THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

HE that will examine this expedition of the Heluetians, by the transmigrations and flittings of other nations, shall finde some vn­exampled particularities in the course of their proceeding: for first it hath neuer beene heard, that any people vtterly abandoned that countrey which nature or prouidence had allotted them; vnlesse they were dri­uen thereunto by a generall calamity, as the infection of the aire, the cruelty & oppression of a neighbour nation, as were the Sueuians, who thought it great honor to suffer no man to border vpon their confines; or some other vniuersal, which made the place inhabitable and the people willing to vndertake a volun­tarie exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the inhabitants of a country were so multiplied, that the place was ouer charged with multitudes of ofspring, and like a poore father had more children then it was able to sustaine, the aboūding surplus was sent out to seeke new fortunes in forraine countries, and to possesse themselues of a resting seat; which might recompence the wants of their natiue country, with a plenteous reuenue of necessary supplementes: And in this sort, we read that Rome sent out manie Colonies into diuers parts of her Empire: And in this maner the ancient Galles disburdened themselues of their superflui­ty, [Page 11] and sent them into Asia. The Gothes came from the Ilandes of the Balticke sea, and in Sulla his time swarmed ouer Germany: besides many other nations whose transmigrations are particularly described by Lazius. But amongst all these, we find none that so forsooke their country, but there remained some be­hind to inhabit the same, from whence as frō a fountaine, succeeding ages might deriue the streame of that ouerflowing multitude, and by them take notice of the causes, which moued them vnto it: for their maner was in all such expediti­ons, and sending out of Colonies, to deuide themselues into two or three parts, equall both in equality and number. For after they had parted their common people into euen companies, they deuided their nobility with as great equali­ty as they could, among the former partitions; and then casting lots, that part which went out to seeke new aduentures, left their landes and possessions to the rest that remained at home; and so by industrie they supplied that defect which continuance of time had drawen vpon them. And this was the means which the first inhabitants of the earth found out after the floud, to people the vnhabited places, and to keepe off the inconueniences of scarcity and famine.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

HE that would prognosticate by the course of these seuerall procee­dings, whether of the two betokened better successe, hath greater reason to foretell happines to these which I last spake of, then to the Heluetians; vnlesse their valour were the greater, & quitted al difficulties which hatred and enuie would cast vpon them: for an action which sauoureth of necessitie, (which was alwaies vnderstood in sending out a colonie) hath a more plauisible pasport amongst men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntarie motion: for as men can be content to tol­lerate the one, if it concerne not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gaine to punish pride with shame, and to oppose themselues against the other.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

ORgetorix, thirsting after princely dignity, discouereth the humor of vaine glory. For not contented with the substance of honor, be­ing already of greatest power amongst the Heluetians, and ordering the affaires of the state by his owne direction, thought it nothing without the markes and title of dignitie, vnto which the inconueniences of ma­iestie are annexed: not considering that the best honour sitteth not alwaies in imperial thrones, nor weareth the diadems of Princes; but oftentimes resteth it selfe in meaner places, and shineth better with obscurer titles. For proofe wher­of, to omit antiquity, take the familie of the Medices in Florence, and particu­larly [Page 12] Cosimo and Lorenzo, whose vertue raised them to that height of honour; that they were nothing inferiour to the greatest potentates of their time, being themselues but priuate gentlemen in that state, and bearing their proper names as their greatest titles. But howsoeuer the oportunity of changing their soile, was well obserued by Orgetorix, as the fittest meanes to attempt an innouati­on; but the successe depended much vpon the fortunate proceeding of their ex­pedition: for as a multitude of that nature, can be content to attribute a great part of their happines, wherein euery man thinketh himselfe particularly inter­essed, to an eminent leader; and in that vniuersall extasie of ioie will easily ad­mit an alteration of their state: so if the issue be in any respect vnfortunate, no man will acknowledge himselfe faultie, but euery one desiring to discharge his passion vpon some obiect: A chiefe director is likeliest to be the marke, at which the dartes of their discontent will be throwen, and then he will finde it hard to effect what he intendeth.

THE OBSERVATION.

AS these prouisoes were all requisite, so one thing was omitted, which might haue furthered their good fortune more then any thing thought of,The omission in the Helue­tian expedi­tion. which was to haue concealed by all meanes the time of their departure: for all the beastes of the wood must needes stand at gaze, when such lyons roused themselues out of their dens, and be then very watchfull of their safety when they knewe the instant of time, when some of their spoiles must needes be offered to appease their furie: Or at the least it be­hooued them so to haue dealt by hostages and treaty, that such as were likeliest and best able to crosse their dessignements, might haue beene no hinderance of their proceedings: considering there were but two waies out of their coun­trey by which they might go, the one narrow and difficult betwene the hill Iura and the riuer Rhone, by the countrey of the Sequani: the other through Pro­uence far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romans. But howsoeuer their errour was, that after two yeares prouision to go, and hauing made an exterminating decree which inioyned them to go, when they came to the point they knew not what way to go.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis manner of prolonging of time to renforce the troupes or get some other aduantage, as it was then of great vse to Caesar, and hath oftentimes beene practised to good purpose; so doth it discouer to a circumspect enemie, by the directions in the meane time (which can­not easily be shadowed) the drift of that delay; and so inuiteth him with greater courage, to take the oportunitie of that present aduantage; especially if tract of time maie strengthen the one, and not further the other, which is easily discer­ned by the circumstances of the action.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe request of the Heluetians seemed to deserue a facile answere, being in effect no more then nature had giuen to the riuer Rhone, which was to passe through the prouince, with as much speed & as little hurt as they could: but Caesar looking further into the matter and comparing things already past, with occurrences that were to follow after, found the maiesty of the Roman Empire to be interessed in the answere, being either to maintaine her greatnes by resisting her enemies, or to degenerat from ancient vertue, by gratifying such as sought her ruin, which in matter of state are [Page 15] things of great consequence. And further, he knew it to be an vnsafe course to suffer an enemie to haue meanes of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is alwaies prone to loade him with further wronges whom he hath once iniured: not but that he could peraduenture be content to end the quarell vpon that aduantage; but fearing the other, whom he wronged, to expect but an o­portunitie of reuenge, he gets what aduantage he can before hand, and so cea­seth not vntill he haue added a bloudie end to an iniurious beginning.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

COncerning this maruellous fortification, betweene the hill and the lake, how seruiceable such workes were vnto him in all his warres; in what sort, and in howe small time, they were made, I will defer the treatise of them vntill I come to the height of Alesia, where he gaue some ground of that hyperbolicall speech: An me deleto, non animad­uertebatis decem habere lectas quidem legiones populum Romanum, quae non solum vobis obsister sed etiam coelum diruere possent?

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis defeat being chiefely a seruice of execution vpon such as were taken at a dangerous disaduantage, which men call vnaware, contai­neth these two aduisoes. First, not to neglect that aduantage which Sertorius by the haires of his horse taile hath proued to be very im­portant, that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficulty to ouercome the whole. Secondly, it may serue for a caueat, so to transport an Armie ouer awater, where the enemy is within a reasonable march, that no part may be so se­uered from the bodie of the Armie, that aduantage may thereby be taken to cut them off all together, and separate them from themselues. The safest and most honourable way, to transport an Armie ouer a riuer, is by a bridge, pla­cing at each end sufficient troupes of horse and foote, to defend the Armie from sudden assaults, as they passe ouer the water; and thus went Caesar ouer the Rhene into Germanie two seuerall times.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

COncerning the circumstance of time, when Caesar went out of his campe, which is noted to be in the third watch, we must vnderstand that the Romans diuided the whole night into foure watches,The maner of their watch. eue­rie watch containing three houres; and these watches were distin­guished by seuerall notes & sound of cornets or trumpets, that by the distincti­on and diuersitie therof, it might easily be knowne what watch was sounded. The charge & office of sounding the watches, belonged to the chiefest Centuriō of a legion, whom they called Primipilus, or Primus Centurio, at whose pauilion the trumpeters attended, to be directed by his houre-glasse. The first watch be­gan alwaies at sunne-setting, and continued three houres, (I vnderstand such houres as the night contained, being diuided into twelue: for the Romans di­uided their night as well as their day into twelue equall spaces, which they called houres) the second watch continued vntill midnight; and then the third watch began, and contained likewise three houres; the fourth was equall to the rest, [Page 17] and continued vntill sunne rising. So that by this phrase de tertia vigilia, we vn­derstand that Caesar went out of his campe in the third watch, which was after midnight: and so we must conceiue of the rest of the watches, as often as we shal finde them mentioned in historie.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis example of the Heluetians maie lesson a commander, not to waxe insolent vpon euery ouerthrow which the enemie taketh, but duely to waie the true causes of a victorie gotten or an ouerthrowe taken; that apprehending the right currant of the action, he maie neither vaunt of a blinde victorie, nor be dismaied at a casuall mishappe. And herein let a heedfull warines so moderate the sequels of victorie in a triumphing spirit, that the care and ielousie to keepe still that sweete sounding fame on foot, maie as farre surpasse the industrie, which he first vsed to obtaine it, as the con­tinuance of happinesse doth exceede the beginning of good fortunes. For such is the nature of our soule, that although from her infancy euen to the manhood of her age, she neuer found want of that which she lusted after; yet when she [Page 18] meeteth with a counterbuffe to checke her appetite, and restraine her affecti­ons from their satisfaction; she is as much troubled in that want, as if she had neuer receiued anie contentment at all: for our will to euerie obiect which it seeketh after, begetteth alwaies a new appetite, which is not satisfied with a for­mer quittance, but either seeketh present paiment, or returneth discontentment vnto the minde. And as our soule is of an euerlasting being, and cannot thinke of an end, to her beginning; so she seeketh a perpetuall continuance of such thinges which she lusteth after: which hee, that meaneth to holde fortune his friend, will endeuour to maintaine.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THe getting of this hill as a place of aduantage, was maruellous im­portant to the happy successe of the battel: for the aduantage of the place is not only noted as an especial cause of easy victory,Places of ad­uantage in the Roman warres. through­out this historie; but in al their warres from the very cradle of their Empire, it cleared their Armies from all difficulties, to what extremitie soeuer they were put. The first reason may be in regard of their dartes and slinges, and especially their piles, which being a heauie deadly weapon, could not any waie be so auailable, being cast countremont or in a plaine leuell, as when the decli­uitie and downfall of a swelling banke did naturally second their violent im­pression: Neither can the shocke at handy-blowes bee anie thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their battels) when the souldiers spent their strength in franchising the iniurie of a rising mountaine, as when the place by a naturall inclination did further their course. And to conclude, if the bat­tell succeeded not according to their desire, the fauour of the place afforded them meanes of a strong retrait, in the highest part wherof, they had commonly their campes well fenced and fortified against all chances. If it be demaunded whether the vpper ground be of like vse, in regard of our weapons: I answere, that in a skirmish of shot, I take the aduantage to lie in the lower ground rather then on the hill; for the pieces being hastily charged, as commonly they are af­ter the first volley, if the bullet chance to lie loose, when the nose of the peece is lower then the breech, it must needes flie at randome, and be altogether vnef­fectuall: but when the nose shall be raised vpward to the side of a hill, the bullet being rammed in with his owne waight, shall flie with greater certaintie and fu­rie; considering the nature of the pouder to be such, that the more it is stopt and shut in, the more it seeketh to enlarge his roome, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury. Concerning other weapons, I take the vpper ground in the shocke and incounter, to be aduantagious, as well for the sword as the pike, and would deserue as great respect, if the controuersie were decided by these weapons, as seldome times it is.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

BY Causidius his demeanour, we see that verified which phisitions affirme, that nothing will sooner carrie our iudgment out of her proper seate, then the passion of feare: and that amongst souldiers themselues, whom custome hath made familiarly acquainted with horror and death, it is able to turne a flocke of sheepe into a squadron of corse­lets, and a few canes or osiers into pikes and lanciers: which may serue to aduise a discreet Generall, not easily to credit a relation of that nature, when a man of reputation, in so perfect a discipline and so experienced in the seruice of three famous Chiefes, was so surprised with feare, that he could not discern his friends frō his enimies: but I wil speake more of this passion in the war, with Ariouistus.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

IN euery relation throughout the whole course of this historie, the first wordes are commonly these,Their maner of victualing Re frumentaria comparata; as the foundation & strength of euery expedition, without which no man can manage a warre, according to the true maximes and rules of the Art military, but must be forced to relieue that incon­uenience, with the losse of many other aduantages of great cōsequence: Which gaue occasion to Gaspard de Coligni that famous Admiral of France amongst other oracles of truth, wherewith his minde was maruellously enriched, often to vse this saying: That he that will shape that beast (meaning warre) must begin with the belly: And this rule was diligently obserued by Caesar, who best knewe how to expresse the true portraiture of that beast, in due proportion and liuely resemblance.

The order of the Romans was, at the daie of measuring, to giue corne to euery particular souldier, for a certain time, which was commonly defined by circum­stances: And by the measure which was giuen them, they knew the daie of the next paiment; for euerie footman receiued after the rate of a bushell a weeke, which was thought sufficient for him and his seruant: for if they had paied them their whole stipend in money, it might haue beene wasted in vnnecessarie ex­pences; but by this meanes they were sure of prouision for the time determined; and the sequell of the warre was prouidently cared for by the Generall.

The corne being deliuered out, was husbanded, ground with hand-milles, which they carried alwaies with them, & made into hastie cakes, daintie enough for a souldiers mouth, by no other but themselues and their seruants: Neither could they sell it or exchange it for bread; for Salust reckoneth this vp amongst other dishonours, of the discipline corrupted, that the souldiers sold away their corne, which was giuen them by the treasurer, & bought their bread by the day. And this manner of prouision had many speciall commodities, which are not incident to our custome of victualing: for it is impossible, that victualers should followe an Armie vpon a seruice, in the enemies countrey twentie or thir­tie daies together, with sufficient prouision for an Armie: And by that meanes the Generall cannot attend aduantages and fittest oportunities, which in tract of time are often offered, but is forced either to hazard the whole, vpon vne­quall tearmes, or to sound an vnwilling retrait. And whereas the victualers are for the most part voluntarie, respecting nothing but their gaine; and the soul­diers on the other side, carelesse of the morrow and prodigall of the present, in that turbulent marmarket, where the seller hath an eie onely to his particular, and the buyer respecteth neither the publike good nor his priuate commoditie, there is nothing to be looked for, but famine and confusion. Where as the Ro­mans by their manner of prouision, imposed the generall care of the publike good vpon the chiefe commander, whose dutie it was to prouide store of corne for his Armie; and the particular care vpon euerie priuate souldier, whome it [Page 21] especially concerned to see, that the allowance which the common weale had in plentifull manner giuen him, for his maintenance, might not be wasted through negligence or prodigalitie; which excellent order, the nature of our victuals will no way admit. Their prouinces and the next confederate states furnished their Armies continually with corne; as it appeareth by this place, that for pro­uision of graine, he depended altogether vpon the Hedui: And when they were in the enemies countrey, in the time of haruest, the souldiers went out to reape and gather corne, and deliuered it threshed and clensed to the treasurer, that it might be kept vntill the daie of paiment. But to leaue this frugall and proui­dent manner of prouision as vnpossible to be imitated by this age, let vs returne to our historie, and see how the Heluetians were led, by a probable errour, to their last ouerthrow.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

COncerning the true sense of this triple battell, which Caesar made vpon the side of the hill, I vnderstand it according to the ancient cu­stome of the Romans;The manner of their im­battailing. who in the infancie of their militarie disci­pline, diuided their Armie into three sortes of souldiers, Hastati, [Page 22] Principes, and Triarij: for I omit the velites, as no part of their standing battels, and of these they made three seuerall battels from front to backe: in the first battell were the Hastati, and they possessed the whole front of the Armie, and were called Acies prima. By triplex Acies. Behinde these in a conuenient distance, stood the Principes, in like sort and order disposed, and were called Acies secunda: and lastly in a like correspondent distance, were the Triarij imbattelled and made A­ciem tertiam. Their legion consisted of ten companies, which they called co­hortes, and euerie cohort consisted of three small companies, which they na­med Manipuli: a maniple of the Hastati, a maniple of the Principes, and an o­ther of the Triarij, as I will more particularly set downe in the second booke. And as these three kindes of souldiers were separated by distance of place from front to backe: so was euerie battell deuided into his maniples; and these were deuided by little allies and waies, one from an other, which were vsed to this purpose: The Hastati being in front did euer begin the battell, and if they found themselues too weake to repell the enemie, or were happily forced to a retrait, they drew themselues through these allies or distances, which were in the second battell betweene the maniples of the Principes into the space, which was betweene the Principes and the Triarij, and there they rested themselues whilest the Princes tooke their place and charged the enemie: Or otherwise, if the commanders found it needfull, they filde vp those distances of the Princi­pes, and so vnited with them into one bodie, they charged the enemy all in grosse; and then if they preuailed not, they retired into the spaces between the Triarij, and so they gaue the last assault, all the three bodies being ioyned all in­to one.

Now if we examine by the current of the historie, whether Caesar obserued the same order and diuisions in his warres, we shall find little or no alteration at all, for first this triplex Acies here mentioned, was no other thing but the diuisi­on of the Hastati, Principes and Triarij, according to the manner of the first in­stitution. And least any man should dreame of that ordinarie diuision, which is likewise threefold, the two cornets and the battell, and in that sence he might saie to haue made triplicem Aciem, let him vnderstand, that the circumstances of the diuision haue no coherence with that diuision; for in that he saith of the Heluetians, successerunt Aciem primam, pressed neare the first battel or vangard, he maketh it cleare that the Armie was deuided into a triple battell from front to backe: for otherwise, he would haue said, successerint dextrum aut sinistrum cornu, aut mediam Aciem: for so were the partes of that diuision tearmed. A­gaine, in the retrait which the Heluetians made to the hill, when hee saith that the first and second battell followed close vpon the enemie, and the third op­posed it selfe against the Boij and Tulingi, and stood readie at the foote of the hill, to charge the legions in the flanke and on the backe. It is manifest, that no other diuision can so fitly be applied to this circumstance, as that from front to backe.

But that place in the first of the ciuill warres taketh away all scruple of con­trouersie, where he vseth the verie same tearmes of prima, secunda and tertia Acies: for being to incampe himselfe neare vnto Afranius, and fearing least his [Page 23] souldiers should be interrupted in their worke, he caused the first and second battel to stand in Armes and keepe their distance, to the end they might shroud and couer the third battel (which was imploied in making a ditch behind them) from the view of the enemie; and this kind of imbattailing Caesar obserued, in most of his fightes: by which it appeareth that he vseth the verie same order and discipline for imbattailing, as was instituted by the old Romans.

Concerning the auncient names of Hastati, Principes and Triarij, which Ra­mus in his Militia Iulij Caesaris, vrgeth to be omitted throughout the whole hi­storie: I grant they are seldome vsed in these Commentaries, in the sense of their first institution: for the Hastati, when the discipline was first erected, were the youngest and poorest of the legionarie souldiers. The Principes were the lu­stie, and able bodied men: and the Triarij the eldest and best experienced. But in Caesars campe, there was little or no difference either of valour or yeares, be­tweene the Hastati, Principes or Triarij, which he nameth Prima, Secunda and Tertia Acies; and therefore were neuer tearmed by those names, in respect of that difference. Notwithstanding in regard of order and degrees of discipline, that vertue might bee rewarded with honour, and that time might challenge the priuiledge of a more worthie place,Lib. 1. de bello Ciuili. the said distinctions and tearmes were religiously obserued: for in the battell with Perreius at Ilerda in Spaine, he men­tioneth the death of Q. Fulginius, ex primo Hastato legionis quartae decimae: and in the ouerthrow at Dirrachium he saith,Lib 3. de bello Ciuili. that the eagle bearer, being grieuously wounded, commended the safetie of his ensigne to the horsemen, all the centu­rions of the first cohort being slaine, praeter principem Priorem. And for the Tria­rij, there is no tearme more frequent in Caesar then Primipilus, which name by the rules of the ancient discipline, but to the chiefest Centurion of the first ma­niple of the Triarij: wherby it appeareth that the maniples kept the same names in regard of a necessarie distinction, although peraduenture the Hastati were as good souldiers, as either the Principes or the Triarij. As touching the spaces be­tweene the maniples, whereinto the first battell did retire it selfe if occasion vrged them, I neuer found any mention of them in Caesar. Excepting once here in England, where in a skirmish the Brittaines so vrged the court of guard, which kept watch before the Roman campe, that Caesar sent out two other co­hortes to succour them, who making distance betweene them as they stoode, the court of guard retired it selfe in safetie, through that space into the campe; otherwise we neuer finde that the first battell made any retrait into the allies betweene the maniples of the second battell, but when it failed in any part, the second and third went presently to second them, as appeareth in the battell fol­lowing with Arionistus and in diuers others.

Concerning the vse of this triple battell,Lib. 5. de mi­litia Romana. what can be said more then Lipsius hath done? where he laieth open the particular commodities thereof as farre forth as a speculatiue iudgment can discerne of thinges so farre remote from the vse of this age, which neuer imitateth this triple battell but only in a march: for then commonly they make three companies, a vangard, a battell and a rere­ward: but in imbattailing, they drawe these three companies all in front, ma­king two cornets and the battel, without any other troupes to second them. But [Page 24] let this suffice concerning Caesar his manner of imbattailing and his triplex A­cies, vntill I come to the second booke, where I will handle more particularly the parts of a legion, and the commodity of their small battailions.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Macedonian Phalanx is described by Polybius to be a square battell of pikemen, consisting of 16 in flancke and 500 in front; the souldiers standing so close together that the pikes of the fift ranke were extended three foote beyond the front of the battell;A phalanx described. the rest whose pikes were not seruiceable by reason of their distance from the front, couched them vpon the shoulders of those that stoode before them, and so loc­king them in together in file, pressed forward to holde vp the swaie or giuing backe of the former rankes, and so to make the assault more violent and vnresi­stable. The Grecians were very skilfull in this part of the Arte militarie, which containeth order and disposition in imbattailing, for they maintained publike professors whom they called Tactici, to teach and instruct their youth the pra­ctise and Art of al formes conuenient for that purpose. And these Tactici found by experience, that 16 in flancke so ordered as they were in a phalanx, were able to beare any shocke how violently soeuer it charged vpon them: which number of 16 they made to consist of foure doubles, as first vnitie maketh no order, for order consisteth in number and pluralitie; but vnitie doubled maketh two, the least of all orders, and this is the double: which doubled againe maketh the se­cond order of foure souldiers in a file, which doubled the third time maketh 8, & this doubled maketh 16, which is the fourth doubling from a vnite; and in it they staied as in an absolute number and square, whose roote is 4 the Quadruple in regard of both the extremes: for euery one of these places, the Tactici had seuerall names, by which they were distinctly knowne. But the particular de­scription requireth a larger discourse, then can be comprehended in these short obseruations: he that desireth further knowledge of them, may reade Elianus, that liued in the time of Adrian the Emperour: and Arianus in his historie of Alexander the great: with Mauritius, and Leo imperator, where hee shall haue the diuisions of Tetrafalangia difalangia, Phalangia vnto a vnite, with all the discipline of the Grecians.

The chiefest thing to be obserued is, that the Grecians hauing such skill in imbattailing, preferd a phalanx before all other formes whatsoeuer; either be­cause the figure in it selfe was very strong, or otherwise in regard that it fitted best their weapons, which were long pikes and targets. But whether Caesar tear­med the battell of the Heluetians a phalanx in regard of their thicke manner of imbattailing onely, or otherwise, for as much as besides the forme, they vsed the naturall weapon of a phalanx which was the pike, it remaineth doubtfull. Bran­catio in his discourses vpon this place, maketh it no controuersie, but that eue­rie souldier carried a pike and a target, the target is particularly named in this historie: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the same, that their offensiue wea­pons [Page 25] were pikes. In the fight at the baggage it is said, that manie of the legiona­rie souldiers were wounded through the cart wheeles, with tragulas & materas, which are commonly interpreted speares and iauelins: and I take them to bee weapons longer then common dartes, but whether they were so long as the sa­rissas of the Macedonians, I cannot tell. Howsoeuer, this is certaine, that the Hel­uetians haue euer beene reputed for the true phalangitae, next vnto the Mace­donians; and that in their thicke and close imbattailing; they failed not at this time of the forme of a phalanx: for they roofed it so thicke with targets, that Caesar saith they were sore troubled, because many of their targets were fastned and tied together, with piles darted through them: Which argueth that their phalanx was very thicke thronged, whatsoeuer their weapon was.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THe ancient sages found it necessary,Speeches of incourage­ment before they gaue battell. to a faithfull and serious exe­cution of such an action, to prepare the mindes of their men with wordes of encouragement, and to take away all scruple out of their conceites, either of the vnlawfulnesse of the cause, or disaduantage against the enemie: for if at anie time that saying be true, that oratio plus potest quam pecunia, it is here more powerfull and of greater effect. For a donatiue or liberanca, can but procure a mercenarie indeuour euer yeelding to a better of­fer, and doe oftentimes breede a suspicion of wrong, euen amongst those that are willingly enriched with them; and so maketh them flacke to discharge their seruice with loialtie: yea oftentimes of friendes to become enemies. But in as [Page 26] much as speech discloseth the secrets of the soule, and discouereth the intent and drift of euerie action, a few good wordes laying open the iniurie which is offered to innocencie, how equity is controlled with wrong, and iustice control­led by iniquitie (for it is necessarie that a commander approue his cause, and settle an opinion of right in the minde of his souldiers, as it is easie to make that seeme probable which so many offer to defend with their bloud, when indeed euerie man relieth vpon anothers knowledge, and respecteth nothing lesse the right) a few good words I say, will so stirre vp their mindes in the feruentnes of the cause, that euery man will take himselfe particularly ingaged in the action by the title of equity; and the rather for that it iumpeth with the necessitie of their condition. For men are willing to doe well, when weldoing agreeth with that they would doe, otherwise the Acte may formerly be effected, but the mind neuer approueth it by assent. And this maner of exhortation or speech of incou­ragement, was neuer omitted by Caesar in any conflict mentioned in this histo­rie: but he still vsed it as a necessarie instrument to set vertue on foote, and the only meanes to stirre vp alacrity: Or if it happened that his men were at any time discouraged by disaster or crosse accident,Lib. 7. de bello gallico. as they were at Gergobia, and at the two ouerthrowes he had at Dirrachium; he neuer would aduēture to giue battell vntill he had incouraged them againe, and confirmed their mindes in va­lour and resolution. But this age hath put on so scornfull a humor, that it cannot heare a speech in this key, sound it neuer so grauely, without scoffing and derisi­on: and on the other side discontinuance of so necessarie a part, hath bred at length such an inutilem pudorem in our chiefe commanders, that they had rather loose the gaine of a great aduantage, then buy it with wordes to be deliuered in publike.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN this Chapter we may further obserue the violence of the Roman pile,The Roman Pile described which being a heauie deadly weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectual against a phalanx, or any other thicke and close battell, or wheresoe­euer els, the stroke was certaine, or could hardly deceiue the aime of the caster: for in such incounters it so galled the enemy, that they were neither able to keepe their order, nor answere the assault with a resisting counterbuffe. By which it appeareth that the only remedie against the pile was, to make the rankes thin, allowing to euery souldier a large podisme or place to stand in, that so the stroke might of it selfe fall without hurt, or by foresight be preuented; as it shal plainly appeare by the sequell of this historie, which I will not omit to note, as the pla­ces shall offer themselues to the examination of this discourse. But as touching the pile, which is so often mentioned in the Roman historie, Polybius descri­beth it in this manner. A pile (saith he) is a casting weapon, the staffe whereof is almost 3 cubites long, and it hath palmarem diametrum, a hand breadth in thick­nesse. The staues were armed with an head of yron, equall in length to the staffe [Page 27] it selfe: But in that sort that halfe the head was fastened vp to the middle of the staffe, with plates of yron like the head of a Halbert: and the other halfe stucke out at the ende of the staffe like a pike, containing a fingers breadth in thicknes, and so decreasing lesse and lesse vnto the point which was barbed. This head was so slender toward the point, that the waight of the staffe would bend it as it stucke, as appeareth in this battell of the Heluetians. This weapon was peculiar to the Romans, and was called Pilum, as Varro noteth of Pilum a Pestell, quod Hostes feriret vt Pilum. Lib. 3. de mi­litia Romana. Lipsius finding that Palmarem diametrum, was too great a thicknesse to be managed by any mans hand, interpreteth it to be foure inches in circuit, if the staffe were either round or square, for they had of both sortes, and so he maketh it very manageable; but nothing answerable to the description giuen by Polybius either in forme or waight. Patricius in his Paralleli, maketh the staffe to haue palmarem diametrum in the butte end,Lib. 5. but the rest of the staffe he maketh to decrease taper wise, vnto the head of yron, where it hath the thick­nesse of a mans finger; and so it answereth both in forme and waight to a Pestell, as may be seene by the figure, and I take it to be the meaning of Polybius. Pa­tricius in that place setteth downe foure discommodities of the Pile. First a fu­rious and hoat spirited enemie will easily preuent the darting of the pile, with a nimble and speedie close: And so we read, that in the battell which Caesar had with Ariouistus, the Germans came so violently vpon them, that the souldiers cast away their piles, and betooke them to their swordes. And likewise in that worthy battell betweene Cateline and Marcus Petreius,Salust. they cast away their piles on either part. The second discommoditie was, that the piles being so hea­uie, could not be cast any distance, but were only seruiceable at hand. Thirdly, they could not be cast with any aime, or as they say point blanke: And lastly the souldiers were to take aduantage of ground backward when they threw them, which might easily disorder their troups, if they were not very wel experienced.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe last thing which I obserue in this speciality is, that the legionarie souldiers had no other offensiue weapon, but one pile or two at the most, and their swordes. By which it may be gathered, that all their victories came by buckling at handy-blowes, for they came alwaies so neare before they cast their pile, that they left themselues no more time then might conueniently serue them to drawe their swordes: neither would their armes of defence, which was compleat, besides a large target which they carri­ed on their left arme, suffer them to make any long pursuit, or continued chase whensoeuer a light armed enemie did make any speedy retrait, as will more plainly appeare by that which followeth.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

COncerning the ensignes of the Romans:The ensignes of the Romans we are to vnderstand that the chiefest ensigne of euerie legion was an Eagle, which alwaies attended vpon the Primipile or chiefe Centurion of the said legi­on. The ensigne of a maniple was, either a Hand or a Dragon, a woolfe or a Sphinx, as it appeareth (besides the testimonie of history) by the Columne of Traiane in Rome, wherein the ensignes are figured, with such pur­traitures: so that these ensignes, resembling the proportions of liuing creatures, had their fore partes alwaies caried that way which the legions were to march, or where they were to fight: and therefore in this historie, by the aspect and ca­rying of the ensignes, the front of the Armie was commonly noted: as in this [Page] [Page]

[Page] [Page 29] place it is said, that the ensignes of the first and second battell were carried to­wardes the hill, whither the Heluetians had made their retrait; and the ensignes of the third battell looked an other waie, towardes the Boij and Tulingi, which stood of the foot of the hill: By which is signified, how the legions were diuided to resist the brunt of the double incounter.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

COncerning the time of the daie:The diuision of their day. we are to vnderstand that the Ro­mans vsed not the same diuision of the daie as we commonly do: for they diuided their artificiall (which is the space betweene sunne ri­sing and setting) into 12 equall partes, which the Astronomers cal­led vnequall or planetarie houres. The first houre of the daie began alwaies at sunne rising; the sixt houre was alwaies high noone; and the twelfth houre was sunne setting. And as the day waxed longer or shorter, so these houres were ei­ther greater or lesse: neither did they agree with equall or equinoctiall houres, such as are now vsed, but only at the Acquinoctium: so that by this maner of rec­koning, ab hora septima ad vesperum, is meant the battell began about one of the clocke according to our Computation, and continued vntill the euening. The like we must vnderstand, throughout this whole historie, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.

THE OBSERVATION.

IF we consider the nature of the action, and looke into the true causes of their ouerthrow, as farre as the right sense of the historie shall direct our iudgment, we shall finde valour not to be wanting in the Helueti­ans, but rather superlatiuely abounding in the Romans. For that vehement opi­nion [Page 30] of their valiancie and manhood, which carried them out of the streights of the country, to seeke larger fortunes in other kingdomes, was not so abated with the losle of the fourth part of their Host at the riuer Arar; nor with the terrible furie of those veteran legions: but it yeelded this effect, which Caesar in his esti­mate of valour thought memorable, that for fiue houres space or more, there was not one man seene to haue turned his backe. Their manner of imbattai­ling, had not the Romans beene the enemy, was vnresistable: for being cast into a phalanx, which in the plaines of Asia had made Alexander the great and the Macedonians famous, they did as farre surpasse any other forme of imbat­tailing (supposing that the conueniencie of the place did fit that disposition) wherein the strength of the whol is deuided into many particulars, as the violēce of a great bodie exceedeth the force and motion of his partes, when it is diui­ded into smaller cantons. For as in a phalanx, many particular souldiers are by a close and compact order incorporated into one entire bodie: so their seueral vertues are gathered into one head, and are as partes vnited into one generall force, which easily swalloweth vp the ability of many other lesser quantities, into which a greater strength is equally diuided.

The aduantage of the place which they got by retrait, and the double charge wherewith they ingaged the Romans both in front and flanke, was able in an in­different conflict to haue made fortune fugitiue, and beare armes on their side; or at the least so to haue steemed the swelling tide of victorie, which carried the Romans so violently in the chase, that they might haue beene equall sharers in the honour of the daie: had it not flowed from an Ocean of valour, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, vntill it came to that height, which true valour and vnexampled resolution affected. And yet the height of this courage could not so alaie the heate of the Heluetians furie; but it brake foorth into dangerous flames, when they came to the place where their cariages were laide, and cost much bloud and many mens liues before they quitted the place: for they fought with that spirit and industry, as though they meant to make triall whether their fortune would proue no better in the night then it had done in the daie.

The ouerthrow of the Tigurine Canton at the riuer Arar, proceeded rather from want of good directions (which is the lesse to be maruelled at, considering they had no chiefe commander as we read of) then from any defect of valour: for the rules of militarie gouernment require especiall care in passing ouer a water;Periculum semper ab hostibus gra­uissimum su­stinet diuisus & inordinatus exercitus. for then especially an Armie is in greatest danger, when it is disordered and diuided. And therfore the Romans atchieued this victorie by the horrible vigilancie as Tully calleth it, of their commander: who alwaies watched oportu­nitates rei bene gerendae, as necessarie and speedie meanes to ouercome in all his warres.

THE OBSERVATION.

THe directions concerning their rendrie and returne, were very sound, and of good consequence. For first in that he commanded them to at­tend his comming in the place where they were, he tooke away al mo­tions [Page 32] of new trouble which often remoues might haue caused, by the oportu­nitie of some accident which might haue happened: assuring himselfe that their abode in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace which they made shew of; considering that the Lingones in whose territories they were, durst not for feare of Caesars displeasure, furnish thē with any necessaries in that extremity. Touching the security which the Ro­mans required of the loialty of such people as they conquered; their manner was, to take as hostages a sufficient number of the men children of the chiefest men of that nation, whose liues depended vpon their parentes fidelitie, and en­ded with the first suspicion of their rebellion: which custome besides the present good, promised the like or better security to the next age, when as those chil­dren by conuersation and acquaintance should be so affected to the Roman Empire, that returning to their owne country, their actions might rather tend to the aduancement thereof, then any way be preiudiciall to the same. And least the loue of liberty and freedome should preuaile more with them, then that affection which nature had inioyned them to beare to their children: he did what he could to take away the meanes and instruments of their rebellion, by causing them to deliuer vp such Armes and weapons as were there present: and so to become sutable to that petition of peace, which they had made. The sum of all is this. He corrected the insolencie of a furious people, & reduced them to a feeling of their owne madnes. He kept thē from sacking the possessions of ma­nie thousandes, in the continent of Gallia; and sent them backe againe to con­tinue their name and nation in the place, where they first inhabited; which con­tinueth vnto this day. And thus we see, that there is no humour so headstrong, nor so backt with strength of circumstances, but it may meete with a remedie to qualifie the insolencie thereof, and make it subiect to correction and control­ment.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN this relation, there are diuers points worthily recommended to the discretion of such, as are willing to be directed by other mens misaduentures. As first into what extremities ambition doth driue her thirstie fauourites, by suppressing the better faculties of the soule, & setting such vnbrideled motions on foot, as carrie men headlong into most desperate attempts: for as it had deserued commendation in either faction so to haue carried their emulation, that by their owne meanes and strength appli­ed [Page 34] to the rule of good gouernment, their authority might wholy haue swaied the inclinations of the weaker states; so was it most odious in the Sequani, to call in forraine forces to satisfie the appetite of their vntempered humor, and in the ende were accordingly rewarded. Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is, to make a stranger a stickler in a quarrell which ciuill dissention hath bro­ched, when the partie that called him in, shall not be as able to refuse his assi­stance vpon occasion, as he was willing to entertaine it for aduantage. Lastlie, the often discontents of these states shew the force of a present euill, which pos­sesseth so vehemently the powers of the soule, that any other calamity either al­ready past or yet to come, how great soeuer, seemeth tollerable and easie in re­gard of that smart which the present griefe inflicteth. So the Sequani chose ra­ther to captiuate their libertie to the Barbarisme of a sauage nation, then to in­dure the Hedui to take the hand of them: and againe, to make themselues vas­sals to the Romans, rather then indure the vsurping cruelty of the Germans: and finally (as the sequell of the historie will discouer) to hazard the losse of life and country, then to suffer the taxes and impositions of the Romans: So predomi­nant is the present euill in mens affections, and so it preuaileth at the seate of our iudgment.

THE OBSERVATION.

I Maie here take an occasion,The authori­tie of the Ro­man Generals to speake somewhat concerning the au­thoritie of the Roman Generals, which we see to be verie large, con­sidering that Caesar of himselfe, without any further leaue of the Se­nate and people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this histo­rie) did vndertake a warre of that consequence, and put in ieopardie the Legi­ons, the Prouince, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia. Wherein we are to vnderstand, that when the state of Rome did allot the gouernment of any Prouince to a Proconsull, they did likewise recommend vnto him the care­ful managing of such accidents, as might any way concerne the good of that re­giment. For considering that such causes as may trouble a well ordered gouern­ment, are as well external and forraine, as internall and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had beene to small purpose to haue giuen him onely autho­ritie, to maintaine a course of wholesome gouernment at home, and no meanes to take awaie such oppositions, which forraine accidentes might set vp against him: And so we see that Caesar vndertooke the Heluetian warre, in regard of the safetie of the Prouince: And this againe with Ariouistus, least the Germans should so multiplie in Gallia, that the Prouince it selfe might at length bee in­dangered. Neither had their Generals authoritie onely to vndertake these wars, but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to treat, capitulate, compound, or what els they thought conuenient for the ad­uancement of the common weale, did wholy rest vpon their direction: repub. bene gesta, being the stile of the warrant for all their actions. Neither may we thinke that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerfull in the course of businesses, as that which absolutely commandeth without control­ment, and proceedeth according to the oportunity of time and occasion, fur­ther then either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore when­soeuer the Roman affaires were distressed and driuen to an exigent, they created a Dictator that had regiam potestatem, such an absolute command, that whatsoe­uer power rested either in the Consuls, or in the Tribunes, in the Senate or in the people, it gaue waie to the greatnes of that magistrate; that there might be no let or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute command could establish, for the good of the common weale. And yet not­withstāding this absolute gouernment, they attributed such power to the course of humane actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted vpon dissolute and vnfortunate leaders, they seemed to acknowledge that no man, how circum­spect soeuer, could promise more then likelihoods or probabilities of good for­tune, as farre forth as his meanes and industrie could atchieue it.Liuie lib. 8. For olde M. Fabius, pleading for the life of his gallant sonne, and opposing the rigor of Papyrius the dictator with examples of antiquity, saith: Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem vnquam atrociorem fuisse in eos qui temeritate atque inscitia exercitus amisissent, quam vt pecunia eos multaret: ca­pite [Page 36] anquisitum ob rem male gestam de imperatore nullum ad eam diem esse. The people (saith he) in whome the soueraigne power of thinges consisteth, neuer shewed greater displeasure against such, as had lost an Armie either by rash­nesse or vnskilfulnesse, then imposing a fine vpon them: but to bring the life of a Generall in question for failing in his indeuours, was neuer heard of to that daie.

The condition of the inferiour officers of their campe, was farre otherwise in regard of militarie discipline: for prescription guided them in all their serui­ces, and the chiefest part of their duetie was obedience; although they saw eui­dent reason to the contrarie, & found their directions vnperfect in that behalfe: And therefore Caesar saith vpon that occasion:Lib. 3. de bello Ciuili. aliae sunt legati partes atque im­peratoris, alter omnia agere ad praescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consu­lere debet. The office of a legate or lieutenant, differeth from that of a gene­rall: The one doing all things by prescription; and the other freely deliberating of whatsoeuer may concerne the cause. And this course the Romans helde, con­cerning the authoritie of their Generals.

THE OBSERVATION.

ANd thus farre proceeded Caesar with Ariouistus, in debating the wronges and agreeuances of the Hedui: Wherin appeareth the dif­ference betweene a matter handled, according to morall ciuilitie in tearmes of mildnesse and pleasing accent, and that which is rudely deliuered, and dependeth rather vpon the plainnesse of the proiect, then suted with wordes fit for perswasion. For that which Ariouistus alleadged, to make good his interest in Gallia, was as consonant to reason, as any thing to the con­trarie vrged by Caesar. But as the Lacedemonian said of one, that he spake the truth otherwise then it should be spoken: so it may be said of Ariouistus answere, that it wanted that sweeting humanitie which giueth credit to veritie it selfe; for as much as it proceedeth from a well tempered spirit, wherein no turbulent passion seemeth to controll the force of reason, nor hinder the sentence of true iudgment; but rather seasoning her conceptions with humilitie, doth couertly complaine of open wrong, and strengthen her assertions with a pleasing deliue­rie. And therfore how great soeuer the controuersie be, that partie which ex­ceedeth not the boundes of modestie, but maketh mildnesse his chiefest aduo­cate, will so preuaile in any auditorie, that albeit equitie doth disallow her title; yet the maner of his cariage will cleare him from offering wrong, in that he v­seth the sequels of innocencie to proue his interest in that which he demandeth. But to leaue this circumstance, as only to be noted; let vs proceed to the war it selfe, which I made the second part of this historie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the speech it selfe are presented many specialities, both concer­ning their discipline and militarie instructions, which deserue exa­mination; amongst which I note first, the extraordinarie number admitted to the Councell, Omnium ordinum ad id concilium adhibitis Centurionibus: Whereas there were vsually no more admitted to their councell of warre but the Legates, Questor, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the first or­ders, which I vnderstand to be the first Hastate, the first Princeps, and the first Pi­lum of euery legion. And this is manifestly proued out of the fift Commentarie where Cicero was besieged by Ambiorix, in which amongst other there were two valiant Centurions, Pulfio, and Varenus: betweene whom there was euerie yeare great emulation for place of preferment, & iam primis ordinibus appropin­quabant, saith Caesar, that is, they had passed by degrees through the lower or­ders of the legion, and were very neare the dignitie of the first cohort, wherein as in all the rest there were 3 maniples, and in euerie maniple two orders.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe first motiue which he vseth to recall their exiled iudgment, dis­couered their breach of discipline: for contrarie to the course of militarie gouernment, they had presumed not only to make inqui­rie, but to giue out whither, and vpon what seruice they were cari­ed; which in the rigour of campe pollicie, could not passe without due punish­ment: for what can more contradict the fortunate successe of an expedition, then to suffer to be measured with the vulgar conceit? or waied in the ballance of such false iudgmentes? especially when those weake Censors are to be Ac­tors, and executioners of the dessigne: for then euerie man will sute the na­ture of the action according to his own humor, although his humor be led with blindnesse, and haue no other direction, then an vncertaine apprehension of profit or disaduantage. And in this case there cannot be a better president then nature hath prescribed: for as natural Agents, whilest they concurre to produce a worke of absolute perfection, neither know what they doe, nor can discerne the thinges they looke vpon; but yeeld themselues to be guided by a moderator [Page 44] of infinite knowledge: so ought a multitude to submit their abilitie to the di­rection of some wise and prudent captaine, that beholdeth the action in true honour; and balanceth the losse of many particulars, with the health and safetie of the publike good. For if euery man should prescribe, who should obay? Tam nescire quaedam milites, quam scire oportet, saith Otho in Tacitus vpon the like disorder: and againe, parendo potius quam imperia ducum sciscitando res militares continentur; which proueth that the greatest vertue which is required in a soul­dier is obedience, as a thing wherein the force of all discipline consisteth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

IN the reason which he vseth to proue their disparitie of valour,Whether men haue greater courage in their owne or in a strangers country. in regard of the Romans, being superiour to the Heluetians that had oftentimes ouerthrowen the Germans; he strengtheneth the argu­ment with the aduantage of the place, and saith that the Heluetians had put them to the worst, not onely where the Heluetians dwelt themselues; but euen in their owne country, and at home at their owne dores: as though an enemie were charged with greater furie in the presence of a mans own country and dearest friendes, then in a strange and vnknowne land. This question was handled in the Roman Senate, by Fabius Maximus, and Scipio surnamed A­fricanus, when they sate in counsell how to ridde their country of that subtile Carthaginian, that for sixteene yeares space had fretted like a canker the beau­tie of Italie, wasted the land and brought it to desolation: sacked their confede­rates, or alienated them from their duety, ouerthrowen their Armies, slaine their Consuls, and threatned their imperiall cittie with ruine and destruction. Fabius vpon the motion to make warre in Africke, thought it agreeable to na­ture, first to defend that which was their owne, before they attempted other mens possessions: when peace was established in Italy, then let warre be set on foot in Africke; and first let them be without feare themselues, before they went about to terrifie others: for those forces afforded little hope of victorie in ano­ther kingdome, that were not able to free their owne country from so dange­rous an enemie. Alcibiades ouerthrew the Athenian common weale with the like couusel: and concerning Hannibal, let them be sure of this, that they should finde him a sorer enemy in his owne country, then in an other kingdome. Sci­pio on the other side, caried on with the honour of so glorious an enterprise, wanted neither reasons nor examples to impugne Fabius his authoritie: for he shewed that Agathocles the Syracusian king, being a long time afflicted with the Punicke warre, auerted the Carthaginean from Cicily, by transporting his forces into Africke: but how powerfull it was to take awaie feare, by retorting danger vpon the oppressor, could there be a presenter example then Hanniball? There was great difference in the nature of the action, betweene the spoile and wast of a strangers country, and to see their owne natiue country wasted with sword and destruction: plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti, for he that inuadeth an others kingdome, easily discouereth both the aduantage which [Page 45] may be taken against the enemy, and the strength whereupon he resteth: And a­mongst the variable euents of warre, many vnexpected occasions arise which present victory to him that is ready to take it; and many strange chances so alter the course of thinges, that no foresight can discerne what may happen. With these and the like remonstrances, this question of no lesse doubt then impor­tance, was handled by two famous and worthy Captaines, whose mindes as it seemed, were intangled with such particular affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their owne humor, then to determine in sin­cerity of iudgment, vpon what specialities the truth was grounded, in the con­trariety of their positions. But to leaue other commodities or disaduantages, which are annexed vnto either part, I will only set downe some reasons to proue how valour and courage may either grow or be abated, by the accidents which rise in a warre of that nature. And first this cannot be denied, the testimonie of an vnfallible truth being grounded vpon the property of mans nature; that as aduantage bringeth hope of victorie, and hope conceiueth such spirites as vsu­ally follow, when the thing which is hoped for, is effected; and thereby the cou­rage becommeth hardie and resolute in victorie: so on the other side disaduan­tage and danger breede feare, and feare so checketh valour, and controlleth the spirits, that vertue and honor giue place to distrust, and yeelde vp their interest to such directors, as can afford nothing but diffidencie & irresolution: Neither can it be denied, but he that setteth vpon an enemie in a strange country, and so preuenteth such attemptes as might be made vpon his owne territories, hath that aduantage which giueth life vnto action, and steeleth his enterprise with resolution; for besides the commoditie of leauing when he list, and proceeding as far foorth as he shall finde his meanes able to fortunate his attemptes; hee knoweth that the strife and controuersie is not for his natiue country, which he quietly enioyeth, and is reserued at all times to entertaine him, howsoeuer for­tune shal fauour his dessignes: but for a strangers kingdome which his ambition thirsteth after; wherein for as much as the ritches and wealth of that state are laide before them as the recompence of their labour, besides the honour which is atchieued thereby, euerie mans valour soareth at a high pitch, and their cou­rage is increased without any trouble or disturbance of the other faculties of the minde. But when a Prince shall be assaulted in his owne kingdome, and in the sight of his subiectes haue his land consumed with ruine and destruction: the danger will so disturbe the powers of the soule, that through the turbulent dis­order of the weaker partes, the better faculties will lose their prerogatiue of ad­uising how the enemy may be best resisted; when as euery man shal apprehend the terrour of the danger, and few or none conceiue the true meanes to auoide it. And albeit the presence of such thinges as are dearest to his soule, as the pi­etie and respect of aged parents, the tender affection towards wife and children, are sufficient to raise valour to the highest point of resolution: yet the motiues are of such waight as will rather make them diffident of their owne worth as vn­sufficient to maintaine so great a cause, then hold them in that key which true honour affecteth: for as much as the terrour and feare of so great a danger will present a greater measure of woes to their minde, then the hope of victory [Page 46] can afforde them ioy. Hence therefore groweth the difference betweene him, that seeketh to maintaine that estate which he hath in possession by force of Armes; and an other, that seeketh to increase his meanes by valour. For the for­mer is presented with the danger of loosing all his estate, which affrighteth and troubleth, hauing no other reward propounded vnto him; and the other loo­keth vpon the aduantage, which he gaineth by ouercomming; which much in­creaseth his valour, without any losse or disaduantage, if he chance to be put to the worst. And therefore there is alwaies great ods betweene him that hath alrea­die lost his goods, and is by that meanes become desperate, hauing nothing fur­ther to loose; and another, that yet keepeth his substāce, but is in danger to loose it: for feare will so dismay his mind, that he will rather distrust his owne ability, then entertaine a resolution of valour. To proue this, we neede not seeke other examples, then those imperiall cities, in whose cause this controuersie was first moued. For when Hanniball was come into Italy and had defeated Semproni­us the Consull at Trebeas, the Romans were driuen into such an extasie of ter­rour, that they beleeued verely that the enemie was then comming to assault the citie; neither had they any hope or aid in themselues to keepe or defend the same. On the other side, Scipio was no sooner landed in Africke, but there was such a tumult in Carthage, as though the citie had been alreadie taken: neither could the opinion of victory, which Hanniball by a conquering Armie in Italy had confirmed for sixteene yeares together, preuaile in the apprehension of so imminent a danger: And then that which Fabius borowed of nature to teach the Romans (that first men ought to defend their own, before they seeke other mens possessions) was carefully followed by the Carthaginians: for with all speed they sent for Hanniball out of Italy, to be their Champion against young Scipio. If therfore other things be correspondent, as there are many other particularities concerning the power and strength of either nation to be considered, I take it much better for a Prince to inuade an enemie in his owne country, then to at­tend him at home in his owne kingdome.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

THe last circumstance which I note in this speech, was the trust which he reposed in the tenth legion, being in it selfe peraduenture as faul­tie as any other: wherein he shewed great arte and singular wisdome. For he that hath once offended and is both burthened with the guilt of conscience, and vpbraided with the reproch of men, can hardly be perswa­ded that his fault can bee purged with any satisfaction. And although the pu­nishment be remitted, yet the memorie of the fact will neuer be blotted out with any vertuous action; but still remaineth to cast dishonour vpon the offen­der, and to accuse him of disloialtie: And therefore it oftentimes happeneth, that an errour being once rashly committed, through despaire of remission ad­mitteth no true penitencie, but either draweth on more grieuous crimes, confir­ming that of the Poet, Scelere scelus luendum est; or maintaineth his errour by [Page 47] wilfull obstinacie: as it is saide of the Lyon that being found by hunters in a caue, will rather die in the place then quit it, for shame that he was found in so base a place of refuge; and therfore his propertie is thus expressed, ingrediendo caecus, exeundo proteruus. This did Caesar wisely preuent, by cleering the tenth legion of that, which he accused the rest of the Armie, which made them so much the more earnest to answere his expectation, in as much as they were wit­nes to themselues of a common errour: and the other legions, enuying at their fortune, resolued to shew as great alacrity in the sequell of the warre, and to de­serue more then the iudgment of the Emperour had imputed to their fellowes.

THE OBSERVATION.

IT may seeme strange vnto the soldiours of our time, that the footemen should bee mingled pell mell amongst the horsemen,Foote men in­termingled amongst horsemen. without hurte and disaduantage to themselues: so vnlikely it is that they shoulde either succour [Page 49] the horsemen in any danger, or annoy the enemy: and therefore some haue i­magined that these footmen in the incounter cast themselues into one bodie, and so charging the enemy assisted the horsemen. But the circumstances of this place, and of others which I wil alleage to this purpose, plainly euince that these footemen were mingled indifferently amongst the horsemen, to assist euery par­ticular man as his fortune and occasion required: and therfore the choise of these footemen, was permitted to the horsemen, in whose seruice they were to be imploied, that euery man might take his friend in whom he reposed greatest confidence: When they were ouercharged these stept in to helpe them; if anie man were wounded or vnhorsed he had his footeman ready to assist him; and when they were to go vpon any speedie seruice, or suddainly to retire vpon ad­uantage, they staied themselues vpon the maine of the horses with one hande, and so ran as fast as the horsemen could go: which seruices they could not pos­siblie haue performed without confusion and disorder, if the footemen had not seuerally attended vpon them, according to the affection specified in their par­ticular election. The principall vse of these footmen of the Germaines consis­ted in the aide of their owne horsemen vpon any necessity, not so much regar­ding their seruice vppon the enemie, as the assistance of their horsemen. But the Romains had long before practised the same Arte to a more effectuall pur­pose, namely as a principall remedy not onely to resist, but to defeat far greater troupes of horse, then the enemy was able to oppose against them. Wherof the most ancient memory which history mentioneth, is recorded by Liuie in the se­cond punicke war, at the siege of Capua, vnder the regiment of Quintus Fului­us the Consul: where it is said, that in all their conflicts, as the Romaine legions returned with the better; so their caualry was alwaies put to the worst: & therfore they inuented this means to make that good by Art which was wanting in force. Out of the whole army were taken the choisest young men, both for strength & agilitie, and to them were giuen little round bucklers, and seuen darts apeece in steed of their other weapons; these soldiours practised to ride behind the horse­men, and speedily to light from the horses at a watchword giuen, & so to charge the enemy on foot: And when by exercise they were made so expert that the no­uelty of the inuention no whit affrighted them, the Romaine horsemen went forth to incounter with the enemy, euery man carying his foot soldior behinde him, who at the encounter suddainly alightning charged vpon the enemy with such a fury, that they followed thē in slaughter to the gates of Capua: And hence saith Liuie grew the first institution of the Velites, which euer after that time were inrolled with the legions. The author of this strategem is said to be one Q. Nauius a Centurion, & was honorably rewarded by Fuluius the consull for the same. Salust, in the history of Iugurth, saieth, that Marius mingled the Velites with the Caualrie of the associates, vt quacunque inuaderent equitatus hostium propulsarent. The like practise was vsed by Caesar, as appeareth in the thirde booke of the Ciuill warre; sauing that insteed of the velites, hee mingled with his horsemen 400. of the lustiest of his legionarie soldiours, to resist the caualrie of Pompei, while the rest of his armie passed ouer the riuer Genusum, after the ouerthrow he had at Dirrachium, qui tantum profecere, saith the text; Vt eque­stri [Page 50] praelio commisso, pellerent omnes, complures interficerent, ipsique incolumes ad agmen se reciperent. Many other places might be recited, but these are sufficient to proue, that the greatest Captaines of auncient times strengthened their ca­ualrie with footemen dispersed amongst them.Lib. 6. The Romaine horsemen, (saith Polibius) at the first caried but a weake limber pole, or staffe, and a little round buckler;Lib. 3. de excid. but afterwards, they vsed the furniture of the Grecians, which Iosephus affirmeth to bee a strong launce or staffe, and three or foure dartes in a quiuer with a buckler, and a long sword by their right side. The vse of their launce was most effectuall when they charged in troupe, pouldron to pouldron; and that maner of fight afforded no meanes to intermingle footmen: but when they vsed their dartes, euerie man got what aduantage of ground he coulde, as our Car­bins for the most part do, and so the footemen might haue place among them: or otherwise, for so good an aduantage, they woulde easilie make place for the footmen to serue among them: But howsoeuer it was, it appeareth by this cir­cumstance howe little the Romaines feared troupes of horse, considering that the best meanes to defeate their horse was by their foote companies. But to make it more plaine, of many examples I will onely alleage two; the one out of Liuie,Lib. 3. to proue that the Romaine horsemen were not comparable for seruice to footemen:De bello A­fricano. the other out of Hirtius, to shewe the same effect against strangers, and Numidian horsemen, In the Consulships of L. Valerius, and Marcus Ho­ratius: Valerius hauing fortunatelie ouerthrowne the Equi and the Volsci, Horatius proceeded with as great courage in the warre against the Sabines, wherein it happened, that in the day of battell, the Sabines reserued 2000. of their men to giue a fresh assault vpon the lefte cornet of the Romaines, as they were in conflict, which tooke such effect, that the legionarie footemen of that cornet were forced to retreit. Which the Romaine horsemen beeing in number 600. perceiuing, and not being able with their horse to make head against the e­nemy; they presently forsooke their horses; and made haste to make good the place on foote; wherein they caried themselues so valiantly, that in a moment of time they gaue the like aduantage to their footemen, against the Sabines; and thē betooke themselues againe to their horses, to pursue the enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point. The Numidians, as Caesar witnesseth, were the best horsemen that euer hee met with, and vsed the same Arte as the Ger­maines did, mingling among them light armed footemen: an Ambuscado of these Numidians charging the legions vpon a suddaine, the history saieth, that primo impetu legionis Equitatus & leuis armatura hostium, nullo negotio, loco pulsa & deiecta est de colle. And as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged vpon the rerewarde of the armie, according to the manner of the Numidian fight; the historie saieth, Caesariani interim, non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani si se conuertissent & pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duorum millium ad vnum terga vertebant. So that to free himselfe of this inconuenience, he tooke his horsemen out of the rereward, and placed his legi­ons there, ita vim hostium per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat. And euer as he marched hee caused 300. soldiours of euerie legion to bee free and without burthen, that they might be ready vpon all occasions, Quos in Equi­tum [Page 51] Labieni immisit. Tum Labienus, conuersis equis, signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime contendit fugere, multis eius occisis, compluribus vulneratis, milites legio­narij ad sua se recipiunt signa, atque iter inceptum ire caeperunt. I alleage the verie wordes of the historie, to take awaie all suspicion of falsifying, or wresting anie thing to an affected opinion. If any man will looke into the reason of this dis­paritie, he shall finde it to be chiefely the worke of the Roman pile, an vnresista­ble weapon, and the terrour of horsemen, especially when they were cast with the aduantage of the place, and fell so thicke, that there was no meanes to auoid them.

But to make it plaine, that any light armed footmen could better make head against a troupe of horse, then the Caualry of their owne partie, although they bare but the same weapons: Let vs consider how nimble and readie they were, that fought on foote, either to take an aduantage, or to shunne and auoide anie danger; casting their darts with farre greater strength and more certaintie, then the horsemen could doe. For as the force of all the engines of olde time, as the Balistae, Catapultae and Tolenones, proceedeth from that stabilitie and resting Center, which nature affordeth as the onely strength and life of the engine; so what force soeuer a man maketh, must principally proceede from that firmenes & stay, which nature by the earth or some other vnmoueable rest, giueth to the body, from whence it taketh more or lesse strength, according to the violence which it performeth; as he that lifteth vp a waight from the ground, by so much treadeth heauier vpon the earth, by how much the thing is heauier then his bo­die. The footmen therfore, hauing a surer staie to counterpoise their forced mo­tion, then the horsemen had, cast their dartes with greater violence, and conse­quently with more certainty.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FIrst we may obserue what especiall importance, this manner of in­camping carried in that absolute discipline which the Romans ob­serued, and by which they conquered so many nations: for besides the safetie which it affoorded their own troupes, it serued for a hold well fenced and manned, or as it were a strong fortified towne in any part of the field, where they saw aduantage, and as oft as they thought it expedient, ei­ther to fortifie themselues, or impeach the enemie by cutting off his passages, hindering his attempts, blocking vp his campe, besides many other aduanta­ges, all auetring the saying of Domitius Corbulo: dolabra vincendum esse hostem: a thing long time neglected, but of late happely renewed by the commanders of such forces as serue the states in the vnited prouinces of Belgia: whom time and practise of the warres hath taught to entertaine the vse of the spade, and to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatsoeuer, which maie bee thought worthie executioners of the deedes of Armes.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN the second place we may obserue, that there was no nation so bar­barous (for I vnderstand the Germans to be as barbarous in regard of the motions of religion as any knowne nation of that time, being in a Climate so neare the North, that it afforded no contemplation at al) that could not make vse in their greatest affaires, of that superstition to which their minde was naturally inthralled; and forge prophesies and diuinations as well to stir vp as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might [Page 53] best serue to aduantage their proceedings. Neither did Caesar let slip the occa­sion of making vse of this their religion: for vnderstanding by their prisoners, that their diuinations forbad them to fight before the newe moone, he vsed all the meanes he could to prouoke them to battell; that their religious opinion of mischieuing might preiudice their resolution to returne conquerers: Which may serue to proue that a superstitious people are subiect to many inconueni­ences, which industry or fortune may discouer to their ouerthrow. It is recorded that Columbus, being Generall of some forces, which Ferdinando king of Ca­stile sent to discouer the west Indies, & suffering great penury for want of victu­als in the Ile of Iamaica: after that he had obserued how the Ilanders worship­ped the moone, and hauing knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen, he tolde the inhabitants that vnlesse they would furnish him with such necessaries as he wanted for the time, the wrath of their God should quickly ap­peare towardes them, by changing his bright shining face into obscuritie and darkenesse: which was no sooner happened, but the poore Indians, stroken with a superstitious feare of that which the course of nature required, kept nothing backe that might assist their enemies to depopulate, and ouer runne their owne countrie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THE Romaines euen from the infancie of their state were euer zea­lous admirers of true honour, and alwaies desired to beholde with the eye, to what measure of vertue euerie man had attained; that the toung with greater feruency of spirit might sounde out the celebrati­on of Macte virtute, which imported more honour then any wealth that could be heaped vpon them. Neither was this the least part of their wisedom, consi­dering that the most pretious things that are, loose much of their worth, if they be not suted with other correspondent natures, whose sympathie addeth much more excellencie then is discerned, when they appeare by themselues without such assistance. For how small is the beauty which nature hath giuen to the eie­pleasing diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificiall forme? or what per­fection can the forme giue without a foile to strengthten it? or what good is in either of them if the light doe not illuminate it? or what auaile all these where there wanteth an eye to admire it, a iudgement to value it, and an heart to im­brace it? such a vnion hath nature imprinted in the diuersitie of creatures con­curring to perfection, and especially in morall actions, in whose cariage there is a far greater exactnes of correspondency required to approue them honora­ble, then was requisite to make the iewell beautiful. And this did Caesar in all his battels; amongst the rest that at Alesia is particularly noted in this manner, Quod in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, neque recte aut turpiter factum celari poterat, vtrosque & laudis cupiditas & timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabat. And when Liuie would expresse how valiantly an action was caried, he saith no more but in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, which is as much to saie, that forasmuch as the Romaines were diligent obseruers of euerie mans worth, re­warding vertue with honor, and cowardice vvith reproch; euerie man bent his vvhole indeuour to deserue the good opinion of his Generall, by discharging that duty which he owed to the common wealth, with all loyalty and faithfulnes of spirit.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Romaines had foure formes of the front of their battell, the first was called Acies recta, when neither the cornets nor the battell was aduanced one before another, but were all caried in a right line, and made a straight front; and this was their most vsuall manner of im­battailing.

The second forme of the front was called obliqua, when as one of the cor­nets was aduanced neerer vnto the enemy then the rest, to beginne the battell: and this was commonly as Vegetius noteth, the right cornet: for the right cor­net of an army had great aduantage against the left of the enemies, in regarde [Page 55] of their weapons and furniture: But Caesar did it in this place, because hee per­ceiued that the enemy was weakest in that part; following a maxime of great authoritie, that the weakest part of an enemie is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an army: for so fauorable are mens iudgementes to that which is already happened, that the sequell of euery action dependeth for the most part vpon the beginning, Dimidium facti qui bene caepit habet, (saith a Poet) and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connexed to the sequel by the nature of a precedent cause, that the ende must needes erre from the common course, when it doth not participate of that qua­litie which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good ende without a good beginning: for although the beginning bee oftentimes disastrous and vnlucky, and the end fortunate and happie, yet before it came to that end there was a fortunate beginning: for the bad beginning was not the beginning of a good, but of an euill end. And therefore that his men might foresee a happy ende in a good beginning, it behooued him with the best of his armie to assault the weakest part of the enemy.

The third forme of the front is called Sinuata, when both the cornets are ad­uanced forward, and the battell standeth backwarde off from the enemy, after the fashion of a halfe moone. Scipio vsed it in Spaine, hauing obserued some daies before, that the enemy continually so disposed of the battell, that his best soldiours were alwaies in the midst; and therefore Scipio put all his old soldi­ours in the cornets, and brought them out first to charge vpon the weakest part of the enemy, that those might decide the controuersie, before the other that were in the midst could come to fight.

The last forme is called gibbosa or gibbera Acies, when the battel is aduanced, and the two cornets lag behinde. This forme did Haniball vse in the battell of Cannas, but with this Art, that he strengthened his two cornets with the best of his soldiours, and placed his weakest in the middest, that the Romaines follow­ing the retreit of the battell, which was easily repeld, might be inclosed on each side with the two cornets.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis phalanx here mentioned, can hardly be proued to be the right Macedonian Phalanx; but we are rather to vnderstand it to be so tearmed, by reason of the close and compact imbattailing, rather then in any other respect: and it resembled much a testudo, as I said of the Heluetian phalanx. Secondly, I obserue, that Caesar kept the olde rule concerning their discipline in fight: for although the name of Triaries be not mentioned in his historie; yet he omitted not the substance, which was, to haue primam, secundam, & tertiam Aciem; and that prima Acies should begin the battell, and the second should come fresh and assist them; or peraduenture if the enemie were many and strong, the first and second battell were ioyned to­gether, and so charged vpon the enemie with greater furie and violence: but at all aduentures, the third battell was euer in subsidio, as they tearmed it, to suc­cour any part that should be ouercharged; which was a thing of much conse­quence, and of great wisedome. For if we either respect the incouragement of the souldiers, or the casualtie of fortune; what could be more added to their dis­cipline in this behalfe, then to haue a second & a third succour, to giue strength to the fainting weaknes of their men, and to repaire the disaduantage which any [Page 57] accident should cast vpon them? or if their valour were equally balanced, and victorie stood doubtfull which of the two parties shee should honour, these al­waies stept in, being fresh, against wearie and ouer laboured spirits, and so drew victorie in despite of casualtie vnto themselues.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

COncerning vse of lots,The vse of lots. it shall not be amisse to looke into the nature of them, being in former times so generall, that there was no nation ciuill or barbarous, but were directed in their greatest affaires, by the sentence of lots. As we may not refuse for an vndoubted truth, that which Salomon saith the 16 of Prouerbs: The lots are cast into the lap: but the direction thereof belongeth to the Lord: Through the knowledge whereof, Iosua was directed to take Achan, the Mariners Ionas, and the Apostles, to con­secrate Matthias. So whether the heathen and barbarous people, whose blindnes in the way of truth could direct them no further then to sencelesse superstition, and put them in minde of a dutie which they owed; but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed: whether these I say, were perswaded that there was any supernaturall power in their lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of destenie, and as the Gods would haue it, it remaineth doubtfull. Ari­stotle the wisest of the heathen, concerning things naturall, nameth that euent casuall, or proceeding from fortune; of which the reason of man could assigne no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause: So that whatsoeuer happened in any action besides the intent of the agent and workeman, was tearmed an effect of fortune, or chance of habnab. For all other effects which depended vpon a certaine and definite cause, were necessarily produced; and therefore could not be casuall or subiect to the inconstancie of chance: And because manie and sun­drie such chances daily happened, which like terrae filij had no father, and could not be warranted, as lawfull children, either to nature or to reason, by the appea­rance of an efficient cause, they reduced them all to the power of fortune; as the principall efficient and soueraigne Motor of all such vnexpected euents, that is, they made nothing else the gouernesse, and directresse of many things: which af­terward grew to such credit amongst men, that it surpassed in dignity all naturall causes, and was deified with celestiall honour, as the Poet saith, Nos te facimus fortuna deam caeloque locamus. By the prouidence of this blinde goddesse which held her deity by the tenure of mens ignorance, were all casuall actions dire­cted, and especially lots; the euent whereof depended onely vpon her pleasure and decree: neither could their direction be assigned to any other power, for then their nature had been altered from chance to certainty, & the euent could not haue been called Sors, but must haue been reputed in the order of necessary effects, whereof discourse of reason acknowledgeth a certaine foregoing cause. Whereby we see vpon how weake an axletree, the greatest motions of the god­lesse world were turned, hauing irregularitie and vncertaintie, for the intelli­gentiae, that gouerned their reuolutions. All herein all sortes of men, (although in diuers respectes) rested as well contented, as if an Oracle had spoken vnto them, and reuealed the mysteries of fatall destinie.

[Page 58] Rome directed the maine course of her gouernment, by the fortune of this mocke destiny. For although their Consuls and Tribunes were elected by the people, who pleased their own fancie with the free choice of their commanders, and suted their obedience with a well liking authority: yet the publike affaires, which each Consull was seuerally to manage, was shared out by lots. For if an e­nemie were entered into their confines to depopulate and wast their territories, the lots assigned this Consull for the gouernment of the cittie; and the other to command the legions, and to manage the war. If forces were to be sent into di­uers prouinces and against seuerall enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could giue to either Consull his taske: but their peculiar charges were authori­sed by lots. If any extraordinarie action were to be done in the citie, as the dedi­cation of a temple, the sanctifying of the Capitoll after a pollution, Sors omnia versat, did all in all. And yet (notwithstanding the weake foundation of this pra­ctise in their Theologie & deepest diuinitie) we may not thinke but these skilfull Architectors of that absolute gouernment, wherein vertue ioyned with true wis­dome, to make an vnexampled patterne: we may not thinke I say, but they foresaw the manifold danger, which in the course of common actions could no otherway be preuented, but by the vse of lots. For when things are equally leue­led betweene diuers obiects, and run with indifferencie to equall stations, there must be some controlling power, to draw the current towardes one coast, and to appropriate it vnto one chanell, that the order of nature be not inuersed, nor a well established gouernmēt disturbed: So the state of Rome casting many things with equall charge vpon her two soueraigne magistrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better meanes could there be inuented to interesse the one in that office and to discharge the other, then to appoint an ar­biter, whose decree exceeded humane reason? Of which it could not be saide why it was so, but that it was so: for if the wisdome of the Senat had been called to counsell, or the voices of the people calculated to determine of the matter; it might easily haue burst out into ciuill discord, considering the often conten­tions between the Senat and the people, the factions of Clients, & the constant mutabilitie of euery mans priuate affections necessarily inclining vnto one, al­thogh their worth were equal & by true reason indiscernable; which might haue made the one proud of that which peraduenture he had not, and cast the other lower then would haue well beseemed his vertues: And therfore to cut off these, with many other inconueniences, they inuented lots; which without either rea­son or will might decide such controuersies. By this it appeareth how little the ancient law-makers respected the ground & reason of an ordinance, so the com­moditie were great, and the vse important to the good of the state: for as they saw the thing it selfe to be casuall, so they saw that casuall thinges are sometimes more necessarie, then demonstratiue conclusions: neither ought the nature, and speculatiue consideration of lawes and statutes, belong to the common people: but the execution and obedience thereof maketh the common weale flourish. And thus endeth the first Commentarie of Caesar his warre in Gallia.

THE OBSERVATION.

I Might heere take occasion to speake somwhat of a particular reuoult in a generall cause; and howe a confederate state may in regarde of their owne safetie forsake a common quarrell, or whatsoeuer the v­niuersall societie hath enacted preiudiciall to their common weale: but that I onely intende to discouer warlike practises, leauing these questions of lawe and policie to men of greater iudgement and better experience. Onlie I obserue in the behalfe of the Romaine gouernment, that such cities as yeelded to the Empire, and became tributarie to their treasury (howsoeuer they were o­therwise combined by confederacy) seldome or neuer repented them of their facte, in regard of the noble patronage which they found in that state, and of the due respect obserued towards them.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis rule of making triall of the worth of an enemy, hath alwaies been obserued by prudent and graue commanders, as the surest principle whereon the true iudgment of the euent may be grounded. For if the doctrine of the old Philosophers, which teacheth that the worde non putabam was neuer heard out of a wise mās mouth, haue any place in the course of humane actions, it ought especiallie to be regarded in managing these main points, whereon the state of kingdomes and empires dependeth. For vnlesse we be persuaded that blind chance directeth the course of this worlde vvith an vncertaine confusion, and that no foresight can swaie the balance of our hap into either part of our fortune; I see no reason why we should not by al meanes indeuor to grounde our knowledge vpon true causes, and leuel our proceedings to that certainty which riseth from the things thēselues. And this is the rather to be vrged, inasmuch as our leaders are oftentimes deceiued when they look no further then to match an enemy vvith equalitie of number, referring their va­lour to bee tried in the battell; not considering that the eye of it selfe cannot [Page 62] discerne the difference betweene two champions of like presence and outward cariage, vnlesse it see their strength compared together and waied as it were in the scale of triall: which Caesar omitted not diligently to obserue, before he would aduenture the hazard of battell. For besides his owne satisfaction, it gaue great incouragement to his men, when they sawe themselues able to counter­match an enemie, and knew their taske to be subiect to their strength: Neither did he obserue it onely at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for we finde that he neuer incountered any enemie, but with sufficient power, either in number or in valour to make head against them: which equality of strength, being first laide as a sure foundation, he vsed his owne industrie and skill, and the discipline wherein his men were trained, as aduantages to ouer­sway his aduersarie: and so drew victorie maugre fortune vnto himselfe, and sel­dome failed in any of his battels.

OBSERVATION.

IF it be demaunded, why Caesar did passe his Armie ouer the riuer, leauing it on his backe; and did not rather attend the enemie on the other side, and so take the aduantage of hindering him, if he should attempt to passe ouer? I will set downe the reasons in the sequell of this warre, as the occurrences shall fall out to make them more euident. In the meane time let vs enter into the particularitie of these sixe cohortes, that wee maie the better iudge of such troupes which were imploied in the seruices of this warre: but that wee may the better coniecture what number of souldiers [Page 63] these sixe cohortes did containe, it seemeth expedient, a little to discourse of the companies and regiments, which the Romans vsed in their Armies.

And first we are to vnderstand,A legion what it was. Lib. 4. De vita Ro­muli. that the greatest and chiefest regiment in a Roman Armie, was tearmed by the name of Legio: as Varro saith, quod legun­tur milites in delectu: or as Plutarch speaketh, quod lecti ex omnibus essent mili­tares; so that it taketh the name Legio of the choise and selecting of the soldiers. Romulus is said to be the first author & founder of these legions, making euerie legion to containe 3000 soldiers: but shortly after they were augmented, as Fe­stus recordeth vnto 4000: and afterward againe from 4000 to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion vntill Hanniball came into Italie,Liu. lib. 22. and then it was augmented to 5000, but that proportion continued onely for that time. And againe, when Scipio went into Africke, the legions were increased to 6200 footmen, and 300 horse. And shortly after the Macedonian warre, the legions that continued in Macedonie to keepe the Prouince from rebellion, consisted of 6000 footmen and 300 horse. Out of Caesar it cannot be gathered, that a legion in his time did exceede the number of 5000 men; but oftentimes it was short of that number: for he himselfe saith, that in this warre in Gallia his soldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3 of the ciuill war, where he saith, that in Pompei his Armie were 110 cohorts, which amounted to the nūber of 55000 men: And being manifest as well by these number of cohortes, as by the testimonie of di­uers authors, that Pompei his Army consisted of 11 legions; if we deuide 55000 into 11 partes, we shall finde a legion to consist of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout, being generally knowne to be the vsuall rate of a legion, the Ro­mans alwaies expressed the strength of their Armie by the number of legions that were therein: as in this warre it is said, that Caesar had eight legions, which by this account might arise to 40000 men, besides associates, and such as neces­sarily attended the Armie. Further we are to vnderstand, that euery legion had his peculiar name, by which it was knowne and distinguished from the rest, and that it tooke either from their order of muster, or inrolment; as that legion which was first inrolled, was called the first legion; and that which was second in choice, the second legion; and so consequently of the rest; and so we reade in this historie, the seuenth, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleuenth and twelfth legion: or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of legiones Germanicae, Panonicae, Britannicae, and such others; and sometime of their Generall, as Augusta, Claudia, Vitellianae, legiones, and so forth. Or to conclude, from some accident or qualitie,Tacitus 3. hist. as Rapax, Victrix, Fulminifera and such like. And this much of the name and number of a legion, which I must necessarilie distinguish into diuers kindes of souldiers, according to the first institution of the olde Romans, and the continuall obseruation thereof vnto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of these smaller partes, whereof a legi­on was compounded.

First therefore we are to vnderstand, that after the Consuls had made a gene­nerall choise and sworne the souldiers,Velites. the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of Velites. Their place [Page 64] in regard of the other souldiers was both base & dishonorable: not only because they fought a farre off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the enemy, as our forelorne hopes are. Hauing chosen out a competent number for this kinde, they proceeded to the choise of them which they called Hastati,Hastati. a degree aboue the Velites, both in age and wealth, and tearmed them by the name of Hastati; forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of Iauelin, which the Romaines called Hasta: but be­fore Polybius his time they vsed Piles; notwithstanding their ancient name con­tinued vnto the latter time of the Empire.Principes. The third choise which they made was of the strongest and lustiest bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called Principes; the rest that remained were named Triarij, as Varro saith, Quod tertio ordine extremis subsidio deponuntur: These were alwaies the eldest and best experienced men, and were placed in the third diuision of the battell, as the last helpe and refuge in all extremity.Lib. 6. Polybius saith, that in his time the Velites, Hastati, and Principes, did consist of 1200 men a peece; and the Tri­arij neuer exceeded the number of 600. although the generall number of a le­gion were augmented:Lib. 1. de mil. Rom. whereof Lypsius allegeth these reasons. First bicause these Triarij consisted of the best of the soldiors, and so might counteruaile a greater number in good worth and valour. Secondly, it seldome came to buckle with the enemy, but when the controuersie grewe very doubtfull. Lastly, wee may well coniecture that the voluntaries and extraordinarie folowers, ranged them­selues amongst these Triaries, and so made the third battel equal to either of the former; but howsoeuer, they neuer exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth, that in Polybius his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.

In this diuision of their men consisted the ground of that well ordered dis­cipline; for in that they distinguished them according to their yeeres and abili­tie, they reduced their whole strength into seueral classes; & so disposed of these different parts,The vse of this diuision. that in the generall cōposition of their whole bodie euery part might be fitted with place and office, according as his worth vvas answerable to the same: & so they made not only a number in grosse, but a number distinct by parts and properties, that from euery accident which met with any part of the armie, the iudgement might determine how much or howe little it imported the whole bodie: besides the great vse vvhich they made of this distinction in their degrees of honour and preferment; a matter of no smal consequence, in the excellencie of their gouernment.

The soldiours,The distincti­on of their companies. Manipuli. at their inrolement beeing thus deuided according to their yeeres and abilitie, they then reduced them into smaller companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they deuided the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, each of them into 10 companies, making of those 3. sortes of sol­diours 30. small regiments, vvhich they called Manipuli: And againe, they sub­deuided euerie maniple into two equall parts,Ordo. and called them Ordo, vvhich was the least companie in a legion; and according to the rate set down by Polybius, contained 60. soldiours. In euerie Ordo there was a Centurion, or Captaine, and a Lieuetenant, whom they named Optio or Tergiductor. The maniples of the Triarii were much lesser then the maniples of either the Hastati or the Prin­cipes; [Page 65] for as much as their whole band consisted but of 600. men. The Velites were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the o­ther Maniples; and therefore the Hastati, Principes, and Triarij were called sub­signanos milites, to make a difference between them and the Velites, which were not deuided into bandes; and so consequently had no ensigne of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies: so that euery Maniple had 40. Velites attending vpon it. And now I come to the description of a cohort, which the history heere mentioneth.

The worde Cohors in latine doth signifie that part of grounde which is com­monly inclosed before the gate of a house,Cohors. Lib. 3. de re rust. which from the same word we call a court: and Varro giueth this reason of the metaphor. As in a farme house, saith he, many out-buildings ioined together make one inclosure; so a cohort consis­teth of seuerall maniples ioined together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for euerie legion had ten cohorts, which must necessarily com­prehend those thirty maniples: but these 3. maniples were not al of one and the same kind of soldiors, as three maniples of the Hastati, 3. of the Principes, and 3. of the Triarij, as Patricius in his Paralleli seemeth to affirme; for so there would haue remained an odde maniple in euery kind, that could not haue been brought into any cohort: But a cohort contained a maniple of the Hastati, a maniple of the Principes, and a maniple of the Triarij; and so al the 30. maniples were included into 10. cohorts; & euery cohort was as a little legion; forasmuch as it consisted of al those sortes of soldiours that were in a legion. So that ma­king a legion to containe 5000. men; a cohort had 500. and so these 6. cohorts, which he incamped on the other side of the riuer, vnder the command of Titu­rius Sabinus, contayned 3000. soldiours: but if you make a legion to consist but of 4200. which was the more vsuall rate, there were 2520. soldiours in these sixe cohortes.

By this therefore it may appeare, that a legion consisted of foure sorts of sol­diours, which were reduced into ten cohorts, and euery cohort contained 3. ma­niples; & euery maniple 2. orders; and euery order had his Centurion marching in the head of the troupe; and euery Centurion had his optionem, or Lieutenāt, that stood in the taile of the troupe.

When a legion stoode ranged in battell ready to confront the enemy,Alegion ran­ged in battell. the least body or squadron that it contained was a maniple; wherein the two orders were ioined together, making iointly ten in front, and twelue in file: and so eue­rie fiue files had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rereward, to direct them in all aduentures. In the time of the Emperours, their battai­lions consisted of a cohort, and neuer exceeded that number how great soeuer the army were.

Polybius distinguishing a maniple into two centuries or orders,The first order saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right order, which was that order which stoode on the right hand, knowne by the name of Primus ordo: and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left or­der; and in the absence of either of them, hee that was present of them two, commaunded the whole maniple. And so wee finde that the Centurion of the [Page 66] first place was called Prior Centurio: in which sense Caesar is to be vnderstood, where hee saith,3. De bello ciuili. that all the Centurions of the first cohorte were slaine, praeter principem priorem. From whence we gather two specialities, first; the prioritie betweene the Centurions of the same maniple: for a cohorte consisting of 3. maniples, vvhereof the first maniple vvere Triarij, the second Principes, and the thirde Hastati; and euerie maniple containing two orders; and euerie order a Centurion: he saith, that all the Centurions of this cohort vvere slaine; sauing the first or vpper Centurion of the Principes.Prima cohors The second thing vvhich I ob­serue, is the title of the first cohort: for these 10. cohortes, vvhereof a legion consisted, vvere distinguished by degrees of worthinesse; and that vvhich vvas held the vvorthiest in the censure of the Electors, tooke the prioritie both of place and name, and vvas called the first cohort: the next, the second cohort; & so consequently vnto the tenth and last.

Neither did the legions want their degrees of preheminēce, both in imbattai­ling & in incāping, according either to the seniority of their inrolement, or their fauor of their General, or their own vertue: And so we read that in these vvars in Gallia, the tenth legion had the first place in Caesars army. And thus much concerning the diuisions, and seuerall companies of a legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.

Vpon this description it shall not be amisse, briefelie to laie open the most apparant commodities depending vpon this discipline;The benefit of this discipline the excellency vvhere­of more plainely appeareth, bein compared to that order, vvhich nature hath obserued in the frame of her vvorthiest creatures: for it is euident, that such workes of nature come neerest to perfect excellencie, vvhose material sub­stance is most particularlie distinguished into parts, and hath euery part indued vvith that propertie, which best agreeth to his peculiar seruice. For beeing thus furnished with diuersitie of instruments, and these directed vvith fitting a­bilities; the creature must needs expresse many admirable effects, and discouer the vvorth of an excellent nature: vvhereas those other bodies, that are but slen­derly laboured, and find lesse fauour in natures forge, being as abortiues, or bar­barously composed, vvanting the diuersitie both of partes and faculties; are no vvay capable of such excellent vses, nor fit for such distinct seruices, as the for­mer that are directed vvith so many properties, and inabled vvith the power of so wel distinguished faculties. Which better works of nature the Romains imitated in the Architecture of their army, deuiding it into such necessary & seruiceable partes, as were best fitting all vses and imploiments: as first into legions, and le­gions into cohorts, and cohorts into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and these into files; wherein euery man knewe his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion. And thus the vniuersall multitude was by order disposed into partes, vntill it came vnto a vnitie: for it cannot bee denied, but that these centuries were in themselues so sensiblie distinguished, that euerie Soldiour caried in his minde the particular Mappe of his whole centurie: for in imbtttailing, euerie centurie was disposed into 5. files, con­tayning twelue in a file, whereof the leaders were alwayes certaine, and neuer changed but by death or some other especiall occasion: and euerie [Page 67] leader knew his follower, and euerie second knewe the third man, and so conse­quently vnto the last.

Vpon these particularities it plainly appeareth, how easie a matter it was, to reduce their troupes into any order of a march or a battell, to make the front the flanke, or flanke front, when they were broken and disrankt to rallie them into any forme, when euery man knew both his owne and his fellowes station. If any companies were to be imploied vpon sudden seruice, the generall Idea of the Armie being so deepely imprinted in the minde of the commanders, would not suffer them to erre in taking out such conuenient troupes, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safetie of the Armie, or nature of the action: At all occasions and oportunities, these principles of aduantage offe­red themselues, as readie meanes, to put in execution any dessigne, or strata­gem whatsoeuer; the proiect was no sooner resolued of, but euerie man could readily point out the companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important, in regard of the life and spirit of euerie such part, their sodalitie was sweetned, or rather strengthened with the mutuall acquain­tance, and friendshippe one of another, the captaine marching alwaies in the head of the troupe, the ensigne in the middest, and the lieutenant in the rere­ward, and euerie man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend; which bred a true and vnfained courage, both in regard of themselues, and of their followers. Besides these specialities, the places of title and dignity depending vpon this order, were no small meanes to cutte off all matter of ciuill discorde, and intestine dissention: for here euerie man knew his place in the file, and eue­rie file knewe his place in the Centurie, and euerie Centurie in the Maniple, and euerie Maniple in the Cohort, and euerie Cohort in the Legion, and eue­rie Legion in the Armie; and so euerie souldier had his place, according to his vertue; and euerie place gaue honour to the man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The vvant of this discipline hath dishonoured the martiall gouernment of this age, with bloudshed and murthers; whereof France is too true a wit­nesse, as well in regard of the French themselues, as of our English forces that haue beene sent thither to appease their tumults: for through defect of this or­der, which allotteth to euerie man his due place, the controuersie grew between Sir William Drurie and Sir Iohn Bowrowes, the issue whereof is too well known to the world: wherein as our commanders in France haue been negligent, so I may not forget to giue due commēdation to the care which is had of this point amongst the English troups, in the seruice of the states in the vnited prouinces, where they are very curious in appointing euerie man his place in the file, and euerie file in the troupe, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reuiuing the Roman discipline.

To conclude this point,The benefit of small battailions: and the disaduantage of great squadrons▪ I will onely touch in a word the benefite, which the Romans found in their small battailions, and the disaduantage, which we haue in making great squadrons. And first it cannot be denied, but that such troupes stand best appointed for disposition and array of battell, which standing strong to receiue a shocke, bring most men to fight with the enemie: for the principall [Page 68] thinges which are required in setting of a battell, are so to order the troupes, that the depth in flanke may serue conueniently to withstand the assault, taking vp no more men then may well serue for that purpose; and giuing meanes to the rest to fight with the enemie; and in these two points, were both their defensiue and offensiue considerations comprehended. But smaller troupes and battailons af­forde this conueniencie better then great squadrons, which drowne vp manie able men in the depth of their flankes, and neuer suffer them to appeare, but when the breaking of the squadron doth present them to the butcherie of the e­nemie. The Macedonian Phalanx, as I haue noted in the first booke, neuer ca­ried aboue 16 in flanke, and brought 500 to fight in front. And these little bat­tailons (considering them as they stood in battell ray) made as great a front or greater, then that of the Phalanx, keeping a depth answerable to the same; be­sides the 2 and 3 battell, which alwaies were to succour them, which the Phalanx wanted: neither would their thicke and close imbattailing admit any such suc­cour behind them. Now if we cōpare the aduantages & discommodities, which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great ods betweene them. These great squadrons are not faisable, but in plaine and open places, where they may either stand immoueable, or make easie and slow moti­ons without shaking, or disordering their bodie: but the lesser are a scantling for all places, champion or wooddie, leuell or vneuen, or of what site or quality soeuer. And to conclude, if two or three rankes of these great battailons chance to be broken and disordered, the whole body is as much interessed in the disor­der, as the said rankes are; and hath lesse meanes to rally it selfe, then any other lesser companie: but if any violence chance to rout a maniple, it proceedeth no further in the Armie, then that part which it taketh: Neither can the disranking of any one part, betraie the safetie of the Armie to disorder and confusion; for as much as their distinction serued to cut off such inconueniences, and yet no waie hindered the generall vniting of their strength into one body. More may be said concerning this matter, but I onely point at it, and leaue the due consi­deration thereof, to the iudgment of our commanders, & returne to our history.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the description of their assault, we are to obserue two circumstan­ces: The first is,To take a towne by sur­prise. the manner they vsed in a sudden surprise: The second is, the forme and quality of a Testudo. Although Caesar seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a towne, as peculiar, to the Galles; yet wee maie not thinke but that the Romans vsed it, as often as they had occasion to surprise any cittie: but because the Galles knew no other means to take a towne but this, therefore he setteth it downe as peculiar vnto them. The Romans cal­led this manner of assault Corona; and so we read oftentimes this phrase, Cinge­re vrbem corona: for as much as the souldiers inclosed the towne with a circle, and so resembled a crowne or garland. Ammianus speaketh of a triple crown of souldiers, which incompased a towne: And Iosephus telleth of Iotapatam, which the Romans besieged duplici peditum corona: and besides these, there was a third circle of horsemen vtmost of all. There is no further matter to be obser­ued but this, that in surprising a towne, they incircled it round about with thick continued rankes of men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they en­tered as they could.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Testudo requireth a larger discourse,A Testudo described. Lib. 44. and is liuely described in Liuie, after this manner. In the Amphitheater, where the people did often assemble to see strange sightes and publike shewes, were brought in (saith he) 60 Iustie young men, who after some motion, and seemely march, cast themselues into a square troupe, & roofing their heads close with their targets, the first ranke which made the front of the Testudo, stood vpright on their feete; the second ranke bowed it selfe somewhat lower; [Page 70] the third and fourth rankes did more incline themselues, and so consequent­lie vnto the last ranke, which kneeled on the ground, and so they made a bodie resembling halfe the side of an house, which they called Testudo. Vnto this squadron thus strongly combined togither, came two soldiours running some fiftie foot off, and threatning each other with their weapons, ran nimbly vp the side of the roofe; and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemy, that would haue entred vpon it; sometimes againe incountering each other in the midst of it, leaped vp and downe as steddily as if they had been vp­on firme ground. And which is more strange, the front of a Testudo being ap­plied to the side of a wall, there ascended many armed men vpon the said Testu­do, and fought in an equall height with other soldiors, that stood vpon the said wal to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the soldiors that were in front, and in the sides of the square, caried not their Targets ouer their heads, as the other did; but couered their bodies with them, and so no wea­pons either cast from the wall, or otherwise throwne against it, coulde any waie hurt them; and whatsoeuer waight fell vppon the Testudo, it quicklie glided downe by the decliuitie of the roofe, without anie hurte or annoyance at all.

Thus far Liuie goeth, neither doe I know what to saie further of it: the chie­fest vse thereof was in a surprise or suddaine attempt against a towne, before the townes men were throughly prepared to defend the same. This inuention ser­ued them to approach the wall with safetie, and so either to vndermine it, or to clime vp: and to that ende they oftentimes erected one Testudo vpon another. Tacitus saith, that the soldiours climed vppon the wall, super iteratam testudi­nem, by one Testudo made vpon an other; and this was the ancient forme and vse of a Testudo in a suddain assault or surprise.

Dio Cassius in the actes of Anthonie,Lib. 49. saieth, that beeing galled with the Parthian Archers, hee commanded his whole armie to put it selfe in­to a Testudo, which was so strange a sight to the Parthians, that they thought the Romaines hadde sunke downe for wearinesse and faintnesse; and so forsaking their horse, drewe their swordes to haue made execution: and then the Romaines at a watch-worde giuen, rose againe with such a fu­rie, that they put them all to sworde and flight. Dio describeth the saide Testudo after this manner, They placed, saieth hee, their baggage, their light armed men and their horsemen, in the middest; and those heauie ar­med footemen that caried long gutter-tiled Targettes, were in the vtmost circles nexte vnto the enemie; the reste which bare large Ouall Targettes were thronged togither throughout the whole troupe, and so couered with their Targets both themselues and their fellowes, that there was nothing discer­ned by the enemy but a roofe of Targets, which were so tiled togither, that men might safely go vpon them.

Further, wee oftentimes reade, that the Romaines cast themselues into a Testudo, to breake through an enemy, or to route and disranke a troupe. And this vse the Romaines had of a Testudo in field seruices, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a Testudo, in regarde of the strength, for that it [Page 71] couered and sheltred, as a shell couereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a Testudo.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THirdly we may obserue,The necessitie of good disco­uerie. how carefully Caesar prouided for the safe­tie of such succours, as he sent vnto Bibrax: for hee commanded the same messengers to direct them that came from the towne, as the best and surest guides in that iourney, least peraduenture through ig­norance of the way, they might fall into inconueniences or dangers: a matter of no small consequence in managing a warre, but deserueth an extraordinarie importunitie, to persuade the necessitie of this diligence. For a Generall that hath perfectlie discouered the nature of the countrey, through which he is to march, and knoweth the true distances of places, the qualitie of the waies, the compendiousnesse of turnings, the nature of the hils and the course of the ri­uers, hath all these particularities as maine aduantages, to giue meanes of so many seuerall attempts vpon an enemy: And in this point Hanniball had a sin­gular dexterity, and excelled all the commanders of his time in making vse of the way, by which he was to passe. But he that leadeth an army, by an vnknown and vndiscouered way, and marcheth blindfold vpon vncertaine aduentures, is subiect to as many casualties and disaduantages, as the other hath opportuni­tie of good fortune. Let euery man therefore persuade himselfe, that good disco­uerers are as the eyes of an army, and serue for lights in the darkenesse of igno­rance, to direct the resolutions of good prouidence, and make the path of sa­fetie so manifest, that we neede not stumble vpon casualties. Caesar in his iour­ney to Ariouistus vsed the helpe of Diuitiacus the Heduan, in whome amongst all the Galles, he reposed greatest confidence to discouer the waie, and acquaint him with the passages; and before hee would vndertake his voyage vntoNow Eng­land. Bri­tanie, he well enformed himselfe by marchants and trauailers, of the quantity of the Iland, the quality of the people, their vse of warre, and the oportunitie of their hauens: Neither was he satisfied with their relations, but hee sent Cai­us Volusenus in a ship of warre, to see what hee could further discouer, con­cerning these points. Suetonius addeth moreouer, that hee neuer caried his army, per insidiosa itinera, vnlesse he had first well discouered the places.

Concerning the order, which skilfull leaders haue obserued in discoueries,The order which is to be obserued in discouery. we are to knowe that this point consisteth of two partes: the one in vnderstan­ding the perfect description of the countrey; and the second in obseruing the motions of the enemy. Touching the first, we finde as well by this as other hi­stories, that the Romains vsed the inhabitants of the country for guides, as best acquainted with their natiue places, that they might not erre in so important a matter; prouided alwaies, that their owne scoutes were euer abroad to vnder­stand what they could of themselues, that they might not altogither relie vpon a strangers direction. The motions of the enemy were obserued by the horse­men, and these for the most part were Veterani, well experienced in the matter [Page 72] of warre, and so the generall receiued sound aduertisements: and yet they were not too forward vpon any new motion, vnlesse they found it confirmed by di­uers waies: for some espials may erre, either through passion or affection, as it happened in the Heluetian warre. If therefore the vse and benefit, which pru­dent and wise commanders made of this diligence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought vpon the ignorant, haue any authoritie to per­swade a circumspect care herein, this little that hath beene spoken may be suffi­cient, for this point.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

THe souldiers which Caesar sent to relieue Bibrax,Slingers with their arte and vse. were Archers of Creta and Numidia, and slingers of the Iles Baleares, which are now called Maiorica, and Minorica: which kinde of weapon, because it seemeth ridiculous to the souldiers of these times, whose conceites are held vp with the furie of these fierie engines; I will in briefe discouer the na­ture and vse of this weapon.

The Latines (saith Isodore) called this weapon funda: quod ex ea fundantur lapides. Plinie attributeth the inuention thereof to the Insulairs called Baleares. Florus in his third booke and eighth chapter, saith, that these Baleares vsed three sortes of slinges, and no other weapon besides: for a boy had neuer any meate giuen him, before he had first strooke it, with a sling. Strabo distinguisheth these three sortes of slings, which the Baleares vsed; and saith that they had one sling with long raines, which they vsed when they would cast a farre off: and another with short raines, which they vsed neere at hand: and the third with raines of a meane sise, to cast a reasonable distance. Lipsius saith, that in Columna Antoni­na at Rome, he obserued that the Balearean was made with one sling about his head, another about his bellie, and the third in his hand; which might be their ordinarie manner of carrying them. The matter whereof they were made was threefold, the first was hempe or cotton, the second haire, and the third sinewes: for of either of these stuffes, they commonly made them: the forme and fashion of a sling resembled a platted rope, somewhat broade in the middest, with an Ouall compasse; and so by little and little decreasing into two thongs or raines. Their manner of slinging was to whirle it twise or thrise about their head, and so to cast out the bullet. Virgill speaking of Mezentius saith, ‘Ipse ter adducta circum caput egit habena.’ But Vegetius preferreth that skill, which cast the bullet with once turning it a­bout the head. In Suidas we find, that these Baleares did commonly cast a stone of a pound waight, which agreeth to these dames in Caesar, fundas, librales. The leaden bullets are mentioned by Salust, in the warre with Iugurth; and by Li­uie, where he saith, that the Consull prouided great store of arrowes, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in request amongst diuers nations, as well in regard of the readines, & easie reiterating of the blow, as also for that the bullet fledde verie farre, with great violence: the distance [Page 73] which they could easily reach with their sling, is expressed in this verse, ‘Fundum Varro vocat, quem possis mittere funda.’ Which Vegetius interpreteth to be 600 foote:Lib. 2. Their violence vvas such, as the same author affirmeth in his first booke and sixteenth chapter, that neither hel­met, gaberdine, nor corselet could beare out the blow; but he that was hit with a sling, was slaine sine inuidia sanguinis, as he saith in the same place. Lucrece, Ouid, and Lucan, three of the Latine Poets saie, that a bullet skilfully cast out of a sling,Lib. 2. natu: questions. went with such violence that it melted as it flew: vvhereof Sene­ca giueth this reason, motion (saith he) doth extenuate the aire, and that exte­nuation or subtilitie doth inflame: and so a bullet cast out of a sling melteth as it flieth. But howsoeuer, Diodorus Siculus affirmeth, that these Balearean slingers brake both target, headpiece, or any other armour vvhatsoeuer.

There are also two other sorts of slings, the one mentioned by Liuie; and the other by Vegetius: that in Liuie is called Cestrophendo, vvhich cast a short ar­rowe with a long thicke head: the other in Vegetius, is called fustibalus, vvhich was a sling made of a coard and a staffe. But let this suffice for slinges and slin­gers, vvhich were reckoned amongst their light armed souldiers, and vsed chief­lie in assaulting, and defending townes, and fortresses, vvhere the heauie armed souldiers could not come to buckle; and present the place of our Hargebusiers, which in their proper nature, are leuis armaturae milites, although more terrible then those of ancient times.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FIrst we may obserue the Arte, which he vsed to counteruaile the strength of so great a multitude, by choosing out so conuenient a place, which was no broader in front then would suffice the front of his battell; and hauing both the sides of the hill so steepe, that the [Page 75] enemy could not ascende nor clime vp, but to their own ouerthrow; hee made the backe part of the hil strong by Art, & so placed his soldiors as it were in the gate of a fortresse, where they might either issue out, or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred securitie and safetie before the vaine opinion of foole-hardie resolution, which sauoreth of Barbarisme rather then of true wisedome: for he euer thought it great gaine, to loose nothing; and the day brought alwaies good fortune, that deliuered vp the army safe vnto the euening; attending, vntil aduantage had laid sure principles of victory: and yet Caesar was neuer thought a coward.

And now it appeareth, what vse hee made by passing his army ouer the ri­uer, and attending the enemie on the further side, rather then on the side of the state of Rheimes: for by that meanes he brought to passe, that whatsoeuer the enemie should attempt in any part or quarter of the lande, his forces were rea­die to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of Bibrax: & yet notwithstanding, he lost not the opportunitie of making slaughter of thē, as they passed ouer the riuer. For by the benefitte of the bridge which hee had fortified, he transported what forces he woulde, to make heade against them, as they passed ouer; and so hee tooke what aduantage either side of the riuer coulde affoord him.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

ANd heere the reader may not maruel, if when the hils are in labour, they bring forth but a mouse; for how soone is the courage of this huge army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruted of their valour? But beeing hastely caried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dis­persed vpon the sight of an enemy, which is no strange effect of a suddaine hu­mour. For as in nature all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durabilitie, or lasting qualitie of all actions, proceedeth from a slowe and temperate progression; so the resolutions of the minde that are caried with an vntemperate violence, and sauour so much of heat and passion, do vanish awaie euen with the smoake thereof, and bring forth nothing but leasurable repentaunce: and therefore it were no ill counsell for men of such natures, to qualifie their hastie resolutions, with a mistrustfull lingering, that when their iudgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedie execution.

But that which most bewraieth their indiscreet intemperāce, in the hote pur­suit of this enterprise, is, that before they had scarce seene the enemy, or had oportunity to contest him in open field, their victual began to faile them: for their mindes were so caried away with the conceite of warre, that they had no leisure to prouide such necessaries, as are the strength and sinewe of the warre: It was sufficient for euery particular man, to be knowne for a soldiour in so ho­norable an action, referring other matters in the care to the state. The states [Page 76] in like manner thought it inough to furnish out forty or fiftie thousand men a peece, to discharge their oath, and to saue their hostages, committing other re­quisites to the generall care of the confederacie: which, beeing directed by as vnskilful gouernours, neuer looked further then the present multitude, which seemed sufficient to ouerthrow the Romaine Empire. And thus each man re­lied vpon an others care, and satisfied himselfe with the present garbe; so ma­ny men of all sortes and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such strife and emulation, what state should seeme in greatest forwardnesse; were motiues sufficient to induce euerie man to go, without further inquiry, how they should goe. And herein the care of a Generall ought especially to bee seene, conside­ring the weakenesse of particular iudgements, that hauing the liues of so many men depending altogither vpon his prouidence, and ingaged in the defence of their state and country; he do not faile in these maine points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike dessignes. To conclude this point, let vs learne by their errour, so to carrie a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handeling it, then it was before we first toooke it to our charge; as it heere happened to the Belgae. For their tumultuous armes sorted to no other ende, then to giue Caesar iust occasion to make warre vpon them, with such assurance of victorie, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that hee should not in all likelihood, meet with the like strength againe, in the continu­ance of that warre. And this was not onely grauius bellum successori tradere, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued warre; but to drawe a dange­rous warre vpon their heads, that otherwise might haue liued in peace.

OBSERVATION.

IT hath beene an olde rule amongst soldiours, that a great and negli­gent errour committed by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to trecherie. We reade of Fuluius a Legate in the Romaine armie, lying in Tuscanie, the Consul being gon to Rome to performe some publike dutie: the Tuscanes tooke occasion by his absence to trie whether they could drawe the Romaines into any inconuenience; and placing an ambuscado neere vnto their campe, sent certaine soldiours, attired like shepheardes, with droues of cattell to passe in view of the Romaine army, who handled the matter so, that they came euen to the rampier of the campe; whereat the Legate won­dering as at a thing void of reason, kept himselfe quiet vntill he had discouered their treacherie, and so made frustrate their intent: In like maner Caesar not persuaded that men should bee so heedles, to carry a retrait in that disorderly and tumultuous maner, would not discampe his men to take the oportunity of that aduantage, vntill he had found that to be true, which in all reason was vn­likely. And thus 296000. Belgae were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the Romaines, for want of gouernment and order in their departure.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN this relation we may obserue the industrious art, which the Romans vsed in assaulting, and taking holdes and townes; wherein we find three sortes of engines described, Vinea, Agger, and Turres.

Vinea is thus described by Vegetius:* Lib. 4. A vinea or vine descri­bed. A little strong built house or houell, made of light wood, that it might be remoued with greatest ease; the roofe was supported with diuers pillars of a foote square, vvherof the formost were 8 foot high, and the hindmost 6; and betweene euerie one of these pillars, there was 5 foot distance: it was alwaies made with a double roofe; the first or lower roofe was of thicke plankes, and the vpper roofe of hurdles, to breake the force of a waight, without further shaking or disioyning the building: the sides were likewise walled with hurdles, the better to defend the soldiers that vvere vnder it: the vvhole length vvas about 16 foot, and the breadth 7: the vpper roofe vvas commonly couered vvith greene or raw hides, to keepe it from burning, Many of these houels vvere ioined together in ranke, vvhen they went about to vnder­mine a vval: the higher end was put next vnto the wal, that all the waights which vvere throwen vpon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the engine: the foure sides and groundsils, had in euery corner a vvheele, & by them they vvere driuen to any place as occasion serued: the chiefest vse of them vvas to couer and defend the souldiers, as they vndermined or ouerthrew a vval. This engine vvas called Vinea, which signifieth a vine, for it sheltered such as vvere vnder the roofe thereof, as a vine couereth the place vvhere it groweth.

Agger;Agger or mount. vvhich vve call a mount, is described in diuers histories to be a hil or eleuation made of earth and other substance, vvhich by little and little was raised forward, vntil it approched neare vnto the place, against which it vvas built; that vpon this mount they might erect fortresses and turrets, and so fight with an ad­uantage of height. The matter of this mount, vvas earth and stones, fagots, and timber. Iosephus saith, that at the siege of Ierusalem, the Romans cut downe al the trees vvithin 11 mile compasse, for matter and stuffe to make a mount. The sides of this Agger vvere of timber to keepe in the loose matter; the forepart which was towards the place of seruice, was open without any timber worke: for on that part they stil raised it & brought it nearer the wals. That which was built at Massilia vvas 80 foot high, and that at Auaricum 80 foot high and 30 foote broad. Iosephus and Egesippus writ, that there was a fortresse in Iudea, 300 cu­bites high, which Sulla purposing to vvin by assault, raised a mount 200 cubites high; and vpon it, he built a castle of stone 50 cubites high, and 50 cubites broad; and vpon the said castell he erected a turret of 60 cubites in hight, and so took the fortresse. The Romans oftentimes raised these mounts in the mouth of a hauen, and commonly to ouer-toppe a towne, that so they might fight with much aduantage.

[Page 79] Amongst other engines,Towers or Turrets de­scribed. in vse amongst the Romans, their moueable Tur­rets were verie famous; for they were built in some safe place out of danger, and with wheeles put vnder them, were driuen to the walles of the towne. These Tur­rets were of two sortes, either great or little: the lesser sort are described, by Vi­truuius, to be 60 cubites high; and the square side 17 cubites; the breadth at the top was a fift part, of the breadth at the base; and so they stood sure without any danger of falling: the corner pillars were at the base, 9 inches square; & 6 inches at the top: there were commonly 10 stories in these little turrets, & windowes in euerie storie. The greater sort of towers were 120 cubites high, and the square side was 24 cubites, the breadth at the top was a fift part of the hase; and in e­uerie one of these were commonly 200 stories. There was not one and the same distance kept betweene the stories, for the lowest commonly was 7 cubites, and 12 inches high: the highest storie 5 cubites, and the rest 4 cubites, and a third. In euerie one of these stories, were souldiers and engines, ladders, and casting bridges, by which they got vpon the wall and entered the towne. The forepart of these Turrets were couered with yron, and wet couerings, to saue them from fire. The souldiers that remoued the tower to and fro, were alwaies within the square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new water-worke by bro­ken Wharfe in London much resembleth one of these towers.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

VPon the building of these mightie engines, it was no maruell if the Suessones submitted themselues to such powerfull industrie. For whatsoeuer is strange and vnusuall, doth much affrighte the spi­rits of an enemie, and breede a motion of distrust and diffidencie, when as they finde themselues ignorant of such warlike practises: for noueltie alwaies breedeth wonder, in as much as the true reasons and causes being vn­knowen, we apprehend it, as diuers from the vsuall course of thinges, and so stand gazing at the strangenesse thereof: and wonder as it addeth worth to the noueltie; so it inferreth diffidencie, and so consequently feare, the vtter ene­mie of martiall valour.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

AS the Romans excelled all other nations in many good customes;The description of the Ro­man campe, with all the parts belon­ging vnto it so especially in their campe-discipline, they stroue to be singular: for it seemed rather an Academie, or a citie of ciuill gouernment, then a campe of souldiers: so carefull were they both for the safetie, and skilfull expe­rience of their men at armes. For touching the first, they neuer suffered their souldiers to lodge one night without a campe; wherein they were inclosed with ditch and a rampier, as in a walled towne: neither was it any newe inuention or late found out custome in their state, but in vse amongst the auncient Romans, and in the time of their kinges; their manner of incamping was included with­in these circumstances.

The Centurions,The Centuri­ons made choise of the place. that went before to choose out a conuenient place, hauing found a fit situation for their campe, first assigned the standing for the Empe­rours pauillion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the campe; from whence he might easily ouerview all the other partes, or any alarum or signum pugnae, might from thence be discouered to all quarters. This pauillion was knowne by the name of Praetorium, The Praeto­rium. for as much as amongst the auncient Romans the Generall of their Armie was called Praetor: in this place where the Praetorium was to be erected, they stucke vp a white ensigne, and from it they measured euerie waie 100 foote, and so they made a square containing 200 foot in euerie side, the Area, or content whereof, was almost an acre of ground: the forme of the Praetorium was round and high, being as eminent among the o­ther tentes, as a temple is amongst the priuate buildings of a cittie: and there­fore Iosephus compareth it to a church. In this Praetorium was their Tribunal or chaire of the estate, and the place of diuination, which they called Augurale, with other appendices of maiestie and authoritie.

The Generals tent being thus placed,The lodging of the legions. they considered which side of the pa­uillion laie most commodious for forrage and water, and on that side they lod­ged the legions, euery legion deuided one from another by a street or lane of 50 [Page]

[Page] [Page 85] foote in breadth; and according to the degree of honour, that euerie legion had in the Armie, so were they lodged in the campe, either in the midst which was counted most honourable, or towardes the sides, which was of meaner re­putation. And againe, according to the place of euerie cohort in his legion, so was it lodged nearer the pauillion of the Emperour, towardes the harte of the campe; and so consequently euerie maniple tooke place in the cohort, distin­guishing their preheminence, by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outsideward; according as they distinguished the place of their legions, there went a streete of fiftie in breadth ouerthwart the middest of all the legi­ons, vvhich was called Quintana;Quintana. for that it deuided the fift cohort of euery le­gion from the sixt.

Betweene the tentes of the first maniples in euerie legion and the Praetorium, there went a waie of 100 foote in breadth throughout the whole campe; which was called Principia;Principia. in this place the Tribunes sate to heare matters of iustice; the souldiers exercised themselues at their weapons, and the leaders and chiefe commanders frequented it as a publike place of meeting; and it was helde for a reuerent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decencie. On either side the Emperours pauillion, in a direct line to make euen & straight the vpper side of the Principia,The tentes of the Tribunes. the Tribunes had their tentes pitched, euerie Tribune confronting the head of the legion whereof he was Tribune: aboue them, to­wardes the head of the campe, were the Legates and Treasurer: the vpper part of the campe was strengthened with some select cohorts and troupes of horse, according to the number of legions that were in the Armie.

Polybius describing the manner of incamping which the Romans vsed in his time, when as they had commonly but two legions in their Armie, with as ma­nie associates, placeth the Ablecti and extraordinarij, which were select bandes and companies, in the vpper part of the campe; and the associates on the out­sides of the legions.

The ditch and the rampier, that compassed the whole campe about, was 200 foote distant from any tent:The space be­tweene the tents and the rampier. vvhere of Polybius giueth these reasons; first, that the souldiers marching into the campe in battell array, might there dissolue themselues into maniples, centuries, and decuries, without tumult or confusi­on: for order was the thing which they principally respected, as the life and strength of their martiall body. And againe, if occasion vvere offered to sallie out vpon an enemie, they might verie conueniently in that spatious roome, put themselues into companies and troupes: and if they vvere assaulted in the night, the dartes and fire vvorkes, vvhich the enemie should cast into their campe, would little indammage them, by reason of the distance betweene the rampier and the tentes.

Their tentes were all of skinnes and hides, helde vp with props, and fastened with ropes: there were 11 souldiers, as Vegetius saith, in euerie tent, and that societie was called Contubernium, Contuberniū. of whom the chiefest was named Decanus, or Caput Contubernij.

The ditch and the rampier were made by the legions,The ditch and the rampier. euerie maniple hauing his part measured out, and euerie Centurion ouerseeing his Centurie; the [Page 86] approbation of the whole worke belonged to the Tribunes. Their maner of in­trenching was this: the soldiors being girt with their swords and daggers, dig­ged the ditch about the campe, which was alwaies 8 foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not farre off, the ditch was alwaies 11. or 15. or 18. foot in latitude, & altitude; according to the discretion of the General: but what scantling soueer was kept, the ditch was made directis lateribus, that is, as broad in the bottome as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch was three foot in heighth, and sometimes foure, made after the maner of a wall, with greene turfes cut all to one measure, halfe a foot in thicknesse, a foot in breadth, and a foot and a halfe in length. But if the place, wherein they were incamped, would afford no such turfe; they then strengthened the loose earth, which was cast out of the ditch, with boughs and fagots, that it might be strong and wel fastened. The rampier they properly called Agger: Agger. the outside whereof, which hung ouer the ditch, they vsed to stick with thicke and sharpe stakes, fastened deep in the mound, that they might be firme; and these for the most part were forked stakes, which made the rampier very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great difficulty. Varro saith,Vallum. that the front of the rampier thus stucke with stakes, was called vallum, a varicando, for that no man could stride or get ouer it.

The campe had foure gates,Praetoria porta. the first was called praetoria porta, which was al­waies behind the Emperours tent: and this gate did vsually looke either toward the east, or to the enemy, or that way that the army was to march. The gate on the other side of the campe opposite to this,Porta Decu­mana. was called Porta Decumana a deci­mis cohortibus, for the tenth or last Cohort of euery legion, was lodged to con­front this gate: by this gate the soldiours went out to fetch their wood, their water, and their forrage, and this waie their offendours were caried to ex­ecution.Portae prin­cipales. Laeua. Dextra. The other two gates were called Portae principales, forasmuch as they stoode opposite to either ende of that so much respected place, which they called principia, onely distinguished by these titles, laeua principalis and dextra, all these gates were shut with doores, and in standing Campes fortified with Turrets, vpon which were planted Engines of defence, as Balistae, Catapultae, Tolenones and such like.

The Romaines had their summer Campes, which they tearmed Aestiua, and their winter Campes,Castra Aestiua. which they called Hiberna, or Hibernacula: their summer campes were in like maner differenced, according to the time, which they con­tinued in thē. For if they remained in a place but a night or two, they called thē Castra or Mansiones; but if they continued in them any long time, they called thē Aestiuas or Sedes: And these were more absolute, aswel in regard of their tents, as of their fortification,Hiberna. then the former, wherein they staied but one night. The o­ther which they called Hiberna, had greater labor & coast bestowed vpon them, that they might the better defend them frō the vvinter season. Of these we read, that the tents were either thatched with straw, or roofed with boards, & that they had their armory, hospital, & other publike houses. These cāps haue bin the be­ginning of many famous towns, especially whē they continued long in a place, as oftentimes they did vpon the banks of Euphrates, Danow, & the Rhene. The [Page] [...] [Page]

[Page 86] [Page 87] order which they alwaies obserued in laying out their camp, was so vniforme, & well knowne to the Romaines, that when the Centurions had limited out euery parte, and marked it with different ensignes and colours, the soldiours entered into it, as into a knowne and familiar Citie: wherein euerie societie or small contubernie, knewe the place of his lodging: and which is more, euery par­ticular man coulde assigne the proper station of euerie companie, throughout the whole armie.

The vse and commodity of this incamping,The commo­dity of this incamping. I briefely touched in my first booke: But if I were worthie any way to commend the excellency thereof to our moderne soldiours, or able by perswasion to restablish the vse of incam­ping in our warres; I woulde spare no paines to atchieue so great a good, and vaunt more in the conquest of negligence, then if my sense had compassed a new found out meanes; and yet reason would deeme it a matter of small diffi­cultie, to gaine a point of such worth, in the opinion of our men, especiallie when my discourse shall present security to our forces, and honour to our lea­ders, maiestie to our armies, and terrour to our enmies, wonderment to stran­gers, and victorie to our nation. But sloth hath such interest in this age, that it commendeth vaine glory and foole-hardinesse, contempt of vertue, and derisi­on of good discipline, to repugne the dessignes of honour, and so far to ouer­maister reason, that it suffereth not former harmes to beare witnesse against er­rour, nor correct the ill atchieuements of ill directions: and therefore ceasing to vrge this pointe anie further, I wil leaue it to the careful respect of the wise.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe fury of the enemy, and their sodaine assault, so disturbed the ce­remonies which the Romaine discipline obserued,The ceremo­nies which they vsed in their preparation to battel to make the sol­diours trulie apprehend the waight and importance of that action, which might cast vppon their state either soueraignty or bondage; that they were all for the most part omitted; notwithstanding they are here no­ted vnder these titles, the first was vexillum proponendum, quod erat insigne cum ad Arma concurri oporteret: for when the Generall had determined to fight, hee caused a skarlet coate or red flag to bee hung out vpon the top of his tent, that by it the soldiours might be warned, to prepare themselues for the battell; and this was the first warning they had, which by a silent aspect presented bloud and execution to their eyes, as the onlie meanes to worke out their owne safetie, and purchase eternall honour. The second was Signum tuba dandum; this war­ning was a noise of manie trumpets, which they tearmed by the name of classi­cum a calando, which signifieth calling: for after the eie was filled with species sutable to the matter intended; they then hasted to possesse the eare, and by the sense of hearing to stir vp warlike motions, and fil them with resolute thoughts, that no diffident or base conceites might take hold of their mindes. The third was, milites cohortandi, for it was thought conuenient to confirme this valour, with motiues of reason, which is the strength and perfection of al such motions. [Page 88] the vse and benefit whereof I somewhat inlarged in the Heluetian warre, and could affoord much more labour to demonstrate the commoditie of this part, if my speech might carrie credit in the opinion of our souldiers, or be thought worthie regard to men so much addicted to their owne fashions. The last was signum dandum, which, as some thinke, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish and know themselues from their enemies. Hirtius in the war of Afrike saith, that Caesar gaue the word Felicitie; Brutus and Cassius gaue Libertie; others haue giuen Virtus, Deus nobiscum, Triumphus Imperatoris, and such like wordes, as might be ominous to a good successe: Besides these parti­cularities, the manner of their deliuerie gaue a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times, and cues: whereof Caesar now complaineth; that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for without all controuersie, there is no matter of such consequence in it selfe, but may bee much graced with ceremonies and complements, which like officers or attendants ad much respect and maiestie to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth farre meaner and of lesse regard.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefest Centurion of the 12 legion,The place and office of a primipile. being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarij, that was of the first Cohort in that legion; for that place was the greatest dignitie that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of Centurio primipili, or simplie Primipilus, and some­times Primopilus, or Primus Centurio. By him were commonly published, the mandates and edicts of the Emperour, and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centurions, at all times had an eie vnto him; and the rather for that the ea­gle, which was the peculiar ensigne of euerie legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this dignitie, without speciall commoditie, as may be gathered out of diuers authors. We reade further, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribunality was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding, there was a law made, I know not vpon what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suf­fice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

ANd heere I may not omit to giue the Target any honour I may,The Target described. and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Caesars hand, as in the place of greatest dignitie, and much honouring the excellencie therof. Polybius maketh the Target to containe two foot and an halfe in breadth, ouer­thwart the conuexsurface thereof; and the length foure foote, of what forme or fashion soeuer they were of: for the Romans had two sortes of Targets amongst their legionarie, the first caried the proportion of that figure, which the Geo­metricians call Ouall, a figure of an vnequall latitude, broadest in the midst, and narrow at both the endes, like vnto an egge, described in Plano: the other sorte was of an equall latitude, and resembled the fashion of a guttertile; and there­upon was called Scutum imbricatum. The matter whereof a target was made, was a double board, one fastened vpon another, with lint and Buls glew; and co­uered with an Oxe hide, or some other stiffe leather; the vpper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of yron, to keepe it from cleauing; and in the middest there was a bosse of yron or brasse, which they called Vmbo. Romulus brought them in first amongst the Romans, taking the vse of them from the Sabines.Lib. 16. c. 40. The wood whereof they were made, was for the most part either sallow, alder, or figtree: whereof Plinie giueth this reason, for as much as these trees are colde and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made vpon the wood, was presently contracted and shut vp againe. But for as much as the Target was of such reputation amongst the Roman Armes, and challenged such interest in the greatest of their Empire, let vs enter a little into [Page 91] the consideration of the vse and commoditie thereof; which cannot be better vnderstood, then by that conference, which Polybius hath made betweene the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I haue thought it good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the surprise,Circūuallatio attempted by the Belgae vpon Bibract, I set downe the maner, which both the Galles and the Romaines vsed in their sodaine surprising of a towne: whereof if they failed (the place importing any aduantage in the course of the war) they then prepared for the siege, in that ma­ner, as Caesar hath described in this place. They inuironed the town about with a ditch and a rampier, and fortified the saide rampier, with many castles and fortresses, erected in a conuenient distance one from another; and so they kept the town from any forraine succor or reliefe: and withal secured themselues frō sallies or other stratagerns, which the townsmen might practise against them. And this manner of siege was called circumuallatio; the particular description wherof,In the seuenth commentarie. I refer vnto the history of Alesia, where I will handle it, according to the particulars there set down by Caesar.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Ram,Aries or the Ram. which Caesar heere mentioneth, was of greatest note a­mongst all the Romaine Engines, and helde that place which the Canon hath in our warres. Vitruuius doth attribute the inuention thereof, to the Carthagimans, who at the taking of Cadiz, wanting a fit instrument to raze and ouerthrow a castle,Cales. they tooke a long beame or tim­ber tree, and bearing it vpon their armes and shoulders, with the one end there­of they first brake downe the vppermost ranke of stones: and so descending by degrees,Aries simplex they ouerthrewe the whole towre. The Romaines had two sortes of Rams, the one was rude and plaine; the other artificial and compound: the first, is that which the Carthaginians vsed at Cadiz, and is purtraited in the column of Traian at Rome.

The compound Ram is thus described by Iosephus;Aries com­posita. a Ramme (saith he) is a mighty great beame, like vnto the mast of a ship, and is strengthned at one end with a head of yron, fashioned like vnto a Ram; and thereof it tooke the name. This Ram is hanged by the middest with roapes vnto an other beame, which lieth crosse a couple of pillars, and hanging thus equallie balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward, and recoiled backeward; and so beateth vpon the wall with his yron heade: neither is there any towre so strong, or wal so broad, that is able to stande before it. The length of this Ramme was of a large scant­ling, for Plutarch affirmeth, that Anthonie in the Parthian warre had a Ram eighty foote long: and Vitruuius saith, that the length of a Ramme was vsuallie 106. and sometimes 120; and this length gaue great strength and force to the [Page 101] engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Centurie or order of souldi­ers: and their forces being spent, they were seconded with another Centurie; and so the ramme plaied continually vpon the wall, without intermission. Iose­phus saith, that Titus, at the siege of Ierusalem, had a ramme for euerie legion: it was oftentimes couered with a vine, that the men that managed it might bee in more safety. It appeareth by this place, that if a towne had continued out vn­till the ramme had touched the wall, they could not presume of any acceptati­on of rendrie; for as much as by their obstinacie, they had brought in perill the liues of their enemies, and were subdued by force of Armes, which affoordeth such mercie as the victor pleaseth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe Aduatici, as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small securitie, which one state can giue vnto another, that commendeth their safe­tie to be protected by it: for as Architas the Pythagorean saith, a bo­die, a familie, and an Armie are then well gouerned, when they con­taine within themselues the causes of their safetie; so we must not looke for anie securitie in a state, when their safetie dependeth vpon a forraine protection. For the olde saying is, that Neque murus, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propria arma non texere. Although in this case the matter was well qualified, by the ma­iestie of the Roman Empire, and the late victories in the continent of Gallia, wherof the Hedui with their associates were very gainful witnesses: but amongst kingdomes, that are better suted with equalitie of strength & authority, there is small hope of safetie to be looked for, vnlesse the happy gouernment of both do mutually depend vpon the safetie of either nation. For that which Polybius ob­serued in Antigonus king of Macedonia, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; That kinges by nature esteeme no man, either as a friend or an ene­mie, but as the calculation of profit shall finde them answerable to their pro­iectes. And contrariwise, it cutteth off many occasions of practises & attempts, when it is knowne that a state is of it selfe able and readie to resist the dessignes of forraine enemies, according to that of Manlius: Ostendite modo bellum, pa­cem habebitis: videant vos paratos ad vim, ius ipsi remittent.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

THe manner of signifying any motion or attempt by fire,To giue no­tice of an A­larum by fire. was of great vse in the might leason, where the fortification was of so large an exten­sion: for fire in the night doth appeare far greater then indeed it is, for as much as that part of the aire, which is next vnto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance cannot be discerned from the fire it selfe, and so it seemeth much greater then it is in substance: and contrariwise, [Page 102] in the daie time it sheweth lesse then it is; for the cleare brightnesse of the aire doth much obscure that light, which proceedeth from a more grosse and mate­riall bodie: and therefore their custome was to vse fire in the night, and smoake in the daie, suting the transparent middle with a contrarie qualitie, that so it might more manifestly appeare to the beholder.

THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

ANd albeit after the victorie, the Romans inflicted diuers degrees of punishment,Lib. 25. according to the malice which they found in an ene­mie; yet as Flauius Lucanus saith in Liuie, there was no nation more exorable,The punish­ments which the Romans laied vpon a conqueredna­tion. nor readier to shew mercie, then the Romans were. The punishments which we find them to haue vsed towardes a conquered nati­on, were these; either they punished them by death, or solde them for bond­slaues, sub corona, or dismissed them sub iugum; or merced them, in taking away their territories; or made them tributarie states.

Of the first we finde a manifest example in the third of these Commentaries, where Caesar hauing ouerthrowne the Veneti by sea, in as much as they had re­tained his ambassadours by force, contrarie to the law of nations, he put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest sub corona.

Festus saith, that an enemie was said to be sold sub corona, in as much as the captiues stood crowned in the market place, where they were set out to sale; as Cato saith in his booke de re militari, vt populus sua opera potius ob rem bene ge­stam coronatus, supplicatum eat? quam re male gesta coronatus vaeneat. And Gellius affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, for as much as the sol­diers that kept them while they were in selling, incircled them round about, to keepe them together; and this round-about-standing was called Corona. Festus saith, that oftentimes they vsed a speare; and therfore they were said to be sold sub hasta: for as much as amongst the Greekes, by the speare or pike, was signi­fied the power of Armes, and maiestie of Empires.

When they dismissed them sub iugum, their order was to erect three trees like a paire of gallowes, vnder which they caused all the captiues to passe, as a signe of bondage: for they had so conquered them by force of Armes, that they laide vpon their necke the yoake of thraldome. Liuie saith, that Quintius the dictator dismissed the Aequos sub iugum; and this iugum was made of 3 speares, whereof two were stucke vpright in the ground, and the third was tied ouer­thwart them. The souldiers that passed sub iugum, were vngirt, and their wea­pons taken from them, as Festus saith.

Sometimes againe they tooke awaie their landes and territories, and either solde it for mony, & brought it into the treasurie, or deuided the land amongst the Roman people, or let it out to farme rent: of all which Liuie hath manie pregnant examples.

THE OBSERVATION.

WHich aduise although at this time sorted to small effect; yet it better suted the valour of the Romans, and sauoured more of tempered mag­nanimitie, then that former hazard, which argued the weakenesse of their mindes, by their ouer hastie and too forward resolution. For as it imported greater danger, and discouered a more desperate spirit, to breake through the thickest troupes of their enemies, and so by strong hand to saue themselues by the helpe of some other fortune; so it manifested a greater ap­prehension of terrour, and a stronger impression of feare, which can affoord no­thing but desperate remedies: for desperate and inconsiderate rashnes riseth soo­ner of feare, then of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the dan­ger with a lesse troubled eie and qualified the terrour of death with the life of their spirite, reseruing extremitie of helpe to extremitie of perill, and in the meane time attended what chances of aduantage might happen vnto them, vp­on any enterprise the enemie should attempt; I say, they so gaue greater scope to fortune and inlarged the boundes of changing accidents.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THe circumstance in this historie, which noteth the sudden breaking out of warres, when the course of thinges made promise of peace: sheweth first,The weakenes of our iudge­ment in re­gard of the knowledge of future times. what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse, in calculating the natiuitie of After-chances; which so seldome an­swere the iudgment we giue vpon their beginnings, that when we speake of hap­pinesse, we finde nothing but miserie: and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part, which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not maruel, if when almost all nations are at oddes, and in our best conceites, threa­ten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace; or if peace be in speech, soothing the world with pleasing tranquilitie, and through the vncertainty of our weake probabilities, promise much rest after many trou­bles: there follow greater wars in the ende, then the former time can truely speake of. Which being well vnderstood, may humble the spirits of our hautie polititians, that thinke to comprehend the conclusions of future times, vnder the premisses of their weake proiectes, and predestinate succeeding ages, accor­to the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of, shall breake the maine streame of our iudgment, and falsifie the Oracles which our vnderstanding hath vttered. And it may learne them withall, how much it importeth a wise commander, to preuent an euill that may crosse his dessigne, (how vnlikely soeuer it be to happen) by handling it in such manner, as though it were necessarily to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it selfe both the causes of his being; and the direct meanes to resist the repugnancie of a contrarie nature: and so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THis practise of the Veneti may instruct a circumspect Prince in cases of this nature, to haue a more watchfull eie ouer that Prouince or city, which shall be found most potent and mightie amongst the rest, then of any other inferiour state of the same nature and condition: for as example of [Page 109] it selfe is of great Authoritie,The Autho­rity of exāple. making improbabilities seeme full of reason, espe­cially when the intention shal sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerfull meanes, and graced with the Acte of superi­our personages: it must needes be verie effectuall to stirre vp mens mindes, to approue that with a strong affection, which their owne single iudgment did no waie allow of. And therfore equalitie bringeth this aduantage to a Prince, which differencie can not affoord, that albeit example doe set on foote any rebellious motion, yet no supereminencie shall authorise the same.

THE OBSERVATION.

FRom hence I may take occasion,The groundes of that reue­rent opinion which is held of ambassa­dors. briefely to touch the reuerent opi­nion, which all nations, howe barbarous soeuer, haue generally conceiued of the qualitie and condition of ambassadours: and what the groundes are of this vniuersall receiued custome, which in all a­ges, and times hath held Authenticall. And first we are to vnderstand, that all man kinde (as indued with the same nature and properties) are so linked toge­ther in the strict alliance of humane society; that, albeit their turbulent and dis­agreeing passions (which in themselues are vnnaturall, as proceeding from cor­ruption and defect) driue them into extreme discord and disunion of spirit, and breake the bonds of ciuill conuersation, which otherwise we do naturally affect: [Page 110] yet without a necessarie entercourse and trafficke of societie, we are not able to keepe on foote the very discord it selfe, in tearmes of reason and orderly pro­ceeding, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion, & go to wrack, for want of these mutuall offices performed by messengers: so streight are the bondes of nature, and so powerfull are the lawes which she enacteth. And ther­fore if it were for no other end, which might sort to the benefit of either partie, (as there are many good vses thereof) yet to holde vp the quarrell and keepe it from falling, making war, according to the grounds of reason, the entercourse of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made a law, ought as religiously to be obserued, as an Oracle of our owne beliefe. Secondly, for as much as the ende of warre is, or at the least should be, peace: which by trea­tie of mutuall messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no peo­ple may seeme so barbarous, as to maintaine a warre; which onelie intendeth bloud, and proposeth as the chiefest obiect, the death and mortality of mankind, no way respecting peace and ciuill gouernment: such as refuse the entercourse of messengers, as the meanes of amitie and concord, are iustly condemned in the iudgment of all nations, as vnworthie of humane societie. Last of all, it is an iniurie of great dishonour, and deserueth the reward of extreme infamie, to reuenge the master his quarrell vpon a seruant, and punish ambassadours for the faults of their state: considering that their chiefest dutie consisteth in the faith­full relation of such mandates, as they haue receiued, which may as well tende to the aduancement and honour of that cittie, to which they are sent; as to the dishonour and ruine of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire warre or peace; the free libertie, and holy order of ambassadours, is reuerently to be respected, and defended from brutish and vn­naturall violence.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN the first booke, I obserued the authoritie which the Roman lea­ders had to vndertake a warre, without further acquainting the senat with the consequence thereof: in this place, let vs obserue the care and circumspection, which the Generals had, not to vndertake a troublesome and dangerous warre vpon a humor, or any other slender motion: but diligently waighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the perill and hazard of the warre, with the good and consequence of the effect; informed their iudgments of the importance of that action; and so tried whether the be­nefit would answere their labour. And thus we finde the reasons particularly de­liuered, that moued Caesar first to vndertake the Heluetian warre: and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrell with Ariouistus: then followeth the necessitie of that warre with the Belgae; and nowe the motiues which induced him to this with the maritimate cities of Bretaine: and so consequently of his passage into Germanie, or what other enterprise he attempted: which he laieth [Page 112] downe as the groundes and occasions of those warres, and could not be auoided but with the losse and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further, let vs obserue the meanes he vsed to preuent the inclination of the Galles, and to keepe them in subiection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into diuers quarters of that continent; and so setling the wauering dis­position of the further skirtes, with the waight of his Armie, and the presence of his legionarie souldiers, which he sent readie to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not breake out to the preiudice and diminuti­on of the Roman Empire, and the good successe of his proceedings: besides the aduantage, which he gained in the opinion of the enemie; whom he so little fea­red concerning the vpshot of that quarrell, that he had dispersed the greatest part of his Armie vpon other seruices, the rest being sufficient to end that war.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN this battell I chiefly obserue the good fortune,The force of industrie. which vsually atten­deth vpon industrie: for amongst other prouisions, which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the vse of this war, they had made readie these hookes, not for this intent wherin they were imploied, but at all oc­casions & chances, that might happen, as seruice able complements rather then principall instruments: and yet it so fell out, that they proued the only meanes, to ouerthrow the Galles. Which proueth true the saying of Caesar, that indu­strie commaundeth fortune and buyeth good successe, with extraordinary la­bour: for industrie in action is as importunitie in speech, which forceth an as­sent beyond the strength of reason; and striueth through continuall pursuit, to make good the motiues, by often inculcations; and at length findeth that dispo­sition, which will easily admit whatsoeuer is required: In like manner diligence and laboursome industrie, by circumspect and heedefull cariage, seldome faile either by hap or cunning, to make good that part wherein the maine point of the matter dependeth. For euetie action is intangled with many infinite adhe­rents, which are so interessed in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherentes, some of them are by wisedome, foreseene; and directed to that course which may fortunate the acti­on: the rest being vnknowne, continue without either direction or preuention, and are all vnder the regiment of fortune; for as much as they are beyonde the compasse of our wisest reach, and stand in the waie either to assist or disaduan­tage: Of these, industrie hath greatest authoritie; in as much as she armeth her selfe for all chances, whereby she is said to command fortune.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THese skilfull and experienced men, which Crassus sent for out of all the Cities in Aquitaine,Euocati. were those, whom the Romans called Euocati: such as were free from warfare, and exempted by their lawes from gi­uing their names in musters, either by reason of their yeares, or the magistracy which they had borne, or for some other causes, which gaue them that priui­ledge: And in that regard were sent for by letters, intreating their assistance in the cariage of that war, as men wel acquainted with the nature of such businesses. Their places were nothing inferiour to the Centurions, for aduise and direction, although they had no part in command or authority.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN this fight we may further obserue, their maner of defence against Mountes, and Caualieros; which we find chiefly to bee mines. Iose­phus in the Iewish warre saith, that the Romans hauing raised an ex­ceeding high mount, the Iewes vndermined the same with such Art, that as they digged vnderneath; they supported the mount with huge props and planks, that it might not shrinke: and watching a time of greatest aduantage, they set all the timber worke, which vnderpropped the mount, on fire, which ta­king fire with the helpe of brimstone and pitch, the mount fell vpon a sodaine, to the great terrour and amazement of the Romans.

At the siege of Auaricum, Lib. 7. de bel­lo Gall. we find how the Galles by vndermining, did take the earth from the mount, as fast as it was caried vnto it by the Romans; and so kept it from rising, and made it vneffectuall. But if it were for the most parte made of woode, or other combustible matter, they sought then by all meanes to burne it; as it happened at the siege of Massilia: and oftentimes when both burning and vndermining failed, they confronted it, with an other mount with­in the walles, to disappoint the disaduantage by equall contesting of it; and so made it vnprofitable. Concerning mines, this much may I saie, without preiu­dice to that Art: that the chiefest points to be respected are these: First, the true distance to a dessigned place, which is best got by instrument and helpe of Geometrie, where other markes of certainty are wanting: secondlie, the direction of the myne, that wee may not erre in our course which the com­passe affoordeth: thirdlie, the strengthening of the mine with timber worke, [Page 122] if neede require: lastly, the countermining and crossemeeting: All which parts haue very many circumstances, and require a larger discourse, then may bee thought pertinent for this place.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe strange contract betweene these Soldurij, and their chiefetaine, may wel deserue a place amongst these obseruations, especiallie con­sidering the obligatorie conditions, which either party stood bound to obserue: for the Captaine was to make his Soldurij partakers of all his happines in this life; in regard whereof, they were to take part of whatso­euer ill chance or disaster shoulde happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensuall miserie, tooke hold of their head, these deuoted were tied voluntarilie to follow him the selfe same way: neither in any memory was there ouer man found, that refused to die, if he to whom he was deuoted, chanced to be slaine. Which bloudy league of amitie, as it was repugnant to the course of nature, multiplying particular destinie to a generall calamitie: so was it dan­gerous in a well ordered state, if the ringleader were either ambitious, or sought to practise any thing contrarie to good gouernement: for hee himselfe would presume much vpon the assistance of his Soldurij; and they on the other side, must needs wish well to his attempts that were so interessed in his life & death.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis Sertorius had followed the faction of Marius and Cinna,Sertorius. and when Sylla had ouerthrowne both the elder and yonger Marius, hee fled into Spaine, and there maintained the quarrell on foote against Pompeie and Metellus; and ouerthrew them in many battels: but in the end was trecherously slaine by Perpanna at a banket. He was a man of great spirit, and of admirable dispatch; and vnder him were these captaines brought vp, which Caesar commendeth for their skil in armes.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN histories,Two meanes to atchieue victorie and to ouermaster their enemies propounding to our consideration the deedes and moni­ments of former ages, we may obserue two especiall meanes, which the great commanders of the world haue entertained to atchieue victory, and ouermaster their enemies: the first by cunning and wise cariage of a matter, before it come to triall by blowes: the second, by forceable meanes & waging of battel; the one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the soule; and the other depending vpon the strength and ability of the body. Concerning the first, it hath euer bin held more honorable, as better suting the worth of the spirit and the diuine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the aduerse part may be weakened by wit, and preuented in the proiects of their better fortunes, by anticipation of meanes and occasions, & so through aduantages taken from their owne proceedings, to be driuen to that exigent, which may determine of the controuersie before they come to blowes, & con­clude the matter by tearmes of arte, taken from the directions of good proui­dence. For to speake a truth,Tubalcaine by war and Naamah by the floud. the action of battel, as it is the last part in that fa­cultie; so it is the worst in regarde of christian duty, and better fitteth the pro­geny of Lamech his second wife, which the Diuines do note to be borne to the ruine and destruction of mankind, then the children of grace, whose ioy con­sisteth in peace and loue.

[Page 124] Caesar in the first of the ciuill warres respected the same thing, but from o­ther grounds: for hauing shut vp Afranius, and Petreius in a place of disaduan­tage, and might haue cut them off without further trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the victorie comming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captaines that were earnest vpon the enemie: Cur etiam secundo praelio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritos milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur? And this course did these Galles take, which vnder Sertorius had learned the Romaine Arte, and the Romaine indu­stry; and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romains at their owne weapon. This first meanes is principally to be imbraced, as the safest waie in these vncertaine and casual euentes: for that which resteth vpon corporall strength, and maketh execution the meanes to a conclusion, is verie terrible euen to the better party, full of hazard and of little certaintie. For it were a miracle of fortune neuer heard of yet, so to carrie a battaile vpon what aduantage or meanes whatsoeuer, that the victor army shoulde buie so great a fortune without bloudshed or losse of men; and erect a Trophee to honour at the sole cost of the enemy, without losse or expence of his owne treasure. And for the vncertaintie in a battell, who knoweth not what infinite chances and changes may happen in euery small moment of time, to turne the fortune of the day to this or that party, and make both sides vnconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and feare, ioy and sorrow? and therefore Caesar thought it not best to tempt the waie-wardnes of fortune, when by other meanes he might obtaine his desires. This I say is chiefely to be im­braced, if our meanes wil affoord vs that happinesse: but howsoeuer I holde it wisedome so to entertaine this course of victorie, that we omit not the chiefest helpes of furtherance when it commeth to blowes, but to thinke of this con­quest by arte and wit, as necessarie, if our meanes will serue vs to compasse it; and of the other, as necessarie whether we will or no: for the historie maketh it plaine, that when Brutus found himselfe destitute of meanes to vndertake that course of victorie, which proceedeth from prouidence and discreete cariage; hee then betooke himselfe necessarilie to the latter, and by the helpe of battell, sought to free himselfe from those disaduantages, into which the Galles had brought him.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

I Obserue further out of this place,Not to forgo an aduantage that what course soeuer be taken, a discreet leader wil not easily forgo an aduantage, without great assu­rance of a better fortune: nor change the certainty of a benefit, vp­on probabilities of other hopes, vntill it haue paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to performe. For so he might forgo his fortune by presuming too much vpon the fauour of future chances, which are oftner seene to crosse our purposes, rather then to further the way which is taken.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

FVrther I obserue, this double battell to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for their vsuall manner was, to make a triple battell, that the first might haue a second, and a third helpe: but where their number would not affoord that commoditie, they then made two battels, that there might be the succour of a second supplie. But they neuer fought with one single battell, for ought that may bee gathered by their histories.

THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

THe last thing which I obserue,The place where suspe­cted forces are best be­stowed in battell. is the place, where Crassus bestowed the Auxiliarie forces, in the disposition of his troupes to battell; which is here said to be, in mediam Aciem: for as their Armies were diuided into three battels; so euerie battell was deuided into three partes; the two cornets, and the battell, wherein these Auxiliarie forces were in this seruice bestowed: of these he afterward saith, that in as much as he durst not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to serue the Romans in time of battell, with stones and weapons, and to carrie earth and turfe to the mount. The reason why suspected troupes are placed in the battell, rather then in either of the cornets, is, for that the battell hath not such scope to fling out, or take aduantage of place to doe mischiefe, as the corners haue: for wheresoeuer there hath beene set battels fought, the strength of their armie consisted alwaies in the cornets, as the two principall instruments of the battell; and as long as these stood sound, the victorie went alwaies certaine on that part: for the cor­nets kept the enemie both from incompassing about the bodie of their Armie, and had the aduantage also of charging vpon the open side of their aduersarie. At the battell of Cannas Hanniball put the weakest of his forces in the battell, and aduancing them towards the enemie, left the two cornets behind: so that, when the enemie came to charge vpon the battell, they easily beat them backe, and as they followed the retrait fell in betweene the two cornets, wherein the strength of the Armie consisted, and being by them incompassed on each side, were defeated and ouerthrowen. And thus we see the aduantage which a Ge­nerall hath, when his two cornets stand firme; although the battell shrinke in the incounter. Hanniball in the battell he had with Scipio in Africke, placed the strangers in the front and in the rereward, according peraduenture as he found their number and the vse of their Armes, which are circumstances to be consi­dered in this case, and depend rather vpon the iudgment of a generall, then of anie prescription that can be giuen in this matter.

THE OBSERVATION.

FRom this place Brancatio taketh occasion to dispute,Lib. 3. Auertimento secundo. how an enemie that is strongly incamped, and for some aduantage will not remoue, may be dislodged, whether he will or no. A point of great cōsequence, in matter of warre: and therefore deserueth due consideration. Con­cerning which he laieth this downe for a maxime, that all forts and strong holds are taken by the foot, and that campes and lodgings are taken by the head: By [Page 127] which is meant, that he who purposeth to winne a fortresse well manned and prouided, must first get the foot and take hold of the ditch; and then sease him­selfe vpon the rampier, and so get the place: for he saith, that mounts and emi­nent eleuations are of little vse against fortresses or sconses, vnlesse they ouertop them; which may be easily preuented by raising the parapet of the fortresse in front, and the curtaine in flanke, according as the enemy shall carie his mounts aloft; and so they shall neuer come to ouertop the holdes. But all campes and lodgings are taken by the head: That is, by mountes and eleuations, which by the aduantage of their height command the champion. For he holdeth it im­possible, to raise a mount within the campe in so short a time, to contest that, which the enemie shall make without. This foundation being laide, he procee­deth to discouer a waie, how to raise a mount maugre the enemie, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillerie, or murther them all within their trenches. And this he taketh from Caesar at the siege of Gergobia.Lib. de bello Gallico. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like vnto the line which the Geo­metricians call Helicall; by this double ditch, he maketh his approch to anie place of most aduantage, where he maie in a night, raise a mount high enough for the ordinance to plaie vpon any quarter of the campe. The censure of this practise, I referre to our iudicious souldiers, which may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in Brancatio himselfe. This much I dare affirme in the behalfe of these workes, that they were of high e­steeme amongst the Romans, when daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to finde out the readiest meanes, both for security and victorie. And if our souldiers could be brought to taste the commoditie of these workes, either by perswasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practises: but our men had rather flie vpon desperat aduentures, and seeke victory in the iawes of death, then to cleare all hazard, with paines and diligence.

THE OBSERVATION.

BY this practise of the Sueui, it appeareth, how little a naked reso­lution of valour auaileth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral carriage and ciuill discretion, to make vse of that greatnesse which prowesse hath obtained: for notwithstanding that they were a nati­on both warlike, and of good abilitie, they were so vainly carried on with a con­ceit of manhood, that it sorted to no other ende, then to maintaine barbarisme at home, and desolation abroad; where as true valour is alwaies subordinate to the preseruation of common weales, and is as the defensiue armes of ciuill so­cietie. Which I haue the rather noted, in as much as it resembleth an humour that aboundeth in this age, especially in the particular hauiour of our young ga­lants, whose naked valour reuelling it selfe onely in the lie and in the stabbe, for want of other assistant vertues to temper the heat of so brittle a mettall, leadeth them into such inconueniences and disordered actions, that it changeth the na­ture thereof, into giddie headed rashnesse; and in lieue of vertues guerdon, is repaide with irrision.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FIrst we may obserue his dissēbling of the practise of the Galles, with the Germans; & the incouragement which he gaue them in a faith­ful and loial affection to the people of Rome, when he himselfe knew they had started from that duty, which both their honor and a good respect of their friendes required: for he well vnderstood that his presence did take away al scruple of any further motion in that kind; & therfore to haue ob­iected vnto thē their errors, had not been to heale, but to discouer their wound: only he tooke the way, to cut off their hopes of any practises, which they might attempt against the Romaine people; and held them in the mean time in the ap­parance of faithful friends, that they might not bee discouraged, by the detec­tion of their reuolt.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SEcondly, vpon this resolutiō that there was no league to be made with the Germans, if they continued on this side the Rhene; we may obserue how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such consents and denials, as might manifest his readines to further what he made shew of, & not weaken the meanes of his best aduantage. For as he was content they should take a quiet farewel of Gallia, and plant themselues in the possessions of the Vbij; so was he loath to yeeld to any condition, which might disaduantage his forcible cōstraint or weaken his command, if perswasion failed: for he well knewe that powerfull means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authoritie in a parlee, then any other motiue, howe reasonable soeuer.

Moreouer wee may obserue,Vincitur haud gratis iugulo qui prouocat ho­stem. howe carefull hee was not to impose vp­on the Germaines a necessity of fighting; but opened a passage (by propoun­ding vnto them the association of the Vbij) by which they might auoide the hazarde of battaile. Which thing was alwaies obserued by Comman­ders of ancient times, who diligently searching into the nature of thinges, founde that neither of those noble instruments, whereby man worketh such wonders (I meane the hande and the tongue) had euer brought so many ex­cellent works to that type of perfection, vnles they had bin forced thereunto by [Page 138] necessitie: and therefore wee are wisely to handle the course of our actions, least while we stand too strict vpon a violent guarde, we giue occasion to the e­nemy, by the way of Antiperistasis, to redouble his strength; and so furnish him with that powerfull engine, which Vetius Mescius calleth vltimum and maximum telum, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appeare by these examples.

Some few of the Samnites,Liu. lib. 9. contrarie to the articles of peace between them and the Romans, hauing made incursions into the territories of the Ramaine confederates; the senate of that state sent to Rome, to excuse the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction: But being reiected, Claudius Pontius generall of their forces, in an excellent oration which he made, shewed how the Romans would not harken to peace, but chose rather to be reuenged by war: and therefore ne­cessity constrained them to put on armes: iustum est bellum (saith he) quibus ne­cessarium, & pia arma quibus, nisi in Armis, spes est.

Caius Manlius,Liu. lib. 7. conducting the Roman legions against the Veij, part of the Veian armie had entered the Romaine campe; which Manlius perceiuing, hee hasted with a band of men to keepe the breach, and to shut in the Veij: which they no sooner perceiued, but they fought with that rage and fury, that they slew Manlius; and had ouerthrown the whole campe, had not a Tribune opened thē a passage, by which they fled away.

In like manner Camillus, the wisest of the Romaine Captaines, beeing en­tered into the citie of the Veij, that hee might take it with greater facilitie, and disarme the enemie of that terrible weapon of necessitie, hee caused it to bee proclaimed, that no Veian shoulde bee hurt, that was founde vn­armed. Whereupon euery man cast away his weapon, and so the towne was ta­ken without bloudshed.

Let a soldiour therefore take such holde of occasions, and oportunities that are offered vnto him, that in time of battaile hee may seeme to cast necessitie vpon his own cause, and retaine it in his paie: considering how the power ther­of altereth the workes of nature, and changeth their effects into contrary ope­rations, being neuer subiect to any ordinance or lawe; and yet making that law­ful which proceedeth from it.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

VPon this circumstance of landing, I may iustly take occasion to handle that controuersie, which hath beene often debated by our English Captaines, which is, whether it be better in question of an inuasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing vpon our coast; or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our forces into some inland place, and there attend to giue him bat­tell? It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opini­on, that we ought not by any meanes to encounter an enemy at his landing; for so wee might much endanger our selues and our countrey; did ground them­selues vpon the authority of Monsieur de Langey, not obseruing the difference betweene an Iland and a continent. For where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes, as border one vpon an other in the same conti­nent: but where their territories are disioyned by so great a barre as the Ocean, and haue not such meanes to supprise one an other, it were meere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appeare by the sequell of this discourse. Where­in I will first laie downe the reasons, that may be vrged to proue it vnsafe to op­pose an enemy at his landing, not as beeing vrged by that party; for I neuer hearde any probable motiue from them which might induce any such opini­on, but set down by such as haue looked into the controuersies, both with expe­rience and good iudgement.

And first, it may be obiected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the vncertaintie of place, as of time: for beeing ignorant in what place hee will attempt a landing, wee must either defende all [Page 150] places of accesse, or our intentions wil proue meere friuolous; and to performe that, it is requisite that our defensiue forces be sufficient, according to the par­ticular qualitie of euery place subiect to danger: which considering the large extension of our maritimate parts, and the manie landing places on our coast, will require a greater number of men, then this Iland canne affoord. And al­though it coulde furnish such a competent number, as might seeme in some sort sufficient; yet the vncertainty of the time of the enemies arriuall, would require that they should be lodged, either vpon or neere the places of danger, manie daies at least, if not many weekes, before the instant of their attempt, which woulde exhaust a greater masse of treasure, then could bee well affoor­ded by the state.

Secondly, it may be obiected, that all our landing places are of such disad­uantage, for the defendantes; that it were no safetie at all to make heade a­gainst him at the landing: for in asmuch as such places are open and plaine, they yeelde no commodity to shelter the defendantes from the fury of the ar­tillerie, wherewith the enemy will plentifullie furnish their long boates and lan­ding vessailes; which beating vpon the beach (for most of our landing places are of that quality) will so scatter them, that no man shall bee able to indure the inconuenience thereof.

The thirde obiection may arise from the disparitie both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either partie: for the first it must needes bee granted, that the defendantes being to garde so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to euerie particular place for defence, as the assai­lants may for offence. Concerning the qualitie of the forces, it is without question, that a great and potent Prince, (for such a one it must bee, that vn­dertaketh to inuade the territories of so absolute and well obeied a Princesse as her Maiestie is) woulde drawe out the floure of his solderie wheresoeuer; be­sides the gallant troupes of voluntaries, which do commonly attend such serui­ces. Now these being thus qualified, and drawne into one head, and being to make as it were but one body: how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being vncertaine) that the defendants should equal them with forces of like vertue and experience?

These are the reasons, which may be drawne from the disaduantage, which they haue that go about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that haue beene vrged, by such as maintaine this opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceede to the answere of these reasons, I will lay this downe for a principle. That it is impos­sible for any forraine Prince how puissant soeuer, to make such a preparation as shal be fitting to inuade a state so populous, and respectiue of their soueragine, (notwithstanding the pretenses deuised to dissemble the same) but it must of ne­cessitie be discouered, before it can bee made able to put any thing in executi­on: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage, which is required for so great a fleete. But I will rest my selfe in the example of the yeere 88. which proueth the discouery of the pretended inuasion, before it could come to execution.

[Page 151] Concerning therefore the first obiection: it cannot indeed bee denied, but the place of the enemies landing will be doubtfull,Answere to the first ob­iection. and therefore our care must generally extend it selfe to all places of accesse: but that our defensiue forces are not sufficient in a competent maner to garde all such places, according as the necessitie of them shall require, that is the point in question. To prooue that our forces are sufficient: wee must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take Kent for a president, as not altogether vnacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceiue not my selfe, is a shore of as large extension vpon the maritimate partes, as any other within this kingdom, for the breadth thereof enlarging it selfe from the point of Nesse by Lyd, which is the vttermost skirt vpon the coast of Sussex, vnto Margate vppon the coast of Essex; is by computation about twenty foure miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixt part thereof is not subiect to the landing of such an enemy, as wee speake of, partly in regarde of the hugenesse of the cliffes, which do inclose a great part of that skirt; and partly in regard that much of that quantitie, which may be landed vpon, hath such eminent and difficult places neere adioyning, as an armie that shoulde put it selfe there on shore, shoulde find it selfe being opposed but by a small force, so straitened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparant ruine of their whole forces. Further it cannot be denied, but that generally along the coast of Kent, there are so many rocks, shelues, flats, and other impediments, that a nauie of great ships canne haue no commodity to anchor neere the shore: and for the most part the coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchor: all which particularities duly considered, it wil appeare that this large skirt of Kent will affoord a far lesser part fit for the landing of an army, then was thought of at the first. And were it that so publike a treatise as this is, would ad­mit with good discretion such an exact relation, as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would vndertake to make it so euident, by the particu­lar description both of the number, quantity and qualitie of the places them­selues; as no man of an indifferent iudgement would imagine our forces to be insufficient, to affoord euery of them such a safe and sure garde, as shall bee thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is vnfitting to giue such par­ticular satisfaction in this publike discourse, giue me leaue, submitting my selfe alwaies to better iudgements, to giue a generall taste of that meanes as woulde secure all places, with a competent number of men.

Hauing shewed you before the circuit of the maritimat parts of Kent, I would obserue this order: first, to make a triple diuision of all such forces, as shall be appointed for this seruice; as for example, I wil suppose the number to be 12000 of which I would lodge 3000. about the point of Nesse, and 3000. about Mar­gate, & 6000. about Foulkston, which I take to be as it were the center: for my greatest care should be so to dispose of them, as they might not only succor one an other in the same shire, but as euery shire bordereth one vpon an other; so they should mutually giue helpe one vnto an other, as occasion should bee of­fered: as if the enemy shoulde attempt a landing about Nesse, not onely the 6000. lodged as before, shoulde march to their succours, but such also of the [Page 152] Sussex forces as were neere vnto that part; and so likewise of the rest: by which you may see how great a force would in few houres bee assembled, for the ren­forcing of any of these out skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one halfe of the whole forces are thus lodged in the center of the shire, which is neerer to all parts then any other place whatsoeuer. There woulde also in the quarte­ring of them, an especiall care bee had to the places of daunger, as might bee answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast by regiments and com­panies, as the country might affoord best oportunity, to entertaine them.

Now concerning the latter part of this obiection, which vrgeth the vncer­tainty of time, when the enemy shall make his approches: I holde it most re­quisite that our defensiue forces should be drawne into a heade, before the ene­my should be discouered neere our coast ready to put himselfe on shoare: for it were a grosse absurdity to imagine, that companies coulde vppon such a so­daine be assembled, without confusion; and make so long a march, with such expedition, as the necessity of the occasion would require. Nowe for that hus­banding respect of her Maiesties coffers, which is vrged to such extremity, as it would be vnsupportable for this state to beare: as I doubt not but good intel­ligence would much qualifie that supposed immoderate expence; so I assure my selfe, that men of sound iudgement, will deeme it much out of season to dispute about vnnecessary thrift, when the whole kingdome is brought in question of being made subiect to a stranger:

the enemy (peraduenture) hath kept 30000. men in paie 2. months before, to make hauocke of our countrey, and to bring vs into perpetuall thraldome; shal we thinke it much to maintaine sufficient forces vppon our coast, to assure our selues, that no such enemy shall enter into our countrey? the extremity of this charge woulde bee qualified by our good espiall, which would proportion our attendance, with the necessity which is imposed vpon vs to bee carefull in busi­nesses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to proue, that our forces are suf­ficient to keepe the sea cost; and that the vncertainty of time, when the ene­my will make his attempts, ought not to hinder vs from performing that dutie, which the care and respect of our Prince and countrey imposeth vpon euerie good subiect, which is the substance of the first reason, which I set downe in the beginning of this discourse.

Now concerning the second reason, which vrgeth the disaduantage of the place,The answere to the second reason. in regarde of the fury of the enemies artillery. True it is, that such pla­ces as yeelde the enemy commodity of landing, are for the most parte plaine and open, and affoord naturally no couert at all. What then? shall a soldiour take euery place as hee findeth it, and vse no arte to qualifie the disaduantages thereof? or shall a man forgo the benefit of a place of aduantage rather, then hee will relieue with industry the discommoditie of some particular circum­stance? I make no question but an ingenious commander, being in seasonable time lodged with conuenient forces vpon any of those places, yea vppon the [Page 153] beach it selfe, which is vnapt to make defensible, as anie place whatsoeuer; woulde vse such industrie as might giue sufficient securitie to his forces, and ouerwaie the enemie with aduantage of place; especially considering that this age hath affoorded such plentifull examples of admirable inuentions in that be­halfe: but this cannot be done, if our forces doe not make head before the in­stant of the enemies attempt, that our commanders may haue some time to make readie store of Gabions, handbaskets, with such moueable matter as shal be thought fit for that seruice.

Neither let this trouble anie man, for I dare auouch it, that if our for­ces are not drawne into a heade before the enemie bee discouered vppon the coast, although wee neuer meane to oppose their landing, but attende them in some inlande place, to giue them battaile; our Commanders will bee farre to seeke of manie important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let vs haue but a reasonable time to bethinke our selues of these necessaries, and we will easilie ouercome all these difficulties, and vse the benefit of the firme lande to repell an enemie, weake­ned with the sea, tossed with the billow, troubled with his weapons, with ma­nie other hinderances and discouragementes, which are presented vnto him both from the land and the sea. He that saw the landing of our forces in the I­land of Fiall, in the yeere 97. can somewhat iudge of the difficulty of that mat­ter: for what with the working of the sea, the steepnesse of the cliffes, the trouble­somnes of their armes, the soldiors were so incombred, that had not the enemie beene more then a coward, he might wel with 200. men haue kept vs from ente­ring any part of that Iland.

Concerning the thirde obiection,The answere to the third reason. this briefelie shall bee sufficient, that wee are not so much to regarde that our forces doe equall them in num­ber, as to see that they bee sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the enemies landing: for wee knowe that in places of aduan­tage and difficult accesse, a small number is able to oppose a great; and wee doubt not but all circumstances duelie considered, wee shall proportiona­blie equall the enemie, both in number and qualitie of their forces: alwaies presupposed, that our state shall neuer bee destitute of sufficient forces trai­ned, and exercised in a competent maner, to defende their Countrey from forraine enemies. For the neglect thereof, were to drawe on such as of themselues are but too forwarde, to make a praie of vs; and to make vs vn­apt, not onelie to oppose an enemies landing, but to defende our selues from beeing ouerrunne, as other nations liuing in security, without due re­garde thereof, haue beene.

And this much concerning the answere to those three reasons, which seeme to prooue that an enemie is not to bee resisted at his landing. Nowe if we do but looke a little into the discommodities, which follow vpon the lan­ding of an enemy, we shall easilie discouer the dangerousnesse of this opinion: as first, we giue him leaue to liue vpon the spoile of our countrey, which cannot be preuented by any wasting, spoiling, or retiring of our prouisions, in so plen­tiful a countrey as this is, especially considering that wee haue no strong townes [Page 154] at all to repose our selues vpon. Whereof wee neede no further testimonie, then is deliuered vnto vs out of the seuenth booke of these Commentaries, in that war, which Caesar had with Vercingetorix.

Secondly obedience, which at other times is willingly giuen to Princes, is greatly, weakened at such times; whereby all necessary meanes to maintaine a war is hardly drawn from the subiect. Thirdly, oportunity is giuen to malecon­tents and ill disposed persons, either to make head themselues, or to flie to the e­nemy. Fourthly, the madnes to aduenture a kingdom vpon one stroke, hauing it in our disposition to do otherwise, with many other disaduantages, which the o­portunity of any such occasion would discouer.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe worde imperator, Of the name Imperator. which the Eagle-bearer attributeth to Cae­sar, was the greatest title that could be giuen to a Romaine leader: and as Zonaras in his second Tome saith, was neuer giuen but vpon some great exploite, and after a iust victorie obtained; and then in the place where the battaile was fought, and the enemie ouerthrowne, the Generall was saluted by the name of Imperator, with the triumphant shoute of the whole armie; by which acclamation, the soldiours gaue testi­monie of his worth; and made it equiualent with the most fortunate Com­maunders.

This ceremonie was of great antiquitie in the Romaine Empire, as ap­peareth by manie histories,3. Annal. and namelie by Tacitus, where hee saith, that Tyberius gaue that honour to Blesus, that hee should be saluted Imperator by the legions; which hee sheweth to bee an ancient dignitie belonging to great Captaines, after they had foiled the enemy, with an eminent ouerthrowe. For euerie victorie was not sufficient, whereby they might chalenge so great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certaine number of the ene­mies to be slaine. Apian in his second booke saieth, that in olde time, the name of Imperator was neuer taken, but vpon great and admirable exploits: but in his time 10000 of the enemy being slaine in one battell, was a sufficient ground of that honour. Cicero saith, that 2000 slaine in the place, especial­lie of Thracians,Phil. 14. Spaniards or Galles, did worthely merit the name of Impe­rator. Howsoeuer it seemeth by the same author, that there was a certain num­ber of the enemy required to be slaine,Lib. 2. epist. 9. where he saith, Se insta victoria Impera­torem appellatum.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

COncerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes there­of; it hath already beene handled in the second booke, to which I will adde this much, as may serue to shew, how the Romaines be­came so ignorant of the spring tides, which happen in the full and new of the moone. It is obserued by experience, that the motion of this waterie element is altogither directed by the course of the moon, wherin she exerciseth her regency, according as shee findeth the matter qualified for her influence. And for asmuch as all mediterrean seas, and such gulfes as are inclosed in sinues and bosomes of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallnes of their quantity, are not so capable of celestiall power; as the Ocean it selfe: it consequently followeth, that the Tuskane seas, wherwith the Romains were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the o­peration of the moon, as the maine sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spa­cious circuit; and through the plenteous abundance of his parts, better answe­reth the vertue of the moone. The Ocean therfore being thus obedient to the course of the celestial bodies, taking hir course of flowing from the North, falleth with such a currant between the Orcades, and the maine of Noruegia; that she filleth our channel between England and France, with great swelling tides; and maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters, then in any other partes of the world. And hence it happeneth, that our riuer of Thames, lying with her mouth so ready to receiue the tyde as it commeth, and hauing withall a plaine leuelled belly, and a very smal fresh currant, taketh the tide as far into the land, as any other known riuer of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ignorant of the spring tides in the ful of the moone.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SVch as either by their own experience, or otherwise by obseruation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the gouernment of common weales, are not ignorant with what difficulty a nation, that ei­ther hath long liued in liberty, or bin gouerned by cōmanders of their own cho­sing, is made subiect to the yoake of bondage, or reduced vnder the obediēce of a stranger. For as we are apt by a naturall inclination to ciuill societie; so by the same nature wee desire a free disposition of our selues and possessions, as the cheefest end of the saide society. And therefore in the gouernment of a subdu­ed state, what losse or disaduantage happeneth to the victor, or how indirectlie [Page 157] soeuer it concerneth the bond of their thraldome, the captiue people behold it as a part of their aduersaries ouerthrow; and conceiue thereupon such spirites, as answere the greatnes of their hope, and sort with the strength of their will, which alwaies maketh that seeme easie to be effected which it desireth. And this was the reason, that the Britaines altered their resolution of peace, vpon the losse which the Romans had receiued in their shipping.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

BY this wee plainely finde, that there were vsually two cohortes (which according to the rate of 120 in a maniple, amounted to the number of 720 men) which kept the daie watch before the gate of the campe, and were alwaies in readinesse vpon any seruice. The commoditie whereof appeareth by this accident, for considering that the aduertisement required haste and speedie recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue to haue so manie men readie to march forward at the first motion, that they might giue what helpe they could, vntill the rest of their fellowes came in.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THeir manner of fight with chariots, is very particularly described by Caesar, and needeth not to bee stood vpon any longer: onely I ob­serue, that neither in Gallia, nor any other country of Europe, the vse of chariots is neuer mentioned: but they haue euer beene attri­buted, as a peculiar fight, vnto the easterne countries, as sutable to the plaine and leuell situation of the place, whereof we finde often mention in the scrip­ture: which may serue for an argument to Geffrey of Monmouth, to proue the Britaines descent from Troie in Asia, where we likewise finde mention of such chariots.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THirdly we may obserue, the discreete or moderate temper of his valour, and the meanes he vsed to make his souldiers confident in his directions: for notwithstanding the Britaines had exceedingly vrged him, to make hazard of a present reuenge; yet finding it an vnfit time, (inasmuch as his men had beene somewhat troubled, with the furie of the Britaines) hee thought it best to expect some other oportunitie. And a­gaine, to auoid the inconueniences of a fearefull retrait, he continued a while in the same place, to imbolden his men with the sight of the enemie. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full perswasion in his souldiers, that his acti­ons were directed with knowledge, and with a carefull respect of their safetie; which gaue his mē resolution when they were caried vpon seruice, being assured that what seruice soeuer they were imploied vpon, was most diligently to bee performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate issue of that warre: wher­as if they had perceiued that headstrong furie, which carrieth men on with a de­sire of victorie, and neuer looketh into the meanes wherby it may be obtained, had directed the course of their proceedinges, they might with reason haue drawne backe from such imploiments, and valewed their safetie aboue the issue of such an enterprise. And hence ariseth that confident opinion, which the sol­diers haue of a good Generall; which is a matter of great importance in the course of a warre.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis Iccius Portus Floide thinketh to be Caleis; others take it to bee Saint Omer, partly in regard of the situation of the place, which be­ing in it selfe verie lowe, hath notwithstanding very high bankes, which incompasse the towne about; and in times past was a verie large hauen. To this maie be added the distance from this towne, to the next continent of the Iland of Britany; which Strabo maketh to containe 320 stadia, which agreeth to the French computation of 13 leages. Caesar maketh it thirtie mile: this is the hauen, which Pliny calleth Britannicum portum Morinorum.

THE OBSERVATION.

WHerein we may behold the true image of vndanted valour, and the horrible industry (as Tully tearmeth it) which hee vsed to preuent fortune of her stroke in his busines, and comprehende casualties and future contingents, within the compas of order and the bounds of his owne power, being able in tenne daies space, to set almost eight hun­dred ships from the hazarde of winde and weather; and to make his campe the Roade for his nauie, that so he might rest secure of a meanes to returne at his pleasure.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis attempt of Caesar seemeth so strange to Brancatio, that hee runneth into as strange conclusions, concerning this matter, as first that he that imitateth Caesar, may doubt of his good fortunes: for his proceeding in this point, was not directed by any order of war; and that a great commander hath nothing common with other leaders: but es­pecially, he crieth out at the basenesse of the Britains, that woulde suffer them­selues so cowardly to be beaten. But if wee looke into the circumstances of the action, we shal find both Art & good direction therein; for being assured by the fugitiues, that the riuer was passable in that place, & in that place onlie, he knew that he must either aduēture ouer there, or leaue Cassiuellaunus for an other sū ­mer, which was a very strong inducement to vrge him to that enterprise. The [Page 173] difficultie wherof was much relieued by good direction, which consisted of two pointes, first, by sending ouer the horsemen in the front of the legions, who might better indure the charge of the enemie, then the footmen coulde, that were vppe to the necke in water; and withall, to shelter the footmen from the furie of the enemie. Secondly, he sent them ouer with that speede, that they were on the other side of the water, before the enemie coulde tell what they at­tempted: for if he had lingered in the seruice, and giuen the enemie leaue to find the aduantage which he had by experience, his men had neuer bin able to haue indured the hazard of so dangerous a seruice. It is hard to coniecture at the place, where this seruice was performed; for since the building of London bridge, manie foordes haue beene scoured with the current, and fall of the wa­ter, which before that time carried not such a depth as now they doe.

THE OBSERVATION.

ANd thus ended the warre in Britanie, which affoordeth little matter of discourse, being indeede but a scambling warre, as wel in regard of the Britaines themselues, who after they had felt the strength of the Roman legions, would neuer aduenture to buckle with them in any standing battel, as also in regard that there were no such townes in Britany as are recorded to haue been in Gallia, which might haue giuen great honour to the warre, if there had been any such to haue been besieged, and taken in by Caesar. And although Tacitus saith, that Britanie was rather viewed then sub­dued by Caesar, being desirous to draw that honour to his father in law Agrico­la; yet we finde here, that the Trinobantes, which were more then either the skirt, or the heart of Britanie, (for our Historians doe vnderstand them to haue inhabited that part, which lieth as farre as Yorkeshire and Lancashire) were brought vnder the Roman Empire by Caesar: who was the first that euer laide tribute vpon Britanie, in the behalfe of the people of Rome; or cast vpon them the heauie name of a subdued people.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Haue heard it oftentimes contradicted by some, that vnderstand not the waight of a multitude, when it was said, that an Armie keeping head continually in one part of a kingdome, was more burthensome to the common-wealth in regard of the expence of victuals, then when it was dispersed into particular cities and families, before the time of the muster and inrolement: for (say they) in the generall account of the publike weale, it differeth nothing, whether a multitude of 30000 men be maintained with necessarie prouisions in one intire body together, or dispersed particularly throughout euerie part of the countrie: forasmuch as euerie man hath but a competent quantitie allotted vnto him, which hee cannot want in what sort or condition of life soeuer he be ranged; neither doth the charge of a multitude grow in regard they are vnited together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude wheresoeuer. But such as looke into the difference with iudgement, shall finde a maruellous inequalitie, both in regarde of the portion of victuals which is spent, and the meanes whereby it is prouided: for first we must vnder­stand, [Page 177] that an armie lying continually in one place, falleth so heauie vpon that part, that it quickly consumeth both the fatte and the flesh (as they say) and lea­ueth nothing vnspent, which that part can affoord them; and without further supply of prouisions, would in a small time come to vtter destruction. This want then must be relieued by taking from the plentie of other bordering quarters, to furnish the wants of so great a multitude: wherin there cannot be obserued that proportion of moderate taking, to vittaile the Armie with a sufficient compe­tencie, but the partiall respect which the purueiers, and vittailers will haue to their priuat commodity, wil quickly make an inconuenience either in the coun­trey, from whence it is taken; or in the Armie, for which it is prouided; accor­ding as the errour may best aduantage their particular, what discipline soe­uer be established in that behalfe. Whereas on the contrarie part, when euerie particular man of that multitude shal be billeted in a seueral family, throughout all parts of the kingdome, the charge will be so insensible, in regard of the ex­pence of the said families, that the country will neuer feele any inconuenience. And if euerie housholder that had receiued into his house one of the said army, should giue a true account of that which riseth aboue his ordinary expence; by the addition of one man, it would fall farre short of that treasure, which is ne­cessarily required, to maintaine the saide number of men vnited together into one bodie. Neither doth the difference consist in the quantitie of vittailes, which euerie man hath for his portion, whether they be dispersed or vnited; but in the maner of prouision, and the meanes which is vsed to maintaine them: wherein euery master or steward of a familie, endeuoureth to make his prouisions at the best hand, & so to husband it, that it may serue for competencie, and not for su­perfluitie; and by that means, the general plenty of the country is maintained, & the cōmon-wealth florisheth by well directed moderation. But in the victua­ling of an army, there is no such respect had, which may any way aduantage the publike good; for there the gaine of the purueier riseth by experience & super­fluous wasting, rather then by thrift and sauing frugalitie: and so the common-wealth is weakned by the il husbanding of that great portion of vittaile, which is allowed for so great a multitude. And if they should haue such varietie of viands in an Armie, as they haue when they are in seuerall families, it were vnpossible it should continue any time together. And therefore the Romans, notwithstan­ding the exactnesse of their discipline, could affoord their armies no other pro­uision but corne, and larde, as well in regard of the commoditie which that kinde of diet affoorded them in the course of their warres, as also for the good of that countrey, wherein they were resident. And if it so fell out, that the extre­mitie of the season, or any other cause, had brought a dearth into the lande, there was no readier waie to helpe that inconuenience, then by dispersing their Armies into diuers quarters; which Caesar disposed with that care, that they might be as neere together as they could.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

COncerning the choice of their souldiers and their maner of inrole­ment, I had rather referre the reader to Polybius, then enter into the particular discourse of that action; which was carried with such grauitie and religious ceremonies, as might best serue to possesse their mindes of the waight and consequence of that businesse: but for as much as the largenesse of their Empire, and the necessitie of their occasions would not admit, that the enrolment should still be made at Rome amongst the citi­zens, as it appeareth by this legion which was inrolled beyond the riuer Po; it consequently followeth, that such Ceremonies, which were annexed to the place, were altogether omitted: and therefore I cannot speake of that which the olde Romans did in that part of their discipline, as a thing continued vnto Caesars time. But he that desireth to see the maner of their choise, with such com­plements as might adde both a reuerent respect, and a Maiestie to the worke; let him reade Polybius of that argument.

THE OBSERVATION.

IT nowe plainelie appeareth, by this negligent and ill ordered march, and the vnlooked for incounter which the Galles gaue thē, that feare had ratified in the iudgment of Sabinus the smooth suggestion of Ambiorix, with an approbation of a certaine truth; and laied that for a principle, which a discourse free from pas­sion would haue discerned to be but weake, and of no probabilitie: which so much the more amazed Titurius, by howe much his apprehension had erred from the truth, and betraied good counsell to a course full of danger; which as Caesar noteth, must needes fall vpon such, as are then to seeke for direction when the businesse requireth execution. I haue handled alreadie the inconue­niences of disappointment; and therfore at this time wil but bring it only into remembrance, that wee may take the greater care to preuent an accident of that nature: wherein, as the best remedie for an euill is to foresee it, according to the saying, praeuisa pereunt mala; so the greatest mischiefe in an euill, is when it commeth vnthought of, and besides our expectation; for then it fal­leth vpon vs with a supernaturall waight, and affrighteth the minde with a su­perstitious astonishment, as though the diuine powers had preuented our des­signements, with an irremediable calamitie, and cut off our appointment with a contrarie decree: although peraduenture the thing it selfe carie no such im­portance, but might be remedied, if wee were but prepared with an opinion, that such a thing might happen. It were no ill counsell therefore, what reso­lution soeuer bee taken, to make as full account of that which may fall out to crosse our intentions, as that which is likelie to happen from the directi­on of our chiefest proiects; and so we shall be sure to haue a present mind in the middest of our occasions, and feele no further danger, then that which the nature of the thing inforceth.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Haue alreadie handeled the nature of an Orbe, with such pro­perties as are incident to a circle; wherein I shewed the con­ueniencie of this figure, in regarde of safe and strong imbat­tailing: I will nowe adde this much concerning the vse thereof, that as it is the best manner of imbattailing for a defensiue strength, and therefore neuer vsed but in extremitie; so we must be very care­full, that the sodaine betaking of our selues to such a refuge, doe not more dismaie the soldiours, then the aduantage of that imbattailing canne benefit [Page 188] them. For vnlesse a leader be carefull to keepe his men in courage, that their hearts may bee free from despaire and amazement, what profit can there arise from any disposition or bodie soeuer, when the particular members shall bee sencelesse of that duty, which belongeth vnto them? for order is nothing but an assistance to courage, giuing meanes to manage our valour with aduantage. In the warre of Africke wee reade, that Caesars legions being incircled about with great multitudes of enemies, were forced to make an Orbe; but he quick­lie turned it to a better vse, by aduancing the two Cornets two contrary waies, and so deuided the enemy into two partes; and then beate them backe to their great disaduantage.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

I Neede not stand vpon this order which the Galles heere tooke, con­cerning pillage, that no soldior should forsake his station, or disranke himselfe in hope of spoile; which is a thing that from the very infan­cie of warres hath often changed the fortune of the day, and solde the honor of a publike victorie, for priuate lucre and petty pilfering. Amongst other examples,Lib. 20 let that which Guichardine reporteth of the battell of Taro, suffice to warne a well directed armie, as well by the good which Charles the eighth of that name, King of France, receiued at that time, as by the losse which the Italians felt by that disorder, not to seeke after pillage vntil the victory be obtained.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe insufficiency of these Commanders, whereof Caesar now com­plaineth as the only want, which these Romans had to cleere them­selues of this daunger; bringeth to our consideration that which former times haue made a question, which is, whether it were the vertue of the Roman leaders, or the valor of their soldiers, that inlarged their Empire to that greatnes, and made their people and senate Lords of the world? Polybius waighing the causes of a victorie, which the Carthagineans gained of the Romans, by the counsell and good direction of one Zantippus a Greci­an, hauing before that time receiued diuers ouerthrowes, during the time of those warres in Africke; concluded, that it was more in the worthines of the Commanders, then in any extraordinary vertue of the soldiours, that the Ro­mans atchieued so many conquests. And besides the present example of Zan­tippus, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of Hanniball; who from the beginning of the second punicke warre, still gained of the Roman Empire, enlarging the territories of Carthage, and streightening the iurisdiction of mightie Rome, vntill it had got a leader matchable to that subtle Carthagine­an, and found a Scipio to confront their Hannibal. To this may be added that [Page]

[Page] [Page 189] famous battell betweene the olde Romans, and the last Latines; wherein both parties were equally ballaunced, both in number and quality of their soul­diers, hauing both the same Armes, the same vse of their weapons, and the same discipline, as if it had beene in a Ciuill warre: neither could fortune tell by the presence of their Armies, where to bestowe her fauour, or where to shewe her disdaine; but that the worthinesse of the Roman leaders brought the oddes in the triall, and made Rome great with the ruine of the Latines. Whereby it ap­peareth, how much it importeth the whole fortune of an Armie, to haue a lea­der worthie of the place which he holdeth: forasmuch as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequalitie betweene two equall Armies, then the wise­dome and experience of a graue commander, or the disabilitie of an vnskil­full leader; which are so powerfull in their seuerall effectes, that there is grea­ter hope of a heard of Hartes led by a Lyon, then of so many Lyons conduc­ted by a Harte.

THE OBSERVATION.

I Haue spoken alreadie of the manner of the Roman fight, consisting altogether in good disposition of imbattailing, and in firme stan­ding, and buckling at handy-blowes: as may appeare by this circum­stance, where Ambiorix forbiddeth his men to buckle with them, but to giue backe and follow on againe, as the lightnesse of their Armes gaue them oportunitie. In like manner in the first booke of the Ciuill warres, in the battell betweene Caesar and Affranius, it appeareth, that Caesar his souldi­ers were bound to keepe their araie, not to leaue their ensignes, nor without a waightie occasion to forsake their stations appointed them: whereas the Af­franians fought thinne, and scattered here and there; and if they were hard laied vnto, they thought it no dishonour to retire and giue backe, as they had learned of the Portugals, and other Barbarous nations.

THE OBSERVATION.

THe ambitious and working spirit of Ambiorix, that could attempt to raise the basenesse of a small and ignoble state, to so high a point of resolution, that they durst aduenture vpon the Roman legions, being setled in the strength of their Empire, by the memorie of so manie victories in Gallia: wanted now no meanes to make an ouerture to a v­niuersall commotion, propounding libertie and reuenge to the Galles, two the sweetest conditions that can happen to a subdued people, if they would but stretch out their hands to take it, and follow that course which his example had proued sure and easie. Which maie serue to shewe, that he that will attempt vpon doubtfull and vnsafe Principles, will take great aduantage from a proba­ble entrance, and make a small beginning a sufficient meanes for his greatest dessignes.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis Q. Cicero is said to bee the brother of Marcus Cicero the fa­mous Oratour, & to him were the letters sent which are found in his Epistles, directed Quincto fratri. In this action his cariage deserued as great reputation, in the true censure of honor, as euer his brother did for his eloquence, pro Rostris. And if it had been the others fortune to haue performed the like seruice, he would haue made it the greatest exploit that euer Roman had atchieued by armes: wherein particularly may be commended the diligence and industrie, which was vsed in raising so manie towers, in so small a time; for prouiding the night before, such thinges as were necessarie for the next daies defence; for making so manie stakes hardened at the ende with fire, for the defence of the rampier; and for the store of these murall piles, which re­sembled the forme of the ordinarie pile, but were farre greater and waightier in regard they were to be cast from the rampier; which gaue them such aduantage, by reason of the height, that being cast by a strong and well practised arme, they were verie effectuall and of great terrour.

THE OBSERVATION.

THe first attempt, which Ambiorix made vpon the campe of Sabi­nus and Cotta, was but short; but here what with the pride of the former victorie, and the great multitude of the assailants, they con­tinued it longer, in hope to carrie it by assault: for the first assault of a place, especially when it commeth by waie of surprise, is of greater hope to the assailant, and of greater danger to the defendant, then such as afterward are made in the sequell of the warre: for after the first brunt, the heate of the enemy is much abated, as well through the nature of a hot desire, which is most vio­lent in the beginning, and afterward groweth colde and remisse, as also with the harmes and perill which they meete with in the incounter; and on the contra­rie side, the defendants hauing withstood the first furie, wherein there is most terrour and distrust, grow more confident and better assured of their manhood, and in experience of their strength stand firme against anie charge whatsoeuer.