WHereas it hath pleased God to call forth two worthy Citizens, by an uncommon Election, to be Sheriffs of London for the Year ensuing; of which Honour they could have little reason, unless for the serving their Generation onely, to be desirous: There are some Friends of Theirs, and of their Countrey, do think fit, upon consultation, to make this Resolution publick, concerning the Corporation Oath, and the Renunciation of the Covenant, (which to morrow, the 28th of September, are to be administred) that no man may be offended by them at present, or offended in them for the time to come; Provided onely their own Consciences, both, be first clear, according to this Paper following, in what they do.

The Oath, we suppose, must be taken in the sense or meaning of the major part of both Houses that passed theTo this Rule there is a double Extreme. The one, is of those who think a man must take every Imposition in the strict literal construction, and can submit to it no otherwise. The other, is of such who suppose that if a man can frame any interpretation of his own that is but reasonable, he may take the words in that sense and be satisfied. The one of these is so rigid, that there is nothing can be imposed, but we shall strain at it; and the other so loose, that nothing can be imposed, but we shall swallow it. The true Medium is this, we must sit down and consider what we believe to be the meaning of the Lawgiver, and if we can submit to an Impo­sition in that sense or meaning which we believe theirs, we must do it; but if we believe their sense to be such, as we cannot take it in that sense, we must for­bear it and suffer. Act. The Law is the Will of the Lawgiver, and the Lawgiver's Meaning is his Will. The Majority of Parliament was the Lawgiver, and we conceive these Sheriffs believe their meaning to be as followeth: Only we must premise thus much, That we take not upon us (as no man may) to put a meaning upon the Oath of our own, which we know must be taken only in theirs that passed it, or to determine and say, This is the Meaning, but to sar, We believe this to be their Meaning; which is necessary to every one that takes it, to determine for himself, that he may act in Faith in what he does.

We must add, That when we say the Parliament is the Law­giver, we understand by the Parliament, the King, Lords and Commons; and consequently, that the sense of the Law, (and so of this Oath) must be always that sense wherein the House of Lords did concur with the House of Commons, and the King with both. If there be any sense therefore of an Imposition which may be supposed to be the meaning of the King, and not of the Houses; or of one of the Houses, and not the other; or of a lesser part of either House, and not the majority of both, that sense must be still lookt on as too narrow, and ought not to scruple the Conscience, the true sense obliging the Subject, being the concurrent sense of the King, Lords and Commons, who as assembled jointly to this end of Legislation, not one without the other, but all three together, as One Corporation (and no other­wise) are the Lawgiver.

Neither is this sense to be collected from the first floating apprehensions of any one that moves [Page 2]a matter in the House, but from the digested thoughts of both Houses, after a mature debate, and the thinghath thrice passed in them both, so that no sense of any Imposition but that which is agreeable to Reason, and more especially to the fundamental Laws of the Constitution, must be re­ceived as the Meaning of a Parliament, the Reason being, because the nature of the Constitution is such, as it cannot be infringed by an Act or Law for the Administration; which is a Note to be laid in here, that by-and-by will be needful. Thus much therefore farther, and no less being pre­mised, we proceed.

By taking Arms, Let us then suppose the Sheriffs believe the Parliament meant the raising an Army, or War; and by the King, the King's own Sacred Per­son: And we can see noThe only objections here which are of weight, may be reduced to two Cases. One is the Case of Private violence, as suppose a Prince should go to ravish a Vir­gin, and she catches up the next Weapon or Instrument to defend herself. In this Case, or the like, we answer, this Defence is not to be accounted taking Arms in the sense of this Act. The other is a Case of Publick violence, as sup­pose a Prince should go about to alienate his Kingdom, or ruine his Countrey, or the like. We answer, we are not for all that to return violence upon his Person; and as for his Officers, Followers, or Armies, the solution must be attended in the next Clause of the Oath. Objection which may not be an­swered from this Little, in the first Clause of the Oath. I A. B. do swear, That I hold it unlawful to take Arms against the King, (or His Rightful Government) upon any Pretence what­soever.

If David's heart smote him for cutting off but Saul's Skirt, when he was actually in Arms to defend himself against Saul's Forces, onely because he was the Lord's Anointed. It is not in this first Clause, (any one may conjecture) but in the ensuing, where the chief Scruples against the Oath are to be removed.

In the second Clause, By those Commissionated by Him, these Gentlemen believe the Parliament meant, and could mean, no o­ther than such as have a due Authority from Him, and exercise it onely according to Law: And so long as the King's Authority and such Commissions are one, (or the same,) we can see no more difficulty remaining in the second Clause, than in the for­mer: And I do abhor (that is, disown or disclaim) that Tray­terous Position, of taking Arms by His Authority against His Person, or against any Commissionated by Him in the pursuit of such Commissions: That is, Legally Commissionated by Him, in the Legal pursuit of such Commissions.

It is not to be imagined that the Parliament, when they passed this Act, (that is, the major part of them) should design the setting up an Arbitrary Government in the Nation: But if the meaning of those Commissionated by Him, be otherwise than thus, they must design it. An Arbi­trary Power, as soon as they passed this Clause in any Act, must be accounted to Commence. A thing most absurd to be believed, and in the contrary belief whereof, we thank God, that both these Sheriffs can take the Oath.

In the third Clause, we distinguish an Endeavor to change or reform any thing in Church or State, which we think conducive to the good of the Nation in a Parliamentary way onely, as is al­lowed by the fundamental Law and Course of the Realm, from an Endeavor in any other way that is not warranted by the same, to wit, in a seditious way, or in such a manner as they did in the late Times, when they endeavored the Extirpation of Prelacy by force against, and without the King's consent in Parliament, (which may be believed to be the assured sense of the majority in the Houses, when they passed this Act) and so long as to do so That the meaning of the Parlia­ment in this Oath and Declara­tion was, that we should declare it to be unlawful for us to do that now, which they did then (or as of late hath been practised, to use the words of the Militia Act,) we are out of doubt; but whether in the peculiar case of those times there was any thing might be lawful, or any way justifiable to be done then (when the King and Houses (the One Corporation) were divided, and he had passed an Act not to dissolve them with­out their consent, which is a case never like to happen any more, and so no danger to put it) which now is certainly unlawful, is a question we have nothing to do with, and interpose nothing to of­fend any. now, may be acknowledged (as assuredly) to be unlawful, and what ought to be disclaimed, the offence must be over in the last part of the Oath also: And that I will not endeavor any Al­teration of Government either in Church or State; to wit, in any manner not warranted by the Constitution of the Land, or any otherwise, than by Act of Parliament.

We confirm this Exposition with one clear Reason. The great thing intended by this Oath, is the preservation of the Govern­ment in the fundamental Constitution against all Alteration. But the Constitution of our Government being such in the founda­tion, that whatsoever is needful or convenient to be altered, it may be proposed to that end in Parliament: to take away that liberty which is universally radicated in the whole Nation in or­der thereunto, were a piece of the greatest Alteration that could be, and consequently never to be understood as intended by the Lawgiver.

As for the Solemn League and Covenant, it is an Oath these Sheriffs never took; so that they can safely say, there lies no obligation upon them at all from it; And as for others that did, we humbly conceive that being [Page 3]taken in its Complex Consideration, as it was pressed and used at that time, for the engagement of People to the extirpation of the Bishops, and change of Church-Government without the King, against His Consent, and Publick Declarations, and by Force, it must needs be Unlawful, and could not bind any body to do so: and consequently we trust, that these Gentlemen shall not offend God, or any good Men, if they farther subscribe this Declaration which is also imposed. I A. B. do declare, That I hold there lies no Obligation on me, or on any other Person, from the Oath common­ly called, The Solemn League and Covenant, to endeavor any Change or Alteration of Government either in Church or State; And that the same was in itself an unlawful Oath, and imposed on the Subjects of this Realm, against the known Laws and Liberties of the Kingdom.

By some of which last words it appears, that this Oath was framed for the Subjects of the Realm, (we say, that this Oath was, in the meaning of the Imposers of this Declaration, the Subjects Oath, and consequently by the words, or any other Person, they must mean, or any other Subject:) which appears also manifestly in the Preamble of that League, We, such and such under the King. There is one part of it moreover express for the preservation of the King; we do suppose there­fore, that though an Oath to the same main effect, or one like it, was imposed on this King by the Scots, that Oath must be conceived another than this, and not the very same, being not so in every point, but an Oath indeed (as they call'd it) toconfirm the Covenant, when He offer'd this very Exception against taking the Covenant itself, because it was an Oath for the Subjects onely. And this being enough to save the Conscience in one chief Scruple, (and chiefest one,) we will gather up again what is said before into one Argument (which we fix upon) for a fuller satisfaction in regard to all others. To own the King and his Authority in the same Oath, and yet to swear to change the Government without His Will and against it, is (we think) in itself unlawful. Such an Oath was the Covenant; and, Quà unlawful, it must be unobligatory.

And what indeed shall now hinder these Sheriffs to subscribe, That there lies no obligation up­on them, or others, from the Covenant, to endeavor any Alteration of Government in that sense as they swear before that they will not endeavor any, in the third Clause of the Oath preceding? For so long as the meaning of the Lawgiver is no other than That which is made to appear there, upon the account given, and the Endeavor which is here, and which is there, is the same out of doubt, we do not see but the Reason which does satisfie any Man upon the Point about taking the Oath, must be sufficient for the Declaration also.

In the Sacred Story concerning Rahab and the Spies, it appears that no body can be engaged any farther by an Oath, than what he agrees or consents to in the taking it. Where he declares before-hand he will not be bound, he is free. We cannot tell how much larger, or how much narrower a compass others may draw to themselves from that Instance, than we; but this we will say, That upon the supposal of either of these Sheriffs making a Declaration for himself (if this Pa­per will not serve) when he takes the Oath, and subscribes the Declaration enjoined, that he does it in this Meaning, which we have all along expressed, supposing it true, (and with these explana­tory limitations to the Meaning, if indeed in any thing it be otherwise,) we do apprehend that his Conscience may receive satisfaction thereby in its complaince with the Law in these Impositions, which he cannot refuse, without the refusal also of his Duty; especially when it is so much expected from him by his Friends, and unto which he has so loud a Call by the City.

After this, there is an Act of Parliament, intituled, An Act for preserving His Majesty, (An. 13. Car. 2. Regis c. 1.) wherein this Covenant is declared peremptorily to be unlawful and null, that does give one of these Sheriffs a peculiar satisfaction. We argue from thence thus for him: As we find in the Law of Moses, when a Wife or a Daughter made a Vow, if the Hus­band or the Father disallowed it, that Vow wasWe lay down this Rule here, that if any man makes a Vow to God, which he cannot perform with­out the consent of another, who is his Superior, (and much more if through him it must be done,) if that Other Reclaimes the thing as soon as he hears of it, the Authority of God by the equity of this Law given by Moses, does (as we suppose) dissolve the Obligation, though else it could not be dissolved by the Authority of a Superior onely. rescind­ed. So does he apprehend the very same Reason to be here in regard to this League or Covenant: For the subject being (quoad hoc) not sui juris, but under the power of the Prince, and much more under the most supreme and absolute Authority of Parliament, and the late King declaring still against this Oath at the very time, and a Parliament, since the return of this King, as soon as it could be done, having passed an Act on purpose for disannulling the same, he sees no difference between the Cases, but that the obligation of this League, as well as of those Vows, must give place to such Authority over-ruling it: And more es­pecially (we must add) because the Alteration of Govern­ment (the sole matter in concern) does belong to the cogni­zance of the Higher Powers, (we mean a Parliament) and is not the business of any private person, unless in order to procuring their Consent and Establish­ment.

If this reasoning now which does satisfie him, be unsatisfactory to another person, let us but warn such a man that he does nothing after his Example, unless he be satisfi'd with his, or our [Page 4] Reasons, and we care not. If our Arguments satisfie any man, and he follows these Sheriffs, we edifie him; if they do not, and he follows his own judgment, we do him no hurt. It is a man's own Conscience is the Discerner to him of his Duty, and he is not to regard another Mans, any farther than to avoid Active Scandal.

We do not mean it, as if every man therefore should lean onely to his own understanding, but rather take advice, and that which is the most serious and proper he can get. For our parts, we have no more to offer, or to say, but that we are particularly beholding for this which is said, to a late Book, intituled, A Peaceable Resolution of Conscience touching our present Impositions. In which Book the Readers (that please) will find the Rule by which we are to walk under such Injun­ctions of our Superiors as these, to be such, or so set out, as that according to the persuasion of a man's mind about the same, both he that Conforms to them, and he that Cannot, may see reason to retain a fair opinion of one another, and to hope that neither of them depart from a good Con­science in what they do.

This is the Moderation we desire our selves, and these Sheriffs to follow, In our Loyalty to our Sovereign, In our Love to our Countrey, and In our Religion to God.