TO beginne with the power of Cuſtome in things naturall, I will firſt ſpeake of ſome parts and faculties, which have beene formerly, and may yet through uſe and cuſtome be attained unto, though not contrary to nature, yet ſo rare and extraordinary, as in the judgement of common ſenſe, and for want of experience, they might ſeeme altogether unpoſsible. By Cuſtome, wee underſtand practice and exerciſe, as uſually others doe upon this occaſion. So (to inſtance in one), Plutarch, where hee diſputes of the power of cuſtome in point of education, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſaith hee, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , by cuſtome I meane uſe and exerciſe; and afterwards hee cals it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; all which words are by him there uſed as ſynonima's, or words of the ſame ſignification. Now to ſpeake of the power of cuſtome in this kind, and to ſet out the marveilous efficacie of it, I know not whom wee ſhould more properly beginne with, then with thoſe, whom the Grecians properly called, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or wonder-workers; men, whoſe profeſſion it was to amaze the people with ſtrange ſights and wonders, (ſo called ordinarily by Greeke Authors, properly and abſolutely, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , wonders:) proceeding for the moſt part from extraordinary either ſtrength, or agilitie, or both. I ſhall mention them the rather, becauſe it is a ſpeculation that divers Philoſphers and Fathers, (but eſpecially Saint Chryſoſtome:) in their morall exhortations often fall upon, and make very good uſe of it. Hero an ancient Greeke Author hath written a whole booke of that ſubject, but I have not yet ſeene it. And becauſe the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is ſomewhat generall, and may comprehend them that bring ſtrange things to paſſe, by the helpe either of naturall, or ſuperſtitious Magicke, as well as others; I will therefore here ſet downe the definition of ſuch as wee underſtand here properly by the word; as I find it in Nicephorus Gregoras; by which they may bee diſcerned from all others, that have any plea to that common name, He therefore in his eight Booke of his Roman Hiſtory, treating at large 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of ſome wonder-workers that came to Conſtantinople, gives the definition of them, and of their art: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Thoſe things (ſaith he:) that were done by them, were prodigious indeed, and full of wonder; yet farre from Diabolicall inchantments, but meere exerciſes of a dextruous nature, long practiſed and accuſtomed unto thoſe things.

Firſt then to begin with agilitie, Saint Chryſoſtome in his nineteenth Homilie ad populum Antiochenum, hath theſe particular inſtances, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to run upon the ground, all parts of the body turning circularly, like a wheele: to draw ones ſelfe up and downe by the motion and agitation of the armes onely, as if it were with wings: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : to caſt up divers ſwords one after another into the aire, and to receive every one by the handle: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : expreſſed by him againe in another place, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : which, in plaine Engliſh, is no more, as I conceive; then what we commonly ſay, to dance upon the rope; or, ire 〈2 pages missing〉 the ſaid 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or ordinary wonderworkers of his time. Hee doth inſiſt upon this particular at large, calling their heads, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , nayled heads, or heads ſtickt all over with nayles. And leaſt any ſhould either miſtruſt the truth of the relation, (though to prevent this I have purpoſely made choice of ſuch a one as Saint Chryſoſtome for my warrant:) or at leaſt ſuſpect (as I ſee divers doe without cauſe in other matters like unto theſe; becauſe not acquainted with the power of cuſtome in things of this nature:) ſome impoſture in the actors, I will confirme this laſt inſtance of nayled heads, with two pregnant teſtimonies of approoved and unqueſtionable experience of latter times: the one taken from Augerius Busbequius, and the other from Iohannes Leunclavius; men of good worth, both; and as good credit, among the learned Cùm jam eſſet in conſpectu Buda (ſaith Busbequius in his fourth Epiſtle:) veniunt nobis obviam juſſu Baſſae ex ejus familiâ aliquot, cum pleriſ que ▪ Chiauſsis; ſed in primis viſenda juvenum in equis multitudo propter novitatem ornatus, qui erat hujuſmodi. In aperto capite, quod eis plerum que raſum eſt, cutem longâ lineâ inciderant, cui vulneri plures pinnas cujuſ que generis inſeruerant: ipſi ſtillantes cruentis guttis, diſsimulato dolore veluti ſenſus expertes, laeti & hilares ferebantur. Ante me proximè pedites aliquot ambulabant; horum unus veluti anſatus ſubnixis brachiis ingrediebatur, quorum utrum que ſupra cubitum cultello (quod genus nos Pragenſes vocamus:) transfixum habebat. Alius à ſuperiore parte umbiculo tenus, nudus incedebat, ſic ſciſſa duobus locis infra ſupra que lumborum cute, ut illac trajectam clavam, tanquam è cingulo pendentem haberet. Alius in vertice capitis, equiſoleam pluribus clavis fixerat. Sed id vetus erat, clavis ita cum carne coalitis, ut nihil moverentur.

The paſſage out of Leunclavius is this: Hos ſequebantur tres lymphatici robuſti homines, caligis tantum induti, caetera nudi; niſi quod capitis vertex parvo pileolo rubro, & humeri nudi ſuperinjecta, de que collo pendente pelle tigridis, exornabantur. Hi ad concentum Zinganorum tripudiabant, tenentes ſinguli vexillum Turcicum rubri coloris, cujus haſtile intra cutem & abdomen ventris, emanante multo ſanguine, defixum erat. Hos duo pueri ſequebantur, qui cuti frontis perforatae pennas gruis inſertas ferebant. Secundùm pueros incedebant quatuor virorum paria, pervulneratis lateribus. Primi duo clavas ferreas, quas pusdiganos dicunt: proximi duo nudos acinaces, per cutem transfixos, geſtabant. Rurſus alii duo ſequebantur, quorum unus ſecurim militarem Vngaricam (ſchacanam vocant) alter oblongum Genizari ſclopetum apertis lateribus in transfixo corpore portabat. Vltimo loco viri duo robuſti ſpectaculum hoc claudebant, qui tempora rectis, latis, & oblongis enſibus, quos Vngari palaſtos vocant, transfixerant. Horum capulos manibus tenebant: In enſium cuſpide pomum erat adfixum, & pomo, penna gruis inſerta.

I ſhall forbeare more particular inſtances concerning the many wonders recorded by the ancients, of thoſe wonder workers: And the rather indeed, becauſe divers examples in this kind may be excepted againſt, as examples rather of ſtrange natures, or naturall properties; then inſtances of the power of custome. For though the art, generally, bee adſcribed by the ancients to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (which gave occaſion to Arrian the Stoick Philoſopher to mention ſome of them by the way in his chapter 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 :) that is, to uſe and practice; yet in ſome of them (for ought wee know:) it might bee nature; or at leaſt, nature concurring. So of prodigious eaters, for example; Suetonius tels us of one, much admired by Nero the Roman Emperour, who by cuſtome had brought himſelfe, crudam carnem, & quicquid daretur manducare; to eate any kind of thing: And doubtleſſe it ſtands with reaſon that cuſtome may doe much in this kind, as generally in point of eating and drinking: whereof learned Phyſicians treat at large. Yet that a man ſhould (uno die aprum integrum, centum panes, vervecem & porcellum: in one day (if not at one meale:) eate a whole boare, a hundred loaves, one weather, and a hogge, as wee read of one in Aurelians time: I dare not adſcribe this unto cuſtome onely: no more then, to devoure nettles, thiſtles, the pith of artichockes, raw and living birds and fiſhes with their ſcales and feathers, burning coales and candles, &c. and all theſe in very great quantitie, as Karew in his Survey of Cornwall, recordeth of one Iohn Size of Cornwall. That which makes mee to doubt the more, is, becauſe I read in Columbus, a famous Anatomiſt, of one Lazarus in Venice, ſurnamed Vitrivorax, or the glaſſe eater, who made a trade of it, mercede propoſitâ, vitrum, ſaxa, lapides, ligna, viva animalia, carbones, piſces è vivario extractos adhuc ſalientes, lutum, lineos laneoſ que pannos, &c, vorare. Now this man falling at laſt, after his death, to the hands of Columbus to bee diſſected by him, hee did his beſt (as hee profeſſeth:) by obſerving all things in him with more then ordinarie curioſitie, to find out a reaſon in nature of this ſo ſtrange and unnaturall qualitie. And his conceit is, that hee did find it; wherein I will not interpoſe my judgement, but leave the further examination thereof, to profeſt Anatomiſts and Phyſicians. But generally, of ſuch particular examples, ſo extraordinary and beyond all example prodigious, I hold it (as I have already ſaid) moſt ſafe, to take in nature and cuſtome, as concurring. As expreſly, for example, wee reade in Suidas of one Marcellus, who being by nature very watchfull, by long uſe and cuſtome had brought himſelfe to that paſſe, as to live without ſleepe; or at leaſt, with ſo little, as could hardly bee obſerved by any others. For the better ſatisfaction therefore of the Reader, that hee may certainely know what cuſtome alone in this kind, can doe, in point of either agilitie or ſtrength; a ſure way will bee to conſider ſome particular performances in either kind, that have beene more common and generall, as either to whole Nations, or to certaine profeſsions, together and at one time; and not proper to ſome few perſons, at ſome times, only.

In point of agilitie, Caeſar in his Commentaries teſtifieth of the old Britans, that uſu quotidiano & exercitatione, they had attained to that perfection of horſemanſhip, ut in declivi ac praecipiti loco incitatos equos ſuſtinere, & brevi moderari ac flectere; & per temonem percurrere, & in jugo inſiſtere, & inde ſe in currus citiſsimè recipere conſueverint. This is much, and more perchance then ſome will eaſily beleeve, that have ſeene no ſuch examples of activitie in theſe dayes. Yet more then that in the ſame kind of exerciſe, is averred to bee true of ſome people to this day, by Authors of good credit and authority. So elegant Maffaeus of certaine people Occidentalis Aethiopiae, which hee cals Ialaphos: Hiſt. Indicae, lib. 1. Exhibitique (ſaith hee:) per eos dies publicè ludi, convivia, venationes, & ſpectacula equeſtria; In quibus Ialophi deſultoriâ arte & peritiâ ita ſe admirabiles praebuere, ut Numidis ipſis (quorum in celeritate motu que corporis praecipua laus eſt:) agilitatis palmam omnium judicio conſenſu que eripuerint. Si quidem tanta erant membrorum vel dexteritate vel robore, ut equi incitatiſsimi ephippiis nullâ omnino curſus intermiſsione tum recti inſiſterent, corpuſ que circumagerent: tum repentè inſiderent, diſpoſitoſ que humi lapillos ad unum inde colligerent; tum etiam momentò deſilirent, reſilirent que .

But if any ſhall deſire to underſtand the utmoſt that long uſe and exerciſe can attaine unto in this kind of Agilitie, let them read what Martinus a Boumgarten, (no obſcure man and of good credit every way;) relates at large in his perigrinations, of the ſundry acts and exerciſes of Chivalrie, performed by the Mamaluques before their Soldan. Certainely had they had wings, I doe not know what they could have done more in that kind, either upon, or about horſes. But becauſe the booke is not very common to bee had, nor perchance very commonly knowne, I ſhall not doe amiſſe I think, to inſert here ſome part of that his relation, His words are:

Alii in pleno curſu equi, ter deſilientes: item que (equo à curſu ſuo non ceſſante:) conſcendentes, nihilo minus omnes illos ſcopos ſagittis tangebant, nec vel aliquatenus aberrabant: Alli ſellis non ſedentes, ſed ſtantes, licet equi volarent, ſingulos ſcopos feriebant. Alii inter plenum & jugem equorum curſum ter arcus remittentes, ter eos loco flagelli capiti circumdantes, ac rurſum ter intendentes, aequè tamen ut & caeteri ſingulos ſcopos jaculis verberabant. Alii in jugi equorum curſu, licet ad utram que partem deſiliſſent non tamen obmittebant, quin & omnes ſcopos ut & reliqui, ſingillatim percuterent. Alii ter per equorum terga retrò deſilientes, ac rurſum currente ſemper equo, inſilientes, à ſagittandi munere ad ſingulos ſcopos non ceſſabant. Alii ſellis more ſolito colligatis ſedentes, eas interim equo currente, ter ſolvebant, ac poſt ſolutionem ſagittantes, ter rurſum eas dorſo equi colligabant, ter que jaculis ſcopos haud gravatim contingebant. Alii in ſellis more conſueto inſidentes, extra ſellam retrò ſe concitè locabant, ac capite deorſum miſſo, rurſus erecti, ſellas inſidebant, hoc que ter facto, toties etiam ſcopos jaculis appetebant. Alii in ſella juſtè ſedentes, caput in equi ponebant tergum, ac apprehenſâ equi caudâ, dentibus eam ingerebant, at que illico ſe erigentes, ſcopos nequaquam jaculis praeteribant. Alii poſt ſingulos jactus ſagittarum, enſem evaginatum circum caput minitabundi rotabant: quo mox vagina recondito, nullum ſcopum à jaculis eſſe ſinebant immunem. Alii inter nudos & acutiſsimos enſes â dextra ternos, laeva tèrnos, in tenuiſsimo amictu ita ſedebant, ut enſes illi (ſi quò minùs immoderaté ſe moviſſent:) corpora eorum crudeliter configerent: tamen ante & retrò admirabili pernicitate & arte ita ſe vibrabant, ut prae ſe, & poſt tergum (quaſi diſcriminis obliti:) nulli ſcopo parcerent. Inter hos talia agentes tyrones, unus ſolus repertus eſt, qui ſuper duos perniciſsima velocitate equos currentes, ſolutis ſtaret pedibus, ac ternas uno impetu, ante & retro ſimul funderet ſagittas. Iterum erat alius, qui itidem ſolus ex omnibus equo non ſellato nec fraenato ſedens, ad ſingulos ſcopos ſe in pedes erigens ſtabat, perculſo que ſcopo dextra laeva que , iterum ſedebat: donec ad ſecundos & tertios ſcopos veniens, iterumſe in pedes erigeret, ac ſagittandi munus egregiè & mirè expleret. Item & alius inſuper repertus eſt, qui ſolus ex reliquis equo inſellato & nudo ſedens, ubi ad ſcopos veniſſet, in tergo equi ſupinus jacens, utrum que pedem in ſublime porrigebat, ſicque concitè erectus ſagittandi officium impigrè complebat: Againe, Et operae pretium erat videre tyrones illos, corpore proceros, veſtitu armiſ que decoros, geſtu ipſo admirabiles, ea in rapido equorum curſu agere quae etiam in terra ſtantibus & factu difficillima, & viſu ſtupenda, deni que & enarratu incredibilia penè viderentur, &c.

And that the unexpert may the better bee ſatisfied, that theſe things are not altogether impoſſible to men, who by their profeſsion make it their conſtant ſtudie and practice; I will adde by the way what ſome ordinary men of our owne Countrey with a little practice, have performed in our dayes. In the yeare of our Lord 1611▪ in the month of Auguſt, the Biſhop of Ely (I thinke I may call him the Biſhop of Ely, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and doe none of his worthy predeceſſors any wrong; but, the Biſhop of Ely that then was:) going to Wiſby in Cambridg-ſhire, and accompanied with many horſes; there met him upon the wayes a plaine Ruſtick, ſtanding upright upon his horſes bare backe; and in that poſture did hee gallop ſo faſt, that none of the company could outgoe him, or ſo much as keepe paſe with him. One that was then preſent made a Memorandum of it in theſe words: Die primo itineris occurrit nobis ruſticus, qui equi ſui nudo dorſo inſiſtens vehebatur tantâ confidentiâ, ut admitteret ad curſum, neque aliquis noſtrum poſſet conſequi eum ita currentem.

In point of ſtrength, firſt active, the Turkiſh archer ſhall bee my inſtance; A ſtrong Turkiſh bow (ſuch you muſt underſtand as they generally uſed in former times before they had ſo much degenerated from their ancient diſcipline:) the ſtring whereof a luſtie ſtrong man (qui non aſſueverit, ſaith Buſbequius in his Epistles:) that hath not beene uſed unto them, ſhall not bee able to ſtirre with all his might ſo farre, as to loozen a piece of money thruſt at one of the extremities betweene the ſtring and the ſteele; a well practized archer of that Countrey and diſcipline, will make nothing to draw to his eare. And ſuch is the ſtrength of one of thoſe bowes, (ſaith learned Barclay, in his Icon animarum, and profeſſeth to have ſeene it done,) that with a little arrow it will pierce through chalybem tres digitos altum (I durſt not Engliſh it, but that I know the Author to bee a man famous, and of good credit, in things of this nature at leaſt:) a ſteele three fingers thicke; and even dart an arrow that ſhall want a head with ſuch force into a reaſonable bigge tree, that the end of it ſhall be ſeene on the other ſide. I bind no man to beleeve it, that hath not ſeene it▪ yet I know the Authors credit will goe very farre with them that have knowne him; and that hee is not the onely that hath reported it.

As for ſtrength paſsive, I will content my ſelfe with that common example of the Lacedemonian boyes, and youths; the more common and the better atteſted, the more uncontrollable and the fitter for our purpoſe. One of their ſolemne yearely exerciſes, that their lawes did oblige them unto, was their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as they called it; that is, a publike whipping of all their youths at a certaine place, to wit, ad aram Dianae Orthiae. Their youth (ſaith Plutarch:) being whipped and ſcourged all day long at the altar of Diana Orthia, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , are wont to indure it, even unto death, oftentimes, with joy and exultation, eagerly ſtriving one with another, who ſhall hold out longeſt and ſuffer moſt. Tullies relation goes yet beyond this. For having ſaid, as Plutarch, ad necem uſ que , even unto death; he addes, quorum non modo nemo conclamavit unquam, ſed ne ingemuit quidem; that none of them (during the time of this bloudy exerciſe:) was ever knowne, either to cry, or ſo much as to groane. And both theſe, in other places, profeſſe to have beene eyewitneſſes of their patience, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſaith Plutarch; Wee have ſeene our ſelves many of them dye at the very Altar, with extreamitie of ſcourging. Adoleſcentium greges Lacedaemone vidimus ipſi, (ſaith Tullie,) incredibili contentione certantes pugnis, calcibus, unguibus, morſu, denique ut exanimarentur, priuſquam ſe victos faterentur. But to ſpeake truth, there is nothing more obvious in all Greeke and Latin Authors that are ancient: and therefore theſe two may well ſuffice. But this is not all that is to bee wondred at in this matter; but this alſo, that whileſt theſe boyes were ſo uſed, their parents and deareſt friends would looke upon them with joy and pleaſure, yea exhort them themſelves unto patience: adſtantibus parentibus & propinquis, ſaith Tertullian, & uti perſeverent adhortantibus. The word that is uſed by Plutarch in his Lycurgus, ſpeaking of theſe things, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , practiſe and exerciſe, puts mee in mind of the ancient Chriſtian Aſceticks, of whom no leſſe in point of patience, if not more by farre, might bee related, but that I would not be long.

In all theſe ſeverall generall inſtances, it is out of all queſtion, and all Authors that write of them are of that opinion, that Cuſtome and long practiſe, is to bee looked upon, as the onely cauſe. The uſe (which I mentioned before, and therefore will briefly ſet downe heere, though it be not the thing that I aime at eſpecially:) that divers antient Fathers, Philoſophers & others make of theſe and the like inſtances, is this: That thoſe great inſuperable difficulties, that men uſually pretend to meete with in the way that leades unto Vertue and godlineſſe, are rather vaine pretences and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as Saint Chryſoſtome in a thouſand places:) that is, meere want of courage and reſolution, then difficulties really hard and inſuperable: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as Polybius in a place, very elegantly and fully:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , And therefore that men muſt not ſtart backe from the proſecution of any thing that is good and profitable by reaſon of thoſe ſeeming difficulties, but betake themſelves to the power of uſe and cuſtome, by which all that good is and laudible, is made poſsible unto man.

Now in all theſe it is apparant, that cuſtome is rather ſupra naturam, then contra naturam, directly. We ſhall therefore in the next place conſider the power of it, even in thoſe things, wherein it is directly oppoſit unto Nature. The diſcuſsion of theſe things at large, I leave unto profeſt Naturaliſts and Phyſicians. Some few inſtances will ſerve my turne, and will ſufficiently afford unto them, that are both capable and curious, (I take it in the better ſenſe:) matter of further ſpeculation.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : all exceſſe is againſt nature. So Phyloſophers and Phyſicians. Yet what exceſſe ſo unnaturall, that a man, by cuſtome, may not bring himſelfe unto? Yea, if a man have once uſed himſelfe unto exceſſe, it is dangerous for him to returne unto nature and mediocritie, becauſe hee hath uſed himſelfe unto exceſſe. For even things naturally and of themſelves hurtfull, through uſe and cuſtome become expedient and neceſſarie. Therefore ſaith Hippocrates, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Thoſe things that we are uſed unto, though worſe of themſelves, uſe to bee leſſe dangerous then better things that we are not uſed unto. And Ariſtotle doth inſtance in Dionyſius the Tyrant, who in a dangerous ſiege having forborne for a while his ryot, fell into a conſumption, of which he could not be cured, untill he returned unto his former cuſtome.

What more contrary to Nature then poyſon; which therefore among other names is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , as the greateſt enemie of Nature? Yet by cuſtome in divers ages both men and women have beene knowne to bring themſelves to this paſſe, as not onely to take moſt dangerous poyſons without hurt, but alſo to feed upon them and to receive nouriſhment from them. Wee read of ſome that have lived upon nothing elſe. Whereof you may read in Gallen de Simpl. Med. lib. 3.18. Sennert. lib. iv. c. 3. And lib. iii. de Febrib. And although in ſome of theſe there might ſometimes concurre ſome ſecret of Nature in the proper conſtitution (whereof ſee Libavius de Venenis, and Gallen 3. de Sim. Med. who ſhewes a reaſon in Anatomie, why that poyſon which killeth men, is a food unto the Stares:) or otherwiſe; yet generally (which ſufficeth us:) that this is adſcribed unto cuſtome as the cauſe, I appeale unto the forenamed Authors, and divers others that have treated of it.

What more naturall unto man, then to live upon the Earth, the naturall mother (both in regard of their beginning and of their ending:) of all men? Yet we reade of ſome, who by cuſtome of often ſwimming and converſing in the waters, have made the waters ſo naturall unto their bodies, that they could hardly endure the land, and not without preſent danger of their health. Iovianus Pontanus, writes of one Colon of his times (as I conceive:) a notable Vrinator or diver, who could not indeed continue long together out of the ſea, and would ſwimme a hundred miles together and above, from one ſhore to another, and from one Countrey to another, with great ſpeed, and at all times of the yeare. But this I muſt confeſſe I take upon truſt; for I have not read it in the Author himſelfe; but in our learned Iohn Barnes a Benedictine, in his contra Aequivoc. 35.323. Neither doe I know whether hee had brought himſelfe to this by cuſtome onely or no. But if this ſtorie bee not to my purpoſe, this other is I am ſure, which I ſhall now produce out of a certaine Commentator upon Ariſtotle his Axiomata: who upon that ſaying of Ariſtotle, Conſuetudo eſt altera natura: hath theſe words: Alibi quanta ſit vis conſuetudinis explicatiori ſermone proditum eſt: Illis tamen hoc velim additum, quod prae ſua novitate & infrequenti ſimilis rei eventu pene incredibile erit, hominem quendam patria Syculum, à puero ita natandi conſuetudine uſitatum, ut deinceps piſcium more ſub aquis longo tempore verſaretur; quibus cum exiret, ut communi hominum uſu frueretur, tanto ventriculi dolore angebatur, ut valetudinis nanciſcendae cauſa, ad aquas eſſet redeundum. Quibus rurſum immerſus, ludi & recreationis gratia, ſi quando naves mari volarent, in eas ſaliebat, at que poſt ſumptum cibum, iterum deſcendebat, ubi ad multam uſ que aetatem vitam protraxit. Whether hee meanes it of the ſame as Pontanus doth, becauſe I have not Pontanus at this time, I cannot tell. To ſome ſuch kind of men it is not unlikely, that Saint Chryſoſtome did allude in one of his Homilies (the ſixteenth as I remember:) upon the Epiſtle to the Hebrewes, where hee tels rich men of their unmercifulneſſe and want of compaſsion, whoſe curioſitie to ſatisfie with ſtrange ſpectacles, among other inventions poore men were driven 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to ſearch and ranſacke the deepeſt parts of the Ocean; that ſome way or other they might extort ſomewhat from them. But Seneca directly, ſpeaking of the ſtrange inventiōs of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or wonder-workers of his dayes, reckons among the reſt, in immenſam altitudinem mergi, ac ſine ulla reſpirandi vice perpeti maria; and againe not long after, penetrare in imum mare; which may give much light to that paſſage of Saint Chryſoſtomes. And among the ſundry kinds of exerciſes Artis Gymnaſticae, I find that one was, continere ſpiritum; to hold and keepe in their breaths: it being one of thoſe things (it ſeemes:) which uſe and cuſtome can doe much in, as well as in other things.

But it would bee infinite to treat of the power of cuſtome from all particular examples and inſtances that occurre in divers writers, Hiſtorians, Philoſophers, and others, both old and late. The truth of ſome of them perchance may bee queſtioned. I deny it not: though I read not ſcarce any thing in any of them ſo ſtrange in this kind, but might be averred and paralell'd, if not as certainely true, at leaſt as poſsible, by manifeſt experience, either in the ſame kind or very like, even in our dayes.

Yet it is not granted by all men, that cuſtome is of ſuch power and efficacie in things naturall. Ariſtotle ſeemes in ſome place to bee one of them, that will not grant it. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſaith hee in a place, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . One cuſtome may be remooved and taken away by ſome other cuſtome, but nothing can ever prevaile againſt Nature. And againe in his Ethicks, Lib. ii. c. 1. as peremptorily 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Nothing that is naturall can bee altered by cuſtome. Others, though they ſpeake not ſo peremptorily of it, yet they reſtraine the power of it very much. So Alex. Meſſaria, a famous Phyſician, in his Treatiſe of the plague, Conſuetudinem (ſaith he) plurimum poſſe negandum non eſt; ſed ita tamen, ut ne limites naturae tranſcendat, &c. And Sennertus, (an exact judicious writer, as moſt of that profeſſion,) more punctually yet, Pract. Medicinae lib. iii. part 1. ſect. ii. c. 2. de longa abſtin. Conſuetudinis (ſaith hee:) maximam vim eſſe certum eſt, non tamen in omnibus locum habet: ſed certa ſaltem opera ſunt, in quae jus habet conſuetudo. Etenim in ſenſus actiones nullam poteſtatem habet, ne que quis poteſt aſſueſcere, ut non olfaciat, ſentiat, vel non reſpiret, &c.

To this many things might bee oppoſed, from certaine experience. In this very point de longa abſtin. that Sennertus ſpeakes of, Ancient Hiſtories afford examples to the contrary. Wee read of one Iul. Viator, who to ſave his life having by little and little uſed himſelfe to abſtaine from drinking as, being farre gone in a dropſie, naturam (ſaith Plinie:) fecit conſuetudine, did at laſt turne cuſtome into nature, & in ſenectam potu abſtinuit, and ſo lived to be an old man without drinke. And Plinie ſaith, ſcimus, as of a thing commonly knowne and not doubted of by any. And Seneca as peremptorily, that aſsidua meditatione (that is, by cuſtome) quidam omni humore interdixere corporibus. And Lipſius there averreth, that even in our age, there have beene examples of ſuch abſolute forbearance, from all manner of drinke. Then for the ſenſes; what ſhall wee ſay to Appianus, who tels us of one Geta, a Citizen of Rome, who in the time of the Civill warres, being one of them that was marked and ſought after to death, to the end that hee might the better diſguiſe himſelfe, among other things counterfeited himſelfe to be blind of one eye, and wore I know not what over his concealed eye ſome yeares. And then his danger being over, when hee thought to have reſtored his long captive eye to his former libertie, hee found the eye there indeed, but the ſight was gone; and ſo continued blind of that eye to his dying day. And Appianus ſaith directly that it was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , for want of uſe of his eye (that is, becauſe he did uſe himſelfe not to ſee with it) that he loſt it.

But to leave particular inſtances; how much the ancients did attribute to the power of cuſtome upon the ſenſes, may appeare by that opinion which wee find in many of them, of the Muſicke of the Sphaeres, cauſed as they conceived, by their circumvolution; audible as they affirmed, but not heard, or rather not diſcerned, becauſe wee heard it alwayes. What good grounds they had for this opinion, is not to my purpoſe to enquire at this time. I dare not ſay that Saint Ambroſe was of that opinion; but that he did not thinke there was any impietie in it, may appeare by his Preface upon the Pſalmes. But Saint Anſelme plainely, Septem coeleſtes orbes cum dulciſona Harmonia volvuntur, ac ſuaviſsimi concentus eorum circuitione efficiuntur, &c. de Imagin. mundi. But that which from that opinion is here pertinent to my diſcourſe, is, that they that maintained it, were alſo, moſt of them, of opinion, that the reaſon why wee did not heare it, was meerely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , becauſe our eares were accuſtomed unto it, as you ſhall find expreſly in Heracledus Ponticus, in his Homericall Allegor. In Ariſtotle de Coelo. ii.9. and others. Tullie alſo aimed at the ſame reaſon, in his Somn. Scipion. when he ſaith, Hoc ſonitu oppletae aures obſurduerunt: though his next words adſcribe it rather to magnitudini ſonitus, then conſuetudini; which would import a totall deſtruction of the ſenſe; and not a deficiencie of it to one particular object onely. This indeed is another conſideration, but apparantly falſe; ſince that upon that ground, all hearing would be quite taken away; as Plinie in his Hiſtory, Seneca in his Naturall Queſtions expreſly affirme of thoſe inhabitants about Nilus, that hee ſpeakes of there; to wit that they are quite deafe. I know there are others yet, that have maintained this coeleſtiall Harmonie upon other grounds. Philo Iudaeus ſaith directly that it is not audible (to us men, that is:) that it doth not reach unto the eares; and the reaſon why God would not have it audible hee ſaith, is, leſt men raviſhed with the ſweetneſſe of it, ſhould give over all care and thought of worldly affaires. Yet for the moſt, as I have already ſaid, that they grounded, if not their opinions, yet their anſwers to uſuall objections againſt it, upon the power of cuſtome, let Saint Baſill tell them that ſhall make any queſtion of it; Whoſe words are theſe: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. But when they that maintaine this opinion are required to make it good by ſome ſenſible evidence, what ſay they? Why, this they ſay; that our eares being uſed to this noiſe from our firſt entrance into the world, through this long uſe and cuſtome from the beginning they have loſt the ſenſe of it. As they who live in Smiths forges, whoſe eares are perpetually, &c. Which is quite contrary to that of Sennertus, that conſuetudo in ſenſus actiones nullam poteſtatem habet. And now ſince that upon this ſubject of Cuſtome, I have had occaſion to ſay ſo much concerning the ſuppoſed Coeleſtiall Harmonie of the Sphaeres, I ſhall willingly impart unto others what I have met with about it in the written Adverſaria (for in any printed Book I have not as yet, that I remember:) of a man well knowne unto the world by his writings; though at this time, for ſome reaſons, I ſhall deſire to ſpare his Name.

Harmonia coeleſtis 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 viridis ſupra fidem ſenectus ultra annum centeſsimum.

Obtulit mihi more gentis ſuae & Germanorum, librū ſuum amicorū, Ieremias Plancius Plancii F. qui nunc Amſterdami miniſtrum agit verbi divini: ſed editione chartarum Geographicarum nomen ſuum fecit celebre. In eo libro inveni haec verba manu Roberti Conſtantini ſcripta.

Robore & conſtantia.

Robertus Conſtantinus Baro Gymatius, & in Academia Montalbanenſi Profeſſor Graecarum literarum, Idemque experientia quotidiana 24. annorum, aſſertor 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 vocalis audibiliſque contra Ariſtotelem naturalis Philoſophiae facile principem omnium, haec 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 occupatiſſ. exaravi in gratiam hoſpitis mei, & Auditoris D. Ieremiae Plancii, viri tum pietate, tum doctrina ſpectabilis. Montalbani anno Domini 1605. Aetatis noſtrae (ſummo Dei beneficio hucuſque tam animo quam corpore ad miraculum integrae:) centeſsimo, ut 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , tum amici, tum invidi dinumerare ſunt conſueti. Senex autem nondum eſt victus, qui virilia munera 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 obire poſſit, & viriliter exercere.

Erat manus illius & elegans & firma, ac plane ejuſmodi qualem veriſimile eſt fuiſſe in ipſo aetatis flore. deſcripſimus vero heic, & quod invenimus in alio libro ſimili de cauſa nobis allato.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .

Robertus Conſtantinus Baro Gymatius & Profeſſor Graecarum literarum in Academia Montalbanenſi, Idemque aſſertor audibilis coeleſtiſque harmoniae experientiâ quotidianâ pluſquam viginti annorum.

Haec raptim exaravi in gratiam amiciſſ. viri atque eruditiſſ. D. Iohannis Davini. Montalbani 24. Febr. Anno 1605. Robore & conſtantia.

Hic eſt Rob. Conſtantinus, qui olim apud Iulium Caeſarem [Scaligerum] vixit, & poſtea Lexicon publicavit. Caeterùm de hac longaevitate ipſius, haud ſatis fidem illi habeo, nam video ipſum non planè affirmare. Quare more ſenum indulget ſibi, & annorum ſuorum numerum, niſi fallor, aliquot ſupra fidem adauget.

So farre thoſe written Adverſaria. Of this Conſtantinus you may read in Thuanus tom. v. of his great age and good worth as a ſchollar; and that hee was (ſummus Bezae amicus:) one of Beza's chiefeſt and deareſt acquaintance. But of this pretended ſenſible knowledge of the Coeleſtiall Harmonie, not one word there; which hath made me the more willing to inſert here, and make publique, what I had elſe-where in my private poſſeſsion about it.

And ſo much ſhall ſuffice at this time concerning the power of cuſtome in things naturall; hiſtorically. Now, Philoſophically, and ſpeculatively, wee thus proceede.

Firſt that it is not without danger, nor according to exact Truth, to ſay that Nature is alterable. For what is Nature properly, but the Order of God? If that bee mutable and violable; then is no more this World a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; or orderly peece, but a maſſe of confuſion; and that is it, that the Atheiſts, and the oppoſers of a Providence would have. Neither can there be any truth properly in thoſe things, the nature whereof is altogether uncertaine; therefore uncertain, becauſe unconſtant. And where there is no Truth, there can bee no knowledge. As to the World therefore, confuſion; ſo to the underſtanding, ignorance, from this uncertaintie and inconſtancie muſt neceſſarily enſue. As for Miracles, though above nature, yet are they not properly againſt nature, ſince they are his proper worke, who is the Author of nature, and therefore originally, and ſutably to his Nature, did reſerve unto himſelfe a power to diſpenſe with his owne lawes whenſoever hee thought fit. All Gods workes of themſelves, and in regard of God, are equally naturall, though not in regard of us.

Wee ſay therefore that cuſtome is not alwayes to be conſidered as oppoſit unto Nature, ſince it is the nature of ſublunarie things, to bee altered by cuſtome. And when cuſtome hath once through continuance naturalized her ſelfe into any of them, then cuſtome (to ſpeake properly:) is no more cuſtome, but Nature: according to that of old Evenus in Ariſt. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that long uſe and exerciſe, becomes at laſt nature. Nature then we ſay, by the ordinance and appointment of its firſt Author, is two-fold; originall, and ſecundarie or adventitious, and ſo Gallen plainely, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , cuſtome is a kind of adventitious, or, adſcititious nature. Neither is cuſtome, when it is once become naturall, though adventitious, leſſe naturall in regard of the common Nature of the Vniverſe, from which at firſt it received the power and proprietie, to turne, in time, into nature; then that originall nature: though in regard of the particular ſubject, that it hath wrought upon, it bee but adventitious. When therefore it is commonly ſaid, that ſuch or ſuch a thing hath loſt its nature; it muſt bee underſtood of that particular nature and proprietie which it had at the firſt; not abſolutely, as though it had departed from the law of Nature in generall; ſince that Nature it ſelfe hath made it ſo alterable. As of death wee ſay vulgarly, that it is againſt nature; though it bee as properly, and truely the worke of Nature, as birth or generation is; and as naturall to the nature of the Vniverſe. And ſo is that true of Ariſtotle (which wee have ſpoken before:) that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Nature cannot bee driven away, being underſtood of Vniverſall Nature.

Gallen, a great admirer of Nature, and much to bee admired himſelfe, for his painefull travels in the ſearch of it, hath another way to reduce cuſtome unto Nature. His opinion is, that any mans nature may bee known, or at leſt, probably gueſt at, by thoſe things that he is uſed unto. And therefore prefers thoſe Phycſiians that allow unto their patients whatſoever they have been uſed to, though cō trary to art; before them who keepe them ſtrictly to the generall preſcripts without reſpect to their proper conſtitution: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſaith hee, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . That is, Moſt men that uſe themſelves to any thing, whatſoever it bee, they muſt be conceived to pitch upon ſuch things, as are moſt ſutable to their owne Nature; for that finding hurt by thoſe things that are contrary unto it, they are forced to forbeare them ſpeedily. Yea plainely, that none can 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , long continue in an evill cuſtome contrary to their proper conſtitutions, who are not extremely madde and ſenſeleſſe. By this, cuſtome and Nature ſhould bee all one: or at leaſt cuſtome for the moſt part, nothing elſe but the fruits and effects of originall Nature. For my part I ſhould eaſily grant that any mans preſent conſtitution (which you may call his Nature, for the time, though improperly:) may not unlikely bee judged of, by thoſe things that are cuſtomarie unto him. But that a mans originall temper and conſtitution (which is it that Gallen there ſpeakes of:) may ſo bee knowne, except we ſhall extend madneſſe, and ſenſleſneſſe very far, common experience will diſproove. For what generally more naturall unto all men, then temperance and ſobrietie? And what more generally practiſed in the World, among all ſorts of men, then exceſſe, and ryot, and intemperance, in ſome one kind or other, if not in all? But by the way; If in the judgement of Gallen a heathen, all ſuch are to be reputed as mad men, becauſe they reſpect their health and corporall welfare no more; what would hee have ſaid of them, had hee beene a Chriſtian, for their wilfull caſting away of their ſoules (ſo much more precious then the body, by how much Heaven doth excell the earth:) by the ſaid courſes? Certainly madneſſe is a far more generall evill, then moſt men thinke. But this, by the way onely. When Phyloſophers diſpute (as many doe:) whether Nature or education, that is, cuſtome, be more powerfull to frame and faſhion a mans life; it would be but an abſurd queſtion, ſcarce fit to be propoſed by any ſober man, much more unfit to bee ſo ſeriouſly diſputed of by learned Philoſophers, if nature and cuſtome in this ſenſe come all to one. But I ſhall here appeale from Gallen unto Gallen himſelfe, whoſe words in his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . upon Hippoc. Prognoſt. (treating there of the proper and moſt naturall time of ſleepe▪) are theſe: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. In the dayes of Hippocrates indeed, that which is according to nature, and that which is according to cuſtome, was all one. But now it is quite otherwiſe, &c. And preſently againe, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. In theſe dayes, cuſtome is of more power then nature, &c.

Tullie alſo his conceit in his Tuſculans is not to be omitted; who having ſpoken of ſome that had hardned themſelves to indure great extremities of heate, and of cold; as alſo bodily paines in other kinds, intolerable unto others; all this with either no ſenſe; or at leaſt, moſt wonderfull patience; whereas other men adſcribe all this unto cuſtome, hee would have it to bee Nature, even common Nature. For ſaith he, Nunquam naturam mos vinceret; eſt enim eaſemper invicta: It is not a thing poſsible that cuſtome ſhould prevaile againſt Nature; for nature it unconquerable. How then, ſay wee, comes it to paſſe that other men cannot endure the ſaid extremities, if not againſt nature? Becauſe, ſaith hee, we have through cuſtome uſed our bodies to tenderneſſe, and ſo made that intolerable unto them, which by nature is very tolerable; His words are, Sed nos umbris, deliciis, otio, languore, deſidia animum infecimus, opinionibus malo que more delinitum, mollivimus, &c. We with our ſhades and other wanton inventions and uſes; with our idleneſſe, looſeneſſe, long continued lazineſſe, have corrupted our minds, and through the power of falſe opinions and bad cuſtomes have ſoftned and effeminated our ſelves into this tenderneſſe: &c. There is certainely, though it ſeemes not perchance ſo plauſible at firſt, much truth in this opinion. I appeale unto them, (and they are not a few:) that have maintained, that Nature hath ſufficiently fenced man (as well as other creatures:) againſt all exceſſe of either heate or cold; and that clothes ſeeme now neceſſary, cuſtome to bee the cauſe, not nature. Syneſius a learned Phyloſopher, at firſt; and afterwards a worthy father of the Church, alſo; in his de Calvitio, or, commendation of baldneſſe, ſeemes to be of opinion (ſeriouſly; though his ſubject may ſeeme but jocular:) that if men did weare neither hats nor hayres upon their heads, their ſculs uſed to the Sunne and to the weather, would in time grow to that hardneſſe, as to become almoſt impenetrable. To this purpoſe hee firſt brings a teſtimonie of Herodotus, of the difference of Aegyptian and Perſick ſculs, obſerved by Herodotus himſelfe by the direction of the natives of the Countrey; the one being ſo hard, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that a ſtone throwne againſt them would hardly crack them; the other ſo brittle, that the leaſt knocke would breake them; this difference being conceived both by the inhabitants themſelves, and by Herodotus, to proceed from this cauſe, becauſe the one were wont to goe bare headed, and ſhaven from their youths; and the others 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (to uſe his owne elegant expreſſion:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſheltered from the Sunne, with hats and other head-attire. This hee further confirmes by an example of his times, there being then (as Syneſius relates it:) in the towne, a certaine poore bald pate (not by nature, but art:) who did uſe to goe up and downe the ſtreets, and to ſhew himſelfe at all ordinary great concurſes of people, as at the ordinary races of the Circus, and the like; ſo that no man was better knowne in the whole towne. This man with his bare head, would butte with a ram (were hee never ſo ſtout:) and put him to the worſt; ſuffer tyles to be throwne at his head, and make them flye in pieces: as alſo endure ſcalding pitch to bee powred upon his head. This, and the like, to ſhew (to the great aſtoniſhment of the beholders:) the ſtoutneſſe and unſenſibleneſſe of his headpiece. But it might be ſo naturally; you may thinke perchance. No; it was by cuſtome; or rather if you will (which is that Tullie would have:) naturally; but no otherwiſe naturally in him, then in other men that would uſe the meanes. For Syneſius ſaith expreſſely, that himſelfe could for a need have wrought his own head to this, in caſe hee had no other meanes to ſubſiſt by; but therfore gives God thanks, that hee needed it not. I ſay therefore, to returne unto Tully, that there is a great deale of truth in that opinion of his. Yet to ſtretch nature ſo farre, as he doth there, even to them, qui cum ad flammam ſe applicuerint, ſine gemitu aduruntur; who can ſuffer their bodies to be burnt by degrees, and yet not ſeeme to feele it; (of whom Lucianus in his Peregrinus ſpeakes, as more particularly, ſo more incredibly; and yet, I thinke, truely enough:) and the like; I cannot hold that to be according to truth. Neither I thinke would Tullie (as excellent a Philoſopher every whit; as he was an excellent Orator:) have affirmed it, but upon ſuch an occaſion, having taken upon him in that place, the defence of that unnaturall paradoxe of the Stoicks, That no extremity of bodily paine and torments, could hinder or leſſen a wiſe mans happineſſe in this world; glad therefore of any thing, that had but ſome colour of truth, though not ſo ſolid otherwiſe. And thus much by the way of Gallen and Tullie their opinions concerning the power of cuſtome.

Secondly, that Nature in a generall ſenſe is not mutable, that is, cannot exorbitate or go beyond the bounds that were at firſt ſet unto it by its author, may appeare, firſt by thoſe lawes and orders that God hath ſet inviolably to ſome ſublunarie things▪ as to the Sea, ſo that it ſhall not overflow the Earth, Iob 38.8, &c. and to the World in generall concerning the ſeaſons of the yeare, that they ſhall never faile, Gen. 8.22. but eſpecially, by thoſe that it hath ſet to thoſe purer bodies above, which as they are not by nature changeable; ſo doe moſt firmely and conſtantly continue in their firſt office and forme. For as for ſuch alterations, that even in them ſome Aſtronomers tell us of, till they bee better knowne and agreed upon, we ſhall not need to take any notice of them; neither indeed are they ſuch alterations, as would croſſe, but rather confirme, what we ſhall here ſay.

Sol & Lunaſuo luſtrantes lumine circum Perdocuere homines annorū tempora verti;

Et certaratione gerirem, at que ordine certo: ſaith old Lucretius. Even they who by reaſon of the frailtie and mutabilitie of ſublunarie things called this world in ſcorne, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a meere hotch pot, a maſſe of confuſion, and the like; yet when they looked up, and obſerved there ſuch glory, ſuch order; ſuch conſtancie, ſuch immutabilitie; they were driven to acknowledge a rationall power and providence over the Whole. And even this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , this mingle mangle, or what ever they will, of ſublunarie things; had they well viewed it with more rationall eyes, then they did; as Plinie well in a place ſpeaking of the gnat (If my memory faile me not,) nuſquam natura magis tota, quàm in minimis; that the power of Nature was greateſt in her leſt workes; ſo would they with admiration have ſaid of it, that nuſquam potentior natura, quàm in maximé fragilibus; or if you will have it in the words of Saint Paul (that ye may know God to be the ſame God in things naturall, as hee is in things ſpirituall, as in truth, there is but one truth both of things ſpirituall and naturall:) that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that it is the heighth and perfection of the divine power to ſhew it ſelfe moſt powerfull in thoſe things that are moſt weake.

Thirdly, it is further to be conſidered, that where cuſtome makes an alteration, and becomes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , aſcititious nature; yet doth it ſeldome ſo overcome nature originall, but that it hath ſome force and ſecret operation in and upon the ſubject; the leſſe viſible, the more powerfull; yea the more dangerous; as it prooves oftentimes. So through cuſtome a man may bring himſelfe to an habite of intemperance, that it ſhall not bee in his power, nor ſafe for his body, perchance to returne unto ſobrietie. Yet neither is it at firſt without danger (it is death unto many to attempt it:) and (if Gallen may be credited:) it is a great chance, if at the laſt (though the inconvenience of it bee not preſently perceived:) it doe not proove ſome way or other pernicious. What, if ſome intemperate men attaine to 60. or 80? They may thank the ſtrength of their nature for it, which bad cuſtome could no ſooner overthrow▪ and had they beene ſober men, it is more then likely, their life how long ſoever, might have beene longer by 20. yeares at leſt. So, a man through continuall labour and induſtrie may doe much in the purſuite of ſome art or ſcience; yet if hee have not a genius to it, a naturall aptitude and diſpoſition, he ſhall never attaine (be his labour never ſo great:) to any great perfection: whereas leſſe labour in a way more ſutable to his nature, might have made him excellent. Hence is that Praecept of the Poet, Tu nihil invita, dices facieſ que Minerva; that we doe nothing invita Minerva, that is, as Tullie doth interpret it in his firſt de Offic. adverſante & repugnante natura. I omit many pregnant paſſages to this purpoſe of the two great Naturaliſts, Hipocrates and Gallen; which you may read, either in themſelves; or, if that will ſerve your turne, in Huart, his Examen des Ingenios. They are all for originall nature, and without it they thinke all labour is loſt. So ſaith Seneca too: Inclinandum quò te vis ingenii defert. Malè enim reſpondent coacta ingenia, reluctante natura irritus labor eſt. I muſt confeſſe, I am not altogether of their opinion; neither was Plutarch I am ſure; and examples there be (if wee were now to argue the caſe) good ſtore to the contrary. Nevertheleſſe, their admonitions, I acknowledge, are to good purpoſe, that Parents and Maſters ſhould carefully obſerve the naturall inclination of youths, before they deſigne them to any particular profeſsion. This for the moſt part is the ſafeſt way. That's enough, though we ſay no more.

Fourthly, beſides, in many things, when a man hath done all that art can, and induſtrie; yet cannot he bee ſecure, but that nature Originall may returne and ſhew her ſelfe upon the ſuddaine; and that to his coſt, as it may proove. As for example, wee read of divers, that have taken great paines to tame wild beaſts, that they might uſe them as familiarly, as wee doe commonly thoſe, which are tame by nature. And we read withall of divers who have found by wofull experience, that forced nature is of thoſe things, which by a wiſe man may not be truſted. Witneſſe hee of whom Martiall ſpeakes, ii.75. Verbera ſecuri ſolitus Leo ferre magiſtri, Inſertam que pati blandus in ora manum: Dedidicit pacem, ſubito feritate reverſa, Quanta nec in Lybicis debuit eſſe jugis: and, de ſpectac. x. Laeſerat ingrato Leo perfidus ore magiſtrum, Auſus tam notas contemerare manus, &c. The Poet therefore had ſome reaſon, (though it hold not in all things equally:) when he ſaid, Naturam expellas furca licet uſ que recurret, Et mala perrumpet furtim faſtidia victrix.

Fifthly, it hath beene obſerved of ſome free ſtones, that when they are uſed in a building if they bee laid in that proper poſture, which they had naturally in their quarries, they grow very hard and durable againſt both time and weather; if that be changed, that they conſume and moulder away in a ſhort time. Certainely, art may doe much, and cuſtome much; but to follow nature (where nature herſelfe hath not degenerated:) is alwaies both the ſurer, and moſt commendable. And ſo I ſhall conclude this part of the power of cuſtome in things naturall, with the words of a Heathen, but ſuch as may become a Chriſtian, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . O nature, from thee are all things, in thee all things ſubſiſt, and to thee all tend. What ever it be that fits thee well, fits me likewiſe, as being part of thee. Nothing that thy ſeaſons beare, is to me, (as either too forward, or too backeward,) unſeaſonable, &c.

THe ancient Greeke Philoſophers ſaid, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , This world is but a change; and the Apoſtle ſpeaking of the World, very elegantly and emphatically cals it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , rather then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , intimating thereby, that this World, to ſpeake of it truely and properly, is rather a matter of faſhion, then of ſubſtance. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (ſaith Theophylact upon the place, lately moſt elegantly printed in London, as the happy firſt fruits of a greater harveſt of Greeke Manuſcripts to bee ſet out here in England, to the great honour of this Realme, and the no leſſe contentment of all true lovers of learning:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Hee cals it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or faſhion, to teach us, that all the things of this preſent world, are but objects of the eye onely, and ſerve but for a ſhew, as things meerely ſuperficiall, without any either ſtabilitie, or ſubſtance in themſelves. It is ſo, if wee conſider thoſe things, which, both in regard of their forme and matter, are meerely naturall, and it is ſo if wee conſider thoſe, which have their exiſtence in, and from the will of man. The body of man is not ſo mutable, as his will is: nor the perſons and outward features of men, ſo different one from another, as their minds. Nova vita, novos mores poſtulat, ſaith the Comick. Wee have more reaſon to ſay, Novus dies, novos mores. And yet that is more then wee can truely ſay of many, who in one day ſhift themſelves often, and are not the men that they were; neither in regard of their mind, nor happily of their faſhions. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (ſaith excellently Saint Nazianzene to this purpoſe. Orat. de Spir. Sancto.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . We are not mixt creatures onely, but alſo contrarie; both to others and to our owne ſelves: not continuing truely and intirely the ſame, not ſo much as one day, much leſſe our whole lives: but both in regard of our bodies and in regard of our ſoules (or minds:) perpetually flowing and perpetually changing.

From this mutabilitie and inconſtancie of mans will, wee may firſt deduce Varietie of faſhions and cuſtomes. But ſecondly, differences of places and times cauſe difference of faſhions and cuſtomes; and this of neceſsitie. For it is not poſsible for many reaſons, that men that live under different clymates, ſhould all live after one faſhion: nor that the inhabitants of one place (the ſtate of things altering often as it doth:) ſhould alwaies live after one ſort. Hence are in different places and Kingdomes, at all times; and in the ſame places and Kingdomes, by certaine revolutions of times, ſometimes longer, ſometimes ſhorter, different faſhions, different cuſtomes, different lawes. Old fables tell us of one Epimenides, who after a continuall ſleepe of fiftie yeares awaked with amazement, finding a new world, every where (as of men, ſo of faſhions:) ſince hee had ſeene it laſt. Let this long ſleepe goe, as well it may, for a fabulous thing: the effects of it, I am ſure; (his amazement, I meane) might have beene credible enough, though the ſleepe had beene ſhorter by many yeares. In ſome Countries (for all Countries are not equally light and phantaſticke; and they are happy Countries, that are leſt:) if men ſhould but put on thoſe clothes that they left of but foure or five yeares agoe, and uſe thoſe faſhions that then were in uſe, they would ſeeme, even unto themſelves, ridiculous; and unto many, little leſſe then monſtrous.

The conſideration of this varietie affords, as unto the Naturaliſts, matter of ſpeculation, how even herein nature delights in varietie; ſo unto the Divine, matter of indignation, to ſee the vanitie of mortall men, who for the moſt part ſpend themſelves wholly, their wits and their lives, upon things ſo tranſitorie; and ſpend little or no time at all, upon the onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , (as both Philoſophers and the Scriptures are wont to ſpeake:) God, that is, and his ſervice, and the Knowledge of his Truth; which are the onely things that are permanent, and have realitie of exiſtence in this World; and therefore commended unto us by Chriſt, as the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of all our many cares and buſineſſes in this World; the one only thing that is profitable & neceſſary. But to forbeare that which I find already done by divers Divines, Naturaliſts, and others fully and ſufficiently: I ſhall here onely obſerve the power and providence of Almightie God, who as hee can out of darkeneſſe bring forth light, ſo can turne theſe wretched effects (in themſelves:) of mans frailtie and corruption, to be the meanes, in part, of his happineſſe. I ſay therefore, that what in the Heavens, the Sunne and the Moone, divers Starres and Planets are, for the naturall diviſion of times, to divide the day from the night, to be for ſignes and for ſeaſons, and for dayes, and for yeares, Gen. i.14. without which diviſion of times and ſeaſons, there would bee no living in this World: ſo varietie of faſhions and cuſtomes, ſerve unto man for the Civill or politicke diſtinction of the ſeverall times and ages of the World, without which there would be little certaine knowledge, and little or no truth amongſt men. By varietie of cuſtomes, I here underſtand alſo varietie of languages, and dialects, and words, (all which depend of cuſtome as much, if not more then any other thing of the World beſides; as elſewhere ſhall be ſhewed▪) as conducing to the knowledge of the Truth in this World, no leſſe then varietie of manners. Now to make this good that I have ſaid, I muſt firſt of all ſuppoſe, which I thinke no man will deny, that by bookes eſpecially wee come to the knowledge of Truth. Of truth in generall, by bookes eſpecially; in ſome peculiar objects of Truth, as in matters of Hiſtorie wee have them onely to truſt to. And in matter of bookes, the Authors of the bookes, and the times when the Authors lived, is mainely conſiderable. For accordingly doe wee give credite (eſpecially in point of Hiſtorie and truth of religion:) to the Bookes themſelves, more or leſſe, for the moſt part. In many things, this alone, to know the Author of the booke, is enough to decide many controverſies. But what if the Title deceive us, and ſome 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of ſome idle braine of our age, repreſent it ſelfe unto us upon the ſtage under the gray haires of authenticke antiquitie? Have there not beene ſuch impoſtors at all times, who have attempted (would I could ſay, they have attempted it onely:) to abuſe the World with ſuppoſititious Titles and Names? What profeſsion ſo ſacred, or ſo vulgar, that hath not ſuffered in all ages, by this kind of men? Divines, Lawyers, Phiſicians, Philoſophers, Hiſtorians, have in all ages complained of them: and in thoſe ages, when by reaſon of the ignorance of the times, men have not beene able to diſcover them, what errors and abſurdities, both in matter of knowledge and practiſe, both in the Church and in the Commonwealth, have enſued thereupon, to thoſe that are learned, is not unknowne, I am ſure; and I may not ſo far digreſſe at this time, to ſatisfie the ignorant. Of all noble Impoſtors in this kind, I will inſtance but in one. Annius Viterbienſis, a Monke by profeſſion, who lived ſome two hundred yeares agoe, having attained to more then ordinary knowledge both of the tongues and Hiſtories, applyed himſelfe by his knowledge and proficiencie, not to helpe, but to cheat the World. To that end hee counterfeited divers ancient Hiſtorians of beſt note and greateſt antiquitie, as Beroſus, Manetho, Catonis Origines, and the like, which had not beene heard of in many ages; and wrote Comments uppon them, himſelfe being both Text and Comment, that the World might have the leſſe occaſion to ſuſpect his fraud: and paſſed ſo current for a long time, that even to this day (though followed and diſcryed by divers learned men of all nations and profeſsions:) many can ſcarce perſwade themſelves, that ſo many fine Titles and ſhewes, ſhould be but a piece of juggling. Now what ſhamefull errors and miſtakes in point of Hiſtory both Eccleſiaſticall and Civill, they that have truſted unto him have beene led into by this jugglor, any man may imagine, and many have written of it.

Now the ordinary and ſureſt way generally to find out a counterfeit Author in this kind, is by his ſtyle, and by an accurate examination of thoſe particular faſhions, and cuſtomes that he doth either obiter, (which can hardly bee avoyded in any booke of what ſubject ſoever it be:) or purpoſely ſpeake of, how well they fit and ſute to the time and place that is pretended. Take away theſe two 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , of words and cuſtomes, and it will bee a hard taske for any man to diſcover and evict the ſuppoſititiouſnes of any writing. Hence it is, that in the Scriptures both of the Old and New Teſtament, by Gods great providence all things (for the moſt part:) bee ſo punctually ſet downe with all kind of circumſtances at large; which though illiterate men perchance paſſe over by reaſon of their ignorance, yet men of learning, to whom the ſtate of the World from the beginning with the ſeverall periods, alterations, and revolutions of it (as farre as it can be knowne by ancient bookes and Records:) is not unknowne, receive marveilous ſatisfaction from them, both for the better confirmation of their faith, and the greater contentment of their minds. For this cauſe men of judgement, that would gladly make uſe of their owne eyes to ſee the way that leades unto truth, and not altogether to depend from the abilitie both and fidelitie of others, have taken ſo much paines about words; as alſo to bee well verſt in the rites and cuſtomes of all ages and places. Neither can it be denyed by men of underſtanding, but that this way of ſtudie hath beene, next under God, the chiefeſt meanes of this bleſſed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or new birth of learning, which begun not much above a hundred yeares agoe. And I muſt confeſſe, I have wondred with my ſelfe ſometimes, that this kind of learning being come to that heighth or perfection as it is in our dayes, no man hath yet laboured for the eaſe of others, to reduce it to ſome certaine Method and rules of art, as it were; as by ſetting downe the proper words and rites of every age and place, whereby they are diſcernable from another; by the help whereof, even men of ordinary learning might give a good gueſſe at the age of every Author that they have occaſion to uſe, nor be altogether ſo lyable to the impoſtures or falſaries, as they are. Which certainely is feaſable enough, if not to perfection, yet to a good degree of publicke utilitie. But on the other ſide, when I call to mind, that Impoſtors would bee the firſt that would make uſe of this art, to make their forgeries the more paſſable (as certainely they would:) then I thinke it very happy, that it is not, neither of it ſelfe more eaſie to attaine unto, nor made more common by the labour of others, then it is.

What I have ſaid of the knowledge of old cuſtomes and the uſe thereof, in matter of bookes, is as true in matter of old writings and evidences of what kind ſoever. True it is, that nothing ſhould bee more ſacred and inviolable amongſt men, then publicke inſtruments, and evidences, whoſe onely end and uſe, is, to be witneſſes unto the truth, and to protect it from her many enemies, as malice, favour, partialitie, and the like. Yet how rightly Seneca ſaid, Nihil eſſe tam ſacrum quod ſacrilegum non inveniat, may appeare even in this particular. For it is well knowne, that even of old, many evidences have beene forged to abuſe the World withall: and that ſometimes, not by one or two ſecretly combining, but even by many unanimouſly conſpiring together, againſt the Truth. For example, I find that about ſome foure hundred yeares agoe, Gregorie the ninth being then Pope of Rome, and Saint Edmond, Archbiſhop of Canterburie, the Monkes of Canterburie were convicted to have counterfeited, or adulterated a certaine Charter of Thomas of Becket, by which they claimed certaine priviledges. For which abominable fact and other enormities, that worthy pious Prelate intended great and ſevere puniſhments upon the whole Convent. But they having made Otho the Popes Legate and Edmunds great enemy, their friend, prevailed with the Pope, that the cauſe might bee referred to the ſaid Otho: And in concluſion, but three of the whole Convent were found guiltie by Otho. And upon this favourable information, and friendly mediation withall of the Legate, the Pope ſent a diſpenſation unto the Monaſterie, by which hee did acquit them both from preſent further troubles, and from future deſerved infamie for ſuch an infamous Act. Even thoſe three that were found guilty, it was judged they had done it in Spiritu ſimplicitatis (ſo runnes the Diſpenſation:) and for this their ſimplicitie, forſooth, they were, not exiled, but confined to certaine places to doe penance. No wonder if others have made bold in that kind ſince, if the imputation of ſimplicitie was the worſt that would come of it. Simplicitas digna favore fuit, ſaith one of the old Poets. If wee looke backe unto better and purer ages, wee ſhall not find I am ſure that Simplicitie, was ever objected unto any as a crime; but in Monckes eſpecially, that once it was thought their chiefeſt commendation, I find in many Fathers. But ſince it is as it is, wee may thanke God, that evidences and old writings as well as other things, have had their proper cuſtomes in almoſt all ages; by the knowledge and conſideration whereof the true for the moſt part, (if the Impoſtor hath not beene very cunning:) may bee eaſily knowne from the counterfeit. For not to ſpeake here either of the words themſelves or forme of writing, or manner of orthographie, as well conſiderable in theſe, as in bookes; beſides theſe, there are divers other things, that are obſervable. There have beene times, when Seales have beene in uſe, and times when they were not: when ſuch and ſuch ſeales, and ſuch and ſuch dates; when ſuch and ſuch ſubſcriptions, and ſuperſcriptions; and ſundry ſuch particulars; much differing one from another all of them, according to their ſeverall times and places. Thoſe therefore take a very good courſe, who when they have occaſion to ſet out any ancient Records and evidences, keepe to their originals in all points, as neere as may be, to give the better ſatisfaction unto the learned: which is the courſe I ſee (and am heartily glad to ſee it:) that Sir Henrie Spilman Knight, that learned and painefull Antiquarie, does take in the publication of the Engliſh Synods; which (for the good and honour of our Engliſh Church:) he is now about. For in very truth, a very ſmall alteration, is enough ſometimes to make a true Record ſuſpected. As for example; That thoſe ſmall Arithmeticall figures (which wee had from the Maures or Arabs, as they from the Indians:) have not beene knowne or in uſe amongſt us Chriſtians ſcarce yet foure hundred yeares, hath beeene obſerved by men perfectly well verſed in the knowledge, both of ancient times and writings. They were much to blame therefore, who ſetting out ſome writings of above ſeven hundred yeares antiquitie, and profeſsing to follow the Originalls very exactly and punctually in all circumſtances of writing; made no ſcrupule in lieu of thoſe Roman figures then in uſe, to put theſe ſmall ones ſo lately received, which certainely they found not in thoſe Originals.

In the ſame Manuſcript, where the Diſpenſation that I have ſpoken of concerning the falſarie Monkes, is regiſtred; I remember to have read a ſtrange Note, (ſo it ſeemed unto me:) concerning ancient Charters and evidences, when they firſt began to bee in uſe in this Countrey: which Note becauſe it is of great conſequence (in caſe it ſhould proove true:) for the better conviction of many ſuppoſititious Charters, pretended to be of great antiquitie, I will here ſet it downe as it is there to be ſeene.

Sanctus Ethelbertus Rex Angliae qui ſuſcepit Chriſtianitatem a Beato Auguſtino miſſo a Beato Gregorio Papa Anno Dom. DXCVI. in Eccleſia Chriſti Cant. dedit eidem Auguſt. & ſucceſſoribus palacium Regium & ſedem perpetuam in Civitate Doroberniae, quae nunc dicitur Cant. cum Eccleſia veteri quae ab Antiquo tempore Romanorum ibidem fuerat fabricata, quam ipſemet Auguſtinus Sancti Salvatoris nomine dedicavit poſt conſecrationem ſuam Arelatenis factam, Statuit & idem Rex authoritate Sanctae Romanae Eccleſiae, ut in Eccleſia Cantuar. ordinem Monaſticum Monachi in perpetuum obſervarent, ne primorum videlicet praedicatio Monachorum, a memoriâ deleretur, ſed ſemper recens in mentibus ſuccedentium perſeveraret. Dedit etiam idem Rex poſſeſsiones amplas praedictis fratribus infra Civitatem Cant. & extra. & exinde dicta Dorobernenſis Eccleſia, propter primatum, & quia inde primò Chriſtiana Religio emanavit, & Regnum Anglorum illuminavit, ſicut Rex ipſe tenuit ſuas terras & conſuetudines liberas & quietas in ſuo dominio, ita Archiepiſcopus & Eccleſia praenominata tenuit terras ſuas & conſuetudines ſuas omnino liberas & quietas in ſuo dominio, & inconcuſſé habuit dicta Eccleſia Cantuar. omnimodas libertates & conſuetudines ſuas in poſſeſsione pacifica ſine interruptione cujuſquam ex conſuetudine & antiquo more ſine cartis vel monumentis Regiis uſ que ad tempora Whytredi Regis (who dyed the 23. of Aprill, in the yeare of our Lord, 725. having reigned 34. yeares, and ſixe months, according to Beda's calculation:) cujus munumenti tenor talis eſt.

This I commit to the further conſideration of the learned antiquaries of this land, not willing in a matter of ſuch moment, to interpoſe my judgement either way; and certaine beſides, that much may bee ſaid, both for it and againſt it. Onely that the matter (to them eſpecially that know nothing but what is now done:) may not appeare altogether incredible, I ſhall put the reader in mind of a paſſage of Ingulphus, who ſpeaking of the times of William the Conqueror hath this obſervation. Conferebantur etiam primò multa praedia nudo verbo abſ que ſcripto, vel chartâ, tantum cum Domini gladio, vel galeâ, vel cornu, vel cratera. & plurima tenementa cum calcari, cum ſtrigili, cum arcu; & nonnulla cum ſagitta. Sed haec initio Regni ſui: poſterioribus annis immutatus eſt iſte modus.

So much of the good that comes unto the World, from this varietie of faſhions and cuſtomes; the wretched effects, in themſelves, and the meanes withall, (in this age eſpecially:) of mans vanitie and miſerie. We have touched upon it, rather then treated of it. For indeed to ſpeake of it fully, it would require a large Treatiſe by it ſelfe. But whatſoever the uſe of this kind of knowledge be, I thinke there is not (I ſpeake it for the further incouragement of them that will take paines in this kind:) any kind of knowledge that can afford more content and pleaſure to an ingenuous mind. For ſince that the ſeverall ages of the World differ little one from another, but by thoſe outward markes and recogniſances of different rites and cuſtomes: Hee that knowes certainely (as it may be knowne by a practized Schollar in this kind of learning:) what hath beene the particular eſtate, if not of all (ſince there are not bookes extant of all:) yet of moſt ages of the World, wherein they differed one from another, and wherein they agreed; what peculiar, and what common to every one; he doth as it were enjoy the memorie, of ſo many yeares, and ſo many ages paſt, even as if hee himſelfe had lived all thoſe yeares, and outlaſted all thoſe ages. Hence it is, that Antiquaries are ſo taken with the ſight of old things; not as doting (as I take it:) upon the bare either forme or matter (though both oftentimes be very notable in old things:) but becauſe thoſe viſible ſuperviving evidences of antiquitie repreſent unto their minds former times, with as ſtrong an impreſsion, as if they were actually preſent, and in ſight as it were: even as old men looke gladly upon thoſe things, that they were wont to ſee, or have beene otherwiſe uſed unto in their younger yeares, as injoying thoſe yeares againe in ſome ſort, in thoſe viſible and palpable remembrances. As for thoſe men that have not this knowledge, though they be told that ſuch things bee ancient, yet for want of that knowledge and judgement, which might ſatisfie them, that they are ſo in very deed; and becauſe happily, they know little or nothing of former ages, the preſent repreſentation whereof, occaſioned by thoſe ancient evidences might affect their minds; it is no wonder if the ſight of ſuch things, be unto them as either pleaſing colours to the blind, or ſweete Muſicke to the deafe.

And now having done with the good Vſes of this Varietie through Gods great mercy; wee are to conſider the bad uſe of it, (which I feare is more generall:) through corrupt man his wickednes partly, and partly his ignorance. That in things of themſelves indifferent, as in matter of eating and drinking; of cloathing, of civill complements, and the like, there ſhould be Varietie of faſhions and cuſtomes in the World, according to differences of either places or times; can bee neither occaſion of wonder, nor offence unto any, that is not a great ſtranger unto the World; or rather indeed, unto reaſon and common ſenſe it ſelfe. But in matters of right and wrong; of that which is juſt, or unjuſt, lawfull, and unlawfull; that there ſhould be ſo much difference among nations (all conſiſting of men reaſonable by nature:) not them onely that are of different Religions, but even them that profeſſe but one Truth; yea, in the ſame nation, at ſeverall times; is that which gives occaſion both of wonder and of offence unto many; of error and wickedneſſe unto more; and hath wrought ſo farre upon ſome, as to make them peremptorily to affirme, that there is not any reall difference in nature betweene right and wrong, but only in the opinions of men, grounded chiefely upon cuſtome. Cùm bonum & malum natura judicetur, & ea ſint principia naturae; certè honeſta quo que & turpia ſimili ratione dijudicanda, & ad naturam referenda ſunt. Sed perturbat nos opinionum varietas, hominumque diſſenſio; & quia non idem contingit in ſenſibus, hos naturâ certos putamus: illa quae alii ſic, aliis ſecus, nec iſdem ſemper uno modo videntur, ficta eſſe dicimus. So learned and judicious Tullie of the vulgar opinions and judgements of his dayes: and had hee lived in ours, it is very probable hee would have ſaid as much of ours. Inſtances to this purpoſe taken from ancient times concerning the varietie of mens judgements in point of right and wrong, wee have many in ancient Authors who either of purpoſe upon this very occaſion; or upon ſome other occaſion, and to another end, have treated of the different Lawes, and cuſtomes of ſeverall nations. See Plato in his Politico, or Minoe. Bardeſanes, in Euſeb. de Praepar. Evangel. lib. vi.10. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrr. hypot. Nicolaus de Mor. gentium, in Stobaeus; not to mention any more. Certainely ſhould wee take all nations of the World (ſuch as have beene accounted moralized and civilized nations, I meane; the wild and barbarous being laid aſide:) into conſideration, wee may generally conclude, that there is ſcarce any vertue ſo much in requeſt in one place, but will be found to bee a vice in another; ſcarce any vice ſo much abhorred at one time in one place, but at another time hath beene thought in the ſame place if not a vertue, yet no unlawfull thing. Thoſe Authors that I have but now mentioned, ſhall bee my warrant for what I have ſaid, if any will not take it upon my credit. But in point of right and wrong, wee need not to goe ſo farre, to fetch our inſtances; neerer times and places unto our ſelves, and ſuch as wee in many reſpects are better acquainted with, will afford us ſufficient inſtances. The Civill Law of the Romans, if any Law, might bee thought to be grounded upon reaſon, both in regard of the Authors of it, men of great worth and fame for their learning; and of the credit that it hath found with moſt nations in Europe, even to this day. That law thought it good reaſon to give abſolute power unto fathers upon their children, power even of life and death, as long as they lived, except by volutary emancipation, or otherwiſe they had made them free. Children that diſpoſe of themſelves in marriage without the conſent of their parents, are not by that law, lawfully married, and are lyable to great puniſhments. Neither of theſe is now any where thought either Law or reaſon; though Bodinus I know, in his Politicks is very eager for the one; and Eſpenſeus a learned Sorboniſt, hath written a learned diſcourſe concerning the latter, whereby he doth endeavour to proove, that it is not onely againſt Lawes, but even contra aequitatem naturalem, that liberi invitis parentibus, ſhould contrahere matrimonia, ſub quorum authoritate, ſaith hee, & in quorum poteſtate, Natura, Scriptura, Deus, & homines, liberos eſſe voluerunt. cap. 8. Which I take the rather notice of, becauſe hee layes the blame of all this, that it is not ſo every where as hee would have it, upon vim conſuetudinis expreſly, the power and tyranny of cuſtome: which hee treates of in the thirteenth chapter. And to the ſame power of cuſtome it ſeemes it muſt be imputed, that ſome Nations by their lawes and cuſtomes, have beene ſo favourable to ſtealers of young heires, to diſpoſe of them in marriage at their owne will, againſt the will of the parents or guardians (of which kind of men you may read at large, Decr. par. ii. Cauſa. 36.) contrary to the practice of other nations, and to the dictates of reaſon, and a man would thinke, of common ſenſe it ſelfe.

By the Roman Lawes (at leſt in Trajans time:) the Father, if a ſonne dyed without Iſſue, and inteſtate (but however, hee was to have legitimam portionem:) was to inherit, hee alone; ſine diminutione, ne ſocium haberet haereditatis, qui non haberet luctus, ſaith Plinie in his Panegyrick; which was thought a good reaſon. For although according to the courſe of nature, & votum parentum, it bee more proper to children to inherit of their Fathers, then otherwiſe, yet turbato ordine mortalitatis, as the Civilians ſpeake, when nature her ſelfe doth alter her courſe, and takes the child away before the Father, Cur poſteris amplior honor quàm majoribus haberetur? curve retrò quo que non recurreret aequitas eadem? ſaith Plinie; who therefore doth highly extoll Trajan for a Conſtitution of his to that purpoſe. And Ariſtotle upon the ſame grounds of Nature, goes yet further, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . That it is not lawfull (in point of right and reaſon grounded upon nature:) for any ſon upon any termes, to diſinherit (abdicare, is more; but includes, diſinheriting:) his Father, though a Father have power to diſinherit his ſon, Ariſt. Eth. Nicom. lib. viii. cap: ult. Yet in ſome Countries, though the Sonne die never ſo wealthy, and the Father ſurvive never ſo poore and decaid, the Vncle ſhall inherit before the Father, by reaſon of a certaine Maxime in Law, that Haereditas deſcendit, non aſcendit, inheritance doth deſcend and not aſcend, not in the right line that is; but in the collaterall it may; elſe the Vncle alſo were excluded. Yet is the Father granted to be neerer of blood: but nevertheles eo nomine becauſe hee is Father, he is conceived uncapable. On the other ſide, that inheritance which they call jure repreſentationis, whereby the Iſſue of the Eldeſt ſonne, doth inherit before the next in bloud, to witte the younger ſonne, is Legall by the Civill Law, and approoved by the practice of moſt Countreys. Yet till within theſe few yeares, it was otherwiſe in France generally for many ages together, amongſt all ſorts of perſons, both great and ſmall.

But inſtances in this kind of the difference of Iudgements and opinions in point of right and wrong, are ſo many and ſo obvious to any man that ſhall but conferre together the Lawes of ſeverall Countries now in force in the principall places of Europe, that one or two are as good as a hundred, and a hundred, if need were, as eaſie to bee found as one or two. And though ſome Countries are more conſtant in their Lawes and cuſtomes, then ſome other are; yet I know none that hath beene ſo conſtant, where divers things may not be obſerved, once forbidden and puniſhable, ſome; now, legall and lawfull: others, now prohibited, which in former times were lawfull: in a word, no Nation or Countrey (neither Medes, nor Perſians excepted:) where cancelling, reverſing, and repealing of Lawes, and enacting of others much different, if not contrary, in their place and ſtead, hath not beene uſuall. I ſpeake not this of ſuch alterations onely, as have neceſſarily proceeded from alterations of times and circumſtances: of which Durantus in his Speculo Iuris, well and pertinently, Nam ſecundùm varietatem temporum jura variantur humana, Et nihil pene in ſemetipſo manet, ſed currit Natura, multas evolvens mutationes, quas ne que praevidere facile eſt, ne que praedicere. Therefore, dicunt quidam (ſaith the addition there:) quod ſcientia juris Canonici vel Civilis non eſt propriè ſcientia, &c. Such alterations, I know, may happen many, much different one from another, though grounded all upon the ſame reaſon. But I ſpeake it of ſuch eſpecially, as proceed from varietie of opinions and judgements, in matter of right and wrong.

Now the power of cuſtome in all theſe changes, alterations, differences according to varietie both of times and places, is two-fold.

Firſt in that moſt of theſe differences and alterations have their beginning from cuſtome, which by continuance doth not onely get the ſtrength of Law, and goes for Law in all places; but alſo commonly begets Lawes, properly ſo called. For that is the originall of moſt Lawes in moſt places. And it was both a witty and a true ſpeech of him that firſt (as I find in Suidas and others:) defined cuſtome to bee nothing elſe, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , an unwritten Law; as on the other ſide Law to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a written cuſtome: ſhewing thereby the difference betweene Law, properly ſo called; and cuſtome; very well; though it will not hold in all. And thoſe Lawes that are thus grounded upon cuſtome, are thought by many as the moſt acceptable, ſo the moſt naturall and obligatorie Lawes that are: as being not the invention of any one ſingle man, but of long Time and experience. Dio Chryſoſtomus is very rethoricall upon this ſubject, and more rethoricall then ſound ſometimes; as when hee ſaith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that it is more proper for men that are free, to bee governed by cuſtome; as for men that ſerve, by Lawes: whereas indeed true libertie doth conſiſt in this, to bee ſubject unto reaſon, whether commanded unto us by Lawes, or recommended by cuſtome. But certainly it is no new thing for any Kingdome to bee governed by cuſtome: and of the two it may generally be ſaid, that cuſtomes were, before written Lawes, if not in all, yet in moſt Kingdomes. Which I obſerve the rather, becauſe ſome learned men I ſee, are of opinion that jus conſuetudinarium, and conſuetudo in point of Law, are phraſes of latter ages onely; and particularly in England, not knowne or uſed till after the conqueſt of the Normans. But certainely jus conſuetudinarium, whether wee looke upon the word or thing, is of greater antiquitie then ſo. In all Greeke Authors, as many as I remember, that write of Lawes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Lawes and cuſtomes goe ſtill together. In the Civill Law you ſhall read, not onely de longa conſuetudine, as part of the Law in generall; but alſo de conſuetudinibus municipiorum, of particular cuſtomes of places, to bee kept and obſerved as Law. But when the word conſuetudo came firſt, either more particularly to be taken pro ſervitio feudali (which the Civilians call ſervitutes praediorum:) for a certaine right that a Lord may challenge, and a Tenant is bound unto by cuſtome; Or yet more generally, for any Ius or due of what kind ſoever, that a man hath right unto by cuſtome, I am not able to ſay certainely. For though this uſe of the word became moſt frequent and ordinary ſince the times of William the Conqueror, yet I find in ſome ancienter Charters Iura & conſuetudines in this very ſenſe: as in a Charter of Knutt, de Portu Sandwici, in theſe words, Nulluſ que omnino habet aliquam conſuetudinem in dicto portu, &c. And among the Lawes of King Edmund, confirmed by William the Conqueror, the title of one is, De Baronibus, qui ſuas habent curias & conſuetudines. But whether the title bee as ancient, as the Law it ſelfe, may perchance bee doubted. I am the more inclinable to conceive the Latin conſuetudo in this ſenſe, to bee of longer ſtanding then ſo, (then the times of the Conqueror, I meane or there abouts:) becauſe I am ſure the Greeke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is; as may appeare by the Greeke Lawes and Conſtitutions: as for example, where 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the cuſtomes are taken and uſed for certaine fees (called alſo 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 :) due and payable at the Conſecration, or, Inthronization of every Biſhop, Archbiſhop, &c. Soe Conſtitut. Novell. Iuſtin. Coll. ix. tit. vi. Nov. 123. c. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Theſe fees (or cuſtomes) onely we allow as lawfull to bee payed by every Biſhop, &c. and ſo often in that one Chapter. And ſince wee are treating of cuſtome, and have ſaid ſomewhat of the Latin word conſuetudo, I thinke it will not bee amiſſe to examine the originall of our adopted Engliſh cuſtome. The Latin conſto hath two ſignifications; to coaſt, and to continue. From conſto, to coaſt, n being changed into u, is the french couſter of the ſame ſignification; from conſto, to continue, it may bee that the french couſtume might bee derived; couſtume, being in very truth nothing elſe but a continued, or conſtant uſe and faſhion, whatever bee the particular object of it. But I thinke it more probable, that it came from couſter, to coaſt; and that couſtume at firſt was properly taken for vectigal, tribute, tolle, or impoſt money. Now becauſe matters of this nature, as tributes and impoſts, are matters which concerne all men generally to take notice of, and ſuch as goe by cuſtome too, (In omnibus vectigalibus ferè conſuetudo ſpectari ſolet, id que principalibus conſtitutionibus cavetur. D. 39. tit. 4. l. 4. f. 2.) for the moſt part; it can bee no wonder if cuſtome from that more proper ſignification, came afterwards to ſignifie conſuetudo or couſtume as wee now uſed it in common ſpeech. So the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Hebrew, which ſignifies a meaſure, commonly; and ſometimes tribute; is by the Rabbins at this day (as it was by the ancient Hebrewes, for ought wee know, though wee have no examples of it in the Scriptures;) commonly uſed for mores, or conſuetudo. And that of this Hebrew middah, not onely the Latin modius, for a certaine meaſure, but alſo modus uſed for faſhion, or cuſtome, in generall is derived, is out of all queſtion. And therefore Ariſtotle, where he treates de jure naturali & poſitivo, (Ethic. l. v. c. 7.) that right, or Law, which he cals, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is, that hath no ground in nature, but wholly depends of mens cuſtomes and ordinances, according to the variety both of times and places; hee very appoſitly compares 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to meaſures; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (ſaith he:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. And ſince Grammarians cannot agree about the derivation of the word mos, ſome deriving it from meo, ſome from modus, ſome from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and ſome from the Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I know no reaſon why I may not more probably maintaine that mos (the rather, becauſe it is a monaſyllable:) is the pure Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 mas, which ſignifies tribute. But to returne to our Engliſh word againe; this is obſervable of it, that when it is taken for impoſt or tolle, it is expreſſed in Latin not by conſuetudo, but cuſtuma properly: as for example, Registri, p. 259. in a Breefe concerning forreigne Merchants: where nevertheles I muſt acknowledge, that I doe not underſtand the difference betweene Telonium, which the marginall note ſaith they are free from; and cuſtuma which the Breefe itſelfe charges upon them. For otherwiſe I ſhould have thought that telonium and cuſtuma had beene all one; but telonium the more common: And this the rather, becauſe I find in the Lawes of Scotland (where the word cuſtuma is more frequent:) telonium and cuſtumam, for the ſame thing. And thus much concerning the words both Engliſh and Latin; though much; yet not too much, I hope, in a Diſcourſe concerning Cuſtome.

Secondly, whatever bee the beginning or occaſion of theſe ſeverall changes, alterations and differences, whether cuſtome or any thing elſe; yet herein appeares the power of cuſtome, to be no leſſe ſtrange and marveilous, in that in proceſſe of time it makes all theſe differences and alterations, though never ſo contary, to appeare in the eyes of men, not onely juſtifiable, but even beſt, ſo that all men of all Countries doe generally like their owne Lawes and cuſtomes, when once they have beene uſed unto them, beſt of any other▪ and are ready, if need be, with great confidence and eagerneſſe, to maintaine them to be ſo againſt any gaine-ſayers. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (ſaith Agathias the Hiſtorian to this purpoſe:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . This is apparantly common to all the nations of the earth, that what law or cuſtome ſoever they have beene long uſed unto, they preferre before any other, and deeme them very excellent. Which made Herodotus, that ancient Hiſtorian, to blame Cambyſes King of Perſia, very much, not as uncivill onely, but even as a mad man, in that hee ſo freely and tartly derided the cuſtomes and faſhions, whether Civill or ſacred of other Countries, which were deare unto them, and in their judgement very plauſible. And why any man or nation ſhould arrogate ſo much unto themſelves, as to condemne and deride ſo freely and peremptorily whatſoever was contrarie to their owne cuſtomes, eo nomine, becauſe contrary to their owne, though practized and approoved by other men and Nations, by nature equally reaſonable; Herodotus, it ſeemes, ſaw no reaſon. Now that men generally thinke beſt of their owne faſhions and cuſtomes, be they never ſo contrary, Herodotus doth ſhew, by relating a triall that Darius made of it, to ſatisfie himſelfe, which was this: The Indians, thoſe that were properly called Calatians, had a cuſtome to eat their Parents and friends after their deaths; whereas the Graecians did uſe to burne them: both theſe being equally contrary to the Perſians; who of the two probably, would ſooneſt have beene perſwaded to eate their dead, then to burne them, which could not bee without prophaning that which they accounted moſt holy, to wit, fire. Darius therefore, firſt ſends for ſome Graecians, and asked them by themſelves what they would take (and he was well able to give it, though they had asked many thouſands,) to eat their Parents when they ſhould bee dead. They anſwered, they would not doe it for the wealth of the World. Then hee ſent for thoſe Indians, and propoſed unto them likewiſe upon what terme they would bee content to burne theirs. The very mooving whereof offended them ſo much, and ſeemed ſo prodigious, that in ſtead of an anſwer, they humbly beſought, he would forbeare ſuch horrible ſpeeches unto them: and ſo were diſmiſſed. Soe true is that of Pindarus (addes Herodotus:) that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is, cuſtome, is an Vniverſall Monarch, or King of all.

This of Herodotus, puts mee in mind of a ſtrange cuſtome once practized, and in great requeſt among the great ones of Europe; which was this: If a Prince dyed out of his Countrey, they would chop his body in ſeverall pieces, and boyle them in a kettle or ſome ſuch veſſell till all the fleſh came from the bones; and ſo ſend his bare bones to bee buried in his owne Countrey. Bonifacius the eight, ſpeaking of it, cals it, deteſtandae feritatis abuſum, morem horribilem, Deo abominabilem, hominibus abhorrendum, immanem, impium, crudelem, &c. and if it were ſo indeed, a man might wonder how Princes and Great men of that age came to bee ſo farre in love with it, as to take order before hand (as we read of divers; and particularly of one of our Edwards, King of England, in Froiſſard:) in their life time, that they might bee ſo uſed after their death: but that the ſame Bonifacius tels us plainely, that it was, vitio conſuetudinis, that they were bewitcht to that mind and opinion of theirs. And not to goe from this very ſubject of the dead, who would not wonder, that Ancient Heathens, having forborne (and deteſted, I may ſay of many of them:) the ripping of humane dead bodies as inhumane, cruell, and barbarous; (which is the reaſon that neither Hippocrates, Ariſtotle, nor Gallen, though great, yea incomparable naturaliſts otherwiſe, never ſaw, as many learned men are of opinion, any dead bodies diſſected:) that now in our dayes the ſame thing amongſt us Chriſtians is ordinarily practized, and is neither matter of wonder nor of ſcandall unto any; though ſometimes it bee done in a moſt unbeſeeming manner, and all manner of perſons admitted unto it, without reſpect at all of that Divine fabrick, which Saint Chryſoſtome, as I remember, ſaith in one place is much reverenced by the Angels of heaven themſelves, in honour to Chriſts body, and his bleſſed Incarnation.

The power of cuſtome then by theſe and the like inſtances, as in things naturall, ſo in Civill alſo, being granted to be very great; the next thing that wee are to conſider, is, Whether wee ſhall grant it ſuch power, as that it can make, if not all things, yet any thing at any time, which is right in reaſon or by nature, to become wrong, actually in point of practice; and on the other ſide, that which reaſon and nature of themſelves are againſt, to become if not laudible, yet allowable, and juſtifiable ſometimes: that is in effect, whether right and wrong are by nature truely, and ſo abſolutely immutable and invariable; or otherwiſe. To this we anſwer;

Firſt, That as there is nothing truly naturall, that is not in ſome ſort rationall (if not as capable of reaſon, yet as the effect of reaſon, in ſummo gradu; that is, God; and ſo rationall▪) Soe there is nothing truely rationall, that is not as truely naturall, both in regard of God, the eternall and infinite cauſe of all things; and in regard of men, whom God by nature hath made rationall. Whatſoever therefore is grounded upon reaſon, is truely and abſolutely naturall. And ſo is the morall Law, which treates of humane vertues, and vices: and therefore altogether and indubitably naturall.

Theſe words nature and naturall, are moſt ſhamefully miſtaken and confounded by ſome Chriſtians that have treated of this ſubject, to wit, concerning vertues and vices naturall; which have made them to fall into deteſtable opinions, even ſuch as Civill Heathens themſelves would have abhorred in other heathens. To inſtance in one; Pontus Hunterus of Delfe in Flanders, in his de libera hominis nativitate, ſeu liberis natalibus, cap. 2.3.4. hath theſe words; Illud verò liberum populis omnibus (exceptis Chriſtianis:) leges cum Naturâ reliquere, uxores è ſanguine junctis acciperent. Nam haec quo que res, Legis eſt, non naturae: ac qui haec ſepta tranſiliunt, non in naturam, ſed contra leges peccant. Nullum enim naturae à rerum Creatore datum eſt, ad animalium generationem impedimentum, modo diverſi inter ſe ſexus, ſanis corporibus conveniant. Non illa Matrem (horreſco referens:) nec Sororem; ſed pudor, verecundia, ac honeſtas, legibus ornatae, rejiciunt: ſanguinem non horret, &c. This man, as appeares by what followes, takes nature here, and ſo in all this his Diſcourſe, for Natura vegetativa, and natura ſenſitiva only; as though there were no ſuch thing in rerum natura as natura rationalis. His rule therefore how wee may know things that are contra naturam, is by the preſent manifeſt inconvenience, that enſues to our naturall healths or lives, by thoſe things. So that by him if a man cut his fathers throat, or rip his owne mother, as Nero did, and ſleepe not a whit the worſe, nor have the worſe ſtomacke to his meate for it, hee doth not crimen contra naturam committere. And this is that Natura, which in another place hee cals them prudentes that obey, notwithſtanding any lawes to the contrarie. I muſt confeſſe he is not the firſt that hath taken nature in this ſenſe. For by thoſe words Lex naturae, ſome underſtand in a ſtrict ſenſe, that law properly which is common unto rationall and irrationall creatures; that is, unto men and beaſts. In this ſenſe they ſay, that Proprium bonum appetere; Vim vi repellere, and the like, is de lege naturae. But it is one thing to ſpeake of the law of nature, as it is common (though in this ſenſe the word Law, is not ſo proper neither:) to all naturall creatures; and another thing to diſpute of that Law, which is naturall unto man properly, who by nature is rationall. Iuſt ſo ſome Heathen Nations of old, as Herodotus relates, thought they might lye together in their temples, becauſe they ſaw that birds, and other dumbe creatures, that were kept in them for ſacrifices, did it freely; whence they inferred that it was not unnaturall, and therefore not diſpleaſing to their Gods; and the reaſon of this their inference, Herodotus gives, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (ſaith he:) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , becauſe they preſumed that men and brute beaſts, are all of one and the ſame nature▪ which he for his part thought very abſurd. And certainely what Saint Iude ſpeakes of ſome, wee may conclude of all men generally, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , If men though rationall by nature, will confine themſelves to that naturall knowledge, which is common to unreaſonable creatures as well as to reaſonable, they muſt needs leade a brutiſh life. I hope I may ſay without offence, that the ancient Stoicks were farre better Chriſtians then ſo, who maintaining that mans happineſſe did conſiſt, in a life according to Nature, have written ſo many accurat tracts and diſcourſes, to proove that all vertues (and among them pudor, verecundia, honeſtas; which this Hunterus doth moſt falſly oppoſe unto Nature:) are naturall unto man. They that deſire further ſatisfaction in this point, let them read Saint Chryſoſtome, who in divers places of his workes, but eſpecially in his Homilies ad pop. Antioch. handles it at large, prooving by many reaſons, arguments and pregnant inſtances, that the knowledge of the Morall Law, or, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , is by nature.

Secondly, Whatſover commeth within the compaſſe of reaſon, properly; belonging as properly to the law of nature; it muſt needs follow, that the law of nature extends of it ſelfe very farre; though men through the naturall, or rather (to ſpeake more properly and phyloſophically:) unnaturall corruption of their underſtanding, apprehend it not in its full extent. Now whatſoever falls within the compaſſe either of reaſon, or of the law of nature, is of itſelfe immutable.

Naturalia jura — ſemper firma, & immutabilia permanent; Soe ſaith the Civill Rom. Law; and ſo all writers generally; Ariſtotle onely excepted, who in a place ſeemes to ſay the contrary; to wit, that Some naturall lawes are mutable. His words are, Some becauſe they ſee 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , lawes and judgements concerning that which is juſt and right, ſo different and ſo variable; are of opinion that nothing is right or juſt in nature, but by opinion onely. But this is not generally true, ſaith hee; but in part it is. For however among the Gods it may very well be, that that which is naturally juſt and right, is altogether invariable: yet among us men, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Some part of that law which is by nature, is naturally mutable: and ſome part of it, is not. Where firſt it is to be obſerved, that Ariſtotle doth diſtinguiſh betweene Iura naturalia, as not being all (in regard of men:) of one nature. And ſo farre we follow Ariſtotle. For it is well obſerved by Thomas Aquinas, that there are ſome Iura naturalia, which may be called fundamentalia, or principalia; becauſe evident of themſelves unto humane reaſon. Others as it were ſecundaria, becauſe not ſo apparant unto man, but elicible, or demonſtrable from thoſe fundamentals by humane ratiocination. The former I ſuppoſe are they that Ariſtotle would have immutable, but the latter not ſo. Some interpret Ariſtotle, as though hee had meant no more then this, that de facto ſome Iura naturalia are changed or violated among men; though de jure, or naturâ ſuâ, immutable; becauſe of thoſe words of his, though happily in regard of the Gods themſelves immutable. But that this could not bee his meaning, may appeare, firſt, becauſe hee ſaith, ſome onely are mutable, not all. Whereas there bee no jura fundamentalia, but de facto are violated, not onely by particular men, but alſo by whole nations, as may eaſily appeare to them, that ſhall peruſe the Authors whom wee have before mentioned. Secondly, by that inſtance that hee brings of things naturall, wherein Nature itſelfe, ſeemes to be unconſtant unto her ſelfe. The right hand, ſaith hee, is by nature the ſtrongeſt, and ſo it is in moſt men; yet in ſome it is not ſo. But more of his meaning, by and by.

Thirdly, Naturall reaſon being granted, by the fall of man, much impaired and vitiated, it is no wonder if all men reaſonable by nature, doe not now agree upon the Iura naturalia; and it ought to bee ſufficient unto any reaſonable man, to ſatisfie him, that thoſe jura that are ſo called, are truely naturalia, that moſt men and nations (though not all:) that are civilized both by their practice, and their opinions, determine them to be ſo.

As for example, Some nations (civilized in other things it cannot be denyed:) allowed of theft, ſome of adultery, or fornication; ſome made no ſcrupule of inceſt; what then? Moſt other nations have condemned them for it; and abſtained from theſe themſelves, as being againſt Nature. That is enough to ſhew that they were things againſt nature indeed; and enough to make any man inexcuſable in the eyes of God, that makes any queſtion of it. The extravagancie of ſome men, upon this ſubject, makes mee the more earneſt herein. For whereas in reaſon, what is allowed by the moſt, ſhould bee adſcribed unto nature; and that which by ſome is practiſed to the contrary, to the corruption of nature partly; (which Muſonius the Stoick, in Stobaeus cals, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 :) and partly to the power of long cuſtome (tanta eſt corruptela malae conſuetudinis ut ab eâ tanquam igniculi extinguantur à naturâ dati, exoriantur que & confirmentur contraria vitia, as Tullie very well in a place:) Some goe a quite contrary courſe. What they find practiſed by ſome, they take to bee naturall; and the contrary, though there be a major part for it, they adſcribe unto the power of cuſtome. Inceſt is a thing that true nature doth abhorre as much as any thing; and as many good reaſons, I dare undertake, may bee given to proove the unnaturalneſſe of it, as for any thing that is generally acknowledged moſt unnaturall. And if we may beleeve ſome ancient Heathens, men of no ſmall authoritie in the world, as Ariſtotle and others, even among the brutes, ſome of the more generous abhorre it naturally. Yet an outlandiſh writer of Eſſayes in his long diſcourſe of cuſtome would perſwade us that all difference and ſcrupuluſnes in this kind proceeds rather from cuſtome, then nature; bringing this among many other particulars, as an argument of the power of cuſtome among men. Many ancient Heathen Philoſophers, I muſt needs ſay, ſhewed themſelves farre wiſer men, who though they had no certaine knowledge (as they could not without revelation:) of the fall of man; yet from this very thing, becauſe they ſaw many men every where, yea ſome whole nations, make no conſcience at all of ſome things which they ſaw by the eye of reaſon were certainely againſt nature, concluded that of certainty, the naturall reaſon and underſtanding of man, had had a fall; though how or when, they could not tell. Many pregnant paſſages out of Plato, Plutarch, Hierocles, Plotinus, Proclus, and others might bee produced heere to that purpoſe, if need were, and had not already upon other occaſions beene obſerved and treated of, (all, or moſt of them:) by others: And all of them agree in this, that in man himſelfe is the cauſe of this his fall, or blindneſſe of his underſtanding, not in him that made him. Even hee that erreth (in matter of life and practiſe:) againſt his will, is impious, in that hee diſagreeth from the nature of the Vniverſe, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . For Nature had furniſht him at firſt with certaine inſtincts, prenotions and opportunities, by the helpe whereof hee might have attained to the knowledge of truth: which having neglected, hence it is that hee is now not able to diſcerne that which is falſe from that which is true: ſaith another, (a Heathen too:) not inferiour to any of thoſe, whom I have named.

Fourthly, As in things naturall, ſome things to ſerve the nature of the vniverſe, forget and forgoe ſometimes their owne particular nature; and are never more naturall in a generall ſenſe, then when they are ſo unnaturall unto themſelves, particularly; (ſo the water to prevent a vacuum, which nature abhorreth, aſcends; and the like▪) So muſt wee conceive in things Civill, a ſubordination Iurium naturalium; and of reaſon unto reaſon.

It is not againſt reaſon then, that ſome things which conſidered in themſelves are againſt reaſon, ſhould in a higher and more generall conſideration, proove warrantable by reaſon. Even by our lawes, ſome things, (ſay our Lawyers:) may bee done warrantably for a publike good, though contrary to the Lawes otherwiſe. Legally therefore in regard of the Lawes, and their generall end, though illegally, becauſe againſt the expreſſe tenor of ſome particular law. So the Civill Law too, tels us of a certaine Ius ſingulare, quod contra tenoris rationem introductum eſt; and allowes of it. It were neither; neither Ius, nor allowable by law, if it were againſt all reaſon; though it bee granted againſt ſome. I am perſwaded, this is it, and nothing elſe, that made Ariſtotle ſay, (as wee have noted before:) that quaedam jura naturalia, were mutabilia: but his termes are dangerous, and therefore to be avoided. It is one of the fundamentall principles of all Commonwealths, Salus populi; ſuprema lex eſto. How farre a man may go pro ſalute populi, contra tenorem rationis, is diſputed at large, by them that have written de Iuribus Dominationis, whether Monarchicae, Ariſtocraticae, or Democraticae. Some are too nice; and ſome goe too farre; but there is no queſtion, but ſomewhat there is, that may bee done in this kind; both by the Lawes of God and of men, allowable; and warrantable by ſound reaſon. Now cuſtome being a thing of great force in a body politick, as well as in a body naturall, and of much importance every way, either to the peace or diſturbance of any Commonwealth; if any thing may bee done at any time rationally, contra tenorem rationis; it is in point of cuſtome eſpecially. Therefore Thomas Aquinas, where hee undertakes to proove (which hee doth very learnedly and ſolidly,) that lex and ratio are all one; yet when hee comes to the point of cuſtome, hee is put to a fortè, not knowing well how to determine it; Si autem adhuc maneat ratio, eadem, ſaith he, propter quam prima lex inutilis erat, non conſuetudo legem, ſed lex conſuetudinem vincit. Niſi fortè propter hoc ſolum inutilis lex videatur, quoniam non eſt poſsibilis ſecundum conſuetudinem patriae, quae erat una de conditionibus legis. Difficile eſt enim conſuetudinem multitudinis removere. Of many cuſtomes therefore wee may boldly ſay, that the unſeaſonable altering of them is againſt reaſon; though conſidered in themſelves they be granted to bee not reaſonable. And herein is moſt true, and applyable that Greeke ſentence, or rather Oracle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; not eaſily to attempt the ſtirring of thoſe things, which cannot bee ſtirred without much ſtirring; and as much hazzard, as ſtirring. The reaſon is given by Auguſtus in Dio, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Thoſe things ſaith he, that long continue in one and the ſame ſtate, are to be preferred before thoſe that are ever upon changing, though it bee for the beſt in all likelihood. Wee ſee that moſt things enjoy their happineſſe in their reſt; but above all things, it muſt needs bee more proper unto eſtates (ſo called from their ſtabilitie:) to bee happy in their ſetled conſiſtence and permanencie; as being liker unto ſtages and pageants, then ſtates truely, when alwayes mooving and changing. And beſides, not onely the happy being of an eſtate, but the very being of it doth depend of its ſtabilitie, in this kind. For rebus novis ſtudere, hath alwayes beene both the marke and the refuge of ill affected malecontents, who have no other hopes to raiſe their ruined fortunes, but by the ruines of the preſent eſtate that they live in. Alcybiades therfore in Thucydides vi. ſaid well, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; That their governement is ſafeſt, to the Commonwealth, that apply themſelves as much as they can to the preſent Lawes and cuſtomes, though they bee not altogether ſo good of themſelves. In this ſenſe muſt Saint Gregory the Pope his words bee underſtood, where hee ſeemes to adſcribe unto cuſtome a power to make things that are bad in themſelves to become juſt and legall. His words are; Si pravae rei aditus antequam diu pateſcat, non clauditur, uſu fit latior; & erit conſuetudine licitum, quod ratione conſtat eſſe prohibitum. Greg. Reg. Epiſt. l. vii. Ind. ii. ep. 120.

Another conſideration that ſhould make mee the more averſe from altering old cuſtomes is, becauſe the reaſon of ſome, though grounded at firſt upon ſome weightie conſideration, cannot equally appeare at all times, thoſe inconveniences happily, which in former ages gave occaſion to ſuch and ſuch cuſtomes being now remooved, and perchance forgotten. Therefore ſaith the Civill Law, Non omnium quae à majoribus conſtituta ſunt, ratio reddi poteſt; Et ideo rationes eorum, &c. I remember what anſwer ſome Turkes made, as it is reported by Busbequius in his Epiſtles, being asked the reaſon of a certaine cuſtome of theirs, which ſeemed very ſenſles; to wit, That their forefathers had done it of old; and as they beleeved, not without reaſon; though now not knowne unto them as they ingenuouſly confeſſed. I will not commend this for a good anſwer to all things; God forbid: In ſome things I thinke it may hold very well. If a Turke (to inſtance in ſome particular:) ſhould aske a Chriſtian, why when any doth ſnize in our preſences (as it is practized in moſt places of Europe:) wee pray to God to bleſſe them, or to that purpoſe; well might hee anſwer, that our Chriſtian forefathers have done it of old, and that long before them their Gentill forefathers had uſed it; but the reaſon, how, and why it firſt began, neither Chriſtians nor Gentiles can certainely tell us, though divers both Gentiles of old, (as Ariſtotle &c.) and Chriſtians ſince have written of it, and have done their utmoſt to find it out. And now that it hath beene ſo long practized in the World, I ſhould, I muſt confeſſe, bee one of them that ſhould make conſcience to take it away, though I muſt acknowledge with the reſt, that the reaſon, or beginning, is unknowne unto mee. If therefore the reaſon of many Lawes and cuſtomes though very good and warrantable, and perchance neceſſarie, bee ſuch nevertheles that cannot bee found out but by time and experience; It cannot be ſafe to reſolve upon the alteration of any long continued Law or cuſtome, though wee can give no reaſon for it, but after long and mature deliberation.

For theſe ſeverall reſpects, it cannot be thought amiſſe or unreaſonable, that all Lawes and cuſtomes ſhould by them, that are ſubject unto them, generally be maintained (in a civill reſpect, at leaſt:) to bee juſt and reaſonable. And truely, whatever may bee alledged againſt them conſidered in themſelves, yet in this reſpect they may be juſt and reaſonable, if they bee not partiall, but extend indifferently unto all, that is, juſt in the execution, or application; though not in their nature. But beſides, if it bee not fit to ſay unto a King, (be he never ſo bad a King:) thou art wicked; and to Princes, yee are ungodly, Iob 34.18. Why ſhould not ſo much reſpect be due to any Law or cuſtome from them, (as I ſaid before:) that are ſubject unto them, who owe their peace and ſafetie (next unto God and the King:) to their protection, as that it ſhould not bee lawfull for them to vilifie them, and openly to declaime againſt them? Cicero ſaith well, Vt ex medicinâ nihil oportet putare proficiſci, niſi quod ad corporis utilitatem ſpectat; ſic a Legibus nihil convenit arbitrari, niſi quod Reipubl. conducat (and that is as much as if he had ſaid, niſi quod juſtum eſt, and there is the ſame reaſon for both:) proficiſci. However it may not be doubted by any man that is wiſe, that there bee many Lawes and cuſtomes in all countries, which though they bee well tolerated and continued for the peace and ſafetie of the publicke, yet cannot bee practized by particular men, (as farre forth as they may avoyd it:) with a good conſcience, and without great perill to their ſouls; as being of themſelves moſt unreaſonable. And therefore the ſame Tullie, who before did teach us, how we may judge and ſpeake of Lawes civilly; elſewhere inſtructing how to judge, according to truth, ſaith very ſolidly, Stultiſsimum eſt, exiſtimare omnia juſta eſſe, quae ſita ſunt in populorum inſtitutis aut legibus: to beleeve that every Law or cuſtome, that is in force and rigidly ſtood upon in every countrey, is therefore juſt and good, is abſolutely to beleeve with the Epicureans and the like, (whom we have before ſpoken of:) that reaſon, and Iuſtice, is not a matter of truth and realitie, but of meere opinion and conceit. And it muſt needs follow, quod ſi populorum juſsis, ſi principum decretis, ſi ſententiis judicum jura conſtituerentur, jus eſſet latrocinari, jus adulterare, jus teſtamenta falſa ſupponere, &c. as the ſame Author very well in another place of the ſame booke. Theſe commendations therefore, that ordinarie Lawyers of every countrie give uſually to their owne proper lawes and cuſtomes, muſt cautelouſly be underſtood; or elſe they are very dangerous. Though ſome of them ſpeake plainely enough ſometime; as that incomparable Lawyer and Philologiſt Cujacius, of the cuſtomes of France, though refined and reformed againe and againe; divers whereof he doth acknowledge to bee grounded upon the errors of former Lawyers, though pretended to be right and juſt of themſelves. To which purpoſe alſo I underſtand (with ſubmiſsion to himſelfe, and his interpretation:) the Cujacius of this Iland, in his Notes upon Forteſcu, that the divers opinions of Interpreters proceeding from the weakeneſſe of mans reaſon and the ſeverall conveniences of divers States, have made thoſe limitations which the Law of nature hath ſuffered, very different. And hence it is, &c. Sure I am, that long before either of them, Tertullian taught us, that the ground of many cuſtomes, is either ignorance or ſimplicitie. His words are; conſuetudo initium ab aliquâ ignorantiâ vel ſimplicitate ſortita, in uſum per ſucceſsionem corroboratur, de virgin. vel. c. i. Hee might have added (which is added by others:) another ground of many Lawes and cuſtomes, which is, wilfull injuſtice, and want of a good conſcience, the rareſt thing of the world, though nothing bee more commonly pretended. It doth therefore much concerne every particular man, (them eſpecially that take upon them to bee men of judgement and underſtanding:) as not to controle the received Lawes and cuſtomes of their countries, the alteration whereof belongeth not unto them: So to underſtand as neere as they may, what Lawes and cuſtomes are abſolutely good and warrantable in themſelves; and which are tolerated and maintained onely for the peace and concord of the Commonwealth. Here therefore is a maine difference to be made, betweene thoſe things that the Law doth command, and doth oblige us unto; and thoſe things, which if wee doe, the Law doth allow, but not command: betweene thoſe things that wee doe as good ſubjects unto the King and his Lawes; and thoſe that wee doe of our owne inclination, taking the advantage of the Law. What Chriſt once ſaid unto his Diſciples, If your righteouſneſſe exceed not the righteouſnes of the Scribes and Phariſes, (the ſtricteſt men for their old lawes and cuſtomes that ever were:) you ſhall never enter into the Kingdome of Heaven; is in this ſenſe applyable unto all men; Such a Legall life, will never bring them unto Heaven. Therefore the Canoniſts teach us that conſuetudo may liberare à paenis civilibus indeed; but cannot, à paenis gehennae; if in itſelfe it bee unconſcionable and unreaſonable. And they are not the Canoniſts onely, that teach us this doctrine, but even our owne Lawyers, that have taken the greateſt paines to uphold the credit, and maintaine the Iuſtice of our Lawes. Many unlearned perſons (ſaith one of them:) beleeve that it is lawfull for them to doe with good conſcience all things, which if they doe them, they ſhall not bee puniſhed therefore by the Law, though the Law doth not warrant them, &c. and ſo goes on, ſetting downe for example ſome particular caſes, of thoſe things which a conſcionable Chriſtian is bound unto, to ſave his ſoule though hee cannot be compelled unto it by the Law, Dr. and Stud. lib. 1. c. 19. And in ſuch caſes (ſaith the ſame Author in another place:) he is in conſcience as well bound if he will ſave his ſoule; as hee were, if hee were compelled thereto by the Law, &c. If there bee not then beſides the Law of the Land, a law of reaſon and conſcience to regulat our actions by, we are certainely but in bad caſe, in point of eternall ſalvation.

HAving treated hitherto (in this ſecond part:) of the Varietie, firſt; then of the power and validitie of cuſtome in things civill; it will not be improper that I adde ſomewhat of words alſo, and of the power that cuſtome hath in matter of words and ſpeeches. For though many men for want of knowledge and experience, thinke that words are but wind, and therefore account no ſubject that is about words, to bee very materiall, or worthy the ſtudie of a ſerious man; yet wiſer men know full well that in very truth, there is nothing that ſetteth men on worke ſo much, or cauſeth ſo much ſtirre in the World, as words, meere words doe, and have alwayes done; that words have beene the occaſion of many warres, by which many great Cities and Countries have beene overthrowne; that words have cauſed bloudy ſtrifes and perſecutions even in the Church; not words onely as they were intended, and ſhould have beene underſtood, but even miſtaken through ignorance. It was once ſaid of ſome ancient Philoſophers, Sentit idem Ariſto, quod Xenocrates, quod Ariſtoteles; loquitur alio modo, ex hac autem non rerum, ſed verborum diſcordiâ, controverſia nata eſt, &c. A happy thing it were for the World, that words were well underſtood every where; and all 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , all ſtrifes and contentions about words quite taken away. But that will not bee as long as the World indures; it is in vaine to wiſh it; though not to wiſh it, be the part of either an ignorant, or uncharitable man. But I have nothing to doe with words here, but as cuſtome, my preſent ſubject, hath to doe with them: to wit, to ſhew the power of cuſtome upon words, and ſome remarkable effects of this power.

A. Gellius ſaith well in a place, conſuetudo omnium rerum domina, ſed maximè verborum; and Quintillian yet more fully, that conſuetudo eſt certiſsima loquendi magiſtra, utendum que plane ſermone, ut numo cui publica forma eſt: and againe, Ridiculum malle ſermonem quo locuti ſunt homines, quam quo loquuntur, & ſane quid eſt aliud vetus ſermo, quàm vetus loquendi conſuetudo? So Horace, and divers others, who all agree in this, that vvords and all right ſpeaking goes by cuſtome ▪ and whereas in other things cuſtome (as hath beene ſhewed:) is an uſurper upon right, here her ſoveraigntie is acknowledged to bee naturall; right and cuſtome in matter of words and language, being in the judgement, of wiſeſt men, but one thing for the moſt part. Now therefore to ſpeake of it ſomewhat more diſtinctly.

Firſt, cuſtome makes vvords, that were but ſounds before, to bee vvords, that is, to ſignifie ſomewhat. As for example it makes the ſound, that thoſe three letters, G. o. and d. being put together, doe make, to ſignifie unto us of this nation, the Lord and maker of all things. For of itſelfe vvhy theſe three letters ſhould repreſent ſuch a thing, there is no ground in nature; but cuſtome. It is true, the Stoicks of old were of another opinion, and it became a great controverſie among Philoſophers, vvhether vvords vvere 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , by nature: or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , by impoſition at pleaſure. Origin, in few vvords, ſtates the queſtion thus; Ariſtoteles ſentit poſitu nomina, Stoici putant Naturâ eſſe indita, imitantibus primis editis vocibus res ipſas ad quas & nomina impoſita ſint: qua ratione & Etymologias inducunt. And A. Gellius to the ſame purpoſe, Nomina verba que non poſita fortuito, ſed quadam vi & ratione naturae facta eſſe. P. Nigidius in Grammaticis Commentariis docet, rem ſane in Philoſophiae diſſertationibus celebrem. Queri enim ſolitum apud philoſophos 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ſint, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. Saint Auguſtine handles it at large in his de Dialectica, to whom and to Gellius I referre them that would know more of it. Hereupon the Stoicks did earneſtly beſtirre themſelves to find out and penetrat into the Etymologie of every word, and to ſhevv the reaſon of it in nature; but to ſpeake truth, their labour tended rather to make ſport unto the idle, then to give ſatisfaction unto the ſoberly curious. Yet the Stoicks were tolerable in compariſon of ſome both of old and of late too, who have proceeded further, laying this for their foundation, that vvords and ſyllables are of great power and efficacie, and have (ſome ſay:) I know not what affinitie and hidden correſpondence with ſtarres and planets. Hereupon ſome by a certaine art which they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , undertake in the name of every man, to read his fortune, and to foretell great matters. I could not but mention ſuch, comming ſo in my way; but I will no more then mention them, their opinions being ſo apparantly abſurd. But vvhy then doth Ariſtotle, vvho determines it ſo peremptorily, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that no words are by nature, in many places ſtand upon vvords ſo much himſelfe, and examine their Etymologies ſo carefully? To this I ſay, that though generally vvords goe by cuſtome, yet ſometimes they may bee ſaid to bee from nature, or naturall in ſome ſenſe, that is, ſet of purpoſe to ſet out unto us the nature of ſuch and ſuch a thing. There be many vvords of that nature, it cannot be denyed; in ſome languages more then others; but in all, ſome; and in this caſe, to underſtand the right Etymologie of a vvord, conduces much to the underſtanding of the thing itſelfe. Of the nature of it I meane; but not to foretell, or foreſee by it any thing future; not more then can bee knowne by the naturall knowledge of the thing itſelfe. Some vvords againe may bee called naturall, becauſe they doe when they are uttered and pronounced imitate the nature of the thing itſelfe, which they ſignifie. So for example when wee ſay in Latin, aeris tinnitum, equorum hinnitum, ovium balatum, tubarum clangorem, ſtridorem catenarum, Perſpicis, ſaith Saint Auguſtine, haec verba ita ſonare, ut res quae his verbis ſignificantur. So moſt of them that they call voces animalium propriae; for the moſt part, both in Greeke and Latin are naturall. Againe, cuſtome doth make ſome words naturall, in that it gives unto them the power and efficacie of things that are naturall, to produce ſome naturall effects. Such are thoſe words and ſounds, whereby dumme creatures are governed; which though of themſelves they be but invalid words and ſounds, yet 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as Plutarch of them in a place:) through cuſtome and skilfull education, become ſo powerfull, that what can bee done upon dum creatures with blowes, or whips, or any other kind of violence, may bee done with them; and ſometimes more. So a man may uſe himſelfe to tremble, or weepe, or laugh, and the like, at certaine words and ſounds, which in time ſhall have that power over his body, that it ſhall not be in the power of his will to forbeare. Even as the ſight of whips and ſcourges (as wee read in ancient ſtories:) hath beene more powerfull upon ſlaves in warres, then the ſight of more dreadfull and mortall weapons, becauſe the ſmart of thoſe which they often felt, as ſlaves, made them in time to abhorre naturally and irreſiſtibly the very ſight of them; ſo words alſo; Long uſe and cuſtome may turne them into charmes, to make them operative upon nature, though of themſelves they have no naturall power at all. All theſe things granted (whereof to diſcourſe at large, is not my preſent purpoſe:) it holds ſtill nevertheleſſe, as we affirmed at firſt, that generally and for the moſt part, words are words, that is, are ſignificant by cuſtome.

Secondly, all difference of words and phraſes in point of elegancie, or barbariſme, is altogether from cuſtome. Hence it is, that thoſe expreſsions which in ſome language are moſt proper and elegant, in another are moſt ridiculous and barbarous, neither is there any reaſon at all for the moſt in nature, either for the one, or for the other, but that uſe and cuſtome hath ſo determined it, whoſe will and pleaſure ſtands for reaſon in theſe caſes. It is true, that Grammarians have taken great paines to reduce ordinarie words and ſpeeches to ſome certaintie of analogie, without which Grammar is no Art, and ſomewhat it is that they have done in this kind for the eaſier teaching and learning of languages. Yet doth cuſtome herein maintaine the power of her ſoveraigntie upon words and ſpeeches, in that when ſhee pleaſes, ſhe breakes the rules, and ſtricteſt bonds of beſt approoved Analogie, and ſuffers no rule of Grammar to paſſe without an exception. All matter of elegancie then or babariſme being but a matter of cuſtome, as it is no wonder to ſee ſilly people for want of knowledge, either to vvonder, or to ſcoffe at the expreſsions of other languages, vvhen they heare ſtrangers ſpeake the vvords of the Countrey perchance, but uſe their owne phraſes and expreſsions; So I cannot but wonder that in all ages men that have beene moſt ambitious to be thought learned, have ſtood ſo much upon elegancie, as I find they have done. The ancient Heathens, Philoſophers, and others, did object, many things, I know, againſt the Goſpel of Chriſt; but I doe not find that any thing generally did in very truth make them ſo averſe from it, as the language; moſt of the New Teſtament being vvritten in Greeke words indeed, ſome few excepted; but for the moſt part, in phraſes and expreſsions that are meerely Hebrew; and the Latin Tranſlation being a mixture of both, both of Hebrew and Greeke phraſes, rather then Latin, that was Latin truely, according to the cuſtome of thoſe times. So hard a thing it vvas for them, that had beene uſed to Plato and Ariſtotle, and the like, to reliſh ſuch a ſtyle; much leſſe to reverence it. A ſtyle nevertheles, vvhich they would have thought elegant enough, had they beene uſed to it; as on the other ſide, that of Plato or Ariſtotle but courſe and barbarous, had not the power of cuſtome interpoſed, and diſpoſed their eares and palates to it. A late writer of Eſſayes treating of the power of cuſtome; after many ſtrange inſtances, brings this, as I remember, among others, as one of the ſtrangeſt; That ſome certaine people of the World, ſhould bee governed by Lavves that are written in a ſtrange unknowne tongue. Certainly if the uſe of a ſtrange tongue in one Countrey in point of Law (vvhich would not be much better underſtood, though it were in the vulgar tongue:) bee a thing ſo much to bee admired; I thinke he might have found ſomewhat that is done in a ſtrange tongue in many Countreys againſt all grounds of ſenſe or reaſon, much more to bee wondred at. But whereas ſome others, to increaſe the wonder, deride and defame the ſaid tongue as barbarous, they rather make themſelves an inſtance of the power of cuſtome, that makes them thinke ſo ſtrange, and ſpeake ſo ſcornefully of a tongue once thought very ſweet and elegant, by them that were uſed unto it; then perſwade us to wonder at others, that make no wonder of it.

Thirdly, cuſtome advanceth or abaſeth words at pleaſure, making them that once were vile to become honorable; and thoſe that were honorable to become vile; yea vvords of title, to become words of reproach; and words of reproach to become words of title. What once knave, and ballad were in old Engliſh, when David was termed the knave of the Lord; and the ſong of ſongs, called the ballad of ballads; is yet too freſh, to be forgotten. Notarius was once a Title for a Secretarie of State, when Secretaries of State, were at the higheſt; and then Cancellarius was an obſcure name, and of little reſpect. Now it is quite contrary, and hee would bee thought (and reaſon he ſhould, ſince cuſtome hath otherwiſe commanded it:) to commit a monſtrous ſoloeciſme that ſhould now uſe thoſe Latine words, as they were uſed when Latin was in uſe. I doe not know any thing to the contrarie, but that men were as ſcrupulous to tell a lye in former ages as they are now; nay for ſome reaſons I ſhould thinke more. As firſt, becauſe the art of equivocation was not then knowne, much leſſe the praiſes of it; and againe, becauſe as Tullie hath taught mee, the ancient Romans were ſo cautelous in their ſolemne atteſtations, as that, were they never ſo certaine of a thing, yet they avoyded as much as they could, religionis & pudoris cauſa, vvords of peremptorie and confident aſſeveration; rather uſing (which hee cals verbum conſideratiſsimum:) the vvord, arbitror. Yet a man might have told another mentiris, that hee did lye, (of the Latin word I find it obſerved by others; and of the Hebrew, wee have examples of it in Scripture, as ii. Reg. iv.16.) without any great either offence, or breach of civilitie; which now to give, though but to another bee he never ſo vile, in the preſence of a man of faſhion, is greateſt incivilitie. But of all things in this kind, I moſt vvonder at that ſome tell us of the vvord Baſtard, which they ſay was once rather a Title of Honor, among great ones; then a note of infamie. Soe Pontus Honterus: Poſtremò, ſaith he, quam longē abfuerit noſtrorum naſutulorum opinio, ab ejus temporis nobilium ſententia, vel ex eo apparet, quod nothi Burgundi è Philippo Bono nati, omiſsis Ducum, Comitum, Marchionum, Baronum que titulis, aliis omnibus praetulerint BASTARDI nomen, ſcribentes in armorū Gentilitiis ſcutis publicè ac privatim hoc tantum modo, Corn. Ant. Phil. Bald. David, &c. Burgundiae BASTARDVS. Ex 〈2 pages missing〉 to ſupreme powers, whether Civill or Eccleſiaſticall. Caeremoniae Deorum, ſanctitas Regum, ſaith Iulius Caeſar in Suetonius; that as religious worſhip is proper unto the Gods, ſo unto Kings to be ſtyled and accounted ſacred. But numen and altaria, and the like, I wonder how Chriſtian eares could away with; yet allowed (time was:) even to Chriſtian Emperors, and uſed by them ſpeaking of themſelves; (as for example in the Code, noſtris altaribus ſuggeſtio offertur, and, de noſtris altaribus petunt, &c.) which is not likely their Chriſtian eares would have borne, had not the power of cuſtome hardned them unto it. Hee is not a civill man now of late yeares among us, that thinkes much to ſubſcribe himſelfe ſervant, though it be unto his equall, or inferior. Yet Sulpitius Severus was once ſoundly chid by Paulinus the Biſhop of Nola, for ſubſcribing (or rather proſcribing, as the cuſtome was then:) himſelfe his ſervant, in a letter of his. But you ſhall heare himſelfe ſpeake, if you pleaſe, and what hee thought of it: In Epiſtolae titulo, imitari praeſtantem in omnibus mihi fraternitatem tuam timui; quia tutius credidi verè ſcribere. Cave ergo poſthac Servus Chriſti in libertatem vocatus, hominis, & fratris, & conſervi inferioris ſervum te ſubſcribere: quia peccatum adulationis eſt magis, quàm humilitatis juſtificatio, honorem uni Domino, uni magiſtro ſuper terram, uni Deo debitum, homini cuilibet, ne dicam miſerimo peccatori, deferre. His words are ſomewhat ambiguous, whether hee meanes uni Domino, uni Magiſtro, and uni Deo, all of one; or rather (as I rather beleeve:) partitively, allowing us the uſe of this word, to thoſe that are truely our Lords and maſters upon earth. But whatever his meaning was, it is certaine that the vvord is extreamely abuſed now adayes; and moſt abuſed by them that know leaſt, and care as little to learne what belongs unto true humilitie, and wherein it doth conſiſt. Now in this and the like caſes, it were happy if in all places (if all places afford ſuch:) ſome of the wiſer and graver ſort of men, would agree by their joynt conſtancie and gravity to reſiſt both in matter of faſhions that belong unto cloaths, and in thoſe that belong unto vvords, the vanitie, fickleneſſe, fooliſhneſſe of ordinarie worldly men, vvho have nothing to buſie their idle braines with, but to invent and follow new faſhions. Then vvere it an eaſie thing for any ſober man to maintaine and embrace conſenſum prudentum (as wiſe men preſcribe in other things) the conſent of ſome (though fewer in number:) that are wiſe; then vulgarem conſuetudinem, the cuſtome of the common people (ordinary wordlings I meane:) which commonly likes that beſt, which is worſt. And certainely they ſhould bee much to blame in my judgement that vvould not doe it. But when a cuſtome in this kind (though vaine, yet not abſolutely impious:) is become ſo generall that a man cannot avoyd it, except he will be ſingular; a man I thinke may ſafely enough (in theſe things which of their nature are indifferent:) condeſcend unto it to avoyd ſingularitie; which alwayes reliſhes of ſome vvant of charitie, and is oftentimes the effects of a worſe diſeaſe, pride and ſelfe-conceit. And ſo much be ſpoken concerning vvords.

AS God both in regard of his will, and in regard of his Nature, is abſolutely immutable, in a tranſcendent kind of immutabilitie, beyond all compariſon; nay beyond all imagination of man; which Saint Iames to expreſſe in ſome ſort, after hee had ſaid that there is no variableneſſe with God; not content with that, addes elegantly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or ſhadow of turning:) So it ſtands with reaſon, that both the worſhip of God, and the opinions of men touching God, ſhould be as invariable; at leſt more invariable, then any other thing, the object whereof is worldly and mutable. Cuſtome a man would thinke of all things in the world ſhould have leſſe to doe with things of this nature. But it is quite otherwiſe. For in very truth of all things in the World, there is nothing generally that goes by cuſtome ſo much as religion doth, both in point of practice, and in point of opinions. So that there is nothing ſo horrible of itſelfe, or ſo ridiculous in the judgement of reaſon and common ſenſe in point of opinions, which long cuſtome (if men bee not very warie of it, and with beſt care and diligence uſe thoſe meanes to prevent it, that ſound reaſon and true philoſophie doe preſcribe:) will not make moſt plauſible and acceptable: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , cuſtome having once got the ſtrength of long continuance, inſinuates errors and impoſtures (bee they never ſo groſſe:) into the minds of moſt men under the ſhape and repreſentation of genuine truth: So Iuſtin Martyr; who fetcheth hence eſpecially the origine of Idolatrie. And Origin addes that of all Cuſtomes, none ſticke ſo faſt in the mind when once ſettled there, none ſo hard to bee wiped and waſhed off, as thoſe which he elegantly cals 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is, the cuſtomes of opinion and doctrine, bee they right or wrong. To this wee may adde the obſervation of Nicetas the Greeke Hiſtorian, from domeſticke experience, who having particularly inſtanced, in the ancient Chriſtian inhabitants of the Pouſguſian poole, then halfe Turkiſh in their rites and cuſtomes, concludes upon it generally, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Long cuſtome hath more power then either nature or religion. Hence it is perchance that the Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 properly, which often ſignifies cuſtome, is alſo taken ſometimes for religion or doctrine.

Now the reaſon why cuſtome can doe more in point of religion, then it can in other things, is firſt, becauſe the object of religion, is of all others the furtheſt off both from the ſenſes, and from the reach of humane reaſon; which makes men the more apt, in things ſo abſtruſe and ſo far exceeding the ſtrength of humane ratiocination, to content themſelves with what they have received from their forefathers, preſuming that they had it by ſome revelation, or other from above. This made Ariſtotle, who did not love to ſpeake of things, but upon demonſtrable grounds of reaſon and nature, not to meddle much in all his writings, with things divine; concerning either God or religion; as hee himſelfe gives the reaſon of it, in his de part▪ animalium, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . profeſſing there that hee preferred the knowledge of things divine, farre beyond any other knowledge; but could ſay but little of it nevertheles for want of certaine grounds. Plato, hee was altogether for Divinitie, it is true; the immortalitie of the ſoule, and the rewards of a godly life in the world to come, and the like, being his chiefeſt ſubject in almoſt all his Treatiſes: for which, as hee was much admired by the ancient Fathers of the Church, ſo in all ages hee hath beene knowne by the Title of Divine Plato. Yet Plato himſelfe doth ingenuouſly acknowledge the imperfection of his knowledge in this kind as both deficient and uncertaine. Witneſſe this divine paſſage of his, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. In another place hee ſaith plainely, that without 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſome divine revelation from above, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to know the certaintie of theſe things in this world, is either abſolutely impoſsible, or extreamely difficult. If therefore Plato himſelfe, coeteris philoſophis gentium longè late que praelatus, ſaith Saint Auguſtine; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that admirable Philoſopher (ſaith Euſebius:) who of all Heathen Philoſophers and writers, was the onely, that reached unto the very porch of Truths Sacrarie: if he nevertheles, was ſo much to ſeeke himſelfe, and ſo unſatisfyed; no wonder if ordinarie men, unto whon the day ſtarre of heavenly truth was not, or is not yet ariſen, have thought it their ſafeſt courſe in all ages, in point of religion eſpecially, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , (as Athenagoras the Chriſtian Philoſopher ſpeakes and ſhewes in the beginning of his Apologie;) to keepe them cloſely to the rites and cuſtomes of their forefathers, bee they never ſo ridiculous and abſurd.

Another reaſon why cuſtome is ſo powerfull in matters of Religion, is becauſe men for the moſt part, every where are for the things of this preſent World, as profit, or pleaſure, or the like; as for thoſe things that belong unto their ſoules, they thinke of them as matters of another world indeed; that is, as matters that doe not much concerne them, and for which they ſee no reaſon why they ſhould overmuch trouble their thoughts. It is true, that faction and violent oppoſition are taken for zeale in moſt places; and thoſe men thought vulgarly very religious, that hate them moſt fiercely, that are not of their opinions; of which kind of men there is ſtore enough in all places, and of all profeſsions. But religion, or faith well grounded (and if it be not well grounded, how we can be ready to give an account of it unto others, as Saint Peter would have us, I know not:) is quite another thing. Wee ſpeake not here of illiterate men or women, whoſe capacitie (for no man is accountable for more then hee hath received, ſo hee make good uſe of it to his utmoſt:) doth not reach to ſuch either preparation or examination, as both the Scriptures and right reaſon doe require, to proceed rationally and with judgement in ſuch a buſineſſe. It is to bee feared that of them that want not judgement and capacitie in other things of the world which they take more to heart, there are but few to bee found in no place, that make that uſe of either (all prejudice and partialitie being layd aſide:) that were fitting in matter of religion. And ſo it comes to paſſe that every where and generally, though few beleeve it, or ſuſpect it, yet in very truth, the beleefe of moſt men if it bee well looked into, is rather cuſtome, then any thing elſe.

But to the end that the power of cuſtome in matter of Religion, may the better appeare unto them that are none of the moſt quickſighted of themſelves, nor diſpoſed to take any great paines by the helpe of long tedious philoſophicall ſpeculations to penetrate into the truth of things, wee will here take into our conſideration ſome one of the many religions that have beene in great uſe and requeſt among men in former dayes: and of all the reſt, wee will make choice of that purpoſely, which in the judgement of all men that were not bred and obliged unto it, hath ever beene accounted the moſt ridiculous, unnaturall and prodigious. I will not therefore here ſpeake of them that have worſhipped the Sunne and the Moone, and the ſtarres, &c. the moſt glorious objects that ſenſuall worſhippers could pitch upon; and which ſome ancients grounding upon a wrong interpretation of the words of Moſes, Deut. 4.19. ſeeme to bee of opinion that it was in ſome manner permitted to the Nations of the world to doe, till the comming of Chriſt. Nor yet of them, that have worſhipped ſtocks and ſtones, the worke of their owne hands, whoſe plauſible pretence for their groſſe idolatrie hath beene in all ages, that they worſhipped not the figures themſelves in ſight, but the inviſible Deities repreſented unto them by thoſe figures. Thoſe that I will inſtance in ſhall be they, whoſe religion was to worſhip thoſe things, which reaſon and nature in the judgement of all other nations hath made unto man either contemptible or abominable; the ancient Aegyptians I meane, whoſe greateſt Deities by them adored with all poſſible reverence, were dogges, and cats; toades and crocodiles, and the like. Of whom among others the Latin Satyriſt vvorthily, Quis neſcit Voluſi Bithinica qualia demens Aegyptus portenta colat? crocodilon adorat Pars haec: illa pavet ſtaturam ſerpentibus ibim Effigies ſacri nitet aurea cercopitheci, &c. How they came firſt to reſolve upon ſuch horrible worſhip, they that have moſt curiouſly ſearched into it, as Diod. Siculus, and others, could never, though they purpoſely conferred with the moſt learned Aegyptians of thoſe dayes, find out certainely. It is moſt likely, that they were at firſt compelled unto it by their princes and governours for ſome politick ends and conſiderations. But in after ages, when this worſhip, how ſtrange and uncouth ſoever at firſt, was once become cuſtomarie and hereditary unto them, with what approbation of judgement and affection of heart (to the ready forſaking of their goods, lives, and liberties for it:) they then did embrace and practiſe it, ancient hiſtories, ſuch as cannot by any ſober man bee queſtioned, beare record unto this day. I will not bring here what we read in ſome of them, becauſe it may be queſtioned with more colour, of great advantages in wars wittingly and willingly forgone by the Aegyptians by reaſon of their ſuperſtition; yea how they have choſen rather to yeeld themſelves unto their enemies, when they might have had the beſt of it, then to violate though but the bare ſignes and pictures of thoſe beaſts which were ſacred unto them. But the teſtimonie of Diod. Siculus, (whoſe words among others, are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , &c. This ſuperſtition of theirs cleaveth ſo faſt unto their ſoules (or, is ſo penetratively infuſed into their very ſoules:) and ſo immoovably bent and affected are they every one of them to the worſhip of theſe creatures, &c.) and thoſe inſtances that hee brings, whereof he was an eye witneſſe, of their zeale to their religion, no man can queſtion with any colour of reaſon. And Tullie ſpeakes of it, as of a thing known to all the World, and whereof examples were obvious in his dayes; Aegyptiorum morem (ſaith he, and marke by the way, that hee cals it morem; by which word he cloſely adſcribes it unto cuſtome:) quis ignorat? quorum imbutae mentes pravitatis erroribus, quamvis carnificinam priùs ſubierint, quàm ibim aut aſpidem, aut felem, aut canem, aut crocodilum violent; quorum etiam ſi imprudentes quippiam fecerint, paenam nullam recuſent. Such was their zeale to their religion, againſt nature, reaſon, and common ſenſe, grounded upon cuſtome onely: whereby it may appeare, that bare zeale, without due obſervation of other circumſtances, is but a weake and uncertaine triall of the Truth.

Now to inſtance (as I have formerly:) in ſome things of our dayes likewiſe, and in our owne practiſe; it will bee hard for me to find an inſtance that will be generally thought ſo pertinent, becauſe though the matter bee of itſelfe never ſo ſtrange, yet cuſtome having made it familiar, it will not ſeeme ſtrange unto ordinary men, whoſe underſtanding, though they know it not, is blinded by it; the more dangerouſly blinded, the leſſe they ſuſpect it to be ſo. But to them that are yet free, or at leaſt will hereafter uſe the meanes to vindicat themſelves into the libertie of a ſound judgement according to truth and reaſon: to them I dare boldly ſay, that it is not more ſtrange (not more ſtrange; I ſay no more:) either that ſome people of the World ſhould worſhip no God at all; or that ſome ſhould with thoſe ancient Aegyptians, whom we have ſpoken of, worſhip dogs and cats for their Gods; then that Chriſtians, contrarie, not onely to reaſon and even common ſenſe it ſelfe, but alſo to the direct example of Chriſt, the founder of their religion, ſhould behave themſelves ſo prophanely in their Churches erected to the honour of their God; and make ſo little reckoning of them, as they doe in many places of Europe; and not onely doe it, but in ſome places (which is ſtrangeſt of all:) thinke themſelves the purer and ſounder Chriſtians, that they doe ſo. Were it but for the ſake of Iewes and Gentiles, who cannot but abhorre that Religion, that allowes of ſuch profaneſſe in and about places dedicated to the worſhip of God; were there no more in it then ſo; Yet it is apparantly againſt the lawes of true Chriſtianitie (which of all others, are moſt ſevere againſt all wilfull ſcandals:) that ſuch irreverence ſhould be allowed. I am the bolder to ſay, that it is againſt true Chriſtianitie, becauſe I know it was not ſo, when true Chriſtianitie did moſt flouriſh. And truely, he that ſhould have ſeene in the times of the primitive Church devout Chriſtians not daring ſo much as to touch a Bible without firſt waſhing of their hands in token of reverence; and in their Churches in great humilitie ſtooping ſometimes to the very ground, (whence as I take it, are thoſe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , ſalutations, or kiſsings of the holy pavements, mentioned in the Ius Orientale:) yea directly, terramfronte concutientes, as Saint Auguſtine ſpeakes in a place; or as Saint Chryſoſtome, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , proſtrating themſelves quite downe, and beating the ground with their foreheads, (which though it were not abſolutely required of any, but ſuch as were either to bee baptized, or did ſolemne penance; whence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for proſtratio, as Billius hath long agoe taught us: yet was voluntarily performed by them of the devouter ſort, as appeares by Saint Chryſoſtome, tom. vi. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . who cals them there 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that did it, in oppoſition to cold careles worſhippers:) and the like: And ſhould now ſee holy Bibles prophanely toſſed up and downe as they are; ordinarie men entring into Churches, with ſuch geſture and countenance, rather as if they entred with authoritie to diſpoſſeſſe God, then to humble themſelves before him; and in time of divine ſervice carrying themſelves in them accordingly; moreover, divers making no conſcience to doe that about and againſt conſecrated walls of Churches, which common civilitie doth prompt us to forbeare about private houſes, thoſe of our betters at leſt; certainely he would hardly be brought to beleeve that things ſo contrary could proceed from men of the ſame Religion; or rather indeed, to beleeve; that men that had any ſenſe of any religion at all, be it what it will, could be ſo ſecurely and ſenſeleſly prophane. However, though it bee not unlikely in this atheiſticall age, that many doe it becauſe they have ſaid in their hearts that there is no God; and in this ſacrilegious age of purpoſe, becauſe it concernes their profit and ungodly deſignes, that conſecrated places bee made common, and profaned; Yet God forbid wee ſhould judge ſo uncharitably of all that offend in this kind; but rather judge and beleeve, that it is nothing elſe but the power of cuſtome, and the want of due conſideration, that leads them into it, and makes them inſenſible of their impietie. One thing I am ſure of, what ever wee thinke of the buſines, that Turkes and Pagans (what advantages ſoever wee have over them in other reſpects:) may ſooner hope to bring us in time to their religion, by their outward apparant reverence and devotion in duties of religion; then we hope ever by all our knowledge to doe good upon them, as long as wee continue ſo prophane. I preſſe it the more, that the power of cuſtome, which makes us ſo unſenſibly (though otherwiſe, I make no queſtion, many of us affectionately deſiring the converſion of Iewes and Gentiles:) to paſſe over all theſe conſiderations, and to doe ſtill what we have done, bee it right or wrong, may the better appeare.

So much being ſpoken hitherto of the power of cuſtome in matters of religion, and having ſufficiently (as I conceive) ſhewed it here alſo to bee great; wee are now (according to the method that wee have followed in the two former parts:) to proceed to the conſideration of the validitie of it, according to right and reaſon; and that both in point of doctrine, and in point of practiſe; that is, in the agendis and the credendis (for there is no Religion but hath theſe two parts:) of Religion. And herein as of my ſelfe I am very willing to be but ſhort; ſo when I conſider the things themſelves, I doe not ſee that I ſhall need to be very long. For Religion, though it goe beyond Nature and policie very farre, yet it is grounded in part upon the ſame foundations, as both Nature and policie are. As for example; particulars in things naturall, muſt yeeld and conforme to the generall if need bee, though it be againſt their owne particular nature. So water to prevent a vacuum; and the like. A maine ground of policie, Salus populi ſuprema lex eſto. So in matter of Chriſtianitie too: as it is, fully both and very elegantly, expreſſed by Saint Chryſoſtome in theſe words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . This is the rule of perfect Chriſtianitie, this the utmoſt bounds, (or, exact definition:) this the higheſt top of it, to ſeeke thoſe things that are profitable to the publicke. Many things therefore formerly delivered, are here applyable. But yet to expreſſe my ſelfe ſomewhat more particularly herein alſo, we thus briefly;

Firſt, In thoſe things that are of the very ſubſtance of religion, and trench upon the principall end of it, whether in matter of practiſe or doctrine, cuſtome is not conſiderable.

The end, as all men know that are wiſe, is the principall thing in all things. And to this purpoſe is Ariſtotles doctrine in the firſt of his Ethicks of difference of ends, ſome principall and abſolute (which in his phraſe wee may call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 :) ſome ſecondarie and ſubordinat, of very good uſe and moment. In the holy Scriptures, though a man meete with many changes, varieties, and alterations, according to varietie of times and places; yet hee that ſhall read and obſerve them with due care and diligence, may obſerve the great things of the Law, as one of the Prophets cals them; or as it is in the New Teſtament, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the weightier matters of the Law, to be ſtill the ſame. Theſe to underſtand truely, and carefully to practiſe, is true Religion both and happines.

Secondly, In things externall conducing more or leſſe (ſo they conduce, though but in a leſſe degree; and not croſſe directly:) to the maine end, ſuperiors may yeeld, ſometimes if they ſee occaſion; and inferiors if wiſe and rationall, muſt alwayes ſubmit unto cuſtome; though otherwiſe of it ſelfe, perchance, not ſo fit and commendable.

Superiors cannot propoſe unto themſelves a better example to imitate, then God himſelfe. God did indulge many things unto the Iewes, which otherwiſe hee would not have liked, becauſe they had beene long uſed to the ſuperſtitions of the Aegyptians. So ſay divers of the Fathers; and rightly, I thinke: and this in God, they call properly, his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or condeſcention. Of Chriſt and his Apoſtles ſomething might bee ſaid, and hath beene ſaid by others to this purpoſe. But certaine it is, that the ancient Fathers of the Primitive Church, men Apoſtolicall, and others (as it is acknowledged by all men that know any thing of Antiquitie:) in inſtituting rites and ceremonies Eccleſiaſticall, had great reſpect unto thoſe rites and cuſtomes, whether ſacred or Civill, that the firſt Chriſtians had beene uſed unto, before their converſion unto Chriſtianiſme. Now if this courſe bee warrantable; where the change is abſolute from one Religion to another; it muſt needs bee more plauſible and expedient in point of reformation; wherein the more we yeeld unto cuſtome in things not ſo ſubſtantiall, the more likely wee are to ſpeed in the redreſſe of more materiall abuſes. As for inferiors, to them properly belong the words of Saint Auguſtine, In iis rebus de quibus nihil ſtatuit ſcriptura divina, mos populi Dei, vel inſtituta majorum pro lege tenenda ſunt. In thoſe things that are not apparantly contrary to the word of God, for private men, though otherwiſe upon grounds never ſo plauſible to oppoſe their opinion to either cuſtome or authoritie, whereby the peace of the Church may bee in danger; though it may goe for zeale in this World, yet certainely in the world to come, and before an higher Iudge, it will be found (and for ſuch puniſhed, I feare) either groſſe wilfull Ignorance, or extreme arrogancie.

Thirdly, In matters of doctrine and truth, though every truth bee precious of itſelfe, and ever to be preferred before any privat ends, yet all truth is not alwayes ſeaſonable to be divulged, where the error is generall, and cannot bee oppoſed without much ſcandall.

As there be cuſtomes in matter of action, ſo in matter of opinion too; ſince (as hath beene ſhewed:) opinions goe by cuſtome, as much as any thing: Whence it is that in the Ius Orientale, you ſhall find 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or, cuſtomes divided into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is cuſtomes in point of doctrine, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , cuſtomes in point of diſcipline, or practice; that is, rites and ceremonies. In matter of opinion then the power of cuſtome is in ſome degree conſiderable, as well as in other things. Civilians tell us, that Error aliquando jus facit; and our common Lawyers alſo; that a Common error by their Law, for publicke quiets ſake goeth for a Law. Finch of Law, p. 40. I will not ſtand to examine upon what ground they ſpeake it; becauſe I doe not meane to ground upon them; though I could not but take notice of their words by the way. Nolite ſanctum canibus; and, keepe thy faith to thy ſelfe, (not generally to be underſtood, wee doe not meane, but in ſome caſes onely:) and ſome other ſuch paſſages, are more to our purpoſe by farre, then any thing that the Law either common or Civill can tell us. But the argument is tickliſh. I leave the reſt to the Angelicall Doctor in his 22ae. q. 43. a. 7. Vtrum bona ſpiritualia ſint propter ſcandalum dimittenda. So farre at leaſt, I could wiſh al men would take it to heart, as not eaſily for their owne onely privat ends and purpoſes (as many are ready to doe:) to vent abroad either old things juſtly and legally antiquated; or new things of their owne deviſing (the unhappy fruits of extravagant braines:) that may any wiſe tend to innovation, and to the prejudice of publicke tranquility.

My concluſion is this, That it is the part of a wiſe rationall man, as to conſider diligently how farre forth cuſtome both in matter of Religion and in other things is conſiderable, leſt hee trouble himſelfe and others without cauſe: So to conſider as diligently wherein it is altogether againſt reaſon, leſt conforming to the vulgar in thoſe things, hee himſelfe become one of them; that is, a man that is led by cuſtome and not by reaſon; which is as much (if we may ſpeake freely:) as if we ſaid, a thing that hath the ſhape of a man, but may more truly & properly be called abrute. And becauſe this cannot be done without much labour and ſearch, I muſt exhort all men that thinke truth and reaſon ſo much worth, to ſpare no paines, no ſtudie, if they meane to ſpeed. It is true, we live in an age, when Idleneſſe is ſo much in faſhion among all ſorts of men, that it is a hard thing for any man of what profeſsion ſoever, to bee induſtrious more then ordinary, and not to ſuffer, even in his reputation, for it. Which cannot but bee a great diſcouragement unto many, who otherwiſe as rationall men, have a good mind to improove themſelves in their better part. But let them propoſe unto themſelves the examples of men famous in former ages for their indefatigablenes in this kind; and let them conſider withall, that the reward is great. Though they adſpire not to bee famous in the World, nor ever live to benefit others by their paines (which nevertheles all good men muſt propoſe unto themſelves, if it may be:) yet they ſhall not looſe the fruit of their labours. If others doe not, yet themſelves (which is the maine:) ſhall reape them. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , for it is the priviledge (as is obſerved by ſome of the ancient worthies:) of a ſoule that is reaſonable, (a rationall man, he meanes;) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ( 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 :) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : that whereas plants, trees, and other creatures, that are not reaſonable, beare unto others, and not for themſelves, ſhee reapes her owne fruites; and whenſoever, or whereſoever her life doth end, be it ſooner, or later, ſhe may have her owne end nevertheleſſe. With which words, wee ſhall here end.