EVROPE A SLAVE, UNLESS England Break Her CHAINS: Discovering the Grand Designs of the French-Popish Party in ENGLAND for several Years past.

LONDON, Printed for W. D. and are to be sold in London and Westminster. 1681.

EUROPE a Slave Unless ENGLAND Break her CHAINS.

WHat His most Chri­stian Majesty has lately enterprized upon Valencien­nes, Cambray, and St. Omers, the best Fortified places of the Spanish Netherlands, and the only remain­ing Bulwarks of those Poor Pro­vinces toward France, together with the Progress of his Armes upon the Frontiers of Germany, the Confines of Spain, in Sicilie and in America, gives all the [Page 2] rest of Europe occasion to be solidly apprehensive of its danger: which if it were, perhaps it might have been more advantagious for this great Monarch not to have done so much.

In truth, by the rapid Conquests which this Victorious Prince has obtain'd in so short a time, of three such important Places, he has apparently demonstrated to all Europe the extent of his great and vast designs; and the weak­ness and low Condition of Spain as palpably discovers, that there is all the reason in the World to believe, that if England would but awake out of that Lethargie wherein it hath layen for so many years, and put her helping hand to the work, she might be a great means to prevent the misfortunes and Calamities to which all those Estates and Countries that border upon France are now exposed.

I was the more apt to flatter my self with a hope of this nature, [Page 3] for that although I am not al­together ignorant, how much the French Court has won upon the Court of England, yet I was of Opinion that the English, being so invincibly jealous for the pre­servation of their liberty, finding that his most Christian [...] had made such an important Conquest, while the Parliament was sitting, would by the Medi­ation of that Noble Assembly, have made their humble addres­ses and earnest representations to their Monarch, and not have left till they had besought him to con­sent what his own honour and the safety of his people required. But by fatal Experience we see, that as to that which all Europe calls a Parliament, if the same Anticipa­tions and Connivances continue there with that fatality which we have hitherto observed, that to our great sorrow, we shall be con­strain'd to believe what the Emis­saries [Page 4] of France publickly them­selves declare, that two thirds of that Assembly are Caball'd and manag'd by the Golden Lewis's of France; in such a manner, that from the same part from whence all Europe hope to behold the Sun of their restauration rise, if there be not a sudden change, which all good men expect for all this from the English Generosity, there they see a formidable power advance it self, in Combination with France, for, the utter destruction of Chri­stendom.

I know there are some that pre­tend to great insight, who being either endu'd or surpriz'd with the Opinions and Maxims which the French Emissaries every where insinuate, are of opinion, that for the Imperialists there might be something done so considera­ble in the Course of this Gam­paigne, which if it should happen prosperously to succeed, it would [Page 5] follow then that some folid reme­dy might be apply'd to cure the mischiefs and apprehensions of all the rest of Europe. This is that which is discoursed in all the Courts and Countries of the North. But not to distaste these men of Contemplation, I must beg leave to be of a contrary judgment, and to hold that all their hopes are ill grounded; and that for se­veral reasons.

We must confess, there is no improbability but that the Impe­perial Army might force a way in­to France, which would certainly prove a notable home thrust: but then on the other side we must consider, that the Army which is design'd for such an Expedition must endure all the hardships of a Twenty Leagues March through Countries burnt and wasted, so that such an Army would be very much incommoded for want of all sorts of necessary Provisions both [Page 6] for Horse and man. Now in re­gard the Imperialists, being once pass'd beyond Mayence, Coblents and Treves, have no Magazines, all the Countrey beyond the Line of Treves to the very Confines of France, except some part of Lux­emburgh, being under the absolute Power of the Enemy; this being so, how is it for us to imagin, that the Imperialists should do any things considerable, being to March either through a Country burnt and wasted, or through that part of Luxemburgh, which is at present a meer Desart, more especially considering that the German Ar­mies are those of all Europe that carry along with them the most numerous luggage and pesterment of women, and unprofitable mouths.

Secondly, though it were true that the Imperialists surmounting all these difficulties, should break in as far as Lorian, the Territory of [Page 7] Metz, or the County of Burgun­dy, which is all that is to be expe­cted in one Campaigne, what is it that this Imperial Army can do considerable, in a Country of which all the strong holds are in the possession of the Enemy, and all the rest of the Country burnt and laid wast? Now as all these exploits of the Imperalists can tend to no other end, but either to give Battel, or to lay Siege to some con­siderable Town, it is easie to fore­see that if they aime at the first, and that the French are intended to decline it, as they are masters of all the Country behind, and of each side, who shall be able to force them to fight? Or if it comes to that pass that they are forc'd to hazard a Battel, it is most certain that the one or the other will be Victor. Should then the Imperialists get the better, let us examine what they will be in a condition to do, should they ob­tain [Page 8] a compleat Victory. I be­lieve it will be granted me that the chief Benefit of such a victory will be only the Siege of some good Town, by that means to secure some post for the Conveniency of the Army against the next Cam­paigne. For to venture far into an Enemies Country without this pre­caution, I do not believe that the Imperialists either will or ought to do it. For should they hazard such an attempt, they would be constrain'd to leave several strong Garisons behind 'em, which be­ing well stufft with French Caval­ry, would never suffer the German Convoys to pass quietly, and perhaps cut off the greatest part of them. But on the other side, suppose the French will avoid fighting, keeping themselves in an-actual posture of defence, or though they should be constrain'd to give battel, and lose the day, yet the scatter'd Troops of that, [Page 9] beaten Army, being spedily re­inforc'd by the adjoyning Garrisons, would be still strong enough, though but in volant parties, to pre­vent the Imperialists from doing anything considerable. Here you are to observe that what I have said already is only in reference to the first Case of the March of the Imperialists in an Enemies Countrey, and the gaining a Vi­ctory. But as it would be an extraordinary piece of Flattery to determine, that the Imperialists should be infallibly Victors; I be­lieve, that before we leave this first point, it will not be amiss to examin what would probably happen, in case the Armies should joyne, and the French should get the day. Nor do I think it will require a long discourse, to make the reader apprehend the bad consequences of such a loss to the Imperialists. It being notorious that in regard of the strong places [Page 10] which the French possess in Lo­rain, Burgundy and Alsatia, after the loss of a Battel, Germany would labour under two inevitable mis­chiefs.

First to see that Army beaten, and consequently utterly ruined and cut off in the pursuit. The second to see the French pass the Rhine at Brisgow, and there cutting out such troublesome work for Germany, which yet she never be­held nor had ever suffered in those parts.

Again if by an attempt no less prosperous than the former, the Emperour and the Empire should make a second tryal, and be so un­fortunate as to lose a second Battel, a thing not unlikely, whether this Campaign or the next, consider­ing how the Correspondencies of the French are maintain'd in the Court of Bavaria, and other Courts of the Empire, we must look upon all that part of Germany which bor­ders [Page 11] upon the Rhine for two or three days journey together total­ly lost without hopes of recovery, and the rather for that a great part of those Countries is all consum'd and wasted, and can never be able to afford Conveniencies for winter Quarters, nor to supply the Im­perial Armies in their Marches. And this is very near as much as I can think observable in case of the March of an Imperial Army in the Enemies Country, and in case of giving Battel, which is the first point. Now let us come to that of laying a Siege.

As to what has pass'd at the sieg­es of Philipsburgh, and Maestricht, with different Enemies, two things are observable. The first, that the French understand very well how to fortifie their strong holds accor­ding to all the Rules of Art. And also for the second, they understand as well how to defend their Fortificati­ons, & dispute it Inch by Inch with [Page 12] their Enemies, with an admirable conduct, and undaunted Courage. From which reflections it may be naturally concluded, that in case the Imperialists, being enter'd in­to an Enemies Country, go about to lay any formal Siege; as with­out question it must be before some considerable Town, 'tis ten to one but that the season of the Cam­paigne will be over before they can bring their design to pass. From whence I conclude that this March of the Imperial Army, whatever way they take, can never produce any greater benefit, than the tak­ing of some place in Loraine, the Territory of Metz, Luxemburgh, or the County of Burgundy, and by the gain of that place to disorder those Garisons which the French hold in Alsatia, which however is not sufficient to save the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, which is the precise Platform, by which his most Christian Majesty might [Page 13] without difficulty mount to the Universal Monarchy, if those Pro­vinces were lost; there being no Power at present in a probable condition to hinder him.

Now if it be true what I have already affirm'd, and what I shall afterwards maintain, that by the Conquest of the united Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, his most Christian Majesty may jump into the Universal Monarchy, that all Europe may evidently know the danger of the present Conjuncture if there be no remedy from Eng­land, and other places interested, and that with all the speed ima­ginable, there are these five things to be attentively considered.

The first is, that his most Chri­stian Majesty being master of all the Posts, Passages and strong Places of the County of Burgundy, it be­hoves us to consider, that though this Prince should do nothing more during this whole Campaigne but [Page 14] only dispute the Ground with the Imperialists, it is not to be avoid­ed, but that the Campaigne must break up, and the Imperial Army retire without doing any thing considerable for the preservation of the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands: For not to flatter our selves, would we have had the Im­perialists have attempted any thing great for the Safety of those Provin­ces, necessity requir'd that while the Imperialists directed their March undauntedly into the Bow­els of France, with an Army of fifty thousand men, the Confede­rate forces, then in the Spanish Netherlands should have broken in­to Picardy, or the Territory of Boloigne, by such a powerful di­version to have favour'd the grand and Capital Enterprize of the Imperial Army. But by the fatal loss of Valenciennes, Cambray and St. Omers, France is so well entrench'd on that side against all [Page 15] the Attempts of the Confederate Armes in those parts, that it is absolutely out of their power by reason of those Conquests to pene­trate on that side into the King­dom of France. Now we may easi­ly perceive, that France having nothing to fear from Flanders, will content it self only to leave a small Army in those Quarters adjoyning to the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, which by the assist­ance of those strong Garrisons un­der its Dominion in the same Pro­vinces, will be a force sufficiently competent to amuse all the power of the Dutch and Spaniards on that side during the season of this Cam­paigne, and to prevent their doing any thing considerable.

In the second place, This be­ing the condition of Flanders, and France being out of all apprehensi­on of danger in reference to its Conquests in the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, and the Pro­vinces [Page 16] of Picardy, Boloigne and Ar­t / ois which are guarded and secur'd by the Conquests of Valenciennes, Cambray, and St. Omers, it plainly appears that France is at her full li­berty, to make head with the main body of its forces in opposition to the enterprizes of the Imperial Armies.

Seeing then that France finds her self in this safe condition, I must leave it to all men of sence and judgment, as a solid prognostica­tion of all that can be expected from the attempts of the Imperial Armes for the preservation of the Provinces of the Spanish Ne­therlands. For suppose that the Im­perialists should advance to the Frontiers of France, with an Army of fifty thousand men, which is al­most all that they can do, France will meet them with an equal force, or perhaps with a greater number, with this difference, that whereas the Imperialists, to obtain [Page 17] the advantage of getting to the Frontiers of France, shall be forc'd to undergo a thousand difficulties and hardships, in crossing a wasted and desolate Country, the French have nothing to do but by easie Marches in their own Countrey to meet them, Masters of all the Ter­ritories behind and on each side, furnish'd and provided with all things necessary, and where they had all the advantages imaginable to attack them as they should see occasion.

Thirdly, that we may not seem to rely in vain upon the endeavours of the Confederate Forces in the said Provinces, we must consider, that by reason of the lopping off so many considerable Members from the body of those Provinces in the Wars of 1667. and since the be­ginning of this present War, it is absolutely impossible to be able to do any thing considerable against France without a force much great­er than that of France.

[Page 18] Fourthly, The Spaniards them­selves since the beginning of this War, through the misfortune of the Minority of their Prince, being unable to establish Magazines of Victuals, Ammunition and Pro­vender for the Horse, for the subsi­stance of their own and the Armies of their Allies, and being under the same necessities and disabilities, through the same misfortune du­ring this Campaigne, it is impossible for this only defect, that any consi­derable Armies should subsist in the said Provinces for so long a time as is requisite, or that the March of the Army should be order'd as the suddenness of emergent occasions requires, to oppose the progress of the Enemy, or to gain any consi­derable advantage upon him. And this may serve for a real proof of this Truth, that we need no more but observe what has pass'd within these three years in the beginning, progress and end of all the Cam­paignes [Page 19] in the said Provin­ces, including the beginning of this.

Fifthly, although it be true that by the advancement of his most Serene Higness Don Iohn of Au­stria to the Dignity of Captain General, and First Minister of the Spanish Monarchy, we may cer­tainly expect a great change in the Government of the Monarchy of Spain, however 'tis very true that if we consider the most wonder­ful disorders which have crept into the Ministry of that Monarchy during two successive Reigns, the little time that this Heroick Prince has enjoy'd his Dignity, and the necessity that constrains him in the first place to provide for the affairs of Sicily and the Fron­tiers of Spain, make it out to be impossible for him to furnish suf­ficient succours for the preserva­tion of these Provinces.

[Page 20] Now all that has been already said, being solidly true, which may be reduc'd to three heads, First, That the Imperialists during this Campaign can do nothing conside­rable for the safety of the United Spanish Netherlands. Secondly, That there is no solid Reliance to be had upon the Enterprizes of those Forces which have defended those Provinces for these 3 years. And, Thirdly, That Don Iohn is not in a capacity to relieve or remedy these misfortunes; we must of necessity conclude that his Most Christian Majesty, at the end of this Cam­paigne, or before the beginning of the next, while the Imperialists and Hollanders are in their Win­ter Quarters, will be in a condition to Randesvouze a new body of an Army out of his Carrisons in the Frontier Provinces, and with this new Army to come and sweep all before him, and make an end of his work, by taking all principal pla­ces [Page 21] that remain unconquered in the Provinces of the Spanish Ne­therlands; by means whereof the rest will easily submit to the Con­querours Yoke; Neither the Loy­alty nor the Courage of the poor Inhabitants being able to protect them from this misfortune. And then his Most Christian Majesty will have no more to do but to push forward by Sea and Land his Monarchical Designs, to bring un­der his Yoke the two thirds of Europe.

But because some Critick may perhaps imagine that my Conclu­sion in the preceding Paragraph is not solidly enough maintain'd to be establish'd and made a positive maxime, after that manner as I have done it, I think it but necessa­ry before I go any farther, that no person may flatter himself to the contrary, to shew palpably and plainly the possibilities for his Most Christian Majesty to execute [Page 22] Victoriously, by the time by me supposed, what I have advanced for truth. To which purpose I desire the Reader to consider these four things by way of addition.

First, That it is naturally impos­sible but that the Dutch Army by death, sickness, or desertion must be diminish'd above a third part.

Secondly, That in case his most Christian Majesty should under­take any such conquest at the time afore-mentioned, it is impossible to determine, but by conjecture, which may prove deceitful, upon which place he will first begin to make his attacques; so that, sup­posing that the Hollanders do lend their Forces to the Spaniards, there will be a necessity that those For­ces should be divided into all those places which the Spaniards possess in the United Provinces; from whence it consequently follows, that it will be impossible that by means of this division and allot­ment [Page 23] of those Forces, they should be capable to defend all the Grand places which the Spaniards yet possess, which being once attacqu'd and taken, all the rest excepting on­ly Luxemburgh, will be constrain'd to surrender.

Thirdly, it being granted that the Hollanders do lend their Forces to the Spaniards, and that they are divided and separated into several Garrisons as I have already decla­red, we may certainly conclude, that if his most Christian Majesty has a design to sit down before the said places, neither the Hollanders, nor the Spaniards having a body of an army in the Field, as being all distributed into Garrisons, for the security of particular places, He is at his full liberty to attacque which, and as many as he pleases at a time without controul, and coming to be master of the Forts, he is master of the Forces likewise: and so the question will be, whe­ther [Page 24] it were not better for them to quit their Towns without so much as a Summons, than to lose their men. For if we do but make a serious Reflexion upon the violent and rapid manner of the French Attacques, it being the humour of the present King not to care how many thousand Mens lives he sa­crifices to his impetuous desires of Conquest, it is naturally impossi­ble but that they should take all the places which they attacque, as being out of all expectance of re­lief. So that all the Places which remain to the Spaniards in the Low Countries shall be swept away, be­fore the Imperialists can be in a condition to move; I only except Luxemburgh for this year, which upon the next Invasion is to run the same fortune with Burgundy, and it may be the next Campaign, as being without Garrisons or For­ces for its defence; there being no­thing more certain than that the [Page 25] Souldiers in the Conquer'd Garri­sons will be prisoners of War to the Victor.

We may add for a fourth, not to flatter our selves that the violence of Seasons, or the maxim of keeping in Winter Quarters gives any stop to the French heat, that it behoves us to consider what time his Most Christi­an Majesty made his first Irruption into the County of Burgundy, and what his Armies have done since the beginning of this War, all in the Winter time, or at the end of Cam­paignes, when the Enemies Army was never so little retir'd, or before they could be upon their marchat the end of Winter. Or if we had forgot all this, the second invasion of Bur­gundy, the conquests of Montbellian, Cambray, Valenciennes and St. Omers may refresh our memories. Which in my opinion may suffice to make us sensible that if England do not step in before the end of this Campaigne, his most Christian Majesty will be certainly in a condition, at the time [Page 26] which I have mention'd, to make a final conquest of all the Spanish Ne­therlands.

Now his Most Christian Majesty being in such a condition, from what you may believe that he will never neglect such a favourable conjun­cture, we are also to take notice, that the said Monarch out of a su­preme and capital Interest, cannot dispense with the Execution of his intended enterprizes at the time by me already expressed. For the Im­perialists at the end of the Cam­paigne, taking up their Winter Quarters in Loraine and Luxem­burgh, his Most Christian Majesty has but one Expedient of Diversion to constrain the Imperial Army of course to quit at the beginning of the next Campaigne, all the said Coun­treys, and to retreat on the other side of the Rhine, which his most Christi­an Majestie will easily compel them to do, if the Spanish Provinces or their Principal strong Holds fall at the said time into his hands. For [Page 27] this Conquest being made, his Most Christian Majesty shall not only be in a Condition to keep up an Army of fifty thousand men, upon the Consines of Lorain, the Territory of Metz, and the County of Burgundy, to oppose the Imperialists, but also with an Army of the same force to seize almost without any opposition upon the Counties of Iuliers and Cleves, and so to get footing beyond the Rhine on that side Westphalia, to encourage the Princes of his Cabal in those parts, and probably to force the Imperialists, wherever they are at that time, by reason of the Alarms of which they are so apprehensive from the Coast of Bavaria, which on­ly expects an opportunity for inva­ding Tirol, to keep close together in a body on the other side of the Rhine, on purpose to watch the mo­tion of their Enemies.

Now all that has been said above being brought to pass in this man­ner, to the end we may believe that his Most Christian Majesty will be in [Page 28] a condition to subdue the third part of Europe, we are to take notice once for all, that this same Prince with only the Forces of his own King­dom, has been able not only to de­fend himself from the consederated Forces of his Enemies, but that to this very time, all that considerable strength has not been able to get one single Farm of the ancient Patrimo­ny of his Kingdom, while this same Prince actually takes without any opposition, from the Principal Chiefs of the Confederacy, Fortres­ses, Cities, Towns and whole Pro­vinces; and as if it were not suffici­ent to advance the Progress of his Victories by Land, in the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, upon the Frontiers of Germany, upon the Con­fines of Catalogne, and in Sicily, to the end you may not be ignorant how formidable his power is every­where, he gives an occasion to all Europe with amazement to behold, how this same Monarch, within these two years under the pretence [Page 29] of the Sicilian War has not obtained only the absolute Dominion of the Mediterranean Sea, upon all the Coasts of Spain, Italy, and his own Dominions, but that he has had the courage, and a force equal to his courage, out of the super abundance of his Naval Power, to send the Count d'Estrees, with a Royal Fleet to the Indies, which to the shame of the English and Hollanders, makes those Conquests, of which the con­sequences will not fail to trouble those two Nations hereafter, and to be most cruelly tormented and in­commoded in their most Essential and Capital Interests both of Estate and Commerce.

And as if it were not enough in so many different Countreys to make all the Progresses above-mentioned, we are seriously to consider that this same Monarch by his vast Banks of ready money is able not only nobly to support his Armies in all those parts by Sea and Land in so many different and distant Countreys; but [Page 30] also in his Cabinet by the same means of his vast treasures, and the dexterity and vigilancy of his Mini­sters, to direct and uphold in a most wonderful manner, the power of the Swede, against all the Opposition that has attacqued him, and in the heart of the Empire to controule and ma­nage those Princes, who under the counterfeit and false Title of Neu­trality, by the assistance of the ready money of France, keep considerable Armies on Foot, which upon the least misfortune that should befall the Empire, would be ready to take hold of the opportunity to the disadvan­tage of the Empire. By the same in­terest of his readymoney he not only governs the secret Counsels of Po­land, but so orders his affairs that the publick Diets of that Kingdom ap­plaud the suffrages of the same Court in those very points, which according to the Rules of Judicious Policie, will certainly ruine by the Consequences all the chief Privi­ledges of that Republick. By the [Page 31] same means he governs the Politick Dyets of the Cantons of Switzer­land, in such a manner, that though that Nation, by the Conquest of Franche Comte, do perceive a curb to be put in their mouths, which may be a means to bring them into slave­ry, nevertheless they still furnish him, through an insufferable blind­ness, with the best of their men, on purpose to assist him to over-run the rest of Europe, as if after all the rest come to be subdu'd and vanquish'd, this Republic alone would be able to resist the power of France, when her victorious Monarch shall ad­vance four several wayes to attack it with all his Forces.

But these are not the bounds that limit the Influence of the French Mo­ney; it spreads it self yet more won­derfully. Italy is replenish'd with persons of great wisdom and fore­sight; and without all contradiction that Nation of all Europe is naturally the most capable to dive into all the consequences that may happen upon [Page 32] the progress of his Most Christian Majesties designs; nevertheless by an Enchantment till now unheard of, the Potentates and Republicks of that part of Europe, remain unani­mously buried in an unconceivable Lethargy, and this at a time, when they see by the successes of his Most Christian Majesty in Sicily, the flames of a War ready to be kindl'd in their own Countrey, and that too in such a part, as has alwayes prov'd fatal to it, and that from the same part, as al­so from Pignerol & Monaco they find the French Armes assured of three infallible Ports that give them free entrance by three different wayes without any Possibility for any Power of Christendom, if the Em­pire and Spain be once brought to submit, to prevent their misfortune.

But if the Mercenary humour of the Swisses, and the softness of the Ita­lians, may seem to furnish those Na­tions with any excuse, whether good or bad, to shake off the blame from themselves for not having hitherto [Page 33] done any part of their Duty, what can England say for it self, a Nation formerly of all Europe most fierce and jealous of their Liberty? In regard that at the same time, while his Most Christian Majesty carries Va­lenciennes, Cambray and St. Omers in the very view of that Nation, she so warlike and so jealous heretofore of the Successes of the French, stands pausing and flegmatickly making it a Question, whether it may be con­venient for her to Arm, and with her ancient courage to cause a Resto­ration of those places into the hands of their ancient Masters: or whether she shall apply her self to the unpro­fitable wayes of mediation, where the Frauds and delayes of the French are to be every day encountred. This it is that causes us to say, that the Seine now triumphs over the mari­time Grandeur of England, and that France by vertue of one of her chief Master pieces, and some certain gol­den Sacrifices, has found a means to lull asleep the English Sampson, that [Page 34] having cut off the locks of his hair, she may be able to make her self ma­ster of his Honour and his Puissance.

Neither is it here that the politick managements of the Counsels of France make a stop: For the mini­stry of France has not only acquir'd almost an universal control in all the Courts of Christendom, from which those of Vienna and Madrid have not been exempted; but it is also cer­tain, that by his pensions of several Millions, neither the deceas'd Grand Visier, nor the Cham of the Precopite Tartars, even to the last Peace with Poland, did act otherwise than ac­cording to the directions and desires of the Most Christian King; of which the last wars and the Peace with Poland have furnish'd us with a lamentable but authentic Proof, and is to us a farther Argument that he who succeeds in that charge, con­curs in the same Politicks with his Predecessour; and that his Most Christian Majesty is not unmindful of his Addresses to him. And it is [Page 35] observable, that no sooner has the Muscovite threatned the Swede with a War upon Livonia side, but the Great Turk has menaced the Musco­vite with an Invasion of his Territo­ries with all his Forces.

If then his Most Christian Majesty by the sole and only Forces of his own Kingdom, at a time when he is constrain'd to keep in pay above a hundred thousand men, without any Hyperbole, as well in Garrison as in the Field, in the parts adjoyning to the Spanish Provinces, and his neighbouring Conquests, yet for all this makes such irresistable Progres­ses as well by his Armes as with his money, I leave it to all rational per­sons to judge, what he will be able to do, after he has finished the Con­quest of the Spanish Netherlands, for that he will be then not only dis­charg'd of the most considerable part of his care and Expence, but that he will be also master of a Countrey, that by means of its ordinary Subsi­dies will be able to furnish with [Page 36] money to pay an Army of fifty thousand men, with all the charges thereto belonging. And that in the same Countreys he shall be supplyed with men, Souldiers and Officers as good as any in Europe. That the Em­pire, Spain, Holland, Switzerland, Ita­ly, and England more especially have reason to tremble at the thoughts that such a thing should come to pass, if they do not rather arm their whole puissance, and undauntedly both in general and particular make it their business to prevent the same. For certainly it is their common In­terest, since that if such a Conquest should be effected by the French, the infallible loss of all their Liberties would follow next.

And for the more home urging of this matter, that we may give you to understand the fatal Posture of the affairs of Europe at this time, & how advantagious they are to facilitate the designed Conquests of his Most Christian Majesty if once he obtain the entire possession of the Spanish [Page 37] Netherlands, we are seriously to con­sider, that as for Germany, after such a success of the French Force, his Most Christian Majesty will be in a condition, not only to support his Alliances, as he does in Svedeland and Poland, so in other parts of the Empire, but also to enable those Al­liances to advance their heads with­out any danger. For by that cor­respondence which this Monarch keeps with the Ottoman Court, be­ing able to prevent for some years the Turk or the Precopite Tartar from making any irruption into Poland, I leave the world to judge how impossible a thing it will be for his Highness the Elector of Branden­burgh to defend Pomerania and Prus­sia, while his Most Christian Majesty occasions the attacque of his Provin­ces, should his Most Christian Maje­sty, as we have already said, attacque his Territories of Cleves and Mark, with an Army of forty or fifty thousand men, without any hin­drance at all to the same Monarch to [Page 38] maintain and carryon his Conquests in Lorain, Burgundy, and Luxem­burgh, either with as numerous or a bigger Army in those parts.

Which happening to be true, it will be an infallible Consequence, upon the Conquest of the Spanish- Netherlands, that the Emperor and the Empire will in all probability be constrain'd to bid adieu for ever to whatever depends upon the Patri­mony of the Emperor from the Rhine to the Frontiers of France, in the same manner as the same Empire has been already fore'd to do to the three Bishopricks of Toul, Metz and Verdun. For the Dutchies of Cleves and Iuliers being subdu'd all of a sud­den, we may easily foresee that two things will infallibly come to pass. First, that the Imperial Army, or at least so much as relates to the Ele­ctor of Bavaria and his friends in the Empire, will be fore'd to keep on the other side of the Rhine, perhaps in a posture of single defence, while the Princes of Westphalia, either compel­led [Page 39] by the necessity of the time, or in pursuance of their own obligations, shall joyn with France, as being there­to already well inclin'd and dispos'd.

The second is, that Holland being humbled and brought down by the calamities and losses sustain'd in the present war, or the Conquest alrea­dy made, shall be forc'd to agree to some dishonourable peace; and that with so much the more reason, in regard that by the loss of the Spanish Netherlands, and the Dutchy of Cleves, it will be out of all hope of being succour'd from any part, un­less it be from England, from whence we know that that Republick can promise to themselves but little fa­vour, so long as the French shall have the chiefest Influence in that Court.

Now the Empire being re­duc'd to this Extremity, it is most certain that nothing can follow but the total Ruine of the same Empire, if by any peace at the discretion of the Ministry of France, the Hollan­ders [Page 40] are forc'd to satisfie the designs of the Ambitious Monarch of that Nation.

The Empire and Holland being thus humbl'd and brought down, we must conclude that France will be at liberty to choose for the subject of its Triumphs Spain, Italy or England, at its own pleasure.

As for Spain, two things being viewed and consider'd; the first, its natural depopulations; the second the want of fortifi'd places in the heart and Bowels of the Kingdom, it is most certain that there is no­thing but its scarcity of Provisions and victuals in the very centre of it, that can save it from an Universal Invasion from France. But let the scarcity of Victuals be what it will, that can be no obstruction, but that his Most Christian Majesty, not­withstanding those natural defects, entring by the passages of Fontaraby, with an Armyonly of thirty or forty thousand men, and by the passages of Catalogne with the same number, [Page 41] by the means of these two Armies, would in two Campagnes be able to make himself master of Navarr, Ar­ragon, Catalogne, and the Kingdom of Valencia, and after that having well fortisf'd his Frontiers, may be in a condition to constrain the King of Spain to become his Tributary for the Kingdom of Castile, and after that to grant him what part he shall desire of his Territories in Italy, and the West Indies, which is an affair not altogether unworthy the serious reflection of England.

As to Italy there are four things to be consider'd. First the importance of those Posts which his Most Chri­stian Majesty has already got posses­sion of, in three different parts of the Country, by means whereof he has a free entry into Italy, which way soever he pleases.

The second is the natural division of Italy into several little states, which are for the most part very inconside­rable, & will be ready to joyn with [Page 42] the French Monarch, if they are not already his creatures.

Thirdly that Italy, formerly the most generous Nation in the world, by the fatal vicissititude of things is now become the most soft and effe­minate. The fourth is, that his Most Christian Majesty is master of the Italian Sea. Whosoever then considers all these things, will be easily convinc'd, that if Lewis the 14th. assail Italy with all his forces, that nation will not be in a condition to make any more resistance against him, than it did against Charles the Eighth, and that if Lewis gets a footing once within it, it will not be so easie to drive him out, as it was Charles the Eighth. For both the Genius's, Politicks and forces you have to deal withall are far different, as also the Conjunctures of form­er opportunities from those at present. Moreover we are to consi­der that upon an irruption of his Most Christian Majesties forces in­to [Page 43] the most delightful part of Christendom, Italy can have no­thing to rely upon but the strength of her own native forces; for any succour she can expect, I see none in a case to afford it her but the Turk, Germany and Spain being sup­posed to be brought so low as not to be in a condition for any such effort. Nor do I think that the Swisses dare undertake any such enter­prize, or if they should, that their strength would prove any thing considerable. From all which rea­sons I determinately conclude, that if France attaque Italy, which 'tis very probable he will do after he has attaqu'd and subdu'd the Empire and Spain, Italy will be entirely lost, and the Court of Rome it self will be glad to draw her self out of the broiles, by conferring the same honours, & granting the same privi­ledges to Lewis the 14th. as she did formerly to Charlemaigne, and several of his successours, that being one of the principal Articles which she [Page 44] must make use of to satisfie the vast ambition and soaring designs of this Monarch

These great things being thus brought to pass, there will nothing remain to his Most Christian Majesty, but to subdue all his neighbours, and to bring the Switzers and the English under his Yoak.

For the first I have said it and will say it again, I cannot tell how the Cantons and Confederate Swis­ses can be in a condition to defend themselves, against all the efforts and assaults of his Most Christian Majesty, they who have not one forti­fi'd place in all their Territories, and who are also often divided in respect of their Religion; and when they shall be assail'd on all sides, from Ita­ly, France, Burgundy and Germany. Against which attempts should they prove successful, they would be more worthy of honour, than their Ancestors ever were, for all [Page 45] their victories formerly obtain'd, against the ancient Dukes of Austria and Burgundy.

As for Engl. I know that Nation is warlike even to the height of valour, I know that Nation abounds with persons of great gravity, judgment and capacity to penetrate into the deepest mysteries of State Politicks. I know moreover that the natural Situation of Engl. being a kind of for­tification and bulwark, that it seems invincible against all the attempts and designs of her enemies, and that joyning all these circumstances to what she is able further to do, consi­dering the natural antipathy which every true English man naturally preserves in his breast against the French Nation, we may from thence conclude, that his most Christian Majesty will find it a very difficult task to bring that famous Island un­der his subjection; and that though he should make a conquest of it, yet it will be a labour as difficult to keep [Page 46] it. But on the other side it would be to make a wrong judgment of the Politicks of the French Ministry, to imagine, that if they undertake either the destruction or the Con­quest of England, they would make use of their won forces, without some plausible pretence, to deprive so great a King, their Allie, of his Dominions. France is too cunning and diligent in her Politick Manage­ments, not to make use of more refin'd methods of craft and In­trigue. And it is a certain and real argument, that the French Po­liticks are already at work for the ruin and destruction of England, if by a Heroick and universal arming of the whole Nation, the English do not put themselves into a posture both by Sea and Land to stop the progress of his Most Christian Ma­jesty, and the unwary proceedings of those among them, who joyn and close with the French Monarch to the utter ruin of their Native Country. [Page 47] I say there is a necessity, to take notice of this piece of Truth, and to dive into the Bottom of two things, the natural designs of the Court of England; and secondly, the con­dition wherein his Most Christian Majesty will be, after a compleated Conquest of the Spanish Nether­lands, by means of such formal Succours as he shall send into Eng­land, to bring about the designs of the prevailing party to triumph at length over the unwary cunning of the one, and the weakness of the rest.

As for the real designs of the in­terested Courtriers at this conjun­cture, we may conclude them to be such undoubtedly, and the same with those that engag'd the English, at the beginning of the present Wars, to confederate with his Most Christian Majesty, against the Republick of the United Provinces, and by consequence against all the Allies of that Republick.

[Page 48] And a most notorious proof of this as­sertion is this, that without doubt En­gland it self did not so well ponder and weight those truths which I am now going to advance, on purpose to let Christen­dom apparently understand the inevita­ble danger into which all Christendom must of necessity fall, by being forc'd to submit to the yoke of France, through the Conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. Now England being sensible of this Truth, and seeing withal that by the con­tinuance of these Successes, his most Chri­stian Majesty will be in a condition to keep up an Army of above 150000 fight­ing men, for which he will have no em­ployment, if he do not send them against England; and yet lying still, and not using any endeavours to hinder the Progress of these Successes; we must of necessity conclude, that England acts according to the same principles which engag'd her to confederate at the beginning of the war with France; and that her mediation a­broad does only tend to do the French some more important kindness, to bring to pass the designs of that Court, than she could do by the assistance of her Arms and a publick Declaration of War, which might be a means to discover, and put a stop to the conduct of self-interest.

[Page 49] And it is an irrefragable proof, that the Self-interested, and the French Party in England are firm in the said Design, for that when the Muscovite threatned the Swede with an Invasion of Livonia, at the same time that, by the Manage­ment of France, the Great Turk also threatned the Muscovite with an Irruption into his Dominions, in case he invaded the Swede; the French Party in England, at the same time threatned the Grand Czar that if he medled with the Swede, they would send a considerable Fleet of men of War into the Bal­tick Sea: which proves not only what I have already declar'd, as to England, but also that France, the Turk, and the French Party in Eng­land, observing the same measures, without being any longer able to conceal them, have form'd such a League, which, together with the Branches of it, that extend them­selves into many Parts of Europe, [Page 50] make it evident, what apprehensi­ons Christendom ought to have of the Enterprizes of his most Christi­an Majesty, to which his Confede­rates are made instrumental, either through Unwariness or Self-inte­rest.

Now it being thus evident that England acts as a Co-partner with France, some may be nice to exa­mine the general and particular aim of such Proceedings.

I shall say nothing of the publick treaty between England and France, at the beginning of this War, only that therein we may find two things.

First, That if the French and Popish Party in England do resolve to persist in the observation of the said Treaty, that then, upon the loss of the Spanish Netherlands, to the ancient Owners, England will be put to a hard choice, either to forgoe her ancient Rights and Pri­viledges to the Will of that same [Page 51] Self-interested Popish Party, or else, with all their Might, to withstand the united Force of the French King, and the French and Popish Party, in England, that shall attempt to constrain them to such a Compli­ance.

The second is this, That in re­gard it is impossible that the Eng­lish should willingly submit to such a Subjection, so it will be impossi­ble for them to hinder the French from landing, so long as the afore­said Power prevails; who, before they quit their hold, nay, before they land, will be sure to have some strong Fort or Post assign'd them for their Security, as is usual in such cases.

Which, if it fall out in this man­ner, who is so blind as not to see, that England being reduc'd to these Terms, it follows, that France, by the Triumphs of politick manage­ment, and by the [...]imitable Sub­tilty of it's Ministers, will not on­ly [Page 52] be in certain Condition, by fo­menting the Troubles, to bring about the total Ruine of England, in regard that the Fortune of the prevailing Party, and consequent­ly of the Kingdom, will be at his disposal; but also by the means of such a favourable Conjuncture, af­ter he has look'd on, while the English cut one another's Throats, to come in and master both Par­ties in the same manner as Hen­gest and Horsus, Generals of the Anglo-Saxons, being call'd in by Vortiger to assist him against the Romans, Picts, and Scots, over­came, not only all the Enemies of Vortiger, but he himself and all his Forces. Or, as more lately, the Turk o'recome the King of Fez in Africa, who had call'd him in to his Assistance against Don Sebastin King of Portugal.

It may be thought perhaps, that I have spok'n too freely; but so it was, that the Son of Croesus, King [Page 53] of Lydia, being born dumb, seeing a Souldier with his Weapon advan­ced, ready to kill his Father, spoke then, that never spoke before: Who then cannot but speak, that sees his Native Country ready to be set together by the Ears, by a prevailing French and Popish Par­ty? For to declare who I am, I am an English man, born and bred up in the Roman Catholick Faith; but by the Grace and Favour of God, reclaim'd from those Erroneous O­pinions and Doctrines, both as to Faith and Politicks, with which my Studies at Leige had infatuated me.

Now, as to the opportunity of be­ing an English Man, and a Roman Catholick, gave me that Advantage to be admitted into several private Conferences held at Paris and Lon­don among those of my own Nation and Religion; and for that I had thereby the means to penetrate to the Bottom, and to discover the Malignity of the present Designs: [Page 54] It is the particular Knowledge of the present Misfortunes, which, to­gether with my Conscience and my Honour, have caused me to put Pen to Paper, as one that would be accounted faithful to my Country, and a true Christian, to advertise my dear Country, that these Mis­fortunes which I have presupposed, are so much the more likely to come to pass, considering that the French Ministry, having prudently foreseen, that it is impossible for his most Christian Majesty to pre­tend to the Conquest of the Spanish Low Countreys, unless he be secure of England, have made it the chief­est Master-piece of their Crast and Cunning to separate the Interest of the English Ministry from that of the Kingdom, and make them two di­stinct things: For the one having made the other believe, that if they would but sacrifice the Spanish Ne­therlands to his most Christian Ma­jesty, that then he would gratifie [Page 55] the other with the Conquest of the Spanish Indies, the Wealth of which places, would put the French-Eng­lish Party into such a Condition, as never to want, or fear a Parliament. This is the Knot which ties France and England together; but because the French Party in the Court of England as wisely foresaw, that it was impossible to form a party in England against the Priviledges and Interest of the Kingdom: For that very reason it was, that they pre­tended to set on Foot the pretence of Religion; and because it was well known, that there was a great Number of Roman Catholicks in England, and those too, generally very zealous for their Religion, though as generally very ignorant; therefore it was, that his Highness the D. of York embrac'd the Roman Catholick Religion, and afterwards, to declare himself openly for the same Party; which he never did do, till he had a full prospect, after [Page 56] the Successes of the last Compaign, of the weakness of the Confedera­cy in opposition to France, and that the Forces of the latter were suffici­ent to beat all the rest put together, unless England struck in to their As­sistance.

Upon this ground it was, that af­ter the Arrival of the Dutchess of Orleans at Dover, so many Cour­riers were seen to post between Paris and London; neither the Peace between England and Hol­land, nor any thing else that hap­pen'd since or before this War, be­ing able to stop the Career of these Proceedings.

Upon this Confidence it was, that many French Priests came in­to England in such Numbers, that besides that every Corner of Lon­don was full of them; it is most cer­tain, that there is not a City or con­siderable Town in England, Scotland, or Ireland, where these Indiscreet Zealots have not got Footing.

[Page 57] From hence it was, that the Court of Rome, which was not ig­norant of these Proceedings, so much rejoyc'd at the beginning of this War which France and England, made at the same time against the Commonwealth of the united Pro­vinces; though that Court has had cause sufficient to understand the Nature of the French Zeal, by what has happen'd through the Power of the French Armies, to one of the Ec­clesiastical Electors of the Empire, as in the most part of the Churches of his Capital City.

Upon this ground it was, that the last Parliament was prorogu'd for eighteen Months, which ended not till the overture of this present Ses­sions, and all to gain time to gain the Members to their Party, where­in we had like to have felt the fatal Consequences of their Success.

Now I say, That this Misfortune is so much the more likely, by how much it appears to be certain, that the [Page 58] King of France is in a Condition, before a year come about, to make a Conquest of the greatest part of the Places and Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, and thereby be enabl'd to subdue all the rest of his Enemies; and then by means of Sorceries in England, to maintain continual Divisions in that King­dom, and by vertue of those Divi­sions, to waft over a considerable part of his Forces for the support of his Party, and so at length, to make himself Master of them, and the whole Nation. In which Attempt, it will be the more easie for France to succeed, in regard, that England may be certainly assur'd, that there are, within the very Center of her Dominions, no less than fifty thou­sand Papists, whose Consciences are govern'd by French Monks and Priests, and consequently, ready to take Arms upon first Opportunity, in pursuance of their Designs, and to joyn with twelve thousand Pa­pists [Page 59] more, that now serve in the Armies of France, which would certainly stick close to the French upon their landing in England. Now I say this, That this 'tis which England may conclude to be certain, with so much the more Credit and Reason to be believ'd, because the Memoirs, Rolls, and Instructions, have not been con­ceal'd from me; and all these things maintain'd and carry'd on by the Management of the Mini­stry and Counsels of France: where­by my dear Country may see what is preparing against her, both with­in and without, for her total De­struction, for which, there is no other Remedy, but by a general Resolution, to lay aside all dis­putes of Religion, which the indis­creet Zealots of all Sects unwarily set afoot, and to bestir themselves for the effecting of five things. The first, to joyn in a league of Confede­racy with the House of Austria, and [Page 60] the Hollanders, and not to sepa­rate until there shall be a Peace made to the full Satisfaction of all in general, and every one in parti­cular. Secondly, in case the Par­liament that is now in Being, do not act more cordially than they have done, for the Honour and Interest of the Nation by their humble Representations and Ad­dresses, to beseech his Majesty to call another.

Thirdly, to implore the Expul­sion of all the French Emissaries, of what quality soever, out of all the three Kingdoms, without Excepti­on.

Fourthly, to recall, by an au­thentick Decree, under pain of Fe­lony, all the English and Scotch who are now in the French Ser­vice; for as for the natural Irish, it will not be amiss, to let them stay behind, and wast themselves in the Wars: for though they be Roman Catholicks, yet are they as fanatical [Page 61] in the Faith of that Church, as the weak Sectaries of the Protestant Re­ligion, are in reference to their Te­nents, and consequently, dangerous Thorns in a Kingdom.

Fifthly, To set forth a Navy as powerful as the Nation is able to provide, of which, the principal Officers must be such as are no way leven'd with the self-interest of the French Popish Faction; and to fur­nish this Navy with such a number of men, as may be able to make an Invasion into such a part of France, as shall be thought most conveni­ent, worthy the ancient Honour of the Nation; to which purpose, the Heads of the Parties in France may be consulted, and never to part with such places as shall be taken by the English Arms, till his most Christian Majesty shall be con­strain'd to submit to Equity and Justice, and to make such a firm and solid Peace as may establish the Repose of Christendom, and re­store [Page 62] a Calm to Europe, and which may secure the English Nation from all her present Fears and Alarums. 'Tis by a Conduct of this Nature, that the Kingdom of England may be able, generally to prevent the Tempest with which the insatiable Ambition of his most Christian Ma­jesty is preparing to overwhelm it, and which seems to be absolutely in­evitable, unless vigorously reme­dy'd by such means as these.

By a Conduct of this nature, the whole Body of the Roman Ca­tholicks in England, returning to their Allegiance, and coming to open their Eyes, might at length be brought to see, that it is impossible for a Prince, who has been the oc­casion of the slaughter of so many millions of Christians within these few years, for the only Satisfaction of his Ambition; who, led by the same ambitious principles, has made slight of all the Solemn Oaths which lie took in the Island of Faisans, [Page 63] before him whom he adores for God, before his Altars, that it is impossible, I say, for them to think that such a Prince would trouble his Conscience what Religion were professed in England: only that it would serve him for a plausible pretence, after he had overturn'd all the rest of Europe, to make an Inundation upon the Cities and Habitations of my dear Country­men, to burn and massacre, to ra­vish our Wives and Daughters, and sack and ruine the whole nation, as he has already done, and still does, in Lorrain, Burgundy, Alsatia, and the Spanish Netherlands, though Peopled by Roman Catholicks. And indeed these Preventions seem therefore the more necessary, by how much the more true it is what I say. For, that my Brethren may understand me, the Dispute is not here about Religion: that's but the mantle which covers the De­sign of the Popishly affected Party [Page 64] and their Leaders, to keep off the sitting of Parliaments. For if his most Christian Majesty keep his word with that Party, the Spanish Indies, with all their Wealth and Riches, will belong to them, by means whereof, there will be no necessity for the calling a Parlia­ment; but it shall be in the power of that Party, to keep up an Army of Foreigners in England so long as they please, and thereby to make themselves the absolute Masters of the Laws and Liberties of the Sub­ject. On the other side, if his most Christian Majesty break his Word with the Popish-English Faction, and conquer the Spanish Indies for himself, which is most probable, (it being no part of Richilen's Poli­ticks) which Lewis the 14th treds in step by step, to take much heed to the observation of Treaties, (as Spain too cruelly experiments at this time) I leave the World to judge what will become of Eng­land, [Page 65] which lies not above seven Leagues from the Coast of France, when the Monarch of that Nation having joyn'd to the rest of his Con­quests the Spanish Indies, who will then, by means of his vast Wealth and Riches which he draws out of this Island, to famish this Kingdom, and consequently, when he pleases, to make himself Master of it, there being rhen no Power in Europe able to prevent it.

By this Reflexion it may be seen, that if Spain falls, all Europe falls, not excepting England; and it is yet in the only power of England to prevent this; there is a necessity to have recourse to this Remedy, as we should run to quench a Fire that had seiz'd upon White-hall; that is to say, there is not a mo­ment to be lost, if England intends not to perish in the General Deso­lation. Religion, Charity, and the General Interest of the Kingdom, demand this Diligence, that my [Page 66] dear Countrey would unanimously agree to give that powerful Assi­stance to that ancient Allie, and by saving her self heroical, to acquire the Honour of having preserv'd the whole Body of Christendom from that universal Shipwrack, with which the French Fury threat­ens it.

I know that by means of that cold Poison which the Emissaries of France insinuate, and sow about in all parts, and which is more es­pecially naturaliz'd and intruded into England, as being most pro­per to calm the tempestuous Jea­lousies of that Nation; there are some that aver with some Proba­bility, that should England be qui­et and not assist the Confederates with her Arms, yet that there may be plausible Expedients found out to make an honourable Peace be­tween all the Puis [...]ances now at Wars. But my dear Country must know, that this was only a Pro­posal [Page 67] hatch'd in the Cabinet of the French Ministry, to amuse and blind England, and with her all Europe: and that I may in three words make out this Truth, be­sides what I have said already, I beseech the Reader to observe, that suppose this very day, by the Mediation of England, there should be a Peace sign'd, which I believe very uulikely to be done, for seve­ral Reasons too long to be here inserted: We must needs say, that in the natural Condition of Af­fairs at present, this Peace cannot be concluded, but to the great Advantage of France, as also, for the Interest of her Allies; which being true, two things will infalli­bly happen upon a Conclusion made in that manner: the first, that the Empire, Spain, and Hol­land, will retire to their several Homes, weary and harass'd by the Inconveniences of the War; the second, that his most Christian [Page 68] Majesty, beside the real Honour and Advantages which he shall get by this War, shall be fur­nish'd with an Army of a hun­dred thousand men, as brisk Soul­diers as any in Europe; which for several Reasons of State and War that speak of themselves, he will never disband. Now if the pre­vailing disaffected Party in Eng­land persist in their Designs of bringing all things under an Ar­bitrary Power, I ask any true Englishman, whether it be the In­terest of England by a Peace of the Nature above recited, that France should be in a Condition, by the loan of an Army of fifty thousand men, which he can easi­ly spare to his Party in England, by an Invasion of that Force, to pro­cure the Ruine of our Country in one year.

Moreover, it behoves us to ob­serve, that in case such a Peace should be made, it would be of no [Page 69] other Service to France, than to enable him, in less than three years, by the Recruits of his Treasuries [...]nd Finances, securing his Intreagues [...] England, in the North, and among [...]he Princes of the Empire, while [...]he Rhine being without any guard, [...]nd it may be the Great Turk en­ [...]red Hungary, to powre himself with a Hundred Thousand Men in­ [...]o the Spanish Netherlands, and the Empire, which is no more than to [...]ecoyl, that he may return with a [...]reater Force, and to take time to [...]onsult his Measures, how to war with less Danger, and more Success; which is no more for the Distressed, than to run out of the Frying-pan into the Fire. the Lion is out of his Den, the Hunters are at his Heels; and there is no more to be done, than to spread the English Toils to the Sea Coast-ward, and there to post the Hunts-men. We owe this Charitable Assistance to our Most Ancient Fellow-Citizens, and the [Page 70] natural Subjects of England. A fai [...] Opportunity offers it self gloriously to reunite to the Crown of our Mo­narch, those Flowers that ought to be inseparable from it. Those un­fortunate People, oppressed by the Power of the French Tyranny [...] stretch forth their Arms to us; le [...] us not abandon them any longer to the Fury of that despotick Power, as being the only means to restore both our own, and the Peace of the Empire, so necessary to put it into a Condition, to be able to resist the Violence of the Common Enemy of the Christian Faith. I say, this is the only means, to the end, that my dear Country, abus'd and into­xicated with French Poyson, may not be so blinded, as to run blind­ly into the Snares of those Proposi­tions for Peace, which without the Remedy already propos'd, can prove no other than an infallible Expedi­ent to enslave all Europe.

[Page 71] I beg the Reader's Pardon if, transported with that Zeal, with which my Heart is enflam'd for the Interest of my Dear Country, I have enlarged my self upon this point of the Condition and Interest of England: I could not either in Honour or Conscience, refrain from making a Discovery of a mysteri­ous Combination, that goes about to tarnish the Honour of England, should this Misfortune proceed any farther. I declare that my Animosi­ty extends it self no farther, than against those Evil Counsellors, who being corrupted with the Gold of France, have betrayed that Fideli­ty which they owed both to their Country and their Prince. Moreo­ver, I am an English man, that is to say, born with my Native Liberty, to declare my Opinion upon so nice a point, as the Preservation of Law and Liberty, ought to be of every true born English Man: For that in Truth, we have as much Right to [Page 72] maintain that Birth-Right of ours, as our Kings have to maintain the Rights and Priviledges of their Thrones and Scepters.

But, while I am enlarging upon this Point, some Person, either out of Ignorance or Corruption, may perhaps take upon him to gloss up­on this formidable Power, which I have attributed to France, to the end that my dear Country, and all other Princes and People, whose Interest it is to abate the Power of France, may be the better instru­cted to make a solid and right Judg­ment of it, both in general and par­ticular, of the formidable Force of France, I desire the Reader to make a true and sincere Parallel be­tween the Reigns of Charles the Fifth, and Francis the First, and the Reigns of Lewis the Fourteenth, and Charles the Second of Spain; for by that only Examen, you will find that I have spoken but very sparingly and modestly of the vast [Page 73] Power of France, which I shall en­deavour to make appear by a suc­cinct Examination of this Parallel.

Charles the Fifth, under the Ti­tles of Emperour, King of Spain, King of Naples, Sicily, and Sardigna, Duke of Milan, and chief of the Houses of Burgundy and Austria, u­nited in his own Person, the im­mensity of a vast Puissance, which, after some Victory obtain'd against his Enemies, gave him the advan­tage, to dispose of an absolute Pow­er, all the Forces of Germany, the Seventeen Provinces of the Low-Countreyes, Italy and Spain, who by his Orders alone march'd undaunt­edly under his Banners, to execute the Commands of this Monarch, as, at present, those of France obey the Orders of Lewis the Fourteenth.

Charles the Fifth was undoubt­ly the greatest Captain, and the greatest Souldier that Christendom had produced for several Ages.

[Page 74] Charles the Fifth had under him the most Famous Persons, both for Military and Civil Affairs, which either the Empire, or the Monarchy of Spain ever had.

Germany, Italy, the Provinces of the Low Countries, and Spain, were full of great Armies, vigorous and well-disciplin'd, and the Ocean and Mediterranean Seas saw nothing more noble nor magnificent than the Fleets of that Monarch.

Moreover, this Prince was one that weigh'd, digested, and resolv'd the most difficult and important Af­fairs, that were handled either in his Military or Civil Councils, and like a second Caesar, confronting in Person all sorts of Perils and Dan­gers, encourag'd by his presence in all sorts of places, the Valour of his Captains and Souldiers, in all his most important Expeditions.

Notwithstanding, this great Em­perour, with all the Territories, For­ces, and Advantages that he had, [Page 76] finding himself necessitated to de­clare a War against Francis the First of France, who, in all, had not a­bove thirty millions of Annual In­come; and although he had with­drawn from the Service of France the Duke of Bourbon, who carried the same sway in that Countrey, which the Prince of Conde may be said to do now, had nevertheless, such an Opinion of the Force of France, that he would not engage himself in that War, till he had first made a League with Henry the 8th, the Pope, and other the most con­siderable Princes of Europe.

And yet, notwithstanding all his Precaution and Wariness, Experi­ence tells us, that Francis the First was in a Condition, not only to de­fend himself against all the Violence of that League, but that also, had it not been for that same accident, and which was but an accident, of his being taken Pris'ner at the Battel of Pavia, Francis the First [Page 76] had found the Emperour work e­nough, and given him his hands full, seeing, that after he was set at li­berty, he was so powerful as to constrain the Emperour to grant him several mitigations in reference to the Treaty of Peace which he had sign'd during his Imprisonment, and that he left his Kingdom in that condition which it has invincibly maintain'd and preserv'd, notwith­standing all its Civil Wars, against the Puissance both of the Spanish Monarchy and the Empire.

Now to make a just and exact pa­rallel between those, and the Con­junctures of these Times, we must observe, that Francis the First, as we have already declar'd, had not above thirty Millions of Annual In­come, and that Lewis the 14th, who now Reigns, at this hour that I write, has infallibly above an hun­dred and fifty Millions within the onely circuit of his Kingdom.

[Page 77] That Francis the First durst not undertake any thing of high Con­cern, but by the Consent of his Estates General and his Parlaments, and that Lewis the Fourteenth reigns despotically, with an absolute Power over all his Subjects.

That Francis the First had a Charles the Fifth to grapple with, comprehends all the rest, and that Lewis the Fourteenth has onely a Charles the Second, and a Ferdi­nand to deal with: the one but six­teen years of Age, the other, a Prince, without doubt, endued with all the Heroick Virtues hereditary to those of his most Illustrious House, but of a Disposition placid and pacifick, and who has no o­ther end in opposing the Enterpri­zes of Lewis the Fourteenth, by Force of Arms, but out of an abso­lute necessity to prevent the total Ruine of the Empire and his whole Family.

[Page 78] Charles the Fifth, as he was on­ly King of Spain, and the Territo­ries annex'd thereto, kept always on Foot, upon the Frontiers of Spain, in Italy, and the Low-Coun­tries, great Armies of six and twen­ty thousand men a piece: Whereas Charles the Second, having suffer'd great Losses of his Dominions in every Quarter, has not now at this time above thirty thousand effe­ctive in all, altho Lewis the Four­teenth attacques him in all his Do­minions with Forces more conside­rable than ever Charles the Fifth made use of against France.

Charles the Fifth had always ready in his Ports, and upon the Coasts of the Low-Countries, a Na­vy of fifty men of War, which, having a Correspondence with his Spanish Fleet on the main Ocean, gave Laws to France so absolutely on that side, that we do not find in any History, that ever France durst make Head by Sea against [Page 79] that great and famous Emperour And at this time I do not know that Spain is able to set to Sea six men of War on that side; where France is now so strong, that some Months since, out of the abundance of their number, they had both the Courage and the Force to send a Fleet to the West-Indies, which made there considerable Conquests.

Charles the Fifth, by reason of his Naval Strength in the Mediter­ranean Sea, and through the con­venience of his Ports upon the Coast of Spain, Italy, and Africa, kept, as it were block'd up, in the Ports of Thoulon and Marseilles, all the Na­val Force of France: Whereas, the Naval Force of France being so vastly augmented in those Parts, has so strangely spread it self, that, being absolutely Masters of those Seas, within these two years, the Spaniards dare no longer appear, but with the Convoyes of some one of their Allies. Charles the Second [Page 80] has been no way able to prevent his total Ruine, but by Leagues and Confederacies: Lewis the four­teenth sustains himself merely by the force of his Arms. Charles the Second wants both Men and Mo­ney, and Lewis the Fourteenth abounds in both.

Charles the Fifth was sole Master of the seventeen Provinces, and Lewis the fourteenth has invaded the chief places of the ten that be­long'd to the Spaniards after the Se­paration of the ten that form'd the Common-wealth of Holland, all which he has taken from Charles the second, together with the County of Burgundy entirely.

In a word, I cannot speak it too often, the Spanish Monarchy is tum­bling, & with that, all the rest of Eu­rope, if Europe, but more chiefly Eng­land, do not counterpoise the formi­dable Force of France, to prevent her being invaded, and forc'd to submit to the same Yoak, which he [Page 81] has impos'd upon his own Sub­jects.

This is that which I have to say upon this Parallel, from which, by the natural Deductions and Conse­quences that may be drawn, it plainly appears, that I may come to my Conclusion, that by the Loss of Valencienns, Cambray, and St. Omers, in three weeks time, his most Chri­stian Majesty is in a fair way, if there be no stop put to his Succes­ses, to triumph over the rest of Eu­rope.

From this Argument it is that I conclude, that all the Princes and People of Europe who love their own Preservation, their Honour and their Liberty, ought to take the Loss of those three places for a signal and universal Alarum given to all Europe, to run to their Arms, and marshal themselves with all di­ligence under the Banners of Justice and Equity; to the end, that the Princes who command this gene­rous [Page 82] party, may be enabl'd, for the universal good of Christendom, to vanquish those cruel Legions that so victoriously march under the En­signs of Injustice and Cruelty, and puft up with their Conquests, so in­solently advance to the general De­struction of all Europe.

It is this Alarum that gives warn­ing to Italy to put her self into a posture by vertue of a unanimous League between all her Potentates and Republicks, as also by the Ef­forts of her Arms, as well by Sea as Land, to drive back all the Forces of France, not only from the Coasts and Island of Sicily, but to expel them, if possible, out of all Italy; and this at a time while the Roman Eagles hold the chief Director of the French Arms in play. Where­as, if Italy neglect so fair an oppor­tunity to prevent the Yoak that threatens them, if the Empire once fall, she can never be able to repair so great a Loss, and then she can [Page 83] expect nothing but the Misfortunes which are inseparable from Con­quests, and of which the Desolati­ons of Alsatia are a dreadful Pro­spect to lay in tablature before their Eyes.

'Tis this Alarum that ought to excite the Swisses with all their Allies and Confederates, to lay hold upon this present and only Conjuncture, and by an authen­tick and general Decree of all the whole Nation, to recall all their Forces, out of the Service of the French, and with the same Forces, and others of their Confederates and Allies joyn'd with them, tho it were at their own Expence, which Spain would doubtless n­ver allow, to go and wrest from the French the Garrisons of Bur­gundy, and clear that County of such bad Neighbours, as being the only Bulwark of their Liberty in the hands of their Majors, if they do not intend to lose the only [Page 84] Opportunity of delivering them­selves from that Slavery to which the Pride and Prosperity of France designs them.

'Tis this Alarum that puts Eng­land in mind of the near Fall of her Honour, and the approaching Loss of her Liberty, if by a noble At­tempt worthy of the Valour of the Nation she do not include her self in the present League of Confede­racy; and by Acts worthy the Eng­lish Generosity, she do not endea­vour to assume to her self the Glory of having sav'd all Europe in saving her self.

This Alarum tells the Conquer­ing Princes of one part of the Ter­ritories of Swedeland, in the Verge of the Empire, that those Territo­ries are sufficiently considerable to reward their Heroick Endeavours, for the Preservation of themselves, though Spain should be utterly un­able to gratifie them one Farthing, though he can never without doubt [Page 85] be brought so low, if the Spanish Netherlands be but preserved.

This Alarum it is that resounds to all the Princes of the Empire, both in general and in particular, as well those who have hitherto won so much Honour out of Zeal to their Duty, as those who have suffer'd themselves hitherto to be abus'd, either by the Artifices of France, or the Corruption of their own Servants, that he who directly attacques the Head, directly at­tacques the Members, and that he who preserves no Respect for the Head, has none for those Princes, that as Members depend upon the Head. The Fortune of the Dutch­ess of Lorrain and Bar, with the Fortress of Pignerol, may give them sensibly to understand, that neither the respect of Blood, Alli­ances or Treaties, are of that Re­straint; but that the Maxims of the French Politicks, will sacrifice them all to their Ambition.

[Page 86] The demolishing of the Fortress of Orange, being a sufficient Argu­ment, that there is nothing but the bare honourary Title of Duke and Peer, that is to be tolerated in France.

This same Alarum may also reach the ears of his Holiness, and let him know, that if the Emissaries of France do flatter him, that the De­signs of that Monarch, are only to extend the Bounds of the Roman Catholick Faith; they are only Cheats and Deceivers: For it is ap­parent, that the Ambition of France aspires at nothing more than to pull down Imperial Crowns and Prin­ces, purely Roman Catholick. The last peace of Poland, with the Pro­tections which France gives to the Protestants in Hungary, together with the Breaches of the same Mi­nistry with Spain, sufficiently testi­fie, do but make a Sport at Wor­ship of the Roman Catholick Faith: It being certain to them, that pene­trate [Page 87] into Affairs, that under the name of the Iansenists Party in France, there is with much Circum­spection preserv'd and cherish'd a sort of Venom more dangerous to the Pontifical Chair, than whate­ver Luther or Calvin instituted in Germany: For they were declared, and open Enemies; these keep themselves conceal'd, and close un­der the Title of Zealous Catholicks, notwithstanding that their Hearts, as they sufficiently demonstrate by their Actions, burn with the same Fury, and it may be with the same Religion of those ancient Northern People that so often took and sack'd the ancient Rome.

The same Alarum Poland seri­ously ought to take; for that if she unwarily undertake to favour the Designs of his most Christian Maje­sty, the Enemy of his Imperial Ma­jesty and the Empire, it behoves her to take heed, that she do not en­gage her self to favour the Destru­ction [Page 88] of the only Bulwark of her Safety, against all the formidable Attacks of the Turk; which it be­hoves Poland to take the more seri­ously into her Consideration, in regard that it is the Interest of the Empire to take care of the Preser­vation and Subsistance of Poland.

It is this Alarum that lastly ad­vertises all France, with a continu­ed and mournful sound, I speak of the Kingdom in her three Estates, that if fourscore and ten thou­sand Gentlemen which are in France do not under the Favour of this present Conjuncture draw their Swords, and joyn with the honest Commonalty, to shake off the Yoak which now oppresses their Necks, the name of Nobili­ty and free people, will be certain­ly extinguish'd over all that vast and populous Kingdom; in re­gard, that nothing but the fre­quent Meeting of the three Estates General of that Kingdom, which is [Page 89] able to re-establish the Priviledges of those Estates, totally lost: which re-Establishment being never to be brought to pass, but by a uni­versal taking up of Arms through­out the whole Kingdom, it may be certainly said, that such a Re­solution being taken at this Con­juncture, by joyning with those Princes, who are now engag'd in the same War against the Court of France, and that also vigorously maintain'd till such a Re-Establish­ment were made according to their desire, firm and lasting; there would be no Power upon the Earth which could ward off the Blow, but that his most Christian Majesty would be forc'd to vail Bonnet, and submit to reason and Equity, as well in respect of his Subjects, as in respect of his Neigh­bours, which is so much the more necessary; by how much it ought to be laid down for a fundamental Maxim, that if by re-establishment [Page 90] of the Liberties of France, which is not to be done but by the sit­ting of the general Estates of the Kingdom. The Monarch of that Nation cannot be constrain'd to content himself with the ancient Revenues of that Crown; it is ab­solutely impossible, that any one of his Neighbours can promise to themselves either Peace or Securi­ty, which being so considerable and certain as I lay it down, I leave it to Judgment, how much it con­cerns all the oppress'd Nobili­ty of France, not to lay down Arms, till that despotick and Arbi­trary Power by some means or o­ther, be absolutely banish'd the Kingdom.

But if the People of this great and vast Kingdom, will be so ge­nerous, as to attempt the shaking off a Yoak so heavy and oppressive; the same Alarum admonishes his Imperial Majesty, and his Catholick Majesty, together with their Al­lies, [Page 91] that these Worthy and Gene­rous Undertakers ought to be suc­cour'd and protected after another manner than those of Bourdeaux, the Britains and Lavedanois were in their late Insurrections; a fatal Experience, giving Light to this most Renowned House of Austria, and it's Allies, that if those Insur­rections had been foster'd and suc­cour'd, according to the powerful Sollicitations of their Deputies a­broad, his most Christian Majesty had not been in a condition to have made those notable Conquests which he has done these last Compaigns in the Spanish Netherlands, nor to furnish the Swede and others with such considerable Sums of Money, from whence those Consequences are to be drawn that speak loud enough of themselves to justifie the solidity of my Assertion in this par­ticular.

[Page 92] But if the Renowned House of Austria, with all their Allies and Confederates, who are now in Arms against France, have any Interest so Supreme and importunate as I suppose they have, not to lay down Arms, till this Despotick Power be banished out of France: How much does it concern England to suppress that formidable Power so threat­ning to them? I am satisfied, that only the Insinuations and Profuse­ness of the Court of France for these many years, have began a Self-in­terested and Popishly affected Par­ty in that Nation, which laid the Foundations of all the Catastro­phees that have appear'd upon the English Theatre, and which no doubt, the same Parties are endea­vouring with the same Vigour to renew, if not prevented by a gene­rous Confederacy of the English Nation against the Common Ene­my, there being no other way to stop the Current of his most Chri­stian [Page 93] Majesties Profusions abroad, by that means, according to the natural Description which he expo­ses to the World of his Absolute Power over his Subjects, to inflame the Minds of other Princes with the same Ambition. And there are two Points so essential to the In­terest of England, besides those that I have already related, that though the Renowued House of Austria, with their Allies, were utterly un­able either to foment or to protect an Enterprize of this Importance, England alone however ought to undertake such an Heroick Work, the Success whereof is so link'd to its Interest, that, if I had not re­solv'd here to conclude, I could make it out by many more unde­niable Reasons, that England can­not support it self but by the re­establishment of the French Liber­ty. Upon this Pole moves the whole Being of the Laws and Li­berties of England, as well as the [Page 94] Universal Calm and Tranquility of Europe, and the Repose of Christen­dom. And because, perhaps, I may be thought by some to have spoken too much in the display of so much Truth, I shall say no more, leaving to every one his full Liberty to think and act according as his parts, his Honour, and his Conscience shall suggest; and so I conclude.


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