ARGUMENTS Against the COMMON COUNCELS ENGAGEMENT.
AS ALSO, Against a PERSONALL TREATY with the KING.
Printed, Anno Domini, 1648.
ARGVMENTS Against the COMMON-COƲNCELS Engagement, &c.
THe mercies of God towards the people of this City, in preserving them (like the Israelites in Goshen) in the midst of those heavy judgements, that have over-spread the Land, have been so great and wonderfull, as were sufficient, to have wrought a most thankfull acknowledgment, in the hearts of the most obdurate people in the World, but mercies have had a most unnaturall effect, the cares of this life, and the deceitfulnesse of riches, choakt, and stifled, the voice and cry of mercies.
The hearts of the great ones growing fat as brawn, and because they have been spared, are puffed up with pride, and haughtinesse of minde, imputing their exemptions from afflictions and judgments, to the multitude of the people, to their wealth and policy; and [Page]are now come to that ripenesse of presumption (though God hath lately pluckt them out of the very fire) as by an unlawfull ensnaring Engagement once more to number their people, purposely to fit them for a new War; against those whom God hath hitherto honoured in their preservations: but God we trust wil yet turn away his wrath, which those men would hasten upon this City, having already stirred up multitudes, who in thankfulnes, for former Mercies, boldly shew themselves in opposition to their pernitious Engagement, and to their poysonous though guilded bait, a personall Treaty; their Arguments against both being as followeth.
ARGVMENTS Against the Common-Councels Engagement.
1.
It is against the Covenant, in that it is against the priviledges of Parliament, to publish in print a debate had between a Commi [...]tee of Parliament and Common-Councell, before any report made thereof, much lesse any result made thereupon by the houses of Parliament, and to endeavour the obtaining of subscriptions to that, and to engage persons in that, before the Parliament had done any thing upon that.
2.
There is one branch in that expresly against an Ordinance of Parliament, enabling Major Generall Skippon to inlist and raise volunteirs, viz. in that it is voted by the Common-Councell, that no other Forces shall be raised or made use of within the City [Page]and late Lines of Communication, but by the authority of the Militia, by the consent of Common-Councell.
3.
It is the taking of all power from all other but that Court, to raise or make use of any Forces within the City, or Lines of Communication, yea, even from the Parliament it selfe, during the time of the Treaty.
4.
They have voted to have power to raise what Forces they thinke fit, and the Parliament not to have power to contradict or restrain them, though they shall thinke fit to raise an Army.
5.
They goe about by taking subscriptions to engage the inhabitants of the City of London, to pay whatsoever Forces they shall thinke fit to raise, during the time of the Treaty, and then to refer them to the King and Parliament.
6.
It is not long since such an enagement was endeavoured, which was ill resented by the Parliament, and by them declared to be a treasonable engagement.
Thursday night, the 13 of July, the Engagement came forth in print, Friday the afternoon, the 14 of July, a report of that was made in the house and not before, but no resolution nor debate upon.
Here might be unmasked the desperate hypocrisie coucht in the Engagement, as in their equivocating Answer to the Committee of Parliament, concerning the disposall of the Kings person (in case he should not consent and agree to such things as should be propounded for a safe and wel-grounded peace) but the fallacie is so perspicuous, as its hoped every ingenious person doth see through it: so that present I shall forbear any further proceedings upon it.
Arguments against a Personall Treaty.
For the Parliament that represents the whole body of the people, to admit a Treaty with the King, that is but one publike Officer, of the Kingdom, though the chiefest, is most conequall, as putting one single person, (their own officer, and as the case stands, one that hath raised and prosecuted, a most bloudy War, contrary to the duty of his Office,) into a ballance or competition with the people, then with what can be more unreasonable, or opposite to their Freedomes. And for the Common Councell or any other as the [Page]case is to be importunate with the Parliament to admit of a personall Treaty with him in London, or thereabouts, in a time of such generall rising, and that for him, and so inclinable to Commotions and Tumults which they have neither supprest nor opposed, but rather countenanc'st, as in admitting Gorings forces so long at Bow, manifesteth that the ruling party in the Common Councell are really for him, and consequently that all those amongst them who have officiously, without authority of Parliament promoted the Engagement, deserveth to be severely punished, as principall promoters of that grand and long sought for dangerous designe, of the Kings, and which appeared to be so, when his forwardnesse to come to London, their personally to treat, occasioned the Parliament to vote, that hee should not come untill satisfaction were given, for all the innocent bloud, that had been spirt, and that that offer of his tended to divide and distemper the people here, and to alienate their hearts from the Parliaments just, as now it proveth, and therefore as most dangerous and destructive is to be avoided.