CHAP. I. The Vnderstanding and the Truth-understood, are one.

TRUTH is indeed of the seed Roy­all, of Progeny Divine: yet so, as to be (for I may say of her, what the Spirit saith of [Page 2] Faith) Rom 10.8 neere us, to be in us. And when she is plea­sed to descend into our val­leys, and to converse with us, shee erects her own pa­vilion, and doth fix it in whatsoever is lovely in us.

The Vnderstanding is her throne, there she reigneth, and as she is there seated, as she shineth in that part of the soule; she appeareth to me under two notions, which are also her measure through the whole sphere of Being; as will be disco­vered more hereafter, when these lesser streames shall have emptied themselves by progresse into a larger river.

First, that very Being, which immediatly floweth from above, and is the rise [Page 3] or the first and uniforme ground-work in this parti­cular Being which we now treat of,The Vn­derstand­ing or Truth there, un­der two notions. and which under this notion wee call the form or substance.

Secondly, those workings which breathe from thence, as all actions and sayings, which are (in our phrase) the effects of a reasonable soule.

I shall first in few words treat of the first, and then very briefly conclude with a word or two upon the se­cond part of Truth.

This first Truth is the Vnderstanding in its Es­sence:An argu­ment pro­ving the nature of the Vn­derstand­ing to be Truth. for what is the Vn­derstanding other than a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, conforming it to [Page 4] the likenesse of the Crea­tor? And is not Truth the same? For the Beauty of Truths character is, that she is a shadow, a resem­blance of the first, the best forme; that she is light, the species, the sparkling of primitive light; that she is life, the sublimation of light, Vitaest in se reflectio. Sen. Epist. Life a higher de­gree of light. that she may reflect upon her selfe.

That she is light, none will deny; that light in rea­sonable creatures is the fountaine of life, is mani­fest. For the forme of a reasonable soule is light, and therefore when the soul informeth and giveth life to Animal rationale, it ena­bleth the creature to work according to light, and up­on Her accesses the organs [Page 5] can entertaine light, as the eye then beholds the light of the Sun;The eye by the pre­sence of the soule made able to see light. upon Her re­tirements they are dark and uselesse. Thus whilst life is light, and light is Truth, and Truth is conformity to God; and the understanding as we yet discourse of it, is this light to the soule, the Vnderstanding and Truth can be but one.

CHAP. II. The second Argument, pro­ving that truth is the Na­ture of the Vnderstanding.

I Know the learned choose rather to stile the understan­ding, a faculty;Most call the under­standing a faculty. and so insti­tute a soule recipient; a [Page 6] Being (scil. Truth) recei­ved; and a faculty, which is the understanding, whereby the soule receiveth and act­eth according to what it doth entertaine.

But with submission to their better judgement, I should crave leave to make one Quaere.

Three no­tions re­quisite to the consti­tution of every Be­ing.Are there not to the con­stitution of every Being three notions requisite?

First, the Fountain com­municating.

Secondly, the Channell entertaining.

Thirdly, the Waters im­parted.

I confesse, we must not in Metaphysicall Beings ex­pect Physicall subsistencies; yet [...] all learning doth allow of. But where [Page 7] shall wee finde these in the understanding? The un­derstand­ing as a faculty af­fordeth not these 3. notions. whilest the intellect passeth under the notion of a faculty. Indeed wee may discerne the last (scil.) those sweet beames of light which beat upon us continually.

But where is the second which entertaineth them?The un­derstand­ing is not the subject of truth. If it be the understanding, then the light which differē ­ceth us from the vegetative and sensitive creatures, lieth in the understanding, and not in the soule; and the soule (which all men hold to be a spirituall Being) is but a Theca to the intellect, as the body is the Tabernacle of the soule. Or, if the soule hath light as well as the un­derstanding, then are there two enlightened Beings in [Page 8] one reasonable creature: Non belle quaedam faciunt duo, Marti. l. 5. epi. 53. sufficit unus Huic operi. Two reasonable Beings in one Compositum, is too un­reasonable a thing.

Thirdly, Who is it that communicateth this light? It is conveyed to the un­derstanding either from the soule, or some other way.

The un­derstand­ing recei­veth not truth from the soule.If from the soule, then the soule doth not finde the defect of the understanding. For, if the soule can com­municate light, then hath it light already; the same, or more excellent; then can it worke, diffuse light, and en­joy it selfe; and so this fa­culty, the understanding, shall be in vaine.

If in any other way, it must either be immediately [Page 9] from God, or mediante Crea­tura.

If from a creature,Not from any crea­ture and not from the soule, it must be by some other facultie intervenient. For, if the soule (which by their con­sent is a more noble Agent than the understanding) can­not, according to their Do­ctrine, act without a faculty; how shall an inferior Being work, without some such like subservient help? And thus may you excurrere in infinitum, which, according to the Philosophers, may not be done; for, Entia non sunt multiplicanda, nisi ne­cessariò.

If the truth come from God, Not from God. then why is it not immediately, intrinse­cally, infused into the [Page 10] soule it selfe? But how­ever the understanding bee enricht with this treasure of Truth,Deus agit á centro in circumse­rentiam. if it be imparted to it, then is it, it selfe that Truth, that light which I contend for. For God doth not communicate light (by light (which I take in a Me­taphoricall sense) I under­stand some spirituall excel­lency) and such light (I say) God doth not offer but to light. For, quicquid recipi­tur, recipitur ad modum reci­pientis. Cleopatra her dissol­ved union would have been to Esops cocke of lesse value than a barly corne. And if the understanding have not light,In spiritu­all giving and recei­ving there must be a metaphy­sical union it cannot take it, unlesse by being tur­ned into the nature of it. For what giving and recei­ving [Page 11] can here be, besides that which maketh both to become one and the selfe same? Light came into the world, Iohn 1.5. but it was refused by darknesse. Ignoti nulla cu­pido.

Thus the understanding and light are different in names, may be different in degrees, but not in nature. For what that Reverend man Doct. of Syn. Dort. p. 25. lin. 12 Neither a quality perma­nent, nor an act im­manent, unless they bee made inherent in the soul, and the latter also produced by it, can be said to be given to the soul. Doctor Twist saith most acutely of a spirituall gift, I may say of spirituall light. The soule cannot re­fuse a spirituall gift (I now speak in his phrase.) The soule and any spirituall Be­ing doe not, as corporeall things, greet each other by the help of the Loco-motive faculty; but when Grace is given by God to the soul, [Page 12] there is, as it were (da veni­am voci) an hypostaticall union betwixt the gift and the soule; and the soule cannot reject it, because they are no more. Two but one.To receive light is to be light. So to be in the capa­city or act of receiving light, is to be light.

Lastly, how passeth this light from the understand­ing to the soule? Will not here be left as vast a gulfe, as they make betweene the understanding and the will, which make them divers; whence grow those inex­tricable disputes, How the the will is made to under­stand, what the understand­ing judgeth fit to bee wil­led?

CHAP. III. A prosecution of the second Argument, wherein these three notions are applied to the understanding, being made one with the truth.

ALl these rubs are easi­ly taken out of the way,If you make the understan­ding light, you have the three notions which make up every Be­ing. if you make that which you call the un­derstanding, truth. For then have you,

First, the Father of mer­cies, dispencing light and truth.

Secondly, light and truth dispensed.

Thirdly, the totum exi­stens, consisting of matter and forme, of materiall and immateriall Beings (as wee [Page 14] distinguish them) called a reasonable creature thus in­formed or constituted, which we name the recipi­ent of this light and truth.

Doe not tell me, that I thus make the recipient and thing received all one; that is not strange in emanation divine. In Scripture you have a parallel of this.The 4. viall men­tioned Rev. 16.8. is the thing emptying and empti­ed upon it selfe.The fourth viall is poured out upon the Sun (scil.) the Scriptures, and the Scrip­tures are the viall it selfe; the Scripture is emptied upon it selfe, it is agent and patient, receiver and recei­ved. I know learned Mede to prevent this, which to him is a difficulty, imagi­neth the Emperour to be the Sun; but in two words that is thus disproved.

[Page 15]First, the Emperour is no where called the Sun in this book; when he receiveth a metaphoricall typicall ti­tle, he is called the Dra­gon.

Secondly the Scriptures are in the Revelation divers times set forth to us by the Sun. So that if you refuse the sense which I fix upon, then you doe not onely for­sake, but oppose the Scrip­ture-phrase.

But were not this truth mounted in a celestiall cha­riot,Nay in all things A­gent and Patient must bee one to him that consi­ders. Reason it selfe would evince it. For, consider any individuall Being you please, vegetative or rationall, or what you will,No Being but it is the thing receiving & received who is it that entertaineth this Being, but the Being it selfe which is entertained? Who is it [Page 16] that receiveth from the womb of Eternity that rea­sonable creature, but the creature received?

The vani­ty of that question, Whether the soule be conti­nens or con­tentum, discoveredThe ignorance of this Point, hath raised that em­pty Question, Whether the Soule or the Body be con­tentum? For if every Being be its own contentum, this Question will seeme to be no more a difficulty. And if there happen any neare union betwixt two Beings, as the Body and the Soule, the first is not continens, the other contentum; but as hus­band and wife, each bring­eth his part towards the making up of the compo­situm.

Thus without any viola­lation of Reasons right, I seeme justly to conclude, [Page 17] that the totum existens, con­sisting of matter and forme, the reasonable creature, is the Recipient of this truth.

CHAP. IIII. This Argument further clee­red by more objections pro­pounded and answered.

BUT still it is de­manded, why may not the understand­ing supply the third place? why may it not be this Reci­pient?

To whom I give this an­swer;The Vn­derstand­ing cannot be the re­cipient. That if they make the understanding but a quality, and depending upon some other Being, it cannot, as I have proved in this Dis­course, [Page 18] course, be the recipient: but if they look upon it as this light, this truth it selfe, then the dispute is reconciled.

Some call the Intel­lect virtus quâ.Some conceive, all these difficulties are cured, if you make the understanding on­ly virtus quâ, concluding with the Philosopher, that ibi subsistendum est, without inquiry after a further pro­gresse. I could Iurare in ver­bamagistri, I could acquiesce here, but that I desire to be convinced by reason and not by termes. I shall therefore humbly ask this question.

The Intel­lect can­not be vir­tus quâ.What difference is there betwixt virtus quâ and a fa­culty? as in a knife, the cut­ting ariseth from the sharp­nesse, and this sharpnesse is virtus quâ, or the faculty whereby the knife doth cut.

[Page 19]If it be but a faculty, then I repaire to my for­mer answere: but if some­thing else than a faculty, it must either be a nominall Being, or reall existence.

If the first, it beareth no weight.

If the second, then I say, it must entertaine species (for all spirituall glories doe operate by the com­munication of their divine species) and then will you be cast upon the former rock.

Yet still they say, the un­derstanding, being a spiri­tuall Being, receiveth light in some way which we know not; and so they proceede to obscure distinctions and voluminous discourses, con­cerning intellectus agens & [Page 20] intellectus patiens or passibi­lis. But the wiser sort of them,As the A­rabians, Zabarell, &c. perceiving the thin­nesse, aerialnesse and crazi­nesse of this Spiders web, have with greater probabili­ty made God to be intellectus agens, by his influence upon the understanding.

The last objection answered. Respon. Is not this the A­thenian Altar, which groa­ned under that Superscripti­on, Act. 17. vers. 23. To the unknowne God? I would I could discover with S. Paul to them this light, this truth, which they know not, that they might love it and imbrace it. But secondly, I dispute not a­gainst things I know not: They know not this. I know that I may better maintaine the other, that the Under­standing is not the Recipient [Page 21] of this light, than they averre that it is, in a way whereof they never hope to finde a­ny footsteps.

CHAP. V. The Soule and truth in the Soule are one.

I May yet be pressed with this objection: All these difficulties may be urged against the Soule, which have been pro­duced against the Vnder­standing.

Resp. Are not these like the untrue Mother, who will kill the childe, because she cannot call it her own? If these inconveniences be justly urged against the Soul, [Page 22] it will not deliver the Vnder­standing. But I will deale ingenuously, and confesse that if you take the Soule under any other notion than Truth; If you deeme it, first to be a Being, and then to be light, as God made A­dam first (I meane the body) and then breathed life into him; if, I say, there be first a Being, and then an infusi­on of light, you will be pressed with the former ar­guments. But if you make the Understāding,The Soul, Vnder­standing, Truth, all but one. the Soul, Light, Truth, one, then are you quite delivered out of all these straights, and then is it true which I averre, that, that degree of light, which we enjoy in the in­ward man, is the specificall difference, which distingui­sheth [Page 23] between us and brutes, deservedly called reason, that ample Sphere of Truth, which is the All in us, and besides which we are whol­ly nothing.

Are not wee said to be made after the image of God?An Argu­ment pro­ving the Soule and Truth to be one. and if in any thing we are honoured with this inscription, it is in the most noble part? Now God is unus, purus, simplex actus. For (with submission to his better learning and judge­ment) I cannot subscribe to D^• Ames his manner of ex­pression,God and his attri­butes are not two. who saith, first there is God, and then his attri­butes are in him, Deo insunt quasi in esse secundo, ab essentiâ & inter se distinguuntur non solùm ratione rationante, sed etiam rationatâ, ita ut fundamen­tum distinctionis sit in ipso Deo. Theo. lib. 1. cap. 4. Sect. 27.28. tanquam in esse secundo. If then we [Page 24] do beare his impresse, quan­quam non passibus aequis, it must be in that which is (as farre as we can judge) DEI formalis ratio, which is to be purus, simplex actus.

In this our shadowy re­semblance of the Deity, I shall not challenge perfecti­on; for though the Scrip­ture say, 1 Ioh. 3. vers. 2. We shall hereafter be perfect as he is perfect, and doth here style us, partakers of divine nature; yet all this is to be understood accor­ding to our little modell. Unity is that wherein wee carry some touches, some lineaments of his Majesty. Unity is Gods Essence. U­nity is all what we are. For division being the birth of nothing, can be nothing. And thus may we raise from [Page 25] our Microcosme,Truth as it hath been described, resembleth the Trini­ty. a passable Hieroglyphick of the Tri­nity.

Truth as it is in the breast of Eternity intended to the Sonnes of men, resembles Patrem intelligentem; as it descends from above, Filium intellectum; as it informeth the Soule, enjoyeth and re­flecteth upon it selfe, Spiri­tum dilectum. We must not then expect, First, a Being of the Soule: Secondly, a faculty whereby it worketh. God and his attributes, are but one; mercy and justice kisse each other in him; he and they are ens necessarium; And so the Soule and the Faculty is one, that divine light and truth.

CHAP. VI. All things are this one light or truth, shining from God.

BUt if the Intellect, the Soul, Light and Truth are (from the reasons alledged) all but one, this argument will presse all things that are; then will all Beeing fall un­der the same Predicament.

This is that which I ay­med at; and why not? See­ing that▪ First, all Beeing is derived from the same foun­taine, scil. from him who is uniforme, in all like him­selfe.

Secondly, All Being is the same in nature, (scil.) a beame of that excellent [Page 27] light, and therefore in Me­taphysicks Vnum, verum, bo­num, Ens, terminicon­vertibiles. All being is this truth. Truth and Be­ing are one.

Thirdly, All Being is en­tertained in the same man­ner by every individuall ex­istence, which is the sub­ject receiving this light from above: and all reall true reception is alone by similitude and union of na­ture.

Yet I shall not agree to confound the names of particular Beings, though I doe conjoyne their natures. For, all Being may be com­pared to light; in such a bo­dy it is styled the Sunne; in another it is called the Moone; in the third it bea­reth the name of a Starre, and under various shapes, the names of various Stars, [Page 28] as Syrius, Canopus, &c. but all is light, and it is but light. The body of waters is by us called Seas; when they beate upon such a coast, it beareth one name; when it coasteth upon another soyle, it recei­veth a severall denominati­on. All Being is this light, this truth; but contained within those Circles, it appeareth to us under this name; and againe, it hath another style when it beat­eth upon a various object.

All Being is but light, communicating it selfe to us through severall cran­nies, some greater, some lesse, whilst all is light.

Vide Pla­tonem in Phile. in Ti­maeo. Ter­minus, In­sinitum, prima ele­menta, un­de quin. que gene­ra teru [...]. Plato most excellently, most acutely, most truly hath madé all Being of Ter­minus and Infinitum.: The [Page 29] first Being appearing to us in severall bounds and mea­sures amidst the vast infinity of darknesse or nothing.Ficin. com. in Tim [...]o. Vide Pla­tonem ubi­que.

The Platonick Philoso­phers do not erre,Omnes numeri in unitate. who re­duce all Beings to number, making one all and the chief, and the other more or lesse glorious, as they have two, three, or foure, more or lesse numbers or degrees.

Whence they had this Maxime, I know not; this I know, Satan, that old Ser­pent, is very learned, and can sometimes (as he doth, when hee calls Jesus the Christ and sonne of God) can, I say, sometimes, tell true, that so hee may even by truth entaile to himselfe a certaine interest in such Disciples as refuse any [Page 30] other allurement than that of golden truth: and it is to be feared, that they have had too great and free con­verse with him. For even this sweet point of learning have they shamefully abu­sed to charmes and spells, as that of the Poet, Virg. in [...]. Numero Deus impare Quia nu­merus im­par, nume­rus indivisi­bilis. Ficin. comment. in Plat. Timae. gaudet. Two was curst, because it first departed from unity; Three whereby unity againe re­turned into it selfe, became sacred.

But it may be (& spero meliora) that they received it from the Egyptians, and the Egyptians from the He­brews.

Now, if this be true, (which I submit to the judgement of the wise) then all Being is but one, and all [Page 31] things are more or lesse ex­cellent, as they partake more or lesse of this first Being.

This doctrine of Plato­nists will not be so unfavo­ry, if we pay unto unity its due tribute. I confesse, ac­cording to true Philoso­phy, Time is but mensura motus vel ordinis, which both are the same; Number, cal­culus temporis; One is prin­cipium tantùm numeri, and so it is hardly a part of that which is but the handmaid of circumstance.

CHAP. VII. How unity is all in all things.

BUt I should desireThe excel­lency of unity. that we might con­sider whether it doth not carry something in [Page 32] it, in nature more glorious, something that may seem to informe a Being. If I can­not tell what it is, you will excuse me, knowing how hard a thing it is to finde out the Forme of any Be­ing, and how much more hard to discover the Being of a Forme.

But from this reason I doe seeme to collect some glimmering light of what I now propound.

All Being seemeth to breath and catch after unity. Gravia doe not more natu­rally incline downwards, than all Being doth natu­rally seeke for unity.

Of Beings there are but two sorts.

Uncreated.

Created.

[Page 33]Uncreated, is God only.

Created, is

• Spirituall.
• Morall.
• Physicall.
• Mathematicall.

In all these you will find Unity as it were the Forme of their Being.

My thoughts, my igno­rance, my no thoughts of the first, incomprehensible, inaccessible Majesty, I de­sire to propound with fear, trembling and reverence.

If Iohn in the midst of revelation,Rev. 22.9. being overcome with nothing but the glitte­rings and sparklings of the creature, did mistake, and worshipped one of his fel­low-servants; if the Jewes refused to trample upon any contemptible scroul, fearing [Page 34] lest, in them, the namelesse name of God might be in­cluded: surely wee in the midst of darknesse, having to doe, not with the name, but with the nature of Eter­nity, ought to cloathe our spirits with much mode­stie.

I shall therefore humbly propound this to conside­ration, Whether unity be not all in God.

I confesse there are three persons in one Godhead (and that is the mysterie) and yet but one God. And more there could not have beene; for this God is infinite, e­ternall, &c. and onely one can be so; there cannot bee two Infinites, two Eterni­ties.

And againe, this one can­not [Page 35] not be otherwise, for if hee could have been something else, hee had not beene in­finite.

If then unity bee such a necessary (give us leave to speake as wee can) ac­cident, as, without which God could not have been what hee is:Vnity all in God. may it not bee said that unity is co-es­sentiall to him, seeing that the Deity admits of no accidents? And if of his Essence, then unity is in him all, for the Essence of God is all in God, and God in his Essence is but one Divi­nity.

Ob. But so, infinity, pow­er, &c. all attributes are in God his Essence, as well as unity?

Answ. All other attri­butes [Page 36] are at length resolved into this of unity. Of this, can be given no accompt, but only negative. All ex­plications flow from this, returne to this, that God is one.

Fic. com­ment. in Plat. Sym­pos.What is it to be infinite? Ficinus answers, to have no­thing of privation mixt, to be plenus sui; which is to be One.

The power of God is the unity of all Being in one point. What is this, I am that I am; but this, I am one? The same we may say of all other the names of God.

Vnity in spirituall Beings.When we survay the na­ture of spirituall Beings, we shall find them in Scrip­ture stiled one. For God reduceth all the comman­dements [Page 37] to love. And the Saints, who are, quatenus Saints, spirituall Beings, (for their Saintship is a spi­rituall excellency) are sti­led, Rom. 12.5. one body; and, Gal. 3.16. they are all one in Iesus Christ.

Christ and his Church are but one body. Now, this union carrieth certainly something with it more es­sentiall than a figure.

When the three persons are united in one deity, the union is more close than a figurative union. The con­junction of the humane na­ture, and the second person in the Trinity, is a very en­tire conjunction; and so is that of the Saints with Christ. There is the union of the whole humane na­ture [Page 38] with one person. Here is the union of divers per­sons to the whole divine nature. And we may easily allow a neare union to these Metaphysicall Beings: see­ing even in naturall things, there is as it were an unity, even of two Physicall ex­istences. For GOD saith, You two shall be one flesh;Gen. 2.24. he saith not one, but one flesh. But these are aenigmata, 1 Cor. 13.12. while we see through glas­ses of flesh.

Morall.Seeing Morall Beings are, by generall consent, of fra­ternall alliance to spirituall, both in nature and operati­on; I shall not say any thing of them, but onely what is said by all, that virtutes sunt concatenatae.

I shall therefore minde [Page 39] you but of this,Vnitie in Physicall Beings. how in Phy­sicall Beings, every thing doth delight in unity. And this is very plaine in the stillicids of water, which, if there be water enough to follow, will draw themselves into a small thred, because they will not sever: and when they must disunite, then they cast themselves into round drops, as the fi­gure most resembling u­nity.

Whence is that Sympa­thy in nature betweene the Earth and the Adamant, but from hence, that they being of one nature, desire to improve their unity by mutuall imbraces?

When have the Sun-beams their vigor and efficacy, bea­ting upon the burning glasse, [Page 40] but when the glasse hath ga­thered them all into one?

Where is the power of our five senses, which are in their nature so honoura­ble, that nihil cadit in intel­lectum, quod non prius cadit in sensum? Where is their vertue, but in communis sen­sus? Nay (if I durst be so bold) but this I may not now dispute: I conceive all the senses are but one, and that is I am in­formed that my Lord Ca­stle. I stand in his book de Veritate, affirmeth that there is but one sense: but I am not so happy as to have that booke by me, nor doe I re­member it since my last read­ing it, so that I dare not say it confident­ly. Tactus. For their Energie is nothing till the ray from the object to the organ, and from the organ to the object touch in one.

It is most happily ex­pressed by Sir Iohn Suck­ling;

When he saith,

What are the Mathema­ticall sciences, but Vnity turning it selfe into severall formes of Numbers and Fi­gures, yet still remaining entire? Harmony, pro­portion, proportionality, which are the subject, the soule of all Knowledge here, are so many severall names of the same unity. Beauty is but one act of grace and sweetnesse,Ficin. Com­ment. in Sympos. Plat. which seemes to us composed of various parcels. Ficin. Com­ment. in Tim. Plat.Musick is [Page 42] one forme resulting from many different sounds. This is that mystery, which un­knowne, hath confounded the Schools in that Questi­on, whether quantity be di­visibilis in semper divisibile. All things are certainly at last reduced to an Vnity; yea, all things appeare to us cloathed with one forme; yet are we never able to search out the perfection of this, when we most ac­curately pursue it. The glory and majesty thereof is such, that it rendreth our minds uncapable of any more than a grosse view, like that of the Sunne in his splendour.

Democritus his definition of Being, is very conside­rable, Plato in Symp. in Orat. Eri­xym. Est aliquid differens [Page 43] à se, quod sibi convenit: and indeed, all Being is but one, taking various shapes, sometimes discovering it selfe under one, sometimes under another, whereas it is but one Being: and this is light, truth, that (as I said before) beame of divine glory, which is the spring of all Beings.

To close this discourse, give me leave thus to set forth that Majesty, where­by Unity wrappeth up all things within itselfe. There can be no recedence from Unity, unlesse by addition of a new, distinct, Unity. But where will you finde This? A simple Unity must be en­tirely one with the First; if you adde any thing to U­nity, whereby it may differ, [Page 44] it remaines no more One, but becomes a Duality.

Nominall division of Being re­quisite for our con­verse.Yet doe I in no wise re­ject that division of Being left us by our Masters, when they teach us, that there is first a Being which is knowne to Be, but it selfe in its Being is insensible.

Secondly, another that is sensible, but knoweth not its owne excellency.

Thirdly, that which know­ing its owne excellency, can reflect upon it selfe. For, I say, this which is cal­led vegetative, sensitive, and rationall, is all of one na­ture.

CHAP. VIII. The nature of Habits.

ANd whilst I affirme that the soule is nothing but this Truth, I doe not refuse the doctrine of Habits, Habits in­fused, ac­quisite. either

For when the soule by vertue of its Being, is cleare in such a truth, it is said to be an infused habit. When by frequent action, such a truth is connaturall to the soule, it may be stiled an habit acquisite: though indeed all is but light more or lesse glorious, discovering it selfe frequently or rarely, and by divine appointment, [Page 46] at such a conjunction of time, and not any other, not that the soule is infor­med by its owne action; for what hath the streame which it derives not from the source? What can those workings added to that, from which they receive them­selves?

And therefore I wholly subscribe to the Platonists, who make all scientia no­thing but reminiscentia; for when it appeareth not, it is not; the soule being but an activity, it must be no more than it acteth: and though we seeme by fre­quent actings to helpe the soule, and so to create in it acquisite habits, yet these are but a Phaenome­non. This is but the way [Page 47] which God discloseth to our eye, whereas all the actings are onely new dis­coveries.

Our Philosophers affirme thus boldly of the unreaso­nable creature, attributing it all to the instinct, or a new influence.

Why may not, why must not we conclude the same of man, seeing it is a recei­ved truth, that acti agimus, and we are in our strength in regard of God no better than the most abject crea­ture?

But if all be one;The diffe­rence be­tween na­turall and supernatu­rall habits. (Soule, Understanding, Habits, all the same:) then neither doe faith and reason differ.

Surely they differ onely in degrees, not in nature.

That Reverend holy man, [Page 48] that dexterous cominus-pu­gnator, seemeth to averre the same or more in historicall and saving faithMr Ball. Divers sorts of Faith. page 3. Faith signifying beleefe, is used to note, first an ordinary knowledge and bare assent to the historicall truth of the Speaker, though sometimes holpen by experiments, and other in­ducements and probabilities of the things: and this is called Faith Historicall, that is, a naked, im­perfect, dead assent, without trust or confidence in the mercies of God, or adherence to the comman­dements. Howbeit we must not imagine, that Faith is reputed unsound or not salvificall, because Histo­ricall (rather it is oftentimes unsufficient to save, because it is not so fully Historicall as might be) but the name of Historicall Faith arose hence, that some are said to beleeve, who did never embrace Christ as their only Saviour with all their hearts, nor confidently rely upon the promises of mercy; otherwise, justifying Faith doth more certainly be­leeve the truth of the history of the Gospel, and so is more historicall than the Faith called Histo­ricall..

Mr Huit in his Anatomy of Conscience, cleerely af­firmeth it. These meanes teach us further to make much of the least beginnings of grace, even those which Divines commonly call repressing, since they prepare the heart to conversion, and in some [Page 49] sense be called the inchoation thereof: seeing tem­porary and living faith differ not in forme, but de­grees of perfection; there is a faith in the true con­vert, of no better perfection than that in the tempo­rary, though he stay not there, as the other (being an unwise son) doth. Huit Anat. Conscience pag. 214.

• The first degree is Rea­son.
• A second, Historicall.
• A third, Temporary.
• A fourth, Saving faith.
• A fift, Plerophorie.
• A sixt,
  1 Ioh. 3. vers. 2.
  Beatifica visio, that light whereby we shall see as we are seene; these are of the same nature with that light which a reprobate is partaker of.

And if any man question the truth of this, let him but consider, that the Donor is the same, our good God.

The Efficient, Instrumen­tall, and Formall cause, is Je­sus Christ.

[Page 50]The subject recipient, the totum existens.

And the Gift it selfe is light or truth, a spirituall Being.

How can it choose then, but to be one and the same, seeing (as I said before) such a Recipient cannot enter­tain any other guest?

The con­troversie about fal­ling from Grace.Neither doe I at all abett that unhappy opinion of falling away from Grace.

There is in the opinion a liquid nefasti, and therefore I study to shun it. The pro­pugnators of it are unhap­py; for they have not onely made a rent amongst us, but strengthened a common ad­versary.

The oppugnators also are unhappy; for they have so managed the cause, that their [Page 51] Adversaries lie almost under invincible darknesse: for the oppugnators fearing to speake plaine, have called Spontaneitatem, liberam vo­luntatem, and it is impossi­ble to distinguish betweene Libera voluntas Contra-Re­monstrantium, & liberum ar­bitrium Remonstrantium.

And whilst the Remon­strants finde no difference in this main Tenet, they weigh all the rest in the same scale, and judge accordingly. For an argument often alledged by many learned men, if it confuteth not, it doth con­firme an error; and thus are they out of the reach of truth.

That learned, that pious man, the first fruit of our Church her resurrection, fa­mous [Page 52] Calvin, styled it Spon­taneitatem, and not liberam voluntatem: For, Deus and libera voluntas are incompa­tible, not to be caemented by that distinction without dif­ference, Libera à necessita­te, sed non ab infallibilitate. And therfore mighty Deo enim, sive scienti­am ejus spe­ctemus, quippe om­nia scit; sive volun­tatem, quae ad nihil cre­atum vel creabile est suspensa, sed ab aeterno determinata, nulla [...] potentia disjunctiva: considerari quidem potest potentia creata, non considerato divino decreto, & in signo ratio­nis decretum Dei antecedente. Sed in tali Chimar [...] consideratione, adversary nobis litem vitiosâ nuce ha [...] emptitandam srustraserunt. Ac verò actu, non est ulla po­tentia creata, nisi quae subest aeterno DEI decreto, nisi qu [...] [...] divinae providentiae renuntiare velit, &c. Rutter Exerc. Apolog. Exerc. 1. c. 1. Sect. 8. Rut­terfort affirmeth, that posito Dei decreto absoluto (and all things are under such a de­cree) insulse quaeritur an po­tentia libera sub eo decreto sit indifferens.

[Page 53]But here I am not to, I can­not, dispute this question. Onely I say thus much, it is so unhappy an opinion, that I hope I shall not at all abett it.

For though Reason and Faith be one in nature: yet is not reason that degree of light, of which the Spirit hath said,1 Ioh. 3.9. Difference betwixt Knowledg and Faith. My seed is in you, and you cannot sinne. And therefore men cannot lose that which they never had. And this will be a little more cleere, by the answer to the next objection, which is this.

If Faith and Reason,Object. if knowledge and grace be all but one light, how com­meth it to passe, that some who have lesse light, have more faith? and those again, [Page 54] who are for knowledge, as Angels of light, are not par­takers of that which is cal­led Saving faith?

This difficulty is rather mazy, than strong; I shall therefore hope to bring the Ariadnean thread.

And at first abord, I deny the proposition. I conceive it a mistake. For I doe ve­rily beleeve, that the weak­est Saint knoweth more of God, than the most intelli­gent of those Spirits, who though once in heaven, are now in intolerable flames.

All men confesse thus much, that even the mea­nest Christian, hath more experimental knowledge of GOD, than Beelzebub the Prince of the aire. And doth not this convince them of [Page 55] what I affirme? For what (to speake in their lan­guage) is experiment,Experi­ence, col­lection of particular lights. but the daughter of light, ga­thered by frequent observa­tion? If experiment be but light, and their experience is more than that of the greatest wits; then (if I mistake not) by necessary consequence, their light is more and greater.

But I suppose, the error may be cleared by this Si­mile.

The one is as the man who hath studied the Theory, the other the Practicke of any art of science.

The first may know more in appearance; but the other indeed knoweth more.

You shall finde two une­qually learned,Knowledg, reall. appa­rent. The first is [Page 56] a Gnosticke, a helluo litera­rum ▪ the other hath not read so much, but hath con­cocted, mastered and sub­dued all before him. Which now is said to know more?

Psal. 14.1. The foole hath said (not, as some expound it, wished) in his heart, there is no GOD. It is true, now and then he hath some glimmering light of a Deity, but anon againe all is shaken, and he faith, there is no God.

Doth not the people of Israel say,Psal. 12.4. Wee are our owne Lords, who shall controll us? We have made a cove­nant with death and hell, and none shall reach us. Can these men, these Beings be said to know God?

If you object the devils age and experience, it can­not [Page 57] help; it is but, as you call it, a collection of his owne lights, and all the starres shining together make not day.

I should onely aske this one question, Can the divels beleeve or know God to be all mercy? It is impossible, be­cause they cannot beleeve him so to themselves.

Ob. But some say, Neither doe the best men beleeve him so to the wicked.

Resp. Yes, we doe, wee know him in his nature to be mercifull to them.

Besides,God, mer­cy and sweetnesse to the di­vels. mercy and ju­stice are all but one thing in God; and this those mise­rable Creatures cannot consent to, that their ruine is the effect of supreme per­fection, infinite sweetnesse.

[Page 58]To the confirmation of this, I shall but presse this one consideration.

As wee know, wee love.If they did know more than the Saints, they must needs love more; and in this I shall have all those my abettors, who hold that the Will doth necessarily follow the understanding; which whilst Aristotle denieth in broad and open disputes, [...]. Arist. Eth. lib 3.c.6. vide &c.7. ci [...]ca fi­nem. he doth in tacite termes close­ly yeeld to.

I doe apprehend it an un­deniable truth, that what Good soever I know to be good, I must love. And therefore if wicked men did know more of God, they must know him needs under the notion of good: and so Seeing goodnesse in his nature, they must love [Page 59] him more.What we know, we are. I might adde, what good we know, we are: our act of understanding being an act of union, which (as before) being Metaphy­sicall in the soule, must be entire.

CHAP. IX. The difference betwixt Know­ledge and affection, discus­sed.

IT may be that what hath beene dispu­ted, will be gran­ted: but there is yet an ob­jection which requireth so­lution.

If all Being diffe­reth onely in degrees, not nature; if knowledge, af­fection, [Page 60] light, activity, bee all one; Whence is it that even amongst Christian men, holy, spirituall men, men of largest affections, (and the affections are the activity, the maine of the Soule) I say men of the lar­gest affections are esteemed to know least of God? And others, whose affections are as it were benummed, and all activity is placed in their braine, understand more of the divine nature?

Doth it not appeare from hence, say they, that all Being is not one, diffe­ring onely in degrees: but that there are even diffe­rent natures, amongst which one may excell, whilst the other is deprest?

I could tell these [Page 61] men, who start the objecti­on, that they deeme the light in the head, more than the love in the heart: and then I shall say,Affection handmaid to Know­ledge ac­cording to some. that with them the head is the higher degree, the heart the lower degree of light, and so all is but a different light; from whence, affection, be­ing judgement in its infan­cy, ceaseth, when Know­ledge groweth mature: as the heate and blaze of fire, is but its labouring towards purity and perfection, which therefore are no more when the cleare flame reacheth its Element. But other men think otherwise, and they doe pitch all in the affections, and the meaner light in the understanding; and so turn­ing the table, still one shall [Page 62] be a parcell of, or a step to the other,Knowledg a step to Affection, according to others. Knowledg & affecti­on names of diffe­rent de­grees in the same nature. and each carry a­long both in equall measure according to reality: how much true affection, so much knowledge, & vice versa: as I shall shew in o­ther two answers, on which I fixe the strength of my thoughts in this point. And therefore

Affection perfection of Know­ledge.Secondly, I affirme con­fidently, and, I hope, truly, that he, who soars upon the wings of Affection, and lay­eth himselfe in the arms of Jesus Christ, though hee amuse not his head with the mysticall nature of the Trinity, with the processi­on of the Spirit, with the incarnation of Jesus Christ, attempting to make that holy oyle; Touching the [Page 63] Arke, this glory which is too high for him; loosing himselfe, while he laboreth to see how humane nature can be raised so high; di­vine condescend so low, as to bring forth the Hypo­staticall Union: I say, such a one knoweth more of God, than the other.

It is often seene,Know­ledge of­ten no Know­ledge, but a vaine swelling. a work­ing head is like an over-hot liver, burneth up the heart, and so ruineth both: Whereas sweet humble af­fections, are the onely way to keepe the poore creature in a constancy of spirituall health. And in this care the Apostle to Titus for­bids foolish questions, Tit. 3.6. endlesse genealogies, contentions, and brawlings about the Law.

This Law is the rule of [Page 64] life; and if we know not the Law, Knowledg without power, e­ven in the law for­bidden. we cannot keepe the Law, and so we must pe­rish; and yet we finde the search of this forbidden.

Object. Some will say, here is meant the Ceremo­niall Law.

Answ. I will allow it; but is not the Ceremoniall in­cluded under the second precept?Ceremo­niall law included in the Mo­rall. The people up­on Christ his Sermon, wherein he taught, that He that looketh on a woman to lust after her, Mat. 5.28. hath commit­ted adultery with her in his heart (and so he gave the Law its full latitude) say, He speaketh as one that hath authority, Mat. 7.29. and not as the Scribes and Pharises: con­ceiving it their duty and happinesse to know the [Page 65] Law in its utmost limits; and yet we are restrained from any brain-sick, heady, nice inquiry, even into the Law, scil. not to busie our heads with the knowing part, in over-great pro­portion, but labour to bring our knowledge to practise.

If then all such know­ledge (I meane all know­ledge of this nature) bee forbidden, it is because it is not good; it is not knowledge, but a vaine tumour in stead of reall greatnesse or growth: and that other of the affecti­on, hath certainly more of God in it, and so more of truth.

The Apostle is so great an enemy to this kinde of [Page 66] knowledge, that having dis­puted such a point in dis­daine of gain-sayers, he concludeth, If any man lust to be contentious, 1 Cor. 11.16. we have no such custome, nor the Churches of God.

—Demonstrat quaelibet herba Deum. He who refreshed with the sweet odours, plea­sed with the various come­ly shapes of a flower, can say, this is sweet, this is lovely, lovely indeed; Yet Iesus Christ is a bed of spices, Cant. 2.1. as the Lilly of the field, the Rose of Sharon, sweeter, much sweeter, ten thousand times more lovely. This man knoweth God, this man lo­veth God, this man know­eth him indeed; and this knowledge, as it is the most pleasant here, so it will cer­tainly [Page 67] prove the most pro­fitable hereafter, and al­wayes declare it selfe most reall.

Doth not the Apostle, doth not he most truly, most pathetically cry out; Though I had the gift of pro­phecie, 2 Cor. 13.2. and knew all secrets, all knowledge, yea, if I had all faith, so that I could remove mountaines, I were nothing; I were as sounding brasse and a tinckling Cymbal, if I have not charity. When all these excellencies meet in a Christian, as happly they may, yet it is charity that maketh him what he is, and the other Beings are but as Phalerae, as trappings which give a handsome set-off, but not a Being to a Christian.

Love is lovely in Gods [Page 68] eye,God, from whom all light com­meth, is stil [...]d Love 1 Ioh 4 16. he is stiled the God of Love, the God Love. And in another place, the Scrip­ture affirmeth that in this we have fulfilled the will of God, if we love one ano­ther; for by this we are made one with God, and so dwell in true light.

The two Tables are re­duced to Love of God and our neighbour. So that sweet affections doe make the most sweet harmony in Gods eares.Women in greatest number truly gra­cious, be­cause most affectio­nate. Of the Cho­rus of Saints, the greatest number will bee found a­mongst the feminine sexe, because these are most natu­rally capable of affection, and so most apt to make knowledge reall. It is true, I confesse, these affections misguided, led them first [Page 69] into transgression; but these same affections after, car­ried them first to the grave, then to the sight of a Saviour, gave them the enwombing of Christ, who (in some sense) might have entertained our nature in another way (if he had so pleased;) and these affecti­ons will one day raise many of them into the sweet em­braces of everlasting joy.

Amongst the Church­Officers, the Pastor and the Doctor, according to Ti­mothie, are more eminent than the rest, because they labour in the word and do­ctrine. 1 Tim. 5.17 Of these two, the Doctor is alwayes to have his sword alwayes girt about his thigh, he must enter in­to the lists with every un­circumcised [Page 70] Goliah. Hee must stand continuall senti­nell, that no herefies be for­ced upon the Church. He must beat his braines in dis­solving difficilia, and clear­ing obscura. He must some­times faint away in wate­ry cold fits, by picking up, and throwing out witlesse, saplesse sophismes, which though they cannot hurt the strong, may seduce the weake. In the meane time, the Pastor leadeth the flock into the sweet and pleasant meadowes,The Pa­stor pre­ferred be­fore the Teacher, because the truth of truth in the heart li­eth in the affection. feeding them by the little brooks of seeming­ly shallow affections; and yet this man shall not onely receive equall honour with the Doctor, but be prefer­red before him; as appea­reth clearly in Eph. 4.11. [Page 71] 1 Cor. 12.26. As it was with the Israelites, so it is here; those who keepe the stuffe, receive equall reward with the combatants. I doe therefore conclude, Hee who hath the largest affe­ctions, hath most of God, most of his image, which is renewed in knowledge.

Thirdly,Know­ledge, where it is eminent in truth as well as ap­pearance, there affe­ction is e­qually e­minent. sometimes it hapneth, that those who have the largest knowledge, have the most enlarged af­fections, even to our eye; and this is happinesse in­deed. I confesse, it doth not so seeme to an eye that would read it running; but if it be exactly looked on, if it be presented to our view in the pourtrait of an example, I thinke it will be very cleare.

[Page 70] David and Salomon compared with Paul. David and Salomon com­pared with Paul, will be as a thousand witnesses. The two first doe seeme to out­strip all men in affection, they are brim-full, running over.

For, David is stiled the sweet Singer of Israel; in his Psalmes he is ever mag­nifying the rich mercies of God, singing forth the praises of God, chusing rather to be a doore-keeper in the house of God, than to dwell in the tents of Mesech: ma­king his Word to be a light unto his feet, and a lanthorn unto his paths, placing all his delight in the Law of the Lord.

Salomon is the happy Pen­man of that Hymne, which by the Spirit is stiled the [Page 73] Song of Songs. Yet for all this, even in this, they are both exceeded by Saint Paul.

But some, it may be, will imagine those Worthies to be endowed with higher gifts of Nature and Art, than S. Paul: and then they will give all the glory to their understanding, and not to their affections.

If it be so, I confesse I have not fitly chosen my Opposites; But the truth will then appeare in Them, without comparison di­stinctly.

For, if in affection they exceed all, and in abilities are as Saul, taller than their brethren by head and shoul­ders, then is it manifest in them, that eftsoone men of [Page 74] the most raised parts, of highest abilities, doe super­abound in love.

But, if, in things which are not directly of Faith, I could cease to be a Scep­tique, I should with that most Reverend Worthy, Thomas Goodwin, give Saint Paul for head and heart, that Throne in heaven which is placed next to Jesus Christ. But secret things belong to God; let us onely compare their eminency here below. I think it will be out of que­stion, that Saint Paul was the most excellent. For, though Salomon (there I suppose will be the difficul­ty) be said to be the wisest of men, that ever were, that ever should be; yet that is to be applied onely to Go­vernment, [Page 75] and (if it may reach so farre) to his ex­cellent skill in naturall Phi­losophy.Solomons preemi­nence in knowledg extended to Poli­ticks, and naturall Philoso­phy only.

View but Saint Paul, and see whether he doth not ex­cell in every thing. He had gathered up vast learning at the feet of Gamaliel; for his parts he was advanced to e­minent power in Church and Common-wealth. He saith of himselfe, I profited in the Iewes religion above many my equalls in my owne nation, being more exceeding­ly zealous of the traditions of my fathers. And after his conversion, he was judged the only man fit to contend with the Philosophers at Athens. For they who see­med to be somewhat, in conference added nothing [Page 76] to him. And therefore to him was committed the un­ravelling of all the difficult knots. It is he that disputes about meates, long haire, divorces, irregular partings of husband and wife. It is he that openeth the nature of prophecie, evinceth the resurrection from the dead, maintaineth justification by faith. And that he may be perfect in knowledge, God is pleased (whether in the flesh or spirit,2 Cor. 12.3 he knoweth not) to take him into the third heavens: and there he was so filled with Revelati­on, that God was forced to put the Philomela-Thorne under his breast, that hee might not fall into the sleep of sin, and so give himselfe up (as Sampson) into the [Page 77] hands of Philistine ene­mies. And yet this man ex­ceeds all men in affections, and in his affections surpas­seth all his other excellen­cies. It is hee that is often in journies,2 Cor. 11.26. in perils of wa­ters, in perils of robbers, in perils by his owne nati­on, in perils amongst the Gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilder­nesse, in perils in the sea, in perils amongst false Bre­thren, in wearinesse and painfulnesse, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold & nakednesse. And as he saith of himselfe, Who was weak and I was not weak? who was offended and I did not burne? It is hee that fought with the beasts at Ephesus. He [Page 78] is content not onely to bee bound, but to die for Christ.

Good Saint Paul was so tender over his kinsmen ac­cording to the flesh, that for their sakes he could wil­lingly be content to be se­parated from the love of the Lord Jesus Christ. And this is greater love than that which Christ mentioneth; for no man had then shew­ed greater love than to die; but this holy Saint will goe one step further, he will suf­fer an eternall death for his friend.

Thus, if suffering either for the head, or members, for the Church, or Christ, will discover affection, I suppose hee will merit the Garland.

[Page 79]And as a complement and crowne of all, if to live be most for Gods glory, though death be his advan­tage, he is resolved to sub­mit, making obedience to Christ in life and death, his gaine and triumph.

I confesse, when he tra­velleth through those briery disputes, he cannot dis­play such sparkling vivid affections: But when hee hath gotten but a little a­bove those lime-twigs, how doth he mount on high, and there, upon even wings, disdaine all things below, triumphing in the imbraces of his Saviour, who is to him more choice than the choicest of ten thousand?

If what I have attempted to prove, be true, as I hope [Page 80] it is, then Consider,

Either those who are e­minent in affection, and o­therwise know little; or those who, as they abound in one, are also Masters in the other:True knowledg, true affe­ction, se­parated from all appearan­ces or out­ward ad­vantages of the bo­dy, or the like, are one. Distinguish ap­pearances from truth; Rea­ding, memory, discourses, effects of sense or com­plexion, from that which entreth the soule, becom­meth reall there, acteth, floweth from thence as a spring: And then will you conclude, that all knowledglieth in the affection; that all knowledge is but one, differing onely in degrees.

And lastly, that all, whe­ther knowledge or affecti­on, is but the Truth, that spi­rituall ray of heavenly light which God is pleased [Page 81] to present to our view un­der severall shapes, yet is but one and the same Being, scil. light and truth.

CHAP. X. That all the severall and par­ticular actings of the soule, are this one light and truth.

THUS have I dis­patch't the first discourse of the generall form and nature of the Understand­ing.Apprehen­sions, con­clusions, affirmati­ons, &c. all one truth in the soule. Now concerning the particular and various work­ings thereof, in conclusions, simple apprehensions, nega­tions and affirmations, &c. which seeme to be the of­spring of the first and ori­ginall [Page 82] Being; even these, I hope to prove all one and the same, as with themselves, so with the former, all con­joyned in one Being of light and truth. That is truth in the fountaine, this in the streames; and no man will deny the fountaine and streame to make one river. Onely, sometimes it appea­reth in such a shape, some­times in another, but is still the same soule.

The ope­rations of the soule are proved one with the essence thereof.This will appeare if wee compare the nature of the Soule or Understanding (for we have proved them both one) with their irra­diations, actings and seve­rall emanations. Res enim dignoscendae sunt ex causis. Now, we conceive the first Being to be no other thing, [Page 83] than activity, so confest by all. And if you would know what an activity is, you shall finde it to be either potentia agendi, or ipsa actio, or rather actus primus & actus secundus.

If it be actus, either Pri­mus or Secundus (for primus and secundus are to me diffe­renc'd onely by time, and so not differenc'd at all, (of which I will presently speak a little more) it must be still in work, and is no lon­ger than it acts. Now, what can this act be in this sub­ject, whereof we discourse, but the reasonable working of the soule in this or that conclusion? If it be any o­ther than a work of reason, how can it constitute, or be­come the forme of a ratio­nall soule and humane un­derstanding? [Page 84] If it be such, how differs it from thought, ratiocination or positions in the minde?

The acti­vity which is the form of the soul, not diffe­rent from the actions thereof.Whilst then these con­clusions, sayings, actions, are the forme of that truth, of that universall first truth, they must be that truth. For, forma quae dat esse, est esse, and whatsoever is the forme of any thing, that is the Be­ing of it. For, Being and Forme are but one.

If the forme of this acti­vity be not these reasonable workings, it must be some­thing either of a baser allay, or of a higher stamp.

Not of a higher straine.If the latter; then you speak of Angels or some o­ther spiritual Being, if there be any which is more noble than the soule. And then [Page 85] how doth this excellency discover it selfe? Where or what is it? How is it said that Action is the perfecti­on of all things?

If the former;Nor of a lower. then first you descend to some lower degree of existency; for, all Being is but an activity; and according to the glory or basenesse of that activity, doth the Being receive de­nomination.

Or secondly; Shall the cause be more ignoble than the effects? What then? If it be neither more excellent, nor lower,Neither can it be various. is it various, hath it lesse or more of action? still you fall at the same stone.

But they who approve of the distinction of actus pri­mus and actus secundus, think [Page 86] they salve all by the distin­ction of substance and acci­dent; So, with them, actus primus is the Being, the substance it selfe: and actus secundus is the product of that Being or accident be­longing to that which they make a soule; and thus for­getting this, that omnis vir­tus consistit in actione, they make the soule a meere vir­tuall Being.

The distin­ction be­tweene actus pri­mus and actus secun­dus, exami­ned.But, besides that the for­mer Reasons are not thus everted, of these men I should ask this question.

What is this their actus primus? What is the forme of it? What is with them the forme of a reasonable soule?

Is not Reason? can there then be a soule, till there be [Page 87] reason? And this Reason is not potentia ratiocinandi, but Ratio. For, if you distinguish between the act and pow­er, the act must ever be first in order, dignity, and na­ture.

So then, What is the form of this primus actus? is not some act? if it be, it must exist; else you will allow it but a bare notionall Being, which lyeth in the appre­hension. And if it doth exist, must it not be this which you call actus secun­dus?

If it be not an act, they make it nothing but a pow­er, a faculty depending upon something else. And if this be the nature of the first, what can the second Being (which is the effect, and so [Page 88] lower) be, but a bare no­tion?

The di­stinction betweene Substance and Acci­dent cal­led into question.If here were fit place, I might perhaps set upon the Rack that long-famous Di­stinction of Substance and Accident, wherby It should be forced to confesse it selfe an aged imposture, at least in the generall and frequent acceptance.

But the activity consisting in the action, That and It shall both be proved but one; and so, actus primus and actus secundus are this same truth, this light which I plead for.

CHAP. XI. An objection answered, in which the nature of Time and Place are touched.

YEt this doth ex­ceedingly stumble mens thoughts; wee see various actings of the soule, distin­guished by the circumstan­ces of Time and Place; there are severall distinct actings; are there then so many severall soules?

First, I could justly give this answer; When these men can tell me what time and place is, I doe hope I shall finde both time and place to dissolve the diffi­culties.

[Page 90]Secondly, I shall, I sup­pose, both by reason and their owne assertions in the like case, prove that time and place are nothing, or alter nothing in this point; and that, these simile's will a lit­tle irradiate.

The na­ture of Beauty il­lustrating time and place.Beauty (if I bring not the exact discription of the learned, yet I shall remem­ber so much as concerneth the point in hand) consists in complexion, in linea­ments, and in harmony.

Complexion draweth his Being from colour, from the subject wherein colour is seated, the spirits which give a Being to this colour, &c. and these are differen­ced by many circumstances. Lineaments as they are adorned by, so are they the [Page 91] ornaments of this com­plexion. And these againe are divers from themselves, and divers from Harmony. And yet, by Harmony, these make up one sweet, one pleasant Being, which we call Beauty.

A Flame rising from di­vers thornes, is not many, is but one flame. A streame filled with various springs, is not various, is but one streame. So is it in our case.

Those Circumstances of time and place, differencing these various Beings, are something, or nothing.

If nothing, the objection is answered.

If something, they are a piece of the whole, they serve to make up that har­mony, [Page 92] which we call Beau­ty, [...]. Thus time and place, with all Beings of the like nature, are either nothing, or else they have a share in the Being, and make up the totum Compositum.

Time and Place no­thing diffe­rent from the essence of the soul.The Soule is but one Act distinguished to our noti­on by severall apparitions; and these intervals, with all variations, either are no­thing, or are of the nature of the Soule, and serve to make up that confort, that truth, that life that we now discourse of.

And that this is so, I hope by this cleere ratiocination to leave you assured.

Time and Place seeme to me nothing but an extrinse­call modification of a thing. I cannot finde that the lear­ned [Page 93] have made anything at all of them. Let us survey them, as they define them, when they treat of them; as they esteeme them, when they meete them occasio­nally.

How hath Aristotle defi­ned Place?The defi­nitions of time and place re­jected. Est superficies concava corporis ambientis; Where is the truth of this in the highest heaven which incompasseth all the rest?Place. Hath Ramus any whit ad­vanced the cause in his de­finition? Est subjectum rei locatae; Idem per Idem! Are not those who propound, and they who entertain such a definition, justly compa­red to the Constable and the Country-Justice? The first having received from some higher power a War­rant, [Page 94] wherein in was this hard word, Invasion, repaired to his Rabbi for Solution: he, that the question might seeme somewhat obscure, paused a little, that it might not shame him; after he had consulted, in a stroke or two with his grave-learned beard, replyed; the sense of this word is very plaine, it is Invasion, it signifieth Inva­sion; with which the Con­stable being fully satisfied, gave him many thankes and departed. Locus and spatium corporis locati, is little better; what have we in this defini­tion, of the intrinsecall na­ture of place? So that, if I be not wholly blinde, they, whilst they treat of it as Scholars, make it nothing: when they make use of it by [Page 95] the By, it is the same. As, the Soule, they say, is tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte; whilst they spread and diffuse the soule over the whole body, from one ex­tremity to the other, Place maketh no division in the soule; it is but one soule, yet extended quite through the body. Angels are defini­tivè in loco; that place which is within the circumference so limited, doth not at all cause them to make two in this angelicall Being.

I may affirme the same of time,Time. Tempus est mensura mo­tus; What doe I know of time by this? how can I from hence ghesse time to have so considerable a Be­ing, as that it shall make two of that whith other­wise [Page 96] would be but one? In the Deity we are sure it can have no such effect. In the Deity wee have creation, preservation, redemption, decree, and execution of that decree. All these to our apprehension are distin­guished by time: and yet no man will say, that in God they are two: for God is purus actus, nulla poten­tia.

But you will say, this is obscurum per obscurius, and not to unmask and unveile difficulties: Which no Si­mile taken from the Divi­nity can doe, because That is all mysticall.

To which I answer, Si magnis licet componere parva, wee shall finde the same in our selves, we shall find that [Page 97] Time doth not at all diffe­rence, or any way act. I sup­pose it is cleare, that Place hath lost all place and cre­dit in this argumentation. Why may not I say the same of Time, seeing by all mens confessions they are twins of the same womb? But secondly, I affirme this, (and I hope truly) that if you make Time any thing,All actions nothing, if time be any thing. you annihilate all the act of the Creation; that is, you will admit of no one perfect action. A thought, I con­fesse, passeth in a moment; and yet, in this moment, un­der this moment, are many subdivisions of Time. We have in an houre, an halfe, a quarter, a minute, a second, (the 60 part of a minute:) & how many subdivisions will [Page 98] a scruple admit of? For ought I know, Time and punctum Physicum agree in this, that they are divisibi­lia in insinitum. If then you will make so many thoughts in a thought, as you have divisions under a scruple, you will have no perfect thought, no com­pleat act. To shun this, you wil confesse that Time doth not divide one act alone: but one Act or thought compre­hendeth many Times. Why may not I say, that if Time doth not parcell out one act, it cannot act upon two, when the duality ari­seth onely from Time? This not being well weighed, hath cast our wits upon strange rocks, hath raised this Question,

[Page 99] How doth God see things? The diffi­culty un­tied, how God seeth things. If in their existencies, then all things are co-eternall with God: if in their Cau­ses onely, then all things are not present with God; but you must admit of suc­cession, a former and a lat­ter, to eye divine; which is blasphemy. This dilemma seemeth strong; but it is be­cause we make Time some­thing: whereas indeed all things did exist in their Be­ings with God ab omni aeterno. For, aeternum & tempus are all one in eter­nity: and this successi­on is but to our appre­hension.

Thus, if Time and Place be nothing, I hope the weight of this objection is is taken off.

[Page 100]But I foresee another ob­jection.

Object. If Time and Place be nothing, if all our Actions are but One: How can there be evill and good?

Answ. I fully conclude with Aristotles Adversaries Anaxagoras, Democritus, &c That Contradictions may be simul & semel in the same Subject, same Instant, same Notion (not onely in two distinct respects, or notions, as one thing may be causa & effectum, Pater & Filius, respectu diversi; but even in the same respect, under one and the same Notion.) For, Non ens is nothing; and so, the Being which it hath, may subsist with that which contradicts it. I speake in their termes.

[Page 101]Now, let us view our acti­ons, either

as Many, in pieces, or, One entire act.

As many; impute Trans­gression to what you please, either to the effects in the body, or the Will, and its workings: all these, so farre as they have Being, are good; for, all Being is good. Where then is the sinne? Certainly, sinne li­eth in this, that there is not so full a goodnesse as there should. Sin is onely a Pri­vation, a Non-Entity: But, a Privation, a Non-Entity may subsist (according to the subsistence it hath) with Being. Such a co-existence of Entity and Non-Entity, was in his faith, who cried, Lord, I beleeve, help my unbe­liefe. [Page 102] This Contradiction (of Entity, Non-Entity) must be in the selfe-same Act, (and not in two distinct Acts:) else the Act is per­fect, (having complete En­tity, goodnesse, without ad­mixture of Non-Entity:) and so is onely the Crea­tor: or else it is more im­perfect than Beelzebub; for, It is Bad, and no Good, Non-Entity wholly, and no Entity, and so no A­ction.

Thus we see Good and Evill may co-exist in seve­rall, in particular Actions; Why then not so, if all Acts should bee but one entire Act, undistinguisht by Time or Place? If the members composing the Body, have matter and forme, why then [Page 103] not the whole Body? Sinne in it selfe is nothing, only a non-conformity to Gods Law.

The Twilight hath not so much light and so much positive darknesse: only it hath not so much light as Noon in cleare day. Here's the defect: and by this de­fect, Light and Darknesse co-exist in the same point of ayre.

So, though our Acts bee but one, undivided by Time and Place: yet, to our griefe, are not free from Sinne.

Thus the Soule, Truth, Light, is alwayes and con­tinually one, though it ap­peareth otherwise to me: and this appearance ought not to dazle the sight of the truth; for, as they say of honour, Honor est in ho­norante: [Page 104] so may I say of ap­prehension, Apprehensio est in apprehendente: the thing is still the same, let my ap­prehension bee what it will bee.

The same truth ta­king vari­cus shapes in our ap­prehensi­ons.I doe not reject the phra­ses of severall truths, and several actings of this truth: for, Loquendum cum vulgo; yet, phrases must not mis­lead us. For whilst I con­fesse loquendum esse cum vul­go, I professe that sapiendum est cum paucis. For, to our apprehension, that truth which is but one, doth va­riegate it selfe, and take di­vers shapes.

Set forth by a simili­tude ta­ken from the Sun.As that Sun which is one and the same, is ruddy in the morning, cleere at noone­day; of a moderate heate early, and at mid-day rather torrid.

[Page 105]Various colours meeting in the same point,The same act of sense perfectly one, yet varied un­to many formes. to make up one indivisible act of sense, are by it judged divers Beings, whereas they all make up but one Being; they are but one and the same object of sense. Rea­son, which is exalted above Sense, telleth us it must be so; because that act of life is but one, and the Sense is not an Ubiquitary; it cannot act upon any more than one at once.

The Trigonall Glasse paints out to us more, A Simili­tude from the trigo­nall glasse. and more lively colours in every object (which as a medium it presents to the eye) than are in the Iris; yet, This object, may be but some duskish sad thing, in which there is no change of colours at all.

[Page 106] Sense con­futed by Copernicus.The three leading Senses have confuted Copernicus these many yeares; for the eye seeth the circulations of the Heavens; we feele our selves upon a stable and firme foundation; and our eares heare not from the volutations of the Earth such a black Cant as her heavy rowlings would rum­ble forth: and yet now if we will beleeve our Capernic. Kepler. Gallilaeus de Galil: new Ma­sters, sense hath done as sense will doe, misguided our Reason.

When the nimble juglers play their pranks, you see and heare, yet neither see nor heare. So your sense is no good judge. Thus let the soule be raised to its supreme height of power, and it will cleerely see, that [Page 107] all the actings of reason which seeme severall (bee they, as we think, distingui­shed by time and place) are but one, a fixt entire unity.

CHAP. XII. Another objection is answered, drawn from the falshood in the workings of the soule.

BUt if these parti­cular actings of truth,Object. are truth; then when this Being, which wee have so long discour­sed of, acteth not truth, it ceafeth to bee: and so, where the soule entertain­eth or pronounceth a false position, the soule is no more it selfe.

[Page 108]Grant that it is with the soule in this moment of time, when it acts upon fals­hood, as when it acts not, and so is not; yet you will advance nothing, till you can prove the succession of moments to have a reall be­ing. By former discourse,Successi­on of mo­ments, ap­parent, not reall. I hope it is cleare, that Time is but a Nominall Being, and then this cessation depend­ing on that distinct mo­ment, which is not, is like­wise it selfe an imagination.

The scule never acts falsly.But secondly, I will al­low it, when any man can shew me that Falshood is a reall being, which the soule or truth can worke upon; For, in every apprehension two things are to be weigh­ed; The Agent it selfe, and the Subject acted upon, (I [Page 109] speake now in other mens language; for I conceive the Agent together with the Subject to be One in the act.) Truth is alwayes truth, Nemine dubitante; and so it must be true, whilst it acteth on a truth. If that be True, which it acts upon, then all is well; if it be False, it is a vanity, a lye, a nothing. For, if Falshood have a Being, then wee must either with the Manichees, make Two sources of Being, or else God must be the author of it; which no man will affirme.

If then it have no Being, the Soule cannot act in it, and so it cannot be the act of the Soule; For, how shall the soule or truth act upon nothing?

[Page 110] Object.But the Soule doth act, when it pronounceth a false position?

Resp. In false propositi­ons of the soule, so farre as it acts, it acts truly: where it is decei­ved, it is by not acting.He that in the twilight, mistaketh a man for a tree, acteth right in what he see­eth; and when he raiseth a false conclusion upon the premisses, he acteth not. For, how is it possible, that a man should act falshood, a vanity, nothing?

In this action, there are two things; There is the see­ing a Being, and the seeing it under a confused notion. Or, which is the same,

You may observe, first, the opining; secondly, the opi­ning uncertainly or falsly.

The opining, is a good act, none will deny; to think, let it be what it will be, is good.

[Page 111]But secondly, the so-think­ing, is that which is obscure. Now certainly, the formalis ratio of this so-thinking, lyeth in thinking of errour, which is nothing; and in thinking of nothing, the the soule cannot act; for, nothing produceth no­thing.

A man, who catcheth at the shadow of a Hornet, acteth rightly in catching, and stingeth not himselfe; because he apprehendeth onely the shadow; because so far he doth not act; for to catch a shadow, to catch nothing, and not to act, are idem. And thus, whilst the soule catcheth at a false po­sition, it graspeth but the shadow, which can be no­thing, seeing evill is, no­thing; [Page 112] ergo, it loseth not truth; for it pronounceth nothing but the truth of the position.

Paine hath no reall Being.The same may be said for Paine. I conceive, it cannot act upon the soule, nor the soule upon it, because, it is but a bare privation of spi­rit and strength. And up­on this ground, I shall sub­scribe to that opinion pro­pounded by that reverend, worthy, that quick-sighted Balearian-jaculator, M^r D^r Twisse: Whether it be not better to be in perpetuall paine, than not to be at all. If Paine be but a bare priva­tion, certainly Any Being is more desirable, than, for feare of a privation (a not­being) to become no-Be­ing.

[Page 113] Hîc rogo, Mart. lib. 2. Epigr. 80. non furor est, ne moriare, mori? If any man shall tell me I speak against sense, I shall modestly ask him this Question: Whe­ther it be not impar congres­sus betwixt Sense and Rea­son: and whether, in that case, Sense be an equall judge. Reason telleth us, that Paine must either be something, or nothing; if nothing, then it is but a pri­vation; if something, it must be either good, or evill; if good, it cannot (as hath, and will yet appeare more in this Pamphlet) hurt us; if evill, it is either a nominall evill, or reall; if it be named an evill, and is not, it will not be disputed; but if it be a Reall evill, then it is no­thing; for, Evill, by con­sent [Page 114] of all, is nothing but privation of good. In this case shall Reason or Sense guide, judge You.

CHAP. XIII. Discovering the consequences of this Position, that All things are one Truth.

WHEN you collect your thoughts, and passe sentence up­on these unsheaved glean­ings, your gentlenes (though the papers merit no such fa­vour) wil smile upon them; and say, here our eyes indeed are pleased with the curio­sity of Pallas her needle: but, what hath Reason to work [Page 115] upon? what is the useful­nesse of this more than A­rachne's web? more than to entangle empty wits with­all? What fruit doth it yeeld better than the Silk­worme, which is worne one­ly for ostentation? Give me leave to plead for my own. Our own (you know, though black) is comely to Our selves.

If This were well weighed,The hap­pinesse of our lives advanced by this o­pinion. that all things are but one emanation from power di­vine: If this were taken ful­ly into the Understanding, that wee might be said to live upon, to live in this truth; we should live more Christianly, more cheer­fully.

[Page 116] I say more cheerfully, more Christianly, in a few mo­ments, than we doe now in the whole course of our di­stracted time. And you will more easily consent to this, if you doe consider that our happinesse is compounded of two Simples only, which are so entertwined, as that they may seeme One,

• The first is to know.
• The second, to doe what is right and good.

Of the former, the Theo­reticall part, I shall speake hereafter. In the Practick, Two things are conside­rable,

This Vnity the foun­taine of knowledg. First, that, Action depend­eth wholly upon know­ledge. And, of Knowledge, this is the well-spring and rule, that, Vnity is all. The [Page 117] Spirit saith, How can you love whom you doe not know? and I may say, How can you do what you know not?

The Not-knowledge of of what is right, with-hold­eth from, and wearieth in action; if perchance wee ever have any glimmering of light.Action wholly de­pends on knowledg. For, Ignorance bringeth this double evill with it.

First, it leadeth into Er­rour; and Errour (simply in the view of it) giveth no content.

Seconly, in the progresse it wearieth and distracteth. One who is lost in a Wood, suffereth as much in seeking as losing the way. Where­as, if we Knew aright, how even and smooth would be the way of action, and how [Page 118] great our contents therin?

Secondly, not only all our actions turn upon this hinge; but out of this trea­sury issueth forth the whole complacency that wee ga­ther from, or receive in action. For, if wee knew this truth, that all things are one; how cheerfully, with what modest courage should wee undertake any action, re-incounter any oc­currence, knowing that that distinction of misery and happinesse, which now so perplexeth us, hath no Being, except in the Brain? Wee should not need to check and raise our selves with Davids out-cryes, why art thou cast downe my soule, why art thou disquieted within me? Our Spirits [Page 119] could with him wait upon God; make him our only rock, and then wee should not be moved. We should not call for Epictetus nor Boëtius de consolatione Phi­losophica; wee might fetch our cures from our own bo­somes, if from this one truth of unity wee could conclude these two things.

First, that Misery is no­thing, and so cannot hurt.

Secondly, that every thing that is, is good, and good to me: then we might sing with a joyfull spirit, O nimium, nimiumque beati; and upon sure ground; for, whilst I being a Being, am Good, and that other Being is Good, and these Two Goods can fall under no other difference, but of de­grees; [Page 120] Good & Good, can­not but agree, and so must be good to me.

Ob.If any man shall say, that the overflowing of another mans good, may be my e­vill; they mis-take;Resp. for, such a though is a falshood; and, as I have already proved, Falshood is nothing, and so cannot hurt.

That such a thought is falshood, I suppose this will cleare it.

The Philosophers fancy to themselves animam mun­di, and say every parcell is as a Simple contributing to the existence of that Compo­situm. But Christians know, and I have (if I mistake not) evinced, that, all Being is but one emanation from above, diversified onely in our ap­prehension. [Page 121] How can then one piece of that Being im­peach the other,All things one piece. one part of the Soule quarrell with the other? As the will (speak­ing in their termes) with the sensitive faculty; or the Eye with the Belly: the vani­ty whereof Esop hath taught us long agoe. So, of neces­sity, if either my envy, or a­nothers folly, lay me low, be­cause my brother is exalted, this must be a lie, and so cannot hurt. E contrario, the Good of another, being the perfection of the whole, is my advantage. If with this eye you view that Scripture, you will see it in its glory, Is thine eye evill, Mat. 20.15 because thy brothers good increaseth?

The rule, you see is, that I should rejoyce at the well­fare [Page 122] of another. Now what is the reason of the rule?Propriety maketh lovely. Philosophy teacheth us, that it is not onely [...], but [...], that is, lovely. If then I must rejoyce, I re­joyce because of some pro­priety, and this propriety ariseth from Vnity; this Al­kermes of Unity, cheereth the drooping spirit, cureth the atra bilis of Melancho­ly. The same potion easeth the heart of envyings, cen­surings and whisperings. So he, who knoweth that inju­ries, because they are no­thing, cannot hurt; and good things, though anothers, doe serve him; cannot cherish such viperous starvelings in his thoughts.

CHAP. XIIII. The benefit which Knowledge and all Sciences receive from this assertion.

I Have in a word showne how Uni­ty untyeth all dif­ficulties, unites all happi­nesse in practicall things. Permit me to discover what influence it hath upon that other simple, which maketh up the compound of our happinesse, (Scil.) Theorie.

Tully saith of Epicurus, The vani­ty of di­viding knowledg into many Sciences. Frangit, non dividit; The breaking of learning into so many Sciences, is but making so many miles, that so the Master may have more hire for his post­horse. [Page 124] They forget, that, vita est brevis, whilst ars est longae. It were much better if all Learning were like the chaine fastned at Iupiters Throne, all of a piece: Or the Beame, which from the Sunne by a continuall tract of irradiation toucheth the treasures of the earth.

To the effecting of this, that learned, that mighty man Comenius doth happily and rationally indeavour to reduce all into one. Why doe wee make Philosophy and Divinity two Sciences? What is True Philosophy but Divinity? and if it be not True, it is not Philoso­phy.

Confusi­ons from division in knowledg.Doe but see a little in particulars, the fruit of such like divisions.

[Page 125]In the knowledge of Be­ings, we must observe

First,Knowledg double, of Beings, & of their Causes. Being is:

Secondly, What it is.

There is the [...], and the [...]. What a tedious work doth this very division lay upon us?Knowledg of Beings twofold, of their existen­cies, and their na­tures. Alas, the very first, the easiest part of it, will take up all our time; and to ascend to causes before we know that there are effects, is to mount the highest round, before we ascend the first. And therefore that learned wit, Sir Francis Ba­con, in his naturall Philoso­phy, bringeth onely experi­ments, leaving the search of causes to those, who are content, with Icarus, to burne their wings at a fire too hot for them. Indeed, sometimes as an imbellish­ment [Page 126] of his discourse, that he may please stirring fancy, he interlaceth some causes, yet gently and modestly propoundeth them, but as for entertainment. If now our humble spirits could be content to see all things, as they are, but one, onely bearing different shapes, we should according to that rule, Noli altum sapere, im­prove in what we know, and there sit downe. But our spirits are mighty Nimrods, hunting after knowledge, venturing all, to eate of the tree of knowledge of good and evill. Which curiosi­tie of ours, is wittily repro­ved by Sir Iohn Davies;

And for this reason we lose with Esops Dog, the sub­stance, and get not the sha­dow.

Causes we cannot,Knowledg of existen­cies neces­sary, but altogether uncertain. neither shall ever finde out: The knowledg of existencies we omit; they are too volumi­nous, if we did attempt; and so much doubted of by men, that what to think, we know not. View all Learning, and see how the very Being of things, is questioned in Na­turall Philosophy. Amongst the Quadrupedes, wee que­stion the existence of the [Page 128] Unicorne: inter volatilia, the Phoenix, and the Bird of Paradise: amongst Fishes, the Mer-maid. When we seek into Minerals, we finde not Ebur fossile; the incom­parable vertues of it wee meet with in all Physicians: but the subject of so many excellencies, we doubtful­ly hope for. Of herbes and plants, Bookes name many which gardens, meadowes, rivers afford not: If they ever were, we may give them to Pancirolla, that he may reckon them with perpetu­um mobile, the Philosophers stone, cum multis alijs, inter Inventa perdita: For every age interreth old things, and is againe fertile of new births.

If we were mighty men, [Page 129] as Adam, Knowledg of the na­tures more uncertain than the existen­cies. that all the crea­tures would come and pre­sent themselves to our view: yet (which is the second part of this first Question) wee could not give them their names according to their natures. For when we doe know that any Being doth exist, we doe not know what their formes, their se­verall qualities and tempe­raments are. We altogether are ignorant of herbes and plants; which are hot and cold, in how many degrees they are so. For in these, how many, how eternall are the debates? Some deny the healing vertue to Dictam­num. Some question the na­ture of that killing-saving Indian herb, Hen-man-bane, Tobacco: whose insolence is [Page 130] such, as to make That part of man a chimny, an outlet of her smoky birth (expres­sed happily by Doctor Tho­ry in these words, In (que) tubo genitas haurire & reddere nubes:) I say, to make That an outlet of her smoky birth, by which the old Romans (in this their Proverb, Est homo nasutus) discovered their judgements of gifts and wit. Some say it is hot, and some say it is cold. Few of the Learned, consent about the degrees of heat and cold in any Simple, and so are forced to palliate all with the gaudy mantle of occulta qualitas; Yet what are all these but matter of observation? manifest ef­fects, which Sense teacheth the plowman, the Country­man, [Page 131] yea the bruites them­selves, as familiarly, as warmth in the Sun-shine, and wet in the Raine. I could name many questions in As all those laws concern­ing slaves, whereas a slave in­deed is non ens, for if any man have given away, with Esau, his birth▪ right, yet he hath not lost it; because manhood and religion are not mei juris; they are talents which God hath intrusted me with, and are no more deputable, than places of jud ca­tu [...]e. Et sic de caeteris. Politickes, Oecono­mickes, Ethickes, &c. the very subject whereof are in dispute. But they will more happily fall in, when I dis­cover our ignorance in causes.

Thus you see in what a Maze you are Meandred,In what sense Knowledg of Beings is to be wished. if you admit of any divisi­on. The very knowledge of the Being of things, is more than we are capable of. And as yet that is neces­sary, [Page 132] so we keepe our selves still to this principle, that those things are all of one nature, variegated only in our apprehension: and this knowledge I must consent to.

But if men once seeke into the Causes of Subsi­stencies, I see no reason but they should suffer as Rei laesae Majestatis. For these are Arcana Imperii, which to meddle with, is no lesse than high Trea­son.

CHAP. XV. Confusion in the knowledge of Causes, discovered, and redressed by this Vnity.

IF wee are thus at a stand, in these very beginnings, what shall wee bee, when wee enquire after Causes? Two lie open to our view.Two only causes re­ceived, God, and emanati­on from God. First, our great and good God, the fountaine of all Being, and this the Ancients styled Fatum.

Secondly, there is that E­manation from him,Aristotles materia prima brought to light. which is the first created cause of all Being, and this was A­ristotle's materia prima, so far as sensible things extend. [Page 134] Which because it is the sub­stance of all things, and the variations of it make all formes; therefore in it selfe, he described it to be neither quid, quale, nor quantum.

All other causes are bet­ter knowne by name, than in the natures of them. They make many, as Effici­ent, Finall, Materiall, For­mall; with divers subdistin­ctions; as instrumental, ex­emplary, &c. All these have matter and forme.Matter & Forme have their matter and forme, both of which meet in the ema­nation. For, there is a matter, and forme of a materiall cause, and forme and matter of formall causes. For in a table of of wood, the materiall cause is not the matter, wood: wood is the subject, upon which this materiall cause bringeth forth that effect, [Page 135] a Table. It may bee the materiall cause shall not be Physicall matter; wee shall by and by finde it ano­ther name.

Of the forme of a mate­riall cause, I shall say no­thing, and so for formall causes.

Faith is said to be the forme of a Christian, and faith hath its forme. The soule is by many deemed (which I understand not) the forme of the reasonable creature, and it hath a par­ticular individuall forme. And thus both materiall and formall causes have matter and forme.

Matter againe, is either Physicall and substantiall, or metaphoricall and metaphy­sicall. And this is the name [Page 136] I promised even now.

Formes are either intrin­secall, or extrinsecall: the intrinsecall are Logicall, Metaphysicall, &c.

Now have you various and severall kinds of forms; but who knoweth the least considerable part of matter or forme? Who will not cleerly lose himselfe in such an inquest? May we not say of these, what one saith wittily of the Soule?

[Page 137]Doe but survey the Phy­sicall Beings of our Philo­sophers, with what impos­sible, with what unnecessary scrutinies of causes,The vaine search of causes in Physicks. do they weary themselves, and their Disciples?

Till numeri Platonici cease to be a Proverb, I must re­maine a Sceptick, although one undertake to teach me, how and whence it is, that va­rious rowlings of the tongue, shall send forth so many ar­ticulate voices, and so ma­ny severall languages.

Till it be known, how all numbers gather themselves into an Unity, I must not give credence to another, who promiseth an accompt of the estuation of the Sea.

I know some surrender Neptunes Trident to the [Page 138] Moone, and there six the reason of Thetis her uncer­tain ebbings. Others Platonici; who make the world animal ma­gnum. Vide Gal. in Sy­stem. Pto­lem. & Co. pernic. Kep­lers Harmo. give the world a good paire of lungs, and from these Bel­lowes expect the causes of what they inquire for. Others take a dish of water, and shaking it up and down, think to cleere this difficul­ty. But these their ratioci­nations discover cleerly, that with NOAHS Dove, through over-much water, they can finde no ground for footing. For veritas non quaerit angulos. And if the reason were ready, they would not have disputed; and yet they are very confi­dent; and why may not they be so, who dare venture to give (before they prove any Orbs) the government of [Page 139] the Orbs to a band of cele­stiall intelligences?

I shall not wonder, if these men every where finde an Euripus, and at its bankes imitate their Grandy'sAristot. out­cry, Quia ego non possum te capere, tu me capias.

How doth the Spirit be­foole these men? First hee telleth them, that they are so farre from finding out the Causes, that they are ig­norant of the Effects: Know­est thou the time when the wild Goats of the rock bring forth? or canst thou mark when the Hindes doe calve? Canst thou number the moneths that they fulfill, or knowest thou the time when they bring forth?

Salomon saith, There are three things too wonderfull [Page 140] for me; yea, foure which I know not.Prov. 30. 18.19.The way of an Eagle in the aire, the way of a serpent upon a rocke, the way of a ship in the midst of the sea, and the way of a man with a maid.

See Aristot. de mundo, de coelo &c.How doth our great Ma­ster perplexe himselfe in the inquiry of causes? Sometimes he makes the principia of naturall things, to be contraria: whereas, neither the heavens, nor the starres, nor anything that is by univocall generation, is that way produced. Some­times he allowes three prin­cipia, Privatio, Materia, & Forma; forgetting his own principle, that Ex nihilo ni­hil fit, not remembring that when hee hath matter and forme, he is yet to seek for the Rock and Pit, out of [Page 141] which matter and form are digged and hewed; and therefore instituteth two severall authors, one of mat­ter, another of forme.

I confesse, his Commen­tators doe file of some rust from these Tenets, but not so cleerely as to make him give the right cause of Be­ing.

Romance's and New-At­lantides, I shall gladly em­brace as pleasant and glori­ous entertainements from specious and Ambrosian wits.Like Pla­to's and sir Francis Ba­con's. But for true know­ledge of causes, having no cause to expect, I will not hope.

Sis Walter Raleigh saith exceeding well, that the Cheese-wife knoweth that Runnet curdleth Cheese, [Page 142] but the Philosoher know­eth not how.

All this while I doe not reject an industrious search after wisedome, though the wisest of men saith, He that increaseth wisedome, increa­seth griefe.

Verulan: Augment. Scient.I doe only, with Sir Fran­cis Bacon, condemne doctri­nam phantasticam, litigiosam, fucatam, & mollem; a nice, unnecessary, prying into those things which profit not.

Too great exactnesse in this Learning, hath caused our Meteorologists to blush when their confidence hath proved but a Vapour. Too great hopes of discovering the mysterie of nature, hath caused some, contrary to the authority of Scripture [Page 143] contrary to the opinion of Iulius Caesar, Picus Miran­dula, Cornelius à Lapide, Io­an. Barclaius, cum multis ali­is, to attribute an unwar­ranted power to the starres over our bodies.

But this ensueth, while we follow, for learning, what is not. And so, that noble comprehensive activity, the soule of man, is hindered from entertaining in its place more generous, more usefull, and sublimated Truths.

How would the soule improve, if all Aristotles Materia prima, Plato's Mens Platonica, Hermes Trisme­gistus his [...], were converted into some spiri­tuall light? the soule might soare and raise it selfe up to [Page 144] Universall Being, bathe it selfe in those stately, deep, and glorious streames of of Vnity, see God in Iesus Christ, the first, chiefe, and sole cause of all Being: It would not then containe it selfe within particular rivu­lets, in whose shallow wa­ters it can encounter no­thing but sand or pebbles, seeing it may fully delight it selfe in the first rise of all delight, Iesus Christ.

Thus, when you see the face of Beauty, you will perfectly be assured how many the severall pieces which make it up, must be, what their nature, and their severall proportions. So shall you with certainty de­scend to knowledge of ex­istences, essences, when you [Page 145] shall rest in one universall cause: and Metaphysicks, Mathematicks, and Logick will happily prove one, while they teach the variations of Vnity through severall num­bers. All particular Scien­ces will be subordinate, and particular applications of these. So all shall be, accor­ding to Ficinus, Circulus bo­ni per bonum in bonum redi­ens; and the face of divine Beauty shall bee unveiled through all.

CHAP. XVI. The unhappy fruits of Divi­sion, in other parts of Lear­ning, made manifest.

CAst your eye on Morall Philosophy, and see how the truth is darkened by distin­ctions and divisions; How our Masters have set up in the same soule, Two foun­taines of Reason, the Will, and the Vnderstanding. Have they not virtutes In­tellectuales & Morales? Is it not a great question, Vtrum Prudentia sit virtus Moralis? Vtrum Summum Bonum sit in Intellectu, an Voluntate? Vtrum Pruden­tia possit separari à virtute Morali? Vtrum virtus Mora­lis sita sit in Appetitu Ratio­nali, [Page 147] an Sensitivo?

I say, these questions, especially the dividing of the soule into so many fa­culties enthrones many rea­sonable Beings in the soule.Many rea­sonable Beings, placed by Philoso­phy in the Soule. For, when the will enter­taineth or rejecteth the proposition of the under­standing, shee must doe it one of these three wayes: Either by an instinct; and this men will not have; for, hoc est brutum. Or by chance; and this many reject; for then she hath no liberty. Or by discourse; and this most pitch upon; for then she doth exercise vim illam im­peratricem, which I reade of amongst them, but under­stand not.

Now, if they conclude upon this third way. What [Page 148] is this Discourse, but the Work of an Vnderstanding? if the Will act that way, which is, or ought to be to the Vnderstanding propri­um quarto modo; Is not then the will an Vnder­standing?

Thus like an unskillfull Artist, they mince with di­stinctions; they whet, till there be no more Steele: and whilst they would shar­pen, they annihilate: Whilst they would inlarge, they o­verthrow the Soule. They create names, and say, with Ajax, Eurip. Tragaed. they are Vlysses, and so fight with them. They do, as one faith very well, giving Passion eyes, make Reason blind; raising the will, they ruine the Vn­derstanding. Termini nul­los [Page 149] habent terminos. The poore Soule oppressed with black Melancholy, belee­veth some part of his body as big as a house: and no man can, in his thought, passe, unlesse he remove it: Even so doe those men.

But what may not bee expected from That happy Inventer, and bold Abetter of errors, who with much confidence maintaineth the eternity of the World, a­gainst Hermes, Museus, Or­pheus, Anaxagoras, Linus, &c. Yet that they may insanire cum ratione, they say, that if you raise not up some faculty to contend with the Vnderstanding, the Vnderstanding seeing right, must ever do right, and [Page 150] that we by wofull expe­rience know to bee other­wise.

I confesse, whilst the Vn­derstanding seeth light and right (I now discourse of the Vnderstanding, Will, Af­fections, &c. in their termes) it doth right;Seeing and doing one in the Soule as knowing and wil­ling. for, seeing and doing is all one; for the act of the Soule is but seeing or discerning. But that Vnderstanding, which now did see right perfe­ctly, at the same instant is blind, even in a grosse, absurd thing: and so the effect and birth of it is but darknesse and folly.

Vanity of dispures in Metaphy­sicks.In Metaphysicks, with what curious nets do they intangle their hearers? cer­tainly, that should be stiled the Art or Science of Di­sputes [Page 151] and quaere's for the very Being and subjectum Metaphysices, is strongly di­sputed. Some will have ens taniùm, the universall na­ture of Being: Others, sub­stances abstract from matter, as Angels, Spirits, Soules of men, to bee the subject of this Learning; And as it beginneth▪ so it grow­eth into thousands of di­sputes.

As, Vtrum differentiae pos­sunt esse sub eodem genere cum illo quod differre faci­unt? Vtrum universale sit aliquid reale, [...]n notionale tantùm? Vnde rerum indi­viduatio exoriatur?

If I should go through Logick, Mediocrem artem, Mathematicall Sciences: I should but weary you with [Page 152] variety of opinions.

Even Divinity it selfe is darkened with mists of inextricable questions.Darknesse in Divini­ty through the igno­rance of unity. The questions about Faith and Love, are sufficient to fill the world with perpetuall quarrels;Faith and Repen­tance coe­vall. As, whether Faith precedeth Repen­tance? which learned Ma­ster Pemble hath sweetly de­termined by making both Faith and Repentance fruits of semen vivisicum. Whe­ther Faith be a particular application of Christ to my selfe, or onely a bare spirituall beleefe, that Christ is the Son of God? Which Reverend, holy, learned Master Cotton, hath most acutely, most truly cleared, by proving that Faith can bee nothing but [Page 153] a laying hold of that pro­mise which God hath made.The ge­nerall promise, the object of faith. Now, that promise is, That, he that beleeveth that Christ is the Sonne of God, shall be saved.

Whether faith be a be­leeving that I am saved, or depending upon God for salvation? And here Bellar­mine hath with mighty wit assaulted our side; for, faith he, if beliefe be to beleeve I am saved, I was saved without faith. If beliefe be to beleeve that God will give me grace to be saved, I beleeve before I have grace, before I have faith. Which knot, I know not how to dissolve, but by o­pening with Reverend Mr. Cotton That (and this is an­other Quaere.)

[Page 154] DeclarativèWe are saved by faith, only declarativè. I am saved, not only in the eternall de­cree, without faith, by Gods free gift (that all consent to) but even in the execu­tion. And when God hath pleased to take me out of eternall darknesse; then faith discovereth to me that I am to be saved; and so, making faith to be a mani­festation of that to me, that I am saved, Bellarmines objection is answered.

There are many other Questions, but I dare not so much as mention them.

If wee should but survey the disciplinable part of Divinity, we should be con­founded with Chiliads of disputes, all which I will wrap up in one, scil.

[Page 155]Whether there be a pre­script forme of Church-government?The ill conse­quence of the divisi­on be­tween do­ctrine and discipline.

Are not the two Testa­ments expositors of the two Tables? Do they leave us any latitude in any other of the Commandements? why should we then think, that That Commandement which God hath honoured in the second place, should be for­gotten? Truly, had the Learned Papists so done, they would never have ex­punged it.

Are not we as unable to prescribe the manner as the matter of Gods worship? If we were left to our selves, should wee not institute cringings, crouchings, all those ceremonies of Will­worship, which carry a voluntary [Page 156] outward visible shew of humility, but give the heart leave to play the Trewant?Doctrine of mater inworship; Discipline of manner, both are Doctrine, both pre­scribed by the same God. If ever distincti­ons did harm, here they have beene deadly poyson: for, Doctrine and Discipline are all one. For, what is Dis­cipline but that Doctrine of the manner of Gods wor­ship? wherein we ought to bee as faithfull, as in any point of Divinity: and this will certainely appeare one day, when God shall with pittylesse holy scorne, aske some, Who hath required these things at your hands?

The mon­strous ef­fects of division made ma­nifest in other pei­ces of Di­vinity.But, to conclude; give me leave to shew you how these exorbitant wits have raised a Babel, have cast Pe­lion upon Ossa; and from thence discharged the Ba­listae [Page 157] of their ignorance, a­gainst the Throne of Eter­nity, against God himselfe.

The Schooles for many ages,The weak­nesse of the distin­ction Sci­entia sim­plicis intel­ligentiae, & purae visio­nis. have looked upon the way of Gods knowledge of things, under two notions; simplicis intelligentiae, & pu­rae visionis. I confesse, I see not the end of this di­stinction. For, if Gods Power and Will be all one, (which I think no man dis­pureth) all the wayes of knowledge, that can bee in God, must bee confined in that one notion of simplicis intelligentiae.

I doe seeme (if I mistake not) to maintaine this po­sition by an evident demon­stration, thus;

Is there any that denyeth God to be purus actus? doth [Page 158] not every body say, that in God there is no potentia? If God then bee actus, and not potentia, all things were, that ever shall be, ab aeterno under a decree; and so, what hee could doe, hee did doe, and can doe no more.

Yet, that Truths may come more cleerely and ea­sily to our apprehension, I shall allow the use of the distinction, so that they improve it only for memory, and doe not expectany rea­lity from it.

But some, not content with this distinction, have found out another, which discovereth a meane paren­tage, by the very name, it is called Media scientia. Scientia maedia dis­cussed. I will not contend with it in [Page 159] the power of those argu­ments, whereby our Divines have so often left it spirit­lesse and helplesse. I shall only from this point of U­nity, shew the vanity of it.

If this sciencia be one with that which wee allow, then is it but nominall and vaine. If it be different, you make two in God: for, if I over-value not my for­mer ratiocination, I have proved it cleerely that sci­entia simplicis intelligentiae carrieth forth as much of God as is discernable to our darknesse; and making two in God, you exalt two Gods; and whilst you finde two Gods, you lose the true God, which is but on­ly one, an eternall Unity. And thus whilst men gaze [Page 160] continually in search of cau­ses, they blinde themselves, and know not effects.

CHAP. XVII. A Recapitulation of former instances, with some addi­tions of a question or two more.

In what sense in­termedi­ate causes may be allowed. I Confesse there is a secondary interme­diate Being, which you may call a Cause; which in our language, doth pre­cede and produce another; the observation of which, is very fitting, so that wee search and puzzle not our selves with the grounds and Reasons of this preceden­cy.

[Page 161]As, apply fire to combu­stible matter, and it will burn; and if you call (which in some sense you may call) this application, the cause of burning: I dispute not onely the search into the nature of wood and fire, and how the fire doth work up­on the wood, and how the wood can be both passive and active, Simul & Semel; for, they say, Nulla est actio quin sit reactio, this is That I desire to shun; for, intus ex­stens prohibet alienum; whilst we entertain our selves with these poore Sophismes of wit, we lose that glory which the immortall soule thirsts after.

But if our spirits, and the light of our reason be dim; Let us goe to the forge of [Page 162] the Philistines, and sharpen our inventions, our appre­hensions there;Division the policy of the Prince of darknesse. Let us learn from the Prince of the aire, who (knowing well, that, dissolve the fasciculus, and Iu­gurtha his prophecy to his children will prove true) taught his Scholars this les­son for these many ages, Divide & impera; Divisions and distractions, being the great road of all errour.

And if you long, with the Israelites, to have a King, as your neighbours have; and you desire to speak in their language: When the soule entertaineth light, say it doth understand. When it doth exercise any morall vertue, say it willeth. When you see some things pre­cede others, call the one a [Page 163] cause, the other an effect: but travell not far in the search of the source of this cause. Doe not make the will and the understanding two facul­ties, Fratrum concordia rara;Recapitu­lation of all. Iacob will supplant Esau in the Womb. Make there­fore the severall Actings of the soule, as Rayes of this one soule; make these rayes, and the soule sending forth these rayes, a perpetuall e­manation Divine: and so by these degrees of truth, mount up into the armes of Eternity, and he will take care of you, that you shall not dash your feete against the stone of free will: that you shall not overthrow all faith, by starting so many nice questions in the point of faith.

If you follow this rule, and see all things in the glasse of Unity, you will not lose all Arts and Scien­ces in the Wood of Divi­sions and Subdivisions in infinitum; you shall be more substantiall, than to make Substance and Accidents Two; neither will it ever happen, that you maintaine transubstantiation, by affir­ming that Accidents can haerere in nullo subjecto.

You shall not make to your selfe a God of contra­diction, dividing the will and power of God. Both which in God, is God; and so but one. You will not maintaine two Covenants, one of workes, another of grace, seeing grace is grace­lesse without workes, and [Page 165] Works worthlesse without grace.

If God shall give you to walke by this light, practi­call questions will be laid aside, as well as Theoreti­call: you will not dispute whether you ought to be more holy on one day (as at a Sacrament) then at o­ther times; for, you will then know, that these Scrip­tures expresse fully the rule you must walke by; Pray continually; rejoyce evermore: blessed is he that feareth al­wayes: Be ye holy [not by fits and starts, but] as I am holy; serving me alwayes, with all your heart, your might, your affections. So that every day, every duty, is to you an holy day, an ordinance di­vine.

[Page 166] The sense of the Sabbaths command.And if any man shall say, Why doth God adde this parcell, Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day, &c. and this strict injunction, before you approach the Table of the Lord, Let every man examine himselfe, and so let him eat?

You will be able to an­swer, that you ought not to be more holy in one day, in one duty, than in another; for, you must be all one, Sem­per idem.

And secondly, you will be able to prove, that the weight of this injunction, is not to adde any other holi­nesse to the day, or the ordi­nance, than a holinesse of se­paration.

For, a holinesse of inhae­rence, cannot fall any [Page 167] where, but upon a reasona­ble creature. The Temple had no more.

For, with the leave of lear­ned and holy Master Cawdry, Time & Place are incapable of any other sanctification.

But the stresse of these and the like precepts, lyeth here. We ought indeed al­wayes to keepe a Sabbath.All things Ordinan­ces. Every bread and every wa­ter, ought to be a confirma­tion of our faith and of our graces.

But God considering that we are lower than the An­gels (and them hee hath charged with folly;The inten­tion of spe­ciall Ordi­nances.) that we are infirme; that we cannot alwayes keep the bow bent: If we cannot be holy all the weeke, if we cannot be pure at our own Tables; as who [Page 168] can? yet, if we will remem­ber the Sabbath, and if wee will come to that feast of marrow and fatnesse with a wedding-garment, and at other times doe our best (though weak) indeavours, he will behold no iniquity in us.

We shall not be perple­xed, how farre we ought to mourne for the sinnes of others, the sinnes of the times, or our owne lives. [And these are intangling questions to many sweet spirits.] For, drawing all things to an unity, we shall know that sorrow and joy may meet in the same sub­ject at once;Mourning and joy reconci­led. they must be both in the actings of faith. Wee must not sorrow as without hope; We may not [Page 169] lose our Faith in our teares; Our teares must be teares of joy; Wee may think, that we have sinned, and so sigh; but at the same instant, wee must know we have a Savi­our, and so triumph. And if I were now all gore blood, would I not now goe to the Chirurgians? Truly the grea­ter my sin, the sooner ought to be my return, the higher my Faith. But great and inlarged Faith, cannot be without exultation and ma­gnificats.

Thus could we lay aside foolish questions, could we seek into our hearts, accor­ding to the Poets advice, Ne te quaesiveris extra, and not into the causes, and the Being of causes, things too high for us; We might have [Page 170] an Heaven here, we might see how Christ is one with GOD, and wee one with Christ; so wee in Christ, one with God.

If wee cannot reach the perfection of this know­ledge, yet let us come as neere it as we can, for the true knowledge of God in Christ, is life everlasting. ⸪