THE Copie of an Aunswere, made vnto a certaine letter: wherein the Aunswerer purgeth himselfe and other, from Pelagius errours, and frō the errour of free will or iustifica­tion of workes: wherewithall he semeth to be charged, by the sayde letter: And further he sheweth, wherin he differeth in iudgement, from certaine Englishe writers and Preachers, whome he chargeth with the teaching of false doctrine, vnder the name of Predestination.

IT had bene very well done of Cerberus to haue set downe in writing the copie of the letter that he sayth he Aunswereth, and the name of him that wrote it: so might those that he nameth in hys aun­swere, haue had some waye to haue founde out the Auctour of the Aunswere, that this mat­ter being debated priuatelye betwéene them, a meane might haue bene founde for the ending of the contro­uersie and the satisfying of suche as by this aunswere are not onely brought into doubt, of the truth of Gods euerlasting Predestination: but also haue conceyued an euill opinion of such as be the teachers therof. But if I shall speake that I thinke: I muste néedes saye, that I thinke there was no such letter written. But Cerberus [Page] hath sayued this, as a grounde to set his foundation vpō. For otherwise it shoulde haue semed too too maliciously done, vpon none occasion to write and set abrode in print to the disfamation of publique Preachers and writers: such matter as in this aunswere he chargeth them with­all. But graunt there were such a letter written: yet was not that a iuste occasion for Cerberus to charge by name, mée or anye other, which knewe not of the wri­ting of it. Well, he purgeth himselfe and other, he sayth, of diuers errours wherewith he semeth to be charged in that letter. It had bene well, he had not in purging him­selfe charged other, that muste fall to purging too. But that was to shewe what spirite he is of. Not of that spi­rite which in loue séeketh the reformation of other mens errours: but of that spirite that in malice seketh to main­taine his owne errours by the defacing of other, which neuerthelesse, will in the ende, be the defacing of him­selfe. For such as vse to digge pittes for others to fall into: doe commonly fall into the same themselues fyrst of all.

I desire of God by his grace and mercy, to settle, strength, and stablishe you in the truth of his holye Worde for euer. Dearely beloued, where you write vnto me, that you haue often hearde, that I and o­ther, shoulde holde the errours of Pelagius: whose er­rours you say are almost vnknowen vnto you what they are. And where further it is reported of vs (as you saye) that we shoulde denie the predestination of God: and seeke a iustification by free will, and by deseruing of workes, which matter you do both vnderstande, and haue also founde good proufe (as you suppose) that we are giltie in the same, laying [Page 2] the whole foundation of your proufe, vpon this saying set forth in print.

With which filthy saying, to burden me and other whome ye name: I maruell greatly that you coulde be so much abused, not considering by whom it was written, and set forth in print: for by the titling you see, it was printed beyonde the seas, in Queene Maries time, for that it is entitled, A prayer to God for his afflicted Church in Englande, and as it there appeareth manifest, it is the worke of W. Samuell, which is a mā vnto me of very small acquaintance: but a Preacher he is. And as for his saying, that a man may deserue God. &c. Which you desire me to proue if I can: it is a doctrine so abhominable and blasphemous: as I am sure neither Papist, nor Pela­gian, nor any other Heretike, eyther olde or newe, hath written or maintained, a more filthy, and ex­ecrable saying. For it is the flatte and manifest de­niall both of God the Father & of his Sonne Christ Iesu: neither doth it require any confutation to him that doth but confesse, that there is a God: and as for my selfe, I assure you: I doe not loue my lyfe so dearely, as I hate this vile saying deadlye. But wonder it is, that such a sentence, conteyning the very filthy dregs, of all Pelagius errours, coulde so long stande printed, and neither be forbidden, nor by any man written against.

I lyke very well, the Prayer that Cerberus begin­neth his Oration withall: but his purpose in praying [Page] (which appeareth to be, to deceiue the simple) I doe lyke nothing at all. The foundation of his friendes proufe of that he chargeth him with (as he sayth) is but slender: for it is but a fault in the print, as euery mā may sée that will reade but two verses going before in y^e same prayer, and sixe immediately following. And that the indiffe­rent reader may be satisfyed, I will write downe those verses, bicause it will be harde for men to finde the bookes wherein the Prayer is printed.

If any of Cerberus friendes had bene Auctour of thys Prayer: he woulde sone haue espied the printers fault, and would haue read those two verses thus.

And so should the saying haue bene no more filthy, than was the saying of Abraham to the Aungell, when he en­treated for the Citie of Sodome, and sayde: What if there lacke fiue of fiftie, wilt thou destroy the whole Ci­tie for lack of siue? Or the saying of the Aungell, when aunswering Abraham he sayde: If I finde but ten iust Gene. 18. men in the Citie, I will spare it for their sakes. But Cerberus was so bent to barke at the Preachers of pre­vestination, that he coulde not haue leysure to reade more than y^e title and those two verses, which being corrupted [Page 3] in printing, semed to serue his purpose. And surely, I doe not yet beleue that any man coulde be so madde as to charge him with those verses. But this I beleue, that he hath written them otherwise than they were printed. For the first verse beginning thus: So, though. &c. he hath written it thus. Although. &c. which argueth that either he neuer sawe the booke that Samuell made, or else, he supposed that none shoulde come to the sight of it, but such as doe fauour his faction. And in very deede some of them haue made verye straunge to shewe that booke. But how so euer y^e matter go otherwise, he hath shame­fully deceiued himselfe in triumphing ouer poore Samu­ell, as ouer him whome he compareth with the moste wicked Heretiques that euer were.

And although I denie not but some other there are, which (maintaining the power of mans freewil, & the meritorious worthinesse of mans deseruing) doe denie the free gift of Gods grace in Christ Iesu, and for his only sake, comprehended in the eternall predestination, and foreordinaunce of God, and declared vnto vs in his moste holy Worde, yet by­cause I see, there are many in these dayes, wrongful­ly and falsely, accused to be enimies of that blessed Predestination, to be Pelagians, iustifiers of them­selues, and such lyke: And with those bitter termes, are in open Auditories defaced, and brought into contempt, emong the multitude (who being decei­ued with giuing ouerhastie credite, vnto such men, not throughly vnderstanding the matter, doe vse to giue sentence, before the cause be hearde,) I haue thought it good therfore, most dearely beloued, not [Page] to them which take more delight in the defamation of other, than in knowing the truth themselues, but to thee, which art willing to vnderstande the matter, before thou iustifie or condemne either partie: in as fewe wordes as I possible can, to shewe what shame­full doctrine, vnder the name and colour of Gods Predestination, is now adayes set forth and taught of many, which both I and many other mislike, and haue diuers times with some of them in priuate and friendely talke, persuaded to leaue, both by cause we iudge the doctrine to be false, and also the distructi­on of all vertue to followe therevpon. For which cause, as the maner is of them that feare not so much the shipwrack of a good conscience, as they doe the losse of worldly estimation, least any such diffauo­rers of their fantasie, shoulde hap to haue some cre­dit among the people, with boystrous breath, they blowe abroade, that the mislikers of this their doc­trine, are enimies to Gods holy Predestination. But right well knowe they, that those whome they nowe so specially accuse, to be such haters of Gods Prede­stination, are in dede, most intire louers of the same. And many of those whom they accuse to be popishe Pelagians and Iustifiers of themselues: haue besto­wed both their goodes and lyues, against that filthy and detestable sect And as for those errours which Pelagius that olde heretike, with Celestinus and Iulianus his adherentes, did hold, and also reuoked the same in the Iudiciall counsell of Palaestine: I think it good to rehearse them: first in Latine & after in Englishe, as they are gathered togither by Augustine. And thē to shewe, according to your request, what parte of their doctrine which they teache vnder the name of Predestination, my selfe and other doe mislyke. To [Page 4] the ende that you and other may the better iudge, who are in deede worthy to be called Pelagians: and whether some parte of their doctrine, be not for iust cause misliked.

Here Cerberus vseth all his Retorique at once, to persuade his dearely beloued friend, whose letter he sayth he aunswereth, that he and other of his minde be falsely and wrongfully accused to be enimies of Gods holy pre­destinatiō. &c. And to this ende he will in as fewe words, as possibly he can, set forth what shamefull doctrine is now taught. &c. But first he will set forth both in Latine and in Englishe, those errours which the olde Heritike Pelagius, with other did holde and also reuoke. &c. That men may the better iudge, who are in deede worthy the name of Pelagians, (for he thinketh that he hath proued that we against whom he writeth, are those that should be called Pelagians) and whether some parte of oure doctrine be not for iuste cause misliked. Now let vs sée how he noteth Pelagius errours out of Augustine, first in Latine, and then in Englishe. Which when we haue weighed, we shall sée who are moste lyke Pelagius, he & his, or I and mine. For this is his purpose, I am sure, for that he toucheth me first by name, and setteth himself and such as he is against al such as I am, affirming that whereas we accuse them as enimies of Gods Predesti­nation, they are in déede y^e most intire louers and we the enimies therof. My chief labor therfore in this Apologie, shall be to make the truth hereof to appeare playnely to all the indifferent hearers.

The wordes of Austen are these. Episto. 106. tomo. 2. Obiectum est enim eum dicere. Quia Adam siue peccaret, siue non peccaret, moriturus esset. 2. Et quod peccatum eius, ipsum so­lum laeserit, non & genus humanum. 3. Et quod infantes, in illo statu sunt, quo Adam suit ante praeuaricationem. 4. Et quod ne (que) per mortem vel praeuaricationem, [...]de, omne genus humanum moriatur, ne (que) per resurrectionem Christi, omne genus humanum resurgat. 5. Et diuites baptizatos nisi omnibus abrenuntient, si quid boni visi fuerint facere, non reputari illis, nec eos habere posse regnum Dei. 6. Et gratiam Dei at (que) adiutorium, non ad singulos actus dari, sed in libero arbitrio esse, vel in lege at (que) in doctrina. 7. Et dei gratiam secundum merit a nostra dari. 8. Et silios Dei non posse vocari, nisi omnino abs (que) peccato fuerint effecti. 9. Et non esse liberum arbitrium, si Dei indiget auxilio, quoniam in propria vo­luntate habet vnusquis (que), facere aliquid vel non facere. 10. Et vic­toriam nostram, non ex Dei adiutorio esse, sed ex libero arbitrio. 11. Et quod poenitentibus veni a nō detur secūdum gratiam & mi­sericordiam Dei: sed secundum moritum & laborem eorum, qui per poenitentiam, digni suerint misericordia. Haec omnia Pelagius anathematizauit.

The first of Pelagius errours which Augustine here citeth is, that Adam shoulde haue died whether he had sinned or not sinned. This is as you heare, one of Pelagius wicked errours, that sinne is not the cause of Reprobation, or casting away, death sprong out of Gods ordinance, or some other way & came not of mans sinne (saith he) whether man had sinned or not sinned, yet should he haue dyed, contrary to the manifest Scripture which sayeth, that by one man sinne entred into the worlde, & death by the meanes of sinne. Roma. 5. b. And the wyse man sayth, that God Rom. 5. b. [Page 5] created mā to be vndestroyed. And againe he saith. Sapiae. God hath not made death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the liuing, he created al things that they might haue their being, yea all the people of the earth hath he made, that they shoulde haue health, that there should be no destruction in them, and that the Kingdome of Hell should not be vpon earth, for righteousnesse is euerlasting and immor­tall, but vnrighteousenesse bringeth death. Wicked and abhominable therfore was this errour of Pelagius which affirmeth, that whether man had sinned or not sinned: he shoulde haue dyed.

And here in the very beginning of Pelagius errours: I reporte me to themselues, euen to themselues (I saye) that blowe the trumpet of defamation against other, with the termes of pestilent Pelagians, whe­ther those, whome they so accuse nowe to be Pela­gians, holde this errour, or whether they themselues which woulde take some mote of errour out of other mens eyes, haue not this Pelagius beame sticking fast in their owne, let they themselues be iudges, or let their owne doctrine iudge, both in print and prea­ching, whereof some parte shall be hereafter rehear­sed. Yea let all the worlde iudge, which haue hearde the doctrine of both parties: who they are that in this point ought worthily to be called Pelagians.

After Cerberus hath set downe in Latine certaine of Pelagius errors, to y^e number of .xi. he repeteth y^e first in Englishe, that is, that Adam should haue dyed, though he had not sinned. And bycause his purpose is to proue that we are those that holde this Pelagian heresie: he [Page] vnderstandeth Pelagius meaning to be, that sinne was not the cause of Reprobation, or casting away, but that heath sprong out of Gods ordinaunce: And so at the last he concludeth, that Pelagius and we are all one in thys point: for we teache the same doctrine. What moued Pelagius to teache that doctrine, I knowe not, neyther did I at any time so much as once thinke to holde or de­sende it. And I thinke I may be bolde to say in the name of all that haue written or preached the doctrine that Cerberus misliketh: that not one eyther hath or will teache it. Although Cerberus doe boast, that hereafter some parte of our doctrine shall be shewed, whereby all men may be able to iudge that we are al one with Pela­gius in this point. For mine owne parte I will put all men out of doubt, that I beleue, and haue, doe, and will (if God permit) wache, that if Adam had not sinned, he had neuer dyed. And that God did create man to be vn­destroyed. And that God made not death as the wise Sapi. 2. man writeth. But by one man sinne entred into the the worlde, and by sinne, death. And I can not sée that any of my breathren haue or doe teache any otherwise, either in writing or preaching. Wherefore Cerberus doth vs open wrong to ioyne vs with Pelagius in thys errour. As for the doctrine that I haue written, and Cerberus wresteth top his purpose against me and my brethren: shall (by Gods helpe) be defended in the place where it is produced against vs.

The seconde errour which Austen rehearseth, is, that Adams sinne did onely hurt himselfe, and not the whole generation of man. This is an other vile and detestable errour which Pelagius helde, that the [Page 6] sinne of Adam brought not miserie and death vpon all his posteritie, contrarye to the open Scripture, which sayth, that by the sinne of one, condemnati­on came vpon all men. And the holy man Esdras Roma. 5. 4. Esdr. 6. sayth: O Adam, what hast thou done? for though it was thou that sinned, yet thou arte not fallen a­lone, but all we that come of thee.

The thirde, depending also vpon the seconde, is this: That Infantes being newe borne, are in that state, that Adam was in, before his transgression, which errour semeth onely, or chiefly to extende to the innocencie of children. For if his minde were, that in all pointes infantes were in Adames estate, then shoulde it be ouer brutishe. For who seeth not, that babes newe borne, suffer of tentimes payne and griefe, which Adam did not before his transgression. But to affirme, that Infants are not borne and con­ceiued in sinne, is to denie Originall sinne, which is an olde and a diuelish errour, and vtterly against the Scripture, which sayth plainely: Beholde, I was borne in wickednesse, and in sinne hath my mother Psalm. 51. conceyued mee.

In these two Articles can Cerberus finde nothing to burden vs withall. For we teache that by their first byrth all Infants are enheritours of that possession that our common father Adam purchased by his first trans­gression or sinne. That is, of bodily trauaile and mise­rie in this lyfe, and euerlasting death after this lyfe. And that euen as the children of bonde slaues, can enioy none other thing by birth than that bondage which their pa­rents are in: so the children of Adam can by nature en­ioy [Page] none other thing but that which belonged to their first father, who by his first transgression, made bath himselfe and all his posteritie, bonde slaues to death, hell, the diuell and damnation. Well therefore we shall not be Pelagians in this point. But if I woulde deale as straightly with Cerberus, as he doth with Samuell: I coulde charge him with breaking of Priscians heade, in the seconde Article, where he writeth leseret for leserit. Which though it be but a small fault, yet is it as great a fault as that which Cerberus maketh so much of in Sa­muels rymes. And the printers were to blame for both, I am sure. And therfore I woulde not y^• eyther Samuell or Cerberus, should beare any blame with them. Who so Iusteth to conferre the copie of this aunswere which was first cast about in the streates of Londō, with this y^• is written in this Apologie: shall easely sée that I haue amended many such faultes, without noting of them to any mans reproche.

The fourth errour is, that neither by the death & transgressiō of Adā, all the generation of mā dyeth, nor that by the Resurrection of Christ, all the ge­neration of man doth rise againe. I doe not vnder­stande that Pelagius did here speake of the last Refur­rection at the day of iudgement, as though he had, after the maner of the Saduceis, denied the Resur­rection of our soules and bodies in the last daye, for then were all them disputation in vaine, of the ma­ner how we shoulde be saued, whether by the grace of God, or by the deseruing of man, if saluation or Rosurrection had on either parte bene denied alto­gither. Neither doth the Scripture attribute the last [Page 7] Resurrection vnto Christ, as though the soules and bodies of men, shoulde haue died lyke beastes and not haue risen againe vnto iudgement, if Christ had not come. Yea no doubt, all men shoulde haue ri­sen againe, and that to the iudgement of euerlasting damnation, if Christ had not come. But I vnder­stande that Pelagius in this Article, denied the gene­ralitie of Redemption by the death of Christ, by which we doe, as it were arise from death, bycause of the state of lyfe and saluation, wherevnto we are bought in Christ by Redemption, lyke as we were in the state of death and damnation in Adam by sinne. Not that any man is purged from the corruption of sinne, vnto the innocencie of Adam: but bycause the sinne is couered in Christ, and pardoned for his sake. And further here is to be noted, that the first parte of this errour, is manifestly, the very same, which is in the seconde and thirde errour, before re­hersed, and by the same Scriptures plainly condem­ned. But to make the latter part of this errour more aparant, it was necessarie and thought good of Au­gustine, to rehearse the first againe: that by the com­parison of condemnation in Adam, and Redemptiō in Christ, it might the more plainely be perceiued that Christ was not inferiour to Adam, nor grace in­feriour to sinne. And that, as all the generation of man is condemned in Adam: euen so is all the ge­neration of man, Redemed in Christ. And as gene­rall a Sauiour is Christ by redemption: as Adam is a condemner by transgression. Which comparison is taken out of S. Paule his Epistle to the Romanes, where he saith. Likewise then as by the sinne of one, condemnation came vpon all men: euen so, by the iustifying of one, commeth the righteousnesse that Roma. 5. [Page] bringeth lyfe vpon all men. Yet shall not all men be cōdemned by Adam eternally: for there is ordained of God againe, away vnto lyfe, which way is Christ. Neyther shall all be eternallye saued by Christ: for there is of God declared a waye againe vnto death, which waye is sinne, and the wilfull contempt of Gods mercy in Christ. But this appeareth to be one of Pelagius damnable errours: That Christ was not a generall Sauiour, that Christ offered not vp the sacrifice of redemtiō for al the whole world, contra­rye to the manifest Scripture which sayeth. He 1. Iohn. 2. it is that obtayned grace for our sinnes, and not for our sinnes onely, but also, for the sinnes of the whole world. The same is also manifestly declared in these Scriptures folowing, and many other. Iohn. 1. a. 6. f. & 12. g. Ro. 5. d. & 14. c. 1. Cor. 8. d. 2. Cor. 5. c. Hebr. 2. c. & 2. d. 2. Pet. 2. a. And here it is worthy to be noted againe, how iustly this errour of Pelagius, reboundeth into the bosome of those, which so falsely accuse other to be giltie in the Pelagians errours. Be indifferent, dearely belo­ued in the Lorde, I beseche thee, and way the matter as it is. I desire no more.

When Cerberus hath framed this fourth Article of Pelagius to his purpose, and persuaded himselfe that it reboundeth into the bosomes of those that accuse him & his sort to be giltie of Pelagius errours: he concludeth that he desireth no more, but that his dearely beloued: whose letter he aunswereth, woulde be indifferent and woulde waighe the matter as it is. Surely, if I maye doe any thing with the same partie, my hartie request to him shall be, that he wyll graunt Cerberus his request. [Page 8] And further, I will be an humble suiter to all that shall reade this Apologie, that they setting all affection a side, will weighe both his aunswere, and this Apologie, euen as they are, and none otherwise, & then haue I ynough also. The Article is, that all the generation of man, doth neyther die by the sinne and transgression of Adam, nei­ther rise againe by the Resurrection of Christ. That is, that neither Adam was by his sinne, a generall con­demner of himselfe and all his posteritie: neither Christ by his Resurrection, a generall restorer of all mankinde. For so doth Cerberus interprete Pelagius meaning. I will not dispute about Pelagius meaning. For I know it coulde not be good, sith he denyeth a truth, plainely af­firmed by S. Paule and Esdras both, as Cerberus hath truely affirmed vpon the seconde Article. But that S. Roma. 5. 4. Esdr. 6. Paule ment in that place, as Cerberus doth vnderstand him: I doe slatly venie. And will by Gods helpe proue, both by the Scriptures & iudgemēt of auncient writers. And that the matter I go about may be the more playne to the reader: I will first set downe in plaine wordes, what meaning Cerberus gathereth of those wordes of Paule. He gathereth, that Paule shoulde minde to teach by those wordes, that Christ restored as many, as Adam loste. Which gathering is very false, and that may be proued by the verye circumstaunce of the place it selfe.

First, Paules purpose is, by comparing Christ with A­dam, to shewe that as Adam was able by disobedience, to make himselfe and all his posteritie bonds slaues to Satan: so was Christ able by obedience, to deliuer the same from that bondage, and to make them the free chil­dren of God. Now for the maner of speache that he vseth in comparing these two togither, we muste beware that we vnderstande it not so, that we make Christ & Adam lyke in all pointes. For then shall we be enforced to [Page] graunt many inconueniences, whereof thys is one. That as Adam lost himselfe by disobedience: so Christ restored himselfe by obedience. Wherof shoulde followe that filthy errour of them that affirme that Christ dyed for his owne sinnes as well as for the sinnes of the peo­ple, contrary to the whole course of the Scriptures, which teache that he was without spotte of sinne, and therfore was able to satisfie to God y^e Father for sinne. Another incōuenience is, y^t there shoulde be repugnācie betwéene this place of Scripture & other, (wherin both S. Paule & our Sauiour Christ, doe teache, that not all mankinde, that is, not euery particular person of mankinde, but a certaine elected and chosen number, are by Christ resto­red into y^e fauour of God) which thing may not be graū ­ted. For in the Scripture there is no repugnaunce at all. And the thirde inconuenience shoulde be, that only origi­nall sinne, (that is y^e sinne that we haue of our parents, euen in our conception) is put awaye by the bloud of Christ, and not our actuall sinne. So that we must ey­ther satisfie for that our selues, or else perishe, notwith­standing Christes death and sufferance. Which is such an inconuenience as cutteth of from Christ as many as dye not in Infancie, before they commit any actuall sinne. These inconueniences considered, we must séeke to finde another meaning in S. Paules wordes, when he compareth Christ with Adam, than that which the bare wordes seeme to giue. His meaning is not to make Christ lyke vnto Adam, but to preferre Christ before A­dam, & to shewe that grace is more abundant in Christ, than sinne was in Adam. Which thing appeareth in Paules very wordes in the same chapter, where he saith. Sed non sicut delictum ita & donū. Si enim vnius delicto multi mortui sunt: multo magis gratia Dei & donum, in gratia vnius Roma. 5. hominis Iesu Christi, in plures abundauit. That is to saye, [Page 9] But the gifte was not lyke vnto the sinne, for if many dyed by y^e sinne of one: much more hath the mercy & gifte of God, in the grace of one man Iesus Christ, abounded vnto many. If these words of Paule should be vnderstād of the number that were loste by Adam, and restored by Christ: then muste we graunt, y^e more were restored by Christ, than lost by Adam. For he saith that the grace or mercy hath abounded vnto moe. Which wordes, being vnderstand of y^e number restored, must be spoken in com­parison, of the many that were lost by Adam: & so must it follow that moe were restored by Christ, than were lost by Adam. Which can not be, vnlesse we will saye that Christ restored moe than all. For Adam loste all. The meaning of Paule is therefore, that as y^e sinne of Adam being but one man, was a sufficient condemnation to himselfe and all his posteritie which are many: euen so, yea and much more was the grace or frée mercy, and gift of God, in Christ being but one, a sufficient restitution of all the chosen Children of God, although y^e same were neuer so many. And that this is the meaning of Paule, doth well appeare by his wordes that follow in the same chapter, where he sayth. Et non sicut per vnum qui peccauit, ita & donum. Nam condemnatio quidem ex vno, in condemnatio­nem: gratia autem ex mult is delictis, in iustificationem. Si enim vnius delicto, mors regnauit per vnum: multo magis, abundan­tiam gratiae & donationis & iustitiae accipientes, in vita regna­bunt, per vnum Iesum Christum. That is to saye. And the gift is not so, as is that which entred in by one that sin­ned. For the condemnation came by one sinne, into con­demnation: but grace or frée mercye, was of many sinnes into righteousenesse. For if by the sinne of one man, death haue raigned, by the meanes of one man: much more, shall they which haue receiued abundance of frée mercye or grace, and of the gifte and righteouse­nesse: [Page] raigne in lyfe, thorow one, which is Iesus Christ. Here doth Paule plainely expresse his meaning. Which is, that they which haue receiued abundaunce of grace, and of the gyft and righteousnesse, are those many, that are restored by Christ Iesu, in whome, through the same Christ, lyse shall raigne. Those are not the whole poste­ritie of Adam. For the same Paule sayth in the .xj. chap­ter of this Epistle, Quod quaerebat Israell non est consecutus, electio. autē consecuta est. Israell hath not obtayned y^e thing that he sought for: but the election hath obtained. Mea­ning that the carnall Israelites obtained not righteouse­nesse, much lesse did y^e whole offspring of Adā obtaine it. But the election, that is the elected and chosen children of God, whether they be of the stock of Israel or no, haue ob­tayned righteousenesse through Christ, which is forgiue­nesse of al their sinnes by his bloud sheading, & righteous­nesse, & euerlasting lyfe by his resurrectiō. According to y^e saying of Paul, Traditus est propter delicta nostra, & resurrex­it propter iustificationē nostrā. He was deliuered vnto death Rom. 4. for our sinnes: and he rose againe for our iustification.

But Cerberus and his fellowes, do vrge the vniuer­sall signe, Omnes. All. Sicut per vnius delictum in omnes ho­mines in condemnationem: sic & per vnius iustitiam in omnes homines, in iustificationem vitae. That is. Euen as by one mans fault, sinne entred into all men, to condemnation, so by the righteousenesse of one man, is righteousenesse entred into all men, to the iustification of lyfe. This vni­uersall signe muste néedes streatche it selfe to all Adams posteritie, and therfore all muste be made righteouse by Christ. These men will not see how suche vniuersall signes are vsed in the Scriptures. They can not per­ceiue how this vniuersall signe shoulde in the first sen­tence streatche it selfe to all the generation of the firste Adam that sinned, and in the seconde sentence to all the [Page 10] generation of the seconde Adam, which is Christ. The generation of y^e first are all that haue or shall be borne of fleshe and bloud, and the generation of the seconde, are al they that be borne of God. If we shoulde in all places of Scripture, streatche this vniuersall signe all, so farre as Cerberus doth streatche it here: we should make as good a piece of worke as y^e Nonne did, which reade in s. Paule Omnia probate, proue all things. And therefore hauing a 1. Thess. 5. minde to sir Iohn, the Chaplen of the house, she proued what it was to lye with a man. And being with childe, the matter came to the knowledge of the Abbas: she ex­cused hir selfe by Saint Paule, who biddeth vs proue all things. If a théefe that taketh another mans goodes, shoulde excuse himselfe with Omnia mihi licent, I may doe 1. Corin. 3. 1. Corin. 6. all things, or Omnia vestra sunt. All things are yours: It would not be founde that these vniuersall signes should either make it léeful for him to take another mans goods, or to haue right to that that is not hys by some iust title. I woulde wishe Cerberus and his fellowes therfore, to weigh this matter better before they triumph ouer vs in such sort as he doth in this his aunswere. And I woulde wishe him to consider well whether saint Austen in the Epistle where these Articles of Pelagius be written, do not write cleane contrary to this iudgement of his. For in the very place that he citeth to make for his purpose, S. Austen sayth thus. Infantes nuper nati, non sunt in illo statu in quo Adam fuit ante praeuaricationem, vt ad ipsos perti­neat quod breuiter ait Apostolus. Per vnum hominem mors, & 1. Corin. 15. per vnum hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur: it a & in Christo omnes viuisicabuntur. Vnde sit, quod Infantes nō baptizati, non solum regnum coelorum, verum etiam vitam aeternam habere non possint. That is, Infantes that be lately borne, are not in that state that Adam was before he sinned, that that thing which the Apostle doth [Page] in fewe wordes affirme, might partaine vnto them. By one man came death, and by one man came the resurrec­tion of the deade. For euen as in Adam all dye: so in Christ shall all be made alyne. Wherby it commeth to passe that Insants which are not baptised, are not onely vnable to enioye the Kingdome of Heauen, but also lyfe euerlasting. These wordes me think, are very plaine a­gainst that which Cerberus would maintaine by Paule and Austen. For if Infants vnbaptised can not haue the kingdome of God nor euerlasting lyfe: how doth this saying In christo omnes viuificabuntur: All shalbe quickned in Christ: pertayne to all the posteritie of Adam? vn­lesse he will say, that Infantes that dye before baptisme be not of Adams posteritie? Better matter can I not wishe for against Cerberus, than that which hangeth to the foundation that he himselfe buildeth vpon. It were for my purpose to aduaūce the auctoritie of this Epistle, bicause it helpeth me very much against this Hel Dogge Cerberus: but bicause I woulde not haue the Reader to conceyue such an opinion of S. Austen, as to thinke that he shoulde be of such minde as the Auctour of thys Epistle doth shewe himselfe to be in certaine pointes: I will cite the iudgement of Erasmus concerning thys Epistle & all other of this title. That is, Ad Bonifacium. To Boniface. Speaking of y^e Booke of Epistles, wher, in this Epistle. 106. is written, he saith. Nonnullae simpli­citor confictae, quod genus sunt illae Bonefacij ad Augustinum, Augustini ad Bonifacium. Some of those Epistles (saith he) are altogether fayned. As are those of Bonifacius to Augustine, and of Austen to Boniface. Now iudge gen­tle Reader what this Cerberus meaneth, that leauing the good and sounde workes of Austen, where he writeth very well of this matter: setteth his foundation vpon such rotten patches as some such as he is, haue put forth [Page 11] in Austens name. No maruell though Cerberus be a­shamed to set his name to his booke. This might suffise for our defence against Cerberus his assaulte in thys point. But I will adde one Scripture or two, and so the iudgement of some learned writers, that he take not occasion of a new calumniatiō, because I promised more than I haue yet performed. Saint Paule writing to Ti­mothe in his seconde Epistle and seconde chapter, sayth 2. Timo. 2. thus. Sed firmum fundamentum Dei stat, habens signaculu hoc. Cognouit Dominus qui sunt sui. The foundation of God, standeth firme and sure, hauing this sure seale. The Lorde knoweth who be his. By which wordes it is ma­nifest, that S. Paule vnderstoode not that all mankinde were elected in Christ, and so restored by Christ: but a certaine number, which though they be vnknowne vnto men, yet doth the Lorde (whose they be) knowe them well, and will not suffer them, no nor any of them, to perishe. Wherfore he exhorteth all such as call vpon the name of the Lorde (that is all Christians) to depart from iniquitie. For in a great house (saith he) there be, not only vesselles of Golde and Siluer, but also of Timber and Earth: some to serue for honorable vses, and some for vile vses. I knowe how some doe wrest these latter wordes of S. Paule, to proue that it is in mans power to depart from iniquitie, bicause Saint Paule doth will Christians so to doe. And especially those wordes which followe, which are these. Si quis ergo, emund. iuerit se ab istis, erit vas in honorem sanctificatum, & vtile domino, ad omne opus bonum paratum. If any man therfore, shall clense him­selfe from these men: he shall be a vessell sanctified vnto honour, and profitable for the Lord, being prepared and made readie for euery good worke. These wordes do ma­nifestly declare, say they, that it is in mannes power to clense himselfe, and to make himselfe a vessel méete for [Page] the Lordes vse and seruice. These men will not vnder­stande that commaundements, admonitions, exhortati­ons, and councelles be to any purpose: except those to whome they be giuen, be able to do the things, that they be commaunded, admonished, exhorted, or councelled to doe. And so shall the commaundements of God be to no purpose. For who hath bene, is, or shall be able, to doe that God commaundeth, when he sayth. Thou shalte loue the Lorde thy God, with all thine heart, with al thy soule, and with all thy minde. And thy neighbour as thy selfe? Doth not S. Paule say that we are not able of our 2. Corin. 3. selues, so much as to think a good thought. And is not this according to y^t which Christ himselfe teacheth when Iohn. 15. he saith to his Disciples: without me ye can do nothing? But these men will not vnderstande that the vse of these things is, to cause the chosen children of God, to acknow­ledge their owne inhabilitie, and humblye to begge at Gods hande his helpe that therby they may doe y^t which is commaunded or taught: and that the reprobate [...] may be without excuse, yea or pretence of excuse. Saint Au­sten, whome Cerberus woulde faine haue to take hys parte, doth vnderstande this place of Paule, cleane con­trary to Cerberus his purpose: As appereth in moe pla­ces then one of his best writings. Namely in the. viz. chapter of the .xx. booke De Ciuitate Dei, that is of the Citie of God, (which is, the Church of Christ) where speaking of that Church called from among all the nations of the worlde: he saith thus. Has enim elegit Deus ante mundi con­stitutionem eruere depotestate tenebrarum, & transferre in regnū silij claritatis suae, sicut Apostolus ait. Nam seducere illum gen­tesDe Ciuitate Dei. lib. 20. Cap. 7.etiam nunc, & secum trabere in aeternam po [...]nam, sed non prae­destinatas in aeternam vitam, quis sidelis ignorat? Nec moueat, quod soepe Diabolus seducit etiā illos, quiiā regenerati in Christo, vias ingrediuntur Dei. Nouit enim Dominus qui sunt eius, ex hijs [Page 12] in aeternam damnationem, neminem ille seducit. Sic enim nouit eos Dominus, vt Deus, quem nihil latet, etiam futurorum, non vt ho­mo, qui hommem ad praesens videt, sic tamen videt, cuius cor non videt, qualis autem postea sit futurus, nec seipsum videt. Ad hoc ergo ligatus est Diabolus, & inclusus in abysso, vt iam non sedu­cat gentes, ex quibus constat Ecclesia, quas antea seductas tenebat antequam essit Ecclesia. Nec enim dictum est, vt non seduceret a­liquem: sed vt non seduceret, inquit, iam gentes, in quibus Eccle­siam proculdubio voluit intelligi. That is to say. God did be­fore the beginning of the Worlde, choose these nations, that he might deliuer them out of y^e power of darknesse, and translate them into the kingdome of the sonne of his owne brightnesse, as the Apostle sayth. For what fayth­full man knoweth not, that the Deuill doth euen now, seduce nations, and draw them with himselfe into euer­lasting paine: but not those nations which are predesti­nated into euerlasting lyfe? Neither let it trouble anye man, that the Deuill doth oftentimes seduce euen those, that being alredy regenerated in Christ, do walke in the wayes of God. For the Lorde knoweth who be hys: of them doth the Deuill seduce none, to euerlasting dam­nation. For the Lorde doth knowe them, as God kno­weth, from whom nothing is hidde, no not of the things to come. Not as a man knoweth, who doth for the pre­sent time see a man, but yet so, as whose heart he séeth not, yea, he séeth not himselfe so, that he can tell what maner a man he himselfe shalbe hereafter. To this pur­pose therfore, is the Deuill bounde, and shut vp in dark­nesse: that he doe not now seduce the nations of whome the Churche doth consist. Which nations he did before holde still in errour, before the Church was. For it is not sayde, that he shoulde not seduce any man: but that he should not now seduce (sayth he) y^e nations, in which nations, no doubt he woulde haue the Church to be vn­derstande.

[Page] This Booke was Austens owne without all doubt, and therefore, we maye be bolde to affirmo that this is Austens minde, not only vpon this place of Scripture, but also vpon this matter, that is, that not all mankind, but a certaine chosen sort, are restored againe by Christ. And that none of those that are so restored, can perishe, although God doe sometime suffer them to fall.

Againe, the same Austen writing against the Do­natists, August. li. 5. de. bapt. capit. 27. in his fift booke De Baptismo, that is of Baptisme, saith thus, in the .xxvij. chapter of the same Booke. Nu­merus ergo ille iustorum, qui secundum propositum vocati sunt, de quibus dictum est, Nouit dominus qui sunt eius: ipse est ortus conclusus, fons signatus, puteus aquae viuae, paradisus cum fructu pomorum. Ex hoc numero, quidam spiritualiter viuunt, & su­pereminentem viam charitatis ingrediunter. Et quum praeoccu­patum hominem in aliquo delicto, instruunt in spiritis lenitatis: intendunt ne & ipsi tententur. Et cum fortè & ipsi praeoccupantur reprimitur in eis aliquantulum, nō autem extinguitur, charitatis affectus: rursus (que) resurgens & inardeseens, pristino cursuiresti­tuitur. Norunt enim dicere. Dormitauit anima mea praetaedio, confirma me in verbis tuis. That is. That number therfore, of the righteous, which are called according to Gods purpose, concerning which it is sayde, that the Lord kno­weth who they be that be his: is the same that is the fen­sed garden, the sealed fountaine, the pyt of springing water, and the paradisefull of the fruite of Apples. Of this number there be some that lyue spiritually, & walke in the excellent waye of charitie. And when they doe in the spirite of leuitie, instruct a man that is ouertaken w^t any fault: they doe take good héede least they themselues be tempted also. And when it happeneth y^e any of them be ouertaken: the affection of loue is something repres­sed in them, but it is not vtterly quenched. And when [Page 13] it riseth againe, and waxeth feruent: it is restored againe to his olde course or rase. For these men can saye. My soule did [...]omber for very wearinesse, do thou make mee strong in thy wordes.

And againe in the same chapter, Saint Austen saith thus. Sunt etiam quidam ex eo numero, qui adhuc nequiter vi­uant, aut etiam in haeresibus, vel in gentilium superstitionibus iaceant: & tamen etiam illic nouit dominus qui sunt eius. Nam (que) in illi ineffabili praescientia Dei: multi qui foris videntur, intus sunt, & multi qui intus videntur, fores sunt. Ex illis ergo omni­bus, qui, vt ita dicam, intrinsecus & in occulto intus sunt: con­stat ille hortus cōclusus, fons signatus, puteus aquae viuae, paradisus cum fructu pomorum. That is. There be also some of that number, which doe yet liue wickedly, either doe lye in Heresies or in y^e superstitiōs of the Heathen: and yet the Lorde doth euen there knowe, who be his. For in that vnspeakeable foreknowledge of God: many that séeme to be without, are within, & many that seme to be with­in, are without. That inclosed garden therefore, that sealed fountaine, that pyt of springing water, and that paradise of the fruite of Apples: doth consist of all those, that be inwardely & secretely within, if I may so speake.

And againe the same Austen saith in the .xlv. treatise vpon Iohn. Et oues vocem eius audiunt, & proprias oues vocat August. Tract. 45. in Iohn. nominatim. Habet enim nomina eorum scripta in libro vitae. Pro­prias oues vocat nominatim: hinc dicit Apostolus. Nouit Domi­nus qui sunt eius. That is. And his shéepe heare his voice, and he calleth his owne shéepe by name. For he hath their names written in the Booke of Lyfe. He calleth his owne sheepe by name. Hereof commeth it that the Apostle sayth. The Lorde knoweeh who they be that he hys.

What shoulde I cite any moe places of this Auctour for this purpose? If these will not satisfie Cerberus: [Page] let him barke still tyll his throte be horse. I knowe these may satisfie all that be not wilfully blinde. For in three seuerall places, S. Austen hath cited these wordes of S. Paule. (The Lorde knoweth who be his) euen in the same sence that I haue done.

One other Scripture I will cite also, which is writ­ten in the .xvij. of S. Iohns Gospell. The wordes were spoken by our Sauiour Christ himselfe, in that Prayer that he made to his Father the night before he suffered, and they are these Non pro mundorogo, sed probus quos ded [...]sti mihi, quia tui sunt. I doe not praye for the worlde (sayth Christ, but for those that thou hast giuen vnto mée, bi­cause they be thine. And that Cerberus may know what is ment here by the worde Worlde: he shall sée what S. Austen writeth in his. 107. treatise vpon Iohn, concer­ning August. tractat. 107. super Ioh. this text. Mundum vidt modo intelligi, qui viuunt secun­dum concupiscontiam mundi, & non sunt in ea sorte gratiae, vt ab illo eligantur ex mundo: non vti (que) pro mundo, sed pro hijs quos ci pater dedit, rogare se dicit. Per hoc enim quod cos illi pater iam dedit, factum est, vt non pertineant ad cum mundum, pro quo nore orat. Deind [...], subiungit. Quia tui sunt. That is. He would now haue vs vnderstande, that those men be the worlde which doe liue according to concupiscence or luste of the worlde, and are not in that state of grace that they might be by him chosen out of the worlde: He doth not therfore say that he doth pray for the world, but for them that his father gaue vnto him. For by that, that his father hath already giuen them vnto him, it commeth to passe, that they pertaine not vnto that worlde, that he prayeth not for. And after this he addeth. Bicause they be thine. If Cerberus were not to obstinately blinde, he coulde not but see and confesse, that S. Austen is full against him. For what other cause doth s. Austen alleadge, why those that Christ prayde for, were not of the worlde, but onely, [Page 14] that the Father had giuen them vnto him? And what cause doth he alleadge why Christ might not choose them out of the worlde that he prayed not for: but onely that they were not in that state of grace or mercye, that they might be chosen out of the worlde? And the text it selfe, might persuade any man but Cerberus and his felowes, that there is a number that be not restored by Christ. For woulde Christ denie to praye for any of them y^• are restored by him? I trowe not.

But to bring Cerberus from Hell gate, if it will be: I will cyte yet one place of S. Austen, wherein he spea­keth as plainely as any man can deuise to speake, con­cerning this matter. In his first booke that he writeth of the deseruings, and forgiuenesse of sinnes, and of y^• bap­tisme of Infants, we reade thus in the .xv. chapter. August, de peccatorum meritis & remissione

Ob hoc etiam dictum est, omnes, & omnes: ne (que) enim qui ge­nerantur per Adā, ijdem ipsi omnes, per Christū regenerantur, sed hoc recte dictum est, quia sicut nullius carnalis generatio, nisi p [...]r Adam: sic spiritales nullius, nisi per Christum. Nam si aliqui possent carne generari non per. Adam, & aliqui regenerari s [...]tu, non per Christum; non liquide omnes, siue hic, s [...] ibi dicer tur. Eosdem autem omnes, posteannultos dicit. Possunt quipp [...] in ali­quare, omnes esse qui p [...]ci sunt. Sed multo [...] [...]bet generatio car­nalis, multos & spiritalis, [...] multos haec spiritalis, quam illa carnalis. Verunt [...], quem [...]dum illa omnes ha­bet [...]s: sic ista omnes iusto [...] homines. Quia sicut nemoprae­ter illā homo, sic nemopraeter istā iustus homo, & in vtrá [...] multi.

After S. Austen had sayde, that it is not the only imi­tation of Christ, that can make a man righteous, but the frée mercy which doth regenerate by the spirite, so is it not the imitation of Adam only that maketh vs sinners, but the punishement which engendreth by the fleshe: he addeth the wordes aboue in Latine, which are in Eng­lishe thus. For this cause also, is it said, all, and all: for [Page] not the same all y^• are begotten by Adam, are by Christ regenerated. But this is well sayde, that euen as the carnall generation of no man, is otherwise than by Adā: so is the spirituall generation of no man otherwise than by Christ. For if there might be some men begotten in the fleshe, and not by Adam, and some men regenerated in the spirite, & not by Christ: we might not say plaine­ly all, either in the one place or in the other. And after­warde, he doth saye, that the same all, are many: for [...] some certaine thing, those which are but fewe, may be all. But the carnall generation hath many, and the spi­rituall hath many also: although this spiritual haue not so many, as hath that carnall. But yet for all that, euen as that hath all men: so hath this all iuste men. For as without that, no man is a man: euen so without this no man is a [...]st man, and in eche of these are many.

Now let Cerberus and his fellowes, bark at Austen. For he hath made the same interpretation of S. Paules wordes, that I haue made before. Whereby it is mani­fest, that that Epistle that Cerberus buildeth vpon, is not Austens owne, but fained by some such as Cerberus is, and put forth in Austens name.

But bycause I promised before to proue mine affir­mation as well by the iudgement of Auncient writers, as by Scripture: I will adde the iudgement of one or two moe, whose autoritie and antiquitie is not to be dis­pised. Of the which Ambrose shall be one. Writing vp­on the Epistle to the Romans, he sayth. Sicut per vnius de­lictum in omnes homines in condemnationem: sic & per vnius iu­stitiam Roma. 5. in omnes homines, in iustificationem vitae. Hoc est, sicut per vnius delictum, omnes condemnationem meruerunt, similiter peccantes: ita & in iustitia vnius, omnes iustificabuntur creden­tes. Si qui autem condemnationem hanc, generalem esse putant: simili modo & iustificationem generalem accipient. Sed non est [Page 15] verum, quia non omnes credunt. Sicut enim per inobedientiam vnius hominis, peccatores constituti sunt plurimi: ita et per vnius obedientiam iusti constituentur multi. Quos supra omnes dixit: hic plures & multos significat. Plures enim delictum Adae se­cuti sunt praeuaricando, non omnes, & multi iusti constituentur, non omnes. Non ergo in eos regnauit mors, qui non peccauerunt in similitudine preuaricationis Adae. That is to say. Euen as by one mans sinne, giltinesse came vpon all men to con­demnation: so did iustification of lyfe come vpon all mē through the righteousenesse of one man. That is, euen as by the sinne of one man, all men that doe sinne as he dyd, haue deserued condemnation: euen so all that do be­leue, shall be iustified in the righteousenesse of one man. And if any doe think that this condemnation is general: let them in lyke maner take the iustification to be gene­rall. But that is not true, bycause all men doe not be­leue. For euen as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners: so by the obedience of one man, ma­ny shall be made righteous. The Apostle doth here call those same, many, that he did before call, all. For many haue in sinning folowed the sinne of Adam, but not all: and many shall be made righteous, but not all. Death therefore hath not raigned ouer them, which haue not sinned in lyke sort as Adam did. These be the wordes of Ambrose. Which though at the first sight, they séeme to incline to the errour of Pelagius: yet when they be well weighed, they giue a good and sounde meaning. That is, that sinne neuer raigned in any of Gods elect. For al­though the elect of God, in as much as they be the childrē of Adam, be partakers of Adams sinne, and in Adam condemned: yet are they by Christe deliuered from that condemnation, so that sinne hath in them no dominion at all: Which thing appeareth in them by the fayth in Christ, which when they come to knowledge, they doe [Page] both by wordes and workes declare. That this is the meaning of Ambros, doth very plainely appeare, by that he sayth, that all the beleuers shall be iustified. For what nedeth iustification, where no condemnatiō was? Thus much I thought good to write concerning y^• simple mea­ning, of this auncient Father, least any mā of simplicity mistaking his meaning, might think y^t he should denie y^e Elect to be conceyued and borne in originall sinne, from which neuer any that was borne (Christ only excepted) coulde be frée. But this is his meaning, that in the Elect and chosen Children of God, this sinne hath no domini­on, as it doth appeare by their obedience that they shewe in beleuing the Gospell: but in the Reprobates, it bea­reth rule still: For Christ hath not killed it in them.

And to make an ende of this matter: Saint Paule sayth thus in his eyght chapter to the Romans. Who shall laye any thing to the charge of Gods Elect? It is God that doth iustifie, who is it that shall condemne? If all mankinde, then, be elected in Christ (as Cerberus sayth) then shall no sinne be layde to any mans charge. For who dare accuse Gods chosen children? And so shall Cerberus doctrine be the destruction of all vertue, as he hath afore affirmed of the doctrine we teache of Predesti­nation.

As for that which Cerberus citeth out of the seconde chapter of S. Iohns first Epistle, & the other places that he sendeth the Reader vnto: I doe nowe passe ouer, as sufficiently aunswered, by that I haue written concer­ning S. Paules meaning in the fift to the Romans.

The fift of Pelagius errours was, that riche men be­ing baptized, except they did vtterly renounce and forsake their riches, though they seeme to doe some [Page 16] good, yet is it not accepted, neither can they haue the Kingdome of God. A filthy, and an abhomina­ble errour, directly repugnant, both to the state of the common wealth, and also to the worde of God, which sayth. Charge them that be riche in this 1. Timoth. 6. world, that they be not exceding wyse &c. And that they doe good and be riche in good workes. &c.

The sixt errour is, that the grace of God and the helpe of God, is not giuē to euery one of our works, but that it is in free choyse, in the lawe, and in doc­trine This errour is exceding wicked and execrable, that mā by the law, by doctrine, and by free choise, is able to doe any maner of good worke, whatsoeuer it be, without the grace and helpe of God. For as S. Paule sayeth; we are not sufficient of our selues, to 2. Corinth. 3. think any thing, as of our selues: but our ablenesse cōmeth of God. And againe. It is God that worketh Phillip. 2. in vs, both the will and the dede, euen of good will.

The seuenth errour is, that the grace of God is giuen according to our deseruing. Vile and abho­minable is this errour also, and contrary to the ma­nifest minde and words of the Apostle, which sayth. If it be of workes, then is it no more grace, for then Roma. 11. were deseruing, no more deseruing.

The eyght errour is, that none can be called the children of God, except they be all together made without sinne. This errour is lyke wicked with the rest, directly repugnant to the open Scripture, where it is written. If we say we haue no sinne, we deceiue our selues, and the truth is not in vs. For as S. Iames 1. Iohn. 1. Iacob. 3. saith of himselfe and of all other. In many things we sinne all.

[Page] In these foure errours, Cerberus can finde nothing to charge vs with all: and therfore he goeth about to get himselfe credite among the simple Christians, by calling these errours, filthy, and abhominable, exceding wicked and execrable, vile and abhominable, and lyke wycked with the reste. But if a man might come to reason with Cerberus: I thinke it woulde fall out in the ende, that he is not so cleare of the sixt errour as he would séeme to be, when he calleth it exceeding wicked and execrable. For if he were asked: why feared he to translate Saint Paules words, according to his meaning, when he saide to the Philippians. Deus est qui operatur in vobis & velle & perswere, pro bona voluntate. That is. It is God, that wor­keth Phillip. 2. in you, both the will and the performance therof, ac­cording to his good will or pleasure. Cerberus can not away with Gods good will. And therefore he translateth S. Paules wordes, euen of good will. He feareth, by like, that some man woulde conclude, y^t it is Gods good will, that by such malicious doings, as his is, in strowing of his staunderous writings: some of them that be slaun­dered therby, shoulde take occasion to open hys subtiltie, both in the detesting of these errours, and also in the cy­ting of Scriptures to the contrary of that which is affyr­med in them. Which is nothing else, but to blinde the eyes of the simple. But such as haue had to doe with such as he is, do knowe, that as he saith here, that man is not sufficient of himselfe to thinke any thing, so he thinketh, and wyl say if he be vrged; that man hath power of him­selfe to withstande the good motions of Gods holy spirit, so that God can not drawe such as he will, but only such as he findeth willing to be drawne. And to auoide the errour of giuing of grace according to merites or deser­uing, he sayth that it is giuen to all mankinde indiffe­rently. Let all men thersore, beware of his subtiltie: for [Page 17] he mindeth to disceiue.

The ninth errour is, that there is no free choyse, if a man haue neede of Gods helpe, seing it is in a mans owne will to doe a thing, or not to doe it. This was also the wicked opinion of Pelagius: that if it be graunted, that a mā hath neede of Gods helpe: then muste it needes followe (saith Pelagius) that he hath no choise in doing of things, but whatsouer a man doth, that must he nedes, and cannot choose but do. This is the Deuils only way, aboue all other to leade men to distruction, not to suffer them to walke in the playne path of the Lorde, but to turne them to some extremitie, either on the left hande, or else on the right, either into the blinde path of crooked superstition, or into the wyde way of leude libertie, either to seeke iustification by deseruing of workes, or by an only fayth, not mightie in loue by opera­tion. Such lyke extremitie doth the Deuill vse in this point of Doctrine, either driuing men into the doubting dreames of destenie, or into the absolute freewill of Papistrie. Either affyrming all things so to be ordeyned of God, that whatsoeuer a mā doth, be it good or euill: he muste needes, and can not choose, but of meere necessitie, by the ordinaunce of God, commit the same. Or else affirming, that man by freewill, or naturall strength, can do the wil of God, and walke in his lawe without the continu­all helpe and grace of God. Which two extremities, Austen doth very plainly condemne, in these words folowing.

Liberum sic consitcmur arbitrium, vt dicamus nos semper Dei [Page] indigere auxilio, & tam illos errare qui cum Manichaeo dicunt ho­minem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos qui cum Io [...]iano asserunt, hominem non posse peccare. Augustinus de verbis Apo­stoli, scrmone. 192.

We doe (sayth he) so confesse free choise, that we saye a man hath alwaye neede of the helpe of God. And that as well they erre, which saye with Mani­cheus, that a man can not eschewe sinne, as also they which saye with Iouinian, that a man can not com­mit sinne. Thus sayth Augustine

To conclude therefore, this is numbred among the wicked errours of Pelagius, that if a man haue free choise, then hath he no neede of the grace or helpe of God, contrarye to the manifest and open Scrip­ture, which sayth by the mouth of S. Paule. I can doe all things, through the helpe of Christ, which Phillip. 4. 4. Esdr. 9. strengthneth mee. And Esdras saith They that haue abhorred my lawe, whilst they had yet freedome and open roume of amendement, and conuersion, and vnderstoode not but dispised it: the same must knowe it after death, in paine.

And here, yet once againe, I desire thee to marke who they are, which with Pelagius fall into this ex­tremitie to affirme, that if a man haue choise, then hath he no nede of Gods helpe: or if he haue nede of Gods helpe, then hath he no choise at all. And who they are, which on the other side, with Austē against Pelagius, do affirme and cōfesse: that man so hath fre­dom or choise, that neuerthelesse, he hath cōtinual­ly, nede of the helpe & grace of God Who they are, I say, which in this point also, ought worthily to be called Pelagians, let all men iudge. The case is so clere, that no lack of knowledge, but onely wilfull blinde­nesse, [Page 18] may helpe to cloke the matter. I will therfore passe forwarde.

Nowe Cerberus thinketh he hath wonne the fielde. This case is so plaine (sayth he) that no lacke of know­ledge may helpe to cloke it, but wilfull blindenesse. And what is the case. Forsoth that he and hys fellowes be cleared of Pelagian heresie: and I and my fellowes pro­ued to be of one minde with Pelagius, who sayde that if a man haue choyse, he needeth not Gods helpe: or if he néede it, he hath no choise at all. And where hath Cer­berus founde that Pelagius sayde so? Not in the ninth Article, written in the 106. Epistle (for there he sayth but thus: If our will or choise, haue néede of the help of God it is not free: for by frée choyse, euery man hath in hys owne will, either to doe any thing, or to leaue it vndone) but he findeth it in the. 191. Sermon De tempore, that is, of the time. Not as the wordes or opinion of Pelagius, but as the wordes of Manichaeus. Here is pretie packing. To make blinde men beleue, that there is no difference betwixte Pelagius opinion in his ninth Article, and vs that now write and preache of the eternall predestinatiō of God: Cerberus bringeth out one of the opinions of Manichaeus, and saith, that forasmuch as we agrée with him in that point, and he and his fellowes doe not, ther­fore, we be Pelagians, and he and his companie are eni­mies to Pelagius and vs to. But as Cerberus hath re­quested his friende, whome he aunswereth: euen so must I desire thée (gentle Reader) yet once againe to marke how Cerberus handleth his matter, that he may séeme to purge himselfe and to charge mée and other with Pe­lagian heresie.

[Page] I will not deale with Cerberus, as he hath done with Samuel: for if I would, I might say that he had shame­fully belyed S. Austen, when he citeth his wordes out of his. 192. Sermon De verbis. Apostoli, y^• is, vpon the words of the Apostle, whereas saint Austen writeth but. 35. ser­mons of that [...]e. Neyther are the workes that he citeth found in the. 19 [...]. sermon De tempore, that is, of the time: but in the. 19 [...]. But as I haue promysed before, I will as­cribe all such things to the negligence of the Printer, al­though therbe iust cause to ascribe this in Cerberus him selfe. For it appeareth by the copie that came to my han­des, that he had read it ouer after it was imprinted, and before it was strowed in [...]e stroates: for he hath emen­ded some faultes wyth his pen, but this fault remaineth vntouched. Wherefore it séemeth that he toke it for no fault at al. Wherof I gather that he neuer read the place in S. Austen him selfe, but had it in some of the patrons of Pelagius errour, and had no leysure to séeke it in S. Austens workes, and therefore mistoke both the title and number. Which if Cerberus might fynde in [...]e, should be a matter of some thing.

Well, to the purpose. Cerberus hath belyed both Pe­lagius and vs. For he saith that we affirme, that if man haue choyse, then hath he no neede of Gods helpe, or if he haue néede of Gods helpe, then hath he no choyse at all. Let vs sée the words that are written in the Epistle. 106. euen as saint Austen (if that Epistle be his) wrate them in Latin. Et non esse. li [...] arbitrium▪ si Dei indiget auxilio, [...]uo [...] in propria voluntate habet vnusquisque, facere aliquid, vel non [...]e. Nowe let vs sée howe: Cerberus him selfe doth english this Latin. The ninth errour (sayth he) is, that there is no frée choyse, if a man haue néede of Gods help, séeing it is in a mans owne wil to do a thing, or not to do it. Now how agréeth this with y^• which he chargeth [Page 19] Pelagius withall? Hath Pelagius sayde that man hath no choyse at all? Or can man haue no choyse at all, vn­lesse the same be frée to do what it lusteth? I thinke all men do sée that he chargeth Pelagius wyth more than e­uer he spake or wrote in this poynt. And as touching the former part of his Article, which being truly translated, are thus much. And y^• choyse is not frée, if it haue néede of Gods helpe. Who is able to speake against this? Un­derstāding Liberum, or Frée, to signifie that which is not vnder the power of any other. And I trowe saint Austen wyll say no lesse in the. 13. sermon that he wrate De verbis Apostoli, of the wordes of the Apostle. Thus sayth saint Austen. Cum dico tibi, sine adiutorio Dei nihil agis, nihil boni dico. Nam ad mala agendum, habes sine adiutorio Dei, liberam voluntatem, quanquam non est illa libera: A quo enim quis de­uictus est, huic & seruus addictus est. Et omnis qui facit pecca­tum, seruus est peccati. Et si vos filius liberauerit, tunc veri liberi eritis. That is to say. When I say vnto thée, that thou dost nothing without the help of God: I meane, no good thing. For thou hast a frée will to doe euill without the helpe of God, although the same be not frée. For looke of whom a man is ouercome, to y^• same is he made a slaue, and euery one that doth commit sinne, is become the ser­uant of sinne. And if the sonne shall make you frée, then shall ye be frée in deede.

Nowe if Cerberus will conclude that Pelagius deni­eth that man hath any choyse, bicause he sayth, it is not frée, if it haue néede of Gods helpe: then let him so con­clude vpon saint Austens wordes in this place. For he sayth that mans wil is not frée, no not in doing euil. For it is subiect vnto sinne, and can not but obey that tyrant. And shall we thinke then that saint Austen woulde saye that it is frée in doing good? I thinke not. For he hath sayd that in that which is good, we can do nothing with­out [Page] Gods helpe.

But least Cerberus shoulde take a newe occasion to calūniate, bicause saint Austen doth often tymes graunt that he denieth not the fréedome of mans will, and so set Austen agaynst Austen: I will in fewe wordes shewe howe both saint: Austen and we, do vnderstande mans will, both to be frée, and not frée.

As mans will is not regenerated, so is it frée from y^• spirit, and bonde to that corruption that entred into all mankinde by the synne of the first man, which corrup­tion saint Paule calleth the lawe of the members, the wisedome of the flesh, the olde man and the flesh, so that it cannot once liste vp it selfe to any thing that is not a­gréeyng to that corruption.

Contrariwyse, man that is regenerate, so farre as he is regenerate, hath his will, fréed, and set at libertie, frō that corruption, so that it cannot leade him further than the spirite of God will suffer him to goe; for he is nowe freed from corruption or sinne, and made the [...]ndman of of y^• spirite, so that he hath now in that regenerated parte, no delite in anie other thing than the lawe of God. Yea he cannot haue anie delite in sinne. But as sainte Paule sayth. As touching my inwarde man, I haue a delyte in Rom. 7. Rom. 8. the lawe of God. And agayne. Such as are ledde by the spirite of God, are the children of God. They are there­fore called spirituall, and newe creatures.

Agayne, as man is a resonable creature, so is his will called, Arbitrium, that is, Choyso, and bycause the same cannot be enforced by any humane or mans power, it is called Liberum, that is, Frée. And so is it Liberum Ar­bitrium, Frée Choise. For though man haue power ouer mā to restaine y^• actiōs of his will, yet hath he not power to restayne the will it selfe. As for example. Simion, being imprisoned in Egypte, had a will to be with his Genes. 42. [Page 20] Father and brethren in the land of Canaan, not with­standing that his body was kept in prison and restrained of libertie to execute his will. For Ioseph had no power vpon the wil to turne it, or restraine it. But Simion had, yea, he coulde not but haue his will at libertie, notwith­standing any thing that Ioseph eyther dyd or coulde de­uise to doe. For to turne or staye the will of man, is the worke of God only. And therfore S. Paule sayth. I haue planted, & Apollo hath watred, but God gaue y^• increase. 1. Corinth. 3. And S. Austen sayth. Qui plantat, & qui rigat, for inseeus ope­ratur: qui vero dat incrementū, intrinsecus opitulatur. He that De verbis Apost. Ser. 4. plāteth, and he that watereth, do worke outwardly: but he that giueth increase, doth help or succour withinforth. And this is not done by any bodyly force, but by that in­ward drawing that Christ speaketh of whē he sayth. No man commeth vnto me, excepte my Father drawe him. Iohn. 6. This drawing is not a forcible drawing: but a wor­king of the power of God, whereby the will that stroue agaynst, is made ready to follow the drawer. An exam­ple wherof we haue in Paule. Who willing to goe to Act. 9. Damasco to persecute Christians, is vpō a sodaine made willing to preach Christ. This was not wrought by the striking him downe to the grounde (for then shoulde the lyke haue bene wrought in the Iewes that came to take Christ, for when he sayde, I am, they al fel to the ground) Iohn. 18. but it was wrought within by the power of the spirite. Saint Augustine therefore, sayth very well. Qui fecit te De verbis Apost. Ser. 15. sine te, non te iustificat sine te: Ergo fecit nescientem, iustificat volentem. He that made thee without thee, doth not iusti­fie thée without thée, therefore he made thée, when thou knewest not: but he doth iustifie thée being willing. To this doe the wordes of Sainct Paule agrée when he sayeth. Deus est qui operatur in vobis & velle, & operari. Phil. 2: It is God that worketh in you both the will and the [Page] worke that is according to the will. But first the will. So that before we follow the drawer, we are by the same drawer made willing to follow. Thus doth S. Austen, and so doe we (that Cerberus barketh so at) vnderstand the will of man to be frée.

To conclude this matter and to see what mans freewil is able to doe: sée what S. Austen sayeth. Creatus est primus De verbis Apost. Ser. 11. homo in natura sine culpa, in naturae sine vitio, creatus est rectus, nō se fecit rectū. Quid se autem ipse fecerit, notum est. Cadens è manu Figuli, fructus est. Regebat enim cum ipse qui fecerat, voluit de­serere à quo factus erat, permisit Deus tanquā dicens. Deserat me, & inueniat se, & miseria sua probet, quia nihil potest sine me. Hoc modo ergo ostēdere voluit Deus homini, quid valeat liberum arbi­trium sine Deo. The first man was created in nature with­out blame, in nature without fault, he was created vp­right, he did not make himselfe vpright. It is knowne what he made himselfe. Falling out of the hande of the Potter, he was broken. For he y^• made him did gouerne him, but he was willing to forsake him that had made him. And God suffered him so to doe, as it were saying thus. Let him forsake me, that he maye finde himselfe, and that he maye by his miserie proue, that without me he can doe nothing. By this meane therfore would God shewe vnto man: what frée will is able to doe without God. This maye suffise to as many as will be satisfied. But I feare me that Cerberus and his felowes are none of them.

By this it appeareth that we runne not into the extre­mities as Cerberus sayth we doe. For we neyther teache fatall destinie, nor popishe will libertie, but we affirme that man hath a choyse, and that in some meaning the same is frée, and yet notwithstanding, Gods forknow­ledge, predessination, and election, to be infallible. As shall more playnely appeare when I shall come to the [Page 21] place wherein I am by Cerberus charged with the set­ting forth of such a doctrine as is worthily mysseliked of many.

In the meane while I must say something of y^• wher­in I with others be charged and playnely affirmed to be Pelagiās. And that it may appeare whether we be so or no: it shall be néedefull that we set downe the opinion of Pelagius, as we finde it written by S. Austen in a booke of more authoritie than is that Epistle that Cerberus buildeth vpon.

Saint Austen being requested by one named Quod vult Deus, to write a Cataloge of heresies: he satysfieth hys request. And thus he writeth of Pelagius heresie. Pelagia­norum est heresis hoc tempore omniū recentissima, à Pelagio Mo­nacho exorta. &c. At this time (sayth he) there is the heresie of the Pelagians, which is the newest of all, and sprang out of one Pelagius, a Monke. Which maister one Ce­lestius did in such sorte followe, that their followers are also called Celestines. These men are such enimies to the grace of God (whereby we are predestinated to be ad­opted or chosen to be his children through Iesus Christ, and whereby we are deliuered from the power of darke­nesse, that we may beleue in him, and be translated into his kingdome, for which cause he sayd: No man cōmeth vnto me except it be giuen vnto him of my Father: and wherby, Charitie is poured out in our hearts, that fayth may worke by loue) that they beleue, that man is able without it, to do all the cōmaundements of God, where­as if that were true, it might séeme that the Lord had in vaine sayde, Sine me nihil potestis sacere. Without me, you can do nothing.

Whether we be of this mind with Pelagius or no: let all the world that séeth our writings or heareth our doc­trine, iudge. Or whether Cerberus and his fellowes be [Page] like to be of this minde, which finde fault with our doc­trine, bycause we teach that there is an elected and chosen number to whome God hath giuen fayth, and hath pou­red out loue in their hearts, so that they maye come vnto Christ, and by their works of obediēce to Gods wil, shew forth the liuely fayth in Christ, that in their election they haue receyued freely at Gods hand.

Let all the worlde, I say, iudge betwixte vs. We say that there is a certayne chosen number, which in mercy are chosen to be the children of God images of the sonne of God Iesus Christ, and inheritoures of his kingdome. And that none can be of this number, but those onely to whome it is giuen fréely without any maner deseruing, eyther past, present, or to come. And that they being thus chosen & predestinated, must alwayes acknowledge, that it is God that worketh in them, and that of them selues they are not able so much as to think a good thought. And yet assure them selues, that Hell gates can not preuayle agaynst them, that is, that the power of the Diuell shall not be able to hurte them. And that though they be still sore assaulted, and sometimes sore woūded: yet they shal neuer be ouercome, but shal ouercome in Christ, and tri­umph with him in immortalitie for euer.

But Cerberus and his company, say that al mankind is elected, and that there is no reprobation at all, and cō ­sequently, no election. For if there be none resused, then is there none election, but a generall acceptation. And this their election they say is so vncertayne, that no man can thereby be certaine of his saluation, but al men must still remayne in doubte of damnation by sinne, whereas S. Paule hath sayde, that there is no damnation to them Rom. 8. that be grassed into Christ. And Christ himself saith, that it is not possible that the elected sorte shoulde be seduced. Math. 24. They say also that the power of mans Frée will is to re­ceiue [Page 22] or refuse the grace of God which is indifferently of­fred vnto al. Which if it be true, then must he be able al­so of himselfe to do that God commaundeth, which is the playne errour of Pelagius. Well, I leaue these two opi­nions to the iudgement of the reader, to consider which of them is most like to be that which Pelagius helde.

But to giue a little more light to the Reader, I wyll note one sentence more out of that that S. Austen wry­teth concerning the heresie of Pelagius. Illam vero gratiam Dei, sine qua nihil boni possumus facere, non esse dicunt nisi in li­bero arbitrio, quod nullis suis praecedentibus meritis, ab illo acce­pit nostranatura, ad hoc tantum ipso adiuuante per suam legem at (que) doctrinam, vt discamus, quae facere, & quae sperare debea­mus. Nos autem ad hoc per donum spiritus sancti, vt quae didisce­rimus esse facienda faciamus. That is. They say (sayth Au­sten) that the grace of God, without which we are able to do no good thing, is not otherwise than in Frewil; which our nature hath receyued of him, not by any deseruings that was in the same before, he only helping vs herevn­to by his law and doctrine, that we may learne what we ought to do, and what to hope for. But we say to this, that through the gift of the holy Ghost, we may do those things that we haue learned to be méete to be done. Here it is playne, that Pelagius maketh the grace of God no­thing else but an helpe to the Frée wil of man. Whether Cerberus and his fellowes do so too, or not, let thē iudge that reade his words that are written in his aunswere to this letter, and do weygh them with indifferent mindes.

Now as touching that place that Cerberus citeth out of the sermon De tempore, that is of the time. 191. Although I knowe what Austen himselfe writeth of all his Epi­stles and his sermons, saying that he had not perused or retracted thē when he set forth his two bookes of Retrac­tations, Retract. 2. in fine. neither doeth it appeare in any of his writings, [Page] that euer he did retract them: Yet I will not reiecte it as none of Austens wordes, for the doctrine is sound if it be rightly vnderstande. It is possible for man by the power of God to be preserued from Actuall sinne, although he can neuer be without the sinne of concupiscence so long as he liueth in mortall flesh. So is it possible also, yea it can not be chosen, but vnlesse God doe by his grace staye man, he shall commit Actuall sinne after his regenera­tion, and of him self man is not able to stay him self from Vide. Lib. 2. De pecc. me­ritis & re­miss. Cap. 6. 7. it. But what make Austens wordes against vs? We confesse with Austen, that man hath alwayes néede of Gods helpe, and we say with the same Austen, that they do erre, which say that man can not auoyde sinne, but yet as I haue sayd before, being stayed by the power of God. For otherwise these wordes of Austen should be contra­ry to his owne wordes in his. 13. sermon De verbis Apostoli, Of the wordes of the Apostle. Where he sayeth thus. In hoc agone cum constigimus, Deum habemus spectatorem, in hoc agone cum laboramus, Deum poscimus adiuterem. Si enim nos ipse non adiuuat, non dico vincere, sed nec pugnare poterimus. That is. When we sight in this battayle, we haue God to be­holde and loke vpon vs, when we are in daunger in this battayle, we do pray vnto God to helpe vs. But if he do not helpe vs, I say not that we shall not ouercome, but that we shall not be able so much as to fight.

We wil not therefore set Austen against him self, but take that meaning of his wordes in one place, that may agrée with his wordes in another place. And so are we with Austen, and not against him, as Cerberus layeth to our charge. Neyther do we holde with Pelagius in a­ny vntruth, but if he do in any poynt confesse truth, then do we agrée with him, although S. Austen shoulde say to the contrary. Loke better vpon your conclusion there­fore (good master Cerberus) and learne to apply Scrip­tures [Page 23] better than you haue applied the words of S. Paul to the Phillippians, else men will say ye vnderstand not Phil. 4. S. Paule, for S. Paule doth not there goe about to as­cribe any thing to the power of his owne Frée will: but altogether to set forth the exceeding great mercy of God towards him who did stay him from falling both in ad­uersitie and in wealth. As it may well appeare to al that will with iudgement reade the place.

Your sentence also cyted out of Esoras: you shoulde 4. Esdr. 4. knowe it not to be of such authoritie, that it might serue in the triall of such a cause as this is. But graunt it were of the greatest authoritie. What can it make against vs which deny not that man hath a choise which in some sort is free (as I haue declared) but do cōfesse that man which despiseth the warnings and long sufferings of God in this life, shall after this life, in paynes learne to vnder­stand what they did then. But procéede as you sayde you would.

There followeth the tenth, and the eleauenth er­rours, which are these: That our victorie commeth not of Gods helpe, but of free choyse, and that re­mission of sinnes is not giuen to thē that repent, ac­cording to the grace and mercy of God, but accor­ding to the deseruing and labor of them, whych by repentaunce are worthy of Gods mercy. O blasphe­mie intollerable, O filthy puddle, and sincke moste execrable: full of stinking errours, full of damnable presumption, like to the pride of Lucifer moste ab­hominable: the detestable vilenesse whereof is such, that rather by exclamation, I haue thought it good to renoūce it, than with Scripture or reason to con­fute [Page] it. All reason, and all Scripture, gyueth all glo­ry vnto God. And this blasphemous errour, taketh awaye all the glorye of al goodnesse, from the father of all mercy, and God of al consolation, and gyueth it vnto vile and wretched man, which hath of him selfe nothing that is good, but doeth altogether re­ceiue it from the mercy and goodnesse of God. Here concludeth Austen wyth the errours of Pelagius, and sayth, that all these errours he reuoked, or renoun­ced in the generall Counsell of Palestine.

I haue not sworne to finde faulte with all that Cer­berus writeth in this his aunswere, as it may seme that he hath, to reproue and depraue, all that I and other that haue, or do write or speake of Gods predestination, do or haue affirmed. I will therefore ioyne with Cerberus in this detesting and renoūcing of these Pelagian errours, as one that doth abhorre them no lesse than he doth. And bicause man can sée no further than these things that be outward: I do with all mine heart wish that he would make it knowen vnto men by such meanes as maye be most to his glorye: whether we, or Cerberus and his fe­lowes do in y^• heart detest and abhorre these errors most. I will not enter into iudgement: but there is cause to suspect that Cerberus and his sorte be not so cleare, as by these wordess they would seme to be. But let God be Iudge.

Thus haue I set forth in Englyshe these errours of Pelagius together, that thou which art willing to [Page 24] knowe the truth, and vnderstande the matter euen as it is, mayest be able to iudge, who they are that holde of any of these errours, and not to credit the malice of certaine, whych to cloke their owne false opinions, accuse other to be Pelagians, who in dede, from their verie heart and soule, abhoral these wic­ked opinions, and haue bene manye yeares willyng to bestow their lyues against all these abhominable errours.

Yet is there one thing whervnto Pelagius was com­pelled to subscribe, whiche I haue not rehearsed a­mong the errours afore sayde, bicause the deniall therof, is of all our Gospellers (as I suppose) recey­ued for no errour. The Article is this. Quod Infantes non baptizati, non solum regnum coelorum, verum etiam vitam aternam habere non passint. Herevnto did Pelagius sub­scribe. That infantes whiche are not baptised, can not haue the Kingdome of God nor eternall lyfe. Which cruel opinion, that all vnbaptised children are damned, Austen in manye places of hys workes doth boldly and vehemently mayntayne. But Cal­uin sayth, Explodendam esse illorum glossam palam est, qui oes non baptizatos, aternae morti adiudicant. It is cleare (sayth he) that theyr glose is worthye wyth hissing or clap­pyng of handes, to be driuen out of the dores: which condemne vnto euerlasting death, all those, whych are not baptised, & bicause Caluin is with so many of vs, whych are Gospellers, in auctoritie fully suf­ficient to encounter with Austen: I thynke it good (for shortnesse) in this article to say no further.

Cerberus, minding to enter into that which he promi­sed [Page] before (that is to shewe what part of our doctrine he missliketh) doeth conclude with his friende to whome he séemeth to write this aunswere: as thoughe he beyng willing to know the truth, and vnderstande the matter, coulde no more gyue credit to anye that writeth or spea­keth contrary to that which he hath here written. Whose doyngs therein, it pleaseth him to terme malice, and the accusing of such as are of sound beliefe, that thereby they may cloke their owne false opinions.

But if it shall please that friend of his (if any such be) or Cerberus himselfe, to reade this my simple Apologie with indifferent mindes: it maye be that they will be of another minde then Cerberus doth in thys aunswere shewe himselfe to be, vnderstanding that oure doyngs are neither malicious, nor yet the clokings of anye false opinions, but the true trauaile of them that seke the glo­ry of God, and the saluation of his people, by the setting forth of the truth of his eternall and euerlasting Prede­stination. Let God gyue the increase at hys good wyll and pleasure.

Yet one thing he woulde not seme to haue forgotten, but rather of purpose to haue deferred to thys place, that he might not seme to agrée with Pelagius in any point that might seme to be erronious. For he hath said before. Here concludeth Austen with the errours of Pelagius. Subtillye handled of Cerberus. For thoughe he con­sent to that which Pelagius hath by his subscription cō ­firmed: yet he agréeth not with Pelagius in his errour, for he was inforced thus to subscribe, & did afterwardes returne to his olde errours againe, as S. Austen affir­meth in his Cataloge of heresies. And if he denye it, yet consenteth he not to Pelagius errour: but to Iohn Cal­uin, and vs Gospellers, and to make vs beleue that he is one of vs in this point: he calleth that a cruel opinion [Page 25] that Pelagius was constrained to subscribe vnto, that is, that Infantes which are not baptised can not haue the kingdome of God, nor eternall lyfe. And to knit vp the knot withall, he setteth Iohn Caluin against S. Austen, affirming, that for as muche as in the opinion of verye many of vs Gospellers (for now Cerberus is one of vs) Iohn Caluin is in authoritie fully able to encoūter with S. Austen: he will for shortnesse sake, say no further of this article. I woulde I had none occasion here to thinke y^• Cerberus vseth a figure, which learned men cal Ironîa. For what a frumpe is this? That Caluin is in autho­ritie fully sufficient, to encounter with Austen. Surelye Cerberus may be a Gospeller, as he tearmeth him selfe: but no Papist could deuise to giue a more kindely mocke to Caluin & vs Gospellers, than this is. For who know­eth not, that the authoritie of wryters, is iudged to stande chiefely in the auncientnesse of their writings, and then there is no comparison to be made betwixt Caluin and S. Augustine, who liued .x. hundreth yere & more before this day. And Caluins modestie was neuer so little, as to compare him selfe with Austen, but in all his writings he doth reuerence the iudgement of that learned Father, and doeth alledge his auctoritie in confirming of truthes, so far forth as the same doth not dissent from truth. And Austen neuer desired to haue hys iudgement in matters to be otherwise receiued, than the same should be found to be sound, & according to the Scriptures. As appeareth in his. 7. Epistle, and in the Proeme of his thirde booke De Trinitate. Of the Trinitie. Whose woordes concerning this matter, being many, it shall suffise to note this short sentence. Noli meis litteris quasi Scripturis canonicis instruire, sed in illis, & quod non credebas cum inueneris, incunctanter cre­de: in istis autem, quod certum non habebas, nisi certum intellex­eris, noli firmiter retinere. That is. Be not bounde vnto my [Page] writings, as vnto the Canonical Scriptures: but when thou shalt finde in the Scriptures that whiche thou didst not beleue, beleue it without any delay or doubting: but when thou findest that in my writings, which thou didst not know certainlye before, except thou shalt certainlye vnderstand it, do not stisfely affirme it.

I am sure that Iohn Caluin did always obserue this rule in reading S. Austens workes. And if he were nowe liuing woulde giue Cerberus the hire of a mocking Pa­rasite, thus to set him against S. Austen. Yea, it might haue becommed Cerberus very well, either to haue bene shorter, and haue written no worde of this matter: or else to haue vttered his iudgemēt of this article, in suche sorte that the reader might haue vnderstand thereby the truth of the article, and howe Caluin & we that be Gos­pellers do hold this article, not setting our selues against S. Austen, but for good cause dissenting in Iudgement, both from Pelagius and Austen. And yet hauing a reue­rend opinion of the one, do detest and abhorre the errour of the other.

Well, I maye not be so shorte in this matter as Cer­berus is, but I thinke it my dutie, hauing this occasion, to do what shall lie in me, to let the reader vnderstande that S. Austen is not so much to be blamed for this cruell opinion, as Cerberus woulde haue men to thinke that Iohn Caluin doth recken him to be. Neither doth y^e wor­thy instrument of God, mind to make the name of Austen odious to the Christian reader, as it semeth that Cerbe­rus would make the names of both those men of God.

Marke therfore, gentle reader, what might cause Au­sten some thing to swarue from the truth in thys article. He had to do with suche a one as denied Infantes to be spotted with Adams sinne, and that therfore they neded no regeneration, and so consequently no sacrament of re­generation. [Page 26] The abhomination of this errour caused Au­sten to flye so far on the other side, that he had not such a consideration of the promise of God, as he shoulde haue had. And so affirmed more than once, that al that die with out baptisme must nedes be damned. Let vs be contented that God hath by this errour shewed Saint Austen to bée a man. And let vs giue him thankes for the abundaunce of good doctrine that this man hath lefte in writing, not doubting, but that that mercifull Lorde whom he serued, woulde not suffer him to ende his life in that errour (no more than he dyd in the Manicheis heresie, which he did sometime stoutly defende) althoughe it haue not pleased him to suffer it to appeare in writing, that euer he did acknowledge it to be an errour.

As touching the opinion, that Caluin and we Gos­pellers do holde concerning Infantes that die withoute baptisme: it differeth something from Austen, but more from Pelagius. Yea, we doe as muche abhorre the er­rour of Pelagius, as Austen did. For we affirme, and are able by the Scriptures to proue, that al Adams natural children are deade throughe Adams sinne, and that none of them can be quickened and reuiued againe, otherwise than by Christ. And that so many as are not giuen vnto Christ, do stil remain in that sinne, and cannot be saued. So far off are we from this Pelagian heresie.

Nowe that it maye appeare howe wée differ from S. Austen: I will cite some matter out of the woorkes of maister Iohn Caluin. Not as Cerberus doth, to set him directly against Austen, but to shewe how God hath reuealed vnto hys seruant Iohn Caluin, that secret that he had not reuealed vnto his seruant Austen so fully: so far forth as we can finde written in his bookes. First, we reade in the booke of maister Iohn Caluins Institutions in the title of Pedobaptisme or baptising of Chyldren, [Page] these words folowing. Sed omissis cauillis, tenenda simplex est interpretatio quam attuli: neminem, donec renouatus fucrit aqua viua, hoc est spiritu, posse ingredi in Regnum Dei. Iam est ex eo, explodendum esse eorum commentum palam est: qui omnes non baptizatos, aeternae morti adiudicant. That is. But, all subtil­ties set a side, the simple interpretaciō that I haue made, must be holden, that is: that none can enter into the king­dome of God, til he be renewed by liuelye water, that is, the holy ghost. Now therfore, euen hereof it is manifest, that the false opinion or fantasie of them that condemne to eternall death, all that be not baptised, is to be dryuen out with hissing and clapping of handes.

Againe, the same Caluin sayth in his Comment vp­on the sift Chapter to the Romaines. Vt misera peccato hae­reditate potiaris, satis est esse hominem, residet enim in carne & sanguine. Vt Christi iustitia fruaris, sidelem esse necessarium est, quia side acquiritur eius consortium. Infantibus peculiari ratione communicatur. Habent enim in soedere ius adoptionis, quo in Chrissti communionem co [...]ptantur. De piorum liberis loquor, ad quos promissio gratiae dirigitur. Nam alij à communi sorte nequaquam eximuntur. That is. To enioy the miserable enheritaunce of sinne: it is enough to be a man: for if dwelleth in flesh and bloud. But to enioy the righteousnesse of Christ, it is required of necessitie, that a man be faithfull, for the com­pany or felowship of Christ is obtained by saith. To In­fants, it is after a certaine peculiar maner cōmunicated. For they haue in the couenaunt, the right of adoption, wherby they are adopted into the communion of Christ. I speake of the children of the godly, vnto whom the pro­mise of mercye is directed. For others are not deliuered from that lot, that is common to all men.

By these wordes of Caluin, it appeareth how we dif­fer from Augustine, for we are of one minde with Cal­uin, who denieth not, that the children of the vnfaithfull [Page 27] that dye without baptisme, do remaine in the same state that the sinne of the firste man brought all mankinde vnto. We differ therfore, only in that we affirme that the children of the godlye doe appertaine to the couenant of God, and therefore do not perishe though they be preuen­ted by death. Whether Austen continued to the ende in that minde that he sheweth him selfe in certaine of hys writings concerning this matter: it is vncertaine, for in his Retractations there is no mention therof. But if he did, this onely is the difference betwixt him & vs, that we ascribe that to the couenāt, promise, and election of God, that he ascribeth to y^e sacraments. And as it appeareth in his. 3. booke of questions vpon the olde Testament, he him selfe teacheth the same doctrine that we doe. His wordes be these, in the. 84. Question. Proinde colligitur, inuisibilem sanctificatimem quibusdam adfuisse, at (que) profuisse, sine visibili­bus August. lib. 3 Questi. vete. test. Quest. 84 sacramentis, quae pro temporum diuersitate mutata sunt, vt a­lia tunc fuerint, & alia medo sint: Visibilem vero sanctificatio­nem, quae fieret per visibilia sacramenta, sine ista iuuisibili posse adesse, non posse prodesse. Nec tamen ideo sacramentum contemnen­dum est: nam contemptor eius, inuisibiliter, sanctificari nullo modo potest. Hinc est quod Cornelius. &c. That is to say. We do therfore gather, that certaine men haue had the inui­sible sanctification, and haue bene benefited therby, with­out the visible Sacramentes, which are according to the diuersitie of the tune chaunged, so that then they were of one sort and nowe of another: And that the visible sanc­tification, which should be wrought by the visible sacra­mentes, maye be present without this that is inuisible, but can not be profitable wythout it. And yet is not the sacrament therfore to be contemned: for he that contem­neth it, can by no meanes be made holy inuisibly. Hereof it came, that Cornelius and those that were wyth him, when they were perceyued, to be inuisiblye sanctified by [Page] the holye Ghost that was poured into them, were not­withstanding baptised. &c.

These words of S. Austen, do plainly declare of what minde he was when he wrate these questions. And thys booke of questions, with the reast, he hath retracted and Retractat. lib. 2. cap. 55. perused againe, allowing this sentence of his therin as it appeareth in the. 55. chapter of his second boke of Retrac­tations. Cerberus had no cause therfore, to set Iohn Cal­uin against Austen, for we take that to be vndoubtedlye the doctrine of Austen, which we finde in his Retractati­ons, and not reuoked.

But Cerberus purpose was, craftily to cause all that would harken vnto him, to estéeme both Caluin & vs, as most arrogant heretikes, that wyll not sticke to compare one of our time with that auncient Father, and to accept his iudgement, without either reason or learning, direct­ly against the iudgement of him, whom al the Church of Christ hath these many hundred yeres worthily reueren­ced. For who séeth not, that Cerberus can not be one of those Gospellers that do accompt Caluin to be fully suffi­cient in auctoritie to encounter with Austen: sith he wri­teth so bitterly, against all thē that eyther write or preach that, that Caluin hath in writing most euidently proued and defended: Yea, he alleageth Austen against Caluins doctrine, and woulde seme thereby to triumphe ouer him and all that be of his minde.

As for the place that he cyteth out of Caluin, I leaue for Cerberus to seke out at his leysure, and when he hath founde it, to note where it may be sound [...]. But I beleue it will be harde for him to find in Caluines workes, that sentence in those wordes.

[Page 28] There remaineth then, as before I promised, briefly to note those thyngs, which I thinke worthye to be reproued, about the doctrine of Predestination, as it is now a dayes taught of many. Wherin least I should seme to speake without assured grounde, and bicause wordes in preaching, in talke, or disputation (wher­of I haue heard great abundance in thys matter) may rashly passe with small aduisement, and eyther easely be denied or soone forgotten: I am determined to touch nothyng but their very wordes, whych are set forth in Print. And bicause the taking and aunswe­ryng of their whole bookes were a matter long and tedious, being commonlye stuffed on the one side, wyth an heape of opprobrious and outragious wor­des against such priuate persons as they take in hand to write agaynst: and on the other side filled, rather wyth obscure subtelties, than wyth plaine affirmati­ons, I haue thought it best therfore, to take certayne sentences whych contayne manifest affirmatiōs, out of diuers late printed Englyshe bookes, wherein the summe and effect of this doctrine (which manye doe for iust cause mislike, is fully, plainelye, and simplye declared.

Nowe Cerberus beginneth to growe to the perfor­mance of his promise, in noting those things in the doc­trine of predestinatiō now preached, as seme to him mete to be reproued. And by the way, he will not taunt vs, but thus he sayth, that in preaching, talking, and reasoning, wordes may passe vs rashly and with small aduisement, and be either easely denied, or sone forgotten: Wherfore he will touche nothing but that which we haue written [Page] and set forth in Print. Well, contented, but yet I would Cerberus should knowe that we neither preache, talke, nor dispute with such rashnesse or small aduisement, but that we are able, and will, by Gods helpe, stande to all that we haue spoken therein, and he is able to charge vs withall. As for the outragious wordes that we vse to­wardes them that we write against, shalbe found modest inough, when they shalbe compared with the words that in this hys aunswere he vseth towards vs. Let him ther­fore procede in noting those things that he misliketh.

I reade in an Englyshe booke set forth by Robert Crowley, and entituled, the confutation of .xiii. Arti­cles. &c. these wordes. Adam therfore, beyng so per­fect a creature, that there was in him no lust to sinne, and yet so weake, that of himselfe he was not able to withstand the assault of the subtile serpent: no re­medye, the onely cause of his fall, must nedes be the predestination of God.

Thou seest, dearly beloued, in the conclusion of this sentence one point declared, wherin the contro­uersie doth consist. For where he plainlye affirmeth, that Gods predestination is the only cause of Adams fall, which is the sountayne of all sinne: other ha­uing a much more reuerend opinion of God and of hys holye predestination, do set their fote, or rather their heart and soule, agaynst their sayd conclusion. Estemyng it far better to be torne in manye thou­sande pieces, than to thynke or say, that Gods fore­ordinance or predestination, is the cause of any sinne or euil. I besech thee, let not thine eies be blinded, or thy minde musfled wyth malice, eyther agaynst the [Page 29] one partie or the other, but in the ballāce of vpright iudgement, waye the difference. The one sayth (as in this conclusion manifestlye appeareth, and as after­warde, yet more plainly he affirmeth) that the pre­destination of God, is the onelye cause of Adams sinne, and so consequently of all euill. The other af­firmeth directly contrary. That God or his predesti­nation, is the cause of no sinne or euyll, but the only cause of all goodnesse and vertue. And herewyth a­greeth the holye and diuine Apostle Sainct Iohn in hys Epistle saying. All that is in the worlde, as the 1. Iohn. 2. concupiscence of the fleshe, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father. Al good things that are in the worlde, are no doubt of God our hea­uenly Father: but whatsoeuer in the worlde, is con­cupiscence, lust, sinne, euill or wickednesse, the same is not of God our heauenlye Father: S. Iohn doeth piainly and precisely affirme. The lyke playnenesse vseth also the holye man Iesus the sonne of Sirach, in these wordes. Say not thou it is the Lordes fault, Eccle. 15. that I am gone by, for thou shalt not doe the thing that God hateth, saye not thou, he hath caused me to go wrong, for he hath no neede of the vngodlye. The verye same thing is plainely declared, in these Scriptures folowyng, and in other places almost in­numerable. Psal 5. Pro. 19. Ieremie. 7. &. 19. Oseae. 13. Iob. 34. &. 36. Rom. 7. 1. Corin. 14. Iacob. 1. Exod. 34. Deut. 5. 2. Reg. 14. Psal. 81. &. 144. Prou. 1. Sap. 1. &. 2 11. 12. 15. Eccles. 2. & 18. Esay. 5. & 30. 55. &. 65. Lament Iere. 3 Ezech. 18. 24. &. 33. Ioel. 2. 4. Esdr. 1. 2. 7. &. 8. Math. 23. Act. 17. 1. Timoth. 2. &. 4. 2. Pet. 3. The same sayth Austen also plainely in these wordes. Non ergo casus ruentium, nee malignitatem iniquorū, ne (que) cupiditates pec­cantium, praedestinatio Dei, aut exitauit aut suasit, aut impulit: [Page] sed plane praedestinauit iudicium suuin, quo vnicui (que) retributu­rus est pro vt gessit siue bonum, siue malum, quod Iudicium futu­rum non esset: si homines Dei voluntate peccarent. Neither the falles of them that fall, nor the wickednesse of them that be wicked, nor the luste of them that offende, hath the predestination of God, eyther prouoked, moued or compelled, but without doubt he hathe forcordeyned his iudgement, wherby he will recom­pence euerye man, according as he hath done, whe­ther it be good or euyll, the whiche shoulde be no iudgement, if men did sinne by the will of God.

I do acknowledge that this English booke, that Cer­berus saith he hath read, was of my writing. I acknow­ledge also, that Cerberus hath cited the wordes truely, e­uen as I wrate them. But that I ment by them as Cer­berus doth conclude vpon them: I vtterly deny. For he concludeth that I haue affirmed, that Gods predestinati­on is the onely cause of all euill. Whiche I neuer ment to teache, neither do my wordes, duely considered, giue a­ny occasion of such conclusion.

I graunt, my words might haue bene more explaned, and my meaning set forth more at large, and all occasi­ons of suche calumniations cut off, if I had sene that be­fore I wrate that booke, whiche I thanke my Lord God, I haue sene since. Wherfore I minde by the help of God to do that now y^e I was not so well able to do then, that the Reader may perceiue, that I haue with Austen profi­ted in writing. My words that Cerberus citeth, are these. August. prol. 1. lib. Retract. Adam therefore, being so perfect a creature, that there was in him no lust to sinne, and yet so weak, that of him selfe he was not able to withstande the assault of the sub­tile [Page 30] serpent: no remedie, the only cause of his fall, must nedes be the predestination of God. Cerberus findeth no fault with any of these wordes, till he commeth to no re­medy. And then no remedy, I must be condemned as one that affirmeth Gods Predestination to be the onelye cause of Adams sinne, and so consequentlye of all sinne. But I haue not saide that Gods predestination was the onelye cause, or anye cause of Adams sinne. My wor­des be that Gods Predestination is the onelye cause of Adams fall. Nowe Cerberus can not sée howe A­dams fall may be good, and therefore he sayeth that it is the fountaine of all sinne, and that to be the cause of that fall, is to be the cause of all sinne. But suche as haue eyes to sée, do sée, that as Gods predestination is the cause of Adams fall: so Adams fall is good. For it is the meane whereby God hath shut vp all vnder vnbeliefe, that he Rom. 11. might haue mercye on all. And the meane whereby the Galath. 3. Scripture shutteth vp all vnder sinne, that the promise which is of the faith of Iesus Christ, might be giuen to the faithfull.

I write therefore now, as I wrate before in my Con­sutation of Shaxtons Articles: that for asmuch as there was in Adam nothing to moue him to sinne (for lust to do contrarie to Gods wil, was not yet entred into him) & Sathan the enimy had no power then, neither hath anye power yet, ouer anye creature of God, further than God doth limit and appoint him: it must nedes followe, that the only cause that Adam was assaulted & ouerthrowen by Satan, was the predestination of God, which is euer all one with his vnsearcheable will & counsel. The fall of Adam thus considered, neyther is, nor can be counted sinne: for it is the performance of Gods purpose, whiche is euer good, although vnsearchable by mans feble vnder­standing. And yet I do not denie Adams fall to be sinno [Page] in Adam himself: for it was Factum cōtramandatum Dei. A dede done contrary to the commasidentent of God. And so it had a cause in Adam himselfe, which was the power of his wil, whereby he consented to y^e enticement of Satan, who vsed the woman as his instrument therin. Of thys will and the power therof, Sainct Austen writeth thus: De libero arbitrio, lib. 3. Cap. 18. Cum autem de libera voluntate rectè faciendi loqui [...]: de illa silicet in qua homo factus est, lo­quimur. When we speak of the will that is frée to do wel, we speake of that will wherein man was made. And a­gaine in his booke De natura & gratia, Cepite. 43. speaking of man, he saith. Quis enim eum nescit, sanum & inculpabilem factum, & libero arbitrio, at (que) ad iustè viuendum libera potestate constitutum? Who knoweth not that man was made found & vnblameable, and that he was ordeined with frée choyse, and frée power or libertie to liue righteously? And againe in his boke De Correptione & gratia. Cap. 11. Istam gra­tiam non habuit homo primus, qua nunquam vellet esse malus: sed sanè habuit in qua si permanere vellet, nunquam malus esset, & sine qua etiàm cum libero arbitrio, bonus esse non posset, sed eam tamenper liberum arbitrium deserere posset. Nec ipsum ergo Deus esse voluit sine sua gratia, quē reliquit in suo libero arbitrio: quo­niam liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem ni­hil est, nisi adiuuetur ab omnipotenti bono: quod adiutorium si homo ille per liberum non deseruisset arbitrium, semperesset bo­nus: sed deseruit & desertus est. Tale quippe erat adiutorium quod desereret cum vellet, & in quo permancret si vellet, non quo sieret vt vellet. The firste man had not thys grace, whereby he shoulde neuer be willing to be euill: but yet he had that grace, whereby he might haue bene alwayes preserued from euill, if he would haue continued therin, and with­out which also he coulde not by frée will, be good, but yet he was able by frée wil to forsake it. God therfore would not haue him to be without his grace, whō he had left in [Page 31] his owne fréewill. For fréewil is able inough to do euil, but to do good it hath no power at al, except it be holyē by the almightie goodnesse: which helpe, if that man had not by fréewill forsaken, he shoulde haue bene good for euer, but he did forsake, and was forsaken. For the helpe was such, that he might forsake it when he woulde, and suche wherin he might remaine if he woulde, not such whereby it might come to passe that he should be willing.

By these places of S. Austen, we maye see of what minde he was concerning the frée will of man before his fall. It was suche that hée mighte consent to what hée woulde. But the grace to be willing to consent to no­thing but that which was good, was not giuen vnto mā, that man might haue experience of the power of his own will, and so for euer after ascribe al the glory to him that worketh all in all.

The cause of Adams fall therfore, euen by the iudge­ment of S. Austen (of whome Cerberus maketh suche boast) was not in himself: For God had fore appoynted, that by that meanes man should haue experience of hym­selfe, and so learne to trust in one stronger than hymself. But the cause that made his fall sinne, was in himselfe. For he did willinglye consent to the perswasion of his wife, who also had in like maner consented to the persua­sion of the Serpent.

If Cerberus could consider the fall of the first man after this sort: he would neuer conclude, that I teaching that the Predestination of God was the onelye cause of mans fall, shoulde withall conclude, that it is the onlye cause of all sinne and euill. For I do not teache that it is the cause of any euill or sinne at all.

In vaine therfore, doeth Cerberus make his Antite­sis or comparison of contraryes, when he sayth. The one affirmeth that the Predestination of God is the onelye [Page] cause of Adams sinne, and so consequentlye of all euill: And the other affirmeth directly contrary, that God or his Predestination is the cause of no sinne or euil. And much more vaine is it, that he citeth so manye testimonies of Scripture to that purpose. For I affirme that which he woulde make men beleue I denye, and denye that which he would haue men to thinke I do affirme.

But one thing I woulde gladly learne of Cerberus. That is, where he findeth, eyther in Scripture, or in auncient writer, that Adams fall is the fountayne of all euill. We may manifestly proue by Scripture, that sinne was before Adam fell, otherwise there coulde haue bene no tempter to entice him to sinne. For God tempteth no man to euill. And man had in himselfe no concupiscence Iacob. 1. or lust to sinne: therfore euill was before Adam fell. And consequently, Adams sal was not the fountain of al euil.

Sainct Austen in the .ix. Chapter of his firste booke of Retractations sayth, that when he with others had dili­gently searched from whence euill might spring: it was agréed vpon amongst them, that it had none other foun­taine than the frée choyse of the will. Mans fall can not then be the fountaine of all euill: for there was euill in Aungels before man was made, and that sprang out of the frée choyse of the will that was in the Aungelles.

But graunt, that the fall of man had bene the foun­tayne of all euill: might not Gods predestination be the cause of mans fal, but it must straight waye follow con­sequentlye that the same is the cause of all the euill that springeth therof? Then tell me (maister Cerberus) how it may be, that Gods predestination is not the cause of all the euill that springeth of the frée choyse of will. For this ye wil not deny, I am sure, that God hath predestinated, both men and Aungels to haue the frée choise of wil. And his will alone, according to which he hath predestinated [Page 32] all things, is the cause why men and Aungels haue the frée choyse of wil. Shal we say therefore, that consequent­ly it is the cause of all euill? bicause it is the cause of that whereout all euilles do spring? No thou hell hound, not so. God is altogether good, and the fountaine of all good­nesse, and from him can spring nothing that is not good. All those things therfore that spring out of the frée choise of the will, are exceding good, as God, or his predestina­tion is the cause of them, and the euill that is in them, commeth of the instrument whereby God doth worke those things. I pray you therfore, loke better vpon your consequently. &c.

As for the sentence that Cerberus citeth oute of S. Austen: Non ergo casus ruentium. &c. I thynke if a man should vpon a Moneth warning, require to sée the place where S. Austen writeth those wordes: it would be hard for Cerberus to shewe it him. And therfore I blame him not, though he haue not quoted the place. But to do him a pleasure, I haue sought it in S. Austens workes and founde it In decimo. articulo falso Augustino imposito. In the x. of those articles that were falslye ascribed to S. Austen. Of what auctoritie that booke of S Austen is, may easely appeare to them that will reade his Retractations: for it is not mentioned among the bookes that he retracted, and reformed in suche pointes as he himselfe misseliked. But lest maister Cerberus should saye (as the Papistes vse to say of the Protestantes, and as some Frée wil men haue said of vs that teache the doctrine of predestination) that this is the common shift of all heretikes and obsti­nate defenders of vntruthes, to diminish the auctoritie of Scriptures and sayings of Doctours that are alleaged against them, by saying that the same are not autentike, or that they maye be suspected not to be the writings of them in whose name they be set abrode: I will admit [Page] this saying of S. Austen as his owne, and that therein he ment as he wrote, and that his meaning is true. Let vs weigh the wordes of S. Austen therfore, and see how his meaning may be true, & yet agrée wyth the doctrine that we teache. The predestination of God (sayth he) hath nei­ther stirred vp, counselled, nor enforced, the falles of thē that do rush downe headlong, nor the malignitie of them that be wicked, nor the desiers of them that do sinne: but doubtlesse he hath predestinated his iudgement, whereby he will rewarde euerye man according to his doings, whether the same be good or euill. Whiche iudgement should not be, if it were the will of God that men shoulde sinne. I haue translated these wordes somewhat other­wise than Cerberus doth. But whether of vs both better expresse the meaning of S. Austen, let the learned iudge. And whether I haue not translated theym so that they may serue better for Cerberus purpose, than as they are translated by himselfe. Let vs therefore loke to the mea­ning, and howe they make with vs or against vs.

Sainct Austen teacheth that Gods predestinatiō, doth not stir vp, entice or enforce any man to sal, to be wicked, or to haue a desire to sinne. And which of vs doth teach y^e cōtrary? Euen you sir (saith Cerberus) when ye say that y^e Predestination of God, must nedes be the only cause of Adams fall. To this I haue sufficiently aunswered be­fore, if any aunswere wil satisfie Cerberus. But yet for further aunswere I saye nowe, that I haue not at anye time saide or written, that Gods predestination did stirre vp, entice or driue Adam to fall. Wherfore I haue not taught contrary to S. Austen in thys pointe. But Cer­berus will saye that our meaning is not alone with S. Austens. Let vs therefore examine S. Austens meaning. I vnderstand his meaning to be, that when man doeth fall, is wicked, or desireth to sinne: his will is not by [Page 33] Gods Predestination stirred vp, enticed or compelled thervnto, but doth fréely consent therevnto being stirred vp, prouoked and driuen forwarde by the tempter, and by none other meane, if we speake of the first man, for in him was not, before his fall, that concupiscence that is nowe in vs, & was in him after his fall. Whether thys be y^e true meaning of S. Austen or no, let the learned iudge. And why may not the same meaning be gathered of my wordes, when I saye, that Adam being so perfect a crea­ture, that there was in him no lust to sinne, and yet so weake, that of himselfe he was not able to withstand the assault of the subtile serpent: no remedie, the onlye cause of his fall must nedes be the Predestination of God. I say not, that Gods Predestination did stir, prouoke, or dryue him forward to fall: And why maye I not meane as S. Austen doth in the eleauenth chapter of his booke, De cor­reptione & gratia, where he sayeth (as I haue cited before) Nec ipsum ergo Deus esse voluit sine sua gratia, quem reliquit in su [...] libero arbitrio: quoniam liberum arbitrium ad malum suffi­cit, ad bonum autem nihil est, nisi adiuuctur ab omnipotēti bono: quod adiutoriū, si homo ille, per liberum non deseruissaet arbitrium, semper esset bonus, sed deseruit, & desertus est. Tale quippe erat adiutoriū quod desereret cum vellet, & in quopermaneret sivellet, non quo fieret vt vellet.

God therfore (sayth Austen) would not suffer him to be without his grace, whom he had left in hys owne frée choise: for free will is able inough to do euill, but to do good it hath no power at all, except it be holpen of the al­mighty goodnesse: which help, if that man had not by his frée wil forsaken, he should haue bene good for euer, but he did forsake & was forsaken. For the help was such that he might forsake it when he woulde, and suche wherein he might remaine if he woulde, not such whereby it might come to passe that he should be willing.

[Page] Doth not S. Austen affirme here, that the help of God which Adam had, was not suche, that by it he might be willing neuer to forsake it? And what other cause of this can you find: thā the Predestination of God, which is according to his euerlasting will, vnto the whiche all things are and must be subiect.

If Cerberus will not be satisfied with thys: let him remember the saying of S. Paule, which S. Austen doth Rom. 11. so often vse, to stop the mouthes of the vnaunswereable enimies of Gods frée grace and predestination. O altitudo diuitiarum, sapientiae & scientiae Dei. Quám incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia cius, & inuestigabiles viae cius? O the depenesse of the richesse of the wisedome and knowledge of God. Nowe incomprehensible are hys iudgementes, and hys wayes past finding out? Stay here, maister Cerberus, go no further I charge you, lest ye be thrust headlong in­to hell for your proube presumption.

And although there be some places of Scripture, whervpon they would ground this opiniō, that men should sinne by the wyll of God, or that God should predestinate or ordeyne men to sinne, as where it is sayde, that God hardened the heart of Pharao, and such like: yet partayneth it nothing to that pur­pose, if it be wayed with the rest of the Scriptures. For as Austen saith. Ipse quasi cos indurat, quia iusto iudicio indurari sinit. Lib. de essentia Diuinitatis. He doth (saith Au­sten) as it were harden them, bicause, that with his iust iudgemēt, he suffreth them to be hardened. And in his booke, De libero arbitrio & gratia. Cap. 21. he sayeth: Where at any time we reade in the scripture, that mē be seduced, or their hearts hardened of God: there [Page 34] may we not doubt, but that their wicked deseruings went before, lest ye runne (sayth he) into the saying of Salomon. Insipientia viri violat vias cius. Deum autem causatur in corde suo. The foolishnesse of a man defileth his wayes, but he sayeth in his heart, God is the cause of this hardening of heart.

Melancthon, in his common places, speaketh ve­ry plainely, saying: Nec figure illae verborum offendunt. &c. Neither, sayth he, do these figuratiue speaches offēd. As I wil harden the heart of Pharao & such like. For it is certaine, that in the Hebrew phrase, they signify a permission or suffring, and not an effectuall wyl of God, as, Lead vs not into temptation, that is to say, Suffer vs not to be led into temptation. These are Melancthons woordes. And marke what he sayth of the Hebrew phrase, for al men know him to be a man learned. But to be short, it is surely to be maruelled at, that although they do thus accuse Gods Predesti­nation, to be the only cause of Adams fal (which is in dede, not onely sinne, but also the very welspring of al wickednesse, and the filthy foūtaine of all our vn­cleānesse) yet they dare affirme themselues to be the only friendes and louers of Gods Predestination, & al others to be the enimies of Gods holy Predestina­tion, which doe not subscribe to this their fantasti­call imagination. Moreouer, if it should be said, that they make God the Autor of sinne, they would crie naye, and saye they were slaundered. But, whether God be not the autor of that, whereof he is the one­lye cause: let the vncorrupted heart iudge. Also to saye the truth, when they see their time and place, they are bolde inoughe, yea, euen to vse the terme Autor, in that same manifest sense, as in a boke set forth by Iohn Knox, against an aduersarie of Gods Pre­destination [Page] (as he calleth hym) where, in the. 158. pa­gine he sayth thus.

Therfore, whatsoeuer the Ethnickes and igno­rant did attribute vnto Fortune, wee assigne to the prouidence of God. And straight way he sayth. We shall iudge nothing to come of fortune, but that all cōmeth by the determination of hys counsell. And furder, it displeaseth him when we esteme any thing to procede from any other, so that we do not behold hym and know him, not only the principall cause of al things: but also the auctour, appointing al things, to the one part or to the other by his counsell.

Marke well his wordes, and the very sense therof. All commeth of God, sayth he, God is the principal cause, and God is the auctour of it whatsoeuer it be. God appointeth al things, both to the one part and to the other, both to the wicked and to the godly all things, nothing is excepted, aswell damnation as sal­uation, as well sinne as vertue, as well wickednesse as holynesse, yea, if it happen to be murder it selfe, for that a little before he rehearseth. Whatsoeuer it be, it procedeth from none other (saith he) but frō God, God so hath appointed it. God is the principal cause of it. Yea, and not onely the principall cause: but al­so the auctor of it. Here seest thou those playne ter­mes, which sometime for a little nice lispyng, they can not, or will not speake, that God is the auctour of all murder and mischiefe. As for fortune, I knowe it to be an Heathenish fable, but where he saith, that God is not onelye the principall cause, but also the auctour of all things, without any exception: and that whatsoeuer the Ethnickes attributed vnto for­tune, that same we ought to ascribe to the prouidēce of God: it is suche a wide wandring and large blas­phemye, [Page 35] as hath not bene lightlye heard. For who knoweth not, that vnto fortune the Ethnickes ascri­bed treason, and craftie conspiracie. As where they call her Insidiosa, Persida & Malesida. Vnto fortune they ascribe cruell murder, and tyrannicall mischiefe. As when they call her Aspera, Dura, Saeua, Truculenta. Vnto fortune they ascribed filthy lust and impudent baw­drye: as when they call her Lenocinaus, Bruta and Im­pudens. Vnto fortune they ascribed, scornefull pride, and vaine glory, calling her, Imperiosa, Procax and Super­ba. Vnto fortune they ascribed, beastly blindnesse, & rude ignoraunce, calling her Coeca, and Exoculata. To conclude, vnto fortune, the Ethnickes ascribed all peruerse and pestilent wickednesse, and all abhomi­nation detestable, calling her Nefaria, Abhominanda & Improba. Yet saye these professors of destiny: whatso­euer the Ethnickes ascribed vnto fortune, that same ought we to attribute to the prouidēce of God: yea and God is the very auctor, the principal cause, and the only cause therof.

Cerberus supposeth nowe, that he hath pulled from vs y^• foūdation of our faith. For he saith, that those scrip­tures that we would ground our opinion vpon, apper­taine nothing to that purpose, when they be weighed with the rest of the scriptures. For the triall of this mat­ter it shalbe mete for me at this time, plainly to set down in writing, what the opinion is, that I and other of my minde in this matter of Predestination, doe holde. And then, what those Scriptures be that Cerberus meaneth of, conferring the same with as manye other places of scripture, as haue any shewe of a contrarye meaning: so [Page] shall it appeare what Cerberus hath wonne by that he citeth out of Austen and Melancthon. First, we hold that what soeuer hath bene from the beginning, is nowe, or shal be to the ende and for euer: was in Gods purpose without beginning, and predestinated or foreappointed to be in the time and order that it hath ben, is, or shal be: so that nothing hath, doth or shal come to passe otherwise than he hath withoute beginning purposed and foreap­pointed the same. The reasons that we stay vppon, are these. Gods power is absolute, so that what he will do, hé is able to do, and what he will haue done, can not be let­ted by any cōtrary power, & what he wil not haue done, can not by anye power be done. But his power coulde not be absolute. &c. if ought might be done otherwise thā he hath purposed & appointed. Therfore, all things come to passe, euen as he hath without beginning purposed & appointed the same. Another reason is thus. Gods wise­dome is most perfect; so that whatsoeuer he doeth, is so done, that the doing thereof cannot be repented: But if ought that he doth, might fal out otherwise, thā he ment it should, whē he did it, it should folow that his wisdome were not most perfect, for it is not y^• point of a wise man to saye, I thought not that it woulde haue so happened. Therfore nothing hath, doeth, or shall happen otherwyse than he ment it should, when he did first ordeine it. The third reason is; that his foreknowledge can not be decei­ued, but euen as he did foresée, and know before hande, that things should come to passe, so they haue, be, and shal be brought to passe. But this coulde not be, if things should be done, otherwise thā by his appointmēt. Ther­fore al things haue, are and shal be done by his appoint­ment. These be the chief reasons that we stay vpon. The scriptures that we do most stay vpō, are these. Conuenerunt enim in ciuitate ista, aduersus sanctum filium tuū Iesum quem [Page 36] vnxisti, Herodes & Pontius Pilatus, cū gentibus & populis Israel: ad faciendum quaecun (que) manus tua & consilium tuum prius de­creuer Act. 4. unt fieri. There gathered together euen in this Ci­tie, against thy holy childe Iesus, whome thou haste an­nointed, both Herode and Pontius Pilate, with y^• Gen­tiles and peoples of Israell: to doe whatsoeuer thyngs thy power and coūsel had before decreed to be done. Actes the iiij. Chapter.

Againe in the .vij. of Exod. it is thus written. Dixit (que) Exod. 7. Dominus ad Mosen. Ecce constitui te Deum Pharaonis, & Aaron frater tuus erit Propheta tuus. Tu loquêris ei omnia quae mando tibi, & ille loquêtur ad Phamonē, vt dimittat filios Israel deterra sita. Se dego indurabo cor eius, et multiplicabo signa & ostenta mea in terra Egypti, & non audiet vos. And y^• Lord said vnto Mo­ses. Behold I haue appointed thée to be Pharaos God, & Aaron thy brother shalbe thy Prophet. Thou shalt speak vnto him all those things that I shall commaunde thée, and he shall speake vnto Pharao, that he let the children of Israell depart out of his land. But I will harden his heart, and will multiply my wonders and signes in the land of Egypt, and he shall not hearken vnto you.

Moreouer, in the .xix. Chapter of the .iiij. booke of the 4. Reg. 19. Kings, we reade thus. Venerunt ergo serui Regis Ezechiae ad Isaam, Dixit (que) eis Isaas. Haec dicetis domino vestro. Haec dicit Do­minus. Noli timere à facie sermonū quos audistis, quibus blasphe­manerunt pueri Regis Assyriorum me. Ecce ego immittam ei▪ spi­ritum, & audiet nuntium, & reuertetur in terram suam, et deij­ciam eum gladio in terra sua. And in the ende of the same Chapter it is written thus. Cum (que) adoraret in templo Nesroch Deum suum: Adramelech, & Saraser filij eius, percusserunt eum gladio. &c. The seruauntes of King Ezechia came vn­to Esay. And Esay said vnto them. Thus shal ye say vn­to your Lord. Thus sayth the Lorde. Be not thou afraide of the wordes that ye haue hearde, wherewith the ser­uauntes [Page] of the King of the Assirians haue blasphemed me. Behold I wil put a spirit into him, and he shal heare a tidings, and he shal returne into his owne country, and in his owne countrye will I ouerthrowe him with the sworde. And in the end of the same Chapter it is written thus. And when he was in the Temple worshipping Nesroch his owne God: Adramelech and Saraser hys owne sonnes slewe him with the sworde. &c.

Furthermore, in the .xlv. of Genesis, we reade thus, Genes. 45. Praemisit (que) me Deus, vt reseruemini super terram, & escas ad viuē ­dum habere possitis. Non vestro consilio, sed Dei voluntate missus sum: qui fecit me quasi patrem Pharaonis, & Dominum vniuersae domus eius. &c. God sent me before, that you might be re­serued vpon the earth, and haue foode to lyue by. It was not by your aduise or counsel, that I was sent hither, but by the will of God, who hath made me to be as a Father vnto Pharao, and Lorde of all his house. &c.

To conclude, in the last chapter of the same booke, we reade the matter repeated after this sort. Nolite timere, num Dei possumus resistere voluntati? Vos cogitastis de me malum: sed Deus vertit illud in bonum. &c. Feare not, are we able to resist Gods will? you did deuise euill for me: but God did turne it to good.

By these Scriptures it appeareth plainelye, that all those thinges that Herode, Pilate, and the Iewes did to Christ: that Pharao did in the hardnesse of his heart: that the sonnes of Sinacharib did to their Father: and that Iosephes brethren did vnto him: were all done by the determinate purpose and Predestination of God. Whervpon, it semeth to me, that we may conclude that all other actions are done according to the same purpose and predestination. Otherwise, we must nedes confesse, that God is either disapointed of his purpose oftentimes, or else that he createth many things, not knowing be­fore [Page 37] what shall become of them. Which obsurdities may in no case be graunted.

Now what those Scriptures be, wherewith Cerberus would haue these and such like scriptures to be weyghed, we must gesse: for Cerberus citeth not so muche as one, I will therefore gesse as nere as I can▪ what scriptures those be that he meaneth of. One as I suppose, is writ­ten by Sainct Paule to Timothe. The woordes are these. Deus vult omnes homines saluos fieri, & ad agnitionem ve­ritatis 1. Tim. 2. venire. God would haue al men saued & come to the acknowledging of the truth. Let vs first weigh this place with the other afore cited, and see how this maye make the other to serue nothing to y^• purpose that we alleage them for. God would haue all men saued, and to come to the acknowledging of the truth: But if he did foreap­poynt Herode, Pilate, and the Iewes, to accuse and con­demne his sonne Christ, and did harden Pharaos heart, kyll Sinacharib with the sword of his sonnes, and sende Ioseph into Egypt by the trecherye of his brethren: he would not haue all men saued: for the rewarde of these workes is damnation: therfore God neuer appointed a­nye of these things to be done. I am sure Cerberus can not applye this place better to his purpose, than it is in this argument applied. Now let vs sée what may be said to the contrarye, without eyther denying or wresting of S. Paules wordes. First, S. Austen doth interprete these wordes of S. Paule after this sort. Libro de voluntate Dei, Cap. 2. Occurrit enim, cùr pereant ex hijs aliqui, quum omnipo­tens Deus, omnes homines saluos fieri velit, & in agnitionem veri­tatis venire. Deinde, cur rursùs induret alios, misertus aliorū, aùt quomodò omnes saluos fieri velit homines, quum ipse nonnullos, nè saluentur induret? Hoc quantum ad humanam iustitiam vide­tur iniustum: sed quis ità desipiat, vel potiùs quis ità blasphemet, vt dicat de iustitia Dei, lege humanae iustitiae disputandum? Quae [Page] profecto, si iustitiae Dei aduersatur, iniusta est. Ab illo enim qui summè iustus est, omne quod qualitercun (que) iustum est, manare manifestum est. Quis ergo crit, qui incommutabiliter manentem, & omnia quae sunt condentem, regentem, at (que) seruantem Dei sapi­entiam, pendit humanae sapientiae arbitrio? De qua idem Aposto­lus dicit, Quia sapientia carnis, inimicae est Deo. Et alibi. Sapi­entia huius mundi, stulititia est apud Deum. Non est ergo de illa maiestate diuinae sapientiae, humanae vanitatis arbitrio disputan­dū. That is to say. For this is obiected. Why should any of these perishe, seing that God that is almightye, is wil­ling that all men should be saued, & come to the acknow­ledging of the truth? Moreouer, why doth he on the con­trary part, harden some, taking mercy on other some: or howe is he willing that all men shoulde be saued, when he himselfe doth harden some, least they should be saued? As touching humaine iustice, this thing séemeth vniust. But who would be so foolishe, or rather who woulde so blaspheme: as to say, that we should reason of y^• iustice of God, by the order of y^• iustice of man? which no doubt, if it be against the iustice of God, it is vniust. For it is manifest, that whatsoeuer hath in it anye iustice at all, doeth spring from him that is iust in the highest degrée. Who shall it be therfore, that will weigh by the arbitri­ment of mans wisdome, the wisedome of God, which re­maineth immutable, and hath made, doeth gouerne and preserue al things that be? Of which wisdome, the same Apostle saith. That the wisdome of the fleshe, is enimie vnto God. And in another place. The wisedome of the world is foolishnesse with God. We maye not therfore, by the arbitriment of mans vanitie, dispute of that ma­ [...]y of the wisedome of God.

Againe, in his booke De spiritu & litera, Capite. 32. the same Austen sayth. Si credemus, vt impetremus hanc gratiam: [...] vti (que) voluntate credimus, De hac quaeritur, vnde sit voluntas. [Page 38] Si natura, quare non omnibus: cum sit idem Deus omniū creator? Si dono Dei, etiam hoc, quare non omnibus, cum omnes homines ve­lit saluos sieri, & ad agnitionem veritatis venire? Prius igitur illud dicamus & videamus, vtrū huic satis faciat quaestioni, quod liberum arbitrium naturaliter attributum à creatore animae ra­tionali: illa media vis est, quae vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclina­ri ad insidelitatem potest. Et ideò, nec istam voluntatem, qua cre­dit Deo, dici potest homo habere, quam nòn acceperit, Quandoqui­dem vocante Deo, surgit de libero arbitrio, quod naturaliter cum crearetur, accepit. Vult enim Deus ōnes homines saluos fieri, & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Nòn sic tamen, vt eis adimat liberū arbitrium, quo vel benè vel malè vterites, iustissime iudicentur. Quod cum fit, infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum eius Euangelio nòn credunt: nec ideò tamen eam vincunt, verùm scipsos fraudant magno & summo bono, malis (que) poenalibus implicant, experturi in supplicijs potestatem eius, cuius in donis misericordiam contempserunt. Ita voluntas Dei semper inuicta est. Vinceretur autèm, si nòn inueniret, quod de contemptoribus fa­ceret: aut vllo modo possent euadere, quod de talibus ille constituit. That is. If we do beleue, to the end that we may obtaine this grace, and do also by the consent of our will, beleue: hereof a question is moued, whence we haue this wil. If it be of nature, why is it not in al mē: seing one God is the creator of all men? If we haue it by the gift of God, why is it not giuen to all men: seing he is willing that all men should be saued, and come to the acknowledging of the truth? Let vs therfore affirme the first, and sée whe­ther it may satisfie this question, bicause fréewill, whiche the Creator hath naturally giuē to the reasonable soule: is that indifferent power, which may eyther be bowed to faith, or inclined to infidelitie. And therfore, it can not be said, that man hath not receyued this wil, whereby he be­leueth in God, bicause, whē God calleth, it riseth of frée­will, which he receiued when he was naturallye created. [Page] For God is willing that all men shoulde be saued, and come to the knowledge of the truth: and yet not so, that he would take from them fréewill, whereby they may be iustly iudged, whē they vse it wel or otherwise. In which doing, the Infidels do worke contrary to Gods will, by­cause they beleue not his Gospell. And yet doe they not therfore ouercome it, but they do defraude them selues of the great and most excellent goodnesse, and do entangle them selues with euilles, wherewith they are punished, and shal in the punishments haue expersēce of his power, whose mercye they did in his giftes contemne. So is the will of God alwayes vnconquered. But if he coulde not finde howe to vse these despisers, or if they could by anye meanes escape that which he hath appointed to become of such: then should his will be ouercome in dede.

Againe, in his booke entituled Enchiridion ad Laurentiū. Capite. 103. he sayeth thus. Ac per hoc, cum audimus, & in sa­cris litteris legimus, quod velit omnes homines saluos furi: quamo uis certum sit nobis, nòn omnes homines saluos sicri, nòn tamen ideò debemus omnipotentissimae Dei voluntati aliquid derogare, sed ità intellegere quod scriptum est: qui vult omnes homines saluos ficri: tanquam diceretur, nullum hominem fieri saluum, nisi quem sal­uum fieri ipse voluerit: nòn quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quem salitum sicri velit, sed quod nullus siat, nisi quem velit, & ideò sit rogādus vt velit, quia necesse est suri si voluerit. De orando quippè Deo agebat Apostolus vt hoc diceret. Sic enim intelligimus id quodin Euangelio scriptum est: Qui illuminat omnem hominem: nòn quia nullus est hominum qui non illuminetur, sed quia nisi ab ipso nullus illuminator. Aut certè sic dictum est. Qui omnes ho­mines vult saluos fieri, nòn quod nullus hominum esset, quem sal­uum sicri nollet, qui virtutes miraculorum facere noluit apud cos, quos dicit actitros fuisse poenitentiam, si facisset: sed vt omnes ho­mines omne genus hominum intelligamus per quascun (que) differen­tias distributum, Reges, priuatos, nobiles, ignobiles. &c.

[Page 39] That is to say. And hereby when we heare and reade in the holy scriptures, that he is willing y^t all men should be saued, although we knowe assuredly that all men are not saued? yet may we not therefore derogate any thing from the almightye will of God, but vnderstande that which is written, on this sort. Not that there is no man, but that he woulde the same shoulde be saued; but that none cā be saued, but such as he wil haue saued. And that therfore he ought to be prayed vnto, that he woulde be willing, bicause it must nedes be, if he be willing that it should be. For when the Apostle spake these wordes, he was in hande with the prayers that are to be made vnto God. And after the same maner we vnderstād that which is wrytten in the Gospell. Whiche lightneth euerye man. Not that there is no man that is not illumined, or lightned: but for that there is none illumined, otherwise than of him. Or els vndoubtedly the wordes haue thys meaning. Which is willing that all mē should be saued, not that there shoulde be no man whome he would not haue saued, which would not worke his miracles among them that he saith would haue repēted, if he had done so: but that we should vnderstand by all men, all sortes of men, by what differences so euer the same be seuered, Kings, priuate persons, noble persons, and ignoble. &c.

And againe in his booke. De correptione & gratia. Cap. 14. S. Austen sayth thus. Cum autèm homines per correptionem in viam iustitiae seu veniunt, seu reuertuntur, quis operatur in cor­dibus eorū salutē, nisi ille, qui quolibet plantante at (que) rigante, & quolibet in agris at (que) arbustulis operante, dat incrementum Deus, cui volenti saluum facere, nullum hominum resistit arbitrium? Sic enim, velle vel nolle, in volentis aut nolentis est potestate, vt diuinam voluntatem nòn impediat, nec superet potestatem. De hijs enim qui faciunt quae non vult, facit ipse quae vult. Et quod scrip­tum est, quod vult omnes homines saluos fieri, nèc tamèn omnes [Page] salui siunt: multis quidèm modis intelligi potest, ex quibus in alijs opusculis nostris, aliquos commemorauimus, sed hic vnum dicam. Ita dictum est. Omnes homines vult saluos sicri, vt intelligantur omnes praedestinati, quia omne genus hominum in eis est, sicut dic­tum est Pharisaeis. Decimatis omne olus, vbi nòn est intelligendum, nisi omne quod habebant. Ne (que) enim omne olus quod erat in toto terrarum orbe decimabant.

That is to say. When men doe by chastisement, ey­ther come or returne into the way of righteousnesse, who is it that worketh health in their hearts, but he who gi­ueth the encrease, whē any man planteth or watreth, and when any man worketh in the fieldes or orchards, which is God, against whome, being willing to saue, no mans frée will doth make resistāce. For to be willing or vnwil­ling, is after such sort in the power of him that is willing or vnwilling, that it be not a let to the will of God, nor do ouercome his power. For of them that do those things that he willeth not, both he make those things that he is willing to make. And where as it is written: that he is willing that all men should be saued, and yet all be not saued: it may be vnderstanded many wayes, whereof we haue in our other little workes made mention of some, but I wil now speake of one moe. This is the saying. He is willing that all men shoulde be saued, that therby, all that be predestinated might be vnderstande, for that a­mong them are men of all sortes. As it was sayd to the Phariseis, ye doe pay the tenth of euerye garden hearbe. Where we may not vnderstande, [...]oe than all that they had. For they did not giue the tenth of al the hearbes that be in the whole circle of the earth.

By these places of S. Austen may Cerberus sée, how this place of scripture (God is willing that al men should be saued. &c.) being wayed with the places that we builde vpon, doth make that they serue nothing to our purpose. [Page 40] For in expounding of these wordes of S. Paule, God is willing that al men should be saued & come to the know­ledge of the truth: S. Austen doth affirme as much as we do, as may wel appeare to as many as will way these places of his, with indifferent iudgement.

One other place for this purpose, is written in the. 33. Chapter of Ezechiell. The words are these. Viuo ego dicit Dominus. Nolo mortem impij, sed vt conuertatur impius à via sua, & viuat. Conuertimini, conuertimini, à vijs vestris pessimis, & quarè moriemini domus Israel? That is to say. As truely as I liue, saith the Lord, I desire not the death of the vngod­ly, but that the vngodly be conuerted frō hys owne way and liue. Be conuerted, be conuerted frō your most wic­ked wayes, why will ye die, O you house of Israel?

Saint Hierome expounding this place, beginneth at Super. Ezech. Cap. 33. these wordes in the same Chapter. Tu ergo fili hominis, dic ad domum Israel: sic locuti estis dicentes. Iniquitates nostrae & peccata nostra super nos. &c. Therefore thou sonne of man, speake thou to the house of Israell and say: thus haue ye spoken, saying: Our iniquities & sinnes are vpon vs. &c. By occasion of which wordes, S. Hierome sayeth thus. Sinegligenter legamus, videtur nobis eadem prophetia esse quae su­pra, in qua dicitur. Nunquid volens cupio mortem iniqui dicit do­minus: nisi conuerti eum à via sua mala & viuere? Et in fine e­iusdem propheti [...]e. Conuertimini & redite ab vniuersis impietati­bus vestris, & non erunt vobis in tormentum iniquitates. Ibi enim ad eos sermo fit qui volunt agere poenitentiam, & iustitia peccata delere, vt cum fiducia conuertantur, & pleno animo agant poeni­tētiam. Hic autèm ad eos loquitur, qui magnitudine peccatorum, imo impietatum suarum desperant salutem & dicunt: Iniquitates nostrae & peccata nostra super nos sunt, & in ipsis tabescimus, quomodo ergo viuere poterinites? Et est sensus. Cum semel nobis mors proposita sit: & vulneribus nostris nulla medicina possitre­stituere sanitatem: quid necesse est laborare & frustra consumi, & [Page] praesentem vitam nòn cum desperatione transigere, vt saltèm hac fruamur: quia futuram perdidimus? Quibus respondet Deus, nòn velle se mortem impij, sed vt reuertatur & viuat. Et Apostropham sacit ad impios desperātes: cōuertimini à vijs vestris pessimis. At (que) vt sciamus, qui sint impij ad quos loquitur, sequēs sermo demōstrat, Quarè moriemini domus Israel? Vita autem & mors in hoc loco nòn haec significatur, qua omnes communi cum bestijs, lege naturae, vel viuimus, vel morte dissoluimur: sed illa de qua scriptum est. Placebo Domino in regione viuentium.

That is to saye. If we reade this negligently, it sée­meth to be the same prophecie, that is before, wherin it is said, do I willingly desire the death of the vngodly, sayth the Lorde: or, but that he be conuerted from his owne euill waye and liue? And in the ende of the same Pro­phecie: Be ye conuerted and come backe againe from all your vngodlinesses, and your iniquities shall not turne you to tormentes. For in that place he speaketh vnto those which are willing to repent, and by righteous life, to blot out their sinnes, that they might with sure confi­dence returne vnto God, and with full mindes repent. But in this place he speaketh vnto thē, that throughe the greatnesse of their owne sinnes (yea their owne impie­ties) do dispayre of saluatiō, and say. Our iniquities and our sinnes are vppon vs, and in them doe we consume a­way: how can we therefore liue? And this is their mea­ning. Seing that death is once set before vs, and no me­dicine is able to heale our woūds: what nede we labour and be consumed, and not passe ouer thys life with des­peratiō: so, that at the least way we may enioy this life? For the life to come we haue already lost. Unto whome God maketh aunswere, that he willeth not the death of the vngodly: but that he be conuerted & liue. And he tur­neth his speach to the desperate vngodlye ones: saying, turne you from your owne wayes, whiche are most wyc­ked. [Page 41] And that we might knowe who those wicked ones were to whome he spake, the wordes that follow do de­clare. O ye house of Israell, why wyll ye dye? And that life and that death, wherby we do by the order of nature, with the brute beastes eyther liue or die, is not in this place signified: but that life whereof it is written. I will please the Lorde in the land of the liuing.

By these wordes of S. Hierome: it appeareth, that he vnderstoode not the wordes of Ezechiell, in such sorte as Cerberus would haue vs to vnderstande them, that is, that by them is taught a doctrine contrarie to that which we teache, and so consequently, the places that we builde vpon, proued to make nothing for our purpose. For Hie­rome saith, that in the .xviii. Chapter of his Prophecie, Ezechiell speaketh to them that be penitent, and woulde by righteous life blot out their sinnes past. These doth he there encourage, with bolde courage and assured hope of forgiuenesse at Gods hand, to go forward with their re­pentance begon, saying: Be ye conuerted, and returne againe from all your vngodlinesses, and your iniquities shall not turne you to torment. But in this place, in the 33. of his Prophecie (sayth S. Hierom) the Prophete spea­keth to the desperate people of y^• Iewes, which said: Our iniquities and sinnes are vpon vs. &c. Giuing them selues to continue in wickednesse, as those that dispayred of for­giuenesse of that which was paste, although they should frō thenceforth endeuour amendment. To these (sayth the Prophet) speaketh God, saying: Turne from your owne moste wicked wayes. Why wil ye die, O ye house of Is­raell? The greatnesse of our sinnes can be no cause why we should dispaire of Gods mercy. Wherefore we teache with Ezechiel, Ieremie, Esaie, and the rest of the holye Prophetes, that God is ready to receiue to mercy as ma­ny as by repentance and amendmēt of life turne to him, [Page] beleuing the promise that he hath made in the death and bloudshedding of his only sonne Iesus Christ. I conclude therefore that this place maketh for our purpose, and not against vs. And least I shoulde trouble the Reader ouer much, with such places as this: I [...] referre all such pla­ces to the aunswere I haue here made, not doubting but the diligent Reader, who seketh nothing but the simple trueth, shalbe therewithall satisfied.

Nowe, as touching the places of S. Austen, whyche Cerberus citeth out of his boke: De essētia Diuinitatis: And De libero arbitrio & gratia: I will first rehearse all the wor­des that S. Austen wryteth in those places, concerning this matter, and then weigh them, that we may sée how they may serue for Cerberus purpose. The wordes are these. Indurare dicitur Deus quorundam malorum corda, sicùt de Pharaone Rege Egypti scriptū est: nòn [...] omnipotens Deus, ppoten­tiā Augusti. De essentia Diui­nitatis. suā corda corum induret, quod est impiū ità credere: sed exegē ­tibus corū culpis, quam duritiā cordis, quā ipsi sibi mala perpetran­do nutriūt, nòn ausert: quasi ipse cos induret, quià iusto iudicio in­durari sinit. That is to say: It is said that God doth hardē the heartes of certaine euill men, as it is written of Pha­rao King of Egypt: not that the Almightye God doeth by his almightie power harden their hearts, which thing to beleue, is an vngodly thing: but when theyr faultes requiring the same, doeth not take from them that hard­nesse, which in committing euilles, they themselues doe nourishe to themselues: he doth as it were himselfe har­den them, bicause he doth, by his iust iudgemēt, suffer thē to be hardened.

If Cerberus woulde haue weighed these words wel: he woulde neuer haue applyed them against vs. For we teach not, that the almighty God, doth by his almightie power harden mens hearts, for we know that it were an vngodly thing so to teach or beleue: but we teache as S. [Page 42] Austen doth, that theyr sinnes requiring the same, he lea­ueth them in the hardnesse of their hearts, which by com­mitting of euilles, they do nourish vnto themselues. For by the sinne of the first man al mens hearts are hardned, and of them selues they can do nought else but nouryshe that hardnesse, and Gods hardning of their hearts, is no­thing else but the withholding of the deawe of his grace from them, without which they can not be softned. And this he doth in iust iudgement, for the sinne of oure first Father hath deserued no lesse in vs all. But here I must let the Reader vnderstande, what places Cerberus pyc­keth for his purpose. Erasmus supposeth, that rather Hu­go Victorinus than S. Austen should be y^• Autor of this booke. Well, I will not striue wyth him for the matter. But let him consider it better before he applie it against vs againe.

The woordes of the other place that Cerberus citeth out of the .xxj. chapter of S. Austens booke. De gratia & libe­ro arbitrio: are as faithfully handled as y^• other. Cerberus August. De gratia & li­bero arbitrio. Cap. 21. feared to set downe to many of Austens wordes, least the Reader shoulde see that they make with vs against Cer­berus and his fellowes. I will therfore set downe so ma­ny of hys wordes as may make his meaning knowen to the diligent Reader. Firste, in the beginning of the same Chapter, he sayth thus. Quis nòn ista iudicia diuina contre­miscat, quibus agit Deus in cordibus etiàm malorum hominum quicquid vult, reddens eis tamèn secundum merita eorum? Robo­am filius Salomonis respuit consiliū salubre Seniorum quod ei de­derant. &c. Who would not (saith Austen) tremble at these iudgementes of God, wherby he doth in the heartes euen of wicked men, worke what he lusteth, and yet rendring vnto them according to their deseruings. Roboam, the sonne of Salomon, refused the holesome counsell of the Elders which they gaue him, which was that he should [Page] not deale roughly with the people, and he hearkened ra­ther to the wordes of them that were of his owne age, giuing a rough aunswere to them, whom he should haue aunswered gentlye. And so forth, citing many examples out of the Scriptures, to proue, that God is he, that wor­keth in the hearts of euill men, those things wherby his purpose is performed in punishing of sinne.

And towards the end of the Chapter, he saith: Hijs & talibus testimonijs diuinorum eloquiorum, quae omnia comemorare [...]s longum est, satis, quantum existimo, manifestatur, operari Deum in cordibus hominum, ad inclinandas corum volūtates quo▪ cun (que) voluerit, siuè ad bona, pro sua misericordia, siuè ad mala, pro meritis corum, iudicio vti (que) suo, aliquando aperto, aliquādò occul­to, sempèr autèm iusto. Fixum enim debet esse & immobile in corde vestro, quia nō est iniquitas apud Deum. Ac per hoc, quādò legitis in litteris veritatis à Deo seduci homines, aùt obtudi vel ob­durari corda corum, nolite dubitare praecessisse mala merita corum, vt iustè ista paterentur: ne incurratis in illud Prouerbium Salo­monis. Insipientia viri, violat vias eius: Deum autèm causatur in corde suo. That is to say. By these and suche like testimo­nies of holy Scriptures, wherof it were too long to make a whole recitall, it is, as I suppose, sufficientlye shewed, that God doeth woorke in the heartes of men, to encline their willes whither it pleaseth him, whether it be to good things, according to his mercie, eyther to euill things, ac­cording to their merits, and according to his own iudge­ment, which is sometime open, and sometime secrete, but alwayes iuste. For this persuasion ought to be fired and vnmoueable in your hearts: that there is none iniquitie with God. And hereby, when ye reade in the writings of the truth, that God doth leade mē out of the way, or that he doth dull or harden their heartes: do ye not doubt, but that their euill deseruing went before, that they might iustly suffer these things, least ye should runne into that [Page 43] Prouerbe of Salomon, which sayth. The foolishnesse of a man doth defile his wayes: but in his heart he layeth the blame in God.

If Cerberus would haue set downe all these wordes of S. Austen: I shoulde not haue neded to write any aū ­swere to that whiche he did set downe. For S. Austens wordes are sufficient for aunswere, when he sayth that God worketh in the hearts of mē to encline their willes, whether it be to good things, according to his mercy, or to euill things, according to their deseruings, & that which way he him self is willing to encline them. Now let Cer­berus finde contradiction in S. Austens words, if he can. As forme, I can sée none. But if Cerberus can finde none, then hath he applied S. Austens wordes against vs, contrary to S. Austens meaning.

Nowe let vs sée what Cerberus hath founde in Me­lancthons common places. Melancthon speaketh verye plainly (saith Cerberus) and sayth, Nec figur [...] illae verborum offendunt. &c. Neither saith he, doe these figuratiue spea­ches offend. As I wil hardē the heart of Pharao, and such like: for it is certain, that in the Hebrew phrase, they sig­nifie a permission or suffering, & not an effectuall will of God. As leade vs not into temptation, y^• is to saye, suffer vs not to be lead into temptatiō. These are Melancthons wordes, sayth Cerberus: and marke (sayth he) what he sayeth of the Hebrew phrase, for all men know him to be a man learned. Here Cerberus beginneth to triumphe, and semeth to himselfe to haue wonne the stelde. Melanc­thon hath said it, therfore it must nedes be so. I reuerence Melancthon, and do acknowledge that he was learned: but let vs sée whether, in this point, Melācthon haue not shewed him selfe to loth to offende such as Cerberus is, and therfore séemed to haue giuen them vaūtage against himselfe. In the same booke of common places, in the first [Page] title, which is De Deo: he describeth God after this sorte: Deut est essentia spiritualis, intelligens, aterna, verax, bona, pura, iusta, misericors, liberrima, immensaepotenti [...]e & sapientiae. &c. That is to saye: God is a spirituall essence, vnderstan­ding, euerlasting, true, good, pure, iuste, mercifull, moste frée, & of vnmeasurable power and wisdome. &c. Nowe, if God do permit any thing to be done which he is not wil­ling should be done, how is he almightye? Other there­fore, as learned as Melancthon, haue sayd, & in my iudge­ment, truly: that to permit and to will is alone, in him that can not be enforced to permit or suffer that which he is not willing should be. But as I haue declared before, we affirme not, that the actions, wordes, and thoughtes of man, as they are willed or permitted by God, are or can be sinne. For he being altogether good, and nothing else but goodnesse; can not will or permit anye thing that is euill. The euill therefore that is in mens thoughtes, wordes or actions, commeth of the Deuil and mens own willes: which God doth will or permit, as a meane, ey­ther to set forth his mercie in forgiuing, or his iustice in punishing, whiche in that respect can not be other than good. What Cerberus hath wonne by citing these words of Melancthon: let y^• learned that haue read other mens writings vppon this matter, iudge. I haue sayde that I thinke to be true.

But now Cerberus thinketh to paye vs home. To be shorte, sayeth he, it is surelye to be maruelled at, that al­thoughe they doe thus accuse Gods Predestination to be the onely cause of Adams sall (which is in dede not onely sinne, but also the very welspring of all wickednesse, and the silthy fountaine of all our vncleannesse) that yet they dare affirme themselues to be the onely friendes and lo­uers of Gods Predestination. &c. Cerberus will be shorte now. Well let him be aunswered as shortly. He hath all [Page 44] this while laboured to proue that was neuer denied, that is, that the sinne of Adam in his first fall, is the cause of al the sinne that hath bene, is, or shalbe committed by his posterity. For we hold, that after Adam had once sinned, neyther he nor anye of hys posteritie, being naturallye brought forth in this worlde, could of them selues do any other thing than sinne. The cause wherof we say, is that concupiscence and lust to do euil, which entred into him, & from him is descended into his posteritie. But what is this to the cause of Adams fall. Thys concupiscence was not in Adam before his fall. It could not therefore be the cause therof. And as I haue declared before: Adams fall coulde not be the cause of all sinne: for sinne was before Adam fell. We knowe that sinne is not a creature: but it is a falling away of the creature from that order that the Creator did commaunde the creature to continue in. But this was in y^• Aungels, Ergo before the fall of mā. By y^• fall of man therfore was declared what mans frée­will was able to do. It was able to admit sinne, and so by freewill sinne entred into man, and by man into the world, that is into all naturall men. And yet we say not, that either mans freewill or man himselfe is euill, as he is Gods creature, and fréewill Gods gifte. I conclude therfore, that as the fall of Adam was the performance of Gods purpose, so was it no sinne, but excéeding good, as euery performance of Gods purposes muste néedes be. And so the Predestination of God being the cause therof, is no cause of sinne. Let Cerberus maruel as much as he will, how we can graunt God to be the cause and not the Autour of sinne. For we do not say that Gods Predesti­nation is the cause of sinne. Much lesse doe we say that he is the Autour, as Cerberus doth charge vs by occasiō of certayne wordes written by Iohn Knoxe against an ad­uersarie of Gods Predestination.

[Page] Although Iohn Knoxe being yet liuing, & able to de­fend his owne writings, I might refer Cerberus to his aunswere: yet I wil not sticke to write a few lines in the defence of his doctrine in this point. Cerberus séemeth to mislike with Knoxe for two things: one is, for that he saith that we assigne to the prouidence of God, all things that the Ethnickes and Ignoraunt attributed vnto for­tune. And the other is, for that hée sayth that we know and beholde God to be, not onelye the principall cause, but also the authour of all things, appointing them to the one parte or so the other by hys counsell. Thys is (sayth Cerberus) suche a wyde wandring blasphemie, as hath not lightly bene hearde of. And although Cerberus would haue vs marke the wordes, & the very sense of thē, as though he would set forth the same so plainely, that al men might easely perceyue the meaning of thē: yet with his leaue, he sheweth that he himselfe did not sée that he would haue other to marke. For what mad man woulde write words in such meaning, as Cerberus would haue vs thinke that Iohn Knoxe wrate his? That is, to call God deceyisull, vnfaythful, and vntrusty? Rough, hard, sierce and cruel? Bawdy, beastly, and shamelesse? Im­perious, malapert, and proude? Blinde, and wythout eyes? Wicked, to be abhorred, and altogether naught? Was there euer man so farre beside himself, as to wryte of God in this meaning? I durst appeale to Cerberus himselfe (though he be the dogge of Hell) whyther in con­science he doe thinke that it were possible that any reaso­nable man may so far forget him selfe, as to write words in any such meaning. Let Cerberus therfore, loke better vpō Iohn Knoxe words, and seke a better sense in them than this. If he wil do so, he shall finde that Iohn Knoxe meaning is, that where as the Ethnickes and Ignorant attributed vnto fortune, a power to giue or take away, [Page 45] to preserue or destroy, to helpe or to hinder. We which know y^• there is no such power in any other thā in God, do assigne all these things to his prouidence: knowing y^• nothing commeth to passe by Fortune or chaūce, but that God by his prouidence doth gouerne and rule all things, appoynting them to the one parte, or the other, by hys counsell. And when he appointeth anye to that thing which in them is sinne (as was the murder of Sinacha­rib in his owne sonnes) yet in Gods purpose it is good, for it is the execution of his iust iudgement, or the meane whereby his glorie shal be the more aduaunced in shew­ing mercie. If Cerberus be not certified with this aun­swere, let him seke for further aunswere at the hands of him whose writings he hath so maliciously peruerted.

But now to returne againe to Crowley. After that he hath written, that Gods predestination is the on­lie cause of Adams fall, then goeth he foorth in the same boke, and the same Article, vnto the next exe­crable wickednesse, committed in the world, saying: Now, what say we to Cain: was he not predestinated to slea his brother? No, saye the freewill men. Here thou seest dearly beloued, who they are that so odi­ouslie are noted with the name of freewyll men. Not only the Papistes, against whom he pretendeth there to wryte: but namely all those that saye, God hath not predestinate any man to cōmit murder, or such like wycked abhomination. These call they free­will men, these cal they Pelagians. In dede such as so maintayn freewil, that a mā by freewyl wythout the grace and helpe of God, may abstayne from euill, or do good, as the blinde Papistes doe, and as before it [Page] is proued, that Pelagius did holde, or as before is re­henrsed, that Willyam Samuell sayth: that man maye deserue God: those I saye, might worthily be called Pelagians, bicause they hold, eyther al, or some part of hys errours. But those which teach, that all mur­der and mischiese spryngeth out of Gods predestina­tion, or that any mansleaer is predestinate of God to kyll hys neighboure, or any adulterer to lye with his neyghboures wyfe, or any traytour predestinate of God, to conspire against hys Prince, or any rebell to ryse against his Soueraigne, as these men most plain­ly assyrme: they holde in thys poynt the errour of the Manicheans, whych was as ye hearde before, by the wordes of Austen. Hominem peccatum vitare nòn posse. That a man can not eschewe euill, or can not choose but commit sinne. These men, I say, whych affirme that Caine was predestinate to murder hys innocent brother Abell. And as in the same boke and the same Article also, he sayth, that the most wicked persons that haue bene, were of God appointed to bee wyc­ked euen as they were. They hold the errour both of the Stoikes, and also of the Manicheans. That is to say, as Austen declareth in the ninth & .xvi. chapter of the first boke of his Retractations: that euil hath his original of Gods ordinance, & not of mans free­wil. For if murderers, theues, adulterers, traitours, & Rebelles be of God predestinated and appoynted to be wicked euē as they are, and can not choose but of mere necessitie by the ordinance of God commit, al such wickednesse, euen as they do: then what is our lyfe but a mere destinie, all our doyngs Gods ordy­naunces, and all oure imaginations, braunches of Gods predestinatiō? And I doubt not, but the Sto­ikes and Manicheans, would also temper the matter [Page 46] wyth a great discretion of wordes, as these men wyll saye, that we must speake more reuerentlie of the matter. But seyng they plainely holde these princi­ples, and when they see theyr tyme, speake plainely thereof them selues, as you maye well perceyue by that whych hath alredy, and shal yet be more largely rehearsed: I see no cause why it should not of al mē be plainely declared. Agayne, if it be a trueth, why should it not be plainly spoken, if it be a truth, that traitours be predestinate of God to conspire the de­structiō of their Princes, and Rebels predestinate of God to make insurrectiō against their soueraines: If (I say) it be a trueth, that God hath so predestinated thē, & that they must of necessity, & can not choose but commit such wyckednesse: why shoulde it not be plainly spoken? except a man should be ashamed to speake the trueth. But in what Scripture is that written? Or is it not rather written. For thy lyfe, shame not to say the trueth. And surelye to say as Eccles. 4. it is: I see not well howe any man can speake more plainely in thys matter than they them selues doe. For what can more plainly be spokē: thā that Gods predestination is the cause of Adams fall? And that Caine was predestinate to slea his brother? And that God is both the principal cause, and also the author of all thyngs, both on the one side and on the other, appoynting al things to al men. And whatsoeuer the Ethnickes ascribed vnto fortune: that same we ought to attribute vnto the prouidence of God. And that the most wycked persons that haue bene: were of God appointed to be wicked euen as they were.

[Page] Here it appeareth, that the chiese quarrell that Cer­berus had, when he wrate this aunswere to his friendes letter, was against Crowley. If the spirit of loue had led him, he might haue had conference w^t Crowley (for belike he knoweth him well ynough) & not thus maliciously by setting out his answere in print, haue gone about asmuch as lieth in him, not only to discredit the doctrine y^t Crow­ley preacheth: but also to bring him in displeasure with his Prince, as one y^e teacheth theues, murderers, traitors & rebells, & al other naughty persons to defend their wic­kednesse by Gods predestination & ordinance. But Crow­ley shal by Gods helpe, be able to cleare him selfe of all this, & to make the malice of Cerberus so knowne to al men, that he shal from henceforth haue little credit amōg such as doe not fauour the errour of our new Pelagians.

For answere to al y^• Cerberus hath in this his returne to Crowley, written, I might referre the Reader to that whiche I haue already written. But least Cerberus should thinke that that were but a shift, I will aunswere to his Taùtologie, or repeticion of the same wordes and matter that is before written and answered, and chiesly bicause he doth here inferre more playnely that which be­fore he meaneth to conclude.

I haue saide, that Gods predestination was the one­ly cause of Adams fall, that Caine was predestinate to slea his brother Abell, and that the most wicked persons that haue bene, were of God appointed to be wicked, euē as they were. For the first, I referre the Reader to that which I haue alreadie written thereof. For the seconde, I say: that as God predestinated Abell to be a figure of Christ and his Churche in suffering, so he predestinated Caine to be a figure of the cruell persecuting Iewes & o­ther, that haue, do, & shall persecute Christ & his Church. And as Caine in sleaing his brother Abell was a figure [Page 47] of the cruell persecutours, so was not the murder euill: but as it was the execution of Caines wicked will, it was abhominable sinne, and deserued no lesse punish­ment at Gods hand, than it had in deede. And as concer­ning the power of Caines will, whereby he consented to do this deede: it was altogether bound to the will of Sa­than, by the sinne that his Father Adam had first com­mitted, & was not deliuered from that bondage, bicause he was none of them whome Iesus Christ, the sonne of God had deliuered and made frée: as doeth well appeare by that he sayeth: My sinne is greater than that it can be forgiuen. He had not receyued the spirite of Adoption, whereby he might cry Abba, Father. Wherefore, it is manifest, that whatsoeuer he did, was abhominable in Gods sight, for he lacked fayth whereby mennes workes are made acceptable before God. For without it, it is impossible to please God. As it is written. Sine fide im­possibile Hebr. 11. est placere Deo. Without fayth, it is not possible to please GOD. And hereof it came, that is written Ad Cain enim & munera eius Deus nòn respexit. God had Genes. 4. no regarde to Caine and his oblations. For euen his verie oblations which he offered, were sinne in the sight of God, according to the wordes of Saint Paule. Quic­quid ex Rom. 14. side nòn est, peccatum est. Whatsoeuer is not of faith, the same is sinne. How can it be then, but that the mur­der of his brother must be sinne, as it was the execution of his malicious purpose: but as it is the performance of Gods purpose, it can not be but good. The lyke is to be saide of the murder y^• the sonnes of Sinacharib commit­ted vpon their own father, and the rebellion of Absolom, 4. Reg. 19. 2. Reg. 16. the whoredome of the same, the thefte of the Sabines, and whatsoeuer wickednesse we reade of. For God had sayde before, that he woulde slea Sinacharib with the sworde, and that the sworde should not depart from Da­uids [Page] house. And Iob sayde: The Lorde hath taken a­way. 2. Reg. 12. Iob. 1. In that Cerberus therefore, hath taken vpon him to write thus maliciouslye againste me and others that teach the true doctrine of Gods euerlasting predestinati­on: he is not by our doctrine iustified from sinne therin, althoughe in the purpose of God the same be good (for it is the stirring vp of me and others, to loke more diligent­ly to the teaching of that doctrine, in suche sorte that the weake Christians be not offended, neyther the enimies occasioned to blaspheme) but when Cerberus and we shall stand before the iudgement seat of Christ togither: then shall it appeare with what mynde wée haue both written. For his malice towards Crowley can not then be couered.

And where as Cerberus woulde know, where it is written that all truth should not be playnely spoken: let him aske Sainct Paule why he would first féede his hea­rers with mylke, and afterwarde with stronger meate. And let him aske our Sauiour Christ, why he sayd that olde bottles coulde not holde new Wyne, and that ther­fore men vse to put newe Wyne into new vesselles that both maye be preserued togither. And as for hys place that he citeth out of Sirache, (For thy lyfe shame not to say the truth) I reser to the Reader to cōsider and weigh Eccles. 4. by the circumstance of the place. Wherby it shal appeare how well it maketh for hys purpose. Sirach sayth: For thy lyfe shame not to saye the trueth, for there is a shame that bringeth sinne, & there is a sinne that bringeth glo­ry & fauour. Now, how can Cerberus proue by this place that a preacher must without discretion vtter all truth at all times & in al places? It is manifest that Sirach mea­neth to instruct all men, that shame should not staye vs from confessing the trueth of our owne euyll, when we are deprehended therein: for that shame bringeth sinne. [Page 48] (That is, causeth vs to lie in hyding our owne faults be­fore committed) but the other shame, that is, to doe that which is not honest, bringeth glorie and fauour. Shame therefore sayth Sirach, to do euil: but for thy life, shame not to confesse the euyll that thou hast once done, and art taken withal, or vehemently suspected therof. But (sayth Cerberus) how can any man speake more plainly of this matter, than they thēselues doe? For what can be more plainely spoken: than that Gods Predestination is the cause of Adams fall? And that Caine was predestinated to slea his brother? And that God is both the principall cause & also the Author of al things, both on the one syde and on the other. &c. Al this is sufficiently aunswered al­ready. But y^• cause, why in our writings we vse so plaine wordes in this matter: is, for that we haue not to doe with babes that néede milk, but with open enimies, that vnder colour to cleare God of iniquitie, go about to take from him the glorie of his almighty power, and libertie, to do what he will do with his owne creatures, without checke or controlement: And to ascribe to the power of their owne fréewil, that glory that the frée mercy of God deserueth. We doe not this therefore in our common or­der of teaching, but being enforced by the malice of such as Cerberus is.

And furder, in the same boke and the same Article. Yea, I am sure (sayth he) that you will graunt, that if God doe predestinate a man to do things rashly and without any deliberation: he shall not deliberate at all, but runne headlong vpon it, be it good or euyll that he doth. He maketh also an argument after this sort, saying: Whatsoeuer God foreseeth and prede­destinateth: [Page] must necessarily come to passe (for his prescience and predestination are infallible) but he foreseeth and predestinateth al things: Ergo al things must come to passe of necessitie. The minor of which Argument is apparantly false. For though God doe foresee all things: yet doeth he not predestinate all things. For his foresight doeth extende both to good and euill: but his predestination is onelye of things that be good. As the Scriptures and all aun­cient writers proue. And here againe it is to be no­ted also: how plainely they make God the Authour of sinne. For if this maior be true, that God doth not onely foresee, but also predestinate all things: Yea, euen sinne and euill, as the fall of Adam, and the murder of Caine, and the wickednesse of all them that haue bene most wycked: then may this minor be truely annexed: That God is the Authour of al that he predestinateth. And so must this conclusion nee­des follow: that God is the Authour of all sinne and euyll. The first parte, that God: predestinateth all thinges, or all that he soreseeth: is a proposition of their own assertiō, without any ambiguitie or dout­full meaning. The seconde part, that God is the Au­thour of al that he predestinateth, is mine assertion. Which is so manifest and true, that they haue scarce any maner of colour to deny it. For what is it to pre­destinate any thing? but first to purpose, decree, and appoint, and ordeine it to be done? Now, he which first purposeth, decreeth, appointeth, ordeineth, or inuēteth a thing to be done: is not he the Author of the same? Or is not he rightly to be called Causa, Ori­go, Fons: Radix, Principium, Autor? The Cause, Origi­nall, Fountaine, Roote, Beginning or Authour of the same? He which first purposeth, decreeth, apoin­teth, [Page 49] and ordeineth an Insurrection or Rebellion to be made against his Prince: is not he to be apprehē ­ded as the very Authour of al the sedition, and wor­thily and rightly to be iudged and called? What mā can be so ignorant: as not to perceiue it? For all the worlde knoweth, that for none other cause, one is sayde to be the Authour of any thing, but onely, for that he is eyther the first inuētor, or else the first pur­poser, appointer, & ordeiner of the same. And also, whosoeuer is the first inuentor, or else the first ordei­ner of any thing: most properly he is sayd to be the Authour of the same. Nowe, marke againe the Ar­gument, and see how the conclusion followeth. God predestinateth all things, yea, euen sinne and euyll: And God is the Author of all that he predestinateth, as hath bene plainely proued: Ergo, he is the Authour of sinne. This must needes follow, if the first propo­sition be graunted. That God predestinateth or or­deineth al things, or al that he foreseeth. Wherfore, the olde writers, in confutation of the Manicheans, laboured in nothing so much; as to proue, that al­though God did foresee all things, both good and e­uyll: yet dyd he onely foresee, and not predestinate those things which are euill. As by an infinite num­ber of places, out of the auncient writers, if shorte­nesse woulde suffer, I coulde easely proue. But one place of Austen, I wil rehearse, which doth not one­ly resolue clearely this matter betwene foresight and for cordinaunce: or betwene the prescience and pre­destination: but also most plainely teacheth, al that is to be sayde of predestination. Prosper. Ad obiectio. Vince. Rehearsing the words, and defending the opi­nion of Austen, where he proueth that the Diuell can scarcely be called the Authour of sinne, by cause [Page] it came of mans owne will, and asketh by what mad­nesse and frensle men doe attribute that vnto God, which can not be altogether ascribed vnto the De­uill. And at the last he concludeth with these words of Austen.

Nihil ergo talium negotiorum Deus praedestinauit vt suret: nec illam animā nequitèr turpiter (que) victinam, ad hoc vt taliter vi­ueret praeparauit: sed talem futuram nòn ignorauit, & de tali iustè se iudicaturum esse praesciuit: at (que) ita ad praedestinationem eius nihil aliudreserri poiest, nisi quod aut ad debitam iustitiae retri­butionem, aut ad indebitam pertinet gratiae largitatem.

Therefore (sayth he) God hath predestinated no part of any such doings, neither the soule, which af­terwarde liued wickedly and filthily, hath he prepa­red to that ende that it should so liue: but he was not ignorant that such a one it woulde be. And so no­thing may be referred to the praedestination of God: but onely that which pertayneth vnto the due re­compēce of his righteousnesse, or to the vndeserued gift of his grace. These are the wordes of Austen. which surely are maruellous ful of pith, conteyning the whole summe of that which may be sayde in this matter of Gods predestinatiō, and are therfore most worthie to be noted, yea, and to be committed to heart, or kept in perpetual memorie. For being tho­rowely weyghed, they do plainely set forth, the full resolution of all this question.

Cerberus is so maliciously bente agaynst Crowley, that he can kepe no order in charging him with that that he hath written agaynst Shaxton. For this (yea, I am sure) wherwith he chargeth me here, standeth in my boke [Page 49] more than eyghte whole leaues after the Argument that he findeth such fault with. Yea, it is parte of that which I doe inferre vpon the confession of Shaxton himselfe, in his Article that I confute, after I had by many Scriptu­res proued the minor proposition of that Argument. But who can hope that Cerberus can with his thrée mouthes kepe order in his barking? Let me (if I can) aunswere him in order, vnto that wherewith he doth so vnorderly charge me.

First he saith, that I say that I am sure that Shaxton will graunt, that if God doe predestinate a man to doe things rashly and without any deliberation, he shall not deliberate at al, but runne headlong vpon it, be it good or euyll that he doth. Nowe let vs see what Cerberus hath sayde to this. He séemeth to make a great matter of it: For he beginneth thus: And furder. As though y^e where­with he wyll nowe charge Crowley, is more to be dete­sted than the rest that is already spoken of. And yet when he hath made rehearsall of the wordes: he séemeth by si­lence to allowe them. Wherefore, I will be bolde to say to Cerberus, as I dyd to Shaxton. I am sure that you will graunt. &c.

But as one that vnaduisedly had gone about to finde fault with words that he was not able iustly to disproue: Cerberus leaueth these wordes, and returneth to an Ar­gument that I wrate well most nyne leaues before, and saith. He maketh also an Argumēt after this sort, saying: Whatsoeuer God foreséeth and predestinateth, must ne­cessarily come to passe (for his presciēce and predestination are infallible) but he foreséeth & predestinateth al things. Ergo, all thinges muste come to passe of necessitie. Here Cerberus hath found matter to brabble about. The maior proposition of this Argument he findeth no fault withal. Wherefore I wyll suppose that he thinketh it to be true, [Page] that whatsoeuer God foreséeth and predestinateth, must necessarily come to passe. But by Cerberus owne confes­sion, God foreséeth & predestinateth all good things. Ergo, all good thinges come to passe of necessitie. Thus much haue we gotten of Cerberus. So that if it be a Stoicall opinion, to say that al things come to passe of necessitie: yet Cerberus shall not be so cleare from it as he woulde séeme to be.

But my minor proposition must be apparantly false. For though God do foresée al things, yet doth he predesti­nate only those things which are good, as the scriptures & auncient writers doe proue. So that nowe there remay­neth no more to be proued by me, but that God predesti­nateth those things that be euyll. Which thing if I can proue: Cerberus and I are agréed.

Well, If Cerberus would be entreated to beléeue all that I haue written in the former part of this Apologie: then should the controuersie betwixt vs, sone be ended. For I haue sayde, that euen those things, that are worst in mans doings, are good in Gods purpose. As the con­senting to the persuasion of the Serpent in the first man: the murder of Abel in Caine, & those wyckednesses that others haue wrought: were in Gods purpose good, al­though in those that did those things, they were excéeding euyll. For then hath Cerberus graunted, that God doth predestinate them, and so consequently he hath graunted that they come to passe of necessitie, as those things that God predestinateth must néedes doe. But whether Cer­berus wyll beléeue that which I haue written or no: I will by Gods help proue that those actions which in man are most wicked, were predestinated by God to be done: And then I trowe mine Argument shal conclude aright, notwithstanding ought that Cerberus shalbe able to say to the contrarie.

[Page 51] And least we shoulde varie aboute predestination, as not agreing vpon the definition what it is: I am contē ­ted to take that description which Cerberus hym selfe hath made of it. He sayth, that to predestinate any thing, is first to purpose, decree, apoynt, or ordeyne it to be done. But God hath first decreed to be done all the euil things as euer were done by men: Ergo, he hath predestinated e­uils. The minor in this argument is proued by that that is written in the fourth Chapter of the Actes of the Apo­stles. Conuenerunt enim in Ciuitate ista, aduersus filium tuum Iesum, quem vnxisti, Herodes & Pòntius Pilatus, cum gentibus & populis Israel: ad faciendum quaecunque manus tua & consiliū tuum decreuerunt fieri. That is to say. In this same Citie (meaning Ierusalem) Herode and Pontius Pilate, with the Heathen and the people of Israell, gathered themsel­ues together, agaynst thy childe Iesus whome thou hast annoynted: to doe vnto him whatsoeuer things thy hand and counsell haue first decréed to be done. What those things were, it is manifest in the hystorie of the Gospels. They called him a Samaritane, they sayd he had a diuel, they sought to take him in his aunsweres, they went a­bout to stone him to death, they accused him, they condē ­ned him, and fastened him to a Crosse, & then rayled vpon him. What could men do worsse than to vse themselues so towardes the sonne of God? But S. Peter sayth, that all these things were done according as the hand & coun­sel of God had first decréed to be done: Wherfore I think my minor in my first Argument that Cerberus findeth such fault withall, to be sufficiently proued.

But nowe Cerberus hath made of my minor, a maior, and framed an Argument for his purpose, which I must say some thing to, otherwise wyll Cerberus glorie in his Arte.

God doth not onely foresée, but also predestinate all [Page] things, yea, euen sinne and euyll. &c. But he is Authour of all that he predestinateth: Ergo, he is the Authour of sinne. The first part (saith Cerberus) is their owne asser­tion. And for my part, I acknowledge it so to be. But not in that meaning that Cerberus sayth it. For it is not our hare assertion without proufe, but we are able by playne Scriptures and reasōs, to proue that God doth both fore­see and predestinate all things, as I haue before proued in the confirming of this same proposition, being the mi­nor in mine Argument. But for more ample proufe: the Reader may consider that which is written in the Psalm 138. where Dauid the Prophet sayth thus. Lorde, thou Psal. 138. hast proued me, and hast knowē me. Thou hast knowen my downesitting and my vprysing. Thou vnderstan­dest my thoughts long since. Thou hast searched my path and my coutch rounde about, and hast foreséene all my wayes. For loe, there is not a worde in my mouth: Be­holde, thou Lord knowest all things. This is sufficient for the proufe of the first parte of this proposition. Which is, that God foreséeth all things. For the proufe of the se­cond part, which is, that God predestinateth all things: I haue cited the words of Peter in the fourth of the Acts: wherin is affirmed, y^t the power & counsel of God did first apoint those things to be done, which were done to Christ by Herod, Pilate, the Gentiles, & y^e people of the Iewes.

Reasons also we haue to proue the same, which are these. If God should not foresée all things, he could not be prouident in all things: but it must néedes be graun­ted that he is prouident in al things: Ergo, he doth foresée all things. If God did not predestinate all things, then might his prouidence be deceyued: but his prouidence can­not be deceyued: Ergo, he doth predestinate all thinges. This may suffice for the proufe of our assertion. Now let vs see, howe Cerberus annecteth hys minor to this maior, [Page 51] which is this. But God is the Author of all those things that he predestinateth. And to proue this doth Cerberus make much a doe, yea and much more than néedeth. For we will not sticke to graunt him that God is the Author of all that he predestinateth. Well sayth Cerberus, then I conclude, that God is the Authour of all sinne & euyll. I denie that Argument.

It were but follie to reason much with this bawling Curre, about the rules of Logicke: For it seemeth by his conclusion that he knoweth no Logicke at all. For if he did, he would not so shamelessely inferre a necessarie cō ­clusion vpon the graunting of pure particulers. For it is a generall rule among Logitians, that A puris particular ribus nòn necesse est sequi veram conclusionem. It is not a thing of necessitie, that a true conclusion shoulde followe vpon those propositions that be pure particulers. As in thys Argumēt that Cerberus hath made, the maior and minor are. Agayne, he concludeth more than is graunted in the Antecedēt (which is also contrary to the rules of Logick) For though it be graunted, that God is the Authour of all that he predestinateth: yet is he not the Authour, as Cerberus doth conclude that he is: That is to say, the cause, the spring, the fountaine, the roote, the beginning and Authour of any thing that is not good. For none euil thing can spring of him that is altogether good & nothing but goodnesse it selfe. As I haue sayd already therefore: so I say agayne. God is the cause, spring, fountaine, roote, beginning and Author of al things that haue any being. For he only hath his being of hymself: & all other things haue their being of him. And he alone is the worker of al actions: Nam in eo viuimus, mouemur & sumus. In hym we lyue, moue, & haue our being. And as these things spring of God the fountaine of goodnesse, so are they al excéeding Act. 17. good. And as the actiōs are wrought by him so are they ex­céeding [Page] good also: although in thēselues they be excéeding euyll, as is the Diuell and al his Angels and members, and all those works that are wrought contrary to the cō ­maundement of God. And the wordes and thoughts that are of the same kinde. As I haue sufficiently proued be­fore, by examples taken out of the holy hystories.

Let Cerberus therfore loke vpon his Logiek againe, and learne to frame a Syllogismus better. Peraduen­ture being in his mad moode when he wrote this answere to his friendes letter: he had quite forgotten the fourtene moodes of the thrée fygures, wherin the Logicians do vse to forme their Syllogismusses. To giue him occasion therefore, to call himselfe to remembraunce: I wyll set downe those short memoriall Uerses which the teachers of Arte vse to print in the minds of their Scholers, to the end that they should not in disputatiōs be abused by such as Cerberus is, which vse to frame Arguments, without eyther fygure or moode. The Uerses are these.

Now, if Cerberus be acquainsed with these Uerses: Let him shewe in which of these fygures and moodes hys Syllogismus is formed. And if he find it in none of thē: then let hym desire some more skilfull than hymselfe, to take this matter in hande. For hys Arte wyll not serue him to goe thorowe withall, so long as he medleth wyth them that knowe what Arte is.

I know that the matter conteined in Cerberus Syl­logisme, may be brought into the forme of a Syllogisme in the first fygure, and the thirde moode called Darij. Af­ter [Page 53] this maner. Whosoeuer doth predestinate any thing, is the Author thereof. But God doth predestinate sinne. Ergo, he is the Author thereof. Thus farre I haue holpen Cerberus to frame his Argument. But least Cerberus should thinke that I haue framed against my selfe such an Argument as I am not able to salute: I wyll shewe the fallace of it. First in the maior, the word Authour is doubtfull. For it may be vnderstanded eyther of him that predestinateth or foreappointeth a thing to be done, or of him that is the doer of the same thing. And therfore in reasoning it must be explaned and made voide of all am­phibologie and doubt. For this is a rule in Logicke, that the termes which are vsed in reasoning, must be plaine and voyd of all doubtfulnesse. If we will therfore make a good maior in this Argument, we must say, that whosoe­uer doth predestinate or foreappoint a thing to de done, is so the Authour of it, that the acte or déede done, must be ascribed to him, in as much as it is a déede or an act done. And then may we adde this minor, but God hath predesti­nated and foreappointed the acte or déede that is done by the sinner: Ergo, so farre forth as it is an acte or a déede, God is the Authour of it. Here is not God charged with the sinne that man committeth, for that springeth of mās choyse, which being corrupted and made bonde to sinne by the sinne that the first man first committed, can not of it selfe choose to do any thing in such sort, that the same shall not be sinne. For mans wisdome and choyse, which S. Paule calleth the wisdome of the flesh, neyther is, nor Rom. 8. can be subiect to the lawe of God. And so all that man thinketh, speaketh or doth in his owne wisdome & choyse, is against the law & commaundement of God, & so sinne by the cōmon desinition of sinne, as is mentioned before.

And to make this matter more plaine, let vs take one example or two, whereof in the holie Histories & bookes [Page] of the Prophetes, we haue many, and let vs sée how God is the Author of the acte or déede, and not of the sinne that is in the acte. First in the .xix. Chapter of the fourth booke 4. Reg. 19. of y^e Kings, we read, that when Sinacharib had blasphe­med God, and Ezechias the King had made his com­plaint and praiers to God: the Prophet Esay was com­maunded to say thus vnto the King. Be not afraid of the wordes wherewith ye haue heard the King of the Assiri­ans seruants blaspheming me. Beholde, I will chaunge his minde, and he shall heare a tidings, and shall returne into his owne country, & I will ouerthrow him with the sword in his owne land. And in the end of y^t same Chap­ter, the Historie sayth thus. And when he was worship­ping in the Temple of Nesroch his God: Adramelech & Saraser his owne sonnes, slew him with the sword. Here it is manifest, that God according to his promise made to Ezechias, hath killed Sinacharib: but yet by y^t sword of his own sonnes. The acte in this murder is Gods, and so it is exceeding good, for it is the performance of Gods promise, and the execution of iust iudgement vpon the wicked blasphemer. But the sinne of the acte, was theyrs whose handes were instruments to murder their father. For they minded nothing lesse than to fulfill Gods pro­mise, or to execute his iudgement vpon the blasphemer.

The same example we read in the .x. chapter of Esay the Prophet, set forth yet more plainely after this sort. Esay. 10. Come Assur, thou rodde of my furie, and the staffe of my wrath, amongst these men. &c. And a little after. But he will not think so, and his heart will not be so persuaded: but his purpose will be to destroy, and to bring many Nations to naught. &c. Here we see, how God vsed Si­nacharib as his rod in chastising the Nations: and yet did he sinne in those actions that God wrought by him. And we sée also how God vsed his sonnes, in destroying [Page 54] him, and yet they sinned in murdering their Father. So is God the Authour of the acte, which was good in him, and they Authours of the sinne of the acte, which was euill in them.

Another example we haue written in the .xii. chapter of the second booke of the Kings, where the Prophet Na­than 2. Reg. 12. sayth thus to King Dauid. Thus sayth the Lord. Beholde, I will stirre vp euill against thée in thine own house, and I will take from thée thy wiues, euen before thy face, and will giue them to thy neighbour, & he shall lie with them in the open sunnelight. Thou haste done this déede in secrete: but I will doe this that I haue spo­ken of, euen in the sight of all Israell, and in the open sunnelight. The fulfilling of this is written in the .xvj. Chapter of the same booke. The acte whereof wrought by Absolome, was in God, who vsed Absolome as his instrument, the iust punishment that Dauids sinne, in abusing Uries wife, had deserued. But the same in Ab­solome, was abhominable and incestuous whoredome, whereby Absolome minded to make all Israell thynke, that he abhorred his father, and that he would vtterly roote him out.

Let this suffice for the making plaine of that whych I haue said, concerning that which I haue said, touching the acte in God, and sinne of the wicked acte in man.

Thus much for the matter of Cerberus Argument reduced into forme.

Nowe let vs sée what may be sayd to that one place, that in stede of so many, Cerberus citeth out of S. Au­sten. Which doth not onely resolue clearely this matter betwene foresight and predestination, but also moste plainely teach all that is to be said of Predestination.

And first, let vs set downe al the words of S. Austen, euen as they stande in the place whereout Prosper doth [Page] cite them. They are writtē in the eleauenth of those Ar­ticles, which are falsly imposed vpon S. Austen. The wordes of the Article are these. Quòd quando paires ince­stant Articulo. 11. fals. Aug. imp silias, & matres silij, vel quando serui Dominos occidūt, ideò fiat, quia Deus praedestinauit, vt ita sicret. That when the fa­thers do abuse theyr owne daughters, and sonnes theyr owne mothers, and seruantes murder theyr owne mai­sters, the same is done, bicause God hath predestinated that it should be so done. To this Article doth S. Austen aunswere thus. Si Diabolo obijceretur, quòd talium facinorum ipse Autor, ipse esset inuentor: puto quòd aliqua ratione hac se posset exo [...]rare inuidia, & talium scelerum patratorem, de ipsorū voluntate vinceret: quia, etsi delectatus sit surore peccantium, pro­haret tamèn se nòn intulisse vim criminum. Qua ergo insipientia, quaue dementia desinitur, ad Dei referrendum esse consiliū, quod nec Diabolo in toto ascribi potest: qui in peccantium flagitijs, il­lecebrarum adiutor, nòn voluntatum credendus est esse generator? Nihil ergo talium negotiorum, Deus praedestinauit vt fieret, nec illam animam, turpitèr, nequiter (que) victuram ad hoc vt taliter vi­ [...]eret praeparauit, sed talem futuram nòn ignorauit & de tali se iustè iudicaturum esse praesciuit. At (que) ita ad predestinationem eius nihil amplius referri potest, nisi quòd ad debitam iustitiae retributionem, aùt ad indebitam pertinet gratiae largitatē. That is to say. If i [...] should be layd to the Diuels charge, that he were the Authour or inuentor of such wicked déedes: I suppose he might by some reason vnburden himselfe of this enuie, and to proue that the committer of such wic­kednesses, commeth of the will of those men that charge him withall. For although he be delited with the out­rage of them that sinne: yet might he proue that he had not enforced them to commit the faultes. By what folly, or what madnesse therefore, is it agréed, that that thing should be referred to the decrée of God, which may n [...] be altogether ascribed to the Diuell, which may be [Page 55] thought to be an helper forwarde of the prouocations, in the wicked actes of them that sinne, but not the begetter of their willes. God therefore hath not predestinated any such things to be done, neyther hath he prepared that soule to liue filthily and wickedly, of purpose that it should so liue: but he was not ignorant that it would proue such a one, and he knewe before hand, that he him selfe should execute iust iudgement vpon such a one. And so, nothing may be referred to the predestinatiö of God, more than that, which appertaineth to the due reward of iustice, or to the vndeserued gyft of grace or mercy.

These wordes (sayth Cerberus) being thorowly weyghed: do plainly set forth, the full resolution of this question. It is very true, they do so. And therefore, I be­sech thée good Reader, weigh them well, that thou maist by them be resolued in this matter of Gods predestina­tion. And that thou mayst so be, thou nedest no more but to weigh the wordes of Austens conclusion, wherein he sayth, that there can no more be referred to Gods pre­destination, but that only which doth appertaine eyther to the due reward of iustice, or else to the vndeserued gift of mercie.

When Sinacharibs sonnes slew their owne father: was not the acte in this murder y^t due reward of iustice, for that he had blasphemed God? And had not God sayd before, that he would slea him with the sword for that blasphemie? Why may we not then by S. Austens wordes, referre this déede to Gods predestination: Whē Absolom abused his fathers wyues, was not the acte of that incestious whoredome, the due rewarde of iustyce, for that Dauid had abused the wife of his seruant Urias? And had not God sayd before, that he would punish it so? Why should not the acte therefore, in that incest, be referred to Gods predestination, euen by these wordes [Page] that Cerberus citeth for his purpose. In like maner may we say of all other actions, which in the men that do thē are wicked, although we know not what sinnes God doth punish by them, whereby the same dedes in him are excéeding good and iust.

If Cerberus would, he might haue séene some other places of S. Austen, wherein this matter is made more plaine, than the bare wordes séeme to make it here. First in his .xviij. boke, De Ciuitate Dei. He sayth thus. Elegit dis­cipulos, quos & Apostolos nominauit, humiliter natos, inhonora­tos, August. de Ciuit. Dei. 18. Cap. 49. illitteratos: vt quicquid magnum essent & facerent, ipse in eis esset & faceret. Habuit inter cos vnum, quo malo vtens benè, & suae passionis dispositum impleret, & Ecclesiae suae tollerandorum malorum praeberet exemplum. That is to say. He (that is to say Christ) did choose Disciples, whom he called also Apo­stles, men borne of poore parentes, not called to honour, vnlearned: that he might be and do in them, what so euer they should be, or do. Among these he had one that was naught, that by vsing well that euill and naughtie one, he might both fulfill the order of his owne passion, and also giue vnto his Church, an example how to beare and suffer those that be wicked.

Againe, in his first Sermon vpon the first part of the. 34. Psalme: S. Austen sayth thus: Ille videbat tra­ditorem suum, & elegit illum magis adopus necessarium, illius August. in Psalm. 34. malo magnū bonum operatus est. Et tamèn inter duodecem electus est, nè ipse duodenarius tā exiguus numerus esset sine malo: hoc ad exemplū nostrae patientiae, quoniam necesse erat vt inter malos vi­neremus. That is to say: He (that is Christ) did sée and know him that should betraie him, and he did the rather choose him as one necessarie for that businesse, and by the euill of that traytour he did worke a great good worke. And yet was the traitour chosen among the twelue, lest that little number of .xij. should be without a naughtie [Page 56] one: this was done for an example of our patience, by­cause of necessitie we must lyue among such as he euill. Againe in the. 59. tract. vpon Iohn he saith. Quod ergo dico, August. in Iohn. tract. 59. inquit, beati critis, si feceritis ea, nòn de oībus vobis dico. Est inter vos qui nòn erit beatus, ne (que) faciet ea, & ego scio quos elegerim: quos? nisi cos qui beati erunt faciendo quae praecepit, ac facienda monstrauit, qui efficere beatos potest? Nòn est igitur traditor Iu­das electus? Quid est ergo quod alio loco dicit? Nonnè ego vos duodecem elegi, & vnus ex v [...]bis Diabolus est? An & ipse ad aliquid electus est, ad quod vti (que) erat necessarius? Nòn autem ad beatitudinem, de qua modo ait, Beati critis si feceritis ea. Hoc nòn de omnibus di cit, scit enim quos ad societ atem beatitudinis huius elegerit. Nòn est exeis iste, qui panem illius sic edebat, vt super eū leuaret calcancum. &c.

That is to say: Where as I say therfore (saith Christ) ye shalbe happie, if he shal do those things: I do not speak those words of you al. There is one amongst you y^• shall not be happie, neyther shall he do those things. And I do know whō I haue chosen. Whō hath he chosen? None but those, that shalbe blessed in doing those things, that he which is able to make them blessed hath commaunded & shewed y^• they ought to be done. Is not y^• traitor Iudas elected then? What meaneth that then, that Christ sai­eth in another place? Haue not I chosen you .xij. and one of you is a Diuell? Was he also elected to some thing, wherevnto euen he was necessarie? Trulie, he was not elected to the blessednesse, whereof Christ spake before, when he sayd: ye shall be happie if ye doe those things. He speaketh not this of all: for he knoweth whome he hath chosen to the fellowship of this blessednesse. This fellow, which did so eate Christes bread, that he did lyft vp his héele against him, is none of that fellowship. &c.

Againe, the same Sainct Austen in the. 62. treatise August. in Iob. tract. 62. vpon Iohn sayth thus. Nisi ergo se traderet Christus, nemo tra­deret, [Page] Christum. Quid habet Iudas nisi peccatum? Ne (que) enim in tradendo Christo salutem nostram cogitauit, propter quam tradi­tus est Christus: sed cogitauit pecuniae lucrum, & inuenit animae detrimentum. Accepit mercedem quam voluit: sed nolenti est data quam neluit. Tradidit Iudas Christum: tradidit Christus scipsum. Ille agebat negotium suae venditionis: iste nostrae redēp­tionis. Quod facis facito citius, nòn quia tu potes, sed quia hoc vult qui omnia potest. That is say. Except therefore Christ would deliuer vp himselfe: no man coulde betraie him. What was there in Iudas more than sinne? For in be­traying Christ he minded not to work our saluation, for which Christ was betrayed: but his minde was vpon the gaine of monie, and he founde the losse of his owne soule. He receyued the reward that he desired: but that reward which he was not willing to haue, was giuen vnto him being vnwilling to haue it. Iudas did betraie Christ: and Christ did deliuer vp himselfe. The one ap­plied his marchandize, the other, our redemption. That thou doest, doe quickly (sayd Christ) not bicause thou art able to do it: but bicause he that is able to do all things, is willing it should be so.

Againe, in the hundreth and .vij. treatise vpon Iohn, he sayth thus: Quos dedisti mihi custodiui, & nemo ex hijs pe­rijt, August. in Iohn. tract. 107 nisi filius perditionis, vt Scriptura impleatur. Filius perditio­nis dictus est proditor Christi, perditioni praedestinatus, secun­dum Scripturam, quae de illo in Psalmo Centesimo octauo maximè prophetatur. That is to say: I haue kept those that thou hast giuen vnto me, and none of them is perished, saue only the childe of perdition, that the Scripture might be fulfilled. He that betrayed Christ is called the childe of perdition, bicause he was predestinated to destructiō, ac­cording to the Scripture, which in the Psalme. 108. chief­lye is prophecied of him.

Assaine in his questions vpon Exodus, and the. 18. [Page 57] question. S. Austen sayth thus. Assiduè Deus dicit, Indu­rabo August. lib. 2 Quest. sup. Ex. Questione. 18. cor Pharaonis: & velut causam insert, cur hoc faciat, & im­plebo signa mea & portenta mea in Aegypto: tanquàm necessaria suerit obduratio Pharaonis, vt signa Dei multiplicarentur vel im­plerētur in Aegypto. Vtitur ergo Deus benè cordibus malis, ad id quod vult ostendere bonis, vel quod facturus est bonis. That is to say: God doth oftentimes say, I wil harden Pharaos heart: and he doth as it were bring in a cause why he would doe it, saying: And I will fulfill my signes and wonders in Egypt: as though the hardening of Pha­rao should be necessarie to the multiplying and fulfilling of Gods wonders in Egypt. God therfore, doth vse well those hearts that be euill, for the fulfilling of that thing that he is willing to showe to them that are good, or of that which he mindeth to do for them.

If Cerberus had had eyes to sée: he might as well haue séen these places of Austen, as that one place which he thinketh so sufficient for the declaration of the whole matter. And there is not one of these places, that is not of equall authoritie with that one place of his. Yea, and the first of these places is of greater authoritie, as may ap­peare to them that will reade the bookes of S. Austens Retractations.

In these places S. Austē saith, that Christ chose to be his disciples, such men as were born of poore parentage, not called to honour, and vnlearned: that he migh the and do in them, whatsoeuer they should be, or do. The actions therefore, that were done by them, were his acti­ons, and were in him exceeding good, although the same were in some of thē excéeding euill. This thing is made more plaine in the other places cited oute of S. Austen. First he sayth: Christ know him that should betraie him, and he chose him so much the rather, as one neces­sary for his businesse. And againe he sayth, speaking of [Page] Iudas, was not he also elected to some thing wherevnto he was necessarie? And againe. Except Christ would haue deliuered vp himselfe: no man could haue be­trayed him. What was there in Iudas but sinne? As who should say, the acte was Christes, but the sinne in the acte was Iudasses. Yea, he saith furder: That which thou doest, do quickly. Not bicause thou art able to do it: but bicause he that is able to do all things will haue it so done. And last of all he sayth of Iudas, that he was cal­led the child of perdition, bicause he was predestinated to destruction.

I suppose if Cerberus had séene and well weyghed these places of Austen: he would not haue triumphed so greatly in that one place of his. Neyther would he haue derided the iudgement of those that ascribing the acte vnto God, do iustly ascribe the sinne of the same acte vn­to sinfull man, from whose frée choyse consenting vnto euyll, the sinne of the acte doth spring, and not from God from whom nothing can come that is not excéeding good (as it commeth from him.) But let vs now sée how this hell hound playeth with his owne tayle.

But to returne againe vnto those, that contra­rie to the Scripture, and all auncient writers: doe teach, that God doeth not onely foresee, but also predestinate both good and euill, as well the mur­der of Caine, as the holinesse of Abell: and thereby make God plainly the Authour of sinne. Whē they perceyue the outragious blasphemie, to be ouer­much apparant and manifest: then doe they some­times closely rolle it vp in a riddle agayne. Which yet for the darke speach thereof, may serue at the [Page 58] least, to blind the eyes of some. As where (among ma­ny other wayes) they plainly make God the Author of sinne is, saying that God is not only the principal cause, but also the Authour of al things without ex­ception, both on the one side and on the other. If they be then vrged with the consequence, that God is the Authour of sinne: they will aunswere, that in all abhomination, God is the Authour of the fact, but not of the crime, as of the fact, deede or worke of adulterie, Sodometrie, murder and Idolatrie, God is the Author say they, but not of the fault or crime. This Enigma haue I heard some men vse, and it is al­so written in a booke, entitled, a briefe treatise of election and reprobation, lately set forth and prin­ted in the English tong, where he saith thus. Though we be compelled to say, that God is the Authour of the fact: yet we must answere, but not of the crime.

Areade, areade, what is that? God is the Author of the very fact & deede of adulterie, theft, murder, and treason: and yet he is not the Authour of sinne. And why? The subtilitie of the Riddle is this. That sinne is nothing. The theefe is not hanged for the deede that he hath cōmitted (for God is the Author therof) but he is hanged for the sinne, and that is for nothing. For whē they say, God is the Author of all things, then nothing is excepted. But sin is nothing, & therfore he is not the Author of sinne. The theefe is hanged for nothing. The murderer is put to death for nothing. The traitor loseth his head for nothing. The wicked are punished in euerlasting fire for no­thing. A maruellous sophistication. A straūge Para­dox, & cautelous riddle. But to be short, though ma­ny ways, this subtiltie might be answered: I wil take onely the definition of sinne, as I finde it written in [Page] the same booke, where he sayth verie truly.

The nature of sinne, is defined by the authoritie of Scripture, to be a thought, word or deede, con­trary to the wyll of God.

Now, bicause they say, that God is the Author of all euil deedes, though not of the crimes: let vs pase ouer the euill thought, and euill words, and speake onely of the deede it selfe, whych he hymselfe desi­neth to be sinne, and contrary to Gods wyll. If God then be Authour of the fact or deede, which deede is sinne, and cōtrarie to Gods wyll: how can he then say, that God is the Authour of the fact, but not of the fault, soyng he hymself setteth forth, not only a thought or a word, but also a deede to be sinne? And if God be the Authour of that same deede, whych deede is sinne: is it not a thing most plain, that God is the Authour of sinne?

Marke gentle Reader, I pray thée, how this Puppie playeth with his owne tayle. He imagineth that all, euē as many as do hold, that God doth not only foresée, but also predestinate al things both good and euill: do therin holde that God is the Authour of all sinne and abhomi­nable wickednesse. The contrarie whereof is in the for­mer part of this Apologie, sufficiently proued. But he hath heard, he sayth, yea and séene in an English booke, an Enigma, a maruellous sophistication, a straunge Pa­radox, and a cautelous Riddle, which is this. Though we be compelled to saye, that God is the Authour of the fact: yet we must aunswere, but not of the crime.

Areade, areade, what is that? sayth Cerberus. The Curre can not smell how the acte may be Gods, and the [Page 59] sinne that is in the acte: his that is the instrument in the working of the acte.

But the subtiltie of this Riddle, saith he, is this. That sinne is nothing. And then the theefe is hanged for nothing, the murderer is put to death for nothing, the traytour loseth his head for nothing, and the wicked are punished in euerlasting fire for nothing. But this is some thing. That Cerberus sayth that there is some thing wherof God is not the Authour. And so it follow­eth vpon his wordes, that eyther there is another being besides God, whereof those things that God is not the Authour of, haue their being: or else that those things haue theyr being of themselues, and are therein equall with God, whose greatest honour is, in that he is and hath his being of himselfe. But Cerberus must be borne withall, whatsoeuer be sayth. For if he be contraried: all hell shall ring of his bauling. We may not conclude vpō his wordes as he doeth vpon ours. But for this once I will be bolde to say, that if God be not the principall cause and Authour of al things wythout exception: then there be some things, whereof God is not the principall cause and Authour. And so must it needes follow, whe­ther Cerberus will or no, that the words in the begin­ning of S. Iohns Gospell are not true, Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, & sine ipso factū est nihil quod factum est. By him Iohannis. [...]. were all things made, and nothing that was made, was made without him. But we knowe this saying to be true. Wherefore we are bolde to conclude, contrarie to the iudgement of Cerberus: that God is not onely the principall cause, but also the Authour and maker of all things. And bicause Cerberus sayth that we holde a Pa­radox contrarie to al the auncient writers: let him read that which S. Austen writeth in the. 26. Chapter of hys August. lib. Retrac. cap. 26 first booke of Retractations. His wordes be these. Viri [...] [Page] Deus Autor mali nòn sic? vbi videndum est, nè maè intelligatur quod dixi. Mali Autor nòn est, quia omnium qua sunt, Autor est, quia in quantum sunt, in tantum bona sunt. Et nè hine pute­tur, nòn abillo esse poenam malorum, quae vti (que) malum est ijs qui puniuntur. Sed hoc ita dixi, quemadmedū dictum est. Deus mor­tem nòn fecit. Cum alibi scriptum sit. Mors & vita à Domino Deo est. Malorum ergo poena quae à Deo est, mala est quidem malis, Sapient. 1. Eccles. 11. sed in bonis Dei operibus est, quoniam iustum est vt mali puni­antur, & vti (que) bonum est, omne quòd iustū est. That is to say: Whether God be not the Authour of the thing that is e­uill? where men must take héede, that they do not miscō ­ster that which I haue sayd, that is: That God is not y^• Authour of that which is euill, for he is Authour of all those things that haue any being, for in asmuch as they be, they be good. Also men must take héede, that here­by they take not occasion to thinke, that the punishment of the wicked cōmeth not of God: which punishment, is also euill vnto them that be punished. But I spake this, euen as it is sayd, that God made not death. Whereas in another place it is written. Death and life are of the Lord God. The punishment therefore of the wicked, which commeth of God, is euill vnto them that be euil. But yet it is among the good workes of God. For it is right that the wicked be punished, and euery thing that is right, is good.

I suppose that when Cerberus hath reade and well weighed these wordes of S. Austen: he will not say that we hold a Paradox, vnlesse he minde to match S. Austē with vs. Which if he shall do, he shall shake his owne building verie sore. For it standeth well most altogether vpon S. Austens groūd, although without Sainct Au­stens consent.

But Cerberus will looke, that some thing should be sayd to the aunswere that he maketh to our subtile sophi­sticatiō. [Page 60] For he séemeth to himselfe to haue sayd so much that will we nill we, it must be cōfessed that God being the Authour of the thing that is euill, he is also the Au­thour of the euill and sinne that is in the thing.

Cerberus saw many wayes, whereby the subtiltie of our Riddle myght be aunswered: but he would vse on­ly the definition of sinne, whiche he found written in the same English booke that our Enigma is written in. Oh what a valiant champion is this, he will vse none of his owne weapons: he wil be able to wound vs, yea vtterly to beate vs downe and conquer vs with our owne wea­pons. Uerie trulie hath that English writer sayd (sayth Cerberus) that the nature of sinne, is defined by y^• autho­ritie of Scripture, to be a thought, word or déede contra­rie to the will of God. And bicause he will not séeme to take too much vauntage: he passeth ouer the thoughts & words, and taketh only the déedes done against the will of God. And with them he wil beate vs down flat to the ground.

The reason that he vseth, is this. If God be the Au­thour of that déede that is sinne and contrarie to the will of God, how can he say that God is the Authour of the fact and not of the fault? Here is a substantiall answere. Bicause Cerberus can not tel how it should be so: ther­fore it is not so, neyther may any man say it is so. And yet I haue proued it to be so, both by the example of Si­nacharibs death and other. As Cerberus may sée, if he will, in the former part of this Apologie.

And all thys their trauell is to proue, that the or­dinaunce and predestination of God, doth so carrie men euen headlong, vnto all actions, though they [Page] be neuer so mischieuous: that of necessity they must needes and can not choose but commit the same. As though Gods predestination were like a tempest of winde, so blowing in the sayles of a mans heart, that by it he is caried headlong to all things, whatsoeuer he doth, according to the saying of the Poet, Iam ma­gis at (que) magis, praeceps agit omnia Fatum. Nowe, more and more destinie hurleth al things headlong. But sure­ly, this Stoicall necessitie, maketh such a confusion of all things: that let them colour vp the matter, with as much cunning as they can, and qualifie it with as fayre wordes as may be: yet shall there neuer the state of a common wealth in England stand, if thys persuasion may once take roote amōg the peo­ple, beside that it is vtterly repugnant to the holie Scripture, and against all the auncient wryters, as shalbe hereafter briefly proued.

Nowe Cerberus is bolde to affirme, that all that we do, is nothing else but to proue, that Gods ordinance and predestination doth carrie headlong all men into all actions, be they neuer so mischieuous, as a tempest carri­eth all afore it. &c. Surely Cerberus is too bolde herein: and doeth much mistake the purpose of our trauaile. If he would, he might sée (except y^e smoke of Hell haue mar­red his sight) that our purpose i [...], to proue that God in wisdome doth knowe, foresée and order all things. And that nothing can be done by any creature otherwise than as by his instruments, which he doeth vse in wisedome, mercie, and iustice, and that so all actions are his, as the chiefe worker in all things. And that the same actions, as they are wrought by him, are excéeding good: although [Page 61] in the creatures that God vseth for his instruments, some of them be excéeding euill. But Cerberus sayth, we doe maintaine Stoicall Fatum or destinie. And that if thys persuasion may once take place in the people: there shall neuer state of a Commonwelth stand in England. Be­sides that, it is contrarie to the holie Scripture, and a­gainst all the auncient writers, as he will briefly proue. Well good Reader. Marke I praye thee, how Cerberus shall proue that he promiseth to proue: and how he shall be aunswered againe. And then doubt not but thou shalt sée how well that blind Curre standeth in his owne con­ceyte, and thinketh himselfe to haue a cleare sight.

And where they denie this doctrine of theirs to be the Stoicall opiniō, bicause the Stoikes (say they) fayned, that nature, wyth such order of cause as she hath tyed together, doth bring all things to passe by necessitie. But they affirme, that God by his e­ternall predestination, foreordinance, and proui­dence, bringeth all things to passe by like necessitie. Thus doe the best learned of them make the diffe­rence. But a playne dilusion it is, to blinde the eyes of men withall. For (as Priscianus sayth) Fatum, (which we call destinie) is deriued of the particple Fa­tus, whych is as much to say, as spoken. Bicause it is nothing else (saith he) but that which is spokē or ap­pointed of God. As if a mā should say, it must nedes be so, for God hath spoken the worde. Eusebius also citing the definitiō of Chrisippus, sayth, that Fatum is nothing else but a certain decree, ordināce or deter­mination of God. Which thyng (to make no more rehearsall of many mens sayings) Augustine plainely [Page] declared in his booke, De Ciuitate Dei. Lib. 5. Cap. 1. Thus sayth he is it proued, that they dyd call the will of the high God, Fatum. Gods wyll sayeth Austen, they called Fatum, or destinie. It is manifest therefore that the Stoikes did not imagine, that nature by an order of causes brought all things to passe by necessitie. But rather that God, foreordeining and appointing in order all causes in nature or otherwyse: brought all thyngs to passe by necessitie. Whych thyng to­gether wyth the order of causes, Tullie speaketh of plainly, saying: Fati necessitas. &c. The necessitie of de­stinie (sayth Tullie) is that, which of God is ordey­ned and appointed that it come to passe by an euer­lasting order of causes.

The Stoikes & we (as Cerberus sayth) do differ only in this. That they affirme al things to come to passe by y^e necessitie of destinie: & we, by y^e necessitio of Gods eternal predestination, foreordinance, & prouidence. And this is the difference that the best learned amongst vs do make. Who these best learned be, Cerberus doeth not tell vs. But this I am sure, that none amongst vs that is lear­ned, wyll say that there is none other difference betwene the Stoicall opinion and ours, thā that which Cerberus hath set downe. For the Stoikes helde, that the willes of men are not vnder the necessitie of their Fatum or desti­nie, bicause they could not sée how it should so be, and yet be frée also, as it may well appeare by that that S. Austē writeth in the .x. Chapter of his fift booke. De Ciuitate Dei. where his words are these. Vnde, nec illa necessitas formidan­daest, August. De Ciuit. Dei. lib. 5. Cap. 10. quam fermidando Stoici laborauerunt: causas rerum ita distinguere, vt quasdam subtraberent necessitati quasdam subde­rent: [Page 62] at (que) in his quaes esse sub necessitate noluerunt, posuerunt etiā nostras voluntates, nè videlicet nòn essent liberae, si subderentur necessitati. &c. That is to say. Wherefore, that necessitie is not to be feared, the feare whereof caused the Stoikes so to deuide the causes of things, that they pulled away some things from necessitie, and thrust some things vn­der it: and amongst those things that they would not suffer to be vnder necessitie, they haue placed our willes, lest they should not be frée, if they should be subiect to ne­cessity. &c. But we hold, that al things, our willes & alto­gether, are subiect to Gods prouidēce: Ergo, there is more difference betwéene the Stoikes and vs, than Cerberus sayth that there is. And it is no dilusion at all that we vse in y^t we refuse to cal it Fatum or destinie: although we know that Priscianꝰ & Tullie, Eusebius, Chrisippus & other, do in their sorts speake of Fatum, after such sort, that to the negligent Reader there may séeme smal difference betwene them and vs, in the matter of Gods eternal and euerlasting prouidence and predestination. For we fol­low herein S. Austen, whose sentence Cerberus would faine frame against vs. But I pray thée gentle Reader, marke well the wordes of S. Austen, euen in the same booke, out of which Cerberus citeth matter against vs. Yea and in the selfe same Chapter, which is the first of the fift booke: where the wordes that he fathereth vpon S. Austen, are not found. But these wordes are found there. Prorsus diuina prouidentia, regna constituuntur humana. Quaesi propterea quisquam fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei volunta­tem vel potestatem sati nomine appellat, sententiam teneat, linguā corrigat. Cur enim nòn hoc primum decit, quod postea dicturus est, cum ab illo quisquā quaesierit, quid dixerit Fatum? Nam id homines quando audiunt, vsitata loquendi consuetudine, nòn in­telligunt nisi vim positionis syderum, qualis est quandò quis nasci­tur, siue concipitur: quod aliqui alienant à Dei voluntate, ali­qui [Page] ex illa etiam hoc pendere confirmant. That is to saye. The Kingdomes of this worlde, are altogether ordeyned by the prouidence of God. Which if any man haue giuen vnto destinie, bicause he doeth call the will or power of God it selfe, by the name of destinie: let the same conti­nue in his opinion, but let him reforme his tong. For why doth he not at the first say that, which afterward he will say, when any man shal aske him what he doth call destinie? For when men do heare that thing: they do not by the common maner of speach vnderstande any other thing, than the force of the position of the starres, as the same is when any is borne or conceyued: which some men do seperate from the will of God, and some do proue that the one doth hang vpon the other.

In these wordes S. Austen doth plainly affirme, that euen Kingdomes of this world are appointed by Gods prouidence: and yet he denieth that the same should be said to be appointed by destinie. Wherefore in affirming the one, and denying the other, we doe but as S. Austen doeth.

How aptly Tullie is cited for the purpose of Cerbe­rus: shal plainly appeare in mine answere to that which here followeth.

The same order of causes also, is not forgotten of our mē, that in al points their doctrine might agree wyth the Stoicall doctrine. As in an English booke, translated out of French, lately set forth in print, & entitled, a briefe declaration of the table of prede­stination, where he sayth. Seyng God hath appoin­ted the end: it is necessarie also, that he should ap­point the causes which leade vnto the same ende. As [Page 63] if he should saye. Like as God hath appointed some man to be hanged: so hath he appointed him also to steale, as a cause leading vnto the same end whervn­to he hath appointed him. Or else, it was his desti­nie to be hanged: Ergo, it was his destinie to steale. Or thus (which is all one) he was appointed by Gods predestination to be hanged: Ergo, he was appointed by Gods predestinatiō to steale. For seyng God hath appoynted the ende (sayth he) it is necessarie also, that he should appoint the causes that leade vnto the same ende. As for ensaple. If thys be true, which they say, that God doth predestinate all things, or that God doth both appoint the end of all things, and also the causes which leade vnto the same end: then doth it follow & may truly be sayd, that Mar­ten Swarth wyth hys men, was appointed and pre­destinate of God to be slaine at the battel of Stoke. And furder, it foloweth, as God appoynted Marte & his fellowes to this end: so was sir Richard Symō the Priest, appointed & predestinate of God, to poure in the pestilent poyson of priuie conspiracie, & traite­rous mischiefe of vayne glorie into the heart of Lā ­bert his scholer, as a cause leading to the same ende. Item that the sayd Lambert, was appointed & pre­destinate of God, to consent and agree vnto the pe­stiferous persuasion of his master Sir Richard, in the pride of Lucifer, to aspire vnto the high type of ho­nor, in deposing (if it possible were) the ryght and most noble heire of England, and eleuating hymself lyke a trayterous villaine, into the royall throne of the same, and that thus he was appointed of God to doe, as another cause leading vnto the same ende which God ordeyned. Item, that the Irysh men were appointed of God to be Rebellious traytours [Page] against their Soueraigne Lord the King of England, and to maintayne the false and filthy quarrell of the said Lambert, as another cause leading to the same end. Item that the Ladie Margret sister vnto King Edward the fourth, was appoynted and predestina­ted of God, to be a traytouresse to Englande, and to employ all hir wyt, sorce and power, to the vtter de­struction of hir naturall countrie, as another cause leading vnto the same end. Item that the sayd Ladie Margret was appoynted of God to conduct and hire Marten Swarth and hys men, to inuade the Realme of England, as another cause leading to the same end. Item that the sayd Marten Swarth, the Earle of Lincolne, the Lord Louell, the Lorde Gerarde, and diuers other Captaines of the Rebels, were appoin­ted or predestinated of God, to be of such valiant courage, in maintayning the false quarrell of tray­terous Lambert, that they were slaine: on the other side, many a true English mans bloud, at the battell of Stoke, which was the ende of this wofull Trage­die, and by this, theyr manifest forme of doctrine, was altogether and euery part, appointed and ordei­ned of God, both the end and also the causes aboue rehearsed, and other innumerable, whych did leade vnto the same ende.

Here are many words and little matter. Great Items and small summes. A great deale of descant and no good plaine song. Seing God hath predestinated the ende: it is necessarie also that he should appoint the causes which leade vnto the same end, sayth an English booke entitled a declaration of the table of Predestination. And what [Page 64] hath Cerberus said here, to disproue this consequence? So far as I am able to iudge: we may graunt him all that he hath said: and yet affirme still, that if God haue appointed the ende: he hath also appointed the causes that leade to the same end. But I will vnderstand Cer­berus, as I suppose he meaneth: that is, that God doth neither appoint the end, nor causes that leade therevnto. If this be not his meaning: then hath he ment nothing, but to make simple men suppose that he is able to saye much. And sée, gentle Reader, how well he agréeth wyth S. Austen, whose authoritie he woulde faine vse, both in steade of a sword and buckler. In the eyght chapter of his fift booke. De Ciuitate Dei. S. Austen sayth thus. Qui verè nòn astrorum constitutionem, sicut est eum quid (que) concipitur, vel nascitur, vel incoatur, sed omnium connexionem seriem (que), causarū, qua fit, omne quod fit, Fati nomine appellant: nòn multum cum cis de verbi controuersia laborandum at (que) certandum est: quan­doquidem ipsum causarum ordinem, & quandam connexionem, Dei summi tribuunt voluntati & potestati. Qui optimè & vera­cissimè creditur, & cuncta scire antequam siant, & nihil inordi­natum relinquere: à quo sunt omnes potestates, quamuis ab illo nòn sint omniū voluntates. That is to say. As for those men, which do call by the name of destinie, not the constitutiō or order of the celestial signes, as y^• same is at the concep­tion, birth, or beginning of any thing, but the knitting together & order of all causes, whereby euerie thing that is done, is brought to passe: we néede not much to labour and contende with them about the controuersie of that word: bicause they do attribute to y^• wil & power of God, that order and certain knitting together of causes, which is verie well and truely thought to knowe all things be­fore they come to passe, and to leaue nothing vnordered: of whom al powers haue their being, although all mens willes doe not spring of him.

[Page] Here mayst thou sée (gentle Reader) howe Cerberus falleth out with him, whose authoritie he woulde séeme chiesly to leaue to. Austen sayth, that whatsoeuer is done commeth to passe by that knitting together and continu­all order of causes which the Stoikes call destinie. But Cerberus will haue al set at six and seauen, and that no­thing should come to passe by any such order. Austē sayth that it is verie well and truely thought, that God doeth knowe all things before they come to passe, and that he doth leaue nothing vnordered. But Cerberus will none of that. For then must Marten Swarth & his men, Syr Richard Simon Priest, and his scholler Lambert, the I­rish men, Lady Margret, the Earle of Lincolne, the Lorde Louell, with the rest that rebelled in King Ed­warde the fourthes time, be appoynted and ordeyned of God to doe as they did. But rather than it should be so, Cerberus wyll say with Cotta, that there is no God at all. For so doth S. Austen conclude vpō Ciceroes dispu­tation that he hath agaynst the Stoikes. His wordes be these. Quomodo igitur ordo causarum, qui praescienti certus est Deo, id efficit, vt nihil sit in nostra voluntate, cū in ipso causarum August. lib. 5 De Ciui. dei. 9 ordine, magnū habeant locum nostrae voluntates? Contendit ergo Cicero cum cis qui hūc causarum ordinem dicunt esse fatalem, vel potiùs ipsum fati nomine appellant, quodnos abhorremus: praeci­puè propter vocabulū, quod nòn in re vera consueuit intelligi. Quod vero negat ordinem omnium causarum esse certissimum, & Dei praescientiae notissimum: plus eum quam Stoici detestamur. Aut enim deum esse negat, quod quidem inducta alterius persona in li­brii de Deorum natura, facere molitus est: Aut si esse consitetur Deum, quē negat praescium futurorum, etiam sic dicit nihil aliud, quàm quod ille dixit insipiens in corde sur, non est Deus. Qui enim non est praescius omnium futurorum: non est vtique Deus. That is to say. How doth the order of causes then, which is cer­tayne to God that knoweth them before, bring to passe, [Page 65] that there should be nothing in our will: seing [...]wils to beare a great sway euen in the order of causes it selfe? Let Cicero therefore striue with them that say that this order of causes is fatall, or rather that do giue it y^• name of destinie, which thing we do abhorre: chiefly for the name, which is not accustomed to be vnderstanded in the thing it selse. But where as he doth denie that the or­der of all causes is most certaine and knowen to the pre­science of God: we do detest him more than the Stoikes did. For either he doth denie that there is a God, which thing in his bookes concerning the nature of the Gods, he doth vnder an other mans person endeuour to do: or else, if he do confesse that there is a God, whom he deni­eth to know of things before they come to passe: euen so saying, he doth none other thing than did that foolish mā which said in his heart, there is no God For he that doth not knowe afore hand all things that are to come, doubt­lesse the same is not God. If Cerberus had had so much leysure as to read ouer this ninth Chapter of S. Austens fift booke, out of the which he would faine finde matter against vs: no doubt he would not haue bragged so much of S. Austens authoritie. But by like he trusted some other mens notes gathered out of S. Austen, and neuer saw the bookes of S. Austen himselfe. I speake this in his fauor. But sée gentle Reader, how well Cicero serueth for the purpose that Cerberus doth alleage him for. And as thou findest him in this point, so trust him in the rest. Cicero doth not only reason against them that say there is a destinie called in Latine Fatum: but also a­gainst all that say there is a God that hath knowledge of things to come. And so consequently he affirmeth that there is no God at all. Spoyling God of his foreknow­ledge (as S. Austen sayth) rather than he would suffer August. lib. [...] De Ciuit. 9. man to be spoyled of his frée will. But y^• religious minde [Page] (sayeth S. Austen) doeth choose both, doeth confesse both, and with the faith of godlinesse doth cōfirme both. That is to say, the foreknowledge of God, and the libertie of mans will. So that whatsoeuer man doth, we say and beleue, that he doth it with the consent of his will.

Alas who seeth not the destruction of England to follow this doctrine? who seeth not the confusion of all common weales, to depend herevpon? What Prince may sit safely in the seat of his kingdome? What subiect may liue quietly possessing hys owne? What man shall be ruled by right of a lawe: if thys opinion may be perfectly placed in the heartes of the people? But to be short: thou seest here by ex­ample, the same which Tullie calleth Series causarum, the continuall order of causes appointed of God. And our men euen in like maner, call it the causes appointed of God, to leade vnto the same end which he hath ordeyned. Whereof followeth the force of cannot chuse, which is called Fati necessitas, Fatall ne­cessitie, or the necessitie of Gods ordinaunce: for as you haue heard, Fatum is nothing else but a decree or ordinance of God. Which necessitie is set forth of some men vnder the name of Gods predestination, & now oftentimes the same thing is set forth also by thys word prouidence. Which name of prouidence likewise the Heathen Stoikes vsed for the same pur­pose, as Cicero sayth. Pronoca anus fatidica Stoicorum, quam Latinè licet prouidentiā dicere. Pronoca in Greke, saith he, the olde wyse of the Stoikes that setteth forth theyr destinie, which in Latine was called Prouidētia, the prouidence of God. But let them cal it prouidence, pre­destination, [Page 66] preordinance, or what they will: this is (no doubt) the very Stoikes opiniō, that God hath so appoynted and preordeyned all thyngs, that of meere necessitie they come to passe. And whatso­euer men do, whether it be good or euill: they can not chose but do it. Which necessitie Seneca also ma­nifestly declareth in these wordes. Necessitates omnium rerum quas nulla vis rumpat: fatum existimo. The necessitie of all thinges, sayth he, which no force or violence can breake: that same I holde to be destinie.

Nowe Cerberus can no longer kéepe it in. He must néedes breake out in an exclamation against the doctrine of prouidence, predestination & preordinance. For (sayth he) it is none other thing than the very opinion of y^t Sto­ikes, call it what we will. Who séeth not the destruction of England? &c.

If God doe by his prouidence gouerne all things: If God haue predestinated or preordeyned all things, so that they shall come to passe in such time and order as God by his prouidence, predestination and preordinance hath ap­poynted that they shall: then must no man be so blinde as not to sée, that Englande must be destroyed. Then must all Commonweales come to confusion. Then shal no King sit safely in his kingdome, nor any subiect in his possession. Yea, no man shall be ruled by the right of a law: but if God do leaue the matter to mans discretion, to vse the matter as he shall sée cause, and doe but put to his helping hand when he séeth that man goeth about to bring things to good effect, but in any case determine vp­on nothing, tyll the same shall be by mans wysedome de­uised and enterprised: then shall England and all other [Page] Commonweales slourish styll, then shall all Princes safely sit in their Kinglie seates, then shall all subiectes quietly enioy their possessions, and euery man be ruled by the right of a lawe. Thus much followeth vpon the pityfull complaynt that Cerberus maketh vpon the doc­trine of Gods prouidence, his predestination, or preordi­nance: but I would gladly know, what Cerberus thin­keth to be the cause, that in King Edwarde the fourthes dayes, Marten Swarth, Syr Richard Simon, and the rest, made such a styrre in England. Was it for that they were persuaded in this doctrine that Cerberus seemeth to make the cause of all such doings? Surely I suppose there was not one of them that did once dreame of any prouidence of God. For those that take such matters in hand, are cōmonly as great enimies to Gods prouidēce, as is Cerberus himselfe. And shall Cerberus wordes make vs afrayde, to say that God in his prouidence had predestinated & preordinated all those things to be done? yea, & that it could not otherwise be, but that those things must then be done? Surely, I can sée no cause why we should feare so to say: Let Cerberus and his fellowes conclude what they wil. For I am sure S. Austen in the x. Chapter of his fift boke De Ciuitate Dei: will take our parte herein. His wordes are these. Si autem illa definitur esse necessitas, secundum quam dicimus, necesse esse vt sit aliquid August. lib. 5 10. Cap. de Ciuit Dei. velità fiat: nescio cùr eam timeamus, ne nobis libertatem auserat voluntatis. That is to say. If we call that thing necessity, whereby we say of anie thing that it must needes be, or that it must néedes be so done, then do not I see why we should feare, least that should take from vs the libertie of our will. When we say therefore that of necessitie Mar­ten Swarth and the rest, must make such a styrre as they did in King Edward the fourthes dayes: do we take frō them the libertie of their wil? No sayth S. Austen. For [Page 67] they did whatsoeuer they did, with the frée cōsent of their willes, and felt no constraynt at all: But Cerberus is not so satysfied, he wyll be inquisitiue to knowe what shoulde be the cause why God woulde in his prouidence predestinate these men to doe these things. I wil answer with S. Austen, I can not tell. God doth know a cause: but he hath not made Cerberus and me priuie to it. Oc­culta Epist. 59. ad Paulinum. causa esse potest, iniusta nòn potest. That is. The cause may be secrete: but it can not be vniust. Is there any ini­quitie with God? God forbyd. What Seneca thought of destinie, we passe not. But with S. Austen we saye. Omnia verò fato fieri nòn dicimus, imò nulla fieri fato dicimus: Aug. De Ci­uit. lib. 5. cap. 9 quoniam fati nomen vbi solet à loquentibus poni, id est, in consti­tutione syderum, qua quis (que) conceptus aut natus est: quoniam res ipsa inaniter asseritur, nihil valere monstramus. Ordinem autem causarum, vbi voluntas Dei plurimum potest, ne (que) negamus, ne (que) fati vocabulo nuncupamus, nisi fortè vt fatum à fando dictum in­telligamus, id est, a loquendo. Nòn enim abnuere possumus, esse scriptum in litteris sanctis: semel locutus est Deus, duo haec audi­ui: quoniam potestas est Dei: & tibi Domine misericordia: quia Psalm. 62. tu reddes vnicui (que) secundum opera eius, Quod enim dictum est, se­mel locutus est: intelligitur immobilitèr, hoc est, incommutabili­tèr est locutus, sicut nouit incōmutabilitèr omnia, quae futura sūt, & quae ipse facturus est. Hac ita (que) ratione possumus à fando fatū appellare, nisi hoc nomē iam in aliare soleret intelligi, quo corda ho­minū nolumus inclinari. That is to say. We say not that al things do come to passe by destinie: yea we say that no­thing is done by destinie. For we do plainely shew, that the name destinie is of no value, in the place where men vse to place it in speaking, that is in the constitution of the heauenlie signes, wherein euerie man is conceyued and borne, bicause the thing it selfe is vainely affirmed. As for the order of causes, wherein the will of God is of great force and power: we doe neither denie, nor call it [Page] by the name of destinie, except it be so as we may vnder­stand Fatum to be deriued of the word For faris, that is of speaking. For we can not denie but it is wrytten in the holie Scriptures: God spake once, these two sayings, I my selfe hearde it: that power belongeth vnto God, and vnto thée (O Lord) belongeth mercie: for thou wilt giue vnto euerie man according to his workes. And where as it is said, he spake once: we vnderstand that he spake vn­moueably, that is vnchaungeably, euen as he did vn­chaungeably know al things that are to come, and that he himselfe will do. After this sort therfore, we may say that Fatum or destinie, is deriued à fando, or speaking, if this name had not now bene accustomed to be vnderstā ­ded of another matter, wherevnto we are not willing that mens hearts should be enclined.

Now if Cerberus haue ought to say against this, let him make S. Austen one of vs. For we are in this point all one with him.

And as for that which the Heathen did attribute to the starres or planets, they meant none other, but that God ordeined the planets in nature to worke such things, as he before had decreed & appointed: Euen as we also iudge, that God vseth the operatiō of the planets in sending such rayne & tempest, faire weather or soule, as his pleasure is, let them say ther­fore what they cā or wil. This meere necessitie which our men do teach, is the verie same which the Sto­ikes did hold, which opinion bicause it destroied the state of a common wealth, it was banished out of Rome, as Augustine declareth. Lib. Quest. vet. & no. Test. Where he notably refelleth that opinion in these [Page 68] few words, saying. Qua ratione nati dicuntur. &c. By what reason (sayth Augustine) were they borne which ba­nished Mathematicos, the setters forth of destinie out of Rome, which law was kept, and they were but Heathen, howe were those things done by destinie which make agaynst destinie? But surely if there be a destinie, it doth nothing against it selfe, saith Aug. For so were destinie, no destinie, or at the least, desti­nie fighting agaynst it selfe: Or to speake the same in those wordes, which our men by abuse take out of the Scripture, to maintain the very same matter. If it be Gods predestination that men should write and speake agaynst hys predestination, as they saye some men do, then is Gods predestination a King­dome, not only deuided, but also fearcely fighting agaynst it selfe. O miserable absurditie which any child may perceyue must needes follow, if all things come to passe with absolute necessitie by Gods pre­destination as they teach. Thys same doctrine also that all euill springeth out of Gods ordinance, or that Gods predestination was the cause of Adams fall and of all wickednesse, is plainly maintained in an English boke lately set forth and entitled agaynst a priuie Papist. &c. where among many open and plaine sentences vpō this matter. I find an argument made in these words: Whatsoeuer was in Adam was in him by Gods wil & ordināce: sinne was in Adam, Frgo sinne. &c. was in him by Gods will & ordināce. The maior of which argument being vnderstand of A­dam after his fall, is manifestly false, & therefore the cōclusion also is false, for if it may be sayd of Adam after his fal (as by the minor you wel perceyue that he so doth vnderstand it) then may it also be sayd now of any man, that what execrable wickednesse so euer [Page] is in any mā, that same is in him by Gods wil & ordi­nāce. He goth about also to proue the same by ano­ther argumēt which he maketh speaking of the lying spirit, saying: God cōmaūded him to sinne, but God commaūded nothing which he ordeineth not, so he ordeined him to sinne. Which argument it was mar­uel that any man could be so blind as not to see how it might with more strength and force, and much more manifest truth be turned against him in this sort: speaking of Adam, yea and of all men saying, God commaunded Adam, and doth commaunde all men to absteine from sinne, but he commaundeth nothing which he ordeineth not. Ergo God ordeined Adam and all men to absteine from sinne. If God then ordeyned Adam and all men to absteine from sinne, than did he not ordeyne Adam or any man to commit sinne, so was not sinne in Adam, or in any man by Gods will and ordinance, nor Gods ordy­nance the cause of Adams fall, or of any mans sinne. And therefore their opinion is vtterly false: also if God in hys secret counsell do predestinate, appoint, and ordeine man to sinne, and yet gyue vnto him a straight law and commaundement not to sinne: is not then his secret wyll contrary to his open word? and hys eternal ordinance, repugnant to his written law: All theyr sayre wordes and sine framed fetches can not auoide it.

Let vs say what we can or wyll (sayth Cerberus) the méere necessitie that we teach shall be all one wyth that which the Stoikes helde, affirming their Fatum, or desti­nie. To this I haue sufficiētly answered before, shewing [Page 69] plainly by S. Austens words, that we teach none other doctrine herein, than did S. Austen in the same booke De Ciuitate Dei, out of which Cerberus citeth matter against vs.

But nowe Cerberus hath founde another authoritie of saint Austen agaynst vs, in his booke (as Cerberus sayth) which he wrate, and entitled: Questiones ex vtro (que) Testamento. In the question. 115. he sayth thus. Qua autem ratione nati dicentur, qui Mathematicos vrbe Roma prohibuerūt, quod ius seruatum non ignoratur? Et certè Pagani fuerunt. Quo­modo fato fiunt quae contra fatum sunt? Sed si est fatum, non fa­cit contra se. &c. That is to say. By what order shall it be sayd that those men were borne, which did forbydde the Mathematicks (that is to say) y^e tellers of mens fortunes, or destinies to come within the Citie of Rome. And it is wel knowen that that lawe was kept. And doubtlesse these men were Heathen men. Howe are those thinges done by destinie, which are against destinie? But if there be a destinie, it worketh agaynst it selfe. &c. sayth Austen. But stay there Master Cerberus: and proue that Austen was Authour of that booke. So may it be of some autho­ritie with vs. But Erasmus hath alreadie proued by sū ­drie good reasons, that S. Austen did neuer write it. As may appeare to as many as wyll reade his iudgement set forth before the beginning of this booke. Where wry­ting of this parte of that booke, out of which Cerberus hath cyted the wordes aboue wrytten, he sayth: Disputat contra Mathematicos, quo (que) altius ingreditur opus, hoc licen­tius ineptit. That is to say. He disputeth agaynst the Ma­thematicks, and the déeper he doth enter into the worke, the more outragiously doth he play the parte of a foole.

But Cerberus wyll not set a Louse by the iudgemēt of Erasmus. He wyll conclude vpon the wordes of hys Austen, that so destinie shoulde be no destinie, or at the [Page] least, destinie fighting against it selfe. Nay, he wyll not stay there, but as though destinie and Gods predestina­tion were all one thing: he wyll conclude, that it is also a Kingdome, not onely deuided, but also fiercely fighting agaynst it selfe. And then knitte vp the matter with hys maner of exclaming. O miserable absurditie. &c. Cerbe­rus his heart would haue brust, if he might not haue bo­rowed his fellowes bable to fetch one flourishe wythall. Euery childe may sée (sayth Cerberus) what absurditie must néedes follow. And euery wise man may sée (say I) that there can no absurditie followe vpon that necessitie that we teach. For it taketh away no fréedome that mans will hath, or euer had. Neyther doth Gods prede­stination sight against it selfe, bycause Cerberus wyth his fellowes, were predestinated before the worlde was in this time of the world, thus to go about to deface those that doe truely teach, that Gods prescience, prouidence, and predestination is infallible. For what wise man wil say, that the Potmaker is contrarie to himselfe, bycause he maketh of his clay some vessels to serue in honourable vses, and some other to vses cleane contrarie? Or who wil say that God is contrarie to hymself, bycause he hath made, and doeth daylie make some of his creatures to be deuourers and destroyers of the rest: or that nature doth fight against it self: bicause it doth bring forth both helth­some foode and poyson? Surely I thinke there is no man of that minde but Cerberus and his fellowes, and that Austen that Cerberus citeth for his purpose. But how worthy credit that Austen is: is afore sufficiētly declared.

But Cerberus hath found in an Englishe Booke en­titled against a priuie Papist, two Argumenes: one in these words. Whatsoeuer was in Adam, was in him by Gods wil & ordinance: sin was in Adam: Ergo, sinne. &c. The other speaking of the lying spirite, in these words. [Page 70] God commaunded him to sinne: but God commaundeth nothing which he ordeyneth not: so he ordeyned him to sinne. Cerberus mislyketh much with these two Argu­ments. The maior proposition in the first Argument is false, sayth Cerberus. Wherfore, the conclusion can not be true. But S. Austen in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium: sayth that the maior is true: Ergo it is lyke that Cerberus sayth not truely. Saint Austens wordes be these. Haec sunt magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius: & Enchirid. ad L [...]tur. cap. 100. tam sapientèr exquisita, vt cū angelica & humana creatura pec­casset .i. non quod ille, sed quod voluit ipsa secisset: etiā per ean­dem creaturae voluntatem, qua factum est quod Creator noluit, impleret ipse quod voluit, benè vtens & malis tanquam summè bonus, ad eorum damnationem, quos iustè praedestinauit ad poe­nam: & ad eorum salutem, quos benignè predestinauit ad gratiā. Quantum enim ad eos [...]tinet, quod Deus noluit fecerunt: quantū verò ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo id efficere valuerunt. Hoc quippe ipso quod contra voluntatem Dei fecerunt: de ipsis facta est voluntas eius. Propterea nam (que) magna opera Domini, exqui­sita in omnes voluntates eius, vt miro, & inestabili modo, non fiat praeter eius voluntatem, quod etiam sit contra eius voluntatē. Quia non fieret, si non sineret: nec vtiquè nolens sinit, sed volens. Nec si­neret bonus malè fieri: nisi omnipotens etiam de malis facere posset benè. That is to say. These are y^• great workes of God, sought out, according to all his wylles: and yet wysely sought out, so that when the nature both of Angels and man had sinned: that is, had done, not the thing that he wylled, but that it selfe wylled, euen by the same will of the creature, wherby that thing was done, that y^•. Crea­tor was not willing should be done, he fulfilled that which he would haue done, euen as he that is best of all, vsing well, euen those things that are euill, to the con­demnation of those whome he hath iustly predestinated to paine: and to the saluation of those whom he hath lo­uingly [Page] predestinated to frée mercy. As touching themsel­ues, they did y^• which God was not willing they should do: but as touching the almightie power of God, they were by no meanes able to bring that to passe. For euen in the verie same thing that they did contrarie to the wil of God: his will was wrought vpon them. For that cause therefore, the workes of the Lord are great, & sear­ched out according to all his willes. So that after a mar­uellous and vnspeakable maner, that thing that is done euen contrarie to his will: should not be done without his will. For if he would not suffer it, it should not be done: neyther doth he suffer it being vnwilling, but wil­ling. Neyther would he that is good, suffer a thing to be euill done: except the same being almightie, were also able to worke a good effect of those things that be euill.

Thou maist sée here, gentle Reader, how great cause Cerberus hath to mislike with this Argument. S. Au­sten sayth, that after a maruellous and vnspeakable ma­ner, that thing that is done contrarie to the will of God, is not without his will. And thou mayst be bolde, rather to consent vnto that which was written against a priuy Papist, hauing Austen also on thy part: than by Cerbe­rus his misliking to be persuaded that that writer hath taught an vntrueth.

Of the other Argument, Cerberus sayth, that it was maruell that any man coulde be so blinde, as not to sée how the same might with much more strength and force, and manifest truth be turned against himselfe that made it, in this sort. God commaunded Adam, and doth com­maund all men, to abstaine from sinne: But he com­maundeth nothing which he ordeineth not: Ergo God or­deyned Adam and all men to absteyne from sinne. But what hath Cerberus wonne by this: I graunt the Ar­gument to be good. But that the conclusion is against vs [Page 71] I denie. For we affirme that when man abstaineth frō sinne, the same is done by Gods will and ordinance, as whē he committeth sinne, the same is also by the wil and ordinance of God: as by the words of Austen afore writ­ten doth plainly appeare. As for Cerberus his argumēt, and the conclusion that he inferreth therevpon: I referre to the iudgement of all wise men that will weygh the a­fore written words of S. Austen. Who shall thereby ea­sily perceyue, that no such conclusion can follow vpon such premisses. But to his, Also if God in his secret coun­sell. &c. I must say some thing. Else will Cerberus say that Gods secret will and eternall ordinance, is contrary to his open word and written law.

When Ionas was sent to Niniue, the open word & cōmaundement of God was, that he should say vnto thē: Yet fortie dayes and Niniue shalbe destroyed. The effect doth declare, that his eternall purpose was not to destroy them, for they were not destroyed. Neyther was this cō ­maundement contrarie to his eternall purpose: but he did vse it as a meane whereby to bring his eternall pur­pose to passe, which was to shew mercie in forgiuing the sinnes of the Niniuites.

When Moses was sent to Pharao, the open word and commaundement was thus. Say vnto Pharao, let my people go, that they may offer sacrifite vnto me. But his eternall purpose was, that by the stubbornnesse of Pharao in refusing to do his commaundemēt, he might haue iust occasion to shew his power vpon him, in pou­ring out vpon him and his people, the manifold plagues that we reade of in the holie Histories, and that thereby his name might be made knowen in all partes of the earth. So that this cōmaundement was not contrarie to the eternal purpose, but did concurre & run together with it, to that ende, that in the eternal purpose was prefixed.

[Page] When Iesus Christ began to preach, the open word was, Repent and beleue the Gospell: but the eternall purpose was, that for his doctrine & miracles, he shoulde be hated of his countriemen and kinsemen (for the most part) and by them be deliuered to the Heathen to be cru­cified, and made a sacrifice for the sinnes of the world. So that this open word was not against the secret purpose of God: [...] as S. Paule doth terme it) it was to them that perished, the sauor of death vnto death, and to them that be saued, the sauor of life vnto life. For in the one sort it did worke beliefe, and by beliefe saluation: and in the other it did manifest and make open the vnbeliefe that was in their heartes before, and so make them vt­terly without excuse. As our Sauiour himselfe sayth: Now haue they nothing to pretend for excuse.

The Law and the Gospell are both written & prea­ched, and the open word is, do this, and thou shalt haue this: but the eternall purpose of God is, that those that haue cares to heare, should heare and obey, and so enioy the reward promysed: and that they which lacke such eares, should haue the iust condemnation of their owne consciences. These two therefore be not contrarie the one to the other, but doe concurre and runne together to one ende.

Much more might be said to this effect, without either faire words or finely framed fetches: and so the inconue­nience that Cerberus would conclude, clearely auoyded. But I will content my selfe with one saying of Austen, writing vpon the ninth Psalme. His wordes be these. Non in toto corde consitctur Deo, qui de prouidentia eius in aliquo dubitat. Sed quia iam cernit occulta sapicutiae Dei, quantum sit inuisibile premium cius, qui dicit, gaud [...] in tribulationibus, & quemadmodum omnes cruciatus, qui corporaliter inferuntur, aut vt exerceant conuersos ad Deum, aut vt conuertantur admo­neant, [Page 72] aut iustè damnationi vltimae praeparent obduratos: & sic omnia ad diuinae prouidētiae regimen referrantur, quae stulti qua­si casu & temere, & nulla diuina administratione fieri putant, ait. Narrabo omnia mirabilia tua. &c. That is to say. That man which doth doubt of the prouidence of God in anye thing: doth not shew himselfe thankful or praise God in all his heart. But bicause he doth now sée the secretes of the wisedome of God, how great the inuisible reward of him is which sayth, we reioyce in troubles: and how all afflictions which are brought vpon the body, eyther to exercyse those y^• be conuerted vnto God, or that they may admonish them to conuert, or that they may prepare to the last damnation, those that be iustly made hard hear­ted, and that so all those things might be referred vnto the gouernement of Gods prouidence, which foolish men do suppose to be wrought by chaunce, at aduenture, and by no diuine prouidence: he sayth. I will declare all thy wonderous workes. &c. We maye be bolde therefore (I thinke) to say, that this which Cerberus hath done, in writing this spitefull aunswere to his friendes Letter (if any such were) was gouerned by Gods prouidence. And yet we are not Genethliaci, or declarers of mens fortunes or destinies, such as were banished out of Rome: for we say not y^• it is Cerberus his fortune or destinie to be han­ged or drowned, or that he shal die a natural death before he shalbe as great a fauourer of Gods predestination, as he doth now shew himself to be a mortall foe therof. But we knowe, that if God haue predestinated any of these things, the same shall vndoubtedly come to passe, in such sort as he hath appointed. And yet shal not Cerberus his will be enforced. But if he hang himselfe, it shall be with the full consent of his will. And if he shalbe a fauourer of our side, it shalbe with the frée choyse of his owne will, gouerned by the prouidence of God. As there be some yet [Page] liuing, that can testifie, that once they were of the same minde that Cerberus is now, and that with consent of will. And now they be of one minde with me: and that with assent of will also.

We leaue Cerberus and his fellowes therefore to him that by his prouidence gouerneth al things. And yet do we our selues vse the meanes that God in prouidence hath appointed to be vsed, and we teach all other to do the same, committing the successe to him that knoweth what he hath determined to worke in all his creatures. And we conclude this matter with Austen, saying: Qua­propter, Aug. De Ci­uit. lib. 5. cap. 9 & voluntates nostrae tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit at (que) praesciuit: & ideo, quicquid valent certissimè valent: & quod facturae sunt ipsae, omninò facturae sunt: quia valeturas at (que) facturas ille praesciuit, cuius praescientia falli nòn po­test. Quapropter, si fati nomen, alicui rei adhibendum placeret: magis dicerē fatum esse infirmioris, potentioris voluntatem qui eū habet in potestate, quàm illo causarum ordine, quem nòn vsitato, sed suo more Stoici fatum appellant, arbitrium nostrae voluntatis auserri. That is to saye. Wherefore, this is the cause why our willes are able to doe, as much as God would & did know afore hand that they should do, and therefore, loke what they are able to do, that are they most certainly a­ble to do: and what so euer they shall do, they shall in déede do: bicause he whose prescience or foreknowledge cannot be deceiued, did know afore hand that they should do it. Wherefore if I could allow the name of destinie to be giuen to any thing: I would rather say that destinie were a thing belonging to the weaker, and will to the stronger which hath it in his power, than that the liberty of our will, should by that order of causes, which y^• Sto­ikes, not after the common custome, but after their own maner, do cal destinie. But Cerberus is not yet aunswe­red. We must yet solue him one other question. Which [Page 73] now he will propone.

Yet would I further aske them a question, seeing it is the decree, ordinance, and wyll of God expres­sed in his word, that man should not sin, how crepte they into that secret councel, where God ordeined, decreed, and willed the contrarie? that is to say, that man should sinne. But I heare their answere already published in print: standing in the third leafe & se­conde page, of the firste Blast in that traiterous trū ­pet, set forth agaynst the regiment of women, where Fol. 2. Pa. 2. briefly and couertly toucheth this close and priuie counsell of God in these wordes. The se­crete counsell of God excepted. But in Fol. 3. Pag. 2. he sayth. I am sure that God hath reuealed to some in this our age, that it is more than a Monster in na­ture, that a woman shall raigne and haue Empire aboue man.

This may be the Apocalips of some men in thys our age: but sure I am, it is not the reuelation of S. Iohn the Euangelist, nor of any other olde Apostle or Prophet. These new reuelations which are reuea­led vnto men of our age out of a secrete counsel, de­cree, and ordinance of God, contrarie to the open worde and commaundement of God, are meete for those which delight in the dānable dreames of some doting destinie, and may well be called inspirations of olde Arrians, reuelations of blinde Anabaptistes, or vnwritten verities of superstitious Papists, rather than the secrete counsel of God, reuealed vnto men of our age. But to conclude: That Angell or spirite, which contrarie to the manifest word of God, hath [Page] reuealed vnto men of our age, that a woman bring right inheritour to the Crowne of a Realme, ought not to be ruler thereof, that same spirit and Aungell of darknesse, hath reuealed vnto mē of our age, that Caine was predestinate to murther his brother Abel, and the most wicked traytours, murtherers, & thee­ues that lyue, are ordeyned of God, in his secrete counsell, contrary to his open worde, to be wicked, euen as they are, and to commit such murther, these and treason, euen as they doe. The same conclusion and newe reuelation, is also playnly set forth in the other late printed English boke before named, tran­slated out of French into English, where an on after the beginning, speaking of Gods wyll, he sayth: By the vertue wherof, al things are made, yea euē those thyngs whych are euill and execrable. Yet when he hath plainly affirmed that by the vertue of Gods wil euill and execrable things are made, least the horri­ble face of Sathan should be perceiued, in the bur­ning flame of those terrible wordes: The matter is afterward trimly couered with a cloke of vnsauerie subtiltie, for he declareth his mind to be, that those euil and execrable things, which are wrought by the vertue of Gods will, are not euill and execrable, in that they are wrought by his diuine counsell. As if he should say, though they be in deede euil and exe­crable things, which the counsell of God worketh, yet are they not in that respect or therfore euill, bi­cause God worketh thē. But for as much (sayeth he) as they proceede from the Prince of ayre. &c. Or to speak it in more vsual termes, bicause the diuel or wicked men do work it, which neuerthelesse, as they plainly hold and affirme, are the instrumētes of God appointed her vnto, & in doing the same, do nothing [Page 74] else but that which God hath ordeyned them to do, & so ordeyned that they can not chose but do it, euē as they do, which opinion Prosper, defending the sen­tence of Augustine, writeth vehemently against, in these wordes. Praedestinationem Dei siuè ad malum siuè ad bonum &c. That the Predestination of God (sayth he) d [...] worke in all men eyther vnto good or vnto e­uill it is most foolishly sayd, as though a certaine ne­cessitie should driue men vnto both, seyng in good things, the will is to be vnderstande not wythout grace, & in euill things, the will is to be vnderstand without grace. Respō. ad obiect. Gal. cap. 6. But that which Prosper, and Aug. do here most truly call a most folish saying. The same do these men call the most hygh & profoūd wisdom, for God say they, predestinateth al things, Ergo al things must come to passe of necessitie.

A man might maruell, what moued Cerberus to moue that question, the aunswere whervnto, he himself sayth is alredie published in print. But when I consider, what spirit it is that hath moued him in this sort to aun­swere his friendes letter: I leaue off that maruell. For I sée his purpose is, by this meane to entangle and trou­ble vs with by matter, neyther pertinent to the thing we haue in hande, nor tending to any good ende. What haue we to do with the matter of the Blast (which booke I neuer reade of) or with Reuelations or Apocalipses? We haue the question of Gods Prouidēce, Prescience & Predestination in hande. To dispute of those matters did neyther appertaine to Cerberus in hys aunswere, neyther doth it appertaine to me in this Apologie. I wyl therefore passe ouer both those questions: and shape him [Page] another maner of answere to his demaund than y^• which he imagineth that he hath séene set forth in print. His question is, how we crept into y^• secrete counsell, where God ordeyned, decréed and willed, that mā should sinne? He imagineth that this can not be aunswered otherwise than by an Apocalips or Reuelatiō. But Cerberus shall well vnderstande, that we can aunswere him by playne Scripture, & proue that it is not against Scripture, that God shoulde ordaine, decrée and will, that man shoulde sinne.

First, S. Paule writing to the Romanes sayth thus. Annō habet potestatem Figulus luti, ex eadē massa facere, aliud Rom. 9. quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? That is to saye. Hath not the Potmaker power ouer his Claye, out of one lumpe to make one vessell to honor, and another to dishonor? And in the same place he sayth thus. Nun­quid dicit sigmentum ei qui se sinxit, quid me fecisti sic? That is. Doth the earthen vessell say vnto him that made it: Why haste thou made me so? And the same S. Paule writing to Timothe sayth. In magna autem domo, non solum sunt vasa aurea & argentea, sed & lignea & fictilia: & quaedā 2. Timoth. 2. quidem in honorem, qu [...]dam autem in contumeliam. That is to say. In a great house, there be not onely vessels of Golde & of Siluer, but also of Timber and of Earth: some ser­uing to honor, and some to dishonor. These Alegories doth S. Paule vse, to shew that there is no iniquitie with God, though he do appoint his creatures at his good will and pleasure, some to honor, and some to dishonor. To the same purpose doth S. Paule cite the wordes that are written in the. 33. of Exodie. Miserebor, cuius misercor: & mi­sericordiam praestabo, cuius miserebor. That is. I will haue compassion vpon him, on whome I haue compassion: And I will shewe mercy, to whome I will shewe mercy. It lyeth not in the willer nor in y^• runner, saith S. Paul: [Page 75] but in God who taketh mercy. For the Scripture sayth vnto Pharao: Quia in hoc ipsum exitaui t [...], vt ostendum in t [...] potentiam meam, & vt annuntietur nomen meu [...] [...]n vniuersd terra. That is. For this cause haue I styrred thée vp, that I might shewe my power vpon thée, and that my name might be declared through the whole earth. And then S. Paule concludeth thus. Ergo, cuius vult mi [...], & quem vult indurat. That is. On whome it pleaseth him, he ta­keth mercy, & whome he lusteth, he maketh harde hear­ted. I knowe the common aunswere to this. Which is: God doth not hearden the hearts of any: but he doth suf­fer them to harden their owne hearts. But it [...] good for them that stande vpon this common aunswere, to cō ­sider what S. Austen writeth concerning Gods suffering of things to be done.

Nec dubitādum est Deum facere benè, etiam [...] fieri quae [...]ū [...] Enchirid. ad Laur. cap. 96. fiunt [...]: Non enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit. Et profecto bo­num est omne quod iustum est. Quamuis ergo ea qu [...] mala sunt▪ in quantum mala sunt, non sint bona: tamen, vt non solam bona, sed etiam sint & mala, bonum est. Num nisi esset hoc honum, vt essent & mala: nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotent [...] bono. [...] proculdubiò, quam facile est quod vult facere? tum facile est, quod non vult esse, non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus, periclitatun ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium, qua nos in Deum patrem omnipo­tentem, credere consitemur. Nequè enim venicitèr ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest, nec voluntate cuiuspiā creaturae, voluntatis omnipotentis, impeditur effectus. That is to saye. It is not to be doubted that God doth well, yea, when he suffreth to be done, whatsoeuer things are euill done. For he doth not suffer this, otherwise than by iust iudgement. And surely, all that is iust, is good. Although therfore those things that be euill, in as much as they be euill, be not good: yet is it good, y^• there should be things, not onely that are good, but also that are euill. For ex­cep [...]t [Page] were good, y^• there should be things that are euill: the almightie goodnesse would by no meanes suffer them to be. To whome, no doubt, it is as easie a thing not to suffer that thing to be which he would not should be: as it is to doe that which he is willing [...] to doe. Except wée beleue this▪ she very beginning of the confession of our sayth, wherein we confesse y^• we beleue in God y^• Father Almightie, is in daunger & like to be fosid vntrue. For he is not truely called Almightie for any other cause, but for that he is able to do what he will, & the effect of his wyll, being Almightie, is not by the wil of any creature letted.

By these wordes of Austen it is playne, that God, be­ing Almightie can not be sayd to suffer ought to be done, which he is not willing should be done. The hardening of hearts therfore, and that wickednesse that is wrought by the hard hearted, is not done without his wil. And al­though those things be euill, in asmuch as they are done by those euill persons, yet in as much as the same are done by the will of God, it is good that they be done. By thys it is plaine, that when God doth ordeyne, decrée, and will that man shoulde sinne: he doth not contrarie to Scripture, which doth witnesse, by the testimonie of S. Austen, that it is good that man should do euil, in such sense as S. Austen hath declared the same.

Moreouer, Salomon in his Prouerbes sayth thus. Prouerb. 16. Vniuersa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus: impiū quo (que) ad diem malum. That is: The Lord hath made all things for himself [...] the vngodlie man also against the euyl day.

Esay the Prophet sayth. Nunquid gloriabitur Securis cō ­tra Esay. 10. cum qui secat in ea? Aut exaltabitur Ser [...] contra eum, à quo trahitur Quomodo si elevetur Virga contra eleuantem se, & exe altetur baculus qui vti (que) lignum est. That is to say: Shall the Are boast it selfe against him that heweth with it? Or shal the Saw set by it selfe against him that draweth it? [Page 76] That were as much as if the Rod should be lifted vp a­gainst him that lifteth it, and as if the staffe that is but timber, should be aduaunted.

The vngodlie man, sayth Salomon, hath the Lorde made for himselfe, euen against the euill day: that is, a­gainst the day of vengeance, wherein the vngodly shall haue theyr iust reward at Gods hand. By this, not onely the vngodlie is iustly punished for his vngodlinesse, but the godlie is also occasioned to acknowledge, that it is mercie alone that doeth preserue him frō the like punish­ment. For he seeth in himselfe no cause why he should not suffer the same condemnation. Thus by the wicked, both the iustice and mercy of God are made manifest vn­to man. But the purpose of the vngodlie is nothing lesse than that Gods iustice and mercie should be set forth by him: therfore he is iustly punished for his wickednesse. And Esaie the Prophet, comparing Nabuchodonosor to an Axe, a Sawe, and a Rodde: doth plainly teach, that it was God that wrought all the plagues and destructions that were by that wicked instrument brought, not onely vpon the people of the Iewes, but vpon other Nations also. And that that bloudie and ambitious tyrant, was but as an Axe, Saw, or Rod in the Lords hād. And ther­fore when he began to boast of his owne power and po­licie, as though he had by his own wisdom and strength ouercome kingdomes, and set himselfe aboue them: the Lord (to let his people know that it was not Nabucho­donosors power that could haue done, or that should doe those things to them, which the Prophetes did tell them should come vpon, by the Kings of Babilon) doeth tell them by the mouth of the same Prophets, that the worke was his, and that the Kings of Babilon were but hys fooles or instrumentes to worke withall.

But this can not Cerberus abide: God must be but a [Page] looker on, and no [...] any of these things. For if God should be a worker, he must needes be the Authour of the sinne that is in the deede. For the old Curre hath his eyes so blinded with the filthie [...]dder of Hell fire: that he can not sée how God may be the Authour of the fact, and not of the sinne that is in it. But when he heareth that saying: he crieth [...] Areade, Areade, what is this? In Cerberus his iudgement, eyther Iob must be a liar, or else God must be a théefe. For when word came to Iob that the Sabeis had slaine his seruauntes, and driuen a­way his cattle: he sayd, the Lord hath taken thē away. But to take away Iobs cattle was felonie, Ergo, ey­ther God was a Felon, or Iob a liar, if Cerberus his o­pinion beleue.

But how God doth worke in the heartes of euill and wicked men, and vse them as his instruments, and yet is not partaker of their sinne: is sufficiently declared a­fore, out of S. Austen, De gratia & libero arbitrio.

Nowe Cerberus will looke that I shoulde say some thing to the words of Prosper. Otherwise he wil make reckning that he hath the victorie. For a little occasion maketh him to brag. The obiection that the Frenchmen made against the sentence of S. Austen, in the place that Cerberus speaketh of, is this. Quòd liberum arbitrium in homine nihil sit: sed siue ad bonum siue ad malum, praedestinatio [...] in hominibus [...]perctur. That is to say. That S. Austen should holde that frée will in man is nothing: but that Gods predestination doth worke in men, whether it be to good or to euill. The answere to this obiection is thus. Liberum arbitrium nihil esse, vel non esse, perperam dicitur: sed ante illuminationem fidei, in tenebris illud, & in vmbra mortis ac gere, nòn rectè nog [...]tur. Quoniam priusquam à dominatione Dia­boli per Dei gratiam liberetur & in illo profundo iacet in quod se sua libertate demersit. Amas ergo langores suos, & profanitate [Page 77] habet, quòd agrotare se nescit, donec prima haec medela conferati [...] aegroto, vt incipiat nosse quòd langueat, & possit opem medici desi­derare, qua surgat. Iustificatus ita (que) homo, idest, ex impio pius factus, nullo praecedente bono merito, accipit donum, quo medio, ad­quirat & meritum: vt quod in illo inchoatum est per gratiam Christi, etiam per industriam liberi augeatur arbitrij, nunquam remoto adiutorio Dei, sine quo, nec prosicere, nec permanere in bono quisquam potest. Praedestinationem autem Dei, siue ad bonum siue ad malum in hominibus operari, ineptissimè dicitur, vt ad vtrum (que) homines quaedam necessitas videatur impellere: cum in bonis, vo­luntas sit intelligenda degratia, in malis autem intelligenda sine gratia. That is. To say that frée will is nothing, or that there is no frée will at all, is euil sayd: but that the same doth wander in darknesse and in the shadow of death be­fore it is illumined by faith, is not well denied. For be­fore it is by the grace of God deliuered from the domina­tion of the Diuell: it lyeth in that déepe dongion, into which by it owne libertie it did cast it selfe. It doth ther­fore loue it owne sore sicknesses, and doth compt it helth, not to knowe that it is sicke, vntyll this first medicine be ministred to it being sicke, that it may begin to know that it is sick, and be able to desire the helpe of the Phisi­tion, whereby it may aryse. When man therefore is iu­stified, that is to say, made godlie of vngodlie, without any good deseruing going before, he receyueth a gift, by which meane he maye also get merit or deseruing: that that thing which is by the grace of Christ begonne in him, may also by the industrie of frée will be encreased, neuer without the helpe of God, without which no man can eyther go forward, or stay in that which is good. But it is most foolishly said, that the predestinatiō of God doth so worke in men, eyther to good or to euill, that a certain necessitie may séeme to force men forward vnto both: see­ing that in good, the will is to be vnderstanded to come [Page] of grace, & in euill, the will is to be vnderstanded with­out grace.

Now (gentle Reader) thou seest what it was that the French men obiected against: S. Austen. Thou séest also what Prosper doth answere in S. Austeus defence. Cō ­sider nowe what occasion Cerberus hath to conclude a­gainst vs as he doth.

The French men obiect, that S. Austen should hold that fréewill in man is nothing, but that Gods predesti­nation doth worke in men, whether it [...]to good or euyl. Prosper aunswereth, that it is an euil saying: to affirme that fréewill is nothing, or that there is no fréewill at al. And that it is most foolishly sayd, that the predestination of God doth so worke in the heartes of men, either to good or euill, that a certaine necessitie may séeme to force men forward vnto both. But we do neyther say that fréewill is nothing, or that there is none at all: neither that pre­destination doth so worke in men, that a certaine necessi­tie may seme to force them forward both to good and euil: No, we do not affirme that predestination doeth worke in men any thing at all. Ergo, Prosper hath written no­thing against vs.

And further, Crowley in the sayd booke of confu­tation before named, and the same article, vsing the very same terme of driuing, he sayeth that Gods predestination hath driuen them to it. And yet not therwith content, anone after he sayeth: We are cō ­pelled by the necessitie of Gods predestination, to do those things for the which we are damned, but to repeate the whole sentence. ‘To this must we answere (sayth he) in thys wyse. If God were an inferiour to [Page 78] anie superior power, to the which he ought to ren­der an accompt of his doings, or if anie of vs were not his creatures, but of another creation besides his workmanship, then might we charge him with ty­rannie, bicause he condemneth vs, and appoynted vs to be punished for the things we doe by compul­sion through the necessitie of his predestination.’

Marke here by the way, how al rulers be charged wyth tyrannie for punishing of male factors, first graūt thys proposition which he affirmeth: That al offenders, as murderers, theues and traytours, cōmit their offences by the compulsion of predestination. Secondly, this assumpted minor (which he also affir­meth) that it is tyranny for one whych is an inferior power, and not theyr creator, to punish them which do commit crimes by such compulsion. Then must it needes follow, that al rulers are tyrants which pu­nish malefactors, and are no creators, but inferior powers, bicause all malefactors could not chose but commit such wicked offēces, being driuen therevn­to by compulsion, through the necessitie of prede­stination.

Wo worth the sinful generatiō of our age, which hath bred and brought forth such a noisome nouel­tie, and straunge Paradox, to whom the handes of Gods mercie are stretched out all the day long: and yet they are euer defying him to the face, as the Pro­phete sayth. Esay. 65. Consider I desire thee, not the persons of them that speake, be they neuer so high, neuer so wise, neuer so many, but marke the opinion it selfe: euen in thy conscience, and in the sight of of God, whether any thing may be spoken more re­pugnant to the nature of God, more contrarie to the word of God, more defacing the iustice and mer­cie [Page] of God, than to say, that God punisheth man with the torments of Hel, in euerlasting fier, for do­ing those thyngs whych he himselfe hath predesti­nate, ordeyned, decreed, determined, appoynted, wylled and compelled hym to do: and that whych a man can not choose but must needes doe, by the force and compulsion of hys predestination.

All which thyngs in those playne termes, they most euidently teach in diuers partes of theyr wry­tings, but of all other this is most odious and horri­ble, where they affyrme that men sinne by compul­sion, through the necessitie of Gods predestination.

And the verie same sayth Knoxe in the. 317. side of his booke, before named, affirming likewyse in those playne termes: that the wycked are not one­ly left by Gods suffryng, but compelled to sinne by power, and he citeth it as the saying of Augustine a­gaynst Iulian. Lib. 3. Cap. 5. But very falsly (as I suppose) for I haue sought the same place in Augustine, and he hath neyther those words, neyther any such like, that import the same or any like matter.

Wherefore, till such time as they make better proufe: I must thinke that they haue forged a lye in Augustines name, supposing thereby to giue Au­thoritie to falshode. But to cōclude, whether it were the saying of Augustine, or not, you see it is plainly their opiniō, not only that men can not choose, but do what wickednesse or mischief soeuer they do, but also they are compelled wyth the power, force, or compulsion of Gods predestination, to commit all those euils and wicked crymes, for the whych they are executed wyth the temporall sworde, or damned with euerlasting torment.

It doth here manifestly appeare, that Cerberus hys chiefe quarrell is against Crowley. For though there be other that haue written as plaine, and as open mat­ter for the necessitie of Predestination as I haue, and to say the truth more plaine too: yet doth Cerberus lay the matter to no man charge so often & so openly as he doth to mine. For this is nowe the fift tyme y^• he hath made playne mention of mée in this his short aunswere to hys friendes Letter. No maruell therefore, though the ma­lice of his minde, doe sometimes cause him to misconster my wordes and writings, as in this place he doeth, pla­cing my wordes so in this his aunswere, that they séeme to haue a manifest meaning farre differing from that which they haue in y^• place where I wrate them in mine aunswere to Shaxton. First he sayth, y^• vsing the terme of driuing, I haue sayde, that Gods Predestination hath driuen them to it. Now (Gentle Reader) I must make thée iudge of the meaning of these wordes, in the place where they stande written by mée.

After I had declared, that the Administration of the common weale by publike Ministers, lawes and ordi­nances, coulde not be other than profitable, and alwayes redounding to the glorie of God, notwithstanding that the hauing of such ministers and ministratiōs, is a thing that commeth to passe of necessitie and can not but be: I laboured to make the matter more plaine by certain que­stiōs, wherof this is one. How could it haue bene, that so great and rude multitudes of barbarous nations, should haue submitted themselues, to be vnder lawes & rulers: had not Gods Predestination driuen them to it?

Here be the words in that order y^• I first wrate them. [Page] Nowe iudge (gentle Reader) whether Cerberus meant simply, when he cited them thus: He sayth, that Gods Predestination hath driuen thē to it. Adding such words immediately after, that it might séeme that I had spoken these wordes in no such meaning: but rather, that my whole meaning had bene, to affirme y^e God doth by his Predestination, forcibly driue men to do the things that they are damned for. For he saith, that I say: We are cō ­pelled by the necessitie of Goddes Predestination, to doe those things, for which we are damned. And then to set a shew of indifferēce vpon his doing, as though he meant nothing lesse than to applie my wordes otherwise than my meaning was, he sayth, that he will repeate y^e whole sentence, in this maner. To this must we aunswere. &c. As though the aunswere that I make, were but an aun­swere to mine own words, which I haue before affirmed.

But y^e thou mayst sée (gentle Reader) what wordes they he that I doe there make aunswere vnto: I will set them downe here in writing, as they stande in my booke against Shaxton. They are these.

‘Well, here followeth yet another inconuenience, and that is this. If all things be done of necessitie: Why should any man be blamed for missedoing? Why should any man be damned, sithens all they do is but the ordi­naunce of God, and that more is, they can not auoide the necessitie, wherby they are constrayned to do al that they do. Wherfore if they should endeuour to refrain the euil y^t they do, it were but al in vaine, for they are predestina­ted eyther to do it, or else to leaue it vndone. Iustly ther­fore can they not be condemned, bicause the euill they do, is not of themselues, but of the ordinance of God.’

And then follow the wordes that Cerberus hath cy­ted. But when he commeth to those wordes that myght some thing shewe my meaning to be otherwyse than he [Page 80] would haue it séeme to be: he stayeth. I will therefore set downe those wordes which doe immediately followe, which are these. But forasmuch as he is subiect to no su­periour power, and we be all his treatures: so that to what ende soeuer he haue framed vs, we are his instru­ments to doe the work that he hath appointed to be done: why shoulde we stande vp and reason with him to know his purpose in creating vs, or why he made vs to this or that fashion? to this or that vse? to be precious or vils? For this one thing we may be sure of, that God hath by his eternall wisedome, created nothing, nor appointed nothing to be done, but the same shall redounde to hys glory in the ende: séeme it neuer so contrarie in y^e meane time. Let vs hearken to the words of S. Paule to y^e Ro­manes Rom. 9. in this matter. What if God (sayth he) willing to shew. &c.

Here thou mayest sée (gentle Reader) what malice may doe. I sayde that so many barbarous and rude na­tions woulde neuer haue submitted themselues to liue vnder lawes, if Goddes Predestination had not driuen them to it: meaning that God in hys wysedome & euer­lasting prouidence, had appointed that all multitudes of peoples should be gouerned by lawes and orders, and to bring thē thereunto, he vsed such meanes, that they were driuen to choose rather to liue vnder lawes, and so to con­tinue and flourish, than to liue without lawes, and so de­cay and come to naught. But Cerberus doth maliciously conster my wordes, as though my meaning were, driuen to be vnder lawes, as shepe are driuen from the pasture to the folde. But I spake of men, and not of brute beasts. We vse to say that men are driuen, some by feare, some by frendship, some by affection, some by infirmitie, and some by pouertie and néede: and yet in all these cases, we meane not that man hath not a will which consen­teth [Page] to the thing that he doeth: but that the will of man is by these meanes induced to choose that which it consen­teth vnto, and to leaue the other which it refuseth to do. Againe, in answering the inconuenience that Cerberus & such as he is, do say wil ensue vpon the doctrine of y^e ne­cessitie of Gods predestination: I sayd: If God were an inserious to any superiour power, or if we were of ano­ther creation, and not of his making: then might we charge him with tyrannie, bicause he condemneth vs, and appointeth vs to be punished for the things we do by compulsion. Not meaning (as Cerberus doth malicious­ly affirme that I do meane) that man is cōpelled by force without the consent of his will, to do those actions which God doth condemne him for, and appoint him to be pu­nished for: For that were to denie God to be God, and man to be man. For God is not God, vnlesse he be both iust and mercifull. But there shoulde appeare in him neyther mercie nor iustice, if he should vse such compul­sion, as Cerberus would haue me seeme to teach. And if man should be so spoyled of the libertie of his will, that he shoulde be compelled to do actions without all con­sent of will: then were man spoyled of his principall part, which is his reasonable soule, without which he is not, neyther can be thought to be man.

I am not so beastly therefore, as to speake of such a compulsion. But I speake of the same that Knoxe spake of in the place that Cerberus citeth, I now, for I dare not assirm vpon his word, neither haue I séene the booke my selfe. But the matter that Cerberus sayeth Knoxe hath cited out of S. Austen. I haue séene in S. Austē, not in the. 3. booke and, 5. chapter against Iulian: but in the. 5. booke and. 3. chapter against the same. Bylike Cerberus had little leysure and lesse lust to reade S. Austēs words. & therefore not finding them at the first chop, he thought [Page 81] it should be enough for hym to say, that he must thinke that we haue forged a lie in S. Austens name. But to put thée out of doubt, gentle Reader, that Cerberus hys thought is a lying thought: I wil set downe S. Austens wordes in writing, and request thée to reade the rest of that Chapter, wherein I haue founde them writtē. And then I doubt not but thou wilt consent to that compulsi­on that I haue spoken of.

The wordes of S. Austen are these. Quid est autem August. lib. 5 Cap. 3. contr. Iulian. quod dicis, cum desiderijs suis traditi dicuntur, relictiper patien­tiam intelligēdi sunt, nòn per potentiam in peccata compulsi: qua­si nòn simul posuerit haec duo idem Apostolus, & patientiam & potentiam, vbi ait. Sic autem volens Deus ostendere iram, & de­monstrare Rom. 9. potentiam suam, attulit in multa patientia vasairae, quae perfecta sunt in perditionem. Quid horum tamen dicis esse quod scriptum est? Et Propheta si errauerit, & locutus fuerit, e­go Ezechi. 14. Dominus seduxi Prophetam illum, & extendam manum meam super eum, & exterminabo eum in medio populi mei Israel: Pati­entia est, an potentia? Quodlibet eligas, vel vtrum (que) fatearis: vio des tamen falsa Prophetantis peccatum esse, poenam (que) peccati. An & hic dicturus es quod ait. Ego Dominus seduxi Prophetam illū, intelligendum esse, deserui: vt pro eius meritis seductus erraret? Age vt vis. Tamèn eo modo punitus est propeccato, vt falsum pro­phetando peccaret. That is to say: What is the meaning of thy wordes, when thou sayest, that those men that are said to be giuen ouer to their owne lustes, must be vn­derstande to be left by patience or sufferance, and not cō ­pelled or thrust into sinne by power: as though that same Apostle did not set downe both these two, both suf­ferance and power, when he sayeth. And so God being willing to shew forth his wrath, and to set forth his po­wer, hath in much patience brought hyther the vessels of wrath, which were made méete for destruction. And yet, whether of these things doest thou say that that is which [Page] is written? And if a Prophet do erre and speake lies: I the Lord haue seduced that Prophet, and I will strotch out mine hand vpon him, and I wil vtterly roote him out from amongst my people of Israell. Is this sufferance, or power? Which soeuer thou doest choose: or if thou graūt both: yet doest thou sée, that the false prophecie is sinne, and the punishment of sinne also. Wilt thou here also say, that where he sayth, I the Lord haue seduced that Prophet: it must be vnderstand, I haue left him, that being seduced according to his owne deseruings, he he might erre? do as thou wilt. Yet is he in this sort pu­nished for his sinne: that by prophecying a lie he might sinne.

Nowe, I trow, Cerberus will not say, that Knoxe hath forged a lye in S. Austens name, supposing thereby to giue authoritie to falsehod. And if Cerberus woulde take the paines to reade the whole Chapter wherin these words of Austen are written: I doubt not but he should vnderstand how God may by power cōpel men to sinne, and yet punish them iustly for their sinne, which they cō ­mit by such compulsiō. For they are not compelled with­out the consent, yea the frée consent, of their owne will.

But least Cerberus should thinke, that not being a­ble to aunswere that which he concludeth vpon my wor­des, I haue slily slipped it ouer: I must say some thing to that wherewith he chargeth me. That is, the charging of all Magistrates with tyrannie, for that they, not being Creators, do punysh men for those offences that they cō ­mit by compulsion. He frameth an Argumēt against me, the maior proposition whereof is not affirmed by me (as Cerberus sayth it is) for I haue not in any place writtē, that theues, murderers. &c. doe commit theyr offences by the compulsion of predestination: but by compulsion, thorow the necessitie of predestination, meaning that cō ­pulsion [Page 82] and necessitie that S. Austen speaketh of in the places that I haue before cited out of his workes, which is not without the frée consent of the will.

The minor (which is, that it is tyrannie for one that is an inferior power, and not their Creator, to punish them that do commit crymes by such compulsion) I do not in any part of my writings affirme. Wherefore Cerberus doth me open wrong, to conclude that I charge al rulers with tyrannie.

The rulers are commaunded of God (who is theyr Rom. [...]3. ruler, and to whom they shal render an accompt of their doings) that they shall punishe the breakers of Gods cō ­maundements, and to that ende hath God giuen them a sword. Woe vnto them therefore, if they do not punysh such, and defend the innocent. And when they do punish the offenders, and defend the innocent: then do they their dutie. So far of do I thinke them to be from the fault of tyrannie.

But Cerberus woulde fayne haue the Rulers an­grie with vs, and especially with Crowley. And there­fore he laboureth to make thē beleue that Crowley saith that which he neuer thought. The words that Cerberus hath cited out of my booke against Shaxton, when they be indifferently weyghed, shall be found none other in effect, than are those wordes that Esaie wrate in the. 45. Chapter of his Prophecies, where he sayeth thus: Vae Esai. 45. contendenti cum sictore suo. Testa cum testis terrae contendat. An dicet lutum sictori suo, quid facis? & opus tuum manibus destituitur. That is to say. Wo be to him that doth con­tende with his maker. Let the earthen vessell contende with the earthen vesselles. Shall the claye saye vnto him that made it: what duest thou make? and thy worke is not made with handes?

What other thing can Esaie meane by these words: [Page] but that as it is a thing farre vnséemely for a piece of clay to stand vp and reason with him that tempereth it with his fingers, and to say vnto him, why doest thou fashion me after this sort: so is it vnséemely that man should reason with God, concerning his purpose in ma­king him after this fashion or that, or to this vse or that vse? But if man wil reason this matter: let him reason it with him y^• is a man as he is: so were there some rea­son in his doings. For although one man haue by Gods ordinance, authoritie ouer other men: yet may not that man do with the rest what he lusteth, as God maye doe with his creatures.

Wherfore, I conclude, that Cerberus his exclamati­on, with woe worth the sinfull generation of our age. &c. is not worth the weighing, neyther would Cerberus if he had séene thus much before, haue thought it worth the writing as I suppose.

Against which errour crieth out the word of God in a multitude of places: manifestly prouing, that through the grace & helpe of God, mē may choose, and are neyther driuen by absolute necessitie, nor compelled by Gods Predestination, to commit mur­der, theft, treason or any such flagitious offence, nor any maner of sinne or euill, whatsoeuer it be. As for example: Moyses sayth: Therefore choose life. Deut. 30. And Iosua sayeth, choose whome you will serue. And after when the people promised to serue the Lord only, he sayth vnto them, you are witnesses vnto your selues, that ye haue chosen the Lord to serue him. Iosua. 24. But afterward when the people forsoke the Lord agayne, and chose other Gods: the [Page 83] Lord sayth vnto them. Goe, crie vnto the Gods which ye haue chosen. Iud. 10. Christ sayeth, Marie hath chosen hir that good part, which shall not be taken from hir. Luc. 10. Dauid sayth: I haue chosen the way of truth: and againe in the same Psalme: I haue chosen thy commaundements: Psalm. 119. But the Lord saith by his Prophet Esay: They did wic­kednesse before mine eyes, and chose the thyng that pleased me not. Esay. 65. and in the next chapter he sayth. Et elegerunt quae ego nolui. And they haue chosen those things whych I would not. Esay. 66.

Thus it is playne, that as choose, and can not choose agree together, so doth their opinion agree wyth the Scripture, for such direct contrarietie is betwene choise and meere necessitie, betwene violēt compulsion and christian libertie, that blacke and white, may wyth more possibilitie, be coupled in a subiect.

But it is maruell to see, how scrupulous some mē are in these wordes of choyse. I doubt whether they dare read these & many such like places of scripture, which so plainly speake of choyse: But perhap they alway skip ouer that word, or reade some other in steade therof, as the Iewes do Adonai in steade of Ieho­uah, for surely manie are so afrayde of freewill, that they fall as the Prouerbe sayth, out of the lime Kell into the cole pit, from high presumption into depe desperation, fiercelie following that olde spirite of wicked Pelagi, as before it is touched in the .ix. of his diuelish errors, where he affirmeth, that if a mā haue neede of Gods helpe, then hath he no freedome or choyse at all: Thus do they breake theyr shippe vp­on the perillous rocke, seeking to escape the daun­gerous Hurlepole. For an horrible presumption it [Page] was of Pelagius, to thinke that a man by nature, had such power to choose good, and refuse euill, that he needed not the grace and helpe of God: and a despe­rate opinion is this of other, to say that the predesti­nation of God worketh all things in man, whether it be good or euill, and that a man can not choose, but do whatsoeuer he doth. For no doubt, thys o­pinion maketh a verie disordered Chaos, and an vtter cōfusion of al thyngs, as it were mixing & thrusting together, both heauen, earth and hell. Making one confused lumpe, of God, the Diuell and the world. Of sinne, grace, and nature, turning all doings into dreames, all trueth into traunces, all veritie into sa­bles, all prayer and meditation into vaine imagina­tion.

For if Gods predestination be the onlie cause of Adams fall and filthie sinne, and consequently the onely cause and worker of all euill, yea euen wyth compulsion & sorce, as they shamefully and plain­ly affirme, then will no man denie, that on the other side: Gods predestination worketh as violently in all thyngs that are good.

So then if Gods predestination work all, without all exception, both in euill and good, then all other things, whatsoeuer they be, although they appeare to worke, and doe some thing, yet doe they in dede vtterly nothyng. So that the Diuell doth nothyng, man doth nothing, lawes do nothing, doctrine doth nothing, prayer doth nothyng: but Gods predesti­nation doth altogether, & is the efficient cause, yea and, the only cause of all thyngs.

Agaynst thys opinion, the worde of God is exce­ding playne and manifest, not only in the places be­fore rehearsed, but also in these folowing, here brief­ly [Page 84] noted, yea and abundantly throughout the whole Scripture. Gene. 4. a. Reg. 24. b. 1. Para. 21. b. Pro. 3. d. Eccle. 15. c. 4. Esd. 7. b. d. &. g. e. &. 9. a. Luk. 10. d. &. f. Ioā 1. b. Act. 5. a. 1. Cor. 7. g. &. 9. a. &. 10. c. &. 14 f. 2. Cor. 13. c. Phil. 4. c. Heb. 11. Against this euill opi­nion, also doe all the auncient Doctors wyth one cō ­sent vehemently write, as they by themselues cannot denie, except only Augustine, whych bicause of his exceeding obscuritie and darkenesse in diuers places, he is often alleaged of both partes.

Also against this opinion, writeth earnestly Phi­lip Melancthon the chiefest and best learned of all the Germaines: In like maner doth Bullenger, the chiefest and most excellent of all the Switcers. The same doth also Erasmus Cercerius, and manie other of the best learned Protestantes, whose sayings were profitable here to rehearse, but that theyr iudgemēt in thys matter is well knowen to all the learned, and my determination is at this present, rather briefly and simplie, to declare what part of doctrine I and many other mislike, than wyth long discourse and manie authorities to disproue the same.

In a multitude of places (sayth Cerberus) the worde of God cryeth oute against the doctrine of the necessitie of Gods Predestination: manifestly prouing that, through the grace and helpe of God, men may choose, and are ney­ther driuen by absolute necessitie, nor compelled by Gods Predestination, to commit murder, thefte. &c. As for ex­ample, Moyses sayth. Deut. 30. Choose lyfe. &c. Haue I sayde that man is driuen by absolute necessitie? Or that he is compelled by the compulsion of Gods Predestinatiō [Page] to commit murder, theft. &c? I am sure Cerberus is not able to shewe it, in any of my writings. And I think he hath not séene it in anye of the writings of them that he writeth against.

But this is his maner, when we speake of such a kind of necessitie as followeth vpon the prescience of GOD, which can not be deceiued: then will he make y^• worlde beleue, that we affirme an absolute necessitie, wherein the will wresteling and striuing to the contrarie, is en­forced to giue place, and violently driuen to doe that it woulde not: And when we speake of that compulsion, that God vseth in deliuering the wicked and obstinate sinners into a reprobate sense, to commit things that are vnséemely: that by sinning, their former sinne might be punished: then Cerberus woulde haue men to beleue y^• we meane of a violent compulsion, which man striueth against, but is not able to resist the force & violence of it.

Wel, I doubt not but the indifferent Readers of this Apologie, will haue a better opinion of vs than so. For it doth plainely appeare by the words hereof, that we teach no such necessitie, violent driuing, nor compulsion.

But we saye, with the Scripture, and auncient and all sounde Fathers: that Gods prescience, prouidence, & Predestination, can not be disapointed, but muste néedes come to passe, as he hath foreseene, and in prouidence pre­destinated that it shoulde: and yet not without the con­sent of the wyll, in those whome God did knowe before woulde consent, and in foreknowledge did appoint to consent, and to choose the things which he knewe before that they woulde choose.

The Scriptures therfore, that Cerberus citeth out of Moises, Iosua, Iudges, Dauid and Esaie: are nothing against vs, for we confesse as much as is taught by them. We confesse also, that man may by the grace and helpe [Page 85] of God choose to refuse murder, theft, &c. What is it then that Cerberus hath sayde against vs? He woulde faine haue men think that we teach, that God is not able with his grace and helpe to make men able to refuse y^• which is euill, and to choose to do that which is good. As though we should think no better of our God, than the heathen Poets did of their Iupiter. Whome they bring in, la­menting that he was by the destinies letted so, that he coulde not doe that good for his deare children, y^• he would gladly haue done for them. But we knowe, that our God is able to doe what he will doe, and that he is pre­sent in all places, and doth in all places al that he is wil­ling to doe. Yea, we doe confesse with S. Paule, that by Phil. 4. his helpe that doth comfort & strengthen vs, we are able to doe all things. So farre are we from thinking, that man is not, or may not be able by Gods helpe to refuse to commit murder. &c.

But Cerberus sayth it is playne, that as choose and can not choose doe agrée togither: so doth our opinion a­grée with the Scripture. And then he setteth méere ne­cessitie and violent compulsion, against Christian liber­tie. That doctrine may be his owne. We refuse it as none of ours. But if Cerberus would come to talke: a man might aske him in what pointes the Christian li­bertie doth consist. Whether he meane that it consisteth in an absolute power to do what we will, bicause he ma­keth mere necessitie and violent compulsion, the contra­ries to it. If he meane so, then doth he not meane as S. Galat. 5. Paule doth meane in his Epistle to y^• Galathiās, where he exhorteth them to stande in that libertie wherewith Christ hath made vs free: As may well appeare to as many as will reade the Text. Well, I will leaue thys matter, tyll I may knowe Cerberus and talke with him mouth to mouth.

[Page] As for those that be so scrupulous in the wordes of choyse, let them (if there be any such) aunswere for them­selues. For my parte, I can be well contented to reade them and heare them too: but to apply them as Cerberus doth, I think no man can be to scrupulous, that will not agrée with Cotta, who woulde rather that God shoulde not know of things before they came to passe, than that man should not haue frée choyse to doe what he will. And yet do I not follow the spirit of Pelagius: as I haue she­wed before vpon that ninth Article that Cerberus spea­keth of: neyther haue I, in séeking to escape the daunge­rous Hurlepoole, dashed my shippe against the perillous Rocke, as Cerberus woulde haue men to thinke that I and such other haue.

But if Gods predestination be the cause. &c. Then, saith Cerberus. &c. This (if) is alreadie aunswered. I wil not therfore trouble the Reader with it any more.

But if Gods predestination worke all: then the Di­uell, man, lawes, doctrine, and prayer, do nothing. Thys is the very reason that Cotta and Cicero made (as S. Austen declareth in his syft booke De Ciuitate Dei. Cap. 9.) And in the tenth Chapter of the same booke, he doth aun­swere this obiection, declaring to what vse, lawes, doc­trine and prayers do serue. His wordes are these: Malè autem viuitur, si de Deo nòn benè creditur: Vnde, absit à nobis eius August. De Ciui. Dei. lib. 5. Cap. 10. negare praescientiam, vt liberi esse velimus, quo adiuuante sumus liberi, vel crimus. Proinde, nòn frustra sunt leges, obiurgationes, exhortationes, laudes, & vituperationes: quia & ipsas futuras praesciuit, & valent plurimum, quantum illas valeturas praesciuit: & praeces valent ad ea impetranda, quae se praecantibus concessurū esse praesciuit: & iusta premia bonis factis, & peccatis supplicia constituta sunt. Ne (que) enim ideo peccat home, quia Deus illum pec­caturum praesciuit: imò, ideo nòn dubitatur ipsum peccare cùm peccat: quia ille, euius praescientia fallinòn potest, nòn fatum, nòn [Page 86] so [...]túnam, nòn aliquid aliud, sed ipsum peccaturum praesciuit, qui si nolit, omnino non peccat: Sed si peccare noluerit: etiam hoc ille praesciuit. That is to saye. The life of man is euill, when his beliefe concerning God is not good. Wherefore, be it far from vs, that we, to y^e end that we our selues woulde be frée, should denie the prescience of him, by whome we are or shalbe frée. Therfore, lawes, reprehensions, exhor­tations, commendations, and sharpe rebukes, are not in vaine: bicause that both he did knowe before hand that they shoulde come to passe, and also they are of great force, euen of as great force as he did foreknow that they should be. And iust rewardes are appointed for good wor­kes, and punishments for sinnes. Neyther doth man sin, bicause God did knowe before that he shoulde sinne. Yea rather, it is therfore out of doubt that he doth sinne, when he doeth sinne: bicause he, whose foreknowledge can not be deceyued, did know before, that it was not de­stinie, nor fortune, or anie other thing, that should sinne, but he himselfe. Which if he be not willing: he sinneth not at all. But if he should not be willing to sinne: God did also know that before.

Here may Cerberus sée (as it were in a glasse) howe far vnlike S. Austen he is in this matter: and how liue­ly he doth resemble his olde friendes Cicero and Cotta. For feare of graunting anie necessitie to follow vpon y^e prescience and predestination of God: he will rather graunt that God may be deceyued, and that he is altoge­ther carelesse, and predestinateth nothing so certainely, but that man may by the power of his will alter and chaunge it. And this is in effect, as much as to denie that there is any God at all.

But the worde of God is excéeding plaine and mani­fest against this opinion (sayth Cerberus.) For Genes. 4. 2. King. 24. &c. are places most manifestly against it. [Page] But al those places I leaue to be weighed by y^e Reader, who keping in minde that which I haue written in the former part of this Apologie, may easily vnderstād how they make against that opiniō that we hold. And to giue the Reader some occasion to conceyue a good opinion of Cerberus in the citing of his Scriptures for his purpose: I wil set downe the iudgement of his owne Austen, in those questions ex vtro (que) testamento, that Cerberus and I haue spoken of before: wherein shall appeare how that Austen vnderstandeth the first of Cerberus Scriptures, which he citeth out of the fourth of Genes. His words be these. Ita (que) nō quia obtulit reprehensus est, sed quia indigna obtu­lit. Ne (que) ex co damnatus est, sed quia factum noluit emendare cō ­monitus. Adte enim ait conuersio cius, & tu dominaberis cius. Hoc est, me nòn accipiente, ad tuum dominium conuersum est mu­nus à te oblatum, vt de caetero seiret quid faceret. That is to say: Therefore he was not rebuked, bycause he did offer a sa­crifice: but bicause he did offer those things that were too vile to be offered. No, he was not condemned for that neyther: but bicause he would not amend his fact when he was told of it. For he sayth, thine offering shal return to thee againe, & thou shalt be Lord of it. That is, where as I do not receyue thine offering, it is returned againe to thine own rule, so that he might know how he should vse the rest.

Nowe let the indifferent Reader iudge, howe thys place may by the iudgement of this Austen: be applied as Cerberꝰ would here haue it to be applied. And if Cerbe­rus will haue this place serue his purpose, he must sight with his owne Austen be he neuer so loth to do it. But least this Apologie should increase too much, and passe the quantitie that I would haue it to growe vnto: I wil leaue the rest of the places that he citeth, to the considera­tion of the diligent Reader, assuring the same, that not [Page 87] one of those places shalbe found to make against vs.

All the auncient Doctors also (sayth Cerberus) and the best learned of the Protestantes. &c. doe vehemently write against our opinion. And Austen only bicause of his exceeding obscuritie. &c. is alleaged on both parts. But when Cerberus shall cite their wordes that they haue so vehemently written against vs: there shall none of them be found to maintaine his opinion. Which is, that in Christ all mankinde is elected. As it appeareth in the former part of this Apologie. Neyther shall any of them be found to write against that which we maintaine, whē their words and ours shal be well weighed, and our pur­poses perceyued, as all the learned may well vnderstand and know, though Cerberus be blinde on that side.

Wherefore, to conclude. Take thys one note, in this matter of cannot choose, or of necessitie, both for the better vnderstanding of the thyng it self, and also of those which write therevpon.

They commonly speake of two kindes of necessi­tie. The one is, of necessitie absolute, and the other, of necessitie of consequence, or mere necessitie, and necessitie vpon condition, which diuision, all lear­ned and good Authours do vse, and it is verie pro­fitable to be considered. For touching the one, there is neyther reason, law, counsell or doctrine, neyther fayre promise, nor sharpe threatning, nor any other thyng whatsoeuer it be, which may helpe or hinder, adde or take away, hurt or profite. Wherfore, there is neuer any of al the aforesaid waies or meanes vsed in any of all those things, whych come to passe by absolute necessitie.

[Page] As for example: It is of meere necessitie, that the Diuell is and euer shall be damned, that the soule of man shalbe euerlasting, and not come to an end, like to the lise of beastes: nor the life of beastes be im­mortall as the soule of man, and such like. Wherein it were more than madnesse, to endeuour, eyther by reason, law, or counsell, or anie other way whatsoe­uer it were, to alter, chaunge, withstand or remoue a­nie of those thyngs, seing of meere necessitie they must needes be so, and can not be altered.

For as Austē saith: ‘Omne enim quod prohibetur, ideo prohi­betur, ne (quia potest sicri) siat. Si autem fati esset, nòn posset fieri, ne (que), prohiberetur. Vet. & noui testamēt. Quest. 115. Whatsoeuer is forbidden (sayth Austen) therfore it is forbidden, bicause it might be done, and yet ought not to be done. But if it were of destinie, then could it not be done, nor should not be forbidden.’

These words of Austen being few, conteine much matter, if they be truly weighed.

Now to the necessitie of consequence, or necessi­tie of condition, wherof Melancthon sayth: Ne (que), enim haec consequentia libertatem voluntatis tollit. Neyther doeth thys consequence take away the libertie of the wyll. And thys necessitie is not repugnant to diligence, prayer, lawes and doctrine. For therfore (that I may vse agayne the wordes of Austen) thyngs are forbid­den to be done, bicause they might be done, but ought not to be done. And thys necessitie groweth vpon former causes, graunted or wrought. As it is of necessitie, or needes must be, that sectes and here­sies shall growe in the Church, bicause the wycked seeke their owne glorie, and Sathan stirreth theyr heartes, to imagine & set forth abhominable errors, wherin they serue the Diuell, wyth all the diligence [Page 88] of their power. Wherefore, it must follow: that sects and heresies shall grow.

Neyther doth this necessitie proue, that they could not choose but commit such euilles: but see­ing they do refuse the light, and embrace the darke­nesse, thys must necessarily follow, thys must needes be the end, that heresie & much mischief shal spring. Or as when a man presently beholdeth with his eyes murder, theft, drūkennesse, or any other wickednesse, it must nedes be true, that such things are commit­ted according to that whych a man doth see plainly before hys eyes. Yet doeth it not follow, that those wicked doers coulde not choose but commit those outragious crimes. But seeyng that they do commit such thyngs, it must needes be true by the necessitie of consequence, that such things are committed of them. These two kindes of necessitie, doeth Austen notably declare, how, & after what sort they spring out of Gods predestination. Lib. De Praedest. Dei. Cap. 2.

‘First of all (sayth Austen) it is horrible iniquitie to say, that God doeth predestinate anie thing: sa­uing only that whych is good. But of predestinati­ons, some be of bynding or of bondage, and other be of condition. These are of iustice, and those of power. And that it may be the more manifest, it shal be declared (sayth he) by example, which are of bin­ding and power: and whych are of condition and iustice. God created heauen and earth, sunne and moone: Furder, he did foreordeyne or predestinate that the heauen should euer be turned, and the vn­moueable earth should be in place of a center vnto the turning heauen. The Sunne and Moone should rule the day and night. The day & night should suc­cede one another in certain times appoynted. These [Page] predestinations are of power and of bynding. For euerie one of those thyngs aforesayd: is so bounde vnto hys worke, by the predestination of God, that it can not be moued from the same. But God crea­ted man, and did predestinate him, that if he were o­bedient, and did absteyn from the tast of the forbid­den apple: he should liue, but if he were disobedi­ent, he should abide the sentence of death. Thys pre­destination is of condition and of iustice. For God before the fall of man, dyd not by the power of bin­ding so predestinate him to die, that of necessitie he must nedes die, but vnder that cōdition, if he sinned. Bicause therfore mā did sin, it was a righteous thing, that he should die. If he sinned not, he should not be boūd to death by any chayn of Gods predestinatiō.’

All these are the wordes of Austen. And thys di­uision, is often repeated and commended, by the best learned of the Protestantes.

Now Cerberus will shortly come to an ende. For he will conclude with one note in this matter of can not choose or necessitie. &c. And this note is of the two sortes of necessitie, one absolute, and the other of consequence. Or méere necessitie and necessitie vpon condition. &c.

And to make men beleue, that all that we doe, is to persuade mē, that al things do come to passe of méere ne­cessitie: he putteth for example the damnation of the Di­uell, the immortalitie of mans soule, and the mortalitie of the brute beastes. As though the thoughts, words and déedes of men were like vnto these. And therfore it should as little auaile, to vsexeason, law, counsell, doctrine, faire promises or threatnings, to pull men from euil thought, [Page 89] words or déedes, and so from damnation, which doth ne­cessarily follow vpō those doings, as it were by the same meanes to goe about to make the Diuell a saued spirite, mans soule mortal, & the life of a brute beast euerlasting.

But we speake not of that necessitie which is méere or absolute: but we speake of the other, which is of conse­quence or condition. And therefore his Austens wordes are cited out of place (I saye his Austens wordes, bicause they are the words of the same Austen that I haue noted before not to be the Bishop of Hippoe) for these wordes of this Austen are spoken of the thoughtes, wordes and déedes of men, which, though they do come to passe by a certaine necessitie, as God dyd without beginning foresee that they should: yet doth man vse the libertie of his wil therein. For he doth neyther thinke, speake, nor doe a­nie thing without the consent of his will. And there is no impossibilitie in man, but that his thoughtes, wordes and déedes may be contrarie to that they are.

As for example. There was no impossibilitie in Cer­berus but that he might haue refrayned, both y^• weiting, and publishing and casting abroade of this aunswere to his friendes letter. Neyther was it impossible for me to refraine from writing this Apologie. And Cerberus and I both haue herein vsed the libertie of our will. And yet did God foresée & predestinate both his doings herein and mine. And as he did foresée that we should choose to do as we haue done: so did he also predestinate oure doings herein. So that choosing to doe as God did foresée and predestinate that we should choose to doe: we haue done it by that necessitie that all learned Authours do call the necessitie of consequence or condition.

And God doeth foresee, whether this Apologie shall persuade Cerberus to be of one minde with vs or not. And if it shall be so: then hath God predestinated my la­bours [Page] so that end. If not: then shall my labours serue to some other purpose that God knew before. And yet do I herein vse the libertie of my wi [...], and so shall Cerberus. vse his. For neyther of vs is or shalbe enforced to do that which our will would not haue vs do.

This is all the matter that the wordes of Cerberus his Austen do conteine, when they be truly weighed.

As for the sentence of Pelancthon, it maketh nothing against vs, for we speake of the same necessitie that he speaketh of: and we affirme with him, that it taketh not away the libertie of mans will.

The same Melancthon, writing De necessario, in hys booke which he doth entitle Erotematum dialectices: sayeth that there be foure sortes of necessities. One absolute. As that God is true, liberall, iust. &c. Another of desinitions or demonstrations: as a thrée cornered stone must of ne­cessitie haue thrée corners, and vertue must néedes be a thing that agréeth with the rule of Gods will. The third is natural, in things which are so ordered in nature, that they can not otherwise be, in and by that order. But this necessitie may be altered at Gods pleasure, as by exam­ples we sée it hath. As at the redde sea when the water stoode still on heapes like hilles, and when at the word of Iosua, the sunne stoode stil and moued not. &c. The fourth and last, is that which al the businesse is about. And Cer­berus would faine make all men beleue, that we make no difference betwéene this fourth and the first.

Of this necessitie, doth Melancthon write thus. Quar­tus gradus est mutabilium, quae tamen vocantur necessaria, nece­ssitate consequentiae, id est, quae suns quidem re ipsa mutabilia: sed nòn mutantur, vel quia sic à Deo decreta sunt, vel quia sequū ­tur ex causis, quae nòn mutantur, cum tamen mutari potuissēt, vel quia cum su [...]t, contradictoriae simul verae esse nòn possunt. &c. That is to saye. The fourth degree of necessities, is of [Page 90] those things which are mutable, which are notwithstan­ding called necessarie, by the necessitie of consequence. That is to say, which are in déede mutable: but are not chaunged, eyther for that they be so decréed of God, or else for that they doe follow vpon causes that are not chaun­ged, where as notwithstanding they might haue bene chaunged. Or else, for that when they be done, the fiat contraries of them, can not at the same time be true.

What haue I written against Shaxton more than this? The thoughts, the wordes, and the déedes of men, are of themselues mutable: but as God hath decréed, so shall it come to passe, in all mens thoughts, wordes and déedes.

It followeth therfore, that though y^e teachers of sects, the muderers, the theues and the drunkerds, might haue withholden the consent of their willes from those wicked doings: yet God hauing decréed to punish eyther them or others by that meane, the thing must fal out according to that decree: and yet God remayne iust, and mans wil vnconstrained, as I haue before sufficiently declared.

As touching the Text of Austen, that Cerberus citeth out of his booke De Predestinatione Dei. Cap. 2. I will first note what Erasmus and the rest of the learned sort, doe thinke of that booke. Hoc opusculum de Praedestinatione Dei, nō esse Augustini, vel ipsa breuitas arguit. Deinde, hoc docot, quod Augustinus fortiter refellit, praedestinationem esse ex operibus nostris. Videtur fragmētum alicuius libri, cuius studiosus quis­piam, prooemium & clausulam attexuit. That is to say. This little worke of the predestination of God: is by the verie shortnesse thereof, shewed not to be of Austens writing. Moreouer, it doth teach that predestinatiō is of our wor­kes, which thing Austen doth mightely refell. It séemeth to be a scrap of some booke, wherevnto some man, beyng desirous therof, hath fastened a proeme and conclusion.

[Page] Here thou mayst sée (gentle: Reader) of what authori­tie this booke is, that Cerberus maketh so much of. I wil not therfore spend any time in aunswering these words.

Many things do offer themselues in this matter to be spoken, but my purpose of briefnesse causeth me to growe to an ende. I haue thought good there­fore in few wordes, to note one point more of euill doctrine, which now a dayes is taught, and it sprin­geth also out of this foresaid proposition, that Gods predestination causeth all sinne and wickednesse, & this it is, that sinne is not the cause of Reprobation, nor of Gods hatred towardes the wicked which are damned, which thing in deede, to be short, I graunt must needes follow, if the former conclusiō be true, that sinne commeth of Gods predestination, or that Gods predestination was the cause of Adams fall, which was the originall of sinne. For if sinne, or the orignall thereof came of God, or of hys ordinance, and from God commeth nothing but that which is holie, iust and good, then is sinne, no sinne, and can­not be the cause of Gods hatred towardes them that perish, except we should saye, that God hateth them for that thing, which is holie, iust, and good.

And least I should be thought, through pretence of breuitie, to passe ouer, wythout plaine proufe of that which I say, that thys part of doctrine, is also set forth and taught. I will rehearse one sentence of theirs published in print, which is so open and ma­nifest, that it may serue as well as a thousand: I read in the forenamed booke translated out of French into English, toward the latter end of the booke, vp­pon [Page 91] this place, thus noted in figures, and these verie words follow. Rom. 9. c. 11. 12. 13. He sayth not onely that Esau was ordeyned to be hated, before he did any euil: for in so saying, he should not seeme to ex­clude any thing, but an actual sinne & incredulitie. But he saith expressely, before he was borne: where­by he excludeth originall sinne, and all that whych might be considered in the person of Esau by hys byrth from the cause of hate.

Touching the Text, whervpon it is spoken, assu­redly Inke serueth not worsse to make Iuorie white: than these words, to open the minde and sence of the Apostle, as it were easy to proue, if shortnesse would suffer to make a digression, but touching that parte of doctrine: thou feest that he speaketh of two opinions: the one that actual sinne or incredulitie, should be the cause of Gods hatred toward the wycked: The other, that originall sinne, is the cause of Gods hate toward them. Thys man agaynst them both, ta­keth occasion vpon thys exāple of Esau: to exclude all that is in man, eyther outward sinne or inwarde, eyther originall sinne or actuall, from the cause of Gods hate, so that (if it be true which they say) God doth hate men: neyther for their outward wicked life, nor for their inwarde diuelish luste, but for hys owne pleasure onely.

The purpose to be briefe, causeth Cerberus to cut of many things that offer themselues to be spoken. Yet for all the hast, he must néedes note one poynt more of euill doctrine. Which is, that sinne is not the cause of Repro­bation. &c.

[Page] I would faine know how Cerberus could aunswere this Argument. All causes are in order before their effe­ctes: but sinne was not before Reprobation: Ergo sinne could not be the cause thereof. Cerberus will denie the minor. For he holdeth that sinne was before Reprobatiō. The minor therefore must be proued thus. Whatsoeuer was before Reprobation, is eternall: but sinne is not e­ternall, Ergo sinne was not before Reprobation. If Cer­berus wil doubt of y^• maior, it shal be proued thus. What­soeuer was before Electiō, is eternall: but Election and Reprobatiō are of like antiquitie: Ergo, whatsoeuer was before reprobation is eternall. The maior is manifest by the wordes of S. Paul to the Ephesians. Cap. 1. Sicut ele­git nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem. As he elected vs in him before the worlde was made. And if Cerberus wyll doubt of the minor (as perhaps he will) then let him shew vs, how there can be a choyse where none are refused.

This might suffise for our desence in this matter that Cerberus doth now charge vs withall. But bicause he sayth that this our conclusion is the sequele of a proposi­tion that we affirme, that is, that Gods predestination causeth all sinne and wickednesse: I must take some what more paine in the defence of that which we haue written.

First, I must say that Cerberus hath belyed vs: For we saye not that Gods predestination doeth cause any sinne. Then I must also denie, and haue alredie proued, that Adams fall was not the originall of sinne. Thirdly, we denie that the originall of sinne came of God: wher­fore the conclusion that Cerberus maketh is not against vs.

But Cerberus hath found one sentence of ours so o­pen and manifest, that it maye serue as well as a thou­sand. It is in the latter ende of the forenamed English [Page 92] booke translated out of French, vpon the words of Paul Rom. 9. c. He saith not only. &c. Cerberus can not sée how this Text of Paul may by those words be better opened, than Iourie may be made white with ynke. But for hast to come to an ende, he will not stande to proue this, al­though he might easely do it, as he sayth.

But touching the two opinions, one that actuall sinne or incredulitie, the other that originall sinne, is the cause of Gods hatred towardes men: this fellow (sayth Cerberus) taketh occasion vpon the example of Esau to exclude all that is in man. &c.

A little helpe woulde make this man of one minde with Origine, who writing vpon this parte of Paules Epistle to the Rom. and these verse wordes, Iacob haue I loued, but Esau I haue hated: saith, that Iacobs soule being yet without a bodie, did purge it selfe, and when God saw the purenesse of it, he tooke it, and put it into that bodie wherin Iacob was borne, and Esau his soule which had not cleansed it selfe, he put into a bodie made out of the same lumpe, but not to honour as the other was, bicause the soule of Esan was not worthie of such a bodie. So he loued Iacob (as Origine thinketh) bicause Iacobs soule had cleāsed it self before it came into y^• body: & he hated Esay, bicause his soule had not cleāsed it selfe.

If a man should aske this question of Cerberus: why did God loue Iacob and hate Esau? what could he aun­swere, if he wyll not say, Quia voluit? bicause he woulde, If he will saye, that God respected the actuall righteous­nesse and sinne that was in them: then shall he be found to ioyne with Origine. If he shall saye that he respected originall sinne in Esau, and did therfore hate him: then may it be asked why he did not hate Iacob for the same. For both were defiled therw^t alike. But if Cerberus wil say, that God had respect to y^e workes that they should do [Page] in the time of their life; then doth he ioyne with the Pa­pistes: And that he would not séeme to do.

His best waye therfore, shalbe to ioyne with vs, and say: That God loued Iacob and hated Esau, bicause it pleased him so to doe. And if any man shall stand vp to dispute the matter any further: then to aunswere with S. Paule. O homo tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo? O thou mā, who art thou, that darest take vpon thée to reason wyth God?

That verie same thyng sayth Knoxe in the. 141. pag. of hys foresayd booke: where his wordes are these. Further I saye: that if Esau was hated for his euill deseruing, then must it needes follow, that Ia­cob was loued for hys well deseruing, by the Argu­ment following: of the nature of contraries.

As well it might be said, it must needes follow by the contraries: that if a King or Prince hate one mā, whych hath well deserued his hate, by stealing from him his ring, his chain, or some great Iuel, thē doth he not loue any other man, but he whych hath well deserued hys loue, by giuing to hym a ryng, a chain, or some great treasure, as though he should say: bi­cause iustice worketh on the one side, therfore mer­cie hath nothing to doe on the other side, or as though God were not both iust & mercifull: Iust in damning for their offence, those which are damned: and mercifull in sauing without their desert those which are saued.

And who seeth not that neyther simile, nor dissi­mile, neyther like thyngs, nor thyngs contrarie, do holde in all poyntes, for nothing is so like, whych in [Page 93] somethyng is not vnlike, neyther any thing so con­trarie, whych doth in all things varie. Christ is like­ned to a Lion, but did he euer rauish, or deuour, and shedde any innocent bloude? Latimer wysheth, that al Byshops were like Byshop Diuell in diligence, thē ought not the Diuell and a Byshop to differ in all thyngs. And most specially and plainely, doeth the Scripture beate in our heads: aboue al other things, that the nature of contraries, doe not holde in both sides of Gods reward, & mans deseruing. For as they are inseparable relatiues in the one part, so on the other side, the one hath neuer any relation to the o­ther, for as Gods hatred and vengeaunce, hath euer relation to mans deseruing: so hath Gods loue and mercie neuer any relation to mans merite. Yea, all the Scripture teacheth vs, that God neuer hateth, or punisheth man wythout his owne deseruing. For as the wyse man sayth: Et cum qui nullam poenam comme­ritus Sapient. 12. sit cōdemnasse, a tua potentia iudicas alienum. And thou Lord (sayth he) estemest it a thyng contrarie to thy power, to haue condemned him whych hath not de­serued punishment.

What should be sayde of the Cananites and the Israelites, if the nature of contraries do alway hold, and haue such relation of the one to the other, must it not then necessarily follow (as he sayth) by the na­ture of contraries: that if the Cananites were cast out of the fortunate land that floweth wyth milke and hony, for their euill deseruing: that on the o­ther side the Israelites were brought and planted in­to that same happie and blessed rest, for their well deseruing? But what sayth the Scripture? Speake not in thy heart, after that the Lorde thy God hath cast them out before thee, saying: for my righteous­nesse Deut. 9. [Page] the Lorde hath brought me in, to possesse thys lande, naye, but for the wickednesse of those Na­tions, the Lorde doth cast them out before thee. So plainly speaketh the holie ghost here, that thou mayst easily perceyue, how grosse and vayne their saying is, which affirme: That if God hate an euill man for his owne euill deseruing, then must it nedes follow, that he loueth a good man for hys owne well deseruing. For the hatred of God and euerlasting damnation are iust rewardes of mans euil deseruing: but the loue of God and euerlasting life are free gyf­tes Rom. 6. of God, for Christes sake wythout any part of mans owne deseruing.

Take therefore this saying of theyrs: No sinne neyther originall nor actuall, is the cause of Gods hate or eternal death, and put the same into the one side of the ballaunce, then take, and put into the o­ther side, this saying of S. Paul to the Romanes: was Rom. 7. that then that was good, made death vnto me? God forbid, but sinne was made death vnto me. Then wey both these sayings together with the hand of good aduisemēt, in the indifferent ballāce of vpright iud­gement, and put not in aboue three graynes of wil­ful partialitie: thus shalt thou plainly see, that the A­postle agreeth farre better with the Maiestie of God, and hath a much more reuerent opinion of hys iud­gements, than these men haue, yea, thou shalt easily perceyue (whatsoeuer they say) that neyther Gods pleasure, nor Gods ordinance, or predestinatiō, nor none other thing that is good, is made death, or the cause of Gods hatred, agaynst any man, but sinne is the very grounded cause, why God hateth, taketh vengeaunce, and punisheth man by death and de­struction, according to that which the same Apostle [Page 94] sayth: Death is the reward of sinne. And the wordes Rom. 6. Osee. 13. of O see are also manifest & plaine where he saith: O Israell thou doest destroy thy selfe, but in me onely is thy helpe. In which words of the holie ghost, thou seest how manifestly God doth, as it were purge him selfe, from being the cause or worker of mans destru­ction, so that the perdition and destruction of man, is altogether to be attributed vnto hym selfe: And God being cleare, neyther accessarie, nor partaker thereof, as the chiefe and hygh Iudge of heauen and earth, vnspotted and wythout blame, gyueth the sentence of euerlasting death vpon man, for his own wicked deseruing and offence.

But on the other side sayth God vnto man, in me only is thy helpe. In God onely, onely in God is our helpe and saluation, in him onely, and of him alto­gether, and not of our selues: commeth our saluati­on, and all whatsoeuer belongeth therevnto. The same is also set forth by all those Scriptures, whych are before rehearsed, to proue that sinne and euill, commeth not of Gods predestination, for vpon that conclusion dependeth also thys proposition, that sinne is not the cause of Reprobation, or of Gods hatred towards man.

Yet once againe hath Cerberus a snatch at Knoxe. Whether he do report his words truly or not, I knowe not: for I haue not seene that booke of his, neither haue I cause to thinke, y^t al is Gospel that Cerberus saith. Much more adoe than néedeth doth Cerberus make, to proue that an Argument à contrarijs, simile and dissimile: doth not alwayes conclude necessarilie. For as he sayth, who [Page] séeth not, that they do not holde in all pointes? This therfore that Cerberus hath here written, is but dalli­aunce, and as it were dauncing about the bushe. The questiō is, whether the sequele be good in the matter that Knoxe doth vse it in, or not. We must therfore consider the matter, and how Knoxe doth applie this maner of reasoning to this matter. The matter therfore, is a que­stion moued concerning the cause why Esau shoulde be hated of God, and Iacob beloued, before any of them had done eyther good or euill, yea and before they were borne, and therfore, before there could be in them any deseruing at all. Now, Knoxe sayth, that if Esau were hated for his euill deseruing: then must it néedes follow, by an Argument following of the nature of contraries, that Iacob was beloued for his well deseruing.

Nowe, I must thinke well of Knoxe, for I knowe hym to be not only learned but also godlie, and therefore not like to ouershoote himselfe so farre, that he woulde stretch an Argument, taken out of the place of contra­ries, further than the nature thereof will suffer. I must thinke therfore, that he meant, that if God do in choosing and refusing, in louing and hating, respect nothing but the well deseruing of one sort, and the euill deseruing of y^e other (as the common opinion of the Papistes is) then it must néedes follow, by an Argument of the nature of contraries, that if he hated Esau for his euill deseruing, he must needes loue Iacob for his well deseruing.

If Cerberus be not satisfied with this, let him looke for furder aunswere at Knoxes owne hand, for he is yet liuing and able to aunswere for himselfe.

As for the similitude of a King or Prince, that Cer­berus vseth to deface Knoxes Argument withall: may serue him among such as know not that God is frée frō al mens affections, and that he can not be moued to loue [Page 95] vs the better for the giftes that we bestow vpon him, nor the worsse, for that we take from him and spoyle him of any treasure that he ought to haue.

The nature of God is not to hate but to loue. For S. Iohn sayth, God is loue. And as the wise man sayth, he 1. Iohan. 4. Sapient. 11. loueth all things that be, and he hateth none of the thin­ges that he hath made. Neyther hath he ordeined or made any thing, hating the same that he ordeyned or made. For in that he made or ordeyned them, they are all excée­ding good. Wherefore, when we say, or when it is sayd in the Scriptures, that God doth hate any of his creatures, (as it is said that he hated Esau) it is meāt that he loued not Esau or those other creatures, whome he is sayde to hate, so well as he loued the others, of whome it is sayd that he loued them.

It can not be denied, but must néedes be confessed, that God loued al his creatures, in that he would make them some thing, where as before they were nothing, and in that he would giue them some part of that which is pro­per to himselfe. For to be, is proper to God. And whatso­euer hath any being: it hath the same of God. When God giueth a being to his creatures, he sheweth that he loueth them: but when he giueth them an euerlasting and blessed being, then he loueth them so, that the other loue in comparison of that, seemeth but an hatred. And therfore it is sayd that he hateth them, whom he appoin­teth not to that euerlasting blessed being, but leaueth thē to themselues, that in them he may haue occasion to ex­ercise his iustice, and by them to gyue occasion to hys dearlie beloued to sée and consider the excéeding great­nesse of his loue and mercie towardes them.

But Cerberus séemeth to haue the whole Scripture on his side. For he sayth, that all the Scripture teacheth vs, that God neuer hateth and punisheth vs without our [Page] owne deseruing. Which saying, I graunt to be true, but not in that sense that Cerberus would haue vs to vnder­stande it. For Cerberus woulde haue vs to thinke that God could not be compted iust, if he shoulde refuse any man in whome there were not sinne, that might moue God to refuse him, and to that ende he citeth the wordes of the wise man. For this is his opinion, as it appeareth Sapient. 12. before, that in Christ all mankinde is elected, and so con­sequently, that Esau was elected in Christ. But by sinne he made himself a reprobate, and was not refused before he sinned.

But let vs sée, how this place of the wise man ma­keth for his purpose. The words are these, as Cerberus citeth them. Et cum qui nullam poenam commeritus sit condem­nasse: a tua potentia iudicas alienum. And thou Lorde, este­mest it a thing contrarie to thy power, to haue condem­ned him that hath not deserued punishment. All the Scripture is nowe, by Cerberus, brought into a short summe. For it is knit vp in lesse than two lines, written in the .xij. Chapter of the booke of wisdome.

Of what authoritie that booke hath awayes bene thought to be: I thinke Cerberus is not ignorant. And how diuers readings there be of that place which he cy­teth: I suppose he knoweth. The Tygurine Bible is it that Cerberus followeth. Other translations there be, that differ from that, and from the olde also. The olde translation hath it thus.

Cum ergo sis iustus, iustè omnia disponis: ipsum quo (que) qui nòn debet puniri, condemnas, & exterum aestimas à tua virtute. That is. Forasmuch as thou thy selfe art iust, thou doest dispose all things iustly: him also that ought not to be punished, thou doest condemne, and doest esteeme him as one exiled from thy power or dominion. Bylike, when Cerberus cited this place, he supposed that no mā should [Page 96] sée his booke, but such as were not able to discerne Chalk from Chéese. What place can make more manifestly a­gainst him and for vs, than this place doeth? For by these wordes it is plaine, that though God do condemne him, that hath not by any déedes deserued to be condem­ned: yet is God neuer the latter, iust, and doth dispose all things iustly.

Yea, and the circumstance of the Text doth shew that this translation is more nigh the meaning of the writer, thā is that which Cerberus followeth. For the sentence going immediatly before, is thus. Ne (que) Rex, ne (que) tyrannus, in conspectu tuo inquirent, de hijs quos perdidisti. That is: Ney­ther King nor tyrant, will in thy presence make inqui­sition for them that thou hast destroyed.

And the sētence that doth immediatly follow, is thus. Virtus enim tua, iustitiae initium est: & ab hoc quod omnium Dominus es, omnibus te parcere facis. That is. For thy power is the beginning of iustice, and bycause thou art Lord of all, thou doest make thy selfe to spare all.

But bicause there is such diuersitie of translations in the Latine, and peraduenture Cerberus wyll saye he hath loked in the Gréeke, and findeth that the Tygurine translation, which he followeth, is most agréeable to the Gréeke Text, out of which all our Latine translations are taken. It shall not be amisse therfore to set downe the Gréeke Text, that suche as haue any skill therein, may iudge betwixt vs.

[...]. That is to say (so far as I am able to vnderstād it) Thou being iust, doest dispose all things iustly, cōmaunding to condemne straunge from the land of thy power, him y^t is not to be iudged ignominious. If any cā sée any other meaning in this Gréeke text: I wil [Page] not contende, for I sée that many men of great learning, haue varied in opinion about the translation therof.

But graunt that Cerberus haue cited that translati­on that is according to the true meaning of the Text: what hath he wonne thereby? Shall all the Scripture be on his side, bicause it is written in y^e booke of wisdom, that God estemeth it a thing contrarie to hys power (or more truly after the Latine Text that Cerberus citeth) a thing straunge from his power, to condemne him that hath not deserued punishment? I thinke not. For the booke of wisedome, is of that sort of bookes that must be made to agrée with y^e Canonical bookes: the Canonicall bookes must not be enforced to agree with it: For it is A­pokryphe, that is a booke permitted to be read priuatly, but not of such authoritie that we may builde our fayth vpon euerie sentence in it.

But graunt that this booke were of as great authori­tie as any other booke of Scripture is: should we thinke that God might not iustly refuse such of his creatures as it pleaseth him not to choose, vnlesse the same creatures had first by sinne made them selues vnworthie to be cho­sen? We must not restraine God of his libertie, to doe wyth his creatures what he himselfe will. Neyther must we say or thinke, that any thing that he doth, is or can be other than iust, albeit that we can not vnderstand howe the same shoulde be iust. We must therefore, wyth re­uerend seare, seeke another meaning of thys place than Cerberus doth teach vs: let vs thinke therefore, that God speaketh here of therecution of his iudgement, and not of election. And it shalbe good for vs to say always wyth S. Austen, that the cause of Gods doings may be secrete, so Aug. Paulino Quest. 6. that we can not know them: but vniust they can not be.

But Cerberus séemeth to himselfe to haue gotten a great aduauntage by the example of the Cananites and [Page 97] Israelites. The Cananites were driuen out for theyr sinnes, and this was iustice: but the Israelites were put in their place without deseruing, and that was mercie. Wherefore in refusing, God worketh by iustice, and in choosing, he worketh by mercie. As though there were no difference betwene choosing and refusing of creatures, and the vsing of them when they be chosen or refused. God chooseth and refuseth without respect of good or euill deseruings: but he maketh not his refusal knowen vnto men, till the refused haue by theyr sinnes shewed them selues worthie to be refused. And though the chosen sort, neyther do nor can shewe themselues worthie for theyr good workes to be chosen: yet before they receyue the great blessing promised, they shewe themselues by theyr workes, lesse worthie to be refused than the other.

And to this do the Scriptures that Cerberus hath ci­ted out of Moses, Paule, O sée and the rest: full well a­grée. But it followeth not hereof that therefore God had not refused the wicked sort before they sinned.

It is true, that death is the rewarde of sinne: but it is not true that euerie one that sinneth, receyueth that reward, for Christ came to saue sinners, and the frée gift of euerlasting life is bestowed vpon such sinners, as were elected in Christ before the beginning of the world.

It is true also, that man destroyeth himselfe, by the frée consent of his will, to do contrarie to the commaun­dement of God, & that his helpe and succour commeth of God alone: & yet doth it not therfore follow, that no man is refused of God before he haue cōmitted sinne, whereby he destroyeth himself. For when the elect were chosen in Christ, then were the rest refused. For otherwise, it could not be an election, but a generall acceptation.

As for the saying that Cerberus sayth is ours, and would haue his friend to lay it in the one side of the bal­launce [Page] against S. Paules wordes to the Romaines: I leaue to himselfe to be weyed wyth the hand of good ad­uisement. &c. And let him put in as many graines of wil­full partialitie as he will: for the saying is none of ours. For we teach, that sinne is the cause of eternall death, in those that be not Gods elect, and were it not that Christ hath washed his chosen slocke in his owne heart bloud: sinne would be theyr destruction too.

It is but for his owne pleasure therfore, that Cerbe­rus doth thus turne round after his owne tayle.

And vpon the same Article dependeth also an other part of doctrine, which they teach, worthy to be misliked of all men, as wel for that it importeth a sophisticall search of bottomlesse secretes, in the ve­rie essence and nature of God, as also, for that it clearely withdraweth vs from Christ, the only staie, and comfort of our weake conscience, deliuered vn­to vs in the word of God, for that they might be sure to holde fast the former principle, that all things come of Gods predestination, as running streames out of a deepe fountaine. They affirme, that the free mercie of God in Christ, is but an inferiour cause of Election, and that we are taught to ascende vnto a higher cause, as vnto the eternall purpose and pre­destination of God, which he determined onely in himselfe. So sayth the printed booke before named, translated out of French into English.

That same thing we reade also, lately set forth in English print, in the glose of the last trāslated Bible. Rom. cap. 9. wyth these wordes. As the only wyl and purpose of God, is the chiefe cause of Election and [Page 98] Reprobation, so his free mercie in Christ is an infe­riour cause of saluation. &c.

But for my part, I trust in minde, neuer to ascēd vnto that high cause of Election, and in heart neuer to taste of that eternall purpose or predestination, which God hath determined only in himselfe, with­out or aboue his free mercie, which is in Christ. For surelie, that eternall purpose, whych cometh not of Gods free mercie in Christ, is to destroy, and not to saue. Agayne, if that eternall purpose spring out of Gods free mercie, then is that free mercie of God, the chiefe cause, and not an inferiour cause why he purposeth to saue vs, for a great dishonor it were to the mercie of God: to be put to an inferiour place, touching election and saluation of man. For if euer Gods mercie be aboue all, it is in the sauing of mise­rable man: and mercie there is not in God towarde man, but onely in Christ.

Therefore S. Paule Ephes. 3. b. calleth it the eter­nall purpose, which he purposed in Christ Iesus our Lord: In Christ therefore was this eternall purpose, and for hys onely sake, God the Father eternally purposed to elect and saue vs. Consider and marke it well, whence commeth thys purpose or wyll of God to saue vs: but of his free mercie? If hys pur­pose to saue vs, spring out of his free mercie, why is then his mercie inferior to his purpose, or how is the fountaine inferior to the springs that come therof?

Also, what may be sayd in God at any time, or in any respect to be higher or greater than his mercie, seeing it is written, that his mercie is as great as him selfe. Ecclesiast 2. d. Yea, and most specially it is so to be sayd, that his mercie passeth all, when we speak of this matter: For of thys it is written, that mercie Iacob. 2. b. [Page] reioyceth agaynst iudgement, and why? all the iud­gementes of God in thys behalfe are not to be com­pared vnto hys mercie, for though it were not true, whych Dauid sayeth, that his mercie is aboue all his Psal. 45. b workes, yet were it cleare, that in Election and Re­demption and saluation of man, Gods mercie in Christ, hath euer the highest place: and those which in the saluation of our soules, make the free mercie of God an inferiour cause, how base a roume will they assigne vnto hys free mercie, in nourishing and preseruing our bodies. Let them reach as hygh as they can, I trust to go no furder, but to hold me fast by the euerlasting mercie of God, and by the hemme of Christes garment, for the Scripture describeth God vnto me, wythout Christ as a wrathfull and moste terrible Iudge, but in Christ, and for hys sake, as a father whose wrath is pacified, and he well pleased, reconciled, agreed, and at one: and to speak of a hygher cause or purpose, to elect and saue only in God, beside or without this free mercie in Christ, or that Christ and Gods free mercie in hym, is not the chiefest cause which worked and obteyneth the decree, and purpose of God, to elect and saue, it is plainely nothing else, but to deny the mercy of God in election, reconciliation, redemption and saluati­on, by Christ, in Christ, and for Christ: As easily it may be perceyued, if a man do but weigh and consi­der, what eternall purpose an Election, and a re­conciliation is, seing Christ is our Aduocate, Media­tor, Peace, Reconciliation & Atonement, as in these Scriptures following, and many other, it doth plain­ly appeare. Psal. 84. a. Math. 1. a. Ephe. 1. a. 2. b. Rom 5. a. b. Coloss. 1. c. 2. Corin. 5 d. 1. Ioā. 2. a. Heb. 5. b. c. and. 7. a. b. c. d. e. 2. Timoth. 1. c.

[Page 99] And although it be true according to the Scriptu­res, that God so loued the worlde, that he gaue his onely begottē sonne. &c. yet did he neither loue the world, nor gyue hys sonne wythout the intercession & mediatiō of his sonne, for if God loued the world without the reconciliation and mediatiō, or before he was reconciled, intreated, and pacified by Christ, then is Christ in vaine come to late to be our medi­atour, seing God the Father is without him alredy reconciled. But horrible false is thys opinion: For like as the sonne of a King might entreat his Father for the seruant, whom for hys offences, the King in hys displeasure, were ready to cast, not onely out of hys seruice, but also into perpetuall prison: euen so Christ our onely Sauiour, and Gods only sonne, did offer vp himselfe, as a raunsome vnto his Father for vs, whereby he pacified the wrath of hys Father, and adioyned vs with himselfe, to be sonne and heyres of hys Fathers glorie. And this hath Christ done, not only now in tyme, but also euerlastingly in the most hygh and eternall purpose of God, before the foun­dation of the world was layde.

Thus I end, thinking it sufficient for this presēt, that I haue in these few wordes pourged my selfe of those thīgs which you lay to my charge, & set forth vnto your iudgement, the errors of Pelagius, that you may the better diseerne, who they are, whych are worthie to be called after that sect: and also plainly declared, in what pointes my conscience differeth, from certayne teachers of our time: and vpon what groūd, I am moued so to misslike some part of their doctrine, whych thyngs if you diligently weye and consider, readyng the same wythout partiallitie: then haue I my desire.

I am glad, that Cerberus is nowe come to an ende. Much adoe he had to let slip so manie things as offered themselues to be spoken off. But now he hath cōcluded, concenting him selfe wyth fewe wordes, in purging him selfe of those things that his friende charged him with, and setting forth the Pelagians errours. &c.

Yet, euen in the winding vp of y^e matter, he hath found one part of doctrine, hanging vpon the Article of Gods eternal predestinatiō, which is to be misliked of al mē (if Cerberus be not deceyued) and that is: That as the only will & purpose of God is the chiefe cause of Election and Reprobation: so his free mercie in Christ is an inferiour cause of saluatiō. &c. Here Cerberus doth of purpose leaue out the ende of that glose, shutting vp the matter wyth his. &c. I will therefore set downe the words that follow, which are these: and the hardening of the heart an infe­riour cause of damnation. Now this glose is some thing more plaine than it was before, as Cerberus hath cited it with his. &c. He thought belike, that the Bible wherin he findeth this glose, is not in euerie mans hande, and therefore his. &c. should cause men to thinke that the rest of the glose must be as good stuffe as he thinketh the first part to be. That is worthy to be misliked of all men, im­porting a sophisticall search of bottomlesse secretes, and drawing from Christ. Such shifts doth Cerberus vse, to make mē mislike with that which he himselfe liketh not.

But to proue this part of doctrine to be such as Cer­berus assirmeth it to be: he vseth two reasons. One is, that the eternall purpose of God, springeth out of hys frée mercie in Christ: wherefore that frée mercie cannot be inferiour to Gods eternall purpose, more than the fountaine, from which streames of water do slowe, can [Page 100] be inferiour to the streames that flow from it. The other is of the mediation of Christ. For if God did in his eter­nall will and purpose, elect vs before Christ had appea­sed his wrath, by his mediation: then was it but a vaine thing for Christ to be a Mediatour, neyther had we any neede of his mediation.

Although I would gladly content my self, to haue de­fended mine own writings, and other mens wherewith Cerberus findeth fault, euen with as fewe wordes as he vseth in purging himselfe and other, of that which his friend layeth to his charge: yet may I not so shortly slip ouer this matter wherewith Cerberus hath shut vp his aunswere.

For if Cerberus would haue sought how to haue set forth to be séene, his owne wilfull ignorance, and errour in the chiefe pointes of our Religion: he could not haue found a better meane, thā he hath vsed in these two rea­sons that he maketh against the doctrine conteyned in the glose wherewith he misliketh.

For what greater errour can there be, than to holde that with God there is time past, and time to come: and that any of the essentiall properties of God do spring out of other in time, as though there had bene or could haue bene a time, wherein God lacked those properties? Or that the sonne of God, the seconde person in Trinitie, should in his diuine nature in time, make mediation to God the Father, that thereby he might purpose to saue man, whom he was before purposed to destroy. For stri­uing against him that hath sayde, that the only will and purpose of God, is the chiefe cause of Election and Re­probation: and that his frée mercie in Christ is an infe­riour cause of saluation. &c. He sayth that the purpose or will of God to saue vs, must néedes spring out of the frée mercie of God, and that therefore the will or purpose of [Page] God in sauing, must of force be inferiour to his mercie, euen as streames that issue from fountaines, are infe­riour to the fountaines that they come from.

And to proue this, he citeth the words of Ecclesiasti­cus the. 2. Chapter. Secundum enim magnitudinem ipsius: sic & misericordia illius cum ipso est. That is: Euen according to his owne greatnesse, so is his mercie with hym. He ci­teth also the saying of S. Iames. Cap. 2. of his Epistle, where he sayth. Iudicium enim sine miscricordia: illi qui nòn sacit miscricordiam. Gloriatur autem miscricordia aduersus iudi­cium. That is: He that sheweth no mercie, shall haue iudgemēt without mercie. But mercie reioyseth against iudgement. And againe, he citeth the words of Dauid in the Psalm. 145. Miscricordia eius super omnia opera eius. That is: His mercie is vpon all his workes.

All this ado he maketh, to proue that Gods will and purpose are inferiours to his mercie. But how well that is by these Scriptures proued, I referre to the iudgement of the indifferent Reader. Sirach sayth, that those which feare the Lorde will prepare their heartes, and humble their soules before the Lord. Let vs fall into the handes of God, and not into the hands of men: For euen as his greatnesse is, so is his mercy. Sirach his purpose is to set forth the effect of y^e feare of God, which worketh in y^e har­tes of mē, a true turning to God, with an assured hope of forgiuenesse at his hande, bicause they be persuaded, that he is no lesse readie to forgiue penitent sinners, than he is able to punish the impenitent.

S. Iames sayth, that the merciful shall finde mercie, minding to persuade all men to shew mercie one to ano­ther. Assuring themselues, that vnlesse they do so, they can finde no mercie with God, and on the contrarie, if they do shew mercie, they shall not néede to feare iud [...]e­ment, for mercie shall preuaile against iudgement.

[Page 101] And Dauid the Prophet hath said, that Gods mercie is vpon all his workes, although it please Cerberus to cite his wordes otherwise, for his purpose. For he sayth, that Dauid hath said, that the Lordes mercie is aboue all his workes. Which words though they be true, yet hath not Dauid so sayd, neyther maye I suffer Cerberus, to cause the Prophet Dauid to speake as he woulde haue him, that his fantasie might be maintained by the Pro­phetes words. Dauids meaning is to teach that the Lord God sheweth mercie vpon all his works, so that there is not one of the works of God, that hath not cause to praise him for his louing kindnesse and mercie. Both y^e Hebrue and Gréeke Text, and al the translations in Latine, and English too (so many as I haue seene) do giue thys sense of the Prophetes wordes.

How can Cerberus proue then, by these Scriptures, that the mercie of God is the fountaine of his wil & pur­pose? All that he doeth therefore is nothing else but a setting forth of his owne wilfull ignoraunce, whereby he is fallen into the filthy errour of them that imagine of God, as of a man, and that he is moued with affectiōs as men be. Whereas, in God: His vnderstanding, his vnmeasurable power, his vnsearcheable wisedome, his mercifull goodnesse, his truth and iustice, his chastenesse and fréedome in all poyntes, to wyll what he lusteth, to do what it pleaseth him, and to purpose & appoynt what liketh him: are essentiall properties, without which he neyther is, nor can be God. To imagine therefore, that there was a time wherein God was purposed to destroy man, and that his mercie in Christ hath chaunged that purpose, and caused him now to purpose and will to saue man: is to imagine y^t there was a time wherin God was not so mercifull as he is now, & so, not so perfectly God as he is now. And that by experiēce he hath learned some [Page] what more wisedome than he had at the first, and there­fore, may be wiser hereafter than he is now. How great absurdities these are, I leaue to the iudgement of the indifferent Readers.

But Cerberus will saye, that though I haue sayde some thing against him, yet I haue sayd nothing for him whose wordes I haue taken in hande to defende: but in my wordes I séeme to fight against them both. I aun­swere: I haue not taken vpon me to defend, eyther mine owne or other mens wordes, sucder than in conscience I thinke them to be true. And if I did thinke that the wry­ter of that glose did meane as grossely, as I perceyue by his open wordes that Cerberus doth: I would not spare him more than I haue spared Cerberus: but for as much as his wordes séeme not to me, to haue any such mea­ning as to teach that there was a time, wherein God was mercilesse towards mā, & that his mercy first sprang out of his will and purpose (as Cerberus doth plainely teach, that his wil and purpose sprang out of his mercie) I must not refuse to take that good meaning of his wor­des, which may séeme to me to be according to the truth of Christian religion.

The wordes of Paule, whervpon this note is made, are these. I will haue mercie on him, to whō I wil shew mercie. Upon this it is noted in the margine, that as the onlie will and purpose of God is the chiefe cause of Ele­ction and Reprobation: so his frée mercie in Christ is an inferiour cause of saluation: and the hardening of the heart an inferiour cause of damnation. I vnderstand the meaning of these words to be, that as the only wil & pur­pose of God is the chiefe cause, that there was an Electi­on and choise of some, and a refusall of other some: so the shewing forth of his mercie in Christ, is an inferiour cause, that is, an instrumentall cause whereby saluation [Page 102] is wrought in the elected, according to Gods will and purpose, and the hardening of the hearts of the repro­bates, an instrumentall cause of damnation, in the re­probates, according to the same eternal wil and purpose.

He therefore that sayth we must ascende to an higher cause of Election, than that which appeareth in the exe­cution of Gods mercie in Christ, doth not teach to set vp the essentiall properties one aboue another, as thoughe one were fountaine of another, and that God lacked the one till it sprang out of the other: but he teacheth that the same mercie that we sée executed in Christ in time, was decreed in the eternall will and purpose of God be­fore all time, and so was the refusall of thē whose hear­tes we see hardened in time. If any man do sée cause to iudge otherwise of this glose: I am well pleased that the same vse his owne iudgement in enterpreting the meaning therof. And if I may perceyue any mans iud­gement herein to be sounder than mine, I trust I shalbe ready to condescend to that.

And least any man should thinke, that herein I doe followe mine owne fantacie, without example of any thing that I sée in the auncient Fathers: I will sette downe the wordes of S. Austen, that haue bene a meane to confirme me herein.

In his. 14. booke, De Ciuitate Dei, [...]. 11. Chapter: S. Au­sten writeth thus. Sed quia Deus cūcta presciuit, & ideo homi­nē quo (que) peccaturum ignorare nòn potuit: secundum id quod prae­sciuit, it (que) disposuit, ciuitatem Dei debemus asserere, nòn secun­dum illud quod in nostram cognitionem peruenire nòn potuit, quia in Dei dispositione nòn fuit. Nec enim homo peccato suo, diuinum potuit perturbare consilium, quasi Deum, quod statuerat, mutare compulerit: cum Deus praesciendo vtrū (que) preuenerit, id est, & homo quem bonum ipse creauit, quam malus esset futurus, & quid boni, etiam sic de illo esset ipse facturus: Deus enim etsi dicitur, statu­ta [Page] mutare: Vnde tropica locutione in Scripturis sanctis, etiam poenituisse legitur deum, iuxta id dicitur quod homo spera [...]rat, vel naturalium causarum ordo gestabat: nòn iuxta id, quod se om­nipotens facturum esse praesci [...]rat. That is to saye: But by­cause God did know all things before hand, and therfore could not be ignorant that man should sinne: we must teach that the holie Citie is such a thing as he did foresée and appoint that it should be, not such as we could not come to the knowledge of, bicause it was not in that dis­position or order that God made. Neyther was man, by his sinne able to disorder the purpose of God, as though he shoulde haue constreyned God to chaunge the thyng that he had once decréed: séeing that God by his foresight did preuent both, that is to say, both how the euill man should become (whom he had created good) and also what thing he woulde make of him, euen when he shoulde in such wise become euill. For although it be sayd that God doth chaunge his purposes (whereof it commeth that by a figuratiue speach, it is reade in the holie Scriptures, that God did repent) the same is spoken according to that which man hoped for, or that which the order of naturall causes did import: not according to that, which the al­mightie did know before hand that he himself would do.

Againe, the same Austen in his booke De diuersis que­stionibus. 83. and the. 15. 16. 17. questions sayth thus. Deus om­nium quae sunt causa est. Quod autem omnium rerum causa est: etiam sapientiae suae causa est. Nec vnquàm Deus sine sapientia sua: Igitur sempiternae sapientiae suae, causa est sempiterna, nec tempore prior est quam sua sapientia. Deinde, si patrem sempiter­num esse inest deo, nec suit aliquandò non pater: nunquam sine filio fuit. Omne praeteritum iam nòn est. Omne futurum nòn dùm est. Omne igitur & praeteritum & futur [...] non deest. Apud d [...]m autem nihil deest: Nec praeteritum igitur, nec futurum, sed omne praesens est apud deum.

[Page 103] That is to saye: God is the cause of all those things that be. And in asmuch as he is the cause of all things: he is the cause of his owne wisedome. Neyther was God at any time without his owne wisedome: therefore he is the euerlasting cause of his owne euerlasting wisedome, neyther is he in time more auncient than his owne wis­dome. Furthermore, if to be an euerlasting Father, be a thing that is in God, and that he hath not at any time not bene a Father: then hath he neuer bene without a sonne. Whatsoeuer is past, is not now. Whatsoeuer is to come, is not yet. Therefore, whatsoeuer is past or to come, is wanting, but with God there is nothing wan­ting. There is with God therefore nothing past or to come, but all present.

These sayings of Austen do séeme to me sufficient to staie a man in that minde that I am of, concerning the cause of Gods Election and Reprobation. His will and purpose which could neuer be wanting in him, neyther can by any meanes be altered, chaunged or letted, maye well be called the cause why he hath chosen some, and re­iected some other some. And this Election is in him euer­lasting as he himselfe is: neither may it be thought that there was euer any time wherein he had not elected those that be elected, and refused those that be refused. But we holde not that this is done without Christ, and therefore Cerberus laboureth more than néedeth to proue by Scriptures that our Election is in Christ. For we ac­compt Christ to be eternall as his Father is, and his in­carnation to be alwayes present with God. And there­fore, that the Election that is in Gods purpose and wil, is not without Christ the mercyseate and mediatour be­twixt God and man. Thus much for the first of Cerbe­rus his two reasons.

Now a fewe wordes to his second reason, and so an [Page] end. First, Cerberus doeth in this reason flatly affirme, that God did not loue the worlde, nor giue his sonne for the worlde, before his wrath was appeased by the medi­ation of his sonne. Wherevpon it followeth, that there was a time, wherein God was wroth with the worlde, and not pacified by his Sonne. Which doctrine is as muche as to denie Christ to be a mediatour. But in the closing vp of the matter, he ouerthroweth that againe, affirming that Christ hath pacified the wrath of his fa­ther, not onely nowe in tyme, but also euerlastingly in the most highe and eternall purpose of God before the foundation of the worlde was layed.

Hitherto he hath fought against vs: but nowe in the conclusiō he ioyneth with vs, calling the purpose of God eternall and most high. And what is that but to affirme all that we teache concerning the cause of Election and Reprobation.

As touching the mediation of Christ: we holde that which S. Austen wryteth in his Homelie, De ouibus. Non mediator homo praeter Deitatem, Non mediator Deus praeter hu­manitatem. Ecce mediator. Diuinitas sine humanitate non est mediatrix. Humanitas sine diuinitate, non est mediatrix. Sed inter diuinitatem solam, & humanitatem solam, mediatrix est, humana diuinitas, & diuina humanitas Christi.

Man without the Godhead, is not mediatour. God without the manhode is not mediatour: Loe here is the mediatour. The diuinitie without the humanitie is not mediatrix. The humanitie without the diuinitie is not mediatrix: but the humane diuinitie and the diuine hu­manitie of Christ, is the mediatrix betwéene the diuini­tie alone and the humanitie alone. And this mediation doe we holde (as in his conclusion, at vnwares I think, Cerberus hath confessed) to be euerlasting in the eter­nall and most highe purpose of God: according to the [Page 104] saying of Saint Iohn in the seconde of his first Epistle. We haue an Aduocate with God the Father, which is Iesus Christ the righteous. To whome with his Fa­ther and the holy Ghost be all honour and glorie. Amen.

Thus in as fewe wordes as I could: I haue defen­ded that doctrine of Gods Prouidence & Predestination, which I and others, haue taught, and as occasion ser­ueth, doe teach, both in preaching and wryting. Besée­ching the Christian Reader to call vpon God, for the ayde of his holy spirite to assist vs, and to make vs able to continue in the teaching of true doctrine, in this and all other Articles that concerne Christian religion, that by vs, as the ministers of God, the congregation of Ie­sus Christ maye be edified.

And if the Authour of the answere, doe finde himselfe grieued for that I haue talked of him vnder the name of Cerberus: my desire is, that he woulde make his right name knowne to me eyther by worde or wryting, and if he thinke himselfe able to disproue ought that I haue written in this defence, he shall eyther finde me able to mayntayne my wryting by good authoritie, or else rea­die to yelde to better. But if he will lurcke still in se­cret, and cast abroade suche libelles as is this an­swere to his friends letter: I wil not trouble my selfe any more in defending my selfe & others against him that dare not shew his face. Farewell. If thou profite in reading, I haue the gayne that I sought in writing.

Seene and allowed according to the order appoynted.