CHAP. 1. The Excellency of Government and Power, the Cause, and Original of Civil Life, Laws, Commonwealths, Society and Cities.

EVery Nature which is not So­litary and Simple, but con­nexed and joyned with some other, must of necessity have something within in it self that Go­verns; as in Man the Understanding, in Beasts something like it, whence their Appetites arise; on a Republick Magi­stracy, which orders and prescribes[?] what [Page 2] is Just, Profitable, and suitable to the Laws.

Nothing therefore is more agreeable to the Equitable condition of Nature, then Government, without which no Family, no Society of Men, no Na­tion, not even Mankinde, nor the world it self can subsist; For the Universe obeyeth God, and to his Dictates and Commands, the Seas, Earth, and the Being of Mankind is subject, as to their Supreme Law-giver.

To these when we apply and add Good Affections, they produce that Founda­tion of stability which we desire in Go­vernment; For Virtue is not Rude, Cruel, or Proud, but assisting to the Defence of all Men, best consults for their safety; ordained by Nature as the surest Guard of Kingly Power, and Hu­mane Society, to reconcile and unite them.

Time was when Men, like Beasts, lived in open Fields, sustaining life with wilde Food, not acting so much by the Rea­son of the Soul, as strength of the Body; having then no knowledge of Divine Re­ligion [Page 3] or Humane Offices. No man re­flected on lawful Marriage, or reguard­ed the Legitimacy of his Children, alto­gether ignorant of that benefit, which a­rising from the Laws of Equity; so that through Error and Ignorance, Blind and Rash Desire predominant in the Minde, abused the strength of the Body to satis­fie it self by pernicious Force. Some therefore who first excelled in Virtue and Wisdom, collected the dispersed into one place, and out of that Barbarity brought them to Justice and Humanity. And then those things which were of Publike Utility, termed by us common Conventions of men, after called Civil Societies, with the Invention of Divine and Humane Laws, in Houses built to­gether denominated Cities, and encom­passed them with walls.

CHAP. 2 The Excellency of Regal Power, the Cause and Origen of Kings and Laws.

BUt that I may come to things nearer and more known to us; All Nati­ons anciently were Govern'd by Kings, which kind of Government was at first conferred on Persons most Just; and this in our Republick (while subject to Re­gal Power) was most highly valued, and derived to Posterity, still remaining in those who now Reign with Purple, the Scepter and other Ensigns of Royal Au­thority.

But the well moderated Monarchy, to Me, seems not only to have been of old constituted among the Medes (accord­ing to Herodotus) but even among our Ancestors for the fruition of Justice; for when in the beginning, the multitude was oppressed by such as exceeded them in wealth, they immediately had re­course to some one person, eminent for Virtue, who protecting the weak from [Page 5] injury, kept all degrees of men by exact Rules of Justice within the bounds of Equity, so that Kings and Laws had the same Origin; for equal Right was that which all men sought, and if they obtained it from a just and good man they were content, but failing of it, they then invented Laws which spoke with the same voice to all Persons. It is therefore most evident, that such only were chosen to command, of whose Justice the People had great opinion; and from them alone (if they likewise were prudent) they believed all good to be derived to them.

CHAP. 3. The Difficulties, Arts and Foundations of Government.

BUt these disaffected to Monarchy, would not pretend a total exemp­tion from Obedience, but not alwayes to be subject to one; it therefore im­ports a Great and Wise Prince, by his Studies of the best Arts and Learning, [Page 6] to render himself such in this high Com­mand, as nothing may seem wanting to compleat him for Government, which of all Arts is the most difficult.

The Foundations and parts of it, which a Prince must preserve and de­fend, even with the hazard of his Life, are Religion, the Power of Magistrates, the Authority of Senates, Laws, Ancient Customes, Justice, Publick Faith, his Provinces, Allies, the Dignity of his Crown, Militia, and Treasury.

Yet are there two Things by which all Requisite to Government in a State may be secured, viz. Knowledge how to Govern, and exact Discipline in the Administration of the Laws.

The first of these (of great Advantage and absolutely necessary to a Prince) containeth in it knowledge of Armies, Camps, Battles, Sieges, Provisions for Troops, &c. with all things pertaining to War.

The other of no less necessity, but of­ten of greater Utility (its subject Matter considered) is understanding Civil Af­fairs, the Authority of the Publick Laws, [Page 7] Records, and Examples of Antiquity, and whatsoever else may advance and conduce to the Benefit of the Common­wealth.

But although these things are set down in Precepts, yet is it too difficult to be conformable to them in all parts of a Politick Life, because what is in the hands of Fortune is to be govern'd (ac­cording to Accidents) by time, and so to be provided for by Council, which was the custome of our Ancestors, who to all new Emergencies of Time, did al­ways accommodate new Resolves.

So that this knowledge in Publick Af­fairs (which we here mention) is acquir­ed, not by the daily affected talking of any particular Minister, nor Formal De­termination of Schools, or Republicks painted out in Books, but a diligent ob­servation of greatest Actions, the me­mory of many, and practice of more, by a continual exercise and serious use of such things as are daily observed to have been of Advantage or disadvantage to the Commonwealth.

CHAP. 4. Of the Office of a Prince in General what he ought to know, do and consider.

IN the administration of Matters of greatest moment, there are Various Acts of Councils and Times which de­pend wholly upon the Prince, and there­fore require his greatest care and dili­gence.

For the Publick being to be formed and governed by Councils, and honest and profitable Actions, it is necessary the Princes Judgment and Virtue should appear most eminent.

And that his Empire may be preser­ved, that Prudence (which is to be seen in his Choice of Good or Evil Mini­sters) is to be quickned by his calling of Councils, continuing or dismissing them, in requiring, giving, taking, communi­cating, changing, and rejecting advice; as likewise in Actions, by undertaking, executing, or laying aside designs.

All which, as they concern the Com­monwealth, [Page 9] the chief is, perfectly to un­derstand the Military Force, what Trea­sure, what Allies, what Confederates, what Stipendaries, and by what Tyes of Amity, Conditions, and Leagues they are obliged; To maintain a constant custom of determining Causes, to consi­der Examples of Ancestors, the Origi­nal of their Power, Publick Laws, the Intent, Manners, and Discipline of the Commonwealth.

For as a Pilot purposeth to himself a safe Course, a Physician the Recovery of his Patient, and the General of an Army Victory; so the Design of a Prince should be the Happiness of his people, that they may be strong in Power, abun­dant in plenty; Great and Glorious in Virtue and Honor, and to effect this work, the best Princes should be most industrious.

Yet is it not to be expected they should haue their eyes upon all things; but if knowingly they omit any thing, it is a great Crime, and they contract something of anothers guilt, if their care could have prevented it; but if any thing [Page 10] happen which they could not obviate, the fault is not theirs. And this hath often befaln the wisest men, who (as the best Pilot cannot withstand the Fury of a Tempest) could not overcome the vio­lence and insult of Fortune; yet this, few rightly consider, all things being expected from Him, to whom nothing ought (at least) to be refused, to per­form all things conducing to the Pub­lick good.

I will not reflect on the miserable con­dition of our Provinces in their Govern­ment, wherein Diligence is Faction, Neglect Dishonor, Severity dangerous, Bounty unacceptable, common conver­sation treacherous, compliance pernici­ous; every man seems chearful, while most are discontented, Malice secret, Dissimulation open, obsequiously obser­ving their new Governors, honoring them when present, and deserting when absent.

Many of these things happen to the best of Princes, but they (like valiant men) should trust so much to their for­titude, as not to fear any assault of For­tune, [Page 11] by performing all things with Wisdom, Courage, and Justice.

For though many men weigh Coun­cils by Events, and conclude that who­ever hath had Success, he foresaw much, and who was not so Fortunate under­stood little; it was always my judgment to value every mans Virtue or Fortune by his Actions, not by events: Who can promise to perpetuate happiness to his Country? or who so hold the Helm of Government in all weathers, as not to be shaken in a violent Storm? Let it be your endeavor to keep the Ship steddy and in a safe Course, and when the Windes rise, it is sufficient if your Art and care be not wanting, for that is all that Virtue can perform.

Be sure always (whether busied in Publick Affairs, or diverted by Recrea­tions) to consider the Tenure of your Power, by what Virtue, Care, and Ho­nor of your Ancestors it was acquired, augmented and preserved, and how it is to be maintained, governed and confirm­ed by your Own.

[Page 12] Miltiades vvas that brave Athenian General vvho vvith 10000 men discomfited the Persian Army of 600000, in the battle of Marathom, the honor of vvhich victory made Themistocles ambi­tious to perform things as great. Themistocles wal­ked the streets in the night because he could not sleep, and being asked the Rea­son, replied that Mil­tiades his Trophies kept him waking.

CHAP. 5. Of Prudence in Councils and Actions.

BUt that you may proceed on Prin­ciples well-weigh'd, and diligently explored: First deliberately consider the Thing to be put in execution, how Just and Honest, and if you haue Power to effect it. Before you venture upon it, make all diligent preparation, and pre­ponderate the Events, whether good or evil, that nothing may happen which may cause you to say, You did not think on't.

In Counsels, those are always most safe, which carry with them reasons of establishing Peace, and nothing of [Page 13] Treachery, on which Cicero endeavor'd to reconcile Pompey and Caesar before they began the War, as appears by his 14. Epistle to Caesar, and elsevvhere. ground had my Ad­vice been followed, we had continued, if not the best, at least some part of that Republick which is now totally subver­ted.

Let the better Opinion always take place, act nothing but on probable (good) grounds, for nothing is in it self honorable wherein there is not a conside­ration of Judgment; and therefore you shall do well maturely to consider that, which once put in execution, cannot be revoked or repressed. I had rather many should judge you to have acted unwari­ly, then a few dishonestly; and in all your Actions be guided more by consi­deration of the matter then the witness, that you may be esteemed as a light shin­ing in darkness, and an imitator of our Senate, who never separated their Profit from their Honor.

Their principles are good, who ad­vise you to do no Act (whether good or bad) of which your Judgment is doubt­ful; [Page 14] for Equity shines by it self, but Doubt signifieth some apprehension of injury. Think not it becomes a King to let his Will be the Rule of his Life, nor that they are happy that live as they will; for to desire that which is not seemly, is a degree of Misery, nor are you so unhappy in not obtaining your Will, as in enjoying what you ought not to desire.

You are the Chief in great Com­mands and Provinces, bear therefore a Minde as Great and Honorable, that you may appear, not only to be above all men, but above their Vices; to contemne all libidinous desires, to judge freely, to consult more for the peoples profit then their pleasure, to provide for the safty of all men against powerful and dange­rous persons; and in these things to give way to none, but excel all.

Keep it always in your Memory, that the Actions of a Prince are naked to Censure, therefore consider your Dig­nity.

Let nothing be done that may leave a dangerous imitation of your example [Page 15] to posterity, for many think what they do by example is of Right, and often add something, nay much of their own, but it becomes a great Prince to do that, which may be, not only of greatest pre­sent advantage, but for future example.

CHAP. 6. Of Prudence in preventing Mischiefs, sup­pressing Commotions in their begin­ings, &c.

BE always Vigilant to prevent Mis­chief, and see that nothing fester under the skin which may endanger you before it can be known or cured; Rea­son and diligence may do much, second­ed by Counsel on the Matter and Time.

It cannot derogate from the Dignity of a Prince, which was held decent in Agamemnon, the chief of Kings, to have a A Wise Counsellor to King Agamemnon. Nestor to consult. Homer makes that great Commander of of the Greeks, Ajax esteemed one of the most valiant Greeks that besieged Troy. never to wish that he had [Page 16] ten such as Ajax, but often ten like Nestor, which could he have obtained, he was confident Troy might soon have been destroyed. Be sure therefore always to entertain near you such a person, with whom you may communicate all your concerns; one which loves you, is wise, replys to all your demands with integri­ty, without dissimulation or reserve. In sudden and pressing occasions be of so present a courage, as not to shift any part of the weight to other shoulders, but be to your self a Senate.

Nothing is more dangerous, then to give time to such as attempt innovation to confirm themselves; be sure always to cut them off in the midst of their de­signs, lest they attain to the end; for that Mischief which may be easily sup­pressed in its beginings, if suffered to grow up, may prove too strong.

Therefore timely to suppress impiety and not to suffer it encrease by impuni­ty, is not only profitable but necessary, by which you may not only put a period to the insolency of wicked men, but to your own Anxiety.

[Page 17] Plancus advised very wisely in the War against Anto­ny, Plancus commanded the Armies in Gallia Transal­pina[?], and came to the relief of Decimus Brutus, when besieged in Muti­na (now called Modena) but seeing Lepidus joyn­ed with Antony, would not ha [...]ard to fight them, but retired to preserve his Province, which must have been lost and he been defeated. to prevent the strengthning of the enemy, and the ap­prehensions of our own men, wherein had celerity been us­ed, the Common­wealth, by the de­struction of those Traytors, had still stood firm in the possession of Victory. He, a knowing Statesman, was not igno­rant of the Weight and advantage of every moment of Time, and of the dif­ference whether the same thing be Resol­ved, undertaken, and Acted before or af­ter. Had all those severe Decrees made at that tumultuous time been put in execution, either the day when I pro­nounced them, and not delayed from time to time; or when they were under­taken, not procrastinated before put in action, that War had never been.

It is prudence rather to punish wick­ed Subjects when in your power, then to [Page 18] entertain perpetual apprehensions of them. Yet in this four things are main­ly to be considered, for prevention of a rash or loose Act, and shewing modera­tion, which best becomes a Prince.

• 1. To be severe on the guilty Lea­ders and Contrivers, and merciful to the Multitude, who offend rather by chance then design.
• 2. To act all things by Publick Justice and Counsel, lest you seem rather to punish by violence and force, than Law.
• 3. Not to be swayd by conjectures of anothers sense, or blind suspicion, lest either the Innocent be oppress'd by the detraction and envy of malicious men, or to evacuate some ill humors, the very bowels and all the veins be open'd.
• 4. But chiefly, use deliberation and prudence, that you may not only have Counsel in providing, but judgment in performing, lest that very mischief, which you apprehend, you seek, so to prevent, as (when it might happily be a­voided) you meet and draw it upon you, which is a very foolish effect of Fear.

[Page 19]In suppressing present Mischiefs, be sure to have an eye to the future, lest they grow by degrees upon you; leave no roots behinde, for from wilde and venemous plants (though they may be cut up) they sometimes (from small Fi­bres) spring up again, and get strength to renew Rebellion. It is not less safe utterly to purge away the last parts (of a distemper) then to repell the first, but both with judgment, nothing carelesly, lest in a short time the Mischief dilate it self; for as after some recovery from a disease, a Relapse is most dangerous; so their trouble is much more vehement, who having almost extinguished, and allayed a War, are constrained to re­new it.

Beware lest the Punisher of one delin­quency, prove the Author of another of more force then the first. In Augustus made Com­mander of an Army against Antony, by that means obtain [...]d povver to gain the Empire. our Trou­bles, the cause of the suppression of every first Mischief, was always the Ground, whence a second sprung worse then the former.

CHAP. 7. Cautions to be observed in Commotions, and causes of Sedition.

BElieve it a great Folly, from a pri­vate Pique, to express open emni­ty; or when you cannot hurt, to shew a desire to do harm.

His counsel is most approved, who thought it best to strengthen himself by recruiting his Army, with multiplyed auxiliaries, that when he should openly de­clare his Intentions,Caesar vvhen he first aspi­red to the Empire, and commanded in Gallia. found it not dange­rous (against the sense of some) to make known what he intended to assert. To at­tain the ends of this resolution, he dissem­bled many things, by which how dange­rous an untimely declaration had been without preparation, he saw in the ruine of his Colleague.

Have a care that Great men under pretence of common affairs or business, have no conventions to take up Arms or raise tumults.

[Page 21]If there be Factions among the peo­ple or Nobility, be diligent to reconcile them; and if Piques grow high (as by heats of opinions, and endeavors for em­ployments it often happens; for in these every one is Tenacious and will not easi­ly recede) let them not proceed to bitter­ness, nor so disagree, as not to consent for the publick safty, but rather contend who shall shew most affection to the Commonwealth.

In Publick Assemblies use Moderati­on, lest the people be incensed by some turbulent and rash tongue, as the Spur to Sedition, like those of Greece, all whose Republickes were govern'd by the Temerity of Long-setting Assemblies; to omit therefore this Greece, so long shaken and afflicted by her own Coun­sels, that more ancient, which once flou­rished in Wealth, Empire, and Glory, was ruin'd by this one Mischief, viz. the Immoderate The Senate of Athens especially notorious for Faction.Liber­ty and Licence of Publick Assemblies. When in the Senate Men unskilful, rude, and ignorant of all [Page 22] affairs had place; then they undertook unnecessary and unprofitable Wars, con­ferred the most eminent employments on Seditious Persons, and banished the most deserving. And if this was then done in Athens (the most glorious City, not only of Greece, but of all the world) what (think you) was the moderation of the Assemblies of Phrygia and Mysia.

We often see the Sea (which in its own nature is quiet) tossed and troubled by the Force of Windes; so the people of themselves inclining to peace, by the voices of Seditious men (as by violent storms) are raised into fury, which to prevent must be your care.

Be no less industrious to preserve your own esteem from the wounds of dis­persed, and Seditious speeches, nor let it suffice that the offender repents, but let his punishment deter others from comitting the like.

All Libellers, and Scurrilous Poets, are to be punished for example. Our twelve Wherein the Laws made by the Decemviri, and those fetched from G [...]eece vvere vvritten, and alvvays held most sacred by the Romans. Tables [Page 23] though they declared very few crimes Capital, yet this was decreed such. If any person published or composed Ver­ses infamous, or mischievous to another, how much more to a Prince.

It should likewise be your care, that no man speak rashly of the State, or dis­perse incertain Rumors, in any conditi­on of the Commonwealth, especially in time of war, and more especially in Civil, which for the most part is govern­ed by Opinion and report.

P. Varienus returning to Rome from Reate (where he had been Praetor) travel­ling by night, two young men on white Horses, told him that King Perses was King of Macedon, and subdued by P. Aemilius. that day taken, which he related to the Senate; at first, as if he had spoken rashly, he was com­mitted to prison; but not long after, Letters arriving from P. Aemilius con­firming his report, he was not only freed from all future service, but rewarded by the Senate with Lands.

But in all these things great caution is to be used, not to insinuate any thing [Page 24] to Ears prejudiced, which desire the death of their Enemies, or Fear, or Hate them; neither to such, as like ill Hounds take up all Scents, and wanting Crimes infer what is false, which in fear and danger are not only believed easily, but invented with impunity. This sort of Men, contriving destruction for others, you ought to look on, as a Pest to your self, whom they would involve in the same.

Give no matter of probable discourse to Malevolent Tongues, which if once gained, they will strive to alienate the good-will both of your Allies and Sub­jects.

Avoid all occasions of infamous Re­ports; for that the esteem and safty of such as sit at the Helm of Government, depends not only on Truth, but Fame; For though Praise is not to be sought in the Shambles, yet the good Report of Good Men is to be desired, that they may with a chearful minde, diligently serve and submit both to the pleasure, advantage, and opinion of the Prince in his Government, whose firmest Founda­tions [Page 25] are Justice, Liberality, and Con­stancy, without which nothing can be Honorable or worthy of Praise.

CHAP. 8. The Decorum requirable in a Prince; the helpes, which may render him and his Kingdom Glorious.

IN every matter be diligent to find out, understand, and defend the Truth, maintain the dignity of your place; do all things with a brave and ge­nerous minde, and without Constancy and Equality of temper believe your self beneath a Prince; for this is a Decorum, then which, nothing can be more useful both to your whole Life, and each parti­cular Action.

And certainly it gives great reputa­tion to all mens lives, to carry still the same countenance and forehead, as we read of Socrates and Cajus Lelius. We finde Philip King of Macedon in actions of war, and glory to be inferior to his Son, but in clemency and humanity, to [Page 26] excell him; and therefore the first was always great, the other often vile; so that they seem to advise very well, who affirm that the Greater we are, we should be the more humble, considering the In­stability of humane things, and changes of Fortune.

Theophrastus deploring the death of his companion Calisthenes a Philoso­pher much in favor vvith Alexander, vvho killed him because he vvold not acknovvledge him a God. Cali­sthenes, was troub­led at the success of Alexander; for Ca­listhenes was unhap­py to be well known to that Man who was of greatest power, but wholly ignorant how to use his Pros­perity.

Much more worthy of praise was that Cyrus described by Xenophon, not with Historical Truth but as a Pattern for just Empire; whose extraordinary gra­vity was mixed with singular clemency, by that Philosopher, whose book, not without good reason, our Affricanus was wont always to carry with him, as com­prehending all the duties of a wary and moderate Government.

[Page 27]And those Republicks, in the Judg­ment of Plato (that Prince of Wit and and Learning) were truly happy, which should be governed by learned and wise men, or at least were industrious to ad­vance Wisdom and Learning; for he believed this conjunction of Wisdom and power might conduce greatly to the welfare of the people; which thing per­haps was once the greatest Advance­ment to our universal Republick, where­in they commonly were raised to the highest commands, whose time and stu­dy from their childhood had been spent in the exercise of Principles of Learn­ing, Virtue, and Humanity.

When Socrates (in Gorgias) was asked by him, if he did not think Archilaus (the Son of Perdiccas) then very successful, very Happy; replyed, I cannot tell, for I never spake with him. What? (re­plyed the other) canst thou know it by no other means? canst thou not say the great King of Persia is Happy? Socrates returned, How can I, when I know not whether he be a Learned or a Good Man?

CHAP. 9. Of Moderation in Command of the use of Reason convenient for Princes neglected by barbarous Nations.

PRinces and Magistrates in their Command, ought so to deport themselves towards their Subjects and Allies, as Parents towards their children, or the Soul over the Body; for the Office of the Soul is to a make right use of Rea­son; and as the Minde of a Wise man, so that of a Prince should always be dispo­sed to make the best of his Understand­ing, which should render him Moderate, Modest, Temperate, Constant, and Conti­nent. We sometimes referre these Epi­thets to the sole term of Frugality as to their Head, because Virtues seem to be comprehended under that Title through the use of a Proverb, that, The Frugal man do's all things well. But, I know, Princes are not to be commended with this attribute, that a King should be a Frugal man, is not much for his Honor; [Page 29] to be Valiant, Just, Severe, Grave, Mag­nanimous, Munificent, Bountiful, Libe­ral, are the praises of a Prince, the other of a private Man; let others take it, as they please, I judge Frugality (that is, Modesty and Temperance) to be a very great Virtue, though not so allowed by Xerxes, who abounding in the benefits and gifts of Fortune, not content with his great Forces both of Horse and Foot, his multitude of Ships, and infinite Treasure of Gold, proposed a Reward to him who should find out a new Plea­sure, which when invented, could not content him; for, Lust is never satisfied, which made Diogenes dispute, how much he was Superior to the King of Persia in his Life and Fortune; for that he wan­ted nothing, and the King never had enough. Nor (said he) will I ever desire those pleasures with which he can never be satisfied, and I am sure he can never obtain mine.

We find in Story, that those Barba­rous Kings of Persia and Syria had many Wives, to whom they gave several Ci­ties; to one a City to find the Attire of [Page 30] her Head, to another one for the Orna­ments of her Neck, to a third a City for some other Dress, &c. So that the whole people were not only conscious of their Luxury, but servants to supply it.

CHAP. 10. Of the manners of Princes how they do good or harm by Example.

BY all which it appeareth, how per­nicious they are to the Common­wealth who err in this kind, since the Vices which they practise are diffused among the people, although even among them who follow the example, the esteem of Princes is more easily lost, then their life reproved; for though we may in this hold them immoderate, yet must we not therefore alledge it, as a Crime. Nay it is the sense of all sober men, and a fixed principle, not only to conceal the faults of Princes, as of our Parents, but patiently to bear them.

Yet it is their part to give Rules of Moderation to themselves, and Laws [Page 31] to others; for if they look back to for­mer times, they may see that as the In­clinations were of the Governors of any City, such was the City; and the people always followed the change of their Princes manners.

There is therefore much in Example, and most men studiously imitate the Actions of the Prince; so that his desires and Vices infect his Dominions, and by his Continency they are correct­ed and amended. How easie is it to re­strain those under your Government, if you contain your self within the bound of grave and constant Discipline? It is for men Barbarous to live for a Day; your Counsels should reflect upon Eter­nity.

CHAP. 11. Of the Preparation of Things Necessary; Lenity and Continence preserve, Negli­gence, Cruelty and Avarice destroy both Prince and People.

BUt principally endeavor to avoid (that to which our Ancestors were often necessitated through the want of Treasure and continuance of Wars) the Levying of Taxes; and that this neces­sity may not fall upon you, make provi­sion long before (for even good men are deaf to the sound of Taxes) and when you attempt any thing, lose no advan­tage by expectation or delay of time; a short time is long to the unprepared, for a Day or an hour, without Providence, oft produceth great mischief; but a cer­tain time (for the execution of such re­solutions is not like that of Sacrifice) to be prefixed.

If necessity shall at any time impose upon you, be careful to make all men un­derstand, they must yield to it for the common safty; and whosoever would be [Page 33] and Govern well, must have his stores filled with all necessaries for his defence. What those things are, and how to be provided, the nature of the Times, and situation of your Kingdom will make ob­vious to your reason.

Let it be your Maxim always to in­cline to Lenity and Equity, that your own people in your troubles may be as willing as able to assist you; for if once their Affections be alienated from you, you will soon find them animated against you.

When I led our Army into Cilicia, and the King of Partha's Son had past over Euphrates with great Forces, I found the affections of our Allies wavering and in suspence, through expectation of Innovation. For their Auxiliaries, through the oppression and injuries of our Governors, were either rendred weak and could not much assist us, or were so alienated from us, that we could neither expect any thing from them, nor trust them.

But in the execution of all publick affairs, even the least suspicion of Ava­rice [Page 34] is chiefly to be avoided. I could wish (said Pontius Samnis) that I had been born, and Fortune had reserved me for those times, when Rome began first to accept Bribes; for I should then soon have stopt their progress to the Empire. He needed not to expect many Ages, for that mischief hath now seised on the Commonwealth, and therefore I could more easily admit Pontius to have had that power at that time then now.

No Vice therefore is more destructive to Government, then Avarice in Princes; for to make their power mercenary, is not only Vile, but Impious; and there­fore what Apollo Pythius gave as Oracu­lar (that Sparta could not be ruined by any force but Avarice) seems to be a pre­diction, not only to the Lacedemonians, but to all opulent people; nor can Princes acquire the good-will of their people by any means more easily, then by Continence and abstaining from this Vice.

Such as would preserve the Weal­publick must be far from that kind of Munificence, which takes from some, to [Page 35] bestow on others; for this sort of inju­rious bounty, the Lacedemonians expel­led Lysander (one of their Ephori) and (which put never before hapned among them) to death Agis their King; and from that time, such dissentions follow­ed, that Tyrants started up, extirpated the Nobility, and that so famously con­stituted Republick fell to ruine; nor did it fall alone, but the Contagion of their miseries diffusing it self, destroyed all Greece.

CHAP. 12. Of Liberality becoming a Prince.

IT is therefore requisite to use such Liberality as may not be hurtful to any, for Lucius Sylla's, and Cajus Caesars translation of Estates from the right Owners to confer them on others, cannot be called Liberality; for nothing is Li­beral which is not Just and Moderate.

King Philip of Macedon notably re­prehends his son Alexander, for insinua­ting himself into the affections of the [Page 36] Macedonians by his excessive bounty. What (a mischief said he) can induce thee to believe, that those will prove Faithful to thee, whom thou corrup­test with Mony? Do you intend the Macedonians should account you not their King but Purs-bearer and Servant. (He said well, that the title of Servant and Purs-bearer did ill become a King, but better, that such a sort of bounty was Corruption) For he is made worse who receives it, and is still more ready to expect it. This to his son, but it may be a precept to All; for it is a great mischief when that which should be effected by Virtue, is attempted by mony.

Yet did not Philip deal so with Fo­rainers, for he forced open the Gates of Cities, and overthrew Kings (his Emu­lators) with Bribes; alledging that all Strong Holds might be taken, into which an Ass laden with Gold could enter. Aristotle gravely and justly reprehends that profusion which is made to captate the multitude with vast loss and infinite cost, especially when neither necessity [Page 37] requires it, nor Honor is encreased; nor doth this sort of daubing last long, but so soon as the satisfaction of it is vanish­ed, the memory of the Pleasure dyes with it; and (as he likewise well col­lects) this may be grateful to women, children, and servants, but when weigh­ed by sober and serious men, it will ne­ver be approved.

The expences on Walls, Ships, Ports, Aquaducts, and such things as tend to Publick benefit, are much more honor­able; as likewise to redeem Captives, and assist necessitous persons, which to have been done frequently by our Or­der, copiously appears by the Oration of Crassus. I therefore prefer this Custom of Bounty before that profusion of Do­natives: This becomes great and wise men, that flatterers of the people, and such as caress the Levity of the multi­tude with pleasures, but you must not always be alike affected in different oc­casions; for his case who is oppressed by calamity, differs from anothers who seeks your bounty, not urged by necessi­ty. Let your Liberality incline more to [Page 38] those in distress, unless they appear to deserve their misery.

Cyrus is worthy your imitation, who bestowed honors and rewards on such as designed things great and honorable, by which he raised an ardor of Glory in the minds of All, every man being studious and industrious to excell in such things as the Prince approved.

To excel in this kind of Liberality is Kingly, though not to be admired in Cyrus for that he was very wealthy, but that in these Offices the Prince should contend with the subject with so much honor and civility was no small wonder to Xenophon. But this he practised from his Grandfathers Discipline and advice, that neither his Treasure should be exhausted by extravagant gifts, nor incitements to Virtue and Obedience be wanting, because it is not an easie thing to be always giving; neither would he that the Honors which the King confer­red (as Bracelets, Collars, and Bridles of Gold, which among the Persians none could wear, but such as received them from the King) should be made common.

[Page 39]It certainly mainly concerns you to preserve the Rewards of Virtue and service, Sacred and unsullied; not to be conferred on Vitious and loose Persons, or made cheap by men of mean deser­vings; for men will be less studious of Virtue when the Rewards of it are de­based, and such as have received Honor for their brave Actions when they see unworthy men alike honored, think themselves lesned.

Keep always a Memory and esteem of good services; nor at any time discover in your self either a want of will, or not to have the Power to reward, for you ought not only to have a value for the well-deserving, but not to suffer them to be necessitated to sue for their recom­pence, difficulty in that kind being in­excusable; nor is it just to confine the memory of a benefit to a time or a day, or to defer the acknowledgment, but rather hasten it, lest you lose the fruit of your Bounty and the thanks; and this is chiefly to be observed, if you are to bestow any thing on the less impor­tunate and modest persons; for it is [Page 40] grievous to a modest man to be put to importune him of whom he hath well deserved, lest he may rather seem to ex­act then desire it, as the Hire rather, not the Reward of his service.

If those who have well merited, are of that Quality, that their Memory should be transmitted to posterity, to such you must not be ingrateful; for all mankind detest those who forget bene­fits received, and you will have use not only of the esteem and judgments of men now alive, but of those who shall come after, although their judgments will be more sincere, as free from malice and de­traction.

Be courteous, not only to those who may seem to deserve it, but to others, that All, according to their quality may have respect.

Give no countenance to men too co­vetous of Mony or Honors, and immo­derate in their desires, which no prey, unjustly gotten, can allay, but rather augment and inflame; so that they should rather be punished then admoni­shed.

CHAP. 13. Of Reward and Punishment.

SOlon, who of all the seven was the wi­sest, and the only Writer of Laws, affirmed the Commonwealth to be con­tained only in two things, viz. in Re­ward and Punishment; of both which (as of other things) there ought to be a Measure and Mediocrity. Be not too liberal (not to say Prodigal) in confer­ring Honors, nor too severe in correcti­on or punishment; but I hold it dange­rous to omit the punishment of a wicked Act, lest it give encouragement to the imitation of the like Folly; neither is clemency and mercy otherwise to be ap­proved then that severity for the com­mon good may take place, without which Government cannot subsist; for a salu­tary severity, excelleth the empty shew of Clemency.

But in this (as in other things) it is to be wished that Princes (like their Laws) would be induced to punish not with [Page 42] Anger, but Equity, and prefer to any Private, the Publick safty.

CHAP. 14. Of the Princes Prudence to be moderated by consideration of Times, Things and Persons, of which are laid down several Rules and Cautions.

TO all Arts we are to add that, which we call common Prudence, of which every man who is to govern any design is to have his share. In a Prince is requisite the knowledge of opportuni­ties proper for Action, for all affairs are managed by Authority, Judgment, and Counsel, which is to be taken from the Matter, Person, and Time, and to be governed (like a Ship in its steerage and course) after the condition of the Commonwealth, since you are not al­ways to adhere to the same Opinion and Reason, but such as the State of Things, Inclination of the Times, and Rule of Concord will admit. In great Commo­tions, Revolution of Affairs and Trou­ble, [Page 43] yield rather to the Times then Customes; yet still have an eye to the main end, viz. Religion and the safty of the people.

This is Plato [...]s Rule (whom, I confess, I zealously follow) Contend for so much in the Republick as may be justified to your Countrimen; for you must not impose violently either on your Parents or your Country, and this he professeth to be the cause why he would never be concerned in the Commonwealth; for finding the Athenian State almost doat­ing on their long continuance, he per­ceived they would neither be perswaded, nor compelled to any better Rule of Go­vernment; and when they could not be perswaded, he did not conceive it Just they should be compelled.

By this you may perceive the Power of Times, the great Variety of Things, how incertain their events, and how flexible the will of men; ponder there­fore with your self the snares and Vani­ties incident to Life.

Cato, though of excellent inclinati­ons and greatest integrity, did some­times [Page 44] hurt the Commonwealth; for he always gave his Opinion, not as in the corrupt constitution of Romulus, but in the polite Commonwealth of Plato, and pleading too pertinaciously, for the (too parcimonious) expence and Institutions of our Ancestors, alienated the Equestri­an Order, and the most eminent persons from the Senate.

It is the duty of every Senator, to en­deavor (as much as in him lies) that no eminent or powerful person be displea­sed with the Prince or his Counsel; and though he be an enemy in the highest de­gree to any particular man, yet this ought to be observed for the common good.

Concerning Priviledges and Honors it is mainly to be considered, that they be not injuriously impaired; it hath been ruinous to many, who have disgusted such as have been eminent in Wisdom, Power, or Military Virtue. For it is more grievous to be divested of Honors, then not to be advanced in dignity, and the sting of lost liberty wounds deeper then perpetual servitude. A man unacquain­ted [Page 45] with contumely, a stranger to dis­grace, bold in Fight, can hardly com­pose the tempest of his thoughts 'twixt grief and anger, when fallen from an high condition.

Never leave a man eminent for Wis­dom, Counsel, or favor nor a powerful Nobleman (though a Fool) to be wrought upon by desperate men. Caesar while Pompey endeavored to lessen his esteem, ran into extremes, and with a violent heat of Youth destroyed the Dignity of our ancient Republick and Empire.

All changes of things of Moment are most easily and commodiously accom­plished if the Times conspire, otherwise they are to be effected gently and by de­grees, as friendships (which when less delightful and satisfactory) in the opini­on of wise men are to be relinquished ra­ther by degrees then suddenly dissol­ved.

In all Fortunes adhere to what is just and honest; nothing ought to be done, given, or taken away from any person which may be of example or advantage to ill-meaning men.

[Page 46]Never confer any thing on powerful men which may render them aspiring or arrogant. The Senate decreed many great, and almost peculiar Honors to C. Caesar (as a Province (out of his Order, supplications in number such) as never to any man in any war; an honor pecu­liar to him; a Prorogation of his com­mand for five years, to shew their esteem of him in his absence; with these things he so much advantaged himself, that he kept both his Army and Province in de­spight of the Senate, whom he hated for that advantage; his desire was to be King of the Roman people and Lord of all Nations which he effected; but the Ori­ginal of all this was, that he was not re­sisted when weak (which was then easie) Pompey began to fear Caesar, too late, and I wish rather that he had never given him so great strength, then that he should have afterwards opposed him when so strong.

Proportion your Trust to the Fideli­ty of the persons, but give command only to such whom you can willingly affect when they have done well, or [Page 47] most easily punish when they neglect their duty.

A man of a private condition raised t [...] great Fortune and power, can scarce contain himself within the bounds of his duty; as neither one born and educated in an eminent Estate, always accustom­ed to applause and glory. This was evi­dent in that Scholar of Aristotle of great Wit, and as great Modesty, till he was saluted King; but then, proud, cruel, and immoderate; next to him that com­panion of Quirinus, who by error of Opinion, phancied to himself the Sove­raignty: When Pompey had given into his hands, all his own and the Roman Peo­ples strength with their Forces, He op­pressed both Pompey and the Roman Peo­ple, and compelled a City, not only Free, but Commandress of the whole World to serve him; but we were little careful of the Commonwealth, when we granted to any one greater strength and power then our Liberty could bear.

Trust nothing in his hands who turns all to his own profit, or wants prudence in Counsel; give no credit, nor com­mit [Page 48] any part of your reputation to one, whom you have once found criminal; for no wise man, yet, thought a Traitor wor­thy of Trust.

That error reproved by that common Proverb, Twice to the same, is very dange­rous in a State; whosoever calls to minde our miseries, will never use the Coun­sel of a treacherous or malicious person, or trust a Coward.

Reject not any man to whom a thing hapneth, which may sometimes befall the wisest and best men, desirous enough to serve the Publick; while it appears he is honest, though he rather followed dangerous then safe Advice which may be lyable to reprehension.

Take no Security for a Person, by whom your own or the safty of the State may be endangered; for the obligation for another mans Inclinations or Judg­ment, is more weighty and difficult, then that of mony, for that may be discharged, and it is only a probable loss of an Estate; but how can any man make good his obligation to you, or the State, unless the person for whom he stood [Page 49] bound, will suffer himself to be se­cured.

Be always so careful of your self, as not to be in the power of those whom you may suspect, but they rather in yours.

Let your ears give a Value to Truth, and not be open to whisperers and flat­terers for advantage.

Gain gotten by calumny, by reason of the mischiefs it brings upon the inno­cent is of all the most vile, and worthy severest pu [...]ishment.

Those Pests of mankind, who envy the glory, and good of other men, are of all to be abhorred and suppressed, who very often alienate Princes from their best subjects, and change their affecti­on to the Prince. These Agesilaus Agesilaus was King of Lacedemon famous for his valour, wisdom, and mo­desty, which vvas s [...]ch as he vvould not suffer any picture or statue to be made of his person, saying, that Princes ought to have no other Monum [...]nts but Memorials of their Virtues and good Actions. hated more then Thieves, for that he held it worse to be deprived of his friends, then robbed of his goods. It is therefore a felicity [Page 50] (to a Prince) when the truth is disco­vered, and the suppressed defence of In­nocence respires, which is commonly done when those skilled in this base art, will not so much dare openly to attempt as design, and those of a more desperate Audacity, are left to their own precipi­tate Counsels.

Credulity is rather an Error then a crime, and may easily insinuate into the minds of the best men, yet is it very dangerous in a State.

Therefore that your Government may not suffer by credulity, adhere to this Maxim of Epicharmus. The Nerves and Joints of Wisdom are, Not to be­lieve rashly; and let it be your Elogie, Not to be capable of being easily de­ceived or overcome.

CHAP. 15. Of the Princes, Seal, Senate, Senators, and Counsel.

LEt not your Seal be as your Instru­ment but as your self, not the Mi­nister [Page 51] of anothers will, but as a witness of your own.

Let your Senate be like that of Areo­pagus, A place very famous in Athens by the Temple of Mars, vvhere the Judges instituted by Solon, sate in the night, and vvere not to see the Persons that pleaded their causes before them, but only heard the voices, and gave judgment vvith ex­act severity. Constant, Severe, Grave and Stout; your Sena­tor do all things which become a person of his condi­tion, and not only those things which are every particular mans duty, viz. to be Faithful and Vigilant, a Lo­ver of his Country, &c. but when he gives his Opinion to be (as one most eminent in the Commonwealth) Pru­dent also. For when I assumed my part in the Government of my Country, I thought my self equally worthy of Re­proof, when I gave in the Senate unpro­fitable, as when unfaithful Advice; nei­ther did I believe my self to be excused, if when the Publick was to be defended, I sought upon pretence of great Affairs, my own quiet, or resolved not to come into the Senate till better Times; for [Page 52] no pretence of Rest or Fear ought to hinder your Duty or Fidelity to your Country.

Take Counsel of the most Faithful and Wise, and confer on such Authori­ty, nor suffer them to be slighted; if any shall presume to that insolence, think your self to be Affronted in their injury and your Authority to be despi­sed. All things of this nature are to be suppressed, as pernicious in their ex­ample and progress; for this mischief groweth on by degrees of Custom, and riseth to a sudden height by presumpti­on, and when the punishment is laid a­side, liberty takes place.

It will be of no little benefit to take those into your Cabinet, whose Fidelity and Experience in Affairs, you have known to excel others, with whom you may freely communicate and examine all events of past and future Actions, and according to their weight what is to be suspended, what put in execution; by these means you will have time to dis­cern Truth from Falshood, and consider [Page 53] what is best to be done, and so publish nothing but what hath been maturely weighed, and consulted by them, to your great honor and advantage.

CHAP. 16. To avoid Flatterers.

MAke it your care never to let your Ears be open to Flatterers; it was Pompey's error, who, though he saw all our dangers involved with his own, adhered to the Counsels of certain inex­perienced and imprudent men.

Do nothing that may create opinion that you hate Truth, or will exercise your displeasure and malice on such as advise Honestly; for this is poison to faithful Counsellors, nourisheth and in­vites the wicked and perfidious, gives temptation to obsequious Humor, which indulging to error, precipitates many in­to Ruine.

But the greatest Mischief to such as despise Truth, and are drawn into snares [Page 54] by compliance, is, that they are most commonly apt to flatter themselves and most delighted with it. Virtue indeed is a Lover of her self, and as she is Ami­able, so she knows best and understands her self. But I speak not here of Virtue, but of the Opinion of Virtue; for many men would rather seem Virtuous, then be really endued with Virtue, and these are pleased with Flattery, and a speech composed to their inclinations, makes them believe that vain Oratory to be a real testimony of their Worth; this therefore is rather pernicious then duti­ful, when the one is neither willing to hear Truth, nor the other prepared to speak it.

But this is certain, when a Princes Ears are so shut up against Truth, that they cannot hear it, his ruine is hardly to be avoided.

CHAP. 17. Of preserving Authority and avoiding evil. desires which diminish it.

LEt your deportment be constant and Grave, which not only resists Flattery, but removes the suspition.

For you are to imitate a wise Judge, who avoids offence by the Equity of his Decrees, and acquires the good will of all men by his patience in hearing, and care to give just satisfaction. Briefly, be so circumspect both in your life and Go­vernment, that there remain not the lest suspition of Sloth or Levity; commit no Act may make you seem Timorous or Effeminate.

If any thing happen worthy of your Fear, dissemble it; use present cour­age and Counsel, and quit not your Reason. This was a Maxim frequently practised in our Republick, most emi­nently in the second Punick War; when after the misfortune at Cannae, they as­sumed greater Courage then before that [Page 56] Victory of the enemy; no signs of Fear, no mention of Peace, for it is dishonor­able in a Prince to submit his Courage to any danger.

As in the steps of a Ladder, if you take away some, cut other, and leave the rest, ill put together, you prepare an instrument to fall down and not to as­cend; so in the distresses of the Com­monwealth, if you desert her, when dis­joynted, nor shew your self Active to confirm your peoples safty, and resolve to remove the danger, you will be so far from recovering what is lost, as you ac­celerate a total ruine.

Be careful in all things that may be foreseen by Counsel, and when there is an error of Judgment, amend it by your diligence. I saw Pompey on the 14 of the Calends of Febr. full of fear; on that day I foresaw his ruine, after that he ne­ver pleased me, but perpetually commit­ted errors; he neither had Courage nor Counsel, Forces nor Conduct. Not to mention that base Flight from the Citie, timorous Orations to the people, igno­rance not only of his Adversaries, but [Page 57] of his own Forces; to be short, he had nothing good left to him but the Cause, which was that only wanting on Caesars side, who excelled in all other things, as vigilancy, expedition, diligence, of which had our General made use, we had reco­vered the Commonwealth.

As (if placed in this degree of Honor) I would not be of a low dejected spirit in adversity; so neither would I want the common sense of Nature. For this hard­ness of the minde is (like that of the Bo­dy, which when burn'd, grows insensi­ble) rather stupidity then courage or Magnanimity. A Prince must flie that error of throwing and offering himself to danger without cause, then which nothing is more foolish; he should en­deavor to acquire glory in his death, and not leave behinde him the blame of a fault and the dishonor of folly.

Very commendable was the prudence of See the 6 Chapter. Plancus, who would not fall by such rashness; for when the two Armies were joined, to hazard most faithful Le­gions (against them) our best Auxilia­ries, [Page 58] the Princes of Gallia, the whole Province: he concluded was highest mad­ness and temerity; and that if by his overthrow he should destroy the Com­monwealth, he should not only deprive himself of all honor, when dead, but of all compassion.

Good men lamented the death of Trebonius commanded the Army in Asia, and Dolobella in Syria, by whom Trebonious, under pretence of friendship, was treacherously slain in Smyrna. Trebonius, yet were there some (severe indeed they were) that said, he was the less to be pittied for that he did not se­cure himself against a wicked and viti­ous man.

CHAP. 18. What things a Prince ought always to have in readiness to defend both himself and his Authority.

IT is the opinion of wise men, That whosoever undertakes the protection of many, ought first to provide for his [Page 59] own safty, which by my advice King Ariobarzanes observed.

For when by the Authority of the Se­nate I was enjoyned to have a care of the safty and preservation of that King of Cappadocia, whose father was mur­thered by his subjects. King, with this ad­ded, that his welfare was of great concern to the people and Senate (which was never before decreed by our order concerning a King) I car­ried the Senates Decree to him, and dis­covering the conspiracies, which I un­derstood to be on foot against his life and Authority; I advised him to use all dili­gence to preserve himself, and withall encouraged those who where tryed friends to his Father, whose sad mis-for­tune, was a Document to them, to de­fend him with all their strength and care; and I gave him this Rule, that he should begin to govern by securing his own life and power, such as he found engaged in designs against him, on them to exercise the Authority of a King, to punish some when he saw a necessity, and to free the rest from the fear of it; [Page 60] that he should make use of the Force of my Army rather to terrifie, then con­tend with the guilty, and by these means I freed him from those conspiracies, and so not only rendred him safe, but pro­vided that he should reign with Autho­rity.

The safty of the Prince is the peoples safty, and commonly on his single life depends the preservation of All.

Nothing therefore is more necessary, then to have good stores of Armes, by which you may secure your self, defie the insolent, and be revenged when pro­voked; as likewise to have ships in your harbors, to secure your Coasts in the Provinces. These Naval preparations by the advice of Themistocles, were never to be omitted, for who is Master of the Sea, is ever thought to be the greatest Prince.

And in my opinion in Islands and Pro­vinces lying on the Sea, where good Harbors are, there ought to be a particu­lar care of Navigation, not only for the common safty, but the honor of the Kingdom. This was Reason and great­ness [Page 61] of minde in our Ancestors, who con­tent with little in their domestick affairs and expences, living very frugally, con­verted all to the glory, splendor, and dig­nity of the Empire; for in private af­fairs, frugalitie; in publick, magnifi­cence is to be preferred and commen­ded.

CHAP. 19. Idleness to be suppressed that all may be use­ful to the Publick, none to be Turbu­lent.

IF in any place your Country be unin­habited and incultivate, make there your plantations, that the Sinks of your Provinces and Cities may be emptied, and the Desarts frequented, but with­out injury to the ancient Proprietors; that you may not seem to have removed the one, or dispossessed the other, but to have constituted both. Consider all things that may invite mens minds from idleness to honest and profitable Arts, [Page 62] study and industry, which may be seve­ral waies effected; especially (as if at publick Game) you propose a Prize to those who excel. For whatsoever is rare and excellent, seems to men plea­sant and desirable for its reward.

Discipline hath great influence on the p [...]ople; the Laws of Crete and those of Lycurgus, educated their youth in labors, as in Hunting, Running, &c. to indure Hunger, Thirst, Cold and Heat. For those who gave the Rules of pub­lick affairs in Greece would have the Bo­dies of the Youth strengthned by labor, which the Spartans imposed even on their Women, who in other Cities in a most soft manner lay idle, within the shaddow of their Walls, but nothing like this was permitted to the Lacedemo­nian Virgins, who were rather pleased with wrestling, swimming, heats, dust, labor, and war, then a Barbarous and un­profitable fertility.

This Nation, while Lycurgus his Laws were in force, were a valiant people. One of whom, when Perses their enemy boastingly told them that they should [Page 63] not see the Sun, for the multitude of his Arrows, replyed, We shall then fight in the shade. In this I only mention their men; but what was that woman, who informed, that her Son was slain in battle, replyed, I therefore brought him forth, that he might not fear to die for his Country.

Such, so valiant, and hardy were the Spartans, and such once the Romans. Exercitus from their ex­ercise of constant Disci­pline and labor. our Armies taking their Name from their harbor, when e­very man would car­ry half a months provision with any thing for use, as Stakes, Palisadoes, &c. For his Target, Sword, and Head-piece, was not accounted as a Burden, no more then Shoulders, Armes, or Hands. For wea­pons are the Members of a Souldier, which are to be so conveniently carried, as throwing away all other burden, they may use them as readily as their Limbs. But what is now the practice of our Le­gions? Why such a difference between our old and new Troops? They are per­haps listed at a better Age, but custom of [Page 64] hardship, service, and contempt of dan­ger, must with a brave desire of honor, render them valiant and famous.

Those labors which are signalized by Honor and Renown, seem alwaies easie. And this is a light which all men follow who seek glory; and therefore Scipio Af­fricanus alwaies carried Socratick Xeno­phon about him, particularly commend­ing this his Maxim, That no labor was so burdensom to a General, as to a Soul­dier, for that Honor made it less tedious to a General.

The books of Xenophon are very useful for many things, and therefore I advise you to read them studiously, not omit­ting that of Husbandry, which he terms Oeconomick; and that you may under­stand how much he believes the Study of Agriculture becomes a Prince, So­crates in that book is introduced discour­sing with Cristobulus, That Cyrus (the less) King of Persia, of an excellent wit, and glorious in his Empire, when Lysan­der the Lacedemonian, a person of great Virtue came to him at Sardis, and brought him presents from his Allies, [Page 65] being many ways civil to Lysander, he shewed him a Piece of Ground exquisite­ly planted; and when Lysander admir­ing the streightness of the Trees, their order and exact distance, the Earth good and well levelled with the sweet odour of the Flowers, told him he could not but admire his care and diligence, who had measured and designed them; Cyrus replyed, that all that design and order was his own work; for most of those Trees had been set and planted by his own hand, whereupon Lysander gaz­ing on his glorious Habit, enriched with Gold and Gemmes (after the Persian manner) answered, The world (O Cyrus) doth justly call thee happy, since this Good Fortune, is added to thy Vertue.

CHAP. 20. Of the Virtues which gain mens Affections and Vices which alienate them from Princes.

ENdeavor to free your self from all passion and perturbation so, that [Page 66] by tranquillity you may with an equal Temper keep your Dignity; for nothing more becomes a Great man, then Gentleness and Clemency.

It is hard to express how much Hu­manity and Affability gaines on mens affections; there are extant Philips Epistles to Alexander, Antipaters to Cas­sander, and those of Antigonus to Philip (three of the most prudent, we read of in Greece) wherein they advise to work up­on the minds of the multitude by cour­teous and civil language, and speaking kindly to the souldiery.

And this ought to be your practice, if you will remember how considerable a thing it is to preserve in Publick the Person of a Prince, which must not only satisfie the minds, but the eyes and ears of his subjects, That his Nature may not seem harsh, his Access difficult, his countenance severe, his answers insolent, and his deportment proud.

Keep up the greatness of your minde with Gentleness and civility; and if your passion be moved by such as intrude into your presence, unseasonably, or petition [Page 67] impudently, suffer not your self to be transported into an odious and useless Morosity, and at length to be perswad­ed into better humor, through the Arti­fice of recovering your good Temper by such as never read of Xenophons Cyrus, or Agesilaus; from which Kings, no man ever heard an harsh word; contrary to the practice of other barbarous Princes, who give their commands thus, Observe and obey my Orders, and if you ask a question, return these Threats, If I see you here again you die for it, which things as they are abhorred in the very reading, so much more in the Pra­ctice.

Avoid all sudden Passion, ill Lan­guage and contumely, which as they are abhorrent from common civility, so are they altogether disagreeable to the dig­nity and power of a Prince; for if your Anger be implacable, it degenerates in­to cruelty, if you quickly relent, it's ac­counted Levity, which notwithstand­ing is to be preferred to the other. What can appear more ugly then Homers Achil­les, or Agamemnons quarrels? For Ajax [Page 68] his Fury, led him speedily to madness and death; but when Alexander had kil­led his friend Clytus, he could hardly hold his hands from violence on himself, so great is the power of Repenting a rash Act.

Nothing appears so ugly as cruelty joyned with power, neither doth any thing more incense or scandalize the minds of men, then when Revenge is equalled to injuries; for dishonor hath a kinde of sting, which modest and good men can ill endure, much less the Facti­ous and Insolent, of a proud and mutable disposition.

CHAP. 21. Of the Charge, Duties and Studies of a Prince, and wherein they consist.

ALL Governors ought to observe two precepts given by Plato. First so to be careful of the Publick benefit, that all their Actions may have respect to that, without thought of their own [Page 69] commodity. Next that they so consider the whole body of the Kingdom, as not to protect one part and neglect the rest. For while they consult for the benefit of one party, and regard not the other, Discord (which is destruction to both) ensueth. Hence springeth not only se­dition, but the Plague of Civil War, which a wise and worthy Prince will flie and detest, and wholly apply himself to the good of all. His first care will be to preserve every one in his right by Law, Justice, not to suffer those of a low condition (for that reason) to be op­pressed; nor with envy to disturb the rich in the possession of their wealth. To me it seems most reasonable, that such as are in Authority, should endeavor to make all happy who are under their command, to suppress seditions, dis­contents, oppressions and murthers; to remove that cruel Minister of Avarice and Ambition, Calumny from the Fame, Fortune, and Quiet of the Wealthy. To be careful that Taxes and publick Con­tributions be equally born. To pro­vide that the Publick suffer not by debts. [Page 70] To be easie of Access, and ready to hear all Complaints. Not to suffer that any mans Poverty or want of Friends should exclude him, not only from a Publick but private Address; and lastly that in the whole Kingdom nothing seem cruel or grievous, but all full of clemency, mildeness, and humanity.

Make this your Rule, that whereso­ever you come men may believe that light and happiness appears with you. Nor let this be your sole Act, but see it be done by all your Ministers and At­tendants, for what can be more to your Honor, or more desirable, then not to see the people terrified in your Progress, ex­hausted by your expence, or troubled at your presence, but rather a Publick and Private Joy wheresoever you come, and when every Town seems to entertain a Guardian, not a Tyrant; not an Oppres­sor, but a welcome Guest.

CHAP. 22. Certain things whence the Ruine or Safty of a Prince proceeds, and on which it de­pends.

NOthing contributes more to the establishment and preservation of a King, then to be beloved; nothing more to his destruction, then to be fear­ed, as Ennius said very well, whom men fear they hate, and whom they hate they desire to destroy; but an universal ha­tred no power can resist, a Maxime lately made manifest, if not formerly known.

Fear is a very ill maintainer of conti­nuance, but goodwill a faithful guard to perpetuity: And how happy they are that desire to be feared, Dionysius the Tyrant is a famous example, for when one of his Flatterers in discourse, cryed up the strength, power, and Majesty of his Kingdom; the abundance of his wealth, and Magnificence of his Palaces, denying any man to have been more hap­py. [Page 72] Wilt thou then Damocles (said he) since this sort of life is so pleasing to thee, once taste it & try my Fortune? To which Damocles assenting, he was placed in a rich Chair of State, upon the most costly and magnificent Carpets, and many Cupboards filled with the statliest and richest Gold and Silver Plate, and round the Table Boys of the choicest Beauty commanded to wait, and dili­gently to observe his Nod; nor were there wanting Crowns, richest Un­guents and sweetest Odours, with all variety of dainties on the Table. Damo­cles hitherto thinking himself very hap­py, till looking upward he saw a bright sword let down from the Ceiling, and hanging only by a horses hair directly over his head, so that terrified with this apparition, he neither looked more on his beautiful Attendants, nor the furni­ture and Plate; nor moved his hand to­wards the Table, and now even his Crown was too heavy, till at length he begged of the Tyrant that he might be released, for that he had no desire, now, to be happy. By this it appears that Dio­nysius [Page 73] thought no man happy, who had any thing of terror hanging over him; nor was it at all safe for him to return to Justice and restore their Laws and liberty to his people; for he so far en­tangled himself in errors in his youth, that he could never be secure if once he began to be sober; in his latter time he wanted all necessaries, lived with Fugi­tives and barbarous people, believed no man to be his friend, who was either worthy of liberty or did affect it, but feared all; for such as desire to be fear­ed, must of necessity fear those to whom they are a terror; neither can any pow­er of Empire be so great, as to be dure­able, when surrounded with fear; of this we our selves are presidents, who having oppressed and ruined Forain Nations, were invaded by Civil Wars, by which the Walls only of our City are left standing, and even those in apprehensi­on of extreamest mischief; but having almost lost the name of a Republick, we fell into these miseries, while we chose rather to be feared then to be desired or beloved.

[Page 74]But nothing confers more to esta­blishment, then to provide that the Dig­nity of the Prince may not be violated, or his Authority brought into common hatred; for the very name of Empire is of great weight, and in light persons is a terror; for that being put into com­mand they abuse their Masters name, and mix their sordidness with the splen­dor of the Prince.

Let the person whom you place in Authority, be a Minister, not of his own but your Clemency, and let him always carry his Axes and Rods as greater En­signs of his Dignity then Power. Make it appear to your whole Kingdom, that the common Safty, their Children, Ho­nor, and Fortune are dearest to you.

Lastly take this as a Maxim, That not only those who receive any thing basely, but such as give it shall be odious to you when it comes to your know­ledge; for then no man will receive or give a Bribe, when it is known that the Ministers of a Prince, and the Magi­strates are so concern'd for their Repu­tation; and that this Law cannot be in­fringed, [Page 75] viz. Let them do no injury, take nor give Bribes either in seeking, executing, or laying down an employ­ment; neither suffer that Authority, which you have given as an Honor, or an Office, conferred as a Benefit or a Charge, as a Recompence of former ser­vices to be abused by unlawful gains. Be likewise careful not to permit any thing injurious, or of a sordid nature to be im­petrated from you by such as pretend to have power about you; but this is not offered as an Advice that you should be harsh to your servants or suspitious; but cautious in believing, and diligent in ob­serving what they possess, be honestly gotten without the imputation of odious or dishonest gain, and let them rather make use of your Liberality then their own Liberty. Neither is it advised (since these inclinations now tend only to too much levity, and less dangerous ambition) that you should be too scruti­nous into all miscarriages, and so sud­denly shake off every man, but to trust nothing to such as follow all ways of mony, and do all things for monies sake.

[Page 76]The Pragmatici, in all their Histo­ries, Precepts, and even Verses, advise to be cautious, and forbid to be credu­lous; but when a man hath performed any thing hansomly and well, to reward, and trust him.

CHAP. 23. Four Guards by which the Prince and his Authority should be secured.

THink nothing more your interest then to have near you, a list of such persons as excel in any Art or Science; to know their qualities and studies, and ex­cite and invite them to your own and your peoples benefit, by advancing to ho­nors and employments, men of your own choice, and obliged to you alone, from whom those rewards ought to proceed, that you may have them every where watchful for you, placed as Guards to secure you from all mischief.

2. To preserve your self Quiet in your Government, it should be your Princi­pal [Page 77] care that not only those who are rai­sed to Honors, Command, and Power, but such as have the Government of your Forts and Garrisons, should wholly and immediately depend on you; and let this be a Maxim in State, to meet all oc­casions, and break all hopes (of Insur­rection) for prevention of their Ambiti­on, who either design or aspire to vio­lent power or Force.

3. By taking Progress at certain times about your Provinces, you may suppress injuries, insolencies, wicked designs, and give timely relief to those parts of your Empire, which are prompt to lapse into distempers, by which you may make your Remedy stronger then the Dis­ease; for those parts which are remotest from the Princes eye, are to be govern­ed with greater care, secured with stron­ger Guards, and looked into with clear­er lights, because all things may fall into change, before they can (by reason of distance) be well heard. But in the seat of the Empire, in view of the Prince nothing can subsist which may not be extinguished and suppressed soon as it [Page 78] springs up or appears; nor can the great ones and prime Ministers so easily violate their inferiors, or spoil the weal­thy, as in remoter Provinces, where commonly such as are oppressed are in that condition, that they cannot so much complain of their Grievances.

4. In the mean time since the people hold all their Benefits, Rights and Safty by the Laws, be so just and careful, as not to recede from them. For all things should be governed and administred by Law, as by the soul (of a Kingdom.) For as our bodies cannot subsist without a soul; so without Laws a Kingdom can make no use of its parts, nerves, blood, and Members.

CHAP. 24. Of Prudence in extreme affairs; several cautions concerning Forainers.

1. BUt you are not wholly to apply your self to Domestick Affairs; the State, Inclinations, Force, Leagues, Contracts and Counsels of Forainers, are likewise to be considered.

2. Be chiefly circumspect, that none about you be corrupted by them, be­tray their Trust and your Counsel to them.

3. That no impressions of Disaffecti­on towards you be made in your Allies.

4. That their Forces raised upon o­ther pretences, be not suddenly turned against you.

5. It will much confer to your Gran­deur to understand what esteem other Kings or Nations, your enemies or Al­lies have of your Person, Government, State and Power. For that in matters of that high nature, men either despise or fear, hate or love, and are moved no [Page 80] less by opinion of Fame, then by certain reason.

6. Keep a strict Amity with such as either by ancient friendship, good offi­ces, dangers, or leagues have been allyed to you.

7. Be Just, not only to these, but to others; suffer not your people to do any rude, barbarous, or injurious Act to Forainers, lest something should be done contrary to the Laws of Nati­ons.

8. Leave what belongs to Dogs, to fawn on Domestickes, and bark at Stran­gers.

9. They are very unadvised, who exclude Forainers from their Cities, for it injures the common Society of man­kinde.

10. By no means admit those (to fa­miliarity) who come as spies, or other­wise decline their duty, which is only to follow their own private affairs, or to be little curious in another Common­wealth.

11. As little as may be, mix not your interest with the quarrels of your neigh­bors, [Page 81] but consult for the Peace of your Successors.

12. Trouble not the Foundation of their Quiet, lest you raise in them de­sires to seek your Ruine and destroy your friends. For those things which perhaps we little apprehend to be of consequence; as that in peace we make use of the most wealthy Citizens (that they have neighboring and remote, fruit­ful plantations, to which they can make easie voyages, wherein they chearfully follow their business, whence they re­turn partly with supplies of Merchan­dize and honest gain; partly with other negotiations of setling their Seats and Families) are of no small Advantage to the Prince and people, to have so consi­derable numbers of their Country to be imployed abroad in so honest and benefi­cial affairs.

13. If any offence be given by your Subjects, whether through the igno­rance or perversness of Allies, shew all readiness to expiate the injury, and Re­ligiously observe on your part, all that relates to you.

[Page 82]14. Be careful to keep the Seas free from Pirats, and safe for Navigation.

15. The Forts and Garrisons of your Kingdom always in good condition.

16. Your Navy in good order.

17. Preserve your Merchants and Husbandmen, not only from Oppressi­on, but even from the fear of it.

18. For in other things when any ca­lamity happens, there is (indeed) a loss received, but in Husbandry and Imposts not only what mischief happens, but even the apprehension of it, brings ca­lamity. For when the enemies forces are not far off, though they make no ir­ruption, yet they leave their Cattle, quit their Tillage, all Traffick ceaseth, and by the sole rumor of danger, and fear of a War, a whole years profit is lost.

19. Never suffer Forainers to abuse your Merchants, whose Estates and Fortunes should be in your strictest care to preserve. For the destruction of a number of Citizens cannot be separate from the whole Republick; for when in a City, Province, or Kingdom, many [Page 83] suffer in their Estates, and Fortunes, they must of necessity draw with them many more into the same misfortune.

20. From this danger the Common­wealth is to be secur'd, and you are to use all study and industry, by which your own and your Kingdoms honor, the safty of your subjects, with the Com­monwealth, may be preserved, defended and augmented.

21. Add to this, that nothing more becomes a Prince, nothing more gene­rous, nothing more munificent then to aide the oppressed, to restore them to safty, and free them from danger (though I confess it a difficult part to assume the care of other mens concerns) it being not only very profitable, but may be (if you expect any thing of advantage) the means to obtain it.

22. Let nothing seem too much in time of danger; but it is not then to be cautious in words. For most men are more apt to fear then to be mindful of their duty, and I know not whether they appear not more easily kind in their fear, then grateful after Victory.

[Page 84]23. If according to League, aid is to be desired, their Defence and your Duty in that particular must not be omitted, for Leagues are things Sacred, and a Kingdoms chief support is its honor and the kindness of its Allies; upon which Maxim (not provoked by any injurie to themselves) our Ancestors made war a­gainst Antiochus, Philip, the Etolians and Carthaginians for their Allies. Nothing therefore can be a greater blemish to your Honor, then when you (who have the esteem of being able to defend, even those who are almost strangers to your Friendship) shall not be capable to assist your Confederates.

24. If your necessities force you to seek aid from Allies, let it not appear that your people are to be secured, rather by the benefit of their Aid, then your own Valour and Power.

25. Beware lest among other mis­chiefs, either Auxiliary Soldiers or your enemies think your troubles to be their opportunitie, as the Roman people pre­tending the defence of their Allies, pos­sessed themselves of all their lands, and [Page 85] when Conquerors gave and took from Kings and Confederates what they plea­sed.

26. A Prince ought chiefly to look to the conservation of the Rules of War; for since there are two kinds of conten­tion, one by Dispute (in Treaty) and another by Force; and the first proper to Mankind, the last likewise common to Beasts; if you cannot make right use of the first, you must have recourse to the second.

27. Wherefore War is to be under­taken to the end you may live in Peace, and after Victory such are to be preser­ved, as have not been cruel or barbarous in the War; and you are not only to provide for those whom you have con­quered by force; but likewise for those who laying down Arms, flie to your Mer­cy, even when you have stormed their Walls. In which procedure, so exact­ly did our Ancestors observe the Rules of Justice, that whatsoever Conquered City or Nation they had received into their Protection, they were afterward the constant Patrons of them; the equity [Page 86] of war was most religiously observed by the The Law which Au­thorized Heralds to pass as persons not to be vio­lated, between Armies and Countries to de­nounce War, or offer peace, always held in­violable and Sacred by all Nations. Fecial Law, by which it may be un­derstood, that no war was just, but that which was en­terprized for repara­tion of injuries, and first denounced or proclaimed.

28. But let war be so undertaken as that nothing but peace may seem first to be desired; every Prince ought to defend his subjects.

29. Our Ancestors levyed war, either when their Merchants were retained or abused. Our Embassadors insolently received at Corinth (the light of all Greece) would have had it extinguished. For that they esteemed the Embassadors to represent the Senate, and Authoritie of the Roman people, and their right not only to be forfeited by strength of men, but guarded by divine Law.

30. But in the subversion and demo­lition of Cities great care ought to be taken, that nothing be done cruelly or [Page 87] rashly, unless perhaps against such as seem void of all Humanity, as the Car­thaginians and Nu­mantins, A City in Spain, vvhich after[?] a long siege, re­duced[?] to all extremities, vvas taken and destroy­ed by the same Scipio, vvho demolished Car­thage. ruined by our Progenitors. I am not for the de­struction of Corinth, though something may be said for it, considering the situa­tion of the place, very opportune to be­gin a war.

31. Be most circumspect in keeping Faith, whosoever infringeth it, attempts against the common Guard of Mankind, and excites the Deceived to secure themselves with the Trust of new Neces­sities, against the Treachery of the old, and to brand him as infamously perfidi­ous and wicked.