The following maxims were found amongst the papers of the Great Almanzor and tho they must lose a good deal of their original spirit by the translation, yet they seem to be so applicable to all times, that it is thought no disservice to make them publick.

The following MAXIMS were found amongſt the Papers of the Great Almanzor; and tho they muſt loſe a good deal of their Original Spirit by the Tranſlation, yet they ſeem to be ſo Applicable to all Times, that it is thought no Diſſervice to make them Publick. I. THAT a Prince who falleth out with his Laws, breaketh with his Beſt Friends. II. That his Exalting his own Authority above his Laws, is like his letting in an Enemy to ſurprize his Guards. The Laws are the only Guards he can be ſure will never run away from him. III. A Prince that will ſay, He can do no good, except he may do every thing; teacheth his People to ſay, They are Slaves if they may not do what they have a mind to. IV. That Power and Liberty are like Heat and Moiſture; where they are mixt, every thing proſpers; where they are ſingle, they are deſtructive. V. That Arbitrary Power is like moſt other things that are very hard, they are alſo very apt to break. VI. That the Profit of Places ſhould be meaſured, as are more or leſs conducing to the Publick Service; and if Buſineſs is more neceſſary than Splendor, the Inſtruments of it ought in proportion to be better paid: That the contrary method is as impertinent, as it would be to let the Carving of a Ship coſt more than all the reſt of it. VII. That where the leaſt uſeful part of the People, have the moſt Credit with the Prince, men will conclude, That the way to get every thing, is to be good for nothing. VIII. That an extravagant Gift to any one man, raiſeth the Market to every body elſe; ſo that in conſequence, The Unlimited Bounty of an Unthinking Prince, maketh him a Beggar, let him have never ſo much Money. IX. That if ordinary Beggars are whipp'd, the daily Beggars in fine Cloaths, out of a proportionable reſpect to their Quality, ought to be hanged. X. That Pride is as loud a Beggar as Want, and a great deal more Sawcy. XI. That a Prince who will give more to Importunity, than to Merit, had as good ſet out a Proclamation to all his loving Subjects, forbidding them to ſerve well, upon peril of being undone by it. XII. That a Wiſe Prince will not oblige his Courtiers, who are Birds of Prey, ſo as to diſoblige his People, who are Beaſts of Burthen. XIII. That it is ſafer for a Prince to Judge of men by what they do to one another, than by what they do to him. XIV. That it is a groſs miſtake, That a Knave betwixt man and man, can be honeſt to a King, whom of all others men generally make the leaſt ſcruple to deceive. XV. That a Prince who can ever truſt the man that hath once deceived him, loſeth the Right of being faithfully dealt with by any body elſe. XVI. That it's not poſſible to find out ſuch an honeſt Knave, as will let no body elſe Cheat him. XVII. That if a Prince doth not ſhew an Averſion to Knaves, there will be Inference that will be Natural, let it be never ſo Unmanerly. XVIII. That a Prince who formeth his Opinion too ſoon, will be in danger of repenting it too late. XIX. That it is leſs dangerous for a Prince to mind too much what the People ſay, than too little. XX. That a Prince is to take care, the greater part of the People may not be angry at the ſame time; for tho the firſt beginnings of their Ill Humours ſhould be againſt one another, yet if not ſtopped, it will naturally end in Anger againſt him. XXI. That if Princes would reflect how much they are in the Power of their Miniſters, they would be more circumſpect in the Choice of them. XXII. That a Wiſe Prince will ſupport Good Servants againſt mens Anger, and not ſupport Ill ones againſt their Complaints. XXIII. That Parties in a State generally, like Free-booters, hang out falſe Colours; the pretence is, The Publick Good; the real buſineſs is, To catch Prizes; like Tartars, whenever they ſucceed, inſtead of improving their Victory, they forceably fall upon the Baggage. XXIV. That a Prince may play ſo long between two Parties, that they may in time join together to be in earneſt with him. XXV. That there is more dignity in open Violence, than in the Unskilful Cunning of a Prince, who goes about to impoſe upon the People. XXVI. That the People will ever ſuſpect the Remedies for the Diſeaſes of the State, where they are wholly excluded from ſeeing how they are prepared. XXVII. That changing Hands without changing Meaſures, is as if a Drunkard in a Dropſy ſhould change his Doctor, and not his Diet. XXVIII. A Prince is to watch that his Reaſon may not be ſubdued to his Nature; ſo as not to be ſo much a Man of Peace as to be a Jeſt in an Army, nor ſo much a Man of War, as to be out of his Element in the Council. XXIX. That a man who cannot mind his own buſineſs, is never to be truſted with the King's XXX. That Quality alone ſhould only ſeem to make a ſhew in the Embroider'd Part of the Government; but that Ignorance, tho never ſo well born, ſhould never be admitted to ſpoil the Publick Buſineſs. XXXI. That he who thinketh his Place below him, will mind it ſo little, that he will certainly be below his Place. XXXII. That when the Prince's Example ceaſeth to have the Force of a Law, it is a ſure ſign that his Power is waſting, and there will be but little difference between mens neglecting to Imitate, and their refuſing to Obey. XXXIII. That a People may let a King fall, and yet ſtill remain a People, but if a King lets his People ſlip from him, he is no more a King.