IT may seem an improper way of mak­ing satisfaction for a former Trouble, to give a new one: yet since you have pardoned the Confidence that made a Present to you of my Essay concerning Reason, and that some very sharp Reflecti­ons have been published on a part of that Essay, I hold my self obliged to send you my Defence of it.

My Intention in this Address is not to in­gage you in the Protection, or to the Countenance of any Opinion, further than as Reason allows it; nor is it to insinuate that you are of mine, to gain it the more Authority: For tho I could not procure a greater Advantage to any Opinion I own, [Page 4] than to have others perswaded that you are of it; yet I must do you the justice to pro­fess that I am wholly ignorant what yours is, as to the Point in debate.

I only appeal unto you now, as I did at first, as to an Arbiter or Judg, for which your excellent penetrating Understanding highly qualifies you, without inviting you as a Party to come to my Assistance, which at this time I hope I shall not need.

Mr. Keil in the Introduction to his Exa­mination of Dr. Burnet's Theory of the Earth, hath done me the Honor (tho I am not sure he designed it for one) to mention me with several very celebrated Persons; but he doth it in that manner, and with that Abatement, that I have no great cause of being exalted on that regard.

After he had instanced in Spinosa, Dr. More, and Mr. Hobbs, as Authors of great Discoveries, which might well demand Esteem and Veneration, if they were real, he picks out some of their Opinions, which he be­lieved the most obnoxious, that by them his Readers may see how well they deserve such a Character. He then adds, ‘But a new Phi­losopher (naming me, who am not am­bitious of that Title) has much outdone any I have yet mentioned, in a Book lately printed concerning Reason; there [Page 5] he assures us that there is but one universal Soul in the World, which is omnipresent, and acts upon all particular Organized Bo­dies, and makes them produce Actions more or less perfect, in proportion to the good Disposition of their Organs. So that in Beasts that Soul is the Principle of the sen­sitive and vital Functions; in Men it does not only perform these, but also all other ra­tional Actions: just as if you would suppose a Hand of a vast Extention, and a prodigi­ous number of Fingers, playing upon all the Organ-pipes in the World, and making eve­ry one sound a particular Note, according to the Disposition and Frame of the Pipe: So this universal Soul acting upon all Bodies, makes every one produce various Actions, according to the different Disposition and Frame of their Organs. This Opinion he as confidently asserts to be true, as other Men believe that it is salse; tho it is im­possible he should any other way be sure of it but by Revelation; and I believe he will find but few that will take it upon his word.’

Mr. Keil, I hope, will give me leave to tell him without offence, that the Represen­tation of my Opinion, had he pleased to make it in my own Terms, would have been less invidious, and withal more just [Page 6] than it appears in his. However, since he hath endeavoured by a Comparison to illu­strate, or else to expose [for I cannot well resolve which 'tis] the Sentiment I own, and that this Comparison is capable of be­ing applied unto it to good purpose, I will my self make use of it my own way.

But first I must give a Plan of my true Notion, which in short is this; That the Mosaical Spirit (called Gen. I. v. 2. the Spirit of God) being a Spirit of Life, and present every where, in all the Parts of the Universe, is the Original of all the Energy, Motion, and Action therein, especially of that which is Animal. And that particular Souls [for such I acknowledg there be] are Portions of that Spirit acting in the several particular Bodies in which they are, ac­cording to the Capacities, Dispositions, and Qualities of those Bodies. A Sentiment conformable to two received Maxims: Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipi­entis. Actus activorum sunt in patiente dis­posito.

To make it imaginable, let us suppose a vast Organ, consisting of innumerable Pipes of different Sizes and Fabrick, and this Or­gan to be filled with Wind blown into it, and the Wind to be received, and some portion of it appropriated by each particu­lar [Page 7] Pipe: Imagine also innumerable Fingers playing upon those several Pipes: For then each particular Pipe being played upon, will, by means of the Wind, be made to sound a particular Note, differing from the Notes of all the other Pipes, according as its Qualities, Dispositions, and Fabrick dif­fer.

The World is as such an Organ [an or­derly Aggregate;] and the several sorts of Bodies that compose it are as the several Pipes of that Organ; the Mosaical Spirit present every where throughout the whole World, is as the Wind (which is) blown into the Organ. This Spirit is received and apportioned by the several particular Bo­dies, as the Wind in an Organ by the seve­ral particular Pipes: and as these inspired with Wind, being played upon, do sound different Notes or Tunes; so those animated with their respective Portions of the Mosai­cal Spirit, being impressed and acted upon by Objects, do perform their several vital Functions, according to their several Dis­positions and Fabrick.

Thus far the Comparison plainly holds; but it may be carried a greater length, and made serve to illustrate what I say in my Essay concerning the nature of Animals, of Spirits, and of Souls. For it may be [Page 8] added, that as the power of making an Or­gan sound at all, or the power of making a particular Pipe to sound a particular Note, arises not solely from the frame of the Or­gan, or from that of the Pipe; for the Or­gan sounds not at all, if it be not inspired with Wind, and tho inspired with Wind, and consequently tho it gives a Sound, yet it will not sound to such and such a particu­lar Tune, if it be not played upon with the Fingers. In like manner, the Power of making a Body live, or of any particular Instrument of it exercise any particular Action of Cogitation, as of Seeing, or of Hearing, arises not solely from the frame of the Body, or from that of the particular Instrument, the Eye, or the Ear: for the Body lives not, if it be not animated with some Portion of the Mosaical Spirit; and if it be animated, and consequently hath Life, as the inspired Organ hath Sound, yet it doth not exercise that Life in this or that particular manner of Cogitation, by its se­veral Instruments, as in seeing by the Eye, or hearing by the Ear, if it be not acted up­on, and impressed by Objects, any more than an Organ which is only inspired, tho it sound, will sound to this or that particular Tune, if it be not played upon with the Fingers. Thus Life originally comes from [Page 9] the Soul: I say, comes from the Soul; for that, speaking properly, it is not in the Soul, consider'd as a Soul, any more than Motion is, which properly is not in the Soul, but from it. And as Life, so Cogi­tation, which is a Species of Life, proceeds from the Soul, but the Specification of it from the Body. And for the actual exer­cise of Cogitation in its several Species, whether of Sensation, or of Intellection, it comes originally from the Impressions and Operations of Objects. For Images and I­deas, that is to say, the Sentiments of the Sense, and those of the Mind or Under­standing (they) are nothing but different Modifications of Cogitation; the former, Modifications of Sensation, the latter of In­tellection; after the same manner as different Notes or Tunes are but different Modificati­ons, or diverse Modulations of sound.

In this way of conceiving, the Produ­ction of Images and Ideas is more perspi­cuous and intelligible, as well as more con­natural, than in that of Malbranch; which, methinks, in things of Nature, instead of having recourse to natural Causes, dotha little too unphilosophically, too soon repair unto the first Cause, which is the Author of Nature. But (as I said) in the way before set out, the Conception of it is very easy: [Page 10] For Images and Ideas being but the Modifi­cations of Cogitation, they are made by Impressions, and made different by diffe­rent Impressions of Objects upon the Facul­ties; as Notes and Tunes are made by the playing, and different Notes and Tunes by the different playing of the Fingers upon the several Pipes of an Organ.

This Comparison of the World animated with the Spirit of God, to an Organ filled with Wind blown into it, cannot but be ac­knowledged to have much of Resemblance and Agreableness; and the more, if we consi­der that this Spirit of God is called Ruach in Hebrew, a word signifying Wind; and like­wise that Pneumatical or Wind-Instruments of Musick are said (tho but metaphorically) to be animated, as I think they are in Psalm 150. v. last. For here it is said, Let every thing that hath Neshamah; the same Word that is used for the Soul of Man, Gen. 2. 7. when God is said to breath into him the Breath of Life: so here, Let every thing that hath Neshamah, every thing that is ani­mated with Wind, let every Wind-Instru­ment (for the Coherence plainly carries it unto Musical Instruments) Praise the Lord. And as Neshamah comes from Nasham, Anhe­lare, to pant or breath, so likewise Nephesh, another Word in Hebrew for a Soul, de­rives [Page 11] from a Root of the like signification, and often stands for Breath, as well as for a Soul.

Nor was this a particular Sentiment only of the Jews, but both the Greeks and Ro­mans were in the same: For in Greek the Name for Spirit is [...], and [...] comes from [...] to blow; and [...], the word for Soul, derives from [...] to breathe. With the Romans, the word for Soul is sometimes Anima, sometimes Animus; words that come from [...], which signifies Wind, as in like manner Spiritus does from Spiro.

When I affirm that [Anima] and [Ani­mus] are often used promiscuously in Latin Authors, I have good Authority to sup­port it, since Cotta in Cicero l. 3. de nat. Deor. saying, Quî magis quam praeter Animam, un­de Animantium quoque constet Animus, exquo Anima dicitur, intimates the same: for there he calls the vital Principle of inferior Animals Animus, and in effect says, both that it consists of Anima or Breath (which is inspired Air or Wind) and that for this reason the Breath is called Anima, because it is to inferior Animals what the Animus is to Man; [Animus ex quo Anima dicitur.] Anima it is Animus with a little distinction; Anima is the Animus or Soul of Brutes, and Animus is the Anima or Soul of Men; [Page 12] as in the Holy Scripture, where St. Paul speaks of Body, Soul, and Spirit, what he means by Soul may be expressed by Ani­ma, what he intends by Spirit by the word Animus; the former word importing the sensitive Principle, which is common to Beasts, the latter the rational or intellectual, which is proper to Men.

To clear this Passage further, which I have quoted out of Cicero, and the sense I have given of it, we ought to consider that the Stoicks held an opinion that all Souls were Fire; and Balbus (who was one of them) taking it for granted, is told by Cotta that he was too forward in as­suming so much; for, says he, 'tis the probable Opinion that the vital Prin­ciple or Soul is not Breath only as most think, or Fire only as Stoicks think, but a Complex or Result of both; probabilius vi­detur, tale quiddam esse Animum, ut sit ex igne at que animâ temperatum.

It is true Julius Scaliger in his 107th Exer­citation against Cardan, is extream severe upon that wonderfully knowing and learn­ed Man for saying but by implication, that other Souls besides the human were called Animi. For Cardan having said, Animi vires praecipuè humani, &c. Scaliger replies upon him, Quasi verò alius sit Animus ab hu­mano. [Page 13] Insinuating thereby, that to hold that every (or indeed that any) Soul might be called Animus is very absurd, as in truth it would be, if what he says was well grounded, to wit, that all wise Men did ever understand by Animus a Faculty of the human Soul, which he says; tho at the same time he confesses Cicero (who, it seems, for this reason he thought not very wise) to be in a different Opinion: Nam tametsi Cicero (says he) Animal ab Animo dictum scribit, tamen hominis proprium Animum, id est, Animae vim, sapientes omnes intellexêre.

And to lessen Cicero's Authority in this particular, he impeaches him of Incon­stancy, telling us that at another time, speaking of Apronius, he uses such Expres­sions as do evidently so distinguish between Anima and Animus, that no room is left to imagine but that he took the latter for only a Power or Faculty of the former. At (says Scaliger) non servabit [Cicero] constantiae opinionem invitis doctis viris, ejus enim verba de Apronio sunt, qui non modo Animum integrum, sed ne Animam quidem puram conservare potuisset, ubi apertè Animae facultatem innuit Animi appellatione.

But our Hypercritick has not exercised his Talent to advantage in this place: for tho it must be acknowledged that Animus is [Page 14] very often used for a Faculty of the Soul, and not always taken for the Soul it self; yet when Cicero says of Apronius that he could not conservare animam puram, he does not mean by Anima his Soul (of which the Animus, that he distinguishes from it should be a Faculty) but he understands his Breath, which was impure, foul, and stinking. This is evident from the Orator himself, who in Verrem lib. 3. describing this Apro­nius, says of him, that his Breath was so fetid, that, as some affirmed, the very Beasts could not endure its Stink: Ut odor Apronii te­terrimus oris & corporis, quem, ut aiunt, ne bestiae quidem ferre possent.

In truth, nothing more surprizes me on this occasion, than to find Scaliger (a very extraordinary Man, and a great Critick) so positive in this Opinion, that none of the Antients who had any Wit, ever deno­minated the Souls of inferior Animals Ani­mi, or even that of Man Animus. For Se­neca Epist. 113. tells it to Lucilius, as the Opinion of the Antients, that the Animus is an Animal, for that it makes us Animals; and that Animals receive their name from ANIMUS: Quae sint (says he) quae An­tiquos moverint dicam; Animal constut Ani­mum esse, cum ipse efficiat ut simus Anima­lia, & cum ab illo Animalia nomen hoc traxerint.

[Page 15] However (to note it by the by) it must not be said neither that the Antients ne­ver gave the name [Anima] to the Soul, or that Anima of old did only signify the Breath: For tho Anima was us'd to signify the Breath, it was so but in a secondary Sense, the Breath being therefore called Anima, because the Anima or Soul was ge­nerally understood to be contained therein, or to consist thereof. This is manifest not only from what is said already, but (to o­mit others) from a Passage in Seneca l. de pro­vid. where As he says, sive haustus ignis cur­sum Animae remeantis interscidit, &c. where [Anima remeans] signifies Respiration or Breathing: So he likewise says, Id quod vo­catur MORI, quo Anima discedit a cor­pore, &c. For here [Anima] is taken for the Soul. But to put it out of question, that even the human Soul is called Anima by antient Authors, I need to cite but Se­neca his 117th Epistle; where, writing of the Immortality of Souls, and saying that the consent of Mankind in that point is a cogent Argument for the truth thereof, he uses the word [Anima] not [Animus] for a Soul; cum de ANIMARUM ae­ternitate disserimus, says he, non leve mo­mentum apud nos habet consensus hominum, aut timentium Inferos, aut Colentium.

I have a fruitful Subject before me, and [Page 16] could add a great deal more, if I believed it proper; but it may suffice at this time to have shewed that both Anima and Animus are Names for a Soul, and that both derive from a Word that signifies Wind or Breath: for this evinces that the Comparison I have made between the animated World and an inspired Organ, is not any remote one, or (as we usually speak) farfetch'd, but very fitting and agreeable.

However, tho this Comparison between the World and an Organ is well enough imagined, and carries much resemblance; yet since an Organ is but a Machin, and on­ly artificial, and that Animals are Works of Nature, and more than mere Machins, I chose in my Essay to illustrate and set out my Notion by Comparisons taken from Na­ture, as from Sound and Echo, from Light and Colours; but more particularly from our own Souls, and their different Opera­tions in the several Organs of Human Bo­dies, by means of their several Faculties.

In that Treatise I have shewed at large, that there is a universal vital Principle diffu­sed throughout the World; and withal have shewed how that Principle comes to be sin­gularized, and individuated, so as that there be particular Souls. I have also en­deavour'd to satisfy Objections, and have instanced in the Theodosian and Scotish [Page 17] Monsters, as sensible Demonstrations of the truth of what I affirm in reference to this Subject.

I have shewed likewise that the Jewish Doctors, many Philosophers, some Fathers, and several Schoolmen, were in the same Sentiment as to the main: for tho perhaps they all agreed not either each with other, or with me, as to particular explications; yet all held a vital Principle that doth per­meate the whole World; and that, unto the Universe, is what the Soul of Man is to his Body. And if common Language does signify a common Sentiment, this must be owned to be one. For why else is Man called a Microcosm or little World, but be­cause he is like the Great, and has Soul and Body? And tho this Expression is appro­priated unto Man, yet if we believe Galen, the Antients held that every Animal is a Microcosm, a World in little; and then surely, in their Opinion, the World it self is, after a sort, an Animal in Great.

Upon the whole it is evident, that for a­ny to imagine I exclude particular Souls, because I do affirm a general (one,) is to do me injury; and, in effect, the same as to infer that I deny there are Colours, be­cause I affirm there is Light; or that I deny there is Echo, because I affirm there is [Page 18] Sound. In sum, he might as fairly con­clude that all those deny the Powers of Seeing, of Hearing, of Feeling, &c. to be in any Animal, who do affirm that the Animal has a Soul which is the Principle of those Powers; for those Powers in di­vided Bodies would be so many Souls, that in the same Body are only so many Facul­ties of one Soul. This way of reasoning goes on the same ground that Seneca's does, when, in another case, he says, Epist. 113. Animal sum & Homo, non tamen duos esse dices: Quare? quia separati esse debent. Ita dico, alter ab altero debet esse diductus, ut duo sint.

Yet, after all, it has pleased Mr. Keil to make a sharp Reflection upon me for this Opinion (but with how much Equity or Candor, our Readers must determine) and he doth it in these Terms.

‘This Opinion he as confidently asserts to be true, as other men believe it is false; tho it is impossible he should any other way be sure of it but by Revelation; and I believe he will find but few that will take it upon his Word.’

First he says, I confidently assert, &c. As for Confidence, I acknowledg that a Con­fidence like his in this Reflection, that does only assert but not prove, cannot merit a­ny [Page 19] great Commendation: But otherwise I know no fault in being confident of any Opinion, or in a confident asserting of it, (which however I am no way conscious of) if there is reason for that Confidence, and that the Opinion be well grounded.

But this he supposes mine is not; for he says, I confidently assert, &c. tho it is impos­sible I should any other way be sure of it but by Revelation. If he mean it is impossible I should be absolutely sure of it but by Re­velation, and that for this reason 'tis a Pre­sumption in me to assert the Opinion, since I am not assured of it that way, he must excuse me if I differ from him. For, in the first place, I will take the liberty to tell him what I believe most others who con­sider, would upon occasion, that there are many Degrees of a just Confidence, that yet do all fall much beneath Infallibility, or absolute Certainty. Besides, methinks it should content him, as being a sufficient ground of asserting any Opinion, even with Confidence, that there is Reason for the Opinion, tho he that asserts it cannot be absolutely sure of it without a Revela­tion; especially since Mr. Keil himself, I dare say, will not affirm he had a Revela­tion for all he confidently asserts in his Book, of which yet he cannot be absolutely sure [Page 18] [...] [Page 19] [...] [Page 20] without one; but what there is of Reve­lation in the Question between him and me, he may be told hereafter, and might have learned somewhat of it from the Essay, where also he might have seen that there was some reason for the Opinion.

And whereas he says, that I as con­fidently assert my Opinion to be true, as other Men believe that it is false: If I should yield him so much, what would follow but this, That if this be all, 'tis only Confidence on either side; I con­fidently assert it to be true, other men as confidently believe that it is false? And when equal Confidence and nothing else is in both the Scales, what shall turn them? But certainly, tho other Men (if but other Men) believe an Opinion to be false, that any one affirms to be true, it will not ne­cessarily follow that 'tis false indeed; for if it should, Mr. Keil himself, who writes in opposition to other Men (and those very worthy Men) must believe himself in the wrong Box, till he can convince them, ay, and all the rest of Mankind that think o­therwise than he does; for till then other Men will believe that what he says is false. Indeed, if my Opinion went contrary to common Sense, and that all other Men, or but all considerate, wise, and thinking [Page 21] Men were in another belief, I should be ve­ry apt to suspect I was imposed upon by false Appearances; but there is nothing of this in the matter, as will be manifest presently.

Mr. Keil closes up his Censure (for all he says against me is Censure only, not Ar­gument) with telling his Readers his Be­lief, which is, that I will find but few that will take the Opinion upon my word. In truth it is not my desire, as it is not reason any should; nor as it falls out, is there any need they should: for if a Revelation in the Holy Scriptures, if the Authority of some of the most thinking and sagacious Philo­sophers, and if Reasons taken from the Phaenomena of Nature, can put any Senti­ment beyond the Misfortune of being pre­carious, mine is safe enough from that Im­putation.

As for Revelation, what interest it hath in this Opinion, I have shewed in my Essay from Genesis Ch. 1. v. 2. compared with Psalm 147. v. 15, 16, &c. which I will not repeat, only I will add that I think it abundantly confirmed by an Evidence I find in the Book intituled, The Wisdom of Solomon, where it is said Ch. 1. v. 7. The Spirit of the Lord filleth all the World; and the same that maintaineth all things hath Know­ledg of the Voice.

[Page 22] This Spirit, as it hath in the Holy Scrip­tures the Denomination of the Spirit of God, because it comes from him, and is his hand in all his Influences upon the World; so it hath that of the Spirit [or Soul] of the Creatures, whether these be Plants, Sen­sitives, or Men, as being that Vital Principle that acts and actuates them all. Thus in Psal. 104. v. 29. that which is called the Breath of the Creatures, or the immediate Principle that makes them live, and is their Soul, upon whose Departure they are said to die, and to return to their Dust, is, in the 30th verse of the same Psalm, called the Spirit of the Lord, which being sent into them, makes them live: Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, and they live; and thou re­newest the face of the Earth.

This is particularly affirmed as to Man by Elihu, Job 33. 4. The Spirit of God hath made me, and the Breath of the Almighty hath gi­ven me Life: By Job himself, Chap. 27. v. 3. All the while my Breath is in me, and the Spirit of God is in my Nostrils: And by Elihu again more comprehensively, Job. Chap. 34. v. 14, 15. If he set his Heart up­on Man [to take notice of him, and re­mark his Iniquities] and [consequently] gather unto himself his Spirit and his Breath; all Flesh shall perish together, and Man shall [Page 23] turn again unto Dust. Plainly intimating that the Spirit of God (as if it were a common Soul) is the Original Principle of Life and vital Operation in Man, as well as in all things else that have Life. See Isa. 42. 5.

The Prophetical Scheme in Ezekiel, Ch. 37. concerning the dry Bones, is very perti­nent, and full to the same purpose. For when the dry Bones are to be made to live, God is introduced saying to them, v. 5. Be­hold, I will cause Breath to enter into you, and you shall live. And he effects it by the same steps, and in the same manner as he created Man at first. For first he organized Bodies, v. 7, 8. The Bones came together, Bone to his Bone, the Sinews and the Flesh came upon them, and the Skin covered them above. But tho the Bodies were organized, yet being not inspir'd, [for there was no Breath in them] they were not made to live as yet; and therefore to make them living Bodies, and put Soul into them, the Prophet had a Commission to the MUNDANE SPI­RIT to come and animate them, v. 9, 10. Then said he unto me, Prophesy unto the Wind, prophesy, Son of Man, and say to the Wind, Thus saith the Lord God, Come from the four Winds, O Breath, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live: So I prophe­sied, [Page 24] as he commanded me, and the Breath came into them, and they lived. Where it may be observed, that the Spirit that quick­neth and giveth Life to those Bodies is com­pared to inspired Wind or Breath; that this Spirit of Life or quickening Breath is diffused throughout the Universe in all the Quarters thereof; and that it is intirely at the Command and Beck of God: For it is Breath is called upon to come and quicken those Bodies; and it is called upon to come and quicken them from the four Winds; and it is no sooner called upon, but it comes forthwith, and quickens them.

It may also be observed that the Breath or common Spirit of Life, that blew upon those Bodies, as it came upon them all, so it was apportioned by each; for the Breath must be in them: And where the Breath is in all, each hath his Portion of it in par­ticular, and then may say as Job, Chap. 27. v. 3. All the while my Breath is in me, and the Spirit of God is in my Nostrils, &c. So long his Breath is in him, as the Spirit of God is in his Nostrils.

Thus every Man hath his own Soul, but this Soul is only a Portion of the Spirit of God that, as a Soul, does permeate the Uni­verse; so that it is (as in Pythagoras's Expression, which I find in Lucretius) [Page 25] [...], a Spark of Ether; or as others choose to express it, particula Aur ae Divinae: which, according to the grounds that I have laid in my Essay, I would ren­der a Portion of Mind in Matter. So much for my Opinion from the Authority of Re­velation.

As for that of Philosophy, I produced in my Essay as Vouchers of my Hypothesis, not only the great Philosopher last named, who was Founder of the Italick Sect, but also Zeno, Seneca, Plutarch, Marcus An­toninus, and Apuleius. To all which, from as many as would fill a Volume, I will add a few more.

Thales the Father of the Ionick Sect, held (as Laertius tells us) that Water was the Principle of all things, and that the World was animated [ [...]] In which Doc­trines (as is very probable) he was in­structed by the Mosaick Tradition [of the Waters, and the Spirit that moved upon them] for unto this his Dogmata are very conformable.

There are in Plato so many Testimonies of a mundane Soul, and his Opinion is so generally known, that it were to overdo to instance Particulars.

I have mentioned Zeno Cittieus in my Essay; but seeing he was Founder of the [Page 26] Stoick Sect, and that I find in Laertius, who wrote his Life, a fuller State of his Opini­on, and in more particulars consonant to mine than what I have mentioned already, I will produce him again. He then, as La­ertius tells us, asserted a Mind that perme­ated every Portion of the World, after the same manner that the Soul in us doth permeate the Body. [...]. But through some more, through others less, [...].] For instance, some, he says, it pervaded only as a Habit [ [...]] as through the Bones and Nerves; but through others as a Mind [ [...]], as through the under­standing or rational part: [ [...].]

This Sentiment of a Divine Virtue that pervaded the whole Universe, was in an­tient time so generally received, that even the Tyrant Phalaris, in an Epistle Consola­tory, written by him to the Children of Stesichorus (if indeed he was the Author of those Epistles passing in his name) men­tions it as such an one; [...], says he, [...], &c. which his honoured and very learned Tran­slator renders thus: Immortalis quippe Dei vis, quae per universum diffunditur, mihi nihil [Page 27] nisi haec ipsa harmonia videtur. He is also understood by that excellent Person in his Annotations, to mean the mundane Soul of the Pythagoreans, when in his 104. E­pistle, which is to the Inhabitants of Cata­na, he says, [...], &c. Si enim Divinae sortis, quemadmodum caetera naturae elementa, &c.

And even Aristotle, tho a great Opposer of the Platonick Soul (yet) being prevail­ed upon by irresistible Experience (he) in a Paragraph quoted out of him by Julius Scaliger, in his 26th Exercitation against Cardan, comes somewhat near to my Opi­nion: For there he affirms, [...]. That both Animals and Plants are produced in the Earth and in the Waters, for that there is, as in the Earth Moisture, so in the Water Spirit, and through­out the Universe an animating [vivifick] Heat; insomuch that after a sort [it is true that] all things are full of Soul.

[Page 28] To those Philosophers I will add the well-known Testimony of a Philosophical Poet, Virgil Aen. 6.

Rendered by Eugenius Philalethes thus:

I begin to be fatigued with the unplea­sant Drudgery of quoting and transcribing; and therefore wholly omitting modern Te­stimonies, I will add but one more of the antient, and that shall be from Cicero, who l. 2. de natur. Deor. introduces Balbus de­monstrating [Page 29] that all things in the World are subject to a sentient perceptive nature, and are administred and governed by it. This he evidences by shewing, that particular works of Nature have infinitely more of the Beauties of Art and Contrivance than the most noble Productions of Human Skill, and yet that no particular Operation of Na­ture, for example, the Production of a Vine, of a Tree, or of that of the Body of any Animal, can shew as to Conformation, Order, and Situation of Parts, or as to Adjustment and Fitness of them for ends and uses, that wonderful Sagacity, that Subtilty of Invention, or that wise Contri­vance that shines with great brightness in the general frame of the World; whence he confidently, but justly infers that the whole World is under the Conduct and wise Administration of a sentient and per­ceptive Nature, or else that nothing at all is so. Aut igitur, says he, nihil est quod à sentiente Naturâ regatur, aut mundum regi confitendum est.

This last Testimony, as it is an Evidence, so it is also an internal Argument; and be­ing taken from the Phaenomena of Nature, reminds me of what I undertook to do in the third place, which was to shew that my Opinion had Reasons for it in Nature, and [Page 30] grounded upon things themselves: And these I will now produce.

The First is taken from the Uniformity even in Difformity, the mutual Relation and the Harmony of Parts that is in the World in its general Fabrick, if it may be allowed to make a judgment of the whole Frame by that of a particular System, which we our selves belong unto: But I will not now insist any longer on this Ar­gument, because it is set out at large in my Essay in many Instances, and the learned Reader will find more in Nemesius de nat. Humanâ.

Again, this Hypothesis accounts for ano­ther Phaenomenon that cannot be so well ac­counted for any other way, that when­ever any Matter becomes disposed for Ani­mal Life, this is presently afforded to it; which how it should come to pass, is easily conceived, on supposal of a mundane Soul, or a Principle of vital Energy diffused e­very where; but otherwise one must ima­gine particular Souls, and those too to be Spi­rits (that are) always every where in waiting for an Office, which is hard to be admitted. I say [and those too to be Spirits] for that 'tis certain that mere corporeal Souls (as some call them) suffice not for Animal O­perations, even tho we should conceive [Page 31] them (as those do) to consist of Flame for vital Actions, and of Light for the sensi­tive ones: for if Matter be not radically vital, and so there be no need at all of Spi­rit or Mind, and then there is no such thing, it will be absolutely unconceivable how Flame and Light (which are only Matter under greater comminution of its parts of a particular Texture, and in rapid Motion) can of themselves be vital and perceptive, or make other things become so. But to return.

Mr. Lewenhoec's Experiment of pepper'd Water, every Drop whereof affords (as he says) so many thousands of Animalcles, is a sensible Demonstration of an omni­present vital Principle that acts as occasion is; and a sensible Demonstration too of spontaneous equivocal Generations: for so I call the Productions of Animals that do not come from Seeds in the common Ac­ceptation of this word. I acknowledg it almost a Scandal but to name equivocal Pro­ductions at this time, they are now so ge­nerally disbelieved and exploded; but for my part, I am not ashamed to confess that as yet I have not observed so much said by the excellent Redi, or by any other Au­thor against the Reality of them, as to oblige me to depart from a Sentiment that [Page 32] hath been the common Belief of most In­quirers into Nature, in all Ages before this last. And the Hypothesis of a mundane Soul will make Productions of that kind conceivable; without which indeed it will be hard to apprehend how they can be.

Dr. Cox, in a Process of extracting vo­latile Salt and Spirit out of Vegetables, which is described in the Philosophical Transactions, intimates this Observation; That, many of the Herbs putrefied and fer­mented after his way, did swarm with Maggots, especially at the Bottom, and in the Middle, where (he tells us) Flies and other Insects could have no access to depo­site their Eggs, and where the Heat is so violent that they could not possibly subsist. Some years after that learned Person, I find another, the experienced Juncken, in Pro­cesses of much a like nature, making the like Observation, that in the Putrefaction and Fermentation of the Vegetables, great numbers of Insects and little Animals were generated, tho (as he says) the Vessels were never so close stopp'd: And indeed it is commonly observ'd that Putrefactions do terminate in Animals of one sort or o­ther.

[Page 33] The Relations of Barnacles, that are said to be Birds arising out of the putre­fied Relicks of shipwrack'd Planks, which Relations have been confirmed to me by an Eye-witness of unsuspected Credit, are fur­ther confirmed by the Testimony of an Eagle-eyed Philosopher, who tells us he hath seen a Creature of that kind; for so I understand Julius Scaliger, when in his 59 Exercitation against Cardan, he says, In O­ceano Britannico magis mireris ignotam avem, anatis facie, rostro pendere de reliquiis putri­dis naufragiorum, quoad absolvatur, atque a­beat quaesitum sibi pisces, unde alatur: hanc quo (que) vidimus nos.

To the former Story Scaliger in the same Exercitation adds another, which he calls miraculous; it is of an Oyster-shell not very great, that was presented unto Francis King of France, and contained in it a little Bird, almost finished with Pinions, Feet, and the Bill, sticking to the Extremities of the Shell. This Bird he says, some Learned Men believed a Transformation of the Oy­ster. His own words are these, Singularis nunc miraculi subtexenda historia est, ubi de aquis agimus. Allata est Francisco regi opt. max. Concha non admodum magna, cum avi­culâ intus penè perfectâ alarum fastigiis, ro­stro, [Page 34] pedibus, haerente extremis oris ostraci. Viri docti mutatum in aviculam Ostreum ipsum existimarunt.

My Lord Bacon, in his natural History, Century 4th, Exp. 228. tells us, That if the Spirits be not merely detained, but protrude a little, and that Motion be confused and inordinate, there followeth Putrefaction, which ever dissolveth the consistence of the Body into much inequality, as in Flesh, rotten Fruits, shining Wood, &c. and al­so in the Rust of Metals; but if that Mo­tion be in a certain order. there followeth Vivification and Figuration, as both in li­ving Creatures bred of Putrefaction, and in living Creatures perfect: But if the Spi­rits issue out of the Body, there followeth Desiccation, &c.

In Experiment 339. his Lordship fur­ther tells us, that all Moulds are Incep­tions of Putrefaction, as the Mould of Pyes and Flesh, the Moulds of Oranges and Lemmons; which Moulds afterwards turn into Worms, or more odious Pu­trefactions, &c.

And methinks the Production of Plants without Seed affords a very weighty Ar­gument [Page 35] for the like Production of Ani­mals. My Lord Bacon gives us many In­stances of the former in the 6th Century of his natural History, where he tells us, Ex­periment 563. That it is certain that Earth taken out of the Foundation of Vaults and Houses, and Bottoms of Wells, and then put into Pots, will put forth sundry kinds of Herbs: but some time is required for the Germination; for if it be taken from a Fathom deep, it will put forth the first year, if much deeper, not till after a year or two. And in the 565th Experi­ment adds, that the nature of the Plants growing out of the Earth so taken up, doth follow the nature of the Mould it self; as, if the Mould be soft and fine, it putteth forth soft Herbs, as Grass, Plantane, and the like; if the Earth be harder and coarser, it putteth forth Herbs more rough, as Thistles, Furs, &c.

Scaliger in his 323d Exercitation against Cardan, speaking of the Production of Frogs, that sometimes have been rained in great abundance, of which there he gives several Instances, tells Cardan, who affirm­ed them to be bred of Frogs-Eggs or Spawn, that they were spontaneous or equivocal, as being Productions of a gene­ral [Page 36] Nature, and not seminal ones; which kind of Animal Productions he evinceth to be possible the same way that I have, by shewing that there are the like in Plants: Quid multa, says he, nonne quotidiana foetu­ra caelestis genii, quae natura est potentiam de­clarant Plantae, nullis ortae seminiis?

My Lord Bacon assures us for a certain truth, that Toads have been found in the middle of a Free-stone, where it cannot be imagined that an Animal of that kind should come and lay her Eggs; and I have been credibly informed that-very lately a living Toad was found in the Heart or Middle of a large Oak when it was felled.

The Animation of Horse-hairs lying in the Summer time in Pools, has been obser­ved of many, some of which I have dis­coursed concerning it; and an understand­ing Man of my acquaintance assured me, that more than once he hath made an Experi­ment which very much confirms the truth thereof. He takes a Hair with the Root, pluck'd from the Main or Tail of a Mare that is proud, and in a warm Season puts it into a wooden Dish full of Water, where letting it lie two or three Days, the Hair in that space will, for the most part, be­come [Page 37] quickned with a strong Motion, and a Head like that of a Serpent grow out of its Root.

The infectious Water of the Showers that accompany the Tornadoes on the A­frican Coast, standing any where, do (as Mr. Terry tells us in his Relation of a Voy­age to East-India) presently bring forth many little offensive Creatures; which is likewise affirmed by Mr. Herbert.

The Vermination in Human (as well as other Animal) Bodies, of which there are innumerable Instances in Medical Writers, as in Bartholinus's Centuries, in Borellus's, in Tulpius's Observations, &c. is another weighty Argument for spontaneous Ge­nerations; but I will mention only one: A Worm of an unusual Figure, with the Head of a Serpent, found in the left Ven­tricle of the Heart of a Gentleman, whose name was John Pennant. The Relation well attested, together with the Figure of the Worm, was in the year 1639. printed at London by one George Miller, to which Re­lation I refer the Reader. This Phaenome­non of Vermination is a good Evidence of SPONTANEOUS GENERA­TION; and this a weighty Confirma­tion [Page 38] of the Existence of a mundane Soul.

Another Argument for it may be taken from the Difficulties that the admittance thereof will remove, as to the Production of Human Souls; which some conceive to come, as they express it, ex traduce; not indeed by way of Eduction from the Power of the Matter, for they acknowledg no such Power therein, but by propagation. But others think them immediately created by God, either all at once, as those do who hold the Doctrine of Praeexistence, or (as most imagin) on occasion, according to the exigence of Matter.

As for the first Opinion, that of Tra­duction, I find it in Nemesius lib. de nat. human. cap. 2. where he tells us, it was the Sentiment of Apollinarius, that Souls do propagate Souls, as Bodies do Bodies; and Julius Scaliger concurs with him, affirming that Souls may come from Souls, ut lumen de lumine, that is, that Souls do propagate one another, after the same manner as Candles light one another. Poiret believes as the two former, that Souls are propagat­ed, but extends the business of Propaga­tion somewhat further than they do, and upon other Grounds. For in his Co­gitat. [Page 39] rational. l. 1. c. 5. in Annot. he affirms that all things are Prolifick, and that as Matter produces Matter, and Motion is productive of Motion, so in like manner one Soul or Spirit may generate and pro­duce another.

But there are many Difficulties in this Opinion, of all which I will insist on this only; That a Soul, if it be an immaterial Substance (as most conceive it to be) is as uncapable of Propagation (otherwise than by a Metaphor) as it is of Discerption or actual Division. For even the Propa­gation of Light is by Discerption; some Effluvia or Emanations of the enlightning Candle passing into that which is lightned. And for the Propagation of Motion, the way thereof is so obscure, it cannot afford Light to this Subject. Only this is certain, that in local Motion derived from Body to Body, so much of it as is imparted unto one, departs from the other; which (I sup­pose) will not be admitted in the Propa­gation of Spirits. And as to the Prolifick­ness of Matter, I should think but few will allow thereof, who consider, that there is no more of Matter in the World now than ever was, and that Matter is ingene­rable and incorruptible, being a Subject of [Page 40] all substantial Mutations, but not the Term of an [...] so that [...] if the Generation of Souls has no [...] [...]r, or no better Foundation than this, [...] Soul is productive of Soul, as Matter [...] of Matter, I conclude the belief thereof will never become general with knowing Men.

As for Creation of Souls (an Opinion ge­nerally held by Divines, and among our late Philosophers, particularly embraced by des Cartes) many Objections lie against it; of which I will touch but one or two, as sticking most with me.

The first is, that it seems a little unphilo­sophical to call in a supernatural Agent for a Business and Work of Nature, such as is (if any is) the Propagation of Kind: My full consent is with Julius Scaliger, when he says nihil quod est in naturâ praeter naturam est: Nothing is in Nature that hath not a Cause in Nature.

Again, it may be further argued, that if human Souls are immediately created by God, it must be admitted that those of Beasts are so too, since nothing can be clear­er, even to Sense, than that Men and Beasts do propagate their kinds the same way, [Page 41] whether that way be by Creation, by Tra­duction, or by any other whatever. There is in Mankind, as well as in the kinds of Beasts, a Distinction of Sexes for the Busi­ness of Generation; a Furniture and Dispo­sition of Organs for it in both; and in both a like Use and Application of Organs. All Men and Beasts are alike conceived in their respective Wombs, alike nourished and aug­mented, and both come out in the same manner: and therefore there being the same Evidence, it is but reason to make the same Conclusion for both.

I know this Argument will have but little effect upon Gartesians, who, against the te­stimony of Sense, believing that Beasts are only Machins, without any conscious Per­ception or Knowledg, do not own them to have Souls as Men have, in the proper Sense of the World. But yet it cannot want its due Weight with all others, who, believing their own, refuse not Senses unto Beasts; as thinking they have reason to conclude that Beasts see and hear, &c. as Men them­selves do, because they have Eyes and Ears, &c. as Men themselves have, and, to all ap­pearance, make the same use of them upon occasion, as Men themselves upon the like would do. And all these will find the same [Page 42] reason to infer that Men and Beasts beget their like the same way, because there are the same Appearances to make us think they should.

These Appearances are obvious, and they ought to be considered; nor are they capable (I think) of being solved, or the other Difficulties, that do lie in both the ways of Creation and Traduction, capable of being removed otherwise than on the Hypothesis I have proposed, by acknow­ledging a Mundane Soul, that, according to the Exigence and Disposition of the Matter, is always ready with a Portion of it self to animate and actuate it; so that there is no need of any new Creation, of Praeexistence, or of any Traduction of particular Souls. But to proceed.

There is another Phaenomenon very obvi­ous, that is better solved on this Hypothesis of a mundane Soul, than it can be on any other; to wit, that certain Animals do move and stir, and give other Tokens of Life and Sensation, tho cut in several pieces, such as Eels, Snakes, Earthworms, Butter­flies, &c. This in the common way is hard to be conceived, since it must infer either that there is a Discerption and actual Divi­sion [Page 43] of Souls, of which, if Souls be imma­terial, they are absolutely uncapable; or else that vital Effects may remain in being after that the Soul, which is the next im­mediate Cause of those Effects, is departed; contrary to the Maxim, Sublata causa, tolli­tur effectus.

But the Reason of this Phaenomenon, if we suppose an universal mundane Soul, will be very plain: for since the Parts of those divided Animals do retain for some time the same Qualities and Dispositions that they had before their Separations, there not being in them, as in those of other Animals, that sudden Dissolution of the Texture, or of the Spirits; it follows that they must receive the same Influences which they had before from the mundane Soul, and consequently, that for some time they must continue to live, and in convenient Circumstances would longer; for like Reasons as the Parts of Ve­getables do, which, tho separated from their Wholes, yet continue to live in Slips, in Buds, in Grafts, when inserted into other Wholes. Nor do I see but that the Parts of Animals might be inoculated, or ingrafted into Animals, as well as those of Vegetables are into Vegetables, if the Qualities and Dispositions of Animal Parts, when separat­ed, [Page 44] could be as well preserved as those of Vegetables, and a Coalition of them as well made: a Sentiment that is confirmed by the Experiment of Taliacotius, and by all the others that the Chirurgia Curtorum affords.

Thus I have instanced in a few Phaenome­na of Nature, to which I might have added many others of a higher Quality; but these sufficiently confirm my Hypothesis, against which I cannot imagine any Objection of moment, capable of being rais'd, except this, that it does seem to render the Distin­ction between human and inferior Souls less conceivable, and in consequence the Im­mortality of the former.

But this Objection will soon vanish, if we but suppose there is a firm and indissolvable Union between the Spirit of God and its Vehicle in Man, and that there is not the like Union between it and its Vehicle in inferior Animals. And this Supposal is not without ground. For such a firm in­dissolvable Union betwixt the Spirit of God and its Vehicle, must be admitted to be in Angels, if they are (as they are) immor­tal; and then the Ligament or Bond of that Union, provided it be natural, must consist in a natural, but a naturally immu­table, [Page 45] Congruity. Now the System of Spi­rits, that in Man is the Vehicle of the mun­dane Soul, must be owned to have more Alliance unto that of Angels than the Ve­hicles of it in inferior Animals have, if we consider the advantage the Human Under­standing hath in excellency of Operations, above the Imagination of Beasts; and also consider that the Souls of Men are capable of the Divine Image, which those of Beasts are not: for thence it will evidently follow that the former have more of a natural congruity to the Spirit of God, which is the Soul of the World, than the latter have; those as to their Vehicles being of a celestial, but these of a terrestrial and an ele­mentary matter. No wonder then if the Spirit of a Man when he dies, goes upward, but that of a Beast goes downward.

Thus Sir, I think I have evinced from the holy Scriptures, and from several Phae­nomena of Nature, that there is a Principle of Life diffused throughout the Universe; and I have likewise evinced that it was the Sentiment of many great Philosophers: so that tho I am not very fond of any Opini­on, I hope I may say of this, without In­justice to Mr. Keil, that what he hath of­fered in contradiction to it, does in no de­gree impeach its Credit, or lessen mine for [Page 46] asserting it. However I do own I am obliged to that ingenious Gentleman for the occasion he hath given me of further ex­plaining and confirming my Hypothesis, and thereby too of professing a second time be­fore the World, that

I am with the greatest Respect,