The Ethi­ques of Ari­stotle, that is to saye, preceptes of good beha­uoure and per­fighte honestie, now newly trā ­slated into English.

The preface HIS RIGHT HO­norable Lorde and Ma­ster Edward Earle of Der­by, His humble and obedi­ente Seruaunte Ihon Wylkinson, Sa­luteth.

ALthough the fe­ble and werie bodye, (right honorable lord and Master) be satisfied with a restinge place: yet the mind cannot be so quieted or reposed, but that of necessitie it is euermore busi. Therfore it shal be good for euery mā to prouide for some vertuouse occupiyng, against the multitude of phāta sies, wherin may be fixed the labour of the mind, so that it stray [Page] not to ferre in vaine. I therfore intending to discharge a part of my duty toward your Lordship haue translated this boke of the Ethiques of Aristotle, out of J­talian into our vulgare toung, not for that your Lordship hath not seene them herebefore in the Italian tōg, but for the instru­ctiō and edifiyng of others that haue not sene them in Englishe. Yet I can notboldli besech your Lordshippe nor others being of more knowledge then I am to allowe this my symple dooyng: but rather to correct thesame, and not to iudge or deme in me a­ny presum­cion.

The ende of the preface.

The Ethiques of Aristotle.

Of Artes. The first Chapiter.

EUery art, eue­ry doctrine, e­ueri operaciō, and euery ele­ction, semethe to require sō ­thynge to bee good: thē it was wel said of the Philosophers. Good is that whiche euery thing desireth. Accor­ding vnto diuerse artes, diuers intencions: Some ben finished in workes, & other that bene no workes. Although they be ma­ny Artes or craftes, euerye one hath his finall intencion.

¶ Example, Phisike intendeth helth, & knighthod victory, ship [Page] worke intendeth sailynge: Go­uernance of housolde intendeth to haue riches. There be Artes generall and artes also that bee speciall. ¶ Example, The science of knighthode is generall vnder the whiche ben conteined other artes particulars, as Sa delars, Armorers, & other craf­tes which may be nedeful in ba­tel, and these vniuersal be more worthy & more noble than bene the particulars, because, the particulars bee for the vniuer­salles, as thynges whyche bee made by nature, and beene an vtter and fynall vnderstan­dynge, vnto the whiche bene or­deyned al the operacion of these craftes. As a man that shoteth at his pricke for his marke: So euery craft hath his final intent [Page] whiche doth set forth the worke. Then the art Ciuil that teacheth to rule Cities is principall and soueraine of all other artes, for vnder her ben conteined diuerse artes. Rethorique is also righte noble, for why? she dothe dispose and set in order al the other that bee conteined vnder her: The fulnesse whereof and end, is the fulnes and intēt of al the other. Than the wealth that foloweth hir science is the welth of man, Because, it doth cōstrain from enyls. The ryghte doctryne is that a man procede therein ac­cordynge as his nature maye sustayne.

¶ Example, He that teacheth Geometry, ought to procede by strong argumentes, which bene named demonstraciōs: & he that [Page] teacheth Rethorique oughte to procede by argumentes sembla bles or very like. And this is for to witte, that euery artificer shoulde iudge well and saye the truthe of that whiche appertey­neth to his craft. The science of rulyng of cities belongeth not to chyldren, nor to men that fo­loweth theyr owne wylles: For they be not wyse in two sortes, neither in age nor in manners, yet somtyme olde of tyme and young in maners, and childe of tyme and olde in maners, then to suche is conuenient to be ru­lers of cities whyche be no chil­dren of maners nor folowers of their owne willes.

¶ There be thynges whiche be manifest vnto nature, and thin­ges that be manifeste vnto vs, [Page] from whence this science ought to be geuen. Of the thīges that be manifest vnto vs, a man that should study in this science and learne it, oughte to vse himselfe in thynges good, iuste and ho­neste. Also he ought to haue his mind naturally disposed to scy­ence. But a man that hath none of these thynges is vnprofyta­ble to this science.

Of the thre liues. Ca. ii.

THe lifes of name & fame bene thre: the one is the life of cō cupyscence, the o­ther is ye lyfe Ciuil: that is to saye the life of honour and prudence: the thyrde is the life contēplatiue. There be ma­ny that liue bestly, which is cal­led [Page] the life of concupiscence, for that thei folow their willes, and echone of these liues is for their propre intent, deuided one from the other: as the arte of Phisike is deuided frō the art of knight hode, and as the Physician in­tendeth helth, so the knight will haue battayle and victory.

Of good. Capi. iii.

GOod is considered in two sortes, the one is good for hī ­selfe, another good is that a man desi­reth for other. Good for thy self is beatitude. Good for other is honoure and vertue. And why woulde a man haue these thyn­ges, but for to be happy? A na­turall thyng it is to euery man [Page] to bee a Citiezen and to be ac­customed with Artificers, and not naturally to inhabite ī desertes there where is no company which naturally a man loueth. Beatitude is a thyng complete that nedethe none other thynge withoute it selfe, by the whyche the lyfe of man is laudable and glorious. Thē is beatitude the gretest welth and the most soue­raiue thing a man can haue.

¶ Here is deuided the powers of the Solle. Capi. iiii.

THe Solle of man hath thre powers, one is called ye lyfe vegitable: in y whiche mā is partener with trees & with plantes: The second power, is the life sensible [Page] in the whiche a man is partener with beastes, for why al beastes haue lifes sēsible. The third, is called solle reasonable, by the whiche a man differeth from all other thinges, for there is none reasonable but man. And this power reasonable is sometyme in acte, and sometime in power, frome whence the Beatitude is whan it is in acte and not whan it is in power.

¶ Euery worke that a man do­eth, is ether good or eiuell, and that man that maketh his work good, is worthi to haue the per­fection of the vertue of his workes: as we wold say, he that har peth well, is worthy to haue the prayse of his art, and the euel to haue the cōtrary. Thē if the life of man, be according to the ope­racion [Page] of reson, than his life is laudable, whan he leadethe it accordyng to his propre vertue. But when many vertues be gathered together in one mans li­uyng, then the life of that man is most best and muche honored & much worthy, so that it can be no more. For it is not one ver­tue that maketh a mā blessed or happy, No more than one Swalowe is a perfight token of the newe spring. Then it is not in a lytel time of the life of man, that he doeth good workes, nor can be said, that man is happy.

¶ Of thre maner of wel­thes. Capitulo .v.

VUelth is deuided in thre partes, the one is the welthe of the solle, the other is the welthe of the bodie, [Page] and the other is the welthe with out the body. And of these thre the welth of the Solle is moste worthy, and the fourme thereof is not knowen but in woorkes, which be with vertue. ¶ Beatitude cōsisteth in the obteinyng of vertues & in the vsīg of thē. But whā beatitude is in a man in habite and not in dede or act, than he is vertuous as a man that sleapeth, whose vertue and whose workes are not manifest, but of necessite must nedes work accordyng to the arte, and is in similitude to him that standeth in trauers and feightes, obtai­neth & hath the croūe: although there be no more stronger than he that hathe the victory, yet he hathe not therfore the crowne because he is most strōg, except [Page] he feighte: Albeit by his power he get the battayle. And so the rewardes of vertue, a man hath not if he bestowe not himselfe in vertue actually: and this is for because the reward is the Bea­titude which he hath so long as he worketh y workes of vertue.

¶ The iuste manne deliteth in iustice, the wyse man in Sapy­ence, the vertuous man in ver­tue. And euerye worke whyche is doone by vertue, is faire and delectable in it selfe. Beatitude is a thing Jocound & pleasant.

¶ Beatytude that is in yearth hathe neede of outewarde he­althe, for it is impossyble to a man to dooe faire woorkes and to haue Arte, whyche is see­myng to good and vertuous li­uing, with abūdance of frēdes. [Page] prosperitie of fortune, withoute good outwardly. And therfore it is nedefull to haue withoute forthe, wherby may be the more manifest the honour & value of man. And if any gifte be geuen to man in this worlde from the gloryous God, it is a worthye thynge to beleue this to bee the Beatitude, because it is the best thyng that may be in man. For whi? it is an honorable and com plet fourme of vertue. There is no generacyon nor kynde that can haue vertue and beatitude but man. There is nether child nor beaste that can haue Beati­tude, for whi? ther works be not according to vertue. Beatitutde is a thing stedfast and fyrm ac­cordīg to very disposiciō, wher­in nether falleth variaunce nor [Page] permutaciō, as for to haue now well and nowe euill, but euer­more well, and this is the goodnes that is in the workes of mā ▪ The pillers of beatitude be the operacions which a man dothe accordīg to vertue. The pillers of the contrarye, be those that a man doth accordyng to vyce.

These workes be stedfaste and stable in the minde of man, and the vertuous manne is not mo­ued nor trobled in him selfe for anye thyng that maye happen contrarye, for then he shoulde neuer haue felicitee it he be tro­bled, because sorowe taketh a­waye pleasure from felicitie.

There be thīges which be hard to be born: but whā a man hath borne theim paciently, he hathe shewed the strēgth of his mind: [Page] and there be thinges also which be light to be borne, in the sustainyng whereof there is no great prudēce shewed therein. A hard thyng it is to sustaine sicknes & death of chyldren: yet although they be strange and harde, they mouenot a man from his Beati tude. The happynes of the man that is wel fortuned, is so much to be praised, as a thing sent frō God, and is so much to be hono­red & cōmended: that their laud & praise can not be spoken: & spe cially, it shal become vs to glori fye, honor & magnify almyghty god aboue al thinges, & we ou­ght to thinke him in him self to haue in his thought algoodnes & felicite, For whi? he is the begīning & cause of algoodnes. Felicite & beatitude ar one certē act, the which procedeth of ye solle & [Page] of the body. And like as the per­fect phisiciā seketh & sercheth dt ligētly the nature of the body of mā to thentēt to cōfirm it in hel the: Likewise tt belongeth vnto good rulers & gouerners of cy­ties to loke studi & prouide tocō serue the form of felicite in ye mi­des of their citizens, & for to put them in comfort to worke accor ding to vertue which is the pre cious frute y cōmeth of felicite.

The powers of the solle, Chap [...]ter .vi.

The solle of mā hath diuers powers, as one called the power irracional: that is to say vnresonable, wherein a manne differeth not frō plātes & brute beastes. And therefore thys is not the propre power in manne. For by this power manne may [Page] worke his operacion sleapyng. The other is the power intelle­ctiue, according to whose work after the forme aforsaid, is good and euell. And this power wor­keth not in slepynge but many­festely, & therfore it is said, that the miserable differeth not from the good in the lymittes of this life. For in the tyme of sleape, which is the good, such is the e­uel, and is because that man re­steth from the worke by the whi che he is called good and euell: but this is not treuth general­lye, because the myndes of the good, seeth somtimes in visions and dreames many good thyn­ges and profitable, Whiche be not sene in the mindes of eiuell men. The other power that the sollc hath, although it be not ra­cionall. [Page] Yet it taketh part with reason, therefore it oughte to o­bey vnto the vertue of reason, and this is called the vertue cō cupissible. And a man oughte to knowe that in the solle there ar somtime contrary mouinges Lyke as are in the bodye, as whē one membre moueth in the Paralitico or Paulsye it muste moue againste nature: but this cōtrary is manifest in the bodi, and in the solle hid and s [...]rete. ¶ The power racional is to be said in two sortes, the one is the power which is very resonable: that lerneth deserneth and iud­geth. The other power, vnrea­sonable, that is to saye, the po­wer concupissible, and is called reasonable as long as it is obe­dyent & vnder the power of that [Page] which is veri reasonable, as the good child vnto the father, whi che receaueth his correction.

Of two maners of ver­tues. Chapter .vii.

THere bee two ver­tues, one is called Intellectuall, as Sapience science and prudence: the other is called Morall, as cha­stitie, liberalitie and humilitie, then if we wyll prayse a manne in vertue Intellectuall, we say this is a wise man and subtil in vnderstandynge, and whan we will praise a man for his morall vertues, that is to sai in his ma ners, we say this is a chast man and a liberall.

Howe vertue groweth in man. Chaptter .viii.

ALthoughe there be ii. vertues, the one intellectual, & the o ther moral, the In­tellectuall ingen­dreth and groweth by doctryne & learnyng. And the moral like wyse ingendreth & groweth by good vse and custome, and this vertue moral is not in vs by na ture, for naturall thynges can not be moued from their dispo­sicions by contrary vse.

¶ Example, the nature of the Stone is to goo down warde, and cannot be caste so hygh but that it preaseth downe agayne. The nature of the Fyer is to gooe vp: and can not bee dry­uen so farre downe but that [Page] it preaseth vpwarde. And vni­uersally, nothyng naturall can naturalli worke against nature Thē these vertues be not in vs by nature: the power to receaue them is in vs by nature, the ac­complisshynge is in vs by vse. Thē these vertues be not put in to vs by nature, but the rootes and fulfillyng of the recepte of thē, is in vs by nature: and the fulnes and perfection of the un­cōmeth to vs by vse. Eueri thīg that is in vs by nature, is in vs first bi power: and after cōmeth to the acte, as it commeth to the senses of man. For firste a man hath power to see & to here: and after by this power he heareth and seeth: and a man seeth not nor hereth before he haue the power to heare and see: then nowe [Page] we see that in these thynges of nature: the power goeth before the acte, and in thynges moral, all contrary, for the acte and the worke goeth before the power.

¶ Example, A man hathe the vertue that is called Justice be cause he hathe dooen ofttymes the workes of Justice: Also the vertue of Chastitie: for that he hath diuerse times wrought the workes of Chastitie. And so it is of Artificers, a man is called a Carpenter because he hathe wrought lōg in that art & craft: Art wil not be had without lōg tyme bestowed therin. Like as the Minstrel, by the long vse of Instrumēts, bereth the name of that arte: and the good man is good by his good workes, and euel for doynge eiuell: one selfe [Page] thyng ingendreth in vs vertu­es & corrupteth. If this thing be done diuersly, it is by vertue as it is by healthe, for one selfe thīg done in diuers fashions is both cause of helth & corrupciō.

¶ Example, labour temperate is helth to mā, and if it be little it corrupteth, to much or to litel corrupteth, & to kepe the meane conserueth. ¶ Example, feare & folyshe hardinesse corrupteth the valiantnes of man, for whi? the fearefull fleeth from euerye thyng. And the hardye assaileth euery thyng, beleuing in hīselfe to bring it to passe: nother in the one nor in the other there is no doutinesse, for prudence is in keping the meane betwene fear and folyshe hardynes. For a mā ought to sle & assail there where [Page] it is to assail. And so it is to bee vnderstād in al vertues, as it is to be vnderstande in prudence: that vertue is gotten & kept by holdyng of the meane.

How a man is vertuous Chapyter .ix.

NOwe it is nedefull to make distinctiō and put a differēce betwene habite, which are without vertue by grefe or by ioie, whi­che be done in their workes.

¶ Exāple, he ye sustaineth car­nal wils, & of the abstainīg frō thē reioiseth, is called chast, & he that sustaineth carnal will and morneth is called lecherus, & specially he that sustaineth terrible thīges & not trobled therwith, is called prudēt and strōg, and he [Page] that sustaineth perillous thyn­ges and troubled with them is called fearful. Euery operacion and euery fashion foloweth ple asure or displeasure. Then eue­rye vertue is wyth delyghte or with grefe: and therfore the go­uernours of Cities do honor delectacions and plesures dewely taken: and scourge with dyuers tormentes delectacions not de­wely taken.

¶ The thre desires of Man. Chapiter .x.

THe thinges that man willeth & desireth bee thre: one is profitable, the other delectable & the third good. The thinges cō ­trary be also three, nether profi­table, delectable, nor yet good. He that vseth reasō in these thinges [Page] is good: And he that vseth not reason in these thynges is euell. And speciallye in dele­ctacion, for why? it is nory­shed with vs frō our natiuitie. And therfore it is a great thing for a mā to haue ryght measure in delectacion. Then al the vn­derstandyng of this oure boke, is to haue delectacion with rea­son: and to haue reason in harde thīges it behoueth to haue art. Then the vnderstanding of ar­tes was out of the science Ciuill: So that it geueth delight vnto his citiesens, in thīges which be cōueniēt, as where, whan & how muche, and who that vsethe of these thīges wel, is called good: & he that doth contrary is euell.

¶ Howe a man is vertu­ous. Chapi .xi.

[Page] TO demaūd how a man is iust accor­ding to the works of iustice, and how he is temperat, do­ing the workes of tēperaunce, a mā might say that it is like vn­to these two vertues. As of grā mer, and to that man that is called a Gramarion, that speaketh according to Grammer: but in trothe it is not like, from the art to vertues, for why? in art, that a man be good it nedeth not but to knowe, but in vertue knowe­ledge sufficeth not, withoute worke: for to knowe withoute worke it auaileth not. Like vn­to this is the sicke which vnder standeth al the commandement of the Phisician, and dothe not thereafter. Such sicknes is far [Page] from health, so be men farre frō Beatitude if they haue vertues and worke them not.

How vertues ar inhabit, Chapyter .xii.

IN the solle of man are three thynges habite, power, and passions. Passiōs be these, Joye, de­sire, loue, enuy, and hate: the po­wers be natural by the whyche we may do the foresaid thinges. Habyte is where a man is prai­sed or dispraysed, thē I say that vertue is no power nor passyon but habite: for nother by passiō nor power, man is praysed nor dyspraysed: but rather by habi­tee standyng and permanent in the solle of man.

¶ What vertue is Chapiter .xiii.

VErtues be founde in thynges that haue a mean betwene extremities, which are ether to muche or to littel: and this meane is in ii. sortes, one accordig to nature, & thother by cōparison, & is cal­led meane accordynge to nature, this in al thing is one self thing ¶ Example, if .x. be to muche & vi. is to litell. then .ii. is to be a meane, for why? vi. be so muche more then .ii. as they be les then x. the meane by comparison to vs is this, nether to muche nor to littell.

¶ Example, yf takyng a great quantitie of foode be to muche, [Page] and a litel quantitie to litel, the meane maye be vnderstande in our handelyng, nether to much nor to littel. Euerie artificer in his art inforseth himself to kepe the meane, from thextremitees. Thē the moral vertues be those workes, in the whiche to muche and to litellbe aduoyded and a­bolyshed, and the meane to bee praised. Then vertue is one willing habite, that standeth in the midward to vs, from whēce the reason is determinate.

¶ There is but one wate onely to do wel, and mani waies to do euil: & therfore it is a hard thing and a laborus to be good, and a light and easy thing to be euell: & ther be mo of the euel sort then of the good. There be thiges in the which there can no mean be [Page] founde, because they be naught at all, as thette, manslaughter, treason, and adultry: so there be thynges whiche bee vertues, and haue no extremities: As tē ­peraunce and fortitude: for the meane hathe no extremitee in it selfe. Fortitude or strength is a meane betwene feare and folish hardinesse: & Chastite is meane betwene the man that foloweth his wil, and he that vtterly for­saketh it. Liberalite is the mean betwene prodigalite & Auarice, for the prodigall is lesse in rece­uing, then he is in geuing, and the couetous contrarie, but the mā that is liberal kepeth the meane betwene these two extremi­ties. Liberalite, truth, and pro­digalite in litel and mean thin­ges: but in greate thynges the [Page] meane is called Magnificence, the suꝑabūdāce hath no name in Latin, but in Greke ir is called Pleonasmonus, & the lyttel is cal­led Pernesa, Meane in the wil is equanimite, that is to sat, equalnes, Equanimite are those that wil not to much. The Magninimus is he that willeth to much, and he that wil not is called pu­sillanimus. A mā that angreth with a thing so much as it veho ueth, is called meke: & he that is angri with a thig withoutcause is called Irefull: and he that is not so angry as he should be is called Iniracibile or angerles, truthe is in the myddes be­twene the twoo extremees, that is betwene ouermuche and to lytel. Those which kepe the me­ane betwene these two thynges, [Page] be called trusty, and thei that o­uerpasse be called vaunters or boasters. And those that bee to short in these thynges, be called humble: and they that kepe the meane in thes thinges of sporte & plaie, be called in Greke Me­trocalor and they that ouerpas, be called skoffers, and they that lacke, be called haskardes: and he that kepeth the meane in cō ­pany is called cōpaniable: and he that passeth the mean loking for no gaynes, is called a good felowe: and he that passeth the middest, and al forgaines, is called a flatterer. Shamfastnesse is a passion of the minde and no vertue, and they that holde the meane in shame, be called sham­faste, and they that bee more a­shamed than nede is, be called [Page] in Greke Recoples and they whiche shame, lesse than thei shulde are called shamelesse.

¶ Howe to knowe ver­tues. Chaptter .xiiii.

THre dysposicyons ben in the workes of man: that is to saye, muche, lyttel and mean. And al thes thre thynges bene contrary emongest theymselues. For lyttell is contrary to muche, and the meane is con­trarye to theym bothe: that is to saye, to lyttell and to muche, whence yf thou wylte make cō ­paryson, betwene the meane and muche, we maye say to mu­che: and yf we wyll make com­parison, [Page] betwene the meane and litel, we may say to litel: whence yf thou wilt make comparison, betwene prowes and feare, ther prowes shalbe called hardines, and yf a man will compare, be­twene prowes and hardines, verely theyr prowes shalbe called fear. But it is to be knowē that ther is a greater contrary from the one extreme to the other, thē it is from the meane to the ex­tremes, yet the one is more nere to the meane then is the other.

¶ Example, hardynes is more nearer to prowes then is feare, and prodygalitee is more nea­rer to Lyberalitee then is Aua­rice, but the sencibilite of the carnall wyll, is more neare vnto Chastitee, then it is to Lechery, and that is by two reasons, the [Page] one reason is accordynge to the nature of the thynge, the other is of oure parte by nature, and thys is the reason whereof that fear is more contrari vnto For­tytude, then is hardynes of our parte: because the extremytees vnto the whiche we been moste ready to fall by nature, been the furthest frō the mean, and ther­fore we fal more redily vnto carnal desires, then we do to the cō ­trary. Then in so much that vertue is in the meane, and to take the mean there nedeth so many consideraciōs, it is a hard thing for a man to become vertuous. Euery art apperteneth to euery mā, & euery man ought to lern, speciallye suche as are wise and expert therin, for euery man cannot find the point of the cercle, [Page] but he onely that is wise in Ge­ometry. Can do and wyl do the thynge, is lightlye sayde, but to do with al dewe circumstance appertcineth onely to them that be wyse in that arte. Euery o­peracion that kepeth the meane is faire and worthi reward, and for this cause we oughte to in­cline our mides, contrary to our desires wherby we may come to the mean, although it be a hard thyng at the fyrst. Then in al thynges the mean is to be praysed, and the extremities to bee blamed.

¶ Howe a man doth wel and euel. Chapiter .xv.

THere bee operacions which a man doth not with his will, that is to saye by force or by [Page] ignorance, as if the wynd shuld take a manne and cary him into another countreye. There be o­ther operacions, whiche a man doth willyngly by his own consēt as a man that doth a worke of vertue or vyce by his propre wil. And there be other operaci­ons whiche be part by his wyl, and parte not accordyng to hys wyll: as yf a man beyng vppon the Sea in time of tempest and casteth forth his harnes & stuffe to saue him selfe: or as it hathe bene sene, that the lord hath cō ­maūded his subiect to slaie hys father or mother in pain of life. Such operacions be not cōpoū ded of the workes of wil nor in­forced: yet if thou do it, thou do­est it by thy wil, although thou dooe it by commaundemente, [Page] therefore suche woorkes haue praise and dispraise. A man ou­ghte rather to die, then to doc so fyithy a thing, as to kyll father or mother, or to do any such like thynges. Lacke of wit and dis­crecion is the cause of all eiuell, for lacke of knowledge what is to be done, & what is not to bee done, is the onely cause of the in crease of euel mē. In this know lage, the mind seeth not the euil name and peril that they run in to. Thinke you a dronken man and Ireful, when he dothe any euell dede, that he doth it by ig­norance without knowledge, al though he be ignorāt in his de­de. Neuerthelesse, the cause of the malice is not without hym, for why? the science of a man cā not depart from him. Then the [Page] cause of the cōcupiscence of this euel, is but in the euel doer, that foloweth hys wyll: for it is im­possyble, that a man may do wel by his wyll, and euell withoute his wyl. And lykewyse the wyll is more common and more generall then is the election. For why? the operacyon of the wyll, is common with Beastes and children, but the election apper­teineth not but to him that ab­staineth him self from concupi­scence. Somtimes a man wold haue a thyng that is possible, & yet doth chose for it that whiche is impossible. Also the wil is thē tent, but the electiō is an antecedēt vnto thentēt, for why? election goeth before the operacion: & the operacion goth after. And a mā is called good or euel by the [Page] worke: but by the election he is nother called good nor euyll.

¶ Also the opinion is of truthe or falsehode: but the election is of wel or euell. And like opyni­ons are of those thynges that a mā knoweth not sureli. But the election is of those thinges whiche a man knoweth of a suretie. yet euery thing is not to be cho­sen, but those wherein a manne hathe had councell before. And yet councel is not to be kepte in euery thing: But of those wher­in wyse men take councell, but of the thynges whereof fooles coūcell is no coūcel to be made, but these thinges which be wei­ghtie and maye be done by vs, the Issue beyng doutefull, that is to saye doutefull in the ende. There be thynges whiche be to [Page] haue councell, as to geue me­dysyns to a sycke manne or like thinges. Of other thinges, whiche appertayneth not to vs, ne­deth no counsayll, as to kepe councell vppon thynges that be perpetuall, and of necessitie: as whether the sonne ryse in the mornyng, or yf it rayne or not: nor yet to councell of thynges that come by chaunce, as too fynde a Pursse or other trea­sure: nor yet to councell vppon the ende, but rather vppon the thynges that go before the end.

¶ The Physicyan counsaileth vpon the lyfe of the sycke, and counsayleth howe he maye he­ale hym. The Rhethorician counsaileth not vppon perswa­syons: and he that makethe the lawe, counsayleth not of the be­atitude, [Page] but rather euery man counsayleth in those thinges by the whyche they maie come to the thynges that be nedefull to theyr arte, by him or by his frē ­des, as he woulde to hymselfe. The wyll is the ende or the in­tente as it is sayd aboue, where it semeth to some men that to be good which please them, & other there be to whom it semeth that all is good that the most would haue cōmonly: but according to the truthe it is not so, but good is that whiche seemeth good to them that be good, that iudge thinges as they bee, and iudge as doth the whole man, that iudgeth that swete, which is swete, and that bitter, which is bitter. But the sicke man doth al cōtrarye, for he iudgeth bitter to bee [Page] swete, & the swete bytter, and so vnto an euel man that which is good seemeth euell, and that is euyll good, and this is because the euel man taketh not delight to be good, but that he delyteth to be euell: and there be manye sicke of this naughty syckenes, because the woorkes good and euell be in their iugemēt. Then it is in vs to do wel, & also it is in vs to do euel, and somtymes it is by the workes of man as it is with chyldren, put the case that some be naught, the father thynketh hym good. And that good and euel is in vs, it appe­areth by thē that made the law, whiche scourgeth theim that do euell with dyuerie paynes, and geueth honoure to theym that do well. The lawes put men in [Page] comforte to dooe wel, and con­strayne them from euell, and no man comforteth another to doo that thynge that is not in his power. There is none that wyll aduyse a manne to mourne for that thyng that he shoulde so­row: nor there is none that wyll beare a man in hand, he shal not warme standing nere the fyer, & that he bee not thrusty nor hun­gry: and they that made the la­wes punishe men for suche Ig­noraunce wherein thei be gilty. And it is to be knowē that there is doble ignorance, one is this of the which a man is notcause, as the ignoraunce of the foole, and for thys a manne is not to bepunished, another ignorance whereof a man is cause, as the ignoraunce of a dronken man, [Page] And for that a man ought to be punished, for euery manne that passeth the commaundementes of reason and of the lawe, ought to bee punished, and euery man that is iuste, or euill, is suche, because he will bee suche. But when a man is made iuste or e­euill, he is not become iust, by­cause he would become iust: As it happeneth to a man that was wonte to bee whole and is sicke and is not healed bycause he had no will that he would not belefe the Phisicion, nor vse the thynges that conserueth health And such like is he that casteth a stone, that before he casteth it, it is in his power to holde it: But when he hath caste it, it is not in his power to holde it nor in his will. And so it is in a man [Page] that becometh euil: in the begin nyng it is in his power to bee come good.

❧ Malice is not onely in man by will: But more ouer it is in the body. As a man to bee blind andlame: and these euils maie be in two sortes, y one is by na­ture, as he that is borne blind & lame, the other maie come by a mannes owne foly. As by them that drinke theimselfes blynde, or fall to stealyng or other euill dedees. Of suche there is no pe­ty to bee taken excepte thei re­pente and amende theim selfes. Then euery manne is the cause of his owne imaginacion, for that a manne hath naturall vn­derstādyng to knowe good and euill. Then ought wee to will to dooe well and to flie from e­uill. [Page] And it is the beste thyng, and not impossible to take a cu­stome and doctrine in goodnes, and he that taketh it at the be­ginnyng and continueth, suche a man hath a good nature and perfight. And who that taketh the cōtrary hath an euil nature But although it be euil he may make it good if he wil: For it is in him to take what he wil, then vertue and vice is according to the will of manne. But marke this, that operacion and habite bee not accordyng to the will of man in one sorte but in diuerse. For why? The operaciōs from the beginnyng to the ende is in the power and will of manne. But the habite is not in the po­wer nor in the will of man if it be not at his beginnyng.

¶ The .xvj. Chapiter. ¶ Of Fortitude.

LEt vs speake now of euery habite, & begin at strength. I laie that strēgth is accordyng as it is said before, a meane betwene feare and hardines. For ther be thynges that a man ought rea­sonably to feare, as vices and euery thing that putteth a man in an euill name: and thei that be not afraied of these thynges be shamelesse and worthy to bee blamed: And thei that be afraid of these are to be praised▪ There be men that be hardy in battail and there be that bee liberall in spendyng money: but the verie strong man is nether more nor [Page] lesse then nedeth, and is redy in all these thynges as nedeth to sustain: But the irefull man ex­cedeth in these thynges, and the fearefull man lacketh in theim. The thynges that be to be fea­red bee not of one nature but of many sortes. For there bee di­uerse thynges that are to be fe­red of al men that haue wit and vnderstandyng: for he that fea­reth not thondre and the waues of the sea is not wise. And there be other thynges that euery mā fereth not, and those thinges be accordyng to the more or lesse: that is to saie, accordyng as on thyng is more to be feared then another. And as I saie of thyn­ges that bee fearfull, so it is to be vnderstand of hardines. For there be men that wil shewe thē [Page] selfes hardy before thei come to the dede, and make a great face, but when thei come to the deede beare themselfes not valiaunt. But a bolde man & strong doth the contrary, that before he cum to the deede holdeth hym still: and when he cometh to the dede he is hardy & strong. Strength is in fiue sortes, the first is ciuil strength, because that menne of Citees suffre muche and many perels to haue honor and to bee blameles of their citezens. The second sort is by wit and policie that a manne hath in his office: As we se of men that be wise in feactes of armes, that do great thynges trustyng in their Sci­ence, and bee not strong accor­dyng to the truthe, bycause that when theise the daunger of bat [Page] taill, thei flee beeyng more a­fraied of death then of shame. But he that is strōg accordyng to the trueth, ought to dooe the contrary and to stande faste in battaill, and feare more shame then death.

❧ The thirde sorte is by furye as we se in wylde strength, that be strōg and hardy by the great furor that is in theim, this is not the very strength, for who so euer putteth hymself in perel by ire or furye, is not to bee cal­led strong. But thei that putte theim selfes in perell by a right vnderstandyng, those be strong

The fourth sort is by strong mouyng of cōcupiscence, as we maie se of brute beastes in tyme of their copulaciō, and so many men let theimselfes fall lightly, [Page] and thei that kepe wel themsel­fes be strong.

The fifte sorte is by suretie wher a man hath had oft tymes victory: as he yt fighteth with one that he hath oft ouercomen, but when he fighteth with an other, there he leseth his hardi­nesse & strength. These fiue sor­tes be not the very strength: for strēgth is a more worthy thyng then Chastite, for it is a lighter thyng for a man to abstain hymself from carnall concupissence, then it is in thynges of griefe.

¶ The .xvij. Chapiter. ¶ Of Chastitee.

CHastitie is the meane betwene folowyng al the delectaciōs of the body or not to folow. [Page] For a man to delight hymself in thynges conuenient: where and when, and how muche, there ne­deth no Chastite. For seeyng of faire thynges, & hering of mery tales, and smellyng of flouers: how muche whē and as it beho­ueth, there nedeth no Chastitee. For Chastitie nedeth not but in two sēces of the body, that is to sai, in the tast and felyng, in the whiche we begin with brute bea stes very strōgly, as delighting themselfes in thynges that thei eate, drinke, and touch: and spe­cially in touchyng is greate de­lectacion, and therefore it is a beastly thyng to folowe to mu­che the delectacion of touchyng For in the tast, a manne deligh­teth not somuch as in touching For the delectacion of tastyng [Page] is onely when a manne exami­neth the sauor. There bee natu­rall delectacions in the whiche a man may haue measure, as in not to muche eatyng and dryn­kyng. This mesure may be cal­led Chastitee, for the vnchast is in the delectacions of the body and not in thynges of grief, for in thynges of griefe the meane is to be vnderstande, strength. Some tyme a man is not tem­perat nor chast when he deligh­teth more then is due, and when he maie haue the thynges that he desireth, it is hard to finde a mā that delighteth himself lesse then he should in carnall delec­taciōs, suche one hath no name set. Then thei be chast that kepe the meane in delectacions, that is to sai, delight to muche in ha [Page] uing of them, nor sorowe not to muche in lesing thē, but delight hymself temperately, contente with sufficien [...]e to the good life of man. It behoueth a manne to withstande the desire of de­lectacions, for if a manne lette reason bee ouercome, it remai­gneth vnder desires, therefore it is nedefull to manne to bee chast from youth and to liue vn der commaundementes, or els shall remain with him, desire to a greater age. And therefore it behoueth vs to studie that rea­son maie remaine aboue desire or concupissence.

¶ The .xviij. Chapiter. Of liberalite or Largesse.

[Page] LIberalite is a meane in geuyng & in recei­uyng of money: then he is liberall that v­seth money conueniently: that is to say, he that geueth it, wher when, and how muche it beho­ueth, and to whō. Prodigall or a waster, is he that excedeth in geuyng & wanteth in receiuing And the coueteous is the con­trary. And it is mete that libe­ralitee bee more in geuyng then in receiuyng: For why? It is a lighter thing, not to receiue, thē to geue. And it is a more lau­dable thyng to geue the thyng where it is conueniente, then is to receiue the thing that is con­ueniente. And generally, it is a more worthy thyng in vertue to do well, then it is to abstain frō [Page] euil. Neuertheles in these thyn­ges ought to bee an equalitie [...], that is to saie litle praise to thē that receiue temperatly but thei that geue temperatly are to bee praised, bicause thei profite him that receiueth the gifte. He is not liberall that is sory for his gifte: For he geueth it not by li­beralitee, but rather for shame, or other cause.

Thē he is liberal that geueth cherefully: he that is liberall is cōtent with litle, so yt he maie do for many muche or litle. For he euer inforceth hymself to worke liberalitee, accordyng to his fa­cultie it, is harde to fynd a man liberall & riche, for riches incre­seth not by geuyng: but increa­seth by receiuyng. And it is oft seen that the riches that a man [Page] hath without laboure maketh him liberal. And great maruell it is when a manne is riche by great labor if he be liberal. The Prodigal manne is not so euill as the coueteous, for the couete ous is nether good to hymself nor other, & therfore euery man hateth hym. Also the Prodigall may be remedied diuerse waies But the coueteous cannot bee healed: and naturally a man is more geuen to Auarice then to prodigalite: and departeth fur­ther from the meane. There bee many sortes of liberalitee, and seldom it can be found in a man that is couetous in kepyng his owne, that he is not also couete­ous in desiryng of other mens. Ther [...]e that cannot kepe their owne: But in desiryng of other [Page] mennes thei be insaciat, and go aboute to gette by euery filthye gaynes, as by maintegnyng of baudry, in kepyng of ruffians and hores, vsery, pla [...]e. And su­che sort of people sinne greuou­sly in Prodigalitee.

¶ The .xix. Chapiter. Of magnificence.

MAgnificence is a vertue that woor­kes in riches, one­ly in greate expen­ces, & the nature of the Magnificus or noble mā ought to bee diligente, that his workes be doen with greate ho­nor and greate expences. For he that restraineth and will do his businesse with litle coste: is not Magnificꝰ, but rather fearfull [Page] in spēdyng. The vertue of ma­gnificēce is vnderstād in great and maruelous thynges, as to make temples & churches wher god is worshipped from whom it is sent & all goodnes cometh. Likewise in makyng great fea­stes, with costly bankettes and sūpteous lodgyng & great pre­sentes. The magnificus or no­ble man thynketh not onely v­pon his expences, but thynketh more ouer to make other. In magnificēce it nedeth not onely that there bee haboundaunce of thynges, but it nedeth therwith for a manne to ordre and spende thynges where it behoueth, for hymself or mē of his stock. And whosoeuer he bee, that wanteth in these two thinges and vnder taketh, is scorned, if he will take [Page] vpon hym magnificence, a man that dooth excede in these thyn­ges aboue said, is he that expendeth more then he ought to doo, and he that maie expende litle and expendeth muche, is as he that geueth to iuglars and scoffers & as he that casteth purple in the waie, and dooth not these for the loue of vertue, but for to apere glorious to the people.

❧ Nigarde is he that in great thynges goth aboute to spende litle, and marreth the beaute of of his dede for a litle spendyng, leseth greate coste and greate honor, and these be the twoo ex­tremites of magnificence. But thei be not to be blamed so that thei hurt not accordyng to their vice. Magnanimus is he that is redy to do greate deedes, and [Page] is ioious and mery in doyng of them. But he that vndertaketh to do great dedes & is not able, is called vainglorious: And he that is worthy to haue honor & dignitee, & is afraied to receiue thē, is called simple And imma­gnanimite is extremite by com­parisō of thynges, but as to the operaciō it is meane. The very Magnanimite is only in great thynges: yt is to saie in thynges by the whiche a mā may or doth serue almightie God. And y ve­rie beatitude is in thynkyng of those so hie thynges, so greate & so honorable, yt of this thought commeth all goodnesse, after so great aduersities: the whiche cā not be estemed. The mā that is magnanimus is the gretest mā and moste honorable yt is, & mo­ueth [Page] not for litle thynges, nor doth not inclyne his magnani­mite to any foule thynges. Thē magnanimite is an ornament & croune of all vertues, and ther­fore it is no light thyng to fynd the man magnanimus, but it is harde. For he is not onely good to hymself, but also to many o­ther. If a mā be Magnanimus he reioyseth not too muche in greate honor doen to hym, & yet so muche honor cannot be doen to answer to his goodnesse and greatnes. And more ouer, y ma­gnanimus reioyseth not muche in prosperitee yt cometh to hym, nor troubled for aduersite. Nobi­lite of bloud riches & antiquite helpeth a mā to be magnanimꝰ And he is very magnanimus y hath in him two thynges by the [Page] whiche he ought to be honored, these be those that be afore said, the surety & goodnesse of a man magnanimus, is as much that he passeth not vpon any perell, for that he doubteth not but to bring his life to good ordre, and taketh pleasure to do for other, and is ashamed to take of o­ther, because it is a more noble thyng to geue then to receiue. And whē he hath receiued bene­fite he doth study to recōpence: he is [...]lowe in litle expenses, but in great thinges wher it is con­ueniēt he is not [...]low. The man that is Magnanimus loueth other, and if he will euil, it is o­penly and not closely, bicause he thinketh great vilenesse to hide his will. He is sharpe and she­weth hymself cruell, excepte in [Page] thynges of mirthe: he is conuer saunt with men merely, and ha­teth flaterars, as bablers and Scoffers, because slaterars bee bondmen and remēbreth wron­ges, but he dispiseth theim and careth not, boasteth not hym­self, nor praiseth other, he pas­seth more on precious thynges then vpon vile thynges. As a manne that suffiseth to himself, when he mouethe, he is not in hast, but grauely, and stedfaste in wordes. And this is the difi­niciō of the Magnanimus: and he that ouerpasseth these: is called vainglorious, and thei that take vpon theim greate honors as if thei wer worthy, wher thei be not. As in making costly ap­parell and other greate appe­raunce, and thynke there by to [Page] be exalted: I say vnto you, wise men take them for fooles.

❧ Pusillanimus, is he that is worthy to haue greate honors, and is afraied to take theim v­pon hym and hides hym from hymself: and this is euill, for e­uery manne ought to desire ho­noure and benefite conuenient to hymself. Then euery manne erreth that departeth from the meane: But there bee not ma­ny euill in this sorte. In honor is founde meanes and extremi­ties, and in lesse thynges: for in these thynges bee founde more lesse then meane. For a manne maie desire more honoure then he oughte to haue: And suche haue no name but [...]omen, as it is saied before in the cōparison betwene the large and the Ma­gnanim̄us, [Page] and betwene their extremes. Therefore these bee the greatest thynges and those the leaste, the meane is to bee honored and the extremities to bee blamed.

¶ The .xx. Chapiter. Of Ire and Mekenes.

INire is a meane & an extreme, & thextremi­ties haue propre na­mes, and the meane is called Mekenes, and he that kepeth ye meane, is called meke, and he that doth habound in ire is called Irefull. And he that is lesse angery then he ought to be is called Iniracible or irelesse. And the verie meke if he be an­gey with whō, when & wherr, he is called irefull & reported y he [Page] that passeth the meane in these thynges, some angry some softe and that is the beste that is in hym. For if all euill thynges should bee together: it should not bee suffered. A man that is not angery where it behoueth, when and with whom and wher is not to bee punished. For he sustaineth vituperacion in that that is not iustly dooen to hym or to his frendes, sometyme we praise suche men that make no great thyng, and sometyme the ireful: saiyng, that thei be strōg menne and hardy. And verely it is a harde thyng to determyne by woordes the circumstance of ire, but so muche wee ought to know, that to kepe the meane is to bee praised, and the extremi­ties is a thyng to be vituperat.

¶ The .xxi. Chapiter. Of the conuersa­cion of manne.

AFter we must speke of thynges whiche hap­pen in company and in the conuersacion of menne and in comunicacion, for kepyng the meane in these thynges is to be praised, and the ex­tremities to be blamed. And the meane is, that a man be plesant in speche and conuersacion with folkes: and it behoueth to be cō panable in thynges conuenient to whom, when, how & wherfore for suche company is nere like vnto frendship. There is diffe­rēce in this, that frendship hath compassion and humble corage and conuersacion hath not. For why? A man maie cōpany with [Page] men that he knoweth not. And the mā that doth excede in these thynges, is he that medleth him self vncōly to be acquainted wt a stranger & with a man that he knoweth not, neighbour or not neighbor without respect: suche one is called a mery felowe, if it bee of nature: But he that ma­keth mirth for gaines, is called a flatterer, and he that is sad is called rude and vncherfull.

¶ The .xxij. Chapiter. Of Truthe and liyng.

TRuthe and liynges be the mooste contrarye thinges that can be in the world, and be vsed in worde & in dede. A honorable man and of a good corage vseth truth in worde & deede: and the [Page] vile mynded the contrary. The very man is he that kepeth the meane betwene the vaūter that cracketh vpō himself more then he is, & he that dispraiseth hymself in hidyng the goodnes that is in hym: In somuche that the verie man affirmeth y goodnes that is in hym nother more nor lesse, but he that dispraiseth is of better disposicion, then is he that vaunteth hymself: For the vaunter lieth in woorde and in dede. Worsse in these thinges a boue saied, is he that knoweth not hymself, and therefore he is more vituperable thē other, the truthe is to bee praised, and lies to bee dispised. For the liar spe­keth such wordes as he maketh in his mind: a man that is true, for the loue of truthe, is better [Page] then he y is true for profite that he maie haue thereby. He that bosteth and presumeth for gold or siluer, is like vituperable to the vainglorious. But he that vaunteth hymself for honor or profit is not so blamable. Ther bee men that reioyse themselfes in lies, and other lie to be regarded: the humble mā dispraiseth himself to fly strife & busines as did Socrates to haue quiete life. and he y exalteth himself in litle thinges is nothing to be named

¶ The .xxiij. Chapiter. ¶ How a manne is kno­wen by his mouyng.

THe mā that laugheth to muche is vituperable, and he that neuer laugheth thei saie he [Page] is sad and vncherful. But a mā that is cōpaniable with his fe­lowe & loureth not, nor moueth not other by foule bourdyng & plaiyng, for sometyme iestyng moueth a man to lechery, and is forbiddē in the law, but to kepe good and louyng compaignie suche a one is to be praised.

❧ Shamefastnes is a passion that is ingendred with fere: for why? He that is a shamed chan­geth colour with euery thyng, & also somtime thei that be afraid Shamfastnes is wit in youth & not vnconuentent to boyes and wenches: for it withdraweth thē frō sinne, but shame is to be blamed in old mē, for age shuld do nothing wherof to be ashamed.

¶ The .xxiiij. Chapiter. Of Justice.

[Page] IUstice is a commen­dable habite, by the which a man is made Juste and dooeth the workes of Justice, and willeth and loueth thynges that be iust Insomuche as it is the habite of iustice, the whiche is vertue. Then iniustice whiche is the cō trary, muste needes bee vice: Justice is saied to bee in three sortes, and the vniust is also in three sortes, he is called vn­iust that doth against the lawe, and he that passeth the nature of equalite, and he that meddeleth with vnlawfull and dishoneste gaynes. And likewise a man is Juste in three sortes, for euen so many sortes as is in the one, so many are in the other. So that the iust man is he that doth ob­serue [Page] the law, and the nature of the equalite, and those that bee content with lawfull gaynes.

¶ The .xxv. Chapiter. ¶ Of the Lawe.

THe law is iust, and all thynges of the lawe be iuste, for it commaundeth the workes of vertue: whiche workes make a mā hap­py, and cōserueth the workes of happinesse in hym, and forbid­deth al euill in citees and toun­trees, and commaundeth vnto good men greate workes: as to ordre & araye battailes, and cō ­maundeth ye men beware of for­nicacion and lechery, and com­maundeth that men bee peace­able from hurtyng one another and forbiddeth vnclene speche. [Page] And generally it commaundeth the workes of iustice, and to flie vice. Justice is the moste noble thing & the most strōgest vertue that is. Wise mē do loue y wor­kes of iustice, hauing more mar uel of y goodnes of thē then of y shinyng ster, or y settyng of the sunne, or rising therof, for it is y moste perfight vertue of all o­ther. And the iust man vseth iu­stice in himself & in his frendes: for a man y is not good to him­self nor to his frēdes, is worst of al other persōs. For a man to be good it sufficeth not onely to be good to hymself, but also to his frendes. Justice is not parte of vertue, but al. And wrōg is not part of vice, but al vice. Ther be kyndes of vices openly for bid­den, as these, adultry, inchātmēt [Page] false witnes, treason fraude and deceit. And ther be kindes of vi ces, which be iniurious, as kil­ling, smityng, & other like thyn­ges, in the which the iust man is somtime equaller, and somtime measurer: in comparison he is called equaller betwene .ii. and a measurer betwene many thynges and fewe, and is in relacion in .iiii. thynges. So the iust mā can be no lesse then in .iiii. thyn­ges. There be two persones be­twene whom Justice is to be do en, & .ii. be causes: that is to saie, right and wrōg, and yet in these selfthinges may be equalite: for if ther might be no disequalnes there shold be no equalnes, and so Justice is in proporcion of number. And as iustice is equal so is wrong vniust & vnequall, [Page] and therfore the Lord of the la­wes laboreth to bring euerithig equal. Wherfore he killeth one and scourgeth another, & other he sendeth to prisō, vntil the par tie haue satisfyed, & so laboreth to bring to muche and to litel in to a meane. Therfore he taketh frō one and geueth to another, til they be egal, and therfore the forme therof is to be knowen, to the intēt that his subiectes may liue stedfastly in the middest:

¶ Yet of Justice, Chapiter .xxvi.

THe inhabitors together in Cities, doo take and geue one to another, and euery one yeldeth too ther according to the quantitee of their thinges, and al to come to the middest: for we put the case, that the Smythe [Page] hath a thing that is worth one, & the Shomaker hath a thing, that is worth two, the Carpēter hath a thing that is worth thre, thē the Smith must nedes take of the Shomaker his woorke: and the Shomaker muste take of the Carpenter his worke, yet the worke of the one, may be better then the other, therfore it is nedeful to some man of equaly­tee, that maye returne them to a meane: and therfore was found money. For money is a mean by the which a man may bryng euery vnegal into egal, and therby may be taken and geuen greate thinges & litel thinges, & is an instrumēt, wherby iudges may do iustice. Money is a liuelesse lawe, but the iudge & the lawes haue life. god is y vniuersal law [Page] of al thinges, the vigor & stren­the of egalnes standeth faste by the obseruacion of the law of ci­ties, and the laborers of the fiel des & rilthe likewise increaseth therby, & for lacke of iustice fall in ruine. The prince is the obser uer of iustice and egalnes: and therfore he geueth not the goo­des wherof he is Lorde more to himself, thē to other. Wherfore it is saide honors and lordships maketh a man knowen. The people presupposeth that libe­ralite is cause of Principalitee and Lordshippe, and some saye that riches is the cause, other put nobilitee of bloudde. But the wise manne saieth, and bele­ueth that vertue is the cause, that a manne is worthy to haue Lordshippe. Justice is in two [Page] sortes, one is natural, and ano­ther accordinge to the lawe: the lawe naturall is one selfe na­ture in euerye man, as the fyer, whersoeuer it be, it goth vpwa­rde: the other which is accordig to the lawe, hath many diuersy­ties, as we se in sacrifices, which be diuersli done, some by beastes and some by certaine generacy­ons of trees, and in bothe these iustices, equalite is to be vnder stand. He that rēdreth the thing that he hath in kepyng, not wil­lyngly but by feare: is not iuste by himselfe, but by other: but he that yeldeth by himself because of honestye with a good wyll, he is iuste. The hurtes whiche be commonly dooen amanges menne, be in thre sortes. The first by error and by ignorance, [Page] the other is by ignoraunce with wil to hurt, the third bi thought malice and in wil to hurte. By ignorance is whē a man in his dede, hathe not studied as other and as he shuld, and these twoo sortes be not imputed vniuste, for why? their dedes procede not of malice, but when a man doth hurt hy malice prepenced or by propre will, there is no circum­stāce, that can excuse his malice, for it is very euel and vituperable. Ther be two maners of ig­norances, one natural, as the na tural fole, an other wherof a mā is cause, as when a man is igno raunt, because he wyll not study to knowe the thyng that he ou­ghte to knowe of troth and wel. Aboue iustice is better then iu­stice, but accordyng to the truth [Page] in the very meane, ther is no de uisiō: and the very iustice is not that whiche is in the lawes, but that iustice whiche is in the Al­mighty & glorious God, & is ge uē to mā, bi the which iustice mā maketh himselfe like vnto god.

Of prowesse, Cha, xxvii.

THere bee two kin­des of vertues, the one is called morall, the whiche belongeth too the life sencible, whi­che hath no reason, another ver­tue intellectuall or reasonable, the whiche is vnderstandynge and discrecion. Then the life sen syble, doth, fleeth and persecu­teth withoute anye delyberacy­on: and therfore it is sayed that [Page] this vertue desyreth concupys­cence, but the vnderstandying affirmeth and maketh no election without him, thē the beginning of the election is desyre intelle­ctuall, beecause of some thyng. And no man vseth the election in the thyng that is past before, because that which is doen can not be vndooen: for there vpon is no power, nor there falleth no electiō in thinges of necessite, as in risyng & setting of the Sūne that ryseth by nature.

❧ In the solle of man bee fyue thynges, of the whiche maye be spoken truthe, affirmynge and deniyng, that is to say: Art, scy­ence, Prudence, Sapience, and vnderstandyng. Scyenceis by suche demonstracion which can not be otherwaies, and nether [Page] doth ingender nor corrupt, and euery science or discipline that is in vse, so may be taughte.

And euery thing that is lerned, must nedes be learned by pryn­ciples, the whiche bee manifeste by them, and the Demonstracy­ons be euer true, and neuer lye. For why? they be of thinges ne­cessary. The disposiciō of the art is of very reason: the wyse and prudent man can councell hymselfe and other, in thynges that be good and euell, which be ap­perteining vnto men. Thē pru­dence is an habite, with the whiche a man may councel with ve­ry reason in thynges towarde men good and euell.

Sapience is an aduaunsing or ioiyng ofartificers that hath obtayned scyence. And when it [Page] is said of one that he is wyse in his art, ther is shewed the goodnes and gretnes of his art. The vnderstanding is it that taketh the commandement of thinges, reason science & vnderstandyng be of those thinges that bee na­turally noble. There may be found yong men, which be wyse of discipline: but not in prudēce: to be wise in prudence wolde be had a long knowlage in many particuler thinges, the whyche cannot be had but by long time, The adolescente and yong man hath but short tyme. Prudence measureth the beginnyng & the end of euery thing, and by & by conscnteth to a good councell.

¶ Wilynesse, is of prudence, with the whiche a manne com­meth to the entent by great sub­teltie [Page] of his vnderstandyng, in thinges that bee good, but the subtile is called qualite, in thin­ges that be euel. As enchantmē ­tes, wytchecraftes. Suche are not called wyse, but councelers of stryfe and wilybegylars.

¶ Felicitee is not a thing to be chosen for other, but for himself as helth, the accions of the solle bee accordynge to the measure of Morall vertues, and accor­dynge to the measure of Pru­dence and of subtelty, then ver­tue-setteth forthe the right pur­pose of man, & prudence, that is to say knowlage confirmeth it, and maketh it good and condu­ceth him vntoiustice. Thes mo­rall vertues make a mā stronge chaste and iust frō youthe, as in children & some maner of bestes, [Page] then these vertues be bi nature, and not by vnderstanding. But the Lordshyp of all vertues be­longeth vnto the vertues intel­lectual, for there can be no electi­on without the vnderstandyng, nor cānot be accomplished with out moral vertue, & so prudence techeth to do that which ought to be done, but moral vertue set teth forth the dede, to fulfill the worke.

¶ Of strengthe. Chapiter .xxviii.

STrengthe is a lau­dable habite & good for the man that is very strong sustay­neth many terryble thynges, and despyseth deathe, in assailyng those whiche beho­ueth, and dothe the woorkes of [Page] strength, not to haue honour or delectacion, but onely for ver­tue. There be men whiche be cō ­strained to worke the workes of strength for shame, and to fle re­proche, & to get them honor put thē selfes in peril of their lyues, rather then to liue with shame.

Wilde strengthe is this that a man dooeth in furor: as when a man is angry for any thing do­en against hym, and wold be re­uenged. Bestial strength is the fulfillyng of a mans luste bur­nynglye desyred. Spirituall strengthe is that whyche a man dothe to obtayne honoure and fame. Strengthe Deuyne is that whiche stronge men natu­rally loue. And Goddes men be very stronge.

¶ Of Chastitee, Chapiter .xxix.

CHastitee is a temperance in eating and drinckinge and in delectacions, and he that bestoweth himself temperatly in thes thin­ges is to be praised, and he that excedeth in thes thinges is to be blamed, but fewe and syldome be founde. Chastitee is a fayre thyng, for it delyteth but when, where, & so muche as behoueth, also there is a secular delectaciō which is departed from the mo­uing of nature, and without cō ­parison more vituperable then fornicaciō or adultry, that is to say, Masculine with Masculine To be inchast is in diuers sorts for why? it may be in eating and [Page] drinking & other filthy thinges▪

¶ Of Mekenesse, Chapiter .xxxi.

MEkenesse is an ha­bite to bee praised betwene beynge to ireful and to dull, and so is Malyn­coly in lōg perseuerance. Mali­cious ire demaūdeth great ven­geance for lyttel offence. But he that is not sturred for wrong or offence dooen to hym nor to hys kinne, is as a manthat hath lost his fealyng.

¶ Of Lyberalitee. Chapiter .xxxii.

LIberalytee, Ma­gnyfycence, & Ma­nanimitee hathe a cōmunite amōgest thē selfes, for why? [Page] they be al in receauyng and ge­uyng moneye: where when and how muche it behoueth. And it is a more fearful thing to geue then to receaue, and suche men flee from filthy gaynes, and the couetous man is a greate desy­rer, and therfore the lyberal possesseth not so muche as doth the couetous.

¶ Of Magnanimitee. Chapyter. xxxiii

THe Magnanimus doth deserue gret honors, & praises, and is euermore redye to set his mind vpon great thinges, and despy­seth the littel and vile thynges, but he that expendeth where he should not, is called Prodigal.

Enuious is he that is sory for [Page] the prosperite bothe of the good and euill, without any differēce Contrary to hym is he that re­ioiseth in the prosperite of them that bee good & euill, the meane betwene theim is he that ioyeth in the prosperitee of theim that be good, and soroweth for the e­uil, he that is a shamed of euery thyng is called shamefaste: He that crackes vpon hymself and dispiseth other menne is called a proude vaunter.

¶ The .xxxiij. Chapiter. ¶ Of compaignie.

THere bee men with whom it is paine­ful to liue, because thei of their nature bee not tractable. Ther be other that be flatterers [Page] of euery body: and ther be other that kepe a meane, and those be thei that vse thēselfes, as where when, with whom, & how muche and suche maner of men bee ve­rely to be praised. Scoffers bee those whiche compaignieth e­mongest folkes with laughyng bourding & gestyng vpon them selfes, their wifes and children, and not onely vpon theim, but also vpon other men. Contrary to hym is he that loketh euer­more as he were troubled, low­ryng, and is neuer mery emon­gest folkes, nor cannot be with theim that be mery. And he that kepeth the meane emongest su­che, is he that vseth mesure The iust man is he that is called E­quall or Equaller, and the iuste equalleth thynges in twoo sor­tes, [Page] one sorte is in deuidyng of money, offices, and honors. The other in helyng the hurtes that one man taketh of an other, for men haue businesse together in twoo sortes, the one is by will, that is to saie, when the begin­nyng of the deede is in our ar­bitre. And out of the wil is this when a man hath to do with an other, and will doo it by force or gyle, as rapine, stelth and other like thynges.

¶ The .xxxiiij. Chapiter. ¶ Of Justice:

THe factor of ye lawes, are the equals, which are the cōtraries ye be betwen to muche and to litle. The equall iudge deui­deth mony & honor, & maketh de [Page] uision betwene two at the least: Justice partes betwene foure thynges, the whiche thynges haue proporciō from the first to the seconde, and from the thirde to the fourth, and the equalnes of theim is accordyng to the proporcion selfe: And Justice iudgeth emongest theim accor­dyng to the qualitee of the ver­tue, and of the merite. The ma­ker whole that healeth the faciō of the deedes that bee dooen be­twene menne, is he that maketh the lawes: For he decerneth and doth iustice betwene theim that dooe wrong and them that take it, and rendereth inheritance to thē that haue right thereto, and taketh frō theim that possesseth wrongfully. Some cōdemne in persone and some in their goo­des, [Page] and some maketh equal the litle with the much, bicause he y receiueth the iniury is lessoned by hym that dooth it, the iudge is equallar betwene them according to the mesure of Ar [...]smethi que. Therfore mē go to ye iudge bicause the iudge is saied to bee in similitude the life of Justice, bicause he ordereth iustice accordyng moderately as it is possi­ble, and iustices is not in euery place in suche sorte, that to hym that doeth, be doen somuche as he hath doen: and that frō hym that did take, bee taken somu­che as he hath taken. For why? The moderate equalnesse stan­deth not euermore in this, and as the iuste man is contrary to hym that is not Juste, so the e­quall is cōtrary to the vnequal [Page] and the meane is somtime more cōtrary to the one extreme, then it is to the other: and the one ex­treme is more contrary to the o­ther, thē it is to the meane. The Justice of citees is a meane, be­twene lesyng and gettyng: and cannot be doen without taking and geuyngchange. As he that weiueth clothe for other thyn­ges that he nedeth. The smithe geueth Iron for other thynges that he nedeth, and therefore in these changes was greate strife so was founde the thyng that might equall all thynges toge­ther: This that is more worthe with that that is worthe lesse, and this thing was money, whiche maketh equall the worke of the Carpenter with the woorke of the shomaker. Aboue iustice [Page] is more then Justice. Then the mā that is better then the good man, is good in al sortes y maie bee. And he that is more Juste then he that is iust, is iust in all sortes that maie bee. Naturall iustice is better thē iustice that is compounded by man, as the hony that is swete by nature, is better then the like hony that is made by crafte.

❧ The iust mā liueth by life of life, that is to saie, the great de­lectacion yt he hath to iustice na­turall. It for it self, belongeth and vseth the iust thing, lokyng not to the punisher of the lawes to put it generally in al genera­ciōs, for bicause it is vnpossible that the generall rules be folo­wed and kepte in all these thyn­ges, the whiche bee not vniuer­sal. [Page] Then the wordes of the law ought to be perticulars, bicause thei iudgē of thynges corporal.

¶ The .xxxv. Chapiter. ¶ Of Vice.

THere be thre maner of vices that bee very e­uill, from the whiche euery māne ought to flie, that is to saie: Malice Cru­elte and Lechery. And yet there bee to these three contrary ver­tues, that is to saie: Benignitee Pitie and Chastitee. There bee some men whiche be of a deuine nature, by the aboundaunce of the vertues that be in them, and suche an habite is all contrary to Cruelte, and suche menne be Angelike deuine, and the ver­tues of them bee aboue the ver­tues of other men. Like as the [Page] vertues of God be aboue al the vertues of mē, so there be other men cruell in their maners and be of wilde nature: and suche be far of from vertue. There be o­ther men that bee of the nature of beastes, in folowyng of their desires and their delectacions, and those bee in similitude like vnto Apes and to hogges, and those men that folowe their wil les bee called Epicures, that is to saie: men that thynke not but of their bodies. Men that bee cal­led deuine and menne that bee wilde of custome: there bee but fewe in the worlde, and special­ly wilde men, yet there be found in thextreme regiōs, in the whi­che thei dwell, yt is in the southe partes where as thei fynde sla­ues, it is saied of the deuine mā [Page] that he is chast and continent, for that he abstaineth hymself from euill concupiscence, accor­ding to the power of the vertue intellectuall.

❧ Manne hath his limittes vnto the whiche he moueth na­turally, wherein he walketh as in the meane, excepte his na­ture inclineth too the nature of beastes, whiche if thei bee loo­sed, folowe the mouyng of their owne desires in runnyng tho­rowe pastures, not abstaynyng theym selues from any thyng that their nature leadeth theim vnto. And in this wise a manne goeth from his termes and li­mettes, & suche a man is worsse then a beast, by the euil life that he choseth, bycause the science of manne is truthe. But that [Page] man that learneth science accor­dyng to the nature of Morall vertue and vertue deuine & in­tellectuall, remaigneth within his bōdes and, vseth vniuersall proposicions which conducteth hym vnto true knowledge.

¶ The .xxxvi. Chapiter. Of Delight.

THere bee delecta­ble thynges why­che bee delectable by necessitee, and there bee thynges delectable by cleccion. And of those, there be that are to be chosen for our selfes, & also of those that are to be chosē for fauor of other. The necessari delectaciōs that a man hath, be in eating, in drinkyng and in lechery, and in [Page] all other corporall delectacion, there where is no measure, those which a man choseth or electeth for hymself, bee these, that is to saie, certētye of knowledge and deuine reason. Elecciōs whiche bee electe for fauor one of ano­ther bee these, victory, honor, ri­ches and al other thynges good in the whiche beastes is comen with vs: Who that kepeth the meane in these thynges is to be praised, and who that wāteth in these thynges is to be blamed.

❧ There bee naturall delecta­cions and beastly delectacions. Also ther be wilde delectacions and ther be delectacions by oc­casion of tyme, & there bee other delectacions by occasion of in­firmitie, and other that come by vse, and other by euill nature. [Page] Wildish delectacion is in them that make women with child to bee opened, bicause thei will se how the childe dooth lie in their bodies: And as thei that eateth mannes fleshe and rawe fleshe. Delectaciōs of infirmitie, or by euil vse, is of pickyng ye browes paryng nailes, eatyng of coles, and other trifles. Delectaciō by euill nature is to lye one Mas­culyne with another, and all o­ther vituperable thynges of le­chery. Ther be some malicious and wild maners, as be in them that bee vnbrideled, madde, and Melancolly, and like vnto thē, the furious man thynketh that all that pleseth hym is against all other men. If he haue a litle cause to bee angree runneth in as a folishe seruaunte to dooe a [Page] thyng before he bee cōmaunded and doth as a dogge y barketh bothe at frendes and enemies. And this incontinence which is in Ire cometh of a light mynde and by violēce of mouyng. And therfore he is more to be pardo­ned then he that incontinent fo­loweth his cōcupiscence. For as sone as he seth the thyng that delighteth hym, he tarieth not the iudgemēte of reason, but rather searcheth for the thyng that he desireth. Then the incontinence of Ire is more naturall then is thin continence of concupiscence and demaundeth darke places. And therefore it is saied of con­cupiscēce that she ouerthroweth her sonne. The man that dooth euil and repenteth hym not, can not be correct: but the man that [Page] doth euill and repēteth, there is hope. Thei that haue no vnder­stādyng be better then thei that haue it, & bestowe it not. Ther­fore thei that let themself to bee ouercome with cōcupiscence by delight of vnderstandyng, bee like vnto them that be dronken with litle wyne, by feblenesse of the brayne. The continent man that hath vnderstandyng, affir­meth hymself and continueth in very reason and holsome elec­ciō, and departeth not from the right moderacion. It is a more lighte thyng to moue custome then nature, yet a hard thyng it is to breke custome, for custome is like nature. There be men to whom it semeth no delectacion to bee good, nether to hymself nor yet to other. And there be o­ther [Page] to whō it semeth that some delectacions be good and some euill, & to some it semeth that al maner of delectacions be good: Delectacions without respecte is not good. For why? It is of sensualite: then it is not like vn to thynges complet. The chaste man flieth delectacions bicause thei make vnderstandyng dron ken and maketh man to forget godnesse. Children and beastes demaunde delectacions. There bee some delectaciōs that make a man seke and bryng trouble, then a man that is of good vn­derstandyng, demaundeth the pleasures of the body but mo­derately.

¶ The .xxxvij. Chapiter. ¶ Of Chastitet.

[Page] CHastite and conti­nēce, ar not al one thing: for Chasti­tieis an habite, the whiche is fixed in the mind of man by longe time, hauing ouercome the desires of the flesh, so that it fealeth no as­saultes of temptacions: but cō ­tinēce is an habite by the which a man sustaineth harde tempta­cions, muche molested: But ne­uerthelesse consenteth not ther­to, so muche reason is in hym. Then Chastitee and continence are not all one. The inchast is an habite by the which a mā sinneth in delectable thinges, with out great instance of temptacy­ons, as a man not constrayned and goeth searchyng delectacy­ons. Then the incontinent is he [Page] that is ouercome with tempta­cions, whiche pricke him strōg­ly. But the vnchaste man is he that letteth him selfe to be ouer­come with tēptacions that pric­keth hym not. And the inconti­nence is suche by debilite of rea­son, and by littell truste. Then there is no meane at al, but stā ­deth as an euill mean, & may be correct, yf vertue & hope lie to­gether. But the inchaste can ne­uer be correcte, for vertue hathe noo power in malice to muche vsed. For the reason ofte tymes corrupteth by two muche con­cupyscence: And the acte of the malicious is knowen, for ver tue is whole in reason, but in malice, reason is corrupte.

¶ Of Constancie. Chapiter .xxxviii.

THere be three ma­ners of stablenes, one is that a man be stable in al hys woorkes trewe or falce, whatsoeuer they be. The second is contrary to this. The third is a man that wyll stande in the thing that is good, and lightely depart from a thing that is euell. But gene­rally the man that is constante, is better then the manne that is mutable, for the mutable mo­ueth with euerye winde, but the constante mouethe not for anye stronge desire, but somtime by his noble delectacion mouethe frome his falce credence, and consenteth to the trewthe. It [Page] is impossible that a man be wise and incontinent to geather. For prudence is but onelye in the worke, ofte tymes incontinence and wylynes be together: and so subteltie is deuided from pru­dence: And prudence is in those thiges which be good: But sub­teltee is both in the good and in the euil. And the wise man that worketh not according to his science, is lyke to hym that slepeth and is droncke. The lighte and wantō man is the pit of carnal desyres, afflict and swalowed in the workes of reason, and is as a drunckard which hath bound his wit and is smothered in his brayne by the vapours of wyne for to much wine peruerteth the ryght iudgement. The frendful man is he that wronges other [Page] by councell prepensed, and by I re maketh election without reason, which is euel withoute re­medy.

¶ Of Amitee. cha. xxxix.

AMitee is one of the vertues of almightie God and of mā, and is much nede­ful to thelife of mā, and a man hath nede of frēdship in this life as of other thynges. And the mighty riche princes of the earth haue nede of frendes, to whom thei may be beneficial and of whom they may receaue thankes, honors and seruices. A gret suretie it is to a mā to haue frendes, for so much as aman is in the degre of gretnes, the more egal he is to fal, and his fal most [Page] perillous. Then frendes are mooste nedefull in the tyme of stryffe and aduersitee. And therfore it is a good and a sure refuge. For a manne that hath no frende, is alone in his dedes: And when he is with his frend, he hathe companye and helpe to brynge his worke to passe. For why? of two perfytte personnes commeth perfite worke and vn­derstandyng. The makers of the lawe put their Citizens in comfort to haue Charitee toge­ther with Justice. For why? yf euery man were iuste, yet Cha­ritee should be nedefull. But yf euery man wer frendly to other, Justice shuld not nede: for whi? frendshippe destroyeth al strife, and euery discorde that may be.

¶ Of the kindes of A­mitee. Chapiter .xl.

THE kyndes of A­mitee bee knowen by the thīges that a man loueth, whiche be thre, that is to saie: Good, Profytable, and delectable. And he that is suche one accordyng to the truthe, lo­ueth hym that is like hym. The kindes of amite ben thre, the one is loued for good, another for gaines, and the other for delectaciōs, and to euery one it is nede­full to manifest tribulaciō. For they that loue, bereth good will commonly one to another, and verely loue the thinges by the which they be frendes, that is to say, delectacion & profit: whence the amitee indureth so longe as [Page] indureth the delectaciō and the perfite, and therfore they be frē ­des and enemies. The frēdshyp is in olde folkes, but the frend­ship of delectacion is amongest them that be yonge, howbeit the perfite Amite is in them that be good, and that be like in vertue, and beare good wil one to ano­ther, because they be like in their vertues. And this frendshyp is a way that conteyneth al good­nes, and amongest themthere is no delectaciō nor euil. And ther­fore this frendship cannot be be twene the good man & the euell. but onely amongest theim that be good. But the amitee that is by delectacion or for profit may be amongest good & euel, howbe it it contyne weth not longe. A­mite is a laudable adornement [Page] to them that company together and is a fayre lyfe, by the which they liue together in tranquilli­tee: and the tranquillttee that is amongest them, doth not depart by the diuersitee of places, and shoulde not stande yf they were farre of, this maye bee a depar­tyng & goyng out of the mynd­fulfrendship, and therfore it is a prouerbe, that long viages de­part frendshippe. A welbeloued thynge hathe some noble good­nes, and therefore frendes loue together, & not because of fode or repaste, but because of habit, and euery frend loueth his wel­the, and rendereth one to ano­ther accordynge to equalitee.

Howe that the substance of the good shuld be cōmen. Chapiter .xli.

THe participacion of theim that be parteners together in good and euell, in marchan­dise and in conuersacion toge­ther, is euer a beginning of frēd ship, and according to the quan titee of the thynges, soo is the quantitee of frendshyppe, and they that haue frendes oughte to common amongest them. For amitee is a thing of commente, and euery commontie desyreth lyke concupiscence. And there­fore is made the solempnitee of Pasch, oblacions and offeryn­ges, so that of thes thinges mai growe company and loue amō ­gest neighboures, of the whiche [Page] thing procedeth honour and ex­altacion of almighty God. And in olde tyme they kept their so­lempnitees after Corne Har­uest, because at that time menne were mooste able to helpe their frendes, and to geue thankes to God for his benefites receiued.

¶ Of Principalitees. Chapiter .xlii.

THere be thre principa­litees, the fyrste of the Kyng, another of the Commonalte, and the thirde of the Father vppon his children, and echone of these ha­the his conntrary. For the King inforceth his subiectes to good­nes, and is studious to procure theyr good estate, as the Herde­manne is studyous vppon his stocke. It is a differēce betwene [Page] the Lordshippe of the king and other in this: For the kinge is Lorde vniuersall of the people, the father is the cause of the ge­neracyon of hys chyldren and of the brynging vp of theym.

Then the father is natural lord of his chyldren, and their loue is greate. Therefore the father oughte to be honoured with the honoure dewe vnto hym. The Justice of euerye manne is ac­cordyng to the quantitee of his vertue, then whosoeuer is gre­ateste, oughte to bee mooste lo­ued and honoured. The loue of brothers is as the loue of fello­wes, because they come together and hathe one symylitude when there commeth aduersytee.

❧ The Lorde and the subiectc haue one Relygyon togyther. [Page] Lyke as the craftes manne and his instrumente, and as the bo­dye and the solle. And he that vseth the Instruemente profy­teth thereby, and therfore he lo­ueth it, but the Instrument lo­ueth not hym that wearethe it.

❧ And lykewyse the bodye lo­ueth not the solle: The Instru­ment is as the bonde man why­che loueth not his Lorde. The father loueth the sonne, and the sonne the father, because the one is made of the other: but the loue of the father is more stron­ger than the loue of the sonne, & the reason is: for that the father knoweth his sonne to be of hym in shorte tyme after his byrthe: But the sonne knoweth not the father of longe after, that is when his wittes be come to him [Page] and discression cōforteth. More ouer, the father loueth the sōne as hymself. But the sōne loueth the father as a thyng made of him. Brothers loue together as beeyng of one beginnyng. For thei be one thing: although thei be departed. And this that con­forteth loue emonges brethern is that thei bee nourished and brought vp together.

¶ The .xliij. Chapter ¶ The loue that a man hath with GOD.

THe loue that aman hath with god, and the loue that a mā hath to his father, is of one nature. For why? Eche one of their lo­ues is by a recordaciō of grace. [Page] But the loue of God oughte to bee preferred before the loue of the father. For ye benefites that a mā receiueth of God: be more greate and more noble then thei whiche be receiued of the father The amite of kyndred, frendes, neighbours and straungers, is more and lesse accordyng to the diuersite of the causes, by y whi­che one beareth good will vnto another. Therefore thei that be brought vp together, beeyng of long tyme conuersant together be of great frendship. The loue that is betwene a man and his wife is loue naturall, & a more aunciēt loue then is ye loue of citezēs emongest thē, and in this loue is great profite. For why? the workes of the mā is diuerse from the workes of the woman. [Page] And that whyche the one canne not dooe, the other dothe, and so they fulfyll theyr busynesse: The chyldren be bondes whiche bynde the womanne to the hus­bande in loue, because the chyl­dren bee the common wealth of them bothe.

How that loue is increa­sed by cōmunicacion of frendes Chapyter .xliiii.

COmmunicaciō ioi­neth theym that be good togyther in one loue, by occaci­on of vertues: whi­che verily be louing together in theym selues, for there is not a­mongest them any strife or con­tencion, nor will to haue victo­ry the one of the other: but only [Page] to serue and please, for why? It is a great pleasure when a man hath dooen seruice to his fren­des. There bee frendships whi­che be called questionalles, and those frendshippes bee in men whiche receiue one of another, wherof commeth greate accusa­cions, as when the one saieth: I haue dooen thee pleasure, and thou hast doen me none: Suche frendship cannot long indure.

❧ Amitee is like vnto Justice and accordyng to iustice in two sortes, that is to saie: Naturall and legall. So is frendship in two sortes, naturall and legall: And the legall is called amitee, and the perticular is a market of change, as she that standeth in geuyng and receiuyng natu­rally frō hand to hande. There [Page] are diuerse men that be pleased with that thyng whiche is well and conuenient, but notwithstā dyng thei leaue the good & take the profitable. A good thyng it is to do good to other without any hope of gaynes. But pro­fitable is when a manne thyn­keth to haue a greater power. This seruice is it that a manne dooth to hym that is mightie and able to geue rewardes and chaunge for seruice dooen.

¶ The .xlv. Chapiter. Of the loue that ought to bee emongest menne.

LOue is the pryce of vertue and thankes or benefites receiued Gaynes or wynnyng is seuerally of nede, & the grea­ter [Page] man ought to geue vnto the lesse winnyng, & the lesse ought to geue vnto the greater honor and reuerence. And this ought to bee accordyng to the deser­uyng of theim bothe: In these waies is conserued frendeship. The honor that a manne ought to doo to almightie God and to his father, is not like other ho­nors; for no man can geue suffi­ciente honores and thankes to God & to his father. Although he inforce himself to do what he can, the commendable equalnes is to equall the kindes of amite that bee diuerse, as it is in the orderyng of citees, that the sho­maker selleth his shooes as he will, and likewise other craftes men emongest them. One thing is loued by the whiche all mar­chaundise [Page] bee made equall and confirmed, this is Gold and sil­uer. When the louer loueth his loue for delectacion, & she loueth him for profite, thei loue not the one the other right wel, therfore suche loue is sone loste. Euery loue y is for light thinges doth shortly departe. But the reasōs that be strong and stedfast cau­seth frendship, and loue to con­tinue that is by vertue, for the good is long laster. For why? Uertue cannot be remoued but profite departeth when profita­ble is taken awaie. A man that syngeth for gaynes, if a manne should syng one song for ano­ther, he would not be cōtent, be­cause he loketh for another re­ward. Then there shalbe no concord in marchandise, if there be [Page] not concord of willes, and that is whē a man receiueth for that that he geueth, that he would haue. And sometymes it is for that for y whiche he geueth no­thing but honor & reuerence, as did Pithagoras the which would haue nothyng of hys Scholers for his doctryne but honoure and reuerence. And somtime for doctryne a man will haue mo­ny, as the Mechaniques, but it is not so in Philosophie, for he that teacheth other knowledge; ought to receiue of his disciple honor and subieccion, as a lord and father. It is nedefull for a manne to knowe the dignitie of men. So that euery man maie geue honoure accordyng to his dutie. For a man oweth one ho­nor to his father, another to the [Page] people, another to the Lorde of the hoste, another to the felowe, another to the neighbor, and a­nother to the strāger. He that v­seth fraude in frēdship, is worse thē he that vseth fraude in gold and siluer, euē somuche as fren­ship is more precious then gold and siluer, so muche the wourse is he that fraudeth amitie, then he that deceiueth in Golde and siluer. And like as false money is shortly broken, so false fren­ship shortely departeth.

¶ The .xlvi. Chapiter. ¶ How almightie God departeth all goodnesse.

THE equall parte of goodnes is almighty God, whiche geueth too euery one accor­dyng [Page] as their nature is apte to receiue. The man that is good delighteth in hymself, hauyng ioye of the good woorkes, and if he bee good reioyseth hym muche with his frende, whiche he taketh as himself. But the e­uill manne flieth from the good and noble operacions, and if he be very euill he flieth from hymself. For when he standeth alone he is rebuked in hymself, in re­memberyng the euill woorkes whiche he hath dooen, and nei­ther loueth hymself nor other, because the nature of goodnesse is mortified in hym in the depe­nesse of iniquite, [...]e delighteth not fully in y euill that he doth. For the nature of goodnes dra­weth vnto delectacion and deu [...] deth in hymself. And therfore he [Page] is in perpetuall troble & paines full of bitternesse and dronken in filthinesse and of diuersitee. Then to suche a man no man cā bee afrende: For a frende ought to haue in hym a thyng to be lo­ued, and suche one hath in hymself so muche misery that there is no remedy, that he may come to felicite. Then let no man fall in to this pitte of Iniquite, but rather enforce hym to come to goodnes, by the whiche he maie haue delectaciō and ioye in him self. Comforte is not frendship althoughe it bee like vnto it. The beginnyng of frendship is pleasure had in tymes past. As the loue of a woman of the whi­che a manne hath had pleasure and delectacion, and is a bonde of loue and foloweth it insepe­rable, [Page] the desperaciō of the whi­che procedeth. Comforte maie bee frendship by similitude, till it bee growē by custome of time and the office of comfort apper­teigneth vnto hym that hath in hym grace and grauite, and ex­cercised in vertue knitte of loue and concorde: for discorde in o­pinions is to bee drawen oute of a noble congregacion, so that it maie remaigne in vnitee and peace and in concord of willes. Those thynges that geue other verite and dignitee to rule bee vertuous & their woorkes. And the vnite of opinions be found in good menne, bycause thei bee firme and stable emōgest theim self in outwarde thynges, for thei beare good will continual­ly: but seldome men agre in one [Page] opinion. And to fulfill their de­sires thei sustaine greate strife and muche businesse, but not because of vertue. And bee solici­tous to deceiue them with whō thei haue to doo, and euer be in strief and in contenciō. The be­nefactors loue their beneficia­tes more then thei bee loued of them. For the benefactor loueth with pure liberalite, but the be­neficiates louen their benefac­cores by debte of thankes. And moreouer the benefactor loueth the beneficiate as creditor: But the beneficiate loueth as a deb­tor, y creditor reioyseth against his debitor. The debitor is tro­bled bicause he feareth his de­bitor: then the beneficiates fain to loue their benefactours by­cause thei would not bee rebu­ked [Page] of vnkindnesse. And yet the receite of the benefite is factor: and in speciall if he haue mynd. For why? The vttermoste per­fecciō of man is in his operaciō

¶ The .xlvij. Chapiter. ¶ How man delighteth hym in many thynges.

A Manne delighteth in three thynges, that is to say: in thynges pre­sent in vsyng of them: In thynges past in remēbryng of them, and in thinges to come in trustyng of them. The woor­kes good and noble contine we long and be delectable to remē ­brance. But the delectable and profitable satisfie but litle, and the memory shortly past. Euery manne loueth more the thinges [Page] that he getteth with paine, then the thyng that he getteth with­out pain, as it is of money: whi­che whē it is gotten with great labor, it is kept with great stu­die and moderatly spente. And who y getteth it without labor spendeth it without moderaciō. And this is the cause wherefore the mother loueth y childe more then dooth the father. For why? She suffreth great trauail and anguishe in the birthe. Now in somuche that it is a light thing to receiue benefites, and a hard thyng to geue theim, the bene­factor loueth better his benefactor, then the benificiator loueth his benefactor. There bee men that loue themself to much, and that is called a filthy loue. The euill man doth euery thyng v­pon [Page] will, but the good and ver­teons manne dooth the workes whiche bee good and verteous, for the loue of vertue and good nes. And there bee other menne that by y nobilitee of their min­des, be good to their frendes, in leuyng them their goodes. So that their workes maie remain in perpetuall memorye. My frend is another. This is a prouerbe. By a prouerbe it is saied Frendes haue one life and one bloud, and all their thynges be bee equally comen: as the nose to the face, the knee to the legge and the fynger to the hande. A manne ought to loue his frend, for in louing him he loueth him self, and should not be loued for honor or corporall delectacion, but rather for the very loue of [Page] vertue. And the manne that lo­ueth his frend in this sorte, is a very frende, he helpeth and supporteth with body and goodes, and with his life if nede be. The full felicitee of mankynde is in the obteignyng of frendes, for no man would haue al the goo­des of the worlde to liue alone. Then a man hath nede of fren­des, to whom he maie bee beni­ficiall, and with whom he maie comenly vse felicite. It is a na­tural thyng to man to liue cite­zenly, and a necessary thyng to a manne to accomplishe his busines of necessitee by his neigh­bores and frendes, whiche can­not bee doen by hymself. To do well it is a noble and delectable thyng: and the vertues electe in good deedes bee fewe. But the [Page] profitable & delectable be many The frendes of pleasure should not bee many, for thei be but for disgestion of meate. There can bee but one verteous frend. As a man can haue but one louer that he loueth intierly. For whi? That loue is of aboundaunce, the whiche is but to one alone. But counsaill honest and con­ueniente, ought to bee to euery man by dutie of vertue. A man hath nede of frendes in tyme of aduersitee and prosperitec to be comen with hym in his goodes: and liuyng in ioye and plesure, so that menne maie become the better one by another. And in aduersitee, so that a man maie haue helpe and counsaill of his frende.

¶ The .xlviij. Chapiter. ¶ How Delectacion is naturall.

DElectaciō is borne and norished with vs from the beginnyng of oure na­ture, therfore chil­dren should bee taughte at the beginnyng, to delight themsel­fes in thynges conuenient, and likewise against that to mislike the contraries. And this is the foundacions of vertue morall, and in processe growethe and is knowen the beatitude of the life. For when a manne deligh­teth in a thyng, it is his choyse, and when it greueth, he flieth it. And there bee menne whiche be seruauntes to the delectacions, [Page] wherfore their delectacions bee destroyed against God of this that thei owe. Those mē whiche claime delectacions and folowe them saie against their mindes, and saie not euill of theim con­cerning the vertue. For the true woorde dooth euer helpe and a­mendeth the maners of the life better: but the operacion woor­keth more then doth the worde. And therefore the good man in­formeth his life with good wor­des & good workes. The thyng that is desired for it self is beste and the griefe is euil. For why? It is contrary to delectacion, & also euery thyng that is good helpeth vnto another thyng to make it good. And delectacion helpeth other thynges and ma­keth theim better. Then she is [Page] good Plato saieth. That delec­tacion was not good, & parad­uenture he saith not truth. For why? In euery thyng is natu­rally some thyng that is good, then in delectaciō is some thing that is good. It is a thyng vn­possible that one good thyng be contrary to the other. And it is impossible that one euill be not contrary to another, and bothe two are to be fled: But two goodes are not contrary together, but rather be like, and both two are to bee electe and chosen, but yet the one maie bee better then the other: As one man maie bee more wise then the other & more iust. Delectaciō is not mouing, for euery thyng that may moue hath tariyng and hastyng. But thynges relatiue haue no mo­uyng [Page] by themselfes, then delec­tacion is not mouyng.

¶ The .xlix. Chapiter. ¶ Of Delectacion sen­sible and intellectuall.

DElectaciō is ether sē ­cible or intellectuall and there wher is the felyng, there is the delectacion, then it must nedes be that this delectacion bee in the sencible life. And there where is the vnderstandyng is the ope­raciō sencible. Then it is of ne­cessitee that these delectacions bee in the mynde intellectuall. And many tymes before the de­lectacions of the senses is grief. As before delectacion of eatyng manne hath honger. And be­fore delectacion of drinkyng a [Page] man hath first, but before the delectaciō of hering, seing, orsmel­lyng: ther is no griefe. And like as in althynges of delectacions intellectuall, delectable thyn­ges be had in men whiche haue peruerse nature, and bee not to be called delectables, according to the truth. As thynges that a­pere bitter to the sicke and are not bitter accordyng to ye truth. So of euery operacion: for as the iuste man delighteth in iu­stice, so the wise man delighteth in the workes of Sapience. E­uery man is pleased with the o­peracions in the whiche he de­lighteth, and the delectaciō ma­keth the woorkes perfight. De­lectacion is a complete fourme whiche hath no neede to her ac­cōplishyng, nether of tyme nor [Page] of mouyng. That is to say: ther is no mouyng accordyng to her forme in the tyme, but fulfilleth her self out of tyme, as if there were no mouyng circuler. The sencible delectaciō is according to the quantitee of the felyng, and in the thyng that is felte, and in the operaciō betwene the one and the other. Then when the senses bee strong: the thyn­ges bee more delectable, when the strengthe of delectacton is geuen to delighte. Because the goodnesse of the worke is in the strength of the thyng that doth and is the beginnyng of the thyng that it suffereth.

¶ The .l. Chapiter. The moste delecta­ble delectacion.

[Page] THE moste delectable delectacions be those whiche be moste com­plete & moste perfite. And those whiche fulfill all the delectaciōs of man. And so lōg indureth the delectaciōs as the vertue of the thynges indureth by the whiche a man delighteth hym as youth when it hath the thing that pleseth. And therfore the delectacions cannot suffice: till thei become lesse, as it com­meth to age. When the vertue minisheth, the man that desireth life desireth delectacion, for de­lectacion is complete of the life The delectaciō intelligible dif­fereth from the sēcible, and eue­ry delectacion multiplieth and increaseth her woorkes, and by this is multiplied Artes & sci­ences, [Page] because mā delighteth in them. There be delectacions of operacions, whiche sometyme letteth other delectacions or o­peracions. As a manne that de­lighteth in Harpyng, somuche that he forgetteth other workes that he hath in hande. Delecta­cions that bee in noble operaci­ons: bee noble and are to be fo­lowed. And the vile is vile and not to be folowed. Those delec­tacions be diuerse in kind: whi­che bee diuerse in operacion, in kynde as delectacions intellec­tuall and sensible. And these be of diuerse kyndes whiche bee likewyse diuerse in operacions as of the sight and felyng. Eue­ry beast hath his delectacion in the whiche he delighteth: but of all other delectacions the intel­lectuall [Page] is moste delectable, and moste noble emongest all other delectaciōs. As the gold emon­gest all other mettalles, accor­dyng to ye diuersities of men, by diuerse delectacions. But those bee very good that apere good to theim that bee good, and not to the vicious, as a thyng that is swete and bitter to the whole man and not the sicke.

¶ The .lj. Chapiter. ¶ How that beatitude is the fulnes of vertue.

SIth y we haue spokē of vertue and delight it therefore behoueth vs to speke of felicite and beatitude, whiche be tha cō ­pleshyng of all the goodnesse of mā. This felicite is not habite, [Page] but rather Acte, to the whiche a man intendeth to cōmen by him self or by other. Beatitude is a thing out of it self, the man that hath not tasted the swetenesse of Beatitude in the whiche is the delight of the vnderstādyng of man: hath his refuge to the ple­sures of the body, in the whiche he hath put his truste. And thei be not of a truth to be called de­lectacions. Beatitude is not to bee chosen by boyes, but verely in this that semeth to be delectable to thē that be good men. Fe­licite is not in sporte and plaic, but rather in thynges had by labor and study. It is a manifest thyng of blessednes, when a mā laboreth with vertue in ordinat thynges & in thynges of solace. And therfore it is saied: that the [Page] vnderstandyng is a more noble thyng then is y nose, for because the moste noble mēbre doth the moste noble operacion, and the best māworketh the best worke, by y whiche it is a worthy thing that felicite be operacion of the most noble vertue whiche is naturalli purposed to al thinges ye bee geuen of God to man. And felicitee is no nother thyng but be stedfast in vertue & in her to workes. The moste perfight de­lectacions that be, are in thacte of felicite, and meruelous delectacions be found in philosophy by the truth & by certēty that is foūd in y lawes. And a more sa­uerous delectacion is this, that a man hath whē he knoweth the thyng, then when he thinketh to knowe. Then the operacion of [Page] this vertue is vppermost & su­preme felicite. The wise manne hath nede of thinges y be neces­sary to y life as other hath. For vertue is busied in outwarde thynges: as in Justice▪ Chastite and strength, and in other ordi­nate operacions: because y mat­ter of operaciō is outward, but the operacion of sapience is in­warde, as to the necessitee. But neuertheles if a man haue help he woorketh more perfightly in his thought. Then this felicite is no nother but hope to knowe And of thought, felicite represē ­teth battail because of health & of peace, and this apereth ma­nifestly in y citees whiche make war to haue rest and peace, and like so to all other vertues of battail. For euery manne inten­deth [Page] some outwarde thynges, but the vnderstanding specula­tiue is euer in peace and in trā ­quilite. But it hath nede of lōgtyme. For it is not semyng or cō uenient to felicitee, to haue any thyng imperfecte. And when a man cometh to this degre of fe­licite, he liueth not by the life of man, but liueth by that deuine thyng whiche is in man. Then the life that aperteineth to this acte is deuine life. But the life that aperteineth to y actes of o­ther vertues, is humain. Ther­fore it is not cōueniēt to a good man that his diligence bee hu­main, nor his desire bee not mo­rall, although it so apere. But yet is bounden to inforce hym­self to bee morall accordyng to his power. And yet euer to in­force [Page] himself to liue by the most noblest life that is in hym. For although a man bee but litle of persone, he is aboue all other creatures. whence the moste de­lectable life that a man hath is by vnderstandyng.

¶ The .lij. Chapiter. ¶ Of the morall vertue and of the happie manne.

THese vertues morall or Ciuill will, bee in more trouble & more solicite then the intel­lectualles, for that liberalitee hath neede of riches. The iuste man is busied with theim that commaūde iustice, and likewise of the straunge man and chaste, but these vertues intellectuall haue no nede, for the accompli­shyng [Page] of their operaciōs of outward thynges. But rather ma­ny tymes the very perfight mē: bee sped in these vertues of the outward thynges. But a man that cannot come to the perfec­cion of this life, oughte to chose a waie to liue, accordyng to the comen lawes. For the operaciō of the vnderstandyng specula­tiue, is in thend of example of the very beatitude of man: And manne is likened to God and his angels. For the other operacions bee not worthy to be like­ned to God nor to heuenly thynges. God and his angels haue moste noble life, for thei be euer in the moste best speculacion, & their speculacion neuer wereth nor faileth. And the manne that inforceth hymself moste conty­nually [Page] to vnderstande & thinke of these thynges, is moste like vnto theim that bee in the very beatitude.

¶ The .liij. Chapiter. Of the knowledge of Uertues.

AMan to bee happie in this worlde hath nede of moderate conduc­tingin outward thin­ges, for because nature geueth not sufficient inwardly of these thynges. As to bee satisfied in brede & of wine, & of other thyn­ges that be nedeful to the life of man. But it is not nedeful to be lorde of the sea and of the land, for suche thynges maie happen to thē that are of lesse degree of riches, that be more ware to bee [Page] happy then the Lordes of these thynges. And therfore it is well saied of Anaxagoras: that felicite is not in riches nor in lordeship his saiyng is to be noted, for the woordes of hym are to be alled­ged, whose woorkes agree with his saiyng. A man that maketh his orision accordyng to the o­bedience of the ordre of the vn­derstandyng: is loued of God, If almightie God haue cure of man whiche is a worthy thyng to beleue? Then moste cure he hath of thē that moste inforceth themselfes to be like vnto hym, and best rewardeth theim, and delighteth hym to them, that is to saie, with them as one frende with another. Thē according to this saiyng, we ought to thinke that it is sufficiente to obtaine [Page] felicite, only to know y thinges written in this boke of vertues and frēdship, and of other thin­ges, but the accōplishyng is in the operacions. For this thyng that of nature ought to be doen sufficeth not only to be said, but to be doen. And in this forme is fulfilled the goodnesse of man.

¶ The .liiij. Chapiter. ¶ Yet of like matter.

THE knowledge of vertue maketh a māne of power to be admonished vn to good woorkes, specially such as haue good na­ture and moued by admonision to do well. Also payn maketh a man to flee from vice, for feare of punishement, and not for the [Page] loue of vertue, but for feare of paine, & thinke not well though thei dooe well. It is not possi­ble for theim that bee hardened in malice to be corrected by wordes. There bee menne whiche bee good by teachyng. And those men that bee good by na­ture haue it not of theim selfes but by the grace of God, whiche is vetely called good nature. Then the solle of him that hath the garmente of goodnesse and of righte loue, hateth euill: the mouyng ingendereth vertue in her as doth the seede that is cast vpon good ground. And to the intente that a man haue a good custome from the beginnyng, & to vse to loue thynges that bee good & to hate euil, he ought to be brought vp frō his youth accordyng [Page] to the noble lawes, and vse the woorkes of vertue: and this oughte to bee in maner of continence, although it bee not delectable to many men, yet the hande may not bee withdrawen from chastesyng of children, yea and from childhode till thei bee greate. There be menne whiche maie not bee corrected by woor­des. And there bee that cannot bee by woordes but by payne. And there bee other whiche will not bee corrected by nother of these sortes. And those bee to be takē from other. The good and noble ruler of the citee, maketh good citezens, whiche obscrue the lawes and doo y worke that it cōmaundeth. Thei be aduer­saries that obserue not the la­wes and commaundementes: [Page] although thei dooe well. In di­uerse Citees there is no good rule because thei liue dissolutly in folowyng their willes. The moste conuenient rule that may be in citees, is that whiche is tē ­pered prouidently in suche sort as maie bee kepte not to heuy, and that whiche manne desireth to bee obserued in hym and in his children and in his frendes. The good punisher of y lawes is he that maketh rules vniuersall, whiche bee determinate in this boke, and conioyne them to the perticulars whiche cometh daily in hādes, therefore to ordre the lawes well, it is nedefull to haue reason and experience.


¶ Imprinted at Lon­dō in the parishe of Chri­stes Church within new gate by Richard Graf­ton, Printer too our soueraigne lorde Kyng Edward the. VI. 1547.

Cum priuilegio ad impri­mendum solum.



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