1. Too great a Proneneſs and Readineſs to paſs Judgment, concerning others in any Reſpect; which is always concerning their Qualities of Power, or Knowledg and Wiſdom, or their Goodneſs, or their Actions hence proceeding. I ſay, too great an one; for all paſſing of Judgment is not here prohibited, as I ſhall hereafter mention. Now this too great a Proneneſs or Inclination, is Various according to Perſons, and muſt be determined by every Mans Prudence, when it is ſo. In ſome Men it may be much their Calling, their Buſineſs, it may be what is committed to their Care, for very excellent Uſes and Purpoſes to obſerve and give Judgment of others. And therefore they are to bend and incline themſelves to get ſo much Readineſs and Aptneſs, or Quickneſs, to obſerve and judg, as may make them beſt able to diſcharge that Truſt. Such are all kind of Governours, who have the Care of others Qualities and Manners; Magiſtrates, Miniſters, thoſe who have the Education of Youth, Maſters of Families. All theſe will do ill if they do not take notice, and judg concerning the Tempers, and Behaviours of their Subjects, People, Youth, Children and Servants, as much as they can, without too much Neglect of themſelves, or other worſe Effects. Again, There are ſome that obſerve others to very good Uſe and Purpoſe: what is Good, they are prone to imitate; what is Bad, to ſhun and avoid: and this that they may clearly apprehend Virtue and Vice; which oft-times we better ſee in others, than in our ſelves. What is uſually ſignified by the Proverb, That Standers-by ſee more than Gameſters. Men oft-times would neither be ſo Senſible of their own Virtue nor Vice, Good or Ill-Qualities, if they did not obſerve them in others. When they ſee a Man practiſing any Virtue, cr uſing any good Quality of Prudence, Diligence, any Inſtance of Power rightly and well, and eſpecially when commended or thought well of, or having ſome other Advantage; it makes them well pleaſed with themſelves in theſe things, if they have them, or to endeavour to obtain them, if they want them. And ſo Vices often appear to us more and more ugly and naſty in others, than in our ſelves: Such as is Intemperance, Pride, Oppreſſion, &c. And what may the Obſerver ſay, Am I like ſuch a Perſon? I did not think I had been ſo Fooliſh, ſo Contemptible, Baſe, or Vile a thing before. Theſe Men too are ſo far from neglecting themſelves thereby (the common Miſchief of our concerning our ſelves ſo much with others) that they mind themſelves hereby the more, and to better purpoſe.

But now on the other hand, but few Men are Governours of others at leaſt of many: many alſo obſerve and take notice of others good Qualities, and are thereby excited to affectation of being Superiour, conſequently to envy Detraction and Contempt. And you ſhall ſee them judg and ſpeak often of the moſt conſiderable Men, and the moſt conſiderable Qualities in them, with Abatement and Diminution; which as it may not ſometimes, ſo it moſt-what proceeds from the above-named Principles. They'll take notice too, more ſurely of their Imperfections, and be apt to be moved to be well-pleaſed therewith, from the former Principles ſtill; and conſequently to multiply and magnifie them. Now it were a great deal better for Men of ſuch a temper, to withdraw their Eyes from abroad, and to turn them home-ward, unleſs they could or would make better uſe of their Obſervation; and readineſs in ſuch Men to Obſerve and Judg others is too much, and therefore here forbidden. Others again there be, who may and do take notice and obſerve what others do, and are generally with Approbation, and be ready to imitate every thing, and it may be the worſt things moſt. Thoſe who you ſhall ordinarily here ſay, that ſuch Perſons do ſo or ſo, that they may excuſe themſelves; theſe it were better for them to neglect and take no notice of other Men, and not to mind what others do. It is much better for thoſe Men to mind what they themſelves ſhould do, than what others do. Here again a little proneneſs to mind or judg what others are or do, is too much.

2. The Second thing I conceive may be here forbidden, is too great a Proneneſs to paſs Judgment on the worſt ſide, to attribute ſome Imperfections to others, to accuſe and condemn them. And this may be, though our Judgment be not falſe, (which is another Particular forbidden) but never ſo true; nor do we yet conſider or attend to the Principle from whence it proceeds, but only to the effect which is conſequent; and here again as in the former Particular, the Degree forbidden is various. Some Perſons may and ought to take notice of, Judg and Condemn other Mens imperfections and faults (but always be ſure, with as accurate truth as they can, with Prudence and Charity) more often and frequently, others rarely or little. Thoſe as I ſaid in the former Particular, who are Governours of others ſo far forth as they do and ought to undertake that Office, ſo much ought they to take notice, obſerve, judg, condemn, yea, reprove and correct (but always with Prudence and Charity, of which more hereafter) their Infirmities or Miſdemeanours. Thoſe alſo who do it out of no worſe end, nor find no worſe effect, than the good one of freeing themſelves from too general and confuſed admiration of other Mens Perſons, and conſequently Approbation, imitation of all they do, though many things weakly and amiſs; finding themſelves firſt without Self-flattery, able to Judg from other Reaſons than Examples.

Thoſe alſo who having a deſire to be more exquiſitely and accurately perfect and good, mark the Imperfections or Miſcarriages of Men, and that of the beſt and moſt conſiderable, that they may prevent and amend them in themſelves, and be more accurate Patterns and Examples of Accompliſhment and Virtue. Not out of Pride or Affectation to be Superiour to all others; but out of a great deſire of perfecting themſelves, and out of Charity to others.

Such Perſons of ſuch a Temper, though very rarely I doubt, we may ſometimes meet withal. So likewiſe when Perſons, Eſtates, or Qualities are of great concernment, and influence to us and others, to the Publick, and this preſently and on a ſudden; and our Judgment might tend to prevent any miſchief there-from, which deferred would be too late in ſuch Caſes, Sufficiency and Tendency to judg or believe rather on the worſt ſide, is to be preferred. The contrary would be too pernicious or hurtful Security. Such as theſe, I ſay, and Men in ſuch caſes, are to be allowed more frequently, to employ themſelves in obſerving and judging other Mens Imperfections or Faults, in their Temper or Conduct. But theſe on the other hand, who may experience not elſe-where better effects of this their Obſervation and Judgment, than an occaſion and temptation for, and a gratification of their Pride, Self-love, Envy, Affectation of Superiority, Malice, Ill-will, Revenge, or the like; ſo far forth as they experience this ſo much to them is it Prohibited.

And in general, it may be delivered as one pretty general ſign, when we may do this too much (there ſeldom being a better effect than this, a bad one) viz. When thereby we are indiſpoſed and hindred to take notice of, and approve of the good qualities and laudable that are in the ſame Perſons, and conſequently judg of them in general very unjuſtly, and are according unreaſonably affected towards them, undervaluing, contemning, hating them; that is, the qualities in them when we ought not, or more than we ought: And this we may ſee, I doubt, too frequent and common an effect, of this Judging and Condemning Perſons; in ſo much that there are very few but may be hence concluded to be too much inclined and prone thereto, and to do it but too much. Where you hear one or once commended, and his good qualities obſerved, you may hear many, and many times diſpraiſed, and his Faults and Imperfections quoted; at leaſt oftner than they are really in proportion to their good Qualities and Actions, or oftner than they ſhould be ſignified and made known.

3. The third thing I conceive may be here forbidden, is ones Judging without any Reaſon at all, but only ones Will and Inclination, or without ſufficient Reaſon, the beſt he could or ought to have had all Circumſtances conſidered; that is, raſhneſs or temerity in Judging, and when it is on the worſt ſide, to condemn any Perſon, it is now uſually called raſh Cenſure. Of the firſt of theſe there is no Degrees or Differences, but it is perpetually in all Perſons at all times forbidden. For if there appear no Reaſon at all to us, why we ſhould judg one or t'other way, we are to ſuſpend our Judgment. That which is uſually expreſt by ſaying, we do not know, we cannot tell, it may, or it may not be ſo indeed; (if we apprehend the poſſibility) but whether it be or be not, we are Ignorant. In our Judgments concerning ſome things, we may ſometimes follow our Inclinations both without and contrary to ſome ſmaller Reaſons; but then they muſt be very ſtrong, ſuch as are natural and born with us, and which we cannot oppreſs or hinder by our wills though we would, and we do not find they proceed from any Inſincerity, any ſecret deſire or inclination to gratifie any Luſt, but that we are poſſeſt with a ſerious and upright unmixed deſire to know the truth in order to Goodneſs: And this, indeed, ſeems to be a ſign of great reaſon for that Judgment, viz. Of this inclination being Impreſſed by God, and conſequently he being Good, that it is true and uſeful. Such are Mens ſtrong inclinations notwithſtanding all appearance of reaſon (though but ſuch, and and real deceits) to the contrary, which may be brought by Cavilling men, to believe God's Exiſtence, his Juſtice to puniſh and reward, Immortality of Souls, diſtinction of Actions right and wrong, univerſal Goodneſs our great perfection, and ultimate Self-love, contrary to the truth of our Senſes, &c. theſe God hath anticipated us withal. But in our Judgments concerning Perſons, no ſuch inclination is to be followed by no means, which notwithſtanding is extraordinary frequent, but always from ſome ſecret paſſion of hatred, diſpleaſure againſt the Perſon, not for any reaſon, but ſome bodily temper which is called Antipathy, and oft-times paſt offences, &c. Of the other, viz. Judging without ſufficient reaſon, there is variety; that which may be ſufficient reaſon to one Man, or at one time in one thing, may not be to another. One Man may be more capable and able to examine a thing further than another; and yet both, may be, ought to paſs their Judgment: As if one Friend ſhould for very good ends, ask the judgment of ſome other, concerning the Qualities or Actions of a third. So ſometimes the time for Deliberation or Information, may be neceſſarily ſhorter in one affair than in another; and yet the Judgment is then to be paſſed too, and not neglected: And ſo the Judgment concerning one thing of leſs moment (and yet enough to deſerve and require our Opinion too) may be with leſs reaſon or probability, than another of greater Importance. And here this raſh Judgment is not to be allowed on either ſide, as well to the advantage as diſadvantage of the Perſon, concerning his good or his ill-qualities or actions. We are not to judg Men better than they are, as well as not worſe; and conſequently falſly and fooliſhly admire and approve of what they ſay or do without reaſon, only becauſe we will, and as we ſay we imagine ſo; not with that ſufficient Reaſon as we ought to have: Though the extream of Judging Men raſhly better than they are, being leſs frequent or hurtful, I ſuppoſe the other is here principally intended, viz. The Judging Men raſhly worſe than they are, and cenſuring them.

This Imperfection very often proceeds from Ultimate, and therefore Inordinate Self-pleaſing our ſelves by meer Activity of this kind. We muſt be paſſing Judgment of every thing we ſee, or that appears to us, and as ſoon and as faſt as may be; we cannot ſtay ſo long as to call to mind, or examine Reaſons. This is too troubleſome to moſt, and would ſpoil the pleaſure of it: Oft-times Men make it their Diverſion but imprudently choſen, to be at any rate wantonly Judging and Diſcourſing of Perſons in general. Oftentimes alſo the Cauſe or Principle is Self-pleaſing again, by the exerciſe and ſenſe of our ability and ſufficiency of Wit or Underſtanding; we much pleaſing our ſelves that we can obſerve what others do and judg, and diſcern whether they are good or bad, do well or ill, eſpecially what the moſt conſiderable Men do; and here moſt, becauſe it is a ſign of a greater Comparative ability, that we ſee Imperfections and Defects, even in the Wiſer and Better ſort of Men, which they do not (as we think) ſee in themſelves. The firſt of theſe Cauſes is more ordinary, the ſecond in thoſe moſt often, who really are of conſiderable ability. Theſe are more innocent Cauſes as not arguing ſo much of Self-Love, in oppoſition to the good of others or to Charity; as the other of Malice, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, and thence ſecret Envy which are but too frequent.

5. The Fifth thing forbidden, is, too great a Proneneſs and Aptneſs to pronounce, to declare and make known our Judgment and Opinion concerning others, eſpecially on the bad ſide: To be always talking thereof, though to no viſible good effect, nor out of any good Principle. And to be in pain as it were till they have delivered themſelves, and this uſually comes too from the Inordinate love of Activity, of doing ſomewhat, of Reſtleſneſs, which is called Buſibodineſs; and ſometimes from the other worſe Qualities ſo often mentioned, Malice, Pride, Envy, Revenge, &c. and moſtly from a mixture of more of them together: With all which too, as in all other Actions of Men inſincere, (as moſt are I doubt) ſome ſmall mixture ſometimes there may be of Juſtice, that is, of a kind of common Charity. This too great Proneneſs or Inclination conſidered without its Principle or End, (as I have told you before) admits of Variety. Some Men ought to have more, as all Governours and Overſeers of others Manners, or in general of their good Qualities. Thoſe alſo that find the good effects of good Inſtruction, Self-amendment, kindly and laudable Emulations, Pity, an endeavour for the good of the faulty, and of others, to amend or prevent the ſame elſe-where. Others on the contrary who are private Perſons, in a private Capacity or Condition, apt to gratifie thereby their Envy, Pride, Hatred, Contempt of others, Self-conceit, affectation of Superiority, will have ſeldomer ſufficient reaſons to paſs or declare their Judgment; and when they have, the good effects are not ſo conſiderable in them as in the former Perſons: Conſequently they muſt nouriſh a leſſer Proneneſs and Inclination thereto. Theſe Men alſo who find they can better diſcern, chooſe, govern, and Inſtruct themſelves in all Circumſtances, of declaring their Opinion concerning Perſons, ſuch as I have before mentioned, of the Perſons judged, the Perſons before whom, &c. Theſe alſo may be more free, and allow themſelves more of this Proneneſs. Thoſe on the contrary, who may and ought to obſerve themſelves forgetful, unable to take notice, or diſcern the fitteſt Circumſtances; or not to be able to moderate or govern themſelves when they do, but what they have in their mind it muſt come out; thoſe who are thus dull and weak, ought to lay aſide this Proneneſs and Inclination, to ſubjugate or weaken it ſo far forth, and to betake themſelves more to mind their own affairs immediately.

6. And laſtly. And above all is here forbidden, the undue end of our Judging others, viz. Self-pleaſing ultimately, and that ſeveral ways, by others hurt or miſchief, poſitive or privative: Theſe are, Malice, Hatred, Pride, Envy, Revenge, Flattery and baſe Fear, Buſibodineſs, Curioſity, &c. This is that which is here principally intended; this mainly advis'd againſt by our Saviour; as alſo judging on the worſt ſide, ſuſpecting, accuſing, condemning Perſons out of the foreſaid Principles. As appears by the reaſon ſubjoyned both in this and the next Verſe, [Judg not] is here taken in the ſenſe in which [that you be not judged] is: But by that is meant ſuſpected, accuſed, condemned by others, principally out of the former Principles. For if it were meant of the Judgment of the good ſide, the avoiding of that would be no motive not to judg, becauſe it would not ſeem an evil to the Perſon judging. I ſay, principally: Moreover, I have mentioned the defect of being too prone in general to paſs Judgment, though it may happen on the good ſide; and ſo to declare ones Judgment, and to judg raſhly or falſly, though ſtill on the good ſide on this occaſion, as belonging to our Judgments, to ſuggeſt unto you, that they might be occaſionally forbidden too, and are Defects, Infirmities. All the forementioned Particulars, if they can be ſuppoſed to proceed not from theſe bad Principles, but from good, viz. Charity, though imprudent and miſtaken; though they may be immediately hurtful and do miſchief, yet they are not vicious, faulty, wicked. But more of this when we come to the Cauſes of theſe forbidden Judgings here, eſpecially of raſh and falſe ones.

TO Inſtance in ſome of the Cauſes of theſe prohibited Judgments here, thoſe eſpecially which are more Proper, Immediate, Frequent, and moſt in our own power to prevent.

We muſt run them over again. And Firſt, Of too much Proneneſs to judg in general the Cauſes ſome of them may be:

1. Too much Idleneſs: By which I mean not a Man's doing nothing (for that cannot be, every Body is always employ'd, his Thoughts are always taken up about ſomewhat) but a Mans not having any deſtined or ſet-purpoſed-Employment, which one ſhould always chuſe, as that in which he can beſt ſerve God and the World, do moſt good in his Generation. A neither deſigning nor purpoſing to purſue always, (or at leaſt but when any extraordinary occaſion happens) any particular, nor his General calling, as is uſually diſtinguiſhed; neither that which he with ſome others employ themſelves about, nor that which all Men ſhould, ſuch as Reflection upon ones own Actions, the end, deſign, the event or effect of them; the having reſpect to the pleaſing of God, and doing good ſome way or other to our Neighbour, to the Publick, and the performance of ſome general Duties to God and our Neighbour, which all are conſtantly obliged to perform. Men's not having, I ſay, conſtantly ſuch deſigned, purpoſed, and ſet-employment, gives their Mind leave, lets them at liberty to wander about any where, to be employed about any thing that ſhall from any cauſe be thruſt upon them, or ſhall occur. Now this is far more uſually others Perſons and Actions than themſelves; partly becauſe they are far more the object of our External Senſes, which affect Men generally more ſtrongly and frequently than any thing from within themſelves; and then what we have propoſed or objected to us, we naturally and laudably are prone to be judging ſomewhat or other concerning them, or appertaining to them. But Men that have any ſet conſtant Calling to employ themſelves in, and beſides perform their general Duties to God, their Neighbour and themſelves, are not ſo much at leaſure to mind and attend to what others are and do, and conſequently to judg. Juſt for Example, as Idle wandring Beggars, who, as we ſay, are never out of their way, and have no certainly deſigned Place or Buſineſs, turn to every By-Houſe to ſee who dwells there. They look upon, obſerve, talk to or talk of every Paſſenger they meet; when the Man that hath ſome deſigned Affair or Buſineſs, with certain time and place in his Journey, hardly obſerves or minds, or but very little and paſſingly, the Company upon the Rode, nor any way diverts or ſtops himſelf: Such was the fault of the younger Widdows which Saint Paul bids Timothy to adviſe: They learnt to be Idle, wandring about from Houſe to Houſe; and then, They were Tatlers and Buſiebodies, ſpeaking things which they ought not, 1 Tim. 5. 13. This is a privative Cauſe.

Secondly, The Love of Activity meerly, ultimately, to no better end but only to pleaſe themſelves therein. Themſelves are too little a Sphere, there is more variety of things to be obſerved and judged in all others who they know, than only in themſelves; whence they do it with greater life and vigour, Men think it a dull thing (and that's their only reaſon) to mind principally themſelves, and things appertaining to them, and it may be the ſame things too for the moſt part, to live in a round; not always, but ſo much as is for moſt Men moſt expedient. And then when Men do obſerve or take notice of others Perſons, qualities, and actions, they will be paſſing Judgment, becauſe there is more of Action, than in ſuſpending, doubting, or meerly obſerving. That ſeems to be a ſlow dull thing too in compare with a Mans briskly and ſmartly, and uninterruptedly paſſing Judgment. Beſides that, ſuſpending, doubting, being Ignorant, argue an imperfection, and this fault may have the name of Buſibodineſs, viz. When out of love of being Buſie, meerly to be always doing ſomewhat, and that with vigour and ſmartneſs, Men employ their Thoughts in Obſerving and Judging other Mens, either Qualities or Actions: Not out of any Neighbourly or Charitable Principle; not becauſe they ſee a great deal of good they may do by it, and therefore would do it accordingly; that is, not out of Reaſon, Prudence, Charity. Men oft-times Buſſle and are Buſie in the World, and they know no other Reaſon but that they love to be ſo; and nothing more often occurs about which they may be ſo, than what other Men are or do.

Sixthly, But I doubt the far more uſual Cauſes of too great Proneneſs to judg on the worſt ſide, are ill-diſpoſitions of Will in general, Self-love and Self-pleaſing ultimately in various Inſtances, ſuch as are more particularly Self-pleaſing by:

1. Hatred of, or Malice (an habitual Hatred) againſt any Perſon in general: Than which there is nothing in the World more deteſtable, becauſe the moſt Miſchievous, and it is the greateſt degeneracy from, the moſt oppoſite and contrary to, the moſt excellent perfection in the World, which is Goodneſs, and is uſually attributed to the Devil; that is, the worſt of Beings. This is when a Man pleaſeth himſelf ultimately in doing miſchief to, in vexing and hurting another Man, other Perſons. It is eaſie to ſee, how this diſpoſeth a Man to the greateſt readineſs to judg any thing bad in the Perſon to whom he is thus affected. For if we thus pleaſe our ſelves in doing Miſchief, we ſhall endeavour that we may ſtill pleaſe our ſelves, ſo to do; and that we may ſo do, we'll repreſent Perſons as bad as we can, as great evils (whether true or falſe, it matters not) as we can. This, I ſay, manifeſtly is a Cauſe in us of being miſchievouſly affected, and of doing what we can to them: And this again, is a Cauſe to ſuch Perſons of Pleaſures and Delight. He therefore that wills the End, viz. Pleaſing himſelf by the miſchief of others, will will the Means thereto; and that's one, viz. Judging them as great Evils as we can. It is like a Man's dreſſing up another Perſon in ugly or contemptible Habit, that he might pleaſe himſelf in hating or contemning him; whereas the Perſon's true and natural Make or Features, was more beautiful and comely than his own. But this is ſo truly a hateful diſpoſition, that I would be willing rather to think there is no ſuch thing amongſt Men, what-ever there may be amongſt the Infernal Spirits, or elſewhere in the World.

2. Though in the ſecond place, Revenge comes ſomewhat near it; that is, to pleaſe ones ſelf in doing evil to another Man, meerly becauſe he hath done evil to him; which is a very unreaſonable thing. For why ſhould there be more miſchief in the World, becauſe there hath been ſome already? Clear contrary, the more there hath been, the leſs there ſhould be. I know oft-times there is a mixture of Juſtice and Selfdefence, to prevent the like for the future, but oft-times too there is more pretended than there is; and when there is a love to Juſtice and a juſt and reaſonable Defence, it is a Cloak to hide much of the other too, or a Pill that hath much of that Poyſon in it. We have the more need to be Skilful and Subtle in the diſcovery of the ſincerity of our Hearts; that is, the ends or deſigns that move our Wills.

Now it is here likewiſe manifeſt, that to judg a Perſon as bad and as imperfect as we can, will augment, whetten and ſharpen our Revenge, and conſequently if we be ſo wickedly diſpoſed, our Pleaſure and Delight too; and as before, he that wills the End wills the Means thereto, when he ſees it is ſo: In revenge too, is often mixed the affectation of Superiority.

3. Somewhat leſs a bad Cauſe, but bad enough too, is Pride, or a Self-pleaſing ultimately in the inſtances of our power: And here more particularly,

(1.) Self-pleaſing in our Superiority to others in any thing, a branch of Pride, i. e. to be Ultimately and more than ought pleaſed therewith, inordinately and immoderately. A very miſchievous Temper and Appetite. I do not ſee that any degree thereof is allowable, or that it doth any good more than the gratification of the proud Perſon. To affect to be Superiour in ſome excellent and uſeful Quality, may be an occaſion ſometimes of a Man's excelling therein, and conſequently of ſome good effect: But it is not becauſe he affects Superiority, that is not the preciſe Cauſe, but becauſe that Superiority happens to be in an excellent thing. And yet more particularly.

(2.) Envy a kind of this affectation of Superiority, not the paſſion ſo much; that is, a deſire of depriving others of any Good they poſſeſs which we have not; (as is to be underſtood too, in the fore-going cauſe of Hatred and Revenge) but the cauſe or principle of our being prone to this Paſſion; that is, pleaſing our ſelves ultimately, that we have ſome good things which others have not, and being very glad they have them not, and ſorry and grieved if they have them: And this makes us to will both that it ſhould ſeem ſo to us, and that it really ſhould be ſo. That it ſhould ſeem ſo; and therefore we wilfully judg it is ſo, that others are in general much Inferiour to us in any good thing, or leſs Superiour at leaſt than indeed they are, and therefore particularly that they are guilty or defective, where we are not, that they are ſuch or ſuch. We would have others not better, or as bad, or worſe than our ſelves, and are much pleaſed it is ſo, and therefore we make it to ſeem ſo to our ſelves, and wilfully judg it ſo, when it may be it is not in our power really to make it ſo. For the ſame reaſon Envy alſo makes us to will it ſhould be ſo indeed, and to endeavour it as much as we can: and therefore particularly, ſo far as we eſteem, honour, love; reward good things, that they ſhould not be honoured, beloved, rewarded, or the like, and conſequently that they ſhould not ſeem to others to merit it; and conſequently both to judg and make known our Judgment very greedily and readily that they do not, to bear witneſs againſt them. It is called Detraction, when a Man from this or ſuch like Principle, is judged not to have ſome good Quality that he hath really; and Slander when he is judged to have ſome bad one, which he is free from. A contrary temper to that wiſe Admonition of the Wiſe-man, Prov. 24. 17. Rejoyce not when thine Enemy falleth, and let not thy heart be glad when he ſtumbleth.

(3.) Contempt, this hath an effect contrary to admiration: Admiration of any Perſon in general and confuſedly, cauſeth a Man to judg all things in or any way belonging to that Perſon excellent, and to attribute more to him than he hath. Contempt in general of a Perſon, on the contrary, cauſeth us to judg all things appertaining to the Perſon contemned, mean or ſmall, or to attribute to him many and greater Imperfections than indeed are in him, in ſome ſuch manner ordinarily ſignified. Tuſh, there is no great matter in ſuch a Perſon, indeed he may be ſo or ſo: But that's a ſmall thing if he be; nay, there is nothing laudable in him, what's matter what he ſaith or doth? He is weak, ſilly, wilful, &c. Whereas we ought not thus confuſedly to paſs Judgment, but more diſtinctly; if there be any thing contemptible, yet there may be other things very conſiderable. Men alſo may pleaſe themſelves meerly in contempt of another, as a Mark or Sign (to themſelves, though it may be to no Body elſe) of their own Superiority, and being better; and that they may more contemn and conſequently pleaſe themſelves, (as it was before in hatred) make him appear to themſelves, and judg him much more contemptible than he is. Both theſe laſt particulars are contrary to the Apoſtolical Precept, in that excellent Chapter, Rom. 12. 10. In honour preferring one another. Be we rather inclin'd to judg others better than our ſelves, and to give unto them the ſigns thereof, rather, I ſay, than aſſume them to our ſelves, even when equal probability of both ſides, or ſome (it may be) advantage of our own: for the more excellent effect only ſometimes of checking and controuling, and ſubduing, and bringing under Command, that unreaſonable and inordinate Self-love. Theſe three are Branches of Pride.

(4.) A fourth cauſe is Flattery in Judging: That is, when a Man pleaſeth himſelf ultimately, in pleaſing any one that is an Adverſary or Enemy to the Perſon concerning whom he gives Judgment, and conſequently is well pleaſed to hear of his Faults or Imperfections. A Man may uſe out of Flattery ſo often to tell his Judgment to the diſadvantage of a Perſon, that at laſt he may unawars come to believe it himſelf; and partly that his Flattery may not at any time be diſcovered, oblige himſelf to believe it, and perſwade himſelf that that is true, which before he did but ſay was ſo, though he thought the contrary. And here it may be obſerved, that as too great a proneneſs to judg on the worſt ſide, doth proceed from theſe Cauſes mentioned: So it is a moſt ordinary thing for the paſſing, and eſpecially declaring ones Judgment and Opinion on the advantagious ſide, i. e. That a Man hath more of ſome good thing than indeed he hath, to proceed from ſome of the ſame Cauſes too, viz. Hatred, Envy, Indignation. For Example, That a Man hath more Revenue, Treaſure, Honour, Power, Eaſe, Pleaſure, than indeed he hath, only to expoſe him more to the Envy or Indignation of others. And in general, Men judg thus in a thing which they account a reward to him who they think doth not, or they would not have him either to merit or receive it, moſt commonly it is an eaſie thing from Circumſtances, to diſcern from what Principles ſuch Judgment proceeds: But ſome may be ſo cunning as to conceal or diſſemble.

Seventhly, For the Cauſes of raſh Judgment and Cenſure, they muſt be the ſame with thoſe of the two former particulars. The Cauſes of raſh Judgment in general, Idleneſs, Buſibodineſs, Activity, Curioſity, Pride, and of raſh Cenſure or Judgment, without Reaſon, but a Mans own Will on the worſt ſide as ſuch; are among others, Hatred, Revenge, Pride, Affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Flattery. To which we may add Anger and Wrath, which if a Man be not very careful, diſpoſeth us to as much uncharitable and unreaſonable Judging as the former, and a Man is ſeldom or never to truſt his Judgment of any Perſon after that fierce and confounding Paſſion, but refer it to another time, when calmneſs and freedom from Paſſion, gives him more ability to ſee the Truth, and more impartiality to judg. And now all theſe Cauſes, methinks, are ſo Unreaſonable, Inhumane, and Unchriſtian, when thus nakedly repreſented, that they cannot but ſtir up in Souls not quite degenerate, or corrupted, dead, and ſenſleſs of what's good, many of theſe very Paſſions againſt themſelves, and ſeem the uglieſt Objects that can be beheld. Theſe are thoſe which compoſe a Devil more, and are more eſſential to him than any other ſhape.

IV. The Cauſes ſome of them of falſe Judging as falſe, or of falſity, errour of Judgment concerning Perſons, whether on the good or bad ſide, may, as in all other falſe Judgments, be reduced to two within us in General.

1. Defect in our Underſtanding which here in this caſe is but one, viz. Ignorance, in a large ſenſe, viz. the Abſence, or want of Apprehenſion, or of the actual Knowledg of ſomething which would influence our Judgments.

2. In our Will, a meer inclination to any certain falſe Judgment, whether it be from Cuſtom and Uſe, or from the Love, and for the ſake of any certain Object.

In this particular caſe of falſe Judgments, ſome of the moſt frequent Cauſes more or leſs remotely, and ſome way or other reducible to theſe two, are theſe:

(1.) In general; meer Ignorance of the truth of things, where there is no defect of Will. So a Man may judg an action in reſpect of the effect and principle of it, to be well or ill done, when it is the contrary; and it was the caſe of the Jewiſh and Gentile Chriſtians, paſſing Judgment of one anothers Eating, and abſtaining from certain Meats, and obſerving or not obſerving ſome certain Days and Times, and conſequently impoſing them upon one another from their own private Opinions; not as determined by their rightful Superiours or Governours, Rom. 14. Some of them through Ignorance judged, that thoſe who took the Liberty to eat forbidden Meats, contrary to the Moſaical Law (which they thought was ſtill even under the Meſſias to be obſerv'd) did an evil Action, and out of an evil Principle too poſſibly, viz. Prophaneneſs, or want of that reſpect for God's Commands which they ought: And this probably too, becauſe they found in themſelves that if they ſhould do ſo, it would proceed from ſuch a Principle (which will be a ſecond Cauſe preſently to be named.) The other Gentile Chriſtians judged right concerning the action of abſtaining from Meats, that it was not right; and the Non-obſervation of, or Liberty from the Jewiſh Law was a Chriſtian priviledg, or it did not belong to the Chriſtian Religion: But poſſibly too they might (if they did not) judg wrong, concerning the Principle of theſe Jewiſh Chriſtians, viz. That it was out of Superſtition or Pride, that the Gentiles might not be in all things equalized to themſelves, and that the Ancient Conſtitutions of their Religion might ſeem more conſiderable. From hence alſo (more particularly) it proceeds, that even very Honeſt and Juſt Perſons (though much oftner in the World, it proceeds from ultimate Self-love or a mixture of it) judg themſelves Comparatively more Superiour to others in good qualities, and truly more valuable than they are, viz. They know and obſerve more their own Perfections and good Qualities, their Number, their Nature, the degrees of their worth and excellency from their effects, than they do thoſe of others. They can tell better all the Good qualities they have in themſelves, than what are in others; many of which, or but few, they may ever have had occaſion to obſerve: They may alſo, and do ſee, and take notice of all the uſes and good effects of any Perfection which is in themſelves, having frequent occaſion to obſerve them; but hardly of any of that which is in another; when he poſſibly could quote as many more of his. And hence (a little further) it comes to paſs, that every one extols and crys up his own Art though never ſo trivial, and prefers it before others, really believing what he ſaith. Hence alſo it is, together with ſome Raſhneſs and Precipitancy in inferring, that Men judg others too generally and too confidently to be Ill or Good qualified Perſons; to have more of Defects or Perfection comparatively each with other, than they really have; that they have (for) ſuch or ſuch ill qualities and imperfections (which may be true) but none or much fewer good quallities to balance them, than indeed they have; and than they themſelves would have known, if they had had ſome other opportunities of knowing them: They have had only occaſion or means to know the defects and Ill qualities, and not the Good, and ſo perhaps on the contrary; and yet they do not obſerve ſo much, nor reflect upon it, nor attend unto this Caution. Now Men ought to paſs Judgment firſt diſtinctly, that at ſuch or ſuch a time, in ſuch or ſuch a performance or action, there appeared to them ſuch defect or commendable quality, and then from thence according to the degree of probability or likelihood in the Conſequence (which if the obſervation be but once, is oft but very ſmall) if there be juſt occaſion, to infer and conclude concerning the Qualities of the Perſon in general, as to number, degree, and conſtancy; which men commonly do allin a clutter together confuſedly. There have been Men known, who have not only once but often appeared very mean and defecttive, (eſpecially in ſome Circumſtances, as in Publick, in Converſation after Action, in haſte or with expedition) and yet have at that time been much more valuable, but could not ſhew it; and generally in other Circumſtances of Life, they have much exceeded thoſe who have appeared much better at certain times.

It moſt often requires a pretty long Converſation, eſpecially to more ſlow Obſervers and Reaſoners, to know and paſs a general Judgment truly concerning a Perſon: That which is uſually ſignified by the Proverb, Of eating a Buſhel of Salt with a Man, before one chuſeth him for a Friend.

This is the reaſon ordinarily (to give no unuſeful Inſtance) that Men are often judged in general better or worſe than they are by their Diſcourſes and • ooks. If a Perſon hath wrote a Book in which there hath appeared ſomewhat conſiderable of Piety or Vertue, or Judgment, or Wit, or other Good quality, he is generally thought more ſuch in more things, and more conſtantly than he is, whereas there is ſet down his Thoughts and Inclinations which are more rare; whence alſo greater expectations from him in his Diſcourſe, Converſation, Employment, than are reaſonable; and ſometimes upon their obſerved failure, greater contempt and under-valuing of him; ſometimes (as when the Judger follows common Opinion and Teſtimony, as moſt do) an undue admiration and approbation of all he ſaith and doth. The like on the contrary; when Men for ſome too light or ſatyrical, or obſcure Speech or Book, are judged more careleſs, trivial, ill-natured, or confuſed in more things, and more conſtantly than indeed they are. All which ſeems much like as if Men ſhould from one handſom or crooked-finger of a Perſon, judg confidently concerning the Beauty or Deformity of his whole Body.

(2.) More particularly; an Opinion or Judgment too univerſal and unlimted, that all other Men are like our ſelves: Which as it is true ſometimes, ſo it is often falſe. This comes from actual Ignorance, or non-attention of this Rule's not being Univerſal; and that other ſigns of Mens Qualities and Tempers are to be adhibited and made uſe of, and that there is great variety in Men. So oft-times we judg ſuch an Action to proceed from ſuch a Reaſon, or ſuch a Principle, or ſuch a Temper in a Man, (ſuppoſe from Self-intereſt ultimately, Pride, or Covetouſneſs,) becauſe it doth ſo in our ſelves, or at leaſt we are ſtrongly inclined thereto; never taking any other account of any other Circumſtances (ſuch as his former Temper, manner of Life, Actions in the like caſe, &c.) which might give us ſufficient reaſon to believe and judg the contrary. The ſame Action may proceed from ſeveral Principles, Ends, and Purpoſes: And very different and contrary Actions (eſpecially in divers Perſons) may proceed, and full often do from one and the ſame general Principle, and due End. So Men are apt to judge other Mens inclinations like their own, and that ſome things pleaſe others as much as themſelves; and other things are diſtaſtful, tedious, and burthenſome, becauſe they are ſo to themſelves. So many judg that the Gratification of many inordinate Appetites or Luſts in us, are extraordinarily pleaſant to all Men, ſay they what they will, and Virtue and Religion is a dry ſapleſs thing to all Men; nothing of Pleaſure or Delight to all thoſe that profeſs it, but that it is taken up or pretended to, for ſome other particular Ends, and that they would be otherwiſe if they dared, and would be glad to be rid of the burthen, or freed from the confinement thereof; and that therefore they are Hypocrites: And from the ſame cauſe are frequent falſe Judgments on the Good ſide, and Perſons and Actions are often judged better than they are, which is the better extream. In ſo much that very oft very Good-minded Men cannot believe that Men are ſo wicked as they are, that they are ſo Selfiſh, Unjuſt, Fraudulent and Deceitful, Perjurious, Filthy, and Senſual, Impious and Atheiſtical, as indeed they are, and ſo are as often cozened in their dealign with them, and oft-times give their Commendation and their Charity where they are not deſerved.

(3.) Too general a belief of every Teſtimony or Report, whether in Talk or Books, which proceeds oft-times again from meer actual Ignorance, or Non-attention, that moſt Reports are moſt-what very fallible ſigns of what's true, and ſometimes none at all: That there are much better Proofs of things ſometimes from contrary Teſtimonies of better Perſons, ſometimes from other things. This proceeds alſo from love of Activity and Curioſity, of Knowing and Judging ſome-what new and freſh, and ſome-times from the worſer Principles ſo often named. All Teſtimonies are more or leſs ſigns of what's true, according as the Perſons are more wiſe and knowing, or more veracious willing and careful to ſay no more than they know: Now how many Actions of Perſons reported to be done with certain Circumſtances, and from certain Principles and Reaſons, by thoſe who neither do, nor can know any thing of them: Or if they do, yet through temerity, raſhneſs, and precipitancy, curioſity, ſuſpition, envy, flattery, or ſome other diſpoſition of Will, do ſo either invent or change, by adding or detracting or ſubſtituting, that ſometimes none at all, moſt-what but little, rarely very much of what they ſay is true and to be believed. But yet what more ordinary than for Men to believe all without ſtick or ſcruple. The further too ſtill Reports go, through the more Perſons they paſs, they are ſtill the more uncertain, becauſe ſtill the more alteration; and as it rarely happens for Perſons who obſerve things by their own ſenſe or reaſon, to report them juſt as they obſerved them, through forgetfulneſs or raſhneſs: (Beſides that they might not diſcern ſome Circumſtances.) So it is as rare and ſeldom for the ſame things to be convey'd from any one to another exactly, without ſome alteration. I believe that the more Cautious and Wiſe, cannot but have obſerved, that in almoſt all Reports and Teſtimonies concerning Perſons, their Actions, Principles, Qualities, or Tempers, either the things are quite falſe, or but ſome general part of them true. The more Cautious and Diſcreet, Honeſt, and lovers of Truth we obſerve Men to be; the more we may in their Reports and Teſtimonies concerning Perſons, either on the Good or Bad ſide, defer to them of our Belief and Judgment of the truth of what they ſay; and theſe in any degree conſiderable, are but too few. A good ſhort Memorandum of this particular is that excellent Precept, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Remember to unbelieve or disbelieve, i. e. Either to ſuſpend thy Belief, or to believe the thing to be falſe.

(5.) A fifth Cauſe is want of a prevalent love of Truth. Men moſt-what in their Judgments and Diſcourſe concerning Perſons (nor is it much leſs in things, witneſs the generality of Books) look more at other things, little or not at all at the truth of what they judg or ſay; they take little heed whether it be really true or no, and therefore ſeldom examine, ſuſpend, or pronounce doubtfully, or according only to appearing probability. It is true, they ſay, and think things to be true, very confidently and ſtrongly, but this not becauſe they ſee the truth of what they affirm, but becauſe they would have it true. Not becauſe their Underſtanding and Perception goes before their Judgment, and their natural affection to Truth makes them ſo judg, but ſome other diſpoſition of will; ſuch as I have ſo often named, Activity, Curioſity, Pride, Hatred, Envy, Anger, Contempt, Flattery, &c. Whereas we ſhould be very careful to poſſeſs our Minds with ſuch a ſerious love of the Truth, that we may have a conſtant reverend regard thereto in all our Judgments and Speeches concerning others. And this we ſhould do without much trouble, if we uſed our ſelves thereto, and did but uſe to check our ſelves, and ask the Queſtion, and pauſe a little whether we know it to be true or no. We ſhould love not only to ſpeak truth with our Neighbour, but of our Neighbour too. We ſhould look upon Truth as a moſt Sacred thing, ever to be inviolable and to be the main, if not the only perfection of our Judgments; without which we had better have none at all. We had better be utterly Ignorant, and never judg at all, than do it erroneouſly: For by that means our Actions and Reſolutions are determined and directed amiſs, and are miſchievouſly made uſe of. For were it not much better that we were ignorant, and paſſed no Judgment at all of Perſons, either of the quantity or quality of their Perfections and Imperfections, than by being miſtaken therein ſometimes to neglect or puniſh the Innocent and Well-deſerving, and to be Beneficent and beſtow good things upon thoſe that ill deſerve, and make ill uſe of them. In few words, Men judg falſly becauſe they will not judg truly, or are not pleaſed therewith, or at leaſt but little and in ſuch degree only that it is not effectual. For it is not every degree of love to the Truth, that will ſecure a Man from falſe Judgments of things, and here of Perſons: But it muſt be a greater degree of Love thereto, than to the thing which at any particular time may be a temptation to the contrary. And if we would be always ſecure, we muſt have a ſtronger Affection thereto than to any other Object, which may occur in our Lives, more than to the favour or good-will of the Greateſt or Beſt, more than to Miſchievouſneſs, Superiority, either in Reputation for, or Poſſeſſion of any Good thing, more than to Power or Greatneſs, more than to Gain or Riches, finally any other good Advantage or Intereſt. We muſt look upon our uprightneſs or truth of our Judgments or Opinions, as a far greater proper Good, a richer and more excellent Poſſeſſion than all theſe; whereby we do more Good than by all theſe without it. And conſequently be more ſhamed and afraid to be Erroneous, and live in Falſhood and a Lye, than any other evil or hurtful thing to us, except Vice and Sin.

We muſt in a general ſenſe, Buy the Truth, and ſell it not: That is, prefer it before all other things that are inconſiſtent with it, and cauſe us to part with it, alſo Wiſdom, Inſtruction, and Underſtanding, the means to obtain it, Prov. 23. 23. If we do not do thus, if we be not thus tempered and diſpoſed, if we do not judg this a greater good; we ſhall have our Judgments affected, ſtrengthened, bent, and determined by our love to other things in all Matters, where there is not apparent demonſtration, but only high degrees of Probability; as it is almoſt in all affairs of Humane life. Nay, even in theſe a Man may wilfully blind and confound himſelf, or divert his attention; and if not make himſelf judg falſe, yet at leaſt hinder himſelf from clearly ſeeing and judging truly, and make himſelf doubt as it were; ſaying, when a thing cannot be denied, Truly, I do not know, or the like; and in ſuch a manner ſhuffle and contrive to bring himſelf at leaſt to ſuſpenſion and doubt and confuſion. Every Man hath ſome degree of love to Truth naturally, ſome more, ſome leſs, more than ſometimes to more, ſometimes fewer other things; and accordingly they are more likely, more often to judg truly. But it is and muſt be a greater degree than to all other things univerſally and conſtantly, that will always ſecure from all prejudices of his will.

(6.) The ſixth Cauſe I ſhall name is our Paſſions, both thoſe of the Concupiſcible and Iraſcible appetite, as they are uſually called: Or more plainly, thoſe that have good, and thoſe that have evil for their immediate Object. Such as are the ſimple ones of Love, Hatred, Joy, and Grief, and Deſire: And others compounded of theſe, as Revenge, Anger, Hope, Fear, &c. Theſe all in every Caſe, cauſe us to judg to the advantage, and in favour of themſelves; that is, ſo as they may be preſerved and maintained, the Inſtances of which are every-where, and innumerable. Thus for Example: Love cauſeth us to attribute to the Object beloved things that are lovely, whereby the Paſſion is maintained or encreaſed; and hatred on the contrary, to attribute, or aſcribe, or adjudg to the Object hated thoſe things that are hateful and evil, for its own preſervation or encreaſe, whereby it is kept up or augmented, and made more keen and fierce: And all this without any regard to the truth or falſhood of what is judged. So likewiſe what we deſire, we will think it is good Poſitively or Privatively. In deſire properly ſo called, or where the good we deſire, is a poſſeſſion of ſome good thing, we moſt readily judg the good thing a great Good, and conſequently its Poſſeſſion. In Anger and Revenge, where the good thing deſired is a removal of ſome evil or grievous thing to us, by doing evil to it (which obtains in Inanimate things, but principally to Perſons) we are extraordinarily prone and forc'd to judg this removal a greater good, and in order thereto the evil to be removed a mighty evil. And therefore more particularly in Perſons to whom we are thus affected or paſſionated, we judg many kinds and degrees of evil or bad things to be in them, many or all, perhaps more than indeed there are, which are ſeldome but very confuſedly apprehended, and ſignified uſually by ſome name, to which our paſſions of Anger, Hatred, or the like have been joyned, (as that of ſome Sect or Party) whereby ſtill theſe our Paſſions are gratified; that is, ſupported, maintained, nay, augmented and boyled up to the greateſt degree of Agitation and Violence. And thoſe Mens judgments thus from Paſſions, whereby they are maintained and increaſed, though they may happen to be true; yet it appears by Experience, that they are more generally falſe. Their happening to be true, ſometimes makes Men oft-times juſtifie and think well of ſuch paſſionate Judgments; whereas the truth was not at all ſeen by them, nor was it the Reaſon or Cauſe therefore of their Judgments.

Theſe Paſſions thus byaſs, and warp, and determine our Judgments three Ways among others.

1. By bringing to mind and furniſhing our Invention only with thoſe things which maintain or increaſe them, and which are true; and keeping out the contrary, hindring thoſe from appearing which may abate or extinguiſh them, which are as true too. We all may have often obſerved how much we have preſently to ſay for a Perſon whom we love, how plentifully and readily our Invention is furniſhed; What long Orations we can make in his behalf and praiſe; How many excellent Qualities, and in what great Degree, appear to us in him, and we attribute to him. All which grant to be true. But we have nothing to ſay againſt him, nothing to his diſadvantage, nothing that is bad, imperfect, or faulty in him appears, or comes to our mind; when as much might as truly there have been ſaid too. And ſo on the contrary (the worſe or at leaſt the more frequent extream) in a Perſon whom we hate, are revengefully and wrathfully affected to, with whom we are angry: Then how many Faults in him, or Imperfections crow'd preſently into our Minds? All his paſt bad Actions and Qualities remembred, his preſent obſerved, nay, his future too foretold; and altogether flie about immediately in our Fancies; and we could give a Catalogue ſometimes of many hours long, and make large Declamations againſt him; the Man hath been this and that, and t'other, all which we'll grant to be true too: But then, how barren are our Inventions for him, we have nothing or very little to ſay to commend him. This would be a very dry Theme for us. We remember, or take notice of nothing conſiderable in him: Whereas it may be here is as much, and as true to be ſaid by any other Perſon who is Calm and Reaſonable, not thus poſſeſſed by theſe Paſſions againſt him; nay, and we our ſelves can do it when we are out of that Paſſion, when the Man is not altered (except it be in that one particular for which we are angry with him) he is the ſame ſtill, he is no better nor worſe, when we are, and when we are not ſo affected to him; 'tis we only alter and change. And ſo in particular Actions, how eaſily can we, by how many Arguments, commend, juſtifie, or excuſe any Action of our Friends, and with as many diſcommend or aggravate that of our conceited Adverſary, whom we are in hatred with, or bear grudge againſt, or are wrathful and angry with? Hence therefore we give falſe Judgments concerning Perſons qualities or actions; judging them much better or worſe than they are; we having only Arguments and Proofs on one ſide brought to our Mind, by our paſſions, and thoſe on the other kept out by them. Which is like, as if corrupted or bribed Officers ſhould permit no Witneſſes to come into, or appear in the preſence of the Judg, but thoſe that ſhall ſerve for that ſide or the Cauſe that they are bribed for: And yet often our Mind and Reaſon, the Judg, not attending and taking notice of this Bribery and Partiality of theſe Officers, the Paſſions (though it might and ſhould) may think it very truly judged; at leaſt as it ought according to the Evidence that it had; and ſet down, and be content, and think all was well done, and truly they were very honeſt and ſincere in their Judgments. This is one of the moſt ſlie and cloſe Cheats and Tricks we by our Paſſions put upon our Reaſons. The more had we need here to be cautious, and now more eſpecially when the Deceit and Cozenage is diſcovered. And both on this and the two following, as well as other accounts, it is a ſpecial Maxim of Wiſdom, not to truſt thoſe Judgments, where Paſſions have gone before Reaſon: But do one of theſe three things. Either, 1. Be calm and and have no Paſſions at all. Or, 2. If thou wilt for Invention-ſake have any, then paſſionate thy ſelf equally on both ſides. Or, 3. Raiſe up in thy ſelf a greater and commanding paſſion for Truth, which will make all the Evidence and Proof thou haſt in thy keeping, appear equally on all ſides. But here I may prevent what is to be ſaid in another Head.

2. And very briefly: Our Paſſions cauſe us to judg in favour of themſelves, bringing into our Minds what is true on one ſide, and keeping back what is ſo on the other, but alſo by thruſting into them more than is true: And therefore we obſerve in our Friends and in our Enemies, (that is, to whom we are ſo) more virtues or faults, fine or foul things, and more of them too than any Body elſe not alike prejudiced can ſee, or than indeed there are. And,

3. When things, on both ſides do come to our Minds, as eſpecially when ſuggeſted by another, who would diſcourſe or defend the Perſon we are paſſionated for or againſt; I ſay, when this is, by thruſting them on one ſide away again, or turning a Man from them, or cauſing one wilfully not to attend to them; or if that cannot be, not to the Proof and Evidence that is in them; nay, not to be able, it confounding and agitating our Minds, and drawing their force another way: And ſo it is by every days Experience obſerved, that he that is under the paſſions of Hatred and Anger againſt any thing or Perſon, will not attend to what can be ſaid or propoſed in their Commendations or Defence; nor will nor can ofttimes apprehend the Proof or Conſequence thereof. So on the other hand, Timidity, or Fear, or Scruple to judg amiſs concerning Perſons, eſpecially on the bad ſide, may cauſe many not to judg according to the beſt probability that doth appear to them, without any prejudice from any Perſon, or ill diſpoſition of Will: But this is an effect of Paſſions, more viſible and more to be obſerved by the Perſon himſelf miſjudging, than the former, and therefore in that reſpect more eaſie to be prevented. And here we ſee manifeſtly one of the principal miſchiefs of Paſſions, as there are alſo very good uſe of them; and how much therefore it concerns us to govern them well.

The Cauſes of the Fifth prohibited Judgment, viz. Too great a Proneneſs to declare and make known our Judgments, may be and uſually are the ſame now often mentioned in ſome of the former, viz. Idleneſs, ultimate Self-pleaſing by Activity, Curioſity, Vain-conceit of ones own ſufficiency and ability to judg of others, fancied Reputation therefor; alſo by Hatred, Revenge, Pride, affectation of Superiority, Envy, Contempt, Anger, Flattery: And Perſons who are too prone thus to do on the worſt ſide out of ſuch Principles, eſpecially now named, one or more of them, and are frequent and buſie in doing of it, are thoſe who are called properly Tale-bearers; concerning whom you have ſo many Adviſements in the Book of the Proverbs, and of the miſchievouſneſs of their Employment, as Prov. 26. 20, 22. and 16. 28. and 11. 13.

Laſtly, For the Cauſes of Mens paſſing Judgment in Thought and Speech, concerning Perſons on the worſt ſide, out of ſuch bad Principles as are aforenamed; I have no other now to name, but only the corruption of their Natures, and inclinations thereof when born into this World, by ſome certain Cauſes, and this improved and increaſed by too conſtant an ill uſage of themſelves, their wilful compliance therewith; few taking care to correct and amend by the Grace of God, what is bad and amiſs in themſelves, their natural Degeneracy and Corruption, their Inordinacy and Immoderacy of appetite, but ſwimming down with the Stream, and doing that which is moſt eaſie.