CHAPTER 1.

[Page 3]1 Albeit ALthough (sonne Marc.) [...]t behooueth or is meet for you cōcer­neth you, hearing. hauing heard Cratippus now a year, & that at Athens a famous Citie & vniuersity in Greece▪ Athens, to a­bounde or flowe. to be throughl [...] fur­nished with rules and instru­ctions or lessons. pre­cepts & institutiōs of Philosophy, for that chiefe. singular authoritie both of your reader Cratippus, viz. your teacher. teacher & also of the City; of which the one▪ the one whereof may increase or fur­nish you. store you with knowledge, the o­ther viz. the Citie may store you with, &c. the other with examples; 2 yet as I my self haue ioyned together. alwaies Latin to Greeke for my profit. haue euer for my bene­fit ioyned Latine studies with greekq exercise of spea­king [eloquently] or practice of pleading. neither haue I dōe that only in Philo sophy, but also in [Page 4] the exercise of spea­king [eloquently] or practice of pleading. practice of o­ratory; I think the same to be don of you. so I think you ought to doe the same that you may be equall. alike in the skill or know­ledge. faculty of both kindes of speech: to which thing indeed. vnto which purpose we (as wee do seeme or are thought. sup­pose) haue broght great furtherance. helpe to our men. countrie­men; that not on­ly [they who are] rude or vnskil­full of Greek let­ters or learning. ignorant of the Greeke tongue, but also the lear­ned, may thinke that they them­selues haue got­ten something, thēselues to haue attained somwhat, both to speake [ [...]] and also to iudge. both to further their eloquence, & also their iudg­ments. 3 Where­fore you shall learne indeede, of the prince. chiefe of the [Page 5] Philosophers of this time. age: & you shall learn as long as you please. will; yea & you shall owe to will or be willing. ought to be willing, [...]o long as it shall not repent you how much you increase in lear­ning. profit. But yet you reading reading our works [or writings.] my books greatly. not much diss [...]ting frō theq disagreeing. Philosophers of Aristotles [...]ect. P [...]ipateticks (be­cause we both desire. wee desire to be both followers both of Socrates and Plato, who was A­ristotles school­master and Socra­tes schollar. So­cratians and Pla­tonians) do as you think good. vse your owne iudge­ment▪ concerning the mat [...]ers them­selues. (For I hinder no­thing. I do not hinder you) but you. but surely you shall make [your] Latine speech. tongue more full or copious. flowing by reading our writings. my [Page 6] workes. Neyther verily. yet wold I haue this to be thought [or deemed] spoken proudly or vauntingly. thought to bee spoken arro­gantly [of me] for granting [or giuing place] to many the skill of playing the Philo­sopher. yeelding vnto many the know­ledge of Philoso­phy, if I take vpon me that. assume that vnto my self, which is the property of an Oratour. properly belongeth vnto an Oratour, [that is] to speak fitly or properly. apt­ly, distinctly & finely. e­loquē [...]ly, bec [...]use I haue consumed. [my] age. spēt [my] time in that study, I seeme to challenge it as by mine own right, in some manner. I seeme after a sort to challenge it [as] by my own right. 4 wh [...]refore. For w^ch cause (sonne Cice­ [...]o) I Exhort you verie greatly. I earnestly exhort you, thatq studio [...]sly or diligen [...]ly. you reade my Cicero. care­fully not only my [Page 7] orations, but also these bookes [which I haue [...]] of Philoso­phy, which haue equalized themselues almost o [...] wel-n [...]ere vnto those. viz. are be­come so many as the other. haue now almost made themselues equall vnto those: for there is a greater power of speech. force of elo­quence in those [orati­ons.] in those, yet this equall of one [...]ort. euen & temperate or meane, viz. not too lofty nor too base. middle kinde of stile is also to bee ado [...]ned or practised. regarded. And truly I see that to haue happened as y [...]t to none of the [...]recians the rather be­cause I do not see, that it hath hap­pened as yet to a­ny of the Greci­ans, that the same man trauel [...]ed in either kind in both those kindes [of speech] & fol­lowed bo [...]h that kinde of speaking belong­ing to the plea­ding place or the bar. that lawyerlike maner of pleading, and [Page 6] [...] [Page 7] [...] [Page 8] this quiet. m [...]lde kinde of disputing or rea­soning. discoursing: except peraduen­ture Demetrius Phalerius may be had or recko­ned. accounted in this nū [...]er; [who was indeede] a sharp disputant. a subtile disputer, an orator smally [or nothing] ve­hement. but no great O­rator, yet pleasant. sweet, that you may knowe [him to haue been] Theophrastus­his scholar. the scholar of Theo­phrastus. But how much vvee haue profited in both [kinds] let it be the iudgement of o­thers. let o­thers iudge: cer­tainely wee haue followed both.

I truly do iudge also Plato to haue been able to speak most grau [...]ly and most copiously, if he would haue [...]ndled [or fol­lowed] that law­yer like kind of speaking. And I think ve­rely, that Pla. also (if he would haue practiced that Lawyerlike kinde [Page 9] of pleading) could haue spo­ken most grauely and with great vari­ety of words. most copi­ously: and Demosthenes t [...] haue been able to doe [...]rimly and glitteringly [or notably]. that Demosthe. could haue don elegant­ly and finely, if he had [...]ept those things which hee learned of Plato, and had beene wil­ling to pronounce them. would haue pronounced thē. Also I iudge af­ter the same man­ner. So I iudge like­wise of Aristotle and Isocrates, both of whom. ei­ther of which be­ing delighted with his owne course. studie, despised the other.

5 But when as. whereas I had decreed or ap­pointed. determi­ned to write som­what vnto you at this time, and ma­ny things hereaf­ter, [Page 10] I haue been most wil­ling. desi­red to make my en­trance from that. to beginne with that especi­ally, which vvas both most apt. fitte for your age, and most weighty, or of most importance, or most besee­ming. graue for authority; For whereas ma­ny things in phi­losophy both weightie, & pro­fitable, are dispu­ted. For whereas there are many things in philosophie both weightie and pro­fitable, disputed of accurrately, or very curiously very exactly and at large. copiously by the Philoso­phers, those which haue beene deliuered by them and giuen in precepts. deliuered & pre­scribed by them concerning Du­ties, do seeme to lye open [or reach the furthest] to extend most large ly. For no part of [our] life, neither in common mat­ters. publicke [af­faires] nor belonging to a mans selfe, or some few. in pri­uate, [Page 11] nor [in mat­ters] common pleas where matters are pleaded for all sorts, or the Iudge­ment Hall. pertaining to the common pleas where matters are pleaded for all sorts, or the Iudg­ment Hall. pleading place, nor in common pleas where matters are pleaded for all sorts, or the Iudg­ment Hall. do­mesticall busines­ses nor if you doe matters at home ought alone, nei ther if you my thing with or by your selfe. haue dealing with ano­ther, may contract [or make bargaine]. bee without Dutie. Al­so all honesty of life is set. doth [...] in practicing or exercising it. regarding it, and [all] filthines or [...]hame. disho­nestie in neglec­ting it. 3 And in­deede this questi­on is cōmon of. to all the Philoso­phers. For who is he, that in no precepts of dutie to be gi­uen, or being deliuered. giuing no precepts of Dutie, dare name himselfe a Philo­sopher? 6 But there are some [Page 12] disciplines [viz. Sects of Philoso­phers]. sects, which ouerturne. peruert all duty, hauing determi ned the ends [or limits] of good things and euill. boūds of good & euill. For hee that so deter­mineth the soue­raigne good, that it hath nothing agreeable to con [...]oined with virtue, and mea­sureth the same by his owne com modities and not by honestie, it cō ­meth to pass, that this man if hee be very like himselfe. consent vnto himselfe, and be not ouercomne sometimes. not somtimes o­uercomne by the goodnes of his nature. of na­ture, can neither loue, vse or exercise. practice friend­ship, nor iustice, nor bounty. liberality. And certainly he [Page 13] can by no means be a valiant [man] iudging. who iudgeth griefe to bee the greatest euill, or temperate determining or setting downe. who determineth plea sure to bee the chief good: which things, although they are so in readinesse, or euident. ap­parant, that the matter needeth not further debating. no disputation, yet they are debated. dis­puted of vs. by vs in another place.

These Disciplines. Sects therefore, vnlesse they will [...] from, themselues. if they will bee agreeable to themselues, can say nothing con­cerning Dutie. neither any pre­cepts of duty can be [...]et downe [as] firme, stable, &c. Neither can any precepts of Dutie [which are] sure. firm, stable, & conioy­ned or coupled. agree­able [Page 14] to nature, be set downe but ey­ther of them. by thē who [affirm] only [ho­nesty] [to be desi­re [...]] or by them who say. hold honesty to bee most earnestly de­sired for it selfe. that honesty is especi­ally to be desired for it selfe. And therefore that doctrine [or the right of giuing precepts] of dutie, doth p [...]o­ly belong. the gi­uing precepts thereof, is proper of. pecu­liar to the Stoiks, and Academiks. and Peripatetiks, because the opini­on of Aristo, Pyr­rho and H [...]rellus, hath beene hissed out of the schooles. his­sed out lōg agoe; who neuertheless should haue. might haue had their right or due. lawfull li­berty, of disputing. discour­sing concerning Dutie, if they had [Page 15] left any choise of matters. things, that ther might be. haue bin an entrance to the finding out of du­tie. 7 Therefore tru­ly wee doe follow chiefely the Sto­iks at this time, and in this questi­on. We there­fore at this time, and in this questi­on, doe chiefly follow the Stoiks: not as expounders or translaters. Interpre­ters, but as vvee are accustomed. wont, we will draw out of their fountaines, so much as shall seem good by any meanes. by any meanes shall seem good, in our iudge­ment and arbitre­ment [or opini­on] accor­ding to our mind and iudgement.

Chap. 2.

q It pleaseth [or liketh] therefore.* I think it therfore meet, sith all my disputati­on [or the whole dispute following] all my discourse shal bee concerning du­ty. of Duty, to describe or set downe. define before. first what duty is: 2 which I wonder. maruell to haue beene omitted of Pane­tius. that Panetius preter­mitted. 3 For eue­rie institution or booke of giuing precepts. treatise of any. cō ­cerning any mat­ter, which is taken in hand. vn­dertaken from reason. viz by an order­ly course. accor­ding to reason, ought to come or pro­ceede from a de­finition. begin with a definition, that it may be vn­derstood, what it is concerning which the dis­course is. wherof it is disputed or in­treated. discoursed.

Chap. 3.

All the question. EVery questi­on concer­ning Dutie, is double [or of two sorts. be­longeth to one of these two kindes▪ One kinde is which appertaineth to the determinat, one of good. ende of good things: the other [kinde] is. the other which is placed. consisteth in precepts; by [Page 20] which the vse of life may bee confirmed into all parts. the course of [man [...]] life may be framed for eue­ry condition there­of: Examples of the former kinde are of this sort▪ or there are such like exam­ples of, &c. Of the for­mer kinde, there are such like exam­ples▪ as these fol­lowing. [...]hether all Duties be per­fect? Whether one Dutie bee not greater then ano­ther? and which are of the same kinde. and such as are of the same kinde. But of What Duties precepts are deliue­red those Duties whereof precepts are giuen, although they ap­pertain to the attaining of the greatest good. the end of good, yet that doth lesse appeare, because they seeme rather to belong rather to [...]e institution [or orderin [...]] of the common life. to belong to the framing of the common kind of life: concerning [Page 21] which it is to bee expres­sed of vs. we are intreate. to shew our mindes in these bookes.

And also there is another diuision of Duty. There is moreo­uer another diuisiō of Dutie. For there is saide [to bee] a certaine meane. middle and a perfect Du­tie. I suppose vvee may call [that] the right. perfect Du­tie which the Gre­cians mame [...]: but they call this common office [...]. but this [we may call] a meane or com­mon. mid­dle [Dutie] which they call [...]. And they define those [Duties] thus: that they define that which is right, to be a perfect Du-Dutie. But they say, that that is a middle Duty. to be a middle Dutie, which wherefore it is done, &c. for w^ch a probable rea­son [Page 22] may bee ren­dered, wherefore it is done.

Chap. 4.

Therefore there is a triple [or three­fold] aduisēent [or maner of aduising] in taking counsell, as it seemeth to Pa­netius. THe delibera­tion then of taking counsell is of three sorts, as Panetius thinketh. For first [men] doe doubt, whether that which falleth into deli­beration, or com­meth to be consi­dered of [or to bee weighed.] commeth to bee consulted of, bee honest to bee done or dishonest. In cōsidering wher­of, their mindes are oft distracted into contrarie sentences. o­pinions. [Page 23] And then or in the next place. Second­ly, they search out or ad­vise. inquire or consult, vvhether the thing whereof they take aduice, may farther [them] for the commodi­tie and pleasantness of life, for riches and store or abundance. ability and plentie of [all] things, for wealth and power, by which things. where­by they may both helpe themselues & their friends. theirs; all vvhich deliberation falleth into the respect. vnder the consi­deration of profit.

3 The third kind of doubting is, whenas that thing which seemeth pro­fitable, is thought to be contrary to honestie. fight with ho­nestie. For whenas profit doth seem to snatch to it selfe, [Page 24] [and] of the other side, contrarily honestie, to recall. call backe againe vnto it selfe▪ it commeth to passe, that the minde is haled to and fro. distrac­ted in deliberating or aduising. deliberati­on, and bringeth a doubtfull. perplexed studie. care of thinking or deli­berating. imagination. 2 Whereas, to passe by. o­mit any thing in diuiding, is a very great fault, tvvo things are ouer [...]lipped. preter­mitted in this diui­sion: for neither are wont to deliberate onely, &c. for men are not onely wont to deliberate whether the matter bee ho­nest or dishonest; 1 but also two honest things being pro­pounded. of two honest things pro­pounded, whether is the honester; 2 and also of two profitable things [Page 25] layde before [vs] vvhether is more profitable. So what reason [or manner of adui­sing] he thought to be &c. that conside­ration, which hee thought to be three foulde, is found to owe, or that [...]t ought. meete to be diui ded into fiue parts▪ First, then wee must dispute. wee are to intreat of hone­stie; but, two man­ner of waies: then by a like reason, or as many waies. in like sort of profit; afterwards. lastly, of the comparison of them. comparing of them together.

Chap. 5.

[Page 24] [...] [Page 25] [...] [Page 28] IT is giuen to * e­uery kinde of liuing creatures by Nature in the beginning or first of all from the beginning, each creature should saue it selfe. to de­fend it selfe, life and body, and auoide or flie from. to shun those things which seeme hurt­full; and also to seek out & prepare all things whatso­euer are necessarie to preserue life. to liuing: as, fee­ding, as dens or hiding places. dens, and other. other things of the same kinde.

2 An appetite. earnest de­sire also of coniunction, co­pulation or ingen­dering. com­ming together for the cause of breeding. pro­creation is common thing of all. com­mon to all liuing creatures, and also a certaine loue. care of those creatures. things [Page 29] which are pro [...]reated or brought forth. bred.

Buth this doth differ chiefly is the speciall difference betweene man and beast. 1 because this. For that the beast applieth. ben­deth it self so much as it is mooued by sense, vnto that thing onely which is at hand, & which is present, very little percei­uing that which is past. what is past or to come: but man because he is indued with rea­son o [...] vnderstan­ding. partaker of reason, whereby he seeth things that follow, or conse­quents or sequels. what will follow, he. percei­ueth the begin­nings and causes of things, also he is not ig­norant. neither is ignorant of the progresses. proceedings of them, and as it were foregoings or forerunners. things going be­fore [Page 28] them, he com­pareth similitudes or semblances. things that are like, and adioyneth & knits together things to come to. vvith things present, considereth or obserueth. seeth easily the course of [his] whole life, and pre­pareth thin [...]s ne­cessary to rule or gouern it. to the lea­ding thereof.

2 to the liuing of it. Moreouer theq And. same Nature doth reconcile or gain. win man to man by the power. force of reason, to both to a fellow­ship of speech and a fellowship of life. a soci­ety both of speech and of life, & doth breed first of all. [...] a certaine chiefe. speciall loue towards them which are procreated. begot­ten; and infor­ceth that a company. compa­nies of men are wil­ling [Page 29] to bee celebrated or ga­thered by many to­gether. assem­bled amongst thē ­selues, and obey themselues. bee al­so seruiceable vnto▪ one another: and for those causes [in­forceth them] to studie to prouide those things, which may minister suffici­ently. furnish them both to cloathing and food or liuing. for appa­rell and also for su­stenance; and that not for themselues alone, but for their wife. wiues, children and others, whom it hath deare and ought to defend who are deare vnto them, and vvhom they ought to de­fend: which care also doth stir vp the mindes. doth also stir vp mens spirits, and doth make them greater to ma­nage their affaires. more couragious to doe their busi­nesse. 3 Also the [Page 28] [...] [Page 29] [...] [Page 28] [...] [Page 29] [...] [Page 32] the inquiry and searching out of the truth is a speciall or chiefe property of man. is espe­cially proper of man. vn­to man. There­fore when wee are* void of necessarie free from necessa­rie businesses and cares, then we couet. de­sire to see, heare and learne somewhat. some­thing; and wee ac­countAl. cogitation. the Al know­ledge of things ei­ther secret. hidden or wonderous. admirable [to be] necessarie to a blessed life. to liue well and blessedly. of which it i [...] ga­thered, that what is true. &c. Wherevpon it is vnderstood, what thing [soeuer] is true, simple, and pure. sincere, that to be. that is the fittest to the nature of man.

4 There is adioy­ned to this. There is a cer­taine earnest longing for. desire of [Page 33] soueraintie adioy­ned to this couetous desire. loue of espying or fin­ding out. seeing the truth, that a minde well framed of nature. informed by Nature, is willing to obey no man, but one instructing. com­mandingq [a man] or teach­ing, or commanding. gouer­ning iustly and law­fully for the cause of [his] commoditie, wherein standeth. for [his] commoditie sake: whereof ariseth. appea­reth [that] great­nesse of courage and the contempt of humane things. worldly vani­ties. 5 Neither indeede is that. this a small force. power of Nature & Reason, that this one liuing creature doth per­ceiue what Order is, what becommeth. is seem­ly in deedes and in [Page 34] wordes, what measure [is to be obserued] in de [...]ds and words. what a measure is. And therefore no other liuing creature per­ceiueth the beauty, grace. faire­nesse, comelinesse and conuenience or agreement. proportion of the partes of those same things which are percei­ued by sight.

Which similitude or pro­portion. resem­blance, Nature & Reason transporting. conuey­ing from the eyes vnto the minde, doth think fairenesse or beautie. com­linesse, steadfastnesse. constancy [and] order also to be kept. to bee also obserued, much more in counsells and in deedes; and bewareth or ta­keth heed. is heedfull lest [...] doe any thing. that it doth not any thing vncomlily or womanishly. ffe­minately; also that [Page 35] it do not nor thinke any thing. neither do not imagine. thinke any thing sensually. wantonly, both in all opinions and. or deedes. Of which things, that honest thing. ho­nestie which vvee seeke is framed. forged and made: which although it be not made noble. honoured, yet let it bee honoura­ble: que for enim. for wee say truly, though it be praised of no man, yet it to be laudable. it is prayse­worthie by Nature. you see indeed. You see doubt­lesse (son Marke) the very forme and as it were the face of honestie: which if it could be beholden with the eyes, it would stirre vp (as Plato saith) admirable loues. a maruelous loue [Page 36] of wisdome.

Chap. 6.

BVt All which is ho­nest. euery part or du­tie of honesty. whatso­uer thing is honest, ariseth out of som [part] of the foure parts. springeth out of some one of [these] foure branches or heads fountaines. 1 For it is occupied or con­uersant. exercised either in the full perceiuing or in [...]ght, o [...] searching out. wise [Page 37] perceiuing of the truth and cunning or po­licie. skilful­nesse: or in pre­seruing the fellowship. soci­ety of men, and gi­uing to euerie bodie his right. euery one that which is his owne; and in the faithfulnesse of things contracted; viz faithfull dea­ling in all maner of couenants. faithfull keeping of contracts; or in the strength or worth greatnesse & power of a high and incon­querable minde. hauty & inuincible cou­rage; or else in the order and mea­sure of all things which are done and which are spoken. & spoken, in which is in. wher­in consisteth moderation or discretion. mo­destie and tempe­tance. 2 Which fower although they be tied or linked, knit wrapped and folden one within another. intangled to­gether amongst themselues, yet certaine kindes certaine seuerall [Page 38] kindes of Duties spring or proceed. doe growe out of euery one of them: as, out of that part which was descri­bed first, wherein wee place wisedom and prudence, is in, viz. issueth out. there is the sear­and inuention. finding out of the truth; and this is the proper office or work. function of that vertue. For as eue­one perceiueth most of all or e­specially. most clearely, what is truest in e­uery matter, and he that can. can both se [...] and expresse or render giue a reason most wittily and most readily, q he is wont to be reputed worthily. to be right­ly accounted the most prudent and wise. 3 Wherfore truth is the subiect thereof. is subiect [Page 39] to his, as the mater which it handleth, and in which it is conuersant or oc­cupied. exercised. But necessities are assigned or are the subiect. propounded to the other three vertues, to get and keepe those things, in which the acti­on of life is contai­ned. wherby the trade of [mans] life is maintained; that both the societie of men and coniunction. neigh­bourhood may be preserued, and his excellencie and greatnesse of cou­rage may appeare. shine a­broad, both in in­creasing of riches or wealth sub­stance, and getting commodities both to himselfe & his [friends] his, and also much more in despising these same things. [Page 40] Also order, & con­stancy, and mode­ration,q stead fastnesse, kee­ping of a measure. and those things which are like vnto these, are exercised in that kinde, vnto which a certaine action is to be added. adioyned, not onely an tossing or exer­cising. oc­cupying of the mind. For we adding or kee­ping measure. ap­plying a certaine meane and order to these things which are handled or med­led with. practi­ced in [our] life, shall keepe. obserue both honestie and com­linesse.

Chap. 7.

And or but. NOw of the foure chiefe heads or common places. pla­ces into which wee haue diuided the nature and force or strength power of honesty; that first which consi­steth in the know­ledge of the truth, doth touch chiefly. especially concerne the humane na­ture or mans nature man­kinde. For we all are drawne wee are all drawne and led to a desire of knowledge and science. skill. In which to ex­cell we account it, &c. Where­in wee thinke it a [Page 42] goodly thing to passe others. excell. But we account it both euill & disho­nest, &c. But to shippe, to erre, to bee ignorant, [and] to de decei­ued, wee account it both an euill thing. euill and dishonest. In this kinde [of vertue] both naturall. being both natu­rall and honest, two vices. faults must be shunned. are to be auoided: the one, that we haue not or ac­count not. take not things which we knowe not, as though wee knewe them. vn­knowen for know­en, and assent vnto them rashly. rashly as­sent vnto them. Which fault hee who will flie from. escape (and. as all ought to desire. to be willing) shall adde. must bestow both leasure. time and diligence to the matters to bee considered. considering of matters. There is another fault. The other fault is, that [Page 43] some [men] confer, or bestow. im­ploy ouergreat studie, & much diligence. too much trauell vpon things ob­scure, &c. viz. in darke and ha [...]d matters. vpon ob­scure and difficult matters, and the same [things.] same nothing necessa­rie, or needlesse. not neces­sarie▪ Which faults beeing shunned or es­chewed. auoided, what, &c. whatsoeuer dili­gence and care shal be put. spen [...] in things honest and wor­thy of knowledge, it, the [...]. shall be pra [...]led by right. rightly commended: as we haue heard [...]. Sulpit [...]s [to haue trauel [...]ed much o [...] been verie excellent] in Astro­logie. as, in Astrologie, wee haue heard of Ca [...] ­us Sulpitius; in Ge­ometry, wee our selues haue known Sextus Pompeyus, many in Logicke, moe in the Ciuill Lawe; all whichq conuersant or oc­cupied. Arts are exercised in the tracing or finding out. searching [Page 44] out of the truth: through the. by the studie whereof, to bee drawen away from doing things, or following necessa­rie businesse. necessarie im­ploiments, it is a­gainst Dutie. For the all the commen­dation. whole praise of vertue doth consist in doing or per­forming good du­ties. in action: from which yet of­tentimes an intermission is made, or may be. there is an intermission, & many returnes are giuen. there are gran­ted many returnes are giuen. many recour­ses vnto the former studies. vnto studies: and also the tos­sing. yea and the stir­ring of the minde which neuer ceaseth. re­steth, may keepe vs. con­tinue vs in the stu­dies of thinking or con­templation. meditatiō, euen without our labour. trauell. But eue▪ thought and mouing. cogitation and motion of the minde is conuersant. ought to [Page 45] be occupied either in consulting. taking aduice concerning ho­nest things. about honest matters, and per­taining to the good and blessed life. to liue well and blessedly, or in the studies of science and know­ledge. And indeed. And thus haue wee spoken of the first foun­taine of Dutie.

Chap. 8.

But of three other ver­tues. the o­ther three [vir­tues] remayning, that reason [or consideration] doth extend it selfe most largely. that part exten­deth it selfe the farthest, wherein there is conta [...]ned the soci­etie, &c. where­in the society of men amongst thē ­selues and (as it [Page 46] were) the commu­nitie of life is con­tained; whereof there are two parts: Iustice, in which. wherein is the greatest splendour. brightnesse of vertue; whereof. which good men [...]re named. haue their name, and bountifulnesse. Beneficence ioy­ned to this. hereunto, which s [...]me it is lawful to call. wee may call either gentlenesse. bountie or libe­rality. But the first. principall dutie of Iustice is, that not any man hurt any one. no man hurt a­nother, vnlesse [he bee] prouoked by an wrong. iniurie: The next, or se­condly. And then that hee vse common [things] as common, and priuate [things] as his owne, peculiar for himselfe, or pri­uate. his owne. But no. How­beit [Page 47] no things are priuate by nature, but either by an­cient possession or tenure. occupation, as [of them] who in time past came into waste grounds or places without in­habitant. empty [pla­ces:] or by victo­rie, a [...] [of them] who obtained in warre. got [things] by warre: or by lawe, couenant, condition, lot.

of which it is don. Whereupon it is come to passe that the field called Ar­pinas. ground Ar­pinas is accounted the Arpinatians [field] Thusculan, of the Thusculanes. saide▪ to bee of the Arpina­tians, the field called Ar­pinas. Thus­culan [ground] of the Thusculanians. And the setting out. descrip­tion of priuate pos­sessions is like. of this sorte. like. Whereup­on, sith that because part of those things [Page 48] which had bin. were com­mon by Nature, the owne of euery one. is becomne pro­per to euery one; let euery one enioy. hold that, which hath chanced. befallen to euerie one or to himselfe. to each. If any man will couet greedi­ly* befallen him. vnto himselfe more then that, he shall breake. violate the lawe of fellowship a­mongst men. of humane societie. But be­cause (as it is no­tably written of Plato. by Plato) we are born not for our selues onely. alone, que for enim. but our Countrey doth claime. chalenge a part of our birth, our parents [clayme] a part. our parents a parte, our friends a part, and (as the Stoiks hlode. as it plea­seth the Stoiks) that all. all things which [Page 49] are bred in the earth, are created. to be crea­ted for the vse of men, and men to bee begotten. borne for mans cause. for the cause of men, that some may profit others. they amongst themselues may benefit or helpe. profit one ano­ther: In this. Herein we are bound. we ought to follow nature [as] a leader. a guide, and to bring into the midst. to bring a­broad common commodities, by exchange of Du­ties, in giuing and receiuing. taking, [and] to knit. binde together the fellowship of men amongst men. society of man with man, both by arts and by trauell, and also by riches.

Chap. 9.

Al BVt the foū ­dationAl And faithful­nesse is the founda­tion of Iustice. of Iustice is faithful­nesse: that is to say, a constancy and truth of words and all agreements. couenants: Whereupon, al­though this per­aduenture shall seeme more difficult. hard to some man, yet we may bee bolde to imitate the Stoiks, who search out studiously. diligently from whence words are deriued, and vvee [Page 51] may belieue. think that faithfulnesse is named thereof. faith­fulnesse to be cal­led, because that which was said is done. that is performed. done which was promised.

Chap. 10.

1 BVt there are two kindes of iniustice. The one [belongeth. is] of those men who bring in or doe iniurie. offer [iniury:] The o­ther of those who doe not put or driue away beate backe an iniurie from them to [Page 52] whom it is offered, if they be able.

2 For hee that makes an assault vpon any man vn­iustly, beeing stir­red vp either by choler. anger or any* perturbation. q passion, hee see­meth as it were to bring violent hands to his fellow. to lay violent hands vpon his fellowe: and hee who doth not defend no [...] [...] iniurie to be don to others defendeth not nor resisteth iniurie if hee can, is as well in fault, as if he should for­sake [his] parents or friends, or coū ­trey. 3 And in­deede those iniu­ries which are done of set purpose for the cause of h [...]rting. to hurt, doe oft times come or proceed. arise from feare: whenas hee who [Page 53] thinketh. intendeth to hurt another, feareth that except. lest vnlesse hee do that to another, himselfe shall incur some damage. should be affected or tou­ched. anno [...]ed with some discōmodity. And [for] the most part, some. ma­ny men attempt. take occasion to doe iniurie. wrong, that they may obtaine those things which they haue coueted or earnestly desired. do earnestly de­sire: in which vice. which kind of vice, coue­tousnesse doth lie open or ex­tend it selfe most largely. shew it self most euidently. Riches also, are earnestly desired, both for necessarie vses of life, and also to en­ioy pleasures. But in those in whom there is a greater courage or stomacke. more lof­tie [Page 54] minde, the co­ueting of money belongeth or hath a respect. hath an eye vn­to gratifying. power, and a­bility of riches. p [...]easu­ring [others:] as of late M. Crassus denyed that any money or any summe of money was suffici­ent, &c. any sub­stance to bee suf­ficient for him, who desired to be a Prince in the common wealth, with the fruits [or increase] whereof. if he were not a­ble to maintaine an ar [...]ie with his reuenew. with whose reue­nues he could not nourish. maintaine an ar­my. Also. Moreouer, sumptuous preparations. fur­nitures do delight, and the tricking or ador­ning. brauery of life with finenesse. ele­gancie and plenty; by which meanes. things it is effected. it commeth to passe, that the de­sire of money should be. is infinite.

[Page 55]4 Neither in­deed the amplifying or in­c [...]rease of the goods of a mans family. enlarge­ment of a mans priuate estate hur­ting no body, is to bee dispraised: but iniurie is euer­more to be fled or shunned. auoi­ded.

5 And very many. most men are brought especi­ally. excee­dingly brought that a forgetful­nesse of Iustice should take them. to forget iustice, whenas they haue or shall fall. fall into a desire of rule, honours. honour, or of glory. For that which is in Ennius (There is no sacred fellowship. holy societie, nor fide­lity of a kingdome) reacheth further. doth extend it selfe more largely. For whatsoeuer is of that sort. of such sort, in which moe cannot be cheefe. excell, therein falleth out for most part so great contention. so great [Page 56] contention is made or hap­peneth. com­meth to passe for most part therein, that it is a very hard thing to keep a holy societie. The storme raised of late by Caius Ce­sar, &c. rashnesse of Caius Caesar decla­red that of late, who peruerted or tur­ned topsie turuie. ouerturned the lawes of God and man. all diuine and humane lawes, for the cause of that principalitie for that souerain­tie which hee had imagined to him­selfe by the errour of [his] opinion. conceit.

And it is a grie­uous thing in this kinde, that the de­sires of honour, rule, power, and glorie, are for the most parte in the stoutest stomacks or brauest mindes. greatest coura­ges▪ and goodliest wits. By how much [Page 57] more it is to be looked to. wee are to take heede, lest it be any thing offended in that kinde or be­halfe. that wee offend not at all in that kinde.

Chap. 11.

BVt it verie much concerneth. it is espe­cially to bee considered in all iniustice, whether the wrong. iniurie be don with any perturbation, or vpon a hotte blood as it is called. some passi­on of the minde, which for most part is short & to a time. for the present time, or else of set purpose or consultation. of purpose and aduisedly. For those things. wrongs are easier. lesse, which *hap­penq befall. [Page 58] vpon some sodaine motion or pas­sion. moode, then such as are done deuised & thoght of b [...]fore. beeing pre­meditated & p [...]epared for. pre­pared. And thus enough hath bin spoken. haue wee spoken of bringing in or offering iniurie. doing iniurie.

Chap. 12.

1 And. MOreouer there are wont to be moe. many causes of [...]termitting. omit­ting* to defend one another. [our] defence, and of forsaking. leauing [our] Dutie.

2 For either they will not. men [Page 59] are vnwilling to take vpon them or vndergoe. to vndertake enmities or ill will. displea­sure, or trauell, or cost. charges: or else they bee so hinde­red with negli­gence, sloth, slugg [...]shnesse▪ ig­norance or cowa [...]d linesse. idle­nesse, or else by their owne priuate studies, or by cer­taine occupations. bu [...]nesses, that they suffer them to bee helplesse. for­saken, whom they ought to saue harmeless. to defend.

3 Therefore we must looke. Wee must therfore take heed▪ that wee doe not thinke, lest it be not suf­ficient. that to be sufficient, which is spoken in Plato concer­ning the Philoso­phers. of Pla­to in behalfe of the Philosophers; [them] to be iust therfore. that they are therefore iust, be­cause they are conuersant or exercised. im­ployed in tracing or search­ing out of the truth. finding [Page 60] out the truth, and because they depise. con­temne and account for no­thing or make no reckning of. set at nought those things which most part of men most men doe greedily seeke after. vehe­mently desire, [&] cōcerning which▪ for which they are wont to fight with swords, contend or braul [...]. to be at daggers drawing a­mongst thē [...]elues. For whilst they at­taine the one kinde of iustice, that they hurt no man in offering iniurie. doing of wrong, they fall into the other: for beeing letted by a desire of getting learning hindred by the studie of learning, they forsake [thē] whom they ought to defend. There­fore in truth he think­eth. hee indeed thinketh, them not about to come to the commonweale, or to in­termeddle in. that they would not en­ter into the affaires [Page 61] of the common weale, but compelled or inforced, or were they not compeld. vnlesse they were compel­led. But it were more reason that it should be done. more equall to be done with good will, without constraint. volunta­rily. For whatso­euer is well done. rightly done, that same is iust to▪ if it be done vo­luntarily. the same is thereby iust, if it be voluntarie. There be also, who either for a loue. desire of looking to their houshold affaires. sauing their sub­stance, or by a certaine hate or some grudge. for some hatred to men, do say, themselues to do, or to follow. that they themselues to do, or to follow. looke vnto their own busines; lest they may be thought. should seeme to do wrong to any man: who whilst they are free from the one kind of iniustice, doe runne into the o­ther. For they for­sake [Page 62] the fellowship. society of life, because they bestowe nothing of study, nothing of labour, nothing of sub­stance. no studie vpon it, no labour, nor sub­stance. Because therefore after we haue decla­red the two kindes of iniustice. Seeing then that two kinds of iniustice being propounded, wee haue adioyned the causes of either kinde. both kindes, and haue set downe those things before, in which iustice is cō ­tained▪ we shalbe a­ble to iudge easily. easily to iudge (vnlesse we will ex­ceedingly loue or flatter our selues too much. fauour our selues) what is the dutie of euery season. For it is hard to take care of other mens matters. the care of other mens matters is difficult, although that Terentian Chremes. Chremes in Terence thinketh nothing to be strange to him of that which appertaineth to man. accoun­teth [Page 63] nothing ap­pertaining to man, to bee estranged from. strange to him. But yet. Neuerthe­lesse, because wee perceiue and feele those things more, which happen vn­to our selues, evther prosperous or crosse. ei­ther luckily, or vn­fortunately, then those things [w^ch befall happen] to o­thers, which wee beholde, as ye would say. as it were, a great way off; wee iudge o­therwise of them, then of our selues. Wherefore they commaunde or teach well. giue a good pre­cept, who forbid to doe any thing, which you doubt of, whether it bee right or wrong. For, equitie it selfe. the rig [...]t it [Page 64] is apparant. shineth by it selfe. of it selfe: but doubting declareth. signifieth a cogitation of in [...]urie. an ima­gination of wrong.

Chap. 13.

[Page 65]BVt the seasons. time doth fall out often. fall out, when those things which seeme most worthy of. meete for a iust man [...] and him whom wee call a good man, are changed & become cleane o­therwise. made contrarie: as, it may be iust, &c. as, not to restore a thing committed to vs to keepe; also not to performe a pro­mise made to a furious. mad man; and sometimes to deny and not keep those things which ap­pertaine to truth and vnto fidelity, may be iust. For it becommeth. it is meet [them] to be referred. that they bee referred to those foundati­tions of iustice▪ [Page 66] which I laid down in the beginning:

1 First that hurt be done to no man. that no man be hurt▪ next. and then that it be serued to the common profit, viz. that the cōmon commoditie be pre­ferred. there be a respect had to the common cō ­moditie. duty is changed when as &c. When these things are changed by the time, Dutie is chan­ged, that remaines not. it is not alwayes the same alike.

for some pro­mise may fall out and couenant. For there may fall out some pro­mise & couenant, that it may be vn­profitable to be effected. which to be per­formed, may bee vnprofitable ei­ther to him to whom it is promi­sed, or else to him that. who promised it. For if (as it reported in sto­ries. is in the Fables) Neptune had not performed. done that, which [Page 67] he had promised to See the marginall note in the latine bookes. Theseus, Thes. had not beene depriued. bereft of his sonne Hip­politus. For of [his] three boones. wishes (as it is written) this was the third, which he being angry. in his fu­ry hee asked. wished for the death. concerning the death of Hippoli­tus: which beeing obtayned hee fell into the greatest mourning. most grie­uous lamentation.

Therefore neither those pro­mises are. nei­ther are those pro­mises to bee fulfilled. kept, which are vnprofi­table to them, to whome you haue promised. made them; nor if they hurt you more, then they profit. benefit him to whome you haue [Page 68] made the promi­ses. promised. It is against Dutie, that the greater losse should be. the greater harme. damage to be put before or pre­ferred to the lesse. rather ad­mitted then the lesse: as, if you shall appoint or promise. haue appointed that you will come to be an ad­uocate or counsel­lour to speake for a­nother in his mat­ter which is in hand. your self to come as an aduocate to any man vpon a present occasion, and in the meane time your sonne shall begin to bee grieuously sicke, it cānot be against Dutie, not to doe. per­forme that which you promised. said; and he to whom the it was promised. pro mise was made, should more depart. swerue from Du­tie, if hee complaine him­selfe to be left desti­tue. should complaine that he was disappointed.

Now who seeth [Page 69] not not to be stoode to, or that we are not to stand to, or that it is not meet to &c. that it is not necessarie to stand to those promises, which any man. a man hath promised, beeing either constrained by feare, or decei­ued by guile? most of which things. which things in­deed, most of them are freed. for most parte, most of them are freed. are dischar­ged by the Chancery or Court of consci­ence. Pretors Court, and many of them by Lawes, or statute­lawes. sta­tutes.

Chap. 14.

[Page 70] Also wrongs are oft times. MOreouer, ther doe oft times iniuries arise by a certaine cauillation, & too craftie but. and naughty or wre­sted misconstruing. sub­tile interpretation of the lawe.

1 Whereupon that [saying] viz. The chiefest or vtmost, or the vi­gour of lawe. Extreamity of lawe is the chiefe. ex­treamest iniurie, is now made. becomne a worne. common pro­uerbe in [our] speech or com­munication. talke. 2 In which kinde many things are done amisse, euen in the common­weale. in the com­mon-weale mat­ters: as hee who when league of peace. truce wasq truce of a hun­dreth and thirtie daies were couenā ­ted with the enemy taken with the e­mie for a hundreth and thirtie dayes, [Page 71] destroyed, wasted or ouer [...]anne. spoiled his fields by night. land in the night, be­cause the truce of daies and not of nights were couenanted the truce was takē for daies, and not for nights. neither truly. No nor yet indeed ou [...]s. our countrie­man is to bee allowed of. ap­prooued of, if it bee true, Quintus Fabius that Quintus Fabius Labeo or any other (for I haue no­thing but by heare­say) beeing giuen. ap­pointed by the Senate to bee an vmpire or daies­man. arbitratour to the Nolanes. be­tween the Nolanes and them of Na­ples. and Neapolitanes about. concerning the bounds of their Land, when hee came to the place, to haue spoken with either of them seuerally. did commune with them both a­part, that they [Page 72] should not do nor desire any thing greedily. couetously, and that they would ra­ther set backe or retire goe backe then encroche one vp­on another. go forward. which when ei­ther of them had done. When Al both of them had done it, there was a par­cell of ground, &c. set out or bounded. some groundAl on both sides. was left in the midst. Therefore hee so q limited their bounds, as they had yeelded. saide; [and] adiudged that which was left in the midst, vnto the people of Rome.

This verely is to deceiue, not to iudge. Wherefore such subtilty is to be eschewed. auoided in e­uery thing, or case. matter.

There bee also certaine Duties to [Page 73] bee obserued euen towards them, of whom you haue receiued wrong.

For there is a measure both in reuenge and chastisement. of reuenge and puni­shing. And [indeed] I wot not. know not whe­ther it be sufficient him who began to repent of his in­iury. that hee who prouoked. began should [onely] repent of his iniury, but [that hee be] punished, that hee commit not any like thing. the like of­fence after, and o­ther also may bee the slower to doe wrong.

Chap. 15.

1 Also. MOreouer the laws of warre. armes are to be preserued in any wise. specially kept in a common weal.

2 For whereas there are two kind [...] of contention, one by disputing or de­bating the mat­ter. reasoning, a­nother by violence. force; and whereas that is [Page 76] proper. the property of man, this of beasts; wee must fly to the later, is. when wee cannot vse the for­mer.

3 Wherfore truly. in very deed, warres are to bee vndertaken. taken in hand to this end and purpose. for that. this, that it may liued [of vs.] we may liue in peace without iniurie.

4 And the victo­ry beeing gotten, they ought to be saued. they are to bee preserued who haue not bin cruell in war. beene cruell nor fierce, sauage or outragious. vnmer­cifull in fight: as our ancestours re­ceiued euen into [their] Citie, the Thusculans, Equies. E­quians, Volscians, Sabines, [and] Her­nicks; but they [Page 77] tooke away [or spoiled] vtterly. vtterly razed Carthage and Nu­mance. I would not Co­ [...]inth. I would they had not so razed Corinth: but I belieue them to haue followed the opportunity of the place especially. I take it, that they chiefly respe­cted the situation of the place, lest the very place might at any time prouoke them to make warre. incourage them to mooue warre. Truly in my opi­nion. Certainly in my minde, we are alwaie to consult for peace. we ought alwaies to aduise for peace, which shall haue no deceipt. which may be free from feare of treachery. Wherein if it had been o­beyed vnto me, or if I had bin obeyed. if they would haue yeel­ded vnto me, wee should haue had, although not the best [common­weale.] best, yet some Common vveale, which now is [Page 78] none. But whereas it is to be proui­ded for them. you are to pro­uide for their safe­tie whome you haue ouercomne. shall subdue by force; then they who their weapons be­ing laide away fly to the fidelitie of the Emperours. thē they es­pecially, who yeel­ding vp their wea­pons, fly vnto the mercy of the go­uernours, are to bee receiued, al­though Aries, is an engine called a ram: which serued in warre to beate downe walls. the ram hath smitton downe. battered the wall. in which thing. In which point, Iustice hath beene so verie greatly. so much regarded at or with ours amongst our men, that they who had receiued vnto their fideli­tie. to [their] mercy Cities or Nations ouercome, sub­dued. conquered in warre, should bee patrones of them, viz. of those cities and na­tions. of the same, after the manner. by the cu­stome of [our] an­cestours. [Page 79] And truly. in very truth the equitie. iu­stice of warre is set downe. described most sincerely. holily in the law of the heralds who were to pro­clame warre. fe­ciall lawe of the people of Rome. of which. Whereby it may bee vnderstoode, no war to be iust. that no warre is iust, but which ei­ther is done. mooued, things being first claymed. demands beeing first made; or which is proclaimed be­fore, and denounced solem­ly or published. bidden by defiance. Pom­pilius the Emperour. the General [of the Romanes] kept a Prouince, in whose armie the sonne of Ca­to, a nouice. Ca­toes sonne, being a young souldier, did play the souldier. did serue. But. And whenas it seemed good to. plea­sed Pompilius to send away or dis­charge. dismisse one [Page 80] legion of soul­diers. band, he dismis­sed also Catoes son, who serued in the same band. But whenas hee remay­ned still in the ar­my, for the loue of fighting. of the warres, Cato writ vnto Pompilius that if he should suffer. suffered him to tarry. remaine in the army, hee should binde him by a second oath of war­fare. sweare him again; because the former [oath] being lost, hee might not fight by right &c. he being discharged of his former oath, might not lawfully fight with the enemies. So chiefe obseruati­on they had. great regarde there was in mouing or mana­ging their warre. ma­king warre. There is an epistle [extant] a Letter of Marcus Cato being an olde man. the elder, to Marcus his sonne; where­in he wrote himselfe to haue heard. that [Page 81] hee had heard, him to haue bin dismissed. that hee was dis charged by the Consull, whenas he was a souldier. being a souldier in Mace­donia in the Per­sian warre. Hee therfore admonisheth him to. warneth him that he take heede. be­ware, that he enter not into the battel. the battell: for hee denyeth that it was lawful. it to bee lawfull [for him] who is not a sworne souldier. a souldier to fight with the ene­mie.

2 And in good truth do obserue. certain­ly I note that. this, that hee who was a stub­borne enemy by a proper name or by a proprietie of speech. who by his proper name was perduellis [id est] an open enemy. a stubborn enemie, was called hostis [meaning] a souldier or man of war. a stranger; the mildenesse of the [Page 82] wordes asswaging the sorowfulnesse. haynousness of the matter. thing. For he was called hostis amongst. with our ance­stours, whom now wee name peregri­nus, [a stranger.] The twelue tables declare [the same] in these words, Aut, &c. Aut status dies cum hoste; and a­gaine, Aduersus hostem aeterna au­thoritas. What may bee added to this gentlenesse or moderation. mildenesse, to call him by so soft or milde. faire a name, with whome you wage warre. make warre?

Although long continuance pro­cesse of time hath now made that name more odious. hard: for it hath. is departed from the name of [Page 83] Peregrinus, [that is to say, a stran­ger] and standeth. remained pro­perly remai­neth properly in him, viz. stands for &c. for him who [...] armour of the contrary part. beareth armes against any one.

3 But. Also vvhen it is contended, viz. the contētion is there is fighting concerning em­pire, viz. about go­uerning or ruling, who shall rule. for soueraigntie, and glory is sought by warre; yet it be­hooueth alwaies, the causes to be the same altogether which I said a little before, to be the iust causes of war. that there be the very same iust cau­ses of warre, which I spake of a little before. But those warres to which. in which the glory of empire or bearing rule. so­ueraigntie is pro­pounded, are to be made lesse bitterly. with lesse cruelty. For as when wee contend ciuilly. in ciuill matters, wee doe one vvay [Page 84] if it bee against an enemie: otherwise if against a competi­ [...]. if he be an enemy [ [...]ith whome wee contend]: other­wise if a [...]uter against vs. a compe­titour: [for] the strife of ho­nour & dignitie is with the one. with the one the strife [is] for honour & dignitie, with the other of the head. for life and honestie. Thus warre was waged. holden with the Celtibers, and with the Cim­brians as with ene­nemies, whether should bee. liue, not whether should [...]eare rule: but war was holden with the [...]atines. with the Latines, Samites, Samnites, Pe [...]os. Carthagineans, [and] with Pirrhus, it was foughten. the fight was a­bout the [...], viz. who should beate rule. Empire. The Penes. Carthagine­nans [were] truce­breakers. Anniball [Page 85] [was] cruell, the rest [were] more iust. That indeed is, &c. That is doubtlesse a worthy sentence or speeche. a no­ble saying of Pir­rhus, concerning cap­tiues to be restored. about resto­ring of prisoners.

Neither require I golde to my selfe. for my self, neither shall he giue me any summe of mony or hire. price;

Neither playing the hu [...] ­sters with war. [are we such as] making war. make a gaine of warre, but making war. warriours.

Let both of vs trie out or fight for our life. make triall for our life, with the iron. sworde, not vvith golde.

Whether the mistresse will haue it, &c. Lady Fortune will haue you or mee to raigne, or what fortune may bring. or vvhat may betide;

Let vs try by vertue. valour, and with­all [Page 86] take this speech. an­swere;

the vertue of whom. Whose man­hood the fortune of war shall be spared. shall spare, Account it for a guift. I haue determi­ned to spare their freedome.

It is determined, me to spare. Accept it: and I giue it, with the great Gods willing. for I giue it, with the good liking of the great gods.

Truly a rega [...]l [or kingly] sen­tence, and worthy the stocke of the Eacidanes. A Princely saying indeed, and well beseeming Al the lineage ofSee the margent Latin. the Eacidanes.

4 And also if euerie one by themselues. Likewise also if And also if euerie one by themselues. priuate men, led or drawne by the times, viz. vpon such extremities. inforced by oc­casions, shall pro­mise any thing to the enemie, fidelitie is to be kept in the same ve­rie thing. they must keepe their promise therein: as Regulus, being taken by the Car­thagineans [Page 87] in the first war of Carthage Punick-war: [who] when hee had bin sent. was sent to Rome concerning the interchanging. about the exchā ­ging of prisoners, and had sworne himself to return. that hee would returne; first, as he came. as soone as he came, he thought not in the Senate, the prisoners to be re­stored. his aduice vvas in the Senate Se­nate house, that the prisoners shold not bee restored: afterwards, when he should haue bin retained or stopped of his. he was staied by his kinsfolkes and friends, chused rather. hee was more willing to re­turne to punish­ment, then to deceiue or fru­strate his fidelity. breake his pro­mise giuen to the enemie. And in the second Punike warre, after the Cannas battel or fielde, viz. battel fought the [...]e. the [Page 88] field at Canes, left in the com­mon treasure, or to pay to the cōmon treasure, or disfran­chiled & put from their freedome to pay as strangers. verb. which ten An­nibal sent to Rome bounde with an oth themselues to returne, except they had obtained concerning the re­deeming of those which were taken; the Censor [...] left them all in fines [or to pay yeerely fines] who had for­s [...]orne, so long as any of them liued. verb. the Censors left in the com­mon treasure, or to pay to the cōmon treasure, or disfran­chiled & put from their freedome to pay as strangers. verb. which ten An­nibal sent to Rome bounde with an oth themselues to returne, except they had obtained concerning the re­deeming of those which were taken; the Censor [...] left them all in fines [or to pay yeerely fines] who had for­s [...]orne, so long as any of them liued. sessed all those tenne at a yearely fine so long as a­ny of them liued, vvho had forsworn themselues: which Anniball sent to Rome bound by oath, that they should returne, ex­cept they obtained the ransoming of those that were prisoners [at Rome:] nor lesse [or and no lesse] him who had found a fault by the decerning of his oth. & him likewise who had found an excuse by deluding his oath: For vvhen as hee had gone out by An­nibals licence. got­out of the Campe by the permission of Annibal, within a little while after. here­turned a little after, b for that he sayd,q because. [Page 89] himselfe to haue forgotten. hee had forgot­ten I knowe not what. And then being gone [again] out of the campe, hee thought him­selfe discharged of his oth. freed from his oath; and [ [...]o] hee was in wordes, but indeed hee was not. For you ought to thinke in fidelitie [or giuing your faithfull word] it is to bee considered alwaies in promi­ses, vvhat a man haue meant [or ought to haue meant.] meant, not what hee said. But the most notable ex­ample. greatest example of iustice towardes an enemie, is constituted or appointed. vvas shewed by our an­cestours. Whereas a traitor hauing run away from Pyrrhus. a runnagate trai­tour from Pyrrhus had promised the Senate, himselfe to giue poison to the king, [or to poison the king.] that hee would giue the king poyson and [Page 90] kill him, He, or the Senate. the Se­nate and Caius Fa­bricius deliuered that runnagate trai­tour to Pyrrhus: so as it did not not approue by treacherie or wickednesse. the trea­cherous the death. death no not of an enemie, both mighty and mouing warre of his owne ac­cord. vn­prouoked. And thus it is spoken. haue we spo­ken sufficiently of warlike or warfa­ring or militarie Duties. Duties appertai­ning to warre.

Let vs also re­member, that there is a iustice to bee kept euen towards the lowest men, viz. the meanest. the basest. And the condition and fortune. estate of seruants. slaues is the basest: whom they that com­mande to vse so, as hirelings or mer­cenarie. hired seruants [Page 91] to exact. require [their] labour, and performe iust things vnto them giue them their due, do not giue precepts amisse. command a­misse. But. Moreo­uer, whereas iniury is. may bee done two manner of waies. that is to say, either by violence. force or by fraude. guile: guile seemeth to be the property of the fox. as of the Fox, force of the Lion; both of them most alienated or [...] ged from man. vn­beseeming man: yet guile deserueth. [is] worthy the greater hatred. But of all iniustice none is more worthy grieuous punish­ment or more hai­nous. more capital, thē of them, who then when they deceiue most, yet so handle the matter. doe it to the end that they may seeme good men. Concerning Iu­stice enough is said. [So [Page 92] likewise] enough is said concerning Iustice.

Chap. 16.

Let it be spoken furthermore, as it was purposed, of bountie and libera­litie. LEt vs now speake, as we had determined. purposed, of bounty and li­berality, then which certainely nothing is more beseeming or a­greeable to. befitting the na­ture of man. But. Not withstanding, it hath diuers [...]. cauti­tions. For 1 First [Page 95] [wee] must see. take heed lest our bountie. that our bountie hurt not both those themselues to whom it shall seeme to bee done bountifully. those to whom wee would seeme to be [...]oun­tifull and also o­thers: afterwards. Secondly, that our liberalitie. bountie be not greater then our substance. more, then our abilitie: Then. Thirdly, that we giue to euery one, according to their dignitie. For that is the foundation of Iustice, where­unto all these things must be applied. are to bee referred. For both they that doe a pleasure to any one which may hurt him, whom they would seeme to will or desire pleasure. willing to profit, are not to be iudged. dee­med [Page 96] bountious, nor liberall, but pestilent. pernicious flatte­rers. And also they who. that hurt others. some, that they may be liberall to others, doe fall into. are in the same iniustice, as if they should turn other mens goods into their owne. For there are: au­tem for enim. And indeede there are many and [those] in­deede. and name­ly [those who] are desirous of honor and glory, who forceablely take. catch away from some, that which they giue vainely. lauish to o­thers. These also suppose that they shall seeme boun­tifull towardes their owne. their friends, if they inrich them by any way. any meanes. [Page 97] But that is so farre off from Dutie, that nothing can be more contrarie to Dutie. We must therfore take heed, that we vse we must see there­fore that. such liberality, as may profit our friends, and hurt no body. no man. Wherefore of L. Syll [...]. L. Sil. las and C. Caesars translating. conueying of money. goods from the iust Lords or maister [...] owners vnto others. strangers, ought not to be thought liberall. liberality. For nothing is liberall which same. which is not iust. the other place of caution was, or the second caution. The second point of caution vvas, that the liberalitie. bounty should not bee greater. more then our abilitie; for that they that will bee [Page 98] more bountifull. liberall, then their substance. abili­tie doth suffer, of­fend first in that. this, that they are iniu­rious neighbours or kinsmen, next any way. to their next kin. for what riches it were more equall, &c. For they conuey those riches vnto fremfolkes. stran­gers, which it were more reason to be dealt and left to their kinsfolks. to these. There is also for the most parte in such liberalitie a greedy desire of catching and taking away. pul­ling away by iniu­rie, that store may abounde. that they may haue store to giue prodigally. lauish out to o­thers. we may also see. Moreo­uer, wee may see the most part. very many, not so liberall by na­ture, as led vvith a certaine glory. vaine [Page 99] glory, that they may seeme boun­tifull: which things may seem to come. pro­ceed rather from ostentation, then from a good will. free heart. And such a dissembling, a neerer neighbour. coun­terfeit shew is nee­rer to vanitie, then either to liberali­ty or honestie.

The third thing propoun­ded. cau­tion is, that in [our] liberality there should bee a choice. re­garde of dignitie. worthi­nesse: wherein both his manners vpon whome the benefit shall be be­stowed shall be looked vnto. are to be looked vnto, and also his minde or good will. affection towardes vs, and community and felowshippe of life, [Page 100] and kindnesses conferred. performed be­foreq good turnes, or seruices or duties. for our com­modities: to our profit. All which, it is a thing to be wished. to bee wished that they may meet together, that all which may concur it is to be wished. con­curr: If not, the moe causes and the greater, shall haue more weight [in them].

Chap. 17.

[Page 101]ANd because it is liued, leade our life. we liue not with perfect men, and throughly or absolutely wise. fully vvise, but with those. such in whom it is done verie well. it is very well, if they be. if there bee [in them] resem­blances of vertue; I thinke. take this also meete to be vnderstoode. con­sidered, no man to be de­spised. that wee despise no man, in whom any signification, or shewe. signe of vertue doth ap­peare. And euerie one to be so honoured especially. Also that euery man be specially so regar­ded, as each shall bee chiefely adorned more speci­ally graced with these milder ver­tues, [viz.] moderation. mo­destie, temperance, and that same iu­sliceq wee haue spoken much before. of which *ma­ny [Page 102] things are spo­ken alreadie. For a valiant minde and great. a hauty & a great spirit. courage is for the most parte more feruent, in a man not perfect nor wise. who is too short in perfection and wisedome: [but] these viz. modestie, temperance and iustice. vertues seeme rather to touch. appertaine to a good man. And these things [may be considered] in manners.

Chap. 18.

[Page 103] And. NOw concer­ning the good wil w^ch euery one beareth. hath towards vs; that is the chief point in Dutie, that we giue most to him, of whome wee are beloued most. But let vs iudge wee must measure good will, not af­ter the guise or fashion. manner of young men, by a certaine feruency. heate of loue; but rather by assurednesse and steadfastnesse. stabilitie and constancie.

Chap. 19.

BVt if the de­serts [of men] be such, that fauour is not to bee gone into or to besought, but to be requited. we are not to seeke to creepe into fauour, but to requite kindnesse; a cer­taine greater care is to be added. vsed, for. be­cause there is no Dutie more neces­sarie then thankfulnesse. requi­ting of thankfulnesse. thanks.

For if Hesiode cō ­mandes to restore those things which you haue receiued to vse or occupy. bor­rowed for your vse, with a greater. larger mea­sure, if that you can; what then ought wee to doe being prouoked by a benefit. kindenesse? Ought wee not to [Page 105] imitate the fruitfull. fertile fields; which bring much more then they haue recei­ued? For if vvee doubt not. stick not to be­stowe kindnesses vpon them, whom wee hope will profit vs. do vs good hereafter; what ones. what manner of men ought wee to be towards them, who haue done vs good alreadie?

For whereas there bee two kindes of liberality, one of giuing. bestowing a be­nefit, the other of requiting, whether we will giue or no is in our owne power, choice it is in our owne power vvhether wee vvill giue or no: [but] not to restore is not lawfull for a good man. it is not lawefull for a good man not to restore, [Page 106] if so that he can do it without iniurie. There are also choises. re­spects to be had of benefits receiued: neyther [is there any] doubt, but most is due to each greatest, or who hath done vs the greatest kindenesse. to e­uerie the greatest. Wherein yet it is especially to bee considered. weighed, with what minde, affec­tion, and good will euery one. any man doth it. hath done it. For many men doe many things of or through. in a cer­taine rashnesse. headinesse, without iudgement, reason discreti­on or measure, to­wards all [alike:] or else being stirred vp by force of minde. carri­ed with violence of affection, as with a certaine rushing. sudden winde: which kindenesses. be­nefits [Page 107] are not to be accounted so great, as those which are deferred or giuen offered with iudgement, considerately. adui sedly and constant­ly. But in gratifying any. bestow­ing of a benefit, and in requiting kindnesse, (if [all] other things bee alike. correspondent) this is chiefly of Duty. this is a princi­pall point of Duty; that as euerie one. any one stādeth especially. most in neede of [our] aide. helpe, so to helpe him especially. Which is done by the most. of verie many contrariwise. clean contrary.

For from whome. of whom they hope for most, although he haue no neede of these things of them, yet they [Page 108] respect him. serue him chiefly. espe­cially.

Chap. 20.

BVt the fellowship, loue. socie­tie, and neigh­bourhood of men shalbe preserued best. best main­tained, if as each, or any one. euery one shall bee the neerest [vnto vs] so most liberalitie shall be bestowed on him. we shall bestow most kindnesse. liberalitie vpon him. But it seemeth wee must to repeate more deepely. fetch somewhat [Page 109] further, what are the beginnings of. naturall first things or principles of nature prin­ciples of neigh­bourhood & the fellowship of man. hu­mane societie: for, the first [princi­ple.] the first is that, which appeareth. is seene in the societie of all mankinde. And the bond thereof is reason & speech: which winneth one man to another. reconci­leth men amongst themselues, and ioyneth them to­gether in a certaine naturall societie by teaching, learning, communicating. conferring, disputing. rea­soning, and iudg­ing. Neither are we further a­way in any thing. do wee differ more in any thing from the nature of sauage. wilde beasts: in vvhich wee say oft times strength to be i [...] ▪ that there is for­titude, [Page 110] as in horses, [and] in lions; but wee doe not say [iustice, equity, or goodnesse to be in them. that there is in them] iustice, equi­tie [or goodnesse:] for they are void of reason and speech. And sure­ly this is the societie. fel­lowshippe which this is the largest spreading fellow­ship. extendeth most largely to men a­mongst thēselues, & to all amongst them­selues. amongst all: in the which a community of all things, which Nature hath giuen or afforded. bred to the common vse of men, is to be kept so, as those things which are described. appoynted by Statutes and the Ciuill lawe, bee so kept. holden as it is or­dayned: [Page 111] of which same things. besides which [all] other things are to be so obserued, as it is in the Greeke pro­uerbe; All things to owe to be. to bee common among friends. And. Likewise all those things doe seeme to bee common of men. to all men, which are of the same kinde: which being put [for example] by [...]nnius in one thing, may bee applied. transferred vnto many; [thus.]

A man who cur­teously sheweth the way to one out of his way,

Doth, as if hee should light a light. can­dle of his light. at his candle;

That neuerthe­lesse [Page 112] it may light himselfe, when he hath kindle it to him. lighted the other.

For that one precept is sufficient. there is suf­ficient commaun­ded by one thing, that whatsoeuer can bee lent with­out losse or hurt. hindrance it. be granted to e­uery one, euen vnknowne. yea though vnknown. Whereupon those things are common. are those common say­ings; Not to for­bidq the running water to any. [* any] the running water: to suffer [any that will] to take fire from [our] fire; to giue faithfull counsell to one delibera­ting. to him that asketh aduice: which things are profitable to those who receiue [thē] [Page 113] [and] not troublesome or burdensome. hurt­full to the gi­uer. Wherefore wee must both vse those things, and doe something to further the com­mon commoditie alwayes bring somewhat to the common cōmo­ditie. But because the of euerie one by himselfe. substance riches. of each priuate man is small, and the multitude of them who neede these riches. it is infinite, common liberalitie must be referred to that end which Ennius speaketh of. of Ennius, that neuerthelesse it may shine to him selfe. light himselfe; That we may haue ability, wherewith we may be liberall to our owne.

Chap. 21.

THere bee also moe degrees of society of men. for to leaue that endlesse number. For that we may departe from that infinitenesse, there is a neerer [de­gree]; To bee of the same countrie or people. stocke, nation, [and] tongue. lan­guage, by which. whereby men are chiefly. especi­ally knit together.

It is also more inward. neere, to bee of one. the same Citie. for there are ma­ny things common to citizens among themselues. For citizens haue many things com­mon amongst themselues; the place where the court is kept or the market. Common Hall, temples. Churches, porches or gal­leries. Gal­lerie walks, waies. High waies, Lawes, rights. Pri­uiledges, [Page 115] Iudge­ments, Voices in election, Customs besides. likewise and Fa­miliarities, also many matters and reasons [coue­nants or dealings] contracted. Bargaines with many. But sundry. a faster k [...]ting [of men] together, isq a straighter bin­ding together or neerer. of the fellowship of kinsfolkes. For from that infinite or innu­merable. vn­measurable society of mankinde, it is shut vp into verie little and streight [place.] it is driuen into a lit­tle and a narrowe compasse. For sith. whereas this is common of all liuing creatures. to all liuing creatures by nature, that they haue a lust of procre­ation, breeding or ingendring. a desire of procreation; the first societie is in wedlocke it selfe. in the very wedlock, the next in chil­dren [Page 114] [...] [Page 115] [...] [Page 116] and then. and after that one house, to which. whereto all things are common. And that. this is the beginning. ori­ginall of a Citie, & as it were the seminarie. seed­plot of a Cōmon­weale. [Then] followe the coniunctions or societies of bre­thren do follow. kin­reds of brethren; after, of cosin germanes, viz. brethren and sisters children. brothers children & sisters children: which when they cannot now bee taken or holden. contay­ned in one house, get them abroad into other houses, as into newe townes. Colonies. [Afterwardes] doe followe mariages. enterma­riages and affinities. allian­ces, of which also moe. many kinsfolke [do spring. arise.] Which multiplication. propagation and [Page 117] issue or ofspring. succession is the originall of com­mon weales.

And so the felowship or matching of bloods. con­iunction of blood & good will [there­upon] bindeth. knitteth men in loue toge­ther. For it is a great matter to haue the same mo­numents of our ancestours, to vse the same holy rites. religi­on, to haue sepulchers, or pla­ces of buriall com­mon. the same burying pla­ces. But of all so­cieties there is none more excellent. better, none more sure or stable. firme, then when good men like in maners. conditi­ons, are conioyned. linked to­gether in familiari­tie. For that ho­nestie, (which wee haue oft times [Page 118] spoken of. mentioned) al­though wee see it in another, yet it allureth vs. moueth vs; and maketh vs to be friendly. friends to him, in whom it seemeth to be in, or to dwell. be. And although euery vertue, or all kinde of vertues. all vertue allureth vs to her. it selfe, and maketh that we loue them. causeth vs to loue them in whome it seemeth to be; yet Iustice and Libera­lityq effecteth it. to be in, viz. dwell or harbour. worketh thatq especially. most of all. And indeed. But, there is nothing more amiable. that winneth more loue, nor more coupling together. that linketh men more surely toge­ther, then similitude of good maners. a like­nesse of good con­ditions. For in whome there are like studies. the same desires, the same wills. mindes, [Page 119] it is done in these. it commeth to passe amongst these, that each is de­lighted equally with, &c. that either is as much de­lighted with the other as with him­selfe: and that is effected or commeth to passe. is brought to passe, which Pythagoras willeth. requires in friend ship, that one be made of many. many become one. Al­so that communitie of fellowship, or so­cieties common fellowship is great, which is made of. groweth of benefits or good turnes. kindnesses giuen and taken. receiued to and fro. which kindnesses. Which whilst they are common from one to another, and such as pleasure one another. mutuall and plea­suring, they a­mongst whome those [kindnes­ses] are. those happen, are tied in fast fellow­ship. linked in a firme societie.

But when you haue viewed or perused. considered [Page 120] all things, in reason and minde dis­course and reason; there is none of all societies. of all societies there is none more acceptable, none more deare, then that which is to euery one of vs. which euery one of vs hath with the Cōmon-weale. [Our] parents [are] deare, [our] children [are] dear. Deare are our pa­rents, deare are our children, [our]q [our] kinsfolkes & familiar [friends] [are] deare. kinsfolkes, and fa­miliars: but our Countrey alone contaynes [in it selfe] all the loues of all [these.] For which, what good man can or would. could doubt to ofter himselfe to death willingly, or to die. to take his death, if he may profit the same. doe it good? By which [or by how much.] Where­by the beastly cru­eltie of these men is more detestable more to be ab­horred, who haue [Page 121] torne in peeces, rende their country in sunder. rent in sunder their Countrey with all horrible wic­kednesse. all manner of mischiefe, and both are and haue beene occupied in blotting it out [or destroying it] vtterly. See heere the pouder traitors & all of that bloody faction. in the vtter ouer­throwe thereof.

But if any contention and comparison bee made. question and comparison be made, to whome most dutie ought to bee yeelded; our Countrey andq most or duty ought to be giuen. parents are theq principall. chiefe, by whoseq by the benefits of whom wee are bounde chiefly. benefits we are es­pecially bound: Al Our childrenAl next our chil­dren and our whole house. [are] next, and our whole familie; which looketh to vs and can haue no other refuge. hangeth vpon vs alone, nei­ther can haue any other refuge.

And then. Afterwards our kinsfolkes agree­ing [Page 122] well [with vs] with whom for most part a cōmon fortune. who also com­monly haue the same estate. Wher­fore the necessarie comforts. aydes of life, are due to those espe­cially whome I spake of before: but life & common­nesse of table. conuersation and common li­uing, counsels, communications speeches, exhor­trtions, comfortings. consola­tions, and sometimes. other­whiles ch [...]dings, do florish espe­cially. are most vsuall amongst friendes. And that is the most pleasant friendship. that friend­ship is the pleasan­test, which the similitude of maners. like­nesse of conditions hath yoked together. linked in one.

Chap. 22.

1 BVt in distributing or performing al these do­ing all these Duties, it is to be seen. we must mark what is most needfull. necessarie for e­uerie man, and what euery one can attaine or cannot. is either able or vna­ble to attaine with vs or without vs. Therefore the de­grees of friendship must not be alike to the degrees of times. shall not bee the [Page 124] same, which [are] of times.

2 Al There areAl. And there are Duties. certaine Duties which are due rather. more due to some then to others: as, you shall sooner helpe your neighbour in getting. inning [his] corn, then either your brother, or your familiar friend.

But if there bee a controuersie in iudgement. trauerse in law, you shall rather defend your kins­man and friende then your neigh­bour.

These things therefore, and the like are to be warily looked vn­to. tho­rowly considered in euery Dutie; al­so custome and exercise. practice is to be taken. are to [Page 125] be vsed, that vvee may bee able to giue vp a good account. good reckners. makers of ac­count of Duties: to see by adding and deducting what may be the summe of the rest or remainder. what summe re­mayneth of the rest. Whereupon you may vnder­stand, viz. a man may vnderstand. wee may vnder­stand how much is due to euery one. But, as nei­ther Physiciās, nor Captaines▪ nor O­ratours, although they haue perceiued [or at­tained] the precepts gotten the rules of [their[art, can attaine to any thing worthy great praise. commen­dation, without vse and exercise. practice: so indeede those rules of obseruing. keeping Duty are set downe or de­liuered. taught vs, that wee our selues [Page 126] may doe them should put them in vre. But. For the greatnesse or difficulty. hardnesse of the matter requireth also vse and exer­cise. And we haue said almost enough. And thus haue we spoken al­most sufficiently, how honestie from which [all] Dutie ariseth or cometh springeth, is drawn or fetched. de­riued from those things, which are in the law of right of mans fel­lowship. hu­mane societie.

Chap. 23.

BVt wee must vnderstand, whereas four kinds [of virtue] are pro­pounded, from w^ch Honestie and Du­tie should slee. pro ceed; that to seem most bright, or most glo­rious. that seemes to shine most brightly, which is done. wrought with a great and haughty courage. loftie spirit, despising humane things. worldly vanities. Therefore [that] is especially in rea­dinesse. commonly ready in reproachfull speeches. reproach, if any such thing may be said.

For in truth yee [Page 129] young men doe beare. carry womanlike mindes. womanish hearts.

And that maid. vir­gin [the heart] of a man.

And if there be any thing like to this.

O Salmacis thou giuest. giue spoyles without blood or sweat.

And contrarily in praises, I wot. know not how, we praise those things, as with a more full mouth, which are done with a noble. great courage, both. valiantly and ex­cellently. Hence is the [large] discourse. field of the Rhetoriciās, concerning Ma­ratho, Salamis, the Plateans, Thermo­pilanes, Luctrians, [Page 130] and [concerning] Stratocles. Here­by our Cocles, hereby the Deci­ans, hereby Cneius & P. the Scipioes. Scipio, here­by M. Marcellus & innumerable o­thers, & especially the very people of Rome hath the com­mendation to excel. excelleth in valorousnesse or noblenesse. greatness or cou­rage. And [their] desire of warlike. Martiall glory is decla­red, for that wee see euen [their images of honour set vp or statues. their] pictures for most parte in military attire, or the attire of souldiers. in vvarlike aray.

Chap. 24.

1 BVt that lof­tinesse of mind or courage. spirit which is seene in perils and in labours. trauells, if it want of iustice. be void of iustice and fight not for the common good. safe­tie, but for the owne com­modities [or a mans priuate gain] pri­uate commoditie, is in fault [or is to bereckoned faulty] is faultie. For that is not onely not the propertie of vertue. no propertie of vertue, but rather of fiercenesse. brutishnesse, repelling all hu­manitie. setting all huma­nitie aparte.

2 Therfore valour therefore. for­titude is well defi­ned [Page 132] of the Stoiks, vvhen they say, it to be a vertue. that it is a vertue contending. fighting for in defence of e­quitie. e­quity. Wherfore no man that hath at­tained the glory of fortitude, [euer] got [that] praise, by wilie traines and naughtie dealing. treacherie, & naughtie deceit: for nothing can be honest vvhich is voide of iustice. That therefore of Plato is worthy. Therefore that is a worthie saying of Plato: Not only (quoth he) [that] knowledge which is remoued. seuered from iustice is rather to be called craftinesse. subtil­ty then wisedome; but also a courage which is prepared. forward to danger, if it be inforced or thrust forward. set on by the own coue­tousnesse or desire of gaine. for ones [Page 133] owne greedinesse, and not for the common profit. good, may rather haue name of rash or lewde hardinesse. audaci­ousnesse then of manhood. fortitude. And therefore we would haue valiant and noble minded men. men who are valorous and puissant, to bee good and simple. plaine hearted, friends. louers of truth, and no­thing at all deceit­full; which are of the middle praise of Iustice of the midst of all the praises of iustice.

3 But that is o­dious, that in this such hautinesse and greatnesse of cou­rage, there grow­eth very soone. most easily obstinacie. a wilfulnesse, and and ouer-great de­sire of bearing [Page 134] rule. For as it is in Plato. as Plato writeth, that the generall fashi­on of the Lacede­monians, was to be inflamed with a desire of conque­ring: euen so euery one as hee doth most excell in greatnesse of cou­rage, so hee speci­ally desireth to bee prince. chiefe of all, or rather to be alone. without p [...]ere. And when you shall earnest­ly desire. a man coueteth to excell all. to bee aboue all, it is a difficult thing to keep equi­tie, which belongeth pro­perly. is most proper to iustice. Wherupon it com­meth to passe, that they cannot abide that they should be ouer­comn or bridled. en­dure themselues to be ouercomn, nei­ther [Page 135] by reasoning, nor by any publike & lawfull right. by any com­mon and right or­der of lawe. And they become for the most part giuers of great gifts. bri­bers & makers of facti­ons. factious, that they may at­taine the greatest wealth, and be ra­ther superiours by power, then equall by iustice. but by how much that is more diffi­cult, by so much [it is] more famous. But the harder it is [to master this affecti­on] the worthier it is▪ For there is no season. time that ought to want. to be with­out iustice. They therefore are to be accounted valo­rous & of a wor­thie courage, not who doe, but who driue away iniurie. not who doe wrong, but withstand it. But a true and wise [Page 136] valour of minde iudgeth that hone­sty which▪ nature chiefly followeth, to be put. to consist in deeds and not in glory; himselfe to be chiefe. and had rather himselfe to be chiefe. bee the chiefe, then to seeme so. For whoso. hee that de­pendeth vpon the errour. erronious conceit of the vnskilfull multi­tude. rude multi­tude, he is not. is not to be accounted in great men. in the number of va­liant men. But as euery man is of courage most high and desirous of glorie, [so] is hee most easily inforced or eg­ed on. driuē on to vniust doings. mat­ters. which is indeed a very slippery place Which place is indeed slipperie, because there is scarce any man [Page 137] found, who, labours being vn­dertaken and perils gone into or a [...]chi­ued. when he hath sustained trauells, and ad­uentured dangers, doth not desire glorie as a reward of his labours.

Chap. 25.

A Valorous and great minde is altogether. alwaies discer­ned in two things especially: where­of the one consi­steth [Page 138] in the contempt. de­spising of outward things: when it is perswaded to a man. one is perswaded▪ a man to owe to admire, wish or to desire earnestly no­thing but that, &c. that a man ought not either to admire, or to wish, or ear­nestly to desire a­ny thinge, but what is honest and comely; and to yeeld to none, neither man. neither to yeelde to no. any either man, or passion or affec­tion. per­turbation of mind, nor to fortune.

The other thing is, that when you are so affected▪ disposed in minde, as I said before, you doe. vn­dertake great matters. en­terprizes, and those indeed most pro­fitable, but vehemently. very hard, and full of trauell and danger both of life, and [Page 139] also of many things which to life do belong. ap­pertaine vnto life. All the splendour or shining brightness. glory and dignitie. honour of these two things, I adde also. moreouer, the profit stands▪ is in the later; but the cause and meanes ma­king worthie men, is in the former. For that is [or con­sists] therein. therin is that which maketh ex­cellent courages, and despising worldly vanities. and such as de­spise all humane things. And this same thing. same is seene. appeareth in two things; if you both iudge that thing onely to be good which is honest, and also be free from all perturbation or vexation of minde. disquietnesse. For it is to bee accoun­ted [Page 140] the part of a valiant and worthy mind, both to account small, or make small recko­ning of. set light by those things, which seem to most men picked out, or most notable or choise. sin­gular and very famous. excel­lent; and also to contemne the same with a steadfast. stable and firme reason. grounded iudge­ment. And like­wise this is [a tokē] of a valiant cou­rage and of great constancie, so to beare those things which seeme bit­ter, which being ma­ny and diuers are conuersant [or fall out.] wherof there are many and di­uerse in the life & and fortune [or con­dition] of men. state of man, that you depart nothing. as that you no­thing swerue from the state. order of na­ture, nothing from. nor from the dignitie of a [Page 141] wise man. More­ouer, it is not agreeable or like­ly. su­table him to be broken that hee should be subdued with couetous desire. inordinate desire, who cannot be broken. subdued by feare. Nor him to be ouer­comn of pleasure. that he should be con­quered by pleasure, who hath shewed himselfe i [...]uincible. vncon­querable by labour. by [any] trauell. Wherefore both these [vices] are to be shunned. auoided, also couetousnesse of money is to be fled. eschewed. for nothing is of [...]o strict and little a courage. For there is no such a signe of a base and ignoble minde, as to loue riches: nothing honest nor any thing more commendable. honest and magnificent. noble, then to contemne. despise money, if [Page 142] you haue it not; [and] if you haue it to imploy it vnto. bestow it in bountie and libe­ralitie. The desire likewise of glorie is to be taken heed of, as I said before. For it plucketh a­way libertie. freedome of minde, for the which all conten­tion ought to be to couragious men. amongst men of worthie spirits.

Neither verely [are] empires to be earnestly desired, & rather not to be re­ceiued sometimes, or now and then to be layed downe. And indeed we ought nor to seeke for rule; but ra­ther, sometimes ei­ther not to receiue it, or otherwhile to giue it ouer. We must also bee free from all passion or disqui­etnesse of minde. pertur­bation of minde, both from desire, and feare, and also [Page 143] from sicknesse of mind. griefe, and pleasure of mind. voluptuousnesse, and angrinesse; that quietnesse of minde may be pre­serued and voidness of care. that we may in­ioy tranquillitie & securitie, which may bring both stedfastnesse and also dignitie. constancy, and also worthie esti­mation.

But many there are and haue been, who earnestly de­siring that same quietnesse. tranquillity of minde, which I speake of, haue remooued. withdrawen thē ­selues from q pub­licke* common affaires businesses, & haue fled or got them­selues away. betaken thēselues vnto idlenesse, quiet­nesse or ease. a quiet life.

In these. Amongst these, both the noblest Philosophers, and far the prin­ces or chiefe. & euen the very chief [Page 144] [of them] others also con­stant or vpright. and indeed both seuere and graue men, could neither beare. en­dure the manners of the people, nor of the princes. rulers; & some of them. many of them haue liued in fields or desert places, or the fiel­den countrie. man­nour places, de­lighted [onely] with matter belonging to their family or priuate businesse. their home matters. The same thing hath bin propoun­ded to these which also [hath bin] to kings. These aymed at the same end, which kings doe; that they might neede no­thing, that they might not obey any man, that they might vse liberty. obey no man, vse their own libertie: whose property it is, to liue so as you will. as they list. Wherefore, [...]ith this is common of them who are couetous. both to them who are desirous of ruling or to be great. of power, with those (whom I spake) leading the quiet life [or idle.] and [Page 145] those seeking a qui­et life, whome I spake of; the one sorte thinke themselues to bee able to obtaine it. that they can attaine it, if they haue great wealth; the other, if they be content both. with their owne and with a little. and a little.

In which indeed. Wherein verely the opinion of nei­ther [of them] is to be contem­ned altogether. is vtterly to be despi­sed. But. For the life of the idle or free from great business those who haue betaken them selues to liue quiet­ly, is both more easie & more safe, and lesse grieuous or troublesome to others: but [the life] of them who haue fitted themselues to the common­weale. applied thē ­selues for the good of the Common­weale, [Page 146] and to doe worthily or goe through with at­chiue great mat­ters, is more fruitfull or bene­ficiall to the kinde of men. pro­fitable for man­kinde, and more apt. fitter for fame and greatnesse. ho­nour. Wherefore peraduenture it may be yeelded to those not going to take, &c. it may bee that both they are to bee borne withall, who doe not taken in hand or meddled with the commonweale, viz. to deale in such matters. vn­dertake the affaires of the Common­wealth, who being of an excellent wit, haue applied. giuen them­selues wholly to quietnesse and to learning: & and also to those. also they who beeing hindred by imbecillity of their health. sick­nesse, or some o­ther more weighty cause, haue gone backe [or departed] from the common weale. retired themselues from businesses of the Common—vveale, [Page] when as they graunted. yeel­ded vnto others both the authority or li­bertie. power and commendation. praise of ma­naging of the same.

But to vvhome there is no such cause. occasion, if they say, themselues to de­spise. that they con temne those things which most men admire haue in admi­ration, [as] rule & bearing office. magistracy; I thinke it to be giuen to those not only not for praise, but also for a fault. to those I thinke it worthie to be ac­counted not onely no cōmendation, but also a fault.

The iudgement of whom, in that they con­temne glory and coūt it for nothing, is a thing difficult to be done not to allowe or approue. Whose iudgemēt it is verie hard to disallowe, in that they despise glory, and esteeme it as nothing. But they seeme to thinke. fear the trauels and. troubles & griefs [Page 148] both of offences. giuing offence, and also of hauing repulses. repulses, as a cer­taine reproach and infamie. For there be [some] who are little constant to themselues. doe not agree with themselues in contrarie matters; who doe most se­uerely contemne pleasures, are more tender in grief [...]s, regarde not glory, [and] bee broken. ouer­comne with infa­mie. And these things indeed [they doe] not constantly enough. very vncon­stantly. But magistracies or gouernments. of­fices are to bee obtained. gotten, and the Common—vvealth is to be gouerned by them. serued of them, who haue helps of dispatch of businesse by nature. by nature helps of dispatch of bu­sinesse, [Page 149] all lingring cast away. set aside. For o­therwise neither can a citie. the State be gouerned or the greatnesse of cou­rage be declared.

Moreouer, both a magnificence. maiestie and contempt. despising of vvorldly things (which I speake of oft. I oft re­peat) also quietnesse. tran­quillity of minde and voidnesse of care. security is to bee added or practised to them going to take the common wealth. vsed of them, who take vp­them [any] go­uernment in the Common-weal, no­thing lesse then of Philosophers, I wot not. knowe not whe­ther [not] yea much more I suppose. more also; if so be that they will not bee carefull. ouermuch op­pressed [Page 150] with cares, and. but will leade their life. liue with grauity and constancy. Which things be so much more easie to Phi­losophers, by how much not so many things in their life lie open, which fortune may strike. the fewer things they haue in their life, which fortune may strike; and by how much they lesse need ma­ny things. and for that they doe not stand in neede of many things, and also because they cannot fall so grie­uously, if any ad­uersity shall fall out. betide.

Wherefore, not without cause, grea­ter motions of [their] mindes are stirred vp, & grea­ter* enterprises q maters are meet to be com­passed. to bee done by them who ma­nage the common-weale. the gouernours of the Common-vveale, [Page 151] then by them who liue quietly. Andq the quiet or pri­uate. therefore by how much both greatnesse of courage & freedom from griefs is more to be added to these the more greatnesse of courage and free­dome from vexa­tions is to be vsed of them. Moreo­uer, whosoeuer commeth to performe a businesse. to at­chieue any great matter, let him take heed, 1 That hee do not only consider that thing. con­sider, how honest the matter is, but also, how it may haue a faculty or abilitie to be effected. how it may bee discharged.

2 In which same thing. thing it is to bee consi­dered. a man must con­sider, that hee nei­ther be out of hope. despaire tho­row sluggishnesse, or lacke of courage. cowardli­nesse, or trust ouermuch nor bee o­uer confident tho­row a greedy de­sire. 3 Also a dili­gent [Page 152] preparation is to be added. vsed in all businesses, before you goe into them or goe in hand with them or vndertake them. goe about them.

Chap. 26.

1 BVt vvhereas verie many men. most men thinke things belonging to war, viz. martiall feats. martiall affaires to be grea­ter [Page 153] then citie causes or matters. ciuil, this opinion is to bee diminished or abated. altered. For ma­ny haue oft times sought warres, for the desire of glory; and that falleth out for most parte in great mindes or coura­ges. stomacks and [excellent] wits: and so much the rather, if they be [men] fit for military seruice. chiualry, and de­sirous of warfare. But. Yet if wee vvill iudge truely. aright, there haue beene many matters belong­ing to the citie. Citie busi­nesses greater and more famous. nobler, then the [...]. martiall. 1 For although Themi­stocles be bee commended by right or right­fully or iustly. rightly commended, and his name be more famous then [the [Page 154] name] of Solons. Solon; and also Salamis be cited [as] a witness of [this] most famous or noble. glo­rious victory, which is preferred before the counsell of Solon, [euen] that whereby hee first ordained the Iudges which de­termined weightie matters concerning the commonwealth Areopagites: [yet] this counsell of Solon. this is to be thought. ad­iudged no lesse commendable. praise-worthie then that. 1 For that profited or did good once onely. auailed one­ly once: this shall profit the citie for euer. shall for euer doe good to the Citie. the lawes of the Athenians [are pre­serued] by this counsell, the insti­tutions of the elders are preserued by this. By this counsell the laws of the Atheni­ans, by this the or­dinances of [their] ancestours are pre­serued. And truly. Moreo­uer, Themistocles in very deed saide [Page 155] nothing, where­with hee helped the village of Mars where the Areopagites [...]at in iudgement or counsell. Areopagus. But it is true Themistocles to haue bin helped. that The­mistocles was hel­ped by Solon. him. For the vvarre vvas managed. maintained by the counsell or direc­tion. aduice of that Senate which vvas constituted or appointed. ordained by So­lon. 2 We may say the same thing the same concerning. of Pausanias and Li­sander: by whose valorous acts. deedes of armes although the empire is thought to haue bin inlarged to the Lacedemonians. the Em­pire of the Lace­demonians is thought to haue beene enlarged; yet in very deede they are [not] to be compared to the lawes, &c. not in the least part. compared, no not in the least part to the lawes and order. discipline of Ly­curgus. [Page 156] moreouer they had, &c. Moreo­uer, vpon these occa­sions. for these same causes, they had [their] armies both more prepared or for­ward. ready and more valiant for these same causes. valiant. 3 Nei­ther indeed we being children or when I was a childe. when wee were children, Marcus Scaurus seemed to yeelde or giue place. to be in­feriour to Caius Marius; nor Q. C. &c. nor when we were conuersant or imploied. had to to doe in the Com­mon—wealth, Q. C. seemed to giue place, &c. Quintus Catulus to Cneius Pompei­us. For weapons or wars do little auaile. armes are of small force abroad, vnless there be counsell. good aduice at home. 3 Nor Africanus, beeing both a singular man, and a worthy an emperour or commander. Captaine, did profit more did more seruice to the [Page 157] Common wealth in cutting downe, destroying, beating downe or sacking. razing of Nu­mance, then P. N. being a priuate [man] did] at the same time when, &c. then at the same time, Pub­lius Nasica a pri­uate [man] did] when he slew Tibe­rius Gracchus.

Although this thing in truth is not onely of the dome­sticall reason, [or a ciuill matter] for it toucheth also the warlike [or belong­eth to martiall feats] &c. Howbeit this case indeed is not onely of a ciuill consideration. For it concerneth also the warlike; be­cause it was done by force and by hand. strong hand: yet the very same was done, by citie counsell. the counsell of the Ci­tie, without an ar­my. That also is the best. a worthy [speach] vvherein I heare me to be wont. that I am wont to be inuaded, set vpon or touched. taxed of en­uious and lewde [Page 158] [persons].

Let wars giue place to peace, let the laurell branch [or garland] be graunted to the oratour. Let weapons or wars, because weapons are a signe of war. armes giue place to the gowne put for peace whereof it is a signe, or for ciuill magistracy. gowne;

Let the the laurell branch a signe of eloquence or a reward thereof. laurell yeeld to the [Ora­tours] tongue.

For, that I may passe ouer. omit other [men]. others, did not armed men. armes yeelde vnto the goune or magi­stracy in the citie. robe, we gouerning or when I gouerned. when we gouerned the Cō ­mon- weale? For neither was there euer a greater perill. a sorer dan­ger nor greater hatred in the Com­mon-weale: so that the very weapons slidden speedily out, &c. by our counsell and dili­gence fell. slipping forth­with out of the hands of the boul­dest Citizens, fell [to the ground] by our counsels & diligence. Therefore what so great a matter in war was euer done. What [Page 159] so great an exploit I pray you, was e­uer done in warre? what triumph [is] to bee compared [with it?] For (sonne Mark) I may boast with you, For I may bee bolde to glorie before you sonne Marke; who are to be the inheritor or heyre of my glory and imitator of my acts. vn­to whom both the inheritance of this glory, and also the imitation of [my] deeds doth apper­taine. In very truth, Cneius Pom­peius, a man flowing full. a­bounding with all martiall praises, gaue me this commendation. attributed this vnto mee many hearing. in the audience. hearing of ma­ny, that he said. whenas hee said, that himselfe to beare away in vaine. hee should in vaine haue borne away the third triumph, [Page 160] had he not had vnlesse hee had had a place in the Common-vvealth by my meanes. benefit, where hee might triumph. haue triumphed. domesticall forti­tudes, or courage at home. Home-valorous acts, then, are not inferior vnto militarie exploits. mar­tiall; wherein also more labour and study is to be put. we are to bestow more labour and studie, then in these. For that reputation, credit. honestie which we seek by a lofty and great. hau­ty and princely courage, is wrought. effec­ted by the strength. power of the minde, not of the body. Yet the body must be exercised and so affected. brought into such order, as that it may bee able to o­bey counsell and [Page 161] reason, in execu­ting businesses, & sustaining or abi­ding trauell. enduring trauell. But that honestie which wee search for, or ear­nestly require. search out, doth wholly consist in the care and deuising. casting of the minde. Wher­in they bring no lesse commodity, who gouerne the common—vvealth being gowned or robed. in peace, then they that make warre. And there­fore wars are often­times either not vndertaken. begun, or ended, and now and then attempted, by their counsell. aduice: as the third war of Carthage. Punicke warre [was] by the counsell of Mar­cus Cato: in which the authority of [Page 162] him preuailed, e­uen being dead. after his death. Wherefore certainely reason or wise­dome of decerning or decreeing is to be desired more, or of. wise­dome in ending the warre. deter­mining is rather to be desired, then fortitude of stri­uing. valour in figh­ting. But we must beware, that wee doe it not rather for the flight of fighting. auoiding of warre, then for the reason of profit. in regarde of commo­dity. And let war be ta­ken in hand so. And so let warre be taken in hand, that no o­ther thing but peace may seeme to haue beene [...]ought. And tis of a vali­ant and constant minde. It is moreouer, indeed a token of a valo­rus and resolute. constant courage, not to be troubled in sharp matters. disquieted in rough stormes; [Page 163] nor vtterly out of or­der. making a hurliburly, to be cast downe from the degree or staire. to be cast downe from his place, as it is said; but to vse the counsell of a present minde. fol­low the aduice of a present resoluti­on: nor yet to depart. swarue from wisedome. rea­son. Although this is of a [great] minde or courage, that also of a great wit. this proceedeth from a worthy re­solution, that also from an excellent wit, to perceiue by ca­sting things to come. to cōceiue a­forehand of things to come; and to appoint. determine some­what before, what may happen or betide, on either part. fall out on both sides, & what is to be done when any thing shall hap pen, nor to commit any thing. doe ought that at any time it should be said I had not thought; or had I thought of such a matter▪ I had done thus or thus. a man shold say, Had I vvist.

[Page 164]These are the workes of a great and lofty courage, and trusting to or lea­ning vpon. relying vpon prudence & coun­sell. But to be conuersant rashly in the edge or forefront of the battel. for a man to thrust him­selfe rashly into the forefront of the battell, & to skirmis [...] with the enemy with hand fight with the enemy hand to hande, is a certaine outragious or fierce. brutish and like vnto beasts. beastly thing. But. Yet when time & necessity doth re­quire, a man must fight hand to hand, and must preferre death. death is to be preferred before seruitude or bon­dage. slauery & shame.

Chap. 27.

BVt of or touching the ouerturning & spoiling of riches, that is greatly to be considered. as concer­ning the ra­zing and sacking of Cities, this is principally to bee considered, that not any thing▪ nothing be done rashly, nor any thing cruelly.

And that is [the part] of. is the cōdition of a noble minde. a va­lorous man, matters being tossed or ended. in the end of broyles, to punish the offen­ders to saue the com­mon sort. preserue the multitude, to retaine right and honest things in each fortune. maintaine right and honestie in e­uery [Page 166] state.

Chap. 28.

FOr as there are some (as I said before) who pre­ferre martiall matters or affaires, to ciuill. martiall prowesse before Ci­tie businesses: So you shall find ma­ny, to whom dangerous. pe­rillous and subtile. craf­ty counsels. deuices seeme more bright. gloriouser & grea ter then quiet cogitations or counsels. cō ­sultations.

1 we must neuer at all. Indeed wee must neuer commit for flight of perill. so carry ourselues for auoiding danger, [Page 167] that wee should seeme cowardous, and timorous. cowardes and but. dastards;

2 that also is to be [...]. Yet q we must also take heede of this, that we offer not our selues to. thrust* that. not our selues in­to dangers with­out cause; then which, nothing can be more foolish.

3 Wherefore in going vnto or ad­uenturing. attempting dan­gers, the custome [or guise] of Physicians is to be imitated. wee are to imitate the course of Physicians, doe lightly cure. who vse light cures to men being sicke lightly. them who are lightly diseased; but are inforced to vse pe [...]ilous & doubtfull cures. to mi­nister dangerous and doubtfull me­dicines to sorer sicknesses. more grieuous diseases. wherefore to wish an aduerse [or boy­sterous] tempest in a calme, is of a mad man. Therefore in a calme to wish a [Page 168] sore tempest is the part of a mad man; but to helpe the tempest [or make shift in a tempest] by any meanes. preuent the danger of the tempest, by all ma­ner of meanes, is the part of a wise man: and so much the rather if you may obtaine more good, the matter beeing dispatched, then good the matter being doubtfull. when the matter is dispatch­ed, then hurt while it is in doubt.

4 and the doing of things. Moreouer, the managing of great attempts. things is dange­rous partly to thē who vndertake, partly to the Com­mon-weale. And also some are called into daunger. are brought into ha­zard of [their] life, others of [their] reputation and fa­uour of the peo­ple. glory, and good­will of [their] Citi­zens. [Page 169] We ought therefore to bee more readie, vnto our owne perils then com­mon [dangers.] to aduenture our own then common pe­rils; and to fight more readily concerning or about honour. for honour and glory, then for other commodities. But there had. haue beene many found, who had. haue been ready to spend not one­ly [their] substance. mony, but also their life. but euen [their] very life for their Countrey, [& yet] the same would not make the least losse [or hazard] of their glory, not the com­monweale requi­ring. vvould not lose, no not the very least iot of their glorie; no though the Com­mon-weale requi­red it: 1 As, Cal­licratides, who when he was Cap­taine [Page 170] of the Lace­demonians in the Peloponesian war, and had done ma­ny things egregiously or very worthily. very notably, ouertur­ned all at the last. in the end, when he obeyed not the counsell of them fol­lowed not their ad­uice, who thought good to transport. remoue the Nauie from Arginuse and not to fight vvith the Athenians. To whom hee an­swered, the Lacedemoni­ans, that nauy being lost, to be able to prepare another. that the Lacedemonians, though they should lose that Nauie, might make forth. pre­pare another, himselfe not to be able to flie. [but] that hee could not fly with­out his reproach or shame. disho­nour. And this was indeede. no doubt a [Page 171] meane or meetely [...]ore plague. prety blowe to the Lacedemoni­ans: 2 [but] that [was] a pestilent blowe. plague, whereby the wealth. power of the Lacedemonians fell downe or were spent. fell flatte to the ground, whenas Cleombrotus fearing enuie, had rashly skirmished or combated. incountered with Epaminondas. How much better [did] Quintus Fabius Maximus? Of whō Ennius [wrote thus;]

One man hath restored [our] matter or wealth to vs. State by pausing or pro­longing of time. delay­ing:

For, hee put not before mens speeches. pre­ferred not rumors before our safety:

Therefore the glorie of the man is famous both after & more. euer the longer his re­nowne [Page 172] is more fa­mous.

Which kinde of offending or misdoing. fault must also be auoided in citie businesses. ci­uill affaires. For there are [some] who although that which they thinke, be neuer so good. the ve­ry best, yet they dare not speake it. vtter it for feare of enuy.

Chap. 29.

They that shall gouerne the com­mon weale, let them altogether [or euer] keepe two precepts, &c. WHosoeuer shall bee gouernours in the Common-weal, let them euer obserue two precepts of Plato. 1 One [is] that they so main­taine the profit of [Page 173] the citizens. commons, that vvhatsoeuer they doe, they re­ferre it thereunto, forgetfull. forgetting their owne priuate com­modities. 2 Ano­ther [is] that they care for or look to haue care for the whole body of the Cōmonweale: lest whilst they defend [or main­taine] any part, they forsake the rest. vp­hold som one part, they leaue the rest destitute. For as a wardship or cu­stodie of a childe. gardianshippe, euen so the procuration or administration. go­uernement of the Common-weale, is to be done. vsed to the commoditie of them who are com mitted [to the gouernment of others. be go­uerned] and not of them to whom the gouernment is, &c. it is committed. But they that pro­uide for part of the citizens, and neg­lect part. But who so pro­uide [Page 174] for [one] part of the people, that they neglect [ano­ther] part, do bring in a most pernici­ous matter into the Commonweal,q citie. [to wit] sedition and discord: wher­upon it happeneth. falleth out, that some seeme people-pleasers. popular, some studious of euerie best [or greatest] man. affectionate to the nobility, [but] few to theq fewe of all. whole. Hereup­on great discord or brea­ches. dissen­tions sprang a­mongst the Athe­nians; and not on­ly seditions, but also pestiferous or sore. pestilent ci­uill warres in our Common-vveale. Which a graue & stout citizen, and worthie of principalitie or dominion. rule [Page 175] in the Common­weale, will fly and hate, and will giue himselfe wholly to the Commonweal, neither will hee follow after or pursue. hunt after riches or power; but. and vvill so defende it wholly. the whole estate that hee may pro­uide for all [men.] Neither in truth will hee call. bring a­ny man into ha­tred or enuy by false accusations; but will so cleaue altoge­ther. alwaies so cleaue to iustice and honestie, that so long as, or whilst. so that hee may maintaine it, hee may. will grieuously of­fend any one. incurre the grieuous displea­sure of any; and desire death rather, then forsake those [Page 176] things which I haue spoken of.

Chap. 30.

Ambition no doubt [or verely.] AMbition & striuing for honours. promotion, is of all other most mi­serable. whereof. Con­cerning which it is notably said. spoken in the same Plato; them who. that they who would contend a­mong themselues, whether of them should rather rule [Page 177] the Cōmon-weale, to doe. should do [...]emblablely or euen in like maner. after the same fashion, as if Mariners shold striue, which of them should chiefly holde [or guide] the helme. gouerne.

2 And the same Plato. man hath commaunded. Al taught vs, that weAl. doth teach. should thinke them ad­uersaries. take them for enemies, who take vp armes or armour. beare armes a­gainst vs, [and] not those who desire to pre [...]erue the Cō ­mon-weal by their iudgement or aduice. discretion; what a one the dissension was, &c. as was the dissension betweene Publius Africanus, & Quin­tus Metellus, with­out [any] bitter­nesse.

Chap. 31.

1 NEither indeede. cer­tainely are they to be heard. worthie to be heard, who shall hold opinion that we are to be grieuously, excee­dingly, vehemently. fu­riously [...] angrie at our enemies. with our enemies, and doe iudge it the propertie of a couragious or ge­nerous. magnanimous and valiant man. 2 For there is no­thing more com­mēdable, nothing more worthie or besee­ming. seemly for a great and famous man. noble personage, then easinesse to be ap­peased, & gentleness placability and clemency.

[Page 179]3 Moreouer in free people or cities. a­mongst free peo­ple, and in equalitie or e­quity of lawe. where there is equality of law, there must be vsed also mildenesse. gen­tlenesse, and loftinesse of minde. no­blenesse of cou­rage, which is said. as they tearm it. cal it; lest if wee bee anger at either. angry either with [those] commers vnsea­sonablely, or cra­uers without shame viz. impudent as­kers. who come out of time, or who aske impu­dently, we fall into weywardnesse. testinesse [both] vnprofitable and odious. And yet mildnesse and mercy. gentlenesse and clemency are. is so to be allowed. approued, that seuerity be vsed for the cause of the com­mon-weale or good of it. Common­weales sake, with­out which a Citie cannot be ordered. gouer­ned.

Chap. 32.

But both all pu­nishment. ALL punish­mēt ought to bee voide of taunting reproch or contempt. contumely; neither to bee re­ferred to the com­moditie of him who punisheth any. and not bee done to serue his turne who punisheth or chastiseth in words. re­buketh any, but to the behoofe. commodi­tie of the Com­mon-weale. 3 We must also beware, lest the punish­ment be greater then the fault, and lest some be puni­shed for, &c. that the punish­ment be not grea­ter then the fault; 4 And that some be not punished for the same causes, others be not indeede called, [or spoken to.] not so much as spoken [Page 181] to. 5 Also anger is to be prohibited [or auoided] in puni­shing. Likewise, wee must chiefly refrain from anger in punishing. For he that goeth about to take punishment. goeth to punish [others] be­ing angry, shall ne­uer keepe that measure. mediocrity which is betweene ouermuch. too much and too lit­tle. Which mediocritie. [mo­deration] pleaseth the Peripatetiks. Peripatecians: and it pleaseth. liketh them iustly or well. rightly, so that they would not commend angry­nesse, & say, it to be profitably giuen of nature. that it is profitably gi­uen of Nature.

But that [affection of angrynesse. af­fection] is in all cases. things to be refused. es­chewed: and it is to be wished, that they that are ouer such as gouerne [Page 182] the Commonweal, be like of lawes. be like the lawes; which are led or drawne moo­ued to punish not by wrath. angrinesse, but by equity.

Chap. 33.

And also let vs flie greatly pride, dis­dainfulnes, & arro­gancy in prosperous [...] and flowing to our will. MOreouer, in prosperity, and when things flowe euen at our will, Let vs ear­nestly fly pride, disdainfulnesse and arrogancy. For as [Page 183] it is a part of incon­stancie to beare ad­uerse things, so pro­sperous immode­rately. a token of lightnesse, to take aduersity [impa­tiently]; so likewise to vse prosperitie immoderately.

And an euen pro­portion [or equal­nesse] in all the life For a continu­all euennesse in all a mans life, also the same counte­nance euer, and the same forehead. and one manner of cheer, is famous or nota­ble. very cō ­mendable, as vvee haue receiued. heard con­cerning Socrates and concerning Caius Lelius also. I see indeed Philip king of the Mace­donians to haue beene excelled or gone beyonde. surmoun­ted by his Alexander. sonne in noble exploites, or prowesse. valorous acts and glory, to haue bin supe­riour. [yet] in facilitie or gen­nesse and humanity mildenesse & curtesie to haue [Page 184] beene farre supe­riour. Therefore the one [was] al­waies great. noble; the other oft times most filthie or disho­nest. beastly. That they seeme to giue precepts or teach well. aduertise a­right, who warne vs, that by how much we are supe­riours [or higher] we carry our selues more sub [...]isly by so much. that the high­er we are, the low­lyer wee demeane. carrie our selues. Indeed Paneti­us saith. Pane­tius reporteth, Africanus his hearer [or scholar] to haue bin wont to say. that Africanus his hearer & familiar friend, was wont to sai, that like as [mē] are wont. vse to deliuer to ta­mers [or horsebrea­kers] horses vaun­ting with fierceness for their often con­tentions of battels. to put to ri­ders, horses wax­ing ouer fierce for their often fights in battel, that they may vse. haue them the readier. more gentle; euen so should men headie, headstrōg. vnbridled [Page 185] through prosperi­ty, & trusting too much to [or ouerweening of] themselues to owe to be brought, as it were, into the circuite of &c. ouer much trusting to them­selues, be brought as it were, within the compasse of reason and lear­ning, that they might thorowly beholde weaknesse. the frail­ty of the world. humane things, and the varietie or incon­stancie. wauering of for­tune. And also we must vse most of all the counsell of our friendes in our most high prospe­r [...]tie. Moreouer, also in our greatest prosperitie, we are especially to vse the aduice of our friends; and a greater au­thoritie is to bee giuen to them then before. and wee must giue them also a greater au­thority then be­fore: and at those same. those times wee must take heede, that wee open not our eares to flatterers, [Page 186] nor suffer our selues to be clawed with flat­tery. flatte­red, wherein it is an easie thing to be deceiued. For we then thinke our selues to be such as we may be praised by by right. such, that of right wee may be praised: whereof innumerable faults doe arise. spring; when­as men puft vppe with opinions. conceites, are shamefully scorned, and are conuersant [or intangled.] vvrapped in the greatest errours. in ve­ry grosse errours. But truly these matters hitherto. But of these mat­ters thus farre.

Chap. 34.

But that. THis then is to be taken thus, that the. so iud­ged; The greatest things or deeds. acts, and of the greatest courage to bee done. vndertaken by them, who go­uerne the Com­mon-weal; because their administration. gouerne­ment lieth open or rea­cheth most largely. extendeth the farthest, and appertaineth vnto most. And to be, and haue beene. Yet there be, and haue been many of great cou­rage, euen in the priuate. quiet life, vvho wold either trace or trie out. search [Page 188] out or take in hand. indeauour certain great enterprises. mat­ters, and containe. keepe themselues within the bounds of their owne businesses; or else being placed or set. cast betweene Philoso­phers, and those that rule the Com­mon-weale, would bee delighted with their owne houshould busi­nesse goods dome­sticall or priuate estate. hous­holde substance; not heaping it vp indeed by euerie way. not heaping vp the same by all ma­ner of meanes, nor barring. excluding theirs from the vse there­of; but rather im­parting it both to [their] friends, & to the Common­weale, if at any time need should re­quire. if there should bee neede at any time.

which substance or goods. Which first let [Page 189] it be gotten well. well gotten, neither by no filthie, &c. by no dishonest nor filthie. odious gain. then that it shew­eth itselfe profita­ble to verie many, so that worthie. Secondly, let it be in readinesse for the good of many, so they be worthy: afterwards. Lastly, let it bee increased by discretion. dis­cretion, diligence and sparing. thrift; neither let it lie, or neither that it lie open to, &c. and let it not lie open rather to lust and riot, then to libera­lity and bountie. It is lawfull for a man obseruing these prescripts to liue. Hee that obser­ueth these pre­cepts may liue magnifically, &c. roi­ally, grauely, and couragiously or stoutly. stoutly, and also plainely, faithfully, and friendly, to the life of men for the life of man.

Chap. 35.

IT followeth, that wee speake of that one part of honesty remaining. one other parte of honesty which remayneth, where­in shamefastnesse. bashfulnesse, and temperance, as it were a certaine ornamēt of life. of mans life, and also of modestie, and all quieting of the perturbations. appeasing of the passiōs of the mind, and the measure of things, is seene. That [comlines] is contained in this place. In this place is contayned that [comlinesse] which may bee called in Latin decorum; for [Page 192] it is called in Greek [...]. The force of this. nature heereof is, that it cannot bee separated from ho­nestie: For both that which becom­meth is honest, & also that which is honest becōmeth. But what a diffe­rence there is of honestie and com­linesse. But what diffe­rence is betweene honestie & come­linesse, may more easily. soo­ner be vnderstood. conceiued then explaned. expressed. For whatsoeuer it is which becometh it then appeareth. doth then appear, when honestie is. hath gone be­fore.

Chap. 36.

[Page 194]THerfore it ap­peareth what is becommeth. decent, not onely in this parte of honesty, where­of we must dispute. wee are to dis­course in this place but also in the three former. for both it be­commeth one. For [as] it is decent both. to vse reason and speech discreetly, and to doe that which a man should doe aduisedly. you doe, considerately; and also both to see and to de­fend in euerie mat­ter that which is true. to espie and maintain that which is true, in euery matter; [and. so] contrarily it doth as much disgrace to erre [or misse.] to erre, to slippe, to bee deceiued, doth as much dis­grace, as to dote, and to be taken [or di­straught] in minde. distract in minde. All [Page 195] iust things also are comely; and con­trariwise all vniust things, as they are dishonest, so they are vncomly. There is a like reason of fortitude. The nature of valour is like hereunto. For what thing. that which is don manfully and with a great courage, that seemeth. seemeth meete for a man, and comely: and what. and that which [is done] otherwise. contrarily, as it is dishonest, euen so it is vncomely. Wherfore in truth, this comlinesse, which I speak of, doth appertaine to all honestie; and doth so appertaine [thereunto] that it is seene not after a certaine hidden sort. in a certaine hidden [Page 196] manner, but may be in readi­nesse. ap­peareth openly.

For there is a cer­tain thing that be­commeth. decencie, & the same is vnderstoode. per­ceiued in euery vertue: which may be separated from vertue rather by cogitation. imagination, then in verie deede. indeed. For, as comlinesse and beautie. beautifulness & fairenesse of bodie cannot be parted. sepa­rated from health; so this comeliness whereof wee speake. in­treat, also it is indeede confused or ming­led. is indeede wholy mixed with vertue, but is di­stinguished in [ones] minde and cogitation. conceit. [...]nd the. More­ouer, the descrip­tion therof is double. of two sorts. For both wee double. vnder­stand [Page 197] a certaine ge­rall meane. decorum, which comlinesse. is in all honesty; and ano­ther is conuersant or exercised or hath to doe. vnder this, which appertay­nethq subiect to this, viz. a speciall com­linesse. to euery se­uerall parte of ho­nesty. And that former is wont almost or for most part to be de­fined thus. to be commonly thus defined; That thing to be comly. That, that is comely, which is agreeable to mans excellency. the excellen­cie of man, in which thing. wher­in his nature is different. dif­fereth from other liuing creatures.

But which part is subiect vnto the ge­nerall, they define it thus, that. But they de­fine that part w^ch is vnder the gene­nerall [viz. the spe­ciall]▪ in such sort, that they will haue that to be comely, which is so agree­able [Page 98] to nature, as both moderation & temperance may appeare in it, with a certaine comly appearance honest shew. [Now] vvee may thinke. conceiue these things to be so, or thus meāt. that these things are so vnderstood. meant by the Philoso­phers, by that comelinesse which the Poets follow: concerning which moe things are wont to be, &c. more is wont to be spoken in ano­ther place.

But then we say. But we say that Poets doe then ob­serue that which is de­cent. that grace which becometh, when that which is worthie or befit­ting euery person. fitting to euery person, is both done and said.

As if Eacus or Minos should say;

[Page 199] q Let them hate, [...] shall hat▪ so that they feare.

Or [this.]

The father him­selfe is a graue to his children:

It should seeme vncomly, because vvee haue heard, them to haue bin iust. that they were iust. But Atreus saying [so,] applauses [or clap­ping of hands] are stirred vp. it would cause a great applause: for the speech is worthie the. it is a speech besee­ming the person.

But Poets vvill iudge of. by the per­son, what may b [...]e. is com­ly for euery one.

And. Moreouer, na­ture it selfe hath put vpon vs a pers [...] great ex [...] surmou [...] ther cre [...] a personage of great excellency & pre­heminence, aboue all other liuing [Page 200] creatures. Where­fore Poets will see. discerne in great variety of persons, what is befitting e­uen to the wicked sort. vici­ous, and what be­commeth [them.] But sith that the parts of * constan­cie,q settlednesse. moderation, temperance, and shamefastnesse. modestie, are gi­uen [vs] by nature, and seeing that the same nature tea­cheth vs not to neglect▪ be carelesse, [...] what maner how we ca [...]. behaue our selues towards me [...] euery man; it is b [...]ht to pass [...] It cometh to pass, that it both appeareth, how farre that comely­nesse, which apper­taines to all ho­nesty, q doth ex­tend [...]or [Page 201] it selfe, and also this comlinesse this which is seene in euery seuerall kinde of vertue. For as the beauty. fairenesse of the body, with a fitte composing of the members or limmes. e­uery parte, doth mooue the eyes, and delighteth [ [...]hem] in this same th [...] euen in this, that all the parts consent to­gether amongst themselues with a certaine plesant grace or comlinesse. grace: euen so this come­linesse which shi­neth in [our] life,q mooueth. shineth out or bright. winneth the good liking. the ap­probation of those with whom we liue, by an order and. con­stancy, & measure. mode­ration, of all [our] words and deedes.

[Page 202] Therefore a cer­taine reuerence is to be giuen. There must be vsed therefore a certaine reuerence towards men, both of euery best [or chiefe] man. to euery one of the best sorte, and also of the rest of meaner degree. to others.

for it is not onely [the part] of an ar­rogant man but al­so dissolute, to neg­lect what euery one [...] of him. For to bee retch­lesse what euery one thinketh of him, is not onely a signe of an arro­gant body, but al­so of one altoge­ther retchlesse or out of all order. dissolute.

But there is that differeth. a certaine difference that differeth. Al in each re­spectAl. in hauing a re­spect of men. to bee had, betweene iustice & shamefastnesse. modestie. The parts of iu­stice are. It it is the parte of iustice not to wrong any by violence. to offer men no vio­lence; of modestie, not to giue offence to to offēd [thē]: wherein the force. na­ture [Page 203] of comely­nesse is most throughly seene. seene es­pecially. These things therefore thus declared, I thinke it vnderstood or plaine. suffici­ently vnderstood, what a one that thing is. what it is which we affirme to be decent. say, to become.

Chap. 37.

And the dutie which is. MOreouer, also the dutie which drawne from it pro­ceedeth from that [comliness] followeth first. hath [Page 204] first of all this way, which leadeth vn­to the agreeablenesse. conueni­ence and preserua­tion of nature: which if wee will followe as a guide, we shall neuer goe awrie. erre. And weeAl. And [...] both fol­loweth that w^ch is. shall sharpe, and quick sighted. followe that which is both a­cute, and witty by nature, and that which is agreeable to the fellowship of men. serueth fit­ly for the consoci­ation of men, and also that which is vehement. forceable & man­ly. But the grea­test force. efficacy of comeliness, is in this. stan­deth in this parte whereof vvee di­spute. For not onely the motions of the body, which are apt, or befit­ting nature. agree vnto nature, [Page 205] but much more the motions of the minde, which are likewise agreeable vnto nature, are to be approued.

Chap. 38.

FOr the power of the mind & of nature is double. consi­steth in two parts. The one part is put or placed in appetite. cō ­sisteth in appetite, which is in Greek which in Greek is [Page 206] called [...], which snatcheth or ha­leth. pulleth a man hither and thither. The other [consisteth] in reason. in rea­son: which teach­eth and sheweth plainely what is to be done or to bee fled. au [...]ided. So it commeth to pas [...]e that reason ruleth, and appetite obey­eth. And. Moreouer, euery action ought to be without. bee free from [...]ashnesse and neg­ligence: neither indeed [ought a man] to doe any thing, wherof he cannot giue a proueable cause. he is not able to ren­der a probable reason. For this is almost the defini­tion. in a manner the almost the defini­tion. description of Dutie. Wee must also effect [or bring to passe this] looke to this [Page 207] that our desires bee ruled by reason. appetites obey reason, and neither runne be­fore it for. through rashnesse, neither leaue it. forsake it, thorow sloath or dastardlinesse, or lacke of courage. coward­linesse; and that they be quiet, and voide of. free from all trouble or passion per­turbation of mind. Whereupon all constancy & all moderation shall shine bright. mo­deration shal plain­ly appeare. For, vvhat appetites. desires goe too far astray. stray further. ouerfarre, and as it were in­sulting too much, either in coueting. longing after [things] or flying [from them] are not sufficient­ly staied by rea­son, these without doubt passe ouer or ex­ceede. passe their bounde. bounds and mea­sure: [Page 208] for they forsake. [...]eaue and cast away or set aside. reiect obedi­ence, neither yet obey reason, wher­unto they are sub­iect by the lawe of nature. Of which moti­ons. Where­by not onely the mindes are troubled, but also the bodies. the mindes, but euen. also the bodies are dis­quieted. We [...]ay see the in the verie faces. very faces of angry [men,] or of those who are moued by any lust or feare, or [who] gesture, leap or skip. reioice with too great pleasure: all whose counte­nances, voyces, motions, & stations or heha­uiours. stan­dings are changed.

Of which that is vnderstood this is gathered (that wee may returne to the forme of Dutie) all appetites to be that all [Page 209] appetites are to be drawne in or pluckt in, asswaged. restrained and abated, and and all heede and diligence to be stir­red vp. that wee must stirre vp all and all heede and diligence to be stir­red vp. care and di­ligence, that wee doe not any thing rashly and at venturously o [...] by chance. ad­uenture, [nor] vnadu [...]sedly. in­considerately, and negligently. for neither are we For we are not so bred of nature, that we should seem to be made to play. for play and for [...]est. sport; but rather to seue­rity, and to cer­taine more weigh­ty and greater stu­dies. And as for those [viz.] sport or iesting. play and iesting, wee may indeede vse them, but e­ [...]en as [we vse] sleep, and other rests. recre­ations, then. at such [Page 211] time when we haue satisfied. dispatched [our] weighty and ear­nest businesses. And the very ma­ner of [our] iesting or pastime sport ought to be not immoderate. nei­ther excessiue, no [...] immodest, but honest. in­genuous and merrie. plea­sant. For as wee giue. grant not to chil­dren all libertie of play, but such as is not strange from the actions of honestie. estranged from honest exer­cises: so in our very iesting there should appeare let some light of an honest wit ap­peare. some light of an honest disposition.

Chap. 39.

There is altoge­ther a double kinde &c. TO be short, there is a double kinde of ie­sting: one illiberall or homely. base saucy, wanton. malapart, vngratious or wicked. lewd, baudy or disho­nest. filthy: the other elegant, ciuill, wit­ty, [and] conceited. plea­sant. With which kinde not only our Plantus, and the ancient Comedy of the Atticks. Athenians, but also the books of the Philosophers of Socrates sect. Socratical Philosophers are well stored or full fraught. full. There are also many things spo­ken pleasantly and wittily of many men. many witty speeches of many men, as those that [Page 212] are gathered by [...]lde [...]ato, which be called short and witty sentences. Apo­thegmes. The difference therfore of an honest and an vnhonest iesting. of an ingenuous and a vnhonest [or base] is easie. homely iest is plaine.

The one is beseeming a free man. meet for an honest man if it bee done in time. seaso [...] & with a remisse or a milde minde. milde­ly: the other is not indeed meete for [any] man, if vncleannesse of the ma [...]ter, being increased with fil­t [...]inesse of words. if vn­cleannes of words bee adioyned to the filthinesse of the things. matter.

Chap. 40.

THere is also a certaine mea­sure of playing or recre­ation. pastime to be kept, that wee doe not poure out or spend all too much lauish out all too exces­siuely; and beeing lift vp with too much pleasure, or too merry. ouer merry, slip into some dishone­stie. But both our [Martiall] field, & also the exercises of hunting do minister vnto vs. af­forde vs honest ex­amples of playing. pa­stime.

Chap. 41.

BVt it belongs to euerie question of dutie. to the whole discourse of Duty, to haue euermore in readinesse. in minde, how farre the nature of man exceedeth the nature of cat­tel. cattell and all o­ther beasts. For the beasts. they perc [...]iue no­thing but pleasure, and are carried [Page 215] thereunto * withq with their whole sway. all violence. But the minde of man is fed with lear­ning. is nourished by learning; and doth euer either study out or in­quire some matter. search out some matter by deuising, or doth perform som­thing; and is led with a delight of seeing and hearing. Moreouer, if there bee any one a little more ready som­what too much q inclined vnto pleasures, so that hee be not of the beastly kinde. kinde of beasts (for there are certaine. some there be [that are] men not in deede, but [onely] in name) but if there be any somewhat erect or lifted vp from pleasure. lesse addicted to plea­sure [then these,] [Page 216] although hee bee * caught with plea­sure,carried, ouertaken hee hideth & dissembleth his appetite. longing desire of pleasure, for modesty or bash­fulnesse. shame fastnesse. Where­upon it is vnderstood. we may ob­serue, the pleasure, &c. to be. that the pleasure of the bo­dy is not befitting. besee­ming the excellen­cy of man; and that. but that it ought to be despised and reie­cted. But if there be any man who attributeth som­what vnto pleasure. yeeldeth some­what vnto pleasure [let him knowe] the measure of in­ioying it, to be hol­den diligently of him. he must very wa­rily keepe a mea­sure of enioying thereof. And therefore. for that cause, the diet, &c. must be, &c. let the diet and apparell of the body be re­ferred [Page 217] to health & strength, not to pleasure. voluptuousnesse. And also. Moreouer if wee will consider what an excellency and Al dignityAl. dignitie of na­ture there is in man. there is in the na­ture of man, vvee shall vnderstand how vnbeseeming it is to lauish out in riot or run to riot. ouerflowe in riot, and to liue deliciously and nicely. wantonly; and how honest. comely a thing is is to liue sparingly. frugally, temperately. conti­nently, seuerely or strict­ly. sagely [&] soberly.

Chap. 42.

Also we must vn­derstand. WE must further vnderstand, that we haue on vs as it were [or sustaine] two persons. are as it vvere [Page 219] cloathed by nature with two estates or condi­tions. persons: vvhereof one is common, q there­upon,* of that. because wee are all partakers of reason, and of that preheminence or dignitie. excellency, whereby we excell. sur­mount beasts: frō which all honesty and comelinesse is drawne. deriued: and out of which the way of finding out of Du­tie is sought out.

But. And the other [is that] which is properly attributed. assigned to euery one. For as there bee great dissimilitudes. differences in bo­dies, (for vvee see some to preuaile or excell. surpasse others in swiftnesse for to run. running, some. o­thers in strength [Page 220] to wrastle. for wrastling: & likewise in [...]ormes, shapes or [...]. coū ­tenances, dignit [...]e to be in som [...], comlinesse in others. that som haue a maie sty, o­ther [...] amiablenesse: so there are in minde [...] also grea­ter differences. varieties.

There was in Lu­cius Crassus and Lucius Philippus much pleasantness; but greater and more of set pur­pose, in Caius Cae­sar the sonne of Lu­cius. Lucius his sonne. But. And in the same times at the same time, there [...] a singu­lar seueritie in, &c. there was in Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Dru­sus being a young man, a singular grauitie; much mirth in Caius [...]. in Cai­us Lelius much mirth, [...] Scipio his fa­miliar. in his fa­miliar friend Scipio [Page 221] greater more seeking of honour. ambiti­tion, more sorrowfull or full of discon­tent, or auster [...]. a sadder life.

Also among the Grecians wee haue heard of Socrates, to haue been sweet & pleasantly con­ceited, and of a merry speech. discourse, and also [to haue beene] an dissembler. a pleasant [...] ­ter or jiber. E [...]ro­nist in al his speech, whom the Greci­an [...] named [...]: contrariwise P [...]tha­goras and Pericles to haue attained the highest au­thoritie. very great esti­mation, without a­ny mirth at all.

Wee haue heard of Hanniball, of [the Captains] of the Carthagini­ans. of the nation of the Carthaginians, to to haue been crafty. sub­tle; Quintus Max­imus of our Cap­taines, [Page 222] easily to conceale, holde his peace, dis­s [...]mble, [...]rap, pre­uent the counsels of the enemies. to haue beene very cun­ning in concealing matters, in silence, dissimulation, plot ting, preuenting the deuices of ene­mies. In which kinde the Greekes preferre Themisto [...] cles the Athenian and Iaso the Phe­rean before all o­ther; and especi­ally the subtile and crafty deed of So­lon: who fained him­selfe to be mad, to the end his life might, &c. who to the end that his life might be the safer, and that he might do better seruice to the cōmōwealth. Al somwhat moreAl. sometime or in time to come. further the Com­mon-wealth, fay­ned himselfe to be madde. There be others much vn­like to these; plaine [Page 223] and open: which thinke nothing to be done, [as] of a se­cret plot, by laying in waite. that no­thing ought to be done secretly, no­thing by guile, be­ing louers of truth, enemies of deceit. And againe there be others, who can endure any thing, doe seruice to any man, so that they may obtaine what they aime at▪ desire: as we saw Sylla and Marcus Crassus. In which kinde we haue heard of Ly­sander the Lacede­monian to haue beene most subtle and most patient. most able to endure any thing; and contrariwise Callicratides, who vvas Admirall of the Nauy next af­ter [Page 224] Lysander. And likewise we see another man to effect by [his] speeches. in speech wee see indeed a­nother man, al­though he be of great authori­tie. ve­ry mighty, yet so to order the mat­ter, that hee may seeme to be [but] one of many. of the com­mon sort. Which thing we haue obserued. seen both in Catulus the father, & in the sonne. the sonne, and also in Quintus Mutius Mancinus. I haue heard also of [mine] ancestours, the same thing to haue bin. that the same was in Publiks Scipio Nasica; And con­trarily his father, euen him. that his father, euen who auenged the mis­chieuous enterpri­ses of Tiberius [Page 225] Gracchus, to haue had no gentle [or curte­ous] maner of speech, or no plea­sing grace. had no af­fability of speech: no no [...] indeede Xenocrates being the most [...]euere of the Phi­losophers. vvho was the sagest of all the Philoso­phers, and for that very cause to haue bin both &c. both great and famous. Innumerable other diuersities there be of nature and ma­ners, yet not at all to bee disprai­sed. But euery mans owne things. [gifts] are verie greatly to be defended. carefully to be maintained; [tho] not such as are faulty. vicious, but yet the pro per. yet those vvhich are naturall, whereby that comelinesse which we doe seek may bee more ea­sily retained. For we must so deale, [Page 226] that wee contend not at all against the vniuersall na­ture, or belonging to all. that nature which is vniuersall: yet that beeing preser­ued, let vs euery one follow our own proper nature; [So] that although there bee other studies more weightie, &c. other grauer and better studies, yet [...]et vs measure. wee measure owne studies. our own by the rule of Na­ture. For neither auaileth it to resist nature. is it to any pur­pose to fight a­gainst Nature, nor to follow. ensue any thing which you cannot attaine.

Whereupon it more appeareth of what sort. what manner of thing this comeli­nesse is: sith that nothing becom­meth, [Page 227] Minerua tho god­ [...] of wisedome and all good scien­ces being vowilling maugre Minerua, as they vse to say: that is, against nature. nature with stan­ding and resisting. If there be any thing at all. And verely if there be any thing comely, certainely there is nothing more, then an euennesse. e­uen and constant carriage. course of our whole life and also. and of euery action: which you cannot keep, if you follow. imi­tate the nature of other men, [and] let passe. omit your owne. For as wee ought to vse that kind of speech. speech which is knowne vntovs, lest inculcating, thru­sting in or beating vpon, or repeating now and then. chop­ping in [certaine] Greeke words, as some [v [...]e to doe] wee bee worthily [Page 226] [...] [Page 227] [...] [Page 228] mocked or laughed at by verie good right. scoffed at: so we ought to bring no disagree­ment [or variance] into our actions and all our life. so wee should shew no contrariety in our doings or in our whole life.

And this diffe­rence of natures hath so great force. power, that som­times one man ought to procure death to himselfe, viz. to kill himselfe. to procure his owne death, another ought not, in the same quarrell. cause.

for M. Cato. was not in one quarrell, the rest in another &c. For was Marcus Cato in one q quar­rell, the rest which yielded themselues to Caesar in Africk, in another? Yet peraduenture it had beene giuen [or impu­ted] for a fault [or a reproach] to the rest. ac­counted for a fault in the rest, if they had killed. slaine them­selues, because their life had been

[Page 229] lesse austere. more pleasant, & their maners more easie. milde. But when­as Nature had gi­uen vnto Cato an incredible grauity; and himselfe had strengthned. confirmed the same by a perpetu­all constancy, and euer remained in his purpose & coun­sell taken to die ra­ther, then that the face of the tyrant was to be looked on. intent and determined pur­pose, he ought ra­ther to die then behold the tyrants face.

How many things suffered. endured Vlysses in that long continued wandering. long tra­uell, when he both serued or became seruiceable. did seruice vnto women (if Circe and Calipso are to be named women) and desired to shew himselfe faire spoken. affable [Page 230] and curteous to all men, in all his speech? and also indured the spite­full taunts of, &c. at home. at home endu­red the reproachfull or spitefull speeches. con [...]ume­lies of seruants & hand­maids or wenches. slaues and girles; that hee might once. at length at [...]aine to that which hee desired. But A [...]ax (with what cou­rage he is reported. being of that courage wihich is reported) had rather die a thousand times. deaths, then to endure those things of a­nother man.

which things wee beholding. Which diuersi­ties when wee be­holde, it shall bee meete. necessarie to weigh, what gifts. what ech­one hath of his owne, and to or­der those aright; neither to be desi­rous to trie. and not to haue [Page 231] a desire to try, how other mens things may becom. others mens gra▪ ces would become him. for euery ones pr [...] [...] [...]ts do [...] of all become him. For that especially becom­meth each man, which is * most of all the owne of euerie one. euery ones owne. Therefore let, &c. Let euery man therefore knowe his owne disposition: and let him make. shew him­self [...] a sharp [...] both of his owne vices, & good things. vertues; lest players in come­dies & enterludes. players may seem to haue more wisedome. discretion then we. For they chuse not the best comedies. en­terludes, but the fittest for them­selues. They that inioy [or delight in] their voice, viz. who haue excellent voice [...]. relie vpon their pronuntiation, chuse Epigonus and [Page 232] Medea. They [who relie vpon their] gesture, chuse. [take] Menalippa, or Cl [...]temnestra. Rutilius, whom I remember, euer chused. [made choyce of] Antiopa: Esop not often. very seldome [chused] Aiax. Shall a player then see this in the stage which a wise man shall not see in his life? Therefore vnto what things we shall be most, &c. We are ther­fore we shall labour chiefly in those. to labour es­pecially in those things, whereunto wee shall bee most apt. But if at any time necessitie shal thrust vs forth or driue vs. inforce vs vnto those things, which shall not bee of our wit. fit for our disposition, all care, meditati­on and diligence is to be giuen. wee must vse all [Page 233] care, meditation & diligence, that wee may doe. performe them, if not come­lily, yet as little vncomlily with as little vncomeliness [as may be.] Nei­ther ought wee so much to endea­uour ourselues that we may fol­low. to follow the vertues which are not gi­uen vnto vs, as that we may flie▪ to fly the vices.

Chap. 43.

[Page 234] And there is a third person adiov­ned vnto those two, &c. MOreouer, vnto those two persons which I spake of aboue. before, a third per­son is adioyned w^ch some chance or time putteth or casteth on vs. imposeth [on vs.] And al­so a fourth which wee shall fashion or frame. fit vnto our selues after our owne iudgement. mind. For kingdomes, em­pires, nobilities. nobility, honours, riches, wealth. power, and those which are contrary to these, being placed in fortune [or in the power of fortune] consi­sting on fortune, are gouerned by the times. are ordered ac­cording to the times. But it pro­ceedeth from our owne will. free will, what calling we will follow. what person wee will. list to beare.

[Page 235]And therefore som apply themselues vnto Philosophy▪ others the Ciuill lawe, others elo­quence: and another or some had rather. som one chuseth to ex­cell in one of those vertues. [another in another.] And. But whose fathers or [...] haue excelled or [...]in notable in any commendation. haue beene famous in any kinde of glo­ry, [...] for the most part. most of theirs doe study to excell in the same kinde of praise. cōmendation: as Quintus Mu [...] ­us the son of Publius Publius his sonne [did] in the Ciuill lawe: Afri­canus the son of Paulus. Paulus his sonne, militarie businesse or feats of armes. in chiual­rie. Also certaine or sundry diuers doe adde some some their owne. of their owne vnto [Page 236] those praises, w^ch they haue receiue▪ from their auncestors. fa­thers: as this same Affricanus increa­sed his martiall glory by [his] elo­quence. Which selfe same thing Timotheus Co­nons sonne did. did also Timothe­us Conons sonne: who whereas. when as hee was not inferiour then his father. to his father in the praise. praises of warre, yet added. adioyned vn­to that commen­dation the glory of learning & wit. Sometimes also it commeth to pass. falleth out, that certaine the imitation of parents being o­mitted or let passe. hauing omitted the imita­tion of their pa­rents, follow some trade or determi­nation. course of their owne; and those [Page 237] especially trauell therein for most part, who beeing borne of scarce knowne or base. obscure parents, appoint to at­tempt. pro­pound vnto them­selues great enterprises. mat­ters. Therefore when we seek what things do become. are come­ly, wee ought to comprehend. cast all these in our minde & thought. co­gitation.

Chap. 44.

BVt first of all wee must de­termine whom and what manner of [Page 238] men wee vvould be. haue our selues, and in. of what kind of life: Which consultation or aduice. de­liberation is the hardest of all o­ther. For in the entrance into the youth which is from 12. or 14. to 25. or 30. youthfull time, to which the greatest weaknesse of counsell is. wherein there is the greatest weak­nesse of counsell; then euery man most slenderness. appointeth vntoq determineth. himselfe that kind of passing his age or liuing. life, which he he hath loued most of all. chiefly liketh. And therefore hee is entangled with some certaine kind and course of li­uing, before then. that hee could. bee able to iudge, what should be best. For that Prodicus saith wher­as Prodicus saith, Hercules. that Hercules (as [Page 293] it is in Xenophon) so soone as he began to haue a beard, or came to maturitie or ripe­nesse of yeares. be­gan to come to mans estate, (which time is gran ted by nature, to chuse what course or trade of life each will follow vvay of liuing euery man will enter) to haue gone forth. went forth into solitarie place or wildernesse. a desart place, and sitting there, doubted long and much with himselfe. long with himselfe and much, when he be­held two waies, the one of pleasure, the other of vertue, whether of them it should be. were better to enter into.

This peraduen­ture might fallout. hap­pen vnto Hercules being bred of the seede of Iupiter. borne of Iupiters seede; but not so to vs, [Page 238] [...] [Page 293] [...] [Page 240] who imitate whom it seemeth best to euerie one. euery of vs; and are allured. inforced to their studies & and determinations. fashions.

And for the most part wee beeing instructed. trayned vp by the precepts of our parents, we are led or doe incline. are drawn vnto their customes. guise and maner. manners. O­thers are carried after the. by the iudgement of the multi­tude, and most wish for long after those things especially, vvhich seeme fairest. goodliest to the greater part. Some notwith­standing haue fol­lowed a right course of life, whe­ther by, &c. Yet some, whe­ther by a certaine happinesse, or by goodnesse of na­ture, or by the in­struction of their [Page 241] parents, haue fol­lowed the right course of life. But that is the most rare kinde of those men. But that kinde of men is most seldome found, who bee­ing indued. adorned ei­ther with excel­lent greatnesse. profoundnes of wit, or else with famous learning & knowledge, or with both of them, haue also. yet taken a time of aduising. delibe ration, what course of life they would especially followe. In which delibera­tion, the whole coun­sell or aduice. all a mans counsell is to bee recalled. applied to each mans owne. proper na­ture. For [...]ith that we search out in all things, &c. in all things that are done, we search out of that maner. [Page 242] nature, wherto euerie one is naturally incli­ned. wherewith euery one is borne (as is said before) what becommeth. is comely; then a greater care by much of that mat­ter is to bee added, in determining our whole life. a farre grea­ter care thereof must be had in set­ting downe the whole course of our life; that vvee may be constant to our selues in the conti­nuance of our life, nor to halt in any dutie. euer agree with our selues in all our whole life, and neuer halt in any dutie. But see­ing that Nature hath the greatest force. power vnto this choice, [and] For­tune the next; there must euer be had a consideration. regarde of both of thē, in chu­sing the kinde. course of our life, but of Nature more. For nature is. it is both much [Page 243] surer. more firme and stable. constant: In so much, that some­times fortune, as beeing it selfe mortall or mortalitie it selfe. mortall, may seeme to fight immortall nature with nature being immortall. Hee therefore that will apply all counsell, or the whole course of his life. his vvhole course to the kind of his nature no [...] corrupted, let him kee [...]e stedfastnesse. constan­cy; For that be­commeth chiefl [...]: except peraduen­ture hee shall p [...]r­ceiue that himselfe haue erred. he hath erred in c [...]using his course of life. the kind of [his] life. Which if it sh [...]ll fall out (and it may fal out. as indeede it may) there must bee made a change of manners and pur­poses. [Page 244] We may. shall make that change more easily and commodiously, if the times shall helpe. further vs; but if not, it must be done by little and little and foot by foot, or [...] and [...]. leasurely, & by little and little: like as wise men do iudge is to be more [...] or [...]. [...] or [...] or [...] [...] as it were stitch by stitch conuenient, to q breake off by lit­tle and little, those friendships, which doe not so much delight vs, and are lesse approued of vs, then to cut thē off, suddenly. of a sodaine.

[...] the kinde of our life being chan­ged, we must care by all reason. And when we haue changed our course of life, wee must by all means take [...]eed, that we be thought to haue done it vpon good [Page 245] counsell. aduice. But for­ [...] as it is said. vvee [...] ▪ a little be­fore▪ [...] auncestors [...] be imitated. that vvee [...] follow. imitate out [...] ▪ [...]et that. this first [...]e ex­ [...], that their vices be not. are not to be imitated▪ [...], that we seek [...] [...]o follow them [...] [...] against our nature▪ And then it Nature will not beare, that they can. we can imitate cer­taine things; [...]s the sonne of the elder [...]. the elder Affrica­nus sonne, who a­dopted this [...]on to Pau­ [...] [...] ▪ this ou [...] [...] his sonne, could n [...]t, for his infirmitie of his health. sicklinesse, be so like vnto his fa­ther, as the other Affricanus sonne. other was like his fa­ther▪ was his: If there­fore one be not a­ble, either to [...]. de­fend causes, or to make orations or [...] to the people. to retaine the people [Page 244] [...] [Page 245] [...] [Page 246] with orations, or to make warre. followe the warres, yet it shall be his duty hee ought to performe those things, which he can. shall bee in his power: as Iustice, faithfulnesse. Fidelity, [...]ibera­lity, Modestie▪ [&] Tēperance; to the end, that that thing may be lesse required. that that thing, which is lacking in him, may bee the lesse missed. And the best in­heritance is left from the fathers to the children, and better then all pa­trimonie [or liueli­hood or childspart] [viz.] the glorie of, &c. And in­deed the best inhe­ritance [which] is left by fathers vn­to their children, and more worth then any patrimo­nie [is] the glory of [their] vertue, and of worthy deedes: whereun­to to be a shame, disgrace or di [...]paragement. staine,q iudge an vniust thing [or disho­nest] and a fault. is to be accounted [both] a fault and [Page 247] shame. And be­cause the same du­ties are not giuen o­befitting. doe not be­long to vnlike a­ges▪ but there are some [ [...]uties] of young men, others of olde, somthing also is to be said of this di­stinction. some are for young men, o­thers for old men, somewhat is also to be spoken of this diuersity.

Chap. 45.

IT is therefore [the Duty] of a young man. a young mans du­tie to reuerence his elders, and to chuse out of them the best and most approued; whose counsel and autho­ritie [Page 248] he may [...]eane vnto. rel [...]e vpon. For the vn­skilfulnesse of entring age, or the tender yeares. youth, is to bee ordered & guided directed and go­uerned by the experience. wis­dome of old men. This age is also to be specially driuen away or weaned. re­frained from pleasures. lust, and to bee exerci­sed in labour and patiently indu­ring toyle both, &c. patience both of minde and bodie, that their industry may florish or be of chiefe strength, or they may be most fit for. excell both in martiall and ci­uill duties. And also. More­ouer, vvhen they will refresh their wits. mindes and betake. giue thems [...]lues to pleasure. pa­stime, let them be­ware of intempe­rance, and remem­ber shamefastnesse. to obserue modesty; which [Page 249] shal be more [...] they may doe more easily, if they will their elders will be presen, or a­mongst them. have their elders also p [...]sent at such times. things.

Chap. 46.

But for old men, labours of, &c. BVt the la­bours of the body are to bee lessened. diminished in olde men, and ex­ercises o [...] the mind doe seeme. seeme meere to be increased. And their diligence must be giuen. they must doe their endeauour, that they helpe as much as they can, or assits verie much. princi­pally [...] both their friends, and [Page 250] the youth & chief­ly the Common­weale vvith coun­sell and wisedome. But olde men are to beware of nothing more. nothing is more to bee taken heede of to olde age, then that it giue not it selfe o­uer to lithernesse & slothfulnesse. idlenesse. But as for riot. Ri­otous [...]esse also is both filthie, as it is dishonest to e­uery age, and also most foule to olde age. so to olde age most shamefull. But if the intemperance of lust shal also come vnto it. more­ouer bee ioyned therewith, there is a double euill or inconue­nience. mis­chie [...]; because both age it selfe conceiueth. recei­u [...]th disgrace. shame [ther­by] and it cau­seth the intemperance of young men. the young mens intempe­rance [Page 251] to bee more impudent. shamelesse.

Chap. 47.

ANd that. this in­deed is not strange or besides the matter. from the purpose, to speak concerning, or touching. of the Du ties of Magistrates, [&] of priuate men▪ of citizens [and] of strangers. It is therefore the pro­per office of a Ma­gistrate, to vnderstand himselfe to beare to consi­der that hee repre­sents the person of the Citie, and to owe. & that he ought to main­taine the dignitie and ho­nour. honour [Page 252] & reputation there­of: to keepe lawes. to see the sta­tutes obserued, [...] describe or set downe. to make lawes, and to rememb [...]r those things to be, &c. that those things are committed to his trust or fidelitie. charge. [...] be­hooueth also a pri­uate man, to liue with an equall & like lawe with the citizens. vnder the like lawe, as the rest of the citizens (nei­ther [...] and base as an vnder­ling and ab [...]ect, no [...] li [...]ting vp himself. hearing himselfe too high) and also to will or desire. seeke those things in the Cō ­mon-weale, which concerne peace and honestie. that are quiet and ho­nest. For wee are vvont both to esteeme. thinke and to call such a one a good citizen. But it is the dutie of a stran­ger [Page 253] and one of another countrie inhabiting in the citie, a [...] ­ner. alien in­habitant, to [...]ed­dle with nothing [...] his owne [...]ulinesse. to inquire [or ask buf [...]ly] nothing of, &c. [...] to enquire of another mans matter; and to b [...]e [...] [...] all. no whit more busie [...] is [...], or o­ [...]er medling. curious in a [...]. strange Cōmon­weale. So almost. Thus for the most parte Du­ties shall be found ou [...], when it shall be sought out. enquired what becommeth. is decent, and what is apt, [...], or agree [...] ­ble. befitting persons, times and ages. And there is nothing that doth so much be­come. can so much grace a man, as to keep constancy in doing or perfor­ming. managing euery matter, and in consultation. ta­king of aduice.

Chap. 48.

BVt because that. this comeli­ness is seene. appeareth in all deeds & words, and finally in the motion and forme. ge­sture of the bodie, & the same is put. con­sisteth in three things, well fauourednesse fairnesse, order [and] adorning or gar­nishing. set­ting forth, meete to action. for ones doings: it is more difficult to expresse. vtter, but it wil be easie enough to be conceiued. vnderstood. That care also is cōtained in these 3. [Page 255] things, that we be allowed. approued of thē with whom, and amongst whom we liue. Let a fewe words. some few [wordes] bee spoken also. likewise of these things.

Chap. 49.

In the beginning verie nature. FIrst of all, na­ture it selfe seemeth to haue had a great regard or consi­deration. re­spect [Page 256] of our body, which hath set in readinesse that our. &c. in open view our fauour, face or physnomy. countenance and the rest of our shape, wherein there is a honest. comely shew: but she hath couered and hidde those parts of the bodie, which being giuen for the ne­cessitie of Nature, would haue an il­fauoured & vnoomly. [...]oule sight. The mo­destie of men. man hath followed this so diligent. cunning a frame of Nature. for all men, who are of a sound [...] remoue from the eies those things which na­ture hath hid. For what things Nature hath hid, those all men, who are well in their wits, do keep from the eyes: and they doe their endea­uour [Page 257] to obey. serue necessitie of na­ture. ve­ry necessitie as secretly. closely as they can: also of what parts of the body there are necessarie or base. seruile vses, they neither tearm. call those partes nor [their] vses by their owne names: and that. and so that which it is no shame to doe, if it be closely or in a se­cret place. secretly; it is filthie to speak of it. vncleanly to re­port. And therfore neither the open acting or doing of. do­ing of those things openly [...] voide of shamelesnesse. impudencie, nor the speech [is voide of] filthi­nesse. nor the speaking of them [free from] dishonestie. Nei­ther yet indeed are the Cynicks to be heard. wor­thie to bee heard, or if there haue [Page 258] beene any Stoicks in maner Cynicks, who find fault with & mocke or [...] at vs. reproue and scoffe at vs, because wee say, those things to b [...] [...] [or shameful] in words. that those things are shamefull to bee vttered in vvords, which are not dis­honest in deede: and yet wee [...]earm those things which be vnhonest. filthie, by their owne names: as it is a thing dis­honest indeed to rob [or goe a thee­uing,] &c. as, to robbe by the high wayes, deceiue or cosin. be­guile, commit a­dultery, is a thing dishonest indeede, but it is reported [or told] not obscenely. spoken of without any dis­honestie: to giue he inde­ [...] for children. to be­get children is in­deed honest, obscene in name. but vncleanely to bee vttered. And moe things are disputed by the same ▪Philoso­ph [...]rs▪ to that sen­tence &c. And so these Philosophers [Page 259] bring many things to that purpose a­gainst shamefastnesse. modestie. But let vs followe Nature, and flie. shun euery thing which abhorreth from [or cannot receiue so much as] the ap­probation, &c. abhorreth the ve­rie pleasing. approbation of the eyes & ears. Let our standing, gate. going, sitting downe, sitting at the table, counte­nance, eyes, moo­uing of [our] hands keepe that same q decorum. In w^ch * comlinesse. things, two [faults]* faults. are to be fled. [...] especially: effeminate [or womanish] and nice or wanton. that wee doe nothing effeminately or nicely, and not any thing [...]ard [or rude] or carter-like. nor rude­ly or clownishly. Neither indeede may wee yeeld vn­to stage players. players & ora­tours, [Page 258] [...] [Page 259] [...] [Page 260] that these things should bee fit for them, disso­lute [or left loosly] to vs. seemely done by them, dissolutely by vs. The very custome of stage­players, hath so great shamefastnesse. modestie from the ancient discipline. order, that no man commeth on the stage without breeches. For they are afraide, lest if it should fall out by any chance that some. certaine parts of the bodie should be opened. discouered, they would bee be beholden. seene vncomely. And indeed after our maner. And as the fashi­on is with vs, chil­dren growing to ripenesse of age. mans estate, are not washed. bathed with their parents, [Page 261] nor sonnes in lawe with their fathers in law. The shamefastnesse or bashfulnesse. mo­destie therefore of this kinde is to be retained. obserued, especi­ally Nature herself beeing Mistresse and guide.

Chap. 50.

BVt whereas there are two kindes of amiablenesse or comlinesse. beau­ty, in the one of [Page 262] which is fairnesse, in the other Maie­sty:q dignitie. wee ought to account fairnesse to belong to the woman, and ma­iesty to the man.

All adorning or tric­king. manner of trimming therfore not worthie man. vnbefitting man, must be remooued from his beauty. outward forme: and let a fault like vnto this be taken heede of in the gesture and in the motion.

For both wrastler-like mo­tions. the stir­rings like wrastlers are oft times too too. more odious. misliked, and al­so some. many gestures [...] players. of players are not vvithout follies. foolish toyes: also in both kinds those things are cōmended w^ch [Page 263] are right & simple. plain. But the maiesty of the fauour is to be preserued by the goodnesse of the colour, [and] the colour by the ex­ercises of the body.

There is to be ad­ded besides. There must moreouer bee vsed a cleanelinesse, [which is] not o­dious, nor too cu­rious, but onely which escheweth all countrie-like and inhumane negli­gence. rude and vnci­uill slouenrie.

we must haue▪ The same regarde is to be had of [our] apparell; in which as in most things a meane is the best: wee must also take heede that wee nei­ther vse too so [...]t slownes­ses, or too much nicenesse. ouer nice slownesse in our going or gate. pase, that vvee [Page 262] [...] [Page 263] [...] [Page 264] should seeme to be like the pageants borne in triumphs or shewes to be seene. Pageants in triumphes, either that we take vp. nor too much swiftnesses. speed in our haste.

Which things whē they are done. fall out, the breathings are moued. there followeth shortnes of breath, the countenances are changed. countenance is changed, the faces are wri­then. the face is disfigured: of which a great significati­on is made, no con­stancie to be presēt. ariseth a great presumpti­on, that they haue no staiednesse. But wee must studie. labour much more, that the affections. motions of our mind depart not. swarue not from Nature: which we shall at­taine, if we beware that we fall not in­to perturbations or moodes. passions and amazednesse. mazes, and if we wil keep our mind [...] [Page 265] attent. heedfull to the keeping. preseruation of comelinesse. But the motions of the minde are double. of two sorts; some of the cogitation. vnderstanding. thoughts, o­thers of the appe­tite. The thought is co [...]uersant or ex­ercised. especially busi­ed in searching out the truth: the appetite stitreth a man to be doing. infor­ceth a man to ac­tion. Therefore wee must care or pro­uide. Wee must therefore bee care­full, that we vse our cogitati­on vnto the, &c. im­ploy our tho [...]ghts about the very best matters, [and] that wee giue. make [our] appetite obedient to reason.

Chap. 51.

ANd because there is great [...] of speech. the power of speech is great, and that double. also [ [...]] of two sortes, the one of contention. vehement speech, the other of talke. ordinarie talk. Let the eloquent speech. vehement speech let it be giuen. serue for pleadings in of iudgements, assemblies [or so­lemne meetings] the Senate house. iudg­ments, orations in assemblies, & spee­ches in the Senate house: speech let it be vsed in circles [or cōmon meetings.] Let the ordinarie speech be vsed in compa­nies, disputations. reasoning a­bout matters, mee­tings [Page 267] of [...]amiliar [friends. [...], and [...] [...] [or [...] [...]pon] feasts. let it also be at feasti [...]gs.

* There are ma­nyq the rhetorician [...] giue m [...]ny precepts concerning vehe­ment speech. precepts of Rhetoricians, of vehement speech, none of ordinarie talke▪ although I wot. knowe not whe­ther these also may be there may not be such also. H [...]wbeit there areq But maisters [or teachers] are found for the studies of learners. masters for their studies that will learne: but there are none that stu­die this: all pla­ces are full with the com­pany of &c. replenish­ed with store of Rhetoricians. Al­though those same precepts which are of words & senten­ces, will appertaine to talke. may serue for talke. But sith that we haue [our] [Page 268] voyce the * decla­rerthe vtterer, or to vtter. of [our] speech, and we follow two things in our voice. and in our voyce we seek two things, that it bee cleare and sweete, both of them is to be required, &c. they both are to be fet­ched altogether from Nature; but exercise vvill in­crease the one, and imitation of men speaking. of thē that speake presly & mildely [will increase] the other. pi­thily and pleasant­ly, the other.

What was there in the Catuli, that you should think them to vse an exquisite iudgement of let­ters, or pronoun­cing. to bee of an ex­quisite iudgement in learning? Al­though they were learned, but and others. so were others also. But these were thought to vse the Latine tongue the best, [Page 269] their sound. pronuntia­tion was sweete, their letters neither expressed nor op­pressed. too much mou­thed nor drowned, lest it should be ei­ther obscure. darke to be vnderstood, or vnpleasant or too much affected. o­uer harsh. [Their voyce was] with­out straining, nei­ther fainting. faint nor shrill. too shrill. The speech of Lucius Crassus [was] more plentifull. flowing, and no lesse pleasant. conceited. But the opinion concerning Catuli, of well speaking, was not lesse. Yet for eloquēce the Catuli were in no lesse estimati­on. But Caesar, the brother of the fa­ther of Catulus, ouercame. went beyond all in salt. wit and plea­sant conceits, that in that verie law­yerlike [Page 270] kinde of speaking, he ouercame the contention. sur­passed the vehe­mencie of others, [euen] in speech. [his] familiar talk. we must labour therfore. We must therfore take paines in all these things, if wee seeke out what becommeth. is de­cent in euery mat­ter.

Chap. 52.

LEt then this familiar talke. talke (in which the Socra­tians most excell) be milde, and not at all obstinate. gentle, and not froward. Let there bee therein [Page 271] a pleasant grace. a pleasantnesse. Neither yet indeed let him exclude. let a man ex­clude others, as though hee were come. entered into his owne possession: but let him think that he ought now and then. oft times to vse an en­terchange—able course, as in other matters so also in common talke.

And let him see. con­sider first of all of what matters hee speake: if [it bee] of earnest bus [...]es­ses, let him adde. vse seueritie or grauity sagenesse; if of merry matters, pleasantnesse. Es­pecially let him foreset. looke vnto it that his talke doe not declare. bewray some [Page 272] vice to bee in his ma­ners. in his man­ners. Which is wont to fall out then especially, when as it is spoken studi­ously of the absent, for the [...] of de­tracting. men do speake purposely of them who are absent, to their re­proach, either by a mocke or seuerely, or re­proachfully or con­ [...]umeliously. in scorn or earnest, either raylingly, or spite­fully. And [common] speeches are had for the most part. Moreo­uer, ordinarie cō ­munication is for the most parte, ei­ [...] of domestical businesses, or of the Common-weale, or of the studies of good artes, and of learning. Therefore our diligence is to bee giuen. Wee must therefore do our endeauour▪ that although our speech. howsoeuer our communicati­on shall begin to stray vnto other [Page 273] matters, [yet] it be called back vnto these things▪ here­vnto. But howso­euer, the matters shall be present. bee (for neither are vvee [all] de­lighted vvith the same things, nor at euery season, nor alike) [ye [...]] we must also marke. consi­der how our speech may haue delight. bee seasoned with de­light: and as there was a way to begin it; so let there bee a measurable mean or good fashion. good manner of the ending ther­of. But because this is most rightly commaunded. inioyned, in our whole life, that we flie [all] perturba [...]ions. passi­ons, that is to say, all ouer great stir­rings. vnmeasurable moodes of minde, [Page 274] not obeying rea­son. not ruled by rea­son▪ so [...] [...] must bee [...] of such passions, lest [...] [...] [...] [in it] either anger, or any greedie desire. couetousnes, or [...]lothfulnesse. lazinesse, or cowardlinesse, or lest any such thing appeare. And a­boue all, we must care. we are to be carefull, that wee seeme both to reuerence and loue them with vvhom we confer speech. we talke. Also now & then, there happen or come by chance. fall out necessa­ry chidings, wher­in peraduenture wee are to vse a greater strayning of voyce, and a sharper grauitie of words. That is also to be done. Wee are also to loo [...]e to [Page 275] that, that wee doe not seeme to doe those things irefully. an­grily: but as Phy­sicians [doe come] to searing & cut­ting, so we come seldome and [as it were] vnwillingly to this kinde of chastising. such kinde of rebuking; and not at any time but vpon ne­cessitie. nor e­uer but necessarily, if no other remedy will be found. But yet let anger be farre away. let it be alto­gether void of an­ger, with vvhich nothing can bee done well, nothing discreetly or aduisedly. considerately.

And for a great part. For the most parte likewise it is lawfull to vse we may vse a gentle manner of rebu­king, yet grauitie being adioyned. tempe­red with grauitie, that both austeritie be ad­ded. seuerity [Page 276] may bee shewed, and all reproachfull [...]peech bee repelled. contu­mely auoided. And also that same thing of bitternesse which chiding hath. same bit­ternesse which is in chiding, must bee signified to haue beene vndertaken. vsed for his sake. cause who is chidden. It is right. good also, euen in those braules or quar­rels. conten­tions, which are made with our greatest enemies, although we heare [wordes] vnbefitting vs, vn­fashionable. vnfit to bee spoken to vs; yet to keepe. retaine a grauity, [and] to repell angrinesse. suppresse the an­gry moode. For those things which are done with any perturbation. passion, can nei­ther be done con­stantly, nor bee [Page 277] approued of them that are present. It is also a matter vnbefit­ting or vnbesee­ming. an vn­comly thing, [for a man] to report [great matters] of himselfe, especial­ly being false; and to imitate the Thraso in Te­rence. glorious soldier, with the laughing at o [...] scorning. scorning of the hearers.

Chap. 53.

ANd because wee pursue all things. euery point (we will it in verie deede. at least certainely we desire to doe it) wee must shew also [Page 278] what a one it pleaseth or it li­keth vs, that the house &c. it be­commeth the house of an hono­rable man and of a Prince to bee: the end whereof is the occupying it. vse, where­unto the description. plot of the building must be accommodated or fitted. framed; and yet [withall] a diligent care is to be added or vsed there must be a respect be had of the dignitie. statelinesse and handsomnesse. commodiousness of it. Wee haue heard it to haue bin, &c. that it was an honor to Kneius Octauius (who was made the first Consull of that familie. who was the first Con­sull of that family) that he had built a famous [or gor­geous] and full of dignitie. goodly and very stately house in the palace: Which when it was visited commonly seen of all the vulgar [Page 279] sort [re [...]orting thi­ther] it was thoght to giue the voice in election. to further the master [of i [...]] (be­ing a newe man. a man newly come vp) vnto the Consulship. S [...]au­rus hauing demoli­shed or th [...]owne downe this, [...]ade an [...] to his, &c. plucked this downe, [and] en­larged [...] owne houses. [...]nd so▪ Th [...]rfore the Emperour. Octauius first brought the Con­sulship into his house: this the sonne of a chiefe and fa­mous man. this othe [...] a noble and fa­mous mans sonne▪ brought into his enlarged house, not onely a repulse but also ignominy and ca­lamity. shame and miserie. For a mans honour is to bee adorned. set out by his house, and not his whole honour sought by. from his [Page 280] house: Neither is the Master to bee honested or ador­ned. graced by [his] house; but the house is to be honested or ho­nored. gra­ced by the Master.

And as in all other things. things else, a re­garde is to be had not onely of a mans owne selfe, but also of others; so in a noble mans house. in the house of a famous. noble man, into which both many guests are to bee intertained. receiued, and a multitude. number of men of all sorts. euery sort [is] to bee admit­ted, there is to be [...]ad a care of largenesse or widenesse. there must be made a prouisi­on for roomth.

Otherwise, a ample. large house oft times is made. prooueth a dis­grace to the Master [Page 281] if it be but little▪ frequented. if there bee in it solitarin [...]sse, and es­pecially if at any time it was wont to be much frequented. well filled by another master.

For it is an odious thing, vvhen it is saide of them that passe by the pas­sers by:

O ancient house, alasse with how vnequall or vn­me [...]te. vnbefitting a ma­ster art thou gouer­ned?

Al. Al. which same thing it is lawfull to say. Which in­deed a man may [truly] say of ma­ny in our times. now a-daies. You must take heed also, especially if your selfe build or bee a builder. name­ly if you builde, that you exceed not. goe not beyond measure in cost. sumptuousnesse & gorgeousnesse or statelinesse. magnificence: in the which kind, [Page 282] ther is q much euill* much hurt com­meth euen by the example. euen in the exam­ple. For the most men do imitate studiously the deed [...] &c. of the chiefe men. very many doe earnest­ly imitate the do­ings of Princes, especially in this part. behalfe: as, Who [doth imitate] the vertue of Lucius Lucul. a chiefe. singular man? yet how ma­ny haue imitated the magnificence [or sumptuousnesse] of his farme houses. statelinesse of his mannour pla­ces? Of which things doubtlesse a meane is to be v [...]ed. Whereof yet in very deede a measure is to bee kept, and to bee recalled. reduced vnto keeping a mean. a mediocritie, and that same medio­crity to be referred Al. Al. to euerie vse, & handsomn [...]sse or conueniencie. to the cōmon vse and ornament of life. But [we haue pro­secuted] these things hitherto. But of these hitherto.

Chap. 54.

And. MOreouer, in euery action to be vndertaken. we vnder­take, three things are to bee kept. obser­ued. First, that ap­petite obey reason: then which, no­thing is more fit to preserue duties. meet to preserue Dutie.

And then that it be considered. Secondly, that wee consider how great the matter is, which wee desire effect. to bring to passe; and that neither lesse. greater nor lesse care & payne. diligence be vndertaken. be vsed then the [Page 284] cause requireth.

A third thing is, that wee take heede, Al. Al. that those things which ap­pertaine to an ho­nest shew be mode­rated by dignitie. that we moderate those things which ap­pertaine to libera­lity, by an honest shew and dignity. seemly grace. And the best meane is, to keepe that come­linesse, whereof we spake before; no [...] to proceede any further. & not to goe beyond it. Also the chiefe of these three is, appetite to obey. that appetite o­bey reason.

Chap. 55.

furthermore wee must speake. NOw wee are to speake of the order of things and oppor­tunity of times: and herein is con­tayned that science or skill. know ledge which the Grecians name. call [...]; not this, w^ch we expound. interpret modestie. moderation, in which worde [...] mo­dus [viz. a mean] is in. is comprehen­ded. But this is [that] [...], in which is vnderstood a preseruation. meant a keeping of order. As therefore wee call the same modestie or mo­deration. dis­cretion [Page 8] is thus de­fined of the Sto­icks: that moderation. discre­tion is a science. the know­ledge of placing or dispo­sing. setting those things which shall bee done or said, in their owne. pro­per place. And so it seemeth there will be the same force or property. power of order and placing or dispo­sition. disposing things aright. For thus also they de­fine Order, to be a framing or or­dering things. a composing of things in apt and fit. conuenient pla­ces. Also they say, place to be of the action, opportuni­tie of the time. And place they say belongeth vnto action, but opportunity vnto time. Also the seasonable [or fit] time of an action. the time conue­nient for the do­ing of any thing [Page 287] [is called] in Greeke [...], inq it is called in La­tine occasio Latine it is called occasio. So it commeth to passe. it is, that this discretion, which wee inter­pret, as I haue said, is a knowledge of the opportunity of fit times to do a thing. seasons to doe any thing. But. Yet there may be the same defini [...]ion of prudence, whereof wee spake in the beginning. But we aske in this place. in this place we dispute concerning moderation and temperance and other like vertues. and [other] vertues like of these. vnto these.

And so. Therefore vvhat were the proper­ties of prudence haue been spoken. shewed in their place. But [Page 288] what properties. things of these vertues, wher­of wee haue spake a good while agoe. be­gun to speake, do appertain to shamefastenesse. dis­cretion, and to the approbati­on of them. to their liking with whom we liue, are now to be shewed.

Chap. 56.

we are therefore to keepe such an order. SVch an order then of our actions is to bee vsed. obserued, that all things be fit and agreeable a­mong themselues, as in a constant ora­tion, so in the life. that as in a well framed oration, so in [our] life all things bee fit. apt and agreea­ble [Page 289] among them­selues. For it is a dishonest thing and very faulty, in a seuere. sage matter to bring in any speech meet for a feast, or delicate. to bring in any table talke, or wan­ton speech. Well spake Pericles, vvhen he had So­phocles the Poet his collegue or fellow. ioyned with him in the Pretorship▪ and they had tal­ked of the com­mon Dutie. and these two were cōmuning a­bout their office; and a faire boy passed by, by chāce. as by chance a well fauoured boy passed by, and So­phocles had saide, Oh faire boy [...] Pe­ricles, [he] answe­red: But for. But Sopho­cles, it becommeth a Pretor to haue not onely abstaining or forbearing. con­tinent [Page 290] hands, but eyes also. And. Now if Sophocles had spoken this same in the approbati­on of wrastlers, or where wrastlers are allowed or tried. in a place of ap­probation of wra­stlers, hee had wanted. beene free from iust reproofe. So great force there is both of place and time, that if any man, when hee is to plead a cause do muse. meditate with himselfe in his iourney, or in his walking, or deuise any matter more attentiuely. think of any other thing more seriously, he may not be repro­ued; but if he doe the same thing the like at a feast he may be thought vn [...]iuil, for the ignorance of the time. for ha­uing [Page 291] no regarde to the time.

Howbeit those things which farre dasagree from humanitie. all ciuility (as if any man sing in the pleading place, or in the street. market place, or if there be any other great peruer [...]enesse. disorder) do soone or plainly. easily appeare, neither doe they greately neede ad­monition or pre­cepts; but what faults seeme to be small, neither can be vn­derstood of many, we must decline from these more diligently. But vvee are more carefully to shun those faults which seeme to be small, and cannot be perceiued of most. many: as, in instruments with strings, as harp or lute. in stringed or pipes. winde instruments, tho they differ, disagree or be out of tune. iarre neuer so littl [...], yet it is wont to be marked. it is vsu [...]dly obserued [Page 292] of a cunning. skilfull [man.] we must liue so in [our] life, or to de­meane our selues. We are so to carry our selues in our life, least peraduenture any thing iarre. that nothing chance to iarre; yea and by much more also, by how much a consent [or con­cord] of actions. as an harmony of deeds is greater and bet­ter then of tunes. sounds. And therefore as the eares of musi­cians. the Musicians eares doe perceiue euen the least dis­cordsq the least things. in instru­ments: so wee (if wee will be sharpe and quicke. diligent iud­ges, and censurers or cor­rectors of vices. markers of faults) shall oft vnderstand great things of small; Wee shall easily iudge by the looking or sted­fast beholding or fixing. set­ting [Page 293] of the eyes, either by the re­mission or contrac­tion of the eye­browes, by heaui­nesse or dumpish­nesse, by mirth, by &c. by either the smooth looking or bending of the browes, by sad­nesse, mirth, laugh­ter, speech, silence, contention and submission. strayning and falling of the voice, and other like things, what is done. which of them is fitly done, which disagreeth. swerueth from Duty and Nature. In which kinde it is not amisse or incon­uenient. in­commodious to iudge by others, what a one. of what sort each of them is: that if any thing bee vndecent in others, wee our selues also may auoid it. For it comes to passe, I know not by what meanes. I wot not how, that wee see more [Page 294] in others, then in our selues, if any thing bee done a­misse. And so they are corrected most easi­ly in learning. There­fore in learning, [those scholars] are very soone cor­rected, whose faults the masters doe imitate for the cause of amending [them.] counterfeit, to the end to amend them. Neither in­deed is it amisse to adde learned men, or also those who are skilfull by practice, to chuse those things, which may bring doubt, and to search dili­gently concerning euerie kinde of du­ty, what liketh them to vse the aduice of learned or ex­perienced men, for the choosing of those things, vvhich may bee doubtfull, and to q enquire what li­keth them concer­ning euery kinde of Duty. For the greater parte is wont almost. is vsually wont to be carried thither, whither it is led by [Page 295] [...]ature it selfe. very nature. In which things wee are not onely to consider, what e­uery one speaketh, but also what eue­ry one iudgeth. thin­keth, and also why each man thinks so, or what their reason is. for what cause each man thinketh so. For as painters, & they who frame signes or make pic­tures. picturers, and al­so the true Poets euerie one desi­reth his work to be considered of the common people. are desirous to haue their workes seene of all sorts of men, that if any thing bee reprehended. found fault with by ma­ny, it may be cor­rected; and they doe diligently examine. en­quire both vvith themselues and o­thers, vvhat is missed or faulty therein. done amisse in it: So very many things are to bee [Page 296] done and left vn­done of vs, by th [...] [...]udgement ac­cording to the iudgement of o­thers, and also changed and corrected. a­mended. but what things are done. As for those things that are done by custome. after the custome and ciuill institutions. ordinances, nothing is to be giuen in precepts concerning them: for these verie things are precepts. there is no pre­cept to bee giuen of them: for they are precepts of themselues. Nei­ther ought any man to be led. caried with this errour, that if Socrates or Aristippus haue done or spoken a­ny thing against the [vsuall] maner and ciuill custome. ciuill order and custome, he shold thinke the same thing to be lawfull [Page 297] for himselfe. For they obtained this freedome of do­ing and speaking as they thought best. liberty by their great and diuine gifts. But the whole reason [o [...] guise] of the Cy­niks is to be vtterly cast out [or refused] fa­shion of the Cy­nicks is wholly to be reiected. For it is an enemy to shamefastnesse. contrarie to modesty, vvithout which * nothingq there can be no­thing right, nor any thing honest. can be right, no­thing honest.

And. Moreouer, we ought to attend vpon or marke. obserue and to honour. reuerence them, whose life hath been thorow­ly tryed in honest and great matters, [being men] thinking or mea­ning well. ha­uing a good opi­nion of the Com­mon-wealth, and hauing deserued or deseruing well [thereof,] [and] [Page 298] affected [or gra­ced] with any ho­nour or dignitie. aduanced to any honour or place of gouernment: & also to haue olde age in high estimation. to giue much vnto olde age.

[we ought also] to &c. To giue place to those which haue a magistra­cie [or be in autho­ritie.] beare office;

to haue a choice [or difference] of a citizen, &c. To make a dif­ference betweene a citizen and a stranger; and also [to consider] in the very stranger, whether hee came priuately [or as a priuate person] or publikely [as a pub­like person.] of his owne pri­uate businesse, or about the Com­mon-wealths af­faires. To the sum [or summarily] that I may not deale of e­uery one. In a word (that I may not intreate of euery particular) we are bound to loue, maintaine and pre­serue the common reconcilement and consociation of the whole kinde of men. agreement, and [Page 299] society of all man­kinde.

Chap. 57.

NOw concer­ning occupations and gaines [or maner of gaining.] trades and commodities, which are to bee accounted liberall. ho­nest, which base, we haue receiued these things almost. thus commonly wee haue heard;

First, those gaines. kinds of gaines are dis­allowed which run into the hate of all. which are odious to all, as [the gaine] of customers taking tole of hauens. tolefarmers, and [Page 300] vsurers. The gaines also of all who serue for hire or wages. all hire­lings, whose labour and not their arts are bought. whose la­bour is bought & not their cunning, are seruile & base. for the very hire in them. For in them the very wages. hire is [as it were] the obligation or presse-money. bond of their bondage. seruitude. They moreouer, are to be thought. to be accoun­ted of the baser sort. base, vvho buy of marchants that which they sell straight way as by retayle. they presently retayle againe. for they profit nothing. For these gaine nought, vn­lesse they lye verie greatly. ex­ceedingly. neither in truth is there any thing more filthie then vanitie. And indeed there is no­thing more dis­honest then lying. Also all kinde of workemen or crafts-men. handicrafts men are imployed in a base art [or trade] serue in base oc­cupations. Nei­ther [Page 301] in truth can the workehouse. shoppe haue in it any ingenuous thing. any thing beseeming a gen­tle-man; and in no wise are those trades to bee ap­prooued which be seruers of plea­sures; [as] Trinkermen. fish­mongers of great fish, butchers, cookes, pudding­makers, fishermen, as, Terence spea­keth: adde to these, if q you it please you. please, list. perfumers, dan­cers, and all makers of sweet oyles, or perfumers. play at dice. But in* players at playes [...] standing on hazard. vvhat arts. sciences there is either grea­ter wisedome, or great gaine. no small gaine is sought, as Phy­sicke, the art of buil­ding or carpentrie. casting plots for buildings, [Page 303] the learning of honest. worthy things, these are honest for them for whose degree they are conuenient to whose estate they agree. Ma [...]chandize also, if it be small, is to bee thought. accounted base: but if it bee great and copious, well fraught. abun­dant, conueying to vs. bringing in from euery side many commodi­ties, & imparting it to many without vani­ty or vaine wordes. dispersing the same into ma­ny mens hands, without lying, it is not much to bee dispraised. And furthermore, if it beeing satisfied. satiate or rather content with gaine, as it hath oft comne from the deepe. sea to the ha­uen, so [it shall change or be changed into lands and possessions to settle thereon. betake] it selfe [Page 302] from the hauen into fields. to lands and pos­sessions, it seemeth to deserue due commendation. that it may bee commended verie iustly. by very good right. for nothing of all things. For of all things from which any [gaine] is gotten. sought, nothing is better then till age of the ground. husbandry: nothing more plentifull. yeelding greater increase, nothing more sweet. pleasant, nothing meeter for a free man. a free borne man. whereof. Cō ­cerning which, be­cause wee spoken things cnow. haue sufficiently spoken in Cato the elder or the elder Cato. in our book cal­led Cato maior [or de senectute] from thence you may fetch. shall take what things shall appertaine to this place. whatsoeuer shall appertaine to this place.

Chap. 58.

BVt it seemeth ex­pounded sufficient­ly. I thinke it sufficiently declared, how du­ties should be drawne or proceede. bee deriued, from those parts which are of honestie. be­long to honesty. But a contention of those very things which are honest, may oft fall out. Yet of those same things which are honest, there may fall out oft times a question, and a cō ­parison whether of two honest things is the honester. of two honest things, whe ther is the hone­ster:q which place is pretermitted by Panetius. which point is passed ouer of Pa­netius. For wheras all honesty floweth or strea­meth. sprin geth out of four [...] [Page 305] parts or fount▪ heads, whereof one is of know­ledge, another is of common societie. community, the third of valorousnesse or couragio [...]snesse. mag­nanimity, the fourth of temperance. mode­ration; it is necessarie that these be compared oft together in chu­sing dutie. of necessitie, that in chusing of Dutie, these be oft cōpa­red amongst them­selues. It pleaseth there­fore, those duties to be more apt to na­ture. We think therfore that those Duties are more a­greeable to Nature, which [are drawne. bor­rowed] from common societie. cō ­munity, then those which are drawne or deri­ued. fetched from knowledge. And that may bee proued. confirmed by this argument: be­cause, if that life shall happen to a wise man. if a wise man shall happen on such a life, that [Page 306] hee bee inriched with flowing plenty or store. abundance of all maner of sub­stance. all things, al­though hee con­sider with himselfe with the greatest aduice. leasure, and viewe. be­holde all things which are worthy knowledge. to bee knowne; yet if his solitari­nesse be so great. should bee so great, that hee cannot. could not haue the sight of a man. see a man, hee would depart out of life, or wish to die. hee would wish to bee out of this life. And that wisdome which the Greekes tearme or name. call sapientia. [...], is the princesse of all vertues.

for we vnderstand another certaine prudence, which the Greekes call [...], which is the science, &c. For we take pru­dence, which the Greekes call [...], to bee ano­ther certain thing, which is the know­ledge [Page 307] of things to be earnestly desired. desired, and [things] to be fled. meete to bee eschewed. But that wisedome (which I named the princesse) is the science of hea­uenly and worldly things, or things belonging to Gods and men. knowledgè of diuine and hu­mane things: wher in is contained the the common conuer­sing o [...] intercourse, or fellowship. community of gods and men, and their society amongst thēselues. [Now] if that vertue. that be the greatest (as certainely it is. as it is indeede) it is necessary that dutie to be the greatest which is drawne from com­munitie. it must needs follow that the Dutie which is borrowed from community, is the greatest also. For knowledge and viewe [or consi­deration.] contemplation of naturall things. Nature is in a certaine maner. is af­ter a sort [...]ame and begun [onely.] may­med [Page 308] and imper­fect, if no doing of things. per­formance of deeds follow: and that doing is seene e­specially. performāce doth especially appeare, in▪ defending commodities of men. mens commodi­ties. It then apper­taineth to this communitie of men. the so­ciety of mankind; and for that cause, is to bee preferred before knowledge. And euery best man. best disposed man doth declare and shew the same thing, in verie deede. when it comes vnto the point. For who is so desirous. studi­ously set in through seeing. the searching out and knowing the na­ture of things; that if the perill & dan­ger of [his] coun­trie which he might &c. tidings should be brought sodainly to him handling [o [...] treating vpon] and viewing matters most worthie [his] knowledge. shold bee brought him [Page 309] of a sodaine, of the perill and hazarde of his countrey, which he might be able to succour and helpe; although hee were handling and contemplating matters most wor­thy knowledge. to be know­en, would hee not leaue and cast away. cast a­side all those things. these [stu­dies;] yea althogh he thought himself to be able that hee vvas able to number the stars, and to measure the greatnesse of the worldes? And the same man would do this thing And he would do the very same thing in the cause o [...] perill of [his] parent. parents or friends. By which things it is vnderstood. wee may plainely gather, [Page 310] the duties of iustice. that the duties of iustice which apper taine to the profit of men, then which nothing ought to bee more auncient. dearer vnto man, to be preferred or put before. are to bee preferred before the studies and du­ties of knowledge. Also they them selues. They moreouer, whose studies and whole life hath beene occcupied o [...] im­ployed. spent in the knowledge of things, yet haue not. haue not yet withdrawneq gone backe or departed. themselues from increasing the pro­fits and commodi­ties of men. For they also haue in­structed many, to make them the better citizens, &c. to the end that they might bee the bet­ter citizens, and the more profitable in [Page 311] their Common­weales; as Lysias a follower of Pi­thagoras, or a Pitha goreā philosopher. the Pithagorean [instructed] Epaminondas of Thebes. the Thebane Epami­nondas; Plato taught Dion Siracusa. the Syracusian, & many [haue taught] many. ma­ny other haue done many moe. And what soeuer thing whatsoeuer benefit wee our­selues haue broght vnto the Cōmon­wealth (if so bee that wee haue brought any thing) wee haue come vnto it, in­structed and ador­ned by teachers and learning. attained vnto it, being in­structed by teach­ers, and furnished with learning.

Neither onely they liuing and pre­sent do instruct and teach &c. Neither doe they onely instruct and teach them that are desirous of lear­ning, while they [Page 312] are aliue and pre­sent; but they at­taine the very same thing also, euen af­ter their death by [their] monu­ments of learning. for neither. Neither is there any place. point pretermitted or o­uer-passed by them omit­ted of them, which might apperaine to the lawes, which [might appertain] to the maners, &c. concerne the lawes, customs and gouernment. discipline of the Commonweal: so that they may seeme to haue im­ployed their quiet studies for our businesse or commodity. lea­sure vnto our af­faires. Thus they themselues beeing giuen to the studies of learning & wise­dome, do cōfer especially do chiefly bestowe Al. theirAl. their prudence and vnderstanding. wisdome, pru­dence and vn­derstanding, to the [Page 31] cōmodity of men. And for that cause also, it is better to vtter the minde plentifully. speake copiously so that it be discreetly. wisely, then to to thinke [or con­ceiue] most sharply without eloquence. meditate euen most wittily without vtterance; because cogitati­on [or conceipt is [...] or imploy­ed] [...] in it selfe, but [...]. for that, medita­tion serueth onely within ones-selfe, but eloquēce [...] those [...] whom &c. ser­ueth for the bene­fit of all those, with whom we beioined in [...] common soci­ety. And as the swarmes of Bees are not gathered together [...]or the cause of framing hony combs. doe cluster toge­ther not to this end to make combes, but whereas they are congregable [or soone assembled] [...] by nature they fa­shion [th [...]ir] comb [...] but beeing swar­ming by nature they worke their hony combs; So & much more also, men being of an assembling▪ or sociable nature, do adde the cun­ning of doing and deuising. gathe­red [Page 314] by nature, doe vse their cunning in doing and deui­sing. Therefore vnlesse that vertue which consisteth of defending. in defending men, that is to say, of the societie of mankinde. in maintaining the society of man­kinde, touch or be ioy­ned with. doe meete with the knowlege of things, it may seeme a lone-wan­dring and barren knowledge And in like manner, greatnesse of cou­rage, separate from humane communitie and neighbourhood. society & friēdship, is a cer­taine beastlinesse. sauagenesse and beastly. vntractable cruelty. So it com­meth to passe, that the consociation. accōpanying together of men & [Page 315] common society, far surmounts the study of know­ledge. Neither is it true which is saide of certaine. some, therefore this. that therfore this com­munity & society with men, to be for the ne­cessitie. is for the necessity of life, because wee could not attaine nor bring to passe. effect without others, those things w^ch nature might desire. For if so be that all things which appertaine to the food & ornament of life. fur­niture of life, were afforded or found. ministred vnto vs as is were, by the diuine rod. grace of God, as they say; then euery one of the best wit [or of an excellent wit.] of a good wit, all businesses o­mitted or▪ set aside. omitting all other businesses, would [Page 316] place or bestowe. imploy himselfe wholly in know­ledge and science. But it is not so. For he would both fly solitarinesse, and seek a cōpanion of his study; & he would. wold both teach and learne, also heare and speake.

[And] therefore e­uery dutie which appertaineth to maintaine the coniunction, &c. to the maintenance of the neighborhood & society of men, is to be preferred before that duty which is contained. consisteth in knowledge and science.

Chap. 59.

That preaduen­ture may be asked. THis question may perad­uenture be well as­ked, whether this cōmunity which is especially apt. most agreeable to nature, be also e­uer to be preferred before moderation and modestie. temperance? It pleaseth not. I thinke not so. For there are certaine things. som things partly so filthie. dishonest, partly so haynous, that a wise man wold not doe them, no not for the cause of preseruing of, &c. for the preseruing of his country. Pos­sid. hath gathered many of them to­gether; but some. certain of them so foule. vile [&] so filthy, that they [Page 318] may seme filthie or disho­nest. shame­full euen to be spo­kē. Not any man therefore shall vn­dertake these things for the cause of the commonweale. These things therefore ought no man to vndertake for the cause of the Cōmonweale, nei­ther indeed would the Commonweale them to be vnder­taken. haue them vnder­takē for her sake. cause.

But this matter hath it selfe more commodiously. stands so much in better case, for that there a time cannot happen. can befall no time, that it should benefit or further concerne the Commonweal, for a wise man to do any of them. Wher­fore let this be con­cluded in chusing of Duties, such kinde of Duties to excell e­specially, which is kept in the societie of men. that such kind of Duties excel most, w^ch cō ­cerne the society of men. For considerate dea­ling▪ wise per­formance will fol­low [Page 319] knowledge & prudence. So it commeth to passe, that to doe aduisedly to performe [our] actions con­siderately, is better. of more [worth] then to deuise or think of, or ponder wisely wisely to meditate. And indeed let these things [suf­fice] hitherto. And thereof thus farre. For the place it selfe is set open. this point is sufficiently layd open, that it is not a difficult thing. difficult in the searching out of Duty, to perceiue. see what is to be pre­ferred of euerie one or what [duty] is to be preferred before euerie other. what euery one is to preferre. Moreouer, in that the commu­nitie it selfe. that very cōmon socie­ty, there be degrees of Duties, whereby it may may be knowne what one is aboue the other. of w^ch it may bee vnder­stood what excel­leth euery other: so as. that the first [Du­ties] be due] to the immortall Gods, the next. second, to [Page 320] [our] country, the third to [our] pa­rents, furthermore the rest are due to o­thers by degrees. & so forth by degrees, Al. the rest are due to the rest. to o­thers.Al. some. Of which things disputed briefly, or handled shortly. thus brief­ly discoursed of, it may bee vnder­stood, men to be wont. how men are wont not onely to doubt that thing. to doubt, whe­ther a thing be ho­nest or dishonest, but also two honest things being, &c. of two honest things set before them. pro pounded, whether is the more honest. honester. This [common] place. point (as I said before) is omitted of &c. o­uerslipped by Pa­netius. But now let vs goe forwarde to those things which remaine. proceed to the residue of duties. the rest.