1 MAN the Epitome of the whole world, Lord of the creatures, in regard of that perfect analogie and re­semblance betweene him & the great worlds frame, is not vnfitly by the Learned, both Diuines and Philosophers, termed, The Lesser world: for there is nothing in the vaste compasse of this vniuersall circumference, whose like­nesse and liuely representation we haue not [Page 2]summarily comprised in man, as in a most perfect compendium and abridgement. For as the first-moued-sphere carieth with its mo­tion, the subiect inferiour circles; so the seruile vnderfaculties, as the sensuall desire & appetite, are by nature subdued to the do­minion and guidance of the more principall and mistris-power of the soule, which wee call reason. And as in the middest of heauen there is situated the Sunne that enlightneth all things with his raies, and cherisheth the world, and the things therein contained with his life-keeping heat: so the heart of man, the fountaine of life and heat, hath assigned to it by nature, the middle part of our body for his habitation, from whence proceedeth life and heat, vnto all the parts of the bo­die, (as it were vnto riuers) whereby they be preserued and inabled to performe their naturall and proper functions. But not to be infinite in prosecuting the particulars of this well knowen comparison, as in other things we see a perfect proportion, so also, beside the analogie we may obserue a mutu­all coexistence. For as the world at the begin­ning was created for man, so with man it shall also be abolished: for it is an vndeniable principle in Philosophy, that God and Nature, [Page 3]or rather the God of Nature neither effectually worketh, nor permissiuely suffereth any thing, but vnto some good end. For being infinitely wise, nay wisedome it selfe, how can we ima­gine so high a point of folly, resident in his Godhead, as to allow of vanities, things so hatefull, and so abhorring from all medio­crity of wisedome? Wherefore man hauing a determinate date of endurance which hee cannot passe, the world also, which is only for mans vse and seruice, must of necessity haue an end of being. Now because there is (as we said) a mutuall coexistence of the world and man, as the world is not but for man, so neither is man, but in and by the world. For as in Nauigation, those that are in the shippe, haue rest and motion with the mouing & cessation of the ship, so we that are tossed in the rough sea of this world, in our voiage vnto heauen our safest hauen, when our vessell of carriage once perisheth, we also perish together. For as Aristotle said truely, that whatsoeuer hath being, hath of necessity be­ing in some place; so from thence ariseth this necessary illation, that when there is once left no place to be in, then shall there remaine no longer being. So that intending to shew this truth as very pertinent to our purpose, [Page 4]viz. that man hath an appointed time of being, which hee cannot passe, the Question of the worlds eternity is fitly incident, especially, seeing, as is aforesaid, the world is for mans sake, and man by meanes of the world.

2 Now if any man shall call into question, the pertinency of this question, for his satis­faction and resolution in that behalfe, let him consider, how necessarily vpon the vari­ation of our temperature (whence the distin­ction of ages proceedeth) a finall destructi­tion, by an vnperceiueable lingring decay of purity in our substance, doth depend. For as in the violent motion of things naturall, we see it comes to passe, that the virtue or pow­er of mouing, imprinted by the vnnaturall mouer, by little and little decaying, at length by continuance of mouing, or rather by the resistance of the bodies about it, is cleane extinguished: So in the naturall proceeding toward the enemie and end of nature, death the preseruing meanes of life (either by the toilesomenesse of their neuer-ceasing opera­tion, or by the corruption and mixture of impure moisture, infecbled and disabled to the sufficient performance of their functi­ons, more and more euery day) at length of force yeelds to the oppressing violence of [Page 5]their resisting aduersaries, not able any lon­ger to maintaine their conquering action, so that the discussing of this contronersie is very homogeneous to the series of this treatise. For till there be granted an end of mans life, the mutation of the temperature by decay of nature may well be doubted of, forasmuch as a successiuc impairing alway importeth a finall dissolution.

3 First therefore touching the continuance of the world, whether as it had a beginning, so it shall haue an end, or rather whether it euer had beginning, or shall haue an end of being. Dionysius in his booke de Diuinis nomi­nibus, distinguisheth things that are, accor­ding to the difference of their indurance; the distinction is after this sort. The whole number of things, how many and diuers so­euer, may be summarily comprised vnder these three seuerall heads. There are some things, or rather there is one thing Eternall, which neither had beginning nor shall haue end, and such is God alone, who onely being immutable, subiect to none, no not the least alteration, is therefore only from euerlasting to euerlasting, for that cause termed in holy writ, the Ancient of daies: amongst the old Egyptians resembled to a decrepit-old-man, [Page 6]and pourtraied like a youth in the prime of his flourishing yeares: by that first Image sig­nifying his long continuance from before, by the second, his liuelinesse and immuni­ty from all manerdefect and alteration by cancred corrupting time. For as his power is infinite, extended not onely to all things in the world, but euen vnto things which are not: as first hee made all things of no­thing, as his greatnesse is vnmeasurable, not limited or bounded by any place or com­passe, and therefore said to haue his centrum vbique, from which the essence of al things is drawen, as lines, and where they end and are all conioyned, & his circumference no where: finally, as all his attributes are infinite, and immeasurable, so is his continuance altoge­ther boundlesse. Wherefore not to enter at all into this inextricable Labyrinth of Gods infinite continuance, let vs proceed vnto the next part of the distinction. Beside God, who is onely Eternall, there are other things in a middle degree, tearmed by the moderne Philosophers, Euiternall, hauing beginning from God, the fountaine of being, yet with­out end, either of annihilation, or corruption; such are all spirituall creatures, Angels, and the Soules of men. Where notwithstanding [Page 7]there is a doubt to be answered: For in the whole Historie of the Creation recorded by Moses, we finde no mention of the making of Angels, nor any word of them till the nar­ration of the Womans treacherous seduction by the diuel in the serpent, so that either they were not created, and so were from euerla­sting, or else, Moses his Chronicle is in this point defectiue. But wee may well answer, that they had a beginning, seeing that eterni­ty is Gods peculiar attribute, and the same, though inclusiuely, expressed by Moses in his booke of beginnings: for by Heauen is signified, not onely the body of heauen, but the things also therein contained. Now of the indirect, and inclusiue mention made of these admirable creatures, there may this reason be giuen: The men of those times being very superstitious, and giuen vnto I­dolatry, (for the Egyptians euen at that time worshipped the Sunne, & the hosts of heauen) Moses fearing to giue new occasion to their false will-worship, of purpose refrained from expresse mentioning of their names, or na­tures in his history. For if these bodily vi­sible creatures, wrung from them such di­uine worship, the Angels, by how much more excellent their nature is, would haue so [Page 8]much the more added new fewell to their begun fire of superstition. Secondly, lest the detractory Nature of corrupted man, should haue ascribed some part of the glory of the worlds creation to those heauenly creatures, the wise pen-man of this excellent story, of purpose concealed what hee knew either of their Creation or Nature: so that Moses his history is in this regard not defectiue, howsoeuer giuing no expresse notion of the creation of Angels. Neither are the Angels, though most excellent creatures, void of beginning, there being but one thing, which one made all things, of it selfe, eternall. The third degree is of those things that had both beginning with time, and shal haue their end in time; such are all bodily creatures as well simple as mixt, although touching the cele­stiall bodies there be some doubt.

4 Now as concerning the world, the questi­on is, to which of these three kinds, it may and ought to be referred. And I finde three seuerall opinions. The first is of them that make the world eternall, wanting beginning, and incapeable of end. The second of them that grant both beginning and end of being. There is a third sect that parts these two o­pinions, affirming, that it had a beginning [Page 9]and shall haue no end. But lest wee sticke in the words, let vs in one word or two, set downe the sense and meaning of the Questi­on: and because that crror is the child of con­fusion, distinguish the things doubtfull, lest through the equiuocation of the words, by mistaking, wee come vnto a contrary sense. By the world therfore, sometime is meant the whole compasse of things that are, as well spirituall as bodily, extended in this sense euen vnto God himselfe. Secondly it is ta­ken for all things, only God excepted, euen the whole worke of the Creation, excluding no creature how excellent soeuer, no not the Angels. Thirdly it signifieth onely the cir­cuite of bodily Creatures, whether you in­terpret bodily things to be such as haue bo­dies as parts of them, or such as, though in regard of composition haue no bodies, yet haue their being onely in creatures bodily, as those things which we call Accidents. For the first acception it concerneth not our pur­pose. For Nature it selfe excludeth God from all kinde of beginning, and it is a principle both in reason, and in religion that God is from euerlasting. In the second sense wee may take it, comprehending all things both spirituall and bodily: for euen the Angels as [Page 10]is before said, had their beginning by creation: but we rather hold our selues vnto the last signification, as being most vsually meant by those that handle this controuersie. And this also according to its threefold conside­ration, hath three seuerall acceptions? For first it is taken for that Idaea & type precon­ceiued of the Maker God, by which he was ruled and directed in the building thereof. And this is tearmed by Plato, the Ideal or exemplary world, as it were the copie which God followed in the creation: whereby if he vnderstand Gods decree to create, we may without error entertain it; otherwise it is som­what harsh: for we are not to imagine that God needeth any long premeditate or fore­conceiued type of his workes, as our finite artificers do, but as his wisedome, and pow­er is infinite, so doth hee, in an vnutterable manner at the same moment, deuise the manner and performe the worke, and yet, not rashly, but most wisely, and with great deliberation. For as he said in another sense, so may I say in this case, One day with God, is as a thousand yeares, and a thousand yeares as one day; length of time adding nothing to his ability and wisedome, nor fewnesse of daies, any way detracting from the perfecti­on [Page 11]of his workemanship. Secondly it is ta­ken for the vniuersity of things contained within the compasse and cope of heauen and earth, now really and actually subsisting; and this is called of Plato, the world reall, as hauing an actuall and externall being in Na­ture, not onely in conceit and intention. Thirdly man is called the lesser world, in re­gard of that perfect analogie and simili­tude, betwixt him and this greater world, wherein there is nothing whose likenesse and resemblance may not be seene in man: and this you may call the Analogicall world. Now by the world in our question, we prin­cipally vnderstand, the frame of all things in heauen and in earth: lesse principally Man, as being but a part thereof. As for the other terme, namely Eternall, that also hath two acceptions; for things are said to bee Eternall two waies: First improperly, that which neuer shall haue end, more fitly cal­led Euiternall or Immortall. Properly that is said to be Eternall which neither had begin­ning, nor shall haue end, nor as Boethius ad­deth, any succession. Now Eternall, we take in the more proper and latter sense. So that the Question may thus more plainlie be expres­sed, Whether the heauen and earth, with the [Page 12]bodily Creatures therein contained, had a be­ginning, or shall haue an end of being.

5 But because that part of the opinion which concerneth the worlds eternitie, a parte ante, as the schoole-men speake, that is, its being from euerlasting, is not so directly pertinent vnto our purpose, we will with all possible breuitie runne ouer the speciall reasons, and foundations thereof, the ra­ther because the authors and maintainers thereof from the want of beginning, inferre the vncapablenesse of an end. Now the chiefe Patron and desender of this opinion in regard of authoritie, though not of time, was Aristotle, who, as I take it, rather affe­cting singularitie, than for any soundnesse of the matter or strength of argument, tanght it in his Lycoeum. For the Philoso­phers which liued before him, with generall consent agreed in the contrarie opinion: Trismegistus, who with his learning wate­red the then barren countrey of Greece, as Diodorus Siculus witnesseth in his first booke of Antiquities, Musaeus, Orpheus, Linus, Epicharmus, Hesiodus, and Homer, amongst the Poets; Zoroastes, Anaxagoras, Melissus, Empedocles, Pherecides, Philo­laus, Democritus, and Plato, as Philo In­daeus [Page 13]Laertius Diogenes, Sulcitius Seue­rus, Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Plutarch, and Tully witnesse, which also his bookes intituled Timaeus, and Critias, together with those De Republica doe testifie. One­ly Aristotle in a selfe-conceit of singularity, howsoeuer elsewhere honoring antiquitie, rather liketh in this case a new broched opi­nion of his owne, contrary to so many fore­going Philosophers: and therefore Hiero­phantes, a deuout, though idolatrous Priest, condemned him of arrogancie, and selfe­loue, not onely because, contrarie to the common receiued opinion of his countrey, continued so many ages vngainsaied, hee denied the pluralitie of Gods, but also, and much more for that he stucke not to teach, that the world was from euerlasting, which all Greece confessed to haue had beginning in time.

6 But to fetch the beginning of this phan­tasticall opinion somewhat higher: we will beginne with Democritus, the archpatron of fortune, who will haue the World Eter­nall, and withall chanceable: But Eternitie and Chance, being (as the learned Sir Philip obserued) things vnsufferable together; If Chanceable, then not Eternall. Againe, [Page 14]what is more absurd then to thinke the World was made by the vntended, and ca­suall concourse of indiuisible substances? for whence came these substances? If you say they came from Euerlasting, & so were Eter­nall, can you conceiue such chanceable ef­fects to proceed from so certaine & necessa­ry causes? Nay rather, if you wil needs main­tane the infinitenes of these diminitiue bo­dies, grant they had beginning from that In­finite One that glued the Infinite parts of your Infinite. All, together, by his vnmeasu­rable Power and Wisedome. For can we ima­gine such a perfect Order and Stabilitie to consist in these disioined substances? Order & Constancie are children onely of Wisdome: & sooner may we prooue Darknesse to pro­ceed from the Sunne, than Constancie and Order from inconstant chance, constant in nothing but in Inconstancie. Finally, we must either exclude Gods Wisedome and proui­dent care of the World made, or els Fortune from making of the World: (for the World is Gods possession, onely by right of creati­on) vnlesse we imagine a deed of gift passed by Fortune at her death: or Fortune the true Owner, (if the true Maker) disinherited, & by violence driuen out of her dominion by [Page 15] God as an Vsurper. But God hauing nothing to plead for his title vnto his kingdome, but the right of creation, if that plea be improo­ued, God cannot any longer call the World his owne, and therefore without crueltie may cast off all care of this his supposed of­spring. For it is onely Gods Fatherhood that bindes him vnto his Prouidence.

7 Therefore not to stay long in this opini­on of Fortune, let vs now come vnto Nature, deified especially by Strato a Naturalist: who fearing to ouersway God with the weight of this burthen, either in the ma­king, or gouerning of the World, hath gran­ted hm a Remedie, or Otium as they terme it, thinking it more reason that God should haue an exemption from trouble, than Gods priests, who for his sake be dispensed withall. But let vs see, what this Nature may bee, so highly by Strato magnified. There is a particular Nature, and there is a generall or vniuersall Nature. The particular is that which in euery seuerall single sub­stance, ministreth Essence to the whole com­pound: and withall, is author of such action, and motion, as is agreeable to the subiect wherein it is, as the Nature of fire, causeth the fires ascention, the Nature of earth, the [Page 16] earths going downward: and in regard of this Nature, we say it is Naturall to the fire to ascend, to the earth to descend, the bo­dies hauing in them, cuen of themselues, by their inherent forme a promptnesse, and in­clination vnto these motions. Now if by the conspiring of these many & manifold Na­tures, this All, we now speake of, were made, as if the Elements, & Ethereall parts should in their town-house set downe the bounds of e­uery ones office; then consider what follow­eth, that there must needs haue beene, a wis­dome ouerruling power, which made them concur: for their natures being so diuers and contrary, would rather haue wrought each others destruction, than so friendly haue cō ­sorted, to make vp so vnexpressable an har­mony. For, to grant knowledge vnto them whereby to moderate the extremity of their naturall fury, or intendment of such agree­ment, were to enter into a bottomlesse pit of absurdities, seeing that knowledge alway pre­supposeth roason, & reason sense; both which are neuer found, either iointly, or in part, in bodilie senselesse creatures. Now touching the Vninersall Nature, which some will haue to be nothing, but an influent virtue, helping & furthering the actions of euery particular na­turall [Page 17]body, others, an Vniuersall ouerruling, and as it were, an Ideall Nature subsisting. For as the particular nature of euery particular body, causeth and mainetaineth the particu­lar actions of the body wherein it is; so this generall Nature is the author and maintai­ner of all actions and bodies: to which, the single seuerall bodies are in subiection, by their obedience acknowledging a kinde of superiority, in that nature which we call vni­uersall. And in the respect of this nature, the fire is said, in some cases, to goe downe­ward, by nature, as to hinder the discontinui­tie of things in the world, and so, that empti­nes which nature so much abhorreth. Now, if by this vniuersall nature, they vnderstand a nature of wisedome, and goodnesse, and pro­nidence, which with knowledge performeth its actions, and so of purpose, & deliberate­ly hath knit togethet these so many points to such an excellent vnitie, this Nature wee reiect not, but retaine, as that God and Ma­ker of all things, that by his infinite irresista­ble power bath conioined the disagreeing parts of this visible world, and of things contrary made a perfect harmony, permit­ting in their nature a mutuall resistance; yet so, as they hinder not their friendly copula­tion [Page 18]in the worlds composition. In sum, touching Nature and Fortune, they are thus onely (saith Scaliger) to be interpreted: that Nature signifies Gods ordinary power; and thus, things extraordinary may be called vn­naturall: Fortune his vnreuealed will, and thus may wee call things chanceable that are beside expectation or beyond reason.

8 Now touching the Epicure, who (as Tully saith) deriued his opinion from Democritus, we will in one word answer his reason, recor­ded by Tully in his second booke de Natura Deorum, and so come vnto Aristotle, and his Scholar the Atheist. The Epicures reason is briefly thus propounded by way of interro­gation: What eies (saith he in his scoffing impudency) had Plato, to behold the fra­ming of this so great a worke? Or what tooles, and fellow-workemen had God to make the World withall? The answer is, that Plato his eie, was the eie of reason, gathering by necessary consequence, both the being of the Deity, as also confusedly apprehending the infinitenesse of God his power and wisdome shinig in the world, as in a most cleere glasse reflecting, in some sort, the Image of Gods inuisible Nature, vpon the eies of all the be­holders. Touching absence of instruments [Page 19]and fellow-workemen, whereby the Epicure would inferre the impossibility to create in God, we are not to thinke, that God, infinite in power, is tied to the helpe of secundary in­strumentall causes, they being but supplies of defects, and helps of wants, in the other­wise insufficient agents: and therefore not requisit, to the eternall infinitenesse of Gods ability. Nay we may adde further, which is Gods priuiledge, God of nothing, is powerfull enough to make all things, much more with­out instruments. Now a possibility of crea­ting in God, may thus briefly be shewn: accor­ding to the maner of being of euery thing, so also is the order of working; but Gods be­ing and beginning dependeth vpon nothing but himselfe: why then should it be thought impossible, that Gods action is not tied vnto any matter? And indeed, the reason (as far as I can perceiue) why other things require a subject whereon to worke, is onely the im­potency of the Agents, but God Al-sufficient, and powerfull, who can out of the rocks bring water, out of darkenesse light, can also (as he hath done) make all things of nothing. An other reason may be this, taken from the difference of the principall efficients, God, Nature, Arte. Arte, alway presupposeth a [Page 20]thing really and perfectly subsisting: Nature onely a matter with a power to be God, (a farre more powerfull Agent then either Arte or Nature) is able, of that which is nothing at all, to make a thing of actuall and reall sub­sistence. For, if Nature can of a thing in the lowest degree of being, and next to a not being, make a thing actually subsisting, God All-sufficient, and infinit in power, can of no­thing create any thing in what degree of be­ing soeuer.

9 Now touching the Atheist, out of Aristo­tle his Philosophie he hath drawen this sub­tile Interrogatorie, which hee propoundeth with so vnsauorie scorne: If the world were not from Euerlasting, but made by the God you talke of, I would know of you, where he liued before the time that hee made the world; how he busied himselfe all the time before? for it is an absurdity, euen among vs, to say, he was idle: as also what he did, if he did not make it from euerlasting? Touch­ing the place of his being, and the maner of his worke, I may not vnfitly answer, as a lear­ned Father of the Primitiue Church did vn­to the same demand; He was in a wood proui­ding fewell for that fire, which should in heltor­ment such curious priers into matters beyond [Page 21]their reach. But for his location, I may thus more fitly answer: that God is tied to no place, being in all places to fill them with his goodnesse, in no place to be circumscribed by the circumference. Touching his action we answer, that howsoeuer the externall worke, (the after-fruit of his externall working) had no externall sensible being, yet was hee not vnoccupied, his very decreeing being an action, and that also hauing relation vnto the creatures, which should afterward haue being. The Hebrewes (who many times do but trifle in matters of waight) giue vnto this friuolous question, as friuolous an answer, saying, that God to keepe himselfe vnoccu­pied, spent that time in trifling experiments, now making a world on this fashion, now on that, then by and by dissoluing his loose & displeasing worke; at length by many trials, to haue light vpon this world, & this fashion, which for his conceiued liking, he establi­shed. But these learned Rabbins, meant a more serious matter then their words beare shew of: and that was, that God did not rashly; nor without great deliberation make the world on this fashion rather than any other, and that he sawe he might haue made it many other waies, and sooner, and [Page 22]more worlds, but would not: alluding, as I take it, to Gods counsell-taking, at the de­decree, touching the time and maner of the worlds creation, which was the sum of our first giuen answer. But more soundly and to the purpose we answer, that the actions of the Deity are of two sorts, immanent & inter­nall: or externall and transeunt: the immanent actions, are those which bee in the Deitie from one person vnto another, as to loue to­gether, and such like: the transeunt actions are those, that passe from the Godhead to some externall obiect: they may both bee thus illustrated. As in the element of fire there is a facultie of heating and enlight­ning, whence proceedeth heat and light vnto the externall neere bodies, and beside this facultie there is also in it a naturall po­wer to go vpward, which when it commeth into act, is receiued in no other subiect but the fire it selfe: so that, if fire could by abstractiue imagination be conceiued of, as wanting these two transeunt operations, yet could we not iustly say it had no action, for­asmuch as it might mooue vpward, which is an immanent and inward action. So, and much more so, though we grant that there was no externall worke of the Godhead, vn­till [Page 23]the making of the world, yet can there be no necessarie illation of idlenesse, seeing it might haue, (as indeed it had) actions im­manent included in the circle of the Trini­ty: Againe, thus reason these blasphemous Atheists against the truth: If for mans sake God made the world, and all things therein, how cōmeth it to passe, that there are in the world so many noisome creatures, as vipers and such like, which procure rather our an­noiance, than serue any way for our vse and benefit? For to say they are chanceable, or of a voluntary & selfe procreation, is (in our Philosophy) absurd, especially, seeing we extend Gods power, and prouidence vnto ve­rie flies, and such like creatures. But we may answer, first that there is nothing so cumber­some, which is not some way seruiceable. Or, if now disobedient, yet not so created, but, for mans rebellion against God, permitted or rather directed to arme themselues a­gainst him, for whose vse and helpe they were created: like vnto that sword, which Hector gaue Aiax, which so long as he vsed against men his enemies, serued for his helpe and defence; but after that he began to vse it, or rather to abuse it, to the hurt of hurtlesse beasts, it turned into his owne bowels. For [Page 24]vntill the transgression Adam liued as Lord of the creatures, hauing the now most dan­gerous and pernicious creatures vnder him in subiection. For the diuell, that subtle se­ducer, was not so simple a sot, as to make choise of the serpent to beguile him wth in­ticements, if he had knowen, or but suspe­cted any resident feare in man of the ser­pent, by some foregoing remembred mis­chiefe; for that had beene rather to terrifie him from all attention, then any way to al­lure him to follow his counsell. So that, all things which now are vnto corrupted man most cumbersome, as punishments of his disloialty, were by creation ordained for his furtherance. Nor need they wonder, that Gods power and knowledge should stretch it selfe vnto flies and such diminutiue crea­tures, as they tearme them: nay it is far more insensible, that the estate of flies should bee vnknowen vnto him, for that were to bound the infinitnesse of his knowledge.

10 But to leaue the professed Atheist, who though from Aristotle his schoole he suc­ked his noisome error, yet went farre beyond Aristotle in impiety: For Aristotle (at least in words) confested Gods being, an infinitnes, which also hee went about to prooue and [Page 25]confirme by reason, whereas these godlesse Heretikes doe not onely deny both in their works, and by consequence of words, but e­uen shamelesly with direct speeches, not only his omnipotency, but euen his very being: let vs therefore come to Aristotle and his lesse profane followers. The Peripatetickes principall and most subtle argument, which also they vrge with greatest vehemency, is briefly this; say they, either the world was from euerlasting, or else made anew, pro­ceeding from not being, vnto this being which now it hath. But it was not made a new; for then, either it proceeded from a power and fitnesse which it had to bee vnto this actuall being, or else it was made of no­thing. If before it was actually subsisting, it had a being potentiall from euerlasting (see­ing things that are potentially, though in the basest degree of being, yet are not meerely nothing) it followeth, that it alwaies was (at least potentially) and so eternall. If we say that it was made of nothing, that is (in their Philosophy) an absurd impossibility. For it is with them a principle not questionable, That euery making presupposeth a subiect. Now if wee obiect, that the necessary pre­sence of a reall subiect dependeth only vpon [Page 26]the Makers infirmity, and imperfection: they answer, that the disability of doing im­possibilities is not defect or imbecillity. To which said argument of theirs (as they would haue it) there may bee a double an­swer giuen. For first, wee affirme that the world proceeded, from not being to being. To the proposition of their prosyllogisme we answer by deniall thereof, and reiect their distinction as sophisticall, putting contrarie­ty (the greatest opposition) betwixt things, not only agreeing, but euen all one. For there is a potentiall being, incident to things that are not at all, and therefore doe the Schoolemen distinguish of the potentiall being after this manner: A thing (say they) may bee said to haue a potentiall being two waies: first, that is said to bee potentially which is not yet, either in whole, or in part subsisting in nature, which hauing no reall, or actuall cause of being, may notwithstan­ding afterward haue a true cause of its es­sence and existence. So that it is not any thing, in, or of it selfe, but is vertually con­tained within the ability of some thing, that may afterward bring it vnto a true and reall being. As for example, there is a potentiall being of moe worlds then one, inasmuch as [Page 27]God by his vnresistable, vndecaied power is able, as well to make more worlds, as hee was to create this one world which wee be­hold and inhabite: yet, who will say, that there are more worlds then one, either to­tally or partially, really and truely now be­ing in nature? Indeed it is a thing within the compasse of Gods omnipotencie, to bring in a multiplicitie of worlds, and therefore we may not vntruely say, that this multipli­citie of worlds hath a being potentiall. So likewise, who will denie, that a man sound and without maime or lacke of his limmes, that neuer set foot ouer his threshold, hath power (with supposition of health and strength) to trauell ouer the whole circuit of the countrey; yet is it absurd to say, that this iourney of his, is any way in nature, either wholly or in part. Secondly, that may iustly and is more properly said; to be potential­ly, that hauing an actuall and reall subsi­sting, euen separate from it efficient cause, wherein it was before vertually contained, yet lacketh somewhat, which by nature it is capable of. As for instance hereof, a childe altogether vnlettred, may iustly be said to be potentially disposed toward the receit of learning, inasmuch as it hath a reasonable [Page 28]soule, which is alway accompanied with a capacitie of learning. To applie this distin­ction vnto our purpose, we say that to be potentially in the first degree, is indeed to be nothing; because this potentiall being is a meere not being: & so was the world from euerlasting, hauing such an abilitie and ca­pablenesse (that I may so speake) of being, forasmuch as God by his omnipotency was from euerlasting powerfull enough to cre­ate the world, as in time hee did actually make the same. Now for that other kinde of potentiall being, incident vnto things onely that haue receiued an actuall being from their causes, it was in that rude Chaos created by God, the first day of the begun­making of the world, and was afterward per­fected in the worke of distinction (as the Schoole-men call it) when God out of that confusion, or rather vpon that rude lumpe, brought this admirable varietie and diffe­rence of creatures, for the ornament of the world: for that the world was in this sort potentially onely at the creation of the first matter, which was in the time by Moses mentioned. Secondly we answer, that it is not impossible for God of nothing to make things really and truly subsisting, as we be­fore [Page 29]proued. To their Axiome or principle, which they call Vndeniable, we answer, that there is a twofolde faction or making: One naturall, incident to creatures, commonly called Generation; the other supernaturall, the priuiledge of God himselfe, which we terme Creation. Now euery making which is a Generation, requireth a really-being subiect, because it is either a motion or mu­tation, which supposeth a matter wherein it is receiued: but the making of Creation, is alway without any matter subiect, being de­sined to be, A making something of nothing: But these aduersaries admit of no such du­plicity of making, holding it a meere impos­sibilitie, for any Agent in this sort to create: Thus therefore somewhat otherwise we an­swer: There be two sorts of Agents or Effi­cients, the one Vniuersall, the other Parti­cular or Partiall. They differ thus: That the Efficient vniuersall is cause of the whole be­ing and essence of it effect, making both matter and forme: and this action of this Agent, is not Motion or Mutation, but a bare Emanation. The Particular Agent is not cause of the whole essence of that it ma­keth, seeing it alway requireth the preexi­stence of the matter, and the action thereof [Page 30]is truely called Motion or Mutation. So then, it is impossible for a partiall or halfe efficient (as you may terme him) to worke or make a thing of nothing; but for an vni­uersall, it is not onely possible, but euen easie. And is it not (thinke you, to answer euery point of their reason) an infirmitie in the maker, not to bee able to make a thing without matter? for why is the existence of the matter necessarie, but because the effici­ent can doe nothing: and doth not this im­port a defect of the workmans abilitie? No, say the aduersaries, for it is no imperfection to be vnable to doe things impossible: but we denie that this is vnpossible vnto any, but vnto particular agents naturall; as for God to whom nothing is vnpossible (but to denie himselfe) as he is the whole and sole cause of being, so is he able, euen from a not being, to bring things to the highest and most excellent degree of being. Second­ly, say they, vnlesse we grant an euer-being of motion, we must needs admit either of a proceeding in infinitum, or els of this sense­lesse contradiction, that before the first mo­tion there was a motion more ancient; two maine absurdities, the one in reason, the other in nature. For the progresse in infini­tum, [Page 31]they thinke it is thus proued; for be­fore the motion, whereby the first mooued body was made, there was of necessity re­quisite some potentiall being thing, because that motion is only incident vnto things of a potentiall existence. If that be granted, then they inferre, that there was some mo­tion wherby this subiect had it being, and so in infinitum. But to stop their long iourney, wee may hinder this infinite proceeding by granting a creation. It is true indeed that there must needes bee a thing capable of motion before there can be any moouing: for in euery motion there is a thing moo­uing, and a thing mooued; but there is no necessitie that this mooueable should haue its being by motion; for it was made by creation, which was no motion, but a simple and bare emanation: For there is a two-fold mediate action, whereby a cause is said to worke, according to which duplicitie of action, they hane thus distin­guished of causes efficient. There is, say the Schoolemen, a double efficient or working cause, one called Efficiens per transmutatio­nem, that is, such a cause, whose operation is alway ioined with some change in the thing working, according as is the resistance, ei­ther [Page 32]of the bodie betweene it, and the pati­ent, or of the thing whereon hee work­eth, which doth more or lesse withstand his impression. The other is, Efficiens per emanationem, as when without any repug­nancy of any patient or labour of the agent, the effect or worke doth voluntarily and freely arise from the action of the work­ing cause: as the shadow from the body: such is God, whose vnresistable power by his bare word of command, euen of no­thing made this admirable worke of the world, as the shadow and obscure represen­tation of his wisedome and omnipoten­cy: not changed in his nature, there being nothing by Reaction to imprint any thing in the impassionable Godhead. And this is the full and sufficient answer to the second ar­gument. Thirdly they reason thus: There is an eternall mouer, therefore there hath bene an eternall motion and a thing moued, in asmuch as these relatiues cannot be but to­gether in nature. For answer whereto wee must remember, that there is an absolute, both consideration, and being of God. Ab­solute I say and out of relation, otherwise Gods being should be onely in relation. It is true indeed that relatiues are alway toge­ther [Page 33]in nature beginning to be, and finishing their being, in one and the same moment. For instance, a father is not a father vntill he haue a sonne, nor is he a father longer than he hath a sonne. And yet for all that those things which are Relatiues, may haue being, one before another, thogh not as Relatiues, yet as things really subsisting in nature. For example, who can deny that Adam was in nature, before either conception or birth of his bloody sonne Cain? yet was he not a fa­ther vntill God had blessed him with that after-cursed-ofspring. And who seeth not, that the Carpenter had being in Nature be­fore he builds the house, although he be no actuall builder till the house be in making? So God that was from euerlasting before all times, had his being without motion, though not as a mouer, yet as a thing really and perfectly existing: but when in fulnesse of time (according to the free determined purpose of his will) he began the frame of the world, then also began he to be a Rela­tiue, a builder in respect of this goodly house and palace, the world; a Father, that is, the Beginning of being vnto the childe of the creation, the image of his greatnesse; and in­deed, in these and such kinde of controuer­sies, [Page 34]we must warily vse these termes of rela­tion, especially in regard of the creatures, lest wee binde God onely vnto a relatiue be­ing, and so make his existence dependent on the creatures.

Their fourth argument is in substance this: If God so long before had being, with­out being a Creator, there was doubtlesse some defect in the foregoing time, the sup­plie whereof in the moment of creation mo­ued him to make the world rather at that time than any other. For there is no new action but presupposeth some new in­citement, which moued the Agent to vn­dertake the worke, more then before; but there could bee nothing at this time more than before, that could moue God the prin­cipall and perfectest workeman, to take in hand this busienesse and worke rather now, than before; for then how could he be the primary and principall cause? But this in short may be the answer; Indeed there was all this time an impediment, forasmuch as God would not actually create, vntill the time foreappointed in his secret purpose was accomplished. Nay, but say the aduersaries, God vntill this time was indifferent to cre­ate, or not to create, therefore there was in [Page 35]the instant of the creation some thing that restrained this his indifferency. But we may answer, That there was no such indifferency, (as they talke of,) God hauing from all e­ternity, purposely determined at this time to beginne the worke of the creation. So that vnto the fore-mentioned demand of the A­theist, why God deferred the creating of the world vntill this moment of time, we may answer, that of the choise of this time, rather then any other, for this his worke, there can no other reason be giuen, but his most free­will, that in his decree of creation restrained, and bound it selfe to this time, rather than vnto any other. Now if they shall reply, that we are not to imagine Gods will vnreasona­ble, and therefore no doubt there was some reason that mooued him to this limitation of his will: we may answer, That we doe not deny but God had some reason (though not without himselfe) of this his prorogati­on. Nay we may without offence, goe so farre, as to giue some reason of this dilation, in generall: That God would not from e­uerlasting create the world, to shew the in­dependency of his existence in regard of the creatures: as also, to giue vs vnderstand, that not for any hope of benefit, which should [Page 36]proceed to him from the creatures, he vn­dertooke this worke: but rather (as it is the property of goodnesse to communicate it selfe) out of the ouerflowing fountaine of his indefectiue goodnesse, to deriue some commodity vnto vs his creatures: for hee that could so long be without vs, might with­out any inconueniency vnto himselfe, for euer haue continued in that state of loneli­nesse. So that, of the deferring of the crea­tion, in generall, there may be a reason gi­uen; but why hee began at this time rather than at any other, either before or after, there is no other reason, but his owne free-will, knowen vnto vs. But heere ariseth a doubt, whether God could haue begun sooner, or put off longer this worke of creation. The answer is, that he could by his potential and absolute power; he could not by his actuall and conditionall. For Gods power hath a two-fold consideration, the one absolute, without regard of any his decrees whatsoe­uer, whereby he is able to do all, euen those things, that he will not; the other conditio­nall, ioined with the consideration and re­spect of his will, whereby he is able to doe all things which hee will, and onely those things which he will. God therefore, respe­cted [Page 37]without his decree, was able, sooner or later to create the world; but if we consider him together with his purpose, hee could not either haue preuented, or deferred this his intended worke of the creation: Nor do we heereby robbe God of his freedome, or binde him to any part of the contradiction, but if hee bee bound, sure hee hath bound himselfe, hauing this law onely prescibed him, that he denie not himselfe, that is in­deed to take away his Godhead. But if God would not from euerlasting make the world, how is he not changed in his will? The an­swer is, that God would from euerlasting make the world, but he would not make the world from euerlasting; that is in plainer tearmes: God had from euerlasting a will and purpose to create the world, but it ne­uer was his will, that the world should haue a coeternall being with himselfe; so that Gods will is stil the same altogether vnalte­red. But they farther vrge this argument, demanding how God by an euerlasting and old action of his wil, could in time create the world anew, remaining himselfe vnchange­able. To which we may answer, that a con­tinued action of his will, how ancient soe­uer, executing onely that which he before [Page 38]intended, may well stand without admissi­on of alteration: as for example, If the pur­pose of my will to day, be to iourney toward London the next weeke, which also accord­ing vnto purpose I performe; will any man say my will is changed? In like sort, God from euerlasting decreeing to create the world at such a time, if at the time purposed this his decree be put in execution, is not thereby changed. Nay rather he is thereby to be thought more vnchangeable, for as much as he performeth that which before he did determine. Why but, say they, God is not freed from alteration, because that of a Non-creator, hee was made a Creator. The answer is, That God was not heereby changed, albeit there was indeed some change (though improperly so called) when as the world proceeded frō not being vnto being: for the succession of a being, after a not being, importeth some alteration, thogh not in the author of the new being, but ra­ther in the thing that receiued that being; we shall make it plaine by this supposition. Let vs imagine a vault or other close place, so fenced from the Sunne beames that no light, not the least glimmering can pierceit, which afterward by digging or some such [Page 39]meanes, may haue passage made thorough it, for the Sunnes accesse; would we say that the Sunne were by this meanes altered, be­cause it inlightneth a place which before was full of darknesse? Euen so, and much more so, God the fountaine of Light, (whose Spi­rit moouing vpon the waters, whereas before there was darknesse vpon the face of the deepe, enlightned that darknesse, distinguishing those things which before were confusedly mixed, or rather bringing them from no­thing, to this their perfection) is not at all altered, but still remaineth the same, euer vnchangeable. And indeed, if euery new worke of God should make him changea­ble, how should hee not be often changed, creating daily the soules of now liuing men? For to say they haue being before their ioin­ing vnto the body, is plainly hereticall, and Origen was in that behalfe accused of a verie grosse error. Nor is it likely, nor yet indeed possible, they should come by traduction or propagation from our parents. For our soules being as the Angels are Spirituall substances, are as farre from that abilitie of procreation, as the Angels are, those super­naturall celestiall creatures: and there is the like reason for both. The Angels by [Page 40]reason of their spiritualitie, are void and vn­capable of procreation, mens soules also being no lesse spirituall than the Angels, are also vnfit for procreation: therefore one soule begets not another, much lesse comes it of a corporall seed, it selfe being spirituall. It remaines therefore that they are then a­new created by God, and so coupled vnto their bodies. Neither is God for this cause changed, seeing, as is aforesaid, he doth now onely put in execution, that which before he had in intention; and therefore (to con­clude this whole argument, with that saying of Hugo de Sancto Victore) Gods will was e­ternall, and the worke of his will was temporary; for alwaies euen from Eternitie, he had a will to create the world; yet neuer was he purposed to make the world from euerlasting, but his pur­pose and will was to make that in time which hee purposed before time to make in time. There­fore by his euer being goodnesse he for euer pur­posed: by his eternall wisedome hee alway dispo­sed that, which by his euerlasting power he once composed. Fiftly, they reason from the Eter­nitie of time, in this sort. Time is Eternall, therefore there is also an Eternall motion; for Time is the measure of moouing. Now the antecedent is thus prooued: That which [Page 41]hath beene alway, and shall be for euer, is E­ternall; but such is the condition of time: for you can designe vs no moment or in­stant before which, Time was not, and after which, Time shall not remaine. For, as Aristotle saith, euery now, or instant of time is the end of time past, and begining of time to come: as in a right line, euery middle point is the end of the fore-part of the line, and the beginning of the part fol­lowing. To which we may answer by reiect­ing this their discription of time, for, (as Scaliger hath well obserued) motion is ra­ther the measure of time; and thence it is (as I take it) that Plato called the Sunne and Starres times Instruments, and as it were the Iacobs staffe of time; because by their motion and dircumuolution we measure the indurance of the world. And therefore also (as I conceiue of it) the Poets called Saturne, that is Time, Heauens Sonne, because that from their circular mouing, came the distin­ction of Daies, and Moneths, and Yeeres. And to say the truth, there is a more gene­rall, and true definition of times then this of Aristotle; and it is this: The past, present and future indurance of things: Which also the authours of this discription distinguish into [Page 42]it kinds. There is (say they) a time perpe­tuall, or eternall, Gods owne peculiar attri­bute, who alone indureth from generation to generation; and there is an indurance or Time momentary, incident vnto the crea­tures. In this sense therefore it is no absur­dity to say, there was a time when Aristotles time was not: for hee maketh time of the same age with the heauens motion, so that, vntill the heauens began to bee mooued, Aristotles time was not: yet was there time before the heauens creation, that is a long space of indurance, in which God alone had being: But because time is indeed proper vnto the creatures, being as (other bodily and spirituall creatures) in scripture said to be made by God, let vs follow Aristotle in his owne Definition, and to his obiection out of his Schoole-interpreters we may fetch this answer: That euery Now, and instant of time is not both beginning of time to come and end of time past: for there is a threefold instant or Now. The first is instans, or Nunc initiatiuum, an instant onely of beginning. The second they tearme, Nunc continuati­uum, a continuing instant, and that is both beginning in respect of time following, and end in regard of time past. There is a third [Page 43]instant or moment, and that they call Nunc finiens, or terminatiuum, and that is such an instant, as only is an end of time foregoing: They may all bee thus illustrated, as in a straight line, the first pricke or point is onely the begining of the line, the last point onely the end of the same, the rest in the middle are both, the end of that part of the line which was before drawn, and the beginning of the hinder part. So in time, we may point out an instant that is onely beginning, another that is onely an end, a third that is both a be­ginning and end. Aristotle his authority there­fore can truely be vnderstood onely of the continuing and coupling instant. But against this distinguishing answer, Aristotle hath this exception: If there be any such instant, as is only a beginning in respect of time [...]llowing, and no end of that time which went before, then before this instant there was no time. What then? Therefore there was an Ante without time, which is absurd. For Ante and Post, before and after, are differences of time: As for example: When we say, Philip liued before Alexander, this word before, signifies a difference in time, betwixt Philip and Alexander his sonnes being. But who seeth not more subtilty than soundnesse in this re­ply [Page 44]of Aristotle; for we will in like sort thus reason against him. In his Physicks he hath this Position, Extra coelum nullus est locus: Be­yond heauen there is no place; therefore, there is some extra, in which is no place. For extra and intra, without and within, are dif­ferences of place; as for example: when we say he is without doores, our meaning is, that he is in some place without the house. Now if wee should thus reason against Aristotle: There is out of heauen a roome or place to be in; for extra without, is a difference of place, things being said to be without onely in regard of place. But Aristotle saith extra coelum, therefore there is without the inward hollow compasse of heauen an external out­roome: would he not straight (and that iustly) reproue our sophistrie? for Aristotle his meaning in that place is, that all things whatsoeuer are conteined within the inside of the body of heauen: and it is as if hee had said, there is no place, but within the inside of the ouercast circle of heauen. In like sort, when we say that before this first mo­ment of the heauens motion, there was no time; our meaning is, that all reall time had beginning with the heauens mouing. Reall time, I say; for there is time only imaginarie, [Page 45]improperly called time, as being rather a part of eternitie, and of that indurance and long continuance, which wee conceiue to haue beene in God before the creation of the world. And thus shall wee reade the words, Before, and After, vsed among the ancient Writers both Christian and Pro­phane: for so did Ouid vse it in the begin­ning of his Metamorphosis; Ante mare & terras, & quod tegit omnia coelum: Before that heauen and earth was made. So in the Scripture: Before the foundations of the world were layd, thou art God from euerlasting, world without end. Where it signifies no true and really subsisting time, for this time began only with the motions of the heauens, as A­ristotle himselfe witnesseth. In briefe there­fore, to shut vp this argument and this whole controuersie: The first instant and moment of time reall (before mentioned) was both a beginning and end; a beginning of time reall, and an end of time imaginary: nor is it any absurdity to say, that time imaginary was before true and really subsisting time.

11 And thus haue we with all possible speed runne ouer the reasons which be vsually brought to proue the worlds being from euerlasting; let vs now with like or lesse [Page 46]breuitie passe ouer those reasons which serue to improue this errour: and they are only two, which we will but propound, auoiding ouer-tedious long discourse; and so go on to the other part of the question. First then, from our owne experience we reason thus: It is a trueth confirmed by the triall of all times, that the quantities of mens bodies haue a perceiuable impairing, as also the length and continuance of their liues: so that, if in that infinit space of foregoing time men had had being (as without question, the world was neuer void of men, the prin­cipall and most noble member thereof) through continuall and incessant decay, their bodies had beene brought to as little a quantitie as they are capable of, if not cleane consumed: but we see their quantitie is not yet come vnto the lowest; therefore had they not being from euerlasting. Se­condly and more specially, had this world beene from euerlasting, infinite also had beene the propagation of man; and so wee should bring into the world an actuall infi­nitenesse, as absurd in Nature as Parolo­gismes be in Logicke: for in this infinite space and generation there had beene an in­finite number of mens soules, which being [Page 47]by Nature vncapable of mortalitie, we can not say, that as one was created another was destroied, and so should there be an infinite­nesse in regard of number, actually subsisting in Nature. And thus hoping that small power will serue to confound an aduersary already ouercome, wee passe to the other part of the Question, purposing as much breuitie as its difficultie and obscuritie will beare.

The Question is touching the worlds im­mortality, whether, as it had a beginning of being, so it shall also haue an end. Aristotle when hee first heard of their opinion, who appointed an end vnto the world, scoffingly burst out into these words: I was once afraid that my house, either by force of tempest, or by iniury of time, or lastly by some defect in the workeman-ship, should haue suddenly ouerwhel­med me, but now I haue great cause to feare my owne and my houses ruine, because of those that in words goe about to pull downe the world. But for the plainer and more speedy proceeding in the controuersie, let vs in one word set downe the true meaning of the question. There is a twofold end, the one of corrup­tion; the other of annihilation: the end of corruption, I call that whereby a thing is [Page 48]changed from being to a not being, not sim­plie as if it ceased altogether to be in nature, but because it loseth that being which be­fore it had; as for example, when wood by force of fire is turned into ashes, we may not vntruely say, there is a corruption of the wood, forasmuch as it ceaseth to be wood, & is become ashes; yet can we not say, heere is any annihilation, for we see there is a sub­stance remaining, but the matter which be­fore was vnder the forme of wood, hath now put on the form of ashes, & so of wood cor­rupted are ashes generated, according to that worne axiome of Aristotle, That the corruption of one thing is the generation of an other. The end of annihilation is, when a thing so loseth its present being, that no part thereof, neither matter nor yet forme abideth any longer in nature; but as it first was made of nothing, so is it againe turned into nothing. The question then (as I take it) must be thus vnderstood, that the world shall haue an end, though not of annihilati­on, yet of corruption; that is in other terms, though it shall not vtterly be abolished and turned vnto nothing, (for the matter there­of shall still remaine) yet shall it be changed into another estate and condition. The first [Page 49]part of the assertion is prooued by the au­thoritie of the learned. For Plato witnesseth in his Timaeus; so saith Bochus and Metho­dius, and Damascene in his second booke viz. of Orthodoxal faith: testified also by the wise Salomon, Eccles. 3. I haue learned (saith the Preacher) that all the works of the Lord indure for euer. that is, as I interpret it, though not without corruption, yet with­out annihilation. Now whether they haue this state of corruption by nature or no, there is a great question: but we may pro­bably answer, that of themselues and their naturall disposition infused by God, they haue no naturall inclination, or desire of corruption, much lesse of annihilation, for­asmuch as euery thing hath a naturall loue of its being, and an innated hatred of all things that bee enemies vnto the same, te­stified by that naturall Sympathie and Anti­pathie which may be obserued in things de­stitute of reason: for so we see in experience the lambe which neuer had experience of the woolues crueltie, euen at the first sight doth tremble and flie for feare. Nay, in creatures of a lower degree then these, tearmed by Aristotle, Plant-animals, wee may obserue, the like antipathie. Scaliger [Page 50]reporteth of a tree, growing in the Pro­uince which hee calles Pudefatamea, that at a mans neere approching, for modesty, draweth in his farre-spreadding boughes, at his departure spreeds it selfe againe, for that cause tearmed by the inhabitants, the shame-fast-tree. But wee may more pro­bably attribute this it contraction, to a na­turall diuining (as it were) and fore-fee­ling that it hath of some harme, whereof it is in danger, as may be proportionably gathe­red by the like behauiour in other things of the same kinde. For so Aristotle writeth of the Spongies that (when a man puts foorth his hand to displace them, as also before a tempest) shrinke vp together on a heape, a if they meant to shift for themselues, either by flight, or else by vniting their dispersed forces, for the stronger resistance: which are euident proofes of that naturall ingrafted desire in all things to preserue there being. For whereas the first matter is said to desire corruption, for that as not contented with the forme it presently enioieth, it desireth an other, whereupon followes the expulsion of the former before inherent: the answer it, that in this laboring to procure an other forme, then that it had: it intends not cor­ruption, [Page 51]but rather perfection, not disliking the form incumbent, seeing it desireth both; but as Esopsdogge, snatching greedily at the shadow which he thought had beene a sub­stance, meant not to lose that which he had fast hold of in his teeth. So the first matter greedily caried to the desire of many formes wherein indeede consisteth its perfection, loseth that which before it had: for as much as by a law of Nature, Two formes of diuers, not subordinate, kinds, are at the same time vn­sufferable together. So then it desires perfecti­on, but in steed therof accidentally gaineth corruption & expulsion of the preexistent forme. Nothing therefore simply desires it owne corruption, but so as it may tend to it further perfection, & consummation, much lesse its vtter abolition. For as much as it is farre better to be in the vilest and most base degree of being, then not to be at all. There­fore the annihilation of the world shal not be of it selfe, nor yet by any meanes internall. Nor can it proceed from any external natu­rall agent, no not that vniuersal fore menti­oned nature is able to bring it vnto nothing: For as nature cannot make some thing of nothing, so neither is she of power sufficient to bring a thing from being, to an vtter not [Page 52]being at all, hauing a limited and finit pow­er. To which purpose a learned frier said excellently well. That, the first maker of all things in respect of its being and not being, is sub­iect onely vnto Gods wil, permitted to the rule of Naturall agents onely in regard of transmutati­on. For a Naturall agent may induce or ex­pell a forme either substantial or accidentall. But how farre soeuer mans Power or Nature is caried in fury, laboring by might and maine towards an vtter ruinating, and di­struction of things, yet shall it neuer attaine vnto Annihilation. They may indeed by tyrannous inflicting of death, make that which is neere the matter of a man, the mat­ter of a carcase, they may also with fire, burne the dead corps, but though a thousand thou­sand woods should bee spent in burning of one poore carcase, yet were they neuer able vtterly to annihilate and bring it vnto no­thing. So that Nature is too weake to cause Annihilation. But yet saie the scrupulous aduersaries, God who by his infinite and su­pernaturall power was able of nothing to make the world, is by the same his boundles power able at his pleasure to returne it to nothing. It is true indeed & out of question, that God by his absolute vndecaied pow­er, [Page 53]is sufficient as well to distroy the world as he was at the beginning, to make it: by his absolute power (I say) considered without regard of his will, but if we respect his pow­er, restrained by his will: that is regard what he will and hath decreed to do if by his word we may learne his will, we may truly answer, that God himselfe cannot annihilate the word, because he can do nothing that impli­eth contradiction, or that any way importeth mutability, whereby of God he should be made no God. Nor do we heerby take away his omnipotency, nay rather we establish his power, it being a chiefe point of infirmity and weakenesse, to bee capable of change, and able to deny it selfe: but God hath de­creed not to annihilate the world, therefore he cannot now turne it vnto nothing, how then (may some man say) shall it haue an end, for if neither of it selfe it incline, nor can be by any meanes naturall inforced to Annihilation, no nor God himself can turne it into nothing, what end shall it haue? The answer is, that as man hath his end by death, whereas, notwithstand his soule is immor­tall, his body is onely changed into its first matter, not turned into nothing: so the world though incapeable of annihilation, as [Page 54]hath beene proued, yet hath in it an end vn­euitable, when it shall be changed from the present corrupt estate into a far more excel­lent and heauenly condition of indurance and immortality. But heere ariseth a doubt, moued by those scoffers that Peter prophe­cied should come in the last daies, which de­maund, Where is the promise of his comming: For since the father fell on sleepe, all things haue continued alike from the beginning of the crea­tion. Where by the way, let vs obserue that they make the time of Christs comming, and the end of the world, things of one and the same signification, so that as many testimo­nies of scripture, as warrant the certainty of Christs comming, serue also to proue the worlds end and dissolution. To their reason we may answer with Peter, that the worlds long and hither to vnchanged continuance, is no sure proofe of impossibility to bee de­stroied. For God that by his bare word could of nothing make the world, can now also with as great facrlity alter the state of the same. But their supposition is most vntrue, for the world hath not from the beginning continued in the same state vnaltred, the whole earth being in Noahs floud ouerwhel­med with waters. But to this they may an­swer, [Page 55]that it was no generall or vniuersall de­struction, being extended onely to the li­uing creatures, & they also in part preserued in Noahs arke. It is true indeed, that this was onely a particular or partial destruction, the heauens remaining altogether vntouched, the other elements also incorrupted. But yet this sheweth a change in the worlds estate which they seemed to deny. Touching the generall distinction of all things, Peter after answereth; to which place we wil refer them: But that wherein the difficulty of the whole controuersie consisteth is the immutable estate of the heauenly bodies wherein hath beene obserued by experience of all ages, a constancy almost admirable: when in this sublunary region of elementish bodies, there hath beene as great variety, and almost a cir­cular alteration. And indeed, were the hea­uens capable of corruption, how could the spheare of the Moone, situated so neere the fire haue continued so long vnconsumed. Let vs therfore a little examine how the cause stands: with the heauens in the matter of corruption.

There are two different opinions of them that make the heauens incorruptible, some to deliuer them from corruption, haue made [Page 56]them void of all matter, others allot them a matter, but in a distinct kinde from that of the sublunary bodies, all agreeing, that they be incorruptible. The chiefe of the first sect, is Auerroes, a learned Turke, who expostu­lating the matter with vs, demands by what meanes we came to know the matter of the heauens? For the onely meanes to prooue the existence of matter in any thing, is, as he calleth it, Substantiall transmutation; or more plainely, the succession of formes. But in hea­uen there hath beene no such succession, no nor any alteration of qualities, therefore the heauens are immateriall. But wee may an­swer, first that the being of matter in anie thing is knowen as wel by accidentary, or lo­call, as by substantiall transmutation. But the heauens haue a locall Motion, or Mutation, at least in their parts, therfore they consist of matter. Secondly we answer thus, that al­though the heauens haue all this while lasted without change in their substance, yet see­ing they are capable of future transmutati­on, we may thence conclude the presence of matter in them. For who would say that there is in a sucking child no reasonable soul because he seeth in him no actuall vse of rea­son, or present conceit of learning, we know [Page 57]that his potentiall disposition and sitnesse to conceiue, is testimony sufficient of that soule which is in him. Their second argument is this, all things consisting of a corporall mat­ter, are withall corruptible for the ability of receiuing the yet absent formes being a pro­pertie inseparable from the matter, which also is accompanied with a longing desire to supply its defects, there must needs be gran­ted an expulsion of the incumbent forme for induction of a new successor, wherein is corruption; or els this, The matters incli­nation and ingrafted desire, as it were, must be alway frustrate, which folly, the most wise God of Nature detesteth: therfore there is in the heauens no such matter as we talke of. To which argument, they that make the matter of the celestiall bodies different from that of the sublunary creatures, frame this answer: Indeed (say they) whatsoeuer is compounded of such a matter as this is, of the sublunary creatures, is subiect vnto cor­ruption; but the heauens haue a matter of a different and farre more excellent state than these vnder elements, and that is the sum and foundation of Aristotle his opinion and reason touching the heauens incorruptible condition. But we that make one matter of [Page 58]both, may thus somewhat probably answer: That though such a matter is alway accom­panied with a capablenesse of corruption, yet may it by some superior ouerruling pow­er be preserued from all actuall cotruption. And so standeth the case with the heauens, which neuer had beene able of themselues so long to haue continued without alterati­on, but by the helpe of some higher power; not as the Peripateticks and Platonicks fondly imagine the Angels or Intelligences (which Alcinous calleth Lesser gods) but by the soueraigne appointment of God, who to moderate and stay the too frequent and ouerhastie alteration of the vnder bodies, hath allotted the heauens this regularity and vniformitie of motion. But heere they will demand a reason, what hath so fulfilled the matters desire of interchangeable successi­on of formes, that it remaineth contented with that forme which it presently inioyeth. The answer is: That either the excellencie of the forme present causeth this content­ment, or els Gods appointment ouersway­eth its desire. How then? Are we Patrons or rather Authours of violence in those ex­cellent agreeing bodies? Nay rather, by the limitation of the matters vnstayed indiffe­rencie, [Page 59]we doe more establish that their ex­cellent harmonie. For as in a city situate on the confines of two disagreeing kingdomes, of it selfe inclining to neither side, but in­different for entertainment of either con­quering aduersarie, if after valourous con­quest performed by one partie, it yeeldeth it selfe to the vanquishers dominion, and by the prouident industrious care of the new superuisor, be fortified against the violent irruption of the forevanquished aduersaries; by this new restraint of its old indifferencie suffereth no violence, but rather is confir­med in a quiet and peaceable condition within it selfe: so the matter of the celesti­all bodies, howsoeuer naturally indifferent to entertaine any forme, if by the conque­ring action of some preuailing Agent it be possessed of so excellent and powerfull a forme, as admits of no outward new impres­sion in this limitation of its equall instable for disposition, is not any way violenced, but rather fitter for the intended harmonie of the celestiall bodies. And that may serue for a sufficient reason of the hitherto-incorrup­ted condition of the celestiall bodies. Now touching their future estate, we shall after dispute, if first wee haue their fourth argu­ment [Page 60]for disproofe of the matter, as also the substance of their opinion. Auerroes there­fore saith, that heauen is a forme of a selfe-subsistence; immaterial, dimensional, local­ly mooueable, participating light and other accidents; wherein (me thinketh) is a plaine contradiction: for to omit the disquisition, whether any forme can consist without mat­ter, what is more absurd then to imagine quantitie really separate from the matter, quantitie hauing its basis and foundation in the matter, and onely limitation from the forme? farther, whatsoeuer is capable of real diuision, hath this capabilitie (that I may so terme it) from the matter: Reall diuision, I say, for the Mathematicians proportionably to their mentall abstraction or separation of quantitie, haue also a mentall diuision, but whatsoeuer hath quantity, is capable of such a diuision, therefore also it hath a matter. Ouer and beside all this, whatsoeuer is per­ceiueable by sense, hath a matter; for the forme of nothing can be perceiued by sense, but is vnderstood and conceiued by its ope­ration in the matter: but the heauen is sen­sible, therefore also materiall. To this adde Auerroes his owne testimonie, set downe in his Comment vpon Aristotle his seuenth [Page 61]booke of Metaphysicks, wherein himselfe confesseth, that accidents are inseparable companions of the first Matter; but the hea­uen (by his owne authoritie in the first al­leaged place) hath in it light and other ac­cidents inherent, how then is it altogether voide of matter? Other arguments taken from the inherencie of qualities peculiarly incident vnto things materiall, for breuities sake I omit, hastning to the second Patrons of the heauens immortalitie, that doe ac­knowledge a composition of a matter and a forme in the celestiall bodies, but will haue it a different and a distinct kinde from the elementish matter of the vnder bodies.

14 Touching the sense of the question, Plato and some of his followers in this error, in­terpret it, as if when we say, the heauens con­sist of elementary matter, wee meant that they are so compounded of the elements, as are mixt bodies heere below: whereupon some of the more ancient sectaries in this kinde, as Heraclitus and Pythagoras thought that it was made of fire: Thales and Anaxi­menes, of earth; Empedocles, of a medley of aire and fire; Plato himselfe, of the foure e­lements, or (as Proclus recordeth his opini­on) of the quintessence of them: whose refu­tation [Page 62]we omit, as impertinent vnto our pur­pose: for our meaning is not that the ele­ments are the matter whereof the heauens be made, but thus we vnderstand it, that the matter of the Ethereall and Elementish bo­dies is of the same kinde; the whole first mat­ter being diuided into these principal parts, as into halfes, the one halfe vnited vnto the formes celestiall, the other halfe coupled vnto the formes of the elements: and so (as I conceiue) is that place in the begin­ning of Genesis to be vnderstood, where it is said, that In the beginning God created the Heauen and the Earth, that is, the matter whereof heauen and the elements were after­wards made, signified vnto vs by the name of those waters wherupon the spirit of God was mooued: and mee thinketh the argument is very sound, which is commonly alleged by our partakers: for as in other kindes of cau­ses, there is one, first & principall whereunto all the rest are reduced, so also in this kinde of the Matter, there being the like reason of al. But if we distinguish the Matter of the heauens frō that of the elements, we can not come to one first Matter of al things; there­fore there is the same Matter both of the celestial & inferior bodies, to which we may [Page 63]adde that thredbare argument of the Philo­sophers, Wit hout necessity we must not imagine a pluralitie in Nature, forasmuch as Nature abhorreth vanitie: but there is no necessitie of the matters pluralitie; for the maine ground of this distinction (for ought that I can see) is, lest they should bee forced to grant a power in the heauens tending to cor­ruption, which (as is before said) hath no ne­cessary illation, forasmuch as the excellency of the forme present, restraineth the wan­dring indifferent desire of the matter, resi­sting the violent impression of forren quali­ties that should breed rebellion of the sub­iect creatures, against their commander the heauens. But touching their reasons, (in my poore opinion) they are very insufficient: for first thus they dispute: The formes of the sublunary bodies may be separated from their matter, but the heauens forme is vnse­parable: when in my iudgement they proue rather a distinction of formes, than any di­uerfity of the matter. Or if they thence prooue a diuersity of matter, because the formes incident, are of greater and lesse ex­cellency, one in respect of an other, we may as well say, that the body of a man is of di­stinct matter from that of the other more [Page 64]base creatures, because his form is so passing excellent. Or if they restraine their compa­rison onely to the power of separation, that because the matter of the heauens is ioyned inseparably to the forme, when contrariwise the elementish matter hath often separation, therefore there is not the same matter of both: wee answer, that the same matter in kinde, may so inseparably bee vnited to its forme, as that it can neuer be seioyned: not that we deny a power of future separation of the heauens matter from the present forme, but that this may bee a sufficient reason of their hitherto inseparable vnion. A second argument is that of Aristotle, saith he, what­soeuer things participate the same matter, are capable of mutable transmutation, but the heauens can neuer bee changed into the inferior bodies, for somuch as the elements are altogether passiuely disposed for receit of the heauens action, without any reacti­on vpon the heauens, therefore there is not the same matter of both. To which we an­swer, that the proposition or first sentence must be vnderstood of a potentiall transmu­tation, and that with this exception; vnlesse the matters imperfectiō be perfected by the formes inherent excellency, or resistance be [Page 65]made of some superiour forme, to turne a­way the violence of the oppugning agent. We say that the forme now being in the hea­uens, is of so powerfull and vnconquerable a nature, as that no naturall contrary agent is able to compasie any the least new impressi­on. Thirdly thus they reason: Were the heauens of the same matter with the bodies of the elements, then in like fort should they (at least by nature) be corruptible; but the corruption is altogether abhorrent from the heauens nature. To which assumption Da­mascen answers by a flat deniall, for euen the heauens in his Philosophie are naturally sub­iect to corruption. To which accordeth that of Plato in his Timaeus, that attributes the heauens incorruptiblenes to a superior more powerfull cause. For so hee brings in the maker of the world speaking vnto the cele­stiall bodies; By nature you are dissoluble, but through my will preserued from dissolution. Nor shall the destintes of death preuaile ouer you, to destroy you, because my will is a bond of more power to keepe you from corruption, than that wherewith at your first making you were holden together. And thus haue we hastily runne ouer the difficult question of the heauens matter. Touching the certainty and meanes [Page 66]of their dissolution we will briefly speake by and by, after the resolution of the other ar-arguments for the non-dissolution of the world.

15 Simon Magus, as it is recorded lib. 3. Recog. Beati Petri. cap. 3. (if the records be true) thus replied vpon the learned Apostle for the worlds immortalitie: If God be in­finitely and only good, and the world also good, how shall God in the end destroy the world? If hee destroy that which is good, how shall himselfe continue good? If hee pull it downe because it is euill, how shall he then be free from euill, that made it euill? To which wee answer with S. Peter in the same place: That the world in its first origi­nall state was good, yet so as it was foreor­deined to dissolution: nor doe wee thereby detract from Gods goodnesse; for the hea­uens (the most excellent part of the world) being not made for themselues, but for some end after to be reuealed; how good soeuer, yet were to be dissolued, that that for which they were ordeined might ap­peare: which also Peter thus familiarlie sheweth; Who seeth not how cunningly an egshell is framed, yet for manifestation of the end of its making, it must be broken of [Page 67]necessitie. So must the present estate of the world, of necessitie, be destroyed, that the more excellent condition of the kingdome of heauen may be made manifest: at which time also this degenerated euill state of cor­ruption shall be done away, that a more glo­rious estate of incorruption may be resto­red. So then, that the world shall haue an end, I take it, it is manifest; and that, not an end of annihilation, but of corruption: which indeed shall be a way vnto its perfe­ction. Now concerning the times and sea­sons of the worlds dissolution, we will not take vpon vs curiously to determine, seeing God, the beginning and end of all things, hath left the time vnreuealed vnto vs. Tou­ching the means and maner of the dissoluti­on, the Stoicks glanced at it a farre off, being of opinion, that the world should by fire be dissolued. For thinking the starres and the skies fire, to haue a wasting action vpon the inferiour elements, their nourishing moi­sture by little and little decaying, when nei­ther the earth can haue refection by the wa­ter, nor the aire procreation after its absolute consumption, there shall-remaine nothing but fire to consume both the heauens and the earth, of which afterward a new world [Page 68]should be made: whose opinion is very con­sonant vnto that of Peter, saue onely that they thought this destruction should come of a natural necessity, for Peter also taugnt, it should be by fire, wherewith God (withdraw­ing his hand of preseruation) should con­sume this world, and of the ashes heereof create a new; yet so, as neither the seate of the blessed souls in heauen, nor the dungeon of the damned in hell should be destroied; that neither the iotes of the Saints, nor the torments of the wicked should be interrup­ted. As for the firmament and the other in­feriour spheres, together with the elements, they shal be indued with another & that a far more excellent cnodition, putting off these accidents and affections of corruption fit for the continuall generation and corruption of the naturall bodies, and receiuing other qualities, agreeable to the incorruptible estate of the world to come; so that their substance shall be all one, howsoeuer they alter their qualities. As in the resurrection mens bodies shall bee of the same substance, but of a different disposition. For this cor­ruption must put on incorruption, and this mor­tall must put on immortality. So that as Saint Paul said, our imperfect knowledge which we [Page 69]haue in this life, shall in the after-world be abo­lished, because then we shall haue a morefull and perfect knowledge of God and his Christ. So may we well say this world shall be destroi­ed, because it shall lose this present estate of imperfection and put on a more glorious condition fit for the world to come. And so, as I take it, are those places of scripture to bee vnderstood, where niention is made of the worlds perishing, that is, the present e­state of this world shall be abolished, and the same substance indued with a more glorious condition. To which accordeth that of Da­uid, Psa. 102. They shall perish, but thou shalt indure, they shall all wax old as doth a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them and they shall bee changed: plainely signifying, that the perishing of the creatures shall be onely an alteration, which God shall bring vpon them.

16 Now to that fruitlesse question of the heauens motion or rest, we may answer pro­bably, that they shall haue an end of moo­uing, for their motion being ordained onely for ordering things below, especially for continuance of their generation, seeing all propagation of the species in liuing crea­tures, as also mutuall procreation in the ele­mentish [Page 70]liuelesse bodies being ended, to what purpose should the heauens mouing longer indure? Which may also semblably be answered touching the action and passi­on of the elements, as also for the being of things compounded of their mixture, as plants and sensible creatures, being things ordained onely for mans helpe, and suste­nance, who in that blessed state of immor­tality without the least defect shall neede no such supply of his wants; which quiet & rest­full estate of these vnder-bodies, is not, as some haue fondly imagined, to be attributed onely vnto the quiet rest of the heauens; for when at the praiers of Ioshua the Sunne stood still, and with it the rest of the celestiall bo­dies, (vnlesse we imagine the whole course of them to haue beene peruerted) yet cea­sed not the naturall actions of things below, for euen at that time did Ioshua fight? But the true cause of their rest from motion is the will of the first cause, without whose ad­iuuant-fellow-working, the secundary cau­ses are quite disabled to performe their functions. From hence therefore, namely from the certainety of the worlds dissolution we thus reason for our maine position. For if the world vncapable of eternity, haue a [Page 71]limited time of endurance which it cannot passe, then hath man also his continuance bounded, at least within compasse of the worlds lasting. For location being a thing inseparable from existence, the world, mans habitation, and mansion house being dissol­ued, man the principall inhabitant, must haue aioynt and fellow dissolution. But for the more through-handling of this vndoubted truth, our purpose is more particularly to treat thereof; therefore to leaue this farre fetched, though not impertinent reason, taken from the worlds ineuitable destructi­on, we will come to a neerer and more pro­per disquisition, holding our selues with­in the compasse of mans owne nature.

17 I haue read of a late liuing learned Phy­sitian, Paracelsus by name, who had such confidence in the absolute perfection of his skill, that he doubted not to professe him­selfe able by Physicke to preserue a man in so perfect a temperature, that he should ne­uer die by sicknesse: but his owne hastie lea­uing of his life, was confutation sufficient, of his either false ostentation, or extreme madnesse. For himselfe either not able, which bewraied his vnskilfull impotencie, or els vnwilling, which shewed his wilfull [Page 72]folly, ere he came to the prime of his age, before he was thirtie yeeres old ended his daies, learning at length by his owne expe­rience, that arte can neuer ouercome the necessitie of nature; nor mans cunning pre­uent or preuert the decrees of the destinies. But to the matter in hand, the question is, whether man by nature is subiect vnto death, the end of nature? To which we an­swer, that mans nature hath a double consi­deration; first in the incorrupt stare and pu­ritie of creation; secondly in the degenera­ted condition of corruption, which al­though it were altogether vnknowen vnto the Gentilish Philosophers, yet is its consi­deration in part Philosophicall, & therefore not wholly to bee omitted. Now in the first cōsideration of nature, we answer negatiue­ly, forasmuch as vndefiled nature was vnca­pable of the soules separation from the bo­die, betweene which there was so absolute and perfect an harmony and consent, that as the vnderfaculties of the soule, were in subiection to the reasonable and most prin­cipall part thereof, without the least iarre and disagreement; so fared it in the bodie, though compounded of the contrarie na­tures of the foure elements, yet so wel tem­pered [Page 73]by proportion, that there could bee no obseruance of the least discord. But after that mans pride set abroch by the diuels suggestion, ventred to taste of the forbid­den fruite for desire of knowledge; the light of reason being the life of the soule, ouer­cast by the vnauoidable cloudes of igno­rance, there grew a disagreement and quar­rell among the subiect inferior parts of the soule, from whence followed the warre of the elements in the bodie, neuer to bee en­ded till the field were lost by blood: and therefore excellent was the speech of the Frier Ferus; The diseases of the bodie came from sinne the soules sicknesse, the death of the body from the death of the soule; and who dares say, the dealing is vnequall, that hee should in­curre the death of the body, who wilfully reie­cted the life of the soule? or who marueils that the diuell by Gods sufferance tormenteth the bo­die with diseases, that gaue the diuell a place of dwelling in his soule? so that the death of the bodie being the separation of the soule from the bodie, was a punishment inflicted for mans wilfull sequestration of himselfe from God; and it is a good collection more then coniecturall, that the bodie had neuer beene subiect to the corruption of destru­ction, [Page 74]had not the soule beene tainted with the corruption of defiling. Man therefore in his primarie state of creation, was not na­turally subiect vnto death, but in the defi­led condition of corrupted nature, death is become ineuitable; and therefore Tha­les Milesius, one of the seuen wise men, was wont to say, that there was no difference betweene a mans life and his death, being both things agreeable vnto nature; and thence proceeded their resolute contempt of death, because they thought it was ineui­table: whereupon the Epicure himselfe considering the ineuitablenesse of deaths comming, was (as Maximus witnesseth) wont to say; that against other things we must finde some defence and remedie, onely death was vnresistable: our bodie (the vndefenced citie of our soule) being all vnsufficient to withstand the violent assaults of death. But to leaue the infi­nite testimonies of the learned, grounded vpon so long experience, let vs deale with reasons more artificiall, and shew this trueth first in particular, that euery man hath his endurance dated which he cannot passe; afterward goe vnto the species, to declare it also in the whole kinde.

The principall and maine reason is taken [Page 75]from his composition; for man consisting of a matter and a forme, as doe also the o­ther bodily liuing creatures, though the spi­rituall substance of his soule be immortall, yet his body being made of the first matter, whose inseparable companion is a desire of change, there must of necessitie follow dis­solution; for God and nature (according to our presupposition) doing nothing in vaine, this insatiable appetite of receiuing newe formes, shall not finally remaine wholly fru­strate: if therefore we grant an induction of a new forme, we must withall grant an ex­pulsion of that that before was inherent, for as much as two formes of diuers kindes are vnsufferable together in the same subiect, whereupon doth follow the corruption of the whole compound: But if we shall make a more diligent and narrow inquirie into the causes of this dissolution, we may find plen­tie of reasons ministred to confirme this trueth. Now the first cause naturall of natu­rall death, is contrarietie in the compound; for all corruption presupposing alteration, which is onely betwixt, and by meanes of contrarie qualities, contrarietie of the inhe­rent qualities, (being the onely cause of al­teration) is also cause of the compounds [Page 76]corruption, which is farther manifested by exprience, for so we see things wherein is least disagreement, to be of longest conti­nuance; and the immateriall substance of the creatures spirituall, voide of all contrarietie, vncapable also of corruption; so that the inherence of contrarietie is one special cause of the compounds dissolution. Man there­fore whose bodie consists of the euer-iarring elements, Fare, Aire, Water, Earth, hath al­so an vnresistable home bred cause of disso­lution. Furthermore, the consent of al Phi­losophers, and reason it selfe hath set downe this trueth as vndeniable, that mans life and the chiefe maintenance thereof, consisteth principally, if not wholly, in the due and iust proportionable temperature of the foure first qualities, Heat, Cold, Drinesse, Moisture, and till their disproportion, there is no dan­ger of death, or any growing sicknesse: whereupon Auerroes hath this definition of sicknesse; That it is nothing els, but the vn­naturall disproportion of those foure qualities, whereby the part whereinto the same is incident, is disabled to performe its naturall functions. whereout ariseth this collection as necessa­rie, being almost all one with those things foresaid, viz. that the disproportion of the [Page 77]foure first qualities, and their swaruing from their iust temperature, is cause of their sub­iects dissolution: but in euerie man wee see a declining from his engrafted natural com­plexion, which also increaseth more and more according as his ages are altered, ther­fore mans dissolution cannot bee auoided: where (by the way) wee must not let passe the saying of the Philosopher; that mans life consisteth in heat, which also is thereby proo­ued, because in the presence thereof, if it be not excessiue, we see a kinde of claritie and vigor as it were newly infused, at its depar­ture, the wonted or rather farre greater re­course of languor. But we are not so to vn­derstand that saying of the Philosophet, as if heat were the sole & onely cause of life; for euen by Aristotle his own witnesse, the tem­per of the foure first qualities, is the truest & most proper continent cause of life: but the meaning is, that our naturall heate is the chiefe instrument of the soule to exercise the vitall functions, as nutrition, augmenta­tion, and such like, yet so tempred, that it exceed not the proportionable measure of our naturall moisture, the food and nourish­ment of our heat. And hence is that of Ficinus, that our life, as light, consisteth in heat, [Page 78]whose foode and maintenance is of an aerie and fatte moisture, not vnlike vnto oile, whose im­moderate excesse and impuritie or defect, are all wasters of our vitall heate; so that there was as great necessitie of moisture as of heat in the performance of our natutall vitall fun­ctions, whence came the necessitie of nou­rishment: for our congenerate heat hauing a consuming action vpon our moisture, the resistance: thereof being altogether vnable to withstand the heats assaulting action, Na­ture, that like a kinde mother is neuer want­ing to the necessities of her of spring, hath bestowed on our soule a faculty, whereby to restore our decaied moisture, through the assimilation of the nourishment applied vn­to the wasted substance. Now the especiall meanes of this decay, as is aforesaid, is our heats assaulting action, whereby the soule continually engendreth of our humiditie, new spirits, for maintenance of the vitall and sensual actions, which being wasted by their neuer-ceasing operation (as nothing is able long to continue without interchangable rest) haue of necessitie a supplie from our humiditie, and our moisture also equally de­caied, hath the like supply made by nourish­ment which wee receiue, lest there should [Page 79]follow a sudden destruction: hence there­fore, that is from the necessitie of continuall nourishment, we inferre a decay of naturall moisture, for otherwise whereunto is nutri­tion directed?

19 But heere remaineth a doubt; for if there be restitution of the lost naturall moisture, made by the receipt of nourishment, whence commeth death the end of nature? for our heat hauing alway what to feede vpon, ei­ther by nature or by this outward supply of nourishment, and death neuer assailing vs, but by the banishment and extinguishing of this naturall heate, where is this necessity of ending our life? The answer is, that the im­purity of the outward nourishment inward­ly applied, by degrees tainteth that naturall ingendred humidity, and by its continuall mixture at length wholly corrupteth it. For as in the mingling of water with wine, the greater the infusion of water is, the more is the infeebling and weakening of the wines force, till at length it be cleane oppressed and extinguished: so is it in the case of nu­trition, wherein though at first our naturall heat and moisture retaine their purity and naturall quality, yet at length by continuall mixture of the alimentary humor, there fol­loweth [Page 80]a totall and perfect corruption of their integrity. Now if by the restoratiue faculty of the soule there could bee supplie made of as pure moisture as that which was lost, the creature might (for any thing in na­ture) be preferued aliue for euer. And there­fore Ficinus beside the iust proportion of moisture vnto the heat, requireth also purity and incorruption in the moisture, for as eue­rie moisture is not a preseruer of the light of a lampe, but though oile maintaines the flame, yet water doth quench it: so is it in the case of our life which principally consi­steth in heat, for the watrish humidity doth cleane extinguish it. And thence it is that old men when they are neerest vnto their end abound with a watrish humour, yet are they said to be cold and dry, as wanting in­deed that moisture which is the fittest for their heat to feed vpon.

20 So that the truth of the position is mani­fest in the particulars, namely that euery man hath an end and tearme of indurance which he cannot passe. Now this end commeth either by meanes naturall and growing in him, or by violent and vnnaturall meanes. Whereupon they haue distinguished death into two kinds, one Naturall, the other Vio­lent: [Page 81]Naturall death is where our natiue moisture is by meanes of our haturall heat (continually working vpon it) consumed & dispatched, whence followeth a lingring, languishing and pining of our naturall heate as wanting what to feed vpon; contrary to the subtile opinion of the fault-finding Iulius Scaliger, that thought our naturall heat to be weakned, and in the end cleane consumed onely by want of interchangeable rest, and ceasing from its operation. For as we see fire not wasted by much vse, but lingringly ex­tinguished by decay and want of fit fewell for to feed vpon; so our home-bred naturall heat not tired with ouer-working, but lan­guishing with the decay of fit food, is at length together with our moisture its natu­rall prouided foode, cleane consumed. To which may be added that saying of Fernelius to this purpose, that though Aesculapius himselfe, the God of Physicke had the gui­ding of the most temperate complexioned man that can be imagined, and that from his birth, to keepe him from all outward annoi­ances whatsoeuer, yet hath he in himselfe an home-bred enemy by little and little to spoile him of his life. Vnnaturall and violent death, is when our naturall heat either with [Page 82]too much cold, or excessiue externall heat, or with an immoderate measure of moisture is extinguished. According to which two kinds of death, the learned School-men haue deuised a double tearme of our life: There is, say they, A tearme of nature, and there is, A tearme beside nature. The naturall tearme, is that vtmost time, that a man by his complex­ion can reach vnto, whch is farther off or ne­rer according to the differences of mens temperatures. The terme or limit beside na­ture is when mans life either commeth short of that length which by his complexion hee may attaine vnto, or is protracted and pro­longed beyond the course of nature, & that they cal the end or terme of Gods prescience, & fore-appointment in his vnreaueled will, which a man can neither preuent, nor yet prolong: and this hath for the most part place in violent death; and was therefore also propounded by those deuout Schoole-men, lest men should not thinke they de­pended only vpon chance, or fell out with­out Gods especiall counsell and disposing. For so we see in daily experience, many men in the prime of their yeeres and strength of their age, either by riot, or famine, pestilence or sword, suddenly cut off, and we are many [Page 83]times mooued with pity in that behalfe, be­wailing their estate that in our iudgements might haue liued a great deale longer: as indeed they might, if we respect what they were capable of by their complexion; but in regard of Gods decree and purpose it was impossible for them to passe that moment and point of time: for Gods prescience can neuer be deceiued. And this, to auoid tedi­ousnesse, may briefly serue for the certainetie of the end of particular men.

21 Now for the indurance of man in specie (in which regard onely he is said to be a part of the world) we may passe ouer vnto it by way of Prolepsis, or preoccupation. For it may be obiected, that though there is a limited endurance of particular and single men, yet there may be a perpetuall preseruation of the species, or kinde: and therefore God hath bestowed on man a faculty of procreation to propagate his kinde; that though euery man must (of a naturall necessity) die, yet might hee leaue an other of his owne kinde behinde him, that so there might be a conti­nuall and euerlasting succession. To which we answer, that if they grant a corruption in the particular, they must withall grant it in the species. For the species being a thing ex­istent [Page 84]onely in imagination, not hauing any reall being, but as wee conceiue of it in the particulars, it is a necessary illation, that from the corruption of all the particulars, we may conclude the like of the generall. But to shew it more plainely, by a demonstratiue proceeding, we may obserue the like course of decay in the species as there is in the indiui­duum. For as nutrition is to the particular, so is generation to the species, in the case of their continuance and preseruation: where­fore as by the nourishment we take for resti­tution of our naturall moisture, there being supplied not so pure humidity as was lost, the particulars decaying by little and little, are at last cleane consumed: so by procreation, the maintenace of our species, the purity of our complexion being by degrees and by time diminished, at length there followes, euen of necessitie, an absolute corruption. Now (as I conceiue of it) the decay commeth thus, for the particulars, whose function this generation is, being by continuall mixture of outward nourishment corrupted, the seed, the matter and means of propagation cannot but be tainted with like corruption. And that is the chiefe reason amongst other lesse principall, that men in this age of the world [Page 85]are of lesse continuance than they were in former time. From all which we thus con­clude; if the naturall vigour of the species, be by little and little continually weakened, there must of necessity in the end follow a full and perfect corruption. For (as Aristo­tle said of the diuision of any thing finite, that by often detraction, though but of a little quantity, the whole becommeth at length vncapable of diuision) so by continuall wa­sting of the vertue of the kinde, there fol­loweth at length euen of necessity, a totall and ineuitable extinguishing.

22 Now to that friuolous fruitlesse question, whether this end and destruction be of na­ture, or proceedeth from any effectual ope­ration of God; wee may thus answer: that we dispute not what shall be in this case, but what may bee: and according to that sense wee say, that euen of ai naturall necessitie (though God should not vntimely cut off the thred of our life) yet euen of its owne accord, should whole mankind haue an end; which is manifest by that forenamed continuall curtalling of our life, obserued by experience, and noted out of the legends of antiquities: for before that vniuersall de­luge in Noahs time, we reade of some that [Page 86]liued, six, seuen, eight, nine hundred yeeres; as Adam, Noah, Methusalem, and others. After the floud, he that liued longest, recor­ded in holy historie, exceeded not the age of a hundred and twentie yeeres: some few yeeres after, in Dauids time, it fell to seuentie yeeres, or if there were any ouerplus, it was mingled with labour and sorrow, more wor­thy the name of death than life. So that we may hence conclude, that it is impossible for mankinde to last for euer, hauing inwardly in his nature sufficient and vnpreuentable causes of dissolution.

Hauing thus euidenced the truth of our two positions, that there is a set time of endu­rance vnto euery man and vnto all mankind, and learning by experience, the naturall and true mother of knowledge, that among the particulars so me haue a longer, some a shor­ter time of continuance, and that euen by nature; it remaineth that with all possible breuity and perspicuity, wee set downe the causes naturall of this naturall difference, which we can no otherwise doe, than by pro­pounding the receiued causes of the length and shortnesse of mans life, and according as they are more or lesse in any man, so iudge of their effects. Aristotle (in his preface to [Page 87]this treatise) premiseth a word or two touch­ing the diuers consideration of this diffe­rence according to the diuersity of that sub­iect vnto which they are incident. For in these tearms, of length, and shortnesse of life, we may compare either things of the same kinde, as man with man, or things of diuers kinds, as reasonable creatures with liuelesse & sensible things; for there are some vnrea­sonable creatures longer liued then man, for so Hesiodus reporteth of the Crow, that he li­ueth out nine mens liues (measuring euerie [...] to be 100 yeeres) the Hart, by the same aut [...]ors witnesse, thrise as many: the Rauen trebleth the Harts endurance: and thence was that plaint of dying Theophrastus, and complaint of natures inequality & as it were blindfolded disposition of her benefits, espe­cially in this kinde, that to Harts and Crowes so thanklesly had giuen so long time of con­tinuance, which was denied vnto man, that could and would haue better imploied that benefit. Which complaint was personally renewed and aggrauated by Bewaldus, an old Grammarian, for the sticks not in the per­son of some captious Atheist to expostulate the matter with God, why our life (in these times) is so curtalled, that for the many hun­dreds [Page 88]of yeeres which in the first age of the world men liued, wee haue our stint and li­mits within the compasse of little more than halfe an hundred? But Iosephus in his first booke of Antiquties, giueth these reasons, and first of all the wholesome goodnesse of their nourishment, and the outward com­passing elements which they inhabited. For their corrupted nature was not greedily ca­ried with desire of their corruptions increase as headlongly & on the sudden to engulfe it selfe into all extremity, but by degrees and lingringly, as vpon constraint by little and little descendeth from that top & perfecti­on of corruption. And as euery thing was neerest vnto that beginning, so was it cleerest and lesse tainted with corruption. We ther­fore in the last age and exteremity of the world, are in a more extreame degree of cor­ruption by reason of that frequent alteration in the elements when euery mutation ad­deth somewhat to the begun impurity. A second reason was Gods wil & bountifulnes, the benefit whereof was not bounded in that small compasse and limit of time, but exten­ded also vnto vs and to our posterity. For God therfore granted them a longer conti­nuance, for reuealing of many hidden my­steries, [Page 89]especially in Astrologie; for the course of many of the celestiall bodies could neuer haue bene learned, no not so much as in any mediocrity, had not God giuen some of them at least six hundred yeeres to liue in, in which time, the great yeere as they call it, is fulfilled and perfected. To which wee may adde the fewnesse of the earths inhabi­tants in the beginning of the world, God preuenting the dispeopling of the new world, and prouiding for its store and re­plenishing. And yet (if we beleeue Anacro­on, I know not how credible a witnesse being a Poet) within these few ages last past, Ar­ganthonius king of the Tartessians, liued an hundred and fiftie yeeres; Cinyras of Cyprus, an hundred and sixtie yeeres; Eginus two hundred; and as Alexander and Cornelius report, there was one in Illyrium called Do­don, that liued the full and complet terme of six hundred yeeres; and Xenophon wri­teth of one, who in the ile of the Latines, li­ued eight hundred yeeres. But I am of opi­nion with Pliny, that it is very vnlikely, see­ing it may bee that they erred in their com­putation, not knowing how according to diuersitie of nations in former ages, there were manifold and sundry measures of the [Page 90]yeares; for the old Arcadians made foure yeeres of one of ours, allotting vnto euerie yeere three moneths. The Egyptians made as many yeeres as moneths, according to the Moones finished and renewed course: and according vnto this reckoning, it will be no strange thing, that a man should euen in these daies liue a thousand yeeres. But not to prosecute the diuers continuance of things in diuers kindes, as also to let passe the farther examination of the decaied estate of mans life, lest wee againe reuiue the now quenched fire of godlesse indigna­tion, at the shortnesse of our life, we wil come to the most pertinent comparison of man with man in this kinde, if first we shall onely remember what was Plinies opinion of the shortning our liues, namely, that God here­in did greatly gratifie vs, by cutting off these daies of miserie: agreeable to which, Silemus being demanded what was the grea­test happinesse and good that God could doe a man, made answer, Neuer to be borne; and the next vnto that, to die quickly.

But touching the causes of long life, wee may thus brieflie dichotomise them, for they are either inward or outward; the in­ward causes are such as either we haue natu­rally [Page 91]ingrafted, or els gotten by arte, indu­strie & wisdome: that of nature is the good temperature and proportionate mixture of the foure first qualities in the body; for mo­derate heat that is vnproportionate to the quantitie of moisture, rather hastneth death by the too speedie consumption of its moist food, than any way prolongeth life, as we see in men of cholericke constitution. So also, too great colde, that is ouerswaying the quantity or vertue of our natural heat, short­neth our life: and thence it is that old men the neerer they draw vnto their ends, haue their bodies ouergrowen with cold: where­upon all the Astrologians haue obserued Saturne to be a Planet enemie vnto life, as hauing a vertue of cold and drought, & ac­cordingly (as some imagine) was he painted with a sithe in his hand, cutting downe as it were and killing men with the operation and infusion of these two deadly qualities: which may also be said of the excesse of the other two contrarie qualities, moisture and drought; for too much moisture oppresseth the naturall heat, as wee see greene-wood quench an vnequall quantitie of fire: and thence it is, that willowes and such like, whose almost naturall place is the riuers [Page 92]side, are of short continuance, because their too much & too waterish moisture drown­eth their heat. So that hereby (as I take it) it is manifest, that none of these qualities singly and by themselues, are true causes of long life, but iointly all in a good and iust pro­portion.

Now if any man shall (out of Aristotle) obiect, that the two qualities of life, name­ly heat and moisture, are onely causes of long life: we may answer, that these two by themselues procure not length of life, but in a certain measure & proportion. Now the rebater of the heats too too actiue qualitie, is his contrarie, cold; and the moderatour & temperer of the moistures accesse is drought: so that in euery man the foure first qualities are requisite; yet were two onely mentio­ned by Aristotle, as being those onely which directly cause long life; the other two one­ly inclusiuely set downe, as being no other­wise effectually profitable for life, than as they temper and abate the excesse of the two principall. But because euery moisture is not cause of life, nor the best moisture in e­uery quantity, there are one or two requisite conditions annexed: first concerning the qualitie, that it be not too thinne and fluid, [Page 93]such as is the naturall disposition of water; but more cleauing and fat, such as may re­semble the nature of oile, for its better pre­seruation from putrefaction: secondly, that it haue some competent degree of heat, to keepe it from congealing; last of all, that it be pure, not mingled with excrementall su­perfluities; forasmuch as all mixture of su­perfluities is against nature, enemie to good digestion, and sound nutrition. Those things thus obserued, our moisture shall be sufficiently qualified for our liues mainte­nance. Touching the quantitie, in a word, (as is before said) it must neither bee exces­siue, lest the too great quantitie oppresse our heat, as wee see infusion of too much oile oftentimes put out the lampe; nor yet defectiue, lest the deuouring action of our heat, too soone consume it: but in a compe­tent mediocrity, such as the heat may nei­ther ouer-hastily vanquish, nor with the violence of excessiue inequalitie too sud­denly be extinguished. Where briefly wee may see the reason, why man is longer liued than other creatures of more vast bodies; for though in the large capacitie of their great receiuers, they haue a greater quantity of this naturall moisture than is incident [Page 94]vnto mans small body, yet haue they it not so well tempered and proportioned to their heat, which may well bee gathered by their slowe and seldome breathing. So that it is true which the Philosopher hath, that the great or little quantitie of the bodie, is no sufficient cause of long life. And yet this is withall most true, that where there is greatest store of humiditie with a compe­tent proportion of heat, there is greatest fitnesse naturally for long life. And that is the reason why those that in their infan­cie are most subiect to a languishing disea­sednesse, are afterward most healthfull, and for the most part longest liued. For the a­bundance of their naturall moisture hin­dreth the too speedy preuailing of the heat, by resisting its action: and so is it the lesse mingled with forren impurities. For as we see the Smiths fire, by the moderate sprinck­ling of water, though at first for a time its force is somewhat abated, yet it at length ha­uing ouercome its weake aduersary, as in tri­umph burneth the cleerer, and lasteth lon­ger; so fareth it in our bodies: for our heat not able on the sudden to ouersway our multitude of moisture, is the longer hindred from consuming it, whence proceedeth long [Page 95]life, and after it hath gotten the vpper hand, performeth with more facility its naturall functions, whence commeth healthfulnesse; where wee may also explane that Probleme, why children that are too ripe witted in their childhood, are for the most part either shortest liued, or els toward their old age most sottish, according to our Prouerbe; Soone ripe, soone rotten: for hence wee may gather, that from the beginning they had but little moisture, ouer which their heat soone preuailed; for much humiditie is cause of blockishnesse and folly: whence is that of Galen, that fleame being a cold waterish humour, is of no force for ornament of good con­ditions: and Plato doubted not to say, that looke how much moisture there is in vs, so much also is our folly; and thereof it is, as the same Plato obserueth, that children and women are for the most part most foolish. For the glorious light and Sunne-like splen­dour of the soule, is therwith as with a cloud obscured and intercepted, which is an eui­dent proofe of the small store of moisture in these quicke witted forward children, o­uer which the heat so much the sooner ob­taining dominion, and in processe of time drying the braine, the subordinate instru­ment [Page 96]of vnderstanding, either quite de­stroieth it, and so bringeth death, or els so corrupts it, that it is altogether vnable and vnfit to steed the inner senses in their fun­ctions, whereon the vnderstanding in this prison of the boby principally dependeth: which may no lesse fitly serue for answer vn­to that consequent demand, why those in­fants for the most part are soonest able to walke, to talke, to conceiue, to remember, and such like; the reason is taken from the little quantitie of moisture; which may bee gathered by the contrary disposition in the otherwise affected subiects, as also by that which we see in daily experience in creatures of other kinds. For whereas man by reason of his fluid, vnsetled substance, hath for the better strengthning of his ioints his bodie swathed, and is a long time before he is able to stand or walke, or performe any such like his vitall functions; we see other creatures almost in the same moment, borne and ina­bled to stand, walke, and such like; for their vnequall quantitie of heat, preuailing ouer the little store of moisture, soone sitteth them for the performance of vitall actions, that being the soules chiefe instrument in the discharge of her duties. Now if any man [Page 97]shall aske what this iust proportion is, and when they are tempred so as may best be a­uaileable for long life, the answer is, that heat and moisture are then well proportio­ned when neither the moisture with its too great quantity deuoureth the heat, nor the ouermuch heat, too suddenlie consumes and eateth vp the moisture. Yet must the heat haue a kind of dominion ouer the moisture, else can it not be able to nourish the bodie. For in nutrition the thing nourished, by rea­son of the instrument ordained for that pur­pose, must actually worke vpon that, where­by it is nourished. And because that euery Agent must be proportioned vnto the pati­ent, in the inequality of excesse, therefore must the heat being the soules sole actiue instrument of nutrition, haue dominion o­uer the moisture, the subiect matter of that facultie.

25 Touching the complexions, the question is, which of them is best disposed and fitted for length of life. To take that for granted which Fernelius doubteth of, namely, that there are foure, if not onely yet chiefely, no­table complexions; we answer that those of a sanguine constitution are by nature capable of the longest life; as hauing the two quali­ties [Page 98]of life best tempred. And therefore is compared vnto the aire, which is moderatly hot and in the highest degree moist. Yet not with that too thinne and fluid watrish moisture, but more oily; oile it selfe resem­bling the true nature of the aire. Therefore the sanguine complexion is fittest for long life. For choler is an humor like vnto fire, extreame hot and moderatly drie, and so vnsufficient to make supply of moisture to the deuouring operation of that firie heat, which is in it. In the flegmaticke the copi­ousnesse of that humour resembling water, oppresseth the heat and so hindreth good digestion, whence proceed crudities in the stomacke and liuer, from whence they are diffused into the veines, and so vnto all the parts of the body, and at length the body is ouergrowen with corruption. Lastly, melan­choly resembling the earth and its qualities, cold and drought, both enemies to life, ha­steneth the destruction of the body where­unto it is incident.

The second inward cause of long life is, the moderation of our affections. Whether it be that naturall appetite of meat and drinke for nourishmēt, or those other of anger, loue, ioy, lust, sorrow, and such like. For all these are [Page 99]auaileable both waies, either in excesse to kill, or in moderation to saue. Touching the moderate vse of meats and drinkes, what neede we seeke farre for proofe of its profi­tablenes to preserue life, when we see so ma­ny daily by surfetting & ouercharging their stomacks with too much and too riotus vse of meats, vntimely end their daies: and contrariwise, men very crasie and sickely by temperancie and moderation many times protract their liues almost to an incredible length? For so is it reported of one Herodi­cus, a student in Aristotle his daies, the most weake and sickely of any that liued in that time by the testimony both of Plato & of A­ristotle; who notwithstanding, by his diligent care and guidance of himselfe liued full out 100. yeeres; and no maruell, for so did he re­paire the daily decay of his humidity, by supply of nourishment, and neither ouer­whelmed his heat, with the abundance of moisture, nor mingled his radicall moisture with too much externall superfluous impuri­ties. Where we may resolue that doubt, how it comes to passe, that often drinkers of wine for the most part hasten their death; The reason is, that the vehement heat of the wine, con­sumeth their moisture, and so by detraction [Page 100]of the heats food, in time also extinguisheth the heat. Now if any man shall require me to prescribe a diet vnto him; though I be no Physitian, yet will I referre him vnto that of the excellent Emperour, who neuer eat till he was hungry, nor euer proceeded to a glut­ing satiety. For the extreames are dangerous both excesse and defect; too much meate hindring good digestion and ingendring crudities, & too little giuing occasion of the heats too sudden preuailing ouer the moi­sture, both which are friends of death: Not would I counsell men strictly to tie them­selues vnto set houres; for that, saith Paracel­sus, is dangerous, causing many times, either delaie of applying nourishment, or too spee­dy ministring before the former digestion is finished.

26 And heere we may seasonably annex the vse of exercise, for that is a thing very auaile­able to digestion; dispersing the nourish­ment into the parts of the body, and being (as it were) the bellowes to kindle and reuiue our naturall heate: for ouermuch rest and ceasing from motion cooleth the body. And as the elementish fire which we vse, vn­lesse it bee sometime blowen and fed as it were with aire is extinguished: so our natu­rall [Page 101]heat without exercise and motion is af­ter a sort cast on sleep, or rather benummed, whence proceedeth that other daughter of dulnesse, collection of excremental superfluities, the heat being not able to digest our recei­ued nourishment; & thence is that corrupti­on and rottennesse which ouertaketh these slow-backes; as we see standing water soo­nest putrifie and gather filth. Wherefore Aristotle enquiring the causes of the toile­some trauell of some women in child-birth ouer others, setteth down this as principall among the rest, namely their idlenesse and want of exercise; for his experience of women in other countries so accustomed to paines ta­king, had taught him; for to them child-bea­ring was not so painefull, their labour con­suming those excrements that are the vsuall impediments of ease in that kinde. Nor will I take vpon me to limit any man to any kind of exercise rather than an other, or appoint any time; although this caueat will not be amisse prescribed, that they vse not to stirre themselues more violently than is ordinary, before the through digestion of meate; for then they clogge their stomacks and make them vnfit for after concoction, and withall fill their bodies with raw humours, which by [Page 102]exercise are dispersed through the veines in­to al the parts of the body: onely as inother things, so especially in exercise of what kinde soeuer, either for delight, or of paines, let them remember moderation, that it be neither too much, nor to little. Not too much, that is, neither too vehement, nor yet continual, but interchangeable, for both these by con­suming of the spirits, are alike hurtfull; not too little, for continued rest and idlenesse (as is afore said) engendreth putrefaction. Where the consideration of the moderate vse of sleepe and waking is very incident, for they are both things necessary for mainte­nance of life in their mediocrity, both as hurtfull if beyond measure. For immode­rate and vnseasonable watching wasteth the spirits, and by consuming of the vitall iuice, causeth leannesse in the body, enfeebleth the parts thereof, hindreth the operation of the senses, drieth the marrow and the braine: insomuch that oftentimes it proceedeth to doting and frensie. So likewise too much sleepe hindreth our health and well-fare by loosing the parts of the body, dulling the naturall heat, consuming the moisture, and such like. But moderatly vsed and inter­changeably they are notable meanes of pro­curing [Page 103]and preseruing health, not only be­cause this varietie and change is verie de­lightsome and refreshing, but much more by restoring or hindring the decay of Na­ture.

27 Now touching these other affections, as anger, ioie, sorrow and such like, though wee read not of many that haue suddenly died for anger, yet by reason of that sudden emis­sion of hear into the outward parts of the body, and kindling as it were the fire of cho­ler, it must needs be very hurtful, when as all suddennesse, especially ioyned with vehe­mency, is an horror vnto nature. And cho­ler inflameth the blood, whence proceedeth that vnreasonablenesse & raging, vsually ob­serued in men ouermuch angred. But exam­ples are plentifull of such as with sudden and immoderat ioy haue died; as Pliny reports of Sophocles and Dionysius the Sicilian Ty­rant, that immediately vpon tidings of vi­ctory gaue vp the ghost. And Liuie maketh mention of two mothers at Rome, that after the bloudy battell of Cannas, for ioie of the safe and vnexpected returne of their sonnes, suddenly fell downe dead: the one meeting her sonne at the City gate, the other in her house bewayling the reported death of her [Page 104]sonne, when on the sudden beside her ex­pectation, safely presented himselfe to her sight. The like also Gellius writeth of one Dingenes of Rhodes, that hauing his three sons, for the mastery obtained at the games, in one day crowned, after his sonnes im­bracements and the peoples applause, sud­denly yeelded vp the ghost. The meanes of this death was the sudden dilatation of the heart, the vitall spirits and the heat whose beginning is the heart, being too farre caried from their fountaine. So also read wee of Aristotle, that not able to finde the reason why Euripus, (a part of the sea situated be­tweene Aulis of Bootia and Eubaea) ebbed & flowed seuen times a day, for very greefe died: the means and maner of his death be­ing the too great contraction of the spirits, whereby the heat was as it were with smoke chaoked. The like is reported of Diodorus a logician, who for shame that he could not at the first answer the trifling question which Stilpo put out, suddenly ended his daies. Which is also written of Homer, who in the Ile Ios sitting on the sea shore, demanded of the fisher-men if they had taken any thing, they thus obscurely in riddle-wise made an­answer; Those that we tooke we left behind, those [Page 105]that we could not catch, we bring with us. For in the sun-shine (as they say it is shipmens fa­shions) they made inquisition for their back­biting familiars, and some they tooke, and cruelly pressed vnto death, leauing their liue­lesse carcases to bee deuoured of the fishes: those that craftily had insinuated themselues either into their flesh, or into the inside of their apparrell, they were faine to bring away with them. But quicke witted Homer, not able on the sudden to expound this pro­bleme, for shame, (as Plutarch and Herodotus write of him) gaue vp the ghost. For the spirits and blood (as in all kinde of feare it falleth out) retiring to the inward parts, as to a tower of defence, by their sudden retrait, and reuerberation, redouble the heate and so inflaming the heart, not able to be cooled againe by respiration, stifles the patient.

28 Concerning Venery, deaths best harbin­ger, I shall not neede to recite the infinite ex­amples of them, that by meanes therof haue hastened their deaths, nor indeed is it pos­sible to number those innumerable troops that through lust either before the actuall accomplishment, or after the too frequent satisfying the same haue ended their youth­full daies. It was well said of one, that Venus [Page 106]prouideth not for those that are already borne, but for those that shalbe borne, and therefore Auicenna, a learned Philosopher & Physitian, doubted not to say, that the emission of a lit­tle seed more than the body could well beare was a great deale more hurtfull than the losse of fortie times so much blood. For it wa­steth the spirits, weakeneth the stomack, en­feebleth and drieth vp the braine and mar­row, whereby especially it hastneth death. And the truth heereof Aristotle prooueth by his experimentall obseruation, for so hath he noted the cocke-sparow by immoderate and too frequent vse of Venery, very seldome to liue out the tearme of two yeeres, and the same reason hee giueth why the Mule a mixt creature begotten betweene an horse & an asse is longer liued, thā either of them, for his insting in that kinde, is but once only through the whole course of his life. To which we may adde the diuersity of the sex, for the male according vnto Aristotle in eue­rie kinde almost, is by nature better fitted for long life than the female, hauing greater force of heat, and the moisture more firm & better able to resist than the fluid substance of the female; and thence it is that women for the most part are sooner perfected than [Page 107]men, being sooner fit for generation, sooner in the flower and prime of their age, and fi­nally, sooner old, for their heat though lit­tle, yet sooner preuaileth ouer that fluid thinne substance and moisture of theirs, than it possibly can ouer that solid and compact humiditie which is in man.

29 But lest our Treatise grow too big, we wil proceed to those other outward causes of long life, such as bee the influences of the Stars, either in our conception and birth, or in the country & soile wherin we liue, as also the goodnesse of the soile it selfe, both of the earth & aire. For though it be true that the celestiall bodies haue no direct action either of inclination or constraint vpon the reasonable soule of man, which is immateri­all, yet is it as true that they haue singular and especiall operations vpon our bodies; for so wee see the fruitfulnesse and barren­nesse of the earth depends vpon the hea­uens good and bad aspect; the sea followes the motion and alteration of the Moone, the yeere distinguished into its foure parts, according to the accesse or farther absence of the Sun; and therefore Galen, the father of Physitians, counselled his scholers to haue especiall respect vnto the coniunction [Page 108]of the Planets in their signes, whensoeuer they vndertake any cure: and, which is more fit for the present purpose, the Astrologers haue assigned vnto euery Planet a monthly dominion ouer the childe conceiued in the wombe, according to their order and situa­tion. The first moneth is allotted vnto Sa­turne: the second vnto Iupiter, and so foorth in order, vntill they haue all finished their dominion, and then they begin againe: which is the especiall reason alleaged by some, why the childe that is borne in the eight moneth, for the most part dieth, when as oftentimes those that are brought foorth a moneth sooner or later, liue in verie good health: for Saturne is a planet whose influ­ence causeth colde and drinesse, which both are qualities enemies vnto life. Now fol­loweth the last, though not the least cause of long life, and that is the goodnesse of the soile, and wholesomnesse of the aire: for it is so recorded in Histories, and approoued by the testimonie of our late trauellers, that in that part of India which is called Oner, the inhabitants are very long liued, and for the most part very healthfull, insomuch that many of them liue vntill they bee aboue an hundred yeeres old; and wee see by experi­ence [Page 109]in our country, how perilous not onely pestilent aire is, but euen the vnholesomnes of the fennie countries, that are often anoi­ed with stinking and vnsauorie fogges. Ari­stotle in his treatise of the length and short­nesse of life, maketh choice of a hot coun­trey, as fittest for preseruation and mainte­nance of life; for so he obserueth it, that ser­pents bred and brought vp in hot coun­tries, are generally bigger bodied then those that are found in colder climets: and those fishes that breed in the red sea, are also lon­ger than those in the seas which are not so hot, and that, though they bee of the same kinde; which is a manifest proofe of their longer continuance: els how commeth it to passe, that they haue greater growth? and againe, those creatures that liue in cold climets, haue a more waterish kinde of hu­mour, and fitter for congelation; whence followeth the speedier destruction of the inhabitants: but the trueth is, that neither hot countries, nor colder climets, are of themselues any furtherance vnto long life, for those that are of a cholericke fierie con­stitution, liue longer in cold countries, and such as be of colder complexion, liue best and longest in hot regions, but according [Page 110]to the diuersitie of mens complexions, so liue they better or worse in diuers countries. Those that are too hot of cōstitution, by my counsell, shall make choice of a country in some measure and degrees cold, lest the out­ward heat of the circumiacent aire increase the fire within, and make it more vehement; and thence is it that those in the hottest part of Ethiopia are shortest liued, hauing that na­turall excesse of heat set on fire with the accesse of the externall heat of the aire. Now for such as abound with too much moisture, their best habitation in my iudge­ment is in hot and drie regions, that the heat and drought of the soile may abate the su­perfluity of the humor. But there are some of a moderate and well proportioned con­stitution, and if any man shall aske what country is best for them to dwel in, I answer, that there are two sorts of men thus tempe­red; some are of a more weake and lesse hardy disposition, and to them I would pre­scribe a dwelling in countries rather hot then cold, that the heat of the place may comfort and strengthen the heate of their bodies. Others againe are more hardy & better able to indure any not extreame violence of cold; and for them it is best to liue in colder cli­mates, [Page 111]for so is their heat better inabled to performe it functions of digestion and such like; and therefore Aristotle in his Politicks saith; that Northren men, and generally such as dwell in colder countries, are strong­er and bigger bodied, and most an end better couraged, and longer liued: for the coldnesse of the compassing aire, reflects the heat into the inward parts; and by that reflexion, the heats force is increased, and the parts gathered better and closer toge­ther, which both further the performance of its duties. And that is the reason why men in Winter are more hungry and de­uouring than in Summer, as experience tea­cheth vs all: for the stomacke is strength­ned by the heats compression, to the better concocting of the receiued nourishment. Thus therefore may wee conclude with the exposition of Aristotle his opinion in this case, when he saith, that hot places are fit­test for long life, in his booke of the Length and shortnesse of mans life; and in his Poli­ticks, The inhabitants of colder climates, are stronger and longer liued: for thus may we re­concile this apparent contradiction: that for men of more cold complexions, hot places are most preseruatiue and healthfull; [Page 112]and for the contrary complexioned men, contrary affected places; so that, if two of the same constitution (imagine them both to be hot) liue, the one in a cold, the other in an hot region (if their heat was not ac­cordingly proportioned to their moisture, but vnequally in the excesse) he that made choise of the colder habitation, prouided best for his life. And thus haue we briefe­lie set downe the common-receiued causes of long life, where-out by the consequence of contraries wee may deduce the cau­ses of short life. And they are, first the small quantity and watrishnesse of the moisture. Secondly, the superfluous abundance of excrements. Thirdly, the badnesse and vn­holesomenesse of the soile. Fourthly, the vngentle aspects of the Starres, that ruled either in our conception or birth. Fiftly, want of good nourishment. Sixtly, intem­perance either in our diet, or exercise, or o­beying of our affections. To which some adde the fewnesse or tendernesse of teeth, for that is a signe of thickenesse in the bone of the head, the matter allotted to the teeths generation being turned into the substance of the scull, which also importeth the weake­nesse of the braine, which is by meanes there­of [Page 113]vnfit for breathing, and therefore being of a moist disposition, the more fit for putre­faction, as standing-waters soonest putrefie and gather filth: but this I take rather for a signe then a cause of short life.

30 Now come we to that we first and princi­pally intended, to shew the differences of mens ages, and the causes thereof, together with their seuerall and singular properties, wherein we will deale so much the more spa­ringly by reason of those doubtes and diffi­culties remooued in the former part of the treatise, so that we shall not neede to digresse into any by-controuersies but keepe a direct and a straight course. And to begin with the Definition, (for more orderly proceeding) it may thus briefely be described: An age is a period and tearme of mans life, wherein his naturall complexion and temperature naturally and of its owne accord is euidently changed. For such is the disposition and nature of our bo­die, that by the continuall combat and inter­changable dominion of the euer-iarring elements it often changeth its primary con­stitution, so that though there were no out­ward cause of transmutation, which notwith­standing are many and manifold, yet haue wee that home-bred cause within vs that [Page 114]would in time alter our temperature, for our naturall heat vncessantly working vpon our natural moisture doth, though not suddenly, change the proportion into extreames, yet by degrees perceiuably preuaileth more and more ouer the humidity. For so see wee the same body in our youth and child-hood, di­uersly tempered, our infancy ful of moisture, as the fluid soft substance of our flesh mani­festly declareth: our youth bringeth a far­ther degree of solidity: our riper age euer tē ­perate: thence still declineth our body vnto colde and drinesse, till at length death cea­seth vpon our bodies, being the last end and period of our life. But euery slight change of the foure qualities proportion changeth not our temperature, for then we shuld eue­ry day haue a diuers complexion, our bodies eftsoones with wine and exercise changed from cold to heat, and by the contrary from heat to cold: yet by reason of the short in­durance of these distemperatures, the body returning to its former constitution, we can­not say there is a new complexion wrought in the body: for a temperature or complex­tion is a firme and standing habit of the body. Nor yet must wee imagine the talnesse and growing of the body or the new budding of [Page 115]haires, to be causes sufficient to procure this distinction; but the variation of our originall constitution is the true and proper cause of this diuersity and difference. And yet not euery change of the complexion, but that onely which proceedeth from that inwardly ingendred cause of destructions; for many times by the vnseasonable and immoderate heat of the aire, as also by intemperate and riotous liuing, men euen in the most milde & temperat countries, alter their complexi­ons, and with the Aethiopian, become euen decrepit old men (if we respect their con­stitutions, and those other incident qualities of old age) before they haue finished the full tearme of thirty yeeres; and therefore was it added in the description, that it must be a naturall and a selfe-alteration. Now according to these naturall and euident alte­rations of heat and moistures proportion, so may we best & most properly diuide the ages. Pythagoras diuides thē into four kinds, or rather setteth downe their number, which be according to his reckoning foure in num­ber, Child-hood, youth, man-hood, old age, pro­portioning our life to the foure parts of the yeere, our Child-hood to the spring, wherein all things together with a pleasant verdour [Page 116]and greenenesse flourish and by a plentifull supply of moisture continually increase in growth. Our youth vnto Summer, for that growen strength of the body and minde. Our man-age vnto the Autumne or Haruest, when after the manifold turmoiles and dan­gers of our fore-spent life, the good giftes and indowments of our minde (as we see it fall out in the fruites of Nature) receiue a kind of seasonable and timely ripenesse. Our old age hee resembleth vnto the colde and troublesome winter season, very fitly thereby expressing the cumbersome coldnesse of the latter end of our life. Aristotle setteth downe onely three distinct ages, child-hood, flours­shing man-age, and old-age; the first plenti­fully abounding with heat and moisture; the middle age hauing the same two qualities of life, aswell tempered as their nature possi­bly can be; old age declining and swaruing from that good and moderate temper, and by little and little decaying in both these qualities, till at length they be both of them consumed. Now that our life is thus often, and thus in order changed in the tempera­ture, it will easily appeare, if we consider the matter whereof we are all made, and that is semen & sanguis parentum, both abound­ing [Page 117]with heat and moisture, whereout ari­seth this consequence, that in the first en­trance into life, wee haue groatest store of those two liuely qualities, which decay not but by length of time; and that in our infan­cie wee are fullest of moisture, our experi­ence and sense teacheth vs, for so we see in­fants flesh most fluid and almost of a waxen disposition, ready to receiue impression of any light touch; and as for heat, Galen and Hippocrates both consent, that man is most hot in the first day of his birth, though by rea­son of the great store of moisture, the heats power doth not so euidently appeere: and because the heat without any the least inter­mission or pause, worketh vpon our moi­sture, and by little and little consumeth it, it selfe also in time decaying, who seeth not that the best part of our life, euen necessarily is most cold and drie? whence also this may be inferred; that the space between the two extremes, is most temperate, forasmuch as Nature neuer passeth from one extreme vn­to the other, but by the meane: and this is the warrant of Aristotles tripartite diuision of ages; the seuerals are thus briefly defined.

31 Childhood is the first part and age of a mans life, wherein their generation and growth is per­fected, [Page 118]and this lasteth (for the most part) vn­till wee be fiue and twentie yeeres old, and this age is proportionable vnto the Spring, hot and moist, for in this time our naturall heat supplieth greater store of vitall aerie moisture, from the nourishment receiued, than was spent of that our naturall store; & thence it is, that within compasse of this time, our bodies grow bigger and taller. But according to the successiue decay and dimi­nution of our heat and moisture, it hath pleased antiquitie to point out certaine de­grees of this first age; the first is our infan­cie, and that lasteth vntil the third or fourth yeere of our life, and is alwaies best stored with moisture: the next is our boy hood, and that lasteth other fiue yeeres: the third our budding and blossoming age, when our cheekes and other more hidden parts begin to be clothed with that mossie exerement of haire, which is proroged vntill the eigh­teenth yeere: the last our youth, lasting vn­till we be fiue and twentie yeeres old; and these are the parts of our growing age. The next is our flourishing and middle age, and this is, when a man is come to the highest degree of perfection in the temper of his body, & continueth in that flourishing liue­linesse, [Page 119]without any notorious decay or im­pairing his heat, supplying the iust quanti­ty of moisture from the nourishment, which in the former action of it, was consumed; and this is compared to the Summer, hot and drie, or rather moderately moist, drie onely in comparison of the former age, not simplie, lest the heat should too soone dissolue the body; and this also hath it parts; the first is our youth, (for so the penurie of our English toong warranteth me to call it) when our growth is staied, and our natu­rall heat beginneth to be most flourishing; you may call it our Prime, for then indeed are wee in our prime and most flourishing estate; it lasteth from the fiue and twenti­eth to the fiue and thirtieth or fortieth yeere of our life: the second part of our middle age, is our Manhood, the most constant and setled part of our life, as hauing our life­qualities most firme and in greatest medio­critie, wherein notwithstanding our naturall heat beginnes a little to decay and decline from its vigour; yet so, as it cannot by sense be perceiued, and this lasteth oftentimes till we be fiftie yeeres old. The last is old age, when not onely the augmentatiue facul­tie of the soule ceaseth to increase the quan­titie [Page 120]of our bodies, but also by reason of our heats and moistures decay, there is a mani­fest declining from our former lustinesse and liuelihood, our bodily strength together with the weake and feeble operations of our soule in her functions sensiblie impaired. And this last part of our life is resembled vnto Winter, for that although it be in it self hot and moist, (as life consisteth wholly in these two qualities) yet in comparison of the former ages, and in regard of death, vnto which it leadeth vs, is accounted cold, and this hath also its degrees or parts: the first wherein our strength and heat are euidently impaired, yet not so much, but that there remaineth a will and readinesse to bee do­ing; and this lasteth vsually from our fifti­eth yeere vnto our three-score and fiue. The second part of this last part of our life, which they call decrepit old age, is when our strength and heat is so farre decaied, that not onely all abilitie is taken away, but e­uen all willingnesse, to the least strength and motion of our bodie: and this is the con­clusion and end of our life, resembling death it selfe, whose harbinger and fore-runner it is: and so haue we seuen seuerall parts of our life, comprising our Pubertatem and adole­scentiam, [Page 121]vnder one: accordingly whereto the Astrologers haue assigned to euerie of them their peculiar predominant Planet: our Infant age is allotted to the Moones milde and moist dominion, cherishing vs with her sweet influence which she hath especially vpon moist bodies: our Boy-hood, Mercury hath charge ouer, inclining vs to sportfulnesse, talke, and learning: Venus guides our blossomming lustfull age: our youthfull prime, by the Sunnes liuely operation is lif­ted vp from base delights, to a loftier and more man like resolution and liuelinesse. Mars the sterne god of warre, hath the pre­cincts of his dominion limited within com­passe of our man-age, adding courage to our liuelihood, and whetting our otherwise dull spirits, vnto a more ventrous boldnesse in quarrelling combats: Old age from Iupi­ter receiueth granitie and staiednesse: De­crepit crooked age, from the angrie aspect of drie Saturne, sucketh the poisonous infir­mities of crasie sicknesse and waiward pet­tishnesse: and this is briefly the summarie explication of the differences of mans ages, and the causes of this distinction, together with those properties which the Astrologi­ans mystically and darkly haue propoun­ded, [Page 122]as proper and peculiar to euery and all of them, to which if we adde the exposition of some few problemes incident to this Treatise, wee will presently annex our Epi­logue.

32 The first doubt is, What the reason may be of our crying and lamenting at our very first en­trance into the world. There are that attri­bute this mourning vnto a diuining, and na­turall forefeeling as it were of the calamities to come: but I rather thinke it ariseth from those infirmities and griefes which wee pre­sently feele, aswell for want of some good thing which we desire, as also for some mis­like and greeuance of some incumbent mi­serie: as first that violent motion from that before so quietly inioied bedde (as it were) in the wombe. Secondly the straight nar­rownesse of that passage by which wee enter into the world. Thirdly, the cold and hun­grie intertainment which we haue, driuen out of our warme harbour in the close im­perceiueable habitation of our mothers wombe, and barred of that nourishment which we before had vncessantly ministred vnto vs; and thence is it, that presently we betake our selues to that dary-house of na­ture, euen by a naturall instinct and directi­on, [Page 123]where when wee haue well battled our selues, & by the enwrapping in our clothes, are armed against the colde aires iniuries, our begunne lamentations are pacified and turned into a quiet contentednesse.

33 Secondly, it may be demanded, why chil­dren in their sucking age are naturally more gi­uen vnto sleepe, then when they be of more ripe yeeres. The reason is natures mother-like prouidence that for the better strengthen­ing and speedier perfection of her of spring, vseth this as a meanes to increase the vertue, and operation of the heat, and for that pur­pose hath stored their head with moist va­pours, fitted through their rarity and thin­nesse, for the braines coole operation vpon them. For as vnited forces are strongest, ei­ther for assault or resistance, so the scattering discontinuity of the thin vapours is an occa­sion of the colds easier impression, and so of their thickning & better stopping of the pas­sages of the spirits vnto the outward senses. Another cause may be the braines coldnesse, as hauing in so little time receiued no great annoiance from the stomacks distempera­ture, it selfe also abounding with moistuure & fit matter for procuring of sleepe. Thirdly, the good digestion of that mild milkie sub­stance, [Page 124]whence ascendeth into the head the soundest and most pure exhalations. And therfore are their sleepes (for the most part) without any the least painefulnesse and mo­lestation, whereas contrarily we see surchar­ged stomackes breed vnquiet sleepes.

34 Thirdly, the question may be, why the na­turall vitall actions, as nutrition, augmentation, and such like, are in infants so powerfull, and those other of sense so feeble and vneffectuall. The answer is, that the good performance of those actions of life dependeth principally vpon our naturall heat; For our soule, the prince of our body hath assigned to our heat the administration and ordering of that pro­uince: no maruell therefore if those duties be well performed in our infancy, when the author of them is at that time most power­full and plentifull. Now the reason of the senses weake operation is the fewnesse of spi­rits deputed to that function: for the in­strumentall spirits of sense being to be made in the shop or worke-house of the braine by the braine, that excellent spirituall artifi­cer, the workeman howsoeuer he bee his craftsmaster, as hauing beene Natures Ap­prentice, yet by reason of his imbeeillity and weakenesse is not able in so short space to [Page 125]make many or at least not so forceable instru­ments, as may serue for the high function & duty of the soule. To which we may adde the abundance of moisture, wherewith the celles of the braine are in our infancy ouer­flowen hindring the actions of the soules sensitiue parts, and dulling her thereto or­dained faculties.

35 Where also wee haue opportunity to re­solue a fourth doubt, why children haue so slip­pery and short memories. The reason thereof is, their braines too great humidity, whereby it is disabled to keepe the impressions of the outward senses obiects. For there are two especiall annoiances of the braine that hin­der our memoratiue faculties, immoderate drinesse and too great moisture. For the ex­cesse of drought causeth excesse of hardnesse to resist the impressions. And therefore it is that old men for the most part haue so bad memories, their naturall moisture being by the heats long continued operation almost wasted. And Galen in his treatise of the me­mories, failing because of drinesse, maketh men­tion of a Student, that through immoderate watching and studiousnesse had so excessiue­ly dried his braine, that he had almost quite lost his remembrance: as also of an hus­bandman [Page 126]that by too much paines in that his painefull vocation, and the slendernesse of hungry-fare, was in danger of the like for­getting inconuenience. And as drinesse by not admitting the impression, is an impedi­ment to the memory, so is also too much moisture by not preseruing the imprinted species. For so see we water howsoeuer most yeelding, yet least fit to retaine any figure imprinted. Children therefore so moist brai­ned must needes be short remembranced.

36 The next question is, Whether speech be naturall or wholly from discipline. The answer is, that it is naturall, as vertue and other good habits be, nature hauing giuen a disposition and fitnesse, together with instruments fit for that purpose. But as wax howsoeuer capa­ble of any impression by reason of its plia­ble nature, yet without the putting to of some outward seale, hath no actuall print or resemblance of any thing; so our nature, though as fit to receiue any thing taught as wax is to receiue impression from the seale, yet without the helpe of some outward in­structer, is not actually and fully indowed with any how proper so euer a quality, espe­cially such as are auailable for knowledge. In the which kind this of speech hath a speciall [Page 127]prerogatiue; but lest I should seeme to bee needlessely busied in this question, I referre the Reader for his farther satisfaction to that excellent French Poet Du Bartas, in his Babylon, Englished by master William L'isle.

37 A sixt question is, Why children in their infancie haue no actuall euident vse of their reason. The cause is, the abundance of moi­sture incident to that age, whereby the fun­ctions of the inward senses as with a cloud are either obscured, or els quite hindred: whence was that forementioned speech of the learned Plato, That there is a little mix­ture of folly and moisture in men: and there­fore Galen was woont to say, that flegme the most waterish of all bumors, was little or no­thing profitable for the attainment of learning. In the seuenth place it is demanded, why children most fretfull are vsually shortest liued? the reason is, their plentie of heat in com­parison of their small store of moisture; for therfore are cholericke complexioned men most pettish, because their blood is by the fiery heat of that humor so soone inflamed: wherupon the Egyptians auouched the Fly to be the Hieroglyphick of anger, and perti­nacie, because (as Pierius obserueth) it is of [Page 128]so cholericke and fierie a disposition, and we see in experience, men in anger fiery co­loured, which proceeds from their heats in­flaming of the blood. Now heat vnpropor­tioned vnto the moisture (as is aforesaid) quickly consumeth that small store of moi­sture prouided for its food and so procu­reth death.

38 To these may be added that welknowen Probleme of Aristotle: why children breath faster and with lesse intermission then doe better growen men. The answer is, their great store of heat in comparison of that small measure in the after-ages, causeth nature for its bet­ter preseruation, to draw the aire oftner for the cooling of the hearts heat: and that is the reason that men who haue beene anie long time troubled with an ague, or any such like distemperature, are alwaies verie short winded: The contrary Aristotle witnesseth to follow, in things contrarily affected, for so he prooneth the horse and exe not to haue so much heat in them; because they take not their breath so thicke together; imply­ing that the cold temper of the heart and other inwards, is cause of longer breath; which is also euident in reason, for the at­traction and emission of the aire being or­dained [Page 131]onely for the cooling and tempring of the harts heat, according to the necessity thereof, must breathing be either oftner or more seldome. What is the reason that in our youth we are more hungrie, and haue a greater desire of meat, than in our declining and elder ages? The reason is, our sound & speedy di­gestion of fore receiued nourishment per­formed by meanes of our naturall heat, whence ariseth a new sucking of the veines, and so an incitement of the appetite.

Whence is it that old men are commonly so iealously suspicious? The cause is their incre­dulity & hardnesse of beliefe, which it selfe also proceedeth from their much experience of mens wilie practises, according to that, The burnt child dreadeth the fire. For such is the extreme badnesse of our nature, that still we go from one extreme vnto another; & so become of men extremely credulous, in our last age extremely suspicious. And that indeed was Aristotles remedie, who to draw vs from conetousnesse, biddes vs incline vnto prodigalitie: and yet onely with this condi­tion, if we cannot at the first instant after our long custome in the one extreme, light vpon the mediocritie betweene both. What maketh them so sottishly deuoted to the things [Page 132]of this world; that when they are neerest vnto death, they are most desirous not only to keepe that which before they had gotten, but more & more to increase their store? The reason is gi­uen by Aristotle in his Rhetoricks: and it is their exceeding great desire of life, euen af­ter those many daies which they haue fore­spent. Whēce proceedeth that other inordi­nate desire of things necessary for life-main­tenance, they hauing in their experience ob­serued how hardly things necessary are got­ten, how easily also they are lost. What is the cause, why old men are so talkatiue and full of words? Either because nature loues to exer­cise that part most which is least decaied: or that knowledge, the onely thing old age can bragge of, cannot be manifested but by vtterance: or that old men, the nigher they are to their end, they much more desire to haue their memory not onely by children and posterity, but euen by the speeches and deedes fore-vttered and performed in their life: or that wisedome (as all good things naturally communicate their good proper­ties) makes them desirous to profit others.

39 Whence is that frosty horinesse that vsually lighteth vpon mens heads in the winter and cold­est age of their life? There are some, that ima­gine [Page 133]it to proceed from the drinesse of those excrements: which also they goe about to prooue by the like experiment in bones, which after their humour is drawen out by seething, grow more and more white, till at length they come vnto a perfect and full whitenesse. But the vntrue resolution of the doubt propoūded, is therby discouered, be­cause that men who vse to couer their haire, are soner gray-headed than those that vse no couering, when as notwithstanding it is ma­nifest, that couered haire hath more store of moisture than that which hath beene expo­sed vnto the iniurious tossing of the winde, and the scorching heat of the sunne. There­fore I rather allow of Aristotles reason, name­ly the put refaction of that excrementall hu­mour, whereof our haire is made: for our naturall heat through its vnintermitted ope­ration, being disabled fully to digest that ex­crement sent from within to that outmost co­uering, our skin, for the haires nourishment, it putrefieth and corrupteth. Now that there is such a rottennesse and putrefaction in the haire, it is euident by experience of such as by long sickenesse haue become vntimely grayheaded: for after the recouery of their disease the feeblenesse of their heate being [Page 134]together with their health restored, the haire receiues its former flourishing and (that I may so speake (vnwasted greenenesse, which restitution can be attributed vnto no other cause but only to the through conco­ction of that vndigested excrement by the restored heat. The like whereof we see also in corne and grasse, that hauing lost its flori­shing greenenesse, by the continuall beating vpon and ouerwhelming of the waters, af­terward being by the Sunnes liuely heat cherished and reuiued, resumeth its naturall vigour and viridity. And that this hoari­headednesse proceeds from a defect of heat, it is farther euidenced by a strange example recorded by Scaliger, of a man who in one nights space had his head ouergrowen with hoarinesse. The cause was this. The Prince of Mantoua, Francis Gonzaga, had vpon suspicion of traiterous conspiracy, either a­gainst his person or state, imprisoned one of his kin & alliance that for his age was wholy vncapable of that alteration: and vpon the next morrow newes was brought vnto the Prince that his head was all vpon the sudden growen hoarily gray; which almost miracu­lous alteration mooued the Princes minde to grant him life and free vse of his former li­berty. [Page 135]Now if any man should demand the reason of this sudden change, it is giuen by the Philosophers, and is nothing else but the extremity of his griefe and feare, whence proceeded that withdrawing of the dispersed heat vnto the inward parts, and so was the humorous nourishment of the haire for want of concoction turned into rottennesse.

40 And thus haue we briefly runne ouer the diuersities of mans ages together with the true causes and properties of the particulars, hauing premised the determination of those vsually incident controuersies for our better and more direct proceeding in the principall treatise: not as Prolegomena or preface to the purpose, but as things essentiall and of the substance of our matter. Wherein if I haue either omitted any thing pertinent, or admitted ought that is superfluous, I hope, the eie of fauour wil wincke at my missing; as for the malicious, seeing I cannot looke for fauourable acceptance, I weigh not their verdict: onely as the Poet saith, Equitem mihi plaudere curo: