WIth what care and cost States and King­domes, which vphold and deriue all happinesse to man, as he is a sociable and a feeble creature, should be pre­served, none will deny; especially since they are so subiect to decay, and the causes of their corruptions so ma­ny.Senec. 117. For the best tempered common-wealth is not of any constant continuance, but full of changes, and those at last, will after much interchange, driue it to a full and fatall period. It must therefore be the care of the present age, to see that it receiue no detriment while they are in it: for they may be so orderly, as to worke no distemper, but conserue it in health and wealth, or at least keepe it from decaying so fast, that hauing some space to fall in, it may recouer, or they haue time to leaue it, and not fall with it, nor that fall vpon them. Now the best, and all that the passing, present generation can doe, is either to keep things in primitiue order, or to reforme them to it. The first of which is difficult to continue, the other dange­rous if long discontinued. Yet Kingdomes must be con­serued, [Page 2] by the same meanes they were first establish­ed. This labour, and care then will be to best purpose be­stowed vpon those parts which are most necessary, and vphold the rest as essentiall and fundamentall, being the principles of the intrinsicall,Polybius hist. lib. 6. originall good: [...], or vpon those that secure these, [...]. Now that which is the only infallible ground of these, must needs be princi­pally respected by those that are vndertakers for the publick good; and that ground is true religion. For though ill manners are per accidens the cause, or rather the occasion of making good lawes, yet they are better in the executing, best when they are obeyed. Now good manners cause obedience, and religion naturally begets good manners. But religion cannot subsist without pub­licke exercise and action, and so the requisites of it are times, places, and some persons who ought to be set a­part, and wholly and only employed in it; and they must be in the common-wealth. Therefore seeing it is necessa­ry to haue a religion to preserue the common-wealth, it is by consequent as needfull, to haue preservers of reli­gion, that may not overturne the common-wealth by o­ver-ruling religion. Wherefore the choyse of them need to be such, that seeing they must be in the common-wealth of necessity, they may be of the common-wealth for vni­versal safety. And yet they are to be distinguished by state, and order, to avoyd confusion; nor doth their distinction enforce any such forme, after which they must governe, as may be inconvenient to the publicke civill state, wher­by they are to be governed. The care then of the wisest must be either to preserue, or restore that forme of the Clergie, which is most agreeing with the Civill State, and that will be the meanes to prolong the age of the state, by preserving concord amongst societies; which, though at last it come to an end, yet it may out-last our dayes, that [Page 3] we be not vnhappy in the ruine; for it is not the infelici­tie of States which haue long flourished to decay, or be destroyed, but the vnhappinesse of those men, whose hap it is then to liue, and not when they did flourish. Now every form of a Clergie will not fit,Guic hypor Poli [...] but according to di­vers countries, they haue beene severall, suiting to the times, places, and people. The first was the originall, domesticall discipline in private families, before God made choyse, and actually seperated a nation to himselfe. Then followed the Leviticall Nationall regiment, com­pounded and composed of, and according to the ceremo­niall and judiciall Lawes. Both these formes were not onely by divine permission, but also by injunction; yet not perpetuall nor vniversall. Neither of these then are the government wee must chuse, because that manner of exercising religion is antiquated. Wee must then consider of a forme, which may be conformable to the present practise of true religion, in relation to Gods revealed Will, which may withall be suitable, and sorting with this present state, that so they may vphold each other; which forme, though it be not according to Gods ex­presse mandate in some particulars, yet it is not against it, but with his permission of approbation in all points. Now in this choyce, wee must consider our owne forme of Civill government, and whether that were imposed vpon vs by conquest, or by our owne consent; if by free consent, and of long continuance, it will with more ease and desire be preserved, and with greatest danger alte­red; if by conquest, the more Charters of priuiledges are granted to vs vnder it, the more it is endeared to vs, and esteemed happy; but our forme of state is a free Monar­chie, erected and protected by free consent, and of long continuance, not imposed but confirmed and reformed to the first freedome by a happy conquest, and endeered vnto vs by many Charters of wholsome priviledges. [Page 4] Therefore we must seeke or keepe such a forme of state Ecclesiasticall, as may best accord with our forme of Civill policie,

§. 2. This present State Ecclesiasticall is the forme that best agrees with the Civill State. That it is not against the Law of God, I will not goe about to proue, because I hope none will question it: neither that it was the pri­mitiue, and should still be the government of the present visible Church, because that is already proved without all contradiction by many most judicious and orthodoxe Divines: But my vndertaking is (as farre as God shall giue mee vnderstanding) to discourse, how it is most a­greeable with this Kingdome. All States haue alwayes endeavoured, as to haue a religion, so to frame the exer­cise of it according to their owne dispositions: but some with more doting indulgence, haue at last changed it into that which they were most naturally disposed to, and did not alter and order their inclinations by it. As the foure grand Monarchies, the Chaldean with whom the Persian may well be joyned, these turned the acts of re­ligion into philosophicall considerations, enquiries, and explications of nature. The Egyptians (a principall branch of these Monarchies, and from whom some thinke the Chaldeans were derived, and that Belus Neptuni Libiae­que filius in Babyloniam colonos ex Aegypto traduxisset, Diodorus Sicu­lus Biblioth. lib. 1. & ex iis Sacerdotes quos Chaldeos Babylonii vocant, qui more Aegyptiorum astra observant, &c.) These Egyptians na­turally [...], superstitious in religion, cu­rious in mysteries, transformed religion into all kinde of superstitions, and by trying conclusions and chymicall experiments vpon it, conceited the substance of it into vnexpected phansies, furthered by mimicall expressions, leading into, and leaving in mysticall mazes. The Gre­cians by nature [...], intelligent, able to find out, and loving to contend, drew religion [Page 5] into disputes, and would beleeue no more than they could finde out by search of reason, and apprehend by force of fansie; and that they obstinately maintained, by a wanton working wit, which they might with more ease doe, seeing their language was so happy for expres­sion. The Romans by nature inclined to dominion, fitted the frame of their religion to a Monarchicall forme vn­der the Pontifices;Cujaci [...] Origin lis, §. 1 yet they seemed to seeke a Monopo­lie of all the Gods in the world: (for they receiued and worshipped the Gods of all the nations they conque­red.) These nations framing religion to these ends,August Civit [...] 20. cap had a forme of government, vnder religious persons, sutable to further, contriue, and compasse by all meanes, their particular purposes, and therefore they gaue them power, of a most large extent, yea they were ruled by them; for the Chaldeans were originally Priests, and [...] a priest,Synesiu 126. and a Prince were all one with them. So the Magi amongst the Persians, the Priests of Apollo at Delphos amongst the Grecians did what they would.Pomp [...] Orig. I. And the Romans were led by their Pontifices and Augures, but it was whither they would, namely to a Monarchy. Wee having not the ends of these nations in our religion, must not vse the same forme of Clergie. For I conceiue the aime of the best and wisest with vs, is to preserue the Church and Common-wealth together. Now that cannot be, where the state of the Clergie governs, but where it is governed. Our ayme being such, let vs consider what forme will be best go­verned vnder this Common-wealth. There are but three distinct formes of Ecclesiasticall government in Chri­stendome, as the Monarchicall, Aristocraticall, Demo­craticall; of these, the Aristocraticall is most conforma­ble to the rule of this Realme. In proving of which asser­tion, I will not onely insist vpon the proofe of past and present experience, that it is so, but discourse in reason [Page 6] why it should be so. And first in opposition to the other formes of Ecclesiasticall government: what they are like­ly to produce, woefull experience hath long since felt in the one, and what we may expect, vpon probable conje­cture, from the other, is not to be desired by any that vn­derstand, and loue the happinesse of this Civill State. For all their principles, fundamentall in their grounds, of augmentation in their growth, of conservation in their heigth, [...]. Polybius lib. 6. and of reparation in their decayes are most dange­rous for this Monarchy, and the causes of their corrupti­on would be so incorporated into the body and bowels of the Civill State, that if it fall not before them and into their hands, they would goe neere to pull it downe with them when they fall. Not so speake of their power, which they must haue, and the exercise of it, either in an ordi­nary and lawfull course, or by indulgence or vsurpation, and the manner of their proceedings in the execution of it, what instruments they vse in counsell and action, how much they trench vpon the power, vndermine the go­vernment, countermine the proceedings, countermand the edict, and confront a Monarchy, I leaue it to wise and actiue men to consider.

§. 3. First to speake of the Monarchicall, which is now the Papall government. How this Monarchicall forme hath heretofore agreed with this State, all know; and it is not likely that it should now so well accord with it, be­cause the reasons of that little agreement then, the pre­sent particular interest, in which this State vsed that Mo­narchy, are ceased; for then wee aymed to enlarge our dominion by the right of succession in France, by the right of conquest in Scotland and Ireland. But the causes of disagreement still remaine, and are in their part ag­gravated to an vtter opposition; so that as before it was dangerous, so now it is a desperate case to re-entertaine that forme of Clergie, which can and will rule vs, and [Page 7] must necessarily alter, and so worke the ruine of the pre­sent state. Vnder this forme this Kingdome was no Mo­narchie, but a Province, vnder a forreiner, an vsurper and a tyrant. This was our best condition when that Clergie ruled vs, though as favourable as they could, or did any Monarchy in Europe. The lawes and priviledges of the land were continually broken and infringed by them, e­specially those lawes that did most immediatly vphold the Kings prerogatiue. Against them they continually promulgated particular edicts, for the decrees were too generall to be applyed to occasions, and therefore they added the decretals, so called, because they gaue wings to the decrees for quicker dispatch. And wee shall finde,Duare [...] benefici [...] Prooem that most of the Decretall epistles, which concerne Iu­risdiction, were written to English Prelates. And (as I conceiue) some reason might be, because the lawes of this land are more contrary to the Canon Law, than the lawes of any other States in Christendome, being they are more ruled by the Civill Law, from which the Canon is deri­ved, and so more causes might arise here amongst vs, ei­ther out of the contrariety of the Lawes, or out of the narrower extent of the Common Law, and also partly out of the ignorance of the proceedings of this State, which was then likely to be most, because intercourse and intelligence with Rome for that time was abridged; (for Henry 2. being then at variance with Thomas Becket, who was sheltered by the Pope Alexander the third, permit­ted not any Legate to reside in the kingdome; but as soone as Vivian was arrived, he was questioned, and that by the Bishops of Winchester and Ely, how hee durst land without the Kings speciall licence.) And partly they writ the oftner to English Bishops, because they suspe­cted them, and justly, to be more partiall for their Prince, than the Prelates of any other kingdome, as appeares by their readinesse to examine this Legate, and also by an [Page 8] epistle Decretall of Alexander the third to the Bishop of London, Lib 4. t [...]t. 17. c [...]p. 7. qui filij legitimi. Sarisburiensis de nugis curial: lib. 7. cap. 24 who then was Gilbert Foliot (a man much commended by Mathew Paris and Iohn Sarisburiensis) in that epistle hee curries favour with him in a cause which hee knew was of Ecclesiasticall cognizance, and was so judged here in the Kings court, (as appeares out of Glanvill then Lord chiefe Iustice) I think in the very particular case.Glanvill, lib. 7. cap. 15. Ad Regem An­gliae pertinet de possessionibus iudicare. Iohannes de Pa­risijs contra Bo­nifacium octa­vum. cap. 12. But he feared, seeing the Bishop could doe so much with the King, and would doe so much for his King, least hee should finde some way to entitle it to the Crowne: and hee had good reason to feare, since the Bishop had so often in the Kings behalfe opposed Tho­mas Becket and him. These may bee some reasons why the Popes sent so many epistles into England, and I am the more confirmed in them, because I finde they were for the greatest part written by the most Pragmaticall Popes, who busied and bestirred themselves most in set­ting up orders, and new fresh Fryes, and fraternities of Fryers; and in pulling downe the powers both of our Kings and Bishops: to wit, from those seaven Popes (who were the thirds; and I thinke the worst of their names, I am sure of their predecessors.) As for the most part they were written from Alex. 3. Lucius tertius, Vrbanus terti­us, Clemens tertius, Coelestinus tertius, Innocens tertius, and Honorius tertius; these men did and undid very much, be­cause they were active and lived long. If then this forme of Clergie was thus prejudiciall to our state before it was opposed and incensed by the statute of Proviso and Pre­munire, and cast off by the Kings just re-assuming their power, (which shewes that all their right was nothing but our soveraignes wrong;) surely now wee are not to expect so much favour from them: and therefore as the State then thought it necessarie and right to casheere it, and brought their purpose fully to passe; so it is now more necessary and just to keepe it out, since it is infi­nitely [Page 9] increased in tyranny, since that unhappy, unadvi­sed, ill advised conventicle at Trent.

§. 4. Those nations shall have the best use of that forme, who propound a civill state as large as their Ecclesiasticall; and to whom he hath first sought too for assistance: and withall are able to overrule it. For after Iustinianus the last of the true Roman Emperours, and Gregory the last of the good Popes, that See claue to Phocas; who named the Pope Vniversall Bishop, that hee might proclaime him Catholique Emperour. But when in the next Centurie the Easterne Emperours were infe­sted with Saracens warre, began to pull downe images as some cause of the warres, which the Pope endeavoured to set up againe: then by the second Councell of Nice, whether because they did him wrong in disobedience, or rather because they could doe him no good; the Greeke Pope Zachary fell off to the French before the next Cen­turie. And then Pipin used him to confirme, not to con­ferre his new atchived Kingdome; for in those dayes they gave no such power, neither did Pope Zachary claime it: for hee deposed not Childericke, but consented to the deposing, which was by the Peeres of France; nei­ther did he set up Pipin in his roome: but they that depo­sed the other onely sent to Rome to have Zacharies advise in it,Bulla [...] because it might passe more plausibly in the world by the consent of so grave an Oracle: as it hath alway beene good wisedome to winde in the conscience of one who is esteemed an upright Iudge, for the countenance of an unusuall cause humorously undertaken by the first Author; especially there being then a faction amongst the Bishops of France: Baro [...] nal. [...] so that this inquirie of his judgement in point of fact did non submit to any claime of right. And Gotefridus Viterbrensis affirmes, and Baronius confes­ses, Francos non Zachariae paruisse decreto, Baro [...] nal. [...] sed acquievisse consilio: and there is great difference betwixt an absolute [Page 10] injunction, and a politique advise, which is onely an an­swere out of discretion and left to discretion, implies no obligation of necessitie. But this is without question, Pipin being ambitious of the Kingdome, and desirous to cover and colour it with religious ends, used the Pope to countenance and compasse his designe; who would not withstand him, being ingaged to him for protection and by bounty, or which is likelier, hee durst not, being too much in his power. But howsoever it was, he clave fast unto the French for that Century: especially to Charles the great, the repairer of the Westerne Empire; from whom the Caroline succession continued till Otho the third. But then the French Kings being distracted by warres at home,Augustinus de A [...]cona de po­test. Papae: quaest. 37. Art. 5. could no more assist them: Gregory the fift an Almaine transferred it to the Almaines, chose those seaven Electors, but they agreed not well together: after the Almaine Pope was dead and Italians succeeded, they presently began to quarrell with the Emperour, and to send challenges of right into Italy; knowing that the Em­perour was not able to doe much for them in giving them as the French had done, and perceiving hee was more unable to hold from them that which they would have:Segebertus [...]hron. passim. so that the Emperours were continually imbroiled by them, being not able to rule them, decreasing as fast as they rose. Then the opposition betwixt many particular Popes and Emperours, as betwixt Gregory the seaventh and Henry the fourth, and Alexander the third with Fre­dericke Barbarossa, was very strong. But after it grew to such a height that they were setled into factions of sepa­rations, as the Ecclesiastiques and Imperialists, especially in Italy; Nabrigensis hist. Anglicana lib. 4. cap. 13. which the Italians quickly perceiving, because earnestly desiring the Emperours power over them to be looser, began to make use of the Papall present oppositi­on to procure their full liberty:Abbas Vnsper­gensis chron. passim. and therefore these fa­ctions were most strong there. Yet that grand faction [Page 11] distinguished by many formalities, was principally main­tained under the names of the Guelfs and Gibellins, which swallowed up all the private and pettie familie factions of Italie. As the Vrsini in Rome were Guelfes, Mat hist. Ann the Collo­nensi Gibellins, the Vberti in Florence were Gibellins, the Bondelmonti Guelfes, and so it was in Naples, Venice, Mil­laine: which strife continued hot till Boniface the eight, who perceiving how much his predecessors had gained upon the Emperour, and saw but little more for him to get; began to practise the like domineering humour upon the other Potentates of Christendome, sending his letters of claime to the Kings of France, England, Scotland, Denmarke, Poland, Hungarie. But being opposed by Philip le Beau King of France, hee did flie backe to the Emperour for succour, who then was Albertus, the first Emperour of the house of Austria (for though his father was Emperour, yet hee was not of the house of Austria, neither of the old Marquesses nor late Dukes, but Earle of Hansburg, who had conquered the Dukedome of Austria for his sonne.) This Boniface the Spaniard first began the faction betwixt the Kingdome of France and the house of Austria, by giving the Kingdome of France to Alber­tus. These two better agreed then any, because the Pope had taken off the Emperour from seeking his owne right in Italie, by imploying him as his champion to enlarge his dominion in other Kingdomes: and partly because the Emperour had good hope to continue the Empire in his familie, as it hath neere foure hundred yeares. From which time the Emperours and Popes disagreements were not so frequent, but onely when some French favourers were Popes, and they sate at Avinion, as Cle­ment the fifth with Henry the seaventh, and during the times of the Councels of Constance and Basill. But by reason of the schismes in the Roman See, they did one another neither much good nor harme, vntill the time [Page 12] of Alexander the sixth, a Spaniard, who was exactly ambitious, a great lover of his countrie, and one that did much for it.Anonymus Hisp. in vita Alex. For hee joyned with Ferdinand the first Ca­tholick King, helping him to subdue Spaine, and there­fore first brought in the Inquisition Contra los Iudios y mores, que le aviantornado Christianos, which Caranza Arch-bishop of Toledo, saith Ferdinand, conceived him­selfe bound in conscience to vse, by vertue of an oath ta­ken with an imprecation by one of his predecessours in the fourth Councell of Toledo, Baronius An­nal. An. 637. which Baronius so much commends. This Pope also bestowed vpon him the then discovered Indies, with many other favours, and for his sake, and in opposition to the French, hee was as fast a friend to the House of Austria, as his deepe dissimula­tion would suffer him;Philip. Comi­noeus, lib. 8. and the rather, because they had lately matched with the House of Burgundie, which much weakned the French force, and strengthned their factions.Thuanus hist. lib. 4. But then most when Philip, the heire of the House of Austria and Burgundie, incorporated himselfe with Spaine. So that I will conclude these things consi­dered, that this forme is onely safe and convenient for those kingdomes that propose conquests, and can rule it as the protectors of it.

§. 5. So then seeing this Clergie is not for vs, I will consider of the other, which for distinct proceeding, we may call Democraticall. When the three Prime Poten­tates of Christendome, were Charles the fifth, Henry the eighth, Francis the first, such as deserved and desired to haue all the soveraigne power that could of right belong vnto them, and yet were contrariwise vsurped vpon, and deprived of all their eminent supremacie, in those things that most concerned them; & perceiving (some beginning to question the Pope) a course of relieving themselues, they began to vrge a Councell for reformation, not onely in doctrine and manners, but also in point of Ecclesia­sticall [Page 13] government. But it was so long vrged by them, to no purpose, that Henry the eigth advisedly wrote to the other; That seeing the Pope had so long put it off,Histo. Trid. and now intended to hold it within his owne territories, it were the best course for every one, to reforme his owne Kingdome, and he did so with the advise, consent, and desire of the Church and Stat [...] representatiue. No sooner was a reformation in any degree setled, but pre­sently it was excepted against by some that favoured the Church of Geneva, as not fully reformed, because not a­greeing with their new neat platforme; & that was vrged vpō vs, as the only Apostolical government of the Church. But I marvell how such an exact government should be so suddenly framed, or else which is more strange, that they could so conceale their happy invention; as that Francis the first, a King of France, that searched into his govern­ment as much as any, should not know of it. For I am very much deceived, if hee had not beene much mistaken, knowing of this project, to desire the Councell might be held at Geneva, being it was Diametrically opposite to the Romane. But our State had no reason to receiue it.Hist. Trid. For though it was necessary, not onely in reason of State, but also out of conscience, that (after we perceived the indisposition of the Romane Clergie to reforme them­selues, (which they seem to hold impossible.) For though every Cardinall takes an oath in the vacancie, yet it can­not binde him when he is Pope; wee should then per­forme our duty, especially seeing it stood with the pub­lick good.) Yet neither of these considerations did en­gage vs to accept of such a forme of Clergie, as seemed to runne a cleane contrary course, seeing we propounded not an innovation, but a reformatioa; that being as dan­gerous, as this was necessary, it could not here be enter­tained without an vniversall innovation. Now all stirring changes are dangerous, especially when the body of the [Page 14] common-wealth is full of diseased, discontented hu­mours. Because all alteration sets the humours a work­ing, and one humour being a-foote, stirs vp all the rest, either alluring by sympathie, or provoking by antipa­thy; and when they are once a-foote, it is to be feared, that they will not onely disburthen the body of malig­nant oppressing cru [...]ties, but weaken it in the most prin­cipall parts, causing it to receiue a disposition to the like distemper, vpon every small distaste. But it is most dan­gerous to innovate in that part of a common-wealth, that is most essentially actiue, and hath beene lately re­covered, especially if the matter proposed doe minister any cause of relapse. Both which seem too true in this new discipline, which gaue an occasion to the Clergie to revolt in the denying the supremacie, which they lately acknowledged. And being a forraine French devise, might seeme to come within the compasse of a praemunire for intrusion. as well as that of the Church of Rome for vsurpation. But this was only propounded, not brought in, and that by men who were by some beleeved to be faithfull to our State. And it may be, they had no dange­rous aime in it, yet it would haue beene very dangerous for our kingdome, since it did necessarily induce an alte­ration in the profession and practise of the lawes, which by reason of their long vse, are as it were naturalized, into the manners and disposition of our nation. [...].Arist. Rhetor. l. 2. cap: 11. It must necessarily haue conferred ruines vpon our schooles of learning and hospitals of charity, razed the foundations of our Churches, con­founded divisions of parishes, changed the right and custome of paying tythes, with many such miserable in­conveniences, which were so in the Apostles times of mi­series, in persecution. So that the State then would not venture to trie conclusions vpon it selfe, by this new receipt, but chose rather to feele the supposed paine, than to [Page 15] take the pill: and yet it hath subsisted, though not in that heigth of health, which that forme of government pro­mised; yet in such a good competent continuance of rea­sonable well, that the present state also had rather indure the worst of the disease, than make the best vse of the re­medie. And if it must haue made such a change in the en­trance, what would it haue done in the continuance? how would it haue agreed with this Monarchie, that must haue entred with such oppositions? so that I neede not to say much to discard it, for it hath enough in it at the first sight to keepe it out. And I confesse, that if I would, I cannot say much of it with any confident certainty, be­cause indeed I doe not know, neither doe I thinke that any of them doe, or at least ever haue set downe, in posi­tiue and plaine termes, the whole frame and face of this platforme, as they would haue it received in this King­dome. But as much as I conceiue of it, and at the best and purest, it is a mixt Democraticall discipline, and it is not likely, that a dissolute Democracie should long agree with this Monarchie. It is not my intent here to discourse of the nature of a Democracie,Clayn Arc. that I should shew the ma­nifold consequent, coincident inconveniences, that doe naturally flow in with it, and follow it (notwithstanding that Machivell in many of his discourses vpon Livie, doth preferre a Democracie before any other forme, but rather wittily, out of a Paradoxicall contradicting hu­mour, than wisely, out of the weight and worth of sin­cere, sage, and serious arguments. And Plato saith thus much for it, in his Idaea of a Common-wealth,Plat [...] lib. 5 [...] inter iniquas formas optima, inter legitimas deterrima. For if it begin to degenerate into an Ochlocratie, (as I cannot con­ceiue it possible, but it must, considering that liberty is the end and excellencie of it) then it turnes to a most head-strong, intollerable tyrannie. For I am not of their opinion, that hold it a contradiction, that where a De­mocracy [Page 16] prevayles, there can be a tyranny. For the Ephori of Sparta, were as the Tribunes of the people of Rome, chosen by the people, and out of the common people, and the conservators of their liberty. Yet I thinke there are but few that discourse of these Ephori, but they conclude, and condemne their government of tyranny. They cast Pausanias into prison, and Thucidides saith, that they v­surped that power over, and against their Kings, for they put Agis junior to death,Plato de leg. lib. 4. as Plato, [...], and they were set vp to restraine their Kings. It is a hard matter to keepe that liberty with­in its limits, in any common-wealth, where it hath the supreme government, and therefore with much difficulty will it submit to be governed by a free Monarchy, espe­cially a Democracie of that new nature, which makes the same persons civill subjects, and ecclesiasticall superious, those lay Elders that are neither Ministers nor Magi­strates, and yet must be governours in the Church, whose jurisdiction doth destroy the nature of a Monarchie. For all publick government in the Church, derived from Christ, the fulnesse of it, is either Propheticall, Sacerdo­tall, or Regall; and they assume not any of these, but the Regall, which is given in charge to supreme Christian Magistrates in a Monarchie; and therefore, if they deriue not this power from him, they establish a regiment a­gainst him. So that if his power, doth not include theirs, they exclude his; and he having no supereminent power over them, as they impeach his right, so they will en­large their owne liberty, till it be dissolved into a loose licentious libertinisme:Polybius hist. lib. 6. [...], (as Polibius well expresses it.) And if they did not thus, it were the greater vertue, seeing they must haue such power limi­ted by lawes left to discretion. And they would finde it a hard peeece of patience, to abstaine and containe them­selues within such bounds of obedience, as this State [Page 17] necessarily requires. Can men that professe themselues popular passe plausiblie and please the vulgar if they doe not to their vtmost vphold them in their highest insolencies?Tull [...] 2. co [...] Agra Tullie found this impossible when as hee withstood the people in Lege Agraria, for they cast him off, and clave to Rullus, who would be popularis though it were but in populatione: and as it cannot stand with the power of our government, so it withstands the honour of our governour, debasing the majestie of a Monarchie into a popular paritie, without respect of His most sacred person. In this it is truly Democritall; for as it was re­ceived for libertie, so it must bee vpheld by equality: [...] cannot be fully free without [...],Poly [...] lib. 6 and I cannot then conceiue how any could apprehend it as a forme likely to agree with state; so that this government at the best would bee like the spleene in the body, which is the subject of the dregs and settlings of the humours, as a Democracie is la feccia della plebe, Gui [...] Hist. and as the spleene being not able to mooue it selfe is not troublesome, so long as it is not pressed vpon by the heart, but permitted full and equall liberty, nor disturbed by a Flatus hypocondria­cus [...], but once mooved [...] affectes the head and heart with turbulent distempers;Hipp notio so in a Demo­cracie as long as they haue all at their loose list, and are not compelled to keepe within compasse, but apprehend themselves equall to the highest in all respects, and are not mooved by some sedicious spirit, they are quiet e­nough; Nam multitudo, sicut mare, per se immobilis est, Livi Psal [...] Ide [...] but if once they perceive that any goe about to oppresse or crosse them in their false and fugitive liberty (as they are very suspicious vpon the least cause) they presently are ready, but tentare magis quàm tueri libertatem: and if any one dare but begin to blow a Trumpet of sedition, (as they doe not easily) statim ferox erit si non ad bellandum, [Page 18] saltem ad rebellandum. I doe confesse that this forme of government may bee of good use in some states at some times, as in a popular state where these Lay Elders may be both Church and Citie Burgesses; as the Democraticall Helvetians approved it: so also as for the enlarging of a Monarchie,Machivellus, l. 1. cap. 5. the Monarchicall is best; so for the settling of a Monarchie, that Democreticall may be safest, and so may bee the best government when a state is not settled but newly erected: for then it is not safe to use severitie a [...] when our state was not fully settled. Martin Mar-Prelate dared to vent his discontented humours in salt ru­mours,Curtius Histor. lib. 5. as men in rheumes: In novo & precario imperio no [...] ­statim jugum rigidum cervici imponendum, but it is good taming them by degrees, for then a Magistrate hath little power to command, much lesse to restraine; & therefore it hath bin found the best course to let thē take their course: for Mos est vulgo, Tacitus Histor. lib. 1. Livius lib. 11. Histor. mutabili subitò, & tam prono in miseri­cordiam, quàm immodicum saevitiâ fuerat, and so by indul­gence finde lascivire magis plebem quàm saevire. And I am perswaded that this discipline was onely chosen for that time when the Apostles were under persecution, and there were no Christian Magistrates to repaire to for justice: then they appointed some to judge betwixt brother and bro­ther. But it doth not appeare that they were Ecclesiasti­call Iudges, certainly no such lay Elders in the Apostles times as the Separatists now plead for, but rather civill ar­biters to make agreement betwixt them in civill contro­versies,1 Cor. 6.4.5. Histor. Con. Trid. lib. 3. (as may appeare out of the place) though the au­thor of the History Concil. Tridentini make that a ground for Episcopall jurisdiction. For the Apostles had no reason to delegate the cognizance of spirituall causes, because in those dayes they were so few, and needed no proofe to them; because they had the gift of discerning of spirits, and of knowing of secrets, hauing the gift of prophecy­ing. And I doe not beleeue that it can bee proved that [Page 19] they gaue commission to any to receiue accusations, (which is much lesse then to giue judiciall censures and decisions) to any but to the Bishop of Ephesus: 1 Tit but I in­tend not to enter into controversies, neither need I, seeing so much hath beene already written in that point to good purpose by many most reverend Fathers of our Church. But to returne to my intended discourse; this state of the soveraigntie of these seniors I grant to be of some use in free Cities in time of tumult; and so I doe beleeue M^r Cal­vin intended it, yeelding to a popular partie, and not as an vniuersall perpetuall government for all truely reformed Churches. For though such a wise respected man as hee was, might during his time preserue it in the same corre­spondent conformitie to his proposed patterne, (as Po­libius saith) the Thebane Democracie [...]; it stood not by the good temper of their pollicie,Polyb but by the vertue of their governours [...]: so might it bee said of the Geneva Church government, that though for the transgression of it many were the rulers of it, being a Democracie:Pro. [...] Nil m prodest curari lunt. Senec [...] Mach [...] lib. 1. [...] yet by a man of understanding and knowledge, the state there­of was prolonged; for hee could doe much to appease seditions, as Franciscus Bishop of Volterra sooner set­tled a tumult in Florence by his graue presence, then the Magistrates could by the weight of their authori­tie. It is plaine then out of this that hath beene spoken, that this government by popular Presbyterie is not for this state.

§ 6 Neither of these being convenient, and there is but another, and it hath alwayes beene the government in this state; it must necessarily follow without any more proofe, that this is most agreeable with the Civill. Those that are no well willers to our state haue strucke at our Church gouernment, with which there is such a happie hartie vnitie, as dare bid the world doe as shee would bee [Page 20] done to (as that absolute Statse-man the Earle of Salisbu­rie replyed.) And it is no marvell, since it is not onely the primitiue ancient government of the Church in generall; but the onely forme also that euer was received in this state, according to the ancient lawes of this Iland, though it seeme to be brought in under Henrie the eight, when it was onely reformed from the euils, and restored to the former state: for our Clergie was never of right subject to the Pope, neither as he was Patriarch to the West, nor in his province. And this Aristocraticall forme hath most happy qualifications that dispose it to the peace, profit, honour, & safety of this state: I could now wish with Tully when hee was to write against Democraticall Agrarian lawes,Ad Atticum, l. 2. epist. 3. Vtinam Theophrastum [...], &c. Vbi multa scribuntur [...]. After this Kingdome with many others had long laboured under a lingring consumption, being continually sucked, and in a manner exhausted by the continuall supplying of the Popes Exchequer, which drew away the vitall spirits, weakned the sinewes of warre; causing extensions and convulsions: and farther also in respect of domestique peace, it had not a just pro­portion of power to exercise its onely civill and lawfull authority: insomuch that many who should have knowne what in possibilitie of state might bee done for a recovery of a temporalitie, distempered and distressed by the ma­lignant humerous power of an usurped spiritualitie, like a feaver in the spirits caused by obstruction; [...]. Hippocrat: lap. 5. prog. All those men gaue it over for desperate, some conceiving the disease in­curable in its owne nature, because, that non obstante the helpe of so many strong statutes and purging provisoes, the distemper was as violent, and more virulent then be­fore; & they saw no safe and certaine course of preventing physick, for it was so far spent, as that it seemed to haue passed the period of curing: but as when men are brought to a desperate point they will trie conclusions, and they [Page 21] that drive them to it doe often repent it; so the Pope put­ting and passing our state upon desperate hazards, forced it to trie its strength, which is soone found; necessitie driving, and opportunitie drawing: Acerrima virtus est, quam ultima necessitas extundit: Senec [...]a men. l and so it cast such an vn­reasonable vnruly rider, who thought, and so did all chri­stendome, that hee had sitten closer and faster upon our skirts, and would not beleeue that it was possible for a Parliamentary power representing the state, euer to haue beene able to dissolue the great Abbies, though they durst fully resolue it; untill they saw them begin with the little ones; then they had reason to grant it possible:Arist. R lib. 2. c [...]. Yea they found it fully finished, and that on such a sudden, that as it wrought admiration in the beholders, so it procured safety to the actors. For in actions of that nature, haste onely makes good speed. That the event of this action was good, is proved by the de­liverance of the state. But for the action in it selfe consi­dered, as I doe not commend it, so I will not condemne it, because I am not able to sift and search into the cir­cumstances of it; but I will onely say thus much of it, That actions that ayme at, and make great alteration, though to the best, doe seldome keepe a just mediocrity, especially in respect of that part of the common-wealth, which is the subject of the alterations: as a strong, stir­ring Chymicall spirit-purge doth in a naturall body, that stirres vp more than should be moved, and purges out good, as well as ill humours. But no sooner was our State thus delivered from vnder the tyrannie of the Ecclesia­sticall Monarchy, but it as soone pitched vpon the Aristo­craticall government, as suitable and fitting best with the weale-publick. And as all the Christian world did then in sincere judgement of State rebus sic staantibus approue their choyce, so we haue ever since found the happy ef­fects of it, in the safety, honour, and treasure of the [Page 22] State. Consider it first, how it wrought little or no alte­ration in the receiving, being according to the lawes, taken by their owne choyce, restrayned with the limita­tions of the Civill State. For all the turmoyle and tossing tumult, was onely in casting out the other forme, as a privation, before the induction of a new forme in natu­rall bodies. It was received without force, as most natu­rall to the Civill State, and no other could haue beene brought in with such certaine good security of the state: for the Monarchicall that time could not be received,Histor. Concil. Trid. lib. 2. but either vpon their repentance of what they had done, and by procuring of a pardon from the Pope, (as it was in Queene Maries dayes: and doe but consider, how evill that was for the State) or else by helpe of forraine force joyning with domestick rebellion, as was often attem­pted. But this was not any thing safe for the kingdome, as is already proved. And for the Democraticall disci­pline, there was great and certaine danger in receiving of that, for it could not possibly be conceived to be re­ceived, but with a schismaticall sedition, since it was approved but by a faction. Now doe but consider, how dangerous seditions are in an ancient kingdome; if it were now a settling, happily the vigour of youth would beare it out, as one maine reason (as I conceiue) why the Ro­man Monarchy was not ruined by those foure first grand seditions, was because it was but secunda aetas, & quasi adolescentia: Lucius Florus lib. 1. cap. 22. But when a State is growing old, seditions are desperate courses to procure changes, though it be for the best. For though the events of them be but doubtfull, yet the deciding-place is certaine of losse. But for this present forme, as it re-entred without a State-earth­quake, without any shaking of the ground of the Civill government, so it hath ever continued peaceable, and a pacifier of growing differences, being the middle State of three, carrying it selfe as a moderating mediator be­twixt [Page 23] the King and the Subjects. And all this good, and much more proceeds from the temper of the forme of go­vernment. For it is the onely forme fit to be vnder this Monarchy, because it will onely be easily ruled and or­dered by the State, when as both the other will rule wher they are entertained, although after a divers manner; one having dominion over the Civill, the other without it. But this is vnder the Civill, in relation to the head; and in it, in relation to the body. And as it is easily ruled, so it will not easily be disordered, as the other will, though they should submit to be ruled for a time, till they be able to resist. For ambition is so perniciously provi­dent, that it will be something able to resist the power of its opposite, to get from vnder it, before it trie to goe about it. First, taking care not to be oppressed, before it endeavour to oppresse; for all the branches of rebellion, are rooted and hid in the depths of dissembled disobedi­ence. But this is not so inclined; for if any forme of po­licie degenerate, it must be either into a Tyranny, an Oli­garchy, or a dissolute Ochlocraty. Now an Aristocracie cannot be immediately dissolved, either into a tyranny, or a tumultuous popularity. And it is not easie to conceiue, how it should by any meanes, by the course of State cor­ruption, ever degenerate into a head-strong popularity of it owne accord, without externall force. And as little reason there is, why this should advance it selfe to a tyranny, by turning the Church into a court,Earle [...] bury hi [...] to scan [...] papers. and reli­gion into a vassall to ambition; for it must be reduced and restrained into an Oligarchie: and there is no great rea­son in this point, to feare the Clergie in this kingdome, all things considered. It is true (as all Historians and Po­liticks obserue) that an Aristocracie is subject and prone to be corrupted into an Oligarchie: But doe but obserue the end of an Oligarchie, and you will finde, that an Ari­stocracie can haue no such ayme; for their end is, to grow [Page 24] rich, as the States of Venice and the Belgick provinces, and their counsels driue at that end,Arist. Rhet. lib. 1. c. 8. [...]; and according to this end, and this counsell to it, he that will prevaile in perswading with them, must deliberate,Sen. Suasor. 1. in libera civitate, non vt apud reges, quae dele­ctant, sed quae prosunt suadenda sunt. But our Ecclesiasti­call Aristocracie is not to be so perswaded, having no such counsels, because not the same end; only they may be rich, if they did desire it, because being poore, they are a fit subject of wealth. The poverty of this Clergie hath charmed it against actiue ambition, so that one of the Optimates doe not looke higher than his peeres, set with him in equall power and honour, in relation to their se­verall Diocesses, though the power of jurisdiction be in some cases larger, in the provinciall Prelate, Nemo no­strum Episcopum se Episcoporum esse dicit, Augustinus contra Donat. lib. 4. cap. 1. neque tyranni­co terrore ad obsequendi necessitatem, collegas suas adigit: so that per accidens, the impoverishing of the Clergie in Henry the eight, when it seemed in the eye of some too rich for the Civill State, did this good, to preserue them from an Oligarchie; even as to take so much bloud away in a plurisie, as to bring a man to a deepe consumption, is a probable preservatiue against dying of a burning feaver. So that alteration of this State is not much to be feared, in respect they haue no reason to alter it; and withall it is not easily altered, if they had this or any other ground to doe it. For an Aristocracie in it selfe conside­red, is a government of a most constant, continuing con­stitution, especially, when it is mixed and tempered with a Monarchy. For the reason of its constancie is not onely the slownesse of the motion, either to augmentation or diminution, like a great engine moving with many joynts, in which poynt a Monarch will much advantage in advancing & setting faster forward, if not their delibe­rations, yet their determinations; and with ease and [Page 25] speed stay all their errors and declinings, while they are but in the breedings, beginnings, and begettings; but then also the force of their factions (which breaking out, are the common ruine of Aristocracies) will be abated, as it may be seene in the Spartane and Venetian States, opposed to the Athenian and Florentine. For these had an Aristocracie without a Monarchie, and were continually tossed with seditions and factions. As that long lasting faction of the Guelfes and Gibilines, which could never be fully taken away, but by the ruine of one partie, when as the Venetians their neighbours (whose Duke was then not a Simulachrum imperij) kept the faction out of their common-wealth, though they did declare themselues sometimes on one side, and sometimes on another, lest they should haue beene hated of all, as negligent neutrals; but they did not nourish the faction amongst themselues, but maintained it in other Countries, as they would doe warres. But the State of Millaine could never be free from it, vntill it was extinguished by Francisco Sforza, Paulu [...] hist. lib (who was a free Prince, though an vsurper) so that the mixture of a Monarchy, and the predominancie in an Aristocraticall State, doth not onely make it actiuely more able to offence, but more passiuely powerfully de­fensiue, not onely by preventing preservations from do­mestick dangers, but also by recovering it out of them. And our present State Ecclesiasticall is thus mixed. Bellar summ [...] cap. 3. (for I doe not vrge a strict Aristocracie; [...] (as Aristotle) and therefore hath the best meanes of conservation in respect of the forme [...]. And it hath one more prevalent preservatiue in the Optimates them­selues, which is, that they are strongly disposed to this kinde of government, not onely by being of quiet con­templatiue natures, but also Academicall Colledge go­vernment, which doth first possesse them and fully please them, is Aristocraticall, having the proper ayme of that [Page 26] forme of government;Arist. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 28. [...], discipline according to law, is the end of that forme of government. And they then that ayme at that, are most likely to preserue it, by persevering in their intentions; when as others that will devise new platformes, and platforme discipline, and will seeme wiser than the lawes, doe suddenly subvert or disturbe this most safe and setled forme of government.Thucydides l. 3. Witnesse the Athenians and the Florentines, who being of a stirring over-actiue temper, and alwayes doing, though it were to the vndoing of things well done, changed this forme of State seven times, which corrupting transmutations, I hope Ma­chivell their Countryman doth not call and commend vn­der the termes of reformation,Machivellus lib 3. c. 10. and reduction to their primatiue principles, without he will grant their prime originall order, to be raysed out of confounded confusi­ons. When as the Venetians, who haue beene calme and cold, and constant in provident proceedings, haue kept to the same forme without any fundamentall alterations, and that because they will be ruled by lawes; whereas the Florentine is so overweeningly wise, that he thinkes he should Emperour-like rule and make lawes [...].Arist. Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 11. So that Bodinus judgement of them, and the Neo­politans is true; and approues him to be a most rationall statist;Bodinus de repub. l. 5. c. 1. Dignos se esse imperio singuli arbitrentur ad populare imperium, magis quàm Optimatum inclinati. But suppose this government should be disordered, it is easiliest re­formed againe, which is a point of very great safety, it may be done without any stirrs of tumults, and speedily, for it hath not that power to resist authority, which the other two formes haue; and that because it vseth not the meanes they doe to procure it. For the Monarchy of the Church of Rome, and the Democraticall discipline, stirre vp the vulgar, and rely and rest vpon them for assistance, and defence, and therefore they endeavour to wooe and [Page 27] win their hearts, that they may vse their hands and pur­ses: yet they doe it divers wayes. As the Romanists, a­mongst many other wayes, they get into their hearts at their eares by auricular confessions, they hold them by their eares, and by their eyes; they fascinate their fond phantasies with superstitious ceremonies, exquisitely in­tricate, full of mysticall and magicall mazes, broached by fancie, continued and countenanced by fables, consi­sting in the massie materiality of bodily exercise, as may be seene in the austerity and State of an Austrian penance, or in a Pontificall procession, where all is done with such concealed secrecie and silence, that nothing is prostituted to be polluted by the vnsanctified view of the vulgar. Thus by feare mixed with delight in superstition, they can leade them as they list, and engage them in their quar­rels, and bequeath to them their dangers they haue pulled vpon themselues. The Disciplinarians are not onely en­deered to them, for the forme and frame of their govern­ment, and for their novelty, but they make vse of super­stition also to hold them, and to haue them at their beck; but in a course cleane contrary to the other, for they vn­doe all the other haue done, in point of ceremony, with­out consideration, whether it be good or bad and that out of a superstitious rage, as the other did out of feare: (for superstition is grounded vpon either of those passions.) And as their feare was mixed with pleasure in the end, so theirs is mixed with profit, when in the destroying of superstition they enrich themselues with the spoiles, and saue charges in ornaments. Which profanesse of theirs, is in some respects worse than their superstition, and it many times ends in Atheisme. For though they were con­secrated after a false manner, yet they were dedicated and devoted to the true God, and should not be profaned to common vses, but sanctified by a new and true consecrati­on, as well as the Churches wherein they were. Thus [Page 28] those formes of Church-government haue power to withstand the reforming rod of authority. But our pre­sent State vseth no such meanes to stand out a rebellion, because if it offend, it rather proceeds out of weaknesse than wickednesse, from scholasticall indiscretions, that deserue rather pitty than punishment. For it is not likely, that they would disturbe the State, who shall certainly lose that little they haue by it, rather than get more. I find, that amongst those Prelates that haue troubled and tur­moyled kingdomes, Peters pretended successours haue only gained, by fishing in such troubled waters. And as they can haue no end worth their stirring, so their natu­rall inclination is not so perniciously pragmaticall, they are farre from the tricks of tumbling projecters, and all actions proceed either from our generall end, or particu­lar inclination; and this inclination is fortified and con­firmed, if not formed and framed by their studies, which haue a great influence into the disposition. I haue not in this discourse, entred much into the commendation of an Aristocracie in generall, preferring it before a Monar­chie, partly because I feare, lest some should serue me as Castellanus, a French Phisolophy reader (who, as I con­ceiue, was Ramus his Tutor) served his antagonist Bigo­tius. For when Francis the first was desired by some of his Nobles, to reade Bigotius his Disputations, Castellanus told his Majestie, he was an Aristotelian, and Aristotle preferred an Aristocracie before a Monarchie,Thuanus, hist. l [...]b. 6. & so tooke off the Kings affection from him. But he might be so ex­cused, because I doe not beleeue it was Aristotles judge­ment, but his policie, to disswade all others from affe­cting it, that his Master Alexander might effect it. But I did purposely forbeare it, because it was not my propo­sition, that an Aristocracie is simply a more convenient forme of State than a Monarchie; but that this Aristocra­cie is more convenient for this State at this time, consi­dering [Page 29] that it was received with an vniversall consent and desire of all, and hath its right according to the lawes; is most easily ruled by them, not easily nor suddenly di­sturbed or disturbing; and most easily reformed if it bee disordered: so that I may now vnde­niably conclude, that the present state Ecclesiasticall is most convenient and best a­greeing with the Civill.

THough they that sit at the tops and stearnes of States, amongst all their great and graue cares, doe little regard the opinion or censure of private men, since they are no bound to giue a reason of their lawes, no [...] an account of their actions, their admini­stration being absolute. Yet if by these lawes, privat [...] persons deserue and suffer publick punishment, not onl for offering private wrongs, but also for with-holdi [...] particular rights: surely these law-makers and Admini­strators of justice, that will not suffer injuries vnpunish­ed, will be so farre from doing wrong, though it be but to poore and private men, that they will feare, though they cannot flie the suspition of it, and be as carefull to obserue a just and geometricall proportion in the distri­bution of dues and duties. Now if private and common subjects are not onely secure from injuries, but also ac­cording [Page 44] to due desert publickly regarded, and rewarded for their particular service to the common-wealth, though their ayme be but at their owne personall and private profit; one may safely conjecture, that the pub­lick and politick parts and pillars, the distinct and setled societies of that State shall be as strongly secured from detriment by wrongs, and as freely and fully favoured by advancement in rights. Yea it may be fully presumed, where a State is so framed, that they are all vnited in one head, without dependance and subordination to each o­ther. As in a Monarchie, which with an equall impartiall proportion, giues protection, distributes rewards; when as if their vnion and communion be continued by a colla­torall relation, and mutualitie of members, their equality of power and desert would breed emulation, if not envie and indignation, and make them ingratefull to each other, if they be not injurious. [...] Arist. lib. 2. c. 12. As it is where the government is Aristocraticall, which may be seene in the envious ostra­cismes of the Athenian, Ephesian, Venetian States: Thu­cydides historicus in exilium pulsus erat, quae fortuna opti­mo cuique Optimatum Athenis accidere solet, (as Paulus Iovius saith of the Venetian common-wealth.Cicero de Orat. lib. 2.) Neminem temerè ex Optimatibus qui vel insigni virtute, vel spiritu in gerendis rebus, caeteris antecellat, potentem & clarum fieri patiuntur. Iovius Histor. lib. 1. Machi vel. dis­c [...]r. l. 1 c. 29. So that it is but a perverse and peevish para­dox in Machivell, to hold, that a princely Monarch vses to be more vngratefull, than free and popular States, when as they either returne malice and mischiefe in re­ward of singular merits; or if suspicion, which he makes one ground of ingratitude, doe not make them, at least to suspend them by a relegation; yet avarice, which is his other ground, will make them really ingratefull, though formally they pretend a reward. For if they giue any thing, it will not be worth the taking, in statu populari & liberis civitatibus, praemia liberalitatis plus habent honoris [Page 45] quàm vtilitatis; they bestow nothing but vaine, vanishing,Bodi [...] pub [...] empty, and aërie titles, which are blowne vp, blowne out, and blowne away with the breath and voyce of the vulgar that gaue them, so that they doe him that is grati­fyed no right and reall good:Aris [...] 2. ca [...] [...]; it is not gratifying to giue things that are contemptible, for no man will confesse that hee hath neede of them, but these toyish titles doe men more harme then their ingratitude could. For titles without proportionable estates; doe not onely fall vnder the miserable succour of other mens pittie, but are also a temptation to provoke all men to contemne them. But one maine reason of this difference in rewarding is, that Aristocracies respect themselues in it, when as a Monarch to whom all giue due and loyall respects, doth powerfully protect and royally reward with respect to all. But as all our moderne Monarchies are distinguished into socie­ties, as in some Kingdomes there are fiue States;Thesa [...] Apotel as in Denmarke, France, and in Brittaine three, which as they are subordinate and inferiour one to another, so the su­preame Governour doth regard and respect them with different degrees of favour and care, with consideration of what consequence they are to him, and so proportions pensions, and of what need they stand of him; and so af­fords protection, searching into the severall circumstan­ces of their imployments and abilities, as of what vse they are in point of necessitie, vtilitie, and honour. Now all these three States are necessary, profitable, and for ho­nour of the Prince, but not equally at any time, nor con­stantly at all times; neither in respect of peace or warre, domestique or forraine: so that as one state doth make it selfe more necessary in relation to an extraordinary time of neede, so another may be more profitable in the conti­nuall supplying of ordinary expences: and the third may bee more for the honour of a King, both in ordinary and [Page 46] extraordinary actions. Now a King that preferres his honour before his profit, at all times will more respect that state which stands strongest for his honour at all times, then that which is more profitable at all times; so will hee more esteeme that which certainely supplies his ordinary continuall charges, then that which may bee more necessary, si coelum ruat, vpon an extraordinary vn­looked for occasion: because wisedome is not imployed in preventing, and providing against what may be in pos­sibility, but against what is likely in probabilitie: so that in the naturall body though there bee more continuall in­tercourse and mutuation of needfull supplies reciprocally betwixt the head and the heart, especially from the heart: yet those externall members that are nearest vnited to the head, haue more externall honour, as the eyes, the eares: so in the body politique, there is a constant interchange of succours and supplies betweene the state Civill and Ec­clesiasticall,His Majesties instructions to the Bishops. 1626. yet the state of the Nobilitie especially taken for the Councell, is of highest assistance, which are as it were the eyes and eares of the King in publique provi­dence and intelligence, [...]. Zetzes Histor. Clibias. 1. (as Dion Chrysostomus) [...].

These principall Peeres that are so closely vnited to the head, that they communicate with it in the most se­cret and serious advisings, deservedly enjoy the fairest fortunes and favours; for it is great reason that Kings should heape and bestow vpon the watch-towers of the state the greatest and highest honours in the state: that as they are nearest, so they may be dearest, being his right trusty and well beloved Councellours. And their im­ployment is no more immediately eminent then the trust of it troublesome and dangerous.

§ 2 And the next state in high estimation with Chri­stian Protentates, and with many the most esteemed in all respects is their Clergie, the state Ecclesiasticall; vpon [Page 47] which they haue heaped favours to the very exhausting of their treasures.Tac [...] lib. 2 Imperium amore religionis semetipsum exhausisse, &c. I am not able to reach the reason in point of state, of that extraordinary extravagant large liberali­tie: but thus much I am able to compasse and conceiue, and shall endeavour to make it plaine; that whatsoeuer right and reason any King in Europe hath had for this 400 yeares to vphold his Clergie, and conferre favours and honours vpon it; our present supreame head of our Civill state hath all that right, and more reason to bee as royally indulgent to our present state Ecclesiasticall, as none can deny: but as he that hath chiefty of power over the whole body of the Common-wealth, may rightly and justly fa­vour, bestow rewards, priviledges and power vpon any publique societie, or private person in the same: so none will affirme that all that haue supreame power haue the same equalitie of right, to endow with priviledges, or in­rich with rewards; because that all doe grant that all Kings haue not Dominion in the same equall altitude and latitude, and so cannot so highly advance in priviledges, least they surmount their petty prerogatiue: nor so largely giue them power and revenewes, lest their extention shorten their owne. And the grounds of this inequalitie are diverse, in handling of which I will neither follow Machivell, nor Iunius Brutus; because I finde them to runne into two extreames, the one granting it to all out of the loosenesse of a wanton wit; the other denying it to all, being carried by the stream of innumerous particular au­thorities; & that because, as the other wanted conscience, so he wanted experience: or rather because Machivell li­ved when all Princes in Italie claimed and vsurped equall and full power, and so writ what they did, not what they should doe; and Brutus might endeavour to diminish the power of all, because he would not haue the French King haue so much, which he might thinke too much for the [Page 48] present: if hee considered it with the times before Lewis the eleventh, wherein as the Peeres and Parliaments had too much, so the Kings had too little: so that their diffe­rence of Dominion is not according to that fullnesse Prin­ces can make it when they are once in possession of a King­dome; nor according to that diminution wherewith dis­loyall subjects impaire it, when they threaten and raise a rebellion; but it is according to the severall meanes where­by they attaine or obtaine their Kingdome. Now all su­preame Dominion in a Monarchie is attained by conquest or succession, or obtained by election: Kings that come to it by the right of conquest may haue as much power as they will take; they make their owne Charters: those that come to it by succession haue as much power as their ancestours, accepting of such lawes as they finde; those that haue it by bequest,Cujacius observ. lib. 7. cap. 7. and are adopted heires (for adoption is good by last will and testament) haue the same right that a naturall successour hath, if the adoption stand good.Hottoman. il­lustr. quaest. 1. As the Kingdome of France was giuen to Edward the third by Charles the sixt: but those that are called to it onely by election, their power is restrained and curbed with cautionary conditions, and stands limited by them.

Now if all these haue great power in their supreame government, by any one of these rights to attaine a Kingdome; surely hee that hath it by all these rights con­joyned, hath more power then any hath that is intitu­led to it but by one,Brissonius de Regno Persico. lib. 1. especially by election. But our pre­sent gratious Soveraigne hath it by lineall succession from an absolute Conquerour, which was confirmed to his fa­ther of pious memory, by the Nuncupatiue will of his sacred predecessor,Anno Iacobi: A just recogni­ [...]on of an vn­doubted succes­sion. who then adopted him, and all was made sure vnto him by the electiue assent of the supreame Nobility, without any crosse-course conditions, (as falls out) when the souldiers or people elect. And as it is [Page 49] plaine that hee holds by all these, so I doe conceiue I could make it appeare, that most Kings in Christendome hold primarily and principally but by one of these, and that of least power. But that I am loath to touch the ticklish and tender titles of forraine Potentates; neither will I speake any thing of them as their states now stand, but onely in a word shew what anciently they were: for in my poore judgement their government may bee as good and lawfull, if they haue had the power and oppor­tunity to cast off and free themselues from these bridles and curbes of government: for not the most limited pow­er, but the best rectified is safest both for Prince and people.

§ 3 To shew then how it was with them heretofore, and to begin with the Empire after it was translated to the Almaine. Long hath that Empire continued by the election of the high Chamber of the Septem-viri, the sea­ven selected Electors of Germany; and some of the best Emperours haue so well liked it, that they haue not onely beene willing to take the promissarie oath containing di­vers strict conditions, but haue also granted them new free Charters; and large prerogatiues; as Charles the 4. in his Bulla aurea, and so held so loose and light a hand over them, that one of the Electors, the Bishop of Ments, in the Councell at Franckford, said, the government was Aristocraticall, which might bee well taken if he meant it with reference to the Councell.Clap Arca lib. 5 Com [...] 10. [...] Gra [...] cia l. man [...] Guic hist. Iere [...] The Kingdome of France seemes not to haue beene anciently so absolute and vnre­strained as now it is, for the twelue Peeres of France, qui sunt ut in Germania principes electores, had not onely roy­all priviledges, and did not owe simple subjection, but respectiue homage; and had a regall authority in their se­verall Provinces, and the command of the chiefe forces: but also had the power, if not to elect their King, (as Nauclerus saith) and as it seemes true, because they haue [Page 50] deposed them; yet to determine, when there is no great doubt who shall succeed: and their setting alwayes vpon an heire male (which is the course of electiue state) shewes it to bee somewhat electiue; for the restraining of it to the heire male, did not primarily proceed from the Salique law, because many of their Kings haue beene Lor­raines; Hottoman. a­pollogia Catho­lica. §. 6. which Dukes, (the French Civilians say) doe not obserue, nor are vnder the Salique law: but if it bee not electiue, it seemes not to be so cleare a succession, because it is a masculine feud entayled vpon the heire male: yea the predominant extravigant power of the Parisian Par­liament seemes to intimate, that the ancient state was not so free and absolute a Monarchie; for they called in the Kings edicts, sent forth the contrary: and no appeale lay from their sentence. Contra illud tantum supplicare licet, a petition of right onely was permitted;Gymerus Com­ment. in prag. sanct. tit. de autoritate Con­ciliorum. so that this state which is most absolute of all others, seeemes to haue been anciently not so free and uncontroleable in its govern­ment, as a free Monarchie ought to be. The next is the Kingdome of Spaine, which hath of old beene so disquie­ted with the continuall incursions and invasions of the Moores and Saracens from the South, and Gothes from the North, that it hath scarce time to settle, as water tos­sed. But when it did pitch vpon the forme of a Monar­chie, it was electiue, as appeares out of the Councell of Tolledo; Con [...]il. Toletan. 5. cap. 3. Si quis ad Regiae Majestatis pervenire fastigia am­bit absque electione nobilitatis Anathema sit: yea and in their latter dayes their forme of inauguration, doth im­port and imply the same: for thus it runnes, Nos qui vale mos, tanto comme vos, y podemos mas quae vos, vos ele­gemos. Hieronymus de Blanca de Hist. [...]egamine. Rey, con estas, y estas conditiones, intra vos, y nos: yea and the Justice of Aragon hath had as much power as ever the Parliament of Paris; as in plaine, not onely in their vnlimited immunities, but also the power they vsed against the Kings edicts: as may bee seene in their writs, [Page 51] called los manifestados, y iure firmos; from which power,Idem Thua though the Inquisition haue freed the Kings since Fardi­nando: yet I doe not conceiue how that state should bee more free then before, because it is vnder the power of a tyrannicall Inquisition. So that the Kings of Spaine had done more providently in preventing their prevailing greatnesse, if wee consider their domestique freedome in government; though their advancement may advantage them to bring forraine states vnder their servitude. But it was hard to hinder them from at least so much power as they were able to take from the other, so that Tullie had no great reason to aske Atticus, (and that in Greeke as a secret,Ad A 9. ep not to bee vnderstood of any that should inter­cept his letters) [...], few doubt it, and this may bee most vnquestionable with Spaine, witnesse Naples and Millaine. These Inqiusitors are like Ephori in the Spartaine republique, whose Kings are observed to haue the most restrained power:Thu [...] for the chiefe of these Inquisitors hath a great power over the King in his owne Court. Inquisitor generalis, qui Aulam Regiam sequitur, Thes lit. cum adjunctis conciliarijs Ecclesiastici or­dinis potestatem contra ipsum Regem vsurpari potest: so that by all this it is plaine, that the Spanish Monarchie hath not long beene a free Monarchie at home. But that which makes most, to proue these states not absolute, is because an appeale will lie from any of them to the Optimates and orders of their Kingdomes, for extrema provocatio is one principle; inter summa iura imperii: Clap Arc [...] lib. In imperio tamen Germanico, (vt testantur pragmatici) ad sacram & super­nam Cameram provocatur, apud Gallos ad octo curias mato­res, apud Hispanos ad quatuor curias; even as a generall Councell is aboue the Pope being electiue. As for the other states of European Monarchies, without all question they are at this present electiue; as Poland which made their King Miecislaus send Lampartus Bishop of Craco­via [Page 52] to Pope Benedict the seaventh, vt Regem se Polonorum & posteros suos esse iuberet, Herbert. histor. Poloniae lib. 1. sed ea res propter iustas causas, ad aliquod tempus dilata fuit: yea, it was never obtained, but it still continues electiue; Moderata est principis Polo­niae potestas, Thuaenus hist. lib. 50 [...]. quia non naturae legibus in paternum regnum succedit, sed communibus suffragiis senatorii & equestris ordinis & publica exclamatione nobilitatis eligitur. Hunga­ry also is electiue, although the Spaniard hath intailed it upon the match with the Infanta, which will easily bee cut off, and suffer a recovery into the former freedome. In Hungaria liberam habent electionem, Cominaeus lib. 10. Coment. & inde ab eius morte proceri Budae conveniunt: I might shew the like of Den­marke, but no more of that, I know not how this may be taken; but I hope well, because in this I deliver onely what is licenced intelligence, even as Honorius and Theo­dosius did interdict, ne alicuius regni arcana scrutaren­tur; Guiccardino Hypomneses Polit. 106. but it was with this Proviso: Legatus tamen reversus omnia narrare debet.

§ 4 These instances are sufficient to proue that our pre­sent Prince hath most vnresistible power, and so most vn­restrained right to favour, and freely bestow immunities, priviledges, and revenewes vpon any single society, or singular person within his Dominions. Now the next thing to bee prooved is, that as hee hath more right to shew favour to what state hee will; so hee hath more reason then they all to favour his Clergie most. This government of our King is not more free in it selfe then it is freely and willingly sustained; which shewes that it is the ancient equall, and as it were the most natu­rall government of this Iland, and therefore the power is most right; because naturallized by custome when as in other Kingdomes, yea in many pettie particular states; that little power they haue improoved by force, they keepe and exercise by the same meanes. Hence it is that they dare onely trust forrainers to be their guards: as the [Page 53] French haue the Scots, and Suitzers; the Dukes of Flo­rence, the low Dutch, which choyse doth either proceed from tyranny in the Kings, or perfidiousnes in the nation, [...], as for instance,Arist. R 1. cap. the first Dukes of Florence were esteemed no lesse, for it was libell-wise written over the doore of Cosmus, De Medices (the first Duke) where he was sicke, and tooke physick, qui Medicè vivit, miserè vivit, which they vn­derstood of the Medicean tyrannie, both in respect of his feares, and their wrongs in his oppression. And in this age there were some, that would haue brought an Italian guard into France and Scotland, but it was when they a­spired to vsurpe them both;Thuan [...] lib. 23. Guisiani Italorum custodias quòd assuetis negotiis suis, non satis fiderent, adhibent, sui potiùs quàm regni, aut regis munimento; when as our Kings haue found out by long experience that to be true, which Dion Chrysostome told Trajane the Emperour,Dion Ch [...]. [...], so that they regard no guard, but the loue of the subject. But to returne: It is no small encouragement to me, before I argue it in any point, and a strong argument for me, that a sacred Sove­raigne hath and doth proue it true, in his most royall and religious practice. For I doe not beleeue, that there hath beene any Emperour, Monarch, or Potentate since Charles the first and the great, that did ever so truly and constant­ly favour, and carefully protect a poore Clergie as hee hath done. But let vs consider what great reason of this favour there is: wherein I will not search vainly into his Majesties particular reasons, for I should not be able to finde them out, because a Kings heart is not to be soun­ded and searched by a private head, that is not able to con­ceiue the heigth of their ends: but I will discourse of it a hee is our King; [...]f from a single relation, there doe arise as singular respect, surely a double portion of respect will follow a double relation. Now this Aristocraticall Cler­gie [Page 54] haue not onely relation to their Prince, as hee is a crowned King and they his lawfull subjects, but also as hee is the Lords annoynted, defender of the faith, accor­ding to his just title (as his Maiestie pleases to speake in his declaration before the Articles.) For they also are the Lords annoynted, deliuering that faith; and the Pri­mate of them, the immediate instrument of his consecra­tion; so that as by the crowning, they are by right his subiects, so this annoynting of God, superinduceth a brotherhood betwixt Kings and Bishops (as S^r Francis Bacon in his Booke to King Iames) for this relation is onely ancient in our Kings amongst the Princes of Chri­stendome; for though, as our Soveraigne is crowned by the Archbishop of Canterbury, so the Emperours when they were Kings of France, began to be annoynted and crowned by the Archbishops of Mentz, Collen, and Trier, as they were Emperours; and by the Archbishop of Rhemes, as they were Kings of France. Yet the Kings of France of the first line, at least, were not annoynted (as one of the freest Historians confesses) De la primiere Lignèe oinct ny sacre à Rhemes. Girarddu Hal­lon des affo [...] ­ [...]es l. 2. And though the Kings of Spaine are crowned by the Arch-bishop of Tolledo, the Kings of Denmarke by the Arch-bishop of Vpsale, the Kings of Polonia by the Arch-bishop of Guesire, the Kings of Hungarie by the Arch-bishop of Strigon, the Kings of Navarre by the Bishop of Pampolune, yet none of them were anciently annoynted. Now it cannot be denied, but as this reall relation doth more peculiar and appropriate the State Ecclesiastick to our King,Vid. Legibus saucti Edvardi. so it makes him not onely the supreame head and governour, but also the chiefe guide and guardian: for by it he is more than a meere Lay-man; hee is a mixt person, having supreame Ecclesiastick as well as Civill government, Reges sancto oleo vncti sunt spiritualis iurisdictionis capaces. Which sentence was applied to our King, in the time of Edward [Page 55] the third:33. Ec [...] Aide l [...] Gryme 12. §. And Guymer in his Comment on the pragma­ticall sanction of France, is peremptorie quòd Reges inun­cti non sunt meri Laici; and addes, inde Reges Angliae con­ferunt beneficia. So that by this is there some addition granted to the power of Princes over the Church. Though the old glosse vpon the Clementines avouch, quòd vnctio nil addit ad potestatem Imperatoris, which the Gre­gorian edition of the Common Law did well to dislike,Cleme [...] tit. 6. Regis. but they should haue done better, not to haue given a worse. And if it adde to their power over the Church, then as they haue more right by it, so they haue more reason from it to doe what good they please for the Clergie. So that, doe but consider the quality and quali­fications of our Kings person, to doe for his Clergie, and you will say, he hath greatest reason of any Prince. Con­sider againe the reasons on the part of the present State Ecclesiasticall, and you shall finde, that they deserue more of their Prince, than any Clergie these foure hun­dred yeares.

§. 5. But I must presuppose before that will be gran­ted, that our Monarch of great Brittaine hath not any reason to giue or bestow meanes and revenues vpon any forraine State Ecclesiasticall. No Prince hath reason to bestow [...]is free favours vpon any, over whom hee hath (for the present) no right to rule, nor hath heretofore promised it, neither by himselfe, or by his predecessours, and thereby bound himsesfe to farther and favour them. So that, though the Romane Clergie doth claime and cla­mour for revenues and priviledges from our King, yet as they haue no right to claime them, so they haue no reason to expect them: for they are so farre from being his de­serving domestick subiects, that they are his deadly ene­mies, though they be imbred and homebred. They haue not then any right; for neither our K. nor any of his law­full predecessours, did ever binde themselues to any such [Page 56] performances. Later & better learned writers of the Ro­mish faction, finding by the carefull and curious examina­tion of sundry passages in infinite interpreters, how hard a thing it was, to proue their vniversall supremacie in temporalibus, by direct evidence out of Gods word, re­solue to proue it by Charter-grant, and priviledge from Princes pieties, as Augustinus Steucus (Librarian to Pope Paul the third) sets downe the claime the Pope laid to all the kingdomes in Christendome, grounding all from the particular grants from the Kings, but especially Boniface the eights letter of Demands. As for instance, from Con­stantine the first and the best, one Phocas the first and the worst, from the vniversall gifts of those vniversall Emperours, they ground a generall right in all king­domes. The Bononian Canonists deale cunningly, and seeme to deale ingenuously, playing the sophisters more than the sycophants in this point, discoursing of this do­nation of Constantine; for they lay it downe as a presup­posed presumption in the Law: That there is such a true deed, notwithstanding there be no mention made of it in any part of the sincere Civill Law. Sed quae notabiliter fiunt, specialiter notanda sunt. But they never question it de facto, but enquire quo iure, and, an sit revocabile; and since they doe not full affirme, that he gaue it vp [...] will not so much as shew the falsitie of it, but referre all to the most judicious and modestly moderate amongst them. But for Phocas his grant,Cov [...]u vias [...]. quest. c. 1 mem. 9. Decius Consil. 130. a faithlesse vsurping tyrant, I leaue it to be judged of, by those that chuse to measure claimes and titles, by the line of equity, and not by the Last of ambition. Yet thus I will inferre against it, that a Charter granted as this was, chiefly vpon a ground of cunning, with a purpose to maintaine a plot, by partie, which was vndertaken and begun by fraud, might haue beene after revoaked by himselfe, or anulled or repealed by his successours. And farther I say, that though this [Page 57] grant were authentick in all points, yet the Popes could haue no right to this kingdome by it, because this king­dome was excluded from the care, protection and pro­vidence of the Romane Empire, neere two hundred yeares before Phocas. For Aelius L. Lieutenant for Va­lentimanus in the parts of France, Poly [...] cap. 1 sent word to the Brit­tains, that they were to looke for no more ayde from the Empire, which was fallen into faction, scarce able to sup­port it selfe, being thus abandoned, all lawes did free them from duty and dependance.Baron nal. 4 But to make these ge­nerall grants the stronger, they pretend particular grants from our owne Kings, as from Ina King of the West Saxons, that was indeed religious, and from King Iohn, that was impious, as well sans foye, as his title was sans terre (as the King of France, Math 1216. Philip the second said) Io­hannes nunquam fuit verus Rex; neither of these binde our State; for [...]he Peter-pence contributed to Rome by Ina, are called in the lawes of Conatus, Larga Regis be­nignitas: and in the abstract (which is the best of the confessours and conquerours decrees) Regis Eleemosynae, which imports not due nor duty, but charity, and the Popes to be his beads-man, not the King to be his ho­mager. There were many manifest nullities in King Iohns grant, for he had no right to hold the Kingdome, and if he had held it by right, yet he could not grant any thing in prejudice of the whole State, without the consent Regni vniversitatis, (as Mathew Paris tearmeth the Parliament) and a third mullitie is in the force of the grant, where, whatsoever is passed in the body of the grant, is resumed by this proviso in the conclusion,Math. ibidem Salvis nobis & haeredibus nostris, Iustitiis liberalitatibus & regalibus nostris: which being luckily inserted salues all, and makes it absolutely voyd. But the maine grant which Baronius relies vpon, is a donation from Ethelulphus King of the West Saxons which seemes very lawfull, if it were (as he saith) salubri [Page 56] [...] [Page 57] [...] [Page 58] consilio Episcoporum & Principum, Baron. Annal. Anno. 854. but yet that deed (if wee free it from being forged) was voyd, if you doe but consider amongst many other things, the incompetencie and incapacitie of the person, to whom the deed was made. Now Baronius is peremptory, that it was made to the immediate successour of Leo the fourth, which accor­ding to all the truest writers of the Popes liues, was Iohn the eight, which they conclude was a woman fu vna donna natio de Inghilterra che vacata là sede Apostolica, Petro de Mexia della silva cap, 9. per la morte di Leon quarto, fu eletta per sonno Pontifice di Roma (as Petro de Mexia) and Boccacio de las mugeres illustres: the King might perhaps haue done much for his country woman, if he had knowne it, but shee was not capable to receiue such a deed to her vse, and therefore, the Iurists haue reason to make this question,Hottoman. quaest. illust. 17. Vtrum acta Iohannis octavi in papatu rata esse debent: And if what shee did was voyd, what was done for her i [...] not firme, being it was given, supposing shee was capable. So it is plaine, that this engine is not able to vphold this claime, being so loose, and hanging together in the joynts like sick mens dreames, shewing their inconsiderate inconstant humours, their proofes being as weake as their imaginati­on is strong, all standing vpon slender supposals, parti­cular interest, making partiall. But they haue another ground for a presumption of their right, because some poore oppressed Princes haue desired to hold their king­domes from them, as some vsurpers sought to obtaine dominions by their gift, who depose Kings, that they may dispose of their kingdomes. But this is nothing, and they stand not vpon it, but when they haue nothing else to say. I doe not by this goe about to deny, that our Kings haue beene bountifull Benefactors to the Roman Clergie, but this onely I stand vpon, that they haue no reason to continue so still, since they were never lawfully bound to it. Neither doe I deny, that any Prince should conferre fa­vours [Page 59] vpon some forraine Ecclesiasticall State with this caution, that he be not prejudiced by the kindnes, & may haue so good vse of their thankefulnesse: As suppose any Prince should be called into Germany, or Italy, Dies nu [...] transit, [...] aliquod p [...] fecerit, s [...] vt Aera [...] non eve [...] (vt de Se [...] Lampr. or any other kingdom, by an oppressed State Ecclesiasticall, that Prince may doe royally to invest them into their former spiritu­all possessions, and yet never impoverish or inslaue his owne kingdome to them, and also binde them to him for protection. Thus did Pipine, Charles the great, Lodovi­cus pius, they releeved the Roman Clergie, and bestowed very much vpon them in large territories, but they gaue them nothing in France, but onely what they recovered for them in Italy: it is then evident,Guicc li hist. Ita [...] that our King hath no reason to bestow honour or power, revenues or pri­viledges vpon any forraine State Ecclesiasticall; and it is as plaine, that he hath the greatest reason of any Prince in Christendome to bestow them all vpon his owne do­mestick Clergie.

§. 6. The Nobility and the Clergie are the prime pil­lars of a Monarchie, and the Communaltie is the ground whereon they stand. And this they well know that intend the ruine of it, for they will be sure to strike at these two props, knowing that then it will fall, and the ground and foundation remaine to them to erect a-new; (as Ball a Masse-Priest, Chaplain to Wat Tyler, advised his chieftane to destroy all the Clergie and Nobility; so Garnet did the Traytors in the powder-plot, (as the Earle of Northamp­ton well observeth:) and therefore Philip the second of Spaine, who was seldome in an errour about the vphold­ing or inlarging a Monarchie, advises his sonne Philip the third, to stick fast to the Clergie, los Clerigos amigo, as I haue beene; but yet so, as you disregard not the No­bility, otherwise they will hate you, and envie them, and ruine all. Now if the Kings of Spaine haue reason so high­ly to favour their Clergie, as to feare, least their kindnesse [Page 60] to them, should kindle indignation in the Nobility; surely our Prince hath more reason so highly to succour his Clergie, as that it may not be the object of the contempt of the vulgar. For the Clergie of Spaine and all the Ro­mish faction are not simply subject to them, but deny Ci­vill obedience alwayes to their Prince, where Canonicall obedience commands the contrary, or priviledges aboue it; when as our Clergie, are as true subjects as any State, & renounce all obedience to any other Potentate. So that this hearty adherence to his Majestie, is one reason, yea they bestow all their labours in Gods service, onely in dominions expect favour from none but his highnesse; and they are more beneficiall to their King than any Clergie in Christendome to his natiue Prince, or any State in this kingdome to the Crowne. For though the reve­nues of other Clergies, as of Spaine, be infinitely aboue ours,Nicholaus Ol­ [...]ev [...] de regno Hispaniae. as one of their Historians, Opes Ecclesiasticorum paenè aequales sunt secularium vnà cum Regis. Yet they are not so constantly beneficiall to the King, but to the Pope: and if the King get any good sum or subsidie out of them, it is either la cruzada, or tenths called el excusado, gran­ted to him by the Popes indulgence; or if he cannot pro­cure a Bull of facultie, he must get all they giue by stri­ving and force (as Cardinall de Ossat in his letter to Henry 4.Ossatns epist. 274. of France speakes of Philip the thirds sacriledge.) Rex Hispaniae omnem argenteam supellectilem Ecclesiarum & Ecclesiasticorum sacrilega manu vsurpare tentat: when as our Clergie, which haue not the tyth of the tenth part of that meanes is not only now and then profitable in small matters. And if Francis 1. beleeved that for a great kindnes from Pope Leo the tenth, in their conference at the inter­view, to haue the tenths of Ecclesiasticall livings in France for one yeare;Guicc. hist. lib. 12. as Guicciardine in a judicious sleighting of the favour: Promes se il Pontifice, al re dar­gli faculta, di riscuotere, per vn anno la decima delle cheise, [Page 61] del Reame, de Francia that the King tooke the proposall into consideration, and communicated it to his Councell; who thought it a great benefit if he might haue them, non secundum antiquum valorem beneficiorum, Concord [...] liae tit. d libus. but as they are improved; surely a farre greater benefit it is to haue the tenth every yeare: Subsides most yeares, and first fruites the first yeare, and that not according to the present value which is much fallen from the ancient revenewes, but ac­cording to the Popes bookes, in most, when as Ecclesia­sticall preferments are abated halfe in halfe. So that as all other states are more charged, so their revenewes are im­proved accordingly; but the meanes of the Clergie is much impaired, and yet their charges increased in many things; in all things keepe the old rate, so that notwith­standing the poverty (as S Nicholas Bacon at the Coun­cell table) we haue no reason to exact or expect any sub­sidie from the spiritualtie, who are so exhausted; yet it is constantly the most beneficiall state of this Realme to the Crowne, both in ordinary and extraordinary revenewes. In these two considerations amongst many, wee see they deserue much, and there is one thing that makes it more safe for our King to bestow greater honour and priviled­ges vpon them, then any other Prince; which is, because he hath not the reason to suspect them of ambitions aspiring to a Monarchie, since they haue cast off their Church Mo­narchies, as the Romans never suspected any of a tyran­nicall vsurpation, after they had by one consent cast out the Kings: so that though the Pope seeme to favour the Clergy vpon good reason, yet our King hath as much, and this reason more then the Pope hath, for he hath not onely all the power of jurisdiction the Pope had over them,1. Eliz. but also the revenewes also the Pope had from them: and yet is without feare and danger of being rebelled against by them, or dis-throned. But in one thing it is more capa­ble of a royall Potentates bounty and protection, then any [Page 62] forraine Clergie is, in respect of its owne Civill supreame head, or any state in our owne Kingdome is of our King; and that is, that it is so poore and obvious to injuries, that it will make the ordinary bounty of a Prince magnificent, and make his power long, and delight to protect such an innocent state, being neither able to resist, nor strong to endure and suffer wrongs: thus from the power of Dominion passeth the in­fluence of protection.

HE that hath publique power and an oppor­tunitie to doe a great good turne for en­dearing a private friend that depends vpon him, will haue much adoe to for­beare to doe it, though the weale publique suffer some detriment by it. Yet if his friend doe so much tender the publique good, that he will not desire any thing to the prejudice of it; surely then the publique person out of his engagements and respects to the publique good, will leaue off his present purpose and pleasure his favorite in some things that may doe him good, and the Common-wealth no harme. Even so our supreame Regent of great Brittaine, hath great and tran­scendent power, and never wants an opportunitie to doe good, & bestow favours vpon the well deserving state of the Clergie; and it were impossible for him to hold his royall bountifull hand, if this Clergie should not in all its [Page 64] petitions; consider the publique good, apprehending it selfe as a member of the Civill state. And hence it is, that though the King hath more power then I beleeue was ever tried, or can be defined, to doe his Clergie good, yet they haue not any thing conferred vpon them; which is not according to the lawes, customes, and liberties of this Common-wealth. All that the state Ecclesiasticall en­joyes, belongs to it as to a principall member of the body politique; and is derived to it from the supreame Civill head on which it doth depend, and in whom it is vnited to the Civill state. It is no debasing or derogation to a spiritualitie, to bee thus subject to the Dominion of a sa­cred Soveraigne; for though servitude according to the Civilians proceed not from the law of nature, but of Na­tions, or at lest from nature corrupted, (as the Schooles) yet orderly subjection and superioritie proceed from the instinct of pure nature: for in Heaven there is order a­mongst the blessed Angels, and in the state of innocency there was superiority, not onely betwixt man and all other creatures, but also betwixt man and woman; and had they lived in Paradise till there had beene father and sonne, there should haue beene Patria potestas, or else the fifth Com­mandement is not morall: and when there had beene many families, there must necessarily haue beene Regiae potestas, or else the best and most happy life must haue beene without the greatest happinesse of life, which is or­der. Now the superiority of our Prince over his Clergie is not an enslaving tyranny, but a sweet and a lawfull So­veraigntie, which government as it is due, so it is our du­ty to obey it; for government and obedience are relatiues of equall extent. And as it is no disparagement to the state Ecclesiasticall to bee subject to our supreame Magi­strate, so it is great benefit to the Clergie, and a satisfacti­on to the Laytie, that all the rights and respects that they enjoy or desire, are deriued from that Prince whom both so willingly obey.

[Page 65]§ 2 All that the state Ecclesiasticall doth enjoy or claime, may bee reduced to these two heads; of power, and of honour: and they deriue these from one sole su­preame governour, who is fully qualified by his personall eminent authority, to transferre and conferre these rights and respects to them, and vpon them: for as these two the power and honour of the Clergie are inseparablie de­rived from the supreame Soveraigne, then in being, and not communicable to any other state: so the particular powers and regalities by which they are more especially conveyed; are inseparably and incommunicably appro­priated to his royall person. As for instance, the power of the state of the Clergie is originally derived from his Ecclesiasticall supremacie, the honours from his lawes and royall prerogatiue. All Kings I confesse haue not Ec­clesiasticall government, and that because many giue up their right; some know it not, as many of our Kings for many yeares were bereaved of it, in whole, or in some principall parts, by giving and granting to the Pope an inch in breadth with them, and he taking an ell in height aboue them. But when the first defender of the faith Henry the eighth was weary of the weight of that intol­lerable vsurpation, especially when he perceived that the Popes ambition soared vpon the wings and winde of the spirituall supremacie, to a temporall superioritie; The King like Iulius Caesar, that he might fully recover into his power the temporalitie, potestatem Pontificiam, Iacob origi [...] §. 9. cum Cae­saria potentia coniunxit: hee resumed the Ecclesiasticall power, finding that it was impossible in the course of the moderne policie of the Popes, to bee supreame agent in temporall affaires, while they were the highest in spiri­tuall government; especially since these powers cannot rest really divided in a Monarchie, though they bee really distinct in a Monarch being a mixt person. So that the statutes in the vicesimo quintò of Henry the eighth, and [Page 66] primo of Elizabeth, which determinately set downe this power of supremacy, are not lawes inductory of a new, but declaratorie of the ancient authoritie of our Prince, with the solemne signification of their reas-sumption. And our sacred Soveraigne doth not alone take this power for his right, but many other Potentates in Christendome that haue not so much reason: As the Kings of France, Spaine, Thesaurus Po­lit. Apoteles. 50. Guiceiardino hist. lib. 4. Denmarke, Poland, Hungarie, and Sicily: which three last states haue more nearer dependance upon the Pope then any in Europe; for Sicily hath beene held of him as a spirituall feud, as Poland and Hungarie were both in one Popes dayes. Benedict the seaventh converted from Paganisme,Herbert. histor. Poloniae lib. 2. cap. 7. and one would thinke, and so it seemes wholly at the Popes disposall, especially in spirituall af­faires. Yet in Sicily the Kings of Spaine doe not onely claime supremacie of over-seeing, but also superintenden­cie in doing in Ecclesiasticall employments;Baron. Anal. Anno 1209. and the Kings of Poland, whose power is moderated by the limits and conditions of an election;Thuanus hist. lib. 56. Archiepiscopos, Episcopos coenobi­archas dicunt, suoque arbitrio eligunt: and the Kings of Hungarie doe vse the same power, and with as much rea­son (in a Canonists opinion) as we doe, for though they cannot de iure, yet, Reges Angliae & Hungariae conferunt beneficia & privilegi [...] Papae. Guymer. Com­ment. prag. sanct. tit. de In­natis. The Kings of France haue al­wayes beene at defiance with the Pope for this power, re­newing continually pragmaticall sanctions in defence of it, especially in the time of Charles the seaventh, there­fore called Carolina sanctio: Duarenus pro libertate Eccles. Gallicanae. §. 4. which was of that force by vertue of that approbation of the free Councell of Basile, that it curbed and casheered the Popes power, causing them to impeach it by appealing from it almost in all causes; which Pius the second perceiving, sollicited Lewis the eleventh the sonne of Charles, to abolish and repeale that sanction,Concordat. Gal­liae Leonina Con­stit. being enacted in a seditious schismaticall conventicle, which he well approved for a generall Coun­cell [Page 67] when hee was a private Aeneus Sylvius, Secretarie to Fredericke the third. The King for the present called it in, but his wisdome presently found the mischiefe, and rewarded Cardinall Balve very well for vrging him to it; as the Popes Legat,Prot [...] gis ad cil. [...] apud histor Phili lib. 9 Conc [...] Guic [...] hist. [...] Rex Cardinalem Balvam in carcerem detrusit ob detrimentum, consilio suo emergens; and with so much displeasure, that Philip de Comynes saith, Cardi­nalis Balvensis carcerem horrendum excogitavit in quem in­clusus primùm erat & quatuordecem annos detentus, non ob­stante Pontifice Romano. The Kings of France were ever after stout in the defence of that sanction, till Francis the first; in his interview with Leo the tenth, did remit the force of it in the Concordata Galliae; which made his seri­ous Secretarie Budaeus say, Palladium Galliae proditum esse. Budae lib. 5 The Kings of Spaine in Casteile haue some limited spiritu­all power, by a late priviledge of Adrian the sixth, gran­ted to Charles the fifth; but when they see their time,Mar [...] della they take so much as shall serue their turne; as Philip the second seised vpon the temporalls of the Archbishoprick of Tolledo, (the Bishop Caranza being apprehended for suspicion of new heresie) and when Sixtus Quintus sent to him to vndertake a warre against England, and told him that he would remit to him all the revenewes that arose of that Bishopricke, sede vacante prudentissimus princeps re­spondet se nil de suo Pontifici largiri: Thu [...] lib. 7 & though at home his power is but what hee pleases to take, yet in other of his territories it is lawfully as large as another Princes; as in Burgundy and Belgia he hath the same right the King of France once had, as Charles the fifth made a statute of Mortmanie. Nullis personis Ecclesiasticis, vel locis sacris licet vllam rem immohilem, Thes lit. 4 absque principis licentia accepta­re, vel habere. And Philip the second his sonne publishing the Councell of Trent in the Low-Countries, did not let it passe in all points with the full strength of an Ecclesia­sticall law, but restrained it with an expresse clause of spe­ciall [Page 68] privision, that it should in no wise prejudice or di­minish any priviledge the King enjoyed touching posses­sary judgements or Ecclesiasticall livings, or concerning nomination therevnto.Boter. Heroic. quast. lib. 1. But I will not now enquire whe­ther our Prince hath such a supreame power iure positivo Pontificio; I am sure it is iure divino Apostolico: and supposing such a power, I will for more distinct pro­ceeding, consider the severall streames and strings of this Ecclesiasticall power; and how they flow and are fastned to the head and top of Soveraigntie, paralleling them in the severall parts and points of this honour, discovering how they are annexed to these powers, and how they arise, are raised and stand by his Maiesties lawes and Re­gall prerogatiue.

§ 5 All power Ecclesiasticall is either power of order, or of jurisdiction,Durandus de o­rigine jure Civ. conclus. 2. and both these depend vpon the power of supremacie. For though these powers of order and jurisdiction be immediately derived from Christ the mi­sticall head of the Church, in respect of their institution, commission, internall qualification, and deputation to per­sons to performe them; yet they are mediately derived from our Prince, the ministeriall head of our particular Church, in relation to their execution. For the power of order cannot bee lawfully exercised in these dominions, without the licence and permission from the power of jurisdiction; which power is originally derived from the Kings dominion,1. Eliz. cap. 1. over Ecclesiasticall causes and per­sons. So that it is plaine in generall, that they are de­pendant on his Crowne and supremacie: To omit the jurisdiction in foro conscientiae, that depends vpon the power of order, I will for a more particular view of this dependent derivation, consider the severall pro­per acts and workes of this Ecclesiasticall supremacie, which (as I conceiue) may be reduced to these foure. The first worke is reformation of the Church in Do­ctrine, [Page 69] manners, and ceremonies. The second is convoca­tions of Councels and Synods, for the reformation. The third is promulgation of the lawes and edicts, proceeding either from his Highnes pleasure in publick declarations, or the Canons & constitutions decreed or confirmed in his Councels. The 4^th is, in receiving of appeales, & giving definite, determinate decisions, restitutions, and deprivati­ons belonging to causes & persons Ecclesiasticall. Now all these acts haue their effects in the power of jurisdiction; for the reforming power of it, is ordinarily & perpetually derived to Archbishops & B. de iure, to Arch-deacons and Deanes, de consuetudine, to be executed by them in their Provinciall, Trienniall, and Annuall visitations: but it is principally restrained to the correction of manners. This power is extraordinarily ad tempus granted to the Church representatiue in Convocation. It is not turned into a running regencie, rolling round to every particu­lar Presbyter, though it be not an ordinarie standing court, the calling of which is the second worke of supre­macie. To this Convocation thus called, there is given power and licence, to deliberate of, to order, and doe all such things as shall concerne the setled continuance of the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England, obtai­ning his Majesties royall consent in the proceeding and determinations (as it is plaine in his Highnesse declarati­on.) And the lawes they make, take their first force from the worke of his promulgation. But before I proceed any farther, I must of necessity take a little time (though to some it may seeme an impertinent parenthesis) rejoycing­ly to consider the gratious countenance, our pious Prince so freely shewes to this discountenanced, disabled house of Convocation. Little did any thinke, (no not that able absolute States-man, the last Lord-Chancellour, though wished it) that his Majestie could haue beene so fully and faithfully informed of the ancient power and priviledges [Page 70] of it, as to thinke of restoring them, seeing not onely in the opinion of the people, but also in the practice of the lower house of Parliament it hath beene long dismem­bred from that high Court, and lost all the power and priviledges as escheated to the same, insomuch, that it is questioned by some, whether ever it was a member of the Parliament or no. But it seemes his Majestie did soone apprehend it to be an essentiall part of it, and vpon a short search discovered, that though heretofore it was a member, whose nerues were wrested, distorted, distra­cted and racked from its naturall head, by extention to a forraine: yet there was no dissolutio continui (as the Phy­sitians speake) from the head, and therefore not from the collaterall members; and seeing it was but a discontented discontinuance that did cause it to be suspected and sus­pended, it being now againe contracted and knit most firmely to the head, is vnited as closely to the members, & may safely exercise and enjoy all the power and privi­ledges that did of right belong vnto it, with the Parlia­ment; for though it was no reason, that it should haue the priviledges of the Parliament, when it was distracted from it, and assembled without it by vertue of the Popes Legates writ, and so the power and purpose of it was for­raine, and justly came within the compasse of a Praemu­nire, for the Clergie then was no true member of the common-wealth, and so the Convocation cut off from the Parliament; yet when as it is now assembled with it by the same writ of the King, and the Parliament is not compleate without it, being one of the three Orders, and that State which makes it haue competent power in mat­ters Ecclesiasticall, that it is not a meere temporall Court, and that in the judgement of those that had least reason so to esteeme it; for wee finde 1. Philip. & Mariae, c. 8.1 Phil. & Mar. c. 8. That the Legate of Iulius the third tooke great care to haue Statutes repealed, made against the Popes suprema­cie, [Page 71] wherein hee granted them to be authentically made, and consequently, that they had Ecclesiasticall power to enact them, otherwise by reason of nullitie, they had been cancelled and abrogated in themselues. And Antonius de Florebellis, an Italian Prelate in his Panegyrick, de resti­tuta religione in Anglia saith, it is done honorifico vniversi Anglorum consilii decreto, in which speech,Florebe [...] rat. ad Marian he supposed their power to decree it, which he would not haue done, if hee had held it to be a meere temporall Court; and he must necessarily haue so accounted it, if hee did not reckon the vpper and lower Convocation Houses, as members of it, exercising equall power with equivalent priviledges. As it was plaine in a particular example in that Parliament;Fox Act pag. 16 for when Arch-deacon Philpot was questioned for some words that passed from him in the Convocation House, hee pleaded, that hee was privi­ledged to speake them, since the Convocation was a member of the Parliament; and this plea was not refused, but neglected. For they were not ignorant what was e­nacted by Henry the sixth, to wit, that all the Clergie,8 Hen. which be called to the Convocation by the Kings writ, shall fully vse and enjoy all such liberties, as the great men, and Commons of the Realme haue, that are called to the Parliament. And as they had some priviledge, so it is plaine by a Statute vicesimo quarto of Henry the eight,24. He [...] (though now abrogated) that they had once as much power in their receiving appeales from inferiour Courts Ecclesiasticall, when it was a Praemunire to appeale to Rome, or else-where. The words of the Statute, printed in the yeare 1550, are: The partie grieved, may appeale to the spirituall Prelates, Abbots, Priors, and Proctors, convocate by the Kings writ, in Convocation. So that the restitution of the Convocation, was a worthy considera­tion in his Majestie, seeing it is as neerly and deerely annexed to his supremacie, as the Parliament is: for his [Page 72] Majestie having two capacities of government in him, the one spirituall, the other temporall, by both these hee hath supremacie, and this supremacie is chiefly exercised in the calling, presedencie, and dissolving of the great as­sembly of the three States, which high Court is not com­petently correspondent to both those powers in the King, vnlesse the Parliament consist collectiue of spiritu­all and temporall persons, which it hath anciently (if the Booke De modo tenendi Parliamenti be authenticall) for hee makes the vpper House consist of three States, the Kings Majestie, the Lords spirituall and temporall; and lower of the Knights,Ridleys view of Ecclesiasti­call Lawes. Procurators for the Clergie, and the Burgesses; which both answer the Kings mixt supre­macie. So that as he is supremus Iustitiarius totius Angliae, in relation to the temporalitie; so he is supremus, or (as Constantine truely entitled himselfe in the Councell of Nice) [...],Eusebius in vita. lib. 3. in respect of the spiritualty. But to returne to my present promise, and purpose, which was to shew how the actes of supremacie haue their ef­fects in the Ecclesiasticall jurisdiction, derived to the Clergie: And I am now to shew, what effect the power of promulgation of lawes hath, which is in consenting, con­firming, and publishing the Ecclesiasticall Lawes which are agreed vpon in Convocation (not excluding the ad­vice of the Parliament, because the State Ecclesiasticall is not an independant societie, but a member of the whole:) hence it is, that they are called the Kings Ec­clesiasticall Lawes, by which the Clergie is ruled in spi­rituall causes, according to which they exercise their ju­risdiction in foro exteriori & contentioso; hence it is, that for this last age, the Ecclesiasticall Lawes of this Realme haue so well agreed with the Civill, because they passe not without the assent of the supreame governour. And it were much to be desired, that Christian Princes would not onely permit lawes to be made, and giue force to [Page 73] them by their authority, but also that they would vouch­safe their personall presence, to be Presidents in all assem­blies for that end, for then they would proceed and con­clude to better purpose. As Isidorus Pelusiota writes to the Emperour Theodosius the younger, to be resident and president in the Councell of Ephesus: [...]: which is, that if hee would be pleased to take so much time, as to be present there, he did not feare, that any thing that should passe, could be faultie; but if he leaue it all to be done by turbu­lent suffrages, [...];Isiodoru [...] lus. lib. 311. Who can free that Synod from scornfull scoffings? his counsell was safe and seasonable, because the cause of feare was very probable and eminent. For in a Councell, where there is a Monarchicall authority, a supreame power in one, there will be more dispatch in deliberations, more expe­dition in executions, than where multitudes of equals sit alone, for they will be many of them over-wise, and most over-wilfull to agree in one poynt; when as every sin­gular person will broach his particular project, and pro­pose it as a publick law, with resolution to be a recusant to all their lawes, if they will not be Protestants to his: and so it comes to passe too often, that they are forced to yeeld to one another, or else no law should passe. Hence is that multiplicitie, vncertainty, confusion & contrariety of lawes in some diseased States, than which nothing dis­covers a State to be more desperately declining, though they are good in their particulars; for they shew the mul­tiplication of ill manners, which per accidens begot them, and they are likely to make them worse, because they being appointed to amend them, are disappointed and disabled by their owne crosse contrarieties. As in a natu­rall body, over-growne and over-flowne with ill hu­mours. If a Philosopher that considers onely a body nei­ther sick nor well, giues that which is good. [...] [Page 74] [...], (as Hippocrates calls it) and when he hath done an Emperick come that considers it as sick, but he knowes not of what, nor the temper of the constitution, but boldly and blindly giues one medicine to all, for all diseases, and at last the judicious Physitian come and con­sider it as it is, and know what to doe, hee must first vn­doe all the other haue done, before hee dare administer that which should first haue beene taken, and by this time, the body is either past cure, or desperate conclusi­ons must be tried to recover it. Therefore happy is our State Ecclesiasticall, in whose Convocation our supream Soveraign is President, so that the Lawes passing with his royall consent, are certaine, and easie to be obeyed, by reason of their rarenesse and paucitie, which makes them pertinent, distinct, and free from confusion. And there­fore I doe not a little marveile at learned Baronius, Baronius An­nal. Anno. 528. that since hee doth not deny Iustinianus the Emperour the power of making Ecclesiasticall Lawes, he should so scru­pulously and busily inquire, what should moue him to meddle with the making of them; when as I doe not doubt, but the Clergie then might request him to it. This last act of supremacie, is to receiue appeales, and giue determinate decisions, and this hath its effect, and is ex­ercised in the Ecclesiasticall Courts. And they doe not exercise any power, that is not derived from this supre­macie, either immediately, or mediately. So that as the lawes they execute, are the Kings Ecclesiasticall Lawes, so these Courts are the Kings, and all the processes and courses approved by his Majesties Lawes. Therefore now there is no ground for a praemunire in them, though the words of the Statute runne (to Rome or else-where) for by (else-where) seemes to be meant, the Romish power,Babylonem [...] Gallicam, vt Petrarch. epist. 123. or Court, which was not then at Rome, because the Popes seat was then at Avignion in France, and not our Bishops consistorie: For I beleeue, that Statute was [Page 75] made to free them as well from the forraine vsurpation, as any other of the King Courts, as the pragmaticall san­ction of France doth, which was of the nature, and in imitation of it about the same time, by Charles the se­venth, brother-in-law to Edward the third. But how­ever it was then meant, I am sure it cannot extend to them now, vnlesse wee will deny the Kings supremacie over all causes and persons Ecclesiasticall; and then they are not the Kings Courts; but if we grant the Kings su­premacie, wee must deny that any of his Courts can in­curre a praemunire. A prohibition, I grant, may lawfully lye there, because it is safe for the whole State, that every jurisdiction should haue its bounds, and keep, or be kept in them. But yet I will not say so in generall, but we must admit them with distinction of prohibitions, one of Law, another of Fact. Now that prohibition which is of Law, according to the expresse words of the Statute, (which are commonly large enough) is the prohibition that is lawfull, as for a prohibition of fact, which is by a sophisticall suggestion sucked and squeezed out of the copie of the libell, without judgment of the Kings Courts vpon it, in my opinion is not right, and is many times the cause of wrong, either in vnjustice or delayes; yea and in abusing of the Statute with the Kings Courts. For the prohibition of law, the most I conceiue it inferres is, to make all the proceedings voide, Coram non Iudice. But if I might know, what degree and quality of offence it is, for a Court temporall to hold plea of a meere Ecclesiasti­call cause, I should more easily apprehend the scandalous nature of the ground of a prohibition, which it may be, is the same with a writ of errour in the temporall Court; since that a consultation doth not ensue vpon that, but af­ter a prohibition grounded vpon a suggestion. So then, all the proceedings of these Courts, haue their power from this last act of supremacie, as well in primatiue pro­cesses [Page 76] of inquisition, as in punitiue processes of execution. As this authentick authoritie is most seene in the procee­dings ex officio, which are not onely, nor alwayes by oath, (as many are mistaken.) These are by immediate com­mission, where an Ecclesiasticall cause is criminall, and prosecuted as criminall: And so also the vtmost punitiue processe Ecclesiasticall, which is a writ de Excommuni­cato capiendo, is evidently derived from the Kings power, and issueth immediately from his favour to the Church, that it may be more easily obeyed,Iohan. de Paris. de Potestate Reg. Concl. 1. and is divers and vari­able in sundry governments, and executed by temporall power, being nothing of the nature of the spirituall ex­communication, but an accession concessâ permissione ex devotione Principum (as Iohannes de Parisiis saith against Boniface the eight.) As for the judgements of Bishops consistories, as they are derived from the power and law of Christ the great Bishop: so they are like the jud­ges of them, who are rather arbiters & amicabiles com­positores (as Panormitane) then Iudges, ruling by the austerity of authority, so that poore defendants may flie to them, as to their altars, who are Ministers of the al­tar: and in this sense, that which Architas speakes is most true,Arist. Rhet. lib. 3. c. 11. [...], Idem esse arbitrum & Aram. And though they haue no forcing power, but from the King, and no power of any force against the King; yet the greatest and best Kings haue yeelded to them in their advice, not as Prelates, but as they are Fa­thers in God, (as Alexander the great said to his father King Philip) [...]:Dion. Chrysost. [...]. farre vn­like the Bishops of Rome, who will rule the highest Prin­ces, and yet professe themselues servants of servants; which makes mee call to minde, the observation of the wisest King Salomon, Proverb. 30. that one of the chiefest instruments whereby the earth is shaken, is, a servant that rules over Princes. And as they vsurpe rule, so they vsurpe the [Page 77] sword of temporall Princes, and carry it in the spirituall scabbard; and drawing it, doe more hurt in their passion, then they can help by their priviledge; when as they found it soberly and orderly put up by S^t Peter when Christ was at his elbow to heale the greatest wound that hee could make. Thus is it somewhat plaine, how Ecclesiasticall power is derived from the King, as hee is supreame head in lawfull and full authority over all causes and persons; which double power in my conceit, the custome of the ancient Persians at the death of their Monarch doth fully and fitly expresse, for the lawes are silent:Brisso [...] Regn [...] lib. 1. [...], yea and their [...] their holy e­ternall fire which every one worshiped in his private house as his houshold god, was put out when the Empe­rour died.

§ 4 The next thing which I promised to declare, was how the honour of the state Ecclesiasticall is annexed to the power by the Kings lawes and royall prorogatiue. The honour of the Clergy is contained in revenewes and priviledges, [...] A [...] lib. 1. which are vnited to their powers of order and jurisdiction; which powers although we should grant that simply considered in themselues, they are not distin­guished jure divino; yet I am sure none will deny that they are distinct, quoad extensionem, permissione & appro­batione divinâ, as Iohannes de Parisiis doth distinguish the power given the Apostles into six parts, in respect of so many severall acts of execution, the fift of which is potestas dispositionis ministrorum, secundum quosdam quoad determinationem jurisdictionis Ecclesiasticae ut vitetur con­fusio. Ioh. de cap. 1 And as they are thus distinct according to the exe­cution, and stand so confirmed by the positiue lawes of the land; so they haue distinct portions and priviledges according to the same lawes: yet after a different man­ner, especially in respect of the portion. For the power of order which hath maintenance of diverse kindes, as [Page 78] tithes, oblations, Gleabland and mortuaries holds them all according to the lawes of this land, as due to the Cler­gie, for executing the power of order, but by different acts of these lawes; as Mortuaries are permitted, and Gleablands granted, Tithes and Oblations confirmed, and all constrained to be paid. Now tithes that are onely con­firmed by the Kings positiue lawes, are supposed to bee due by some other law of higher nature then the Kings, which is not any forraine law,Bellar. de Cler. lib. 1. cap. 10. as Ius Ecclesiasticum (as Bellarmine calls the Cannon law) it must bee then by law divine; or immediately arising from supernaturall and morall considerations, which law we grant to be positiue; yet not meerely humaine,Hooker Eccles. Polit. l. 1. §. 15. nor changeable in respect to us: and they must necessarily runne into many grosse errours, that take onely such lawes for positiue as are invented by men; and thence conclude them mutable. And therefore I presume that the learned Selden doth so vnderstand the positiue law, by which hee holds tithes to be due, not in opposition to divine and morall; but as specially diverse from it (as it partly appeares in the whole drift of his history) where I doe not beleeue that any can finde that hee ever delivers his judgement, denying them to bee jure divino: so that in my apprehension, and I hope not against his intention, he may doe the Church much good in his relating what wrongs the Clergy in all ages haue sustained. For his history is onely de facto, what hath beene done; hee giues not his judgement de iure what ought to haue beene done, which if he had, he would assu­redly haue pronounced for them; and this I am forced to beleeue, when I consider his exact generall knowledge, and the reverent respect he beares to authentique antiqui­tie. I doe not in this confesse that they are not iure divino, because I affirme not them to be due by the law of Moses, that is no direct consequence vpon my proposition; for not onely the judiciall law which was the commend, and [Page 79] I beleeue in most points is still the counsaile of the most wise God (especially in this particular where the ground of the command is morall) doth proportion a tenth part as necessary then to be paid; and though the same necessi­ty binds vs not now, yet the correspondencie of the con­veniencie (as I conceiue) doth hold vs as strongly to it as it did that state. For I see no inconvenience in tithes-paying in our state more then in theirs, but onely they were brought home vnto Priests (which onely exception M^r Cartwright makes against tithes:Annot. i [...] Test. 7.) But I stand not onely vpon this, but I am also partly perswaded, that they were confirmed by Apostolicall approbation, though it bee not in expresse words so set downe. For though the Apostles did all preach the Gospell, yet they did not all write, nei­ther did those that did write commit all to writing which they did teach:2 Thes. for S^t Paul adviseth the Thessalonians to keepe the traditions they had beene taught either by word or epistle. And therefore it is freely acknowledged by a famous Orthodox divine of our owne, non omnia esse scripta in libris voteris & novi Testamenti, Whittak [...] Bellar. q [...] cap. 6. quae Apostoli aut docuerunt aut fecerunt; sed fatemur Apostolos ritus & consuetudines sanxisse, non autem scripsisse; hence it is pro­bable, that they might by consent confirme them, because it was not onely a custome and a law then in force, and they did not delight to innovate, but vpon necessitie: but also because we doe not finde one word of their abrogati­on or alteration. Yea it seemes to mee that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrewes entitles the Ministers of the Gospell to them by a more particular right,Heb. 7. (as Bishop Andrewes calls it) jure Benedictionis, for it is not onely said that Abraham paid Melchizedeck tithes as hee was the highest Priest,Benedixit tantùm v [...] vatus ex [...] tione, sed perior ex [...] ritate. but that hee received them and blessed him; which implyes blessing to be the duty he performed for them. And whatsoever wee hold of these tithes, I as­sure my selfe the Primitiue Church did so conclude, other­wise [Page 80] they would not with such a generall consent haue bound themselues to that meanes and portion of mainte­nance. I speake of the Church in statu pacato, it was otherwise with them I confesse in statu perturbato, in per­secution; but not out of good choise, but hard chance: For obserue but from the first generall Councell of Nice, (not to reckon vpon Provincall Synods, because they doe not bind our state but onely in point of doctrine and ex­ample) peruse them till the last of the Lateraine, and you shall finde they are plaine and peremptory. And not onely in the acts which in some Councells are erroneous, (as in the second Councell of Nice) being the seaventh ge­nerall, there is a Cannon very particularly passed with a generall consent; so in the Councell of Lateraine vnder Innocent the third,Balsomon con­cil. Nicen. se­cundo can. 12. Concil. Later. 4. can. 54. where it is particularly set downe, that the English Ambassadors were present. There is a Canon that runs thus, Statuimus quòd solutio decimarum praecedat exactionem tributorum. We haue nationall Councells also as at most Coronations of the Kings before the conquest, and also immediately vpon the conquest; and many ge­nerall Charters wherein tithes haue beene confirmed to the Clergy, and that with solemne vowes and imprecati­ons, which dedication to God, if there be no other divine right, puts the detainers of them into Ananias and Saphi­ra's case;Acts 5. because that though while it was wholy with them, it was their owne; yet when it was thus sepe­rated by their solemne vowes, then sanctified by the solemne act of Bishops; not onely ratifying the Founders vow, but consecrating them with the Church to divine vses, the nature, property, with the propriety was chan­ged. So that I will conclude from these premises, that the positiue law by which tithes are due to the Clergie, is not meerely humane but mixt and preternaturall, be­cause it binds men as they are members of the supernatu­rall society of the Church visible: and because they haue [Page 81] bound themselues by it in divine considerations. But yet they are enjoyed by the confirmation and constraining power of the Kings lawes: And were it not for the lawes, as they are an vndoubted due, so they would be a perpetu­all debt with many; and that out of severall grounds: some desiring to haue stipends in stead of tithes, doe too willingly remit them for a sufficient stipend though it bee vncertaine, especially to their successors. But I hope this ground will never be generall, as long as this Kingdome is a Monarchie, for if it is a miserie of free Cities and Demo­cracies,Arist. [...] 4. cap. [...] — yet I must needs confesse that at the first originall of Vicarages they had but stipends, but it was vnjust;Linwoo [...] cio Vica roch. Vicarii stipendio sunt contenti, which was but a permitting provinciall constitu­tion. Another meanes whereby the due payment of tithes is impeached, is, the customes of many places: which are lawfull and laudable with these conditions; if they were not the inventions of men, but begotten by time, and if they be as reasonable as ancient;Cujaciu [...] pus Vlpi [...] 10. nam debent esse tàm ne­cessariae continuatione quàm rectae in ortu: and where the law is defectiue, for customes against law are voyd by the Civill law, if they bee not expresly confirmed by the supreame power. With these conditions let customes be enjoyed.L. Sacra Q. de leg But the next pretense is prescription against tithes once paid, and that we may admit with his limita­tions; as that it extend not to those things that cannot be alienate, that are annexed to the Crowne,Dier. rep 31 [...]1. or if it stand not contra statutum postea editum, and be granted vpon a good custome, and the person qualified, to possesse the thing claimed; for lawfull prescription cannot proceed with­out as lawfull possession. The want of these lawfull limi­tations made the Councell of Laterane vnder Alexander the third, condemne and controule the grand prescription of Clyentary tithes continued from Charles Martellus. Duarenus nef. l. 6. [...] The taking away of which shirking shifts made many de­vise [Page 82] another, which priviledge is either of societies or persons, granting immunities from payment of tithes, which pretense of all others (as far as I vnderstand) can­not bee made good by the most favourable forced inter­pretation that may be; for they are void and nullified ac­cording to all the restraining Provisoes that bound a pri­viledge. For they were granted against the law of God and nature, not onely besides it; there are some revoked by the same power that granted them, as Innocent the third in the fourth Councell of Laterane. And in this particular Kingdome Henry the fourth made many sta­tutes to restraine those priviledges granted to the Friers,4. Hen. 4. c. 7. especially providing that none should haue any de novo; but that which proues them void in this Kingdome, is, that not onely the particular persons, but also their whole societies are dissolved and distroyed; and so they are ex­pired and extinguished with them:Bartolus in D. Q. Sodales. tit. 24. Idem ibidem. Destructo Collegio pe­reunt privilegia, especially when their revenewes are con­fiscate, & non privilegiatus praescriptione, non succedat pri­vilegiato. But when other meanes began to be restrained, they procured appropriations and annexions of benefices presentatiue, not onely in point of patronage, but also they tooke the whole due without discharging any of the duty; which last and worst pretense I will not deny but the wit of man may make it plausible, yet I am sure it will never bee pleasing to the will of God. Monkes and Friars were the authors of these immunities and appro­priations, (to omit customes and prescriptions, because they doe not so much wrong, and haue more ground of right:) I doe not accuse the Monkes who lived in the first fiue hundred yeares after Christ, who lived holy, and laboured in their callings, and had no such priviledges: Neither doe I condemne Benedict who was the father and first founder of all that professed a regular life in a seque­stred cloyster in the Western Church.Hospinianus de origine Mona­ [...]hat. For he had good [Page 83] reason so to doe, considering the tumults and many broiles that fell out vnder the government of Iustinian, & by reason of the continuall incursions of the barbarous nations into Italy. But when he was thus shut vp, many resorted vnto him, admiring his devotion; at last they tooke rules from him, and grew into a fraternitie of the Benedictines: and from them sprang many other orders; who living a life far different from other men, bred great wonderment in all, and that admiration procured adoration of their professi­on, & made those that were able bestow great revenewes vpon them: Yea they did so dote vpon them, that after a while they endowed them, if not with the greatest, yet I am sure the best and fattest part of their Countryes; in­somuch that most of the most pious Princes of Christen­dome were forced to make a statute of Mortmaine, (like Moses, Exo. who made the first statute of Mortmaine) for these revenewes which they possessed were in a dead hand, that did no good to the Common-wealth. Whence we may obserue that this statute was rather for the bene­fit of the Common-wealth, then made out of the dislike of the Church meanes; especially since these Friers were not of the Clergie, but meere Lay-men; and the Clergy had as much reason to desire a law for Amortization as the Common-wealth, because as they had conferred lands and goods vpon them, (for not onely Princes, but Popes were taken with admiration of them) so they were also more charged with the publique, and had lesse meanes. And this statute gaue the occasion to them to procure pri­viledges and immunities from payment of tithes. For though at first for a time they came to their Parish Chur­ches, yet when they procured to haue Churches or Chap­pels of ease for their fraternities; then they obtained un­der Alexander the third in the Laterane Councell, when hee condemned prescription,Dua [...] nef. l [...] to be confirmed priviledged from payment of tithes of those lands which they tilled [Page 84] themselues; when as Adrian the fourth our country-man, his immediate predecessor had revoked or restrained the immunities granted to them by Paschall the second.Flavius Chen. Compend. Bulla tom. 1. Paschal. But when Innocent the third, who loved to bee doing and vn­doing, restrained the grant of Alexander the third, which they perceived did much prejudice their plentifull pro­fit, they procured dispensations from the Pope to haue parsonages appropriate to their houses in more great abundance. For I deny not but some were annexed be­fore, as to the Abbey of Crowland, and others; yet these were granted more by the Popes licence then the Princes authoritie. And then began the Schoolmen to entangle the right of tithes, and their curiositie and their cove­tousnesse enabled them, and put them vpon it: for when vnder Innocent the third, they multiplyed into multitude, (as there were sixteene orders set vp in that Century) and hee limited and lessened their revenewes, they sought to maintaine that by right which before they had obtained by wrong, and retained by protection and priviledge. Then began the contention betweene the Schoolmen and the Cannonists about the right of tithes; and I conceiue Innocent the third to be of the Canonists part, because he was the first great advancer of them in the Church, and no free friend to the Friars. This I haue conceived by comparing Church histories with the Cannon law, espe­cially Decretalls: these wrongs of the Clergie were so brought in and vpheld, so continued in our Kingdome till Henry the eighth of famous memorie; who either inten­ding a reformation in religion, seised vpon the reve­nues of religious houses; or ayming at their revenewes set vpon, rather then finished a reformation, confiscated them to his vse, as escheated as their lands were, and sei­ses vpon their appropriations which were not theirs; but morgaged as it were in commendam to them, and he pos­sessed the Crowne of them, and sold them to private men; [Page 85] which hold them by as much right as the Monasteries did, & no better. Though some would willingly perswade themselues that they hold them by as right and just law, as they doe any purchased inheritance; for they say, though they were once spirituall, yet now they are made temporall, & lay-fees by the lawes of dissolution; especi­ally in the two and thirtieth of Henry the eighth. It is true that those statutes apply diverse law termes, (I will not call them meere law fictions) to those things that properly belong to temporall inheritances, and haue made them demandable by originall writs, and given order of conveyance, by deed, fine, and act of Parliament; which act, as it is bootelesse, so it is contumacie in any private subject to question: onely thus much I hope I may say without generall offence, since I conceiue it the truth, and yet not all the truth; I doe not yet vnderstand how that can bee made manifest to bee a free Parliament in that point. For I doe not beleeue, that the lower House did either propose, or generally approue it, though they assented to it. Neither doe I thinke, that King Henry the eight did freely propound it out of his owne choyce, but that the necessity of the present time did put him vpon it. And I hope he intended to call it in, if hee had lived. As Dionysius the King of Syra­cusa in Italy, when his treasure waxed too short for a great imployment: [...]:Poly [...] Strat hee commanded to take the trea­sures of Asclepius his temple, and to proclaime them to be sold in the market, as profane and common commodi­ties, which the Syracusans were very eager to buy, be­cause they had Church-bargaines. But when hee had got­ten what his necessity required, he presently sent forth an edict, [...], that if any one had bought those devoted treasures, they should againe restore them to the Church. This course [Page 86] had beene somewhat just, if hee had let them enjoy the treasures, vntill they might haue regained by them what they cost, (as perhaps most purchasers of Impropria­tions haue.) But that which most hinders me from ap­prehending it to be a free pure act, is, because the most actiue and spirituall part in Parliament, was pittifully passiue in it, it was at best mixt by reaction in the patient Clergie, who did neither absolutely obey, nor resolutely resist, but silently suffer that to passe, which was not right; and therefore the act was not free from wrong. Neither doe many of the judicious sages of our law so fully ap­proue of it.Consideration 6. Yea S^r Francis Bacon in his considerations of the Clergie of England, dedicated to King Iames of peace­able memory, confesses, that hee was of opinion, that all the Parliaments, since the twenty seventh, and thirtie one of Henry the eight, stand obnoxious and bound in conscience to God, to doe somewhat for the Church, to reduce that patrimonie; or, that since they haue debarred the Church of her dowry, they should make her a com­petent joynture. Which opinion of his, is more ingeni­ous, in my apprehension, and advantageously pertinent than theirs, who onely enveigh against the Parliament, and Henry the eight the head and ruler of it: which act (admitting the necessity then that vrged him to vse the power of Ecclesiasticall dominion) is not altogether in­excusable, (though this reformation did more wrong to the Clergie, than the conquest:) For what he was to do, was to be done in haste; and in that routing-rush of re­formation, who could expect but the part corrected, must needs be for the time, neere to vtter ruine; though hap­pely, if the author of the reformation had lived to finish it, amends would haue beene made in some measure. But Henry the eight did rather put down the Roman Church, than set vp ours; as Alexander the great pulled downe the Persian Monarchie, but set not vp the Grecian. But to [Page 87] pull downe one was the onely way to set vp another; as Aristotle rooted out all the opinions of the former Phi­losophers, to set vp his owne; or as Hypocrates, who being their [...] (as Zetzes in his Chiliads) he burned the bookes of all the ancient Phisicians, to set vs his owne,Chil. 155. or theirs as his. So that if a publick reformer begin once to alter, he must of necessity, for the time, stirre, if not remoue more than hee first intended, especially if hee be crossed and curbed by an adversary, that stands strongest by that part which needs reformation, and by that in it, which will best helpe him in the performing of it. For he that will prevaile against an incroaching enemy, that hath a party in his kingdome, must be sure with all apt industrie, to obserue and oppose him in his counsels, by bereaving him of his counsellers and agents, either by taking them away at once, or putting them as exiles from him, or pulling them to himselfe, which is the safest and honourablest course. Now the Pope, who was the absolute insolent adversary to Henry the eight, stood by the Monkish part of the Clergie, and chiefly by their rich revenues; and therefore, it behoved the King, either to reconcile them to himselfe, or vtterly to ruine them (as fell out because they rebelled.) And in the persecution of them, hee ranne a cleane contrary course to the Pope. As I re­member, when Cyrus tooke Babylon, he drew Euphrates drie, and made all land; And Xerxes when he went against Athens, would haue made all sea,Dion. C [...] [...]: So Henry the eight made all Lay and land, when hee intended to be free from the vsurpation of the Pope, and the Pope made all spirituall and his See, when hee aymed at his absolute vnrestrained extravigan­cie both in See and Scepter. This heat and height of oppo­sition made the King proceed too farre, which, I beleeue, hee did somewhat perceiue, in that he did retract in some [Page 88] particulars, from the first course: As in erecting some E­piscopall Seats, and more Cathedrall Churches, out of the ruines of Monasteries and Priories. And in that hee made of the appropriation of Royston, 33. Hen. 8. a Parish-Church. And I presume, he might haue proceeded farther, if hee had not beene soone after cut off by death, and hindred by profane and sacrilegious instruments while he lived, who, I per­swade my selfe, were the same men and meanes, that tried to procure the dissolution of the Bishoprick of Durham by act of Parliament, during the nonage of Edward the sixth. So that the vnhappinesse of Henry the eight, is, be­cause men judge by the event, not knowing the intent (as Paulus Iovius exclaimes of him.Iovius de vir. illust.) In my minde, hee may be well paralelled with Charles Martellus, the Cham­pion of the Church, who, when hee defended the Pope, was the first that was called Christianissimus among the French Kings, by Gregory the third; yet hee was the first that robbed the Clergie in France, by giving Clientary tythes,Baronius Anno 759. which they call feudall to his followers: yea and hee deposed the Archbishop of Reemes, and disposed of the Bishoprick to one Miloeo Caualeire. So Henry the eight had first the title of the Defender of the Faith, for publishing a booke against Luther, Bellarm. de script. Eccles. which (Bellarmine saith) Roffensis wrote, and presently after fell foule vpon the Clergie. So that, (I beleeue) the Pope repented of the title, and was ready, no [...] to giue him so good a title, as his predecessour Iulius the second gaue Lewis the twelfth of France, in his Bull, which Guicciardine notes to pro­ceed of malice,Guicc. hist. l. 11. Nella nominon dolo, non piu Christianissimo, ma illustrissimo. But let him be as bad as they will make him, yet I dare excuse him, as Baronius doth Martellus, and say of him as Guicciardine said of the Popes,Guicc. Hypomn. Polit. 123. that hee was an honest man, because he was not more wicked than most men. I haue in this as farre as I am able with a good conscience, cleared our State from the forraine fame of [Page 89] sacriledge. But I cannot free particular men from it, which haue no pretence for what they detaine, or take from the Clergie, but onely that they are not convinced that there is such a sinne as sacriledge; and that because they hold not tythes due iure divino, and that because they desire still to hold them by the law of the land. And that they may more colourably continue it, they hold no such sinne as Symonie, that the presented may make a symonaicall contract, whereby they are confirmed and corroborated in their sacrilegious vsurpations. But I will not dispute the poynt, whether there be any such sinne as Symonie, in relation to a private presentation without respect to or­ders taken with it. But I am sure, none will deny, but where is a symonaicall contract, there is perjurie in the Instituted. As for sacriledge, I grant it is not easie for men that are guilty of it, to be convinced that it is a sinne. For sinnes of omission cannot so quickly and sharply, touch the conscienee, because they are the breach of an affirmatiue law, which doth not so strongly check the vice, as in­forme to the dutie; especially when pleasure or profit haue bribed the judgement. For I feare, some hold stolne tythes, the sweetest part of their inheritance, as it is said by the Epicures;Zetzes Chil. 7 [...]: who doting vpon voluptuous sweet delicates, called hony the tenth part of the Ambrosia; and perhaps that sect set vp the trade of Bee-mongers in Athens, (as Synesius) [...].Synesiu [...] 136. So I am afraid, the tickling sweetnesse of tythes, is the cause, why the smart and sowrnesse of sacriledge is not felt, nor ta­sted. And therefore, in my opinion,Thom. [...] q. 155. Thomas Aquinas doth well, to make sacriledge, speciem luxuriae; so that it may be a sinne, and yet they never be convinced of it. I am sure, not onely the ancient Fathers of the most pure primitiue Church, but even the godly Emperours did esteeme it a sinne, and that in a high degree, that when [Page 90] they granted generall pardons at Easter, and other so­lemne tim [...]s, they excepted sacrilegious persons: As Theodosius the great,Theod. tit. de Indulg. Crim. ob diem Paschae, quem intimo corde celebramus, quos reatus astringit, carcer inclusit, solvimus; attamen sacrilegus maximè à communione istius munieris se­paretur: So also Gratian and Valentinian; Religio anniver­sariae observationis hortatur, vt omnes periculo carceris, & à metu poenarum eximi iubeamus: verùm eos excipimus, quos scelera graviora compulerunt, Theod. eodem tit. vt qui sunt sacrilegi & sepul­chri violatores. So in many of the Novels; [...], vpon Easter day set all persons free [...],Harmenopulus Promp. Iur. Civ. l. 6. tit. 5. but if any be guilty of sacriledge, set him be kept still in hold. So that you see, it was reckoned inter extraordi­naria crimina in those dayes; and so it would be thought with vs, if profit did not blinde the judgement in the payer of tythes, and indiscreet covetousnesse leade many Clergy-men to make no distinction betwixt free and friendly compositions with a bountifull Patron and sacri­ledge. In my poore judgement, the Canon Law is but just,Quicunque c. 6. q. de Iur. Patronatus. in decreeing, that Si patronus Laicus ad inopiam fu­erit redactus, hee must haue some competent sustenance from the incumbent, especially if he haue not beene sacri­legious, and so by Gods judgement brought to it. And I doe conceiue, that this may be, notwithstanding they doe not charge any parsonage with annuitie rents, which is prohibited by the statute of Elizab. 3 Eliz. c. 2. Thus it is plaine, that the revenues and maintenance of the Clergie are possessed by the Kings Lawes, and may be demanded as due by them.

§. 5. The other part of the honour of the Clergie, an­nexed to the power of order, is in priviledges, & immu­nities, by which this power is exercised with more ease, delight, and respect; and, as it were, with the whole man without distraction. Now all the priviledges the Church doth enjoy or desire, arise, and are raised by the [Page 91] Kings lawes, and royall prerogatiue. As that ancient-of­ten-confirmed Magna Charta doth fully confirme all for­mer priviledges of the Clergie.Mag [...] ta cap And that was then favour enough, for then they had priviledges to a surfeiting sur­plussage, but now the Clergie stands in more need of them, and they humbly expect them onely from the favour of their Prince, who hath a plenitude of power, to grant more and larger priviledges, than ever they will desire. For all priviledges are granted in relation to some Law, and the power of an absolute Prince is aboue all Lawes, (as Dion Chrysostome told just Trajane) [...]:Dion [...] [...] [...] Cujac vat. li [...] or as the same Counsellour to the same Empe­rour, [...]: which Cujacius explaines and limits to coactiue correctiue Lawes, which Dion saith, began in Augustus dayes, [...]:Dion none of the ancient Romans were freed from lawes, [...], that is from the necessity of obeying. And I doe beleeue, that the Scriptures (seeing that they say more for the right of Kings, than any booke in the world) doe, if not fully set downe this power, yet permit it with approba­tion in some cases, especially for the publick good of the Church, which, I am sure, is a farre more conscionable and commendable course, than to accommodate religi­on to serue the turne of the State (as that judicious Ami­ratus vpon Tacitus) Bisogna accommodar la ragione di stato alla religione, & nan la religione, alla ragione di stato.

Our King then being a most absolute Monarch, hath this prerogatiue, and from that wee haue and hold our priviledges, not from that written prerogatiue, abstra­cted out of Fitzherberts Abridgement, by S^r William Stanford, whereby the Kings Exchequer hath many pri­viledges, and peculiar processes (as the Civilians call them privilegia fisci, fiscus [...] habet. Cujaci [...] serv. l. 2) But from an vn­written vnrestrained right of dominion, whereby he hath [Page 92] plenarie power, not onely to make legall propositions of validitie, or voyde in their first institution, or to inter­pret them either by declaring them to bee corrected in some poyntes and cases, especially if hee correct them by a more particular expresse pressing law, as hee may correct the law of nature by the law of nations; the law of nations, by the law of armes; the law of armes, by the law of particular Leagues; and all by the power of do­minion: or restraine them in respect of some persons, or publick societies; but he may dispence also with them, since some penall statutes are made with relation to his power of pardon after the act; therefore it is not so much to exempt them from being obnoxious to the punishment, by pre-interpreting that it was not intended to extend to such persons; for so the priviledge is not against law, but besides it, or aboue it. Yea there are statutes dispensato­rie; as that of the pluralitie, and non recidencie which the Archbishop of Canterbury limits by his approbation.Eccl. Anglicanae Canon. 41. And priviledges must necessarily bee where there are multi­tudes of statutes, which be so strict in point of injunction, as if the makers of them had not considered, that poli­tique lawes must be made with respect to morall possibi­litie, as what men may doe; and yet the punishment of their transgression is not expressed, but left to the pleasure or displeasure of the King. But these are not the privi­ledges that the Kings royall prerogatiue doth grant, as immunities and impunities, for then the lawes should bee onely punitine, if there were onely vse of protections and pardons: but as lawes are also remuneratiue, so Princes haue power to reward after a priviledging manner, and chiefly in our Kingdome, where it seemes to be on purpose omit­ted by the written lawes, and left to the Kings pleasure and power; especially concerning Ecclesiasticall persons, who haue most neede of them, and may now as freely en­joy them as any other persons. For though heretofore [Page 93] it was prejudiciall to our Kings to grant priviledges to all Ecclesiasticall persons, when they were so encreased in multitudes, and overgrowne in magnitude for the whole Kingdome, and the Popes would confirme them as irre­vocable: yet now they are but few in number and small in power, and the King may call them in when hee pleases. This want of these priviledges hath beene the cause of much evill in the Church, and the more they are impea­ched by those that professe themselues the maintainers of the Kings peace, lawes, and royall prerogatiue, the more will the state Ecclesiasticall runne to ruine. And they are much infringed in our Vniversities, which I am forced to complaine of, with feare, lest that fall out which happened to the Vniversitie of Prague; which was vt­terly ruined by Charles the fift, taking the priviledges away at Don Le [...]is desire. Whereas Francis the first of France fearing and favouring the Vniversitie of Paris, re­stored all the priviledges which Lewis the eleventh had taken away vpon a just ground of sedition,Dino hist. [...] which hath made it to reviue and flourish ever since. But there are some politiques that hold it a needlesse thing, to bee any way indulgent to silly Schollers,Cuja [...] sent. 1. tit as Cujacius saith out of Galen, that they expressed weake men vnder the title of scholastici: they make meere [...], Iohn a noakes of them, but the fault is in themselues according to the French Proverbe, Qui se fait brebis le l [...]up la mange: For though the Clergie bee weake of it selfe, and tempt the contemners of it to over-top and over-turne it: Yet since we haue a pious prudent Prince, that is royally rea­dy vpon the first appeale, to protect and relieue his poore Clergie: we are not to be pittied, if we neglect to implore his supreame assistance. And thus it is something evident how the honour of the Clergie annexed to the power of order, is granted and sustained by the Kings lawes and [Page 94] royall prerogatiue. I must now in briefe shew the like of the honour annexed to the power of jurisdiction.

§ 6 The power of jurisdiction which I doe here in­tend, is not that deligated power which is in Bishops, Vicars, or Officialls; nor that power Archdeacons and Deanes enjoy, either by custome or priviledge: but that ordinary power which is in Bishops. To this power of jurisdiction there is honour annexed by the lawes of this land, and the Kings royall prerogatiue: which I divide as before, into revenewes ordinary, and priviledges; the re­venewes are their temporalls, and part of the perquisits, called the Census Cathedraticus: the first of which are gi­ven and granted by the Kings royall bounty, & confirmed by the lawes; the other are set downe and approved by the same lawes. Bishops temporalls are annexed to their sees by the Kings gift,Stanford prae­rogat. cap. 1. and are as it were their Gleab, but are indeed their Baronies which they hold of the King in capite, and performe services for them; and therefore they are as it were wards to the King during the vacancie: quae ratione Baroniae (as Linwood) ad Episcopum spectare possunt, Linwood de im­munitatib. Ec­clesiae. Duarenus de be­neficijs. l. 3. c. 11. Dominus Rex custodiam habet; (as Duarenus sayes of the Kings of France) Princeps quàm diu vacat Episcopalis sedes, feudorum lege, praediorum omnium administrationem susci­pit. But these temporalls are not to be restored till conse­cration, and so seeme to be annexed to the power of order in Bishops;Augustinus de Ancona de po­test. P. P. quaest. 22. Art. 9. for their consecration (according to the scho­lasticall Canonists) is but perfectio characteris, which they at first received when they tooke the order of Priest­hood, and so seeme not properly annexed to the power of jurisdiction: for before consecration, vpon election and confirmation they may exercise the power of jurisdicti­on, though not of order. Episcopus electus & confirma­tus potest exercere quae sunt jurisdictionis, Panormitan. in Decret. Ver. Cons. §. 6. non quae sunt or­dinis Episcopalis ante consecrationem, (as Othobone vpon [Page 95] Linwood) suspendere potest à beneficio, non ab officio; Linwoo [...] de consti [...] Glanvil cap. 10. quia ab officio suspendere, est à potestate ordinis ordinaria. But Iustice Glanvil seemes to intimate that they were resto­red, when they were but Lords elect, because electi ante consecrationem homagia sua facere solent, but whether it were de jure or de gratia (as the learned in the Common law distinguish,) I leaue to them to determine; and thinke it great happinesse for the Bishops, and the great honour of our moderne Kings, that they are so fully resto­red at all, since they haue as much power, and may pre­tend as much reason to seise the temporalls into their hands as well as others. — But our Royall Soveraignes pious Father,1. Iacob. set a good example to his Majestie to fol­low; for in the first yeare of his raigne hee enacted a sta­tute to prevent all diminution of Episcopall revenewes, though it were to alienate them to the vse of his Crowne: yea though it were but in exchange for impropriations, (a course which was too common in Queene Elizabeths dayes,) insteed whereof our Kings haue out of royall in­dulgence given some licences for Mortmaines. If this redresse had come before they had beene too much im­paired: Bishops would not haue desired so many Com­mendams, nor Rectors of Parishes made vse of the statute of pluralitie. To their revenewes in these temporalls, there are many honourable priviledges annexed, as they are Barones; So that Bishops haue the priviledges of Ba­rons in the Parliament, and that vpon good ground, since they hold of the King, and performe the services belong­ing to them;Mathew Hen. 2. (as Mathew Paris) Episcopi de rege tenent in capite Baronias, & faciunt omnes consuetudines regis, & si­cut caeteri Barones debent interesse iudiciis regis cum Baro­nibus. Now the Bishops (especially since the reformation) are ready and willing, not onely to take the oath of ho­mage, which some denyed heretofore, as Thomas Becket, [Page 96] and Glanvill, who was the chiefe Iustice, seemes to coun­tenance it, by saying Episcopi consecrati non solent Domino Regi homagium facere de Baroniis suis, Glanvil. lib. 9. cap. 1. sed fidelitatem. The present Clergy I say is not onely ready to take the oath in the old favourable free forme, [salvo ordine,] but as it is now more strictly obligatorie by putting in these words, [in verbo veritatis;] and leaving out the former. Which oath may be taken without any suspicion of Symonie, (as Panormitan) Homagium, vel fidelitas ab Episcopo praestari possit, citra periculum Symoniae: and Cajetaine the learned schooleman doth in this agree with this ancient able Can­nonist;Cajetan in se­cund. secunde. q. 184. art. 5. Episcopus legitimè iurare potest Homagium quod­dam vel fidelitatem, quia nil in isto iuramento continetur, circa curam animarum; for that is taken in relation to their temporalls which they haue from the Kings favours; not in relation to their consecration, which they haue from the qualifying grace of God, which was well expressed anciently in their stile [Dei gratiâ Episcopus] and now by [providentia divinâ,] so that seeing they perform the same services, they may enjoy the same priviledges with the Barons. Now as all priviledges, so these that they enjoy common with them, are besides and aboue the common course of law. For instance, as they are Assessors in Parlia­ment, they may appeare by Proxie; as they are witnesses, they may sweare onely Visis Evangeliis, verbo sacerdotis; as Barons, by their honour; and when they are at any time Delinquents, they should bee tried by their Peeres, (if they were tried as Bishops, and not first degraded;) and so some haue beene tried, vntill one appealed from them to the Pope. And good reason in those dayes they had, (if not now) to bee so tried, because many of the Bishops of those times were of the Princes of the nobilitie; (as may be seene in Bishop Godwins Catalogue of Bishops:) so that when Peeres were Bishops, why should not Bi­shops [Page 97] bee Peeres. It seemes in Richard the seconds dayes they were so accounted, for when hee did make vp the number of the twelue Peeres of the land, he chose Bren­tingham Bishop of Exeter one of them, which (I con­ceiue) hee would not haue done if hee had not beene a Peere before: and I am the rather perswaded so to thinke, because Richard the second extends the statute of Scanda­lum magnatum, to Bishops as well as Dukes,2. Rich Earles and Barons vnder the title of Peeres of the land. Besides these priviledges which they haue as they are Barons, the Kings of this land haue beene pleased out of their Princely favours to bestow many freedomes vpon them, especially on the Archbishop of Canterbury as amongst other ordi­nary and knowne,Stamfo [...] rogat. c. one against his Majesties written pre­rogatiue, as that the land held of that Bishop shall not be Ward to the King. And I beleeue the high estimation of that See abroad might mooue them to it, for they are not onely stiled Primates of all England, and Metropolitans,Duaren [...] gradibus cap. 9. Laelius Z [...] statu Leg but Patriarches; Patriarchae minorum gentium sunt Can­tuariensis, Aquiliensis, Biturgiensis, & Gradensis, and the most lawfull Legats of the Apostolicall See: Legati nati dignitas Archiepiscopatui Cantuariensi, Remensi, Eboracensi, & Pisano annexa est. This forraine respect might mooue them more particularly to honour them, though they haue alwayes most highly favoured Bishops in generall, in somuch, that they haue made them not onely á sacris, but à secretis, which is safe for a King, and no distraction to a Bishop in his calling;Lipsius A [...] 3. Polit. with Lipsius limitation interesse eos posse imò debere, sed rarenter cùm de rebus planè seriis agitur, & quae tangunt vnivers [...] statum; then should not Princes need to forbid Bishops the Court without they were sent for, (as Baronius saith, Iustinian was faine to doe). Thus I haue brifely discoursed,Baron. A [...] Anno 528 though not fully discovered some thing of the relation betwixt the state [Page 98] Ecclesiasticall and the Civill; which I haue done without advising in any thing to an alteration, or devising any thing for innovation; and with sub­mission to the licence of authority and the judgement of the learned.