Of Artes. The firſt Chapiter.

EUery art, euery doctrine, eueri operaciō, and euery election, ſemethe to require ſō thynge to bee good: thē it was wel ſaid of the Philoſophers. Good is that whiche euery thing deſireth. According vnto diuerſe artes, diuers intencions: Some ben finiſhed in workes, & other that bene no workes. Although they be many Artes or craftes, euerye one hath his finall intencion.

¶ Example, Phiſike intendeth helth, & knighthod victory, ſhip worke intendeth ſailynge: Gouernance of houſolde intendeth to haue riches. There be Artes generall and artes alſo that bee ſpeciall. ¶ Example, The ſcience of knighthode is generall vnder the whiche ben conteined other artes particulars, as Sa delars, Armorers, & other craftes which may be nedeful in batel, and theſe vniuerſal be more worthy & more noble than bene the particulars, becauſe, the particulars bee for the vniuerſalles, as thynges whyche bee made by nature, and beene an vtter and fynall vnderſtandynge, vnto the whiche bene ordeyned al the operacion of theſe craftes. As a man that ſhoteth at his pricke for his marke: So euery craft hath his final intent whiche doth ſet forth the worke. Then the art Ciuil that teacheth to rule Cities is principall and ſoueraine of all other artes, for vnder her ben conteined diuerſe artes. Rethorique is alſo righte noble, for why? ſhe dothe diſpoſe and ſet in order al the other that bee conteined vnder her: The fulneſſe whereof and end, is the fulnes and intēt of al the other. Than the wealth that foloweth hir ſcience is the welth of man, Becauſe, it doth cōſtrain from enyls. The ryghte doctryne is that a man procede therein accordynge as his nature maye ſuſtayne.

¶ Example, He that teacheth Geometry, ought to procede by ſtrong argumentes, which bene named demonſtraciōs: & he that teacheth Rethorique oughte to procede by argumentes ſembla bles or very like. And this is for to witte, that euery artificer ſhoulde iudge well and ſaye the truthe of that whiche apperteyneth to his craft. The ſcience of rulyng of cities belongeth not to chyldren, nor to men that foloweth theyr owne wylles: For they be not wyſe in two ſortes, neither in age nor in manners, yet ſomtyme olde of tyme and young in maners, and childe of tyme and olde in maners, then to ſuche is conuenient to be rulers of cities whyche be no children of maners nor folowers of their owne willes.

¶ There be thynges whiche be manifeſt vnto nature, and thinges that be manifeſte vnto vs, from whence this ſcience ought to be geuen. Of the thīges that be manifeſt vnto vs, a man that ſhould ſtudy in this ſcience and learne it, oughte to vſe himſelfe in thynges good, iuſte and honeſte. Alſo he ought to haue his mind naturally diſpoſed to ſcyence. But a man that hath none of theſe thynges is vnprofytable to this ſcience.

Of the thre liues. Ca. ii.

THe lifes of name & fame bene thre: the one is the life of cō cupyſcence, the other is ye lyfe Ciuil: that is to ſaye the life of honour and prudence: the thyrde is the life contēplatiue. There be many that liue beſtly, which is called the life of concupiſcence, for that thei folow their willes, and echone of theſe liues is for their propre intent, deuided one from the other: as the arte of Phiſike is deuided frō the art of knight hode, and as the Phyſician intendeth helth, ſo the knight will haue battayle and victory.

Of good. Capi. iii.

GOod is conſidered in two ſortes, the one is good for hī ſelfe, another good is that a man deſireth for other. Good for thy ſelf is beatitude. Good for other is honoure and vertue. And why woulde a man haue theſe thynges, but for to be happy? A naturall thyng it is to euery man to bee a Citiezen and to be accuſtomed with Artificers, and not naturally to inhabite ī deſertes there where is no company which naturally a man loueth. Beatitude is a thyng complete that nedethe none other thynge withoute it ſelfe, by the whyche the lyfe of man is laudable and glorious. Thē is beatitude the greteſt welth and the moſt ſoueraiue thing a man can haue.

¶ Here is deuided the powers of the Solle. Capi. iiii.

THe Solle of man hath thre powers, one is called ye lyfe vegitable: in y• whiche mā is partener with trees & with plantes: The ſecond power, is the life ſenſible in the whiche a man is partener with beaſtes, for why al beaſtes haue lifes ſēſible. The third, is called ſolle reaſonable, by the whiche a man differeth from all other thinges, for there is none reaſonable but man. And this power reaſonable is ſometyme in acte, and ſometime in power, frome whence the Beatitude is whan it is in acte and not whan it is in power.

¶ Euery worke that a man doeth, is ether good or eiuell, and that man that maketh his work good, is worthi to haue the perfection of the vertue of his workes: as we wold ſay, he that har peth well, is worthy to haue the prayſe of his art, and the euel to haue the cōtrary. Thē if the life of man, be according to the operacion of reſon, than his life is laudable, whan he leadethe it accordyng to his propre vertue. But when many vertues be gathered together in one mans liuyng, then the life of that man is moſt beſt and muche honored & much worthy, ſo that it can be no more. For it is not one vertue that maketh a mā bleſſed or happy, No more than one Swalowe is a perfight token of the newe ſpring. Then it is not in a lytel time of the life of man, that he doeth good workes, nor can be ſaid, that man is happy.

¶ Of thre maner of welthes. Capitulo .v.

VUelth is deuided in thre partes, the one is the welthe of the ſolle, the other is the welthe of the bodie, and the other is the welthe with out the body. And of theſe thre the welth of the Solle is moſte worthy, and the fourme thereof is not knowen but in woorkes, which be with vertue. ¶ Beatitude cōſiſteth in the obteinyng of vertues & in the vſīg of thē. But whā beatitude is in a man in habite and not in dede or act, than he is vertuous as a man that ſleapeth, whoſe vertue and whoſe workes are not manifeſt, but of neceſſite muſt nedes work accordyng to the arte, and is in ſimilitude to him that ſtandeth in trauers and feightes, obtaineth & hath the croūe: although there be no more ſtronger than he that hathe the victory, yet he hathe not therfore the crowne becauſe he is moſt ſtrōg, except he feighte: Albeit by his power he get the battayle. And ſo the rewardes of vertue, a man hath not if he beſtowe not himſelfe in vertue actually: and this is for becauſe the reward is the Beatitude which he hath ſo long as he worketh y• workes of vertue.

¶ The iuſte manne deliteth in iuſtice, the wyſe man in Sapyence, the vertuous man in vertue. And euerye worke whyche is doone by vertue, is faire and delectable in it ſelfe. Beatitude is a thing Jocound & pleaſant.

¶ Beatytude that is in yearth hathe neede of outewarde healthe, for it is impoſſyble to a man to dooe faire woorkes and to haue Arte, whyche is ſeemyng to good and vertuous liuing, with abūdance of frēdes. proſperitie of fortune, withoute good outwardly. And therfore it is nedefull to haue withoute forthe, wherby may be the more manifeſt the honour & value of man. And if any gifte be geuen to man in this worlde from the gloryous God, it is a worthye thynge to beleue this to bee the Beatitude, becauſe it is the beſt thyng that may be in man. For whi? it is an honorable and com plet fourme of vertue. There is no generacyon nor kynde that can haue vertue and beatitude but man. There is nether child nor beaſte that can haue Beatitude, for whi? ther works be not according to vertue. Beatitutde is a thing ſtedfaſt and fyrm accordīg to very diſpoſiciō, wherin nether falleth variaunce nor permutaciō, as for to haue now well and nowe euill, but euermore well, and this is the goodnes that is in the workes of mā ▪ The pillers of beatitude be the operacions which a man dothe accordīg to vertue. The pillers of the contrarye, be thoſe that a man doth accordyng to vyce.

Theſe workes be ſtedfaſte and ſtable in the minde of man, and the vertuous manne is not moued nor trobled in him ſelfe for anye thyng that maye happen contrarye, for then he ſhoulde neuer haue felicitee it he be trobled, becauſe ſorowe taketh awaye pleaſure from felicitie.

There be thīges which be hard to be born: but whā a man hath borne theim paciently, he hathe ſhewed the ſtrēgth of his mind: and there be thinges alſo which be light to be borne, in the ſuſtainyng whereof there is no great prudēce ſhewed therein. A hard thyng it is to ſuſtaine ſicknes & death of chyldren: yet although they be ſtrange and harde, they mouenot a man from his Beati tude. The happynes of the man that is wel fortuned, is ſo much to be praiſed, as a thing ſent frō God, and is ſo much to be honored & cōmended: that their laud & praiſe can not be ſpoken: & ſpe cially, it ſhal become vs to glori fye, honor & magnify almyghty god aboue al thinges, & we ought to thinke him in him ſelf to haue in his thought algoodnes & felicite, For whi? he is the begīning & cauſe of algoodnes. Felicite & beatitude ar one certē act, the which procedeth of ye ſolle & of the body. And like as the perfect phiſiciā ſeketh & ſercheth dt ligētly the nature of the body of mā to thentēt to cōfirm it in hel the: Likewiſe tt belongeth vnto good rulers & gouerners of cyties to loke ſtudi & prouide tocō ſerue the form of felicite in ye mides of their citizens, & for to put them in comfort to worke accor ding to vertue which is the pre cious frute y• cōmeth of felicite.

The powers of the ſolle, Chap • ter .vi.

The ſolle of mā hath diuers powers, as one called the power irracional: that is to ſay vnreſonable, wherein a manne differeth not frō plātes & brute beaſtes. And therefore thys is not the propre power in manne. For by this power manne may worke his operacion ſleapyng. The other is the power intellectiue, according to whoſe work after the forme aforſaid, is good and euell. And this power worketh not in ſlepynge but manyfeſtely, & therfore it is ſaid, that the miſerable differeth not from the good in the lymittes of this life. For in the tyme of ſleape, which is the good, ſuch is the euel, and is becauſe that man reſteth from the worke by the whi che he is called good and euell: but this is not treuth generallye, becauſe the myndes of the good, ſeeth ſomtimes in viſions and dreames many good thynges and profitable, Whiche be not ſene in the mindes of eiuell men. The other power that the ſollc hath, although it be not racionall. Yet it taketh part with reaſon, therefore it oughte to obey vnto the vertue of reason, and this is called the vertue cō cupiſſible. And a man oughte to knowe that in the ſolle there ar ſomtime contrary mouinges Lyke as are in the bodye, as whē one membre moueth in the Paralitico or Paulſye it muſte moue againſte nature: but this cōtrary is manifeſt in the bodi, and in the ſolle hid and ſ •• rete. ¶ The power racional is to be ſaid in two ſortes, the one is the power which is very reſonable: that lerneth deſerneth and iudgeth. The other power, vnreaſonable, that is to ſaye, the power concupiſſible, and is called reaſonable as long as it is obedyent & vnder the power of that which is veri reaſonable, as the good child vnto the father, whi che receaueth his correction.

Of two maners of vertues. Chapter .vii.

THere bee two vertues, one is called Intellectuall, as Sapience ſcience and prudence: the other is called Morall, as chaſtitie, liberalitie and humilitie, then if we wyll prayſe a manne in vertue Intellectuall, we ſay this is a wiſe man and ſubtil in vnderſtandynge, and whan we will praiſe a man for his morall vertues, that is to ſai in his ma ners, we ſay this is a chaſt man and a liberall.

Howe vertue groweth in man. Chaptter .viii.

ALthoughe there be ii. vertues, the one intellectual, & the o ther moral, the Intellectuall ingendreth and groweth by doctryne & learnyng. And the moral like wyſe ingendreth & groweth by good vſe and cuſtome, and this vertue moral is not in vs by na ture, for naturall thynges can not be moued from their diſpoſicions by contrary vſe.

¶ Example, the nature of the Stone is to goo down warde, and cannot be caſte ſo hygh but that it preaſeth downe agayne. The nature of the Fyer is to gooe vp: and can not bee dryuen ſo farre downe but that it preaſeth vpwarde. And vniuerſally, nothyng naturall can naturalli worke againſt nature Thē theſe vertues be not in vs by nature: the power to receaue them is in vs by nature, the accompliſſhynge is in vs by vſe. Thē theſe vertues be not put in to vs by nature, but the rootes and fulfillyng of the recepte of thē, is in vs by nature: and the fulnes and perfection of the uncōmeth to vs by vſe. Eueri thīg that is in vs by nature, is in vs firſt bi power: and after cōmeth to the acte, as it commeth to the ſenſes of man. For firſte a man hath power to ſee & to here: and after by this power he heareth and ſeeth: and a man ſeeth not nor hereth before he haue the power to heare and ſee: then nowe we ſee that in theſe thynges of nature: the power goeth before the acte, and in thynges moral, all contrary, for the acte and the worke goeth before the power.

¶ Example, A man hathe the vertue that is called Juſtice be cauſe he hathe dooen ofttymes the workes of Juſtice: Alſo the vertue of Chaſtitie: for that he hath diuerſe times wrought the workes of Chaſtitie. And ſo it is of Artificers, a man is called a Carpenter becauſe he hathe wrought lōg in that art & craft: Art wil not be had without lōg tyme beſtowed therin. Like as the Minſtrel, by the long vſe of Inſtrumēts, bereth the name of that arte: and the good man is good by his good workes, and euel for doynge eiuell: one ſelfe thyng ingendreth in vs vertues & corrupteth. If this thing be done diuerſly, it is by vertue as it is by healthe, for one ſelfe thīg done in diuers faſhions is both cauſe of helth & corrupciō.

¶ Example, labour temperate is helth to mā, and if it be little it corrupteth, to much or to litel corrupteth, & to kepe the meane conſerueth. ¶ Example, feare & folyſhe hardineſſe corrupteth the valiantnes of man, for whi? the fearefull fleeth from euerye thyng. And the hardye aſſaileth euery thyng, beleuing in hīselfe to bring it to paſſe: nother in the one nor in the other there is no doutineſſe, for prudence is in keping the meane betwene fear and folyſhe hardynes. For a mā ought to ſle & aſſail there where it is to aſſail. And ſo it is to bee vnderſtād in al vertues, as it is to be vnderſtande in prudence: that vertue is gotten & kept by holdyng of the meane.

How a man is vertuous Chapyter .ix.

NOwe it is nedefull to make diſtinctiō and put a differēce betwene habite, which are without vertue by grefe or by ioie, whiche be done in their workes.

¶ Exāple, he ye ſuſtaineth carnal wils, & of the abſtainīg frō thē reioiſeth, is called chaſt, & he that ſuſtaineth carnal will and morneth is called lecherus, & ſpecially he that ſuſtaineth terrible thīges & not trobled therwith, is called prudēt and ſtrōg, and he that ſuſtaineth perillous thynges and troubled with them is called fearful. Euery operacion and euery faſhion foloweth ple aſure or diſpleaſure. Then euerye vertue is wyth delyghte or with grefe: and therfore the gouernours of Cities do honor delectacions and pleſures dewely taken: and ſcourge with dyuers tormentes delectacions not dewely taken.

¶ The thre deſires of Man. Chapiter .x.

THe thinges that man willeth & deſireth bee thre: one is profitable, the other delectable & the third good. The thinges cō trary be alſo three, nether profitable, delectable, nor yet good. He that vſeth reaſō in theſe thinges is good: And he that vſeth not reaſon in theſe thynges is euell. And ſpeciallye in delectacion, for why? it is noryſhed with vs frō our natiuitie. And therfore it is a great thing for a mā to haue ryght meaſure in delectacion. Then al the vnderſtandyng of this oure boke, is to haue delectacion with reaſon: and to haue reaſon in harde thīges it behoueth to haue art. Then the vnderſtanding of artes was out of the ſcience Ciuill: So that it geueth delight vnto his citieſens, in thīges which be cōueniēt, as where, whan & how muche, and who that vſethe of theſe thīges wel, is called good: & he that doth contrary is euell.

¶ Howe a man is vertuous. Chapi .xi.

TO demaūd how a man is iuſt according to the works of iuſtice, and how he is temperat, doing the workes of tēperaunce, a mā might ſay that it is like vnto theſe two vertues. As of grā mer, and to that man that is called a Gramarion, that ſpeaketh according to Grammer: but in trothe it is not like, from the art to vertues, for why? in art, that a man be good it nedeth not but to knowe, but in vertue knoweledge ſufficeth not, withoute worke: for to knowe withoute worke it auaileth not. Like vnto this is the ſicke which vnder ſtandeth al the commandement of the Phiſician, and dothe not thereafter. Such ſicknes is far from health, ſo be men farre frō Beatitude if they haue vertues and worke them not.

How vertues ar inhabit, Chapyter .xii.

IN the ſolle of man are three thynges habite, power, and paſſions. Paſſiōs be theſe, Joye, deſire, loue, enuy, and hate: the powers be natural by the whyche we may do the foreſaid thinges. Habyte is where a man is praiſed or diſprayſed, thē I ſay that vertue is no power nor paſſyon but habite: for nother by paſſiō nor power, man is prayſed nor dyſprayſed: but rather by habitee ſtandyng and permanent in the ſolle of man.

¶ What vertue is Chapiter .xiii.

VErtues be founde in thynges that haue a mean betwene extremities, which are ether to muche or to littel: and this meane is in ii. ſortes, one accordig to nature, & thother by cōpariſon, & is called meane accordynge to nature, this in al thing is one ſelf thing ¶ Example, if .x. be to muche & vi. is to litell. then .ii. is to be a meane, for why? vi. be ſo muche more then .ii. as they be les then x. the meane by compariſon to vs is this, nether to muche nor to littell.

¶ Example, yf takyng a great quantitie of foode be to muche, and a litel quantitie to litel, the meane maye be vnderſtande in our handelyng, nether to much nor to littel. Euerie artificer in his art inforſeth himſelf to kepe the meane, from thextremitees. Thē the moral vertues be thoſe workes, in the whiche to muche and to litellbe aduoyded and abolyſhed, and the meane to bee praiſed. Then vertue is one willing habite, that ſtandeth in the midward to vs, from whēce the reaſon is determinate.

¶ There is but one wate onely to do wel, and mani waies to do euil: & therfore it is a hard thing and a laborus to be good, and a light and eaſy thing to be euell: & ther be mo of the euel ſort then of the good. There be thiges in the which there can no mean be founde, becauſe they be naught at all, as thette, manſlaughter, treaſon, and adultry: ſo there be thynges whiche bee vertues, and haue no extremities: As tē peraunce and fortitude: for the meane hathe no extremitee in it ſelfe. Fortitude or ſtrength is a meane betwene feare and foliſh hardineſſe: & Chaſtite is meane betwene the man that foloweth his wil, and he that vtterly forſaketh it. Liberalite is the mean betwene prodigalite & Auarice, for the prodigall is leſſe in receuing, then he is in geuing, and the couetous contrarie, but the mā that is liberal kepeth the meane betwene theſe two extremities. Liberalite, truth, and prodigalite in litel and mean thinges: but in greate thynges the meane is called Magnificence, the ſuꝑabūdāce hath no name in Latin, but in Greke ir is called Pleonaſmonus, & the lyttel is called Perneſa, Meane in the wil is equanimite, that is to ſat, equalnes, Equanimite are thoſe that wil not to much. The Magninimus is he that willeth to much, and he that wil not is called puſillanimus. A mā that angreth with a thing ſo much as it veho ueth, is called meke: & he that is angri with a thig withoutcauſe is called Irefull: and he that is not ſo angry as he ſhould be is called Iniracibile or angerles, truthe is in the myddes betwene the twoo extremees, that is betwene ouermuche and to lytel. Thoſe which kepe the meane betwene theſe two thynges, be called truſty, and thei that ouerpaſſe be called vaunters or boaſters. And thoſe that bee to ſhort in theſe thynges, be called humble: and they that kepe the meane in thes thinges of ſporte & plaie, be called in Greke Metrocalor and they that ouerpas, be called ſkoffers, and they that lacke, be called haſkardes: and he that kepeth the meane in cō pany is called cōpaniable: and he that paſſeth the mean loking for no gaynes, is called a good felowe: and he that paſſeth the middeſt, and al forgaines, is called a flatterer. Shamfaſtneſſe is a paſſion of the minde and no vertue, and they that holde the meane in ſhame, be called ſhamfaſte, and they that bee more aſhamed than nede is, be called in Greke Recoples and they whiche ſhame, leſſe than thei ſhulde are called ſhameleſſe.

¶ Howe to knowe vertues. Chaptter .xiiii.

THre dyſpoſicyons ben in the workes of man: that is to ſaye, muche, lyttel and mean. And al thes thre thynges bene contrary emongeſt theymſelues. For lyttell is contrary to muche, and the meane is contrarye to theym bothe: that is to ſaye, to lyttell and to muche, whence yf thou wylte make cō paryſon, betwene the meane and muche, we maye ſay to muche: and yf we wyll make compariſon, betwene the meane and litel, we may ſay to litel: whence yf thou wilt make compariſon, betwene prowes and feare, ther prowes ſhalbe called hardines, and yf a man will compare, betwene prowes and hardines, verely theyr prowes ſhalbe called fear. But it is to be knowē that ther is a greater contrary from the one extreme to the other, thē it is from the meane to the extremes, yet the one is more nere to the meane then is the other.

¶ Example, hardynes is more nearer to prowes then is feare, and prodygalitee is more nearer to Lyberalitee then is Auarice, but the ſencibilite of the carnall wyll, is more neare vnto Chaſtitee, then it is to Lechery, and that is by two reaſons, the one reaſon is accordynge to the nature of the thynge, the other is of oure parte by nature, and thys is the reaſon whereof that fear is more contrari vnto Fortytude, then is hardynes of our parte: becauſe the extremytees vnto the whiche we been moſte ready to fall by nature, been the furtheſt frō the mean, and therfore we fal more redily vnto carnal deſires, then we do to the cō trary. Then in ſo much that vertue is in the meane, and to take the mean there nedeth ſo many conſideraciōs, it is a hard thing for a man to become vertuous. Euery art apperteneth to euery mā, & euery man ought to lern, ſpeciallye ſuche as are wiſe and expert therin, for euery man cannot find the point of the cercle, but he onely that is wiſe in Geometry. Can do and wyl do the thynge, is lightlye ſayde, but to do with al dewe circumſtance appertcineth onely to them that be wyſe in that arte. Euery operacion that kepeth the meane is faire and worthi reward, and for this cauſe we oughte to incline our mides, contrary to our deſires wherby we may come to the mean, although it be a hard thyng at the fyrſt. Then in al thynges the mean is to be prayſed, and the extremities to bee blamed.

¶ Howe a man doth wel and euel. Chapiter .xv.

THere bee operacions which a man doth not with his will, that is to ſaye by force or by ignorance, as if the wynd ſhuld take a manne and cary him into another countreye. There be other operacions, whiche a man doth willyngly by his own conſēt as a man that doth a worke of vertue or vyce by his propre wil. And there be other operacions whiche be part by his wyl, and parte not accordyng to hys wyll: as yf a man beyng vppon the Sea in time of tempeſt and caſteth forth his harnes & ſtuffe to ſaue him ſelfe: or as it hathe bene ſene, that the lord hath cō maūded his ſubiect to ſlaie hys father or mother in pain of life. Such operacions be not cōpoū ded of the workes of wil nor inforced: yet if thou do it, thou doeſt it by thy wil, although thou dooe it by commaundemente, therefore ſuche woorkes haue praiſe and diſpraiſe. A man oughte rather to die, then to doc ſo fyithy a thing, as to kyll father or mother, or to do any ſuch like thynges. Lacke of wit and diſcrecion is the cauſe of all eiuell, for lacke of knowledge what is to be done, & what is not to bee done, is the onely cauſe of the in creaſe of euel mē. In this know lage, the mind ſeeth not the euil name and peril that they run in to. Thinke you a dronken man and Ireful, when he dothe any euell dede, that he doth it by ignorance without knowledge, al though he be ignorāt in his dede. Neuertheleſſe, the cauſe of the malice is not without hym, for why? the ſcience of a man cā not depart from him. Then the cauſe of the cōcupiſcence of this euel, is but in the euel doer, that foloweth hys wyll: for it is impoſſyble, that a man may do wel by his wyll, and euell withoute his wyl. And lykewyſe the wyll is more common and more generall then is the election. For why? the operacyon of the wyll, is common with Beaſtes and children, but the election apperteineth not but to him that abſtaineth him ſelf from concupiſcence. Somtimes a man wold haue a thyng that is poſſible, & yet doth choſe for it that whiche is impoſſible. Alſo the wil is thē tent, but the electiō is an antecedēt vnto thentēt, for why? election goeth before the operacion: & the operacion goth after. And a mā is called good or euel by the worke: but by the election he is nother called good nor euyll.

¶ Alſo the opinion is of truthe or falſehode: but the election is of wel or euell. And like opynions are of thoſe thynges that a mā knoweth not ſureli. But the election is of thoſe thinges whiche a man knoweth of a ſuretie. yet euery thing is not to be choſen, but thoſe wherein a manne hathe had councell before. And yet councel is not to be kepte in euery thing: But of thoſe wherin wyſe men take councell, but of the thynges whereof fooles coūcell is no coūcel to be made, but theſe thinges which be weightie and maye be done by vs, the Iſſue beyng doutefull, that is to ſaye doutefull in the ende. There be thynges whiche be to haue councell, as to geue medyſyns to a ſycke manne or like thinges. Of other thinges, whiche appertayneth not to vs, nedeth no counſayll, as to kepe councell vppon thynges that be perpetuall, and of neceſſitie: as whether the ſonne ryſe in the mornyng, or yf it rayne or not: nor yet to councell of thynges that come by chaunce, as too fynde a Purſſe or other treaſure: nor yet to councell vppon the ende, but rather vppon the thynges that go before the end.

¶ The Phyſicyan counſaileth vpon the lyfe of the ſycke, and counſayleth howe he maye heale hym. The Rhethorician counſaileth not vppon perſwaſyons: and he that makethe the lawe, counſayleth not of the beatitude, but rather euery man counſayleth in thoſe thinges by the whyche they maie come to the thynges that be nedefull to theyr arte, by him or by his frē des, as he woulde to hymſelfe. The wyll is the ende or the intente as it is ſayd aboue, where it ſemeth to ſome men that to be good which pleaſe them, & other there be to whom it ſemeth that all is good that the moſt would haue cōmonly: but according to the truthe it is not ſo, but good is that whiche ſeemeth good to them that be good, that iudge thinges as they bee, and iudge as doth the whole man, that iudgeth that ſwete, which is ſwete, and that bitter, which is bitter. But the ſicke man doth al cōtrarye, for he iudgeth bitter to bee ſwete, & the ſwete bytter, and ſo vnto an euel man that which is good ſeemeth euell, and that is euyll good, and this is becauſe the euel man taketh not delight to be good, but that he delyteth to be euell: and there be manye ſicke of this naughty ſyckenes, becauſe the woorkes good and euell be in their iugemēt. Then it is in vs to do wel, & alſo it is in vs to do euel, and ſomtymes it is by the workes of man as it is with chyldren, put the caſe that ſome be naught, the father thynketh hym good. And that good and euel is in vs, it appeareth by thē that made the law, whiche ſcourgeth theim that do euell with dyuerie paynes, and geueth honoure to theym that do well. The lawes put men in comforte to dooe wel, and conſtrayne them from euell, and no man comforteth another to doo that thynge that is not in his power. There is none that wyll aduyſe a manne to mourne for that thyng that he ſhoulde ſorow: nor there is none that wyll beare a man in hand, he ſhal not warme ſtanding nere the fyer, & that he bee not thruſty nor hungry: and they that made the lawes puniſhe men for ſuche Ignoraunce wherein thei be gilty. And it is to be knowē that there is doble ignorance, one is this of the which a man is notcauſe, as the ignoraunce of the foole, and for thys a manne is not to bepuniſhed, another ignorance whereof a man is cauſe, as the ignoraunce of a dronken man, And for that a man ought to be puniſhed, for euery manne that paſſeth the commaundementes of reaſon and of the lawe, ought to bee puniſhed, and euery man that is iuſte, or euill, is ſuche, becauſe he will bee ſuche. But when a man is made iuſte or eeuill, he is not become iuſt, bycauſe he would become iuſt: As it happeneth to a man that was wonte to bee whole and is ſicke and is not healed bycauſe he had no will that he would not belefe the Phiſicion, nor vſe the thynges that conſerueth health And ſuch like is he that caſteth a ſtone, that before he caſteth it, it is in his power to holde it: But when he hath caſte it, it is not in his power to holde it nor in his will. And ſo it is in a man that becometh euil: in the begin nyng it is in his power to bee come good.

❧ Malice is not onely in man by will: But more ouer it is in the body. As a man to bee blind andlame: and theſe euils maie be in two ſortes, y• one is by nature, as he that is borne blind & lame, the other maie come by a mannes owne foly. As by them that drinke theimſelfes blynde, or fall to ſtealyng or other euill dedees. Of ſuche there is no pety to bee taken excepte thei repente and amende theim ſelfes. Then euery manne is the cauſe of his owne imaginacion, for that a manne hath naturall vnderſtādyng to knowe good and euill. Then ought wee to will to dooe well and to flie from euill. And it is the beſte thyng, and not impoſſible to take a cuſtome and doctrine in goodnes, and he that taketh it at the beginnyng and continueth, ſuche a man hath a good nature and perfight. And who that taketh the cōtrary hath an euil nature But although it be euil he may make it good if he wil: For it is in him to take what he wil, then vertue and vice is according to the will of manne. But marke this, that operacion and habite bee not accordyng to the will of man in one ſorte but in diuerſe. For why? The operaciōs from the beginnyng to the ende is in the power and will of manne. But the habite is not in the power nor in the will of man if it be not at his beginnyng.

¶ The .xvj. Chapiter. ¶ Of Fortitude.

LEt vs ſpeake now of euery habite, & begin at ſtrength. I laie that ſtrēgth is accordyng as it is ſaid before, a meane betwene feare and hardines. For ther be thynges that a man ought reaſonably to feare, as vices and euery thing that putteth a man in an euill name: and thei that be not afraied of theſe thynges be ſhameleſſe and worthy to bee blamed: And thei that be afraid of theſe are to be praiſed▪ There be men that be hardy in battail and there be that bee liberall in ſpendyng money: but the verie ſtrong man is nether more nor leſſe then nedeth, and is redy in all theſe thynges as nedeth to ſuſtain: But the irefull man excedeth in theſe thynges, and the fearefull man lacketh in theim. The thynges that be to be feared bee not of one nature but of many ſortes. For there bee diuerſe thynges that are to be fered of al men that haue wit and vnderſtandyng: for he that feareth not thondre and the waues of the ſea is not wiſe. And there be other thynges that euery mā fereth not, and thoſe thinges be accordyng to the more or leſſe: that is to ſaie, accordyng as on thyng is more to be feared then another. And as I ſaie of thynges that bee fearfull, ſo it is to be vnderſtand of hardines. For there be men that wil ſhewe thē ſelfes hardy before thei come to the dede, and make a great face, but when thei come to the deede beare themſelfes not valiaunt. But a bolde man & ſtrong doth the contrary, that before he cum to the deede holdeth hym ſtill: and when he cometh to the dede he is hardy & ſtrong. Strength is in fiue ſortes, the firſt is ciuil ſtrength, becauſe that menne of Citees ſuffre muche and many perels to haue honor and to bee blameles of their citezens. The ſecond ſort is by wit and policie that a manne hath in his office: As we ſe of men that be wiſe in feactes of armes, that do great thynges truſtyng in their Science, and bee not ſtrong accordyng to the truthe, bycauſe that when theiſe the daunger of bat taill, thei flee beeyng more afraied of death then of ſhame. But he that is ſtrōg accordyng to the trueth, ought to dooe the contrary and to ſtande faſte in battaill, and feare more ſhame then death.

❧ The thirde ſorte is by furye as we ſe in wylde ſtrength, that be ſtrōg and hardy by the great furor that is in theim, this is not the very ſtrength, for who ſo euer putteth hymſelf in perel by ire or furye, is not to bee called ſtrong. But thei that putte theim ſelfes in perell by a right vnderſtandyng, thoſe be ſtrong

The fourth ſort is by ſtrong mouyng of cōcupiſcence, as we maie ſe of brute beaſtes in tyme of their copulaciō, and ſo many men let theimſelfes fall lightly, and thei that kepe wel themſelfes be ſtrong.

The fifte ſorte is by ſuretie wher a man hath had oft tymes victory: as he yt fighteth with one that he hath oft ouercomen, but when he fighteth with an other, there he leſeth his hardineſſe & ſtrength. Theſe fiue ſortes be not the very ſtrength: for ſtrēgth is a more worthy thyng then Chaſtite, for it is a lighter thyng for a man to abſtain hymſelf from carnall concupiſſence, then it is in thynges of griefe.

¶ The .xvij. Chapiter. ¶ Of Chaſtitee.

CHaſtitie is the meane betwene folowyng al the delectaciōs of the body or not to folow. For a man to delight hymſelf in thynges conuenient: where and when, and how muche, there nedeth no Chaſtite. For ſeeyng of faire thynges, & hering of mery tales, and ſmellyng of flouers: how muche whē and as it behoueth, there nedeth no Chaſtitee. For Chaſtitie nedeth not but in two ſēces of the body, that is to ſai, in the taſt and felyng, in the whiche we begin with brute bea ſtes very ſtrōgly, as delighting themſelfes in thynges that thei eate, drinke, and touch: and ſpecially in touchyng is greate delectacion, and therefore it is a beaſtly thyng to folowe to muche the delectacion of touchyng For in the taſt, a manne delighteth not ſomuch as in touching For the delectacion of taſtyng is onely when a manne examineth the ſauor. There bee naturall delectacions in the whiche a man may haue meaſure, as in not to muche eatyng and drynkyng. This meſure may be called Chaſtitee, for the vnchaſt is in the delectacions of the body and not in thynges of grief, for in thynges of griefe the meane is to be vnderſtande, ſtrength. Some tyme a man is not temperat nor chaſt when he delighteth more then is due, and when he maie haue the thynges that he deſireth, it is hard to finde a mā that delighteth himſelf leſſe then he ſhould in carnall delectaciōs, ſuche one hath no name ſet. Then thei be chaſt that kepe the meane in delectacions, that is to ſai, delight to muche in ha uing of them, nor ſorowe not to muche in leſing thē, but delight hymſelf temperately, contente with ſufficien • e to the good life of man. It behoueth a manne to withſtande the deſire of delectacions, for if a manne lette reaſon bee ouercome, it remaigneth vnder deſires, therefore it is nedefull to manne to bee chaſt from youth and to liue vn der commaundementes, or els ſhall remain with him, deſire to a greater age. And therefore it behoueth vs to ſtudie that reaſon maie remaine aboue deſire or concupiſſence.

¶ The .xviij. Chapiter. Of liberalite or Largeſſe.

LIberalite is a meane in geuyng & in receiuyng of money: then he is liberall that vſeth money conueniently: that is to ſay, he that geueth it, wher when, and how muche it behoueth, and to whō. Prodigall or a waſter, is he that excedeth in geuyng & wanteth in receiuing And the coueteous is the contrary. And it is mete that liberalitee bee more in geuyng then in receiuyng: For why? It is a lighter thing, not to receiue, thē to geue. And it is a more laudable thyng to geue the thyng where it is conueniente, then is to receiue the thing that is conueniente. And generally, it is a more worthy thyng in vertue to do well, then it is to abſtain frō euil. Neuertheles in theſe thynges ought to bee an equalitie • , that is to ſaie litle praiſe to thē that receiue temperatly but thei that geue temperatly are to bee praiſed, bicauſe thei profite him that receiueth the gifte. He is not liberall that is ſory for his gifte: For he geueth it not by liberalitee, but rather for ſhame, or other cauſe.

Thē he is liberal that geueth cherefully: he that is liberall is cōtent with litle, ſo yt he maie do for many muche or litle. For he euer inforceth hymſelf to worke liberalitee, accordyng to his facultie it, is harde to fynd a man liberall & riche, for riches increſeth not by geuyng: but increaſeth by receiuyng. And it is oft ſeen that the riches that a man hath without laboure maketh him liberal. And great maruell it is when a manne is riche by great labor if he be liberal. The Prodigal manne is not ſo euill as the coueteous, for the couete ous is nether good to hymſelf nor other, & therfore euery man hateth hym. Alſo the Prodigall may be remedied diuerſe waies But the coueteous cannot bee healed: and naturally a man is more geuen to Auarice then to prodigalite: and departeth further from the meane. There bee many ſortes of liberalitee, and ſeldom it can be found in a man that is couetous in kepyng his owne, that he is not alſo coueteous in deſiryng of other mens. Ther • e that cannot kepe their owne: But in deſiryng of other mennes thei be inſaciat, and go aboute to gette by euery filthye gaynes, as by maintegnyng of baudry, in kepyng of ruffians and hores, vſery, pla • e. And ſuche ſort of people ſinne greuouſly in Prodigalitee.

¶ The .xix. Chapiter. Of magnificence.

MAgnificence is a vertue that woorkes in riches, onely in greate expences, & the nature of the Magnificus or noble mā ought to bee diligente, that his workes be doen with greate honor and greate expences. For he that reſtraineth and will do his buſineſſe with litle coſte: is not Magnificꝰ, but rather fearfull in ſpēdyng. The vertue of magnificēce is vnderſtād in great and maruelous thynges, as to make temples & churches wher god is worſhipped from whom it is ſent & all goodnes cometh. Likewiſe in makyng great feaſtes, with coſtly bankettes and ſūpteous lodgyng & great preſentes. The magnificus or noble man thynketh not onely vpon his expences, but thynketh more ouer to make other. In magnificēce it nedeth not onely that there bee haboundaunce of thynges, but it nedeth therwith for a manne to ordre and ſpende thynges where it behoueth, for hymſelf or mē of his ſtock. And whoſoeuer he bee, that wanteth in theſe two thinges and vnder taketh, is ſcorned, if he will take vpon hym magnificence, a man that dooth excede in theſe thynges aboue ſaid, is he that expendeth more then he ought to doo, and he that maie expende litle and expendeth muche, is as he that geueth to iuglars and ſcoffers & as he that caſteth purple in the waie, and dooth not theſe for the loue of vertue, but for to apere glorious to the people.

❧ Nigarde is he that in great thynges goth aboute to ſpende litle, and marreth the beaute of of his dede for a litle ſpendyng, leſeth greate coſte and greate honor, and theſe be the twoo extremites of magnificence. But thei be not to be blamed ſo that thei hurt not accordyng to their vice. Magnanimus is he that is redy to do greate deedes, and is ioious and mery in doyng of them. But he that vndertaketh to do great dedes & is not able, is called vainglorious: And he that is worthy to haue honor & dignitee, & is afraied to receiue thē, is called ſimple And immagnanimite is extremite by compariſō of thynges, but as to the operaciō it is meane. The very Magnanimite is only in great thynges: yt is to ſaie in thynges by the whiche a mā may or doth ſerue almightie God. And y• verie beatitude is in thynkyng of thoſe ſo hie thynges, ſo greate & ſo honorable, yt of this thought commeth all goodneſſe, after ſo great aduerſities: the whiche cā not be eſtemed. The mā that is magnanimus is the greteſt mā and moſte honorable yt is, & moueth not for litle thynges, nor doth not inclyne his magnanimite to any foule thynges. Thē magnanimite is an ornament & croune of all vertues, and therfore it is no light thyng to fynd the man magnanimus, but it is harde. For he is not onely good to hymſelf, but alſo to many other. If a mā be Magnanimus he reioyſeth not too muche in greate honor doen to hym, & yet ſo muche honor cannot be doen to anſwer to his goodneſſe and greatnes. And more ouer, y• magnanimus reioyſeth not muche in proſperitee yt cometh to hym, nor troubled for aduerſite. Nobilite of bloud riches & antiquite helpeth a mā to be magnanimꝰ And he is very magnanimus y• hath in him two thynges by the whiche he ought to be honored, theſe be thoſe that be afore ſaid, the ſurety & goodneſſe of a man magnanimus, is as much that he paſſeth not vpon any perell, for that he doubteth not but to bring his life to good ordre, and taketh pleaſure to do for other, and is aſhamed to take of other, becauſe it is a more noble thyng to geue then to receiue. And whē he hath receiued benefite he doth ſtudy to recōpence: he is • lowe in litle expenſes, but in great thinges wher it is conueniēt he is not • low. The man that is Magnanimus loueth other, and if he will euil, it is openly and not cloſely, bicauſe he thinketh great vileneſſe to hide his will. He is ſharpe and ſheweth hymſelf cruell, excepte in thynges of mirthe: he is conuer ſaunt with men merely, and hateth flaterars, as bablers and Scoffers, becauſe ſlaterars bee bondmen and remēbreth wronges, but he diſpiſeth theim and careth not, boaſteth not hymſelf, nor praiſeth other, he paſſeth more on precious thynges then vpon vile thynges. As a manne that ſuffiſeth to himſelf, when he mouethe, he is not in haſt, but grauely, and ſtedfaſte in wordes. And this is the difiniciō of the Magnanimus: and he that ouerpaſſeth theſe: is called vainglorious, and thei that take vpon theim greate honors as if thei wer worthy, wher thei be not. As in making coſtly apparell and other greate apperaunce, and thynke there by to be exalted: I ſay vnto you, wiſe men take them for fooles.

❧ Puſillanimus, is he that is worthy to haue greate honors, and is afraied to take theim vpon hym and hides hym from hymſelf: and this is euill, for euery manne ought to deſire honoure and benefite conuenient to hymſelf. Then euery manne erreth that departeth from the meane: But there bee not many euill in this ſorte. In honor is founde meanes and extremities, and in leſſe thynges: for in theſe thynges bee founde more leſſe then meane. For a manne maie deſire more honoure then he oughte to haue: And ſuche haue no name but • omen, as it is ſaied before in the cōpariſon betwene the large and the Magnanim̄us, and betwene their extremes. Therefore theſe bee the greateſt thynges and thoſe the leaſte, the meane is to bee honored and the extremities to bee blamed.

¶ The .xx. Chapiter. Of Ire and Mekenes.

INire is a meane & an extreme, & thextremities haue propre names, and the meane is called Mekenes, and he that kepeth ye meane, is called meke, and he that doth habound in ire is called Irefull. And he that is leſſe angery then he ought to be is called Iniracible or ireleſſe. And the verie meke if he be angey with whō, when & wherr, he is called irefull & reported y• he that paſſeth the meane in theſe thynges, ſome angry ſome ſofte and that is the beſte that is in hym. For if all euill thynges ſhould bee together: it ſhould not bee ſuffered. A man that is not angery where it behoueth, when and with whom and wher is not to bee puniſhed. For he ſuſtaineth vituperacion in that that is not iuſtly dooen to hym or to his frendes, ſometyme we praiſe ſuche men that make no great thyng, and ſometyme the ireful: ſaiyng, that thei be ſtrōg menne and hardy. And verely it is a harde thyng to determyne by woordes the circumſtance of ire, but ſo muche wee ought to know, that to kepe the meane is to bee praiſed, and the extremities is a thyng to be vituperat.

¶ The .xxi. Chapiter. Of the conuerſacion of manne.

AFter we muſt ſpeke of thynges whiche happen in company and in the conuerſacion of menne and in comunicacion, for kepyng the meane in theſe thynges is to be praiſed, and the extremities to be blamed. And the meane is, that a man be pleſant in ſpeche and conuerſacion with folkes: and it behoueth to be cō panable in thynges conuenient to whom, when, how & wherfore for ſuche company is nere like vnto frendſhip. There is differēce in this, that frendſhip hath compaſſion and humble corage and conuerſacion hath not. For why? A man maie cōpany with men that he knoweth not. And the mā that doth excede in theſe thynges, is he that medleth him ſelf vncōly to be acquainted wt a ſtranger & with a man that he knoweth not, neighbour or not neighbor without reſpect: ſuche one is called a mery felowe, if it bee of nature: But he that maketh mirth for gaines, is called a flatterer, and he that is ſad is called rude and vncherfull.

¶ The .xxij. Chapiter. Of Truthe and liyng.

TRuthe and liynges be the mooſte contrarye thinges that can be in the world, and be vſed in worde & in dede. A honorable man and of a good corage vſeth truth in worde & deede: and the vile mynded the contrary. The very man is he that kepeth the meane betwene the vaūter that cracketh vpō himſelf more then he is, & he that diſpraiſeth hymſelf in hidyng the goodnes that is in hym: In ſomuche that the verie man affirmeth y• goodnes that is in hym nother more nor leſſe, but he that diſpraiſeth is of better diſpoſicion, then is he that vaunteth hymſelf: For the vaunter lieth in woorde and in dede. Worſſe in theſe thinges a boue ſaied, is he that knoweth not hymſelf, and therefore he is more vituperable thē other, the truthe is to bee praiſed, and lies to bee diſpiſed. For the liar ſpeketh ſuch wordes as he maketh in his mind: a man that is true, for the loue of truthe, is better then he y• is true for profite that he maie haue thereby. He that boſteth and preſumeth for gold or ſiluer, is like vituperable to the vainglorious. But he that vaunteth hymſelf for honor or profit is not ſo blamable. Ther bee men that reioyſe themſelfes in lies, and other lie to be regarded: the humble mā diſpraiſeth himſelf to fly ſtrife & buſines as did Socrates to haue quiete life. and he y• exalteth himſelf in litle thinges is nothing to be named

¶ The .xxiij. Chapiter. ¶ How a manne is knowen by his mouyng.

THe mā that laugheth to muche is vituperable, and he that neuer laugheth thei ſaie he is ſad and vncherful. But a mā that is cōpaniable with his felowe & loureth not, nor moueth not other by foule bourdyng & plaiyng, for ſometyme ieſtyng moueth a man to lechery, and is forbiddē in the law, but to kepe good and louyng compaignie ſuche a one is to be praiſed.

❧ Shamefaſtnes is a paſſion that is ingendred with fere: for why? He that is a ſhamed changeth colour with euery thyng, & alſo ſomtime thei that be afraid Shamfaſtnes is wit in youth & not vnconuentent to boyes and wenches: for it withdraweth thē frō ſinne, but ſhame is to be blamed in old mē, for age ſhuld do nothing wherof to be aſhamed.

¶ The .xxiiij. Chapiter. Of Juſtice.

IUſtice is a commendable habite, by the which a man is made Juſte and dooeth the workes of Juſtice, and willeth and loueth thynges that be iuſt Inſomuche as it is the habite of iuſtice, the whiche is vertue. Then iniuſtice whiche is the cō trary, muſte needes bee vice: Juſtice is ſaied to bee in three ſortes, and the vniuſt is alſo in three ſortes, he is called vniuſt that doth againſt the lawe, and he that paſſeth the nature of equalite, and he that meddeleth with vnlawfull and diſhoneſte gaynes. And likewiſe a man is Juſte in three ſortes, for euen ſo many ſortes as is in the one, ſo many are in the other. So that the iuſt man is he that doth obſerue the law, and the nature of the equalite, and thoſe that bee content with lawfull gaynes.

¶ The .xxv. Chapiter. ¶ Of the Lawe.

THe law is iuſt, and all thynges of the lawe be iuſte, for it commaundeth the workes of vertue: whiche workes make a mā happy, and cōſerueth the workes of happineſſe in hym, and forbiddeth al euill in citees and tountrees, and commaundeth vnto good men greate workes: as to ordre & araye battailes, and cō maundeth ye men beware of fornicacion and lechery, and commaundeth that men bee peaceable from hurtyng one another and forbiddeth vnclene ſpeche. And generally it commaundeth the workes of iuſtice, and to flie vice. Juſtice is the moſte noble thing & the moſt ſtrōgeſt vertue that is. Wiſe mē do loue y• workes of iuſtice, hauing more mar uel of y• goodnes of thē then of y• ſhinyng ſter, or y• ſettyng of the ſunne, or riſing therof, for it is y• moſte perfight vertue of all other. And the iuſt man vſeth iuſtice in himſelf & in his frendes: for a man y• is not good to himſelf nor to his frēdes, is worſt of al other perſōs. For a man to be good it ſufficeth not onely to be good to hymſelf, but alſo to his frendes. Juſtice is not parte of vertue, but al. And wrōg is not part of vice, but al vice. Ther be kyndes of vices openly for bidden, as theſe, adultry, inchātmēt falſe witnes, treaſon fraude and deceit. And ther be kindes of vi ces, which be iniurious, as killing, ſmityng, & other like thynges, in the which the iuſt man is ſomtime equaller, and ſomtime meaſurer: in compariſon he is called equaller betwene .ii. and a meaſurer betwene many thynges and fewe, and is in relacion in .iiii. thynges. So the iuſt mā can be no leſſe then in .iiii. thynges. There be two perſones betwene whom Juſtice is to be do en, & .ii. be cauſes: that is to ſaie, right and wrōg, and yet in theſe ſelfthinges may be equalite: for if ther might be no diſequalnes there ſhold be no equalnes, and ſo Juſtice is in proporcion of number. And as iuſtice is equal ſo is wrong vniuſt & vnequall, and therfore the Lord of the lawes laboreth to bring euerithig equal. Wherfore he killeth one and ſcourgeth another, & other he ſendeth to priſō, vntil the par tie haue ſatiſfyed, & ſo laboreth to bring to muche and to litel in to a meane. Therfore he taketh frō one and geueth to another, til they be egal, and therfore the forme therof is to be knowen, to the intēt that his ſubiectes may liue ſtedfaſtly in the middeſt:

¶ Yet of Juſtice, Chapiter .xxvi.

THe inhabitors together in Cities, doo take and geue one to another, and euery one yeldeth too ther according to the quantitee of their thinges, and al to come to the middeſt: for we put the caſe, that the Smythe hath a thing that is worth one, & the Shomaker hath a thing, that is worth two, the Carpēter hath a thing that is worth thre, thē the Smith muſt nedes take of the Shomaker his woorke: and the Shomaker muſte take of the Carpenter his worke, yet the worke of the one, may be better then the other, therfore it is nedeful to ſome man of equalytee, that maye returne them to a meane: and therfore was found money. For money is a mean by the which a man may bryng euery vnegal into egal, and therby may be taken and geuen greate thinges & litel thinges, & is an inſtrumēt, wherby iudges may do iuſtice. Money is a liueleſſe lawe, but the iudge & the lawes haue life. god is y• vniuerſal law of al thinges, the vigor & ſtrenthe of egalnes ſtandeth faſte by the obſeruacion of the law of cities, and the laborers of the fiel des & rilthe likewiſe increaſeth therby, & for lacke of iuſtice fall in ruine. The prince is the obſer uer of iuſtice and egalnes: and therfore he geueth not the goodes wherof he is Lorde more to himſelf, thē to other. Wherfore it is ſaide honors and lordſhips maketh a man knowen. The people preſuppoſeth that liberalite is cauſe of Principalitee and Lordſhippe, and ſome ſaye that riches is the cauſe, other put nobilitee of bloudde. But the wiſe manne ſaieth, and beleueth that vertue is the cauſe, that a manne is worthy to haue Lordſhippe. Juſtice is in two ſortes, one is natural, and another accordinge to the lawe: the lawe naturall is one ſelfe nature in euerye man, as the fyer, wherſoeuer it be, it goth vpwarde: the other which is accordig to the lawe, hath many diuerſyties, as we ſe in ſacrifices, which be diuerſli done, ſome by beaſtes and ſome by certaine generacyons of trees, and in bothe theſe iuſtices, equalite is to be vnder ſtand. He that rēdreth the thing that he hath in kepyng, not willyngly but by feare: is not iuſte by himſelfe, but by other: but he that yeldeth by himſelf becauſe of honeſtye with a good wyll, he is iuſte. The hurtes whiche be commonly dooen amanges menne, be in thre ſortes. The firſt by error and by ignorance, the other is by ignoraunce with wil to hurt, the third bi thought malice and in wil to hurte. By ignorance is whē a man in his dede, hathe not ſtudied as other and as he ſhuld, and theſe twoo ſortes be not imputed vniuſte, for why? their dedes procede not of malice, but when a man doth hurt hy malice prepenced or by propre will, there is no circumſtāce, that can excuſe his malice, for it is very euel and vituperable. Ther be two maners of ignorances, one natural, as the na tural fole, an other wherof a mā is cauſe, as when a man is igno raunt, becauſe he wyll not ſtudy to knowe the thyng that he oughte to knowe of troth and wel. Aboue iuſtice is better then iuſtice, but accordyng to the truth in the very meane, ther is no de uiſiō: and the very iuſtice is not that whiche is in the lawes, but that iuſtice whiche is in the Almighty & glorious God, & is ge uē to mā, bi the which iuſtice mā maketh himſelfe like vnto god.

Of proweſſe, Cha, xxvii.

THere bee two kindes of vertues, the one is called morall, the whiche belongeth too the life ſencible, whiche hath no reaſon, another vertue intellectuall or reaſonable, the whiche is vnderſtandynge and diſcrecion. Then the life ſen ſyble, doth, fleeth and perſecuteth withoute anye delyberacyon: and therfore it is ſayed that this vertue deſyreth concupyſcence, but the vnderſtandying affirmeth and maketh no election without him, thē the beginning of the election is deſyre intellectuall, beecauſe of ſome thyng. And no man vſeth the election in the thyng that is paſt before, becauſe that which is doen can not be vndooen: for there vpon is no power, nor there falleth no electiō in thinges of neceſſite, as in riſyng & ſetting of the Sūne that ryſeth by nature.

❧ In the ſolle of man bee fyue thynges, of the whiche maye be ſpoken truthe, affirmynge and deniyng, that is to ſay: Art, ſcyence, Prudence, Sapience, and vnderſtandyng. Scyenceis by ſuche demonſtracion which can not be otherwaies, and nether doth ingender nor corrupt, and euery ſcience or diſcipline that is in vſe, ſo may be taughte.

And euery thing that is lerned, muſt nedes be learned by prynciples, the whiche bee manifeſte by them, and the Demonſtracyons be euer true, and neuer lye. For why? they be of thinges neceſſary. The diſpoſiciō of the art is of very reaſon: the wyſe and prudent man can councell hymſelfe and other, in thynges that be good and euell, which be apperteining vnto men. Thē prudence is an habite, with the whiche a man may councel with very reaſon in thynges towarde men good and euell.

Sapience is an aduaunſing or ioiyng ofartificers that hath obtayned ſcyence. And when it is ſaid of one that he is wyſe in his art, ther is ſhewed the goodnes and gretnes of his art. The vnderſtanding is it that taketh the commandement of thinges, reaſon ſcience & vnderſtandyng be of thoſe thinges that bee naturally noble. There may be found yong men, which be wyſe of diſcipline: but not in prudēce: to be wiſe in prudence wolde be had a long knowlage in many particuler thinges, the whyche cannot be had but by long time, The adoleſcente and yong man hath but ſhort tyme. Prudence meaſureth the beginnyng & the end of euery thing, and by & by conſcnteth to a good councell.

¶ Wilyneſſe, is of prudence, with the whiche a manne commeth to the entent by great ſubteltie of his vnderſtandyng, in thinges that bee good, but the ſubtile is called qualite, in thinges that be euel. As enchantmē tes, wytchecraftes. Suche are not called wyſe, but councelers of ſtryfe and wilybegylars.

¶ Felicitee is not a thing to be choſen for other, but for himſelf as helth, the accions of the ſolle bee accordynge to the meaſure of Morall vertues, and accordynge to the meaſure of Prudence and of ſubtelty, then vertue-ſetteth forthe the right purpoſe of man, & prudence, that is to ſay knowlage confirmeth it, and maketh it good and conduceth him vntoiuſtice. Thes morall vertues make a mā ſtronge chaſte and iuſt frō youthe, as in children & ſome maner of beſtes, then theſe vertues be bi nature, and not by vnderſtanding. But the Lordſhyp of all vertues belongeth vnto the vertues intellectual, for there can be no election without the vnderſtandyng, nor cānot be accompliſhed with out moral vertue, & ſo prudence techeth to do that which ought to be done, but moral vertue ſet teth forth the dede, to fulfill the worke.

¶ Of ſtrengthe. Chapiter .xxviii.

STrengthe is a laudable habite & good for the man that is very ſtrong ſuſtayneth many terryble thynges, and deſpyſeth deathe, in aſſailyng thoſe whiche behoueth, and dothe the woorkes of ſtrength, not to haue honour or delectacion, but onely for vertue. There be men whiche be cō ſtrained to worke the workes of ſtrength for ſhame, and to fle reproche, & to get them honor put thē ſelfes in peril of their lyues, rather then to liue with ſhame.

Wilde ſtrengthe is this that a man dooeth in furor: as when a man is angry for any thing doen againſt hym, and wold be reuenged. Beſtial ſtrength is the fulfillyng of a mans luſte burnynglye deſyred. Spirituall ſtrengthe is that whyche a man dothe to obtayne honoure and fame. Strengthe Deuyne is that whiche ſtronge men naturally loue. And Goddes men be very ſtronge.

¶ Of Chaſtitee, Chapiter .xxix.

CHaſtitee is a temperance in eating and drinckinge and in delectacions, and he that beſtoweth himſelf temperatly in thes thinges is to be praiſed, and he that excedeth in thes thinges is to be blamed, but fewe and ſyldome be founde. Chaſtitee is a fayre thyng, for it delyteth but when, where, & ſo muche as behoueth, alſo there is a ſecular delectaciō which is departed from the mouing of nature, and without cō pariſon more vituperable then fornicaciō or adultry, that is to ſay, Maſculine with Maſculine To be inchaſt is in diuers ſorts for why? it may be in eating and drinking & other filthy thinges▪

¶ Of Mekeneſſe, Chapiter .xxxi.

MEkeneſſe is an habite to bee praiſed betwene beynge to ireful and to dull, and ſo is Malyncoly in lōg perſeuerance. Malicious ire demaūdeth great vengeance for lyttel offence. But he that is not ſturred for wrong or offence dooen to hym nor to hys kinne, is as a manthat hath loſt his fealyng.

¶ Of Lyberalitee. Chapiter .xxxii.

LIberalytee, Magnyfycence, & Mananimitee hathe a cōmunite amōgeſt thē ſelfes, for why? they be al in receauyng and geuyng moneye: where when and how muche it behoueth. And it is a more fearful thing to geue then to receaue, and ſuche men flee from filthy gaynes, and the couetous man is a greate deſyrer, and therfore the lyberal poſſeſſeth not ſo muche as doth the couetous.

¶ Of Magnanimitee. Chapyter. xxxiii

THe Magnanimus doth deſerue gret honors, & praiſes, and is euermore redye to ſet his mind vpon great thinges, and deſpyſeth the littel and vile thynges, but he that expendeth where he ſhould not, is called Prodigal.

Enuious is he that is ſory for the proſperite bothe of the good and euill, without any differēce Contrary to hym is he that reioiſeth in the proſperite of them that bee good & euill, the meane betwene theim is he that ioyeth in the proſperitee of theim that be good, and ſoroweth for the euil, he that is a ſhamed of euery thyng is called ſhamefaſte: He that crackes vpon hymſelf and diſpiſeth other menne is called a proude vaunter.

¶ The .xxxiij. Chapiter. ¶ Of compaignie.

THere bee men with whom it is paineful to liue, becauſe thei of their nature bee not tractable. Ther be other that be flatterers of euery body: and ther be other that kepe a meane, and thoſe be thei that vſe thēſelfes, as where when, with whom, & how muche and ſuche maner of men bee verely to be praiſed. Scoffers bee thoſe whiche compaignieth emongeſt folkes with laughyng bourding & geſtyng vpon them ſelfes, their wifes and children, and not onely vpon theim, but alſo vpon other men. Contrary to hym is he that loketh euermore as he were troubled, lowryng, and is neuer mery emongeſt folkes, nor cannot be with theim that be mery. And he that kepeth the meane emongeſt ſuche, is he that vſeth meſure The iuſt man is he that is called Equall or Equaller, and the iuſte equalleth thynges in twoo ſortes, one ſorte is in deuidyng of money, offices, and honors. The other in helyng the hurtes that one man taketh of an other, for men haue buſineſſe together in twoo ſortes, the one is by will, that is to ſaie, when the beginnyng of the deede is in our arbitre. And out of the wil is this when a man hath to do with an other, and will doo it by force or gyle, as rapine, ſtelth and other like thynges.

¶ The .xxxiiij. Chapiter. ¶ Of Juſtice:

THe factor of ye lawes, are the equals, which are the cōtraries ye be betwen to muche and to litle. The equall iudge deuideth mony & honor, & maketh de uiſion betwene two at the leaſt: Juſtice partes betwene foure thynges, the whiche thynges haue proporciō from the firſt to the ſeconde, and from the thirde to the fourth, and the equalnes of theim is accordyng to the proporcion ſelfe: And Juſtice iudgeth emongeſt theim accordyng to the qualitee of the vertue, and of the merite. The maker whole that healeth the faciō of the deedes that bee dooen betwene menne, is he that maketh the lawes: For he decerneth and doth iuſtice betwene theim that dooe wrong and them that take it, and rendereth inheritance to thē that haue right thereto, and taketh frō theim that poſſeſſeth wrongfully. Some cōdemne in perſone and ſome in their goodes, and ſome maketh equal the litle with the much, bicauſe he y• receiueth the iniury is leſſoned by hym that dooth it, the iudge is equallar betwene them according to the meſure of Ar • ſmethi que. Therfore mē go to ye iudge bicauſe the iudge is ſaied to bee in ſimilitude the life of Juſtice, bicauſe he ordereth iuſtice accordyng moderately as it is poſſible, and iuſtices is not in euery place in ſuche ſorte, that to hym that doeth, be doen ſomuche as he hath doen: and that frō hym that did take, bee taken ſomuche as he hath taken. For why? The moderate equalneſſe ſtandeth not euermore in this, and as the iuſte man is contrary to hym that is not Juſte, ſo the equall is cōtrary to the vnequal and the meane is ſomtime more cōtrary to the one extreme, then it is to the other: and the one extreme is more contrary to the other, thē it is to the meane. The Juſtice of citees is a meane, betwene leſyng and gettyng: and cannot be doen without taking and geuyngchange. As he that weiueth clothe for other thynges that he nedeth. The ſmithe geueth Iron for other thynges that he nedeth, and therefore in theſe changes was greate ſtrife ſo was founde the thyng that might equall all thynges together: This that is more worthe with that that is worthe leſſe, and this thing was money, whiche maketh equall the worke of the Carpenter with the woorke of the ſhomaker. Aboue iuſtice is more then Juſtice. Then the mā that is better then the good man, is good in al ſortes y• maie bee. And he that is more Juſte then he that is iuſt, is iuſt in all ſortes that maie bee. Naturall iuſtice is better thē iuſtice that is compounded by man, as the hony that is ſwete by nature, is better then the like hony that is made by crafte.

❧ The iuſt mā liueth by life of life, that is to ſaie, the great delectacion yt he hath to iuſtice naturall. It for it ſelf, belongeth and vſeth the iuſt thing, lokyng not to the puniſher of the lawes to put it generally in al generaciōs, for bicauſe it is vnpoſſible that the generall rules be folowed and kepte in all theſe thynges, the whiche bee not vniuerſal. Then the wordes of the law ought to be perticulars, bicauſe thei iudgē of thynges corporal.

¶ The .xxxv. Chapiter. ¶ Of Vice.

THere be thre maner of vices that bee very euill, from the whiche euery māne ought to flie, that is to ſaie: Malice Cruelte and Lechery. And yet there bee to theſe three contrary vertues, that is to ſaie: Benignitee Pitie and Chaſtitee. There bee ſome men whiche be of a deuine nature, by the aboundaunce of the vertues that be in them, and ſuche an habite is all contrary to Cruelte, and ſuche menne be Angelike deuine, and the vertues of them bee aboue the vertues of other men. Like as the vertues of God be aboue al the vertues of mē, ſo there be other men cruell in their maners and be of wilde nature: and ſuche be far of from vertue. There be other men that bee of the nature of beaſtes, in folowyng of their deſires and their delectacions, and thoſe bee in ſimilitude like vnto Apes and to hogges, and thoſe men that folowe their wil les bee called Epicures, that is to ſaie: men that thynke not but of their bodies. Men that bee called deuine and menne that bee wilde of cuſtome: there bee but fewe in the worlde, and ſpecially wilde men, yet there be found in thextreme regiōs, in the whiche thei dwell, yt is in the ſouthe partes where as thei fynde ſlaues, it is ſaied of the deuine mā that he is chaſt and continent, for that he abſtaineth hymſelf from euill concupiſcence, according to the power of the vertue intellectuall.

❧ Manne hath his limittes vnto the whiche he moueth naturally, wherein he walketh as in the meane, excepte his nature inclineth too the nature of beaſtes, whiche if thei bee looſed, folowe the mouyng of their owne deſires in runnyng thorowe paſtures, not abſtaynyng theym ſelues from any thyng that their nature leadeth theim vnto. And in this wiſe a manne goeth from his termes and limettes, & ſuche a man is worſſe then a beaſt, by the euil life that he choſeth, bycauſe the ſcience of manne is truthe. But that man that learneth ſcience accordyng to the nature of Morall vertue and vertue deuine & intellectuall, remaigneth within his bōdes and, vſeth vniuerſall propoſicions which conducteth hym vnto true knowledge.

¶ The .xxxvi. Chapiter. Of Delight.

THere bee delectable thynges whyche bee delectable by neceſſitee, and there bee thynges delectable by cleccion. And of thoſe, there be that are to be choſen for our ſelfes, & alſo of thoſe that are to be choſē for fauor of other. The neceſſari delectaciōs that a man hath, be in eating, in drinkyng and in lechery, and in all other corporall delectacion, there where is no meaſure, thoſe which a man choſeth or electeth for hymſelf, bee theſe, that is to ſaie, certētye of knowledge and deuine reaſon. Elecciōs whiche bee electe for fauor one of another bee theſe, victory, honor, riches and al other thynges good in the whiche beaſtes is comen with vs: Who that kepeth the meane in theſe thynges is to be praiſed, and who that wāteth in theſe thynges is to be blamed.

❧ There bee naturall delectacions and beaſtly delectacions. Alſo ther be wilde delectacions and ther be delectacions by occaſion of tyme, & there bee other delectacions by occaſion of infirmitie, and other that come by vſe, and other by euill nature. Wildiſh delectacion is in them that make women with child to bee opened, bicauſe thei will ſe how the childe dooth lie in their bodies: And as thei that eateth mannes fleſhe and rawe fleſhe. Delectaciōs of infirmitie, or by euil vſe, is of pickyng ye browes paryng nailes, eatyng of coles, and other trifles. Delectaciō by euill nature is to lye one Maſculyne with another, and all other vituperable thynges of lechery. Ther be ſome malicious and wild maners, as be in them that bee vnbrideled, madde, and Melancolly, and like vnto thē, the furious man thynketh that all that pleſeth hym is againſt all other men. If he haue a litle cauſe to bee angree runneth in as a foliſhe ſeruaunte to dooe a thyng before he bee cōmaunded and doth as a dogge y• barketh bothe at frendes and enemies. And this incontinence which is in Ire cometh of a light mynde and by violēce of mouyng. And therfore he is more to be pardoned then he that incontinent foloweth his cōcupiſcence. For as ſone as he ſeth the thyng that delighteth hym, he tarieth not the iudgemēte of reaſon, but rather ſearcheth for the thyng that he deſireth. Then the incontinence of Ire is more naturall then is thin continence of concupiſcence and demaundeth darke places. And therefore it is ſaied of concupiſcēce that ſhe ouerthroweth her ſonne. The man that dooth euil and repenteth hym not, can not be correct: but the man that doth euill and repēteth, there is hope. Thei that haue no vnderſtādyng be better then thei that haue it, & beſtowe it not. Therfore thei that let themſelf to bee ouercome with cōcupiſcence by delight of vnderſtandyng, bee like vnto them that be dronken with litle wyne, by febleneſſe of the brayne. The continent man that hath vnderſtandyng, affirmeth hymſelf and continueth in very reaſon and holſome elecciō, and departeth not from the right moderacion. It is a more lighte thyng to moue cuſtome then nature, yet a hard thyng it is to breke cuſtome, for cuſtome is like nature. There be men to whom it ſemeth no delectacion to bee good, nether to hymſelf nor yet to other. And there be other to whō it ſemeth that ſome delectacions be good and ſome euill, & to ſome it ſemeth that al maner of delectacions be good: Delectacions without reſpecte is not good. For why? It is of ſenſualite: then it is not like vn to thynges complet. The chaſte man flieth delectacions bicauſe thei make vnderſtandyng dron ken and maketh man to forget godneſſe. Children and beaſtes demaunde delectacions. There bee ſome delectaciōs that make a man ſeke and bryng trouble, then a man that is of good vnderſtandyng, demaundeth the pleaſures of the body but moderately.

¶ The .xxxvij. Chapiter. ¶ Of Chaſtitet.

CHaſtite and continēce, ar not al one thing: for Chaſtitieis an habite, the whiche is fixed in the mind of man by longe time, hauing ouercome the deſires of the fleſh, ſo that it fealeth no aſſaultes of temptacions: but cō tinēce is an habite by the which a man ſuſtaineth harde temptacions, muche moleſted: But neuertheleſſe conſenteth not therto, ſo muche reaſon is in hym. Then Chaſtitee and continence are not all one. The inchaſt is an habite by the which a mā ſinneth in delectable thinges, with out great inſtance of temptacyons, as a man not conſtrayned and goeth ſearchyng delectacyons. Then the incontinent is he that is ouercome with temptacions, whiche pricke him ſtrōgly. But the vnchaſte man is he that letteth him ſelfe to be ouercome with tēptacions that pricketh hym not. And the incontinence is ſuche by debilite of reaſon, and by littell truſte. Then there is no meane at al, but ſtā deth as an euill mean, & may be correct, yf vertue & hope lie together. But the inchaſte can neuer be correcte, for vertue hathe noo power in malice to muche vſed. For the reaſon ofte tymes corrupteth by two muche concupyſcence: And the acte of the malicious is knowen, for ver tue is whole in reaſon, but in malice, reaſon is corrupte.

¶ Of Conſtancie. Chapiter .xxxviii.

THere be three maners of ſtablenes, one is that a man be ſtable in al hys woorkes trewe or falce, whatſoeuer they be. The ſecond is contrary to this. The third is a man that wyll ſtande in the thing that is good, and lightely depart from a thing that is euell. But generally the man that is conſtante, is better then the manne that is mutable, for the mutable moueth with euerye winde, but the conſtante mouethe not for anye ſtronge deſire, but ſomtime by his noble delectacion mouethe frome his falce credence, and conſenteth to the trewthe. It is impoſſible that a man be wiſe and incontinent to geather. For prudence is but onelye in the worke, ofte tymes incontinence and wylynes be together: and ſo ſubteltie is deuided from prudence: And prudence is in thoſe thiges which be good: But ſubteltee is both in the good and in the euil. And the wiſe man that worketh not according to his ſcience, is lyke to hym that ſlepeth and is droncke. The lighte and wantō man is the pit of carnal deſyres, afflict and ſwalowed in the workes of reaſon, and is as a drunckard which hath bound his wit and is ſmothered in his brayne by the vapours of wyne for to much wine peruerteth the ryght iudgement. The frendful man is he that wronges other by councell prepenſed, and by I re maketh election without reaſon, which is euel withoute remedy.

¶ Of Amitee. cha. xxxix.

AMitee is one of the vertues of almightie God and of mā, and is much nedeful to thelife of mā, and a man hath nede of frēdſhip in this life as of other thynges. And the mighty riche princes of the earth haue nede of frendes, to whom thei may be beneficial and of whom they may receaue thankes, honors and ſeruices. A gret ſuretie it is to a mā to haue frendes, for ſo much as aman is in the degre of gretnes, the more egal he is to fal, and his fal moſt perillous. Then frendes are mooſte nedefull in the tyme of ſtryffe and aduerſitee. And therfore it is a good and a ſure refuge. For a manne that hath no frende, is alone in his dedes: And when he is with his frend, he hathe companye and helpe to brynge his worke to paſſe. For why? of two perfytte perſonnes commeth perfite worke and vnderſtandyng. The makers of the lawe put their Citizens in comfort to haue Charitee together with Juſtice. For why? yf euery man were iuſte, yet Charitee ſhould be nedefull. But yf euery man wer frendly to other, Juſtice ſhuld not nede: for whi? frendſhippe deſtroyeth al ſtrife, and euery diſcorde that may be.

¶ Of the kindes of Amitee. Chapiter .xl.

THE kyndes of Amitee bee knowen by the thīges that a man loueth, whiche be thre, that is to ſaie: Good, Profytable, and delectable. And he that is ſuche one accordyng to the truthe, loueth hym that is like hym. The kindes of amite ben thre, the one is loued for good, another for gaines, and the other for delectaciōs, and to euery one it is nedefull to manifeſt tribulaciō. For they that loue, bereth good will commonly one to another, and verely loue the thinges by the which they be frendes, that is to ſay, delectacion & profit: whence the amitee indureth ſo longe as indureth the delectaciō and the perfite, and therfore they be frē des and enemies. The frēdſhyp is in olde folkes, but the frendſhip of delectacion is amongeſt them that be yonge, howbeit the perfite Amite is in them that be good, and that be like in vertue, and beare good wil one to another, becauſe they be like in their vertues. And this frendſhyp is a way that conteyneth al goodnes, and amongeſt themthere is no delectaciō nor euil. And therfore this frendſhip cannot be be twene the good man & the euell. but onely amongeſt theim that be good. But the amitee that is by delectacion or for profit may be amongeſt good & euel, howbe it it contyne weth not longe. Amite is a laudable adornement to them that company together and is a fayre lyfe, by the which they liue together in tranquillitee: and the tranquillttee that is amongeſt them, doth not depart by the diuerſitee of places, and ſhoulde not ſtande yf they were farre of, this maye bee a departyng & goyng out of the myndfulfrendſhip, and therfore it is a prouerbe, that long viages depart frendſhippe. A welbeloued thynge hathe ſome noble goodnes, and therefore frendes loue together, & not becauſe of fode or repaſte, but becauſe of habit, and euery frend loueth his welthe, and rendereth one to another accordynge to equalitee.

Howe that the ſubſtance of the good ſhuld be cōmen. Chapiter .xli.

THe participacion of theim that be parteners together in good and euell, in marchandiſe and in conuerſacion together, is euer a beginning of frēd ſhip, and according to the quan titee of the thynges, ſoo is the quantitee of frendſhyppe, and they that haue frendes oughte to common amongeſt them. For amitee is a thing of commente, and euery commontie deſyreth lyke concupiſcence. And therefore is made the ſolempnitee of Paſch, oblacions and offerynges, ſo that of thes thinges mai growe company and loue amō geſt neighboures, of the whiche thing procedeth honour and exaltacion of almighty God. And in olde tyme they kept their ſolempnitees after Corne Harueſt, becauſe at that time menne were mooſte able to helpe their frendes, and to geue thankes to God for his benefites receiued.

¶ Of Principalitees. Chapiter .xlii.

THere be thre principalitees, the fyrſte of the Kyng, another of the Commonalte, and the thirde of the Father vppon his children, and echone of theſe hathe his conntrary. For the King inforceth his ſubiectes to goodnes, and is ſtudious to procure theyr good eſtate, as the Herdemanne is ſtudyous vppon his ſtocke. It is a differēce betwene the Lordſhippe of the king and other in this: For the kinge is Lorde vniuerſall of the people, the father is the cauſe of the generacyon of hys chyldren and of the brynging vp of theym.

Then the father is natural lord of his chyldren, and their loue is greate. Therefore the father oughte to be honoured with the honoure dewe vnto hym. The Juſtice of euerye manne is accordyng to the quantitee of his vertue, then whoſoeuer is greateſte, oughte to bee mooſte loued and honoured. The loue of brothers is as the loue of fellowes, becauſe they come together and hathe one ſymylitude when there commeth aduerſytee.

❧ The Lorde and the ſubiectc haue one Relygyon togyther. Lyke as the craftes manne and his inſtrumente, and as the bodye and the ſolle. And he that vſeth the Inſtruemente profyteth thereby, and therfore he loueth it, but the Inſtrument loueth not hym that wearethe it.

❧ And lykewyſe the bodye loueth not the ſolle: The Inſtrument is as the bonde man whyche loueth not his Lorde. The father loueth the ſonne, and the ſonne the father, becauſe the one is made of the other: but the loue of the father is more ſtronger than the loue of the ſonne, & the reaſon is: for that the father knoweth his ſonne to be of hym in ſhorte tyme after his byrthe: But the ſonne knoweth not the father of longe after, that is when his wittes be come to him and diſcreſſion cōforteth. More ouer, the father loueth the ſōne as hymſelf. But the ſōne loueth the father as a thyng made of him. Brothers loue together as beeyng of one beginnyng. For thei be one thing: although thei be departed. And this that conforteth loue emonges brethern is that thei bee nouriſhed and brought vp together.

¶ The .xliij. Chapter ¶ The loue that a man hath with GOD.

THe loue that aman hath with god, and the loue that a mā hath to his father, is of one nature. For why? Eche one of their loues is by a recordaciō of grace. But the loue of God oughte to bee preferred before the loue of the father. For ye benefites that a mā receiueth of God: be more greate and more noble then thei whiche be receiued of the father The amite of kyndred, frendes, neighbours and ſtraungers, is more and leſſe accordyng to the diuerſite of the cauſes, by y• whiche one beareth good will vnto another. Therefore thei that be brought vp together, beeyng of long tyme conuerſant together be of great frendſhip. The loue that is betwene a man and his wife is loue naturall, & a more aunciēt loue then is ye loue of citezēs emongeſt thē, and in this loue is great profite. For why? the workes of the mā is diuerſe from the workes of the woman. And that whyche the one canne not dooe, the other dothe, and ſo they fulfyll theyr buſyneſſe: The chyldren be bondes whiche bynde the womanne to the huſbande in loue, becauſe the chyldren bee the common wealth of them bothe.

How that loue is increaſed by cōmunicacion of frendes Chapyter .xliiii.

COmmunicaciō ioineth theym that be good togyther in one loue, by occacion of vertues: whiche verily be louing together in theym ſelues, for there is not amongeſt them any ſtrife or contencion, nor will to haue victory the one of the other: but only to ſerue and pleaſe, for why? It is a great pleaſure when a man hath dooen ſeruice to his frendes. There bee frendſhips whiche be called queſtionalles, and thoſe frendſhippes bee in men whiche receiue one of another, wherof commeth greate accuſacions, as when the one ſaieth: I haue dooen thee pleaſure, and thou haſt doen me none: Suche frendſhip cannot long indure.

❧ Amitee is like vnto Juſtice and accordyng to iuſtice in two ſortes, that is to ſaie: Naturall and legall. So is frendſhip in two ſortes, naturall and legall: And the legall is called amitee, and the perticular is a market of change, as ſhe that ſtandeth in geuyng and receiuyng naturally frō hand to hande. There are diuerſe men that be pleaſed with that thyng whiche is well and conuenient, but notwithſtā dyng thei leaue the good & take the profitable. A good thyng it is to do good to other without any hope of gaynes. But profitable is when a manne thynketh to haue a greater power. This ſeruice is it that a manne dooth to hym that is mightie and able to geue rewardes and chaunge for ſeruice dooen.

¶ The .xlv. Chapiter. Of the loue that ought to bee emongeſt menne.

LOue is the pryce of vertue and thankes or benefites receiued Gaynes or wynnyng is ſeuerally of nede, & the greater man ought to geue vnto the leſſe winnyng, & the leſſe ought to geue vnto the greater honor and reuerence. And this ought to bee accordyng to the deſeruyng of theim bothe: In theſe waies is conſerued frendeſhip. The honor that a manne ought to doo to almightie God and to his father, is not like other honors; for no man can geue ſufficiente honores and thankes to God & to his father. Although he inforce himſelf to do what he can, the commendable equalnes is to equall the kindes of amite that bee diuerſe, as it is in the orderyng of citees, that the ſhomaker ſelleth his ſhooes as he will, and likewiſe other craftes men emongeſt them. One thing is loued by the whiche all marchaundiſe bee made equall and confirmed, this is Gold and ſiluer. When the louer loueth his loue for delectacion, & ſhe loueth him for profite, thei loue not the one the other right wel, therfore ſuche loue is ſone loſte. Euery loue y• is for light thinges doth ſhortly departe. But the reaſōs that be ſtrong and ſtedfaſt cauſeth frendſhip, and loue to continue that is by vertue, for the good is long laſter. For why? Uertue cannot be remoued but profite departeth when profitable is taken awaie. A man that ſyngeth for gaynes, if a manne ſhould ſyng one ſong for another, he would not be cōtent, becauſe he loketh for another reward. Then there ſhalbe no concord in marchandiſe, if there be not concord of willes, and that is whē a man receiueth for that that he geueth, that he would haue. And ſometymes it is for that for y• whiche he geueth nothing but honor & reuerence, as did Pithagoras the which would haue nothyng of hys Scholers for his doctryne but honoure and reuerence. And ſomtime for doctryne a man will haue mony, as the Mechaniques, but it is not ſo in Philoſophie, for he that teacheth other knowledge; ought to receiue of his diſciple honor and ſubieccion, as a lord and father. It is nedefull for a manne to knowe the dignitie of men. So that euery man maie geue honoure accordyng to his dutie. For a man oweth one honor to his father, another to the people, another to the Lorde of the hoſte, another to the felowe, another to the neighbor, and another to the ſtrāger. He that vſeth fraude in frēdſhip, is worſe thē he that vſeth fraude in gold and ſiluer, euē ſomuche as frenſhip is more precious then gold and ſiluer, ſo muche the wourſe is he that fraudeth amitie, then he that deceiueth in Golde and ſiluer. And like as falſe money is ſhortly broken, ſo falſe frenſhip ſhortely departeth.

¶ The .xlvi. Chapiter. ¶ How almightie God departeth all goodneſſe.

THE equall parte of goodnes is almighty God, whiche geueth too euery one accordyng as their nature is apte to receiue. The man that is good delighteth in hymſelf, hauyng ioye of the good woorkes, and if he bee good reioyſeth hym muche with his frende, whiche he taketh as himſelf. But the euill manne flieth from the good and noble operacions, and if he be very euill he flieth from hymſelf. For when he ſtandeth alone he is rebuked in hymſelf, in rememberyng the euill woorkes whiche he hath dooen, and neither loueth hymſelf nor other, becauſe the nature of goodneſſe is mortified in hym in the depeneſſe of iniquite, • e delighteth not fully in y• euill that he doth. For the nature of goodnes draweth vnto delectacion and deu • deth in hymſelf. And therfore he is in perpetuall troble & paines full of bitterneſſe and dronken in filthineſſe and of diuerſitee. Then to ſuche a man no man cā bee afrende: For a frende ought to haue in hym a thyng to be loued, and ſuche one hath in hymſelf ſo muche miſery that there is no remedy, that he may come to felicite. Then let no man fall in to this pitte of Iniquite, but rather enforce hym to come to goodnes, by the whiche he maie haue delectaciō and ioye in him ſelf. Comforte is not frendſhip althoughe it bee like vnto it. The beginnyng of frendſhip is pleaſure had in tymes paſt. As the loue of a woman of the whiche a manne hath had pleaſure and delectacion, and is a bonde of loue and foloweth it inſeperable, the deſperaciō of the whiche procedeth. Comforte maie bee frendſhip by ſimilitude, till it bee growē by cuſtome of time and the office of comfort apperteigneth vnto hym that hath in hym grace and grauite, and excerciſed in vertue knitte of loue and concorde: for diſcorde in opinions is to bee drawen oute of a noble congregacion, ſo that it maie remaigne in vnitee and peace and in concord of willes. Thoſe thynges that geue other verite and dignitee to rule bee vertuous & their woorkes. And the vnite of opinions be found in good menne, bycauſe thei bee firme and ſtable emōgeſt theim ſelf in outwarde thynges, for thei beare good will continually: but ſeldome men agre in one opinion. And to fulfill their deſires thei ſuſtaine greate ſtrife and muche buſineſſe, but not becauſe of vertue. And bee ſolicitous to deceiue them with whō thei haue to doo, and euer be in ſtrief and in contenciō. The benefactors loue their beneficiates more then thei bee loued of them. For the benefactor loueth with pure liberalite, but the beneficiates louen their benefaccores by debte of thankes. And moreouer the benefactor loueth the beneficiate as creditor: But the beneficiate loueth as a debtor, y• creditor reioyſeth againſt his debitor. The debitor is trobled bicauſe he feareth his debitor: then the beneficiates fain to loue their benefactours bycauſe thei would not bee rebuked of vnkindneſſe. And yet the receite of the benefite is factor: and in ſpeciall if he haue mynd. For why? The vttermoſte perfecciō of man is in his operaciō

¶ The .xlvij. Chapiter. ¶ How man delighteth hym in many thynges.

A Manne delighteth in three thynges, that is to ſay: in thynges preſent in vſyng of them: In thynges paſt in remēbryng of them, and in thinges to come in truſtyng of them. The woorkes good and noble contine we long and be delectable to remē brance. But the delectable and profitable ſatiſfie but litle, and the memory ſhortly paſt. Euery manne loueth more the thinges that he getteth with paine, then the thyng that he getteth without pain, as it is of money: whiche whē it is gotten with great labor, it is kept with great ſtudie and moderatly ſpente. And who y• getteth it without labor ſpendeth it without moderaciō. And this is the cauſe wherefore the mother loueth y• childe more then dooth the father. For why? She ſuffreth great trauail and anguiſhe in the birthe. Now in ſomuche that it is a light thing to receiue benefites, and a hard thyng to geue theim, the benefactor loueth better his benefactor, then the benificiator loueth his benefactor. There bee men that loue themſelf to much, and that is called a filthy loue. The euill man doth euery thyng vpon will, but the good and verteons manne dooth the workes whiche bee good and verteous, for the loue of vertue and good nes. And there bee other menne that by y• nobilitee of their mindes, be good to their frendes, in leuyng them their goodes. So that their workes maie remain in perpetuall memorye. My frend is another. This is a prouerbe. By a prouerbe it is ſaied Frendes haue one life and one bloud, and all their thynges be bee equally comen: as the noſe to the face, the knee to the legge and the fynger to the hande. A manne ought to loue his frend, for in louing him he loueth him ſelf, and ſhould not be loued for honor or corporall delectacion, but rather for the very loue of vertue. And the manne that loueth his frend in this ſorte, is a very frende, he helpeth and ſupporteth with body and goodes, and with his life if nede be. The full felicitee of mankynde is in the obteignyng of frendes, for no man would haue al the goodes of the worlde to liue alone. Then a man hath nede of frendes, to whom he maie bee benificiall, and with whom he maie comenly vſe felicite. It is a natural thyng to man to liue citezenly, and a neceſſary thyng to a manne to accompliſhe his buſines of neceſſitee by his neighbores and frendes, whiche cannot bee doen by hymſelf. To do well it is a noble and delectable thyng: and the vertues electe in good deedes bee fewe. But the profitable & delectable be many The frendes of pleaſure ſhould not bee many, for thei be but for diſgeſtion of meate. There can bee but one verteous frend. As a man can haue but one louer that he loueth intierly. For whi? That loue is of aboundaunce, the whiche is but to one alone. But counſaill honeſt and conueniente, ought to bee to euery man by dutie of vertue. A man hath nede of frendes in tyme of aduerſitee and proſperitec to be comen with hym in his goodes: and liuyng in ioye and pleſure, ſo that menne maie become the better one by another. And in aduerſitee, ſo that a man maie haue helpe and counſaill of his frende.

¶ The .xlviij. Chapiter. ¶ How Delectacion is naturall.

DElectaciō is borne and noriſhed with vs from the beginnyng of oure nature, therfore children ſhould bee taughte at the beginnyng, to delight themſelfes in thynges conuenient, and likewiſe againſt that to miſlike the contraries. And this is the foundacions of vertue morall, and in proceſſe growethe and is knowen the beatitude of the life. For when a manne delighteth in a thyng, it is his choyſe, and when it greueth, he flieth it. And there bee menne whiche be ſeruauntes to the delectacions, wherfore their delectacions bee deſtroyed againſt God of this that thei owe. Thoſe mē whiche claime delectacions and folowe them ſaie againſt their mindes, and ſaie not euill of theim concerning the vertue. For the true woorde dooth euer helpe and amendeth the maners of the life better: but the operacion woorketh more then doth the worde. And therefore the good man informeth his life with good wordes & good workes. The thyng that is deſired for it ſelf is beſte and the griefe is euil. For why? It is contrary to delectacion, & alſo euery thyng that is good helpeth vnto another thyng to make it good. And delectacion helpeth other thynges and maketh theim better. Then ſhe is good Plato ſaieth. That delectacion was not good, & paraduenture he ſaith not truth. For why? In euery thyng is naturally ſome thyng that is good, then in delectaciō is ſome thing that is good. It is a thyng vnpoſſible that one good thyng be contrary to the other. And it is impoſſible that one euill be not contrary to another, and bothe two are to be fled: But two goodes are not contrary together, but rather be like, and both two are to bee electe and choſen, but yet the one maie bee better then the other: As one man maie bee more wiſe then the other & more iuſt. Delectaciō is not mouing, for euery thyng that may moue hath tariyng and haſtyng. But thynges relatiue haue no mouyng by themſelfes, then delectacion is not mouyng.

¶ The .xlix. Chapiter. ¶ Of Delectacion ſenſible and intellectuall.

DElectaciō is ether ſē cible or intellectuall and there wher is the felyng, there is the delectacion, then it muſt nedes be that this delectacion bee in the ſencible life. And there where is the vnderſtandyng is the operaciō ſencible. Then it is of neceſſitee that theſe delectacions bee in the mynde intellectuall. And many tymes before the delectacions of the ſenſes is grief. As before delectacion of eatyng manne hath honger. And before delectacion of drinkyng a man hath firſt, but before the delectaciō of hering, ſeing, orſmellyng: ther is no griefe. And like as in althynges of delectacions intellectuall, delectable thynges be had in men whiche haue peruerſe nature, and bee not to be called delectables, according to the truth. As thynges that apere bitter to the ſicke and are not bitter accordyng to ye truth. So of euery operacion: for as the iuſte man delighteth in iuſtice, ſo the wiſe man delighteth in the workes of Sapience. Euery man is pleaſed with the operacions in the whiche he delighteth, and the delectaciō maketh the woorkes perfight. Delectacion is a complete fourme whiche hath no neede to her accōpliſhyng, nether of tyme nor of mouyng. That is to ſay: ther is no mouyng accordyng to her forme in the tyme, but fulfilleth her ſelf out of tyme, as if there were no mouyng circuler. The ſencible delectaciō is according to the quantitee of the felyng, and in the thyng that is felte, and in the operaciō betwene the one and the other. Then when the ſenſes bee ſtrong: the thynges bee more delectable, when the ſtrengthe of delectacton is geuen to delighte. Becauſe the goodneſſe of the worke is in the ſtrength of the thyng that doth and is the beginnyng of the thyng that it ſuffereth.

¶ The .l. Chapiter. The moſte delectable delectacion.

THE moſte delectable delectacions be thoſe whiche be moſte complete & moſte perfite. And thoſe whiche fulfill all the delectaciōs of man. And ſo lōg indureth the delectaciōs as the vertue of the thynges indureth by the whiche a man delighteth hym as youth when it hath the thing that pleſeth. And therfore the delectacions cannot ſuffice: till thei become leſſe, as it commeth to age. When the vertue miniſheth, the man that deſireth life deſireth delectacion, for delectacion is complete of the life The delectaciō intelligible differeth from the ſēcible, and euery delectacion multiplieth and increaſeth her woorkes, and by this is multiplied Artes & ſciences, becauſe mā delighteth in them. There be delectacions of operacions, whiche ſometyme letteth other delectacions or operacions. As a manne that delighteth in Harpyng, ſomuche that he forgetteth other workes that he hath in hande. Delectacions that bee in noble operacions: bee noble and are to be folowed. And the vile is vile and not to be folowed. Thoſe delectacions be diuerſe in kind: whiche bee diuerſe in operacion, in kynde as delectacions intellectuall and ſenſible. And theſe be of diuerſe kyndes whiche bee likewyſe diuerſe in operacions as of the ſight and felyng. Euery beaſt hath his delectacion in the whiche he delighteth: but of all other delectacions the intellectuall is moſte delectable, and moſte noble emongeſt all other delectaciōs. As the gold emongeſt all other mettalles, accordyng to ye diuerſities of men, by diuerſe delectacions. But thoſe bee very good that apere good to theim that bee good, and not to the vicious, as a thyng that is ſwete and bitter to the whole man and not the ſicke.

¶ The .lj. Chapiter. ¶ How that beatitude is the fulnes of vertue.

SIth y• we haue ſpokē of vertue and delight it therefore behoueth vs to ſpeke of felicite and beatitude, whiche be tha cō pleſhyng of all the goodneſſe of mā. This felicite is not habite, but rather Acte, to the whiche a man intendeth to cōmen by him ſelf or by other. Beatitude is a thing out of it ſelf, the man that hath not taſted the ſweteneſſe of Beatitude in the whiche is the delight of the vnderſtādyng of man: hath his refuge to the pleſures of the body, in the whiche he hath put his truſte. And thei be not of a truth to be called delectacions. Beatitude is not to bee choſen by boyes, but verely in this that ſemeth to be delectable to thē that be good men. Felicite is not in ſporte and plaic, but rather in thynges had by labor and ſtudy. It is a manifeſt thyng of bleſſednes, when a mā laboreth with vertue in ordinat thynges & in thynges of ſolace. And therfore it is ſaied: that the vnderſtandyng is a more noble thyng then is y• noſe, for becauſe the moſte noble mēbre doth the moſte noble operacion, and the beſt māworketh the beſt worke, by y• whiche it is a worthy thing that felicite be operacion of the moſt noble vertue whiche is naturalli purpoſed to al thinges ye bee geuen of God to man. And felicitee is no nother thyng but be ſtedfaſt in vertue & in her to workes. The moſte perfight delectacions that be, are in thacte of felicite, and meruelous delectacions be found in philoſophy by the truth & by certēty that is foūd in y• lawes. And a more ſauerous delectacion is this, that a man hath whē he knoweth the thyng, then when he thinketh to knowe. Then the operacion of this vertue is vppermoſt & ſupreme felicite. The wiſe manne hath nede of thinges y• be neceſſary to y• life as other hath. For vertue is buſied in outwarde thynges: as in Juſtice▪ Chaſtite and ſtrength, and in other ordinate operacions: becauſe y• matter of operaciō is outward, but the operacion of ſapience is inwarde, as to the neceſſitee. But neuertheles if a man haue help he woorketh more perfightly in his thought. Then this felicite is no nother but hope to knowe And of thought, felicite repreſē teth battail becauſe of health & of peace, and this apereth manifeſtly in y• citees whiche make war to haue reſt and peace, and like ſo to all other vertues of battail. For euery manne intendeth ſome outwarde thynges, but the vnderſtanding ſpeculatiue is euer in peace and in trā quilite. But it hath nede of lōgtyme. For it is not ſemyng or cō uenient to felicitee, to haue any thyng imperfecte. And when a man cometh to this degre of felicite, he liueth not by the life of man, but liueth by that deuine thyng whiche is in man. Then the life that aperteineth to this acte is deuine life. But the life that aperteineth to y• actes of other vertues, is humain. Therfore it is not cōueniēt to a good man that his diligence bee humain, nor his deſire bee not morall, although it ſo apere. But yet is bounden to inforce hymſelf to bee morall accordyng to his power. And yet euer to inforce himſelf to liue by the moſt nobleſt life that is in hym. For although a man bee but litle of perſone, he is aboue all other creatures. whence the moſte delectable life that a man hath is by vnderſtandyng.

¶ The .lij. Chapiter. ¶ Of the morall vertue and of the happie manne.

THeſe vertues morall or Ciuill will, bee in more trouble & more ſolicite then the intellectualles, for that liberalitee hath neede of riches. The iuſte man is buſied with theim that commaūde iuſtice, and likewiſe of the ſtraunge man and chaſte, but theſe vertues intellectuall haue no nede, for the accompliſhyng of their operaciōs of outward thynges. But rather many tymes the very perfight mē: bee ſped in theſe vertues of the outward thynges. But a man that cannot come to the perfeccion of this life, oughte to choſe a waie to liue, accordyng to the comen lawes. For the operaciō of the vnderſtandyng ſpeculatiue, is in thend of example of the very beatitude of man: And manne is likened to God and his angels. For the other operacions bee not worthy to be likened to God nor to heuenly thynges. God and his angels haue moſte noble life, for thei be euer in the moſte beſt ſpeculacion, & their ſpeculacion neuer wereth nor faileth. And the manne that inforceth hymſelf moſte contynually to vnderſtande & thinke of theſe thynges, is moſte like vnto theim that bee in the very beatitude.

¶ The .liij. Chapiter. Of the knowledge of Uertues.

AMan to bee happie in this worlde hath nede of moderate conductingin outward thinges, for becauſe nature geueth not ſufficient inwardly of theſe thynges. As to bee ſatiſfied in brede & of wine, & of other thynges that be nedeful to the life of man. But it is not nedeful to be lorde of the ſea and of the land, for ſuche thynges maie happen to thē that are of leſſe degree of riches, that be more ware to bee happy then the Lordes of theſe thynges. And therfore it is well ſaied of Anaxagoras: that felicite is not in riches nor in lordeſhip his ſaiyng is to be noted, for the woordes of hym are to be alledged, whoſe woorkes agree with his ſaiyng. A man that maketh his oriſion accordyng to the obedience of the ordre of the vnderſtandyng: is loued of God, If almightie God haue cure of man whiche is a worthy thyng to beleue? Then moſte cure he hath of thē that moſte inforceth themſelfes to be like vnto hym, and beſt rewardeth theim, and delighteth hym to them, that is to ſaie, with them as one frende with another. Thē according to this ſaiyng, we ought to thinke that it is ſufficiente to obtaine felicite, only to know y• thinges written in this boke of vertues and frēdſhip, and of other thinges, but the accōpliſhyng is in the operacions. For this thyng that of nature ought to be doen ſufficeth not only to be ſaid, but to be doen. And in this forme is fulfilled the goodneſſe of man.

¶ The .liiij. Chapiter. ¶ Yet of like matter.

THE knowledge of vertue maketh a māne of power to be admoniſhed vn to good woorkes, ſpecially ſuch as haue good nature and moued by admoniſion to do well. Alſo payn maketh a man to flee from vice, for feare of puniſhement, and not for the loue of vertue, but for feare of paine, & thinke not well though thei dooe well. It is not poſſible for theim that bee hardened in malice to be corrected by wordes. There bee menne whiche bee good by teachyng. And thoſe men that bee good by nature haue it not of theim ſelfes but by the grace of God, whiche is vetely called good nature. Then the ſolle of him that hath the garmente of goodneſſe and of righte loue, hateth euill: the mouyng ingendereth vertue in her as doth the ſeede that is caſt vpon good ground. And to the intente that a man haue a good cuſtome from the beginnyng, & to vſe to loue thynges that bee good & to hate euil, he ought to be brought vp frō his youth accordyng to the noble lawes, and vſe the woorkes of vertue: and this oughte to bee in maner of continence, although it bee not delectable to many men, yet the hande may not bee withdrawen from chaſteſyng of children, yea and from childhode till thei bee greate. There be menne whiche maie not bee corrected by woordes. And there bee that cannot bee by woordes but by payne. And there bee other whiche will not bee corrected by nother of theſe ſortes. And thoſe bee to be takē from other. The good and noble ruler of the citee, maketh good citezens, whiche obſcrue the lawes and doo y• worke that it cōmaundeth. Thei be aduerſaries that obſerue not the lawes and commaundementes: although thei dooe well. In diuerſe Citees there is no good rule becauſe thei liue diſſolutly in folowyng their willes. The moſte conuenient rule that may be in citees, is that whiche is tē pered prouidently in ſuche ſort as maie bee kepte not to heuy, and that whiche manne deſireth to bee obſerued in hym and in his children and in his frendes. The good puniſher of y• lawes is he that maketh rules vniuerſall, whiche bee determinate in this boke, and conioyne them to the perticulars whiche cometh daily in hādes, therefore to ordre the lawes well, it is nedefull to haue reaſon and experience.