The first part of the disquisition of truth, concerning political affaires Handled in two seuerall sections. The first whereof (by way of certaine questions probleme-wise propounded and answered) consisteth of foureteene chapters. Written by Henry Wright.

❧ THE FIRST PART OF THE DISQVISITION OF TRVTH, Concerning Politicall Affaires.

SECT. I. CAP. I.

Of Religion, and the force thereof: whereupon, and how it commeth to paſſe that there be ſuch, and ſo many, diuerſities, and differences, of Opinions, concerning the ſame.

It may bee demanded wherefore the wiſeſt Licurgus. Solon. Epaminondas, Numa, Xenophon. Lawgiuers did euer concluſionally determine, that the care of Religion, and all holy things ſhould belong vnto the Prince?

WAs it becauſe they thought it fit, that that which was Diogenes apud Stobaeum. beſt, and moſt worthy to bee had in honour, ſhould bee honoured of the beſt, and him who bare the chiefeſt rule in the Monarchy, or State? Or was it rather, becauſe they wiſely conſidered, that Xenophon Paedia Cyri. l. 8. if their Subiects feared God, they would bee the more loath to do any thing which might redound to the hurt of one another, or attempt any thing againſt the Prince? Or was it not for theſe cauſes alone, but rather likewiſe, Ariſt. Rhet. ad Alex. for the augmenting and enlarging of their Empire and Dominions, as though the Diuine Powers were more prone, propitious, and fauourable, towards thoſe that ſerue them, then vnto any others? Or to conclude, was it for the generall good of a Common-wealth, as a certaine Lactantius de ira Cap. 12 • . Diuine plainely proteſted, who held that Religion, and the Feare of God, were the ſureſt bands for conſeruing of Humane Society?

It may further bee demanded, how farre a Prince ought to take care of matters concerning Religion?

OVght hee (as ſome do thinke) to take care for the examination of the truth or falſhood of that Religion which hee profeſſeth, and in all Eccleſiaſticall matters to take vpon him to bee chiefe Iudge and Determiner of them, according to his owne municipall Lawes? Or ought hee rather (as others imagine) to bee a defender onely of that Religion which formerly hath beene receiued, or afterwards is propounded or obtruded vnto him?

The opinion of all Princes and States not ſubiect to the Pope. This latter may be thought an vniuſt limitation, that any Prince, or State, ſhould bee ſo curbed: and as touching the former, The opinion of the Church of Rome and her adh • rents. others thinke that a Prince hath no free power, or authority, to conſtitute or determine Eccleſiaſticall buſineſſe, but that by bare permiſſion onely, hee may haue a meere inſpection into them: Which monſtrous Opinion, in a Treatiſe (almoſt ready to come forth) I haue reſuted: Euidently prouing that the Church, being a part of the State, it cannot bee without apparant danger to the ſame, to admit of forraigne Iuriſdiction in managing matters Eccleſiaſticall, but that ſuch affaires ought alwaies to bee ordered by thoſe who beare the Soueraignety, or ſome other, by their appointment, within the ſame State.

It may bee further demanded, wherefore the Liu. lib. 7. hiſt. Rom. Romanes alwaies confeſſed and acknowledged that they were more obliged and indebted to Numa then to Romulus.

THis queſtion (Right Honourable) out of the Romanes owne Hiſtory is thus reſolued: Affirming that Romulus (though founder of their Citty) left little or nothing vnto them, but their names to be called Romanes: But Numa (being the chiefe bringer in of Religion) perpetuated the ſame, and ſeemed to giue vnto them their very eſſence and being, and (as it were) to cauſe the proſperous ſucceſſe of their State. For Romulus (ſaith the Hiſtory) brought in the forme of a Common wealth, which was likely not to be durable, but might end with himſelfe: But his Succeſſor Numa, vpon the bringing in the continuall practiſe and exerciſe of Religion, did in ſuch wiſe forme and frame the Common-wealth, that though himſelfe ſhould ſhortly die, yet there was left an euident meane and way to make it durable for many ages.

To the ſame purpoſe it may be demanded, wherefore the Liu. lib. 10. Hiſt. Rom. Romanes did make more account of Religion then all other Nations?

VVAs it becauſe they plainely ſaw, that the ſetling Religion in the State, was the firmeſt prop they could rely vpon, for the vpholding, conſeruing, and perpetuating of their Commonwealth, and that it would ſerue moſt fitly for the bringing in of Military Diſcipline, and Armes, to which they were moſt addicted, and without which they iudged their State could not ſtand? Or was it rather, for that they vnder this pretence (as thoſe who knew how to (make vſe of Religion) did practiſe it ore fortunately, and with better ſucceſſe then others, to retaine and keepe thoſe which were good in their allegeance and obedience, and to curbe and reſtraine thoſe who were ill diſpoſed from committing euill, or perſiſting and continuing in their lewd courſes: as likewiſe to Liu. lib. 3. Circa legem Terentillam. pacifie the ſeditious, Liu. lib. 3. circa creationem tribulorum plebis conſulari dignitate. reconcile ſuch Subiects as were iuſtly offended and grieued, with the Rulers and the gouernment, Liu. lib. 5. retaine their Military Diſcipline, and keep their Souldiers in good order, Liu. lib. 10. get credite and authority to their Commanders: enterpriſe warres, and to bring them to a happy end?

Againe, it may bee demanded to the ſame purpoſe, wherefore the Romanes, euen in their greateſt ſtreights and difficulties did rather vſe the pretext and colour of religion, to expedite and helpe themſelues, then any other meanes whatſoeuer.

WAs it becauſe Franciſe. Guicciardin. they were perſwaded that the Common-people did rather iudge by the ſhadowes then the ſubſtances of things? Or was it not for that cauſe alone, but rather for that they found by experience, that men are more throughly moued, and thinke themſelues faſter tyed vpon an Liu. lib. 3. oath taken (which hath his dependancie vpon Religion) then by any Lawes or Statutes whatſoeuer?

It may further bee demanded wherefore in former times men (generally) were more religious then they are in theſe dayes?

WAs it becauſe that in thoſe elder times there was not that contempt of Religion, and neglect of God & his ſeruice, as is now in theſe moderne dayes? Or was it rather, becauſe in thoſe more happy times, it was held altogether vnlawfull for any man to make what conſtruction he liſt of an oath when hee had taken it, and thereout to frame rules of liuing to himſelfe, according to his owne liking; but to faſhion his life and manners rather to ſuch lawes as were giuen, and impoſed vpon him to obſerue?

It may finally be demanded, wherefore (ſeeing there is but one truth) there are at this day ſo many and ſundry opinions about Religion, euen among Chriſtians themſelues.

IS it becauſe the Clergie themſelues in diuers poynts diſagree, being diſtracted into factions, and writing and diſputing one againſt another; which the rude and ignorant multitude once ſeeing, do thereby take vpon them to diſpute of Diuinitie, to eſtabliſh their fond and fooliſh opinions in matters of Religion, which in no wiſe belonged vnto them to meddle withall? Or may it bee, for that ſometime yong Schollers, either in yeares, learning or diſcretion taking vpon them to preach, teach, or write, doe propound falſe or vnſound Doctrine to the people: whoſe corrupt opinions once ſet abroach (as though it were a ſhame for them to change them vpon more mature deliberation into better) do continually beſtirre themſelues, and employ their wits, rather to confirme, then amend their errors? Or is this the reaſon rather, for that the followers of any Sect whatſoeuer, ſtudy to tread in their firſt Teachers ſteps, and obſerue ſuch courſes and cuſtomes as formerly haue beene preſcribed vnto them?

SECT. I. CHAP. II.

Of the beſt forme of a Commonwealth.

It may bee demanded, wherefore according to many mens opinions, the Monarchy, or ſole rule of one, ought to be preferred before other formes of gouernement?

IS it becauſe that Cic. de legibus lib. 3. Iuſtinus H • ſtoricus lib. 1 in initio. Monarchy is the moſt ancient kinde of gouernment, ſeeing that the name of Monarchy and Empire was firſt in the world? Or is it becauſe this kinde of gouernement beſt agreeth to Salust in Epiſtolis. nature, as is to be ſeene by all, or the moſt of all other creatures, in whom this image and ſhadow of one to rule ouer the reſt may plainly appeare? Or is it becauſe it is moſt agreeable to Tacit. 1. Annal reaſon, that the body of an Empire being but one, ſhould likewiſe be ſwayed by the diſcretion of one ſole Ruler? Or is this rather the reaſon, becauſe that neither in a Tacit. 4. Annal popular eſtate, where many gouerne, nor in an Ariſtocracie, where a few ſway the ſcepter, there can be poſsible any long concord and agreemēt among them? Or is it becauſe that both in Tacit. 1. Annal Liu. lib. 5. Democracies and Ariſtocracies it hath bin euer obſerued, 〈2 pages missing〉 euer great ſtore of good wits, which may bee fitted and accomodated to all times and occaſions, better then other formes of gouernement? Or might this rather bee their reaſon, becauſe they obſerued that this forme of gouernement was not ſo ſubiect to Ariſt. Polit. 5. alteration, or to grow into tyranny? For to ſpeake as they would haue the thing to be, The opinion of Machiauel, lib. 1. Diſputat. Cap. 5. though theſe few of the Clariſsimi who ſway the gouernement, be naturally ambitious; notwithſtanding when they ſee and conſider that all the authoritie is in their owne hands, and by reaſon thereof that they ſurpaſſe and excell the reſt of their people, they content themſelues (for the moſt part) with this prerogatiue, and ſo raiſe no tumults, or ſtirre vp any troubles whereby the Common-wealth might bee vexed or diſquieted for their ambitious humors.

And thus (Right Honorable) you ſee how that as euery one moſt fancied and affected this, or that kinde of gouernement: ſo they yeelded reaſons for the maintaining of their opinions? Wherein (in my conceit) they haue miſt the Cuſhion, and vpon good grounds (as I hope) I may argue againſt them all. And thus for Argument ſake I reaſon againſt their Monarchy.

Euery Monarch is either tied to rule, according to the lawes of the kingdome hee poſſeſſeth, or he is not; If he be not bound, then all men will confeſſe with me, that that Monarchy may eaſily degenerate, and grow into tyranny. But if the Monarch bee tied to obſerue lawes, nothing letteth (notwithſtanding) but that forme of Commonwealth may not bee durable, eſpecially when the kingdome commeth by ſucceſſion. Dantes Poeta Ital •• . For very ſeldome falleth it out, that to a wiſe and godly Father, a Sonne of that ſtampe, and endowed with like vertues, ſhould ſucceed. Now, whenas by the peruerſe, careleſſe, or bad carriage of the Monarch toward his people, the manners of his ſubiects are once corrupted, it muſt of neceſſitie follow, that either the lawes are of ſmall force, or none at all. And ſo farewell to that forme of gouernment.

Againſt their Democracie, I this auerre, or (rather) finally determine, That if any good Councels or Decrees come from the people, they proceed from them rather by meere chance, and accidentally, then for any prime or principall intention of the Councellers. For the people being driuen by ſome extreame neceſsity, to runne ſuch and ſuch courſes, or put in practiſe thoſe or theſe counſels, or being furthered by ſome memorable accident falling out in the nicke (as we ſay) may oftentimes decree things well and wiſely, otherwiſe it is impoſsible for them ſo to doe? For they know not (for the moſt part) what they would haue, they aske what they know not, and when they haue obtained what they asked, by and by they ſpurne, kicke at it, and deſpiſe it: ſo that the prouerbe in them, and of them, is true, and euer will bee verified; The people is a beaſt of many heads, wauering and enuious. So that I may very ſafely conclude, that this forme of gouernment is worſt of all.

Againſt the State Ariſtocraticall, I this affirme, that experience hath made it manifeſt to the world, that thoſe, who for a while haue iuſtly and vprightly gouerned the Common-wealth, not long after haue abuſed their power and authority to the gathering of riches, and getting poſſeſſions of lands into their hands, inſomuch that they haue growne ambitious, earneſtly thirſting after priuate reuenge, and the fulfilling of their owne filthy luſts and appetites, as appeared plainly in the Ariſtocracie of the Romanes, when after they grew weary to be gouerned by Conſuls, and had ſet vp the Decemvirate, in the beginning of the ſecond yeare of their gouernment, they were inforced to change that ſtate into a Democracie, becauſe the Decemviri ruled ſo villanouſly. Againe, it is recorded by antiquitie, that the ſonnes of vertuous parents, who were, and did ſucceede in diuers gouernements, became extreame inſolent, common letchers, and ſpend-thrifts of thoſe patrimonies which their carefull parents had left vnto them: Vpon which grounds I conclude, That the Ariſtocraticall gouernment cannot ſtand long firme, and ſtable, much leſſe to bee permanent and durable.

Theſe things then being, as I haue ſaid, and conſidering that euery forme of gouernmēt is ſo ſubiect to change & alteration, it were welworth the labour to make a true Diſquiſition of this nice point, to wit, what forme of gouernment were fitteſt for euery Kingdome and Country, whereby the welfare thereof might bee procured and continued.

TO determine this queſtion (Right Honourable) were a very hard taske to be vndertaken and performed of any man, yet becauſe I haue taken vpon to diſcourſe of this ſubiect, I will in briefe ſhow your Lordſhip my opinion therein.

And firſt, I am verily perſwaded, that this, or that forme of gouernement, whether already eſtabliſhed, or to be brought in, and eſtabliſhed, in any Kingdome or Country, doth chiefly depend vpon the nature and diſpoſition of that Kingdome or Country, into which it hath bene already, or is to be brought: For it would be a very hard matter to bring a free forme of gouernment into that Country, who haue bene vſed to liue vnder a Monarch, as contrariwiſe, to reduce that people, to liue vnder the obedience and command of one abſolute Ruler, who haue vſed to liue free of thēſelues, & to bee gouerned by their owne Lawes. The Eaſterne Countries not enduring to brooke the Ariſtocraticall or Democraticall State, were euer deuoted to liue vnder one ſole Monarch. On the other ſide, no forme of gouernment would pleaſe the Athenians and Heluetians (whom at this day wee call Switzers) but a Democracy: None the Lacedaemonians but an Ariſtocracy. The Syracuſians affected a tyranicall forme of gouernement: Neither could any of theſe people euer bee perſwaded to forſake that forme of gouernment which they had once choſen: Nay, which is more, they did with ſuch deadly and implacable hatred, proſecute all thoſe who erected, or ſet vp any other kinds of Policies to bee gouerned, and to gouerne by, that whereſoeuer, and whenſoeuer, they became Conquerours, they altered and abrogated, that forme of Gouernement, and brought in their owne forme.

Secondly, I vtterly deny all right formes of Common-wealthes, as the Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy, to bee abſolute and perfect: much leſſe do I hold that any goodneſſe can be in a Tyranie, Oligarchy, or Ochlocracy; For theſe laſt related, by reaſon of the multitude of euils which accompany them, are of, and in themſelues alwaies euill, the Magiſtrates neuer regarding the common-good but their owne ends: The former likewiſe, although in themſelues they are good (for that in all of them, the chiefe good of the Common-wealth, or State, either is, or ought to be ſought) yet accidentally, they many times become euill; as well for that they laſt not long, as that they ſo eaſily degenerate.

To conclude therefore, I hold that forme of Common-wealth to bee beſt, which is compounded of the temper of all theſe, or at leaſtwiſe is ſo mixed of a Monarchy and Ariſtocracy, that one (indeed) for the Maieſty of the State ſhould bee the chiefe Commander, but his power ſhould be gouerned, and his Councels ordered by the decrees and wiſedome of the Senate: For by this meanes, the Prince ſhould retaine his ſplendor and dignity, the Senate their power and authority, and the people their lawfull liberty.

SECT. I. CHAP. III.

Of the Prince, Court, and Courtiers, &c.

It may bee demanded why priuate men, can neuer well and rightly iudge of the affaires of Princes?

IS it becauſe they exactly Guicchardine. know not the matters of State, the ends of Princes, or how farre this, or that buſineſſe, effected, or neglected, doth concerne them? Or may this rather bee the reaſon that Idem. foraſmuch as the counſels, purpoſes, and deſignes of Princes, differ ſo farre from the drifts and courſes of priuate men, it is impoſſible that the ſelfe-ſame proiects ſhould be auaileable to them both? For it (moſt what) ſo falleth out, that although matters of State, determinations of buſineſſes, and the commodities or diſcommodities which may be expected to ariſe thereof, ſhould be knowne as well to priuate men, as to Princes themſelues, their applications, cenſures, and iudgements, notwithſtanding touching the premiſſes, would be diuers, as their firſt ends and intentions were, which they had propounded to themſelues.

In the next place it may bee demanded, wherefore, as wee commonly reade in Hiſtories, as out of Tacitus and others, that that man, whoſe aide and helpe a Prince hath made vſe of bring him to the Crowne, within a while after is neither liked nor loued of that Prince, but either is fed with the ſmoake of innouation, or made ſhorter by the head?

IS it becauſe that ſome Princes being naturally ſuſpicious, do eſteeme the faith of thoſe to be fickle to them, which they haue proued to haue beene to the damage of others? Or is not that the reaſon, but this rather, that the very ſight of them whoſe helpe they haue vſed to their riſing, groweth idious vnto them, for that it ſeemeth to vp-braide them with the baſeneſſe of their former meane fortunes? Or may it not be ſo neither, but for that it is Philipus Cominaeus. grieuous vnto ſome Princes to remember that they owe any thing, or that they are any waies beholding to their Subiects?

It may further bee demanded, how that Prince, who hath bereaued another of his Kingdome, might behaue himſelfe to enioy his new-got Empire with ſafety?

SShall hee effect this, if hee This was the errour of Seruius Tullius King of the Romanes, whō Tarquinius Superbus ſlew. affect him whom he hath ſo ſpoyled, with new fauours and benefites, endeuouring thereby to reconcile him, and binde him faſt vnto him? But it is to bee feared, that old iniuries will hardly bee forgotten, by collating and beſtowing of new benefites vpon the wronged, eſpecially if the greatneſſe of the iniuries, exceede the rate of the benefites, as it falleth out commonly in the caſe of Kingdomes. Or ſhall he bring this about the rather, if he This was the practiſe of Selimus, the Turkiſh Emperor, who being but a yonger brother, poyſoned Baiazet his father, made away Corcut and Acomat his two brethren, &c. So dealt Rich. the 3. with his two nephewes the ſonnes of Edward the 4. with the Duke of Buckingham likewiſe, and others. murther, and kill, all thoſe whom he imagineth to ſtand in his way, or whom hee ſtandeth in doubt of, leaſt in time they may become his enemies? But if he take theſe courſes, he muſt needs fall into ſome great miſchiefe; for he ſhall ingulfe himſelfe in the vaſt Ocean of the peoples hatred, and thereby weaken his owne power againſt the time he ſhould haue moſt occaſion to vſe it.

It may further bee demanded, why it ſo much importeth Princes, and great men, to be cautelous that they do not iniury, or reproach any man?

IS it for that hee who is wronged of thoſe who are in Philipus Cominaeus. eminent place, and authority, perceiuing himſelfe to bee daily and hourely ſhot at, and noted for the ſame, grieueth the more therat, and ſo ſets vp his reſt to take a ſharp reuenge? Or ought they to be cautelous for this cauſe likewiſe, Cominaeus. leaſt if the wronged hauing formerly retained vnto them, or made any dependency vpon them, ſhold vpon any truſt committed vnto him, pay them home, in neglecting, or vtterly ouerthrowing their chiefeſt buſineſſes?

It may further be demanded, why it greatly importeth a Prince, to bee Vertuous, Honourable of his word, iuſt, and of good Example among all men, as well Forreigners, as Domeſtiques?

IS it for that he may be thought vnfit Xenophon in Paedia Cyri. to gouern, who is not better euery way then thoſe who are to bee gouerned? Or is it not for that cauſe onely, but for that Sen. 1. de Clementia. his good name and fame likewiſe at home, and abroad is greatly blemiſhed and ſtained, if the courſe of his life and dealings bee not currant? Or ought hee to bee ſuch an one for the better ſtabliſhing of his Kingdome alſo? Sen. Thieſt. For where there is no ſhame, care of doing of Iuſtice, Sanctity, Piety, & keeping of promiſe, thatkingdom muſt needs bee vnſtable, and the State tottering.

It may be the ſame purpoſe further demanded, why a Prince ought to be iuſt, to make ſpeciall reckoning of the adminiſtration thereof equally to his Subiects, ey, to do iuſtice vpon himſelfe, if hee deſire to be held for a good Prince?

IS it for that Plato in Polit. a Lawleſſe Principallity, and looſe gouernement is yrkſome to euery one (eſpecially of the better ſort) ſo that they do not delight, or haue any deſire to liue vnder it? Or is it for that the conſtant and ſtrict obſeruation, and adminiſtration of Iuſtice, doth ſtabliſh and ſtrengthen a Kingdome, as the Cic. Parad. Oratour well perceiued, who ſaid that Iuſtice and Equity were the true conſeruators of Common-wealthes and Cities? Or is it not onely for that iuſtice doth ſtabliſh a Kingdome, but for that it doth truely make a kingdome to be a Kingdome, giuing vnto it his very eſſence and being, whereby it is, that which it is? For take away Iuſtice, and what are Kingdomes but great Robberies? as well ſaid the Auguſt. de Ciuil. Dei lib. 4. learned Diuine.

It may further be demanded, why many Princes are very fearefull, ſuſpicious, and iealous of their eſtates?

IS it becauſe that Attius. Kingdomes are commonly ſubiect to treacheries? Or is this rather the reaſon, for that the Sen. Oedip. nature of moſt Princes is prone to feare, and be iealous of their Eſtates? as well ſaid the Poet, Sen. in Agam. Kingdomes and Mariages brooke no riuals.

It may further bee demanded, wherefore all credit, countenance, honors, and authority in Court, are for the moſt part ſlippery, and not to be truſted vnto?

HAppeneth it thus by reaſon of the Fates vncertainty (as it pleaſeth the Tacit. 3. Annalium. Hiſtorian to ſet downe) who auerreth, that Court-fauours, euen by decree of the deſtinies, are not alwaies laſting? Or might this rather be the reaſon, for that Tacit. 17. Annalium. Courtiers credites are (commonly) vpheld by others, and not by their owne ſtrengths? Or not ſo neither, but for that theſe things thus fall out through the fault of the Princes, their Maiſters, whom they ſerue, whoſe wils and pleaſures as they are Saluſt. Iugurth. vehement for the time, ſo they are very changeable, and oftentimes contrary to themſelues?

Seeing that the Sen. in Hippolito. Court is ſo ſlippery a place, that a man ſhall hardly get faſt footing: It may fitly bee demanded, by what Compaſſe a Courtier ſhould ſaile, that hee may bee without all danger of ſhipwracke, whereby either his life may bee hazarded, his goods diminiſhed, or his honour blemiſhed?

SHall he attaine vnto thoſe ends, if he ſhow himſelfe dutifull, obſequious, and reſpectiue of his Prince, as it pleaſed the Tacit. 1. Annal. Hiſtorian to affirme? For by how much the ſeruant in the iudgement of his Maiſter, ſhall bee held more deſirous and ready to pleaſe him, then another ſhall; by ſo much the more hee ſhall bee aduanced to honours and riches? Or may hee compaſſe his deſires the better, if he be The ſaying of Conſtantine the Great. ſeruiceable likewiſe, and not like the moathes, and caterpillars of the Court? Or may hee rather further his intents, if he be bold ſpirited alſo? For ſhamefaſtneſſe is an ill ſeruitour in a Princes Palace, as well ſaid the Sen. in Hippol. Poet. Or ſhall he be cautelous likewiſe, taking heed that whatſoeuer he well doth or performeth, he do it as Velleius. 11. though he ſeemed not to do it, and without boaſting or bragging? Or (to auoid enuy) ſhall he learne to Tacit. 16. Annal. diſſemble, cloake, and obſcure his owne vertues, and proper gifts? Or ſhall hee, being any wayes aduanced by his Princes fauours, like the Moone, Tacit in Agric acknowledge (oftentimes) that he hath receiued all the light of his glory, and grace of his riſing, from that Sunne his maiſter? Or ſhall hee ſtriue and endeuour to become very Sen. 11. de ira. patient, and Sen. Hippolit. extreame wary likewiſe? He muſt be very patient, that he may beare iniuries the better, & not flie out, or run into paſſion vpon euery croſſe he ſhall meet withall, or ſuch diſtaſtes as ſhall be giuen him. He muſt bee cautelous, leaſt he be taken in the traps of his fained friends, or ſecret, or open profeſſed enemies.

It may further be demanded, why it is better to liue with, and ſerue a prudent and wiſe Prince, then a fooliſh?

IS it becauſe that a Philip. Cominaeus. lib. 4. fooliſh Prince being (for the moſt part) very ſuſpitious, thinketh that euery of his ſeruants goeth about to deceiue him, which to an Honeſt minde muſt needes be a great erroſiue? Or is it for that a Idem ibidem. fooliſh Prince not vnderſtanding his owne affaires, cannot make difference of good ſeruice from bad, whereupon it commeth to paſſe, that his loue is turned into hatred, and his hatred into loue in a moment? Or is it not for theſe reaſons onely, but for this likewiſe, that Phil. Com. lib. 4. thoſe ſeruants which liue vnder a wiſe Prince, haue moe meanes affoorded them to retaine their maiſters fauour, if they once haue had it, or to recouer it if they haue loſt it, then it is poſſible they can haue, who liue vnder an Ideot, or fooliſh Prince? For no man almoſt dealeth in any thing with the Prince himſelfe, but with his This was wel ſeene in the Duke of little Brittaine, who vſed onely Peter Landoys. ſeruants, whom he changeth as often as he putteth on a cleane ſhirt.

To the ſame purpoſe it may further be demanded wherefore (notwithſtanding) many Courtiers haue rather choſen to liue in the Courts of ſome great Prince, though a foole, then in the Palace of a leſſe potent Prince, though neuer ſo wiſe.

IS it becauſe that Lucas de Penna. it is true libertie (as ſome ſuppoſe) to liue vnder the command of a potent Prince? Or is it rather, as others affirme, for that Egiſippus cum alijs, vt refert Guic. the ſeruitors ſeruices are graced and beautified by the greatneſſe and ſuper-eminent dignitie of their maiſters?

Seeing that none are borne Artiſts it may be demanded, what manner of Courtier is to be deemed and eſteemed to be the better Crafts-maiſter in managing affaires of State?

IS he the man who is Guicchard. furniſhed with the knowledge of diuers tongues, well ſeene in Hiſtories of the lawes of his owne and other Countries, that is religious, hath a quicke wit, a ripe iudgement, a fluent tongue, a graue ſtile, & is an excellent pen-man? Or is he rather to be ſo accounted, who is Guic. & Tacit 3. Annal. ſmooth-tongued; gorgeouſly apparrelled, a great feaſt-maker, an artificiall coſouner, a deepe diſſembler, a whoore-maiſter, tale-bearer, flatterer, a priuy-whiſperer, and one that is giuen to all kinde of villanie?

It may further be demanded, what might bee the beſt meanes wherby Princes may free themſelues, from being abuſed by flatterie?

MAy they effect this if they beware and take heed that they Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 22. cap. 8 grow not into contempt with their people? Or ſhall they bring their purpoſe better about, if they ſit often in counſell, and touching thoſe things which they propound to be conſulted vpon, doe ſhew themſelues Plut. Apotheg. patient in hearing the truth, that their people may vnderſtand that they will not be offended, if they freely ſpeake their mindes, and confidently deliuer that which is true? Or may this likewiſe further their intents, if vpon the Machiauel his doctrine in his Prince. Cap. 23. perceiuing and finding out of ſome or other, who for ſome ſiniſter reſpects (though towards themſelues) haue held their peace, or forborne to ſpeake the truth, they do either ſhew themſelues to be greatly offended with them, or ſeuerely puniſh them?

SECT. I. CHAP. IIII.

Of a Kingdome: How it may be got, how kept, how it may be increaſed, how it may be made laſting or durable: And laſtly, how it may bee loſt, or ouer-throwne by hatred, contempt, &c.

It may be demanded, by what wayes and meanes any Principalitie may be gotten, or conquered.

IS it to be atchieued by Quintus Curtius. lib. 6. forraigne Armes, as it happened to Alexander, when hee had ouer-throwne Darius at Arbella? For after that victory, he neuer vſed in the full conqueſt of Aſia, or other kingdomes, any other but forraigne forces, for the moſt part. Or is it rather to be gotten by an home-bred Army, ſeconded by the vertue and the manhood of the Leaders, and Captaines, as it fell to the lot of Xenophon. Cyrus, Romulus, and Theſeus? Or may it bee attained by forraigne force alſo, ſeconded by Fortunes fauours, as it happened to Francis Sfortia, and Borgia Caeſar? Or may it bee gotten by the putting in practiſe of ſome notorious and deſperate deſigne, as it happened to Agathocles? Or may it be compaſſed by the fauour of the Citizens, as Nabides got his dominion?

In the next place it may bee demanded, how any Principality being once gotten, may be ſafely kept.

MAy this be effected if the Prince proue induſtrious, and accomodate himſelfe to make and take aduantage of ſuch accidents and occaſions as time will continually affoord him, and in all other things to imitate and follow the ſteps of his Aunceſtors? Or may it be effected, if he neuer giue any offence to thoſe, whoſe helpe he vſed in getting his dominion, but ſatisfie them according to their deſires and hopes (if it be poſſible) as they haue conceiued of their owne worths? Or may he this way rather attaine therunto, if finding treaſon intended againſt him, he ſhould moſt ſeuerely puniſh it, for terrour to the reſt? Or may it this way be effected, if vpon the obtaining of his dominion, he The barbarous and inhumane practiſe of the Turkes at euery change of Prince. deſtroy all the bloud Royall, iſſues and allies, of the former Prince, and then obſerue the Countrey cuſtomes without changing their lawes? Or may this rather bee effected, if hee that hath once gotten the ſoueraignty, remoue his ſeat thither, and make his continuall reſidence in his new dominion? Or may this yet rather bee effected, if the Prince ſend Colonies into his newgotten kingdome, or maintaine garriſons both of horſe and foote, in the frontier townes? Or may hee better bring this to paſſe, if (after conqueſt made) dealing courteouſly with them, hee retire himſelfe, and accept of an annuall penſion, in the name of a tribute, leauing onely ſome ſmall company behinde him, rather to nouriſh and encreaſe his ſubiects good opinion of him, then for any other end or purpoſe? or may he effect this the better, if he altogether ſhould change their lawes and cuſtomes, and tranſlate them to other remote places in the ſame kingdome, then thoſe which before they inhabited? or may this rather be the way to purchaſe the fauour and good opinion of the Senators, or commons, hauing them alwayes addicted to his fortunes, taking vpon him valiantly and couragiouſly to defend thoſe of his partie, againſt the other faction? or were not this the better courſe, to ſtand vpon his owne guard, hauing an army euer in a readineſſe to chaſten his ſubiects if they ſhould rebel? Or finally, what if the This did Craeſus among the Lidians, as Polib. reporteth. Conquerour ſhould diſpoyle the conquered of their weapons, and other meanes of defence or offence?

It may further be demanded, how a new got Kingdome may be enlarged?

SHall this be attained vnto, if the This was the practiſe of the Romans in ſending their Pretors. Conquerour ſhew himſelfe milde & gentle to his new ſubiects, thereby to allure the hearts of the neighbour borderers, to take a liking of his manner of gouernment? Or may it rather be effected, if This fell out in the Macedunian Monarchie. a great many of wiſe and warlike Princes do ſtil ſucceed one another in the ſelfe-ſame gouernement? Or may this be better done, if the conqueror haue a great care that Military diſcipline be alwaies vſed within his territories? Or ſhould he rather go this way to worke, to This & ſuch like practiſes were the Romanes. demoliſh the walles of the neighbour Cities, and cauſe the inhabitants to remoue their dwellings into his territories? Or ſhall he friendly inuite all ſtrangers to come into his dominions, giuing them letters of ſafe conduct, and ſecuring them of their dwelling ſafely vnder his protection? Or ſhall he combine with diuers neighbouring Cities, ioyning themſelues with them as aſſociats, ſo as the name of the Empire and gouernment, as likewiſe the authoritie of leuying of warre, may euer remaine with him, and bee proper vnto him? Or ſhall he make thoſe whom hee hath conquered to Thus dealt the Spartans, Venetians and Florentius with them whom they conquered. become vaſſals and ſlaues vnto him? Or might this be effected, if certaine Cities making The practiſe of the Switzers at this day. league among themſelues, that they will all be gouerned, and with equall dignities, and reſpect, ſhould draw in other Cities to affect that kind of gouernment, and ſo to ioyne in the ſame league and amitie with them?

It may further be demanded, which might bee the beſt way to make a ſtate durable and laſting?

SHall this be brought to paſſe, if by lawes it bee prouided for, vnder paine Capitall, that All theſe things were fore-ſeene by Lycurgus, the Laced. emonian Law-giuer. no man ſhould affect the Gouernement? Or may it better bee effected, if the Prince being ſtrong of himſelfe, ſhall yet giue teſtimony to his neighbour Princes, that hee is not ambitious, nor ſeeketh by leuying of Armes, to enlarge his Dominions to any of their detriments? Or ſhall hee doe it yet the better, if by idleneſſe, and vaine pleaſures hee ſuffer not the mindes of his ſubiects to bee corrupted, or that they ſhould grow too much effeminate?

Conſidering that Kingdomes are ſtrengthened as well by awfull Armes, as bright ſhining Vertue, it may bee demanded, by what kinde of force a Kingdome may beſt bee preſerued, and made durable.

SHall it bee made firme and ſtable by hauing an Armie euer in a readineſſe, rather to offend then defend, according to the counſell of the Emperour Seuerus; which he gaue to his ſons, Sic habetur apud Dionem in vita eius. Agree among your ſelues, enrich the Souldier, and contemne all others? Or ſhall this bee the better way to make it ſtable, if the Prince So did the Florentines to keepe Piſa and Francis Sforeia to conſerue Millaine, but not to much purpoſe. build many Forts, Towers, Citadels, Sconces, &c. within his Territories?

Seeing that hatred once conceiued againſt a Prince by his ſubiects, is the next way to bereaue him of his Crowne, it may bee demanded, how the Prince may run into ſuch hatred, and what meanes hee might beſt vſe to auoid it?

MAy hee runne into this hatred by his owne Mach. de Repub. lib. 2. boundleſſe ambition, ſeeking to bring into bondage, and the great deſires of his Cittizens to continue free? Or may hee come hated of his Subiects, by reaſon of Mach. de Repub. lib. 3. cap. 6. the iniuries hee hath offered them, either in ſeeking their liues, touching their honours, or preying vpon them for their riches? Or rather may it this way come to paſſe that hee be hated, for that he hath Cic. Phillip. 2. giuen cauſe to the Subiects to feare him, leaſt he do them a miſchiefe? For, to feare, deſire of reuenge is a perpetuall companion. And this prouerbe is moſt true, whom a man feareth, him hee hateth; whom he hateth, he would gladly bee rid of? Or may this bee the reaſon hee runneth into ſuch hatred, for that hee is Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 22. vitious; as cruell, couetous, ſacriligious, &c.

It may bee further demanded, how the inflicting of ſeuere puniſhments vpon offenders, may bee freed from hatred?

SHall the Prince free himſelfe there-from, if hee bee Sen. de Clem. ſlow to puniſh delinquents, and thereby giue teſtimony to the world, that his intent is rather to heale, and bind vp a ſoare, then to launch and make it bleed by the arme of Iuſtice? Or ſhall hee this way free himſelfe, if hee neuer puniſh, but Sen. de Clem. when the ſafety of the Common wealth calleth vpon him ſo to do, or at leaſt his Subiects be ſo perſwaded? Or ſhall hee this way rather bee freed, if hee Cic. 2. de Offic. neuer exact to take puniſhment of delinquents in an angry moode? Or may he this way auoide his Subiects hatred, if hee Sen. 1. de Clem. ſhew no • any ſignes of reioycing, when hee inflicteth puniſhment vpon offendours, as though he thirſted after bloud, or were delighted with the ſhedding of it? Or rather may this be his way, that when many haue offended, hee do not Tacit. Agric. now and then call them to account, as hee liſteth, holding them in a perpetuall feare, but take his aduantage againſt all, and puniſh all forthwith? Or rather by this way may he be freed therefrom, by not deuiſing any new kind of puniſhments, but inflicting thoſe which haue beene in vſe, according to old and ancient cuſtome of the Country? Or may he this way likewiſe free himſelfe, if hee be very ſparing in puniſhing of delinquents, and when he doth it, hee might bee thought to command it to bee inflicted againſt his will, but neuer to bee a ſpectator thereof? Or finally, may hee thus free himſelfe there-from, if to pleaſe his ſubiects, hee diuert the force of his fury another way, Tacit. 13. Annal. cauſing ſuch as haue beene his counſellours, and perſwaders to wrong the Common-wealth, to taſte the cup of his choler, by inflicting ſeuere puniſhments vpon them, or deliuering them into the peoples hands to be tormented?

It may further be demanded how a Prince may free himſelfe of that hatred which hee hath purchaſed, by vexing his Subiects with Impoſitions, Taxes, Tallages, &c. which are commonly grieuous to them to beare?

MAy this be done if the Prince perſwade the people Tacit. 13. Annal. that if they will liue in peace and out of danger, that it is altogether neceſſary they indure ſuch impoſitions, which if they ſhould not, it were impoſſible for them to liue in ſafety, or the State to bee durable? For Tacit. 4. hiſt. peace is not purchaſed but by Armes, nor Armes maintained but by Souldiers well paid, nor can the Souldier be paid without leuying of Subſidies? Or ſhall the Prince free himſelfe, if hee command the gatherers of ſuch Impoſitions, that they Idem. Ibid. neither by force, nor fraude, exact more of the Subiect, then anciently hath beene accuſtomed to be paid? Or ſhall hee rather this way auoide their hatred, if ſparingly, as iuſt occaſion inforceth him, hee impend and lay out ſuch treaſure, as hath beene leuied by Subſidies, that his Subiects may ſee and perceiue, that hee is but a Steward, for the good of the Common-wealth, and no riotous ſpender, or exhauſter of the treaſure ſo gathered: or that he hath any deſire to conuert any of it, to his owne vſe, or ends? Or ſhall hee thus rather free himſelfe, by taking of a courſe, that Plin. Paneg. iuſt and vniforme contribution be made according to euery mans ability, neuer by fauour ſparing one man, that the burthen may lye the heauier vpon another mans ſhoulders?

It may further be demanded, how, and by what meanes, a great and potent Subiect, may auoide and ſhunne, the hatred of his Prince?

MAy this be effected, if this great Noble man make himſelfe firſt odious to the people? Or ſhall hee better effect it, if hee ſhew himſelfe very dutifull and obſequious to his Prince, praiſing all his good deeds, and ſayings, and craftily diſſembling whatſoeuer is bad in him? Or ſhall hee attaine therevnto, if hee This was the practiſe of Antipater, one of Alexanders Captaines, as Q. Curt. reporteth. neuer proiect to make himſelfe great, ſtrengthen himſelfe with friends, or ſeeke to bee maiſter of greater riches, then is conuenient for his eſtate? Or if fortune haue eaſt all theſe things vpon him, that hee acknowledge continually, that hee hath receiued, gained, and gotten them, by the grace and fauour of his Prince, whoſe they are, whenſoeuer he ſhall pleaſe to make vſe of them? Or ſhall hee this way auoide his Princes diſpleaſure, if he haue a ſpeciall care to This was the practiſe of Ioab, Dauids Generall. attempt or do nothing, without conſulting with, or obtaining the conſent of his Prince, though otherwiſe hee were aſſured that hee could preuaile in his attempts, and that it would turne to the good of his Country? Or ſhall hee this way ſhunne it, if being for a certaine time made Deputy, Lieutenant General, or raiſed and euected to any other ſpeciall place and dignity, he The praictſe of Antipater and Lucius Lucullus. forth-with at the end, and expiration of his time reſigne his office to his Princes hands, and in no wiſe ſeeme to be deſirous that it be prolonged, or continued vnto him, leaſt hee ſhould ſeeme to be ſick of the ſwelling humours of Ambition? Or may hee this way auoide it, if hauing wonne, and prouing victor in diuers battels, hee impute the glory of his Conqueſts to the good fortune of his Prince, deſiring that the victorious Army may now bee led by ſome other, whom the Prince ſhall thinke good of, and retiring, put himſelfe into his Princes protection, carrying himſelfe in a moderate faſhion, as free from pride and ambition? By this onely meanes a great Generall, though ſuſpected and feared of his Prince, may ſo mollifie and lenifie his minde, that hee ſhall haue no cauſe to thinke ill of him, but ſhall make to himſelfe great and apparant reaſons to reward him for his good ſeruices.

It may further bee demanded, why euery Kingdome is ſo fickle and vnſtable?

IS it becauſe that euery Sen. Oedip. Idem. etiam Ep. xcij. Principality is the obiect of Fortune, who can neuer be daunted, but challengeth the like priuiledge againſt Empires, as Emperours. Or may this bee the reaſon rather, becauſe it is expoſed to ſuch, and ſo many hatreds, as the Tragicall Senec. Theb. Poet ſung, The Maker of the world coupled theſe two together; Hatred and a Kingdome. Or may this be the cauſe, for that it is ſubiect to ſo many Attius. treaſons, treacheries, &c. for there bee very many in a Kingdome which bee naught and vnfaithfull, few good?

To the ſame purpoſe it may bee demanded, why among the Grecians and Romanes, Senec. Theb. a Kingdom was ſo hatefull for the moſt part?

DId this come to paſſe by reaſon of the Idem Agam. manners, and crooked diſpoſitions of their Princes, who being (for the moſt part) licentiouſly giuen, thought it was a great pledge of their Kingdome, and badge of their Royaltie, that it was lawfull for them to do that which no body elſe might? Or being ſelfe-wild, or proud, Idem in Hippolito. accounted it no leſſe diſhonour vnto them, to be drawne to yeeld to any thing (though neuer ſo iuſt) againſt their wils, then to be vanquiſhed in battell? Or is not the fault ſo much in the diſpoſitions & wils of kings, as in the harſh Soluſt. ad Caeſarem. natures of the Subiects, being ſtubborne, refractary, and hardly wonne to yeeld due obedience? For no man willingly, would draw in another mans yoake.

Seeing that authority is as it were the Cicero pro Cluent. ſpirit by which euery Common-wealth is gouerned, being flatly oppoſed to contempt, which may bee called the Arist. 5. Poſit. bane and deſtruction of all Kingdomes, it may be demanded, how a Prince may behaue himſelfe, that hee neither fall into contempt amongſt his owne Subiects, or forraigne States?

SHall he effect this, if the Tacit. 11. hiſt. faſhion of his gouernement proue not too remiſſe, and gentle, whereby he may be thought to be negligent in ordering affaires of State? Or ſhall hee performe it the rather, if hee Idem Ibidem. ſhew no leuity in the forme of his gouernment, but conſtantly gouerne, according to the Lawes and Decrees of the Commonwealth? Or ſhall he effect this likewiſe, if he ſhew himſelfe firme in his purpoſes, conſtant in his promiſes, and that hee hath no Idem Ibidem. notable touch of mutability in his diſpoſition? Or ſhall hee bring this to paſſe, if (curiouſly) pondering things paſt, expending, and well weighing things preſent, and prouidently fore-ſeeing things to come, hee doe timouſly conſult, and determine, to beſtow honours on Idem Ibidem. ſuch men, as for their worth haue deſerued; not vpon euery fawning and obſequious fauourite, or ſuch as can purchaſe them with money? Or may hee doe this the better, if Fortune proue a mother vnto him, and not a ſtep-dame? Or ſhall he finally effect this likewiſe, if he firſt Tacit. 15. Annal. repreſſe his owne luſts, and inordinate affections, giuing thereby his Subiects examples to follow him in the like, and cauſing Forreigners to admire him therefore?

It may be further demanded how an Empire, or Kingdome may be finally loſt?

COmmeth it thus to paſſe, by a kind of a Tholoz. lib. 22 de repub. fatall neceſſity, when this or that State hath come

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a Councellour to a Prince to be skilfull of the cuſtomes of other nations, and to be a ſtranger in his owne Common-wealth: or ſhall he compaſſe this the better if he make choyce of Saluſt. Catil. graue and auncient men, as alſo of ſuch as haue Idem in frag. beene toſſed and tried with the variety of Fortune, hauing therby learned to carry themſelues both in weale & woe? Or laſtly, ſhall the Prince neuer admit of any for his Councellours, but ſuch as Plin. Paneg. generally are accounted wiſe and vertuous? For particular men may deceiue and bee deceiued, but no one man can deceiue all men, neither hath any man bene deceiued of all men.

Againe it may further be demanded, how a Prince may behaue himſelfe in his Conſultations, that he may grow wiſe thereby, and ſo be accounted?

SHall hee effect this, if hauing wiſe Councellours to aduiſe him, hee apt and accomodate himſelfe to follow their directions, and what they haue maturely deliberated and concluded vpon, hee forth with put in practiſe and execution? Or ſhall hee better effect this, if ſitting in Councell himſelfe, he propound, and heare them with patience and diſcretion debate the matter, and Capitolinus de Marco Antonio. neuer ſeeme to be angry, or ſtriue to maiſter and ouerrule their opinions, though they determine cleane contrarie to his owne humours, minde and deſire? Or ſhall he rather bring this to paſſe, if being able to Vigetius lib. 3. containe himſelfe, and keepe cloſe his owne Councels and intentions, he doe (indeede) propound what ought to bee done to all, or the moſt of his Counſell to conſider of; but what he will doe, to communicate it with very few, or rather none, but aduiſe onely with himſelfe? Or ſhal he rather performe this, if he grant free liberty of ſpeach, neither doe too much affect thoſe Quint. Curt. lib. 8. ſoft and ſilken words of the Court, which his flatterers will be ready to claw him withall; knowing that they will pleaſe his humours? Or finally ſhall hee effect this, if with indifferencie, and all alike equality, he heare euery mans opinion, neuer Thucid. lib 3. rewarding any councelling well, leaſt for the hope of gaine, they might vpon ſiniſter reſpects (at any time) decline from the right, nor Quint. Curt. lib. 3. puniſh any (though they ſhould counſell ill (ſo they do it not of maliciouſneſſe) for ſo he ſhall euer want Councellours, if it be dangerous to giue counſell?

It may further be demanded, why it is ſo exceeding auaileable to a Prince, to haue his counſels and determinations kept ſecret?

IS it becauſe that if they were Guicchardine knowne, they might be preuented and hindered? Or is it for this reſpect rather, becauſe his honour and eſtimation both at home and abroad, is thereby much increaſed and augmented? Or not ſo much for the former reaſons neither, but for that if his determinations were once knowne, Idem. many men pricked forward with enuy, would detract from his wiſedome, blaming him that hee put not his intentions ſooner in execution, though hee could not (happily) finde fit opportunity ſeruing thereunto?

It may further bee demanded, what courſe a Prince might beſt take, that hee might not erre in his Conſultations?

SHall he performe this, if hee fully vnderſtand the Tholoz. lib. 24. nature of the buſineſſe, which is to be deliberated vpon? Or ſhall he do it the better, if vnderſtanding the matter, whereof to conſult, hee Guicchardine conſtantly determine with himſelfe rather to reſpect (cautelouſly) the extreames, and finall ends of buſineſſes, then to regard middle courſes, much leſſe to run them? Or ſhall hee alſo effect this, if hee obſerue and marke how Idem. wiſely and prudently his aduerſarie (if any he haue) behaueth himſelfe in thoſe things, which concerne his honour, profit or ſafety? Or ſhall he rather accommodate and apply his counſels to the nature, manners and condition of his aduerſarie, and by that meanes learne out and expiſcate what might be likely that he will attempt againſt him? Or ſhall hee compaſſe theſe things the better, if in all his counſels and deliberations concerning the Common-wealth, he rather propound to himſelfe how the honor, dignitie and ſplendor thereof may bee augmented, then what profit might thereby redound vnto it?

It may further be demanded, what is chiefly required of Senators, that they may giue wholeſome counſell.

MAy they effect this, if they be Plin. Panet. men fearing God, making his plaine & euen lawes the ſtrict and ſtraight rule of their conſulations? For ſeeing it is Tholoz. lib. • 4. God alone, which ſuſtaineth and vpholdeth Common-wealths, it were very fit that he ſhould be made the chiefe head, and director of the counſels thereof. Or may they do it the better, if ſtanding for the Tacit •• . Hist. libertie of themſelues, and the Common-wealth, they do ſtoutly and couragiouſly, not faintly and fearefully pronounce and deliuer their mindes and opinions, leaſt they might rather be thought to runne with the Fortune of the Prince, then with him, or the good of the Common-wealth? Or may they alſo effect this, if they ſhew themſelues Tacit. 3. Hiſt. modeſt, and of a quiet diſpoſition? Or may they likewiſe effect it the better, if they can Quint. Curt. lib. 4. keepe their owne counſels? For it is very certaine that no great matter can be looked for at his hands, who will vent what hee ſhould hold in? Or finally, may this better be performed, if choyce be made of ſuch Councellors which haue Tholoz. lib. 24. de repub. no particular intereſt in thoſe things which are to be conſulted vpon? For no man in his owne cauſe, can ſpeake, thinke, or iudge vprightly, becauſe euery man therin will be partiall.

Conſidering that middle courſes (for the moſt part) proue vnfortunate, it may be demanded why notwithſtanding the running of a middle courſe being propounded by ſome one or other in publike deliberations, it is (moſt what) embraced, followed, and put in execution?

COmmeth it to paſſe through the ill Fran. Guich. diſpoſition and worſe affection of ſome addicted to faction and oppoſition, who perceiuing that their owne conceits cannot paſſe currant, had rather giue way to, and allow of that which is worſe, not extreame (leaſt hee ſhould ſeeme to oppoſe) but different in a leſſe diſtance, that thereby they may ſeeme to haue (in part) aſſented?

Or is it not for this reaſon alone, but for that likewiſe the other aduiſers, Idem. leaſt they ſhould diſpleaſe ſome prime-man, who hath propounded a middle courſe of proceedings, will likewiſe run along with him, and approue of his deuiſe? Or rather is this the reaſon why ſuch middle courſes are by ſome no ſooner propounded then approued, becauſe (for the moſt part) prouident and wary, eſpecially auncient and aged Statiſts, do approue of that courſe which they imagine to bee leaſt violent and dangerous, and incline to the meane, as being the ſweeter and more paſſable without noyſe or Nuiſſance.

Seeing that the cloſe minds, wils and ends of Councellours be ſtrange, diuers, and for ſiniſter reſpects, priuately kept to themſelues, for (oftentimes) vpon pounding of matters to bee conſulted vpon, This was the practiſe of Torlton Archbiſhop of Canterbury, againſt Edward the ſecond, by whoſe aduice his ſon was ſent into France, who ioyning with his mother & Mortimer, became the head and Captaine of the Rebels againſt his owne father. one thing is ſpoken, another thought and meant, whereby the mindes and opinions (onely) of others may be diſcouered; it may here be demanded, how a Prince may iudge whether his Councellours aduiſe him well or no?

SHall hee know this by the Mach. in Prin. diſpoſition of the Councellor? For he that more reſpecteth himſelfe then his Prince, & in the carriage of any matter regards his owne priuate more then the good of the Common-wealth, as long as hee beareth this minde, he can neuer proue a faithfull Councellour, nor one whom the Prince or State may truſt or rely vpon. Or ſhall hee vnderſtand this by the Tholoz. lib. 24. frequent vſe & experience he hath had of his Councellours in the like buſineſſes falling out ill, or well? Or ſhall he rather come to the knowledge hereof by making an Idem ibidem. exact: ſearch and diſpoſition how matters are carried and diſpoſed of within his owne territories? Or ſhall he rather come to this knowledge by the frequent reading of Hiſtories? or by the apprehending or comprehending of theſe two Principles, What is Profitable, What is Honeſt. Which two indeed are the bounds and grounds of truth, and of that worthy wiſedome and iudgement which ought to be in a Senator.

SECT. I. CHAP. VI.

Of Example, the vſe and abuſe thereof in a Common-wealth.

It may bee demanded, why ſubiects (for the moſt part) Claudian. frame & conforme themſelues to the faſhion of their Princes?

IS it for that both the Plin. Paneg. eyes of the minde, and the body, (for the moſt part) looke vpwards, and ſtand (as it were) at gaze at greatneſſe and eminencie, tending and bending the whole man to dance as they pipe? Or is it becauſe Tacit. 3. Annal Examples vrge and enforce more then Lawes can do, ſeeing it is the nature of man, rather to be led of his owne accord; then to be cōpelled? Or is it rather for that Quintilian decl. 4. Example in Princes is a kind of ſecret law? For it fareth and falleth out thus (for the moſt part) with their acts, that what they doe, they euen ſeeme to command it.

•

Againe it may be demanded, why in reforming of a Common-wealth, the producing of examples of the moſt famous and illuſtrious men, for vertue in the ſame do very much auaile?

IS it becauſe that ſuch men being compelled by no Lawes, yet of their owne accord, and freewill, acting, exerciſing, and exhibiting, ſingular and rare examples of vertue, do excite and ſtirre vp ſuch as bee good, to follow them, and thoſe which are bad, they doe either make them a ſhamed, or diſcourage them from going on in their lewdneſſe? Or is it rather for this, that when by long proceſſe of time, there hath bene no examplary puniſhment inflicted vpon offenders, men grow regardleſſe of Lawes, and the number of delinquents ſo increaſe, that the Magiſtrate is afraid to puniſh them? Then one Manlius Torquatus to puniſh his owne ſonne; or a Quintus Fabius to bee accuſed and condemned for ioyning battell with the enemy, without the Dictators leaue; and ſuch examples, do much bridle and repreſſe other mens inſolencies.

It may further bee demanded, why hee that iudgeth by examples is commonly deceiued?

IS it for that Franciſo. Guicch. all the ſelfe-ſame reaſons and circumſtances in the like actions, do ſeldome, or neuer concurre, and meete againe? Or is it becauſe the Idem. like actions are not alwaies gouerned with the like wiſedome and diſcretion? Or may this bee the reaſon rather, becauſe Idem. Fortune at all times, playeth not her part alike, but now and then faileth her fauorites?

SECT. I. CHAP. VII.

Of Wits, Manners, and Diſpoſitions: of diuers Cities, Countries, and Nations, as well free as ſeruile.

It may bee demanded what kind of wits, may bee termed the beſt wits.

MAy ſuch bee counted for the beſt, which are Guicch. more ſtirring, ſharpe, and acute, fiery and ſubtile, then ordinary? But theſe noble and excellent wits (for the moſt part) do proue very croſſe, and are oftentimes the cauſe of much diſquietneſſe, turmoile, and trouble to him who is indued therewith. Or may thoſe rather bee taken for the beſt, which though Idem. more blunt, yet are more certaine and laſting, and (for the moſt part) are more fortunate then the other.

It may further be demanded, why in one and the ſelfe-ſame Citie, there may be found many diſtinct families, whoſe manners and conditions are particular to themſelues; as wee read amongſt the Romanes, that the Manlij were euer ſterne and ſeuere, the Publicolae courteous and gentle, the Appij proud and ambitious, &c.

COmmeth this to paſſe, by reaſon of the diuerſity of their temperatures? But that (as it may bee thought) might be changed and altred, by the variety of Marriages. Or may this rather be the cauſe, for that euery Family hath a peculiar manner of bringing vp their children? for this commonly holdeth true, Mach. Diſput. de Repub. lib. 3. cap. 46. whatſoeuer manners and opinions, are inſtilled into the minds of youth in their infancy, they will hardly or neuer bee remoued, but continue with them euen to their old age.

It may bee further demanded, why Liu. in his bookes affirmeth this of the Frenchmen. diuers Nations, at the firſt aſſault, or onſet giuen, ſeeme to bee magnanimious, and very fierce and forward to the battell, but within a while after doe grow very fearefull, and turne Cowards?

MAy the cauſe conſiſt in any peculiar affect in their natures? But it is poſſible that Mach. diſput. Cap. 36. nature from day to day, may bee corrected and amended? Or might this rather bee the reaſon, that ſuch Nations being Idem Ibidem. without order or exerciſe of Military Diſcipline, are not enabled with ſuch ordinary manhood, as may eſtabliſh their hearts and mindes, making them to conceiue an aſſured hope of victory, and therefore if they be not vanquiſhers in the firſt aſſault, they ſtraight waies quit the field? And this (vnder correction) I take to be the true reaſon of their fearefulneſſe and running away.

It may further bee demanded, wherefore diuers men (euen lewd perſons) hauing many times occaſions offered them, to commit ſome memorable and notable villany, notwithſtanding (for the moſt part) they dare not attempt it, or put it in practiſe, and execution?

IS it for that they are afraid leaſt they ſhould Mach. diſp. lib. • . cap. 27. incurre the note of infamy? But the greatneſſe of the thing, might (happily) couer the badneſſe of the fact, and likewiſe protect the party from danger. Or do they abſtaine from perpetrating and committing ſuch horrtble villany, by reaſon of their Idem Ibidem. owne in-bred goodneſſe, or nice touch of their conſcience? But ſuch godly and holy motions do neuer enter into the hearts of ſuch lewd loſſels. Or may this rather bee the reaſon, for that by nature, it is not affoorded to the moſt men, to be Idem Ibidem. abſolutely euill, or perfectly good?

It may further be demanded, why there ſhould bee ſuch, and ſo great difficulty, in chaunging or amending old cuſtomes, though moſt men (conuicted ſecretly in their conſciences by euident truth) ſhould confeſſe they were altogether vnprofitable, and dangerous to the Common-wealth to continue them?

MAy this bee the reaſon, for that although ſome good Citizens, or Patriots, foreſeeing the danger, do perſwade the change thereof, yet they ſhould not be able fully to turne the peoples mindes, by reaſon of others oppoſitions? Or may this rather be the cauſe, for that moſt men ſtand ſo affected, and affectionated, to their auncient courſe of liuing, that they would not willingly depart there-from? Or may this bee the reaſon of the difficulty of amending euill cuſtomes, for that there is euer a want of proportionable meanes agreeable to the Lawes, to bring that buſineſſe about, ſo that they muſt bee driuen to flie to new courſes altogether, which ſeldome proue fortunate? Or may this rather bee the reaſon, for that if ſome few, or any one man, ſhould go about to change the forme of gouernement, it ſhould bee neceſſary for him, firſt by force to inuade the State, and then to ſeize the liberties thereof into his hands, which might bee thought not to bee the part of a good man, and therefore hee will rather deſiſt from his purpoſe, then do his Cittizens ſo much good? Or may this bee a further reaſon, for that the moſt men are perſwaded, that there can ſcarcely be that man found, who hauing once brought a State vnder ſubiection, by ill meanes, would afterwards vſe that power and authority which hee had ſo ill gotten, to the benefite and good of the people?

SECT. I. CHAP. VIII.

Of Benefites, and when to bee beſtowed: Of Ingratitude, and how a friend may be purchaſed that a man may truſt vnto.

It may bee demanded when Benefites are to bee beſtowed vpon a man?

ARE they to bee collated vpon him Mach. d • ſp. lib. primo, cap. 23. iuſt at that time, when the beſtower of them is compelled ſo to doe, as needing the preſent help of ſuch a man, or for ſome priuate end to himſelfe beſt knowne? But this manner of giuing ſhould ſeeme to be very extrauagant, and diſtaſtefull, to the receiuer, as thinking that they were collated vpon him by reaſon of the parties neceſſity, which once ſerued, he would neuer conferre more vpon him. Or are they not ſo to bee collated vpon any man, but Idem Ibidem. timouſly rather, before hee which may haue need of them, ſhall haue occaſion to vſe them, or the Collator thereof the perſon?

It may further be demanded, wherefore they who haue As Charond as amongſt the AEginenſians, The miſtocles amongſt the Athenians; Camillus, Scipio, &c. among the Romans, were impriſoned, baniſhed, or put to death. beſt deſerued of a Common-wealth are (oftentimes) worſt recompenced and requited?

IS this the reaſon, for that Pindarus. there is nothing leſſe laſting then the very name of a Benefite? Or is this rather the cauſe, for that it is This was proper to the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. appropriate and peculiar to certaine Common-wealths, ſo to enuy thoſe which excell in vertue and goodneſſe, as they themſelues being not able to follow and imitate them therein, ſeeke to ſpoile them of their gouernement and Empire? Or may this rather be the reaſon, that ſome Philip. Comin. ſtanding too much vpon their owne merites, haue borne themſelues too proudly againſt tje State, or their owne ſociety? Or might this likewiſe bee the cauſe, for that thoſe, who either by their rare exploits, or cunning ambition, creepe into the fauour of the people at home, and hunt after renowne and admiration abroad, may ſeeme to dimme the glory of their Princes, who greatly deſire to be accounted well-deſeruing of their owne people, as thoſe to whom it more properly belongeth, and therefore they muſt needs oppoſe ſuch, and grow in diſtaſte of them? Or is it for that all men generally by their owne corrupt nature, are leſſe prone, prompt, and ready to requite a good turne, then to reuenge an iniury? Or may this rather bee the reaſon for that the Prince, or Vpon this very conceite the Venetians put to death Lauderanus, becauſe hee pacified a commotion by his owne authority; as Petrus Bem bus reporteth in his Venetian Hiſtory. State, groweth into ſuſpicion of ſuch kinde of men, leaſt they ſhould affect innouation, or ſeeke to tyranniſe?

It may further bee demanded, why kindneſſes, and good will, are oftentimes requited with ingratitude, and vnthankfulneſſe?

IS it becauſe that he which neither can, nor hath any deſire to remunerate him, to whom hee is ſo much indebted, will either forget them, or perſwade himſelfe, and the world, that no ſuch kindneſſes were offered vnto him, or receiued by him? Or may this be the reaſon, that thoſe men, who haue beene (as it were) driuen, and by fatall neceſſity compelled to receiue kindneſſe of other men, ſhould afterwards grow aſhamed of it, that they ſhould bee thought to haue had neede of ſuch meanes?

Seeing that no man can deny, but that the vſe of friends is ſuch, and ſo great, that many times a man may bee driuen to relye his whole eſtate thereupon; It may bee demanded, how a man may bee aſcertained, that hee hath purchaſed a true friend?

SHall hee giue confidence to him, whom hee hath Guicchardine. bound by grace and benefites? Or ſhall hee truſt him, who hath any waies neede of his helpe? Or ſhall hee rather repoſe his confidence in him who is bound Pindarus. vnto him, by hauing equall profite and ſhare in any buſineſſe, which they ſhall ioyntly attempt and obtaine?

SECT. I. CHAP. IX.

Of Eſtimation and Credit, of Authoritie, publique and priuate, Seueritie, ſtrictneſſe of Gouernment, Conſtancie, Pietie, and Prouidence.

Seing Authoritie is the prop of kingdomes, and that it is of the moſt men confeſſed, that the maieſty of an Empire conſiſteth in the ſplendor, grace, and defence thereof: it may bee demanded, how a Prince might beget ſuch a reuerent opinion of himſelfe amongſt his ſubiects, & forreigners likewiſe, whereby he might become both admired and feared?

SHall he effect this, if he inſtitute ſuch a forme of gouernment, which is Cicero pro milone. ſeuere, conſtant, and ſtrict, bearing an hard ouer thoſe whom he ruleth? Or ſhall he attaine therunto the better, if hauing Mach. Prin. & Tholoz. home-bred ſtrength & forces, he continually keepe them about him, and haue them in a readineſſe? Or if he be deſtitute of ſuch forces, doe ſtraight wayes take a courſe to prouide them elſe-where? Or ſhall he compaſſe this the rather, if he excell other Princes in the Claudian. 3. integrity and ſoundneſſe of his manners, faſhions, and good conditions? Or ſhall he yet the better effect this, if hee delight ſtill So Ferdinand King of Spain, and Henry the 5. King of England, grew famous. to be in action, and grow famous for well performing of what hee vndertaketh? Or ſhall he likewiſe obtaine his purpoſe, if in caſes of difference betwixt Princes, he Mach. Prin. Cap. 21. cut off all reſpects of Newtrality, and declare himſelfe for one of them? Or ſhall he this way come to his ends, if he giue this teſtimony to the world, that hee is a louer of vertue, honouring all excellent men, of what ſort and Art ſoeuer? Or finally, ſhall he this way compaſſe his deſires, if hee giue incouragement and hope to his ſubiects whom hee gouerneth, that they ſhall liue quietly vnder his protection, and peaceably go about their affaires and buſineſſes, in what kinde ſoeuer they ſhall traffique or deale?

It may further be demanded, wherefore it concerneth a Prince ſo deeply to be highly eſteemed both at home and abroade?

IS it for that Fran. Guicch. eſtimation and authority once loſt (which may eaſily be done) can hardly or neuer be recouered againe? Or is it for that Idem. eſtimation and authority in martiall affaires, is of ſo great conſequence, that the effecting of any buſineſſe of import, doth wholly ſeeme to depend thereupon? Or may it be for this reaſon rather, that it ſhall be much more difficult for him whoſe credit and eſtimation beginneth to decay to defend himſelfe and his eſtate from the leaſt dangers, then for him who keepeth vp his eſtimation, and hath it imprinted in the hearts of his ſubiects or ſouldiers, to effect great matters, though his meanes be weaker? Or may it be for this reaſon likewiſe, for that it ſometimes importeth a Prince to ſet his authority vpon the tentors, and ſtretch it beyond his ability for the effecting and performing of ſome great enterpriſe? Now a Prince ſhall neuer bring this to paſſe, vnleſſe his ſubiects and ſouldiers be perſwaded, that his power, authority, and eſtimation, is greater then (indeed) it is; but if they be thereof once perſwaded, he ſhall haue that done readily, freely, and of their owne accords, which otherwiſe he ſhould neuer haue had granted, much leſſe extorted from them againſt their wils.

It may further be demanded, how a Prince may compaſſe it to be feared of his ſubiects, and withall get himſelfe great reputation thereby?

SHall he doe this, if he vſe them Fran. Guich. rigorouſly, and oftentimes inflict ſeuere puniſhments vpon them? For they will eaſily be brought to ſtand in feare of him, whom they know both can and will correct them, and bring them into order, eſpecially if they perceiue him by his naturall inclination, to be thereunto addicted. Or ſhall hee finally effect this the rather, if he neuer vſe a ſtronger Guicchardine. medicine, then the nature of the diſeaſe, or ſtrength of his ſicke ſubiects are able to beare?

It may further bee demanded, how a ſubiect may gaine himſelfe reputation with the common people?

SHall he doe this, if he be Mach. diſp. cap. 34. deſcended of noble Aunceſtors, who haue approued themſelues braue and excellent men in the carriage of themſelues, and managing of great actions? Or ſhall he do this the rather, if he betake himſelfe to a wiſe and well ſetled courſe of life, conuerſing with none (as neere as he can) but with excellent men, and ſuch are vertuous? Or ſhall he yet effect this the better, if in his younger yeares he ſhall performe any thing, either publickly or priuately, which in it ſelfe is memorable, and withall is honeſt? Or ſhall he attaine thereunto likewiſe, if being truſted with the Mach. Prin. cap. 21. managing of publique affaires of his Countrey, he diſcharge himſelfe well thereof, hauing rather an eye that his actions may redound to the good of the common-wealth, then to his owne or other mens priuate, how neere or deere ſoeuer they may be vnto him, or himſelfe to himſelfe?

It may further be demanded, wherefore the Romans thought it neceſſary, that their Generals of the field managing Armes amongſt forraigne Nations, ſhould haue free libertie to diſpoſe of thoſe affaires according to their owne beſt liking.

WAs it for that the Mach. diſp. lib. 2. Cap. 33. Senate did well vnderſtand, that if they commanded their Generals ſhould attempt nothing without their directions, aduice and priuities, it would be the next way to make them looſe, idle, and leſſe circumſpect in exerciſing their charge and office? Or was this rather the reaſon, for that they were perſwaded, Idem Ibidem. that the fortune of the warres were doubtfull, and that ſometimes ſuddaine accidents might fall out, which might very much either aduance and further their deſignes, or greatly hurt them; which occaſions (as they rightly deemed) he onely could take, vnderſtand, and make aduantage of, who ſhould bee preſent when they were offered?

It may further be demanded, how the Authoritie and eſtimation of a Prince may bee made famous, if he ſhould carry a ſtrict hand ouer his ſubiects, in ruling and gouerning them?

SHould hee compaſſe his ends, if hee alone ſhould Tacit. 2. Annal. Liu. etiam lib. 9. retaine and keepe all the maine offices and buſineſſes of the crowne in his owne hands, ſo that all men ſhould be enforced to looke vpon, and vnto him, as of whom onely they were to expect all things which might doe them good? Or ſhall hee yet compaſſe his deſignes, if hee neuer prorogue, or continue any too long in an office, (eſpecially in militarie affaires) leaſt his ſubſtitute growing too proud, ſhould work any thing which might turne to his preiudice?

It may further be demanded, why this or that Prince his gouernement is counted ſharpe and ſeuere; when the rule of others is thought to bee very gentle and eaſie.

MAy this be the reaſon, for that Mach. diſp. lib 3. cap. 22. ſome auſtere man comming to the gouernement, doth wiſh, and hath (as it were) a longing deſire to haue all men like himſelfe? Or may this rather be the reaſon, for that ſuch a man comming to ſway the ſtate, is commonly a valiant man, and therefore commanding great and difficult enterpriſes to be vndertaken by his ſubiects, vſeth ſomtimes ſeueritie, whereby thoſe things may be put in execution, according as they were commanded them?

It may further bee demanded, wherefore it ſhould bee needfull that that gouernment ſhould be ſtrict and ſeuere, which ſhould beget authoritie and eſtimation to a Prince?

MAy this bee the reaſon, for that Ienitie (for the moſt part) cauſeth contempt, and that in any corruption of manners it is neceſſary the Saluſt. Lepid. ſubiect doe ſtand in awe, or be made to ſtand in awe of his Prince? Or may this rather bee the cauſe, for that Cicero pro Milone. clemencie and remiſſneſſe opens the maine gappe to offending, when men are perſwaded that they ſhall ſcape vnpuniſhed? For Sen. 1 de Clem. who will feare him who alwayes keepeth his ſword faſt locked in the feabbard, or for a little Cic. 1. in Catil. idleneſſe ſuffereth the edge of his authoritie to be blunted? Or may this rather be the reaſon, for that the common people are euery way better ordered, being compelled to do their duties, and by keeping them in feare, then if all the clemencie, courteous intreatie, and demeanor of the Prince ſhould be affoorded them?

It may further be demanded, why the conſtant keeping of one manner and forme of gouernment, muſt needes much auaile to make a Prince much eſteemed?

MAy this bee the reaſon, for that (as all Tholoz. innouation in a State is dangerous) the Prince ſhall be put in fault, and greatly blamed, if vpon changing any thing in the gouernement, it ſhould not well ſucceed and proſper? Or may this rather be the reaſon, for that Thucid. lib. 6. experience hath taught vs, that thoſe States and Common-wealths are beſt gouerned, which affect the leaſt alteration of old cuſtomes and manners, though they be not all of the beſt?

It may further be demanded, why a godly and Religious Prince is held in great honour and eſtimation with the people?

IS it for that Tacit. 2. Annal Pietie and Godlineſſe euen of it ſelfe is venerable, making Princes to ſeeme like Gods among their people? Or may this rather be the reaſon, for that the people are perſwaded that the Liuy in his firſt book maketh mention, that Numa Pompilius conferred mightily with the Nymph Egeria &c. Prince will not attempt or goe about any enterpriſes, but ſuch wherein he ſhall bee ſeconded by the helpe of Heauen?

SECT. I. CHAP. X.

Of Glory and Renowne, the deſire thereof profitable to the Common-wealth: Of Power and Greatneſſe, and the acquiring thereof. Of Ambition and vnlawfull deſire of raigning: Of eminent Citties, and their being free, for the moſt part, from practiſes of Treaſons, Rebellions, Inſurrections, Mutinie, &c.

It may bee demanded, what might bee the reaſon, that the vehement deſire and thirſt after glory and renowne, hath alwaies beene praiſe-worthy, and held profitable for the Common-wealth, whereas the leaſt deſire of raigning, in any great Subiect, hath beene condemned on all hands, and euer thought to bee dangerous and hurtfull to the State?

IS it becauſe Fran. Guicch. the hunting after honour and renowne, eleuateth and raiſeth a mans thoughts, and exciteth to noble and generous actions? Whereas contrary wiſe the ambitious, and boundleſſe deſire of ruling, prouoketh a man to propound to himſelfe dangerous courſes, and to runne them though it be to his owne vndoing? Or may it bee for this reaſon likewiſe, for that hee which is of an Idem. ambitious and turbulent ſpirit, regardeth neither right or wrong, of Soueraigne or Subiect, but vpon the leaſt conceit to compaſſe his vnlawfull deſires, engageth himſelfe in factions, brawles, and quarrels, filling all mens hearts with feare, and diſturbing the quiet of the State ſo farre, that as much as in him lyeth, he will rather hazard the ſafety of it, then deſiſt from his barbarous enterpriſe? Whereas hee who is onely deſirous of honour and renowne, neither feareth dangers, nor attempteth or alloweth of any lewd courſes, whereby hee, or his, might bee branded with the note of infamy, or digrace?

It may further bee demanded, how Liuy lib. 2. Potency is the high-way to gaine authority. potency and greatneſſe may bee acquired, whereby the authority of a Prince may bee made more illuſtrious and reſplendant?

IS it to bee purchaſed with money, to whom Ariſt. Rhet. II. cap. 16. & horat. Serm. 11. all things do ſtoope? Or is it to bee acquired by Armes rather? for this is an infallible rule, that large Empire and Dominion, is not gotten, kept, or maintained by Tacit. 15. Annal. idleneſſe, but by the vſe and exerciſe of Armes, and Millitary Diſcipline? Or is it not gotten by theſe meanes alone, but by Tacit. 11. Annal. firme counſell, and wary circumſpection alſo? Or may it be attained vnto, by making Ariſt. Rhet. ad Alex Cap. Vltim. firme leagues, and ſure peace with forraigne Princes? Or to conclude, may it bee gotten by the Quint. Curt. lib. 8. benefite of fortune, who (moſt what) doth maruailouſly fauour and aduance ſome ſpeciall ſorts of men?

It may further bee demanded, what might bee the reaſon that thoſe men who are ambitious, and haue an itching deſire to bee inueſted with the gouernment of States, if they once bee euected to ſome eminent place in the Common-wealth, So it fared with Iohn of Gaunt Duke of Lancaster, and Thomas Woodſtocke Duke of Gloceſter, protectors of Rich. the 2. And with Rich. the 3. protector of Edw. the 5. &c. they are neuer contented, but ſtriue and endeuour to riſe higher and higher, and if once they can ſurprize the State, they wil rather die, then come afterwards to leade a priuate life?

COmmeth it thus to paſſe, for that all Mach. diſp. lib. 1. cap. 37. men euen by nature, are apt and prone to deſire great matters, though they bee not ſo fitted and accommodated in themſelues, to obtaine and keepe them? Now where the deſire is more then the ability to get, the minde can neuer be at quiet, or contented with thoſe things which already it doth enioy. Or is it for that Guicchardinus. Ambition of it ſelfe blindeth the eyes of men, perſwading them that their merites and deſerts are greater then (indeed) they bee, and thereupon they affect and attempt ſtrange matters, and run head-ſtrong courſes to their owne deſtructions oftentimes? Or may this bee the reaſon, for that hee who once hath had his temples circled with a Crowne, can neuer after brooke a priuate life, becauſe Kings and Kingdomes, are euer to bee thought and beleeued to exceed proportion?

It may further bee demanded, what man may rightly be cenſured and deemed to be ambitious?

IS hee ſo to bee deemed and taken, who vnder Aul. Pol. pretence of amplyfying and enlarging the dignity Royall; will ſeeke to dominere ouer others, and rule all things according to his owne luſts? without cauſe or reaſon, changing the auncient Officers (though neuer ſo honeſt) at his will and pleaſure, and ſuffecting others into their places, whom hee well knoweth to be of his owne faction, and (when time ſhall ſerue) will fauour his party? Or may hee likewiſe be thought ambitious who with great Tholoz. lib. 22 gifts, large promiſes, and all kind and friendly Offices, ſeeketh to conciliate and get the fauour and good will of the people, whereby hee may be one ſtep higher to his riſing?

It may further bee demanded, why all the Arts, cunning and practiſes, by which ambitious men ſtudy to climbe to the height of greatneſſe, are kept ſo ſecret, that they hardly or neuer burſt out, or come to be knowne, till they haue obtained what they ſought for?

COmmeth it ſo to paſſe, for that Mach. diſp. lib. prim. Cap. 46. men do not by and by (and as it were vpon the ſodaine) but by degrees grow ambitious; whoſe progreſſes being not obſerued (except of ſome few) they may more eaſily deceiue and blind mens eyes? Or may this rather be the reaſon, for that the ambitious do alwaies Idem. Ibidem. vſe ſome honeſt pretext whereby they may compaſſe their deſignes, as though all their actions did tend and bend to theſe ends, leaſt the Common-wealth (forſooth) or themſelues ſhould be wronged, when the truth is, that they ſtriue to get the garland, that thereby they may both oppreſſe others, and the weale Publick?

It may further be demanded, how, and by what ſafe meanes it may be prouided for, that a man ſhall not grow too ambitious and inſolent in a State, or if hee ſhould, how his inſolency may bee repreſſed, and nipt in the head, whilſt it is yet in the bud?

MAy this bee effected, if there ſhould neuer way be giuen, or meanes affoorded, to create or erect any ſuch office, or eminent dignity in the Common-wealth, out of the which the State might haue cauſe to feare, leaſt in proceſſe of time, Tyranny might take her firſt riſing, and beginning there-from? Or may it rather thus bee compaſſed, if the State take heed, and with wary circumſpection prouide, Ariſtophanes in Ranis. that they neuer foſter, cheriſh, orbring vp, any Lyons Whelpe, much leſſe the Lyon himſelfe, within their Territo ries? Or may it thus likewiſe be done, if ſuch wormes, and Tholoz. lib. 22. moaths, which breed of too much moiſture, and are wont to conſume thoſe things whereof they had their beginnings, bee choked or ſhaken off, before they come to any great bigneſſe, or turne the whole Subſtance of that they feed vpon, into their owne? Or may it thus likewiſe bee brought to paſſe, if heed be taken, that if by the heate of the boſome of the Common-wealth, there bee hatched and nouriſhed any dangerous ſerpent, it bee The errour of the Athenians and Florentiues, that they would not doe after this Counſell. timouſly expoſed to the cold (which is the onely way to kill it) yet neuer ſuffer it to hiſſe other where in a place more commodious, leaſt by ſucking out the poyſon thereof, there might follow a deeper ſtinging? Or may this alſo be effected, if heed be taken that the The practiſe of Rich. the 2. againſt the Duke of Hereford, and Tho. Mowbray Duke of Norfolke: For the King feared Heref. leaſt (hauing the loue of the people) hee ſhould haue vanquiſht Mowbray, and ſo hee baniſhed them both, and leaſt alſo it might haue fallen out that the Duke of Heref. ſhould haue gotten the victory, & ſo haue graced himſelfe. ambitious bee neuer permitted to ingage himſelfe in any publique buſineſſe, eſpecially neuer employed in Martiall affaires, leaſt by the well managing thereof, he draw vnto himſelfe credit and eſtimation with the Common-people, which hee abuſing, might afterwards turne to the hurt and dammage of the Weale Publique? Or may it bee brought to paſſe by this menes alſo, if diuers of his Tholoz. lib. 22. owne ranke and quality do bandy with him, and of ſet purpoſe oppoſe his proceedings, the munition, and all other warlike furniture, being (in the meane time) vnder the command of the Prince, or Common-wealth? Or may this finally be effected, if Mach. diſ • . lib. 1. cap. 52. hinderance be giuen to his ambitious deſignes, by the ſame waies, meanes, and inſtruments, which he himſelfe vſed to climbe to the top of his deſires?

It may laſtly be demanded, wherefore the more eminent Cities (as in particular it may truely bee inſtanced in, and of, this Honour able Citie of So Ia cke Straw his rebellion begun in Kent, in the time of Rich. the 2. who was flame by the Right Honourable William Walworth, in Smith-field, whereby the Citie for that honourable ſeruice had the Dagger added to their Armes. So Iacke Cade his conſpiracy and rebellion in Henry the 6. his daies, came from Kent likewiſe. So Kets conſpiracie came from Norfolke in the time of Edw. the 6. So the rebellion in the North, was moued againſt Q Elizabeth of Famous memory by impious Pius Quintus B. of Rome. So the powder-treaſon was plotted & contriued in our Soueraigne Lord King Iames his London) are generally free from plotting, practiſing, or contriuing any treaſons, rebellions, inſurrections, mutinies, &c. againſt the Prince, or State: when other more remote parts of the Kingdome, are, and euer haue beene more ſubiect to put in practiſe ſuch helliſh proiects?

IS it for that in the more famous and eminent Cities (where the Magiſtrates are commonly more carefull and watchfull then other where) the plotters of treaſons and rebellions, cannot ſo conueniently conueene and come to together, to conſult about their villanies, without being noted, obſerued, and eſpied, as they may do vnder any colourable pretext, in the Countries neere adioyning, or other remote parts from ſuch Cities? Or is it not for this cauſe alone, but for that in ſuch eminent Cities (and in particular within this Citie of London) the word of God is more plentifully Preached, whereby the Citizens are better inſtructed in their duties to God and their Prince, then commonly they are in all the Countrie beſides? Or may this bee a further reaſon for the ſaid Citie of London in particular, for that as well the chiefe Magiſtrate thereof, as other worthy time, by diuers Gentlemen in ſeuerall Countries. But in all theſe there was neuer a Citizen in any of them. Citizens therein, are neerer to the Court, and by reaſon of their eminent places, and prime Offices which they beare, and daily do execute for the Prince, and in his name, to the good of Towne and Country, haue (euer) more dependance of their Prince, then in other places further diſtant there-from, the other ſubiects can haue: whereby it commeth to paſſe that they neuer deſire innouations, nor engage themſelues and their eſtates by plotting of treaſons, raiſing rebellions, &c. but content themſelues with their owne conditions, ſtudying to loue, and to bee beloued of their Prince, which things are not ſo well performed by particulars, in places further diſtant therefrom, as hath beene ſhewed? Or, to conclude, may this likewiſe be the reaſon, for that the ſaid Citie of London, being the Chamber of the Prince, wherin hee euer preſumeth that hee may be moſt ſafe, the Citizens euen out of their loue and loyalty to their Prince, haue euer thought foule ſcorne that themſelues ſhould be found vntrue, or diſloyall; or that themſelues, or their Citie ſhould be branded with the hatefull name of Traytors, or hauing treaſon, rebellion, or treachery, batched in it?

SECT. I. CHAP. XI.

Of Studies, diſpoſitions, & whence the diuerſitie thereof may proceed: Of Learning likewiſe, knowledge of tongues and Hiſtories, how neceſſary & auaileable they are in generall, but eſpecially for a Prince, that thereby he may more cleerly ſee, and exactly iudge of his owne affaires. Of Intelligence, and the vſe and benefit thereof.

It may be demanded, whence the varieties of ſtudies and diuerſity of diſpoſitions of men might proceed?

DOth this diuerſity happen by Fran. Guicch. reaſon of the varietie of times and places? Or not ſo neither, but by the mutabilitie of the vnſtable multitude rather, of whom this Prouerbe is truly verified, So many men, ſo many mindes? Or falleth it out thus the rather, by reaſon of the Tholozanus. difference of yeares, and vnlikeneſſe of manners of the inhabitants of one and the ſelfe-ſame kingdome, the deſires and ends of the Nobles, Senators, and people, being cleane contrary one to the other?

It may further be demanded, wherefore wiſe men haue in all ages greatly indeuoured to perſwade all men to get learning and knowledge before any other thing?

WAs it becauſe they plainly ſaw and perceiued, that it was the beſt meanes Sen. Epiſt. 98. to purge and purifie the mindes of men, whereby they might bee apted to receiue and retaine vertuous precepts? Or might this be the reaſon, for that they well knew, that the embracing of good letters was Quintilian, lib. 12. the high-way to wiſedome, by which the policie of a State is moſt aduanced?

It may further be demanded, wherefore the knowledge and skill of languages is neceſſary and profitable for all men, but eſpecially for a Prince and priuy Councellour?

MAy this be the reaſon, for that all men are commonly well pleaſed to Guicch. vnderſtand, & to be vnderſtood of thoſe with whom they ſhall chaunce to haue any dealing? Or may this be the cauſe, for that a man being skilfull in the tongues, can Cominaeus. better explaine himſelfe and his owne meaning, and ſhall much better bee vnderſtood, then if he ſhould deale by an Interpretor? Or may this likewiſe be a maine reaſon, for that many times it falleth out, that a priuy Councellor is to take notice of ſome ſerious buſineſſes, which mightily import the State to know, and bee ſecret in, which things can neuer be related, and tranſacted ſo well, nor to ſuch good purpoſe, if for want of knowledge of the tongues, the Councellor or Relator muſt of neceſſity vſe the helpe of ſome third perſon? Or may the knowledge of tongues bee thought ſo auaileable to a Prince or Stateſman, for the entertaining and giuing audience to Embaſſadors, hearing of their meſſages, be they hoſtile or friendly, and giuing them their diſpatches, anſweres, and diſmiſſions?

It may further bee demanded, wherefore wiſe men haue held the knowledge of Hiſtories to be the readieſt way whereby a man may become wiſe, calling Tacit. 4. Annal. Cic. de Orator. Diodorus Siculus. Cominaeus. Hiſtory the life and ſoule of memory, the light of truth, director of mans life, &c?

IS it becauſe that by reading of Hiſtories, a man ſhall truely find Diod. Sicul. 1. Bibliorum. Vertue, to haue her due praiſe, and honour giuen her, as contrariwiſe to Vice, her due ſhame and reproofe? Or may this bee the reaſon, for that Plutarchus. in Timol • onte. Hiſtory is auialeable to inſtruct any priuate man (of what degree ſoeuer) how to flame his life, and carry himſelfe with commendation in the eye of the world, when, as in a glaſſe, he ſhall ſee how to beautifie & compoſe it, according to the patterne of other mens vertues? Or may this bee a further reaſon, for that thereby a man may Liuy lib. become a Stateſman, and know how to manage publique affaires, drawing his rules and directions out of old Antiquities, and times paſſed, as out of a Store-houſe, and making application thereof to the time preſent?

It may further be demanded, what may be the chiefe vſe, benefit and end of Intelligence?

MAy it be beneficiall to a Prince or State, becauſe he may thereby Fran. Guicch. Aul. Pol. diſtinctly know the condition and ſtate of all Countries, the power and ſtrength of their Princes and Gouernors, the wiſedome and skilfulneſſe of their Senators, in managing the affaires of State, and the originals and continuance of their families, with many other particulars neceſſary to bee knowne to a Prince or State, who either hath, or may haue dealing with other Nations? Or may this rather be the chiefe vſe & end of Intelligence, that a Prince or wiſe Stateſman may thereby better Polib. lib. 1. Pacuvius & Guich. diſcouer the ſecret fraudes, and cunning practiſes of his faire tongued, and ſmooth-faced friends (but indeed his craftie and ſubtile aduerſaries) as likewiſe the machinations, drifts, and intents of his open enemies, whereby he may better be enabled to explicate and winde himſelfe out of dangers, or fruſtrate their intentions, by croſſing and counter-mining of them?

SECT. I. CHAP. XII.

Of peace, and the conditions thereof: Of the State, and affaires of Princes: Of Embaſſages, Embaſſadours, and who are fitteſt to vndertake ſuch charge: what Arguments are moſt perſwaſiue, and of the great vſe of Eloqence in a Stateſ-man or Embaſſadour.

It may bee demanded, why wiſe-men haue alwaies thought peace to be expedient for both parties, as well for the victor, as thoſe who haue beene conquered?

MIGHT it bee for this reaſon, for that they ſuppoſed it Senec. Here. Fur. impoſſible for the world to continue, if it ſhould bee vexed with continuall wars? Or might this rather be the reaſon, for that they truely iudged that the Idem Ibidem, conquered muſt of neceſſity, accept of what peace and conditions ſoeuer the Victor ſhall grant them? And that they thought it likewiſe to bee a Liu. lib. 30. comely and gracefull thing to the conquerour, to affoord them peace vpon reaſonable termes, that all men might take notice, that hee knew how to begin, and ingage himſelfe in a iuſt warre, and was able likewiſe to make an end thereof? Or might not this be the onely reaſon, but for that they thought it Tacit. Annal. lib. 12. profitable likewiſe, and ſafe for the Conquerour to lay downe his Armes, conſidering that if hee ſhould ſtill proſecute the warres, hee ſhould reape nothing but weariſomeneſſe by continuing and protracting of them, and if hee ſhould make too much haſt, and as it were inforce an end of them, hee might runne himſelfe into many and Henr. Ranſov. de re Bellica. needleſſe dangers, euen to the hazard of his owne eſtate, which otherwiſe hee might eaſily haue auoyded? For Fortune will ſometimes play the Iade, and the euent of warres is vncertaine?

It may further bee demanded, how a ſafe and firme peace, may bee diſtinguiſhed and knowne from that which is vnſure and not to be truſted vnto?

MAy this be knowne, if the peace bee Liu. lib. 25. honeſt, as putting an end to the warres, by giuing and accepting of tollerable conditions? Or may it this may be knowne likewiſe, if it bee Tacit. 4. Hist. ſimple, plaine, and without falſe colours or gloſſes, ambuiguity of words, or equiuocations, and not ſubiect to what conſtructions the peace-breaker may wreſt or draw them?

It may further bee demanded, why that Prince who came to his Kingdome by ſome of the Nobility, or Senate, ſhall more hardly keepe it, then another, who obtained the Crowne by the ſuffrages and aſsiſtance of the people?

IS it becauſe that Mach. Prin. cap. 9. thoſe of the Nobility thinke themſelues to be little inferiour, or rather equall with the Prince, whereupon hee cannot ſway the Scepter as him liſteth, but muſt bee glad in the moſt things to be ruled by them? Or may this rather bee the reaſon, for that it will bee thought the Prince will So fared it with the Duke of Buckingham, in the time of Richard the 3. with Charles the 8. and Lewis the 12. Kings of France, in the loſſe of Millane, &c. as reporteth Mach. Prin. Cap. 9. neuer be able ſufficiently to ſatiſfie thoſe Nobles, without the hurt and wronging of others, which when hee cannot, thoſe very men, by whoſe aide and aſſiſtance hee got the Crowne, will bee the firſt who will pull him downe againe? Or may this be the reaſon, for that Idem Ibidem. if the Commons ſhould make head againſt the Prince, hee could neuer bee ſecured of his ſafety, or retayning of his Kingdome, becauſe they would oppreſſe him with multitude, the Nobility being but a handfull to them?

It may further be demanded, wherefore it ſo much importeth a Prince to manage his Martiall affaires in his owne perſon, if hee euer looke to grow famous by his conqueſts?

IS it becauſe it Quint. Curt. Mach. Prin. So Alexander the Great, Ferdinand King of Spaine, and Hen. the 5. King of Eng. became famous. ſo much encreaſeth and augmenteth his eſtimation, and credit with forraigne Princes abroad, and breedeth and begetteth him loue and authority among his owne people at home? Or may this be the reaſon, for that by this meanes, all Mach. diſput. lib. 1. cap. 30. wrangling occaſions, and heart-burnings are cut off, whereby a Prince ſometimes proueth vngratefull to men, euen of the beſt deſerts? For when Princes preſent, and behaue themſelues brauely in the field, all the honour and glory thereof (as it pertaineth) ſo it redoundeth vnto them: whereas otherwiſe if they were abſent, and committed the managing of thoſe affaires to their Generals, they ſtraight waies imagine, that if their forces ſhould preuaile, the glory of the day ſhould reſt with the Generall, who led the Army, and that themſelues can neuer challenge any part of the victory, gotten, vnleſſe they extinguiſh the merites of the Generall, or himſelfe, and by that meanes proue vniuſt and vngratefull to their ſeruants.

It may further be demanded, how a Courtier may come to bee much imployed in his Princes affaires?

MAy he effect this, if he Guicch. ſhould waite diligently, and bee alwaies in the eye of the Prince? Or may hee compaſſe this the rather, if once imployed hee manage that affaire well? For by this meanes, hee ſhall both gaine himſelfe reputation, and bee thought fit and able to deale in any buſineſſe, and be ſure (almoſt) neuer to be out of action, by reaſon of the dependencies which other buſineſſes haue vpon thoſe, wherein hee formerly hath beene employed.

Conſidering that by well or ill managing and handling of the affaires of Princes, in negotiating for them with forreigne Princes, either great good, or great hurt may accrew to the Prince and State, it may be demanded what manner of men a Prince might chiefly imploy for Embaſſadours to forreigne Princes?

SHall hee vſe ſuch as are Comineus. skilfull to picke and gleane ſomething out of other mens employments, and appropriate it to themſelues, if there bee hope that their credit and eſtimation, may grow greater by it? Or ſhall not a Prince truſt to ſuch to negotiate for him, but to thoſe rather, who are faithfull, carefull, meeke, and gentle, and haue beene long practiſed and experienced in managing ſuch affaires?

It may further be demanded, with what tooles an Ambaſſadour ſhall ſooneſt perſwade a forreigne Prince, and draw him to fauour, and further his maiſters deſignes?

SHall he aſſaile him with Tholoz. firme arguments and ſound reaſons? But hee that is nice, and hath a ſpeciall opinion of his owne wiſedome, will preſently diſtaſt that or any thing that is ſolide. Or ſhall he rather ſet vpon him with Fran. Guicch. Cominaeus. Mach. Prin. repreſentations of colours, Popularities, and circumſtances? And (to ſpeake as the truth is) theſe are of no leſſe (if they bee not of more) force, then firme and ſound reaſons: For circumſtances, colours, repreſentations, and ſuch like ſtuffe, are of ſuch power and efficacy, that they can giue life to true and ſound reaſons, peruert the iudgement, if it bee not ſtable and well grounded, and quickly leade into errour.

It may further bee demanded, why eloquence is ſo neceſſary for a Councellour, or an Embaſſador?

IS it becauſe that daily amoſt it falleth out, that a Prince hath occaſion to ſend ſome one or other of his Councell to forreigne States, either to perſwade; to accuſe, or defend; to gratulate, or condole, &c. Now it is both requiſite, and neceſſary, and commodious for a Prince to bee furniſhed with men ſo qualified, with eloquence, vtterance, &c. as that they may with credit to him and his Court, well diſcharge the place, and perſon they ſuſtaine; And it ſhould be a great ſhame, diſaduantageous, and diſhonourable to the Prince, if for want of ſuch gifts, in any whom hee ſhould ſend on ſuch errands, it ſhould fall out otherwiſe. Or may it rather be for this cauſe; for that in Quintilian. pacifying ſuch as are ſeditious in the State, and compounding the quarrels and differences of ſuch as are factious, there is no better meane to accord them, then to vſe an eloquent and plauſible ſpeech vnto them?

SECT. I. CHAP. XIII.

Of Diſcord and Faction, whereof they take their beginnings, and of the nouriſhing, or not nouriſhing of them in a Common-wealth.

It may bee demanded from whence diſcords and factions haue their beginnings?

DOE they ariſe of ſuch Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 22. motions as are ſodainely ſuggeſted to the people, ſo that there cannot bee time giuen them to thinke or conſider what matter they go about? Or do they take their beginnings rather of Idem Ibidem. the priuate or open hatred of Familiers? Or may they proceed rather from the roote of Senec. Epiſt. 74 pride and ambition, whilſt euery man ſtriueth to proceed, and go before another, and is alwaies detracting from him hee liketh not? Or may they haue their beginnings from idleneſſe and looſeneſſe of liuing, which oftentimes are wont to miniſter occaſions of ciuill (or rather vnciuill) brawles and contentions? Or may they ariſe of the Tholoz. de Re pub. lib. 22. different mindes and diſpoſitions of the people, from the deſignes and intentions of the Nobility? Or not ſo much from thence neither, but of the wauering mutability of the vnconſtant multitude alſo? their years being ſo diuers, and their manners ſo vnlike: For it is impoſſible, that where there is ſuch and ſo great diuerſity of yeares, and diſparity of manners, that the multitude or Commons altogether, ſhould equally well like of, affect, and comport the preſent State, but contrarywiſe diſagree, grow factious, and contentious.

It may further bee demanded, whether it may bee beneficiall to a Prince or State to nouriſh factions, or no?

IT were too hard a taske for mee (Right Honourable) to take vpon mee difinitiuely to determine this queſtion: for I am not ignorant that amongſt diuers men, and thoſe of the wiſeſt ſort, this doubt hath beene canuaſed, and greatly controuerted; yet ſeeing that I am entred into it, I thought it not fit altogether to paſſe it ouer in ſilence, without ſhewing your Honour my priuate opinion therein, which that I may do the better, I will rip vp the Arguments on both ſides. That factions (therefore) ſhould bee nouriſhed of a Prince or State, many things may induce and perſwade thereunto, but eſpecially theſe two, Honour and Profit. For that Prince Mach. Prin. cap. 20. muſt needes bee honoured and feared, who alwaies hath an enemy at his owne deuotion, and neuer reſiſting his deſignes and enterpriſes: For hee that can conquer when hee liſt, is not onely admired, but much feared likewiſe, both at home and abroad. For all men with one voyce will giue it out, that hee got the victory by his owne valour and proweſſe: Which ſo reported and beleeued, there is no doubt but that hee ſhall bee much renowmed therefore, though he atchieued it otherwiſe; namely, by being ſeconded with a potent faction, ioyning with him againſt their owne Prince, or otherwiſe. Againe, that the chiefeſt and moſt potent Cities of a Kingdome, ſhould be brought vnder the Princes ſubiection, it were not onely conducible and neceſſary, but alſo profitable, both to him and the common-wealth. Now to effect this, a Prince muſt either vſe force or policy. If hee ſay to compaſſe his deſignes by force, hee muſt of neceſſity offer many iniuries to the people, which the more openly they are done, the more they do prouoke them to miſlike the Prince: For that which the Law hath made Mine, and Thine, if it ſhould be ſnatched away from the Subiect, it would bee grieuouſly taken, and held for no better then an intollerable peece of iniuſtice. But when the Mach. diſ. lib. 2. cap. 25. Cities of themſelues are become factious, and the Citizens doe waſte and cōnſume themſelues by quarrels and factions, the fault ſhall neuer bee laid on the Prince, but on the factious, and yet by this meanes the Prince in effect, ſhall obtaine what hee deſired. For the Cities hereby growing weake, and wearied with continuall garboiles, will willingly put themſelues into the Princes protection, and yeeld themſelues ſubiect to his will. Further, for a Prince to diuert the current of the warres, or any hoſtile inuaſions, from his owne dores, it is very neceſſary, behouefull and conuenient: Now it is not incredible, that euer hee ſhall haue any better way, or meane to bring this to paſſe, then by Herod. lib. 4. Xenoph. de Pedia Cyri. lib. 3. nouriſhing factions, and diſſentions in his enemies Countrie; for many haue put this in practiſe heretofore, and greatly thriuen thereby: Moreouer diuers of the wiſeſt ſort, haue thought it very aduantageous to the Prince, that the Tacit. Agric. Subiects ſhould neuer come altogether, to conſult, or agree altogether, vpon any thing which might tend to their common or particular ſafeties. To conclude, Tholoz. de Repub. lib. 23. that a great Prince, or Monarch, may become more wary of his enemy, and better conſerue his owne eſtate, it hath beene thought fit, by ſome of the wiſeſt heads that euer haue beene, that ſuch a Prince ſhould neuer bee without an enemy, or be a great nouriſher of factions in a forreigne Land: Which courſe, if Rome had taken, and not deſtroyed Carthage, they ſhould haue had their braue ſpirited youth better trayned vp, practiſed, and made ready in feates of Armes, which might haue ſteeded the Common-wealth for offence or defence thereof; Graue and mature counſell ſhould haue flouriſhed in the Senate, the Citizens ſhould not haue waſted themſelues with ciuill warres, and ſo the Empire ſhould haue beene more durable and laſting. The reaſons of thoſe who hold it vnprofitable, and euery way diſaduantageous to a Prince, to nouriſh factions, are as follow. It is Mach. lib. 3. diſ. cap. 37. impoſſible, ſay they, by reaſon of an inbred inconſtancy in the nature of men, that thoſe factions, which at this, or that preſent, depend vpon a Prince, ſhould alwaies, and after one and the ſelfe-ſame manner, bee ſo affected towards him, for that men being wauering, doe greatly deſire ſometimes this Prince, ſometimes that Prince, to be their chiefe Patron. Againe, Idem Ibidem. the nourſhing of factions, by a Prince in a forreigne Land, is oftentimes the cauſe, that by little and little, diſcords and ciuill garboyles are brought into his owne Country, which will ſcarcely be thought to bee conuenient. Further, a great inconuenience, or rather an apparant loſſe might happen to a Prince, who ſhould nouriſh factions within his owne Dominions; For Idem Prin. cap. 20. vpon any ſodaine inuaſion, ſuch Cities of his, which ſhould happen to bee rent aſunder by factions, muſt of neceſſity be all loſt: For the Tholoz. lib. de Repub. 23. weaker part would rather ſubmit, and apply it ſelfe to a ſtranger, then yeeld to the aduerſe faction in any thing. Moreouer this courſe of gouerning, by nouriſhing of factions, muſt needs Mach. Prin. cap. 20. argue the weakeneſſe, and imbecility of the Prince, both in power and iudgement: For if hee were ſtrong and prudent, hee would neuer indure that his Country ſhould bee torne in peeces by factions and contentions. To conclude, ſeeing that euery faction conſiſteth of few or many, both of theſe muſt needs bee hurtfull to the Common-wealth: This latter for that Liu. lib. 34. they truſting to their owne ſtrength, would preſently take Armes, and turne the quiet of the State into garboiles: The former likewiſe, though perhaps ſomewhat more ſecretly and ſlowly, would no leſſe vexe and moleſt the Commonwealth, by reaſon that Ariſt. 5. Polit. cap. 4. factions of the Nobility are wont to draw vnto themſelues all, or the greateſt part of the Commons, to take part with ſuch or ſuch of them, as they moſt affect. Theſe things thus ſtanding, they conclude, that factions are rather to bee extinguiſhed and quenched, then nouriſhed. For mine owne part (Right Honourable) though I will determine nothing of this matter, yet thus I thinke thereof. That Factions, to the ſingular benefite of the Prince, and Commonwealth, may be nouriſhed in a forreigne gouernement: and though it were not ſo conuenient (perhaps) they ſhould bee ſet on foote, and maintained at home, yet at no hand are they to be neglected, eſpecially in the time of peace. For ſeeing that there is no Common-wealth, which doth not breed and bring forth, yea foſter and cheriſh ſome enuy and contention: theſe contentions may proue healthfull to the State of a Common-wealth, as Agues are ſometime beneficiall to the ſtate of a mans body: And it is certaine that the Romane Common-wealth, was neuer in better health and ſafety, then when the Tribunes of the People, and the Patricians were at variance: and the Lacedaemonian State neuer in better ſtate, then when their Ephori, and their Kings could not agree. For by this curbing of one another, the publique Offices of a Common-wealth were better diſcharged, both at home and abroad.

SECT. I. CHAP. XIIII.

Of Sedition, Mutiny, and defection, of the greateſt part of the people in a State, and of ſtanding Newtrall, or part taking.

It may be demanded whence ſedition and mutining, in, or, againſt a State taketh his beginning?

MAY it ariſe and ſpring out of the bitter Tholoz. Ariſtotle 5. Pol. Cap. 3. roote of oppreſſion, as when men apprehending the remedy of preſent euils and dangers, to bee the euils and dangers themſelues, doe vpon a ſodaine breake out, and ſo take Armes? Or may it proceede Idem Ibidem. of feare as the Phyloſopher well conceited? For feare may moue and incite men, to bee ſeditious, fearing or expecting puniſhments to be inflicted vpon them, for the wrongs they haue done, and by this meanes running out, they thinke (or at leaſt are willing) to preuent them before they can bee put in execution. Or may this proceed of too much indulgency, clemency, and remiſſneſſe of the gouernement, together with the ſuperfluity and aboundance of all things, it being rather the nature of the people to Liuy lib. 2. grow to bee Wantons then Warriours? Or may it come rather of Saluſt. Sugurth. penury, and ſcarcity of things neceſſary? Or may it happen through the Liu. lib. 38. pride and ambition of euill Gouernours and Councellours? Or may it rather ariſe of taking vp too much mony at Vſe, with the which the Commons being (as it were) eaten vp, and their ſtates conſumed, they grow deſperate thereupon, and ſo take Armes, thinking Tacit. 1. Hist. themſelues moſt ſafe when they runne the moſt vncertaine courſes? for worſe then they are, they thinke they cannot bee.

It may further bee demanded, whether, when once ſedition groweth hot, and commeth to Heads, it were better to ſtand Newtrall, then to fall to part-taking?

TOuching this Queſtion (Right Honourable) vnleſſe that Solon. great Athenian Law-giuer, had decreed and eſtabliſhed by Law, that vpon any ſedition ariſing in that State, Sic refert A. Gaellius. in Noct. Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12. he that would not take part with one ſide, ſhould bee baniſhed the Citie, and looſe all that euer hee poſſeſſed; I ſhould ſcarce haue thought it worth the looking into: but after ſo wiſe a man had determined it, and for that I perceiued others, who thought themſelues as wiſe, as the ſaid Law giuer, did ſtiffely ſtand againſt his opinion, and vpon good grounds (as they ſuppoſe) produced arguments to the contrary, I thought it worthy my labour likewiſe, to put downe the reaſons on both ſides, and in concluſion to enterpone mine own priuate opinion touching the premiſſes. Thoſe therefore who ſtand on Solons ſide, and allow and ſtand for part-taking doe thus argue: A. Gaellius noct. Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12. If the good men, which be in the Citie or Common-wealth, perceiuing the Seditious to bee madded with fury, and to grow to an head, ſhould apply themſelues to either part, there is no doubt, but that they might bee a meanes to reduce them to vnity; perſwading firſt with their owne ſide, how ill beſeeming a thing it is, for Citizen to ſtriue with, or take Armes againſt Citizen, and what deſtruction of them and theirs may enſue, if they ſuffer themſelues ſtill to be led with paſſion, and by that meanes mollifying their owne friends minds, they may (happily) get leaue likewiſe to deale with the other ſide, in thoſe or ſuch like termes, and ſo perſwade both parties to lay downe their weapons. Againe, Phauorinus Philoſophus. thoſe which take part with neither ſide, if the differences of the factious ſhould once bee compounded, ſhould ſmart for it, being hated on both ſides, deemed as publique enemies, and ſuch as ſolaced themſelues, and reioyced to ſee them at thoſe oddes, and therefore are iuſtly expoſed to the prey, and iniuries of either party. Further, it were very dangerous when the Citie or Common-wealth is diuided into faction, not to take part with the one or the other ſide, leaſt a Ioſephus de bello Iudaico. third faction ſhould ſpring out of the others, as hath ſometimes beene read to haue falne out in the Iewes Commonwealth. But thoſe which ſtand for newtrality, think otherwiſe, and thus they reaſon Tacit. Annal. Ciuill Armes of themſelues, can neither be prouided, taken vp, or managed by any good or lawfull meanes, and the iſſue and end of them commonly proueth naught. For the Leaders and Captaines of the ſeditious, vnder the pretence of ſeeking the good of the Common wealth, do euery one ſeeke to promote his owne ambitious humours, and ſo draw the people to follow their fancies, which no good Patriote ought to do. Againe, it argueth great folly in any, who ſhal take either part, and ioyne with the ſeditious: for by that meanes they Saluſt. in bello Iug • rthino. ſtrengthen and encourage them, encreaſe their malice towards their Countrey-men, and fellow-Citizens of the aduerſe partie, and become partakers of their rebellions, madneſſe, and folly. Touching mine owne priuate opinion herein, I think (right Honourable) that newtrality is regularly to be auoyded in either Prince or Courtier, except in ſome maine caſe, where a man by making ſhew to be newtrall, may more handſomly compouud and contriue his owne buſineſſe, and better promote, and ſooner come to his owne ends.

FINIS.