METAPHYSICKS.

METAPHYSICKS is a Science which contemplates Beings as Beings; that is to say, abstracted from all Matter.

The Etimology of the Word is from [...], which signifies praeter, post, or trans, and [...], naturalis; that is, something besides, above or beyond Nature. Above or beyond Nature, be­cause this Science transcends Natural things, and is above that part of Philosophy which we call Physicks; and besides Nature, because in her 10 Doctrine those Affections and Divisions of Ens or Being are not handled, which Metaphysicks treats of.

And for this Reason it is called Philosophy, ab­solutely and in opposition to all other, because it is the most sublime and noble part of it.

Again, sometimes it is called the first Philoso­phy, because it treats of the first Conceptions and first Principles, upon which the Principles of all other Sciences are founded.20

Sometimes it is called Natural Theology, be­cause it handles immaterial, incorruptible, and the highest things, as far as they are discernable by the light of Nature.

And sometimes they call it Wisdom, because it disputes of First Causes, and of the highest and most difficult things.

The Material Object of Metaphysicks is Being, the Formal Object or Manner of considering Being is as Being: so that Ens or Being is in this 30 definition of Metaphysicks the Subject; Quatenus ens, or as Being, is the Predicate, and makes the Object of this Science.

The Division of Metaphysicks is into General and Special: The General Part treats of the Nature; Distinctions, and Affections of Beings. The Special or Particular treats of their several kinds, as Substance and Accident.

A Being is that which hath a real Essence, that is, a true and not a feigned Essence, and such an 40 one as is fit really to exist.

There is a distinction between Essence and Existence. Essence is that which hath a real Being, though it do not Exist, that is, though it be not in Act, as a Rose in the Winter. But Existence supposes that Act also, as a Rose in its Season.

Again, Ens or Being is divided into that which hath a Being in Nature, as an Horse, an House, Fire, Water, &c. or that which hath no other 50 Being, but in our Thought and Conception, as a Chimera, or any Monster we can imagine that never yet was. And this is called Ens Rationis, or a Being in our Reason.

These are the most ordinary and general divi­sions of Ens, or Being; and now we come to its Affections.

That Ens or Being hath Affections is certain, because there are some things reciprocated with it, which are not at the first Conception we have of it, but follow that first Conception: For Ex­ample, Vnity, Verity, Goodness, to be in Act, or in Power, and these Metaphysicians call simple Affections.

There are some other that are not reciprocated with it, but divide it not as Genus is divided into Species, but as a Subject is divided into its Acci­dents; and so they cannot be so large, or extend as far as the Being it self. Such kind of Affecti­ons are Cause, Effect, Necessary, Contingent, and many other of the like kind, and these are called Disjunctive.

First, We are to treat of those Affections of Being which are reciprocated with it, and they are these three, Vnity, Verity, and Goodness.

By Vnity we must by the way observe, that the Vnity which is the reciprocal Affection of Be­ing is Vnity in General; so Colour is general in the Adequate Affection of a mixt Body; for it is truly said, No Body is without a Colour, and no Colour without a Body: But this is not to be un­derstood of any one Colour in particular, but of Colour in General.

One Division of Vnity is into that which is one by it self, and one by Accident.

Another is into Indivisible and Undivided. Indivisible is that which is neither divided in Act, nor yet in Power: Vndivided is that which is not actually divided, but yet hath a power or capacity of being divided.

The last division of Vnity is into Universal, Formal, and Individual.

That which is opposite to Unity is Many, actually divided.

Verity is the Conformity in the Conformity of any thing with the Understanding.

This is the general definition of Verity; but as it is Metaphysically considered to be an affecti­on of Ens or Being, it is said to be that by which a Being may be known or apprehended by the Understanding, to be real and such as it is: And the conformity and relation of the Being with the Vnderstanding is founded in this Truth. Thus we distinguish between that which is true Go [...]d, and that which only appears to be such: for true Gold hath a certain entity particular to it self▪ cognoscible by the Understanding, which ca [...]t be said of apparent o [...] seeming Gold. And thus we distinguish betwixt a true Body an [...] a Phantastick Body, or that which only appears [...]o be a Body. The true Body is apprehended [...]y us according to the essential and proper concep­tion of Body, but the other cannot apprehend so.

[Page 16] Ens Verum then (or a true Being, as Philoso­phers speak) is that which is apprehended by the Understanding to have a Being, like that which is proper and Essential to such a Nature. So the Office or Business of this Verity is to distin­guish Real Beings from Apparent ones, and there­fore excludes all sorts of Entia Rationis, or such things as only have a Being in our Understand­ing, and no real one of themselves.

The opposite or contrary thing to this Verity 10 is Falsity, which Falsity is founded in the Under­standing only, and not in the things; for Exam­ple, That Metal which only seems to be Gold is false, not but that it hath in it self a true Nature, as a Body of another kind; but it is false Secun­dum quid, and in this sense, that it agrees not with that conception which we have in our Un­derstandings concerning true Gold.

The last simple Affection of Being, is Goodness. Things or Beings are said to be Metaphysically 20 Good, as they have that Essence whereof they are capable; or more plainly, as they have that Essential perfection which is convenient or agreeable to them. And in this sense every thing in the World, whether Substance or Accident, is said to be good.

The other Affections of Being we said were called Disjoyned, because they do divide and dis­joyn it, and they are either Immediate, or Me­diate. Immediate, as Act and Power, Principium 30 and Principatum, that is, the Principle of a thing, and the thing it self; The Cause, and the Thing caused; Necessary and Contingent. These are the Immediate disjoyn'd Affections of Ens or Be­ing.

We shall begin with Act and Power.

By Act we are to understand a Being that doth exist, and by Power that which doth not always exist, but is capable of existing.

Thus a Log of Wood is a Statue in Power we 40 say, because a Statue may be made of it; but when the Carver has wrought it up, it is a Sta­tue in Act. So that this Division of Beings into Actual and Potential is Universal, and compre­hends all the Beings in the World, for whatso­ever it is, either in Power or in Act.

But here we are to observe, that sometimes the Power and Act do consist together, and the Act doth not always take away or deny the Power: For Example, The Act of Laughing in 50 Man doth not at all take away the Power. And yet sometimes the Act doth wholly take away the Power; for Example, A Rule of two Foot long hath a Power of being divided into two Rules of a Foot long apiece; but as soon as it is Actually divided, it hath for ever lost that Power.

But to give you some of the Divisions of Power.

Power is either Vnivocal or Equivocal, as they 60 speak, that is, Power either properly or impro­perly so called; that is Power improperly so cal­led, which is attributed to those things which are never really in Act. And this Power is either properto the Mathematicians or Logicians.

A Mathematicol Power is that which Mathe­maticians feign to themselves, or suppose, ab­stracted from all kind of Bodies or Matter, as when they say, A right Line is in Power a Tri­angle.

A Logical Power is a meer denial of a Contra­diction; as when they say, The Earth may or hath a Power to be removed higher or lower from the place where it is, because such a Re­moving doth not destroy its Essence, and implies no Contradiction. And to this Logical Power is referr'd that which in Metaphysicks is called Ob­jective Power; that is, a Non-repugnance of any thing to be produced by such or such a Cause. Whence it is plain that this Objective Power is not real, because it only consists in a bare Negation of an Impossibility.

Besides this Negation was true of the World, before any thing of it was Created by God, and therefore is a formal Non Ens, or no Being at all.

That Power which is Univocal or Proper, is either Active or Passive. An Active Power is in that which transmutes and produceth any thing in another Subject: The Passive is the Power of being produced, or changed in the Subject.

The Active Power is either Infinite, as that of God; or Finite, as that of the Creature.

The Active Power of God is called Omni­potence, whereby he can do every thing that is not contrary to his own Essence, or implies not Contradiction; for we must not believe, that Gods Omnipotence consists in doing whatever we can conceive. So God can't Lye, because it is contrary to his Essence; nor Create a Man which should be Irrational, for then at the same time he should be a Man and no Man, Rationality being his very Essence.

The Active Power in Creatures is either Ratio­nal, or Irrational.

Rational, which is indifferently free to several kinds of Acts, as is the Will of Man.

Irrational, which is determin'd to one Act a­lone; As the Power of burning in Fire is to burn, which if it be applyed to Combustible Matter can't suspend the Act, but must needs burn.

A Passive Power is divided, first into that which may either be, or not be, which Philoso­phers call Power of Contradiction. Such properly the Power of Contingent things is said to be.

Such a Power hath all Matter under the Moon of becoming a Body Animate, or Inanimate; and such a Power hath a piece of Timber, of being made either a Statue, or a Chair.

Again, this Passive Power is divided into Phy­sical, and Metaphysical. Physical is a power of Matter to receive Forms, either Substantial or Ac­cidental: Metaphysical is the power of any Sub­stance, whether Material or Immaterial, to receive Accidents.

Act is divided into First and Second.

The first Act is the Essence of any thing, as Reason is said to be the first Act; but to Reason or Discourse is the second Act.

Again, Act is divided into Perfect and Imper­fect; A Perfect Act is that which is directed to no further Act: An Imperfect Act is that which is directed to some more Perfect.

[Page 17] Thus Motion is an Imperfect Act, because it is the way to a more Perfect Act, to wit, the Form which is acquired by that Motion; but the Form it self, because it is no further directed, is said to be a perfect Act.

The next immediate disjoyn'd Affection of Being is Principium and Principiatum, the Princi­ple, and the thing Principiated, if we may so speak for vvant of Terms.

A Principle is that from which any thing is 10 made or known, or from vvhich any thing pro­ceeds after any manner vvhatsoever.

To give any thing the name of a Principle, there are these two things required; viz. 1. That it be before the thing Principiated, for so the very Name alone informs us. Secondly, That there be some connexion between the Principle and the thing Principiated; for the Child that vvas born yesterday can't be said to be the Prin­ciple of the Child vvhich vvas born to day; be­cause 20 though the one vvere before the other, yet there is a connexion betwixt them.

The main Division of Principles vvas implied in the Definition, and that is this, Principles are either of Things, or of Knowledge.

There is also another Division of Principles, into such as are Causes; As the Father is the Principle, and likewise the Cause of the Son: And such as are not Causes; As Privation is the Principle, but not the Cause of this or that 30 Form.

Principles are before the things that are Prin­cipiated by them, both in Time, Nature, Order, and Knowledge or being known.

The thing Principiated, is that which hath the same order to its Principle, which latter hath to former. And from what hath been said of Prin­ciples, we may judge of things Principiated.

We come to speak of the Cause, and the thing Caused, or the Effect. 40

A Cause in general, is that by whose Power any thing is.

Its Principal, and first Division, is into first and second.

That is said to be the first Cause which is first and highest in the order of Things, and that is God alone. Or else, that is said to be a first Cause which is the next to, and doth immediately pro­duce the Effect: As for Example, Rationality is the first Cause of all the Properties which are 50 found in Human Nature.

The second Cause, if it be taken in opposition to the first Cause in the former sense, it is then every Cause in Nature, every thing but God on­ly; and so the other first Cause is also a second Cause.

But if it be taken, as it is opposed to the first Cause in the second signification, it comprehends all remote Causes; that is, all those other Causes which have this Cause (called the first in the 60 latter signification) between them and the Ef­fect.

Causes are these four in Number, Efficient, Ma­terial, Formal, and Final.

The Efficient Cause is that which by it self produces any Effect, and so it is distinguished from all the other three. It is divided into Phy­sical and Moral.

Physical is every Cause that hath any real in­fluence upon the Effect, or which doth truly and by it self contribute to the Esse or Being of the Effect.

Moral Cause is such, as though it do not really operate in producing the Effect, yet it has such an influence upon our Manners (as they speak) that it seems to confer something to the produ­ction of the Effect. Such Causes are Counsellors or Instructors; and such as do not hinder when it lies in their power to do it.

Again, The Efficient Cause is divided into the Principal Cause and the Instrument; As the Smith and his Hammer.

It is further divided into Equivocal and Vni­vocal. Equivocal, as when God, the Sun, or the Stars are said to produce any thing: And Vni­vocal; when any thing produceth another of its own Species or likeness.

The last division of Efficient Cause is into Im­mediate and Mediate. Immediate, as when the Sun gives its light to the Earth by its self; and Mediately, when it reflects its light to the Earth from the Moon.

But to speak something more particularly of God Almighty; We must know, that in Meta­physicks God is considered either generally, as he is the first Cause of all Beings; or specially, as he is Himself the first of all Beings.

As He is the First Cause of all things, He may fall under a threefold Consideration in regard of his three Operations, viz. Creation, Conservation, and Cooperation, or concurring with second Causes in producing their Effects.

Concerning Creation, there are many things that may be enquired into, vvhich because they properly belong to Theology we shall omit, and only consider vvhether a Man by the meer Light of Reason may understand and prove, that God is the Efficient Cause of the World, and likewise vvhat he can by the Light of Reason discern of the Circumstances of that great Work.

As to the first, 'tis believed, that by the Light of Natural Reason alone a Man may arrive at the knowledge of a first Cause, by which all o­ther things were produced, supposing no prece­dent Matter at all. And of this Opinion were Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, Halensis, Durandus, Sua­rius, and other Learned men.

But to come to the Proof: The first Argu­ment shall be taken from the nature and condi­tion of the Materia Prima or first Matter of all things; for if we can prove God to be the Crea­tor of all this visible World. We proceed thus:

The first Matter was either from it self, or from something else: It can't have its being from its self, for then it would have the highest Per­fection that any thing can have; that is, to have infinite Power and Vertue, and to depend on nothing but it self for its Being. I say, If it had its Being from it self it is Ens perfectissimum, the most perfect Being of all other, which is ab­surd; for it is the worst and most imperfect of all Immaterial Substances.

It must needs therefore have its Being from something else; that is, it must needs be pro­duced [Page 18] by some other cause. Now if it be pro­duced by something else, it must be either pro­duced by Matter that was pre-existent to it, or by no Matter. Not from some Matter that was pre-existent to it; for that were absurd to say, there was some Matter before the first Matter (for we speak now of the first and most simple Matter.) And if it were produced by no pre­existent Matter, then of necessity it must be Created (that is to say, made of Nothing.) If 10 therefore Matter be by any Cause created or made of Nothing, that Cause must needs be of Infinite Power and Vertue; for no Being can produce something out of Nothing, but that which is of Infinite Power; the Reason is, because there is an Infinite Distance between Something and No­thing, which requires an Infinite Power.

Now if the Power of this Cause which pro­duced the first Matter be infinite, so must also its Essence; for to be Infinite in Operation, supposes 20 of necessity Infinity of Being also. Again, If this Cause be Infinite, then all other Beings are Finite, and depend upon it; for there can be but one only Infinite. And this I think sufficient to prove a first Cause, not only of all Visible, but all Invisible things whatsoever, which is God.

To this Argument some have thus Objected, That to Create there is required an Infinite Pow­er; but no such Infinite Power can be demon­strated, and therefore there can be no Creation. 30

To which we Answer, That it is not necessa­ry first to demonstrate an Infinite Power, and thence to prove the Creation; but it suffices to demonstrate the Creation, and thence to prove an Infinite Power, which I think is done in this Argument.

As for the Argument they draw from that Axiom, Nothing is made of Nothing, we say the Axiom is only to be understood of Finite or Second Causes, and so does not reach the thing in hand.

Thus 'tis proved, that by the Light of Natural 40 Reason it may be known, that there is one first Efficient Cause and Infinite Essence, which is all one as if we said, God. But the Doubt that re­mains is, That if it can be demonstrated that God created the World, may it not be as well demonstrated that he created it from all Eter­nity? Or can it be demonstrated, that it was made at the Beginning of Time, that is, at a cer­tain time?

So that there are three Opinions to be exa­mined; 50 The first is that of the Peripateticks, who think it demonstrable (that is, by Natural Reason) that the World was created by God from all Eternity.

The second Opinion is Theirs, who think that it can neither be demonstrated, that the World was Created by God from all Eternity, nor yet that it was Created at the Beginning of Time; and so they think it possible either of the 60 two may be true, and that neither of the Opi­nions can be refuted by Natural Demonstration.

The third Opinion is, that it is demonstrable by the Light of Nature, that the World was Created at the Beginning of Time. To every one of these we shall speak apart.

We shall begin with the first, where we shall prove against Aristotles own Principles, and a third, which though it be not evidently set down in his Philosophy, yet 'tis plain to Natural Rea­son.

The first Principle is, That there is one first Effici­ent Cause of all things; and this they admit who hold a Creation from Eternity.

The second is, That the first Cause or Being is endued with Vnderstanding and Will; which is plain in Aristotle.

The third is, This first Cause acts freely, and is not constrained by any Necessity of Nature: And this is plain, because Liberty is the very Essence of the Will. And again, If this first Cause did act by the Necessity of Nature, it should have a more imperfect and ignoble way of Act­ing, than Men themselves have.

Thus having laid down the Principles, the Ar­gument follows.

That which Acts freely, can Act when it will, and also forbear Acting when it will.

But the first Cause in the Creation of the World did Act freely.

Therefore it could Create the World when it pleased, and forbear the Creating when it pleased. And so it is not necessary that the World should have been from all Eternity, but it might be Created in time.

And now let us consider of those Arguments, that Aristotle brings to prove the Eternity of the World.

His first Argument is this, If the Motion of the Heavens be not from Eternity, then there was some other first Motion. If there be another first Motion, then that Motion began; and if it be­gan, then there was a Motion before the first Motion; for the beginning of that Motion sup­poses a Change or Motion, because without Change or Motion nothing begins or is generated.

To this we Answer in short, That in the Be­ginning of Time, both the Heavens and their Motion began to be at once; but they were not pro­duced by any Motion or Change, but were Created, and Creation they tell us is no Motion or Change, because Motion or Change is nothing but an alter­ing of state or condition; and this can't properly be said of that which before had no state or con­dition, as the World had not, because it was sim­ply Nothing.

His second Argument is from Time. If Time (says he) had a Beginning, once it was not, and afterwards it began to be; but Before and After, or Sooner and Later, are the very Speci­fick difference, and can't be without Time; there­fore it follows, that Time was before Time, which is absurd.

To this we Answer, That when we say that once Time was not, and that afterwards it began to be; that same Once doth not import the diffe­rence of real and true Time, but only Imaginary, and that was always. Just as Philosophers say, There was before the World was made, an Ima­ginary Space in vvhich afterwards it was made.

His third Argument is this, That either God could have made the World sooner, but would not, or would but could not; or else, that he nei­ther [Page 19] would nor could. The first of these three things is not to be said, because that would ar­gue envy in God. Nor the Second, because that would argue Weakness; Nor the Third, because that would argue both. Therefore it remains that he always both could and would Create the World and so it was Created from Eternity.

To this we answer, That God had from all E­ternity both a Power and a Will to Create the World at the beginning of Time; and that it was 10 neither Weakness nor Envy which made him de­fer it so long, but 'tis very probable it was the greater Manifestation of his own Glory and Power; Because from that late Creation it appeared plain­ly that God did not work by the necessity of Na­ture, and that he needed it not, but was from all Eternity happy in himself.

We come now to the second Opinion, the as­serters whereof are at some difference amongst themselves.20

Some say the World was just as it is from all Eternity, with its continual changes of Genera­tion and Corruption; and shall also continue to all Eternity just as it is, but yet with some de­pendance on the Creator.

But this Opinion cannot be defended, by rea­son of the Absurdities that would follow upon it; for instance take this one. If the World hath continued, and been as it is from all Eternity, and Men have from all Eternity been born, and 30 dyed, it must needs follow then that there are an infinite number of Souls separated from Bo­dies; which is point blank contrary to that Opi­nion of Aristotle, that there can be no infinite number actually. And if they say that this he speaks only of Bodies, and not of Spirits, they may consider, that if already there be an infinite number of Souls, and this number is daily increas­ed; then Infinity may be increased, or something added to it, which is absurd.40

Others there are that would limit the Opinion a little, and say, that the World and the motion of the Heavens hath been from all Eternity, though it may be Man hath not.

To these may be answered, That it is impossi­ble that infinite revolutions of Years, Months, and Days should be past and gone; because Infi­nity can't be past, no more than it can be encreas­ed; and then again there would be as many Days and Months as Years, for they would be all 50 equal if the World had been from Eternity; for infinite Days are as many as infinite Hours, one Infinite being no greater than another.

There are others, that seeing the Absurdities of both these, would yet limit the Opinion of the Worlds Eternity thus. That it may have been from all Eternity, but without all Motion, or Operation till the beginning of Time.

To these we answer, That this were inconsistent with the Wisdom of God, who doth nothing in 60 vain; and as Aristotle says▪ Always doth that which is best: Now it is better, and more con­venient things should not exist, than that they should exist without any Motion or Operation, that is, without any use or fruit.

It may be therefore concluded, That they who assert the World to have been Created in the be­ginning of Time are in the right, and that accor­ding to Natural Reason the World may (now it is created) endure to all Eternity, because it de­pends upon an infinite Being, which supports it. And yet on the other hand it may be destroyed again when God pleaseth; because his Power is infinite; and he that made All things from No­thing, can again if he pleaseth bring all things (I mean except such as he hath declared to be Eternal, as Rational Souls) to nothing again.

And thus we may arrive to the knowledge of the first Cause, and the Creation of the World by the Light of Nature.

We come now to the second Operation of the first cause, which is the Conservation of the World, or Providence. And we assert, That God from the first existence of any thing, doth continually give it Being by his Conservation, which is the same Action in him with his Creation of it; just as the Sun at first enlightens the Air with darting its Rays through it, and conserves and keeps that light with the same Action of darting its Rays through it; So that we have no Principle that is sufficient to distinguish these two Actions, (if we may so call them). Again they are the same in their Principle, and in their Terminus or End; for both proceed from one first cause, and both terminate in one thing, to wit the Being of the thing conserved. But this belongs properly to Theology, and so doth the third Operation of the first cause, which is called its Cooperation with the second cause; and therefore we purposely o­mit to speak any thing of them here.

Thus far of Efficient Causes; the next of Final Causes; and both these are External Causes, whereas Matter and Form are said to be Inter­nal.

The end or Final Cause is that for whose sake or cause any thing is done.

It hath several Divisions; as 1. It is divided into Finis Cui, and Finis Cujus; that is, the end for whom any thing is desired, as for the Sick Man, Cure is desired; here the Sick Man is the end for whom, or to whom.

Finis Cujus, the end of which is not the Sub­ject for whose sake a thing is desired, as the o­ther is, but something different from it, as Cure is desired for Healths sake; here Health is the end of which (as they speak) that is of the Cure.

2. The End is either Formal, or Objective. Formal is the Action about any Object. Objective is the Object it self of the Action. For Example, the last formal end of Man is the Beatifical Visi­on of God, the Objective end of Man is God himself.

3. The End is either Vltimate, which is referred to no other; or Intermediate which is not. Thus the Intermediate end of Eating is Health. The Vltimate or Matter is an inward Cause, out of which any thing is made by its own passive or receptive Power concurring. And it is either Ex qua, In qua, or Circa quam, that is, out of which, in which, or about which.

Matter out of which any thing is made, is 1. either First or Second, or 2 Permanent or Tran­sient.

[Page 20] 1. Permanent is that Matter out of which some­thing is made, and yet the Essence of the thing re­mains, as a Cup is made of Gold. Transient Matter is that which doth not retain its own Essence when something is made out of it, as when a Chicken is made of an Egg.

Matter is called in which, in regard of the Form existing in it.

Matter is called about which, in regard of the Agents operating about it disposing it to receive 10 the Form; so that the Matter is one and the same thing, but diversly considered.

Form is the Reason of any things Essence, or that which makes a thing to be what it is, and distinguishes it from other things.

The first division of Form is into Inward and Outward; By outward Form they understand no­thing but the Copy or Pattern after which and in whose likeness any thing is made, and the Exemp­lars, or Copies. Or Copies are either Real or 20 Intentional.

Real are those Exemplars which do subsist, and are without the mind of the Artificer, and are obvious to sence, and such as Artificers have for the most part by them.

An Intentional Exemplar is the Image or Idea of the thing to be made in the Mind of the Work-man.

Intrinsecal Form is that which constitutes the formed, either Substantially or Accidentally; and hence we have that division of Intrinsecal or In­ward 30 Form into Substantial and Accidental.

Accidental Form is that which subsists in the substance, either in part of it, or in all of it; As Whiteness in a Wall.

The Substantial Form is that which informs any body, and distinguishes it from other things, and is called Forma partis, in opposition to the Matter of that body.

And these Substantial Forms are such as are ei­ther separable from their Bodies (that is can, exist 40 separate from them) or not. Inseparable Forms are only Rational Souls, all other Forms whatsoever are separable.

The Causality of Forms in general consists in the manner of their union to Matter, and their actuating and possessing it.

All Inseparable Forms in Bodies are concluded to be nothing but Matter; But the separable, to­wit, the Rational Souls are perfectly Immaterial.50 And it will here be worth our while to enquire a little into the several Opinions of Philosophers con­cerning the Original of the Soul.

1. The first I shall mention is that of Philo Judaeus, who teacheth that the Rational Soul is a particle of the Divine Essence, and is neither im­mediately created by God, nor yet derived from the Seed of the Parent, but miraculously inspired from God himself. But this Opinion is so absurd, that I scarce think it worth the naming, since the 60 Essence of God is Immutable, and Indivisible.

2. The second is, that the Souls of Men were all created in the begining of the World out of no­thing, at the same time with the Angels, and growing weary and disdainful of Heaven and good things, began to love Earthly things, so that they were cast down by God into Bodies as into Prisons for their punishment. But this we must not allow, because of the many Absurdities that would follow upon it. For why then should God in the Deluge have delivered so many wicked Souls out of Prison, and have left his Servant Noah behind? The same also might be said of the destru­ction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the preserva­tion of Lot.

Again, it would follow hence that the Resur­rection of the Body would be nothing but a re­turning to Prison again, even to the Righteous themselves.

Again, this would destroy all Philosoply, be­cause this asserts that the Rational Soul was not appointed to be a part of Man, but is a compleat Substance in its own nature, and that Man▪ con­sisting of Soul and Body, is but an Ens, or Being by Accident.

3. The Third is, That all Souls were created at first with the Angels, and sent into Bodies, as the Bodies were prepared by Generation. This Opi­nion differs form the former, because it doth not say that Souls sinned in Heaven, and for their pu­nishment were sent down into Bodies. But the chief Reason why it affirms that all Souls were created at first, is because that Text of Genesis tells us, that God rested or ceased from his Works.

The Error of this Opinion appears, in that we understand or remember nothing of that for­mer State. Nor will it suffice to say, that being sunk into these gross and earthly Tabernacles the Soul hath lost all its Memory of former things; for since it is natural for the Soul to be joyned to the Body, it is not reasonable that by being joyned to its proper matter it should thereby re­ceive so great detriment and disadvantage.

And whereas they object, that of Gods rest­ing from his Works, we understand that only thus, That he then rested or ceased from producing any new Species of Beings.

4. The Fourth Opinion is, that the Souls are be­gotten by the Parents, and that the Sons Soul is from the Fathers as his Body is. To this we shall answer by and by.

5. The Fifth is, that the Original of Souls is not known, nor should we adventure to deter­mine any thing in the matter. A modest thought indeed, but such as Baronius thinks below a Divine and a Philosopher.

6. The Sixth, and that which we hold is, That Mens Souls are not from their Parents, or from any Matter, but created by God, and put into the Matter when it is conceived and prepared for A­nimation.

The Arguments for confirming this Opinion and refuting that of Souls being begot by Parents, are these.

1. If the Soul were Generable; it would be Corruptible. To this, those of another Opinion Answer, That the Soul is Corruptible, because it depends upon Matter, both in its Production and Being, they say; but that it shall endure to Eternity, because God hath determined to pre­serve it: And if you ask them, Why the Soul considered in it self should be Corruptible, They Answer thus; Because if God should cease from that Act whereby he keeps and preserves the [Page 21] Soul, it would presently return into Nothing.

But this Answer doth not satisfie us, Because, first of all, when Divines and Philosophers divide into eternal and fading, they do not then mean that any Substances are eternal, because God doth not preserve them by his influence, but because they can't be destroyed by any action of any Creature; and in this sense not only Angels and the Heavens, but also the Souls of Men are said to be incorruptible. Again, our Adversaries own 10 that Souls can't be destroyed by any Physical or material Action; and hence we infer, That they cannot be produced by any material Action. And why cannot they be destroyed by any material Action? Because their Substance is spiritual. For the same reason they cannot be produced by any material Action, because their substance is spiri­tual.

2. A Second Argument against their Opinion is, That God would have the Soul of Man sub­sist 20 without the Body after Death, but the Souls of Beasts to perish with the Body; and ther­fore he gave the rational Soul a Nature indepen­dent on any bodily Matter, that by reason of that nature it might subsist without bodily Matter. Whence we infer, That the Soul according to its Nature is independent on bodily Matter; And if the Soul in regard of its Essence doth not de­pend on Matter, then it doth not necessarily pre­suppose Matter out of which it is made, nor is it 30 produced by the power of Matter; so then if the Soul according to its Essence doth not depend upon Matter, Matter doth not concur to give it its Being; for if Matter did concur to give it its Being, then the Soul as to its Being should depend upon Matter.

3. The Third Argument is this. No active Power acts beyond its own Genus; But the In­tellective Soul exceeds the whole Genus of bodi­ly Nature, because it is a spiritual substance, there­fore 40 no bodily Power can produce a Soul.

Now every Action of the seminal faculty is from a bodily Power, for it proceeds from the vegetative Power; Therfore an Intellective Soul cannot be produced by that Power; for so an A­gent might produce an Effect much more noble and excellent in nature than it self, which is im­possible.

4. Fourthly, Those that maintain the contrary Opinion are forced to admit of many Absurdities to avoid the force of such Arguments as are 50 brought against it, to wit, That the Soul is not a spiritual Substance; That the Soul might be de­stroyed by a Physical Action, if God did not by his special Influence preserve it; which Assertion derogates not only from the worth and excellen­cy of our Souls, but also from the Divine Wis­dom, which intending our Souls should exist without the Bodies, gave them no fit or proper Nature to do so.

The next Affections of Ens or Being we are to 60 treat of, are Necessary and Contingent; and this Division is very well placed immediately after the former, because things are said to be neces­sary or contingent, chiefly in regard of the causes from whence they proceed.

A necessary thing is that which cannot be o­therwise.

They are to divide Necessity into the Necessity of the Proposition, and the Necessity of the Thing; Where note, that the Necessity of the Pro­position is always founded in the Necessity of the Thing. For Example; because God can't but be Just, therefore this Proposition, God is Just, can't but be true.

And likewise we may here observe, That all those Divisions which are attributed to the Necessity of the Thing, may also be attributed to the Neces­sity of the Proposition: For if the Thing be thus necessary, the Proposition must needs be so too.

The Necessity of the Thing is two-fold; there is one kind of Necessity which belongs to a Thing by it self, considered alone; and there is another kind of Necessity which belongs to a Thing in its order and relation to another Thing, as they a­gree or disagree.

The former of these they call the Necessity of Existence, or simple Necessity, or incomplex; and the latter they call Necessity of the Relation or Cohesion of Things, and likewise compound­ed, or complex Necessity.

The former is of it self, and in its own nature necessary; the latter as it is conjoyned with such and such causes.

The Necessity of Existence, as to speak, is ei­ther absolute, or secundum quid, or in part.

Absolute Necessity of Existence only belongs to God, because he only so exists as to depend on nothing, and cannot have his Being taken from him.

Necessity of Existence secundum quid or in part, belongs to incorruptible Creatures; As Angels, the Heavens and rational Souls, because absolutely they may not be, because they depend on a free Agent.

The necessity of Cohesion belongs not to things considered barely by themselves, but as they are related and cohere to other things.

And if we consider the Cohesion, we shall find that in some it is Necessarium, and one of those things can't be without the other; for Example, Socrates and his Nature. There is another Co­hesion amongst things which may be dissolved, and this is said to be Contingent; As Cohesion be­tween Socrates and his several Accidents.

The Necessity of Existence then is a Necessity in any by it self; the Necessity of Cohesion is that, whereby two or more things do adhere or stick together, not to be separated.

This Necessity of Cohesion is by Philosophers divided into the Necessity of the Consequent, and the Necessity of the Consequence. The Necessity of the Consequent is when one thing so follows another, that they can't by any means be sepa­rated; As, That Man is a living Creature. The Necessity of the Consequence is that Necessity, whereby things that are not by their own nature determin'd or forced to adhere together, do yet so stay together as for the time they can't be separated, and that by reason of the determi­nation of some outward Cause or Supposition. Thus we say, That he who by an irresistible Force hath changed his place, did it by Necessity; because though the Man and Changing of Place [Page 22] be things which are by no means determin'd to stick together, yet by this outward Force they are so united, that for the time they can't be se­parated; for supposing an irresistible Force, the Man must of necessity Change his Place.

Contingent is said to be that which may be otherwise. And this Contingency is either equal on both sides, that is, it may equally be so, and not be so; or else Contingency may be said of those things which are so for the most; or lastly,10 Contingency may be of those things that are sel­dom so.

There are other particular disjoyn'd Affecti­ons of Being, which are Mediate, as Simple and Compound.

1. Simple is that which can't be resolved into more; Compound is that which may: For Exam­ple, The Heavens are a Simple substance, be­cause they can be resolved into no more kinds of Substance; but the Earth is a Compound, be­cause 20 it may.

Composition is either Real or Imaginary.

Real, which either consists of Matter and Form, or of Integral parts, or of Degrees of Intension, or of Essence and Subsistence; As An­gels.

Imaginary Composition is the Act of Reason, whereby we do in our minds joyn two different things together, and make a third of them.30

2. Whole, and its Parts. The Whole is that which contains the Parts contained, so that they are one.

There are two Things to the making up of that which is called Whole.

A Plurality of Parts, and a Union of them besides.

The Whole is said to be either.

1. Essential is that Whole whose Parts are different in Power, but one and the same in Act: 40 And this Whole is either Physical, as the Soul and Body make one Man; and Logical or Metaphy­sical, whose Parts are only distinguish'd by our Reason, as the Species are in any Genus.

2. Integral is that Whole which contains many Parts only by Continuity, or Contiguity, as they speak: And these Parts are either Similar, as Drops of Water in a Glass; or Dissimilar, as the Eye and the Hand in the Body.

3. Vniversal in regard of its Parts, which are 50 Singular, as Genus, in respect of Species; Animal, in regard of Man and Beast, and the like.

4. Numeral, as Ten contains so many Ones.

5. Potential, or Potestative. This Whole con­tains several Powers or Faculties, which like Parts make up the Whole; as the Soul contains the Vnderstanding, Will, &c.

Part is a portion of the Whole, which together with its Fellows is sit to make the Whole.

Parts are also like the Whole, said to be Essen­tial 60 and Integral, or Similar and Dissimilar.

The next Affection of Being, in the Order of our Method, is The same and Another.

The Same is that which can't be divided, or distinguished from it self; and is divided into, The Same by it Self, and the Same by Acci­dent.

The Same by it Self is either generical, as when Man and Beasts are said to be the same as to their Animality; or specifical, as Peter and Paul are of the same Species; or numerical, as Peter is the same Peter being old, that he was when young.

The Same by Accident is said of those things which agree in their Accidents, as when an Horse and an Ox are both White, &c.

Another thing may be understood by what hath already been said Of the Same. Some other Things are only distinct, and some are oppo­site.

Distinction barely distinguishes one thing from another, with supposing any contrariety in them. And is either Real, and such as is found in the things themselves; or else Imaginary, such as we make in our own Minds.

Opposition is a repugnance of things, which will not let them be in the same Subject after the same manner.

Opposition is either Negative or Positive.

Negative Opposition is either Contradictory, as Being and not Being; or Privative, as Sight and Blindness.

Positive Opposition is either Contrary, as Heat and Cold; or Relative, as Father and Son.

The next Affection of Ens or Being, is Uni­versal and Singular. And this Division of Being is only the Act of the Mind; for in Nature there is no such thing found as an Vniversal. But we understand by it something, which con­tains under it many Singulars of the same Spe­cies, or such as we imagine it to be. Singular, or Individual, is that which can't be divided into more things like it self. Thus Humane Nature is the Vniversal, in regard of the Nature of Peter and Paul; but the Nature of Peter is Singular, and can't be divided, nor doth it comprehend any more Humane Natures than his own. There are some that refer Vniversal and Singular to the common Place of the Whole and its parts.

Another Affection of Ens, is Finite and Infinite. Finite Beings are such as are contained in certain determined Bounds and Limits; as all the Crea­tures which are said to be Finite, either in regard of their Number, Quantity, Duration, Perfection, or Essence.

Infinite is that which is contain'd or compre­hended in no Bounds, and is only God, who is said to be in all those respects wherein the Crea­tures are Finite, and more if there be any.

And thus we have done with the general Part of Metaphysicks; We come now to speak briefly of the Special, which treats of Substance and Ac­cidents.

Substance is a Being which subsists by it self, and is not in any other thing as in its Subject; and it is either Compleat, or not Compleat.

Compleat Substances are either Finite, or Infi­nite. Finite are either Corporeal, as Body; or Incorporeal, as Angels and Spirits.

Infinite is only God.

An Accident is that which is in another thing, as in its Subject; and it is either Primary or Se­condary.

[Page 23] Primary Accidents are either Quantity, Quality, or Relation.

Secondary Accidents are either Absolute, or Re­lative.

Absolute, as Quality, which contains Action and Passion; and Quantity, which contains When and Where.

Relative, as Situs or Situation, which signifies the disposition of Parts in order to Place; and Habitus, which signifies those things which are adjacent and near to any Body.

And thus I have finished this short. Tract of Metaphysicks, wherein I have for Method in most things observed the Ancient Philosophers; but in Difficulties, those whom I judge to have the most Reason.