CHAP. I. Of Ideas, according to their Nature and Ori­ginal.

THE word Idea is of the number of those words which are so clear, that they need not to be explain'd by any other; there being no other more clear and simple.

[Page 46] So that all that can be done in this case to avoid errour and mistake, is to observe the false notions and interpretations that may be attributed to this word: while some make use of it only to signifie that manner of conceiving, which is perform'd by the appli­cation of the Mind to those Forms that are depainted in our Fancies, and is call'd Ima­gination.

For as St. Austin observes, Man ever since his fall has been so accustom'd to contemplate Corporeal Things, the forms of which en­ter through our Sences into our Brains, that the most part believe they cannot apprehend a thing, when they cannot imagine it, that is, contemplate it as a Thing Corporeal: As if Man had no other way to think or appre­hend.

Whereas no man can make a Reflection upon what occurs to his Thoughts, but he must acknowledg, that he conceives many things altogether destitute of Corporeal Form; and finds a difference between Imagination and perfect understanding. As for example, when I imagine a Triangle, I do not contemplate it only as a Figure consisting of three Right Lines; but I also consider those three Right Lines as present by the force and internal Ap­plication of the Mind; and this is properly to imagine. Or if I would think of a Figure [Page 47] with a Thousand Angles, I presently apprehend that it is a Figure consisting of a Thousand Sides, as easily, as I apprehend a Triangle to consist of three Sides; but I cannot imagine the Thousand sides of that Figure, nor be­hold 'em as being present, with the Eyes, as I may so say, of my mind.

Nevertheless, 'tis very true, that the day­ly practice of Imagination, in apprehending Corporeal things is the reason, that oft times, when we imagine a Figure of a thousand An­gles, we form in our Thoughts some confused Figure or other. But it is evident that the Figure thus form'd by the assistance of Ima­gination, is not a Figure of a Thousand An­gles; as nothing differing from that form, which any one would frame in his Thoughts, were he to imagine a Figure of ten Thousand Angles; as also for that it is no ways ser­viceable to discover the Proprieties that made the difference between a Figure of a Thou­sand Angles from any other Polygon.

And therefore I cannot properly imagine a Figure of a Thousand Angles, for that the Figure which I would frame in my Imaginati­on would represent to me any other Figure with a great Number of Angles; and yet I can very clearly and distinctly conceive it, as being able to demonstrate all it's proprieties; as that all the Angles together are equal to [Page 48] 1996. Right Angles. And thus by conse­quence it is one thing to imagine, another thing to apprehend.

This is yet more evident by the Considera­tion of many things which we clearly appre­hend, and yet can no way in the World at­tain 'em by Imagination. For what do we apprehend more clearly, then our thought when we think? Nevertheless, it is impossi­ble to imagine a thought, nor to delineate any form of it in the Brain. What forms of the Particles of Affirmation, Yes, and Ne­gation, No, can be describ'd in the Fancy. Yet both he that denies, and he that affirms the Earth to be round have the same express Imaginations, Earth, and Rotundity. To these the one adds Affirmation, which is an Action of the Mind, which conceives with­out any Corporeal form; the other adds a Negative, which is another Action of the Mind, and much more incapable of a formal description.

When we speak then of Ideas, we do not call by that name those Images that present themselves to the Fancy, but whatever of­fers it self to our thoughts; at what time we may truly affirm, that we apprehend a cer­tain Thing, after whatever manner we appre­hend it.

Whence it follows that we can express no­thing [Page 49] in words, so that we understand what we say, but that it is evident from thence, that we have in our selves the Idea of the thing signifi'd by our words; though that I­dea may happen to be sometimes more plain and distinct; sometimes more obscure and confus'd, as we shall declare hereafter. For he would contradict himself that should af­firm he knew what he meant by the words which he pronounces, and yet at the same time that he pronounces 'em, should un­derstand nothing but the sound of those words.

And this is that which shews us the falsity of two Opinions broach'd by the Philoso­phers of these Times.

The first is, that we have no Idea of God. For if we had none, in pronouncing the word God, we should apprehend no more then the three Letters G, O, D, and he that only speaks English, would have no more in his thoughts, when he hears that word pronounc'd, then if he should come into a Synagogue not understanding a tittle of Hebrew and hear the names of God Adonia or Elohim.

Moreover when some men would be call'd Gods (which was the Frenzie of Caligula and Domitian) there could be no Crime of Impiety laid to their charge, for that there is nothing in the three Letters G, O, D, or the [Page 50] two Syllables De-us which may not be attri­buted to a Man, abstracting the Idea from the word: For which reason the Hollander was never tax'd with Impiety, who call'd himself Ludovicus De-us. What was then the Impiety of those Princes, but that they left at least a part of it's Idea to the word Deus, so that it signifi'd that transcendent and adorable Nature of a Deity, and appropria­ted to themselves both the Word and the Idea.

But had we not the Idea of God, upon what could we ground all that we say of God? As that he is One, that he is Eternal, Omnipo­tent, all Mercy, and all Wisdom. Of which there is nothing comprehended in the sound of the word God, but in the Idea which we have of God, and which we joyn to the sound of the word.

And hence it is that we refuse the name of God to all false Divinities; not but that the Word might be attributed to 'em, being tak'n materially; but because the Idea which we have in our selves of the Supreme Being and which we have annex'd to the word God, be­longs only to the True God.

The second of these false Opinions is what an English man asserts, That Ratiocination is nothing else but a Connexion and Chain of names linkt together by the word, Est, it is. Whence it [Page 51] follows, that by reasoning we can conclude nothing of the nature of Things, but only concerning their Appellations; That is to say, that we barely see whether we assemble together well or ill, ac­cording to the Covenants we have made with our Fancy concerning their significations.

To which the same Author adds, If this be true, as it may be it is, reasoning will depend upon words, words upon imagination, and ima­gination perhaps, and which is my Opinion, will depend upon the motion of the Corporeal Organs; and so our Soul will prove no other then the mo­tion of some parts of the Organical Body.

We are willing to believe that these words contain an Objection far remote from the Sence of the Proposer; but in regard that being so Dogmatically express'd, they ruin the Immortality of the Soul, it will be of great importance to lay open the fallacy of the Objection; which it will be no difficult thing to do. For the Covenants of which the Philosopher speaks, can be no other then the consent of men to take certain sounds for signs of those Ideas existing in our Minds. So that if we had not besides the Names, the Ideas of Things in our selves, those Covenants would have been impossible; as it is impossible by any such Covenant to make a blind man understand what is meant by the words, Red, Green, or Blew. For not having these Ideas [Page 52] in his Mind, he cannot joyn 'em to the sound.

Moreover several Nations having given different Names to Things, even to those that are most apparent and simple, as are those which are the Objects of Geometry, they could not discourse in the same manner of the same Truths, if discourse were nothing but a Connexion of names by the word, Est, it is.

And since it appears by this variety of words that the Arabians (for example sake) do not agree with the English about the same signification of Names, so could they never agree in judgment or discourse, if their Di­scourse depended upon that Covenant.

Lastly, when we say that the signification of words are Arbitrary or ad placitum, we stick deep in Equivocation. For it is true that it is a thing altogether Arbitrary to joyn this Idea to that Sound, rather then another. But Ideas are not Arbitrary things that depend upon our Fancy, more especially those that are evident and distinst: Which that we may make manifest we say, that it would be very ridioulous to think that real Effects could de­pend upon things purely Arbitrary. Now when a man has concluded by his Reason, that the Iron Axel that passes through the two Mill-stones of a Corn-Mill could turn a­ about, [Page 53] without turning the lower Mill-stone, if being round it pass'd through a round hole; but that the same Axle could not turn without turning the upper Mill-stone; if be­ing square, it were fastn'd in a square hole of the upper Mill-stone; what he has underta­ken to prove undenyably follows. And by consequence this Discourse is not a Connexi­on of Names according to a Covenant en­tirely depending upon the Fancy of men; but a solid and conclusive Judgment of the Nature of Things by the consideration of I­deas, which men have been pleas'd to de­note and signifie by certain Names.

Thus much as to what we understand by the word Idea; we are now to say something concerning their Original.

And now the Question is, whether our I­deas proceed from the Senses, and whether that common Maxim be true; There is nothing in the Intellect, which was not first in the Sense.

This is the Opinion of a Philosopher of Great Reputation in the World, who begins his Logic with this Proposition; Every Idea de­rives it's Original from the Senses. He confes­ses however that all Ideas are not the same in our Senses, as they are in the mind. But he pretends that they were at least form'd out of those that past through our Senses, either by [Page 54] composition; as when out of the separate I­deas of Gold, and a Mountain, we make a Mountain of Gold; or by Amplification and Diminution, as when out of the Idea of a Man of Ordinary Stature, we make a Giant, or a Pigmee; or by similitude and Proportion; as when out of the Idea of a House we have seen, we make the Delineations of a Stru­cture that we have not seen: And thus, saith he, we apprehend God, who is above the reach of Sense, under the shape of a vene­rable Old Man.

But according to this Doctrine, it would follow, that all our Ideas, tho' relating to no particular Object that ever approach'd our Senses: must be all Corporeal, and represent nothing to us, but what has past at least by parts, through our Senses: and consequently that we can conceive nothing but by the help of Images, like those which are form'd in the Brain when we see, or imagine Bodies.

But tho this Opinion be maintain'd by o­ther School Philosophers as well as himself, I shall not scruple to affirm that it is very ab­surd, and as contrary to Religion as to true Philosophy. For to speak nothing but what is evident, what is there that we conceive more distinctly then our thoughts themselves? What proposition clearer then this, I think, therefore I am? However we can never be [Page 55] certain of the truth of this Proposition, un­less we understand distinctly what it is to Be, and what to think. Neither is it to be re­quir'd from us to explain these terms any far­ther; because they are such that Men so clearly understand, that a copious explanation would but render 'm more obscure. If then it cannot be denied but that we have in our selves the Ideas of Entity and Thought, I ask, through what door of the Senses they enter'd into the Mind? Are they Ideas of Light or Colours to enter through the Sight? Are they shrill or deep sounds to make way through the Ear? Are they Odoriferous or noisom to enter the Smelling? Are they savory or nauseous to enter the Taste? hot or cold, soft or hard, to glide through the Feeling. If it be said they were form'd of other sensible Images, let 'em demonstrate what those sen­sible Images are, from vvhence these Ideas of Entity and Thought proceeded; as also hovv they were form'd, whether by Composition, or by Amplification, by diminution or propor­tion; for if they cannot answer agreably to Reason, it must be taken for granted, that the Ideas of Entity and Thought are far from any way deriving their Original from Sense; but that our Soul is endu'd with a Faculty to form'em of her self, though it may happen sometimes, that she may be incited to make [Page 56] use of something that strikes the Sence. As a Painter may be induc'd to paint a Picture for the price that is promis'd him; and yet it cannot be said that the picture drew its O­riginal from the Money.

But what the same Authors add, that the Idea which we have of God, draws its origi­nal from Sence, because we apprehend him under the Idea of an Old-Man, is a thought unworthy any other then the Anthropomor­phites, and which confounding the true Ideas that we have of Spiritual things with the false Imaginations that we conceive of those Sublimites out of an evil custom, of imagining all things amiss; whereas it is as absurd to pretend to imagine that which is not Corporeal, as to hear Colours, and see Sounds.

To refute this opinion, we need no more then consider, that if we had no other Idea of God, then of a venerable Old-Man, all those other Judgments which we make of that Idea ought to appear false to us, that are contrary to that Idea; for we are natu­rally induc'd to believe that our judgments are false, when we clearly see that they are contrary to the Ideas which we have of things. Otherwise we shall never be able to conclude certainly that God does not con­sist of parts, that he is Incorporeal, Omnipre­sent, and Invisible, when all those Ideas are [Page 57] no way agreeable to that of a venerable Old Man. And if God had at any time ever ap­pear'd in that form, it does not presently follow that we should have no other Idea of him but that; for so we should have no other Idea of the Holy-Ghost then that of a Dove because he once appear'd in that Shape, as God in the same manner might be conoeiv'd to be a Sound, because the sound with which the Name of God is pronounc'd, awakens the Idea of God in our Minds.

It is therefore false that all our Ideas pro­ceed from the Sense: rather it may be affirm­ed on the other side, that none of those I­deas that enter our Minds, deduce their Ori­ginal from the Senses unless by accident, that is when the motions stirr'd up in the Brain, which is all the Senses can do, give an occa­sion to the Soul to produce true Ideas, which it would not otherwise do; tho' for the most part those Ideas are nothing like the other that are form'd in the Sence and in the Brain; and besides the greatest number of Ideas be­ing such, as not having any mixture of Cor­poreal form, cannot without a most manifest absurdity, be referr'd to the Sense.

If any one object that at the same time that we have an Idea of spiritual things, as of Thought (for examples sake) we entertain also a certain Corporeal Image of the sound [Page 58] that expresses it, they averr nothing contra­ry to what we have alreadly prov'd; for that form of the Sound which is present in the ima­gination is not the Image of the Thought, but of the Sound; nor does it serve to represent it otherwise, then as the Soul being accustom'd when she hears this Sound, to conceive the thought, forms at the same time an Idea of thought, altogether Spiritual; which has no reference to the Idea of Sound, but as only an­nexed to it by Custom; Which is apparent in Deaf people, who have no Ideas of Sound, yet have the Ideas of their thoughts, at least when they reflect upon their thoughts.

CHAP. II. Of the Objects of Ideas.

WHatever we conceive, is represented to our Minds, either as a Thing, or a manner of a Thing, or as a thing modified.

I call that a Thing which is conceiv'd to con­sist of it self, and as the Subject of all those things that are comprehended in it, which by another name is call'd Substance.

The Manner, Attribute, or Quality of a Thing, I call that, which when it is conceiv­ed to be comprehended in the Substance, and [Page 59] not to be able to subsist without it, deter­mines it to exist after a certain manner, and gives it a certain denomination.

A Thing modified, I call a substance, as it is determin'd by a certain mode or manner.

All which things will be apprehended more clearly by Examples.

When I consider a Body, the Idea of it represents to me a Thing or Substance: be­cause I consider it as a thing subsisting by it self, and which has need of no other to exist.

But when I consider this Body to be round, I consider a Round-Body, and this Idea re­presents to me the Thing Modified.

The names which are used to express these things are called Substantives, or absolute, as the Earth, the Sun, the Soul, God.

Those also that primarily and directly sig­nify the Modes or Manners, because they have some Correspondence with Substantives, are call'd Substantives and Absolutes, as Hard­ness, Heat, Justice, Prudence, &c.

Such names as signifie the Things as Modifi­ed, marking out primarily and directly the Sub­stance, tho' more confusedly, and indirectly the Manner, tho' more distinctly, are call'd Adjectives, and Connotatives, as Round, Hard, Just, Prudent.

[Page 60] But here we are to observe that the Mind being accustom'd to know most things as Modified (in regard she attains not the know­ledg of 'em but only by accident, or by those qualities that strike the Senses) often di­vides one essence of a Substance into two Ide­as, of which the one she takes for the Sub­ject, the other for the Mode. Thus altho there be nothing in God, which is not God himself, yet we apprehend him as an Infinite Being; and with us Infinite is the Attribute of God, as Being the Subject of the Attribute. Thus also we consider Man as the Subject of Humanity, or having Humanity, and con­sequently as a Thing Modified.

And then the essential Attribute, which is the thing most it self, is apprehended by the Manner of the Manner, because it is as it were inherent in the Subject. And this is call'd the Substantive Abstrasted, as Humani­ty, Corporeity, Reason.

Nevertheless it is of great Importance to distinguish that which is truly the Mode from that which onely seems to be so, For the Con­founding of Manners with Substances, and Substances with Manners is the chief ground of all our Errors. Therefore the Nature of the true Mode is such, that the Substance of which it is the Manner, may be clearly and distinctly conceiv'd without it; but the man­ner [Page 61] cannot be alternately clearly conceiv'd; unless the Relation which it has to it's Sub­stance be as readily apprehended, without which it cannot naturally exist.

Not but that we may apprehend the Man­ner, without such an exact and distinct consi­deration of the Subject. But that which de­monstrates that the Relation of the Manner to the Subjest, is contain'd, at least, confus­sedly in it's conception; because we cannot deprive the Manner of that Relation, but that we must destroy the Idea of it at the same Time. Whereas when we conceive two Sub­stances, we may deny one thing of the o­ther; yet never destroy the Ideas of either.

For example, I may deny Prudence, without considering the Man, who is prudent; but I cannot conceive Prudence, and at the same time deny the Relation, which it has to Man, or any other intelligible Nature capable of Prudence.

Contrariwise, when I consider what ap­pertains to an extended Substance, which is call'd a Body, as Extension, Figure, Mobility, Divisibility, and on the other side whatever belongs to the Mind, as Thinking, Doubting, Memory, Will, Discourse, I may deny all that of the Extended Substance, which I conceive belongs to the Thinking Substance, and yet di­stinctly apprehend the Extended Substance, and [Page 62] all the Adjuncts that belong to it. And I may reciprocally deny of the Thinking Substance, whatever I apprehend of the Extended Sub­stance, without considering what I have con­ceiv'd of the Thinking Substance.

Which also proves, that Thinking is not the Manner of the Extended Substance, because that Extension with all the rest of the Attri­butes belonging to Extended Substance may be deny'd of Thought, and yet a man may rightly apprehend of Thinking.

It may be here farther observ'd, that there are some of these Modes or Manners, which may be call'd Intrinsic; because they are ap­prehended to be in the Substance, as round or square; others may be said to be extrinsic; be­cause they are tak'n from something which is not inherent in the Substances; as beloved, seen, desired; but these things depend upon the A­ctions of others. And these sorts of Modes or Manners, are called in the Schools, Ex­tinsical Denominations. But if these Modes are taken according to the Manner whereby things are apprehended, they are called Second Intentions. Thus to be Subjected, to be Predicated are Second Intentious, because they are the Manners whereby the things them­selves are apprehended, as they are in the Understanding, conjoining two Ideas, affirm­ing one to be the other.

[Page 63] It is farther to be observ'd, that there are other Modes which we may call Substantials, because they represent to us true Substances applied to other Substances like to Manners; of which sort are Cloath'd, Arm'd, &c.

There are others which we may call simply Real, and these are the true Manners, which are not Substances, but Manners of Substance.

Lastly, there are others which we may call Negatives, because they represent the Sub­stance to us with a Denial of some real or sub­stantial Manner.

Now if the Objects represented by these Ideas, whether Substances or Manners, are re­ally such as they are represented to us, we call 'em true. If not, they are false Ideas, in such a manner as they may be. And these are they which in the Schools are called En­tia Rationes, Entities of Reason, which hap­pen for the most part when the Mind con­joins two Ideas real in themselves, but di­stinct; thus the Idea of a Golden Mountain is an Entity of Reason, compounded of two Ideas of a Mountain and Gold, which the Mind represents as conjoin'd, when really they are not so.

CHAP. III. Of Aristotle's Ten Predicaments.

TO this Head of the Objects of Ideas, the ten Predicaments of Aristotle may be reduc'd; as being but several Classes, under which that Philosopher comprehended all the Objects of our Thoughts; compredending all Substances under the First, and all acci­dents under the other Nine.

The first Substance, which is either Spiritu­al or Corporeal; the second Quantity, which is either discrete, when the Parts are divided as Numbers.

Or Continued, when the parts are conjoin­ed, and then either successive, as Time and Notion; or Permanent, which by another name is call'd Space, or Extension in Length, Breadth, and Profundity; length alone mak­ing lines, Length and Breadth making sur­face, and all together causing Solidity.

Third Quality, of which Aristotle makes four Kinds.

The first comprehends Habitude, a dispo­sition of Mind or Body, acquir'd by reitera­ted Acts, as the Sciences, Vertue, Vice, Ex­cellency [Page 65] in Painting, Writing, Dancing.

The Second Natural Ability; such as are the Faculties of the Soul or Body, the Under­standing, the Will, the Memory, the Five Sen­ses, Swiftness of Foot.

The Third, Sensible Qualities, as Hardness, Softness, Ponderosity, hot, cold, colours, sounds, odors and several sorts of Relishes.

The Fourth, Form and Figure, which is the extrinsecal determination of Quantity, as Round, Square, Spherical, Cubical.

Fourthly Relation of one thing to another, as of Father to Son, Master to Servant, King to Subject, of Power to the Object, of sight to the Thing Visible; to which may be added all things denoting Comparison; as like, equal, bigger, less.

Fifth, Action, either consider'd in it self; as to walk, leap, to know, to love; or externally, as to strike, to saw, to break, to manifest, to hear.

Sixth, Suffering; as to be stricken, broken, to be manifested, heated.

Seventh, where; as when we answer to Que­stions about Place; He is at Rome, at Paris, in his Study, or a bed.

Eighth, When we answer to questions a­bout Time, as when did he Live? a hundred Years ago; When was this done? Yesterday.

Ninth, Scituation, as Sitting, Standing, [Page 66] Lying, behind, before, upon the Right-hand, on the Lost.

The Tenth, the manner of having, as to have any thing about a Man for Cloathing, Ornament, Armour; or to be Cloath'd, Adorn'd, Arm'd, to wear Breeches, &c.

These are Aristotle's Ten Predicaments form'd for the Birth of so many Misteries, though to say truth, of very little use, and so far from rectifying of Judgment, which is the Scope of Logic, that they frequently do much mischief; and that for two Causes which it will be worth while to display in this place.

The first is that these Predicaments are things lookt upon as things grounded upon Reason and Truth, whereas they are things meerly Arbitrary, and which have no ground but the Imagination of a Man that has no Authority to prescribe Laws to others, who have as much Right as he, to dispose in the same, or any other order the Objects of Think­ing, according to the Rules of Philosophy, which every one embraces. In a word, the following Distic contains whatever falls un­der our Consideration according to the new Philosophy.

[Page 67] Mens, Mensura, quies, motus, Positura, Figura, Sunt cum materia Cunctarum Exordia rerum.

For the followers of this Philosophy be­lieve they have drain'd all Nature out of these seven Heads.

1. Mens or the Thinking Substance. 2. Matter, or the Extended Substance. 3. Measure, or the Bigness or Smallness of eve­ry part of the Matter. 4. Position, or Scituati­on one in respect of another. 5 Figure. 6. Their Motion. 7. Their Rest, or slower Motion.

The other Reason why we think this Series of Predicaments to be pernicious is this, because it occasions Men to satisfie themselves with the outward Rind of Words, instead of Pro­fiting by the wholsome Fruit, and to believe they know all things, so they are able to say by rote certain names of Arbitrary Sig­nification, which yet imprint no clear or di­stinct Ideas, as we shall afterwards demon­strate.

Here something might be said of the At­tributes of the Lullists, Goodness, Patience, Magnitude, and the rest. But it is such a ridiculous Invention, to think that they are able to give a Reason of all things by the ap­plication of a few Metaphisical words, that it is not worth refuting.

[Page 68] And therefore a very Modern Author has affirm'd with great Reason, that the Rules of Aristotles Logic are serviceable, not so much to discover what we are Ignorant of, but to explain to others, what we know already: but that Lully taught us to prattle fluently and without Judgment of that of which we know nothing at all. And there­fore Ignorance is to be preferr'd far before this false Knowledg; for as St. Austin judiciously observes in his Book of the utility of Belief, such a disposition of the Mind is highly to be blam'd for two Reasons. One, for that he who is perswaded that he understands the Truth, renders himself uncapable of Learning any more: and Secondly because such a Presumption and Rashness is a sign of an ill-govern'd and ill­qualified Mind. Opinari saith he, Duas ob res turpissimum, est, quod discere non potest, qui sibi jam se scire persuasit, & per se ipsa te­meritas non bene affecti Animi signum est; For the word Opinari, in the purity of the Latin Tongue, signifies a disposition of Mind, that consents too lightly to uncertain things, and so believes that he knows what he does not understand, and therefore all the Philo­sophers maintain'd, Sapientem nihil Opinari; and Cicero blaming himself for that defect, says that he was Magnus Opinator,

CHAP. IV. Of the Composition and Simplicity of Ideas, wherein is discours'd the manner of knowing by Abstraction or Precision.

WE have affirm'd by the by, in the second Chapter; that we may ap­prehend the Mode or Form without consi­dering distinctly the Substance of which it is the Mode, from whence we take an occasi­on to explain, what is Abstraction of the In­tellect.

The narrow Limits to which our Souls are confin'd are the reason that we cannot per­fectly apprehend things, if a little compound­ed, without considering 'em in Parts, and ac­cording to the several shapes that they may receive. Which is that, which we generally call knowing by Abstraction.

But in regard that things are variously compounded, some of Parts really distinct, which we call Integral, as the Body of Man, Number, &c. It is easie thence to understand, that the Mind may consider one Part and not another, because these Parts are really di­stinguish'd: [Page 70] But this is not that which we call Abstraction.

Now it will be more advantagious to con­sider these Parts separately, to a distinct knowledg of which we can never else attain. For example the Body of Man can be no o­therwise known, then by dividing it into all it's Parts; as well similar as dissimilar, and by setting several names upon every one. A­rithmetic also stands upon this foundation. For we have no need of Art to measure or compt little Numbers, for the Mind is a­ble to receive them entire. So that the whole Art consists in numbring seperately those Parts of Number, which being whole we cannot reck'n. For as Capacious as the Mind is, it is impossible for it to multiply two Numbers consisting of eight or nine Figures, without a seperate Multiplication of each Fi­gure by it self.

Secondly, we know by Parts, when we apply our selves to one manner not consider­ing the Substance; or to two seperately, which are not however inherent in one and the same Subject. This is done by the Geo­metricians who make a Body extended in Length, Breadth, and Profundity, the Ob­ject of Geometry. But for the more accu­rate knowledg of this they first apply them­selves to the Consideration of one only Di­mension. [Page 71] Then they consider two dimensi­ons, Length and Breadth, which they call a Superficies; and lastly all the three dimensions together, which they call solid Bodies.

Hence it appears how vain and ridiculous the Subtleties of the Skeptics are, who endea­vour to call in question the certainty of Geometry, because it supposes Lines and Su­perficies that never were; for it does not sup­pose Lines without Latitude, nor Superficies without Profundity; but it supposes that Longitude may be consider'd without the consideration of Latitude; which is a thing beyond all Controversy, for in measuring the distance between City and City, we only measure the length of the way, not troubling our selves about the Breadth.

Now by how many the more Manners we divide things, so much the more capable we become of accurately understanding 'em. Thus we see in motion, when the determina­tion to what place, is not rightly distinguish'd as well from the motion, as the parts of the determination, so long nothing can clearly be concluded concerning the causes of Reflecti­on and Distinction, which is done by the help of this Distinction, as may be seen in the Se­cond Chapter of Des Cartes's Optics.

Thirdly we know by Abstraction, when the thing has several Attributes, but we only [Page 72] consider one, setting all the rest aside. For Example, I consider, That I think and by Consequence that I am he who thinks. Now in this Idea of my self thinking, I can only consider the Thing-Thinking, not considering that I am the Thing-Thinking, tho' in Me, My self, and the Thing-Thinking are one and the same, and so the Idea which I have con­ceiv'd of the Person-Thinking will not only represent me my self but all other Persons that think. In the same manner, if I consider an E­quilateral Triangle, as it is describ'd in such a Paper, with all its other determining Cir­cumstances; that Idea will only represent this Triangle to me. But if I call off my thoughts from the consideration of these par­ticular accidents, and apply my self to the con­sideration of this Figure, as consisting of three Lines; the Idea thus form'd will hence more clearly explain the Equality of the Lines, and thence I become more apt and Skilful to make a representation of all other Triangles of the same Nature. If I am to go farther, and not to stop at the Contemplation of the E­quality of Lines, but am to consider it as a figure consisting of three right Lines, this Idea will express all the sorts of Triangles. Lastly, if omitting the number of the Lines, I only conceive a superficies bounded with Right-Lines, I shall form an Idea of Figures [Page 73] consisting of Right-Lines; and thus by de­grees I may ascend to extension it self. For in these Abstractions, the inferiour degree contains the Superiour, together with some conjoin'd determination. Thus I think con­tains the Thing Thinking: thus an equilateral Triangle contains a Triangle, and thus a Tri­angle comprehends a Right-lin'd Figure, and the upper degree represents many things so much the more clearly, by how much the less it is determin'd.

Lastly, It is manifest, that by the benefit of Extraction, Common Ideas are produc'd out of Singular, and out of Common ones still more Common. By which we are admonish'd to proceed to what is to be said concern­ing the Ʋniversality and Particularities of Ideas.

CHAP. V. Of the Ʋniversality, Particularity and Singu­larity of Ideas.

ALtho' whatever exists be Singular, ne­vertheless by the help of Abstractions, we may have several sorts of Ideas, of which some will express Singulars; and such is the Idea which every one has of himself; others will express many things together, as when a Man thinks a Triangle, considering nothing else but that it is a figure containing three Lines, and as many Angles; which Idea so form'd, may serve for the apprehension of all other Triangles.

Ideas representing one thing, are calld Sin­gular and Individual: and their Objects are called Individuals, but they that represent several things, are called Ʋniversal, Common or General.

The names that denote the first, are Pro­per Names, as Socrates, Rome, Bucephalus. These that signify the latter Common and Ap­pellatives: as a Man, a City, a Horse. And [Page 75] as well Ʋniversal Ideas as Common names may be call'd Generical Terms.

Note that there are two sorts of Generical Terms, one of those that are called Ʋnivo­cals, to which the Ʋniversal Ideas are so tied, that the same name may agree with several things according to the same sound, and the same Notion that is annexed to the Sound; of which sort are a Man, a City, a Horse.

The other is of those that are called E­quivocalls, the Sound of which is the same, annexed to different Ideas, so that the same sound or word may agree to several things, but not according to the same but various I­deas which custom has subjected to the word. Thus Canon signifies a great Gun, and Eccle­siastical decree, and a Rule of Art; for these significations belong all to different Ideas.

These Ʋniversal Equivocalls are of two sorts. For various Ideas subjected to one Sound, have either no Relation one with another, as in the word Canon; or else they have some Relation; as when the name primarily signi­fies one Idea: others no otherwise then as they relate to the first Idea, as the Cause, Effect or Sign, and these Equivocalls are called A­nalogous; thus Animals, the Air, and Diet are said to be Healthy.

Now the Idea first joyn'd to the word, de­notes Health, which is proper to Animals; [Page 74] [...] [Page 75] [...] [Page 76] but others are added, approaching near to the primary Idea, as being the Cause of Health; and therefore we call the Air Heal­thy, and Diet healthy, because they both con­tribute to the preservation of Health.

Nevertheless when we hear speak only of Ʋniversal Terms, we understand Ʋnivocalls only, with the Ʋniversal Ideas annexed.

But among all these Ʋniversal Ideas there are two which it highly concerns us rightly to distinguish, that is to say, Comprehension and Extension.

I call the Comprehension of an Idea all those Attributes that are contain'd within it, so that none can be taken away, but the Idea must be destroy'd. Thus the Comprehension of the Idea of a Triangle, includes Extensi­on, Figure, Three Lines, three Angles, and the equallity of those Angles with two right Angles.

I call Extension the Subjects with which the Idea agrees, which are also call'd the Inferi­ors of the Ʋniversal Term, which being rela­ted to those, carries the name of Superior. Thus the Generical Idea of a Triangle ex­tends it self to all the several Species of Trian­gles.

But tho the Generical Idea confusedly ex­tends it self to all the inferior Subjects, never­theless between the Attributes which it com­prehends, [Page 77] and the Subjects to which it is ex­tended, the difference arises from hence, that we cannot despoil the Idea of any of its attributes without destroying it, as hath been said; whereas we may restrain the Extension of the same, by applying it to some of the Sub­jects, yet never injure the Idea.

Now the Restriction of the Generical Idea may happen two ways.

First by the addition of an Idea distinct and determin'd. Thus if I add to the Generical Idea of a Triangle, that it has a right Angle, I restrain the Generical Idea of a Triangles to a certain species of a Triangle, which is therefore called a Rectangle Triangle.

Secondly, By the addition of an Idea con­fus'd, and undetermin'd; as if a Man should say, some Triangle. In which case the Term is made particular, because that now it extends it self only to a part of the Subjects, which before comprehended all, and yet that part to which it is restrain'd is not deter­min'd.

CHAP. VI. Of the five Ʋniversal Ideas; Genus, Species, Difference, Proper, and Accident.

WHAT has been said in the former Chapters opens us a way for the ex­planation in few words of those Ʋniversals which are Vugarly made use of in the Schools.

For when the Generical Idea represents to us their Objects as Things, and that in Sub­stantives and absolute Terms, it is call'd either Genus or Species.

CHAP. VII. Of the Complex'd Terms, their Ʋniversality, and Particularity.

Sometimes to some certain Term we join other Terms, from which arises in our Minds a total Idea, of which we may affirm or deny those things, which cannot either be de­ni'd or affirm'd of the single terms separately taken; from whence proceed the Complex'd Terms; as a Prudent Man, a Transparent Bo­dy, Alexander the Son of Phillip.

[Page 88] These additions are sometimes made by Pronouns Relative, as the Body which is Tran­sparent, Alexander who is the Son of Philip; the Pope who is Antichrist.

And indeed it may be affirm'd that altho these Pronouns are not always express'd, yet they are always to be understood, because that in altering the Proposition, they may be Exprest. For a Transparent Body, and a Body that is Transparent, are equivalent.

But that which is chiefly to be observ'd in Complex'd Terms is, that there are two kinds of Additions, of which the one may be cal­led Explicative, and the others Determinative.

The Explicative in positive words, explains that which before lay hid either in the Compre­hension of the Idea of the first Term, or at least which agrees with it as an Accident, so that it agrees with it generally and according to its entire Extension. As when I say, A Man who is a Creature endu'd with Reason; or a Man who naturally desires Happiness; or a Man who is Mortal. For what is here added is only Ex­plicative, not changing any thing in the whole Idea, which is annex'd to the word Man: nor restraining it to signifie only certain Men; but only it denotes those things more clearly which are common to all Mankind.

Of this nature are those Additions which are appli'd to Names, distinctly denoting [Page 89] Individuals, as when we say, London is the largest City in Europe; Julius Caesar was the greatest Captain in the World; Aristotle the Prince of Philosophers; Lewis the Fourteenth King of France; for here the Single Terms so pronounc'd, loose nothing of their Exten­sion, as being first determin'd as much as they could be.

Determinative is that, which being added, restrains the Signification of the General Term, so that it is not now accepted in its full extension, but comprehends only a part of it; as Transparent Bodies, Wise men, a Rational Creature. These additions are not simply Ex­plicative, but Determinative, because they maim and curtail the Extension of the first Term; for the name of Body here signifies only a part of the Body of Man, as a part of Men; of a Creature, as part of the Creatures.

But it is the Nature of these additions sometimes to create a Singular out of a Com­mon Term, when they contain Conditions Individuant: as when I say the King now Reign­ing, the Common name of King is determin'd to the single and only Person of James II.

There are also two other kinds of Com­plex'd Terms; of which the first is Complex'd in words, the other in Sence only.

Of the first kind are those that have the Addition express'd, as in the Examples hi­therto mention'd.

[Page 90] Of the other kind are They, in which one of the Terms is only pronounc'd, the other understood: as when we say, the King. This Term is Complex'd in Sense; because when we pronounce the word, the Idea of the Com­mon name does not present it self to our minds alone, but, as adjoyn'd to it, the Idea of Lewis 14. who now Raigns in France. The infinite number of Terms is meant of those which being thus complex'd, occur in daily Talk, as in every Family, Master, implying such a One. Some Terms are also Complex'd as well in Words as Sense; but after various manners. Thus the Prince of Philosophers is complex'd in words, because the name of Prince is determin'd by the word Philosopher; but in respect of Aristotle, to whom the School-men are so addicted to give that Ti­tle, it is complex'd in Sense, when the Idea of Aristotle is only obvious to the mind, nor be­ing express'd by any Sound that denotes the Person.

All Adjectives or Connotatives are either Parts of Connex'd Terms, though they are clapt to­gether with their Substances, or complex'd in Sense, when the Substantives are understood. Because, as we have said in the Second Chap­ter, these Connotative Names denote the Sub­ject directly indeed, but more confusedly; the Mode or Form indirectly; but more di­stinctly.

[Page 91] And therefore the Idea of the Subject is very General and very confus'd, representing sometimes Entity, sometimes a Body, which for the most part is determin'd by a distinct Form of the Idea. Thus White signifies a Thing that has Whiteness. And hence the Confus'd Idea of the Thing, is determin'd to signifie those things only that are White:

However in this Matter, it is chiefly to be observ'd, that there are some Complex'd Terms, which although they be only de­termin'd to one only Iudividual, nevertheless retain an Equivocal Ʋniversality, which may be call'd an Ʋniversality of Error. For when men agree that one only Thing is signify'd by such a Term, but dispute what that only Thing really is, it happens that this Term is apply'd by some to signifie this Thing, by o­thers, another Thing. Hence it is requisite that such a Term be farther determin'd ei­ther by the variety of Circumstances or the Series of Discourse that the signification of the Term may be made precisely appa­rent.

Thus true Religion signifies one sole Reli­gion, which is really the Church of Eng­land; but because all People and eve­ry Heresie think their own Religion to be truest, these Terms are highly Equivo­cate, by Equivocation of Error. For if an [Page 92] Historian should write that his Prince was most addicted to the true Religion, it cannot be said what he means, unless it be known what Religion the Historian profess'd. For if he were a Church of England Man, it is under­stood of a Church of England Prince, or of a Mahumetan, if the Historian were an Arabian Mahumetan; and so of a Roman Catholic Prince; if the Author were a Roman Catho­lick.

Complex'd Terms, wherein there is Equivo­cation of Error cheifly comprehends those Qualities of which the Sense is no Judge, but the Mind. For men are prone to differ in their Opinion, concerning such Things.

For Example, should we affirm, that no Soldiers were listed by Marius, but such as were six foot high, this Complex'd Term, Sol­dier, six foot high, is not subject to Equivocation of Error, when it is easie for Soldiers to be measur'd, that we may know whether they be six foot high or no. But had it been decreed that none should be listed but such as were stout, this Term had been much more liable to Equivocation, when as it might be attribu­ted to such Soldiers, that lookt like stout Men, but are indeed but meer Cowards.

This Equivocation of Error is often found in Complex'd Terms, The Chiefest of the Parisian Geometricians; the most Learned, the wicked­est, [Page 93] the richest of Men. For though these Terms are divided by Individuant Conditions, seeing that one Person might be the chiefest of the Parisian Geometricians; nevertheless this Term might be ascrib'd to several, though proper only to one; in regard it is an easie thing for men to vary in their Judgments con­cerning this matter; so that every one shall give this Title to him, whom he thinks to be the best and most excellent Geometrician.

These Forms of Speech also; The Sence of the Author, what the Author declares upon this Subject, are of the Number of these Equivo­cates; especially if the Author be so obscure, that there be any Dispute about his Sense. And thus we find continual Altercations concern­ing Aristotle's Opinion of Philosophers, while every one endeavours to draw him to their Party. For although Aristotle had but one Sence concerning one Thing; yet because he is variously understood by several, these words, the Sence of Aristotle, are the Equivocations of Error. For every one pronounces that to be the Judgment of Aristotle, which he is perswa­ded that Aristotle meant; and so if several believe, That Aristotle had a different Opi­nion of the same thing; these Terms, the Sence of Aristotle in such a matter, though singular in themselves, can never be apply'd to Many, that is to say, to all those things, that Aristotle [Page 94] shall be said to have written upon such a Sub­ject; for so they shall signifie with every one, what every one is perswaded the Philosopher thought.

But that we may the better understand, where lies this Equivocation of Error, it is to be observ'd, that the Terms of it are Con­notative; either expresly, or in sence. Now as I have said, in Connotative Terms may be consider'd as well the Subject, which is di­rectly or confus'dly express'd, as the Form or Mode which is directly and indistinctly signi­fi'd.

Thus White confusedly denotes a body, di­stinctly Whiteness; thus, the Sence of Aristotle, confusedly signifies some Sentence, Thought, or Doctrine of his; distinctly, the Relation of that Doctrine to Aristotle, to whom it is attributed.

However the Equivocation which is found in these Terms does not properly arise from the Form or Mode, which being distinct, can never vary; nor from the Subject confus'dly consider'd, as not being freed from that con­fusion. For Example these words, Prince of Philosophers, cannot be Equivocates, in re­gard the Idea of Prince of Philosophers can be distinctly apply'd to no Individual. But E­quivocation consists only in This, that the Mind instead of the confus'd Subject substi­tutes [Page 95] another which is distinct and determi­nate, to which Form or Manner are apply'd. But in regard men dispute about this matter; they may ascribe the Title of Prince or Cheif to several Persons, and signalize 'em after­wards with what additional word they think most convenient. Thus formerly Plato was call'd the Prince of Philosophers; which Title is now conferr'd upon Aristotle. Thus the words, True Religion, not having any distinct, but a con­fus'd Idea of any Religion, are no Equivo­cates, because they denote nothing but that Religion which is absolutely True. But when the Mind has annex'd the Idea of True Reli­gion to the distinct Idea of some particular Worship distinctly known, they become e­gregious equivocates, and signifie that Worship with every one, which they account the True Religion.

The same is the Condition of these words, That which such a Philosopher held of such a Mat­ter. For while they abide in their general I­dea, the general Idea simply and generally will signifie the Doctrine deliver'd by such a Philosopher concerning such a Matter; as the Doctrine of Aristotle concerning the Nature of the Soul. Whereas the same words, that which, &c. that is to say, this Doctrine, while it is under a confus'd Idea apply'd to no di­stinct Idea, is not capable of Equivocation. [Page 96] But when the Mind instead of that Doctrine confus'dly conceiv'd, substitutes a distinct Doc­trine, & a distinct Subject; then according to the variety of distinct Ideas, that same That which, &c. may be liable to Equivocation. Thus the Do­ctrine of Aristotle touching the Nature of the Soul is an Equivocate with Pomponatius, who as­serts that Aristotle believ'd the Soul to be Mor­tal; and with several others of his Interpreters, who on the other side affirm that Aristotle taught the Immortality of the Soul, as well as Plato and Socrates. Hence it is, that words of this nature most frequently signify the thing with which the form indirectly express'd cannot agree. Suppose for example's sake, that Philip was not the Father of Alexander, as Alexander himself endeavoured to make out; these words, the Son of Philip, denoting Generality, any person begot by Philip, erro­neously spoken of Alexander, denote the per­son that is not really the Son of Philip. In like manner these words, the Sence of Scripture alledg'd by a Quaker, to prove a Sect quite contrary to Scripture shall denote that very Sect in his Mouth, which he thinks to be ac­cording to the Sence of Scripture, and which he has therefore dignify'd with that name, of the Sence of Scripture; nor are the Papists more in the right then they, who pretending to adhere to the Word of God; [Page 97] for among them the word of God, signifies that O­glio of Superstitions which they would obtrude upon the Protestants instead of Gods Word.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Clearness and Distinction of Ideas, as also of their Obscurity and Confusion.

IN Ideas clearness may be discern'd from Distinction, and obscurity from confu­sion; for we may call that a clear Idea, when it imprints in us a lively, as I may call it, Sence of it self, whereas otherwise it may not be so distinct. The Idea of Pain because it strikes us so sensibly, may be call'd a Clear Idea; but yet it is confus'd, because it repre­sents Pain to us, as being in the Hand, when indeed it lies in the Sence.

Nevertheless we may call every Idea clear, so far as it is distinct; for all obscurity arises out of Confusion. Thus the sence of the Pain that hurts us is clear and also distinct; but what is confus'd in the Feeling, that is to say, that the Pain is in the hand, cannot be said to be clear.

Now because Clearness and Distinction are one and the same in Ideas, it will be very re­quisite to examine why some Ideas are clear, others confus'd.

[Page 98] But this will be more apparent by the help of examples, then any other way, and there­fore let us weave together a Catalogue of the first Ideas, as well clear and distinct, as ob­scure and confus'd.

The most clear Idea is that which every Man has of himself, as of the Thing that thinks; as also the Ideas of those other Appendixes to our thoughts, as to Judg, Discourse, De­liberate, Perceive, Imagine.

Ideas of extended Substances also are most chiefly clear to us, as also the Ideas of their Properties; as Figures, Motion, Rest; for tho' we may feign that there is no Body, no Figure, (tho' we cannot feign any such thing of the thinking Substance, while we think) yet we cannot say we clearly perceive what is Extension and Figure.

We also clearly apprehend Duration, Or­der, and Number, so that we consider the Du­ration of any thing to be form, under which we consider the thing, so long as the form continues in it. Thus order and number no way differ in effect from things Order'd and Number'd.

All these Ideas are so clear, that we fre­quently render 'em more obscure, while we endeavour to illustrate 'em with new Ob­servations, and frame to our selves other Ide­as then those which we have from Nature.

[Page 99] We may also say, that the Idea of God is clear in one respect, tho' in another most ob­scure and imperfect.

It is clear, because it suffices to discover the great number of Attributes in God, which we certainly know are no where else to be found but in God, but it is obscure in respect of that Idea which the Blessed have of him in Heaven. And it is also Imperfect, in regard our Minds being limited and finite, cannot but most Imperfectly conceive an infinite Being; for Perfection and Clearriess in Ideas are two different things. For they are Perfect, when they represent to us whatever is in the Object; Clear when they represent to us as much as suffices to apprehend the object clearly and distinctly.

On the other side they are confus'd and obscure Ideas which we have of Sensible Qua­lities; as of Colours, Sounds, Odors, Tasts, Cold, Heat, Ponderosity, &c. As also those of our desires, as of Hunger, Thirst, Pain, &c. Now mark the reason of the Obscurity of these Ideas.

In regard we were first Children before we were Men, and that exterior things operating within us, stirr'd up various Sensations in our Mind by the help of those Impressions which they made in our Bodies; the Mind conscious that those Sensations are affected against her [Page 100] will, and that by some Body's (as for example the Sensation of heat by the Eire) would not only judg that there were some things without her, which were the causes of these Sensations, (wherein she was not deceiv'd) but going farther, imagin'd something in the Objects, altogether like Sensation, or at least like the Ideas thence arising. Upon these Considera­tions therefore, she form'd Ideas to her self, and transfer'd the Sensations of Heat, Cold, &c. into those things that are without her. And by that means those confused and obscure I­deas of sensible qualities arose from hence, that the Mind intermix'd her own false Judg­ments with those that she deriv'd from Nature.

Now in regard these Ideas are not natural but Arbitrary, Men have made a most fanta­stical use of 'em, and turn'd 'em into meer Chimeras; for tho' that Heat and Burning are two sorts of Sensation; the one weaker, the other fiercer, we have allow'd heat to the Fire, affirming Fire to be endu'd with Heat, yet we have depriv'd Fire of the burning faculty, or of the pain which we feel in ap­proaching too near it, denying Fire to be af­fected with Pain.

But if Men had rightly apprehended that Pain is not to be attributed to the Fire that burns the Hand; yet had they been in ano­ther error, while they thought pain to be in [Page 101] the hand which the Fire burns, when as pain is only in the Sense.

This was not only the Opinion of some of the antient Philosopers, as the Cyrenarchs, but even of St. Austin himself; For says he in his 14 Book, de civitat. dei, Pains said to be Pains of the Flesh, are pains of the Soul in the Flesh and out of the Flesh; for pain of the Flesh is only an Injury to the Soul, and a certain dissent from its suffering: as the Pain of the Soul, which is Sadness, is a dissent from those things that befal us against our Wills.

Thus in his seventh Book upon Genesis. C. 19. When the Soul feels the Afflictions of the Bo­dy, she is offended in her act of Government of the Body, her Rule being disturb'd, and this of­fence is call'd Pain.

Now that that Pain which is call'd the Pain of the Body, belongs to the Soul and not to the Body, is manifest from this, that those things that affect us with Pain, seldom trou­ble us when our minds are intent upon other things, as we sind by the Affrican Priest, (of whom St. Austin L. 14. de Civitat. dei C. 24. Who when pleas'd, upon the Counterfeiting of Groans and Lamentations, would so abstract himself from his Senses, and lye as it were for Dead, that they could not make him sensible of Pinching and Pricking, nor of the heat of Fire, till it began to scorch his Skin.

[Page 102] Moreover it is to be observ'd, that neither the ill disposition of the hand, nor any motion a­rising from burning, causes the Soul to be sensible of the Pain, unless this Motion be Communicated to the Brain, by certain small Strings included in the Nerves, and extended from the Brain to the Hands, and other parts of the Body, which cannot be mov'd unless that part of the Body be also mov'd from whence they derive themselves. So that if there be any accident that hinders these little Strings from communicating their motion to the Brain (as in the Palsy) a Man may en­dure Wounds and Pain without any Sence of Pain. Insomuch that what appears yet more strange, a Man may have a pain in his hands that wants hands, as often it happens to those whose hands are cut off; for that if the threads of the Nerves extended from the Hand to the Brain be mov'd near the Elbow, where they terminate, they may move that part of the Brain to which they are fastened, in the same manner as it might be mov'd, if the same threads descended to the hand, as the one end of a small Rope may be moved in the same manner, if drawn about the mid­dle, as if pull'd at the other extremity; and thus the Soul should feel the same Pain as it would feel if the Person had hands. For the Soul directs its attentiveness thither from [Page 103] whence that motion of the Brain us'd to pro­ceed, which before affected it with that sort of Pain. Thus the Reflections that we be­hold in a Glass appear in the same place where they would be, should they be lookt upon with direct beams, as being the most usual manner of beholding Objects.

And these things shall suffice to let us un­derstand that it may well be, that a Soul se­parated from the Body may be liable to the Torments of Hell-Fire, and to feel the same Pain, as any one would feel through the tor­tures of Earthly Fire; in regard that when it was join'd to the Body, it was not the Body but the Soul that felt the pain of the Fire, and that pain was nothing but a certain sadness of the Mind wherewith it was afflicted for the suffe­rings of the Body, to which it was join'd by God. Why then may we not conceive that di­vine Justice may so accommodate some part of the material Body to the separate Soul, that the motion of that matter may excite trouble­some and afflicting thoughts in the Soul so se­parated.

But let us return to confus'd Ideas. The Idea of Ponderosity is no less confus'd then any of the rest already recited; for having observ'd from our Infancy, that Stones and other heavy things fall down as soon as let go out of our hands, we form'd an Idea of [Page 104] the thing falling which is genuine and true. We also form'd an Idea of the reason why the thing does fall, which is true likewise; but when we only saw the Stone, and nothing else that forc'd it downward, out of the rashness of our Judgment we concluded that there was no such thing as what we did not see, and therefore that the Stone fell by ver­tue of its own proper and intrinsic Force, and at length we affix'd to this confused Idea, coin'd only in our own Judgments the name of Ponderosity.

It came to pass also that we made diffe­rent Judgments of the same things of which the same Judgment was to be asserted, for as we saw Stones mov'd toward the Earth, we found straw move toward Jet, and Steel toward the Loadstone. Therefore the same Reason that bequeathes that quality to Stones to be mov'd toward the Earth, ought to al­low the same qualities to Straw and Iron for moving towards Jet and the Loadstone. However this would not satisfy; but on the contrary we have assign'd to Jet, Amber, and the Loadstone certain qualities which we call Attractive, when with the same ease we might have endu'd the Earth with the same quality of attracting heavy things. However these attractive qualities, (as also Ponderosity it self) sprang from Illegitimate Ratiocina­tion, [Page 105] by which it was concluded, that Iron was necessarily attracted by the Loadstone, because there was nothing seen that push'd the Iron toward the Magnet; whereas it can never be conceiv'd, that one Body should attract another, unless the Body attracting be mov'd, and the Body attracted be fasten'd to it.

To these Judgments of our infancy we owe for those Ideas that represent to us Pon­derous and hard things, more solid then Light and thin, and having more Body or Matter. Thus we believe that a Vessel full of Gold contains more matter then if it were fill'd with Air, for those Ideas deriv'd themselves from no other Foundation, then that when we were Children we were wont to make ex­trinsical Judgments of all things, according to their Actions in reference to us. Hence because ponderous and hard Bodies acted more violently then Light and Thin, we con­cluded that they contain'd more Substance then the other. When true Reason tells us, that the same part of matter possesses the same space, and the same space is always fill'd with the same quantity of Matter.

So that a Cubic Vessel of a Foot will con­tain no more Matter, being fill'd with Gold then Air. Nay, in some Sence it may be said that being fill'd with Air, it contains more [Page 106] matter for a Reason not now longer here to be insisted on.

It may be said that from the same Root of fore-judging of things, sprang the foolish o­pinions of some, that our Souls are either the thinnest part of the Air compos'd of A­toms, according to Democritus with the Epi­cureans, or the Air kindled, as the Stoicks; or a particle of Celestial Light, as the Mani­cheans, or of later days Flud; or a suttle Wind, as the Socinians; for none of these could ever perswade themselves that Wood, Stones or Durt could ever be capable of thinking. And therefore Cicero at the same time that he asserts with the Stoicks, our Soul to be a suttle Flame, places it among absurdi­ties, not to be endu'd to think it should e're derive its Original from Earth or thick Air; For saith he, I beseech ye, is it possible to think that such a force and mass of Memory was ever sowed in the Earth to spring up again, or thicken'd together out of Cloudy and Foggy Air? For they believ'd that the more suttle and pure they made the matter, so much the less ma­terial, the less thick and corporeal it would be, that so at length they might rarify it into a thing of Thought, which however is very ri­diculous; for a Body is not thinner then a Body, only that it is divided into lesser par­ticles, and more easily agitated. For thus on [Page 107] the other side it makes less resistance then o­ther Bodies; on the other it more easily pe­netrates their Pores. But whether it be indi­visible or divided, whether it rest or be mov'd, however it is not less material, less corporeal, or more capacious of Thought, it being impossible that the motion or figure of the Matter whether suttle or thick should have any thing common with Cogitation; or that a certain part of the matter that never thought, when it rested like the Earth, or was gently mov'd like the Water, should come to a knowledg of it self upon a more vehe­ment Motion or augmenting the force of A­gitation.

Much more might be said upon this Subject, but this shall suffice for the understanding of all confus'd Ideas, when they have all their Causes like to these.

There is one Remedy for this mischief, to cast away all prejudicate opinions ingraft­ed in our Infancy, and to assert nothing of what it belongs to Reason to pronounce, be­cause we so judg'd it heretofore, but because we now judg it to be so upon Examination. So shall we have only natural Ideas, and for such as are confus'd, we shall only retain those that are clear, as that there is something in the Fire which is the reason that I feel the heat; that all things which are ponderous, [Page 108] are push'd down by some certain cause; not determining any thing of what is in the Fire that causes that burning, or of the cause that makes the Stone fall down till I find my know­ledg confirm'd by clear Reasons.

CHAP. IX. Some Examples of confus'd and obscure Ideas drawn from Ethics.

IN the former Chapters we have brought some Examples of confus'd Ideas, which for the reasons given we legally assert to be false; But being all taken out of Physicks, it may not be from the purpose to produce some others out of Ethics, in regard that false Ide­as, which are form'd of Vertues and Vices, are far more dangerous.

Nor indeed is any one more happy, or more unhappy because he has a true or false, a clear or obscure Idea of Ponderosity, Sensible Qualities, or the Senses. If in those things he be more or less knowing, he will neither be the better nor the worse; whatever our opi­nion be touching those things, we shall never [Page 109] alter it for our own sakes. Their Being is in­dependant from our knowledge, and the Con­duct of our Life is Independant from their Be­ing. So that all Men are allow'd to await that Knowledg which shall be our portion after this Life, and to leave the Government of the World to the Goodness and Wisdom of God who governs it.

But no Man can excuse himself from en­deavouring to acquire a right Information concerning Vertue and Vice, because that from the prescripts of Judgments made upon these things, our Lives are to be go­vern'd, our Manners compos'd, and the E­ternity of good or evil to be expected.

And as the false Ideas of Vertue and Vice are the reason that we judg amiss of 'em; so in­finitely better would it be to know and amend these with Care and Industry, then to study the rectifying of those other, which precipitancy of Judgment, or the prejudicate errors of Youth have obtruded upon us in reference to natu­ral things, which can only supply Matter for lean and barren Speculation.

To discover all those false Ideas, would require a Transcription of the whole Body of Ethics; but our only design here is to pro­pose certain Examples of the manner, how they are form'd by annexing together several Ideas that are not really annexed, which [Page 110] produces several vain and idle Phantoms, which Men never cease hunting after, and mise­rably waste their time in hopes to attain that which is of no value when attain'd.

Man finds in himself the Ideas of Misery and Happiness, which is neither false nor confus'd, while general and abstracted: He has also the Ideas of Baseness and Excellency. He covets Happiness, avoids Misery; he ad­mires Excellency, despises Baseness.

But the Contamination of Sin, which has a­lienated God from Man, in whom alone he could have found true felicity, and to whom alone he ought to affix the Idea of it, has af­fix'd this Idea of Happiness to an Innumera­ble company of other things. To the Love and Prosecution of which Man is carried headlong, as if he thought to recover his lost felicity in them.

Hence has arisen a vast heap of false and obscure Ideas, while every one thinks he shall be happy in the possession of what he loves; miserable, if depriv'd of it. But Man has lost his true Nobility, and real Excellen­cy by Sinning. Hence, that he may love him­self, he is constrain'd to represent himself to himself, other then what indeed he is, and to hide his Indigencies and Miseries from him­self; to add many things to the Idea of him­self, which belong not to him to the end he [Page 111] may appear Greater and more August. And now behold the common Series of these false Ideas.

The first and chiefest is the propensity of Concupiscence to the Pleasures of the Sence, arising from some exterior things: For when the Soul perceives that her darling Pleasures proceed from those things, she immediately joyns the Idea of good to those things, and the Idea of bad to those other things that de­prive her of those Pleasures. And observing afterwards that Power and Riches are the u­sual Instruments, whereby to acquire the means to indulge Concupiscence, she be­gins to esteem these for great Happinesses, and pronounces for Blessed, the Rich and Potent that enjoy 'em; the poor miserable, for being depriv'd of these Delights.

But now as Felicity has always Excellency for her Companion, the Mind never separates those two Ideas, but always looks upon as great, all those that she considers as happy, and as little and mean, all those that are poor and unhappy. And this is the reason that we con­temn the poor, and admire the opulent. But these are such unjust and false Judgments, that St. Thomas believes, it is this worship and ad­miration of Riches, which is so much con­demn'd by St. James the Apostle, while he for­bids a more honourable place to be assign'd to [Page 112] the Rich then to the Poor; tho' this place is not to be so literally expounded, as if we were not to shew some outward-veneration to the Rich, which is not due to the Poor; seeing that the order of the World, which Religion does not disturb, requires it, and this practise has been all along observ'd among men, high­ly eminent for their Piety. And therefore it is to be understood of that inward respect, which looks upon the Poor as subjected under the Feet of the Rich, and the Rich as infi­nitely exalted above the Poor.

But though these Ideas and the judgments that arise from thence are false and unreaso­able, yet are they common to all men that have not rectifi'd 'em, as proceeding from concupiscence with which all men are infected. Hence it happens that we not only think so honourably of the Rich, but that we also know that all other Mortals render 'em the same honour and esteem. So that we repre­sent to our selves their Condition not only as environ'd with all splendour and advantages that attend it, but worship it with all that inward Adoration of Judgments with which we flatter the Wealthy, and are known not only by the Common Discourse of Men, but by our own Experience.

This Phantome of a Rich man, whom the Croud of his admirers surround, gaze upon [Page 113] with fixed Eyes, and reverence with an inward Worship of Fear, observance and abject ser­vility, is the true Idol of the Ambitious, for for whose sake they endure so many miseries and throw themselves into so many dangers.

Now that it may appear that this is that which they all covet and adore, let us sup­pose that there were but one only man in the World endu'd with Reason, and all the rest men meerly in shape, were all but Statues mov'd by Engines; and that that one Think­ing Man, knowing well that all those Statues that resembl'd him outwardly, were all de­priv'd of reason and thought, had a secret way to move 'em by certain Springs so that they might perform all the Offices which he had a mind to require from men; we may be­lieve this Person would sometimes take plea­sure to divertise himself with the several Movments he should give to these Statues; but certainly he could never delight himself or take any pride in the Honours, Bows and Cringes that they made him: rather he would be as weary of 'em as of so many Puppets; and at length would satisfie himself with such a train as should suffice for necessary Services, without desiring any greater number of these Statues then should be for his use.

So that it is not the simple and external Obe­dience of Attendants seperated from the inter­nal [Page 114] submission of the Mind that is the Object of aspiring Ambition. 'Tis Dominion over men not Statues which they covet; and the plea­sure of those that Rule proceeds from the im­pressions of Fear, esteem and admiration which they imprint in others.

From whence it is manifest that the Idea with which they are blinded is no less vain and empty, then the Idea of those whom we properly call Vain-glorious men, who are they that feed themselves with Praises, Eulogies, Titles, and other things of this nature: The only thing that distinguishes the one from the other is the single difference of Opinions and Judgments, which both are desirous to com­municate to others. For as it is the main de­sire of the Vain-Glorious to excite in others a sense of Love and Esteem for their Know­ledg, Eloquence, Wit, and Dexterity; 'tis the delight of the ambitious to excite in others motions of Terrour, of Obedience and Sub­mission to their Grandeur, and Ideas conform­able to those judgments, by means whereof they appear formidable, exalted and Potent. So that both the one and the other place their happiness in the Thoughts of another: but the one make choice of one sort of Thoughts, the other of another.

There is nothing more common then to see these vain Phantomes compos'd of the false [Page 115] Judgments of men, how they overturn Enter­prizes of greatest importance, as being the principal mark to which all the Actions of our lives are directed.

That same Valour so highly esteem'd in the World, which causes them that would be signaliz'd for brave and stout, to throw them­selves into the most apparent and threatning dangers, is no more oft times then an over ear­nest bending the Mind to these vain and shal­low Things that fill the Brain. Few Persons when they are serious despise Life, and they who seem to dare death at a Breach or in a Battel, tremble like others and frequently are more afraid when Death attacques 'em in their Beds. But this same bravery of theirs which they shew upon sundry Occasions proceeds from hence; that they have still hovering be­fore their Eyes the reproaches thrown upon Cowards and Pusilanimous Creatures; and on the other side the applauses which are gi­ven to the Valiant; and the Phantosm arising from these two Considerations so possesses their Minds, that they have no leisure to think upon Death.

For this reason the Person that is most con­versant in the sight of men, becomes the most Generous and Brave; and that, because of the Judgments which other men make of him. Hence it comes to pass that the Captains are [Page 116] more couragious then the Common Souldiers, and that the Nobility and Gentry carry more lofty minds then the Ordinary Sort of People. For that having more honour to loose and to acquire, they are more sensible and jealous of it. The same labours, said a great Captain, are not equally toylsome to a General of an Ar­my and a Common Soldier: For the Captain of an Army, upon whom the Eyes of all men are fix'd, is thrust forward to difficult under­takings, whereas a Common Souldier dilates his thoughts no farther then the hopes of his Pay, or the gains of Plunder, or the Repu­tation of being stout, which seldom extends beyond his own Regiment.

What do they propose to themselves that build such stately Fabricks above their Condition and their Fortune? Not the ad­vantage of commodious living therein. For such a costly Magnificence does 'em more harm then good; and it is evident, that if they were alone in the World, they would never put themselves to that Charge and trouble; or if they thought they should be despis'd by all that saw those Houses. Therefore the Houses are built for the sake of others that they think will applaud the Buildings. They imagine that all that shall behold those Pala­ces, will entertain motions of Respect and Admiration for the Master. And therefore [Page 117] they represent themselves to themselves as in a Theater, sitting in the midst of their Palaces environ'd with erouds of People, that behold all from top to bottom, and thence conceive 'em Great, Potent, Happy and Magnificent; and this Idea filling their Minds, spurs 'em on to those expences and to be at that trou­ble.

Why do men load their Coaches with such a great number of Lacqueys? Not for the great service they do, for they are rather a trouble then a Convenience; but to imprint in the minds of the beholders an Idea, that it is some person of great Quality that passes by; and the prospect of that Idea, which they i­magine the sight of a Coach so loaden will create in the beholders, satisfies the vanity of him to whom those Coaches belong.

And thus, if we weigh in the same ballance all Conditions, all Employments, all Professi­ons that are esteem'd in the World, we shall find that that which renders 'em delightful, and alleviates the pains and toyl that attends 'em, is this, that they represent to the Mind the Ideas of Respect Esteem, Fear and Admira­tion that others have for us. On the other side, that which renders solitude tedious to the most part of the World, is this, that in seperating themselves from the view, they also seperate themselves from the judgments and thoughts [Page 118] of men. For so their hearts become empty and famish'd as being depriv'd of their usual nourishment, and not finding in themselves, wherewithal to feed their Thoughts. And therefore the Heathen Philosophers deem'd a solitary Life so insupportable; that they scrupl'd, not to aver, that a wise man would not be bound to enjoy all the blessings of Bo­dy and Mind, to live alone; and not to have any person to whom he might impart his hap­piness by discourse. And indeed there is no­thing but the Christian Religion that can ren­der Solitude desirable; for because it teaches men to despise the World, it affords 'em at the same time other Objects to employ the mind and more worthy to fill the heart, for which they have no need of the sight and commerce of Company.

But here it is to be observ'd, that the de­sires of men do not terminate in knowing the thoughts and judgments of others concerning themselves; but being known, they make a farther use of 'em to aggrandise and exalt the Idea which they have of themselves, adding to them, and incorporating other Ascititious and Forreign Ideas, and imagining through a gross delusion that they are really greater, be cause they live in a larger House, and that there are more people who admire 'em. Though all these things are extrinsecal as to [Page 119] themselves, and belong not to 'em at all; nor can the thoughts of other men preserve or vindicate 'em from the want and misery to which they were before obnoxious.

From whence we may discover what it is that renders agreeable to men several things which otherwise are altogether incapable to divert and delight the mind. For the rea­son of the pleasure that men take therein a­rises from this, that the Idea of themselves re­presents 'em to themselves greater then ordina­ry, by means of some vain circumstance which they add to it.

They take delight in discoursing óf the dangers they have run, as forming from the ac­cidents an Idea which represents us to our selves either as prudent, or else particularly favour'd by God. We love to discourse of sicknesses we have escap'd, as representing to our selves the strength of our Bodies, able to encounter such desperate attacks of Mor­tality.

We love to be Victorious in every thing, e­ven in Play, wherein there is nothing of cun­ing but all hazard, though we do not play for gain; adding to our own Idea the Idea of Hap­piness at the same time. This imaginary hap­piness we are apt to think, belongs to us, as a permanent Quality, which makes us claim the same success for the future as our Right. Thus [Page 120] Gamesters chuse to try the Fortune of the Dice with some before others: which is ne­vertheless very ridiculous: for a man may be said to have liv'd happily to such a moment; but that he shall have the same Fortune the next hour; there is no farther probability, but that we may be as certain that they who have been hitherto miserable, may for the fu­ture be happy.

And thus their Minds who are addicted to the World, have no other Objects of their desires, then these vain Chimera's that daily distract their Brains; and even they who carry the greatest reputation for wisdom, feed them­selves with these Dreams and Delusions. And therefore only they who direct their Lives and the Action of their Lives to Eternal Things, may be said to fix their thoughts upon real, solid, and permanent Objects, when all o­thers do but follow vanity and empty No­thing, and give themselves over to Lies and Errours.

CHAP. X. Of another Cause of Confusion in our Thoughts and Discourse; Ideas annex'd to Words.

WE have already said that the Necessi­ty we have to make use of Exter­nal signs to express our Minds, is the reason that we fix Ideas to words in such a manner, that many times we consider the words more then the things.

For it is to be observ'd, that tho' Men have frequently different Ideas of the same things, nevertheless they make use of the same words to express 'em; as the Idea which a Heathen Philosopher has of Vertue, is not the same which a Divine hath, yet both express their Idea by the same word Vertue.

Moreover the same Men at different Ages have consider'd the same things after very different Manners; and yet they have ram­mass'd all these Ideas under one name: which is the reason that in pronouncing the word or hearing it pronoun'cd, a Man is presently Confounded, apprehending the word some­times according to one Idea, sometimes ac­cording to another. For Example, a Man [Page 122] understanding that he has something within him, whatever it be, which is the occasion of his Nourishment and Growth, has call'd it a Soul, and has extended this Idea not only to what resembles it in Animals, but in Plants.

And perceiving also that he had Thoughts, he has call'd this principle of Thought by the Name of the Soul. Whence it has come to pass that by this Resemblance of the name, he has taken for the same thing, the princi­ple of Thought, and the principle of Nou­rishment and Growth. In like manner the name of Life is given to that Faculty from whence the Animal functions proceed, as al­so the Cogitative Faculty, which are two things absolutely different.

Thus these words, Sence and Sensation, when they are spoken of any of the five Sen­ses, are vehemently pester'd with Equivocati­ons. For three things happen to us when we make use of our Senses, as 1. when we see any thing. There is a Motion in the Corporeal Organs, as the Brain and Eye. 2. These motions give an occasion to the Soul to per­ceive something. As when by the motions first begun in the Eye, by the reflexion of the Light, in the falling Rain oppos'd to the Sun-Beams, it has the Ideas of Red, Blew, and Yellow. 3. We make a Judgment of what [Page 123] we see; and thus we judg these Colours to belong to the Rainbow, which we pronounce to be of such a Magnitude, of such a Figure, and at such a distance from us. Of these three the first only belongs to the Body; the other two solely to the Mind; however by oc­casion of what is perform'd in the Body. Nevertheless we comprehend all these three things under the name of the Sence or Sensa­tion of the Sight or Hearing. For when we say the Eye sees, or the Ear hears, it cannot be understood but according to the Corpore­al Organ; it being apparent that the Eye does not apprehend the objects which it sees, nor judg of 'em. On the other side we do not say we have seen such a one, if the mind call'd off by another object has not made re­flection upon the person that presented him­self before our Eyes. And then we take the word See for the thought form'd in our Mind, in pursuit of what pass'd in our Eye and in our Brain. And according to this Significa­tion of the word See, it is the Soul and not the body which sees, as Plato maintains and Cicero after him. For indeed saith he, we do not now behold with our Eyes the thing which we see; for there is no sence in the Body. There are as it were certain Passages made from the seat of the Soul to the Eyes, the Ears and Nose, and therefore seeing often interrupted either by some [Page 124] thought, or the force of some Disease, we neither hear nor see with open or entire Eyes or Ears. Whence we may easily apprehend that the Soul both hears and sees, not those parts which are but as the Windows of the Soul. In short, we take those words Sensation of Sight, Hearing, &c. for the last of these three things, that is, for the Judgments which the Soul makes in pur­suance of the Preceptions it has made, by occasion of what pass'd in the Corporeal Organs, as when we say the Sences are de­ceiv'd, at the same time that we see a crook­ed Stick so appearing in the Water, or the Sun but two foot in Diameter. For it is cer­tain there can be no Error or Falsity neither in those things that happen in the Corporeal Or­gans, nor in the bare Perception of the Soul, which is only a simple apprehension; but the Error proceeds from hence, that we judg a­miss, in concluding that the Sun is but two Foot in Diameter, in regard that by reason of its vast distance from us, it comes to pass that the Image of the Sun which is form'd in the bottom of the Eye, is near at hand, of the same bigness which an object of two Foot would form at a distance more proportionable to our manner of Sight. But because we have made this Judgment in our Youth, and for that we are so much accustom'd to it, that it is made at the same Instant that we see the [Page 125] Sun, without any Examination hardly, we attribute it to the Sight, and we say we see the objects little or great, as they are nearer or more distant from us, tho' it be indeed the Mind, not the Eye that judges of their smallness or magnitude.

All Languages are full of words of the same nature, which not having any more then one Sound, are nevertheless the significations of Ideas altogether different.

But we are to understand that when an E­quivocal word signifies two things which have no Relation one to another, and which Men have never confounded in their thoughts, it is almost impossible that Men should there­by be deceiv'd, or that they should be the cause of Errors. For the Equivocal word Aries a Ram, which signifies both a certain Creature, and a Sign in the Zodiac, shall ne­ver impose upon a Person that has but a grain of common Sence. Whereas it is a difficult thing not to be deceiv'd when the Equivoca­tion arises from the errors of Men, who have regligently confounded different Ideas, as in the word Soul; for we take it for granted, that they who first made use of those words, did inquire into their Significations, and so it suffices us to pronounce 'em, without ever exa­mining whether the Idea which we have of it be clear and distinct. Nay, sometimes [Page 126] we attribute those things to the signification of the same word, which falls not, but upon Ideas of things altogether Incompatible, not perceiving that we have confounded two dif­ferent things under the same Word.

CHAP. XI. Of the Remedy of Confusion in our Thoughts and Ratiocinations, arising from the Confusi­on of Words: Of the Benefit of defining Words; and of the difference between the de­finition of Things and Names.

THE best way to avoid the confusion of Words, which we find in different Languages is to make a new Language, and to coyn new Words, to belong only to those I­deas, which they are assign'd to signifie. To which purpose there is no necessity to frame new Sounds of Words, because we may make use of such as are usually practis'd, looking upon 'em, as if they had no signification, that we may ascribe to 'em those Notions which we intend 'em; which it behoves us design by other simple words, free from all Equivo­cation. Thus were it to be prov'd, that the Soul is Immortal, this Word Anima, the Soul, [Page 127] being Equivocal, will easily make a Confusion in what is to be said. For the avoiding of which, I will retain this word Soul, as a sound destitute of all Notion, and make use of it only to denote that thing which in us is the principle of Thought, by saying I call the Soul that, which in us is the Principle of Thought.

Behold here the definition of the word, with so much benefit made use of by the Geometri­cians, which is cautiously to be distinguish'd from the definition of the thing.

For in the definition of the thing, as thus, a Man is a Rational Creature, time is the mea­sure of motion, we leave to the Term defi­ned, that is Man, and Time the usual notion wherein we assert other Ideas to be contain'd, as the Idea of Rational Creature, Measure of time, whereas in the definition of the word, as we have already said, we only mind the Sound, and afterwards determine the sound to be the sign of some Idea, design'd for other Words.

But great heed is to taken least we con­found this definition of the word of which we here discourse, with that other of which others speak, who will have it be the explana­tion of what a word signifies according to the vulgar Idiom of the Language, or its Etimo­logie, which we shall speak more of in another [Page 128] place. But here we only mind the particular use to which he that defines a word, will have it apply'd for the better understanding his meaning, not caring whether it be taken in the same Sence by others.

And from hence it follows 1. That the De­finitions of words are at pleasure, but that those of things are not so. For every Sound being of it's self and in it's own nature indif­ferent, to signifie any thing, it is lawful for me for my particular use, provided I adver­tise others of it, to determine a Sound to signifie any thing precisely without the mix­ture of any other. But it is quite otherwise with the Definition of things. For it does not depend upon the pleasure of men that I­deas should include whatever they would have 'em to include: for that if in defining Ideas we add any thing which they do not com­prehend, we fall into inevitable Errour.

To give an Example of the one and the o­ther: If in despoiling the word Parallello­gram of all other signification, I apply it on­ly to signifie a Triangle; this is lawful for me to do, nor do I commit any Error in so do­ing: nay provided I only take it in this Man­ner; I may affirm that a Parallellogram has three Angles equal to two Right Angles. But if I leave the Vulgar Idea to this word, to fig­nifie a Figure whose sides are Parallel, and [Page 129] yet affirm that a Parallellogram is a figure con­sisting of three Lines, in regard this would be then a Definition of the Thing, it would be absolutely false; it being impossible that a Figure consisting of three Lines should have it's sides Parallel.

In the second place it follows, that Con­tentions about the Definitions of words ought not to be rais'd, for that Reason, because they are Arbitrary. For you cannot deny that a man has not given the signification to a Sound which he says, he has, after he has given no­tice of it, nor that it has not that significati­on according to the use which he makes of it; but we may contend about the Definitions of Things because they may be false, as we have already shewn.

Thirdly it follows that every Definition of a word when it cannot be call'd in Question, may be taken for a Principle. Which cannot be said of the Definitions of Things; in re­gard they are propositions that may be de­ny'd by those who shall find any Obscurity therein. And therefore like other Propositi­ons they ought to be prov'd, and not to be taken for True; unless they appear perspicu­ous in themseves, like Axioms.

But as to what I said but now, that the De­finition of a Name may supply the place of a Principle, it requires a farther Illustration. [Page 130] For it is only true, in regard it cannot be controverted but that the determin'd Idea may be call'd by the assign'd name. Never­theless we ought not to conclude any thing of the Idea it self, nor to believe it can exhi­bite any thing positively to us for that reason alone, because it is call'd by such a Name. For Example, I may define the Name of Chi­mera and say, I call a Chimera that which implies a contradiction; however it does not thence follow that a Chimera is any thing. In like manner, a Philosopher says to me; I call Pon­derosity the Interior Principle which causes a Stone to descend without any compulsive vio­lence; I should willingly grant the Definiti­on without contradiction, because it leads me to the knowledg of what he desires to make me understand; but I will deny, that what is signified by the word Gravity is any thing real, in regard there is no such princi­ple in Stones.

I will explain this a little farther, because there are two great Errours committed in Vul­gar Philosophy upon this Subject. For it con­founds the Definition of the Name with the Definition of the Thing, and attributes to the former what only belongs to the Second. For the Philosophers having coyn'd an infinite number not of Names but of Things accord­to their own Fancies which are altogether [Page 131] false, as not explaining neither the Nature of Things nor the Ideas which naturally we have of 'em, yet they obtrude these Definitions up­on us for such as are not to be contradicted. So that if any one deny 'em, when deser­vedly they may be denied, they exclaim a­gainst him as one that ought to be exter­minated the Schools, as not fit to be disputed with.

Secondly the vulgar Philosophers very sel­dom or never make use of those Definitions of names, to remove or clear any obscurity, nor fix 'em to any certain Ideas clearly de­sign'd, but leave 'em in darkness and confusi­on. Whence it happens that most of their disputes, are only disputes of words; and whatever is clear and true in Ideas, that they abuse, to establish and maintain, what is con­fus'd and dark in the same: which Errour would be avoided by the Definition of the Name. Thus the Philosophers believe that there is nothing in the World more unquesti­onable then that Fire is hot, or that a Stone is heavy, and that it would be a folly to deny either. Which indeed they may make all the World believe, so long as they forbear from the Definition of Names. But when once they do that, it will presently appear what is obscure, and what apparent in reference to those things. First then it is to be ask'd 'em, [Page 132] what they mean by these words Hot and Pon­derous? For if they answer that by Hot they only mean that which is only proper to cause in us a Sentiment of Heat, and by Heavy that which falls downward not being propt up; they may then deservedly say, that it is a folly to deny Fire to be Hot and Stones to be Hea­vy. But if they mean by Heat that which has in it's self a Quality like to that which we imagine when we feel heat; and by Heavy that which has in it self an Internal Principle which causes it to fall to the Center, not being compell'd by any violence from without; it will be easy then to demonstrate to 'em, that it is no denial of a clear thing, but of a thing which is very obscure, if not altogether false, that Fire is hot in that Sence, or that a Stone is heavy; in regard it is apparent that Fire causes in us a sence of Heat, by that acti­on whereby it operates upon our Bodies, but it is no way evident that there is in the Fire any thing like to that which we feel in the Fire. And it is as evident in the same man­ner that Stones fall down; but it is not so clear, that they fall of themselves without a­ny outward detruding Violence.

Thus we see the great benefit of defining names, for that by this means we understand what it is we dispute of, that we may not contend in vain about words, which [Page 133] we understand some one way, some another, as is frequently practis'd even in our ordina­ry discourses.

But besides this benefit there is also ano­ther, which is, that we cannot many times have a distinct Idea of a thing, unless we make use of many words to denote it. Now it would be Impertinent especially in writings that concern the Sciences to be always repea­ting a long Series of words. And therefore having once defin'd the thing by several words, we fix to some one word the Idea con­ceiv'd to serve instead of all the rest.

Thus after we have found that there are numbers that may be divided into two equal Numbers, to avoid the often repetition of those words, we fix this Propriety, and call a number that may be divided into two e­qual Numbers, an even Number. Whence it is apparent, that as often as we make use of the defin'd Name, the Definition is to be mentally suppli'd, which a Man must have al­ways so ready in his Mind, that as soon as he hears even Numbers, he presently understands such a number as may be divided into two Numbers: and these two things ought to be so inseparable from the thoughts, that the Tongue should no sooner express the one, but the Mind should add the other. For they who have defin'd Names as the Geometrici­ans [Page 134] do with so much Care, did it only to a­bridg their Writings (or as St. Austin says) Least by continual Circumlocution they should Create delays: but yet they do not do it to abridg the Ideas of the things of which they discourse, believing the Mind will supply the entire Definition to short words, which they only make use of to a­void the Perplexity which multitude of words would produce.

CHAP. XII. Certain Observations of great Importance, touch­ing the Definition of Words.

HAving thus explain'd the nature, bene­fit and necessity of the definition of Names, it will not be from the purpose to speak something of their use, least an ill use be made of 'em.

First, all Names are not to be defin'd; for that would be often unprofitable and impos­sible to be done. I say unprofitable; for that when the Ideas conceiv'd of things are di­stinct, and that all Men understanding the same Language, conceive the same Idea, it [Page 135] would be superfluous to define such a name, because we have already the intent of the Definition, as being fix'd without a definition to the distinct and clear Idea.

But this happens in things that are purely simple, of which all Men naturally have the same Idea, so that the words by which they are denoted, are understood by all men in the same sence, or if there be any mixture of obscurity, that which is clear is primari­ly understood. And so they who make use of such words to denote a clear Idea, need not fear least they should be understood amiss. Such are the words, Ens, or being, Thought, Extension, Equality, Duration or Time. For tho' some may obscure the Idea of Time by several Propositions, which they call Definiti­ons; as that Time is the measure of motion accor­ding to Priority and Posteriority; nevertheless they never mind these definitions themselves, when they speak of Time, nor do they con­ceive any other thing of it. So that both Learned and Unlearned with the same facili­ty understand the same thing when they hear, that a Horse takes up less time in pacing a Fur­long then a Tortoise.

I have said moreover, that it is impossible to define all words. In regard that to define some words, there is a necessity of using other words that express the Idea, to which that [Page 136] word is to be annex'd. And then if these words which were made use of to explain the the first, be also to be defin'd; there will be a necessity for other words, and so to the Worlds end. And therefore there are some primitive words which cannot be defind, and it would be as great a fault to be too curious about their Definitions, as not to define suffi­ciently; for both ways we fall into the same Confusion, which we labour to avoid.

The second observation is, that we ought not to change Definitions known and alrea­dy receiv'd, unless we meet with something in 'em that is to be found fault with; for it is always more easy to teach the signification of a word to others, when Custom already re­ceiv'd, at least among the Learned has fix'd it to an Idea, then to annex it anew to ano­ther Idea, and force it from a former, to which it has been properly join'd by daily use. And therefore it would be a great error to alter the Definitions receiv'd by the Mathematici­ans, unless where there are any that are not sufficiently plain and obvious to Sence, or such whose Ideas are not Politely describ'd as in Euclid may be thought the Definition of Angle and Proportion.

Thirdly it is to be observ'd that when there is a necessity to define a name, it behoves us to approach as near as may be to common [Page 137] Custom, and not to give to words a Sence altogether foreign to what they already have, or which are contrary to their Etimo­logie; as if a Parallelogram should be de­fin'd, a figure consisting of three Lines. But if the word has two significations, it must be depriv'd of one, that the other may be only affix'd to it. Thus when Heat signifies as well the feeling which we have of it, as the Quality which we believe to be in the Fire, like to that which we feel, to re­move this ambiguity, I will use the name of Heat, but I must not apply it but to one of these Ideas, dismising it from the other, say­ing, I call Heat that feeling which I have when I come near the Fire; and to the cause of this Sensation I would give a name altoge­ther different, as of Ardour or Burning; or else the same name with some addition, which determines and distinguishes it from Heat ta­ken for the Sensation of it, as is that of Vir­tual-Heat.

The reason of this observation is taken from hence, that Men after they have once affix'd an Idea to a word, are not easily in­duc'd to separate it from the word: and so the old Idea still returning, obliterates the new which they have from the late Definition. So that Men more easily accustom them­selves to a word of no Signification, as if a [Page 138] man should rather use the word Bara to signi­fie a Figure consisting of three Lines, then despoyl the word Parallellogram of the Idea of a Figure whose opposite sides are Parel­lel, to make it signifie a Figure whose oppo­site sides are not Parallel.

This is an Errour into which all the Chy­mists are fallen, who take delight to change the names of the most things of which they discourse, and to give them names which already signifie quite other things, and which have no correspondence with the Ideas to which they joyn the words. Hence those ri­diculous Ratiocinations of some of those people, particularly of one who asserts, that the Pestilence as he imagin'd, being a Satur­nine Disease, was to be cur'd by hanging a­bout the Neck of the Patient, a plate of Lead, which is call'd Saturn by the Chymists, and whereon is also to be engrav'd upon a Satur­day, which day is also sacred to Saturn, the Character by which the Astronomers denote that Planet. As if arbitrary and feigned sympathetic Affinities between Lead and the Planet Saturn, or between the same Planet and Saturday or the little Signature of the A­stronomers could be any way effectual for the Cure of Diseases.

But that which is more insufferable in this jargonry, or gibbrish of the Chymists, is [Page 139] their Prophaning the Sacred Misteries of Re­ligion to make 'em serve as a Vail to cover their pretended Secrets; insomuch that some are arriv'd at that hight of Impiety; as to apply what the Scriptures speaks of the true Christians, That they are the Chosen Race, the Royal Priesthood, the Holy Nation, the People purchas'd by God, and whom he has call'd out of darkness to his wonderful Light, to the Chi­merical Fraternity of the Rosie Crucians, whom in their own Imaginations they term the only wise men that have attain'd Immortal Happi­ness; as having by vertue of the Philosophers Stone found out the way to fix the Soul in the Body; for as much, say they, as there is no Body so fix'd and incorruptible as Gold. Of which dreams, and of several others of the same nature there are to be found a great number in Gassendus's Examen of Fludd's Phi­losophy. Which demonstrates that there is no disease of the mind more dangerous then that of Enigmatical Scribling, which causes men to imagine that their least solid thoughts, if I may not call 'em false and altogether Im­pious, will pass for great Mysteries, if clad in words unintelligible to the Common sort of men.

CHAP. XIII. Of another sort of Definition of Names by which their Significations are denoted according to Common Ʋse.

ALL that has been said of the Definition of names, ought to be understood only of those, by which every one defines the words for his particular use; and this is that which renders 'em free and Arbitrary, it be­ing in the power of every one to make use of what Sound he pleases to express his Ideas, provided he give notice before hand. But in regard that men are not perfect Masters of a­ny but their own language, every one has a priviledge to make a Dictionary for his own Use, but not for others, nor to interpret their words by particular Significations which we have fix'd to words of his own. And there­fore seeing that notion of words is not to be explain'd which is proper to our selves, but that which is proper to the word according to Common Use, such Definitions are not to be call'd Arbitrary; yet are they to be oblig'd [Page 141] to represent, though not the truth of the Thing, yet the truth of the Use; and they are to be esteem'd false, if they do not really express the Use, that is, if they do not joyn to Sounds the same Ideas which are annex'd to such Sounds by the Common Custom of those that make use of 'em. And this demon­strates also to us that Definitions may be con­tested, because we find daily disputes about the signification which Custom gives to words.

Now, though these sorts of Definitions of words seem to be the business of the Gramma­rians, whose Province it is to make Dictiona­ries, which are nothing else but the Explica­tion of Ideas which men have agreed to af­fix certain Sounds, yet may we raise upon this Subject several important Reflections for the rectifying our Judgments.

The first, which may serve as the founda­tion of all the rest, that men do not many times consider the whole signification of words; that is, that the words often signifie more then they seem to signifie, and that therefore they who interpret the signification, do not thoroughly unfold all the Ideas which the words imprint in the minds of the Hearers.

For to signifie in a Sound pronounc'd or written is no other then to raise an Idea by striking our Ears or our Eyes. Now it [Page 142] comes frequently to pass, that one word, be­sides the principal Idea, which is look'd upon as the proper signification of the word, ex­cites several other Ideas, which may be term'd Accessories, of which we take little no­tice, although the mind receive their Im­pression.

For Example, if a man should say to ano­ther; You Lie, and that there should be no more notice taken then of the principal sig­nification of the Expression, 'tis no more then to say, You know the contrary of what you affirm. But besides this principal significati­on, the words according to Custom raise an immediate Idea of Scorn and Con­tempt, and make a man believe that he who speaks the words cares not what injury he does the other; which renders the significa­tion of the words injurious and offensive.

However sometimes these Accessory Ideas are not fix'd to words by Common Use, but are only added thereto by him that makes use of 'em. And these are such as are rais'd by the Tone of the Voice, by the Alteration of the Countenance, by Gestures, and other natural Signs which six to our words an infi­nite number of Ideas which vary, change, diminish, augment the signification by joyn­ing thereto the Image of the Motions, Judg­ments and Opinions of him that speaks.

[Page 133] And therefore if he who affirm'd that the Tone of the Voice was to be measur'd by the Ears of the Hearers, believ'd it sufficient to speak loud enough to be heard, he under­stood not the use of the Tone of the Voice, the Tone oft times signifying as much as the words themselves. There is one Tone for Instruction, another for Flattery, another for Reprehension. Sometimes a man is willing that his Voice should not only reach the Ears of him he speaks to, but that it should peirce and run through 'em. Nor would any one think it well, that a Lacquey being loudly and vehemently reprov'd, should answer, Sir speak lower, I hear you well enough. For 'tis the Tone of the Voice that makes one part of the Reproof; and it is necessary to im­print that Idea in the mind of the Servant, which the Master would have it make.

But sometimes these accessory Ideas are fix'd to the words themselves, for that u­sually they thoroughly excite those that pronounce 'em. And this is the reason that among several expressions that seem to signi­fie the same thing, some are injurious, some are mild, some modest, others impudent, some honest, others dishonest; for that besides the principal Idea with which they agree, men have affix'd other Ideas which are the cause of this variety.

[Page 144] And this observation may serve to disco­ver a peice of Injustice very usual among those who complain of the reproaches thrown up­on 'em, which is to change the Substantives into Adjectives. For example, if they are accus'd of Ignorance or Imposture, presently they cry out for being call'd ignorant and fal­sifying fellows, which is not reasonable be­cause that the words do not signifie the same thing; for the Adjective, ignorant and falsifi­ing, beside the signification of the offence which they discover; they include the Idea of Scorn; whereas the Substantives of igno­rance and imposture, denote the thing to be such as it is, without aggravation or extenu­ation. And we might instance other things that would signifie the same thing after such a manner, as would include moreover a soft and lenifying Idea, and which would demonstrate that the person had a desire to excuse and extenuate the Crime which he laid to the o­thers charge. And those are the ways which prudent and moderate men make use of, un­less some reason prevail with 'em to act with more tartness and vehemency.

Hence also may be understood the diffe­rence between a plain and a figur'd Stile, and why the same thoughts seem much more lovely, when they are express'd by a figure, then if they were restrain'd to a plain man­ner [Page 155] of Speech. Which proceeds from hence, that figur'd expressions, besides, the principal thing, signifie the Motion and Gesture of him that speaks, and imprint both the one and the other Idea in the mind, whereas simple expressions sets forth only the naked Truth: For example, of this half Verse of Virgil, ‘Ʋsque adeone mori miserum est?’ were express'd simply and without a Figure; ‘Non est usque adeo mori miserum:’ Without doubt the sentence would not have had that force; and the reason is, because the first Expression signifies more then the se­cond; for it does not only express the thought, that it is not so miserable a thing as Men think to die; but it represents also the Idea of a Man, as it were provoking death; and undauntedly looking it in the face; which; without question is a great and lively Accessi­on to the signification of the words: Hence it is no wonder that it makes a deep impres­sion in the Hearer; for the mind is only in­structed by the verity of Ideas, but she is not rous'd but by the representation of Af­fections.

But as figur'd stile not only signifies the things themselves, but also those affections of the mind, which we conceive in meditating and speaking, we may judge from thence, the use which we ought to make of it, and what are the Subjects most proper for it. Visible it is, that it is ridiculous to make use of it in matters meerly speculative, which we con­template with a calm and placid Eye, and which produce no motion in the Mind. For since that Figures express the Passions of the Soul, when Figures are intermix'd where the Soul is no way mov'd, such agitations of the Mind are contrary to Nature, and seem to be a kind of Convulsion. For which reason there can be nothing more preposterous then the stir and hurlyburly which some Preachers make, who fly out into fury and extravagant Bombasts, upon all manner of Subjects, and who are no less furious upon Philosophical Digressions, then upon truths, the most weigh­ty and necessary for Salvation.

On the other side, when the Subject of the [Page 157] Discourse is such, that it requires a rousing and waking of the mind, it is a fault to de­liver himself in a jejune and frigid stile, and without any manner of motion.

Therefore Divine Truths not being simply propos'd only to be known, but much more to be belov'd, reverenc'd and ador'd by Men, without doubt, the noble, elevated and fi­gur'd manner of Elocution, observ'd by the Holy Fathers, is much more proportiona­ble to the Subject, then a flat and meager Stile, like that of the Scholastics; since it not only teaches us the Truths we are to know, but also endeavours to raise in us, those Sentiments of Love, Reverence and Affection, which the Fathers had for those Truths, when they wrote, and which repre­senting to us the Image of that Holy disposi­tion, must of necessity contribute more to imprint the like in us. Whereas the Schola­stic stile being plain, and contenting it self with the Ideas of the Naked Truth, is no­thing so effectual to produce in our Souls those Motions of Respect and Love, which we ought to have for the Truths of Christianity, which render it not only less profitable, but less delightful, since the soul it self is more delighted in observing the motions of her af­fections, then in acquiring knowledg.

[Page 158] Lastly, 'tis by means of this Observation, that we may resolve that famous Question a­mong the Ancient Philosophers, whether there be any words to be counted unchast? And by which we may also refute the Arguments of the Stoicks, who justify'd that we might make use indifferently of any words, though impudent and obscene.

They were of opinion, saith Cicero in a Let­ter, which he wrote upon this Subject, that there were no words that were either nastie or obscene; for they say, that the obscenity proceeds either from the things, or it is in the words. It does not proceed simply from the things, because they may be express'd in other words that are not esteem'd so nauseous; nor is it in the words, consider'd as they are, be­cause it happens ofttimes, that one word sig­nifies two things, and so in one signification it may be nauseous, in another well enough approv'd.

But all this is no more then a vain piece of suttlety which grew from hence, that those Philosophers did not consider those accessory accidents, which the mind adds to the princi­pal Ideas of things: for from thence it comes to pass, that one and the same thing may be ex­press'd honestly by one sound, and lasciviously by another, if one of the sounds has an Idea which covers the obscenity, and the other an Idea that lays it open.

[Page 159] Thus Adultery, Interest, Male-Copulation are no obscene words, tho' they signifie most obscene actions, because they represent 'em cover'd with a vail of Abhorrency, which shews that we look upon 'em as crimes, so that those words rather signifie the wicked­ness of the actions themselves. Whereas there are certain words that express those Acts, without any Abhorrency, and which describe 'em rather grateful and pleasing with­al, adding an Idea of Impudence and Lasci­viousness. And those are the words which are said to be bawdy and dishonest.

There are also certain Circumlocutions, by which certain actions are chastly exprest, which though lawful, yet participate some­thing of the Corruption of Nature; for such Circumlocutions, not only plainly express the things themselves, but also the disposition of him who speaks of 'em in that manner, and which by his reserv'dness testifie, that he mentions 'em with trouble and dislike, and that it is his desire they should be conceal'd, as well from himself as from others: Where­as others uttering the same things more free­ly and at random, make it appear, that they take delight in those kind of objects, which being a Lascivious pleasure, it is no wonder, if the words which imprint that Idea, should be accounted contrary to modesty.

[Page 160] For which reason it comes to pass, that sometimes the same word is esteem'd modest at one time and immodest at another; which has constrain'd some of the Hebrew Rabbies, to place certain Hebrew words in the Margin of the Bible, to be pronounc'd by those that read it, instead of those which the Scripture makes use of; which happen'd from hence, that when those words were made use of, they were not at all immodest, because they were read with some certain Idea that repre­sented these words with reserv'dness and mo­desty. But afterwards that Idea being sepa­rated, and custom having added another of impudence and Wantonness, they became nau­seous and uncivil: And therefore the Rab­bies, to prevent the mind from being amus'd with that evil Idea, were solicitous, that the People should make use of others in reading the Bible, which no way alter'd the Text.

And therefore it was an ill Excuse of an Author, whom the profession of Religion oblig'd to an exact Modesty, and who was deserv'dly tax'd to have made use of an un­decent word, to signifie an infamous place, to alledge, that the Fathers had not scrupl'd to make use of the word Iupanar, a Brothel­house, and that he often found in their wri­tings, the words Meretri [...]e, and Leno, whore and Pander, and several others hardly to be [Page 161] endur'd in our Language. For the liberty which the Fathers took to make use of those words, ought to have convinc'd him, that they were not at that time accounted words of Ignominie; that is to say, that custom had not added that Idea of obscenity which render'd 'em Infamous; and therefore he drew an ill conclusion from thence, that it was for that reason, permitted him to make use of terms of Debauchery, so esteem'd to be in our language; for that these words do not really sig­nifie the same thing, which those did of which the Fathers made use; seeing that besides the Principal Idea in which they agree, they also exhibit the Idea of a debauch'd mind, and contain a mixture of Licentious Impudence.

Seeing then these Accessory Ideas are of so great Importance, and dissolve the Pri­marie Notions into so many various Ideas, they would do well, who compile Vocabularies or Dictionaries, to mark out those significations, and make a distinction to the Readers, be­tween words Contumelious and Civil, Tart, Chast and Immodest, or rather absolutely to obliterate the Latter, which it would be much better to be ignorant of, then to understand.

Chap. I. What a Proposition is? Of the four sorts of Pro­positions.

AFter we apprehend the things them­selves, by the help of Ideas we compaer the Ideas together, and observe 'em as they agree or differ one among another, and in that manner joyn or seperate 'em, [Page 163] which is call'd to affirm or deny, and by a general name to judge.

This Judgment is otherwise call'd a Propo­sition; and it is manifest that it ought to have two Terms, the one, of which any thing is affirm'd or deny'd, which is call'd the Subject, the other which is affirm'd and deny'd, which is call'd the Attribute or Predicate.

Nor does it suffice to have apprehended these two Terms, but they must be conjoyn'd or separated in the Mind. And this operati­on of the mind, is noted in the Proposition, by the worst Est, it is; when it is alone, it is Affirmative; but when we deny, we add the Participle non or not: Thus when I say, God is just, God is the Subject of the Propo­sition, just the Predicate. The Verbs is, de­notes the action of the mind affirming, that is conjoyning the Idea of God, and the Idea of just, as agreeing together. But if I should say, God is not unjust, the Verb is, with the Adverb joyn'd, denotes an action contrary to affirmation; by which I affirm those Ideas do not agree together; for that there is something in the Idea of unjust, which does not agree with that which is contain'd in the Idea of God.

But though it be necessary that every Pro­position should consist of these three words, yet it may consist of two, and sometimes on­ly of one.

[Page 164] For Men, for the more succinct way of speaking, have invented several words, which signifie both the affirmation, that is the Sub­stantive, and the attribute which is affirm'd. Of this number are all those words that are call'd Substantives, as God exists, that is, is existent: God loves Men, that is, He is a lover of Men; but the Substantive, when it is sin­gle, ceases to be purely Substantive; for that then the most general of the attributes, is joyn'd to it, which is ens, or being, and so non ego sum, I am not, is as much as, I am not a being, or any thing.

In the same manner at other times, the Sub­ject and the Affirmation is included in the same word, as in the first and second Persons among the Latins, as when I say, sum Chri­stianus, I am a Christian; for ego is the Sub­ject of this Proposition, included in the word sum.

Hence it is apparent, that one word among the Latins constitutes a Proposition, in first and second Persons of those Verbs, which before contain'd the affirmation with the Pre­dicate; so veni, vidi, vici, are three intire Propositions.

Hence it may also be concluded, that eve­ry Proposition is either Negative or Affirma­tive; and this is that which is contain'd ei­ther in the affirmation or the denial.

[Page 165] But there is another difference of Propo­sitions deduc'd from the Universality, Parti­cularity or Singularity.

For the Terms, as is said in the first part, are either singular, particular or Universal.

Universal Terms may be taken, either ac­cording to the full extent, the signs of U­niversality being either express'd or under­stood. As are all, for an affirmation, for denial none, as all Men, no Men, or accor­ding to the indefinite part of the extent, with the addition of the word some, as aliquis Ho­mo, some Man; or any other way, accor­ding to propriety of Speech.

Hence happens a certain variety, greatly to be observ'd in propositions; for when the subject of the proposition is the Universal Term, taken in its full extent, it is call'd a universal proposition, whether it be affirma­tive; as every impious Man is a fool; or ne­gative, no wicked Man is blessed.

When the common Term is taken accor­ing to the indefinite part of its extent, as be­ing restrain'd by the addition of the word some, it is call'd a particular proposition, whe­ther it be Affirmative, as some cruel Men are Cowards; or Negative, some poor Men are not miserable.

But if the Subject of a Proposition be sin­gular, as when I say, Lewis the 13th. hath ta­ken Rochel, it is call'd singular.

[Page 166] But tho this Proposition singular be diffe­rent from the Universal in this, that the Sub­ject of it is not common, yet has it a greater Affinity with it, then with the particular, be­cause the Subject, for the very reason that it is singular, is necessarily taken in its full ex­tent, which is the Essential Propriety of an Universal Proposition, and distinguishes it from the particular; for, that a proposition may be universal it little imports, whether the extent of the Subject be great or small, pro­vided it comprehend all things: And this is the reason that singular Propositions supply the place of Universals in Argumentation; so that all Propositions may be reduc'd to four sorts; which are mark'd by these four Vow­els A. E. I. O. for the ease of the Memo­ry.

• A. An Universal Affirmative, as, All vicious Men are slaves.
• E. An Universal Negative, as, No vicious Man is happy.
• I. A Particular Affirmative, as Some vicious Man is Rich.
• O. A Particular Negative, as, Some vicious Man is not Rich.

And that they may be the better retain'd in memory, they are comprehended in this in Distic.

They are wont also to call Quantity, the Universality, or Particularity of Propositi­ons.

And Quality is call'd the affirmation or ne­gation, which depend upon the word which is accounted the form of the Proposition.

And so A. and E. agree according to quan­tity, but differ according to Quality, as do also I. and O.

But A. and I. agree according to quality, but differ according to quantity, as also do E. and O.

Propositions are also divided according to matter, into true or false; and it is clear, that there can be no Proposition, which is neither true nor false; for that every Proposition de­claring the judgment which we make of things, it is true, when that judgment is con­formable to truth, and false when it is not conformable.

But because we often fail of sufficient light, to discern truth from falsehood, besides those Propositions that seem to be true, and those that seem to us to be false, there are some that seem to be true; but of which the truth is not so evident, but that we have some ap­prehension [Page 168] that they may be false; or else such as seem to be false; but of the falshood of which we are not sully assur'd. These are call'd probable Propositions, of which the first are more probable, and the latter less probable.

CHAP. II. Of the opposition of Propositions, having the same Subject and Predicate.

WE have already declar'd, there are four sorts of propositions, A. E. I. O. Now it may be demanded wherein they agree or differ, when several sorts of Propo­sitions are deduc'd from the same Subject, and the same Attribute, which is call'd oppositi­on.

It is easily seen, that there can be but three sorts of oppositions; tho one of the three is subdivided into two others.

For if they be oppos'd in quantity and quality both together, A. O. and E. I. they are call'd contradictories, as every Man is an Animal; Some Man is not an Animal: No Man is free from sin. Some Man is free from sin.

[Page 169] If they differ in Quantity only, and agree in Quality, as A. I. and E. O. they are call'd Subalterns. As every Man is a Creature, some Man is a Creature: No Man is free from sin; some Man is not free from sin.

But if they differ in Quality, and agree in Quantity, then they are call'd contraries or subcontraries: Contraries, when they are Ʋni­versal; as Every Man is a Creature, No Man is a Creature.

Subcontraries, when they are particular: Some Man is a Creature; Some Man is not a Creature.

Now if these Propositions are lookt upon as they are true or false; it is easie to judg,

That contradictories are never together ei­ther true or false; but if one be true, the other is false; and if one be false, the other is true; For if it be true that every Man is a Creature, it cannot be true that some Man is no Creature; on the other side, if it be true that some Man is no Creature, it can­not be true that every Man is a Creature.

This is so clear that a farther explanation would but render it more obscure.

2. Contraries can never be probable, but they may be both false. They cannot be true, because then contradictories would be true; for if it be true that every Man is an Animal, it is false that some Man is not an Animal, which is the contradictory, and by conse­quence, [Page 170] much more false, that no Man is an Animal; which is its contrary.

But the falsity of the one does not infer the falsity of the other; for it may be false; that all Men are just, and yet it may not be true, that no Man is just; since there may be just men, though all men are not so.

3. Subcontraries, by a Rule altogether op­posite to that of contraries may be probable, as in these two Propositions. Some Man is just; some Man is not just; for justice may agree with one part of Men; and not with the other. And therefore affirmation and negation never happen in the same Sub­ject; for some Man is taken for one part of Men, in one part of the Proposition, and for another part in the other. But they can­not be both false; for if it were false, that some Man is just, it would be true, that no Man is just, which is the Contradictory, and much more true, that some Man is not just, which is the subcontrary.

4. As for the opposition of Subalterns, it is no true opposition: because the particular is the consequence of the Universal; for if all Men are Creatures; some Man is a Crea­ture: If no Man be an Ape, some Man is not an Ape: Therefore the truth of Universality in­fers that of Particulars; but the truth of Par­ticulars does not infer that of Universals; [Page 171] for it does not follow, because it is true, that some Man is just, that it should be true, that all Men are just: On the other side the fals­hood of Particulars infers the falshood of Universals; for if it be false that some Man is free from sin, it is more false that all Men are free from sin: But the falshood of Uni­versals does not infer the falshood of Parti­culars; For though it be false, that all Men are just, yet it does not follow, but that some Man may be just: Whence it follows, that many times Subaltern Propositions may both happen to be true, and sometimes both to be false.

I forbear to speak of the Reduction of opposite propositions to the same sence, as be altogether unprofitable, and for that the Rules are only true in the Latin.

CHAP. III. Of Propositions simple and compos'd; That there are some which seem to be simple, but are not, and which may be call'd complex. Of Complex Propositions both as to the Subject and Attri­bute.

VVE have said, that every Proposi­tion ought to have at least, one [Page 172] Subject and one Attribute; but it does not follow from thence, that it ought not to have no more then one Subject and one Predicate. Such then as have but one Subject and one Attribute are call'd simple, and they that have more then one Subject and one Predicate are call'd Compos'd. As when I say Good and Evil, Life and Death, Poverty and Riches come from the Lord. The predicate, Come from the Lord is affirm'd not only of one Sub­ject, but of many, that is of Good and Evil, &c.

But before we explain the compos'd Pro­positions, we must observe that there are some which seem to be compos'd that are not so, but Simple. For the singleness of a Proposi­tion is taken for the Unity of the Subject and the Attribute. Now there are several Pro­positions that have properly but one Predi­cate and one Attribute; but of which either the Subject or the Attribute is a term com­plex, which includes other Propositions, that may be call'd Incident, which make no part of the Subject or Predicate, being join'd by the Pronoun Relative, who or which, whose propriety it is to join together several Propo­sitions, to the end they may all encorporate into one.

Thus when Christ says, He that does the will of my Father who is in Heaven, shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.

[Page 173] The Subject of this Proposition contains two Propositions, as containing two Verbs; but in regard they are join'd by the Relative who, they only make a part of the Subject. Whereas when I say, good and evil proceeds from the Lord, there are properly two Sub­jects, because I affirm equally both of the one and the other, that they come from God.

The reason is this, for that the Propositi­ons being join'd to others by the Relative, who, are either Propositions but imperfectly, as shall be said hereafter; or else are not con­sider'd as Propositions then made, but as Propositions that have been made before, which are at that time only conceiv'd like single Ideas. Whence it happens to be the same thing, whether we pronounce these Pro­positions by Noun-Adjectives, or by Partici­ples without Verbs, and without the Relative, who; or with Verbs and with the Relative. For it is the same thing to say, The invisibile God has oreated the visible world; or God who is visible, has Created the World which is visible. Alexander themost valiant of Princes vanquish'd Darius; or Alexander who was the most vali­ant of Princes, vanquish'd Darius. For as well in the one as the other, my principal aim is, not to affirm that God is Invisible, or that Alex­ander was the most generous of Princes; but supposing both the one and the other as af­firm'd [Page 174] before, I affirm of God, conceiv'd as Invisible, that he Created the visible World; and of Alexander conceiv'd to be the most ge­nerous of Princes, that He vanquish'd Da­rius.

But if I should say, Alexander was the most valiant of Princes, and the Vanquisher of Dari­us, 'tis evident that I should no less affirm of Alexander, both that was he the most valiant of Princes, and that he was the Vanquisher of Darius; and therefore there is good rea­son that the latter sort of Propositions should be call'd compos'd Propositions; whereas we may call the other Propositions complex'd.

We are also to observe, that complex'd Propositions may be of two sorts. For Com­plexity, if I may so call it, may light either upon the matter of the Proposition, that is to say, upon the Subject, or the Predicate, or both; or else upon the form only.

1. Complexity falls upon the Subject, when the Subject is a Term Complex'd, as in this Proposition. He is a King who fears nothing.

[Page 175] For the Verb Est is understood in the last Proposition; Beatus being the Predicate, and all the rest the Subject.

2. Complexity falls upon the Attribute, when the Attribute is a Term complex'd, as Piety is a Vertue that renders a Man happy in the greatest Adversities.

But here we must observe that all Propo­sitions compos'd of Verbs active, and their cases govern'd, may be call'd Complex, as containing in some manner two Propositions. For example, if I say, Brutus kill'd a Ty­rant, this is as much as to say, that Brutus kill'd some-body, and that he whom he kill'd was a Tyrant; which is very remarka­ble to be observ'd; for when these Proposi­tions are urg'd in Arguments, sometimes there is but one part prov'd, the other being sup­pos'd, by which we are frequently oblig'd to reduce those Arguments into the most natural Form, and to change the Active into the Passive, to the end, that the part which is prov'd may be directly express'd; as we shall shew when we come to discourse of Argu­ments compos'd of complex Propositions.

3. Sometimes Complexity falls upon both Subject and Predicate, both the one and the [Page 176] other being a complex Term, as in this Pro­position. The great ones who oppress the Poor, shall be punish'd by God, who is the Protector of the Poor.

The first three Verses, and the half of the fourth, compose the Subject of this Proposi­tion, and the rest makes the Predicate, and the affirmation is included in the word Cano.

These are the three ways that Propositions may be complex'd as to their Matter, that is to say, both as to the Subject and the Pre­dicate.

CHAP. IV. Of the Nature of Incident Propositions, that make a part of Propositions Complex'd.

BUT before we speak of Propositions, whose Complexity may fall upon the Form, that is to say, upon the Affirmation or Negation, there are several important re­marks to be made upon the nature of Incident Propositions, which make one part of the Subject or Attribute of those that are com­plex'd according to matter.

1. It has been already said, that Incident Propositions are those whose Subject is the Pronoun, Who; as Men who are created to know and love God; or Men who are Pious, where the Term Men being taken away, the rest is an Incident Proposition.

But here we must call to mind what has been said in the sixth Chapter of the first Part. That the additions of Terms complex'd are of two sorts, the one may be call'd simple Explications, when the addition alters no­thing in the Idea of the Term, in regard that what is added, agrees generally with the term in its full extent: as Men who are created to know and love God.

[Page 178] The other may be call'd Determinations; for that, what is added to the term not a­greeing with it in its full extent, restrains and determines the Signification, as in the second Example Men who are Pious. From whence it follows that there is a Pronoun, Who, Ex­plicative, and a Pronoun (Who) Determina­tive.

Now when the Pronoun (who) is Explica­tive, the Attribute of the Incident Proposi­tion is affirm'd of the Subject, to which the Pronoun (who) refers; tho' it be but incident­ly in respect of the total Proposition; so that the Subject it self may be substituted to the Pronoun (who) as in the first Example, Men who were Created to know and love God. For we might say, Men were created to know and love God.

But when the (who) is Determinative, the Predicate of the Incident Proposition, is not properly affirm'd of the Subject to which the (who) refers. For if in this Proposition, Men who are Pious are Charitable, we should put the word Men in the place of (who) by say­ing, Men are Pious, the Proposition would be false, for this would be to affirm the word (Pious) of Men, as Men. But in the other Proposition, Men who are Pious are Charitable, we affirm neither of Men in general, nor of any Man in particular, that they are Pious; [Page 179] but the Understanding joining together the Idea of (Pious) with that of Men, and ma­king an entire Idea, judges, that the attri­bute of Charitable agrees with the entire Idea. And therefore the entire Judgment which is express'd in the Incident Proposition is only that, by which our Understanding Judges that the Idea of Pious, is not incompatible with that of Men, and so they may be consider'd as join'd together; and afterwards we may examine how they agree together, being thus united.

Many times there are Terms that are dou­bly and trebly Complex'd, being compos'd of several parts, of which every one is sepa­rately complex'd; and so we may meet with several Incident Propositions, and of several sorts; the Pronoun of the one being Expli­cative, and the other Determinative, as in this Example. The Doctrine that places Soveraign Happiness in the pleasures of the Body, which was taught by Epicure, is unworthy a Philoso­pher. The attribute of this Proposition is Ʋnworthy a Philosophyer and all the rest is the Subject: and so the Proposition is a Complex Term that includes two incident Propositions. The first, That places Soveraign happiness in the pleasures of the Body, where the Pronoun is determinative; for it determines (Doctrine) in general to be that which affirms Soveraign [Page 180] Felicity to consist in the pleasures of the Body; whence it would be an absurdity to substitute the word Doctrine to the Pronoun, by saying Doctrine places Soveraign Happiness in bodily Pleasure.

2. The second incident Proposition is, which was taught by Epicurus, and the Subject where­to the Pronoun [which] refers, is the whole complex Term [The Doctrine which places Soveraign happinness in bodily Pleasure] which denotes a singular and individual Doctrine, capable of divers accidents; as to be main­tained by several persons: tho' in its self it be determin'd to be taken always after the same manner, at least in this precise case, as it is extended. And therefore it is, that the Relative of the second Incident Proposition, [which was taught by Epicurus] is not deter­minative but only Explicative; so that the Subject to which the Pronoun refers may be substituted in the place of the pronoun, by saying, The Doctrine which places Soveraign happiness in bodily Pleasure, was taught by Epi­curus.

3. The last remark is, that to judg of the nature of these Propositions, and to know whether it be determinative or explicative, it behoves us to mind rather the Sence and Intention of him that speaks, then the Expression alone.

[Page 181] For there are many times complex'd Terms, that seem uncomplex'd; or less complex'd then indeed they are; for that one part of what they enclose in the mind of him that discourses, is altogether understood and not express'd, as has been said in the sixth Chapter of the first part, where we have shown that there is nothing more usual in discourse then to signify singulars by general words, for that the Circumstances of discourse make it appear that there is a singular and distinct Idea, join'd to that common Idea which answers to the word, that determines it to signifie only one thing.

I said that this was generally known by the Circumstances, as in French, the word Roy or King signifies Lewis XIV.

But there is yet a Rule that may serve us to judg, when a common Term retains a ge­neral Idea, and when it is determin'd by a di­stinct and particular Idea, though not ex­press'd.

When it is a manifest Absurdity to apply a Predicate to a Subject, retaining a general Idea, we must believe that he who made that Proposition, has depriv'd that Subject of its general Idea. Thus if I hear a Man say, the King has commanded me such a thing, I am as­sur'd that he has not left the word King in its general Idea, for a King in general gives no particular Command.

[Page 182] If a Man should say to me, The Brussells Gazet of the 24th of January 1662. is false as to what was transacted at Paris, I should be assur'd, that there was something more in the mind of him that spoke, then what was express'd in those Terms. For those words are not sufficient to make me judge whether the Gazet be true or false: So that the Rela­tor must have in his thoughts some piece of News Distinct, and particular which he judges contrary to the Truth; as if the Gazet had related, that the King had made a hundred Knights of the Order of the Garter.

Also in such judgments as are made of the Opinions of Philosophers, when we say, that the Doctrine of such a Philosopher is false, without expressing distinctly what that do­ctrine; is as (the Doctrine of Lucretius, touch­ing the Nature of our Soul is falfe) it necessa­rily follows, that in such sorts of Judgments they who make 'em, do mean a distinct and particular Opinion under the general words (Doctrine of such a Philosopher). And so such sorts of Propositions dissolve into others like to these. Such an opinion that was main­tain'd by such an Author is false. The opinion that our Soul is Compos'd of Atoms, which was taught by Lucretius is false. So that these kinds of Judgments always enclose two Affir­mations, when they are not distinctly ex­press'd. [Page 183] The one Primary which relates to the Truth it self; which is, that it is a great error to believe that our Soul is compos'd of Atoms; the other Incident, which refers on­ly to the Historical part; that this error was generally taught by Lucretius.

CHAP. V. Of the falshood that occurs in Complex Terms and Incident Propositions.

WHAT we have already said may serve in answer to one celebrated Question, how to know whether there be no falshood but in Propositions, and whether there be none in Ideas and simple Terms.

I speak of falshood, rather then of Truth; for there is a truth in things that is cer­tain, which is their Conformity to the Will of God, whether Men think of 'em or not; but there can be no falshood of things, but as they relate to the understanding of Man, or any other understanding subject to errors, which judges falsly that a thing is that which it is not.

[Page 184] The Question is, whether this falshood is only to be met in Propositions and Judgments.

The usual answer is, no; which is true in one sence; however that hinders not, but that there may be falshood, not in single Ideas, but in complex Terms. For it is sufficient, that some­thing may be judg'd or affirm'd in them, ei­ther expresly or virtually.

Which will be more plain, if we consider particularly two sorts of complex Terms; the one, of which the Pronoun is explicative, the other of which it is determinative.

In the first sort of Complex Terms, we are not to wonder if we find any falshood. For the attribute of the Incident Proposition, is affirm'd by the Subject to which the Pronoun relates. As in Alexander who is the Son of Phi­lip, I affirm, though incidently, the Son of Philip of Alexander; and by consequence there is a falshood in it, if it he not so.

But here we are to make two or three re­marks of moment.

1. That the fasilty of an Incident Proposition does not blemish the truth of the Principal Proposition.

For example, Alexander who was the Son of Philip, overcame the Persians: This proposition ought to pass for true, though Alexander were not the Son of Philip; because the affirmati­on of the principal Proposition, falls only up­on Alexander, and what is incidently added, [Page 185] does not hinder, but that Alexander might vanquish the Persians.

Nevertheless, if the attribute of the prin­cipal proposition, had relation to the incident proposition, as if I should say, Alexander the Son of Philip was Amintas's Grandchild: Then would it only be, that the falshood of the in­cident proposition, would render the princi­pal proposition false.

2. Titles that are given to certain Dignities may be given to all that possess that Dignity; though what is signify'd by the Title, do not at all agree with 'em. Thus because the Ti­tles of Holy, and Thrice Holy, was formerly given to all Bishops, we find, that the Catho­lic Bishops at the conference of Carthage, did not scruple to give that Title to the Donatist Bishops (the most Holy Petelian said it) though they knew well that there could be no true Holiness in a Heretic Bishop. We find also, that St. Paul gives the title of best and most ex­cellent to Festus Governour of Judea, because it was the Title usually given to the Chief Go­vernours,

3. But it is not so, when a Person is the Author of a Title which he gives to another, and which he gives according to his own, and not the opinion of others, or according to popular error; for then we may impute to himself the falshood of such proposition. Thus [Page 186] when a Man says, Aristotle who is the Prince of Philosophers, or simply, The Prince of Philo­sophers, believ'd that the Original of the Nerves was in the Heart; we have no reason to tell him this is false, because Aristotle was not the best of Philosophers; for it is enough that he has follow'd in this the common opinion, though it were false. But if a Man should say, That Gassendus, who is the most Learned of Phi­losophers, believ'd that there was a Vacuum in nature; we may with reason dispute the Title which he would give Gassendus, and make him responsible for the falshood, couch'd in that incident proposition. A Man may be al­so accus'd of Falshood, who gives to the same person a Title which is not suitable to him, yet not be blam'd for giving him another Ti­tle, which is less true and less agreeable. For example, Pope John the XII. was neither Holy, nor Chast, nor Pious: As Baronius acknow­ledges; for tho' they who call'd him most Holy could not be tax'd of falshood, yet they who call'd him most Chast and Pious, were very great Liars, though they did it by Inci­dent Propositions; as if they had said, John the XII. the most Chast Pope, decree'd such a thing.

This is what I had to say concerning inci­dent Propositions, where the Pronouns (Who or Which) are explicative; as to those [Page 187] other where the Pronouns are determinative, as Men who are Pious, Kings who love their Sub­jects, certain it is, they are not liable to fals­hood, because the predicate of the Incident Proposition is not affirm'd of the Subject to which the Pronoun relates. For example, should it be said, That such Judges as do nothing for favour or reward, are worthy of applause, it is not therefore affirm'd, that there are any such Judges, who are so upright. Nevertheless I be­lieve there is always in these Propositions a ta­cit and virtual Affirmation, not of the actual Congruity of the Predicate, with the Sub­ject to which the Pronoun relates; but of the possible Congruity. And if there be any de­ceit in this, we may rationally conclude there is a falshood in the Incident Propositions. As if it had been said, Souls that are square are more solid than those which are round; here the Idea's of Square and Round being Incompati­ble with the Idea of a Soul, taken for the principle of Thought, I judg that those Inci­dent Propositions ought to pass for false.

And hence it may be said, that the great­est part of our errors proceed. For having the Idea of a thing we frequently join to it another incompatible Idea, and by that means attribute to the same Idea, that which is not suitable to it.

Thus finding in our selves two Ideas, one [Page 188] of the thinking Substance, another of the extended Substance, it frequently happens, that when we consider our Soul, which is the thinking Substance, we insensibly intermix something of the Idea of the extended Sub­stance, as when we imagine that the Soul fills up a space like the Body, and that it could not be at all if it were no where, which are not Properties that belong to a Body. Whence arose that Impious error of the Mor­tality of the Soul. We may read an excel­lent discourse of St. Austin upon this Subject, in his tenth Book of the Trinity; where he shews that there is nothing so easy as to know the nature of our Soul. But that which con­founds men is this, that being desirous to know it, they are not satisfied with what they know, without any great trouble; that is to say, that it is a Substance that thinks, desires, doubts, and knows; but they add to what it is, what it is not, fancying the Soul under some of those Phantosms, under which they were wont to conceive Corpore­al things.

On the other side, when we consider Bo­dies, we have much adoe to abstain from in­termixing something of the Idea of the Sub­stance that thinks, hence we affirm that hea­vy things tend to the Center; of Plants, that they seek for proper nourishment; of Crisis's [Page 189] in Diseases, that it is nature that goes about to discharge it self of what is baneful, and a thousand other Whimseys. More especial­ly in our Bodies, that Nature has an Inclinati­on to do this or that; when we are assur'd that we have no such desire, nor ever had any such thought, and that it is ridiculous to imagine, that there is within us any other thing then our selves, that knows what is good or hurt­ful for us, that desires the one, and eschews the other.

I believe moreover that we are to attri­bute to these incompatible Ideas, all those murmurings of Men against the Deities; for it would be impossible to murmur against God, if we conceiv'd him aright: as he is, al­together Wise, Omnipotent, and all Good­ness. But the Ungodly considering him as Omnipotent, and the Sovereign Lord of all the World, attribute to him all the misfor­tunes that befall 'em, wherein they are not deceiv'd; but because at the same time they apprehend him to be cruel and unjust, which is incompatible with his goodness, they im­piously inveigh against him as the Author of the miseries which they suffer.

CHAP. VI. Of Complex Propositions, according to Affirma­tion and Negation: of one sort of those kinds of Propositions which the Philosophers call Modal.

BEsides those Propositions where the Sub­ject or Attribute is a Term Complex, there are also others that are Complex; be­cause there are Terms or incident Propositions, which only regard the form of the Propositi­on, that is, the Affirmation or Negation which is express'd by the Verb; as if I should say, I affirm that the Earth is round. Here I affirm, is only an incident Proposition, which ought to make a part of something in the principal Proposition. Nevertheless it is visi­ble that it makes no part either of the Subject or of the Attribute: for they suffer no alte­ration, as being understood as entirely as if I should simply aver, the Earth is round. So that the incident Proposition falls only upon the Affirmation which is express'd in two man­ners; the one most commonly by the Verb [Est] the Earth is round; and the other ex­presly by the Verb I maintain.

[Page 191] So when they say, I deny it, it is true; it is not true. Or when they add in one Pro­position that which supports the Truth; as when I say, The Reasons of Astronomy convince us, that the Sun is much bigger then the Earth. For the first part is only a support of the Argument.

Nevertheless it is of great Moment to know that there are a sort of these Propositi­ons which are Ambiguous, and which may be taken differently, according to the design of the Propounder. As when I say, all Phi­losophers assure us, that heavy things fall of themselves. Now if it be my Intention to shew that heavy things fall down of them­selves, the first part of this Proposition will be only Incident, and will only support the affirmation of the latter part. But if I intend to report this opinion of the Philosophers, without approving it, then the first part will be the principal Proposition, and the last will only be a part of the Attribute. For so I af­firm not only that heavy things fall of them­selves, but that all Philosophers assert it. And it is easily seen that these two ways of changing the proposition, alter it in manner, that it becomes two different Propositions, and different in Sence. But it is easy to judg by the Consequence, in which of the two Senses the Propositions are to be taken. For [Page 192] Example, the Proposition being laid down, I should add; But Stones are heavy, therefore they fall down of themselves, would be plain that I had taken the first Sence, and that the first part was only Incident. On the other side, if I should conclude thus, Now this is an Error, and by consequence an Error may be taught by the Philosophers, then it would be ma­nifest that I had taken the Proposition in the second Sence; that is, that the first part will be the principal Proposition, and the second part only the predicate.

As for Complex Propositions, where the Complexity falls upon the verb, and not up­on the Subject, nor the Predicate, Philoso­phers have particularly taken notice of those that are called Modal; because the Affirma­tion or Negation is modified by one of the four Modes, Possible, Contingent, Impossible, Necessary.

And because every Mode may be affirm'd or denied, as it is possible, it is not possible, and in both manners be join'd with the Affirma­tive or Negative Proposition, every Mode may have four Propositions, and the four to­gether sixteen, which are denoted by these four words, PƲRPƲREA, ILIACE, AMABIMƲS, EDENTƲLI; of which this is the Mistery. Every Syllable marks one of the four Modes.

• [Page 193]1. Possible.
• 2. Contingent.
• 3. Impossible.
• 4. Necessary.

And the Vowels in every Syllable, which are A. E. I. or U. denotes whether the Mode be affirm'd or denied, and whether the Proposition which they call the Thing said, ought to be denied or affirm'd in this manner.

• A. The Affirmation of the Mode, and the Affirmation of the Proposition.
• E. The Affirmation of the Mode and deni­al of the Proposition.
• I. The denial of the Mode, and Affirma­tion of the Proposition.
• U. The denial of the Mode, and denial of the Negation.

It would be lost time to produce Examples, which are easily found out. We are only to observe that PƲRPƲREA answers to the A, of Propositions Incomplex. ILIA­CE to the E. AMABIMƲS to the I. EDENTƲLI to the U. So that if we intend the Example should be true, hav­ing chosen a Subject, we must take for Pur­purea an Attribute that may be universally affirm'd. For Iliace, one that may be uni­versally denied. For Amabimus, one that may be affirm'd particularly, and for Edenti­li, one that may be denied particularly.

[Page 194] But whatever Predicate we take, this is al­ways certain, that all the four Propositions of the same word have always the same Sence, so that one being true, all the rest are true.

CHAP. VII. Of several sorts of Compos'd Propositions.

WE have already said, that compos'd Propositions have either a dou­ble Subject, or a double Predicate. Now of these there are two sorts. One where the Composition is expresly mark'd; the rest where it lies more conceal'd, and which the Logici­ans for that reason call Exponable; which require Exposition or Explanation.

Those of the first sort may be reduc'd to six Kinds, Copulatives, Disjunctives, Conditi­nal, Causal, Relative and Discretive.

CHAP. VIII. Of Propositions Compos'd in Sence.

THere are other compos'd Propositions, whose Composition is more conceal'd and intricate; which may be reduc'd under four sorts. 1. Exclusive, 2. Exceptive, 3. Com­parative, 4. Inceptive or Desitive.

CHAP. IX. Observations to find out the Predicates and Sub­jects in Propositions, express'd after a less usu­al manner.

CErtainly it is a defect of vulgar Logic, that it does not accustom young begin­ners to understand the nature of Propositi­ons or Arguments, but according to the order and formes which are used in the Schools, which are frequently different from what we find in the Writings of others, whether in Oratory, Morality, or any other of the Sci­ences.

And therefore they have no other Idea of a Subject or an Attribute, but that the one is the first Term of the Proposition, and the [...]he other the latter. And of Universality and Particularity, but that there is in the [...]ne, (All) or (None) and in the other, (Some) whereas all these things are subject to Frequent Errors; and it requires Judgment to discern these things in several Propositions. Let us begin with the Subject and Attri­bute.

[Page 216] The only and true Rule is to observe by the Sence, of what a thing is affirm'd, and what is affirm'd is this, for the first is always the Subject, and the latter the Predicate, how­ever dispos'd in order.

Thus there is nothing more common then these sorts of Propositions; It is a shameful thing to be a slave to Lust. Where by the Sence it is visible, that a shameful thing is that which is affirm'd, and consequently the Pre­dicate; and to be a slave to Lust, is that which is affirm'd of the thing, that it is a shameful thing, and consequently the Subject. Like­wise in St. Paul according to the Latin. Est questus magnus Pietas cum sufficientia; where­as the true order should be Godliness, with sufficiency, is great gain.

Likewise in this verse.

Happy is the Predicate, all the rest is the Subject.

But the Subject and the Attribute are yet more difficult to be found out in complex Propositions. And we have already shew'd that sometimes there is no discerning, but by the consequence of the Discourse, and the Authors Intention, which is the chief Propo­sition, [Page 217] and which the Incident in the two pro­positions.

But besides what has been said we may yet observe, that in complex propositions, where the first part is only the Incident Pro­position, and the latter is the principal; as in the Major and Conclusion of this Argu­ment,

Here the Verb Active is to be chang'd into the Passive, to find out the true Subject of this principal Proposition. For it is plain when I argue after this manner, that my principal intention in the Major, is to affirm something of Kings, Whence I may conclude that we are to honour Lewis the XIV. And therefore what I affirm of the Command of God is only an incident Proposition which confirms this Affirmative, that Kings are to be honour'd. Whence it follows that Kings is the Subject of the Major, and Lewis the XIV. the Subject of the Conclusion. Tho if we consider things but only superficially, both the one and the other seem to be no more than a part of the Attribute.

[Page 218] These Propositions are also frequent in our Language. It is a folly to listen to Flatterers. It is the Hail that falls. It is God who has pur­chas'd us; But the Sence sufficiently demon­strates, that to replace these Propositions in their natural order, they ought to be thus express'd.

And this is almost Universal in all Propositi­ons that begin with It is, and where after­wards follows (who) or (that) to have the Attribute at the beginning, and the Subject at the end. And let this suffice for once, to let you see, that the examples produc'd de­monstrate, that we are to judg by the Sence, and not by the order of the words. And this is necessary to be known, that we may not be deceiv'd in taking those for false Syllogisms, that are really true. For that want of di­scerning the Subject and the Attribute in the Propositions, we believe 'em contrary when they are conformable to the Rules.

CHAP. X. Other Observations to know, whether the Propo­sitions are Ʋniversal or Particular?

SOme Observations of the same nature, and no less useful, may be made of Par­ticularity and Universality.

CHAP. XIII. Certain Rules for the guidance of Reason, the belief of Events that depend upon Human Faith.

THE most customary use of sound Judgment, and that faculty of the Soul, by which we dis­cern Truth from falshood is not employ'd in specu­lative Sciences, about which so few Persons are o­blig'd to spend their time, and yet there is no occasi­on wherein it is more frequently to be made use of, and where its more necessary then in that Judgment which we ought to make of what passes every day among Men.

I do not speak of judging whether an Action be good or bad, worthy of applause or reproof, for that belongs to the regulation of Morallity; but of judging of the Truth or Falshood of human E­vents, which may only be referr'd to Logic, whe­ther we consider 'em as past, as when we only en­deavour to know whether we ought to believe 'em or not; or whether we consider 'em as being to come, as when we fear or hope they will come to pass, which regulates our hopes and our fears.

Certain it is, that some Reflexions may be made upon this Subject; which perhaps may not be alto­gether unprofitable, or rather may be of great use for the avoiding of certain Errors into which most People fall, because they do not sufficiently study the Rules of Reason.

[Page 226] The first Reflexion is, that there is a vast diffe­rence to be made between two sorts of Truths; the one that only relates to the nature of things, and their Immutable Essences abstracted from their exist­ence, the other that relates to things existent that re­late to human and contingent events, which may or may not come to pass when we speak of the future, and may probably never have been, when we talk of what is past. I speak this with reference to their next causes, making an abstraction of their Immu­table order in Divine Providence; because on the one side it does not hinder Contingence, and on the other side being unknown to us, it contributes no­thing to make us believe the things themselves.

Now as all things are requisite in truths of the first sort, there is nothing sure, which is not Uni­versally true, and so we must conclude that a thing is false if it be false in any case.

But if we think to make use of the same Rules in human Events; we shall always judg falsly, and make a thousand false Arguments.

For these Events being naturally contingent, it would be ridiculous to seek out in them for a neces­sary Truth. And so that person would be altoge­ther void of Reason, who would believe nothing of such things unless it were made out to him, that it was absolutely necessary they should be so.

Now would he less deviate from Reason that would require me to believe any particular Event, (suppose it were the Conversion of the King of Chi­na to the Christian Religion) upon this only ground, because it is not Impossible to be so. For seeing that another who should assure me to the contrary may make use of the same Reason; it is clear that that [Page 227] reason alone cannot determine me to believe the one rather then the other.

We must therefore lay it down for a certain and unquestionable Maxim upon this occasion, that the Possibillity alone of an Event is not a sufficient rea­son to make me believe it, and that I may have rea­son also to believe a thing, tho I judg it not impos­sible, but that the contrary may have come to pass; So that of the Two Events I may rationally believe the one and not the other, tho I believe 'em both possible.

How then shall we resolve to believe the one ra­ther than the other, if we judg 'em both possible? Observe the following Rule.

To judge of the Truth of an Event, and to per­swade my self into a Resolution to believe, or not to believe a thing; it must not be consider'd naked­ly, and in it self, like a Proposition in Geometry; but all the circumstances that accompany it, as well internal as external, are to be weigh'd with the same consideration; I call Internal Circumstances such as belong to the Fact it self; and external, those that relate to the Persons, whose Testimonies induce us believe it. This being done, if all the Circum­stances are such, that it never, or very rarely hap­pens, that the same Circumstances are accompa­ny'd with Falshood: Our Understanding naturally carrys to believe the thing to be true; and there is a reason for so doing, especially in the Conduct of the Actions of our Life, that never requires a greater assurance than a moral Certainty, and which is sa­tisfy'd upon most occasions with a great Probability.

But on the other side, if these Circumstances are such as are frequently accompany'd with Falshood; [Page 228] Reason requires us to suspend our Belief; or that we should look upon as false what is told us, when we see no likelyhood, that it should be true, tho we do not find any absolute Impossibility.

For Example, we demand, whether the History of the Baptism of Constantine by Silvester be true, or false? Baronius believes it true; but Cardinal Per­ron, Bishop Spondanus, Petavius, Morinus, and the most eminent of the Roman Church believe it false. Now if we insist upon the sole Possibility, we have no reason to reject Baronius. For his opinion contains nothing absolutely impossible; and to speak abso­lutely, it is also possible, that Eusebius, who affirms the contrary, affirm'd an untruth in favour of the Arrians; and that the Fathers that follow'd him were deceiv'd by his Testimony. But if we make use of the Rule already laid down, which is to consider what are the Circumstances both of the one and the other Baptism of Constantine, and which are those that carry the greatest marks of Truth, we shall find 'em to be the latter. For on the one side, there is no great reason to rely upon the Testimony of a Wri­ter as fabulous as the Author of the Acts of Syl­vester who is the only person of Antiquity, who has spoken of Constantin's being baptiz'd at Rome. And on the other side there is no liklihood that a Person so Serious and Learned as Eusebius should presume to report an untruth relating to a thing so remarkable, as the Baptism of the first Empe­ror that restor'd the Church to her Liberty, and which ought to have been spread over all the World, at the same time that he wrote, which was not above four or five Hundred years after the Death of the said Emperor.

[Page 229] Nevertheless there is an Exception to this Rule, by which we ought to be satisfied with possibillity or likelihood. That is, when an action, which is otherwise sufficiently attested, is contradicted by In­congruities, and apparent contrarieties with other Histories.

For then it suffices that the Solutions brought to enervate these Repugnancies be possible and proba­ble; and it would be unreasonable to require other positive Proofs; for that the Act it self being suffi­ciently prov'd, it is not equitable to require that we should prove all the Circumstances in the same manner. Otherwise we might call in question a thousand most certain Histories, which we cannot make agree with others of less Authority, but by Conjectures which it is impossible to prove posi­tively.

For example, we cannot bring to an agreement what is deliver'd in the Kings and Chronicles concern­ing the years of the Reigns of several of the Kings of Juda and Israel, but by assigning to some of the Kings, two beginnings of their Reigns, the one du­ring the Life of the Reigning Prince, and the other after the decease of their Parents. Now if it be ask'd what Proof we have that such a Prince raign'd for some time with his Father; we must confess there is none Positive. But it suffices that it is a thing Possible, and which has often come to pass at other times, to make it Lawful for us to sup­pose it, as a Cicumstance necessary to reconcile Hi­stories otherwise certain.

And therefore there is nothing more ridiculous then the endeavours of some persons of this latter Age, to prove that St. Peter never was at Rome. [Page 230] They cannot deny this Truth to be attested by all the Ecclesiastic Writers, and those the most ancient, as Papias, Dionisius of Corinth, Caius, Irenaeus, Tertullian; against whom there is not any one that has made the the least Contradiction.

Nevertheless they imagine they can ruin this Truth by Conjectures; for example, because St. Paul makes no mention of St. Peter in his Epistles written to Rome; and when they are answer'd that St. Peter might be then absent from Rome, in re­gard he is not said to have fix'd his seat there, as being one that often travail'd abroad to Preach the Gospel in other places; they reply that this is urg'd without any Proof, which is Impertinent, be­cause the Act which they oppose, being one of the most confirm'd Truths in Ecclesiastical History, it is sufficient for those that uphold it to reconcile these pretended Contrarieties, as they do those of the Scrip­ture it self; for which, as we have shew'd Possibilli­ty is sufficient.

CHAP. VII. An Application of the preceeding Rule to the Belief of Miracles.

THE Rule which we have explain'd is without doubt of great Importance for the well re­gulating our Reason in the belief of particular Acts. For want of the due Observation of which we are in great danger of falling into the two dangerous extremities of Credulity and Incredulity.

[Page 231] For example, there are some, who make a Con­science of questioning any Miracle; because they have a fancy, that they should be oblig'd to questi­on all, should they question any; and for that they are perswaded, that it is enough for them, by know­ing that all things are possible with God, to believe whatever is told 'em touching the Effects of his Om­nipotency.

Others as ridiculously imagin, that it is in the Power of the Understanding to call all Miracles in question, for no other reason, because so many have been related that have prov'd to be false, and therefore there is no more reason to believe the one than the other.

The Inclination of the first is much more tolera­ble than that of the latter; tho true it is, that both the one and the other argue equally amiss.

They both depend upon common Places. The first upon the Power and Goodness of God; upon certain and unquestionable Miracles, which they bring for proof of those that are called in question; and upon the Blindness of Libertines; who will be­lieve nothing, but what is proportionable to their Reason. All this is very good in it's self; but very weak to convince us of a particular Miracle. For God does not always act according to his Power; nor is it an Argument, that a Miracle was wrought, because others of the same nature have been wrought. And we may do well to believe, what is a­bove our Reason, without being oblig'd to believe all that Men are pleas'd to obtrude upon us, as being a­bove our Reason.

The latter make use of common Places of ano­ther sort.

[Page 232] Truth says one of 'em, and Falshood appear with Countenances alike; the same Gate, the same Steps we behold with the same Eyes. I have seen the rise of several miracles in my Time. And tho' they vanish'd in the birth, yet we cannot but foresee the Train they would have gathered, had they liv'd to their full Age. For it is but to find out the end of the Thread, and to cut it into as many peices as we please, and there is not a greater distance between nothing and the smallest thing in the World, then there is between this and the greatest. Now the first that were intoxicated with this beginning of No­velty, coming to spread their History, find by the op­position which they meet with, where the difficulty of Perswasion lodges, and make it their business to Fucus over that part of a false Peice. Particular Error first cau­ses publick Mistake, and afterwards publick mistake cau­ses particular Error. Thus the whole Structure of the miracle by some pull'd down, by others upheld, and by addition enlarg'd at length grows up to a considerable Pile. So that the most remote Witness is better instru­cted then he that lives close by, and the last that heard of it, better confirm'd then the first Publisher.

This Discourse is ingenious, and may be profita­ble to prevent us from being led away with every Idle Report. But it would be an Extravagance from hence to conclude generally that we ought to suspect whatever is said of Miracles. For certain it is, that what is here alledg'd relates only to those things which are taken up upon common Fame, without enquiring into the original cause of the Report. And we have no reason to be confident of what we know upon no better grounds.

[Page 233] But who so blind as not to see that we may make a common place opposite to this, and that at least upon as good a Foundation?

For as there are some miracles that would de­serve but little credit, should we enquire into their Original, so there are others that vanish out of the memories of Men, or which find but little credit in their judgments, because they will not take the pains to inform themselves. Our understanding is not subject only to one sort of distemper, but several, and those quite contrary. There is a sottish stupi­dity, that believes all things the least probable. But there is a conceited presumption that condemns for false, whatever surpases the narrow limits of the understanding. Sometimes we hunt after trifles, and neglect things of greatest moment. False sto­ries spread themselves every where, while true ones can hardly get liberty to creep abroad.

Few Persons have heard of the miracle that hap­pen'd in our time, at Faramonstier, in the Person of a Nun, so blind, that hardly the Balls of her Eyes were left in her Head, who recover'd her sight by touching the Reliques of St. Fara, as I am as­sur'd by the Testimony of a Person that saw her in both conditions.

St. Austin affirms, that many real miracles were wrought in his time, that were known but to few; and which, though most remarkable and wonder­ful, spread no farther then from one end of the Town to the other. Which induc'd him to write, and relate, in his Sermons, to the People, such as were most certain. And he observes in his Twenty second Book of the City of God, that in the single ci­ty of Hippo, near Seventy Miracles were wr [...] [Page 234] within two years after the Building of a Chappel in Honour of St. Stephen, besides a great number of others which he did not commit to writing, which however he testifies to be true upon his know­ledge.

We therefore see that there is nothing more irra­tional, then to guide our selves by common places, upon these occasions; whether it be in rejecting all Miracles, or embracing all. And therefore we must examin 'em by their particular Circumstances, and by the credit and knowledg of the Reporters.

Piety does not not oblige a Man of Sence to believe all the Miracles in the Golden Legend or the Metaphrast: In regard those Books are so full of Fables, that there is nothing to be credi­ted upon their Authority: As Cardinal Bellarmin has made no scruple to confess of the last.

But I affirm, that every Man of Sence, bating his Piety, ought to acknowledge for true the Mira­cles which St Austin recites in his Confessions and his Book de Civitate Dei, some of which he saw, and others of which he was inform'd by the Per­sons themselves, in whose sight they were wrought. As of the Blind Man cur'd at Milan before all the People, by touching the Relics of St. Gervace and Protasius, which he reports in his Confession, and of which he speaks in the 22d. Book de Civi­tate Dei, cap. 8. A certain Miracle was wrought at Milan, when we were there, when a Blind Man was restor'd to his sight, which could not be unknown to Thousands; For it is a large City, and there was then the Emperor; and the thing was done before a vast Multitude of People, crowding to the Bodies of the Martyrs, St. Gervase and Protasius.

[Page 235] Of a Woman cur'd in Africa by Flowrs that had touch'd the Relics of St. Stephen, as he testi­fies in the same Book.

Of a Lady of Quality cur'd of a Cancer by the sign of the Cross which she caus'd to be made up­on the Soar, by one that was newly Baptiz'd ac­cording to a Revelation which she had had.

Of a Child that dy'd unbaptiz'd, whose resto­ration to Life the Mother obtain'd by her prayers to St. Peter, in the strength of her Faith, invo­king him in these words, Holy Martyr restore me my Son: thou knowest, I ask his Life for no other reason, but because he should not be eternally separated from God.

Now if these things may be suppos'd to have happen'd as they are related, there is no rational Person but must acknowledge these things to be the Finger of God. So that all their Incredulity could do, would be to doubt of the Testimony of St. Au­stin, and to believe him a falsifyer of the Truth, to gain a Veneration of the Christian Religion a­mong the Pagans. Which is that which they have no colour to imagine.

First, because it is not likely that a Person of his judgment would have told an untruth in things so public, wherein he might have been convinc'd of falshood by infinite Numbers of Testimonies, which would have redounded to the Ignominy of the Christian Religion.

Secondly, because there was never any Person more a profess'd Enemy of Falshood, then this Ho­ly Man, especially in matters of Religion, having made it the work of entire Treatises, to prove that it is not only unlawful to tell a lie; but a thing so de­testable, [Page 236] that it is not to be made use of, though for the Conversion of Men to the Christian Faith.

I have the more enlarg'd my self upon this re­markable example, of the judgment that is to be made of the Truth of Actions, to serve as a Rule upon the like occasions, because we most common­ly deviate in those things. For every one thinks, that it is sufficient for the decision of these to make a common Place, which for the most part is only compos'd of Maxims, which not only are not Uni­versally True, but not so much as probable when they are joyn'd with the particular Circumstances of Actions, that fall under Examination. And therefore Circumstances are to be compar'd and consider'd together, not consider'd a part. For it often happens, that an Act which is not very pro­bable in one Circumstance, ought to be esteem'd and taken for certain, according to other Circum­stances: And on the other side, an Action which appears to us true, according to one Circumstance which is usually joyn'd with truth, ought to be deem'd false, according to other weakning Circumstances, as we shall make out in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XV. Other Remarks upon the same Subject, of the Beleif of Events.

THere is yet one other Remark of great Mo­ment, to make upon the Belief of Events. Which is, that among those Circumstances which we ought to consider, that we may know whether credit be to be given to the Fact, or no; there are some which we may call common Circumstances, be­cause they frequently occur; and are far oftner joyn'd to Truth then Falshood, and then if they be not Counter-ballanc'd by other particular Circumstan­ces, that ruin the motives of belief drawn from common Circumstances, we have reason to believe those events, if not to be certain, yet at least to be probable; which probability is sufficient, when we are bound to pronounce our opinion in such cases. For as we ought to be satisfy'd with a moral assu­rance, in things not capable of Metaphysical cer­tainty; so when we cannot obtain a full moral as­surance, the best we can do, when we are to resolve, is to embrace the most probable; for it would be contrary to reason to embrace the least probable.

But if on the other side these common Circum­stances, which would have induc'd us to believe a thing, be joyn'd with other particular Circumstan­ces that ruin the motives of belief, drawn from common Circumstances, or be such as are rarely [Page 238] found without falsehood, we are not then any lon­ger to believe that event. But either we remain in suspence, if the particular Circumstances enfeeble the weight of common Circumstances, or we be­lieve the action to be false, if the Circumstances are such as are usually the marks of Falshood.

For example, it is a common Circumstance, for many Contracts to be sign'd by two public Nota­ries; that is, by two public Persons, whose chiefest Interest it is to be just and true in their employ­ments, because not only their Conscience and Re­putation, but their Lives and Estates lie at Stake. This consideration alone is sufficient, if we know no other particularities of the contract, to make us believe that the Contract is not Antidated. Not but that it might be so; but because it is certain, that of a Thousand Contracts, Nine Hundred Ninety Nine are not. So that it is infinitely more probable, that this contract is one of the Nine Hundred Ninety Nine, then the only Antidated Contract of a Thou­sand. So that if withal, the integrity of the No­tary that sign'd it be known to me, I shall most cer­tainly believe, that there is no foul play in the Writing.

But if to this common Circumstance of being sign'd by two Notaries, there are joyn'd other par­ticular Circumstances, as that the Notaries are Per­sons of no Conscience or Reputation, so that they might be instrumental in falsifying the deed, yet shall not this make me conclude that the deed is antidated. But if besides all these, I can discover other proofs of the Antidate, either by Witnesses or convincing Arguments, as the inability of the Per­son to lend Twenty Thousand Crowns, at a time [Page 239] when it shall be demonstrable that he had not a Hundred in cash, I will then resolve to beleive the contract to be falsify'd, and it were unreasonable for any Person to believe me to believe otherwise; and I should do ill, to suspect others, where I did not however see the same marks or Falshood, not to be false, since they might be as well Counterfeit­ed as the other.

We may apply all this to several matters that cause frequent disputes among the Learned. We demand if such a Book were written by such an Author whose Name was always to it? And whe­ther the Acts of a Council are True or Counter­feit?

Certain it is, that we ought to give Sentence for the Author, whose name has been long acknoledg'd and affix'd to the Work; and for the Acts of a Coun­cil which we read every day; nor are we to believe the contrary, but upon very strong Reasons.

Therefore a most learned Person of this Age, being to prove, that the Epistle of Cyprian to Pope Steven, about Martian Bishop of Arles, was none of the Holy Martyrs, he could not convince the Learned, his Conjectures not seeming sufficient to deprive St. Cyprian of a Peice that had always car­ry'd his Name, and which has a perfect resemblance of Style, with the rest of his Works.

In vain also it is, that Blondel and Salmasius, not able to answer the Argument drawn from the Epi­stles of Ignatius, for the superiority of Bishops a­bove Priests, in the Infancy of the Church, pretend those Epistles to be Counterfeit, though as they were Printed by Vossius and Ʋsher, from the An­tient Manuscript in the Florentine Library: Inso­much [Page 240] that they have been refut'd by those of their own party. For that confessing as they do, that we have the same Epistles which were cited by Eu­sebius, St. Jerom, Theodoret, and Origen him­self, there is no likelihood that the Epistles of Ig­natius, being collected by Polycarp, that the true Epistles should have disappear'd, and others be coun­terfeited in the time between Polycarp and Origen or Eusebius. Besides that those Epistles of Ignati­us, which we have now wear such a Character of the holiness and simplicity, so proper to the Apo­stolic Times, that they justifie themselves against the vain accusations of being false and counterfeit.

Lastly, all the difficulties that Cardinal Perron proposes against the Epistles of the Council of A­fric, to Pope Celestin▪ touching Appeals to the See, cannot prevail with us to beleive otherwise now then before, but that those Epistles were really written by the Council.

But it happens sometimes that particular Circum­stances carry more weight in Perswasion, then long Possession.

So that altho' the Epistle of St. Clement to St. James Bishop of Jerusalem be translated by Ruffinus, near upon thirteen hundred Years ago, and that it is cited and own'd for St. Clement by a Council of France, above twelve Hundred years ago, yet we can hardly believe it otherwise then Counterfeit. In regard that St. James being Martyr'd before St. Peter, it is impossible that St. Clement should write after the Death of St. Peter, as the Epistle supposes.

Thus tho the Commentaries upon St. Paul are attributed to St. Ambrose, and cited under his Name by a great number of Authors, together with that [Page 241] imperfect Work upon St. Mathem, under the name of Chrysostome. All Men however at this day agree that they belong to neither, but to other antient Au­thors full of many Errors.

Lastly, the Acts of the two Sinuessan Councils under Marcellin, and two or three at Rome, under Silvester, and another at Rome under Sixtus III. might be sufficient to perswade us of the verity of those Councils, if they contain'd nothing but what were congruous to reason, and which might be pro­per for the times, wherein they are said to be Ce­lebrated; but they contain so many absurdities, so disagreeable from those times, that there is great likelihood of their being false and counterfeit.

And these are the Remarks which may serve for these sorts of judgments. But we must not ima­gin 'em to be of such great use, as always to free us from the danger of being deceiv'd. All that they can do at most, is to guard us from the more gross and apparent Absurdities, and to enure us not to be carry'd astray by common Places, which contain­ing something of general Truth, cease not however to be false upon many particular occasions, which is one of the chiefest sources of human Error.

CHAP. XVI. Of the Judgments we ought to make of Future Accidents.

THese Rules that serve us to judge of Things past, may be apply'd to things to come. For as we probably judge a Thing to have come to pass, when the certain Circumstances which we know to be usually joyn'd to the Fact; we may as probably believe that such a thing will happen, when the present Circumstances are such as are u­sually attended by such an Effect. Thus the Phy­sitians judge of the good or bad success of Diseases; Captain of the future Events of War; and that we judge in the world of the most part of contin­gent Affairs.

But as to these Accidents of which we are some part our selves, and which we may either promote or prevent by our care and foresight, in avoiding or exposing our selves to harm or danger; it hap­pens that most persons fall into many errors, so much the more greivous, by how much they seem to be guarded by reason; because they only set before their Eyes, the Grandeur and consequence of the advantage which they wish for, or the mis­chiefs that they fear, not considering the likelihood and probability that this advantage or inconve­nience may happen or not happen.

In like manner, when it is any great misfortune which they fear, as loss of Life or Estate, they [Page 243] think it prudence not to take any care to prevent it. Or if it be any great advantage which they expect, as the gain of a Hundred Thousand Crowns, they think they act wisely to endeavour the gain­ing of it, if the Venter cost but little, let the pro­bability of success be never so small.

By such a Ratiocination as this it was, that a Princess hearing that some Persons had been over­whelm'd by the fall of a Roof, would never go in­to a House, 'till she had all the Roofs first view'd; and she was so fully perswaded, that she had a rea­son for so doing, that she accounted all other im­prudent, that did not as she did.

'Tis also this appearance of Reason, that engages several Persons into inconvenient and excessive cauti­ons for the preservation of their Health. This is that which renders others distrustful even in little Things; for that having been sometimes deceiv'd, they believe they shall be deceiv'd in all their other Business.

This is that which enveagles so many People to Lotteries, to gain, cry they, Twenty Thousand Crowns for one Crown, is not that a very great ad­vantage? And every one believes himself shall be that happy Person, upon whom this great Fortune shall showr it self: Never considering, that though the Lots promise Twenty Thousand for One, 'tis Thirty times more probable to every particular person, that he shall be a looser then a winner.

And this is the Defect of this Ratiocination; for that we may judge what is fit to be done, to ob­tain the good and avoid the evil, we ought not only to consider the good and the evil in its self; but al­so the probability whether it may happen or no; and Geometrically to consider the Proportion which [Page 244] the things hold together; which may be demonstra­ted by this Example.

Ten Men at play, stake every one a Crown, there is but one can win the whole Stake, all the rest are loosers. So that every one has these two chan­ces, either to loose One Crown or win Nine. Now if we should consider only the gain and loss in them­selves, it might seem that all had an equal advan­tage: But we are to consider moreover, that if e­very one may win Nine Crowns, and can only loose one, it is also nine times more probable in respect of every one, that he shall loose his One, then win the Nine; while every Man has nine De­grees of Probability to loose one Crown, and but one degree of Probability to gain Nine; which equals the hopes and fears of Gain and Loss.

All Plays of this Nature, are as equitable as Plays can be, but all that are not under this Equal­lity of Lots are unjust. And hence it is that it may be plainly made out, that there is an evident Inju­stice in all sorts of Lotteries; for the Master of the Lottery usually claiming the tenth part of the whole Fund for his own share, the whole crowd of those that play is cheated in the same manner as if a Man playing at a Game, wherein there were as much likelihood of winning as loosing should Play nine Pistols to one. Now if this be disadvantageous to the whole Crowd, it must be also the same to eve­ry particular person, because the Probability of loosing, far more surpasses the Probability of gain­ing, then the advantage we hope for, the disadvan­tage of Loosing.

Sometimes there is so little likelihood in the suc­cess of a thing, that how advantageous so ever it [Page 245] be, and how small soever the hazard of winning, it is better not to hazard. Thus it would be a foo­lish thing to play twenty Sols against ten Millions of Livres, or against a Kingdom, upon condition he should not win, unless such an Infant taking out the Letters out of a Printers Case by accident, did all of a suddain Compose the first twenty Verses of Virgil's Aeneiads. For indeed there are few Mo­ments scape us, wherein we do not run the Risco of loosing more, than a King that should stake his Kingdom to such a Condition.

These Reflexions seem of little value, and are so indeed if westop here; but we may make use of 'em in matters of greater Importance; and the chiefest use we can make of 'em is to render us more rational in our hopes and fears. For Example, there are some Persons that are in a Pannic dread when they hear it Thunder; which clatter and hurly-burly in the Sky, if it put 'em in mind of God and Death, 'tis well; but if only the fear of being Thunder-struck causes this extraordinary ap­prehension, then it will easily appear how little Rea­son they have. For of two Millions of Persons 'tis very much if one be kill'd in that manner: and we may also averr, that there is no sort of violent Death happens so rarely. Since then the fear of mischief ought to be Proportionable to the great­ness of the danger, and the Probability of the E­vent, as there is no sort of danger that so rarely be­falls us as to be kill'd with Thunder, so have we the least reason to fear it: since that fear will no way avail us to avoid it.

Hence Arguments may be produc'd not only to undeceive such People as are so over morosely and [Page 246] unseasonably cautious in the Preservation of their Health and Lives, by shewing 'em that those Pre­cautions are much more mischeivous then the dan­ger so remote from the accident which they fear; but also to disabuse another sort that always argue thus in other affairs, there is danger in this Business, therefore it is evil. There is Profit in this, there­fore it is good: In regard we are not to judg of those things, either by the danger or the advantage, but by their proportion one with another.

It is the Nature of things Finite to be exceeded, how bulky soever they be by the least of things, if multiplied often enough; or if the little things are far more Superiour to the great ones in probability of Event, then they are inferiour to 'em in big­ness.

For an Atome may exceed a Mountain if it be sufficiently multiplied, or if this great Good we wish for is so difficult to be obtain'd, that it surpas­ses the little one more in Magnitude, then the little one surpasses the greater in facility of being obtain'd. The same is to be said of those mischiefs which we fear; that is, that the least Evil may be more con­siderable then the greatest Evil, which is not Infinite, if it surpass it according to this Proportion.

There are nothing but Infinite things that can be equall'd by any temporal advantage, and therefore they are never to be put in the Ballance with any of the things of this Word. And therefore the least degree of Facility for a Man to save himself is worth all the felicities of this World join'd together. And the least danger of loosing it is more conside­rable then all temporal mischeifs, if only look'd upon as Misfortunes.

[Page 247] And this may be sufficient, for all rational persons to draw from what has been said, this Conclusion, with which we will end our Logic. That the grea­test of all Imprudence, and highest of all Madnesses is this, to spend our Lives and our Time in any thing else then in what may be serviceable to acquire us a Life that never shall have any end. Since the Good and Evil of this Life is nothing, if compar'd to the feli­cities and sufferings of the other; and the danger of falling into the one is as great as the difficulty of acquiring the other.

They who draw this Conclusion, and follow it is the conduct of their Lives, are Prudent and Wise, let 'em be never so unlearned in Arguments con­cening the Sciences. Whereas they who neglect it, tho never so Learned in other things, are call'd in Scripture Fools, Madmen, and make but an ill use of Logic, Reason, or their Lives.