The nature of truth, its union and unity with the soule which is one in its essence, faculties, acts, one with truth / discussed by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, in a letter to a private friend ; by whom it is now published for the publick good.

The nature of truth, its union and unity with the soule which is one in its essence, faculties, acts, one with truth / discussed by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, in a letter to a private friend ; by whom it is now published for the publick good.

Table of contents

Title page

THE PREFACE to the Reader, Shewing what first gave Birth to This Discourse of TRVTH.

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THE NATURE OF TRUTH. Discussed in a Letter to a private Friend.

THE NATURE OF TRUTH. Its union and unity with the SOULE.

CHAP. I. The Vnderstanding and the Truth-understood, are one.

CHAP. II. The second Argument, proving that truth is the Nature of the Vnderstanding.

CHAP. III. A prosecution of the second Argument, wherein these three notions are applied to the understanding, being made one with the truth.

CHAP. IIII. This Argument further cleered by more objections propounded and answered.

CHAP. V. The Soule and truth in the Soule are one.

CHAP. VI. All things are this one light or truth, shining from God.

CHAP. VII. How unity is all in all things.

CHAP. VIII. The nature of Habits.

CHAP. IX. The difference betwixt Knowledge and affection, discussed.

CHAP. X. That all the severall and particular actings of the soule, are this one light and truth.

CHAP. XI. An objection answered, in which the nature of Time and Place are touched.

CHAP. XII. Another objection is answered, drawn from the falshood in the workings of the soule.

CHAP. XIII. Discovering the consequences of this Position, that All things are one Truth.

CHAP. XIIII. The benefit which Knowledge and all Sciences receive from this assertion.

CHAP. XV. Confusion in the knowledge of Causes, discovered, and redressed by this Vnity.

CHAP. XVI. The unhappy fruits of Division, in other parts of Learning, made manifest.

CHAP. XVII. A Recapitulation of former instances, with some additions of a question or two more.

A Postscript.

The Contents of the severall Chapters handled in this TREATISE of TRUTH.

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THE NATURE OF TRUTH Its Union and Unity with the SOULE, Which is One in its Essence, Faculties, Acts; One with TRUTH.

Discussed by the Right Honorable ROBERT Lord BROOK, in a Letter to a private Friend.

By whom it is now published for the Publick Good.

LONDON, Printed by R. Bishop, for Samuel Cartwright, at the Bible in Duck-lane, 1641.

THE PREFACE to the Reader, Shewing what first gave Birth to This Discourse of TRVTH.

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READER,

WIthout an Epithet: for, you must expect no complements. I am now a Pleader, and so am forbid [...] or [...]: Yet, with submission to That Severe [Page] CourtAreopagus: for, such were the orders for all Pleaders there: Aristotel. Rhet. lib. 1 Lucian. in Anachars., I hope 'twill be no offence, by breaking their First Injunction, to keepe their Second. One Word then by way of Preface, may perhaps not seeme unseasonable, unnecessary, and so not [...].

This Divine Discourse of Truth, comming to me, from so Noble an Hand; I could not envy it the Publique Light: For, what heart could indure to stifle such a Beauty, at its first Birth, at its first Breath? Nay, though Cruelty [Page] should scorne to take a check, yet Power it selfe, might plead impotent, for such an Act. For, where, or who is He, that can resist the struglings of Divine Truth, forcing its way out from the Wombe of Eternity? Where, or who is Hee that by a Viperous wrea [...]heWi [...]h such, Iuno assay'd to kill Hercules in his cradle, as the Poets say., or other assault, can smoother Hercules, though yet but sprawling in his cradle? View then This newborne Beauty; mark its Feature, proportion, lineaments; Tell mee now, was Its Birth an [Page] object of pity? or rather of envy? at least admiration; for, Envy findes no place in Noble spirits.

One thing yet, I must excuse (which yet indeed needs no excuse) A Second Conception is here First borne; yet not Abortive; no, but by mature thoughts, 'tis againe decreed, the elder shall serve the younger. For, That was meant the Act, This but the Prologue, ushering in That yet more curious Concept (if such be possible) which was an Embryo [Page] before This, but is yet Vnborne.

The truth is, This Noble Lord (the Author of this following Discourse) having dived deep in those Prophetick Mysteries (at which his first lines glaunce,Matth. 24. Apocal. 20 in this) was even forced (by that occasion) upon a more exact and abstract speculation of Truth it selfe; naked Truth, as in her selfe, without her gown, without her crown.

At first view, hee saw her sparkle with most glorious luster; But her [Page] Rayes daz'led his eyes, so that he durst not, hee could not, enough behold, admire, and adore, her perfect Beauty, exact Proportion, Divine Harmony; yet though daz'led, he viewed still; remembring that of the Ar [...]opagite Dionys. de Divinis Neminib., Earthly Bodies are best seene in, and by, Light; But Spirituall Beauties, [...], in, and by, Divine Clouds, Divine Darknesse? This, This is the best Perspective to Divine Objects; and the Brightest Starres shine best, sparkle most, in [Page] the Darkest, the Blackest Night.

That which ravisht his Soule most, and most inforc'd him more to pry, to adore more, Was, the experience of that which Plato speaks: When our Soules (saith he) glance first upon Divine Light, Epist. ad Dionys. they are soon ravisht, and cannot but pry more and more, because in it they see [...], somewhat of Kin to themselves. And this Kindred, if I mistake not, is the neerest possible; more then Consanguinity; I had almost said more [Page] then Identity it selfe. For, alas, that Corporal Vnion in Materials, which we miscall sometimes Identity, is at best but a cold touch in a point or two; a most disdainful embrace (at greatest distance) in those Beings which have much [...],See Plato's Parmenid. & Timeus. and but little [...], as Plato's Mastet taught him long agoe. But in Spirituall Beings, and in These only, is True Harmony, Exact Convenience, Entire Identity, Perfect Vnion, to be found.

Such, even Such, is That neer Relation, [Page] That neere Kindred between the Soule and Truth; as will fully appeare in This following Discourse of Truth; (which was never meant, nor now published, but as a Prodromus to a Future Treatise about Prophetick Truth revealed now in Scripture:) Of which I shall only adde this; Read it; if it displease, Read it again, and yet again; and then judge. It needs not my Apology; if so, I might truly say, When 'twas first VVrot, 'twas intended but a Letter to [Page] a private Friend, (not a Critick;) and since its first writing, and sending, 'twas never so much as perused, much lesse, refined, by its Noble Author.

One VVord more I must speak, and so have done. If any Ingenuous Reader shall Dissent (in any Particular of Consequence) and freely, yet ingenuously, manifest the Reasons of his Dissent: Nothing can bee more gratefull to This Noble Lord, who promiseth the Fairest Answer; for, [Page] His Aime is only Search of Truth; which, His Lordship well knows, is oft best found, as Sparks in the Flint, by much Contusion.

Yet, if any shall wrangle, not dispute: rudely thrust, or strike not like a Gentleman; His Return will be, only a Rationall Neglect.

I. S

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REcensui tractatum hunc, qui inscribitur, (The Nature of Truth,) per illustrissimum piissimumque Dominum. Robertum D. Brooke editum: apprimè sanè Doctum, profundisque conceptibus insignitum: quapropter dignissimum arbitror qui in summam utilitatem typis mandetur.

Novemb. 19. 1640.

Johannes Hansley, R. P. Episc. Lond. Capell. domest.

THE NATURE OF TRUTH. Discussed in a Letter to a private Friend.

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SIR,

I Have according to my poore talent, essayed to finde out the true sense of the Spirit in these Mat. 24. Rev. 20. Expounded, in another Treatise. two Chapters, [Page] and in this Inquest, have improved the labours of the piously learned; from whom I have received little other favour than this, that they have not seduced me; they not having approached so neere to the truth, as to dazle it. I confesse, that Reverend, that bright man, Master Brightman, hath clothed his opinion, with such a Sirenian glory, that he had almost been to me an ignis fatuus. I had almost, in following the old, lost the young, lost the nest of Lapwings. But, with all respect to his Worth, (if I am not mightily mistaken) I have escaped that Syrtis; and yet dare I not with the Philosopher cry out [...]; for, 2 Cor. 2.16. who is fit for these things?

[Page]Every truth is Veritas in sundo putei. Democr. a myste [...]y; what must that be then, which is purposely vailed by the Spirit? Iesus Christ, who is styled in Scripture, the Ioh. 14.6. way, truth, life, light, (and these things are apprehended by sense, and are common) is to 1 Cor. 1.23. the Iewes a stumbling blocke, and to the Greekes foolishnesse.

May we not then justly say of him that dares pry into the Arke, with hopes and thoughts cleerly to unfold the mysterious, the propheticall part of Iesus Christ, to unknit the Gordian knot; May wee not say of him, what GOD saith of Iob; Who is this that darkeneth wisedome with counsell? Iob 38.2.

Alas, are we not all since Adams lapse buried under [Page] the shadow of death, and lost in the region of darknesse? Who is there that knoweth truth? 1 Cor. 8.2 He that thinketh hee knoweth any thing, knoweth nothing as he should.

Morall truth, which (as some thinke) is yet more within our reach, than those sacred mysteries, is unknown to us, both in the universall nature, and in the particular actings of it; Difficilia quae pulchra.

Indeed Truth is that golden apple, which though it hath (in some sense) beene offered to the fairest; yet the most refined wits, the most high-raised fancies of the world, have courted her in vaine, these many ages: For whilst they have sought, [Page] with a Palsie hand, this glorious star, through the perspective of thicke reason, they have either mounted too high,A double errour in searching of truth. and confounding the Creator with the creature, made her God; or descending too low, and deserting the universal nature, have cōfined their thoughts to some individuall Truth, and restrained her birth to severall parcels within the Chaos.

THE NATURE OF TRUTH. Its union and unity with the SOULE.

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CHAP. I. The Vnderstanding and the Truth-understood, are one.

TRUTH is indeed of the seed Royall, of Progeny Divine: yet so, as to be (for I may say of her, what the Spirit saith of [Page] Faith) Rom 10.8 neere us, to be in us. And when she is pleased to descend into our valleys, and to converse with us, shee erects her own pavilion, and doth fix it in whatsoever is lovely in us.

The Vnderstanding is her throne, there she reigneth, and as she is there seated, as she shineth in that part of the soule; she appeareth to me under two notions, which are also her measure through the whole sphere of Being; as will be discovered more hereafter, when these lesser streames shall have emptied themselves by progresse into a larger river.

First, that very Being, which immediatly floweth from above, and is the rise [Page] or the first and uniforme ground-work in this particular Being which we now treat of,The Vnderstanding or Truth there, under two notions. and which under this notion wee call the form or substance.

Secondly, those workings which breathe from thence, as all actions and sayings, which are (in our phrase) the effects of a reasonable soule.

I shall first in few words treat of the first, and then very briefly conclude with a word or two upon the second part of Truth.

This first Truth is the Vnderstanding in its Essence:An argument proving the nature of the Vnderstanding to be Truth. for what is the Vnderstanding other than a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, conforming it to [Page] the likenesse of the Creator? And is not Truth the same? For the Beauty of Truths character is, that she is a shadow, a resemblance of the first, the best forme; that she is light, the species, the sparkling of primitive light; that she is life, the sublimation of light, Vitaest in se reflectio. Sen. Epist. Life a higher degree of light. that she may reflect upon her selfe.

That she is light, none will deny; that light in reasonable creatures is the fountaine of life, is manifest. For the forme of a reasonable soule is light, and therefore when the soul informeth and giveth life to Animal rationale, it enableth the creature to work according to light, and upon Her accesses the organs [Page] can entertaine light, as the eye then beholds the light of the Sun;The eye by the presence of the soule made able to see light. upon Her retirements they are dark and uselesse. Thus whilst life is light, and light is Truth, and Truth is conformity to God; and the understanding as we yet discourse of it, is this light to the soule, the Vnderstanding and Truth can be but one.

CHAP. II. The second Argument, proving that truth is the Nature of the Vnderstanding.

I Know the learned choose rather to stile the understanding, a faculty;Most call the understanding a faculty. and so institute a soule recipient; a [Page] Being (scil. Truth) received; and a faculty, which is the understanding, whereby the soule receiveth and acteth according to what it doth entertaine.

But with submission to their better judgement, I should crave leave to make one Quaere.

Three notions requisite to the constitution of every Being.Are there not to the constitution of every Being three notions requisite?

First, the Fountain communicating.

Secondly, the Channell entertaining.

Thirdly, the Waters imparted.

I confesse, we must not in Metaphysicall Beings expect Physicall subsistencies; yet [...] all learning doth allow of. But where [Page] shall wee finde these in the understanding? The understanding as a faculty affordeth not these 3. notions. whilest the intellect passeth under the notion of a faculty. Indeed wee may discerne the last (scil.) those sweet beames of light which beat upon us continually.

But where is the second which entertaineth them?The understanding is not the subject of truth. If it be the understanding, then the light which differē ceth us from the vegetative and sensitive creatures, lieth in the understanding, and not in the soule; and the soule (which all men hold to be a spirituall Being) is but a Theca to the intellect, as the body is the Tabernacle of the soule. Or, if the soule hath light as well as the understanding, then are there two enlightened Beings in [Page] one reasonable creature: Non belle quaedam faciunt duo, Marti. l. 5. epi. 53. sufficit unus Huic operi. Two reasonable Beings in one Compositum, is too unreasonable a thing.

Thirdly, Who is it that communicateth this light? It is conveyed to the understanding either from the soule, or some other way.

The understanding receiveth not truth from the soule.If from the soule, then the soule doth not finde the defect of the understanding. For, if the soule can communicate light, then hath it light already; the same, or more excellent; then can it worke, diffuse light, and enjoy it selfe; and so this faculty, the understanding, shall be in vaine.

If in any other way, it must either be immediately [Page] from God, or mediante Creatura.

If from a creature,Not from any creature and not from the soule, it must be by some other facultie intervenient. For, if the soule (which by their consent is a more noble Agent than the understanding) cannot, according to their Doctrine, act without a faculty; how shall an inferior Being work, without some such like subservient help? And thus may you excurrere in infinitum, which, according to the Philosophers, may not be done; for, Entia non sunt multiplicanda, nisi necessariò.

If the truth come from God, Not from God. then why is it not immediately, intrinsecally, infused into the [Page] soule it selfe? But however the understanding bee enricht with this treasure of Truth,Deus agit á centro in circumserentiam. if it be imparted to it, then is it, it selfe that Truth, that light which I contend for. For God doth not communicate light (by light (which I take in a Metaphoricall sense) I understand some spirituall excellency) and such light (I say) God doth not offer but to light. For, quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis. Cleopatra her dissolved union would have been to Esops cocke of lesse value than a barly corne. And if the understanding have not light,In spirituall giving and receiving there must be a metaphysical union it cannot take it, unlesse by being turned into the nature of it. For what giving and receiving [Page] can here be, besides that which maketh both to become one and the selfe same? Light came into the world, Iohn 1.5. but it was refused by darknesse. Ignoti nulla cupido.

Thus the understanding and light are different in names, may be different in degrees, but not in nature. For what that Reverend man Doct. of Syn. Dort. p. 25. lin. 12 Neither a quality permanent, nor an act immanent, unless they bee made inherent in the soul, and the latter also produced by it, can be said to be given to the soul. Doctor Twist saith most acutely of a spirituall gift, I may say of spirituall light. The soule cannot refuse a spirituall gift (I now speak in his phrase.) The soule and any spirituall Being doe not, as corporeall things, greet each other by the help of the Loco-motive faculty; but when Grace is given by God to the soul, [Page] there is, as it were (da veniam voci) an hypostaticall union betwixt the gift and the soule; and the soule cannot reject it, because they are no more. Two but one.To receive light is to be light. So to be in the capacity or act of receiving light, is to be light.

Lastly, how passeth this light from the understanding to the soule? Will not here be left as vast a gulfe, as they make betweene the understanding and the will, which make them divers; whence grow those inextricable disputes, How the the will is made to understand, what the understanding judgeth fit to bee willed?

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CHAP. III. A prosecution of the second Argument, wherein these three notions are applied to the understanding, being made one with the truth.

ALl these rubs are easily taken out of the way,If you make the understanding light, you have the three notions which make up every Being. if you make that which you call the understanding, truth. For then have you,

First, the Father of mercies, dispencing light and truth.

Secondly, light and truth dispensed.

Thirdly, the totum existens, consisting of matter and forme, of materiall and immateriall Beings (as wee [Page] distinguish them) called a reasonable creature thus informed or constituted, which we name the recipient of this light and truth.

Doe not tell me, that I thus make the recipient and thing received all one; that is not strange in emanation divine. In Scripture you have a parallel of this.The 4. viall mentioned Rev. 16.8. is the thing emptying and emptied upon it selfe.The fourth viall is poured out upon the Sun (scil.) the Scriptures, and the Scriptures are the viall it selfe; the Scripture is emptied upon it selfe, it is agent and patient, receiver and received. I know learned Mede to prevent this, which to him is a difficulty, imagineth the Emperour to be the Sun; but in two words that is thus disproved.

[Page]First, the Emperour is no where called the Sun in this book; when he receiveth a metaphoricall typicall title, he is called the Dragon.

Secondly the Scriptures are in the Revelation divers times set forth to us by the Sun. So that if you refuse the sense which I fix upon, then you doe not onely forsake, but oppose the Scripture-phrase.

But were not this truth mounted in a celestiall chariot,Nay in all things Agent and Patient must bee one to him that considers. Reason it selfe would evince it. For, consider any individuall Being you please, vegetative or rationall, or what you will,No Being but it is the thing receiving & received who is it that entertaineth this Being, but the Being it selfe which is entertained? Who is it [Page] that receiveth from the womb of Eternity that reasonable creature, but the creature received?

The vanity of that question, Whether the soule be continens or contentum, discoveredThe ignorance of this Point, hath raised that empty Question, Whether the Soule or the Body be contentum? For if every Being be its own contentum, this Question will seeme to be no more a difficulty. And if there happen any neare union betwixt two Beings, as the Body and the Soule, the first is not continens, the other contentum; but as husband and wife, each bringeth his part towards the making up of the compositum.

Thus without any violalation of Reasons right, I seeme justly to conclude, [Page] that the totum existens, consisting of matter and forme, the reasonable creature, is the Recipient of this truth.

CHAP. IIII. This Argument further cleered by more objections propounded and answered.

BUT still it is demanded, why may not the understanding supply the third place? why may it not be this Recipient?

To whom I give this answer;The Vnderstanding cannot be the recipient. That if they make the understanding but a quality, and depending upon some other Being, it cannot, as I have proved in this Discourse, [Page] course, be the recipient: but if they look upon it as this light, this truth it selfe, then the dispute is reconciled.

Some call the Intellect virtus quâ.Some conceive, all these difficulties are cured, if you make the understanding only virtus quâ, concluding with the Philosopher, that ibi subsistendum est, without inquiry after a further progresse. I could Iurare in verbamagistri, I could acquiesce here, but that I desire to be convinced by reason and not by termes. I shall therefore humbly ask this question.

The Intellect cannot be virtus quâ.What difference is there betwixt virtus quâ and a faculty? as in a knife, the cutting ariseth from the sharpnesse, and this sharpnesse is virtus quâ, or the faculty whereby the knife doth cut.

[Page]If it be but a faculty, then I repaire to my former answere: but if something else than a faculty, it must either be a nominall Being, or reall existence.

If the first, it beareth no weight.

If the second, then I say, it must entertaine species (for all spirituall glories doe operate by the communication of their divine species) and then will you be cast upon the former rock.

Yet still they say, the understanding, being a spirituall Being, receiveth light in some way which we know not; and so they proceede to obscure distinctions and voluminous discourses, concerning intellectus agens & [Page]intellectus patiens or passibilis. But the wiser sort of them,As the Arabians, Zabarell, &c. perceiving the thinnesse, aerialnesse and crazinesse of this Spiders web, have with greater probability made God to be intellectus agens, by his influence upon the understanding.

The last objection answered. Respon. Is not this the Athenian Altar, which groaned under that Superscription, Act. 17. vers. 23. To the unknowne God? I would I could discover with S. Paul to them this light, this truth, which they know not, that they might love it and imbrace it. But secondly, I dispute not against things I know not: They know not this. I know that I may better maintaine the other, that the Understanding is not the Recipient [Page] of this light, than they averre that it is, in a way whereof they never hope to finde any footsteps.

CHAP. V. The Soule and truth in the Soule are one.

I May yet be pressed with this objection: All these difficulties may be urged against the Soule, which have been produced against the Vnderstanding.

Resp. Are not these like the untrue Mother, who will kill the childe, because she cannot call it her own? If these inconveniences be justly urged against the Soul, [Page] it will not deliver the Vnderstanding. But I will deale ingenuously, and confesse that if you take the Soule under any other notion than Truth; If you deeme it, first to be a Being, and then to be light, as God made Adam first (I meane the body) and then breathed life into him; if, I say, there be first a Being, and then an infusion of light, you will be pressed with the former arguments. But if you make the Understāding,The Soul, Vnderstanding, Truth, all but one. the Soul, Light, Truth, one, then are you quite delivered out of all these straights, and then is it true which I averre, that, that degree of light, which we enjoy in the inward man, is the specificall difference, which distinguisheth [Page] between us and brutes, deservedly called reason, that ample Sphere of Truth, which is the All in us, and besides which we are wholly nothing.

Are not wee said to be made after the image of God?An Argument proving the Soule and Truth to be one. and if in any thing we are honoured with this inscription, it is in the most noble part? Now God is unus, purus, simplex actus. For (with submission to his better learning and judgement) I cannot subscribe to D• Ames his manner of expression,God and his attributes are not two. who saith, first there is God, and then his attributes are in him, Deo insunt quasi in esse secundo, ab essentiâ & inter se distinguuntur non solùm ratione rationante, sed etiam rationatâ, ita ut fundamentum distinctionis sit in ipso Deo. Theo. lib. 1. cap. 4. Sect. 27.28. tanquam in esse secundo. If then we [Page] do beare his impresse, quanquam non passibus aequis, it must be in that which is (as farre as we can judge) DEI formalis ratio, which is to be purus, simplex actus.

In this our shadowy resemblance of the Deity, I shall not challenge perfection; for though the Scripture say, 1 Ioh. 3. vers. 2. We shall hereafter be perfect as he is perfect, and doth here style us, partakers of divine nature; yet all this is to be understood according to our little modell. Unity is that wherein wee carry some touches, some lineaments of his Majesty. Unity is Gods Essence. Unity is all what we are. For division being the birth of nothing, can be nothing. And thus may we raise from [Page] our Microcosme,Truth as it hath been described, resembleth the Trinity. a passable Hieroglyphick of the Trinity.

Truth as it is in the breast of Eternity intended to the Sonnes of men, resembles Patrem intelligentem; as it descends from above, Filium intellectum; as it informeth the Soule, enjoyeth and reflecteth upon it selfe, Spiritum dilectum. We must not then expect, First, a Being of the Soule: Secondly, a faculty whereby it worketh. God and his attributes, are but one; mercy and justice kisse each other in him; he and they are ens necessarium; And so the Soule and the Faculty is one, that divine light and truth.

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CHAP. VI. All things are this one light or truth, shining from God.

BUt if the Intellect, the Soul, Light and Truth are (from the reasons alledged) all but one, this argument will presse all things that are; then will all Beeing fall under the same Predicament.

This is that which I aymed at; and why not? Seeing that▪ First, all Beeing is derived from the same fountaine, scil. from him who is uniforme, in all like himselfe.

Secondly, All Being is the same in nature, (scil.) a beame of that excellent [Page] light, and therefore in Metaphysicks Vnum, verum, bonum, Ens, terminiconvertibiles. All being is this truth. Truth and Being are one.

Thirdly, All Being is entertained in the same manner by every individuall existence, which is the subject receiving this light from above: and all reall true reception is alone by similitude and union of nature.

Yet I shall not agree to confound the names of particular Beings, though I doe conjoyne their natures. For, all Being may be compared to light; in such a body it is styled the Sunne; in another it is called the Moone; in the third it beareth the name of a Starre, and under various shapes, the names of various Stars, [Page] as Syrius, Canopus, &c. but all is light, and it is but light. The body of waters is by us called Seas; when they beate upon such a coast, it beareth one name; when it coasteth upon another soyle, it receiveth a severall denomination. All Being is this light, this truth; but contained within those Circles, it appeareth to us under this name; and againe, it hath another style when it beateth upon a various object.

All Being is but light, communicating it selfe to us through severall crannies, some greater, some lesse, whilst all is light.

Vide Platonem in Phile. in Timaeo. Terminus, Insinitum, prima elementa, unde quin. que genera teru [...]. Plato most excellently, most acutely, most truly hath madé all Being of Terminus and Infinitum.: The [Page] first Being appearing to us in severall bounds and measures amidst the vast infinity of darknesse or nothing.Ficin. com. in Tim [...]o. Vide Platonem ubique.

The Platonick Philosophers do not erre,Omnes numeri in unitate. who reduce all Beings to number, making one all and the chief, and the other more or lesse glorious, as they have two, three, or foure, more or lesse numbers or degrees.

Whence they had this Maxime, I know not; this I know, Satan, that old Serpent, is very learned, and can sometimes (as he doth, when hee calls Jesus the Christ and sonne of God) can, I say, sometimes, tell true, that so hee may even by truth entaile to himselfe a certaine interest in such Disciples as refuse any [Page] other allurement than that of golden truth: and it is to be feared, that they have had too great and free converse with him. For even this sweet point of learning have they shamefully abused to charmes and spells, as that of the Poet, Virg. in [...]. Numero Deus impare Quia numerus impar, numerus indivisibilis. Ficin. comment. in Plat. Timae. gaudet. Two was curst, because it first departed from unity; Three whereby unity againe returned into it selfe, became sacred.

But it may be (& spero meliora) that they received it from the Egyptians, and the Egyptians from the Hebrews.

Now, if this be true, (which I submit to the judgement of the wise) then all Being is but one, and all [Page] things are more or lesse excellent, as they partake more or lesse of this first Being.

This doctrine of Platonists will not be so unfavory, if we pay unto unity its due tribute. I confesse, according to true Philosophy, Time is but mensura motus vel ordinis, which both are the same; Number, calculus temporis; One is principium tantùm numeri, and so it is hardly a part of that which is but the handmaid of circumstance.

CHAP. VII. How unity is all in all things.

BUt I should desireThe excellency of unity. that we might consider whether it doth not carry something in [Page] it, in nature more glorious, something that may seem to informe a Being. If I cannot tell what it is, you will excuse me, knowing how hard a thing it is to finde out the Forme of any Being, and how much more hard to discover the Being of a Forme.

But from this reason I doe seeme to collect some glimmering light of what I now propound.

All Being seemeth to breath and catch after unity. Gravia doe not more naturally incline downwards, than all Being doth naturally seeke for unity.

Of Beings there are but two sorts.

Uncreated.

Created.

[Page]Uncreated, is God only.

Created, is

Spirituall.

Morall.

Physicall.

Mathematicall.

In all these you will find Unity as it were the Forme of their Being.

My thoughts, my ignorance, my no thoughts of the first, incomprehensible, inaccessible Majesty, I desire to propound with fear, trembling and reverence.

If Iohn in the midst of revelation,Rev. 22.9. being overcome with nothing but the glitterings and sparklings of the creature, did mistake, and worshipped one of his fellow-servants; if the Jewes refused to trample upon any contemptible scroul, fearing [Page] lest, in them, the namelesse name of God might be included: surely wee in the midst of darknesse, having to doe, not with the name, but with the nature of Eternity, ought to cloathe our spirits with much modestie.

I shall therefore humbly propound this to consideration, Whether unity be not all in God.

I confesse there are three persons in one Godhead (and that is the mysterie) and yet but one God. And more there could not have beene; for this God is infinite, eternall, &c. and onely one can be so; there cannot bee two Infinites, two Eternities.

And againe, this one cannot [Page] not be otherwise, for if hee could have been something else, hee had not beene infinite.

If then unity bee such a necessary (give us leave to speake as wee can) accident, as, without which God could not have been what hee is:Vnity all in God. may it not bee said that unity is co-essentiall to him, seeing that the Deity admits of no accidents? And if of his Essence, then unity is in him all, for the Essence of God is all in God, and God in his Essence is but one Divinity.

Ob. But so, infinity, power, &c. all attributes are in God his Essence, as well as unity?

Answ. All other attributes [Page] are at length resolved into this of unity. Of this, can be given no accompt, but only negative. All explications flow from this, returne to this, that God is one.

Fic. comment. in Plat. Sympos.What is it to be infinite? Ficinus answers, to have nothing of privation mixt, to be plenus sui; which is to be One.

The power of God is the unity of all Being in one point. What is this, I am that I am; but this, I am one? The same we may say of all other the names of God.

Vnity in spirituall Beings.When we survay the nature of spirituall Beings, we shall find them in Scripture stiled one. For God reduceth all the commandements [Page] to love. And the Saints, who are, quatenus Saints, spirituall Beings, (for their Saintship is a spirituall excellency) are stiled, Rom. 12.5. one body; and, Gal. 3.16. they are all one in Iesus Christ.

Christ and his Church are but one body. Now, this union carrieth certainly something with it more essentiall than a figure.

When the three persons are united in one deity, the union is more close than a figurative union. The conjunction of the humane nature, and the second person in the Trinity, is a very entire conjunction; and so is that of the Saints with Christ. There is the union of the whole humane nature [Page] with one person. Here is the union of divers persons to the whole divine nature. And we may easily allow a neare union to these Metaphysicall Beings: seeing even in naturall things, there is as it were an unity, even of two Physicall existences. For GOD saith, You two shall be one flesh;Gen. 2.24. he saith not one, but one flesh. But these are aenigmata, 1 Cor. 13.12. while we see through glasses of flesh.

Morall.Seeing Morall Beings are, by generall consent, of fraternall alliance to spirituall, both in nature and operation; I shall not say any thing of them, but onely what is said by all, that virtutes sunt concatenatae.

I shall therefore minde [Page] you but of this,Vnitie in Physicall Beings. how in Physicall Beings, every thing doth delight in unity. And this is very plaine in the stillicids of water, which, if there be water enough to follow, will draw themselves into a small thred, because they will not sever: and when they must disunite, then they cast themselves into round drops, as the figure most resembling unity.

Whence is that Sympathy in nature betweene the Earth and the Adamant, but from hence, that they being of one nature, desire to improve their unity by mutuall imbraces?

When have the Sun-beams their vigor and efficacy, beating upon the burning glasse, [Page] but when the glasse hath gathered them all into one?

Where is the power of our five senses, which are in their nature so honourable, that nihil cadit in intellectum, quod non prius cadit in sensum? Where is their vertue, but in communis sensus? Nay (if I durst be so bold) but this I may not now dispute: I conceive all the senses are but one, and that is I am informed that my Lord Castle. I stand in his book de Veritate, affirmeth that there is but one sense: but I am not so happy as to have that booke by me, nor doe I remember it since my last reading it, so that I dare not say it confidently. Tactus. For their Energie is nothing till the ray from the object to the organ, and from the organ to the object touch in one.

It is most happily expressed by Sir Iohn Suckling;

[Who having drawn the brests of wit and fancie drie,

[Page]May justly now write Man, must not a Suckling die.]

When he saith,

The circumambient aire doth make us all

To be but one bare Individuall.

Sir Iohn Suckling in his Play, Act 2, Scene 1.

What are the Mathematicall sciences, but Vnity turning it selfe into severall formes of Numbers and Figures, yet still remaining entire? Harmony, proportion, proportionality, which are the subject, the soule of all Knowledge here, are so many severall names of the same unity. Beauty is but one act of grace and sweetnesse,Ficin. Comment. in Sympos. Plat. which seemes to us composed of various parcels. Ficin. Comment. in Tim. Plat.Musick is [Page] one forme resulting from many different sounds. This is that mystery, which unknowne, hath confounded the Schools in that Question, whether quantity be divisibilis in semper divisibile. All things are certainly at last reduced to an Vnity; yea, all things appeare to us cloathed with one forme; yet are we never able to search out the perfection of this, when we most accurately pursue it. The glory and majesty thereof is such, that it rendreth our minds uncapable of any more than a grosse view, like that of the Sunne in his splendour.

Democritus his definition of Being, is very considerable, Plato in Symp. in Orat. Erixym. Est aliquid differens [Page]à se, quod sibi convenit: and indeed, all Being is but one, taking various shapes, sometimes discovering it selfe under one, sometimes under another, whereas it is but one Being: and this is light, truth, that (as I said before) beame of divine glory, which is the spring of all Beings.

To close this discourse, give me leave thus to set forth that Majesty, whereby Unity wrappeth up all things within itselfe. There can be no recedence from Unity, unlesse by addition of a new, distinct, Unity. But where will you finde This? A simple Unity must be entirely one with the First; if you adde any thing to Unity, whereby it may differ, [Page] it remaines no more One, but becomes a Duality.

Nominall division of Being requisite for our converse.Yet doe I in no wise reject that division of Being left us by our Masters, when they teach us, that there is first a Being which is knowne to Be, but it selfe in its Being is insensible.

Secondly, another that is sensible, but knoweth not its owne excellency.

Thirdly, that which knowing its owne excellency, can reflect upon it selfe. For, I say, this which is called vegetative, sensitive, and rationall, is all of one nature.

[Page]

CHAP. VIII. The nature of Habits.

ANd whilst I affirme that the soule is nothing but this Truth, I doe not refuse the doctrine of Habits, Habits infused, acquisite. either

Infused or Acquisite.

For when the soule by vertue of its Being, is cleare in such a truth, it is said to be an infused habit. When by frequent action, such a truth is connaturall to the soule, it may be stiled an habit acquisite: though indeed all is but light more or lesse glorious, discovering it selfe frequently or rarely, and by divine appointment, [Page] at such a conjunction of time, and not any other, not that the soule is informed by its owne action; for what hath the streame which it derives not from the source? What can those workings added to that, from which they receive themselves?

And therefore I wholly subscribe to the Platonists, who make all scientia nothing but reminiscentia; for when it appeareth not, it is not; the soule being but an activity, it must be no more than it acteth: and though we seeme by frequent actings to helpe the soule, and so to create in it acquisite habits, yet these are but a Phaenomenon. This is but the way [Page] which God discloseth to our eye, whereas all the actings are onely new discoveries.

Our Philosophers affirme thus boldly of the unreasonable creature, attributing it all to the instinct, or a new influence.

Why may not, why must not we conclude the same of man, seeing it is a received truth, that acti agimus, and we are in our strength in regard of God no better than the most abject creature?

But if all be one;The difference between naturall and supernaturall habits. (Soule, Understanding, Habits, all the same:) then neither doe faith and reason differ.

Surely they differ onely in degrees, not in nature.

That Reverend holy man, [Page] that dexterous cominus-pugnator, seemeth to averre the same or more in historicall and saving faithMr Ball. Divers sorts of Faith. page 3. Faith signifying beleefe, is used to note, first an ordinary knowledge and bare assent to the historicall truth of the Speaker, though sometimes holpen by experiments, and other inducements and probabilities of the things: and this is called Faith Historicall, that is, a naked, imperfect, dead assent, without trust or confidence in the mercies of God, or adherence to the commandements. Howbeit we must not imagine, that Faith is reputed unsound or not salvificall, because Historicall (rather it is oftentimes unsufficient to save, because it is not so fully Historicall as might be) but the name of Historicall Faith arose hence, that some are said to beleeve, who did never embrace Christ as their only Saviour with all their hearts, nor confidently rely upon the promises of mercy; otherwise, justifying Faith doth more certainly beleeve the truth of the history of the Gospel, and so is more historicall than the Faith called Historicall..

Mr Huit in his Anatomy of Conscience, cleerely affirmeth it. These meanes teach us further to make much of the least beginnings of grace, even those which Divines commonly call repressing, since they prepare the heart to conversion, and in some [Page] sense be called the inchoation thereof: seeing temporary and living faith differ not in forme, but degrees of perfection; there is a faith in the true convert, of no better perfection than that in the temporary, though he stay not there, as the other (being an unwise son) doth. Huit Anat. Conscience pag. 214.

The first degree is Reason.

A second, Historicall.

A third, Temporary.

A fourth, Saving faith.

A fift, Plerophorie.

A sixt,

1 Ioh. 3. vers. 2.

Beatifica visio, that light whereby we shall see as we are seene; these are of the same nature with that light which a reprobate is partaker of.

And if any man question the truth of this, let him but consider, that the Donor is the same, our good God.

The Efficient, Instrumentall, and Formall cause, is Jesus Christ.

[Page]The subject recipient, the totum existens.

And the Gift it selfe is light or truth, a spirituall Being.

How can it choose then, but to be one and the same, seeing (as I said before) such a Recipient cannot entertain any other guest?

The controversie about falling from Grace.Neither doe I at all abett that unhappy opinion of falling away from Grace.

There is in the opinion a liquid nefasti, and therefore I study to shun it. The propugnators of it are unhappy; for they have not onely made a rent amongst us, but strengthened a common adversary.

The oppugnators also are unhappy; for they have so managed the cause, that their [Page] Adversaries lie almost under invincible darknesse: for the oppugnators fearing to speake plaine, have called Spontaneitatem, liberam voluntatem, and it is impossible to distinguish betweene Libera voluntas Contra-Remonstrantium, & liberum arbitrium Remonstrantium.

And whilst the Remonstrants finde no difference in this main Tenet, they weigh all the rest in the same scale, and judge accordingly. For an argument often alledged by many learned men, if it confuteth not, it doth confirme an error; and thus are they out of the reach of truth.

That learned, that pious man, the first fruit of our Church her resurrection, famous [Page] Calvin, styled it Spontaneitatem, and not liberam voluntatem: For, Deus and libera voluntas are incompatible, not to be caemented by that distinction without difference, Libera à necessitate, sed non ab infallibilitate. And therfore mighty Deo enim, sive scientiam ejus spectemus, quippe omnia scit; sive voluntatem, quae ad nihil creatum vel creabile est suspensa, sed ab aeterno determinata, nulla [...] potentia disjunctiva: considerari quidem potest potentia creata, non considerato divino decreto, & in signo rationis decretum Dei antecedente. Sed in tali Chimar [...] consideratione, adversary nobis litem vitiosâ nuce ha [...] emptitandam srustraserunt. Ac verò actu, non est ulla potentia creata, nisi quae subest aeterno DEI decreto, nisi qu [...] [...] divinae providentiae renuntiare velit, &c. Rutter Exerc. Apolog. Exerc. 1. c. 1. Sect. 8. Rutterfort affirmeth, that posito Dei decreto absoluto (and all things are under such a decree) insulse quaeritur an potentia libera sub eo decreto sit indifferens.

[Page]But here I am not to, I cannot, dispute this question. Onely I say thus much, it is so unhappy an opinion, that I hope I shall not at all abett it.

For though Reason and Faith be one in nature: yet is not reason that degree of light, of which the Spirit hath said,1 Ioh. 3.9. Difference betwixt Knowledg and Faith. My seed is in you, and you cannot sinne. And therefore men cannot lose that which they never had. And this will be a little more cleere, by the answer to the next objection, which is this.

If Faith and Reason,Object. if knowledge and grace be all but one light, how commeth it to passe, that some who have lesse light, have more faith? and those again, [Page] who are for knowledge, as Angels of light, are not partakers of that which is called Saving faith?

This difficulty is rather mazy, than strong; I shall therefore hope to bring the Ariadnean thread.

And at first abord, I deny the proposition. I conceive it a mistake. For I doe verily beleeve, that the weakest Saint knoweth more of God, than the most intelligent of those Spirits, who though once in heaven, are now in intolerable flames.

All men confesse thus much, that even the meanest Christian, hath more experimental knowledge of GOD, than Beelzebub the Prince of the aire. And doth not this convince them of [Page] what I affirme? For what (to speake in their language) is experiment,Experience, collection of particular lights. but the daughter of light, gathered by frequent observation? If experiment be but light, and their experience is more than that of the greatest wits; then (if I mistake not) by necessary consequence, their light is more and greater.

But I suppose, the error may be cleared by this Simile.

The one is as the man who hath studied the Theory, the other the Practicke of any art of science.

The first may know more in appearance; but the other indeed knoweth more.

You shall finde two unequally learned,Knowledg, reall. apparent. The first is [Page] a Gnosticke, a helluo literarum ▪ the other hath not read so much, but hath concocted, mastered and subdued all before him. Which now is said to know more?

Psal. 14.1. The foole hath said (not, as some expound it, wished) in his heart, there is no GOD. It is true, now and then he hath some glimmering light of a Deity, but anon againe all is shaken, and he faith, there is no God.

Doth not the people of Israel say,Psal. 12.4. Wee are our owne Lords, who shall controll us? We have made a covenant with death and hell, and none shall reach us. Can these men, these Beings be said to know God?

If you object the devils age and experience, it cannot [Page] help; it is but, as you call it, a collection of his owne lights, and all the starres shining together make not day.

I should onely aske this one question, Can the divels beleeve or know God to be all mercy? It is impossible, because they cannot beleeve him so to themselves.

Ob. But some say, Neither doe the best men beleeve him so to the wicked.

Resp. Yes, we doe, wee know him in his nature to be mercifull to them.

Besides,God, mercy and sweetnesse to the divels. mercy and justice are all but one thing in God; and this those miserable Creatures cannot consent to, that their ruine is the effect of supreme perfection, infinite sweetnesse.

[Page]To the confirmation of this, I shall but presse this one consideration.

As wee know, wee love.If they did know more than the Saints, they must needs love more; and in this I shall have all those my abettors, who hold that the Will doth necessarily follow the understanding; which whilst Aristotle denieth in broad and open disputes, [...]. Arist. Eth. lib 3.c.6. vide &c.7. ci [...]ca finem. he doth in tacite termes closely yeeld to.

I doe apprehend it an undeniable truth, that what Good soever I know to be good, I must love. And therefore if wicked men did know more of God, they must know him needs under the notion of good: and so Seeing goodnesse in his nature, they must love [Page] him more.What we know, we are. I might adde, what good we know, we are: our act of understanding being an act of union, which (as before) being Metaphysicall in the soule, must be entire.

CHAP. IX. The difference betwixt Knowledge and affection, discussed.

IT may be that what hath beene disputed, will be granted: but there is yet an objection which requireth solution.

Ob.

If all Being differeth onely in degrees, not nature; if knowledge, affection, [Page] light, activity, bee all one; Whence is it that even amongst Christian men, holy, spirituall men, men of largest affections, (and the affections are the activity, the maine of the Soule) I say men of the largest affections are esteemed to know least of God? And others, whose affections are as it were benummed, and all activity is placed in their braine, understand more of the divine nature?

Doth it not appeare from hence, say they, that all Being is not one, differing onely in degrees: but that there are even different natures, amongst which one may excell, whilst the other is deprest?

Sol.

I could tell these [Page] men, who start the objection, that they deeme the light in the head, more than the love in the heart: and then I shall say,Affection handmaid to Knowledge according to some. that with them the head is the higher degree, the heart the lower degree of light, and so all is but a different light; from whence, affection, being judgement in its infancy, ceaseth, when Knowledge groweth mature: as the heate and blaze of fire, is but its labouring towards purity and perfection, which therefore are no more when the cleare flame reacheth its Element. But other men think otherwise, and they doe pitch all in the affections, and the meaner light in the understanding; and so turning the table, still one shall [Page] be a parcell of, or a step to the other,Knowledg a step to Affection, according to others. Knowledg & affection names of different degrees in the same nature. and each carry along both in equall measure according to reality: how much true affection, so much knowledge, & vice versa: as I shall shew in other two answers, on which I fixe the strength of my thoughts in this point. And therefore

Affection perfection of Knowledge.Secondly, I affirme confidently, and, I hope, truly, that he, who soars upon the wings of Affection, and layeth himselfe in the arms of Jesus Christ, though hee amuse not his head with the mysticall nature of the Trinity, with the procession of the Spirit, with the incarnation of Jesus Christ, attempting to make that holy oyle; Touching the [Page] Arke, this glory which is too high for him; loosing himselfe, while he laboreth to see how humane nature can be raised so high; divine condescend so low, as to bring forth the Hypostaticall Union: I say, such a one knoweth more of God, than the other.

It is often seene,Knowledge often no Knowledge, but a vaine swelling. a working head is like an over-hot liver, burneth up the heart, and so ruineth both: Whereas sweet humble affections, are the onely way to keepe the poore creature in a constancy of spirituall health. And in this care the Apostle to Titus forbids foolish questions, Tit. 3.6. endlesse genealogies, contentions, and brawlings about the Law.

This Law is the rule of [Page] life; and if we know not the Law, Knowledg without power, even in the law forbidden. we cannot keepe the Law, and so we must perish; and yet we finde the search of this forbidden.

Object. Some will say, here is meant the Ceremoniall Law.

Answ. I will allow it; but is not the Ceremoniall included under the second precept?Ceremoniall law included in the Morall. The people upon Christ his Sermon, wherein he taught, that He that looketh on a woman to lust after her, Mat. 5.28. hath committed adultery with her in his heart (and so he gave the Law its full latitude) say, He speaketh as one that hath authority, Mat. 7.29. and not as the Scribes and Pharises: conceiving it their duty and happinesse to know the [Page] Law in its utmost limits; and yet we are restrained from any brain-sick, heady, nice inquiry, even into the Law, scil. not to busie our heads with the knowing part, in over-great proportion, but labour to bring our knowledge to practise.

If then all such knowledge (I meane all knowledge of this nature) bee forbidden, it is because it is not good; it is not knowledge, but a vaine tumour in stead of reall greatnesse or growth: and that other of the affection, hath certainly more of God in it, and so more of truth.

The Apostle is so great an enemy to this kinde of [Page] knowledge, that having disputed such a point in disdaine of gain-sayers, he concludeth, If any man lust to be contentious, 1 Cor. 11.16. we have no such custome, nor the Churches of God.

—Demonstrat quaelibet herba Deum. He who refreshed with the sweet odours, pleased with the various comely shapes of a flower, can say, this is sweet, this is lovely, lovely indeed; Yet Iesus Christ is a bed of spices, Cant. 2.1. as the Lilly of the field, the Rose of Sharon, sweeter, much sweeter, ten thousand times more lovely. This man knoweth God, this man loveth God, this man knoweth him indeed; and this knowledge, as it is the most pleasant here, so it will certainly [Page] prove the most profitable hereafter, and alwayes declare it selfe most reall.

Doth not the Apostle, doth not he most truly, most pathetically cry out; Though I had the gift of prophecie, 2 Cor. 13.2. and knew all secrets, all knowledge, yea, if I had all faith, so that I could remove mountaines, I were nothing; I were as sounding brasse and a tinckling Cymbal, if I have not charity. When all these excellencies meet in a Christian, as happly they may, yet it is charity that maketh him what he is, and the other Beings are but as Phalerae, as trappings which give a handsome set-off, but not a Being to a Christian.

Love is lovely in Gods [Page] eye,God, from whom all light commeth, is stil [...]d Love 1 Ioh 4 16. he is stiled the God of Love, the God Love. And in another place, the Scripture affirmeth that in this we have fulfilled the will of God, if we love one another; for by this we are made one with God, and so dwell in true light.

The two Tables are reduced to Love of God and our neighbour. So that sweet affections doe make the most sweet harmony in Gods eares.Women in greatest number truly gracious, because most affectionate. Of the Chorus of Saints, the greatest number will bee found amongst the feminine sexe, because these are most naturally capable of affection, and so most apt to make knowledge reall. It is true, I confesse, these affections misguided, led them first [Page] into transgression; but these same affections after, carried them first to the grave, then to the sight of a Saviour, gave them the enwombing of Christ, who (in some sense) might have entertained our nature in another way (if he had so pleased;) and these affections will one day raise many of them into the sweet embraces of everlasting joy.

Amongst the ChurchOfficers, the Pastor and the Doctor, according to Timothie, are more eminent than the rest, because they labour in the word and doctrine. 1 Tim. 5.17 Of these two, the Doctor is alwayes to have his sword alwayes girt about his thigh, he must enter into the lists with every uncircumcised [Page] Goliah. Hee must stand continuall sentinell, that no herefies be forced upon the Church. He must beat his braines in dissolving difficilia, and clearing obscura. He must sometimes faint away in watery cold fits, by picking up, and throwing out witlesse, saplesse sophismes, which though they cannot hurt the strong, may seduce the weake. In the meane time, the Pastor leadeth the flock into the sweet and pleasant meadowes,The Pastor preferred before the Teacher, because the truth of truth in the heart lieth in the affection. feeding them by the little brooks of seemingly shallow affections; and yet this man shall not onely receive equall honour with the Doctor, but be preferred before him; as appeareth clearly in Eph. 4.11. [Page] 1 Cor. 12.26. As it was with the Israelites, so it is here; those who keepe the stuffe, receive equall reward with the combatants. I doe therefore conclude, Hee who hath the largest affections, hath most of God, most of his image, which is renewed in knowledge.

Thirdly,Knowledge, where it is eminent in truth as well as appearance, there affection is equally eminent. sometimes it hapneth, that those who have the largest knowledge, have the most enlarged affections, even to our eye; and this is happinesse indeed. I confesse, it doth not so seeme to an eye that would read it running; but if it be exactly looked on, if it be presented to our view in the pourtrait of an example, I thinke it will be very cleare.

[Page] David and Salomon compared with Paul. David and Salomon compared with Paul, will be as a thousand witnesses. The two first doe seeme to outstrip all men in affection, they are brim-full, running over.

For, David is stiled the sweet Singer of Israel; in his Psalmes he is ever magnifying the rich mercies of God, singing forth the praises of God, chusing rather to be a doore-keeper in the house of God, than to dwell in the tents of Mesech: making his Word to be a light unto his feet, and a lanthorn unto his paths, placing all his delight in the Law of the Lord.

Salomon is the happy Penman of that Hymne, which by the Spirit is stiled the [Page] Song of Songs. Yet for all this, even in this, they are both exceeded by Saint Paul.

But some, it may be, will imagine those Worthies to be endowed with higher gifts of Nature and Art, than S. Paul: and then they will give all the glory to their understanding, and not to their affections.

If it be so, I confesse I have not fitly chosen my Opposites; But the truth will then appeare in Them, without comparison distinctly.

For, if in affection they exceed all, and in abilities are as Saul, taller than their brethren by head and shoulders, then is it manifest in them, that eftsoone men of [Page] the most raised parts, of highest abilities, doe superabound in love.

But, if, in things which are not directly of Faith, I could cease to be a Sceptique, I should with that most Reverend Worthy, Thomas Goodwin, give Saint Paul for head and heart, that Throne in heaven which is placed next to Jesus Christ. But secret things belong to God; let us onely compare their eminency here below. I think it will be out of question, that Saint Paul was the most excellent. For, though Salomon (there I suppose will be the difficulty) be said to be the wisest of men, that ever were, that ever should be; yet that is to be applied onely to Government, [Page] and (if it may reach so farre) to his excellent skill in naturall Philosophy.Solomons preeminence in knowledg extended to Politicks, and naturall Philosophy only.

View but Saint Paul, and see whether he doth not excell in every thing. He had gathered up vast learning at the feet of Gamaliel; for his parts he was advanced to eminent power in Church and Common-wealth. He saith of himselfe, I profited in the Iewes religion above many my equalls in my owne nation, being more exceedingly zealous of the traditions of my fathers. And after his conversion, he was judged the only man fit to contend with the Philosophers at Athens. For they who seemed to be somewhat, in conference added nothing [Page] to him. And therefore to him was committed the unravelling of all the difficult knots. It is he that disputes about meates, long haire, divorces, irregular partings of husband and wife. It is he that openeth the nature of prophecie, evinceth the resurrection from the dead, maintaineth justification by faith. And that he may be perfect in knowledge, God is pleased (whether in the flesh or spirit,2 Cor. 12.3 he knoweth not) to take him into the third heavens: and there he was so filled with Revelation, that God was forced to put the Philomela-Thorne under his breast, that hee might not fall into the sleep of sin, and so give himselfe up (as Sampson) into the [Page] hands of Philistine enemies. And yet this man exceeds all men in affections, and in his affections surpasseth all his other excellencies. It is hee that is often in journies,2 Cor. 11.26. in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils by his owne nation, in perils amongst the Gentiles, in perils in the city, in perils in the wildernesse, in perils in the sea, in perils amongst false Brethren, in wearinesse and painfulnesse, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in fastings often, in cold & nakednesse. And as he saith of himselfe, Who was weak and I was not weak? who was offended and I did not burne? It is hee that fought with the beasts at Ephesus. He [Page] is content not onely to bee bound, but to die for Christ.

Good Saint Paul was so tender over his kinsmen according to the flesh, that for their sakes he could willingly be content to be separated from the love of the Lord Jesus Christ. And this is greater love than that which Christ mentioneth; for no man had then shewed greater love than to die; but this holy Saint will goe one step further, he will suffer an eternall death for his friend.

Thus, if suffering either for the head, or members, for the Church, or Christ, will discover affection, I suppose hee will merit the Garland.

[Page]And as a complement and crowne of all, if to live be most for Gods glory, though death be his advantage, he is resolved to submit, making obedience to Christ in life and death, his gaine and triumph.

I confesse, when he travelleth through those briery disputes, he cannot display such sparkling vivid affections: But when hee hath gotten but a little above those lime-twigs, how doth he mount on high, and there, upon even wings, disdaine all things below, triumphing in the imbraces of his Saviour, who is to him more choice than the choicest of ten thousand?

If what I have attempted to prove, be true, as I hope [Page] it is, then Consider,

Either those who are eminent in affection, and otherwise know little; or those who, as they abound in one, are also Masters in the other:True knowledg, true affection, separated from all appearances or outward advantages of the body, or the like, are one. Distinguish appearances from truth; Reading, memory, discourses, effects of sense or complexion, from that which entreth the soule, becommeth reall there, acteth, floweth from thence as a spring: And then will you conclude, that all knowledglieth in the affection; that all knowledge is but one, differing onely in degrees.

And lastly, that all, whether knowledge or affection, is but the Truth, that spirituall ray of heavenly light which God is pleased [Page] to present to our view under severall shapes, yet is but one and the same Being, scil. light and truth.

CHAP. X. That all the severall and particular actings of the soule, are this one light and truth.

THUS have I dispatch't the first discourse of the generall form and nature of the Understanding.Apprehensions, conclusions, affirmations, &c. all one truth in the soule. Now concerning the particular and various workings thereof, in conclusions, simple apprehensions, negations and affirmations, &c. which seeme to be the ofspring of the first and originall [Page] Being; even these, I hope to prove all one and the same, as with themselves, so with the former, all conjoyned in one Being of light and truth. That is truth in the fountaine, this in the streames; and no man will deny the fountaine and streame to make one river. Onely, sometimes it appeareth in such a shape, sometimes in another, but is still the same soule.

The operations of the soule are proved one with the essence thereof.This will appeare if wee compare the nature of the Soule or Understanding (for we have proved them both one) with their irradiations, actings and severall emanations. Res enim dignoscendae sunt ex causis. Now, we conceive the first Being to be no other thing, [Page] than activity, so confest by all. And if you would know what an activity is, you shall finde it to be either potentia agendi, or ipsa actio, or rather actus primus & actus secundus.

If it be actus, either Primus or Secundus (for primus and secundus are to me differenc'd onely by time, and so not differenc'd at all, (of which I will presently speak a little more) it must be still in work, and is no longer than it acts. Now, what can this act be in this subject, whereof we discourse, but the reasonable working of the soule in this or that conclusion? If it be any other than a work of reason, how can it constitute, or become the forme of a rationall soule and humane understanding? [Page] If it be such, how differs it from thought, ratiocination or positions in the minde?

The activity which is the form of the soul, not different from the actions thereof.Whilst then these conclusions, sayings, actions, are the forme of that truth, of that universall first truth, they must be that truth. For, forma quae dat esse, est esse, and whatsoever is the forme of any thing, that is the Being of it. For, Being and Forme are but one.

If the forme of this activity be not these reasonable workings, it must be something either of a baser allay, or of a higher stamp.

Not of a higher straine.If the latter; then you speak of Angels or some other spiritual Being, if there be any which is more noble than the soule. And then [Page] how doth this excellency discover it selfe? Where or what is it? How is it said that Action is the perfection of all things?

If the former;Nor of a lower. then first you descend to some lower degree of existency; for, all Being is but an activity; and according to the glory or basenesse of that activity, doth the Being receive denomination.

Or secondly; Shall the cause be more ignoble than the effects? What then? If it be neither more excellent, nor lower,Neither can it be various. is it various, hath it lesse or more of action? still you fall at the same stone.

But they who approve of the distinction of actus primus and actus secundus, think [Page] they salve all by the distinction of substance and accident; So, with them, actus primus is the Being, the substance it selfe: and actus secundus is the product of that Being or accident belonging to that which they make a soule; and thus forgetting this, that omnis virtus consistit in actione, they make the soule a meere virtuall Being.

The distinction betweene actus primus and actus secundus, examined.But, besides that the former Reasons are not thus everted, of these men I should ask this question.

What is this their actus primus? What is the forme of it? What is with them the forme of a reasonable soule?

Is not Reason? can there then be a soule, till there be [Page] reason? And this Reason is not potentia ratiocinandi, but Ratio. For, if you distinguish between the act and power, the act must ever be first in order, dignity, and nature.

So then, What is the form of this primus actus? is not some act? if it be, it must exist; else you will allow it but a bare notionall Being, which lyeth in the apprehension. And if it doth exist, must it not be this which you call actus secundus?

If it be not an act, they make it nothing but a power, a faculty depending upon something else. And if this be the nature of the first, what can the second Being (which is the effect, and so [Page] lower) be, but a bare notion?

The distinction betweene Substance and Accident called into question.If here were fit place, I might perhaps set upon the Rack that long-famous Distinction of Substance and Accident, wherby It should be forced to confesse it selfe an aged imposture, at least in the generall and frequent acceptance.

But the activity consisting in the action, That and It shall both be proved but one; and so, actus primus and actus secundus are this same truth, this light which I plead for.

[Page]

CHAP. XI. An objection answered, in which the nature of Time and Place are touched.

YEt this doth exceedingly stumble mens thoughts; wee see various actings of the soule, distinguished by the circumstances of Time and Place; there are severall distinct actings; are there then so many severall soules?

First, I could justly give this answer; When these men can tell me what time and place is, I doe hope I shall finde both time and place to dissolve the difficulties.

[Page]Secondly, I shall, I suppose, both by reason and their owne assertions in the like case, prove that time and place are nothing, or alter nothing in this point; and that, these simile's will a little irradiate.

The nature of Beauty illustrating time and place.Beauty (if I bring not the exact discription of the learned, yet I shall remember so much as concerneth the point in hand) consists in complexion, in lineaments, and in harmony.

Complexion draweth his Being from colour, from the subject wherein colour is seated, the spirits which give a Being to this colour, &c. and these are differenced by many circumstances. Lineaments as they are adorned by, so are they the [Page] ornaments of this complexion. And these againe are divers from themselves, and divers from Harmony. And yet, by Harmony, these make up one sweet, one pleasant Being, which we call Beauty.

A Flame rising from divers thornes, is not many, is but one flame. A streame filled with various springs, is not various, is but one streame. So is it in our case.

Those Circumstances of time and place, differencing these various Beings, are something, or nothing.

If nothing, the objection is answered.

If something, they are a piece of the whole, they serve to make up that harmony, [Page] which we call Beauty, [...]. Thus time and place, with all Beings of the like nature, are either nothing, or else they have a share in the Being, and make up the totum Compositum.

Time and Place nothing different from the essence of the soul.The Soule is but one Act distinguished to our notion by severall apparitions; and these intervals, with all variations, either are nothing, or are of the nature of the Soule, and serve to make up that confort, that truth, that life that we now discourse of.

And that this is so, I hope by this cleere ratiocination to leave you assured.

Time and Place seeme to me nothing but an extrinsecall modification of a thing. I cannot finde that the learned [Page] have made anything at all of them. Let us survey them, as they define them, when they treat of them; as they esteeme them, when they meete them occasionally.

How hath Aristotle defined Place?The definitions of time and place rejected. Est superficies concava corporis ambientis; Where is the truth of this in the highest heaven which incompasseth all the rest?Place. Hath Ramus any whit advanced the cause in his definition? Est subjectum rei locatae; Idem per Idem! Are not those who propound, and they who entertain such a definition, justly compared to the Constable and the Country-Justice? The first having received from some higher power a Warrant, [Page] wherein in was this hard word, Invasion, repaired to his Rabbi for Solution: he, that the question might seeme somewhat obscure, paused a little, that it might not shame him; after he had consulted, in a stroke or two with his grave-learned beard, replyed; the sense of this word is very plaine, it is Invasion, it signifieth Invasion; with which the Constable being fully satisfied, gave him many thankes and departed. Locus and spatium corporis locati, is little better; what have we in this definition, of the intrinsecall nature of place? So that, if I be not wholly blinde, they, whilst they treat of it as Scholars, make it nothing: when they make use of it by [Page] the By, it is the same. As, the Soule, they say, is tota in toto, and tota in qualibet parte; whilst they spread and diffuse the soule over the whole body, from one extremity to the other, Place maketh no division in the soule; it is but one soule, yet extended quite through the body. Angels are definitivè in loco; that place which is within the circumference so limited, doth not at all cause them to make two in this angelicall Being.

I may affirme the same of time,Time. Tempus est mensura motus; What doe I know of time by this? how can I from hence ghesse time to have so considerable a Being, as that it shall make two of that whith otherwise [Page] would be but one? In the Deity we are sure it can have no such effect. In the Deity wee have creation, preservation, redemption, decree, and execution of that decree. All these to our apprehension are distinguished by time: and yet no man will say, that in God they are two: for God is purus actus, nulla potentia.

But you will say, this is obscurum per obscurius, and not to unmask and unveile difficulties: Which no Simile taken from the Divinity can doe, because That is all mysticall.

To which I answer, Si magnis licet componere parva, wee shall finde the same in our selves, we shall find that [Page] Time doth not at all difference, or any way act. I suppose it is cleare, that Place hath lost all place and credit in this argumentation. Why may not I say the same of Time, seeing by all mens confessions they are twins of the same womb? But secondly, I affirme this, (and I hope truly) that if you make Time any thing,All actions nothing, if time be any thing. you annihilate all the act of the Creation; that is, you will admit of no one perfect action. A thought, I confesse, passeth in a moment; and yet, in this moment, under this moment, are many subdivisions of Time. We have in an houre, an halfe, a quarter, a minute, a second, (the 60 part of a minute:) & how many subdivisions will [Page] a scruple admit of? For ought I know, Time and punctum Physicum agree in this, that they are divisibilia in insinitum. If then you will make so many thoughts in a thought, as you have divisions under a scruple, you will have no perfect thought, no compleat act. To shun this, you wil confesse that Time doth not divide one act alone: but one Act or thought comprehendeth many Times. Why may not I say, that if Time doth not parcell out one act, it cannot act upon two, when the duality ariseth onely from Time? This not being well weighed, hath cast our wits upon strange rocks, hath raised this Question,

[Page] How doth God see things? The difficulty untied, how God seeth things. If in their existencies, then all things are co-eternall with God: if in their Causes onely, then all things are not present with God; but you must admit of succession, a former and a latter, to eye divine; which is blasphemy. This dilemma seemeth strong; but it is because we make Time something: whereas indeed all things did exist in their Beings with God ab omni aeterno. For, aeternum & tempus are all one in eternity: and this succession is but to our apprehension.

Thus, if Time and Place be nothing, I hope the weight of this objection is is taken off.

[Page]But I foresee another objection.

Object. If Time and Place be nothing, if all our Actions are but One: How can there be evill and good?

Answ. I fully conclude with Aristotles Adversaries Anaxagoras, Democritus, &c That Contradictions may be simul & semel in the same Subject, same Instant, same Notion (not onely in two distinct respects, or notions, as one thing may be causa & effectum, Pater & Filius, respectu diversi; but even in the same respect, under one and the same Notion.) For, Non ens is nothing; and so, the Being which it hath, may subsist with that which contradicts it. I speake in their termes.

[Page]Now, let us view our actions, either

as Many, in pieces, or, One entire act.

As many; impute Transgression to what you please, either to the effects in the body, or the Will, and its workings: all these, so farre as they have Being, are good; for, all Being is good. Where then is the sinne? Certainly, sinne lieth in this, that there is not so full a goodnesse as there should. Sin is onely a Privation, a Non-Entity: But, a Privation, a Non-Entity may subsist (according to the subsistence it hath) with Being. Such a co-existence of Entity and Non-Entity, was in his faith, who cried, Lord, I beleeve, help my unbeliefe. [Page] This Contradiction (of Entity, Non-Entity) must be in the selfe-same Act, (and not in two distinct Acts:) else the Act is perfect, (having complete Entity, goodnesse, without admixture of Non-Entity:) and so is onely the Creator: or else it is more imperfect than Beelzebub; for, It is Bad, and no Good, Non-Entity wholly, and no Entity, and so no Action.

Thus we see Good and Evill may co-exist in severall, in particular Actions; Why then not so, if all Acts should bee but one entire Act, undistinguisht by Time or Place? If the members composing the Body, have matter and forme, why then [Page] not the whole Body? Sinne in it selfe is nothing, only a non-conformity to Gods Law.

The Twilight hath not so much light and so much positive darknesse: only it hath not so much light as Noon in cleare day. Here's the defect: and by this defect, Light and Darknesse co-exist in the same point of ayre.

So, though our Acts bee but one, undivided by Time and Place: yet, to our griefe, are not free from Sinne.

Thus the Soule, Truth, Light, is alwayes and continually one, though it appeareth otherwise to me: and this appearance ought not to dazle the sight of the truth; for, as they say of honour, Honor est in honorante: [Page] so may I say of apprehension, Apprehensio est in apprehendente: the thing is still the same, let my apprehension bee what it will bee.

The same truth taking varicus shapes in our apprehensions.I doe not reject the phrases of severall truths, and several actings of this truth: for, Loquendum cum vulgo; yet, phrases must not mislead us. For whilst I confesse loquendum esse cum vulgo, I professe that sapiendum est cum paucis. For, to our apprehension, that truth which is but one, doth variegate it selfe, and take divers shapes.

Set forth by a similitude taken from the Sun.As that Sun which is one and the same, is ruddy in the morning, cleere at nooneday; of a moderate heate early, and at mid-day rather torrid.

[Page]Various colours meeting in the same point,The same act of sense perfectly one, yet varied unto many formes. to make up one indivisible act of sense, are by it judged divers Beings, whereas they all make up but one Being; they are but one and the same object of sense. Reason, which is exalted above Sense, telleth us it must be so; because that act of life is but one, and the Sense is not an Ubiquitary; it cannot act upon any more than one at once.

The Trigonall Glasse paints out to us more, A Similitude from the trigonall glasse. and more lively colours in every object (which as a medium it presents to the eye) than are in the Iris; yet, This object, may be but some duskish sad thing, in which there is no change of colours at all.

[Page] Sense confuted by Copernicus.The three leading Senses have confuted Copernicus these many yeares; for the eye seeth the circulations of the Heavens; we feele our selves upon a stable and firme foundation; and our eares heare not from the volutations of the Earth such a black Cant as her heavy rowlings would rumble forth: and yet now if we will beleeve our Capernic. Kepler. Gallilaeus de Galil: new Masters, sense hath done as sense will doe, misguided our Reason.

When the nimble juglers play their pranks, you see and heare, yet neither see nor heare. So your sense is no good judge. Thus let the soule be raised to its supreme height of power, and it will cleerely see, that [Page] all the actings of reason which seeme severall (bee they, as we think, distinguished by time and place) are but one, a fixt entire unity.

CHAP. XII. Another objection is answered, drawn from the falshood in the workings of the soule.

BUt if these particular actings of truth,Object. are truth; then when this Being, which wee have so long discoursed of, acteth not truth, it ceafeth to bee: and so, where the soule entertaineth or pronounceth a false position, the soule is no more it selfe.

[Page]Grant that it is with the soule in this moment of time, when it acts upon falshood, as when it acts not, and so is not; yet you will advance nothing, till you can prove the succession of moments to have a reall being. By former discourse,Succession of moments, apparent, not reall. I hope it is cleare, that Time is but a Nominall Being, and then this cessation depending on that distinct moment, which is not, is likewise it selfe an imagination.

The scule never acts falsly.But secondly, I will allow it, when any man can shew me that Falshood is a reall being, which the soule or truth can worke upon; For, in every apprehension two things are to be weighed; The Agent it selfe, and the Subject acted upon, (I [Page] speake now in other mens language; for I conceive the Agent together with the Subject to be One in the act.) Truth is alwayes truth, Nemine dubitante; and so it must be true, whilst it acteth on a truth. If that be True, which it acts upon, then all is well; if it be False, it is a vanity, a lye, a nothing. For, if Falshood have a Being, then wee must either with the Manichees, make Two sources of Being, or else God must be the author of it; which no man will affirme.

If then it have no Being, the Soule cannot act in it, and so it cannot be the act of the Soule; For, how shall the soule or truth act upon nothing?

[Page] Object.But the Soule doth act, when it pronounceth a false position?

Resp. In false propositions of the soule, so farre as it acts, it acts truly: where it is deceived, it is by not acting.He that in the twilight, mistaketh a man for a tree, acteth right in what he seeeth; and when he raiseth a false conclusion upon the premisses, he acteth not. For, how is it possible, that a man should act falshood, a vanity, nothing?

In this action, there are two things; There is the seeing a Being, and the seeing it under a confused notion. Or, which is the same,

You may observe, first, the opining; secondly, the opining uncertainly or falsly.

The opining, is a good act, none will deny; to think, let it be what it will be, is good.

[Page]But secondly, the so-thinking, is that which is obscure. Now certainly, the formalis ratio of this so-thinking, lyeth in thinking of errour, which is nothing; and in thinking of nothing, the the soule cannot act; for, nothing produceth nothing.

A man, who catcheth at the shadow of a Hornet, acteth rightly in catching, and stingeth not himselfe; because he apprehendeth onely the shadow; because so far he doth not act; for to catch a shadow, to catch nothing, and not to act, are idem. And thus, whilst the soule catcheth at a false position, it graspeth but the shadow, which can be nothing, seeing evill is, nothing; [Page] ergo, it loseth not truth; for it pronounceth nothing but the truth of the position.

Paine hath no reall Being.The same may be said for Paine. I conceive, it cannot act upon the soule, nor the soule upon it, because, it is but a bare privation of spirit and strength. And upon this ground, I shall subscribe to that opinion propounded by that reverend, worthy, that quick-sighted Balearian-jaculator, Mr Dr Twisse: Whether it be not better to be in perpetuall paine, than not to be at all. If Paine be but a bare privation, certainly Any Being is more desirable, than, for feare of a privation (a notbeing) to become no-Being.

[Page] Hîc rogo, Mart. lib. 2. Epigr. 80. non furor est, ne moriare, mori? If any man shall tell me I speak against sense, I shall modestly ask him this Question: Whether it be not impar congressus betwixt Sense and Reason: and whether, in that case, Sense be an equall judge. Reason telleth us, that Paine must either be something, or nothing; if nothing, then it is but a privation; if something, it must be either good, or evill; if good, it cannot (as hath, and will yet appeare more in this Pamphlet) hurt us; if evill, it is either a nominall evill, or reall; if it be named an evill, and is not, it will not be disputed; but if it be a Reall evill, then it is nothing; for, Evill, by consent [Page] of all, is nothing but privation of good. In this case shall Reason or Sense guide, judge You.

CHAP. XIII. Discovering the consequences of this Position, that All things are one Truth.

SIR,

WHEN you collect your thoughts, and passe sentence upon these unsheaved gleanings, your gentlenes (though the papers merit no such favour) wil smile upon them; and say, here our eyes indeed are pleased with the curiosity of Pallas her needle: but, what hath Reason to work [Page] upon? what is the usefulnesse of this more than Arachne's web? more than to entangle empty wits withall? What fruit doth it yeeld better than the Silkworme, which is worne onely for ostentation? Give me leave to plead for my own. Our own (you know, though black) is comely to Our selves.

If This were well weighed,The happinesse of our lives advanced by this opinion. that all things are but one emanation from power divine: If this were taken fully into the Understanding, that wee might be said to live upon, to live in this truth; we should live more Christianly, more cheerfully.

Non est vivere,

Mart. li. 6. Ep. 70.

sed valere, vita.

[Page] I say more cheerfully, more Christianly, in a few moments, than we doe now in the whole course of our distracted time. And you will more easily consent to this, if you doe consider that our happinesse is compounded of two Simples only, which are so entertwined, as that they may seeme One,

The first is to know.

The second, to doe what is right and good.

Of the former, the Theoreticall part, I shall speake hereafter. In the Practick, Two things are considerable,

This Vnity the fountaine of knowledg. First, that, Action dependeth wholly upon knowledge. And, of Knowledge, this is the well-spring and rule, that, Vnity is all. The [Page] Spirit saith, How can you love whom you doe not know? and I may say, How can you do what you know not?

The Not-knowledge of of what is right, with-holdeth from, and wearieth in action; if perchance wee ever have any glimmering of light.Action wholly depends on knowledg. For, Ignorance bringeth this double evill with it.

First, it leadeth into Errour; and Errour (simply in the view of it) giveth no content.

Seconly, in the progresse it wearieth and distracteth. One who is lost in a Wood, suffereth as much in seeking as losing the way. Whereas, if we Knew aright, how even and smooth would be the way of action, and how [Page] great our contents therin?

Secondly, not only all our actions turn upon this hinge; but out of this treasury issueth forth the whole complacency that wee gather from, or receive in action. For, if wee knew this truth, that all things are one; how cheerfully, with what modest courage should wee undertake any action, re-incounter any occurrence, knowing that that distinction of misery and happinesse, which now so perplexeth us, hath no Being, except in the Brain? Wee should not need to check and raise our selves with Davids out-cryes, why art thou cast downe my soule, why art thou disquieted within me? Our Spirits [Page] could with him wait upon God; make him our only rock, and then wee should not be moved. We should not call for Epictetus nor Boëtius de consolatione Philosophica; wee might fetch our cures from our own bosomes, if from this one truth of unity wee could conclude these two things.

First, that Misery is nothing, and so cannot hurt.

Secondly, that every thing that is, is good, and good to me: then we might sing with a joyfull spirit, O nimium, nimiumque beati; and upon sure ground; for, whilst I being a Being, am Good, and that other Being is Good, and these Two Goods can fall under no other difference, but of degrees; [Page] Good & Good, cannot but agree, and so must be good to me.

Ob.If any man shall say, that the overflowing of another mans good, may be my evill; they mis-take;Resp. for, such a though is a falshood; and, as I have already proved, Falshood is nothing, and so cannot hurt.

That such a thought is falshood, I suppose this will cleare it.

The Philosophers fancy to themselves animam mundi, and say every parcell is as a Simple contributing to the existence of that Compositum. But Christians know, and I have (if I mistake not) evinced, that, all Being is but one emanation from above, diversified onely in our apprehension. [Page] How can then one piece of that Being impeach the other,All things one piece. one part of the Soule quarrell with the other? As the will (speaking in their termes) with the sensitive faculty; or the Eye with the Belly: the vanity whereof Esop hath taught us long agoe. So, of necessity, if either my envy, or anothers folly, lay me low, because my brother is exalted, this must be a lie, and so cannot hurt. E contrario, the Good of another, being the perfection of the whole, is my advantage. If with this eye you view that Scripture, you will see it in its glory, Is thine eye evill, Mat. 20.15 because thy brothers good increaseth?

The rule, you see is, that I should rejoyce at the wellfare [Page] of another. Now what is the reason of the rule?Propriety maketh lovely. Philosophy teacheth us, that it is not onely [...], but [...], that is, lovely. If then I must rejoyce, I rejoyce because of some propriety, and this propriety ariseth from Vnity; this Alkermes of Unity, cheereth the drooping spirit, cureth the atra bilis of Melancholy. The same potion easeth the heart of envyings, censurings and whisperings. So he, who knoweth that injuries, because they are nothing, cannot hurt; and good things, though anothers, doe serve him; cannot cherish such viperous starvelings in his thoughts.

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CHAP. XIIII. The benefit which Knowledge and all Sciences receive from this assertion.

I Have in a word showne how Unity untyeth all difficulties, unites all happinesse in practicall things. Permit me to discover what influence it hath upon that other simple, which maketh up the compound of our happinesse, (Scil.) Theorie.

Tully saith of Epicurus, The vanity of dividing knowledg into many Sciences. Frangit, non dividit; The breaking of learning into so many Sciences, is but making so many miles, that so the Master may have more hire for his posthorse. [Page] They forget, that, vita est brevis, whilst ars est longae. It were much better if all Learning were like the chaine fastned at Iupiters Throne, all of a piece: Or the Beame, which from the Sunne by a continuall tract of irradiation toucheth the treasures of the earth.

To the effecting of this, that learned, that mighty man Comenius doth happily and rationally indeavour to reduce all into one. Why doe wee make Philosophy and Divinity two Sciences? What is True Philosophy but Divinity? and if it be not True, it is not Philosophy.

Confusions from division in knowledg.Doe but see a little in particulars, the fruit of such like divisions.

[Page]In the knowledge of Beings, we must observe

First,Knowledg double, of Beings, & of their Causes. Being is:

Secondly, What it is.

There is the [...], and the [...]. What a tedious work doth this very division lay upon us?Knowledg of Beings twofold, of their existencies, and their natures. Alas, the very first, the easiest part of it, will take up all our time; and to ascend to causes before we know that there are effects, is to mount the highest round, before we ascend the first. And therefore that learned wit, Sir Francis Bacon, in his naturall Philosophy, bringeth onely experiments, leaving the search of causes to those, who are content, with Icarus, to burne their wings at a fire too hot for them. Indeed, sometimes as an imbellishment [Page] of his discourse, that he may please stirring fancy, he interlaceth some causes, yet gently and modestly propoundeth them, but as for entertainment. If now our humble spirits could be content to see all things, as they are, but one, onely bearing different shapes, we should according to that rule, Noli altum sapere, improve in what we know, and there sit downe. But our spirits are mighty Nimrods, hunting after knowledge, venturing all, to eate of the tree of knowledge of good and evill. Which curiositie of ours, is wittily reproved by Sir Iohn Davies;

Why did my Parents send me to the Schooles,

[Page]That I with knowledg might enrich my minde:

When the desire to know, first made men fooles.

And did corrupt the root of all mankinde.

And for this reason we lose with Esops Dog, the substance, and get not the shadow.

Causes we cannot,Knowledg of existencies necessary, but altogether uncertain. neither shall ever finde out: The knowledg of existencies we omit; they are too voluminous, if we did attempt; and so much doubted of by men, that what to think, we know not. View all Learning, and see how the very Being of things, is questioned in Naturall Philosophy. Amongst the Quadrupedes, wee question the existence of the [Page] Unicorne: inter volatilia, the Phoenix, and the Bird of Paradise: amongst Fishes, the Mer-maid. When we seek into Minerals, we finde not Ebur fossile; the incomparable vertues of it wee meet with in all Physicians: but the subject of so many excellencies, we doubtfully hope for. Of herbes and plants, Bookes name many which gardens, meadowes, rivers afford not: If they ever were, we may give them to Pancirolla, that he may reckon them with perpetuum mobile, the Philosophers stone, cum multis alijs, inter Inventa perdita: For every age interreth old things, and is againe fertile of new births.

If we were mighty men, [Page] as Adam, Knowledg of the natures more uncertain than the existencies. that all the creatures would come and present themselves to our view: yet (which is the second part of this first Question) wee could not give them their names according to their natures. For when we doe know that any Being doth exist, we doe not know what their formes, their severall qualities and temperaments are. We altogether are ignorant of herbes and plants; which are hot and cold, in how many degrees they are so. For in these, how many, how eternall are the debates? Some deny the healing vertue to Dictamnum. Some question the nature of that killing-saving Indian herb, Hen-man-bane, Tobacco: whose insolence is [Page] such, as to make That part of man a chimny, an outlet of her smoky birth (expressed happily by Doctor Thory in these words, In (que) tubo genitas haurire & reddere nubes:) I say, to make That an outlet of her smoky birth, by which the old Romans (in this their Proverb, Est homo nasutus) discovered their judgements of gifts and wit. Some say it is hot, and some say it is cold. Few of the Learned, consent about the degrees of heat and cold in any Simple, and so are forced to palliate all with the gaudy mantle of occulta qualitas; Yet what are all these but matter of observation? manifest effects, which Sense teacheth the plowman, the Countryman, [Page] yea the bruites themselves, as familiarly, as warmth in the Sun-shine, and wet in the Raine. I could name many questions in As all those laws concerning slaves, whereas a slave indeed is non ens, for if any man have given away, with Esau, his birth▪ right, yet he hath not lost it; because manhood and religion are not mei juris; they are talents which God hath intrusted me with, and are no more deputable, than places of jud catu [...]e. Et sic de caeteris. Politickes, Oeconomickes, Ethickes, &c. the very subject whereof are in dispute. But they will more happily fall in, when I discover our ignorance in causes.

Thus you see in what a Maze you are Meandred,In what sense Knowledg of Beings is to be wished. if you admit of any division. The very knowledge of the Being of things, is more than we are capable of. And as yet that is necessary, [Page] so we keepe our selves still to this principle, that those things are all of one nature, variegated only in our apprehension: and this knowledge I must consent to.

But if men once seeke into the Causes of Subsistencies, I see no reason but they should suffer as Rei laesae Majestatis. For these are Arcana Imperii, which to meddle with, is no lesse than high Treason.

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CHAP. XV. Confusion in the knowledge of Causes, discovered, and redressed by this Vnity.

IF wee are thus at a stand, in these very beginnings, what shall wee bee, when wee enquire after Causes? Two lie open to our view.Two only causes received, God, and emanation from God. First, our great and good God, the fountaine of all Being, and this the Ancients styled Fatum.

Secondly, there is that Emanation from him,Aristotles materia prima brought to light. which is the first created cause of all Being, and this was Aristotle's materia prima, so far as sensible things extend. [Page] Which because it is the substance of all things, and the variations of it make all formes; therefore in it selfe, he described it to be neither quid, quale, nor quantum.

All other causes are better knowne by name, than in the natures of them. They make many, as Efficient, Finall, Materiall, Formall; with divers subdistinctions; as instrumental, exemplary, &c. All these have matter and forme.Matter & Forme have their matter and forme, both of which meet in the emanation. For, there is a matter, and forme of a materiall cause, and forme and matter of formall causes. For in a table of of wood, the materiall cause is not the matter, wood: wood is the subject, upon which this materiall cause bringeth forth that effect, [Page] a Table. It may bee the materiall cause shall not be Physicall matter; wee shall by and by finde it another name.

Of the forme of a materiall cause, I shall say nothing, and so for formall causes.

Faith is said to be the forme of a Christian, and faith hath its forme. The soule is by many deemed (which I understand not) the forme of the reasonable creature, and it hath a particular individuall forme. And thus both materiall and formall causes have matter and forme.

Matter againe, is either Physicall and substantiall, or metaphoricall and metaphysicall. And this is the name [Page] I promised even now.

Formes are either intrinsecall, or extrinsecall: the intrinsecall are Logicall, Metaphysicall, &c.

Now have you various and severall kinds of forms; but who knoweth the least considerable part of matter or forme? Who will not cleerly lose himselfe in such an inquest? May we not say of these, what one saith wittily of the Soule?

For, Her true forme, how can my sparke discerne,

Which dim by nature, Art did never cleere:

When the great wits, of whom all skill we learne,

Are ignorant, both what she is, and where?

[Page]Doe but survey the Physicall Beings of our Philosophers, with what impossible, with what unnecessary scrutinies of causes,The vaine search of causes in Physicks. do they weary themselves, and their Disciples?

Till numeri Platonici cease to be a Proverb, I must remaine a Sceptick, although one undertake to teach me, how and whence it is, that various rowlings of the tongue, shall send forth so many articulate voices, and so many severall languages.

Till it be known, how all numbers gather themselves into an Unity, I must not give credence to another, who promiseth an accompt of the estuation of the Sea.

I know some surrender Neptunes Trident to the [Page] Moone, and there six the reason of Thetis her uncertain ebbings. Others Platonici; who make the world animal magnum. Vide Gal. in System. Ptolem. & Co. pernic. Keplers Harmo. give the world a good paire of lungs, and from these Bellowes expect the causes of what they inquire for. Others take a dish of water, and shaking it up and down, think to cleere this difficulty. But these their ratiocinations discover cleerly, that with NOAHS Dove, through over-much water, they can finde no ground for footing. For veritas non quaerit angulos. And if the reason were ready, they would not have disputed; and yet they are very confident; and why may not they be so, who dare venture to give (before they prove any Orbs) the government of [Page] the Orbs to a band of celestiall intelligences?

I shall not wonder, if these men every where finde an Euripus, and at its bankes imitate their Grandy'sAristot. outcry, Quia ego non possum te capere, tu me capias.

How doth the Spirit befoole these men? First hee telleth them, that they are so farre from finding out the Causes, that they are ignorant of the Effects: Knowest thou the time when the wild Goats of the rock bring forth? or canst thou mark when the Hindes doe calve? Canst thou number the moneths that they fulfill, or knowest thou the time when they bring forth?

Salomon saith, There are three things too wonderfull [Page]for me; yea, foure which I know not.Prov. 30. 18.19.The way of an Eagle in the aire, the way of a serpent upon a rocke, the way of a ship in the midst of the sea, and the way of a man with a maid.

See Aristot. de mundo, de coelo &c.How doth our great Master perplexe himselfe in the inquiry of causes? Sometimes he makes the principia of naturall things, to be contraria: whereas, neither the heavens, nor the starres, nor anything that is by univocall generation, is that way produced. Sometimes he allowes three principia, Privatio, Materia, & Forma; forgetting his own principle, that Ex nihilo nihil fit, not remembring that when hee hath matter and forme, he is yet to seek for the Rock and Pit, out of [Page] which matter and form are digged and hewed; and therefore instituteth two severall authors, one of matter, another of forme.

I confesse, his Commentators doe file of some rust from these Tenets, but not so cleerely as to make him give the right cause of Being.

Romance's and New-Atlantides, I shall gladly embrace as pleasant and glorious entertainements from specious and Ambrosian wits.Like Plato's and sir Francis Bacon's. But for true knowledge of causes, having no cause to expect, I will not hope.

Sis Walter Raleigh saith exceeding well, that the Cheese-wife knoweth that Runnet curdleth Cheese, [Page] but the Philosoher knoweth not how.

All this while I doe not reject an industrious search after wisedome, though the wisest of men saith, He that increaseth wisedome, increaseth griefe.

Verulan: Augment. Scient.I doe only, with Sir Francis Bacon, condemne doctrinam phantasticam, litigiosam, fucatam, & mollem; a nice, unnecessary, prying into those things which profit not.

Too great exactnesse in this Learning, hath caused our Meteorologists to blush when their confidence hath proved but a Vapour. Too great hopes of discovering the mysterie of nature, hath caused some, contrary to the authority of Scripture [Page] contrary to the opinion of Iulius Caesar, Picus Mirandula, Cornelius à Lapide, Ioan. Barclaius, cum multis aliis, to attribute an unwarranted power to the starres over our bodies.

But this ensueth, while we follow, for learning, what is not. And so, that noble comprehensive activity, the soule of man, is hindered from entertaining in its place more generous, more usefull, and sublimated Truths.

How would the soule improve, if all Aristotles Materia prima, Plato's Mens Platonica, Hermes Trismegistus his [...], were converted into some spirituall light? the soule might soare and raise it selfe up to [Page] Universall Being, bathe it selfe in those stately, deep, and glorious streames of of Vnity, see God in Iesus Christ, the first, chiefe, and sole cause of all Being: It would not then containe it selfe within particular rivulets, in whose shallow waters it can encounter nothing but sand or pebbles, seeing it may fully delight it selfe in the first rise of all delight, Iesus Christ.

Thus, when you see the face of Beauty, you will perfectly be assured how many the severall pieces which make it up, must be, what their nature, and their severall proportions. So shall you with certainty descend to knowledge of existences, essences, when you [Page] shall rest in one universall cause: and Metaphysicks, Mathematicks, and Logick will happily prove one, while they teach the variations of Vnity through severall numbers. All particular Sciences will be subordinate, and particular applications of these. So all shall be, according to Ficinus, Circulus boni per bonum in bonum rediens; and the face of divine Beauty shall bee unveiled through all.

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CHAP. XVI. The unhappy fruits of Division, in other parts of Learning, made manifest.

CAst your eye on Morall Philosophy, and see how the truth is darkened by distinctions and divisions; How our Masters have set up in the same soule, Two fountaines of Reason, the Will, and the Vnderstanding. Have they not virtutes Intellectuales & Morales? Is it not a great question, Vtrum Prudentia sit virtus Moralis? Vtrum Summum Bonum sit in Intellectu, an Voluntate? Vtrum Prudentia possit separari à virtute Morali? Vtrum virtus Moralis sita sit in Appetitu Rationali,[Page]an Sensitivo?

I say, these questions, especially the dividing of the soule into so many faculties enthrones many reasonable Beings in the soule.Many reasonable Beings, placed by Philosophy in the Soule. For, when the will entertaineth or rejecteth the proposition of the understanding, shee must doe it one of these three wayes: Either by an instinct; and this men will not have; for, hoc est brutum. Or by chance; and this many reject; for then she hath no liberty. Or by discourse; and this most pitch upon; for then she doth exercise vim illam imperatricem, which I reade of amongst them, but understand not.

Now, if they conclude upon this third way. What [Page] is this Discourse, but the Work of an Vnderstanding? if the Will act that way, which is, or ought to be to the Vnderstanding proprium quarto modo; Is not then the will an Vnderstanding?

Thus like an unskillfull Artist, they mince with distinctions; they whet, till there be no more Steele: and whilst they would sharpen, they annihilate: Whilst they would inlarge, they overthrow the Soule. They create names, and say, with Ajax, Eurip. Tragaed. they are Vlysses, and so fight with them. They do, as one faith very well, giving Passion eyes, make Reason blind; raising the will, they ruine the Vnderstanding. Termini nullos[Page]habent terminos. The poore Soule oppressed with black Melancholy, beleeveth some part of his body as big as a house: and no man can, in his thought, passe, unlesse he remove it: Even so doe those men.

But what may not bee expected from That happy Inventer, and bold Abetter of errors, who with much confidence maintaineth the eternity of the World, against Hermes, Museus, Orpheus, Anaxagoras, Linus, &c. Yet that they may insanire cum ratione, they say, that if you raise not up some faculty to contend with the Vnderstanding, the Vnderstanding seeing right, must ever do right, and [Page] that we by wofull experience know to bee otherwise.

I confesse, whilst the Vnderstanding seeth light and right (I now discourse of the Vnderstanding, Will, Affections, &c. in their termes) it doth right;Seeing and doing one in the Soule as knowing and willing. for, seeing and doing is all one; for the act of the Soule is but seeing or discerning. But that Vnderstanding, which now did see right perfectly, at the same instant is blind, even in a grosse, absurd thing: and so the effect and birth of it is but darknesse and folly.

Vanity of dispures in Metaphysicks.In Metaphysicks, with what curious nets do they intangle their hearers? certainly, that should be stiled the Art or Science of Disputes [Page] and quaere's for the very Being and subjectum Metaphysices, is strongly disputed. Some will have ens taniùm, the universall nature of Being: Others, substances abstract from matter, as Angels, Spirits, Soules of men, to bee the subject of this Learning; And as it beginneth▪ so it groweth into thousands of disputes.

As, Vtrum differentiae possunt esse sub eodem genere cum illo quod differre faciunt? Vtrum universale sit aliquid reale, [...]n notionale tantùm? Vnde rerum individuatio exoriatur?

If I should go through Logick, Mediocrem artem, Mathematicall Sciences: I should but weary you with [Page] variety of opinions.

Even Divinity it selfe is darkened with mists of inextricable questions.Darknesse in Divinity through the ignorance of unity. The questions about Faith and Love, are sufficient to fill the world with perpetuall quarrels;Faith and Repentance coevall. As, whether Faith precedeth Repentance? which learned Master Pemble hath sweetly determined by making both Faith and Repentance fruits of semen vivisicum. Whether Faith be a particular application of Christ to my selfe, or onely a bare spirituall beleefe, that Christ is the Son of God? Which Reverend, holy, learned Master Cotton, hath most acutely, most truly cleared, by proving that Faith can bee nothing but [Page] a laying hold of that promise which God hath made.The generall promise, the object of faith. Now, that promise is, That, he that beleeveth that Christ is the Sonne of God, shall be saved.

Whether faith be a beleeving that I am saved, or depending upon God for salvation? And here Bellarmine hath with mighty wit assaulted our side; for, faith he, if beliefe be to beleeve I am saved, I was saved without faith. If beliefe be to beleeve that God will give me grace to be saved, I beleeve before I have grace, before I have faith. Which knot, I know not how to dissolve, but by opening with Reverend Mr. Cotton That (and this is another Quaere.)

[Page] DeclarativèWe are saved by faith, only declarativè. I am saved, not only in the eternall decree, without faith, by Gods free gift (that all consent to) but even in the execution. And when God hath pleased to take me out of eternall darknesse; then faith discovereth to me that I am to be saved; and so, making faith to be a manifestation of that to me, that I am saved, Bellarmines objection is answered.

There are many other Questions, but I dare not so much as mention them.

If wee should but survey the disciplinable part of Divinity, we should be confounded with Chiliads of disputes, all which I will wrap up in one, scil.

[Page]Whether there be a prescript forme of Church-government?The ill consequence of the division between doctrine and discipline.

Are not the two Testaments expositors of the two Tables? Do they leave us any latitude in any other of the Commandements? why should we then think, that That Commandement which God hath honoured in the second place, should be forgotten? Truly, had the Learned Papists so done, they would never have expunged it.

Are not we as unable to prescribe the manner as the matter of Gods worship? If we were left to our selves, should wee not institute cringings, crouchings, all those ceremonies of Willworship, which carry a voluntary [Page] outward visible shew of humility, but give the heart leave to play the Trewant?Doctrine of mater inworship; Discipline of manner, both are Doctrine, both prescribed by the same God. If ever distinctions did harm, here they have beene deadly poyson: for, Doctrine and Discipline are all one. For, what is Discipline but that Doctrine of the manner of Gods worship? wherein we ought to bee as faithfull, as in any point of Divinity: and this will certainely appeare one day, when God shall with pittylesse holy scorne, aske some, Who hath required these things at your hands?

The monstrous effects of division made manifest in other peices of Divinity.But, to conclude; give me leave to shew you how these exorbitant wits have raised a Babel, have cast Pelion upon Ossa; and from thence discharged the Balistae [Page] of their ignorance, against the Throne of Eternity, against God himselfe.

The Schooles for many ages,The weaknesse of the distinction Scientia simplicis intelligentiae, & purae visionis. have looked upon the way of Gods knowledge of things, under two notions; simplicis intelligentiae, & purae visionis. I confesse, I see not the end of this distinction. For, if Gods Power and Will be all one, (which I think no man dispureth) all the wayes of knowledge, that can bee in God, must bee confined in that one notion of simplicis intelligentiae.

I doe seeme (if I mistake not) to maintaine this position by an evident demonstration, thus;

Is there any that denyeth God to be purus actus? doth [Page] not every body say, that in God there is no potentia? If God then bee actus, and not potentia, all things were, that ever shall be, ab aeterno under a decree; and so, what hee could doe, hee did doe, and can doe no more.

Yet, that Truths may come more cleerely and easily to our apprehension, I shall allow the use of the distinction, so that they improve it only for memory, and doe not expectany reality from it.

But some, not content with this distinction, have found out another, which discovereth a meane parentage, by the very name, it is called Media scientia. Scientia maedia discussed. I will not contend with it in [Page] the power of those arguments, whereby our Divines have so often left it spiritlesse and helplesse. I shall only from this point of Unity, shew the vanity of it.

If this sciencia be one with that which wee allow, then is it but nominall and vaine. If it be different, you make two in God: for, if I over-value not my former ratiocination, I have proved it cleerely that scientia simplicis intelligentiae carrieth forth as much of God as is discernable to our darknesse; and making two in God, you exalt two Gods; and whilst you finde two Gods, you lose the true God, which is but only one, an eternall Unity. And thus whilst men gaze [Page] continually in search of causes, they blinde themselves, and know not effects.

CHAP. XVII. A Recapitulation of former instances, with some additions of a question or two more.

In what sense intermediate causes may be allowed. I Confesse there is a secondary intermediate Being, which you may call a Cause; which in our language, doth precede and produce another; the observation of which, is very fitting, so that wee search and puzzle not our selves with the grounds and Reasons of this precedency.

[Page]As, apply fire to combustible matter, and it will burn; and if you call (which in some sense you may call) this application, the cause of burning: I dispute not onely the search into the nature of wood and fire, and how the fire doth work upon the wood, and how the wood can be both passive and active, Simul & Semel; for, they say, Nulla est actio quin sit reactio, this is That I desire to shun; for, intus exstens prohibet alienum; whilst we entertain our selves with these poore Sophismes of wit, we lose that glory which the immortall soule thirsts after.

But if our spirits, and the light of our reason be dim; Let us goe to the forge of [Page] the Philistines, and sharpen our inventions, our apprehensions there;Division the policy of the Prince of darknesse. Let us learn from the Prince of the aire, who (knowing well, that, dissolve the fasciculus, and Iugurtha his prophecy to his children will prove true) taught his Scholars this lesson for these many ages, Divide & impera; Divisions and distractions, being the great road of all errour.

And if you long, with the Israelites, to have a King, as your neighbours have; and you desire to speak in their language: When the soule entertaineth light, say it doth understand. When it doth exercise any morall vertue, say it willeth. When you see some things precede others, call the one a [Page] cause, the other an effect: but travell not far in the search of the source of this cause. Doe not make the will and the understanding two faculties, Fratrum concordia rara;Recapitulation of all. Iacob will supplant Esau in the Womb. Make therefore the severall Actings of the soule, as Rayes of this one soule; make these rayes, and the soule sending forth these rayes, a perpetuall emanation Divine: and so by these degrees of truth, mount up into the armes of Eternity, and he will take care of you, that you shall not dash your feete against the stone of free will: that you shall not overthrow all faith, by starting so many nice questions in the point of faith.

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If you follow this rule, and see all things in the glasse of Unity, you will not lose all Arts and Sciences in the Wood of Divisions and Subdivisions in infinitum; you shall be more substantiall, than to make Substance and Accidents Two; neither will it ever happen, that you maintaine transubstantiation, by affirming that Accidents can haerere in nullo subjecto.

You shall not make to your selfe a God of contradiction, dividing the will and power of God. Both which in God, is God; and so but one. You will not maintaine two Covenants, one of workes, another of grace, seeing grace is gracelesse without workes, and [Page] Works worthlesse without grace.

If God shall give you to walke by this light, practicall questions will be laid aside, as well as Theoreticall: you will not dispute whether you ought to be more holy on one day (as at a Sacrament) then at other times; for, you will then know, that these Scriptures expresse fully the rule you must walke by; Pray continually; rejoyce evermore: blessed is he that feareth alwayes: Be ye holy [not by fits and starts, but] as I am holy; serving me alwayes, with all your heart, your might, your affections. So that every day, every duty, is to you an holy day, an ordinance divine.

[Page] The sense of the Sabbaths command.And if any man shall say, Why doth God adde this parcell, Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day, &c. and this strict injunction, before you approach the Table of the Lord, Let every man examine himselfe, and so let him eat?

You will be able to answer, that you ought not to be more holy in one day, in one duty, than in another; for, you must be all one, Semper idem.

And secondly, you will be able to prove, that the weight of this injunction, is not to adde any other holinesse to the day, or the ordinance, than a holinesse of separation.

For, a holinesse of inhaerence, cannot fall any [Page] where, but upon a reasonable creature. The Temple had no more.

For, with the leave of learned and holy Master Cawdry, Time & Place are incapable of any other sanctification.

But the stresse of these and the like precepts, lyeth here. We ought indeed alwayes to keepe a Sabbath.All things Ordinances. Every bread and every water, ought to be a confirmation of our faith and of our graces.

But God considering that we are lower than the Angels (and them hee hath charged with folly;The intention of speciall Ordinances.) that we are infirme; that we cannot alwayes keep the bow bent: If we cannot be holy all the weeke, if we cannot be pure at our own Tables; as who [Page] can? yet, if we will remember the Sabbath, and if wee will come to that feast of marrow and fatnesse with a wedding-garment, and at other times doe our best (though weak) indeavours, he will behold no iniquity in us.

We shall not be perplexed, how farre we ought to mourne for the sinnes of others, the sinnes of the times, or our owne lives. [And these are intangling questions to many sweet spirits.] For, drawing all things to an unity, we shall know that sorrow and joy may meet in the same subject at once;Mourning and joy reconciled. they must be both in the actings of faith. Wee must not sorrow as without hope; We may not [Page] lose our Faith in our teares; Our teares must be teares of joy; Wee may think, that we have sinned, and so sigh; but at the same instant, wee must know we have a Saviour, and so triumph. And if I were now all gore blood, would I not now goe to the Chirurgians? Truly the greater my sin, the sooner ought to be my return, the higher my Faith. But great and inlarged Faith, cannot be without exultation and magnificats.

Thus could we lay aside foolish questions, could we seek into our hearts, according to the Poets advice, Ne te quaesiveris extra, and not into the causes, and the Being of causes, things too high for us; We might have [Page] an Heaven here, we might see how Christ is one with GOD, and wee one with Christ; so wee in Christ, one with God.

If wee cannot reach the perfection of this knowledge, yet let us come as neere it as we can, for the true knowledge of God in Christ, is life everlasting. ⸪

A Postscript.

[Page]

AND now, Sir, I have with what brevity I can, run through, what I never intended to speake of. I had prepared a little in lieu of This, upon the nature of Prophecy, which I now shall reserve for a Discourse upon the fourteenth Chapter of the second to Corinth: But it was with me in this case, as it is with the soule, prostrating it selfe at the throne of grace. It designes to breath it selfe out in confession, but is suddenly raised up into [Page] to sweet exultation. It intends a Magnificat, but by some unexpected irresistible power, it is dissolved into teares; which never did, nor ever can happen in a Forme, as might appeare by ventilating the opposit arguments, if opportunity prevailed as well as reason.

I had nothing in my resolution, but, by a word or two, to mediate in the behalfe of these lines, a free and a friendly accesse, to Your more serious and usefull studies. But (quo fato nescio) I have let fall my plummet into waters too deepe, that if you lend not your favourable construction in the perusall, I must suffer. I confesse my confidence in your Gentlenesse is [Page] great; I shall therefore, without any further plea, after this long Parenthesis, give you a short accompt of what these papers beare.

You have here my poore thoughts upon the twentyfourth Chap. of Matth. that I was forced to, because I quote it, more than once, in sense differing from our Commentators: yea, I was necessitated to run through the whole Chapter. It will appeare in costly robes, adorned with lofty and glorious language, sweetned by many a pleasant and cleare Simile, quickned by divers acute and learned Criticismes: These, none of these are mine: My Cabinet enshrineth no such Treasure. I confesse, to save the labour [Page] of contending with Pareus, and others, I delivered to a Friend of Yours, and Mine, onely the substratum of the Discourse, desiring him, from those principles to undertake my adversaries. In lieu of this, he returned me the Chapter Matth. 24, imbellished with so much wit and learning, that I durst not call it mine, and so thought to have suppressed it; and Had done so, but that from the Law of friendship, you may challenge a share in what is His; and from that reason it liveth now, and is presented to Your view, hoping (for his sake, not for mine) to finde grace in your eyes.

You have also, my Thoughts, upon the twentieth [Page] of Revelations, because therein I have done Two things.

First, According to my Modell, answered your three Quaeries.

Secondly, Various sorts of Millenaries. Discovered my opinion concerning the Millenaries. I finde That point entertained by many learned and pious men, under various and different notions.

The first who were of that opinion, The first too earnall. lived immediately after St. Iohn, as Papias, Irenaeus, and so on; in after ages, Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine, cum multis alijs: these men did a little Alcoranize; for, with Mahomet, they cast all the glory of it, into the outward pomp the Church should then enjoy: [Page] which is but as the body of that other spirituall beauty, wherein the Church of God shall at that time be more than exceedingly resplendent. Yet these men have happily fixed upon the due Season, expecting them at the powring out of the seventh Vial, a thousand yeares before the end of the World.

The second only Spirituall.Of latter dayes, most famous and glorious Lights, as Calvin, Beza, Iunius, Tremelius, Broughton, &c. have wrapt up all the glory under a spirituall notion, robbing both it and other Scriptures, of that sweetnesse; whereon even Our Soules, but especially Our children shall feed as upon Marrow and Fatnesse; [Page] wherewith we shall be refreshed as with Wine refined upon the lees. Contraries may sometimes (in some sense) be Errors; the others erred because they have not the spirituall; and these have mistaken, not observing the temporall glory of this thousand yeares.

These last men are succeeded by a generation of Worthies,A third sort, in some things too literall. who have come nearer to the Truth; yet (if I mistake not) have missed it; and some of these are Alstedius, (who justly meriteth the Anagram of Sedulitas) Mede, and some others; who indeed expect a time of glory, confuting the first men, because they made theirs too [Page] carnall. Yet doe they faile themselves, by placing the time after the burning of the world with materiall fire, spoken of in Peter; and joyning with it their opinion, of the resurrection of the Martyrs, which I do not wholly condemne, though therein I am not yet so cleere.

Lastly, we have the Reverend man Mr. Brightman, against whom I will not now dispute, whose opinion, seeing I must oppose it, when I mention it, I will not now name. For hee ought always à me non sine honore nominari. Pliny saith Venerabilis Catonis' ebrietas, and so say I of Brightman, The very Errors (if errors) of Brightman [Page] have their beauty: I must confesse, if God hath been pleased to discover light to me, I have borrowed from him. If there be any thing of sweet, I have gathered it from the strong. And I do seriously protest I have not with Scaliger the Souldier; undertaken Cardan, that his ruines may be my rise.

No, no, I honour his very Urne, and do beleeve that one day I shall see the Jews very zealous in raising to him some stately Mausoleum, who hath been the first meanes of quickning the affections of Christians to pray for their returne.

Sir, I have overtired your Gentlenesse, and your Patience, [Page] therefore now give me leave to refresh your spirits; Let me in a word say here, what I prove more amply elsewhere; the days are at hand; We shall see the Laying of the first stone, if not the rearing of the structure to some good height.

I know there is a Great Reader, who, though hee hath Lynx his eyes, yet using overmuch the Septuagenary Spectacles of antiquate Antiquity, loseth to himselfe, and, by his justly-merited authority, robbeth others of, this sweet truth, of the Church her approching glory, which is in my apprehension, as blood to the veines, as life to the blood, as spirit to the [Page] life, as all to the Spirit. But certainly, while he thinketh the Witnesses, to be yet unburied, hee doth bury two witnesses, which are as able to bring Christ to his Espousals, as the two post-knights were to naile him to the Crosse.

I know there is another worthy, who hath for many yeares stayed Christs sainting Spouse with flagons of Generous and Good Wine, who adjourneth our happinesse by expecting the sad downfull of the two Witnesses. But (as I have, I hope, cleerely proved elsewhere) That is past. Macte ergo gaudio, Tune up your ten-stringed instrument: Let us heare that pleasant melody of a Christian [Page] Hymen; O Hymenaee! Let Your sweet spirit sing, and We will dance: For certainly ere long, all teares shall be wiped away from our eyes, and perfect fruition of Love will cast out Feare.

And now, I commit You, and Your Hopefull, Flourishing Studies, to the expectation, and advancement of these glories which make way for the comming of our Saviour.

And to Him alone be the glory

FINIS.

The Contents of the severall Chapters handled in this TREATISE of TRUTH.

[Page]

CHAP. I. The Vnderstanding, and the Truth-understood, are one.

page 1.

CHAP. II. The second Argument, proving [Page] that Truth is the Nature of the Vnderstanding.

p. 5.

CHAP. III. A prosecution of the second Argument, wherein all Requisites to a Being are applied to the understanding, being made one with the truth.

p. 13.

CHAP. IIII. This Argument further cleered by more objections propounded and answered.

p. 17.

[Page] CHAP. V. The whole Soule and truth in the Soule are one.

p. 21.

CHAP. VI. All things are this one light or truth, shining from God.

p. 26.

CHAP. VII. How unity is all in all things.

p. 31.

CHHP. VIII. The nature of Habits.

p. 45.

[Page] CHAP. IX. The difference betwixt Knowledge and affection, discussed.

p. 59.

CHAP. X. That all the severall and particular actings of the soule, are this one light and truth.

p. 81.

CHAP. XI. An Objection answered, in which the nature of time [Page] and place are touched.

p. 88

CHAP. XII. Another Objection is answered, drawn from the falshood in the working of the soule.

p. 109

CHAP. XIII. Discovering the consequences of this position, that All things are one Truth.

p. 114

CHAP. XIIII. The benefit which Knowledge and all Sciences receive from [Page] this assertion.

p. 123

CHAP. XV. Confusion in the knowledge of Causes, discovered, and redressed by this Vnity.

p. 133

CHAP. XVI. The unhappy fruits of Division, in other parts of Learning, made manifest.

p. 146

[Page] CHAP. XVII. A Recapitulation of former instances, with some additions of a question or two more.

p. 160

FINIS.

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Title statement

The nature of truth, its union and unity with the soule which is one in its essence, faculties, acts, one with truth / discussed by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, in a letter to a private friend ; by whom it is now published for the publick good.

Brooke, Robert Greville, Baron, 1607-1643.

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1641

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2004-03 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

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A29667

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Wing B4913

ID [STC]

ESTC S103446

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11942902

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ocm 11942902

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51295

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— The nature of truth, its union and unity with the soule which is one in its essence, faculties, acts, one with truth / discussed by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, in a letter to a private friend ; by whom it is now published for the publick good., Brooke, Robert Greville, Baron, 1607-1643..

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[20], 189 p.

Printed by R. Bishop, for Samuel Cartwright ...,. London :: 1641.. (Reproduction of original in British Library.)

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