Man in Paradise.
SUch is the excellency and original of Man's Soul, brooded and hatched by the all-enlivening breath of God, fashioned by Divine artifice after the Idea and most perfect exemplar, co [...] ceived first in the minde of God, whose architype it doth faithfully resemble: such, I say, is its excellency and noble extraction, that the contemplation hereof [Page 2] cannot chuse but heighten our serious thoughts into admiration, and translate the considerate minde into an extasie. For whatsoever excellencies the Great Monarch of Heaven and Earth hath scattered and diffused amongst the lower species and degrees of creatures; all these hath he concentred, collected, and moulden together in mans Soul; that by union, whose property it is alwayes to add virtue and efficacy to the things united, they might become more perfect here, then in the creatures singly, and, [...], super-excellent.
The natural abilities, which are the meanest of the Souls endowments, and [Page 3] as it were, the dregs of all the rest, what lustre and splendor do they shew in their sweet harmony, order, disposition, and sufficiency to attain the end for which they were bestowed?
No sooner hath the Embryon all its parts and Organs woven of fine spermatical threeds, by the industry of the plastick or formative virtue, but it receives from this divine particle of Air, vim nutritivam, a nutritive faculty, to maintain the substance then begun: vim auctricem, an augmentative power, to encrease and bring it to a just quantity and bulk, that the Palace wherein this noble Prince, the Soul, is to reside, [Page 4] may be compleatly built, and furnished with necessaries fit to entertain so great a Majesty.
These powers have other subordinate faculties, as careful and thrifty Hand-maids, waiting upon them; wherein you may see the oeconomy of a well-ordered house. There is an attractive faculty, as a hand, to pull nourishment in; and a retentive, to keep carefully what is gotten. A concoctive, to fit and prepare what is so retained, for the use of the whole body; which concoctive hath also a distributive faculty, as another subordinate Handmaid under her, whereby there is performed a just anadosis, or distribution of [Page 5] matter to each several part according to its particular exigency. And under all these, there is an expulsive faculty, which serves as a drudge to carry out of the body the feculent part, or caput mortum, wherein there is no convenient chyle remaining; as also, to make way for new matter to be contained, and then concocted, as was the former.
Thus have we that pattern and Idea which all well-ordered Families, and well-composed Commonwealths do imitate and follow.
Yet notwithstanding, the fabrick of man thus kept, would in time decay, and the species utterly perish, [Page 6] unless to prevent this, a generative power were also implanted in him. In this the Philosopher acknowledgeth, [...], a Spice of Divinity; in emulation of whose eternal continuance, Nature, whose strength cannot maintain a solitary individuum to eternity, by this help preserveth the specifical unity, and so compleateth her desire.
Here I would ask, With what curious Pencil this plastick power draws forth the lineaments & features of that body whose structure drew the Psalmist into such admiration? Wonderful hast thou made me behind and before. With whom doth it consult, to assign a due station and place for every [Page 7] member, leaving no chasme or gap unfilled, and superadding nothing superfluous or in vain? what Euclide or Master-Geometrician doth it ask counsel of, to give a fit proportion, a just dimension, and perfect Figure to every part? by what Arithmetick doth it count the number of the parts, and then by certain paralellisms of extuberances behinde and before, doth so counterpoise the whole body, that the countenance of man, and onely man, may be erected towards Heaven, there to behold his image as in a glass; whilst all other Creatures look prone upon the Earth, out of which their earthy souls were first extracted?
Prona (que) cum spectent animalia caetera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit: calum (que) tueri
Jussit, & erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.
The sensitive faculties are sublimed to a higher pitch, and may elevate our minds to a higher degree of admiration. Who cannot but wonder at the swiftness of the sensible species posting with all speed to the sense, and the quickness and readiness of the sense to receive it? here you may see a vast mountain in a moment of time, contracted into a small model, and dwelling in an angle and corner of the eye. Who [Page 9] cannot but admire the faithfulness of the sensitive Organs? who no sooner receive, but transmit their respective species, sending them immediately to the common sense, as into some Common-councel-house, where the busie imagination, by spelling, joyning, and compounding them together, reads a Lecture to the appetite to prove its assent or dissent, whilst other species are commanded to their Cells, and reserv'd in the store-house of memory till need require them? Look back, and you may see the pellucid coats wherewith the eyes are covered, the clear waters wherewith they are bedew'd, the winding labyrinth [Page 10] wherein the sound received into the ear must wander, till, beating upon that drum-like membrain which through the ingenite Air propagates the continued sound, the sense, by a [...], interceding, is married to the object: look forward, and you shall see the appetite no sooner awaked, but the locomotive faculty, a most obedient servant, puts the decree in execution; earnestly prosecuting that good, or flying that evil, which the affection for that time president shall dispose unto. In the mean time the passions, as love, joy, hope, anger, fear, grief, &c. as Hand-maids, are subservient, according as they are [Page 11] respectively concerned in the object apprehended, whether good or evil, past, present, or to come. In this sweet agreement, we may compare man's Soul to an artificial Lu [...]e, and these to be the strings of it, upon which it playes such ravishing Tunes, as would drive the considerate ear to an astonishment or plain extasie. Anima creaturarum inferiorum compendium: centrum in quod omnes perfectionū lineae concurrunt: speculum in quo suam quaeque creatura faciem, sed longè pulchriorem, contempletur: eccho mirabilis, quae solitarias nudas (que) voces a creaturis, aliis sigillatim expressas, multiplicato & suaviori sono refert. The Soul is an abstract of [Page 12] inferiour creatures: a centre wherein all the lines of perfections meet: a glass wherein each creature may behold its face, but much fairer: an admirable eccho which carries back the naked and solitary voices of other creatures, by them singly express'd, in a multiplied and sweeter sound.
But what are all these, compared with the rational powers of the Soul? what is the sense, which traffiques onely with gross bodies, and quailities from thence emergent, compared with reason, by which the Soul negotiates with Angels and immateriate beings, and by metaphysical and and abstruse notions, wings it self up into the arms of [Page 13] him who breath'd it first into the body of man?
In this upper room and higher loft of the Soul's residence, we may contemplate the Soul, as a Monarch, wisely restraining or giving liberty to the misunderstanding affections according to the rule of right reason. Here have we man ruling in man, dressing and cultivating man, as another Paradise, wherein is all possible variety, yet no confusion, no ataxy or disorder, no passions contradicting one another, or tyrannizing over reason; no disturbance of minde, no distemper of body, but a most admirable harmony of all things in the whole universe of man.
Reason is that Sceptre whereby the Soul doth rule without tyranny, the will and affections. Reason is that rod wherewith the Soul is kept in awe to obey without servile fear, the great Monarch of Heaven and Earth.
By reason, the Soul discerns that there is a God; drawing one Argument from the Creation of the World, which either did exist of it self, or was produced by another: but it could not give a being to it self, seeing that it is repugnant that any thing should be the cause of it self. Therefore the consequence is necessary, that the World was made by another; and; such another, [Page 15] as was the efficient cause thereof; not produced by any other former efficient cause, but was of himself, and by himself from eternity: which can be no other but God.
Another Argument the Soul: draws from the necessary dependence of a finite being upon an infinite: for every thing in the World is finite, both in respect of its essence and efficacy. Now every thing that is finite must necessarily be limited by another, seeing it is impossible that any thing should give bounds to it self: and there being not in things finite a progress to infinity, we must at length come to some certain being which is not [Page 16] limited by another, but is of it self essentially and virtually infinite: which can be no other but God.
A third Demonstration is taken from the necessary dependence of a secondary cause upon a first: for unless we do here also grant a progress to infinity, which is absurd; in ascending the scale of subordination of causes, we must at length meet with one primary both efficient and final cause, having no other cause superiour or before it; which is only God.
A fourth Demonstration is taken from the necessary dependance of a contingent and temporal being, [Page 17] upon an absolutely necessary and eternal being: for that which is temporal and contingent, was not alwayes, but commenced in time, and had a beginning of its duration. Wherefore seeing it is absurd, to grant that there was once nothing, and that which afterwards was, gave unto it self a beginning to be; we must conclude, that there was alwayes an absolutely necessary, and eternal being without all beginning; which is onely God.
A fifth Argument the Soul useth to prove a Deity, is the necessary dependance of all things that are good in an inferiour order, upon some [Page 18] primary and chief good: for we see amongst all things in the world which are good, some are more, and others less good. Now seeing that all things are such more or less, according as they do more or less participate of that which is most of all such; it follows from hence, that there must necessarily be some Fountain of good, from whence all other goods do flow, as offsprings thereof; by which they are also measured: and this can be none other then onely God.
Not onely these, but many other rational Arguments the soul useth, to satisfie her self fully in this Truth; as, the general consent [Page 19] of all people and Nations; the dictate of Conscience, when there is none to accuse; the goodly fabrick of the world; and, the continued Order of all things preserv'd in their first station, through all the vicissitude of generation and corruption; intimating a wise Rectour and Governour upon whose nod and direction all things depend.
No sooner doth the Soul by such-like Arguments thorowly convince her self that there is a God, but this heavenly creature, wing'd with Reason, soars yet higher, endeavouring to see God's face, and to know what God is. Here she approaches: but such [Page 20] is the transcendent splendour of his bright Majesty, that she judgeth it impossible to look God in the face, or to know a priori what God is, as Cicero saith in his first Book De naturae Deorum, under the person of Cotta: Rogas me quis & qualis sit Deus: auctore utar Simonide, de quo cum quaesivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi causa sibi unum diem postulavit: cum idem ex eo postridie quaereret, biduum petiit. Cum saepius duplicaret numerum dierum, admirans (que) Hiero, quaereret cur ita faceret? Quia, inquit, quantò diutius considero, tantò mihi res obscurior videtur. You ask me who and what is God: I will use the speech of Simonides, [Page 21] who, when King Hiero asked him the same question, desired a days time to deliberate concerning it. The day after, when he asked him again, he desired two days. Having in this manner divers times doubled the number of days, Hiero wondring at him, asked, Wherefore he did so? Because, saith he, the longer time I take to consider upon this matter, the more obscure it appears unto me. And indeed, those Arguments are infallible which are usually brought for this Opinion, viz. that it is impossible for the Soul to know God a priori.
Yet though she cannot see his face, she hath leave [Page 22] granted her to behold his back-parts: though she cannot strictly define the Deity, yet she may in some maner describe it: though she cannot attain to any knowledge of God by fetching Arguments a priori ad posterius, from that which went before to that which follows after, from the cause to the effect, from that which is insensible to that which is sensible; yet she may argue a posteriori ad prius, from that which follows after to that which went before, from that which is corporeal to that which is incorporeal, from that which is compound to that which is simple, from that which is temporal to that which is eternal, from that [Page 23] which is finite to that which is infinite, from that which is natural to that which is supernatural, from the effect to the first efficient cause. By this way of argumentation the Soul makes a description of the Godhead, and, either by way of negation or transcendence, attributes that unto God, which can in no wise, without absurdity, be attributed to any of the creatures: as, that he is actus purus, a pure act, without all potentiality; simplicissimus, most simple, without all composition; foelicissimus, most happy: with many other. The very Heathen Philosophers, as Cicero, Aristotle, and Plato, by the onely light of nature, [Page 24] have left such sentences in their writings, as may clearly demonstrate the Soul's abilities in this kinde. Aristotle in his twelfth Book of Metaphysicks, saith, That God is vivens, aeternus, & optimus; living, eternal, and transcendently good: and a little after, That he is substantia aeterna, immobilis, magnitudinis expers, indivisibilis, infinita, impassibilis & immutabilis, a sensibus separata. An eternal substance, immoveable, without bulk, indivisible, infinite, not capable of suffering or of alteration, separted from the senses. Plato likewise in Timaeo, and in his Book De Legibus, saith of God, That he is Genitor Universitatis, [Page 25] the Begetter of this Universe: bonus, & causa bonorum omnium; good, and the cause of all good things.
That very Attribute which Christians do, [...], after a more special manner ascribe unto God, Cicero hath left in his writings, saying, as we say, That God is, [...], the knower of the heart. He saith in3 De nat. Deorum. one place, Obscurum Deo nihil potest esse: and in2 De Divin. another place, Ignorare Deus non potest, quâ quisque mente sit. The same Author, by the onely light of nature, hath contemplated God in the most happy fruition of himself, as also in his providence towards the world, and hath exprest himself in a most Christianlike [Page 26] manner in both these respects. As touching the fruition of himself, he saith, Ea est Dei vita, quâ nihil beatius, nihil omnino bonis omnibus affluentius cogitari potest: nihil enim Cicero nullus intellexit Deitatem absolute nihil agere: sed nostro more non agere, sc. cum labore & molestia. agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus, nulla opera molitur: sua potentia & virtute gaudet, habet exploratum fore se semper tum in maximis, tum in aeternis voluptatibus. Such is the life of God, than which nothing is more happy, nothing in the world can possibly be thought to abound with more good things: for he doth nothing; he is implicated in no businesses, he undergoeth no labour, but enjoyeth his own power and virtue; and knoweth certainly, that he shall alwayes be in transcendent [Page 27] and eternal pleasures. As concerning God's providence, he saith thus: In mundo Deus est aliquis, qui regit, qui gubernat, qui cursum astrorum, qui mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservat; terras & maria contemplans, hominum commoda vitasque tuetur. In the world there is a God which ruleth, governeth, and preserveth the course of the stars, the mutations of times, and the vicissitudes and orders of things; who beholding both Sea and Land, doth defend the goods and lives of men. I could produce a large Catalogue of such-like expressions from the mouths of Heathens: but presuming that what I have already [Page 28] enumerated, may suffice to vindicate the Soul 's Prerogative, as touching the knowledge of God in his Attributes; I shall wave all maner of enlargements, and pursue my intended brevity.
To know God in his Attributes, is a neer approach to the Deity; yet the rational Soul comes still neerer: first, prying about his essence, then returning to her self, and contriving which way she should know more; at length she saith within her self, Operatio sequitur esse; action depends upon being. Then she busies her self in the contemplation of God's actions, which, saith she, are either immanent or transient: [Page 29] the immanent actions of God, are such as are perform'd within himself without respect had to the creatures, whereby he is said to know himself, and to love himself; as Scaliger saith, Deus generat ex seipso, in seipso suiipsius intellectionem, eodem modo, eandem aequalem sibi. God doth from himself begat an understāding of himself in himself, after the same manner, the same equal to himself. Here the Soul takes notice of a reflection of the Deity upon it self, and is sublim'd into the supposition of a Trinity: for whereas God doth conceive and know himself, he doth beget a most perfect image of himself, from whence also proceedeth a most perfect [Page 30] love of himself. Now seing there is nothing in God, which is not God; both the image of God, and the love of God seem to be distinctVocabulum Graecum, [...], multisariam accipitur; & inter varias ejus acceptiones aliquando sumitur pro essentia entis: quo sensu Patres Concilii Sardiensis censuerunt, ut est apud Theodoretum in Ecclesiastica Historia, lib. 2. cap. 8. unam esse hypostasin Patris, Filii, & Spiritus sancti. Verum enim vero [...] pro supposito naturae intelligentis haud obscuri Authores accipiunt: quo sensu Graeci Patres in divina essentia tres hypostases esse asserunt; & Dionysius Areopagita, qui Apostolorum coaetaneus fuisse perhibetur, in lib. De Caelesti Hierarchia, vocat divinam essentiam unitatem, [...], hoc est, in tribus hypostatibus subsistentem. Hypostases or subsistences of the same essence with him from whom they do proceed, as if an eye should see it self: there is first the eye seeing; secondly, the eye [Page 31] seen, or at least, the image or species of that eye seen: from which action of seeing, there must necessarily proceed a desire of enjoying; for every action hath its end. This comparison of the eye doth in some sort adumbrate the Trinity; yet by shewing how far short the comparison is, the true notion of the Trinity may be more clearly demonstated. The Eye cannot see it self, but the Deity cannot but behold it self; there being no object beyond it, or extraneous to it. God doth primarily see and know himself: But secondarily, the creatures, who live, move, and have their being in him.
The Eye doth not always [Page 32] [...] [Page 33] [...] [Page 32] see, but doth in time begin, and afterwards cease to see: but the Deity cannot but alwayes behold and know it self; and cannot but subsist in the eternal contemplation of it self.
If we should grant that the eye could see it self; yet in propriety of speech, we must deny our supposition; for the Eye sees not the naked essence of any thing, but a certain accident, viz. the intentional species: but the Deity is essentially beheld of it self, reflecting no other species or image from it then its naked essence, whose perfection is such, that it cannot but subsist eternally beheld and contemplated by it self.
From the reflection of the Eye upon it self, there can proceed onely an appetite of enjoying: but from the reflection of the Deity upon it self, there cannot but proceed an absolute fruition. Actiones feruntur in bonum, saith the Philosopher: from the reflection of an eye upon it self, there can onely proceed bonum desiderii, a good of desire: but from the reflection of the Deity upon it self, there cannot but proceed [...], or bonum complacentiae; a good of complacency. After this manner doth the Soul discourse freely & ingenuously within her self; I mean the rational Soul not clouded with sensuality, nor straightned [Page 34] and girt with prejudice. Then doth she conclude, that there are three necessary distinct subsistences, yet but one essence of the Deity; or that the Deity, which is essentially one, is subsistentially three. The Deity doth necessarily subsist, first, in the eternal contemplation of it self; secondly, it doth subsist eternally, contemplated by it self; and thirdly, it doth subsist in an eternal complacency of it self: yet are there not three eternals, but one eternal; because the notion we have of eternity excludes plurality: neither do we conceive the first, second, and third subsistence, to be one before [Page 35] another in time or duration, because eternity is indivisible, having neither priority nor posteriority; but onely by a priority of order or disposition of their relation. When we say that God is merciful, or that God is just, we speak improperly or [...], after the manner of men; there being no real distinction betwixt God's mercy and his justice. But when we denominate the Deity to subsist contemplating or contemplated, &c. we speakScientia seu contemplatio proprie competit divinae naturae, & improprie tribuitur creaturis: notitia enim nostra est obscura & imperfecta, divina vero est perfecta & [...]bsoluta. Multo magis ab aeterno in aeternum scire & contemplari Dei proprium est, quod nullo modo de creaturarum perfectissima predicari potest. properly and absolutely. Wherefore, [Page 36] although these three subsistences be all concentred in the Deity; yet they areDistinguntur ab invicem, quia ad invicem referuntur. Ratio enim formalis relationis est semper supponere aliud cui unumquod (que) rela [...]orum referatur. Quemadmodum Aristoteles, [...], &c. Et infra subjungit, [...]. distinct each one from the other. In that they do susibst invisible in themselves, and really distinct from each other, we may properly call them persons:Persona est substantia individua, intelligens, incommunicabilis. Haec definitio a Zanchic, lib. 1. De tribus Elohim, & uno Jehova. cap. 2. ex communi Patrum Latinorum consensu affertur. for a person according to Philosophers, is a rational or intelligible subsistence distinct from others, and indivisible in it self.
Hither is the Soul arriv'd, viz. to the knowledge of three persons in one essence of the Deity; or, to the acknowledgement of a Trinity in Unity, by the consideration of God's immanent actions. Now doth she pass from hence, unto his transient actions, which are the Creation of the World, and the preservation thereof. Here she doth premise, that the world was not from eternity, but did commence with time; as also, that there could be no first matterAbsurdum enim esset [...], absolutam aeternitatem & essendi necessitatem ali [...]ui nisi soli Deo tribuere. eternally coexisting with the Deity. Moreover, she doth presuppose that it would be absurd either to affirm or grant that the Deity did act positively [Page 38] upon nothing; although before the Creation of the world, there was besides God, privatively, not any thing. There was before the Creation of the world, one onely absolutely necessary infinite Being, viz. God, who by reason of his infinity and absolute perfection, could perform no action absolutely transient: neither had he any object besides himself to act upon. Time, and place, or finity might have then been denominated nothing, it being contradistinct to infinity, or a negation of that infinite being, which did onely then exist. Wherefore, time and place before the Creation of the World, could never have [Page 39] beenNihil non est intelligibili nisi per notionem alterius de quo simplicitur negatur: sed tempus & locus ante creationem mundi nihil erant: Ergo. conceived or willed by the Deity; unless he had conceived and willed himself, together with time and place. So that it seems to the rational Soul, that time and place had its being by the Deities conception and volition of himself, together with time and place; which was the position of the word of his minde in time and place.
Here is also so clear a Demonstration of the Trinity in the Creation of the world, that it seems impossible to the rational Soul to have the true notion of Creation without the conceit of the Trinity: Insomuch, that the Ancients, who were [Page 40] more profound Philosophers, did express the word create by an Hebrew word consisting of three Letters, viz. א Aleph, ב Beth, and ר Resch, which signifie the Father, the Son, and the Spirit: which three Letters, by addition of their proper Vowels, either exprest or understood, are a Verb of the Preterperfect tense, [...], signifying, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have joyntly acted, or, they have conspired to act. This word, [...], creavit, doth in it self sufficiently express the action of the Deity, subsisting in a three-fold manner: yet the Ancients go farther, putting to it a word expressing the Deity in the [Page 41] Plural Number, saying, [...], Elohím bara, the Gods have created, or rather, God as he is personally three hath created. Hermes a most profound Rationalist, who was therefore called Trismegistus, in his Book intituled Pimander, hath [...]eft a sen [...]ence to posterity, relating to the Creation of the World, as some do interpret; but as others do construe it, it doth onely express the Trinity. In this ambiguity, it is not difficult to decide the controversie, by affirming that Mercurius Trismegistus did, by one and the same sentence, primarily adumbrate the Trinity, and secondarily the Creation of the World. For God, [Page 42] who is himself a pure and most simple act in the eternal contemplation of himself absolutely infinite, doth necessarily contemplate himself, coexisting with the world, or time and place: the World being an inclusion or parenthesis of infinity. The sentence is this: Monas genuit monadem, & in se suum reflexit ardorem. In 1 Part summae theolog. quaest. 32. art. 1. Thomas understands it to be onely related to the production of the world, supposing it to be analogical to these words of his, viz. Unus Deus produxit unum mundum propter suiipsius amorem: but most Philosophers say, that Hermes by ratiocination came to the knowledge of the Trinity, [Page 43] and exprest it after the aforesaid manner. He saith not, Monas produxit monadem; but, Monas genuit monadem. Now the world may not properly be said to have been begotten: for in the Creation of the World by his will, the World can in no wise be called verbum mentis, the Word of his minde; in that the world being nothing, could not have been conceived in the minde of God, had not he conceiv'd himself together with the World: so that God himself, being primarily conceiv'd of himself, is verbum mentis Dei, the word of his own minde; by whom all things were made, and without whom there could nothing [Page 44] have been made, which was made; who, as he is conceived, is personally distinguished from himself conceiving, although he be essentially the same. The Soul, whose property it is to try all things, and by discourse, either to reduce her superficial conceits into impossibilities, and so pass them by as phantasmes, or else to prove them necessary, and then to retain and embrace them as eternal Truths, doth, by such-like preceding discourse, prove an absolute necessity of the eternal being of one God, whose every action is but one action, and that eternal: in which eternal action, which is also himself, who is actus purus, he hath [Page 45] eternally subsisted personally three; in which personal subsistency, he hath eternally created the World.
The Soul having contemplated the World in fieri, comes now to take a survey thereof, as it doth exsist in facto esse.
In this place she doth not consider it, as consisting of such and such parts, or containing such and such particular creatures; but she onely looks upon it as a finite being, contradistinct to infinity: and first she discourseth the nature of time, defining it, according to common Philosophy, to be mensura motûs Coeli per prius & posterius. But being jealous, lest [Page 46] she should impose upon her self, by a paralogism, and so be mistaken in the finding out of that most precious Jewel, which she so earnestly seeks after, viz. Truth; she rests not contented with this definition, but convinceth her self of the nature of time, by comparing it with Eternity.
Eternity is a duration without either beginning or ending, having neither priority nor posteriority, but indivisible.
Time is a duration having both beginning and ending, and is in it self divisible into priority and posteriority. Time, as time, whether we look upon all time, or the least particle [Page 47] thereof, doth consist of these two essential parts, viz. the later, and the former; which have their dependence upon a point or moment, in the midst thereof. If then; before all time, there was one onely infinite being, who by the position of his Word in time, caused time to be; the rational Soul collects from hence, together with what is premised, that the Word of God was, in the fulness or midst of all time, to impose a period to the former, and a commencement to the later time; or to constitute the essential parts of time, viz. priority and posteriority, by [Page 48] being in the midst thereof. And seeing it is that middle point, which doth, by dis-joyning duration, give a being to priority and posteriority; we must necessarily conclude, that the Word of God, which is the second Person in the Trinity, not onely in his eternal essence, but also in his existence, in the fulness of time, was [...], the beginning of the creation of God.
Now the Soul comes to examine the nature of place; which, saith she, is that determinate and circumscrib'd ubi, wherein a body is contain'd; which can neither [Page 49] be named, nor rightly understood without the presupposition of a body;Corpus a Philosophis dicitur esse in loco bifariam, sc. vel circumscriptive, quatenus ab alio corpore extrinsecus ambiente continetur: vel repletive, quateuus sua m [...]le occupat & replet certum spatium locale. Priori modo quicquid est corporum excepto Caelo supremo, localitatem habet. Posteriori autem modo de omni cor [...]ore simpliciter localitas praedicatur. Omne enim corpus est, quantum, & quatenus quantum, est extensum in longum, latum, & profundum: & quatenus est extensum, habet certum situm & distantiam partium: ac proinde certum spatium locale replet ac occupat. insomuch, that it is impossible there should be a body which is not in place, as also, that there should be place which doth not contain a body: so that a body and place have a relative convertibility, the one to the other; and are so mutually reciprocated, that the one being granted, the other is necessarily presupposed.
The Soul from hence collects, that if the Word of God did so exist in place as to give a being thereto; the Word of God did assume a body, which being from eternity conceived in the minde of God, as the onely Idea and platform of the whole creation, must necessarily be of the nature of the perfectest of bodies; which is flesh.
The Soul is now arrived to the incarnation of the Word. The Word, saith she, became flesh and dwelt amongst us; yet in such a Tabernacle as might be the patern of the great Temple, the World, as also of other living Temples of the Holy Ghost. Here she conceiveth, that though flesh in [Page 51] the general be the perfectest of bodies; yet not any manner of flesh could make a fit Tabernacle for the Word to dwell in, but such onely, as should contain all the variety of the whole world; which is the humane nature.
Here the Soul contemplates the Word incarnate to be [...], both God and Man, having a perfect humane body, and rational Soul personally united with his Divinity. This personal Union of the divine and humane nature of the Word, must necessarily be the immediate act of God; and consequently, that body which the Word did assume (although, as it was perfectly [Page 52] humane, it should necessarily consist of flesh and blood, & other such essential parts as do constitute an absolute humane body) could not be produced by generation according to the will of man, having no need of seminality to contribute unto it its plastick or formative virtue; not onely in that it was eternally conceived in the minde of God, as the Idea of the whole Creation; but also, in that it did exist in the fulness of time, which is the beginning of all time, according to the true notion thereof. In this moment or middle point, which gave time a being, which doth divide and couple time with eternity, [Page 53] and doth dis-joyn and unite priority with posteriority, which is in a several respect, both time and eternity: I say, in this both temporal and eternal duration was the light created; in this fulness of time, was the Word incarnated; which Word incarnate is both God, and Man; the image of God, and the light of Man; and Man is the image or shadow of that light.
This at the first view may seem mysterious and profound: yet after a more inward scrutiny, it squares with the humane intellect, being pure quintessentiated and sublim'd reason: for time is so included in, interwoven with, and as it [Page 54] [...] [Page 55] [...] [Page 54] were strung upon eternity, that eternity is both the centre and the circumference, the poles and the axle-tree of all time: and according to the notion we have of time, together with its dependence upon, and connexion with eternity; we must necessarily grant some duration to be both time and eternity; wherein we imagine the first act of the Creation to have been performed. Which first act of the Creation, the rational Soul demonstrates to have been the incarnation of the Word, as a cause; and the Creation of light, or the angelical nature, under the notion of an immediate effect: for even as the [Page 55] Word by existing in time and place did give a being thereto, and by assuming a most compleat and perfect body, which being both elementary, vegetative, sensitive, &c. he did contribute essence to the Elements, Vegetables, living Creatures, &c. even so by the personal union and perfect conjunction of his divine and humane nature, (which personal union is to be considered before the humane nature alone, or those other subordinate natures comprehended in it, viz. sense, vegetation, corporeity) he hath created the Angels, which are a middle nature betwixt [Page 56] God and Man: so that the whole Creation seems to be a most perfect Scheme, Image, or Shadow of the Word incarnate; and all the variety thereof, in each particular, analogically received from his fulness. Although, quoad nos, the Word incarnate may seem to be the second Adam, who may seem to us to have existed in the world before him; yet quoad Deum, he is the beginning of the Creation of God, and the protoplast of mankind, after whose image Man was made. Who by the conjunction of his divine and humane nature, is the Supporter and Bearer of the whole world; [Page 57] to whom, each Creature ows its being; by whom, as an efficient cause; by whom, as a final cause; and by whom, as [...], the world was made: and whithout whom, in each of these respects, was not any thing made, that was made. Who in his divine nature is ubiquitary; and in his humane nature, was, in the midst of time generally taken, conversant in the midst of the then habitable world; and in the very midst of time strictly taken, did, without doubt, locally descend, together with all the immateriate powers of the humane nature, into the bottom, centre, or midst of all circumference; which could not be,Si unum corpus per aliud penetraret, sequoretur corpus non esse corpus, sed substantiam incorpoream quantitatis expert [...]m: quod absurdum est, & manifestam implicat contradictionem. Quemadmodum Damascenus l. 1. Orthodoxae fidei, cap. 3. ait, [...]. except [Page 58] he should have put off the material and corporeal part of his humanity, not reassuming the same until his assent from the infernal pit. Now such must necessarily have been theRationi consentaneum est eam fuisse [...], corporis illius [...], & [...], ut si omnia ossa ejus fracta fuissent, statim conglutinarentur. Probabile autem est tam balsamica polluisse vi humores illius corporis; ut vulnera in exterioribus inflicta mortem non conciliassent: sed innato corporis balsamo, humoribus, sc. illuc deflu [...]ntibus sanari potuissent. Methodum igitur isthanc frustrancam frangendi ossa ejus omniscia recusavit providentia. Et ad vulnera quod attinet: previdit, ut non tantum exteriora infligerentur, sed ut ipsum cor lancea perfoderetur: ita ut ex ipso corde sanguis efflueret, & ab ejusdem capsula, sc. pericardio aqua dimanaret. exact crasis or temperament of that most perfect and compleat body which the Word did assume; that it is conjecturable, that it might suffer and be deprived of its form, by solution of continuity, rather then from any [Page 59] internal principles proceeding from a depraved habit or evil constitution: and being deprived of its form, it is probable it should be incapable of corruption, in that it is impossible it should have been produced by generation.
The Soul is ravished with the contemplation hereof, being not able to express a tythe of what she cannot but conceive: being so oppress'd and overwhelm'd with reason, that she cannot possibly utter her notions herein, except she had cloven tongues to multiply her expressions. For the Word incarnate is that All in All, both of finity and infinity, wherein are all the reasons of things, together [Page 60] with their beings, concentred: whereby corruption hath a possibility to put on incorruption, and mortality to put on immortality. For, as his being in the world, caused the world to be; so the perfect conjunction and personal union of his divine and humane nature, which can never be disjoyned, giveth an eternal precarium esse to the whole humane nature; or a possibility to all man-kinde to enjoy an eternal being: yet must the whole world besides necessarily return unto its first nothing, whose existence is but as a parenthesis in infinity; in which parenthesis the two extreams, viz. Creation and [Page 61] Annihilation must necessarily be equally distant from that point in the midst, wherein the Word did exist, to give an absolutely finite being thereto. At the dissolution whereof, it is necessary that the Word incarnate do actually exist in the world, to impose a period thereto (whose commencement did depend upon his actual existence therein) by recollecting into himself that scattered light, which is tutelary to the world, which was at first from him dispersed: before whom the whole world must necessarily be collected, together with the angelical nature, which is the next and immediate supporter thereof, [Page 62] and must be rolled up as a Book; and then being deprived of its tutelary light, must pass away as a Scheme; the glory whereof shall no sooner be reassumed into the Word, then reflected upon the humane ashes, to revive the same into an incorruptible and eternal being.
After this manner doth the rational Soul ascribe the Creation of the World to God, as the first efficient cause thereof: which one God, she doth demonstrate by reason to have subsisted personally three, in the very act of Creation: but in a more special manner, she doth ascribe the Creation to the Word, which is the second Person in the [Page 63] Trinity, whose actual existence in the world, gave a being thereto. In the contemplation whereof, she cannot but discern with the Eye of Reason, that all those mysteries which the holy Scriptures hold forth unto us, are not at all repugnant to Reason: As, that the Word was incarnated in the fulness of time, having been eternally conceived by the Holy Ghost: that he took upon him the humane nature: that he died by a violent death: that he descended into hell; with many others.
Having found out in the Book of Nature those mysteries which are express'd in the Scriptures, she comes in the next place to observe [Page 64] whether those things less mysterious in the Scriptures, be not also written in the Book of Nature. In the holy Scriptures, which are the written Word of God, the Soul conceives her self chiefly concerned, as a rational creature: for there is no other creature in the whole world, except man alone, to whom the Scriptures do properly belong: before whom God hath set the way of good and evil, upon the onely account of rationality; having breath'd into him the breath of life, whereby he became a reasonable Soul: although all other inferior creatures do owe continual praises to God for their being; whereupon, they [Page 65] are commanded to observe the Sabbath, which is by God an appointed time of thanks to him for their Creation, wherein he is said to have rested; and is in the course of nature a pause, period, or full stop, wherein most actions do commonly terminate; according to the observation of Philo Judaeus, [...]. I say, although all Creatures do owe continual praises to God for their Creation, and do in an obscure manner perform their service therein, having also certain secret Sabbatisms in all their actions; yet man, in a more especial and particular manner hath an Ingagement to perform [Page 66] an immediate service to God, being the worlds high Priest, to offer sacrifice not onely for himself, but also for all other Creatures which are subjected under him; according to that of Mr. George Herbert, sometimes Oratour of the University of Cambridge:
Man, who is the High Priest of the World, hath the Scripture as a Light to direct and guide his Soul [Page 67] to the high Altar, the Word, who is also the High Priest of man-kinde.
Now it is necessary, that there be some proportion betwixt the Light and the Eye; otherwise the Light would rather dazle and blinde the Eye, then help it in its performance. If the Holy Scripture were not rational, and in some sort proportionable to the humane intellect, it might rather induce incredulity, then enlighten the understanding. Thus doth the Soul discourse. Then doth she attempt by reason, to understand the written Word of God: conceiving it a contradiction, that any thing should be presented, as an adequate object of [Page 68] the humane intellect, not under the notion of rationality.
Herein she first observes the goodly order of the Creation, according to the description of Moses, to be much conformable to Reason. As, that the Elements should be created before mixt bodies; and, that out of the Elements there should be procreated all mix'd bodies in such an order and method, as doth correspond the logical series in the predicament of substance: that Creatures more perfect should require greater time for their production out of the Earth, then Creatures more imperfect: That first vegetables should be produced, [Page 69] then living Creatures, viz. those indued with sense; & last of all Man, who is the most perfect of all living Creatures: and that in the Creation of each species, there should be also a gradual ascent answerable to the scale of Nature: as of Animals, first the Fish, then the Fowl, afterwards, the four-footed Beasts: and so of Vegetables, first Grass and Herbs, then Shrubs and Trees. That Man should be at first made up of such matter contained in the Bowels of the Earth, as is the Embryon in the Wombe, viz. of red slime, which is analogous to Blood, the thinner parts whereof are, by vertue of its innate heat, [Page 70] resolved into Spirits; whilst the grosser are converted into flesh: and so all the diversity of parts made up answerable to the heterogeneity of the matter.
After the Heaven and the Earth were finished, and all the Host thereof, the Scriptures tell us, That God saw every thing which he had made, and behold it was very good. The very same we read in the Book of Nature. For Reason doth dictate unto us, that all things are good, not onely because every thing in the whole world beareth some proportion or similitude with God, who is the original of its being; but also because there is no one thing in [Page 71] the whole world which is not agreeable and convenient to some other thing. Wherefore seeing that goodness is defined to be the congruity of one thing with another, it follows that every thing in the world is good.
There was no written, positive, or Moral Law given for the space of above two thousand yeers after the Creation: then afterwards the Law was given by God unto Moses, and from him delivered unto the Children of Israel. There was reason wherefore the Law should be so long omitted; and afterwards there was reason wherefore it should be then given. Why it was so long [Page 72] omitted, may appear by the Contents thereof: for he that reads the Moral Law, and considers all the particulars therein, may observe, that the main scope thereof, was to establish the Children of Israel into a Commonwealth; and to preserve the same Commonwealth, by defending each man 's propriety: that so they might, as a peculiar people, comfortably serve the Lord, who had delivered them out of captivity. Now there are three things required to a Commonwealth: first, that there be a competent number of people; secondly, that this people be entire and free, neither scattered at a distance, nor [Page 73] intermix'd with other people; and thirdly, that there be propriety of possessions, whereby one man may call somthing his own which is not another mans. Before the Posterity of Jacob had these three Conditions, it was impossible they should be capable of that whole Law which was afterward given unto them. Although, when they were in Egypt they did increase, and became numerous; yet they could have no Law unto themselves, in regard they were not of themselves a free People, but were strangers in the Land of Egypt, and consequently Servants unto the Egyptians, who had Task Masters over them, as the [Page 74] Scriptures do inform us.
And afterwards, whē they were delivered from the Egyptian slavery, although they were, in the wilderness, not onely numerous, but also a free People, and entire to themselves; yet the whole Law could in no wise belong unto them, because they had no propriety of possessions.
To impose a Curse upon him that should remove his Neighbours Land-mark, would have been nonsense to the Children of Israel before they had marked out their Lands, and taken to themselves proper possessions: and so to impose proportionable penalties, if peradventure their Oxen should hurt or [Page 75] gore one another, or hurt a man; would have been absurd, before they had any Oxen belonging unto them. By this may appear the necessity wherefore the Law was so long omitted.
Now although the Law was written whilst the Children of Israel were yet in the Wilderness; yet it could not be in force until their Common-wealth began; but so soon as they had a Common-wealth, they could not possibly be without a Law; for the Law is the Soul thereof, which doth both constitute and preserve the same: whereby their confused multitude was digested into a Re-publick; and their [Page 76] Re-publick was continued entire without division or confusion. The multitude indeed might have been continued entire, without so much circumstance of Law, whilst it did subsist as an Army, and was preserved by one common food, Manna, which did cost them onely the taking up; yet could it not possibly have subsisted as a Common-wealth, wherein there is propriety of possessions, without the Law, which doth, by defending each mans propriety, preserve the whole Common-wealth in the same state and condition wherein it was first established.
If we look into the Law, we shall finde it to be nothing [Page 77] else but a Systeme of rational precepts, commanding or forbidding upon such proportionable penalties or rewards as are agreeable to the dictate of Nature, or the Law of Reason. Here we have an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, &c. Double restitution is injoyned for Theft; and Murther is forbidden upon penalty of Death. And in like manner for Trespasses committed, we finde in the Law such rational proceedings, as honest and understanding men would contrive for the due administration of a Common-wealth: as for example: If men strive together and one smite another with a stone, or with his [Page 78] fist, and he die not, but keepeth his bed: if he rise again, & walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: onely he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thorowly healed, Exod. 21.18, 19. If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and shall put in his beast, and shall feed in another man's field; of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard shall he make restitution, Exod. 22▪ 6. Who can be so ignorant, as not to understan [...] this to be reason?
If we look into other Precepts of the Law, which do not concern any private controversie betwixt man and man, nor are related to the happiness [Page 79] of any particular Common-wealth, but onely to the beatitude of mankind in general; we may observe the like rationality: as for example: Thou shalt not see thy Brother's Ox nor his Sheep go astray, and hide thy self from them; thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy Brother: and if thy Brother be not nigh unto thee, or if thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it unto thine own house, and it shall be with thee until thy Brother seek after it; and thou shalt restore it to him again. In like manner thou shalt do with his Ass, &c. Deut 22.1, 2. Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him; for ye were strangers in the Land of Egypt. [Page 78] [...] [Page 79] [...] [Page 80] Ye shall not afflict any widow or fatherless childe, Exod. 22.21, 22. Such-like Sentences of Humanity and Charity, are so sweetly intermix'd with the other precepts of Equity thorowout the whole Law, that the Law of Nature, and the Moral Law, seem both to intimate the same thing, and both to be summed up in this rational Precept: Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris: Do not thou unto another, that which thou wouldst not have another do unto thee. As concerning those Meats which are forbidden in the Law to be eaten, they are also such, most of them, as even Nature would admonish all people to refrain; of which [Page 81] sort are Eagles, Ravens, Kites, Hawks, Owls, Bats, Cuckows, &c. and on the contrary, those Meats which are tolerated, are, for certain Physical Reasons, the wholesomest food; and also by natural instinct are suggested unto mankinde as esculent: of which sort are the Ox, the Sheep, the Goat, the Hart, the Ro-Buck, the Fallow Deer, the Wilde Goat, &c.
Some may object, That if the Moral Law be the same in effect with the Law of Nature, the said Moral Law must necessarily have been observed by other Nations before it was given by Moses unto the Children of Israel. To which I answer [Page 82] affirmatively: for it is not hard to prove by Scripture, that almost every punctillo of the same Law, though not as positive but as natural, was observed before it was given unto Jacob's Posterity.
Murther was punishable by the Egyptian Laws, as may appear by the second of Exodus, where we read that Moses looked this way and that way, and when he saw that there was no man, he slew an Egyptian which was smiting an Hebrew, one of his Brethren: and so soon as he had done it, expecting nothing but death if he had been found out, he hid himself in the sand for his own safety: and afterwards, when Pharaoh [Page 83] heard of it, he fled from Pharaoh, out of Egypt, into the Land of Midian, because. Pharaoh sought after him; being the chief Magistrate to punish such-like offenders.
Adultery was also accounted an offence as hainous before the Law, as it was afterwards; which is manifest by the story of Abraham and Abimelech in the twentieth of Genesis, where we read, That Abraham supposing that the fear of God was not in the Land of Gerar, denied his Wife because he knew that Adultery was so odious even in those places where the fear of God was not▪ that they would rather slay him, and then [Page 84] take his Wife, then take his Wife he being alive: they would rather do Murther, then commit Adultery.
Another example we have in Gen. 39. of Joseph, who would by no means sin against God in committing Adultery with Potiphar's Wife: although there was no Moral or Positive Law to make Adultery a sin; but onely the Law of Nature, or the Rule of right Reason.
How severely simple Fornication was punished before the Law, by Jacob's two Sons Simeon and Levi, we may read in the 22 of Genesis.
That Theft was made a Crime by the Law of Nature, [Page 85] may be collected out of Gen. 44. from the passage of Joseph and his Brethren concerning the Cup which was put into Benjamin's sack, &c.
Add to all these, Jacob's vow of the tenth of all he had unto God, and his obedience to his Father and Mother, which is in the 28 of Genesis. By all which it is evident, that the same Law which was afterwards given by Moses unto the Israelites, had been anciently practised both by the Hebrews and the Egyptians: which was at first written in the Heart of Man, and was connatural unto him; but, by degrees being obliterated, & in process of time almost [Page 86] wholly defaced, it was afterwards engraven upon Tables of Stone; whereby it did change its property: being before, the Law of Nature, which did sweetly incline, and was more arbitrary; but afterwards, it became a positive or Moral Law, strictly commanding, and leaving without excuse. Thus much shall suffice to have spoken concerning the Precepts of Holy Writ. I come now in the last place to demonstrate the rationality of Miracles.
A Miracle is an effect produced out of the ordinary course of Nature.
From the notion we [Page 87] have of a Miracle, or from its definition, we may collect, that it is not in the power of any Creature to perform a Miracle: for the course of Nature is a Decree gone out from God; which Decree it is impossible that any should have power to alter, but he that made i [...]: so that the exhibition of a Miracle, is a rati [...]nal demonstration, that he that performs the same i [...] sent of God, and hath hi [...] power from above. From the observa [...]ion of the act, we come to the knowledge [...]f the agent. We say, That to produce such or [...]uch an effect, immediately to turn Water into Wine, or the like, is an [Page 88] action not natural, but supernatural: wherefore the agent cannot possibly be any of the Creatures, but must necessarily be the Creator. Now when the Soul is convinced in Reason, that God is the Ag [...]nt of Miracles, a Miracle seemeth not strange unto her. For, saith she, He that in the beginning, by hovering upon the Waters, could hatch them into Elements, and afterwards could gi e power and desire to the El [...]ments to sy [...]gi [...]e and copulate, whereby they did generate a [...]l other Creatures: H [...] that without materials could erect so stately a Fabrick a [...] is this Universe, may very well in Reason [Page 89] be conceived to be able to perform such-like actions as are recorded in Scripture by the names of Miracles.
By this way of argumentation, which is called Regression, even Miracles do melt into Reason, and do become so familiar to the rational Soul, that when she doth consider the circumstances thereof, viz. first, that all Miracles are performed by the Finger of God; and secondly, that there is no Miracle recorded in Scripture which doth imply a contradiction; she ceaseth to admire the same: but wondreth rather, that there should be an Infidel left in the World, or any [Page 90] Soul so dulled with sensuality, or deaded with prejudice, as to lose her Prerogative in not discerning the Truths of Christian Religion with the Eye of Reason.