1

It may bee demanded wherefore the wisest Licurgus. So­lon. Epaminon­das, Numa, Xe­nophon. Law­giuers did euer conclusionally determine, that the care of Religion, and all holy things should be­long vnto the Prince?

WAs it because they thought it fit, that that which was Diogenes apud Stobaeum. best, and most worthy to bee had in honour, should bee honoured of the best, and him who bare the chiefest rule in the Monarchy, or State? Or was [Page 2] it rather, because they wisely considered, that Xenophon Paedia Cyri. l. 8. if their Subiects feared God, they would bee the more loath to do any thing which might redound to the hurt of one another, or attempt any thing against the Prince? Or was it not for these causes alone, but rather likewise, Arist. Rhet. ad Alex. for the augmenting and enlarging of their Empire and Dominions, as though the Diuine Powers were more prone, pro­pitious, and fauourable, towards those that serue them, then vnto any others? Or to conclude, was it for the generall good of a Common-wealth, as a certaine Lactantius de ira Cap. 12 [...]. Diuine plainely protested, who held that Religion, and the Feare of God, were the surest bands for conseruing of Humane Society?

2

It may further bee demanded, how farre a Prince ought to take care of matters concerning Religion?

OVght hee (as some do thinke) to take care for the examination of the truth or falshood of that Religion which hee professeth, and in all Eccle­siasticall matters to take vpon him to bee chiefe Iudge and Determiner of them, according to his owne municipall Lawes? Or ought hee rather (as others imagine) to bee a defender onely of that Re­ligion which formerly hath beene receiued, or af­terwards is propounded or obtruded vnto him?

The opini­on of all Prin­ces and States not subiect to the Pope. This latter may be thought an vniust limitation, that any Prince, or State, should bee so curbed: and as touching the former, The opini­on of the Church of Rome and her adh [...]rents. others thinke that a Prince hath no free power, or authority, to constitute or [Page 3] determine Ecclesiasticall businesse, but that by bare permission onely, hee may haue a meere inspection into them: Which monstrous Opinion, in a Trea­tise (almost ready to come forth) I haue resuted: Euidently prouing that the Church, being a part of the State, it cannot bee without apparant danger to the same, to admit of forraigne Iurisdiction in ma­naging matters Ecclesiasticall, but that such affaires ought alwaies to bee ordered by those who beare the Soueraignety, or some other, by their appoint­ment, within the same State.

3

It may bee further demanded, wherefore the Liu. lib. 7. hist. Rom. Ro­manes alwaies confessed and acknowledged that they were more obliged and indebted to Numa then to Romulus.

THis question (Right Honourable) out of the Ro­manes owne History is thus resolued: Affir­ming that Romulus (though founder of their Citty) left little or nothing vnto them, but their names to be called Romanes: But Numa (being the chiefe bringer in of Religion) perpetuated the same, and seemed to giue vnto them their very essence and being, and (as it were) to cause the prosperous suc­cesse of their State. For Romulus (saith the Histo­ry) brought in the forme of a Common wealth, which was likely not to be durable, but might end with himselfe: But his Successor Numa, vpon the bringing in the continuall practise and exercise of Religion, did in such wise forme and frame the [Page 4] Common-wealth, that though himselfe should shortly die, yet there was left an euident meane and way to make it durable for many ages.

4

To the same purpose it may be demanded, wherefore the Liu. lib. 10. Hist. Rom. Romanes did make more account of Religion then all other Nations?

VVAs it because they plainely saw, that the setling Religion in the State, was the fir­mest prop they could rely vpon, for the vpholding, conseruing, and perpetuating of their Common­wealth, and that it would serue most fitly for the bringing in of Military Discipline, and Armes, to which they were most addicted, and without which they iudged their State could not stand? Or was it rather, for that they vnder this pretence (as those who knew how to (make vse of Religion) did practise it ore fortunately, and with better successe then others, to retaine and keepe those which were good in their allegeance and obedience, and to curbe and restraine those who were ill disposed from commit­ting euill, or persisting and continuing in their lewd courses: as likewise to Liu. lib. 3. Circa legem Te­rentillam. pacifie the seditious, Liu. lib. 3. circa creationem tri­bulorum plebis consulari digni­tate. reconcile such Subiects as were iustly offended and grieued, with the Rulers and the gouernment, Liu. lib. 5. retaine their Military Discipline, and keep their Souldiers in good order, Liu. lib. 10. get credite and autho­rity to their Commanders: enterprise warres, and to bring them to a happy end?

5

Againe, it may bee demanded to the same purpose, wherefore the Romanes, euen in their greatest streights and difficulties did rather vse the pretext and colour of religion, to expedite and helpe them­selues, then any other meanes whatsoeuer.

WAs it because Francise. Guicciardin. they were perswaded that the Common-people did rather iudge by the shadowes then the substances of things? Or was it not for that cause alone, but ra­ther for that they found by experience, that men are more throughly moued, and thinke themselues faster tyed vpon an Liu. lib. 3. oath taken (which hath his de­pendancie vpon Religion) then by any Lawes or Statutes whatsoeuer?

6

It may further bee demanded wherefore in former times men (generally) were more religious then they are in these dayes?

WAs it because that in those elder times there was not that contempt of Religion, and neg­lect of God & his seruice, as is now in these moderne dayes? Or was it rather, because in those more happy times, it was held altogether vnlawfull for any man to make what construction he list of an oath when hee had taken it, and thereout to frame rules of liuing to himselfe, according to his owne liking; but to fashion his life and manners rather to [Page 6] such lawes as were giuen, and imposed vpon him to obserue?

7

It may finally be demanded, wherefore (seeing there is but one truth) there are at this day so many and sundry opinions about Religion, euen among Christi­ans themselues.

IS it because the Clergie themselues in diuers poynts disagree, being distracted into factions, and writing and disputing one against another; which the rude and ignorant multitude once see­ing, do thereby take vpon them to dispute of Diui­nitie, to establish their fond and foolish opinions in matters of Religion, which in no wise belonged vn­to them to meddle withall? Or may it bee, for that sometime yong Schollers, either in yeares, learning or discretion taking vpon them to preach, teach, or write, doe propound false or vnsound Doctrine to the people: whose corrupt opinions once set a­broach (as though it were a shame for them to change them vpon more mature deliberation into better) do continually bestirre themselues, and em­ploy their wits, rather to confirme, then amend their errors? Or is this the reason rather, for that the followers of any Sect whatsoeuer, study to tread in their first Teachers steps, and obserue such cour­ses and customes as formerly haue beene prescribed vnto them?

1

It may bee demanded, wherefore according to many mens opinions, the Monarchy, or sole rule of one, ought to be preferred before other formes of gouerne­ment?

IS it because that Cic. de legibus lib. 3. Iustinus H [...]storicus lib. 1 in initio. Monarchy is the most ancient kinde of go­uernment, seeing that the name of Monarchy and Empire was first in the world? Or is it be­cause this kinde of gouerne­ment best agreeth to Salust in Epi­stolis. nature, as is to be seene by all, or the most of all other creatures, in whom this image and shadow of one to rule ouer the rest may plain­ly appeare? Or is it because it is most agreeable to Tacit. 1. Annal reason, that the body of an Empire being but one, should likewise be swayed by the discretion of one sole Ruler? Or is this rather the reason, because that neither in a Tacit. 4. Annal popular estate, where many gouerne, nor in an Aristocracie, where a few sway the scepter, there can be possible any long concord and agree­mēt among them? Or is it because that both in Tacit. 1. Annal Liu. lib. 5. De­mocracies and Aristocracies it hath bin euer obserued, [...] [Page 10] euer great store of good wits, which may bee fit­ted and accomodated to all times and occasions, better then other formes of gouernement? Or might this rather bee their reason, because they obserued that this forme of gouernement was not so subiect to Arist. Polit. 5. alteration, or to grow into tyranny? For to speake as they would haue the thing to be, The opinion of Machiauel, lib. 1. Disputat. Cap. 5. though these few of the Clarissimi who sway the gouernement, be naturally ambitious; notwith­standing when they see and consider that all the authoritie is in their owne hands, and by reason thereof that they surpasse and excell the rest of their people, they content themselues (for the most part) with this prerogatiue, and so raise no tumults, or stirre vp any troubles whereby the Common-wealth might bee vexed or disquieted for their ambitious humors.

And thus (Right Honorable) you see how that as euery one most fancied and affected this, or that kinde of gouernement: so they yeelded rea­sons for the maintaining of their opinions? Wherein (in my conceit) they haue mist the Cushion, and vpon good grounds (as I hope) I may argue against them all. And thus for Argu­ment sake I reason against their Monarchy.

Euery Monarch is either tied to rule, accor­ding to the lawes of the kingdome hee possesseth, or he is not; If he be not bound, then all men will confesse with me, that that Monarchy may easily degenerate, and grow into tyranny. But if the Mo­narch bee tied to obserue lawes, nothing letteth [Page 11] (notwithstanding) but that forme of Common­wealth may not bee durable, especially when the kingdome commeth by succession. Dantes Poeta Ital [...]. For very sel­dome falleth it out, that to a wise and godly Fa­ther, a Sonne of that stampe, and endowed with like vertues, should succeed. Now, whenas by the peruerse, carelesse, or bad carriage of the Mo­narch toward his people, the manners of his sub­iects are once corrupted, it must of necessitie fol­low, that either the lawes are of small force, or none at all. And so farewell to that forme of go­uernment.

Against their Democracie, I this auerre, or (ra­ther) finally determine, That if any good Coun­cels or Decrees come from the people, they pro­ceed from them rather by meere chance, and ac­cidentally, then for any prime or principall in­tention of the Councellers. For the people being driuen by some extreame necessity, to runne such and such courses, or put in practise those or these counsels, or being furthered by some memorable accident falling out in the nicke (as we say) may oftentimes decree things well and wisely, other­wise it is impossible for them so to doe? For they know not (for the most part) what they would haue, they aske what they know not, and when they haue obtained what they asked, by and by they spurne, kicke at it, and despise it: so that the prouerbe in them, and of them, is true, and euer will bee verified; The people is a beast of many heads, wauering and enuious. So that I may very safely [Page 12] conclude, that this forme of gouernment is worst of all.

Against the State Aristocraticall, I this affirme, that experience hath made it manifest to the world, that those, who for a while haue iustly and vprightly gouerned the Common-wealth, not long after haue abused their power and authori­ty to the gathering of riches, and getting posses­sions of lands into their hands, insomuch that they haue growne ambitious, earnestly thirsting after priuate reuenge, and the fulfilling of their owne filthy lusts and appetites, as appeared plain­ly in the Aristocracie of the Romanes, when after they grew weary to be gouerned by Consuls, and had set vp the Decemvirate, in the beginning of the second yeare of their gouernment, they were inforced to change that state into a Democracie, because the Decemviri ruled so villanously. A­gaine, it is recorded by antiquitie, that the sonnes of vertuous parents, who were, and did succeede in diuers gouernements, became extreame inso­lent, common letchers, and spend-thrifts of those patrimonies which their carefull parents had left vnto them: Vpon which grounds I conclude, That the Aristocraticall gouernment cannot stand long firme, and stable, much lesse to bee perma­nent and durable.

4

These things then being, as I haue said, and conside­ring that euery forme of gouernmēt is so subiect to change & alteration, it were welworth the labour to [Page 13] make a true Disquisition of this nice point, to wit, what forme of gouernment were fittest for euery Kingdome and Country, whereby the welfare thereof might bee procured and continued.

TO determine this question (Right Honoura­ble) were a very hard taske to be vndertaken and performed of any man, yet because I haue ta­ken vpon to discourse of this subiect, I will in briefe show your Lordship my opinion therein.

And first, I am verily perswaded, that this, or that forme of gouernement, whether already establi­shed, or to be brought in, and established, in any Kingdome or Country, doth chiefly depend vpon the nature and disposition of that Kingdome or Country, into which it hath bene already, or is to be brought: For it would be a very hard matter to bring a free forme of gouernment into that Coun­try, who haue bene vsed to liue vnder a Monarch, as contrariwise, to reduce that people, to liue vn­der the obedience and command of one absolute Ruler, who haue vsed to liue free of thēselues, & to bee gouerned by their owne Lawes. The Easterne Countries not enduring to brooke the Aristocra­ticall or Democraticall State, were euer deuoted to liue vnder one sole Monarch. On the other side, no forme of gouernment would please the Athe­nians and Heluetians (whom at this day wee call Switzers) but a Democracy: None the Lacedaemoni­ans but an Aristocracy. The Syracusians affected a tyranicall forme of gouernement: Neither [Page 14] could any of these people euer bee perswaded to forsake that forme of gouernment which they had once chosen: Nay, which is more, they did with such deadly and implacable hatred, prosecute all those who erected, or set vp any other kinds of Policies to bee gouerned, and to gouerne by, that wheresoeuer, and whensoeuer, they became Conquerours, they altered and abrogated, that forme of Gouernement, and brought in their owne forme.

Secondly, I vtterly deny all right formes of Common-wealthes, as the Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, to bee absolute and perfect: much lesse do I hold that any goodnesse can be in a Ty­ranie, Oligarchy, or Ochlocracy; For these last rela­ted, by reason of the multitude of euils which accompany them, are of, and in themselues al­waies euill, the Magistrates neuer regarding the common-good but their owne ends: The former likewise, although in themselues they are good (for that in all of them, the chiefe good of the Common-wealth, or State, either is, or ought to be sought) yet accidentally, they many times be­come euill; as well for that they last not long, as that they so easily degenerate.

To conclude therefore, I hold that forme of Common-wealth to bee best, which is compoun­ded of the temper of all these, or at leastwise is so mixed of a Monarchy and Aristocracy, that one (indeed) for the Maiesty of the State should bee the chiefe Commander, but his power should be [Page 15] gouerned, and his Councels ordered by the de­crees and wisedome of the Senate: For by this meanes, the Prince should retaine his splendor and dignity, the Senate their power and authori­ty, and the people their lawfull liberty.

1

It may bee demanded why priuate men, can neuer well and rightly iudge of the affaires of Princes?

IS it because they exactly Guicchardine. know not the matters of State, the ends of Princes, or how farre this, or that bu­sinesse, effected, or neg­lected, doth concerne them? Or may this rather bee the reason that Idem. forasmuch as the counsels, purposes, and designes of Princes, differ so farre from the drifts and courses of pri­uate men, it is impossible that the selfe-same pro­iects should be auaileable to them both? For it (most what) so falleth out, that although matters of State, determinations of businesses, and the commodities or discommodities which may be [Page 16] expected to arise thereof, should be knowne as well to priuate men, as to Princes themselues, their applications, censures, and iudgements, notwithstanding touching the premisses, would be diuers, as their first ends and intentions were, which they had propounded to themselues.

2

In the next place it may bee demanded, where­fore, as wee commonly reade in Histories, as out of Tacitus and others, that that man, whose aide and helpe a Prince hath made vse of bring him to the Crowne, within a while after is neither liked nor loued of that Prince, but either is fed with the smoake of innouation, or made shorter by the head?

IS it because that some Princes being naturally suspicious, do esteeme the faith of those to be fickle to them, which they haue proued to haue beene to the damage of others? Or is not that the reason, but this rather, that the very sight of them whose helpe they haue vsed to their rising, groweth idious vnto them, for that it seemeth to vp-braide them with the basenesse of their for­mer meane fortunes? Or may it not be so neither, but for that it is Philipus Co­minaeus. grieuous vnto some Princes to remember that they owe any thing, or that they are any waies beholding to their Subiects?

3

It may further bee demanded, how that Prince, who hath bereaued another of his Kingdome, [Page 17] might behaue himselfe to enioy his new-got Empire with safety?

SShall hee effect this, if hee This was the errour of Ser­uius Tullius King of the Romanes, whō Tarquinius Su­perbus slew. affect him whom he hath so spoyled, with new fauours and be­nefites, endeuouring thereby to reconcile him, and binde him fast vnto him? But it is to bee fea­red, that old iniuries will hardly bee forgotten, by collating and bestowing of new benefites vp­on the wronged, especially if the greatnesse of the iniuries, exceede the rate of the benefites, as it falleth out commonly in the case of Kingdomes. Or shall he bring this about the rather, if he This was the practise of Se­limus, the Tur­kish Emperor, who being but a yonger bro­ther, poysoned Baiazet his fa­ther, made a­way Corcut and Acomat his two brethren, &c. So dealt Rich. the 3. with his two nephewes the sonnes of Edward the 4. with the Duke of Buckingham likewise, and others. mur­ther, and kill, all those whom he imagineth to stand in his way, or whom hee standeth in doubt of, least in time they may become his enemies? But if he take these courses, he must needs fall in­to some great mischiefe; for he shall ingulfe him­selfe in the vast Ocean of the peoples hatred, and thereby weaken his owne power against the time he should haue most occasion to vse it.

4

It may further bee demanded, why it so much im­porteth Princes, and great men, to be cautelous that they do not iniury, or reproach any man?

IS it for that hee who is wronged of those who are in Philipus Co­minaeus. eminent place, and authority, perceiuing himselfe to bee daily and hourely shot at, and no­ted for the same, grieueth the more therat, and so sets vp his rest to take a sharp reuenge? Or ought [Page 18] they to be cautelous for this cause likewise, Cominaeus. least if the wronged hauing formerly retained vnto them, or made any dependency vpon them, shold vpon any trust committed vnto him, pay them home, in neglecting, or vtterly ouerthrowing their chiefest businesses?

5

It may further be demanded, why it greatly impor­teth a Prince, to bee Vertuous, Honourable of his word, iust, and of good Example among all men, as well Forreigners, as Domestiques?

IS it for that he may be thought vnfit Xenophon in Paedia Cyri. to gouern, who is not better euery way then those who are to bee gouerned? Or is it not for that cause onely, but for that Sen. 1. de Cle­mentia. his good name and fame likewise at home, and abroad is greatly blemished and stai­ned, if the course of his life and dealings bee not currant? Or ought hee to bee such an one for the better stablishing of his Kingdome also? Sen. Thiest. For where there is no shame, care of doing of Iustice, Sanctity, Piety, & keeping of promise, thatkingdom must needs bee vnstable, and the State tottering.

6

It may be the same purpose further demanded, why a Prince ought to be iust, to make speciall reckoning of the administration thereof equally to his Sub­iects, ey, to do iustice vpon himselfe, if hee desire to be held for a good Prince?

IS it for that Plato in Polit. a Lawlesse Principallity, and loose gouernement is yrksome to euery one (especial­ly [Page 19] of the better sort) so that they do not delight, or haue any desire to liue vnder it? Or is it for that the constant and strict obseruation, and admini­stration of Iustice, doth stablish and strengthen a Kingdome, as the Cic. Parad. Oratour well perceiued, who said that Iustice and Equity were the true conseruators of Common-wealthes and Cities? Or is it not onely for that iustice doth stablish a Kingdome, but for that it doth truely make a king­dome to be a Kingdome, giuing vnto it his very essence and being, whereby it is, that which it is? For take away Iustice, and what are Kingdomes but great Robberies? as well said the August. de Ciuil. Dei lib. 4. learned Diuine.

8

It may further be demanded, why many Princes are very fearefull, suspicious, and iealous of their estates?

IS it because that Attius. Kingdomes are commonly subiect to treacheries? Or is this rather the rea­son, for that the Sen. Oedip. nature of most Princes is prone to feare, and be iealous of their Estates? as well said the Poet, Sen. in Agam. Kingdomes and Mariages brooke no riuals.

9

It may further bee demanded, wherefore all credit, countenance, honors, and authority in Court, are for the most part slippery, and not to be trusted vnto?

HAppeneth it thus by reason of the Fates vn­certainty (as it pleaseth the Tacit. 3. An­nalium. Historian to set [Page 20] downe) who auerreth, that Court-fauours, euen by decree of the destinies, are not alwaies lasting? Or might this rather be the reason, for that Tacit. 17. An­nalium. Cour­tiers credites are (commonly) vpheld by others, and not by their owne strengths? Or not so nei­ther, but for that these things thus fall out through the fault of the Princes, their Maisters, whom they serue, whose wils and pleasures as they are Salust. Iu­gurth. vehement for the time, so they are very changeable, and oftentimes contrary to them­selues?

10

Seeing that the Sen. in Hip­polito. Court is so slippery a place, that a man shall hardly get fast footing: It may fitly bee demanded, by what Compasse a Courtier should saile, that hee may bee without all dan­ger of shipwracke, whereby either his life may bee hazarded, his goods diminished, or his ho­nour blemished?

SHall he attaine vnto those ends, if he show him­selfe dutifull, obsequious, and respectiue of his Prince, as it pleased the Tacit. 1. An­nal. Historian to affirme? For by how much the seruant in the iudgement of his Maister, shall bee held more desirous and ready to please him, then another shall; by so much the more hee shall bee aduanced to ho­nours and riches? Or may hee compasse his de­sires the better, if he be The saying of Constantine the Great. seruiceable likewise, and not like the moathes, and caterpillars of the Court? Or may hee rather further his intents, [Page 21] if he be bold spirited also? For shamefastnesse is an ill seruitour in a Princes Palace, as well said the Sen. in Hippol. Poet. Or shall he be cautelous likewise, ta­king heed that whatsoeuer he well doth or perfor­meth, he do it as Velleius. 11. though he seemed not to do it, and without boasting or bragging? Or (to auoid enuy) shall he learne to Tacit. 16. An­nal. dissemble, cloake, and obscure his owne vertues, and proper gifts? Or shall hee, being any wayes aduanced by his Prin­ces fauours, like the Moone, Tacit in Agric acknowledge (of­tentimes) that he hath receiued all the light of his glory, and grace of his rising, from that Sunne his maister? Or shall hee striue and endeuour to be­come very Sen. 11. de ira. patient, and Sen. Hippolit. extreame wary like­wise? He must be very patient, that he may beare iniuries the better, & not flie out, or run into pas­sion vpon euery crosse he shall meet withall, or such distastes as shall be giuen him. He must bee cautelous, least he be taken in the traps of his fai­ned friends, or secret, or open professed enemies.

11

It may further be demanded, why it is better to liue with, and serue a prudent and wise Prince, then a foolish?

IS it because that a Philip. Comi­naeus. lib. 4. foolish Prince being (for the most part) very suspitious, thinketh that e­uery of his seruants goeth about to deceiue him, which to an Honest minde must needes be a great errosiue? Or is it for that a Idem ibidem. foolish Prince not vnderstanding his owne affaires, cannot make [Page 22] difference of good seruice from bad, whereupon it commeth to passe, that his loue is turned into hatred, and his hatred into loue in a moment? Or is it not for these reasons onely, but for this like­wise, that Phil. Com. lib. 4. those seruants which liue vnder a wise Prince, haue moe meanes affoorded them to re­taine their maisters fauour, if they once haue had it, or to recouer it if they haue lost it, then it is possible they can haue, who liue vnder an Ideot, or foolish Prince? For no man almost dealeth in any thing with the Prince himselfe, but with his This was wel seene in the Duke of little Brittaine, who vsed onely Pe­ter Landoys. seruants, whom he changeth as often as he put­teth on a cleane shirt.

12

To the same purpose it may further be demanded wherefore (notwithstanding) many Courtiers haue rather chosen to liue in the Courts of some great Prince, though a foole, then in the Palace of a lesse potent Prince, though neuer so wise.

IS it because that Lucas de Pen­na. it is true libertie (as some sup­pose) to liue vnder the command of a potent Prince? Or is it rather, as others affirme, for that Egisippus cum alijs, vt refert Guic. the seruitors seruices are graced and beautified by the greatnesse and super-eminent dignitie of their maisters?

13

Seeing that none are borne Artists it may be de­manded, what manner of Courtier is to be deemed and esteemed to be the better Crafts-maister in ma­naging affaires of State?

IS he the man who is Guicchard. furnished with the know­ledge of diuers tongues, well seene in Histories of the lawes of his owne and other Countries, that is religious, hath a quicke wit, a ripe iudge­ment, a fluent tongue, a graue stile, & is an excel­lent pen-man? Or is he rather to be so accounted, who is Guic. & Tacit 3. Annal. smooth-tongued; gorgeously apparrel­led, a great feast-maker, an artificiall cosouner, a deepe dissembler, a whoore-maister, tale-bearer, flatterer, a priuy-whisperer, and one that is giuen to all kinde of villanie?

14

It may further be demanded, what might bee the best meanes wherby Princes may free themselues, from being abused by flatterie?

MAy they effect this if they beware and take heed that they Tholoz. de Re­pub. lib. 22. cap. 8 grow not into contempt with their people? Or shall they bring their pur­pose better about, if they sit often in counsell, and touching those things which they propound to be consulted vpon, doe shew themselues Plut. Apotheg. patient in hearing the truth, that their people may vnder­stand that they will not be offended, if they freely speake their mindes, and confidently deliuer that which is true? Or may this likewise further their intents, if vpon the Machiauel his doctrine in his Prince. Cap. 23. perceiuing and finding out of some or other, who for some sinister respects (though towards themselues) haue held their peace, or forborne to speake the truth, they do ei­ther shew themselues to be greatly offended with them, or seuerely punish them?

1

It may be demanded, by what wayes and meanes a­ny Principalitie may be gotten, or conquered.

IS it to be atchieued by Quintus Cur­tius. lib. 6. for­raigne Armes, as it happened to Alexander, when hee had ouer-throwne Darius at Ar­bella? For after that victory, he neuer vsed in the full con­quest of Asia, or other king­domes, any other but for­raigne forces, for the most part. Or is it rather to be gotten by an home-bred Army, seconded by the vertue and the manhood of the Leaders, and Captaines, as it fell to the lot of Xenophon. Cyrus, Romulus, [Page 25] and Theseus? Or may it bee attained by forraigne force also, seconded by Fortunes fauours, as it happened to Francis Sfortia, and Borgia Caesar? Or may it bee gotten by the putting in practise of some notorious and desperate designe, as it hap­pened to Agathocles? Or may it be compassed by the fauour of the Citizens, as Nabides got his do­minion?

2

In the next place it may bee demanded, how any Principality being once gotten, may be safely kept.

MAy this be effected if the Prince proue indu­strious, and accomodate himselfe to make and take aduantage of such accidents and occasi­ons as time will continually affoord him, and in all other things to imitate and follow the steps of his Auncestors? Or may it be effected, if he neuer giue any offence to those, whose helpe he vsed in getting his dominion, but satisfie them accor­ding to their desires and hopes (if it be possible) as they haue conceiued of their owne worths? Or may he this way rather attaine therunto, if finding treason intended against him, he should most se­uerely punish it, for terrour to the rest? Or may it this way be effected, if vpon the obtaining of his dominion, he The barba­rous and in­humane pra­ctise of the Turkes at e­uery change of Prince. destroy all the bloud Royall, issues and allies, of the former Prince, and then obserue the Countrey customes without changing their lawes? Or may this rather bee effected, if hee that hath once gotten the soueraignty, remoue his seat [Page 26] thither, and make his continuall residence in his new dominion? Or may this yet rather bee effe­cted, if the Prince send Colonies into his new­gotten kingdome, or maintaine garrisons both of horse and foote, in the frontier townes? Or may hee better bring this to passe, if (after conquest made) dealing courteously with them, hee retire himselfe, and accept of an annuall pension, in the name of a tribute, leauing onely some small com­pany behinde him, rather to nourish and encrease his subiects good opinion of him, then for any o­ther end or purpose? or may he effect this the bet­ter, if he altogether should change their lawes and customes, and translate them to other remote pla­ces in the same kingdome, then those which be­fore they inhabited? or may this rather be the way to purchase the fauour and good opinion of the Senators, or commons, hauing them alwayes ad­dicted to his fortunes, taking vpon him valiantly and couragiously to defend those of his par­tie, against the other faction? or were not this the better course, to stand vpon his owne guard, hauing an army euer in a readinesse to chasten his subiects if they should rebel? Or finally, what if the This did Crae­sus among the Lidians, as Po­lib. reporteth. Conquerour should dispoyle the conquered of their weapons, and other meanes of defence or offence?

3

It may further be demanded, how a new got King­dome may be enlarged?

SHall this be attained vnto, if the This was the practise of the Romans in sen­ding their Pre­tors. Conquerour [Page 27] shew himselfe milde & gentle to his new subiects, thereby to allure the hearts of the neighbour bor­derers, to take a liking of his manner of gouern­ment? Or may it rather be effected, if This fell out in the Macedu­nian Monar­chie. a great ma­ny of wise and warlike Princes do stil succeed one another in the selfe-same gouernement? Or may this be better done, if the conqueror haue a great care that Military discipline be alwaies vsed within his territories? Or should he rather go this way to worke, to This & such like practises were the Ro­manes. demolish the walles of the neighbour Cities, and cause the inhabitants to remoue their dwellings into his territories? Or shall he friend­ly inuite all strangers to come into his domini­ons, giuing them letters of safe conduct, and secu­ring them of their dwelling safely vnder his pro­tection? Or shall he combine with diuers neigh­bouring Cities, ioyning themselues with them as associats, so as the name of the Empire and go­uernment, as likewise the authoritie of leuying of warre, may euer remaine with him, and bee pro­per vnto him? Or shall he make those whom hee hath conquered to Thus dealt the Spartans, Venetians and Florentius with them whom they conque­red. become vassals and slaues vn­to him? Or might this be effected, if certaine Ci­ties making The practise of the Switzers at this day. league among themselues, that they will all be gouerned, and with equall digni­ties, and respect, should draw in other Cities to affect that kind of gouernment, and so to ioyne in the same league and amitie with them?

4

It may further be demanded, which might bee the best way to make a state durable and lasting?

SHall this be brought to passe, if by lawes it bee prouided for, vnder paine Capitall, that All these things were fore-seene by Lycurgus, the Laced. emonian Law-giuer. no man should affect the Gouernement? Or may it better bee effected, if the Prince being strong of himselfe, shall yet giue testimony to his neighbour Princes, that hee is not ambitious, nor seeketh by leuying of Armes, to enlarge his Dominions to any of their detriments? Or shall hee doe it yet the better, if by idlenesse, and vaine pleasures hee suffer not the mindes of his subiects to bee corrupted, or that they should grow too much effeminate?

5

Considering that Kingdomes are strengthened as well by awfull Armes, as bright shining Ver­tue, it may bee demanded, by what kinde of force a Kingdome may best bee preserued, and made durable.

SHall it bee made firme and stable by hauing an Armie euer in a readinesse, rather to of­fend then defend, according to the counsell of the Emperour Seuerus; which he gaue to his sons, Sic habetur a­pud Dionem in vita eius. Agree among your selues, enrich the Souldier, and contemne all others? Or shall this bee the better way to make it stable, if the Prince So did the Florentines to keepe Pisa and Francis Sforeia to conserue Millaine, but not to much purpose. build many Forts, Towers, Citadels, Sconces, &c. within his Territories?

6

Seeing that hatred once conceiued against a Prince by his subiects, is the next way to bereaue him of his Crowne, it may bee demanded, how the [Page 29] Prince may run into such hatred, and what meanes hee might best vse to auoid it?

MAy hee runne into this hatred by his owne Mach. de Re­pub. lib. 2. boundlesse ambition, seeking to bring in­to bondage, and the great desires of his Cittizens to continue free? Or may hee come hated of his Subiects, by reason of Mach. de Re­pub. lib. 3. cap. 6. the iniuries hee hath of­fered them, either in seeking their liues, touching their honours, or preying vpon them for their ri­ches? Or rather may it this way come to passe that hee be hated, for that he hath Cic. Phillip. 2. giuen cause to the Subiects to feare him, least he do them a mis­chiefe? For, to feare, desire of reuenge is a per­petuall companion. And this prouerbe is most true, whom a man feareth, him hee hateth; whom he hateth, he would gladly bee rid of? Or may this bee the reason hee runneth into such hatred, for that hee is Tholoz. de Re­pub. lib. 22. vitious; as cruell, couetous, sacrili­gious, &c.

7

It may bee further demanded, how the inflicting of seuere punishments vpon offenders, may bee freed from hatred?

SHall the Prince free himselfe there-from, if hee bee Sen. de Clem. slow to punish delinquents, and thereby giue testimony to the world, that his intent is ra­ther to heale, and bind vp a soare, then to launch and make it bleed by the arme of Iustice? Or shall hee this way free himselfe, if hee neuer punish, [Page 31] but Sen. de Clem. when the safety of the Common wealth cal­leth vpon him so to do, or at least his Subiects be so perswaded? Or shall hee this way rather bee freed, if hee Cic. 2. de Offic. neuer exact to take punishment of delinquents in an angry moode? Or may he this way auoide his Subiects hatred, if hee Sen. 1. de Clem. shew no [...] any signes of reioycing, when hee inflicteth pu­nishment vpon offendours, as though he thirsted after bloud, or were delighted with the shedding of it? Or rather may this be his way, that when many haue offended, hee do not Tacit. Agric. now and then call them to account, as hee listeth, holding them in a perpetuall feare, but take his aduantage against all, and punish all forthwith? Or rather by this way may he be freed therefrom, by not deui­sing any new kind of punishments, but inflicting those which haue beene in vse, according to old and ancient custome of the Country? Or may he this way likewise free himselfe, if hee be very sparing in punishing of delinquents, and when he doth it, hee might bee thought to command it to bee inflicted against his will, but neuer to bee a spectator thereof? Or finally, may hee thus free himselfe there-from, if to please his subiects, hee diuert the force of his fury another way, Tacit. 13. Annal. cau­sing such as haue beene his counsellours, and per­swaders to wrong the Common-wealth, to taste the cup of his choler, by inflicting seuere pu­nishments vpon them, or deliuering them into the peoples hands to be tormented?

8

It may further be demanded how a Prince may free himselfe of that hatred which hee hath purchased, by vexing his Subiects with Impositions, Taxes, Tallages, &c. which are commonly grieuous to them to beare?

MAy this be done if the Prince perswade the people Tacit. 13. An­nal. that if they will liue in peace and out of danger, that it is altogether necessary they indure such impositions, which if they should not, it were impossible for them to liue in safety, or the State to bee durable? For Tacit. 4. hist. peace is not purchased but by Armes, nor Armes maintained but by Souldiers well paid, nor can the Souldier be paid without leuying of Subsidies? Or shall the Prince free himselfe, if hee command the ga­therers of such Impositions, that they Idem. Ibid. neither by force, nor fraude, exact more of the Subiect, then anciently hath beene accustomed to be paid? Or shall hee rather this way auoide their hatred, if sparingly, as iust occasion inforceth him, hee im­pend and lay out such treasure, as hath beene leui­ed by Subsidies, that his Subiects may see and perceiue, that hee is but a Steward, for the good of the Common-wealth, and no riotous spender, or exhauster of the treasure so gathered: or that he hath any desire to conuert any of it, to his owne vse, or ends? Or shall hee thus rather free him­selfe, by taking of a course, that Plin. Paneg. iust and vni­forme contribution be made according to euery [Page 32] mans ability, neuer by fauour sparing one man, that the burthen may lye the heauier vpon ano­ther mans shoulders?

9

It may further be demanded, how, and by what meanes, a great and potent Subiect, may auoide and shunne, the hatred of his Prince?

MAy this be effected, if this great Noble man make himselfe first odious to the people? Or shall hee better effect it, if hee shew himselfe ve­ry dutifull and obsequious to his Prince, praising all his good deeds, and sayings, and craftily dissembling whatsoeuer is bad in him? Or shall hee attaine therevnto, if hee This was the practise of An­tipater, one of Alexanders Captaines, as Q. Curt. repor­teth. neuer proiect to make himselfe great, strengthen himselfe with friends, or seeke to bee maister of greater riches, then is conuenient for his estate? Or if fortune haue east all these things vpon him, that hee ac­knowledge continually, that hee hath receiued, gained, and gotten them, by the grace and fauour of his Prince, whose they are, whensoeuer he shall please to make vse of them? Or shall hee this way auoide his Princes displeasure, if he haue a speci­all care to This was the practise of Io­ab, Dauids Ge­nerall. attempt or do nothing, without con­sulting with, or obtaining the consent of his Prince, though otherwise hee were assured that hee could preuaile in his attempts, and that it would turne to the good of his Country? Or shall hee this way shunne it, if being for a certaine time made Deputy, Lieutenant General, or raised [Page 33] and euected to any other speciall place and dig­nity, he The praictse of Antipater and Lucius Lu­cullus. forth-with at the end, and expiration of his time resigne his office to his Princes hands, and in no wise seeme to be desirous that it be pro­longed, or continued vnto him, least hee should seeme to be sick of the swelling humours of Ambi­tion? Or may hee this way auoide it, if hauing wonne, and prouing victor in diuers battels, hee impute the glory of his Conquests to the good fortune of his Prince, desiring that the victori­ous Army may now bee led by some other, whom the Prince shall thinke good of, and retiring, put himselfe into his Princes protection, carrying himselfe in a moderate fashion, as free from pride and ambition? By this onely meanes a great Ge­nerall, though suspected and feared of his Prince, may so mollifie and lenifie his minde, that hee shall haue no cause to thinke ill of him, but shall make to himselfe great and apparant reasons to re­ward him for his good seruices.

10

It may further bee demanded, why euery King­dome is so fickle and vnstable?

IS it because that euery Sen. Oedip. Idem. etiam Ep. xcij. Principality is the ob­iect of Fortune, who can neuer be daunted, but challengeth the like priuiledge against Empires, as Emperours. Or may this bee the reason rather, because it is exposed to such, and so many hatreds, as the Tragicall Senec. Theb. Poet sung, The Maker of the world coupled these two together; Hatred and a [Page 34] Kingdome. Or may this be the cause, for that it is subiect to so many Attius. treasons, treacheries, &c. for there bee very many in a Kingdome which bee naught and vnfaithfull, few good?

11

To the same purpose it may bee demanded, why among the Grecians and Romanes, Senec. Theb. a Kingdom was so hatefull for the most part?

DId this come to passe by reason of the Idem Agam. man­ners, and crooked dispositions of their Prin­ces, who being (for the most part) licentiously gi­uen, thought it was a great pledge of their King­dome, and badge of their Royaltie, that it was law­full for them to do that which no body else might? Or being selfe-wild, or proud, Idem in Hip­polito. accounted it no lesse dishonour vnto them, to be drawne to yeeld to any thing (though neuer so iust) against their wils, then to be vanquished in battell? Or is not the fault so much in the dispositions & wils of kings, as in the harsh Solust. ad Cae­sarem. natures of the Subiects, being stub­borne, refractary, and hardly wonne to yeeld due obedience? For no man willingly, would draw in another mans yoake.

12

Seeing that authority is as it were the Cicero pro Cluent. spirit by which euery Common-wealth is gouerned, being flatly opposed to contempt, which may bee called the Arist. 5. Posit. bane and destruction of all Kingdomes, it may be demanded, how a Prince may behaue him­selfe, that hee neither fall into contempt amongst his owne Subiects, or forraigne States?

SHall he effect this, if the Tacit. 11. hist. fashion of his go­uernement proue not too remisse, and gentle, whereby he may be thought to be negligent in or­dering affaires of State? Or shall hee performe it the rather, if hee Idem Ibidem. shew no leuity in the forme of his gouernment, but constantly gouerne, accor­ding to the Lawes and Decrees of the Common­wealth? Or shall he effect this likewise, if he shew himselfe firme in his purposes, constant in his pro­mises, and that hee hath no Idem Ibidem. notable touch of mu­tability in his disposition? Or shall hee bring this to passe, if (curiously) pondering things past, ex­pending, and well weighing things present, and prouidently fore-seeing things to come, hee doe timously consult, and determine, to bestow ho­nours on Idem Ibidem. such men, as for their worth haue de­serued; not vpon euery fawning and obsequious fauourite, or such as can purchase them with mo­ney? Or may hee doe this the better, if Fortune proue a mother vnto him, and not a step-dame? Or shall he finally effect this likewise, if he first Tacit. 15. An­nal. re­presse his owne lusts, and inordinate affections, giuing thereby his Subiects examples to follow him in the like, and causing Forreigners to admire him therefore?

13

It may be further demanded how an Empire, or Kingdome may be finally lost?

COmmeth it thus to passe, by a kind of a Tholoz. lib. 22 de repub. fatall necessity, when this or that State hath come

a Councellour to a Prince to be skilfull of the cu­stomes of other nations, and to be a stranger in his owne Common-wealth: or shall he compasse this the better if he make choyce of Salust. Catil. graue and auncient men, as also of such as haue Idem in frag. beene tos­sed and tried with the variety of Fortune, hauing therby learned to carry themselues both in weale & woe? Or lastly, shall the Prince neuer admit of any for his Councellours, but such as Plin. Paneg. generally are accounted wise and vertuous? For particular men may deceiue and bee deceiued, but no one man can deceiue all men, neither hath any man bene deceiued of all men.

2

Againe it may further be demanded, how a Prince may behaue himselfe in his Consultations, that he may grow wise thereby, and so be accounted?

SHall hee effect this, if hauing wise Councel­lours to aduise him, hee apt and accomodate himselfe to follow their directions, and what they haue maturely deliberated and concluded vpon, hee forth with put in practise and execution? Or shall hee better effect this, if sitting in Councell himselfe, he propound, and heare them with pati­ence and discretion debate the matter, and Capitolinus de Marco Antonio. neuer seeme to be angry, or striue to maister and ouer­rule their opinions, though they determine cleane contrarie to his owne humours, minde and desire? Or shall he rather bring this to passe, if be­ing able to Vigetius lib. 3. containe himselfe, and keepe close his [Page 39] owne Councels and intentions, he doe (indeede) propound what ought to bee done to all, or the most of his Counsell to consider of; but what he will doe, to communicate it with very few, or ra­ther none, but aduise onely with himselfe? Or shal he rather performe this, if he grant free liberty of speach, neither doe too much affect those Quint. Curt. lib. 8. soft and silken words of the Court, which his flatterers will be ready to claw him withall; knowing that they will please his humours? Or finally shall hee effect this, if with indifferencie, and all alike e­quality, he heare euery mans opinion, neuer Thucid. lib 3. re­warding any councelling well, least for the hope of gaine, they might vpon sinister respects (at any time) decline from the right, nor Quint. Curt. lib. 3. punish any (though they should counsell ill (so they do it not of maliciousnesse) for so he shall euer want Coun­cellours, if it be dangerous to giue counsell?

3

It may further be demanded, why it is so exceeding auaileable to a Prince, to haue his counsels and de­terminations kept secret?

IS it because that if they were Guicchardine knowne, they might be preuented and hindered? Or is it for this respect rather, because his honour and esti­mation both at home and abroad, is thereby much increased and augmented? Or not so much for the former reasons neither, but for that if his determi­nations were once knowne, Idem. many men pricked forward with enuy, would detract from his wise­dome, [Page 40] blaming him that hee put not his intenti­ons sooner in execution, though hee could not (happily) finde fit opportunity seruing thereunto?

4

It may further bee demanded, what course a Prince might best take, that hee might not erre in his Consultations?

SHall he performe this, if hee fully vnderstand the Tholoz. lib. 24. nature of the businesse, which is to be de­liberated vpon? Or shall he do it the better, if vn­derstanding the matter, whereof to consult, hee Guicchardine constantly determine with himselfe rather to re­spect (cautelously) the extreames, and finall ends of businesses, then to regard middle courses, much lesse to run them? Or shall hee also effect this, if hee obserue and marke how Idem. wisely and prudently his aduersarie (if any he haue) behaueth himselfe in those things, which concerne his ho­nour, profit or safety? Or shall he rather accom­modate and apply his counsels to the nature, manners and condition of his aduersarie, and by that meanes learne out and expiscate what might be likely that he will attempt against him? Or shall hee compasse these things the better, if in all his counsels and deliberations concerning the Com­mon-wealth, he rather propound to himselfe how the honor, dignitie and splendor thereof may bee augmented, then what profit might thereby re­dound vnto it?

5

It may further be demanded, what is chiefly requi­red of Senators, that they may giue wholesome counsell.

MAy they effect this, if they be Plin. Panet. men fearing God, making his plaine & euen lawes the strict and straight rule of their consulations? For seeing it is Tholoz. lib. [...]4. God alone, which sustaineth and vp­holdeth Common-wealths, it were very fit that he should be made the chiefe head, and director of the counsels thereof. Or may they do it the bet­ter, if standing for the Tacit [...]. Hist. libertie of themselues, and the Common-wealth, they do stoutly and coura­giously, not faintly and fearefully pronounce and deliuer their mindes and opinions, least they might rather be thought to runne with the For­tune of the Prince, then with him, or the good of the Common-wealth? Or may they also effect this, if they shew themselues Tacit. 3. Hist. modest, and of a quiet disposition? Or may they likewise effect it the better, if they can Quint. Curt. lib. 4. keepe their owne counsels? For it is very certaine that no great matter can be looked for at his hands, who will vent what hee should hold in? Or finally, may this better be per­formed, if choyce be made of such Councellors which haue Tholoz. lib. 24. de repub. no particular interest in those things which are to be consulted vpon? For no man in his owne cause, can speake, thinke, or iudge vp­rightly, because euery man therin will be partiall.

6

Considering that middle courses (for the most part) [Page 42] proue vnfortunate, it may be demanded why not­withstanding the running of a middle course be­ing propounded by some one or other in publike de­liberations, it is (most what) embraced, followed, and put in execution?

COmmeth it to passe through the ill Fran. Guich. dispositi­on and worse affection of some addicted to faction and opposition, who perceiuing that their owne conceits cannot passe currant, had rather giue way to, and allow of that which is worse, not extreame (least hee should seeme to oppose) but different in a lesse distance, that thereby they may seeme to haue (in part) assented?

Or is it not for this reason alone, but for that likewise the other aduisers, Idem. least they should dis­please some prime-man, who hath propounded a middle course of proceedings, will likewise run a­long with him, and approue of his deuise? Or ra­ther is this the reason why such middle courses are by some no sooner propounded then appro­ued, because (for the most part) prouident and wary, especially auncient and aged Statists, do ap­proue of that course which they imagine to bee least violent and dangerous, and incline to the meane, as being the sweeter and more passable without noyse or Nuissance.

7

Seeing that the close minds, wils and ends of Coun­cellours be strange, diuers, and for sinister respects, priuately kept to themselues, for (oftentimes) vpon [Page 43] pounding of matters to bee consulted vpon, This was the practise of Torlton Arch­bishop of Can­terbury, against Edward the se­cond, by whose aduice his son was sent into France, who ioyning with his mother & Mortimer, be­came the head and Captaine of the Rebels against his owne father. one thing is spoken, another thought and meant, whereby the mindes and opinions (onely) of others may be discouered; it may here be demanded, how a Prince may iudge whether his Councellours aduise him well or no?

SHall hee know this by the Mach. in Prin. disposition of the Councellor? For he that more respecteth him­selfe then his Prince, & in the carriage of any mat­ter regards his owne priuate more then the good of the Common-wealth, as long as hee beareth this minde, he can neuer proue a faithfull Coun­cellour, nor one whom the Prince or State may trust or rely vpon. Or shall hee vnderstand this by the Tholoz. lib. 24. frequent vse & experience he hath had of his Councellours in the like businesses falling out ill, or well? Or shall he rather come to the knowledge hereof by making an Idem ibidem. exact: search and disposition how matters are carried and disposed of within his owne territories? Or shall he rather come to this knowledge by the frequent reading of Histo­ries? or by the apprehending or comprehending of these two Principles, What is Profitable, What is Honest. Which two indeed are the bounds and grounds of truth, and of that worthy wisedome and iudgement which ought to be in a Senator.

1

It may bee demanded, why subiects (for the most part) Claudian.frame & conforme themselues to the fashi­on of their Princes?

IS it for that both the Plin. Paneg. eyes of the minde, and the body, (for the most part) looke vp­wards, and stand (as it were) at gaze at greatnesse and e­minencie, tending and ben­ding the whole man to dance as they pipe? Or is it because Tacit. 3. Annal Examples vrge and enforce more then Lawes can do, seeing it is the nature of man, rather to be led of his owne accord; then to be cōpelled? Or is it rather for that Quintilian decl. 4. Example in Princes is a kind of secret law? For it fareth and falleth out thus (for the most part) with their acts, that what they doe, they euen seeme to command it.

[...]

Againe it may be demanded, why in reforming of a Common-wealth, the producing of examples of the [Page 45] most famous and illustrious men, for vertue in the same do very much auaile?

IS it because that such men being compelled by no Lawes, yet of their owne accord, and free­will, acting, exercising, and exhibiting, singular and rare examples of vertue, do excite and stirre vp such as bee good, to follow them, and those which are bad, they doe either make them a sha­med, or discourage them from going on in their lewdnesse? Or is it rather for this, that when by long processe of time, there hath bene no exam­plary punishment inflicted vpon offenders, men grow regardlesse of Lawes, and the number of delinquents so increase, that the Magistrate is afraid to punish them? Then one Manlius Torqua­tus to punish his owne sonne; or a Quintus Fabius to bee accused and condemned for ioyning bat­tell with the enemy, without the Dictators leaue; and such examples, do much bridle and represse other mens insolencies.

3

It may further bee demanded, why hee that iudgeth by examples is commonly deceiued?

IS it for that Franciso. Guicch. all the selfe-same reasons and cir­cumstances in the like actions, do seldome, or neuer concurre, and meete againe? Or is it be­cause the Idem. like actions are not alwaies gouerned with the like wisedome and discretion? Or may this bee the reason rather, because Idem. Fortune at all [Page 46] times, playeth not her part alike, but now and then faileth her fauorites?

1

It may bee demanded what kind of wits, may bee termed the best wits.

MAy such bee counted for the best, which are Guicch. more stirring, sharpe, and acute, fiery and subtile, then ordi­nary? But these noble and excellent wits (for the most part) do proue very crosse, and are oftentimes the cause of much disquietnesse, turmoile, and trou­ble to him who is indued therewith. Or may those rather bee taken for the best, which though Idem. more blunt, yet are more certaine and lasting, and (for the most part) are more fortunate then the other.

2

It may further be demanded, why in one and the [Page 47] selfe-same Citie, there may be found many distinct families, whose manners and conditions are parti­cular to themselues; as wee read amongst the Ro­manes, that the Manlij were euer sterne and se­uere, the Publicolae courteous and gentle, the Ap­pij proud and ambitious, &c.

COmmeth this to passe, by reason of the diuer­sity of their temperatures? But that (as it may bee thought) might be changed and altred, by the variety of Marriages. Or may this rather be the cause, for that euery Family hath a peculiar man­ner of bringing vp their children? for this com­monly holdeth true, Mach. Disput. de Repub. lib. 3. cap. 46. whatsoeuer manners and opinions, are instilled into the minds of youth in their infancy, they will hardly or neuer bee re­moued, but continue with them euen to their old age.

3

It may bee further demanded, why Liu. in his bookes affir­meth this of the French­men. diuers Nati­ons, at the first assault, or onset giuen, seeme to bee magnanimious, and very fierce and forward to the battell, but within a while after doe grow very fearefull, and turne Cowards?

MAy the cause consist in any peculiar affect in their natures? But it is possible that Mach. disput. Cap. 36. nature from day to day, may bee cor­rected and amended? Or might this rather bee the reason, that such Nations being Idem Ibidem. without order or exercise of Military Discipline, are not ena­bled [Page 48] with such ordinary manhood, as may esta­blish their hearts and mindes, making them to conceiue an assured hope of victory, and there­fore if they be not vanquishers in the first assault, they straight waies quit the field? And this (vn­der correction) I take to be the true reason of their fearefulnesse and running away.

4

It may further bee demanded, wherefore diuers men (euen lewd persons) hauing many times occa­sions offered them, to commit some memorable and notable villany, notwithstanding (for the most part) they dare not attempt it, or put it in practise, and execution?

IS it for that they are afraid least they should Mach. disp. lib. [...]. cap. 27. in­curre the note of infamy? But the greatnesse of the thing, might (happily) couer the badnesse of the fact, and likewise protect the party from dan­ger. Or do they abstaine from perpetrating and committing such horrtble villany, by reason of their Idem Ibidem. owne in-bred goodnesse, or nice touch of their conscience? But such godly and holy moti­ons do neuer enter into the hearts of such lewd lossels. Or may this rather bee the reason, for that by nature, it is not affoorded to the most men, to be Idem Ibidem. absolutely euill, or perfectly good?

5

It may further be demanded, why there should bee such, and so great difficulty, in chaunging or amen­ding old customes, though most men (conuicted se­cretly [Page 49] in their consciences by euident truth) should confesse they were altogether vnprofitable, and dangerous to the Common-wealth to continue them?

MAy this bee the reason, for that although some good Citizens, or Patriots, foreseeing the danger, do perswade the change thereof, yet they should not be able fully to turne the peoples mindes, by reason of others oppositions? Or may this rather be the cause, for that most men stand so affected, and affectionated, to their auncient course of liuing, that they would not willingly depart there-from? Or may this bee the reason of the difficulty of amending euill customes, for that there is euer a want of proportionable meanes agreeable to the Lawes, to bring that businesse about, so that they must bee driuen to flie to new courses altogether, which seldome proue fortu­nate? Or may this rather bee the reason, for that if some few, or any one man, should go about to change the forme of gouernement, it should bee necessary for him, first by force to inuade the State, and then to seize the liberties thereof into his hands, which might bee thought not to bee the part of a good man, and therefore hee will rather desist from his purpose, then do his Citti­zens so much good? Or may this bee a further rea­son, for that the most men are perswaded, that there can scarcely be that man found, who hauing once brought a State vnder subiection, by ill [Page 50] meanes, would afterwards vse that power and au­thority which hee had so ill gotten, to the benefite and good of the people?

1

It may bee demanded when Benefites are to bee be­stowed vpon a man?

ARE they to bee collated vpon him Mach. d [...]sp. lib. primo, cap. 23. iust at that time, when the bestower of them is com­pelled so to doe, as needing the present help of such a man, or for some priuate end to himselfe best knowne? But this manner of giuing should seeme to be very extrauagant, and distastefull, to the receiuer, as thinking that they were collated vpon him by reason of the parties necessity, which once serued, he would neuer conferre more vpon him. Or are they not so to bee collated vpon any man, but Idem Ibidem. timously rather, before hee which may [Page 51] haue need of them, shall haue occasion to vse them, or the Collator thereof the person?

2

It may further be demanded, wherefore they who haue As Charond as amongst the AEginensians, The mistocles a­mongst the A­thenians; Camil­lus, Scipio, &c. among the Ro­mans, were im­prisoned, bani­shed, or put to death. best deserued of a Common-wealth are (of­tentimes) worst recompenced and requited?

IS this the reason, for that Pindarus. there is nothing lesse lasting then the very name of a Benefite? Or is this rather the cause, for that it is This was proper to the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. appropriate and peculiar to certaine Common-wealths, so to enuy those which excell in vertue and goodnesse, as they themselues being not able to follow and imitate them therein, seeke to spoile them of their gouernement and Empire? Or may this rather be the reason, that some Philip. Comin. standing too much vpon their owne merites, haue borne themselues too proudly against tje State, or their owne society? Or might this likewise bee the cause, for that those, who either by their rare exploits, or cun­ning ambition, creepe into the fauour of the peo­ple at home, and hunt after renowne and admira­tion abroad, may seeme to dimme the glory of their Princes, who greatly desire to be accounted well-deseruing of their owne people, as those to whom it more properly belongeth, and therefore they must needs oppose such, and grow in distaste of them? Or is it for that all men generally by their owne corrupt nature, are lesse prone, prompt, and ready to requite a good turne, then to reuenge an iniury? Or may this rather bee the [Page 52] reason for that the Prince, or Vpon this very conceite the Venetians put to death Lauderanus, be­cause hee paci­fied a commo­tion by his owne authori­ty; as Petrus Bem bus repor­teth in his Ve­netian History. State, groweth in­to suspicion of such kinde of men, least they should affect innouation, or seeke to tyrannise?

3

It may further bee demanded, why kindnesses, and good will, are oftentimes requited with ingrati­tude, and vnthankfulnesse?

IS it because that he which neither can, nor hath any desire to remunerate him, to whom hee is so much indebted, will either forget them, or per­swade himselfe, and the world, that no such kind­nesses were offered vnto him, or receiued by him? Or may this be the reason, that those men, who haue beene (as it were) driuen, and by fatall neces­sity compelled to receiue kindnesse of other men, should afterwards grow ashamed of it, that they should bee thought to haue had neede of such meanes?

4

Seeing that no man can deny, but that the vse of friends is such, and so great, that many times a man may bee driuen to relye his whole estate thereupon; It may bee demanded, how a man may bee ascertained, that hee hath purchased a true friend?

SHall hee giue confidence to him, whom hee hath Guicchardine. bound by grace and benefites? Or shall hee trust him, who hath any waies neede of his helpe? Or shall hee rather repose his confidence [Page 53] in him who is bound Pindarus. vnto him, by hauing e­quall profite and share in any businesse, which they shall ioyntly attempt and obtaine?

1

Seing Authoritie is the prop of kingdomes, and that it is of the most men confessed, that the maiesty of an Empire consisteth in the splendor, grace, and de­fence thereof: it may bee demanded, how a Prince might beget such a reuerent opinion of himselfe a­mongst his subiects, & forreigners likewise, where­by he might become both admired and feared?

SHall he effect this, if he in­stitute such a forme of go­uernment, which is Cicero pro mi­lone. seuere, constant, and strict, bearing an hard ouer those whom he ruleth? Or shall he attaine therunto the better, if hauing Mach. Prin. & Tholoz. home-bred strength & forces, he con­tinually [Page 54] keepe them about him, and haue them in a readinesse? Or if he be destitute of such forces, doe straight wayes take a course to prouide them else-where? Or shall he compasse this the rather, if he excell other Princes in the Claudian. 3. integrity and soundnesse of his manners, fashions, and good conditions? Or shall he yet the better effect this, if hee delight still So Ferdinand King of Spain, and Henry the 5. King of Eng­land, grew fa­mous. to be in action, and grow fa­mous for well performing of what hee vnderta­keth? Or shall he likewise obtaine his purpose, if in cases of difference betwixt Princes, he Mach. Prin. Cap. 21. cut off all respects of Newtrality, and declare himselfe for one of them? Or shall he this way come to his ends, if he giue this testimony to the world, that hee is a louer of vertue, honouring all excellent men, of what sort and Art soeuer? Or finally, shall he this way compasse his desires, if hee giue in­couragement and hope to his subiects whom hee gouerneth, that they shall liue quietly vnder his protection, and peaceably go about their affaires and businesses, in what kinde soeuer they shall traffique or deale?

2

It may further be demanded, wherefore it concer­neth a Prince so deeply to be highly esteemed both at home and abroade?

IS it for that Fran. Guicch. estimation and authority once lost (which may easily be done) can hardly or neuer be recouered againe? Or is it for that Idem. esti­mation and authority in martiall affaires, is of so [Page 55] great consequence, that the effecting of any bu­sinesse of import, doth wholly seeme to depend thereupon? Or may it be for this reason rather, that it shall be much more difficult for him whose credit and estimation beginneth to decay to de­fend himselfe and his estate from the least dan­gers, then for him who keepeth vp his estimation, and hath it imprinted in the hearts of his subiects or souldiers, to effect great matters, though his meanes be weaker? Or may it be for this reason likewise, for that it sometimes importeth a Prince to set his authority vpon the tentors, and stretch it beyond his ability for the effecting and perfor­ming of some great enterprise? Now a Prince shall neuer bring this to passe, vnlesse his subiects and souldiers be perswaded, that his power, au­thority, and estimation, is greater then (indeed) it is; but if they be thereof once perswaded, he shall haue that done readily, freely, and of their owne accords, which otherwise he should neuer haue had granted, much lesse extorted from them against their wils.

3

It may further be demanded, how a Prince may compasse it to be feared of his subiects, and withall get himselfe great reputation thereby?

SHall he doe this, if he vse them Fran. Guich. rigorously, and oftentimes inflict seuere punishments vp­on them? For they will easily be brought to stand in feare of him, whom they know both can and [Page 56] will correct them, and bring them into order, e­specially if they perceiue him by his naturall in­clination, to be thereunto addicted. Or shall hee finally effect this the rather, if he neuer vse a stron­ger Guicchardine. medicine, then the nature of the disease, or strength of his sicke subiects are able to beare?

4

It may further bee demanded, how a subiect may gaine himselfe reputation with the common people?

SHall he doe this, if he be Mach. disp. cap. 34. descended of noble Auncestors, who haue approued themselues braue and excellent men in the carriage of them­selues, and managing of great actions? Or shall he do this the rather, if he betake himselfe to a wise and well setled course of life, conuersing with none (as neere as he can) but with excellent men, and such are vertuous? Or shall he yet effect this the better, if in his younger yeares he shall per­forme any thing, either publickly or priuately, which in it selfe is memorable, and withall is ho­nest? Or shall he attaine thereunto likewise, if be­ing trusted with the Mach. Prin. cap. 21. managing of publique af­faires of his Countrey, he discharge himselfe well thereof, hauing rather an eye that his actions may redound to the good of the common-wealth, then to his owne or other mens priuate, how neere or deere soeuer they may be vnto him, or himselfe to himselfe?

6

It may further be demanded, wherefore the Romans [Page 57] thought it necessary, that their Generals of the field managing Armes amongst forraigne Nations, should haue free libertie to dispose of those affaires according to their owne best liking.

WAs it for that the Mach. disp. lib. 2. Cap. 33. Senate did well vnder­stand, that if they commanded their Ge­nerals should attempt nothing without their directions, aduice and priuities, it would be the next way to make them loose, idle, and lesse circumspect in exercising their charge and office? Or was this rather the reason, for that they were perswaded, Idem Ibidem. that the fortune of the warres were doubtfull, and that sometimes suddaine accidents might fall out, which might very much either ad­uance and further their designes, or greatly hurt them; which occasions (as they rightly deemed) he onely could take, vnderstand, and make aduan­tage of, who should bee present when they were offered?

6

It may further be demanded, how the Authoritie and estimation of a Prince may bee made famous, if he should carry a strict hand ouer his subiects, in ruling and gouerning them?

SHould hee compasse his ends, if hee alone should Tacit. 2. An­nal. Liu. etiam lib. 9. retaine and keepe all the maine offices and businesses of the crowne in his owne hands, so that all men should be enforced to looke vpon, and vnto him, as of whom onely they were to ex­pect [Page 58] all things which might doe them good? Or shall hee yet compasse his designes, if hee neuer prorogue, or continue any too long in an office, (especially in militarie affaires) least his substitute growing too proud, should work any thing which might turne to his preiudice?

7

It may further be demanded, why this or that Prince his gouernement is counted sharpe and seuere; when the rule of others is thought to bee very gentle and easie.

MAy this be the reason, for that Mach. disp. lib 3. cap. 22. some au­stere man comming to the gouernement, doth wish, and hath (as it were) a longing desire to haue all men like himselfe? Or may this rather be the reason, for that such a man comming to sway the state, is commonly a valiant man, and therefore commanding great and difficult enter­prises to be vndertaken by his subiects, vseth som­times seueritie, whereby those things may be put in execution, according as they were comman­ded them?

8

It may further bee demanded, wherefore it should bee needfull that that gouernment should be strict and seuere, which should beget authoritie and esti­mation to a Prince?

MAy this bee the reason, for that Ienitie (for the most part) causeth contempt, and that [Page 59] in any corruption of manners it is necessary the Salust. Lepid. subiect doe stand in awe, or be made to stand in awe of his Prince? Or may this rather bee the cause, for that Cicero pro Mi­lone. clemencie and remissnesse opens the maine gappe to offending, when men are perswaded that they shall scape vnpunished? For Sen. 1 de Clem. who will feare him who alwayes keepeth his sword fast locked in the feabbard, or for a lit­tle Cic. 1. in Catil. idlenesse suffereth the edge of his authoritie to be blunted? Or may this rather be the reason, for that the common people are euery way better ordered, being compelled to do their duties, and by keeping them in feare, then if all the clemen­cie, courteous intreatie, and demeanor of the Prince should be affoorded them?

9

It may further be demanded, why the constant kee­ping of one manner and forme of gouernment, must needes much auaile to make a Prince much e­steemed?

MAy this bee the reason, for that (as all Tholoz. innouation in a State is dangerous) the Prince shall be put in fault, and greatly blamed, if vpon changing any thing in the go­uernement, it should not well succeed and pros­per? Or may this rather be the reason, for that Thucid. lib. 6. ex­perience hath taught vs, that those States and Common-wealths are best gouerned, which affect the least alteration of old customes and manners, though they be not all of the best?

10

It may further be demanded, why a godly and Re­ligious Prince is held in great honour and estima­tion with the people?

IS it for that Tacit. 2. Annal Pietie and Godlinesse euen of it selfe is venerable, making Princes to seeme like Gods among their people? Or may this rather be the reason, for that the people are perswaded that the Liuy in his first book ma­keth mention, that Numa Pompilius con­ferred mighti­ly with the Nymph Egeria &c. Prince will not attempt or goe about any enterprises, but such wherein he shall bee seconded by the helpe of Heauen?

1

It may bee demanded, what might bee the reason, that the vehement desire and thirst after glory and renowne, hath alwaies beene praise-worthy, and held profitable for the Common-wealth, whereas the least desire of raigning, in any great Subiect, hath beene condemned on all hands, and euer thought to bee dangerous and hurtfull to the State?

IS it because Fran. Guicch. the hunting after honour and renowne, eleuateth and raiseth a mans thoughts, and exciteth to noble and ge­nerous [Page 62] actions? Whereas contrary wise the ambi­tious, and boundlesse desire of ruling, prouoketh a man to propound to himselfe dangerous cour­ses, and to runne them though it be to his owne vndoing? Or may it bee for this reason likewise, for that hee which is of an Idem. ambitious and tur­bulent spirit, regardeth neither right or wrong, of Soueraigne or Subiect, but vpon the least con­ceit to compasse his vnlawfull desires, engageth himselfe in factions, brawles, and quarrels, filling all mens hearts with feare, and disturbing the quiet of the State so farre, that as much as in him lyeth, he will rather hazard the safety of it, then desist from his barbarous enterprise? Whereas hee who is onely desirous of honour and re­nowne, neither feareth dangers, nor attempteth or alloweth of any lewd courses, whereby hee, or his, might bee branded with the note of infamy, or digrace?

2

It may further bee demanded, how Liuy lib. 2. Potency is the high-way to gaine authori­ty. potency and greatnesse may bee acquired, whereby the authori­ty of a Prince may bee made more illustrious and resplendant?

IS it to bee purchased with money, to whom Arist. Rhet. II. cap. 16. & horat. Serm. 11. all things do stoope? Or is it to bee acquired by Armes rather? for this is an infallible rule, that large Empire and Dominion, is not gotten, kept, or maintained by Tacit. 15. An­nal. idlenesse, but by the vse and exercise of Armes, and Millitary Discipline? Or is [Page 63] it not gotten by these meanes alone, but by Tacit. 11. An­nal. firme counsell, and wary circumspection also? Or may it be attained vnto, by making Arist. Rhet. ad Alex Cap. Vltim. firme leagues, and sure peace with forraigne Princes? Or to con­clude, may it bee gotten by the Quint. Curt. lib. 8. benefite of for­tune, who (most what) doth maruailously fauour and aduance some speciall sorts of men?

3

It may further bee demanded, what might bee the reason that those men who are ambitious, and haue an itching desire to bee inuested with the gouern­ment of States, if they once bee euected to some eminent place in the Common-wealth, So it fared with Iohn of Gaunt Duke of Lancaster, and Thomas Wood­stocke Duke of Glocester, pro­tectors of Rich. the 2. And with Rich. the 3. pro­tector of Edw. the 5. &c. they are neuer contented, but striue and endeuour to rise higher and higher, and if once they can surprize the State, they wil rather die, then come afterwards to leade a priuate life?

COmmeth it thus to passe, for that all Mach. disp. lib. 1. cap. 37. men euen by nature, are apt and prone to desire great matters, though they bee not so fitted and accommodated in themselues, to obtaine and keepe them? Now where the desire is more then the ability to get, the minde can neuer be at quiet, or contented with those things which already it doth enioy. Or is it for that Guicchardi­nus. Ambition of it selfe blindeth the eyes of men, perswading them that their merites and deserts are greater then (in­deed) they bee, and thereupon they affect and attempt strange matters, and run head-strong courses to their owne destructions oftentimes? [Page 64] Or may this bee the reason, for that hee who once hath had his temples circled with a Crowne, can neuer after brooke a priuate life, because Kings and Kingdomes, are euer to bee thought and beleeued to exceed proportion?

4

It may further bee demanded, what man may rightly be censured and deemed to be ambitious?

IS hee so to bee deemed and taken, who vnder Aul. Pol. pretence of amplyfying and enlarging the dig­nity Royall; will seeke to dominere ouer others, and rule all things according to his owne lusts? without cause or reason, changing the auncient Officers (though neuer so honest) at his will and pleasure, and suffecting others into their places, whom hee well knoweth to be of his owne facti­on, and (when time shall serue) will fauour his party? Or may hee likewise be thought ambitious who with great Tholoz. lib. 22 gifts, large promises, and all kind and friendly Offices, seeketh to conciliate and get the fauour and good will of the people, whereby hee may be one step higher to his rising?

5

It may further bee demanded, why all the Arts, cunning and practises, by which ambitious men study to climbe to the height of greatnesse, are kept so secret, that they hardly or neuer burst out, or come to be knowne, till they haue obtained what they sought for?

COmmeth it so to passe, for that Mach. disp. lib. prim. Cap. 46. men do not by and by (and as it were vpon the sodaine) but by degrees grow ambitious; whose progresses being not obserued (except of some few) they may more easily deceiue and blind mens eyes? Or may this rather be the reason, for that the ambiti­ous do alwaies Idem. Ibidem. vse some honest pretext whereby they may compasse their designes, as though all their actions did tend and bend to these ends, least the Common-wealth (forsooth) or them­selues should be wronged, when the truth is, that they striue to get the garland, that thereby they may both oppresse others, and the weale Publick?

6

It may further be demanded, how, and by what safe meanes it may be prouided for, that a man shall not grow too ambitious and insolent in a State, or if hee should, how his insolency may bee repressed, and nipt in the head, whilst it is yet in the bud?

MAy this bee effected, if there should neuer way be giuen, or meanes affoorded, to cre­ate or erect any such office, or eminent dignity in the Common-wealth, out of the which the State might haue cause to feare, least in processe of time, Tyranny might take her first rising, and be­ginning there-from? Or may it rather thus bee compassed, if the State take heed, and with wary circumspection prouide, Aristophanes in Ranis. that they neuer foster, cherish, orbring vp, any Lyons Whelpe, much [Page 66] lesse the Lyon himselfe, within their Territo ries? Or may it thus likewise be done, if such wormes, and Tholoz. lib. 22. moaths, which breed of too much moisture, and are wont to consume those things whereof they had their beginnings, bee choked or shaken off, before they come to any great bignesse, or turne the whole Substance of that they feed vp­on, into their owne? Or may it thus likewise bee brought to passe, if heed be taken, that if by the heate of the bosome of the Common-wealth, there bee hatched and nourished any dangerous serpent, it bee The errour of the Atheni­ans and Floren­tiues, that they would not doe after this Counsell. timously exposed to the cold (which is the onely way to kill it) yet neuer suffer it to hisse other where in a place more commo­dious, least by sucking out the poyson thereof, there might follow a deeper stinging? Or may this also be effected, if heed be taken that the The practise of Rich. the 2. against the Duke of Here­ford, and Tho. Mowbray Duke of Norfolke: For the King feared Heref. least (hauing the loue of the people) hee should haue vanquisht Mowbray, and so hee banish­ed them both, and least also it might haue fallen out that the Duke of Heref. should haue gotten the victory, & so haue gra­ced himselfe. am­bitious bee neuer permitted to ingage himselfe in any publique businesse, especially neuer employ­ed in Martiall affaires, least by the well managing thereof, he draw vnto himselfe credit and estima­tion with the Common-people, which hee abu­sing, might afterwards turne to the hurt and dam­mage of the Weale Publique? Or may it bee brought to passe by this menes also, if diuers of his Tholoz. lib. 22. owne ranke and quality do bandy with him, and of set purpose oppose his proceedings, the munition, and all other warlike furniture, being (in the meane time) vnder the command of the Prince, or Common-wealth? Or may this finally be effected, if Mach. dis [...]. lib. 1. cap. 52. hinderance be giuen to his ambi­tious [Page 67] designes, by the same waies, meanes, and in­struments, which he himselfe vsed to climbe to the top of his desires?

7

It may lastly be demanded, wherefore the more emi­nent Cities (as in particular it may truely bee in­stanced in, and of, this Honour able Citie of So Ia cke Straw his re­bellion begun in Kent, in the time of Rich. the 2. who was flame by the Right Honou­rable William Walworth, in Smith-field, whereby the Citie for that honourable seruice had the Dagger added to their Armes. So Iacke Cade his conspiracy and rebellion in Henry the 6. his daies, came from Kent like­wise. So Kets conspiracie came from Norfolke in the time of Edw. the 6. So the rebellion in the North, was moued against Q Elizabeth of Famous me­mory by impi­ous Pius Quin­tus B. of Rome. So the pow­der-treason was plotted & contriued in our Soue­raigne Lord King Iames his Lon­don) are generally free from plotting, practising, or contriuing any treasons, rebellions, insurrecti­ons, mutinies, &c. against the Prince, or State: when other more remote parts of the Kingdome, are, and euer haue beene more subiect to put in practise such hellish proiects?

IS it for that in the more famous and eminent Cities (where the Magistrates are commonly more carefull and watchfull then other where) the plotters of treasons and rebellions, cannot so con­ueniently conueene and come to together, to consult about their villanies, without being no­ted, obserued, and espied, as they may do vnder any colourable pretext, in the Countries neere adioyning, or other remote parts from such Ci­ties? Or is it not for this cause alone, but for that in such eminent Cities (and in particular within this Citie of London) the word of God is more plentifully Preached, whereby the Citizens are better instructed in their duties to God and their Prince, then commonly they are in all the Coun­trie besides? Or may this bee a further reason for the said Citie of London in particular, for that as [Page 68] well the chiefe Magistrate thereof, as other wor­thy time, by diuers Gentlemen in seuerall Coun­tries. But in all these there was neuer a Citi­zen in any of them. Citizens therein, are neerer to the Court, and by reason of their eminent places, and prime Offi­ces which they beare, and daily do execute for the Prince, and in his name, to the good of Towne and Country, haue (euer) more dependance of their Prince, then in other places further distant there-from, the other subiects can haue: whereby it commeth to passe that they neuer desire inno­uations, nor engage themselues and their estates by plotting of treasons, raising rebellions, &c. but content themselues with their owne conditions, studying to loue, and to bee beloued of their Prince, which things are not so well performed by particulars, in places further distant there­from, as hath beene shewed? Or, to conclude, may this likewise be the reason, for that the said Citie of London, being the Chamber of the Prince, wher­in hee euer presumeth that hee may be most safe, the Citizens euen out of their loue and loyalty to their Prince, haue euer thought foule scorne that themselues should be found vntrue, or disloyall; or that themselues, or their Citie should be bran­ded with the hatefull name of Traytors, or hauing treason, rebellion, or treachery, batched in it?

1

It may be demanded, whence the varieties of studies and diuersity of dispositions of men might proceed?

DOth this diuersity happen by Fran. Guicch. reason of the varietie of times and places? Or not so neither, but by the mutabi­litie of the vnstable multitude rather, of whom this Prouerbe is truly veri­fied, So many men, so many mindes? Or falleth it out [Page 70] thus the rather, by reason of the Tholozanus. difference of yeares, and vnlikenesse of manners of the inhabi­tants of one and the selfe-same kingdome, the de­sires and ends of the Nobles, Senators, and peo­ple, being cleane contrary one to the other?

2

It may further be demanded, wherefore wise men haue in all ages greatly indeuoured to perswade all men to get learning and knowledge before any o­ther thing?

WAs it because they plainly saw and percei­ued, that it was the best meanes Sen. Epist. 98. to purge and purifie the mindes of men, whereby they might bee apted to receiue and retaine ver­tuous precepts? Or might this be the reason, for that they well knew, that the embracing of good letters was Quintilian, lib. 12. the high-way to wisedome, by which the policie of a State is most aduanced?

3

It may further be demanded, wherefore the know­ledge and skill of languages is necessary and pro­fitable for all men, but especially for a Prince and priuy Councellour?

MAy this be the reason, for that all men are commonly well pleased to Guicch. vnderstand, & to be vnderstood of those with whom they shall chaunce to haue any dealing? Or may this be the cause, for that a man being skilfull in the tongues, can Cominaeus. better explaine himselfe and his [Page 71] owne meaning, and shall much better bee vnder­stood, then if he should deale by an Interpretor? Or may this likewise be a maine reason, for that many times it falleth out, that a priuy Councellor is to take notice of some serious businesses, which mightily import the State to know, and bee secret in, which things can neuer be related, and trans­acted so well, nor to such good purpose, if for want of knowledge of the tongues, the Councel­lor or Relator must of necessity vse the helpe of some third person? Or may the knowledge of tongues bee thought so auaileable to a Prince or Statesman, for the entertaining and giuing au­dience to Embassadors, hearing of their messages, be they hostile or friendly, and giuing them their dispatches, answeres, and dismissions?

4

It may further bee demanded, wherefore wise men haue held the knowledge of Histories to be the rea­diest way whereby a man may become wise, calling Tacit. 4. An­nal. Cic. de Orator. Diodorus Sicu­lus. Cominaeus. History the life and soule of memory, the light of truth, director of mans life, &c?

IS it because that by reading of Histories, a man shall truely find Diod. Sicul. 1. Bibliorum. Vertue, to haue her due praise, and honour giuen her, as contrariwise to Vice, her due shame and reproofe? Or may this bee the reason, for that Plutarchus. in Timol [...]onte. History is auialeable to instruct any priuate man (of what degree soeuer) how to flame his life, and carry himselfe with commen­dation in the eye of the world, when, as in a glasse, [Page 72] he shall see how to beautifie & compose it, accor­ding to the patterne of other mens vertues? Or may this bee a further reason, for that thereby a man may Liuy lib. become a Statesman, and know how to manage publique affaires, drawing his rules and directions out of old Antiquities, and times passed, as out of a Store-house, and making ap­plication thereof to the time present?

5

It may further be demanded, what may be the chiefe vse, benefit and end of Intelligence?

MAy it be beneficiall to a Prince or State, be­cause he may thereby Fran. Guicch. Aul. Pol. distinctly know the condition and state of all Countries, the power and strength of their Princes and Gouer­nors, the wisedome and skilfulnesse of their Se­nators, in managing the affaires of State, and the originals and continuance of their families, with many other particulars necessary to bee knowne to a Prince or State, who either hath, or may haue dealing with other Nations? Or may this rather be the chiefe vse & end of Intelligence, that a Prince or wise Statesman may thereby bet­ter Polib. lib. 1. Pacuvius & Guich. discouer the secret fraudes, and cunning practises of his faire tongued, and smooth-faced friends (but indeed his craftie and subtile ad­uersaries) as likewise the machinations, drifts, and intents of his open enemies, whereby he may better be enabled to explicate and winde himselfe out of dangers, or frustrate their intentions, by crossing and counter-mining of them?

1

It may bee demanded, why wise-men haue alwaies thought peace to be expedient for both parties, as well for the victor, as those who haue beene con­quered?

MIGHT it bee for this reason, for that they supposed it Senec. Here. Fur. impossible for the world to continue, if it should bee vexed with continuall wars? Or might this rather be the reason, for that they truely iud­ged that the Idem Ibidem, conquered must of necessity, ac­cept [Page 74] of what peace and conditions soeuer the Victor shall grant them? And that they thought it likewise to bee a Liu. lib. 30. comely and gracefull thing to the conquerour, to affoord them peace vpon rea­sonable termes, that all men might take notice, that hee knew how to begin, and ingage himselfe in a iust warre, and was able likewise to make an end thereof? Or might not this be the onely rea­son, but for that they thought it Tacit. Annal. lib. 12. profitable like­wise, and safe for the Conquerour to lay downe his Armes, considering that if hee should still prosecute the warres, hee should reape nothing but wearisomenesse by continuing and protract­ing of them, and if hee should make too much hast, and as it were inforce an end of them, hee might runne himselfe into many and Henr. Ransov. de re Bellica. needlesse dangers, euen to the hazard of his owne estate, which otherwise hee might easily haue auoyded? For Fortune will sometimes play the Iade, and the euent of warres is vncertaine?

2

It may further bee demanded, how a safe and firme peace, may bee distinguished and knowne from that which is vnsure and not to be trusted vnto?

MAy this be knowne, if the peace bee Liu. lib. 25. honest, as putting an end to the warres, by giuing and accepting of tollerable conditions? Or may it this may be knowne likewise, if it bee Tacit. 4. Hist. simple, plaine, and without false colours or glosses, am­buiguity of words, or equiuocations, and not [Page 75] subiect to what constructions the peace-breaker may wrest or draw them?

3

It may further bee demanded, why that Prince who came to his Kingdome by some of the Nobili­ty, or Senate, shall more hardly keepe it, then ano­ther, who obtained the Crowne by the suffrages and assistance of the people?

IS it because that Mach. Prin. cap. 9. those of the Nobility thinke themselues to be little inferiour, or rather equall with the Prince, whereupon hee cannot sway the Scepter as him listeth, but must bee glad in the most things to be ruled by them? Or may this ra­ther bee the reason, for that it will bee thought the Prince will So fared it with the Duke of Buckingham, in the time of Richard the 3. with Charles the 8. and Lewis the 12. Kings of France, in the losse of Mil­lane, &c. as re­porteth Mach. Prin. Cap. 9. neuer be able sufficiently to satis­fie those Nobles, without the hurt and wronging of others, which when hee cannot, those very men, by whose aide and assistance hee got the Crowne, will bee the first who will pull him downe againe? Or may this be the reason, for that Idem Ibidem. if the Commons should make head against the Prince, hee could neuer bee secured of his safety, or retayning of his Kingdome, because they would oppresse him with multitude, the Nobili­ty being but a handfull to them?

4

It may further be demanded, wherefore it so much importeth a Prince to manage his Martiall affaires in his owne person, if hee euer looke to grow fa­mous by his conquests?

IS it because it Quint. Curt. Mach. Prin. So Alexander the Great, Fer­dinand King of Spaine, and Hen. the 5. King of Eng. became famous. so much encreaseth and aug­menteth his estimation, and credit with for­raigne Princes abroad, and breedeth and beget­teth him loue and authority among his owne peo­ple at home? Or may this be the reason, for that by this meanes, all Mach. disput. lib. 1. cap. 30. wrangling occasions, and heart-burnings are cut off, whereby a Prince sometimes proueth vngratefull to men, euen of the best deserts? For when Princes present, and behaue themselues brauely in the field, all the honour and glory thereof (as it pertaineth) so it redoundeth vnto them: whereas otherwise if they were absent, and committed the managing of those affaires to their Generals, they straight waies imagine, that if their forces should pre­uaile, the glory of the day should rest with the Generall, who led the Army, and that themselues can neuer challenge any part of the victory, got­ten, vnlesse they extinguish the merites of the Generall, or himselfe, and by that meanes proue vniust and vngratefull to their seruants.

5

It may further be demanded, how a Courtier may come to bee much imployed in his Princes affaires?

MAy he effect this, if he Guicch. should waite dili­gently, and bee alwaies in the eye of the Prince? Or may hee compasse this the rather, if once imployed hee manage that affaire well? For by this meanes, hee shall both gaine himselfe reputation, and bee thought fit and able to deale in any businesse, and be sure (almost) neuer to be out of action, by reason of the dependencies which other businesses haue vpon those, wherein hee formerly hath beene employed.

6

Considering that by well or ill managing and handling of the affaires of Princes, in negotiating for them with forreigne Princes, either great good, or great hurt may accrew to the Prince and State, it may be demanded what manner of men a Prince might chiefly imploy for Embassadours to forreigne Princes?

SHall hee vse such as are Comineus. skilfull to picke and gleane something out of other mens employ­ments, and appropriate it to themselues, if there bee hope that their credit and estimation, may grow greater by it? Or shall not a Prince trust to such to negotiate for him, but to those rather, who are faithfull, carefull, meeke, and gentle, and [Page 78] haue beene long practised and experienced in managing such affaires?

7

It may further be demanded, with what tooles an Ambassadour shall soonest perswade a forreigne Prince, and draw him to fauour, and further his maisters designes?

SHall he assaile him with Tholoz. firme arguments and sound reasons? But hee that is nice, and hath a speciall opinion of his owne wisedome, will pre­sently distast that or any thing that is solide. Or shall he rather set vpon him with Fran. Guicch. Cominaeus. Mach. Prin. representations of colours, Popularities, and circumstances? And (to speake as the truth is) these are of no lesse (if they bee not of more) force, then firme and sound reasons: For circumstances, colours, representations, and such like stuffe, are of such power and efficacy, that they can giue life to true and sound reasons, peruert the iudgement, if it bee not stable and well grounded, and quickly leade into errour.

8

It may further bee demanded, why eloquence is so necessary for a Councellour, or an Embassador?

IS it because that daily amost it falleth out, that a Prince hath occasion to send some one or [Page 79] other of his Councell to forreigne States, either to perswade; to accuse, or defend; to gratulate, or condole, &c. Now it is both requisite, and ne­cessary, and commodious for a Prince to bee furnished with men so qualified, with eloquence, vtterance, &c. as that they may with credit to him and his Court, well discharge the place, and person they sustaine; And it should be a great shame, disaduantageous, and dishonourable to the Prince, if for want of such gifts, in any whom hee should send on such errands, it should fall out otherwise. Or may it rather be for this cause; for that in Quintilian. pacifying such as are seditious in the State, and compounding the quarrels and diffe­rences of such as are factious, there is no better meane to accord them, then to vse an eloquent and plausible speech vnto them?

1

It may bee demanded from whence discords and factions haue their beginnings?

DOE they arise of such Tholoz. de Re­pub. lib. 22. mo­tions as are sodainely sug­gested to the people, so that there cannot bee time giuen them to thinke or consider what matter they go about? Or do they take their begin­nings rather of Idem Ibidem. the priuate or open hatred of Familiers? Or may they pro­ceed rather from the roote of Senec. Epist. 74 pride and ambiti­on, whilst euery man striueth to proceed, and go [Page 81] before another, and is alwaies detracting from him hee liketh not? Or may they haue their be­ginnings from idlenesse and loosenesse of liuing, which oftentimes are wont to minister occasions of ciuill (or rather vnciuill) brawles and con­tentions? Or may they arise of the Tholoz. de Re pub. lib. 22. different mindes and dispositions of the people, from the designes and intentions of the Nobility? Or not so much from thence neither, but of the waue­ring mutability of the vnconstant multitude also? their years being so diuers, and their manners so vnlike: For it is impossible, that where there is such and so great diuersity of yeares, and dis­parity of manners, that the multitude or Com­mons altogether, should equally well like of, affect, and comport the present State, but con­trarywise disagree, grow factious, and con­tentious.

2

It may further bee demanded, whether it may bee beneficiall to a Prince or State to nourish factions, or no?

IT were too hard a taske for mee (Right Honou­rable) to take vpon mee difinitiuely to deter­mine this question: for I am not ignorant that amongst diuers men, and those of the wisest sort, this doubt hath beene canuased, and greatly con­trouerted; yet seeing that I am entred into it, I thought it not fit altogether to passe it ouer in si­lence, [Page 82] without shewing your Honour my priuate opinion therein, which that I may do the better, I will rip vp the Arguments on both sides. That factions (therefore) should bee nourished of a Prince or State, many things may induce and perswade thereunto, but especially these two, Honour and Profit. For that Prince Mach. Prin. cap. 20. must needes bee honoured and feared, who alwaies hath an enemy at his owne deuotion, and neuer resisting his designes and enterprises: For hee that can conquer when hee list, is not onely admired, but much feared likewise, both at home and abroad. For all men with one voyce will giue it out, that hee got the victory by his owne valour and prowesse: Which so reported and beleeued, there is no doubt but that hee shall bee much re­nowmed therefore, though he atchieued it other­wise; namely, by being seconded with a potent faction, ioyning with him against their owne Prince, or otherwise. Againe, that the chiefest and most potent Cities of a Kingdome, should be brought vnder the Princes subiection, it were not onely conducible and necessary, but also pro­fitable, both to him and the common-wealth. Now to effect this, a Prince must either vse force or policy. If hee say to compasse his designes by force, hee must of necessity offer many iniuries to the people, which the more openly they are done, the more they do prouoke them to mislike the Prince: For that which the Law hath made Mine, and Thine, if it should be snatched away [Page 83] from the Subiect, it would bee grieuously taken, and held for no better then an intollerable peece of iniustice. But when the Mach. dis. lib. 2. cap. 25. Cities of themselues are become factious, and the Citizens doe waste and cōnsume themselues by quarrels and facti­ons, the fault shall neuer bee laid on the Prince, but on the factious, and yet by this meanes the Prince in effect, shall obtaine what hee desired. For the Cities hereby growing weake, and wea­ried with continuall garboiles, will willingly put themselues into the Princes protection, and yeeld themselues subiect to his will. Further, for a Prince to diuert the current of the warres, or any hostile inuasions, from his owne dores, it is very necessary, behouefull and conuenient: Now it is not incredible, that euer hee shall haue any better way, or meane to bring this to passe, then by Herod. lib. 4. Xenoph. de Pe­dia Cyri. lib. 3. nourishing factions, and dissentions in his enemies Countrie; for many haue put this in pra­ctise heretofore, and greatly thriuen thereby: Moreouer diuers of the wisest sort, haue thought it very aduantageous to the Prince, that the Tacit. Agric. Sub­iects should neuer come altogether, to consult, or agree altogether, vpon any thing which might tend to their common or particular safeties. To conclude, Tholoz. de Re­pub. lib. 23. that a great Prince, or Monarch, may become more wary of his enemy, and better conserue his owne estate, it hath beene thought fit, by some of the wisest heads that euer haue beene, that such a Prince should neuer bee with­out an enemy, or be a great nourisher of facti­ons [Page 84] in a forreigne Land: Which course, if Rome had taken, and not destroyed Carthage, they should haue had their braue spirited youth better trayned vp, practised, and made ready in feates of Armes, which might haue steeded the Common-wealth for offence or defence thereof; Graue and mature counsell should haue flouri­shed in the Senate, the Citizens should not haue wasted themselues with ciuill warres, and so the Empire should haue beene more durable and la­sting. The reasons of those who hold it vnpro­fitable, and euery way disaduantageous to a Prince, to nourish factions, are as follow. It is Mach. lib. 3. dis. cap. 37. im­possible, say they, by reason of an inbred incon­stancy in the nature of men, that those factions, which at this, or that present, depend vpon a Prince, should alwaies, and after one and the selfe-same manner, bee so affected towards him, for that men being wauering, doe greatly desire sometimes this Prince, sometimes that Prince, to be their chiefe Patron. Againe, Idem Ibidem. the nourshing of factions, by a Prince in a forreigne Land, is oftentimes the cause, that by little and little, dis­cords and ciuill garboyles are brought into his owne Country, which will scarcely be thought to bee conuenient. Further, a great inconuenience, or rather an apparant losse might happen to a Prince, who should nourish factions within his owne Dominions; For Idem Prin. cap. 20. vpon any sodaine inua­sion, such Cities of his, which should happen to bee rent asunder by factions, must of necessity [Page 85] be all lost: For the Tholoz. lib. de Repub. 23. weaker part would rather submit, and apply it selfe to a stranger, then yeeld to the aduerse faction in any thing. More­ouer this course of gouerning, by nourishing of factions, must needs Mach. Prin. cap. 20. argue the weakenesse, and imbecility of the Prince, both in power and iudgement: For if hee were strong and prudent, hee would neuer indure that his Country should bee torne in peeces by factions and contentions. To conclude, seeing that euery faction consisteth of few or many, both of these must needs bee hurtfull to the Common-wealth: This latter for that Liu. lib. 34. they trusting to their owne strength, would presently take Armes, and turne the quiet of the State into garboiles: The former likewise, though perhaps somewhat more secretly and slowly, would no lesse vexe and molest the Common­wealth, by reason that Arist. 5. Polit. cap. 4. factions of the Nobility are wont to draw vnto themselues all, or the grea­test part of the Commons, to take part with such or such of them, as they most affect. These things thus standing, they conclude, that factions are ra­ther to bee extinguished and quenched, then nou­rished. For mine owne part (Right Honourable) though I will determine nothing of this matter, yet thus I thinke thereof. That Factions, to the singular benefite of the Prince, and Common­wealth, may be nourished in a forreigne gouerne­ment: and though it were not so conuenient (perhaps) they should bee set on foote, and maintained at home, yet at no hand are they to [Page 86] be neglected, especially in the time of peace. For seeing that there is no Common-wealth, which doth not breed and bring forth, yea foster and cherish some enuy and contention: these contentions may proue healthfull to the State of a Common-wealth, as Agues are sometime be­neficiall to the state of a mans body: And it is certaine that the Romane Common-wealth, was neuer in better health and safety, then when the Tribunes of the People, and the Patricians were at variance: and the Lacedaemonian State ne­uer in better state, then when their Ephori, and their Kings could not agree. For by this cur­bing of one another, the publique Offi­ces of a Common-wealth were better discharged, both at home and abroad.

1

It may be demanded whence sedition and muti­ning, in, or, against a State taketh his beginning?

MAY it arise and spring out of the bitter Tholoz. Aristotle 5. Pol. Cap. 3. roote of op­pression, as when men ap­prehending the remedy of present euils and dangers, to bee the euils and dangers themselues, doe vpon a so­daine breake out, and so take Armes? Or may it proceede Idem Ibidem. of feare as the Phylosopher well conceited? For feare may moue and incite men, to bee seditious, fearing or ex­pecting punishments to be inflicted vpon them, for the wrongs they haue done, and by this [Page 88] meanes running out, they thinke (or at least are willing) to preuent them before they can bee put in execution. Or may this proceed of too much indulgency, clemency, and remissnesse of the gouernement, together with the superfluity and aboundance of all things, it being rather the na­ture of the people to Liuy lib. 2. grow to bee Wantons then Warriours? Or may it come rather of Salust. Su­gurth. penury, and scarcity of things necessary? Or may it hap­pen through the Liu. lib. 38. pride and ambition of euill Gouernours and Councellours? Or may it rather arise of taking vp too much mony at Vse, with the which the Commons being (as it were) eaten vp, and their states consumed, they grow despe­rate thereupon, and so take Armes, thinking Tacit. 1. Hist. themselues most safe when they runne the most vncertaine courses? for worse then they are, they thinke they cannot bee.

2

It may further bee demanded, whether, when once sedition groweth hot, and commeth to Heads, it were better to stand Newtrall, then to fall to part-taking?

TOuching this Question (Right Honourable) vn­lesse that Solon. great Athenian Law-giuer, had de­creed and established by Law, that vpon any se­dition arising in that State, Sic refert A. Gaellius. in Noct. Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12. he that would not take part with one side, should bee banished the Citie, and loose all that euer hee possessed; I should scarce haue thought it worth the looking [Page 89] into: but after so wise a man had determined it, and for that I perceiued others, who thought themselues as wise, as the said Law giuer, did stiffely stand against his opinion, and vpon good grounds (as they suppose) produced arguments to the contrary, I thought it worthy my labour likewise, to put downe the reasons on both sides, and in conclusion to enterpone mine own priuate opinion touching the premisses. Those therefore who stand on Solons side, and allow and stand for part-taking doe thus argue: A. Gaellius noct. Attic. lib. 2. cap. 12. If the good men, which be in the Citie or Common-wealth, per­ceiuing the Seditious to bee madded with fury, and to grow to an head, should apply themselues to either part, there is no doubt, but that they might bee a meanes to reduce them to vnity; per­swading first with their owne side, how ill besee­ming a thing it is, for Citizen to striue with, or take Armes against Citizen, and what destructi­on of them and theirs may ensue, if they suffer themselues still to be led with passion, and by that meanes mollifying their owne friends minds, they may (happily) get leaue likewise to deale with the other side, in those or such like termes, and so perswade both parties to lay downe their wea­pons. Againe, Phauorinus Philosophus. those which take part with nei­ther side, if the differences of the factious should once bee compounded, should smart for it, being hated on both sides, deemed as pub­lique enemies, and such as solaced themselues, and reioyced to see them at those oddes, and [Page 90] therefore are iustly exposed to the prey, and iniu­ries of either party. Further, it were very dan­gerous when the Citie or Common-wealth is diuided into faction, not to take part with the one or the other side, least a Iosephus de bello Iudaico. third faction should spring out of the others, as hath sometimes beene read to haue falne out in the Iewes Common­wealth. But those which stand for newtrality, think otherwise, and thus they reason Tacit. Annal. Ciuill Armes of themselues, can neither be prouided, taken vp, or managed by any good or lawfull meanes, and the issue and end of them commonly proueth naught. For the Leaders and Captaines of the seditious, vnder the pretence of seeking the good of the Common wealth, do euery one seeke to promote his owne ambitious humours, and so draw the people to follow their fancies, which no good Patriote ought to do. Againe, it argueth great fol­ly in any, who shal take either part, and ioyne with the seditious: for by that meanes they Salust. in bello Iug [...]rthino. strengthen and encourage them, encrease their malice to­wards their Countrey-men, and fellow-Citizens of the aduerse partie, and become partakers of their rebellions, madnesse, and folly. Touching mine owne priuate opinion herein, I think (right Honourable) that newtrality is regularly to be a­uoyded in either Prince or Courtier, except in some maine case, where a man by making shew to be newtrall, may more handsomly compouud and contriue his owne businesse, and better promote, and sooner come to his owne ends.