supported by Glory, and Credit, and the Love of its Confederates! In this particular I often disagreed from my old Friend b Cato; whom I always thought to be somewhat too head-strong, in standing up for the Interest of the Publick Treasury; and exacting the Tributes with so much rigour, as not to make a­ny Allowances to the Farmers, and very seldom or never grant any thing to the Confederates: where­as we ought always to be kind to the latter, and to deal with the former, as we would do with our own Bayliffs; and that so much the more, because all the Safety and Welfare of the Republick de­pends upon the Agreement of c the several Orders in it. Nor less Ill than Philip's, was the Counsel of d Curio; who, in the Case of the e People inha­biting beyond the Po, tho' he confess'd their De­mands were but just and reasonable, yet always ad­ded, Vincat utilitas; Every thing must give way to the Interest of the Publick. He should rather have said that they were not just, because not comport­ing with the Publick Interest; than thus have de­clar'd that they did not comport with it, and at the same time confess 'em to be just and reasonable.

CHAP. XXIII.

Several Cases put by Hecaton the Rhodian. Diogenes and Antipater oppose one another. Whether bad Money receiv'd for Good should be put off?

a HEcaton proposeth, in his sixth Book of Offices, several Questions such as these which follow: Whether a Good Man, in time of great Scarcity, may refuse to give Victuals to the Servants of his own Family? He discourses indeed upon either side the Question, but at last concludes, That he should rather be guided by his Interest, than Hu­manity. He demands again, If a Merchant in a Storm be forc'd to throw his Goods over-board, whether of the two should he choose to cast away, a very valuable Horse, or a Servant that's good for nothing? Here Interest, and the saving of his Goods draws one way, and compassion of Human Nature another. Should a Fool in a Shipwrack have gotten a Plank, may a Wise Man take it a­way from him if he can? He answers, No; be­cause it would be plainly a piece of Injustice: But what if the Owner of the Ship should come? may not he take it away when it properly belongs to him? No, not at all; no more than he may throw a Man out of the Ship, under the pretence that the Ship belongs to him: For till they are arriv'd whi­ther the Ship was hired for, it does not more pro­perly belong to the Owner, than it does to the Passengers by whom it was hired. Suppose two Men, that are equally Wise, should both of 'em in a Shipwrack lay hold of the same Plank; may either of 'em seize upon it forcibly to himself, or [Page 302] should one of them voluntarily yeild it to the other? Let one yield to the other; provided that other will be more serviceable to the Publick, or there is more depending upon his Life and Preservation. But what if these are equal in either of them? Why then there's no more to be said about it, but it must e'en be let alone for Chance to determin, as tho' they should cast Lots, or b play at Even and Odd for it. What if a Father should rifle Temples, and dig Passages under-ground into the Treasury? Should the Son discover him to the Publick Ma­gistrate? No; that were an horrid unnatural Im­piety: he should rather on the contrary defend his Father, if any one else should pretend to accuse him. But what! ought not the Interest of my Country to be consulted, before that of any one else what­soever? Yes undeniably; but then it is very much the Interest of your Country, to have Citizens that are dutiful and obedient to their Parents. But if a Father should attempt to make himself King, or any ways endeavour to betray his Country; should a Son in such a case hold his Tongue and Conceal it? In the first place, let him beg of his Father to desist: if that does no good, let him proceed to rebuke and even to threaten him about it: but if at last he perceive that it directly tends to the Ruin of his Country, he should prefer its Safety be­fore that of his Father. Another of the Questions he proposes is this, Suppose a Good Man to receive, by an oversight, bad Money for good, and after­wards come to understand that 'tis bad; may he pay it for good, if he owes another any thing? Dio­genes thinks he may, but Antipater not; whom I rather assent to. Suppose a Man be a selling a Ves­sel of Wine, which he knows won't keep; is he [Page 303] bound to tell of this? Diogenes thinks he's under no such Obligation; Antipater will have it to be every honest Man's Duty. These are the things, which whether they are Right and one's Duty or not, is often controverted amongst the Stoicks. In selling a Slave is one bound to declare what his Faults are or not? I don't mean those, which un­less they are told, the Law it self commands he shall be return'd upon our Hands; but his being a Liar, c a Filcher, a Player at Dice, or a Drunkard. One's of Opinion we ought to declare 'em, and the other not. Should an ignorant Body sell a quantity of Gold, and suppose it to be Copper; is a good Man oblig'd now to tell him that 'tis Gold; or may he buy for a Penny what is worth a thousand Pence? 'Tis plain enough by this time what my Thoughts are, and wherein consists the Controversie between d the foremention'd Philoso­phers.

CHAP. XXIV.

Whether a Man's oblig'd to perform all his Promises, or not; tho' at the Expence of his Life or Reputa­tion. Some Examples upon it.

ARe we bound to perform all those Promises and Bargains, which (in the Praetor's Language) have neither Force nor Fraud in them? Here's a Man, for Example, that has gotten the Dropsie, and another prescribes him an infallible Cure for't, [Page 304] upon Condition that he'll never make use of it a­gain. The Man recovers by its help at present, but falls again, some time after, into the same Di­stemper. Suppose now that he, to whom he made such Promise, will by no means allow him to use the Cure again; what would be his Duty in such a Case! Why, since he, who denies him the Re­quest, is Inhuman, and 'tis a a thing that will do him no manner of Prejudice, 'tis the best way to take care of his Life and Safety. A Good and Wise Man is desir'd by one, who appoints him his Heir, and leaves him by Will a considerable Estate, that before he enters upon the Possession of it, he should Dance at Noon-day in the open Streets; and this he accordingly Promises to do, because otherwise the Testator would not make him his Heir: would you have him perform now what he promis'd, or not? I could wish that he never had promis'd it at all, which I think would much better have suited with his Character: But since he has done it, if he think it dishonourable to Dance so in publick, the best way will be not to stand to such a Promise, pro­vided he takes none of the Money that was left him. Unless the Money may be turn'd to some very great Benefit and Advantage of the Publick; so that 'twould be no Disgrace for a Man b even to Dance, when it brings so much Good to his Country along with it.

CHAP. XXV.

Several other Cases, wherein a Man is not oblig'd to perform his Promises and Vows; nor to give up a Trust. The Method he designs to take in the fol­lowing part of the Work.

NEither is one bound to perform those Promises, which are hurtful and prejudicial to the Per­sons they were made to. Thus Father Phoebus (a that we may return to our Fables) promis'd to grant b Phaethon whatsoever he should desire; and the mad young Fellow desir'd to get up into his Father's Chariot. 'Twas accordingly granted him; but be­fore he could get to be well setled in it, he was struck down with Lightning. How abundantly better had it been, in such a Case, if the Father had refus'd to perform such a Promise? The same may be said of another, which c Theseus ob­tain'd of Neptune: This God had promis'd to do any three things for him, whatever he should re­quest: and he requested the Death of his own Son Hippolytus, upon a false Suspicion, that he had been naught with his Mother-in-law. He obtain'd what he ask'd; which occasion'd him very much Sor­row [Page 306] and Affliction. Again, d Agamemnon had vow'd, for a Sacrifice to Diana, the most beautiful thing that was born that Year in his whole Dominions. To be as good as his Word, he was forc'd to offer his Daughter Iphigenia, than whom nothing that Year had been born more beautiful. Had not it been e better to have broke his Promise, than have done such an horrid and unnatural Action? In some Cases then a Man is not oblig'd to perform his Pro­mises: no more is he to restore what was given him in Trust. Suppose, for the purpose, a Man in his Wits had entrusted you with his Sword, and should demand it of you again when he's beside himself; your Duty would be not to give it him again, and if you did, you'd be guilty of a very great Errour. Again, f should a Man put a large Sum of Money [Page 307] in your Hands, and afterwards raise a Rebellion against his Country; would you deliver up your Trust, if demanded it by him? Certainly no; for this would be to act against the Publick Inte­rest, which ought to be preferr'd before every thing else. Thus a great many things, which are Honest of themselves, we may see cease to be so when the Circumstances alter: to perform a Promise, for In­stance, to stand to an Agreement, or deliver up a Trust, ought not to be done when they become Unprofitable. This may suffice to have been said of those things, which a g pretended Wisdom would fain count Profitable, tho' contrary to Justice. But having laid down four general Heads in the First Book, from which all Offices or Duties are deriv'd, I shall discourse upon each of the same in this; and make out, that what's contrary to any of those Virtues, is only in shew, and not really Profitable. Of Prudence then, which a knavish sort of Cunning endeavours to imitate; as also of Justice, which is never but Profitable, we have discours'd already. It h remains that we speak of the other two gene­ral Heads of Duty; the one of which consists in the Greatness and Excellency of a couragious Soul; and the other in such a Regularity of our Actions, as is conformable to the Precepts of Temperance and Moderation.

CHAP. XXVI.

That nothing can be Profitable, which is contrary to the Virtue of Fortitude, shewn from the Examples of Ulysses and Regulus.

ULysses thought 'twould be Profitable for him, (if what the Tragedians tell us be true; for Homer, a Writer of the greatest Authority, never once in­sinuates any such thing) but the Writers of Tra­gedy accuse Ulysses, for feigning to be Mad that he might avoid the War; a Design that was by no means Honest and Creditable: Well, but 'twas Pro­fitable (will some one say) to stay and govern at his own home, and enjoy himself quietly in his Island a I­thaca, together with his Parents, his Wife and Son. Is there any such Credit in the daily Dangers and Fa­tigues of War, that you can ever think comparable with living such a Life of Tranquility and Security? Yes; I wholly despise and contemn your Security, being fully persuaded that it can never be Profitable, so long as 'tis b Dishonest. Pray what would they have said, do you think, of Ulysses, suppose he had continued in his pretended Madness? when after his c glorious Atchievements in the War, he had yet these Reproaches thrown upon him by Ajax,

Tho', you all know, he first propos'd this d Oath,
Yet he's the only Man that would have broke it.
[Page 309] He first endeavour'd not to join i'th' War,
Faint-hearted Coward! feigning to be Mad.
And had not prudent Palamede found out,
By Cunning, this his impudent Deceit;
The Villain, notwithstanding all the Ties
Of sacred Oaths, had certainly gone off.

'Twas much better for him to bear all the Hazards, not of the War only, but of the Sea too, (as at last e he did) than not to make one among the rest of the Grecians, then resolving, by Consent, upon a War with f the Barbarians. But to remove the Scene from Foreign Countries, and fabulous Rela­tions, that we may come nearer home, and to a thing that really happen'd: M. Atilius Regulus, then a second time Consul, was surpriz'd in Africk by g Xanthippus the Lacedaemonian, and made a Prison­er, (h Amilcar, Father of Hannibal being General of the Carthaginians) and was sent by the Carthagini­ans to the Roman Senate, upon solemn Oath given, that, unless some remarkable Prisoners were restor'd 'em, he should himself return back again to Car­thage. Now as soon as this Man arriv'd at Rome, he could not but perceive what appear'd to be his Interest, but withal was persuaded (as the E­vent [Page 310] declar'd) that it only appear'd so. The Case was thus: Here he might have staid in his Native Country, and have liv'd at home quietly with his Wife and Children; might have judg'd his Misfor­tune, receiv'd in the War, no more than what all Men in that State are liable to; and might still have continu'd in his old Degree of Honour among those of consular Dignity. And who can deny now, (will any one say) that all these things are Expedi­ent and Profitable? Who do you think? why i Greatness of Soul, and true Courage deny it. Can you desire any greater and more illustrious Autho­rities?

CHAP. XXVII.

What Courage and Greatness of Soul teach us. A con­tinuation of the Story of Regulus.

THese are the Virtues, by which we are taught to be afraid of nothing, to despise all the out­ward Concerns of Life, and count nothing intoler­able that can possibly befal a Man. Well, but pray what did this Regulus do then? He came into the Senate, and told 'em what 'twas he was sent about, and refus'd to give his own Vote in the Case, for­asmuch as he was not to be counted a Senator, as being by Oath under the Enemy's Power. And in his Speech, which he spoke to the Senate upon that Subject, (Fool that he was, some will be ready to say, and an Enemy to his own Interest!) he told 'em, 'Twas best not to give up their Prisoners; that [Page 311] they were young Men, and might make able Leaders; but that he, for his part, was grown almost useless, and worn away with old Age. The Senate were so far persuaded by his Speech, that they resolv'd the Prisoners should be detain'd in Custody, and he himself return'd back again to Carthage; not all the Love which he had for his Country, his Friends and Relations, being able to detain him. And tho' he knew well enough what a barbarous Enemy, and what a exquisite Torments he was going to return to; yet he thought it his Duty, whatever came of it, not to violate his Oath. I think he was in a better condition therefore, even whilst he was mur­dred by being kept from Sleeping, than e're he could have been, had he stay'd at home, and liv'd under the Scandal of being an old Captive and a perjur'd Nobleman. But was not it very great Folly and Madness, if he would not persuade the Releasing of the Prisoners, yet to go and dissuade it as much as he could? Pray how Folly and Madness? What, tho' 'twere conducive to the Good of the Republick? or can any thing be Profitable to a private Citizen, which brings a Disadvantage to the Commonwealth in general?

CHAP. XXVIII.

To separate Profit from Honesty, is to pervert the first Principle of Nature. All Men naturally desirous of Profit. The Reasons given by those, who think Re­gulus did ill in returning.

THose Men, who separate Profit from Honesty, wholly pervert the a first Principles of Nature: For we all of us naturally desire our Interest, to­ward which we are carried with so strong a Biass, as that 'tis not in our power to turn the other way. For who is averse from? or rather, who does not most eagerly follow his own Advantage? But since we can find out no real Advantage, except in what's Honest, Becoming and Commendable, there­fore we count these the principal things; and take the word Profit to signifie something, which only relates to our outward Necessities, and the supply­ing of them; without all that glorious and shining Excellence, which appears in the Actions of Vir­tue and Honesty. b But after all is done, perhaps some Men will say, pray what is there in an Oath, that he should be afraid thus to break it? What! was it Jupiter's Anger that he dreaded? But this is agreed [Page 313] on by all Philosophers; not only those, c who main­tain that the Gods lead an idle Life, neither busy­ing themselves, nor disturbing others; but d those who affirm they are always busie, and always do­ing something that relates to the World: in this thing, I say, they are all agreed, That the e Deity neither hurts, nor is angry with any one. But supposing the worst, Pray what hurt could Jupiter's Vengeance have done Regulus, greater than what Regulus did to himself? It could not be any thing of Religion therefore, that hindred him from fol­lowing what appear'd to be his Interest. Again, Was he afraid of the Baseness and Dishonesty of the Action? As to that in the first place, Always of two Evils choose the least: and where was any Evil in the Baseness of the thing, so great as was that of the Torments which he endur'd? Beside, pray remember that Sentence of Accius, which how­ever it might be said by an impious King, is yet generally acknowledg'd to be very well said, who when one told him, You have broken your Oath to [Page 314] me: answer'd, f I neither am, nor have been tied by Oath to any treacherous Deceiver. Again they tell us, That as we affirm some things seem Profitable, which are not so; so they affirm some things seem Honest, which are not so: As this, for Example, of return­ing to be tormented, rather than break one's Oath; which is not Honest, tho' it may seem to be so; be­cause no Man's oblig'd to perform that Oath, which was g extorted from him by the force of his Ene­mies. And lastly they argue, That whatever makes very much for one's Profit and Advantage, thereby becomes Honest, tho' before it did not seem so. This is what is generally brought against Regulus; but let us see and examin all the parts of it in or­der.

CHAP. XXIX.

He answers the first part of the Arguments brought a­gainst Regulus. The Sacredness of an Oath. The Divinity of Faith. Pain none, or at least not the greatest Evil. Dishonesty the greatest, if not on­ly Evil. Faith to be kept even with those who are Treacherous. Oaths made to Enemies should be kept. Not so those made to Pirates, and why. What 'tis to Forswear one's self. The Form of Oaths among the Romans. Laws of War to be kept in­violable.

a FIrst then they say, He could fear no Harm from the Anger of Jupiter, who neither can be Angry, nor do Harm to any body. This proves as strongly a­gainst all Oaths in general, as it does in particular against this of Regulus. But the thing to be consi­der'd in Peoples taking of Oaths, is not what Dan­ger they are in, shou'd they break 'em; but what a sacred and powerful Obligation is laid upon 'em. For every Oath is a religious Affirmation; and whatever is promis'd after such a manner, as it were calling God for a Witness to your Words, ought certainly to be perform'd. For now Faith and Ju­stice require it of us, and not any Fear of that An­ger of the Gods, which is not incident to their Di­vine Natures. That Faith I mean, of which Enni­us has got these incomparable words:

O Faith All-glorious and Divine!
In lofty Temples fit to shine;
[Page 316] Ev'n b Jove himself by thee doth Swear!

Whosoever therefore doth not perform his Oath, af­fronts the c Deity of that Divine Faith, which was (as Cato in his Speech informs us) set up by our Fa­thers in the Capitol it self, even next to the Statue of the great God Jupiter. d But, secondly, they tell us, Supposing Jupiter had been Angry with Regulus, he could not have brought any Evil upon him, greater than what Regulus brought upon himself. This, I confess, would be very true, if there was no other Evil but only Pain: But that is so far from being the greatest Evil, that, if we may credit some of the e chief Philosophers, it is not so much as any Evil at all: Among whom, I pray you, let Regulus be counted of no small Authority; if I may'nt rather say of the greatest and most weighty: For what greater Testimony can any one desire, than that of a principal Man among the Romans; who rather than be wanting in any point of his Duty, chose to undergo the most exquisite Torments? f But of two Evils, say they, always choose the least: That is, in plain words, Rather be a Rogue than undergo any Calamity. Can any Calamity then be greater, than that of Baseness and Injustice? For if even the Filth and Deformity of the Body be loathsome and [Page 317] offensive; how much more so must that of the Mind needs be, when 'tis cover'd and polluted with Shame and Dishonesty? Those Philosophers therefore, who discourse of these things with most Closeness and Severity, venture bodly to affirm, That nothing is Evil but only what's Dishonest: and even those themselves, who do it more loosly, yet al­ways acknowledge, That 'tis the greatest however of all Evils. g That Saying of the Poet's indeed is good, I neither am, nor have been tied by Oath to a treache­rous Deceiver; but 'tis therefore so, because when Atreus was brought upon the Stage, he was to make him speak that, which was suitable to his Charact­er. But if once they begin to lay down this for a Maxim, That Faith, when given to those who are trea­rous, is not to be kept; they had best have a care, that this be not made a Refuge and Cover for Per­jury. h As for his Oaths being made to an Enemy; even War it self has Laws that belong to it; and Faith, except in some very few cases, is always to be kept even with our greatest Adversaries. For whatever you swear, for Example, in such a manner, as that i your Conscience tells you it ought to be done, you are bound most inviolably to perform it: But where it is otherwise, you don't lie under any such Obligation; and are not perjur'd, tho' you should not perform it. Suppose, for the purpose, you had sworn to a Pirate, That you would pay him such [Page 318] a Sum, if he'd spare your Life; it would not be Perjury, tho' you should not pay it him. k For a Pirate is by no means a lawful Adversary, but ra­ther a common Pest and Enemy of Mankind; so that no one's oblig'd to keep his Faith or Oath with him. For to Swear to a thing, and yet not perform it, is not immediately to Forswear one's self: But then a Man is properly said to be Perjur'd, when he Swears l upon his Conscience (as our Form runs) to do such and such things, and yet does not do them. For that of Euripides may be said in m some Cases to be very good, My Tongue indeed Swore, but my Conscience did not Assent. But had Regulus, in his Case, done any thing contrary to the Laws, and Conditions, that are kept between Enemies, it had been down-right Perjury. For the Carthagi­nians, with whom he had then to do, were a law­ful [Page 319] Adversary, between whom and us there is all n the Fecial, and several other Laws that are com­mon to Nations. For had it been otherwise, 'tis certain the Senate would never have deliver'd up some o eminent Persons in Chains to their Enemies.

CHAP. XXX.

Examples of several eminent Romans given up to the Enemy. Answer to the rest of the Arguments brought against Regulus.

BUt they did deliver both a Lucius Veturius and Sp. Posthumius, in their second Consulships to their Enemies, the Samnites; because, being bea­ten at the Passage of Caudium, and the Legions being disarm'd and sent away with Disgrace, they had concluded a Peace of their own Heads, with­out any Orders from the Senate or People. T. Numicius and Q. Melius, who were Tribunes of the People at the same time, because by their Authority the Peace was concluded, were like­wise deliver'd; that so we might be freed from any Obligation of keeping it. And all this was done upon the Proposal and Advice of Posthumius himself, who was the Person deliver'd. The Case of b Mancinus, a great many Years after, was ex­actly [Page 320] the same; who having, without any Orders from the Senate, struck up an Alliance with those of c Numantia, was the first Man that spoke for that Bill in the Senate-house, which by L. Furius and Sext. Atilius was carried to the People; and which they agreeing to, he was deliver'd to the Enemy. He did more honestly than d Sext. Pom­peius, who being concern'd in the same sort of Crime, made Interest to be excus'd from undergo­ing the same Punishment; and by that means e­scap'd it. This Man now let the Appearance of Profit prevail over Honesty; but in all the others mention'd, the Authority of Honesty easily carry'd it from the pretended Profit. e But to go on with Regulus: Another thing urg'd by his Adversaries is this, That he should not have perform'd what was for­cibly put upon him. As tho' a Man of Courage could be wrought upon by Force, But why, say they, did he go at all to the Senate, being resolv'd to disswade the Delivery of the Captives? This is to blame him for that, which particularly deserves Commendation: He would not depend upon his own Judgment, but pleading for that which he thought most Profita­ble, left it to be determin'd by the Judgment of the Senate: And had not it been for his Counsel in the [Page 321] Case, the Prisoners had surely been sent again to Carthage, and he remain'd safe in his Native Coun­try: But this he concluded would be a Prejudice to the Publick; and therefore esteem'd it to be no more than his Duty, to speak what he thought, and endure what might come of it. Lastly, They add, That whatever makes highly for one's Profit and Advan­tage, thereby becomes Honest. I answer, That it f may indeed antecedently. be such, but can never thereby become such: For nothing is Profitable but what is Honest; and things don't become Honest by their first being Profitable, but become Profitable by their first being Honest. I conclude therefore, That of all those great and wonderful Examples, which might easily be brought upon this Subject, 'twill be hard to find any more illustrious and commendable, than this of Regulus.

CHAP. XXXI.

Regulus's Returning to Carthage a Commendation of those Times. The Sacredness of an Oath, tho' extort­ed by Force, among the ancient Romans. This il­lustrated by the Example of Pomponius and Man­lius.

BUt the only thing that deserves our Admiration, in all this glorious Conduct of Regulus, is his persuading the Senate not to restore the Capives. As for his returning again to Carthage, 'tis true we admire it in our Days, but at those times he could not have possibly avoided it. The Age, I think, [Page 322] therefore should rather be commended for that, than the Man. For there's nothing our Ancestors took greater care of, than that the Tie of an Oath should be always held as most Sacred and Inviola­ble. This appears plainly from the XII Tables; it appears from those Laws which are call'd a Sa­cratae; it appears from the strict Observation of Leagues, by which we're oblig'd to keep Faith e­ven with Enemies; and lastly, it appears from the Punishments and Penalties which have been inflict­ed by the Censors; who in no one thing have been more severe, than in punishing those, who had transgress'd their Oaths. M. Pomponius, a Tribune of the People, once enter'd an Action against b L. Manlius, the Son of Aulus, who had been Dicta­tor, for holding that Office somewhat longer than he should have done. And amongst other things brought in this too against him, That he kept his Son Titus, who was afterwards Torquatus, from Conversation with the World, and had strictly charg'd him to live solitary in the Country. As soon as the Son heard his Father was in Trouble about this Business, he's reported immediately to have set out for Rome, and come early in the Morn­ing to Pomponius's House. Pomponius was no soon­er told of his coming, but he got up immediate­ly; and thinking the Youth, out of Anger, had brought some Complaint against his Father, com­manded all others to depart the Room, and him [Page 323] alone to be brought in to him. As soon as the young Man was got into the Room, he drew his Sword, and swore he would immediately kill Pomponius, unless he'd promise him upon Oath, to meddle with his Father no further. Pomponius, out of sudden Apprehension of the Danger, did swear to him accordingly; and discharged his Father from any more Trouble; having first reported the Mat­ter to the People, and told 'em why he was forc'd to let fall his Action. Thus strict and conscientious were People at those times, in observing their Oaths. And this Titus Manlius is that very Person, who, being afterwards challenged by a mighty French Man, c kill'd him in a Duel by the River d Anien, and was Sirnam'd Torquatus from wearing a Chain, (in Latin Torquis) which he took from his Neck. The same Man again, in his third Consul­ship, put to flight and defeated the Latins near e Ve­seris. He was indeed a very great and extraordina­ry Person; who as he shew'd his Love, in this Case, to his Father, so he was f unnaturally Cruel to his Son.

CHAP. XXXII.

The Severity of the Romans against the Breakers of Oaths. The Example of ten sent by Hannibal to the Senate, upon Oath of returning. Fraud not suf­ficient to excuse a Perjury. A resolute Action of the Senate in not redeeming eight Thousand Prison­ers. The Conclusion of this Head.

BUt as Regulus did well in performing his Oath; so those ten, who, after the Battel at Cannae, were by Hannibal sent to the Roman Senate, upon Oath of returning to the Carthaginian Camp, if they could not obtain an Exchange of Prisoners; did ill if they did not return accordingly: Con­cerning whom Writers have differ'd in their Relati­ons. a Polybius, an Author of very good Credit, informs us, Ten Persons of considerable Quality were sent to the Senate; and that nine of 'em ho­nestly return'd to the Camp, not having been able to obtain what they went about; but the tenth staid behind and remain'd at Rome. This Man, as soon as he was out of the Camp, pretending he had forgot to take something along with him, went back thither again; as thinking his returning un­der such a colour, was a very sufficient Performance of his Oath. But certainly he was mistaken; for Cunning's so far from excusing a Perjury, b that [Page 325] it aggravates it rather, and makes it the more crimi­nal. This therefore was no more than a foolish piece of Craftiness, impudently pretending to pass for Prudence: Whereupon the Senate took care to order, that my crafty Gentleman should be sent back in Fetters again to Hannibal. But the glori­ousest Action of the Senate was this: Hannibal had c eight Thousand of our Soldiers his Prisoners; not such as had either been taken in Battel, or had fled from any imminent Danger of their Lives; but were left in the Camp by Paullus and Varro, the then two Consuls. The Senate decreed that these should not be Ransom'd, tho' it might have been done with a small Sum of Money; for no other end but to let our Soldiers see, that either they must resolve to Conquer, or Die. Upon the News of which, as the same Author tells us, Hannibal pre­sently began to be disheartned, when he saw that the Senate, and People of Rome, had so great Re­solution even in the midst of their Misfortunes. Thus, we see, Honesty gets the better in the com­parison, against that which has only the Appearance of Profit. But d Acilius, who has written an Hi­story in Greek, says, More of 'em return'd under this Pretence to the Camp, hoping by such a Trick to get quit of their Oaths; and that they were all of 'em branded with Shame and Dishonour by the [Page 326] Censors. But let us now put an end to this third Head; since from what has been said 'tis apparent­ly manifest, That whatever is contrary to the Vir­tue of Fortitude; that is to say, whatever is done with a timerous, mean, disheartned, abject Spirit, can never be really and truly Profitable, because it is wicked, disgraceful and odious. And such would this Action of Regulus have been, had he either, in delivering his Sence about the Captives, spoke what was for his own, not the Publick Security; or afterwards chosen to remain at home, instead of returning to fulfil his Oath.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Nothing contrary to Temperance, &c. can be truly Profit­able. Who those Philosophers were, that made Hap­piness and Misery consist in Pleasure and Pain. This Opinion ruins all Virtue, Prudence, Fortitude, Tem­perance and Justice: However these Philosophers en­deavour to clear themselves of this Imputation; but can't get well off. Pleasure opposite to Honesty. The Absurdity of those, who would have made Hap­piness to consist in both these. A short Recapitula­tion of this last Book. How far Pleasure may be allow'd. A Conclusion, by way of Exhortation to his Son.

WE have now finish'd our third Head, a the fourth and last remains only to be spoke to, which contains in it Decency, Modesty, Modera­tion, Continence and Temperance. And can any [Page 327] thing be Profitable, that is opposite to a Train of such excellent Virtues? There hath been however a Sect of Philosophers, Scholars of Aristippus, who were call'd b Cyrenaicks; and others, who had the Name of c Annicerians given them, that affirm all Good to consist in Pleasure, and count Virtue it self therefore only desirable, because of some Plea­sure which it brings along with it. But these being now almost worn out of Date, Epicurus is mightily come into Vogue, the great Supporter, and, as 'twere, second Founder of the same Opinions. With these we must fight (as they say) with might and main, if ever we think of supporting the Cause, and maintaining the Interest of Virtue and Honesty. For if what d Metrodorus has written pass for Truth, That whatever can truly be call'd our Profit, nay and all the Welfare and Happiness of Life, consists in a firm Constitution of Body, and a well-grounded Hope of its lasting Continuance; it is certain this Profit, nay this sovereign Profit (for such they account it) must sometimes be set in opposition to Honesty. e For what, in the first place, will be the Office of Prudence? only to cater and look about for Plea­fures? [Page 328] How miserable a case is that Virtue in, which is thus made a Servant and Pander to Plea­sure? But what shall be her Business in this Office? to tast and distinguish ingeniously betwixt Pleasures? Supposing this to be a pleasant Business, 'tis certainly the most scandalous one that could ever have been thought on. Again, Can he that makes Pain be the greatest Evil, have ever such a Virtue as For­titude in him, the very Nature of which consists wholly in despising of Pains and Difficulties? I know Epicurus upon several Occasions, and this in particular, speaks very couragiously as to the mat­ter of Pain; but we must not consider so much what is said, as what ought to be said by a Man of his Principles, who makes Pleasure and Pain to be the ultimate Bounds of Man's Happiness and Misery. So again, if you'd hear him about Continence and Temperance, he tells you abundance of extraordi­nary things in a great many places; but he's gra­vell'd (as we speak) and can never be able to ac­quit himself handsomly. For with what Face of Reason can he commend Temperance, who places his Happiness in the Enjoyment of Pleasures? f when the sensual Appetite follows after Pleasures, and 'tis the Business of Temperance to correct that Appetite. g But still they endeavour, in each of these Virtues, to bring themselves off by one little Shift or other: Thus Prudence is admitted, and de­fin'd [Page 329] to be The Skill of supplying us with Pleasures, and defending us from Pains: And they make out Fortitude as well as they can, by saying it consists in despising Death and enduring Torments: They do bring in a sort of Temperance too, tho' not without a great deal of Straining and Difficulty; but how­ever they make a shift, after some fashion, by saying, they count it the greatest Pleasure, if they can but be exempt from Pain and Uneasiness. Thus these three Virtues stand up pretty well; but Justice, the fourth, totters mightily with them, or rather indeed is quite fal'n to the Ground; with all those Duties, which relate to the maintenance of Human Socie­ty: h For what Kindness, Liberality, Affability or Friendship can there be amongst those, who desire these Virtues not purely for themselves, but only in relation to their Pleasure or Advantage? To make short then, I shall only say, that as I have shewn before, That nothing can be Profitable which is contrary to Honesty; so now I do affirm, That Pleasure in general is contrary to Honesty. I the more blame therefore i Dinomachus and Callipho, who thought this Dispute might be brought to an Issue, if they joyn'd both Pleasure and Virtue to­gether, like a Man and a Beast as it were in the same Yoke. For Virtue can never admit of this Conjunction, but abhors and disdains it; nor can ever the soveraign Good and Evil, which must be one single and simple thing, be made up and com­pounded of such different Principles. But of this, which is a thing of the greatest Moment, I have written at large in k another Work: Let us now [Page 330] return to our present Subject: What has been said in this last Book, I hope, is enough to let any one see, How 'tis his Duty to determin his Choice, if that which seems useful and expedient for him, should come into competition with that which is Honest. But if it should be said, That even Plea­sure carries with it the appearance of Profit; let it also be consider'd, That it never can be brought to an Agreement with Honesty: For the most that can possibly be said for Pleasure, (that we mayn't seem wholly to exclude it) is, That it serves by way of Sauce, to give a Relish to things, but has no true Profit or Advantage in it self.

This is the Present, dear Son Mark, that your Father sends you, and in my Opinion 'tis a very good one; but that must be judg'd of according to the use you your self shall make of it. However entertain, among Cratippus's Lectures, these three Books, and shew them at least the Civility due to Strangers. Had it been my fortune to have come to Athens (l which had surely been done, if I had not been recall'd by the Cries of my Country) you might then perhaps sometimes have heard my Le­ctures: However since now, in perusing these Sheets, you'll have my Voice, as it were, by Proxy; Pray bestow upon them as much time as you can, and I am sure you can as much as you please. When I hear you take a pleasure in this sort of Studies, 'twill delight me to talk to you (which I hope may be speedily) face to face; or however to write to you, tho' at never so great a distance. In the mean time Adieu, my dear Cicero, and assure your [Page 331] self, that tho' no one in the World is more dear to me than you are, yet you'll hereafter be much more so, if I find you take Delight in such Wri­tings and Instructions.

FINIS.

THE INDEX.

☞ The first Figure refers to one of the Three Books, the second, &c. to the Chapter of that Book.

A.
  • ACademicks little differ­ing from the Peripa­teticks, 1, 1. 3, 4. have a right to treat about Duties, 1, 2. how differing from the Scepticks, and why they dispute against every thing, 2, 2. formerly the same with the Peripate­ticks, 3, 4. are not tied to a Set of Opinions, 3, 4.
  • Accusing, how far allowable, 2, 14.
  • Acilius the Historian, 3, 32.
  • Acknowledgment a sufficient return of a Kindness, 2, 20.
  • Acropolis, its entrance, 2, 17.
  • Action gives a true Value to Virtue, 1, 6. to take place of Speculation, 1, 6, 43, 44, 45. not to be ventur'd on, if we doubt of its Honesty, 1, 9. should be free from Rashness, &c. 1, 29. three Rules to be observ'd for keeping Decorum in our A­ctions, 1, 39. Order and Re­gularity to be observ'd in our Actions, 1, 40. these de­pend upon Time and Place, 1, 40. good Actons ill ap­ply'd become ill ones, 2, 18.
  • Actors choose the Parts fittest for their Humours, 1, 31. respect Modesty, 1, 35.
  • Admiration, how mov'd in Men, 2, 10, 11.
  • Advantages tempt Men to be Rogues, 3, 10.
  • Advice of Friends to be ask'd in Prosperity, 1, 26. of ex­perienc'd Men, in doubt, 1, 41. Rules about taking this Advice, 1, 41.
  • Advocates may plead for what is not really true, 2, 14.
  • Aediles who, and their Mag­nificence, 2, 16.
  • Affability wins Peoples Love, 2, 14.
  • Affectation odious, 1, 36.
  • Africanus his saying, That Men grown proud, &c. 1, 26. his Retirement and say­ing, That he was never less Idle, &c. 3, 1. Afric. [Page ii] the Younger razes Carthage and Numantia, 1, 22. Son of Paullus, 1, 33. not to be corrupted by Money, 2, 22.
  • Agamemnon sacrificed his Daughter, 3, 25.
  • Agreement between the seve­ral Orders, the Support of a State, 3, 22.
  • Agriculture commended, 1, 42.
  • Ajax, his Character, 1, 31.
  • Alexander Phereus the Ty­rant, 2, 7.
  • Alex. the Great, often guilty of great Vices, 1, 26. chid­den by his Father for gi­ving Money, 2, 15.
  • Ambition a great Cause of In­justice, 1, 8, 19. is general­ly in Men of the greatest Souls, ibid. is contrary to true Courage, 1, 19, 20. robs a Man of his Liberty, 1, 20. is destructive to a State, 1, 25. 3, 21.
  • Anger against Adversaries to be avoided, 1, 25. especial­ly in Punishing, 1, 25. also in common Discourse; in Chiding, and in Quarrels, 1, 38.
  • Annicerian Philosophers, 3, 33.
  • Another's Right, see take.
  • Antipater the Stoick, 2, 24. 3, 14.
  • Apelles's Venus, 3, 2.
  • Applause, the desire of it to be avoided, 1, 19, 20.
  • Aquillius's Formulae, 3, 14, 15.
  • Aratus the Sicyonian, 2, 23.
  • Aristippus, 1, 41. 3, 33.
  • Aristo, 1, 2.
  • Aristotle neglected Eloquence 1, 1. his Opinion about Shews to the People, &c. 2, 16. makes Honesty far outweigh all other Goods, 3, 8.
  • Armies of little use abroad, without Prudence at home, &c. 1, 22.
  • Assent not no be given hasti­ly, 1, 6.
  • Athens a famous University, 1, 1. 3, 2.
  • Athenians make a cruel E­dict, 3, 11. forsake their City for fear of the Persi­ans, ibid. reject a dishonest Proposal, &c. ibid.
  • Avarice one great cause of In­justice, 1, 7, 8. a sign of a narrow and sordid Spirit, 1, 20. Magistrates should be free from Suspicion of it, 2, 21. is destructive to a State, 2, 22.
B.
  • BArdylis the Illyrian, 2, 11. Bargains should be made at a word, 3, 15.
  • Beauty of two sorts, 1, 36. how to be gotten, ibid.
  • Becoming, see Decency.
  • Benefits; how we should judge of their Value, 1, 15. done either by our Money or Industry, 2, 15. relate ei­ther to the Republick, or to Particulars, 2, 19. &c. up­on whom best bestow'd, 2, 18, 20.
  • Body should be enur'd to La­bour, 1, 23. the care Na­ture has taken in its Fa­brick, 1, 35.
  • Bounty, 12. see Liberality.
  • Boys not allowed all sorts of Plays, 1, 29.
  • Bragging very unbecoming, 1, 38.
  • Bribery in Magistrates the [Page iii] Ruine of a Republick, 2, 21, 22. Laws made against it by the Romans, 2, 21.
  • Brutes, how differing from Men, 1, 4, &c. we often talk of their Courage, but not Justice, &c. 1, 16.
  • Brutus depos'd Collatinus, 3, 10.
  • Building; its Measures and End, 1, 39.
  • Buyers should not use Arts to beat down the Prizes, 3, 15. see Seller.
C.
  • Caesar, Brother of Catulus, a facetious Man, 1, 37.
  • Caesar broke thro' the most sacred Ties for the sake of Empire, 1, 8. Rob'd some that he might be Generous to others, 1, 14. rent and mangled his Country, 1, 17. was Murder'd for his Tyranny, 2, 7. Triumphs over Marseilles, &c. 2, 8. his Party was Wicked and Detestable, 2, 13. lov'd Vil­lany, tho' he got nothing by it, 2, 24. makes himself K. of the Romans, &c. 3, 21.
  • Callicratidas too careful of his own Honour, 1, 24. a Lover of Simplicity, 1, 30.
  • Calling, see Life.
  • Callipho and Dinomachus joyn Pleasure and Virtue, 3, 33.
  • [...] what, 1, 3.
  • Cannius's Bargain, 3, 14.
  • Carriage toward all Men to be taken care of, 1, 28, 35.
  • Carthaginians Treacherous, 1, 12.
  • Cato Censorius, his Letter to Poppilius, 1, 11. caus'd the third Carthaginian War, 1, 23. his Apothegms, 1, 29. his Answer about mana­ging an Estate, 2, 25.
  • Cato, Father to Uticensis, his Determination of a Case, 3, 16.
  • Cato Uticensis's Genius, 1, 31. too headstrong in standing up for the Interest of the Publick, 3, 22.
  • [...] what, 1, 3.
  • Catulus not inferior to Pom­pey, 1, 22. Catuli counted the best Speakers, 1, 37.
  • Chiding sometimes necessary, 1, 38. Rules to be observ'd in it, ibid.
  • Children naturally lov'd, 1, 4.
  • Chrysippus's excellent Saying, 3, 10.
  • Cicero's Service to his Coun­try-men by Writing, 1, 1. as­sumes to himself the Vir­tues of an Orator, &c. ibid. his prudent Management of the Republick, 1, 22. 2, 24. got his Preferments by all the Votes, 2, 17. betakes himself to Retirement, 3, 1. design'd to have gone to Athens, 3, 33.
  • Cimbers and Celtibers, 1, 12.
  • Cimon of Athens's Hospitality, 2, 18.
  • Circumstances of Men to be regarded in Giving, 1, 8. 2, 18. make that not to be a Crime, which usually is one, 3, 4.
  • Cities, in taking 'em nothing to be done cruelly, &c. 1, 24. the great use of 'em, 2, 4. why at first built, 2, 21, 22.
  • Citizens Duties, 1, 34.
  • Claudius Centumalus, 3, 16.
  • Clemency, how far laudable, 1, 25.
  • [Page iv] Cleombrotus beat by Epami­nondas, 1, 24.
  • Cloaths; only Health to be regarded in 'em, 1, 30. Mo­deration to be observ'd in the fineness of 'em, 1, 36.
  • Clownishness to be avoided, 1, 35, 36.
  • Common: all things at first were so, 1, 7. what things are common to all, 1, 16.
  • Company; a Man would be weary of his Life without it, 1, 43. to keep company with Good and Wise Men recommends young People, 2, 13.
  • Conceal, how differing from not to tell, 3, 12. what it is, 3, 13.
  • Concord a Pillar of any State, 2, 22.
  • Confidence, see Trust.
  • Constantia, what it is, 1, 20.
  • Contemplation should give place to Action, 1, 4, 6, 43, 44, 45.
  • Copulation, the Desire of it natural to all Animals, 1, 4.
  • Corinth raz'd by the Romans, 1, 11. 3, 11.
  • Correction, see Chiding, Pu­nishment.
  • Covetousness, see Avarice.
  • Countenance to be kept al­ways the same, without Dejection, 1, 26.
  • Counterfeit: nothing can be lasting that is such, 2, 12.
  • Country claims a share in us 1, 8. the Love we have for it swallows up all other Loves, 1, 17. their Wick­edness who injure it, 1, 17. every one that is able ought to serve it, 1, 20. should be preferr'd even before Pa­rents, 1, 17, 45. 3, 23.
  • Courage is a Virtue contend­ing for Honesty, 1, 19. an Enemy to Treachery, &c. ibid. to desire of Applause, 1, 20. consists in two things, ibid. is obtain'd by the Mind, not the Body, 1, 23. in War, recommends young Men, 2, 13. teaches us to fear nothing, &c. 3, 27. no­thing Profitable that's con­trary to it, 3, 26, &c.
  • Craft, see Cunning.
  • Crassus [Marc.] his Saying a­bout Riches, 1, 8. made Heir by a false Will, 3, 18. an ill Man, 3, 19.
  • Crassus Luc. an Orator, 1, 37. got Honour by an Accusa­tion, 2, 13.
  • Crassus the Wealthy, Aedile, 2, 16.
  • Cratippus, who he was, 1, 1. 2, 2.
  • Cruelty most contrary to Na­ture, 2, 11.
  • Cunning far from true Wis­dom, 1, 19. 2, 3. 3, 17. the great Mischief of it, 3, 17. doth not excuse from Per­jury, but rather aggravates it, 3, 32.
  • Custom and Civil Constitu­tions to be follow'd, 1, 41. some may act against 'em, and others not, ibid.
  • Cynicks argue against Mode­sty, 1, 35. to be wholly re­jected, 1, 41.
  • Cyrenaick Phisophers, 3, 33.
D.
  • DAncing in the Streets scan­dalous, 3, 19, 25.
  • Danger how far to be under­taken, 1, 24. we should en­danger [Page v] our selves rather than the Publick, ibid.
  • Debts forgiven, &c. 2, 22, 23. Governours should hinder People from running into Debts, 2, 24.
  • Deceit frees a Man from be­ing bound by his Promise, 1, 10.
  • Decency observ'd by Man on­ly, 1, 4. inseparable from Honesty, 1, 27. is seen in all the parts of Honesty, i­bid. two sorts of it, uni­versal and particular, ibid. draws the Approbation of all, 1, 28. relates both to Body and Mind, ibid. no­thing Decent that's contrary to a Man's Genius, 1, 31. De­cency of Living according to Universal Nature, 1, 28, 29, 30. according to each Man's particular one, 1, 30, 31. according to one's Place or Station in the World, 1, 32. is seen in our Words, Actions, &c. 1, 35. in our Eyes, Hands, &c. ibid. con­sists in three things, ibid.
  • Decorum of the Poets, 1, 28.
  • Defending more laudable than to Accuse, 2, 14. to defend a guilty Person lawful, ibid.
  • Define; the Subject of a Dis­course ought to be defin'd at the beginning, 1, 2.
  • Deliberation, five Heads of it, 1, 3. in some Cases sinful, 3, 4, 8, &c.
  • Demetrius Phalereus, who he was, 1, 1. blames Pericles, 2, 17.
  • Demetrius forsaken by the Macedonians, 2, 7.
  • Demosthenes a Hearer of Pla­to, 1, 1. at what age he be­gan his Study, 2, 13.
  • Desire of Riches, &c. see Ava­rice, Ambition.
  • Despising different from ha­ving an ill Opinion of, 2, 10.
  • Dicaearchus's Book about the Destruction of Men, 2, 5.
  • Difficult Subjects, see Study, Difficulty makes a thing more honourable, 1, 19.
  • Diogenes and Antipater dis­pute, 3, 12, 13.
  • Dion taught by Plato, 1, 44.
  • Dionysius the Sicilian Tyrant, 2, 7.
  • Direct a wandring Traveller, 1, 16.
  • Discourse; variety in Mens Ways of it, 1, 30. not to be dress'd up with Greek Expressions, 1, 31. of two sorts, 1, 37. 2, 14. common Discourse should be easie, &c. ibid. free from Passion, &c. 1, 38. should be agree­able to the Subject we dis­course upon, 1, 37, 40.
  • Disputing of two sorts, by Reason and by Force, 1, 11.
  • Dissimulation should be ex­cluded, 3, 15.
  • Division should take in the whole Matter divided, 1, 3.
  • Dolus malus what, 3, 14. pu­nish'd by the Civil Laws, 3. 15.
  • Donations to the People when allowable, 2, 16, 17.
  • Doubt: We should do no­thing, of which we doubt whether 'tis Honest or not, 1, 9. in Cases of doubt ask experienc'd Mens Advice, 41.
  • Duties: the whole Subject of 'em consists of two parts, 1, 3. middle and perfect [Page vi] ones, ibid. 3, 3, 4. incum­bent on us in every part of our Lives, 1, 2. greater ones to take place before less, 1, 10. Duty to Parents adorns a young Man, 2, 13.
E.
  • EDucation of Youth a lau­dable Employment, 1, 42. makes many useful Men, &c. 1, 44.
  • Effeminacy to be avoided, 1, 4. see Niceness.
  • E [...]r, its signification, 1, 30.
  • Eloquence preferable to acute Thinking, 1, 44. its great force, &c. 2, 14. its down­fal in Rome, 2, 19. gives one opportunities of Obli­ging many, ibid.
  • Enemies by the old Romans call'd Strangers, 1, 12. Ju­stice to be kept towards them, 1, 11, 12. 3, 29. dif­ference of Carriage to be observ'd toward 'em, 1, 12. none to be reckon'd Ene­mies, but who take up Arms against the State, 1, 25.
  • Ennius, 1, 8, 16.
  • Epicurus ruins all Virtue, 1, 2. 3, 33. makes Happiness consist in Pleasure, 3, 33. endeavours to bring him­self off, but in vain, ibid.
  • Estate, how to be gotten, bet­ter'd, &c. 1, 26. 2, 24, 25. 'tis a scandal to ruin it by neglect, 2, 18. what the best, that can be left to a Son, 1, 33.
  • Evenness of Temper, a part of Courage, 1, 26.
  • Evils; the least to be chosen, 3, 1, 28, 29. those of Body and Fortune less than those of the Soul, 3, 5.
  • Euripides's Phoenissae, 3, 21.
  • [...], what it signifies, 1, 40.
  • Exacting to be avoided in Dealings with others, 2, 18.
  • Exercise requisite to make Men perfect, 1, 18.
  • Extraordinary things move admiration, 2, 10.
F.
  • Q. Fabius Lab [...]o's Trick, 1, 10. Fab. Maximus his Wise Delaying, 1, 24. his Subtilty and Cunning, 1, 30.
  • Fabricius's Justice, 1, 13. 3, 4, 22.
  • Faith the Foundation of Ju­stice, 1, 7. set up in the Capitol next to Jupiter, 3, 29. to be kept with Ene­mies, ibid. See Oaths.
  • Fathers often follow'd in course of Life by their Sons, 1, 32. Rules to be ob­serv'd in imitating them, 1, 33. whether to be ac­cus'd by their Sons, should they Plot against the State, 3, 23.
  • Fear one cause of Injustice, 1, 7. Promises made thro' fear not binding, 1, 10. an improper way of getting Men to be of our side; and the ill Consequences of it, 2, 7, 8.
  • Fecial Law of the Romans, 1, 11. 3, 29.
  • Fides deriv'd by the Stoicks, 1, 7. Ex fide bona, a Form in Law, 3, 17.
  • Fighting when laudable, 1, 23.
  • [Page vii] Fimbria Judge in a Case, 3, 19.
  • Flatterers to be avoided, 1. 26. Estates got by Flattery, scandalous, 3, 18.
  • Force and Fraud, the two ways of injuring Men; the latter more odious, 1, 13. a couragious Man can't be forc'd, 3, 31.
  • Forms in Judgment, 3, 15. the general Form or Rule, 3, 5.
  • Fortune must yield to Nature, 1, 33. her influence upon the good or ill Su [...] of Actions, 2, 6. Seditions will never be wanting, while Men hope to make their Fortunes by 'em, 2, 8. to be transported with good or ill Fortune shews a mean Spirit, 1, 26.
  • Freedom; wherein it consists, 1, 20.
  • Fretfulness upon unseasonable Visits, &c. to be avoided, 1, 25.
  • Friends necessary for all, 2, 8. all common among Friends, 1, 16. the Counsel of Friends should be ask'd, 1, 26. Men are born for their Friends, as well as themselves, 1, 8. Corrections, Counsel, &c. due among Friends, 1, 17. How much may be done for the sake of a Friend, 3, 10. Damon and Pythas two Friends, ibid. closeness of Union between Friends, 1, 17.
  • Friendship makes many be­come one, 1, 17. is cement­ed by likeness of Manners, ibid. to be broken off by little and little, 1, 33.
G.
  • GAte should not be too slow, &c. 1, 36.
  • Generals of the Romans deli­ver'd to their Enemies, 3, 30.
  • Genius, see Nature.
  • Geometricians Method, 3, 7.
  • Gentile Jests, 1, 29. Carriage, 1, 35.
  • Glory made upof three Ingre­dients, 2, 9. Cicero wrote two Books about it, ibid. must be us'd with Discre­tion; and what the short­est cut to it, 2, 12, 13. not to be gotten by Counter­feit, 2, 12. but by Justice, 2, 13. can't be durable un­less founded upon Virtue, 2, 20. inconsistent with Wick­edness, 3, 22.
  • Gods; Duties to them to be perform'd first, 1, 45. how their Favour may be pro­cur'd, 2, 3. they never hurt, ibid. are never angry, 3, 28, 29.
  • Good Fortune; 'tis a sign of a low Spirit to be transport­ed with it, 1, 26.
  • Good Men so call'd from Ju­stice, 1, 7. 2, 11. who, 3, 15, 19. very hard to be found, ibid. 'tis always pro­fitable to be one, ibid. Good Men desire Honesty, not Secrecy, 3, 9.
  • Good-will, see Love.
  • Government of a State like the Office of a Guardian, 1, 25. the several Duties of those that govern, 2, 21, &c.
  • Gownsmen as useful as Sol­diers, 1, 22, 23.
  • Gracchus Father of the two [Page viii] Gracchi's, 2, 12. his Sons justly slain, ibid. ruin'd by their levelling Principles, 2. 23.
  • Gratidianus, 3, 16, 20.
  • Gratitude a most necessary Duty, in which we should imitate fruitful Fields, 1, 15. all People hate one that is not Grateful, 2, 18.
  • Greatness of Soul, natural to Man, 1, 4. what it appears in, 1, 5. enclines Men to Ambition, 1, 8, 19. is often too hot, 1, 15. usually made most account of in the World, 1, 18. necessary for Statesmen more than Phi­losophers, 1, 20. its Des­cription, and how it differs from Greatness of Under­standing, 1, 23. seen even in a retired Life, 1, 26. is Savageness, if not accom­pany'd with Justice, 1, 44. see Courage.
  • Greek and Latin to be joyn'd, 1, 1. to bring Greek into Discourse, ridiculous, 1, 31.
  • Guilty Persons may some­times be defended, 2, 14.
  • Gyges's Ring, 3, 9, 19.
H.
  • HAnnibal Cruel, 1, 12. sends ten to Rome after the Fight at Cannae, 1, 13. 3, 32.
  • Hastiness in giving assent, a Fault in the search of Truth, 1, 7. the Passions should not thro' hast out-run Reason, 1, 29.
  • Hate able to ruine the great­est Power, 2, 7, 8.
  • Haughtiness in Prosperity to be avoided, 1, 26.
  • Health how to be preserv'd, 2, 24.
  • Hecaton the Rhodian, 3, 15, 23.
  • Help: not to help the Injur'd, if we can is Injustice, 1, 7.
  • Hercules sees two ways, 1, 32. is plac'd among the Gods, 3, 5.
  • Herillus exploded, 1, 2.
  • Herodotus the Historian, 2, 12.
  • Hesiod's Rule, 1, 15.
  • Hire; the worst means of winning Men to our side, 2, 6.
  • Honestum, whence it results, 1, 4, 5. laudable in it self, ibid. would make the World in Love with it, could it be seen, 1, 5. shews it self by its own brightness, 1, 9. entitles a Man to our Liberality, 1, 14, 15. 2, 20. more especially deserves our Study, 2, 3. naturally plea­seth Men, 2, 9. is the same with Profit, 3, 3, 7, 8, &c. honest Man, who, 3, 19.
  • Honour; the Desire of it tempts Men to Injustice, 3, 20.
  • Hortensius Aedile, 2, 15. uses a false Will, 3, 18.
  • Hospitality to be kept by great Men, 1, 39. prais'd deservedly by Theophrastus, 2, 18.
  • Hostis, its signification among the old Romans, 1, 12.
  • Hot Counsels and Deiigns preferr'd by some, 1, 24.
  • House, of what sort becomes a great Man, 1, 39. the Ma­ster should be an Honour to his House, ibid.
  • Humility requisite in Prospe­rity, 1, 26.
  • Humours, see Nature.
  • Hunting, a Manly Recreation, 1, 29.
  • [Page ix] Hypocrisie should be banish'd cut of the World, 3, 14.
I.
  • JEsting in what kind and de­gree allowable, 1, 29.
  • Inheritance; the best a Father can leave to his Son, is the fame of his Virtues, 1, 33.
  • Injuries, two ways of doing 'em, 1, 13. injuring others most contrary to Nature, 3, 5.
  • Injustice of two sorts, and the Causes of each, 1, 7, 8, 9. the greatest, which is done under the mask of Honesty, 1, 13.
  • Innocent Persons never to be accus'd, 2, 14.
  • Interest draws one way, and Honesty another, 1, 3. no base thing can be any one's Interest, 3, 19. should be measur'd by Justice, 3, 21.
  • Isocrates contrary to Aristotle, 1, 1.
  • Judges Duty, 2, 14.
  • Justice the most splendid Vir­tue, 1, 7. makes Men be call'd Good, ibid. 2, 11. the Duties of it, 1, 7. is alter'd upon an alteration of the Circumstances, 1, 10. to be kept toward those that have injur'd us, and Ene­mies, 1, 11. toward the meanest, such as Salves, 1, 13. is the only way of ob­taining our Ends, 2, 3. makes Men trust us more than Prudence, 2, 9. no Man just, who is afraid of Death, &c. 2, 11. Justice gets us all the three Ingre­dients of Glory, ibid. is ne­cessary for all Men, even Pirates, 2. 11. Kings were at first chose, and Laws made for the sake of it, 2, 12. no Credit can be lasting, that is not built upon it, 2, 20. is the Queen of all Virtues, 3, 6. nothing Profitable that's contrary to it, 3, 22, &c.
K.
  • KIndnesses should be done to Honest rather than Great Men, 2, 20. not to be done to one, by injuring another, ibid. See Benefits.
  • Kings formerly chose for their Justice, 2, 12. no Faith in case of a Kingdom, 1, 8. Justice violated for a King­dom, 3, 21. many treache­rous, and but few faithful to Kings, ibid.
  • Knowledge how desir'd, &c. by Men, 1, 4, 6. must give place to Action, 1, 43. is a barren accomplishment, without Justice, 1, 44. that of Honesty, best, 2, 2, 3. 3, 2.
  • Knavery to be avoided, 2, 3. few Actions wholly free from it, 3, 15. See Dolus malus.
L.
  • LAcedaemonians: Plato's Ob­servation of 'em, 1, 19. ruin'd by Epimanondas, 1, 24. forsaken by their Al­lies, 2, 7. murther their King Agis, &c. 2, 23.
  • Laetorius's Law, 3, 15.
  • Language, see Discourse.
  • Largi, of two forts, 2, 16.
  • Latin to be joyn'd with Greek, 1, 1.
  • [Page x] Laws; a malicious Interpre­tation of 'em a means of Roguery, 1, 10. punish Of­fenders according to Ju­stice, 1, 25. why first in­vented, 2, 12. use the same Language to all Conditi­ons, ibid. the knowledge of 'em creditable at Rome, 2, 19. gives a Man oppor­tunities of obliging, ibid. the End and Design of 'em, 3, 5. how they root out Frauds, 3, 17. the Law of Nations different from that of particular Cities, ibid. Roman Law taken from Nature, and its Excellence, ibid. Law of Nature takes in all Men, 3, 6. Law-suits to be a voided, 2, 18.
  • Learners how best corrected, 1, 41.
  • Learning; who may be al­low'd to give 'emselves up to the Study of it, 1, 20. is a Pleasure, not a Labour, 3, 2.
  • Letters, how to be express'd, 1, 37.
  • Levelling Estates destructive, &c. 2, 21, &c.
  • Liberality: Three Cautions to be observ'd in it, 1, 14. 2, 25. must be govern'd by Justice, ibid. to give to one what is taken from ano­ther not Liberality, ibid. to whom it should be most shewn, 1, 15, 18. 2, 18, 20. moves the Peoples Love, 2, 9, 18. consists in doing Kindnesses either by Money or Labour; the latter pre­ferrable, 2, 15. has got no bottom, ibid. how the Li­beral dispose of their Mo­ney, 2, 16.
  • Liberty ought to be most of all contended for, 1, 20. wherein it consists, ibid. bites deeper after she has been chain'd, 2, 7.
  • Life of Retirement, and that of Publick Business com­par'd, 1, 21. several Men take several ways of Life, 1, 32. the difficulty of choo­sing a way of Life; and what chiefly to be regarded in it, 1, 32, 33. should not easily be changed, 1, 33. how such Change should be made, ibid.
  • Little Indecencies especially to be avoided, 1, 40. in the least things we observe what's becoming, 1, 41.
  • Love of 'emselves and Off­spring in all Animals, 1, 4. Love a stronger Motive to Obedience than Fear, 2, 7, 8. how to be gain'd of the People, 2, 9. by what we are to judge of Mens Love to us, 1, 15. we should do most for those, by whom we are lov'd most, ibid. ge­neral Love, and that of Friendship, how far neces­sary, 2, 8.
  • Lucullus magnificent in Build­ing, 1, 39.
  • Lycurgus the Lawgiver of Sparta, 1, 22.
  • Lying abominable, 1, 42. 3, 14. should be banish'd from all Commerce, 3, 15. is in­consistent with the Cha­racter of a good Man, 3, 20.
  • Lysander enlarg'd the Spartan Empire, 1, 22. Crafty, 1, 30. the Ephore banish'd, 2, 23.
  • Lysis Master of Epaminondas, 1, 44.
M.
  • [Page xi]MAcedonians desert Deme­trius, 2, 7. Paullus took the Treasure of Macedon, 2, 22.
  • Magistrates Duties, 1, 24, 25, 34. 2, 21, &c.
  • Mamercus put by the Consul­ship, 2, 17.
  • Man; how different from Brutes, 1, 4, 30. not born for himself alone, 1, 7. all things on Earth made for him, say the Stoicks, ibid. we should shew a respect for all Men, 1, 28, 36. and desire to be thought well of by 'em, ibid. some are Men in Name only, 1, 30. Men may be allow'd some Or­naments; but must avoid Niceness, 1, 36. naturally love Society, 1, 43, 44. do the most Good and Harm to one another, 2, 3, 4, 5. to procure their Love the chief of Virtue, 2, 5. by what means they are drawn to be for us, 2, 6. every Man should help any other because he is a Man, 3, 6.
  • Manlius Luc. and Titus, 3, 31.
  • Marius made Consul, &c. 3, 20. Marius Gratidianus, 3, 16, 20.
  • Marriage the closest Bond of Society, 1, 17.
  • Medes chose the justest Men Kings, 2, 12.
  • Merchandice, how far credit­able, 1, 42.
  • Merchant of Corn's Case, 3, 12, 13.
  • Merits of the Receiver to be consider'd in giving; of four sorts, 1, 14.
  • Metelius accus'd by Marius, 3, 20. and Africanus's Dissent, 1, 25.
  • Metrodorus's Opinion about Happiness, 3, 33.
  • Milo got great Honour, 2, 17.
  • Mind of Man always in Mo­tion, 1, 6. consists in Rea­son and Appetite, 1, 28, 36. decency to be kept in its Motions, 1, 36. filthiness of the Mind more loathsome than of the Body, 3, 29.
  • Moderation what, 1, 40. is best in most things, 1, 36.
  • Modesty, Bashfulness, &c. 1, 27. the Duties of 'em diffe­rent from those of Justice, 1, 28. forbids to do or name some things, 1, 35. the Cy­nicks argue against it, ibid. nothing virtuous or becom­ing without it, 1, 41. sets off Eloquence, especially in young Men, 2, 14.
  • Money: See Hire, Riches, &c. those tryed with Fire, who have withstood its Temptations, 2, 11. how best laid out, 2, 16, 17, 18. bad Money should not be put away, 3, 23.
  • Motives drawing Men to fa­vour us, &c. 2, 6.
  • Mummius took Corinth, &c. 2, 22.
  • Musicians discover the least Faults in Musick, 1, 40, 41.
N.
  • NAsica murther'd T. Grac­chus, 1, 22.
  • Nature should be taken for Guide, and then we can't err, 1, 28. Pleasure, &c. unworthy Man's Nature, 1, 30. variety of Mens parti­cular [Page xii] Natures, ibid. every one should follow his own Nature; and how far, 1, 31. nothing becoming that is contrary to it, ibid. its great influence on our Acti­ons, ibid. has greater sway than Fortune, 1, 33. directs to Modesty, 1, 35. is both an Human and Divine Law, 3, 5. enjoyns each Man to help another, 3, 6. always desires what is be­coming, 3, 8. to live accord­ing to Nature the Stoical, chief Good, 3, 3.
  • Necessity not the Motive to Society among Men, 1, 44.
  • Niceness in Carriage, 1, 35. Dress, &c. 1, 36.
  • Nola and Naples quarrel a­bout their Bounds, 1, 10.
  • Non putaram, a Fool's shift, 1, 23.
O.
  • OAths given to Soldiers, 1, 11. what is to be con­sider'd in Oaths, 1, 13. 3, 29. I am not tied by Oath to a Deceiver, 3, 28, 29. Oath is a religious Affir­mation, &c. 3, 29. the Sa­credness of 'em among the old Romans, 3, 31. not elu­ded by shifts, 1, 13. 3, 32.
  • Obscene Jesting, 1, 29. Talk­ing discovers ill Inclinati­ons, &c. 1, 35.
  • Obscure Subjects to be neg­lected, 1, 6.
  • Offence: a fear of giving Offence, a cause of Inju­stice, 1, 9. a cause of Mis­management in Civil and Military Affairs, 1, 24. 'tis the Duty of Modesty not to give Offence, 1, 28. no­thing to be done, that may offend the Eyes and Ears, 1, 35.
  • Offices a most useful and com­prehensive Subject, 1, 2. 3, 2. who have a Right to discourse about 'em, 1, 2.
  • Old Age to be reverenc'd, 1, 34, 41. the Duties of it, 1, 34.
  • Opinion of the World con­cerning us not to be neg­lected, 1, 28.
  • Oratory and Philosophy to be joyn'd, 1, 1.
  • Order in our Words and Acti­ons, 1, 40.
  • Orestes gives a Dinner to the People, 2, 17.
  • [...], 2, 5.
  • Other Mens Affairs appear small to us, as things at a distance, 1, 9. we should mind by others what is becoming, 1, 42. we can soonest see Faults in others, ibid.
  • Own: every one to be kept in the Enjoyment of his own, 2, 22. own's Interest how far to be regarded, 3, 5, 10.
P.
  • [...], 2, 5.
  • Pain racks and torments us, 2, 10. not the greatest E­vil, 3, 29.
  • Pains should be proportion'd to what we are about, 1, 39.
  • Painters set their Works out to be view'd, 1, 41.
  • Panaetius, who he was, 1, 2. left his Work about Duties unfinish'd, 3, 2, 7.
  • [Page xiii] Particulars; nothing to be done for 'em, that is a Da­mage to the Publick, 2, 21. should not have Interest se­parate from the Publick, 3, 6.
  • Parts; Men have several parts to be acted, 1, 30, 32. parts of the Body well fit­ted by Nature, 1, 35.
  • Passion: Injuries done in a Passion less heinous than in cold Bloud, 1, 8. should be govern'd by Reason, 1, 29, 36, 39. 2, 5. disturb both Body and Mind, 1, 29. to be shunn'd in Discourse, 1, 38. nothing can be lik'd, that is done in a Passion, ib.
  • Pausanias, Spartan General, 1, 22.
  • Paullus had all the Riches of Macedon, 2, 22.
  • Pericles's Answer to Sophocles, 1, 40. is blam'd by Phale­reus, 2, 17.
  • People caress'd, &c. 2, 16.
  • Peripateticks differ little from the Academicks, 1, 1. 3, 4. have a Right to treat about Duties, 1, 2. require a Me­diocrity, and say Anger was given us to good Pur­poses, 1, 25. theirs a most noble and ancient Philoso­phy, 2, 2.
  • Perjury; when a Man is guil­ty of it, 3, 29.
  • Phaeton, 3, 25.
  • Phalaris, 2, 7. 3, 6.
  • Philip of Macedon, above his Son in good Nature, 1, 26. advises his Son to speak kindly to the People, 2, 14. rebukes him for giving them Money, 2, 15.
  • Philip's Harangues in his Tri­buneship, 2, 21. his ill Coun­cil, 3, 22.
  • Philosophers unjust in mind­ing only their Studies, 1, 9. relinquish the Publick, ibid. their Method of root­ing out Frauds, 3, 17. none may assume that Name, without giving Rules a­bout Duty, 1, 2. their Study commended, 2, 2. Philoso­phy a Comfort in Afflicti­on, 2, 1, 2. a rich and plen­tiful Soil, 3, 2. the meaning of the word, 2, 2.
  • Pirates ought to have no Faith kept with 'em, 3, 29. can't be without Justice, 2, 11.
  • Place, its influence on our Actions, 1, 40.
  • Plato might have made an excellent Orator, 1, 1. his saying, That Men aren't born for themselves only, 1, 7. his Mistake about the Philosophers, 1, 9. his two Rules about Government, 1, 25. his Saying about Ambition, ibid. his excel­lent Saying about Pru­dence, 1, 19. his Fable of Gyges, 3, 9.
  • Plays and Recreations how far allowable, 1, 29. Play at Even and Odd, &c. 3, 19.
  • Players choose the parts fit­test for 'em, 1, 31. their re­spect to Modesty, 1, 35.
  • Pleasures of Body beneath a Man, 1, 30.
  • Pleasures are alluring Mistres­ses, 2, 10. are contrary to Honesty, 3, 33. may serve to give a relish to Actions, ibid. should not be regard­ed in Eating, &c. 1, 30.
  • Poetical Decorum, 1, 28. Po­ets set their Works out to be view'd, 1, 41.
  • [Page xiv] Polybius the Historian, 3, 32.
  • Pompey Sext. a Geometrician, 1, 6.
  • Pompey the Great, his Saying to Cicero, 1, 20. his Party unsuccessful, 2, 13. his mag­nificent Shews to the Peo­ple, 2, 16.
  • Pomponius the Tribune, 3, 31.
  • Pontius C. the Samnite, 2, 21.
  • Poppilius a Roman Com­mander, 1, 11.
  • Popular Expressions to be us'd, 2, 10.
  • Power; the desire of it draws Men to Injustice, 3, 21.
  • Practice necessary to perfect a Man in Virtue, 1, 18.
  • Precepts insufficient without Exercise, ibid.
  • Present things more accepta­ble for a time, 2, 17.
  • Pride in Prosperity to be a­voided, 1, 26.
  • Private Men should be kept in their Estates, 2, 21.
  • Prodigal who, 2, 16.
  • Profit the same with Honesty, 2, 3. 3, 3, 7, 12, &c. moves all Men, 3, 8, 28. the ap­pearance of it makes Men act contrary to Duty, 3, 11. ought to be rejected, ibid. every thing Honest Profit­able, and every thing Pro­fitable Honest, 3, 8.
  • Promises not always obli­ging, 1, 10. 3, 24, 25.
  • Property, its Original, 1, 7.
  • Prudence; the Duties result­ing from, 1, 5. consists in the Knowledge of Truth, and is most natural to Man, 1, 6. of but little Worth with­out Justice, 1, 43. different from Craft, 1, 19. 2, 3. 3, 17. a Definition of it, 1, 43. makes Men confide in us, if joyn'd, &c. 2, 9.
  • Publick Officers should be free from Passion, &c. 1, 20, 25. should see that what they undertake be Honest, ibid. remember Plato's two Rules, 1, 25. a Description of a good one, ibid. should be Courteous, Affable, &c. ibid. do the bravest Acti­ons, 1, 26. should guard their Eyes as well as Hands, 1, 40. not to be resisted, 1, 41. publick and private Life compar'd, 1, 21.
  • Punishments; Rules to be ob­serv'd about 'em, 1, 15. if some escape 'em, others grow more insolent, 2, 8.
  • Pyrrho can give no Rules a­bout Duty, 1, 2. 2, 2.
  • Pyrrhus his Speech upon gi­ving up the Prisoners, 1, 12. a Deserter offers to Poy­son him, 1, 13. 3, 22.
  • Pythagoras, 1, 17, 30.
  • Pythias, a Banker, &c. 3, 14.
R.
  • RAshness in giving up our Assent to be avoided, 1, 6. 2, 2. in our Actions, 1, 29.
  • Reason ought to be the go­verning Faculty in Man, 1, 28.
  • Rebukes in Friendship, 1, 17, see Chiding.
  • Regularity, see Uniformity.
  • Regulus taken by the Cartha­ginians, &c. 1, 3. 3, 26, &c.
  • Relations should be consi­der'd before other People, 1, 14, 16.
  • Republick. Cicero wrote six Books about it, 2, 17.
  • Respect should be had for all Men, 1, 28. especially those we converse with, 1, 35, 36, 38.
  • [Page xv] Retir'd People do very noble things, 1, 26. See Life.
  • Revenge must be kept with­in bounds, 1, 11.
  • Rhetorick Masters over-run all, 1, 36.
  • Riches why desired, 1, 8. 'tis not enough to get, unless one know how to use 'em, 2, 12. neither to be kept too close, nor too open, 2, 15. the best Fruit of 'em, 2, 16. are too much respect­ed. 2, 20. to be got not for our selves alone, &c. 3, 15. aren't Profitable, if accom­pany'd with Infamy, 3, 22. See Avarice, Liberality.
  • Romans famous for Courage, 1, 18. their ancient Justice and Kindness to Allies when chang'd, 2, 8. ruin'd by Ty­ranny and Oppression, ibid.
  • Romulus did ill in killing Re­mus, 3, 10.
  • Roscius Amerinus defended by Cicero, 2, 14.
  • Rule; the Desire of it natu­ral to Men, 1, 4. general Rule or Measure, 3, 5.
  • Rutilius had the Name of an Honest Man, &c. 2, 13. Scholar of Panaetius, 3, 2.
S.
  • SAlamis famous for a Victo­ry, 1, 22.
  • Salmacis, 1, 18.
  • Scaevola gives more than was ask'd for an Estate, 3, 15. Pontifex max. 3, 17.
  • Scepticks; their Opinion, 2, 2.
  • Secrecy, nothing to be com­mitted out of hopes of it, 3, 8, 9, &c.
  • Self-love keeps Men from see­ing their Duty, 1, 9. Na­ture allows a Man to Love himself first, 3, 5, 10. but not to injure others for the sake of self, ibid. 3, 6.
  • Seller, bound to tell the Faults of his Goods, 3, 12, 13, &c. should use no Arts to en­hance their Price, 3, 15.
  • Serious things to be handled seriously, 1, 37, 40.
  • Shews to the People, how far allowable, 2, 16, 17.
  • Sincerity agreeable to Man's Nature, 1, 4.
  • Singing openly a great Rude­ness, 1, 40.
  • Slaves how to be dealt with, 1, 13. 2, 7. Tricks in selling 'em punish'd, 3, 17.
  • Society; the Principles, sorts and degrees of it, 1, 16, 17. nothing that Men should be more concern'd for, 1, 43. Man by Nature socia­ble, 1, 44. Necessity not the Motive to Society, ibid. Du­ties of it of several Degrees, in what Order to be per­form'd, 1, 43. Universal So­ciety of what Nature, 3, 12.
  • Socrates facetious and drol­ling, 1, 30. of extraordina­ry Virtues, 1, 41. his short­est cut to Glory, 2, 12, 13. us'd to Curse those that separate Profit and Ho­nesty, 3, 3.
  • Solon, Athenian Lawgiver, 1, 22. his Craft, 1, 30.
  • Sons should live as becomes the Name of their Ance­stors, 1, 22, 23. don't bath with their Fathers, 1, 35.
  • [...], 1, 43.
  • Sophocles the Tragedian, 1, 40.
  • Soul's Functions more noble than the Body's, 2, 13.
  • Speech, see Discourse.
  • State, how to be supported, 2, 7, 8. 3, 22.
  • [Page xvi] Stiles of Eloquence and Philo­phy to be both cultivated, 1, 1.
  • Stoicks; Cicero follows 'em in this Book, 1, 2. great Admi­rers of Derivations, 1, 8. their chief Good, &c. 3, 3.
  • Strangers Duties in a place, 1, 34. a difference to be made between 'em, 1, 41. should not be forbid a City, 3, 11.
  • Study not to be spent upon ob­scure and difficult Subjects, 1, 7. the end of it, ibid. should give place to Action, 1, 4, 6, 43, 44, 45.
  • Subject of a Discourse must be first explain'd. 1, 2. different Subjects require different ways of Expression, 2, 10.
  • Subjects of common Discourse, 1, 37.
  • Sulpitius an Astronomer, 1, 6. an Orator accuses Norbanus, 2, 14.
  • Summum jus summam injuria, 1, 10.
  • Swearing upon one's Conscience, 3, 19. my Tongue swore, but, &c. 3, 29.
  • Sylla [Lucius's] inhuman Victo­ry, 2, 8.
  • Sylla [Pub.] Kinsman to the former, ibid.
T.
  • TAking away what is ano­ther's, a breach of Ju­stice, 1, 7. most contrary to Nature, 3, 5, 6. taking away from one and giving to ano­ther, no liberality, 1, 14. no good Man will take from a­nother to enrich himself, 3, 19.
  • Talk, see Discourse.
  • Taxes, the People not to be burthen'd with 'em, 2, 21. Tax-gatherers hated, 1, 42.
  • Ten Men sent by Hannibal to Rome, &c. 1, 13. 3, 32.
  • Temperance, 1, 5. the Duties of it must not always give place to those of Justice, 1, 45. and sobriety adorn a young Man, 2, 13. nothing Profitable that is contrary to it, 3, 33.
  • Tenths paid to the Gods, 2, 17.
  • Terence's Chremes, 1, 9.
  • Thebe Wife of Tyrant Alexan­der, 2, 7.
  • Themistocles, 1, 22. his Opinion about Marrying a Daughter, 2, 20. his Proposal to the Athenians, 3, 11.
  • Theophrastus, 1, 1. his Book a­bout Riches, 2, 16. praises Hospitality, 2, 18.
  • Theseus's Wish granted by Ne­ptune, 1, 10. 3. 25.
  • Thieves can't subsist without Justice, 2. 11.
  • Thinking; the end of it, 1, 6. a good Man won't think what he's asham'd should be known, 3, 19.
  • Thracians branded, 2, 7.
  • Time and Place make Actions good or bad, 1, 40.
  • Trades which creditable, &c. 1, 42. Tradesmen should a­void Lying, 1, 42. be Just, 2. 11.
  • Treachery, &c. contrary to Reason, 3, 17.
  • Truce for thirty Days, 1, 10.
  • Trust: how Men are induc'd to Trust us, 2, 9. Trusts not al­ways to be restor'd, 3, 25.
  • Truth; the Love of it natural to Man, 1, 4, 30. two Faults in search of it to be avoided, 1, 6.
  • Tyrants generally come to ill End, 2, 7. to kill 'em count­ed glorious among the Ro­mans, 3, 4. are Enemies of Human Society, 3, 6. lead miserable Lives, 3, 21.
U. V.
  • [Page xvii]VIctuals: Pleasure should not be regarded in it, 1, 30.
  • Viriathus, the Lysitanian Rob­ber, 2, 11.
  • Virtue alone, or at least chiefly desirable, 1, 2. 3, 7. Virtues all connected, 1, 5. 2, 10. forces us to love the Persons that possess it, 1, 17. 2, 9. its principal Office to procure the Love of Men, 2, 5. con­sists in three things, ibid. moves Mens Admiration, 2, 10. when it appears with greatest Splendor, ibid. scorns Affinity with Pleasure, 3, 33. see Honesty.
  • Ulysses of a Temper to undergo any thing, 1, 31. would have avoided the War, 3, 26.
  • Unable: those who are unable to exercise some Virtues, should take the more care to get others, 1, 33.
  • Ungrateful Men hated by all, 2, 18.
  • Uniformity of Life, whence it arises, 1, 31, 40. is most be­coming, ibid.
  • Unjust: those who spend their Lives in Contemplation are so, 1, 9. and those who mind no body's Business but their own, ibid.
  • Voice should be clear and har­monious, &c. 1, 37.
  • Voluntary: no true Virtue, that is not so, 1, 9.
  • Userers hated, 1, 42. Cato's O­pinion of Usery, 2, 25.
W.
  • WAnt: we should be most liberal to those that want most, &c. 1, 15. 2, 18.
  • War: Laws of it to be observ'd, 1, 11. 3, 29. may be under­taken; but it must be for the sake of Peace, 1, 11, 23. the Management of it less glorious than Civil Prudence, 1, 22. Courage in it recom­mends a young Man, 2, 13.
  • Ways two, of Pleasure and Vir­tue, 1, 32.
  • Wicked: to be so, never Pro­fitable, 3, 15.
  • Will forg'd of Minut. Basilus, &c. 3, 18.
  • Wing of Horse, 2, 13.
  • Wisdom, which the chief, 1, 43. the Desinition and Commen­dation of it, 2, 2. to be often with Wise Men, recommends a young Man, 2, 13. a Wise Man not Wise for himself, good for nothing, 3, 15,
  • Work-house can have nothing gentile in it, 1, 42.
  • World: we should endeavour to be well thought of by all the World, 1, 28.
X.
  • XAnthippus the Lacedemoni­an, 3, 26.
  • Xenocrates the severest Philo­sopher, 1, 30.
  • Xenophon's O Economicks transla­ted by Cicero, 2, 24.
Y.
  • Young Men: the Duties of 'em, 1, 34. how they should make 'emselves taken notice of in the World, 2, 13. are not envy'd, but rather en­courag'd, ibid.
Z.
  • ZEno holds Virtue to be the only Good, 3, 8.

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