Man in Paradise: OR, A Philosophical Discourse vindicating The Soul's Prerogative in discerning the TRUTHS OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION with the EYE of REASON.

Printed at London by James Cottrel.

Man in Paradise.

SUch is the ex­cellency and original of Man's Soul, brooded and hatched by the all-enlivening breath of God, fashioned by Divine artifice after the Idea and most perfect exemplar, co [...] ­ceived first in the minde of God, whose architype it doth faithfully resemble: such, I say, is its excellency and noble extraction, that the contemplation hereof [Page 2] cannot chuse but heighten our serious thoughts into admiration, and translate the considerate minde into an extasie. For whatsoe­ver excellencies the Great Monarch of Heaven and Earth hath scattered and diffused amongst the lower species and degrees of creatures; all these hath he concentred, collected, and moulden together in mans Soul; that by union, whose property it is alwayes to add virtue and efficacy to the things united, they might become more perfect here, then in the creatures singly, and, [...], super-excellent.

The natural abilities, which are the meanest of the Souls endowments, and [Page 3] as it were, the dregs of all the rest, what lustre and splendor do they shew in their sweet harmony, order, disposition, and sufficiency to attain the end for which they were bestow­ed?

No sooner hath the Em­bryon all its parts and Or­gans woven of fine sperma­tical threeds, by the indu­stry of the plastick or forma­tive virtue, but it receives from this divine particle of Air, vim nutritivam, a nu­tritive faculty, to maintain the substance then begun: vim auctricem, an augmen­tative power, to encrease and bring it to a just quan­tity and bulk, that the Pa­lace wherein this noble Prince, the Soul, is to re­side, [Page 4] may be compleatly built, and furnished with necessaries fit to entertain so great a Majesty.

These powers have other subordinate faculties, as careful and thrifty Hand-maids, waiting upon them; wherein you may see the oeconomy of a well-order­ed house. There is an at­tractive faculty, as a hand, to pull nourishment in; and a retentive, to keep careful­ly what is gotten. A con­coctive, to fit and prepare what is so retained, for the use of the whole body; which concoctive hath also a distributive faculty, as an­other subordinate Hand­maid under her, whereby there is performed a just anadosis, or distribution of [Page 5] matter to each several part according to its particular exigency. And under all these, there is an expulsive faculty, which serves as a drudge to carry out of the body the feculent part, or caput mortum, wherein there is no convenient chyle remaining; as also, to make way for new mat­ter to be contained, and then concocted, as was the former.

Thus have we that pat­tern and Idea which all well-ordered Families, and well-composed Common­wealths do imitate and fol­low.

Yet notwithstanding, the fabrick of man thus kept, would in time decay, and the species utterly perish, [Page 6] unless to prevent this, a ge­nerative power were also implanted in him. In this the Philosopher acknow­ledgeth, [...], a Spice of Divinity; in emulation of whose eternal continuance, Nature, whose strength cannot maintain a solitary individuum to eternity, by this help preserveth the specifical unity, and so com­pleateth her desire.

Here I would ask, With what curious Pencil this plastick power draws forth the lineaments & features of that body whose stru­cture drew the Psalmist into such admiration? Wonderful hast thou made me behind and before. With whom doth it consult, to assign a due sta­tion and place for every [Page 7] member, leaving no chasme or gap unfilled, and super­adding nothing superfluous or in vain? what Euclide or Master-Geometrician doth it ask counsel of, to give a fit proportion, a just dimension, and perfect Fi­gure to every part? by what Arithmetick doth it count the number of the parts, and then by certain para­lellisms of extuberances be­hinde and before, doth so counterpoise the whole body, that the countenance of man, and onely man, may be erected towards Heaven, there to behold his image as in a glass; whilst all other Creatures look prone upon the Earth, out of which their earthy souls were first extracted?

[Page 8]

Prona (que) cum spectent anima­lia caetera terram,

Os homini sublime dedit: ca­lum (que) tueri

Jussit, & erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.

The sensitive faculties are sublimed to a higher pitch, and may elevate our minds to a higher degree of ad­miration. Who cannot but wonder at the swiftness of the sensible species posting with all speed to the sense, and the quickness and rea­diness of the sense to re­ceive it? here you may see a vast mountain in a mo­ment of time, contracted into a small model, and dwelling in an angle and corner of the eye. Who [Page 9] cannot but admire the faithfulness of the sensitive Organs? who no sooner receive, but transmit their respective species, sending them immediately to the common sense, as into some Common-councel-house, where the busie imaginati­on, by spelling, joyning, and compounding them to­gether, reads a Lecture to the appetite to prove its as­sent or dissent, whilst o­ther species are command­ed to their Cells, and re­serv'd in the store-house of memory till need require them? Look back, and you may see the pellucid coats wherewith the eyes are co­vered, the clear waters wherewith they are be­dew'd, the winding laby­rinth [Page 10] wherein the sound received into the ear must wander, till, beating upon that drum-like membrain which through the ingenite Air propagates the conti­nued sound, the sense, by a [...], interceding, is married to the object: look forward, and you shall see the appetite no sooner a­waked, but the locomotive faculty, a most obedient servant, puts the decree in execution; earnestly pro­secuting that good, or fly­ing that evil, which the af­fection for that time pre­sident shall dispose unto. In the mean time the pas­sions, as love, joy, hope, anger, fear, grief, &c. as Hand-maids, are subservi­ent, according as they are [Page 11] respectively concerned in the object apprehended, whether good or evil, past, present, or to come. In this sweet agreement, we may compare man's Soul to an artificial Lu [...]e, and these to be the strings of it, upon which it playes such ravishing Tunes, as would drive the conside­rate ear to an astonishment or plain extasie. Anima crea­turarum inferiorum compen­dium: centrum in quod omnes perfectionū lineae concurrunt: speculum in quo suam quae­que creatura faciem, sed lon­gè pulchriorem, contempletur: eccho mirabilis, quae solitarias nudas (que) voces a creaturis, aliis sigillatim expressas, multipli­cato & suaviori sono refert. The Soul is an abstract of [Page 12] inferiour creatures: a cen­tre wherein all the lines of perfections meet: a glass wherein each creature may behold its face, but much fairer: an admirable eccho which carries back the na­ked and solitary voices of other creatures, by them singly express'd, in a mul­tiplied and sweeter sound.

But what are all these, compared with the rational powers of the Soul? what is the sense, which traffiques onely with gross bodies, and quailities from thence emergent, compared with reason, by which the Soul negotiates with Angels and immateriate beings, and by metaphysical and and abstruse notions, wings it self up into the arms of [Page 13] him who breath'd it first into the body of man?

In this upper room and higher loft of the Soul's re­sidence, we may contem­plate the Soul, as a Mo­narch, wisely restraining or giving liberty to the mis­understanding affections according to the rule of right reason. Here have we man ruling in man, dressing and cultivating man, as another Paradise, wherein is all possible va­riety, yet no confusion, no ataxy or disorder, no pas­sions contradicting one a­nother, or tyrannizing o­ver reason; no disturbance of minde, no distemper of body, but a most admirable harmony of all things in the whole universe of man.

Reason is that Sceptre whereby the Soul doth rule without tyranny, the will and affections. Reason is that rod wherewith the Soul is kept in awe to obey without servile fear, the great Monarch of Heaven and Earth.

By reason, the Soul dis­cerns that there is a God; drawing one Argument from the Creation of the World, which either did exist of it self, or was pro­duced by another: but it could not give a being to it self, seeing that it is re­pugnant that any thing should be the cause of it self. Therefore the conse­quence is necessary, that the World was made by a­nother; and; such another, [Page 15] as was the efficient cause thereof; not produced by any other former efficient cause, but was of himself, and by himself from eterni­ty: which can be no other but God.

Another Argument the Soul: draws from the neces­sary dependence of a finite being upon an infinite: for every thing in the World is finite, both in respect of its essence and efficacy. Now every thing that is fi­nite must necessarily be li­mited by another, seeing it is impossible that any thing should give bounds to it self: and there being not in things finite a pro­gress to infinity, we must at length come to some certain being which is not [Page 16] limited by another, but is of it self essentially and virtually infinite: which can be no other but God.

A third Demonstration is taken from the necessary dependence of a secondary cause upon a first: for unless we do here also grant a progress to infini­ty, which is absurd; in as­cending the scale of sub­ordination of causes, we must at length meet with one primary both efficient and final cause, having no other cause superiour or before it; which is only God.

A fourth Demonstration is taken from the necessary dependance of a contin­gent and temporal being, [Page 17] upon an absolutely neces­sary and eternal being: for that which is temporal and contingent, was not al­wayes, but commenced in time, and had a begin­ning of its duration. Wherefore seeing it is ab­surd, to grant that there was once nothing, and that which afterwards was, gave unto it self a beginning to be; we must conclude, that there was alwayes an absolutely necessary, and eternal being without all beginning; which is onely God.

A fifth Argument the Soul useth to prove a Dei­ty, is the necessary depen­dance of all things that are good in an inferi­our order, upon some [Page 18] primary and chief good: for we see amongst all things in the world which are good, some are more, and others less good. Now seeing that all things are such more or less, ac­cording as they do more or less participate of that which is most of all such; it follows from hence, that there must necessarily be some Fountain of good, from whence all other goods do flow, as off­springs thereof; by which they are also measured: and this can be none o­ther then onely God.

Not onely these, but many other rational Argu­ments the soul useth, to sa­tisfie her self fully in this Truth; as, the general con­sent [Page 19] of all people and Na­tions; the dictate of Con­science, when there is none to accuse; the good­ly fabrick of the world; and, the continued Order of all things preserv'd in their first station, through all the vicissitude of gene­ration and corruption; in­timating a wise Rectour and Governour upon whose nod and direction all things depend.

No sooner doth the Soul by such-like Arguments thorowly convince her self that there is a God, but this heavenly creature, wing'd with Reason, soars yet higher, endeavouring to see God's face, and to know what God is. Here she approaches: but such [Page 20] is the transcendent splen­dour of his bright Majesty, that she judgeth it impossi­ble to look God in the face, or to know a priori what God is, as Cicero saith in his first Book De naturae Deorum, under the person of Cotta: Rogas me quis & qualis sit Deus: auctore utar Simonide, de quo cum quae­sivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi causa sibi unum diem postulavit: cum idem ex eo postridie quaereret, biduum petiit. Cum saepius duplicaret numerum dierum, admirans (que) Hiero, quaereret cur ita faceret? Quia, in­quit, quantò diutius consi­dero, tantò mihi res obscurior videtur. You ask me who and what is God: I will use the speech of Si­monides, [Page 21] who, when King Hiero asked him the same question, desired a days time to deliberate concer­ning it. The day after, when he asked him again, he desired two days. Having in this manner divers times doubled the number of days, Hiero wondring at him, asked, Wherefore he did so? Because, saith he, the longer time I take to consider upon this matter, the more obscure it appears unto me. And indeed, those Arguments are infal­lible which are usually brought for this Opini­on, viz. that it is impossible for the Soul to know God a priori.

Yet though she cannot see his face, she hath leave [Page 22] granted her to behold his back-parts: though she can­not strictly define the Deity, yet she may in some maner describe it: though she can­not attain to any know­ledge of God by fetching Arguments a priori ad poste­rius, from that which went before to that which fol­lows after, from the cause to the effect, from that which is insensible to that which is sensible; yet she may argue a posteriori ad pri­us, from that which follows after to that which went before, from that which is corporeal to that which is incorporeal, from that which is compound to that which is simple, from that which is temporal to that which is eternal, from that [Page 23] which is finite to that which is infinite, from that which is natural to that which is supernatural, from the effect to the first effici­ent cause. By this way of argumentation the Soul makes a description of the Godhead, and, either by way of negation or tran­scendence, attributes that unto God, which can in no wise, without absurdity, be attributed to any of the creatures: as, that he is actus purus, a pure act, with­out all potentiality; sim­plicissimus, most simple, without all composition; foelicissimus, most happy: with many other. The ve­ry Heathen Philosophers, as Cicero, Aristotle, and Plato, by the onely light of na­ture, [Page 24] have left such sen­tences in their writings, as may clearly demonstrate the Soul's abilities in this kinde. Aristotle in his twelfth Book of Metaphy­sicks, saith, That God is vivens, aeternus, & optimus; living, eternal, and tran­scendently good: and a little after, That he is sub­stantia aeterna, immobilis, magnitudinis expers, indivi­sibilis, infinita, impassibilis & immutabilis, a sensibus se­parata. An eternal sub­stance, immoveable, without bulk, indivisible, infinite, not capable of suffering or of alteration, separted from the senses. Plato likewise in Timaeo, and in his Book De Legibus, saith of God, That he is Genitor Universitatis, [Page 25] the Begetter of this Universe: bonus, & causa bonorum om­nium; good, and the cause of all good things.

That very Attribute which Christians do, [...], after a more special manner ascribe unto God, Cicero hath left in his wri­tings, saying, as we say, That God is, [...], the knower of the heart. He saith in3 De nat. Deorum. one place, Obscu­rum Deo nihil potest esse: and in2 De Di­vin. another place, Ignorare Deus non potest, quâ quisque mente sit. The same Au­thor, by the onely light of nature, hath contemplated God in the most happy fru­ition of himself, as also in his providence towards the world, and hath exprest himself in a most Christian­like [Page 26] manner in both these respects. As touching the fruition of himself, he saith, Ea est Dei vita, quâ nihil beatius, nihil omnino bo­nis omnibus affluentius cogi­tari potest: nihil enim Cicero nullus in­tellexit De­itatem absolute nihil agere: sed nostro more non agere, sc. cum la­bore & mo­lestia. agit, nullis occupationibus est im­plicatus, nulla opera molitur: sua potentia & virtute gau­det, habet exploratum fore se semper tum in maximis, tum in aeternis voluptatibus. Such is the life of God, than which nothing is more happy, nothing in the world can possibly be thought to abound with more good things: for he doth no­thing; he is implicated in no businesses, he undergoeth no labour, but enjoyeth his own power and virtue; and knoweth certainly, that he shall alwayes be in transcen­dent [Page 27] and eternal pleasures. As concerning God's pro­vidence, he saith thus: In mundo Deus est aliquis, qui regit, qui gubernat, qui cur­sum astrorum, qui mutati­ones temporum, rerum vicis­situdines ordinesque conser­vat; terras & maria contem­plans, hominum commoda vitasque tuetur. In the world there is a God which ruleth, governeth, and pre­serveth the course of the stars, the mutations of times, and the vicissitudes and orders of things; who beholding both Sea and Land, doth defend the goods and lives of men. I could produce a large Catalogue of such-like ex­pressions from the mouths of Heathens: but presuming that what I have already [Page 28] enumerated, may suffice to vindicate the Soul 's Pre­rogative, as touching the knowledge of God in his Attributes; I shall wave all maner of enlargements, and pursue my intended brevity.

To know God in his At­tributes, is a neer ap­proach to the Deity; yet the rational Soul comes still neerer: first, prying about his essence, then returning to her self, and contriving which way she should know more; at length she saith within her self, Ope­ratio sequitur esse; action de­pends upon being. Then she busies her self in the con­templation of God's acti­ons, which, saith she, are either immanent or tran­sient: [Page 29] the immanent actions of God, are such as are per­form'd within himself with­out respect had to the crea­tures, whereby he is said to know himself, and to love himself; as Scaliger saith, Deus generat ex seipso, in seipso suiipsius intellectio­nem, eodem modo, eandem ae­qualem sibi. God doth from himself begat an understāding of himself in himself, after the same manner, the same equal to himself. Here the Soul takes notice of a reflection of the Deity upon it self, and is sublim'd into the supposition of a Trinity: for whereas God doth conceive and know himself, he doth beget a most perfect image of himself, from whence also proceedeth a most per­fect [Page 30] love of himself. Now seing there is nothing in God, which is not God; both the image of God, and the love of God seem to be distinctVocabu­lum Grae­cum, [...], mul­tisariam ac­cipitur; & inter varias ejus acceptiones aliquando sumitur pro essentia entis: quo sensu Patres Concilii Sardiensis censuerunt, ut est apud Theodore­tum in Ecclesiastica Historia, lib. 2. cap. 8. unam esse hypostasin Patris, Filii, & Spiritus sancti. Verum enim vero [...] pro sup­posito naturae intelligentis haud obscuri Au­thores accipiunt: quo sensu Graeci Patres in divina essentia tres hypostases esse asserunt; & Dionysius Areopagita, qui Apostolorum coaetaneus fuisse perhibetur, in lib. De Caelesti Hierarchia, vocat divinam essentiam unitatem, [...], hoc est, in tribus hypostatibus sub­sistentem. Hypostases or subsistences of the same essence with him from whom they do proceed, as if an eye should see it self: there is first the eye seeing; secondly, the eye [Page 31] seen, or at least, the image or species of that eye seen: from which action of see­ing, there must necessarily proceed a desire of enjoy­ing; for every action hath its end. This comparison of the eye doth in some sort adumbrate the Trini­ty; yet by shewing how far short the comparison is, the true notion of the Trinity may be more clearly de­monstated. The Eye can­not see it self, but the Deity cannot but behold it self; there being no object beyond it, or extraneous to it. God doth primarily see and know himself: But secondarily, the creatures, who live, move, and have their being in him.

The Eye doth not always [Page 32] [...] [Page 33] [...] [Page 32] see, but doth in time begin, and afterwards cease to see: but the Deity cannot but alwayes behold and know it self; and cannot but subsist in the eternal contemplation of it self.

If we should grant that the eye could see it self; yet in propriety of speech, we must deny our supposition; for the Eye sees not the naked essence of any thing, but a certain accident, viz. the intentional spe­cies: but the Deity is es­sentially beheld of it self, reflecting no other species or image from it then its naked essence, whose per­fection is such, that it can­not but subsist eternally be­held and contemplated by it self.

From the reflection of the Eye upon it self, there can proceed onely an ap­petite of enjoying: but from the reflection of the Deity upon it self, there cannot but proceed an ab­solute fruition. Actiones feruntur in bonum, saith the Philosopher: from the re­flection of an eye upon it self, there can onely pro­ceed bonum desiderii, a good of desire: but from the refle­ction of the Deity upon it self, there cannot but proceed [...], or bonum complacentiae; a good of com­placency. After this man­ner doth the Soul discourse freely & ingenuously with­in her self; I mean the ra­tional Soul not clouded with sensuality, nor straight­ned [Page 34] and girt with preju­dice. Then doth she con­clude, that there are three necessary distinct sub­sistences, yet but one es­sence of the Deity; or that the Deity, which is essenti­ally one, is subsistentially three. The Deity doth necessarily subsist, first, in the eternal contemplation of it self; secondly, it doth subsist eternally, contem­plated by it self; and third­ly, it doth subsist in an e­ternal complacency of it self: yet are there not three eternals, but one e­ternal; because the notion we have of eternity ex­cludes plurality: neither do we conceive the first, second, and third sub­sistence, to be one before [Page 35] another in time or durati­on, because eternity is in­divisible, having neither priority nor posteriority; but onely by a priority of order or disposition of their relation. When we say that God is merciful, or that God is just, we speak improperly or [...], after the manner of men; there being no real distin­ction betwixt God's mer­cy and his justice. But when we denominate the Deity to subsist contem­plating or contemplated, &c. we speakScientia seu contem­platio proprie competit divinae naturae, & im­proprie tribuitur creaturis: notitia enim nostra est obscura & imperfecta, divina vero est perfecta & [...]bsoluta. Multo magis ab aeterno in aeternum scire & contemplari Dei proprium est, quod nullo modo de creaturarum perfectissi­ma predicari potest. properly and absolutely. Where­fore, [Page 36] although these three subsistences be all concen­tred in the Deity; yet they areDistingun­tur ab in­vicem, quia ad invicem referuntur. Ratio enim formalis re­lationis est semper sup­ponere ali­ud cui u­numquod (que) rela [...]orum referatur. Quemad­modum A­ristoteles, [...], &c. Et infra subjungit, [...]. distinct each one from the other. In that they do susibst invisible in themselves, and really di­stinct from each other, we may properly call them persons:Persona est substantia individua, intelli­gens, incommunicabilis. Haec definitio a Zan­chic, lib. 1. De tribus Elohim, & uno Jeho­va. cap. 2. ex communi Patrum Latinorum consensu affertur. for a person ac­cording to Philosophers, is a rational or intelligible subsistence distinct from o­thers, and indivisible in it self.

Hither is the Soul arriv'd, viz. to the knowledge of three persons in one es­sence of the Deity; or, to the acknowledgement of a Trinity in Unity, by the consideration of God's im­manent actions. Now doth she pass from hence, unto his transient actions, which are the Creation of the World, and the preserva­tion thereof. Here she doth premise, that the world was not from eter­nity, but did commence with time; as also, that there could be no first mat­terAbsurdum enim esset [...], absolu­tam aeterni­tatem & essendi ne­cessitatem ali [...]ui nisi soli Deo tribuere. eternally coexisting with the Deity. Moreo­ver, she doth presuppose that it would be absurd ei­ther to affirm or grant that the Deity did act positive­ly [Page 38] upon nothing; although before the Creation of the world, there was besides God, privatively, not any thing. There was before the Creation of the world, one onely absolutely ne­cessary infinite Being, viz. God, who by reason of his infinity and absolute per­fection, could perform no action absolutely transient: neither had he any object besides himself to act upon. Time, and place, or finity might have then been de­nominated nothing, it be­ing contradistinct to infi­nity, or a negation of that infinite being, which did onely then exist. Where­fore, time and place be­fore the Creation of the World, could never have [Page 39] beenNihil non est intelligi­bili nisi per notionem alterius de quo simpli­citur nega­tur: sed tempus & locus ante creationem mundi nihil erant: Ergo. conceived or willed by the Deity; unless he had conceived and willed himself, together with time and place. So that it seems to the rational Soul, that time and place had its being by the Deities con­ception and volition of himself, together with time and place; which was the position of the word of his minde in time and place.

Here is also so clear a Demonstration of the Tri­nity in the Creation of the world, that it seems im­possible to the rational Soul to have the true no­tion of Creation with­out the conceit of the Tri­nity: Insomuch, that the Ancients, who were [Page 40] more profound Philoso­phers, did express the word create by an Hebrew word consisting of three Letters, viz. א Aleph, ב Beth, and ר Resch, which signifie the Father, the Son, and the Spirit: which three Letters, by addition of their proper Vowels, ei­ther exprest or understood, are a Verb of the Preter­perfect tense, [...], signify­ing, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have joyntly acted, or, they have con­spired to act. This word, [...], creavit, doth in it self sufficiently express the action of the Deity, sub­sisting in a three-fold man­ner: yet the Ancients go farther, putting to it a word expressing the Deity in the [Page 41] Plural Number, saying, [...], Elohím bara, the Gods have created, or rather, God as he is per­sonally three hath created. Hermes a most profound Rationalist, who was there­fore called Trismegistus, in his Book intituled Piman­der, hath [...]eft a sen [...]ence to posterity, relating to the Creation of the World, as some do interpret; but as others do construe it, it doth onely express the Tri­nity. In this ambiguity, it is not difficult to decide the controversie, by affirm­ing that Mercurius Trisme­gistus did, by one and the same sentence, primarily adumbrate the Trinity, and secondarily the Creation of the World. For God, [Page 42] who is himself a pure and most simple act in the eter­nal contemplation of him­self absolutely infinite, doth necessarily contem­plate himself, coexisting with the world, or time and place: the World be­ing an inclusion or paren­thesis of infinity. The sen­tence is this: Monas genuit monadem, & in se suum re­flexit ardorem. In 1 Part summae theolog. quaest. 32. art. 1. Thomas un­derstands it to be onely related to the production of the world, supposing it to be analogical to these words of his, viz. Unus Deus produxit unum mun­dum propter suiipsius amo­rem: but most Philoso­phers say, that Hermes by ratiocination came to the knowledge of the Trinity, [Page 43] and exprest it after the a­foresaid manner. He saith not, Monas produxit mona­dem; but, Monas genuit monadem. Now the world may not properly be said to have been begotten: for in the Creation of the World by his will, the World can in no wise be called verbum mentis, the Word of his minde; in that the world being no­thing, could not have been conceived in the minde of God, had not he conceiv'd himself together with the World: so that God himself, being primarily conceiv'd of himself, is verbum mentis Dei, the word of his own minde; by whom all things were made, and without whom there could nothing [Page 44] have been made, which was made; who, as he is conceived, is personally distinguished from himself conceiving, although he be essentially the same. The Soul, whose property it is to try all things, and by dis­course, either to reduce her superficial conceits into im­possibilities, and so pass them by as phantasmes, or else to prove them necessa­ry, and then to retain and embrace them as eternal Truths, doth, by such-like preceding discourse, prove an absolute necessity of the eternal being of one God, whose every action is but one action, and that eter­nal: in which eternal acti­on, which is also himself, who is actus purus, he hath [Page 45] eternally subsisted perso­nally three; in which personal subsistency, he hath eternally created the World.

The Soul having contem­plated the World in fieri, comes now to take a survey thereof, as it doth exsist in facto esse.

In this place she doth not consider it, as consisting of such and such parts, or containing such and such particular creatures; but she onely looks upon it as a finite being, contra­distinct to infinity: and first she discourseth the na­ture of time, defining it, according to common Phi­losophy, to be mensura mo­tûs Coeli per prius & posteri­us. But being jealous, lest [Page 46] she should impose upon her self, by a paralogism, and so be mistaken in the finding out of that most precious Jewel, which she so ear­nestly seeks after, viz. Truth; she rests not con­tented with this definiti­on, but convinceth her self of the nature of time, by comparing it with Eter­nity.

Eternity is a duration without either beginning or ending, having neither priority nor posteriority, but indivisible.

Time is a duration having both beginning and end­ing, and is in it self divisi­ble into priority and poste­riority. Time, as time, whether we look upon all time, or the least par­ticle [Page 47] thereof, doth consist of these two essential parts, viz. the later, and the former; which have their dependence upon a point or moment, in the midst thereof. If then; before all time, there was one onely infinite being, who by the po­sition of his Word in time, caused time to be; the rational Soul col­lects from hence, toge­ther with what is pre­mised, that the Word of God was, in the fulness or midst of all time, to im­pose a period to the for­mer, and a commence­ment to the later time; or to constitute the essential parts of time, viz. pri­ority and posteriority, by [Page 48] being in the midst there­of. And seeing it is that middle point, which doth, by dis-joyning duration, give a being to priority and posteri­ority; we must neces­sarily conclude, that the Word of God, which is the second Person in the Trinity, not onely in his eternal essence, but also in his existence, in the fulness of time, was [...], the beginning of the creation of God.

Now the Soul comes to examine the nature of place; which, saith she, is that determinate and circumscrib'd ubi, wherein a body is con­tain'd; which can neither [Page 49] be named, nor rightly un­derstood without the pre­supposition of a body;Corpus a Philosophis dicitur esse in loco bifa­riam, sc. vel circum­scriptive, quatenus ab alio cor­pore extrin­secus am­biente con­tinetur: vel repletive, quateuus sua m [...]le occupat & replet cer­tum spati­um locale. Priori modo quicquid est corporum excepto Caelo supremo, localitatem habet. Po­steriori autem modo de omni cor [...]ore simpliciter localitas praedicatur. Omne enim corpus est, quantum, & quatenus quantum, est extensum in longum, latum, & profundum: & quatenus est extensum, habet certum situm & distantiam partium: ac proinde certum spatium locale re­plet ac occupat. in­somuch, that it is impossi­ble there should be a body which is not in place, as also, that there should be place which doth not con­tain a body: so that a bo­dy and place have a relative convertibility, the one to the other; and are so mu­tually reciprocated, that the one being granted, the other is necessarily presup­posed.

The Soul from hence collects, that if the Word of God did so exist in place as to give a being thereto; the Word of God did as­sume a body, which being from eternity conceived in the minde of God, as the onely Idea and platform of the whole creation, must necessarily be of the nature of the perfectest of bodies; which is flesh.

The Soul is now arrived to the incarnation of the Word. The Word, saith she, became flesh and dwelt amongst us; yet in such a Tabernacle as might be the patern of the great Temple, the World, as also of other living Temples of the Holy Ghost. Here she conceiv­eth, that though flesh in [Page 51] the general be the per­fectest of bodies; yet not any manner of flesh could make a fit Tabernacle for the Word to dwell in, but such onely, as should con­tain all the variety of the whole world; which is the humane nature.

Here the Soul contem­plates the Word incarnate to be [...], both God and Man, having a perfect humane body, and rational Soul personally united with his Divinity. This personal Union of the divine and humane nature of the Word, must necessa­rily be the immediate act of God; and consequent­ly, that body which the Word did assume (al­though, as it was perfectly [Page 52] humane, it should necessa­rily consist of flesh and blood, & other such essen­tial parts as do constitute an absolute humane body) could not be produced by generation according to the will of man, having no need of seminality to contribute unto it its pla­stick or formative virtue; not onely in that it was e­ternally conceived in the minde of God, as the Idea of the whole Creation; but also, in that it did ex­ist in the fulness of time, which is the beginning of all time, according to the true notion thereof. In this moment or middle point, which gave time a being, which doth divide and couple time with eter­nity, [Page 53] and doth dis-joyn and unite priority with poste­riority, which is in a seve­ral respect, both time and eternity: I say, in this both temporal and eternal du­ration was the light crea­ted; in this fulness of time, was the Word incarnated; which Word incarnate is both God, and Man; the image of God, and the light of Man; and Man is the image or shadow of that light.

This at the first view may seem mysterious and pro­found: yet after a more inward scrutiny, it squares with the humane intellect, being pure quintessenti­ated and sublim'd reason: for time is so included in, interwoven with, and as it [Page 54] [...] [Page 55] [...] [Page 54] were strung upon eternity, that eternity is both the centre and the circumfe­rence, the poles and the axle-tree of all time: and according to the notion we have of time, together with its dependence upon, and connexion with eter­nity; we must necessari­ly grant some duration to be both time and eternity; wherein we imagine the first act of the Creation to have been performed. Which first act of the Cre­ation, the rational Soul de­monstrates to have been the incarnation of the Word, as a cause; and the Creation of light, or the angelical nature, under the notion of an immediate effect: for even as the [Page 55] Word by existing in time and place did give a being thereto, and by assuming a most compleat and per­fect body, which being both elementary, vege­tative, sensitive, &c. he did contribute es­sence to the Elements, Vegetables, living Crea­tures, &c. even so by the personal union and perfect conjunction of his divine and humane nature, (which personal union is to be consider­ed before the humane nature alone, or those other subordinate natures comprehended in it, viz. sense, vegetation, cor­poreity) he hath cre­ated the Angels, which are a middle nature be­twixt [Page 56] God and Man: so that the whole Creati­on seems to be a most perfect Scheme, Image, or Shadow of the Word incarnate; and all the variety thereof, in each particular, analogical­ly received from his ful­ness. Although, quo­ad nos, the Word incar­nate may seem to be the second Adam, who may seem to us to have existed in the world before him; yet quoad Deum, he is the be­ginning of the Creation of God, and the protoplast of mankind, after whose image Man was made. Who by the conjunction of his di­vine and humane nature, is the Supporter and Bearer of the whole world; [Page 57] to whom, each Creature ows its being; by whom, as an efficient cause; by whom, as a final cause; and by whom, as [...], the world was made: and whithout whom, in each of these respects, was not any thing made, that was made. Who in his di­vine nature is ubiquitary; and in his humane nature, was, in the midst of time generally taken, conversant in the midst of the then ha­bitable world; and in the very midst of time strictly taken, did, without doubt, locally descend, together with all the immateriate po­wers of the humane nature, into the bottom, centre, or midst of all circumference; which could not be,Si unum corpus per aliud pene­traret, se­quoretur corpus non esse corpus, sed substan­tiam incor­poream quantitatis expert [...]m: quod absur­dum est, & manifestam implicat contradicti­onem. Quemad­modum Da­mascenus l. 1. Ortho­doxae fidei, cap. 3. ait, [...]. ex­cept [Page 58] he should have put off the material and corporeal part of his humanity, not re­assuming the same until his assent from the infernal pit. Now such must necessarily have been theRationi consentane­um est eam fuisse [...], corpo­ris illius [...], & [...], ut si omnia os­sa ejus fra­cta fuissent, statim con­glutinaren­tur. Proba­bile autem est tam bal­samica pol­luisse vi hu­mores illius corporis; ut vulnera in exteriori­bus inflicta mortem non conciliassent: sed in­nato corporis balsamo, humoribus, sc. illuc de­flu [...]ntibus sanari potuissent. Methodum igitur isthanc frustrancam frangendi ossa ejus omniscia recusavit providentia. Et ad vulnera quod atti­net: previdit, ut non tantum exteriora inflige­rentur, sed ut ipsum cor lancea perfoderetur: ita ut ex ipso corde sanguis efflueret, & ab ejus­dem capsula, sc. pericardio aqua dimanaret. exact crasis or temperament of that most perfect and compleat body which the Word did assume; that it is conjectu­rable, that it might suffer and be deprived of its form, by solution of conti­nuity, rather then from a­ny [Page 59] internal principles pro­ceeding from a depraved habit or evil constitution: and being deprived of its form, it is probable it should be incapable of cor­ruption, in that it is impos­sible it should have been produced by generation.

The Soul is ravished with the contemplation hereof, being not able to express a tythe of what she cannot but conceive: being so op­press'd and overwhelm'd with reason, that she can­not possibly utter her no­tions herein, except she had cloven tongues to mul­tiply her expressions. For the Word incarnate is that All in All, both of finity and infinity, wherein are all the reasons of things, to­gether [Page 60] with their beings, concentred: whereby cor­ruption hath a possibility to put on incorruption, and mortality to put on immortality. For, as his being in the world, caused the world to be; so the perfect conjunction and personal union of his di­vine and humane nature, which can never be dis­joyned, giveth an eternal precarium esse to the whole humane nature; or a pos­sibility to all man-kinde to enjoy an eternal being: yet must the whole world besides necessarily return unto its first nothing, whose existence is but as a paren­thesis in infinity; in which parenthesis the two ex­treams, viz. Creation and [Page 61] Annihilation must necessa­rily be equally distant from that point in the midst, wherein the Word did exist, to give an absolutely finite being thereto. At the dis­solution whereof, it is ne­cessary that the Word in­carnate do actually exist in the world, to impose a period thereto (whose commencement did de­pend upon his actual ex­istence therein) by recol­lecting into himself that scattered light, which is tu­telary to the world, which was at first from him dis­persed: before whom the whole world must necessa­rily be collected, together with the angelical nature, which is the next and im­mediate supporter thereof, [Page 62] and must be rolled up as a Book; and then being de­prived of its tutelary light, must pass away as a Scheme; the glory whereof shall no sooner be reassumed into the Word, then reflected upon the humane ashes, to revive the same into an in­corruptible and eternal be­ing.

After this manner doth the rational Soul ascribe the Creation of the World to God, as the first efficient cause thereof: which one God, she doth demonstrate by reason to have subsisted personally three, in the very act of Creation: but in a more special manner, she doth ascribe the Crea­tion to the Word, which is the second Person in the [Page 63] Trinity, whose actual ex­istence in the world, gave a being thereto. In the con­templation whereof, she cannot but discern with the Eye of Reason, that all those mysteries which the holy Scriptures hold forth unto us, are not at all re­pugnant to Reason: As, that the Word was incar­nated in the fulness of time, having been eternally conceived by the Holy Ghost: that he took upon him the humane nature: that he died by a violent death: that he descended into hell; with many others.

Having found out in the Book of Nature those my­steries which are express'd in the Scriptures, she comes in the next place to observe [Page 64] whether those things less mysterious in the Scrip­tures, be not also written in the Book of Nature. In the holy Scriptures, which are the written Word of God, the Soul conceives her self chiefly concerned, as a rational creature: for there is no other creature in the whole world, except man a­lone, to whom the Scrip­tures do properly belong: before whom God hath set the way of good and e­vil, upon the onely account of rationality; having breath'd into him the breath of life, whereby he became a reasonable Soul: although all other inferior creatures do owe continu­al praises to God for their being; whereupon, they [Page 65] are commanded to observe the Sabbath, which is by God an appointed time of thanks to him for their Creation, wherein he is said to have rested; and is in the course of nature a pause, period, or full stop, wherein most actions do commonly terminate; ac­cording to the observation of Philo Judaeus, [...]. I say, although all Creatures do owe conti­nual praises to God for their Creation, and do in an obscure manner perform their service therein, having also certain secret Sabba­tisms in all their actions; yet man, in a more especial and particular manner hath an Ingagement to perform [Page 66] an immediate service to God, being the worlds high Priest, to offer sacri­fice not onely for himself, but also for all other Crea­tures which are subjected under him; according to that of Mr. George Herbert, sometimes Oratour of the University of Cambridge:

Man is the Worlds High Priest; he doth present
The Sacrifice for all, while they below
Unto the Service mutter an assent,
Such as Springs use that fall, and Winds that blow.

Man, who is the High Priest of the World, hath the Scripture as a Light to direct and guide his Soul [Page 67] to the high Altar, the Word, who is also the High Priest of man-kinde.

Now it is necessary, that there be some proportion betwixt the Light and the Eye; otherwise the Light would rather dazle and blinde the Eye, then help it in its performance. If the Holy Scripture were not rational, and in some sort proportionable to the humane intellect, it might rather induce incredulity, then enlighten the under­standing. Thus doth the Soul discourse. Then doth she attempt by reason, to understand the written Word of God: conceiving it a contradiction, that any thing should be presented, as an adequate object of [Page 68] the humane intellect, not under the notion of ratio­nality.

Herein she first observes the goodly order of the Creation, according to the description of Moses, to be much conformable to Reason. As, that the Ele­ments should be created before mixt bodies; and, that out of the Elements there should be procreated all mix'd bodies in such an order and method, as doth correspond the logical se­ries in the predicament of substance: that Creatures more perfect should re­quire greater time for their production out of the Earth, then Creatures more imperfect: That first ve­getables should be pro­duced, [Page 69] then living Crea­tures, viz. those indued with sense; & last of all Man, who is the most perfect of all living Creatures: and that in the Creation of each species, there should be also a gradual ascent answera­ble to the scale of Nature: as of Animals, first the Fish, then the Fowl, after­wards, the four-footed Beasts: and so of Vegeta­bles, first Grass and Herbs, then Shrubs and Trees. That Man should be at first made up of such matter contained in the Bowels of the Earth, as is the Em­bryon in the Wombe, viz. of red slime, which is ana­logous to Blood, the thin­ner parts whereof are, by vertue of its innate heat, [Page 70] resolved into Spirits; whilst the grosser are con­verted into flesh: and so all the diversity of parts made up answerable to the hete­rogeneity of the matter.

After the Heaven and the Earth were finished, and all the Host thereof, the Scriptures tell us, That God saw every thing which he had made, and behold it was very good. The very same we read in the Book of Nature. For Reason doth dictate unto us, that all things are good, not onely because every thing in the whole world beareth some proportion or similitude with God, who is the original of its being; but also because there is no one thing in [Page 71] the whole world which is not agreeable and conve­nient to some other thing. Wherefore seeing that goodness is defined to be the congruity of one thing with another, it follows that every thing in the world is good.

There was no written, po­sitive, or Moral Law given for the space of above two thousand yeers after the Creation: then afterwards the Law was given by God unto Moses, and from him delivered unto the Chil­dren of Israel. There was reason wherefore the Law should be so long omitted; and afterwards there was reason where­fore it should be then gi­ven. Why it was so long [Page 72] omitted, may appear by the Contents thereof: for he that reads the Moral Law, and considers all the parti­culars therein, may ob­serve, that the main scope thereof, was to establish the Children of Israel into a Commonwealth; and to preserve the same Com­monwealth, by defending each man 's propriety: that so they might, as a pe­culiar people, comfortably serve the Lord, who had delivered them out of cap­tivity. Now there are three things required to a Commonwealth: first, that there be a competent number of people; se­condly, that this people be entire and free, neither scattered at a distance, nor [Page 73] intermix'd with other peo­ple; and thirdly, that there be propriety of pos­sessions, whereby one man may call somthing his own which is not another mans. Before the Posterity of Ja­cob had these three Condi­tions, it was impossible they should be capable of that whole Law which was afterward given unto them. Although, when they were in Egypt they did increase, and became numerous; yet they could have no Law unto themselves, in regard they were not of them­selves a free People, but were strangers in the Land of Egypt, and consequent­ly Servants unto the Egyp­tians, who had Task Ma­sters over them, as the [Page 74] Scriptures do inform us.

And afterwards, whē they were delivered from the Egyptian slavery, although they were, in the wilder­ness, not onely numerous, but also a free People, and entire to themselves; yet the whole Law could in no wise belong unto them, be­cause they had no proprie­ty of possessions.

To impose a Curse upon him that should remove his Neighbours Land-mark, would have been non­sense to the Children of Israel before they had marked out their Lands, and taken to themselves proper possessions: and so to impose proportionable penalties, if peradventure their Oxen should hurt or [Page 75] gore one another, or hurt a man; would have been absurd, before they had a­ny Oxen belonging unto them. By this may appear the necessity wherefore the Law was so long omit­ted.

Now although the Law was written whilst the Children of Israel were yet in the Wilderness; yet it could not be in force until their Common-wealth be­gan; but so soon as they had a Common-wealth, they could not possibly be without a Law; for the Law is the Soul thereof, which doth both constitute and preserve the same: whereby their confused multitude was digested in­to a Re-publick; and their [Page 76] Re-publick was continued entire without division or confusion. The multitude indeed might have been continued entire, without so much circumstance of Law, whilst it did subsist as an Army, and was pre­served by one common food, Manna, which did cost them onely the taking up; yet could it not pos­sibly have subsisted as a Common-wealth, wherein there is propriety of pos­sessions, without the Law, which doth, by defending each mans propriety, pre­serve the whole Common-wealth in the same state and condition wherein it was first established.

If we look into the Law, we shall finde it to be no­thing [Page 77] else but a Systeme of rational precepts, com­manding or forbidding upon such proportionable penalties or rewards as are agreeable to the dictate of Nature, or the Law of Rea­son. Here we have an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, &c. Double resti­tution is injoyned for Theft; and Murther is forbidden upon penalty of Death. And in like man­ner for Trespasses com­mitted, we finde in the Law such rational proceed­ings, as honest and under­standing men would con­trive for the due administra­tion of a Common-wealth: as for example: If men strive together and one smite ano­ther with a stone, or with his [Page 78] fist, and he die not, but keep­eth his bed: if he rise again, & walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: onely he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thorowly healed, Exod. 21.18, 19. If a man shall cause a field or vine­yard to be eaten, and shall put in his beast, and shall feed in another man's field; of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard shall he make restitution, Exod. 22▪ 6. Who can be so ignorant, as not to under­stan [...] this to be reason?

If we look into other Precepts of the Law, which do not concern any private controversie be­twixt man and man, nor are related to the happi­ness [Page 79] of any particular Com­mon-wealth, but onely to the beatitude of mankind in general; we may observe the like rationality: as for example: Thou shalt not see thy Brother's Ox nor his Sheep go astray, and hide thy self from them; thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy Brother: and if thy Brother be not nigh unto thee, or if thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it unto thine own house, and it shall be with thee until thy Brother seek after it; and thou shalt restore it to him a­gain. In like manner thou shalt do with his Ass, &c. Deut 22.1, 2. Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him; for ye were strangers in the Land of E­gypt. [Page 78] [...] [Page 79] [...] [Page 80] Ye shall not afflict any widow or fatherless childe, Exod. 22.21, 22. Such-like Sentences of Humanity and Charity, are so sweetly in­termix'd with the other precepts of Equity thorow­out the whole Law, that the Law of Nature, and the Moral Law, seem both to intimate the same thing, and both to be summed up in this rational Precept: Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris: Do not thou un­to another, that which thou wouldst not have another do unto thee. As concerning those Meats which are for­bidden in the Law to be eaten, they are also such, most of them, as even Na­ture would admonish all people to refrain; of which [Page 81] sort are Eagles, Ravens, Kites, Hawks, Owls, Bats, Cuckows, &c. and on the contrary, those Meats which are tolerated, are, for certain Physical Rea­sons, the wholesomest food; and also by natural instinct are suggested unto mankinde as esculent: of which sort are the Ox, the Sheep, the Goat, the Hart, the Ro-Buck, the Fallow Deer, the Wilde Goat, &c.

Some may object, That if the Moral Law be the same in effect with the Law of Nature, the said Moral Law must necessarily have been observed by other Nations before it was given by Moses unto the Children of Israel. To which I answer [Page 82] affirmatively: for it is not hard to prove by Scripture, that almost every punctil­lo of the same Law, though not as positive but as natu­ral, was observed before it was given unto Jacob's Po­sterity.

Murther was punishable by the Egyptian Laws, as may appear by the second of Exodus, where we read that Moses looked this way and that way, and when he saw that there was no man, he slew an Egyptian which was smiting an Hebrew, one of his Brethren: and so soon as he had done it, ex­pecting nothing but death if he had been found out, he hid himself in the sand for his own safety: and afterwards, when Pharaoh [Page 83] heard of it, he fled from Pharaoh, out of Egypt, into the Land of Midian, be­cause. Pharaoh sought after him; being the chief Ma­gistrate to punish such-like offenders.

Adultery was also ac­counted an offence as hai­nous before the Law, as it was afterwards; which is manifest by the story of Abraham and Abime­lech in the twentieth of Genesis, where we read, That Abraham supposing that the fear of God was not in the Land of Gerar, denied his Wife because he knew that Adultery was so odious even in those places where the fear of God was not▪ that they would rather slay him, and then [Page 84] take his Wife, then take his Wife he being alive: they would rather do Murther, then commit A­dultery.

Another example we have in Gen. 39. of Joseph, who would by no means sin against God in com­mitting Adultery with Potiphar's Wife: although there was no Moral or Po­sitive Law to make Adul­tery a sin; but onely the Law of Nature, or the Rule of right Reason.

How severely simple Fornication was punished before the Law, by Jacob's two Sons Simeon and Levi, we may read in the 22 of Genesis.

That Theft was made a Crime by the Law of Na­ture, [Page 85] may be collected out of Gen. 44. from the passage of Joseph and his Brethren concerning the Cup which was put into Benjamin's sack, &c.

Add to all these, Jacob's vow of the tenth of all he had unto God, and his obedience to his Father and Mother, which is in the 28 of Genesis. By all which it is evident, that the same Law which was afterwards given by Moses unto the Israelites, had been anciently practised both by the Hebrews and the Egyptians: which was at first written in the Heart of Man, and was con­natural unto him; but, by degrees being obliterated, & in process of time almost [Page 86] wholly defaced, it was afterwards engraven upon Tables of Stone; where­by it did change its pro­perty: being before, the Law of Nature, which did sweetly incline, and was more arbitrary; but afterwards, it became a positive or Moral Law, strictly commanding, and leaving without excuse. Thus much shall suffice to have spoken concerning the Precepts of Holy Writ. I come now in the last place to demon­strate the rationality of Miracles.

A Miracle is an effect produced out of the ordinary course of Na­ture.

From the notion we [Page 87] have of a Miracle, or from its definition, we may collect, that it is not in the power of any Crea­ture to perform a Miracle: for the course of Nature is a Decree gone out from God; which Decree it is impossible that any should have power to alter, but he that made i [...]: so that the exhibition of a Miracle, is a rati [...]nal de­monstration, that he that performs the same i [...] sent of God, and hath hi [...] po­wer from above. From the observa [...]ion of the act, we come to the know­ledge [...]f the agent. We say, That to produce such or [...]uch an effect, immedi­ately to turn Water into Wine, or the like, is an [Page 88] action not natural, but su­pernatural: wherefore the agent cannot possibly be any of the Creatures, but must necessarily be the Creator. Now when the Soul is convinced in Rea­son, that God is the A­g [...]nt of Miracles, a Mira­cle seemeth not strange unto her. For, saith she, He that in the beginning, by hovering upon the Waters, could hatch them into Elements, and af­terwards could gi e power and desire to the El [...]ments to sy [...]gi [...]e and copulate, whereby they did gene­rate a [...]l other Creatures: H [...] that without materials could erect so stately a Fabrick a [...] is this Universe, may very well in Reason [Page 89] be conceived to be able to perform such-like actions as are recorded in Scripture by the names of Mira­cles.

By this way of argu­mentation, which is cal­led Regression, even Mi­racles do melt into Reason, and do become so fami­liar to the rational Soul, that when she doth con­sider the circumstances thereof, viz. first, that all Miracles are performed by the Finger of God; and secondly, that there is no Miracle recorded in Scripture which doth im­ply a contradiction; she ceaseth to admire the same: but wondreth rather, that there should be an Infidel left in the World, or any [Page 90] Soul so dulled with sensu­ality, or deaded with pre­judice, as to lose her Pre­rogative in not discerning the Truths of Christian Religion with the Eye of Reason.

FINIS.

Literato Lectori.

INterrogas for­san, Lectorum Literatissime, cujus ergo publicitus e­derem nauci­pendulum isthunc De Signa­turis Tractatulum: quasi sagacissimos moderni seculi Medicos lateret quicquid est, in re Medicâ, aut notatu dig­num, aut observatu insigne.

Nullus equidem eo inficias versatiores esse nunc dierum omnes in polydaedalae Naturae latifundio, quam olim fuisse, [Page] Imò lubens agnosco nunc tandem eò culminis evasisse Artes Scientias (que): ut, si in hâc mundi senectute in vivis superessent qui in Infantiâ ejus vitam traduxerunt, mira­rentur valdopere [...] prae omnibus autem, non medio­cre additamentum sortita est Medicina, Scientiis, ex quo cumprimis Aesculapius divi honorem adeptus est tradendo confusa quaedam, & incerta, procul methodo, curandi Morbos programmata. O quam, tunc temporis, tenel­lula, & in cunis vagiens, Medicina, impos erat peragen­di e [...] quae indies hodie pera­gu [...]tur! plurima Galenus & Hippocrates habuêre com­perta quae praecedentibus non nota fuerunt: & multa sa­puêre [Page] Successores eorum quae non innotuerunt illis. Nonnulla nobis patesiunt quae proximum abhinc retrò seculum latuerunt. Verum enim verò, non eam adhuc Medicina tetigit perfectionis metam, ut ulterius perfici nequeat: sed, ut sensim & pedetentim Corpora humana vacillant indies & labascunt; ita paulatim nova suppullu­lant, ad supplendos Naturae defectus, [...].

Sic visum est Providentiae, cui mortalium neminem pe­nes est refragarier. Omnia quidem Naturae sunt [...], sed non nobis omnia. Circulum sang [...]inis, novum illud chyli receptaculum, ductus lymphaticos, & quic­quid est istiusmod [...]; quicquid casus reperit, aut ingenium [Page] invenit, antiquitus Natura tenuit: estò quodlibet Na­turae munus suo tempore Mens humana persentiscit. Ad eundem planè modum Natura primitus indidit Cor­poribus simulachra quaedam, non frustra quidem, sed ut ad vivum depingeret cui inserviunt usui, & quibus pollent facultatibus. Na­tura primitus sanxivit ut unumquod (que) Corpus ageret in subjectum sibi Naturà proxi­mum.

Omnia Corpora semper habuerunt attractricem cum magnete communem, & vice versâ. Natura sem­per fuit [...]; quo Nomine nunquam non potis erat indigitandi quomodo Edulia, quomodo pharmaca, quomodo venena vires suas [Page] exerunt: viz. eodem ipsissi­mo modo, putà similitudine quâdam substantiae inter a­gens & subjectum.

Haec esse, & semper fuisse, Naturae munera agnoscimus; horum verò observamen quantulumcun (que) vocamus nostrum: quod non inexperti scripsimus: quare idem tum Rationis, tum Experi­entiae specillo audacter credi­mus.

Ad hanc posteriorem quod attinet, quae j [...]m pr [...]ma in lu­cem prodit, opellam: nemo as­serat Theologi magis interesse quam referre nostrâ: Non enim Rationis extravaga­mur terminos. Quod si Ra­tio nostra cum fide coincide­rit, nihil nobis imputandum esse speramus. Imò potius summae sunt agendae D.O.M. [Page] gratiae, qui Animam huma­nam tam splendide orna­vit & i [...]struxit, ut tam Di­vinae quam humana sapiendi par esset.

Hoc unicum, literate Lector, perpendas obsecro: sc. aequè absurdum esse Rationem [...] damnare, & Ratio­nem improbandam esse Rati­one probare. Vale.

R. B.

ERRATA.

PAg. 7. l. 1. for amalgamated, read amalgamates. p. 10. l. 4. for and, read that. p. 24. l. 18. for acquainued, read acquainted. p. 30. l. 3. for Senicus, read Seincus. p. 51. l. 6. for Gatiopsis, read Ga­liopsis. p. 60. l. 23. for Figure from, read Figure proceed from. p. 61. l. 1. leave out Bodies.

Page 5. l. 8. for mortum, read mortuum. p. 24. l. 20. for separted, read separated. p. 25. l. 11. for [...], read [...]. p. 32. l. 19. (and in other places) for then, read than. p. 36. l. 6. for invisible, read indivisible. p. 58. l. 5. for assent, read ascent.

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