A TREATISE OF THE COVRT: OR Instructions for Courtiers.
The first Booke.
Wherein is very amply set foorth, the principall parts requisite and necessary in a Courtier.
CHAP. 1.
- 1 Of the incertainty, variablenesse, and alteration of the Court.
- 2 That in Court there is more Fortune, then conduction.
- 3 That in Court Preferments, Fortune is intermixed with good conduction.
- 4 The Author his excuse, vpon the method, order, and diuision of his Treatise.
1 OOf all sorts of conuersations, the most entermixed, dificult and ticklish is that of the Court▪ Where (vsually) no others betake themselues, but [Page 2] those who are either driuen thereunto by Ambition, or fraughted with a desire to eraise their owne fortunes. Now as these passions are violent, and for the most part, more abounding in those who resolue to vndertake so painefull a profession and facultie: so their motions are likewise violent, their occurrences harsh and distastefull, and commonly the more vsuall and frequent, in that diuers ayme at one and the same end: for haue Countiers occasion to conceale any thing, their dissimulation is more apparant and their subtilty more malitious, as being necessarily constrained to sympathize, and beare vp with the Pride and Vanitie of those, who are in fauour & credit with the Prince; and many times being not able to content them in their (seldome reasonable) desires: they runne a hazard, rather to ruine then aduance their owne fortunes.
In which Compo [...]tment, such is the variablenesse and incertainety, that it is absolutely impossible to prescribe infallible and certaine rules: Wherefore the best aduise and counsell in this cause is, that which wee sodainly conceiue, when our vigilancy and circumspection (as it were) denounceth warre to our eyes: which makes that in this variety and incertainty, many haue beleeud that in Court preferments there is more hazard and fortune, then cariage & conductiō.
[Page 3] 2 And the Emperour Sigismund to teach a Courtier of his (who after many yeares seruice, complained to haue receiued no profit nor preferment of him) that such faults proceed not from Princes, rather from the ill fortune of Courttiers: proffered him two close boxes, the one full of gold, the other of lead; giuing him the choise of either of them, for his reward and recompence: who thinking to take that of gold, tooke that of lead; whereby perceiuing and acknowledging his owne bad Fortune, hee condemned himselfo and acquitted the Emperour, in that hee had not formerly tasted the fruits, and enioyed the effects of his liberalitie.
3 Neuerthelesse wee must not beleeue that Court affaires, are alwaies gouerned by Fortune: for it falls out there, as at Primere, or other plaies, wherein Fortune is directed and conducted by Art, and the best and subtilst Gamester may lose if it crosse him; but if it smile on him, and fauour him, he then best knowes how to manage and gouerne it: and we may well say that not onely the Court, but the whole course of our life is the same, and hereunto may bee fitly and pertinently Compared.
Neuerthelesse, sith the Court is an emmi nent and conspicuous Theatre, exposd to the sight and eyes of the world: we may therefore therein the better obserue and remarke [Page 4] the hazard of Fortune, in respect we must not omit the vniuersall and common rules that may best auaile and profit vs in this our comportment and carriage, although they correspond, or concurre not alwaies with our desires: many skilfull Pilots haue suffered shipwrack, although they haue beene well acquainted with the Art and experience of Nauigation; and others lesse seene therein, without Astrolobe or Carde, haue happily vanquished and ouer-past many long and dangerous voyages, and yet wee know it folly to inferre or conclude, that therefore without Art, experience, Carde, or Astrolobe, we should expose our selues to the mercy of the windes and seas.
4. But certainly I could desire and wish, yee had chosen a more expert Pilot then my selfe, to wa [...]t yee through the Ocean of these Court affaires, it being impossible, that (in the solitarinesse wherein I liue) I should present ye any other then a strange and vncertaine mappe, and so depaint ye the directions and examples, that fore-past time (the ordinary recreations of my solitarinesse) hath taught and instructed mee: for to produce examples of these moderne times, although it could bee performed with more profit: yet sith wee cannot speake of the liuing without enuie, I hold [Page 5] it more safe, lesse dangerous therein to be silent.
Also, I beleeue your intent is not that I ingage my selfe in such Treatises of the truth, wherein yee are more expert then my selfe; to the end therefore that I may obserue and follow some order, and Decorum in so confused a subiect, I will first speake of the requisites most necessarie in a Cour [...]er, then of the practise and vse thereof in his behauiour and carriage: whither it bee to aduance himselfe into reputation and fauour; or to maintaine himselfe therein, being already aduanced; or to preuent his fall and disgrace, to the end he make himselfe more pleasing and lesse rediculous.
CHAP. II.
- 1 Of the qualities most requisite and necessary in a Courtier, being the first head and subiect of this first Booke.
- 2 Of his Ciuilitie.
- 3 Of his gracefull speech.
- [Page 6] 4 Of the countenance and gesture.
- 5 Of his apparell, and the nearing thereof.
1 THe necessariest qualities requisit in a Courtier for his first entrance, are ciuilitie and readinesse to doe Good vnto all men: for his conduction and behauiour, Gracefulnesse, and Dexterity, and for his subsistence and continuance, Patience, Humilitie, Boldnesse, and Capacitie.
2 Ciu [...]litie chiefly consists in two points, whereby it makes vs compleat and accomplished: the one a decency or gracefulnesse, whereunto with our best endeauours wee must pertinently striue to conforme our selues: The other a pleasing Affabilitie, which makes vs not onely haue accesse and welcome to all those whom wee would frequent, but also inwardly incite; and animates them both to craue our company, and desire our familiarity and conuersation.
3 This Dcc [...]cy, or gracefulnesse, lookes three waies: to wit, to our Speach, Countenance and Apparell. In our speach, our voice must be cleare, not harsh, and yet neither too shrill, nor too low; not slammering, but smooth and distinct; out tearmes and phrases must be modest, significant, intelligible, and plaine, and yet neither base nor affected: but still pertinent and proper to [Page 7] the matters we conferre of.
4 In our Countenance the ayre of our Visage must be pleasing, gracious and modest, not affected, or constrained, but without the least shaddow of ridiculous postures or smiles: the carriage and comportment of our bodie must be free from all Mimicke, or peeuish gestures, and in all our vsuall actions, as in eating, drinking, exercise, pastime, or the like: We must be Modest and still followe that which is generally applauded of those, with whom we conuerse.
5 In our Apparell wee must bee decent, not prodigall or superfluous, and the fashion thereof must correspond with the time, without too much affecting the new, or being wedded to the old; but herein to bee the better ordered and instructed, we must consider the apparell and fashion, worne by those who in Court are reputed both wise and gracefull: to the ende wee may thereby sympathize with them in the fashion of our Apparell, and so (as neere as we may) both reforme and conforme our selues to their immitation.
CHAP. III.
- 1 Of Affabilitie in generall, and wherein it consists.
- 2 Of the allurements thereof.
- 3 To hearken and to be attentiue.
- 4 To reproue pleasantly, yet modestly.
- 5 What is chiefly necessary in great Personages.
- 6 Wherewith Affabilitie must be seconded and attended.
1 AFsabilitie consists of many points, but chiefly in knowing how to salute and receiue men respectiuely, and to entertaine them courteously, how to meete, honour, and entitle them: in a word, by exteriour demonstration of affection, and by assuring them of our Courtesie and good will, and with many alluring gestures and compliments, giuing them all approbation and considence to speake freely vnto vs.
2 Neither is it sufficient to satisfie mens conceits, and only to make them beleeue we loue them, that we beare them much affection, and eagerly and earnestly desire to serue and assist them: but we must endeauour with a pleasing countenance; yea, with an agreeable reception, not only to entice but to allure them to hant and frequent our company.
[Page 9] 3 And hauing thus preuailed with them, and drawn them to our desires, we must giue eare and hearken to them, with all demonstration both of Content and Patience; for he that will not be attentiue, is neuer Affable: neither likewise is he, who interrupts, or contradicts another man in his discourse; or which is worse, who fore-stals, or foretels that he would say: it falling out often, that they make themselues both rediculous and confounded, together with their losse of breath & time, finding thēselues many times in their owne erronious opinions, farthest off from that which another inten [...]s to say: besides, to interrupt or distract the conceptions of him that speakes, or not to listen to him, is both an offence and iniurie, as also a true testimony of contempt and disdaine.
4 But we shall principally testifie our attention, in answering pertinently, and with iudgement, and pleasantnesse, in auoiding as much as possible wee may all harsh iests and sharpe replies, which in those who speake to vs, will speedily ingender a hope that they may easily haue accesse to vs, and conuerse with vs as often as they please.
5 Yet although this facilitie and disposition to vnderstand and answer, be necessary to all sorts of people, as also to all replies, yet it is more befitting and beseeming great Personages, who communicate of weightie [Page 10] affaires: for their inferiours, beleeuing that those who vse these pleasing respects and complements, do as it were make themselues their equals; are thereby induced and assured, that they neede not feare, fully to open and discouer them their thoughts and designes, as if it were to their friends and fellowes. Yea we may well affirme that in a manner, such doe hereby as it were keepe and retaine the keyes of mens hearts.
But as the respect and honour a great man sheweth vs, is not onely agreeable and pleasing to vs in respect of his person: but also because his coutenance and fauour purchaseth vs more credit in those who are present: right so his dis-respect and disdaine, doth not onely anger vs because of himselfe, but it is insupportable in respect of the base esteeme that others make of vs, to see vs so sleighted and neglected of him.
6 Neuerthelesse, although this Affabilitie must be accompanied with a pleasing behauiour and carriage: yet it is not therefore to infer, that it must not be waited & attended on by that Decency & Grauitie, which is answerable to our ranke and condition.
But as true harmony is ingendred of the sweet and iudicious Diapason of these two discordant [...]ones, pleasant, and graue: so affabilitie must be intermixed with sweetnes, and seueritie, (or statlinesse:) or to say truer, [Page 11] to be a Medium twixt these two extreames: so as the one affright not those with whom we conuerse, nor the other make vs seeme displeasing, or vitious in their eyes: but that it be conducted and gouernd with an agreable sweetnesse and grauitie, according to the estate and qualitie, of the affaires, persons, & other dependant circumstances answerable in all respects to the aduise and counsell that the Emperour Emanuell gaue his Sonne Paliogus.
CHAP. IV.
| 1 | That pleasant Iests and replies beare a part in Affabilitie. |
| 2 | How we must vse them. |
| 3 | Whereof they must be framd. |
| 4 | What Iests and replies we must eschewe and auoyd. |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | Of their difference and diuersitie. |
| 9 |
1 PLeasant Iests and Replyes make also a part of Affabilitie, and serue to temper our speach: Nature hauing infusd laughter into man, purposely to case [Page 12] and recreate his sad and melancholly humours incident and subiect to follow his affaires: neuerthelesse, herein we must beare a cleere iudgement and a solid discretion; for those who vpon all occasions, licentiously vse the contrarie: in stead of being Affable and Courteous, are commonly held for scoffers and fooles.
2 Wee must therefore vse them soberly and modestly, and intermixe and disperce them as lightning in the darkenesse of a Graue discourse: so that they neither debase the dignitie person, or mat ter that is to be treated of.
For as a little water powred on a great sire, the more enlightens and inflames it, and if wee throw too much thereon, doth wholly dead and extinguish it: so the frequency and excesse of these Iests, lose their dignitie and grace, in him who makes it a continuall profession to vse them: whereas, if they bee scattered and disperced iudiciously, they reinflame, and giue them the more lustre, vigour, and life; for to say truly, we should vse them as sauce or prouocation to appetite, and not as meate, for feare lest in thinking to giue some relish to affaires, and negotiations, they chance procure distast, if not a surfet.
3 But the quantitie and qualitie of these [Page 13] Iests and replies, must be such, as they comprehend in them, no odious conception or matter: to wit, that they sauour not of scurrilitie, turne not into a scandall or laughter, or into a reproch of any shamefull truth to him with whom wee speake or conferre: for such broad taunts, quips, and lests, insted of counselling or reconciling mens humours, sometimes prouoke them to contempt, disdaine, or hatred, and especially great men are subiect a long time to remember those of this nature.
And howsoeuer, although it be lawfull to reply when wee are toucht or assaulted with the like [...]ests: Neuerthelesse, the most modest and wisest councell we can take herein, is to rebate the edge of such Iests, either with a graue silence, or with no distastfull smiles, or laughter; rather then through a bitter Iest or sharpe reply to lose our friend.
4 Wee must also eschew and slye those Iests that are vsually frequent in the mouthes of common people, which commonly sauour something of basenesse and scurrilitie, as also those that are deriued from equiuocations, or those that import a double sence or meaning: because for the most part, they are foolish, constrain'd, and subiect to be taken in ill part: but aboue all [Page 14] let vs be carefull not to accompany our Iests with wry mouthes, deformed gestures, or vnseemely countenances, as Knaues and Fooles vse to doe.
5 Neither must such Iests be affected or premeditated, but conceiud, and vttered without pondering or ruminating thereon.
6 Wee must also slye those that are too vnkindly fetch'd, or that fauour of Pride or Presumption: and we must nor bite so sharpely, that we ingage our selues, either in other mens malice, or hatred, or in our owne shamefull acknowledgement or satisfaction.
7 Neither must we reproach others of that whereof wee our selues may bee iustly reproached: nor Iest at those who are misfortunate or miserable, sith tis two great a cruelty: nor at the wicked, sith they are more worthy of hatred then of laughter: neither at our friends, or patents, as being a matter full of enuy; and a true signe of a peruerse and vnnaturall Nature. Briefely, whosoeuer will delight in Iesting, hee must be very considerate and respectiue of persons, time, and place; as also of other necessarie and dependant circumstances.
8 As for the diuersitie of Iests and replies, they are many: some consisting of a short word; some in the conceit and vnderstanding [Page 15] of him who speakes, others in the manner thereof: Or that wee answere to that they lest expect from vs; or that we answere faintly and coldly, to a question demanded of vs with much vehemency and impatiency.
9 Of which Iests and answers although I could here produce many examples of the Ancients: neuerthelesse, sith they are sooner and better learnt by practice and conuersation, I will omit them, in respect they for the most part are cold and impertinent to recite: if the words bee not inflamd, and inrich'd with that Grace wherewith they were formerly pronounced and vttered.
CHAP. V.
- 1 That Complements beare a great part in Affabilitie, with their definition.
- 2 Of their Medium and Extreames.
- 3 That we should practise them according to occasions, as also how to practice them.
- 4 Of the answers we ought returne vnto them.
1 COmplements likewise clame a great part and share in Affabilitie; wee define them to be a brief expression of loue, a declaration [Page 16] or demonstration of Honnor, and an obligation to those whom we desire should beleeue they are exceedingly respected and beloued of vs with a reciprocall affection.
2 The manner of this Office and Compliment (as of all other matters) hath both its Medium and Extreames, in so much as to obserue the Mediocritie, it is necessary wee enter into the consideration of the circumstances, person, place, time, matter, and cause: why and wherein this phrase of speech is more sit for great, small, or equall personages; or when there is no farther neede, then to testifie a simple and small good will; or contrariwise when wee ought expresse and dilate a deeper respect and obligation.
But aboue all we must be carefull, not so much to affect lofty words, as that wee ingage our selues in any impertinent or impropper termes, or in any vnfit or farre fetcht replies, but to our familiars; we must vse common phrases, and not those that are affected or strained: in a word, heere our tongue and our Iudgement must march hand in hand, as equals; and we must still accompany our discourse with gestures, countenances, and other exteriour behauiour which may expresse the like affection and desire; briefly making known the causes and reasons that induce vs to loue or honour any one, or that we feele our selues oblig'd to thē.
[Page 17] Among which, we must make choice of those Complements, that are more fit and proper for the purpose, and that are more apparant and knowne of him to whom we will performe them.
And if we haue formerly receiued any testimonie of his affection: either in that he hath perform'd vs some friendly office, or that hee hath testified, or expressed so much in his speeches: we must often remember it to him, and attribute it to his kinde Nature, full of affection and courtesie, the which he will the sooner beleeue; because euery one being deceiued with the loue of himselfe, very easily perswades himselfe thereof, and reioiceth that another beleeues, hee possesseth those perfections and qualities, that may make him pleasing, esteem'd, and beloued of all men.
And this meanes being practised with Art and Discretion, hath a certaine secret, and hidden power, to moue and dispose our Vnderstandings to beleeue those who make vse thereof.
I say discretion, because we meet with some Natures (although they are rare in Court) who are so farre from this common U [...]itie, as they only esteeme and repute it, but the tricke of a Mount-banke or Iugler; yoa, and for the most part, they suspect and are iealous of this forme of proceeding.
[Page 18] 3 Wherefore with these we must auoid all degrees of affectation, and not enter into such like complements: but in those Iest & replies whose custome makes them necessary; or when we are enforc'd thereunto by the consequence or dependance, of a discourse, or businesse, that may testifie in vs, rather a habit, and firme resolution of our Will, then the impetuositie of any violent or vehement affection, that may bee suspected to bee performed, either out of inconstancie, immitation, or of set purpose and designe.
4 In the answers wee returne to these complements: wee must behaue our selues in the same manner and temper; but more particularly to meete and answer the good offices, reported and acknowledged to be receiued of vs: and albeit we ought to extenuate them, yet not to diminish them more then is requisite and fit, as some vsually doe.
Sith in diminishing them too much, or by affirming it a matter we would performe for any other, we thereby accuse him who receiue and applaude those our good offices done him: and who thinkes to inioy therein an extraordinary testimonie of our affection and good will; the which we our selues deminish in deminishing it, so as we thereby dis-esteeme and vnderualew his worth, who thought he had been obliged to vs as a friend in comparison of those who are not.
[Page 19] In which regard although our dutie hath sometimes led vs to performe a good office; yet we must make shew that it is a particular affection that induced vs thereunto; and this neuerthelesse must be perform'd without any signe or demonstration of vanitie.
So much in generall may be said of these degrees of friendly offices, which practised discreetly, may much auaile to purchase vs reputation and credit; where contrariwise, if they are not accompanied with Wisedome, they will in the ende proue rediculous, and so it being omitted and neglected, may iustly offend those who expect to receiue them from vs.
CHAP. VI.
| 1 | Of our readinesse to performe a pleasure or good office. |
| 2 | Considerations thereon. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | We must doe it voluntarily, speedily, liberally. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | Hauing performed it, we must not instantly expect or [...]raxe the like. |
| 9 | We must not displease one to please another. |
| 10 | Examples hereon. |
1 REadinesse to performe a pleasure (or good office) is one of the chiefest requisites that should be in a Courtier, at least, in him who desires to bee scene, and bid welcome in good Companies, it containes the principall effects of good will and friendship: that is to say, to pleasure others, and to acknowledge it, hauing receiued the like of others.
Good offices wee performe, are the cyment of humane societie, and the fetters and manacles (saies an Antient) wherewith we may inchaine and captiuate others, especially at Court, where the interest and performance thereof is the twist, or coard, that conioines and combines so many people one to another: yea, although for the most part, they are drawne thereunto with different and contrarie affections.
2 But the chiefest consideration we must haue and retaine in performing a good office, or pleasure, is to performe it in that manner that it may be agreeable and pleasing to him that receiues it of vs: there being many occasions wherein thinking to please, we displease; and this fals out through our owne default, in not knowing the desire [Page 21] and inclination of him to whom we would doe good.
3 Another consideration, is the manner how to performe a good office: for there are diuers sorts and degrees of them; some are Honourable to those who receiue them, and indeed, these should be done, before the publike eye of the world, to the end their honour be the greater and more apparant.
4 Others are profitable; such are those when wee assist and releeue the pouertie, weaknesse, shame, or necessitie of him who receiues them; and these indeed must be performed secretly, and apart.
5 But both the one and the other should be done willingly, and cheerefully, not repiningly, by constraint, or importunat solicitation, or request: for, that which we depart from, or distribute in this manner, we giue not, but rather sell it at a deere rate; sith requests and praiers are alwaies accompanied with submission and bashfulnesse.
6 They must also be done speedily, and willingly, for the lingering & delaying hereof, is a signe either of doubt or of no great good will or affection for soone to refuse, or late to giue, is almost one and the same thing.
7 According to Philosophie, good offices performd, shold neither be mercinary, or performd in hope to receiue the like: but in Court there are none perform'd or giuen otherwise; [Page 22] and yet we must doe them so, as none may discouer this hope in vs: but with all our industrie striue to make them beleeue, that what we doe is freely; otherwise they are no more beholding to vs, then to a Vsurer, who lends sorth his money to receiue it againe with interest.
8 Wherefore he that hath performed a good office or pleasure to his friend▪ must bee aduisd, and take heed that he not suddenly demand him a recompence, for feare that being discouered, to desire and craue the like, he make it apparant he did it purposely for the same end.
9 We must also be carefull, that in pleasuring one we displease and offend not another in Court, for feare lest: we lose by the bye, that which we thought to haue gotten by the maine: if a good office that we propose our selues take no desired effect, it shall be neuerthelesse wisedome in vs to continue our best endeauors and solicitations therein, there by to inforce the Ingratefull person to take notice and knowledge thereof; at least if we be any way bound or oblig'd to him for so by our new affections and good offices, we still refresh and confirme our old.
But one thing whereof we must principally take heed, (although it be common in Court) is, not to trouble or disturbe him in enioying that good he hath receiued by our [Page 23] meanes, as doe those, who hauing procured an office for a man, will make him execute it according to their owne fantasie, and pleasure, and refusing it will conuert their affection into hatred, and so seeke and plod to ruine him, whom they haue formerly preferred and aduanced.
10 Thus did Ruffinus (vnder the Emperour Arcadius) to Lucian, whom hee had made Earle and Iudge of the East; who afterwards, not satisfying him in his iniust request of Eucherius (Vnkle vnto Arcadius) he caused him miserably to be slaine.
This Example might be accompanied with diuers others of the like nature had I not (as before) propos'd breuitie in this my Treatise.
CHAP. VII.
- 1 Of acknowledging and requitting good offices receiued, and wherein is consists.
- 2 Of the consideration thereof.
- 3 How they are, to be measured.
- 4 How to be considered according to the Persons.
- 5 The meanes we must obserue in acknowledging a good office done vs.
- [Page 24]6 When to acknowledge it.
1 LEt vs proceed to the vnderstan [...]ing of a Courtesie or fauour done vs, which consists in the orderly receiuing & remembring thereof, as also in knowing worthily both how, and when to requite it.
This fauour, or good office done vs, must be graciously receiued, with amiable speeches, and a smiling countenance.
As for the remembrance thereof, we must expresse and testifie it, in reuealing the content we haue receiued, not only in praising and cherishing it, but also in applauding and extolling our benefactor.
And for the regard of the recompence and requitall, it must beare proportion, and relation, to the benefit we haue receiued, and to the persons and meanes we haue to acknowledge it.
2 A good office or courtesie done vs, must be measured and considered in its true nature, as whether it be great or small, easie or difficult, singular or common, true or false, by accident or occasion, or whether it were done vs in our great need and necessitie: for such fauours and gratuities, are of great force, and make vs forget all former iniuries and offences, if there haue beene any betwixt vs: as [Page 25] contrariwise the refusall thereof in such a time is very iniurious, and makes vs forget all former fauours.
3 Good offices and Courtesies are likewise to be measured by the intent of him who hath done them: as if he haue performed them to pleasure vs, or for his own priuate benefit, and ends; or through vanitie, constraint, necessity or hazard, either in not thinking therof, or in imagining to haue done the contrary.
4 The consideration of the persons may also more or lesse oblige vs to acknowledge receiued fauours; for those are alwaies best welcome, that are imparted vs from a friendly hand; and from those who for other respects we are disposd and addicted to loue. Contrariwise, it displeaseth and distasts vs, to be oblig [...]d to those who displease vs, and to whom we would be no way ingaged or indebted; and that also which proceeds from him, that is in some respect bound to vs: for his courtesie being then iustly due to vs, we in that regard are the lesse obliged to him.
5 As for the means we must vse in requiting a receiued Courtesie, we must if possible we can exceed, at least equall them, withall demonstration, that we are bound to more: and that this is not to satisfie the debt, but rather only to acknowledge the obligation.
Likewise, when we cannot doe otherwise, we must at least pay with a pleasing demonstration [Page 26] of good will, wherein those exceedingly fa [...]le, who hauing receiued some especiall fauour, which in effect, they cannot sufficiently acknowlege, instead of requiting their benefactors with affection and friendship, they reward them with contempt and hatred, flying and eschewing all meanes to meet them: for feare their presence reproach them either with ingratitude or pouertie.
6 Now hauing obtain'd the meanes to requite a former receiued court [...]sie, we must then seeke all occasions to come out of their debt, yet with these precautions, that we doe it not either too soone or too curiously; to the end that wee seeme not impatient to be oblig'd to our friend; or that thereby wee imagine, he did vs a fouour purposely to receiue another from vs.
But we must requite a fauour or benefit a little after we haue receiued it; and yet not protract or delay it too long neither: to the end it grow not old, but we must doe it when some fit occasion presenteth it selfe to vs, or shall be sought for by vs; yet still, with this Prouiso that we doe it without flatterie, or ostentation.
CHAP. VIII.
| 1 | Of an actiue and nimble wit, the second head of this first Booke. |
| 2 | A digression vpon the difference of the Person [...], and wits of men, and of their naturall Capacities. |
| 3 | Of naturall Capacitie. |
| 4 | Of mens temper in generall. |
| 5 | From whe [...]ce Capacitie and Vnderstanding proceed, and of Intellectuall wisedome and her faculues. |
| 6 | A rule how to treate and conuerse with those who are wise and iudicious, and of their behauiour. |
| 7 | |
| 8 | Of Wisedome that proceeds from Imagination, and of the manners of those who are fortunate therein. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | Why Fortune is most commonly propitions, and fauourable to the wicked. |
1 A Sharpe and sound Iudgement, (or an actiue & nimble Wit) consists in knowing how to distinguish of Persons, affaires, and other circumstances, and accordingly how to order the manner of his proceedings, both in his speech and silence.
2 Now the difference of mens affaires [Page 28] and other circumstances are infinite: wherefore we will heere select and produce no others but those we obserue to be most frequent and common in mens conuersations: and that may awaken and stir vp our wisedome, to the consideration of others, whom we not so vsually frequent and meete.
The difference of persons, is drawne either from their interiour faculties, from whence proceed their actions; or from their exteriour conditions, whereby (as through a cloude) we may discerne something of their inclinations.
There are two Interiour Influences, and powers in vs, which serue to propagate & produce all our actions: to wit, our Vnderstanding, and our Will. But mens spirits, or Vnderstandings, are very different, so as we may make as many degrees of them, as there are of men in the whole world; but for the better order and method in our Treatise, wee will destinguish them by Capacitie and Incapacitie.
3 Naturall Capacitie proceeds of the perfection of the Organes or instruments which Nature giues vs: for the operation of the functions of Understanding; and these wee may reduce to three heads, Vnderstanding, Immagination, and Memorie: and the Capacitie of Wit, is either in one, two, or all [Page 29] three of these: this diuersitie, as some report, comming from the temper of the heart; but according to others (whom indeed I follow) from that of the braine.
4 This temper is nothing else but a commixture of the foure first qualities which not being in one, and the same subiect, all in the like quantitie, weight, and measure. Wee tearme the temper from the name of that, which in vertue and strength predominates and o're-swaieth all the others.
Some attribute the Capacitie of Vnderstanding to a drie temper that consists in distinguishing, choosing, and inferring.
Hence it comes to passe, that old men, whose braines are dry, haue commonly most Vnderstanding, and are wiser then yong men; and so likewise are poore men, who because necessitie afflicts them, consequently dries vp their braine: and these very often are both fortunate in Wisedome, and rich in Vnderstanding.
5 I say of Wisedome that springs from Vnderstanding, there being another sort that proceeds from the vigour of Immagination, whereof wee will anon speake: but this whereof wee now intreat, is heauie, and slow, because of a long discourse and ratiocination we must make before, wee resolue: yea, to proceede diliberatly, [Page 30] and vpon sound foundations, intermixt with dissidence and coldnesse, an excellent temper to negotiat with all sorts of people.
6 For those Wits and Vnderstandings not staying, or stopping, to the authoritie of others, in their conceptions and perquisitions: but resolute in themselues to examine the first and fundamentall Maximes by their own particular discourse and ratiocination; we must content them with reason, and not neglect or lose time, to perswade them through other mens reputation and credit.
7 But for the rest of their comportment and proceedings, they must commonly relish of Simplicitie, Innocency, Humilitie, Mercy, and Affabilitie, and the greatest part of their actions, are very temperat and moderat.
8 From the hot temper comes Immagination, and as heat is the actiuest qualitie of all foure; so Immagination is more nimble and actiue then the other faculties: but as there are many degrees of heat, so the vertue and efficacie of Immagination is likewise different.
9 He that is truly Immaginatiue, is generally talkatiue and a great speaker, as also Incontinent, Arrogant, Presumptuous and Vaine: heat representing him diuers humours in his Immaginations; whereof to content himselfe, he now chooseth one, and anon another: and [Page 31] this very heat doth as it were boile his moistnes, and thereby stirs vp many vapours in his braine, that ingender Presumption and Vanitie: which debarre and hinder that Vnderstanding can neither see, nor choose, the truth, which to define rightly is indeed her chiefe and princ [...]pall effect: so that in such Wits we very rarely meet with that Wisedome we now spa [...]e off, but only a sparke of heat that throwes them into some pretty inuention, with a fore-sight of that which ensues, which only Imagination presents them, and this Wisedome consists chiefly in ending and breaking off of matters, which neuer fals out fortunatly, vnlesse wee negotiate with men of the same humour, except it be in affaires that depend of a speedy execution: for surely in these, Imagination preuaileth.
And it many times fals out, that such Wits giue themselues sooner to euill then good: because heat thrusts them on violently to vice, and forgeth them many subtill inuentions to compasse their desires and designes.
10 Hence it is that Fortune generally proues propitious to the wicked, sith they be more Imaginatiue then the Veruous: sharper in their inuentions, and more inconsiderate, and lesse staied in their executions: althings through the swiftnesse and viuacitie of their indeuours: (for the most part) happily succeed and answer their desires.
[Page 32] Now as we haue said, that (commonly) poore men are wiser in the operations of Vnderstanding then of Imagination: so we may well affirme, that the rich are more apter and proper in those of Imagination then of Understanding: because (as Naturalists affirme) these through their dainty fare become Sanguine, and consequently of a hot, and moist temper, which is opposite to that of a dry.
CHAP. IX.
| 1 | From whence comes the Capacitie of Memorie, with their conditions who excell therein. |
| 2 | That Imagination and Memory neuer meete together. |
| 3 | The humours of the Imaginatiue in the first degree. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | In the second degree. |
| 6 | In the first and last degree. |
| 7 | The conclusion of the naturall Capacitie of Vnderstanding. |
1 MEmory hath for her share and portion, the moisture of the brain; from whence it comes, that Children and yong folkes haue better and readier memories [Page 33] then old people: and after their mornings sleepe, haue it farre fresher then at night, the reason consists in this; sleepe moistneth the braine, and watching dries it vp.
Among these sorts of Wits, we shall not finde much lesse Vanitie and Ostentation then in the Imaginatiue: neuerthelesse, wanting more pondering and deliberation, they are easier carried away, by authoritie, reputation, and president, then the others.
But as temper consists not in one particular quality, but in the combination and commixture of all foure: so although in the operations of Wit, we know one of the three faculties domineer in some persons; yet to make it capable and compleat, we must haue the other two: and if not in the like degree and measure, yet with some power and sufficiency to direct it.
2 Vnderstanding & Memory, can in no sort conioine and sympathize in the same degree; because dry and moist can in nothing conceiue, or imagine with the like power and efficacie: from whence wee may conclude, that he who hath a good Vnderstanding, hath but a bad Memorie: and contrariwise, he that hath a good Memorie, hath but a bad Vnderstanding.
Likewise, where moisture abounds, there can be no great heat; because, in the end heat consumes moisture: and consequently, [Page 34] they cannot excell in Memorie, who in the third degree haue hot braines, as they doe that are truely Imaginatiue.
For if they remember matters well and perfectly, it is not in them as much an effect of Memorie, which is only a passiue facultie to receiue, and not an actiue, as an effect of Imagination that depends, and hath a share in remembrance.
These sort of people likewise, haue no great Vnderstanding: for although this heat produce and engender drinesse in the braine; neuerthelesse, because it is an enforced and constrain'd drinesse, which dries vp the most delicate parts of the braine, and leaues nothing but the grosse and earthly; it cannot produce the effects of the Understanding, as Naturall drinesse doth.
3 And from th [...]nc [...] it comes that Poets and great bablers, who enioy this degree of Imagination (for the most part) are seldome wise.
4 For this promptitude and viuacitie, that heat engenders in these sorts of Wits, and which for a time makes them admired; is not only contrarie to the operations of Vnderstanding, that requires time and leasure, but also is a great propension and disposition to folly.
Of whom wee may vnderstand that which Aristotle saith, that there is no great [Page 35] Wit without some mixture or spice of folly: and to speake truth it is a miracle to finde one of them wisely moderate, and moderately wise.
We therefore conclude, that Imagination and Understanding in this degree of heat, cannot meete together in the same subiect; from whence it comes, that those who excell in Vnderstanding, neuer proue good Poets, or great Orators; and those of this temper, who are their Art-masters in this profession, haue had neede to refresh and warme their Imagination, some by Wine, some by Loue, and others haue obtain'd to be Poets through Choller and Indignation.
5 In other degrees of heat, Imagination may meete with Understanding and Memorie: but those who are in the second degree, shall haue lesse Memorie, more Vnderstanding, and a perfecter Imagination; and shall finde out and know that which is most profitable, as by inuenting of subtilties, wiles, and expedients, to treat and manage affaires: yea, to foresee and preuent the future, and to leade, and as it were to counsell and gouerne others.
Such people are commonly cholerike, and swart, and therefore variable and inconstant in their humours and resolutions; now heate, [Page 36] then dryth, and anon cold, working their seuerall effects in them.
6 In the first, and last degree of heat, Imagination concurres & sympathizeth with Memorie, the heat being not so excessiuely feruent to consume the moistnesse; and those who easily learne to paint and write well, hold of this temper: and so likewise do those, who we see are very curious to be proper, neat, and decent in their apparell, as also in other small curiosities that recreat and delight the eye.
7 Notwithstanding, although for the most part these sort of men are arrogant, and proude; neuerthelesse, being endued with no great Understanding, they conduct, and beare themselues more by the authoritie and reputation of others, then by their owne reason or iudgemen [...]s: Let this suffice to know the Naturall Capacitie of the Vnderstanding.
CHAP. X.
- 1 Of Capacitie obtained by Wit.
- 2 As also by Arts.
- 3 Which Arts haue neede of Vnderstanding.
- 4 Which of Memory.
- [Page 37] 5 Which of Imagination.
- 6 How gotten by Experience, and wherein experience consists.
1 LEt vs come to the purchase: this Capacitie is obtained, either by Art, or by Experience; and that it may bee such as may answer our desires, it must of necessitie be conioyned with the naturall: (to wit) that the facultie of Vnderstanding most predominant in vs, be proper for the Art, whereunto we will adresse and betake our selues.
2 Of Arts and Sciences, some haue more neede of Vnderstanding then others; some of a nimble Imagination, and others principally want Memorie.
3 Schoole Diuinitie, the Theorie of Phisicke; Dialect of Naturall, and Morall Philosophie, and the practice of Law, which is to Consuit and Iudge, all these haue neede of an excellent Understanding.
4 To learne Languages, the Theorie of Law, positiue Diuinitie, Cosmograph [...]e and Arithmatique, wee must striue to excell in a ripe and happy Memorie.
5 As for Imagination, all that consists in forme, neatnesse, proprietie, correspondence proportion, harmonie, and order, depend thereon; and consequently Poesie, Eloquence, [Page 38] Musique, the Mathematicks, Astrologie, Phisique, Policie, the Art Millitarie, Painting, Meca [...]ke Trades, with Architecture and Commerce: and all these in seuerall manners and degrees, which are best knowne, according as euery profession hath more or lesse neede, either of Vnderstanding or Memorie.
6 Experience chiefly consists in remembring of Examples, or of that which we haue formerly seene, done, or vnderstood: it hath neede of Imagination, but chiefly of Memory; Neuerthelesse, the Examples that we might here present, agreeing not in all points and circumstances; if we will hence draw any consequence, and so please our selues with choice, & iudgement, we haue alwaies more neede of Vnderstanding, then of any other facultie.
CHAP. XI.
| 1 | Of the Incapacitie of Wits, and the causes of this Incapacitie. |
| 2 | From whence proceeds the naturall weakenesse of Wit, and the effects thereof. |
| 3 | Of Inconstancie in opinions. |
| 4 | Of Presumption. |
| 5 | Of Vanitie. |
| 6 | Of the manner how to negotiate with the Vain glorious. |
| 7 | That Presumption and Iudgement cannot agree. |
| 8 | The properties of those who haue moist braines. |
| 9 | Of those who haue moist and hot braines. |
| 10 | Of those who haue moist and cold braines: and of the Incapacitie of some sorts of Wits. |
| 11 | Of the weakenesse of Wit, which proceeds from Ignorance: two sorts of Ignorance; |
| The one Presumptuous, and of her effects. | |
| 12 | The other simple and Innocent, and of her effects. |
1 BY the difference of the Capacitie of Wits we may easily know those that turne into Incapacitie: Neuerthelesse, because our defects are farre more then our perfections, which wee can obtaine, either through Nature, or Industry: we will discourse of them seuerally, that by the differences of Incapacitie, wee may the better discerne and know those of Capacitie.
2 The Incapacitie of Wit proceeds of many causes, whereof the chiefest is the weaknesse of Wit, & preoccupation The weaknesse [Page 40] of Wit, proceeds either from Nature or Ignorance: From Nature, if the temper of the braine be contrary, or vnfit to the operation of the faculties of Wit, or that it ingender some disorder in their functions.
3 The brain that is either too hot or too cold, begets Inconstancie in opinions: but in the last, the motion thereof is slow, and the Wit dull in her Vnderstanding, and conceits; and alwaies accompanied by feare, and Inconstancie, in these sorts of Wits; without execution, very often disolues into Irresolution, still relishing and finding that councell best, when the time of its execution is past, and consequently too late to be remedied.
Inconstancie that comes from the excesse of heat, is occasioned by diuers expedients that Imagination representeth to our Vnderstanding, and through defect in not being able to choose that which is best, in respect of the promptitude incident to this actiue qualitie.
4 I haue heeretofore said, that Presumption and Uanitie, vsually concurre in those tempers that are fit for Imagination and Memorie: but Presumption is more frequent in that of Imagination; and Vanitie in that of Memorie; and yet both are opposite to the opperations of Vnderstanding and Iudgement.
5 For the nature of Vanitie, is to esteeme and value matters, by the shew, the lustre, [Page 41] the beautie, and not by the truth thereof; reputing actions, as they are performed, with much greatnesse and ostentation: dispraising those that are done softly, coldly, quietly, and peaceably; as preferring Art before Nature, an enforced Wit before a naturall one, and extraordinary before ordinary.
6 These Wits, are also most commonly paid home with smoake, winde, exteriour decking, and false coine, which they preferre before that which is perfect and good, prising more the currantnesse, then the interiour value thereof: wherefore, they must be fed according to their pallate: and Curiositie being commonly engendered of Vanitie, we must entertaine, and feast them with curious things, although neuer so vnprofitable.
7 As for Presumption, shee likewise cannot sympathize with Iudgement: for shee makes Vnderstanding preferre her owne sufficiency and inuentions, before other mens; beleeuing nothing but that which shee vnderstands, and holds that impossible shee vnderstands not; framing all things according to her beleefe and opinion, without farther examination thereof: and these are the defects found in these sorts of Wits.
8 Those whose braines are too excessiuely subiect to a waterie and slymie moistnesse (there being another sort, that is oylie and [Page 42] subtile) doe both quickly learne and forget as hauing their senses stupified, and their motions dull and slow.
9 If the braine be excessibly moist and hot, their conceits are grosse and shallow; if cold and dry in youth, they mount higher then the course or strength of age permits: but the more we aduance and ascend herein, the more our Vnderstanding becomes old and rustie.
For that which makes our Wits actiue and sprightfull in our youth, is naturall heat; being then in its prime and force, which as we increase in yeares by degrees, waxeth olde and diminisheth.
10 And if the braine be cold and moist, then their Vnderstanding will be dull and slow.
11 The nature of these Wits, is to examine a matter more by the colour then the cause: whereat their Capacitie cannot reach vnto, to iudge of Counsels by the euent, rather then by reason, and not to lay hold of any part of a businesse, but the skinne or barke, without examining the depen [...]ance or importance thereof, although it be farre distant.
The Imbecilitie that Ignorance engenders in our Wits, are of two sorts.
The one is commonly attended on by Presumption which makes vs contemne and disdaine all that is prepos d vs: and this indeed is true Ignorance, (the mother of Obstinas [...], [Page 43] Contention, and Contradiction) and incapable to be either left or chang'd: Wherefore, by one and the same meanes, we may reuenge our selues, and be entertain'd of this sort of people, in still leauing them to their errors: and commonly such presumptuous persons giue faire play, and leaue a breach open to those who wil enterprise vpon them: whereof Seianus tooke his aduantage to be freed of Drusus.
12 As for the other sort of Ignorance which is more simple and innocent, it is still accompanied with astonishment and admiration: yet being flexible and tractable, it may be instructed and chang'd, vsing reason with authoritie, which oftentimes is very preualent with such Vnderctandings.
CHAP. XII.
| 1 | Preoccupations, are the cause of Incapacitie in our Vnderstanding: from whence they proceede. | |
| 2 | Two sorts of opinions, proceeding from the perswasion of one particular man. | |
| 3 | What they occasion, and the remedie thereof. | |
| 4 | From whence come those opinions grounded on custome. | |
| 5 | Euery profession haue their particular opinions. | |
| 6 | Whereof a Courtier must be chiefly informed, and his precautions. | |
| 7 | The effects, and considerations of opinions, built vpon common estimation. | |
| 8 | according to the | Raritie. |
| 9 | Aboundance. | |
| 10 | Absence, or Presence. | |
| 11 | Facilitie, or difficultie. | |
| 12 | Nouelty, or strangenesse. | |
| 13 | Custome. | |
1 LEt vs proceed to preocupations, that may ingender and breed in vs some Incapacitie. False opinions wherewith the Vnderstanding may be preocupated, come either from some particular mans perswasion, or from custome, or passions wherewith our Will may bee surprisd.
2 A particular man may imprint in vs an opinion contrary to truth, either through the credit, or authoritie he hath ouer vs; or as being the first which giues vs this impression.
3 The first, is a witnesse of facilitie, and the second, of too much promptitude, which being not accompanied with Iudgement, for want of Capacitie to iudge and distinguish the truth, remaines and is linked to the first impressions: wherefore the safest course [Page 45] and counsell herein, is to preuent those Wits, and to take order that others preuent not them.
4 The opinions that Custome imprint in vs, proceede either of breeding and particular conuersation, or else of a generall custome: it is true, that he who hath beene bred at home, is of other opinions then those that are professed Trauellers, and for not vnderstanding to make this difference: Musonius the Philosopher was laught at, for preaching peace to the Souldiers of Ualens.
5 Euery Profession and Vocation haue their particular opinions; not only, because they concerne the said Profession, but sometimes for those very things that are common one to another.
6 Wherefore a Courtier must be informd not only of the Court, but also of those of particular men, with whom he is to conferre, to the end, that accordingly he gouerne and conduct himselfe: the which he shall learne not only by their actions and discourse, but also by the breeding and conuersation wherin they haue beene brought vp, and liue; it being certaine, that it commonly fals out, that we resemble those with whom we haue liu'd and conuers'd.
7 As for those opinions built vpon the estimation, which the vulgar sort of people make of things: they to ouerthrow the truth, [Page 46] fight with more authoritie and power in our Vnderstandings: not only in this vniuersall approbation, whereunto none dare oppose, but also by the scarcitie or aboundacce, absence or presence, difficultie or facilitie, noueltie or Custome of certaine things whereof the price riseth or fals, according as we please to vse or esteeme them.
8 So through scarcitie and raritie, many things not greatly profitable, are much prisd and esteem'd, as Dimonds and Pearles, by reason whereof those who haue in them some rare qualities and perfections, although vnprofitable, are alwaies reputed and esteem'd aboue others.
9 Contrariwise, aboundance makes vs disesteeme and vnderualue our plenty, althogh it be not only profitable, but necessary.
10 Likewise, the want and absence of any thing makes vs in our Imagination more esteeme it then the enioying thereof; whether it be before we haue it, or after we haue left it, and the retaining thereof makes vs dis-esteeme it, because of the sacietie which the enioying thereof commonly engendereth in vs.
11 The difficultie also in getting it, makes vs value things beyond their worth: prouided that the purchasing and obtaining thereof, be not altogether impossible, and the facilitie makes vs prise them as Common; [Page 47] without respecting their worth or naturall value.
12 Noueltie and strangenesse make vs likewise condemne certaine things, as being vnprofitable; and in others (as we haue formerly said) the admiration of the raritie and strangenesse thereof, induceth vs to ouerprise and value them.
13 Contrariwise, Custom [...] makes vs vnderualue some things, as being too common; and sometimes againe, it causeth vs esteeme and prise them farre beyond their value and worth.
CHAP. XIII.
| 1 | Of Preocupation according to our Passions, and his effect according to loue and hatred. |
| 2 | Ioy. |
| 3 | Sorrow. |
| 4 | Feare and Choler. |
1 AS for the preocupation of Passions, it is but too often that they inueagle, and sometimes absolutly blinde our Vnderstandings; as loue that addes beautie to the obiect wee affect; which is neither [Page 48] seene nor knowne to those that are not blinded with this passion; so hatred and Enuy suggest deformitie, and extraordinary horror in the obiect, it hateth.
2 Ioy so much affects the obiect of that which inflames it, as shee cannot be silent, and sometimes becomes so vaine and talkatiue, that it apparantly discouers our Understanding is out of her proper throne or seate, and so make it selfe ridiculous.
3 Contrariwise, sorrow is dumbe and silent, and as it were forsaken and deiected; yea, it so enfeebleth our Wit and Iudgement, as from thence comes the Prouerbe, That from slaues, and miserable people, God hath taken away the one halfe of their Understanding.
4 As for the alterations, that Feare, Choller and other passions ingender in our Vnderstanding, euery man not only discernes, but feeles them in himselfe. Whereof purposing hereafter to entreat, I will at present content my selfe with that which I haue already written to shew the obstacles and hinderances they giue to the functions of Vnderstanding, although very capaple in other matters, as also the differences and alterations they produce not only in our Wils, (as wee will hereafter shew) but also in our Wits and Vnderstandings.
CHAP. XIV.
| 1 | Of our Will, being the third head of this first Booke. |
| 2 | From whence comes the diuersitie of Wils. |
| 3 | The difference of the Will of our Vnderstanding. |
| 4 | Considerations of goodnesse, and her obiect. |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | Considerations of the motions of our Will. |
| 9 | Of the diuersitie of their obiect, and of that it produceth. |
| 10 | Considerations of euill simply: of her obiects, and of that it produceth. |
| 11 | |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | |
| 15 |
1 COme we now to speake of our Will, which giues an assault to our Understanding, which of it selfe is indifferent to all sorts of obiects.
2 The differences of our Will proceeds either [Page 50] of the Diuersitie of obiects, which present themselues to her, or of the Diuersitie of her owne motions.
3 The obiects are infinite: but all are conceiued and taken by the Will, either as Good or Euill: as Good, the Will followes them; as Bad, it flies from them: from whence are deriued the two principall motions, the one first, the other last.
4 Good and Euill, in this cause must not be esteem'd according to the opinions of Philosophers, or common people, but according to the particular opinion of the person whose Will we would vnderstand and know, to the end, that according thereunto we may rule and order our selues in that we haue to doe, it being the chiefest effect of an actiue and solid Iudgement.
5 For in some men, the consideration of H [...]nour will effect more then that of Wealth; and in others the hope of enioying a pleasure, is more powerfull then either hope, profit, or pleasure.
6 A mans discourse and actions, sufficiently teach vs the chiefe inclinations that he affects one obiect more then another: at least, if wee will carefully descerne and espie it.
7 But if wee haue to treat of any particular affaire: wee must especially obserue what the partie with whom we treat [Page 51] chiesly desires or feares in that businesse, although it may fall out, that according to his desire, there is no thing to be feared of: For heerein wee must gouerne our selues according to other mens opinions, and not to our owne: Let this suffice for the effects.
8 In the motions of our Will, wee must consider not only their Diuersities and Differences, but also, the vse of this Knowledge; thereby neatly to preuaile in all occasions that befall vs.
9 The Diuersitie of the motions of our Will comes from the diuers formes which the obiect conceiued of vs, representeth vs: for Good considered of vs, simply as it is, engenders a pleasing affection of the obiect, which wee tearme Loue, or Friendship: and if it bee present, then in obtaining thereof, is borne Ioy; in the vse, Reioycing, Pleasure, and Content; if to come, that motion is called Desire: and if wee seeke the meanes to obtaine it; iudging it possible, we thereby enter into Hope: if impossible, into Dispaire.
10 Euill, considered simply as it is, breeds in vs only Hatred, which in anoiding and flying thereof, is tearmed Horrour; if it proceed from the absence of any good thing we want, Sorrow takes place in vs; if of [Page 52] the presence of any euill, then griefe and anger; if it touch our Honour and Reputation, before the act, it breeds bashfulnesse, then shame.
11 If the euill be to come, it breeds Timiditie; if it extend to the execution either of our Nature or being, feare; if for euill past, repentance; or if for that of others, then pitie and compassion.
12 If we thinke to ouercome this euill, as inferiour to our strength, confidence will assure vs, and courage and boldnesse, animate and prouoke vs on to vndertake it.
13 if the euill we haue receiued, beare in it any contempt or disdaine, either of our selues or our friends, then the feeling and remembrance thereof will excite vs to Choller; which if it last not long, we may terme Anger.
14 Sometimes other mens good and prosperitie, is an euill to vs, and their euill and miserie a good to vs, according to the affection or hatred wee beare the partie to whom it hapneth: as that which befals our Riuals, Competitors, or Enemies; from whence comes Enuie: And the good or prosperitie which we desire only for our selues, without any intent to conferre, or impart it to others: if another participate thereof, wee esteeme it a wrong, and euill to our selues; from whence ariseth Iealousie.
[Page 53] 15 If we be angry at the good or prosperitie of other men, esteeming them vnworthy thereof; from thence growes Indignation; or if we desire it for our selues, then Emulation.
CHAP. XV.
| 1 | The vse of the knowledge of the motions of our Will. |
| 2 | Three things to be considered therein. |
| 3 | The dependancy of these motions in ingendering one the other. |
| 4 | The motions of the Concupiscible part. |
| 5 | Of the Cholerique part. |
| 6 | The Order and dependances of the Will, destinguished according to the intention and execution. |
| 7 | |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | The Order of the motions of the Concupiscible part among themselues. |
| 11 | |
| 12 |
THese are the chiefest motions of our Will: from whence wee may recollect and know in how many sorts and degrees, good and euill presents themselues vnto vs.
[Page 54] 1 Neuerthelesse, for the vse, and to draw some profit hence, we must passe on to the Knowledge of these motions: the vse whereof chiefly consists in seeking out the meanes, either to incite and stirre them vp in others, or to moderate them not only in others, but also in our selues: or else by pleasing and humouring them, to dispose and accommodate our selues to others, if it bee requisite and necessary to follow them.
2 To stirre vp these motions in others, the knowledge of three things is very necessary, to wit, the dependance of these motions in engendring one the other: of the most vniuersall causes which stirres vp euery motion, or at least the chiefest, whereon the rest depend, or mens dispositions in more bending or enclining to one of these affections, then to the other.
3 To come to the dependance, we must know, that euery obiect is considered, simply; either as good or euill: or else with an intent and desire to obtaine the one as good, and to secure himselfe from the other as euill.
4 The motions produced of the first consideration (as Naturalists hold) are engendered of the Liuer (being the seate of the facultie which they tearme Concupiscible); and [Page 55] this is occasioned by the spirits that are in our blood: from whence proceed the motions of all the faculties.
5 And those that are produced by the second consideration, are bo [...]ne in our heart, the seat of the facultie, which they tearme Cholericke: and according to this destinction we seperate and diuide in two, all the motions of our will.
Those of our Concupiscible Will, spread farther then those of our Cholericke: for those moue without any respect or obseruance to the obiect: so doth desire, and the other staies thereat; so doth Ioy, but none of the motions of our Cholericke Will staics at the obiect.
6 But the stay or rest, being the end of the motion, is the first in intention, and the last in execution: wherefore if we conferre or ioine our Cholerike motions, with those of our Concupiscible which stop and stay at good; it is certaine that those of the Cholericke in the order of execution will deuance and take the hand of our Concupiscible motions, which only stop and stay at good: so hope takes place and is the Herauld and Forerunner of Ioy.
7 But our Concupiscibile motion which staies at euill, will be in the middest of our two Cholericke motions: so Anger followes Feare; and yet goes before Choler.
[Page 56] 8 As for our Concupiscible motions, which stay not, either at good or euill, being conioyn'd with those of our cholericke: our Cholericke adding the consideration of the difficulty, either in obtaining good, or auoiding euill, marcheth first, & goes beyond our Concupiscible: so hope addes some power beyond desire, and feare ads debilitie or basenesse to our courage, in the apprehension either of horrour, or euill.
9 From whence wee may conclude, that Cholerike motions are betweene those of the Concupiscible, that stop or stay not; to the obiect, and for those that doe stay, they are deuanc'd by the first, and followed by the last.
10 As for the order of Concupiscible motions among themselues, it must also be diuersly considered, either according to the intent or execution in the obiect of good: and that which is first conceiu'd and ingendred in vs, is a certaine delectation and agreeablenesse of the obiect, after our desire is once fram'd & form'd, which is a motion to Good, and the last point is the purchase and obtaining thereof, and this ingendereth I [...]y and Pleasure.
11 According to the intent, Pleasure marcheth first: for the which wee desire good; and from this desire comes loue, then delight.
[Page 57] 12 But the appetite and desire of Good, being an occasion that we flye Euill: the obiect of Good, in this goes before the obiect of Euill; and so the motions and passions which looke to the obiect of Good doe in intention take the hand, and goe before those which looke to the obiect of Euill: and this hath power aswell in Cholerike as Concupiscible motions.
CHAP. XVI.
| 1 | Of the order of Passions as they engender one another. |
| 2 | The causes of Passions. |
| 3 | Of those Passions which haue Goodnesse for their obiect. |
| 4 | Of the loue of conformitie, and all that is considerable therein. |
| 5 | Of friendship for our owne particular interest. |
| 6 | Of the effect of friendship. |
| 7 | The causes of Desire, and from whence it is engendred. |
| 8 | The causes of Hope. |
| 9 | How Experience forti [...]ies Hope. |
| 10 | The force and Power of Hope. |
| 11 |
1 THe order of Passions as they produce, and engender one the other, is thus: Loue, Desire, Hope, Boldnesse, Ioy; and contrariwise, Hatred, flight to Horrour, Feare, Choler, Disp [...]ire, and Sorrow.
So Ioy and Sorrow, are the Passions wherein the others end and terminate. Hope, Feare, Choler, and Dispaire, are those wherein reside the most violent motions of the Will, assaulted and shaken, either by loue and desire of Good; or by hatred and horrour of Euill.
I will purposely omit to speak of other Passions, because they obserue no order among themselues; but as the one or other of these entermixe and conioine among themselues, so accordingly they either march before, or follow after.
2 Let vs come to the most vsuall causes whereby these Passions may be stirred vp, and we will begin with those who haue Goodnesse for their obiect.
3 Loue, Desire, and Ioy, haue this Good for their common obiect; but hec that loues considereth it particularly, as an obiect that may bee vnited to himselfe.
[Page 59] But a Vnion being not able to proceed, except in the like things, or though, not in all points, at least in some one which is very considerable: as, the similitude or resemblance is of two sorts, so this affection proposeth it selfe now to the one, anon to the other: according to the accedents and euents of matters.
For that wherein two persons conioyne and meete, is either actually or effectually in these two p [...]rsons; as, the like humours & conformitie of Wils, from whence comes true friendship: or else it is in effect, either in the one or other, through Desire, or Incli [...]ation; and from thence, likewise is ingendered Loue, or Amitie, for our owne interest, whose principall foundation, is the loue of himselfe: whereon almost all the friendships of the World (yea, those likewise of the Court) are grounded and built.
4 This sort of A [...]tie or Friendship hath relation to Kinsfolkes, Alliances, Familiarities, Conuersation, Conformities of Manners, Wils, and Professions: if it fall not out that this last bee thwarted by Enuie, or Emulation, which is vsually found in men of the same profession and facultie. The like wee may allcadge of the Friendship of those to whom both Good and Euill is common; or of those who are of the same age or [Page 60] Countrie, to those who are not: (in a word) of all those who resemble in any considerable point, which seperates and distinguisheth them from many others, by reason of this conformitie, resemblance, agreeablenesse, obedience, and all that may tend and serue to erect and build vp this frame of friendship.
5 The other sort of Frindship, hauing for foundation, the loue of our selues; wee cannot stir vp this Affection in the Vnderstanding of any one, vnlesse it be in consideration of his owne priuate and particular interest.
6 With this affection the poore man loues the rich, thereby to inrich himselfe: and the rich the poore, thereby to draw either seruice or honour from him: so in the same sort, we likewise loue those, who either haue or may doe vs a good office: or those also who we cherish or esteeme.
Sith then our owne interest is the chiefest cause of this friendship; we must seeke that which hath most power and interest towards the person in whom we would stirre vp this affection: as, to a Couetous man, Profit; to one that is Ambitious, Honour; to a yong man, Uoluptuousnesse and Pleasure; euery one measuring his interest according to his necessity, and his necessitie according to his desire.
[Page 61] 7 Which being found out, it will be easie for vs to stirre vp Desire and Ioy: for Desire is deriued from two principall causes; the first, from the knowledge of Good, in the obiect that is proposd vs, which (by way of Retribution) Loue giues vs according as it hath receiued it: and the other from the absence or want of this Good.
Neuerthelesse, this will not suffice to stir vp a great motion in some, if they iudge not the obtaining of their desires possible; so that wee must anexe and adde the meanes whereby hope may bee enkindled; which meanes, are of diuers sorts.
8 For all that can make a man powerfull, as Riches Strength, Authoritie, Reputation, Friends, Kinsfolkes, and the like: or that can steed vs in our designs, may put vs in hope to obtaine our desire, at least, if we know these aduantages to be in vs.
9 Likewise, Experience in that we vndertake, may fortifie our Hope: first, because hauing done, or seene a thing done, we are still more apt and fitter to doe it, then if we had neuer seene it done: secondly, because it makes vs beleeue and assure our selues, it is possible to be performed.
From whence it followes, that the Example of the like thing which another hath performed and finished, will serue to reuiue and encourage our owne hope, [Page 62] that we may obtaine what we desire.
10 This Motion is that which helps vs in al our affaires; and saith Lucian, Hope and Feare, are the two T [...]a [...]ts, that is to say, the strongest and most violent motions that rouze and stir vs vp: for conceiuing a matter to be difficult, stirs vp our intention, and the opinion we haue, that it is easie; makes vs not greatly care to see an end thereof.
11 Moreouer, Hope makes the future time seeme as it were present in our Imagination: it ingendereth Ioy in our Vnderstanding, which in this cause is more free and clcere sighted, to deuise and inuent many means how to obtaine our desires, then if we were afflicted either with Sorrow or Anger.
For Hope hauing already iudg'd the means possible for vs to obtain our desire; it breeds in vs a confidence to passe on and a resolution to march towards boldnesse.
CHAP. XVII.
| 1 | The causes of Considence, and how considered. |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Her Motion. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | From whence it proceeds. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | The causes of Boldnesse brought forth by two meanes. |
| 8 | The causes of Ioy and how it is conceiu'd and form'd in vs. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | Of presupposed enioyance, or imaginary presence. |
| 11 | Which is the greatest Ioy. |
| 12 | How Euill, is still present with vs. |
1. 2. FOr if Confidence should stop, and make a stand at the bare tearmes of assurance, it were rather rest then motion: but we must consider it as a passag [...] from Hope to Boldnesse: and this is it that makes vs iudge the meanes easie to surmount all hinderances and oppositions, to the end we may obtaine our desires.
3 This Motion is chiefly engendered in vs, when we imagine that those things that may warrant and secure vs, are neere, or in our power, and that those which may endommage or offend vs, are far remote from vs, either in respect of place, time, occasiō, or will.
4 And according to the nature of the matter: for this last wee must ground our selues on the consideration either of our power, or of the innocencie and equitie of our behauiour, or of the sufficiency and inclination of those, whose power we haue reason to feare: if they are honest, respectfull, modest, or friends: if they hope for some benefit from vs; or else, if they feare vs.
[Page 46] 5 Confidence comes also, when those things we would doe, are profitable, either to many, or to personages of greater ranke and qualitie, then are those whom they may offend.
6 To haue no proofe of misfortune, and not to know it, may likewise make vs secure and confident. The small repute and esteeme that our Inferiours make of this euill: the hope they haue of assistance from Heauen, and other mens perswasions and requests, may likewise assist and serue to this effect.
7 Confidence being thus form'd and fashioned; we must proceed to giue the last shaking and assault to our Will, that is very boldly to attempt & enterprise what we desire, & this is produced by two means; that is, by those things which may stir vp Hope in vs, as our strength, experience, power, assistance of friends, and other aduantages, (whereof we haue heretofore spoken) and by those things which may banish and exclude feare; which consist, either in the remotenesse of that which may offend vs, or in the hinderance or remedie that may be giuen or applied hereunto.
8 And being by these motions led & conducted to the obtaining of desired Good: Ioy is instantly ingendered in vs, which is not so much a motion, as the end of a motion, hauing [Page 65] regard to the execution, or beginning of a motion, if wee respect the intention thereof.
9 Which to frame and fashion, two things are necessary; the knowledge how to obtaine and purchase a Good, and the enioying thereof: the first, because many possesse those things that are good, whereof being ignorant, they reioice not in enioying the same.
10 As for the enioying thereof, it presupposeth either real, or imaginary presence, such as Desire, Hope and Remembrance, presenteth vnto vs: for albeit Desire, or Hope, haue reference to the future, and Memory to the past: Neuerthelesse, Imagination makes those things seeme present that are absent; from whence it followes, that Ioy, and Sorrow, alwaies accompany Desire, and Hope.
11 And although of all degrees of Ioy, that which a Good really present, produceth in vs, seemes to be the greatest, as being best grounded; Neuerthelesse, through the disesteeme or carelessenesse, which the often taste of a Good giues vs: and contrariwise, representing those things we enioy not, greater in Imagination, then in effect: it comes to passe, that that Ioy which produceth Desire, and Hope, is alwaies the greatest, especially in Hope, which not only compriseth and anticipateth a Good▪ through apprehension, [Page 66] but also through the possibilitie to obtaine it.
12 As much, wee may likewise say of Euill, that is present with vs, not only when it befals vs, but also when we anticipate it through feare, or being past, that we recall to our remembrance, from whence proceeds Sorrow and Anger.
So then, insteed of Good or Euill really present we may stirre vp and engender these Passions by their Imaginary presence, not only with as much power, but sometimes with more effect.
CHAP. XVIII.
| 1 | Of those who are subiect to the Passions occasioned through the ob [...]ct of Good. |
| 2 | The Motions and Passions of the Will, that haue euill for their obiect. |
| 3 | Why wee are more sensible of Euill then of Good. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | The causes of Hatred, and what it engendereth. |
| 9 | As Feare. |
| 10 | The things that affright and feare vs. |
| 11 | Of those we haue offended, and which of them we must most feare. |
| 12 | Of that which we must most feare. |
1 NOw to know those who are most dispos'd, and aptest to receiue these impressions, although the knowledge of those obiects, that are most pleasing and agreeable to them, may sufficiently teach and informe vs: we must neuerthelesse know that those Natures who are modest, affable, curteous, humble, no ill speakers, or quarellers, are most commonly capable of these Passions; as also, those who loue pleasures, plaies, or pastimes; or to be honoured, respected, or curteously intreated; those also, who are pitifull, charitable, or officious; or who loue not solitarie companies, or that of head-strong, or peruerse people; of desemblers, cousoners, irreconcilable, vndictiue, or presumptuous persons: and yet those who are vaine, in any of these Natures, so they are not tainted with Presumption, by honoring & respecting thē, they will be soon drawn to loue.
But particularly, for Hope, Confidence, and Boldnesse, those will be more easily won, who are most couragious, sierce, and actiue: as also those who conceiue and flatter themselues with a good opinion of their own sufficiency, [Page 68] credit, authoritie, strength, meanes, and experience; and likewise, who haue beene still fortunate in their enterprises, will be easily perswaded to it, either because of their facultie, or in respect of their ignorance, and want of experience.
And so likewise will yong people, fooles, and those who we tearme haire-braind, in respect of the inconsideration and precipitation that attend and accompany these humors; as also, those who ouer-heat themselues with Wine; the violence of which heat, and the fumes of their spirits and brains, make them as the rest, inconsiderate, and rash: let this suffice for the passions of those whose obiect is Good
2 If by the knowledge of one contrary, it be easie to discry and discerne another: it will then be casie for vs, who know the causes of Loue, Desire, Hope, Confidence, Boldnesse, and Ioy, to finde out likewise those of Hatred, Horror, Feare, Distrust, Dispaire, and Sorrow; it being certaine, that as conformitie, and simpathie of humours, or the consideration of profit, combine and lincke men together in friendship; so contrarietie of humours; and the consideration of domage, breedes likewise hatred and enmitie betwixt them.
3 Neuerthelesse, there is herein this difference, that those passions whose obiect is Euill, are more powerfull then those whose [Page 69] obiect is Good, not that the motion is stronger, but because Euill being contrary to our Nature, it makes it selfe to be more sensibly felt then the obiect of Goodnesse, which is neere like, and conformable thereunto: the reason of Antip [...]uhie being desirous that two contraries striue and contend, whereby they may the more sensibly feele each others oppositions.
4 That which resembleth, is more difficult to discerne in our Understanding then that which is contrary: white vpon white is more difficult to discerne, then blacke vpon white; right so, Good is more difficult to distinguish from Good, then from Euill.
5 In the confusion of many things, those which most resemble, are least knowne the one from the other, but in the commixture of diuers things, either contrary in qualitie or substance, they are instantly distinguished and found out.
6 Wherefore Goodnesse vniting it selfe to our Nature, we esteeme not of it, thinking we haue no more then we ought haue, but if Euill be fall vs, because our Nature is contrarie to it, there remaines still a reluctation, and repining, which is nothing else, then a sensible feeling of Euill.
7 From whence it comes to passe, that we easily forget any good office done vs, but difficultly an ill one.
[Page 70] 8 But as from the knowledge of Euill is engendered the hatred wee beare it; so from Hatred comes horrour, which cannot be imagined to bee without the company of Feare no more then can Desire without Hope, although they apprehend the obiect diuersly; wherefore the causes of feare, teacheth vs the causes of flight, or horrour of euill, wherof these are the most vsuall and ordinarie.
9 All things that can hurt or anoy vs, make vs feare them; yea, the very signes and resemblances thereof afflict and distast vs, as that of Death, of a tempest, and other things likewise affright and terrifie vs, because the signe thereof demonstrates that the thing it selfe is not farre from vs.
10 But of all things that terrifie vs, the chiefest and greatest, is the hatred and malice of those who haue any power ouer vs, as those who are powerfull in Ualour, audacitie, wealth, friends, attendants, and to say truth, in authoritie, and reputation; because Will ioyn'd with Power to doe Euill, makes vs beleeue, the Euill it selfe is very neere vs: so Iniuslice seconded and fortisied by authoritie is likewise to be feared for the same reason; as also valour being outraged and offended, conioyn'd with power, makes it fearefull and formidable: for an iniutie receiued drawes on the Will to reuenge, and force and [Page 71] power giues him meanes to effect it: likewise, the feare and distruct of great men, is to be redoubted and feared: for they by all meanes, and waies, desire to warrant and secure themselues.
11 But of those we haue offended, or who distrust vs, or are either iealous or enuious of our Good, those are most to be doubted and feared, who spin the web of their malice secretly and silently; saying nothing, but only desembling their iniuries and designes: because we shall not discouer when they are on the point to reuenge or preiudice vs.
12 We must also feare, to haue our Liues, Goods, Honours, yea, or our Persons in the power, and discretion of another; from whence it comes, that those who know any Euill by vs, are much to be feared; because of the apprehension we still must haue in being discouered of them, either through Enuie, hatred, [...]alousie, imbecilitie, future hope, or present profit.
CHAP. XIX.
| 1 | The disposition in the motions and Passions whose obiect is Euill. |
| 2 | What they are who feare no hurt can befall them. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | A remedy not to feare it. |
| 5 | Of those who are much giuen to Feare. |
| 6 | The vse of Feare Considered in two sorts. |
| 7 | |
| 8 | Of Feare accompanied with distrust. |
| 9 | Of the Passions of Sorrow, and Anger, and what other Passions they engender. |
1 AS for the disposition requisite to receiue those Passions, wee may easily iudge those who are dispos'd and addicted to hatred, because we haue already spoken of those who are dispos [...]d to loue.
2 But in respect of Feare, it is certaine that those who beleeue no hurt or domage can befall them, are not easily shaken or daunted at this Passion: for Fear [...] cannot be without the Imagination and Expectation of Euill: wherefore, those who haue alwaies beene happie in their actions, and who are powerfull in wealth, friends, reputation, strength, and authoritie; thinking that all should answer their expectations; yea, and stoope to their greatnesse, doe sildome or neuer feare what may befall them.
3 Those likewise who haue lost all hope of Good, and who haue beene still oppressed [Page 73] with afflictions, and crosses, and as it were inured and accustomed to Euill, they no longer feare it.
4 Sen [...]ca saith, that Not to hope, is a remedy not to feare: for it must needs be, that in those who feare, there is still remaining some sparke or hope of Good: for which they suffer this affliction and anxitie.
From whence it comes, that those who feare, are alwaies ready and willing to heare and receiue counsell: but we vse not to consult, if we haue once lost all hope of what we desire.
5 Of all which formerly spoken, wee may conclude, that those who are subiect to Feare, and thinke they may receiue some Euill; and knowing likewise their owne weaknesse to resist it: as the greatest part of olde men, and the poorer sort of people, who are destitute of all helpe, friends, and meanes; or of those of inse [...]iour condition, and of sm [...]ll reputation, and authoritie; who are despis d, hated, enuyed, or suspected, of Uice; or for being heeretofore too valiant, or to haue had too much Credit with the vulgar people: and this onely suspition and distrust ha [...]h procured the vtter ruine and downefall of many great personages.
6 The vse of this motion is frequent and common, and may serue vs to draw [Page 74] two profitable vses thereof: the one to make vs lose all Hope of that we desire; and herein we must aggrauate and augment the Euill, and the hinderances that may arise in the successe of that we desire, without discouering the remedy and expedients, that may facilitate and make easie the purchase and enioying thereof.
7 The other is to incite and stir vp our prouidence and fore-sight; and herein it is necessary we obserue a Medium in our feare, and that against the difficulties that may ariue or arise, wee come arm'd with some meanes and deuices, to surmount and ouercome them; wherein Feare in this kinde performes more then Hope: because Hope pre upposeth that this Good may be obtain'd, and Feare beleeues that this Euill will be very hardly auoided: wherefore her in as regarding that which is most difficult, our Wit and Vnderstanding is more bent then in the other.
8 Dis [...]d [...]nce followes Feare, and knowing her selfe Incapable to anoide the Euill or enioy the good wee desire (the depriuation of Good being taken by our W [...]ll for an Euill) it conuerts it selfe into Dispaire, and this Dispaire into Sorrow, and Anger; which is more or lesse in vs: according to the iudgement our Vnderstanding makes of the importance of the obiect, [Page 75] and this Passion breedes diuers effects in vs.
9 For sometimes shee is the ende of motion, staying at the consideration of Euill, as ioy is the rest and repose of Good: and sometimes it reuiues and stirres vp in vs many other motions, whereof the chiefe and most vsuall, are Choter, Shame, Compassion. En [...], [...]e [...]ousie Indignation, and Emulation, which are deriued, partly from Anger, and partly from the affluence of diuers considerations that are obserued in one and the same obiect.
CHAP. XX.
| 1 | Of Choler, and the Passions that concurre therein. |
| 2 | Of contrarie obiects in Choler. |
| 3 | The causes of Choler. |
| 4 | That Disdaine and Iniurie are the chiefest. |
| 5 | |
| 6 | Of those who are soonest subiect to Choler. |
| 7 | The Passions that dispose vs to Choler. |
| 8 | Shame followes Choler, and how it is stirred vp in vs. |
| 9 | The causes of shame. |
| 10 | |
| 11 | Disposition to Shame. |
1 CHoler is fram'd, & form'd, in vs by the concurrence and affluence of many Passions: for beginning with Anger, and Sorrow, of a receiued iniury, it is accompanied with Hatred, against him that hath offended vs, as also a desire to be reuenged of him: the which is conioin'd with a certaine hope to effect it, because Desire, and Hope are things possible and feasable, although they beare in them a shew of difficultie: for if wee esteeme reuenge impossible, this motion would then reside and dwell, in the tearmes of hatred and sorrow.
But Hope presenting Reuenge to our Immagination, wee are instantly possessed with Pleasure, and Content, which Choler findes out to free our selues of Sorrow, as being the only remedie to make vs ioyfull. Euery one still delighting to thinke on that he desireth.
Or had we perpetrated our Reuenge, our pleasure and content were then both perfected, & accomplished, because it banisheth all Sorrow, & appeaseth the motion of Choler.
[Page 77] 2 So this Passion hath two cōtrary obiects (to wit) [...]euenge, and him of whom we would be reuenged. Reuenge is considered, as being Good and desired, and held for such: from whence it followes, that it being performed, wee reioyce, and him of whom wee would bee reuenged, is considered as an Euill, very odious and distastfull to vs.
3 As for the causes of Choler, they are vsually two: the one, the small esteeme made of vs, whether it be through Iniury, Disgrace, or any other degree of Disdaine: the other the hindrance and opposition giuen vs, to doe or obtaine that which wee desire: which others comprehend vnder the name of Contempt, as also, to reioyce at our misfortune, to forget vs, or the like.
4 In [...]ury is measured according to the oppinion we conceiue and retaine of the Iniustice of contempt and disdaine, so if wee esteeme the Iniustice great; Iniury then will the more prouoke and exasperate vs: So Disdaine, or domage, offered a great man, to whom is due more respect; being more iniust the more stirres him vp to Choler, and Indignation; and also to an honest man, the wrong and Euill that is done him.
5 By this reason we are more chollerike to be disprais'd for that wherein we thinke to excell, then in that it excell not, as [Page 78] still esteeming this degree of disdaine more iniust.
6 From whence it comes, that those who are vaine-glorious, proud, and presumptuous; and briefly, all those who conceiue good opinions of themselues for any imaginary aduantage or perfection in them, doe more easily and quickly grow Cholericke; the iniury being so much the greater in their Imagination, in that they conceiue and hold a better opinion of themselues then they deserue.
7 True it is, we omit not sometimes to be angry to see our selues dispis'd for defects in vs: but it is because the defects themselues ingender in vs weakenesse of Capacitie and So row, whereof the last conducts, and preuokes vs to Choler: from whence it followes, we easily wax cholerick, against those who bring vs bad newes, and that makes vs more apt and vehement to commit iniuries; and hence it comes to passe that a very small matter makes children, women, old, and sicke folkes, Cholericke, as also those that are possest with Loue, Suspition, or Feare, as not hauing the courage to resist this motion; and this Passion continues longer in those Understandings, that are rude and barbarous, then in those that are more polished and ciuilis'd.
[Page 79] 8 Shame is a degree of Feare that depends of Honour: but sometimes Anger, and then Choler steps within it; it hath its birth in vs by actuall presence, or by supposition of shamefull, dishonest, or vndecent actions, as well past, present, as to come, whether they proceede from our selues, or from those who touch vs in affinitie, or those that for some other respect and reason we affect and loue.
9 But flatterie and praises of vs, spoken in our owne presence, before whom, then, and where they ought not haue beene reported, may also make vs blush, and stirre vp in us this affection: likewise, the reproach of a good turne, or office done vs: to be reproued of a fault, to confesse it and craue pardon, not to participate of those things that are common to our inferiours and equals: to serue in any base or seruile manner, and to be fallen from a greater fortune, makes vs likewise ashamed in presence of those who haue seene vs enioy the same. Shame for the most proceeding from the presence of those before whom wee present our selues, as also, before those whom wee respect and admire, or those with whom wee are conioyn'd in Office, or Dignitie; who obserue our actions, and are accustomed to slaunder, and backbite vs: but to those who [Page 80] Cannot reproue our actions, as children; or toward those who will not as friends, or dare not, as our Seruan [...]s, we are not vsually moned or stirred vp in this manner.
10. We are also shame fac'd before those to whom wee are oblig'd and beholding, without hauing had the meanes to requite it: for then their presence doth as it were reproue, and check, our Ingrati [...]ude.
11 Of all which aboue spoken: we conclude that those who are iealous of their Honours, and desire to liue in a good reputation, as also those who haue receiued any iniurie or disgrace, o [...] that are in any contemptible estate, are very subiect to entertaine, and incident to retaine this motion: the which neuerthelesse, as all others changeth and assumes other formes, according to time, place, persons, and other conditions and circumstances, that concuire and meet in humane actions.
CHAP. XXI.
| 1. | Of Compassion, and from whence it pr [...] ceeds. |
| 2. | Of those who are vsually vncharitable and not compassionate. |
| 3 | Disposition to Compassion, and those who are aptest thereunto. |
| 4 | Of that which may ingender Compassion in vs, and more stirre vs vp to Pitty. |
| 5 | |
| 6 |
1 COmpassion ariseth in vs through Displeasure, and Anger, wee conceiue for the euill or domage of others, but to stirre vp this A [...]ger, it must needes be that our affection towards him afflicted, or the conceit, that he suffereth it iniustly, doth chiefly occasion it: for if we loue him not, or if we esteeme his wickednesse equall to the Euill he suffereth: we would neuer pitie nor commiserate it.
Neuerthelesse, there be euents wherein the condition of our nature, as also the power and inconstancy of Fortune, may without any other consideration, stirre vp and prouoke in vs this motion; making vs affraid to see in our selues the miseries and afflictions which we see befals others.
Which comes to passe when wee esteeme this Euill not to bee farre from vs, neither also to be so neere as to touch vs: for in this last point, insteed of thinking on other mens crosses, we thinke on our owne, and insteed of consideration, Feare surpriseth [Page 82] vs: and formeth it selfe in our hearts and thoughts.
Which is the reason why we will not enter into this motion for vnknowne persons; because they are too farre distant from our consideration, nor for persons who are so neere as their afflictions and ours seeme to sympathise and make but one, but only for those whom wee know to be betwixt these two extreames and of our ordinary and familiar acquaintance.
2 Of that wee haue spo [...]en of the consideration of our Nature and the inconstancy of Fortune: wee may conclude that two sorts of men are very mercilesse and vncharitable; those who are driuen to so extreame an indigence and necessitie that they are so farre from pittying others, as they only comfort and releeue their owne miseries by those of others: it being (as I haue formerly said) the common consolation of poore and miserable people, to haue compartners and fellowes in their affictions: and those who beleeue they are lifted vp so high as they esteeme themselues secured against all sorts of aduerse accidents, and who insteed of being compassionate to the afflicted, deride and laugh at them, and many times vse them with much pride and insolency.
[Page 83] 3 Contrariwise then; those will bee soonest dispos'd and inclin'd to Mercy, who feare afflictions and calamities, because they haue heeretofore felt them, and who with much difficultie and danger haue escaped them; and consequently, old men who haue had more experience of the weaknesse and mutabilitie of humane matters, and those who acknowledge themselues weake in strength, wealth, reputation, friends, & kinsfolkes: and in a word, those who haue a greater feare and knowledge of aduersitie, will the sooner permit themselues to embrace this motion of P [...]e, and Commiseration.
4 But of miseries and afflictions, those that can soonest moue vs to C [...]mpassion and Pitie, are these which either accompany the affliction of the body, or the distemperature of the mind, and which befall vs not through our owne default, but as we beleeue either through the Malice of Fortune, or of our enemies.
5 And as these afflictions encrease by their circumstances, so doth our Compassion as if in affliction we are forsaken of our owne, depriued of our meanes and wealth, oppressed without cause, by strong or cruell enemies, or if we depend of our enemies and other like particularities, which commonly follow those that are afflicted & vnfortunate.
6 But not only present but future Afflictions, [Page 84] if they be any thing neere hand may moue vs to pitie, as also, those that are past: if it be not too farre beyond the present, or that the remembrance thereof be yet recent and fresh in our memories: from whence it proceeds that the representation of the gesture, voice, apparell, and countenance of the afflicted, doth the more powerfully moue vs; because by these exteriour signes, the crosses that afflict them, are as it were present in our owne imaginations, and contemplations: In the foure ensuing Passions, Hatred, and Anger, are entermixed, and in some one of these, as in Jealousie; Loue hath also her part and share.
CHAP. XXII.
| 1 | Of Enuie. |
| 2 | From whence it proceeds. |
| 3 | |
| 4 | Of the causes that dispose vs to Enuie. |
| 5 | |
| 6 | Of Indignation, and with what it is entermixt. |
| 7 | That Wealth breedes in vs this Passion of Enuie. |
| 8 | From whence ariseth Indignation. |
| 9 | That great men are more subiect to it then others. |
| 10 | The causes that prouoke vs to this Passion. |
| 11 | The nature of Indignation. |
| 12 | That Emulation is a degree of Enuy, and the causes thereof. |
| 13 | |
| 14 | Of those who are subiect to Emulation. |
| 15 | |
| 16 | How Emulation is engendered, and of those that are not subiect to this motion. |
| 17 | |
| 18 | Of Iealousie, and the causes thereof. |
1 ENui [...] engendereth when wee repine and are angry at anothers prosperitie, without any other consideration then that wee wished he enioyed not his prosperitie.
2 And although there be no other cause of former variance and distast: neuerthelesse, it cannot be conceiued without Hatred, or Ill-will; nay, hardly without a kinde of silent Choler, which not properly extends but to those we beleeue are no greater then our selues, or in some respect, if not in all, our inferiours, or against those wee know, and that dwell not farre from vs.
For wee Enuie not a mans wealth whom we know not, or who dwels in the Indies; or if he haue not beene our equall or inferiour, [Page 86] or with whom we haue had no cause of strife and contention.
3 So likewise he that hath beene still our Superiour, can neuer be enuyed of vs: but contrariwise he that hath beene formerly our equall, and is of late become great, he who enioyes that which were fit and propper for vs, and on whom Fortune hath confer'd it with more ease and lesse difficultie then to our selues: him commonly we enuy; yea, although hee be our Parent and Kinsman.
4 By the same reason, those will be prouoked to En [...], whose equals or inferiours enter into a riuall-ship to enioy any thing with them; and it is vsually seene, they are most Enuious, who only want some meanes, and yet are in some prosperitie, thinking because already they enioy many aduantages, they ought also enioy this which they want.
5 Those also who desire honour, and reputation, are for the most part more enuious then these who are lesse Ambitious: esteeming that other mens reputation and greatnesse ecclipseth and deminisheth their owne: so much for Enuie.
6 In Indignation, we are angry at another mans prosperitie, through the consideration of the person that enioyeth it: whom againe we deeme vnworthie thereof: and [Page 87] this motion is intermix'd with Anger, Hatred Enuy and Choller.
7 But the prosperities, and aduantages, that stirre vp in vs this affection, are these of [...]o [...]tune. and of Body; as, Wealth, Nobilitie, Friends, Honour, Power, Greatnesse, Health, Strength, Beautie, and the like; and not those of Iudgement, and Vnderstanding: because we cannot say that a man is vnworthy to be Iust, Vertuous, or Learned; and the anger which in this respect we receiue, or conc [...]iue, may properly be tearmed Enuie.
8 Indignation proceeds likewise, when without Industrie, or by base and dishonest meanes, another obtaines Wealth, or Dignitie, from whence it comes to passe, that the hastie and sudden aduancements of some, make vs assume this motion, as being a thing he hath not deserued, either through care or labour: and generally, all aduancements and preferments from low to higher fortunes, beget in vs these three Passions, Enuie, Indignation, and Emulation.
Contrariwise, the frequent seeing a man in the same Estate, makes vs iudge & esteeme that he deserues it: time making the enioying of al things lawfull, & as it were by prescription, it seemes that those enioy their owne, who haue a long time enioyed it.
9 Likewise, Great men with whom those of a meaner ran [...]ke are conioyn'd in any place [Page 88] or office, are soone mou'd, and prouok'd to Indignation, esteeming that their owne condition and qualitie is hereby debased and deminished.
10 Inexperience, in the charge or office wherein some are aduanced, likewise driues vs into this Passion; because dignities, and offices bestowen on a man, should still be preportioned according to his [...] and Condition; all sorts of pr [...]ferments being not fit for all sorts of men: as, the conduction and command of an Army to one of another profession, who is no souldier, though otherwaies endued and fraughted with other excellent qualities and deserts.
11 The best, and more vertuous sort of people, are likewise subiect to this passion, because hating iniust things, they cannot endure to see vnworthy persons enioy places of honour and preferment, and generally those who thinke they deserue well, seeing any thing conferd on another, that is inferiour to him, either in birth, sufficiency, or other conditions, and qualities, doe soone murmure and repine thereat: whereas contrariwise, the baser and seruiler sort of people, as also those of the meanest Cap. cities, and Iudgements: knowing themselues to be such, are not in this manner moued; because they cannot reproach or tax those faults in others, which they know are in themselues.
[Page 89] 12 Emulation seemes to be a degree of Enuie; and yet neuerthelesse they are farre different: for Enuie is angry at other mens prosperitie, not so much for the Loue of it selfe, as for some hatred or malice which waits and attends on this Passion.
13 But Emulation is not so much angry for other mens Prosperities, as it being possessed of others: but for that she possesseth it not her selfe; which is the reason and cause that sometimes it stirres vp in vs, an infinite number of vertuous operations, to obtaine and purchase the like.
14 In respect whereof we many times see those addicted and subiect to this Passion, who are of a hautie courage, and endued with many great and faire qualities, as with Capacitie, Wealth, Credit, Friends, Dignities, or the like requisites, fit to effect any great matter of moment or i [...]portance: because such men thinke they should enioy that which is fit and worthie for those of good parts; in such sort as seeing them in others, they are thereby incited and st [...]iue with their best industrie and endeuours to procure the same or the like.
15 Young folkes are also much subiect to this Passion as also those who are descended of Noble Parentage, and are much reputed and honoured, esteeming that this honour ought be conferd and continued them; [Page 90] and that as it is fit, so it must not be neglected.
16 But to frame and modell this Emulation in our Understandings; besides, the loue of our selues, we must haue the knowledge of that Good we desire, which in this motion chiefly aimes at Honour, and Profit.
17 Which to desire we must first want them, and yet in such sort, that we are still of opinion to obtaine them, for those who know not the want thereof but haue them in abundance; or which dispaire to obtaine them, will neuer participate of this motion.
18 Iealousie hath her chiefest foundation, in the loue of our selues; which is the reason why we so closely affect and embrace the obiect that wee chiefly loue and desire, as wee will not impart any part thereof to others; and if any chance to participate thereof, we not only torment our selues with Enuie against our Coriuall, but also aduance so farre, as to hate that obiect which before we so de [...]rely and tenderly loued.
But this Passion being alwaies deuanc'd, and anticipated by Suspition, Mistrust, and Feare, those who are subiect to this motion, will finde themselues fit to enter into lealousie of that Good they inioy, in remembring another, where many Riuals and Competitors seeke and desire the same Good.
These are the causes and meanes that are [Page 91] most commonly vsed to incite and stir vp the motions of the Will, according to the circumstances of place, time, persons, and affaires.
CHAP. XXIII.
- 1 The vse of the knowledge of Passions, and the meanes to moderate them both in our selues and others.
- 2 The benefit by moderating Passions in our selues, liuing in Court.
- 3 That they are moderated by faire meanes, and by the power of Courage.
- 4 By naturall Pleasantnesse.
- 5 Or by that which we Procure or Purchase.
- 6 By our Breeding.
- 7 By Experience.
- 8 By discoursing of Reason, and how farre it extends.
- 9 Diuers Considerations hereon.
1 COme we to the meanes to moderate them; wherein I am of opinion, that we must begin by our selues: for to imagin that we shal haue more predominance ouer other mens wils then our owne, is very vnlikely and contrary to sence and reason.
[Page 92] 2 But if we can once command our selues, then there is no doubt, but we are capable to gouern the World, & to become masters of other mens affections, because this moderatiō giues vs leisure to espie out the place, time, occasions, and other necessarie aduantages, to compasse our designes: yea, wee must fawne, bow, and easily deferre, according to occasion, alwaies walking as it were with the bridle in our hand, and if we faile of our purpose, we must not notwithstanding lose courage, and so despaire; but if we finde the doore shut one way, wee must without torment, or affliction, seeke out and open another passage.
Briefly, wee shall secure our selues from those sharpe and passionate Motions, which disturbe and hinder the conduction and progression of affaires: yea, that fetter and stop vs, and often times make vs lame: and produce in ou [...]selues precipitation, obstinacy, indiscretion, bitternesse, suspition, and impatiency.
3 But these motions whether in our selues or others, are moderated, either through the agreeablenesse of our conuersation and manners, by force of courage, prouidence or by dehortation.
The agreeableuesse of our manners, and force of courage, although they are different in themselues, yet in this respect, they [Page 93] oftentimes produce the same effects; and both the one, and the other, is either naturally, or artificially obtained.
4 As for the naturall, it is most certaine, that we shall sinde some Wils and Inclinations, that are naturally more stayed and moderate one then another; and others againe more lifted vp and eleuated aboue the obiects of that may prouoke and stirre vp those Motions, which is the reason they are not so often remoued and shaken, nor with so much violence or impetuositie.
I mean not here stupiditie, insensiblenesse, or Ignorance, which take from vs the feeling of Good, as they doe of Euill: for to be of this humour & inclination, were to participate more of a Beast then a Man: neuerthelesse, because we may preuaile according to the occasions of these sorts of Natures, wee must likewise be acquainted with those who are subiect to these defects of Wisedome and Iudgement; for, in the Court, as well as in a priuate Family, euery one is necessary, and hath his proper vse.
But this agreeablenesse of manners, and force of Courage, arising from certaine Complexions; and among others, from the Sanguine, which is farthest distant from excesse, as being betwixt the Fleame that engendereth Stupiditie, and the Gall that produceth Choler: to beare our selues vpright in this [Page 94] cause, we must auoid to fall into the two distempratures of the blood; which are the yellow Gall, and Melancholly: which engender in vs many extraordinary motions: and wee must temper Fleame, for feare least through its coldnesse, it benumme and stupisie our Vnderstanding.
Neuerthelesse, I referre it to Phisitions to prescribe that rule of Dyet, that may be sit; not only because I will not vsurpe on their Profession; but likewise, because of the difficultie that we sinde to practise that which others haue prescribed and written; as also, for the small benefit and good we can reape, and receiue thereby.
5 As for the meanes to obtaine this agreeablenesse in our manners, and force of courage there are three chiefe and principal, Education, Experience, and Discourse of Reason.
6 To be bred and brought vp among those that are either moderate or resolute, wee vsually follow their steps, and inherit, and participate of their inclinations for frequenting them often, their conuersation destils in vs the same opinions, and manners.
7 Likewise the experience or knowledge of diuers accidents that haue befalne vs, or those of our acquaintance, make vs behaue and beare our selues, either moderatly as they haue formerly done in the like occurrences.
[Page 95] 8 But the discourse of Reason, goes further, and embraceth all sorts of considerations, whereof we will here produce the chiefest that may pertinently serue for this matter and purpose.
9 The first is that of the true estimation of things; yea, of those things themselues that may be apprehended of vs, either as Good or Euill.
And hereunto all Philosophie aimes, and endeuours to fortifie vs against many thinges, that may either dasell our sences, or astonish vs: but hitherto it hath preuail'd and gain'd but little among Common people, and lesse of Courtiers who spurn at these rules; whereof as I will aduise none to make vse thereof against any one whom he knowes incapable: for feare least he become either importunate or rediculous; so I willingly counsell euery one in his owne particular, that he seeke and procure this moderation (which is the most requisite perfection in a Courtier) and hauing found it to make vse thereof, and neuer to neglect it.
CHAP. XIV.
| 1 | The fourth head of this first Booke: three Principall faults we commit in seeing things Good or Euill. | |
| 2 | The indifferency thereof being a remedy for the first fault. | |
| 3 | What Death is. | |
| 4 | Time and delay is a remedy for the second fault. | |
| 5 | ||
| 6 | Considerations vpon these rem [...]dies. | |
| 7 | ||
| 8 | ||
| 9 | ||
| 10 | ||
| 11 | Disaduantages, or Domages, a remedy for the third fault. | |
| 12 | Examinations of the disaduantages of an Obiect, and examples thereon. | |
| 13 | Weaknesse, Credulitie, and Curiositie, three d [...]fects, from whom proceede the ill opinions wee conceiue either of our selues or others. | |
| 13 | Remedies for this | Weaknesse. |
| 14 | Credulitie. | |
| 15 | Curiositie. | |
| 17 | The conclusion of this | Chapter. |
1 TO say something as wee proceede in this Treatise: We must know that wee faile many times in the iudgement and true estimation of obiects that presents themselues to our Will.
First, in interpreting and reputing that [Page 97] Good or Euill, which is not, or else in representing Good or Euill farre greater in shew, then it is in effect, or else in tearming that Good which is Euill, and that Euill which is Good.
2 As for the first fault: it is most certaine that the greatest part of things in this world haue two handles, o [...] holdfasts, whereby wee may take th [...]m: by the one they seeme to be grieuous, and also heauy; by the other easie and light, and it is in our choice to take them which way we please, there being no reason whatsoeuer, but wee may find out, and produce its contrarie.
3 Death is the distastefullst Accedent wee feare: but if we consider the miserie of this world, it is an enfranchising and speedy remedie from and against all miseries; yea (to vse but a word) it is a harbour and shelter against al the stormes and tempests of our life.
It is almost the same in all other obiects; for there are not many so absolutely to bee held for afflictions, from whence we may not deriue and draw some profit; nor none so absolutely good, from [...] there may not proceed some preiudice [...] inconueniencies.
If then those motions [...]hat are stirred vp by the consideration of Good, transport vs with too much violence, we must enter into consideration of the losses and profits that may arise, and those which are occasioned by [Page 98] the consideration of Euill may be moderated, in representing to themselues the profits they may receiue thereby: and so excercising themselues in this indifferency, we shall find our selues in the tearmes of this moderation that is necessary for vs, in the managing and conduction of affaires, and we must not feare that it either coole or weaken our designes: for our Iudgement will alwaies bend more one wa [...] then the other; but it must not be with precipitation and inconsideration.
4 And not to be guiltie of the other fault, which is committed in representing Good or [...]uill greater then they are; wee must giue leisure to our Iudgement maturely to consider it, and so vnst [...]ip and deuest the obiect, which may moue and incite vs to all those qualities and occurrences, that may make them seeme greater then they are.
5 Time weakeneth the impetuositie of this Motion, and giues place to a more perfecter knowledge of that, which incites vs hereunto; yea, although it be but in giuing our selues so much time, as to repeate the letters of the Alphabet, as a wise man councelled Augustus to doe, when he was cholerick.
Euery one knows how to condemne Iudgments giuen in Passion and Choller, and yet notwithstanding all those sentences and iudgements we pronounce, are for the most part of this sort.
[Page 99] 6 Let vs then permit this motion, to grow and waxe old that our Vnderstanding returne to her proper seate, especially sith all that is done in passion, ought to be doubted and suspected of vs: and let vs consider this obiect naked and deuested of all her circumstances, and wee shall find it farre otherwise then it seem'd to vs at the first appearance.
7 As for Example, the presence of Euill at first sight thereof, makes it seeme farre greater then it is; from whence proceeds Sorrow, which in the end is worne away by Time; whereas if Euill were as it seemes to bee, it will be the same at twenty yeeres end, as at present. Let vs therefore deuest it of this circumstance of presence, and conforme our Imagination to the truth, and we shall find that we shall not bee so vexed and pestered with this motion.
8 But it is not onely the circumstance of time present that encreaseth Euill or Good in our Imagination, for the future performes likewise as much, for she it is that often deceiues vs, both in our feares and hopes: for we misse that wee hope for; that which wee feare vanisheth, and passeth away; and that which we neither waite nor expect, oftentimes befalls vs.
9 Many Accidents likewise befall vs, which preuent what wee foresee, Thunder and [Page 100] Lightning is driuen away with the wind of a Hat, as also the fortune of great men in a small moment of time, one turne of a wheele makes that which was aboue, beneath; and very often from whence we expect our ruin, proceedes our securitie and preseruation.
10 And so it is in other circumstances ofsearcitie, aboundance, facilitie, difficultie, noueltie, strangenesse, and custome; which as we haue formerly said, hinders the functions of our Iudgement, and whereof we must of necessitie deuest the obiects, if we wil iudge according to truth, as also our Iudgements and Understandings from all preocupation of opinions, and popular errours.
11 The third fault is greater then the two former, when we perswade our selues, that an obiect is profitable and Good, which is Euill and noysome, and that euill and pernitious which is not.
This errour comes to passe, sith all things as we haue already said, haue two handels or hold-fasts, and except we be cautious and carefull, wee onely take hold of the first that comes to our hand.
12 Wherefore before wee iudge of the qualitie of an obiect, we must first know the profits and preiudices, weigh and consider the consequences of both, and compare them one with another, and if the profits exceede the preiudices; not onely in number, but in [Page 101] weight, qualitie, dependance, or importance, we may then tearme them Good and profitable; or if the contrary, we must reiect them as Euill.
As for Example: euery one holds reuenge to be Good, and as a pleasing and agreeable thing is desired of all men, because of the content it brings with it, which notwithstanding is far lesse then distaste, and angers, who torment and trouble vs in seeking the meanes to accomplish and perpetrate our designes.
This thought of reuenge, is a worme that frets and eates out our hearts, prouokes vs by day, torments vs by night, and most commonly in vaine; and whilest we thus afflict our selues, our enemy laughes and liues ioccund and merry: and when wee are on the point to execute our reuenge, thinking to put out one of his eyes, wee commonly lose both our owne; for the feare of Iustice and punishment surpriseth vs, and driues vs to this extremitie, either to hide our selues, or to flie.
If then wee ballance all this with a little Content, which for the most part lasteth not long, and sometime is but meerely imaginarie, we shall then find, that it doth not match or counterpoyse these our angers and afflictions, and so likewise it is in many other matters.
[Page 102] As for those who imagine they are wronged and iniured when they are not, they againe are in a greater errour, although they s [...]me to be more wise and iudicious, as hauing an eye to all things, and enquiring after all Matters.
It is to bee too ingenious to torment and afflict himselfe, to seeke that he desires not to find; and it is to haue a bad stomack, ill to digest good Viands.
Contrariwise, we must in all things seeke the pleasingst interpretation, and that which contents vs best, if wee will resolue to taste that which is worst.
Hath not one saluted thee as he ought; yet attribute it not to disdaine; for if hee bee thy friend, it is your great familiaritie that is cause thereof, if he bee thine inferiour, it is not credible that he thought it so, or neglected it, either out of folly, or indiscretion, although it be anothers fault, whereby hee makes himselfe more worthy of disdaine then your selfe, whose reputation and honour should not depend on people of that ranke and qualitie.
13 These ill opinions proceede of three defects that are in vs, Weakenes, Credulity, & C [...]osi [...]e, the weaker we are, the more easier are our to bee shaken, and the more violent we are motions resembling the actions of children and old people, who runne when [Page 103] they thinke they walke.
14 Wee must then bee couragious and chearefull, and through conference and discourse stirre vp in vs the knowledge of that which befalls vs: yea, we must auoide and slie the loue and delight of these things, which most animate and prouoke vs.
15 Also to be credulous and light of beliefe, and to permit our selues to be carried away with the first opinion, we conceiue either of a man, or a businesse, or by the perswasion of another, doth in the same manner afflict vs. Wherefore wee must shut our eares against the ordinarie reports of the Court, yea wee must haue recourse vnto time, and giue our selues leisure not onely to see, but to consider, if the end and dependances of actions answere their beginning, or correspond with that which hath been reported vnto vs.
16 Likewise, Curiositie in seeking that which may offend and anger vs, being preuented by an ill opinion, and attended on by doubt, makes vs interpret other mens actions in a bad and contrary sense.
Wee must then slie these two l [...]tter defects, and fortifie our selues against the former, and also in that which concernes any particular person, we must represent to our eyes the common and most frequent imperfections of men in generall.
[Page 104] 17 Euery one halts of one legge, it is much when they doe not of both; and if wee will bee moderate in censuring other mens faults, let vs by little and little examine our owne, and then perhaps wee shall find some of them no lesse defectiue, and enormous, and it may bee the like, and as bad, if not worse then theirs: but withall let vs lend such excuses to other mens faults, as we giue to our ow [...]e. Thus haue yee the manner how to beare our selues in the estimation of matters.
CHAP. XXV.
| 1 | Consideration of our power to moderate our Passions. |
| 2 | W [...]rein this power consisteth. |
| 3 | Why we throw our selues on the Court. |
| 4 | To consider our abilities by the difficulties wee meete withall. |
| 5 | |
| 6 | Fore-sight is a second meanes to moderate our Passions. |
| 7 | The first effect of this fore-sight, is to flie the causes and occasions, and not to enter into these Motions. |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | The second effect of this foresight, is to prepare our selues against that which we foresee must b [...] fall vs, and to attend and expect it with a firne and constant resolution. |
| 11 | The third effect of this fore-sight, is to change and diuert this Euill [...]eing befallen vs another way, or else to familiarize it to our selfe in our Imaginations. |
| 12 | Of the diucrsion thereof, the third meanes to moderate these Passions. |
| 13 | Other meares to diuert our Passionat Wit and Conceits. |
| 14 | |
| 15 | |
| 16 |
1 THe other consideration that may scrue vs to moderate our Passions, is the knowledge of that which we can do, limmitting thereby our hopes and desires vnto things certaine, neare at hand, and casie, and accustoming our selues to facility and simplicitie (the Mother of peace and tranquillitie) we are not deceiued in our desire and hopes, but by a false opinion which we conceiue thereby to accomplish it: for if by little and little wee examine our selues how farre our power can extend, wee shall not then heape vp desire on desire, nor hope vpon hope as we doe.
2 But this power not onely consists in Authoritie, Reputation, Friends, Capacitie, or the llike meanes, whereby we may obtaine that which we desire but also in disposing of our Wills to indure and suffer that, which is commonly [Page 106] incident in the research of things of this nature.
3 We throw our selues on the Court, to obtaine Wealth, Honour, Authorit [...] and Power, wee haue many faire entrances thereunto, many Friends, many good Qualities and Perfections which may bring vs into reputation and credit. But these are not enough, we must examine and enquire of our selues, if we are disposde to flatter great men, and sometimes their Groomes, to waite and attend a Porter, after he hath a long time ma [...]e vs stay to number the Nayles of the Gate or Doore; if wee will suffer our selues to bee scan [...]alizd, and calumniated, and can pack vp iniuries without da [...]ing to complaine thereof, and if we can accommodate our selues to other mens pleasures or passions: for it is with this price and coyne that this Merchandise of the Court is purchased and bought.
4 Turne ouer these circumstances sound the depth of your power, weigh this money, and consider if these wares bee worth this price, and it may be you will indge, that you must goe into this Faire of the Court with more aduisement and moderation, then others doe.
5 It is the like in all other actions; for we must measure and compare our abilities with the difficulties that doe, or may arise, [Page 107] yea, and without the least flattering of our selues: for it is a common error & ouer-sight that insensibly destills into vs, and that not being able to doe what we would, wee must frame our Will to performe that which wee can. Let this suffice for the most generall meanes, that wee may extract from discoursing of Reason, thereby to moderate our Passions.
6 Come wee now to the meanes which the weakest and simplest practice and vse, which are fore-sight and dehortation.
7 The first effect of fore-sight, is to free our selues of all canses and occasions, that may stir [...]e vp in vs any irregular motion, and so to cut off all their approaches, and to stop their entrances.
8 In their birth all things are weake and tender, and it is more easier to repell and stoppe the fi [...]st st [...]ppe, or asault to this motion, then to delay, or protract it, either through difficultie, or order.
9 So hee who is accustomed to be cholerick in his play, let him auoyde play; hee that is hasty and angrie, let him eschew all causes of debates and contentions; and hee that loues or hates any obiect, let him not present himselfe before it, but rather let him estrange and sequester himselfe from it.
[Page 108] 10 The second effect of this fore sight or prouidence, is to foresee the Good or E [...] that may concurre, and meete in a businesse: and not onely by little and little to examine the same according to all the circumstances thereof, but also to stand vpon our gard, and constantly toawayt and expect it in tranquilitie and silence, yea, and without any exteriour disturbance, which commonly redouble, and reinflame the Motions of our Understandings, and makes them more impetuous and violent.
11 The third effect is, to wheele about, or to diuert another way the Euill we see, ready to befall vs: or if we cannot performe it, we must in such sort represent it often to our Imaginations that when it ariues, we may bee armed to receiue it with more patience, and lesse anger, Sith it is certaine, that propensed and premeditated dangers alwaies least preiudice and hurt vs.
12 As for the deuerting thereof, it is a meanes vsed in all passions: for as one naile driues out another, so one passion expelles another, and herein we may beare our selues two manner of waies.
For wee diuert our Vnderstanding; that is, prouokt or moued, in preposing another obiect to the same passion that moues vs: so to him that is in loue with a woman, we present him another farre more fairer and amiable, [Page 109] or to him that follows a sute or businesse by tedious and troublesome meanes, we propose him a shorter and farre easier course to effect it.
13 Or else wee diuert the Understanding from one passion to another, as in an ambitious man, wee moderate his hopes from pearching or soaring higher, by fearing him, lest he fall into his former estate, or peraduenture; to a worse; a subtiltie which hath been often practised by many Princes towards their Fauourites.
14 Likewise also, when to a sorrowfull man we present. and proffer some thing that may reioyce him, to a fearefull man that may resolue and secure him, and to one that hates vs, some testimony of our affection, thereby to allure and draw him to loue vs.
15 But herein we must bee cautious and careful, that the obiect whereunto we would draw our Understanding, be more powerfull in our Imagination, then that wherewith it was first surprised and possessed.
16 And if one alone obiect be not sufficient, we must then present many; for there is nothing that subdues and weakeneth the Understanding so much, as pluralitie and diuersitie of obiects: for bending himselfe against all, his motions are made lesse violent towards euery one of them seuerally deuided.
CHAP. XXVI.
| 1 | The third vse of the knowledge of the motions of our will, and wherein it consists, as in Affabilitie, or agreeablenesse; and how to vse it in Court, which is the fifth Head of this first Booke. |
| 2 | Of the profit and necessities of this Affabilitie, with Examples thereon to that effect. |
| 3 | Of Affabilitie in our Choller. |
| 5 | How to beare our selues in this Passion. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | In mildnesse and pleasantnesse, and of their Natures who are mild. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | In feare and of their natures who are fearefull. |
| 11 | To accommodate our selues to this Passion. |
| 12 | Of confidence and beliefe, and how we ought to demeane our selues to those, who are adicted and subiect thereunto. |
| 13 | Of shame, and of their natures, who are shame-faced. |
| 14 | How to beare our selues towards those, who are subiect to this Motion. |
| 15 | |
| 16 | |
| 17 | |
| 18 | Of hatred and malice, with their remedies. |
| 19 | Of Courtesie. |
| 20 | How to beare our selues to those who are courteous. |
| 21 | Of Affability in ingratitude and how to beare our selues to those who are ingratefull. |
| 22 | Of Compassion and Pitie, and of their Natures, as also how to beare our selues towards those, who are subiect to this Passion. |
| 23 | Of Indignation, and of their Nature who are prouoked to this Passion. |
| 24 | That the malicious, and enuious, resemble those who are passionate. |
| 25 | How to beare our selues towards them. |
| 26 | Of sorrow, and how to beare our selues towards those who are sorrowfull. |
| 27 | |
| 28 | |
| 29 | |
| 30 | Of Ioy, and how to beare our selues towards those who are ioyfull. |
| 31 | Aduice for Courtiers how to behaue themselues in their gestures and Countenances, according to the Examples of the Courtiers of Alexander, and his Father Phillip. |
| 32 | |
| 33 | If it bee lawfull for Courtiers to imitate the Vices as well as the Vertues of those with whom they conuerse: Examples hereon. |
| 34 | That those who haue flexible and changeable Wits, are fit to be Courtiers. |
| 35 | The Conclusion of the difference of persons, proceeding from the difference of their interiour conditions and qualities. |
1 THere remaines the third vse of the knowledge of the Motions of our Will, which consists in squaring and framing our affections, and actions, to those of others, which in a word we tearme Asabilitie, and is most commonly abused in Court, or many times degenerates into flattery.
2 Notwithstanding it may not onely be profitable (as was that of Arcacius. Patriarke of Constantinople, who thereby mollified and appeased the crueltie of the Emperour, Leon Macella) but also necessary in many accedents as well towards our Prince as particular persons: I will hereunto adde some thing that may sort more for example, then to present that which might be alleaged vpon this subiect, and I will begin with Choler.
3 He that is tormented with this passion of Choller, it may be complains of iniuries receiued amplifies and augments them, hath his Wits bent on reuenge, and applaudes it, is ready to attempt it, not fearing the danger, but rather seekes the execution, then once to enter into the consideration of that he doth; [Page 113] hee approues and followes his head-strong and precipitated resolution, speakes ill of him, who hath offended him, procures him as many enemies as possible he can, and by his countenance diuers wayes, bewraies this his vindictiue and reuengetull passion, his complexion changeth, he speakes with impetuositie and confusion, lookes aduerse and ghastly, now here now there.
4 Whosoeuer therefore will dispose himselfe to be conformable to his humour, that is possesst of this passion, hee must somewhat immitate his actions, and ma [...]e him vnderstand he does it for the same effect and purpose, seeming to be angry for the iniurie h [...]e hath receiued, blaming him that hath done it, praysing reuenge, and approuing his forwardnesse, boldnesse, resolution, and the like to be reuenged of his enemy.
5 But because these actions and countenances are not fit for all people, nor towards all sorts of persons, wee must therefore vse much discretion, and propose many degrees of reuenge; yea, wee must endeauour to choose that, which requires most time for its execution, as being the surest, to the end that time may deminish and coole our choller, and so make roome for reason.
6 Briefly, in all hastie and rash resolutions, which choller suggesteth vnto vs, wee must procrastinat and deferre the execution [Page 114] thereof by the most apparant and colourable pretexts we may, grounding this delay (if possible we can) vpon some considerations which we see he embraceth or retaineth, that is thus passionatly offended.
7 For in this cause, it is Charitie to deceiue our friend, thereby to diuert him from this Motion of Reuenge; yea, it is an excellent wile and viuacitie of Wit to performe it, so as it appeare not that we are opposite or contrary to him: for feare he be not offended with vs.
8 But with those who are milde and opposite to Choller, we must obserue and follow a contrary rule: for these are commonly estrang'd from reuenge: for they speake courteously of those who haue offended them; seeking to deminish and excuse the iniuries they haue receiued, and considering the dangers and difficulties these are to be reueng'd, they approue this resolution, not to permit themselues to be transported and vanquished with this Passion, and so proceeding with reason and aduisement, they in the [...]nd content themselues with that satisfaction which is offered them.
9 To accommodate and sit our selues then to these sort of men, we must extoll the resistance they oppose, as well to the violence of Choller, as to the desire of Reuenge, it being Wisedome in them, to estimate the [Page 115] iniury by the qualitie and condition, as well of him that offred it, as of him that hath receiued it.
10 He that is fearefull, esteemes and considereth all these dangers, although they are small in apparance; yea, it seemes vnto him, that the Euill or danger is neerer vnto him then it is; for fearing all things his hope is weake: yea, he is doubtfull of those things that are certaine, changeth often his purpose and counsell: hee is irresolute, and betakes himselfe to that party and side where he thinkes there is lesse danger, although it proue lesse honourable; he still augmenteth and aggrauates the danger wherein he is; forgets himselfe and those who are neerest and deerest to him; not esteeming them in respect of his owne securitie, but makes his feare apparant by his gestures and countenance, now changing complexions; and then againe speaking confusedly, inconstantly, and with much impertinencie, and distraction.
11 To accomodate and fit our selues to this Passion, we must support F [...]are with Reason, which we entitle Wisedome and foresight (the mother of securitie) and blaming that Leuitie that is built vpon vaine and infirme hopes, wee will tearme it timeritie and rashnesse to performe the contrarie, [Page 116] and shew our selues, as if we were possest with feare; yea, wee will excuse that, which (without shame) wee cannot commend.
12 Contrariwise, if we haue to doe with a man, who is full of resolution, and confidence, who enters not into the consideration of those things, that may procure vs feare and preiudice, or who deemes himselfe secure enough from any Euill that may betide or ariue him, amplifying the conceit thereof, and deminishing the Euill and Danger, being ready to hazard, and execute his designes, bearing himselfe in his gesture, actions, and countenance chearefull and resolute, and in his speeches constant and secure, wee must put such a one in mind of his condition, qualitie, power and reputation, which assure vs he will finish and accomplish his desires; deminishing the danger and hazard, and extolling the care and meanes he hath in his power to effect it; highly applauding his forwardnesse to resolue his constancy to follow, and his audacitie and courage to execute; and if occasion present, we must likewise informe him, that in matters of the like nature that concern'd our selues, wee perform'd the same, and followed the very same stepps and resolutions.
13 But if wee will fit and and accommodate our selues to the humours of those who [Page 117] are shamefac'd, considering that these sort of people are commonly angrie, and complaine when there befalles them any thing that makes them ashamed, wee must endeauour and striue to couer and excuse it; and their faults being reueal'd and dlsclosde, to acknowledge and confesse them, and seeming to be sorrowfull and repentant for their honour and reputation lost, not to take any delight or pleasure to refresh their remembrance of what hath formerly befallen them.
14 We must seeme to grieue for the discontent they suffer, and that we very vnwillingly enter into this discourse; that this shame proceeds not, but from a praise worthy nature, that is iealous of Honour; and that there are none but are subiect to the like accidents, which in the end either time or some contrary action will deface, and rase out of mens memories.
15 But if we meete with some impudent or brasen-fac'd fellow, considering that such fellowes conceiue neither displeasure, shame or repentance at any thing they commit, although neuer so dishonest, but contrariwise applaud and apologize it, yea, and somtimes take a delight and felicitie to report it, hauing neither consideratian nor care of the blemish and preiudice which this may bring to their reputations, but rather hating and [Page 118] disdaining those who are opposite and contrary to them, or that dislike their actions and behauiour.
16 If we cannot vntwist and sequester our selues from these sort of people, we must runne with the Hare, and condemne the great respect we must beare some men, to whom those who serue them are slaues, and depriu'd of many infinite pleasures and contents; yea, we must blame those who betake themselues hereunto, either with too much seueritie or simplicitie.
17 To accomodate our selues to him that is affectionately bent to a man, knowing that these sort of people, willingly extoll, Honour; respect, defend, and excuse those whom they affect and loue: and when occasion presents, doe admonish, and exhort them, wee must seem to approue the choyce and election he hath made, praising his constancy in his friendship, and his courtesie and kinde offices perform'd to those he loues.
18 But if he hate a man, and that we see our selues enforc'd to please him, we must then blame him who is hated, and aggrauate the wrong he hath perpetrated and committed; yea, seeme to reioice at his errour and to be angrie at any good he hath perform'd; and not only blame him, but likewise enerease & augment the preiudice or wrong he hath done others.
[Page 119] 19 But because wee see that Affection is neither seene nor knowne but by her effects, which are comprehended vnder the name of Curtesie; we must therefore know that those who are subiect to this Motton, are apt and ready to performe a good Office, reioycing that they meete with any occasion, and watching and espying out the time, place, and conditions of those that may perswade and enuite them to doe it, or to giue them the meanes to performe a good Office; yea, to be well contented and to delight that they are the sirst, in making the only demonstration of this courtesie, thereby blaming those who doe the contrary: and withall reputing themselues happy, to be found and esteem'd such; thereby to be beloued, cherished, honoured, praised, and respected.
20 Wherefore with such people we must approue and commend their forwardnesse and promptitude to doe a courtesie, either that which they haue done, or intend to doe; shewing our selues to be much contented, when we meet with any occasion to perform a good Office to any; still seeming to be respectiue and carefull, either by acknowledging or in being thankefull, or else by requitting, or performing some good Office, to him who hath formerly oblig'd vs.
21 Or if we haue to doe with Ingratfull persons (whose company I alwaies counsell [Page 120] yee as much as possible yee may to anoyde) then we must deminish the good office receiued, blaming the intention of him that perform'd it, and shewing, that it is a difficult thing to charge our selues with an obligation without cause; and that those who are wise, know how to make a difference, and destinction betwixt reall good offices, and those that are counterseit and dissembled, that as ingratefull men are not to bee condemned for their ill will, no more are those who acknowledge themselues debtors for that thev owe not.
22 Those whose hu [...]ors who are free and friendly, are likewise commonly accompanied with Pitt [...]e and Compassion towards others, grieuing at their afflictions, seeming not onely to know how vndeseruedly their misfortune is befallen them, whom we bewaile, but also to take occasion to feare, that the like befall not themselues, or those whom they loue; to commend and applaude the courage, conditions, and qualities, of those, who are afflicted; cherishing and comforting them, and proffering them our helpe and assistance; yea, to some, giuing testimony of our compassion with sighes and teares: and thus we must likewise beare our selues, yet still according as the quality of the Affliction or Euill, and also as Discretion and Decency requires.
[Page 121] 23 Those who are Angrie, at the Good, or prosperitie that befalls a man, who deserues it not, doe commonly augment or deminish his conditions and merits, storming and repining at the conduction and nature of humane affaires, as also at the partialitie and blindnesse of Fortune.
24 The Enuious, and Malitious man beares himselfe almost in the same manner, but the better to gratifie him, wee must enter into the consideration and comparison of him who beares enuie, with him who is enuied, still augmenting the merits of him who is enuious, and deminishing those of him that is enuied, alwaies remembring the bad actions which this last hath committed, or that are worthy either of contempt or hatred.
25 But such motions being of the ranck and Nature of those, which an honest man ought to eschew and flie; hee must not ingage himselfe to those obseruances, except hee bee constraind through some great respect or consideration; and yet with this Prouiso, and Discretion, that hee neither preiudice, nor wrong his owne Capacitie and Merits.
26 As for Ioy and Sorrow, wee must beare our selues therein differentlie: for Ioy neither accepts nor admits willinglie of Sorrow into her companie.
[Page 122] 27 But our Sorrow may be of this Nature, that he that is sorrowfull, may willingly admit a pleasant and merry man into his company, prouided alwaies that he know how to infinuate himselfe fairely and discreetely: for if in the middest of sorrow, one come and play the merry fellow, or foole, hee then makes himselfe not onely distastefull, but importunate and rediculous: but hauing ouer-past the violence and impetuositie of our sorrowes, and accommodating and disposing of our selues to the time, some one running from matter to matter, chance to enter into a discourse, which is agreeable and pleasing to him that is sorrowfull, no doubt but he may thereby somewhat mollifie and appease it.
28 For man being naturally more enclined and addicted to Pleasure then to Griese, Pleasure beeing first duely presented him, hee more willinglie embraceth it then the other.
29 But this hath relation and reference more to displeasing then pleasing, which in this sorrow will be accompanied and waited on by silence; yea, and then when with our best endeauours and skill we cannot immitate the gesture and countenance of him that is afflicted.
30 As for Ioy, euerie man knowes how to represent and counterfeit it; and if we [Page 123] entermixe prayses to him, whom we would delight and please, wee shall still bee the better welcome. I should bee to tedious, if I vndertooke to represent the different actions that proceede from our interiour motions; yea, and it would not onely bee troublesome but vnprofitable. That which I haue already written shall suffice, and is sufficient to comprehend how wee should beare our selues in pleasing and obseruing our friends.
31 Onely as it were in passing by, I wil cursorily aduise yee, not to immitate those foolish and rediculous Countenances of Alexanders Courtiers, who bore their heads awrie, and of one side, because. Alexander himselfe did so; or like the Courtiers of King Phillip his Father, who seeing this Prince to bind about his face with a linnen cloth by reason of a blow he had receiued on his eye, did likewise the same, although they had no hurt whatsoeuer.
32 This indeed smells too much of the parrasytes of elder times, who indifferently practised this obseruance, or rather of ignoble and base flatterie, which cannot bee well receiued or taken, except among blockheads and dunces.
33 Tis true, sometimes Courtiers in a maner are constrained to immitate the Uices and Imperfections as well as the Uertues [Page 124] of those with whom they conuerse: For Alcibiades being at Athens, played the Orator and Philosopher, among the L [...]c [...]d [...]monians, he was austere and seuere, with the Thracians hee exercisde not onely to ride great Horses, but also to drinke and carouse stiffely; with the Ioniens he was voluptuous, iocund and lasie; and with the Persians, arrogant, and very sumptuous in his apparrell and household stuffe.
34 Such spirits are fit for the Court, where we must be conformable and flexible to all sorts of humours and fashions; yet neuerthelesse so, as no constraint thereof be either re marked, or perceiued in vs.
35 These then shall suffice, and here I will end the discourse of the difference of men, proceeding from the diuersitie of their interiour conditions, and so will passe on to the exteriour; which being likewise infinite, we will onely produce those that may pertinently serue vs there, to know the interiour, or that are most commonly obserued and remarked in our publike conuersation.
CHAP. XXVII.
| 1 | The difference of men by exteriour conditions according to their Age, being the seventh Head of this first Booke, |
| 2 | Mans Age diuided into many Parts. |
| 3 | The manners and Complexions of young Men. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |
| 11 | The Manners, Humors and Complexions of old Men. |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | |
| 15 | Of Virility, and of their, Humors who haue obtain'd this age. |
| 16 |
1 THe exteriour conditions of men which may serue to make vs iudge of their interiour, proceed either from Age or Fortune.
2 Wee may deuide mans Age into many parts, neuertheles the difference of manners is chiefly remark'd and obserued in Youth, old Age, and Ver [...]litie.
3 In youth we are alwaies full of our delights, and pastimes, hastie and rash to execute our desires, burning in the incontinency and pleasures of the flesh, inconstant wauering, and easie to bee seduced, any way; yea, willing to surfet, and to pester our [Page 126] selues with delights and pleasures, which we more then other violent things cannot subsist and continue.
4 Wee are easilie prouok'd to Choller and Anger and many times without cause; yea, wee permit our selues to bee transported with the impetuositie of choller, the reason consisting in this, because being in this age more desirous of Honour, wee can lesse endure to bee contemned and despised; but withall wee are lesse couetous, hauing not yet made prooffe or triall what it is to want Wealth, and Meanes, which is the cause and reason that in this age we so inconsiderately throw our selues into excessiue and superfluous expences.
5 There is also in youth lesse Malice, and more Simpli [...]itie, then in any other degree of Age, because they consider not, but are ignorant what villanies and wickednesse there is acted and perpetrated in the world.
6 From whence it comes to passe, that not hauing beene often deceined, young men are credulous and light of beliefe, in respect whereof they are commonlie so full of hopes, that they thinke and flatter themselues, they shall obtaine all which they desire: and wee likewise affrme, that Hope is alwaies more predominate [Page 127] in them, then Remembrance: for Hope lookes to that to come, which is farre more forcible and preualent in young men then that which is past, being the proper obiect of Remembrance.
7 So being Cholerike, and likewise replenished with Hope; Choller, is the cause that they attempt any thing hastily and rashly, and the hope they conceiue to obtaine, their desires, makes that they feare nothing whereby they become confident in themselues.
8 They are also shamefaced and bashfull, as well because they are vnexperienced in matters, as also sith they haue been still trained vp in Feare: they sooner follow Vanitie then Profit; and in this age, friendship is stronger in them, then in any other, aswell for that they are now more desirous of companie, as also in respect the consideration of Profit, which sometimes dissolues affections is very seldome, or rather neuer in the memories of young people.
9 And although in many things they are commonly Ignorant; yet neuerthelesse they are not still the lesse Presumptuous: for presuming to know all, they are confident of all: from whence it comes to passe, that they often exceede the limmits of their designes and resolutions [Page 128] bending in all their affections towards extremities bee it either to loue or hate a man
10 Neuertheles, they offend rather through Insolenc [...], and Choller, then Malice; they are easie to bee drawne to Compassion retaining a good opinion of all men, as belieuing them better then they are, because frequency of Vice in respect of their youth, is vnknowne to them, which likewise is the reason, that being innocent themselues, they in their iudgements condemne Vice more seuerely, and the Sanguine complexion commonly, most predominating in this age they are seduced and allured to mirth, and to passe their time in sport and recreation.
11 But old men as they are commonly of a contrary temper, so they differ likewise from the humours of young men, for hauing liued long in the world, and been often deceiued, they neither assure others, nor promise themselues any thing, seeming to suspect and doubt all things, and to know the certaintie of nothing, they are of a poore and weake courage, in hauing obserued and seene in the course of their liues, many accidents that haue hindred them from attempting any thing, still speaking ambiguouslie and doubtfullie, taking all things at the worst hand and construing & representing them in the worst sense, reputing things [Page 129] sometimes for Euill that are Good, yea, and performed with a good intent: they a [...]e [...]uspitious and doubtfull, being the true effects of feare which freezeth and congealeth their hearts: and of the experience they haue formerly had of mens infidelities: they neither loue nor hate excessiuely, but desire to out liue young men; because De [...]rs is chiefly deriu'd from those things which are distant from vs, and which we want: so as their life absenting it selfe daily from them, and a small point of time remaining them to liue, they therefore in this respect desire that which they want, which consideration partly makes them more couetous, because wealth serues to support and maintaine our life, as also, the remembrance of the care and toile they, haue had to purchase and precure it, together with the small hope they haue to retaine it, during the short tearme of their life, as also their facilitie to lose it.
12 The remembranee of things past, makes them sometimes be too talkatiue, and full of kakling, and sometimes in their speeches to be too vaine and importunate; and although they are soone angry and cholericke, and very often with much vehemencie and bitternesse; yet, neuerthelesse they commonly performe it weakely and faintly.
[Page 130] 13 The vsuall and customarie appetites and desires which other men conceiue, haue partly abandoned and forsaken them, and those that remain with them are but of small power & efficacie; from whence it proceeds, that they are often caried away with their owne Wils, which they measure and interpret according to the profit they receiue and reape thereby.
15 From these two extremities, it is easie to point out and imagine the humours and dispositions of those who are in their Virill age, which will be still separated and estrang'd from the Considence and Presumption of young, and the Feare and Diffidence of old men.
16 So as vsing Moderation in their manners, and Iudgement and Discretion in their affaires, they will beare themselues circumspectely, ioyning profit with honesty, and recollecting and accumy plating what they haue wanted aswell in their youth as old age; the excesse and defects that are found in both these ages, will be conuerted to a mediocritie in this.
CHAP. XXVIII.
| 1 | The difference of men according to the condition of their Fortunes. |
| 2 | The Profits and Preuidices we receiue by Fortune. |
| 3 | That Nobilitie is the first benefit thereof, and of Noble mens conditions. |
| 4 | That Wealth is the second benefit thereof, and of the natures of Rich men. |
| 5 | |
| 6 | The difference 'twixt him that is of late grown Rich, and hee that hath beene a long time Rich. |
| 7 | The Conditions of Great men and of those that are in authoritie being the third benefit of Fortune. |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | The conditions of him that is fortunate, being the fourth benefit. |
| 11 | Other differences of men besides Age and Fortune, and how to be considered in our behauiour, and conuersation with euery one in particular. |
| 12 | How to behaue our selues towards our seruants and confidents, and how towards strangers. |
| 13 | How to honest and vpright men. |
| 14 | How to those of a pleasant conuersation. |
| 15 | How to those who are Proude, Ambitious, Modest, Malitious, or of a Kinde Nature. |
| 16 | How to the Officious, or Inofficious, or towards those that are [...]ngaged, or not [...]ngaged to vs. |
1 COme wee to the difference that proceedes from the diuers conditiof Fortune.
2 The chiefest benefits wee receiue of Fortune, are these foure, Nobilit [...]e (or Gentilitie) Wealth, Authoritie, and Happinesse: whereunto are oppos'd foure disaduantages, that may alter our demeanours, and change our manners and behauiour: because by the knowledge of contraries, the thing it selfe is best knowne, we will therefore here content our selfe, only to represent the Inclinations and Manners of those who enioy these foure benefits and aduantages.
3 Noblemen, and Gentlemen, are more desirous and ambitious of Honour then others, it being the common nature of men that are enrich'd and grac'd with any priuiledge of Fortune, to seeke and striue to encrease it; and Pride alwaies accompanying and attending those of this rancke and condition, they not only contemne those of lower and inferiour degree: but those likewise who are not so anciently Noble, or well descended as themselues, and this contempt proceeds, bebecause [Page 133] those things which resemble, in that they are distant and farre from vs, they are by so much the more esteem'd and respected of vs then these we see before our eyes.
4 Rich men are Proud and [...]nsolent, drawing the conceit thereof from their wealth, which they preferre and value aboue all things, and consequently imagine that all things lye within the lists of their power: In their speech and actions they are imperious and stately, aswell because abundance of wealth occasioneth it, as also, that they delight to make ostentation of their greatnesse.
5 They are Ingratefull, Vinaictiue, Arroga [...], and Vaine; because men delight to thinke and speake of that which they admire and loue: and Rich men admire and loue nothing so much as their wealth, whereof they commonly speake, and boast, beleeuing that others take as much pleasure therein as themselues: to conclude they hereby in effect make themselues happy in their folly.
6 But there is a great difference, betwixt those who haue beene long and those that are lately become rich, for the last are commonly more Indescreete, Couetous, and Insolent, then the former.
And for the iniuries which Rich men offer and commit, they performe them more out of Pride, and Brauerie, then out of any [Page 134] intent to molest or wrong vs.
7 Those who are oppulent, and in any high degree of authoritie, are almost of the same humour, but they are more haughtie and ambitious of Honour, and not so vaine or retchlesse as rich men.
8 For authoritie being subiect to reprehension, and still in action, it behoues them to be vigilant and distrustfull; Their countenances holds more of Pride then Anger and are faire more modest then those of rich men, beeing alwaies accompanyed with a gracefull kinde of temperate seueritie.
9 As for their iniuries and wrongs they are great according to their power, they very difficultly reconcile themselues to those whom they mistrust, or to those who they thinke are offended with them.
10 Those who haue beene fortunate in all their enterprises and actions, sympathize and participate of the humours of the No [...]le, Sich, and Powerfull men; but they are more arrogant, cholericke, inconsiderate and rash, thinking that all things should answer their desires, and nothing oppose them.
11 Besides the differences that proceede from the differences of Age, or the variable Condition of Fortune, we must consider it in a mans conuersation and behauiour: as if the [Page 135] person with whom we conuerse be a Domesticke, or a Straunger, whither he be a confident, or not; equall, or vnequall; inferiour, or superiour to vs; whither of a good, or euill nature; giuen to speake truth, or to lye: pleasant, or seuere; proud, or modest, ing [...]ged and beholding to vs, or not: Whereof each particular qualitie requires a particular forme to conuerse and treat with them.
12 Because with our Domesticke and Confidents, we must be free; with strangers distrustfull, and more retired and retentiue: yea, we must honour our superiours, respect our equals, and be pleasant and courteous to our inferiours.
13 We must also proceed with all assurance and con [...]dence towards those who are true and really honest, but we must not beleeue those who are common lyars, or that haue no good reputation, although as wee say they haue already their reward in their owne hands.
14 To those that are Affable and Pleasant in company, wee must be familiar; to those who are seuere or sullen, more retired and cautious, and both receiue and entertaine them with few words and much silence.
15 To Ambitious and Great men we must yeeld all the Honour they can desire of vs; [Page 136] making shew as if we much respected and esteem'd them, but to those who are temperate and modest, wee must beare our selues without any affectation, we must not listen to the Enui [...]u [...] or Malitious, and yet wee must demeane our selues so, as that we make them confident, we repute them not for such: to those that beare vs much good will and affection, we must he alwaies readie and willing (to our vtmost power) to yeeld and afford them reciprocall testimonies of our inuiolable friendship.
16 Wee must seeke aad frequent those that are Of [...]ciou [...], if they can steed or pleasure vs, and withall we must auoid the company of the [...]officiou [...]; to those that are in [...]ag'd to vs, we [...] must beare our selues discr [...]etly, in that which concernes their interest, and not rashly or suddenly beleeue all that proceeds from them: and contrariwise to those, who are not obliged, or ingaged to vs, wee must adde more credit and beliefe. Thus haue yee the forme how wee must demeane and beare our selues according to the difference of persons.
CHAP. XXIX.
| 1 | The eighth head of this Booke, discoursing of matters, whose subiects are infinite. | |
| 2 | Seuerall differences of affaires drawne from causes which examine and consider them. | |
| 3 | By meanes Possible or Impossible; necessary or not; easie or difficult; Profitable or Preiudiciall. | |
| 4 | The difference of mens actions. seruing to iudge of Possibilitie, or Impossibilitie. | |
| 5 | Of Power and Will, requisite in the Production of Actions. | |
| 6 | Considerations vpon this Power. | |
| 7 | ||
| 8 | Considerations vpon this Will. | |
| 9 | ||
| 10 | Considerations vpon the means and differences. | |
| 11 | The Circumstances of Place in things moueable. | |
| 12 | The Circumstance of Time. | |
| 13 | Considerations vpon | The diuersitie of hinderances. |
| 14 | The fac [...]ltie of a businesse. | |
| 15 | The necessitie thereof. | |
| 16 | Absolute. | |
| 17 | Conditionall. | |
1 WE E will proceede to the difference of affaires, whereof the subiects being infinite, and the confluence of particularities which may transforme and alter them numberlesse; I will content my selfe thereby to stirre vp Iu [...]gement and Courtship, to prefixe some common an [...] ordinarie circumstances, whereof we may draw vse and profit in their examination.
2 Affaires are chiefely examined by the causes that gaue them their first [...]otion and Essence. and which ought conduct them to their end, as by the meanes which we may obserue and practise to that effect, by the end why and wherfore we vndertook it, and by the effect or issue that may redound to vs thereby.
13 The examinaton of the cause and meanes will informe vs; whether it bee possible or impossible, necessarie or not; and will shew vs the facilitie or difficultie in the execution thereof. In the ende and effect, wee must consider Good or Euill neere or farre from vs; and both in the cause, meanes, end, and effect, we must consider [Page 139] the Iustice thereof.
4 But of mens Actions, some are produced by one onely cause, and others need meete with many; and this coniunction and commixture is performed either successiuely by a dependance, and certaine order deuoluing one after another; or by a concurrence of all together, and at one and the same time: and in this concurrence of many causes, wee must bee carefull to destinguish those that are principall from those that are but seconds and assistants: and likewise those that are absolutely necessarie from those that are not, except for greater facilitie or pro fit.
5 The chiefe causes of affaires or actions residing in persons, in whom for the perfection of an action it is requisite (according to the order of discourse and reason) that Power and Will meete and con curre together in the same point and time; and power, hauing manie degrees, and being composde of manie sorts, wee must research and seeke, if this sort which is requisite and fit for our businesse in question, is or may bee found in him that must mannage and effect it.
6 For a poo [...]e fellow, although he be Incapable in other matters, may sometimes performe more in a busines of another nature [Page 140] then those who are more eminent and rich: they being often times hindred and withheld either through shame, respect, dissidence, or suspition, or by some other such like consideration.
7 So our Power must be proportioned according to the qualitie of the businesse, and not measur'd according to the priuiledges and aduantages of fauour, reputation, or greatnesse; if they serue not for that businesse which is in question.
8 As for our Will, it may be knowne by the qualitie of the ende, and by the opinion a man conceiues thereof: for wee presume, he desires that which is profitable either for himselfe or his, or for that he esteemes it iust and reasonable, and his opinion may bee knowne by his words, councels, speeches, actions, gestures, and ex [...]e [...]iour compliments and demonstrations, as well present as past: I say past, for the execution of the like businesse, as well as the experience and example, to haue formerly vnprofitably attempted and enterpris'd it, may make vs iudge not only of the opinion, who can help and assist vs; but also of the possibilitie or impossibilitie that is now proffered: entering into the comparison of the meanes, time, place, occasion, and other circumstances, aswell of the execution, as hindrance thereof.
[Page 141] 9 And these considerations of Power and W [...]ll, must not only be had or conceiued of him who hath the chiefe managing and conduction of the businesse, but of all others that directly or indirectly may preuent or crosse it.
10 We must next examine the necessary meanes and instruments, with their quantitie and qualitie, proportionable to the action: As that which must goe before, follow after, or accompany it: the beginning, middle, and end thereof, and in all these we must still haue a watchfull and yigilant eye to Place and Time.
11 For considering that in passing from one place to another, we thinke not only of the place, where we are, but from whence we came, where wee must trauell, whither we would goe, and where wee must recide and stay: so whether it be for the managing and conduction of a businesse, that we our selues vndertake: or for the vertues and perfection of any one that may steed or serue vs herein, still pondering and considering that euery particularitie in this exchanging of place may either bring aduantage or disaduantage, to the businesse we haue in hand.
12 In the Time wee must consider when our businesse may be treated of, or finished, how long wee must imploy therein: since when we began it, if it haue been neglected [Page 142] or deferred, if too soone, or too late, or if after, before or at the instant of some other.
13 Which performd, wee must by the same meanes and wayes examine the causes of the hindrances, that may concurre and meete in the execution, whether they arise from the persons qualitie, quantitie, dependance, or order; or from the meanes, or other circumstances: to preuent which hindrances wee must seeke the fittest, and most pertinent remedies, to facilitate and finish the action.
14 But a businesse is held easie, when it may bee performed and finished with small labour, charge and time, and that to bring it to its absolute perfection; we need not imploy m [...]ny persons or meanes, which we cannot easily procure, or who depend not of vs.
15 Another consideration which must bee had in the cause of actions, is that of Necessi [...]ie, whereunto most commonly all others yeeld, and giue way: for of actions some proceede from our selues, others from others, in those that come from our selues, and that are in our owne power to performe, wee must performe them with as much iudgement as possibly wee can, thereby to obtaine, and arriue to the ende and felicitie of our desires, and to storme, [Page 143] and bee cholerick at those which proceede not from vs; yet with a future reseruation and intention, to direct and shape our course that way againe, when the winds of Choller of either side, shall be ouer-past, and blowne away.
16 But if this Choller and Uiolence proceede from Fortune, that is to say, of a certaine affluence, or concurrence of circumstances which we could not foresee, or from a certaine forme or necessarie dependance of things we cannot auoide, we must accordingly thereunto order and accommodate our behauiours.
17 But the chiefest discourse and effect of our Iudgement depends not so much on absolute, as on conditionall necessitie, which tends to the end whereat we aime, and to the necessarie meanes to obtaine it.
CHAP. XXX.
| 1 | The meanes to purchase a Kings fauour. | |
| 2 | Considerations in procuring it. | |
| 3 | ||
| 4 | ||
| 5 | The Order and Meanes wee must obserue therein. | |
| 6 | Consideration of the Benefit, or Domage, that may thereby accrue vnto us. | |
| 7 | Consideration of the | Honour. |
| 8 | Profit, and how it is to be considered. | |
| 9 | Pleasure, and Profits, it brings with it. | |
1 WE say then, that to obtaine the fauour of our Prince: we must make our selues knowne to some one neere him: and in this sort of conditionall necessitie wee must consider two things: the one the consequence and importance of the end why we betake and reduce our selues to this necessitie.
2 For if this Necessitie whereunto wee tie and ingage our seluos, bring vs more preiudice and domage, then the end whereunto our desires and hopes ayme, doth aduantage and profit, it will be, then descreetly done of vs, to desist from our former purpose, and to diuert our designes another way.
3 In which respect wee must poize and ballance (by the comparison of more or lesse) the profit of the end, by the disaduantage of the meanes to obtaine it.
4 The other is to consider if there are many meanes tending to this end, all which wee must likewise weigh and compare one [Page 145] with another, and so choose the surest and least doubtfull, yea the speediest and most honourable.
5 For although in all actions, Honour should march first, and take the chiefest place, neuerthelesse in those which are necessary, and when there are choise of meanes to obtaine it, the first and chiefest consideration, is Assurance and Security, then Facility, and then Honour: after which we may adde the consideration of Profit, because in such actions wee chiefly seeke to withdraw our selves from necessitie, which (according to the old prouerbe hath [...]o law) and the end of the action being Honourable, the very name thereof amends and bettereth the forme that wee haue obserued in attaining thereunto: being otherwise of it selfe excused by necessitie.
6 Hauing made vse of these considerations, both vpon the Cause and Meanes, we must consider in the End and Effect; the Good or Euill that remains therin; which we must not examine according to the particular opinions of Philosophers; but according to the vulgar, or according to the opinions of those, who must either contribute or participate in this action.
All that is Good, aymes at Honour, Profit, or Pleasure.
7 Honor consists, either in the opinions we conceiue of a mans perfections & merits, or in the ceremonies of respect and reuerence, wherwith [Page 146] we honour him who is our superiour, in power, authoritie, reputation, wealth, or in some other remarkeable aduantage; the which in respect of the Honour that is vnited and fixed to it; is desired of all men: by which contrary reason, all things that haue [...] themselues, or in their dependancy any Dishonor or Infamy, is iustly reputed and held as Euill.
8 P [...]ofit taken in the l [...]gest sence is considered in two things, that is to say: In the particular or publike assurance, or in the gaine, which not onely consists in the purchase of wealth which we want: but also in the conseruation of that we haue; yea, to sile repell, and diminish the present Euill, and to diuert and put off the future.
9 As for Pleasure: it is (in some sence) found in all sorts of things which are good; for Honour, and Profit [...]ngender Pleasure, neuerthelesse wee chiesly attribute to Pleasure, those good things that cannot be attributed to Profit and Ho [...]our, which are d [...]lightfull and pleasing vnto vs: not only for the feeling we haue of their presence, and through a voluntary enioying thereof▪ not constr [...]ined (for constraint i in all things distastfull) but also by the remembrance thereof which is past, and by the desire and hope which is yet to come.
It is in this respect the like in Euill: which is not onely such b [...] its presence, as wee haue formerly mentioned; but also afflicts vs [Page 147] through feare and apprehension, which as futurely to befalls vs, as fore past faults doe through repentance.
CHAP. XXXI.
| 1 | Of the Equitie and Iustice of a matter. |
| 2 | Rules of this Iustice in two sorts vniuersall. |
| 3 | Truth is a dependant of vniuersall Iustice. |
| 4 | And also of Particular. |
| 5 | Custome is more receiued and followed at Court: then particular or vniuersal Iustice. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Examples hereon. |
| 8 | Conclusion of the differences of Persons, and Affayres. |
| 9 |
1 GOod or Euill may bee in the end or approch of an Action, and it being once perfectly discerned and knowne, wee must examine it by Iustice, there being no man, how wicked soeuer, that desires not to giue this Iustre to his actions: yea not onely in the End, but also in the Cause and Meanes thereof.
2 But the rules of Iustice are of two sorts, the one vniuersall, receiued by most men; yea confessed by those which in other matters are of a contrary opinion, and held for iust almost of all: As to acknowledge a Di [...]i [...]itie, to loue [Page 148] and obey our Parents, to traine vp our children, to receiue and acknowledge a good office done vs, and by the same reason to chastice and reuenge an iniury offered vs.
Neuerthelesse Policy hath found it more expedient to take away the reuenge of greatest iniuries from particular persons, for feare they should beare themselues indiscreetly therein, and hath therefore placed and imposed it in the hands of publike authoritie.
3 Truth (which likewise giues testimony what euery thing is, may be termed dependancies of this Iustice; as also Fidelitie and Faith (being the cyment and foundation of all sorts of Treaties, Promises and Conuentions) without which all th [...]ngs would be in confusion, and the commerce and societie of men could not possibly subsist.
4 The other rules of Iustice are particulars proceeding either from the vse that authoriseth them, or from the command of the Magistrate, as Lawes and Ordinances, or the interpretation of these Lawes and Ordinances, being in other matters alike, whereof they haue not plainely and expresly dispos'd.
5
6 If it bee not in very serious matters, we seldome inform our selues at Court of these [Page 149] two later degrees: but contrariwise wee there receiue and follow Custome, although it be many times directly opposite to Lawes and Ordinances.
7 For Example; hee that iudgeth in some Courts vpon the point of Honour, or of the Iustice of an Appeale for a Duell, or single combate; according to the expresse letter and sence of the Law, or the rule of Conscience, he makes himselfe ridiculous in the corruption of these sinfull times.
8 This shall suffice to administer to our affayres, the most common and generall considerations; not onely thereby to iudge what must bee done, but also to coniecture that which is done, in those things that may bee prepos'd vnto vs.
9 For from mens Power and Will, and from the qualitie of affayres, Circumstance, Place and Time, it will bee very easie for vs to conclude of that which may bee done.
CHAP. XXXII.
| 1 | Of Proceedings. |
| 2 | The consideration of Circumstance [...]. |
| 3 | The most frequent and vsuall manner to negotiate and manage a businesse in Court, |
| 4 | To diuert the hindrances, and to p [...]rchase Reputation. |
| 5 | What those hinderances are in our selues. |
| 6 | The qualities that may diminish our Reputation. |
| 7 | |
| 8 | The meanes to diuert and auoid them. |
1 LEt vs come to the manner of proceeding; wherein the circumstances are of no lesse consideration, then the order, which must varie and change as they do, accommodating and fitting our selues to the Place and Time, and choosing the most conuenientest answerable to the persons and affaires: husbanding the occasions without precipitation, and making it knowen, that we proceed in euery thing according to Nature, still following rather Reason and the aduice of the wise and experienced then Fortune or Passion; doing nothing without mature deliberation, and being on the very point of its execution, to performe it with promptitude and celeritie.
2 Sometimes according to need and extremitie wee must dissemble, deferre and obey necessitie, and reduce our selues to doe that which we can, being not able to performe what we would.
3 But the most frequent and generall order to treat of an asfayre, and to insinuate and [Page 151] draw any one to our opinion, is to foresee and preuent the hinderances that may diuert him from that whereunto wee would induce him, and so to worke and skrew our selues into his fauour and approbation.
4 The hindrances proceed either from our selues, or from hi [...] to whom wee addresse our selues; from those that contradict vs, and to whom our aduise is not pleasing, or may offend him, or else from the businesse it selfe which we vndertake, or from that whereunto we would perswade others.
5 For our owne regard and respect; wee must consider why we ingage our selues in this businesse, either voluntarily of our selues, or as being requested or commanded by others.
Wee must know what opinion men generally & particularly conceiue of him to whom we addresse our selues, which they haue of our owne Sufficiency, Wisedome and Friendship: yea and for the regard and reason it selfe, of that whereunto we would draw them: and thereunto to adde and ioyne the consideration of our owne profession, condition, authoritie and reputation, which we may haue toward him, in what degree of equalitie, superioritie, or inferioritie we are, and thereunto dispose and accommodate our discourse: and yet neuerthelesse remembring that Modestie doth more delight and please, then to beare our selues imperiously and arrogantly.
[Page 152] But aboue all wee must not demonstrate any shew of Malice, Folly, or Ill-will, as also not report any thing that may contradict our actions and behauiours, which are publikely expos'd to all mens sight; nor either through forgetfulnesse, or otherwise to giue the Lye to our owne Discourse and speeches.
6 But, of the qualities that may disparage or diminish our reputation, some b [...]are their disfauour and distaste with them, as weakenes throughage, small experience ignorance, indiscretion, lenity, inconstancy, and presumption.
7 Others make vs suspected of those to whom wee addresse our selues; as Power, Authoritie, the particular interest which wee may haue in the businesse wee treat of, be it through corruption, or otherwise: or through Enute, Feare, Choller, or the like passions; or else heretofore to haue vainely and vnprofitably attempted it, to haue often spoken of it, without bringing it to any perfection, to haue been often deceiued in our opinions, to haue first motioned it, or either too soone, or too late.
8 These and such like hinderances must be sore-thought, and fore-seene of vs; and some of them according to their qualities must bee ingeniously confessed and blamed of vs, others wee must disauow, shewing that they are not so, or excusing and yeelding reason for them, or entermixing that Euill with some other Good, or diminishing it, as hauing done it to a [Page 153] good intent, or accusing Fortune, Hazard, or the nature of things, or else reiecting and retorting the Euill which may redound heereby vpon others.
CHAP. XXXIII.
| 1 | The meanes to know the hinderances that befall vs, of him with whom we are to treat, or who is opposite to vs therein. |
| 2 | Knowing them, then of the Precaution wee must obserue therein. |
| 3 | The meanes to diuert and auoid them. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | Considerations vpon those hinderances, and vpon the meanes to avoyd them. |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | How to diuert hinderances that proceed from others, and not from those with whom we are to treat. |
| 9 | Hinderances proceeding from the busin [...]sse it selfe whereon to treate. |
| 10 | The meanes to diuert and auoyd them. |
| 11 | |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | |
| 15 | The hinderances being remooued, the meanes then to purchase Reputation. |
[Page 154] 1 IN him who wee will perswade or draw to effect our desire. we must consider his Age, Ranke, and Profession, (be it that hee hath many, few, or onely one) what commonly are his manners, passions, and affections, what his Capacitie, Iudgement, Affabilitie, and Wisedome: We must consider his disposition to that whereunto wee would perswade him, as also the respects he may haue to diuers matters or persons; which may occasion his affection to bend and incline more one way then another: the Ignorant and Common sort of people, being subiect to permit themselues to be carried away with Profit; whereas Gentlemen, and those of eminent ranke, ayme onely at Honour.
Men are likewise more readie to flie and eschew Euill, then to follow Good; and the feare of the first mooues them with more power and efficacie then the hope of the last.
Wee must also know, that it is farre easier to perswade those who are Fearefull, diffident, or Irresolute, not to doe, then to doe a thing.
2 Hauing found out the hinderances that may proceed from a man; we must be carefull that there ariue no other from any other way, as if hee bee perswaded alreadie to the [Page 155] contrary: if hee bee weary to speake or to heare spoken thereof: if hee be out of hope, discouraged, or not respectiue heereof, or not desirous to performe that which wee desire, or if he be possessed by flatterers, or people who are contrary and opposite to that we would perswade.
3 In all these hinderances we must gouerne our selues according to the qualitie both of the person, and matter, for sometimes wee must mildly reprooue and admonish him of his Dutie: that hee perscuere to follow the aduise and counsell of his friendes: sometimes incourage him, acquainting him with the occasion of a more happy Issue then heretofore, so farre foorth as he will follow good counsell, and to make him vnderstand that he neither listen nor giue care to those who would perswade him to the contrary.
4 Sometimes it is fit to excuse him, by throwing the fault on Fortune, or the like, that he promise and hope for speedie and easie remedies, and that hee fight against passion by these meanes which we haue heretofore alleaged, and so to inkindle and stirre vp in him those conceits and resolutions which chiefly make for vs.
5 Wee must also consider the hinderances that may proceed from him who is opposite and contrary to vs heerein: and whither his Authoritie, Fauour, Power, Affabilitie, or [Page 156] any other qualitie or perfection in him, can offend or wrong vs: and these wee must diminish as much as wee may, or else augment and extoll them; shewing that we feare least they should heereafter offend him whom wee thus counsell; discouering the confidence and assurance which such a one conceiues of his qualities, and shewing how much such confidence hath, and may offend him who enioyes it.
6 And this must be practised more or lesse, freely and openly according to mens conditions, and other circumstances, hauing alwayes a regardfull and circumspectious heed, both to flye that which may preiudice, and to follow that which may aduantage and pro fit vs.
7 And if hee whom wee contradict bee subiect to bad conditions, as if hee bee a flatterer, impudent, partiall, corrupt, quarrellous, inconstant, malicious, or passionate, wee may perchance preuayle, by lessening and diminishing his reputation; as also if hee giue any simple or weake reason to support his contradiction, wee may then shew him his want of sence and experience in this matter.
8 Sometimes the hinderances may proceed from other men, as those to whom the counsell may offend, which wee giue to another, if hee bee any way linked by friendship, [Page 157] consanguinitie, or any other obligation to him with whom wee treat; and then wee must diminish the damage, or propose some remedie to the contrary; or else exagerate aboue this damage the profit and aduantage, which hee whom wee counsell may receiue; or else to shew that that person hath changed his will and affection towards him, whom we endeuour to perswade.
9 The hinderances that may arise from those who enterpose in a businesse, being remooued and taken away: wee must then consider if the businesse it selfe haue no defect or distast in it, that may disfauour or disappoint our enterprise, as, if it be too difficult, or almost impossible; if it bee incredible or not very likely, if it bee hazardous; vniust, vnworthy, or of small moment or consideration; or heeretofore counselled or attempted in vaine; with an ill issue contrary to a former conceiued resolution.
10 The which wee must deny, diminish and repayre, and so weigh the Difficultie, Danger, Dishonour, and other such defects, with the greatnes and importancie of the matter: shewing that it hath chang'd condition, and that wee need not thus to ill presage or preiudge it: Examples being not alike nor concurring in all their circumstances.
11 That if our Misfortune or Necessitie enforce [Page 158] vs to perswa [...]e a thing which in exterior shew and appearance is not honest, we must excuse it either as being necessary, or else as being practised by others, or as being fit and properly agreeing with the time, or tending to a good end, and conformable to the opinion of many others: From whence wee may proceed to the Profit and Vtilitie.
12 But if wee haue to meete and fight with Necessitie, then we must enter into comparison of the like matters: Wee must deny this Necessitie with as many reasons as we can: Wee must suggest and propose new expedients and remedies as well to anoide the dangers we feare, as to obtaine the Good wee desire.
13 And because wee doe not willingly vndertake things which wee esteeme difficult or vnpossible: if wee will diuert any one from attempting a thing, we must particularly amplisie the difficulties, and if this faile vs, wee must esteeme the profit, either as little, nothing or vncertaine, or else contrariwise wee must consider and weigh the Euill that may proceed from such an enterprise if it take not effect.
14 And if wee cannot daunt it by Profit, we must then fight against it with Honestie and Iustice, shewing that the enterprise is full of Iniustice and no way Honourable for him that vndertakes it.
[Page 159] 15 Those hindrances this remou'd and taken away: to purchase Glory and Reputation with him whom wee would perswade, wee must accomodate and fit our selues to his inclination, as much as the subiect will permit vs; yea, we must vse all our reasons, and make our selues agreeable and pleasing to him: and so stirre vp in him those Passions that may steed and serue vs; yea, we must frame and engender in his conceit, a certain opinion, that we loue, esteeme, and honour him; yea, and with such respect, that he may acknowledge we would not attempt any thing that might be distastfull or preiudiciall to him: and in all our speeches and actions demonstrating our censeritie, and sufficiency.
CHAP. XXXIV.
| 1 | How to order our speeches, being the ninth head of this first Booke: how to obserue Silence with Modestie, Breuitie, and Iudgement. |
| 2 | How to auoid Importunitie. |
| 3 | How to auoid Lyes, with diuers consideratitions vpon lying, and also vpon his reputation that speakes. |
| 4 | According to the subiect whereof we speake. |
| 5 | How if we speake of our selues or of others. |
| 6 | How if he be our Equall or Inferiour. |
| 7 | How if hee bee knowne to bee more Iudicious then our selues. |
| 8 | Of some sorts of Flatterers, which are more excusable. |
| 9 | Of others altogether inexcusable, and how. |
| 10 | |
| 11 | Of Lyes co [...]sidered according to the intent of the Lyar. |
| 12 | How to auoyd the Vanitie that is in Boasting and Ostentation. |
| 13 | How farre wee may vaunt, and the Moderation which we must obserue therein. |
| 14 | Of Presumption, Obstinacy, and Contradiction, and how wee must beare our selues in contradicting others. |
| 15 | Considerations vpon Contradiction, to the end it be well taken. |
| 16 | |
| 17 | Precautions thereon. |
1 THE Order and Decorum to proceed heerein being knowne, it remaines that we modestly gouerne our speech and silence, and studie to be acute and briefe without obscuritie, adding thereunto such faire carriage and decencie, as is beseeming and answerable, not onely to our owne condition, but with those with whom we [Page 161] conuerse and negotiate, and in other circumstances that may arise, we must chiesly slye and eschew Importunitie, Lying, and Uanitie.
2 Importunitie in speaking nothing Cholerickly, or impertinently, not to repeat often one and the same thing, and not to speake whiles another is speaking.
3 As for Lyes, they are differently considered, either according to his reputation that deliuers them; and if he beleeue what he speakes, that he may not be termed a L [...]r Neuerthelesse he commits a fault, to assure a thing which he knowes not, and the [...]ng [...] nious honest man, although neuer so well reputed shall doe wisely in this respect to be silent, but if he that speake beleeue it to be otherwise then he speakes, he is then a true Lyar; and according to his desert, is commonly little esteem'd or regarded: For in effect, it is to ruine and betray commerce betwixt man and man, which cannot continue or subsist, except by the beleef we should haue one of the other: and there is no greater weakenesse nor folly then to contradict and bely his owne knowledge.
4 Wherein wee must consider lying according to the subiect of those things whereof wee speake; as if wee speake of our selues, or others: to speake of our selues for our owne profit, wee shall be held not [Page 162] only Vaine, but Lyars; and as Lying makes vs odious, so doth Vanitie, rediculous.
5 Speaking of others wee must be carefull not to speake to their preiudice or disaduantage: for if herein truth be odious, Lying must needes be farre more, as being commonly accompanied with Malice: and neuerthelesse in the Companies wee frecuent, are commonly backbiters and those who to seeme wiser then their fellowes, willingly reproue and blame them, where contra [...]iw [...]se we should ayme rather to praise then dispraise them.
6 For if he of whom we speake be our [...]f [...]riour, or Equall, in that whereof wee praise him, wee make him not only to be praised and applauded of others, but also teach them who know vs to be their [...], or Equals, likewise to praise and applande vs.
7 Or if he be knowne to be more capable and sufficient then our selues; in blaming him, we make our selues simple and rediculous; yea, wee thereby disparage our selues, because being lesse then those whom wee dispraise, wee thereby make our selues the lesse worthy to bee praysed.
8 It is then better to speake to the profit then the preiudice of another; for although [Page 163] it be imputed to flattery, to speake much in commendation of a man; neuerthelesse, I hold it is to extend flattery very far, to tearme those prayses flatteries: for I beleeue there are some flatteries excusable, and others inexcuseable.
9 I tearme those inexcuseable, if wee praise a man for any wicked fact hee hath done, or if we praise him with an intent to deceiue him, or when by our praises we incourage him to do Euill, or to commend him for that which we know he hath not performed.
10 But when we praise a man, only to sooth and content him without any other wicked designe, or to eschaw any Euill, or for some Good, we may hope for without preiudicing any man, this flattery is more excusable in mens conuersations.
11 In which respect we must likewise consider of Lyes, according to the intent of the Lyar: for when he lyes only for pastime and sport, that is fitter rather for a Foole then a Gentleman of reputation and honour: or if he lye to Offend a man, in this cause, we must not consider if he can profit himselfe in profiting another; for be it that he reape or reap not benefit thereby; Lying, being offensiue to a man, hee must flye and auoide it that intends to frequent good companies, whereof the chiefest linkes and bonds, are Good not [Page 164] Euill Offices. But if lying wrong no man, and yet may profit some, wee may then dispense therewith, prouided that the cause deserue it.
12 Uanitie is the other Uice that we must auoid and flye in our conuersation and discourse. It hath two principall branches; Boasting and Presumption: wee haue formerly spoken some thing of boasting, which is rediculous, when wee vaunt of that which we haue not perform'd; he which relates and praiseth what he hath affected and performed, is a little more excusable, but in that he shewes himselfe not to be very D [...]cr [...]et and Wi [...]: for in steed of reaping praise, he purchaseth himselfe dispraise: for those prayses that proceede from our owne tongues, can seldome or neuer be taken in good part.
13 Wherefore if it fall out that we speak of our selues; it must be with much Retention, and Modesty it being no lesse fault in a man to boast h [...]n to blame himselfe.
14 As for Presumption, it extends further then Speech: Wherefore setting a part that which regards Actions. I say it appeares and is seene in two sorts, either not to yeeld to the aduise of any; from whence proceeds o [...] [...], o [...] that wee will haue others to subscribe to ours, from whence ariseth a very odious and iniurious contradiction, [Page 165] seeming to know and vnderstand more then others, and euery where to haue the vpperhand. We must auoid both the one and the other forme of this proceeding; and aboue all things, if there be cause of contradiction, we must not then be prouoked to be either bold, bitter, or obstinate, but we must temper our selues with humble tearmes and speeches; seeming rather desirous to be taught then to teach; and to propose things by the way of difficultie and doubt, and not, either by an affirmatiue or negatiue resolution.
15 And to the end it may be well taken, it must be conceiued in vs at the very instant of our discourse, and not otherwise, nor from any other former cause, and that it touch not the person, but only the cause in question. Contrariwise, we must praise him whom we contradict; yea, and sometimes wee must confesse our doubt, to bee our owne Fault, and Ignorance, and when it is needfull and requisite wee must giue place and subscribe.
16 But aboue all things we must be carefull not to contradict two sorts of men, to wit, those to whom we owe respect for feare of offending them, and those who are our superiours, for feare to disparage them too much in making vs by this contestation their equals, it being still more shamefull [Page 166] for vs, to be vanquished by them, then honourable to vanquish them.
17 He that is discreet and wary in his contestations, will not offend or astonish himselfe at other mens opinions, although they seeme extrauagant, nor at follies indiscretions, or leuyties, committed in his presence: but will rather consider wherein they may be profitable to him; be it to entertaine our selues in such mens companies and conuersations, or to take heed of them; or to aduance his owne designe and purpose, whereby hee may draw aduantage and profit.
CHAP. XXXV.
| 1 | Of Retention and Reseruednesse, the last part of an actiue and ingenious Wit, which is necessarie in affaires, both for our selues and our friends. |
| 2 | Towards whom chiefly wee should reserue our selues. |
| 3 | That Reseruednesse is necessary for a Courtier. |
| 4 | How we must vse it. |
| 5 | In how many sorts and degrees it is practised and vsed. |
| 6 | By silence. |
| 7 | Concurrence of Iests in silence, & their remedies. |
| 8 | To be Reseruedly Cautious in our speech and how it must be perform'd |
| 9 | Of the Answers and Replies, [...] [...] and obseruations thereon. |
| 10 | To diss [...]mble by exteriour shewes, and [...] [...] must performe it. |
| 11 | That it is a point of true Wisedome, when a man desembles a necessary matter in Court; and of the meanes to discouer the same. |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | The Conclusion of actiue and solid Wisedome, and the meanes to discouer by his countenance whither a man be so, ye or no. |
1 HEerein and in many other Iests, and Replies, Reseruednesse is necessary, it being the last, but the chiefest part of an actiue and solid Wit, without which, it is impossible to conduct our selues securely through mens actions and malice: for not knowing how to conceale his play, giues a great aduantage to those who would enterprise, not only against those who are carelesse, but also against their friends; because their friends affaires are lincked and vnited to their owne; as Gamesters, who discouering their Cards, not only lose themselues, but also cause their friends to lose: & right so the friends of th [...]s [...] [Page 168] participate and beare a share in their friends losse.
Besides we cannot safely trust him, who so easily discouers and bewraies himselfe; from whence it proceeds, that those men (most commonly) in the midst of their affaires, remaine without counsell or friends.
2 But these with whom we must chiefly desemble, are those, who to draw some secret from vs, are accustomed to search and esp [...]e out occasions, whereby they may o ocure so [...] reputation and beleefe from [...] ▪ [...]ither by communicating vs a businesse [...] [...] is [...]ll importance and co [...]quence, thereby striuing to make vs r [...]p [...]se confidence in them, purposely to draw from vs a matter of greater weight & worth: Now feigning to hate one, anon to loue another, although their affections in themselues are quite opposite, and otherwise fixed and disposed.
3 And although Reseruednesse (in some sort) be necessary in all men; so it is farre more requisite in a Co [...]rtier, thereby to manage and conduct his Ambition
4 Yet hee must bee carefull how to vse [...]sernation: For hee must vse it as Apo [...] [...] doe their Antidotes in the composition and tempering of their Ph [...]sicke: who in [...]it time intermixing it with Iudgement, doe cure; otherwise, hurt the Patient.
[Page 169] Reseruednesse (as well as Subtiltie) being detected and discouered, not onely serues his Master for nothing, but makes those whom he frequents to suspect and grow iealous of him.
5 But it is practised three waies, either by Silence, Speech, or Actions, and exteriour semblances.
6 By Silence, in concealing that which may preiudice either our selues, friends, designes, or thoughts, or our owne or their secrets; but chiefely our owne wronges receiued, not onely thereby to giue vs the better meanes to reuenge them (if they deserue that we wade so farre), but also that wee doe not occasion and enuite him, who hath offended vs, speedily to offer vs greater iniuries, thereby to preuent our reuenge. This Reseruednesse that is cloaked and masked in silence, is approoued in all occasions; and so the Romane Senators behau'd themselues towards their Emperour Tiberius, alwaies seeming in their countenances not to know, or vnderstand his designes.
7 Neuerthelesse, there are occurrences where silence will be suspected, and such are fit to be reuealde, as al [...]o that we make our discontent knowne; but yet so, that after a light complaint we make the world belieue, we wil no farther remember it, nor be sencible thereof.
[Page 170] Valens not being able to punish his mutinous souldiers, accused onely some of them, for feare lest in dissembling their generall delict and fault, they might conceiue hee would punish them the more seuerely.
8 But it falls out often, that it is needfull and requisite for vs, to be cautulous in our speeches, which requires more Art and Skill. There are some, who abruptly breake off their talke, and so leape into a new matter, but the end thereof is neuer successefull.
9 Wherefore our answere in such causes must resemble a retrait, which wee performe without either flying or fighting: for first, we must not enter into an absolute negation and deniall: secondly, we must not speake that which wee should not, or which may offend: thirdly, to him with whom wee conuerse, wee must leaue his iudgement doubtfull, by speaking to him in doubtfull and ambiguous tearmes, whereby wee may bee vnderstoad in a double sense, and the more our answers are retired and reserued, the more commendable and praise-worthie they are.
10 Againe, it is lawfull to reserue our selues in exteriour Shewes and apparances, by hiding & concealing our Ioy, Sorrow, Hope, Desire, Feare, Choller, or the like passions, seeming neither to see, heare, do, or speake, if we reape not some profit and aduantage therby.
[Page 171] 11 But as Reseruednes is part of an actiue and powerful wit, so to know how to discouer it in others, and from thence to find out the depth of their thoughts, with whom we haue to conuerse and treate, is a most necessarie point in a Courtier; the meanes also that serue to maintaine friendship, serue likewise to make him lie open, and disclose himself, who relyes and trust in vs. Some Nations giuen much to Drink, haue to this effect imployde and made vse of Wine, which commonly discouers his masters secrets, & somtimes without Wine▪ the heat of discourse makes vs vent & vtter some things, wherof we after repent.
12 The manner how wee beare our selues in our Choller, Prosperity, and Aduersity, makes men also iudge of the rest of our humors and inclinations.
13 There are those who haue vsd play and gaming hereunto, wherein occasion sometimes hapneth, that we imploy and exercise all the motions of our Will; and we discouer it more freely in secrecy and familiarity, vsd and practisde among Gamsters: but this will craue time to effect it.
14 Briefly, to recolect the carriage and countenance of a discreet and wise Courtier, his wits must be bent by little & little to examine, as wel his own as other mens actions; he must still be vigilant, and stand vpon his guard, that he see, vnderstand, and iudge all [Page 172] things, but speak but little: neuertheles, couering and oueruailing his thoughts, desires and designes, with an affable and pleasing countenance.
CHAP. XXXVI.
| 1 | Of Dexteritie, bring a part of an ingenious and actiue Wit. |
| 2 | The definition of Dexteritie. |
| 3 | Some are vnapt for this Dexteritie. |
| 4 | The ready proceedings of those, who are skilfull and iuditious herein. |
| 5 | |
| 6 | Some precepts for this Dexteritie. |
| 7 | |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | Other precepts and points for the same Dexteritie. |
| 11 | |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | |
| 15 | |
| 16 |
1 DExteritie is so vnited and conioyned to a nimble and ingenious Wit, that the one cannot bee without [...] [...]her; wee commonly terme those dexterious, who are of a sharpe and nimble Apprehension [Page 173] and Vnderstanding, who are quicke, proper, and gracefull in all sorts of Motions and Actions, and who with a ready and braue disposition, know how to meete and surmount all oppositions and difficulties
2 And it is according to this similitude, that we terme this power and vertue Dexteritie, to performe a businesse; by meanes whereof we conuerse and treate fortunately, making that which is difficult, easie and pleasant, and representing and receiuing it without gall or bitternesse.
3 Contrariwise, there are some so vnfit and vnapt for this purpose, that they make small things great and those which are easie, difficult; yea, they make that sower, that was scarce sharpe, being not capable to manage a businesse; but in an vndecent and disgracefull manner, making it to be defectiue and imperfect yea, and sometimes impossible: like vnskilfull Chirurgeous, who in lieu of healing a wound, make it incurable; and in stead of sowing it vp, doe rend and teare it.
4 Opposite to whom are those who are wise and Iuditious, who sweeten the wound with lenitiue and coole oyntments; so as if they must cut off any thing from him, they first so allure and prouoke the Patient to sleepe, as hee feeles no paine; in whose immitation and example those who are Wise [Page 174] and Iuditious, represent angry and distastefull matters, by softly insinuating into the conceits and iudgements of those to whom they speake, without violence or trouble; and so by little and little dispose them to enter into the consideration of their reasons, whereby chiefely seruing themselues towards them, who being of a sharpe and harsh nature, or for some passion or interest, shew them to bee insupportable, speaking arrogantly and proudly; yea, in such sort, as they seeme rather to challenge vs to a combate, then in amiable and amicable manner to treate with vs; because from this their violent and impetious assault, they almost like inraged Bulls, without Wit or Feare, not onely rush, but runne furiously to ouerthrow vs.
5 And it is not as some esteeme, a seruile or base act for a Wise man to answere thus pleasantly, or not to be cholerick with those, who are either in choller, or speake with passion; but it is a point worthy of a temperate spirit and full of Wisdome and Discretion; and againe farre fitter for greater men, then for those of any other condition, who must not the lesse inforce themselues, to become masters of their owne proper affections.
6 In this Dexteritie then, wee must resemble Tennis Players, who to commit no fault in their play, not onely looke to take [Page 175] the Ball fully, but also with their best endeauour and skill, watch to bee sure to receiue him handsomly, and to returne him to that place, that shall make most for their aduantage.
7 Also in conuersing or treating, we must obserue the same consideration, being verie carefull and circumspect, that we commit no fault in the matter wherof we treat, bringing those words with vs, which are pertinent and proper, and receiuing those from him that speakes to vs in the best manner the sense thereof will safely permit.
8 With this skill wee may sometimes dissemble, or conseale some truth very honestly; yea, and make shew not to know or vnderstand some thing that is of consequence and importance in the businesse wee haue in hand, to the end that wee may gaine time to answere, and not bee surprised, or taken vnprouided.
9 And the resolutions from whose conclusions, we may take assurance and securitie must bee so conceiude, that which way soeuer they turne, wee may still subsist and stand, and find (as the saying is) a Posterne doore open to saue our selues; according to the example of Mucianus, his answere to Antoniuns Prumus, who asked him his aduice, if whilest he staid for Vespasian, he should assault Rome.
[Page 176] 10 It will bee also a point of Dexteritie to yeeld in those things, wherin we haue the vpper hand so farre forth, that another way we be sure to obtaine a greater aduantage.
11 It is likewise Wisedome to be flexible and tractable in a businesse, and a Vice to bee too partiall and iealous of his owne opinions; wee must sometimes be lofty and fast girt, and then againe wee must abate our pride, and vnloose that which wee haue so straightly bound.
12 But aboue all, we must auoide the occasion to breake friendship with any man, and rather excuse and shift our selues from those, who are tedious and importunate vpon the haste and necessity of their businesse, referring them to another time, or shewing them the qualitie of other businesse, is not fit to be treated of in this time or place; or if this will not suffice, then to shew them the impossibilitie thereof.
For it is one of the most difficult and ticklish points in our conuersation, absolutely to refuse a man; the reason thereof is, because euery one flatters and perswades himselfe, that his demand is iust.
13 In which respect some do consent and promise all; yea, they cannot, and which is worse, they will not any longer stand off, hoping that before the time of the execution, many accidents will fal out, which may hinder [Page 177] and frustrate the effect of their promise, and so free them from that whereunto they are obligd and tyed, or else that they will find out some excuses and euasions, hauing in the Interim, neuertheles, giuen content to the demander; and as said Aulus Sempremu [...], Many hold themselues better satisfied with this Coyne, then with bare and simple hopes.
14 But these manner of proceedings are good to be practisud but once, because being found out and knowne, they soone discouer and deserie him that vseth them often; as also they descrie themselues, which to content their vanitie, and to bee courted and followed, make vse of these hopes.
But the best and surest way, is neither to yeeld nor promise any thing but that which we can, we ought, and wee will performe.
15 And if that which is demanded of vs, participate of neither of these three, we must then vnder colour of diuers other pretexts, deferre the answer thereof as long as we can; or else make those who presse vs thereunto, alter their designes and purposes; in preposing them in stead of their demands, some o ther thing, wherin we may aide & assist thē or to make them know, and be sensible of our good will and affection towards them, although [Page 178] the issue thereof answere not their desires, or else to contriue our promise in such generall tearmes, that it do not precisely bind and oblige vs.
16 This last forme of proceeding, is somewhat remoted far off from freenesse, but the iniustice of the demaunds makes it excusable, es [...]ecially if our refusall proceede rather from our insufficiency, then from any defect or fault of our good will the effects whereof we will assuredly demonstrate, and testifie in any other subiect and occasion, that may depend of vs towards those wee refuse; and in this sort reuiuing their courage and affection by the hope they receiue, that the doore of our affection is not altogether shut, for them to obtaine some other request and fauour, wee not onely sweeten the bitternes of this refusall, but also by the most moderate and temperate sort of people, this refusall will bee interpreted and taken for Grace and Fauour.
CHAP. XXXVII.
| 1 | Of other requisites necessarie in a Courtier, as Patience to support iniuries. |
| 2 | Wherein Court Patience consistes. |
| 3 | A Courtier must not speake ill of any man. |
| 4 | Another Court Patience, is for him to be [...] still assiduall and resident at Court. |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | It is one thing to bee obstinate in a reasonable businesse. |
| 8 | And another not to precipitate or run headlong in any thing. |
1 IT remaines to speake of foure other points, that are requisite and necessarie in a Courtier, which are Patience, Humilitie, Boldnesse and Capacitie: as for the regard of the first, an old Courtier be ing demanded, how he was grown so old, and had remained so long at Court, answered, that it was in supporting iniuries patiently, and in giuing of thankes: and Augustus, as it is written and reported of him, loued Agrippa for her patiency, and Mecaenas for his secrefie.
[Page 180] 2 But Court-Patience not onely consists in supporting and desembling other mens iniuries, but also as we haue formerly said, their errours and imperfections, there being nothing so odious as to reproue and censure, although many mens vanitie may deserue it, or to thinke themselues not reputed or esteemd, if they controle not other mens actions.
Neuerthelesse, such are commonly admired of none, but of the vulgar, and ignorant sort, and their conuersation and carriage can neither be suffered nor [...]upported, except by those who are farre their inferiours; and if they are not th [...] more capable and sufficient, they make themselues rediculous, and a common may game to those, who seeme to admire them.
3 A Courtier therefore must take heede, not to speake Il [...], or mocke at those things that are true, which commonly off [...]nd vs most, and whereof Great M [...]n do longest and chiefely remember.
4 Another sort of Court-Pati [...]nc [...] is [...]o subiect our selues constantly to continue and remaine there, and not sl [...]igh [...]ly to abandon and forsake it, although some disgrace ariue and befall vs, but still to haue one foote firme there, sith there is nothing so subiect to reuolution and c [...]ange, as the affections of Princes, which are as it were continually [Page 181] ebbing and flowing.
5 But aboue all things wee must keepe our selues still in sight, and as neere our Prince as wee may, not onely to auoyde the aspersions and calumnies, which are vsually cast vpon those that are absent, but also because it may so happen, that vpon some occasion (although but small) you may bee the man among all the rest, which hee may obserne to continue in Court, and so by your assiduall residence and attendance, knowing heereby your zeale and affection to his seruice, hee may belieue, that hee may intrust you with any of his commaunds; whereof if you worthily acquite your selfe, the Prince may take you into his Grace and Fauour, and so continue to conferre and heape others on you, and in the end admit you into his seruice.
6 There is in the Court (as well as wee say, there is in loue) the happinesse and felicitie of a Carre-man: for a Prince hath neede of so many diuersitie of Seruants and Attendants, that hee which is sometimes esteemed the most vnfit and vnprofitable, the Dice may so runne, and alter, as Fortune may make him not onelie profitable, but pleasing to his P [...]ince.
7 Another effect of necessary patience in court [Page 182] is, that if we vndertake a businesse with likelihood and reason, we must be constant and obstinate to finish it, and not to forsake it; but withall, wee must not precipitate our selues, or run headlong therein, but with a Wise Patience we must awai [...]e and attend the occasion.
8 There are many, who with the helpe and assistāce of time, mought haue hoped to haue risen their Fortunes at Court; but cutting off, and preuenting their hopes, they not onely retire and forsake it, but also through their headlong impatiency, haue shipwrackt and ruined their Fortunes.
CHAP. XXXVIII.
| 1 | Humilitie is a second perfection, necessarie and requisite in a Courtier. | |
| 2 | Wherein it consists. | |
| 3 | ||
| 4 | ||
| 5 | ||
| 6 | Uoluntarie Humilitie consists in two parts. | |
| 7 | The Sxteriour is remarked. | |
| 8 | in our | Countenance. |
| 9 | Speeches. | |
| 10 | Actions, wherein there are three degrees of Humility. | |
| 11 | Which of the three suffi [...]eth for a Courtier. | |
| 12 | The vnseemely and unproper behauiour of Courtiers risen from a low Fortune. | |
| 13 | ||
1 HVmilitie is no lesse necessary in Cour [...] which (for the most part) is [...]omposed of vaine and Ambitious persons, who commonly hauing nothing commendable in themselues, seeke those outward c [...]ouches, and exteriour submissions giuen them by others, thereby to make themselues esteemed and honoured; and so much the more are they carefull and Ambitious hereof in that they know, they themselues are of farre lesse sufficiency and merit.
2 Neuertheles, Humility consists not only in this point; for it is seene and remarkd in vs, either by the opinion which we seeme to make others know, we conceiue and esteeme wel of our selues, or through the Desire and Will we haue to attempt any thing, either according to our quality and condition, or aboue it, or else by our exteriour behauiour and carriage.
3 The opinion which an humble Wit holds of himselfe, consists in esteeming little of himselfe to belieue himselfe vnprofitable, to acknowledge his imbecilitie and weaknesse, [Page 184] to the end hee attempt nothing aboue the reach of his Capacitie.
4 But although wee must inwardly conceiue this opinion of our selfe, neuerthelesse let it suffice, that a Courtier must not vaunt of himself, or of any thing he cannot performe, and not knowing how farre his Capaci [...]i [...] can extend it is more safe and commendable for him to performe a thing, without speaking or vaunting thereof.
5 For hee shall then beare himselfe, without prom sing or praysing too much of himselfe, and al [...]o without disparaging or making himselfe base or vn [...]rofitable, whereby others bee not induced so to repute and esteeme him
6 Humilitie which consists in our Will, hath two branches Obe [...]ience to their commands on whom we depend, and the Moderating of our desires (whereof we haue formerlie spoken.)
7 As for Humilitie which appeares in exteriour shew, it is obserued in our Countenance Gesture, Words and Actions.
8 In our Countenance by a modest regard, neither too loftie, nor too bold; by a graue, yet pleasing smile, and not by a laughter or mockerie, and by respectiue complements, as salutations, reuerences, and the like ceremonies.
9 In words, by proffering our seruice, & the [Page 185] like cōp [...]ements, as also by speaking soberly, pertinently, & respectfully, being silent till we are questioned or demanded, and attentiue to that which is spoken vnto vs.
10 In Actions there are: degrees of Humility, First, to submit our selues to Great men, and not to esteeme our selues aboue our Equalls: Secondly, to submit our selues to our Equals, and not to esteeme vs more then the least: and thirdly, and lastly, to submit our selues to the least.
11 Many are of opinion, that it is fit for a Courtier to hold and beare himselfe in this first degree: to the end that too much familiaritie and humilitie procure him not contempt; but the Court being so composed, that very often great men haue need to vse those of lower ranke: and there being therein Offices, which none but they can performe: we are also sometimes constrained, with humble countenances, & faire speeches to seeke and re-search them: Caesar (as reporteth Dion) liuing in a Common-wealth, wherein this Hu [...]ility was no lesse necessary to an Ambitious man, then in a Prince his Court: was enforced to flatter and make faire weather, not only with the greatest, but with the meanest thereof.
But heerein notwithstanding wee must vse a Medio [...]ritie, and bearing our selues according to the qualitie of the person and [Page 186] occasion: we must not permit our selues to bee too much depressed and disparaged, but still hold and detaine our Humilitie within the lists and bounds of Courtesi [...].
12 So [...]e men issuing from a base descent, & seeing themselues in a short time aduanc'd and preferd: imagine they cannot surmount the contempt of their first condition; and qualitie; if they beare not themselues high: and make themselues to be feared; deferring by courteous and faire meanes to moderate and reproue, when through the continuance of their good Fortune and happinesse: this contempt with the remembrance of their first condition, will be rased out and defaced.
13 But it is to be feared that this Exchange befals vs not, but with much difficultie or too late; because a man which is inured and accustomed to Pride, cannot easily forsake it.
CHAP. XXXIX.
- 1 Of boldnesse, a necessary Point in a Courier, he must be bold to aduance himselfe, and not step backe for any refusall.
- 2 How it must be tempered.
- 3 Of the Iudgement and Sufficiency of a Courtier.
- [Page 187] 4 Whereof a Courtier must be chiefly capable, and of the dusersitie & differences of Courts.
- 5 The affaires of Estate, are more frequent in Court then any other.
- 6 The Court is subiect to alterations.
- 7 The Conclusion of the first Booke of this Treatise.
1 BOldnesse is a necessary requisit in a Courtier (whereas those who are bashfull lose it) be it to giue vs entrance and admittance in many places, the which he himselfe must procure: or be it, not to retire or step backe for one or two refusals, but to remaine and present himself alwaies there with one and the same constant resolution.
For although Importunitie be distastfull to many; yet we must consider there are many Natures who delight to bee pressed and importuned.
2 Notwithstanding, this boldnesse must be accompanied and conducted with much discretion and modesty, for feare it be not imputed to impudency and deceit, which is subiect to many vnfortunate accidents and disgraces.
3 As for the regard of a Courtiers Sufficiency, or Capacitie; as the Court is composed of all sorts of men, and that all sorts of affaires are there treated of, so he which frequents [Page 188] it, must be vers'd and seene in all things as well to the ende he may be imploved in all sort [...] of occasions, as also, to make himselfe necessary to many, and thereby to purchase himselfe more friends and reputation.
4 Which neuerthelesse, if he cannot performe, he must chiefly make himselfe capable of that which is most esteem'd and prisd in Court, wherein he intends to remaine: for wee see some of one profession haue more au thoritie then others, as Martial [...]ts and oulaiours in the Court of a Warlike Prince; Ecclesiasti [...]kes or Churchmen, in that of a Religious Prince; Phisitions, in that of an old and [...]ickly Prince; Lawyers, in that of a Peaceable and Iust Prince; Excheckerers, who know how to manage & inuent new means to finde money in that of a couetous, prodigall, or poore Prince; & Scholers, in that of a Learned Prince: for in all these Courts, these sorts of men, are for the most part still welcome.
From whence, by the Prince his inclination, and by the Nature of the affaires which are treated of, we may conceiue and iudge what sort of sufficiency is most requisite and necessary for a Courtier.
5 But as the affaires of the Estate are the most frequent and common, so we must diligently informe our selues of the particular humours, interests, & dependancies of those [Page 189] who manage them, or who must suruay or controule them, with their Issues, which the greatest part of Courtiers, either ignore or forget.
6 And because the Court is subiect to alteration and change, and that those who are there this day are not to remaine long in authoritie, be it that they are drawne away for other occasions, or for want of fauour: those who enter into their places, are subiect to commit great faults, in being ignora [...]t how affaires haue formerly past, or in not knowing the motiues and reasons of those who managed them before them: from whence it followes, that by changing of forme, their end [...]nours are disliked and disauowed of their Prince, and so the Sunne shine of his fauour and their prosperitie lasteth not long.
7 Let this suffice concerning the parts and perfections, necessary in a Courtier, and let vs now see how hee must vse and imploy them in his Cariage and Conduction, expressed in the second Booke.