CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Division of Logick.

Axiome 1. LOGICK is the Art of making of Instruments Which In­struments are Definiti­on, Division, Syllogism and Method., and therewith di­recting the understanding in the Knowledge of Things.

There is yet an Homonymie, or Ambiguity of meaning, lies hid in this Word Logick; for it is used either for a natural Faculty of Discourse, as when Persons of little Learning or Understand­ing are said to use Logick or Discourse, when af­ter [Page 2]their Manner; they question and maintain Disputes. Or for a Habit obtain'd by frequent Exercises and Rules. Or lastly, for a Systeme of Logical Precepts; as when one says, The Logick of Aristotle, The Logick of Ramus, &c. Logick in the de­liver'd Definition, left any one shou'd mistake, is taken for a Habit, which is as it were the End to which Precepts are design'd.

Ax. 2. Logick of the third and last Acceptation, that is, a System of Logical Precepts, consists of two Parts, Thematick and Organick.

Ax. 3. The first is that which is imploy'd about Theams, and their various Affections, and second Notions, as about the Matter of the Instruments of Logick.

Ax. 4. The other converses about the Organs themselves, with which the Understanding en­treats of Themes, and according to its Capacity attains to the Knowledge of them.

CHAP. II. Of Themes Simple and Composed, Ʋni­versal and Singular.

Ax. 1. A Theme is whatsoever may be propos'd to the Understanding to be known.

Ax. 2. Themes are either Simple or Composed.

Ax. 3. Themes Simple are those which are un­derstood without a Composition or Complexion of Notions, as Man, runs, &c.

Ax. 4. Compos'd, such as are understood by two or more Notions, by an Affirmation or Negation join'd together, as Man runs.

A Complexion of Notions is nothing else but an Affirmation or Negation in the Understanding or Speech. And by this means are Themes Sim­ple to be discern'd from Complex, and not by the Multitude or Composition of Words: For a Simple Theme is often express'd by a Compound Word, as Common-Wealth, Goat-Hart, &c. Frequent­ly also by many Words, as, Love of Parents to'ards their Children. Sometimes in one, and that a Sim­ple Word, you have a Theme Complex; as when I say in Latin, pluit, ningit, itur, statur; that is, it Rains, it Snows, we go, we stand, &c.

Ax. 5. A Theme Simple is either Universal or Singular.

Ax. 6. A Universal is that which is apt of its own Nature to be predicated of many things, as Man, Horse, Plant, &c.

A Universal is said to be predicated of many things either actually Existing, or at least such as may Exist. So Man was a Universal when Adam only was in being; because Man was not only apt of its own Nature to be said of Adam, but of all Men that were to be born. So altho' the Sun be really but One, it may yet, that is, the Term Sun, be call'd a Universal, because many Suns may be made of the same Nature with this of ours.

A Universal is said to be of its own Nature apt to be predicated; lest any one shou'd think Homonymous Words, or Words given to many Singulars of the same Species; as, When many Men are call'd Peter, to be Universals: For Ho­monymous, as Homonymous, are predicated of ma­ny as to their Names only, not Definitions, or, as to their own Natures.

Ax. 7. The Singular is that which of its own Nature, is apt to be predicated only of One.

Ax. 8. Singulars are also call'd Individuals be­cause not divisible into more of the same Name and Nature: So Plato, altho' he may, be divided [Page 4]into Body and Soul, Head, Belly, Breast, Feet, and his other Members; yet cannot he be divided into more Plato's.

Ax. 9. Individuals are either Determin'd or Vague; that is, Uncertain.

Ax. 10. Individuals are determin'd four ways: first, by their Proper Names, as Alexander, Buce­phalus, &c. And secondly, by a Common Name taken by way of Excellency, for their Proper; as Philosopher for Aristotle. Thirdly, by a demonstra­tive Pronoun, as this Man. Fourthly Periphrasis, as The Apostle of the Gentiles, for St. Paul.

Ax. 11. An Uncertain Undividual is that which is pronounc'd with a particular Pronoun; as Some Man, a certain Man, &c. by the Greeks [...].

CHAP. III. Of the Categories in general.

Ax. 1. A Category is a Series of Things gradually dispos'd under the same chief Genus.

A Category is so call'd from the Greek Word [...], that is, to Accuse; for it was a Word us'd in the Forum, and from thence brought into the Schools, and signifies to say or affirm a Thing of any Body. But the School-men say Praedicate. Farther, a Category either is taken for the Affirmation it self, or for the Series and Disposition of those things which may be affirmed of others under the same Genus. Such a Series Boethius calls a Predicament. We have chosen rather the Greek Word.

Ax. 2. The Categories are Ten, Substance, Quan­tity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, When, Where, Seite, and Habit.

Ax. 3. Of which the one is of Substances, the rest of Accidents. This Number is taken from the diversity of Questions which may be made concerning the first and individual Substances, as appears from the very Appellations of the Cate­gories.

Ax. 4. In these Ten are contain'd all things which can be praedicated of any Subject; others directly, others indirectly.

Ax. 5. That which directly, requires these Five Conditions.

I. It must be a Finite Being.

By this Condition God is excluded out of the Categories: For altho' God be a Substance, yet is he not put in the Category of Substance; for those things which are directly plac'd in this Category, not only subsist of themselves, but are subject al­so to Accidents, as we shall hereafter make ap­pear, which to think of God were impious. Be­sides, the Genus, properly so call'd, of those things which are directly plac'd in the same Category, must be the same: But neither Substance, nor any thing else, can be the Genus properly so call'd of things Finite and Infinite: God therefore be­ing Infinite cannot be directly contain'd under the Genus of Finite Substances. Yet is he aequi­vocally revok'd to this Category. For Substance is the Genus aequivocal both of God and Finite Substances.

II. True and Positive. To a true Being first are oppos'd Beings of Reason, as Genus, Species, &c. which are by no means in Categories. 2dly. The fictitious or feign'd, as Chimaera, Centaure, &c. which are referr'd to Categories Hypothetically, or by way of Supposition: For if a Centaure were that which it is feign'd to be, it wou'd really be put in the Category of Substances. 3dly. Ap­pearances, or, as they commonly say, Intentio­nals, as the Rain-bow, Colours appearing, Species's and [Page 6] Spectres of the Senses and Understanding, and o­ther things whose Essence only consists in their Apparition. These things belong to Categories, because of their Similitude; for they are the Resem­blances of true things. Hither also referr painted Images of true things as they are Images. To Po­sitive Beings are oppos'd Privations; as Blindness, Darkness, &c. which are reduc'd to Categories by their opposite Habits.

III. Compleat and Perfect. By this Condition are excluded, 1st. The Principles or Beginnings of things, as Unity, Moment, &c. 2dly. All Parts what­soever. 3dly. Imperfect Beings, and, as they com­monly say, in fieri or Action, as an Embrio, Moti­on, &c. 4thly. Modes and Compliments of other Beings. These are all reduc'd to the Categories by Concomitancy, except Differences, which altho' Parts of Species are said to belong collaterally, because they adhere collaterally or sideways to their Species's.

IV. One by it self. By this Condition are re­mov'd, 1st. Complex Beings, as A Man Runs. 2dly. Concrete, as White, Just. 3dly. Aggre­gate, as an Heap, an Army. These are all reduc'd by Accident to the Categories of those things of which they are compos'd.

V. Universal. By this means are rejected, 1st. Transcendents, as, Being, Thing, One, True, Good, which by their Community exceed all the de­grees of Categories, and then Singulars, which be­cause naturally they are not praedicated, but sub­jected only, are not in Categories, but underneath them, as it were a Basis.

Ax. 6. The first and principal Use of Categories is, that things which are of their own Nature, infinite, being reduc'd to certain Forms or Clas­ses, our Mind may survey them at one View or Glimpse, and observe how this or that may be compared with any other thing.

This Use confers much not only to the know­ledge of Logick, but of all Philosophy, and other Disciplines.

Ax. 7. Out of this first Use three more do arise. For, First, the Dispositions of things in Categories conferr much to the delivering of the Affections of Simple Themes, and second Notions, which are to be form'd out of the first.

2dly. From the same Disposition it appears, what of its own Nature is fit to be subjected, what prae­dicated.

3dly. There is no greater Assistance towards defining, dividing, disposing, I may add also Ar­gumentation, than an Order of Categories well dispos'd.

From whence it appears how much they are mistaken who would cut off from Logick this so useful and necessary part; which Aristotle so much esteem'd, that he wrote a particular Book of it, if yet that Book be Aristotle's; and has again incul­cated it in his Metaphysicks; and moreover in his Logical Precepts, made mention of it very frequent­ly in the first Book of his Topicks, also Cap. 9. commending it not obscurely for its Utility: The like to which Porphiry has done in his In­troduction.

CHAP. IV. Of Substance.

Ax. 1. A Substance is a Being subsisting of it self, and subject to Accidents.

That which in Latin is call'd Substantia, or Sub­stance, is in Greek [...], from the Word signifying To be.

To subsist by it self is nothing else but not to be in any thing as a Subject; and agrees to all Sub­stances, even to God, but to be subject to Acci­dents only to Finite; For God is not subject to Accidents, as I said before.

Ax. 2. Substance is either First or Second.

Ax. 3. The First is a Singular Substance, or that which is not said of a Subject; as Alexander, Bu­cephalus.

Ax. 4. The Second a Universal, or that which is said of a Subject; as, Man, Horse. For Man is said of Alexander and Philip; and Horse of Buce­phalus and Cyllarus.

Ax. 5. The Notes of Substances are six; First, A Substance is not in a Subject.

Ax. 6. Secondly, Substances are said of others Sy­nonimously.

The first Note agrees to all and only Substan­ces. Enough of which is said in the Definition of Substance. The Second only to the Second Sub­stances. For the First are not said of a Subject; the Second are said of the First Synonimously, that is, as to Name and Definition.

Ax. 7. Thirdly, A Substance signifies [...], or, this something.

To signifie this Something, is nothing else but to be Something Singular, which may be demonstra­ted with the Finger. This Note agrees only with the First Substances. For although Second Sub­stances in the Scheme of Category, that is, Figure of Predication, may seem to signifie this Something, yet in truth they signifie [...], that is, What Something; not indeed of themselves primarily, but upon the account of the Differences of which they are constituted: For Second Substances sig­nifie a Nature affected with a Difference, which is nothing else but some Essential Quality.

Ax. 8. Fourthly, A Substance hath no Contra­ry.

That is, not by reason of their Substance but Qua­lities; as Heat and Cold, Driness and Moisture, Weight and Lightness, &c.

Ax. 9. Fifthly, A Substance receives not more or less.

That is, is not intended or remitted. This is understood of one and the same Substance, which in succession of Time, cannot be made more a Substance in Genus or Species than it was be­fore. So Man and Stone cannot be made more a Substance, or more a Man and Stone than they were before.

Ax. 10. Sixthly, One and the same Numerical Substance receives Contraries.

That is, A Substance, altho' it has receiv'd Con­traries, remains still the same Substance as it was before. So cold Water, altho' by a Mutation it becomes hot, yet it is not another Substance, but remains still of the same Nature as it was before.

CHAP. V. Of Quantity.

Ax. 1. AN Accident is a being inherent in a Substance.

That is, so as that it can no ways exist separate from it. Hence follows, that,

I. An Accident cannot exist without a Subject.

II. Cannot pass from one Subject to another.

III. Cannot inhere in another Accident. Of which more is to be philosophiz'd in the Me­taphysicks.

Ax. 2. Quantity is an Accident which hath by it self Part out of Part.

In which three things are attributed to Quan­tity: 1st. To have Parts; and therefore God, An­gels, Human Souls, Points, Unites, &c. are nei­ther Quantity, nor Parts of Quantity, because not consisting of Parts. 2dly. To have Part out of Part; that is, to have Parts not in Essence only, but also in Scite and Space different: For there are two kinds of Parts: Some together, and mutually penetrating each the other; as Matter and Form: Others not, but are different in Scite, as Head, Breast, Body, Limbs, &c. And such as these are re­quir'd in Quantity. I said Part out of Part, rather than Parts, because Quantity may have but two, as in the Number Two. 3dly. To have Part out of Part by it self. Because a Corporeal Substance, and every Accident inhering in it, hath Part out of Part; but by reason of Quantity, not by it self: But, Quantity, as Magnitude, and Number, and Time, have Part out of Part, and that by themselves.

Ax. 3. Quantity is either continu'd or discrete.

Ax. 4. Continu'd is that whose Parts are con­nected together by one common Term.

Ax. 5. Discrete, whose Parts are not connected by one common Term, and is nothing else but Number.

Number uses to be divided into Number num­bering, and Number numbred. Number number­ing is nothing else but Number in the Abstract, or a Collection of Unities it self, as two, three, &c. Number numbred is only Number in the con­crete, or the things that are to be numbred, as Two Men, Three Horses, &c.

Ax. 6. Quantity continu'd, is either Magnitude or Time.

Ax. 7. Magnitude is a Permanent Quantity.

Ax. 8. Time a Fluent.

Ax. 9. Its Term is a Moment, or [...].

That Quantity is said to be permanent which consists of Parts having a Position amongst them­selves, or whose Parts exist together, and of which each may be shewn, where seated, and to which of the other Parts it sticks or coheres. But the Parts of Magnitude exist together, and each of them may be shewn where it is seated, and to which of the other Parts it coheres. But the Parts of Time have no Scite, because they consist in a continual Flux. Nor have the Parts of Number any Position, because they are no where seated, neither do they cohere. Yet the Parts both of Time and Number have an Or­der amongst themselves, by which some are be­fore others, &c.

Ax. 10. Magnitude is either a Line, or a Super­ficies, or a Body.

Ax. 11. A Line is a Magnitude one way divisible.

Ax. 12. Its Term is a Point.

Ax. 13. A Superficies is a Magnitude, and two ways divisible.

Ax. 14. Its Term is a Line.

Ax. 15. A Body is a Magnitude three ways di­visible.

Ax. 16. Its Term is a Superficies.

Ax. 17. A Term is an Extremity or Bound.

A Line is said to be one way divisible, be­cause it is a meer Length without Breadth or Depth, as an Ell, a Furlong, a Mile. A Superficies two, because Length and Breadth, without Depth; as an Acre of Land. A Body three; that is, into Length, Breadth, and Thickness; as a Cube, a Sphere, &c. For altho' a Body elsewhere signifies a Substance compos'd of Matter and Form, yet in this place it denotes nothing else, but Mag­nitude or Quantity every way divisible in the Abstract.

Nor are we yet to imagine a Longitude is to be found without Breadth, or a Breadth without Thickness: For these things are not really sepa­rate, but distinct only in the Mind.

Ax. 18. To Superficies is reduc'd Place.

Place is the next Superficies of the Body con­taining, as the next Superficies of the Cask is the place of Wine, &c.

Ax. 19. The Notes of Quantity are these Three: First, Quantity has not its Contrary.

That is, By it self: For if Quantity be said to be contrary to Quantity, it is because of its Quality adjoined; as when the Winter Season is said to be contrary to the Summer, because of the Cold and Heat.

Ax. 20. Secondly, Quantity receives not more and less.

That is, Is not intended or remitted; but it is extended and contracted.

Ax. 21. Thirdly, Things are said by Quantity to be equal or unequal.

I. For Equality and Inequality are Relations a­greeing to things on the account of Quantity.

[Page 13]II. Hitherto of Quantity, properly so call'd, which, because contain'd in this one Category, is wont to be call'd Praedicamental. There is also another Quantity improperly so call'd, which con­sists not in the Extension of Parts, but in the Perfection and Vertue of every thing. Hence uses it to be call'd, The Quantity of Perfection, and Quantity of Vertue. For the Essential Perfections of Things and Vertues are compos'd of divers De­grees, as, the Quantity of a Heap or Mole of several Parts. This, because diffus'd almost through all the Categories, uses to be call'd a Transcendental Quantity.

III. To these may be added the Precepts which Aristotle gives us, Book IV. of his Metaphysicks, Cap. 13. Of Quantities, says he, some are by themselves, others by Accident. Those are said to be Quan­tities by themselves, in whose Definition is put Quantity. And these are either Quantities, [...], that is, according to their Essence, as Line, Superficies, and those other things which we have before-mention'd: Or [...], that is, Affecti­ons of those things which may be call'd Quan­tities according to their Essence, as Multum, Parum, Magnum, Parvum; that is, Much, Little, Great, Small, &c. And the like if taken [...], that is, absolutely. For if [...], that is, compared one with another, they belong to the Catego­ry of Relation.

IV. Quantities by Accident are said two ways, First, those which are said to be Quantities upon the account of the Quantity in which they are, whether extended with the extension of the Sub­ject, as, Whiteness in the Wall; Or not, as, Musick in a Man. Secondly, Those whose Divisibility arises from the Divisibility of other things, as that of Motion, &c.

CHAP. VI. Of Quality.

Ax. 1. QUality is that Accident by which a Subject is said, and only said to be of what Quality it is.

Ax. 2. The Species's of it are Four: Habit and Disposition, Natural Power and Impotency, Patible Qua­lity and Passion, Form and Figure.

Two Names are attributed to each single Spe­cies, to fignifie Qualities diverse rather in Degree or Time, or other Accidental Circumstance, than Species or Essence: For Habit and Disposition, Power and Impotency, differ in Degree: Patible Quality and Passion, in Time: Form and Figure, in Reason or Manner.

Ax. 3. Habit is an adventitious Quality of ope­rating or doing any thing with ease.

Ax. 4. Disposition is an imperfect Habit.

1. §. Habit, in Greek [...], is sometimes taken for whatever form which may be separated from the Subject, as when oppos'd to Privation. So it is taken in the Tenth Chapter of the Book of Cate­gories, and many other places. Sometimes for Cloathing, as Book IV. of the Metaphysicks, Chap. 20. whence also the last Category is call'd the Category of Having. Amongst Physicians it is taken for a Habit of Body, whether Good or Evil. Hence [...], or, a firm Constitution of Body, such as of old the Gladiators and Champions had: And [...], that is, a bad Constitution; but in this place it is taken for the first Species of Quality which we have defin'd.

[Page 15]2. §. A Habit is said to be an adventitious Quali­ty, because not flowing from the Essence of the Subject, or its Principles, but from elsewhere; and is either infus'd by God, as Faith, Hope, Cha­rity, Prophecy, Gift of Tongues, &c. or acquir'd by frequent Acts. Acquir'd Habits are either in Body, as, a good Habit of Body acquir'd by In­dustry; or in the Mind; and these either in the Understanding, as Sense, Intelligence, Wisdom, Pru­dence, and Art; or in the Appetite, as Vertues and Vices Moral.

3. §. Disposition, in Greek [...], either signifies the Order of that which hath Parts, as in Book IV. of the Metaphysicks, Chap. 19. or any Quality which prepares Matter for the Re­ception of Substantial Form; or any Quality of the first Species: In which Sense the Philosopher says, Chap. 8. of the Categories, where he disputes of Quality, Every Habit is a Disposition, but not eve­ry Disposition a Habit. Or, Lastly, A Habit begin­ning and imperfect, which is the signification of this Place.

4. §. A Habit differs from a Disposition, be­cause inhering deeper in the Subject, it becomes more permanent and lasting than it: For a Dis­position, as it is soon occasion'd, so it is soon mov'd and chang'd, as Aristotle speaks in the re­cited Place.

Ax. 5. Natural Power is a Quality not obvious to the Sense by which a Subject of its own Nature is apt to do or bear.

Ax. 6. Impotency is a diminish'd Power.

1. §. Natural Power, in Greek [...], differs from the third Species of Quality, because not obvious to the Senses, as that is. The same differs from Habit, both because it is from Na­ture, Habit elsewhere, and because it only renders the Subject fit to do or suffer. Whereas Habit [Page 16]also renders a Subject propense, and that to do expeditiously and with facility.

2. §. Natural Power is also divided by Aristotle, Book IV. of his Metaphysicks, Chap. 12. into Active and Passive. Both are defin'd in this manner: Some Power is said to be a Principle of Motion or Mutation in another, as it is another; some from a­nother as another: That is Active; This Passive. For Example; The Power of Generating, moving from Place to Place, Heating, Building, &c. is an Active Power; But Softness is a Passive Power to Cutting or Section.

3. §. To these may be added a certain mixt Power, which, because a Principle of Mu­tation in it self, is at the same time Active and Passive; as, the Intellect, and Will, &c. From this Power flow Actions immanent; as, to Understand, and Will, &c. From Active, Transient, or passing out.

4. §. Besides which, Natural Power is either, First or Second. The first is that which flows im­mediately from the Form of the Subject. The Second, a disposition only of the Matter, and Ap­paratous of the Organs, with which the former exercises its Functions. For Example: The Faculty of Seeing, as it flows from a Sensitive Soul, is the First Power; but as it consists in the Structure and Temperation of the Eye, it is the Second. The first Power cannot be taken away from any Subject, or diminish'd. The second be both taken away, and diminish'd: When therefore Impotency is said to be diminish'd Power, the second Power is to be understood.

5. §. To the Second Power are to be recall'd all Nature's Gifts, as well those of the Mind; as Ingenuity, Aptness, Memory; as those of the Body, as Strength, Hailness of Constitution, &c. Such Gifts as these, if they are very imperfect, as if any one be of a dull Wit, slippery Memory, &c. are said [Page 17]to be Impotences; if wholly absent, they are not Qualities but Privations meerly.

Ax. 7. Patible Quality is that which effects a Passion in the Sense.

Ax. 8. Which if it soon vanishes, is said to be a Passion.

1. §. Patible Quality, in Greek [...], is not so called because the Subject suffers any thing from it, in which it is, but because it effects a Passion in the Senses.

Hitherto belong the Five proper Objects of the outward Senses, viz. Light, Colour, Sound, Smell, Taste, and the Tactile Qualities, such as the Four First Qualities, viz. Heat, Cold, Moistness, Driness, and those which arise from these, as Gravity, Levity, Ra­rity, Density, &c. every one of which Qualities af­fects a particular Sense; Colour, the Sight; Sound, the Hearing; Heat, the Touch, &c. In which they are dif­ferent from Figure and Form, which effect a Passion in more Senses than one, &c.

2. §. If the Patible Quality soon perish; as, Pale­ness from Fear, or Redness from Shame, it is cal­led [...], or Passion, because it comes with a Passi­on. And so it comes to pass that Regard, being had more to the Passion than to the Quality arising from the Passion, they are not so much said to be Quales, that is, affected so and so with a Quality, as to have suffered something, as Aristotle says, Cap. 13. of the Categories.

Ax. 9. Figure is a Quality arising from a Term of Magnitude.

Ax. 10. Form is a Figure with a Colour.

Form in Greek is term'd [...] & [...], Figure [...], Form is either Substantial or Accidental. Substanti­al Form belongs to the Category of Substance. Acciden­tal Form in general is nothing else but an Accident; which, like a Form, inheres in its Subject. In this Place every Accidental Form is not understood, but only that which consists about every thing, or which [Page 18]in the Superficies of a Body appears to our Eyes and Touch.

2. §. And altho' Figure and Form are often con­founded, yet in this Place they are wont so to be distinguished as that Figure is given to things Ma­thematical, in which nothing is considered but Magnitude; Form to things Physical, in which also Colour is considered. To Fi­gure belong Triangle, Circle, Square, Sphaere, Cylinder, and other Appellations of Mathematical Figures and Affections of continued Quantity. To Form, Comliness, Deformity, &c.

Ax. 11. The Notes of Quality are Three: First, Quality has a Contrary.

1. §. So Vertue to Vice, Heat to Cold are Contra­ry. Contrariety is only found in the First and Third Species, not in the Second and Fourth, unless Fairness and Deformity seem Contraries; which yet belong to Form.

Ax. 12. Quality admits of more and less.

1. §. That is, is intended and remitted: For one thing is hotter or less hot than another; colder or less cold: This Note, or Affection of Quality arises either from Contrariety or Disposition of the Matter. Habit and patible Qualities receive more and less from Contrariety. For they are remitted when in­termixed with their Contrary, and intended when they are free from it, Light excepted; which altho' a a Patible Quality, yet is intended or remitted upon the Account of the unequal Disposition of the Sub­ject, because is has not a Contrary. After the same Manner are the natural Powers intended and remit­ted. To which nothing is contrary with which they can be mixed.

Ax. 13. Things by Quality are said to be like or unlike.

1. §. For Likeness and Unlikeness are Relations agreeable to things by Reason of their Qualities.

CHAP. VII. Of Things related to each other.

Ax. 1. THose things are said to be related, which in Respect of what they are, are said to be others, that is, of others or in any other Manner or Respect are referred to [...].

1. §. This Definition of things related is Extant in the Beginning of the First Chapter of the Categories.

Ax. 2. Relateds are usually divided into Re­lateds in Respect of their Names, and those in Respect of their Essence.

Ax. 3. Relateds according to their Names are absolute things, which include or connote a Relati­tion; and therefore not in Essence but in Name on­ly are referred to something else.

Ax. 4. Relateds according to their Essence, are those things in whom to be, and to have respect to something else, is the same thing; or whose Essence is wholly placed in the Respect they bear to some o­ther thing.

1. §. Relateds in Respect of their Names, and Relateds in Respect of their Essence, differ not in the Nature of their Relation, but their Names. For the Names which agree to Relateds according to their Names signifie of themselves first, an Absolute thing, and secondly, connote a Relation which is included in that Absolute thing. But to Relateds according to their Essence, are such Names given, which of themselves signifie a Relation, and connote an Absolute thing, which that Relation presupposes, as it were, its Subject. For Example: Knowledge and a thing Knowable, are said to be Relateds according to [Page 20]their Names; because Science is the Name of a Qua­lity which includes a Respect to the Object knowable, or which may be known. And therefore the whole Essence of Science is not placed in Respect to the Object which may be known: Nay, the Essence of Knowledge or Science is an Absolute Quality, which is yet said to be referred to another; because it connotes a Relation. But Father and Son are Re­lateds according to their Essence; because these Words of themselves first signifie a Relation, or Mutual Respect; and therefore the whole Essence of the Fa­ther as he is Father, is placed in Respect to the Son; and that of the Son in Respect to his Fa­ther. For what is it else to be a Father, but to have a Son, and to be a Son, but to have a Fa­ther?

2. §. From Relateds, according to their Names, little or nothing differ Relateds transcendent, so called, because they surpass or transcend all the Bounds of Categories. For there is nothing to which such Relateds do not agree. So Accident to the Subject, Action to the Object, Part to the whole, and Cause to the Caused, &c.

Ax. 5. Relateds are also divided into Relateds Real, and Relateds Rational.

Ax. 6. Relateds Real are those which of their own Nature, and without the Help of the Mind are referr'd to some other thing.

Ax. 7. Relateds of Reason are such as only by the Operation of the Mind are referred or rela­ted to somewhat else.

1. §. For Example: Father, Son; Husband, and Wife, and other Relateds of that sort are real Re­lateds; because the Father's being the Son's Fa­ther, and the Husband's the Wive's Husband, does not depend upon the Cogitation of our Mind. But Right and Left are Relations of Rea­son; because that to one standing betwixt two Co­lumns, this should be Right, that Left, rather [Page 21]than the Contrary, is from the Ordination of the Mind. In this Sense to the Heaven also we as­sign Right and Left, Before and After; and other Differences of Positions. But that One Hand shou'd be called Right and the other Left, seems not to be attributed to Reason, but Nature. To Rela­teds of Reason, also, Identity or Sameness is to be referred. For when any thing is so com­pared with it self, as that it is said to be the same with it self, that one thing is so used by the Understanding as if it were two: Hitherto also refer Beings of Reason, which are mutually referred to each other, as Genus and Species; Sub­ject and Predicate, &c.

Ax. 8. In every Relation are required Subject and Term.

Ax. 9. That is called the Subject to which the Relation is attributed; or that which is referred to some other thing.

Ax. 10. That, the Term to which the Subject is referred.

Ax. 11. The Subject is said to be the Relate, and the Term the Correlate, when affected with a Relati­on, and considered together with it.

Ax. 12. Related and Correlated are mutually re­ferred each to the other; and that not in one, but a two-fold Relation.

Ax. 13. In which Reciprocation, or mutual Relation, that which is the Subject of one Relation is the Term of the other; and so on the contrary.

Ax. 14. As also that which is in one Relation the Relate, is in the other the Correlate; and so on the contrary.

1. §. These things that you may understand, sup­pose we between the Father and the Son, Two Relations to intercede; of which the One in which the Father is referred to the Son, is commonly called Paternity; the Other in which the Son is referred to the Father, Filiation or Son-ship. But [Page 22]Paternity and Filiation are not one, but two Re­lations diverse from each other; Because the Father is otherwise related towards the Son than the Son is towards the Father. These Two Relations require two Subjects and two Terms, which are two Men; as, suppose Philip and Alexander; Philip is the Subject of Paternity, Alexander the Term. On the other side, Alexander is the Subject of Filiation; Philip, the Term; Father is the Relate in Paternity, Son the Correlate. On the other side, Son is the Relate in Filiation, Father the Correlate.

2. §. Father the Subject of Relation is wont vul­garly to be distinguished into Subject of Inhaesion, and Subject of Denomination. But these things have more in them of Subtilty than Truth.

Ax. 15. Some Relations are supposed, supposing the Subject and Term: Others besides these do re­quire a Foundation.

Ax. 16. And a Foundation is that by whose Means the Relation accrews to the Subject.

1. For Example: When an Egg is said to be like an Egg, the Similitude between these two Eggs arises in each as soon as they begin to exist; nor is there any thing required towards their Relati­on, besides the Existence of two Eggs. But the Relation of Servant does not presently arise in the Subject so soon as the Term exists; but it be­hoves that something else also do intercede upon which this Relation is founded: For a Servant is therefore the Servant of one; because by him he has been either saved or purchased, &c.

Ax. 17. Relateds are said either to be Synoni­mous, or of the same Name; or Heteronymous, viz. of a diverse.

1. §. Relateds Synonymous are usually called Relateds of Aequiparancy; as, Friend, Rival, &c. Heteronymous of Disquiparancy; as, Father, Son; Ma­ster, Servant, &c. If the Relation which agrees [Page 23]to Heteronyms has a Name, one of the two is called the Relate, to wit, that from which the Relation has its Name; the other, the Correlate. If the Relation be without a Name, as when the Buyer is refer­red to the Seller, the Distinction of Related and Correlated depends only upon our selves; as also in Synonymous: For there is no reason why the Buyer should be any more called the Related than the Correlated; or of two Friends, that the One should be so called rather than the other.

Ax. 18. The Notes of Relateds are Five; and first, Relateds have a Contrary.

1. §. The Relate is not contrary to its Corre­late, but one related to another. This Note agrees not with Relateds per se; that is, by themselves; but by Virtue of their Foundation or Subject, and therefore not to all: For nothing is contrary to Father or Son, double or half, but to such only which lean on contrary Founda­tions, or accrue to contrary Subjects: For Friend and Enemy are Contraries; because the Founda­tion of Friendship and Enmity, viz. Good Will and Ill Will are Contraries; so like and unlike, e­qual and unequal are Contraries, because the things themselves or Subjects are Contraries. For Simi­litude is between the same Qualities, and Equality between the same Quantities. But Dissimilitude be­tween divers Qualities, and Inequality between divers Quantities.

Ax. 19. Secondly, Relateds receive more and less.

1. §. This Note also agrees to Relateds in Re­gard of Subject or Foundation, and therefore not to all Relateds. For a Father or a Master is no more a Father or a Master than another; but to such only as lean upon a mutable Subject or Foun­dation: For when the Subject or Foundation is vari­ed, the Relation is intended or remitted. For Ex­ample: Those things which are unequal, become more or less unequal, when Quantity, which is the Subject of [Page 24]Inequality, is in either of the two more or less. And dissimilar things become more or less dissimilar, when the Quality in either of them is either intended or re­mitted.

Ax. 20. Thirdly, Relateds are Reciprocated.

1. §. That is, every Related is referred to a Re­ciprocal Correlate: As, the Master is the Master of the Servant; and the Servant is the Servant of the Master. The half, the half of the double, and the double the double of the half. But it often hap­pens through want of Words, that this Reciproca­tion does not appear: For the Head is the Head of something, and the Wing the Wing of some­thing; and yet to these there wants an answerable Correlate. For Animal cannot be a proper Corre­late for Head, because all Animals have not a Head; nor can Bird be a proper Correlate for Wing; because even Flies, Wasps, Batts, have Wings and yet are not Birds. It is therefore necessary, says Aristotle upon this Head, to feign Words altho' not so much used; that therefore the Reciprocation may be made apparent in the aforesaid Relationss, we must say, the Head is the Head of something having an Head, &c. and the Wing the Wing of something having a Wing, &c.

Ax. 21. Fourthly, Relateds are together in Na­ture.

1. §. That is, as they are related: For altho' Philip be before Alexander, yet is not Philip a Fa­ther before Alexander be a Son.

Ax. 22. Fifthly, Relateds are together in Know­ledge.

1. §. Because one Related as a Related cannot be known without the other: For altho' he may be known who is the Son, without knowing him who is the Father; yet can he not be known to be a Son, unless we know him to have a Father; nor can it be known, whose Son any one is, if we are ignorant who is his Father, &c.

CHAP. VIII. Of Action and Passion.

Ax. 1. ACtion is nothing else but the manner af­ter which we do a thing, or by which we are said to act.

Ax. 2. To Act is to Effect something.

Ax. 3. Passion is nothing else but the manner af­ter which we suffer a thing, or that by which we are said to suffer.

Ax. 4. To suffer is to receive the Effect of the Agent.

1. §. Action and Passion are not so much things as the Way to things, or the Manner after which things are done, and the Flux of that which is said to be done.

Ax. 5. In Actions are to be distinguished A­gent, Patient or Subject; the Term from which, and the Term to which.

1. §. For Example: In the Action of Heating, the Agent is the Fire, or Sun; the Patient or Sub­ject, the Person who is warmed; the Term from which, Cold; the Term to which, Heat: For he who is warmed, is from being cold, made hot; the Term to which, is always some true thing; but the Term from which, is sometimes only a true thing, and contrary to the Term to which; as in Calefaction or Heating: For Cold and Heat are true Qualities, and contrary one to the other: But sometimes that from which is nothing else but a meer Privation of the Term to which; as when one from unlearned be­comes learned: For when nothing is contrary to the Term to which, the Term from which is only privative­ly opposed to it.

Ax. 6. In every Action are necessarily requi­red, in Agent, a Term from which, and a Term to which.

Ax. 7. And if the Term to which, cannot subsist of its self, then there is also required a Subject or Patient.

Ax. 8. If the Term to which subsist of it self, the Action consists without a Patient.

1. §. For since Action is nothing else but a Flux of the Effect, or the Term to which in fieri, as they say. If the Term to which requires a Subject, as in all Acti­on, except Creation it does, the Action also requires a Subject: For since the Effect of Creation or Term to which is the whole Substance, it follows, that Cre­ation has no Subject or Patient. For Creation is no­thing else but the producing of something out of no­thing; that is, out of no Subjected Matter.

Ax. 9. When an Action has a Subject or Patient, it is not in the Agent, but Patient

1. §. For Action (as we have said) is a Flux of the Effect, and therefore ought to be in that Subject in which it is effected; but the Effect is in the Patient, and therefore the Action ought to be in the Patient also.

Ax. 10. Even Action and Passion differ not in the Thing it self, but in Respect only to diverse Things.

1. §. For there is but one Flux of one Effect, which, as it proceeds from the Agent, is said to be Action; as receiv'd by the Patient, a Passion. For as the Way from Athens to Thebes, and from Thebes to Athens, is one only Way collated to diverse Terms: And as the Rising and Falling of a Moun­tain or Hill differs only in Respect, so also Action and Passion are in this only Respect different; one being referred to the Agent, the other to the Pa­tient.

Ax. 11. Of Actions some are Immanent, others Transient.

Ax. 12. An Action immanent is that whose Ef­fect is in the Agent, as to understand, to will.

Ax. 13. Transient, whose Effect is in another thing, as, to burn, to beat.

Ax. 14. In the Action immanent, the Agent and the Patient are the same. In the Transient, dif­ferent in the thing it self.

Ax. 15. An Action Transient is divided accord­ing to the Diversity of its Term to which, into four Species; the first of which is that of Substance, as Ge­neration, to which is opposed Corruption. The second: Quantity, as Accretion, to which is opposed Diminution. The third, Quality, as Alteration. The fourth, of Place or Ubi, as Local Motion.

1. §. These things are delivered by Aristotle in the 14th Chapter of the Categories, but more fully to be handled in the Physicks.

Ax. 16. Action may also be divided into Univo­cal and Aequivocal.

Ax. 17. Action Univocal is that by which the A­gent produces an Effect of its own Species.

Ax. 18. Action Aequivocal, of a diverse.

1. §. As when a Mouse generates a Mouse; or Heat, Heat; the Action is Univocal: But when the Sun ge­nerates Mice, or Light, Heat; the Action is Aequivo­cal.

Ax. 19. Lastly, Action is divided into Perficient, or Corrupting; that is, Spoiling.

Ax. 20. Action Perficient is that by which some­thing is effected without the Destruction of any thing.

Ax. 21. Corrupting, that by which something is done, and another thing destroyed.

1. §. For Example: Illumination is an Action Perficient: For when the Air is enlighten'd it is done by Light, Nothing of Form destroyed; but Generation and Heating are Actions Corrupting: For when an Animal or any such thing is generated, at the same time something else is destroyed; and he that was hot, becomes so by the Dismission of the Cold. The Cause of this Difference is because Action Per­ficient is conversant amongst Terms privatively opposed; corrupting between either Contruries or Disparates.

Ax. 22. The Notes of Action are two: First, Action has a Contrary.

Ax. 23. Secondly, Action receives more or less.

1. §. The Action of Heating is contrary to that of making cold; and some things heat or cool more, others less: And to heat more in this Place is not to heat more swiftly, but intensly; that is, to produce a more intense Heat.

Both these Notes belong to Action upon the Ac­count of the Term to which, and therefore neither to all; but those only whose Terms are contrary and receive Intension and Remission: And therefore to gene­rate, to figure, &c. have no Contrary; nor are they in­tended or remitted, because Substance or Figure neither has a Coutrary, or is intended or remitted.

2. §. And all those things which we have said of Action, agree also to Passion. For the Divisions and Notes of both are the same.

CHAP. IX. Of the Four last Categories

Ax. 1. UBi is a Mode after which finite things are said to be somewhere.

1. §. Ubi differs from Place; in that Place, if strict­ly taken, agrees only with Bodies: Ubi also with Incorporeal Substances if finite: For Substances In­corporeal are said to be in a Place definitively; that is, they are so said to be somewhere as not to be elsewhere; but yet so as they occupy not any Place, or exclude other Substances, whether Corporeal or Incorporeal out of it, which is improperly to be in a Place; but Corporeal Substances are said to be [Page 29]in a Place circumscriptively; that is, are said to oc­cupy, and expel other Corporeal Substances out of it; which is properly to be in a Place. I say, definite, because God, who is Infinite, is not said to be some­where, but everywhere.

2. §. There is also another difference between Place and Ubi: For Place belongs to the Question in which it is asked, How much a thing is in Quantity? or how much Room will it take up? Ubi to the Que­stion in which it's ask'd, Where, or whence the Thing is? Whither, or which Way gone? And those Answers which are made to these Questions; as, at home, abroad, in the Country, in the Temple, hence, thence, hither, thither, this Way, that Way, &c. are plac'd in this Category.

Ax. 2. When is a Mode, after which finite things are said sometime to be, to have been, or to come.

1. §. Quando, or When, differ from Time strictly and properly so called; as Ubi from Places For Time strictly taken, agrees only to Things Successive and consisting in a perpetual Motion and Flux of Parts: That is, accor­ding to Priom­ty or Posterin­rity. For it is defined a Number of Motion ac­cording to First and Last in Book 4. of the Physicks, Cap. 11. But When is al­so attributed to things moment any and permanent, if fi­nite: For those things which are infinite and eternal, are not said sometime to be, but always.

2. sect;. Besides, the Words of Time belong to Quan­tity, and to the Question made by how long? as, an Hour, a Year, an Age, &c, But the Words which belong to this Category to the Question made by When; as, to Day, to Morrow, Yesterday, in the Summer, in the Spring, in the Calends, in the Nones, in the Consulship of Man­lius, &c.

Ax. 3. Site is the Order of the Parts of the Body a­mongst themselves.

5. §. For Site belongs only to Bodies: For the Or­der of the Parts in Time or Number uses not to be cal­led Site: For although Site cannot be changed with­out Local Motion; which is a Motion to Where, yet [Page 30]is not Site to be confounded with Ubi, not so much as in Bodies: For the Ubi may be changed, not changing the Site. As when one without any Motion of Parts is car­ried out of one Place into another.

2. §. Site is either natural, as that of the Arm at the Shoulder-Blade, or of the Hand at the Wrist; or vo­luntary; as, to sit, to stand, to lie, to be prone, su­pine, &c.

Ax. 4. Habit is a Manner, after which Clothes, or any thing like Clothes, are put about the Bo­dy, appended or any other way adjoined to it.

1. §. To this Category belong all those Words which signifie the Conjunction of Clothes, Armour, and such like things with the Body; as Clothed, Armed, Gowned, Shield­ed, Speared, Bearded, Strewed, or Covered with Arras, Tapestry, &c. These and the like Words signifie not Clothes or Arms, but the Conjunction of Clothes or Arms with the Body; which Aristotle signified when in the 4th Book of the Metaph. Cap. 20. he called Habit the Act of him which has, and of that which is had; and between him which has on the Garment, and the Gar­ment it self, &c. And thus far of the Categories.

CHAP. X. Of the Praedicables in general.

Ax. 1. TReat we now of the Affections of simple Themes, or second Notions, which a­rise out of the Collation of the first, and things dispo­sed in Categories.

Ax. 2. Those Affections are either simple or con­joyned.

Ax. 3. Simple, which are agreeable to things singly and apart by themselves.

Ax. 4. And are either Praedicables, Whole and Part, Cause and Caused, Subject or Adjunct, &c.

Ax. 5. Conjoyned; Those that are agreeable to many things conjointly.

Ax. 6. And are either Convenience, Diversity, Oppo­sition, or Order.

Ax. 7. The Predicables are five in Number, viz. Ge­nus, Species, Difference, Property and Accident.

1. §. This Number is gathered thus. Whatever is affirmed of another after the Manner aforesaid, is either contained in the Essence of its Subject or not. That which is contained in the Essence, is either pre­dicated in the Enunciation in which it is said; what the Subject is; or in that which it is said, of What Quality or Sort it is. That which is predicated in the Enunciation of which it is said; What it is; either expresses the Essence of it imperfectly, and is the Genus; or fully and perfectly, and is the Species. That which is contained in the Essence, and expresses the Quality, is the Difference. That which is not contained in the Essence of the Subject, is ei­ther predicated of it necessarily, and is its Property; or casually, and is its Accident, &c.

Ax. 8. The Use of Praedicables is either common or proper.

Ax. 9. The common Use is to be serviceable in the Formation of Definitions, Divisions, Syllogisms, and Method.

Ax. 10. The proper Use is double; first, to de­clare what in every Category is superiour, what in­feriour, what first, what last; and from thence what of its own Nature is apt to be subjected, what predi­cated, &c.

Ax. 11. Of this Use are Genus, Species and Dif­ference.

Ax. 12. The second is to shew after what Man­ner Accidents are predicated of their Substances.

Ax. 13. And of this are Propriety and Accident.

1. §. And therefore they are not to be heard, who deny Propriety and Accident to be of this Place.

CHAP. XI. Of Genus and Species.

Ax. 1. GEnus is that which is predicated of ma­ny things, and those different in Spe­cies, in the Question in which it is asked, What a thing is; as, What is a Man or a Beast? You say an Animal, &c.

1. §. Genus is so called of that Relation or Similitude it has to that Genus or Stock of Ancestry from whence a Generation of Men is descended: For as the Forefa­thers or Progenitors are the Beginning of their Posteri­ty, and their Posterity again are in some kind of Relati­on or Kindred to each other, as proceeding from the said Stock: So also Genus is in some Respect the Be­ginning of its Species, and the Species themselves subject to it, agree so far amongst themselves as they are consonting in the same Genus, &c.

2. §. This Definition of Genus is extant, Book 1. of the Topicks, Cap. 5. and in Porphyrie, Cap 2.

Ax. 2. Species is that which is placed under the Ge­nus, Or that of which the Genu is predicated in the Question in which it is asked What a thing is; and is so called from that ancient Word Specio. See from whence the Words Aspicio, Respicio, &c. are derived.

Ax. 3. Of Genus's the one is the most general or chief, the other subaltern or middle.

Ax. 4. As also of Species's, the one of them is the most special or lowest, the other Subaltern.

Ax. 5. Genus the most general is that which when a Genus is not a Species; or, than which there is not a superiour Genus.

Ax. 6. Species, the most special, is that which when a Species is not a Genus, or, than which, there is no other more inferiour Species.

Ax. 7. Those Genus's and Species are said to be Sub­altern, which interjected between the Chief Genus and Lowest Species in respect of their Inferiours are said to be Genus's of their Superiours Species.

1. §. But that this Subordination of Genus's and Species may the better be understood, be for our Ex­ample, The Category of Substances; in which Sub­stance it self is the Chief Genus; Man the lowest Species, or most special. The Interjected between them, viz. between Substance and Man; such as Animal, Living Creature, Body, &c. are Subaltern: For Animal is the Genus of Man, and Species of living Creature; and living Creature is the Genus of Animal, and Species of Body: and Body is the Species of Substance and Ge­nus of living Creature, &c.

2. §. Subalterns have two Habitudes or Relations: For they are Genus's and Species with a diverse Re­spect. The chiefest and lowest have but one Habi­tude: For the Chief Genus is nothing else but a Ge­nus, and the Lowest Species nothing else but a Species. The Species may indeed be conferred ei­ther with the Genus or Individuals: For it is to the Genus subjected, and predicated of the Individu­als; but in both of these Collations it is a Species: For in Respect of the Genus it is called a subjected Species; or, as they vulgarly say, subjici­cible; and in Respect of the Individuals, a Predica­ted, or Predicable. And this alone constitutes the Second Predicable; and is thus by Porphyrie de­fined.

Ax. 8. A Species is that which is predicated of many different in Number in the Question in which it is asked What a thing is?

1. §. For when it is asked What is Plato and Socra­tes? It is rightly answered, a Man. A Species differs from Individuals; because it is predicated of many; [Page 34]Genus's, because of those things which are different in Number. Those things are said to be different in Number, which when of the same Essence, may be numbred as many things; as the Individuals of the same Species. Species also differs from Difference, Propriety and Accident; because it is predicated in the Question in which it is asked What a Thing is.

Ax. 9. Genus is also divided into Synonymous or U­nivocal, and Homonymous or Equivocal.

Ax. 10. Genus Univocal is that which is equally predicated of its Species.

Ax. 11. Equivocal, Unequally.

1. §. To be unequally predicated of its Species is nothing, else but to agree to one Species more; to another less: Or to one immediately, to the other by some other. And this is when one Species de­pends upon another. So Ens, if a Genus, is equivocal, because Substance is more so than Accident. Nay, Accident is no being, any farther than as it depends upon Substance. But Animal is an Univocal Genus; because Man is no more an Animal than a Beast, nor a Beast than a Man.

2. §. A Genus Equivocal is a Genus in an imper­fect Manner.

3. §. These are the Precepts usually given in this Place concerning Genus and Species: But because A­ristotle in his Topicks delivers many, and those the most profitable Rules, of which some belong to the Business of Syllogism, and the Ratio of finding a Me­dium, others to the Doctrine of simple Themes: Therefore it will not be besides our Purpose, if out of many we select the Principal of them, which ap­pertain to the Illustration of simple Themes, and in­sert them in their Places, referring the rest to the Do­ctrine of Syllogism: And 1st remember that,

Ax. 12. Species partake of their Genus's, Genus's of their Species's not so.

[Page 35]1. §. [...], that is, Participare, by the Defini­tion of Aristotle in the 4th Book of Topicks, Cap. 1. where this Canon is extant, is nothing else but to re­ceive the Definition of that of which it participates. But the Species receives the Definition of the Genus, but the Genus not that of the Species: For whatso­ever is in the Definition of the Genus, Suppose Ani­mal, that is all likewise included in the Definition of the Species, to wit, Man or Beast, but not on the con­trary.

Ax. 13. The Genus is said of the Species Syno­nymously, not Paronymously, or Denominatively: Also not Homonymously, or by way of Metaphor.

1. §. To be said Synonymously of a thing is no­thing else but to be said as to its Name and Definiti­on, as is before said out of Aristotle, Cap. 5. of the Categories. But Genus is said of the Species as to Name and Definition, because participated of its Spe­cies. Therefore it is said of Species Synonymously. And this is taught Book 2. of the Topicks, Cap. 2. Nor is the Genus only said Synonymously of the Spe­cies, but also in the Question in which it is asked, what the thing is: For all things which are answer'd to the Question, what is it, are predicated Synony­mously of the Species, as is aforesaid; but cannot be rendred to the Question, What is it? Paronymous those things are called, which are said of another as to Name only, not Definition; and that not in the Que­stion in which it is asked, what a thing is; but in which it is asked of what Quality it is; or in an Oblique Case. From whence follows that, that cannot be the Genus of any thing which is said of it Paronymously. And therefore Whiteness is not the Genus of Snow; because Snow is not said to be Whiteness, but white. See the 4th Book of the Topicks, Cap. 1. In like man­ner they are said to be Homonymous, under which also, [...] are contained: Or, those, which, as A­ristotle speaks, are said by way of Metaphor of many things, as to Name only, and not Definition: And [Page 36]for this Reason cannot be Genus's. So Dog cannot be said to be the common Genus of barking Animal, and a Star; because an Homonymous Word: Nor can Ardor be said to be the Genus of Love; because by way of Metaphor Love is said to be the Ardour of Concupiscence. See B. 4. Top. Cap. 3. which brings us to the next Axiom, viz. That,

Ax. 14. That which is the Cause of a thing, or Part, or Affection, or Subject, that cannot be its Ge­nus.

1. §. This Precept is extant Book 4. Topicks, Cap. 9. and leans upon this Reason; viz. because these things are all said obliquely, and not in the right Case, or in Quid or What. So Grief, because it is the Cause of Anger cannot be said to be its Genus. In like man­ner Body cannot be the Genus of Animal, because its Part; nor Immortality the Genus of Life Eternal, because it is its Affection; nor Air of Wind, because it is its Subject. For Wind is not Air moved, but the Motion of the Air, or rather, of the Airy Ex­halation.

Ax. 15. Genus, and Species, are under the same Genus, and if Accidents, in the same Subject.

1. §. The first Member of this Precept is extant Book 4. of the Topicks, Cap. 1. the other, Cap. 5. Both of which are founded upon this Reason; be­cause the Genus is contained in the Species. So Will is not the true Reason of Justice; because a natural Power, when Justice is an Habit. So Science is not the Genus of Moral Virtue; because in the Intellect when Virtue is in the Appetite.

Ax. 16. The Genus is before its Species, and Spe­cies its Individual.

1. §. This Rule is delivered Book 4. of the To­picks, Cap. 2. but it is to be understood as to the Consecution of the Existence: For that Priority has Place here: for supposing the Species, you suppose the Genus; but not contrariwise. The Species there­fore cannot be without its Genus; but the Genus [Page 37]may be without its Species's; that is, either of them, but not both together. A Synonymous Genus may be without either of them, but an Aequivocal not; but only the less principal. For Example; Animal may be without Man or Beast; but not Man and Beast: But Ens not without Substance, but only Ac­cident. That therefore is a Genus Synonymous, this Homonymous: As also the Genus is towards its Species, so is the Species towards its Individu­als.

Ax. 17. Genus is predicated of more than its Species, and the Species than its Individuals.

Ax. 18. And altho' the Species may be preserved in one Individual, yet cannot the Genus be so, in one Species.

1. §. That the Genus is of greater Latitude than its Species, and the Species than its Individual, and consequently that the Genus is predicated of more than its Species, and the Species than its Individual, follows from the Definitions of them both, and is taught by Aristotle Book 4. of the Topicks, Cap. 1. But that the Species may be concerned in one Indivi­dual, when the Genus, not in one Species, is from hence, because the Species is more perfect in its Es­sence than the Genus, but not the Individual than its Species: For the Species includes its Genus, and be­sides its Genus an Essential Difference: But the Indi­vidual has no Essential Difference added to the Speci­es; but the Species absolves its whole Essence, there being only Occasion for Accidents, whereby it should be discern'd from other Individuals of the same Speci­es. Since therefore a Species is constituted by a Genus, and an Essential Difference, and every Difference re­quires a Multitude, it follows that one Species can­not constitute a Genus. But Individuals have no Es­sential Difference by which to distinguish them a­mongst themselves: For they agree in their whole Essence, and therefore no more Individuals are requi­red for the constituting of a Species.

CHAP. XII. Of Difference.

Ax. 1. Difference is that by which one thing differs from another.

Ax. 2. And is either Accidental or Essential.

Ax. 3. Accidental is that by which all things differ by Accidents, either from other things, or them­selves.

Ax. 4. Essential which being added to the Genus, constitutes the Species, and distinguishes it Essential­ly from other Species's.

CHAP. XIII. Of Property, and Accident.

Ax. 1. PRoper is that which declares not what a thing is, and yet is only in it, and reciprocated with it.

CHAP. XIV. Of Whole and Part.

Ax. 1. A Whole is that which consists in the U­nion of many things, or Parts.

Ax. 2. Those things which, united compose or constitute the whole, are called Parts.

CHAP. XV. Of Cause and Caused in general.

Ax. 1. A Cause is that by the Force of which a thing comes to pass.

CHAP. XVI. Of Matter and Form.

Ax. 1. OF the Four Causes Two are Internal, Matter and Form; and as many Ex­ternal, Efficient and End.

Ax. 2. Those Causes are said to be Internal, which enter the Essence of the Caused, as Parts.

CHAP. XVII. Of Efficient Cause.

Ax. 1. CAuses External are those which enter not the Essence of the thing, as Efficient and End.

Ax. 2. An Efficient is an External Cause, from which a thing proceeds by a true Causality.

1. §. For a thing may be said to proceed also from the End, but by a Metaphorical, not a true Causa­lity.

Ax. 3. An Efficient is of a very large Ex­tent.

Ax. 4. And is first divided into Active, which, by the Mediation of Action, causes the Effect; and into that from which a thing immediately flows and proceeds without any Action.

1. §. It sometimes happens that a Cause causes the Ef­fect by the Mediation of some Action which is said to be its Causality in causing. Such a Cause we call Active; sometimes by its own Existence with­out any Causality distinct from its Existence; and this by some is call'd Emanative: Which Word tho' feign'd with Repugnance to the Analogy of the Latin Tongue, yet is it to be used upon this Oc­casion till a more Convenient can be found out. For Example: The Fire is the Emanative Cause of its own Heat; but the Active of anothers.

Ax. 5. Secondly, Cause Efficient is divided into Immanent and Transient.

Ax. 6. Immanent is that which produces the Ef­fect in its self.

Ax. 7. Transient, out of it self.

1. §. For Example: When a Workman builds a House, or any one throws a Stone, both these are said to be Transient; but when our Mind understands or desires any thing, it is said to be the Immanent Cause of those Conceptions or Affections, which in understanding or desiring, it forms.

Ax. 8. The Conditions of the Transient Cause are Two: 1st that it be conjoin'd with the Patient; and 2dly unlike unto it.

1. §. The first of these is precepted, Book 7. Phy­sicks, Cap. 3. and the other Book 1. of Gener. and Corrup. Cap. 7. An Efficient is said to be two ways joined to the Patient, to wit, either by Existence vulgarly call'd Suppositum, or Virtue. For Example: When Fire burns Wood, it is conjoyn'd to the Wood by its Existence; when heats the Sitters by, it is not joyn'd to them by its Existence, but Power, or Virtue.

2. §. An Agent likewise is said to be Two Ways unlike the Patient, either as to Species or Degree. In the first manner Hot to Cold; in the last, that which is more hot to that which is less hot; or that which is more cold to that which is less cold. Those which nei­ther the one cannot act upon the other, or suffer from it any manner of ways.

Ax. 9. Thirdly, the Efficient is divided into free and necessary.

Ax. 10. A Free is that which Causes Consultedly, or with Design.

Ax. 11. A Necessary, not, but by Necessity of Na­ture.

1. §. Liberty, in general is a Faculty of doing what one pleases, and therefore he who is absolutely free, is free from all Servitude, Law imposed upon him by others, Coaction and Necessity of Nature. But when the Will is said to be free, and a free Cause opposed to a Necessary, nothing farther is understood by the Name of Liberty, but an Immunity from Coaction, [Page 60]Necessity, and natural Determination. For he who is a Servant or Subject to another's Law, enjoys the Liber­ty of his own Will, when he judges that he is to live according to the Law or Beck of him with whom he lives. But Natural Necessity and Coaction evert Liber­ty. Why therefore is not coacted Cause contained in this Division? Because he who is compell'd, is so compell'd by another, as that he conduces no­thing to the Effect himself, and therefore cannot be numbered amongst the Efficients.

2. §. By Natural Necessity we understand not only that by which Inanimate things act, as Plants, but that also by which Brutes and Infants before the Use of Reason. For the Actions of Brutes and Infants pro­ceed almost, in the same manner from Natural In­stinct, and Sense; as do the Actions of Plants from Nature it self. In this Sense are the Parts of the Division immediately opposed; and in this are contained all the Species's of Causes which fol­low.

Ax. 12. A free Cause can act, and not act, what, how, and when it pleases.

Ax. 13. A Necessary is determin'd to one cer­tain thing, and acts both when, and as much as it can.

1. §. For Example: For this Cause is one said freely to dispute or write; because Voluntarily and of ones own Accord one disputes or writes; and also because one can dispute or not dispute; and the Disputation begun, can at Will interrupt; or do any of those things, which are said to be in our own Power. For to these only does the Liberty of the Will extend. Causes necessary are determin'd to one thing; that is, they can, but cannot but act; and that only which they do, and nothing else; and as much as they can: So Fire cannot but heat fit Matter, and heats every thing so much, as that it cannot heat it any more.

Ax. 14. Fourthly, Cause Efficient is divided in­to Cause by it self, and Cause by Accident.

Ax. 15. Cause by it self is that which as it is such, produces an Effect of its own Council, and agreeable to its Natural Disposition.

Ax. 16. By Accident, which not as such, or else be­sides its own Council or Natural Propension.

1. §. That a Cause Efficient be a Cause of it self two Conditions, thus, are required. First, that the Effect answer to its Council or Natural Propension; to its Council if a Free, Propension if a Necessary. The other, that it produce it as such. If either of these are wanting, the Cause is said to be by Acci­dent: If the first, because some Event, or Effect by Accident, coheres with the Effect which is produc'd by the Cause Efficient, by it self. As when one dig­ging up the Earth, finds a Treasure: For to dig the Earth, is the Effect of the Digger by it self, with which Effect, the finding of the Treasure by Accident; that is, besides the Council of the Digger and Na­ture of the Digging is joyn'd. So when an Animal begets a Monster, it is the Cause of the Monster by Accident. Because the Generation of the Monster is joyned with that of Nature by Accident, and be­sides its Scope and Intention; If the latter, that is, if the latter Qualification be wanting, the Cause is said by Accident; because the Effect is not ascrib'd to the Cause, but that which happens to it. As when Polyclete, or a Musician is said to be the Cause of a Statue: For neither does Polyclete make the Sta­tue as he is Polyclete, or Musician as he is Musician, but a Statuary: For it is Accidental to the Sta­tuary; that he is either Polyclete or a Musician. See Book 2. of the Physicks, Cap. 2.

Ax. 17. To cause by Accident are reduc'd Fortune and Chance.

1. §. Videlicet, To the first Species of it which is said to be by reason of its Effect. Fortune in Greek [...], is defin'd by Aristotle, Book 2. of the Physicks, Cap. 5. [Page 62]thus; It is therefore manifest, that Fortune is a Cause by Accident in those things which are done for the sake of something, and consultedly undertaken. By The­mistius in his Periphrase upon this Place, more fully, to be a Cause by Accident of those things which nei­ther necessarily, nor often, but rarely happen; and in those alone which for the sake of something are consultedly undertaken.

2. §. Now Chance in Creek [...], is a Cause by Accident of those things which rarely happen, and that in all those things which are undertaken for the sake of another, and not only consultedly: For Chance extends farther than Fortune. For whereas both are Causes by Accident, which act for the sake of some End, and are conversant in things rarely happening, Fortune only is placed in those things which act con­sultedly: Chance also in those which act by Necessity of Nature; as in Infants, Brutes, Plants, and also inani­mate things, in which there is no Place for Fortune. As for Instance, when any one digging, finds a Trea­sure, we may say, that 'twas by Chance or Fortune done: But when a Tile falling from a House shall wound a Passer by, that is, we say, by Chance, not For­tune done. All Fortune therefore is Chance, but not on the contrary; as is said Book the same, Cap. 6. Al­tho' these Words are often confounded.

Ax. 18. Fifthly, Cause Efficient is divided into Principal and less Principal.

Ax. 19. A Principal is that which produces the Ef­fect by its own Virtue.

Ax. 20. A Less, which inserves the Principal to­wards its producing the Effect.

Ax. 21. The Principal Cause, is either equal to, or nobler, never worse than the Effect; the less Princi­pal as far as it causes, is always worse than or inferi­our to the Effect.

1. §. When we compare the Effect with the Cause we are to consider the Cause as it is such; that is, ac­cording to that Virtue by which it causes, when the [Page 63]Virtue of the Cause is such as that it contains in it, whatever is in the Effect, it is said to be a principal Cause. The Effect is said to be contained in the Cause, either formally or eminently. When formally, or the Effect is of the same Nature with the Cause, the Cause is said to be univocal, and is equal to its Ef­fect; as when Heat begets Heat, or a Mouse a Mouse: When Eminently, or the Cause by a Nobler Sort of Virtue produces the Effect, it is said to be Aequivo­cal, and is better than its Effect; as, when Light pro­duces Heat, or the Architect an House; when nei­ther formally nor eminently, it is said to be less Principal, and that not so much effects as subserves the Principal in producing the Effect.

Ax. 22. The less Principal is subdivided into pro­catarctical, Proëgumenal, and Instrumental.

Ax. 23. Procatarctical, is that which Extrinsically excites the principal Cause to Action.

Ax. 24. The Proëgumenal, which inwardly dis­poses, or also excites the principal Cause to Action.

1. The Cause in Greek [...] or Proca­tarctical, in Latin may be called Incipiens or Inchoans, that is, beginning or inchoating: And is either Ob­ject, Occasion, Author, or Merit. So far it may be said to be the Object, as it moves or excites the prin­cipal Cause to Action. Occasion is the Conveniency of Time and Place to act in, which it self also has some Force of moving to Action, in as much as it removes Impediments to Action. Author, here is said to be him who proposing Reasons, persuades the principal Cause either to, or from Action: He is also call'd the Moral Cause. Merit or Meritorious Cause is that which moves the Agent to a Requital, and that either in good or evil things. And even all these are without the principal Cause: In which they are di­stinguished from the Proegumenal, which consists in the principal Cause it self. For Example: If any one walking about in the Night should see many precious things in the open House of his Enemy, from [Page 64]whom just before he had receiv'd an Injury, to be negligently kept, and at the Instigation of another should take them away. The objective Cause of of this would be the Precious Things themselves, ex­citing the Covetousness of the Thief; the Occasion, the Darkness of the Night and open House, which in no little Measure further him in his Purpose; the Au­thor or Moral Cause, he who instigated him; the Me­ritorious, the Injury received, for which the Thief comes to be more prone to steal: The Proëgumenal Cause is the proper Avarice of the Thief. Farther­more, Author or Cause Moral, has Place only in vo­luntary Causes. Object, Occasion, Meritorious and Proëgumental, also in others. Occasion is some­times taken for Cause Meritorious. As when an In­jury committed or done is said to be the Occasion of a Fight, or War, or Slaughter; and in this Sense if feigned, is call'd by the Greeks [...] and [...], and the Latins Pretext. The Proëgumenal ei­ther disposes only the principal Cause; as when the Temperament of the Body is said to be the Cause of Manners; or, also, moves it and spurs it on: As when Anger is said to be the Cause of Revenge, or Avarice of Theft.

2. §. The Procatarctical and Proëgumenal Causes are of great Use in Physick: For Physicians reduce almost all Diseases to three Causes Procatarctical, Proegumenal and Synectical or Containing. The Pro­catarctical with them is the External and Evident Cause. The other Two the Internal and hidden Cau­ses. The Proëgumenal the Antecedent. The Con­taining the [...], or that which is connate with and also exists together with the Disease, and coheres immediately with it; and this, with us, is the next Cause. For Example: The Procatarctical Cause of the Fever is either Cold, or the Astringent Bathes; the Proë­gumenal, the Skin bound up and Evaporation hindred; the Containing, the Humour Putrescent and accen­ded.

Ax. 25. The Instrumental Cause is that which subserves the principal Cause in its Effecting.

1. §. All Instruments subserve not the Princi­pal in the like Manner: For there are some Instru­ments joyn'd to the principal Cause in acting; and there are some in acting separate from them. Those are Instruments conjoyn'd, of which the principal Cause makes use in the Effection of the thing. And these are either Active as the Heat in the Fire, or Passive, as a Knife, a Sword, &c. Separate Instru­ments are those which act in the place and stead of the principal Cause. So the Ambassadour is the Instru­ment of the Prince; and the Seed seems, to many, the Instrument of Generation, but mistakenly: For separate Instruments have no Place in Naturals, but Morals. And this brings us to the next Maxim, viz.

Ax. 26. The Essence of Instruments consists in their Fitness for Use.

1. §. Instruments, says Aristotle Book 2. of An. Cap. 4. in Offices and Uses, are distinguish'd or convene amongst themselves: For every Instrument is that which it is, because, and so far as it is fit for some certain Use. So an Ax is so far an Ax, as that in the Quality of its Matter and Form, it is fit to cut: And the Eye so far an Eye as it is fit to see with. For the Eye, the Hand, and other Organical Parts of Man or Beast, when dead, are not Eye or Hand, unless Homonymously or ambiguously, that is, doubtfully, as Aristotle says, Book 4. of the Meteors, Cap. 17.

Ax. 27. Sixthly, Cause Efficient is divided into First and Second.

Ax. 28. The First is that which depends upon none.

Ax. 29. The Second, which depends upon the First.

1. §. A Cause is Two Ways said to be First; to wit, absolutely, or in its own Genus. That is said to be absolutely, on which all things depend; both [Page 66]when they are Made, Exist, and Operate; or as they say in Fieri, Esse, and Operation. The Cause absolute­ly First, is only One, to wit, God. For all things depend on God, both as to their Making, Being and O­perating; according to that of the Apostle St. Paul, Acts 17. In him we live, and move, and have our Being. Furthermore, all things are said to depend upon God as they are made, or in Fieri, as they say, by rea­son of Creation; and that either proximately or re­motely; as they are; or in being, by reason of Con­servation, as they operate of his Providence, either ordinarily or extraordinarily, &c.

2. §. That Cause is said to be First in its own Genus, on which the rest of the Causes of the same Genus de­pend. Such a First Cause is, not only given, in eve­ry Genus of Causes, but also in every Subordination. So Adam is the first Cause of Men in his Species; because begotten of no other Man as the rest were, but immediately created of God: So also the Heaven is the first Cause of Motion, not absolutely, but in the Genus of Natural Causes; as is collected from the 1st. Book of the Meteors, Cap. 1. In the same manner may the Soul be said to be the first Cause of vital O­perations; and likewise every principal Cause in re­gard of its Instruments, &c.

Ax. 30. Seventhly, Cause Efficient is divided in­to Universal and Particular.

Ax. 31. Universal is that which concurrs with o­ther Causes, with the same Efficiency, to the producing of many Effects.

Ax. 32. A Particular only which by its Efficiency produces but one Effect.

1. §. Universal Causes are God and the Heavens. God concurrs with particular Causes to all Effects. The Heavens only to them which are Natural and Material. In this Sense Book 2. of the Physicks, Cap. 2. The Sun, and Man, I add God, are said to beget Man: The Sun as an universal: For with the same Effici­ency it concurrs to the producing of all things; Man [Page 67]as a Particular: So, also may a Driver be said to be a Universal, when driving a Team of Horses; be­cause in the same manner, and with the same Vir­tue, he drives all his Horses, as well the Sound as the Lame.

Ax. 33. Lastly and Eighthly. Cause Efficient is divided into next and remote.

Ax. 34. The Next, is that which produces the Effect immediately.

Ax. 35. The Remote, which produces the Effect by means of some more neighbouring Cause.

1. §. A Cause Efficient is said to be two ways Next; to wit, either generally or specially. In general, that Cause is said to be Next, which either by its Existence they commonly say, Suppositum, or Virtue is joyned to the Effect: For such Virtue being an Instrument of the principal Cause, it is deem'd with the Principal to be one only. And therefore when the principal Cause by its Virtue is joyned to the Effect, it is its self esteemed to be joyned to the Effect. Neither is it any matter, whether that Virtue be an Instrument conjoyned or separate. For Example: The Fire is said to be the next Cause of Ustion; Parents of their Children; not­withstanding the Fire acts by Mediation of Heat, and the Parents of Seed: For altho' Heat and Seed are In­struments, yet do they not effect by their Intervening; but that the principal Cause may be said to be next to the Effect, A Cause therefore is said to be remote in this Sense, viz. which neither by its Existence nor Virtue is joyned to the Effect: As when the Grand­father is said to be the Cause of his Son's Son, or Grandson, &c.

2. A Cause Efficient is said to be next in Species which is so joyned by its Existence to its Effect; as that it is joyned to it without any mediating Virtue. And a next Cause has no Place in Substances, but only Ac­cidents especially proper: For a Substance does not effect a Substance without some mediate or instru­mental Virtue. And this is the Cause which is said [Page 68]to be absolutely next; and that is either Internal or External. Internal is that which is in the Subject of the Accident, of which it is the Cause. So the Soul and every Substantial Form, is said to be the next Cause of its own Proprieties. Hitherto appertaineth the Emanative Cause: Likewise the Continent, or Synectical of the Physicians. External is that which is not in the Subject of that Accident whose Cause it is. And so the Interposition of the Earth, is said to be the next Cause of an Eclipse. But the Use of this Cause in the Definition, and Demonstration of proper Acci­dents is much the more great.

CHAP. XVIII. Of End.

Ax. 1. ENd is defin'd to be that, for the sake of which a thing is.

1. §. Being that which moves the Efficient to A­ction by superinducing its Love upon it, and beget­ting an Appetite on, and Desire of it self.

Ax. 2. End is three ways divided; and first in­to that of which, and for which.

Ax. 3. The End of which, is that which the Ef­ficient desires.

Ax. 4. For which, for whose sake, or for which, the Efficient desires such an End.

1. §. As for Instance, The of which, of Medicine is Health; for which, the Sick.

Ax. 5. Secondly, End is divided into Principal and Secondary.

Ax. 6. The Principal End is that which the A­gent first, or also, principally intends.

Ax. 7. The Secondary, which the Agent so intends as that it may enjoy it with the Principal; or else attain it, if the first and principal End should fail.

1. §. For Example: The principal End of Clothes, is, that our Bodies should be defended against the Inclemency of the Heavens; the Secondary Conjoyned with that Principal, is that they should adorn it. So the Principal End for which God was pleas'd to mani­fest himself in the Creation of the World, was, that Man should be endued with the Knowledge of God and Piety: The Secondary and Succedaneous, that he might render them inexcusable, who holding the Truth in Unrighteousness, go on still in Iniquity.

Ax. 8. Thirdly and Lastly, End is divided into Subordinate and Last.

Ax. 9. A Subordinate End is that which is refer­red to some farther End.

Ax. 10. The Last, to which all other Ends are re­ferred; that it self to no farther.

1. §. There is often a long Series of Subordinate Ends, in which the Subordinate is a Means in Respect of the Sequent End. For Example: One digging in the Earth, to fetch out Iron: Iron is drawn out, that of it may be made some Instrument, which may be ser­viceable for our Use: As, suppose a Penknife, or a Lancet; the Lancet inserves the Physician for the Cutting of the Vein; the Cutting of the Vein to trans­mit the Superfluous Blood, or take away the Vitious. The Loss of Blood conduces to the Conservation or Recuperation of Health. Our Health indeed of it self is to be desired; but referred notwithstanding to this End, that our Actions may be free and Expedite. A­ctions again are referred either to Pleasure, or Glory, or Honesty, or something else; in which Subordination of Ends there is no going to Infinity as we have taught before. For otherwise vain and fruitless, would be that Appetition which Nature has planted in all things; as the Philosopher argues Book 1. of the Ethicks, [Page 70] Cap. 1. There is therefore some chief End in which the Appetite must terminate and acquiesce.

2. §. An End is said to be two ways last; either in its own Genus or absolutely. That is said to be so in its own Genus, which is the last amongst those Ends which are intended by the same Agent. So in that Series which I have brought, there are many Ends which are last in their own Genus: For to fetch forth Iron is the last End of such who dig in the Mines; the Penknife of the Smith, Health of the Physician: But there is but one absolutely last, and that is Feli­city.

3. §. That End which is subordinated in its own Genus, is referr'd to a farther End by it self: But that which is last, by Accident. For Example: The Smith softens Iron in the Fire, puts it upon the Anvil, strikes it, hammers it, polishes it, whets it, till of it he makes a Lancet. All these by themselves, and in respect of the same Agent, viz. the Smith, are subordinated: For the Lancet is the whole Endeavour of the Smith. But that it should be serviceable to the Physician in letting of Blood is no Care of the Smith's; and there­fore all those things which the Smith does in Order to the making the Lancet, are subordinated to this End of the Pysician's by Accident.

Ax. 11. When the End is good, by how much the farther off it is, by so much the better it must needs be; the last End therefore must be the best, and the chief Good it self.

1. §. This Theorem is extant Book 1. of the Eth. Cap. 5. That the End is good, is abovesaid; Otherwise it would not move the Efficient: Nor is it yet sufficient that it be good; but it ought also to be good of it self; since the Means are no otherwise good than as they are serviceable to the obtaining of the End; from whence follows that the End is better than the Means. But the sub­ordinate is a Means in respect of the Sequent, that is, the subordinate End. The last End therefore is [Page 71]something which is best; because in no respect a means by which it should become worse: Nor is it material whether this End be real or imaginary, as is said Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 2. Since the End no other­ways moves the Efficient, than as it seems to be good, and so we come to the next Axiom, which is,

Ax. 12. By how much an End is the last in the Execution, by so much the earlier is it in the Intension. And so on the contrary.

1. §. End also is divided into Internal and External; but this Division has not Place in all things, but only Faculties and Arts Conjectural, in which that is said to be Internal, which the Artificer attains to as often as he pleases; External, which he does not always at­tain to: So the Internal of Oratory is to speak Ornately, and Accommodately to persuade; the External to per­suade.

2. §. The Division of End into End by it self, and End by Accident, as vulgarly understood is not with­out its Fault: For an End by Accident is not a Final Cause: For a Final Cause is not a Cause any farther than it is intended. But an End by Accident is not intended, but evenes besides the Intention. Wherefore when an End is said to be by Accident, the Event or Effect by Accident is to be understood: For if any one digging in the Field, that he may make it more Fertile, should by Accident find a Treasure, the finding that Treasure will not be the End, but Effect, or Event of it by Accident.

CHAP. XIX. Of Subject and Adjunct.

Ax. 1. A Subject is that to which something is adjoyn'd besides its Essence.

Ax. 2. And an Adjunct that which is adjoyn'd to something besides its Essence.

CHAP. XX. Of Conveniency of Things.

Ax. 1. NOw follow Convenience, Diversity, Op­position and Order; which we said were Affections conjoyn'd.

Ax. 2. Convenience is that by which many, or as many, are united amongst themselves.

Ax. 3. And is either Real, or of Reason.

Ax. 4. Real Convenience is the Convenience of on­thing with it self.

Ax. 5. Reason of many Things in One Concep­tion.

1. §. This Distribution is by the Philosopher men­tioned Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 7.

Ax. 6. Convenience is also divided into Simple and Analogical.

Ax. 7. Simple's the Convenience of one thing with another in the same Third.

Ax. 8. Analogical, or Analogy, of many, with many in the same Habitude.

1. §. Analogy, in the Latin Tongue Proportio, is desin'd by Euclid Book 5. Prop. 4. to be a Similitude of Ratio's. A Ratio according to the same Author is a certain mutual Habitude of two Magnitudes of the same Genus with Respect to Quantity. And therefore since a Ratio has two Terms, and Analogy two Ratio's at the least; it follows, Analogy consists in four Terms at the least; of which the first has the same respect to the second, as the third has to the fourth; as may be seen in these Numbers, 4, 8.6, 12. For as 4 are in respect of 8, so 6 are in respect of 12.

2. §. And altho' Mathematicians do usually con­stitute Analogy in Quantity only, and in the Habi­tude of the Whole to the Part, or on the contrary; there is no Cause yet why Analogy may not be attributed to all things in general, which by a mutual Habitude convene amongst themselves, whether it be that of Whole to Part, Cause to Caused, or Subject to Adjunct, or on the contrary, &c. For as 4 and 6 are Analogi­cal Parts, having the Ratio of half to 8 and 12, so the Sun and Mouse, as most think are Analogical Ef­ficients of those Mice, which are generated of Matter and Seed, &c. and Bone and Root Analogous Means de­stinated to the Nourishment of Animals and Plants.

Ax. 9. Simple Convenience is either Essential or Accidental. Essential is that which we call Iden­tity.

Ax. 10. Identity is a Unity of Essence.

Ax. 11. Those things, says the Philosopher, are the same, whose Essence is one and the same.

1. §. The first of these Definitions is in Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 9. The last in Book the same Cap. 15.

Ax. 12. Identity is either Subordinate or Coordi­nate.

Ax. 13. The Subordinate is that in which Superi­ours agree with their Inferiours subordinate to them.

[Page 79]1. §. So Genus with Species's, and Species's with Individuals, Subject to them; and so on the contrary: And thus Animal and Man, Man and Socrates, Whiteness and Colour are the same; and so on the con­trary.

Ax. 14. Coordinate Identity is either Numerical, Specifical, or Generical.

Ax. 15. Numerical, of one Individual with it self.

Ax. 16. Those things are said to be the same, says the Philosopher, in Number whose Matter is one and the same.

1. §. This Definition is taken out of Book 1. of the Metaph. Cap. 15. where by the Name of Matter the Philosopher understands that Collection of Propriaties which can never be the same in any other. So Peter is said to be the same with himself, not any o­ther.

2. §. Furthermore there are four sorts of Modes, re­cited by Aristotle in the 1st Book of his Top. Cap. 7. of those things which are the same in Number, viz. 1. Synonymous Words, as Sword and Rapier. 2. De­finition, and Defin'd, as Man, and Rational Animal. 3. Subject and its Propriety, as Man and Risible. 4. Subject and its Common Accident, as Socrates and he who disputes in the Academy, when it is certain that Socrates only disputes. To these add a Fifth, out of Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 6. where those things are said to be the same in Number, which are continual, whe­ther by Natural or Artificial Continuity, as a Perch, a House, &c.

Ax. 17. Specifical Identity is the Identity of many Individuals under the same Species.

Ax. 18. Those things are the same in Species whose Ratio of Essence is one; or, which when many differ not in Species; as, Socrates, and Plato, and Bucephalus, and Hirpinus, Melampus, and Phylax.

Ax. 19. Generical that of many Species's, or Individuals, under the same Genus,

Ax. 20. Those things are the same in Genus, which are under the same Genus; that is, either the next; as Man and Beast, and their Individuals, under Animal; or remote as Body, and Spirit, and their Species's and Individuals, under Substance, &c.

Ax. 21. Accidental Convenience is either Internal or External; and Internal is either Parity or Simi­tude.

Ax. 22. Parity is a Convenience in Quantity: For,

Ax. 23. Those things are said to be equal, whose Quan­tity is one, viz. either in Bulk, Virtue or Perfecti­on.

Ax. 24. Similitude is either in Quality or Passion.

Ax. 25. Those things are said to be alike the one to the other, which have suffered the same things, and more of the same things than of others, and whose Quality is one.

1. §. Suffered we say not done, because the Action is not in the Agent but Patient. Whose Quality is one; that is, either in Degree or Species. Not improperly also may you reduce hitherto Convenience in Site: For an Egg is like unto an Egg, because of its Colour and Figure, &c.

Notes of Similitude are such as these; like, after the same manner, as, as tho', alike, after the same sort, not otherwise, not contrariwise, &c. When the Similitude is explained by way of Proposition and Answer or Return, it becomes Analogy.

Ax. 26. External Convenience is a Conveniency in such and such Causes, Effects, Subjects or Adjuncts. External, which appertain not to the Essence.

1. §. So two own Brothers agree in Efficient; House and Clothes in End: For the End of both, is to repell the Injuries of the Heavens. Hitherto also may be re­duc'd those things which agree in Matter; as Snow and Hail, Wind and Earthquake: For altho' Matter be an Internal Cause, yet it contributes nothing to the Spe­cifical Essence: For those things which agree n [...] Form, [Page 81]agree in Essence, and so on the contrary. Farther two Artificers agree in Effects; Virtues and Vices in Sub­ject: For both are in the Mind. The Convenience of things in Adjuncts is various. Convenience in In­ternal appertains to Parity and Similitude.

Hitherto only, that in Objects, Signs and Circumstan­ces: But if Cause Efficient, or Final, Subject or Ad­junct be put into the Essential Definition of things, and then an Agreement be in them, such an Agree­ment then is not to be esteem'd External, but Essential.

CHAP. XXI. Of Diversity, or Distinction of Things.

Ax. 1. DIversity is that Affection by which Things are distinguished one from the other.

Ax. 2. And is, either Real, Rational, or Modal.

Ax. 3. Real is that by which a thing is distin­guished, either from another thing, or from the Negation of it self.

CHAP. XXII. Of Opposition of things.

Ax. 1. OPposition is a Fight, or Battle of things.

Ax. 2. Things are said to fight, which cannot truly be affirm'd, either of each other or the same Third, according to the same, to the same in the same Manner, and in the same time.

CHAP. XXIII. Of Order, and of that which is said to be first, last, and together with.

Ax. 1. ORder is that, according to which, any thing is said to be before, or after another, or also together with it.

1. §. Of that which is said to be before or after and their Modes Aristotle treats Cap. 12. of the Cate­gories, of those together with Cap. 13.

Ax. 2. First and last things are said to be five Ways, viz. in Time, Nature, Disposition, Dignity, and Cognition.

Ax. 3. And in time, as that according to which a thing is said to be Elder, or of greater Antiquity than another thing.

Ax. 4. Nature two Ways, viz. in Consecution of Existence, and Causality.

1. §. Aristotle indeed affirms that alone to be first in Nature which is first in Causality: But that also seems to be reasonably so call'd which is first in Con­secution of Existence, viz.

Ax. 5. That from which Consecution of Exi­stence is not reciprocated. And,

1. §. This Simplicius interprets in this manner: That, says he, is said to be first, which, another thing be­ing supposed, is it self supposed: But that supposed, that other thing is not supposed. For Example: Sup­posing the Binary Number, you suppose also Uni­ty; but supposing Unity, you suppose not the Bi­nary Number; and supposing Man, you suppose al­so Animal; but supposing Animal, you do not [Page 95]suppose also Man: Unity therefore, is before the Bi­nary Number, and Animal before Man: And likewise every Genus before its Species, and Species its Individu­al, as to Consecution of Existence.

Ax. 6. That which is before in Causality, is that which is reciprocated according to the Con­secution of Existence, and is every way the Cause why the other exists.

1. §. So the Sun is before its Light, and Thing Truth of Speech. For altho' the Sun and Light, Thing and Truth of Speech may be reciprocated according to Consecution of Existence, and mutually take away, and suppose each other: Yet the Sun is the Cause of its Light, and the Thing of Verity in Speech: Because as the Thing is, or is not, the Oration is said to be true or false. In this manner, therefore, the Sun is said to be before its Light, and the Thing Verity in Speech.

2. §. That which is before in Causality, or Na­ture causing, farther, by the Testimony of Aristotle Book 2. of the Parts of An. Cap. 1. is said to be two Ways, viz. either by Nature so generating or in­tending: That which is first, by Order of Nature ge­nerating, that is, which is most simple: As, the Parts the Whole; Principles and Elements than the things which out of such Principles and Elements are made. Of Na­ture intending; that which is the most perfect, and for whose sake and Cause other things were made. As the Whole than its Parts; that which consists of Principles and Elements than the Principles and Ele­ments themselves, and every End than its Means, &c.

Ax. 7. That is said to be First in Disposition, which is the least distant from the beginning.

1. §. So the Exordium in a Speech, is before its Proposition; the Proposition, the Narration; the Narration, the Confirmation; the Confirma­tion, the Refutation; and the Refutation, the Epi­logue, &c. And, in every Discipline, that which is first delivered.

Ax. 8. That in Dignity is always first, which is of the more Worth or Value. So the Magistrate is before the Subject; the Father the Children; the Master, the Servant; Gold, Silver; Virtue, Gold, &c.

Ax. 9. In Cognition, that which is most easily known.

1. §. Of this Mode no Mention is made by Ari­stotle in this Place: But in Book 4. of the Metaph Cap. 11. and Book 6. of the Top. Cap. 4. he does mention it: Where that which is first in Cognitions, he calls more known; or rather, that I may so say, more noscible. A Thing is so said, two Ways, viz. either simply, or in regard of us. That is said to be so simply, which is so according to Rea­son, and them in whom Reason is rightly disposed. To us which as to the Senses and vulgarly. Those things, therefore, are said to be simply more known which, by their own Natures, are first; as Univer­sals, Singulars, or less Universals: Parts than their Whole; Principles, than those things which are made of such Principles: But to us, which are Posterior in Nature, and more Neighbouring upon the Senses. Farther, those things which are simply so, are more known according to a distinct and perfect Knowledge: For a distinct and perfect Knowledge fol­lows the Order of Nature and lies in them which are endued with a well-disposed Mind: But those things which to us, are according to a confused and imperfect Knowledge, which takes its Original from the Senses, &c.

Ax. 10. Things also are said to be together as many Ways as first: But Two are more used than the rest, and those are Time and Nature.

Ax. 11. Those things are said to be together, in time which exist at the same time, and that may be said,

1. §. Two Ways, viz. Simply or according to something. Those things are said to be together simply, which take their Originals together at the same time, as Equals. Some respect, of which the one [Page 97]begins before the other ends: As such as live at the same time, or are Contemporaries. So Aristotle and Pla­to are said to be Contemporaries, altho' Plato was born before him, and died before him.

Ax. 12. Together in Nature also, Things may be said two Ways, viz. some simply or absolutely; and others according to something, or in some respect, And,

Ax. 13. Such things are said to be so absolute­ly, which are reciprocated indeed according to Conse­cution of Existence; but yet, not so as that the one should be the Cause why the other exists.

1. §. So the Relate and Correlate are said to be together in Nature, and two Effects depending upon the same next Cause. As, to be risible, and capa­ble of Disciplines, in Man.

Ax. 14. Those things are said to be together ac­cording to something, or with respect to some third, which are opposed under the same Genus, in Division each to the other.

1. §. So Man and Beast are said to be together, nor simply, and of themselves, but in respect of Animal: For Animal is predicated of both together, and not first of the one, and then of the other. In which the Synonymous Genus is distinguished from the Homonymous; because this is not predicated together of its Species's; but first of one, and then of the other. And thus far of Affe­ctions of simple Theme, as well the simple as the con­joyned.

CHAP. XXIV. Of Interpretation in general, and of Noun and Verb.

Ax. 1. INterpretation is an Articulate Voice, signify­ing the Conceptions of the Mind according to Institution.

1. §. Of Voices, the one is Articulate whilst the other not. That we call. Articulate which consists of so many Syllables, or Letters, as so many Joynts: So that it may be written, as, Man, Animal, &c. Inarticulate, which consists not of Syllables and Letters, as the other, and may not be written, as Lowing, Whynnying, Weeping and Laughing, &c. Ac­cording to Institution, that is, the Arbitrary Use of Men, which use the same Society, in whose Power it is, to give Force and Law to Speech. Or Interpretation might have been defin'd in this Manner, viz. Interpre­tation is a Symbol consisting of an Articulate Voice, signi­fying the Conception of the Mind according to Institution, Which brings us to the next Observation.

Ax. 2. That Interpretation must be perspicuous, that is, distinct, proper, and used.

Ax. 3. Interpretation is either Word or Speech. And so we proceed to the twenty fifth Chapter. viz. that of Etymologies and Conjugates.

1. §. Speech is either perfect or imperfect. Perfect is that that absolves the Sentence; an Imperfect is not.

CHAP. XXV. Of Etymology and Conjugates.

Ax. 1. IN Dictions are first to be consider'd their Etymology and Conjugation, and then Synonymy, and Homonymy, and Acception Words, which the Schoolmen call Supposition.

Ax. 2. Etymology is the Reason of a Words Sig­nification declar'd out of the Original.

CHAP. XXVI. Of Synonyms, Homonyms, and various Acceptations of Words: And first,

Ax. 1. THose Words are said to be Synony­mous which signifie things whose Ratio of Essence accommodated to a common Name, is the same.

Ax. 2. Homonymous, Diverse.

CHAP. XXVII. Of Ʋtterance or Enunciation in General, and that which is Simple, and Compo­sed, in Special.

Ax. 1. NOw follows Complex Theme and its In­terpretation, which is called Enuncia­tion.

CHAP. XXVIII. Of Enunciation Pure and Modal.

Ax. 1. A Pure Enunciation is that in which it is not express'd how the Parts cohere.

Ax. 2. Modal, in which it is.

CHAP. XXIX. Of Enunciations Ʋniversal Particular, Indefinite and Singular.

Ax. 1. AFfections of Enunciations are either Ab­solute, or Related.

Ax. 2. Absolure, are Quantity and Quality.

Ax. 3. In Respect to Quantity an Enunciation is divided into Universal, Particular, Indefinite, and Singular.

Ax. 4. A Universal is that in which the Univer­sal Subject is taken Universally; which then happens, when to the Universal is added a Note of Universali­ty, as, every one, none, &c.

Ax. 5. Particular, in which the Subject is taken particularly, that is, when to the Universal is added a Note of an uncertain Party, or Particularity; as this, some one, some body. &c.

Ax. 6. An Indefinite is that whose Universal Sub­ject is not defined by any Note of Quantity.

Ax. 7. A Singular is that whose Subject is singu­lar, &c.

CHAP. XXX. Of Enunciation Affirming, Denying, Finite and Infinite, and

Ax. 1. IN Regard of Quality, it is, that an E­nunciation is divided in this manner; and first, into Affirming and Denying, and then True and False.

Ax. 2. Affirming is that which conjoyns, Denying, that divides the Parts.

Ax. 3. Affirming is that which conjoyns, Denying, that divides the Parts.

CHAP. XXXI. Of Enunciation True and False, Neces­sary and Contingent, and their De­grees.

Ax. 1. A True Enunciation is that which con­joyns those things which are of their own Nature conjoyn'd, or divides those things which are of their own Nature divided.

Ax. 2. A False, that conjoyns those things which are divided as before, or divides those things which are conjoyn'd.

CHAP. XXXII. Of Conversion, Aequipollence, and Sub­alternation of Enunciations.

Ax. 1. THose Affections are said to be Related, which agree to Enunciations amongst themselves Compared.

Ax. 2. And these are four, viz. Conversion, Aequi­pollence, Subalternation and Opposition. And,

Ax. 3. Conversion is the Transposition saving the Truth of the Predicate into the Place of the Subject; and the Subject into the Place of the Predicate.

CHAP. XXXIII. Of Opposition of Enunciations.

Ax. 1. OPposition of Enunciations, is either in- Truth or Appearance. And

Ax 2. A True Opposition is a Fight of Enunciati­ons in Affirming and Denying. Now

Ax. 3. Enunciations are said to fight, in which the same, of the same, according to the same, to the same, in the same manner and time, is Affirmed and Denyed.

Ax. 4. True Opposition afore-mentioned is either Contrariety or Contradiction.

Ax. 5. Contrariety that which is between Two Universals.

Ax. 6. Of which both may not be together true, al­tho' false they may.

1 §. For Example; both these Enunciations, Eve­ry Man is just; no Man is just, are false. But nei­ther these nor any other Contraries can be together true; because those things which are both at the same time true, are not truly opposed.

Ax. 7. A Contradiction is an Opposition between one Universal and a Particular; or two Singulars.

Ax. 8. Of which the one is always true, and the other false.

1. §. As, Every Man is just, every Man not just; no Man is just, some Man is; Aristides is just, Aristides not just, &c. Of these the one is true, and the other false; and so in other Instances of the like Nature, the same. In Singulars of future Contingents, in­deed, it appears not to Man, which of the two is true, which false: But yet this is evident, that both cannot be together true, nor both false. For Example: One of these is true, that a Player at Dice will win or lose; but whether, cannot by Man be de­fined, tho' before God it be certain and determi­ned.

Ax. 9. An Opposition appearing is either Subcon­trariety or Indefinite Opposition.

Ax. 10. Subcontrariety is between two Particu­lars; Opposition Indefinite between two Infi­nites.

Ax. 11. Both of which may be together true, but not false.

1 §. Subcontraries are, Some Man is just, some Man is not just: Of these both are true: For Aristides was just, Verres not just; but not false: For if Subcontra­ties might be together false, then Contraries might be together true; because Contraries, the Negation added, or taken away, contradict Subcontraries. Indefinite Oppositions are much the same with Con­tradictings, For the one is always true, the other false. But this proceeds not from the Form of the [Page 114] Opposition, but the particular Condition of the Mat­ter.

2 §. Subcontraries are said to be in Appearance oppos'd not Truth, both because they may be together true; as also, because they have not the same Sub­ject: For when I say some Man is just, some Man not just, I understand not in both the same Person; or if I do, it will be a Contradiction of Singulars. Af­ter the same Manner, is the Ratio of Indefinitely opposed.

Ax. 12. Contradiction in Modals consists in the Affirmation and Negation of the Mood in the same Dictum.

As it is necessary Man should be an Animal; not ne­cessary Man should be an Animal. So are Impossible, not Impossible; Contingent not Contingent, op­posed.

Ax. 13. Contrariety of them consists Part in the Dictum, Part in the Mode.

Ax. 14. By reason of the Dictum, those Enunciations are contrary; both which have the Mode Neces­sary or Impossible; if in one the Dictum be affirmed, the other denyed.

1 §. As it is necessary Man should be an Animal, it is necessary Man should not be an Animal; im­possible Man should be a Stone, impossible Man should not be a Stone, &c.

Ax. 15. By reason of Mode, two, the one of which has the Mode necessary, the other impossible; if the Dictum of both be of the same Quality.

1. §. As, it is necessary Man should be an Animal, impossible he should be so.

Ax. 16. Subcontraries are two, having the Mode Possible or Contingent, if in one the Dictum be affirmed, the other denyed.

1 §. As, It is possible, or may happen that one Playing at Dice, may win; it is possible, or may hap­pen, that one playing at Dice may not win, &c.

Ax. 17. Now Enunciations that are Exclusive and Restrictive, receive Contradiction from a Negation ad­ded to the Exclusive or Restrictive Particles.

1. §. As only Faith justifies, Faith only does not justifie; or, Man is Mortal as to his Soul; Man is Mortal, but not as to his Soul, &c.

Ax. 18. Contradiction of Composed is plac'd in that Negation, which appertains to the Connection of the Con­sequent with the Antecedent.

1. §. And therefore this, viz. if he is not misera­ble, he is yet vain, and of a lying Tongue, is thus everted by Virgil, Book 2. of Aenaeids. ‘Nec si miserum fortuna Sinonem, &c.’ ‘That is, Nor yet, if hard Fortune has made him mi­serable, has she also made him a Lyer too.’ Which you may thus resolve: Nor if Sinon be made miserable, is he also vain, and of a lying Tongue, &c. And so of all other the like.

But that the Aequipollency, Subalternation, and Opposition of Enunciations may the better appear, behold a Diagram in which they may be seen at one View.

In which are to be observed four Classes of Enun­ciations; and in each of them, four Enunciations, according to the four Modes. First, The Enunciati­ons of the same Class are Aequipollents. Secondly, The Enunciations of the First, are subordinated to those of the Fourth; and those of the Second to those of the Third. Thirdly, the Enunciations of the First and Third, as also the Second and Fourth, are con­tradictory to each other. Fourthly, those of the Third and Fourth are Contraries, by reason either of their Dictum or Mood. Fifthly, the Enunciations of the First and Second, are Subcontraries. Sixthly, The Vowels of the Words which are prefix'd to each Class, denote the Quality of the Dictum and Mood; as,

AEIU

Denotes

• The Dictum and Mood to be affirm'd.
• The Dictum to be deny'd and Mood affirm'd.
• The Dictum to be affirm'd, and Mood deny'd.
• The Dictum and the Mood both to be deny'd.

And thus far of the Thematick Part, which was in the first Place to be handl'd: Now follow Defi­nition, Division, Syllogism, and Method; of which in the second Part we are to entreat.

CHAP. I. Of Definition in General, and Defini­tion Nominal.

Axiom 1. A Definition is said to be an Oration, viz. Internal or External, that is, either in the Mind, or brought forth in Words, declaring what that is which is sought.

1. §. Which consisteth in two Words at the least: And therefore an Explication of one Name by another more known, as if one should call a Rapier a Sword, cannot properly be call'd a Definition, but yet it must be referr'd to Definition, as we shall after­wards make appear. The Reason why Definition must be a Speech is plainly this: Such is the Imbe­cillity of our Minds, that by one Conception we cannot easily attain to the Essence of a thing. That Definition therefore might occur, that is, accom­modate it self to this Imbecillity, it distributes the thing into Parts, viz. Genus, and Difference, or the like, and so delivers it to be understood by the Mind by many Conceptions, calling each Part by its Name.

Ax. 4. Now of Definitions, the one is of the Name and the other of the thing.

Ax. 5. Definition of the Name is that which de­clares, what that is which is said; or what is signi­fied by the Name.

Ax. 6. And that either by Etymology, or a Conju­gate, or a Synonymous Word. So that

1. §. Nominal Definition appears to be three­fold, viz. that which is according to Etymology, and so declares the Signification of the Name out of the Original. As, a Triangle is that which has three An­gles; Philosophy is the Love of Wisdom, &c. Or, Second­ly, according to Conjugation; and declares the Name by a Conjugate Word; as, Quality is that by which Things are said to be of what Quality they are. Or, Thirdly and Lastly, According to Word; as, when an obscure one is declared by one, or more, more known; as, a handsome Thing is one that is decent and honest, &c. For altho' when one Word is explained by another, it is im­properly enough said to be a Definition, because such Explication is not [...], or an Oration as we have observ'd above, yet must such an Explication be referr'd to Definition, as Aristotle says Book 1. Top. Cap. 5. And so we proceed to the next Chapter, viz. That.

CHAP. II. Of Perfect Definition.

Ax. 1. NOw Definition of the Thing is that which explains what the Thing it self is.

Ax. 2. And is either Perfect or Imperfect.

Ax. 3. A Perfect, that which perfectly explains the Es­sence of the Thing by its Essential Attributes.

Ax. 4. Imperfect, not, at least not Perfect­ly.

Ax. 5. The Laws of Perfect are principally Six, and the first is that the Definition be short.

1. §. Now Definitions are said to be short when there is nothing less, nor more in 'em than there ought to be. Now that there may be something more, may chiefly happen three Ways; and first, when a Tautology is committed; which is not only then when the same thing is repeated by a Synonymous Word; as if a Man should be defin'd to be a Rational Animal, and endu'd with the Power of Understanding; which is the same thing in other Words; but also, when that is put into the Definition of the Species which ought to have been put into the Definition of the Genus: As if Blind­ness should be defin'd to be a Privation of the Sight, which naturally ought to have in-been: For those Words which naturally ought to have in-been, are Redun­dant, and included in the Word Privation it self: That, Secondly, is otiosè, or unnecessary in a Definiti­on which distinguishes not the Defined from any other thing, as Transcendents; As if Virtue should be defin'd to be that for which a Man should be accounted Honest, &c. In this manner yet, are chief Ge­nus's [Page 4]to be defin'd. In the third Place, that is said to be otiosè in a Definition, which being taken away, the Definition would nevertheless be proper, and explain the Nature of the Thing; as if a Man should say of a Man, that he was a Rational Animal capable of Disci­plines: For al tho' that of Capable of Disciplines should be withdrawn, yet the rest of the Definition would be proper to explain the Essence of Man, &c.

Ax. 6. Secondly, Definitions ought to be Perspi­cuous.

1. §. The Perspicuity of Definitions, says the Prince of Philosophers, ought to be such as that it may presently appear what that is which is taught: Nay, that from it, that of the Thing con­trary also may be collected. All those things there­fore are to be avoided, which may any ways beget Obscurity; as, Unusualness, Ambiguity, Metaphor, &c. But if there be none proper, or else if any Word be more used in the Metaphorical than it is in the Proper Signification, nothing hinders but that we may ad­hibit a Metaphorical Word in a Definition. And there­fore when Logick is defin'd to be an Art of Dispu­ting well, expressing by the Word Disserendi, signify­ing properly something else; that Definition is im­properly rejected for the Metaphor; because the Word Disserendi is much seldomer used in its proper Signification, which is to distribute or disperse, than in the Metaphorical; tho' something else possibly there may be, which may be reprehended in that Defini­tion.

Ax. 7. Thirdly, Definitions ought to be Reciprocal with the Defined.

1. §. That is, whatever is contain'd in the Defined ought also so to be in the Definition; and so on the contrary. Wherefore when the Lawyers define natu­ral Right to be that which Nature has taught all living Things, the Definition is too lax: For Right consists only amongst Men, and appertaineth not to Brutes. On the other side, when Logick is defined to be an [Page 5]Art of Disputing or Arguing well, the Definition is too streight: For Logick is not only a disputing or Art of Disputing, but also Defining, Dividing and Ordering well, which are not sufficiently contained under that Notion of Disputing.

Ax. 8. Fourthly, Definitions are to be af­firmed.

1. §. For that Negative Definitions do not so much explain what a Thing is, as what it is not: Where­fore Aristotle having propos'd two Definitions of Ac­cident, Book 1. Top. Cap. 5. preferrs the latter before the former, because conceiv'd by Negation. Often yet are we forc'd thro' the Inopy of Words, or Im­becillity of our Understanding, or Imperfections of things, to make use of Negative Definitions; as, when we define an Angel to be a Finite Substance, void of Body, a Beast, an Irrational Animal; Blindness a Pri­vation of Sight. But then they are Imperfect Defini­tions.

Ax. 9. Fifthly, Definitions ought to be propos'd without Copulation or Conjunction of Parts.

1. §. For a Definition is the Explication of one Es­sence, and therefore it ought to be one and that a sim­ple Oration; But Copulative and Disjunctive Parti­cles connect many together. For Example: A Man is not to be defin'd a Terrestrial Animal and two-footed, but a Terrestrial two-footed Animal; as is collected Cap. 5. of the Interpret. and Cap. 4. Book 2. of the Post. After the same manner Number is not to be defin'd, a Multitude even or uneven: For this is its Di­vision, but a Collection of Unites. But such Defini­tions as these are frequently to be dispens'd with, not because perfect, but because there are no perfecter: as when Book 2. of the Phys. Nature is defin'd to be the Principle and Cause of Motion and Quiet; and Enun­ciation Cap. 4. of the Book of Interp. an Oration pro­nouncing true or false.

Ax. 10. Sixthly, Definitions are to consist of Prior Attributes, and simply more known, and also Indemon­strable.

1 §. This Canon does the Philosopher explain and confirm in the 6th Book of the Top. Cap. 4. to this Effect. Definition is given us, says he, that we may know: But we know not from every thing or all: but from those that are Prior and more known. Now then since Definition may consist either of them, which are to us more known, or simply: We ought rather to endeavour that the latter may be made known by the former, and simply more known than on the contrary; because this manner of Defining is the most accommodate to Science. But yet a­mongst those who are incapable of such Definitions it may be necessary, it may be, to make Definitions of those that are more known to us, rather than those that are more known in themselves. But such Definitions declare not the Essence of a thing, and therefore are imperfect; unless the same thing happen to be more known to us, and more known in it self. But neither must a perfect Definition consist only of those that are more known, but also Indemonstra­ble: For Definition is the Principle of Demonstration, as is said Book 1. of the Soul, Cap. 1. and Book 1. Post. Cap. 1. It is taught that the Principles of De­monstration are immediate; which, certainly could not be, if their Parts were to be demonstrated by for­mer Causes.

Ax. 11. A perfect Definition consists of the next Genus and Specifick Difference.

1. §. This Canon is precepted Book 6. Top. Cap. 1. But yet if the next Genus want a Name, there is ad­ded in its Place a Remote with a Difference to limit it, and make it a next Genus. So when an Animal is desin'd to be a Living, Feeling, Corporeal Substance; Living Corporeal Substance is put in place or lieu of a next Genus, and the specifick Difference is Feeling.

Ax. 12. The Difference of Substances, if not without, is always taken from their Form; but if without, or that Form be unknown, Propriety is added in the stead of Form.

1. §. So when Man is defined to be a Rational A­nimal, the Difference is taken from his Form, which is a Rational Soul. But because incorporeal Substan­ces have none, and the Specificks of Corporeal, even lye hid; because of themselves they incurr not our Senses in the Place of Form, some Property must be taken; as, An Angel is an Incorporeal Substance, a Dog a Barking-Beast, &c.

Ax. 13. The Differences of Accidents are not taken from their Form or Essence, but their respect to their Subject, Object, Cause Efficient or Final, or somewhat else not contain'd in the Essence.

1. §. Which is the Cause, or Reason why Aristotle Book 6. of the Metaph. Cap. 5. says, that Substances are simply and primarily defin'd; Accidents secondarily only, or according to something; and that the Definitions of Accidents are Orations through Additions, because those things that are added to their Genus in their Definitions are without their Essence; and almost of another Category.

Ax. 14. Proprieties are defin'd by Genus, Sub­ject and next Cause; and that either Efficient, Final or both.

1. §. And first, Efficient, as an Eclipse of the Moon is a Defect of Light in it by Reason of the Earth's being Diametrically interposed between the Sun and it: Thunder is the Noise of a broken Cloud by reason of the Fire's being oppress'd; and so 2dly Final; as, Sense is a Natural Faculty in an Animal, for the End of Judging betwixt Singulars: The Ap­petite for the gaining of what is good to its self, and avoiding what is Evil; or both, as the Act of Respirati­on is a Reciprocal Attraction and Expulsion of the Air by the Lungs, for the Refreshment of the Heart, &c. The Subject now's sometimes in a Definition of Proprieties [Page 8] unmentioned; because it is contained either in the Genus or next Cause: As, the Memory is an internal Sense, conserving of the Images of things known. Here the Subject of Memory is not express'd, to wit, Animal, because contain'd in the Word Sense, and express'd in the Definition of that. So also Risibility is a na­nural Faculty of Laughing, arising from a Rational A­nimal. I say not of Man, because sufficiently under­stood, when I say arising from a Rational Ani­mal, &c.

Ax. 15. Accidents improper, besides the Genus, take to themselves in Definition, in the Place of Difference, either Subject or Object, Cause Efficient or Final, or something that is made out of these, But,

1. §. The manner of defining of these is scarcely to be contained within any certain Rules: For, some are defined by Genus and Subject, as, Simity is the Crookedness of the Nose. Some Genus and Object as, Physick is the Science of Natural Body. And after this manner Theoretical Sciences; and some again by Genus and End; as, Grammar is the Art of speaking well: Also Genus, End and Object; as, Logick is an Art of making of Instruments, and therewith directing the Understanding in the Knowledge of Things; or Liberality is a Virtue observing a Mediocrity in giving and receiving of Moneys, &c. After this manner Arts and Habits Moral. Some lastly, by Genus and Cause Efficient; as, Whiteness is a Colour arising from a Predomination of Clear. Sound, a Patible Quality arising from a Stroke of the Air between two Bodies collided, or hit one against another. And after this manner all Patible Quali­ties, if not proper, of other Genus's of Accidents there can scarce be given any certain Rules; but each how they are to be desin'd, Use and Ex­amples of approved Authors must teach; which for this End the Studious of Logick ought to collect together.

Ax. 16. The Parts of Definition are always so to be plac'd, as that the Genus may precede the Diffe­rence; and every Word following may limit its foregoing.

1. §. So teaches Aristotle Book 2. Post. Cap. 13. For Example: An Animal is not to be defined a Feeling Animate; but an Animate Feeling Body; &c and so we come to Imperfect Definition.

CHAP. III. Of Imperfect Definition.

Ax. 1. IMperfect Definition is properly a Description, and that is either Necessary or Arbitrary.

Ax. 2. Necessary, viz. when the Defined is either not capable of a perfect Definition, or else through the Imbecillity of our Minds we cannot attain to a perfect Definition of it; or, lastly, when there are wanting fit Words required for an Accurate Defini­tion.

Ax. 3. Of the first Sort are first, Infinite Things, and Secondly, those which have not a true Es­sence: Thirdly, a Perfect one, and Fourthly, one by it self: Fifthly, and lastly, those which are not placed immediately under some Genus.

CHAP. IV. Of the Manner of Investigation or Quaest of Definition.

Ax. 1. DEfinitions are collected from Division or Induction, or Demonstration or Etymology, or Derivation, or, Lastly, from the Definition of the Contrary.

CHAP. V. Of Division, its Laws and Species's.

Ax. 1. OF Division, one is of the Name, or Nominal, the other of the Thing.

Ax. 2. Division of the Name is an Enunciati­on of the Significations of an Homonymous or Doubtful Word, or Sentences of an ambiguous or doubtful Speech.

CHAP. VI. Of the Definition of Syllogism, and its Parts.

Ax. 1. A Syllogism is a Speech in which some­thing being suppos'd, something different from that suppos'd, by Reason of the Suppos'd, does of Necessity follow.

CHAP. VII. Of the three Figures of Syllogism and their Modes.

Ax. 1. THE Figures of Syllogism are three, be­cause so many Ways may the Argu­ment be dispos'd with the Parts of the Question,

Ax. 2. The first of which is, that in which the Ar­gument is subjected to the Major, and predicated of the Minor Term: As for Instance,

In which the last Extreme or Subject is plainly Man the first or Predicate feels; Medium, Animal. Where Man is contain'd under Animal, and Animal that [Page 25]which feels. Let us see another Argumentation, viz. This.

Here the Minor indeed is contain'd in the middle; For Man is an Animal; but the Middle not in the Predicate: For Man is not a Stone, &c.

Ax. 3. Now the second Figure or Fashion of Ar­gumentation is that in which the Argument is predica­ted of both Extremes.

In which the Term Feels which is the Medium is predicated of one affirmatively, the other Negatively; and so both.

Ax. 4. The third is, that in which the Argument is the Subject of both Extremes: as,

In which we see the Argument Animal is subjected both to Feels and Lives, they being both said of it, &c.

There are not wanting those that conceive the Medium may be dispos'd in a fourth Manner, with the Parts of the Question; and so that there is a fourth Figure, in which the Argument may be pre­dicated of the greater Extreme, and subjected to the less: For Example:

[Page 24] [...] [Page 25] [...] [Page 27]In which we see the Term Animal is said of Man, and the Term Feels, of it, which is the lesser Ex­treme: But such Syllogisms as these, conclude indirectly in the first Figure. For of the two Extreme Terms, that is to be esteem'd the Major which is pre­dicated of the Medium, that the lesser which is sub­ject to it. If both are subjected, as in the second, or both predicated as in the third, then that is to be adjudged Major which is the first, and that Minor which is the last conjoyn'd with the Medium. Of the Propositions, that the Major in which the Major; that the Minor in which the Minor is conjoin'd with the Medium: And the Conclusion is so to be inferr'd as that the Major Term be the Predicate, and Minor the Subject of it; for if otherwise the Conclusion will be indirect. For Example: In the Syllogism of the fourth Figure above: Animal is the middle Term, Feels, therefore must be the Major, because predi­cated of Animal; and Men the Minor, because Subject; From whence follows that this Proposition, Every Animal feels; is the Major Proposition, be­cause therein the Major Term is joyn'd to the Me­dium, and this, Every Man is an Animal; Minor, because therein the Medium is joyned with the Mi­nor: And consequently this the Conclusion, viz. E­very Man therefore feels; Not this, viz. Something which feels is Man: For when the Minor Term is col­lected from the Major, the Syllogism is Indirect, &c.

Ax. 5. Now the Modes, viz. Universal, certainly and directly concluding, are fourteen: Four in the first Figure, viz. Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio; as many in the second. Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco; and six in the third, viz. Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

1. §. All which for the sake of Memory are contain'd in these four Versicles, such as they could be render'd from the Latin.

Ax. 6. Of which Words, each Syllable is to be prefix'd to each Proposition; to shew its Quantity and Qualities by its Vowels:

Ax. 7. The Vowels are Four. viz. A, E, I, O. Whereof A, denotes a Universal Affirming; E, a Universal Denying; I, a Particular Affirming; and O, a Particular Denying.

1. §. All which are likewise particularly Express'd in this Couplet, viz.

Ax. 1. Now Indefinite Propositions are all here taken for Particulars, as also Singulars, if adjoin'd in the same Syllogism, to a Proposition Universal or Particu­lar; For if alone, they constitute Singular Syllogisms, or Expository.

Ax. 9. Of which in each Figure there are two; of which those of the first and second are less Natu­ral; because a Singular is Naturally affirmed of no other.

1. §. Examples of the Universal Moods certainly and directly, concluding in the first Figure, are such as these, viz.

2. §. Of the Singulars in this Figure, the one af­firms, the other denies. For Example:

3. §. Examples of the Universal certainly and directly concluding in the second Figure, are such as these;

4. §. The singular Modes of the second Figure con­clude both Negatively. For Example:

5. §. Examples of Universals certainly and di­rectly concluding in the third Figure, are such as these, viz.

6. §. Of the Singular Moods in the third Figure, the one also affirms, and the other denies. For Example:

7. §. And these are the direct Modes, the Use of which is much the greatest in Disputation: To which Aristotle has also added some Inverted, which from a Major affirming Universal or Particular, and Minor Denying, conclude a Particular Negation of the Mi­nor Term. As,

But these, together with the Ways of Conversion and Transposition, as being useful to very few, are better sought for out of the Institutions: And so we proceed to the 8th Chapter, viz. that of the Rules, Laws and Proprieties of Syllogisms, as far as sutes to our Purpose.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Laws, Rules and Proprieties of Syllogisms.

Ax. 1. THE Necessity of Consecution, which we call'd the Soul of Syllogism, leans upon certain Foundations and Rules; so certain and known that they cannot be deny'd by any one.

Ax. 2. Universal Syllogisms affirming depend on the Rule or Dictum de omni, that is, all, which is this: Whatsoever is predicated Universally of any Universal; That is also predicated of all that are con­tain'd under that Universal.

CHAP. IX. Of the Declaration of the Second and Third Figure, by Reduction to the First, and Exposition so far as is ne­cessary for our Purpose.

Ax. 1. THE Syllogisms of the first Figure are more perfect than the rest, for two Reasons; First, because in that may be concluded all manner of Questions, whether Affirming, Denying, Universal, Particular,; whereas in the Second only Denying, and in the Third, Particular.

Ax. 2. Secondly, because in that there appears the Necessity of the Syllogistical Sequel, and the Dictum of [Page 42]All and None, which in the rest of the Figures are not so conspicuous, but that they require a De­claration.

Ax. 3. Which Declaration is to be made, two ways, viz. by Reduction to the First and by Exposition.

Ax. 4. Reduction is either ostensive, or else by Way of Impossible.

Ax. 5. Reduction by Impossible is perform'd by one of the Premisses retaining, and the Conclusion's Contradiction being put in Place of the other.

Ax. 6. Ostensive by the Propositions being conver­ted, or also transposed.

Ax. 7. To both which are of Use those Consonants, which are contained in the Names of the Modes, to be farther read of in Logicks; but too long here to recite.

Ax. 8. By Exposition the Necessity of the Conse­cution is declared, viz. in the third Figure. When in Place of the Medium Universal, there is taken a sin­gular: As, suppose Aristotle, or some other Person instead of Man., which is contained under that Univer­sal, by which to collect the same Conclus [...] as,

1. §. For Example; a Syllogism in Datisi, viz.

If any one should doubt this Illation, one may take a singular Medium: As, suppose Aristotle, or the like instead of Man, and make an Expository Syllo­gism, with it in this manner, viz.

Which Conclusion is therefore the more evident; be­cause it has a sensible Medium, in which Conform to [Page 43]that most evident Maxim, viz. Whatever things agree in the same singular Third; they also agree amongst themselves.

2. Syllogisms of the second Figure are not so well declared by Exposition, because the Medium in the Second, ought to be predicated; but a Singular cannot naturally be predicated, but only subjected. And thus far of the Genesis, or manner of making of Syllogisms.

CHAP. X. Now of finding out a Medium, with Propriety to each Figure and Mode.

Ax. 1. THE Medium may be compared with the Parts of the Question, either as An­tecedent, Consequent, or Repugnant.

Ax. 2. The Medium is said to be Antecedent, when in an Affirming Enunciation it is subjected; Consequent when predicated; Repugnant, when either subjected or predicated in an Enunciation Denying.

1. §. And hence it will be easie to guess what kind of Medium each Mood and Figure requires: In Barbara and Darii, the Medium is the Antece­dent of the Predicate, and Consequent of the Sub­ject: In Celarent, Ferio, Cesare, Festino, repugnant of the Predicate, and Consequent of the Subject: Ca­mestres and Baroco, Consequent of the Predicate, and Repugnant of the Subject: Darapti, Disamis and Da­tisi Antecedent of Both: In Felapton, Bocardo and Fe­rison, repugnant of the Predicate, and Antecedent of the Subject. If the Medium be the Consequent of the Predicate, and Antecedent of the Subject, the [Page 44]Syllogism will be indirect in the First, viz. vulgar­ly the fourth Figure. If repugnant of both a Pa­rallogism, and that of two Negatives; if of the Pre­dicate Antecedent, and Consequent of the Subject: So, by reason of the Minor denying in the first or third Figure. If lastly, Consequent of both, one of the two Affirmatives in the second Figure.

2 §. All which is taught in these few Words which are contained in this Distich. ‘By Napcas, Nipcis, or Nipis, Repcere Cepres, And Ropcos, Copros, Nosrop, you'll find every Me­dium.’ In which Versicles are to be considered, First, the Vowels A, E, I, O, which denote the Quality and Quantity of the Conclusion according to the accustomed Valuation. And then the Consonants N, C, R, S, P. Of which N denotes the Antecedent, C the Conse­quent, R the Repugnant, S the Subject, P the Predi­care, &c. And therefore if a Universal Conclusion Af­firming be to be proved, Napcas will shew by its Con­sonants N, P, C, S. that a Medium is required, which is Amtecedent of the Predicate and Consequent of the Subject; and if a Particular Affirming: Nipcis, that there is need of a Medium, that is Antecedent of the Predicate also, and Consequent of the Sub­ject: Nipis Antecedent of both. If a Universal de­nying, the Word Repcere shews that the Medium ought to be Repugnant of the Predicate and Consequent of the Subject; and so by the Confonants, minding only what it is they signifie, it will be easie for a Practi­ser to whom this is principally significant, to determine of the rest.

3. For our Example; be this vulgar Probleme, Is Pleasure good? Seek first the Consequences of the Predicate, viz. to be Chosen, Conducible, &c. then the Antecedents, as, Febicity, Sanity, &c. then the Repugnants, at, to be [Page 45]avoided, turpid, &c. Seek also the Consequences of the Subject, as Peaceable, according to Nature. Then the Antecedents, as Pleasure of Musick, &c. Lastly, the Repugnants, as, what is molestous, laborious, &c. Make we now a Universal Conclusion after this man­ner. All Pleasure is good. This is found only in Napcas, as being the Word which indicates the Me­dium to he the Antecedent of the Predicate, and Con­sequent of the Subject. Take we, for Instance the Me­dium, according to Nature: And the Syllogism will be this in Barbara, Whatever is according to Na­ture, is good; but all Pleasure is according to Nature: And therefore all Pleasure is good, &c. If, we were to conclude, Some Pleasure is good, then accord­ing to the Word Nipcis, the Antecedent of both of them were to be taken: As, suppose Musical Pleasure, and then the Syllogism would be in Darapti, Disamis, or Datisi: As this; All Musical Pleasure is good; All Musical Pleasure is Pleasure: Some Pleasure therefore is good, &c.

But thus much of a Medium, as it has Re­ference to each Figure and Mode; in another Capacity, we shall consider it hereafter. We come now to the Species's of Syllogism, and First speak we of Induction, Enthymeme, and Example.

CHAP. XI. Of Induction, Enthymeme, and Example.

Ax. 1. AN Induction is a Syllogism in which one Extreme is concluded by the other of the Medium; also defined a Progress from Singulars to U­niversals.

1. §. An Induction is so called, because by those things which are certain, it induces the Mind of the Hearer to believe those that are Uncertain. Now an Induction collects the greatest Extreme, that is, the Predicate of the Medium by the other Extreme, that is, the Subject, and all those things that are like unto it. So in an Induction, for Instance, it's proved, that A­nimals void of Bile are long-liv'd; because a Man, a Horse, an Ass, &c. are long-liv'd.

2. § When an Induction is said to be a Progress from Singulars to Universals, the Words must not be too strictly taken; For there are two sorts of it, as thus explained, viz. one by which the Genus is collected of the Species's, or Universal of Singulars; and the other in which the Whole of the Parts. Ex­amples of which are to be met with almost in e­very good Author. Thus Aristotle Book 8. of his E­thicks, Cap. 1. proves Friendship necessary to Men: To the Rich, because it Exercises their Charity, and conserves a Prosperous Fortune; Poor, because their Re­fuge and Supply; Old Men, that they may be reverenced; and what cannot by themselves be done by reason of their Infirmities, may be done by others that are their Friends. Youth, for fear they commit Sin; Vigorous Age, that it may perform famous Enterprises, &c. and [Page 47]this is an Induction of the first kind, and properly a Progression from Singulars to Universals, or at least, less Universals to more. But an Example of the other it would be, if one should prove the Holy Scriptures to be divinely inspired, because the Law, the Pro­phets, the Gospels, and Writings of the Holy Apo­stles, &c. are divinely inspir'd; and this would be but improperly called a Progression from Singulars to Univer­sals; and so of like Instances.

Ax. 2. That the Induction may be firm, all the Singulars are to be numbered up, that from thence the Universals, or also all the Parts, that from hence the Whole may be concluded.

Ax. 3. Or if this be too troublesome after an Enume­ration of several, it may be subjoyn'd that the Ratio of the rest is the same or some such like.

1. §. So Horace intending to prove that no Men were content with their Lots, after he had affirmed that neither Merchant, Knight nor Husbandman, nor Lawyer were content with their Lots, he summs up all in this manner, viz. that Instances of this kind are so numerous, that it would weary even the Talka­tive Fabius, to recite them, &c.

Ax. 7. An Induction is everted, when an unlike Example can be given, and that is termed an Instance.

1. §. For Example; If any one should collect that any part of the Body should be cut off if so ill affe­cted, as that there should be no hopes of its Reco­very, and there were Danger that the whole should be infected by it, because the Foot, the Hand, the Ear in such a Case is to be cut off, it may be an­swered, that in the rest of the Parts omitted there is another Ratio: For it would be a Ridiculous thing to cut off the Head for the Preservation of the rest of the Body; and if mention had been made also of the Head in the Induction, no body would have granted that that Part, tho' evilly affected, should have been cut off. And thus much of Induction or a Syllogism of Induction.

Ax. 8. A Syllogism farther may be divided into Perfect and Imperfect. A Perfect is that in which nothing is wanting.

Ax. 9. An Imperfect, in which there is some Pro­position, as the Enthymeme; or some Part of the Argu­ment, as, Example.

1. §. An Enthymeme, says Aristotle, is an imper­fect Syllogism, Example, Induction.

Ax. 10. An Enthymeme is a Syllogism maimed or mutilated, of one Proposition.

Ax. 11. And therefore consists of two, of which the former is called the Antecedent, the latter the Con­sequent.

Ax. 12. Now if the Subject of the Consequent be put into the Antecedent, the Major is suppress'd; if the Predicate, the Minor; whether the one or the other, the Enthymeme may be reduc'd to a Categorical, by adding the Proposition wanting.

Ax. 13. If neither the Subject, nor Predicate of the Consequent, be in the Antecedent, the Major is suppress'd; and that being added, the Enthymeme is reduc'd to an Hypothetical Syllogism, or Syllogism of Supposition.

1. §. Now this Mode of Arguing or Argumenta­tion, is so call'd from a Greek Word, signifying to think; because one of the Propositions is express'd and the other not, &c.

Now in this Enthymeme, for Example,

A Covetous Man wants; therefore a Covetous Man is not rich; the Subject of the Consequent, is put into the Antecedent, from whence it is to be col­lected, that the Major is wanting; which being ad­ded, it will be a full Syllogism in this manner. No Rich Man wants; Every Covetous Man wants: And therefore no Covetous Man is Rich. But let us fee an­other: He that sins not, is not the Author of Sin: And therefore God is not the Author of Sin. Here the Predicate of the Consequent is expressed in the Ante­cedent, [Page 49]and therefore the Minor is wanting; which being added, it will be such a Syllogism as this: He that does not sin, is not the Author of Sin: God does not sin: And therefore God is not the Author of Sin, &c. Add a Third to these, viz. Virtue makes hap­py: And therefore Vice miserable. Here neither the Subject nor the Predicate of the Consequent is ex­press'd in the Antecedent: And therefore the Major is wanting, which being added, it will make an Hy­pothetical Syllogism in this manner, viz. If Virtue makes happy, then Vice makes miserable: But Virtue makes happy: And therefore Vice makes mi­serable, &c.

Ax. 14. Now an Example is, when one Extreme is shewn to be in the Medium by the Resemblance which it has to the other Extreme.

1. §. That is, when the Major Extreme or the Predicate is collected to be in the Medium by some Example, which is like unto the Third, that is, the Subject. For Example consists in four Terms, out of which are made two Ratiocinations; one Perfect, in which out of a Universal Major is collected some Par­ticular; the other Imperfect, in which out of a Par­ticular like to the Subject of the Conclusion brought, is collected a Proposition Universal containing the Si­militude of both Particulars, and was the Major of the First Ratiocination. For Example; Let the greater Extreme be this; It is Pernicious; The Me­dium, To wage War upon our Neighbours; The Mi­nor, The Athenians wage War upon the Thebans; The Simile, The Thebans wage War upon the Phocenses, or Citizens of Phoce in Boeotia. Of the which we may make this like Argumentation Ex­emplary. To wage War upon Neighbburs is per­nicious; but if the Athenians infer or wage War upon the Thebans, they wage War upon Neighbours; and therefore if the Athenians wage War upon the Thebans it is pernicious. Add we to this Ra­tiocination [Page 50] some Example; and by that we may con­firm the Major Proposition, viz. that it proved pernici­ous to the Thebans their waging War with the Pho­censes, or Citizens of Phoce: But that was waging War upon Neighbours; and therefore to wage War upon Neighbours is pernicious. Here now is con­cluded the Predicate of the Medium by something which is like unto the Subject of the Preceding Syllo­gism.

2. §. Now indeed an Example does not necessarily conclude; because it proceeds from a Particular to a Universal: It persuades yet and begets Opinion, and that upon this Foundation, viz. That the like should agree to the like, is meet and reasonable. In fine, it persuades, if examined, that the Medi­um agrees with the Subject, as here, viz. that for the Athenians to wage War upon the Thebans was for them to wage War upon their Neighbours, and that the Predicate agrees to that which is like unto it, viz. that it was pernicious to the Thebans to wage War upon the Phocenses. &c. And so we come to the Twelfth Chapter, viz. that of,

CHAP. XII. Of Syllogism Hypothetical, Disjunctive and Relative.

Ax. 1. IN the third Place a Syllogism may be di­vided into Simple and Composed. A Sim­ple is that which neither consists of Composed Propositi­ons, nor yet can be resolved into more Syllogisms.

Ax. 2. A Composed is that in the which ei­ther one or both of the Premisses are composed, or else is made up of more Syllogisms than one.

Ax. 3. That of the first Nature, viz. that in which either one or both of the Premisses are composed, is either Hypothetical, Disjunctive or Relative.

Ax. 4. Hypothetical is that in which either the Major, or Minor, or both, are Hypothetical.

Ax. 5. If only the Major, then the Conclusion is Categorical: But if the Minor, then the Conclusion, of Necessity must be Hypothetical too.