[Page] Imprimatur,

November 23, 1677.

Guil. Jane, R. P. D. Hen. Episc. Lond. à sacris domest.

[Page] Organum Vetus & Novum: OR, A DISCOURSE OF REASON AND TRUTH.

WHERE IN The Natural Logick common to Mankinde is briefly and plain­ly described.

By RICHARD BURTHOGGE M. D. In a Letter to the most Honou­red Andrew Trevill Esq. of Èthe in the County of Cornwal.

Marc. Ant. [...]. l. 7. 1. 12. [...].

LONDON: Printed for Sam. Crouch, at the Prin­ces Arms a Corner-shop of Popes­head ally in Cornhil. 1678.

FOR The most Honoured ANDREW TREVILL Esq AT Ethe in the County of Cornwall.

SIR,

THat of making many Books is no End, was truly said by the wisest man that ever was: Not in this sense only, that multitudes of Books, begetting in the mindes of those that read them infinite Distra­ctions, deprive them of the Benefits they might receive from fewer; but in another, that there is a Prolifick­ness in Books, that one produces a­nother, and this a third, and so on [Page 2] without End; and consequently that the labour men are at in making them, is not onely Useless, but End­less.

You will have reason to believe this second Sense to be as just and true as the first, when you consider that I, who lately wrote an Apology for the Deity, am obliged by the Reflexions made upon it, now to write Another to defend it; and no question (but) the Latter may be as obnoxious to Unjust Exceptions as the Former: So that if Occasion given, be also taken, there will ne­ver be an End of writing, but by what gives End to the Writer.

However, having received an Invitation to adde something to the former Essay, I am (at last) re­solved, both in justice to my self and to my Book, to comply with it, and to enter into thoughts of the Causes that not irrationally may be presu­med to have had an Influence on the Objectors, and into most of the Objections; and then to offer to [Page 3] them (by way of Obviation) such Considerations as (it may be) will not prove unuseful to Rectifie Mistakes in other Matters, as well as in this.

And the main Causes I intend to touch on (not to mention Envy, &c.) are Three: Proud Ignorance, Ignorant Zeal, and Impertinent Reasoning.

1. Proud Ignorance consists in a mans presumption of his own Omniscience, (for the Sciolist is ever most conceited) so that he presently and peremptorily condem­neth that for Errour, which himself hath never learnt for Truth; as if there were no growth in Know­ledge, or that any Humane Under­standing were adequate to Verity: Whereas Capacities of the largest size are yet but narrow; and they that know most, do but the better know how little it is they know, and how much they are to seek. The most the Wisest know, is, that their own and others Ignorance is [Page 4] the surest Object of Knowledge. True Knowledge is not conceited; it is humble, and aspireth after more. If any man think that he knoweth any thing, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know.

2. Ignorant Zeal, (a cause of very general influence into many Mistakes, not onely in matters of Religion, but also in points of Phi­losophy) what is it but a Horse of high metal without eyes? Indeed, nothing is more commendable in Religion, or administers a better Ar­gument of Sincerity in its Profes­sors, than fervency of Zeal; but then it must be Zeal according to Knowledge, and managed with dis­cretion, or else it is but Rage and Fury, not Zeal. Zeal regulated by the Holy Scriptures, that is, Zeal according to Knowledge, and go­verned with Wisdom, is Fire from the Altar: but then Irregular Zeal, Zeal without Knowledge, Zeal without Wisdom, is Wild-fire, which (as the corruption of the best is [Page 5] worst) hath nothing more perni­cious than it self to Church or State.

Zeal without Knowledge may be stiled Blinde Zeal, and is that when men are passionately concerned for or against an Opinion and Practice, from a strong, but groundless and unwarranted perswasion, that what they do, and what they are for, is highly to the honour and glory of God, and what they oppose, is a­gainst it: as if they knew abstract­ly of themselves, and by their own discoursings, what is for God's Glo­ry, or what is otherwise, further than it hath pleased God himself in his Word to reveal it. That onely is for God's Glory, which is grounded on God's Word. The Word of God is able to make the Man of God perfect. The Corin­thians had a Zeal for God, but not according to Knowledge: and so had the Jews, who persecuted and murther'd the Christians, but thought they did God good service. [Page 6] What manner of men they were, who among them call'd themselves the Zealous, Josephus hath left on Record. Yes, the Disciples of Christ, in Zeal too, they would have Fire from Heaven, and cite an Ex­ample; but our meek and blessed Saviour tells them, they knew not the Spirit they were of. They took it to be a Spirit of Zeal, but He knew it to be a Spirit of Passion. A persecuting furious Spirit is none of Christ's; it is Antichrist's. The Wrath of man worketh not the Righteousness of God.

Zeal without Wisdom may be call'd Imprudent Zeal, and is Zeal unseasonably and unsitly shewn in circumstances of time, place, and persons that will not bear it; as when men shall take their Pearls, their Reprehensions, Counsels, In­structions, or whatever other in­stances a Zeal is shewn in, and cast them before the Swine; and that though they have a Prospect them­selves, or an Advertisement from o­thers, [Page 7] of the probable ill success, both that the Pearls shall betrodden under foot, and they themselves be rented; This is not to employ and use Zeal, but to lose it. There is a time for every Purpose, and every thing is beautiful onely in that time. Pearls so cast, are cast away.

3. Impertinent Reasoning, (the third Cause I mention'd, and a Cause of all others of most general influence into Errours and Mistakes) I call not onely that which of the Logicians is named [...], a passing and arguing from one thing to another, when yet there's no Agreement, no Connexion be­tween them; but that also which is bottomed on single Mediums, and runs on in a long, but simple line and train of Consequences, from thing to thing; or else is founded but on second Notions, and inlaid with them: which way of Rea­soning must be shewed to be Imper­tinent, and that by shewing a better, pertinent one.

[Page 8] Thus, Sir, I am arriv'd to what I principally design'd; and I crave your pardon if, for my Readers sa­tisfaction as well as for mine own, I now enlarge, and take the bold­ness to let him understand my ap­prehensions of Reason, both as to its nature, and the interest it hath in Religion, and how (I think) it must be circumstanced and condi­tion'd, to assure us of Truth. By which Performance if I gain no more, I shall this; that as well the persons that approve my former Es­say, as those that cavil it, will know the Rule and Method I proceeded by (in framing it;) which, to the former will afford a greater Confir­mation, if it be Right; and to the latter, a fairer rise of Assaulting (me) if it be not.

1. Before I can proceed to shew what Reason is, I am first to shew the many sences the Word is taken in; which, not done by most, is one occasion of the great Confusion in their talks about it. And Rea­son [Page 9] (to omit some other sences not so necessary here) is in ordinary Language taken either largely, or strictly, or appropriately and most strictly.

2. Reason largely taken, is the same with Minde or Understanding, and so is commonly affirmed to ex­ert it self in three Acts; the Ap­prehension of simple Terms, the Composition of those Terms by way of Affirmation and Negation, and Discourse, or illation of one thing from another. Reason strictly ta­ken, is the Understanding as it issues out in its third Act, not in the Ap­prehension of simple Terms, nor in the Composition of them, but in Discourse and Illation; and so Rea­son is the Understanding as it ar­gues, discourses, infers. But Rea­son is appropriately taken, or most strictly, as it is oppos'd to Faith and Revelation, of which hereafter.

3. Reason taken for the Minde or Understanding, is that Faculty whereby a man is said to be Reason­able, [Page 10] Intelligent, Understanding; as Sight is that Faculty whereby an Animal is said to be Seeing: or 'tis that Faculty whereby a man is said to Elicite Acts of Reason, or to Understand; as Sight is that Facul­ty whereby an Animal is said to See. I so define it by the Act, for that the Act is better known than the Faculty. To Understand (as well as to see) is a first Notion, and he must be very simple that under­stands not what is meant by it; nor are there any Notions more intelli­gible, whereby to mark Faculties, than those of their Acts. Acts we see, being conscious of them when we exert them; but Faculties we see not, we know not but by their Acts.

4. The Acts of Reason in this large sence (as the same with Minde or Understanding) to speak of them as they offer and present themselves to mine (without confining of my self to Notions of the Schools, or common Logicians) are Two; [Page 11] Apprehension and Judgement.

5. Apprehension is that Act of Understanding whereby it is said to See or Perceive things, and is the same in relation to the Minde, that Seeing is in relation to the Eye.

6. Apprehension is Conversant with things either as in themselves, or as they are noted; and they are noted either by simple words, or else by Propositions, which are words joyned by way of Affirmation or Negation; both which the Minde sees or apprehends but as it hath the Sense of them. Sence or Meaning is the Motive and immediate Object of Apprehension, as Colour is of Seeing. The Eye sees nothing but under Colour; the Minde appre­hends nothing but under Sense.

7. I know well that Truth is usu­ally affirmed the proper, adequate, immediate, formal Object of the Intellect; but (it) is not so. Not Truth, but Sence or Meaning is the proper, adequate, immediate Object of the Minde, as to its first Act [Page 12] [that of Apprehension;] Truth is onely the proper, adequate, imme­diate Object of it as to another, which is called Assent, and is a kind of Judgement. I understand and apprehend a Proposition which is false, that is, I have a Sence and Meaning of it, though when I Un­derstand or Apprehend it, I refuse my Assent. So that it is not Verity that is the Motive and immediate Object of Understanding in its Acts of Apprehension, but Sence or Mea­ning.

8. Sence or Meaning is that Con­ception or Notion that is formed in the Minde, on a proposal to it of an Object, a Word, or Proposi­tion; as Colour is that Sentiment begotten, and caused in the Eye, upon the impression of its Object on it.

9. To understand this, we are to consider, That to us men, things are nothing but as they stand in our Analogie; that is, are nothing to us but as they are known by us; and [Page 13] they are not known by us but as they are in the Sense, Imagination, or Minde; in a word, as they are in our Faculties; and they are in our Faculties not in their Realities as they be without them, no nor so much as by Picture and proper Re­presentation, but onely by certain Appearances and Phaenomena, which their impressions on the Faculties do either cause or occasion in them.

10. Every Faculty hath a hand, though not the sole hand, in making its immediate Object; as the Eye makes the Colours it is said to see, the Ear the Sounds, the Fancy the Idols, and so the Understanding the Conceptions or Notions under which it apprehends and sees things. So that all the immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation (to use the word in its largest sence) are Entia Cogitationis, All Appearances; which are not properly and (may I use a School-term) formally in the things themselves conceived under them, and consequently conceiv'd as if [Page 14] they had them, but so onely in the cogitative Faculties. No such thing as Colour but in the Eye, nor as Sound but in the Ear, nor as No­tion, Sense, or Meaning, but in the Minde. These, though they seem in the Objects, and without the co­gitative Powers, yet are no more in them than the Image that seemeth in the Glass is there indeed.

11. So that all immediately cogi­table beings (that is, all immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation) are either Entities of Sense, as the immediate Objects of Sense, Colour, Sound, &c. or of Imagination, as the Images therein, the Idols it frames; or of Reason and Under­standing, Mental Entities, the Mea­nings or Notions under which the Understanding apprehends its Ob­jects; which (Notions) though they seem to the Understanding to be without it, and to be in the things understood, yet (as I said before) are no more without it or in the things themselves, than Colours are [Page 15] without the Eye, or Sounds with­out the Ear, or Sapours without the Tongue, although they seem so to Sense.

12. Faculties and Powers, Good, Evil, Virtue, Vice, Verity, Falsity, Relations, Order, Similitude, Whole, Part, Cause, Effect, &c. are Noti­ons; as Whiteness, Blackness, Bit­terness, Sweetness, &c. are Senti­ments: and the former own no other kind of Existence than the latter, namely, an Objective (one.) A Notion that will free the Minde of much Intanglement in framing Notions. We generally conceive Faculties, Good, Evil, and other Notions (under which the Minde apprehends things) to be Realities, and to have an Existence of their own without the Minde, and though there were no Minde to think of them, when indeed they are but Noemata, Conceptions, and all the formal being any of them have, is onely in it. And no wonder if he that takes Noemata to be Realities [Page 16] findes himself confounded by that mistake, in forming his Conceptions about them. Notions therefore are very aptly, though somewhat bar­barously, stiled by the School-men, Conceptus Objectivi; Notions of the Minde, but yet seeming to be in the Object. He that looks for Notions in Things, looks behinde the Gláss for the Image he sees in it.

13. Such Cogitable Beings aś have no foundation, no ground in Reali­ties, that is, in things without the Cogitative Faculties, but are mere effects of the Faculties, are call'd Chimerical (Entities;) and in the Imagination are Fictions, in the Understanding mere Notions; as in the former a Golden Tree, in the latter a Philosophical Romance, or Groundless Hypothesis. But such as have Foundation in Realities, are called Real, [Real Notions] not that in their own nature they are in Realities themselves, but that they have their Grounds in those that are; [Page 17] they are real (as a School-man would express it) not formally, but fundamentally; they are incho­ately and occasionally in the things, but not consummately and formally but in the Faculties; not in the things, but as the things relate to our Faculties; that is, not in the things as they are Things, but as they are Objects.

14. Those Words or Propositi­ons any one hath a sence of, those things to which the Words or Pro­positions relate, he hath a Notion of. Sence is Notion; onely it is called Sence as it relates to the Words or Propositions, and Notion as it relates to the Things; but in­deed Sence is Notion, and to have the sence of a Word or Proposition, is to frame a Notion of it, or of the thing signified by it.

15. 'Tis as impossible to appre­hend a Word or Proposition one hath no notion, no sence of, as to see an Object that maketh no im­pression of Colour on the Eye; for [Page 18] what Colour is to the Eye, that Sence, Meaning, or Notion is to the Minde.

16. Sence, Meaning, or Notion arises from a Congruity in the Ob­ject to the Faculty; so that to en­quire why one cannot understand or apprehend a Non-sensical Propo­sition or Word, is to enquire why he cannot see or hear Tastes, or taste and smell Sounds, or taste, hear, and smell Colours, or see an Object hath none.

17. That Congruity in the Ob­ject to the Faculty, whereby it ei­ther actually moves it, or is capable to move it to frame a Notion or Sence, ought to be distinguished from that Congruity which is in the Object within it self, or with other Objects: The former (for di­stinction sake) I call a Congruity to the Faculty; the latter a Congruity in Things. The harmony of Ob­jects to their Faculties, and that of them within themselves, or one to another, are distinct Harmonies. I [Page 19] can make sence of a Proposition that is not true, so that 'tis Congruous to the Faculty, it moves that; when yet (it being false) the Parts of it are Incongruous one with ano­ther.

18. To understand and appre­hend a Proposition or Discourse, it sufficeth not to have a Perception of the sence and meaning of the words; those words as in Conjunction, and ty'd together, ought to make such an impression on the Minde, as mo­veth it to make a Notion of them in that Relation. One may have a sence of the words in a Discourse, when yet he cannot make any of the Discourse it self, because he can­not frame a Conception, a Notion of them in the Composition that is given them in it. He cannot see how they are joyn'd.

19. There are a thousand Instan­ces of Discourses of this kinde in Jacob Behmen, but I need not go so far as Germany to seek some; I might have many neerer home with­in [Page 20] the compass of our own time and observation; but I decline them as Invidious; I will onely point to one in Dr. Fludd, a person that could speak as good Sence (if he listed) as another, but I could never make any of many Passages I finde in him, and of one particularly, name­ly, that in his Mosaick Philosophy, Book 3. sect. 1. Chap. 4.

20. Those Discourses in which nor Words nor Propositions are sen­sible, or wherein the Words are sen­sible but not the Propositions, and yet are taken by those that make them for High Sence, may be called Enthusiasm. Of the former sort I apprehend the Whims of Basilides, of Valentinus, and the Gnosticks; and of the latter, those of the Fami­lists, and of others of late.

21. Enthusiasm either may pro­ceed from a spirit, or from Com­plexion and a certain temper of Minde; the former I call Demonia­cal, the latter Complexional; and not unlikely but in most Enthusiasts [Page 21] it comes from both: whereof an Upstart Sect among us, in its first appearing, afforded strong Evin [...]c­ments.

22. That there are Philosophical Enthusiasts, is as certain as that there are Theological; Enthusiasts in matters of Philosophy, as well as Enthusiasts in matters of Divinity. Paracelsus, Helmont, and many o­ther Chymists, are Examples of the first sort; as H. Nicolls the Father of the Familists, and others, are of the second: Jacob Behmen and Dr. Fludd may pass for Examples of both.

23. When Enthusiasts think they understand one another, (as they All pretend to do, and that serious­ly, and therefore must have some impression to justifie that Pretension, whereas yet no sober man can un­derstand Any of them;) I conceive it not to be by Apprehension, but Sympathy; not Intellectually, by Apprehending, that is, by framing just, steady, distinct Notions of [Page 22] what is said; but Sympathetically, by having excited in their minde on such Expressions, Motions, confor­mable to theirs that use them; for they all being of the same frame and temper of Minde or of Imagination, whatever touches One agreeably, also moves the Rest; as in Unison-Lutes, or other Instruments fitly tu­ned, but to strike One, is (at once) to move All.

24. Notions of the Minde are bottomed on Sentiments of Sense; so that as Realities are Grounds to Sentiments, so Sentiments are Grounds to Notions: the impres­sions of things without upon the Sensories, produce or occasion in them the Cogitations which we call Sentiments, as Colours, Sounds, Sa­pours, &c. And Sentiments (again) impressing of the Fancy, and so the Minde and Understanding, be­get or occasion in it those higher Cogitations which we call Notions, Apprehensions of Reason, or Ideas. Idols or Fantoms are in the Fancy, Ideas in the Minde.

[Page 23] 25. The neerer our Sensories are unto the Objects impressing them, (if not too neer) the clearer and distincter is the Sensation made by them; as we more cleerly and di­stinctly see an Object at a neerer than a remoter distance: so the nearer the Minde and Understan­ding is to Sentiments, the more cleer, distinct, and evident its Perceptions are; I mean, the more sensible No­tions are, and the neerer to their Grounds, the more effective, more impressive, and consequently clearer and more evident they be.

26. Hence Knowledge and Ap­prehension of things is better both acquired and conveyed by first No­tions, which are next to Sentiments, than by second which are more re­mote: The Knowledge which is had of things by first Notions, is more real, evident, cleer, distinct, than that which is by the second. First Notions are founded immedi­ately on things; Second Notions are Notions concerning Notions: [Page 24] These are not so impressive and ef­fective as the first. By first and Se­cond Notions, I both understand Terms or Words, and the Notions signified by them.

27. So much for the Object of Apprehension, which is Sense and Notion; and for the Grounds of that Object, which is Sentiment: Now for the Affections of Apprehension (if a good one) and they are two, namely, Cleerness and Distinctness.

28. Cleerness of Apprehension, which is in the Minde the same that Cleerness of Seeing is in the Eye, is opposed to Obscurity and Dark­ness, and presupposes Light.

29. Light is that which manifests, and consequently Intellectual Light is that means whereby the Under­standing comes to See and Appre­hend its Objects; or that which manifests them to it: and is either Light of Revelation, which is also called Light of Faith; or Light of Nature, which is also called Light of Reason; where Reason is Appro­priately [Page 25] taken, and most strictly.

30. The Light of Revelation is that Discovery or Manifestation God himself is pleased to make of things by his Spirit, and is chiefly in the Holy Scriptures. The Light of Nature is All other Light what­ever but that of Revelation, where­by we See and Apprehend things, and is that we have by Sense and Discourse.

31. Some things there are that may be seen in both Lights, in that of Nature, and that of Revelation, though more cleerly in the latter than in the former; as that God is Good, and that he is the Maker and Conserver, and supreme Director of All things: Other things are onely to be seen in the Light of Revelation, being of a nature not to be disco­vered but in and by it; as the My­steries of Christian Religion, the Doctrine of the Trinity, the Incar­nation of God, &c.

32. The Lights of Faith and Nature, of Revelation and Reason, [Page 26] though they be not the same, yet are not contrary; I mean, that what is shewn or seen to be true in one Light, can never be shewn or seen to be false in the other: What is Apprehended by Sense rightly circumstanced and condition'd, to be This, or to be That, or else by Rea­son rightly acting to be so, or so, it is never contradicted by Revelati­on. Things are nothing to a man but as they stand in his Analogie: for him to believe against his Facul­ties, is to believe a Contradiction. If in the Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the Elements first and last are Bread and Wine to Sense, and to Reason judging according to Sense, I cannot hold my self o­bliged by (any) Revelation to be­lieve them Flesh and Blood, but in a Notion consistent with the judg­ment Sense and Reason make of them; that is, not flesh and blood substantially, but sacramentally; not flesh and blood really, but only by signification. Else Truth might [Page 27] be Incongruity, Inconsistency. Tran­substantiation is to me a Mystery; I am so far from making truth of it, that I cannot make any sense of it; I might as well believe that two and two make not four, or three and three six, as that it is not Bread, or Wine, which to my Eye, my Taste, my Touch, in a word, which being an Object of Sense, to all Examinations of my Sense is so. What is against Sense, is against Knowledge.

33. An Object onely to be seen by the Light of Faith, may be said to be seen by Reason above Reason, by Reason assisted with the Light of Revelation, above Reason not so assisted, but acting onely by the Aids of Nature; but still it is Rea­son sees in both: As I can see an Object with a Tube, that with my naked and unarmed Eye I cannot: or see in the Sun-light an Object that I cannot by Moon-light; but still it is the Eye that sees in both; the Organ is the same, although the [Page 28] Lights be not. It is the same Rea­son and Understanding, the same Faculty that sees in the Light of Revelation, as it is that sees by the Light of Nature; and the same that Argues and Discourses in the one, as by the other.

34. The great Designe of God in all the Doctrines, and even in the highest and most sublime Mysteries of our Religion, is to affect the hearts of men: and therefore as (1.) He represents and reveals them in first Notions; so (2.) He also doth it in sensible and comparative ones; and usually (3.) He repre­senteth one thing by many Notions. (1.) To make it more Affective; and withal (2.) to signifie, that no one Notion he represents the thing in, is adequate and just to it. Thus he represents the great Mystery of our Union unto Christ, and our Communion with him, by that be­tween the Vine and Branches, be­tween the Husband and Wife, be­tween the Head and Members: As [Page 29] also the great work of Conversion that passes upon Men in the change he makes on them, from their Dark­ness into his most marvellous Light, He compares it to Generation, to Adoption, to Creation: In fine, the New Covenant is not only stiled a Covenant, but also a Testament, and a Promise. All which resembling and comparative expressions may and ought to be employed and used for the apprehending of the things they are designed to signifie, and the making of them more affective; but neither of them so (to be insi­sted on) as if it were adequate, or just.

35. The Light of Faith and Re­velation, must not be confounded with that of Reason and Nature; I mean, we ought not to consider points of mere Revelation in the light of mere natural Reason: Spi­ritual things cannot be discern'd but spiritually, and therefore must not be compared but with Spirituals. In Points of (mere) Revelation, we [Page 30] ought entirely to confine our selves to the Notions, Comparisons, Simi­litudes and Representations God himself hath made of them, with­out pretending to be wise above what is written, and to say or un­derstand just how in themselves the things are, abstractly from the Dresses Revelation puts them in.

36. He that pretends to under­stand the Mysteries of Christian Religion, or any Point of meer Re­velation stript of those Notions, Resemblances, and Comparisons, when they be not revealed or dis­covered but in them; as he looketh not on these things in the Light of Faith and Revelation, but in that of Reason or Nature; so not looking on them in their own Genuine and Proper Light, no wonder if he ei­ther erre or trifle about them.

37. Justly liable to this Reproof I judge them that are not content to think and speak of God (the proper Object as well as Author of Reve­lation) in that manner that he [Page 31] speaks of himself; who Reveals him­self to us men in Analogous and Comparative Notions, not in such as adequate and adjust him, but such as do proportion and suit with us; as if he had an Understanding, Will, and Affections; and did pur­pose Ends, and elected Means to compass them; did consult and de­cree, and were touched with the Affections of Joy, Grief, Love, Ha­tred, Anger, Revenge, &c.

38. They that tell us that he is not angry, that Revenge is an Im­perfection not to be imputed to him, and pretend to tell us just what's meant by it, they might as well tell us that he doth not love nor hate; that he doth not propose Ends to himself, nor designe Means; that he doth not consult nor decree; that he hath no Providence, no Foresight, there being Imperfection in all those Notions; and yet without them, and the like, you can nor Think, nor Speak of God. Abstract the Deity from these and other Compa­rative [Page 32] Notions, Notions of Him, which are not in Him, and yet wherein He pleases to Reveal Him­self, and you will soon make Him such an one as Epicurus fanci'd, an Infinite Excellency, but unknown, not concerned, nor concerning of Himself with things below Him.

39. It seems to me, that he that would abstract God, or any matter of Religion, from the Notions or Comparisons which He or That is represented in, would do like one that would consider the World onely in its Realities of Matter, Figure, Texture, and Motion, ab­stractly from those Phaenomena and Appearances occasion'd by them in our Senses and Mindes: And if the latter may be thought to have but an Empty, Dry, and Barren Notion of the World, the former would not have a much better of God (whom now we cannot know as He is) or of any Subject of Revelation, that should so consider it.

40. Whoever well attends, will [Page 33] finde that all the Notions under which we apprehend God, are No­tions of Him, like those we have of the World, not as He is in Himself (for so we know him not;) but as He stands in our Analogy, and in that of the World; which Notions are very fitly stiled Attributes, not Accidents, as not speaking things Inherent Really in Him, but things ascribed by the Minde, or attributed to Him; as Colours, which but in the Eye, are yet ascribed to the Ob­ject; and Sounds, that indeed exist but in the Ear, are attributed to the Air: For we regarding God in that Relation that He bears to the world, and to our selves, and so considering Him, have excited in us such No­tions by the impressions the things we look on, and God himself as in­terested in them, make upon us. The Attributes of God are but (as) so many Aspects. Much Obscurity and many Errours in forming Noti­ons about God and his Attributes, are owing to an Unacquaintance with this Truth.

[Page 34] 41. Having spoken of Clearness of Apprehension, and of the Lights that make it, I will onely adde a Consideration, which though obvi­ous enough, is not reflected on as it should; namely, that the Lights are gradual; [even that of Revelation] and that all things are not equally clear (in them:) so that we ought to put a difference, as between Phi­losophical and Theological Points, and Points unrevealed and revealed; so in those revealed between Funda­mental Points (which are but few and plain) and Superstructures upon them; between what is in Scripture in express Terms, and what is there but by Consequence; and in Conse­quences, between those that are immediate and next to Principles, and those that are remote and fur­ther off. As there are weighty Points of the Law, so there are Tythe-mint, Anise, and Cummin; he that makes no difference, takes not his mea­sures by Jesus Christ's. As it is inept and foolish, so it is inhumane [Page 35] and bloudy, not to distinguish Er­rours from Heresies. Heresie in Religion, is as Treason in the Law, a subversion of Fundamentals; and it must be plainly and directly so, and not by Consequences and far­fetcht Deductions: For Heresie, it must be eradicated; but as for Er­rours, he that is exempt from them, let him throw the first stone at the guilty. But this is not intended as a Plea for Errour, God forbid! but for Humanity.

42. I proceed to the second Af­fection of Apprehension, which is Distinctness. And to apprehend a thing distinctly, is to form such a Notion and Conception of it, and to have such a sence as doth distinguish it from all things else.

43. Distinctness of Apprehension is acquir'd by Distinction, and by Definition. Distinction, as I take it, is of Words; Definition of Things. To make a Distinction is, when a Word hath many Significa­tions, to determine, fix, or define [Page 36] the Sence it is taken or us'd in, and by certain Marks and Tokens to di­stinguish it and circumscribe it from all the others (it hath.) Definitions of things are properly Descriptions. To describe, is to notifie, mark, and represent a thing in and by its At­tributes, that is, according to the impressions that it makes upon our Faculties, and Conceptions it occa­sions in them. Essential Definitions are Non-sence. Things are not Ex­plicable, but as they are to us in our Faculties.

44. The more particularly any thing is marked, the more distinct is the knowledge we have of that thing.

45. Most Errours in Divinity as well as in Philosophy, owe their be­ing to confused Apprehensions, and confused Apprehensions their's to the Ambiguity of words, and the uncertainty of their Signification. He that uses words of many Signifi­cations without distinctly marking them, and without particularly no­ting [Page 37] what Sence he takes the word in when he uses it, may easily be apprehended to take it sometimes in one Sence, sometimes in another, that is, to take one Sence for ano­ther; and he that takes one Sence of a word for another, mistakes, and confounds things. To confound things, is to take one for another. Confusion of things comes from Ambiguity of words. A Word in one of its Sences may belong to a thing, when in all it cannot.

46. Caution. Take heed of be­ing abused with the Agreement of Words, into a belief of answerable Agreement in Things.

47. Direction. To avoid confu­sion of Apprehension, the best way is to look beyond the words we hear or read, or have in our mindes, unto their Sences and Meanings: for Words may be uncertain and equi­vocal, whereas Sence and Notion is not so, but certain and fixt.

48. Having treated of Apprehen­sion in the general, of its Object, and [Page 38] of its two Affections, Clearness and Distinctness, it remaineth to speak of those Conditions which are requi­site to the forming of a clear and distinct Apprehension; and they are four: a Due Illumination or Illu­stration of the Object; a Right Disposition of the Faculty; a Due Distance from the Object; and a Due Attention to it. The same Conditions in Apprehension as in Vision.

49. A Due Illumination of the Object; by which I mean here but Perspicuity of Expression: a Repre­sentation of things unto the Minde in plain, apt, and significant Words, and in a plain and instructive order and method. Plainness of Expression and Method is the Light of a Dis­course; he that uses it is Didactical, [apt to teach,] but he that will clearly and methodically express his Thoughts to others, must first con­ceive them so himself: so that here I might say over again what I have already about Clearness and [Page 39] Distinctness of Apprehension.

50. A Right Disposition of the Faculty; a Right Temper of Mind, [Rectitude of Minde] consists in a full and perfect Exemption of it from all the prejudices that either Education, Custom, Passion, or false Reasoning have imbibed it with. Prejudices are erroneous (or false) Anticipations, and are in the Minde as Tinctures in the Eye, which falsi­sie its Vision. Other Diseases of the Minde there are besides Preju­dice, as Levity, Curiosity, Scepti­cism, &c. in an Exemption, from which also Sanity of Minde consists; but the principal is Prejudice. And besides Sanity of Minde, there is (for the apprehending of some par­ticular Objects) necessary also a Sanctity of Minde. The pure in heart [onely] see God.

51. A Due Distance from the Ob­ject; not to look too neer, nor at too Remote a Distance.

52. Not too near. Too near look­ing is a cause of much entanglement [Page 40] and errour, both in forming of Philosophical and Theological No­tions; he that looks too near, doth either see nothing at all, or but con­fusedly: he looks too near to things, that not contented with common Notions of them, wherein all the world agrees, will have more ex­act ónes; or that not contented with the knowledge of things according to appearances, as he may see them, is always attempting to know them in their Realities, in which he can­not; As in Quantity the common Notion of it, how evident is it! 'Tis evident to all men, and none but knows what is meant by it; and he that looks on Quantity but so, observes a due distance; but who­soever looks nearer, looks too near, and is confounded with the compo­sition of the Continuum [and well he may that takes a Phaenomenon, a Spectrum, an Appearance for a Reality.]

53. Not at too remote a distance. He considers Objects at too remote [Page 41] a distance, that looks on them but in second Notions, or contents him­self with general ones, which at best are but confused and uncertain; and being so, no wonder if they cause mistakes: the more particular and distinct, the surer the knowledge is: we are often deceived with appea­rances, and take one thing and per­son for another, when we only see them afar off.

54. Due attention is a fixed and steady beholding of the Object, in order to a framing clear and distinct conceptions about it; and 'tis op­posed to Inadvertency, or a preci­pitate and hasty skipping from thing to thing, without a due considering of any: A Distemper of Minde, to which Youth and warm Complexi­ons are subject, which though they may be more ingenious and witty, and more prompt and ready, are yet for that reason seldom so judi­cious, prudent and weighty, as those of cooler Tempers and of more Age.

[Page 42] 55. So much for Apprehension, the first Act of Understanding; I now pass on to the second, which is Judgement.

56. Judgement is that Act of the Understanding whereby it having compared and considered things (presented to it, and apprehended by it,) comes in the end and upshot, either to Assent, or Dissent. So that Judgement is a compounded Act, and (as it were) made up of two; one of which is Mediate and In­choate, the other Ultimate & Com­pleat; the first is Comparing and Considering; the second, Resolving and Decreeing: That the Premisses; this, the Conclusion. The former properly is Reasoning; the later, Resolving according to Reason.

57. Reasoning is (a) producing or shewing of (a) Reason. (A) Rea­son is the Ground of Intellectual Judgement; or the Cause why the Understanding either assents, or dissents. Assent is the Approving Judgement of the Understanding; [Page 43] Dissent is the Disproving Judge­ment of the Understanding. To shew Reason for a thing, is to prove it: to shew Reason against a thing, is to disprove it. Plain Reason is that which convinceth: Forced Reason is that which only confutes. To confute is, so to entangle a per­son that he cannot answer: To con­vince is, so to shew him Reason, that he cannot deny it to be so. A man is often confuted, when yet he is not convinced.

58. Method of Reasoning is called Logick; and is either Arti­ficial or Natural. Artificial is the Logick of Schools, of which the chiefest is Aristotle's: and is useful many waies, but among others, mainly (as a Whetstone) to acute and sharpen the Wit; and to render it more sagacious, circumspect and wary, both in making and admit­ting Deductions and Consequences. Natural Logick, that of plain and illiterate men, of which I designe to discourse, is the natural method [Page 44] of Reasoning; in relation where­unto the Scots are said to have a Proverb, That an Ounce of Mo­ther-wit is worth a Pound of Cler­gy.

59. Natural Logick is universal, a Logick of the whole kinde; so that what in Natural Logick is rea­son to one man, is so to all; for all having the same Faculties, and using them in the same Method, must needs come to the same issue, and by the same Principles arrive to the same Conclusion.

60. As one naturally by often seeing and attending to his own acts, acquires a method how to look to see to the best advantage, as also Optical Rules by which he judges of Objects; which Method and which Rules are [to speak gene­rally] the same among all men: So may he by frequent reasoning, and attending to his own and others reasonings, easily and insensibly ac­quire a Method [which as reasoning itself will for the general be the [Page 45] same with all men] how to use his Reason to the best advantage, to reason out things. This common method of Reasoning, (which be­cause common, and in some measure acquired without assistances of Art, I call natural) is natural Lo­gick.

61. All Reasoning is either Spe­culative or Practical. Speculative Reasoning is shewing a thing is true or false: Practical Reasoning is shewing a thing is to be done, or not to be done. (A) Speculative Reason is the ground of Specula­tive Judgment. (A) Practical Reason, the ground of Practical Judgment. Speculative Judgment is judgment that a thing is true or false: Judg­ment that it is true, is Speculative Assent; that 'tis false, Speculative Dissent. Practical Judgment is Judgment or Decree that a thing is to be done, or not to be done. Judgment that a thing is to be done, is Judgment for it, or practi­cal Assent: Judgment that a thing [Page 46] is not to be done, is Judgment a­gainst it, or practical Dissent.

62. Speculative Reasoning is either Proving or Disproving. To prove, is to shew a thing to be true; to disprove, is to shew a thing to be false. So that in natural Logick, [as to speculative Reasoning,] there are but two Topicks, or principal places of Arguments, and those are Verity and Falsity: The one affords us a medium of Proving, the other a medium of Disproving: I prove what I say, by shewing the Truth; I disprove what another says, by shewing the Falsity of it.

63. Truth and Falsity are to the Minde, as white and black to the Eye; as these are kinds of Colours, and so the objects of the Eye; so the former are kinds of Sense, and consequently objects of the Minde: And as the Eye rightly circumstan­ced and condition'd sees white to be white, and black to be black; so the Understanding sees Truth rightly shewn to be Truth, and Falsity to be Falsity.

[Page 47] 64. Wherefore to prove a Truth to be one, is but in a right method to shew it to the Minde, the Un­derstanding apprehending a thing to be true when rightly shewed, as the Eye doth see the shew to be white that is duely held before it. A Notion may be true, yet not ac­knowledged to be so, because not rightly apprehended, or seen; and it is not rightly seen or apprehended, because not rightly shewed: Then Truth is rightly shewed, or shewed to be Truth, when 'tis shewed Systo­matically, or Harmonically. The like is to be said of Falsity. But to enlighten this Point, I am to shew at large what Truth, and consequent­ly, what Falsity is.

65. Truth, in the apprehensions of some of the School-men and of others, is that conformity which is in things to their original Ideas in the Divine Intellect. All second Beings are but Copies of the Minde of the first, in which they have their Exemplars: and wherein doth [Page 38] the verity, the truth of Copies con­sist, but in a conformity to their Originals?

66. But this notion of Truth (however true it may be) is not per­tinent to us; 'tis Metaphysical Truth that it relates unto; a Truth of things as standing in the Analogy of God: but the Truth we treat of, and whose notion we are enquiring after, is Logical, a Truth of things as standing in our Analogy, and which is the ground of Assent. Certain it is, this notion that the Schools afford us, is not (nor can it be to us) a Medium of Reasoning; since we cannot say what is conformable or what is not unto the divine Ex­emplars. He must see the Original, and compare the Copy with it, that on knowledge will affirm this to be true.

67. Of late the old Catalepsis has seen the light again, that compre­hension discoursed of by Cicero in his Lucullus. The meaning of which is, that there is no other Criterium, [Page 49] no other judicial note of Truth, no other Rule, Mark, or Measure where­by to know a thing to be true, than clear and distinct Perception. And thus also the Cartesians.

68. But on the contrary, clear and distinct Perception is not the Cause and Ground of Assent, but onely a Condition of causing; Truth is the onely Adequate and effectu­al Motive or Reason of Assent; but to be so, it must be clearly and distinctly perceived. Truth (as whiteness) is something in the Ob­ject that invites Assent: clear and distinct Perception is not in the Object, but of it; and consequent­ly is not Truth, but conversant a­bout Truth. Sight is not Colour, but of Colour; so neither is Per­ception Truth, but of Truth. Be­sides, that cannot be a certain mark of Truth, which may be affirmed as well of Errour as of Truth. I may as clearly and distinctly per­ceive a thing to be false, as to be true. A thing may be evidently [Page 50] false, as well as evidently true.

69. If any say (as doubtless some will) that by clear and di­stinct Perception, they mean nothing but a clear and evident apprehen­sion of the truth of things; I an­swer, That then either they know what Truth is by its mark and de­finition, and by the impression that it makes on the Minde, as well as what Whiteness (is) by the impres­sion made thereby on the Eye; or they do not. If they do not, how can they say they clearly and distinctly perceive a thing to be true, who know not Truth? They might as well say, they clearly and distinctly see a thing to be white, when they know not whiteness. Or if they know what Truth is, then that Impression, that Form, that Notion of Truth they have, ought rather to be insisted on, and not the (bare) Perception. They should say, The thing is true, we see clearly the Form and Notion of Truth in it. For indeed, nothing [Page 51] makes a thing true, but the Form and Notion of Truth therein: For did I apprehend a thing to be true never so clearly and distinctly, yet if I did but apprehend it so (as I may, and many do) and that the Notion and Form of Truth were no wise in it, it were not true by vertue of the Apprehension I had of it, but onely seemed so. As I clearly and distinctly see an Image in the Glass, when indeed it is not there; or an Oar in the Water bow­ed and crooked, when indeed it is not so. It is an Errour (and a most dangerous one too) to assert, that seeming or intellectual sense (for clear and distinct Perception signifies no more) is the measure of Truth: There are so many ways wherein a thing may be seen clearly and distinctly, that is, may seem true, and yet not be so. No convincing Hereticks, or opinionate Philoso­phers, if Seeming be the mark of Truth.

70. To this Opinion, I am now [Page 52] to adde another much of kin to it; That of the truly-Noble and Learned the late Lord Herbert, name­ly, That Truth consisteth in the A­nalogy, Agreement, Harmony of things to our Faculties, inviting a most free and full Assent: Or, in his own Terms; Veritas est Harmonia inter object a & Facultates, habens sensum gratissimè & lubentissimè sine ulla haesttatione Responden­tem.

71. All the difference between the Former and the Latter Opinion is, that in the former Apprehension clear and distinct, in the latter As­sent Free and Full, is made the Mark and Measure of Truth. Of this (Latter) Opinion, as that emi­nent Person (last mentioned) among the Moderns; so among the An­tients were a many noble Philoso­phers; in Tully it is called [...]. and as described by him, it hath the same Foundation that his Lordship builds on, namely the [...] of Truth. That Truth is so Domestical and [Page 53] Congruous to the Faculty, so Ana­logous and fit to it, that the Incli­nation of the Minde thereto, in Nàture and Necessity, resembles that of a Stone, or whatever or other heavy Body you'll imagine, to the Center.

72. But (1) a bare Congruity between the Object and the Under­standing is not the ground of Truth, but of Sense or Intelligibility; and though there be a Congruity in all Truth, because there is a sense in it, and happily more Congruity because a more agreeable Sense; Yet since that Congruity is unob­servable, unremarkable but by As­sent, and Assent (of it self) is no sufficient Evincement of Truth; I lay it by as Illogical and useless. (2) Nor doth the Understanding blindly incline to Truth, and as it were by Sympathy, or a natural Mo­tion of Aggregation; its Assent is (an act of) Judgement: The Minde proceeds therein judicially upon Al­legations and Proof; judging a [Page 54] thing to be true, that is, assenting to it, onely because it sees therein the Form, Notion, and Mark of Truth, as it judges a thing to be white wherein the Eye assures it there is the form of Whiteness. And (3) one may readily and chearful­ly assent to Falsities and Errours, and mistake them for Truths; and therefore free and full Assent is no sufficient evincement of Truth. Not to urge that chearfulness of Assent, that readiness and promptness we many times observe in it, is oftner an effect of a Passion bribing of the Understanding, than of a pure clear impartial Reason.

73. Wherefore, others of the Antients, as well as of the Moderns, abundantly convinced of the in­sufficiency both of Perception clear and distinct, and of Assent free and full to ascertain them of Truth, and yet unwilling to have Nature (so liberal in other matters) exposed to the reproach of Deficiency in One so important as intellectual [Page 55] Judgement; They have conceited humane understanding furnish'd by her with certain [ [...]] Antici­pations, that is, with Connatural and Ingrafted Notions; Principles designedly implanted in the Minde, to be a rule to it to direct it. Thus in the speculative Understanding they have set up a habit, which they call Intelligence; in the Practical another which is called Synteresis; in both, a Constellation of Princi­ples, shining with their own Light, and imparting it to others that want it; not much unlike to what is af­firmed of Dionysius in his Celestial Hierarchy concerning Spirits, that those of superiour Orders enlighten all beneath them in the inferiour.

74. But were there really such a System of Notions and first Princi­ples ingrafted in the Minde by Na­ture, in whose Light all others were to shine and to be seen, it would follow that Contemplation of our own mindes, acquainting us with the Chain, Concatenation, and So­rites [Page 56] of the Principles therein, and Propositions deducible therefrom, would more import to the rendring us Philosophers (not to say Divines also) than observation of the World and Experience; and so the greatest School-men (those Metaphysical Alchymists) that insisted much on this Method, and spun out all their notions of their own Bowels, should have been the wisest and most fruit­ful of men. Whereas we know the men, and the manner of their Com­munication; all their Discourses are indeed subtle and acute; but also empty and barren, and no more agreeing with Realities (and in our Analogy) than Light with Dark­ness.

Again, the Soul in its state of U­nion and Conjunction with the Bo­dy, is so dependent on it in all its Operations, that it exercises none without the Aids of it. Ratioci­nation it self it is an Animal act; not an abstract Action of the Soul, but a (Concrete) act of the Animal; it [Page 57] is the Man reasons. And in the or­dinary method of Nature, we re­ceive into our Mindes no Impres­sions, no Images, but what are han­ded to them by our Senses. I am apt to think that person who should never have seen, nor heard, nor tasted, nor smelt, nor felt any thing, would have his minde as little fur­nish'd with Idea's or Notions, as his Memory with Images, and would understand as little as he had sensed. Besides, those very Principles them­selves we call First ones, or Antici­pations shining with their own lu­stre and light, Propositions which we cannot but assent to assoon as we hear them, or minde them; It will appear, if we reflect warily on what doth pass in our Mindes, that even these are not assented to, but on the Evidence they bring; I mean not assented to naturally, but (as other Propositions are) judicially. For instance, that the whole is grea­ter than the part, we assented not unto it on the first hearing, but first [Page 58] considering what was meant by Whole, what by Part, what by Grea­ter, what by Lesser; and then ha­ving sensibly, either by Eye-sight, or by Imagination, compared one unto the other, we evidently saw it to be so; that the Notion of Greater, even to Sense, ever agreed to the whole; and that of Less, to the Parts. The like that Two and Two make Four. This is the way we first ad­mitted to belief the Propositions which are called Principles; and it is no other than that wherein we admit all others. Onely the Propo­sitions (which are) call'd Anticipa­tions, or first Principles, are Propo­sitions of so easie, sensible, and plain an evidence, and so obvious, that we early admitted them, so early, that we cannot well remember when we first did so; and therefore they are stiled Anticipations, or prole­ptick Notions: for being of so early an admission and existence in our Mindes, they preceded all our (af­ter) knowledges, whose acquire­ment we well remember.

[Page 59] Further, Beings are not to be multiplied without Necessity, and there is none of faigning such Anti­cipations and Habits of Principles to direct the Minde in inquisitions after Truth, since all acknowledge there are no such principles in the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue to direct them, and why then in the Minde? Besides, Reflection on our ordinary reasonings, evinces that in them we seldom attend to such Principles, but to the Object discoursed of; nor need we to do otherwise, if it can be evidenced that there is a certain Notion, Form, Ground of Truth that runs through all things true; which Form or Notion of Truth, assoon as the Un­derstanding rightly circumstanced and conditioned, apprehends in an Object, it cannot but acknowledge it to be true, as it would another to be white or black, wherein it is as­sured by the Eye rightly circum­stanced and conditioned, that there is the Form of Whiteness or Black­ness. [Page 60] As for Anticipations, they are too particular, and not of a nature so large and comprehensive as to be the Rules and Measures of Truth, which is infinite. Let those Antici­pations be reckoned, and then Ex­periment be made upon comparison with the immense Latitude of Que­stions, and of Truth relating to them.

75. Thus I have shewn the Indi­cations, Marks, and Notions of Truth that (in my judgement) are not proper, adequate, or useful; it now remaineth that I shew one (that) is. And Truth, as it is the Ground, Motive, and Reason of Assent, is objective Harmony, or the Harmony, Congruity, Even-lying, Answera­bleness, Consistence, Proportion, and Coherence of things each with other, in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes. Truth is uni­versal and exact Agreement or Har­mony.

76. On the other hand, Falsity (as the ground, motive, and reason [Page 61] of Dissent) is Objective Dishar­mony, or the disharmony, incon­gruity, inequality, unanswerableness, inconsistence, disproportion, and incoherence of things, in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes. Any Disagreement or Disharmony is Falsity.

77. Probability or Likelihood of Truth, is an appearance of Congrui­ty. A thing is probable, when it hath some consistence and agree­ment; it Quadrates and lies even with what we do know; but in regard there are particulars relating to the same Systemes and Frames of Thoughts which yet we do not know, therefore we know not if it will lie even and square with them. Improbability is apparent Incon­gruity.

78. That Truth is Harmony and Proportion, and consequently that Probability is apparent Harmony, apparent Proportion; and Falsity, Disharmony, Disproportion cannot be but very evident to him that [Page 62] shall consult with Nature and com­mon sense.

79. In Nature it is plain: For Harmony, it is the Reason of the World; the World was made by it, cannot be known but by it. The rule of Proportion is the King-Key, unlocking all the Mysteries of Na­ture. The Great Creator framed all things in the Universe in Num­ber, Weight, and Measure: Ex­tremes in it are united by partici­pating Middles; and in the whole System there is so admirable Uni­formity as ravishes every one that be­holds it: every thing in its place is aptly knit with what is next it; and all together into one most regular Frame of most exact Proportions. Every thing we look on affords Examples; and Galen in his Books of the use of Parts, has a Thousand, to whom (if in so plain a matter it be necessary) I remit the Learned Reader.

80. And 'tis a common sense, that what is congruous is true, and what [Page 63] is true is congruous; so common, that none ever fancied any notion of Truth but in Congruity: some School-men, in Congruity to the Divine Intellect; Others in Con­gruity to our Faculties; and all men (though they speak not out, and it may be minde not that they do so) in Consistence and Congrui­ty of things with one another; all generally concluding that Narration (for instance) to be probable, which seems consistent; and Probability being appearance of Truth, if what seems consistent be probable, what is so is true. But to give a Mecha­nical instance; one that would re­pair a broken China-dish, or make up a Watch or other Engine taken abroad, what Measures doth he naturally take to do so? what Rule proceeds he by? None verily, but by that of Congruity; he makes no question but that when he hath found a place for every part where­in it lies consistently and aptly with others, so that in the whole [Page 64] there is exact Coherence and Con­gruity, no Flaw, no Unanswerable­ness, it is truely set together, and every part in its place. Truth is Harmony.

81. And seeing Truth is Harmo­ny, and the Universe it self, as it consists in our Analogy, is but one System; it follows that properly there is but one Science (which some will call Pansophy) one Globe of Knowledge, as there is of Things: As also that the partition of Scien­ces, or rather the crumbling of them into so many, hath been a great impediment of Science; the dependency of Things, and their Relations one to another, thereby becoming unobserved and unconsi­dered. And in fine, that the more large, general, and comprehensive our Knowledge is, the more assured and evident it is. It is in Science as it is in Arch-work, the Parts up­hold one another, and mutually contribute strength and beauty. The consinement of the Understanding [Page 63] to particular Knowledges, as also the limiting of it in any unto cer­tain Methods and Terms of Art, is like too straight a swathing of the Childe, and spoils its growth.

82. So much for the two Topicks of natural speculative Reasoning, namely, Truth and Falsity. It now lies on me more expresly to describe How Reasoning is performed in re­ference to them, and so what the Nature of it is. And natural spe­culative Reasoning is Systematical, and Harmonical; it is a shewing, an evincing the Truth or Falsity of a thing, by conferring and com­paring thing with thing; it is a shewing a Notion to be true or not true, by representing of it in a Frame, a Scheme of real Notions, with all its Relations in it; and so by Comparing, Evidencing how it squares, agrees, and harmonizes, or otherwise.

83. That Natural Reasoning is Harmonical, Systematical, that it is conferring, comparing, is evident [Page 64] in the Natural Reasonings of Plain and Illiterate, but Understanding men; who not having other Lo­gick but that of kinde, to verifie their Tales, desire but to have them heard out from end to end; and who no otherwise confute their Adversaries, than by telling over again in their own way the whole Relation, that so both may be com­pared. Besides, the comparative method of Reasoning, used by the Minde in intelligible Objects, is no other than that we naturally use in those that are sensible: For, be it a visible Object we enqure into, and examine the truth of, we turn it every way, and into all postures, so to make a certain judgement of it; and Circumspection, (which is Ci­cero's word for it) or the Mindes comparing and conferring of things is no other. And if Truth indeed be Harmony, Proportion, Congruity, an Object cannot be evinced true, but by being evinced Harmonical, Congruous, Proportionable; and [Page 65] it cannot be evinced Harmonical, Congruous, Proportionable, but by being conferred and compared, and upon collation and comparison shewn to be so.

84. To prove Harmonically, is in a Scheme and Frame of Notions bottomed on things, to shew the thing to be proved, to quadrate, lie even, and to be entirely congru­ous and answerable. To disprove a thing Harmonically, is in a Frame and Scheme of Notions bottomed on things, to shew it not to qua­drate, but to be incongruous, un­answerable, and unadequate.

85. The best way of Confuting Errour, is to do it by shewing the Truth: There is so great a delicacy in Proportions, that a Scheme of Thoughts may seem congruous and agreeing by it self, which compared with another, is observed no lon­ger so; as two pieces of fine Cloath looked on at a distance, and not compared together, may be judged equally fine, and one no better than [Page 66] the other; whereas when put to­gether and felt, and so compared, the difference is plain and discerni­ble.

86. The Effect of Reasoning, (and as it were the Conclusion) is Assent, or Dissent, according to e­vidence. Evidence is the Assurance we have a thing is true or false, and so is either of Truth or of Falsity, and answerably bottomes either As­sent or Dissent.

87. Assent is the judgement of the Minde upon evidence of Truth, that the thing is true. Dissent is the judgement of the Minde upon evidence of Falsity, that the thing is false.

88. Evidence of Truth is either certain or probable. Certain Evi­dence is full Assurance. Probable Evidence is good Assurance, but not full. Certain Evidence is evi­dence of certain Truth. Probable Evidence is evidence of probability. Probable Evidence is now a-days termed a Motive of Credibility.

[Page 67] 89. In Proportion, as the Evi­dence is, so is the Assent. If the Evidence be certain, that is, indu­bitable and unquestionable, [and that is to be understood to be so, of which there is no cause to doubt, or make any Question] then the Assent is firm and certain, and with­out doubting; (but) if the Evidence be but probable, the Assent then is infirm, and with doubting more or less, as the Evidence is lesser or greater. To Doubt, is to fear lest the thing to which Assent is given should not be true.

90. Evidence of Certainty, is to the Minde (as to its Assent) all as much as Evidence of Infallibi­lity: For the Minde as firmly ad­heres to what it hath all reason for, and no reason against; all reason to believe it to be so or so, and no reason to believe it to be otherwise, as to what it apprehends impossible to be otherwise; seeing it were un­reasonable and contradictious for Reason any wise to doubt, when it [Page 68] hath no reason at all to do so. I am as sure that once there were such persons as William the Conquerour and Henry the Eight, and that there are or lately were such Cities as Rome and Constantinople, as I am that Two and Two make Four, or that the Whole is greater than the Parts.

91. Firm Assent in matters in themselves mutable and of a con­tingent nature, may be called Con­fidence; but in matters of a neces­sary, firm, and immutable nature, it is Science. Infirm Assent, or As­sent with Dubitation, is called Opi­nion. Suspition is a beginning As­sent, or an inclination to believe a thing, and is short of Opinion. Su­spition on grounds is called just suspition. Suspition on no grounds is mere suspition. Probability is appearance of Truth: And ground of Suspition is Appearance of Pro­bability. Suspition is also called Presumption.

92. Assent on Evidence by the [Page 69] testimony of our own Senses rightly circumstanced and conditioned, is as firm as firm can be, and is called Knowledge. Assent to a thing up­on anothers knowledge and not our own, is called Belief. To Be­lieve, is to take a thing upon ano­thers word; and if that word be divine, the belief is called Faith; or if but humane, it is called simply Belief or Credit. Belief is groun­ded on the wisdom and veracity of the person believed: for he that believes another, believes him to have wisdom enough not to be im­posed upon or deceived himself; and Veracity or Truth (which a­mong men is called Honesty) enough not to impose upon or to deceive him. The Word of God therefore is the most proper object of belief, God being so wise he cannot be de­ceived, and so true he cannot de­ceive. Notoreity of a thing [of a fact] is the certainty of it on Com­mon Knowledge: It is not Presum­ption, nor Probability, but Certainty.

[Page 70] 93. Assent to Falsity under the notion of Truth, if it be firm, is called Errour: If infirm, and with dubitation, it is erroneous Opinion.

94. Ratiocination Speculative, is either Euretick or Hermeneutick, Inventive or Interpretative; and this latter again is either interpre­tative of the World, the Book of Nature; or of the Scriptures, the Book of God. But of these per­haps, another time, as also of the method of Reasoning which I called Practical, and is either that of Pru­dence (1. Humane, or 2. Christian) or of Conscience.

Now on the whole Matter, who seeth not the share and interest (that) Reason hath in matters of Religion? Men are reasonable Creatures, and therefore their Religion must be reasonable: Every Tree must bring forth Fruit in its kinde. Faith it self it is a rational Act [If I have any reason to believe Men, I have all reason to believe God] and [Page 71] Ratiocination is as much imploy'd in points of Revelation, as in points of mere Reason. Truth is the im­mediate reason of Assent in matters of Revelation as well as in others; and there is an Analogie of Faith as well as of Nature; the Mediums are different; but Ratiocination is the same in both: We are as well obliged to compare Spiritual things with Spiritual in the one, as Natu­ral things with Natural in the other. Thus are the Bereans applauded as persons of nobler and more ge­nerous Mindes than those of Thes­salonica, because they took not all on trust as these did, but examined the things were told them, and compared them with the Scri­ptures.

It is easie also to infer, that if any person shall give himself the trou­ble of disproving what in my Apo­logie I presented to the World; to do it to Conviction, he must produce a frame and Scheme of Thoughts more Congruous and Harmonical [Page 72] than mine, and must account for those Phaenomena which I therein essay'd to solve, in a method more perspicuous and natural, and with more agreeableness and uniformity of Notions than I have; or else he will not Confute, but confirm it.

I say this, to shew the fairer play to those that undertake to answer me, if after I have said it any shall resolve to do so; and I say no more, to shew the Opinion I yet avow to be mine of all the Objections whi­spered up and down, that in them­selves they have as little force and evidence, and as little conviction, as those that make them have yet had either Courage to own them to the world, or Candour to own them to me.

Thus, Sir, I have performed what I principally designed. I have shew'd the nature of Reason: I have shewed the true method of Reasoning; as also the nature of Truth, and (up and down my Di­scourse dispersedly) the causes of [Page 73] Errour: and I have shew'd the ex­tent of Reason. In which perfor­mance, whatsoever other Incon­gruity or Errour I may have been guilty of, sure I am I have com­mitted none in dedicating it: For to whom could I address a Discourse of Reason and of Truth more proper­ly, than to a Person who is so great a Lover and owner of both? and withal who is so perfectly honoured as you are by all that have the hap­piness to know you: But by none more than

Sir,
Your most humble Servant and Son, Richard Burthogge.

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FEltham's Resolves, Divine, Moral, Political, with new Additions.

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The Sabbath of Rest, to be kept by the Saints here. By N. Smith Master of Arts.

Cole's English Dictionary.

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Purchasers Pattern, much enlarged.

The English Tutor: or the plain Path­way to the English Tongue; with examples of most Words from one to six Syllables, both in whole Words, and also divided: with Rules how to spell them, by way of Question and Answers.

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