What you say, Laelius, is true: for there never was a Man of greater Prudence or Renown than Africanus, but you must consi­der that the Eyes of all are now upon You; [Page 5]You only are call'd and counted Wise. This was lately the Attribute of Cato, and formerly of L. Atilius: But both of them had it in a different respect, Atilius for his knowledge in the Civil Law, Cato for his long Experience in the World, his Wisdom and Courage in the Senate, and his Wit and Eloquence at the Bar: So that when He came to be Old, the Epithet of Wise was in a manner become his Proper Name. But You are esteem'd for another kind of Wis­dom, which is no less owing to your Indu­stry and Knowledge, than to your Nature and Manners: And that not as Wisdom goes among the Vulgar, but as the better sort describe a Wise Man, such as Greece never had; For the more exact Critics will not allow those Seven, who were called the Sages, to be perfectly Wise: we read of One only at Athens, and Him pronounced so by Apollo. Now the Wisdom which is held to be in You, is such as enables you to esteem all that can be call'd your own, as pro­ceeding from your Self, and to look upon all humance Accidents as things beneath the thoughts of a Vertuous Man. Therefore several have enquir'd of Me, and I believe of Scaevola, how You bear the Death of Africanus: and so much the rather, because [Page 6]when we met last Nones (according to our custom) in D. Brutus's Garden, to discourse, You only were absent, who always us'd to observe that day and that Duty very punctually.

'Tis true, Laelius; several (as Fannius says) enquire: But I answer them from my own observation, that You bear the loss of so great a Man and so good a Friend, with all the moderation that can be expected; that indeed a Man of your good Nature cou'd not but be somewhat moved, but that your absence from Us was occa­sion'd by your Illness rather than by any excess of Grief.

You say well, Scaevola: No small Im­pediment should have kept me from an Office which I always attended when I was in health: For I don't think, that any Accident can excuse a Man of Resolution from the performance of his Duty. But you, Fannius, that attribute more to Me than I either desire or deserve, shew more [Page 7]of your Friendship to Me, than of your Justice to Cato; for either no Man ever was Wise (which I am more inclinable to think,) or if ever Man was, He was. For (to omit other Instances) how bravely did he bear the Death of his Son? Paulus I remember, and Caius I have seen: but their Loss was not so great as Cato's, and consequently their Trial less; Their Sons died in their Childhood: Cato's was a Man not only of great Hopes, but of approved Ver [...]ues. Wherefore have a care of prefer­ring even Him, whom you say, Apollo judged the Wisest of Men, before Cato; for if the Sayings of the First deserve our Praise, the Actions of the Last will challenge our Ad­miration. But now to deal freely with you Both, as to your Sentiments of Me.

Whether I shou'd do well or no in denying my self to be concern'd for Sci­pio's Death, let the Learned determine: I'm sure I should not speak the Truth; for I must needs say, I am moved at the loss of such a Friend as I think there never will be, and I am certain there never was. But I want no Remedies: I am my own Comforter, and chiefly in this, that I am freed from an Error with which most Men are possess'd upon the Death of their [Page 8]Friends; for I think not that any Harm has hapned to Scipio, all that has hapned, is to Me: Now to take one's own Misfortunes to heart, shews more like Self-love than Friendship. But who can deny that all is well with Scipio? For unless He expected an Immortality on Earth, (which I dare say He never did) what is there in the Am­bition of Man that He did not obtain? who in his growing years not only an­swer'd, but out-did the mighty Hopes which all Rome had of his Childhood: who never sought the Consulship, yet was twice made Consul; once before the usual time, and again for his own sake at the usual time, tho' for the Nations sake not soon enough: who by conquering two Cities that were the greatest Enemies to this Em­pire, did not only put a stop to those Wars for the present, but prevented them for the future. What shall I say of his sweet dis­position, his Dutifulness to his Mother, his Kindness to his Sisters, his Goodness to his Friends, his Justice to all the World? These you Both know; and how dear he was to Rome, their Sorrow at his Funeral suffici­ently declares. Now what good could the addition of a few Years have done Him, since Age, tho' it is not grievous (as, I [Page 9]remember, Cato told Me and Scipio the year before he died,) yet it takes off from that Vigor and Activity of Mind which was yet alive in Scipio, whose Life, as well as his For­tune and his Glory, was already such as not to be capable of any improvement. The sense of his Death was lessen'd by the suddenness of it; what kind of Death it was is hard for me to determine: what others suspect, you hear. But this I may truly say for Scipio, that of all the glorious and happy days of his Life (and they were not a few) none was more remarkable than That on which, after the dismission of the Senate, He was attended to his House in the Evening by all the Senators, the Latins, and other Allies of Rome, which was the day before He died. So that from so high a pitch of Glory, He seem'd fitter to ascend to Heaven, than to descend so low as the Grave.

I am not of their Opinion, who have undertaken of late to maintain, That the Soul is mortal as well as the Body, and that both are extinguish'd in Death; but am rather govern'd by the Authority of the Ancients, whether it was derived from our Fore-fathers, who perform'd such solemn Obsequies to the Dead, (which certainly [Page 10]they would never have done, had they thought they had no sense of them:) or from Those who were formerly of this Na­tion, and instructed the bigger Grecia (which then flourish'd, and is now destroy'd) with their Precepts: or, whether we receiv'd it from Him whom Apollo declared the Wisest of Men, who never contradicted his own Assertions (as several have done,) but always taught, That the Souls of Men were Immor­tal, that upon their departure from our Bodies they were receiv'd into Heaven, and that the best and justest Persons had the easiest and quickest passage thither. This was Sci­pio's Opinion, who, as if he had foreseen his Death within a few days before it hapned, when Philus and Manilius and my Self, together with You, Scaevola, and some Others were with him, spent three days in a Discourse about the Commonwealth, and concluded with the Immortality of the Soul: all which he told us he had heard from Africanus in a Dream.

Now if it be true, that every good Man's Soul is so easily loosen'd from the Prison and Fetters of his Body, who, think you, could have a freer passage to Heaven than Scipio? So that to Weep for his Fate I'm afraid would look more like Envy than [Page 11] Love. Nay, tho' I should suppose that all Sense is lost with Life, and that Body and Soul die together; yet as there is no good in Death, so certainly there can be no harm: For when Scipio loses all Sense, he is in the same condition as if he had never been born; for whose Birth not only I, but all Rome will rejoice as long as it is a City. Thus Heaven seems [...] have dealt more kindly by Him tha [...] by Me, who, as I came first into th [...] World, ought to have gone first out of it: But the very remem­brance of our Friendship is so delightful to me, that I esteem my self happy in having liv'd with Scipio, whose Care and mine (in the management of publick and private Affairs) was always the same; our Life in Peace and War still the same: and (which is the very Soul of Friendship) our Tem­pers, Inclinations and Opinions ever the same. Wherefore I am not so much pleas'd with the Name that Fannius and the World give me of Wise, (which is false,) as with the hopes I entertain, that the memory of our Friendship will be Eternal; and I am so much the rather induc'd to flatter my self with this Opinion, because in all past Ages there are not mention'd above three or four pair of Friends, among whom [Page 12]I have some reason to hope, that the Friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to Posterity.

That must needs be, Laelius: But since you were pleas'd to make mention of Friendship, and we are at leisure, you will mightily oblige Me, and (I hope) Scaevola, if as you us'd formerly to discourse upon other Subjects that were propos'd; so you will now let us know what are your Senti­ments of Friendship, how you would define it, and what Rules you would lay down for the establishment of it.

'Twill be very acceptable to Me; and, I assure you, I was only prevented by Fan­nius from making the same Request: There­fore, Sir, what you please to say upon this Theme will oblige us Both.

I should not be against it, could I think my self sufficient: For the Subject is noble, and we are at leisure (as Fannius says;) but who am I? Or, what is there in Me? 'Tis for the greatest Philosophers in Greece to speak Extempore upon every Argument; the Undertaking is great, and requires no small Preparation; therefore, if you would hear a formal Discourse upon this Subject, you must expect it from those whose Pra­ctice and Profession lay that way. As for me, I can only advise you, to prefer Friendship before all things in the World, since nothing is so agreeable to the Nature of Man, nothing so necessary in Prosperity or Adversity.

My first Opinion is, that there can be no real Friendship, but between Good Men: Not to be so very nice as some, whose Notion of Goodness (tho' perhaps it is not altoge­ther false) is very useless to, and destructive of Society; for they deny, that any Man can be Good, unless he be Wise. Be it so: But their Wisdom, as they define it, is such as never Man yet attain'd. Now the Wis­dom I would look for in a Good man, is [Page 14]such as is useful and practicable, not an imaginary Vertue that is only to be wish'd for. According to their Rules, I shall never allow C. Fabricius, M. Curius, and T. Corun­canius to be Wise, tho' all our Fore fathers esteem'd them so. Therefore let them keep to themselves their obscure and invidious definition of Wisdom, and grant that These were Wise Men; but they won't do that: They'll deny this to any one that is not their Wise Man. Then let us speak a plain Truth in plain English: They whose Life and Conversation is such, that their Honesty, Integrity, Justice and Goodness are generally approv'd: They that are neither Covetous, Lustful, nor Bold, and have but that Prin­ciple of Honor that was in the Persons I just now mention'd, they (I think) are and ought to be accounted Good Men: Who, as far as Man can go, follow the Dictates of Nature, the best and surest Guide. For (me­thinks) 'tis Natural to all Mankind to main­tain a mutual Society, especially where there is a Relation; thus we find that our Country men are dearer to us than Foreigners, and our Kinsmen than Strangers: For Na­ture seems to have planted in us a kind of regard and tenderness for the former. But these are not always sufficient tyes upon [Page 15]our Affections: For there is this difference between Affinity and Friendship, that the first may subsist without Love, whereas the last cannot; take away Love, and the very Name of Friendship is gone, tho' that of Affinity shall remain. How great the power of Friendship is, we may gather from hence, that of all the numerous and different Societies which Nature has appointed among Men, This alone is contracted into so narrow a compass, that Love is always limited to Two, or very few Persons.

Now Friendship is an unanimous consent of Opinions in all Matters relating to Religion, or Civil Affairs, with all Love and Kindness: Which (next to Wisdom) I hold to be the greatest Blessing that the immortal Gods ever bestow'd upon Man. Others may prefer Riches, Health, Power, Honor and Pleasure, (which, indeed, is the highest Bliss that Beasts are capable of attaining;) but these are frail and fleeting Enjoyments, whose possession lays not so much in our own power, as in the arbitrary disposal of Fortune. They that place the Supreme Good in Vertue are most in the right; but in the mean time, 'tis this very Vertue that creates and maintains Friendship, for there can be no such thing as a Friend without it. [Page 16]Let us now measure Vertue by the common Rules of Life and Conversation; not like some of our modern Virtuosi, by lofty Expressions; let us call them Good Men, who have always been reputed so; such as Paulus, Cato, Gallus, Scipio and Philus, who are the best Patterns to live by; and not seek after Others, who are never to be found. Among these Men there were more and stronger engagements of Affection, than I am able to number or express.

First then, How can Life live (as Ennius has it) without an acquiescence in the mu­tual Love of some Friend? What is hap­pier, than to have a Companion whom one may trust as one's self? Where were the pleasures and enjoyments of Prosperity, without a Friend, who shall rejoice for them as if they were his own? How hard is it to undergo the burden of Adversity. without one that shall take the greatest share upon himself? All other things that are desirable to Man, are proper only for one end or occasion; Riches serve for Ʋse, Power for Respect, Honour for Praise, Pleasures for Delight, Health for Ease and Business: but Friendship is suitable to every occasion, wherever you go it follows you; [Page 17]it is neither to be excluded from any Place, nor unseasonable or troublesom at any Time; so that we have not more frequent occasion (as they say) for Fire, Air, and Water, than we have for Friendship. I am not now. speaking of the common and ordinary Friendship, (tho' that too is not without it's Pleasure and Use) but of that which is more refin'd and perfect: That, I mean, which was between those few Persons I have mention'd. Such Friendship as this is an Ornament to Prosperity, and a Support and Comfort in Adversity.

But amongst all the Conveniences of Friendship, (which are many and great) I hold this to be the greatest, that in the lowest ebb of Fortune, it still bears up with chearful hopes of a better condition, never suffering the Mind to despond or be cast down. He that looks upon his Friend, sees Himself, as in a Glass: so that Absence cannot divide them, Want impoverish them. Sickness weaken them, nor (which is stranger) Death kill them; such esteem and honor for his Memory does a Man leave behind him to his surviving Friend, that the Life of the One is glorious, and the Death of the Other happy. Take away mutual Love from among Men, and you will find that [Page 18]neither Cities nor Families will stand, nay, not so much as Agriculture will last. If this does not serve to convince you of the efficacy of Friendship and Concord, you may learn to value it from the fatal con­sequences of Dissention and Discord. What Family is so strongly Allied, what City so well Fortifi'd, that it cannot be utterly destroy'd by Factions and Animosities? From hence (by the Rule of Contraries) we may easily gather the many benefits that arise from Friendship. A certain Philoso­pherEmpedocles. Vid. Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. lib. 8. of Agrigentum, is re­ported to say in Greek Verse, That all things in Nature and in the Universe, whether they be fix'd or moveable, are kept together by Friendship, or divided by Discord; the Truth of this Sentence is evident to every Man from his own Experience. What Acclamations were there in the Theatre t'other day, when in my Friend Pacuvius's new Play, the King, not knowing which of the two Strangers was Orestes, Pylades avouch'd himself to be Orestes, that he might die for his Friend, and Orestes pro­tested himself to be (what he really was) the true Orestes? Now, if the bare Repre­sentation of a Story was so generally ap­plauded, [Page 19]by the Audience, what do you think they would have done, if it had been Matter of Fact? Here Nature plainly shews her power, when Men own that to be well done in another which they would not do themselves.

Thus have I, as well as I could, declar'd my Sentiments of Friendship: If any thing more remains to be said, (as I believe there is much) you must expect it from those who handle this Subject more at large.

But we had rather expect it from You; for tho' I have frequently desired it from others, and heard them with some satis­faction, yet we know, You have another way of Delivering your self upon all occa­sions.

You would say so indeed, Fannius, had you been present at the Debare which was held about the Republick, in Scipio's Garden, to hear how bravely he desended Justice against the subtle Objections of Philus.

'Twas easie for so Just a Person to speak for Justice.

Then, sure it must be as easie for him to discourse of Friendship, whose chief glory it is, that he has with all the strictest Me­thods of Truth, Constancy and Justice, observ'd its Rules and Precepts.

Nay, now ye lay a Force upon me; no matter by what Arguments: 'tis enough that I am forc'd; for to deny so fair Request to one's Kinsmen, were not only unkind, but unreasonable.

As often therefore as I think upon Friendship, this Consideration offers it self first to my thoughts, whether Weakness or Necessity should be any inducements to contract a Friendship, that so, whereas ei­ther Party would be helpless of himself, the Occasions of the one might be supply'd by [Page 21]the other, and all kind Offices perform'd by both, in a mutual reciprocation of Benefits; whether (I say) this might properly be call'd Friendship, or whether there were not some other Motive of greater worth and beauty, which proceeds from Nature. And cer­tainly Love (from whence the Name of Friendship is deriv'd in Latin) is the first and strongest tye of our Affections. Some Men shall receive a good Turn from those whom they only flatter with an outward shew of Friendship, and to whom they pay a Respect suitable to their present occasions: But Friendship will not admit of any Dis­guise or Dissimulation, whatever proceeds from That, must be sincere and voluntary. So that methinks Friendship arises rather from Nature than Want, and from a secret application of the Mind with a tender sense of Love, rather than from any consideration how to make it serviceable to our Interest. Experience shews us this in most Animals, who for a time love their Young so entirely, and are so well belov'd by them, that one may easily perceive the force of Nature in these Creatures, which is more eminently apparent in Man: First, from the mutual Love between Parents and their Children, which nothing but some horrible Crime [Page 22]can destroy; and next, when there are equal grounds for Love on both sides; as when we light upon one of the same Temper and Disposition with our selves, in whom we have discover'd some eminent Ray of Goodness and Vertue. For nothing is more amiable than Vertue, nothing more attractive of our Affections. We find in our selves an inclination for some Persons whom we never saw, meerly upon the Report of their Vertue. Who has not an honor and esteem for the Memory of C. Fabricius and M Curius, tho' he never beheld them? Who does not at the same time detest Tar­quinius Superbus, Sp. Cassius, and Sp. Moelius? When the two Generals, Pyrrhus and Han­nibal, strove for the Mastery in Italy, we had no great aversion to the former, because of his Generosity, the later Rome always hated for his Cruelty. Now, since the power of Vertue is so great as to render it lovely in a Stranger, and (which is more) in an Enemy, 'tis no wonder if we are affected with it, when we see it every day in an Acquaintance. Tho' I must confess, Friend­ship is mightily confirm'd by receiving some demonstrations of Kindness, by an expe­rience of Love, and by frequent Conver­sation: All which being added to that first [Page 23]Motive of Love, will flame out into a won­derful Endearment of Friendship; now if any one thinks this to proceed from a Weakness in our selves, and a design to obtain private Ends and Interests upon others, he makes the Rise of Friendship mean and ignoble, by ascribing it to Neces­sity and Want, which at that rate would best qualifie a Man for Friendship. But 'tis quite otherwise: For he that has most assu­rance in himself, and is endued with so much Wisdom and Vertue that he wants no Body, but has every thing that is needful within himself, this Man is worthiest to gain and preserve a Friend. How did Africanus want me? Not at all: Neither did I stand in need of Him; but as I lov'd him out of an Honor I had for his Vertue, so He regarded me for some little Esteem he had of mine; Time and Conver­sation increas'd our Affection: And tho' many and great Conveniences on both sides did arise from thence, yet we never made the hopes of them any Inducements to contract a Friendship. For as we are sometimes willing to assist and oblige one another, not through any hopes of Requital, (for that were to put a Benefit out to Use;) but because we are all naturally inclin'd to [Page 24]Humanity: So methinks we should cover Friendship, not for any expectation of an outward Recompence, but because it is always its own Reward.

Some, who (like Brutes) place all Happi­ness in Pleasure, have a quite different No­tion of Friendship; but 'tis no wonder if such as misplace their Affections upon so low and worthless an Object, can never raise them to the contemplation of any thing that is Sublime, Noble, and Divine. Such therefore we shall exclude from our discourse, and rest satisfi'd, that Nature creates in us all a propensity to Love, and that the appearance of Vertue begets a true and sincere Affection. This last Motive makes us place our selves as near as we can to Him we love, that we may more freely enjoy the benefit of his Conversation and Manners, that there may be an equality and correspondence in love, and a readiness to oblige without the least expectation of a Re­turn. From this kind Contention many Be­nefits will arise, and its Foundation will be stronger and surer than that of Weakness and Want: For if Interest were the only tye of Friendship, when one fails, the other cannot last; but because Nature cannot be chang'd, therefore true Friendship, which [Page 25]proceeds from Nature, is immutable and eternal.

Thus have I shewn you the Rise of Friendship: Would you know any thing further?

Good Loelius, proceed; for Fannius, who is my Junior, I dare Answer.

My Brother has spoken my Mind; there­fore, pray Sir, let us hear you on.

Hear then, Gentlemen, what Scipio and I have often said of Friendship. He always thought, that nothing was more difficult than to preserve an inviolate Friendship till Death: For things may so happen, that the Interests of Friends will be distinct, or their Opinions in Matters of State diffe­rent. We find (said He) every day, that the Humors of Men change with their Condition, or their Tears. An Instance of this he brought from Children, who commonly [Page 26]lay aside their greatest Friendships with their Play-things; or if they continued them till their Youth, they were generally parted by some dispute for a Pleasure or Advan­tage, that could not be obtain'd by both at the same time; but if any were so constant as to preserve their Friendship under these Trials, yet at last it would be violated when both were Competitors in Honor: For there is no greater bane of Friendship than among most Men, Avarice, among the Better sort, Ambition; these have too often prov'd the causes of great Enmities between the greatest Friends. Besides, (said Scipio) many, and sometimes just Occasions of Sepa­ration are given by some Ill Men, that expect to be gratifi'd by their Friend in every unlawful Request; as that he should be an Instrument of their Lust, or an Assistant to their Injustice; which if he refuses to do, let his Refusal be never so well grounded, he shall be tax'd with a breach of Friend­ship; tho' at the same time, when these Men have the confidence to require a Compliance with all their Demands, they seem to profess that They would do any thing right or wrong, to serve a Friend. But this is an old Com­plaint, which has not only parted Friends, but created Mortal and Implacable Ene­mies. [Page 27]These are the Inconveniences which Scipio thought so incident to common Friendships, that he who could conquer or avoid them, was to be esteem'd not only a Wise, but a Happy Man.

And now, if you please, let us consider how far Love ought to proceed in Friend­ship. If Coriolanus had Friends, ought they to have born Arms with him against their Country? Should the Friends of Viscelli­nus, or Sp. Moelius have assisted their Am­bition in aspiring to the Empire? We saw but t'other day that Tib. Gracchus, when he disturb'd the Government, was forsaken by Qu. Tubero, and all his Friends that were of any Quality. But C. Blossius of Cuma, an Acquaintance of your Family (Scoevola,) when he came to me to the Senate (Loenas and Rupilius being then Consuls) to sue for his Pardon, urg'd this Argument for his Excuse, Because he had so high an esteem for Tib. Gracchus, that he thought himself oblig'd to do whatever he desir'd: But what (said I) if he should bid you Fire the Capitol? He would never have propos'd that (answer'd he:) Well, but what if he had? Truly (said he) I should have done it. You hear how Wic­kedly he spoke; and really he did as he said, or rather more: For he was no longer. [Page 28]the Instrument, but the Author of Gracchus's Rage, and was his Leader rather than his Companion in all his desperate Attempts; at last, the Hot brain'd Rebel being terrifi'd by a heavy Accusation for fresh Crimes, fled into Asia and revolted to the Enemy, and in the end was overtaken by a se­vere, but just Punishment for all his Trea­sons.

Therefore it won't excuse you from the Offence to say you offended for a Friend's sake; for Vertue being the very cement of Friendship, there is no preserving the one, if you forsake the other. Now, if we judge it very fit for us to comply with all the Desires of a Friend, and for him to do the same by us, we have Reason on our side, as long as the Matter of his Request is not unlawful. I speak here of such Friends as we have before our Eyes, such as we meet with in History or Conversa­tion, Those we are to make our Precedents, and those chiefly who come nearest to the true Wisdom. We have heard of the inti­mate Friendship between Papus Aemilius and C. Luscinus, who (as Tradition tells us) were twice Consuls together, and twice Censors; and we find that M. Curius and T. Coruncanius were familiar with them, and [Page 29]between themselves. Now we can't sup­pose that any one of these would ever press the other to the performance of ought that touch'd their Honor, their Oath, or their Loyalty. No; they were Men of so much Vertue, that if such Demands were ever made, I dare say, they were never granted. Yet we see Tib. Gracchus was assisted by C. Carbo, C. Cato and his Brother Caius, who proves a greater Stickler for that Faction, since his Brother's Death, than he was before.

Therefore we may take this for a general Rule in Friendship, Neither to make nor grant any dishonourable Request: For in all other Offences, but especially in those that are against our Country, 'tis a poor Evasion to cry, They were committed upon a Friend's account. Now we are fallen into such Times, (Fannius and Scoevola) that it concerns us to look as far as we can into the Future state of the Republick, especially since we have degenerated from the Customs and Manners of our Ancestors. Tib. Gracchus strove to obtain, or rather did actually usurp the Supreme Power for a few Months. Did ever any Roman see or hear the like? Yet even after his Death, his Friends and Adhe­rents maintain'd what he had done; nor can [Page 30]I mention their usage of P. Nasica Scipio without Tears. Carbo (whom I nam'd just now) we bore with, by reason we had punish'd Tib. Gracchus so lately. What will be the Event of C. Gracchus's Tribuneship, I shall not pretend to guess; that Affair grows daily upon us, and if it once gets a Head, will be very pernicious to the Re­publick. You may see by every Poll for Magistrates, what mischievous Consequences have attended the Gabinian Law, and that which Cassius brought in, two years after. And now, methinks, I see the Senate and People of Rome divided, and all things manag'd by a Head-strong Multitude, whilst some stand looking on, and are more curious to enquire what occasion'd these Calamities, than how they should be reme­died. But what's the Reason of all this? Truly, because no Body would dare to attempt such a thing without a Party. Therefore every Honest Man must be cau­tion'd, that tho' his Friendship should betray him unawares into such Alliances, yet he must ot hold himself oblig'd to stand by his Friend, in any Design that tends to the subversion or prejudice of the Commonwealth: For all Offenders of this kind, some Punishment must be provided, and no less for the Ad­herents [Page 31]than for the Leaders of a Fa­ction.

Who in all Greece was more Renown'd or more Powerful than Themistocles, who deliver'd that Nation from Slavery in the Persian War, where he was General? Yet after all, this Man, when he was Banish'd thro' the Jealousie of his Fellow-Citizen, knew not how to bear that Affront from his Un­grateful Country, (tho' 'twas his Duty to have born it;) but took the same course as Coriolanus had done here Twenty years before him, and Revolted: Neither of these could find a Friend that would assist them against his Country, and therefore Both kill'd themselves. Now, I say, such wicked Associations as these, must not only be deny'd the umbrage of Friendship for their Excuse, but should be made liable to some heavy Censure, that no Man may think it lawful upon any account to take up Arms with his Friend against his Country, which, for ought I can see, as things go now, may too frequently happen. For my part, I am no less concern'd to think what the Condi­tion of the Republick will be after my Death, than what is now in my Life time.

Therefore this must be laid down as the first Maxim in Friendship, To request what is just of our Friends, and to perform what is just for them, scarcely respiting the per­formance so long as to be ask'd. Let us always be ready to oblige them, and exclude all delays from Friendship: Let us be wil­ling and glad to give good Counsel, and let the Authority of a Friend, if his Advice be honest, go a great way with us; this Authority must extend it self not only to open Admonitions, but, where occasion requires, to severe Reproofs, and then it must be strictly obey'd.

Yet some, who (I hear) are esteem'd Wise in Greece, please themselves with strange and singular Opinions; but nothing can escape the nicety of their Distinctions. They (forsooth) will tell us, that we must not be over-stock'd with Friends, for that's the way to involve one Man in the Cares of a Multitude, who at the same time has enow, and it may be too many of his own: That 'tis troublesom to have too great an Interest in other Mens Concerns, and more conve­nient to have the Knot of Friendship as slight and as loose as we can, that upon occasion, we may streighten or slacken it, as we see fit: That Quiet is the readiest Means [Page 33]to obtain Happiness, which the mind can never enjoy, if it must be in continual labour for the Fortunes of so many sever­al Men. Others, they say, are of a more selfish Opinion, (which I have hinted at already,) that Friendship was to be desir'd for Convenience and Interest, not for Love and Affection: And therefore the more helpless a Man is, the more reason he has to seek a Friend; from hence (say they) it comes to pass that, Women rather than Men, the Poor rather than the Rich, the Distressed rather than the Happy fly to Friendship as a Sanctuary. Brave Wisdom indeed! They may as well rob the World of the Sun, as Human Life of Friendship, the best and happiest Gift of Heaven. But what is that Quiet they talk of, which in appearance may be pleasant, but is really to be avoided in most cases? Would any Man in his Wits excuse himself from un­dertaking an honorable Action or Employ­ment, or lay it down when he has under­taken it, merely because there is some trou­ble in the performance of it? He that would avoid all Care, must by the same Rule avoid Vertue, which cannot without some difficulty reject and hate it's contrary, as Good does Evil, Temperance Lust, or [Page 34]Courage Cowardice. Thus, you see, Vertu­ous Men have the strongest aversion for those that are Vitious, the Valiant for those that are Fearful, and the Sober for those that are Lewd. 'Tis therefore essential to a well govern'd Mind to delight in all that is Good, and to be offended at all that is otherwise. Now since Trouble will sometimes befal the wisest Man, (which it must necessarily do, unless we can suppose him devested of all Humanity,) I see no rea­son why we should banish Friendship from our Life, because it may give us a little trouble. Take but away the Affections of the Soul, and tell me what difference there is, (I will not say between a Beast and a Man, but) between a Man and a Stone, a Stock or any senssess thing. We must not heark­en to those, that will make Vertue so hard and cruel a Mistress, which in all things is easy and gentle, especially in Friendship, where she allows us a well to share the Comforts of our Friend's Prosperity, as the Sorrows of his Adversity. Therefore Friend­ship is not to be laid aside, because some trouble must be undergon for a Friend, no more than Vertue is to be neglected, be­cause it is attended with some difficulties.

Now Vertue being (as I told you) the very Cement of Affection, when That ap­pears so eminently in one Man, as to create in another of the like disposition, a desire of being joyn'd to him; when, I say, this happens, an Amity must necessarily fol­low. And methinks 'tis strange, that Men should take so much Pleasure in the Va­nities and Superfluities of Life; as Honor, Grandeur, Building, Dressing and Beauti­fying the Body, and yet find no delight in a Mind enrich'd with Vertue, that knows where to bestow and how to return Affe­ction. For certainly nothing can be more Charming than a Correspondence of Kind­ness, and a mutual intercourse of friendly Offices. Now if we add, what we justly may, that Likeness is so attractive of Friend­ship as nothing more, 'twill easily be grant­ed that Vertuous Men love such as are Ver­tuous, and delight to associate with them, as if there were already some Alliance in Nature, and Affinity in Blood: For nothing is more desirous, and (I may say) greedy of it's Like, than Nature.

And now, (Fannius and Scoevola,) I hope I have demonstrated the necessity of a good Will between good Men, which is the natural spring of Friendship. But this Good­ness is of a large extent: For Vertue is not so selfish, insociable or proud, but that she is equally communicative of her Bene­fits to every particular, and active for the publick Good; which would never be, had she not an universal kindness for all. There­fore they that make Interest an inducement to Friendship, seem to me to loosen it's most amiable Tye; for 'tis not so much the Advantages we receive from a Friend, as the Love he has for us, that ought to be valued; and then it is that a good turn is most acceptable, when it comes with a good will. Now 'tis so far from being true, that Friendship proceeds from Necessity, that they who abound most in the posses­sion of Riches and Vertue, (which of all things has least need of any outward assis­tance) are generally the most liberal, and readiest to oblige. Yet I question, whe­ther 'tis always necessary that nothing should be wanting between Friends: For if Scipio had never stood in need of my Service, Advice, or Assistance, neither at home nor abroad, what proofs had their been [Page 37]of our mutual Affection? Therefore Con­venience and Interest ought not to be the causes, but the consequences of Friend­ship.

We must not give ear to those World­lings who entertain such notions of Friend­ship, as are grounded neither upon their knowledge nor their experience: For (God knows,) what Man living, would purchase the greatest Wealth and Plenty in the World at so dear a rate, as not to Love the rest of Mankind, nor to be belov'd by them? This were to live the Life of a Tyrant, destitute of the least assurance of Kindness or common good Will, and so full of Jealousies and Distrusts, that there is no room for Friendship. For who can Love that Man whom he Fears, or by whom he thinks himself to be Fear'd? Tyrants are flatter'd indeed for a while with an appear­ance of Friendship, but when they fall, (as commonly they do,) then they see too plainly how few Friends they have. 'Tis reported of Tarquin, that he should say in his Banishment, that now he could discern his Friends from his Enemies, when he was not in a capacity of being useful to the one, or hurtful to the other: Tho' I should wonder if so proud and cruel a Tyrant, could find [Page 38]one Friend in the World. Now as this Man's ill qualities, gain'd him no true Friends, so commonly the affluence of Wealth indisposes some Men for a real Friendship: For Fortune is not only Blind her self, but she hoodwinks her Fa­vourites, so that they are generally puff'd up with Pride and self-conceit; and cer­tainly nothing is more unsufferable than a fortunate Fool. Of this we have frequent instances in some whose humor is at first not disagreeable, till Honor, Power and Prosperity make such an alteration in them, that they slight their Old Friends and grow fond of New. Now what can be a greater weakness, than for Men abounding in Riches, to lay out vast Sums upon Horses, Equipage, Cloaths, Furniture, and twenty other Commodities that every Man may have for his Mony, and yet not to be so­licitous in the obtaining a Friend, the Richest Treasure and Lovelyest Ornament of ones Life? For let a Man bestow never so much in the purchase of worldly Goods, yet he can't tell for whom they are pur­chas'd, or who shall enjoy the Fruits of all his Cost and Care, which may at last be snatch'd from him by some stronger hand; but a Friend is a sure and lasting Possession. [Page 39]Nay, tho' we should suppose our selves absolute Masters of all that Fortune can give, yet even in that condition, a Life destitute of Friends would be Solitary and Uncomfortable.

And so much for this Point. Let us now set some Bounds and Limits to Friendship, how far it should proceed in Kindness; concerning these, I find three several Opi­nions, none of which I approve.

• The First is, That we must stand equal­ly affected to our Friends, as to our Selves.
• The Second, That our Returns of Friend­ship, must bear an exact proportion to the Obligations we receive from our Friends.
• The Third, That accordingly as a Man esteems of Himself, such he must be esteem'd by his Friend.

Of these three Assertions there is not one to which I can assent. First, It is not true, that a Man ought to stand equally affected to his Friend as to Himself. For how many things are there which we would never do in our own Case, and yet we are [Page 40]willing to do them for a Friend's sake? For instance, to sue to an unworthy Man, to be importunate, to reproach any one with some Bitterness and Passion, all which would not appear so well in our own be­half, yet might be excusable upon a Friend's account. Besides, there are many cases in which a good Man willingly neglects or quits his own Convenience, that his Friend rather than himself may enjoy it.

The next Opinion limits Friendship to a mutual equality and exact Correspondence in all good Offices. This is to call Friend­ship to too strict and severe an account, by requiring that the Returns should be equivalent to the Obligations. True Friend­ship, methinks, is of a more generous and noble Nature, and scorns to be exact in observing whether more is return'd than has been receiv'd; for we must not be afraid, lest any thing should fall to the ground and be forgotten, or lest our Friends should have too much of our Kindness.

The last and indeed the worst is, that a Man must be esteem'd by his Friend, as he esteems of Himself. We frequently see some Men dejected in Mind, and hopeless of mending their Condition: in such a [Page 41]case it will not become a Friend to enter­tain the same mean thoughts of his des­ponding Companion, as he has of him­self; but rather to use all arts and endea­vours to raise his drooping Spirits, and to animate him with better thoughts of him­self and his Fortunes.

But we shall find that true Friendship has a nobler End than any of these; if we remember what Scipio found so much fault with, when he said, there could be no Opi­nion more pernicious to Friendship than his, who said that a Man must love with this reserve, that he may one day hate. He could never be persuaded that this Sentence was spoken by Bias, who was one of the Seven, but rather by some Lewd ill-natur'd Fellow, that had a mind to subject all the World to his Interest and Ambition. For how can any Body be that Man's Friend, whose Enemy he thinks he may become hereafter? Besides, he must needs wish that his Friend may offend often, that he may find more Occasions to rebuke him; and he must as necessarily be displeas'd when he does well, or succeeds well. Wherefore this Doctrine (whoever was the Author of it) tends to the utter dissolution of Friendship. He should rather have ad­vis'd [Page 42]us to use such Caution in chusing a Friend, as not to begin to love one, whom at some time or other we may hate; but if we are not so happy in our Choice as we could wish, 'twas Scipio's Opinion, that we must rather bear with it than ever think of a Separation.

This, in my mind, should be the chief aim of Friendship, that the Manners and Dispositions of Friends should be good, and that there may be a Communication of all things between them, both of their Intentions and Thoughts, without any re­serve. And tho' it should sometimes fall out, that a Friend's Request is less reason­able than it ought to be, yet if his Life or Credit lies at Stake, we may step a little aside to serve him, unless we foresee that some scandalous Consequence will attend our Compliance: For tho' there are some Allowances to be made in Friendship, yet we must not hazard our own Reputation, nor that necessary Instrument in all our Affairs, the good Will of our Neighbours, which to purchase by Fawning and Flattery, is base and mean. Above all things we must be mindful of Vertue, which is the Founda­tion of Friendship.

Scipio (for I must often return to Him, who was always talking of this Subject) us'd to complain, that in all other Matters Men were more diligent than in this. Every one can tell you how many Sheep or Oxen he has; but ask him how many Friends, and he is silent: Most People are cautious and curious enough in the purchase of the first, but very negligent and indifferent in the choice of the last. All this proceeds from an ignorance of the true Marks and Tokens by which we may discern one that is well qualifi'd for a Friend. We must therefore pitch upon those whom we think to be Men of a firm, steady, and constant Principle; there are so few of this sort, that we can hardly judge of them, but by making some Trial, and this Trial can't be made till we have entred into some Fami­liarity, which being antecedent to our Ex­perience, seems to prevent our making a right Judgment of a Friend. Therefore a Prudent Man must know as well how to stop the Torrent of his Affection, as a good Rider how to check the Cariere of a head strong Jade. Friendship must be us'd like Manag'd Horses, the Humors and Dispositions of those we intend for our Friends must be observ'd by degrees. [Page 44]Some are tried in a little matter of Mony how slight their Professions are; Others again, who are not to be tempted with a small Sum, will be prov'd in a greater. But if you can find a Man after all, that scorns to prefer your Mony before your Friendship, where will you light upon one that will not value Greatness, Power, Wealth and Empire above his Friend, that, when These stand in competition with the Laws and Rights of Friendship, will not chuse the first before the last? So hard is it for Flesh and Blood to resist the Temptations of Honor and Interest: And tho' they are purchas'd with the violation of Friendship, yet some Men shall think it very allowable to make bold with a Friend upon so great an account. So that true Friendship is hardly to be looked for from the Ambitious and Busy part of Mankind; for 'tis almost impossible to find One among them that will wish his Friend's Advancement before his own. To say no more of this—how grievous and intolerable is it to some Men, to bear the least share of their Friends Misfortunes? How few are there in the World that can submit to that? Now tho' Ennius was in the right when he said, [Page 45] ‘Our cruellest Fortune shews our kindest Friends:’ Yet there are two Cases in which most Men shew the levity and inconstancy of their Nature, namely when they slight a Friend in their Prosperity, or forsake him in his Adversity. He therefore that in both Conditions of Fortune is a constant, firm, faithful Friend, He (I say) ought to be esteem'd as one of that Noble and almost Divine sort of Men. Now the main Foun­dation of that Stability and Constancy which is requir'd in Friendship, is Truth; for nothing can be lasting that is not true. We must chuse a Man that is Plain, Cour­teous, good Humor'd, and of the same Mind with our selves; these are the inse­parable Marks of Fidelity; for a Heart that is various and full of doublings can never be faithful, nor can one that is of a Temper and Disposition different from ours be either cordial or constant. Give me leave to add this, That a Man must not be too forward in laying Faults upon his Friend of himself, nor in believing them from others: All this belongs to that Con­stancy which I mention'd just now.

Thus have I prov'd what I told you at first, that there can be no Friendship, but between Good Men. For 'tis the part of a Good Man (whom I may justly call a Wise Man) to observe these two Rules in Friendship:

• First, That it be without any Deceit or Dissimulation; for 'tis more ingenuous to profess an open Hatred, than to disguise it under the Mask of Love.
• Secondly, Not only to defend his Friend against false Accusations; but to keep him­self from suspecting that he violates the Laws of Friendship.

'Tis necessary too, that there should be a sweetness of Temper, and a pleasantness in Conversation, which certainly gives a delightful relish to Friendship; Sullenness and Moroseness must be avoided by all means: For tho' Friendship admits of Gravity, yet it must always be remiss and easie, and dispos'd to all innocent Chear­fulness and Complaisance.

Here some will think it a disputable Question, Whether a New Friend, if he deserves our Love, should not be preferr'd before an Old one; as we use to prize a young Horse above one that is past his Prime? This is an ill natur'd Doubt: For we must not think that Friendship (like the ordinary Pleasures of Life) is capable of Satiety; but rather that Old Friends (like Old Wine) are the better for their Age. 'Tis a true tho' common Saying, that One must eat many a Bushel of Salt with a Friend, before he can acquit himself in all the Offices of Friendship. Novelties indeed, like young Plants, if they give us any hopes of Fruit, are not to be rejected; but still that which is of an elder Date is to be cherish'd most: For certainly long Acquain­tance and continual Use are strong Engage­ments upon our Nature. And if the Horse I was speaking of, has no great Faults, I know no Man that would not rather chuse to Ride one that he has been long us'd to, than a skittish Colt that was never Back'd. This power of Custom and Use is not only discernible in Living Crea­tures, but even in things Inanimate: 'Tis a common Observation, That Men take most Pleasure in those Places where they [Page 48]have dwelt longest, tho' they are never so Wild and Mountainous.

'Tis a great Step to Friendship, when the Superior descends to an Equality with his Inferior: For many times there will happen a difference in Degree, as there was between Scipio and us that were his Friends; yet He never would esteem him­self above Philus, Rupilius, Mummius, or any of his Friends that were of an Inferior Rank; but on the contrary always respe­cted his Brother Q. Maximus, who was a Worthy Gentleman, but no way Scipio's Equal (for he was a great deal younger,) as if he had been his Superior, and look'd upon all his Friends as Men that were his Betters in their intrinsick Worth. 'Tis pity but all Men should follow Scipio's Example in this; and if they have any Advantage above their Friends in the Gifts of Nature or Fortune, they should freely impart it to them, and share it with them. For Instance, If their Parentage be low, or their Endow­ments of Mind or Fortune mean, they should increase their Stock in both, and do them all the Honor and Service they can. As we read in Romances of some Heroes, who having been brought up in Mean Families, thro' the obscurity of their [Page 49]Birth and ignorance of their Parentage, and proving at last the Sons of some King or God, retain their first Affection to the Shepherds, whom till then they look'd upon as their Natural Fathers. This Duty is much more incumbent upon us where our Real Parents are known: And then it is that the Fruits of Knowledge and Wisdom and every Excellence are most certainly enjoy'd by our Selves, when they are com­municated to Others.

Therefore as they who are any way Supe­rior to their Friends, should make them their Equals; so on the other side, they that are Inferiors must not be dissatisfi'd if they have a Friend that excels them in Know­ledge, Fortune or Dignity. But 'tis the Humor of some to be always complaining of their Friends, or else upbraiding them, especially where they find any colour of saying, such a thing was done for their sake, and that they shew'd enough of their Kindness by serving them in an Affair, where none but a Friend would have given himself half the trouble. This sort of Men is intolerable, for they turn their very Favours into Reproaches; whereas the nature of an Obligation seems to require that it should be remembred by him that re­ceiv'd [Page 50]it, not upbraided by him that gave it.

Now as the Superior must submit him­self, so must the Inferior in some sort raise himself to an Equality with his Friend. Some Men make their Friends very uneasie by thinking themselves slighted; tho' this seldom happens, but to such as are conscious of their own Demerits: such as these are to be won from their Opinion, not only by Persuasion, but by real Assistance. And here it might be proper to consider first how far it lays in our power to oblige, and secondly how far the Person we would oblige is qualifi'd for the Character and Post we intend him. For 'tis impossible for a Man (let him be never so able) to advance all his Friends and Acquaintance. We see Scipio had interest enough to make P. Rutilius Consul, but he could not serve his Brother Lucius upon the same occasion. Nay, tho' we can do never so much for a Friend, yet (as I said before) we must consider whether he is fit for such or such an Employment.

There is no true Judgment to be made of our Friendships, till they are confirm'd by length of time, and maturity of un­derstanding. If in our Youth, we had a [Page 51]Love for the Companions of our Recrea­tions, this does not oblige us to contract a strict Friendship with them, in our riper Years; for at that rate our Nurses and Tutors might justly challenge the largest share in our Affection. Now tho' these are not to be slighted, yet they are to esteem'd after another manner than our Friends, whom otherwise we can never preserve long. Different Manners create different Minds, and consequently dissolve Friendship: And the only Reason why Good Men can never Love those that are Bad is, because there is the widest differ­ence imaginable in their Minds and Man­ners.

'Tis a good Rule in Friendship, to take care lest the Intemperance and Extrava­gance of our Affection, should hinder the Occasions of our Friends, or prejudice their Interest. For (to return to Story,) Neoptolemus had never taken Troy, if he had hearken'd to his Father-in-Law Lyco­medes, who had the Education of Him, and strove with many Tears to stop his Journy. Sometimes there will fall out pres­sing occasions, that must necessarily divide Friends; which he that goes about to ob­struct, because he can't bear a Friend's [Page 52]absence, shows a weak impotent and un­reasonable Friendship. Therefore we must always consider what we ought to ask of our Friends, as well as what we ought to grant them.

Sometimes there falls out an unhappy necessity of a final Separation between Friends: For my Discourse descends now from the Friendship of the Wiser Sort, to that of the Vulgar. For Instance; Suppose a Friend of ours has done some great injury to a third Person, and that the Infamy of it is likely to extend to all that hold any Familiarity or Corres­pondence with him: In this case, we must let our Friendship cool by degrees, and discontinuance of Conversation, and (as Cato us'd to say,) rather unty it gently, than break it off abruptly; unless some intolerable enormity breaks out, so that we cannot with any appearance of Justice or Honesty, avoid an immediate Separa­tion. Where we find an alteration in the Manners and Inclinations of our Friend, (which often happens,) or a difference bet­ween their Sentiments, and ours in mat­ters of Government, (for as I told you, I am not now speaking of a Philosophical Friendship, but of that which is more or­dinary:) [Page 53]There, I say, we must take heed lest instead of laying down our Friend­ship fairly, we take up a mortal Enmity: for nothing can be worse than to own an open Quarrel, where one has formerly us'd a Familiarity. You see, Scipio withdrew from Q. Pompeius's Friendship upon my account, and left off all Familiarity with my Collegue Metellus, because he was disaffected to the State: In both he us'd that Wisdom and Moderation, as to disco­ver a Resentment free from Passion. There­fore it must be our first care, to have no variance between our Friends and our selves, and where such a misfortune hap­pens, to use that Temper in our demeanor towards them, that our Friendship may rather seem to dye of it self, than to suf­fer any Violence from us. We must take heed, lest of intimate Friends, we become Irreconcilable Enemies: For this is common­ly the occasion of Quarrels, Reproaches and Railings, which if they are by any means tolerable, must be born with; and we ought to have so much regard for our for­mer Friendship, that he that does the In­jury, may be more to blame, than he that receives it.

Against all these Errors and Inconveni­ences, there is but one caution and remedy; and that is, not to begin our Friendship too soon, nor to misplace it upon such as do not deserve it. Now those are to be look'd upon as most deserving, in whom we find such good Qualities, as seem to command our Affection. This sort of Men (as every thing that is excellent) is hard to be met with; and 'tis very difficult to find any thing that is every way Perfect in it's kind. There are a great many that will allow nothing to be Good, but what is Profitable, and value their Friends as Grasiers do their Cattel, ac­cordingly as they think they will turn to account. Such as these want that generous and most natural Friendship, which is to be desir'd of it self, and for it self, and never understood by any experience upon themselves, how great the force and effica­cy of Friendship is. For a Man loves himself, not because he expects any re­ward, or return of his own Affection from himself, but because every one is natural­ly dear to himself. Now he that does not find he stands thus affected towards ano­ther, can never be a true Friend: for a Friend is one's other Self. And since 'tis evident in Birds, Beasts and Fishes, and all [Page 55]Creatures Wild or Tame, First, how they love themselves, (for this affection is born with them,) and next, how naturally they apply themselves to others of their own kind, and that with a strange tenderness and emulation (as it were) of Human Love; we must certainly conclude, that these Inclinations are much more strongly imprinted in the Heart of Man, and that 'tis Natural for him to Love himself, and to seek some other, with whom he may so mingle Souls, as to unite Two into One.

Yet some Ill-natur'd (not to say impudent) Men would have their Friends be such as they can never be themselves, and expect that from them, which was never done by them­selves. 'Tis therefore necessary in the first place, that the Man who would be a Friend, should be a Good Man; and next, that he should find, and fix upon one of his own disposition; for then it is, that the Friendship I mention'd, is throughly esta­blish'd, when two Men equally affected to one another, have so entirely master'd those Appetites, to which the greatest part of Mankind is enslaved, as to find a Pleasure in Vertue and Integrity, and to delight in the mutual performance of all friendly Offices, neither party desiring any thing [Page 56]from the other but what is fair and honest, and Both having a Regard as well as a Love for each other: For he that would separate Modesty from Friendship, will Rob it of it's greatest Ornament. 'Tis a great Heresy in Friendship, to think that it gives any encouragement to a loose and licentious Life: For certainly a Friend was design'd by Nature, for an Assistant to Vertue, not for a Companion in Vice, that because a solitary Vertue would be helpless and un­able of her self, to reach that degree of Perfection which she aims at, she might be enabled by the assistance of some Com­panion, to obtain her desires. If therefore this noble Association ever was, is, or can be found between any two Persons, they are to be look'd upon as the best Guides, to this greatest Blessing of Human Na­ture. This, this is the Society in which is to be found all that Man can wish for, Vertue, Honour, Peace of Mind, Pleasure, and every solid Enjoyment that makes our Lives happy, and without which they cannot be comfortable. This, doubtless, is the highest consummation of Human Fe­licity; and if we would attain to it, we must make Vertue the means, without which we can never deserve a Friend, nor [Page 57]any thing that's worth our wishes; and which being neglected, they that think they have Friends will (too late) find their Error, when they have occasion to make use of them. Therefore (for I cannot re­peat it too often) we must Try before we Love, and not Love before we Try. But as our neglect in other matters of moment is too visible, so is it chiefly blameable in the choice and management of our Friend­ships, in which many of us use very pre­posterous Methods, and (in spite of the Proverb) frustrate our own designs. For sometimes we suffer our selves to be so incumber'd with our own worldly concerns, or engage our selves so deeply in publick affairs, that upon the least distast or disap­pointment in them, we immediately take pett, and fall out with our Friends.

But nothing can excuse our want of Care in a matter of so great importance; for Friendship is the only thing in the World, concerning whose usefulness all Men agree. Nay, tho' Vertue it self is derided by some, and passes with them for Singularity and Ostentation, tho' many that content them­selves with a little, despise Riches; tho' Honor and Greatness which inflame the Am­bition of most Men, are so slighted by [Page 58]some, that nothing is thought more vain and empty, (and so for other things of this nature that are admir'd by some and con­temn'd by others:) yet all Men have the same respect for Friendship; the States­man and the Philosopher, the Idleman and the Man of Business, nay even those that mind nothing but their Pleasures will tell you, that there is no living without a Friend, if you mena to live happily. For Friendship runs through every Stage of our life, no Age or Condition is exempt from it: Nay, tho' a Man were of that morose and savage disposition as to hate and shun the conversation of Mankind, (as we read one Timon an Athenian to have done,) yet that very Man can't live without some body to whom he may vent his spleen and ill nature. This we should find by our own experience, if it were possible for some God to take us from the Society of Men, and to place us in a Solitude, there supplying with all the necessities of nature, and only debarring us of the power to see any of our Fellow-creatures: Is there any Man of so hard a temper that he could endure such a life, and to whom that So­litude would not render all Pleasures fruit­less and insipid? 'Twas a very true Say­ing [Page 59]that, which we have receiv'd from our Forefathers and they from theirs, as spoken by Archytas of Tarentum, that if a Man were to ascend into Heaven, and there to contem­plate the nature of the Universe and the beauty of the Stars, all that Entertainment would be ungrateful to him, which, if he had a Companion to speak to, would have been very acceptable and pleasant.

Thus we see, Nature flies Solitude, and seems to seek some support and assistance from without, which every true Friend does with pleasure. But tho' Nature by so many tokens declares what she wants and requires, we stop our ears I know not how nor why, and will not hearken to what she suggests. Now as the usefulness of Friendship is various and manyfold, so in it there are too many occasions given of suspicions and distasts, all which a wise Man will avoid, lessen, or bear. And without doubt, it requires a great deal of Discretion to preserve the Truth and Faith­fulness of a Friend, without giving offence at some time or other. For our Friends must be often admonish'd and sometimes rebuk'd, both which, if they are wellmeant, are to be taken well. But 'tis too true, as my friend Terence says in a Play of his call'd [Page 60] Andria, Compliance gains Friends, and Truth Enemies: Truth is ungrateful, be­cause it begets Hatred, which is the Bane of Friendship: But Compliance is infinitly worse, for that ruins a Friend by indulg­ing him in his faults, and suffers him to run headlong into destruction. But he of all Men is most to blame, that both hates Truth, and suffers himself to be misled by Compliance. In this case, all possible care and diligence is to be us'd, that our Admo­nitions be without Severity, and our Re­proofs without Scurrility: But let our Com­pliance (to use Terence's expression) be tem­per'd with all Freedom, and void of Flat­tery, that Pandar to Vice, which is misbe­coming not only of a Friend, but of a Gentleman: For 'tis one thing to live upon equal terms with a Friend, and another thing to live under a Tyrant; but he that stops his Ears against the Truth, and will not hear it tho' it comes from a Friend, is certainly in a desperate condition, and must be given over. What Cato tells us, is infallibly true, that some Men are more beholding to their sharpest Enemies than to their smoothest Friends, for the first speak truth sometimes, but the last never. 'Tis very absurd in most Men, when they [Page 61]are admonished, to be troubled where they should not, and not to be troubled where they should: For usually they are not so angry with Themselves for committing a fault, as with their Friend for telling them of it; whereas on the contrary they should be sorry they have Err'd, and glad they are Reprov▪d.

As therefore 'tis the property of cordial Friendship mutually to admonish and to be admonish'd, and as the one is to be done with all Freedom, but without any Sharpness, and the other to be taken with all Patience and without any murmuring: so we may be sure that there is no greater Canker to Friendship than Flattery, fawn­ing and assentation. This Vice has too many Names as well as Shapes, and is the infallible symptom of a base deceitful tem­per, that speaks and acts every thing out of a love to Compliance more than Truth. But Dissimulation, besides that 'tis odious in all cases, (for it corrupts and destroys our Judgment,) is utterly inconsistent with Friendship, because it is repugnant to Truth, without which, the name of Friendship is but taken in vain. For since the End and Excellence of Friendship is to unite our minds, how can that be effected where one [Page 62]Man has not always one and the same mind, but is unsetled, inconstant, and in­consistent with himself? What can be so flexible and slippery as his mind, who con­forms himself not only to the Will, but even to the very Looks of another? Does any one deny? I deny too: does he affirm? So do I; in short, I have that command over my self, as to be of every Man's mind, as Terence has it in another Play; this he ap­plies wittily to Gnatho a Parasite, which would look very absurd in a Friend. There are too many in the World that resemble Gnatho in their Character, tho' they make a better figure than he did upon the Stage: Flattery in them is fullsome, when they think their Vanity authoriz'd by their Greatness. But we may as easily discern a Flatterer from a Friend, with a little care, as we can distinguish false and sophistica­ted Ware from that which is right. The very unthinking Multitude (where one would little expect to find any Judgment) shall sometimes find the difference between a fawning Demagogue, that is, a Publick Flat­terer, and a wise and worthy Patriot.

What fine arts did C. Papirius use to insi­nuate himself into the minds of his Audi­tors, when he endeavour'd to bring in a [Page 63]Law for making the same Person Tribune of the Commons as often as they pleas'd? I oppos'd it; but I shall say nothing of my self, of Scipio I shall speak most wil­lingly. Lord! what weight, what Majesty was there in his Oration? One would have thought he had been their Governor and not their Fellow-Citizen— But you were present, and his Speech is in every Man's hands. Thus through his means that popular Law was rejected by the unanimous Consent of the People: But to speak a word or two of my self. You may remember, when Q. Maximus (Scipio's Brother) and L. Mancinus were Consuls, how universally the Law that C. Licinius Crassus propos'd concerning the Creation of Priests, had obtain'd among the Vulgar: Now the intent of this Law was to transfer the right of chusing Men into that Office, upon the Populace. 'Twas he that first brought up the Custom of Haranguing the People in Verse: But the Honor every one had for the immortal Gods, together with my best endeavours in their defence, did easily defeat his mercenary Oration. This was done when I was Praetor, five years before I was Consul; tho' I must confess, the success of that Affair is more owing to the Justice [Page 64]of the Cause, than to the Abilities of its Advocate.

Since therefore upon so publick a Stage as a Vulgar Audience is, where there is room enough for Shuffling and Prevarica­tion, Naked Truth can prevail, when 'tis laid open and illustrated; how much more can it do in Friendship, which is wholly measur'd by it? For here, unless your Friend unlocks his Breast to you, and you do the same to him, there can be no Trust or Confidence between you; you cannot so much as Love or be Belov'd, but will be forc'd to doubt the sincerity of each other's Affection. Now tho' Flattery is very pernicious of it self, yet can it hurt no Body but him that admits of it, and is pleas'd with it; from hence it comes to pass, that those Men are most expos'd to the Flattery of others who are most apt to flatter themselves, and to have an over-weaning Conceit of their own Worth. 'Tis true, Vertue is lovely in her own Eye, for she best knows her self, and understands how Amiable she is to others: But I speak not now of Vertue, but of an Opinion of Vertue; for most Men desire not so much to be Vertuous, as to appear so: Such as these are pleas'd with Flattery; [Page 65] These, when they meet with some ela­borate Panegyrick that tickles the vanity of their Humor, shall think the fulsom Encomium to be a true Testimonial of their Merit. But this is not Friendship, where one does not care to hear Truth, nor the other to speak it. The Flattery of the Parasite in the Play would not seem so witty to us, unless there was such a Fop for him to work upon, as the Braggadocio. But does Thaïs thank me kindly, d'ye say? One would have thought it enough for Gnatho to have answer'd, She does: But he cries, Oh! infinitely! Thus your right Flatterer always aggravates that which the Vain-glorious Man desires should look Big. Now tho' this sort of Witchcraft has most power over such as invite and encourage it, yet the Wisest and Gravest Persons must be caution'd to take care lest they be overtaken by it some time or other. Any Man that has his Wits about him may quickly discern an open Flatterer: but we can't use too much Caution in arming our selves against the subtle Insi­nuations of the sly undermining Sycophant, who shall then be most guilty of Assentation, when he seems the Spirit of Contradiction; who all the while he pretends to oppose you, [Page 66]shall only amuse you, and at last in Com­plaisance to you, shall suffer himself to be convinc'd; so that he who is most in the Wrong, shall seem to have the Better side of the Question: Now what is more gross than to be thus impos'd upon? To prevent all this, we must take care (as the Poet says in his Epiclerus) lest we be banter'd and bubbled worse than all the foolish Old Fellows in Comedies use to be: For even upon the Stage we think the Character of an improvident Credulous Dotard very ridiculous.

My Discourse has deviated I know not how from the Friendships of the more Refin'd, that is, the Wiser sort of Men (I mean here such Wisdom as Man is capable of,) to those of smaller account; let us now return to the first Motive of Friendship, and end with it.

'Tis Vertue, Vertue (C. Fannius and Q. Mucius) that creates and preserves Friend­ship; in That alone we shall find all that is agreeable, faithful, or constant. Vertue, having rais'd her self above the common Pitch, and shewing her own Light, sees the same, and knows it in another, to whom she joyns her self by a mutual giving and [Page 67]receiving of all that is needful for Both: From hence proceeds Love or Friendship, which are both deriv'd from the same word (Amo) in Latin. Now Love is no­thing else but a well wishing to him whom you affect, without any inducement from Necessity or Interest; for the Later will naturally follow upon Friendship, tho' you do not think of it. This sort of Affection I had when I was young, for L. Paulus, C. Gallus, P. Nasica and T. Gracchus (my Friend Scipio's Father in-Law) who were all of them Old Men. This is more eminently perfect between those of the same Age, as between Me and Scipio, L. Furius, P. Rupi­lius and Sp. Mummius. Again, when we grow Old, we are pleas'd with the Conver­sation of Younger Persons; as I am with Yours and Tubero's: Nay, I take great delight in my familiarity with P. Rutilius and A. Virginius; tho' they are very young.

Now, because the condition of our Life and Nature is so order'd, that one Age grows out of another; it might be wish'd, that as we began the Race of Life together with our Equals, so we might all along continue it and end it with them. But since all things in this World are so frail and [Page 68]uncertain, we must never be without some One whom we may love, and by whom we may be mutually belov'd; for without Friendship, there is no Enjoyment of Life.

Tho' Scipio was suddenly snatch'd from me, yet to Me he still does and always will live; for I lov'd his Vertue, and That can never die: That is not only continu­ally before my Eyes, in whose Arms it sometimes was; but will be signally Famous to all Posterity. No man will think of any gallant and extraordinary Undertaking, but He will Copy out his Actions from Scipio's Life. Among all the Blessings that Fortune or Nature ever bestow'd upon me, I know none that I can compare with Scipio's Friendship. With Him I advis'd and agreed in the management of all Public and Private Affairs; in Him was treasur'd up my Happiness. I never offended him (to my knowledge) in the least; I never heard any thing from him that I could wish un said. Our Lodging and Diet was in one House, and at one Table; and not only our Warfare, but our Travels and our Retirements were always together. Not to mention our Studies, which, having withdrawn our selves from the Eyes of the World, we spent in the search of Knowledge?

Now if the Remembrance of these things had dy'd with Scipio, I could never have born the Loss of so dear and loving a Friend; No, that can never decay, but is rather continually strengthen'd and renew'd by the frequency of my Thoughts, and the freshness of my Memory: Nay, tho' That too were gone, yet I should find some Comfort from my Age, for by the Course of Nature I cannot want Him long; and what is but short must be born pati­ently, tho' it be grievous.

This is all I have to say upon this Sub­ject; and let me advise you, Gentlemen, to have that esteem for Vertue, without which there can be no Amity, as to think that (That only excepted) nothing is more excellent than Friendship.