SOme errour doeth, as it were, growe, & very neerly cleaue vnto euerye deter­minatiō, and treatise, whi­che dependeth & is groun­ded vpon the trueth of these thinges.

But it procéedeth not of any principle, and naturall inclination of the thinges, nor of the causes of their substaunce, but by the labour, and means, of them, which do estéeme and haue in great honour coī ­terfeyt séede, to corrupt y^e trueth withall.

That this thing is true, you may easily gather. First by the earnest study of aur­cient writers, which bestowed their la­bour vpon this matter, in that they do dis­sent, both from them whiche were long time before thē, as also from those which liued in their time. But especially you maye gather it by the variety of opinions which were amongst them.

For these men dyd let no trueth passe without some deprauing, no not the es­sence, not y^e knowledge, not the working, of God, nor many other things, which do in order followe these. No not so much as [Page] speache which is y^e painter of al godlines.

For some of them do vtterly dispayre to atteyne the trueth of such things, other some do writhe away themselues to that which séemeth to them best, and other do much doubte in thinges manifest.

Wherefore I thinke, that he, whiche mindeth to dispute of these matters, had néede to vse twoo maner of treatises, the one to make defence for the trueth. The other to try which is the trueth. The first I thinke must be vsed against those, whi­che be doubtfull, and harde of beléefe, the seconde to them, that wishe well, and bée fauourers of the trueth.

Wherefore it behooueth them, which do minde to boolte, and to search the nature of these matters, to marke diligentlye, what presente commodity requireth, and therby to directe their discourse, and fitly apply the order of things to necessitie, that whils they do place those things, which be first according to order in y^e first place, they do not against that, which is seemely, and forsake the respecte of necessitie, care, and or congruitye.

For like as vnto a demonstration, & na­turall consequence, those thinges, whiche do entreate of the matter, are before those [Page] which are spoken in defence of it: so when wée haue respect to profite, those thinges, which are in defence of the matter, are to be hādled before those, which do discourse of the matter.

For like as the husbandman can not conueniently sowe his domesticall séede, vnlesse his grounde bee purged from all wilde, and vnkindely matter, and suche things as may annoye good seede: neither the phisicion minister any wholsome me­dicine to a sicke bodye, vnlesse he purge him from all his noysome humours, or stay the affluence of excessiue corruption and filthinesse: so can not he, whiche tea­cheth the trueth, speaking of the trueth, perswade any thing, as long as their abi­deth in the minds of men a certayne false opinion, which doth gainsaye the reasons of the trueth.

Wherevpon wée hauing a respect, and regarde vnto cōgruity, & conueniēce, haue preposed our treatise of the defence of the trueth, before it, that doth entreate therof.

Whiche thing at this time and in this question to do séemeth not vnprofitable, whilest we haue before our eies that, whi­che necessitie requireth, especially in that discourse which handleth the resurrection [Page] of the dead.

For in this matter wée finde some, that vtterly beleeue it not, other some that are very doubtfull, and of them, which admit, and assent to the principles, and grounds of this question, some do yet neuerthelesse wauer in an vncertayne, and inconstant opinion, as muche as they, whiche be doubtfull, and, that is moste absurde, they do suffer this wauering of minde without any occasion of doubting, which they can drawe from thinges them selues.

For they can alledge no cause any thing likely, why they either doubt, or stagger.

That this thing is true you may easily perceyue after this maner.

For truelye all hardenesse of beléefe, doth procéede not rashly of a vayne, & light opinion, but for some vrgent cause, & like­lihoode well fortified.

For then incredulitie hath a reasonable excuse, when the matter it selfe, whiche is not beléeued, conteyneth some thing, whi­che is incredible.

For not to beléeue those thinges which haue no cause of doubting, is propre to such men, as do not vse any sounde iudge­ment in searching out of the trueth.

Therfore it behooueth them, whiche do [Page] not beléeue y^e resurrectiō, or do doubt of it, not to directe their opinions according to that, which without consideratiō séemeth to them probable, or acceptable to the pro­digall, and those which liue in too muche riote: but in searching and considering y^e trueth of this doctrine, either to ascribe no cause therof to the creatiō of man, whi­che is easie to be refuted, or else to im­pute all things created to God the aucthor of all, and therby to prooue that the resur­rection in no case is to be beléeued.

And they may do this, if either they de­clare, that God lacketh will, or wanteth power to restore to life a dead and dissol­ued body, so that he make it sounde, and ioyne it together, to renewe the forme of the olde man. Which thing if they can not prooue, let them leaue of their wicked vn­beléefe, and detestable blasphemie.

But it shall appeare by those thinges, that follow, that they say falsely, whether they alledge, that God can not, or that he will not. For lacke of power in anye man is therby perceyued, if either he know not what must be done, or if he know it, yet is so weake in strength, that he can not well accomplish the same.

For he which knoweth not what must [Page] be done, can neither take in hande, nor yet bring to passe anye thing at all, espe­cially of those thinges, whiche he hath no knowledge of.

But he that knoweth what is to bée done, and howe, and by what meanes it maye be finished, but yet hath either no strength at all, or else not sufficient to ac­complish the matter, y^e which he well vn­derstandeth: he, if he be wise, & wil looke vpon his owne abilitye, either will not take it in hand vnaduisedly, or shalbe disa­pointed of the ende of his worke.

But it is impossible, that God should be ignoraunt in any point, or parcell of the bodyes, which be appointed for the resur­rection.

For it is not possible, that it shoulde bée hidde from him, whether euery one of the corrupted members bee gone, and what putrified, things the partes of y^e elements haue receyued into them, & haue admit­ted into like nature, although amongest men, y^t which is powred again into y^e vni­uersall nature of the elemēts doth séeme altogether inseperable, & indeprehēsible.

For to him, which before that any thing was created, was not ignorant of the na­ture of the elementes, before they were, [Page] where of bodies do take their beginning, neither were the parts of the elementes vnknowen, out of the which he was min­ded to gather that, which pleased him for the constitution of mans bodye, it is ma­nifest enough, that he would not be igno­raunt, whether euery thing might departe which he tooke to make perfect his worke withal, when the composed masses are to be sundered, and seuered.

For as touching the order of our affay­ers, and the iudgement of other our busi­nesse, it is a greater matter to foreknow those thinges, whiche are not, yet before they come to passe: but as touching the maiestie, & wisedome of God, both these are naturall & like easie, both to foreknow those thinges, which are not yet created, & also to discerne those things, which be re­solued.

And truely euen the creation of bodyes doth well declare, that God hath power sufficient to restore dead bodyes.

For if he made bodies, whē as yet they were not, and brought foorth the princi­ples of them, whence they had their be­ginning: he can also repayre the same by what meane soeuer they were dissolued, with the like case.

[Page] Neither here shall this reason fayle, whether they draw y^e beginning of things from the matter, and stuffe of them, or frame bodies of the elementes, as the firste principles of all thinges, or of their séede in procreation.

For in whose power it is to transforme matter, which in the beginning was with out forme, and to adorne it with many, and diuerse countenaunces, which before had no shape, and to gather together the partes of the elementes, and to diuide in­to manye parts the séede, which was one, and vniforme, and to garnish that with ioynts which before was without ioynts, and to geue life to a thing without life: he also is able to vnite together that, which is scattered abroad, & raise vp that, whi­che lyeth, and make that aliue, whiche is dead, and chaunge that, whiche was cor­ruptible, into incorruption.

The same workeman also, can by his power, and wisedome, when a bodye is is toarne in péeces by a multitude of di­uerse beastes (howe many so euer do vse to set vpon such bodies, & therby fill their paunches) seperate it from them, and ioyne it again to his mēbers, and partes, whether they went into one beast, or mo, [Page] or whether they went into diuers, one after another successiuelye, or whether with them being consumed, they do re­tourne againe to their first beginninges, as by naturall putrefaction thinges are accustomed to do.

This thing truely, doth séeme to haue greatlye troubled men of excellent lear­ning, which thought the doubting of the common people (I know not vpon what occasion) to be weightie, & of great force.

They saye that manie bodies in ship­wracke by sea, and in riuers, haue béene meate to fishes, and that bodyes, whiche were slayne in warre, or vpon some other sharpe occasion, & other circumstances of things, when they could not be buried, were a praye to euery beast, as eche first could méete therewith.

Séeing therefore that these bodies bée deuoured in such sorte, and the mēbers, and partes, wherof these bodies dyd con­sist, be torne in péeces, and therefore by the nature of growing together be made the brawnes, sinews, & inyutes of beasts, they say it is impossible, that they should suffer any separatiō, or diuision one from an other.

Besides this they bring foorth another [Page] thing, which is more harde, namely, that séeing those beastes which be nourished with the members of men be eaten as fit for mans meate, and therefore being put into mens bellyes, be vnited together with the bodye of them, which eate them: it followeth necessaryly say they, that the members of man, whiche tell before to these beastes, for their foode, do passe into other mens bodies séeing those beastes whiche dyd deuoure the fleshe of man, do transmit their substance into y^e brawnes of them, whiche receyue nourishment of those beastes whom men were eaten.

Then do they here vnto tragically ex­aggerate, the limmes of Children cut of and eaten either in hunger, or madnesse, and children denoured of their parentes, through the craft and deceyt of enemies, they adde moreouer the table of y^e Meads and the tragicall banket of Thiestes, and what so euer mischiefe hath béene com­mitted, either amongst the Gréecians, or among the Barbariās vpon these groun­des they inferre wel as they suppose, that there can be no resurrection, séeing it can not be, that the same members shoulde rise againe in diuerse bodyes together. For either the first bodies can not consist, [Page] when the limmes are gone thether, where they make a furniture, or if they be resto­red to the first owner, the bodies of them, which followe, can not be perfit.

These men do séeme to me, first of all to be ignoraunt of the power, & wisedome of the creatour, & gouernour of all things, which prepareth nourishinent fit, & agrée­able to euery nature, and kinde of liuing thing, & doth not ordeyne euery nature to concurre to the contemperature, and mixture of euerye naturall body, neither doth stagger, & stay in seuering the parts of thinges growen together, and suffe­reth all thinges according to their proper nature, both to do, & suffer, and sometime contrariewise stoppeth them, & doth con­ueigh, & take awaye, what he list, & whe­ther he listeth.

Beside this the same men séeme to me, not to knowe throughly, the strength and nature, either of thinges, whiche do nou­rishe, or of those which are nourished. Otherwise they would haue knowē, that not euery thing, whiche is powred from one in to another, is made foode fit, & agrée­able to y^e nature of y^t thing, that taketh it.

But that some thinges assoone as they be receyued into the bellye, do perishe, [Page] either by vomiting, or by excrement, or by auoyding, by some other meane, so that they endure not one litle while the first, and natural concoction, or any other mix­ture with the things, y^t nourishe. As ther­fore not euery thing, which is cōcoct, & hath suffered the first alteration, is wholly ioy­ned with that, which nourisheth the body, séeing that some thinges thereof be, as it were, expelled of the nourishing power & faculty of man, by the belly, & other some after the seconde chaunge, and alteration in the liuer, are auoyded and seuered vn­to other thinges, which do excéede y^e power of nourishing, & the very chaunge it selfe, which is in the liuer, doth not wholly nou­rishe, but strayneth some of it vnto accu­stomed superfluities: so in like maner the liuer doth sometime conuert that, which it did reteyne to nourishe the partes of the bodie with all, into some other thing ac­cording to the nature of that, whiche bea­reth greatest sway, and doth most abound, which is accustomed either to destroy that which is next vnto it, or else to chaunge it into his owne nature.

Séeing that there is therfore much na­turall difference, in all liuing creatures, & séeing that foode must by nature bée aptly [Page] applyed to euery kinde of beast, and chaū ­ged with the body, whiche is nourished therwith, and séeing that in the meate of creatures there be thrée maners of puri­fyinges, and auoydinges therof, it is re­quisite that, that meate perishe wholly, or be sent whether it is accustomed, or be chaunged into some other thing, what soeuer is not couenable for the nourish­ment, & foode of any creature, as a thing, which can not be mingled, and contem­pered therwith, and the force of the nou­rishment of the creature must naturally agrée, and descende through naturall (as I may terme them) sieues & sarches, and being throughlye purged by these natu­rall cleansinges be made most pure, that it maye be adioyned to the body, the whi­che only (if you vse the termes of things a right) you maye call nourishmente, as that, which hath cast awaye all, which is not agréeable, but hurtfull to the consti­tution of the creature to be nourished, & hath also shaken of that great infarced, and stuffed waight, which the stomacke vsed to fill it selfe, and satisfie appetite withall.

But no man will doubt, that this most pure nourishment is vnited with the bo­dy, [Page] and that it is entangled, & doth grow with all the members and ioyntes ther­of, and that it, which is not so, but is con­trary to nature, doth perish by and by, if it be mingled with the strongest partes of the body, or doth destroy by litle & litle the strength of the body, which it ouercō ­meth, and doth turne it into naughty, and venemous iuyse, as a thing whiche brin­geth nothing agréeable and holesome to nourishe the body withall.

And the greatest argumente of this thing is, because that either griefe, or daungers, or death doth thervpō inuade bodies, if with an eger appetit they swal­lowe with their meate some poyson, or other thing, which is cōtrary to their na­ture, whiche without peraduenture brin­geth destruction to the whole bodye. For truelye those thinges, which are nouri­shed, are nourished with those thinges, wherewith they bée acquainted and bée naturall, but are destroyed with those thinges, which be repugnant to their na­ture.

If then by the discorde of these thinges, which do striue with the nature of liuing creatures, y^e naturall nourishment also is corrupted, and doth take neither al those [Page] things, which be ministred to the body, nor yet any thing vpon a sodayne to the increase of the flesh, but that only, which being purified by all concoctions com­meth pure, and therfore sheweth it selfe fit to nourishe the partes: it is plaine, enough that nothing which is against na­true, can be vnited to those creatures, to whom that meat is not both naturall, & agreable: but that either it is cast downe rawe, and corrupt through the belly, be­fore it be chaūged into some other ioyce, or if it doe longe continue in the mem­bers it doeth bréede some fault, or di­sease harde to be cured, corrupting either the naturall nourishmēt, or else the flesh, which hath néede of nourishment.

And if it be driuen awaye with medi­cines, or ouercome with better dyet, or naturall strength, yet it will not departe out of the body without some smal hurt, as bringing nothing auaylable for lacke of abilitie to growe, & to be ioyned to­gether with it.

To be short if anye man graunt nou­rishment to be subministred therby, and adde, there withall that it is vsuall, al­though in déede it be contrary to nature, that it be digested, and changed into anye [Page] thing that is moyste, or drye, or hote, or coulde, yet although these thinges bée graunted, it shall not folowe, that any furtherance commeth thereby to the bo­dies of those which rise againe, that they get therby a fuller number of members, séeing that it is neither a part of the bo­dye, nor yeldeth the likenesse, or stéede of any parte of the bodye, nor yet doth con­tinue still with the members nourished, or if it do rise againe together with the members rysing againe, it doeth profite nothing to the vse of life, whether it be blood, fleame, choler, or spirite. For then the bodies, whiche were nourished shall not now haue néede of that, which some­time they néeded, when hunger, and cor­ruption being past, the necessitye of ta­king nourishment shalbe taken awaye.

Now if any man imagine, that suche transmitation of meate doeth extende it selfe to the creation of fleshe, yet not­withstanding necessitye shall not com­pell, that this fleshe being newlye crea­ted of nourishment, when it commeth to the body of an other, must retourne again to absolue y^e perfection of the for­mer body, as a parte of it: because y^t the [...]she which hath receyued this nourish­ment [Page] from some other body, neither doth kéepe it long, nor that whiche commeth frō another, doth long abyde there why­ther it commeth, but to the contrary suf­fereth a great alteratiō, when sometime it vanisheth away by gréefe, sometime it pineth awaye by care, sorowe, labour, and sickenesse, and sometime by reason of the vntemperatnesse of heat and colde, the humours do not chaūge themselues into flesh and fatnesse, so that the bodyes which haue receyued these meats, do cō ­tinue still the same that they are.

Séeing that such thinges happen in the affections of the fleshe, you maye muche more easily perceyue y^e same in the fleshe whiche is nourished wyth improper meats, séeing y^t it somtime increaseth to a huge bignesse, and couereth it with fat by reason of the meates, which are taken and agayne casteth it awaye by some meanes, & is diminished either for some one, or for manye of those causes whiche wée haue before rehearsed, so that that flesh only remayneth, which hath strēgth to binde, to thickē, and to cherish, namely suche as is chosen of nature, and is like and agréeable to those meats, wherwith according to nature, nature furnisheth [Page] life, and susteyneth the labours of life.

But neither, as the right is, whether those thinges whiche we haue spoken of be cleansed away, or whether they be re­ceyued, can that bée prooued to be true, which is obiected by these men, neither can mens bodies be mingled & coupled with bodyes of the same kinde, whether in eating they be beguyled by some mās guyle, so that they feele not y^e taste ther­of, or else voluntaryly for hunger, or by reason of madnesse do pollute thēselues with deuouring bodyes of their owne kinde, vnlesse peraduenture wée knowe not that there be some beastes indued with the shape of men, or compounded of diuerse natures, so that they consist part­lye of men, partly of beastes, such as the bouldest of the Poets are woont to fayne.

But what shall I saye of those bodyes which are geuen to no liuing creature to deuoure, and which onely for the wor­thinesse of their nature haue obtayned the honour of buriall, séeing that the ma­ker of all things hath assigned to no crea­ture any bodye of like forme for meate, although according to nature they are fedde with bodies of diuerse forme.

If so be that, they can declare, that the [Page] flesh of men is geuen to men for meate by the ordinaunce of nature, what impe­diment shall there be, why there shoulde not be mutuall slaughters of vs commit­ted, as is accustomed to be done in things graunted by nature.

And truely, let them, which dare saye thus, rauenously deuoure the bodyes of their dearest friendes as moste deyntye meate, that they may eate them, whome they loued best.

But if this be vngodly, and an haynous, and abominable offence to be spoken, & to bée detested aboue all other wicked meates and mischieuouse actes, for man to deuoure the limmes of men, & againe if it be true, that that whiche is against nature, is not receiued of the hungry mē ­bers, and that which is not receyued for meate, cannot growe together with those bodyes, for whiche it is not meate natu­rally: it cannot be y^t mens bodies at any time should be cōfounded with other bo­dies of the same kinde, into whō contra­rye to nature they are thrust for meate, although they be stuffed into their belies by reason of some gréeuous calamitie.

For flying backe and refusing nutri­tiue facultye, and being cast thither, from [Page] whēce they had their first beginning, are ioyned to their first groūdes for a time, & yet being seuered frō thence by the wi­sedome & power of him, which ordreth al things, they shalbe ioyned one to another again in most conuenient order, whether they haue béene burnte with fire, or con­sumed with water, or deuoured of beasts or being cut of frō the body of him, which is yet aliue, waxed rotten before y^e other partes: yet comming together agayne a­mongest themselues they shall possesse the same place, that they maye make the same proportion and constitution of the body, and repayre the resurrection & the life of the bodye being dead or all toge­ther dissolued.

It is not cōuenient to prosequute these thinges at large: for they haue a declara­tion confessed and not doubted of, especi­ally among such men, as do hate beastly and brutishe customes.

But séeing their be many thinges pro­fitable to the searching out of these mat­ters: first of all I wish them to be exclu­ded, which runne to humane workes, & to men, the makers thereof, whose wor­kes being worne out, or rottē by reason of time, or cleane vndone by some other [Page] meane cannot be renewed again by a si­militude drawne their hence, do go about to prooue, y^t God either will not, or if hée will, can not restore a dead and vanished karcas to his former state: neither do they consider with them selues, that by this meanes, they be contumeliouse a­gainst God, whilst they compare powers differing one from an other in euery re­specte, or rather the possessours of the powers, and do compare thinges artifi­ciall with thinges naturall.

It is not without fault earnestlye to deale with such men. For it is a foolishe thing in déede to gaynsaye light, & vayne persons: but it is a great deale more pro­bable, & of al other the truest to affirme that to be possible to God, which is impos­sible to mē. Wherfore if either by these thinges whiche are probable, or by all those things, which be heretofore exami­ned, reason doth declare it to bée possible to God, it is manifest enough, that it must not be counted impossible, or to abhorre from the will of God.

For what he will not do, therfore hée will not do it, either because it is vniust, or els because it is vnworthy.

Furthermore this iniustice is percei­ued, [Page] either about him, which ryseth, or about some other thing without him.

But it is manifeste, that there is no iniury done to any thing at all, which is without those, that rise againe, and are existent in nature. For the intelli­gible creatures do receiue no iniurye by the resurrection of men, for there being is nothing therby hindered, and the re­surrection of men doth bring no reproch or hurt to them, as it doth seme not to do also vnto thinges without reason, and soule.

For they after the resurrection shall not remayne, and to such thinges which be not, can no wrong be done.

But if you do imagine them to be, then yet shall they féele no wrong by the resurrection of men.

For if when they are bestowed on the nature of man, and be broughte vnder yooke, and all kinde of seruitude, for the behoofe of them, being subiect vnto mi­serye, do yet suffer no wrong, much lesse shall they suffer iniury, when man shal­be made incorruptible, and be placed frée from all néede, and misery, and they also deliuered from all kinde of seruitude.

For if they were endued with the gifte [Page] of speaking, they woulde not accuse the maker of all thinges, as though contra­rye to right they were placed vnder the condicion of men, because they were not admitted into the fellowship of the same resurrection.

For to those thinges, whose nature is not equall, he y^t is iust, doth not attribute one ende or honour, & where is no sense of iustice as in brute beastes, and things without life, there is no indignation for any in iustice.

This also can not be sayd, that in man any iniurye is perceyued by that hée is raysed from the dead.

For he, as he is framed of soule, and bodye, so he receyueth iniurye againste other parte, other bodye, or soule, and a wise man will not affirme the soule to suffer iniury therefore, because by this meanes it doeth not retayne the same trade of life, in which nowe in this pre­sent worlde it liueth.

For if nowe, dwelling in a corruptible body, and subiect to passions, it suffereth no iniury, much lesse dwelling in an in­corruptible body, & subiect to no passions, shall it abide any wrong.

Nay, farther then this, euen the bodye [Page] féeleth no iniurie. For if nowe being cor­ruptible, and ioyned in fellowship with an incorruptible soule, it taketh no wrong thereby, muche lesse shall it take wrong, when on both sides they are in­corruptible.

Furthermore neither can this be said, that it is an vnworthye thyng for God, that he should restore and gather againe resolued bodies.

For if that, which is lesse in dignity (na­mely to create a mortall bodye, subiect to affections) did not séeme vnworthye God, much lesse shall it bée vnworthy for him to bring that into the worlde, which is more excellente, and endued with im­mortalitie, and fréenes from passions.

If therfore by those things, which are first in nature, & those also, which conse­quētly do follow y^e first, euery point, whi­che was in question, be plainly shewed, & declared: it is manifest enough, that the restoring of bodyes is such as is not vn­worthy of God, and which he both will and can bring to passe.

For by these thinges the falsitie of the contraries, and the absurditie of them, which beléeue not is declared.

For what néede is there to speake of [Page] the mutuall agrée of one thing with ano­ther, and of the mutuall coherence be­twéene them, as though they were sepe­rated by some diuersity, and it were not lawfull to saye that what God will, that he can do, and is for his maiestie, to do with dignitie.

But wée haue sayde before that there is one disputation cōcerning the trueth, another in defence of the trueth, & haue declared wherein one of them differeth from an other, and when, and amongst whom it profiteth.

Notwithstanding it will nothing hin­der vs, for common, safties sake and or­der, that those thinges, which haue béene saide may agrée with those thinges that shalbe saide, to take our beginning from the selfe same thinges, and suche as are congruente vnto them: for it behooueth the one by nature to haue the prehemi­nence, & the other in stéede of a wayting man to make waye for the chiefe. And with his waymaking which goeth before to take awaye all hinderaunces and im­pedimentes.

For the treatise which is of the trueth, séeing it is necessary for all men, both for their safegarde, and preseruation is first [Page] and chiefe, both by nature, order, and pro­fite: by nature because it setteth foorth the knowledge of thinges: by order, be­cause it is in, and together with those thinges, the iudgement and knowledge wherof it promiseth: by profite, because it maketh defence and safegarde to them which knowe and learne it.

But the discourse▪ whiche is for the trueth, is inferiour both in nature and power: for it is lesse to reproue a falshood then to establishe a trueth, and followeth by order.

For it exerciseth force against them, which beléeue the falshoode. But a false opinion groweth, and procéedeth of a se­cond sowing, as it were, & of corruption.

But although these thinges be thus, yet somtime this is put before the other, and is more profitable, because it taketh away, and forepurgeth troublesome in­credulitye, or some new doubt, or some false opinion, and both these tende to one ende.

For both séeketh godlines, as well that which refuseth the falseshood, as y^t which establisheth the truth, & yet are they not all one. For y^e one is necessary, as I said, for all beléeuers, and them whiche haue [Page] anye care of the trueth, & their owne sal­uation, the other is more profitable in some time and among some men.

These thinges are spoken briefely, to kéepe the remembraunce of the former woordes.

But nowe we must retourne to oure purpose, and declare that that treatise is true, which is concerning the resurrectiō and that vpon that cause, for the whiche, and by the which the first man & his suc­cessours were borne, although they were not both created after one maner.

Then we must prooue it by the nature of all men, in that they be men.

Afterwarde by the iudgement of the creatour, which he will geue of them, ac­cording as they haue liued, whiche iud­gement no man will doubt of, but that it is most iust.

But the handling of the cause doth cō ­siste in this point, that wée searche out, whether man were made vnaduisedlye, and to no ende, or for some purpose.

If he were created for some purpose, whether it were that he should liue, and continue in this life, the, whiche hée was naturally ordeyned vnto, or that hée should minister some profit to an other.

[Page] But if he were created for some pro­fite, whether it were for the profite of the creator, or of some other thing whi­che belongeth to the creatour, & is more regarded of him, then man.

Here truely, vsing a common and sim­ple kinde of searching in beholding of thinges wée finde, that whosoeuer is en­dued with reason, and is mooued to do any thing by reasonable iudgement, doth nothing vnaduisedlye, of those thinges, which he doth willingly.

For that he doth, he taketh in hande, ei­ther for his owne sake, or for some mās sake, whiche he loueth, or inflamed with the desire and naturall inclination to that thing, which he hath done.

As for example (For we will vse a si­militude that our purpose may be playn) A man buyldeth a house, and that for his owne proper vse; hee furnisheth also his house being in order; with Camels and other beastes, whose helpe he hath néede of, not for his owne vse as it séemeth (al­though the latter end be referred to him) but as touching the next & néereth cause, for their commoditie whome hée careth for.

But he begetteth children, not for his [Page] owne vse, nor for the profit of any thing, which belōgeth vnto him, but that those, whom he begetteth, may be & remayne aliue, as farre as it is lawfull, and maye be done, ministring a remedye to his owne death by the succession of children, & beléeuing thus farre, that he hath put of mortalitie.

But God neither created man vnad­uisedly, séeing he is wise. (For a wise man doth no thing vnaduisedlye) neither for his owne vse & necessity (for he hath nede of nothing) & that which hath néed of nothing, doth not desire profite of those thinges which he createth) neither dyd he make man for the profite of any other of his woorkes, for nothing amongst those thinges, which are endued with reason and iudgement, whether it be great or small, is created or shalbe created for the vse of any other thing. For suche thinges are created only for theyr owne life and safetye.

Neither hath reason found out any o­ther end, why men were created, séeing that they were ordeyned to be immortall without y^e néede of any thing, séeing that they require no helpe of men for the safe­garde of their life, & séeing that all beasts [Page] be subiecte, and all thinges else do mini­ster commoditie to men, for whose vse they were made.

But beastes haue no vse of men: for neither is it, nor was it at any time law­full to debase y^t creature, which is chiefe & ruler of all, for the vse of other thinges whiche are vnder him, or to bring that which is endued with reason, vnder the yoke of those thinges, which be without reason and vnfit to rule.

Wherfore, if man were created neither without cause, nor vnaduisedly, nor to no end, (for there is nothing amongst the woorkes of God done vnaduisedly, if we consider the meaning and intention of God) nor yet for the profite of y^e creator, nor for the commoditie of other thinges, whiche the creatour made, it is manifest enough that if we looke vpon the first and vniuersall cause, GOD created man for himselfe, and his owne goodnesse & wise­dome, whiche you may easily perceyue in all thinges created: but if you searche out the next cause, and that which agréeth with men being created, you shall finde that man was borne to this ende, that he shoulde liue.

But not in such a life that should con­tinue [Page] for a while, & straight way shoulde perish for euer.

For God (I thinke) hath geuen such a life to beastes that créepe, and to birdes, and to fishes: but to them which beare about them his owne Image, and there withal haue a minde which is the finder out of things, and are adorned with the giftes of reason, he hath assigned a perpe­tuall continuaunce, that by knowing their creator, and following his power and wisedome by lawes and iustice, they might with those vertues happyly continue euerlastingly, with which they established their former life, when they yet liued in their earthly, and corrupti­ble bodies.

For such thinges as are created for the behoofe of other thinges, when those thinges, for whose vse they were ordey­ned do perish, do not without cause pe­rishe also, and can not remayne for any purpose, because ther is no place amōgst thinges created of God, for vaine idle­nesse.

But those thinges which were for this end created, that they should be and continue (the cause being ioyned and in­tangled with their nature, séeing the [Page] cause doth onely exacte and require, that they should bée) it is not possible that they should at any time suffer such vio­lence, wherby they should vtterly bée a­bolished.

Furthermore, séeing that this cause is vnderstoode by a perpetuall kinde of being, and doth consist in this poynt, it is necessary that that creature do remaine in safetie, which was thus created, and do and suffer those thinges which bée a­gréeable to the nature thereof, both the partes whereof it consisteth, doing that which in them lyeth, so that the minde doth continue and remaine inua­riable in the nature wherin it was crea­ted. For it was therfore created, to bry­dell the affectiōs of the body, & to estéeme with séemely iudgement, and measure, with vpright measures whatsoeuer be­falleth: But the body was ordeyned to this ende, that it should incline it selfe to suche thinges, as be naturall, & receyue those alteratiōs, which are attributed to it by nature, and that amongest other chaūges, which happen vnto it, either in age, or beautie, or bignesse, it should ad­mit the resurrection.

For the resurrection is a kinde of [Page] chaunge, and that the last of all, and also the alteration into a better thing, which then shalbe in the bodies of them, which be a liue.

We are as sure of these things, as we are of them, which haue already happe­ned, and considering our owne nature, wee do not beare impacientlye this our néedy, and corruptible life, as agréeable to this present world, and we constantly hoope for Eternitie of life, rydde of all corruption, whiche wée do not grounde vpon the inuentions of men, féeding our selues with a vayne hope, but we beleue an vnfayned and sufficient witnesse (na­melye the reason and ordinaunce of the creatour) according to the which, he hath framed man of a soule immortall, and a body, which also he hath endued with reason and equitye, geuen by nature to conserue, and kéepe his giftes, and those things, which be agréeable to a discrete life, and a minde endued with reason.

Whereby we knowe well enough, that God would not haue ordeyned such a creature, nor furnished it with all thinges necessarye for perpetuall conti­nuance, if he would not haue it continue, which he had in such sorte created.

[Page] Wherefore, if the maker of the world created mā, that he should vse wisedome in all his doinges, and that being made a beholder of his magnificence, and wisedome, whiche he declared in eue­rye place: with the cōtemplation of these thinges should continue, and that accor­ding to his purpose, and will, and the na­ture, which he ingendered in them, truly the cause of the creation doth confirme, and make credible an endlesse continu­aunce, and this continuance a resurrec­tion, without the which man cannot con­tinue.

It is manifest therfore by those things which haue béen spoken, namely by the cause of the beginning, and the will of the creatour, that the resurrection is cō ­firmed.

Séeing that therfore the cause is such, why man was brought into the world, it shalbe now expedient to consider those thinges which by naturall order, do fol­lowe the former reasons.

For if we weigh, and consider this bu­sinesse, the nature of men created doth followe the cause of their creation, and the iuste iudgemente of the creatour vpon them, doth followe the nature of [Page] men created, and after all these, follo­weth the end, why they liue.

Séeing that therefore those thinges, which go before be playnly declared, the nature of men must be hereafter decla­red, and that either by true opinions, or by inquisitions, what sorte soeuer they be of.

That demonstration doth get a credite not inconstant to those thinges whiche are spoken, whiche hath his beginning not from some thing, or place, which is without the matter, or doth arise of the opinions, or decrees of others: but doth arise of common vnderstanding, or is gathered by the consequence of those thinges, which be last, to them which be first.

For that, is either of the first decrées, or of those thinges, which only by war­ning, do stirre vp, and as it were, rayse out of sléepe naturall vnderstanding, or of those thinges, which naturally in fel­lowship do cleaue vnto the first decrées, and be of naturall consequence.

And it behooueth him, which declareth this order, to make playne, what doth follow consequently the first, or the last, in déede that he do not negligētly handle [Page] either the trueth, or some assertion pro­céeding from the trueth, neither confoūd those thinges whiche be repugnant in nature, or peruert the naturall order of thinges.

Wherfore, I thinke it expediente for them which take paine in this argumēt, and do desire wisely to determine, whe­ther ther be any resurrectiō of mens bo­dies, first to consider the force of those thinges, whiche do make this demon­stration, the partes being compared to­gether, and what place euery thing doth obtaine, and what difference is betwéen these thinges, and the first, seconde, and thirde, and last of all what doeth consiste in the last place. In placing of these thinges in order, it behooueth that the cause be declared why man was created that is to say, the minde and purpose of y^e creator, for the which he tooke in hande to create man. Afterwarde, the nature of man (which in order obteyneth the se­conde place) muste bée fitlye placed and applyed, partly because we cannot iudge of both at once, partlye because they bée both together, & do bring the same fur­theraūce to this present purpose: partly also because by these thinges, as chiefe, & [Page] principall, and drawing their beginning from the workemanship of God, the re­surrection is playnly declared: notwith­standing by the rule of wisedome also a man maye gather the certentye of this thing.

I say the rule of wisedome doth con­siste in this, that rewardes, and punish­mentes according to iust iudgemēt, may be bestowed vpon euery man, according to his desertes, and that the end of them do aunswere to theyr life.

For many which haue taken in hande to dispute of the resurrection, did assay to bring all their businesse to effecte, onely for that which is thirde, thinking y^e cause of the resurrection of men to be only for iudgement.

But that is manifestly prooued false, because that all men rise againe, yet all that rise againe are not iudged.

For if only the iustice of iudgemente be the cause of the resurrection, it should necessarylye followe, that they, whiche haue not at all offended, or haue commit­ted notable actes in their liues, should be exempt from the resurrection, and they also, which in the beginning of their age, do ende their life, which they themselues [Page] also thinke sufficient, that the resurrec­tion be not for iudgement, according to the principall cause, but according to the determination, and appointment of the creatour, and the nature of that, which is created.

But séeing that the onely cause of the creation of man doth suffice, if it be well looked vpon, to confirme the resurrectiō, which by the naturall guyding of reason doth followe the bodies being dissolued, yet peraduenture it shalbe reason to omit nothing of those, which we haue ap­pointed, and to declare in cōuenient or­der the power & efficasie of the causes, then afterwarde of those thinges that followe, for the behoofe of such men, as cannot perceyue those thinges by their owne wit, and amongst other things to set foorth the nature of men created, whi­che doth leade vs to the knowledge of the same matter, and doth bréede as great credite to the resurrection.

For if the whole nature of man doth consist of an immortal soule, and a body made fit according to his creation, and if God haue attributed neither to y^e soule by it selfe, nor to the bodye alone, suche a beginning or life, but vnto perfit men, [Page] which are made of both these parts, that whilest they liue, vsing the same partes, of the which they receyued their begin­ning, and life, they mighte come to the same common ende, and rewarde, it is necessarye, séeing one creature is made of both these partes, whiche is endued with all the affections both of the minde and bodye, which doth, and exerciseth all thinges, that requyre the iudgement ei­ther of the senses or of reason, that the whole course of these things be referred to some ende, that all thinges, and in all pointes, both the beginning of man, and the nature of man, and the life of man, and whatsoeuer hée doth, or suffereth, & the ende agréeing to his nature, do run together to one consente, and mutuall combination.

But if there be one consent, or harmo­nie of euery liuing creature, and a mu­tual passion, and participation of affecti­ons, both of those which haue theyr be­ginning from the minde, as also of those which procéede from the body, it is neces­sary that in all these, there remaine one ende, and one rewarde, but there shalbe one ende in déede, when the same crea­ture shall consist of both his partes, whi­che [Page] shall happen for the endes sake: but the same creature shall perfitly consist, when those thinges shalbe present with it, and those partes restored to it, by the which his perfitnesse is absolued.

But the renuing of the same men, doth declare that the resurrection of dead bo­dies doth necessaryly followe, whether the selfe same partes can not bee natu­rally ioyned together, or the same men restored, or returne again to their owne nature.

If therefore, minde and reason be ge­uen to men, to the ende that they shoulde iudge, not onely of intelligible, substan­ces but of the wisedome, iustice, & good­nesse of him, that gaue these thinges: it is necessary that if those things remayne for whose sake this reasonable iudgemēt was geuen, reasonable iudgemēt should also remayne, whiche was geuen to di­scerne those thinges.

But it is impossible y^t this iudgement should cōtinue, vnlesse that the nature do eke continue, which kepeth & cherisheth it, in the seate & resting place therof: but man is he, which receyueth wit & rea­son into him, and not the soule by it selfe, therfore it must néedes be, that man con­sisting [Page] of both partes, do continue for euer. But it is impossible for him to con­tinue for euer, vnlesse he rise agayne. For vnlesse a resurrection be a meane, man in no case can endure. And if the nature of man can not endure, the soule was in vayne mingled with the néedi­nesse of the body & the accidents, and af­fections therof.

The bodye also is in vayne vnto the soule, geuing place to the regiment ther­of, and is bridled by it to the ende it may obtaine y^e thing, which it desireth. And in vaine is minde, in vayne wisedome, in vaine the obseruation of iustice, and ex­ercise of vertue among men, and the ap­pointing, and disposing of lawes, is to no purpose. And to be short, what soeuer is commendable in men, & by mens pro­curement, is in vayne. Yea, & that which is greater, the very engendring and na­ture of men is in vayne.

Wherefore, if all vainenesse bee all together excluded from all the workes of God, and his function, it is necessary that the continuance of the bodye in hys nature be coeternall with the immorta­litie of the soule.

Let no man maruayle, that wée call [Page] life cutten in sunder by death, and cor­ruption, a continewing, sith wee are not ignoraunt, that there is not one only sig­nification of the worde, nor one only ma­ner of continewing, and no maruayle séeing the nature of thinges continuing, is not all one. For euery thing according to the nature therof hath her proper con­tinuance. You shall not finde in those things which are wholly incorruptible, and immortall, a like, and vniforme con­tinuaunce, because the substaunces of the things aboue, are not like the things beneath.

Neither is it conuenient to require in men a continuaunce euer like vnto it self, indistinct without any variety, as in those thinges is, which from the be­ginning were created immortall, and do onely by the appoyntment of the crea­tor continue euerlastingly, but that mē haue their continnaunce according to the soule from their creation without a­ny alteration or chaunge. But according to the nature of the body, men haue im­mortalitie by a chaunge. For the cause of the resurrection doth require it, & loo­king thervpon, wée looke for the dissolu­tion of the body, as it, which followeth [Page] this néedy, and corruptible life, and after ward we hope for an incorruptible con­tinuance without alteration, neither making our end like to the end of bruite beastes, neither to the continuaunce of those thinges, which be immortall, lest for the lacke of knowledge in this mat­ter we make the nature and life of men equall, and like to those thinges, which we ought not.

Wée must not therfore be troubled. If there be any inequality espied in y^e per­duration of men, neither oughte wée to dispayre of the resurrection, when the separating of the soule from her bodylye members, and the dissoluing of the bo­dyly members from it do dispart the cō ­tinuall tenoure of the life.

For although the bringing a sléepe of the senses, & of other naturall strengths, which naturally doth arise in mans rest, & for a season do slumber, and in a ma­ner are again reuiued, do séeme to cut a sunder the sensible life, yet wée do not refuse to count it a life, for which cause, I thinke, some men dooe call sléepe the brother of death, not because they would therby declare the stocke of them as though they came of one aunceters, & [Page] parentes, but because like thinges hap­pen to them, which be a sléepe, and to thē which be dead in respecte of the rest and quietnesse of the senses, when they vn­derstande nothing of thinges present, or which are then done, nay they perceyue not themselues either to be, or to liue.

If therfore wee do not refuse, to call the life of man, being full of suche ine­qualitie euen from mans birth vnto his death, & interrupted by all those meanes which we haue before rehearsed, a life: then ought we not to dispayre of the life, which is ordeyned to succéede our dissolu­tiō, which bringeth together with it y^e re­surrectiō, although for a season it be cuttē a sunder, by the departure of the soule from the body.

For the nature of men posseding from the beginning, and that according to the decrée of the creatour, an inequalitie attributed vnto it, hath an vnequall lyfe, and a continuance, distinct some­time by sléepe, sometime by death, & by diuerse alterations of ages, so that the first do not playnlye appeare, when the last do sodenlye come vpon them.

For who woulde beléeue, vnlesse he were taught by experience of thinges, [Page] that so great force lyeth hid in the moist and softe séede, or that such diuersitye of bignesse, and greatnesse, whiche ariseth and is framed therof, is hidde therin, na­mely of bones, sinewes, gristles, and al­so of muscles, fleshe, and bowelles, and other partes of the bodie?

For in the séede, being yet moist, a man can perceyue no suche thing, nor in chil­dren be those thinges perceyued, which in young men do encrease, nor those thinges do appeare in youth, whiche the estate of man possesseth: nor agayne in the state of man, which age hath.

But although amongst those thinges, which are sayde before, some do nothing at all, and some but obscurelye declare the naturall chaunges, and alterations comming on men, yet notwithstanding they, which are not blinded with naugh­tinesse, and sluggishnesse, do know, what we must iudge of these things. For first of all it is requyred, that the séede bée sowen, afterwarde when, it is separated into partes, & ioyntes, & the young ones being nowe fashioned do come to light, receyue in their first age height, af­ter their height the absolute perfection of the whole bodye, after a while commeth [Page] on the naturall decreasing of strength, which prolongeth it selfe euen vnto old age, then at the last, when the bodies are worne awaye, dissolution commeth on.

Like as therefore in this businesse, nei­ther the séede by any likenesse, or simili­tude, doth declare, either the life, or forme of man, nor the life doth foreshewe the dissolution, wherwith the ioyning toge­ther of partes shalbe resolued into the first element, yet the order, and guyding of naturall euentes doth get credit to those thinges, which in their owne ap­parence, and shew, do séeme to deserue no credite: euen so reason by searching the naturall consequence, finding the trueth, doth establishe the resurrection, (which is much more certayne, then ex­perience, to prooue those sayinges, wher­with a litle before we endeuoured to get credite to the resurrection) and that ther­fore because we are all of one [...] kindred, as procéeding frō one & the [...] beginning. For our beginning procée­deth from the procreation of our first pa­rentes, whome God created.

But some men euē from the beginning, whence they come are established to be­léeue, other some following nature, and [Page] the life of man, as their guide, do get be­leife, of the wisedome of God toward vs.

For the cause, according to the which, and for the which mē were borne, agrée­ing with the nature of men, doth obteine her force, by the workemanship of man created.

But the cause of iustice, according to the which God will iudge men, whether they liue well, or ill, doth take his force from the ende of men. For therefore are men borne. But it dependeth rather vpō the prouidence of God.

Séeing that therefore those thinges be declared, and prooued by vs, as fare as we coulde, which were of the first order, let vs declare nowe also those thinges that follow. But I speake of the reward and punishment, which according to iust iudgement, shalbe bestowed vppon eue­ry man according to his desertes, and of [...] which shalbe correspondent to [...] of man. But let that bée done in such order, that such thinges go before, as be naturally of the first place, and first let vs entreate of the cause of the iudge­ment, which words we therefore speake, because we haue a care of the cheife stay and order of this disputation in hande, [Page] and because it behooueth them, which admit God, as the creatour of the whole worlde, to attribute the charge, & care of all thinges to his wisedome, and iustice, if so be y^t they will sticke vnto the foun­dation appointed, & the principles once allowed.

Furthermore, séeing they be of this opinion, it is reason, that they thinke no­thing either of thinges terrestriall, or celestiall to be destitute of the care and prouidence of God, but that the care of the creatour doth extende it selfe vnto all thinges indifferentlye, as well vnto those which be open, as those, which be hid, and vnto those, which be great, as those which be smal. For al things, whi­che be, haue neede of the prouidence of their creatour, but euerye thing pecu­liarly according to his nature, & for that purpose, for which it was created.

For I do not thinke it expedient, with much labour particularly to declare, and distinguish with diuisiōs, what is agrée­able to the nature of euery thing. Man truely, of whom we nowe entreate, as he is hungry, hath néede of meate, as hée is mortall, hath néede of succession of children, as he is endued with reason, [Page] hath néede of iudgement.

But he hath néede of iudgement, that he may lawfully labour for liuing, and succession.

But it is necessary, that séeing suste­naunce, and succession do pe rtayne to that, which consisteth of both partes, iud­gemēt also do perteyn to the same. But I call that whiche is compounde of both partes, a man consisting of a soule, and a body, and such a man to be accused of all thinges, which he doth, so that he recey­ueth either a rewarde, or punishmēt for them.

If therefore the sentence of iust iudge­ment be pronounced against that, which consisteth of both parts, according to his doinges, it cannot be, that the soule alone should receyue either rewarde, or puni­shement for those thinges, which it com­mitted with the body.

For the soule by it selfe is not touched with those offences, which are commit­ted by the pleasures of y^e body, or meate, or apparell: neither must y^e body receyue rewarde, or punishment, because it per­ceyueth not the daunger of lawes, & iud­gement, but man which cōsisteth of both these partes, must receyue iudgement [Page] for all his doinges.

But you can perceyue by no meane, that this doth happen in this life, for that is not lawfully obserued in this present life, séeing that we sée many, which are wicked, and abounde in all iniquitie, to persist voyd of any misfortune euen vn­till death, & we sée them, which are well knowen for there vertue, to spende their life in suffering gréefes, vexations, sclaū ­ders, reproches, and al kind of affliction. Neither can you perceyue it after death, for that which consisteth of both partes doth not remayne, séeing the soule is se­parated from the body, and the bodye it selfe dissolued into those thinges, of whi­che it was first made, and nothing now remayneth, whiche reserueth the olde forme, or nature, or yet the memorye of those thinges, which are done.

Wherefore, that which followeth is euident, namelye that (as the Apostle sayth) this corruptible being dissolued, must put on incorruption, that those bo­dies which be dead, being made aliue by the resurrection, and those thinges being ioyned together agayne, which were cast a sunder, or altogether consumed, euery man may iustlye receyue those thinges, [Page] whiche he hath committed by reason of the body, whether they be good, or ill.

Against them therefore, which do ad­mit the prouidence of God, and receyue the same principles, and groundes, whi­che we do, and afterwarde (I know not howe) do shrinke, and reuolt from those opinions, which they receyued, & thought well of, you may vse such woordes, and other much more plentifull: if you will dilate at large those thinges, which haue béen spoken briefely, & in fewe wordes. But against such, as make a doubt con­cerning the principles them selues, it shalbe good to appoint another principle, and ground before these, y^t in the meane time wee maye imagine thinges, that maye be doubted of, and must be sear­ched out by questions, which they doubte of, namely whether the life, and maners of men be neglected, and darkened with the grosse shadowe of the earth, which hideth, and wrappeth in ignoraunce, and silence both the men themselues, and also their déedes.

Or which is much more certen, whe­ther wée must thinke, the creatour to be ruler of the thinges created, and to bée the obseruer, and iudge of all thinges, [Page] whiche are done, or committed, as well déedes, as thoughtes.

For if there shall at no time be iudge­ment of the actes of men, then men shal haue no preheminence aboue bruite beastes, and they shalbe in worse case, then bruite beasts, which do bring their affections vnder bondage, and do greatly regarde, and honour godlinesse, iustice, & other vertues. Cōtrarywise, the beastly and sauage life shalbe counted best, and vertue on the other side a foolish thing, the threatens of iudgment worthy to be laughed at, and to followe pleasure the happyest thing of all, & that shalbe coun­ted the common decrée, and chiefe lawe of all men, which is pleasant to naughty­packes, and riotous persons, let vs eate and drinke, for to morow wee shall dye.

For the ende of suche a life, is not pleasure, as some men thinke, but a full voydnesse of perceyuing.

If therfore the creatour hath some care of his creatures, and the iudgement of good, or euill actes shall at any time ap­proch, it shalbe either while they do wel, or ill in this present life, or after death, as long as they consist in dissolution, and separation. But neither waye can you [Page] finde that iust iudgement is obserued.

For good men in this presente life do not receyue the rewardes of vertue, nor euill men punishment for their wicked­nesse, that I maye in the meane time let passe, that as long as the nature, wherein wée nowe are doth continue in safetye, the nature of man cannot abyde sufficient punishment for his manifold, & gréeuous offences. For when a théefe, or prince, or tyrant doth heap innume­rable murders of men one vpō another, it cannot be, that he can make satisfactiō for his sinnes by one death. Whē also a man doth thinke nothing truely of God, and hath liued in al voluptuousnesse, and blasphemie, hath despised all the diuine commaundementes, hath broken the lawes, hath cōmitted whoredome both with women, and children, hath iniu­riously ouerthrowne Cities, hath burnt houses with the inhabitants, hath spoy­led prouinces, hath destroyed by slaugh­ter great people, and countryes, & whole nations: how can he in this corruptible body suffer condigne punishment for his desertes, séeing death doth preuent his deserued tormentes, and this mortall nature is not sufficient to punish duely [Page] one offence.

Therfore in this present life, the iudg­ment of euery mā according to his wor­thinesse, and desert, can not be declared, nor after death, for death is a destroying of the whole life altogether, if the soule perish, and be putrified together with the body.

Or els truely the soule remayneth, & cannot be dissolued, nor broke in sunder, nor corrupted, but the body is dissolued, kéeping no longer the remembraunce of things done, or the sense of such things, as happen vnto it.

For if the whole life of man be vtter­lye destroyed, there appeareth no respect or care of men, neither doth there séeme any iudgment ordeyned for well or euill doing: but whatsoeuer wickednesse is in a lawlesse life, will approch, and ouer­flowe again, and other inconueniences, which such a life doth bring with it, as a flocke of companiōs, and amongst them impietie the denyer of God, whiche is chiefe, & ruler of that life, in whiche men liue without lawe.

And if the body be corrupt, and as eue­ry part is dissolued, so it departeth to the elementes, which be of the same nature, [Page] but the soule doth continue by it self in­corrupt, yet there shall not be place to iudge the soule, when iustice shall not be present.

But it is an heynous offence to suspect any iudgement to procéede from God, or of God, in which iustice is not present: but iustice is not present whē he remay­neth not in safety, and capable of iudge­ment, which committed iust, or vniuste actes, but he that committed all thinges in his life, which muste be iudged, was man, and not the soule alone, to be short this kinde of dealing doth defende iustice in no poynt.

For in receyuing rewardes for things well done, vndoubtedly the bodye shall suffer wrong, because it was partaker of the trauayle in doing thinges wel, and nowe is not partaker of the honor which is rendred for well doing: and séeing par­don is often graunted to the soule for di­uerse offences, in respect of the néede and necessitie of the body, if the body be disa­poynted of the rewardes, for the which whilest life lasted, it suffered laboures, howe shall it be counted not vniust?

Contrarywise, if wickednesse be condē ­ned, the soule shalbe iniuriouslye dealte [Page] withall, if it alone suffer punishemente for those thinges, which it committed in life time, at the suggestion of the bodye, drawing it to his owne appetites, and motions, whilest some time it is lead from that, which is honest by violence, sometime by stealth, sometime it is drawen by a violent inclination, & some time it geueth it selfe to vices, for to gratifie, and slatter the fellowship of the bodye.

Or howe, I pray you, is it not vniust, that the soule only should be condēpned for those things, to the which according to his own nature, it hath neither desire, nor motion, nor inclination, as super­fluitie in carnall pleasure, violence, co­uetousnesse, iniustice, & other offences, which are committed for this cause?

For if many offences be committed, because men cannot well rule their in­ordinate affections, and the affections kéepe a whurly burly to this ende, that they maye helpe, and remidy the néede, and necessitie of the body.

For they prepare all thinges for the behoofe of these thinges, that thereby a man may come to the vse, and fruition, and also mariages are begon, and other [Page] businesse, which happen in the life time, in which, and about which euery thing, that is worthye either of prayse, or dis­praise, is cōsidered. Where is here equi­ties, séeing the soule is condemned for those things, which the body is destrous of, and draweth the minde to the felow­ship of the same affection, that it maye obtayne the thing desired? And séeing desire, pleasure, feare, gréefe, the vnru­linesse of which affectiōs is subiect to iud­gement, haue their beginning from the body, notwithstanding the offences pro­céeding from thence, and the punishmēts for them, do lye vpō y^e soules shoulders, which required no such thing, which de­sired no such thing, nor feared, nor suf­fered any such thing by it selfe, as man is accustomed to suffer.

Furthermore, if wée say, that they be affections not onely of the bodye, but of man, because he hath a life consisting of both partes: yet can we not affirme, that they pertayne to the soule, if wée playn­lye beho [...]de the proper matter therof.

For if it haue no néede at all of anye nourishment, it will neuer desire those thinges, whose vse it requireth not to conserue his being, neither will it be ra­uished [Page] with those thinges, which by na­ture it doth not inioye, nor yet be sorye for the want of mony, and possessions, as thinges nothing perteyning vnto it.

Wherefore, if it remayne frée from corruption, it feareth nothing, that may destroy it. For it feareth not hūger or sic­kenes, or mayming, or mangling, or fire or sworde, because it can take no misfor­tune, or hurt by these thinges, séeing no bodye, or that which hath a bodye, can touch it in any point.

If therfore it be absurde, to ascribe the affections peculiarly to the soule, it is also great iniurye, and farre from the iudgement of God, to attribute the pu­nishment of them to the soule.

Beside these things, which haue bene spoken, how, I pray you, is it not vniust, that although the vertues, and vices can not bée considered to remayne, spe­cially in the soule, séeing we throughlye perceyue, that all vertues of men, as al­so vices contrarye to vertues, bee not in the soule separated frō the bodye, and consisting by it selfe, yet we wil referre the punishment, and rewarde of them to the soules alone?

Or how I praye you can a man per­ceyue [Page] valiaunce, and manlinesse in ad­uenturing daungers to bée onely in the mynde, whiche feareth neither death, nor wounds, nor mayming, nor hurt, nor re­prochfull handeling, nor those gréefes or miscries which happen thereby?

Or how againe can you perceiue tem­peraunce, and wisedome, where no de­sire doth allure the minde to meat, or na­turall copulation, or any other pleasure, or delight, and where nothing either dis­turbeth within, or prouoketh without?

Or last of all, howe can you imagine prudence, when the matter of thinges to bée chosen, or to bée eschued, doeth not perteyne vnto the Soules, séeing the matter of choyse in doing thinges is not subiecte to the soule, or rather no mo­tion, or naturall inclination is in it to do any thing.

But where is there at all any fit iu­stice amongste the soules, whether you consider thinges of the same nature, or thinges externall, or from whence, or to whome, or by what means, shall they geue that, which is right, according to the worthynesse of euery man, or accor­ding to proportion? Trulye there is no such thing, if you except the honour to be [Page] bestowed by them vpon GOD, séeing they haue no inclination, or motion, ei­ther to vse their owne, or absteyne from other mens, séeing vse and abstinence is séene in those thinges, whiche by na­ture haue néede of such things. Contra­rywise the soule is so borne that it née­deth no such thing, and thence is it, that you can not perceyue the propre vse of the members in a thing so ingendered.

Furthermore, this is moste absurbe, that the lawes made, should be referred to men, and the punishmente of the lawes wrested to the soules alone.

For if he whiche receyued the lawe, ought also rightlye receyne punishment for breaking the lawe, and man recey­ued the lawe, and not the soule alone, it is right, that man suffer punishment for his offences, and not the soule alone.

For truely God commaunded not the soules, to abstreyne from thinges vn­lawfull, as adulteries, murders, théefts, robberies, and from contempte of pa­rentes, and all hurtfull, and vniust de­sire of other mens goodes.

For this commaundement, honour thy, father and mother, doth not apper­taine vnto the soules, séeing such names [Page] do not belong to them. For one soule doth not beget another, that it may chalenge to it selfe therby the name of a parent. But one man begetteth another.

And furthermore this commaundemēt, thou shalt not commit adulterye, can not bée spoken, or vnderstoode aptlye of the soules, séeing in them there is no discretiō of y^e masculine, or feminine kinde, or apt­nesse, or desire of carnall copulation, and where y^e desire is not, it is impossible, that y^e mixture should be made. But amongst whom such mixture is not, truely lawful copulation, namely which is in wedlocke cannot be found, & where such copulatiō, as is in wedlocke, is not, there also vn­lawfull desire of carnall companye with another mans wife (for that is adultery) hath no place.

Moreouer, the precept of eschuing theft, or desire of too muche, doth not serue for the soules. For they haue no néede of such thinges, as they that haue néede of, do get for themselues for their naturall néede, or necessitie, either by thefte, or robbery, as golde, siluer, cattell, or any thing els ne­cessary, either for meate, or apparell.

For that is vnprofitable for an immor­tall nature, which is desired of them, that [Page] néede, because it is profitable.

But let a more curiouse trade be left for them, whiche desire more diligentlye to search out these thinges, or more earnest­lye striue with our aduersaryes.

But séeing those things, which haue bene spoken before, be sufficiēt for vs, & agrée­able with these things, & as it were with one consent do establish the resurrection, it doth not séeme conuenient to tary lon­ger in them.

For we did not direct our purpose to this marke, that wée should omit nothing, that belongeth to this matter, but that wée might briefly declare to all them, that are come hyther, what men oughte to thinke concerning the resurrection, and that by the force of those things, that we haue al­ready spoken, they mighte measure the force of other reasons, belonging to the same purpose.

Séeing those thinges, whiche wée had in hande be searched out, and examined, it remayneth nowe, that wée consider the cause of the ende, already playne, and euidēt, which hath néede of no care more, then that it bée added to the rest, lest it séeme either to be omitted by reason of obliuion, or hinder the argument in hand, [Page] and diuision made in the beginning. For these causes, and other belonging to the same purpose, it shall bée conuenient, to declare the matter only for this cause because those things, whiche consist by nature or arte, haue their peculiar ends, which custome, & common vnderstan­ding doth teach, & those things which are before our eyes, do witnesse the same.

Do wée not sée one ende ordeyned for husbandmen, another for Phisicions, and againe one for those thinges, which growe out of the earth, another for crea­tures liuing therby, and ingendered ac­cording to a naturall order, and sequele of succession?

Wherefore, if it bée euidente, and necessarye, that naturall, and artificiall faculties, and the actes of them do fol­lowe their ende, euery one according to his nature: it is necessarye altoge­ther, that the ende of man, be excepted from the communiō of the rest, as a pe­culiar nature.

For it is not lawful to assigne one end to those things, which lacke reasonable iudgement, and those, which according to naturall lawe, and reason dooe their actions, and vse wisedome, and iustice [Page] in life.

Neither therfore voydnesse of gréefe is y^e proper, & peculiar end of these things. (For you maye finde that also in those, that bee without sense) nor yet the en­ioying of those thinges, whiche delight, or nourish the body, nor aboundance of pleasures. Otherwise it were necessa­rye, y^t the beastly life did excell, & the life adorned with vertues were an vnperfit thing. For such an end is proper to bea­stes, and cattell, & doth not perteyne to men, which haue an immortall soule, & reasonable iudgement, nor yet the feli­city of the soule separate from the body.

For we do not looke vpon either the life, or end of either parte, of which man consisteth, but on that, whiche hath ful­nesse, and perfection of both partes.

For man which hath receiued this life, is such a one. And it is necessary, that he haue a proper end, agréeable to his life.

Wherfore, if an end must be ordeyned for that, which is both together, namely for that which consisteth both of soule & body, & you cannot finde it, neither while he continueth in this life, for the causes now oftentimes alleged, nor then, when y^e soule is separate frō the body, because [Page] man must be thought no such thing, whē his bodye is dissolued, or wholye disper­sed, although the soule remayne by it selfe, it is altogether necessarye that the end of men do appeare in some other recomposition, and renuing of both par­tes, and the same creature, and séeing that doth followe of necessitie, it is ne­cessary also, that there be a resurrection of bodyes dead, and wholye dissol­ued, and that the same men be made a­gayne, séeing that the law of nature doth commaunde not euery ende, nor of all men, b [...]t of those, which liued in the for­mer life. But it is impossible for y^e same men to be made again, vnlesse the same bodyes be restored to their soules. But that the bodye receyue the same soule, can by no other meane be broughte to passe, then by the resurrection.

For when that cōmeth to passe, an apt ende doth followe the nature of men, an ende trulye of: a [...] life, and reasona­ble iudgment. A man shall not offend if he saye it is it, that wée maye for euer cleaue, and continue with those thinges, wherwith chiefely, and especially natu­rall reason doth agrée, and consent, and that in respecte, and consideratiō of him, [Page] which is, & for the behoofe of those things which it plesed him to promise, although the common sort of men more earnestly, and vehemetlye desire such thinges, as are nowe presentlye, and dooe nothing estéeme or regarde this ende. For the multitude of suche, as do leaue, and go from the ende agréeable to them, doth not wea [...] [...] common ordinaunce of duety [...] a peculiar examina­tion is [...]pointed against that, and puni [...]ment, and rewardes or­ [...]ned, which be corres­pondent to the mea­sure of well or euill do­ing.