THE Art of Logick; OR, THE ENTIRE BODY OF LOGICK In ENGLISH. UNFOLDING To the meanest Capacity the Way to dispute well, and to refute all Fallacies whatsoever.

The Second Edition, corrected and amended.

By Zachary Coke of Grays-Inn, Gent.

Jam. 1. 17.

[...].

Multi multa canunt admiranda, haud sat credenda.

Cato Lib. 3. Distich. 17.

LONDON, Printed for John Streater, and are to be sold by the Book-sellers of London. 1657.

TO THE ILLUSTRIOUS, His Excellency Oliver Cromvvel, GENERALISSIMO OF England, Scotland, and Ireland, Chancel­lour of Oxford, &c. AND TO The most Renowned his Generall Councell of Officers.

SIRS,

THe Commodement of the Publike in the Appendages of an holy Peace, as it is the [...], and just Carac of Heroick En­terprizings; so haerentes capiti multâ cum laude Coronae, the Crown and Apex of their Glories, whom God shall honour to contribute thereunto, though but a Grain or Atome.

Whereof (my Lords) by the conduct of Pro­vidence, [Page] and Advantage of your incompara­ble Magnanimities, after long Exagitations and Repugnance of Affairs, we have gotten more then a (glad) glimse, and by your unwearied Zeals may shortly obtain the ful Prospect and Fruition. Doubtlesse Sir, there is a Standard of Reforming all things. Nor is any Model so gratefull to good men, as whose footsteps appear in the Word of God; wherein there is no Peccadillo; To which you do well to take heed, as unto a most exact and perfect Rule.

And because, to Tranquillity of Government, Corruption of Manners, and Mazing Errors are grandly opposite (these delude and distract, that doth deboish a people,) It will be your Prudence, Sirs, who sit at Helm, steering affairs of the first Magnitude, to debel and overrun the one, as it may be any ones part (who to common Weal oweth both himself and his Devoire) to abandon in his capacity the other, as Fatal thereunto; Which humble Attempt, my Lords, here Implo­ [...]eth both your Resentment and Patronage.

The smattering (Sciolus) Soul of Lapsed man, in its most vigorous contendings unto Beatitude by its own Acies, cannot now (as in its estate of Native Innocence) with the Eagle behold the refulgence of Sunny Truths; Soaring in the high­est Region of Contemplations, Penetrating the Arcana, and Essences of things; But through the flagginesse of her Pinion, flutters Estrich like, in grosse and earthy Idaeas; Forming sensual and faint conceptions, and in its survey, often taking shewes and shaddows for substances, gets the the minde great of Distemperature, and the State of Insecurity.

[Page]But this Iargon, my Lords, or rather System of Logico-Theologie, as it will medicine the dis­ease, so it will purge out the humour and serve (with Heavens concurrence) as the Clew of A­riadne, to guide the intricate and perplexed thoughts of the unfixed people through the great Labyrinth of Time, and involvednesse of affairs to a point of consistency; and as a Jacobs staff o [...] Astralabe, to help them in taking the dimensions and full heights of things, by an infallible Rule of certitude.

And since knowledge is the excellency of man (seeing he abhorrs more to be accounted ignorant then vicious) surely the excellentest part of him (needs) must be that wherein this perfection in­thrones, which being no other then intellect a­bove Inferior Powers, challengeth the preroga­tive of Ayds and Organs: Of which kinde Lo­gick (in our Native Tongue, as most rare, so) is the greated and most proper, which frameth and teacheth the use of Instruments accommodable to every operation of the understanding in its distinct and deliberate Quests of Truth.

This quality in man is the true Philophers stone it turneth all that his minde toucheth into Gold and Treasure of satisfaction. It is Janitrix Scien­tiarum; the Tutelary and Guardian of all, both Morall and Intellectual Habit: On the raisen wings of whose perfections, the prone and Rep­tile Soul soars a pitch, Circuiting all the stately Provinces and Dominions of knowledge.

This is that which by (Grace) recovers us to our Primogenial condition, unclouds the masqued mide, plows up, and useals the depths of Reason, [Page] Evolves the hidden Idaeas of things, and unites the knottinesse of every emergency.

By it are confuse things made Distinct; Ab­stru [...]e, Obvious: And the Planetick thoughts to act Syncentrick, and in its Sphere. This also rang­eth the Pel-mel Conceptions to Battlia and Or­der; It unforks Oracles, making them Toothlesse, turneth into Milk bony Paradoxes, and Cloudy AEnigma's to clear Sunshine.

Ignorance, Sirs, benights the Soul, or rather Eclipseth it: By interposingit makes a man go all his way groping as he were blind: It is the Rack of ingenious and generous Spirits; who will oft rather drown then not dive beyond it; Nor did they ever finde a better way to chase or conquer it, then by Logicall Adjuments; The faithfull Organ to scent the footsteps of Truth (amidst the various Abolets of Error) in the Indagation and Researches after knowledge.

It is a Zealous (but frivolous) Mistake of (the [...]) some that would be thought Christians in these times; That Learning aversates, & Logick leadeth from the Grace and Truths of God: As if the Donations of Heaven were opposed, subor­dinated in mans tendency to Blisse and Glory; Can that be erroneous or bad, that teacheth what things be, or what be not, right and good? Such prove but the opinion of those men, who affirm the World groweth old, in their beginnings thus to dote and talk idly; Can there be contrariety in means that conspire one common end, mans perfection and happinesse? Gods gifts may serve, not shut out one another. Wherein Transcended us the first and second Adam and Solomon too, as [Page] to the Complement of their Natures, but in Lo­gick and Philosophick endowments? The Con­naturall Imposition of Names, at first to things; That Herbal of Herbals, swallowed of Time; And the famous disputes with the Sanhe­drin-doctors, and Saducean Families, abundant­ly argue the advantages of acquired Habits; Nor can the manner of their having them, diversie the Nature of them.

By this time then it transpares, That, as Na­ture needs Grace, so Grace desireth Nature: and Art both Grace & Nature. Nature without Grace cannot do well; Grace without Nature cannot do at all: But Grace in Conjunction with nature and art, can do all things, as the great Apostle and Master of Learning affirmeth of himself; and as Symilus saith, Without Art Nature cannot be perfect, and without Nature Art can claim no be­ing, [...].

Now seeing this is the key of the Sciences, the study whereof is not more pleasing then profi­table, and quisque cupit se beare: Why should it longer lie covert and concealed from the commu­nity? Is not Communication the excellency and measure of Good? Bonum est sui diffusivum; Doth not the Glorious and Superessentiall Being of beings ( [...] delight himself in scattering beams, and filling every thing with the Expandings and Circumfusi­ons of his goodnesse? And why should the lesser Beauties of Knowledge, and Arts be vailed with, and confined to Forraign Languages (to the most, Barbarous and unknown) since science is no mans property?

[Page]I do not derogate Sirs from the Universities, which I know are the Seminaries and Founts of Learning and Liberall Acquisitions. Rich streams have, do, and may hereafter flow from thence, to Indent the Land with (Rivulets of) Refreshing Blessings: Yet beleeve I not, they should still (as formerly) have the Monopoly of Letters to in­haunce them as by Patent, above the price of the meanest capacity (if willing) to purchase them.

There cannot be a greater Prop (next that of quenching the heavenly Tapers of the Word) to the black Monarchy of the Prince of Darknesse, than the Engrossments and Enclosure of the Sci­ences (which this layes open.) What were the Hieroglyphicks, and Imagery Resemblances of Egypt, and Ancient Greece, but to captive the People under blindnesse of mind, whilst some few obtained Titles of Magi, Daemones, and So­phoi; The Guerdon of their most injurious ser­vices.

But this Book, my Lords, as it designeth the Disempa [...]ing of the Sciences, unlocking to the People the Mysteries of them: So Heaven (no doubt) may follow it with a Correspondence of blessing, and breaking up the Caverns and Cells of raigning ignorance, may enamour the People with the Attractive Beauty of them, and clearly inform them (omitting matters of faith) what is payable to the Magistrate, and practicable each to other. The want whereof agitates their lighter minds, scorched with flashing Zeal (unduly tem­pered and set on fire) to pinch the Magistrate of their duty, whilst they know it not perfectly, and Ravelling the bond of love in the unity of the [Page] Spirit; for minute differences, uncharitably in­vade one another, contending as for their Fires and Altars.

And seeing Religion is the Pallisado, or rather the Palladium of Republikes, and knowledge the Cement of Religion; For that blesseth a people, this blasteth errour and drowns their breaches of Harmony; It importeth you Sirs whom God hath honoured with the chief Conduct of affairs, to promove both (which struck together, make a Diapason) since not-rare experience hath proved, where they have rung out for one, they have be­gun to toll for the other.

Indeed my Lords, you drive couragiously, you have almost doubled the Cape of Bon Speranze; Reformation and a happy peace will not longer ride at dead Anchor. These Mountains now re­moved, who were so long in travell of a Mouse of Reformation; We have hopes to receive (by your hands, as by some good Angels) the first born of our blood, establishment of Religion and liberty, which lately was like to have miscarried in the birth.

Sirs, God hath set you up the Oracles of War, made you to your Enemies Rocks, dashing them as Waves of the Sea; Your Drums▪ like Zizca's, conquering with Alarms, the clashing of your Armour terrible as thunder, your Victories al­way as sure as the Rancontre; Every Field to bear you new Palms, immense structures to be crow­ded with Ensigns and Trophies of your admira­ble Successes: But these my Lords, are but Me­teors adding Blaze, little of true Brightnesse: They have an Umbrage of Grandeur, not a spark [Page] or Dram of Glory; The Enamel of these Gay­eti [...]s and Gauds, Sully and soon grow Dusky. It is your Zeals to the Interest of Heavens affairs. and the good of Community, that will be the Heralds to blazon your Escutcheons without stain, and Aggrandize your names to all Poste­rity.

And when the Ardour of Christian Charity in its sweetest Vigor, and the light of knowledge (by Providence. and your powerfull influences) shall flame, & as a flood break in upon us, and our youthful liberty open into a flower, then shal we grow rich with the increases of God, and the World venerate each of you, [...]; As a little Deity guesting in a body of flesh.

Or what is it to have the airy titles of a great Alexander, a victorious Caesar, a politick Hani­bal, a valiant Serpio? What Fate attended these Philomathies? Some of them liv'd the Idols of the age, and mounting upon the pinacles of State (elevated on the wings of their ambitions) were most ingloriously dasht & precipic'd; whilst others like descending spokes of Fortunes wheel, beheld the solemnities of their Honors funerals: Nor could the Monuments of these Whirligigs serve Muniments to their expiring glories.

Greatnesse without goodnesse is a slippery height: The possessor in endeavouring to stand. accerseth his fall: But who builds on the Rock of ages, shall grow still and Bourgeon, his leaves shall refresh and shade the afflicted of the People; his dayes shall be many and good, his walks shall be on an Helix, still dilating.

[Page]And since God hath made you thus Great, may he also make you gratefull; he hath given you the Conquest of affairs, to give him the Conquest of your selves and wills. Be the shadow and Echo, or rather Heliotropes shutting and opening to his good pleasure: Then having perfected Deliver­ance for this Nation (whose expectations you are) your greatnesse shall be complemented with goodnesse, and your aspirements with Glory.

But that I build not too spatious Gates to my Mynda, or throw the Fabrick out at the Case­ments, I only add, that your Lordships fixing this Land to a happy Temperament of Justice, and Equity, advancing Letters, and reforming all things to the standard of the Word, will render England the Worlds Eutopia, the most Felicitous of Nations, and having absolved your courses thorow the Zodiac of praise-worthy actions, you will set laden with Lustre, and satisfying soul­peace: Treasures of an higher Carac than the worlds Magnalia; And the prayers of the Saints ascending with you, will Petarr your enterances thorow Heavens Portcullis; while you scale the Battlements of Glory to perfect your Triumphs, and with Seraphic Hierarchies chaunt Eternal Trisagions in ravishing Division; and every Co­lon and Column of your lives, quartered with the memory of your Atchievments, cause your Names (Rivalling with time) to survive on Earth, perfumed as Incense, and Odorous as a pile of Spices.

—Magnum hoc ego duco,
Quod placeat tibi, qui turpi secernis honestum.
Your Excellencies, Your Honours, and the Common-wealths most faithfull servant. Zach. Coke.

TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

GOd hath made you an Ingenious and curious People, may he also make you wise unto Salvation. Not one of you (I presume) but would know much, and dispute well: This Book will serve you in both your ends. It will lead you through the plainnesse and depths of knowledges, both natu­rall and Divine, which as yet perhaps seem Mysterious to you, and impenetrable; make it but your own, and you have conquered the difficul­ties of all the Sciences; Truths that before de­luge'd you, will take you now but up to the An­cles.

Though it be a little one, it may live to do you much good: and like the Bee of Myrmecides, hath not the lesse Labour and Artifice. It is not [Page] the Enchanted Egg of Oromazes, instead of universall happinesse, stuffed onely with winde and Vapor, or as the numerous Tomes of the Times, Cui quidlibet scribendi est Cacoethes; which serve but to beat down the price of waste­paper, and to make the world sit straight about you; but securing always the Interests of truth, It will teach you to dispute and form a right Judgement of any thing, to discern golden Veri­ties from glaring and guilded; and to assure your faith against the strongest Sconces of error, to Raze or batter it.

It will not lead you out of the right way (as some blind guides) but help you to reduce those that are strayed: From it, as from a spirituall Artillery, you may deprome all weapons of reason, to guard, not affront the truths of God (which not seldom suffer in mens hands.) But as the end of war is a calm and good peace, so Harmony and agreemement of spirit, is the Mark, or rather Center of disputings: for Fencing is but fooling in the Faith.

Look then into it, go over it, and you will quickly see the use and Advantage of it: Judge it not by the Frontispiece no more then you would the Riches of the Indian Mines, by the barren and Raggy surface of the Earth, or the Treasure of a Lapidaries store by the presentment at his Window: Yet when you have read it, and (per­chance) [Page] dispute whether it doth more please or profit you, know that as a passion to the common good both▪ conceived and brought it forth, so I have obtained, if growing up with the peace of the Nation, it shall beget any thing of Amity and Unity among the Saints: That Paul being nothing, and Cephas nothing, The God of Truth and Love may be All in all.

Z. C.

The Art of Logick.

THe prime perfection and pleasure in this lifeGenerall rules to be foreknown of Logick. (second to that supernaturall one, Faith in Christ blessed for ever, and Sanctification through the Spirit) consists in mans conver­sing according to understanding and Reason: i. e. to understand, know and judge distinctly of things as they are in their Natures.

To the attainment of such a knowledge, three things are necessary.

1 The object or thing to be known, viz. Every thing in Nature.

2 A naturall faculty or power of understanding, which floweth from a reasonable Soul, and is innate to every man.

3 A certain disposition whereby this power is ordinate­ly and regularly, that is in order, and without errour, led into Act. Now this is either,

1 Immediate, and by infusion of God, which is extra­ordinary and rare, and in these Ages of the Church promi­sed to no person in particular.

2 Or it is acquired, and gotten by information and dis­cipline, which is frequent and ordinary.

Now the disciplines disposing a mans understanding to the knowledge of things, are either.

  • 1 Objective.
  • 2 Directive.

[Page 2]1 Objective disciplines be such as handle things whichObjective disciplines. are in Nature as Objects of our understanding, which are principally four.

  • 1 Theologie.
  • 2 Jurisprudence.
  • 3 Medicine.
  • 4 Philosophy.

1 Divinity, called by the Greeks Theologie, which is the knowledge of God, and things Supernaturall, as they are Supernaturall, &c.

2 Jurisprudence, or Law, which takes in beside the special Laws of God and Nature, the Canon, Civil Laws, the Law of Nations, our Laws Common, Statute and Municipall, &c.

3 Medicine or Physick, both the Speculative and Pra­ctique.

4 Philosophy, which comprehends Metaphysicks, which considereth things as they are such, &c Also Physiques, or naturall Science; next of all Mathematicks, which contains Arithmetick, Geometry, Astronomy▪ Musick, Opticks, and last of all Ethicks, or Morals, containing Occonomicks and Politicks, under which again (beside History) is comprized Strategicks, called Martiall Discipline.

Directive Disciplines be such as handle not the thingsDirective discipline. themselves to be known, nor do they inform or perfect the understanding of man in those things, but they prepare only some operation of man, and with framed Rules and Instru­ments do guide and direct it.

Now the operations of man requiring and needing such artificial Rules, are chiefly two. The first is the under­standingObserve. All faculties have two things in them, Matter, and Form, or somewhat not unlike; the Matter, Precepts; the Form, the order of the Precepts. The Matter every faculty hath of it self, as of its own nature. The Form is by Lo­gick administred. or cogitation of things. The second the sig­nification either by word or writing of those cogitations (as for the Disciplines Di­rective of the signification of mens thoughts, as Grammer, Rethorick, Poetry, they are beside our purpose to treate here) and that which thus directs the understanding or co­gitations, [Page 3] is Logick only: to the consideration whereof, IThe AEqui­vocation of the word Logick. mean the Homonomy and AEquivocation of the Word of Term, we now come.

This word Logick

Hath divers significations: For first is meant by it the1 Naturall Logick. power or faculty of the understanding and reasoning, which is innate, and floweth from mans Essence or Nature.

2 It may be taken for a frame or constitution of Logical precepts, by this or that man written, called a systeme; which frame may be also taken for an Art, by a Metonomy of the Cause for the Effect, accepting Art not for an habit ingenerated in the mind by precepts and use, but for a col­lection of universal precepts, to operate in a determinate la­titude and limit of End.

3 It may be accepted for a certain part of this whole frame or constitution, namely that which is of a Syllogism Contingent or Commune.

4 It may signifie an Act or Habit, begotten by precepts and use in the mind of the Artist; as when we say Peter is a good Logician: and this is the most proper signification of the word Logick, according to which we define it: So therefore

Logick is an Art of ordering and directing of mans The thoughts of mans mind is nothing else but his reason or understanding wholly oc­cupate about things. under­standingThe first Definiti­on of Lo­gick. The second. in the knowledge things: Or secondly,

Logick is an Art that teach­eth how to think and judge distinctly of all things.

In this Definition are contained,

  • 1 The Genus.
  • 2 The Object.
  • 3 The End.

The Genus of Logick is an Art; for Genus The five principall Habits of Aristotle. It cannot be Wis­dom which teacheth and treateth of the highest causes and things.

2 Its not Understanding which containeth and consist­eth of the habit of principles.

[Page 6]3 Nor is it Science, which is made up only of such thingsReasons drawn from the properties. as are real and universal.

4 Nor can it be Prudence, which teacheth things that are particular to be done and practised. It remains therefore that it be an Art: For,

First it imitates and perfecteth Nature.Reasons why Logick is an Art.

2 It presupposeth a certain end whereunto it directeth all the means.

3 It is to be known, not for its own, but for the sake of some other; the profit thereof being in use, not speculation.

4 It adviseth nothing of the means, it consults not whe­ther to use these or those means to obtain the end, for that they all are predetermined, and in a certain disposition or­dinated to their end.

5 It operates without any contrariety, or repugnancy of the appetite and affections, as not engaging or disengaging them.

6 It is not commendable for the intent or purpose, but for the thing done, the work it self.

7 It is not to be dispraised when it errs of set purpose and industry (for it could have done otherwise) but when it errs of ignorance and unwillingly.

8 It is delivered by an Analytical and Resolutive me­thod, proceeding from the object and end foreknown, unto the means which are to be ordinated.

Ergo, Logick is an Art.

Of the Object of Logick.

2 Object of Logick.

The object of Logick is two-fold.

  • 1 That which it direct­eth.
    Also the primary object of Logick is Reason, the seconda­ry, Speech, the manifestation and utterance of Reason.
  • 2 That whereto the un­derstanding is direct­ed.

1 The object which Logick directeth, is the Understand­ing, Reason, Mind or thought of man: wherein two things are to be foreknown.

  • 1 The properties of the understanding.
  • 2 The parts and degrees thereof.

[Page 5]1 The properties of the understanding to the preknowledg9 Proper­perties of the under­standing. of Logical precepts necessary, are 1 That those perceived of sense, be first and best known of the understanding; letBy sin there are three defecti­ons in mans Reason. 1 Aberration from the ap­prebending of things.2 Obscurity and difficulty, either not being able to compre­hend the natures of things, or to discern them with their notes and properties, as in a glasse.3 Distraction and confu­sion in the apprehension of them. Logick now hath a medicine to cure these, which it doth, 1 By the explanation of things.2 By the Probation.3 By Ordination. the understanding deduce thence its original know­ledge. 2 That since the de­fection of our first parents in Paradise, our understanding cannot faithfully and cer­tainly determine to compre­hend the natures of things with distinctnesse and order, and by its own acies and strength to discern the truth, unlesse by artificiall and out­ward rules, directed and go­verned, unto which the un­derstanding looks, as the Mariner to the Compasse; In which respect and sense, it is in worse case than the sense [...], which have conserved themselves sound & entire since the first apostacie, of their own force and vigour being still able to determine themselves faithfully to know their own ob­jects. 3 That the understanding of it self, is rather carried to the cogitation of things universal (and such objects as are not determined either by will, place, time, &c. circum­stances) then unto determinate things and singular, the ef­fects and products of sense. 4 That the understanding acts not in a moment, but successively, in time, and by order. 5 It understands not the same independently, and of it self, but goeth from one thing to another; and hence it is that the distinct knowledge of God is paramount the reach of the understanding, there being nothing in God diverse from God, or what is not God himself: in man there are many things more obvious to knowledge than man himself, but in God there's no such thing, who is conceivable only (& that but most imperfectly) by himself. 6 That at one and the same time it is occupied about, and understandeth but one thing. 7 That the object must be proportionate to it self, and finite; it cannot understand God who is infinite. 8. That [Page 6] it may assent certainly to conclusions proved, even Testimo­ny (if authentique) yet so as no distinct knowledge can be be­gotten in the understanding, except there be a mean from the nature of the Predicate or Subject; for that to know, is by the Cause. 9 That the instruments of its operation need be pure and composed, should be spirits void of affectuous humours, as Anger, Fear, Malice, Revenge, &c.

Degrees are three,

1 The first degree of the understanding is simple, viz. 2 The De­grees of the under­standing. the apprehension of a single Term or Theme, as Peter, Paul, a living Creature.

2 Is the conception of two Terms by way of compositi­on, as when we think, A man is a living Creature: or, A man is a reasonable Creature.

3 Is when in order we think of more than two Terms passing the thought from one to the other, till you come to a third. This is discourse.

Discourse now is two-fold. [...].

  • Illative.
  • Ordinative.

Illative is such a moving of our Thoughts, as when by the repeating the co-ordination of things, that is, the third Term with the two former, we judge the co-ordination of these two Terms to be true or false: This discourse is that which is called Syllogistical.

2 Ordinative is a moving of our thoughts from one part of the doctrine to another, that so we may judge how they consist and hang together. This discourse is called Methodical.

The Object to which the understanding is directed and ordered, is every thing in Nature; for the understanding and comprehending of which in our thoughts, the Under­standing needeth and seeketh rules of Logick.

1 Of this object there is a three-fold partition of things.Things to be known, threefold. 1 Some are infinite, as God, and hereunto the serv'ce of Logical Instruments is not sufficient for the eliciting of a perfect conception or knowledge: Others are finite, and create; and of them some be spiritual and imperceptible by sense, and with much ado can the understanding conceive [Page 7] them: Some also be corporall, and to know them and their instruments, Logical instruments chiefly serve.

2 Things in nature are considerable two wayes. 1 Inde­terminately without respect or restraint to Term, Place, or other circumstances, as a Man. 2 Determinately unto cir­cumstances, as Peter Paul, &c. About the first (as about things universal) are Logical instruments and directions pri­marily and principally used About the latter (as about singular) they are used but secondarily.

3 Things are considered absolutely and in themselves, and so are called simple beings, or entia, or things, as a Man. Sometime as co-ordinate, and one with another, as a Man, a living creature: now they are called compounded. About the first, the first part of Logick is used; about the latter, the second and third parts.

The proper end of Logick, is, the ordering and directing3 End of Logick. of mans cogitations (or the acts of mans understanding) in the knowledge of things; this is the true and proper end ofMark, other Disciplines do not so much direct the mind (Phy­sicks, Mathematicks) as teach and minister the knowledge of things; whereas Logick of it self is but [...]. Logick. 1 Because every es­sential end must be equall to its thing ended, (nor streigh­ter nor larger) because the end constituteth the essence. 2 Every end must be one, for the unity of an Art depends of the unity of the end; as the unity of knowledge depends of the unity of the subject. 3 An End in Arts not conjecturall, such is Logick, must be put when the means are put; and these three Criteria, or rules, exactly do agree in the direction of the under­standing: and hitherto having minded the nature and es­sence of Logick, lets now consider the properties and effects that followeth the essence.

Properties of Logick.

1 No discipline more helpeth the wit, or contemplativeProper ac­dents, and the effects of Logick. [...] sharpness, i. e. the inclination of the temperature to con­template distinctly and accurately. 2 Unto the wit belongs, 1, The judgement, or judging faculty, i. e. a disposition soundly to think and perceive whats true, and whats false in 2 things. 2 A facility of learning. 3 Discipline. 4 A witty 3 faculty quickly to find out the mean to prove the truth, and 4 [Page 8] refute the falshood, all which Logick helpeth, ordereth, di­recteth.

3 Logick is the directory of the thoughts, making them regular, that whatsoever is conceiveable of a thing, may be drawn to a right sum, for an orderly processe in them, and to avoid confusion.

4 When a man hath soundly and well thought on a thing, it enableth him exactly and in order to reach and write it.

5 It causeth a man well to learn that which is well taught.

6 It giveth a reflexive knowledge to a man, that is, it makes a man not onely know (directly) but makes him know that he knoweth a thing.

7 It enableth a man to resolve what is compositively handled by others.

8 It much avails and profits to conference and collati­ons, whether occasional or other.

9 By it, is a man enabled to an apt and regular placing and acquiring of intellectuall vertues, as on which depends the disposition and order of all disciplines, as to their frames and constitution.

10 It is the rule of those habits a man hath acquired, instructing him to work aright; yet I mean but the rules of ingenious and intellectuall operations.

11 In respect of man (that is to learn) it is the rule of all other disciplines whatsoever, but especially for Divinity. I say not, it is essentiall to the simple knowledge of things substantiall to salvation (for this may be by infusion from heaven, without any humane artifice) but I mean, the ordi­nary way of erudition and skill to handle places in Theolo­gie, depends on Logick.

Now unto Logick (as unto every habit) are required three things, (as it were efficient causes of it) Nature, Method, Exercise.

1. [...] or Nature, that is, a naturall faculty, which con­sists1 Nature required unto Lo­gick, as the (as it were) effi­cient cause. of the humours, disposition and temperament of the bo­dy, whereby a man is inclinable to this, more then to that Discipline.

2 Method ( [...] in the Greek) is a Collection and frame of all Logicall precepts, needful to the acquisition or getting the habit of the Art.

[Page 9]About this frame two things are considerable.

  • 1 Invention. m
  • 2 Conformation. n

The principal Inventor of this Art (as of all other) is them Spirit of God, viz. the holy Ghost; then, men his Instru­ments in all Ages.

Now the Causes motive of men to invent this Art, were 1 The defect of mans nature, who out of a perception [...] that the thoughts of men could not wel determinate them­selves to the understanding of things without the help of second thoughts, were forced to frame and devise such, and they call them Logicall notions. a

2 [...]: Admiration of natural effects, arising out of abstruseness of the Causes, causing grief to ingenuous spirits (for, wonder speaks ignorance) by which they were ir­ritated to a serious enquiry after the Causes, which without Logical determinations was not feasable.

3 A puritation and itch after knowledge (innate to eve­ry man) Now he that desireth an end, adviseth of, and de­sireth the means conducent thereunto, and such in speciall is Logick.

The means men used at first (I mean since the Fall) for [...]. the expoliting and adorning of the Art of Logick, is, first, Outward Sense, principally those of Seeing and Hearing. 2 [...], Observation; and this ever presupposeth For no­thing comes into the un­derstanding but that was some manner of way first in the sense. remem­brance, which is nothing but a reflexion upon something formerly taken notice of. 3 [...], Experience, that is, the collection of many Observations and Examples, and re­taining them in memory. 3 [...], Induction (the third [...], that is, effect of the understanding, is invention) which from the judgement of the senses, and experience of observations, formeth in the understanding a common and universal notion, which as it were is a rule by which the knowledge and vertue of working are directed in the ope­ration to come.

In the Conformation of this whole Logical Constituti­on,n two things are very observable.

  • 1 The Formal. q
  • 2 The Material.

1 The formal, &c. consists, 1 In the determinate di­stribution of the parts. a 2 In the co-ordination of theq parts so determined, unto the end of the whole: b

[Page 10]1 In the distribution of the parts, these [...], or rulesa are observeable. 1 Every good distribution should be made with words fit and significative unto the minde, of the parts of the whole distributible, but not of any thing not therein contained. 2 Division should be of the whole, not of the parts of the whole. 3 If it be a good division, the parts (divi­ded) will be equal to the whole, and neither more nor less. 4 It should consist of such parts onely as are in the whole, retaining the same order, and agreeing with it. 5 In a good partition there should be a disjunction & segregation of the parts one from another, neither presupposing or in­cluding one the other. 6 And this disjunction of parts must be such a disjoyner which mensurates the whole, and where­by the whole is constituted. 7 A division should distinguish the whole, not confound or perplex it. 8 The parts (inte­gral) should be amongst themselves of the same order and nature with the whole, that the whole might the better measure them. 9 Lastly, A good division should be com­modious, and apt to notificate the whole.

The second (as it were) efficient cause of Logick, is Me­thod,2 Method requisite to Logick. the division whereof (or the generall way to learn it) is into three parts.

1 The first is of the generall precepts to be foreknown (which precepts are as the Porch of a building) as of the sig­nification of the word or name, the acception of it▪ the genus, or generall title of it, the end, the object, and the parts.

2 Is the Method or frame of the precepts constitutive ofThree parts of Logick precepts. 1 Directrix [...],2 Directrix [...]3 Directrix [...] the Art; these are the chief rooms of the house.

3 The Exemplar or pattern of this Art of Logick to be used and practised, which servs as the Postick and hinder part of this Edifice.

Again, the second of these is tripartite, or admits of a three­fold division. The first is, which shews the cogitation to co-ordinate two terms one toward another. The second and third, which direct the discoursive cogitations▪ when they are first Illative, & go by way of inference and consequence; Or 2 When they are ordinative, methodicall, and by con­clusion, as is premonstrate; And so much as to the determi­nate distribution of the parts.

2 Now come we to the Co-ordination of the parts, con­cerningb which, note these [...], or Rules. 1 That every constitution or frame, is a mean to some determinate & cer­tain [Page 11] end, therefore it ought to be proportioned and ordered to this end, with a certain proportion, adornment and me­thod, and adapted to the happy acquisition thereof. 2 What­soever is in the end or use, must be put into the constitution and frame, not more or lesse. 3 Let no precept go into the frame, that maketh not for the end or use. 4 The use should easily and plainly be understood by the precepts, it being a thing unfit that the instrument should be more hardly un­derstood than the use of it. 5 That we may attain without precepts, there should be no precepts delivered of the same. And thus much of the Formall, of the frame of Logick, now come we to the Material.

2 The Material then of the frame of Logick, consists inThe Mate­rial of the frame of Logick. that wherein the partition and conformation before hand­led is, and it is two-fold.

  • 1 Primary.
  • 2 Representative and Secondary.

The primary Material also is two-fold.

  • Simple. a
  • Compound. b

1 The simple material, be the Logical terms, [...]. wordsa made to represent the sense of the cogitations, so that the understanding is as it were limited and confined within it self in cogitating and thinking; they are called Second No­tions.

The first Notions are the conceptions we have of things, as they are things.

Now these second Notions do not directly and by them­selves shadow out unto us the things themselves, nor any thing accidental or appendant unto them, but point unto certain intellectual Rules, whereby we do with all distinct­nesse and regularity form things, that is, the conceits of things: As the Sailors Compasse doth not give direction to the Mariners by subjecting to the sight the very winds them­selves really, but the North-wind, South-wind, &c. as they may be specificated, or the Regions wherein they range. Those that primarily imposed names, intended to name first the things themselves, & then secondly they added second Notions, which we call Mental and Logical: As the word Man, is to expresse primarily the conceit which we form of Humane Nature, and is as the image thereof, and immedi­ately founded therein; for mans nature is the immediate ob­ject, [Page 12] and this is a word of the first intention; but when we say, a man is a Species, or a Genus, or Difference, &c. these are words of the second intention, not desumed immediately from the thing, which is humane nature, but from the man­ner of understanding, whereby we understand such Terms to agree unto Peter, John, and every man.

2 The compound Materiall be the precepts in Logick,b framed of and from those Notions of second [...]ntention, ex­plicitely & plainly exhibiting to our minds and understand­ings, those things which the second Notions themselves do but implicitely and darkly; these therefore are necessary un­to the learning of this Art of Logick, and ought to be form­ed according to these subsequent Rules.

1 The precepts of Logick should be made regularly and [...] For the constitu­ting of Lo­gical pre­cepts. fully to obtain the End. 2 Both as to the words of them and number, they should be conceived and set down determi­nately. 3 They should be Homogeneal, that is, of the same kinde, mensurated and adapted only to this Art and End. 4 They should be framed plain and with perspicuity. 5 They should be apposite and fit to the teaching and lear­ning of this Art.

And so much for the primary Material of Logick.The secon­dary Mate­rial of Do­gick. [...] Of the se­condary Material.

The secondary Material, or representative, are Examples added to the Precepts, which is only a particular experiment of this or that precept, either upon our selves or others; wherein are observable these following Rules.

1 Examples ought to be agreeable and fitting to the na­ture and end of the Art, deducing carefully the experiments from those had arrived unto the end of the Art, and that accordingly operated 2 Examples, as accommodate to the precepts, so they should be very intelligible, fit to be made use of, and proportionate to the truth and verity of the pre­cepts. And thus much of the first and second efficient causes, by which the habit of Logick is acquirable (viz.) the Na­ture, and Method. We come briefly to the third Efficient, which is, Exercise of Logick.

The Exercise then of Logick consisteth in this, that we fre­quently3 Efficient cause of Logick. think on, & diligently meditate things conformable to the prescriptions and rules of Logick, that is, orderly and distinctly: This indeed is the chief, most principal, and the nearest Efficient Cause of this habit in us of this Art of Lo­gick, and immediately engenerates and expresseth Logick [Page 13] in us, whereas Wit and Precepts are Causes but remote.

The means and parts of this Exercitation are two.

  • Representative.
  • Operative.

1 Representative are such as are superadded to theThe means and parts of Exercise two. Rules of Logick, as Experiments and manifest Testimonies, Forms of Disputation, Resolution, &c.

2 Operative is the very Art it self of this Exercitation and Use, which should be by an assiduous imitation of the most eminent wits, and by the agitation of our own. And thus much of the Prolegomena's, and things necessary to the foreknowledge of Logick.

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE Art of Logick.

LOgick is an Art which conducteth the mindWhich dire­cteth simple terms. 3 Parts of Logick. [...]. in the knowledge of things.

It hath three things to be remarked as parts thereof. The first is, that which di­rects the first operation of the mind, which objecteth to it self onely single or simple things, by the mediation of a single or simple term, which is a notion or instrument of Logick, re­presenting unto the understanding one thing (called there­fore incomplex:) and it is called a second notion as it is the minds image and pourtraict, shadowing to it self some out­ward [...]. thing. First notions are (as it were) the string or rule of a Dial; second notions are (as it were) the ombre and sha­dow made by that rule or string: these both shew the hour, but the string or stem first and fundamentally; the second (that is the shadow) but secondarily, as it configurateth to the other.

A single or simple term is,

  • 1 On whom the latter depends, and it
    Simple terms two­fold.
    is either
    • of a word,
    • or of a thing.
  • 2 Arising from the first, and it is also either
    • of a word,
    • or of a thing.

Of a Word or Voice.

The term of a Word is that whereby the naming of a thing is considered; a word is the sign of things or concep­tions, pronounced or written with a certain frame of let­ters and syllables.

In a word three things are remarkable.

  • 1 The Material.
  • 2 The formal.
  • 3 The Imposition.

The Materiall is the sound in the pronouncing of the letters and syllables, whereof the word is constituted, either in speaking or writing.

The Formal is the signification of the word, and by con­sequence the relation to the conceit of the minde which [...] giveth knowledge of: now the efficient cause of this signif­cation, is, the imposition and institution, which in the He brew Tongue is Divine (as God was the institutor and im­poser) in other tongues humane, as having been invente and imposed by man.

Unto a Word appertain

  • 1 Divisions.
  • 2 Affections.

1 Of the division of words.

1 Words have their divisions either

  • Of the thing signified. a *.
  • Of the manner and ordering of signifying. b *

Of things sig­nified, some words are

  • Of themselves significative, as a Man or
    a.
    Woman, Worm, &c. and all Nouns that signifie a thing wholly.
  • Consignificative, and that need other words to expresse their meaning, as Ad­verbs, Pronouns, &c.

Significative words also are of the first intention which sig­nifie of themselves without the help of the minde, and they are the things themselves, or

[Page 16]2 Of the second intention, which means not a thing (it self) but the manner of it, or word of Art, whereby the thing is understood.

Now the division of the manner of signifying words isb

into Abstract Concrete [...]. Abstract, is which signifieth a thing apart, causing the minde to meditate the simple and precise nature of any thing, as God­head, Manhood, whiteness, redness, &c.

Concrete is that which signifies things conjoyntly, as ha­ving more natures then one complicate or conjunct, as man, white, holy, &c.

Words also are either of

  • 1 A particular signification, as man.
  • 2 Collective signification, as a flock, a company, a Church, &c.

Again, of the manner of sig­nifying, words are either

  • Distinct.
  • Ambiguous.

Distinct, which hath a certain and distinct signification, as fire, earth, ayr, and other names of things existent in nature.

An ambiguous word, is which indistinctly signifieth things that in nature are divers, as Cancer, which signifieth both a living creature and a disease; hereunto all words that are Eqvivocall, and have divers senses are referrible.

Now words become doubtful either

  • by chance.
  • of purpose.

Words ambiguous by chance is, when reason cannot be [...]. given why one name should be given to things divers in nature and definition.

Of purpose doubtfull, is when a common name is given to divers things upon counsell, and for some certain reasons, and this again is doubtfull either of

  • Dependance. a
  • Similitude. b

Ambiguous of dependance, is when a generall name is gi­vena to divers things, whereof one is dependant on another (as upon the more principall) touching the nature of it; as this word thing is most generall, and therefore doubtfull, it being attributed both to substances and accidents, but not equally and alike; for to a substance it is given of it self, and principally; to an accident, lesse principally, as having its na­ture [Page 17] dependent of the substance, it is therefore called an Analogous [...]. general or Genus.

Ambiguous of similitude, is, when for some consimilitude or likenesse, together, one name is given to divers things,b d and is either 1 Simple, d or 2 Compound e

1 Simple, is, when the Similitude lies between two and no more, and is of

  • Conceit.
  • Things really.

Ambiguous by similitude of conceit, is, when two things altogether divers (as God and the Creature) obtain one and the same attribute or name upon the conception we make of some similitude betwixt them; so God and man are both said to be good, just, to repent, &c. whereas really, no words can be found to expresse Gods most incomprehensible being.

Ambiguous by similitude of things in reality, is, when the significations of their natures or operation bear an evi­dent and known similitude. As when meat and medicine are called healthfull, because both cause health: Or, as when a beast and a disease are called a Wolf, because of the rapa­city and ravenousnesse of both; and upon this account are the Seals of Gods Covenant called Sacraments, because of the correspondence and similitude they bear unto those So­lemn Oaths, wherewith men were in former ages bound and consecrate to the Wars.

Ambiguous of a Compound Similitude, is, whose like­nessee consisteth of a proportion between four; and it is cal­led Analogie. As this word Governour is Analogical and [...]. proportionable, when attributed to a Magistrate and a Ship­master; for (here is the proportion between four) as the Master of a ship or Pilot is unto a ship (whereof he hath government) so is the Magistrate unto the Common-wealth. In like manner, flesh is Analogical in respect of beasts, birds, and of apples, cherries, &c. And in this sense are Ma­gistrates called Gods upon earth, Psal. 82. 6. And thus much of the divisions of Words; Now follow their affections, or their Canons and Rules, which be three.

The first affection of a word, is, that it should be perspi­cuous,Rules of the affecti­ons of words. that is, plain, and significative unto the mind of that which it ought to signifie, 2 It should be received by a com­mon consent and use. 3 It should be proper, determined and adapt to the signifying of the thing to be signified.

Of the Order of things.

Having hitherto treated of the first single Term, which is of a word; the next thing to be treated of, is the single Term of a Word which without the word representeth to the understanding somewhat of the thing it self.

And it is either The order of things called Predica­ment, or some Term or Not on with­out the Order. [...].

The Predicamental Order is a distinction and disposition of all things by certain orders, and degrees of orders.

Herein are considerable,

  • 1 The manner how things are received into this order a
    What a Predica­ment is. a 1 The man­ner of re­ceiving things.
  • 2 The graduation or degrees of this order. b
  • 3 The particular things themselves. c

1 The manner of receiving them into this order, is first Direct. 2 Proportional. 3 Collateral. 4 Indirect. 5 By accident: all which are declared by eight Rules follow­ing.

First then directly and primarily in the order or Predica­mental scale, is a thing which is, 1 Real and positive. 2 Simple and of it self. 3 Universal. 4 Compleat or Whole. 5 Univocal (that is) a thing signified by one distinct and certain word; these five are as it were conditi­ons of referribility in things unto a Predicamental order.

2 Receiving things into this order, is by proportion; thus may God (blessed for ever) be brought in, not directly, because he is a most simple Being, one in Number, having neither Genus above him, nor difference to restrain him, be­cause whereof, he cannot be placed in the Predicament of substance, but Analogically, and by proportion.

3 Collaterally, side-wise, or obliquely; thus a difference is placed in the Predicamental scale or series (as a reasona­ble soul, if it be taken for the difference of a living crea­ture, is placed in the Predicament of Substance, but side­wise, not directly: hitherto also may be referred Abstracts, to wit, Abstraction of Inferiours (as they are called) as Humanity, Animality, &c.

4 By Reduction, or indirectly: things placed in this Pre­dicamental scale, are first Concrete, and which simply con­sist [Page 19] not of one and the same thing, as just, mercifull, and other Concretes, containing both substances and accidents: so the Church, the World, and other like Collectives: hi­ther also may the parts of any whole be referred, as the head, hand, foot, &c. but reductively, and by reducing them unto their whole.

5 By Accident do appertain to the Predicamental order things compounded; and this they do by reason of their simple Terms, as Man is a living creature; this sentence is referred to the order of substance; A man is learned, this is referred to the order of substance in part, as it respects the man; and partly to the predicament of quality, as this man is learned. 2 Things Intentional, without the minde, as the Images of true things, colours seen in a glasse, &c. 3 Se­cond Notions, as words of Art, Genus, Species, Difference, &c. 4 Relations of Reason, as the right or left side of a pillar, &c. 5 Privations, which are alway referred unto the same Predicamental order that the habits thereof are; as blindnesse is in the same rank that sight is. 6 Fained things, things of fiction, as a Golden Mountain, Hirco-cervus, &c. referred to the predicament of substance.

6 From the predicamentall order be excluded plainly 1 All words of ambiguity and doubt, at least before they be distinguished and limited. 2 Fained things, which are absolutely impossible, as a Created God, Deified flesh, an unbloody Sacrifice, merit of works in a sinner, universall Election, and other such prodigious fantasies.

7 A thing in it self simply one, pertains to one Predica­ment; if it be Concrete, it may be referred to two, but in­equally, and so that it be primarily under one, viz. that which it most respecteth; so Baptisme and the Lords Supper are not to be referred to Substance or Action, but to Rela­tion, because water and the washing therewith are but the materiall things in Baptism; the formall being the holy Relation in signing and sealing the Spiritual washing away of sin.

8 Lastly, things themselves are placed in the Predica­ments of themselves and fundamentally; Conceits and Names of things but secondarily, and so far forth as they re­present things: and so much of the manner how things are received into the Predicamentall scale or order: we passe now to the second, viz. The degrees of the order, or Predi­camentall Series.

[Page 20]The degrees then of this Order, by which things are to be understood in their ranks, some are superiour, some in­feriour to others, and these degrees are not unfitly called Predicables.

A Degree is

  • 1 Direct. a a
  • 2 Collateral. b b

1 Direct, when we ascend or descend forthright, that is in a strait and direct line in order, as Genus, Species, Indi­viduum.

2 Collateral, when the ascent or descent is made in an indirect line, and side-long, as Difference.

Again, the direct degree is either Primary or Secondary.

Primary, as Genus, and Species: Secondary, as Indivi­dual.

Primary, is that which in the Predicamental order is uni­versal or common to many, and is Genus and Species.

Genus.

Genus, is that which hath Species under it, that is, a ge­neral is that which containeth two specials or more under it.

The common Rules hereof are four.

Rules 4.

1 The Genus or general is alway of the same Predica­ment1 or order of things with it Species or special. By which Canon or Rule, you may discern any, and many false gene­rals, as that the body of Christ is not the true Genus or ge­neral of the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; that water is not the true Genus of Baptism, nor an action the Genus of sin, nor air of sound, that harmony or number is not the Genus of the soul, for such be not in one Predicament; by this also Metaphors are removed, as when the Church is called Noahs Ark, or the Spouse the body of Christ; these are true, but not the true genera or generals: for Meta­phors shew not what a thing is, but what a thing is like to.

2 The Genus is never the cause of his Species, nor the2 subject, nor the accident, and therefore is never predicated or spoken of his Species in the Concrete, but alwayes abso­lutely in the right (that is the nominative) Case: They therefore erre, that in the Meteors make water to be the [Page 21] Genus of rain; fire the Genus of a Comet; air of the wind; whereas Meteors are called waterish, fiery, airy; so the cause cannot be the true Genus, as when dubitation is said to be the counterpoise of equal reason; Anger the boiling of the blood about the heart; Death the separating of the soul from body, &c. In such, the causes are placed in stead of ge­nerals; so also for the subject, when we define wind to be the air moved; Original sin to be corrupt nature, &c.

3 The Genus is alwayes and necessarily more large than all the Species of it, and is not returned or reciprocated with them.

4 The Genus is inseparable from his Species; nor can that be the true Genus without which the Species are or may be in any, or any where: this proves motion cannot be the true Genus of pleasure, seeing pleasure may be some­where, where motion is not or ceaseth.

Genus is twofoldGenus twofold.

  • Supream.
  • Subaltern.

1 The highest and most general, is so a Genus, as it can never be a Species.

2 Subaltern Genus is, that is successive and by turn, that is, when it is Genus of them contained under it, and Spe­cies of that which is above it.

Also the Genus is either remote and afar off from the Species, or, 2 Neer and next unto it; as the Genera of a man, a living Creature is the remote Genus, and Animal is the neerest Genus; for there are none other so neer man as those two.

Again the Genus is

  • Perfect. a
  • Imperfect. b

Perfect Genus, or a Synonymous general is, when his [...] Species all of them take equal part of him; as a living crea­ture is the equal and perfect Genus of man and beast; for a beast is a living creature no lesse than, and equally with a man.

The Canons and Rules of a perfect Genus are five.

1 A perfect Genus hath a Nature not separated, but yet5 Rules of a perfect Genus. distinct from all his Species.

2 All that which is in the Genus is equally communicated with the Species, so as nothing can be said of the Genus, [Page 22] but the same also may, and must be said of every species.

3 The Genus is in Nature before all his Species, and therefore first in that knowledge which is according to Na­ture.

4 The Genus hath necessarily many species, as not being able to be conserved in one; for every genus is perfected in determination of opposite differences, and opposition im­plyeth plurality; so that one genus must of necessity have at the least two species.

5 A perfect Genus being put, there needs not therefore any determinate or certain species to be put; and if one spe­cies be denyed, the genus is not thereupon denyed.

There is an Analogy and similitude between a Genus and Matter: For first as the matter is more imperfect than the form, &c. So is the genus more imperfect then the difference or species. 2 As the first matter is undetermined to any of his forms so is the genus to any of his differences; & as the matters have a power unto the opposite forms; so hath theb generall unto the opposite differences; yet neverthelesse there is great discrimination betwixt the genus and the matter, and they be not the same.

An Imperfect Genus is that which is not communicated with his species equally and alike, but to one more, to ano­ther lesse.

The Rules and Canons of this be three.3 Rules of an imper­fect Ge­nus.

1 An Imperfect Genus, is immediately, properly and of it self communicated but with one species, with ano­ther it is communicated but mediately and secondarily in order to the primary species; so this genus (thing or ens) is an imperfect genus to substance and accident; for thing is communicated primarily to substance; to accident but secon­darily in and by the substance, accidents being not so much things Create as Concreate.

2 An Imperfect Genus hath not a Nature altogether distinct from its species; so a thing naturally is not altogether distinct from substance or accident.

3 To put an Imperfect Genus, we must needs put some certain species, viz. that species by which it agreeth to the other; and this species being denyed, the genus it self is forthwith denyed.

And so much for the first Predicable of the first degree, to wit the genus.

The Species.

Species, or the special, is an universal thing subjected, or subordinate unto the Genus: and it is,

  • Perfect. a
  • Imperfect. b

Perfect is that which is under a perfect Genus.a

The Rules hereof be four.

1 The Species is in Nature after the Genus, & in Know­ledge distinct.

2 It ariseth from the determination of the Genus, so as it swalloweth up, as it were, the whole Genus in it self; that whatsoever the Genus hath, it also hath.

3 Perfect Species do equally participate of their Genus, one as well as the other.

4 Perfect Specials be in Nature together. As a Man is not after a Beast in nature, though in time Beasts were first created. So Baptism and the Lords Supper be in Nature together (being alike Species of the Sacrament of the new Testament) though in time Baptism was first.

Imperfect Species, is that which is under an imperfectb Genus.

The Rules hereof be three.

1 Under an imperfect Genus, one Species is more principal than another. So a Substance is the more principal Spe­cies of a Thing; An Accident is lesse principal.

2 The principal Species of an imperfect Genus, commu­nicateth as much to the other Species, as doth the Genus it self. So an Accident is as much bound to a Substance, as to a Thing.

3 The principal Species is in Nature and Knowledge be­fore the less principal, for it depends wholly on the princi­pal, and is that which it is, by benefit thereof. This Rule discovereth the Popish Errour, That in the Masse the Ac­cidents of Bread and Wine should remain without the Substance.

Also the Species is either

  • Subaltern, that is, Species of one, and Genus of another.
  • Most special, or lowest Species, never Genus.

[Page 24]The Rules hereof be two.

1 The lowest Species cannot be divided by opposite dif­ferences.

2 It may be conserved in one Individuum.

Hitherto of the direct degree Primary. Now followethThe Indi­viduum. the Secondary, or Individuum.

An Individuum or singular thing, [...], is that which under the generals and specials is determined unto certain circumstances of Existence.

The Rules hereof be four.

1 The note of on Individuum is sometime more strict, sometime more large. The word whereby an Individuum [...]s signified, is sometime single, sometime compound.

Single, as proper names, as Christ, Abraham, Peter, &c. or [...] [...]f proper, as the Apostle, meaning Paul; the Philo­ [...] meaning Aristotle.

1 Compounds be either [...]. Demonstrative, as this Man, that Woman, &c. O [...] uttered by commune names [...]., as a cer­tain man, or the Saviour of the world, the Virgins Son, meaning Christ: the enemy of Mankind, i. e. Satan. These some call Individua vaga, and Individua vaga ex hypothesi.

2 Singulars, or Individua, as they are the secondary ob­ject of Logick, so also they cannot perfectly be defined; neither of themselves, as they be singulars, are they consi­dered in disciplines: [for they belong to sense, as to be seen, felt, &c.] whereas universall things, appertain to reason; and as sense properly perceives not universal things, so neither doth reason singular things, viz. as they are sensible: nor so excellently as universals.

3 Singulars primarily and by themselves, do exist work, and are perceived, [ [...]. Essence is of universals. [...]. Existence is of singulars:] for hereto is required the Termination of some certain time and place, which is not in universals.

4 Singulars are incommunicable; for they having a most restrained Nature, have no inferiours to communicate with.

An Individuum is either,

  • Accidental. a
  • Substantial. b

1 Accidental is, which is under the order of Accidents; [as Accidents have their Predicaments, so also their Ge­nus, Species, singulars] So an habit is the Genus of Faith. Faith is the Species; but Abrahams faith, the Centurions faith, &c. are singulars, or Individua.

[Page 25]Substantial is that which is under the order of Substance.

And isb m n

  • Absolute. m
  • With Addition. n

Absolute, which is looked on absolutely.

With Adjection, is a person, which is the first substance intelligent, incommunicable, not part of another, nor su­stained by another.

Some singulars be called indirect, as are the names of Cities, Rivers, Mountains, &c.

Note these Properties, A Person must he 1 A Substance; so no Accident is a Person: It is 2 The first Substance, or a singular thing; so no Universall is a Person. It must have 3 Un­derstanding; so no particular Beast, as Balaams Asse, is a Per­son. It is 4 Not part of another; so a mans soul is not a Person. It is not 5 Sustained by another, so Christs humane Nature is not a Person. It is 6 Not communicable; so the divine Essence is not a Person, for it is communicated with the Father, Son, and holy Ghost.

We have seen the direct degrees; now follow the Col­lateral,b b or sidelong, which is called Difference.

Difference is here taken in a strict and peculiar significati­on,The Diffe­rence. only for the determination and restraining of the uni­versal and indifferent Nature, in the Predicamental order, and not for every distinction and diversity of things, where­of we treat hereafter. And thus Difference pertaineth to the degrees of Order, not as constituting or informing, but as binding and knitting, not as causing any thing properly, but as determining and tying together the universal in the Pre­dicamental line.

The Difference is that which restraineth and determineth the Genus in the Species.

The Rules hereof are eight.

1 The Difference respecteth the general and the special in a divers respect: the general as determinable; the spe­cial as determinated.

2 The Difference, as it is a difference, never noteth a thing compleat and separate, but alwayes incompleat.

3 The Difference is after the general, and before the spe­cial, yet is it in the general indeterminately, or in [...]. power.

Universals are like a long rope, loose without knot: diffe­rence is like a knot; the special is as a rope tied with a knot. [Page 26] The knot is after the loose rope, but before the knit rope: and the knot which in power was in the loose rope, is in act in the tied rope. A rope with knots differeth not really from a rope which hath not knots: so the Species restrained by difference, differeth not really from the Genus.

4 Every Difference inferreth his proper and certain Ge­nus. Therefore differences should not be transferred from Genus to Genus.

5 The Difference that is to determine the general, must needs be opposite [...].; for difference restraineth not the Genus, but by a kind of opposition and se junction of the Species.

6 Every Difference is inseparable from his Species.

7 The Difference is not varied by degrees.

8 The Difference is apt to be avouched (praedicari) of his Genus, but in the Concrete, or in quale. For no difference sheweth what a thing is, but of what manner it is: As if one ask, What manner of living creature is a man: The answer is, A reasonable, living creature: so that the difference is not so much spoken of the Species, Man, as of the Genus, Living Creature, or Animal; for it maketh the Genus to dif­fer, and determineth it.

Difference is either,

  • Far off.
  • Nearest.

Far off, is that which is not reciprocate with his Species, called Generica.

Nearest, is that which is equal with his Species: It is cal-Specifica.

As sensible maketh a man differ from a stone, in a far dif­ference; for other Species, as Beasts, have the same diffe­rence, but reasonable is the nearest, whereby he differeth from a stone, beasts, and all other things.

Hitherto hath been handled, 1 The manner how things are received into Predicamental Order. And 2 The de­grees of the Order. Now follow, 3 The particular Or­ders,Predica­ments. [...]. or Predicaments themselves.

There be ten Predicaments, or Orders, and of them,

  • Some principal.
  • Some lesse principal.

The principal are, in which things first and properly so called, are disposed and ordered: and they be the first six.

And these be either,

  • Of Substance. a
  • Of Accidents. b

[Page 27]1 The Predicament or orderly row of substance, is thatSubstance. [...]. where in the substance is orderly disposed by his Generals and Specials.

A Substance is a thing subsisting by it self.a

The Rules or properties whereof be three.

1 A substance, as it is a substance, is not contrary to ano­ther; but as it hath accidents or qualities, it is contrary, as Fire and Water, Sheep and Wolves, &c. be contrary in qua­lity and temperature.

2 A substance, as it is a substance, is not varied by de­grees, or receiveth not more or lesse; but the variance or comparison is in respect of accidents, as a Wise man, and a Fool, an Old man, and a Child, one water hotter than another: these differ in qualities, not in substance.

3 A substance remaining one in number, may receive in­to it contrary accidents. As water may be now seething hot, anon frozen cold.

The Order of Substances is to be seen in a Table, As

Substance, is either
  • Vncreated, infinite, and beyond our understanding, as, the most holy God.
    Created, and is either
    • Spiritual
      • Absolute: as Angels, good and evil.
      • Determined to another: as Mans soul.
    • Corporal, and is either
      • Incompleat, and is
        • Passive, called, Matter, first and second.
        • Active, called Form, first and second.
      • Compleat, or perfect, and is either
        • Far from mix­ture, as the hea­vens, whose parts are
          • Orbs
            • without Star.
            • with Star▪
              • Fixed: The firmament.
              • Planets
          • Stars
            • Fixed.
            • Wandering, Saturn, Mars, &c.
        • Ordained for mixture (and therefore not existing apart and compleatly) called ele­ments, and is
          • Fire.
          • Air
          • Water.
          • Earth.
        • Mixed
          • Imperfect­ly, as
            • Smoke,
            • Vapours, whereof are Meteors
              • Fiery, as Lightenings, Co­mets, &c.
              • Aiery, as Winds, &c.
              • Waterish, as clouds, rain, snow, hail, &c.
          • Perfectly
            • without life
              • Metals, perfect and Imperfect, as gold, silver, brasse, quicksilver, &c.
              • Minerals
                • Hard, as Sand, Stones, precious and base kinds of earth, &c.
                • Soft, as Salt, Al [...]um, Pitch, Myrrhe, Frankincense, &c.
            • with life
              • Vegetant, as
                • 1 Trees, fruitful and unfruitful: Oke, Ash, Elm, Lawrel, &c.
                • 2 Bushes, Rose, Bramble.
                • 3 Herbs of all sorts, Wheat, Rie, Pease, Rise, Beets, Mallows, &c.
              • Sensible.
                • Reasonable, as Man.
                • Without Reason, as Beasts.
            • 1 Of the Air, Fowls, Swans, Geese.
            • 2 The Earth, Beasts, and creeping things, Horse, Lion, Dog, Worm.
            • 3 The Water, Fishes of all sorts, Whales, Pikes, Eeles, Oysters, Serpents, &c.
  • Compounded of a created and increated Substance, in a mystery of marvellous union, Christ Iesus, the Son of God and the Virgin.

[Page 29]We have seen the Predicament of substance.Accident: b [...]

Now followeth Accidents.

An Accident is a thing which dependeth upon a substance, for the essence and existence thereof. The word Accident is commonly used in a large sense, for all that betideth, chan­ceth, or cleaveth to any thing: but here it is more properly taken for that which cleaveth to a substance, and is no part thereof, and yet cannot be without the same.

An Accident is either

Absolute, having an absolute nature, as Relation.

  • Quantity.
  • Quality.
  • Action.
  • Passion.

The Predicament of quantity, is that wherein the Gene­rals2 Quantity and Specials of it are orderly disposed. Note that in every Predicament there is the Material, or thing it self (which Logick doth but lightly touch, as belonging to ano­ther place) and the Formal or disposing, and Table of the thing, which is chief in all Predicaments.

Quantity is that whereof the greatnesse or number of any thing is named.

And therefore quan­tity is either

  • continued, as greatnesse.
  • dissevered, as number.

1 Greatnesse is extension, or stretch­ing out, and is called

  • Properly.
    1
  • Improperly.

Properly so called Extension is of the matter in a Natu­ral Body, which therefore is said to be continued, and di­visible.

The Rules or Notes hereof be five.

1 Greatnesse hath a certain continuance and position of parts.

2 Greatnesse hath of it self no motion, or efficacie.

3 Unto it nothing is contrary; for contrarieties are in qualities.

4 It receiveth not more or lesse. As one house is not more or lesse a house than another, though one be a greater house than another.

5 Of greatnesse, the subject is said to be equal or une­equal; greatnesse or extension properly so called, is length, breadth, deepnesse or thicknesse; the beginning of all which is a point or prick.

Length, is that which of the Mathematicks is called a line. Breadth or latitude, is called the Superficies.

[Page 30]Thicknesse or deepnesse is the threefold dimension, which is called also height, and of the Mathematicks, Metaphoricè, a body.

2 Number or multitude is the gathering together of U­nities. And unity is the beginning of number.

Number is considered2

  • Abstractly. a
  • Concretely. b

Abstractly considered, is that which is primarily in thisa Predicament. As 2, 4, 10, &c.

The Rules hereof be five.

1. 1 Number is not coupled with any common term, nei­ther hath its parts indued with Position. As 3 and 7 are coupled with no common Term, though they concur to the making of 10.

2. 2. Of number, things are said to be even or odd.

3. 3. Number also as it is number, hath no force, no effi­cacie.

4. 4. Number of it self hath nothing contrary thereto.

5. 5. Number receiveth not more and lesse.

Concretely considered Number here, is, things collective, which may be referred hither materially. As a Wood con­taineth many Trees, an Host many Souldiers, an heap many grains, &c.

The Formal thing of this Predicament is the Table or Order of all Quantities: As,

Quantity is taken either for
  • Dissevered quantity or number, which is taken
    • Continued extension, which is taken, either
      • Vnproperly, and by proporti­on, as
        • Continuance of any thing: as in time the [...] of durance.
        • Extension of degree, called Intension, as one heat [...] said to be greater than another.
        • Extension of weight, or heavinesse.
      • Properly so called, which is the extension of a Body on­ly, and it is either
        • Incompleat, as
          • Length or line, which is either
            • Right or straight.
            • Round or circular.
            • Mixt of sundry sorts.
          • Breadth, or superficies, which is ei­ther
            • Right lined
              • Of three sides.
              • Of four sides.
              • Of many sides.
            • Crooked lined; As a circle.
            • Mixt of right and crooked; As half a circle.
        • Compleat: the three­fold dimension cal­led a Body, which is either
          • Regular, having basis, sides, cor­ners, equal and like, as Pyrami­des, &c.
          • Irregular, as a wedge, collar, &c.
      • Largely, for any multitude of divers things, and ye call it T [...]a [...]scendental Number. Such as is the holy Trinity, in spirits, and other things that have no quantity.
      • Strictly for a col­lection of disconti­nued quanti­ties. It is called predica­mental number, and con­sidered
        • Absolutely, and either it is
          • Simple either
            • Perfect, which is equal to his parts.
            • Imperfect
              • A bounding, which is lesser than the parts of it, as 12.
              • Diminished which is greater than the parts, as 88. Again both per­fect and im­perfect is ei­ther
                • Even when it may be divi­ded into two equal parts & it is either
                  • A likely even, as 32.
                  • A likely odd, as 18.
                  • Vnlikely even, as 12.
                • Odd, which cannot be divided into two equal parts, and is either
                  • First, which unity onely measureth, as 3, 5, 7.
                  • Compound, divi­ded by 2, or more numbers, as 15.
                  • Mean as 9, which 3 only measureth; 25, which 5.
          • Figured, which is either
            • Plain, arising of the multiplication of one number by another, as seven times five are 35.
            • Square, arising from multiplication of number in­to it self, as 25.
            • Cubick, arising from a number led in it self, & that which comes of them multiplied again by the first number, as 125.
        • Concretely, or determinately unto some subject to be number­ed, as a flock, an host, a talent. Hexameter, for a verse of six feet. A Church, a Common-wealth, a City, an Oration, &c.

[Page 32]The predicament of quality is, wherein the generals andQuality [...]. specials thereof be disposed.

The general Rules hereof be five.

1 Quality, is of all absolute antecedents, the most copi­ [...]us and frequent in Nature; for whatsoever we see, hear, [...]aste, smell, feel, all of it is quality.

2 Of all accidents, quality is most accommodate to the sense.

3 Qualities onely have contrariety.

4 Qualities have degrees, or more and lesse. And these [...]. they have not in respect of the essence, or definition (which is no where varied) but in respect of the existence or singu­lar cleaving to this or that subject, disposed so or so; So Faith in general in respect of the essence, is one and single, without degrees, but faith in this or that person, is greater or lesser, yet retaineth it the same essence and definition in all. For a weak faith, is yet Faith. The like is for other qualities, heat, cold, &c.

5 By reason of qualities, things are said to be like or un­like one another. As men of one colour are said to be alike, but of one stature they are said to be equal.

Quality hath four kinds or specials▪ 1 Habit. 2 Natural power. 3 Sufferable quality. 4 Figure.

1 Habit is a quality brought into man, whereby he is li­able unto those works which by Nature alone he cannot do. Here habit is taken properly and strictly, and not for every accidental form contrary to privation; nor for the ha­bit and stature of the body, nor for apparel, or any general power, which sometime in a large use are called habits.

The general Rules of Habit are two.

1 Unto Habit there is required a certain inclination go­ing before, and a power of Nature.

2 Habit maketh easinesse and cheerfulnesse in working ought.

Habit is either

  • begun. a
  • full-ended. b

1 Begun, it is called [...], Disposition. Taken here strictly, though sometimes it is largely used for all fitness to any thing, or unfitness also for disposing and ordering parts in method, for degrees of every accident, as when water waxeth warm, it is said to have a disposition to heat.

[Page 33]The Rules of disposition be two.

1 Disposition goeth before habit, as a Degree therto.

2 It is more easily lost then is an habit.

2 Full-ended, or compleat habit, is that which hath got his confirmation and complement. And it is either infused, or gotten otherwise.

Infused, is that which is shed by the singular grace ofb the Holy Ghost into mens minds, as Faith, Love and other gifts of God.

Gotten, is that which is gotten by the Humane Industry, precepts and often repetitions of Actions; As the Art of Lo­gick, Rhetorick, &c.

Naturall power, is that which is in us by Nature: And is

  • Active.
  • Passive.

Active, is that whereby we are able and apt to do.

Passive is that by which we are apt to suffer or receive ought.

Naturall power also is either

  • First.
  • Second.

The first power is that which next followeth from the form of the subject, [as in a natural body power to move in a man to speak, &c.

The second power is a disposition of the temperature and instruments by which the first power is brought into act, [as a living creature hath not only the first power of seeing, flow­ing from the sensitive soul (which it retaineth alwayes) but hath also a disposition of the eye, (which may lost) whereby one seeth clearer then another. Hereto belongs towardnesse of wit, strength of body, originall sin, vertues of Herbs, Gems, &c.

3 Sofferable quality, [...], is that which maketh suffering or passion in the senses, Or it may be called [...]ffici­ent quality, for it affects the senses, as sweet smels refreshes a man, and stenches annoy him. So cold and heat.

4 Figure or form is a certain configuration of the colour and lineament in the body, [it may be called Figure in re­spect of the lineaments and disposition; and Form in respect of the colour or light.

And it is either

  • Naturall,
  • Artificiall.

[Page 34]Naturall is the figure which Nature gives every one.

Artificial is the form which is given by Art: [as the Gold­smith puts Gold into the form of a Ring, Cup, or Chain, &c.]

The rank and order of all qualities followeth.

Quality properly so called, is either

  • Potential. *
  • Actual. * *

Potentiall is either*

  • Natural.
  • Brought in, and it is called Habit.

Natural is

  • First. a
  • Second. b

First, which is eithera

  • Manifest, whose causes are manifest, as in a man, facility to learn, to laugh, &c.
  • Hidden.

Hidden, which is given to a thing, either by

  • Proper temperature: As the Load­stone to draw Iron.
  • Sympathie, as between the Vine and the Elm.
  • Antipathie, as between the Olive and the Oak.

Second, which is eitherb

  • Common.
  • Singular.

Common is the naturall disposition of the instruments which every first power needeth, if it should be brought into Act.

Singular ariseth from the temperature of some persons; as wittinesse, boldnesse, &c.

Habit brought in, is either

  • Incompleat, called Disposition.
  • Compleat, properly called Habit or Vertue.

Compleat Ha­bit is either

  • Extraordinary, such as was in the Prophets and Apostles, and by the image of God in man before his fall.
  • Ordinary.

Ordinary Habit or Vertue, is either

  • Speculative. m
  • Operative. n

[Page 35]Speculative, is eitherm

  • In Part, as opinion and knowledge of some conclusion.
  • Totall.

Total or Aggregative, peculiarly called Science, which is either 1 Metaphysick: Or a Physick, under which is A­stronomy. 3 Mathematick, under which is Geometry, A­rithmetick, Optick, Musick, &c.

Operative is eithern

  • Practick. A
  • Factive. B

Practick isA

  • More perfect. a
  • More imperfect. b

More perfect, by the special help of the holy Ghost. And is eithera

  • Total. h
  • In part. i

Total or Aggregative is consideredh

  • Absolutely, called Theologie.
  • Relatively, called Church-policie.

In part, is called spirituall Vertue, and isi

  • General.
  • Special.

General, and the common directive of all other vertues; which are 1 Religion, Love, fear of God, &c. 2 Love of our neighbours. 3 Universal Justice. 4 Prudencie.

Special, and it is ordered towards

  • Our selves.
  • Another.

For ourselves:

To rule:

  • The appetite and pleasure, by Temperance.
  • Anger, by Meeknesse.
  • Fear, by Fortitude, Patience, &c.

To another

  • God.
  • Our Neighbour.

Towards God, Worship, Prayer, Profession, Swearing by him, &c.

Towards our Neighbour

  • Superiour: Reverence, Obedience.
  • Equal: Particular Justice, Peace, Concord, Kindnesse, &c.
  • Inferiour: Gentlenesse, Mercy, Liberality, &c

More imperfect, by generall Grace of God, and for this life; and is also

  • Total.
  • In part.

[Page 36]Total & Aggre­gative, & is ei­ther

  • Absolute: Ethicks, or moral vertue.
  • Relative, unto
    • The Common-weal, Poli­ticks, Law.
    • Families, as Oeconomicks.

In part, com­monly called moral vertue, and is

  • General, directing others, as
    • Universal Justice.
    • Prudency.
  • Special, which is
    • Absolute.
    • In conversation:

Absolute, about Fear, Fortitude, Pleasure, Temperance, Riches, Liberality, Magnificence, Ho­nours, Modesty, Magnanimity, Anger, Meeknesse.

In conversati­on, [...], as is

  • Gentleness.
  • Kindness.
  • Justice particular.
  • Urbanity.
    • Commutative.
    • Distributive.

Factive, called Art, & is eitherE

  • More worthy or Liberal. a
  • Less worthy or Mechanical. b

Liberala

  • Is Directive.
  • Or Principal.

Directive and instrumentary, Governing the

  • Speech by
    • Forming it Grammatically.
    • Adorning it Rhetorically.
    • Poetry.
  • Reason, Logick.

Principal, as Medicine: under it

  • Surgery.
  • Apothecary Art:

Mechanical, which is profit­able to live ei­therb

  • 1 Absolutely.
  • 2 Commodiously.
  • 3 Comely.
  • 4 Pleasantly.

1 Absolutely: As, 1 A Midwives Art, 2 Husbandry, 3 Shepherdy, 4 Hunting, Fishing, Fowling. 5 Milners Art. 6 Baking, Brewing, Butchery, &c.

[Page 37]2 Commodi­ously, of which some be

  • 1 As the Art of Printing. 2 Warfare 3 Building, 4 Book-binding. 5 Mer­chandize.
  • Mean, As 1 About Metals, Minerals, Smiths, &c. 2 About Wood, Carpenters, Joyners, &c. 3 About Wooll, Cloth­makers, &c. Tailors. 4 About Stones, as Stone-hewing, &c.
  • Base. As Curriers, Shoomakers, Sad­lers, Barbers, &c.

3 Comely, as 1 The art of Painting, 2 Carving, 3 Graving, &c.

4 Pleasantly, as the art of 1 Singing and Minstrel [...]e, 2 Dancing, 3 Gaming, &c.

Actual quality is either* *

  • Affecting the Senses [...], a
  • Conforming. b

Affecting isa

  • First.
  • Second.

The first is ei­ther

  • More effectual, as
    • Light.
    • Cold.
    • Heat.
  • Lesse effectual, as
    • Moistnesse.
    • Drinesse.

The Second a­riseth of the first: either

  • Neat: as Thinness, Thicknes, Light­nesse, Heavinesse, Softnesse, Hardnesse, Smoothnesse, Roughnesse, Slipperi­nesse, Clamminesse, Drinesse.
  • Further off: as, 1 Taste, 2 Smell, 3 Colour, 4 Sound:

1 Taste, which is either

  • Hot: as Acrimony, Bitternesse, Salt­nesse, Sweetnesse, Fatnesse.
  • Cold: as Sowernesse, A [...]sterity, Ta [...]t­nesse.

2 Smel

  • Simple. Sweet or stinking.
  • Mixt.

3 Colour, which is either

  • Intentional, as they that appear in
    • a Glasse.
    • the Rainbow.
  • Real and true, and is either
    • Simple.
    • Mixt.

[Page 38]Simple as

  • Whitenesse.
  • Blacknesse.

Mixt of the former two either

  • Exactly, as red­nesse,
  • Inequally, with one of the
  • First & redness, and that either
    • exceeding
      • Saffron-
      • Colour
      • Purple.
    • wanting as
      • Yellow-
      • Colour
      • Greennesse.

4 Sound, which is

  • Direct.
  • Reflexive, as the Eccho.

Direct is either, 1 Simple, as high and low, or 2 Mixt, as the mean.

Conforming, b called form and figure, which is ei­ther

  • Naturall in bodies
    • Unperfect, as Meteors in the Air.
    • Perfect, as in Plants, Beasts, &c.
  • Artificiall, as the figure of a Garment, Table, Sword, &c.

Action.

Action, is the agitation or stirring of a substance, and as it [...] were, the flowing out and execution of the forces thereof.

The Rules are four.

1 Every Action is taken in hand, and finished to some End.

2 Every Action is before the Passion, in order of Nature and dignity: whereupon it is better alway to give than to receive.

3 Action taketh contrariety: Not of it self, but by and for the qualities, by means of which the Agent acteth. As heating and cooling are two contrary actions, because heat and cold are contrary.

4 Action receiveth more and lesse. In the same respect as before.

Action is either

  • Immanent and tarrying.
  • Transient and passing.

[Page 39]Immanent, is which inferreth no real & evident change, outward, such is understanding, willing, perceiving. Transient is, which inferreth a change indeed, as warming, cooling, burning &c. Whereby the Patient is changed.

Also Action is either

  • Dividuall.
  • Individuall.

Dividuall, which is distinguished as with certain parts of the progresse

Individuall, which hath not many parts of progresse. So forgivenesse of sins is an Individual Action; for it is done in a time inobserveable, but sanctification and regeneration is a divided Action; for it is done by degrees and successively in the Elect in this life.

A Table of Actions followeth.

An Action is either

  • Of God. a
  • Of a creature. b

Of God; either

  • Inward.
  • Outward,

Inward or Abso­lute, not termi­nate to creatures, and is

  • Essential, proceeding from Absolute Es­sentiall properties.
  • Personall proceeding from personall properties, as
    • Generation.
    • Mission.
      [...]

Outward referred to the creatures, and is

  • Commune. A
  • Proper. B

Commune to the three persons, and is

  • General. c
  • Special. d

A Generall pertaining to all Creatures indifferently, and is

  • Ordinary, as the Creation, Conservation, Govern­ment of the World.
  • Extraordinary, or miracu­lous.

[Page 40]Extraordinary, when things are either

  • Perfected, as raising up the dead, healing diseases.
  • Hindred, as the staying of the Sun Josh. 10. of the fire, Dan. 3.
  • Used for that which is not of their Nature, as a rock to send forth water: a Virgin to conceive, &c.

Speciall, pertaining to some creatures, as Election toB life, calling to Grace, Redemption, Justification, &c.

Proper to some certain Person, as

  • The Father to send the Son.
  • The Son take our Nature, and be our Mediatour.
  • The Holy Ghost to illuminate and sanctifie.

A Creatures acti­onb on is either of a

  • Spiritual, Creature.
  • Temporall, Creature.

1 Spiritual, which is

  • General, or common to all, as locall motion.
  • Speciall of
    • Angels.
    • A reasonable soul, such as it doth apart from the body.

Angels

  • Good, as praising of God, executing his Com­mandments, &c.
  • Evil, as afflicting, and tempting of creatures.

2 Corporal, which is

  • Superiour, and more wor­thy, as in the heaven. Circular motion Illumination by stars:
  • Inferiour. Circular motion Illumination by stars:

Inferiour in

  • Generall, & is either
    • Alteration.
    • Local motion rightforth either
      • Pulsion or driving:
      • Traction or drawing.
      • Vection or carying.
  • Speciall.

In special, of

  • Elements, which have their alteration and motion locall.
  • Mixt things.

Of mixed things that be Without life, as all operations, mineral and metallical with­out life or living.

[Page 41]Of living things in

  • General.
  • Special.

In the general, as be either

  • Nourishment, under which be Grouth.
  • Generation taken actively.

In special, of

  • Plants, as the operations of herbs, trees, &c.
  • Animals or living Creatures.

Animals or living creatures

  • General. a
  • Special. b

In general,

  • Sense, active­ly taken
    • Inward
      • Common sense.
        [...]
      • Phantasie actively taken.
    • Outward
      • more worthy, as
        • Seeing.
        • Hearing.
      • lesse worthy, as
        • Touching
        • Smelling,
        • Tasting.
  • Appetite
  • Actively taken under which is
    • Desire
      • of Food.
      • of Generation.
    • Affection [...].
  • Respiration and locall going.

In special

  • Of Man. a
  • Of brute Beasts. b
    b

a Man, whose actions are

  • Naturall.
  • Habituall.

Naturall

  • Inward, as be the
    • 1 Understanding The apprehension of simple things, compo­sition, and division.
    • 2 Remembring The apprehension of simple things, compo­sition, and division.
      Discourse
      • Syllogistical.
      • Methodical.
    • 3 Willing,
  • Outward, as speaking, laughing, weeping,

  • [Page 42]Speculation [...], contemplation of the Heavens, and other Natural things.
  • Practises, [...]
    • Sacred
      • Common, as praying to God, loving of our Neighbour, &c.
      • Ecclesiastical, as preaching, mi­nistring the Sacraments, &c.
    • Moral as
      • Comm [...]on to exercise Tem­perance, Meeknesse, &c.
      • Special
        • Political, to govern a Commonwealth, &c.
        • Oeconomical, to rule the house, bring up children, &c.
  • Faction, [...]
    • More worthy, as to read, write, dispute, heal the sick, &c.
    • Lesse worthy, as to weave, spin, &c.
  • Of Brute beasts, which are diverse, according to the
    b
    diversity of kinds in Beasts.

Of Passion.

Passion is the receiving of an Action.

The Canons hereof are three.

1 Passion, is received not so much by the condition of the Agent, as by the disposition of the Patient. So, many Passions and effects of the holy Ghost are imperfect, be­cause of us which receive them, not for the condition of the holy Ghost.

2 Passion receiveth contrariety.

3 Passion receiveth more and lesse.

Passion is either. 1 Transmutative, or 2 Intentional.

1 Transmutative, when some reall change is made in the Patient.

2 Intentionall, when no real change is made, but onely a Termination of the Action. Thus a coloured thing is said to suffer, because it receiveth & terminateth the sight. Some call this Spiritual and Logical Passion.

The Table of Passion followeth.

Passion is

  • Perfective. a
  • Defective. b

Perfective of the Crea­tures, either

  • In general Ordina­ry, as
    • Government Passive
    • Sustentation Passive
  • In speciall, Extraordinary, as the Sun staye [...] from moving.

In special, of

  • Spirits.
  • Bodies.

Of Spirits, as of the

  • Good Angels, which have their passions, joy in God, anger against his Foes, &c.
  • Holy souls, which also have joy, &c. By which they are perfected.

Of Bodies, and these

  • Superior, as Heaven, whose circular motion is a kinde of passion.
  • Inferiour, and this is either
    • In Generall, as all alteration and motion Passive.
    • In Speciall.

In Speciall, as of the

  • Elements, in which is mutuall alte­ration.
  • Mixt Bodies.

Of mixt bodies, which be either

  • Common, as to be heated, cooled, moist­ened, dried, boiled, &c.
  • Speciall, of things
    • without life, as passions of Metals, &c.
    • with life.

With life

  • In generall, as Nourishment increasing.
  • In speciall.

In speciall either of

  • Plants, as the Passions of herbs, &c.
  • Animals, or things with soul.

[Page]Animals in

  • General. m
  • Special. n

m In gene­ral, as the

  • Sense, inward and outward, passive.
  • Appetite either
    • Desire [...] of
      • Food
        • Dry, as hunger.
        • Moist, as thirst.
      • Generation, as Lust.
    • Affections [...]
      • Appro­ving and following
        • Common, as Pleasure.
        • Special of good
          • Present, as joy, love.
          • Future, as desire.
      • Eschew­ing and flying
        • Common, as Dolour.
        • Special of evil
          • present, as sorrow, anger.
          • future, as fear.

In special

  • Of Brute beasts.
  • Of Man. *

* Of man either

  • Adventitial, as to learn, to receive habit Theoretical.
  • Ingrafted.

Ingraft

  • Outward, as weeping, laughter passive.
  • Inward.

Inward

  • Receiving of Intellectuall Species, &c.
  • Reasonable appetite, or will
    • Approving and following either
      • Common, as humane pleasure.
      • Speciall of good
        • Past, as a good conscience.
        • Present, love, joy.
        • Future, hope, desire.
    • Shunning
      • Grief of minde
      • Speciall ei­ther of
        • Terrible [...]
          • ones
          • own
            • Present heavinesse.
            • Future fear.
            • Anothers mercy.
        • Indignity, as shame.

Defe­ctive & priva­tive in

  • Spirits
    • Evil Angels, as hatred of God and good men, despair, en­vie, joy in evil. Torments.
    • Souls of Reprobates, despair, pains eternal.
  • Bodies
    • Heavenly, as Eclipses of Sun and and Moon.
    • Inferiour things
      • In general, Corruption.
      • In special mixt things
        • Generally, Rottennesse.
        • Specially in living things
          • In general
            • Diseases of death Intempe­ratenesse Hot, pestilent, Ague, Apoplexie, Epile­psie, mixt, the joynt ague.
            • 2 Ill conformation, as of parts out of joynt. Solution of that which is continued. As wounds, impostumes, &c.
          • In spe­ciall in men
            • all commonly
              • Evil concupiscence, ter­rors of conscience for sin.
              • Calamities, as punish­ments.
            • Specially the Reprobates, as Despair, Torments.

Relation.

We have seen the Order of Absolute Accidents: now followeth Relation, which is the Union of two or more.

The Canons hereof are six.

1 Every Relation is more unworthy than any Ab­solute Accident, and in Nature after it. For Relation is not a thing real by it self, but by the foundation of it, that is, either the subject, or the efficient cause; for every real thing added to another, maketh composition▪ but Rela­tion added to a Subject, makes no composition; for in God be many Relations, but in him is no Composition. So the name of a Doctor or Captain, given to a man, is nothing but a vain title and shadow, except there be qualities of Learning, Vertue, Fortitude. Also Relation may be ta­ken from a Subject, it remaining safe as it was. So relati­on of the Sacrament may be taken from the water, and yet be water still. So in us after forgivenesse of sins, there remains Original sin, as touching the material thereof, that is, inclination to evil; though the formal of it, that is, guiltiness, be taken away by Gods gracious imputa­tion.

2 Relations do in company and multitude exceed all Absolute Accidents: for infinite references are added both to qualities, and all other Accidents. All disciplines are full of References. In Theologie, all Doctrines have re­lation, as of sin, of the Law, of the Mediatour, of the Per­sons in the Trinity, of Sacraments, of Miracles, &c.

3 Relation by it self is not perceived by the senses. As a man sees a stone in the field, but knows not whether it be a Dool stone, unless he be admonished of it. Abime­lech saw Sarah to be a fair woman, but could not see her to Abrahams wife.

The Relate and the Correlate, as they are such, are together both in Nature and knowledge, and so mutually do put or take away one another, as well in being as in knowing. So the Father and the Son, as they are Relate and Correlate, are together, though materially: as the Fa­ther is a man, he must needs be before his Son.

[Page 46]Hereupon Christ saith, He that knoweth me, knoweth the Father.

5 Every Correlate doth so answer to his Relate, that the one may be said to be of the other So Adam was the Father of Cain, and Cain the son of Adam.

6 Relations need no local Touching for the bringing in or conservation of themselves. As a Father being in Eng­land, may have a son born in France. Christ now bodily in Heaven, hath true and real union and eleaving with his members on Earth. The same body hath also true and real union Sacramental with the Bread in the Lords Supper. So as there needs no Popish Transubstantiation.

Moreover, the Term of the Relation is not to be tied to the Relate, as the Communion with the substance and benefits of Christ, is not to be tied to the bread and wine in the Supper; nor the washing away of sins, to water in Baptism.

The Table of Relations Followeth.

Relation is either

  • Natural, [...]. a
  • By Institution, [...]. b

a Naturall which is either

  • 1 Of Measure, either
    • Inward and productive, as is every cause: hither may be referred the de­grees of Kindred, which is either
    • Outward,
      • Ruling: as every Rule, Square, &c.
      • Adja­cent.
        • Place.
        • Time.
          • Primary, as Degrees of consanguinity in a line.
            • Right, as great Grandfather, Grandfather, Fa­ther, Son, &c.
            • Sideloong,
              • Equall, as Brother▪ Si­ster.
              • Unequall, as Uncle, &c.
          • Secondary, as degrees of affi­ntiy, Father in Law, Son in Law, &c.
  • 2 Of Convenience.
  • 3 Of Difference.
  • 4 Of Disposition.

  • 2 Of conveni­ence, or, A­greement, and this ei­ther in
    • Substance, called ( [...]) the self-same ab­solutely.
    • Quantity, called ( [...]) equality and proportion:
    • Quality, called ( [...]) similitude.
    • Representation, called Signification, and all Na­turall Signes.
  • 3 Of Difference; as diversity and opposition of things.
  • 4 Of Disposition; or order and situation in the world and world­ly bodies.

[Page] b By Institution, either

  • Divine. A
  • Humane. B

  • A Divine, which is either
    • Of Power,
      • General as the
        • Regiment of the world.
        • Law of Nature.
      • Special, as touching.
        • The Church, as the Regiment of the Church.
        • The head of the Church, Christ Christ the Mediator.
          • Prophet.
          • Priest.
          • King.
        • The Ministers of the Church, to
          • Preach.
          • Minister Sacraments, &c.
      • Of Conjuncti­on, as
        • The Law.
        • The Gospel.
    • Of Confirma­tion, as touching.
      • Temporall things, as the Rainbow.
      • Spirituall, as
        • Gods Word, which is a signe for­mally considered.
        • Figures or Types. Sacra­ments.
          • Old; Circumcision,
          • Passeover,
          • New; Baptisme,
          • Lords Supper.
    • B Humane which is either
      • Of Power, and Office, and Dignity.
        • Greater, as Kingdom, King, Prince, Duke, Earl, Consul, &c.
        • Lesser, as Master, Tutor &c.
      • Of Conven­tion or Con­sent.
        • To be rightly, as is
          • Marriage.
          • State of the Commonwealth.
            • Monarchy.
            • Aristocrasie.
            • Democraciy.
        • To be well, as are
          • Societies and Confederacies, Contracts, Covenants, Testaments, Obligations, &c.
          • Contracts specially so called, and are either
            • Named
              • Borowing,
              • Lending,
              • Trusting,
              • Pawning;
              • Buying,
              • Selling.
            • Un-named.
      • Of collation, either.
      • Distinction and Disposition: Armies, Order▪ and Method of Diciplines.
      • signification
        • Vocall, as all Towns formally.
        • Reall
          • Simple, as
          • signing or con­firming,
            • Seal, Diadem, Scepter &c. Souldier Coats, Badges, &c. Pawns and Pledges
            • Limits, Bounds, &c.

[Page 49]Hitherto of the principall Predicaments; now follow the lesse principall, in which onely things by accident and se­condarily so called, are disposed.

And they be four. When, Where, Situation, Habit.

The Predicament When, is that wherein are placed things in the Concrete, noting the manner or circumstance of the7 When. time. Hereunto belong Ages, Infancy, Youth, Old age, parts of the yeer, Summer, Winter, Spring, Autumn, Morning, Noon, Night, &c. Also the Concretes of Ages, as a Childe, an Old man, &c.

The Predicament Where, is that wherein are placed8 Where. things in the concrete, noting the manner or circumstance of place. As Europe, Germany, England, an English man, a Londoner, an Ilander, a Sea-man, &c. All Countries and their Inhabitants.

The Predicament of Situation, is that wherein are pla­ced9 Situation. things in the concrete, noting the certain position and order of the parts of the body. As standing, sitting, lying upright, groveling, &c.

The Predicament of Habit, is that, wherein are placed10. Habit. things in the concrete, noting some artificiall Adherent. As armed, cloaked, booted, spurr'd, with a breast-plate, &c.

Of the Cause.

We have seen the Order of things: now followeth the Term without that Order, which is no degree of the Predicamental rank.

  • And it is either Inward. a a
  • And it is either Outward. b b

Inward, is that which inwardly cleaveth with another.a a

Inwards, be the Cause, the Caused, the Subject, the Ac­cident, the Whole, the Part.

A Cause, is that whereon the thing caused doth depend.Cause [...]. And so it differeth from a beginning, which hath not alwaies respect of dependance; as God the Father, may be said to be the beginning of the Son, but not the cause; for the cause and the caused differ in essence, which the Persons in the Trinity do not,

[Page 50]The Canons of the Cause are three.

1 Every Cause is before his thing caused, in order of nature, of knowledge, and dignity.

2 As without a cause nothing is done, so also without it nothing is distinctly known. Therefore God is without Cause; for he is not made, nor done, but existeth of him­self.

3 There is a certain Order of Causes, neither is there granted in them a Proceeding to infinite.

There be four Causes. The Efficient, the Matter, the Form, the End.

The efficient Cause, is that whereon the effect dependeth, and is

  • By it self. m
  • By accident. n

Efficient by it self, is that whereon the effect dependethm by it self.

The Canons hereof be three.

1 No Efficient doth in vain, but all for some certain End.

2 The same Efficient Cause, as it is the same, alwaies doth the same thing. ‘Idem, quà idem, semper facit idem.’

3 The Efficient Cause, properly so called, doth not ef­fect but some good thing in it self. For evil things are not things properly, but defects of things. A Thief puts forth his hand to take another mans goods; this moving of it self proceeds from the soul that moveth, but the misorder [ [...]] in this motion, is not from the soul. So the theft is not properly an effect, but a defect and ataxie in the mo­tion, proceeding from the ataxie of the appetite.

Moreover the Efficient cause, as it is a cause, is alwaies a simple thing: so when a man is said to be the cause of his own accidents, properly he is not the cause, but the subject that hath the cause; and things are spoken of him, not as ef­fects but accidents. A man is not the cause of laughter, but the commotion of the heart and midriffe by some ridiculous object known; neither is a man the cause of the faculty of laughter, but a reasonable soul.

The Efficient is of it self di­vided by

  • 1 The Force and the manner. of Effecting.
  • 2 The order of Effecting.

1 Of the force of effect­ing, it is

  • Principall▪
  • Lesse Principall.

[Page 51]Principal, whereon the effect princi­cipally dependeth, and s

  • Solitary.
  • Partaking.

Solitary, is that which hath alone the chiefty in produ­cing [...]. the effect, and is therefore called the total cause [...]. As Sampson was the sole cause of carrying away the Philistines gates. Christ, the whole or onely cause of Mans Redemption.

Partaking, is, which not alone, but with others hath the chiefty in producing the effect, and is called partiall, [...].

And it is partaking or sociated, either 1 Necessarily, or 2 Contingently,

1 Necessarily sociated, are, when all of them together are needfull, if the effect should be produced.

2 Contingently sociated, are, when there is not need of All, &c. So a man and a woman are causes necessarily so­ciated in producing a childe. Again, six-horses may for more pomp be joyned together in drawing a chariot, when two or three are sufficient.

Lesse Principal, is that whereon the effect lesse principal­ly dependeth.

And it is either, 1 Impulsive: or 2 Instrumentall.

Impulsive, is that which impelleth or moveth the princi­pal agent, to do.

And it is

  • [...], which within moveth to do.
  • [...], which outwardly moveth to do▪ Occasion.

[...], is alway a cause within the Efficient himself; but,

[...], is without the Efficient cause.

So of our Justification, the principal Cause is God. The cause Proegumene, is Gods good will and love; for these move God in himself to forgive us ou [...] si [...]s. The Cause Procatactick, is likewise obedience and merit, whereby outwardly he is provoked to take us into favour, seeing his Justice is satisfied for us. So in an Ague, the Proëgumenon is some corrupt humour in the veins; the Pr [...]cata [...]cticon is outward heat of the Sun, or the Northern wind, whereby the pores are stopped, and the humour boileth.

2 Instrumentall, is that which is taken of the principall cause, to produce the effect, called [...], or [...].

The Canons hereof are two.

1 The whole Instrument serveth for the Action of the Principall Agent, by whom it is directed. Therefore when it serveth not the principal Agent, it loseth the Nature of an Instrument. As men when they oppose themselves to Gods Commands and Rule, are not Gods Instru­ments, but the Devils. Hereupon note, that an Instru­ment taketh the determination of his action from his prin­cipal Agent. As Ink of its own nature blotteth the Paper, but it fashioneth no letter, unlesse the Writer guideth the Pen.

The whole force of an Instrument consists in the use; for then it is in Act a cause, when it is caused; but when it is idle, it is not an Instrument, but some other thing. In­struments have no dignity of themselves, but of the prin­cipall cause, and serve not but in use and work; when the principall Agent can use them no more, they are no longer called Instruments, but [...] by homonymy. And all Instruments▪ because they are indeterminate, are therefore [...], i. e. such as one may use well or ill: as a sword, riches (called of their use [...].)

An Instrument is either

  • Co-operative,
  • Passive.

Co-operative, is that which by an inward force together is moved in producing the effect. As a servant is an Instru­ment used by his Master, yet so as he also moveth him­self. So the Creatures, though they be instruments in re­spect of God, yet have they their action distinct from Gods. As Paul calleth Ministers Gods co-workers [...]. Unto such instruments often is given the efficacie of the princi­pall Agent, as Preachers are said to convert and save souls when the Lord doth these by them; so Baptism is said to re­generate, &c. by an improper predication; whereof here­after in the second Book.

Passive is, that moveth not it self at all, in producing the effect; as the earth under us is an instrument of walking, so a copy to write on other things, or a pattern: some instruments are necessary, some not, as God useth Angels, &c. when as he needeth them not. And it is true the prin­cipal efficient cause worketh well by evil instruments, to wit when it needs not the instruments. As God made Joseph▪ [Page 35] Ruler of Egypt by his envious brethren; and by Balaam blessed his people; otherwise in necessary instruments such commonly is the action of the principal doer, as is the in­strument; so a man cutteth ill if he have a blunt knife; ri­deth ill if he have a lame horse, &c. Also in divine things, often instruments do move, but it is all one as if they mo­ved not; for the force of the effect is not in them. So Mo­ses staff was moved at the dividing of the Red-sea, but this motion caused not the Sea to part, save only in a similitude. So Peters shadow, Acts 5. Pauls napkins, Acts 19. had of themselves no force to heal the sick.

Also the efficient cause is either

  • Naturall. a
  • Voluntary. b

Naturall is, which of the readinesse and necessity of Ni­turea bringeth forth the effect. As fire of necessity natural­ly burneth, &c.

The Canons hereof are two.

1 A Naturall cause is properly determined unto one of the Opposites; As fire naturally is carried upward, not down­ward, only heateth and cooleth not. The Loadstone draw­eth iron to it, and doth not both draw and drive it away.

2 A Naturall cause doth not adde a certain moderation and dilation of the action, but it worketh to the utmost of his power; as fire when it hath fewel, burneth without measure.

3 A voluntary cause is, which doth of certain foreknow­ledgeb and counsell.

The Canons hereof be three.

1 A Voluntary cause is free and indifferent to an action; [...] so as it may do or may not do. And freedom is two-fold. 1 of Contradiction, and 2 of Contrariety; the first is, when a cause may do or not do; and so every voluntary cause is simply free. But liberty of contrariety is again. 1 Natural, or 2 Moral. Natural when contrary natural effects pro­ceed, as a Physician may use medicines, cooling or heat­ing. Moral is, when men may effect things good or evil, honest or dishonest.

2 A voluntary cause doth by certain moderation; and, at his pleasure, can suspend the action, though occasion be gi­ven of doing. So God gives not all his gifts to one, or al­wayes punisheth, but deferreth, &c. at his pleasure.

[Page 54]Again, a voluntary cause is free either

  • Meerly.
  • After a sort.

Meerly free, which with full appetite willeth and produ­ceth the effect:

And it is called, [...] [...], [...], & [...].

After a sort free, which willeth and produceth the effect, but with an heavie and sorrowfull appetite. As in a tempest, a Merchant casts his goods into the Sea to escape Ship­wrack.

Moreover, the efficient cause is either

  • Transmutative.
  • Emanative.

Transmutative, which doth with some notable change or motion: as when fire worketh on water and heateth it, &c.

Emanative, when the effects flow without any notable change: as, from the soul flow forth the powers of sense, understanding, speaking, &c. From the Sun comes light, and yet in the soul or Sun is no change.

2 We have seen of the 1 force or manner of effecting; now follow the divisions of 2 the orders of effecting.

The efficient cause is subordinate either

  • Essentially. m
  • Contingently. n

Essentially, when the inferiour doth of it self, and ne­cessarilym depends on the superiour in effecting: as in Gene­ration, a man depends on the Sun.

The Canons hereof be three.

1 In causes of themselves subordinate, there is not grant­ed [...]. a proceeding to infinite; for subordination presupposeth order, and order resisteth infinitenesse.

2 Of causes subordinate, the inferiour in causing, hangs on the superiour.

3 In causes essentially subordinate, that which is cause of a cause, is the cause of the thing caused. This is true on­ly in causes essentially subordinate, but false in contingent­ly subordinate; for God is not the cause of sin, though he be the cause of mans will; which causeth sin, for will is not, o [...] it, self and as it is will, the cause of sin (for then it should sin always) but as it hath defect; so the nature of the horse is not the cause of halting, though it be the cause of motion.

[Page 55]Causes subordinate be either

  • First. a
  • Second. b

First is that which hath the highest place in the Order ofa causing; and it is either, 1 simply first, or 2 after a sort.

1 Absolutely first is, which in no respect is second; as onely God.

2 After a sort first, is that which is first in a certain kind onely: as in the moving of living Creatures, the soul is the first cause whereon all other causes and effects in such crea­tures depend.

The second cause, is that which hangeth on the first, ei­therb Mediate or Immediate.

Mediate, when others do come between it and the last effect: It is called, [...] [...], cause in power, for putting it, the last effect is not yet, but onely may be.

And this mediate cause is either

  • Farr off.
  • Or neer.

Far off, when many come between it and the last effect: as the motion of Heaven is a cause far off of mans walking, &c. For many other causes come between.

This pertains not to the first cause, God; for he is not far from every one, Acts. 7. 27. but he walks immediately with every created Agent.

Neer is, when one only comes between it and the effect: as the lifting up of vapours unto the clouds, is a neer cause of rain; for one only comes between, even the resolution of the cloud.

Immediate cause is, which produceth the effect by im­mediate and next force, called [...].

The Canons hereof be five.

First, The next cause presupposeth all the causes farther off.

2 The next cause being granted, needs must the effect be granted or taken away, when it is taken away. For the next cause is the cause in Act, and therefore cannot want an effct, any more then a father can want a childe. So then they greatly erre, which strive, that the essentiall Proprie­ties may be taken away, the forms of the subjects remain­ing safe, whereas the form of the subject is the next [Page 56] cause of all those properties that are in the subject.

3 One effect hath but one next cause, though it may have many effects.

4 By the next cause, Accidents are distinctly and per­fectly known.

5 The next cause is enquired, both by sense and observa­tion, and by the Examen of Logick: these two Instruments God hath given men to finde out the next causes, chiefly of Naturall effects.

The next cause, is either

  • Inward.
  • Outward.

Inward, which is essentiall to the subject unto whom it produceth the effect. So forms are always next causes of many faculties in subjects, as a reasonable soul is the next cause of laughing, speaking, &c.

Outward, which is without the Essence of that subject, to whom it produceth the effect; so the next cause of laugh­ter, is a moving of the heart and midri [...] by some ridiculous object known; and this is called outward, because it is nei­ther the form, nor matter, though it be in man.

Contingently subordinate causes, are when the Inferiourb hangs not on the superiour of its self, and its own Nature. As man depends on the Sun, and the picture depends on man; but because this picture depends not on him as a man or naturall thing, but as he is an Artificer onely, there­fore the picture is subordinate to the Sun contingently; So is it for mans will and sin; for though sin hang on the will, yet because it hangs not on it according to the preferment of nature, and as it is will, but as it is corrupted, therefore are they subordinate contingently.

Hitherto of a cause by its self; now followeth a cause [...] by accident, which is either in 1 Naturall, or 2 Voluntary Agents.

First, the Naturall Agent; That is called a cause by acci­dent, which brings not forth the effect of its own Nature, but by something that happens to it; as an Ague causeth temperance, not of its self, but by accident; for of it self the cause is the will, bridling the appetite. So knowledge puf­feth up; The Law causeth wrath, for it lighteth on them that cannot keep it.

[Page 57]2 In voluntary Agents, cause by accident is, which brings forth an effect besides the intent and purpose, or by ignorance: as a man cutting wood, his Ax-head flies off, and kills his neighbour unawares. Thus Judas, Pilate, and the Jews were causes,, by accident of Christs Passion and mans Redemption; for they never purposed, nor thought of such a good effect.

Hither belongs Fortune, which sometime is taken large­ly for any chance: as when a glasse falleth, and by fortune is not broken: sometime strictly taken, Fortune is the cause voluntary by accident, of that effect which one knew not, meant not, nor hoped for: as a man digging or plowing the ground, findes a bag of gold. Thus many things amongst men may be said to be done by fortune or luck, not in re­spect of God the first Cause, but in respect of secondary causes.

The Canons of causes by Accident, as well Natural as Voluntary, be four.

1 One end of the same thing may be a cause, both by accident and by its self, in a diverse respect: as the Go­spel by its self is the cause of Conversion, by accident the cause of hardening.

2 Every effect of a cause by accident, is reduced to a cause by its self. And thus all chances of Fortune, are to be reduced unto God.

3 Things that be done by chance or fortune, be rare, but of causes by themselves many and often.

4 Causes by accident are infinite and inordinate [ [...]. Some make it a kinde of cause, Sine qua non, [...]. But it needs not; for such causes may be referred to instruments, or some other before.

The matter next fol­loweth, which is either

  • Properly so called.
    2 Matter. [...].
  • Improperly so called.

First, properly so called, is

  • Principal. a
  • Lesse principal. b

Principal, which is onely matter, and in no respect com­pounded.

[Page 58]Second, which so is matter, as it is also a materiall com­pound. As a mans body is the matter of a man, though it be all compounded of Elements.

The Canons hereof be two.

First, every second matter depends on the first, viz. in a certain Order of Nature.

2 Every second matter is necessarily determined in a cer­tain quantity to one onely and certain form: So the matter of a man is onely determined to a reasonable soul, and can­not receive any unreasonable, and so in all other creatures; that vain is the M [...] or transamination of Pytha­goras, the Jews, &c. Hereby is confirmed the doctrine of the Resurrection, when every one shal receive the same bo­dy and soul.

The second matter is either

  • Far off.
  • Neer.

Far off, which makes a compound, others coming be­tween. So an humane body is the next matter of a man.

Lesse principall is that, whereof it being changed and notb remaining, a thing is made; Called therefore matter, pas­sing away, whereas the other is permanent: so seed is the matter passing away of living Creatures; for it is changed, and as it were perished before the constitution of the body.

And it is either

  • Far off, when things are made of it from far.
  • Neer, whereof a thing is next made.

As of meat and drink a man is engendred afar off, for of it is blood, & of blood seed, but seed is the next matter.

Matter improperly so called, is in a similitude, and by Ana­logy or proportion called matter.

The Canons hereof be three.

1 That which Artizens work on in their Art, and are occupied about, is called matter. As the matter of the Goldsmith, is gold and silver: The matter of Idols, is sil­ver, gold, wood, or stone, &c.

[Page 59]2 The Notion of matter is also often given to Acci­dents: so three Propositions are called the matter of a syl­logism. The two Tables the matter of Gods Law.

3 The name of Matter is also given to a subject where­in the accident is; and the Object about which the Action of a thing is busied.

The form answereth to the matter, and is so called

  • Properly. m
    3 Form.
  • Improperly. n
    m

Form, properly so called, is a cause that with the Matter constituteth a substantial compound or body: it is called [...] and [...]: And the substantial Form.

The General Rules hereof be seven.

1 Every form properly called is a substance.

2 The form is the chiefest part of the essential compound, whereby it is constituted, and essentially distinguished from all others: Every thing is named not of the matter, but of the form: hereupon the form is called Act; for the Ante­cedent matter is not in esse, but in power, till the form come; and this the Greek name [...] meaneth.

3 Unto the Form are due properly the operations of eve­ry compounded thing. The form being put, three things are put: 1 the being of a thing, 2 the distinction of it. 3 the operation; and he that grants the form, grants the consequences of it, that is, the proper operations.

4 The Form in a diverse respect, assumes the relation of the efficient cause and end. Of the efficient in respect of the powers that flow from it, and operations in which the powers cease; and of the end, in respect of the beget­ter and disposer, who intends nothing but the consequences of the Form.

5 Every Form is more perfect than the matter, and ac­cording to Natures scope, before it: wherefore the form is called species, [...].

6 The Form by it self comes not into the senses; be­cause it is not endued with qualities, which are the Objects of senses: therefore man who begins to understand by sense, is very ignorant of forms, and their names; by reason whereof our knowledge is like the shadow in the Sun.

[Page 60]7 The Form is not varied by degrees, nor increaseth it by its self, though the whole compound be varied in quantity. For the Form consists in indivisibility; it is like a number, which if one adde to, or take from it, it continueth not the same it was before.

Form is either

  • First.
  • Second.

First Form is, which in Order goes before all other: in Order I say, not of intention, but of generation: This also is called the first beginning active, and the common form of all bodies and Nature.

Second Form is that which follows the first; called also the inferiour and the particular Form, as Nature is called the Universal Form.

The Canons hereof be two.

First, The second Form is not united to the Matter, un­lesse the matter be rightly disposed and prepared.

Secondly, A certain and specifical Form, is determined to a certain matter, so as it cannot be communicated with an­other, nor go out of one unto another, nor be together in two disjoyned Matters. Mens souls cannot go into the bo­dies of beasts, &c.

Form, improperly so called is either Natural or Artificial,n [...]. Arist. 2. Phys. cap. 1 of which we have spoken in the Predicament of quality. In a most generall signification, Privation sometime is cal­led a form: so every relation in Philosophy is called form and formal; as the formal thing of a Syllogism, is, the or­der of knitting the three Propositions, which are the Mate­rial. What formal difference is, shall be shewed after in distinction.

The End is, that unto which the Efficient is ordained. [...], or [...]. End is diversly ta­ken, as for the last or utmost of any thing; here properly we treat of the End of intention, called also the scope.

End is eitherEnd. [...].

  • By it self. A * [...]
  • By Accident. B

[Page 61]An end by it self, is that whereunto the efficient andA * means of their own Nature are ordered:

And it is either so called

  • Primarily. a
  • Secondarily. b

Primarily, which the Efficient intendeth to attain [cal­leda Finis, [...], i. e. cujus.]

The General Rules hereof be six.

1 The End moveth the efficient to do; therefore is it called the cause of causes; for Matter without Form is rude. Form, if there want the preparing and efficient cause, is not brought into the matter; but the efficient worketh not, if it be not moved with desire; so without the end, no cause is caused.

2 The end by it self and in its own Nature, is only good and of good. So an End and Good are convertible; for the end is that which we most would: what we most would, is most to be desired, and desire naturally is alwayes order­ed to good. All vice wanteth both efficient and end.

3 Whatsoever hath an efficient cause, hath also an end.

4 The end is both cause and effect, in a diverse respect; so the celebrating of Gods Name, is mans action and [...], and yet is also the end of man.

5 The end, as it is an end, is also before and better than the means: before it, not in order of production, but of perfection and intention: So Justification is before Faith, though also it be gotten by Faith. I say also (as it is an end) for otherwise as touching the absolute essence, the means may be as perfect, or more. Christs incarnation and office, hath greater perfection than mans Redemption, absolute­ly considered.

6 The end and the efficient are causes each of other: the end causeth the efficient, as touching causality, not as touch­ing being, and not causality. Walking before meat is the ef­ficient cause of health, and health is the end or finall cause of such walking.

The end is either

  • Principal. * 1
  • Lesse principal. * 2

[Page 62]* 1 Principal, unto which a thing is ordered of its own nature, and by first intent of the efficient: as the principal end of the Lords Supper is the confirmation of Faith, and sealing up of Spiritual benefits, with a thankfull remem­berance of Christs death.

And it is either

  • A mean between. a
  • Last of all. b

A mean between, is, which tendeth yet further. As thea intermiddle end of a Souldier, is to fight valiantly; but this tends to a further end, to get the victory.

And it is either

  • Work.
  • Ending of the work.

The work [...] is a certain thing brought forth by Na­ture, or by the Artizen: so the house is the end and work of the builder. The ending of the work [...], is the pos­session and use thereof. As dwelling is the ending of the house.

The last end is whereunto all the rest are ordered, calledb [...], and [...], the first scope and chief intention.

The Canons hereof are seven.

1 The end, which is last in execution, is first in in­tention.

2 The last end is necessarily and chiefly good, and chief­ly moving or to be desired, [...]. Galen.

3 In the last end, both appetite and operation of the ef­ficient is terminate.

4 It gives to all the means, lovelinesse; order and mea­sure: So tribulations for the Gospel are joyfull, because the end is eternal life.

5 Onely the last end perfecteth both doer and deeds: wherefore we must know the last end, if we would intend and use the middle end aright; which is against Popish Do­ctrine of perfection of vertues, even without respect of the last End. Bellarm▪ 5. de grat. cap. 9.

[Page 63]6 The End being put, all means to the end are put: As, in Gods predestination, whom God hath destinated to Life, he hath also to Faith in good works.

7 The End entreth the manner of being, and supplyeth places of Form, viz. in those things whose essentiall per­fection is in operation.

The last end, is last either

  • Simply.
  • After a sort.

Simply last, which in respect of all things whatsoever is the last: and this is alwaies the end, and never a mean to the end; so the seeing and celebrating of God is the last and utmost end wherein mans understanding, will, and de­sires, shall rest, Prov. 8.

After a sort last, which in order of some things is the last: thus the last end of War is Victory and Peace; the last end of Logick, is the direction of the minde in know­ledge.

The lesse principal end, is, whereto things are lesse princi­pally* 2 ordered, viz. not of the nature of the thing, but the appointment of the Agent: So the principall End of the Lords Supper, is, a faithfull and thankfull remembrance of Christs death; but the lesse principall Ends be many, as ex­exercise of Repentance, distinction of the Church from other Companies, &c.

The Canons hereof be two.

1 Lesse principall Ends are not taken away by the princi­pall.

2 One thing may have many lesse principall Ends; and they either sub-ordinate, or well co-ordinate.

The End secondarily so called, is that whereto the Endb primary so called is intended, called Finis [...] cui.

And it is either of

  • Imperfection.
  • Perfection.

Of Imperfection is, to whose use and need the thing is [Page 64] intended: so the End cui to whom of health is the sick man▪ so the end of the Lords Supper, is faithfull people. So Re­probates are not the end cui of Christs passion; for the end cui by destination of the efficient and of its nature, ought to be capable of the end cujus, but Reprobates are not inten­ded by Christ, nor are capable in applying of it, and there­fore are removed by Christ, John. 17. 7.

Of Perfection the End cui is, of whom the efficient re­ceiveth perfection; called also the end of assimilation; thus God is the End to whom of all our actions, as the perfecter of them.

A [...] End by Accident, is, unto which the means are or­dained* B. by accident, and not of their Nature. So the End of sin is the manifestation of Gods Justice: the End of Here­resies and Atheism, is the illustration of the truth: such Ends are indeterminate and confuse.

Of the Caused.

The Caused is that which hangeth [...], upon the Cause, and is

  • The effect.
  • The Mattered.
  • The Formed.
  • The destinate.

The effect is that which hangeth on the Efficient.1 Effect.

The Canons hereof are three.

First, No effect, exceeds the vertue of its cause: So the Sun, though it hath not formally the heat which it giveth, yet it hath it eminently, that is, something much more ex­cellent then that heat, namely, pure light. Absurdly there­fore do the Popish Priests give unto Accidents the power of making a substance; for they say in the Masse, the accidents of Wine in the cup do change the water into another sub­stance.

2 As is the cause, such is the caused; This is meant, 1 of causes by themselves, not of causes by accidents; therefore it followeth not, to say, This Ship-wright is a good man, therefore he makes a good Ship; for he makes the Ship, not as he is a man or good, but as he is a Wright or Artizen.

[Page 65]2 It is meant in causes natural, and those chiefly parti­cular; so it followeth not, to say the effects of the Sun are hot, therefore the Sun is hot; for the Sun is a universal thing, and not a particular in causing. 3 It is meant of cau­ses doing voluntarily, if they would produce an effect con­formably: as a good Ship-wright makes a good Ship if he will. 4 It is meant upon condition and manner of the re­ceiver, not of the thing received; so the Argument follows not from the chief perfection of God to the chief perfection of the gifts in the Creatures; for God works voluntarily, and according to the measure of the receiver, and when we speak here of goodnesse, it is not meant moral goodnesse, but the Natural and Artificial faculty and force of causing, and by this many Canons of effects are to be understood.

3 That for which any thing is so, is it self so much more: [...]. This Canon hath three limitations. 1 The cause must be by it self; for it follows not, This man is drunken with wine; therefore this wine is more drunken; because wine maketh not a man drunken, but by the abuse of it. 2 It is requi­red, that that affection, whereof the cause and effect is na­med such, be in both. 3 That it receive more and lesse.

1 The Mattered is, that which hangs on the matter.2 Mattered

As the whole compound naturall body, is the caused of the matter.

3 The Formed is, that which hangs on the form. As the3 Form. said natural informed body.

4 The Destinate is, that which is ordered unto the End;4 Destinate it may also be called the Ended; for by the End it is deter­mined; so vocation, justification, sanctification, are the De­stinates of Eternal Life; for they are ordered as means hereunto.

The Distinctions and Subdivisions of these may be ga­thered from the divisions of their causes going before; for among Relates, one is known by another.

Of the Subject and the Accident. [...].

A Subject is that whereunto an Accident sticks [...]and is

  • Absolute. a
  • Limited. b

[Page 66]Absolute is, that whereto an Accident sticketh abso­lutely, without any limitation of part: So Christs person is the absolute subject of the Mediatours office, and all things thereto pertaining; for to be Mediator agreeth to the whole person as it is the whole: So the whole man is the subject of life and death; and it cannot rightly be said the body dieth; for that which is compounded, is also dissolved, and consequently dies, and that is the whole man. So also man is the absolute subject of laughter; and an Animal is the ab­solute subject of sense.

And it is either [...].

  • Proper.
  • Common.

Proper, which is reciprocate with his Accident, viz. so as it be determined to it alone, not larger nor straighter: so a man is the proper subject of laughter, and Animal of sense.

Common is, which is not reciprocate with his Accident, but may have, or not have the accident, as a man is the subject of whitenesse.

A Limited Subject is, that whereto an accident is given inb part, not absolutely; as a Black-moor is the limited subject of whitenesse, being white but in his teeth; so Christ is the sub­ject of accidents limited [...]. As when whole Christ is said to be every where, it is by limitation to his infinite Nature or Godhead; so when he is said to be born, die, &c. it is by limitation to his finite nature or manhood: this the Greeks note by the phrase, [...].

An accident is, that which sticketh to the subject; it is [...]. called also adjoynt.

The Canons hereof be three.

1 An Accident by nature is later than his Subject.

2 One Accident in number cannot be in divers Subjects in number.

3 One Accident in number goes not from Subject to Subject.

An Accident is either

  • Proper. m
  • Common. n

[Page 67]Again proper is so called eitherm

  • Absolutely and primarily.
  • After a sort.

Absolutely so called, is reciprocate with the subject of some certain Species.

The Canons hereof be three.

1 Every proper floweth from the Essential beginnings of his subject, as the power of laughter floweth from a rea­sonable soul.

2 Every proper is determined to some certain Species in Nature.

3 Every proper accident of one Species is communicable to another that is really divers; every thing to the perfe­ction of it requireth three things, knit, undivided. 1 Es­sence. 2 Essential properties. 3 Operations, wherefore a propriety cannot be communicated, unlesse first the Essence of things be made common and confounded.

Absolute proper is either

  • Perfect.
  • Imperfect.

Perfect, is that which is not only alone and in all, but always and perpetually in it, as qualities in respect of a na­tural body: the faculty of wit, will, speech, &c. in a man.

The Canons hereof are three.

1 A subject cannot without contradiction be conceived under the denial of a perfect proper adjoynt: as I cannot conceive man without power of wit, &c. But it must imply contradiction, a man to be no man.

2 It is not possible for perfect Propers to be severed from their subjects, a moment of time; because they come from the form of the subject, and the next cause being put, the effects are put; and contrary, he that takes away proprie­ties, takes away Nature.

3 Perfect Propers are first in Universals, as reason is in man generally; then it is in this or that man, more or lesse.

[Page 68]Imperfect proper, is, that which is in a thing alone, and in all, but not alwayes; as the acts of speaking, laugh­ing, weeping, &c. are onely in a man, and in all men, but not alwayes.

Proper after a sort, which is called proper onely by com­parison with another; as it is proper for a man to be two­footed in respect of a four-footed beast. Fewnesse is proper to the Elect in respect of the Reprobates.

Common accident is, that which commonly and contin­gentlyn is in subjects that be diverse in specie.

The Canons hereof are five.

1 A Common accident floweth not from the Essential beginnings of the subject.

2 It is such as a subject may be conceived under the op­posite thereof, without any implying of contradiction: a man may be conceived under the opposite of an Ague with­out implying contradiction, a man to be not a man.

3 A common accident may be in two divers, specifically distinct, subjects.

4 It is more and rather in singulars than universals; for they flow not from the essence, but from the existence.

5 Common accidents receive degrees; as one man is whiter than another, but one man is not more risible than another.

A common accident is either

  • Separable.
  • Inseparable.

Separable, which may easily be separated from the sub­ject; as health from a man, sleep, &c.

Inseparable, which is not easily separated from the sub­ject, though to be separated nothing repugneth, as black­nesse is inseparable in a raven.

Of the Whole and the Part.

Now follow the inward terms, the Whole, and the Part.

The Whole is that which hath parts, and it is either

  • by it self. a
  • by accident. b

[Page 69]Whole by it self, is, which hath parts properly and per­fectlya so called.

And it is either

  • Universal.
  • Co-ordinate.

Universal whole, is a thing common and universal in re­spect of Particulars; as an Animal is the whole of man and beast.

Co-ordinate is, which is made of parts co-ordinate in act, and is

  • Ordinary. a
  • Extraordinary. b

Ordinary, which hath ordinary parts, and isa

  • Essential.
  • Integral.

Essential, which hath essential parts, as Matter and Form, called [...], as a man in respect of body and soul.

And it is either, 1 Perfectly, or 2 Imperfectly so called.

1 Perfectly called, is substantial, which is compounded of Matter and Form. 2 Improperly so called, as an Ora­tion consists of Letters, Syllables, Words, as the Material; and the signification as the Formal. A Common-weal of Magistrates and Subjects as the Material, and of their union by Laws to felicity as the Formal.

Integral, which consists of Integrant parts, and is

  • Perfectly called,
  • Imperfectly called,

Perfectly, which consists of substantial parts united.

And is either of

  • The same kind, Homogeneum.
  • Of another kind, Heterogeneum.

Of the same kind, which hath parts having the same name with the whole; as every part of water, wine, blood, &c. is called water, &c.

Of another kinde, which hath parts having a name di­verse from the whole as a mans body consists of head, breast, belly, &c.

[Page 70]Imperfectly called, is that which consists of parts im­perfect.

And is

  • Substantial.
  • Accidental.

Substantial, which consists of the Aggregation of substan­tial parts, as a heap of corn of many grains, &c.

Accidental, when an accident is as it were compounded of other accidents; so the Moral Law is the whole in re­spect of the ten Commandments; mans conversion is the whole in respect of mortification and vivification.

Extraordinary whole, is, whose parts are united extraor­dinarily; [...] such a whole is the person of our Mediator Christ, which consists of Natures, as of parts; yet is neither a whole essential nor integral, though it have a great Analogy with the Integral.

The whole by accident, is which is whole improperly andb plain accidentally: as the caused, which is divided by his causes; the subject which is divided by accidents, and the accident by the Subject; so heat is the whole in respect of the Sun and fire.

Parts.

Part.

A Part is that which is referred to the whole, and is either

  • By it self. a
  • By accident. b
    [...].

By its self, which is referred to the whole by it self, and is

  • Subject.
  • Co-ordering.

Subject is that which is subjected to the universal whole,a as a straighter to a larger; so man and beast are the subje­ctive parts of Animal.

Co-ordering is, by whose co-ordination the whole is made or compounded

  • Ordinary.
  • Extraordinary. †

The Canons hereof be five.

1 Parts as they make their whole, so also they deter­mine and measure it.

[Page 71]2 Parts differ from their whole, though they be taken together: for, the whole is never the constituter, but the constituted, and the parts are alwayes constituters; and the same thing constitutes not it self; also the whole (as it is the whole) is one thing; parts, though taken together, are many.

3 That which is of a part, (as it is a part) the same al­so is of the whole, viz. according to that part. Note that some things are in the part as a part, that is, cannot be there, but in asmuch, and as long as it cleaves to the whole.

Again some things are in it, not as it is a part, but as it hath a substance diverse from the whole; and therefore those may remain, though separated from the whole: of this sort attributes and accidents are not rightly given to the whole, but onely to the part; as it is rightly said, The eye is mixt of humours, is round, &c. for such is the eye, though it be pluckt out of the body; but it is not properly said, the eye seeth, the ear heareth, &c. for those agree to those parts as they are parts and instruments of the whole, which if it be extinct, the eye seeth not, nor the ear heareth. The like is in all other parts, in every essential and integral whole that is one by it self; for in Aggregate totals, as a heap, &c. it is otherwise; for they are not indeed totals; this hath great use in the Doctrine of Christs Person, which is the whole consisting of two Natures; for rightly and really do agree to the whole person the attributes of either Nature; fitly therefore it is said, Christ is omnipotent, as touching his Divinity; Christ died for us touching his Humanity; and this is more aptly spoken thus than in the Abstract.

4 Note, whatsoever is of the whole, is also of the part. Here distinguish between the whole Universal, and the whole Essential & Integral. For whatsoever is in an universal whole, as an Animal, the same is in the parts of man and beast; but in other totals it is not so; for there, what the whole hath, cannot be properly given to the parts, because such parts receive not the definition of their totals, as in the Universal whole; it is not fitly said, the soul understand­eth, thinketh, pitieth, &c. but the man that hath the soul doth those things; so whatsoever is spoken of whole Christ, or the person of the Mediatour, is not properly spo­ken of the Humane Nature, nor of the Divine.

[Page 72]5 Every part in respect of his whole, is an imperfect thing; as the soul and body are things incompleat; but a man, compleat.

And this part is either

  • Essential. a
  • Integral. b

Essential, is, which is referred to the Essential whole. And is

  • Perfectly called.
    a
  • Imperfectly called.

Perfectly, which is referred to an Essential whole, perfectly so called; as soul and body are perfectly Essential parts; for they make a perfect Essential whole.

Imperfectly, which is referred to an Essential whole im­perfectly so called: so sound and signification, are the Es­sential parts of Speech, but imperfectly called, the sound as the Matter, the signification as the Form.

Integral, is, which is referred to an Integral whole.b

And is also

  • Perfectly called.
  • Imperfectly called.

Perfectly, which is referred to an Integral whole, having quantity.

And perfectly so called. And it is either

  • Of the same, Homogenea.
  • Of another kind, Heterogenea.

Of the same kind, which hath the same Name with the whole; as every part of flesh is called flesh; of blood, blood; of gold, gold, &c.

Of another kinde is, which hath a diverse Name from the whole; as the parts of a man; head, hands, feet, &c.

And it is either

  • Principal.
  • Lesse Principal.

1 Principal, without which the whole cannot be: As in man, the heart, the brain, &c.

2 Lesse principal, which may be away without the de­struction of the whole, as the finger, toe, &c.

[Page 73]Imperfectly so called, is, which is referred to an Integral whole, imperfectly so called, named [...], Intelli­gible part; such parts be the propositions in a Syllogism; the ministering of the Word and Sacraments, are the parts of the Ministery.

An Extraordinary part, is, which is referred to an Extra­ordinary whole; as the two Natures in Christs person.

A Part by accident, is that which is referred to an wholeb by accident: as subjects when they are divided by their accidents, and accidents by their subjects, causes by the effects, &c.

Outward Terms.

We have seen the simple terms inward. Now follows theb b outward term which is preferred unto others outwardly, so as it constituteth them not inwardly; but, in deed and place, is diverse and distinct from them.

The outward Term is either

  • Adherent. m *
  • Concomitant. n *

Adherent is either

  • [...], Adjacent. a
    m *
  • [...], Object. b

Adjacent, [...], again is either

  • Knit together. 1
  • Circumstance. 2
    a
  • Adjoynt. 3

1 Knit together, or Connex, is that which happeneth, and is done together with the thing: as with Christs passi­on the darkening of the Sun, the rending of the veil, &c.

2 Circumstance is, which is about a thing, and to it ad­jacent, as place and time, named [...]; so the circumstances of Christs suffering, were the place, Golgo­tha; the time, Tiberius reign; the day, hour, &c. So sha­dow is the circumstance of the body.

3 Adjoynt, is that which is adjoyned neer to a thing, as the Thoray Crown, Reed, Purple Robe of Christ, &c.

An Object, is about which a thing or operation of a thing [...] is busied.

[Page 74]And it is either

  • By it self. e
  • By accident. f

By it self, unto which a thing is ordered by its self, ande of its own Nature; such an Object of the Will, is Good, of the understanding, Truth, &c.

And it is either

  • Common.
  • Proper.

Common, is about which many things together are bu­sied; so the common object of all the senses is greatnesse, figure, and motion; for these are apprehended and judged of all the senses in common.

Proper, is which is determined to one, as colour to seeing, sound to hearing, &c.

Both of them again is

  • Primary.
  • Secondary.

Primary, unto which a thing is first carried; as univer­sall things, [...], are the primary object of the un­derstanding. And God is of the Philosopher (Ethic. 10.) acknowledged to be, [...].

Secondary, unto which a thing is secondly carried; as things singular in respect of the understanding, and things universal in respect of sense.

Also the object is either

  • Mediate.
  • Immediate.

Mediate, which is objected by means of another: as sen­sible substances are objects of the senses by means of the qua­lities▪

Immediate, which is objected without any means; so qualities are objects of the senses, as colour of sight, &c.

An Object by accident, is about which a thing is busied byf accident; and this is meant both in respect of the action, and of the object; so evil is the object of the will by acci­dent; [Page 75] for about it the will is busied, not of its own Nature, as it is will, but of vice and defect outwardly accident; thus also the understanding by accident is busied about falshood; the preaching of the Gospel about Reprobates. And of the object, Sarah Abrahams wife was sensible by her acci­dent, when the King saw her not as Abrahams wife, but as a fair woman, &c.

Concomitant, is either

  • Antecedent. 1
    n *
  • Consequent. 2

1 Antecedent is, which goeth in order of time before a thing, so as it cannot be the cause.

And it is either

  • Necessary.
  • Contingent.

Necessary which goeth before necessarily, either by nature or by will, as Childhood goes before Manhood, Spring time before Harvest, Resurrection before Eternal Life.

Contingent, which goes before a thing contingently; as the rednesse of the evening, in respect of the next day's fair weather, the red lowring of the morning in respect of rain at evening. Such antecedents may be called signes.

2 Consequent is, which followeth the thing, so as it is not the effect. And it is either

  • Necessary.
  • Contingent.

Necessary, which needs must follow the antecedent, as in the necessity of Gods decree, Christs suffering necessarily followed his last Supper, death followed his suffering, re­surrection his death and burial, &c.

Contingent, which followeth contingently; so fair wea­ther contingently, or it may be followeth the white Moon, for sometime it doth not, &c.

Of simple Terms arising from the first.

Having seen the first single Terms; next follow those that arise, and are conceived by means of the first.

A Term arising from the first is either of

  • A Word. 1 *
  • A Thing. 2 *

Of a Word.

The Term of a Word is either the

  • a Explication of a Word.
    1 *
  • b Conjugation of a Word.

The Explication of a Word, is either 1 a Definition ofa a Name; or 2 a Distinction of a doubtfull word; or a 3 clearing of a dark word.

1 A Definition of a Name, is, which turneth up and unfoldeth the significa­tion of a Word, and is either

  • by a Word, [...].
  • by Notation, [...].

Definition by a word, is, which declareth the signification of a word by some other that is more known, either by a Synonymy and Metalepsis, or by a contrary word: As when I say a Condition is a Promise; Stibium is Antimony; An­tichrist is he that is against Christ and for the De­vil, &c.

Etymologie.

Definition by Notation or Etymologie, is, which declares the Word by the Original of it; and this not Grammati­cally, but Logically, for the meaning and explaning of a thing; as Noble is he which by vertue is noscible, famous or well known.

[Page 77]The Canons or Etymologie are three.

1 The Etymologie of all words is not to be sought; for many words are primitive.

2 In Etymologies we must not go on without End, but must stay in some that is first; as the English word, Mix, may come from the Latine Misceo, and that from the Greek [...]. And the Greek from the Hebrew [...] Masach. And here we must rest; for the Hebrew is the first tongue, and many words in it are primitive.

3 Etymologies are taken from the end, effects, proprie­ties, object, and opposites of a thing; and are therefore from these to be derived, and these by those to be declared; as a River comes from the Latine Rivus, and both of them from the Hebrew [...] Ravah, which signifieth to wet or moisten, because Rivers do moisten the dry Land. World so called of War▪old, because the older it is, the War or worse it is, &c.

Distinction 2.

A Distinction is, the freeing of a doubtfull word from the variety of hidden significations.

The Canons hereof are seven.

1 The Distinction of a doubtful word must be first in all consideration of things.

2 When one word or name is given to things of divers Orders and kinds, it is doubtful, and needeth distinction; as if one speak of a Canker, it is to be known whether it be of the Canker-worm, or the Canker-sore, &c.

3 When a word is given to any in a diverse respect, viz. Absolutely, and by relation, it is doubtful, and needeth di­stinction: as Justification is taken either absolutely, as it is in the Justified person only, Rom. 4. or relatively to our neigh­bour, as he may acknowledge us to be justified by the effects of Faith. Jam. 2.

4 When a word meaneth sometime more things, some­times fewer, it is doubtfull: as Faith is sometime large­ly [Page 78] used, sometime strictly; so Church, Grace, Electi­on, &c.

5 When the opposite of any word is doubtfull, the word it self is doubtful; as Election to life hath opposite, Repro­bation: Election to an Office hath no opposite; therefore Election is a doubtfull word.

6 When a Primitive word is doubtfull, the Derivative is so too; and if one of the conjugates be doubtfull, so is the other; as Faith is diversly taken; therefore a faithfull man or infidel, is diversly to be taken.

7 Distinction of a word, repugneth not the Nature and use of things, neither darkeneth it, but cleareth the under­standing of the minde, viz. a good distinction; but evil di­stinction doth darken and confound things.

Illustration.

8 The clearing or Illustration of a dark word, is the re­ducing of it to perspicuity.

The Canons hereof be four.

1 When a word is dark by barbarousnesse or Soloecism, it is to be judged by Grammar Rules: as Transubstantiation is a monstrous word, and hath bred as monstrous opinions, so Opus operatum, &c.

2 When a word is dark for want of use, let a more usu­all and safe word be put in place: as the Sacrament of the Altar is an unproper word, not to be used for the Lords Supper.

3 When a word is larger or straighter than the thing meant thereby, let another word, if it may be had, be put in the room; as when the word Clergy is applied to the Mi­nisters onely, which is said to be common to all the Saints, 1 Pet. 5.

4 When a word is figurative, not for any need, but for finenesse sake, put a proper word for it.

The Conjugation, [...], or yoking together of words,b is a depending of words yoked together. And is

  • Primitive.
  • Derivative.

[Page 79]Primitive, on which another word hangs in deduction.

Derivative, which hangs on the Primitive; as faithfull on Faith.

And they are either

  • Of a word only.
  • Of thing.

Of word only, when not so much the Natural Order of signifying is looked on, as the forming of words, one from another.

Of thing, when there is a union of signification, and is

  • Primary.
  • Secondary.

Primary, which is in which the dependance, both of sig­nification and determination is observed; of Faith faithful, and Justice just, &c.

Secondary, In which there is a dependance of significa­tion only, and not of termination also; as when of vertue one is said to be studious, gracious, &c.

Of a thing.

2 *

The arising term of a thing without the word is

  • Resolving.
  • Conferring.

Resolving is either

  • Definition.
  • Division.

Of a Definition.Definition, [...].

Definition, is the unfolding, or turning out of the defi­ned thing.

And it is either

  • 1 Perfect.
  • 2 Imperfect.

1 Perfect is the unfolding of the thing by essentiall terms, [...].

The Canons hereof be five.

1 Every defined thing of perfect definition must be by it self, and directly in the predicamental order of things; so then there can be no perfect definition of doubtfull things, of Fictions, or Privations, as sin, &c. of things con­crete, incompleat, &c.

2 Whatsoever is perfectly defined, is a Species.

3 A Definition must be formed perspicuous and deter­minate, viz. free from all ambiguity.

4 A Definition should be reciprocall and equall to the thing defined.

5 An essential Definition must consist of things simply before more known, and so indemonstrable. Not regarding what we must know, or what this or that man is able to comprehend, but absolutely and simply what is first in na­ture, and more known according to the Essential Order of things.

Definition hath two Notions and Conceits.

1 The one of agreement or conveniencie, called the Genus.

2 The other of distinction or difference, called the Diffe­rence.

The conceit of agreement, or Genus, both of Substances and Accidents, is found by bringing the defined thing into his predicamental Order, and by conferring with his supe­riours, by the Canons of a true and next Genus.

The Notion of Distinction or Difference, is either

  • Of Substances.
  • Of Accidents.

In Substances, there is one onely and simple Difference, which also may easily be known by the same predicamental Table.

In Definition of Accidents, the Difference is taken from the Subject, the Efficient, the End, and Object.

The Canons of Defining Accidents by every of the Orders are nine.

1 Proper Accidents are defined by the Subject made equal, and the next efficient cause.

[Page 81]2 Common Accidents are defined by the mention of the efficient cause.

3 Quantity taken in general, and compleatly, is defined by mention of the subject and the efficient: as that it is [...] bodies Accident, arising from the extension of the matter. Special quantities, as a line, &c. are not defined, because they are things incompleat; neither is number.

4 Qualities potentiall naturall, are defined by the sub­ject, the efficient cause, and act, unto which they are carried as to an end; As, risibility is the power of man to laugh, proceeding from a reasonable soul.

5 Habits are defined by the end & the object: as Logick is an Art directing the operations of the mind about the know­ledge of things, Liberality is a vertue of taking & bestowing.

6 Qualities patible, are defined by the efficient cause, and the subject, if they be proper accidents; as colour is the quality of a mixt body, arising from the tempering toge­ther of bright and dark. Smell is an affecting quality of a mixt body, arising from the predominion of a d [...]y thing sa­vouring tempered with moist.

7 Actions are defined by mention of the subject, the ob­ject, the efficient and the end; as sense is the knowledge of a sensible object, arising from the receiving of sensible spe­cies, by a fit sensory instrument, to the conservation and perfection of the living creature. Sight is a sense about Co­lour and light, arising from the receiving of both by their species, unto the perfection of the living Creature. Adora­tion is an holy operation of a Faithfull man▪ arising from the acknowledgement, and trust of God Almighty, and (in his Son) mercifull, by the holy Ghost stirred up, to the honour of God, and the faithfull mans salvation.

8 A Passion is defined by the subject, and the efficient cause; as, anger is an affection arising from heat of the blood, moved about the heart for some hu [...]t done. Sleep is a passi­on ceasing from operations in living creatures, arising from the Alimentary, nourishing and profitable humour, imbru­ing the brain, and as it were congealing the passages of the Animall Spirits.

9 Relations are defined by the subject relate, correlate, foundation and term.

The subject rela [...]e and correlate, is wherein the relation is of mutual part; some call it the materiall; as the subject [Page 82] of marriage, is man and woman; hereupon the Relate and Correlate is the husband and wife.

The Foundation, is, from which the relation riseth, or for which it is in the subjects: the foundation is ratio refe­rendi, without which it would be nothing; it is answera­ble to the efficient cause, and is either neer or far off; as the next foundation of Marriage is the lawfull consent of each party; the far Foundation, is Gods first institution in Para­dise.

The term is as the end for which the relation is brought into the subject▪ it is the office and effect of the relation; so the term of Baptisme is the seal and confirmation of the washing of sins by Christs blood; so marriage is an order or union between husband and wife, established by mutuall con­sent for procreation of seed, and pleasant society of life and goods.

Description [...]:

An Imperfect definition is the unfolding of a thing by terms lesse essentiall; it is called

Description: and is either.

  • Principal.
  • Lesse Principal.

Principal, which unfoldeth the thing by the Genus, and the Accidents, or the proper effects; as a man is a living Creature that can laugh, go upright, made after Gods Image.

Lesse Principal, is the unfolding of a thing by terms meer­ly contingent, or outward, without assigning the exact Genus, called [...], shewing not what, but what manner a thing, it is.

And it is either. 1 Of the part of the concrete, or, 2 of the part of the thing. Of the part of the concrete, when a thing by its nature capable of a perfect definition, is yet un­folded to us unperfectly,

Of the part of the thing, when the thing it self is not ca­pable of a perfect definition; as be all privatives, incom­pleat, concrete, &c.

The Canons hereof be two.

1 Privations are described by mention of the habits whose privations they are; as originall sin is an ataxie, or disorder of the understanding, will and appetite, born with us, and opposite to Gods Image.

[Page 83]1 Concrete accidents are not unfitly described by put­ting the subject in the place of the genus: as a Minister of the word is a person lawfully called and ordained to the preaching of the word, and administrating of the Sacra­ments. A Magistrate is a publique person, ordained of God, to rule and defend the Subjects with Justice, Prudence, and Fortitude.

Boetius gathereth from the Greeks ten forms of Descriptions

1 [...], when the name of a thing is unfolded, as Antichrist is he that is against Christ. Justification is a repu­ting for Just.

2 [...], when a thing is declared by its difference; as hatred is that which dureth longer than wrath.

3 [...], when a thing is said to be that which it is like to; as a man is a bubble; the Church is Noahs Ark.

4 [...], when a thing is declared by removing the contrary; as vertue is to flee vice; death is the privation of life.

5 [...], by circumlocution; as Paul was the Teacher of the Gentiles.

6 [...], by Example; as a substance is, for exam­ples sake, a man, a horse, &c.

7 [...], by want of the full of the same kinde. As an Enthymeme is that which wanteth one of the premisses to be a Syllogism.

8 [...], by praise; as a history is the witnesse of Times, the light of Truth, the life of memory, the mi­stresse of life, the shower of Antiquity; also by dispraise; as riches ate the enticements to evil.

9 [...], when one thing is said to be another, for natural similitude: as a man is a little world; wine is the soul of a Banquet.

10 [...], by Notation; as the World is that which waxeth worse and old.

Of Division.

Division is the resolving of the whole into parts, and is

  • Perfect. a
  • Imperfect. b

Perfect, is the resolving of the whole properly so calleda and perfect, into parts properly called.

The Canons hereof are nine.

1 That which is rightly divided, must needs have parts;

Therefore the truth is ill divided into Philosophical; see­ing, it is not an whole thing, but simple and impartible. So Omnisciency into Ubiquity, &c.

2 The divided and division should be without all doubt­fulness and darkness; as works should not be divided into operation, & operantis; nor Faith into Historical, Miracu­lous, and saving Faith; not blindnesse into corporal and spiritual, nor liberty into civil and spiritual.

3 The members dividing should agree with the whole; therefore Logick is not well divided into Invention and Judgement, seeing these are actions, and Logick a qua­lity.

4 The members dividing should be equal to the whole; so ceremonies are ill divided into godly and ungodly; for this contains not the whole Nature of ceremonies, because some are mean or indifferent.

5 The members dividing should be disjoyned one from another; so a body, is ill divided into head, eyes, belly, heart, &c. for the eyes are contained in that head, and the heart in that body, &c.

6 Division should be made into the next and immediate members: so a body is ill divided into man, beast, and tree; for many members that come between are leaped o­ver; for next a body is, either simple or compound.

7 Division should consist of as few members or parts as the nature of the whole that is to be divided will bear.

8 A true division should be made by those things which are in the whole, and not by the things outward and acci­dents to the whole; so quantity is ill divided into Mathe­matical, [Page 85] Physical, and Logical; for Disciplines are acci­dentary, and outward to things; neither is a thing by and by diverse, when it is diversly considered by sundry disci­plines.

9 A perfect division is the beginning of understanding, and of constituting the method of things and disciplines.

A perfect division also is either of

  • The whole Subordering.
  • The Co-ordered,

Of the sub-ordering is, which resolveth the general into the specials that are subordered or subjected thereto, as to divide Animal into man and beast.

The Canons hereof are two.

1 The divided must be a general; we must learn to dis­cern the diverse respects and considerations of things from the divisions; as when the Church is distinguished into visible and invisible, it is not properly a division, much less a division of the general into specials; for a Church is a lowest special; but it is only a diverse respect and manner of considering the Church; likewise when a man is divided in­to inward and outward.

2 The difference by whose means the general is divi­ded, should be essential and proper, viz. not translated from one general to another.

The division of the co-ordered, is which resolves the whole into parts co-ordered: and is either

  • Essential. a
  • Integral. b

Essential, which resolves the essential whole into essen­tiala parts, and is either 1 First, or 2 Secondarily so called.

1 First, is when the Essential whole properly called is re­solved into matter and form: as a man into soul and body. And here, the true and next matter and form must be taken.

Secondarily so called, is when an Essential whole impro­perly so called, is resolved into his material and formal; as an Oration into a sound, or words written, and their sig­nification. A Church into men called, &c. The union of [Page 86] th [...]se with Christ, and one with another by faith and obedi­ence of the Faith; whereof these are the materiall of the Church, those the formall.

Integral division is which resolveth the whole into inte­gral parts, and it is also either, 1 First primarily. 2 Se­condarily so called.

1 Primary, is which resolveth into parts the entire whole properly called; as the Tabernacle was divided into the Court, the holy, and the most holy.

This manner of partition should be instituted in right order, descending from the more principall and greater parts unto the lesser.

Secondarily called, is, which resolveth into parts an en­tire whole improperly called, such as accidents be; as a Syl­logism is resolved into three Propositions and Terms: the Law into two Tables, or ten Precepts.

An imperfect division is, when the whole is resolved intob parts by accident; and it is either: 1 Of the subject into his accidents and circumstances: or 2 Of accidents by their subjects. 3 Or of the effects by their efficient, or fi­nal causes: or 4 Of causes by the effects: or 5 Of things by their objects: as 1 Of men, some are tall, some low, some learned, some unlearned, some dwell in hot countries, some in cold. 2 Agues, some are in the spirits, some in the hu­mours, some in the solid parts. 3 The Scriptures, some were written by the Prophets, some by the Apostles. Gar­dens, some are for profit, some for pleasure. 4 Gods word, either terrifieth the conscience, as the Law; or comforteth it, as the Gospel. 5 Love is either of God, or of our neigh­bour.

Of the self-same being.

Hitherto of the arising term resolving; now followeth the conferring, whereby thing with thing is compared.

And is either

  • Consentany.
  • Dissentany.

Consentany (or agreeing) is when the Identity, [...], [Page 87] or self-same being of things is looked on.

Indentity, is the unity and agreement of things, and is

  • Ordinary. a
    a
  • Extraordinary. b
    b

Ordinary in ordinary things, and is either

  • Greater. a
  • Lesser. b

Greater Identity of them, which is are the same in some greater manner, and as it were absolutely.a

And is either

  • Formal.
  • Numerical.

Formal, is of them which differ onely in evolution of de­finition, otherwise are the same in all things. As a man and a reasonable Animal.

Numerical Identity, is the unity of one singular undivided thing.

And is either; 1 Primary. or 2 Secondary.

1 Primary, which simply and properly is one in Number; As Heaven, Peter.

2 Secondary; Which are one in Number by some out­ward conjunction. As one Church under Christ the head; One heap of Corn, &c. b

Lesser Identity, is of them which are one after a sort.

And is

  • Inward.
  • Outward.

Inward, is of them which agree in some inward manner or Term.

And is either, 1 Subordinate, or 2 Co-ordinate.

1 Subordinate, is of them which agree under the Predi­dicamentall Order, and is either

  • Conjunctive,
  • Disjunctive.

Identity of Conjunctive subordination, is of them which in the Predicamentall order do straight follow one another: As be all Generalls with their subordinate specials: These are called really the same; as a man, & an Animal; for they [Page 88] are not two disjoyned things, but only subordinate,

The Canons hereof are two.

1 They which are really the same, of them the Superi­our concurreth to the constitution and the definition of the Inferiour.

2 They which are really the same, fight not in anything.

Identity of disjunctive Subordination, is of them which so agree under the predicamentall Order, that they are not­withstanding disjoined one from another, as two diverse things.

And is either

  • Generall.
  • Or Specificall.

Generall, of them which agree in the Generall, [...], As a man and and a beast agree in an Animal.

Specificall, which agree under one lowest speciall: As Peter and Paul agree in humane Species, [...].

2 Coordinate, is of them which agree in Coordinate Terms, and is

  • Causall.
  • Co-haesive.

Causall Identity is of them which agree in the causes, or caused: So in 1 Cor. 12. the distinct gifts agree in one effici­ent, God, &c.

Cohaesive Identity, is either of the Subject, or of the Acci­dent.

Of the Subject, is of Accidents which are in one Subject, [...]: As the Propheticall, Priestly, and King­ly Office in Christ; this may also be called the same really: so the faculty to understand, to will, &c.

Accidentall Identity is of them that agree in Accidents; as a Moor, and a Raven agree in blacknesse:

And it is either

  • Primary,
  • Secondary.

Primary, is of them which agree in Primary and properly called Accidents.

[Page 89]And it is either

  • Parity.
  • Similitude.

Parity, is the Identity of things that agree in quantity: As when two men are of like stature, or having a like number of children.

Of Similitude.

Similitude is the Agreement of things in quality chiefly; and then also in action, passion, and relation.

And is either

  • Absolute.
  • Parabolicall.

Absolute, is the agreement of things in quality, Action; Passion, Absolutely and simply.

Parabolicall, is when the Accidents of things have a kind of Image among themselves: As Christs Parables, Mat. 13. &c.

The Canons hereof are four.

1 Parabolicall similitude is the most fit instrument for plain and popular kinde of Teaching: Seeing all our Do­ctrin proceeds from known to unknown, we must needs learn so much the more easily, as that is easie from whence the be­ginnings of learning are taken, as, are in Parables, sensible things.

2 Every like is also unlike, Simile non estidem.

3 Similitude must not be made between things too much dissevered; As some have compared the ten Command­ments with the ten plagues of Egypt.

4 A Parable must be fitted to the Principall scope and intent of the Declarer, and not be stretcht beyond this; As when Christ likeneth his comming to a thief, &c.

[Page 90]Similitude is either

  • Simple.
  • Compound.

Simple, which is between two Terms: As a subtile wit likened to fire.

Compound, which is between four: So a Magistrate is to the Commonwealth in War, as a Governour is to a Ship in a tempest.

Secondary Accidental Identity, is of them that agree in relations: Thus two parts are said to be same, as two Mast­ers, as two Sons, &c:

Outward Indentity, is when things agree in outward Terms, as in Time, Place, Obiects, Antecedents, Conse­quents As Moses and Balaam lived in one age, &c.

Extraordinary Identity is when things agree extraordi­narily.

And it is either

  • Essentiall.
  • Hypostatical.

Essential, is in three persons of the holy Trinity which communicate in one essence in number: Called [...].

Hypostatical, is when two compleat Natures are united in one Hypostasis, or persons, called [...], where­of there is onely example in the person of our Mediatour Christ, where the Divine and Humane Nature are said to be the same in Hypostasis: such are called [...]; as they that agree in Essence, are called [...].

Of Distinction.

Hitherto of the arising Term Consentany; Dissentany followeth, whereby the diversity of things is understood.

And is either

  • Distinction.
  • Opposition.

[Page 91]Distinction is the diversity of things without sight.

And it is either

  • Primarily so called.
  • Or Secondarily.

Secondary is that which is only in consideration and con­ceit of mind: As when we distinguish in mind the right side of a Pillar from the left; so in light, though it be a most simple quality, we distinguish the form of warming, and of drying. So in the attributes of God from the Essence, and one from another; as when we distinguish between Gods un­derstanding, Willing, Punishing, Pardoning, &c. Though in the Godhead there is properly no distinction indeed; but onely thus in reason.

Primarily called distinction, is, which is in things immedi­ately without the mind.

And is either

  • Ordinary.
  • Extraordinary.

Ordinary is in ordinary things, as in the Creatures.

And is

  • Formal. a
  • Real. b
  • Modal. c

Formal, is of those whereof one is taken in the definitiona of another; as between Genus and Species; Species and Singulars, &c.

The Canons hereof are two.

1 They that are formally distinguisht, are not as thing and thing, nor as two separated things; as substance cannot be separate from man, &c.

2 They that are formally distinct, do yet communicate in the same nature and properties.

Reall distinction, is of them that are as two severed andb distinct things.

The Canons are three.

1 Things that really differ, may be severed one from an­other, as water from cold.

2 They are never subordinate one to another.

3 They may receive opposition and repugnancie; as, man and beast.

Real distinction is either

  • Inward.
  • Outward.

Inward is of them which differ in inward Terms.

And is

  • Subordinate.
  • Co-ordinate.

Subordinate, is of them which differ in subordinate or predicamental Terms.

And is either

  • Generical Distinction.
  • Specifical Distinction.
  • Individual Distinction.

Generical, is of them which differ in the general, far off or neer: As, man and vertue; For one is a substance, and the other is a quality.

Specifical, is of them which coming of one general, are separated by essential differences, or put under sundry spe­cials: Thus man and beast differ in species. Also Man, and Lion, Horse, &c.

Individual, is a separation of two or more singulars, which also are said to differ in number: As Peter, Paul, James, &c.

Co-ordinate distinction, is, which is made by co-ordinate Terms:

And is

  • Causal.
  • Subjective.

Causal is of them which differ in cause far off or neer: As [Page 93] man and beast differ in form; laughing and weeping differ in the efficient and end.

Subjective, is either of

  • The Subject.
  • The Accident.

Distinction of Subject, is when accidents differ in subject; as speaking and bleating, laughing and neighing, &c.

Distinction of accidents, is of subjects that differ in acci­dents.

And is either

  • Primary.
  • Secondary.

Primary, is of them that differ in accidents primarily called.

And it is either, 1 Imparity, 2 Dissimilitude.

1 Imparity is when things differ in greater or lesser quan­tity; as love excels faith, 1 Cor. 13. The soul excels the body, &c.

2 Dissimilitude is distinction of things after diverse qualities, actions, passions, and the image of all these.

Secondary distinction of accidents, is of them that differ in relations: as when one is a father or a master, another not.

Outward real distinction, is when things are distinguished by outward Terms, as by Objects, Time, Place, Antece­dents, Consequents, &c.

Modal distinction, is when not the things so much as thec manners of the things are distinct; either things by their manners, or manners by their things.

And it is either

  • Simple.
  • Comparative.

Simple, when manners of things are simply distinguished: so essence and existence differ in a simple modal distinction.

Comparative, is when the same thing or quality is distin­guished by more and lesse. As between hot and lukewarm.

1 More and lesse do never vary the species; so weak faith and strong faith; Paul a child and a man, do not differ in specie.

[Page 94]2 Things compared by more and lesse, must not be AE­quivocall: As the sharpnesse of voice, and of a sword, may not be compared.

3 Things compared by more or lesse, must be of the same species and nature; so it is not meet to compare a Smiths saw to a Carpenters mallet; nor to ask, which was best learn­ed, of Galen (a Physician) or of Bartolus (a Lawyer.)

Extraordinary distinction, is in things extraordinary.

And it is either between God and the Creatures, or be­tween the essence and persons of the Godhead, or of the persons one from another: God differs from Creatures more than in generall, and agrees onely in Analogy; in the persons there is distinction somewhat like the Modall: For Justin Martyr cals the persons [...].

Of Opposition.

Now followeth Opposition, which is the Fighting toge­ther of two simple Terms, so as neither the one can agree with the other, nor both of them with the third, after one and the same manner. They agree not [...], nor [...], nor [...], nor [...];

The Canons of Opposition are two.

1 Opposites so far forth as they are such, are together.

2 One Opposite helps the knowledge of another in that that is an Opposite. [...].

Opposition is either

  • Common. a
  • Special. b

Common, is contradiction, which is the first opposition ofa a thing and not a thing.

The Canons hereof are four.

1 Contradiction is of all Oppositions the first, and so the measure of all the rest: Cold and heat were not op­posed, [Page 95] unlesse Cold were not Heat, and Heat not Cold.

2 Contradiction is of Oppositions the simplest.

3 It wants simply all mean: For between a thing and not a thing, there is no mean thing.

4 It is of all Oppositions the greatest or strongest.

Contradiction, is either

  • 1 Exprest.
  • 2 Implyed.

1 Exprest, when the note of denyall is plainly put to one part: As a man, and not a man.

2 Implicit, when the note of denyall being omitted, one part overthrows another: As an unbloody Sacrifice: For that which is not bloody, is not a Sacrifice: so the Catho­like Romane Church; Christs every where present Body; for if it be every where, it not a body.

Speciall Opposition, is which is between special ex­treams; and is

  • Primary.
    b
  • Secondary.

Primary, whose parts are most strongly opposed.

And is either

  • 1 Privative.
  • 2 Disparation.
  • 3 Repugnancy.
  • 4 Contrariety.

1 Privative Opposition, is the fighting betwixt habit and privation▪ Habit is the presence of a thing that cleaveth to some certain and fit Subject. Privation is the absence of an habit in a Substance capable of the habit. [...] or [...].

The Canons hereof are five.

1 A privative Opposition is neer akin to Contradictory.

2 Privative Opposition admits a Mean; as, to the eye, twilight is a Mean between light and dark; God is neither moveable, nor immoveable, Privatively.

3 Privative Oppositions have extreams of the same Ge­nus, the Habit directly, the Privation indirectly; as sight and blindnesse.

[Page 96]4 Habit and Privation are about the same Subject: As, because an Animall onely hath sight, therefore an Animall only is blind, not a stone, &c.

5 Privative Opposition requires determination of a cer­tain time▪ neither can privation be given to a Subject but after the time that by its nature and fitnesse it might receive the habit; as none can be said to be bald untill the time by Nature they should have hair.

Privation is either

  • Naturall.
  • Comming otherwise.

Naturall, when that is wanting which the Subjects should Naturally have, whether it be Accident that is due to the Subject, or a part required to the constitution of the whole.

And it is again, either, First totall, or Secondly after a sort.

Totall privation, is from which there is granted no ordi­nary regresse to the habit.

The Canons hereof are three.

1 Totall privation is properly of dispositions, or powers onely.

2 Totall privation is beside Nature

3 From privation to habit no regresse is granted: As, he that is once quite blind, can never see more, viz. ordina­rily.

Privation after a sort, or in part, is when an ordinary, and easie regresse is granted from the privation to that habit. As darknesse of the night, which at morning returns to light; so sleep to awaking, sicknesse to health, &c.

Privation adventitial, or coming otherwise, is of a thing outwardly cleaving; as poverty is the privation of riches, imprisonment of liberty, &c.

2 Disparation is an opposition of specialls, arising from the division of one Generall by opposite differences; as a man and a beast are disparates, or dissevered.

The Canons hereof are three.

1 Disparates never agree to the same things as they are [Page 179] Disparates; So, bread is the body of Christ, cannot be spok­en substantially, but onely relatively, as bread hath relati­on to Christs body.

2. Compleat Disparates do not concur as body and soul to make a man; so God and man concur to one hypostaticall thing in Christ, but not essentiall.

3. Repugnancy is opposition either between one Dispa­rate, and the property of another, or between two or moe properties of Disparates, and also properties of contraries, and their antecedents and consequencies: As to fein, and to be indeed a friend, to be elect, and to fall from the grace of God▪ To be bread, and to be born of the Virgin: To be prudent, and not to be able to dissemble anger; for this is Repugnant to prudency.

4 Contrariety is an opposition between two qualities that drive out one another.

And it is either

  • By it self.
  • By Accident.

Contrariety by its self is of qualites by themselves, and absolutely taken,

The Canons hereof be eight.

1. Of contrariety, each part is positive, as hot, and cold.

2. Of contraries, both are under a certain general, neer or far; As white, and black are under the general of colour.

3. Contraries are about the same subject, viz. either the generall or the speciall; But not always about the same in number, or those things which onely differ in Accidents: So white and black are in the same mixt body generally taken, but not in the same body in number; As a Swan, and a Raven, &c.

4 If one of the contraries be, the other also must needs be, or at least have possibility to be: If in nature there be fire, there must also be water.

5 Contraries cannot be in the same degree that excell; But may be in degrees that are remiss: So what is hot in ex­tremity, is not cold at all.

6. One contrary if it▪ overcomes, corrupteth another.

[Page 98]7 The remission of one contrary often comes to pass by the weakning of the other.

8 Contraries have contrary Causes, Effects, Properties, and next Subjects: So Vertue is of God, Vice of the Devil, Temyerance helps health, Intemperance hurts it, &c.

Contraties by themselves, are either

  • Mediate.
  • Immediate.

Mediate, which do admit a Mean, viz. of taking part with the extreams; as heat and cold admit between, luke­warmness

Immediate, which do not admit a Mean: As Vertue and Vice.

Contrariety by accident, is which agreeth unto other things for the qualities: as fire and water are contrary, be­cause of heat and cold.

The secondary opposition is betwixt the Relation and the Correlate.

The Canons hereof be three.

1 Relative opposition is of all the weakest.

2 Opposites relatively have no Mean, viz. which takes part of the extreams, as Father and Son,

3, Opposites relatively are both affirmative.

And thus much of the simple Terms of the first part of Logick.

A Generall Sum of the first Part of Logick.

The first part of Logick is about a simple Term, and is either

  • The first which is either,
    • Of a word with the
      • Divisions.
      • Canons.
    • Of a thing which is either
      • The predicamental Row wherein is considered
        • The manner how things are received into the Rows.
        • The degree,
          • Direct which is
            • Primary
              • The General.
              • The Special.
            • Secondary, the singular.
          • Collateral, or sidelong, the difference.
        • The partiti­on; for a pre­dicament is either
          • Primary.
            • Of Substance.
            • Of Accidents.
              • Absolute.
                • Quantity.
                • Quality.
                • Action.
                • Passion.
              • Of Relation.
          • Secondary, as
            • When.
            • Where.
            • Situation.
            • Habit.
      • the term a­bout the Row, which is either
        • Inward.
          • The cause
            • Efficient.
            • Matter.
            • Form.
            • End.
          • The caused.
          • The Subject and Accident.
          • The Whole and the Part.
        • Outward.
          • Adherent either Adjacent which is either
            • Connex.
            • Circumstance.
            • Adjoint.
          • Concomitant, which is either
            • Antecedent.
            • Consequent.
  • Arising of the first, and is either
    • Of a word, and is either
      • The unfolding of a word.
      • Conjugates.
        • Definition of a Name.
        • Distinction of the doubtfull.
        • Clearing of the obscure.
    • Of a thing, and either
      • Resolving, and is either
        • Definition.
        • Division.
      • Conferring, aud either is
        • Consentany, as the identity of things.
        • Dissentany, as
          • Diversity.
          • Distinction.
          • Opposition.

THE SECOND BOOK, Handling the Second Part OF LOGICK; Which is a Director of a Compound conceit.

Of a Proposition.

THe second Part of Logick directeth a compoun­ded conceit, which is done by Precepts con­cerning a Proposition.

A Proposition is a sentence wherein one thing is affirmed or denied of another.

And it is consi­dered either

  • In general, and is called Formal. a a
  • In Special, and determi­natly called material. b b

In Generall, when the disposition of a sentence is lookeda a on nakedly, and absolutely, without any special condition of the things themselves.

[Page 102]And is again either

  • Primary, or simple, and Categori­cally perfect. c c
  • Secondary, or Compound, and Hy­pothetical, and Imperfect. d d

Primary or Simple, is, which in one simple Compositionc c propoundeth any thing to be or not to be. Of this we are to consider both the 1 Constitution, and 2 Division, and also the 3 Affections.

The Constitution of a Proposition is of the parts, and theConstitu­tion. disposing of the parts, of which those may be called the ma­terial, and this the Formal.

The Parts are either the Signed, or the Signers, or Signs.Material.

The parts Signed, or Absolute, are

  • The Antecedent, or Subject.
  • The Consequent, or Predicate, or Attribute.

The Subject or Antecedent, is, of which any thing is pro­nounced.

The Consequent or Predicate, is, that which is pronoun­ced of the Subject; As in this sentence, True faith doth work by love: the first part, true faith, is called the Subject, or Antecdent; the latter part, work by love, is called the Consequent, or Attribute, or Predication.

The Canons of the Subject and Attribute are two.

1 That is the true natural subject (or antecedent) in a Pro­position, which without the proposition, even in the Nature of things is subjected; And that is the true Natural attribute or consequent, which in the very Nature of things is in an­other: and if in any Proposition that be put first, which is not first in Nature; or last, which is not last in Nature: it is called a proposition against Nature, and Inordinate, which must be marked and brought into order; as, It is not good for man to be alone: Here good is not the true Antecedent or Subject, but the Lonedom of the man, of which it is said that it is not good.

[Page 103]2. The Consequent or Attribute must be diverse from the Subject: For the same is not to be pronounced of the same; as a Sword is a Sword; no though it be in other Terms as the Gospel is glad tidings. Stibium is Antinomy.

The Signing parts of Signs be either

  • Significative, Categorematical.
  • Consignificative, Syncategorematical.

A Significative Sign, is which represents to the mind a certain Antecedent and Consequent.

And it either

  • A Noun.
  • A Verb.

A Noun is a simple word, signifying a certain and ab­solute thing without time.

The Canons of a Noun are six.

1. A Noun is a simple word, and never a whole sen­tence.

2. A Noun should be instituted to signifie some certain thine, by institution of God and man.

3. A Noun should be one in Unity of Signification, not equivocal.

4. A Noun should be of finite Signification.

5. A Noun of the first or right case, is properly a Nouni. e. No­mina­tive Case. in Latine.

6. A Noun by it self signifies not distinction of time.

A Verb is a simple word, inferring with the principal signification of Action or Passion, Distinction of time.

The Canons hereof are four.

1. Every Verb includes in it some Noun or Signification of a certain thing: As I speak, Includes in it Speech.

2. A Verb beside the conceit of some certain things notes fitness of avouching of some other.

3. A Verb primarily infers with it a certain distinction of the time present.

[Page 104]4. A Verb of the Indicative mood is of all, most fit for Enunciative composition and division.

A Consignificative Sign, is, which signifies no certain thing in the Proposition; But the manner only of a thing; As, all, none, some, &c

The Formal thing in a Proposition, is A disposing of theFormal. Parts to others: And it is either Signed or Signing.

Signed, is, the Order of the parts of the Proposition ab­solutely looked on in the mind, agreeing with the order of things without the mind.

Signing is, an outward note of this Disposition & Order.

And it is either Exprest or Included in the Verb.

Exprest, when the antecedent is put with the conse­quent, by mean of the Verb Substantive [ls] as▪ Faith with­out works is dead.

Included, is, when a Verb Consequent, or Attribute, is immediately added to a Noun Antecedent or Subject, As for Peter runneth, understand, Peter is running.

Thus have I shewn the constitution of a Proposition.Division from the Material.

Now followeth the Division, taken partly from the Ma­terial, partly from the Formal.

Of the Material, a Proposition is either

  • Finite.
  • Infinite.

Finite, is, which consists of a finite Antecedent and Con­sequent.

Infinite, which consists of an Infinite Term: as, Faith ju­stifieth, faith is not without works, these are Finite. But, Pe­ter will do any thing rather than deny christ: This is an Infi­nite affirmation. Man was able not to sin, and man was not able to sin; the first is an Infinite affirmative, the later a Negative.

Both of these is either, 1 Universal. 2 Particular, or 3 Singular.

1 Universal, whose Subject or antecedent is universal.

And is either

  • Definite. a
  • Indefinite. b

[Page 105]Definite, which hath the Sign of Universality expreslya added to the Subject: As all, every one, none, &c.

This Consignificative not all, is either

  • Distributive. c
  • Collective. d

Distributive, when it signifies that the Consequent mayc be distributed into those things which are contained in the Antecedent.

And it is again either distributive into Singulars of the Generals, or into Generals of the Singulars.

Distributive into Singulars of the Generals, is which sig­nifieth that the Consequent is distributed into every singu­lar thing contained in the antecedent.

And it is again either

  • Restrained, or Limited.
  • Absolute.

Absolute, when a thing to which the note of Universality is added, is absolutely distributed without restraint; As, every man is a living creature.

Limited, when there is a restraint included to be under­stood: As Psalm 8. Thou hast put all things under his feet. Yet he himself is restrained that put all things under, 1 Cor. 15. So, No man received his Testimony, meaning no Repro­bate man, &c.

Distributive into Generals of the Singulars, is when the Consequent is distributed not into every singular thing, but into certain Orders and Estates of the Singulars; as, every beast was in Noahs Ark, that is, not every Singular or Parti­cular beast; But some singulars of all sorts of Beasts. Christ cured every disease, that is, every kinde of disease; God would all men to be saved, that is, all sorts of men.

Collective, is when the antecedent is so taken under a [...] numbering Collection, that the Consequent cannot be di­stributed into the Inferiors▪ As, all the Apostles were twelve, all the Evangelists were four, all the Commandments ware ten; of this we cannot gather, Peter is an Apostle, therefore he is twelve.

The Canons of an Universal Sign are these.

A Note or Sign of Universality is not added to the Con­sequent: As we cannot say, every man is every living Creature; But here it must be excepted, if the Consequent be a Verb Adjective; for we may say God preserveth all men, Christ redeemed all the Elect, &c.

2 Adverbs that have the place of a Noun, make also uni­versal propositions: as, Never do the Godly want affliction: No where are the Saints free from troubles?

2 Every Note Collective, as also Distributive into Ge­nerals of the Singulars, Imperfectly, and Secondarily, dob [...]. make an Universal Proposition.

An Indefinite Universal, is which hath an Universal Sub­ject (or Antecedent) without Note.

The Canons hereof are two.

1. The chief force and use of Indefinites is in Propositi­ons of the Idea: That is, in such, as where the Universal Subiect is taken absolutely: As, The Lords Supper is a Sa­crament, Man is the Noblest Creature, The soul of man is immortal, &c.

2. There is also an use of Indefinites; to signifie that the Consequent is in the antecedent, for the most part, though not alwayes [...] As, The Cretians be lyars, Mothers are too much Cockerers of their children, &c,

2. A Particular is, which to a particular antecedent adds a particular Note: as, Some men fear God, Few are Elected, not many are Called, &c.

3. A Singular is, which hath an Antecedent singular or undivided: as, John Baptist is not the Christ; This man is a true Christian, &c.

The Canons hereof are two.

1 When a Note of Universality is added to a singular An­tecedent, it means nothing but a Collection of singulars: as all Pharoahs were Tyrants. All Herods were cruel.

2. To the Antecedent of a singular Proposition, may not be added a denyal Infinite.

[Page 107]From the Formal, a Proposi­tion is divided into

  • Affirming.
    Division from the Formal.
  • Denying.

Affirmative is when the Consequent is joyned with the antecedent.

The Affirmation is before, and more worthy than the Negation.

Denying or Negative, is which divideth the Consequent from the Antecedent, As, Good works do not justifie: A man is not a stone.

The Canons are two.

1 That a Proposition may be a Negative, it is necessary that the Particle of denying be either set before the whole Proposition: as, No Elect are damned; or be immediately added to the Coupler, and Verb adjective that hath the force of the Coupler, or Band; as, Marriage is not a Sacra­ment; Works justifie not.

2 Every true Negation hangs on a true Affirmation: For it could not rightly be said, Works justifie not, unlesse it were true, that Faith onely justifieth.

Both of these (Affirmative and Negative) is either

  • Pure.
  • Modal.

Pure, is, wherein the Consequent is purely disposed with the antecedent, without the expresse manner of disposition.

Modal, is, which is affected with a certain mood or man­ner of disposition.

And it is either

  • Primary. a
  • Secondary. b

Primary, is, which is affected with some Primary man­ner,a 1 [...]. 2 [...]. as be those four.

  • 1 Necessary, or needs.
  • 2 Impossible.
  • [Page 108]3 Possible.
    3 [...]. 4 [...].
  • 4 Contingent, or perhaps.

1 As, It is necessary that a Creature be finite. The Elect must needs be saved. 2 It is impossible that God should be created. 3 It is possible for him that fighteth to win the victory. 4 It is contingent for a man to sit, for he may also not sit.

The Canons of those Modal propositions are five.

1 There is more use of those Modals among the Greeks than the Latines.

2 No other Modes (or manners) are here looked on than Formal, that is such as affect the disposition of the Conse­quent with the Antecedent.

3 A Modal Proposition hath the manner for the Conse­quent indirect, and by Analogie so called: in every Modal Proposition, there are two things, the Saying, and the manner; as in this, It is impossible that the Elect should be deceived. That the Elect should be deceived, is a saying; impossible is the manner; the saying is put in stead of the Antecedent, the manner in stead of the consequent, but this must nar­rowly be taken.

4 The quantity of a Modal proposition is esteemed part­ly by the saying, partly by the manner; but chiefly and properly by the saying, as that which hath the quantity of multitude. Secondarily by the manner, as that which hath the quantity of time; Necessary hath the force of an Adverb universally affirming; as, It is necessary for a man to be rea­sonable, that is, a man is alwayes reasonable; Impossible, hath the force of an universal Negative, as, It is impossible for a man to be a Stone, that is, a man is never a stone: Pos­sible and contingent, have the force of particulars, as sometimes, for the most part, &c.

5 The quality or affirmation and Negation of a modal proposition is esteemed by the manner: as, It is impossible for the Elect to perish. This is a Negative: It is necessary that Christ should be true man, this is affirmative by reason of these Manners, Necessary and Impossible.

[Page 109]Secondary Modals which have a secondary man­ner, are either

  • 1 Exclusive.
    b
  • 2 Exceptive.
  • 3 Restrictive.

Exclusive, which hath an exclusive significative word, as onely, alone, &c.

And it is Exclusive either of the

  • Antecedent or Subject.
  • Consequent.

Exclusive of the antecedent, is, which with an exclusive word set before it, excludes or shuts out other antecedents from participation of the same consequent: as, Only faith justifieth; Only God is uncreated.

The Exclusive of the antecedent, excludes not concomi­tants, or them that accompany the same: as onely the Fa­ther is true God, excludes not the concomitant, the Son and the holy Ghost, but false gods, idols, &c.

Exclusive of the consequent, is, which by a sign of Exclu­sion put between antecedent and consequent, excludes other consequents from the same antecedent, as, Repro­bates do evil onely; Carthusians do onely eat fish.

2 Exceptive, is, which consists of an excepting particle, as Except, Besides, Unlesse, &c.

The Canons be four.

1 In an Exceptive proposition, alway the antecedent is excepted from participation of the consequent, and not contrary as was in the Exclusive.

2 The antecedent excepted must be contained under the Excepter: For it is foolish to say, Every man, except a beast, is able to laugh, because a beast is not contained under a man.

3 The antecedent from which the exception is made, must be an Universall, that it may be distributed: As it is foolish to say, Some man except Judas is elected.

4 That which is excepted should be straiter than that from which it is excepted; For it is vain to say, A man, ex­cept a man, runneth.

[Page 110]3 Restrictive is, which consists of restraint or limitation; as far forth as, in respect of, according to, &c.

Limitation is the determination of that according to which the Consequent agreeth with the Antecedent, or not agreeth.

And is

  • General.
  • Special.

General, which is conceived with general terms.

Special, which is conceived with special Terms, that is, which pertain to any thing in special, and properly.

And it is either of

  • One Noun.
  • Diverse.

Of one Noun, is, which limits the thing by it self, that the Consequent may be understood to agree essentially: As, A man, as he is a man, hath reason.

Of a diverse Noun, which limits the Antecedent by some­thing diverse from the Antecedent.

And it is either

  • Essential. a
  • Accidental. b

Essential, which is done by an essential term.a

And is either

  • General.
  • Partial.

General, when it is limited by his Genus: as, a man, as he is a body, is local; as he is a living thing, he is nourished; as he is Animal, he hath sense, &c.

Partial, when a thing is limited by some part Essential, or Integral: As, A man touching his soul is Immortal: Sacra­ments touching their matter are visible, touching their form are invisible; Christ as man died, &c.

[Page 111]Accidental is which limits a thing Accidentally.

And is

  • Inward.
  • Outward.

Inward, when a thing is limited by some Inward accident either absolute or Relative: as, Fire, as it is hot, burneth; not as it is dry: God willeth hardning of sinners; not as it is sin, but as it is a punishment.

Outward, when a thing is limited by some outward com­parison and respect; as when a mean man is said to be great in respect of a dwarf, Isaac was a Son in respect of Abraham, and a Fat [...]her in respect of Jacob; Faith justifieth as it hath reference to Christ.

The Canons of limitation are six.

1. A Consequent or Attribute contradictory, can with no Limitation, be made to agree with the antecedent [...]; False therefore are the Popish Limitations to prove that Acci­dents may be without the Subject in their Transubstanti­ated Sacrament; For it implieth a contradiction.

2. Every lawfull Limitation should have possibility to be referred to some form of Limitation, delivered by the Art of Logick,

3. A Limitation should be made by that which agreeably is in the antecedent, or Consequent, whether it be in it ab­solutely, or Relatively.

4. The manner Limiting in part should be distinct in deed and words, from the Limited in the antecedent and Conse­quent.

5. Limitation should be perspicuous, casie to be ex­plained.

6. Limitation in a diverse respect, pertaineth to the ante­cedent and Consequent of the proposition Limited.

The Affection of propositions either

  • Consentany. a
    3 Af­fections.
  • Dissentany. b

[Page 112]Consentany, whereby propositions agree together,

And is

  • Equal valour [...] a
    a
  • Conversion, b

The Canons of equal valor are either

  • General.
  • Special.

General, which pertain as well to the Pure as to thea Modal, though chiefly to the Pure.

And they be ten.

1. Equal Valor of Propositions which is taken from the Signs of quantity, is shewed by the signification of the Signs and their mutual correspondence: These therefore are equi­valent, Not every man is elected, and some man is not elected; there is no man that is not a sinuer, and every man is a sin­ner. Not any man is good, and, No man is good, &c.

2. Diversity of words takes not away the equal value of sense, when the things signified by the words in the sense and meaning of the Speaker are the same: These therefore are equipollent, Bread is the body of Christ, and bread is the Communion of Christs body; For its Christs intendment, as Paul expounds him.

3. Equivalents should have Antecedent and consequent the same indeed: The transplacing of antecedents and Consequents changeth the sense of propositions; For these are not equivalent, to say, Bread is Christs body, and in bread is Christs body, or Christs body is in the bread; nor these, Bread is Christs body, and, let Bread be Christs body, &c.

4. Of Equivalents, one may be more forcible and signi­ficant then another; and yet the agreement of sense remain safe: As these agree in sense, Bread is Christs body, and read is an holy sign of Christs body; Though the first hath a more forcible signification.

5. A Proposition of this sign [all] having limitation, is of equal value with the particular, when the limitation is taken away: as, All men that beleeve shall be saved, and, onely some men shall be saved.

[Page 113]6 A proposition of the sign All, distributing into gene­rall of the singulars, is of equal value also with a particular; as, God would all men to be saved; and, God would some of every sort of men to be saved.

7 A proposition of the sign All collective, is equall to an indefinite; as, All the outward senses are five; and there are five outward senses. Note also, that in the Hebrew, not all, is equivalent to none, as Psal. 143. Not all living shall be justified, i. e. no living.

8 Indefinites sometime are equivalent to universals, sometime to particulars; to those in a matter necessary, to these in a contingent.

9 The affirming of a privation, and deniall of an habit, are equivalent in an hable subject; as, He is not just, there­fore he is unjust; this is true in a man, not in an infant, nor in a stone.

10 He that puts one eqvivalent, puts also the other; and contrary, He that takes away one, takes away the other: so when Christ saith, Few are chosen, he saith in effect, All are not chosen.

The speciall Canons which pertain to the Modals onely are five.

1 Propositions of necessary and impossible are equiva­lent when they have the manner of the same spoken of a diverse quality, as, It is necessary that offences arise; and, it is impossible that offences should not arise.

2 Propositions of necessary and contingent are equiva­lent when they have a diverse quality in a word & in man­ner; It is necessary for the Elect to abide in Gods grace; It is not contingent for the Elect to abide in Gods grace.

3 Propositions of impossible and possible are eqvivalent when they have the saying of the same, and the manner of a diverse quality; It is impossible for the Elect to perish; It is not possible for the Elect to perish.

4 Propositions of possible and contingent, in the Greek, phrase are often equivalent, when the manners considered in themselves import a diverse signification.

5 In Modals secondarily so called, an exclusive in a ne­cessary matter is eqvivalent to an universal; as, The elect only are saved, and all the elect are saved.

[Page 114]Conversion, is the agreement of two propositions by [...]. transposing of the parts; and it is either 1 simple, or 2 by accident, or 3 by counterplacing. 1 Simple, is the mu­tuall change of the Antecedent and consequent, the quanti­ty and quality abiding the same; first, and properly about an universall denyer, and particular affirmer: 2 And by reason of the mater, about an universall affirme, necessary and reciprocall; as, No unbeleever eateth Christs flesh; therefore none that eateth Christs flesh is an unbeleever.

2 By accident is the mutuall change of antecedent and consequent, the quality abiding, but the quantity being changed, viz. the universall into a particular affirmant; as, Every man is a living creature; therefore, some living crea­ture is a man.

3 By counterplacing is the mutuall transplacing of the consequent and antecedent, the quantity abiding, but the quality changed, viz. about an universal affirmant; as▪ All that are ordained to life do beleeve; therefore they that be­leeve not, are not ordained to life, Acts 13.

The Canons of conversion are nine, of which the first four are generall, the other pertain to the Modais.

1 That which is to be converted, must have a proper connexion, understood without any ambiguity; these there­fore are not to be turned; Christ is a vine; Bread is Christs body, &c.

3 The whole antecedent of that which is converted, must be made the consequent of the converter, not maimed or cut off.

4 In converting, the obique Cases must be made light, as not because, Some tree is in the Garden, therefore some Garden is in the Tree; but thus; therefore something that is in the Garden is a Tree.

5 Conversion of Modals is made by change of those extreames which are in the saying, the manner alway abiding fast, and the quality of the saying▪ kept.

6 There is no other conversion in Modals then simple and by accident.

7 Propositions of the manner necessary are converted so as the pure simply, when they are universall negatives, or particular affimatives; and by accident▪ when they are uni­versall affirmants, though so also they be simply converted; [Page 115] as, It is necessary that no man be a stone, is converted sim­ply, therefore it is necessary that no stone be a man.

8 Propositions of possible are converted as the former of necessary.

9 Propositions of contingent, if they be affirmative, are converted as the former, but negatives not so; for particu­lars are converted simply, but universals no way.

Thus much of the consentany affections.

Dissentany is the opposition of Propofitions.

Opposition, is the fight of two Propositions according to [...] the disposition, in affirming and denying.

The Canons hereof be four.

1 Opposition must have the same antecedent and con­sequent understood without ambiguity; as, It is not good for man to be alone; it is good for man to be alone; here is no opposition; for the one is meant simply, the other respe­ctively.

2 Opposition, must be [...] in the same respect, i. e. the consequent must be disposed with the antecedent according to the same part and nature of the antecedent, as, Christ was before Abraham; Christ was not before Abraham: the first is Time, meant as he is God: the other, as he is man; so here is no opposition.

3 Opposition must be [...] unto the same: as the Sun is darkened, the Sun is not darkened; by limitation both those are true, and not opposite; for in respect of our sight the Sun is darkened, but in it self the Sun is not darkened.

4 Opposition must be in respect of the same time; o­therwise both may be true; as, Paul was at Rome, Paul was not at Rome, viz. at the same time.

Opposition is either

  • Contradictory. a
  • Contrary. b

Contradictory [...], which is of perpetual dis-jun­ction;a and it is principal or lesse principal.

Principal, is the fight of Propositions both in quality and quantity, as is between an universal affirmant, and a parti­cular [Page 116] negant; also between a particular affirmant, and uni­versall negant; as, All men are good, Some men are not good, &c.

Lesse principal, is between two singulars, two indefinites, and two immediate universals, fighting in quality onely; as Peter was at Rome: Peter was not at Rome. A man is good; A man is not good, &c.

The Canons of contradiction are three.

1 Contradiction, is of all oppositions the first, the most perfect, and most fighting, and therefore the measure of them.

2 Contradiction, is of eternal dis-junction, so as it is im­possible for both parts to be together true or false.

3 Contradiction wanteth all mean.

Contrariety is opposition between two universals, viz. them whose antecedent or subject is manifest without the consequence; as, Every man is wise; no man is wise.

2 Two contraries can never be together true, though they may be together false.

The opposition of Modals hath three Canons.

1 Contradictory Modals are, which have the same man­ner of diverse qualities, but the saying of the same quality; as, It is not possible for the elect to be deceived, It is possi­ble for the elect to be deceived.

2 Contrarie Medals are, two universals having the same universal manner affirmant; but the saying in one denying, in another affirming; as, It is possible to be; It is possible not to be.

3 In Exclusives (which are Modals secondary) the par­ticular negative added to the only manner exclusive, ma­keth the opposition: as, Only the elect are reconciled to God; not only the elect are reconciled, &c.

Hitherto of a simple proposition: now followeth the compound, which consisteth of a sense or sentence com­pounded.

[Page 117]And it is either

  • 1 Expressed. m
  • 2 Implied. n

1 Expressed, which hath the expresse note of compo­sition. [...]

And it is either by conjunction, or particular relatives.

Compounded by Conjunction, is, whose parts are tied by a Grammatical Conjunction.

And it is either

  • Connexive.
  • Separative.

Connexive, whose parts are tied by a connexion, and is

  • Copulative.
  • Conditional.

Copulative, whose conjunction is copulative; as, Love God and thy brother.

The Canons are four.

1 A Copulative is affirmed and denied by reason of thei. e. Propo­sition. conjunction copulative, whereto if a negation be added, it alwayes maketh a negative; We are justified by faith, and not by works, &c. this is affirmative. Not by faith and works are we justified; this is negative.

2 The whole copulative proposition is esteemed by rea­son of the conjunction copulative.

3 To the truth of a copulative, there is required the truth of either part; and if one part be false, the proposi­tion wholly is false.

4 Copulation noting the time, is to be taken in respect of one and the same time; otherwise the copulation will be false; as, Paul was at Rome, and saw Jerusalem. This is a deceitfull copulation, for both were not at one time; but at several times both were true.

Conditional, is, whose conjunction is conditional, as, If thou sin, thou shalt die.

The Canons are six.

1 A conditional hath two parts, whereof the first is cal­led the antecedent, which contains the condition; the lat­ter the consequent.

2 A conditional putteth nothing in esse, and onely suspendeth the sentence, or sense of the minde, unlesse the manner and condition be put, which the antecedent de­signeth.

3 All the truth and force of it, is in the union and cohe­rence of the parts, whereby the consequent rightly follow­eth from the antecedent.

4 The measure of it is some simple composition, to which it must be resolved, that the force of it may appear, and the reason of the connexion be manifest.

5 The affirmation hangeth on the affirmation of the condition; therefore it is then Negative, when the denial is put before the conjunction If, not when it is put after: So, If the Lord keep not the citie, the Keepers watch in vain: this is affirmative, not negative.

6 A conditional, having an impossible condition annex­ed, is equivalent to a simple denial: as, If the sands can be numbered, Abrahams seed shall be numbered, meaning they shall not be numbered.

Separative, which hath a separative conjunction: and is either

  • Disjoyned. a
  • Discrete. b

Disjoyned, whose conjunction is disjunctive; as, eithera we are justified by faith, or by works.

The Canons hereof be five.

1 The disjoyned parts of a proposition must be subor­dinate; it is therefore vain to say, Either it is a living crea­ture, or a man.

2 The affirmation or negation is esteemed by the dis­junctive conjunction onely, whereto there must needs be added a negation, if the sentence must be negative.

3 For the truth of the disjunctive, it is enough if one part be true.

[Page 119]4 That therefore is false which hath no part true, and wherein taking away one, another member can be given which is true: as, Either the Pope is head of the Church, or it hath no head; both are false; and a third is true, Christ is the head, Colos. 1.

5 When the disjunctive opposition is immediate, and ei­ther member is removed, it makes the rest requivalent ex­clusively; as, Either we are justified by faith, or by works; but works are removed, Rom. 3. Therefore this exclusive sentence is true, Onely by faith are we justified.

A discrete sentence, is, which hath a discrete conjuncti­on;b as, although, yet, notwithstanding, &c.

The Canons are two.

1 To the truth of a discretive is required the truth of both parts.

2 False therefore is the discretive when any one part is false; as, Christs humane nature is not eternall, yet it is eve­ry where present.

Compounded of particular relatives, is, which hath notes of comparison according to quality, quantity, time and place: as, Such as the Shepherd is, such is the sheep. He is as honest as he is learned▪ Where the treasure is, there is the heart. Then men fast when the Bridegroom is gone, &c.

2 An implyed compound sentence, is, which hath no ex­presse note of composition.

The Canons are two▪

1 The truth or falshood of an implyed sentence, wholly dependeth upon the manner of the consequence, or knitting of the antecedent or consequent; as, They that are guilty of Christs body, they eat Christ, body; this is a false com­pound proposition; for there is no connexion of parts.

2 As much as may be, this proposition is to be reduced to a meer simple.

Hitherto of a proposition common, called formall; now fol­loweth a proposition in speciall, called materiall; which is determined to a certain condition of things antecedent and consequent.

[Page 120]It is divided partly by the words, partly by the things, and partly by both together.

First therefore every proposition is either

  • Dark.
  • Clear.

Dark, when the sense needeth Interpretation; Interpre­tation is the unfolding of the sense or sentence, and bring­ing of it to clearnesse.

The darknesse of a sentence is cured by six Canons; Ac­cording to which every lawfull Interpretation is to be made.

1 A dark proposition must first of all be called back to a certain Method of some kind of discipline, and judged by the principles and analogie of the things delivered there­in.

2 Interpretation is to be made according to the first in­tent and scope of the Speaker or Writer.

3 The order of the context is carefully to be weighed, and interpretation to be made by the knitting of the antece­dents and consequents.

4 Like places are to be compared together, and by con­ference and agreement the sense to be set down.

5 Let the agreeing expositions of famous Interpreters be looked unto.

6 The dark places are to be expounded by the more clear, and not the dark by as dark.

A clear proposition, is, whose sense is manifest by its self, and needs no interpretation.

Again each of them is either

  • True.
  • False.

True, is, which agreeth to the composition and division of things without the mind, or which affirmeth or denieth as the thing is.

[Page 121]And it is either

  • Connominative Synonimical.
  • Denominative Paronimicall.

Synomina, be those that have a common name, and in re­gard thereof, one and the same essentiall definition.

Paronima, be those that be derived, and have their de­nomination from others.

Connominative, is, in which the consequent is spoken of the aatecedent connominatively, Synonimicè.

And it is either

  • Notional,
  • Or Real.

Notionall, in which the second Notion is avouched of the first; as Animal is the Genus, Man is the species, &c.

Real, is, in which the consequent Synonimicall Real is disposed with the Antecedent, As, A man is an animal, Faith justifieth.

And it is

  • Ordinary.
  • Or Extraordinary.

Ordinary, in which the consequent is ordinarily disposed with the antecedent: As, A man is an animal; Peter is a man; Whitenesse is a Colour.

Whatsoever is said of the consequent by a Synonimical attribution, the same may also be said of the antecedent.

Extraordinary, is, in which there is a disposition of the Consequent connominative, with an extraordinary antece­dent, viz. the Person of the Mediator Christ; as, Christ is God, Christ is man.

Denominative (or paronimical) attribution, is, which consists of an attribute (or consequent) paronimicall, as when either difference, or part, or accident, or circum­stance, &. is spoken of the Subject, or antecedent; as, A man is reasonable; a man is bodied, is headed, is booted, is Temporal, is Local, &c. So, Christ is Eternal, is the Medi­ator, [Page 122] King, Priest, Prophet; Christ hath redeemed us with his blood, &c.

Each attribution, as well connominative, as denominative,

Is either

  • Proper.
  • Improper.

Proper, is, whose disposition and words are proper.

And it is Necessary, or Contingent.

Necessary, in which the Consequent is necessarily dispo­sed with the antecedent.

The degrees hereof are three

  • 1 [...]. Universal.
  • 2 [...]. Immediate or of it self.
  • 3 [...]. Reciprocall.

[...]; Or Universal, is, when the Consequent is attributed to an universall antecedent.

And it is either of the

  • Subject or Antecedent.
  • Adjacent.

[...], (or Universall) of the Subject, is, when the consequent agreeth to all contained under the subject, viz. Specials or Singulars: as, an animall hath sense, this is spoken of man and beast, as also of all singular men and beasts. Therefore it is an attribution universall, ( [...]) by reason of the subject.

Universall ( [...]) of the adjacent, is, when the consequent is attributed to the antecedent without any ex­ception of time or place: as, Every man is reasonable; this is true in all time and places.

[...], Or Immediate, is when the consequent is in the antecedent immediately.

And it is either of

  • The First Manner.
  • The Second Manner.

[Page 123]Of the first manner, is, when the consequent is of the Essence or definition of the antecedent: As, a man is a li­ving creature, a man is reasonable, Melchizedeck was a man, &c.

Of the second manner, when the antecedent is of the Es­sence or definition of the consequent; and this is either prin­cipal, or lesse principal.

Principal, when an accident perfectly proper is given to the subject: As, a man laugheth, weepeth, learneth, &c.

Lesse principal, when an accident imperfectly proper, is given to the subject; as a man is risible, and every risible thing is a man: This is the highest degree of necessity; no­ted therefore with two titles, [...] and [...].

[...], Universe, respecteth the consequent, and signi­fieth that it is wholly, and every whit drawn up of the ante­cedent, so as it is neither straighter, nor larger than it. It is not therefore [...] when I say, A man moveth. For moving is also without a man, and is not all contained in him; nor is it [...] when I say, A man is learned; for this consequent is more narrow than a man, and extends not so large; Seeing there are many men that are not learned.

The other term [...], 1 Respecteth the subject or an­tecedent, and saith that that is the only and sole thing, of which the consequent is strictly spoken, so as there is no o­ther subject to whom it is rather than to this, as there is no subject wherein laughter rather and neerer is; than a man.

The Canons of necessary propositions are six.

1 A Necessary proposition, is not onely affirmant but also negant: As, Christs body is not every where; A man is not a stone. As in affirmatives it is [...]; so in Negatives it is [...], in none at all.

2 Of necessary avouching, some is pure, some mixt of necessity, and contingencie: As, A man laugheth: this is mixt.

3 In pure Necessaries the couple or word Is, is freed from all difference of time or place, and from all exi­stence.

4 A necessary consequent can in no respect, limita­tion, [Page 124] or Distinction be denied of the antecedent: as, A body is finite.

5 The latter degree of necessary propositions, is alway more perfect than the former which it includeth: So a per­fect [...] includeth a [...], and a [...] includeth both a [...], and a [...].

6 Necessary attributions have the force of principles or beginnings; A Contingent proposition, is, wherein the con­sequent is contingently, or changeably disposed with the antecedent.

The Canons hereof are three.

1 A Contingent attribution hath such a consequent as may without contradiction be separated from the antece­dent, when it is affirmative, or be given to it when it is a Negative.

2 Contingent propositions chiefly consist of common ac­cidents, and integral parts lesse principal, and of adhe­rents: As, A man is white, is bearded, booted, &c.

3 Contingent propositions are said to be probable, when the truth of them is neither by sense nor by other reason manifest unto us; For that is probable, which when it can neither certainly be affirmed, nor certainly be denied, in­clineth the assent unto the one part.

An improper attribution, is, in which the consequent is improperly disposed with the antecedent.

And it is either by reason of

  • The Disposition▪ a
  • The Words. b

By reason of the disposition, is, when proper words beinga retained, the consequent [...] for any inward or Essential [...]lation or Union.

[Page 125]And it is either

  • Common,
  • Or Mystical.

Common, is, when an outward consequent is given to an antecedent for some vulgar and common Union or Rela­tion: these Relations are of four sorts.

1 The Relation of the cause to the effect; As, The Sun is said to be hot, because it causeth heat; the Gospel is the power of God unto Salvation.

2 The Relation or Union of place, and cleaving to; as when Iron is said to burn for the fire united unto it.

3 The Relation or representation; as when the title of the Prince is given to his Ambassadour.

4 The Union of consent and indissoluble society; as when the wife hath the titles and dignity of her husband, as to be called Princesse, Prophetesse, Doctoresse, &c.

Mystical, is, in which the outward consequent is given to the antecedent for mystical or holy relation.

And it is either

  • Typical,
  • Or Sacramental.

Typical, when for the certainty of the representation, that is given to the Type which belongs to the Antitype. These attributions are simple or compound.

Simple, as when that which is due to Christ onely, is given to his Type and Figure; as of David it is said, Psal. 16. Thou shalt not suffer thy holy One to see corruption; Of Solomon, I will establish his house for ever, 2 Sam. 7. These are fulfilled in Christ alone.

Compound, when partly they agree to the type, partly to the antitype, as, thou shalt not break a bone of him, Exod. 12. Joh. 19.

Sacramental, is, in which for the Union Sacramental, and certainty of sealing up, the thing signed or propriety thereof is given to the holy sign: As, Circumcision is a Covenant, the Lamb is a Passeover, Sacrifices are expiations of sins, Bread is Christs body, Baptism is the laver of Regenera­tion, Bread is the Communion of Christs body, &c.

[Page 126]Improper by reason of the words, is, in which a word is [...] transferred from the Native signification to some other: As when we say, The Woods do sing, The Seas clap their hands, The Fields laugh, and other figurative speeches.

A false attribution, is, which answereth not to the com­position and division of things out of the mind; and it is either wholly false, or false in part; also either necessarily, or contingently false.

And thus much of the second part of Logick.

A Summary View of the Second Part of Logick.

The 2d. part of Logick is about a proposition, which is considered either

  • Commonly, and so is
    • Simple, in wich the
      • Constitution of
        • Parts
          • Signed
            • Antecedent, or subject.
            • Consequent, or attribute.
          • Signing Significative
            • Noun.
            • Verb.
          • Consignificative.
        • Disposition of parts which is either,
          • Signe
          • Signing
            • Expresse.
            • Implyed.
      • Division from the
        • Material
          • Finite both either
          • Infinit both either
            • Vniversal
            • Secondary
              • Definite.
              • Indefinite
        • Formal
          • Affirming Each either
          • Denying Each either
            • Pure
            • Modal
              • Primary
              • Secondary
                • Exclusive
                • Exceptive
                • Restrictive.
      • Affection
        • Consentany
          • Equivalence
          • Conversion
        • Dissentany, opposition, either
          • Contradictory.
          • Contrary.
    • Specially & conditionally, and is
      • Compounded
        • Expres­sed by.
        • Imploy­ed
          • Conjunction
            • Connexive
              • Copulative.
              • Conditionall.
            • Separative
              • Disjoyned.
              • Discrete.
          • Relative particles.
      • Dark Both is either
      • Clear Both is either
        • True
          • Connominative
            • Notionall.
            • Reall
              • Ordinary.
              • Extraordinary.
          • False
          • Denomi­native, And both of them either
            • Proper
              • Necessary.
              • Contingent.
            • Improper by the
              • Disposi­tion.
                • Common.
                • Mystical.
                  • Typical.
                  • Sarcamental
              • Words.

THE THIRD BOOK, Handling the Third Part OF LOGICK; Which is the Director of DISCOURSE.

Of a Syllogism.

THE third part of Logick is busied in di­rectingThe defi­nition of Discourse. the Discourse.

Discourse is an act of the mind of man, moving it self forward from a known thing to an unknown, by a fit collation of things former and latter.

And it is either

  • Inferring.
  • Ordering.

[Page 130]Inferring Discourse is an action of mans mind by certain premised propositions proving another proposition, or im­proving it, by help of the Precepts of a Syllogism.

A Syllogism is consi­dered, either [...].

  • Commonly. a
  • Specially, in certain conditions of matter. b

A Syllogism commonly considered, is either perfectly soa called, or imperfectly.

Perfectly called, is, the disposition of three Propositions, wherein from the two former and better known, a thirdA Perfect Syllogism. more unknown or doubtful is fitly inferred, and gathe­red.

In this are to be considered the

  • Constitution.
  • Division.

A Syllogism is constituted of the

  • Material. m
  • Formal. n

The Material, is either 1. Simple, or 2. Compound.m

1. Simple are the Terms into which at last the Syllogism is resolved.

The Term is either the utmost or the mean.

The utmost or extream, is that which is put both in the Conclusion and in the Premises. And it is greater, or lesser.

The greater or Major, is the Consequent of the Conclusi­on,Major. always to be put in the first Proposition.

The lesser or Minor, is the Antecedent or Subject of theMinor. Conclusion, always to be put in the second Proposition.

The Mean, is, by means whereof the extreams are dispo­sedMean. together.

The compound matter of a Syllogism, is a Proposi­tion.

A Proposition, is either inferring or inferred.

Inferring, is, which inferreth the Conclusion: called therefore Premises: and it is either the major or minor.

[Page 131]The Major, or greater, is, in which the greater extream is disposed with the Mean.

The Minor, or lesser, is, in which the lesse extreame is dis­posed with the Mean.

The Inferred, is that which is gathered from the Pre­mises.

The Formal of a Syllogism, is the fit disposition of the [...] Mean with the extreams.

The disposition of the Mean ariseth from the finding of it out.

The finding out of the Mean, consists in two things. 1. The foreknowledge of the Conclusion. 2. The Collation of the extreams one with another.

1. The foreknowledge of the Conclusion, is either

  • Simple. a
  • Compound. b

Simple, is, when the nature and propriety is foreknowna of both the extreams, as well the Antecedent as the Con­sequent.

Of this Foreknowledge there are three Canons.

1. Let the Word or Voice of both extreams be diligently examined, what it is, and of what sort; and if it be doubt­ful, let it be carefully distinguished, and that distinction be presupposed in place of a Principle, as well for confirma­tion as refutation.

2. Let it be observed, whether the extreams of the con­clusion be universal or singular.

3. Let the causes, proprieties, and whole definition of both extreams be set down, either implicitely or expresly, as a certain and necessary Principle of the confirmation and refutation to come.

The Compound foreknowledge of the conclusion, is, when the nature, quality, and quantity thereof is considered.

The Canons hereof are seven:

1. Let the conclusion or state of the controversie be rightly informed.

2. Let a compound or Hypothetical, never be put in [Page 132] the place of a conclusion, but only a Simple or Categori­cal.

3. That conclusion is more easily proved, which may be concluded in many figures and moods; And that which can be but in few, is harder to be proved.

4. An universal affirmative is hardly proved, not easily refuted.

5. An universal negative is easily proved, hardly refelled.

6. A particular affirmant is more easily proved, more hardly refelled.

7 A particular negant is easie to prove, most hard to refute.

2. Now followeth the taking of the mean by Collation of the extreams.

The mean or medium, is either Perfectly so called or Im­perfectly.

Perfectly called, is that simple Term which being taken from the nature of both extreams, either knitteth or dis­joyneth them one with another.

Hereof, are three Canons.

1. Every mean is taken from the Terms of both extreams in the conclusion, as well the natural, as the repugnant Terms; therefore he that would find a medium, must mind the general, the special, the causes, the accidents, the parts, the cognata, the opposites of both Terms in the con­clusion.

2. What manner of mean is required to make a Syllogism of this or that quantity, the Vowel Letters in the Modes of every Figure, do evidently shew.

3. The mean, though it may be taken from the part of the antecedent as wel as of the consequent, yet that is coun­ted more noble which is drawn from the nature of the con­sequent; As for example, a mean is to be found to prove this conclusion, Every man is an Animal; mind the nature of this consequent Animal, and from it take the property of it, which is sense; this agreeth with both Terms, and is an excellent mean, or Argument to prove the conclusion, thus, Every thing that hath sense is an Animal. Every man hath sense; therefore every man is an Animal.

4. One and the same mean for a diverse respect of the [Page 133] Antecedent or consequent, may be referred to diverse places of Inventiom; as for example, A man hath sense, because he is an Animal: This Argument in respect of the Antecedent man, is from the place of the genus; but in respect of the con­sequent, it is from the place of the subject; for an Animal is the proper subject of sense.

5. Store of Means or Arguments is gotten chiefly two ways: 1. By deducing both extreams one after another through the places of invention, as well contingent as ne­cessary. 2. By discerning the principal means from the less principal; for example, take the consequent of thy opposed conclusion particularly, and lead it through the contingent places; argue and reason from the Notation of it, the likes, equales, conjugates, and the other contingent titles of pla­ces: which are at least 16. now thou hast so many Means. Then come to the others store-house of necessary places; and reason from the Genus, the difference, the subject and accident, the proper, the causes, and the other titles of ne­cessary places, which are at least 17. Then do the like a­bout the Antecedent of the proposed conclusion; and thus maist thou have for one Conclusion fifty Means or Argu­ments: but not the store of Arguments is to be respected so much as the weight or force of them; three or four sound Arguments are enough to prove any common Con­clusion.

The Mean imperfectly so called, is when a Testimony, or speech of any Author is taken to prove the conclusion. This mean is called [...] inartificial, because testimonies want artificial force to prove any thing of themselves. It is called also the Place from authority, that is, the dignity of the speaket.

And thus much of the constitution of a Syllogism; Now followeth the division of it.

Of the three Figures of Syllogisms,

A Syllogism is divided by three Figures.

A Figure is the conformation of a Syllogism, according to the certain situation of the Mean term, and certain man­ners (or modes) of quantity and quality; Figura est [...]. Alexand.

[Page 134]A mode or manner, is a lawful constitution of Propositi­ons in every figure, according to the quality and quan­tity.

And it is either

  • Principal.
  • Lesse Principal.

Principal, is, when the Propositions are general, that is, joyned with universals, or indefinite, or particular.

Less Principal, is, when the premises are singular.

The Figures of Syllogisms are three:

The first Figure, is, in which the mean or middle Term is the Antecedent (subject or foregoer) in the major or first pro­position: and the consequent (Attribute or follower) in the minor or second Proposition.

The Modes of this Figure are four, called Barbara▪ Celarent, Darii, Ferio; these are but words of Art, and serve for no other meaning then that the vowel Letters in them denote the quality and quantity of the Propositions; a noteth an universal affirmative; e an universal negative. i No­teth a particular affirmative, and o noteth a particular negative.

As may be seen in the examples following.

Bar­ba­ra.
  • Every sinner is subject to Gods wrath.
  • Every man is a sinner: therefore,
  • Every man is subject to Gods wrath.

Ce­la­rent.
  • No sinner deserveth Gods favour.
  • Every man is a sinner: therefore,
  • No man deserveth Gods favour.

Da­ri­i.
  • All sin is to be shunned.
  • Some pleasure is sin: therefore,
  • Some pleasure is to be shunned.

Fe­ri­o.
  • [Page 135]No sin giveth a man true comfort:
  • Some pleasure is sin: therefore,
  • Some pleasure giveth a man no true comfort.

A Singular Syllogism.

  • The promised Messias ought to die for the sins of the world.
  • Jesus Christ is the promised Messiah: Therefore,
  • He ought to die for the sins of the world.

The second Figure, is, in which the Mean or middle term is in both the Premises put in the place of the Consequent.

The Modes of this Figure are also four, Called, Cesare, Ca­mestres, Festino, Baroco.

Ce­sa­re.
  • No true Christian loveth this worlds good:
  • Every covetous man loveth this worlds good: therefore,
  • No covetous man is a true Christian.

Ca­me­stres.
  • All righteousness pleaseth God.
  • No faith without works pleaseth God: therefore,
  • No faith without works is righteousness.

Fe­sti­no.
  • No true Worship displeaseth God:
  • Some prayer displeaseth God: therefore,
  • Some prayer is not true worship.

Ba­ro­co.
  • All vertue deserveth praise:
  • Some love deserveth not praise: therefore,
  • Some love is not vertue.

Singular Syllogisms.

  • Jupiter Belus was an Assyrian.
  • Jupiter of the Poets was not an Assyrian: therefore,
  • Jupiter of the Poets, is not Jupiter Belus.

  • Jude Iscariot was a Traytor.
  • Jude that wrote the Epistle, was not a Ttaytor: therefore,
  • Jude that wrote the Epistle, was not Jude Iscariot.

[Page 136]The third Figure is, in which the Mean or Medium is put3. Figure. in the place of the Antecedent in both premises.

The Modes of this Figure are six.

Called, Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Fe­rison.

Da­rap­ti.
  • Every godly man is happy.
  • Every godly man is hated of the world; therefore,
  • Some that is hated of the world is happy.

Fe­lap­ton.
  • No will worship pleaseth God.
  • All will-worship is the invention of man: therefore,
  • Some invention of man pleaseth not God.

Di­sa­mis.
  • Some man shall be saved,
  • Every man is a sinner: therefore,
  • Some sinner shall be saved.

Da­ti­si.
  • Every holy man is loved of God.
  • Some holy man is afflicted of God: therefore,
  • Some that is afflicted of God, is loved of God.

Bo­car­do.
  • Some in the visible Church shall not be saved.
  • All in the visible Church professe Christ▪ therefore,
  • Some that profess Christ shall not be saved.

Fe­ri­son.
  • None whom God loveth are wretched.
  • Some whom God loveth are poor: therefore,
  • Some poor men are not wretched.

Singular Syllogisms:

  • Judas was not saved.
  • Judas was an Apostle: therefore,
  • Some Apostle was not saved.

  • Abraham entred into the Kingdom of Heaven.
  • Abraham was rich: therefore,
  • Some rich man entreth into the Kingdom of Heaven.

[Page 137]And thus much of the Species or Figures of a perfect Syllogism.

Now followeth the proprieties.

Of the Proprieties of a Syllogism.

The Proprieties of a Syllogism are either

  • General.
  • Special.

General, are which agree to all the Figures together.

And they are comprehended in these Canons.

1. The disposition of a Syllogism is called by the prin­ciples set in the mind of man, of which the first is that which is called Spoken of All, and of None; to wit, when any thing is said or denyed of the Universal, the same is also said or denyed of the particulars contained under it.

The other Principle is of proportion.

Whatsoever do agree in one third Term, do agree be­tween themselves; and they that dis-agree in one third, dis­agree between themselves.

2. In a Syllogism three Terms are only disposed, not more, nor fewer: The fourth Term must needs trouble the frame: For the mean is referred unto two: And four Terms may either be expressed, or implyed in a doubtful word; For every doubtful word, is a double word. Neither can there be lesse then three Terms; For two extreams cannot be disposed and knit without a third mean; Not but that one Term repeated more effectually may stand for two Terms; as in this A man in extream poverty is yet a man.

3. The mean (or middle Term) may not come into the conclusion.

4. If Abstract Terms be confounded with Concrete: and Oblique cases, with Right; so as the Principle of the spoken Of all, Of none, be violated, or that there be four Terms, the Syllogism must needs be naught.

5. Let there be a right placing of consignificative, or exceptive, and restrictive words, lest that which pertains [Page 138] to the conclusion be plucked from it, or lest the particular restrictive be twice repeated in the premises; For if that be, it is meer trifling; As in this example, Good, as it is good, is lovely; Justice is good, as it is good, Ergo, &c.

6. A Syllogism consisting of meer particulars is naught. One Term must be universal, else 'tis against both those Syl­logistical principles noted before in the first Canon of All, and of None, and agreeing in one third; Moreover in pure particulars there be four Terms; For the Major speaks of one subject, and the Minor of another; As Some man is rich, some man is learned, Therefore learned men are rich.

7. A Syllogism of meere Negatives is naught: For it is against the second Syllogistical principle, which will have the middle Term at least attributed to the one extream. Example, No Infidel pleaseth God; No Elect is an Infi­del; Therefore, No Elect pleaseth God.

8. Let the Premises in a Syllogism have the same kind of Attribution, or Predication; that is, the major must not be proper, and the minor improper, or otherwise. As, Bread is eaten with the mouth; Bread is Christs body; Therefore, Christs body is eaten with the mouth: Here that which is attri­buted or spoken of the Bread, in the first proposition, is pro­per; in the 2d. figurative: the conclusion therefore is false.

9. The major and minor Term, must be brought into the conclusion, as they were disposed in the Premises, not chang­ed or maimed; Therefore it is not right to say; All sinners repentant find mercy; Some men find not mercy; There­fore, some men are not finners: Here the conclusion is maimed, and is not as in the first proposition.

10. There must be no more in the conclusion then was in the premises.

11. The conclusion must imitate the more unworthy and weaker part that is premised: The worthiness is estee­med by the quality, and quantity; so that an Affirmative is always more worthy then a Negative, and an Universal then a Particular. It is therefore ill to reason thus; Some faithful are saved; Every faithful man is called; Therefore, every man that is called is saved. Here, of a particular Ma­jor is inferred a general conclusion; And it followeth not the weaker, but the stronger.

12. In a Syllogism, sometime by reason of the form, a true conclusion is gathered from false premises: But it is [Page 139] impossible for a false Conclusion to be gathered from true premises: Truth cannot be gathered from falshood▪ but by accident; as, Every man is a Living creature: Every man is a stone: therefore, Every man is a living creature: Here the conclusion is true, (by reason of the form) though both the premises be false.

13. Of one Syllogism rightly framed, many conclusions may be gathered. And this, four manner of ways.

1. By consequence; As, They that have communion with the Devil abide not in Christ, and consequently do not eat Christs body.

2. By conversion of propositions; As, No elect abideth in sin all his life; Every believer is an elect; Therefore, none that abideth in sin all his life, is a Believer.

3. By inclusion of one proposition in another; As, All the Elect believe in Christ; Some men believe not in Christ; Therefore some men are not Elect; Therefore also it is false that all men are Elect; For in proving the truth of the one part of the contradictory, the falshood of the other part is included and proved.

4. By descention, or undertaking a particular term under an Universal; As, All that conserveth society, is profitable; All vertue conserveth society; Therefore, all Vertue is pro­fitable, Therefore every lawful contract (because it conser­veth society) is profitable.

And thus much of the general properties, common to all the Figures. Now followeth the special.

Of these some pertain to the

  • Primary. Figure.
  • Secondary, Figure.

The properties of the primary Figure, are five, contained in so many Canons

1. The disposition (or frame) of the first Figure, is most perfect: And this for three causes.

1. Because the frame of this Figure most agreeth to natu­ral sense, and the Syllogistical principles that are in all men, and is of all the most evident.

2. Because the Mean of this Figure, is indeed the Mean or middle in place and situation; whereas in other figures, it is the Mean [...], and by reason of illation.

[Page 140]3. Because in this, all kind of conclusion may be gather­ed; Affirmative, Negative, Universal, and Particulars, which is done in none of the other Figures.

2. In the first figure there is a proceeding from Universals to Particulars, or from the Genus to the Species.

3. The major of the first Figure must alwaies be Univer­sal.

4. The minor must alwaies be Affirmative.

5. The Antecedent of the minor proposition in the first figure, must be included in the Antecedent of the Major, as the Special in his General. This Canon is most profitable to be noted: For the whole frame, and form of this first figure is overthrown, if in the Antecedents of the major, and minor be two disjoyned things, and not subordinate one to another.

The properties of the secondary figures, are either com­mon to both, as well the second as the third, or special to each one.

Common to both, is imperfection arising both from lesser evidence, and from placing of the mean with the extreams.

Imperfection requireth both

  • Reduction, and
  • Exposition.

Reduction, is the transforming of a Syllogism formed in the first or second Figure, into a Syllogism of the first Fi­gure.

Reduction is either

  • Direct, or
  • Indirect.

1. Direct, is, which is done by the only transposing, or turning of the Propositions, the extreams of the conclusion remaining.

The Canons of this Reduction are eight.

1. Reduction of the second and third Figure unto the first, is not alwaies necessary; therefore not always carefully to be essayed.

2. The Consonants in the beginning and the midst, do shew the manner of Reduction.

[Page 141]3. The Consonanrs in the beginning are four; B C D F▪ shewing unto which Mode of the figure, every Mode of the second and third figure is to be reduced; Namely to that which beginneth with the same Consonant. As Cesare and Camestres are reduced to Celarent; Festino and Felapton unto Ferio; Disamis and Datisi unto Darii.

4. Also the four Consonants in the midst. C M P S, do shew by what Instrument the reduction is to be made, whether by Conversion, Transposition, or deduction unto impossible.

5. C, therefore noteth indirect Reduction, or that which is done by the Impossible, and is onely in those words, Baroco and Bocardo.

6. M, noteth that there must be a transposition made of the propositions, the Minor in the place of the Major, and the Major in place of the Minor.

7. P, noteth conversion of the proposition by accident: to wit of the minor, into which the syllable having P, falleth, if the syllable of the modes be rightly distributed into the propositions.

8. S, sheweth that there must be a simple conversion made either of the Major, or the Minor, and the conclusion together: as this letter is hard, either in the first, or midle, or last syllable: For if it be heard in the first syllable, As Cesare, it noteth the simple conversion of the major; if in the midst, it notes the conversion of the minor: And if in the last, the conversion of the conclusion, as in Camestres it is twice heard, in the midst and the last, and therefore noteth the conversion to be made of the Minor and of the conclusion. As take the syllogism in Cesare.

Ces­sa­re.
  • No true Christian loveth the World,
  • Every covetous man loveth the World: therefore
  • No covetous man is a true Christian.

First the letter C sheweth it must be reduced to Celarent; S, in the first syllable shews the manner of reduction; to wit, by a simple conversion of the major, thus.

Ce­la­rent
  • None that loveth the world is a true Christian.
  • Every covetous man loveth the world: therefore,
  • No covetous man is a true Christian.

[Page 142]Indirect Reduction, is, when we shew the evidence of the Illation by absurdity of the contradiction to be admitted.

The Canons hereof are six.

1. Indirect Reduction hath place only in two Moods Ba­roco of the second, and Bocardo of the third Figure.

2 Indirect Reduction is made by concession, and by Assumption.

3. By concession, because the adversary granteth both premises, and yet denies the inference of the Conclusion.

4. The premises therefore, being granted, by supposition, the contradictory is to be taken of the conclusion, which is in the imper ect Syllogism, that is to be reduced.

5. The contradictory of the conclusion being taken, is put in the place of the Minor, if it be Baroco of the second Figure: and in place of the Major, if it be Bocardo of the third Figure: and so the Major in the second Figure, is al­way left in his place, as the Minor in the third.

6. Hence is made the conclusion in the first Figure, wherein contradiction is made to the proposition left of the imperfect Syllogism; and so the adversary is driven to an absurdity, that is, to the contradictory of that proposition, which before he had granted as true.

And thus much of shewing the evidence by Reduction.

Exposition, is the declaration of a Syllogism formed [...]. with a middle Mean general Term in the third Figure, by a singular Mean contained under the general, as neerer to the sense; for example,

  • None of the Elect sin unto death.
  • Some of the elect sin grievously,
  • Therefore, Some that sin grievously, sin not to death.

Exposition of this may be made by singulars known unto us, as David, Peter, &c. David sinned not unto death; Da­vid sinned grievously; therefore, some grievously sinning, sin not to death.

The Properties peculiar to the second Figure now follow, which are comprehended in three Canons.

1. The second Figure is ( [...]) most sit to refute with; for it disjoyneth two diverse things, because they a­gree not in one third.

2. In the second Figure the Major must alway be Univer­sal, even as in the first Figure.

3 In the second Figure, may be no meer affirmants.

The Proprieties of the third Figure, are four, set down in four Canons.

1. The proceeding of the third Figure is, for the most part, from the straighter to the larger. Therefore Logicians say, the first figure hath process [...]: the third, [...].

2. The Minor must always be affirmant.

3. The whole and entire consequent of the Minor must needs be inferred in the conclusion, and put in the place of the Antecedent; for if it be maimed, or in part, all is trou­bled, and there are four Terms. As, Whole Christ is every where; whole Christ consisteth of the Godhead and the Manhood; therefore the Manhood is every where. Yea, though the Matter be good, the Form may be evil; as, God is the God of the living; God is the God of Abraham: therefore, Abraham liveth. Here, in the Conclusion, the Consequent of the Minor is impaired; which whole is not Abraham, but the God of Abraham. The Argument then must not be in the third, but the first Figure; thus, They, of whom God is God, do live; but God yet, is the God of A­braham; therefore he liveth: the Major followeth, because to be God, is to exercise Divine properties in the Object; and in whom such things are done, he must needs exist.

4. The Conclusion in the third Figure, is never Univer­sal. And hitherto, of a perfect Syllogism.

[Page 144]Animperfect Syllogism, is, which hath an imperfect dis­positionImperfect Syllogism. of Syllogistical Form.

And it is

  • Direct. f
  • Indirect. g

g Indirect, is which concludeth by indirect or absurd.

And it is

  • Primary. a
  • Secondary. b

Primary, is, when the adversary by the contradictory ofa the conclusion which he denyeth, and by the complication of a proposition manifestly true and granted, is driven to an absurdity.

The Canons hereof are seven.

1. Let the contradictory be taken of the conclusion which the adversary denyeth.

2. Let a contradiction be assumed manifestly true, and which the adversary cannot deny; and let that be placed instead of the Major.

3. Let the contradictory of the conolusion be put instead of the Minor: and thereupon with the Major manifestly true, let be inferrd an absurd conclusion.

4. From the absurd conclusion inferred, go back to the absurd proposition, or contradictory of the first conclusion.

5. The falshood of the Minor being shewed by the force of the contradictory principle, let it be shewed that the first conclusion is true, as, that whereto the Minor is contradicto­rily opposed; for example, Arians deny this conclusion, The Holy Ghost is God. I take the contradictory, The Holy Ghost is not God, but a Creature: and thus I infer, The spirit of God is not God, but a Creature; therefore, the The spirit of God is without God. This Conclusion is absurd; for no spirit is without that whose spirit it is: therefore Paul saith plainly, The spirit of God is in God. Therefore either the Major or Minor is absurd; not the Major, for it is manifest, [Page 145] the creatures are without the Creator; therefore the Minor: And therefore the right conclusion is true, which is opposed to this Minor.

6 Therefore a Syllogism leading to absurdity, is faulty either when the Major is infirm, or the conclusion not ab­surd or opposed to a true conclusion.

7 A Syllogism leading to absurdity, much urgeth in dis­puting, and hath the chief use in shewing the verity of prin­ciples, and specially of those conclusions which are nigh to principles, so as they cannot well be proved by demon­stration.

Secondary, is, which by the Adversaries grant of con­contradictories, inferreth the denyall of the same by it self; as, No Naturall body is infinite; some body, viz. Christs, by the Ubiquitaries opinion is infinite: therefore some body, viz. Christs, is not a body.

A direct, imperfect Syllogism, is, 1 Enthymema. 2 Conse­cution of sentences. 3 Induction. 4 Sorites

1 An Enthymema is a Syllogism wherein one of the premises is kept in.

The Canons are three.

1 In an Enthymema; the first proposition is called the an­tecedent, the other the consequent.

2 It may easily be made a Syllogism by adding the pro­position that wanteth.

3 Which of the premises is wanting, may easily be judged by the conclusion; whereof, if the attribute (or latter part) appear not in the antecedent; the Major is wanting: if the subject (or first part) appear not, the Minor is wanting; as, a living creature moveth; therfore man moveth. Here wants the Minor; for this word man appeareth not in the antece­dent. A man is aliving creature; therefore he moveth; Here wants the Major; for the attribute in the conclusion, mo­veth, appeareth not in the antecedent.

Consecution of sentences, is, when without disposition of the Mean, one sentence followeth another.

[Page 146]And it is

  • Consentanie. a
  • Dissentanie. b

Consentanie, is, when the consecution procedeth by con­sent of the sentences; Namely by conversion, inclusion, and other naturall Relations of the Sentences.a

The Canons hereof are nine.

1 The converting to the converted▪ in all kinds of con­version, followeth rightly: as, No Infidel eats Christs body; therefore, None that eats Christs body is an Infidel.

2 That inference which is made from a contrary sense is neer kin to conversion by contrary placing: as, Vertue is to be praised, therefore, Vice is to be dispraised.

3 From the Superiour or Universall unto the Inferior or Particular distributely there is a good consecution: as, All sinners repenting finde mercy: Therefore all great sinners repenting do finde mercy. But from one particular to ano­ther, it followeth not rightly; As to say: Some sin is not forgiven in the life to come, therefore some sin is for­given in the life to come.

4 From the affirmative of a finite consequent (or attri­bute) followeth the Negative of an infinite consequent: as man is just, therefore man is not not-just.

5 From the affirmative of an infinite consequent follow­eth the Negative of a finite consequent, if the antecedent be capable of the habit: as, Man is not just, therefore neither is he just, neither un just. But of an infant it followes not, he is not just, therefore he is unjust; for he is not capable.

6 From a conjoyned consequent are inferred things di­vided, where there is no ambiguity nor repugnancy in the adject: as, Man is a living sensible body; Therefore man is a body, man is living, man is sensible. But it follows not, a Carkase is a dead man, therefore it is a man; For between a Carkase and a man there is a repugnancy.

7 From two or mo disjoyned consequents that cleave together by themselves, and are taken without ambiguity, we may infer conjoyned things: as, Man is a body, and he is mixt, and he is living, and he is sensible; therefore, man [Page 147] is a living mixt sensible body. But it followeth not if one say; This man is a Musitian, and he is good, therefore he is a good Musitian; because Musitian and good, cleave together by accident; And there is ambiguity in the word good, which may be understood either of Moral good, or of perfection of Arts. Neither is this right to say; This servant is a father, and he is thine; therefore, he is thy father; For there is am­biguity in the word thing.

8 From an exclusive to an Universal of transposed terms, is a good consequence. As, Onely man can laugh▪ therefore whatsoever can laugh is a man.

9 From the removing of the one immediate member, unto the exclusive, is a good consequence: As, We are not justified by works: therefore by faith onely.

Dissentany consecution, is, when from the truth of the oneb of the opposites is understood the falshood of the other; and contrary from the falshood of the one, the truth of the o­ther. As, It is true that some man is not chosen to life: therefore, It is false that every man is chosen to life. It is true that every Christian man is to be baptized: therefore, it is false that no Christian Infant is to be baptized.

Induction is either

  • Principal. a
  • Lesse principal. b

Principal, is, when from many singulars, or particulars,a there is drawn a general conclusion.

The Canons hereof are three.

1 An Induction standing of particular propositions, may bring in all the particulars: As if one would prove that Wine heateth, he may reckon up all sorts of Wine in the World, as French, Spanish, Rhenish, European, Asian, Affri­can Wine, &c.

2 When singulars are infinite, it is enough to alledge some chief, with addition of this clause, Neither can an un­like example be shewn: As Paul in Heb. 11. to prove that all that are saved, are not saved but by faith, alledgeth Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, &c. and at last [Page 148] saith, There are many moe examples; Neither can any be shewed unlike to those.

3 An Induction may be made a Syllogism of the first Fi­gure, by putting in the place of the Major such a proposition in which the consequent of the conclusion is spoken of all particulars or singulars (reckoned up or understood) as of the mean; and adding a Minor, in which the same particu­lars or singulars are spoken of the Antecedent (or first part) of the conclusion. As, Spanish, French, Rhenish, and all Wines do heat. All Wine is Spanish, French, Rhenish, &c. therefore, all Wines do heat.

Lesse Principal Induction, is, when one or two singularsb are induced, or when one is proved by another: As, Abra­ham was justified by faith: therefore, other godly are so justified also.

Sorites is an imperfect Syllogism, wherein the consequent of the first proposition is made the Antecedent of the se­cond; and so forward as by a chain, until at length the last consequent be spoken of the Antecedent of the first propo­position: [...] an heap, [...] a coacervator, an heaper together. This is called a Stoical argument.

The Canons are five.

1 The reason of the consequence in a Sorites is both the connexion of the subordinates in the same predicament, and also the coherence of the causes and effects by themselves.

For Example. A man is an animal, an animal is a sensual body, a sensuall body is living, that that is living is mixt, that that is mixt is a substance: therefore, a man is a sub­stance; also, Rom. 8. All foreknown are predestinate, all predestinate are called, all called are justified, all justified are glorified: therefore, all foreknown are glorified.

2 When terms not subordinate are confounded, and causes by themselves are mixt with causes by accident, the Sorites is naught: as, Of evil manners spring good Laws, good Laws are worthy of praise, things worthy of praise are to be desired: therefore, Evil manners are to be desired. This conclusion is naught; for evil manners are not causes of themselves of good Lawes, but by accident.

3 A denial makes a faulty Sorites, when it cannot be re­duced [Page 149] to some figure; and begetteth either both premises negant, or a negant Minor in the first figure: otherwise when there is a good connexion of negative consequents or attributes, Negative Sorites are not simply to be rejected; as, Affliction bringeth patience, patience bringeth experi­ence, experience brings forth hope, hope makes not asha­med, therefore affliction makes not ashamed.

4 When a particular proposition in a Sorites it put in the second or third place, or when the particular negant is put in any place, the Sorites is naught; for the Major is parti­cular, or the Minor negant in the first Figure.

5 In a Sorites, the Antecedent or first part of the con­clusion is the Minor term, the consequent the Major; the other which besides these are found in a Sorites, are Means; and look how many Means, so many Syllogisms.

An imperfect Syllogism also, is either

  • Simple.
    A com­pound or hypothetical Syllogism.
  • Compound.

Simple, which consisteth of simple Propositions; of which we have heard before.

Compound, is, which consisteth of a compound Proposi­tion, called also hypothetical, and [...].

And it is either

  • 1 Conditional.
  • 2 Disjunctive.

Conditional, whose Major is Conditional or Hyprthe­tical.

The Canons hereof are seven.

1 An Hypothetical Syllogism, consists of antecedent and consequent: the antecedent is of the first part of the Proposition; the consequent of the latter.

2 The Union of antecedent and consequent, is called the reason of the consequent, which is the very form of an hy­pothetical Syllogism; and therefore if it cannot be granted, the hypothetical Syllogism must needs be faulty.

3 That Hypothetical Syllogism is good, which may be reduced to a good simple Syllogism; for as the perfect is al­ways [Page 150] the measure of the unperfect, so a simple Syllogism is the measure of a compound.

4 Therefore in an Hypothetical Syllogism, from the as­sumption of the antecedent to the conclusion of the conse­quent, the inference is of force, but not from the assumpti­on or putting of the consequent, to the putting of the ante­cedent; for so in the second figure should be meer affir­mants; as, If Infidels be grafted into Christ, they eat his flesh: But they eat his flesh; therefore they are grafted in­to Christ. The Argument is not of force.

5 From removing the consequent to the removing of the antecedent, the inference is of force; but not from the de­struction of the antecedent to the destruction of the conse­quent; for so there should be a minor negant in the first fi­gure: as, If he be a man, he hath reason; but he is not a man: therefore he hath not reason. The Conclusion is true, but it followeth not of the premisses formally, but by acci­dent onely.

6 When an Hypothetical hath three terms in the first Proposition, it is easily reduced to a Categoricall (or simple) Syllogism; for the reason of the consequence being granted, is put for the Major in a simple Syllogism, and then the Minor followeth of its own accord; as, If the Heaven be hot, it may be corrupted by another body: the reason of the consequence is, Every hot thing may be corrupted with another body that is cold; but it is not corruptible; therefore neither is it hot. Here of make a simple Syllo­gism in the second figure, thus▪ Every hot thing is corrupti­ble. Heaven is not corruptible: therefore Heaven is not hot.

7 But when four terms are in the first Proposition, the reduction is hard and laborious, because the reason of the consequence cannot so easily be rendered by a simple Pro­position: as, I [...] Justice be by the Law, Christ died in vain; But Christ died not in vain: therefore Justice is not by the Law. Here are four terms in the first Proposition.

2 A Disjunctive Syllogism is, which hath the first Pro­position a Disjunctive.

[Page 151]And it is either

  • Uniform. c
  • Biformed, or a Dilemma. d

Uniform, is, which of members disjoyned takes away thec one to put the other, or puts the one to take away the other. as, Either we are justified by faith, or by works: not by works; therefore by Faith.

The Canons hereof are two.

1 The whole force of the consequence in a disjoyned Syllogism, consists in the opposition and disjunction of the parts, whereupon that must needs be naught whose parts are subordinate: as, We have instruction either from God, or from our teachers; but it is from God; therefore not from our teachers. The disjunction is naught, for it disjoy­neth things subordinate.

2 A right disjunction, requires a full enumeration of parts: if therefore a third part can be given, or a fourth, the disjunction is naught: as, Heaven is either Hot or Cold: but it is not cold; therefore it is hot,

Here the first proposition hath an imperfect enumeration; for we should adde, or else it is without all Elementary quality.

A Biformed disjunctive is, that when a disjunction of parts is made, which soever be granted, the adversary is fast:d it is called a Dilemma [...], as it were [...], twice taken and taking; also an Horned Syllogism, and a Crocodiline Syllogism. As, Johns Baptism is either of God or of men. If of God, why do we not receive it? If of men, we are in danger of the people which count him a Prophet.

The Conons hereof are four.

1 The force of consequence in a Dilemma dependeth on the ful enumeration of the disjoyned members, and the con­venient removing of them both.

2 The Dilemma hath no force, if there be not a full disjunction, but a third or fourth member may be given.

[Page 152]3 It is also without force if both members be granted, as making nothing against us. As the Jews reasoned against Christ: Tribute must be given to Cesar, o [...] unto God; If to God, then not to Caesar, and this is Treason: If to Caesar, then not to God, and this is Sacriledge. Our Saviour answereth by granting both, Give to Caesar that which is Caesars, and to God that which is Gods.

4 Finally, A Dilemma hath no force if it may be turn­ed and returned upon the adversary.

Often also in the undertaking of a Dilemma, they are faulty in evil consequence, and then we must answer by de­nying the consequence, as, Infants which while they are a Baptizing, do cry and resist, either they understand, or not: If they understand not, neither beleeve they; and therefore should not be baptized: If they understand, they are Sacri­legious that oppugne Gods Institution.

Here be evil consequences in both branches; for it fol­loweth not, That Infants do beleeve, although they under­stand not explicitely what there is done. Neither followeth it, That they are Sacrilegious and repugne Gods Ordinance though they cry and struggle; for they stuggle not against the water as it is an holy sign, or with formal reason; but as it is a cold Element oftensive to their tender body. Even as a godly man that loves no wine, doth naturally abhor the wine which is in the Lords Supper; but he abhors it only as it is wine, and not as it is a Sacred signe of Christs blood.

And thus much of a Syllogism Formal, or commonly considered.

A Special or Material Syllogism, is, which is restrained un­to certain conditions of matter.

And it is either

  • True.
  • Apparent.

True, is, when not only the form, but also the matter of it is good.

And is either

  • Notional. a
  • Real. b

[Page 153]A notionall Syllogism, is, whose conclusion and premisesa have some second Notion or term of Logick.

The Canons hereof are two.

Of which the first for foreknowledge of the conclu­sion.

The latter is for finding out of the mean.

1. Every simple Notion handled in the first part of Lo­gick comes into the conclusion of a National Sillogism; for every second Notion may be compared with the first. We ask, Whether time and place be words conjoyned or abso­lute? Whether the Genus of sin be an action, or the Genus of faith be knowledge? Whether Antichrist is to be one sin­gular person? Whether faith be proper to the Elect? Whe­ther persons in the Trinity be really, modally, or formal­ly distinguished, and so of all other points. So as there is great use of a Notional Syllogism.

2. The Mean term for a notional Syllogysm, is easily taken from the nature and properties of that second Noti­on, of which question is made in the conclusion; so as from the first part of Logick the Canons of every second Notion may be put for the Major in the Syllogism, and then let the assumption be made affirmative or negative.

For example. It is asked, Whether an action be the ge­nus of sin, or not. For a denyal, there is found out a mean term, from the nature and properties of a good genus. As by this Canon. No subject is the genus of that whereof it is the subject. l. 4. Top. cap. 6. But an action is the subject whereto sin cleaveth; therefore it is not the genus of sin.

Again, It is asked, Whether good works be the cause of Justification. Take for Major this Canon of a cause; No cause is after the effect; but good works are after Justifica­tion; for the person must first be justified and please God before he can do any good work: therefore good works are not the cause. And so of all other Notions, with their Ca­nons treated of in the first part of Logick, wherby appeareth the great use of those Rules: and that there needs here no long discourse of a Notional or topical Syllogism.

A Comparative Syllogism.

Seeing every Syllogism is first absolute; As when we ask whether this be that or not: or else secondly Comparative, as when we ask whether this be more or lesse then that; here shall be added Canons of a Comparative Syllogism.

The generall Canons hereof are two.

The 1 For the foreknowledge of the conclusion. 2 The other to finde the Mean.

1 The conclusion of a Comparative Syllogism being contingent, and for the most part taken confusedly, need­eth therefore diligent distinction and limitation: As it one ask, whether this or that be better; We must distinguish between better simply and absolutely, [...], and better in respect, and after a sort, [...], and [...], rather to be chosen in respect of time and place: So marriage is simply better than a sin­gle life, because of propagation, Gen. 2. Yet single life is rather to be chosen in time of persecution, 1 Cor. 7.

2 The mean term of a comparative Syllogism, is hardly found by the places of reall invention; because the attri­bute is most common, and almost Notional, not reall; therefore this is here handled after a Notional Syllogism.

The speciall Canons pertain either to the question as it is asked indefinitely, whether this be rather then that? or un­to the question as it is asked, whether this be better then that, or worse?

1 That which is such by Nature, is rather such then that which is not such by Nature; as, flowers are fairer then gar­ments; For, they have a naturall beauty, these but an artifi­ciall.

2 That which maketh an other such, is rather such then that which maketh not; and if both do make, that which rather maketh, is rather such; As Fire is hotter then Water; for it maketh the Water such.

The Canons pertaining to a conclusion, better or not bet­ter, are these.

1 That which is more lasting and constant, is better than that which is lesse lasting; So 1 Cor. 13. Love is better than faith; For love endureth alwayes.

2 That which is of it self good, is better than that which is good by another, and by accident; So, To live is better than to eat, because we eat to live, and live not to eat.

3 Simply good, is better than that which is good for some; As marriage is better than single life; Study of learn­ing better than Merchandize.

4 That is more excellent which is in the more worthy and honourable thing; As a Monarchy is the best Regi­ment; For God is a Monarch. It is better to give, than to receive; For God giveth onely.

5 The end is better than the means unto the end; As better is health than the use of Physick; better is peace than Triumph.

6 That which is possible, is better than that which is im­possible.

7 That is better which of it self is more fair and honour­able.

8 That which is after, is oftentimes better than the for­mer; to wit, if other things be like, &c. As, the later thoughts are better than the former.

9 Many good things are to be preserred before few.

10 That which effecteth many good things, is better than that which doth but few; So a Publike person is better than a Private.

11 That which is joyned with pleasure, is better than that which wanteth pleasure.

12 At what time a thing is more necessary, at that time it is more to be chosen; So comfort is better in sorrow than in prosperity.

13 That which is alwayes profitable, is better than that which is but sometime; So, Bread is better then all Phesants, Partridges, &c. For it is alwayes needfull.

14 That which hath all kindes of good, as honest, pro­fitable, and pleasant, is better than that which is under but one kinde of good.

[Page 156]15 That is most to be shunned, which most hindereth things to be chosen.

16 They are most to be chosen, whose opposites are most to be shunned: So prudence is better than knowledge, be­cause imprudence is more hurtfull than simple igno­rance.

17 That is best which is most famous and notable.

18 Hard things are to be preferred before easie.

19 Things that we may communicate with others, spe­cially with friends, are better than those which we may not; So learning is better than health, liberality than tem­perance.

20 That is best which is most proper; So Gods grace is better for his children, than worldly riches; For these are common with the wicked, that proper to the elect; To use reason, is better than to use sense; For that is proper to man, this is common with beasts. So wit is better than memory, which many fools have.

21 Of those which are under the same Genus or Spe­cies, that is better which hath its own proper vertue; So cold water is better than hot; Natural gesture than af­fected.

22 They which are of abundant, seem better than neces­sary things; As to have fair cloaths better than mean, to be a good Artizen better than a mean.

23 Things that cannot be given by men, are better than those that can: So wit is better than riches.

24 That is more to be chosen, the abundance whereof is more to be chosen than of any other thing.

25 Better is when a thing may be chosen without an other, than when without an other it is not to be chosen: As prudence is better than strength.

26 Of what things we deny the one, that the other may seem to be in it; that is the better which we would have seem to be in it: So many deny they took pains about a thing, that they may seem to be witty; therefore, wit is bet­ter than pains taking.

27 Such things as whose losse we take not more grie­voussy, we are more blamed for, are more to be chosen, As children than riches, for we are more blamed if we be not sorry for losse of our children, than of our goods.

[Page 157]28 That which effecteth good, is better than that which doth not.

29 Conjugates follow mutually; therefore, if one be better, the other also shall be better; As the New Testa­ment is better than the old; therefore, also a Minister of the New, is better than a Minister of the old.

30 That which pleaseth God, is better than that which pleaseth man.

31 That which we choose for it self, is better than that which we choose for glory.

And this much of a Notional Syllogism, and a compara­tive.

A Reall Syllogism, is, whose terms are Reall: that is, firstb Notions put without the mind.

And it is either

  • Contingent. a
  • Or Necessary. b

A Contingent is, whose contingent mean contingentlya disposed with the extreams, getteth a suspended and weak assent to the conclusion, and is called opinion.

A contingent mean, is that which is taken from a contin­gent place.

Contingent places be either

  • From the word. c
  • From the things. d

Places from the word, are either

  • 1 From the definition of a Noun.
  • 2 From the Conjugates.

A place from the definition of a Noun, hath three Ca­nons.

1 To what the definition and notation of a noun is gi­ven, to that also the defined thing is given.

2 When the definition and Notation is larger than the thing defined and noted, the consequence is of force onely negatively; As, it is not a sacred sign; therefore, not a Sa­crament.

[Page 158]3 When the Notation is equall to the noted, the con­sequence is of force as well affirmatively as negatively: as, He foretels things to come, therefore he is a prophet: he is not a prophet, therefore he foretels not things to come.

A place of Conjugates hath three Canons.

1 One of the conjugates being put, another is put; and one taken away, another is taken away; as, Sin pleaseth not God: therefore not the sinner.

[...] That which is given to one of the Conjugates, is gi­ven also to the other: as, Religion is contemned, because the Religious are contemned. They that have one God, one Spirit, one Baptism, ought to have Unity amongst them­selves: In the Trinity there is Unity, because the Father, the Son, and the holy Ghost are one.

A place from the things is either

  • Artificial. h
  • Inartificial. i

Artificial, is, which containeth Terms arguing of them­selves.b

And it is either

  • First.
  • Or, rising from the first.

First, is, which containeth the first Terms.

And it is either

  • Inward. m
  • Outward. n

Inward, is, which containeth inward Terms: as, Of them cause and caused, of the subject and accident; of the whole and the part.

The place of the cause and caused hath five Canons.

1 The far-off efficient cause being put, it is probable that the effect should be put: as, The clouds gather, therefore it will rain.

[Page 159]2 The cause [...] and [...] being put, it is probable the effect is put, and contrariwise; also the effect being put, it is probable such a cause is put: as, He loves her, therefore he will marry her: He married her, therefore he loved her.

3 The Instruments being put, it is probable the effect is put; and contrary, the effect being put, it is probable the instruments are put, and contrary: as, He reads good books, therefore he will be learned: He useth proper physick; therefore he shall recover health, &c.

4 From the common matter put or taken away, or the matter whereof, to put or take away the mattered, and so on the contrary, is a contingent inference: as, In Germany is much wood, therefore they have many ships.

5 From a voluntary end to the means, and from these to the end, is a contingent inference: as, He studied hard, therefore he means to have the degree of a Doctor, &c.

The Canons of Subiect and Accident, Whole and Part, are four.

1 From the common accident being put unto the sub­ject, is a contingent inference; as from the accident remo­ved, to the removing of the subject: as, It is a black Bird, therefore a Crow: She loves the childe, therefore she is the mother of it.

2 From a common subject being put, to the putting of a common accident, and contrary, is a contingent inffer­ence: as, She is a Mother, therefore she loves the children: He is a Cretian, therefore a lyar.

3 The whole being put, it is probable this or that part is put: as, He is a man grown, therefore he hath a Beard.

4 Some integral part being put, it is probable the whole is put; and contrariwise: as, There is a foundation and walls, therefore a house.

Places of outward terms have five Canons.

b

1 The adherent being put, it is probable that is put which it is wont to cleave to, and contrary; As he goeth brave; therefore he is rich.

2 The contingent object being put, it is probable that is put, about which it is busied, and contrary; as, There are many sick; therefore, many Physitians.

3 The circumstance of place or time being put, it is probable that is put which is wont to be therein, and con­trary; as, It is eight of the clock in the morning; there­fore, he is not drunk: He was not seen about the house in the night, therefore, he is a thief.

4 The antecedent being put, it is probable the conse­quent is put, and contrary; as, The Moon is pale; there­fore, it will rain.

5 The con [...]ingent consequent being put, it is probable the antecedent was, and contrary; as, It raineth; there­fore, the Moon was pale.

Places of terms arising from the first,

Are either

  • From Description.
  • From Comparison.

The place from description hath one Canon.

To whom the lesse principal description agreeth, it is pro­bable that the described agreeth, or agreeth not thereto; as, It is not a Bush bigger then a Biamble, with strong twigs, and red Berries; therefore, it is not the Dogg-bryar.

The place from com­parisons, the place is either from

  • Consentany a Comparison.
  • Dissentany b Comparison.

From consentany compari­sons,a the place is ei­ther from,

  • Even.
  • Like.

The place from Even hath two Canons.

1. Even things agree ro Even; and what is given to the one, is given to the other of even things, and contrary: as Rom. 5. By one man salvation may be restored to the world; seeing by one man sin and death came on the world.

2. Whereto one of the even things agreeth or not, there­to it is probable the other also agreeth, or not; as, Christ had power to heal the Palsie-sick; therefore, he had power to forgive sins, Mat. 9.

The place from Like hath three Canons.

1 That which agreeth or not, to one of the like things, that also agreeth or not to the other: as, The rain returns not back to heaven, but watereth the earth; neither Gods Word returneth in vain.

2. To whom one of the Similies agreeth, or not▪ the other also agreeth, or not.

3. A similitude, or comparison allegericall, if it should have any force in arguing, it must needs have authority in the Scriptures, and application Ministred by the Holy Ghost.

Of Proportionals, there is the same Judgement; and what is affirmed or denied of one by proportion, that is also of another: For as is the seed in the land, so is the word to the heart, but seed falling into good ground, bears good fruit; therefore doth Gods Word likewise in a good heart.

Neer to the place of Even and Like things, is the pla [...] from a singular thing and example, whose Canon is one.

Of Even▪ and Like things, there is the same Judgement; and that which agreeth, or not, to one singular of the same kinde, doth so to the o [...]her: as, Abraham was justified by faith, therefore also other men.

[Page 162]An example is either

  • True.
  • Feigned.

True, which hath indeed come to passe.

Feigned, which is devised for the teaching of children.

And it is

  • A Parable.
  • A Fable.

A Parable, is a feigned example, drawn from such actions of men, as may or are wont to be done.

A Fable, is a feigned example, drawn from beasts and other such things, whereunto humane actions do not agree.

From dissentany comparison the places are from

  • Uneven.
  • Unlike.
    b

Uneven, either greater or lesser.

The place from the greater hath two Canons.

1. If there be the greater, there will also be the lesser, and whereto the greater agreeth, the lesse doth also: as, God hath given us life, therefore he will give us food and rayment.

2. That which in the same proportion agreeth not to the greater, agreeth not also to the lesser: as, The Just is scarce saved, therefore much lesse the wicked.

The place from the Lesser, hath onely this one Canon.

If the lesser be not, then the greater will not be; as, Of our selves we cannot think a good thought; much lesse, do a a good deed.

2. The place from Unlike, is either

  • Simple.
  • Compound.

Simple Unlikes agree to Unlikes; and whatsoever agreeth to one of the Unlikes, as it is unlike▪ agrees not to the [Page 163] other: as, Though beasts have all things common, tis un­fitting men should.

For compound unlikes, they which are not proportionate, to them proportionals do not agree: as, A good shepherd deals not with his flock like an hireling: the hireling flies when the wolf comes; therefore the good shepherd doth not so. And thus much of places Artificial.

Inartificial, is a place which argueth not of it self, butb by the assumed force of an artificial place, and it is called the place of testimony.

Contingent testimony, is that which cometh from man as he is man.

The Canons of humane Testimony are 13.

1 Though no humane testimony as such, be of necessa­ry truth, yet admitteth it certain degrees, and one is more strong, or weak than the other.

2 Proper, or ones own testimony of things, done or not done, especially in the worser part, if it be not wrung out of force, is counted for firm.

3 Publike testimonies of publike seals are firm.

4 Testimony of publike and long-lasting fame is also to be esteemed for meanly firm,

5 Old testimony is more worth than new.

6 Grammatical testimonies, to wit, which treat of the use, signification, quantity of words, syllables, &c. gathered out of the best Authors, are firm.

7 Testimonies Practick, that is Ethick, Politick, Legal, of honest, filthy, right, wrong, spoken of grave Authors, are firm.

8 Testimonies historical, of approved Historians, are firm.

9 Testimonies Theoretical of some great and received Author, alledged after reasons of a Theoretical conclusion, have great force.

10 Testimonie of many Wise men and Famous, is to be preferred before the testimony of one and an obscure man.

11 Testimony of a skilfull Artizen, is to be preferred before the testimony of another unskilfull, however famous otherwise.

[Page 164]12. Testimonies of ancient Fathers, if they be subordi­nate to the holy Scripture, have a force in proving Theo­logicall conclusions, but no proving humane, yet greater.

13. An Argument from humane Testimony negatively, is of no force.

And thus much of a contingent Syllogism.

Of a necessary Syllogism.

A necessary Syllogism, is, which hath a Mean or Medium of necessary disposition to b [...] get in the minde firm and im­movable assent to the conclusion. It is called Science.

The generall Canons thereof are three.

1. The Conclusion of a necessary Syllogism sometime is pure, [...]r proper to one discipline; sometime mixed, or of di­vers Disciplines: as, Onely Faith justifieth, this is a pure conclusion; for both the terms, faith, and justifieth, are terms of Theology, and handled therein.

A narurall body is in a place; this is pu [...]e; for only Natu­rall Philosophy treateth of a place, and a body; but this, Accidents in the Lords Supper are not without the holy bread and wine, is necessary, and may be proved by a ne [...]es­sary Syllogism; but it is not pure; for the word Accident is Metaphysical o [...] Logical; the other terms Theological.

2. In a pure conclusion we must needs use a Mean of the same kinde, that is, such as together with the extream of the co [...]clusion, pertaineth to one and the same discipline, and not to diverse.

3. Of a necessary Syllogism, the propositions also are necessary.

A necessary Syllo­gism is either

  • Monstrative, [...]. f
  • Demonstrative, [...]. g

Monstrative, is, whose Mean is taken from a monstrativef place that is, from every place of necessary invention▪ ex­cept the place of the efficient cause, the end, and the effect.

[Page 165]And it is either

  • Artificial. c
  • Inartificial. d

Artificial places again are either of first Terms, or se­condlyc of Arisen.

Places of the first terms be

  • Inward. a
  • Outward. b

Inward, are they which are taken from inward terms, anda they are nine.

1. From the Genus. 2. From the Species. 3. From the cause material. 4. The Formal. 5. The Subject. 6▪ The Accident. 7. The proper. 8. The whole. 9. And the part.

The first place of the Genus hath two Canons.

1. To what the Genus is given, to the same some Species must needs be given, but indeterminate; as, It is sin; there­fore Original, or Actual.

2. From what the Genus is taken away, from that neces­sarily all the Species are taken: as, It is no sin, therefore neither original nor actual; therefore no sin.

The place of the Species hath two Canons.

1. To what the Species is given, to the same the Genus must needs be given: as, He is a man, therefore a living creature.

2. From what all the Species are taken, from it the Genus must needs be taken: as, It is neither original [...] actual sin, therefore no sin.

The place from the Form and specifical difference hath two Canons.

1. Whereto the Form is given, or taken away, thereto the formed is given or taken away: as, Satyrs have no rea­son, therefore are [...]o men.

[Page 166]2 Whereto the Form is given, thereto the determinate matter must needs also be given; and contrarywise: as, Ne­buchadnezzar kept the Form of a man still; therefore also the body.

The place from the matter hath three Canons.

1. Whereto the matter is given or taken away, thereto the mattered thing must needs also be given or taken away: as, Glorified bodies shall consist of the four Elemements; therefore they shall be mixt

2. Whereto the matter is given, thereto the determined Form must needs also be given; and contrariwise▪ as, Pig­ [...]eyes have the bodies of men, therefore the Forms also.

3. As is the matter, such is the mattered thing: as, The Image is of rotten wood; therefore it is also rotten.

The place from the proper subject hath this one Canon.

Whereto a proper accident is given, or taken from it, thereto the subject also m [...]st needs be given or taken from it: as, Christ is God, therefore hath power to forgive sins.

The place from the proper accident hath two Canons.

1. Whereto a proper accident is given, or taken from it, thereto the subject must needs be given, or taken from it: as, Christ forgiveth sins, hath life▪in himself, and gives [...] life to others; and therefore he is God.

2. That which is said of the proper accident in theicon­crete, is said also of the subject: as, A questioner is to be shunned, because a blab is to be shunned.

The place from the whole and parts hath three Canons.

1. The whole being put or taken away, needs must the parts be put or taken away: as, the whole Supper pertain­eth to Lay men, therefore the Cup.

2. That which agreeth, or not, to an whole of the same kinde, that also agreeth, or not, to the part, if the attri­bute be such, as may by proportion agree to the part: [Page 167] as, Water is moist, therefore every drop of water is so.

3 One principall part being destroyed, the whole is ta­ken away. as, This building hath no Roof, therefore is no house: He hath no head, therefore is no living body.

Places of outward terms, are Circumstances, Object,b Concomitancy.

The place of Circumstances hath this one Canon.

Circumstances being put or taken away, the adject is put or taken away; and the adject put or taken away, so is the Circumstance: as, The flowers are badded, therefore it is spring time: it is a body, therefore there is a place wherein it is.

The place of the necessary object hath also one Canon.

Whereto an even object is given or taken from it, there­to that which is busied about the object is given or taken from it; and contrariwise: as, He is exercised about the worship of Idols; therefore he is an Idolater: Christ is true God; therefore he is to be worshipped.

The place from the necessary Antecedent, hath this one Canon.

A necessary Antecedent being put or taken away, the con­sequent of it, is put or taken away: as, he is dead in Christ, therefore he shall rise to eternall [...]. The woman is not with childe, therefore she shall not bring forth.

The place from the necessary consequent hath also one Canon.

A necessary consequent being put, the antecedent is put▪ as, The woman brought forth, therefore she had conceived: he is a man, therefore he was a childe.

2. Places of termes arisen from the first, are of Definition, Division, and Opposites.

The place of definition and description principal, hath one Canon.

Whereto a definition or description is given or taken from it, thereto the defined or described thing is given or taken from it; and that which agrees, or not, to the definition, or description, the same agreeth, or not, to the defined or described; and contrariwise: as, In the Old Testament there was a state of worshipping God in and by Christ; therefore in the Old Testament, there were Christians.

The place of Division hath these two Canons.

1. All the members of the divided being taken away, the divided it self is taken away.

2. One of the Immediate members of a Division being taken away, the other is left.

The place of Opposites hath seven Canons.

1. Of Opposites, so far forth as they be such, the attri­butes are opposite; so as the opposition be made by the dif­ferences whereby the opposites disagree, and not by the ge­nus or common accidents▪ and that proportion be kept be­tween the causes and effects of the opposites. So, It fol­lows not, Whitenesse is colour, therefore blacknesse is no colour; for the opposition is made by the common Genus. Neither followeth this, Evil works condemn, therefore good works justifie; for there is no proportion of good works to salvation, when our works cannot be said to be truly good of themselves, as Evil deeds are truly evil. Neither this, We must do good to our friends; therefore evill to our Ene­mies; For Enemies, in that respect that injuries are to be forgiven them, are not so much our enemies as our friends. Neither followeth, virginity is good, therefore marriage is evil; for goodnesse is common to both in divers respects▪ But this follweth, Heat disseve [...]eth things of diverse kinds, therefore cold gathereth them: Purity cherisheth the Spirit, therefore impurity expelleth it.

[Page 169]2. From what a disparate is removed, from it all in the dis­parate are removed: As 1 Sam. 15. God is not as man, that he should lye, or the Son of man, that he should re­pent.

3. One of the [...] and repugnants being put, the other is removed; As, It is unbloody; therefore, it is no Sacrifice; For these are contradictory, 1 Cor. 10. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and of Devils.

4. One of the contraries in an high degree being put, the other is removed. As, He is in despair: therefore, he hath no comfort.

5. One of the privatives being put, the other is removed, and contrarywise: As, He is blinde: therefore he seeth not.

6. One of the Relatives being put, the other is put; As, God is an eternall Father; therefore he hath a coeternall Son. Christ is alwaies Mediatour and head: therefore, he will alwaies have a Church.

7. Whereto one of the Relatives is giving, thereto the other cannot be given in the same respect; And from the remotion of the Relative▪ to the remotion of the Correla­tive, the inference is right: As Christ is Davids Lord: therefore, he is not his servant.

An Inartificiall place, is necessary Testimony.b

Necessary Testimony, is either

  • Of God. a
  • Or of the Senses. b.

Gods Testimony is a sentence spoken of God.a Testimony.

And is

  • Mediate.
  • Immediate.

Immediate, which God uttereth without means of any Mi­nister.

And it is either. First, By Vision, as of old to the Pro­phets.

Or Secondly, By Voice; as, at Christs Baptisme,

[Page 170]Mediate, is, which God hath uttered by his Son sent in the flesh; Or by inferiour Ministers, the Prophets and Apo­stles.

The Canons of Gods Testimony, Mediate, and Immedi­ate, are twelve.

1. Gods Testimony is beleeved for God himself, and his Authority, not for the mans sake by whom it was ut­tered.

2. There is no Divine testimony written this day; But in the Bible.

3. All principles of Theologicall conclusions, pertaining to the perfection and Salvation of the Elect, are sufficiently delivered in the Scriptures.

4. Argumentation from Gods testimony, proceedeth both Affirmatively and Negatively in things pertaining to Salvation.

5. It ceaseth to be the testimony of God, if wrested ei­ther to a wrong sense or unmeet allegories.

6. From places or testimonies doubtfull, Doctrines of faith are not firmly stablished.

7 That which by good consequence is gathered from any Divine testimony, it hath the same force with it.

8. What is proved or explained by the Scripture, that is understood to be also proved and explained by the true Church, Lawfull Councels, and Antient Doctors.

9. From Gods revealed will to his power, the argumeent alwayes is of force; But it follows not, because he will not, that therefore he cannot.

10. From Gods will Indefinite and Hypothetical unto the simple execution thereof, an argument is not of Force: as, God would all men should be saved: therefore, they shall all be saved; It follows not; For that Will is Hypothe­ticall or Conditional, If they believe.

11. Gods affirmative Commandments are to be taken with limitation.

12. Gods negative Commandments do binde simply.

Testimony of sense, is that which every ones sense tellethb him.

[Page 171]And it is

  • Outward.
  • Inward.

Inward, is, which Laws of Nature and Conscience tells us.

Outward, is, that with the outward senses (as seeing, hearing, &c.) rightly disposed, and so the sensuall observa­tion and experience doth confirm: Matth. 11. Go tell John what ye hear and see. Come see the place where the Lord was layed.

And thus much of the first kinde of necessary Syllogism.

The other kind of necessary Syllogism hath the mean term from the place of the Efficient cause, the Final, andDemonstra­tion. [...]. the Effect. And it is called Demonstration [...].

And it is either

  • Perfect, [...]. a
  • Imperfect. [...]. b

Perfect Demonstration called [...]. (i. e.) Wherefore, is, whose mean is taken from the place of the efficient cause or end, for to get the knowledge of such a conclusion as wherein the accident is attributed to (or spoken of) his subject.

The general Canons of this Demonstration are eight.

1 Three things are in every demonstration. 1 The sub­ject [...]. 2 The affection, or accident [...]. 3 The cause [...].

2 The conclusion of a demonstration consisteth of two extreams, viz. the affection or accident which is put in place of the attribute; and then secondly, the subject wherein the affection is.

3 The foreknowledge of the conclusion is the same that was of others, viz. that the subjects both name and exi­stence, and definition of the Essence be foreknown, and the name of the attribute or affection.

4 The finding of the mean also agreeth unto the gene­ral [Page 172] precepts; For it is taken from the nature of the ex­treams, viz. the efficient cause of th [...] attribute, which often is the form of the Subject, and from the end of the same attribute.

9. A demonstation hath certain degrees; So that one exceeds another in necessity, and so hath propositions, one more necessary, another lesse.

6. Demonstrations are given in all kindes of disciplines contemplative, of practick, though the demonstrations of contemplative disciplines be more worthy.

7. There are given demonstrations aswell Negative as Affirmative, though the affirmative be more worthy.

8. A Demonstration perfect ( [...]) hath great kin with the perfect definition of an accident: For the things that are in a perfect definition, as Efficient, Cause, End, and Subject, the same are also in a demonstration.

A perfect Demonstration, is either

  • Of the Efficient. a
  • Of the End. b

A Demonstration of the efficient cause, is, whose mean [...] is taken from the place of the next efficient cause.

And it is either

  • Principall. c c
  • Lesse Principall. d d

Principal, whose mean is the next principal efficientc c cause; and it is either of the inward cause, or Out­ward.

Of the Inward, whose mean is the next principal effi­cient.

Outward, whose mean is the outward principal next effi­cient cause.

The Canons of both these are two.

1. Whereto the next efficient cause is given, thereto the effect must needs be given; and from what the cause is ta­ken, the effect is also.

2. A Demonstration of the Inward cause, is perfecter [Page 173] then a Demonstration of the Outward cause: Examples of Demonstration: That which hath the guilt of sin, is wretch­ed; But all mankind since the fall, hath guiltiness: there­fore, it is wretched. Whatsoever differeth from the Law and will of God, deserveth Gods wrath; but every small sin differeth, &c. therefore, it deserveth Gods wrath. He that hath satisfied Gods wrath, hath perfectly redeemed us; Onely Christ hath satisfied, &c. therefore, he hath redeem­ed us. They that are constantly kept of God in the purpose of Election once mode, their Salvation is sure: But all the faithful are so kept: therefore, their Salvation is sure. What­soever hath matter, is moveable; Every naturall body hath matter; therefore, Every naturall body is moveable.

Lesse Principall, is, whose mean term is a lesse principalld d efficient cause, viz. either▪ Impulsive, or first Instrumentall.

The Canon hereof, is.

Whereto the Impulsive and Instrumentall which is more matching, is given; thereto also must needs be given the effect and power or faculty unto which the instrument is ordained: and contrary, from what the instrument is taken, from that also the end or effect must needs be taken; Thus Demonstration is made▪ that fishes do not breathe, because they have no lungs, that the wicked eat not Christs body, because they have no faith; So man is a communicable and sociable creature, because he hath speech, the Instrument of communion.

Demonstration of the end, is, whose mean term is drawnb from the place of the finall cause.

The Canons thereof are two.

1. The end being put, (specially the fitted end) needs must the means to the end be put, or contrariwise.

2. Even as the end is either fitted and principall, or lesse principall, accordingly the Demonstration is more perfect, or imperfect. Thus Christ shewed they ought not to buy and sell in the Temple, because it was an house of prayer. Heresies must be, that the approved may be known; &c.

[Page 174]Imperfect Demonstration (or [...]: That a thing is)b whose mean is taken from the place of the effect.

The Canons hereof are three.

1▪ The effect being put, the cause is necessarily put; and the effect being taken away, so is the cause (as it is a cause of that effect); So it is shewed that some men are Elect; because in time they are called justified, and sanctified; and contrary, that some are not Elect, because they are not cal­led, &c. So, Infants are sinners, because they die, Ro­mans 5.

2. Even as the effect is either principal, or lesse principal, accordingly is the demonstration more or lesse principal.

3. When by the effect it is proved, the cause is, or not; on the contrary also, the effect may be shewed by the cause; which Reciprocation, Logicians call Regresse.

And thus much of Demonstration:

Of an Apparent Syllogism, or Fallacie.

Hitherto we have treated of a true Syllogism; Now fol­loweth the Apparent, which hath a false disposition or mat­ter, painted with a shew of a true; Whereupon ignorance or naughty disposition is begotten in the mind.

The Doctrine hereof hath two parts.

The 1. whereof is the caution of a deprehended Fal­lacie.

The 2. is, Shewing and loosing of that Fallacie.

First, Of the deprehension, or finding out of a Fallacie.

A Sophism or Fallacie is a deceit, either

  • In Form. a
  • In Matter. b

A Fallacie of Form, is when men sin against the disposi­tiona [Page 175] of a Syllogism, violating the Canons, either generall or speciall of all the Figures.

A Fallacy of matter, is either

  • In words. m
    b
  • In things. n

A Fallacy of words, is either in a word

  • Simple. g
    m
  • Compound. b
    g

A fallacy of a simple word is either

  • Of want of use. k
  • Of Ambiguity. l

A Fallacy of the want of use of a word, is either

  • 1. For the darknesse of it.
  • 2. For the oldnesse.
    k
  • 3. For the Novelty.
  • 4. For the impropriety of it.

These are opened in the first part of Logick.

Ambiguity of a word is either

  • For the many meanings.
  • For the doubtfull forming.
    l

Ambiguity for many meanings, is, when a term in a Syl­logism is taken in this meaning or in that: as, That which is begotten beginneth to be: The Son of God is begotten, therfore beginneth to be.

Here is ambiguity in the word, begetting; for the genera­tion that is in the Holy Trinity, differeth generally from the generation of the creatures.

Ambiguity for the forming of a word, is either in re­spect of the

  • 1. Orthography.
  • 2. Etymologie,
  • 3. Prosodie.

1. In respect of the Orthography, is when the doubtful­nesse ariseth from the diverse pronouncing of word, or writing: as, If a man, pretending to make one his heir, should say, I will make thee mine hair; or to commend one for a full-hardy souldier, saith, He is fool-hardy.

[Page 176]2. In respect of the Etymologie, doubtfulnesse is which ariseth either of likenesse of ending, or confounding one number for another. This Fallacy is called, [...].

3. In respect of Pro [...]odie, doubtfulnesse is which a [...]i [...]eth from wrong pronounciation; a long syllable for a short, or otherwise.

A Fallacy of a compound word, is, which is in a sentence and is called Amphib [...]lie▪ which is a double uncertainty of the meaning in a sentence.

And it ariseth either

  • 1. Of the construction and distinction.
  • 2. Of the phrase.
  • 3. Of the Composition and Divi­sion.

1. Of the construction, when the coherence and con­struction of words is doubtfull.

2. Of the phrase, when not the construction, but the kinde of speech makes uncertainty of sense: as, Christ went up to Heaven to fill all things. Therefore, His body is diffused everywhere. It is a Fallacy, by not understand­ing the Apostles phrase, Fill all things, which is meant of the effusion of the Holy Ghost, not of the diffusion of his body.

3. Of Composition and Division, when words are joy­ned together which should be disjoyned, or contrariwise: as, Two, and three are even and odde; but five are two and three; therefore five are even and odde.

A Fallacy in things, is eithern

  • 1. About the conclusion, or que­stion. a
  • 2. About the proof of the conclu­on, on o [...]ing the Mean. b

About the conclusion, is eithera

  • 1. Asking of many questions, [...].
  • 2. Asking of another questi­on, [...].
  • 3. Ignorance of the argu­ment [...].

[Page 177]1 The Fallacie of many questions, is, when many que­stions or conclusions are confounded in one: As, Were Moses, and Aaron, and David, good Kings? Here is confusion; for Aaron was not a King. So, when we ask, Have you left your stealing? If one answer, Yea, it intimateth he was once a thief; if he answereth, No, he argueth himself now to be a thief.

For every ambiguous question is not one, but manifold. As, Was Judas elected? Here tis doubtful, whether tis meant Election to life, or election to an Apostleship; therefore, it is no simple question.

Ubiquitaries reason thus; That which is Sacramentally united with the Bread, is eaten; though not after a natu­ral, yet a supernatural manner. But Christs body is Sacra­mentally united with the Bread: Therefore, it is eaten, though not after a natural manner, &c. Answer is, In the conclusion, there is [...].

For two questions are confounded,

  • 1 Whether Christs body be eaten.
  • 2 How it is eaten.

2 Ignorance of the Argument or Elench, is, when either the state of the question is quite turned and wrested, or the adversaries conclusion is not directly opposite to our Thesis, according to the Canons of lawful opposition: As, They that are conceived and born in sin, are not holy, The children of the faithful are conceived and born in sin: therefore, the children of the faithful are not holy. Here is ignorance of the Elench; for the conclusion is not directly opposed to our conclusion, who make the children of the faithful holy with the holinesse of the Covenant of calling and promise; But the Adversaries conclusion speaketh of holinesse which is immunity from sin.

About the proof of the con­clusion, Fallacies are either

  • 1 About the finding of the mean.
    b
  • 2 About the premisses risen of the disposition of the mean.

[Page 178]1 About the finding of the mean is

  • Begging of the question. a
  • Assumption of a false mean, b

Begging of the question (or Petitio Principii) is whena no mean is taken, but the conclusion is proved by it self, repeated either by the same words, or by others Equivalent: As if one would prove pleasure to be the chiefest good, be­cause delight is the chiefest good; or one would prove Je­conias to be the father of Salathiel, because Salathiel was son of Jeconias.

The Fallacie of a false mean, is when to prove a question,b there is taken a false mean having the appearance of a true: Whereupon, either the Major, or Minor is false.

A false mean is either

  • Of Contingency apparent.
  • Of Necessity apparent.

Of Contingency apparent, is that which seemeth to be drawn from some place of contingent invention: As Peter is named à Petra, the Rock of the Church: therefore, he is the Foundation and Head.

Answer. It is a Sophisticall Syllogism taken from the place of false Notation; And so of the places.

Of Necessity apparent, is, when a false mean is so pro­pounded as taken from some necessary place, Monstrative, or Demonstrative: As from a false Genus, false Difference, Definition, &c.

As, Extream Unction is a Sacrament: therefore, it sealeth spirituall graces: It is from a false Genus.

Also, That which is united to the word, is every where; Christs humane nature is united to the word: therefore, it is everywhere; It is a Sophism, having for the Medium a false efficient cause.

[Page 179]2 Fallacies about the premises or disposition of the mean, are

  • Fallacie of the consequent.
  • Fallacie from a thing spoken af­ter a sort.

Fallacie of the consequent, is, when there is a naughty con­nexion of the mean with the greater extream in the Major Proposition: as, He that said, Bread is my body, said, my body lieth hid in the Bread, but Christ said, &c, Ergo It is a Sophism of the consequence, whereof no good reason can be rendred: So Christ taught us to pray for our daily Bread: therefore, Lay-men must not drink of the Wine in the Lords Supper.

Fallacie from a thing spoken after a sort, to spoken sim­ply, is when from the mean Term disposed with limitation, or after a sort with both or either of the extreams, a con­clusion is inferred absolutely and simply true: as, He that is lesse then the father is not equall with him; Christ is lesse then the Father. Joh. 14. therefore, he is not equal with him. It is a Sophism from that which is limited, to that which is not limited. It should be thus, He that is lesse, simply and in all respects, is not equall: but then the Minor is false, For Christ is lesse, not in degree of Essence, or of substantiall perfection; But, First, By hiding the Godhead in the State of Humility. Secondly, By Office of Mediatour, whose parts he handleth with the Father. So he that saith, thy words are words, saith true; He that saith, thy words are ly­ing words, saith, thy words are words: therefore, He that saith thy words are lying words, saith true. Answer, He that saith thy words are words, viz. Absolutely, or Indetermi­nately, not adding false difference, saith true, and so the Minor is false. Under this is contained Fallacia Accidentis.

Of the loosing or soluting of Fallacies.

The Detection and loosing of Fallacies,

Is either

  • True. a
  • Apparent, b

[Page 180]True Solution, is the shewing of the deceit used by the Sophister.

And it is either

  • Direct. a
  • Indirect. b

Direct, is when answer is made directly to the Syllogisma Shewing, and naming the Fallacie.

And it is either of the

  • 1 Forme.
  • 2 Matter.

Solution of the Form, is the rejecting of the Syllogism; by shewing some Syllogisticall Canon against which the form of it sinneth.

Solution of the matter, is either of the

  • Word.
  • Thing.

Solution of the word, is, when the ambiguitie of simple words, and the amphiboly of joyned words is shewed and distinguished.

Solution of the Thing, is, either of the

  • Question.
  • Proof.

Solution of the Question, is, when the state of the con­troversie is rightly constituted, the manifold question dis­cerned, and the fault of evil opposition shewed.

Solution of the proof, is either about the

  • 1 Finding of the Mean.
  • 2 Disposition with the Extreams.

About the finding of the Mean, is either the shewing, and denying of a vicious consequence in the Major, or a limita­tion: when there is a fault by omitting a limitation.

[Page 181]So there are in all, five direct Solutions and answers to the matter.

1 Distinction or explication of a word simple or con­joyned.

2 Information and distinction of the conclusion or que­stion,

3 Denyal of one of the Premises.

4 Rejection of a naughty consequence. And

5 Limitation.

Of these three be three Canons.

1 When the form is plain, straightwayes we must think of the conclusion of the proposed Syllogisme▪ and see whe­ther it be constituted rightly, or opposed to our position.

2 When the conclusion is plain, We must answer to the Premises either by distinguishing and limiting, or by deny­ing.

3 We must never answer by denyall when the argumentb may be soluted by distinguishing and limiting.

Indirect Solution, is when we answer indirectly, and thwartly to the Syllogism proposed.

And that is either unto the

  • Thing. †
  • Person. *

Indirect an­swer unto the thing, is either

  • 1 By Retortion.
  • 2 By Contrary objection.
  • 3 By shewing contradiction.
  • 4 By opposition of equal or lesse private
    authority.
  • 5 By comparison, &c.

1 Answer by Retortion, is, when we shew that the mean or proof brought by the adversary maketh for us, or over­throweth the same conclusion which he would prove by it, or at least other assertions of the adversary: As, Christ is first begotten before the creature: therefore he is a creature. [Page 182] Answer, Nay, therefore he is not a creature, because he was begotten before any creature was.

2 Solution by contrary objection ( [...]) is when the objection is not solved, but another stronger objection is propounded to the adversary: So Christ an­swered them that would have the Oyntment sold and given to the poor, by opposing a stronger reason: The poor ye have alwaies with you, but me not.

3 Shewing of contradiction, [...], is when we shew contradiction in our adversaries words▪ As, when the Papists except that in their Mass, Christ is not crucified again, be­cause the sacrifice is unbloody; it is [...]: for a Sacrifice and unbloody are contradictory.

4 Opposition of equall authority, is, when to an humane Testimony we oppose another Testimony as good, or bet­ter.

5 Comparison with like absurd, is when we compare our adversaris argument with the like absurd.

Indirect answer unto the person, is either* *

  • A Blame.
  • A Comparison.

A Blam or chiding ( [...]) is, when we blame the adversary for that he disputeth against Piety and Honesty, or against manifest sense and Experience.

A Comparison of the like, or greater, is, when we put a­way any thing objected against our or an others person, with an other personall objection: As, Christ, when the Pharisees blamed his Disciples for eating with unwashed hands, an­swered, Why do you also transgresse Gods Commandments by your traditions?

Apparent Solutions, are, by which nothing is fitly answer­ed;b Onely in shew something is said.

Of this Solution there be five sorts.

1 The first, when nothing is answered to the Syllogisme propounded: But somewhat is said of the thing generally, lest the Answerer should seem to say nothing.

[Page 183]2 When generall and ill understood Fallacies are ap­plied, which pertain not to the Syllogism proposed.

3 Provocation unto wrath.

4 Is a setting at naught ( [...]) when we mock the adversaries reasons as light.

5 Is running aside ( [...]) and leading from the matter in hand ( [...])

And thus much touching the Doctrine of Syllo­gisme.

A Type of the whole Doctrine of the Fallacies.

The finding out of the Fallacies; For it is either of the

  • Form
    • In the word
      • Simple of
        • Want of use.
        • Ambiguity.
      • Compound, wherein is Am­phiboly by the
        • Construction. Phrase.
        • Composition. And division.
    • Matter & that
    • Out of the word, and that either about.
      • The con­clusion or question.
        • Many questions.
        • Ignorance of the Elench.
      • The proof and that either
        • The Mean
          • Begging of the question.
          • Taking a false Mean.
        • The premises as the Fallacie
          • Of consequence.
          • From spoken after a sort. to spoken absolutely.

The resolution, which is either

  • True.
    • Direct
      • Of the Form.
      • Of the matter.
        • 1 True constitution of the state of the controversie.
        • 2 Distinction and Explication of doubtfull words and phrase.
        • 3 Deniall of false premises.
        • 4 Rejection of a naughty consequence,
        • 5 Limitation.
    • Indirect; which is ei­ther unto▪
      • The thing
        • Retortion.
        • Contrary Objection.
        • Shewing contradiction.
        • Opposition of Authority.
        • Comparison.
      • The person
        • Blame.
        • Comparison.

Apparent,

  • 1 When nothing is answered to the matter.
  • 2 Applying of a fallacie ill understood.
  • 3 Provoking of the Adversary.
  • 4 Setting at naught.
  • 5 Running aside.

A Type of the Doctrine of Syllogisms.

A Syllogism is to be considered.
  • Commonly
    • Primary of the Figure, First, Second, and Third,
    • Secondary either
      • Indirect,
        • Prima.
        • Secon­dary.
          Both which are
          • Simple.
          • Com­pound:
            • Conditional
            • Disjunctive.
              • Vniform.
              • Biform, or
              • Dilemma.
      • Diarect,
        • Enthymeme.
        • Consecution of sentences.
        • Induction.
        • Sorites.
  • Speially under condition of some certain matter, and it is either.
    • True
      • Reall which is either,
        • Contingent wich is either
          • Notionall
            • Of the word
              • Definition.
              • Conjugates.
          • Of things which is either
            • Artificial, which is either
              • First,
                • Inward
                  • Caused caused.
                  • Subject, Accident.
                  • Whole, part.
              • Outward
                • Adjacent
                • Object.
                • Concomitant,
            • Risen of the First from
              • Description.
              • Comparison.
                • Consentany.
                  • Even.
                  • Example,
                  • Like.
                • Dissentany
                  • Vneven.
                  • Vnlike.
                    • Great.
                    • Lesse.
          • Inartificiall, Humane Testimony.
  • Apparent of which see before,
    • Necessary.
      • Monstra­tive from places.
        • Artificial.
          • First.
          • Arisen.
            • Definition.
            • Opposites.
              • Inward
                • Genus, Species.
                • Matter, Form,
                • Proper Subject.
                • Proper accident.
                • Whole, parts.
              • Outward.
                • Circumstances.
                • Objects concomi­mitants.
      • Demonstra­tive, or Apo­dictike. which is either
        • Inartificiall or testimony,
          • Of God.
          • Of the Senses.
        • Perfect
          • The efficient.
          • The End,
            • Principal.
            • Lesse principal.
        • [...] Imperfect [...] from the place of the effects.

OF METHOD, OR ORDER.

HItherto hath been the directnesse of discourse Illa­tive.

Now followeth the directnesse of discourse Ordinative, which is an act of the minde or understanding proceeding from one part of Doctrine to another, by conferring them one with another, & knitting them together with the help of the precepts of the Method.

Method is the constitution of the parts of Doctrine, froma a certain beginning unto a certain end.

And it is either

  • Artificial. a
  • Inartificial. b

Artificial, is which is Instituted according to the Nature of Things, and Rules of art.

The Canons hereof are five.

1 Let no Part be wanting, none Overplus.

2 Let the proceeding of Method imitate the natural proceding and order of things; going on from things first and best known, to things after.

3 The parts before and after distinct between themselves, [Page 187] must agree with a kind of Harmony, in a certain beginning▪ and end, or scope.

4 The knitting together of things before and after, should be shewed in the Chapters, and Heads of the Trea­tise by Bands and Forms of Transition.

5 Let all the parts of the Method be of the same kinde.

Method also is either

  • Compositive, Synthetical. a
  • Resolutive, Analytical. bb

The Canons of the Preceps of a Discipline are two.

1 Let every Precept be, Definition, Division, or Ca­nou.

2 Let the Precepts be True, Methodical, Profitable, and informed with proper and perspicuous words.

Compositive Method, is wherein the parts of a contem­plativea Discipline are so disposed as that progresse is made from the Universal Subject of contemplation unto the par­ticulars, and so from Simples to Compounds.

The Canons hereof are five,

1 The parts of Compositive Method are three; First, the Subject. Secondly, The beginnings or causes. Thirdly, The affections.

2 The subject of a Science is necessarily one in Unity of Collection, and of Universality

3 The Subject is foreknown. First, That it is, Secondly, What it is. Thirdly That it hath certain Properties, or Af­fections.

4 The beginnings are foreknown that they are, and what they signifie.

5 The Affections are foreknown what they signifie.

Resolutive Method, is, wherein the parts of an operativebb discipline are disposed so as that from the knowledge of the end, the progresse is made to the knowledge of the beginnings or means, by which that end may be brought into his subject,

The Canons hereof are six.

1 The Parts of this Method are three. First, the end to to brought in. Secondly, the Subject whereinto it is brought. Thirdly, the beginnings or means by which the end is brought in.

2 The end is foreknown, First, that it is, or that it may be produced: and Secondly, What it is.

3 The end hath double accidents; Of which, some per­tain to the finding of the means by which it should be pro­duced, and they are to be known at the first; Others per­tain to the Possession and conservation of the end, and that is not needfull to be foreknown.

4 The Unity of an operative discipline, dependeth on the Unity of the end.

5 The Subject is foreknown. First, that it is. Secondly, that it is capable of the end. Thirdly, that it hath accidents, which pertain next unto the end.

6 The means are not foreknown, but are handled in proceeding from Universals to Particulars; from Simples to Compounds; so as that they be profitable, and sufficient for the end.

Particular Method, is wherein a certain and special themeb is disposed.

And it is either of a theme,

  • Simple a
  • Compound. b

Method of a Simple, is, in which a simple Theme is hand­leda and declared.

And it is either

  • Principal. 1
  • Lesse Principal. 2

Principal, is, in which a full Progresse is made from sim­ples to more compounded.

This Progresse hath nine parts.

1 The name or word of every simple thing is considered, whether Concrete, or Abstract; Withall the definition of the name is given, &c. If it be ambiguous, it is distinguished.

2 The Genus of the thing is found out by looking in the predicamental order.

3 The causes are found out and put; In substances, in respect of the Essence, Matter, and Form, in respect of the Existence, Efficient, and End; In accidentals, because Es­sence and Existence fall together, the Efficient and Finall causes, the Object and the Subject are found out.

4 If it be a singular accident, also the antecedents, con­sequents, and other circumstances are considered.

5 The whole definition is made, viz. divers, even as the Theme is either Accident, or Substance.

6 The proper accidents and Effects of this thing are pro­posed, and often also the adjacents and concomitants are taught.

7 The theme is divided into the parts chiefly integrall; For the division into the Species, if the theme be a Genus, is kept till the last place, if one would handle the matter at large.

8 The things akin unto it are laid down.2

9 The things diverse and opposite are added.

Lesse Principal, is, when first the Definition is laid down,b and then it is resolved by parts.

The Method of a compound or conjoyned theme, is, wherein the handling of a conjoynt question or probleme is instituted.

The parts thereof are eight.

1 A right constitution of the probleme or state of the con­troversie.

2 A choice or setting down of a position, Negative; or Affirmative, which you will defend.

3 A foreknowledge of both extreams, viz. of the ante­cedent and consequent; as touching Limitations, Definiti­ons, Distinctions, and so the presupposition of thine Hypothe­sis.

[Page 190]4 Confirmation of thy position.

5 A laying down of the adversaries position.

6 A foreknowledge and refutation of the adversaties di­stinctions.

7 A solution of the adversaries Objections.

8 A repetition of the proved position, and a collection of consequences or conclusions.

In artificial Method, is, which is instituted not so much byb the Order of Nature and rules of Art, as by the circum­stance of the Learner and Auditor at the discretion and pleasure of the Teacher and Learner.

And thus much of the whole frame and body of the art of Logick.

OF The use and Exercise OF LOGICK.

AFter the absolute Frame or method of the Pre­cepts of Logick, followeth in order of Nature, and of Doctrine, the use and Exercise of the Art more fully and plainly to be delivered.

Exercise of Logick, is a function of the mind or reason, whereby the Precepts of art comprehended in the mind are indeed and work applied to the things that are to be known out of the art.

And it is either

  • Particular.
  • Universal.

The particular or special Exercise of Logick, is, when some one particular Logical precept, is by the example thereof illustrated and exercised: Unto this speciall use there need no other direction then the frame of Logical Pre­cepts before laid down; For there the use through every Precept is declared by special Examples,

The Universall Exercise, is when some whole Rank of Logical precepts is applyed to things that are to be known or recognized: Like as a Smith, when some litle part of a work is to be done, taketh in his hand the Hammer onely, or the Tongs; But when he hath a whole work to do, he useth the furniture of all his Smiths Tools.

So in Logick, sometime the genus, or the cause, or some [Page 192] accident of a thing only, is to be dealt of, and proved or re­futed by a Syllogism or two; and for this the special Rules before delivered are sufficient: But these are not enough when one hath a general argument, or whole matter to treat of Logically. For a larger course is now to be taken.

This Universal Exercise is either

  • The handling of a thing, called [...].
  • The recognizing of a thing handled, called [...].

Of the Tractation or handling of a thing, called [...], or Generation.

Tractation (or Handling) is the meditation of a Theme, or matter to be done by Instruments of Art.

And it is either

  • Simple. a
  • Conjunct. b

Simple treating, is, whereby a simple Theme is explained.a

A simple Theme is one thing signified by one Term onely.

The handling of a simple Theme, is either

  • Universal.
  • Singular.

The general Canons of handling a Theme are five.

1 Let the name of the propounded theme be considered, whether it be simple; and if it be not simple, but combined of many words, whether it may be reduced to one simple word, either in the Latine, or in the Greek, or other tongue. For a word of that language is to be preferred, which signi­fieth a simple thing most simply.

2 When the word is found to be simple; Let it be consi­dered whether it be a Noun Abstract or Concrete.

3 It is also to be considered whether the word of the proposed Theme be certain, or ambiguous; and if it be am­biguous, let it carefully be distinguished.

[Page 193]Let there be added a definition of the Noun; Either [...], according to the term, or [...], accord­ing to the Etymologie and Notation: And especially the latter.

5 Having considered the definition, think then careful­ly of the Genus (or general) of a Theme; Namely, in what order of things, and how it is placed: and if it be no where found in this order among the predicaments, let it be counted for a Non [...]ns; And so the handling of it be end­ed with the consideration of the Name.

For example. If a man would treat of Purgatory; First, let him weigh the name; Then mind the Definition and Declaration of the Name by the Etymologie, viz. That by this Name is signified some Infernal fire; But some­what gentler, wherein the souls of them that are to be saved, must be purged, and rosted therein, so long as till full satisfaction be made for their sins. This Declaration of the name sheweth that such a fire there is no where: there­fore, Not to be sought in any predicament (or Rank of things.) And so it is but folly, either to define it, or declare it by the causes and properties thereof. But here note, that this consideration, Whether a thing be or not, is not to be ac­cording to the Existence ( [...]) in some certain place, or time; but it is to be minded essentially ( [...]) As if one would treat of Christs Incarnation; The question, Whether it be or no, is not to be minded so, as whether it be to day, or whether it shall be; But this is enough, that at any time it hath been, and now also dureth in effect, al­though Christ be no more Incarnate, nor brought forth. The like is also to be minded for things to come, as the day of Judgement, Resurrection, &c. For though these have not yet Existence, yet have they Essence; and because it is sure they shall be, they are to be treated of, in order and manner of things that now are.

Treating also is either

  • Of a Perfect Theme. a b
  • Of an Imperfect Theme. a b

A perfect theme, is, that which is perfectly placed in thea order of things or predicaments; as an Universall thing, one, and whole by it self.

[Page 194]And it is either

  • Substantial.
  • Accidental.

The treating of both these is either

  • Primary. 1
  • Secondary. 2

Primary treating is, which, when the beginnings of the De­finition are foreknown, gathereth from them the Definiti­on, and then useth the other Logical terms for explaning the term, according to those Canons that follow pertaining to the explication of a substance.

1 When the name of the theme is weighed, and the law­fullA Theme substiantial Genus found, let the difference be sought for, either by the predicamental Tables, or by some notable effect, or antecedent of a Theme known to the senses.

2 When the Genus and difference are found by its self, the Definition must be gathered and made.

3 The Definition of a substance being gathered, the form thereof and matter is distinctly to be considered.

4 Let the Form then be assigned, and (so far as the per­spicuity of the Doctrine will suffer) declared.

5 After the Form, let the matter generally be weighed.

6 After, the Integral parts, which make the matter entire; let those parts at least be considered which are most principal, and primary Instruments to bring forth the operations of the Form.

7 The efficient cause Principal and Instrumental, al­though it pertains not to the Essence of a Substance, yet it is to be considered for the knowledge of the Existence; The like is also to be minded for the final cause.

8 The proper accidents or effects flowing from the Form, and cleaving to the whole compound, must be reckoned.

9 Then let there be added a Division of the proposed substance, by the Primary accidents, by the Integral parts, inferring a manifest distinction; and if the Theme be a Genus, let the Species thereof be recounted, which [Page 195] after may have their peculiar handling also if the handler be so purposed.

10 Let the things that are akin to the proposed substance be added.

11 And then let there be shewed the things that are di­verse and contrary.

For example, Let this Theme Animal (or living crea [...]ure) be to be handled.

1 Weigh the name, which in Latine is of Anima, a Soul; which signifieth any living Form, which also is in plants; but is by an excellencie given to other sensible crea­tures, in whom the Soul more manifestly appeareth by sense and motion. In Hebrew it is called [...] Cajah, of life; for that such creatures seem onely to have life. Of the am­biguity of the name, or concretion, or abstraction, there needs none ado.

2 Next look for the Genus which is found in the Table of Substances to be a living body.

3 The difference restraining that Genus, is found in the same Table also to be sensitive.

4 The whole Definition therefore is, that an Animal is a living body sensitive.

5 The matter far off of an Animal, are the Instruments of life; The next matter is the Instruments of sense and motion; which taken all together are called the body of the Animal.

6 The Form neer, is the Soul Vegetant; the neerest, is the Soul sensitive, which by the effects or proper accidents that cleave to the Animal, are as it were by the latter words evidently perceived.

7 Then come to the existence, and here weigh the effi­cient cause of an Animal: The principall Efficient, is the Forming of the youngling of an Animal, whereby the sensi­tive Soul is united with the body; The Instrumental cause is the Seed, the Womb, the Birth; all which may be treated of peculiarly.

8 The end is to be shewed wherefore an Animal was at first created, and wherefore in time gendered; The End U­niversal is the glory of God the Creator; The particular is the Complement of all the degrees of life, and so the perfection of the World and Creatures, which require not onely a Body vegetant, but also sensible.

[Page 196]9 The proper accidents of an Animal are principally, 1 Sense Inward and Outward. 2 Appetite. 3 Going. Secondarily, 1 Breathing, 2 Watching, Sleep, Dream­ing.

10 The Integrant parts of the body or matter, are, 1 Similary parts, as blood and other Humours, Flesh, Bones, Sinews, Arteries. 2 Dissimilary parts principall, are the Brain, Heart, Stomack, Liver; and other lesse principal all over the body.

11 The division of an Animal, is, 1 By reason of the temperature and parts, into Male, and Female. 2 By the Species, into Man and Beast, which also may severally and distinctly be considered.

12 The things akin to an Animal, are, Plants, especi­ally those that are called [...] Plant Animals, and half Animals, as Sponges, &c.

13 The Opposites of an Animal, are things that want Life, Sense and Motion; and Poysons, which are pernicious to the Life.

And thus much for handling a perfect Theme Sub­stantial.

A Theme Accidental is handled according to these Ca­nons.b A Theme accidental.

1 After due consideration of the name, First think of the Order or predicament of the proposed accident; whether it be quantity, quality, Action, Passion, or Relation; For so it will appear, whether it indeed be an accident, or a Non ens, and feigned Theme.

2 When the Genus is found, let the Subject of the acci­dent be shewed; And withall, consider whether the accident treated of, be common or proper; For these two have diverse explications; Wherefore an accident should alway be redu­ced to his first and even subject, that of a common it may be made proper.

3 Because Relation is busied between two Subjects, of which one is called the Relate, the other the Correlate, therefore in explaning of a relation, both of them must be assigned.

4 The Object then is to be minded about which the ac­cident is occupied; and Objects bear rule in qualities and Actions.

[Page 197]5 The Principal efficient causes must be found out; First the neer, and then the neerest causes.

6 In Relations the ground or Fundament must be enqui­red, and it differeth not from the neerest cause.

7 Then let the end of the accident be shewed, which also bears sway chiefly in quality and action.

8 But in Relations the Term must be enquired, which is the same with the final cause.

9 Then give the definition of the accident according to the nature of every predicament, assigning besides the Ge­nus the essential terms, as the Subject, the Object, the Effi­cient cause, and the End.

10 Often also the Antecedents, Connexes, Circumstances and Consequences are to be reckoned; As when the pro­pounded Theme is an Action or Passion.

11 The effects of the proposed accident must be distinctly told.

12 A Division must be added, either into the Species, if the proposed accident be a Genus: or into other members fitting to an accident.

13 Then shew the things akin thereto, or which have some affinity of nature with the proposed theme.

14 Let the diversity which is between Themes akin be shewed.

15 Let the Opposites or Contraries be added.

For Example. This accidental Theme is to be handled; Calling upon God.

1 The Name is absolute.

2 The Genus in the Predicament of Action is found to be this, a religious action.

3 The Subject of this Action, is, a faithfull man.

4 The Object, First, to whom it should be directed, is the whole Trinity, and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, re­conciled by the Son. Secondly, The Object of the things to be asked, which are Bodily and Spiritual. Thirdly, The Ob­ject for whom, is our selves and others.

5 The Efficient cause principal, is, the manner of confidence, stirred up by the holy Ghost, by the authority and merit of Christ the Mediator, Joh. 4. Rom. 6. The outward moving cause ( [...]) is Gods commandment, and his promise to hear us, Joh. 16. Psal. 150. The inward mo­ving [Page 198] cause ( [...]) is, the feeling of our own wants, and remembrance of Gods benefits before received▪ The Instrumentall causes are the Form given by Christ, Mat. 6. and our members Inward and Outward; as heart, tongues, eyes, hands, knees, &c.

6 The end, is the obtaining of benefits, and thankfull glori­fying of God.

7 So the whole definition is this; Invocation is a Reli­gious action, or operation from the motion of faith, kindled by the holy Ghost, with trust and authority of Christ the Mediatour, done by a faithfull man, and directed unto God propitious in his Son, for the obtaining of good things need­full, and for the glorification of Gods holy Name.

8 The proper accidents or things requisite, are, First, That it be done in true faith without wavering. Jam. 1. Secondly, That it be directed to Gods will. Thirdly, That it be with devout inward Motions and outward gestures (if it may be.) Fourthly, That it be not hasty, limiting God a time or manner. Jsaiah 28. Fifthly, That it be conceived with brief words without any redundance of speech.

9. The effects, are Union with God, joy and comfort of mind, the obtaining of good things needfull.

10. The Circumstances, are the place, now free. Joh. 4. publike, or private; the time also free, at all hours, &c.

11. The things connexed unto it, are, purity of life, sobriety, tentations of the Devil much to be resisted.

12. The Division, is by circumstance of the place, publike or private: By the object: it is supplication ( [...]) Prayer ( [...]) Intercession ( [...])

13. The things akin unto it, are, diligent reading of the Scripture, Meditation of holy things, continual diligence in the works of our calling.

14. The contraries, are, A corrupt conscience, an unclean life, doubting, profaness, and contempt, blasphemy and ex­ecration.

And thus much of the primary handling of a perfect Theme.

The Secondary, is when the Definition of a Theme is put at the first beginning, and afterwards is resolved and ex­plained by parts: This way is commonly used of many in an [Page 199] their treatises: And though it be good, yet is it not so arti­ficial and profitable as the former.

Now followeth the handling of Imperfect Themes.

Imperfect Themes, are they that are imperfectly placed in the Predicaments and Order of things.Imperfect▪ Theme.

And they are imperfect, either

  • In respect of our under­standing.
  • Of their own Nature.

In respect of our understanding, onely the nature of the most high God cannot perfectly be treated of & explained.

Of its own nature, a Theme Imperfect is five-fold,

  • 1 A singular thing.
  • 2 A Part.
  • 3 A Concrete.
  • 4 A Collective.
  • 5 A Privation.

A Singular thing or Individuum, is either

  • Substantial. a
    1
  • Accidental. b

Substantial hath these Canons.

a

1 Among substantial Themes, those chiefly come to be handled in use which are called persons.

2 The Genus and Species are, in secret thought, presup­posed in singulars.

3 The persons name, and Etymologie, and reason of the giving of it, is to be considered.

4 Then comes to be considered the efficient cause, or be­ginning and birth of the person, with the Circumstances of place and Countrey, of time when; and then the subjects of this birth, his Father and Mother.

5 These are to be told; the accidents of the person; First, Pertaining to his body; as Stature, and Health. Secondly, to his minde; as Wit, Judgement, Memory, Learning; Also Moral Vertues, Chastity, Liberality, &c. And these may be led along his ages, as his childhood, youth, mans age,

[Page 200]6 The effects of the person are to be recited, what memo­rable things he hath done in every age, especially in his manhood.

7▪ Let the things which are akin be shewed, as they that live in his time, his friends, and the things wherein the person most delighteth.

8 Finally, let the diverse things and contrary to the person, be rehearsed, as Foes, Enviers; and his death with the cause thereof, as the disease; or if it were violent, by what adversity he perished; Then the things connex to his death, if any strange signes went before: or if he spake any memorable thing at last; whereto adde the consequents of his death, as his Burial and Funerals.

A singular accident, is, which cleaves to a singular sub­stance,[b] as either the quality▪ or action, or Passion, or Rela­tion of it.

The Canons for handling this Theme are these.

1 Let the name be weighed, as was in a theme universal.

2 Let the Genus and Species of the propounded theme be presupposed.

3 The Subject, namely, the singular substance is to be considered; as also the Object about which it is occupied.

4 Let the antecedents, connexes, adjacents, and circum­stances specially be explaned.

5 Let the causes Efficient, both Principal, and Impul­sive, and Instrumental be diligently discussed, and the final cause also added.

6 Let the description be gathered, by naming of the Species, assignation also of the subject, object, circumstances of time and place, with mention also of the efficient and final causes.

7 Let the proper Requisites and Effects be added.

8 Let the Consequents be named.

9 Let the things akin be rehearsed,

10 Let the things diverse be compared, and the oppo­sites at last assigned.

For example, Let Christs ascension be the theme to be handled,

1 Ascension is the scansion or moving from an inferiour place to a superiour.

2 The Genus of it is a motion local, whose extreams are [...] what, and unto what, and then the mean by which the [...] is made▪ Now here we are to mind whether Christs [Page 201] Ascention be a Natural moving, or Supernatural. And we may find it to be a Naturall moving, First, In respect of the Subject, which is a natural Body. Secondly, and in respect of the terms and mean. But in respect of the Efficient cause and end, it is Supernatural.

3 The Subject of this ascention, is Christs whole person; not absolutely, but restrictively, according to that part which could move from place to place, which is his hu­mane nature. As for the Object, Local moving is not oc­cupied about it.

4 The Antecedents far off, were Christs Ministery, and all that he did in his life, the neerer, are his Passion, Resur­rection, conversing after with his Disciples forty dayes, and bringing of them to Mount-Olivet &c. The Connexes, are the term from whence; Namely, Mount-Olivet: The term whereto, namely, the Heaven of Heavens. The means by which, are the Air, and Sphere of fire, and other Orbs, thorow which his Body went. The Circumstance of places agrees with the terms; The time was forty dayes after his Resurrection: The other Connexes, were, the gazing of his Disciples, the appearing of the Angels, &c.

5 The principal Efficient cause, was the vertue of the Godhead, the inward moving cause ( [...]) is Christs love to his Elect: The outward moving cause ( [...]) is the profit and salvation of his Elect. The final cause in respect of Christ, is, the full possession of glory. Secondly, In respect of his Elect, to fulfill his kingly office, by defending and ruling of his Church; Also, his Propheti­cal and Priestly office, by sending the holy Ghost to teach them, and the interceding for them with the Father.

6 Hereupon the Description ariseth, this, That Christs ascension was a Local moving, whereby he, as touching his body, leaving the earth on Mount-Olivet, came thorow all the Regions of the Elements by vertue of the Godhead into the glorious Heaven to possesse full glory, and to de­fend his Church against all Enemies, and by the power of the holy Ghost from Heaven to teach and instruct, and by Intercession to commend us to the Father.

7 The Effects of his ascension, are, the sending of the holy Ghost, the gathering of his Church by the Ministery of his Apostles; the suppressing of the Enemies, and defence of his Church; sitting on Gods right hand, and Intercession.

[Page 202]8 The Consequent of his Ascension, was, the Apostles wondering, and returning to Jerusalem; Fear, and dwelling together till the Spirit was sent down.

9 The things akin to his Ascension, were, his Resurre­ction, the ascending of Enoch, and especially of Elias.

10 Diversity may be shewed between those; for the ascen­sion of Enoch and Elias was not a Victory over sin and the Devil; nor a triumph of merit, but of grace; not by their own power, but by anothers, &c. And the Opposites of his ascension, are, His base estate on earth, and that disparition & vanishing away, which Ubiquitaries feign of his Body, &c.

And thus much of the handling of a singular accident.

The handling of a Part hath these Canons.2

1 Let the name of the part in several tongues be consi­dered, and the Notation shewed.

2 Because every Part is a thing Incomplete, a complete Genus or Species of it cannot be had, but it must be referred unto the predicament in which the whole is: therefore, by Comparison to the whole, and Relation to the whole, the Nature of the Part is of our understanding to be conceived; For every part is part of the whole; and if it be cut from the whole, it deserves almost no consideration, because the use of it is ceased.

3 It must be considered whether the part be Essential, or Integral.

4 If the part be Essential, let it be minded whether it be the Form, or the Matter: If the Form, it must chiefly be explained by his Operations, or Forces, and Effects. If it be the Matter, the disposition of it must be considered, by which it is apt to receive the Form, and so the Instruments by which the operations of the Form are wrought; and so let the whole body be subdivided into parts greater and princi­pal, lesser and least of all.

5 Let it be considered, whether the Integral part be si­milar, or dissimilar: For Similars come rarely under consideration, because it is of the same name, nature, and properties with the whole, but dissimilars are wont chiefly to deserve explication.

6 In every part therefore, besides the name, there must be considered 1 The quantity and figure▪ 2 The quality or temperature. 3 The situation, and how it is placed, and [Page 203] knit with other parts. 4 The uses or actions of the parts, for whose sake this Instrument is of Nature made. 5 The lesser parts of which it is compounded.

7 After this, let the things akin to the part be weighed as are either parts like unto it; and finally let the Opposites be added, as are in mans body, the peculiar diseases of the parts.

The use of this Doctrine of the Part is chiefly seen in anatomies, and in astronomy, and architecture or building; But most of all in the anatomy, and parts of a mans body.

A Concrete accident is explained chiefly by these Canons.3

1 Besides the ambiguity of the name, and the Etymologie, let the Absolute accident be considered of which the Con­crete is denominated, because the resolution of the Con­crete into the Absolute is the best explication of the Concrete.

2 In the accident absolute, whereinto the Concrete is re­solved; let the Genus, Causes, Objects, Effects, Things akin, and Opposites be considered, and let them be applied to the Concrete accident after the same manner.

3 In relations, concrets are often wont to be taken for abso­lutes, by the unheedy: therefore, there needeth great discretiō.

4 When the nature of the absolute accident is perceived, the description of the Concrete may be annexed, viz. that which is builded by the consideration of the absolute.4

Collectives are diverse things, especially substances uni­ted together, not by any essentiall Band, but by Number and Relation.

The Canons for explaining Collectives, are these.

1 Besides the Name, consider whether the Collection be made of many accidents, or of Substances.

2 Consider whither unto those many Subjects gathered together, there cleave any Relation, and then that Rela­tion is to be explained by the Precepts given before.

For example. To treat of the Church, which is a collecti­on of many singular persons, 1 Consider the name in He­brew, Greek, and other Languages; And then mind it after a double kind. 1 In respect of the Material thing. 2 And in respect of the Formal. The Material of the Church, be Gods people: therefore, the Church may after a sort be referred unto Substance: And after a sort to quantity, or Number. But because to this Number there cleaves a Rela­tion, therefore first of all thou must turn thy minde to Rela­tion: For the Church is the Communion of Saints; and all [Page 204] Communion is Relation. Now the Relation of the Church is twofold. 1 Of the members to the head. 2 And of the members one to another: therefore, the Church may be defined, The company of the Elect united in one head Christ, and one with another in the Bond of the Holy Ghost, unto the fruition of eternal Salvation.

A Privative Theme hath these Canons.5

1 Besides the name, consider the Genus of that thing whose Privation is propounded, to wit, so as that there may be a calling back unto the Habit.

2 Then let the description of the Privation be added, the Privative causes being added to the denial of the habit, and the Subject wherein the privation is.

3 Things akin and repugnant, may so be added in Pri­vatives, that it may be thought the opposition of the priva­tion is perfection.

And thus much of the handling of a simple Theme.*

A conjoyned Theme, is, which is combined of simples; So as it is made the matter and object of the second and third function which the reason or understanding of man exerciseth.

The handling of a conjunct Theme, according to the se­cond part of Logick, is, which combineth and constituteth some proposition or sentence.

The Canons hereof are these.

1 Let the antecedent and consequent of the proposition be rightly ordered, each one in his place.

2 Let the Negative Particle to make a Negative Propo­sition, be put in that place where the Band of the Affirma­tion may be broken.

3 Let the note of universality be rightly placed, & shewed, whether it be absolute or limited, distributive or collective.

4 Let the consequent rightly be restrained and limited to the antecedent.

5 Let the Conjunctions, specially the conditionals rightly be distinguished in the proposition from the other parts.

6 Let a conditional proposition be revoked by cogitation of the mind unto a simple proposition.

7 Let the sentence constituted be rightly reciprocate and turned.

8 Let an improper proposition be reduced to a proper.

9 Let a contingent proposition be called to a necessary.

[Page 205]10 Let it be considered unto what Discipline the propo­sed sentence doth pertain: Which may be learned by the Nature of the simple terms in the proposition; For if these be Theological, the proposition belongs to Theologie: If Political, to Politicks, and so the rest.

And this may suffice for the handling of a conjoynt theme, by the Instruments of the second part of Logick.

The handling or generation of the third part, is either

  • Syllogistical. a
  • Methodical. b

Syllogistical, is, when any probleme or conjoynt proposi­tiona is handled by confirming, or refuting, that the truth, if it be unknown, may be found out: if obscure, may be decla­red; if doubtfull, may be confirmed.

And this handling of Logick, is called Disputation. Disputation is either

  • Solitary. 1 *
  • Social. 2 *

Solitary disputation, is when our selves secretly treat of1 * any controverted Probleme, or question, the adversary be­ing not present, or instant.

In this, two things are to be considered. 1 The question it self, or state of the controversie. 2 The manner of con­firming and refuting.

The question (or Probleme) is the matter subjected to Disputation. The Canons of this matter are these.

1 Let not the matter propounded to be disputed of, vi­olate Piety and Religion. (As, whether there be a God, whether Parents are to be honoured, &c.)

2 Let it not be of things plainly manifest, & without doubt.

3 Let it be profitable, grave, not inept, or ridiculous.

4 Let it not exceed the capacity of mans mind.

5 Let it be framed with words perspicuous, and not am­biguous.

6 Let it be such as is this day controversed.

A Probleme propounded to be disputed of, is either

  • Perfect.
  • Imperfect.

Perfect is, whose terms are Universal, so as they may be proved, or disproved, by necessary and artificial arguments.

Imperfect, is, whose terms are singular, so as they have need to be proved; chiefly by Inartificial arguments taken from authority of Writers, or from testimony of the senses.

The handling of a Probleme, is either

  • Primary.
  • Secondary.

[Page 206]Primary, is, which is instituted according to these Canons.

1 Let the state of the controversie be rightly constituted, and without all ambiguity, by choosing the Affirmant, or Negant Thesis which thou wilt defend.

2 Let a full precognition of the future proving and re­futing be instituted by definition of the Antecedent & Con­sequent; Also by fit Limitations and Distinctions which are the future Principles of all the disputation to come.

3 Let the propounded Thesis be confirmed by arguments. 1 Artificial, drawn from the nature of the Antecedent and Consequent. 2 By Inartificial, that is, Testimonies and Au­thorities.

4 After confirmation let our Adversaries Thesis be set down directly opposite to our Thesis.

5 Let a Refutation be added, both of the Distinctions by which they answer unto our arguments, and also of the ad­versaries Objections.

6 Let the proved Thesis be repeated, and let the Con­sequences ( [...]) be gathered from the conclusion, confirmed by the arguments.

Sociall disputation hath in it two parts, one of the Op­ponent,2* the other of the Answerer.

The Canons of these parts, some are common to both parts, and some proper to each of them.

The common Canons are six.

1 Let there be brought unto disputation a good inten­tion of the mind, which seeks not glory, but truth.

2 Let the mind be pure from all prejudices.

3 Let the disputers agree whether of them shall oppose, or answer.

4 Let both parties bind themselves to the Laws and Rules of Logick.

5 Let them agree between themselves of certain fore­known Principles.

6 Let brevity and plainnesse be kept in opposing, and answering all ambiguities, and Ambages of Oratorious De­clamations be avoided.

The Canons of the Opponent are six.

1 The Opponents parts are two: 1 To move the objecti­on. 2 To insist upon the solution given

2 As touching moving the question, let the position di­ligently be weighed, against which thou wilt oppose.

[Page 207]3 The position being carefully weighed, let the mean terms be brought forth for that conclusion thou desirest to infer, from the nature of the Antecedent and Consequent, and then also from testimony of chief Authors; Yet having withal a choice of arguments.

4 Let the arguments be clearly and briefly included in a Syllogistical Form.

5 Let the Opponent use a double kind of argumentation; Direct, or Offensive, and then that which leadeth to absur­dity; and let him prefer this oft times before the other

6 If either of the premises in the Syllogism need mani­fest proof, let not the Opponent expect until the proof of the Major, or Minor be required; But let himself by and by confirm his proposition by making a Prosyllogism.

The Opponents duty in urging, or insisting on the Obje­ction, hath these Canons.

1 Having heard the answer to the objection, let the Opponent in secret thought examine with himself, whether it be unto the Form, or the Matter.

2 If the Form of the argument be refused, let the Rule of Logick, against which it faulteth, be required; and if he acknowledge it to be a fault, let him urge it no more. For it is childish to go about to defend a naughty Form of Syllogism.

3 If answer be given to the matter, as for the most part it is, he must look whether it be by the distinction of an ambiguous Word, or a Limitation, or a Denial; And if it be none of these, let the Answerer be minded to deal Lo­gically, and to use some certain form of Answer, which is fitting unto either of the Premises.

4 If the Answer be by Distinction, let it be examined by the Rules and Laws of a good Distinction, set down in the Frame of Logick, and let the like be done for Limitation.

5 Let there be endevor also that from the answer given there be a Syllogism made leading to absu [...]dity: Namely, so that the sum of the answer be put in place of the Minor, and some other proposition manifestly true in plac [...] of the Major; from which an absurd conclusion being inferred, may convince the answer to have been evil.

And thus much for the Opponents duty.

The Answerer is either Inferior, or Superior.

The Inferior Answerer, is he that absolutely is so called, as [Page 208] that hath propounded the Thesis to dispute of.

The Answerers duty, is both to assume the argument, and to solve it.

The taking of the argument hath two Canons.

1 Let the Answerer diligently look that he take the ar­gument faithfully without any Circumlocutions; and for that purpose let him take to himself some leasure.

2 If the argument be not formed by the Opponent, let him bid it to be formed; and if he cannot form it, let the Objection be rejected; or if the Form of the argument be not plainly desperate, let the Answerer himself form it.

His other Duty to Solve, hath these Canons,

1 When the Form is agreed of, let first the conclusion be minded, as whether the Opponent hath rightly formed the state of the controversie: and whether he hath lawfully opposed his position or conclusion unto our position.

2 If the conclusion be rightly framed, Let the minde have recourse straightway to the Major Proposition: As, weigh whether it be true, and whether it be simply true, or but after a sort, and whether it be compounded, having a faulty knitting or composition.

3 Let the Answer never be by denial, if the argument may be by Distinction and Limitation.

4 The Minor Proposition seldom comes to be limited, or distinguished, but often to be denied.

5 Let not the Answerer rashly reject the authorities of famous men, but deal thus. 1 Let him cause their words faithfully to be recited. 2 Let him reconcile them what he he can to his sentence. 3 If he cannot, then let him oppose the authority of another man as famous as he, or more.

6 To a direct Answer, which is so to be made as we now have shewed, let there be sometime added an indirect an­swer, as, chiefly a Retortion, whereby we shew how the Ad­versaries argument maketh for us.

The duties of the Superiour Answerer or President, are two, to Rule, and to Help.

For Ruling, Let the President diligently attend whether they dispute to the purpose, and abide in the matter that is within the lists of Disputation: which if it be not done, let him warn both the Opponent and Answerer of their duty.

For Help. If the Answerer fail, let the President shew a more solid and firm answer; Yet, without the Answerers [Page 209] shame; But if the Answerer give a tolerable answer, let him praise it, and explain it somewhat more fully for the Aud­tories sake.

And thus much for Generation, or Syllogistical handling.

The Generation or handling of Method, is, whereby we frame a Method and Order to our Tractation.

Ordination therefore or Dis­position, is either

  • Particular.
  • Universal.

Particular Ordination, is, whereby the Method is framed of any simple or conjoyned Question or Theme; This hath been treated of enough before in the Precepts of handling a single and conjoyned Theme.

Universal Ordination, is whereby the whole Discipline or Frame of any Art or Science is disposed.

The Canons hereof are these.

1. He that would orderly Frame any Discipline, let him first mind of what sort it is, either Contemplative, or Ope­rative.

2. Necessary things which cannot by man be produced, are Delivered in Contemplative Disciplines, whose Method is called Compositive.

3. He therefore that would dispose a Contemplative Dis­cipline, must proceed thus. 1. That he fore know the Subject of it touching the name. 2. That he deliver the Principles of the Subject. 3. And that he follow the properties of the Subject which flow from the Principles or Causes.

4. Operative Disciplines are handled. 1. By the End. 2. By the Subject whereinto the end is to be brought. And 3. By the means whereby his end may be obtained. And this Me­thod is called Resolutive, ( [...]).

The Operative Disciplines thus to be disposed, are, Grammar, Rhetorick, Logick, Ethicks, Oeconomicks, Politicks; and the three Superior Faculties, Theologie, Law, Physick or Medicine.

For example, In the disposition of Logick, First, there is mention made of the end; Namely, The direction of mens thoughts in the knowledge of things; then the Subject of it: Namely, the three Operations of mans mind. And then that wch remaineth in this Art, is all spent in handling the Instruments or means, by which this end may be obtained of man, which means are taught in the three parts of Logick.

Hitherto we have heard of handling or Generation se­parate, [Page 210] or a part, which is instituted according to each of the parts of Logick.

Now followeth combined generation which mingleth theThe way of teach­ing well. use of all the parts of Logick tog [...]ther.

Combined generation or treating is either

  • In Teaching. a
  • In Learning. b

Teaching is ofa two kinds,

  • Accurate or exact, called Acroamatical▪ a
  • Popular, called Exoterical, b

The accurate kind of Teaching, is, which is instituted ac­cordinga to the strict Rules of Logick, and is not so much applyed to the capacity of the Learner, as to the nature and distinct knowledge of the things.

The General Canons hereof are five.

1. In Teaching, three things are to be looked on. 1. The Teacher. 2. The Learner. 3. The manner of teaching.

2. Let the Teacher apply himself chiefly to the nature of that thing which he would teach; and therefore let him not choose every Learner; but one that is of a good wit, and capable of exact Doctrine.

3. The Method of teaching must be esteemed by the nature of the things and Laws of Logick, not by the plea­sure of the Teacher, or capacity of the Learner.

4. Let brevity in teaching be used, such as is fitted for the nature and greatness of the thing.

5. Let the words be fitted only to the understanding and mind, not to the affections and delight.

Exact manner of teaching is eithera

  • Free. a
  • Textual. b

Free, is when we do not explain other mens words or writings: But we our selves propound the thing

And it is eithera

  • Of the whole Discipline. a
  • Of some part or Theme. b

A whole entire Discipline is taught by these Canons.

1. Let the Teachers first care be, to perceive whether the Discipline that he will teach, be Contemplative or Opera­tive.

2. Let the Frame of the Discipline, if it be Contempla­tive▪ be disposed according to the Precepts of Compositiv [...] [Page 211] Method; if it be Operative, according to the Precepts of resolutive Method.

3. After the things to be foreknown, let there be a right partition of the Discipline.

4. Let the Precepts be given in a Lawful Order by Partition, and Subpartition, by Definitions, Divisions and Canons.

5. Let the Precepts have these three Requisites. 1. That they be true. 2. That they be profitable. 3. That they be Methodically disposed.

6. Let Commentaries be added to the Precepts; But so as the Scholler may discern the difference between the Pre­cepts and Commentaries.

A Theme is taught by these Canons.

b

1. Let the teacher look whether the Theme he is about to propound be Simple or Compound.

2. If it be Simple, let him handle it by a simple Method; if conjoyned, then by a conjoynt Method [Of both these, Rules have been before.]

Textual, or a strict kind of teaching, is when we declareb to the Hearers any Authors text.

And this is handled both by

  • Resolution.
  • Illustration.

Resolution, is the recognizing of those Artifices by which the Author hath handled his purpose.

Illustration, is either of Words or Things.

Words are either

  • Simple.
  • Conjoynt.

Both of them are Illustrated by help of

  • Grammer.
  • Logick.

By Grammer help, the Natural meaning of words is shewed, Synonomies are compared, Constructions are weighed.

By help of Logick a doubtful word is distinguished, and a Figurative is reduced to a Proper, a dark Proposition is made clear.

The Things themselves are declared by the Essential [...]ope of the text propounded.

[Page 212]Ev [...]ry Text is either

  • Doctrinal. 1. [...]
  • Practical. 2.
  • Mixt. 3.

A Doctrinal Text, is, which is referred unto knowledge1 only. This is declared, 1. By revocation to some Method. 2. By filling up those things which in the Text are wanting for the full handling of it.

Practical writings are declared either2.

  • Historically.
  • Rhetorically.

Historically we declare any thing, 1. By bringing like Histories. 2. By explaining the Chronology, Topography, and Prosopography (that is, description of time, place and person,) 3. And by translating the Hypothesis to a Thesis, or Particular to a General.

Rhetorical kind of Teaching pertains to popular, and consisteth chiefly in Amplifying and Augmenting: Of these it is not here further to be spoken of, they rather pertaining to Rhetorick then Logick.

And thus much for the way of right teaching.

To Learn, is to comprehend in mind those things which theThe way of Learn­ing well. Teacher propoundeth, and we in our Judgment do approve.

The manner of Learning is either

  • Exact.
  • Popular.

To Learn exactly, Acroamaticè, is to conform ones judge­mentb in the comprehension of things to the Nature and Order of the things themselves, and to the exact judgment of the Teacher.

And thus men learn by these four things. 1. Attention▪ 2. Ordination. 3. Selection. 4. Imitation.1.

Attention, is the attaining and firm impression of the things taught.

The Canons hereof are three.

1. Let a Teacher be chosen Methodical and perspicuous, and one that knoweth the exact manner of teaching, and is willing faithfully to communicate it with thee.

2. A living voice is alwayes to be preferred before a dead or written.

3. Let the Learner meditate with himself alone the things heard or read, and let him take occasion of speaking to others that which he learneth.

[Page 213]The Ordination or ordering of studies hath these Canons.2.

1. Let the Study of words be discerned at first from the Study of things, and let one time be bestowed in the lear­ning of Tongues, another in the comprehending of things.

2. On Tongues, let the flowring years of youth be be­stowed: For unto these there needeth little judgement, but only memory which hath vigor in youth.

3. Because Tongues are learned for the things, and Words are only Images of things: therefore less time is to be be­stowed in manly age, on words, then on things.

4. For the right ordering of the Study of any Tongue, two things are required. 1. A Methodical & dexter Frame of the Art of Grammar. 2. A Comprehension of the mean­ing of every word in that Tongue.

5. As for the Study of things, they are learned either in whole Disciplines, or in particular Themes.

6. Frames of Instrumental Disciplines must needs be learn'd before the Principal.

7. Instrumental Disciplines pertaining to things, are Rhetorick and Logick, needful to be learned before other Disciplines: For they are the keys whereby the doors of o­ther Disciplines are unlocked.

8. Among Principal Disciplines, one may begin with Ethicks then proceed to Physicks, Mathematicks, Metaphy­sicks, till at length they stay in Theology, or some other that is aimed at.

9. When the Frame of the Discipline is rightly ordered and comprehended in the mind, then come to the reading of Authors, which serve to confirm or illustrate that Disci­pline.

10. The Learner must diligently distinguish the Com­mentaries of the Precepts, from the Precepts themselves: and in the Precepts observe this Order, that he keep in mind the Definitions and Divisions, making Tables for the same use; And then, that he turn him to the Canons and Rules, and have them diligently, both in understanding and Me­mory.

11. Let the Learner handle one Discipline only at one time; and having done that, let him go then to another in order as before is said, beginning at the Instrumentals.

12. In the Learning, let Ardent love of the thing which [Page 214] is learned be cherished in thy mind; and that which is be­gun, let it be continued without interruption.3

Selection, is whereby the things which we read in others, worthy observation; or which we our selves do find out, we dispose under certain Classes and Titles: commonly it is called the gathering of Common places.

Common places are titles Methodically disposed, unto which things read and meditated, are referred.

And they are either of

  • Words.
  • Things.

Places of Words are either of

  • Common Words.
  • Words of Art.

Places of common Words, are again either of

  • Single. Words.
  • Conjoynt. Words.

Places of Single words are in Lexicons, and in the No­menclator.

Places of Conjoynt Words or Phrases, seem to be things best disposed, if you gather only the more solemn and usual Forms, either in common life, or in the faculty which thou professest according to the order of the things them­selves.

Common places of Words of Art, are so gathered as the places of the things themselves.

Places of things themselves are either

  • Theoretical.
  • Practical. †

Theoretical, which pertain to knowledg only.

And they be either of

  • Essential Precepts.
  • Commentaries.

[Page 215]Places of Precepts, are the seats of matters which are dis­posed in every Discipline, according to the proper Method; The matters of every Discipline are to be disposed accor­ding to the Method of the simple Question, as, that the fr [...]t title be of the name of every Theme, another of the Genus, and so forward as the Order is diligently designed in the handling of a simple Theme.

Places or Commentaries pertain chiefly to Disputations and Controversies which are moved about any matter of the Frame of any Discipline.

The Canons of the common places of controverses, are.

1. The Controversies that fall about the matter, ought diligently to be severed, and the titles or places of these, from the titles of the simple things themselves lookt upon in their nature.

2. The order of the Controversies, depends upon the Order of the things.

3. Under-titles also of Controversies must be disposed according to the members of the Probleme to be handled.

4. But whether to absolute simple titles any man will subject the titles of Controversies, or assign a peculiar Vo­lume to Controversies, that is Arbitrary, or at ones plea­sure.

5. Controversies should be brought to a few, as much as may be, that in every Discipline, onely the necessary sums, and such as be this day in use, be set into a common place.

Practick places be either

  • Rhetorical. a
  • Historical. b

By Rhetorical places here we mean not those that per­tain [...] to the Precepts of Rhetorick; But which are referred to the use and practice of the Precepts.

The Canons of gathering common places Ecclesiasti­cal are these.

1. Let the Common places of Ecclesiastical Rhetorick [Page 216] be distributed into two Volumes; Of which let the first con­tain places gathered for teaching, the other places that p [...]r­tain to moving.

2. The first Volume of teaching-places, let it be so furnisht, that, according to the Chapters of the Catechism, the titles of the Common places, of which the people are wont to be taught, may be noted.

3. Under these titles, let Forms be written in which any head of Religion may popularly be propounded in the mo­ther Tongue, that the people may be taught both truly and perspicuously.

4. The other Volume of moving places, should be dis­posed according to the chief affections, which by Sermons are to be moved.

5. In the first place may be put the title of the motion of Repentance, which again may be divided into his under­titles.

6. Next we may come to the Affection of love and desire, or Adhortation.

7. Let the last Affection be of Joy and Consolation.

Historical places are eitherb

  • Simple.
  • Compound.

Simple, are examples of Vertues, Vices, Punishment [...], and of Rewards, whose disposition is to be made according to the Frame of Ethicks.

Compound places are titles of Aphorisms, Ethick, Oeco­nomick, Politick, Ecclesiastick; which (as it were Practick Conclusions) are proved by their Examples as In­duction.

Imitation is the Conformation of the Learner unto the4 Image of some Notable Doctor.

Imitation is either

  • Grammatical.
  • Rhetorical.
  • Logical.

[Page 217]Grammatical Imitation is about Words and Phrases.

Rhetorical is chiefly in Amplifying and Adorning, and it is learned in Institutes best from Rhetorical common pla­ces.

Logical Imitation, is, when we conforme our under­standing unto the understanding and judgement of excel­lentest Wits in the handling of a simple and conjoyned Theme.

And thus much of the first part of the Exercise of Logick; Namely, of Tractation or Generation.

OF The Recognizing of a thing handled, OR ANALYSIS.

ANalysis (or Resolution) is a Logical Exer­cise whereby the Artifices are recognized, by which the handling of any matter hath been instituted.

The General Canons of Resolution are two.

1. Every Resolution is understood by the Construction; for with what Artifices any thing is constructed or framed; with them it is also resolved or unloosed.

2. Every Analysis consisteth in two things. 1. In the knowledge of the thing or work to be resolved. 2. In the weighing the manner or Artifice whereby the work is Framed.

[Page 218]Analysis is either

  • Grammatical.
  • Rhetorical.
  • Logical.

Grammatical resolution, is which weigheth a simple or compounded word, as touching the forming and fit knitting together for the learning of any Language.

Rhetorical resolution, is whereby the Artifices are exa­mined of Amplifications and Adornations in any Oration, or other writing.

Logical resolution, is whereby are weighed the Artifices of Explication, Probation, and Ordination or Method: which are used of the Author in making the work.

This resolution is either

  • Separate. a
  • Combined. b

Separate, wherein the handling of one Theme is weigh­eda apart.

And it is either of a Theme

  • Simple, a
  • Conjoyned. b

Resolution of a Simple Theme, is whereby the Artificesa used in a simple Tractation are Recognized.

The Canons hereof are these.

First of all, let the Theme it self be gathered out of the Text, as being the Object and Scope of the whole Resolu­tion.

2. Let it be diligently minded, whether the The [...]e be [Page 219] perfect or imperfect, Singular or Universal; for hereon hangeth the applying of the Terms, which may be used in the handling of any Theme.

3. It is also to be minded to what Discipline the Theme of the propounded Text doth belong.

4. Because it seldome falls out that the Authors do ex­plain any Theme by all the Instruments of the first Part of Logick: therefore in Resolving, the mind is to be applyed unto some certain Instruments by which the Author handled his Theme.

5. Let Amplifications be diligently severed from the Explication of the Theme, instituted by the Terms there­of.

6. Let the Terms by which a Theme is handled of an Author, be judged by the Canons of the first Part of Logick; as whether it be a Genus, a Cause, a Property, or an Ef­fect.

Resolution of a conjoyned Theme is either of the second,b or of the third Part of Logick.

Resolution of the second part of Logick, is, which turns over Sententious Texts; wherein meer propositions are contained without proofs.

Resolution of the third Part of Logick is either.

  • Syllogistical. a
  • Methodical. b

Syllogistical Resolution, is, whereby the handling of aa Conjoynt Question is unfolded, According to these Canons following.

1. Let the Propositions or Conjoynt Theme of the Au­thor be first of all gathered out of the Text.

2. That Proposition, if it be not by the Author put in the Indicative Mood must be reduced thereunto.

We must look if the proposition be often repeated in [Page 220] the Text; for these repetitions must be gathered into one, and counted but for one Proposition.

4. But if the Proposition be not only repeated, but also explained, or limited by the Author, that explication and limitation is to be shewed before the Resolution of the Arguments. And if the Author have not explained or limi­ted it, and yet the Proposition needeth explanation and li­mitation, we our selves ought to do it.

5. Let it be considered, whether the propounded Theme be universal or singular, or whether it be a [...], or an [...].

6. Let it also be considered whether it be a Theme do­ctrinal, or practical.

7. After the Theme is thus considered, let the next ca [...]e be of the Means by which the Theme is handled of the Au­thor, which are Arguments either proving or refuting, or Anticipations, or unloosing of objections, or amplifications, or exaggerations.

8. Of the Arguments, We are first to mind whether they be artificial, or inartificial i. e. Testimonies.

9. Let the artificial Mean be reduced to the place of In­vention; and conferred with the Antecedent and Con­sequent of the propounded Conclusion.

10. We must look whether any of the premises be omit­ted▪ by the Author in the Text, and then he that resolveth must add them.

11. If any of the Premises be proved by a Prosyllogism, then must we use the same process in resolving the Prosyllo­gism that was used before in the primary Syllogism.

12. Let the confirming Arguments be distinguished from the refuting.

13. If the Author bring in a secret Objection, that also must diligently be distinguished from the Confirmation, and reduced to a syllogistical form: We must also mark how the Text answers to this Objection.

14. Let Amplifications be referred to their certain pla­ces, and Adornations to the certain Figures of Rhetorick.

[Page 221]Methodical Resolution, is, whereby the Artifices of Me­thodb are examined.

The Canons thereof are three.

1. As Method is Universal or Particular; so must the Resolution also needs be made, Either according to the Parts of Universal Method, or according to the Canons of particular Method.

2. The Bonds of knitting together, and of passing from one point to another in the Method, must in the Resolving diligently be shewed.

3. If any things occur in the Author, either superfluous, or strange from the propounded Theme; he that resolveth must give warning of them.

And thus much of Simple Resolution or separate.

Combined Resolution, is, whereby is unfolded any Treatise made by the Author, according to more Parts of Logick.

And it is either of a whole Discipline, or of some Writing or Treatise pertaining to some Discipline.

The Resolution of a whole Discipline, is, whereby the Method of any Frame or Body of Discipline is unfolded.

The Canons of which Resolution, are these.

1. Let the Praecognita, or things fore-known of the pro­posed Discipline be so instituted, that first it may appear whether it be a Contemplative, or an Operative Disci­pline.

2. If it be Contemplative, then the whole Resolution must be directed to these three as to a most certain Load­star; Namely, that first the Subject of the Discipline be enquired; Afterwards, the Species of this Subject, and also the affections both General and Special, and then the causes or beginnings of these affections.

3. And if it be an Operative Discipline, also three things must be enquired in the Authors Writings. 1. The end that is to be got by the Operation. 2. The Subject where­unto this end is to be brought. And 3. The means by which it is to be brought in.

[Page 222]4. Let the Precepts alwayes be distinguished from the Commentaries.

An Authors Treatise is Resolved by these Canons.

1. Mind, whether the writing be accurate (Acroamatical)▪ or popu [...]ar (Exoterical), or mixt.

2. Let lawful foreknowledges be made of the Efficient cause, or Author of the Writing, of the Scope of his Writing; of the Object, if it be an Epistle to any.

3. Let a general partition be made of the whole Treatise; and if it be divided into Chapters, let every Chapter be referred to his part.

4. A general Resolution being so made, then come to a particular Resolution of every Member & Chapter; where­in, when any Theme, Simple or Conjoynt is handled, let the process of the Resolution be made according to the Precepts before given of either Theme.

And thus endeth the Doctrine of the Exercise of Logick:

Blessed be God.

FINIS.

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