ΤΑΓΑΘΟΝ, OR, Divine Goodness Explicated and Vindicated FROM THE EXCEPTIONS OF THE ATHEIEST: Wherein also the Consent of the Gravest Philosophers, with the Holy, and Inspired Penmen, in many of the most important points of Christian Doctrine is fully evinced.
By Richard Burthogge, Dr. in Phys.
London, Printed by S. and B. Griffin, for James Collins, and are to be sold at the Kings-Armes in Ludgate-street, 1672.
TO THE Most Honoured ANDREW TREVIL, Esq.
OF all the Attributes are owned by the Deity, This whereon I have engag'd my Pen, is the most remarkable and Glorious. Which I undertook the rather, and with the more assurance, because I knew that if I did come short in my Discourses on it (as who ever enterpriz'd it must) I had my consolation in my Subject.
[Page] It is Divine Goodness to accept of what a Person hath, and not of what he hath not. I know that God is great, as well as good, that he is in Heaven, and we on Earth; and that therefore as in our addresses to him, so in our Discourses of him, our words should be few. But I also know, what Cicero observ'd before me, that he is Opt. Max. that he is first Good, and then Great, and that he glories in his Goodness, as his greatest Excellency, [His making of his Sun to rise on the Evil, and on the Good, and his sending Rain on the Just, and on the unjust, is called his Perfection, and indeed is so, 'tis, be you perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect.
Once, it is the Interest and Cause [Page] of God I plead in this Essay, and so much, that all Religion is concerned in it. For 'tis an apprehension of the Goodnesse, and Bounty, and Beneficence of God, that established in Mens hearts doth powerfully tie them to Adore, Obey, and Serve him. There is Mercy (sayes the Royal Psalmist) with thee, that thou mayest be feared. It was for this Reason that he prefaced the Law he gave the Jewes, with a Repitition of the benefits, which had accrued to them by him, I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the Land of Egypt, out of the House of Bondage, Thou shalt, &c. Namely to imprint upon them a [Page] due sence of all his Obligations and Engagements, that having first possess'd them of a rational and well establish'd Love, he might afterwards the better influence them by it, to a due respect to all his commands. ['Tis, if you love me keep my commands.] And the Holy Evangel, wherein Almighty God is admirably represented as most infinitely Loving, Gratious, and Benigne, what other end, intention or design has it, but by so ample proof and Declaration of the Divine Love to prevail with man for his, that believing he may love, and loving he may serve and obey? This is the Evangellical Obedience; that of Faith, which workes by Love.
[Page] Thus our Love to God it is the life of all our Devotion and Obedience to him, and his Benignity and kindnesse unto us, it is the ground of all our love. And Sathan knows it well enough, and therefore he is so industrious (for we are not ignorant of his devices) to instil into the minds of men, hard and frightful apprehensions of the great God; as that he rules by will; that he hath no consideration in the world of his Creatures comfort, but onely of his own Glory, that he made the greatest part of Men to damne them, and triumphs in their Ruin; and that he cruelly exacts impossibilities, and obliges Men to come, when yet he knowes they cannot. And that Evil One is intimate enough [Page] with all our minds, to know that if he can but once perswade them, that the Master, whom we are to serve is most Tyrannicall and hard, and that he reapeth, where he hath not sown, and gathereth, where he hath not strewed; no question, but we will away, and dig and hide our Lords money, as that unfaithful servant did.
So much it is the interest of God and True Religion, that Divine Benignity be vindicated; a work as necessary now as ever, when Lucretius is as much consulted as Moses, and when there are almost as many, who blasphemously dispute Divine Goodnesse, as there are that seriously believe it. And it is with those I principally deal.
[Page] In doing which I have endeavour'd to acquit my self, not onely Philosophically by alledging Reasons which Philosophy, Common sense, and the Natures of the things I treat of, do suggest to me, but also as a Christian, by blending with those other, such considerations also as the sacred Oracles (whereon I most relie) do prompt me with; not insisting on the former, (which yet too many do) but as they have the countenance and favour of the latter.
This, Sir, is what I offer you. Be pleased to accept an Essay [but a Part of that whole you have a Title to] which with those designs, and this Furniture (such as it is) doth lay it self before you, at your seet? 'Tis its Ambition, [Page] to have a Person for its Parton, whom its Subject hath for its Admirer. And it cannot easily despair of being owned by you, and so of being made another Instance of your great Goodness, of which its Author is already One, seeing to be so, it is enough to need it.
And, Sir, with this high Encouragement it is, that I presume to own my self in these circumstances, in that capacity you long ago vouchsafed me the honour to be, even that of
AN ADVERTISEMENT TO THE READER.
THE Method I have taken in the following Discourse, is to second the evincements, which I urge from common Reason, or Nature, with the suffrage of the sacred Oracles. Which that the Reader may not mis-interpret, and accuse of want of judgement, seeing my pretences are against the Atheist, who believes not Scripture; he is to know, that there are Reasons for the Atheist, which though to make them more perspicuous, and convincing, I have backed with the verdicts of the gravest Philosophers, and to shew them to be also Scriptural, I have confirmed from the Scriptures; yet I insist [Page] not on them with the Atheist, as they are Scriptural, but as they are Reasons, Scriptural Reasons. He may understand me, that I Insist not with him on the Authority, but on the Reason of Scripture.
And yet truely taking on me to assert the Christian Religion, and such Apprehensions of the Great God, as that obligeth us to have, I thought it point of Duty, not onely to produce Reasons, and Notions, that might satisfie, but also to evince them Scriptural; for as much as otherwise, though they might be Philosophical, and carry in them something of conviction, yet not being Scriptural, they could not possibly be Christian, and so answer my Ends.
In Fine, to be ingenuous with him, I was willing to annex the Testimonies of the Scriptures, and of Philosophers together, to all or most of those considerations I insisted on from Nature, or Reason, that I might insinuate into the Atheist [Page] a good belief of Scriptures; as, that there is some conformity in them with Nature, that they are replenish't with recondite wisdome; and that that Religion comprehended in them is a piece of high Reason, and Philosophy. And he cannot but believe all this, when he shall see before his eyes, so good a correspondency and understanding between them.
As for the Philosophers, I have quoted them at large, and in their own Terms, that I might not be suspected to abuse them, or my Reader; but yet have so conveniently dispos'd the Texts, that those, who list not to attend to them, as perhaps a many will not, that yet may have a mind to read the Rest, they may skip and pass them over, without any great trouble or interruption.
Onely one thing must be noted, that in some of these Citations I have made of the Philosophers, it is the Medium, the Reason onely, [Page] which I urge them for; the Application being mine perhaps and not theirs; which yet I cannot reasonably be arraigned for, seeing 'tis certain, that the Reason may be one and the same, when yet the matters wherein it is to hold are innumerous. And though I have Suppos'd a God to be, and all things in the world to be made by Him, 'tis no more than what my Subject justifies; and yet by way of Obviation to the Atheists Cavils, I have occasionally prov'd it, towards the end of this Discourse; and therefore, if in Reading any part of it, a such exception do arise, I must oblige the Reader to suspend his thoughts a little, till it be remov'd.
I intended not to give my Reader any further trouble here, but on second thoughts, I crave his pardon if I do, because it looks to some, as if there were an irrepairable defect in the following Discourse [Page] in one Point, in as much as I have quoted no Philosophers about it (and it is believ'd I cannot;) not having given any intimations of the knowledge of a Saviour [the greatest instance of Divine Benignity] and of the method of salvation by him, among the Gentiles. And indeed I purposely declin'd the doing that, because it is a point that will oblige me to a large Discourse another where; but yet for present satisfaction, if I should say there were among the Heathen, some darker intimations of that great Truth, for which we Christians are beholden to the Evangel, though I might be judged very Paradoxical therein, yet I conceive, I should affirm nothing, but what I had authority enough to verifie.
It cannot be denied, but that the Ancient Heathens understood that God was unattoneable, but by humane blood; the Canaanites did offer up their Children unto [Page] MOLOCH [Deut. 18. 10.] and conformably the Carthaginians, Plat. in Politic. who were a Colony of Canaanites, did yearly offer some of theirs to Saturn. Among the Lacedemonians, Vid. & Stuckium de sacr. & sacrif. the Altar of Diana Orthia was besprinkled once a year, with humane blood; two Persons being Annually elected by the Lot for Sacrifice. Which usage,Bodin de Rep. lib. 1. c. 5. Num. 34. 35. as it was highly barbarous and cruel, is affirmed to be changed by the great Lycurgus for a milder; he ordaining, that the persons on whom the Lot did fall,Pausan. in Lacon. instead of being killed, should be whipped, till the blood did flow. And with that, they did besprinkle the Altar.
This is much, but there is more. For some of them did understand, (if yet they understood what their Performances implyed) not onely that the great God was not to be propitiated and attoned but by humane blood; but also, that that bloud must be the blood of One that was to take upon him (as [Page] it were) the Persons and the guilt of all, or of an One that by his sufferings was to purge and cleanse the rest that offer'd him.
And this is evident,Nic. Leonic. Thom. de varia hist. liq. 3. cap. 33. in that the old Athenians every year in (their) Thargelion, did sacrifice a Man and a Woman, for the Men and Women of their City, to Expiate and Lustrate them; and those whom they did sacrifice, they calledSo the Author, but better Pharmaca. Pharmaci, as who would say, that those were persons, who, by being sacrificed and offer'd up unto the Gods, were proper Medicines to purge and cleanse those others (from their sins) that offer'd them.
And it will be yet more manifest,De var. hist lib. 3. c. 106. if we consider what Leonicus Thomaeus further tells us out of Lycophron, that in the most antient times, if on any City there fell a Judgement of Famine, or Plague, or Sword, or other great Calamity, they were wont to take the vilest, and most vitious person in it, whom [Page] they called aOr rather Catharma and Pha [...] macon. Catharmus, or a Pharmacus, and him they carried to the place of sacrifice; and having there performed several Ceremonies, at last they burned him, and threw his ashes into the Sea, and so appeased the Gods. It is not to be doubted, but that something Figurative and Mystical did lie in this; for otherwise they knew, what by the Light of Nature is remarkable to All, that to the Best, the Best was to be offer'd: And indeed the usage seemeth but a Depravation of the Grand Tradition of the Seed of the Woman, and of that Propitiation and Attonement to be made to God for Sin by the offering up the Man Christ which was the ground of all Propitiatory Sacrifices
'Tis not improbable, but Caiaphas, of whom the Holy Ghos [...] doth witness, that he prophesied▪ and wist it not, that is, that he spoke righter than he was aware of▪ alluded hereunto, in saying it wa [...] [Page] necessary one should die for the People, he meaning (it is likely) that it was very fit, that one [intending Jesus Christ] should be made a kind of Pharmacus or Catharmus, and so be offer'd as a Victim for the People, to settle its Tranquility and Peace.
And indeed Jesus Christ he is the true Pharmacum and Catharma for the whole World; it is he that taking on him the iniquities of us all, did make his Soul an offering for Sin, by whose Stripes we are healed. and of him it is that our Apostle saith (and perhaps alluding to the Grecian Lustrations, as well as to the Jewish Purgations) That he did—‘— [...]’that he did by himself purge our Sins; or which is aequivalent, that in his own person, he was our true Catharma.
I might also argue their imperfect knowledge of a Saviour from [Page] the many Appellations which I find among them of their Jupiter, as Jupiter Melichius, Jupiter Eleutherius, Jupiter Servator, &c. And also take a hint to shew from whence they had it, namely from the Old and First Believers, from whom they took this usage to denominate their Jupiter, as these were wont to do their El, or Jehovah, from occasional occurrents, as El Roi, Jehovah=Nissi, &c. I say, they seem to have receiv'd these intimations of the true Religion, not so much from the Jews, whom generally all the Gentiles hated; of whom they make but little mention in their Writings, and with whom they did not care to converse, as by the Catholick Tradition of the world, from the First and most Ancient Ages, and Patriarchs. So Plato who is express.‘— [...] [Page] [...]—.Platon. Politic.’Again. ‘— [...]—Id. in Philebo.’Again. ‘— [...]—Ibid.’
But to return, there is one Authority more that I shall urge, and that is Plato's, who seemeth to have pointed his Disciples to our Saviour, for who else can he be thought to mean, when he telleth them they should adhere unto his Dogmata, but till another Person, a Divine One came, who would instruct them in the Truths themselves, and him they were obliged to hear.
I confess, I never met with this passage in the workes of Plato my self (and yet he seemeth in his Politicks to hint something of an [Page] [...] a fit Messenger, one that should reveal things) but in an Author, who it is to be presumed, had it in the Schools of Plato, in him I have; and that is AEneas Gazaeus, who introduceth Theophrastus (one of the Persons in a Dialogue, which he intitles so) assenting to Axitheus, the other, in these terms.‘—Agnosco quod dicis optime: Nam & Platoni ipsi placuit, ut suis decretis eatenus staretur, dum aliquis divinior homo in terris appareret, qui veritatem ipsam aperiat, cui conveniens sit omnes assentiri, atque obtemperare.’
There is one thing more I must intreat the Reader not to be offended with, and that is, that I here annex some farther Testimonies of Philosophers, which might indeed have more conveniently been added in their proper places, in the Body of the Discourse it felf: but that the Copy being out of my hands, I was not capable of doing that: and yet I was unwilling to [Page] omit them, they seeming unto me so full of evidence and clearness, and so apt to bring a great addition of light, to what I have already offer'd from others.
I have said in my Discourse, that God is therefore Liberal, Bountiful, and Beneficent, because he is most Perfect, and is the Best Being, and I am here to say, it is no more than what is intimated to us by Maximus Tyrius. ‘— [...] Max. Tyr. Dissert. 2 [...].’
Again, for as much as I have said that the Heathen understood somewhat of the State of Happiness, wherein Divine Bounty did at first [Page] establish man, it is no other than what Plato meaneth,Plato in Politic. when in his Politicks he treateth of the Golden Revolution under Saturn. For he declareth that to be a time, when God did rule, when Men were naked, and when the Earth afforded all things unto Men without labour; that in it Men had a vast and comprehensive knowledg of the nature of things, that they did confer, and talk with the Beasts, and that these were tame and friendly unto one another, and that all were subject to man. Who seeth not in this Tradition how agreable it is unto that of Moses.
But Hierocles, (besides what I have cited out of him, about the State of Pre-existence, which I have evinced to be this of Innocence) doth in his Definition of Philosophy, egregiously insinuate, that Man in former time, was in another Condition, infinitely more Agreable and Happy [Page] than his present, and that then He was in Gods Image. For the Definition that he gives us of Philosophy, is to this purpose, that it is a Restitution of a man unto his proper state of Happiness, that of which he was possesled heretofore, and withal a re-conforming of him to the image of God. You shall have his own termes,‘ [...].Hierocl. in Carm. Pythag. p. in princip.’
As for the Impotency of the Humane Will, and the cause thereof, that Notion of it I have offer'd in the Treatise, is the very same with what Max. Tyrius doth alledge as his.‘— [...]—Max Tyr. dissert. 22.’
[Page] And what I said of Grace, or of Divine Assistance, how absolutely necessary 'tis, that we may do good, is but what the Author last mention'd, doth also say.‘— [...]—’
I had almost forgotten one passage in Plato, about a Future Judgment, which added unto that of Plutarch, I have cited in the following Treatise, will render the belief of that Article most Rational. And it is so full and clear a testimony of it, and so particular, that that account thereof in Matthew, hath not, in respect of its distinctness so great advantage of it, as in respect of its authority it has. For my part I am astonisht at it: 'Tis in his Discourse De Rep.
Therein, he introduces ERUS, the Pamphilian, Son of one Arnienius; [Page] a Person slain in Battle, and fabled to have risen again, the twelfth day after, as they were laying him upon the (Funeral) Pile. Him he introduces reporting to the Inhabitants of the present World, the Observations he had made in the other; which he was commanded to recount, at his return to this, and he brings him in speaking thus.‘ [...]—’
In fine the Method I have taken in evincing the Benignity of God, from the instances thereof, that are in things, is the very same that Socrates, [Page] Plato, Cicero, Plat. de legib. lib. 10. Id in Epinom. (Authors worthy to be read in all Languages) and others of the Antients used to establish Providence.Xenoph. de fact & dict. Socrat. lib. 1. Galen's laudatory Hymn in honour of the Great Creatour, is admirable,Cicer de nat. Deor. lib. 2. and verily the ablest Christians that have gone the same way as Lactantius did of old, and as Lessius, Morney, and some others do of late, have not got a foot beyond them. It was therefore I but hinted things on that head, because I would oblige my Reader to consult with these.
I had many other things to add, but I fear, I have already surfeited the Reader, And I know it is not fit the Gates should be too wide; onely I will tell him, I have offer'd more Reasons, why the Great God defers the punishment of the wicked, and bears with them so long, because my subject did not fairly lead me to it; I considering that Patience, Long-suffering, and forbearance of Almighty God, as [Page] a great example and instance of his Goodness, and no objection against it. And so did the Apostle, who puts them together. Or despisest thou the riches of his Goodness, and Forbearance, and Long suffering, not knowing that the Goodness of God leadeth thee to Repentance.
But those who will not be content with this account thereof, may be pleased to converse a while with Plutarch, who having undertaken in a Treatise made on purpose, to solve this common appearance, hath quit himself as excellently in it, as he doth in all things else he undertakes. He shews it is, that God might be an Example of the Goodness he would have us imitate; that the wicked might have time to repent; that though he doth defer their punishment, he doth not pardon 'm? 'Tis that the Wicked may be instruments to punish others, and for many other Reasons, which he mentions there.
And now I'le cast my self upon [Page] the Readers ingenuity and candor, when I have once confessed freely to him, that I have nothing else to offer in excuse for this unusual trespass on his patience, but that of Apuleius. Apul Florid. lib. ‘—Nec quidquam omnium est quod possit in primordio sui perfici: sed in omnibus ferme ante est spei rudimentum quam rei experimentum.’
Corrigenda.
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[Page 1]DIVINE GOODNESSE Explicated and Asserted.
CHAP. I.
Goodness an Essential Notion of God. The Definition of it. Divine Perfection or Allsufficiency what. That it is the fundamental Reason of Divine Goodness. An impression of it on the Creature. Divine Goodness demonstrated out of Metaphysics, and out of Nature, by Instances and Harmony.
SECT. 1.
THE Goodness of the great God, or rather his Optimity, and [...], is so illustrious and acknowcedg'd an Attribute of his, that the very Heathen knew him, and ador'd him by it: Their Jupiter was Optimus as well as Maximus. And it [Page 2] is a Notion so inherent unto that of God, and so inseparable from it, that you destroy the Godhead, if you but abstract Goodness; not to make him Good, is to make him no God. It is the Devil is the evil one; God is the Good. [He is Good, and doth Good.
This Optimity or transcendent Goodness of the great God, is nothing but that insinite Perfection, whereby he eminently in himself involveth all Good, and consequently, whereby (seeing all de [...]siable, amiable, excellent, and lovely things are centred, and comprehended in him,) he is most lovely, all lovely, and all desireable. He is the universal Good, in whom the universal love, and universal desire, the desires of all things, and the loves of all, do all concentrate. And (saith Aristotle) what all doth desire, is simply good; so none is good but God. He is universally, others but particularly good. This is Aristotle's [...] ‘— [...].Arist. de [...]o ib. l. 1. c. 1,’ ‘— [...]. [...]d l. 5.’
Now it is the infinite Perfection or Alsufficiency of God, in respect of which [Page 3] the celebrated Aristotle calls him [...], and which is signified in the Holy Scriptures by the name El Shaddai, a name by which he is remarkable, not only to the Jewes, but also to the Greeks and Latines, for as much as [...] (from which his Title Shaddai probably deriveth) doth seem to be the Origen of the Genitive [...], of the Dative [...], and of the Accusative [...], from the Nominative [...], and not unlikely the Latine Deus and the phrase sub Dio (as a learned Critic wittily conjectures) cometh from it. I say this absolute Perfection [or infinite concurrency of all things excellent, and Good, and lovely in God, whereby he being absolutely perfect and accomplished in all kindes, as standing on the Top of all, doth defect and want in nothing, which is good in any;] It is the ground of his Optimity, or Universal Convenience, and Desireableness. For he therefore is most agreeable and good to all, and consequently most Desireable, because he is All; he is the [...], that Universal, First, Original, and Fountain-Fulness, that replenisheth the whole Creation, which without him [Page 4] would be all but empty Cask, and meer vacuity. All the Creatures, their Springs are in God, they are but Cisterns with him, and without him, empty Caskes. God is [...], the the Plenitude of all things, and it is his Plenitude that botomneth his Goodness. So Aristotle, ‘— [...].’ Again;‘— [...], &c.’
And, God, he hath enough for himself, and all things else, My Grace is sufficient for thee.
There is an evident impression on the world, of this Alsufficiency and [...] of God; the World is an Universe, there are in it all imaginable Sorts of Being and all imaginable Furniture, Provisions, and Accomodations for them; Porus marries Penia; there are Remedies for all Distempers; agreeable supplies for all Occasions and Necessitie [...]; there is nothing wanting, no more than is Redundant in Nature.Vide Plutar de Placit. Philosoph. l 1. c. 5. The Earth is the Lords, and the fulness [the fulness] thereof. Philo [...]ophers call the world [...], Universum.
SECT. 2.
Now, having shewed what Optimity, or Transcendent goodness is, wherein it formally consists, as well as what Foundation, and what ground it has; it now remaineth, that I do evince it competent to God▪ which I shall Essay to do, (but very briefly) both from the Metaphysics, and from Nature it self.
And there are many Topics in the Metaphysics, which do evidently argue and evince him so Good; I shall insist on one, That as there is a first Being, so there is a first Good; there is a First in every Kind, a First in genere bonorum, as there is in genere entium; for as much as every thing is either First, or from it. And if there he a Primitive and First Good, which all inferiour ones derive from, and do participate (as, if there be a First, they must) It is the First Being, and consequently it is God, which is it. Good and Being are convertible; and therefore the First Being is the First Good. God is the First Being. All Second Beings are derived from the [Page 6] First Being: All Second and inferiour Good participates the First Good.
And for Physics. The Divine Optimity or Transcendent Goodness is so remarkably impressed on the whole Universe, that Moses that excellent Origenist, introducing God reveiwing it in its Creation, doth also introduce him thus commending it; God saw every thing that he had made, and behold [behold] it was very good, it was good, very good, [...]; and God saw it. It was very good in Gods eye, and therefore may be well so in Mans; and very Good it is,
For there is Nothing in the whole world, but is good for something, if it be not so for one thing, it is so for another; and is either Good to profit, or to please; a Verity so great, that in the Metaphysics Bonity and Entity are made convertible; [that cannot be at all, that is not good.] Onely, all inferiour is Dispersed good, and Limited; so that what is eminently good in one kind, is very rarely so in another; that is seldome most useful, and of most advantage for either Medicine or Meat, which is most embellisht [Page 7] and adorn'd. The creeping Worms, many of them, are more curiously set off, and clad more richly, than the noblest Animals. Solomon in all his Glory, was not half as brave, and as magnificent, as a Tulip; and yet a Tulip, that is the most beautiful and the most fair, it is the least useful, and least medicinal of Flowers. What is most gaudy, is not most great, God hath tempered the body together, giving more abundant honour to that which lacked it. The Goodness shining in the world, is a Wise one, a well ordered Goodness.
But to return, it were endless to expatiate all the world over, and to instance in the Excellencies scattered in it, there is an admirable Majesty in Man, and in the Heavens a magnificence and grandeur, which surprizeth all that view them. How infinitely pleasant is the Spring! and in it, how gaudy is the Earth! and in how delicate pentadoes is it cloathed! All the Seasons have their proper goodness; the world can't subsist without them. There are in them, and as in them, in all things else, so infinite, and so agreeable Varieties, such Miracles of [Page 8] Beauty, Order, and Proportion to entertain and feast the Atheist, that they cannot but convince him, if he once attend, that seeing there is so much excellency and goodness in the things made, there must needs be infinitely more, in him that made them.
SECT. 3.
Moreover, 'tis as easie to demonstrate from the world, and from all Appearances therein, as 'tis to undertake it, that all inferiour is participated good; that seeing all participation is of some Superiour, there is not any Good below, but what is from One above, and doth descend; and that the great God, the Highest Being, is of necessity the Best.
For there are in the world many Classes, Ranks, and Orders of Beings, and very comely disposition of them, Secundum sub & supra, of one above another, but of all in such Relation, that those Perfections, which are scattered in the inferiour, are collected and amassed [...]n the Superiour; and what are col [...]ected and amassed in the Superiour, are dispers'd and scattered in the inferiour. [Page 9] So that, as the lower any Being is, it, having the fewer perfections, is the less perfect and good; so the higher any is, it having more perfections, is the better, and consequently the Highest Being is the best. God is the Father of Lights from whom every good and perfect gift descendeth. All ascent upon the scale of Being, is by Addition; all descent, is by Substraction, and Participation. There is participated intelligence in Man; participated Reason in Beasts; participated Sense in Vegetables; participated Life in Naturals. Nature is in Vegetables, with vegetative Life; Nature and vegetative Life, with Sense in Sensitives; Nature, vegetative Life, and Sense, with Reason in Rationals; and no higher can we go upon the scale, in the visible world. So well contrived and Harmonical the world is. Witness Cicero. ‘—Est enim admirabilis quaedam continuatio, seriesque rerum, ut alia ex alia nexa, & omnes inter se aptae, colligataeque videantur.De' Nat Deor. lib. 1.’
CHAP. II.
Sect. 1.
Two consequent Notions from that of God's Goodness, Beneficence, and Finality. Divine Beneficence defined, and demonstrated from Divine Bonity, and Supremacy, and in Providence. Testimonies of Providence from Pythagoras, Socrates, Aristotle, Cicero, &c. What Epicurus and Lucretius thought of it.
SO much for Divine Goodness or Optimity, consider'd absolutely in it self; but for its Of-Spring; there are other Attibutes resulting from it, two of which I shall consider, viz. The Infinite Beneficence or Benignity of God, and then his absolute Finality; that he is good to all, as well as in himself, and is the End of all.
Divine Beneficence, (wherein I comprehend the Love, and Kindness, the Mercy, Grace, Benignity, and Bounty of God) is that infinite Diffusiveness of Nature, whereby he is most ready to Communicate, and to impart the Good is in him. A perfection so Essential to [Page 11] him, that he could not be a God, because not Good, without it; it being this communicativeness, this propensity of Nature to impart, that in the common Sense and Language of the whole World, doth eminently entitle and denominate one so. For He in common Language is denominated a Good, who is a Liberal, a Loving, a Kind, a Merciful, an Appeasable, and Bountiful Man; as also in the sacred Scriptures, For a good Man one will even dare to die; and for a Good, is for a Bountiful, Benign, Merciful, Ingageing Man: One that hath obliged him by courtefies, and is his Benefactor, for such an one another may dare it.
And such an One is God; his NameVide Arist. ubi supra. of Alsufficiency implies it, for El Shaddai, or his Name of Alsufficiency is composed of [...] which signifies Sufficience, and of the relative [...], as who would say, Divine Sufficiency is Relative: the [...] of God is [...]; and it is imported in that ravishing expression, My Grace is sufficient for thee. For were not this implyed in it, that what sufficiency soever is in God, is in him for the Creature, to assist and help it, [Page 12] what consolation could it minister? or what incouragement? 'Tis onely relative Sufficiency that is a consolation or incouragement, an absolute one is none. For God to say he has enough, but not to give it, were to tantalize. But God's Sufficiency is relative, he is very liberal, and open handed, and he cannot possibly be otherwise, because he is so good.
For all Good, it is communicative and Diffusive, and by how much more good a Being is (if that inelegance be tolerable) by so much more Diffusive (as Philosophers assure us) and more communicative 'tis: so that God in being most good [...], the absolutely best, is also most Diffusive and Beneficent. It is a Scriptural connection, that God is good and doth good; that is, He is in proportion as propense to be communicative, and imparting as he is good; he is good and doth good, [...]. As is the Man so is his strength, God is abundant in goodness. He is the Original, Fountain, and First Good; and so hath all Good for others, as well as in himself.
And the world shews it, for as on [Page 13] Porphyrie'sTree the higher grades are the commoner, and more extensive too they be, and the highest are the most so; so on the scale of Being, the lower and inferiour, which are more immers'd in matter, are the more determin'd and contracted, but the higher and Superiour, which are more immersed and spiritual, are more diffusive and free. All Confinement is from Earth and Matter, but it is form and Spirit, that is the Root of all inlargement and freeness. Minerals are absolutely determin'd; Vegetables, less; Animals, spontaneous; Rationals arbitrary. Thus also in Mechanic Spirits, the subtiler they are, the more spreading. And Light of all Corporeal Beings, the most refin'd and pure, is also most imparting and diffusive.
Now God, He is an absolute pure and spiritual Act, inhabiting in Light as inaccessable as glorious, and therefore, seeing he Presideth on the Top of all Being, he cannot but be infinitely Free, and so much more, more imparting and communicative than is any other, as he is purer and more high than it. For sayes our Saviour, If ye then being [Page 14] Evil, know how to give good gifts to your Children, how much more shall your Father which is in Heaven, give good things to them which ask him. Evil is oppos'd to Heavenly, if ye being Evil. &c. How much more shall your Father, which is in Heaven, &c. To be earthly is to be evil, narrow, and illiberal. But what is pure Heavenly and High, is free and noble. God is the most High, and therefore most communicative.
But to give the Atheist Instances, as well as other Proofs and Demonstrations of Divine Beneficence. It is Illustriously exemplified in his Providence; which is so visible in all the world, that it is acknowledged by all Philosophers (not to mention Poets, Orpheus, &c.) and particularly,
By Pythagoras of whom Iamblicus.‘— [...].Iambl. de vit. Pythag. c. 32.’
By Socrates of whomXenoph. de fact. et dict. Socrat. l. 1. Bessarione interprete. Vid. Socrat. orat. apud Indic. in Cicer. Tusc. Quest. l. 1. Xenophon.‘—Horumit aque omnium, si qui sunt qui nil a divina providentia putent, sed a nostro arbitrio omnia pendêre, hos insanire asserebat.’
[Page 15] By Aristotle, (but somewhat uncertainly) of whom Diogenes Laertius. ‘— [...].Diog. Laer. de vit. l. 5’
And Velleius in Cicero.‘—Aristoteles quo (que) in tertio de philosophia libro, multa turbat, a Magistro Platone uno dissentiens: modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem: modo mundum ipsum Deum dicit esse: modo quendam alium praeficit mundo: eiq [...] eas partes tribuit, ut replicatione mundi quadam motum regat, atque tueatur, &c.Cic. de nat. Deor lib. 1.’
By Cicero‘—Haec igitur, & alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his praesit aliquis vel effector, si haec nata sunt, ut Platoni videtur: vel si semper fuerint, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis & muneris? sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides; tamen, ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex memoria rerum & inventione, & celeritate motus, omnique pulchritudine virtutis, vim divinam mentis agnoscit [...].Cic. Tusc. Quest. l. 1.’
[Page 16]Again,‘—Quid vero tanta rerum consentiens, conspirans, continuata cognatio? quem non coget ea, quae a me dicuntur comprobare.—de nat Deor. lib. 2.’ ‘Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum, & omnes mundi partes & initio constitutas esse, & omni tempore administrari: &c.Ibid.’
By Seneca.‘Quaesisti a me, Lucili, quid ita si providentia mundus ageretur, multa bonis viris acciderent mala. Hoc commodius in contextu operis redderetur, cum praesse universis providentiam probaremus, & interesse nobis Deum, &c.Senec. de pro id. c. 1.’Again.‘—Quid est Deus? Mens universi Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, & quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari potest. Si solus est omnia, opus & extra & intra tenet, &c.—natural. Quaest. l. 1.’Again.‘—Nec haec intra vulgum dementia est, sed sapientiam quoque professos contigit. Sunt qui putent, sibi ipsis animum esse, & quidem providum ac dispensantem singula, & sua, & aliena, hoc [Page 17] autem universum, in quo nos quoque sumus, expers esse consilii, & aut ferri temeritate quadam, aut natura nesciente quid faciat.Ibid.’
By Arrianus.‘ [...], &c.Arrian. Epict. de provid. cap. 6. lib. 1.’
By Hierocles.‘— [...].Hier. in Carm. Pythag.’
By Chrysippus in Plutarch, who makes it of a large extent.‘—Horum ne (que) minimum, neque maximum, praeter Jovis rationem & legem, & justitiam, ac providentiam esse Chrysippus putat. Plutarch. de Stoic. contrar. Jano Carnario interpr.’
By Plato and Plutarch in innumerable places.
By Apuleius.‘—Mundus est ornata ordinatio, Dei munere; Deorum recta custodia, &c.Apul. de mundo.’Again,‘—Re [...]at, quod caput est sermonis [Page 18] hujus, ut super mundi rectore verba faciamus. Indigens quippe videbitur oratio de Mundo disputantibus, ut etsi minus curiose, at quomodo possumus, disseramus. De rectore quippe omnium non, ut ait ille, silere melius est: sed vel parum dicere. Vetus opinio est, at (que) cogitationes omnium hominum penitus insedit, Deum essentiae originis haberi auctorem, Deum (que) ipsum salutem esse, & perseverantiam earum quas effecerit, rerum. Ne (que) sulla res est tam praestantibus viribus quae viduata Dei auxilio, sui natura contenta sit. Hanc opinionem Vates secuti, profiteri ausi sunt, omnia Jove plena esse; cujus praesentiam non jam cogitatio sola, sed oculi & aures, & sensibilis substantia comprehendit, &c.Ibid.’Again,‘—Postremò quod est in triremi gubernator, in curru rector, praecentor in choris, Lex in urbe, dux in exercitu; hoc est in Mundo Deus: nisi quod, &c. Ibid.’ [Page 19]Again.‘—Unde susceptam providentiam Dii secundae providentiae ita graviter retinent; ut omnia etiam quae coelitus mortalibus exhibent [...]r, immutabilem ordinationis paternae statum teneant. Daemones vero, quos Genios & Lareis possumus nuncupare, ministros Deorum arbitratur, custodes (que) hominum & interpre [...] si quid a Diis velint. Nec sane omnia referenda ad vim Fati putat: sed esse aliquid in nobis, & in Fortuna nonnihil, & Fortunae quidem improvidos casus ignorari a nobis fatetur, &c.Apul. de dogm. Platonis.’
In sum by all others, who acknowledg'd a Divinity (but in a very different way) excepting only Epicurus,
[Of whom Vellius in Cicero.‘—Quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, QUOD aeternum beatumque sit, id nec habere ipsum negotii quidquam, nec exhiber [...] alteri. Ita (que) ne (que) ira, ne (que) gratia teneri, quod, quae talia essent, [Page 20] imbecilla essent omnia. Si nihil aliud quaereremus, nisi ut deos pie coleremus, & ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum, nam & praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum & aeterna esset & beatissima. HABET enim venerationem justam quidquid excellit: & metus omnis a vi, at (que) ira deorum pulsus esset. Intelligitur enim a beat [...] immortalique natura & iram & gratiam segregari: quibus remotis, nullos a superis impendere metus, &c.]Cic. de nat Deor. lib. 1’and a few forlorn Ones that follow him; among which Lucretius that notorious Athiest, who maketh Providence a Fiction, and a meer effect of Fear and Superstition, is the Leader or Chief.
SECT. 2.
Providence describ'd, and specifi'd. (1.) 'Tis General, Particular, Special, most Special. The great evincement of it, that all things are order'd for the best (1.) In the Natural World! This shew'd by many Instances in Nature.
Now Providence it self, whereof the Stoicks were so great Assertors,Cicer. de nat. deor. lib. 1. that it is called by Velleius. Stoicorum [...],Apul. de dogm. Platon ubi susupra. Plutarch. de Fato. is Nothing but the Fatherly and prudent care of God, in ordering of the Universe. To comprehend which, whoever hath a Family of his own, or knowes what it is to have one, and what to Govern it, he need but to consider that the World is God's. The World is a great House, and God is Master in it.Plutarch. Symposiac. lib. 8. quaest. 1. He is that great Father, of whom all the Family in Heaven and Earth is named; and his Providence, is but his ordering and disposing, his [Page 22] Looking (as we call it) to his Family, and his caring and providing for it. Providence is [...].
And this his Providence,Senec. de Provid. c. 1. as it is general and comprehensive, extending over all the kinds so it also is particular, and reacheth every individual and numerical thing in every kind; for, as he preserveth Man and Beast in general,Chrysip in Plutarch. Apul de mundo. Senec. nat. quae st. vid. omnes ubi supra. so a Sparow in particular, falleth not without our heavenly Father. And indeed it is no more beneath the divine Majesty, to provide and care for all, than it was to form all, and make them. Cicero is plain 'tis so in Men.
But it is more distinguishing and sp [...]cial over Mankind, than over others, and so eminently so, that in comparison thereof, whatever providence [Page 23] he hath for other Species. (that are lower) is esteemed none. Doth God take care for Oxen? yes, but not comparatively; God eminently cares for men. Hear Cicero,
But it is most distinguishing and special over pious and religious Men, or those that fear him, He is the Saviour of all Men, but especially, of those that believe; and there is Reason for it. For Pious and Religious, are Divine Men; they are the very Habitations, Houses, and Temples of the great God, and so it is [...] special interest to look to these. The Hairs of their Head are numbred. So the Apostle,‘—Ye are the Temples of the Holy Ghost.’ ‘—Partakers of the Divine Nature.’
And so Cicero,‘—Quod autem ex hominum genere[Page 24] consecratos, sicut Herculem, & ceteros, coli lex jubet, indicàt omnium quidem animos immortatales esse: sed fortium bonorumque divinos. Bene verò, quod Mens, Pietas, Virtus, Fides, consecratur manu: quarum omnium Romae dedicata publicè templa sunt, ut illa qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent. &c,Cic. de legib lib 2.’ ‘—NEMO igitur vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit, &c.Cic. de nat deor. lib. 2.’
I intend not to expatiate now on this subject, but only to illustrate in it, the Goodness, and Beneficence of God: which, I suppose, I shall have done effectually, when I have proved, that all things in the world, are contrived and order'd for the best; and all administrations in it so conducted. All is for the best, both in the Natural and Moral World.
And verily, it were as easie to evince at large (if I had leasure) [Page 25] that all things in the Natural World are order'd and contrived for the best, Ki [...]cher. Magnet. l. 1 par. 2. as to Essay to do it; In the Magnetisme of the Earth; the Atmosphaere that fringes it;Id in [...] exstat Vid. Cicer. de nat. deor. lib. 2. cum [...] aliis. the obliquity of the Zodiac, and the motions of the Sun and Moon respectively therein. The Alternations of the Seasons, of Day and Night, of Summer and Winter. The happy coaptation of the Sea and Land into one Globe and Center. The Saltness of the Sea; its perpetual Aestuation, Flux and Reflux. The Elevation and Depression of the Earth in Hills and Valleys. The Irrigation of it with Rivers. Rain from Heaven. The freshness of the Rain, as well as of Rivers. The Elasticity of the Air, or its springiness: its ventilation by Winds; the purgation of it by Storms, Lightnings, and Thunders. The commodities of Navigation. The admirable circumstance of Providence, to render a Torrid Zone (beyond the Apprehension of the old Philosophers, [Page 26] and School men) habitable. The Breezes and Monsoons. The Distribution of the Gifts of Nature, some to one Country, some to another, but of all to none.
And it where infinite to instance in the particulars (whereon some able persons have very learnedly discoursed) of the Fabrick and Anatomy of Plants and Animals; the Beauty of the former; the Instincts of the latter; the Propagation of the kinds in both; the Subordination and Usefulness of all; and in the plentiful Provision which is made for all; wherein the Order of the House is admirable.
There is an infinite increase of little Fishes, Herberts travels, lib. 1. L'Blancs travels, par. 3. c. Sandys travels, l. 2. &c. on which the greater were to prey; and in the Island of Fierro, a Tree is ever dropping, which supplies the whole with water. There are extraordinary dews in Aegypt, where is no Rain; and in Peru, where also is none, a [Page 27] Wind that fans and moistens. The watring of Aegypt with the Nile, is miraculous. The flying Fishes persecuted in the sea by the Dolphins, Boneta's, Albicores, and Sharkes, and so compell'd to use their finny wings, and take the Air to avoid them, afford a meal to hungerbitten Birds, that look for them. And which is admirable and surprizing, the young Ravens, when abandon'd and relinquisht by their Old ones cry, and crying gape, and gaping receive the flies that skiffing up and down the Air, (as if impuls'd to do so) direct their course into their mouths; and so they are fed. Thus the Royal Psalmist, He giveth to the Beasts their food, and to the young Ravens which cry, [which cry] the Ravens cry, and then, and thus he hears them. Dissection proves it true; their Ventricles are full of Flies: the Ravens cry, and God hears, we must alwayes ask, and sometimes cry, if we will have.
SECT. 3.
2. In the Moral World, proved in the Law and Order of the House. An Objection about the existence of Evil anticipated, Paenal and Afflictive Evils for mans Good. How things are best for the Beasts. Evils as Entities, necessary for the plenitude of the World; as Afflictive for Gods Glory; and as Paenal for Mans good. Things ought to be as they are. An Objection from the Apparent ill administration of things [Good to the Evil, Evil to the Good] proposed,
But in his Administration of the Government of the Moral World, (for so I call that of Mankind, in distinction to the Natural,) his Providence and Goodness, are as visible as great; in that all things in it are designed for the best, and ultimately issue in it: Her ruleth in [Page 29] his House, in all things, as a wise and prudent Master, by assigning to his Children and his Servants, their respective duties (in it) which are for the Good of all in general, and each of them in particular, as well as for his own Glory; and by obliging them unto them with Rewards, and Punishments. Thus he Disciplines and Governes them. Government is for the Good of Man, and all Government is from God. He holds the reins of all himself, and he prescribes the Rules and Lawes of it.
I ask the Atheist, if it would not be a Golden and most happy Age, wherein all men loved others as intirely and sincerly as they do themselvs: wherein together with their own concernments, and interests all equally reminded those of others; wherein they universally abstaining from all injustice and wrong, each assisted other to the utmost; and wherein they lived and conversed each with other devoid of Envy, [Page 30] Malice, Covetousness, Pride, Contention, &c. And if he answer me it would; I tell him this is the Order of the House, that Law of Nature, (which is nothing else, but what the Practical and common Reason of man doth dictate to be done) that God hath sanction'd in the world, to which he hath obliged all his Servants to conform; thus he will have them do, and thus be; and that they may, he hath adapted means (the best imaginable) to ingage and move them to it: He disciplines and acts them with Rewards and Punishments: He promiseth them Good, if they obey, and threatens them with Evil, if they do not. So the Apostle,
[Page 31]And so Cicero.‘—Nec, si regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Romae scripta Lex de stupris, iccirco non contra illam legem sempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretiae Tricipitini filiae attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à rerum natura, & ad recte faciendum impellens, & a delicto avocans: quae non tum deni (que) incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est, orta autem simulest cum menté divina, quam ob rem lex vera at (que) princeps, apta ad jubendum, & ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis, &c. Cic. de leg. lib. 2.’ ‘—Ergo est lex justorum, injustorum (que) distinctio, ad illam antiquissimam, & rerum omnium principem expressa naturam, ad quam leges hominum diriguntur, quae supplicio improbos afficiunt, & defendunt, & tuentur bonos, &c.Ibid.’ ‘—Sit igitur hoc jam a principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores does, ea (que) quae gerantur, eorum geri judicio, ac numine, eosdem (que) optime de [Page 32] genere hominum merert, & quali [...] quis (que) sit, quid agat, quid in s [...] admittat, qua mente, qua pietat [...] religiones colat, intueri, piorum (que) & impiorum habere rationem: hi [...] enim rebus imbutae mentes, haud sane abhorrebunt ab utili, & a vera sententia: &c.Ibid.’
There must be Paenal and Afflictive Evils that there may be Punishments, as well as there are Goods: agreeable obliging things for Compensations and Rewards; it being very often very good for the Child, though he think not so, that his Father take the Rod in hand; Crosses, Losses, Pains, and sinister incounters are but Rods in God's. Now the means are good if the end be so. Finis dat mediis amabilitatem, bonit atem &c. It is good for Man, there are afflictive, paenal Evils: His Vices are Distempers, and these are Medicines to cure them, and Wars themselves, are Punishments to Nations, as Diseases are to single [Page 33] persons. No Government without Rewards and Punishments, no Rewards and Punishments without Good and Evil.
And if it be best for Man it is so for the Beasts, and other Animals, and other inferiour Beings; Man is the End and Lord of these, and therefore [these not having any interest of their own distinct, from his, because they are but his, and not their own] That is best for them, which is so for him. The Accessory followes the Principal. Now Man, he hath an interest in these and so is punishable in them; and is afflictable by these, and so is punishable by them. Wherefore, the Good and Evil, that is in them, the poyson and malignity in Minerals and Plants; the venom, enmity, and violence, the fury and rapacity in many Animals, as well as the commodity and usefulness of others; Tempests in the Air; Convulsions in the Earth; the Fiery Eruptions of Aetna and Vesuvius, [Page 34] and other such enormous, and irregular emotions of the Elements, as well as regular and orderly, are not in them for themselves, but all for Man, Man is their end, as God is Mans. Let not the Atheist complain. God is very Good and Liberal to Man, who has so bountifully given all (these) things to him. Yea, and he is good to the Beasts also, in that he hath oblidged man to be so to them.
But to be more distinct. If we reflect on all the things, are called Evils, and consider them as things, and absolutely in themselves, so they have a good of Entity or Being, and are necessary to the Universe, that it may be Uniform full, and perfect. In the day of Prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other, to the end, that Man should find nothing after him. [...] The Septuagint [...] The Latine Interpreter, Et quidem [Page 35] istud congruum huic. Sym. [...]. God hath set good over against Evil, and Evil over against Good, so to answer one another, that Man coming after him, in review and observation of his workes might not find any thing wanting, or to be added. All is full and uniform and answering. So Seneca,
So Apuleius.‘—Gramaticorum artes vide quaeso quam ex diversis collectae sint literis, ex quibus aliae sunt insonae, semisonantes aliae, pars sonantes, hae tamen mutuis se auxiliis adjuvantes syllabas pariunt, & de syllabis voces. Hoc Her aclitus, &c.’
So Porphyrie.‘— [...], &c.Porphyr de antro Nym.’
And if we consider them as dolorous [Page 36] and afflictive, so also they are necessary in respect of God, that he may have a rise of shewing his Beneficence and Goodness, in its full extent: For, if there were no evils in the world, no infelicities, necessities, nor miseries, there could be no compassions, nor no evincements of his Tendernesses and Mercies in relieving, or removing them. He could not shew his readiness to Help, if there were no need of help; and therefore he hath sometimes hid himself behind the Curtain, even from his dearest Children, that on his return on their cryes, they may be more affected with his kindness, and become more sensible of it, else there had been no crying to God, nor help from him, nor thanks for it: See the 107 Psalm. For where there are no Evils, it might be said of God, as is said of a virtuous Man, by Seneca,
[Page 37] But, if we consider them as paenal Evils, so they have a mediate goodness, and an usefulness for Man, that much obliges him, for so (as we have said) they are as many Means to discipline and govern him; who, if he were not as he is, and were not govern'd and Disciplin'd as he is, but had been fixed by an Act of Power, without them, half the Shew had then been lost. So much of the Divine wisdome and goodness as is, visible in this conduct (which is very much) had then been never shewn, and so God had been deprived of a good part of his Glory. His is [...], a manifold wisdome, and manifold Goodness. And manifold wisdome must be shewn in many wayes, and not be limited to one.
Well (saith the Atheist) this is indeed a pretty colour, but 'tis no more, for the Government, if any, is not administred as you assert it; the Good and Evil in the world, are [Page 38] not for the ends you mention, to discipline and order it; these are too promiscuously dispens'd, and too blindly, to be so for Ends; 'tis rather to the contrary; the Good (if any difference) are most unhappy and unfortunate, and the wicked, most successeful and prosperous. A Phaenomenon, so Plain and obvious that not only Telamon in Cicero,
But also Solomon himself hath noted it; no man (saith he) knoweth, either love or hatred by all that is before him, all things come alike to all, there is one event to the Righteous and to the Wicked, &c. So undistinguishing and common are the external accidents. And 'tis strange, if there be indeed a Providence, that the Godly only should have the Promise of the present life, but no more the performance of it, than the Wicked.
SECT. 4.
The Objection remov'd. (1.) By denying its Ground: for all is Good to the Good, and Evil to the Evil. (2.) By settling this Rule. That Providence is not to be understood but in the End. This illustrated by several Resemblances, and by an Instance. The promiscuousness of Providence in events explained. External things indifferent in their own Nature, and nor Good nor Evil. Seemingly promiscuous Providence further vindicated, by several considerations. The false measure of Good and Evil detected. A right one settled.
This Appearance, I acknowledge, hath offended very many, and till he went into the Sanctuary, and there observ'd the End, it scandalized David: But Seneca hath fully solved it, and so hath Plutarch also, and Arrian's Epictetus, a Triumvirate [Page 40] of worthy Authors, and let the Atheist read them. He is mistaken, there is nothing Good in this Life to the Evil, and to the good and vertuous nothing is amisse and bad. Trahit quis (que) in suum colorem. To the Pure all things are Pure, The famous, but, &c. Story of the Angel, and unbelieving Hermite (that which Bradwardine relates, if yet it be a History) abundantly illustrates it. All things work together, in the End, for Good to one, and all for Evil to the other. You must take a Providence entire and altogether, and not in pieces and abroad, to make a Judgment on it. All is as the End is. That is well, which ends well, and that is otherwise, which ends so. You must stay the End to judge it; [the End of the Providence, and the End of the Man] Now marke the Perfect man, and be hold the Upright, for the End of that Man is peace, but the Transgressors shall be destroy'd together, the End of the Wicked shall [Page 41] be cut off. Two sorts of Men, and answerably two Ends; Heaven and Hell.
So Porphyrie out of Plato.‘— [...].’And again.‘— [...]’
The Providence of God is what Augustus thought it,‘ [...].Suet [...]n in vit. Octav. Aug [...]st.’ a well composed Drama; wherein a man is so surpriz'd and intricated with Variety, that all along he cannot once imagine its design, until he come to the End of it; and then he sees it clearly, how every Passage and adventure in the whole most excellently contribute to it, and most orderly. And surely, he that believeth (and Religion obligeth [Page 42] men to be believers) maketh no haste; One must await the End, to see the whole laid open. It is the excellency of a Work, to have its main design so skilfully conceal'd, as to suspend Spectators, and to lead them all about in a maze, until it all be finish't. The Atheist lookes but to a part, when he should stay to see the whole; at least the whole piece. He seeth but the wrong side of the Arras, the thrums and ends of the threads, when it is rowled up; the Beauty is in the right side, and he must stay the opening to see it. 'Tis unreasonable to complain of that in Providence, which he calls an Ornament, and which doth make his greatest pleasure and delight in Playes and Romances, viz. The interruption of the Story, and that suspence which is in it. We must stay the end of all to see the Harmony of all, and the last day will declare it; and we must stay the end of every piece of Providence, [Page 43] to make a judgement on that.
But, to give a Scriptural instance in the History of Joseph (not to mention that of Job or David,) what a marvellous surprize is in it! Take every passage of it solely by it self, and separate it from the rest, and how hard a one it is; all is then against him: To be hated by his brethren, that is bad; to be sold by them for a Slave to the Ishmaelites, and by these to Potiphar is worse; to be injuriously accused of his Mistress, and so condemn'd to perpetual Prisonment, worst of all. All these are hard, and separately all against him; but in concatenation and together, as one disposeth and prepareth for another, so they all co-operate in the End to his preferment, and are all for him.
For it was by the Buttler whose Dream he had interpreted, that such a mention was made in favour of him unto Pharaoh, as occasion'd his Preferment. It was in Prison he [Page 44] became acquainted with the Buttler, and interpreted his Dream; it was his Mistress's Accusation, which compos'd his Mittimus, and hurried him to Prison; it was the avarice and griping of the Ishmaelites, that brought him to his Mistress; and it was the Malice and Envy of his Brethren, that brought him to the Ishmaelites; and thus he comes to Preferment, and who would have thought it thus? All work together, and in the End for Good. Such an Ordering and over-ruling hand hath God in all the evil actions of Men; when Josephs Brethren sell him into Aegypt: God is said to send him. Humane Malice and Divine Providence, may be together in the same act; wherein Men have an evil hand, God hath a good one; who brings Light out of Darkness, and turns Evil in the End to Good. This for Particular Providence.
Hear Seneca.Senec. cur. [...]
Once, it is the End of all (as we have evidenc'd) that must open and unlock the Cabala, and Mystery of things at full; and if it be, then certainly, in being so precipitate [Page 46] and hasty, as not to stay it, to make a settled and establish't judgment, we as well betray an exraordinary Ignorance, and Folly, as a like Temerity and Rashness. For though there be a visible and apparent correspondency in some administrations, [Good in the End of them to the Good, as to Job, to Joseph, to David; and Evil at the furthest, in the End of them to the Evil, as in Adonibezek, Pherecydes Syrus, Attila, &c.] That we may acknowledge the righteousness and justice, which doth rule the world; yet it is obscure and hid in many others, that we may also know there is another day to come, that must more fully declare it. Some Mens sins go before to judgement, and others follow after. So Job 21. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 30. (the wicked) spend their Daies in wealth, and in a moment go down to the Grave. (But) He is reserved to the day of Destruction, they shall be brought forth to the Day of wrath.
[Page 47] It was this consideration satisfied many thinking and inquisitive Philosophers, about the seeming inaequality of things, who had otherwise been foundred on the same Rock with Diagoras Melius, [One of them, that made at first a great Profession of Religion and Piety, but did afterward abandon and forsake it, utterly denying the Being, and Existance of God, because he saw not speedy vengeance executed by him, on his perjur'd Friend, with whom he had deposited his money, and who forswore it.] But those being throughly perswaded of a Future day of judgement, and that there was a Minos, or a Radamanthos, or an Aeacus, a righteous and severe Judge, who would accurately scan there in the Lives and Actions of all men, and then accordingly retribute to them, as he found upon research; They acquiesced in that, and so should we. For when things are try'd, the Heavens shall record that [Page 48] Righteousness of God. Hear the Grave Plutarch.
SECT. 5.
Again, though all things for the Matter come alike to all, and so there is but one event both to the Righteous and the Wicked, yet formally, and in respect of Good and Evil, so they do not; the same event is sanctified to the one, which is not to the other; so that to the one it is Good, and to the other Evil: Fortune (as they call it) as well Adverse as Prosperous, [Page 49] it makes a Good man better, and so is good to him; but a Bad man worse, and so to him it is Evil.
So Epictetus.‘— [...] Epict in Enchirid. cap. 24.’
Arrianus.‘— [...] Arrian. Epict. lib. c. 6.’
Seneca.‘—Nihil accidere bono viro mali potest. Non miscentur contraria—Manet in statu, & quicquid evenit in suum colorem trahit.Senec. cur. bon. vi [...]. mal. fiant. cap. [...].’
So Socrates.‘—Nec enim cuiquam bono mali quidquam evenire potest, nec vivo, nec mortuo: nec unquam ejus res a diis immortalibus negligentur. Nec mihi ipsi hoc accidit fortuitò, nec verè iis, a quibus accusatus sum, aut a quibus condemnatus habeo quòd succenseam, nisi quod mihi nocere se crediderunt. Orat. ad Iudic. in Cicer. Tusc. Qu [...]st l.1.’
Now Events Materially accepted, [Page 50] and as in themselves, so they are not markes to judge by, either of the Love or Hatred, which Almighty God has for us, but only Formally, as Good and Evil, as sanctified and unsanctisied; that is, either as they are blessed to be Instruments or means of vertue, or else are cursed, and so are Rises and occasions of vice; or else of greater temporal Evils. Thus Solomon is understood. All come alike Materially, but not Formally. And there is the wisedom, that when the Events are the same, the Good and Evil are not. And thus it is.
For none of those external things the Atheist calleth Goods or Evils, are in themselves intrinsecally so, but being in themselves indifferent, are only relatively Good or Evil; so as they are either used or abused by those that have them; and as they prove in the end. Mens Tables may become snares, and out of the Eater meat may come, and 'tis [Page 51] to shew this, that God promiscuously bestows them. So Seneca. ‘—Hoc est propositum Deo, quod sapienti viro, ostendere haec quae vulgus appetit, quae reformidat, nec bona esse, nec mala. Apparebunt autem bona esse, si illa non nisi bonis viris tribuerit, &c.Senec. cur. bon. vir. mal. fiant. cap. 5.’Again.‘—Divitias nego bonum esse: nam si essent, bonos facerent.Senec de vit. beat. cap. 24. Vide Arrian. in Epict. suo. lib. 4. cap. 6. per totum.’
All Goodness, it consisteth in relation and convenience; things are onely good, so far as sutable and proper, (and) those are Evil which are otherwise: what is one Mans meat, it is anothers poison; and what is good in one circumstance is not alwayes so, but it is often very evil in another; and what seemeth temporally Good, as also Evil, for the present, may in the End prove contrary; and often doth; we daily see't. Quod videtur non est.
Wherefore, if God denies his Children or Servants what the Atheist thinketh good for them, [Page 52] (because it seemeth so) or else inflicteth on them what the Atheist apprehendeth Evil; he doth the former because he seeth, and he seeth furthest and clearest, that indeed it is not good; and so he doth the latter, either to procure them greater Good, or for preventing greater Evil. Arrianus saw this.‘— [...] Arrian. Epict. lib 4. cap. 7.’and this consideration justifieth God.
For as a Father who corrects his child, but to mend him, or who refuses to him a knife, wherewith he seeth he will cut his Fingers; or who abstructs a marriage that seemeth advantageous to his Son, which (he foresees) in the End will prove his Ruin; He loses not the Reputation of a Good or Kind Father, but acquireth to it that of wise; so also 'tis with God, God is a Good [Page 53] Father, and if he afflict, it is (if need be) but to embetter and improve his Children; or if he refuse them what they apprehend to be obliging, and Good, 'tis because indeed it is not so; it would be ruinous (if he should grant it) or detrimental at the least, to their eternal, or else their temporal State. They would lose in Goods of the mind, and in their Spiritual Comforts, what they gain in these of the body, or the like.
Nor has he absolutely promis'd Health, or Riches, or Honour, or any one External thing, but all as far as they conferr (to us) [no Good thing will he withhold;] and 'tis Good he has not absolutely promis'd any: seeing as the case may be, they all may turn to hurt. There is a sore Evil which I have seen under the Sun, Senec. de Pro. id. c. 3. namely Riches kept for the Owners thereof to their hurt. And there is a time wherein one man ruleth over another to his own hurt.
So Seneca.
SECT. 6.
And here it ought to be remarked, that a great occasion of mistake in this matter, is the impertinent judgement, which is made of Good and Evil by Sense; to reform which, we must consider that Sense is not the sole and proper Measure of them; there is indeed a Sensitive, but this is but an Animal, an inferiour Good or Evil; there is a Higher, a more exalted and Superiour, which is the Rational and Humane. It is the Rational Appetite, and not the Sensitive, that is the Measure of Good and Evil among men, that will not sink themselves to the Beasts. To man there are better Goods than the Sensitive, and worse Evils. These of Reason, are as much Superiour unto them of Sense, as men themselves [Page 55] to Beasts. Wherefore, he is no gainer, that gets but sensitive Good, by the losse of Rational. So Seneca. ‘—Altum quiddam est Virtus, ex celsum, regale, invictum, infatigabile: voluptas humile, servile, imbecillum, caducum, cujus statio ac domicilium fornices & propinae sunt.Sen. de vit. beat. cap. 7.’ ‘—Quid mihi voluptatem nominas? Hominis bonum quaero, non ventris, qui pecudibus ac beluis laxior est.cap. 9.’
And if a Father try his Son, or exercise his vertue: and refuse to gratifie him in a small and petty Boon, but to see how he will take it; resolving if he take it well, to recompence him with a greater, what injury is done the Child? or what unkindness can the Atheist find in the Father? And this is the Case. For no Believer is a loser by his Crosses, seeing if he bear them well, his light afflictions, which are but for a moment, work out for him [Page 56] a far more exceeding and eternal weight of Glory. Now a Poet bringeth not his Heroe to his utmost Felicity, but in the conclusion, after he hath made him give a thousand proofs of his vertue, and hath made him pass a thousand difficulties. We must be at pains for heaven; many shall seek, and shall not enter; we must strive if we will enter. Heaven is taken by violence. Remember the Olympic Exercises. The Apostle alludes to them; So run, as you may obtain. Strive lawfully, &c.
SECT. 7.
The Genesis of Man and Things, the best Apology for Providence, against the cavils of the Atheist; and a great instance of Divine Benignity. The Atheists (1.) Objection, That God did not fix and settle Adam in it, fully answered and exposed as irrational. (2.) Objection, The Iniquity of God and Providence in concluding all men under misery, for the Sin of One: This removed and the righteousness of God asserted and vindicated.
[Page 57] But what does most illustriously set off the Goodness and Benignity of God beyond exception, is this consideration, that Man was in his first Condition, made both Innocent and Happy; placed by Divine Bounty in a Garden most delicious, and as free from all trouble, as he was from sin; he had as many Servitours obsequious to his will, while he was so to God's, as there were Creatures; nor had he any Cross Incounters or Displeasures then. And if he have occasion to complain now of any alteration made in it, (as it cannot be denyed, but indeed he has) it must be of himself, who if he be no longer Happy, it is because he is no longer Innocent, but having first revolted from his Maker, all the Creatures [Page 58] now revolt from him. The very ground is Cursed, and he is made to see his Folly and his Sin together, in the Punishment of it. But, from the beginning it was not so. Death and Curse came in by Sin. Cursed is the Ground for thy sake, in sorrow shalt thou eat, &c. Many Heathens saw this, That of Homer is Pertinent.
Which one well translates.
Hear Catullus.
And Hesiod in his [...], describing the Golden Age, doth evidently represent the State of Man in Paradise.
Wherein also the famous Ovid admirably imitates him; and what other is his Story of Pandora, than an Allusion to the Fall of Man, which was occasion'd by a Woman.
It may be Plato and Timaeus had regard to Genesis, when they asserted nothing mortal was immediately created; for nothing was at first made so; unless you will be subtil, and distinguish accurately, by affirming that the things created, were at first Mortalia, though they were not Moritura; and be it so, yet Death came in by Sin, and [Page 60] so, it could not be before it; which is as much as (probably) they meant, or we would have them to.
But if they meant it not in that, it is as evident as Light it self, they did in Pr [...]-existence; [a Theory obtaining over all the World] This being nothing but a Depravation of the History of Adams Fall and his Exilement on it out of Paradise. This is Plato his descent of Souls. Which whosoever shall peruse Hierocles his account thereof, a person that could well give it, must needs as soon acknowledge, as he shall consider. And in regard it is important to demonstrate this Truth, as well against a knot of Learned men, that understand it in the Letter, as for the present purpose, I shall here alledge Hierocles in his own terms, and at large,Hierocl. in carm. Py. thag. ‘— [...] [Page 61] [...]’ ‘— [...].’
A Pregnant Testimony. Here's a Fall, and of Man, and for Sin. Ate is from [...] Peccare. God made Man Upright, but he found out many inventions. This is Plato's Descent of Souls.
But if God be infinitely Good and Pure, and Righteous, (replies the Atheist) how is it, that he did not [Page 62] settle Adam in his Innocence and Happiness? What salvo hath he for his own Righteousness, who so unmercifully suffered man to slide from His? Is he not an Accessory to the Crime, who (when he could prevent) permits it? He that doth not hinder Murther, or other wickedness, when 'tis in his Power so to do, is to be interpreted in all reason, to will it. God could have hinder'd Adam's. What say you therefore since he did not? How can you call him good and charitable, that would not prevent such misery? and how Righteous and Holy, that did permit such sin?
But seeing nothing gives but what it has it self, must not he be Holy, Pure, and Righteous, that Formed man so? and he Good, that so abundantly accommodated man, and freely furnish't him with all conveniencies and Comforts? Now God not onely most Benignly created Man in Innocence and Happiness, but obligingly [Page 63] conferr'd also to Establish him and fix him in it. He ordained him a Tree of Life [and Adam might have eaten of it, if he would himself, as well as of the other of knowledge.] Nor was it proper that he should do more toward it. It was not congruous and fit, he should determine arbitrary and spontaneous Agents, (and let the Atheist Judge) as he had done the Natural: nor agreeable that Man, an Agent ad utrum-libet, one that could deliberate and act on choice, that could freely and electively incline to both extreams, should be determin'd, as a Stone to one of them. It was fit elective Creatures should be left to their choice; and so was Man. A Tree of Life, and a Tree of knowledge [Life and Death] were both before him, and he might take his choice. Verily, God is irrationally charged (and let Arrianus in his Epictetus judge) [...] for not designing a perpetual happiness unto a Rational and knowing [Page 64] Creature, in a way that was not agreeable to Reason, as sure he must, if he had settled and established a willing, a free, an arbitrary, and elective Creature, in a State against his will, or without it. Nothing wanted but mans will, to make his happiness eternal. The Tree of Life was before him, and he might have eaten, and so have lived for ever, if he would, the very Angels themselves in Heaven were left to their choice; and reason good sayes Hierocles. ‘— [...]—’ Hierocl. in Carm. Pythag.
For if the great God should have restrained Adam phisically and forcibly, and not morally onely (as he did) and by a Law, from eating of the one Tree, or else should violently have compel'd him (as now the Atheist doth require) to pluck and eat of the other; as he had not congruously treated Adam, [Page 65] in the Notion of a Free and Arbitrary Agent, so neither had he tryed what he would do of himself. Besides, there had not then been any need of Law, for as much as it had been impertinent, to interdict eating to one, that could not possibly eat; and then if no Law, there had been no obedience neither, and consequently no Reward nor Punishment; and if no Law, no Obedience, no Reward nor Punishment, then no Government neither, and then in vain had Adam, in the very constitution of his Nature, been a governable Creature, seeing (if this had been) he were never to be actually governed. Natural Agents are not (properly) governed, but Morall Ones, and Moral Agents must be governed Morally. Hear Arrianus. ‘— [...] [Page 66] [...]’ Arrian. Epict. lib. 1 c. 6.
Nor is God obliged in the Notion of Good or Righteous Governor, violently to restrain the Governed from all unrighteousness, or to promote their weal and Good violently; that is not for a Governor (as such) to do; and therefore that God did not, is not in derogation of his Purity or Goodness. A Governor restraineth Evil, and advanceth Good, not by tying mens hands, but by enacting good Laws; by enforcing them with Menaces and Threats, and with Rewards and Compensations; by executing penalties on those that break them, and by renumerating those that do [Page 67] not. And though a Subject be an Accessory to the Crime, and Evil which he doth not hinder, if he can, and be interpreted to will it, if he do not do his natural utmost to prevent it, because he is obliged by a Law to do so; yet the Governour that maketh Law, [he being under none, but that of Equity and Fitness, which is to rule by Law, and as a Governour] is not accusable of Crimes, which he forbids and Punishes. He is a good Governour, that makes good Laws, and rules by them, and not by force.
But grant it (says the Atheist) that it was Divine Bounty to create Adam in a state of Happiness, and no omission, not to establish him, and fix him in it; but what equality in this, not to say what injurie, that when but One was in the Sin and guilt, he yet concludeth all men in the Punishment; as if, because the Parents eat the sowr grapes, the Childrens teeth must be on edge. Euripides complaint is just here‘[Page 68]— [...] Plutarch. de iis qui car [...]a Num. corrip’
I answer, There is no iniquity at all, in imputing unto all the sin of One, when you consider that that One was All; and those All are One. Adam was the whole kind; and All descendants from him, are but One Adam. Many members make but One whole. Mankind is a Tree, whose Root is Adam, all whose Children are but Branches, which deriving from him, and proceeding out of him, were at first in him, and so they all were; and when he sinned, not one of them but was; All were yet unborn, which must be minded.
And what maketh this consideration of the greater moment, is another, that Eve herself came out of Adam; so that Adam was intirely All; All are come from Adam and Eve, and Eve herself from Adam. Had there been Non Adamites, or Non intire Descendants from Adam, such as Jesus Christ, who was begotten [Page 69] of the Holy Spirit, it had not seemed reasonable, that the Sin of Adam, should be imputed to them. But seeing Mankind is an Extended Adam, and as it were, but one suppositum; and Actions are of supposites; though it were but He, the Root that sinned (actually) the Guilt is yet imputed to the Branches, which were in him; it not being thought unreasonable, that he which stealeth, or else Assassinates but with his hand, should yet be hanged for it by the Neck. All are concluded with him, being All included in him. And therefore Adams fall, is call'd the Fall of Man.
This is a Scriptural ground ‘ [...]’ and so agreeable to Reason that the Light of Nature shews it; for (beside the use of Men, wherein the whole blood is looked on as tainted, if but the Father be a Traytour, and wherein nothing is more common, than for Parents to covenant [Page 70] for Children, &c.) Plutarch speaketh home.‘— [...]’
Again, if Adam had not lapsed, then all Descendants from him had been possessed of the Happiness which be enjoyed
, and so had stood with him, and the Atheist holds not that unreasonable; and if it be not so, that [Page 71] he should stand, it cannot be so, he should fall for his Children; since it is but reason, that, if Children may be benefited and advantag'd by their Parents, they may be also disadvantag'd and disserv'd in them. Qui sentit commodum, sentiet incommodum. Plutarch thought so.‘ [...].’
Finally though all have Sinn'd in Adam, and so have Misery and Punishment entail'd upon them, yet that misery and Punishment is [Page 72] not so great, but that there is a greater mixture of Clemency and Mercy in it; the Life is left them with entailment of calamity upon it, is yet such as they are loath to part with; and they are favoured in it, with opportunities of making their condition better than at first it was, by playing an after Game, Thus the Fall is made to be good for them, since they have a rise to get by it: and hear Plutarch. ‘— [...]’
SECT. 8.
Divine Benignity and Goodness illustrated in his relieving Acts of Grace. Man gets by the Fall. Why his First State, though Good, was not best.
Well then God is Good; yes so infinitely Good and Bountiful, that, though man had miserably bankrupt, and fool'd all he had away; [Page 73] yet has he of his own alone immense Goodness and Charity, so stupendiously repaired him again, with such a new Stock in Jesus Christ, that if he be not infinitely wanting to himself, as well as to his Master, he may be made for ever by his breaking. God so [so] loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believed in him should not perish, but have everlasting life, Everlasting Life.
Thus, Humane condition, it is capable of being better'd by the Fall, it being in the kind of Man by Grace, as 'tis in other kinds by Nature, he riseth by his Fall; the Corn is not quickened nor multiplied, except it die; Man was not to be quickened by the Lord from Heaven, nor advanced from a natural into a better State of Spiritual, and Immortal Life, but after he was Spiritually dead. You who were dead in trespasses and sins, hath he quickened.
[Page 74] The Natural condition of the Man was Good in Paradise, and as good as that could be, but his Spiritual is better, and it was agreable unto the Law and Method of Nature, that what was good should precede, and what was better follow after; it being Nature's order, to proceed from things lesse Perfect, unto things more so. For in the Genesis of things (if you consult it) it was first Evening, then Morning; first Darkness, then Light; first the Naturals were made, then the Vegetables; first the Animals, then the Rationals; and 'tis to this that our Apostle alludes; The first man Adam was made a living Soul, the last Adam was made a quickning Spirit. Howbeit that was not first which is Spiritual: but that which is natural, and afterward that which is Spiritual. The first man is of the earth Earthy. The second Man is the Lord from Heaven. Thus is Man's Condition better'd, in that now, Divine Grace is brought by Jesus Christ.
SECT. 9.
The Atheists Objection of impossible conditions, and of Reprobation destroyed, Gods Universal love evinced, Election, and Reprobation explained. Reprobation in a comparative sense vindicated. The Terms of Grace, Practicable. Humane Impotency Moral, not Physical.
Yes (sayes the Atheist) so it lookes; for if he do extend his Grace (as he is said) to men, it is on Terms, so insupportable and hard, that they cannot possibly perform them; as if impossible conditions did not nullifie his grants, and make his Promises Denials; but that it were in his Law, as Lawers tells us it is in ours, wherein a Promise on Impossible Conditions, does immediately invest in Right. What Grace is this to look for tales of Bricks, without affording Straw? He bids [Page 76] us come inded (but when be knows we cannot) and then he tels us, we shall have. And is not this a great Evincement of Benignity, and love to Mankind, is it not? that he hath made the greatest part thereof to damne it? what means Reprobation else?
A most malicious imputation this! For as Plutarch. ‘— [...] Plutarch. in Platonic. Question.’
God has not made a man to damn him; he hath an universal (though not an equal Love) for all the Kind: and has given ample demonstrations of it in his Son: who assumed not the Person, but the Nature; He so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, &c. God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved.
What Evidences are there of his Pleasure (let me see but one of it) that the wicked die? when there are so many of his will (that) he should [Page 77] return from his wicked wayes, and live! Doth he not invite all? Doth he not beseech, and call all? [Ho every one that thirsteth, &c.] Doth he not afford sufficient means, and send his Ministers and Word to All? Is there not an universal Act of Amnesty, without a Man excepted, so he will come in? yes verily the Apostles were obliged to go to all the world, and preach the Gospel to every Creature.
And that very Reprobation, which is so great a scandal and offence unto the Atheist, onely because he has no right understanding and resentment of it, what is it but a lesser love? It may not be interpreted in a positive and simple sence, but onely in a comparative, as not impor [...]ing a simple Aversation or Hatred, but a lesse intense love. So that as they are called Chosen or Elect, whom he especially favours, so these are Reprobate or hated, whom he doth [Page 78] only generally love, but doth not specially favour. It was thus he Reprobated Esau, or hated him before his doing Good or Evil, not in a positive and simple, but in a comparative sense; he loved him not in that degree he loved Jacob, with that especial and distinguishing love. And so comparatively he is said to hate him; just as Jesus Christ affirmeth them to hate Father and Mother. who love them eminently lesse then him, So Scriptural a Notion this is of Hatred.
Now to apply it; What if God, who has a general and common love to all (which he hath evinced in a thousand wayes, by his creating, his conserving, his providing for them in the present life, and by capacitating of them for a better end) have yet so special and distinguishing an one for others, that in respect thereof the former is as none? Is he the less Good, or less Benigne, because he is so much so? or must it be interpreted a want [Page 79] of Goodness or Benignity to some, because he is abundant in it to others? as if it were not Righteous for the Great God to have his Favourites, when yet it is allowed and approved in men to have them. God doth but generally love some, to shew his Power; and he specially doth favour others, to shew his Rich Grace. Had he loved all a like, it would not look of Grace to any. Grace is Favour, and Favour is particular, and distinguishing. Nor had he shew'n his power, if he had not passed some by, when he obliged others with Favours.
So infinitely Good is God; that the veryest Reprobate in all the world, has no occasion of a just complant against him; He is as good as Soveraign, and to manifest himself so, he has in all Transactions so admirably temper'd Love and Power, that if he is Soveraignly Gratious in some of them, He is in others as Benignly Soveraign: though he [Page 80] Favours some and not others, and that because he will, yet he has an universal love and general kindness for them all. Those that are not Favourites are yet consider'd as his Subjects, he willeth their Repentance, and as a Governour endeavours it; for though he use his Power and Dominion, that he might shew his indignation against Sin, as well as his aversion, yet it onely is on such he has first endured with much long suffering, who by aggravated guilt, have merited destruction, and so have fitted and prepared themselves for it, and now, is God Evil or Unrighteous? if you state it thus; and so Scripture states it, keep to these Termes, and Reprobation is defensible.
Nor is God a hard Master; he requireth not impossibilities, or Tales of Brick without Straw; for, though he might consider man in great Justice, not as he hath made himself, but as he was made at first, and so agreably expect from him [Page 81] according to the Stock, which then was given him; yet He hath condescended to compound, and by an Act of Grace, as infinite as is himself, has offered bankrupt Adam New Termes, and such as are agreable unto him now in this Condition, and feasible. I say now, for otherwise indeed Impossible Conditions (as Logicians tell us) were refusals; or if, as many say, the Terms offered unto Man, were bottomed on Aestimates that are not, and on consideration of a Stock at first given, but which is no longer, they were not gracious and relieving, and consequently could not be intended to oblige Man anew, since his contracted inability; but to upbraid him and reproach him with it.)
No, God requires nothing of a Man [not in the Covenant of Grace] but what substantially is natural; and let the Athiest or any other otherwise perswaded, instance but in one required Act to [Page 82] the contrary; to believe, to repent, to love, &c. Are Acts substantially within the compass of the Humane Nature, and which one exercises every day; He believeth some reports, and he Repenteth some Follies, he loves his Friend, &c. and God obliges him but to Believe and Credit him, to repent of Follies practised against him, and to affect and love him, as his Friend and Benefactor, the Acts substantially are the same, though the determinations of the Acts are not, their Moral Principles and Objects differ.
And, that Inability, or Impotency of humane will, which occasions so great a noise and murmur, is not to be understood as if there were not in it Natural Liberty; the Will of Man Essentially is free, and Lady of her own actions, and its adaequate and proper object, Good; It is not Natural but Moral impotence, an inability in the Will of willing Spiritual Good, through a prepossession [Page 83] of it, with such resistent Habits, with Love of the World, and with Lust, as being enmity to God, and all Divine Good, do so powerfully chain her unto one extream, that she is not capable as long as she is under them, of inclining to the other. An irregenerate and unconverted man, he has the Faculty of willing, though not the exercise. [Voluntatem habet, non velle.] As one may have the Visive Power in the dark, though he cannot see, but in the Light. Potentiam habet, sed non Posse, and the Faculty of willing, Man hath, because he has the Faculty of Nilling. [& Ejus est velle cujus est nolle.] Boetius proves it.‘Animadverto inquit, id (que) uti tu dicis it a esse consentio. Sed in hac haerentium sibi serie causarum, estne ulla nostri arbitrii libertas, an ipsos quo (que) humanorum motus animorum fatalis catena constringit. Phi. est inquit, neque enim fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas adsit arbitrii, &c. Boet. lib. 1 Pros. [...].’
[Page 84] So that its impotency is but vitious and habitual, such an One as in Truants, that say they cannot learn, or in Prejudiced Persons, that say they cannot love, and indeed but very hardly can, as long as they are so; both which experience in themselves, something rising and reluctant at the thoughts of Love and Learning; and so do wicked Men, who all are Truants and Prejudiced with the Love of the World, and of Lust, they have Reluctancies arising in them, at the thoughts of God, and of all true Goodness. Intus exhistens prohibet alienum. You must cure their prejudices to convert them.
SECT. 10.
The Atheists Reply of Termes still impossible, though but morally so, remov'd. Man's Power, but by Gods Grace, explicated, asserted. The cures of the wither'd Arm, and of the Impotent man at Bethesda, Emblematical. Their Application.
Well, But call it Moral or Habituall impotency (saith the Atheist) and render it as culpable and faulty as you can, yet, seeing it is such as Grace did find him in, it reflects as ill on that, if it be invincible and obstinate, as if it were a Physical and Simple one, what Grace is in the Terms, which neither do consider, nor relieve necessities; which oblige a man to things impossible unto him; and which exact a Victory and Conquest over prejudices that are inveterate, and Raigning, and that 'tis known, a man himself can [Page 86] never overcome, or vanquish? We are asserted dead in Trespasses and Sins; that we can do nothing of our selves: the natural Man discerneth not the things of God; neither indeed can he, &c.
Then hear again, O Atheist, and admire, and never open more against Divine Goodness, which is much above the contradiction of the Wicked, as the Heavens themselves above the Earth; and herein see it, that in the Covenant of Grace, the Great God requireth nothing of a Man, but what he offers him his Help for, [in me is thy Help] which he conferreth on him in the way of Duty and Dependance. So that nothing is exacted as a Term, but what a man is able and sufficient to perform, not from any Power in himself, but by the help of God, who, by way of caution, (for the greater security of it) now keeps the whole Stock, intirely and solely in his own hand, seeing Man hath bankrupt once already with it, [Page 87] when it was in his, and it is his Goodness to keep it for us. Now every Man can do with God's help, what every Saint doth do; Nothing without it, All with it. Not that we are sufficient of our selves to do any thing, as of our selves. A Sufficiency there is, but not of our selves; our Sufficiency is of God, 'tis not in him that willeth, that he willeth; nor in him that runneth, that he runneth; but in God that sheweth mercy, who giveth both to will and to do of his own good pleasure. Man can do nothing of himself, that no Flesh might glory; but with God's Help, he can do every thing, that he that glorieth, might Glory in the Lord. And men may have God's help, if they will; it is but ask, and have. But God must help, and therefore sayes Pythagoras. ‘— [...]—Hierocl. in Carm. Pythag.’
[Page 88]And Hierocles on him.‘ [...]’
And Plutarch.‘— [...] Plutarch. C. Marc. Coriolanus.’ and God will help if Men will try. So Aeschylus. ‘— [...]’
[Page 89] This Concernment and Transaction of Almighty God with men is admirably represented in the Method of Jesus Christ used when he cur'd the Impotent and Lame; For Instance, when he cur'd the wither'd hand; which he did, by bidding him that had it, stretch it out: and so that other impotent and maimed man, at Bethesda, who could hardly stir his hand or foot; by bidding him take up his bed and walk.
One would have thought he had but mocked, to bid the wither'd arm be extended, or the Impotent to take his bed and walk; to bid them go that had no legs; but they believed him to be serious, and that he was able to enable them, and therefore tryed and in trying found ability come in. And so it is with us, we are unable in our selves for all the duties he obliges to, we are bid to stretch our wither'd arms out, to believe, to love, to obey him spiritually, and [Page 90] (as it were) to take up our beds and walk, when we are impotent and lame; but yet on such a trying he enables us; vertue comes in with our obedience, if we believe. It is not means but Gods blessing. And your Indeavours are to be in Gods name, and not in your own. Many have indeavour'd in their own strength, and fal'n short; you must try in Gods, and so you can do every thing. You say you cannot come, when God obliges you; but pray try. Can't you pray, can't you hear (the Word) can't you read? &c. Try in Gods Name. Do what you can. If men will not try, when God saith he'l help; 'tis of perverseness, and not of impotence, that they do not come. Love offers help to all, but Grace gives help to some. All may have it if they will, but some shall will to have it. If any be lost 'tis of their own Wills, but if any be sav'd, 'tis long of God's. God is willing indeed (as General Rector) [Page 91] (that all should be saved, but he doth not will, or decree (as a special Father) that all shall be saved.
SECT. 11.
A foolish Objection from the immaturity, and imperfection of the Divine Life here proposed, and the Vanity of it detected.
But may the Atheist say, what need so much adoe then, for man to pray, and hear, and read, and meditate, and try, if God do all? And why is the Life of God in men so long imperfect, when if he were good, he would, and, if he would, he could at once immediately accomplish it? why doth he let them creep, whom he could make to flie, and so defer that utmost happiness and perfection, which he is said to ordain them to, when, if he would, he might as soon possesse them of it, as design it.
[Page 92] I answer, There are means as well as ends, and wisdome lies in suting them; the Atheist might as well require, that every thing in Nature should immediately, without an orderly progression and advancemen, arrive unto perfection, that there should immediately be Trees, without seeds▪ and growing, and those immediately should bear fruit, without blossoming before; as what he doth. For, as it is in other kindes, so it is in Mankind, both as to his Naturals and Morals, he must orderly advance, and grow in use of means, from an imperfect, immature, unripe estate unto a perfect, and mature. The Newman hath Ages, as the Natural. God is uniform in his workes: Grace hath its orderly advancements and Progressions, as well as Nature. We must Grow in Grace, toward the measure of the Stature, as we do in Nature. We are born Infants and not Men.
SECT. 12.
A brief transition toward, a Conclusion on this Head. The excellency of Divine Goodness; it maketh God most lovely, and is the Ground of all Devotion.
Thus (as I was capable) I have explained and asserted the Divine Bonity, and also the Bounty, and Beneficence of God, which is, his most (1.) illustrious Attribute, and that which maketh him most Dear, most amiable, and most desireable to men, and which is the (2.) ligament and Bond of all Devotion to him. For so Cicero. ‘—(1.) Ipse Jupiter, id est juvans pater, quem conversis casibus appellamus a juvando Jovem, à poetis pater divumque hominum (que) dicitur, a majoribus autem nostris, optimus maximus, & quidem ante optimus id est, beneficentissimus, quam maximus: quia majus est, certe (que) gratius [Page 94] prodesse omnibus, quam opes magnas habere, &c.Cicer de nat deor. lib. 2.’ ‘—Quid est melius, aut quid praestantius bonitate & beneficentia? quâ cum carere deum vultis, neminem deo, nec deum, nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari, neminem diligi vultis.Cic. de nat Deor. lib. 1’ ‘—(2.) Quae porro pietas ei debetur, a quo nihil acceperis? aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei deberi potest? Est enim pietas, justitia adversum deos: cum quibus quid potest nobis esse juris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit communitas? sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum: qui quamobrem colendi sint, non intelligo, nullo nec accepto ab iis, nec sperato bono.Ibid.’
And there is nothing can administer to Men, in all their fluctuations and perplexities, a greater Consolation, than this consideration, that the World hath a Governour, and him a good one;Apul. de Mundo. that the Ship is not without a Pilot, nor [Page 95] nor the House without a Master; but that every thing is order'd as well by infinite, and carefull, and supream Goodness, as by most excellent wisdome. So Arrianus. ‘— [...] Arrian. Epict. lib. 1. cap. 7.’
So Seneca.‘—Ideo fortiter omne ferendum est: quia non, ut put amus, incidunt cuncta, sed veniunt, Olim constitutum est, quid gaudeas, quid fle [...]s, &c. 'Tis Decreed.Senec. cur. bon. vir. mal. fiant. cap. 5.’
SECT. 13.
First Corollarary. Nothing so indecent, and unbecoming for men, nor so dishonourable to God, as superstitious Fears and Scruples. Several considerations to evince it.
And being so. (1.) There is nothing more undecent and unbecoming for men, nor more dishonourable, as well as more ungrateful to Divine Goodness, than superstitious Scruples, Fars, Distrusts, and Apprehensions of God; as if he were a Mean and Low Being, whom insignificant and little things could either irritate or please: as if he did not know, or not consider, that we are but flesh; but that he weighed us in a Ballance, as by grains and scruples; or that he were inexorable, hard, and rigid. In a word, as if He were not an infinitely excellent perfect Being; [Page 97] [the Best] but had a Composition in his Temper, of somewhat Little, Small, Evil, and Weak. No, God looketh to the Heart, and so thou be sincere, it is enough. [But don't mistake Sincerity.] He accepteth not according to what a Man hath not, but according to what he hath. Mind the great Duties, and Perfections of the Humane Life, and of the Divine; and know assuredly, that God will wink at unavoidable infirmities, in thy discharging of them. Take heed of Diffidence, and Slavish Feares; and know it more obliging to the Great God to Love him cordially, than to Fear him servilely, for it is Love, and not Fear, that hath the honour to fulfil the whole Law; and let the Scrupulous consider it.
Once, a Melancholly, Scrupulous, Unchearful, and Fearful, it is a Miserable and Forlorn Life.
.
So Plutarch.‘— [...] [Page 98] [...] Plutarch. de superstit.’ and, it also is a thing that makes a Christian as utterly unlike to Jesus Christ, as any thing can be; He, came eating and drinking, in a complacent and chearful fashion, and not as John the Baptist, with a hair Coat and Leathern Girdle. And it is utterly improper to the Gospel State, in which he is, He is not under the Law, but under Grace: Jesus Christ is come on purpose, to bring Life, and Immortality to Light; to let him understand the infinite, and inexpressible Good will of God the Father; and to acquaint him with those eternal motions in the Heart of God in his Favour, that God is willing to adopt him. And this good News should make him to rejoyce. A little should not cloud his joyes. [Page 99] The Apostle bids us rejoyce, and again rejoyce, that we may perform Duties chearfully. God loves a cherful Giver.
So Porphyrie.‘— [...] Porphyr de Abstinent. lib. 2.’
Believe it all our Melancholly, Fear, and Apprehension, saving onely so much of it, as is constitutional, proceedeth from our ignorance of God, and of the Gospel liberty we are redeemed into, that we don't consider (and perhaps distemper will not let us) that we have not now receiv'd the Spirit of Bondage [that Spirit of the Law] again to Fear, but the Spirit of adoption, [that Evangelical and Gospel Spirit] by which we invocate one God as our Father. For we are not come unto the Mount that might be touched, and that burned with Fire, nor unto blackness, and darkness, and tempest. And the sound of a Trumpet, and the voice of words, which voice [Page 100] they that heard, intreated, that the Word should not be spoken to them any more. (For they could not indure that which was commanded: and if so much as a Beast touch the Mountain, it shall be stoned, or thrust through with a dart. And so terrible was the sight, that Moses said I exceedingly fear and quake.) But we are come to Mount Sion, and unto the City of the Living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of Angels. To the General Assembly and Church of the First born, which are written in Heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the Spirits of Just men made perfect, and to Jesus the Mediatour of the New Covenant, and to the blood of Sprinckling, that speaketh better things than that of Abel.
But this is not said to encourage any in their insolent Affronts, or Provocations of God. Shall Sin abound because Grace hath abounded? God forbid. The Goodness, [Page 101] Patience, Long-suffering, and Forbearance of Almighty God, where there is any Ingenuity, to take a right Impression, and Resentment of it, Leadeth to Repentance. Such as take incouragement (for none is given them) to do evil, because they know that God is good, have reason to consider, that there is Mercy with him, but not that he may be presumed on, but Feared. That he is Maximus as well as Optimus; That he is Judge of all the Earth, and will as surely right himself as others; that he wanteth not Ability, if once he have the will to A [...]enge. And finally that Despised Bonity and Patience, will at last convert to Fury.
SECT. 14.
Second Corolary. Nothing so Decent and becoming for Men, nor so obliging to God, as Confidence in him, as adoring and glorifying of him. To glorifie God what. [...] in Psalm 150. What it imports.
Wherefore (2.) It is most Decent and becoming for Men, who are obliged of God, and know him to be God, to acknowledge it in Prayer to him, in dependance on him, in confidence in him, and in Praises of him. For to Believe, Pray, and Trust, it is the Work of Earth; and to Admire, Adore, and Praise, it is the work of Heaven, but to be begun on Earth; 'Tis all the Retribution that Almighty God requires, that he be blessed for his blessings, which he then is, when we return with his blessings, and really (as [Page 103] well as verbally) acknowledge them unto him, that they are effects of his alone Bounty, that all derive from him,Pausan. in Arcad. and that he is the Origen and source of all. Bonus Deus had a Temple among the Megalopolitans. We must Pray, and Praise.
Praise is comely.
So Porphyrie. ‘ [...] Porphyr. de Abstinent. l. 2. Sect. 24.’
So Pythagoras in Iamblicus.‘— [...] Iamblic. in vit. Pythag.’
For this shall every one, that is Godly Pray.
So also Pythagoras in Iamblicus. ‘— [...] Ibid.’
But it ought to be remembred, that he that Praiseth, glorifieth God, more than he that Prayeth, for as much as he that prayeth, but [Page 104] hopeth that he will be Good, but he that praiseth doth acknowledge (that) He is so; and therefore, we ought not to be more in application and address to God, by way of Supplication and Petition, than of Acknowledgement and Praise; which yet, as gross a Piece of Inequality as 'tis, we all are subject to▪ who are very often infinitely more concerned, and zealous in our Prayers, than in our giving of thanks. It is because, our Prayers are for our selves, but giving thanks is to God.
We have the Psalmist for a great. Example of our Duty; how many Psalms has he composed all of Praise? the 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. and in fine, 150. are all Laudatory. Praise ye the Lord. Praise God in his Sanctuary, Praise him in the Firmament of his Power. Praise him for his mighty Acts: Praise him according to his Excellent Greatness. Praise him with the sound of the Trumpet, &c. [Page 105] And let every thing that hath breath, praise the Lord. Every thing that hath [...] is a word affirmed of the Rabbines, and some others out of them, to be only used for the understanding, and superiour part of Man, and so to be distinguished from [...], that also signifies the sensitive and lower. But it is a Groundless apprehension, and the present text evinces it so. For as [...] otherwhere is put for Wind, so is [...], here, let every thing that hath [...] is as much as every thing, that hath wind, Every windy and Pneumatical instrument; for it were Instruments he had invoked; the Trumpet, the Psaltery, the Harp, the Timbrel, the Stringed Instruments and Organs; and let every windy and Pneumatical instrument, [perhaps every Musical, whether Pneumatic or Pulsatic] let it praise the Lord; and praise ye the Lord. An Apostrophe to the Church, q. d. O Saints praise ye the Lord.
[Page 106] And to what I would oblige others, that I desire my self; namely, to admire and adore the Providence and Bounty of the Great God, and withal implore his Favour, Assistance, and Protection: Which I shall, in Terms which Boetius prompts me with.
CHAP. III.
SECT. 1.
Divine Finality what. Acknowledged by Orpheus, all the Ancients, and Boetius. Evinced from Divine bounty, and universal Efficiency. How all things are for God. His Glory internal and external. How God is glorified.
ANd so much for Divine Benignity, that glorious Attribute of God; the first Result of his Transcendent Goodness. There is another, that obliges us a little to consider it, and that is his Finality, that, whereby he is Omega, or the ultimate and furthest end of all things; so as that they are ultimately for him, as he is for himself. He is the last, for whom are all; and so himself is for no other; for if he were, he were not last.
Thus Orpheus, or if as Aristotle tells us, there was never such a [Page 109] Poet; let it be as those Disciples of Pythagoras affirm, one Cercops ‘ [...] Apul. de Mundo’ and all the Antients.‘— [...] Plutarch. advers. Cototen.’
So Boetius also.‘—Sed dic mihi, meministine quis sit rerum finis, quove totius natura tendat intentio. Boet. Audieram inquam, sed memoriam maeror hebetavit. Phi: At quî scis unde cunct a processerunt. Boeti. Novi inquam Deumque esse Mundi. Phi. Et quî fieri potest ut Principio cognito, quis sit rerum Finis ignores.Boet. lib. 1. Pros. 6.’
For if he be the best Being, as has already been evinc'd, it evidently follows, that be is the last End, in as much as Good and End, for all their formal Notions and Idea's be distinct, are yet convertible with one another. The Chiefest Good is All-sufficient, and [Page 110] of an universal comprehension, and capacity, containing in it all Good; and he must needs be the End of all, that containeth in himself the Good of all.
It might be also argued, and perhaps with greater evidence and perspicuity, as Boetius, and the Scriptures do, from his first and universal Agency; for he that is the First efficient, must needs be the last End; Being is a Circle, wherein it is impossible, but that the Alpha is Omega, and that the Point beginning All, is the End of it. The Lord hath made all things for himself.
And, if he be the End of all things, seeing that an End is that, for which a thing is, and so the End of all, is that for which all others are; it followes, that they all are for God [so our Apostle, to him are all things] or, as the Holy Scriptures also happily expresse it (they all) are for the Glory of God.
[Page 111] But to prevent misapprehensions, it ought to be consider'd, that Divine Glory is either internal or external Glory. His Internal, it is his Essential Glory, that in respect of which the Great Apostle calls him the Glory, and Peter the excellent Glory; and is as inseparably inherent to him, as is that which doth compose the Sun, to it. To which it is in this resembled, that 'tis as inaccessable and dazling to the mind, as this, to the Eye; and utterly uncapable of all Addition, as well as all Diminution. This is the Finis cui.
But this is not the End of acquisition, or as the Metaphysics stile it, the Finis cujus; it is not this, but his external Glory, that all things else are lastly for. And his external Glory (as it were the shining of the Sun (is nothing but the Manifestation of Divine Perfections and Attributes (which as Aristotle De [...] lib. 1. c. 12. intimates are all Glories) in his [Page 112] Operations and Effects, in respect of which, when they are seen, admir'd, acknowledg'd, and ascrib'd to Him; He is affirmed to be Glorified, or to have Glory given him: and this properly. For so Cicero. ‘—Est enim Gloria solida quaedam res & expressa, non adumbrata, &c. Cicer. Tusc. Quaest. l. 3.’
Indeed God is said to be Glorified, or to have Glory given him, either Passively and Objectively, or else Actively and Formally. The Heavens above, the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, and also the Earth below, the Minerals and Plants, and mere Animals, things that comprehend not the Divine Perfections, but as objects onely represent and shew them, do by interpretation give him Glory or Glorifie him in the first sense; but Man himself, in taking Rise from these to do so, doth perform it in the second. But properly, God is Glorious in the former; but Glorified, [Page 113] by the latter. The Invisible things of God, are clearly seen in the things that are made, &c. There's the One. How Excellent is thy Name in all the Earth, there is the other. Other Beings are designed to Exhibit and Express Divine Glory, but Man is made to view it, and acknowledge it. All thy Workes praise thee, but, thy Saints bless thee.
So Arrianus.‘— [...].’
So Seneca.‘—Nisi ad haec admitterer, non fuerat operae praetium nasci.Senec. nat. Quaest l. 1. praefat.’
SECT. 2.
A Capitulation of the things to be discoursed. (1.) Man not an ultimate End, evinced. 1. From his dependency in Being, and 2. From his Faculties. That he is a mediate End conceded, and argued from the authority of the Stoicks, of Aristotle, and of Cicero, and by Reason, from the Essential Notion of the world, and the Doctrine of Signatures,
But to be more particular, (as this Subject of Divine Finality, which is of great importance, and concernment, doth engage us) I shall endeavour to evince distinctly. (1.) That Man is not his own End. (2.) That another, One above in Heaven, and the Origen and Source of all, is it. And then (3.) That the infinite Transceudency of God, or his highest Exaltation, and Supremacy, is [Page 115] the ground of his Finality; which effected, I shall shut up this Discourse in two or three Corollaries.
And first, That Man is not his own End, is evident; For as much as He is from another: The Son is from the Father, and he from his, and so along unto the first, who being of the same kind, is as dependent as the second; so first, and second, and every one, is from another, and he is for another, and not himself, that is dependent; and is not from himself, but from another.
But if this first evincement, seem too Metaphysical and Delicate, there is a second, from the Humane Faculties and Powers, which is more Harmonious, and convincing. It is that Man himself is constituted for address to Good without him, that he is a willing and affective Creature; that is, that he hath Will and Affections, which inclining him to Things without, [Page 116] transport him. Now it cannot be imagined, that he should be his own End, who is connaturally carried out to Good beyond himself; it being utterly impossible, that that should be a Terminative, Central Being, which hath Pondus in it, and doth gravitate and weigh. That is off the Center which inclines and gravitates. Now the Will is Pondus animae, and Love is Exstatical. Man is not his own end, because he is not his own Good. He is an Appetent, and inclining Being; and therefore his Good is all without him, because his Love, and his Desire export him.
I confess indeed He is the visible End of all inferiour Beings. For though I know Velleius, [He in Cicero] Carneades, and many others, do smartly argue on the contrary; yet I also know, he is acknowledg'd so by Aristotle, by most other great Philosophers, and generally, all the Stoicks, [Page 117] as we are told by Cicero ‘—Sunt autem alii Philosophi, & hi qūidem magni at (que) nobiles, qui deorum mente, atque ratione omnem mundum administrari & regi censeant: ne (que) vero id solum, sed etiam ab iisdem vitae hominum consuli, & provideri. Nam & fruges & reliqua, quae terra pariat, & tempestates, ac temporum varietates, coelique mutationes, quibus omnia quae terra gignat, maturata pubescant a diis immortalibus tribui generi humano putant: multa (que) quae dicentur in his libris, colligunt quae talia sunt, ut ea ipsa dii immortales ad usum hominum fabricati paene videantur. Contra quos Carneades, &c.Cicer de nat. deor. lib. 1.’ And‘—An haec, ut ferè dicitis, hominum causa, a deo constituta sunt? &c.Ibid.’
And, beside the first of Genesis wherein we have the Charter of Dominion; and the second, wherein Adam in sign of his Propriety, and Right over them, imposeth [Page 118] Names and Titles on the Creatures; there are two Considerations, which abundantly confirm it.
First, The World, it is called [...], for the Beauty, Order, Relations, and Proportions in it, but for which it were a Chaos, a Tohu B [...]hu, not a World; and these in being Adaequate and proper Objects of the Rational and Humane Nature, do evidently shew, that it was made for this. It is the Order, Relations, and Proportions in the World, that makes it; and these are onely for the understanding, which alone discernes them; as Colours are for the sight, and Sounds are for the hearing, and Odours are for the smelling, &c. There is nothing in the World, but there is a Faculty in Man to reach it; and Objects are for Faculties. And there are Entertainments in every Being in the World, which are not so to any other but Man; and therefore, [Page 119] were not made for any other, but for him. Every thing hath its Beauty, its Order, and its Relation to others, which only Man discerneth. And Cicero noted it.‘—Nec verò illa parva vis naturae est, rationis (que) quod unum hoc animal sentit quid sit Ordo, quid deceat, in factis dictisque quis sit modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit. Cicer. de Offic. lib. 1.’
And secondly, The Theory of Signatures, which are but so many Hieroglyphicks, or sacred Characters, and Notes on things, to intimate their Natures, and Uses, is another proof of it. For seeing there are such impressions made on things by Nature, whereof he cannot doubt, that hath attentively consider'd her, and that they are intelligible unto Man, and unto none beside, it cannot be, but that they were intended and alone intended [Page 120] for him. How eminent a Signature is on the Lujula, or Woodsorrel? it exactly represents the Heart, and is Cardiacal, or proper for it. The Perforations of Hypericon, import its uses. And not to mention the Aetites, the Speckled Jasper, and other Stones; there are remarkable Resemblances on Pulmonaria maculosa, or the Sage of Jerusalem? on the Lesser Celondine; on the Dragons; on the common Pimpinel, and on all the Orchiss, &c. And there are Agreable Effects performed by them. Such as are curious may consult Crollius, and other learned Writers.
SECT. 3.
One above, who is demonstrated the Maker of Man, and other things, is also evinced his End. (1.) From Congruity. (2.) The limitation of inferiours in their services of Man, and (3.) from the Harmony of the World.
But Man though he be the visible and immediate End of all things in the World, yet, not being the Author or Original of any in it, He is obliged to asend to One above himself, Who having made those other things, and also so design'd them for Man, as that he cannot but confess he could not do it for himself, is to be acknowledged as much Superiour and above him in Efficiency and Power, as in Beneficence and Bounty. And this is the second thing I promised to evince.
For those other things are evidently, [Page 122] for the use and ends of Man, they are so apt and fit to them; and consequently being for an End, it cannot be, but they must have an Efficient. [Whatsoever is for somewhat, also is from somewhat] and it cannot be from Man (that) they should be, who is so indigent to live upon them; it being unimaginable, how a thing should be from him, who cannot be himself without it. Now Man subsists on the Elements, and on Elementary concretes.
It remaineth then, there is another Being they are from, which is infinitely much above the Humane; of which it is as well the Origen and Source, as of those other. For seeing it is utterly impossible, that Man himself should be unmade, who cannot possibly subsist, or be without the things made: 'Tis most agreable that he should have the making of him, who hath the making of the things on which he lives. I say, 'tis most [Page 123] rational, that he should make Man, if he be made (as he is proved to be) who, by providing for him, conserves him. Thus other things and Man himself, lead us up to one above Man.
Now, admitting that Man hath such an Authour of his Being, as is infinitely much above him, (for he made him) and hath bountifully made all others, to accommodate and serve him; how can it be imagined, but that he is for this? For 'tis not to be thought, that God, who had so great considerations for another, should incuriously neglect himself, but that rather, seeing he hath made so many things for Man's Ends, he made Man, and all things else for his own, and in constituting Man a kind of God to them,Iamblic. in Protrept. and so capacitating of him to receive Duties, did but agreably instruct him in those other, which he is to pay. For what he looketh for, from those beneath him, why [Page 124] should he refuse to one so much above him, who made him for himself.
And that he hath done so, the Humane Faculties do further shew, For as much as Man hath both a mind and Understanding capable of apprehending God, and of conversing with him, and a will also as capable of weighing and inclining to him; and what other demonstration can a Man expect in Nature, of his being formed to maintain an intercourse with God, to glorifie him in the World, and to recognize him as the first Efficient, and the last End, as Allmighty, and All-Good, and by doing it to be conformed to him, but that he is inabled and proportion'd by him to do so? What Evidence we have to convince us, that the Eye was made to see colours, that very same we have to prove that our understandings and Wills were ordain'd to converse with God: for we can Apprehend [Page 125] him, Love him, Desire him, and Delight in him, and therefore were ordained to do so. Porphyrie is full, this is that Mans End.‘— [...] Porphyr. de Abstinent. l. 1. Sect. 29’
But Iamblicus is fuller.‘— [...] Iamblic. Protrept. cap. 3.’
This is abundantly confirm'd, in that Inferiour Beings are so confin'd and qualified in their services to Man, that they do him none, but in Dependance on a Superiour. For instance, the Soil it self, for all the pains and industry the Husband man is at in cultivating and [Page 126] manuring it, will afford him nothing without the Rain from Heaven, which makes the fruitful Seasons. And who holds the Key of Rain but God?Pausan. in Attic. The Athenians acknowledg'd it; they own'd a Jupiter Pluvius. Pausan. in Corinthiac. [So Pausanias tells us] and also the Arcadians, who saught it of him,Idem in Arcad. when they needed it. In a word all Greece acknowledged it, when destitute of rain, they sent to Delphos. The same Pausanias reports the whole passage.‘—Cum diuturna siccitate Graecia labor aret ac non minus reliqua, quae extra Isthmum est, Graecia quamtota Peleponnesus caelestium aquarum penuria affecta esset, missi Delphos sunt, qui ex oraculo calamitatis causam ac remedium cognoscerent, &c. Id. in Corinthiac. Romul. Amasaeo. Interpret.’
This is the very Argument by which the great Apostle doth establish the belief of both the Divine Being and Beneficence among the Lystrians, when (as the Text implies) [Page 127] by way of obviation to the Doctrines of the Zabi, and others, who ascrib'd them unto their vanities and Idols, he asserteth Rain from Heaven and fruitful Seasons made by it, to proceed from God alone, who is the Living and Almighty. For, sayes he, they Witness for Almighty God [He left not himself without Witness] That he is above, that he is gracious and benign, and that by reserving in his own power, things so absolutely necessary both for humane subsistance, and for that of all things living, he doth at once remind us of the indissolvable and strict dependance, which we all have on him, and also of the Deference and Duty we owe him. If God give gifts, we owe acknowledgements; Rain and fruitful Seasons come down, and therefore Man must look up. The year makes the encrease; but God makes the year. This the Gentiles acknowledg'd. Jupiter Pluvius had an Altar.
So Pausanias.‘Est item ara ibidem alia, ad quam Jovi, quem modò Pluvium, modo Innoxium appellant, rem divinam faciunt.In Attic.’
And the Ancients paid their first Fruits.
So Porphyrie. —Sect. 27. ‘ [...] Porphyr. de Abstinent. Sect. 27.’ and he thought it reasonable,‘— [...] Ibid. Sect. 24.’
And in fine the Harmony of things evinces it; there is a visible subordination in the world, of the lower to the higher Region: This Earth depends on Heaven; the motions of Celestial Bodies, inspire and continue those of the Earthly, the Sun by its accesse unto us, and its removal from us, makes the Seasons; Particular causes, those are here below, but all the universal are above, as who would say, the cause of all is there.
SECT. 4.
The Supremacy of God the Ground of his Finality, evinc'd to be so Harmonically.
And 'tis most apparent from what I have already argued, that it is the infinite Transcendency, Supremacy, Superlative Eminency of Almighty God (which I promis'd to demonstrate in the third place) that is the Ground of his Finality: That therefore he alone is the Ultimate and furthest end of all things, because he is most Eminent and High, and One above them all.
To confirm this, I shall but offer one consideration (more then what I have already) That there is a visible Subordination and Design in things; that the Earth is for the Grass, the Grass is for the Beasts, the Beasts, and Grass, and Earth, are for Man; one thing for another [Page 130] but all in such Relation, that what is Higher and Superiour, is the End of what is Lower and Inferiour; The Earth is for the Vegetables, the Vegetables for the Sensibles, the Sensibles are for the Rationals, the Lower for the Higher; and therefore the Rational and all for the Highest. All for God, and Hosea's climax
intimates it.
SECT. 5.
Three Corollaries deduc'd (1,) Man ought to be at God's dispose. Hard Apprehensions of God anticipated. Epictetus urged. (2.) All ought ultimately to be referr'd to to God's Glory, and how that is done. God to be injoyed, not used. Wherein Blessedness consists.
And first it Evidently followes, that if Almighty God be Man's End, he ought to be his Measure: and that 'tis infinitely more agreable [Page 131] that man should absolutely be at Gods dispose and beck, than that the Beasts should be at Man's; he being infinitely more inferiour unto God, than the meanest Creatures are to him. And what if God had loved Esau lesse than Jacob, and make his power known in some, &c.
What? are Inferiour Animals so much at Man's will, as that they live and die at his dispose and pleasure, and shall Man himself repine to be at Gods? bethink thy self a little, O thou Man that murmurest, is not he thy Maker? Thou art not thy Beasts, which yet thou travellest, labourest, slaughterest, and fattest but for slaughter. Doth not he support thee in thy Being, which he first gave thee? Hast thou any thing that is not his? Who then art thou, O Man, that durst dispute? Hath not the Potter power over the clay? Shall not that be reason for God, which is for thee? to do [Page 132] with his own, as he lists? The Beasts are made for thee; but thou thy self for God.
Remember Epictetus.‘ [...]’ ‘ [...]’ ‘ [...] Epict in Enchirid. cap. 77, 78, 79.’
And Secondly, If God be our ultimate and furthest End, it will become us to refer in all things to him, whether we cat or drink, or what ever we do; let all be done to the glory of God; which as we then perform Actually, when in doing any thing we actually do mind it, so we also then implicitely [Page 133] and virtually at least do so, when we perform all as he will have us according to the Gospel Rule; for example, when we eat and drink moderately, temperately, justly, and as the Gospel doth oblige us with due acknowledgement and giving of thanks.
Hear Arrianus.‘ [...] Arrian. Epict lib. 1. [...]ap. 15.’
Finally if God be our ultimate and last End, we are not to imagine we may use him as an instrument and means to rise by, as those who make Religion, but a point of interest, a Tool of State, or else a Stale to other Matters; he is an End and not a Means. But, we must consider him, as the only Maker of our utmost Happiness, and as that central, infinite, and comprehensive Good, who being infinitely blessed in conversing with himself, and in enjoying [Page 134] of his own Fulness, doth render others so by their enjoyments of him, and converses with him. Blessedness is nothing but a State of aggregation of all Good, and he is in it, that hath a ful enjoyment and fruition of God. God is all Good. He is self happy; Happy Essendo, We are happy in him, by Union & conjunction to him, happy Fruendo.
He that is joyned unto the Lord is one Spirit.
So Porphyrie.‘— [...]—Porphyr. Sentent par 2. Sect. 34.’
So Seneca, ‘—Virtus quam affectamus magnifica est. Non quia per se beatum est, malo caruisse; sed quia animum laxat, ac praeparet ad cognitionem coelestium, dignumque efficit, qui in CONSORTIUM DEI veniat,Senec. nat. Quast l. 1. praefat.’
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