CONSIDERATIONS Touching a War with SPAIN.
YOur Highness hath an Imperial Name. It was a CHARLES that brought the Empire first into France; A CHARLES that brought it first into Spain: Why should not Great Britain have his turn? But to lay aside all that may seem to have a shew of Fumes and Fancies, and to speak Solids: A War with Spain, (if the King shall enter into it,) is a mighty Work; It requireth strong Materials, and Active Motions. He that saith not so, is zealous, but not according to knowledge. But nevertheless, Spain is no such Giant: And he that thinketh Spain to be some great Over-match for this Estate, assisted as it is, and may be, is no good Mint-man; But takes greatness of Kingdoms according to their Bulk and Currency, and not after their intrinsique Value. Although therefore I had wholly sequestred my thoughts from Civil Affairs, yet because it is a new Case, and concerneth my Countrey infinitely, I obtained of my self, to set down, out of long continued Experience in Business of Estate, and much Conversation in Books of Policy and History, what I thought pertinent to this Business; And in all humbleness present it to Your Highness; Hoping, that, at least, you will discern the strength of my Affection, through the weakness of my Abilities: For the Spaniard hath a good Proverb; Desuario siempre con la Calentura; There is no Heat of Affection, but is joyned with some Idleness of Brain.
To a War are required; A Just Quarrel; Sufficient Forces and Provisions; And a prudent Choice of the Designs. So then, I will first justifie the Quarrel; Secondly, ballance the Forces; and lastly, propound variety of Designs for Choice, but not advise the Choice; For that were not fit for a Writing of this Nature; Neither is it a Subject within the Level of my Judgement, I being, in effect, a Stranger to the present Occurrences.
Wars (I speak not of ambitious Predatory Wars,) are Suits of Appeal to the Tribunal of Gods Justice, where there are no Superiors [Page 2] on earth to determine the Cause. And they are (as Civil Pleas are) Plaints, or Defences. There are therefore three just Grounds of War with Spain: One Plaint, Two upon Defence. Solomon faith, A Cord of three is not easily broken: But especially when every of the lines will hold single by it self. They are these. The Recovery of the Palatinate; A just Fear of the Subversion of our Civil Estate: A just Fear of the Subversion of our Church and Religion. For in the handling of the two last Grounds of War, I shall make it plain; That Wars Preventive upon Just Fears, are true Defensives, as well as upon Actual Invasions: And again, That Wars Defensive for Religion, (I speak not of Rebellion,) are most just; Though Offensive Wars, for Religion, are seldom to be approved, or never, unless they have some Mixture of Civil Titles. But all that I shall say in this whole Argument, will be but like Bottoms of Thred, close wound up, which with a good Needle (perhaps) may be flourished into large Works.
For the Afferting of the Justice of the Quarrel, for the Recovery of the Palatinate, I shall not go so high, as to discuss the Right of the War of Bohemia; Which if it be freed from doubt on our part, then there is no Colour nor Shadow, why the Palatinate should be retained; The Ravishing whereof was a meer Excursion of the first Wrong, and a Super-Injustice. But I do not take my self to be so perfect in the Customs, Transactions, and Priviledges of that Kingdom of Bohemia, as to be fit to handle that part. And I will not offer at that I cannot master. Yet this I will say (in passage) positively, and resolutely: That it is impossible, an Elective Monarchy, should be so free and absolute, as an Hereditary: No more than it is possible for a Father, to have so full Power and Interest, in an Adoptive Son, as in a Natural: Quia Naturalis Obligatio fortior Civili. And again, that Received Maxim is almost Unshaken and Infallible; Nil magis Naturae consentaneum est, quam ut iisdem modis Res dissolvantur, quibus constituuntur. So that, if the part of the People or Estate be somewhat in the Election, you cannot make them Nulls or Cyphers in the Privation or Translation. And if it be said, that this is a dangerous Opinion, for the Pope, Emperour, and Elective Kings: It is true, it is a dangerous Opinion, and ought to be a dangerous Opinion to such personal Popes, Emperors, or Elective Kings, as shall transcend their limits, and become Tyrannical. But it is a safe and sound Opinions for their Sees, Empires, and Kingdoms; And for themselves also, if they be wise: Plenitudo Potestatis, est plenitudo Tempestatis. But the chief Cause, why I do not search into this point, is, because I need it not. And in handling the Right of a War, I am not willing to intermix matter doubtful, with that which is out of doubt. For as in Capital Causes, wherein but one Mans life is in question, in favorem vitae, the Evidence ought to be clear; So much more, in a Judgement upon a War, which is Capital to Thousands. I suppose therefore the worst; That the Offensive War upon Bohemia had been unjust; And then make the Case; Which is no sooner made, than resolved; [Page 3] If it be made, not enwrapped, but plainly and perspicuously. It is this in Thesi. An Offensive War is made, which is unjust in the Aggressour; The Prosecution and Race of the War, carrieth the Defendant, to affail and invade the Ancient and Indubitate Patrimony of the first Aggressour, who is now turned Defendant; Shall he fit down, and not put himself in Defence; Or if he be dispossessed, shall he not make a War for the Recovery? No man is so poor of Judgement, as will affirm it. The Castle of Cadmus was taken, and the City of Thebes it self invested by Ehaebidas the Lace demonian, insidiously, and in violation of League: The Process of this Action drew on a Resurprise of the Castle by the Thebans, a Recovery of the Town, and a Current of the War, even unto the walls of Sparta. I demand, was the Defence of the City of Sparta, and the Expulsion of the Thebans, out of the ancient Laconian Territories, unjust? The sharing of that part of the Duichy of Millain, which lieth upon the River of Adda, by the [...], upon Contract with the French, was an Ambitious and unjust Purchase. This Wheel set on going, did pour a War upon the Venetians with such a Tempest, as Padoua and Trevigi was taken from them, and all their Dominions upon the Continent of Italy abandoned, and they confined within the Salt Waters. Will any man say, that the Memorable Recovery and Defence of Padotia, (when the Gentlemen of Venice, unused to the Wars, out of the love of their Countrey, became Brave and Martial the first day;) And so likewise the Readeption of Trevigi, and the rest of their Dominions, was matter of Scruple, whether just or no, because it had fource from a Quarrel ill begun? The War of the Duke of Vrbin, Nephew to Pope Julius the second, when he made himself Head of the Spanish. Mutineers, was as unjust, as unjust might be; A Support of desperate Rebels, An Invasion of St. Peters Patrimony, and what you will. The Race of this War fell upon the loss of Vrbin it self, which was the Dukes undoubted Right; Yet in this case, no Penitentiary, (though he had enjoyned him never so strait Penance to expiate his first Offence,) would have counselled him to have given over the pursuit of his Right for Vrbin; Which after he prosperously re-obtained, and hath transmitted to his Family yet until this day. Nothing more unjust than the Invasion of the Spanish Armada in 88. upon our Seas; For our Land was holy Land to them, they might not touch it: Shall I say therefore, that the Defence of Lisbon, or Cales, afterward, was unjust?. There be thousands of Examples; Vtor in Re non dubia Exemplis non necessariis: The Reason is plain; Wars are Vindicte; Revenges, Reparations. But Revenges are not infinite, but according to the measure of the first Wrong, or Damage. And therefore, when a voluntary Offensive War, by the Design or Fortune of the War, is turned to a necessary Defensive War, the Scene of the Tragedy is changed, and it is a new Act to begin. For though they the particular actions of War, are complicate in Fact, yet they are separate and distinct in Right; Like to cross Suits in Civil Pleas, which are sometimes both just. But this is so clear, as needeth no further to be insisted upon. And [Page 4] yet, if in things so clear, it were fit to speak of more or less clear, in our present Cause, it is the more clear on our part, because the Possession of Bohemia is setled with the Emperor. For though it be true, that, Non datur Compensatio Injuriarum; yet were there somewhat more Colour to detain the Palatinate, as in the nature of a Recovery, in Value or Compensation, if Bohemia had been lost, or were still the Stage of War. Of this therefore I speak no more. As for the Title of Proscription or Forfeiture, wherein the Emperor (upon the matter) hath been Judge and Party, and hath justiced himself, God forbid but that it should well endure an Appeal to a War. For certainly the Court of Heaven, is as well a Chancery, to save and debar Forfeitures, as a Court of Common Law to decide Rights; And there would be work enough in Germany, Italy, and other Parts, if Imperial Forfeitures should go for good Titles.
Thus much for the first Ground of War with Spain, being in the Nature of a Plaint, for the Recovery of the Palatinate; Omitting here that which might be the Seed of a larger Discourse, and is verified by a number of Examples; That whatsoever is gained by an Abusive Treaty, ought to be restored in Integrum. As we see the daily Experience of this in Civil Pleas; For the Images of great things are best seen contracted into small Glasses; We see (I say) that all Pretorian Courts, if any of the Parties be entertained or laid asleep, under pretence of Arbiterment or Accord, and that the other Party during that time, doth cautelously get the start and advantage at Common Law, though it be to Judgement and Execution; Yet the Pretorian Court will set back all things in statu quo prins, no respect had to such Eviction or Disposition. Lastly, let there be no mistaking; As if when I speak of a War for the Recovery of the Palatinate, I meant, that it must be in lineae rectae, upon that Place: For look into Jus faeciale, and all Examples, and it will be found to be without scruple; That after a Legation ad Res repetendas, and a Refusal, and a Denunciation or Indiction of a War, the War is no more confined to the Place of the Quarrel, but is left at large, and to choice, (as to the particular conducing Designs,) as Opportunities and Advantages shall invite.
To proceed therefore to the second Ground of a War with Spain; We have set it down to be, A just Fear of the subversion of our Civil Estate. So then, the War is not for the Palatinate onely, but for England, Scotland, Ireland, our King, our Prince, our Nation, all that we have. Wherein two things are to be proved. The one, that a Just Fear, (without an Actual Invasion or Offence) is a sufficient Ground of a War, and in the Nature of a true Defensive; The other, that we have towards Spain Cause of Just Fear; I say Just Fear; For as the Civillians do well define, that the Legal Fear is, Justus Metus qui cadit in constantem Virum, in private Causes; So there is, Justus Metus qui cadit in constantem Senatum, in causa publica; Not out of Umbrages, light Jealousies, Apprehensions a far off; But out of clear Foresight of imminent Danger.
Concerning the former Proposition, it is good to hear what time [Page 7] saith. Thucydides, in his Inducement to his Story of the great War of Peloponnesus, sets down in plain Terms, that the true Cause of that War was; The Overgrowing Greatness of the Athenians, and the fear that the Lacedemonians stood in thereby; And doth not doubt to call it, A Necessity imposed upon the Lacedemonians of a War. Which are the Words of a meer Desensive: Adding, that the other Causes were but specious and Popular. Verissimam quidem, sed minime sermone celebratam, arbitror exitisse Belli Causam, Athenienses magnos effectos, & Lacedemoniis formidolosos, [...] illts imposuisse Bellandi: Quae autem propalam [...] utrinque [...], [...] fuerunt, &c. The truest Cause of this War, though least voiced, I conceive to have been this; That the Athenians being grown great, to the terrour of the Lacedemonians, did impose upon them a Necessity of a War: But the Causes that went abroad in speech were these, &c. Sulpitius Galba, Consul, when he perswaded the Romans to a Preventive War, with the latter Philip King of [...], in regard of the great Preparations which Philip had then on foot, and his Designs to ruine some of the Confederates of the Romans, confidently saith; That they who took that for an Offensive War, understood not the state of the Question. Ignorare videmini mihi, (Quirites) non utrum bellum an pacem habeatis, vos consuli, (neque enim liberum id vobis permittet Philippus, qui terra marique ingens bellum molitur,) sedutrum in Macedoniam legiones transportetis, an hostem in Italiam recipiatis. Ye seem to me (ye Romans,) not to understand, that the Consultation before you, is not, whether you shall have War or Peace, (for Philip will take order you shall be no Choosers, who prepareth a mighty War both by Land and Sea;) but whether you shall transport the War into Macedon, or receive it into Italy. Antiochus, when he incited [...] King of [...], (at that time in Leagne with the [...]) to joyn with him in War against them, setteth before him, [...] [...] Fear of the over-spreading Greatness of the Romans, [...] it to a Fire that continually took, and spread from Kingdom to Kingdom: Venire Romanos ad [...] Regna tollenda, ut nullam usquam orbis terrarum nist Romanum imperium esset; Philippum & Nabin expugnatos, se tertium peti; Ut quisque proximus ab oppresso sit, per omnes velut continens incendium pervasurum. That the Romans came to pull down all Kingdoms, and to make the State of Rome an universal Monarchy; That Philip and Nabis were already ruinated, and now was his turn to be assailed: So that as every State lay next to the other that was oppressed, so the Fire perpetually grazed. Wherein it is well to be noted, that towards ambitious States (which are noted to aspire to great Monarchies, and to seek upon all occasions to enlarge their Dominions,) Crescunt Argumenta justi Metus: All particular fears do grow and multiply out of the Contemplation of the general Courses and Practice of such States. Therefore in Deliberations of War against the Turk, it hath been often, with great judgement, maintained; That Christian Princes and States have always a sufficient Ground of Invasive War against the Enemy: Not [Page 6] for Cause of Religion, but upon a Just Fear; For as much as it is a Fundamental Law in the Turkish Empire, that they may (without any other provocation,) make War upon Christendom, for the Propagation of their Law; So that there lieth upon the Christians a perpetual Fear of a War, (hanging over their heads,) from them: And therefore they may at all times, (as they think good) be upon the Prevention. Demosthenes exposeth to scorn Wars which are not Preventive, comparing those that make them, to Countrey Fellows in a Fencing-School, that never ward till the Blow be past: Ut Barbari Pugiles dimicare solent, it a vos bellum geritis cum Philippo, Ex his enim is qui ictus est, ictui semper inhaeret: Quod si cum alibi verberes, illo manus transfort; Idum autem depellere, aut prospicere, neque scit, neque vult. As Country Fellows use to do when they play at Wasters, such a kinde of War do you (Athenians) make with Philip; For with them he that gets a blow, streight falleth to ward when the blow is past, And if you strike him in another place, thither goes his hand likewise: But to put by, or foresee a blow, they neither have the skill, nor the will.
Clinias the Candiaen, (in Plato) speaks desperately and wildly; As if there were no such thing as Peace between Nations; But that every Nation expects but his Advantage to War upon another. But yet in that Excess of Speech, there is thus much that may have a Civil Construction; Namely, that every State ought to stand upon his Guard, and rather prevent, than be prevented. His words are; Quam rem fere vocant Pacem, nudum & inane Nomen est; Revera autem omnibus, adversus omnes Civitates bellum sempiternum perdurat: That which Men, for the most part, call Peace, is but a naked and empty Name; But the truth is, that there is ever between all Estates a secret War. I know well this Speech is the Objection, and not the Decision, and that it is after refuted; But yet (as I said before) it bears thus much of Truth, That if that general Malignity, and Pre-disposition to War, (which he untruly figureth to be in all Nations,) be produced and extended to a just Fear of being oppressed, then it is no more a true Peace, but a Name of a Peace.
As for the Opinion of Iphicrates the Athenian, it demands not so much towards a War, as a just Fear; but rather cometh near the opinion of Clinias; As if there were ever amongst Nations a Brooding of a War, and that there is no sure League but Impuissance to do hurt. For he, in the Treaty of peace with the Lacedemonians, speaketh plain language, Telling them, there could be no true and secure Peace, except the Lacedemonians yielded to those things, which being granted, it would be no longer in their power to hurt the Athenians, though they would. And to say truth, if one mark it well, this was in all Memory, the Main Piece of Wisdom, in strong and prudent Counsels; To be in perpetual watch, that the States about them, should neither by Approach, nor by Encrease of Dominion, nor by Ruining Confederates, nor by Blocking of Trade, nor by any the like means, have it in their power [Page 7] to hurt or annoy the States they serve; And whensoever any such Cause did but appear, straightways to buy it out with a War, and never take up Peace at Credit, and upon Interest. It is so memorable, and it is yet as fresh, as if it were done yesterday, how that Triumvirate of Kings, (Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the First of France, and Charles the Fifth, Emperour, and King of Spain,) were in their times so provident, as scarce a Palme of Ground could bee gotten by either of the Three, but that the other Two would be sure to do their best to set the Ballance of Europe upright again.
And the like diligence was used in the Age before, by that League, (wherewith Guicciardine beginneth his Story, and maketh it (as it were) the Kalendar of the good dayes of Italy,) which was contracted between Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzo of Medici, Potentate of Florence, and Lodovico Zforza Duke of Milan, designed chiefly against the growing Power of the Venetians; But yet so, as the Confederates had a perpetual eye one upon another, that none of them should overtop. To conclude therefore, howsoever some School-men, (otherwise Reverend Men, yet fitter to guide Pen knives than Swords,) seem precisely to stand upon it; That every Offensive War must be Ultio; A Revenge, that presupposeth a precedent Assault or Injury; yet neither do they descend to this Point, (which we now handle) of a Just Fear; Neither are they of Authority to judge this Question against all the Presidents of time. For certainly, as long as Men are Men, (the Sons, as the Poets allude, of Prometheus, and not of Epimetheus,) and as long as Reason is Reason, A Just Fear will be a Just Cause of a Preventive War; But especially, if it be Part of the Case, that there be a Nation that is manifestly detected, to aspire to Monarchy, and new Acquests; Then other States (assuredly) cannot be justly accused for not staying for the first Blow; Or for not accepting Poliphemus Courtesie, to be the last that shall be eaten up.
Nay, I observe further, that in that passage of Plato, which I cited before, (and even in the Tenet of that Person, that beareth the Resolving Part, and not the Objecting Part,) a Just Fear is justified for a Cause of an Invasive War, though the same Fear proceed not from the fault of the Foreign State, to be assailed. For it is there insinuated, That if a State, out of the distemper of their own Body, do fear Sedition and Intestine Troubles to break out amongst themselves, they may discharge their own ill Humours, upon a Foreign War, for a Cure. And this kinde of Cure was tendred by Jasper Coligni Admiral of France, to Charles the Nineth, the French King, when by a vive and forcible Perswasion, he moved him to a War upon Flanders, for the better Extinguishment of the Civil Wars of France; But neither was that Counsel prosperous; Neither will I maintain that Position; For I will never set Politiqu's against Ethicks; Especially for that true Ethicks are but as a Hand-maid to Divinity and Religion. Surely, Saint Thomas, (who had the largest heart of the [Page 8] School Divines, (bendeth chiefly his stile against the depraved Passions, which reign in making Wars, speaking out of St. Augustine; Nocendi Cupiditas, ulciscendi Credulitas, implacaius & implacabilis Animus, Feritas Rebellandi, Libido Dominandi, & si quae sunt similia, haec sunt qu ae in bellis jure culpaniur. And the same St: I hom as in his own Text, defining of the just Causes of a War, doth leave it upon very general Terms; Requirilur ad Billum Cause justa, ut scilicet illi qui impugnaniur, propter al qu im culpam, Impugnationem mereantur; For Impugnatio Culpae, is a far more general word than Vltio Injurae. And thus much for the first Proposition, of the Second Ground of a War with Spain: Namely, that A just Fear is a just Cause of a War; And that A Preventive War is a true Defensive.
The Second, or Minor Proposition was this, That this Kingdom hath Cause of Just Fear of Overthrow from Spain. Wherein it is true, that Fears are ever seen in dimmer lights, than Facts. And on the otherside, Fears use (many times) to be represented in such an Imaginary fashion, as they rather dazle Mens eyes, than open them. And therefore I will speak in that manner which the Subject requires; That is, probably, and moderately, and briefly. Neither will I deduce these Fears to present Occurrences; but point onely at general Grounds, leaving the rest to more secret Counsels.
Is it nothing, that the Crown of Spain hath enlarged the Bounds thereof, within this last sixscore years, much more than the Ottomans? I speak not of Matches, or Unions, but of Arms, Occupations, Invasions. Granada, Naples, Milan, Portugal, the East and West Indies; All these are actual Additions to that Crown. They had a minde to French Britain, the lower Part of Piccardi, and Piemont; but they have let fall their Bit. They have to this day, such a hovering possession of the Valtoline, as an Hobby hath over a Lark; And the Palatinate is in their Tallons: So that nothing is more manifest, than that this Nation of Spain runs a race (still) of Empire, when all other States of Christendom stand in effect at a stay. Look then a little further into the Titles, whereby they have acquired, and do now hold these new Portions of their Crown, and you will finde them of so many varieties, and such natures, (to speak with due respect,) as may appear to be easily minted, and such as can hardly at any time be wanting. And therefore so many new Conquests and Purchases, so many Strokes of the Larum-Bell of Fear, and Awaking, to other Nations, and the Facility of the Titles, which hand over head have served their turn, doth ring the Peal so much the sharper, and the louder.
Shall we descend from their general Disposition, to enlarge their Dominions, to their particular Disposition, and Eye of Appetite, which they have had towards us; They have now twice sought to impatronize themselves of this Kingdom of England; once by Marriage with Queen Mary; And the second by Conquest in 88. when their Forces by Sea and Land, were not inferiour to those they have now. And at that time in 88. the Counsel and Design of Spain, was, by many Advertisements, revealed and laid open to [Page 9] be; That they found the War upon the Low [...], so churlish and longsome, as they grew then to a Resolution; that as long as England stood in state to succour those Countreys, they should but consume themselves in an endless War; And therefore there was no other way, but to assail and depress England, which was as a Back of Steel to the Flemmings. And who can warrant (I pray) that the same Counsel and Design will not return again? So as we are in a strange Dilemma of Danger: For if we suffer the Flemmings to be ruined, they are our Cut-work, and we shall remain Naked and Dismantled: If we succour them strongly, (as is fit) and set them upon their feet, and do not withal weaken Spain, we hazard to change the Scene of the War, and to turn it upon Ireland or England: Like unto Rheums and Destuxions; which, if you apply a strong Repercussive to the Place affected, and do not take away the Cause of the Disease, will shift, and fall straightways to another Joynt, or Place. They have also twice invaded Ireland: Once under the Popes Banner, when they were defeated by the Lord Grey; And after in their own name, when they were defeated by the Lord Mountjoy. So as let this suffice for a Taste of their Disposition towards us. But it will be said: This is an Almanack for the old Year; Since 88. all hath been well, Spain hath not assailed this Kingdom, howsoever by two several Invasions from us migh tily provoked. It is true, but then consider, that immediately after 88. they were embroyled, for a great time, in the Protection of the League of France, whereby they had their hands full; After being brought extream low, by their vast and continual Embracements, they were enforced to be quiet, that they might take breath, and do Reparations upon their former Wastes. But now of late Things seem to come a pace to their former Estate. Nay with far greater Disadvantage to us. For now that they have almost continued, and (as it were) arched their Dominions, from Milan, by the Valtoline, and Palatinate, to the Low Countreys; We see how they thirst and pant after the utter Ruine of those States; Having in contempt almost the German Nation, and doubting little opposition, except it come from England: Whereby either we must suffer the Dutch to be ruined, to our own manifest prejudice; Or put it upon the hazard, I spake of before, that Spain will cast at the fairest. Neither is the point of Internal Danger, which groweth upon us, to be forgotten; This; That the Party of the Papists in England are become more knotted, both in Dependance towards Spain, and amongst themselves, than they have been. Wherein again comes to be remembred the Case of 88. For then also it appeared by divers secret Letters, that the Design of Spain was, (for some years before the Invasion attempted) to prepare a Party in this Kingdom, to adhere to the Foreigner at his coming. And they bragged, that they doubted not, but to abuse and lay asleep the Queen and Council of England, as to have any fear of the Party of Papists here; For that they knew (they said) the State would but cast the eye, and look about, to see whether there were any Eminent Head of that Party, under whom it might unite it self; And finding none worth [Page 10] the thinking on, the State would rest secure, and take no apprehension; Whereas they meant, (they said) to take a course, to deal with the People, and particulars, by Reconcilements, and Confessions, and Secret Promises, and cared not for any Head of Party. And this was the true reason, why after that the Seminaries began to blossom, and to make Missions into England, (which was about the three and twentieth year of Queen Elizabeth, at what time also was the first suspition of the Spanish Invasion) then, and not before, grew the sharp and severe Laws to be made against the Papists. And therefore the Papists may do well, to change their thanks; And whereas they thank Spain for their Favours, to thank them for their Perils and Miseries, if they should fall upon them: For that nothing ever made their Case so ill, as the Doubt of the Greatness of Spain; which adding Reason of State, to Matter of Conscience and Religion, did whet the Laws against them. And this Case also seemeth (in some sort) to return again at this time; except the Clemency of his Majesty, and the State, do superabound: As, for my part, I do wish it should; And that the Proceedings towards them, may rather tend to Security, and Providence, and Point of State, than to Persecution for Religion. But to conclude; These Things briefly touched, may serve, as in a Subject Conjectural, and Future, for to represent, how just Cause of Fear this Kingdom may have towards Spain: Omitting (as I said before) all present, and more secret Occurrences.
The third Ground of a War with Spain, I have set down to be; A Just Fear of the Subversion of our Church and Religion. Which needeth little Speech: For if this War be a Defensive, (as I have proved it to be,) no Man will doubt; That a Defensive War, against a Foreigner for Religion, is lawful. Of an Offensive War there is more Dispute: And yet in that instance of the War for the Holy Land, and Sepulchre, I do wonder sometimes, that the School-Men want words to defend that, which St. Bernard wanted words to commend. But I, that in this little Extract of a Treatise, do omit things necessary, am not to handle things unnecessary. No man, I say, will doubt, but if the Pope, or King of Spain, would demand of us to forsake our Religion, upon pain of a War, it were as unjust a Demand, as the Persians made to the Grecians of Land and Water; Or the Ammonites to the Israelites of their Right Eyes. And we see all the Heathen did stile their Defensive Wars, Pro Aris & Focis; Placing their Altars before their Hearths. So that it is in vain of this to speak further. Onely this is true; That the Fear of the Subversion of our Religion from Spain, is the more just, for that all other Catholick Princes and States, content and contain themselves, to maintain their Religion within their own Dominions, and meddle not with the Subjects of other States; Whereas the Practice of Spain hath been, both in Charles the Fifth's time, and in the time of the League in France, by War; And now with us, by Conditions of Treaty, to intermeddle with Foreign States, and to declare themselves Protectors General, of [Page 11] the Party of Catholicks, through the World. As if the Crown of Spain had a little of this; That they would plant the Popes Laws by Arms, as the Ottomans do the Law of Mahomet. Thus much concerning the first main Point of Justifying the Quarrel; if the King shall enter into a War; For this that I have said, and all that followeth to be said, is but to shew what he may do.
The Second main Part, of that I have propounded to speak of, is the Ballance of Forces between Spain and us. And this also tendeth to no more, but what the King may do. For what he may do, s of two kindes: What he may do as Just; And what he may do as Possible. Of the one I have already spoken; Of the other I am now to speak. I said, Spain was no such Giant; And yet if he were a Giant, it will be, but as it was between David and Goliah; for God is on our side. But to leave all Arguments that are Supernatural, and to speak in an Humane and Politick Sense; I am led to think that Spain is no Over-match for England, by that which leadeth all Men; That is, Experience, and Reason. And with Experience I will begin; For there all Reason beginneth.
Is it Fortune, (shall we think,) that in all Actions of War or Arms, great and small, which have happened these many years, ever since Spain and England have had any thing to debate one with the other, the English, upon all Encounters, have perpetually come off with honour, and the better? It is not fortune sure; She is not so constant. There is somewhat in the Nation, and Natural Courage of the People, or some such thing. I will make a brief List of the Particulars themselves, in an Historical Truth, no ways strowted, nor made greater by Language. This were a fit Speech, (you will say,) for a General, in the Head of an Army, when they wére going to Battel; Yes; And it is no less fit Speech, to be spoken in the Head of a Council, upon a Deliberation of Entrance into a War. Neither speak I this to disparage the Spanish Nation, whom I take to be of the best Soldiers in Europe. But that forteth to our honour, if we still have had the better hand.
In the year 1578. was that famous Lammas Day, which buried the Reputation of Don Ihuan d' Austria, himself not surviving long after. Don Ihuan, being superiour in Forces, assisted by the Prince of Parma, Mondragon, Mansell, and other the best Commanders of Spain, confident of Victory, charged the Army of the States near Rimenant, bravely and furiously at the first; but after a Fight maintained by the space of a whole day, was repulsed and forced to a Retreat, with great slaughter of his men, and the Course of his further Enterprizes was wholly arrested; And this chiefly by the Prowess and Vertue of the English and Scottish Troops, under the Conduct of Sir John Norris, and Sir Robert Stuart, Colonels. Which Troops came to the Army but the day before, harrased with a long and wearisom march; and (as it is left for a Memorable Circumstance in all Stories,) the Sculdiers, being more sensible of a little Heat of the Sun, than any cold [Page 10] Fear of Death, cast away their Armour and Garments from them, and fought in their Shirts: And, as it was generally conceived, had it not been that the Count of Bossu was slack in charging the Spaniards, upon their Retreat, this Fight had sorted to an absolute Defeat. But it was enough to chastise Don Ihuan, for his insidious Treaty of Peace, wherewith he had abused the States at his first coming. And the Fortune of the day, (besides the Testimony of all Stories), may be the better ascribed to the Service of the English and Scottish, by comparison of this Charge near Rimenant, (where the English and Scottish, in great numbers came in action,) with the like Charge given by Don Ihuan, half a year before at Glembours, where the Success was contrary; There being at that time in the Army, but a Handful of English and Scottish, and they put in disarray by the Horsemen, of their own Fellows.
The first Dart of War which was thrown from Spain, or Rome, upon the Realm of Ireland, was in the year 1380. For the Design of Stukeley blew over into Africk; And the Attempt of Sanders, and Fitz Maurice, had a spice of Madness. In that year, Ireland was invaded by [...] and Italian Forces, under the Popes Banner, and the Conduct of St. Josepho, to the number of seven hundred, or better, which landed at Smerwick in Kerey. A poor number it was, to conquer Ireland to the [...] use; For their Design was no less: But withal they brought Arms for five thousand men above their own Company, intending to arm so many of the Rebels of Ireland: And their purpose was to fortifie in some strong Place of the wilde and desolate Countrey, and there to nestle till greater Succours came; They being hastened unto this Enterprise, upon a special Reason of State, not proper to the Enterprise it self; Which was, by the Invasion of Ireland, and the noise thereof, to trouble the Council of England, and to make a diversion of certain Aids that then were preparing from hence for the Low-Countreys. They chose a place, where they erected a Fort, which they called The Fort del Or; And from thence they bolted like Beasts of the Forest, sometimes into the Woods and Fastnesses, and sometimes back again to their Den. Soon after Siege was laid to the Fort, by the Lord Gray, then Deputy, with a smaller number than those were within the Fort; Venturously indeed; But haste was made to attache them before the Rebels came in to them. After the siege of four days oneiy, and two or three Sallies, with loss on their part, they that should have made good the Fort for some moneths, till new Succours came from Spain, or at least from the Rebels of Ireland, yielded up themselves without Conditions, at the end of those four days. And for that there were not in the English Army enough to keep every man a Prisoner; And for that also the Deputy expected instantly to be assailed by the Rebels; And again, there were no Barques to throw them into, and send them away by Sea, they were all put to the sword; With which Queen Elizabeth was afterwards much displeased.
In the year [...]. was that Memorable Retreat of Gaunt; Than the which there hath not been an Exploit of War more celebrated. [Page 13] For in the true judgement of Men of War, Honourable Retreats are no ways inferior to brave Charges; As having less of Fortune, more of Discipline, and as much of Valour. There were to the number of three hundred Horse, and as many thousand Foot English, (Commanded by Sir John Norris,) charged by the Prince of Parma, coming upon them with seven thousand Horse; Besides that, the whole Army of Spaniards was ready to march on. Nevertheless Sir John Norris maintained a Retreat without Disarray, by the space of some miles, (part of the way Champagne) unto the City of Gaunt, with less loss of Men than the Enemy: The Duke of Anjou, and the Prince of Aurange, beholding this noble Action from the Walls of Gaunt, as in a Theatre, with great Admiration.
In the year 1585. followed the Prosperous Expedition of Drake, and Carlile, into the West-Indies. In the which, I set aside the Taking of St. Jago, and St. Domingo in Hispaniola, as Surprizes, rather than Encounters. But that of Cartagena, where the Spaniards had warning of our coming, and had put themselves in their full strength, was one of the hottest Services, and most dangerous Assaults, that hath been known. For the Access to the Town, was onely by a Neck of Land, between the Sea on the one part, and the Harbour Water, or Inner Sea, on the other; Fortified clean over with a strong Rampier and Barracado; So as upon the Ascent of our Men, they had both great Ordnance and small Shot, that thundred and showred upon them, from the Rampier in front, and from the Galleys that lay at Sea in flank. And yet they forced the Passage, and wan the Town, being likewise very well manned. As for the Expedition of Sir Francis Drake, in the year 1587. for the destroying of the Spanish Shipping, and Provision upon their own Coast; As I cannot say, that there intervened in that Enterprize, any sharp Fight or Encounter; So nevertheless, it did strangely discover, either that Spain is very weak at home, or very slow to move; When they suffered a small Fleet of English to make an hostile Invasion, or Incursion, upon their Havens and Roads, from Cadez to Capa Sacra, and thence to Cascais; And to fire, sink, and carry away, at the least, ten thousand Tun of their great Shipping, besides fifty or sixty of their smaller Vessels: And that in the sight, and under the favour of their Forts; And almost under the Eye of their great Admiral, (the best Commander of Spain by Sea,) the Marquis De Sancta Cruz, without ever being disputed with by any fight of importance. I remember Drake, in the vaunting stile of a Souldier, would call this Enterprize, The Cingeing of the King of Spains Beard.
The Enterprize of Eighty Eight deserveth to be stood upon a little more fully, being a Miracle of Time. There armed from Spain in the year 1588. the greatest Navy that ever swam upon the Sea. For though there have been far greater Fleets for number, yet for the Bulk and Building of the Ships, with the Furniture of great Ordnance and Provisions, never the like. The Design was to make, not an Invasion onely, but an utter Conquest of this Kingdom. The number of Vessels were one hundred and [Page 14] thirty, whereof Galliasses and Gallions seventy two, goodly Ships like floating Towers, or Castles, manned with Thirty thousand Souldiers and Mariners. This Navy was the Preparation of five whole years at the least. It bare it self also upon Divine Assistance; For it received special Blessing from Pope Zistus, and was assigned as an Apostolical Mission, for the Reducement of this Kingdom to the obedience of the See of Rome. And in further token of this holy Warfare, there were amongst the rest of these Ships, Twelve, called by the name of the Twelve Apostles. But it was truely conceived, that this Kingdom of England could never be over-whelmed, except the Land-Waters came in to the Sea-Tides. Therefore was there also in readiness, in Flanders, a mighty strong Army of Land-Forces, to the number of Fifty thousand veterane Souldiers, under the Conduct of the Duke of Parma, the best Commander, next the French King Henry the Fourth, of his time. These were designed to joyn with the Forces at Sea; There being prepared a number of Flat-bottom'd Boats, to transport the Land Forces, under the Wing and Protection of the Great Navy. For they made no account, but that the Navy should be absolute Master of the Seas. Against these Forces, there were prepared, on our part, to the number of near one hundred Ships; Not so great of Bulk indeed, but of a more nimble Motion, and more serviceable; Besides a less Fleet of 30 Ships, for the Custody of the Narrow Seas. There were also in readiness at Land, two Armies, besides other Forces, to the number of Ten thousand, dispersed amongst the Coast Towns, in the Southern Parts. The two Armies were appointed; One of them consisting of Twenty five thousand Horse and Foot, for the Repulsing of the Enemy, at their landing; And the other of Twenty five thousand for safeguard and attendance about the Court, and the Queens Person. There were also other Dormant Musters of Souldiers, throughout all Parts of the Realm, that were put in readiness, but not drawn together. The two Armies were assigned to the Leading of two Generals, Noble Persons, but both of them rather Courtiers, and Assured to the State, than Martial Men; yet lined and assisted with Subordinate Commanders, of great Experience & Valor. The Fortune of the War made this Enterprize, at first, a Play at Base. The Spanish Navy set forth out of the Groyne in May, was disperst and driven back by Weather. Our Navy set forth somewhat later out of Plimouth, and bare up towards the Coast of Spain, to have fought with the Spanish Navy; And partly by reason of contrary Winds, partly upon advertisement that the Spaniards were gone back, and upon some doubt also that they might pass towards the Coast of England, whilest we were seeking them afar off, returned likewise into Plimouth, about the middle of July. At that time, came more confident Advertisement, (though false,) not onely to the Lord Admiral, but to the Court, that the Spaniards could not possibly come forward that year; Whereupon our Navy was upon the point of Disbanding, and many of our Men gone ashore. At which very time, the Invincible Armada, (for so it was [Page 15] called in a Spanish Ostentation throughout Europe) was discovered upon the Western Coast. It was a kinde of Surprize; For that (as was said) many of our men were gone to Land, and our Ships ready to depart. Nevertheless the Admiral, with such Ships only as could suddenly be put in readiness, made forth towards them: In so much as of one hundred Ships, there came scarce thirty to work. Howbeit with them, and such as came dayly in, we set upon them, and gave them the chase. But the Spaniards, for want of Courage, (which they called Commission) declined the Fight, casting themselves continually into Roundels, (their strongest Ships walling in the rest,) and in that manner they made a flying march towards Callis. Our Men, by the space of five or six days, followed them close, fought with them continually, made great slaughter of their Men, took two of their great Ships, and gave divers others of their Ships their Deaths wounds, whereof soon after they sank and perished; And (in a word) distressed them almost in the nature of a Defeat; We our selves, in the mean time, receiving little or no hurt. Near Callis the Spaniards anchored, expecting their Land-Forces, which came not. It was afterwards alledged, that the Duke of Parma did artificially delay his Coming. But this was but an Invention and Pretension given out by the Spaniards; Partly upon a Spanish Envy against that Duke, being an Italian, and his Son a Competitor to Portugal; But chiefly, to save the Monstrous Scorn and Disreputation, which they and their Nation received, by the Success of that Enterprize. Therefore their Colours and Excuses (forsooth) were, that their General by Sea had a limitted Commission, not to fight until the Land-Forces were come in to them: And that the Duke of Parma had particular Reaches, and Ends of his own, underhand, to cross the Design. But it was both a strange Commission, and a strange Obedience to a Commission, for Men in the midst of their own blood, and being so furiously assailed, to hold their hands, contrary to the Laws of Nature and Necessity. And as for the Duke of Parma, he was reasonably well tempted to be true to that Enterprize, by no less Promise, than to be made a Feudatary, or Beneficiary King of England, under the Seignorie (in chief) of the Pope, and the Protection of the King of Spain. Besides it appeared, that the Duke of Parma held his place long after, in the Favour and Trust of the King of Spain, by the great Employments and Services that he performed in France: And again, it is manifest, that the Duke did his best to come down, and to put to Sea: The Truth was, that the Spanish Navy, upon those proofs of Fight which they had with the English, finding how much hurt they received, and how little hurt they did, by reason of the Activity and low building of our Ships, and skill of our Sea-men; And being also commanded by a General of small Courage and Experience; And having lost, at the first, two of their bravest Commanders at Sea, Petro de Valdez, and Michael de Oquenda; durst not put it to a Battel at Sea, but set up their rest wholly upon the Land-Enterprize. On the other side, the Transporting of the Land-forces failed in the very foundation. For [Page 16] whereas the Council of Spain made full account, that their Navy should be Master of the Sea, and therefore able to guard and protect the Vessels of Transportation; When it fell out to the contrary, that the Great Navy was distressed, and had enough to do to save it self; And again, that the Hollanders impounded their Land-forces with a brave Fleet of thirty Sayl, excellently well appointed; Things (I say) being in this state, it came to pass, that the Duke of Parma must have flown, if he would have come into England, for he could get neither Barqne nor Mariner to put to Sea: Yet certain it is, that the Duke looked still for the coming back of the Armada, even at that time, when they were wandring, and making their Perambulation upon the Northern Seas. But to return to the Armada, which we left anchored at Callis. From thence, (as Sir Walter Rawleigh was wont prettily to say) they were suddenly driven away with Squibs; For it was no more but a Stratagem of Fire-boats, Manless, and sent upon them by the favour of the Wind, in the night time, that did put them in such terrour, as they cut their Cables, and left their Anchors at Sea. After they hovered some two or three days about Graveling, and there again were beaten in a great Fight, at what time our second Fleet, which kept the Narrow Seas, was come in and joy ned to our main Fleet. Thereupon the Spaniards entring into further terrour, and sinding also divers of their Ships every day to sink, lost all courage, and in stead of coming up into the Thames Mouth for London, (as their Design was) fled on towards the North, to seek their Fortunes; Being still chaced by the English Navy at the heels, until we were fain to give them over for want of Powder. The Breath of Scotland the Spaniards could not endure; Neither durst they as Invaders land in Ireland; But onely ennobled some of the Coasts thereof with shipwracks. And so going North wards aloof, as long as they had any doubt of being pursued, at last when they were out of reach, they turned, and crossed the Ocean to Spain, having lost fourscore of their Ships, and the greater part of their Men. And this was the End of that Sea-Giant, the Invincible Armada. Which having not so much as fired a Cottage of ours at Land, nor taken a Cock-boat of ours at Sea, wandred through the Wilderness of the Northern Seas; And according to the Curse in the Scripture; Came out against us one way, and fled before us seven ways. Serving onely to make good the judgement of an Astrologer, long before given; Octuagesimus Octavus Mirabilis Annus; Or rather, to make good, (even to the astonishment of all Posterity) the wonderful Judgements of God poured down, commonly, upon vast and proud Aspirings.
In the year, that followed, of 1589. we gave the Spaniards no breath, but turned Challengers, and invaded the Main of Spain. In which Enterprize, although we failed in our End, which was to settle Don Antonio in the Kingdom of Portugal, yet a man shall hardly meet with an Action, that doth better reveal the great Secret of the Power of Spain: Which Power, well sought into, will be found rather to consist in a Veterane Army, (such as upon several Occasions [Page 17] and Pretensions, they have ever had on foot, in one part or other of Christendom, now the space of (almost) sixscore years,) than in the strength of their Dominions and Provinces. For what can be more strange, or more to the Dis-valuation of the Power of the Spaniard upon the Continent, than that with an Army of Eleven thousand English, Land-Souldiers, and a Fleet of Twenty six Ships of War, besides some weak Vessels for Transportation, we should within the Hour-glass of two Moneths have won one Town of importance by Escalada; Battered and Assaulted another; Overthrown great Forces in the Field, and that upon the disadvantage of a Bridge strongly barracado'd, Landed the Army in three several places of his Kingdom; Marched seven days in the Heart of his Countreys; Lodged three nights in the Suburbs of his principal City; Beaten his Forces into the Gates thereof; Possessed two of his Frentire Forts; And come off, after all this, with small loss of Men, otherwise than by Sickness. And it was verily thought, that had it not been for four great Disfavours of that Voyage; (That is to say; The failing in sundry Provisions that were promised, especially of Cannons for Battery; The vain Hopes of Don Antomo concerning the People of the Countrey, to come in to his aid; The Disappointment of the Fleet that was directed to come up the River of Lisbon; And lastly, the Diseases which spred in the Army, by reason of the Heat of the Season, and of the Souldiers Misrule in Diet;) the Enterprize had succeeded, and Lisbon had been carried. But howsoever, it makes proof to the World, that an Invasion of a few English upon Spain, may have just hope of Victory, at least of Pasport to depart safely.
In the year 1591. was that Memorable Fight, of an English Ship called The Revenge, under the Command of Sir Richard Greenvil; Memorable (I say) even beyond credit, and to the Height of some Herorcal Fable. And though it were a Defeat, yet it exceeded a Victory; being like the Act of Sampson, that killed more Men at his Death, than he had done in the time of all his Life. This Ship for the space of fifteen hours, sate like a Stag amongst Hounds, at the bay, and was seiged, and fought with, in turn, by fifteen great Ships of Spain; part of a Navy of Fifty five Ships in all; The rest like Abettors looking on afar off. And amongst the fifteen Ships that fought, the great St. Philippo was one, a Ship of fifteen hundred Tun; Prince of the twelve Sea Apostles, which was right glad, when she was shifted off from the Revenge. This brave Ship the Revenge, being Manned onely with two hundred (Souldiers and Mariners,) whereof eighty lay sick, yet nevertheless after a Fight maintained (as was said) of fifteen hours, and two Ships of the Enemy sunk by her side; Besides many more torn and battered, and great slaughter of men, never came to be entred, but was taken by Composition; The Enemies themselves having in admiration the Vertue of the Commander, and the whole Tragedy of that Ship.
In the year 1596. was the Second Invasion, that we made upon the Main Territories of Spain, prosperously atchiev'd by that Worthy and Famous, Robert Earl of Essex, in consort with the Noble [Page 18] Earl of Notingham, that now liveth, then Admiral. This Journey was like Lightning; For in the space of fourteen hours, the King of Spains Navy was destroyed, and the Town of Cadez taken. The Navy was no less than fifty tall Ships, besides twenty Gallies to attend them. The Ships were straightways beaten, and put to flight. with such terrour, a the Spainards, in the end, were their own Executioners, and fired them all with their own hands. The Gallies, by the benefit of the Shores and Shallows, got away. The Town was a fair, strong, well built, and rich City; Famous in Antiquity, and now most spoken of for this Disaster. It was mann'd with 4000 Soldiers Foot, and some 400 Horse; It was sacked, and burned, though great Clemency was used towards the Inhabitants. But that which is no less strange than the sudden Victory, is the great patience of the Spaniards; Who, though we staid upon the place divers days, yet never offered us any play then, nor ever put us in suit, by any Action of Revenge, or Reparation, at any time after.
In the year 1600, was the Battel of Newport in the Low Countries, where the Armies of the Arch-Duke, and the States, tried it out by a just Battell. This was the only Battell, that was fought in those Countries, these many years. For Battels in the French Wars have been frequent; But in the Wars of Flanders, rare, as the Nature of a Defensive requireth. The Forces of both Armies were not much unequal: That of the States exceeded somewhat in number; but that again was recompensed in the quality of the Souldiers; For those of the Spanish Part were of the Flower of all the Forces. The Arch Duke was the Assailant, and the Preventer, and had the fruit of his Diligence and Celerity. For he had charged certain Companies of Scottishmen, to the number of eight hundred, sent to make good a Passage, and thereby severed from the Body of the Army, and cut them all in pieces: For they like a brave Infantry, when they could make no honorable Retreat, and would take no dishonorable Flight, made good the place with their Lives. This Enterance of the Battel did whet the Courage of the Spaniards, though it dulled their Swords; so as they came proudly on, confident to defeat the whole Army. The Encounter of the Main Battel, which followed, was a just Encounter, not hastening to a sudden Rout, nor the Fortune of the day resting upon a few former Ranks, but fought out to the proof by several Squadrons, and not without variety of success; Stat pedi pes, densusque viro vir. There fell out an Errour in the Dutch Army, by the over-hasty Medly of some of their Men, with the Enemies, which hindred the playing of their great Ordnance. But the End was, that the Spaniards were utterly defeated, and near five thousand of their Men, in the Fight, and in the Execution, slain, and taken; Amongst whom were many of the principal Persons of their Army. The Honour of the Day was, both by the Enemy, and the Dutch themselves, ascribed unto the English; Of whom Sir Francis Vere, in a private Commentary, which he wrote of that Service, leaveth testified; That of fifteen hundred in number, (for they were no more) eight hundred were slain in the field; And (which is almost incredible in a day of Victory,) of the remaining [Page 19] seven hundred, two onely Men came off unhurt. Amongst the rest Sir Francis Vere himself had the principal honour of the Service, unto whom the Prince of Aurange (as is said) did transmit the Direction of the Army for that day. And in the next place, Sir Horace Vere his Brother, that now liveth, who was the principal in the Active part. The Service also, of Sir Edward Cecill, Sir Iohn Ogle, and divers other brave Gentlemen, was eminent.
In the year 1601. followed the Battel of Kinsale in Ireland. By this Spanish Invasion of Ireland, (which was in September that year) a Man may guess, how long time a Spaniard will live in Irish ground; which is a matter of a quarter of a year, or four moneths at most. For they had all the Advantages in the world; And no man would have thought, (considering the small Forces imployed against them) that they could have been driven out so soon. They obtained, without resistance, in the end of September, the Town of Kinsale; A small Garison of 150 English, leaving the Town upon the Spaniards approach, and the Townsmen receiving the Foreiners as friends. The number of Spaniards that put themselves into Kinsale, was 2000 men, Soldiers of old Bands, under the command of Don Ihuan d'Aquila, a man of good valour. The Town was strong of it self; neither wanted there any Industry to fortifie it on all parts, and make it tenable, according to the Skill and Discipline of Spanish Fortification. At that time the Rebels were proud, being encouraged upon former Successes; For though the then Deputy, the Lord Mountjoy, and Sir George Carew, President of Munster, had performed divers good Services to their prejudice; Yet the Defeat they had given the English at Blackwater, not long before; And their Treaty (too muth to their honor) with the Earl of Essex, was yet fresh in their memory. The Deputy lost no time, but made haste to have recovered the Town, before new Succors came, and sate down before it in October, and laid siege to it by the space of three Winter Months, or more: During which time, Sallies were made by the Spaniard, but they were beaten in with loss. In January came fresh Succors from Spain, to the number of 2000. more, under the Conduct of Alonzo d'Ocampo. Upon the Comforts of these Succors, Tirone and Odonnel, drew up their Forces together, to the number of 7000. besides the Spanish Regiments, and took the field, resolved to rescue the Town, and give the English Battel. So here was the Case: An Army of English, of some 6000, wasted and tired with a long Winters Siege, engaged in the middest between an Army of a greater number than themselves, fresh and in vigor, on the one side; and a Town strong in fortification, and strong in Men, on the other. But what was the Event? Thus in few words; That after the Irish and Spanish Forces had come on, and shewed themselves in some Bravery, they were content to give the English the honor, as to charge them first; And when it came to the Charge, there appeared no other difference between the Valour of the Irish Rebels, and the Spaniards, but that the one ran away before they were charged, and the other straight after. And again, the Spaniards that were in the Town, had so good Memories of their Losses, in their former Sallies, as the Confidence of an Army, which came for their [Page 20] deliverance, could not draw them forth again. To conclude, there succeeded an absolute Victory for the English, with the slaughter of above 2000 of the Enemy; The taking of nine Ensigns, whereof six Spanish; the taking of the Spanish General, D'Ocampo, Prisoner; And this with the loss of so few of the English, as is scarce credible; Being (as hath been rather confidently, than credibly reported) but of one Man, the Cornet of Sir Richard Gream, though not a few hurt. There followed immediate y after the Defeat, a present yielding up of the Town by Composition; And not onely so, but an Avoiding (by express Articles of Treaty accorded) of all other Spanish Forces thorowout all Ireland, from the Plaees and Nests where they had setled themselves, in greater strength (as in regard of the natural Situation of the Places) than that was of Kinsale: Which were, Castle haven, Baltimore, and Beere-haven. Indeed they went away with sound of Trumpet; For they did nothing but publish and trumpet all the Reproaches they could devise against the Irish Land and Nation; Insomuch as D'Aquila said in open Treaty; That when the Devil, upon the Mount, did shew Christ all the Kingdoms of the Earth, and the Glory of them, he did not doubt, [...] the devil left out Ireland, and kept it for himself.
I cease here, omitting not a few other proofs of the English Valor and Fortune. in their later times: As at the Suburbs of Paris, at the Raveline, at Druse in Normandy, some Encounters in Britanny, and at Ostend, and divers others; Partly because some of them have not been proper Encounters between the Spaniards and the English, and partly because others of them have not been of that greatness, as to have sorted in company with the Particulars formerly recited. It is true, that amongst all the late Adventures, the Voyage of Sir Francis Drake, and Sir John Hawkins, into the West-Indies, was unfortunate; Yet in such sort, as it doth not break or interrupt our Prescription; To have had the better of the Spaniards upon all Fights of late. For the Disaster of that Journey was caused chiefly by sickness; As might well appear by the Deaths of both the Generals, (Sir Francis Drake, and Sir John Hawkins) of the same sickness amongst the rest. The Land-Enterprise of Panama, was an ill measured and immature Counsel; for it was grounded upon a false account, that the Passages towards Panama were no better fortified, than Drake had left them. But yet, it sorted not to any Fight of importance, but to a Retreat, after the English had proved the strength of their first Fort, and had notice of the two other Forts beyond, by which they were to have marched. It is true, that in the Return of the English Fleet, they were set upon by Avellaneda, Admiral of 20 great great ships Spanish, our Fleet being but 14, full of sick men, deprived of their two Generals at Sea, and having no pretence but to journey homewards: And yet the Spaniards did but salute them about the Cape de los Corientes, with some small offer of Fight, and came off with loss; Although it was such a new thing for the Spaniards to receive so little hurt up on dealing with the English, as Avellaneda made great brags of it, for no greater matter, than the waiting upon the English a far off, from Cape de los Corientes to Cape Antonio; Which nevertheless, in the Language of a Souldier, and of a Spaniard, he called a Chace.
But before I proceed further, it is good to meet with an Objection, which if it be not removed, the Conclusion of Experience, from the time past, to the time present, will not be sound and perfect. For it will be said, that in the former times (whereof we have spoken) Spain was not so mighty as now it is; And England on the other side, was more afore-hand in all matters of Power. Therefore let us compare with indifferency, these Disparities of times, and we shall plainly perceive, that they make for the advantage of England at this present time. And because we will less wander in Generalities, we will fix the Comparison to precise Times; Comparing the State of Spain and England in the year 88. with this present year that now runneth. In handling of this Point, I will not meddle with any Personal Comparisons, of the Princes, Councellors, and Commanders by Sea or Land, that were then, and that are now, in both Kingdoms, Spain and England; but onely rest upon Real Points, for the true Ballancing of the State, of the Forces, and Affairs of both Times. And yet these Personal Comparisons I omit not, but that I could evidently shew, that even in these Personal Respects, the Ballance sways on our part: But because I would say nothing that may favour of a spirit of Flattery, or Censure, of the present Government.
First therefore, it is certain, that Spain hath not now a foot of Ground in quiet possession, more than it had in 88. As for the Valtoline, and the Palatinate, it is a Maxim in State, that all Countreys of new Acquest, till they be setled, are rather matters of Burthen, than Strength. On the other side, England hath Scotland united, & Ireland reduc'd to obedience, and planted, which are mighty augmentations.
Secondly, in 88. the Kingdom of France, able alone to counterpoize Spain it self, (much more in conjunction) was torn with the Party of the League, which gave Law to their King, and depended wholly upon Spain. Now France is united under a valiant young King, generally obeyed, if he will himself; King of Navarre as well as of France; And that is no ways taken Prisoner, though he be tyed in a double chain of Alliance, with Spain.
Thirdly, in 88. there sate in the See of Rome, a fierce thundering Fryer, that would set all at six and seven; Or at six and five, if you allude to his Name. And though he would after have turned his teeth upon Spain, yet he was taken order with before it came to that. Now there is ascended to the Papacy, a Personage that came in by a chaste Election, no ways obliged to the Party of the Spaniards; A man bred in Embassages and Affairs of State; That hath much of the Prince, and nothing of the Fryer; And one, that though he love the Chair of the Papacy well, yet he loveth the Carpet above the Chair; That is, Italy, and the Liberties thereof, well likewise.
Fourthly, in 88. the King of Denmark was a stranger to England, and rather inclined to Spain; Now the King is incorporated to the Blood of England, & Engaged in the Quarrel of the Palatinate. Then also Venice, Savoy, and the Princes and Cities of Germany, had but a dull Fear of the Greatness of Spain, upon a general Apprehension onely of the spreading and ambitious Designs of that Nation: Now that fear is sharpned and pointed, by the Spaniards late Enterprises, upon the [Page 22] Valtoline, and the Palatinate, which come nearer them.
Fiftly and lastly, the Dutch (which is the Spaniards perpetual Duellist) hath now, at this present, five Ships to one, and the like Proportion in Treasure and Wealth, to that they had in 88. Neither is it possible (whatsoever is given out) that the Coffers of Spain should now be fuller, than they were in 88. For at that time Spain had no other Wars save those of the Low Countreys, which were grown into an Ordinary: Now they have had coupled therewith, the Extraordinary of the Valtoline, and the Palatinate. And so I conclude my Answer to the Objection raised, touching the Difference of times; Not entring into more secret passages of State; But keeping that Character of Stile, whereof Seneca speaketh, Plus significat quam loquitur.
Here I would pass over from Matter of Experience, were it not that I held it necessary, to discover a wonderful Erroneous observation that walketh about, and is commonly received, contrary to all the Account of Time, and Experience. It is, that the Spaniard, where he once getteth in, will seldom (or never) be got out again. But nothing is less true than this. Not long since they got footing at Brest, and some other parts in French Britain, and after quitted them. They had Calais, Ardes, and Amiens, and rendred them, or were beaten out. They had since Verseilles, & fairly left it. They had the other day the Valtoline, and now have put it in deposite. What they will do with Ormus, which the Persian hath taken from them, we shall see. So that to speak truly of later Times, they have rather poched and offered at a Number of Enterprizes, than maintained any constantly, quite contrary to that idle Tradition. In more antient times (leaving their Purchases in Africk, which they after abandoned,) when their great Emperor Charles had clasped Germany, (almost) in his fist, he was forced in the end, to go from Isburg, (and as if it had been in a Masque, by Torch-light,) and to quit every foot in Germany round that he had gotten; which I doubt not, will be the Hereditary Issue of this late Purchase of the Palatinate. And so I conclude the Ground, that I have to think, that Spain will be no Over-match to Great Britain, if his Majesty shal enter into a War, out of Experience, & Records of time.
For Grounds of Reason they are many: I will extract the principal, and open them briefly, and (as it were) in the Bud. For Situation, I pass it over; though it be no small point: England, Scotland, Ireland, and our good Confederates the United Provinces, lie all in a plump together, not accessible but by Sea, or at least by passing of great Rivers, which are Natural Fortifications. As for the Dominions of Spain, they are so scattered, as it yieldeth great choice of the Scenes of the War, and promiseth slow Succours unto such Part as shall be attempted. There be three main parts of Military Puissance; Men, Money, and Confederates. For Men, there are to be considered, Valour, and Number. Of Valour I speak not: Take it from the Witnesses that have been produced before: Yet the old observation is not untrue; That the Spaniards Valour lieth in the Eye of the Looker on; But the English Valor lieth about the Souldiers Heart. A Valor of Glory, and a Valor of Natural Courage, are two things. But let that pass, and let us speak of Number. Spain is a Nation thin sown of People; Partly [Page 23] by reason of the Sterility of the Soil; And partly because their Natives are exhausted by so many Employments, in such vast Territories as they possess. So that it hath bin accounted a kind of Miracle, to see ten or twelve thousand Native Spaniards in an Army. And it is certain, (as we have touched it a little before in passage) that the Secret of the Power of Spain, consisteth in a Veterane Army, compounded of Miscellany Forces of all Nations, which for many years they have had on foot upon one occasion or other: And if there should happen the Misfortune of a Battel, it would be a long work to draw on Supplies. They tell a Tale of a Spanish Ambassador, that was brought to see the Treasury of St. Mark at Venice, and still he lookt down to the ground; And being asked why he so lookt down, said; He was looking to see whether their Treasure had any Root, (so that if it were spent, it would grow again) as his Masters had. But howsoever it be of their Treasure, certainly the Forces have scarce any Root; Or at least such a Root, as buddeth forth poorly & slowly. It is true, they have the Wallons, who are tall Souldiers; but that is but a Spot of Ground. But on the other side, there is not in the world again, such a Spring and Seminary of brave Militar People, as in England, Scotland, Ireland, and the United Provinces. So as if Wars should mowe them down never so fast, yet they may be suddenly supplyed, and come up again.
For Money, no doubt it is the principal Part of the Greatness of Spain; For by that they maintain a Veterane Army; And Spain is the onely State of Europe, that is a Money grower. But in this Part, of all others, is most to be considered, the tick lish and brittle State of the Greatness of Spain. Their Greatness consisteth in their Treasure; their Treasure in their Indies; And their Indies (if it be well weighed) are indeed but an Accession to such, as are Masters by Sea. So as this Axeltree whereupon their Greatness turneth, is soon cut in two, by any that shall be stronger than they by Sea. Herein therefore I refer me to the Opinions of all Men (Enemies, or whomsoever) whether that the Maritime Forces of Great Britain, and the United Provinces, be not able to beat the Spainard at Sea. For if that be so, the Links of that Chain whereby they hold their Greatness, are dissolved. Now if it be said, that admit the Case of Spain be such, as we have made it, yet we ought to descend into our own Case, which we shall finde (perhaps) not to be in State, (for Treasure) to enter into a War with Spain. To which I answer; I know no such thing; The Mint beateth well; And the Pulses of the Peoples Hearts beat well. But there is another Point that taketh away quite this Objection: For whereas Wars are generally Causes of Poverty, or Consumption; on the contrary part, the special Nature of this War with Spain, (if it be made by Sea) is like to be a Lucrative and Restorative War. So that, if we go roundly on at the first, the War in continuance will find it self. And therefore you must make a great difference between Hercules Labors by Land, and Jasons Voyage by Sea for the Golden Fleece.
For Confederates, I will not take upon me the knowledge, how the Princes, States, and Councels of Europe, at this day, stand affected towards Spain; For that trencheth into the secret Occurents of the [Page 24] present Time, wherewith in all this Treatise I have forborn to meddle. But to speak of that which lieth open and in view: I see much Matter of Quarrel and Jealousie, but little of Amity and Trust towards Spain, almost in all other Estates. I see France is in competition with them, for three noble Portions of their Monarchy; Navarre, Naples, and Millain; And now freshly in difference with them about the Valtoline. I see once in 30 or 40 years cometh a Pope, that casteth his eye upon the Kingdom of Naples, to recover it to the Church: As it was in the minds of Julius 2. Paulus 4. and Zistus 5. As for that great Body of Germany, I see they have greater reason to confederate themselves with the Kings of France, and Great Britain, or Denmark, for the liberty of the Germane Nation, and for the Expulsion of Spanish and foreign Forces, than they had in the years 1552. and 1553. At which time they contracted a League with Henry II. the French King, upon the same Articles, against Charles V. who had impatronized himself of a great part of Germany, through the discord of the German Princes, which himself had so wen and fomented, Which League at that time did the Deed, and drave out all the Spaniards out of that part of Germany; and re-integrated that Nation in their antient Liberty and Honor. For the West Indies, though Spain hath had yet not much actual disturbance there, except it have been from England; yet nevertheless I see all Princes lay a kind of claim unto them; accounting the Title of Spain, but as a Monopoly of those large Countreys, wherein they have, in great part but an Imaginary Possession. For Africk upon the West, the Moors of Valentia expulsed, and their Allies, do yet hang as a Cloud or Storm over Spain. Gabor on the East, is like an Anniversary Wind, that riseth every year upon the Party of Austria. And Persia hath entred into Hostolity with Spain, and given them the first blow by taking of Ormus. It is within every mans observation also, that Venice doth think their State almost on fire, if the Spaniards hold the Valtoline. That Savoy hath learnt by fresh experience, That Alliance with Spain is no Security against the Ambition of Spain; And that of Bavaria hath likewise bin taught, that Merit and Service doth oblige the Spaniard but from day to day. Neither do I say, for all this, but that Spain may rectifie much of this ill blood, by their particular and cunning Negotiations: But yet there it is in the Body, and may break out, no man knows when, into ill Accidents: but at least it sheweth plainly that which serveth for our purpose; That Spain is much destitute of Assur'd and Confident Confederates. And therefore I will conclude this Part, with the Speech of a Councellor of State, in Spain, at this day, which was not without Salt. He said to his Master, the King of Spain, that now is, upon occasion: Sir, I will tell your Majesty thus much for your comfort; Tour Majesty hath but two Enemies; whereof the one is, All the World; And the other is, Tour own Ministers. And thus I end the Second Main Part, I propounded to speak of; which was, The Ballancing of the Forces, between the Kings Majesty, and the King of Spain, if a War must follow.