Sect. I.

1 FIrst therefore Franciscus Suarez a most famous Diuine of the Societie of Iesus, (whom in this we haue ra­ther chosen to follow then others, for that his authoritie, both in re­gard of his singular learning, and also of the religious course of life, which he professeth, will not be so easily reiected by the chiefe impugners of the oath) doth di­stinguish [Page 2] Lib. 6 de Leg. cap. 1. nu. 1. three sorts of interpreting lawes: to wit, an ‘Authenticall, Vsuall, and Doctrinall interpretation. Authenticall he calleth that, which is done by the au­thoritie of him, who hath power to make the law, and who consequently hath also full power to interprete the same, and to declare the true meaning of euery word therein contained, according to that Decree of Iustinian the Emperour,Leg vlt. Cod. de Leg § Dif­finimus. Diffinimus autem, &c. Wee define, that all interpretation of lawes, which the Emperours make, is to be accounted firme, and certaine. For if it be onely at this present granted to the Empe­rour to enact lawes, it is also onely meete for the Impe­riall crowne to interprete lawes. The second interpre­tation, which is called vsuall, dependeth only vpon common vse, and custome, which, according to that vulgar axiome of the Lawyers,Cap. cum dile­ctus de consue­tud. & leg. si de interpretat. ff. de leg. is the best interpre­ter of lawes. For as custome hath the force of a law, and therefore is commonly called a law not written, so also it hath power to interprete the true and pro­per meaning of the law.’

‘2 The third kinde of interpretation by way of do­ctrine is only grounded vpon the iudgement of men skilfull in the lawes. For seeing that such is the con­dition of man, that he can scarcely declare his minde with such perspicuous words, but that ambiguities, and doubts may oftentimes arise, especially in hu­mane lawes, which are deliuered briefly, and in gene­rall termes, therefore in the applying of them to di­uers cases in particular, many doubts do vsually arise, for the deciding whereof (sith the Law-maker is not alwaies at hand to declare his meaning) the iudge­ment of learned, and prudent men, and a doctrinall interpretation is necessarily required. From which necessitie proceeded the science of the Ciuill law; whose true end is to deliuer the true sense, and vnder­standing of humane lawes; and which without all doubt is greatly to be regarded, for that in euery art [Page 3] the iudgement of men skilfull therein is of great mo­ment, and causeth at the least no small probabilitie; I said, at the least, for if it should so fall out, that all In­terpreters should agree in the expounding of any law, it would cause then a morall certainty, and (spea­king regularly) it would also induce an obligation to vnderstand the law according to their interpreta­tion.’ But to finde out by a doctrinall interpretation, in what sense the words of any law are to be taken, the same Suarez, Cap. 1. cit. nu. 7. following herein the common doctrine of Diuines, and Lawyers, doth assigne many generall rules, wherein three principall heads, vpon which the true interpretation of euery law doth chiefly depend, are to be obserued; to wit, the words of the law, the meaning of the Law-maker, and the reason or end, for which the law is made.

Sect. II.

‘1. AS concerning the words, we say, that in eue­ry humane law the propertie of the words, that is, the proper signification of them is first of all to be regarded, for from it the true interpretation of the law is chiefly to be gathered, and which, if there be no other impediment, is alwaies to be preferred, as may be deduced by many texts of the CanonExtra de translat. Episco­pi cap. 2. & in cap. ad audien­tiam de deci­mis., and Ciuill lawLeg. Non ali­ter ff. de legat. 3. leg 1. §. si is qui nauem ff. de Exercitoria actione: & in leg prospexit ff. qui, & à qui­bus.. And the reason is manifest, because in common speech words are to be taken in their pro­per, and vsuall meaning, vnlesse by some circumstance the contrarie may be gathered, therefore much more this is to be obserued in lawes, which ought to be cleere, and not exposed to circumuentions, and false interpretations: for otherwise nothing could bee certaine in lawes, neither could mens actions be ru­led, and directed by them, for that euery one might according to his pleasure wrest them to improper senses. And in regard of this rule the ancient Fathers, [Page 4] and Diuines doe teach, that the words of holy Scrip­ture, and which doe deliuer any doctrine of faith, or precepts of manners, are to be taken in their proper sense, vnlesse by circumstances, or otherwise the con­trarie may necessarily be gathered.’

‘2. But if it chance, that any word of the law hath together many proper, and vsuall significations, then we must vse that rule, which in all ambiguous, or e­quiuocall speeches is wont prudently to be obser­ued: to wit, that the matter of the law, with other circumstances, be diligently considered, for by them the meaning of the words will easily be determined. And especially wee must consider the beginning of the law, and with it to ioyne the rest which follow­eth, for to the beginning, if there be no obstacle all which followeth, is to be applied. For in the begin­ning of euery constitution the finall cause, and which doth chiefly moue the Law-maker, is vsually contai­ned, and therfore, according to the common doctrine of the Lawyers, that most of all is to bee regarded to vnderstand the meaning of the law. Wherefore it is necessarie, that euery man, before hee deliuer his iudgement, how any equiuocall word of the law is to be vnderstood, to peruse diligently the whole law from the beginning to the end, according to that principle of the Ciuill law, Inciuile est, Leg. Inciuile ff. de leg. &c. It is an vnciuill part to giue his iudgement, or answere concer­ning any one particular clause of the law, vnlesse the whole law be first perused. Therefore by the antece­dents, and consequents, together with the matter, and other circumstances, the equiuocall signification of any word is to be determined. But if the words of the law should be so equiuocall, that neither by the ante­cedents, nor consequents, nor by the matter, or reason of the law, the determinate sense of the law could be knowne, then it were no law, because not only it were not cleere, but also it should not sufficiently expresse [Page 5] the meaning of the Law-maker. Neuerthelesse it can hardly fall out, but that one sense be more agreeable to the matter, which is handled, and that is to be pre­ferred according to that rule of the law:Leg. Quoties ff de Regulis Iutis. Whensoe­uer the same speech hath two senses, let that especiallie be taken, which is more agreeable to the matter, which is in hand.’

Sect. III.

‘1. SEcondly,Suarez cap. 1. cit. nu. 12. concerning the intention, or will of the Law-maker, it is to be considered, that as well the substance, as the force of the law doth chiefly depend thereon, because the will of the Law-maker is the soule of the law; whereupon as in a li­uing creature, both the substance, and operation of life doth principally depend on the soule, so in a law on the will of the Law-maker. And therefore al­though the Law-maker doth pronounce words,Suarez lib. 3. de leg. cap. 20. which of themselues are sufficient to command, and with all other things externally requisite to the ma­king of a law, if he haue no intention to commaund, and to enact a law, he doth not enact it, neither is it a true law. And in this manner are rightly vnderstood those assertions of the Ciuill law, Quod Principi pla­cuit, Instit de Iure natur. gent & Ciuili §. Sedet. &c. That which pleaseth the Prince hath the force of a law: because the whole law dependeth vp­on his will, and pleasure. And, Non dubium est, Leg. Non du­bium Cod. de leg & leg. con­tra legem ff. de leg. &c. Without doubt he offendeth against the law, who follow­ing the words of the law doth against the will thereof; verily for that the will, or intention is the soule, and as it were, the substance of the law. Therefore that is the true interpretation of a law, by which wee follow the intention, and will of the Law-maker, where­upon if by any meanes the will of the Law-maker can be knowne, according to it especially the law is to be interpreted.’

[Page 6] ‘2. Neuerthelesse, that which wee haue said, is not so to be vnderstood, as though the only internall will of the Law-maker considered by it selfe without words, can be a sufficient rule to interprete any law, both for that no man can vnderstand another mans minde but by his words, and therefore the meaning of the law, which consisteth in words cannot be ta­ken from the will of the Law-maker, seeing that the will it selfe cannot be made manifest vnto vs but by words; as also for that a law is not enacted by the Princes will, vnlesse by the words of the law it be suf­ficiently expressed, seeing that the will alone is not of it selfe sufficient to binde; neither also is it sufficient, that it be priuately knowne by some other way, but it is necessarie, that it be sufficiently contained in the law it selfe;See Suarez lib. 3. de Leg. cap. 15. and therefore the Diuines define a law, to be a sensible signe, whereby the commanding will of a Superiour is made manifest. But what we haue said, is so to be vnderstood, that whereas the words of the law, being taken barely by themselues, be oftentimes ambiguous, and may proceed from diuers intentions, and wils, therefore by the things to it annexed, to wit, by the matter, and circumstances it must pru­dently bee gathered, from what will, and intention they did proceed, and then the signification, and in­terpretation of the words must bee accommodated to the intention of the Law-maker, whereupon the substance, and force of the law doth chiefly depend. Wherefore it is true, that men doe iudge of the mind of the speaker by his words, and that a law is not made by the internall will, vnlesse it be in the law it selfe sufficiently expressed; for that a law, being a rule of humane actions, hauing force to binde, (wherein it differeth from a councell, or any other admonition, which hath not force to binde,) it must by words suf­ficiently expressed in the lawe bee propounded to them, whom it intendeth to binde. Neuerthelesse, that [Page 7] words may sufficiently expresse the intention of the speaker, and the will of the Law-maker, they are not to be taken seuerally, and barely by themselues, but they must, and ought by all circumstances annexed be determined rather to this, then to that significa­tion.’

‘3. But to vnderstand, what meanes, and conie­ctures, besides the naked force of the words, are to be vsedSuar. cap. 10. cit nu. 17. to finde out the will of the Law-maker, the Lawyers doe assigne many rules. And among the rest, (for, to set downe all at this present were ouer te­dious) the matter of the law is chiefly to be regarded, for the words must especially be agreeable to the mat­ter, according to that saying of S Gregory, Lib 1. epist. 28 ad Aristobu­lum, & habe­tur in cap. prop­terea, extra de verborum signi­ficat. Plerun (que) dum proprietas, &c. Oftentimes when one attendeth to the propertie of the words, he loseth the force of their meaning, or, as in the Decretals we reade, he loseth the true meaning of them. Wherefore if at any time the words taken in their proper signification should ar­gue any iniustice, or like absurditie to be in the minde of the Law-maker, they must be drawne to a sense al­though improper, wherein the law may bee iust, and reasonable; because this is presumed to be the will of the Law-maker, as hath been declared by many lawes in ff. tit. de legibus. Nam in ambigua voce le­gis ait lex, Leg. in ambi­gua ff. de legibus. &c. For in a doubtfull word of the law, saith the law, that sense is rather to be chosen, which is void of all default, especially seeing that, the will also of the law may be gathered by this. Because it ought not to be presumed, that the Law-maker did intend to commaund any absurd, or inconuenient thing, vnlesse the contrarie doe euidently appeare.’ And this rule the ancient Fathers doe obserue in expounding the ho­ly Scriptures, and the Diuines in declaring the precepts of nature: for which cause those words of our Sauiour, I am a doore, I am a vine, I am a shepheard, are by them transferred to improper, and metaphoricall senses; so [Page 8] also that precept, thou shalt not kill, is to be vnderstood of vniust killing; and, thou shalt restore to euery one his owne, ought not to bee extended to restore to a mad man his sword.

‘4. In like manner, a benigne, and fauourable in­terpretation, if there be no other let, is alwaies to bee preferred, according to that approued rule of the law,Leg. Benig­nius ff. de legi­bus. Benigniùs leges, &c Lawes are to be interpreted in the more fauourable sense, that thereby their will, or meaning, may be conserued. And if any word of the law hath two senses equally proper; or if the things be any way equally doubtfull, in punishments,Salas disp. 21 de leg. sect. 3. § Octaua re­gula. as also in all odious matters wee must follow the milder part. But in benefits, and fauourable causes, which are vsually contained in last Wills, and Testaments, the larger interpretation ought to be made, so that there­by no man be preiudiced, according to that saying of the Canon law,De regulis Juris in Sexto. Odia restringi, fauores conuenit am­pliari. It is meete, that odious things be restrained, and fauours to be inlarged. In iudgements, if the matter be doubtfull, the person accused is rather to be fauou­red, then the plaintiffe; the possessour, rather then the suiter, and doubtfull speeches are to be taken in the better sense, and which is more profitable to the speaker.Sa verbo in­terpretatio. nu. 1. In a generall speech the person, who spea­keth, is vnderstood to be excepted,Salas regula 22. & Sa nu. 14. and to conclude, In lawes the diuersitie of words, doth argue diuersitie of things, for otherwise the law should superfluously vse varietie of words.’ Salas regula 7. ex Azorio, & Panormit. leg. si [...]d [...]m codicilli. Cod. de codi­cillis. Many other obseruations are set downe by Diuines, and Lawyers, which may be seene in Ioan. Azor. Tom. 1. lib. 5. cap 16. q. 9. & seq. Ioan. de Salas, Disp. 21. de leg. sect. 3. Franciscus Suarez. Cap. 1. cit. & seq. and the Summists, verbo, Interpretatio, where Syluester, Angelus, Tabiena, Sa, and others, who treate of lawes.

Sect. IIII.

1. LAstly, concerning the reason, and end of the law, which was the third of those three heads before rehearsed, which ought to be obserued ‘to finde out the true meaning of the law by a doctrinall inter­pretation, it is first of all to be supposed,Suarez lib. 3. de leg. cap. 14. that there be two sorts of humane lawes to be distinguished: the one is called a constitutiue law; the other a decla­ratiue; the diuersitie of which lawes is sufficiently knowne by the words themselues. For a declaratiue law, as it is declaratiue, doth impose no new com­mand, but doth onely declare, what is commanded, or forbidden to be done by some former ancient law: but a constitutiue law doth of it selfe impose a new command, and obligation: so that betwixt these lawes there is this difference, that a constitutiue law is a rule to guide, and direct humane actions by, and therefore it is extended only to future actions, and not to such as are alreadie past, which, for that they are alreadie past, can haue no rule to guide them by: but a declaratiue law of it selfe is no such rule, but it doth suppose, and declare a former rule, neither doth it make a new obligation, but it supposeth an obliga­tion alreadie made; and therefore it comprehendeth not only future actions, but such also as are alreadie past: for whiles it declareth a former law, it also ver­tually declareth, that all those actions, which haue, are, or shall be committed against that law, were, are, or shall be euill. But some lawes there are, which in part are declaratiue, and in part constitutiue, for that partly they declare a former obligation,’ and partly they impose a new; of which kinde are all humane lawes, which vnder paine of death doe forbid thefts, murthers, and such like villanies, which are alreadie forbid by the law of God, and nature; which in respect [Page 10] of the punishment newly imposed, are constitutiue lawes, but in regard of the offence, which was before a­gainst iustice, they are only declaratiue. Wherefore ac­cording to the common opinion of Diuines, he that committeth theft, doth not commit two sinnes, one a­gainst the law of God, and nature; and another against the Princes law, vnlesse the Prince should forbid that vniust action vpon a motiue of some other vertue, for then it were two sinnes and not one only sinne. And so the Church, or ciuill common wealth in honour and re­uerence of Religion forbidding to shed blood in con­secrated Churches; or to steale Church goods, and which are dedicated to Gods seruice, causeth those ac­tions, which otherwise would be only repugnant to the vertue of iustice, to be now sacrilegious, and opposed to the vertue of religion; in regard whereof they are rightly accounted constitutiue lawes: and so hee that robbeth Churches consecrated to diuine seruice, or doth in the same giue any man a bloody wound, doth commit not only iniustice, but also sacriledge.

‘2. This supposed, Suarez Lib 3. de leg. cap. 20. affirmeth, that the end, or reason of the law is farre different from the will, or intention thereof: for without all doubt in the minde of the Law-maker these two are distinguished, to wit, his will, or intention, whereby hee intendeth to command, or binde his subiects; and the reason, which moueth him to make that command. For the will, or intention of the Law-maker, whereby he intendeth to command, doth giue force to the law, and it is the intrinsecal forme, and soule of the law, as before hath been said, but the reason is only the end, which mo­ueth the Law-maker to enact the law, & is as it were the personall reason of the Law-maker himselfe; neither doth it substantially compound a constitutiue law: As for example, in the precept of fasting, the ma­cerating of the body, or mortification, or satisfaction for ones sinnes, and such like, which may moue the [Page 11] Law-maker, are not of the substance of the law, nei­ther of themselues are necessarie to the constitution of such a law, whereupon the same law may be ena­cted without these motiues, and by one Law-maker it may bee enacted for one motiue, and by another Law-maker for another motiue, whereas the law is the very same. Yea sometimes the Law-maker may be moued for some priuate, or vnreasonable By the Prin­ters fault it is in Suarez rea­sonable. motiue, and yet the law shall be of force, if in regard of the matter, and obiect it be reasonable. I said according to Suarez, that the reason of the law doth not substan­tially compound a constitutiue law; because, as Suarez in the same placeNu. 10. doth well obserue, if the law doth only declare a former law of God, or nature, then it only dependeth vpon the reason, or, which is all one, vpon the precedent law, for from it all the obligation thereof doth proceed.’

‘3. Wherefore the end, or reasonSuarez lib. 6. cap. 1. nu. 19. of a constitutiue law doth not sufficiently containe the minde, or will of the Law-maker, both for that the reason of the law is not the text of the law, as also for that many things are decreed by humane lawes, rather because so it pleaseth the Law-maker, then for any certaine reason; and therefore, as wee reade in the Digests, Leg. Non om­nium, ff. de leg. Non omnium, &c. There cannot be yeelded a reason of all things, which haue been decreed by our Ancestors. For although a law must alwaies be agreeable to rea­son, neuerthelesse the chusing, or electing of those things, which are reasonable, is oftentimes without reason; for one may chuse that thing, which is in ve­ry deede reasonable, not moued thereunto for a rea­sonable cause, but for some vnhonest end; and there­fore the reason, which moueth the Law-maker, can­not alwaies be knowne, according to that saying of the Ciuill law,Leg. Et ideo, ff. de leg. Et ideo rationes eorum, &c. And there­fore the reasons of those things, which are decreed, ought not to be examined, otherwise many things, which [Page 12] are certaine, would be ouerthrowne. Wherefore the sole reason of the law doth not containe the will of the Law-maker, because hee might according to his pleasure not conforme himselfe to it in all things, but only so farre foorth as he would, and hath declared himselfe by his words. Neuerthelesse, if the reason of the law be knowne, as commonly it is expressed in the forefront of the law, it much auaileth to finde out the intention, and will of the Law-maker, especially that reason, which is expressed in the law: for after the words themselues it seemeth to haue the second place of certaintie, for then the reason of the law is in some manner a part thereof; for it is contained, and supposed therein. Whereupon it is necessarie, that the precept, and will of the Law-maker be agreeable to his reason, and consequently that the words, which signifie the act commanded, if they be ambiguous, be determined by the reason therein expressed.’

‘4. And therfore that reason which is expressed in the law, is morally a sure meanes to finde out the will of the Law-maker, yet it is not so infallible, but that also other circumstances are to be regarded; for the sense, and meaning of the reason it selfe may some­times be ambiguous, and by other circumstances be made more perspicuous, and certaine. And it may al­so fall out, that for the same reason the will may bee moued diuers waies, and to diuers things, and there­fore to know fully the will, which is the proper mind of the Law-maker, the sole reason expressed euen in the law it selfe, doth not suffice, but all circumstances are to be weighed, and diligently to be considered. But that reason; which is not expressed in the law, but inuented by Expositors, although it may somewhat auaile to finde out the will of the Law-maker, yet it is not a certaine token, but only a probable conie­cture; both because the reason is not alwaies cer­taine, but controuerted among Doctors, and also be­cause [Page 13] it is much more vncertaine, whether that was the reason, which moued the Law-maker, seeing that there may be other reasons, for which he might bee moued, and consequently it is vncertaine, to what reason the true meaning of the law is more agree­able.’ Many other obseruations, which now to rehearse would be ouer tedious, are set downe by Doctors, to know how by a doctrinall interpretation lawes may sometimes be extended, somtimes restrained, but these, which wee haue taken out of Suarez almost word for word, will giue no small light to the better vnderstan­ding of the true meaning of the oath, whereof we now doe treate.

Sect. I.

1. AGainst this branch two obiections especially are vsuallie made. And first Iacobus Gret­zer, In Comment. Exeget. cap. 6. pag. 103. a famous Diuine of the Societie of Iesus, doth a­gainst this clause [our Soueraigne Lord] obiect in this manner.

Whosoeuer affirmeth that King Iames, and not the Pope is supreme head of the Christians in great Bri­tannie euen in Ecclesiasticall, and spirituall matters; de­nieth the Catholique faith; But hee, that taketh the oath prescribed by King Iames, affirmeth that King Iames and not the Pope is supreme head of great Bri­tannie [Page 14] euen in spirituals, therefore hee denieth the Ca­tholique faith. The Minor I proue: because in the be­ginning of the oath hee professeth, testifieth, and decla­reth swearing in his consciēce before God, and the world, that King Iames is his Soueraigne Lord, but according to the commmon vse, and practise of England, this Soue­raigne Lordship, or Supreme dominion is referred not on­ly to the Supreme ciuill, but also to the spirituall, and Ec­clesiasticall; for it is treason to deny or not to grant to the King this spirituall Supremacie.

2. To this obiection it is answered by denying the Minor proposition. For first of all, although his Maie­sties Subiects, according to the present lawes of this kingdome, are sometimes vnder grieuous punishments compelled to sweare, that our most Noble Prince King Iames is Supreme Gouernour of this Kingdome as wel in causes Ecclesiasticall, as in temporall, neuerthelesse they are not compelled to acknowledge the aforesaid Kings Supremacie, by vertue of his oath of Allegiance, whereof now we treate, but by vertue of another oath, commonly called, the oath of Supremacie. And there­fore although this word Lord, or Dominus, may signi­fie in general as well a spiritual, as a temporal Lord, yet when it is spoken of a temporall Lord, and its an oath of temporall Allegiance, it ought in common speech, and vnderstanding, to which in this oath we are tyed, to be limited by the matter, which is handled, and o­ther circumstances annexed, according to the rules be­foreCap. 1. sect. 2. related, to signifie only a temporall Lord, or a Lord in temporall affaires.

3. Besides, if wee must needes scan so strictly euery word of the oath, first, in the oath it selfe of Suprema­cie, whereon Gretzer groundeth his obiection, these words [Soueraigne Lord are not so much as named, but only [Supreme Gouernour] that hereby it may ap­peare, what a seuere Censour Gretzer is, to condemne so rashly, and vpon so weake a ground, for these words [Page 15] forsooth [our Soueraigne Lord] this oath of Allegiance, as containing a manifest deniall of the Catholique faith.

4. Secondly, sith that Gretzer will be so rigorous a Censour, that proposition, which he supposeth to proue his Minor, is also false. For I doe not in this branch of the oath professe, testifie, and declare swearing, that King Iames is our Soueraigne Lord, as Gretzer doth falsely affirme, for so Soueraigne Lord should be the predicate, and not the subiect of the proposition, whereas true, and lawfull King is the predicate, or, which is all one, is affirmed of our Soueraigne Lord King Iames.

5. True indeed it is, that in this branch of the oath, wee call King Iames our Soueraigne Lord, by which name all Kings, what Religion soeuer they professe, are vsually called by their Subiects, yet, if wee will speake strictly, and in rigour, wee doe not in this branch pro­perly affirme, or sweare, as Gretzer faineth, that King Iames is our Soueraigne Lord (although we might tru­ly, and lawfully sweare the same:) but wee doe onely here affirme, and sweare, that our Soueraigne Lord King Iames is lawfull, and rightfull King of this Kingdome. Now who seeth not, that betwixt bare calling, and swearing there is a great distinction? For Iewes, Infi­dels, or Heretikes, who especially are subiect to the Pope in temporals, will not be much afraid, if cause re­quire, to call him their most holie Lord, because this name, or title is giuen him by all men; but to professe, affirme, and sweare, that he is a most holy Lord, or, which is all one, that he is truly so called, they will perchance stand in some feare. As also those, who so vehementlie impugne this oath, will not sticke perchance to call it the oath of Allegiance, seeing that commonly it is so called, yet to professe, testifie, and by oath affirme, that it is truly, and in very deede an oath of allegiance, as it is vsually called, without doubt they will not aduenture. Neither is this, which we now haue said, for that cause [Page 16] affirmed by vs, as though wee doe thinke it lawfull, to call King Iames our Soueraigne Lord, but not to ac­knowledge by oath, that he is our Soueraigne Lord; but only to shew how idly Gretzer from those words, our Soueraigne Lord, doth take occasion to impugne this oath, as repugnant to Catholique faith.

6. If perhaps Gretzer had dedicated this his Exegi­ticall Commentarie to King Iames, who now reigneth in great Britannie, (as hee hath consecrated the same to his most holie mother, who now reigneth with Christ in heauen) he would greatly haue feared to haue called him most potent Lord, as he calleth him somtimes most potent King, lest that he should haue seemed to ac­knowledge him to bee a Lord in spirituals, seeing that this Lordship, or Dominion of the K. of England, if we may giue credit to Gretzer, is according to the common vse, and practise of England, to be referred not only to the ciuill, and temporall, but also to the spirituall, and Eccle­siasticall Lordship, or Dominion. And wee also doe not a little meruaile, how Gretzer durst aduenture to call the Kings Maiestie so often in his booke King of great Britannie, sith that betwixt a King, and a supreme Lord, or Gouernour, Gretzer can alleage no great distinction; and, according to Gretzer, this supreme gouernment, or Soueraigntie, is referred not only to the ciuill, and tempo­rall, but also to the Ecclesiasticall, and spirituall Soue­raigntie.

7. But of a farre different opinion are Martinus Be­canus, and Father Parsons, both eminent Iesuites, who, concerning these words, our Soueraigne Lord, are not so scrupulous. For Becanus In Contro­uers. Anglic. cap. 3. pag. 102. printed at Mentz an. 1612. writeth in this manner: And truly to me it is certaine, that all the parts, and pro­positions of this oath are not false, if they be well declared. For these be true; 1. That King Iames is lawfull King of England, Scotland, and Ireland. 2. That in the same Kingdomes he is Supreme Lord in temporals: And Fa. Parsons In his booke intituled, The iudgement of a Catholique En­glish man liuing in banishment, &c. part. 1. nu. 22. pag. 13. & 16. doth confidently affirme, that there is no man, [Page 17] who sticketh, or maketh difficultie to acknowledge our So­ueraigne to be true King, and rightfull Lord ouer all his Dominions; for that euery English Catholike will sweare, and acknowledge most willingly all those parts, and clau­ses of the Oath, that doe any way appertaine to the Ciuill, and Temporall obedience due to his Maiestie, whom he acknowledgeth for his true, and lawfull King, and Soue­raigne ouer all his Dominions. Whereby it is apparant, that this violent exposition, which Gretzer wresteth from those words, our Soueraigne Lord, is neither ap­proued by Becanus, nor Fa. Parsons, nor by any other, that I haue either read, or heard of, either of our owne, or of any other nation. See also beneathCap. 4. sect. 3. somewhat appertaining to this obiection.

Sect. II.

1. SEcondly, Leonard Lessius, In his Apo­loget. Disputa­tion pag. 396, and in the En­glish Recapitu­lation of his booke, entitu­led, A briefe and cleere Declara­tion, &c. pag. 51 a most learned Di­uine of the Societie of Iesus, against these words [true, and lawfull King] argueth in this manner:

No man can lawfully affirme with an oath that thing to be true, whereof he hath no certain knowledge, for o­therwise he should expose himselfe to danger at the least of periurie: but no man can haue any certaine knowledge of the true, and lawfull titles of Kings, sith that to them some things are required, which are hidden, and cannot cleerely be knowne, therefore no man can lawfully sweare, that such a one is a true, and lawfull King. The like argu­ment with farre greater shew of probabilitie may bee vrged against Popes, and especially inferiour Bishops; to whose true, and lawfull Ordination some things are necessarie, which by naturall meanes cannot be certain­ly knowne; and especially the true intention, and in­ward minde of him, who ministreth the Sacrament, without which neither Baptisme, which of necessitie is supposed to the true Ordination of a Bishop, neither the Consecration it selfe of a Bishop, is of any force at all.

[Page 18]2. To this obiection, which Becanus, and Fa. Par­sons according to their principles but now related, must confesse, to bee but a meere Sophisme, (seeing that, ac­cording to them, it is certaine, that euery man may by oath acknowledge, King Iames to be true, and lawfull King of England, &c.) it may bee answered two waies: First, that, according to the common opinion of Di­uines, euery man may lawfully, and without any dan­ger of periurie, sweare that thing to be true, which hee perswadeth himselfe to bee morally certaine, neither hath he any probable doubt of the contrary; although the thing, which he confirmeth by oath, be perchance in very deede not true: but of the true, and lawfull title of our most noble Prince King Iames to this kingdome, we are morally certaine, neither can wee haue any pro­bable reason, to moue vs to any neuer so small a doubt to the contrary, especiallie seeing that his true, and rightfull title to this kingdome hath been declared, and confirmed by the vniuersall consent of the whole kingdome.

3. The second answere is, that the immediate obiect of this oath, or, which is all one, the thing immediatly sworne, is not this proposition, King Iames is true, and lawfull King of this kingdome, &c. but this, I doe trulie, and sincerely acknowledge, professe, testifie, and declare in my conscience, that King Iames is true, and lawfull King of this kingdome, &c. but of this my vnfained, and sin­cere acknowlegement, profession, testification, and de­claration I am not onely morally, but also Physically certaine, and therefore no man can incurre any danger at all of periurie by taking this branch of the oath. So that Lessius vntruly, and against the expresse words of the oath doth affirme, that this branch of the oath is of the thing it selfe, and not of my acknowledgement, pro­fession, testification, and declaration: seeing that the words themselues doe most cleerely shew the contra­rie, and Father Parsons, and Becanus (but now cited) doe [Page 19] in expresse words suppose the same as certaine. And this second answere is diligently to be obserued for the better vnderstanding of the next ensuing branch of the oath.

Sect. I.

1. THis second branch of the oath is that rocke of scandall, and stone of offence, whereat so many of this age, as well learned, as vnlearned doe vsually stum­ble. For certaine eminent writers of this age, to wit, Card. Bellarmine, Iacobus Gretzer, Leonard Lessius, Martin Becanus, all Diuines of the Societie of Iesus, and some others moued especially with the authoritie of these men, who, to defend his Holinesse Breues, di­rected to the English Catholiques, haue taken vpon them to impugne this oath of Allegiance, doe chiefly relie vpon the Popes power to depose Princes, as a most sure and firme foundation to proue euidently the said oath to bee vnlawfull, and to containe many things, [Page 20] which are flat contrary to faith and the health of soules, as his Holinesse hath publikely, and in expresse words by his Breues declared.

2. The first therefore, and most principall obiection, which is commonly made against this second branch, is framed by Martin Becanus In Contro­uersia Angli­cana, cap. 3. q. 4 pag. 138. in this manner.

No man can with a good conscience take that oath, wherein is contained any proposition, which he iudgeth to be cleerely false. But in the oath of Allegiance, which his Maiestie hath propounded, there is contained a proposi­tion, which Catholikes iudge to be cleerely false, therefore Catholikes cannot with a good conscience take this oath. The Maior proposition is euident, because no man can with a good conscience affirme any thing without an oath, which he iudgeth to be false, therefore much lesse with an oath; for if a simple lie be not lawfull, much lesse per­iurie.

The whole difficultie therefore is to proue the Mi­nor proposition, which if it be once sufficiently confir­med, it will forthwith be euidently conuinced, that this oath cannot with a good conscience be taken by any Catholike.

3. And first of all Card. Bellarmine, and Lessius, and which also Becanus doth insinuate, doe openly pro­fesse, that it is not only false, but also cleerely repug­nant to Catholike faith, to affirme, that the Popes Ho­linesse hath not authoritie to depose Princes; and this they imagine to haue demonstrated by the testimonie of Scriptures, holy Fathers, Councels, holy Canons, and by most euident reasons. But that Card. Bellarmines arguments are not conuincing, and demonstratiue, I haue in another placeIn my Apolo­gie for the po­wer of Prin­ces, and in the Preface to my Apologet. An­swere, nu. 33. & seq. abundantly proued, and there­fore I thinke it needlesse to repeate them now againe.

4. But Lessius (besides the authorities, and reasons, brought by Card. Bellarmine, to proue this doctrine of the Popes power to depose Princes, to be embraced as a receiued principle of saith, which I haue, as I said be­fore, [Page 21] alreadie answered, and besides certaine other his reasons omitted by Card. Bellarmine, which I also haue elsewhereIn the afore­said Preface, nu. 52. & seq. alleaged, and satisfied) produceth this argu­ment, as a chiefe ground, to confirme the aforesaid do­ctrine to be certainly beleeued as a point of faith. Thus therefore he writeth:In his Apolo­geticall Disputa­tion for the Popes power, part. 2. sect. 3. pag. 396. But it is certainly to be held, that this doctrine [of deposing] is not ambiguous, that one may lawfully hold either opinion, but altogether certaine, so that without iniurie to faith it cannot be denied. Which first I proue, for that these propositions are in expresse termes defined in a Romane Councell vnder Gregorie the seuenth, That the Pope may lawfully depose the Empe­rour, That he may absolue the subiects of wicked men from their allegiance. This Councell is to be seene in O­nuphrius in the life of Gregorie the seuenth, and in Baro­nius in the yeare of our Lord 1076. But a definition made by the Pope with a Councell appertaineth to faith. Therefore, &c.

5. I cannot in truth but greatly meruaile, that so singularly learned a man should bring so weake, and vnlearned an argument to proue a matter of so great importance, as is the dethroaning of Soueraigne Prin­ces; as though it were lawfull for any man to play with the Crownes of Kings, and Emperours, First therefore we denie, that the aforesaid two propositions were de­fined in a Romane Councell vnder Gregorie the 7. al­though we will not denie, but that they were indeede openly maintained by Pope Gregorie the 7. who was the first of all the Popes, as Historiographers do write,See beneath cap. 6. sect 3. nu. 16. that deposed the Romane Emperour. But that the Reader may fully perceiue the truth of the whole mat­ter, he must obserue, that in the third tome of the Coun­cels betwixt the 55, and 56 epistle of the second booke of the Epistles of Pope Gregorie the seuenth, are inser­ted twentie seuen briefe sentences, which are there cal­led Dictatus Papa [...] among which the aforesaid two propositions related by Lessius are also cōtained. These [Page 22] briefe sentences of Pope Gregorie, Cardinall Baronius (belike to make them to carrie more credit) affirmeth to belong to the Romane Councell, held vnder Grego­rie the seuenth the yeare 1076: but to proue the same he bringeth neither reason, nor authoritie, but we must, forsooth, giue credit to his bare word, that these senten­ces are knowne to belong to the Romane Councell.

6. If they bee knowne to appertaine to the Romane Councell, Baronius should haue shewed, to whom this is knowne, and for what reason, authoritie, or conie­cture they are knowne to appertaine to the aforesaid Councell. But Lessius proceedeth further, and very bold­ly affirmeth, that they were defined in that Councell. But we beseech you, most learned Lessius, that you will also make knowne to vs, how this, which you doe so confidently auerre, is knowne to you. In the Decrees of the Councels these definitions are not to be found, and from Baronius you onely haue, that these sentences are knowne to appertaine to the Romane Councell. May not many things appertaine to a Councell, which neuerthe­lesse are not defined therein? Will you auerre that all those things, which are knowne to appertaine to the Councell of Nice, of Laterane, of Vienna, of Constance, of Florence, and lastly of Trent, are defined in those Councels? I thinke verily that you will scarcely admit this much. Besides, if those sentences were defined in the Romane Synode, how is it knowne to you, that they were defined, as propositions belonging to faith, or on­ly as probable assertions.

7. But what kinde of definitions those were, you might haue gathered by the eighth, ninth, tenth, ele­uenth, and eighteenth sentence. For the eighth sen­tence is, that only the Pope can vse the Imperiall armes: The ninth, That all Princes doe kisse only the Popes feete: The tenth, That the Popes name only is to be rehearsed in Churches: The eleuenth, That there is but one onely name in the world, to wit, the Popes: The eighteenth, [Page 23] That the Pope, if he be canonically ordained, is by the me­rits of S. Peter vndoubtedly made a Saint, as witnesseth Ennodius Bishop of Pauia, to whom many holy Fathers do agree as is contained in the Decrees of blessed Pope Sym­machus. Will you now auerre, that also these sentences were defined in that Councell? Truly I doe not thinke you will. And if it most cleerely appeare euen in your owne iudgement, that these sentences were not defi­ned in that Synode, how can it bee knowne to you, that the former two sentences, rather then the rest, were therein defined? Be carefull therefore, most lear­ned Lessius, not to obiect against vs such kinde of defi­nitions, inuented first by your selfe, which in these times it had been farre better to haue omitted, then to haue vrged, for that they call either your learning, or since­ritie in question, and also doe rather weaken, then con­firme the Popes power to define without a Generall Councell, which you doe so vehemently maintaine, that you will scarcely haue them to be accounted Ca­tholikes, who are not herein of your opinion. Neither would I, for reuerence to the Sea Apostolike, haue made any mention of them at all, if you through incon­siderate zeale, and being moued thereunto by no sound and sufficient reason, had not aduentured, to enforce ti­morous consciences, and to thrust by violence vpon the Christian world doubtfull positions for certaine, and to coyne new articles of faith, to the great obloquie of so famous Diuines, who are not of your opinion, and also to the exceeding great temporall preiudice of all vs English Catholikes.

8. But be it so, let vs grant you for disputation sake, which you cannot proue, that these briefe sentences were defined in that Romane Councel not only as pro­bable assertions, but also as most certaine positions of faith, yet wee may, without iniurie to the Catholike faith, with the Doctors of Paris, and many others, whom we will beneathCap. 10. nu. 27 relate, denie your Minor pro­position, [Page 24] to wit, that the Popes definition only with a Prouinciall Councell, as that Romane Synod was, doth of necessitie make the doctrine, which it defineth, to be beleeued of all men as a point of faith, seeing that there are many Catholikes both of singular doctrine, and pietie, as I said before, who doe constantly auerre, that the Pope defining without a Generall Councell may erre, and be deceiued. And I would willingly behold the shamelesse forehead of that man, who would not blush to traduce so great, and so worthie men of such eminent authoritie, learning, and pietie, as being halfe Catholikes, and enemies to the Sea Apostolike, or to distaine their honour with the reprochfull infamie of heresie, errour, or temeritie.

9. Secondly, Becanus In Contro­uers. Anglican. cap. 3. in fine. for confirming the Minor proposition, onely relieth vpon the authoritie of the Councell of Laterane, and the vniuersall consent of the whole Christian world, so that he thinketh it to be most certaine, that the Pope, if not by diuine law, and the insti­tution of Christ, yet at the least by humane law, and by the permission of the whole Christian world decreed, recei­ued, and approued in the Councell of Laterane, hath power to depose disobedient Kings, and Princes. And at the last he concludeth, that it is all one to sweare, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose the King, and to sweare, that the great Councell of Laterane, and that all the Popes, Diuines, and Lawyers, and all others, who doe teach, that the Pope hath power to depose the King, haue erred in this point. What Catholike man dare presume to sweare this? Truly, it were all one, as if hee should say, I sweare in my conscience before God, that concerning this point I know more then all others: No man, as I thinke, is so arro­gant.

10. To this obiection of Becanus wee answere in like manner, that wee also doe no lesse meruaile, that a man so excellently learned (to impugne the oath of Al­legiance) should so nakedly, and rawly produce the sole [Page 25] authoritie of the Councell of Laterane, which I haue alreadie in the Preface of my Apologeticall Answere fully satisfied, and abundantly shewed, first, that the aforesaid Councell hath neither defined, nor supposed as certaine this doctrine of the Popes authoritie to de­pose Princes. And secondly, that although it had sup­posed this doctrine as true, yet vnlesse it had supposed it as certainly, and vndoubtedly true, and not only as probably true, the contrarie opinion may be maintai­ned without any danger of faith, or any temeritie at all.

11. But that you may perceiue the weakenes of your argument, tell vs, I pray you, most learned Becanus, whether all those Diuines, who with might and maine doe defend, that the blessed Mother of God was con­ceiued without originall sinne, among whom are Al­phonsus Salmeron, and Franciscus Suarez, both famous Iesuites, who, to confirme this doctrine, doe alleage the consent almost of the Vniuersall Church, and the vni­forme assent of all Vniuersities, must forthwith auerre, that all other Catholikes, who are not of their opinion, haue erred in this point, or that they in this point know more, then all others, who embrace not their opinion? What Catholike dare presume to auerre this much? No man, as I thinke, is so arrogant. May not in the Church of God many opinions be probably defended on both sides without impeaching, either of errour, temeritie, or any other crime?

12. Doth not Ioan. Maldonate, an excellent Diuine of your Order, boldly affirme,In Summula q. 12. ar. 7. vide etiam qu. 15. ar. 21. & 22. that neither the Pope, nor the whole Church hath power to dispense in the so­lemne vow of chastitie, and that those Ecclesiasticall per­sons, and Interpreters of the Canon law, who haue taught the contrarie, doe seeme to him to haue had more regard of some examples of certaine Popes, then of the holy scrip­ture: For what Diuinitie would auerre, that the Church can dispense in the law of God, and nature? But who, vn­lesse [Page 26] an heretike, will deny, that the vow of chastitie doth binde by the law of God, and nature? And neuerthelesse I thinke you will scarcely affirme, that Maldonate there­fore intended to condemne of errour, or any other crime, so many Popes dispensations, and all those Ca­tholikes, who be not of his opinion herein. Truly I am ashamed, that men of so great learning, and who aboue others professe religious perfection, should be so stiffe in their owne opinions, that they feare not vpon sleight grounds both against the rule of Christian charitie, and in reproch of Catholike Religion, to slander most lear­ned, and vertuous Catholikes, who cleaue not to their opinions, with heresie, errour, temeritie, or any other grieuous crime. And this may suffice for the satisfying of Becanus his argument, vntill he do demonstrate, that those answeres, which I haue made to the Councell of Laterane, be altogether improbable.

13. Thirdly, Franciscus Suarez also a most learned Iesuite, and one of the chiefe Professors of Diuinitie in this age, in his Treatise of lawes, lately printed at Ant­werpe, hath alleagedLib. 4. de Le­gibus cap. 9. certaine arguments, whereby the aforesaid Minor proposition may be confirmed; to wit, that the temporall power is subiect, and subordinate to the spirituall, and consequently that the Pope, for the spirituall good, hath power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all their temporals: for the indirect domi­nion, or authoritie, which the Pope hath ouer the vniuer­sall world, from which the Diuines do deriue his power to depose Princes, is only grounded, saith Suarez, in the subordination of these two powers. And although the reasons, which Suarez bringeth, be triuiall, and haue long since been produced by Card. Bellarmine, and di­uers others, yet I thought it necessarie to put them downe in this place, for that his authoritie is of great moment with the best learned Priests of our nation, who with great expectation haue long desired to see, what arguments he could produce to confirme this do­ctrine [Page 27] of deposing Princes by the Popes authoritie, as­suring themselues, that a Diuine of so profound erudi­tion now at the last, after so exact debating of this con­trouersie, would bring the very best, and choisest rea­sons, which could be inuented, to demonstrate the a­foresaid authoritie.

14. Two therefore onely arguments Suarez doth bring to proue the subordination of the Ecclesiastical, and Ciuill power, wherein (saith he) the indirect domi­nion in temporals, which the Pope hath ouer the vniuer­sall world, is only grounded.

The first and principall ground (as hee saith) of this subordination is taken from the vnitie of the Church suf­ficiently signified in the Gospell, and declared by S. Paul, 1. Cor. 12. who saith, that we all are baptized into one bo­die, &c. and, Rom. 12. wee being many are one bodie in Christ, &c. and Ephes. 4. and many other places: which reason Suarez dilateth in this manner.

15. Seeing that Christ our Lord hath instituted his Church as one spirituall kingdome, wherein there should be also one King, and one spirituall Prince, it is necessarie, that the temporall power should be subiect to the spirituall, as the body is subiect to the soule. For by this example doth Gregorie Nazianzene Orat. 17. ad populum timore perculsum. very well declare the subor­dination of these two powers: for as a man were not well compounded, vnlesse the bodie were subordinate to the soule, so neither the Church should be conueniently insti­tuted, vnlesse the temporall power were subiect to the spi­rituall, as Pope Boniface the 8, out of S. Bernard, hath well concluded, affirming, that the sword must be vnder the sword, and the temporall power must be subiect to the spirituall. For where there is one body, it is necessarie that there be one head, whereunto all the members must in some sort haue recourse; otherwise neither peace, nor perfect vnitie could be in the body: But the Church of Christ is one body, therefore, although there be in it many powers, or Magistrates, it is necessarie, that they haue [Page 28] among themselues a subordination. For as much there­fore as it were a peruerse order, if spirituals were subiect to temporals, it must of necessitie be granted, that the tem­porall power is subordinate to the spirituall. Which subor­dination may also be confirmed by Pope Gelasius, Dist 96 can. Duo sunt. who out of those words, Pasce oues meas, doth insinuate, that Kings and Emperours are subiect to S. Peter.

16. But if thou answere, that Kings and Emperours are subiect to S. Peter in his spirituall gouernment: A­gainst this answere Suarez replieth in this manner: For to make (saith he) the temporall gouernment right, and honest, it must of necessitie haue a spirituall rule, therefore it is necessarie, that the temporall power it selfe of gouer­ning be directed by the spirituall: and this is to be subiect, and subordinate to it. And for this cause Popes are to render an account for Kings, and Emperours, because it belongeth to them to correct, and amend in whatsoeuer they, not only as men, but also as Kings, shall in exercising their power offend.

17. The second argument, which Suarez bringeth to confirme this subordination, is this: because Christ our Sauiour had not otherwise sufficiently prouided for his Church, if he had not giuen her power, to keepe Kings and Princes in due order at the least, by vsing the spiri­tuall sword.

18. To these arguments of Suarez I answere, that, to speake the truth, I am by them rather much confir­med in my ancient opinion, to wit, that the doctrine concerning the Popes power to depose Princes is not certaine, then any way withdrawne from the same. For he affirmeth nothing else, then what I will most wil­lingly grant him, and which in my Apologie for the rightfull power of Princes, and my Apologeticall an­swere, I haue more at large declared. First therefore I admit, that the Church of Christ is one mysticall bo­die, and one spirituall kingdome, and that all Chri­stians as well Kings, as Subiects, are members of this [Page 29] body. But we vtterly deny, that this spiritual kingdome of Christ is compounded of the Ecclesiasticall, and po­litike power; neither will Suarez, as I thinke, affirme the same, but the only politike, or temporall power doth compound earthly kingdomes, and of the sole spirituall power is compounded the kingdome of Christ, as I elsewhereIn Apolog. nu. 137. & seq. out of Card. Bellarmines grounds haue more plainly shewed, and also Becanus Aduersus Torturam Tor­ti part. 2. cap. 3. arg. 3. in ex­presse words doth acknowledge the same.

19. Moreouer, we grant with Pope Boniface the 8, that the temporall sword is vnder the spirituall, and that the temporall power is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, not only in nobilitie, nor yet of it owne nature, as Cardi­nall Bellarmine Lib. 5. de Ro­man. pont c. 6., and Becanus De Primatu Regis Angliae cap. 1. nu. 4. doe well affirme, but only accidentally, in that manner, which I haue here­toforeIn the place before cited. more fully declared, to wit, in regard of the sin, which Princes, when they abuse their temporal power, doe commit: which in very deede is nothing else, then that a temporall Prince in spirituall matters is subiect to the spirituall power of the Church. And this is the onely meaning of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, when hee compareth the spirituall, and temporall power, to the soule, and bodie. Which similitude, as I haue else­whereIn the place but now cited, and in my Apo­loget. answere nu. 19. & seq. shewed, doth rather weaken, then confirme the Popes power to depose Princes, and to dispose of their temporals. For as the soule hath power to com­mand the body to exercise all corporall actions, which are subiect to the command of our free will, yet she hath not power of her selfe to exercise those actions, which are proper to the body, without the helpe and assistance of a corporall organe; so also the spirituall power of the Church hath authoritie to command the temporall power, or rather a temporal Prince, in whom the supreme temporall power doth reside, to doe all those temporall actions, which are necessarie to the preseruing of the spirituall good, yet the spirituall po­wer hath not authoritie of her selfe to dispose of tem­porall [Page 30] things, or which is all one, cannot of her selfe ex­ercise those functions, which are proper to the ciuill power, without the aide and concurrance of the Secu­lar Magistrate. But all this is nothing else, then that temporall Kings, and Princes in spirituals, or in tempo­rals, as in regard of the sin annexed, which is spirituall, they are made spirituall, be subiect to the spirituall di­rection, command, chastising, and gouernment of the Ecclesiasticall power. Neither doth Suarez in his Re­ply, when hee affirmeth, that the very power of gouer­ning temporally, to make it vertuous, and honest, must be directed by a spirituall rule, proue any thing more then what we haue said, vnlesse he will contradict both himselfe, and most euident reason.

20. Neuerthelesse, I cannot denie, but that the a­foresaid assertion of Suarez is very equiuocall. For if by a spirituall rule hee vnderstand a supernaturall, and Ecclesiasticall rule, and by rectitude, and vertue hee meane supernaturall rectitude, and vertue, his assertion is most true: for, to make temporall gouerning to bee good and vertuous supernaturally, it must of necessitie be directed and guided by a supernaturall rule. But if he speake onely of morall rectitude, and vertue, it is most false, that to make temporall gouerning good and ver­tuous morally, it must of necessitie be directed by a su­pernaturall rule, but it sufficeth, if it be directed by the rule of morall rectitude and vertue: which morall rule, although in some sort it may be said to be spirituall, as also all morall vertues are, which are inherent in the soule, which is spirituall, yet it is not an Ecclesiasticall, or supernaturall rule. And thus much Suarez himselfe in the same Treatise doth suppose for certaine. For hee admitteth, as vndoubted, that Infidel Princes haue true, and full authoritie to enact iust and honest lawes, and yet it is manifest, that in making such lawes they are only guided, and directed by morall rectitude, and ho­nestie, and not by any Ecclesiasticall, or supernaturall [Page 31] rule. And by this the Reader may easily perceiue, how weake, and vnsound is the chiefest foundation for the Popes power to dispose of temporals, which, as Suarez himselfe confesseth, is only grounded in the vnitie of the Church, and in the subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall. And thus much concerning Suarez his first argument.

21. His second argument also we doe freely grant him. For wee doe willingly admit, that Christ hath left in his Church sufficient power to keepe Kings, and Princes in good order, at the least by vsing the spirituall sword. But from hence it cannot be certainly gathered, that the Church hath power to depose Princes, or to dispose of their temporals; for so he should haue pow­er to vse not only the spirituall, but also the temporall sword. And the very same reasons, which our Aduer­saries can bring to proue, that the Church for the spiri­tuall health of soules must of necessitie haue sufficient power and authoritie to depose Princes, will in like manner conuince, that she must also haue sufficient force and meanes to execute this her authoritie, and actuall to thrust them out of their kingdome: for by the actually reigning of wicked Princes, more then by their right, and title to reigne, the health of soules is chiefly endangered. By this therefore it is manifest, that Suarez is not in very deede contrarie to our opinion, but that rather he may be rightly alleaged for a fauou­rer thereof; seeing that by his arguments no other thing can be gathered, then that the temporall power in re­gard of sinne, which is spirituall, is subiect to the spiri­tual direction, command, and chastising of the Church: which both I, and both the Barclaies, with all other Catholikes, doe freely acknowledge; and that Suarez doth not in very deede dissent from our opinion, his manner of handling the question doth cleerely shew. For vnlesse hee would in expresse words haue auerred, what we affirme, what other thing could he haue said, [Page 32] then that, which he, handling this question of set pur­pose, hath taught, and last of all concluded, that the Church must haue a power to keepe Kings and Princes in good order, at the leastwise by vsing the spirituall sword.

22. Wherefore to the principall obiection, which is put downe in the beginning of the Chapter against this second branch of the oath, it is easily answered by denying the Minor proposition, if it be vnderstood of all Catholikes, as without doubt it must be vnderstood to make the argument to haue any colour of probabi­litie. For many Catholikes, whom heretoforeIn my Apolo­gie nu 4. & seq. I haue named, and some of them I will beneathSect 3. nu. 5. & seq. relate, doe plainly hold, that the Pope hath no authoritie to de­priue Supreme Princes of their kingdomes, and to dis­pose of temporall things. And therefore this doctrine of deposing Princes by the Popes authoritie is not cer­taine, and without all doubt, and much lesse to be be­leeued as a point of faith as Card. Bellarmine, and Les­sius, and before them Gregorius de Valentia doe ouer rashly affirme, sith that the contrarie opinion is proba­bly defended by Catholikes, and consequently may be maintained without danger of mortall sinne. But this at this present wee doe suppose both out of that, which we haue alreadie abundantly disputed, and will hereaf­terAgainst D. Schulckenius his Apologie for Card. Bellar­mine. dispute against the arguments which Card. Bellar­mine hath gathered out of holy Scriptures, ancient Fa­thers, Councels, and Principles of Diuinitie, and also out of Iohn Barcklay, who hath very learnedly defen­ded his father, Master Doctor Barcklay, against the Treatise of Card. Bellarmine for the Popes power in temporals.

Sect. II.

THe second obiection, somewhat different from the former, which is vsually made against this second branch of the oath, and insinuated by Lessius In Disput. Apolog. nu. 216. 217., as his [Page 33] English Recapitulator Pag. 52. § Fourthly. doth relate, may be framed in this manner.

1. No Catholike can without danger of periurie sweare that to be true, whose truth in the iudgements of all Catholikes is accounted at the least to be doubtfull, for so he should expose himselfe to danger of swearing an vn­truth, but whether the Pope hath power to depose Kings and Princes, is by all Catholikes accounted at the least to be a doubtfull, and disputable question, as doth appeare by the streame of Doctors, whereof some are of opinion, that this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is vn­doubtedly true, and no man doth condemne it as vndoub­tedly false: therefore no Catholike can, without danger at the least of periurie, sweare, that the Pope hath no au­thoritie to depose Kings and Princes.

2. To this obiection two answers are vsually made, and both of them doe out of my Apologie for the rightfull power of Princes, and out of Iohn Barcklay In Vindicijs pro Regibus. suppose, that without any danger of heresie, errour, or any other crime, it may by Catholikes be probably de­fended, that the Pope hath not authoritie to depose Princes, or, which wee now doe take for all one, to de­priue them of their lawfull right, and title to reigne: and consequently, that this question of depriuing Princes by the Popes authoritie, is not a doubtfull thing, to wit, whereof no determinate assent can be had, but pro­bable, and by Catholike Doctors controuerted on both sides. For betwixt doubfull, and probable, or disputable, which two are cunningly confounded in the obiection, there is a great distinction, as beneathCap. 10. sect. 2 nu. 9. & 19. out of the do­ctrine of Gabriel Vasquez we will shew more at large.

3. This supposed, the first, and most principall an­swere is, that the thing, which in this branch of the oath wee doe immediatly, directly, and properly sweare, is not, that the Pope hath not authoritie to depose the King, as the obiection doth falsely suppose, but, that I doe truly, and sincerely acknowledge, professe, testifie, and de­clare [Page 34] in my conscience, that the Pope hath not authoritie to depose the King, as the expresse words of the oath both in the first, and the last branch therof do most eui­dently declare, and alsoCap. 2. sect. 1. nu. 7. Martinus Becanus, and Father Parsons, whose words wee haue before related, doe freely confesse: which my sincere acknowledgement, and declaration of my opinion, sith that it is in no sort doubtfull, but physically certaine vnto me, I may law­fully, with a safe conscience, and without any danger of periurie confirme by oath.

4. The second answere is, that betwixt depriuing, and deposing a King, there is a great distinction, if wee will speake according to the expresse meaning of this oath, which betwixt these two doth make a manifest difference, as appeareth by those words contained in the fourth branch of the oath, Princes depriued by the Pope, may be deposed by their subiects, or any other what­soeuer. For to depriue Princes, is by a iuridicall, or law­full sentence to take away their right, and iust title to their kingdomes, which depriuing is in the fourth branch of the oath referred to the Pope; but to depose Princes, is to execute this sentence, and to displace, or thrust them out of the possession of their kingdomes, which deposing is attributed to the subiects, or any o­ther whatsoeuer. If therefore in this second branch of the oath it is only affirmed, that the Pope hath no au­thoritie to depose the King, that is, to thrust him out of the possession of his kingdome, then that proposition, (if we once suppose, y^t this his authoritie to depriue Princes, is not decided by the Iudge, nor certainly agreed vpon by Catholikes) is in my opinion morally certaine, nei­ther is it by any Diuine, or Lawyer, whom I haue read, called in question; seeing that the Pope hath no autho­ritie to depose the King, or to put him out of the lawful possession of his kingdome, so long as it is vncertaine, not decided, and in controuersie among vertuous and learned Catholikes, whether he hath any such authori­tie [Page 35] to depriue Princes, or no, as in the end of my Apo­logie, out of the approued rules of the Canon, and Ciuill law I haue sufficiently deduced, and also out of the knowne principles of Diuinitie, if neede require, I will further confirme.

Sect. III.

1. THirdly, against this second branch it may be obiected, that although a learned and skilfull Diuine, who is able to search into the depth of this diffi­cult controuersie, and to examine exactly all the reasons and proofes, which are vsually made against, and for the Popes authoritie to depriue Princes of their kingdomes, may perchance haue some sufficient ground prudently to perswade his conscience, that the Pope hath no such au­thoritie; yet an vnlearned man, who for want either of naturall capacitie, or of sufficient learning, is not able to examine these deepe Theologicall questions, cannot pru­dently, and without euident temeritie frame vnto himself a right dictamen of conscience, whereby he may lawfully perswade himselfe, that the Pope hath not this authoritie giuen him by Christ, which the greater part of Catho­likes, both Diuines and Lawyers doe constantly affirme to be giuen him by Christ his institution; therefore at the least an vnlearned man cannot without great temeritie take this second branch of the oath, although he should on­ly sweare his opinion, perswasion, or declaration.

2. But this obiection is easily satisfied: And first it may be answered, that although one rashly conceiuing this, or that opinion, or hauing any bad intention to do euill, doth offend in this, that hee iudgeth rashly, or in­tendeth to doe euill, yet the oath it selfe, wherein hee truly auerreth, that he hath this rash opinion, or wicked intention, may be without any offence at all. As if a Su­periour should command his subiect to declare vnto him sincerely his opinion concerning such a matter, the [Page 36] subiect may lawfully, and without any temeritie tell his opinion, and if neede require, confirme it by oath, al­though perchance hee conceiued that opinion rashly, and vnaduisedly. Wherefore from this obiection it can not well be gathered, that this second branch of the oath cannot without temeritie be taken by vnlearned men, but at the most it may be inferred, that vnlearned men cannot without some note of temeritie perswade themselues, that the Pope hath such authoritie granted him to depriue Princes, albeit, if they haue once, al­though rashly, conceiued such an opinion, they may without any temeritie sweare this their temerarious opinion.

3. The second therefore, and principall Answere is, that also an vnlearned man may with a safe conscience, and without any danger of temeritie take this second branch of the oath, for that he may prudently, and vpon sufficient grounds perswade his conscience, that the Pope hath no authority to depriue Princes granted him by Christ his institution. For as heretoforeIn the end of my Apologie. I haue briefly insinuated, and will beneathCap. 10. sect. 2 nu. 10. repeate the same againe, there bee two sorts of principles, or grounds, whereby a man may be perswaded, that this, or that o­pinion is true, or false. The first are called intrinsecall grounds, and doe consist in the discussing, and debating of all the reasons and arguments, which may be allea­ged for, and against any opinion: And these kinde of grounds doe only appertaine to learned men, who are able to discerne what force the reasons, and answers on both sides haue. The other grounds are called extrin­secall, and they are only founded vpon the bare autho­ritie of prudent, and learned men, vpon whose authori­tie in a matter disputable, and controuerted among Doctors, any man may prudently, and without any note of temeritie relie. And these grounds are com­mon also to vnlearned men, who, although they are not able to weigh exactly the reasons, or intrisecall [Page 37] grounds of this, or that opinion, yet they can easilie learne, and discerne, what opinion learned men doe fol­low. And this is a sufficient ground for vnlearned per­sons, to cleaue vnto the opinion of skilfull, and prudent men, whose iudgements, sith that they themselues bee not able to discusse the controuersie, may safely, and securely follow, although the contrarie opinion bee perchance the more probable, the more secure, and em­braced by the greater number of Diuines, as beneathCap. 10. sect. 2 nu. 11. & seq. out of the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez, a most learned Iesuite, I will shew more at large.

4. As for example, in this case of vsurie there is a great controuersie among Diuines, whether in lending of money it be lawful to take interest ob lucrum cessans, that is, in consideration of the profit, or gaine, which the lender might haue made, if he had employed his mo­ney otherwise, some Diuines affirming, and some de­nying it to be vsurie. Now, if a vertuous, prudent, and learned Diuine doe confidently tell an vnlearned per­son, that the opinion, which affirmeth it to be no vsurie, is probable, and in practise secure, and which liketh him best, although many others, and perchance the greater, and better sort of Diuines doe follow the contrarie o­pinion, which also without all doubt is the more se­cure, yet the authoritie of this learned Diuine is, accor­ding to the truer, and more approued opinion of Di­uines, a sufficient ground for the vnlearned man, where­by he may securely, and without any note of temeritie perswade his conscience, that he may lawfully take in­terest for that respect, and reiect in practise the more common, and the more secure opinion of other Di­uines, albeit he, sith that he is vnlearned, be not able to examine the nature, qualitie, and conditions of vsurie. And the like may be applied to this present controuer­sie of deposing Princes by the Popes authoritie, and o­thers such like disputable cases.

But that the vnlearneder sort of people may in part [Page 38] perceiue, what sufficient extrinsecall grounds, and au­thoritie of learned and prudent men they may haue, to perswade their conscience securely, that the Pope hath not any power to depose Princes, and to dispose of their temporals, I will only produce some few authori­ties of so many, which I haue heretoforeIn Apolog. & Resp. Apolo­get. alleaged.

5. The first authoritie is of Iohn Trithemius an Ab­bot, of the Order of S. Benedict, and a man of singular learning & pietie, who writeth, that in his time, to wit, in this present age, wherein nothing hath been newly defined either by Councels, or Popes, concerning the Popes authoritie to depriue Princes (for all the decrees of Popes, and Councels, which by Card. Bellarmine are vsually alleaged to confirme the aforesaid authoritie, were long before Trithemius his time) this opinion which denieth the Pope to haue any such authoritie, was probably defended by Scholasticall Doctors. For so he writeth,In Chronico Monasterij Hirsaug the yeare 1106. He indeede [Henry the 4.] was the first among all the Emperours, who was deposed by the Pope. The Scholastickes are at strife, and as yet the controuersie is not decided by the Iudge, whether the Pope hath autho­ritie to depose the Emperour, or no; which question, seeing that it belongeth not to vs, we will leaue indiscussed.

6. The second testimonie is of Albericus Roxiatus, a most famous Professour, as Trithemius De Scripto­ribus Eccles. ad annū 1340. writeth, both of the Canon, and Ciuill law, and a man excellently learned, who liued in the yeare 1340. For he calleth in question the foure most principall Decretall letters of Popes, which fauour their authoritie to dispose of temporals, (whereof one is that famous, and so often inculcated by our Aduersaries, sentence of deposition, giuen against Fredericke the Emperour by Pope Innocent the fourth, in the presence of the Councell of Lyons) and affirmeth, that they are not in his opinion, agreeable to law, but that they were made by Popes against the libertie, and right of the Empire. The Pastors of the Church (saith heIn Dictiona­rio verbo, Electio.) medling with that, which belongeth not vnto them, [Page 39] haue made foure Decrees; the one concerning the election of the Emperour, which beginneth, Venerabilem, and of this it is there noted by all men. Another is about the de­posing of Fredericke the Emperour, extra de sententia, & re iudicata, cap. ad Apostolicae in Sexto, where also of this it is noted by all men. Another is concerning the dis­cord betwixt Henry the Emperour, and Robert King of Sicily, and the sentence of treason published by the Empe­rour against him, which Decree is in Clementina de sen­tentia, & re iudicata, cap. Pastoralis. Another is in Cle­mentina prima de Iureiurando, that the Emperour is bound to sweare allegiance to the Pope, and concerning the Popes authoritie ouer the Emperour. Which Decrees, whether they be iust, or no, God knoweth. For I (vnder correction) (and if it should be erroneous I recall it) doe thinke that none of them be agreeable to law. Yea my opi­nion is, that they were published against the rights, and li­bertie of the Empire, and I thinke that by God they were instituted distinct powers. Whereof I haue noted suffici­ently lege prima, Cod. de Summa Trinitate, & fide Ca­tholica.

7. The third authoritie is of Ioannes Parisiensis, a fa­mous Diuine of the Order of S. Dominicke, and, as Tri­themius affirmeth,De Scriptori­bus Eccles ad annum 1280. most learned in the holy Scriptures, and who in the Vniuersitie of Paris was for a long time to­gether publike Professor, and left behinde him many disci­ples; he flourished about the yeare 1280. This Doctor (therefore) although hee be of that opinionDe potest. Regia, & Papa­li cap. 14. ad 20., that if a King should become an heretike, and incorrigible, and a contemner of Ecclesiasticall Censures, the Pope might doe somewhat with the people, whereby he might be depriued of his Secular dignitie, and be deposed by the people, to wit, he might excommunicate all those, to whom it be­longeth to depose the King, who should obey him, as their Soueraigne: Neuerthelesse hee is of this opinion, that it belongeth not to the Pope to depose iuridically Kings, or Emperours for any crime whatsoeuer, although it be spiri­tuall, [Page 40] that is, by a definitiue sentence to depriue them of their kingdomes, in such sort, that after the sentence be published, they should haue no more power, and authori­tie Almainus de potest. Eccles. q. 2. cap. 8.. For hee affirmeth, that Excommunication, or such like spirituall punishment is the last, which may be infli­cted by a spirituall Iudge. For although (saith he) it be­longeth to the Ecclesiasticall Iudge to recall men to God, and to withdraw them from sinne, yet hee hath not power to doe this, but by vsing those meanes, which be giuen him by God, which is by excluding them from the Sacraments, and participation of the faithfull. Wherefore, although Parisiensis doth thinke, that the temporall common wealth hath in some cases of very great moment, au­thoritie to depose their Prince, with which question I doe not at this present intermeddle, yet concerning the principall controuersie, which is now betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine, to wit, whether it be hereticall, erro­neous, or temerarious to affirme, that the Pope hath no power to depriue Princes of their Royall right, and au­thoritie, Ioannes Parisiensis doth most plainly, as wee now haue shewed, contradict the opinion of Cardinall Bellarmine.

8. The fourth authoritie is of William Barcklay, a most learned man, and yet no more learned, then reli­gious (howsoeuer some falsely, and vnchristianly doe calumniate him) who in times past was Counsellor to the Duke of Lorraine, and Master of Requests, and in the V­niuersitie of Mussepont Professor of the Canon, and Ciuil law, and also Deane. Antonius Posseuinus ver­bo Gulielmus Barclaius. This Doctor therefore in his booke de Regno, printed at Paris in the yeare 1600, with priuiledge of the most Christian King of France, (which booke Posseuine in his Bibliotheca relateth a­mong other approued bookes, and taketh no exception against it) writethIn lib. 4. de Regno cap. 4. in this manner: First of all wee ac­knowledge, that all Kings are by the most streight bonds of nature, and religious oath obliged to keepe Gods com­mandements, to worship him religiously, and to vse all care [Page 41] and diligence, that their subiects doe not reuolt from true Religion, and fall into Idolatrie, Iudaisme; or heresie. But if they omit to doe the same, or be negligent therein, they are to be iudged by God alone, because only to God they are subiect, I speake of temporall iudgement, and subie­ction. For all Kings, as they are children of the Church, as they are Christians, as they are sheepe of Christ his flocke, ought to acknowledge the Pope S. Peters successor, and Christ his Vicar, to be as much their Superiour, as they are to euery one of the people, that as they haue authoritie to iudge rebels, and traitors, and to deliuer them to the executioner to be punished, so the supreme Prince, and v­niuersall Pastor of the Church, hath power to condemne with spirituall iudgement Princes offending against God his law, and to deliuer them to inuisible tormentors to be punished with the rod of the inuisible spirit, and with the two edged sword of Excommunication. And this his opi­nion he in his booke published after his death, hath a­gainst Cardinal Bellarmines reasons very learnedly, and elegantly maintained, whom his sonne Iohn Barcklay hath with great learning, and elegancie defended a­gainst the most foule calumnies, which Cardinall Bel­larmine endeuoured to lay to his fathers charge.

9. The fifth testimonie may bee grounded vpon the authoritie of Master George Blackwell In his Exami­nation, a vertuous and learned man, and not long since the Archipresbyter of the English Priests, who euen vntill death maintained this opinion, that the Pope hath not power to depriue Princes of their kingdomes: and also of Master William Barret In his booke de Iure Regis. an English Catholike, and moreouer of those thirteene English Priests, whose authoritie to confirme this opinion, I did heretoforeIn the Pre­face to my A­pologeticall Answere nu. 26 alleage in these words.

10. And the very same opinion are bound to follow, to make their fact to bee lawfull, those thirteene D. William Bishop, Iohn Colleton, Iohn Mush, Robert Charnock, D. Iohn Bosseuile, Antony Heb­borne, Roger Cadwalader, Ro­bert Drury, D. Antony Champney, Iohn Iackson, Francis Barnebey, Os­wald Needham, Richard But­ton. Whereof three are Do­ctors of Sorbon, the rest are ac­counted by Ca­tholikes to be graue, vertuous, and learned mē. English Priests, and all of them, two onely excepted, at this present time aliue (whose names, if before In the end of Master Black­wels Latine Examination. they had not been published, I would in truth haue concealed) who, [Page 42] to giue assurance of their loyaltie to the late Queene Eli­zabeth, did by a publike instrument protest, and made it knowne to all the Christian world To wit, as much as did lye in them; for that they made a publike in­strument of this their protestation, to be published to the whole Christian world, when it should please the Magistrate; So that I won­der vnder what colour of pro­babilitie any learned, or prudent man can obiect against those words [to all the Chri­stian world] al­though they were not ex­pressed in any part of the in­strument, as in very deed they are in expresse words contai­ned., that she (being at that time excommunicated by name, and depriued by the sentence of Pope Pius the 5. of her Regall authoritie) had neuerthelesse as full authoritie, power, and Soueraign­tie ouer them, and ouer all the subiects of this Realme, as any her Highnesse Predecessors euer had. And that not­withstanding any authoritie, or any Excommunication whatsoeuer, either denounced, or to be denounced against her Maiestie, or any borne within her Maiesties Domi­nions, which would not forsake the defence of her, and her Dominions, they thinke themselues not only bound in con­science not to obey this, or any such like Censure, but also doe promise to yeeld vnto her Maiestie all obedience in temporall causes.

11. Wherefore this their promise, and declaration doth not onely belong to a matter of fact, but also to declare the lawfull right, and authoritie of her Maiestie to reigne. For these Priests doe not onely protest, that Queene Elizabeth (being then by the Pope depriued of her Regall authoritie) did reigne de facto, whereof there could be made no doubt, and doe not only pro­mise, that they will obey her Maiestie de facto, but also they do acknowledge, and professe, that she at that time had as full authoritie, power, and soueraigntie ouer them, and all the subiects of this Realme, as any her Highnesse Predecessors euer had. Which their assertion truly is most false, if the Pope had power to depriue her of her Regall authoritie. To these our English Priests I could adde many others both learned, & vertuous, who are of the selfesame opinion, although to auoid his Holinesse indignation against them, they are fearefull publikely to professe the same, and therefore I thinke it not con­uenient to expresse their names.

12. Finally, the sixth authoritie, (which therefore, in the last place I haue produced, for that it, as also the for­mer [Page 43] authoritie of Master Blackwell, and those thirteene Priests, doe confirme almost euery clause of the oath) is grounded in a very substantiall testimonie of the king­dome of France. And first in a Generall assemblie of the States of France, held at Paris in the yeare 1593, Cardinall Pelleue, and other Prelates, who then were present, would not receiue certaine Decrees of the Councell of Trent, among which that of the 25. Ses­sion, chap. 19, wherein Kings are forbidden to permit single combat, was one.In the De­crees of the Church of France, compi­led by Laurence Bochellus, tit. 20 pag. 917. The Councell of Trent (say they) doth excommunicate, and depriue a King of the ci­tie, or place, wherein he permitteth to fight single com­bat. This article is against the authoritie of the King, who cannot be depriued of his temporall dominion, in re­gard whereof he acknowledgeth no Superiour at all.

13. Secondly, Petrus Pithaeus, a man, as Posseuine In Apparatu verbo, Petrus Pithaeus. affirmeth, truly learned, and a diligent searcher of anti­quitie, in his booke of the liberties of the Church of France, printed at Paris by the authoritie of the Parla­ment in the yeare 1594, doth out of a generall maxime, which France To wit, be­cause the grea­ter part of France, from which denomi­nation is takē, did approue it., as hee saith, hath euer approued as cer­taine, deduce this particular position. The Pope cannot giue as a pray the kingdome of France, or any thing ap­pertaining thereunto, neither hath hee power to depriue the King thereof, or in any other manner to dispose there­of. And notwithstanding any admonitions, Excommuni­cations, or Interdicts, which by the Pope may be made, yet the subiects are bound to yeeld obedience due to his Maie­stie for temporals, neither therein can they be dispensed, or absolued by the Pope. Which words if we diligently consider, as also that protestation of the thirteene Priests, wee shall finde, that the principall branches of this oath, against which Cardinall Bellarmine, Gretzer, Lessius, and Becanus doe take so great exception, are in them comprehended: to wit, that the Pope hath not any power to depose the King, or to dispose of his temporall do­minions, and that notwithstanding any Excommunica­tion, [Page 44] or sentence of depriuation, I will beare faith, and true allegiance to his Maiestie, and will defend him to the vt­termost of my power, &c. and that from this the Pope hath no authoritie to absolue me, and therefore without all doubt I may renounce all pardons, and dispensations to the contrarie.

14. If therefore that be true, which Nauarre an ex­cellent Diuine, and most skilfull in the Canon law, as Pos­seuine affirmethVerbo Mar­tinus ab Alpiz­cueta., doth write, to wit, that although in the contentious, or external Court regularly many things are to be obserued, that one may follow an opinion, which is in controuersie among Doctors, yet in the Court of con­science to this effect that we shall commit no sinne, it is suf­ficient to chuse his opinion for true, whom for good cause we thinke to be a man sufficiently learned, and of a good conscience, how much the more may an vnlearned man, according also to the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez, which beneath we will set downe, prudently perswade his conscience, that this branch of the oath, to wit, that the Pope hath not power to depose our King, is true, which not one only learned, and vertuous man, but ve­ry many doe allow, and who also haue diligently read, examined, and abundantly satisfied all the arguments, which their Aduersaries haue deduced out of holie Scriptures, ancient Fathers, Decrees of Popes, and Councels, and other Theologicall reasons against the same?

15. And although very few, whose writings are now extant, in comparison of others, who defend this temporall power of the Pope, are to be found, who de­nie his authoritie to depriue Princes of their king­domes, this neuerthelesse ought not greatly to moue any man, sith that heretoforeIn my Apolo­gie nu. 449. I haue alleaged many reasons for this purpose, which now to repeate againe I think it not to be altogether superfluous. Thus there­fore I wrote in the place before cited.

Neither ought any man to meruaile, that this opinion, [Page 45] which defendeth the Popes temporall authoritie, hath ta­ken so deepe roote in the mindes euen of the most learned; partly for that from the very beginning of this contro­uersie the Pope wanted no flatterrs, (as neither at this day he doth want) who either for hope of gaine, or desire of preferment, or for fauour, or feare For to say that so worthie men, among whom some al­so were Popes, did write a­gainst their cō ­science in fa­uour of Prin­ces, or for feare of them, is to stretch forth his mouth into heauen. For contrariwise it might be said more probably that those Do­ctors, who doe so vnmeasura­bly aduance the Popes au­thoritie, doe speak for feare, or fauour of him, seeing that they are Ecclesiasticall persons, who may by him get greater prefer­mēt. And espe­cially, sith that they say (al­though not well) that the Pope doth gra­ciouslie em­brace them, who doe amplifie his authoritie, and depresseth them, who doe speake against the same. Thus writeth Ioannes Parisiensis de potest. Regia, & Papali cap. 21. ad 41. of him, would ad­uance his authoritie more then is fitting: partly for that the reasons, and arguments, whereon this temporall au­thoritie of the Pope, in regard of spirituall good is groun­ded, doe make a great shew of probabilitie to them, who do not exactly consider the whole matter: partly for that, al­though there euer haue been, and also at this present are, very many vertuous and learned men, who are of the con­trary opinion, neuerthelesse, for feare of incurring the Popes displeasure, or giuing any occasion to wicked Prin­ces to afflict the Church more freely, or to liue more licen­tiously, who seemed with this temporall power of the Pope, as with a bridle, to be more easily kept in good order, they thought it more expedient to passe ouer this present con­trouersie with silence, and lest they should giue any scan­dall to the weake, onely to conceale, but not to denie the truth: partly, for that Popes are not accustomed willing­ly to permit, that the facts, or opinions of their Predeces­sors, which doe fauour the Papall authoritie, should either be impugned, or called in question.

16. And therefore both the Pope himselfe, and other ordinary Bishops, and Inquisitours against heretikes are very carefull, that no bookes, which doe seeme to derogate any way from the Popes authoritie, be published; and if they be already published, that either they be altogether suppressed, or be read by no man without speciall license, (and that obtained in writing) vntill they be corrected. And so it is a most hard matter especially in these daies, either to finde in Catholike bookes any one sentence, or clause, which seemeth any whit at all to call in question [Page 46] the Popes temporall authoritie, or else to know certainly, what the Authors of bookes doe thinke concerning the aforesaid authoritie, but rather what opinion the Corre­ctors, and Censours of bookes doe follow, seeing that the Authors are oftentimes against their wils compelled to speake, and to deliuer their opinion not with their owne, but with these mens words.

17. And to confirme what I haue said, dai]y expe­rienceSee in what manner Auber­tus Myraeus, a Canon of Ant­werpe, hath in Sigebert, an an­cient writer, lately set forth by him & prin­ted at Antwerp, especially in the yeare 773. and 1111. cut off, added, chā ­ged whole sen­tences concer­ning the ele­cting of Popes, and the inue­sting of Bi­shops, granted to the Emperors. And if in an­cient writers these men dare presume to correct in this manner, how much the more may we ima­gine that they will doe the same in mo­derne writers? Through the Printers fault it is in my Latine copy by the Emperours. can yeeld innumerable examples, among which it shal at this time suffice one only to relate, concerning a very learned man, who sending to certaine men an excellent worke of his to be printed by their meanes, wherein hee plainly signified, that he was of this opi­inion, that the Pope by Christs institution had neither directly, nor indirectly any temporall dominion, and therfore no authoritie to depriue Princes of their king­domes: when his booke, if it may be called his, which was so much changed from his, was printed, and sent him back againe, he found it so chopped, and changed, as if now hee should only affirme, that the Pope had no direct dominion in temporals, nor any direct power to dispose of Princes dominions. And therefore it is no meruaile, that this opinion, for the Popes power to de­pose Princes, hath so many, and the contrarie so few Patrones, and Supporters. But if his Holinesse would be pleased to giue leaue to learned Diuines and Law­yers, to speake plainly their mindes, without danger of incurring his displeasure, and would compell them, as Al­maine De Authori­tate Ecclesiae cap. 3. in princi­pio, who taketh it out of Occam. saith, by oaths, and horrible threatnings to de­clare sincerely what belongeth to the fulnes of the Eccle­siasticall power, I doe not doubt, but that a very great number of learned Catholikes would forthwith shew themselues, and in publike writings would cleerelie teach, that this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is not certaine, without all controuersie, and to be held of faith, as Cardinall Bellarmine and some few others doe vehemently affirme, but that the con­trarie [Page 47] opinion may without any danger of heresie, er­rour, or any other crime be probably maintained.

18. But because their is small hope, as I am perswa­ded, to finde out the truth by this way, I know no other remedie at this present, but humbly to request his Ho­linesse, and those, whom it doth concerne, that, vntill the Church hath cleerely defined the matter, (for I doe not thinke, that the vncertaine collections of Card. Bellar­mine, or of any other Doctor, although he be most lear­ned, out of the holy Scriptures, Councels, or Decrees of Popes, are to be accounted Ecclesiasticall definitions) they will permit, that this most difficult, and weightie controuersie, the ignorance whereof may breede either perpetuall amitie, or discord betwixt temporall Kings, and Clergie men, may modestly, peaceably, and with­out contumelious speeches, by learned Diuines bee with solid argumēts disputed on both sides; and with­all, that vertuous, and skilfull Diuines, who both for their singular learning are able to finde out the truth, and being once found, will also for their true zeale, and loue of God, without any humane respect defend the same, will endeuour to haue alwaies before their eyes this notable sentence of most learned and deuout Ger­son In his trea­tise De exami­natione doctri­narum §. Secun­da veritas.: The second truth, saith Gerson, is, that the Popes sentence bindeth all men not to dogmatize the contrarie, vnlesse by them, or among them, who doe perceiue a mani­fest errour against faith, and doe know, that, vnlesse they oppose themselues, there will by their silence arise a great scandall vnto our faith. And if there be any prosecuting of censures, and punishments against them, let them know, that blessed are they, who suffer persecution for iustice sake.

19. Neuerthelesse, I do not by this intend to auerre, that this doctrine, for the Popes power to depose Prin­ces, is contrarie to faith, or saluation; seeing that it is, and hath been defended by so many, and so worthie Diuines; but this only I doe now affirme, and I do con­stantly [Page 48] think it to be most true, that the opinion, which with such might and maine doth maintaine that the aforesaid doctrine, for the Popes power to depriue Princes, is certaine, without controuersie, to be beleeued as a point of faith, and that it cannot be impugned by any Catholike, without denying the Catholike faith, (which is not the common opinion of Catholike Diuines, but proper and peculiar to Cardinall Bellarmine, and some few others, and which with all their might, by right and by wrong, by arguments, and reprochfull speeches they endeuour to maintaine) is, I speake it alas with griefe, a very great scandall to Catholike Religion, and will by al likelihood breed a great dissention betwixt the Cler­gie, and the Laitie, and that therefore it ought by euery man, who desireth true peace, and vnitie betwixt the holy Church of Christ, and the earthly kingdomes of this world, with all diligence to be contradicted.

Sect. IIII.

1. FOurthly, it is obiected by Lessius Nu. 213., as also we may perceiue by his English Recapitulator Pag. 44., against those words [nor by any other meanes with any other] wherein all power to depose Kings is absolutely denied, and consequently it is vertually affirmed, that neither the Pope, nor the ciuil common wealth hath in any case what­soeuer any authority to depose the King, which seemeth in many mens iudgements to be repugnant to naturall rea­son, and to the principles of morall philosophie. And ther­fore this question of deposing Princes by the authoritie of the common-wealth, being at the least vncertaine, and in controuersie among Catholikes, the very same argumēts, which haue been before obiected against the former clause of this branch, concerning the Popes authoritie to depose Princes, may in like manner be vrged against this clause of the oath.

2. To this obiection it is answered first, that concer­ning [Page 49] this question, which is rather a morall, and poli­tike, then a Theologicall controuersie, many learned Diuines are of opinion, that the ciuill common-wealth hath no authoritie at all ouer their Soueraigne Prince, and that a Supreme temporal Prince cannot be iudged, and punished with temporal punishments, but by God alone, whose opinion to condemne as temerarious, and improbable, without doubt were great temeritie. See­ing therefore that this question is probably disputed on both sides by Catholike Doctors, the very same An­swers, which before were giuen to the former obie­ctions, concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, may be also applied to this obiection, concerning the power of the ciuill common-wealth to depose their So­ueraigne: to wit, that also an vnlearned man may by ex­trinsecal grounds, that is to say, by reason of the autho­ritie of prudent, and learned men, securely perswade himselfe, that the ciuill common-wealth hath no au­thoritie at all ouer their Soueraigne & absolute Prince, and also that this his perswasion, acknowledgement, and declaration, he may with a safe conscience, if neede require, confirme by oath: And so of the rest.

3. Secondly, it is answered, y^t in this second branch of the oath I doe not absolutely acknowledge, testifie, and declare, that the ciuill common-wealth hath no autho­ritie to depose the King; but if in those words [nor by any other meanes with any other] wee must needes com­prehend also the ciuill common-wealth, at the farthest I doe acknowledge, that the Pope neither by meanes of the common-wealth, nor with the common-wealth, hath authoritie to depose the King; which proposition verily is most true, so that we suppose, that no authori­tie hath been hitherto granted to the Pope to depose absolute Kings, and Princes. For otherwise we should also by these words expressely acknowledge, that the Pope hath authoritie to depose the King, which neuer­thelesse wee haue before denied. As for example, this [Page 50] proposition, A stone by meanes of a man, or with a man, hath power to vnderstand, is most false. For although a man be indued with the power of vnderstanding, yet a stone neither without a man, neither with a man, nei­ther by meanes of a man can vnderstand. For this pre­position by, or by meanes, doth signifie a secondarie, or instrumentall cause, which supposeth a principall, as a man is said to see by meanes of his corporall eye: but this preposition with, doth import vsually a concourse, or cooperation of two causes, as Socrates with Plato doth draw a boate. In like manner, although it were granted, that the ciuill common-wealth hath power in some case to depose their Prince; yet it doth not therfore follow, that the Pope either with the common wealth, or by meanes of the common-wealth, hath also authoritie to depose their Prince: for so the Pope him­selfe, as a chiefe and principall cause, should also haue power to depose a Prince, which neuerthelesse hath not been hitherto by any man sufficiently proued. As also no man can deny, but that this proposition is most true, A stone neither with the common-wealth, nor by meanes of the common-wealth, hath authoritie to depose a King. And although betwixt the Pope and a stone there is great difference in this, that a stone is not capable of such a power, and therefore neither hath, nor can haue any power to depose Princes, yet if we speake onely of the actuall power to depose, it is manifest, that there is no difference at all betwixt them, if so be that wee sup­pose, that the Pope hath not as yet any such authoritie granted him. Those therefore, that thinke this oath to be vnlawfull, by reason of the aforesaid words, doe not seeme, in my iudgement, with any sufficient reason to be moued thereunto, for that neither the power of the common-wealth to depose the King is herein denied, neither can that opinion, which denieth such a power to be in the common-wealth, by reason of the authori­tie of such famous Doctors, who doe approue it, and for [Page 51] the reasons, which doe moue them to approue it, be for any sufficient ground drawne from the principles either of Philosophie, or Diuinitie, without great temeritie, be condemned as temerarious, and improbable.

Sect. V.

1. THe fifth, and last obiection may be made against those words [or to authorize any forraine Prince to inuade, or annoy him, or his countries, or to discharge any of his subiects of their allegiance,] For it is well knowne, that the Pope is not only a spirituall, but also a temporall Prince, and that he hath other inferiour Prin­ces subiect to him in temporals: Therefore he hath as ample authoritie temporall, as any other temporall Prince whatsoeuer; but if a King doth any notable wrong to an other Prince, or his subiects, for repairing, or reuenging of which wrong he may iustly, and lawfully wage warre a­gainst that King, the Prince wronged hath power to au­thorize other inferiour Princes, who bee his subiects, to beare armes, and to inuade the countries of that King: Therefore the Pope, if hee should receiue any great losse and damage, by meanes of our King, which cannot be auoided, or recouered but by warre, may authorize, and giue leaue to forraine Princes, who be his subiects, to an­noy him, and to inuade his Countries; and therefore no Catholike can with a safe conscience take this oath vnder this generall forme of words.

2. To this obiection it is easily answered, to wit, that the aforesaid clause of the oath, as also all the rest, which make mention of the Popes power to depose the King, to discharge subiects of their allegiance, and to absolute from this oath, are, according to the vsuall and proper meaning of the words, and according to the expresse mind of the Law-maker, to be vnderstood of the Pope, as he is Pope, and the spirituall Pastor of our soules, and not as he is a temporall Prince. Neither doth the King, [Page 52] and Parliament in this oath intend to denie, that the same power to beare Armes, wage warre, and inuade Countries, which belongeth to all other secular Prin­ces, is also granted to the Pope, as he is a secular Prince.

3. Lastly, against that clause [or to discharge any of his subiects of their allegiance, and obedience to his Ma­iestie] I cannot see what other thing can bee obiected, then which before hath been obiected against the for­mer clauses. For it is most certaine, as Cardinall Bellar­mine Intr [...]ct de potest. Papae contra Guliel. Barcla [...]um cap. 21. pag. 202. himselfe in expresse words acknowledgeth, that Subiects are bound by the law of God, wherein the Pope hath not authoritie to dispense, to beare true faith and allegiance to their lawfull Prince; Neither is it necessarie to adde with Car­dinall Bellar­mine that redu­plication so long as he is Prince, for there is no man so igno­rant as to ima­gine, that obe­dience is by the law of God due to a Prince, whē he is no Prince. And therefore if it be lawfull to acknowledge, professe, and declare, and this declaration to confirme by oath, that the Pope hath no authority to depriue a King, or which is al one, to make a King no King, it necessarily followeth, that the Pope hath not authoritie to discharge subiects of their alle­giance, and obedience, which by the law of God and nature they owe to their lawfull King.

Sect. I.

1. AGainst this branch three obiections are com­monly made. And first Card. Bellarmine In Respons. ad Apologiam pro Iutamento &c. printed at Collen 16 [...]o. pag. 9., Gret­zer In Commēt. Exeget. cap. 6. arg. 1. 2. 3. 4., and Lessius Nu. 218., as also his English Recapitulator Pag. 5 [...]. relateth, doe obiect, that in those words [notwithstan­ding any sentence of Excommunication, I will beare faith, and true allegiance to his Maiestie, &c.] is plainly de­nied the Popes power to excommunicate euen hereti­call Kings. For how a Catholike (saith Cardinall Bellarmine) sweare lawfully, and iustly not to obey the Pope excommunicating an hereticall King, vnlesse hee beleeue that an hereticall King cannot bee excom­municated by the Pope? And Gretzer, without any proofe at all, supposeth as manifest, that in the afore­said words the Popes power to excommunicate Kings is denied. But Lessius, foreseeing what may be answe­red to the aforesaid argument of Cardinall Bellarmine, preuenteth the answere in these words: You will say, saith Lessius his Recapitulator, that the power to excom­municate is not here denied, but onely a certaine effect of excommunication, which is, that notwithstanding a Prince be excommunicated, yet shall not his subiects be released from the bond of their allegiance. But this effect doth necessarily follow the sentence of Excommunication, as the practise of the Church for the space of more then twelue hundred yeeres doth shew, which this Author [Lessius] hath euidently proued in other places of his booke.

2. To this obiecton we answere, that the Popes au­thority to excommunicate the King is not in the afore­said [Page 54] words denied, but rather granted, and supposed, as also the Kings most excellent Maiestie in his Premoni­tion to all Christian Monarchs doth in expresse words auerrePag. 9.. For in this branch it is only vertually denied, that Excommunication, being a spirituall censure, wor­keth this temporall effect to depriue Princes of their temporall kingdomes, and dominions, or, which is all one, to make lawfull Kings no Kings, and consequently to absolue subiects from their temporall obedience, which, according to the doctrine of Cardinall Bellar­mine, is by the law of God due to all lawfull Kings. The truth is, saith his Maiestie,In the place now cited. that the Lower house of Parliament, at the first framing of this oath, made it to containe, that the Pope had no power to excommunicate me; which I forced them to reforme, onely making it to conclude, that no excommunication of the Popes can war­rant my subiects to practise agianst my person, or State; denying the deposition of Kings to be in the Popes lawfull power, as indeede I take any such temporall violence to be farre without the limits of such a spirituall censure, as ex­communication is. So carefull was I, that nothing should be contained in this Oath, except the profession of natu­rall allegiance, and ciuill, and temporall obedience, with a promise to resist to all contrary vnciuill violence.

3. Now let vs examine how sufficiently Cardinall Bellarmine replieth to this answere of his Maiestie. For whereas his MaiestieIn the Cata­logue of the lyes of Tortus, nu. 1. had charged Matthaeus Tortus, or Cardinal Bellarmine, whose booke at that time went vnder Tortus his name, with lying, for that he had affir­med, that in the oath of Allegiance the Popes power to excommunicate euen hereticall Kings, is expressely de­nied; Seeing that, saith his Maiestie, the point touching the Popes power in excommunicating Kings is neither treated of, nor defined in the oath of Allegiance, but was purposely declined: which his Maiestie in his Premoni­tion had before more at large declared, Card. Bellar­mine In his Apo­logie chap. 15. in the first lye. to this answere replieth in this manner:

[Page 55]4. The Author of the booke did not write, that in the oath of Allegiance the question touching the Popes power in excommunicating Princes is treated of, or properly de­fined; for he knew well enough, that in the tenour, or forme of an oath there is no place to dispute Theologicall que­stions. But he affirmed, that in the aforesaid oath is de­nied the Popes power to excommunicate euen hereticall Kings: And that this is true, it is euident by those words of the oath; Also I doe sweare from my heart, that not­withstanding any declaration, or sentence of Excom­munication, or depriuation made, or granted, or to bee made, or granted by the Pope, or his Successors, &c. I will beare faith, and true allegiance to his Maiestie, his Heires and Successors. But whosoeuer sweareth, that he will obey an hereticall King, notwithstanding the Popes Excommunication, doth not hee together sweare that hee acknowledgeth not in the Pope, power to excommunicate hereticall Kings? for otherwise it were not an oath, but sacriledge to sweare, that he will not obey the sentence of excommunication made by the Pope against an hereticall King, if he should beleeue, that the Pope had power to ex­communicate hereticall Kings.

5. But this answere of Cardinall Bellarmine, with reuerence to so worthie a man, is of no force at all. For, (besides that hee too rigorously wresteth that word, [treate of] as though his Maiestie, affirming that the question concerning the Popes power to excommuni­cate was not treated of in this oath, should vnderstand a Theologicall Treatise, or Disputation, whereas it is most euident, that the true meaning, & intention of his Maiestie, is, that nothing at all concerning the Popes power to excommunicate, is either affirmed, or denied in this oath, but all mention of the aforesaid power was purposely declined) his answere is neither true, neither, if it were true, doth he thereby cleere himselfe at all of that falsehood, wherewith his Maiestie doth charge him. For why, I pray you? cannot one, either moued [Page 56] for hope of gaine, or terrified with feare, sweare that he will not obey a iust excommunication, and by so swea­ring commit sacriledge, who neuerthelesse doth not denie the power it selfe to excommunicate? How ther­fore doth Cardinall Bellarmine out of those words, notwithstanding any Excommunication I will beare al­legiance to his Maiestie, or, to speake more plainly, not­withstanding a iust Excommunication, I will not obey it, rightly deduce, that I therefore, so much as obscurely doe denie the power to excommunicate? But Card. Bellarmine answereth, that whoseouer sweareth in that manner, either denieth the power to excommunicate, or committeth sacriledge. Be it so. But if his Maiestie would freely grant him this second, this neuerthelesse granted, I can in no wise perceiue how he excuseth him­selfe from falsitie, in that he before not with any disiun­ction, but absolutely pronounced, In this branch the Popes power to excommunicate euen hereticall Kings is expressely denied.

6. Secondly, neither is that true, which Cardinall Bellarmine, vnder the aforesaid disiunction, doth in­ferre, to wit, that by swearing this branch, either the Popes power to excommunicate is abiured, or sacri­ledge committed. For he that sweareth, that notwith­standing any sentence of excommunication to be made against the King, yet hee will beare to his Maiestie true faith, and obedience in temporals, although hee doth sweare, that hee will obey the King though he be ex­communicated, because Excommunication hath not power to depriue Kings of their temporall dominions, and to take away the temporall obedience of the sub­iects, as very learned Diuine, whom heretoforeIn my Apolo­gie nu. 346. I haue cited, doe affirme, yet he doth not sweare, that hee will not obey a iust Excommunication, as Cardinall Bellarmine doth ill conclude. For although he belee­ueth, that the Pope hath authoritie to excommunicate hereticall Kings, yet he doth not beleeue, that Excom­municatiō, [Page 57] being a spirituall censure, worketh this tēpo­rall effect, to depriue hereticall Princes of their Regall authority, to make kings to be no kings, or to take away from subiects their natural and ciuill obedience, which by the law of God, according to Card. Bellarmines Before cap. 3. sect. 5 nu. 3. where also we obserued, that the aforesaid reduplication added by Car­dinall Bellar­mine [so long as they remaine Kings] is super­fluous. opinion, they owe euen to hereticall Kings, so long as tney remaine Kings, no whit lesse then to Catholikes.

7. Finally, that, which Lessius affirmeth, that the ab­soluing of subiects from the bond of their allegiance is an effect, which is necessarily annexed to the sentence of Ex­communication, as the practise of the Church, for the space of twelue hundred yeares, and vpwards, doth shew, is altogether vntrue. For by no practise at al of the Church can it be shewed, that the absoluing of subiects from the bond of their allegiance, which by the law of God is due to absolute Princes, is an effect of Excommuni­cation, but at the most another punishment, although sometimes imposed together with Excommunication, as Suarez, Becanus, and many other Diuines, whom hereforeIn my Apo­logie nu. 346. I haue related, do in expresse words acknow­ledge; (concerning which punishment, whether it may for any crime be imposed by the Popes authoritie vpon absolute Princes, or only vpon inferiour Princes by the consent of absolute Princes, to whom they are subiect in temporals it is now a controuersie among Diuines;) And very lately Becanus writethIn contro­uersia Angli­cana cap 3. q 2. pag. 108. and in the same cor­rected pag. 122. in this manner: It is one thing to excommunicate a King and another thing to depose him, or to depriue him of his kingdome, neither is the one necessarilie connected with the other. Many Kings and Emperours haue been excommunicated, and yet not therefore deposed; and contrariwise many depo­sed, and yet not therefore excommunicated. Now that subiects cannot be absolued from their allegiance, vn­lesse the Prince be also depriued of his Regall authori­tie, we haue now but a little before cleerely shewed out of the doctrine of Cardinall Bellarmine, who expressely affirmeth, that to denie obedience to a Prince, so long as he [Page 58] remaineth Prince, is repugnant to the law of God, from which the Pope hath no authoritie to absolue. Behold therefore how well these most learned Diuines of the Societie of Iesus doe agree among themselues in as­signing the chiefest reason, for which this oath of Alle­giance doth containe a flat deniall of the Catholike faith. And whether we English Catholikes for so weake and slender arguments, and wherein our most learned Aduersaries do not agree among themselues, are bound to hazard our perpetuall libertie, and whole estate, with the vtter ruine of our posteritie, and withall to be ac­counted by our Prince no faithfull subiects, I remit to the iudgement of the pious, and prudent Reader.

8. Lastly, who doth not perceiue, that the very same obiection, which the aforesaid three Doctors haue made against this third branch of the oath, to proue thereby, that this oath cannot be taken by any Catho­like, without manifest abnegation of the Catholike faith, in the very selfesame manner may in the same ex­presse words be alleaged against those thirteene Eng­lish Priests, and also against the kingdome of France, who, as we haue seene before,Cap. 3. sect. 3. nu. 13. doe constantly defend, that the Pope hath not power to depriue the King of France of his kingdome, and that notwithstanding any Excommunications, which by the Pope can be made a­gainst the aforesaid King, yet the subiects are bound to yeeld obedience due to the King in temporals, neither can they in this be dispensed or absolued by the Pope. See also how those thirteene English Priests, whom also be­foreCap. 3. sect. 3. nu. 10. we haue cited, did protest, that they would yeeld all obedience in ciuill causes to Queene Elizabeth, notwith­standing any authoritie, or sentence of Excommunication denounced, or to be denounced against the said Queene. For in the very same manner, and for the selfesame rea­son Cardinal Bellarmine might denounce against these, Here is cleerely denied the Popes authoritie to excom­municate Kings and Princes.

Sect. II.

1. SEcondly, against that word [Sucessors] some ob­iect in this manner: It may sometimes fall out, that a Successor is not a lawfull Heire, but an vsurper. Seeing therefore that I am bound to take this oath according to the expresse words thereof, and according to the plaine and common sense of the same words without any equiuo­cation, as in the seuenth branch is expressely signified: and this word [Successor] signifieth in generall euery Succes­sor, either lawfull, or vnlawfull; by vertue of this clause I am bound to sweare to beare faith, and true allegiance to all his Maiesties Successors without limitation, and con­sequently to euery his Successor, although he should be an vsurper, therefore no Catholike can lawfully take this clause of the oath in these expresse words, vnlesse to the word [Successors] this word [lawfull] be added.

2. To this obiection it is answered, that, although this word [Successor] doth in generall, and being ta­ken by it selfe signifie euery Seccessor either lawfull, or vnlawfull, yet particularlie, and properlie, especiallie when it is placed in a law, it is commonly taken only for a lawfull Successor, and who rightfully succeedeth. Wherefore according to that rule beforeCap. 1. sect. 3. nu. 3. alleaged out of Suarez, and confirmed by the Ciuill law, to wit, that the words of a law must be taken in that sense, which is without default, this word [Successors] must in this oath established by his Maiesties law be limited only to lawfull Successors, and who, according to the lawes of the kingdome, doe succeed. For, as according to law, id tantùm possumus, quod iure possumus: we can onely doe that, which we can doe by law: so according to law, hee only is accounted to succeed, who by lawful right doth succeed. Whereupon the Ciuill Lawyers doe define In­heritance, Leg nihil ff. de verborum signifie. to be a succeeding to all the right of a partie deceased, and an Heire, who succeedeth him in all his [Page 60] right; without adding lawfull succeeding, or lawfully succeedeth, for that it is alwaies so to bee vnderstood, and therefore being necessarily supposed, it is not ex­pressed, but altogether omitted in the definitions of an Heire, and of Inheritance. And whensoeuer in the com­mon, or Statute lawes, or pragmaticall decrees of this kingdome any mention is made of the King, and his Successors, this word [lawfull] is but few times added, although alwaies it ought to be vnderstood: And ther­fore this word [Successors] in this branch of the oath is, according to the proper, vsuall, and ciuill, or legall sig­nification of the word, to be taken only for lawfull Suc­cessors. I said ciuill, or legall, because it may fall out, that some word by extension, restriction, parification, or fi­ction of the law, may haue another euen proper signifi­cation, then it had at the first imposition thereof, as death, sonne, and many like words, which in the law are also properly taken, for a ciuill death, and an adoptiue sonne.

Sect. III.

1. THirdly, some obiect against those words [And him, and them I will defend to the vttermost of my power, against all conspiracies and attempts whatsoeuer, which shall bee made against his, or their persons, their Crowne and dignitie, &c. and will doe my best endeuour to disclose, and make knowne vnto his Maiestie, his Heires, and Successors, all treasons and traiterous conspiracies, which I shall know, or heare of to be against him, or any of them.]

For, say they, according to the present lawes of this Realmes, it is Treason, and a Traiterous Conspiracie, and Attempt against his Maiesties Crowne and dignitie, to reconcile any man to the Pope, or to be reconciled, to be made a Priest beyond the Seas by the Popes authoritie, and afterwards to returne into this kingdome, and more­ouer [Page 61] to deny, that the Kings Maiestie of England is su­preme Gouernour in his kingdome euen in causes Eccle­siasticall: Therefore by vertue of these words I am forced to sweare to defend his Maiestie against all such reconci­lings, and returnings of such Priests into this kingdome, and to disclose all the aforesaid Treasons, and Traitors to his Maiestie, which no Catholike by reason of his tempo­rall, and ciuill obedience is bound to performe, and there­fore this oath doth not containe only temporall allegiance, as his Maiestie pretendeth, but many other things, which are flat contrary to Catholike doctrine.

2. To this branch also of the oath may be reduced that obiection beforeCap. 2. sect. 1. nu. 1. & seq. rehearsed, which Gretzer made against those words [our Soueraigne Lord] contained in the first branch: As also the principal ground, where­on Antonius Capellus in his booke intituled, Against the pretended Ecclesiasticall primacie of the King of Eng­land, doth chiefly relieControuers. 1. cap. 2. pag. 30. & seq., to proue, that the obedience, which his Maiestie requireth of his subiects in this oath, doth to a Catholike exceede the bonds of ciuill obedience, inuade the spirituall power of the Church, and is flat con­trary to the Catholike faith, which by this argument he thinketh to demonstrate.

Whosoeuer committeth fellonie, and treason, falleth from the allegiance, which is due to the King by the oath of Allegiance.

But he, that will be reconciled to the Pope, he that will obey whatsoeuer authoritie the Romane Sea doth pretend, and to conclude, hee that refuseth the oath of the Kings Ecclesiastical Supremacy, framed in times past by Queene Elizabeth, is guiltie of fellonie, and treason: He is not re­puted guiltie of treason, who refuseth the oath of Supre­macie, vnlesse after it [...]ee three times tendered him, he shall refuse to take it.

Therefore, he that will not be a perpetuall enemie to the Pope, he that acknowledgeth whatsoeuer his authoritie, he that refuseth that impious oath of Supremacie, falleth from the allegiance due to the King by the oath of alle­giance.

3. The Maior proposition cannot be denied. The King [Page 62] himselfe proueth the Minor by his lawes made in this ve­ry same Session of Parliament, wherein this oath is com­manded. For first, the King ordaineth, that no subiect of his shall depart the Realme to serue in the warres, vnlesse he become bound by Obligation with two Suerties, not to be reconciled to the Pope, who doth otherwise, is accoun­ted a Fellon. Moreouer, he is guiltie of high treason, that shall cause, counsell, helpe, or be priuie to, that any person be reconciled to the Pope, or Sea of Rome, or shall procure that any one promise obedience to whatsoeuer authoritie of the Bishop of Rome. Neither will he haue these to haue their pardon, vnlesse they shall first take two oathes, the one, of the Kings Supremacie, the other this of Alle­giance.

4. The King himselfe therefore hath by his law pro­ued the Minor proposition to wit, that he committeth fel­lonie, and treason, who doth not sweare perpetuall emnitie with the Pope, who will obey him in any sort whatsoeuer, who refuseth to take the oath of Supremacie. How there­fore can Catholikes with safetie of the Catholike faith, which they beleeue, take this oath? If in this oath all friendship, all obedience, all power of the Pope be abiured, how can they take it without hurt to their soules? Where­fore it is cleerely false, as I thinke, that only ciuill obedi­ence is demanded of English men in this oath, and that the spirituall power of the Pope, or the Catholike faith is no way touched therein; and that it is truly said by Tortus, that therein is abiured the Catholike faith, and all power of the pope no lesse then in the oath of Supremacie.

5. Moreouer, reade the Kings Apologie, and euery man shall perceiue, that he bringeth the approuing, con­firming, and calling of Councels to proue, that ciuill obe­dience is due to Kings. Wherefore, according to his Ma­iestie, ciuill obedience doth comprehend these, which truly no Catholike doth beleeue to be ciuill things, or to belong to ciuill obedience. Wherefore his Maiestie cannot deny, but that vnder the name of ciuill obedience hee re­quireth [Page 63] of his Catholike subiects many things, which to a Catholike doe exceede ciuill obedience. Thus farre Ca­pellus.

6. To this obiection it is answered first, that, al­though this word, Treason, or Traiterous Conspira­cie, hath of late yeeres, according to the lawes of this Realme, been extended in some sort to certaine spiri­tuall causes; yet according to the proper, formal, plaine, and vsuall signification of this word [Treason] it onely comprehendeth ciuill, and not spirituall causes. And although some spirituall causes bee punished with the ordinarie punishment of proper, and naturall treason, and in that respect may be called treasons, neuerthelesse truly, really, and formally they are not natural treasons, neither can they in any other manner be called trea­sons, then may whatsoeuer Secular crimes, as thefts, murthers, adulteries, if they be forbidden by the Prince vnder the punishment of true and naturall treason. For true, proper, and naturall treason is of the same nature in all places, in all countries, and among all nations, and is forbid by the law of nature, and nations, although in diuers Countries, according to the custome of euery one it be punished diuers waies, with what kinde of punishment euery outragious crime, if the Prince shall so ordaine, may be punished, and in that respect, taking it name from the effect, may be called Treason.

7. Secondly, and principally we answere, that, accor­ding to the rules beforeCap. 1. sect. 3. nu. 1. alleaged, no humane law can haue greater force to binde, then the Law-maker inten­deth it shall binde, and the words of a law are to bee ta­ken in that sense, wherein the Law-maker declareth they are to be vnderstood. But both the King and Par­liament doe plainly declare, what treasons, and traite­rous conspiracies they intend shall be comprehended vnder those names, whiles in expresse words they af­firme, that in this oath they intend nothing else, then the profession of naturall allegiance, and ciuill obedience, [Page 64] which by the law of God and nature is due to all lawfull Princes, whatsoeuer Religion they professe, with a pro­mise to resist, and disclose all contrarie vnciuill violence. So carefull was I, saith his MaiestieIn his Pre­monition p. 9., that nothing should be contained in this oath, except the profession of naturall allegiance, and ciuill, and temporall obedience, with a pro­mise to resist to all contrary vnciuill violence. And againe in his ApologiePag 46., For as the oath of Supremacie (saith he) was deuised for putting a difference betweene Papists, and them of our profession: so was this oath, which hee would seeme to impugne, ordained for making a difference betweene the ciuilly obedient Papists, and the peruerse disciples of the powder Treason. And in the second Ses­sion of ParliamentCap 4. holden the third yeere of his Ma­iesties reigne, wherein this oath was deuised, in the Preamble to the oath thus it is written: And for the better triall, how his Maiesties subiects stand affected in point of their loyaltie, and due obedience, Be it also ena­cted, &c. Which loyaltie, and due obedience in the fourth Session of ParliamentCap. 6. in the beginning., holden the seuenth yere of his Maisties reigne, is in these words more cleerely expressed: Whereas by a Statute made in the third yeare of your Maiesties reigne, intituled, An Act for the better discouering, and repressing of Popish Recusants, the forme of an oath to be ministred, and giuen to certaine persons in the same Act mentioned, is limited, and prescribed, ten­ding only to the declaration of such dutie, as euery true, and well affected subiect, not only by bond of Allegiance, but also by the commandement of almightie God ought to beare to your Maiestie, your Heires, and Succes­sors, &c.

9. Seeing therefore that his Maiestie hath publikely and plainly declared, that he only requireth of his sub­iects the profession of naturall Allegiance, and ciuill, and temporall obedience, with a promise to resist all contrarie vnciuill violence, and purposely for that cause would not, that the denying of the Popes power to ex­communicate [Page 65] him should bee contained in this oath; and the Parliament in like manner doth onely demand in this oath that obedience, which by the bond of alle­giance, and the commandement of almightie God is due to his Maiestie, it is most euident, that those Trea­sons, and traiterous conspiracies, which by vertue of this oath wee are bound to disclose, and against which wee are bound to defend his Maiestie, are not spirituall re­concilings to the Pope, nor detecting of Priests, who doe not plot any temporall conspiracie, or vnciuill vio­lence against his Maiesties royall person, Crowne, or dignitie; but onely such ciuill, or rather vnciuill trea­sons, and traiterous conspiracies are forbidden in this oath, and commanded to be disclosed to his Maiestie, which the law of God and nature doth oblige subiects, what Religion soeuer they professe, not to attempt a­gainst their lawfull Prince.

10. To comprehend therefore the whole matter in few words, two kinde of Treasons, or traiterous conspi­racies may be distinguished; the one, true, naturall, and proper, which are forbidden by the law of nature, and nations, and are of the same nature in all Countries, and which are opposite to naturall allegiance; the o­ther metaphoricall, positiue, and improper, which are made treasons onely by the positiue decree of the Prince, and onely for that cause are called Treasons, or Traiterous Conspiracies, for that they are punished with the punishment of true, and naturall treason. The former treasons, and traiterous conspiracies his Maie­stie intended onely to comprehend in this oath of alle­giance: Concerning the later treasons, and traiterous conspiracies, which are forbidden by other lawes, and oathes, his Maiestie did not intend to ordaine any thing at all in this oath.

11. From hence it is easie to answere to the obiection of Capellus. For if his Maior proposition be vnderstood of true, proper, and naturall treason, and of that naturall [Page 66] allegiance, and ciuill obedience, which by the law of God and nature is due to euery lawfull Prince, what Religion soeuer he professeth, and which onely, as hath now been shewed, his Maiestie intendeth to demand of his subiects in this oath, then we doe willingly grant his Maior; For whosoeuer committeth such treason, whosoeuer offereth such vnciuill, or vnnatural violence to his Maiestie, whosoeuer attempteth such traiterous conspiracies, falleth from the allegiance due to his Ma­iestie, by vertue of the oath of naturall Allegiance: But then his Minor proposition is false; for he that will be reconciled to the Pope, he that refuseth the oath of the Kings Supremacie in causes Ecclesiasticall, &c. doth not commit naturall, or rather vnnaturall treason, doth not offer vnnaturall violence to his Maiestie, neither doth he attempt vnnaturall, or vnciuill Conspiracies. For al­though the aforesaid reconcilings are by the later lawes of this Realme adiudged Treasons, and are punishable as true, and naturall Treasons, and therefore they may be called positiue Treasons, yet they are not true, pro­per, and naturall Treasons, which only by vertue of this oath we are bound to reueale, and against which onely by vertue of this oath wee are bound to defend his Ma­iestie; neither are they contrarie to that naturall alle­giance, which onely the King and Parliament doth re­quire of vs in this oath. And so one may commit such treasons without falling from that naturall allegiance, which is due to his Maiestie by vertue of this oath of al­legiance, wherein only naturall allegiance is demanded of the subiects.

12. But if Capellus by the name of Treason doth in his Maior proposition vnderstand all sorts of treasons as well improper, and positiue, as true, and naturall trea­sons; then wee denie his Maior to be vniuersally true. For one may commit such treasons without falling from that allegiance, which is due to his Maiestie by vertue of this oath of allegiance, wherein onely naturall [Page 67] allegiance is required of the subiects, with a promise to resist all contrarie vnnaturall violence, and to disclose all such vnnatural treasons, and traiterous conspiracies, and to defend his Maiestie against them to the vtter­most of his power.

13. Therefore neither hath the King proued the Minor proposition by his law, as vntruly affirmeth Ca­pellus, neither hath Capellus proued it by argument, but as yet it remaineth to bee proued: And therefore his Conclusion is euidently false: to wit, that in this oath all friendship, all obedience, all power of the Pope is abiured. For that only friendship, that only obedience, that on­ly power of the Pope is denied in this oath, which can­not stand with that naturall, and constant allegiance, which subiects by the law of God and nature doe owe to their Prince. And therefore neither is it truly said by Tortus, or Capellus, that in this oath is abiured the Ca­tholike faith, and all power of the Pope, no lesse, then in the oath of Supremacie.

14. Wherefore, although we should grant to Capel­lus, that the Kings Maiestie, according to the principles of his Religion, which he embraceth, is of opinion, that many things doe appertaine to ciuill obedience, which according to Catholike doctrine doe not appertaine, (wherewith, as being impertinent to that, whereof now we treate, I will not intermeddle) yet we vtterly denie, that his Maiestie in this oath of Allegiance (for of other oathes there is no question at this present) doth require of his Catholike subiects vnder the name of ciuill obe­dience, anything, which to a Catholike doth exceede ciuill obedience: for that, as wee haue often said, he re­quireth of his subiects in this oath no other allegiance, then naturall, and which by the law of God and nature all subiects owe to their lawfull Princes, whatsoeuer Religion they shall professe.

15. And truly, if this manner of arguing, which Ca­pellus vseth, were to be allowed for good and lawfull, it [Page 68] might by the very like reason bee proued, that it were not lawfull for any Catholike (the present lawes of this Realme standing in force) to take euen that oath of Al­legiance, which in times past, when the Kings were Ca­tholikes, was required of the subiects. For although Catholikes should only sweare in these general words, that they truly, and sincerely professe, testifie, and de­clare, that King Iames is true, and lawfull King of this kingdome, and of all other his Maiesties dominions, and that I promise to beare vnto him all true obedience and allegiance, which no man doubteth but that it is law­full to sweare, as Fa. Parsons, and Becanus, beforeCap. 2. sect. 1. nu. 7. rela­ted, doe affirme, yet the selfesame argument of Capellus may in the very same words bee also vrged against this oath, as any man, though but meanely learned, may cleerely perceiue; which truly is a manifest signe, that the aforesaid argument of Capellus is in very deed falla­cious, captious, and sophisticall, as wee also haue suffi­ciently proued.

Sect. I.

1. AGainst this fourth branch three obiections are commonly made. And first some obiect against that word [abiure;] For, say they, this word [abiure] [Page 69] doth import a recalling, or recanting of a former doctrine, which one before hath maintained, and therefore this branch cannot lawfully be taken by him, who neuer main­tained such a doctrine. Seeing therefore that all his Ma­iesties subiects indifferently, and without exception may be compelled by the Magistrate to take this oath, it is euident, that this branch cannot lawfully, and without periurie be taken by those, who neuer maintained this do­ctrine concerning the Popes power to depose, or murther Princes.

2. To this obiection it is answered, that although this word [abiurare, to abiure] be sometimes taken for to periure Abiurare cre­ditum, to for­sweare his debt, apud Salust., or to forsweare, yet though we turne ouer al the Dictionaries, wee shall neuer finde, that to abiure a doctrine, doth only signifie, to recant a doctrine, which one before hath maintained; but to denie, condemne, or detest by oath any doctrine, whether before he hath maintained it, or notSimancas in tit abiurare, nu 1 & 2.. And although in rigour of speech this word [to abiure] should signifie to recant, or vnsay by oath that doctrine, which before hee hath maintained, yet according to the plaine and common sense of this word, and according to the vsuall practise which is obserued in abiuring heresies, or errors, this word [to abiure] doth signifie to damne, deny, or detest by oath not only a doctrine, which before in very deede he hath maintained, but also which either he hath in­deed maintained, or it is suspectedSimancas nu. 18., that he hath main­tained. And so the custome of the Inquisition is, that he who is either accused, or denounced before that tri­bunall for defending any heresie, must purge himselfe by abiuration, and he is compelled to abiure that here­sie, whereof hee is denounced, or suspected, although perchance in very deede hee did neuer either by word teach it, or with heart beleeue it. Whereof we may see some examples in the great Councell of Chalcedon. For in the eighth action Bishop Theodoret, who was suspe­cted of heresie, was compelled publikely to anathema­tize [Page 70] Nestorius, and all heretikes. And in the ninth, and tenth Action of the same Councell, Bishop Iba, who being accused of certaine errors, and found innocent, yet by reason of the suspition, hee was compelled to sayAct. decima, in fine., I haue anathematized Nestorius, and all his per­uerse Dogmata. opinions, and I doe now againe anathematize him ten thousand times, and I do anathematize euery one, who doth not hold, as this holie Synode doth. Now that the King and Parliament, by reason of that horrible Gun­powder-treason attempted by some Catholikes, vn­der pretence to aduance Catholike religion, had great cause to suspect, that also other Catholikes did main­taine the same damnable doctrine concerning the mur­thering of Kings, at leastwise by the Popes authoritie, which these Gunpowder-Traitors did defend, is alas, with griefe I speake it, too too manifest.

Sect. II.

1. SEcondly, against those words [as hereticall] some Diuines of this kingdome doe vehemently, and almost only obiect, in so much that they are of opinion, that this onely branch is sufficient to condemne the oath as altogether vnlawfull. For they perswade them­selues, that out of the most certaine principles of Lo­gicke it may euidently bee conuinced, that this branch of the oath cannot be taken by any man without mani­fest periurie. And this obiection (which Leonard Les­sius Nu. 219., as his English Recapitulator Pag. 54. doth relate, Anto­nius Capellus Controuers. 1 cap. 1. nu. 3. pag 34., and another Englishman, in his answere to a certaine Proclamation published by his Maiestie Pag. 84., doe briefly insinuate) is more largely, and strongly vr­ged by the Author of a certaine English Dialogue, [in­tituled, The iudgement of Protestancie, and Puritanisme, both highly displeased at this passage in the oath] where­in this Author with great confidence, as it seemeth, perswadeth himselfe, to haue cleerely demonstrated, [Page 71] that no Protestant, or Puritane, according to the prin­ciples of their Religion, can, without manifest periurie, take this branch of the oath. And this his pretended demonstration may in the very like manner be vrged against Catholikes.

This therefore is the summe, and substance of his demonstration, and of his whole Dialogue.

2. No man can without periurie abiure that position as hereticall, which is not hereticall, but this position, That Princes, which bee excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may bee deposed, or murthered by their sub­iects, or any other whatsoeuer, is not hereticall: there­fore no man can without periurie abiure it as hereticall.

The Maior proposition hee supposeth as manifest. The Minor hee prooueth. But first hee supposeth two knowne grounds, and granted by all men. The first is,Cap. 2. pag. 8. That an oath consisting of diuers passages, parcels, or branches euery one affirming, or denying some thing, it is impossible the whole oath should be true vnlesse euery one of the said passages, parcels, or branches be true, and law­full. For if any one parcell be false, before a man hath ta­ken the whole, hee must needs haue sworne the falsehood contained in that part. And this vndoubted truth is foun­ded vpon the common receiued principle, Bonum est ex integra causa, malum ex quocun (que) defectu; That which is good proceedeth of a whole and entire cause, euill pro­ceedeth from the least defect.

3. The second supposition is,Pag. 13. That Heresie being an error against faith obstinately maintained in the vn­derstanding of him, that professeth Christ, it must needes follow, that nothing can be hereticall, vnlesse it containe some error against faith. So that although a position bee repugnant to naturall reason, yet it is not enough to make it hereticall, vnlesse it containe some falsehood against faith, and consequently to the expresse word of God; which according to the Protestants doctrine, is the sole and only rule of faith, and the onely touchstone to trie faith from [Page 72] heresie. Many positions are false, as that London is but a mile distant from Yorke, but not hereticall, because their falsehood is only repugnant to naturall reason, and is not contained in the expresse word of God.

These being supposed, he argueth in this manner.

4. Whensoeuer an affirmatiue proposition is hereticall, of necessity it must either be against faith, and consequent­ly against the expresse word of God, or else the contradi­ctorie negatiue must be a position of faith, and contained in the expresse word of God:

But neither this affirmatiue position, That Princes, which bee excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed, or murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, is against the expresse word of God, neither the contradictorie negatiue, to wit, That Princes being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may not be deposed, or murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, is contained in the expresse word of God.

Therefore the former position, That Princes being ex­communicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be depo­sed, or murthered by their subiects, or any other what­soeuer, is not hereticall.

5. And if perchance it should bee answered, that, whereas it is written in the 20. chapter of Exodus, Thou shalt not kill: and 1 Reg. 26. Destroy him not, for who shall lay his hand on the Lord his annoynted, and bee guiltlesse? one part of the aforesaid position, to wit, That Princes may be murthered, is hereticall, and against the expresse word of God, and therefore the whole position, in regard of this one part, may be abiured as hereticall; yet this answere is not sufficient: For the position in hand to wit, That Princes being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may bee deposed, or murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, doth not absolutely affirme, that Princes, after they be excommunicated, or [Page 73] depriued by the Pope, may be murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, but with a disiunction, to wit, my be deposed, or murthered. And therefore, although the position were hereticall, if it did onely affirme, they might be murthered, yet not affirming this, but only that they may be deposed, or murthered, there is no shew of he­resie in it in regard of being contrary to the aforesaid texts of Scripture, to which it is nothing contrary at all.

6. For according to the most true and approued rule of the Logicians, to make a disiunctiue proposition, or any thing affirmed vnder a disiunction, to be false and here­ticall, it is necessarie, that both parts of the disiunction be also false and hereticall, neither is it sufficient, that one only part be hereticall. And therefore although the se­cond part of the disiunction, to wit, That Princes may be murthered, be hereticall, and against the expresse word of God, yet because the first part of the disiunction, to wit, That Princes, being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed by their subiects, or any o­ther whatsoeuer, is not hereticall, nor contrary to the ex­presse word of God, the whole disiunction position cannot be in very deed hereticall, and therefore by no Protestant, or Puritane can it be abiured, as hereticall. And this is the summe and substance of the pretended demonstra­tion of this Author, and also of his whole Dialogue.

7. The very selfe same argument, which this Author maketh against Protestants, and Puritanes, may in the very like manner bee alleaged against Catholikes, who hold, that the infallible rule of faith is the holy word of God deliuered by Scripture, or Tradition, and the true sense, and right meaning thereof declared so to be by the Catholike Church, vnto whom the infallible assi­stance of the holy Ghost, to declare the true sense and meaning of God his holie word, was promised by Christ our Lord. For neither out of holy Scripture, or Tradition, neither by any definition of the Church, or Generall Councel, can it sufficiently be proued, that the [Page 74] Pope hath not authoritie to depriue Princes, or that af­ter they be depriued by the Pope, they may not be de­posed by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, but rather by the continuall practise of Popes the contrary seemeth to be supposed for certaine, which also Cardi­nall Bellarmine, both in his Controuersies, and in his answere to Doctor Barcklay, doth endeuour (but in vaine) to demonstrate.

8. Wherefore in this branch, saith Lessius, as his Eng­lish RecapitulatorPag. 54. 55. relateth, the doctrine of the Catho­like Church is abiured as hereticall, and impious: For the plaine sense of the oath condemneth not only the opinion of murthering, but also of deposing, and he that taketh the oath, abiureth both the one, and the other. And were the sense ambiguous, yet could it not be taken, it being in a matter belonging to faith, wherein no equiuocation, or ambiguous speeches may bee vsed. Whereby it is euident, that no man can from his heart detest this Catholike do­ctrine as impious, and hereticall, if hee be not himselfe al­ready fallen deeply into heresie, and impietie.

9. To this obiection two Answers are vsually made. The first, and principal answere is, that albeit the afore­said proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may bee deposed, or murthered by their Subiects, &c. doth seeme by reason of that later coniunction [or] to be a disiunctiue proposition, or ra­ther a Categoricall proposition of such a disiunct predi­cate, as the Logicians terme it, which vertually doth imply, or may bee resolued into a disiunctiue proposi­tion (to the veritie of which disiunctiue proposition is onely required, as it was said in the obiection, that one part of the disiunction be true, and to make the whole disiunction false, and heretical, both parts of the disiun­ction must be false, and hereticall, neither doth it suffice that one onely part be false and hereticall) Neuerthe­lesse, according to the common sense, and meaning of the words, it is in very deed, and according to our Eng­lish [Page 75] phrase, equiualent to a copulatiue proposition, or rather to a Categoricall proposition of such a copulate predicate, which may bee resolued into a copulatiue proposition, to the veritie whereof, according to the Logicians rule, it is contrariwise required, that both parts of the copulation be true, and to make the whole proposition false, and hereticall, it is not required, that both parts of the copulation be false, and hereticall, but it sufficeth that one only part thereof be false, and he­reticall. Neither is it vnusuall, that a coniunction dis­iunctiue be sometimes taken for a copulatiue, and con­trariwise a copulatiue for a disiunctiue, as we may see in leg. sape. ff. de verborum significat. Whereof reade Feli­nus in cap. inter caeteras, extra, de rescriptis. Ioannes A­zorius, tom. 1. Instit. lib. 5. cap. 25. and Salas disp. 21. de Legibus sect. 3. regula 26.

10. But if any one will needes contend, that the a­foresaid proposition, Princes, which are excommunica­ted by the Pope, &c. by reason of that disiunctiue con­iunction [or] is indeede a disiunctiue proposition, this notwithstanding being granted, the obiection may ea­sily be answered. For albeit we admit it to be a disiun­ctiue proposition, neuerthelesse we affirme, that it is not an absolute disiunctiue, whereof the aforesaid rule of the Logicians, to wit, that both parts of the disiunction must be hereticall to make the whole disiunction to be he­reticall, is to be vnderstood, but it is a conditionall dis­iunctiue, which importeth a free choice, or election of the will, or, which is all one, a free power to chuse whe­ther part of the disiunction we please; to the veritie of which conditionall disiunctiue is required, that you may chuse whether part of the disiunction you please; and if it be hereticall to affirme, y^t it is in the free power of the will to chuse whether part of the disiunction we please, the whole disiunction, or disiunctiue proposi­tion, implying such a condition, or free election, with­out doubt is hereticall.

[Page 76]11. Now that this disiunctiue coniunction [or,] be­ing placed in the aforesaid proposition, doth in com­mon sense, according to our English phrase, import a copulation, or such a disiunction, which leaueth a free power in the Subiects to chuse whether part they will, that is, to depose the King, or if they please, to murther him, will most euidently appeare, if both in common speech, and also in the lawes of the Realme, we diligent­ly consider the proper, and vsuall signification of this word [may] when there followeth the coniunction dis­iunctiue [or.] And this may be shewed by almost innu­merable examples, whereof some of them we will here set downe. As for example: You may stay here, or depart. You may eate, or drink, You may buy in such a place wine, or oyle. You may haue in the shambles beefe, or mutton. You may goe to such a place by land, or by water. You may buy that land in fee-farme, or by lease. The King by ver­tue of an Act of Parliament may take of conuicted Po­pish Recusants twenty pounds for euery moneth, or the third part of all their lands. The Sherife may presently hang a theefe condemned to die, or delay his death for some small time. If any person hold any lands of any other Lord, then of the King, by Knights seruice, he may giue, dispose, or assure by his last will and testament two parts of the said lands holden by Knights seruice, or of as much thereof as shall amount to the full yeerely value of two parts. If a man by his last will and testament ordaine, that his Executors may bestow twentie pounds vpon the poore, or repaire such a bridge, it is in the free power of the Exe­cutors to chuse whether of those two they please. Finally, in clauses of reuocation, where the words are, that one may by any deed in his life time, or by his last will and te­stament reuoke the said vses, and limit new, it is in his free power and choice to doe it by the one, or by the other, as he shall please. And in infinite such like examples the verbe [may] implieth a free power to chuse either part of the disiunctiō one pleaseth, neither can there scarce­ly [Page 77] be alleaged any one example, wherein the coniun­ction disiunctiue [or] immediatly following the verbe [may] is not so take.

12. Wherefore the plaine and vsuall meaning of the aforesaid proposition, [Princes, which be excommu­nicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed, or mur­thered by their subiects, &c.] or, which is all one, Sub­iects may depose, or murther their Prince, being excom­municated or depriued by the Pope, (for in this last the verbe passiue is onely changed into the actiue) is, that it is in the free choice of the Subiects to depose such a Prince, or, if they will, to murther him. So that if it bee hereticall to affirme, as without doubt it is, that it is in the free power of the Subiects to depose, or murther such a Prince, because it is hereticall, and against the ex­presse word of God to affirme, that they may murther him, the aforesaid position consisting of that disiun­ction is hereticall, and therefore it may without any danger at all of periurie be abiured as hereticall.

13. From hence it may be gathered first, that, accor­ding to the common, and vsuall vnderstanding of our English phrase, there is a great distinction betwixt these two verbs [may] and [can.] For [can] doth vsually signifie a power in generall, whether it bee naturall, or morall; but [may] for the most part importeth a morall power; to wit, if it be vsed alone without any coniun­ction following it, most commonly it signifieth a law­fulnes to doe the thing proposed: As, I may doe this, sig­nifieth, that it is lawfull for me to doe this: but if there follow it a coniunction copulatiue, or disiunctiue, it implieth a choice, or free power to chuse whether part of the disiunction, or copulation one will.

14. Seeing therefore that the Latine verbe [possum] implieth power in generall, whether it be naturall, or morall, and according to the thing affirmed, or denied, it is limited to a natural, or morall power, as in this pro­position, Ignis potest comburere: The fire hath power to [Page 78] burne, it signifieth a naturall, and necessary power in the fire to burne; and in this, Potest homo eligere bonum, aut malum; A man hath power to chuse good, or euill, it sig­nifieth a free, and morall power: from hence it follow­eth, that this proposition, Subiects may depose, or mur­ther their Prince, being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, is not so properly, and significantly translated into Latine by the verbe [possum] Subditi possunt depo­nere, aut occidere suum principem excommunicatū, &c.] as by the substantiue of [possum] or by the verbe per­mittitur, to wit, in potestate est subditorum, or, permitti­tur subditis principem suum excommunicatum, vel depri­uatum per pontificem deponere, aut occidere: It is in the power of subiects, or, it is permitted to subiects to depose, or murther their Prince, being excommunicated, or de­priued by the Pope. And therefore the Latine translation of this oath, doth not by the verbe [possum] sufficiently expresse the proper, and vsual signification of the verbe [may] contained in the aforesaid position, vnlesse either the coniunction copulatiue [and] be put in place of [may] to wit, Principes per Papam excommunicati, vel depri­uati possunt per suos subditos deponi & occidi, deposed, and murthered, as Cardinall Bellarmine, and Antonius Capellus haue it in their bookes translated: or else there bee vnderstood a condition of the free will to chuse whether part of the disiunction one pleaseth, to wit, possunt deponi per suos subditos, aut, si velint, occidi, be de­posed, or if the subiects will, be murthered.

15. Secondly, from hence it is also gathered, that in a disiunctiue proposition, wherein is implied a condi­tion of the will, to chuse freely either part of the disiun­ction, it maketh all one sense, whether the coniunction copulatiue [and] or the disiunctiue [or] be vsed. For both of them doe signifie a free power to chuse which part one pleaseth: and so the coniunction disiunctiue hath in sense the vertue, and force of a copulatiue, and the copulatiue of a disiunctiue. Wherefore the ancient [Page 79] Fathers, when they speake of our free will, and doe af­firme, that it is in our power to chuse good, or euill, they vse indifferently the coniunction disiunctiue [or,] and the copulatiue [and,] sometimes affirming, that it is in our power to chuse good, or euill: other times, that it is in our power to chuse good, and euill. Yea Cardinall Bellarmine himselfe propounding in his Controuersies the question concerning free will, doth confound [or] with [and] and taketh them for all one. There is a con­trouersie (saith he)Tom. 4. lib. 5. cap. 13. betwixt Catholikes, and heretikes, whether a man in the state of corrupt nature hath free will to chuse morall good, [and] to auoide euill, or which is all one, to obserue, [or] breake morall precepts.

16. Seeing therefore that in this proposition, Prin­ces being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed, or murthered by their subiects; or, which is all one, Subiects may depose or murther their Prince, be­ing excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, the verbe [may] doth import a free power in the subiects to chuse which part of the disiunction they please, that is, to de­pose him, or if they please, to murther him, it maketh all one sense, whether it be said, Princes may be deposed, or murthered by their subiects, or, Princes may be deposed, and murthered by their subiects; as Cardinall Bellar­mine In editione Politana, & Coloniensi, printed 1610. and Antonius Capellus Pag. 12. putting the coniunctiō copulatiue [and,] doe seeme to haue well obserued, and to be of opinion, that the aforesaid disiunctiue propo­sition is in very deede equiualent to a copulatiue, or such a conditionall disiunctiue, which vertually doth containe a copulatiue. And truly if this pretended de­monstration of this Author were so euident an argu­ment, as he imagineth it to be, to condemne this oath as sacrilegious, without doubt it could not haue esca­ped the most quicke vnderstanding of Cardinal Bellar­mine, who also would not haue neglected to produce any reason, which might cleerely haue conuinced the oath to be apparantly vnlawfull.

[Page 80]17. Now from this which hath been said, it is easie to answere in forme to the aforesaid obiection, whose whole strength dependeth vpon the nature, and quali­tie of a disiunctiue proposition.

Wherefore to the Minor proposition it is answered, that it is hereticall, and against the expresse word of God cōtained in the aforesaid two texts of holy Scrip­ture, to affirme, that Princes, which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed, or murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer: or which is all one, that Subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, may depose, or murther Princes, which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope. For the plaine and common meaning of this proposition is, as wee haue shewed before, that it is in the free power of subiects, or of any other whatsoe­uer, to depose such Princes, or if they will, to murther them, which proposition is flat hereticall.

18. And whereas it is obiected, that the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which he excommunicated, &c. is a disiunctiue, but to the veritie of a disiunctiue proposition it is sufficient, that one part of the disiunction be true, and to make the whole disiunctiue proposition to be false, and hereticall, it is necessarie, according to the most certaine rule of the Logicians, that both parts of the disiunction be false, and hereticall.

It is answered first to the Maior, that although in ex­ternall sound the aforesaid proposition, Princes which be excommunicated, &c. seeme to be disiunctiue, yet in very deede, and according to the plaine and com­mon vnderstanding of our English phrase, it is, as wee haue alreadie shewed, equiualent to a copulatiue, to the veritie whereof it is necessarie, that both parts of the copulation be true, and to make the whole copulatiue proposition to bee false and hereticall it sufficeth, that one only part of the copulation be false and hereticall. Now that one part of the aforesaid proposition, to wit, that, Princes, which be excommunicated, or depriued by [Page 81] the Pope, may be murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, is flat heretical, is too too manifest.

19. But lest we should seeme to contend about the bare words, wee answere secondly, and grant that the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which be excommunica­ted, &c. is a disiunctiue: but then the Minor proposi­tion is to be distinguished: For when the Logicians af­firme, that to the veritie of a disiunctiue proposition it is sufficient that one part of the disiunction be true, and to make the whole disiunctiue hereticall, it is necessary that both parts of the disiunction be hereticall, that ap­proued rule of the Logicians is to be vnderstood of an absolute disiunctiue, to wit, which doth not vertually containe in it a condition, or free power in the will to chuse whether part one pleaseth: For to the veritie of this conditionall disiunctiue it is necessary, that both parts of the disiunction may be chosen, and if it be he­reticall to affirme, that it is in the free choice of any man to chuse whether part of the disiunction he plea­seth, the whole disiunctiue proposition is hereticall. Now that it is hereticall to affirme, that it is in the free power of the subiects to depose, or if they will, to mur­ther their Prince, being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, no man can call in question.

20. Neuerthelesse, the Author of this Dialogue doth seeme to deale somewhat cunningly, and ende­uoureth not so much to impugne directly the affirma­tiue proposition, which is expressely contained in the oath, and to proue directly, that the aforesaid position, Princes being excommunicated, &c. may be deposed, or murthered, not to bee hereticall, as the oath affirmeth; but he flieth from the affirmatiue to the negatiue, and endeuoureth to shew, that the contradictorie proposi­tion, to wit, Princes being excommunicated, &c. cannot be deposed, or murthered, &c. is not certaine of faith, nor contained in the expresse word of God; from whence he concludeth, that the former affirmatiue pro­position, [Page 82] which is in expresse words contained in the oath, is not hereticall; because in what degree or false­hood any position is false, in the opposite degree of truth the contradictorie must be true.

21. But this Author by his manner of arguing see­meth desirous to shun the difficultie, and to impugne a proposition, which is more cleere, and manifest, by ano­ther more obscure, and equiuocal, which among Logi­cians is accounted a great defect in arguing, whose na­ture is to proue one thing lesse manifest by another more apparant. For the falsehood of this affirmatiue position, Princes, which bee excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed, or murthered by their subiects, &c. or which is all one, Subiects may depose, or murther their Prince, being excommunicated, &c. is more cleere and manifest in the common vnderstanding of our English phrase, then is the truth of this negatiue, Subiects may not depose, or murther their Prince who is excommunica­ted, &c. by reason of that negatiue aduerbe [not] which, as the Logicians say, is of a malignant nature; for that it destroyeth, or denieth whatsoeuer followeth after it, making an affirmatiue to be a negatiue, and a negatiue to be an affirmatiue, an vniuersall to be a particular, and a particular to be an vniuersallAs this vni­uersall affirma­tiue proposi­tion, all men are sensible, is by putting not in the beginning, Not all men are sensible, made a particular ne­gatiue.. So that the meaning of the aforesaid negatiue proposition is by reason of that negatiue aduerbe [not] made ambiguous, and may haue this sense, that Subiects may neither depose, nor murther their Prince, being excommunicated, &c. which propo­sition so vnderstood is not of faith, neither in very deed contradictorie to the proper and vsuall meaning ac­cording to our English phrase, of the former affirma­tiue which is abiured in the oath. And therefore no meruaile, that this Author was desirous to flie from the affirmatiue propsition to the negatiue.

22. Supposing therefore, that contradiction, accor­ding to the approued doctrine of Aristotle Lib. 1. de In­terpret. cap. 4. is an affir­ming, and denying of the selfesame thing in the selfesame [Page 83] manner, we answere, that this negatiue position, Prin­ces, which be excommunicated &c. may not be deposed, or murthered by their subiects, &c. is contradictorie to that affirmatiue position, which is abiured in the oath, if the verbe [may] be taken in the same manner, or sense in the negatiue, as it is taken in the affirmatiue: And then, that as the affirmatiue is heretical, so the negatiue is of faith. For as the sense of the affirmatiue is, as we haue shewed before, that it is in the free choice of the subiects either to depose their Prince being excommunicated, &c. or, if they will, to murther him, which is false, hereticall, and against those expresse words of Scripture, Thou shalt not kill; Destroy him not, &c. So the sense of the negatiue contradictorie must be, that it is not in the free choice of the subiects to depose such Princes, or if they please, to murther them; which proposition is most true, and contained in the expresse word of God, be­cause it is not in their free power to murther them, as is manifest by the former places of Scripture. And this, which hath been said, is sufficient for any man, but of meane learning, to perceiue both the weakenes of this Authors pretended demonstration, or rather scarce probable argumentation taken from the nature and qualitie of a disiunctiue proposition, and also how rash­ly, and without sufficient proofe, Lessius, as his English Recapitulator relateth, so barely affirmeth, that in this branch the Catholike doctrine is abiured as hereticall, and impious, and that the plaine sense of the oath doth not only condemne the opinion for murthering Princes, but also for deposing them.

23 And thus much concerning the first and princi­pall answere to this second obiection. The foure next numbers 24. 25. 26. 27. which are in the Latine Edi­tion concerning the nature, and conditions of copula­tiue, and disiunctiue propositions, because they cannot easily be vnderstood by the vnlearneder sort; and also for that they are not very necessarie to the full vnder­standing [Page 84] of this first answere to the former obiection, I haue in this English Edition purposely omitted.

28. The second principle answere, which some of our countrimen doe make to the aforesaid obiection, is ga­thered from the doctrine of Cardinall Bellarmine Lib 2. de Concil. cap. 12., who expounding that sentence of Pope Gregorie the firstLib. 1. ep. 24., I confesse, that I doe receiue the foure first Councels, as the foure bookes of the Gospell, affirmeth, that the aduerbe [as] doth import a similitude, and not an equalitie, as that Matth. 5. Be you perfect, as your heauenly father is per­fect. For in like manner these doe answere, that those words, I doe abhorre, detest, and abiure as hereticall, &c. doe not import an equalitie, but a similitude; and so in common speech do only signifie, that I doe exceeding­ly detest that doctrine. And so wee vsually say, I hate him as the Diuell, I loue him as my brother, not inten­ding thereby to affirme, that the one is in truth a Diuel, or the other my brother.

29. Now to omit that word [murthered] as though there were no mention at all made in the oath concer­ning the murthering of Princes, and to speake onely of deposing them; these men affirme, that the aforesaid position, Princes, which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, supposing that this question concerning the Popes power to depose Princes is not yet decided, is in their iudgements a false, and seditious proposi­tion, and that it hath some similitude with errour, and heresie; not for that they thinke it to be in very deede hereticall, or erroneous, but for that they doe constant­ly hold it to be of such a nature, that it may be condem­ned by the Church as an erroneous, and hereticall pro­position, if deposing be taken in that sense, as it is in this branch of the oath distinguished from depriuing. For to depriue a Prince, is to take away by a lawfull sentence his Regall authoritie, and in this branch is referred to the Pope, but to depose a Prince, is to thrust him out of [Page 85] the possession of his kingdome, and in this branch is re­ferred to subiects, or any other whatsoeuer. The false­hood therefore of the aforesaid position may be gathe­red partly from holy Scripture, Render to Caesar the things which are Caesars; which precept is plainly vn­derstood not onely of rendring to Caesar which is Cae­sars, but also of not taking away from him that which is his, and which he lawfully possesseth: as also contra­riwise the plaine meaning of that precept of the Deca­logue, Thou shalt not steale, is not only to take away vniustly that thing which is our neighbours, but also not to render to him that which is his; and partly it may bee gathered from the most true principles of the Di­uines, and Lawyers, to wit, that no man is to be put out of his lawfull possession, vntill the right of the aduerse part be sufficiently decided. Seeing therefore that this question concerning the Popes power to depriue Prin­ces, is not as yet sufficiently decided, for that as yet the Iudge hath not determined the controuersie, as Trithe­mius Cited before cap. 3. sect. 3. nu. 5. well affirmed, and we also heretofore haue shew­ed, so long as it is in question among Catholikes, and probably disputed on both sides, whether the Pope hath such authoritie to depriue Princes, or no, they can not by vertue of any Excōmunication, or sentence of depriuation made by the Pope against them, be depo­sed by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, or which is all one, bee violently by their subiects, or any other thrust out from their kingdome, which they doe right­fully possesse. By this therefore which hath been said it is manifest enough, that according to both these an­swers, although many doe like better the former, that the aforesaid position, Princes, which be excommunica­ted, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed, or murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, may truly, law­fully, and without any danger of periurie be abiured as impious, and hereticall doctrine.

Sect. III.

1. THirdly, some obiect against those words [this damnable doctrine:] for say they, no man can tru­ly detest, abhorre, and abiure, that which is not, but there is no such doctrine, which affirmeth, that Princes which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope may be murdered by their Subiects, or any other whatsoeuer (in which sense the aforesaid position, according to the first, and principall answere to the former obiection, is vnderstood) therefore according to that former answere no man can truely, and with a safe conscience take the aforesaid clause of the oath.

2. To this obiection it is answered by denying both the Maior, and the Minor proposition. For to detest and abhorre a doctrine (which is all one with to abiure, if this detestation be confirmed by oath) being an act of the will, and not of the vnderstanding, wherein truth, and falsehood doe onely reside, is not to affirme, that the doctrine, which I detest, is at that time defended by any, but it doth onely signifie, that I haue a great dislike, and hatred (of which my dislike I call God to witnesse) to that doctrine, whether heretofore it hath been main­tained, or hereafter may be maintained, or that time, when I abiure it, it is maintained, or else suspected to be maintained by any. Now, that it may iustly bee suspec­ted, that this doctrine, to wit, that Princes, which be ex­communicated, or depriued by the Pope, may bee murdered by their Subiects, is maintained by Catholikes, the late most wicked murthers of the two Kings of France, to­gether with that execrable Powder-Treason intended by certaine Catholikes doe yeeld sufficient testimonie. For if before any publike Excommunication, or sen­tence of depriuation denounced by the Pope against the aforesaid three Kings, those Traitours thought it lawfull to murther them, how much more would they approue this doctrine to murther Princes as lawfull, if [Page 87] they should by the Pope be Excommunicated, depri­ued, and declared to be publike enemies of the Church?

3. Besides, a Prince depriued by the Pope, accor­ding to the opinion of those, who defend the Popes au­thoritie to depriue Princes, is not a true, and a lawfull Prince, but a Tyrant, not onely such a one, who gouer­neth the Kingdome wickedly, and Tyrannically, but al­so who hath no authoritie to raigne; but whether the doctrine of lawfully killing such a Tyrant, is at this time maintained by any Catholike, let the writings of Ioan­nes Mariana, Emanuel Sa, Gregorious Valentia, and o­ther Diuines, who treate of this question, giue iudge­ment.

4. Moreouer, doth not Gregorius de Ʋalentia, a most learned Iesuite, most manifestly teach this doctrine, of killing Kings by the Popes authoritie? For thus hee writeth. By 2.2. Disp. 1. q. 12. punct. 2. assertio. 2. the authoritie of the Church, and so also of the Pope, any man for the sinne of apostacie, and forsaking of his faith, may bee altogether depriued of his dominion, and superioritie ouer his Subiects, &c. This assertion is proued first, and inuincibly by all those arguments, whereby in the precedent question punct. 3. we haue conuinced, that He­retikes, and Apostatates from the faith may by the autho­ritie of the Church be depriued euen of their life. For if they may be depriued of their life, much more of all their goods, and therefore also of the Superioritie ouer others, seeing that life doth ouerway all such kinde of temporall goods, and it heing taken away, all other things are with it taken away. The like also hath Martinus Becanus Both in his English con­trouersie, which was cen­sured at Rome, cap. 3. q. 3. pag. 115. and in his corrected pag. 130. a Diuine of the same Societie of Iesus, who from the authoritie, which the high Priests had in the olde Testament to depose Princes, endeauoureth to proue, that the same authori­tie was also giuen to the Pope in the new Testament; and withall in the same place he affirmeth, that the high Priest in the old Testament had authoritie to command that Kings should be killed, if they were rebellious, and would not obey his sentence, from whence he inferreth, [Page 88] that hee might also depriue them of their Kingdome. The high Priest, saith he, might in the old Testament de­priue Kings of their life, therefore also of their Kingdome. Of this no man doubteth. And who perceiueth not, that this argument was by Becanus produced for this end, to shew, that as much authoritie was graunted to the Priests of the new Testament ouer Kings, and Princes, as was giuen to the Priests of the old Testament.

5. And what shall we say of Iaspar Sciopius in that his railing Eccelesiasticus, which is stuffed with malepart reproachfull speeches against our Kings Maiestie, who also in expresse tearmes maintaineth this doctrine of killing Kings by the Popes authoritie. Christ, saith he,Cap. 42. pag. 140. when now the Church, which is Christs bodie was come to full age, hath armed her with an iron red, or with the secu­lar sword, &c. to bee reuenged of the Heathens, and to rebuke the people, to binde their Kings in fetters, and their nobles in manacles of iron, that they may iudge them as it is written, Psalm. 149. Or, that his Viceroyes, to wit, Peter, and his Successors may iudge them according to Kingly right, and by prescript of the law: that is, when they will not receiue the law of Chrsst, and acknowledge him for their King, may depriue them of their Kingdome, and with­all also of their life. See also the argument which hereto­fore in my ApologieNu. 43 & seq. I vrged to proue, that Kings, and Princes, if for the spirituall good, may by the Popes au­thoritie be depriued of all their temporall goods, may in like manner for the same spirituall good be depriued of their life, which is also a temporall thingThe same doctrine of depriuing Kings of their life by the Popes autho­ritie, haht now lately publi­shed Docter Schulckenius in his answere to Widrington, pag 413. & 490. and Doctor Weston, who af­firmeth pag. 403. that the Pope hath au­thoritie not onely to de­priue Princes of their King­domes, but also to dispose of the bodies of Christians, al­though in o­ther places they would gladly winde themselues out of this laby­rinth: but all in vaine, as hereafter, God willing, we will manifestly shew..

Sect. I.

1. AGainst this branch fiue obiections are com­monly made. First, Cardinall Bellarmine In respons. ad Apolog. pag. 10 of the Collen edition 1610. ob­iecteth against those words, [That the Pope hath not power to absolue mee from this oath, or any part thereof,] in which words, saith he, the Popes power to absolue, or loose is denied. For out of those words of our Sauiour, whatsoe­uer thou shalt loose vpon earth, shall be loosed also in Hea­uen, all Catholikes doe gather, that it belongeth to the Popes authoritie, not onely power to absolue from sinnes, but also from Punishments, Censures, Lawes, Vowes, and Oathes, whensoeuer it is expedient to the glorie of God, and the health of soules.

2. To this obiection it is answered, that in this branch of the oath is not denyed in general the Popes power to absolue from oaths, as some vnlearned Catholikes doe imagine, and Cardinall Bellarmine by vrging this obie­ction, seemeth desirous to perswade them to the same; but heerein is onely denied the Popes power to absolue mee from this oath, or any part thereof. Neither is this manner of arguing to be approued as lawfull, but to bee reiected as deceiptfull, and captious. The Pope hath not authority to absolue me from this oath, therefore hee hath not authority to absolue from oaths.

3. All Catholikes doe acknowledge, that the Pope hath power to absolue from punishments, lawes, vowes, and oaths, but not from all: who will affirme, that hee hath authoritie to absolue a Theefe, or Traitor iustly condemned by the Secular Magistrate to death, from the gallowes? Very many Diuines both vertuous, and learned doe auerre, that the Pope hath not power to ab­solue any man from the solemne vow of Religion, and that he hath not authoritie out of his owne territories, to make a bastard so legitimate in temporals, that hee shall haue as much right to inherite as other lawfull [Page 90] children haue. And from oaths, if the absoluing from them should tend to the temporall preiudice of a third person, many Catholike Doctors are of opinion, that the Pope hath no authoritie to absolue, vnlesse hee haue temporall iurisdiction ouer that third person.

4. To that, whatsoeuer thou shalt loose, I answere, saith Ioannes Parisiensis In tract. de potest. Regia, & Papali cap. 15, according to Saint Chrysostome, and Rabanus, that by this is not vnderstood to be giuen him any authoritie, but spirituall, to wit, to absolue from the bond of sinnes. For it were folly to vnderstand, that by this is gi­uen authoritie to absolue from the bond of debts. And therefore this manner of arguing, from a particular to infer an vniuersall, is not onely deceitfull, and captious, but being in a matter of so great importance, as to proue, that no Catholike can without flat deniall of the Catholike faith take this oath, to the perpetuall losse of his libertie, and of all his goods, and to the vtter ruine of his whole posteritie, it is, I speake it with griefe, too too pernicious. And whether Cardinall Bellarmine by these his sophisticall arguments giuing cause to so great o­uerthrow of Catholikes, be bound to restitution, I leaue it both to his owne conscience, and to the vertuous, and learned Reader to examine.

5. Besides, what excessiue, and almost illimitate po­wer hee giueth to the Pope, to absolue from punish­ments, lawes, vowes, and oaths, to wit, whensoeuer it is expedient to the glorie of God, and the health of soules, (seeing that there can scarcely be assigned any certaine limit of those things, which are expedient to the glorie of God) and what great inconueniencies both to Prin­ces, and Subiects by this doctrine may arise, I haue in an other placeIn my Apo­logie nu. 52. & seq. partly insinuated, and partly the prudent Reader will easilie comprehend. The truth of Catho­like faith necessarie to eternall saluation can be no whit preiudiciall either to Pope, Princes, or Subiects, and therefore it ought by Doctors, and Pastors to be cleare­ly, perspicuously, and without artificious colouring of [Page 91] words to be declared & propounded to the faithful peo­ple, who, as they are fearfull to disobey the Pope, whom they acknowledge to be their supreame Pastour in spiri­tuals, so also they are desirous to yeeld all obedience by the law of God, and nature due to their lawfull Prince, whō they profes to be their soueraigne Lord in tēporals

6. Lastly, that the Reader may most clearly perceiue, vpon how weak a ground Card. Bellarmine, and the rest, who condemne this branch of the oath as vnlawfull, do rely, it is to be obserued, that there are two kindes of oaths assigned by the Diuines,S, Thom. 22. q 89 ar. 7. & 9. Caiet ibidem. Petrus Aragona ibidem art. 3. 7 & 9 Greg. de Ʋalentia 2. 2. disp. 6. q. 7. punct. 4. Sayrus lib. 5. Thesauri cap. 2. & 8. Syl­uester verbo Iu­ramentum 1. & 5. nu. 2. & alii Summistae. the one they cal an asser­torie oath, and the other, a promissorie. An assertorie oath is that which is taken for the affirming or denying of a thing present or past. As for exāple, I sweare that I haue euer been a most loyal Subiect to King Iames. I sweare, that I doe truely, and sincerely acknowledge, and pro­fesse, that King Iames is my Soueraigne Lord in tempo­rals, & that he is lawfull King of this Kingdome of Eng­land. I sweare, that I doe from my heart detest this impi­ous doctrine, which teacheth, that Princes, although they be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be murdered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, and so of the rest. And this assertorie oath can not be di­spensed withall, neither hath the Pope power to absolue any man from the bond of this kind of Oath. The reason is, because the matter of this oath, or, which is all one, that thing which in this oath is affirmed or denied, being of an act present or past, is now made altogether neces­sary, and irreuocable, for that as soone as euer the Oath was made, it was either true, or false by reason of the truth or falshood of the act, which now is past. Where­fore seeing that it is impossible, that the act, which is past, be not past, so also it is impossible, that the Popes di­spensation, or absolution can alter it, or recall it. For it is impossible, that the act of swearing, which is now, or hath been true, be not now, or hath not been true.

7 The Pope indeed hath power to absolue any man in [Page 92] the Court of conscience from the sin, or offence, if per­chance by false, vniust, or incōsiderate swearing he hath offended, and being penitent doth confesse the same: but this is not the plaine & common meaning of this word [absolue] contained in this branch of the Oath, as some vnlearned Catholikes with vs doe imagine, who there­fore are fearefull to take this branch, suspecting that the Popes power to absolue from sins in the Sacrament of Penance, is abiured herein. For to absolue from an Oath, is all one, with to dispense therein, or to release the obli­gation thereof; but no dispensation, or absolution can make, that the act of swearing, which is, or hath beene false, is not, or hath not bin false. And therfore according to the common doctrine of all Diuines, dispensation, ab­solution, commutation, relaxation, irritation are not exten­ded, neither doe they appertaine to assertorie oathes,

8. A promissorie oath is that, which is taken for the performing, or not performing of some future thing. As for example, I sweare that I will alwaies beare true faith and allegiance to King Iames, that I will to the vtter­most of my power defend him from all conspiracies, and wil doe my best endeuour to make them knowne to his Maiestie. But in this promissorie oath, one thing I doe af­firme, to wit, that, when I do promise, I do sincerely, and vnfainedly promise; the other thing I doe promise, to wit, that I will truely performe what I doe promise; or to vse other words, which in sense are al one; in this promis­sorie oath two kinds of truth are to be considered, one is alreadie present, which doth consist in this, that he, who sweareth, doe affirme the truth, which is, that he haue a presēnt intention, vnlesse hee will be periured, to make that true, or, which is all one, to performe that, which he hath promised to performe; which act of swearing doth not differre from the nature and quality of an asser­torie oath and therfore is altogether inuariable and indi­spensable: the other truth is future, which doth consist in this, that he make that true which he promised, by really [Page 93] performing that thing which hee swore to performe, which thing to be performed, seeing that it is variable in such sort, that in some case the performāce therof may be vnlawful or hurtful, therfore such a promissorie oath may be dispensed withall, because such a dispensation & absolution is not from the act of swearing, but from the the thing which is sworne, in such sort, that as by obli­gation of the oath I was bound to performe that thing, which by oath I promised to performe, so by vertue of absolution or dispensation, I am freed from performing the same. For this is the effect of absolution and di­spensation, that the thing, which before was a fit mat­ter to be sworne, and to bee performed, now vpon iust occasion is no fit matter to be sworne, or to be perfor­med. As for example, if one should sweare to fast, and af­terwards he should be doubtfull, that this fasting would be either euil, or an hindrace of greater good, he might also iustly doubt, that it is now no longer a fit thing to be sworne, or performed: and therefore according to the common opinion of Diuines, an absolution and dispen­sation therein may be iustly demanded, and also gran­ted by him, who hath authoritie to dispense in oaths.

9. Now in this oath of allegiance, which containeth many particular oaths, three onely things I doe promise to performe, all which are comprehended in the third branch of the oath, to wit, that notwithstanding any de­claration, or sentence of Excommunication, or depriuation made, or to be made against the said King, his Heires or suc­cessors, or any absolution of the said subiects from their o­bedience. First, I will beare faith, and true allegiance to his Maiestie, his Heires and Successours. Secondly, I will to the vttermost of my power defend him, and them against all con­spiracies, and attempts whatsoeuer, which shall be made a­gainst His, or their Persons, their Crowne and dignitie, by reason or colour of any such sentence, declaration, or other­wise. And thirdly, I will doe my best endeuour to disclose and mae knowne vnto his Maiestie, his Heires and Successors, [Page 90] [...] [Page 91] [...] [Page 92] [...] [Page 93] [...] [Page 94] all Treasons and Traiterous conspiracies, which I shall know or heare of to be against him, or any of them. Seeing there­fore that in this Oath I doe promise to performe these three onely things, and all the other parts of the oath are meerely assertorie, to which absolution and dispensa­tion doe not belong, it is euident, that neither Cardi­nall Bellarmine, nor any other can bee moued with any shew of reason to impugne this fifth branch as vnlawful, to wit, that the Pope hath not power to absolue me from this oath, vnlesse hee will contend, that the Pope hath power to absolue mee from some one of those three things which I haue promised, to wit, either from bea­ring true faith and allegiance to his Maiesitie, or from defending him from all Treasons, or from disclosing them to his Maiestie.

10. From whence it doth cleerely appeare, that the subiects cannot incurre any more danger of periurie, by swearing that they beleeue, and are resolued in their conscience, that the Pope hath not power to absolue them from these three things, which they promise to performe, then by swearing, that they doe acknow­ledge, beleeue, and are resolued in their conscience, that the Pope hath not authoritie to depriue his Maiestie. For this once supposed, it is most certaine, that all sub­iects, by the law of God and nature, wherein the Pope hath not power to dispense, or to absolue any man from the bond thereof, are bound to beare allegiance, and true obedience to their lawfull Prince, as also Car­dinall Bellarmine▪ In tract con­tra Barclaium cap. 21. p. 202. doth expressely auerre, and conse­quently by the same law of God and nature they are obliged to defend him against al Treasons, and to make them knowne vnto his Maiestie. Wherefore suppo­sing that the Pope hath not power to depriue his Ma­iestiq, or to make him no King, which is a controuersie a­mong the Scholasticks, and as yet the Iudge hath not deci­ded it, as Trithemius In Chron. monast. Hir­sang. adannum 1106. affirmeth, I may truely, and lawful­ly sweare, that the Pope hath not authoritie to absolue [Page 95] me from this oath, or any part thereof, without deny­ing the Popes power to absolue in generall. As also the kingdome of France affirming that the Pope hath not power to absolue the Kings subiects from their obe­dience due to him for temporals, doe not therefore in­tend to deny the Popes power to absolue in generall. And although Ioannes Maldonatus, a famous Diuine of the Societie of Iesus, doth confidently, as wee haue seene beforeCap. 3. sect. 1. nu. 12., affirme, that neither the Pope, nor the whole Church hath power to dispense in the solemne vow of chastitie, and that they, who say the contrarie, do seeme to him to haue more regard of some examples of certaine Popes, thou of the holy Scripture, yet no Iesuite without all doubt will from thence conclude, that Maldonate doth thereby deny the Popes power to dispense in ge­nerall.

Sect. II.

1. SEcondly, Gretzer In Comment. Exeget. cap. 6. pag 106. against these very same words [That the Pope hath not power to absolue me of this oath, or any part thereof,] propoundeth two obiections, which yet in substance are not much different, for that the later is contained in the former, as a particular pro­position in an vniuersall.

The first obiection, which in order is Gretzers fifth argument, is this:

Whosoeuer denieth, that the Supreme Pastor of the Church hath power to loose all that the loosing whereof is euidently necessarie to the preseruation, and propaga­tion of Christ his flocke, denieth the Catholike faith; but he that taketh this oath, denieth this, therefore he denieth the Catholike faith.

The Maior proposition is certaine out of that Mat. 16. I will giue thee the keyes of the kingdome of heauen. For what? vnlesse to open, and shut, or which is all one, to loose, and binde, when euident necessitie doth shew, that [Page 96] there is need of opening, or shutting, loosing, or binding.

The Minor is proued; because in this oath the swearer denieth generally, that the Pope hath power to absolue subiects from their oath of allegiance, therefore he denieth that then also it may be done, when the preseruation and safetie of Christs flocke doth euidently require the same, because the oath is generall, and without any exception. But this is contrary to that, whatsoeuer thou shalt loose vpon earth, to wit, with reason, circumspection, prudence, and discretion, shall be loosed also in heauen. When, I pray you, is the loosing of a bond more necessary, then when it appertaineth to the preseruing of the Catholike, and Apostolike Religion, and to the repelling of heresie?

2. The second obiection, which in order is Gretzers sixth argument, is this:

Whosoeuer beleeueth, and in his conscience is firmely resolued, that the Supreme Pastor of the Church, or his Lieutenant, hath not power to absolue any man from the bond of the oath prescribed by King Iames, if either wil­lingly, or for feare he tooke the same, denieth the Catho­like faith: But he that taketh this oath beleeueth this, and in his conscience is firmely so resolued, therefore hee denieth the Catholike faith. The Maior is manifest out of that, whatsoeuer thou shalt loose vpon earth, shall be loosed also in heauen. Wherefore vnder this [whatso­euer] should not be comprehended this oath, which is so pernicious to soules, and to the Catholike Religion? Truly it were wonderfull, if kingly power were so great, that it could make void, or diminish that [whatsoeuer]. The Mi­nor is apparant out of the aforesaid words of the oath. The Conclusion good.

3. These are the arguments of Gretzer, which are different from the obiection of Cardinall Bellarmine 1. Sect. 1. nu. 1. & seq., before related, and answered in this, that Card. Bellar­mine out of that, whatsoeuer thou shalt loose, &c. doth for the ground of his reason deduce this proposition, to wit, that according to the doctrine of all Catholikes the [Page 97] Pope hath power to absolue, not only from sinnes, but also from punishments, lawes, vowes, and oaths, whensoeuer it is expedient to the glorie of God, and health of soules, whereby he maketh the Popes power to absolute to be almost without any limitation. But Gretzer procee­deth more warily. For he out of those words, whatsoe­uer thou shalt loose, &c. doth for the ground of his argu­ments onely inferre this proposition, to wit, that the Pope hath power granted him to loose, and binde euery thing, when it is euidently necessarie to the preseruation, and safetie of Christ his flocke. Neuerthelesse this ground of Gretzer is in substance all one with the second, and fifth reason, which Cardinall Bellarmine in his Contro­uersies brought to proue the Popes authoritie to dis­pose of temporals for the spirituall good. And there­fore out of my Apologie, wherein I haue out of Cardi­nall Bellarmines owne principles cleerely shewed the weakenes of these his arguments, the answere to this ground of Gretzers will most easily appeare.

4. Wherefore to the first argument of Gretzers it is answered, that to make his Maior proposition to be vn­doubtedly true, those words, loose, and loosing, are not to bee vnderstood of temporall, but onely of spirituall loosing, and only concerning such persons, ouer whom he hath spirituall iurisdiction. Otherwise out of that, whatsoeuer thou shalt loose, &c. one might inferre, that the Pope hath power to binde the Diuell from temp­ting men, and withdrawing them from the Catholike faith: For so the interlineall Glosse doth vnderstand those words,Matth. 18. whatsoeuer you shall binde, &c. with the bond, saith hee, of Excommunication. And Suarez Tom. 5. disp. 1. sect. 2. nu. 3., a most famous Diuine of the Societie of Iesus, writeth thus: But that, which is added, shall bee bound also in heauen, doth sufficiently declare, that this power is not naturall, but supernaturall, and that bond to be spirituall, and of an higher order. And to the same purpose Ioannes Parisiensis, beforeIn this chap­ter sect. 1. nu. 4. related, citeth S. Chrysostome, and [Page 98] Rabanus. Now it is manifest enough, that to dispose of temporals, to depriue Kings of their temporall king­domes, and liues, are not spirituall, but temporall loo­sings.

5. If therefore the sense of the Maior proposition be that the chiefe Pastor of the Church hath power by spirituall loosing and binding, to loose, and binde all that, whose loosing and binding is euidently necessarie to the preseruation, and encrease of Christ his flock, we grant the Maior, otherwise we denie it. For out of this place,Matth 16. whatsoeuer thou shalt loose, &c. and out of that other,Iohn the last chapter. Feede my sheepe, no other thing can be certainly concluded, but that all spirituall power, which is neces­sarie to the gouernment of the Church, hath been giuen to S. Peter, and the Church, which as by Christ his in­stitution is not a temporall, but a spirituall common-wealth, as I haue heretoforeIn my Apo­logie nu. 83. & seq. declared more at large, so also it ought to haue all authoritie, which is agree­able to the nature of a spirituall common-wealth.

6. Wherefore to the spirituall loosing of the bond of an oath two things are principally required: the first, a power to dispense, or absolue from the oath: the second, a sufficient cause, for which the oath may bee dispensed withall; to wit, that the dispensation, or absolution bee granted with reason, circumspe­ction, prudence, and discretion, when necessitie, or great vtilitie requireth. For otherwise if an oath be dispensed withall without a sufficient cause, although the dispenser or absoluer haue sufficient authoritie to dispense, or absolue, yet the dispensation, or absolu­tion is rather a dissipation, neither before God, and in conscience is it of any force at all. Therefore rea­son, circumspection, prudence, and discretion, which Gretzer mentioneth, doe suppose indeede authori­tie to dispense, but they giue not authoritie, and for that cause are required to dispensing, that he, who hath authoritie to dispense, or absolue, may rightly, lawfully, [Page 99] and without any sinne at all exercise his authoritie. For although the Pope should, for example, dispense with any man in the solemne vow of chastitie, and in so dis­pensing vse neuer so much reason, circumspection, pru­dence, and discretion, neuerthelesse wee could not from thence rightly conclude, that the Pope hath ful and suf­ficient authoritie to dispense in that vow, seeing that according to the doctrine of Maldonate the Iesuite, who followeth herein the opinion of S. Thomas, and other excellent Diuines, that vow is not subiect to the Popes power of dispensing. And thus much concerning Gretzers Maior proposition.

7. Concerning his Minor, we denie first, that to ab­solue subiects from their temporal allegiance, to thrust Princes out of their temporall Dominions, and to dis­pose of temporal things, are to be numbred among spi­rituall, but onely among temporall loosings, and which therefore are not agreeable to the nature and condi­tion of a spiritual common-wealth, which, as Pope Iohn the eighth affirmeth,Cap. Porro. 16 q. 3. knoweth not corporall weapons, and, as Pope Nicolas Cap. Inter haec, 33. q. 2. writeth, hath no other sword then spirituall.

8. Secondly, wee also denie, that to depriue Princes of their kingdomes, or life, to absolue subiects from their temporall allegiance, and to dispose of temporall things, are euidently necessarie to the preseruing, or en­creasing of Christ his flocke, as heretoforeIn my Apo­logie nu. 182. & seq. out of Car­dinall Bellarmines grounds I haue most cleerely shew­ed. The visible Pastors of Christs flocke in earth are bound by the law of Christ, to vse all those meanes in­stituted by him, which are euidently necessarie to de­fend his flocke from the cruell assault of rauening wolues, and yet neither S. Peter, nor any other of those holy Popes of the Primitiue Church, who liued vnder most cruell persecutors of the Church, euer vsed these meanes to depose Princes, and to absolue subiects from their temporall allegiance, which without all doubt [Page 100] they must, and would haue vsed, if they had been neces­sarie to the preseruation of Christ his flock. And might not Gretzer, I pray you haue brought the selfesame ar­gument for the murthering of wicked Princes, when there is no other way to depose them, or thrust them out of their kingdome? Might it not also by this argu­ment be conuinced, that Christ our Lord hath giuen to his Church, not onely sufficient authoritie to depriue Princes, but also sufficient force actually to depose them, and to thrust them out of their actuall possession, considering that the actuall deposing of wicked Prin­ces is for the most part more necessarie to the preser­uation, and encrease of Christ his flock, then is her sole authoritie to depriue them by a iuridicall sentence of their Regall authoritie?

9. To Gretzers second argument, whose solution will more cleerely appeare by the answere to the next obiection, it is answered by denying his Minor. For he denieth not the Catholike faith, who in heart & words doth acknowledge, beleeue, and firmely perswade him­selfe, that the Pope hath not power to absolue him from the bond of this oath. For the bond of an oath, as well saith S. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 89. ar. 7. with whom all other Diuines doe accord, is referred to some thing, which is to be perfor­med, or omitted: wherefore it doth not appertaine to an assertorie oath, which is of a thing present, or past, but on­ly to a promissorie oath. Now in this oath, as I haue said beforeIn this chapt. sect. 1. nu. 9., three onely things are promised, which the swearer is bound to performe, to wit, to beare faith, and true allegiance to his Maiestie, to defend him to the vt­termost of his power against all treasons and conspira­cies, and to doe his best endeuour to make them knowne to his Maiestie, from the obligation whereof the Pope without doubt hath no authoritie to absolue his sub­iects, as weeIn this chapt. sect. 1. nu. 9. haue cleerely deduced out of Cardinall Bellarmines doctrines, beforeChap. 3. sect. 5 nu. 3. related, vnlesse of a King he hath authoritie to make him no King; which autho­ritie, [Page 101] whether it bee granted to the Pope, is not yet de­termined, but thereof not onely the Scholasticks doe dis­pute, and as yet the Iudge hath not decided it, as Trithe­mius affirmeth, but also the most noble kingdome of France, if any credit is to be giuen to Petrus Pithaeus, doth suppose the contrarie to be certaine.

10. Wherefore Gretzer doth without sufficient proofe affirme, that this oath is pernicious to soules, and to the Catholike religion: For neither Gretzer, nor Car­dinal Bellarmine, nor any other hath with any firme and solid reason hitherto proued, that in this oath is con­tained any thing, which is repugnant to Catholike faith, or the health of soules. And, to vse Gretzers words, It were truly wonderfull, if the Popes power were so great, that it could make void, or diminish that Regall power, which the law of God and nature hath granted to Princes, and that temporall allegiance which by the same law of God and nature is due to them. Neither is that [whatsoeuer] which Gretzer doth so often inculcat, to be taken generally, but with a con­uenient distribution, or limitation, as the Logicians speake, as he may perceiue by Maldonate, and those o­ther Diuines, whom Maldonate doth follow. And I would to God that Gretzer, and some others, who are so vehement against the oath, would seriously con­sider with themselues, what great account they are to make in the dreadfull day of Iudgement to the su­preme Pastor and Iudge of all, for maintaining so stifly their owne opinions, and those not grounded vpon any solid reason, but onely vpon sophisticall deductions, will needs haue the ignorant people, (who are not able to examine their sophismes, but doe only relie on their authoritie, as being men of such singular learning) to beleeue them as an vndoubted doctrine of faith, and which without danger of heresie or error, may not be impugned, and that in things of no small moment, but which, if they bee not true, may tend to the great [Page 102] reproch of the Catholike faith, to very much dis­grace of the Sea Apostolike, to the infinite wrong of Soueraigne Princes, and to the perpetuall temporall ouerthrow of very many Catholikes, and of their whole posteritie.

Sect. III.

1. THirdly, against the selfesame words, [That the Pope hath not power to absolue me of this oath, or any part thereof] others obiect in this manner:

In euery oath, which is taken to confirme the perfor­ming of some future thing, which is otherwise comman­ded by the law of God and nature, two sorts of obligations may be distinguished: The first bond is naturall, or ciuill, which is precedent to the oath, and which hath force to binde, before any oath to confirme the same be taken. The other is sacred, or religious, which either freely, and with­out constraint, or for feare is made to confirme the for­mer bond, and wherein the bond, or obligation of an oath doth properly, and formally consist, and which being ta­ken away doth not of necessitie dissolue the former bond. Seeing therefore that, according to Catholike doctrine, there is giuen by Christs institution authoritie to S. Pe­ter, and his Successors to dispense, or absolue from oaths vpon a reasonable cause, it cannot doubtlesse be denied, but that the Pope hath power to dispense, or absolue, vpon iust cause, from euery oath, that is, from the sacred and reli­gious obligation thereof, although perchance it be denied, that hee hath authoritie to absolue from the precedent naturall, or ciuill obligation.

2. Now that there is a iust cause, which may moue the Pope to dispense, or absolue from this oath, that is, from the religious obligation, wherein the substance of an oath for­mally consisteth, is too too manifest. For as all Diuines, and Lawyers doe confesse, among other sufficient causes, which are required to demaund, and grant an absolution from [Page 103] an oath, these two are the principall. The first is, if the oath be enforced, and extorted through feare: the other, to pu­nish him to whom the oath was made, for some notorious crime by him committed: As to punish excommunicated persons, the oaths, which are made to them, are released, and their subiects are resolued from their oath of allegi­ance. can. Nos Sanctorum, and can. Iuratos 15. q. 6. and can. Absolutos, extra, de haereticis. But in regard of both these causes the Pope may absolue from this oath of allegiance. For first it is extorted from the subiects for feare of losing all their lands, goods, and libertie. Second­ly, our King is no Catholike, but rather an aduersarie to Catholike Religion: and therefore in consideration of both these causes this oath of allegiance, that is, at least­wise the sacred obligation thereof may by the Popes au­thoritie be released, if any credit be to be giuen to the Ca­nons of holy Church: Therefore it is not lawfull for any subiect to sweare, that the Pope hath not power to absolue him from this oath, or any part thereof, which at the least, if we will speake properly, and formally, ought doubtlesse to bee vnderstood of the sacred, and religious obligation, wherein the substance of euerie oath doth formallie con­sist.

3. To this obiection, in soluing whereof, for that some of our countrimen both graue, and otherwise learned, doe make great reckoning thereof, I must bee somwhat the longer; it is answered first, that the plaine, common, and vsuall signification of this proposition, The Pop hath power to absolue me of this oath, is, that the Pope hath power to absolue me, not only from the thing sworne, with this reduplication, as it is sworne, but also absolutely frō the thing it selfe, which is sworne; or which is all one, not only to absolue me from the sa­cred and religious bond, but also from the naturall and ciuill obligation. Seeing therefore that a promissorie oath, which only is subiect to dispensation, or absolu­tion, doth formally consist in this, that God his holie [Page 104] name is brought as a witnes for the performing, or not performing of some future thing, as in this oath I doe only promise to performe these three things, to wit, that I will beare faith, and true allegiance to his Maie­stie, that I will defend him against all Treasons, and trai­terous conspiracies, and that I will doe my best ende­uour to make them knowne to his Maiestie, if they shal come to my knowledge; when it is affirmed, that the Pope hath not power to absolue me from this oath, or any part thereof, by this according to the common meaning of the words it is signified, that the Pope can­not giue me leaue either not to beare faith, and true al­legiance to his Maiestie, or not to defend him against all treasons, or not to disclose them to his Maiestie. And this also is the vsuall practise of Popes, that when they release subiects of the oath of allegiance, they doe not only absolue them from their allegiance as sworne, but simply, and absolutely from their allegiance it selfe, or from the naturall bond of their obedience, as plainly may be seene in the canon, Nos Sanctorum, and the ca­non Iuratos 15. q. 6. before cited. And therefore this distinction of the sacred and ciuill bond of an oath, little auaileth to proue this branch of the oath to be vnlaw­full.

4. Besides, this also seemeth to bee the minde, and chiefe meaning of the Law-maker, which for the in­terpreting of the words of lawes is principally to be re­spected. For I thinke his Maiestie doth little regard, whether the Pope hath power to absolue his subiects from the sacred bond of this oath, so that he may be as­sured, that notwithstanding the releasing of the sacred bond, yet the ciuill and naturall allegiance of his sub­iects, for confirmation whereof this oath is moreouer added, doe remaine inuiolable, and indispensable, nei­ther by the Popes authoritie may it any waies be dissol­ued, but that his subiects, after they be absolued by the Pope from the sacred bond of the oath, are neuerthe­lesse [Page 105] by the law of God and nature, obliged to beare faith and true allegiance to his Maiestie.

5. Secondly, although wee should grant, that the common meaning of these words, to absolue me from this oath, were to absolue me only from the sacred ob­ligation, wherein the formall substance of an oath con­sisteth, yet supposing that the Pope not so much as in­directly, that is, in regard of the spirituall good, hath not authoritie to dispose of the temporals of Princes, and to depriue them of their kingdomes and domini­ons, which of necessitie must be supposed at the least as probable by him, who will take the oath: this, I say, supposed, it is answered, that any man may lawfullie thinke, and safely perswade his conscience, and this his opinion, or perswasion confirme by oath, that the Pope hath not power to absolue him from his oath, that is, from the sacred and religious obligation thereof. For, according to the common opinion of Diuines, the Pope hath not power to absolue from oaths, when the absoluing from them tendeth to the temporall preiu­dice of a third person, vnlesse either directly, or indi­rectly he hath power to dispose of the temporall goods of that persons.

6. From hence, saith Dominicus Sotus Lib. 8. de Iust. q. 1. ar. 9., a most lear­ned Diuine of the Order of S. Dominicke, doe arise two other differences to bee considered in the dispensing of vowes and oaths. The first concerning those persons, who haue power to dispense. For, although the Pope can dis­pense in a vow, which is greater, yet he cannot in an oath, which is lesse. For he hath not power to release an oath, which one hath made to another man, to pay him that debt which he oweth him. Neither doth this proceed from the lesse power of the Pope, neither from the worthinesse of the oath, but from the nature of the contract, which by oath is confirmed. For, because the Pope is the Vicar of God, he hath power to change the vow, which is made to God, into that, which is more acceptable vnto him. But [Page 106] because he hath not power to take from another man that which is his owne, hee cannot doe him wrong in releasing the oath, which was made vnto him. And contrariwise, although a priuate man cannot dispense in a vow, which is made to God, for that he is not his Vicar, yet he, to whom an oath was made, hath power to release the same; not for that he hath more ample power, then the Pope, but be­cause he is Lord of his owne goods, and therefore as hee hath power to giue them so also hath he power to release the oath made vnto him concerning them. Wherefore this is not a dispensing, but a remitting, or releasing. The second difference is concerning the matter; that in changing and dispensing of vowes that only must bee re­garded, which is more pleasing to God, but in releasing of oaths great caution must be vsed that no wrong bee done to a third person. Hitherto Sotus, from whom Petrus Aragona 22. q. 89. ar. 9., and our countriman Gregorius Sayrus Lib 5. The­sauri cap. 8. nu. 4. haue taken the selfesame words.

7. Seeing therefore, as oftentimes hath been said, that the Pope hath not power to depriue our King, or to dispose of his temporals, or of his subiects, from this supposall it doth euidently follow, that he hath not po­wer to absolue his subiects from this oath, which they haue taken for the performance of those three things beforeIn this chapt. sect. 1. nu. 9. rehearsed, which euery subiect by the law of God and nature is obliged to performe. And truly, ac­cording to the probable doctrine of S. Thomas, and his followers, who are of opinion, that the Pope, when hee dispenseth in vowes, and oaths, doth not dissolue the sacred and religious bond of the oath, (in that manner as many, saith Maldonate, doe vnderstand dispensation; for so, saith he, he should disanull, and altogether loose the law of God and nature, as commonly it is done in many dispensatiōs, which is not to be a dispensator, but a dissipa­tor) but doth only interprete the oath, to wit, by de­claring, that the thing promised by oath, which before was a fit thing to be sworne, and therefore by vertue of [Page 107] the oath to be performed, so long as it remaineth so, is now by reason of some particular euent or circum­stance become hurtfull, and an hindrance of a greater good, and therefore now no fit matter to be sworne, nor by vertue of the oath to be now any more perfor­med: According, I say, to this doctrine of S. Thomas, which is also the more common of Diuines, it is plaine enough, that this obiection of our countrimen, taken from the difference betwixt the sacred and ciuill bond of the oath, is of no force at all.

8. For whereas those three things before rehearsed, which by the law of God and nature are due to lawfull Princes (whereof only there can be made any contro­uersie concerning the Popes power to absolue from this oath, considering that all the other parts of the oath are meerely assertorie, neither are they subiect to abso­lution, or dispensation) are only in this oath promised to be performed by the subiects; as the precepts of na­ture, the same circumstances remaining, are immutable and indispensable, neither can God and nature com­mand an vnlawfull or hurtfull thing, or which is an hin­drance to greater good, so in those three things, which, according to the doctrine of Cardinall Bellarmine of­tentimes related, are due by the law of God and nature to lawfull Princes, no interpretation or dispensation can be made. Neither can the Pope absolue from this oath of allegiance, vnlesse hee doe withall declare, that our allegiance, which is due to the King by the law of God and nature, be vnlawfull, hurtfull, or an hindrance to greater good, which hee cannot in any wise declare, vnlesse hee hath power to make a King no King. For consequently he should also declare, that God and na­ture commanding subiects to beare true faith and alle­giance to their lawfull Prince, should inioine them an vnlawfull or hurtfull thing, or which is an hindrance to greater good. It is plaine therefore that, according to the common doctrine of S. Thomas, and his Schoole, [Page 108] the Pope cannot absolue from the sacred and religious bond of this oath of allegiance, vnlesse also he doe de­clare, that the natural bond of our allegiance be vnlaw­full, hurtfull, or an hindrance to greater good; that hereby it may easily appeare, how weake is this obie­ction of our countrimen to condemne this branch of the oath as vnlawfull.

9. Now concerning the two causes alleaged in the obiection, for which an absolution, or dispensation in an oath may be demanded, or granted by the Pope, to wit, either to punish him to whom the oath was made, or when the oath was extorted through feare; it is an­swered, that both these causes be sufficient, to moue the Pope to dispense in those oaths, wherein he hath power to dispense. I say, wherein hee hath power to dispense, be­cause, as I insinuated a little beforeSect. 2. nu. 8., there is a great difference betwixt the Popes power to dispense in a vow, or oath, and a sufficient and iust cause for which he may dispense therein. For a iust and lawfull cause to grant a dispensation, doth suppose in the Pope a pow­er, but doth not giue him a power to dispence. And therefore if the Pope hath no authoritie giuen him by Christ to dispense, for example sake, in the solemne vow of chastitie (whereof, notwithstanding many ex­amples of Popes, who haue dispensed therein, there is a great controuersie among Diuines euen to this day) then no vrgent cause whatsoeuer, as the preseruing of a kingdome from eminent danger of some notable tem­porall, or spirituall harme, can giue a true and reall po­wer to the Pope to dispense in this vow.

10. Wherefore when Diuines doe affirme, that one sufficient cause, why the Pope may dispense in an oath made to a third person, is to punish that third person, this their assertion is to bee vnderstood of such third persons, vpon whom he hath authoritie to inflict such a punishment. For otherwise a iust cause to absolue from an oath, doth, as wee now haue said, suppose in the [Page 109] Pope a power to absolue, but doth not giue him such a power. And so the Pope hath authoritie to absolue subiects vpon a iust cause from their allegiance, which they owe to that Prince, ouer whom the Pope hath temporall iurisdiction, because hee hath authoritie to punish such a Prince, if hee deserue it, of whom he is a temporall Lord, with temporall punishment: But the Pope hath no authoritie to absolue subiects from their temporall allegiance, which they owe to Soueraigne Princes, who in temporals acknowledge no Superiour beside God, vnlesse either directly, or indirectly he hath power to depriue such Princes, and of Princes to make them no Princes, which as yet neither Cardinal Bellar­mine, nor any other hath sufficiently proued.

11. In like manner when Diuines affirme, that one sufficient cause, for which the Pope hath power to ab­solue from an oath, is, if that oath be extorted through feare, this their assertion is to bee vnderstood of such oaths, which are wrongfully extorted, as if one, for feare of death, should sweare to giue a theefe a certaine summe of money: for to absolue frō such kind of oaths is iniurious to no man; but it is not to be vnderstood of such oaths, which are commanded by a iust law, and a great punishment imposed vpon the infringers there­of. If therefore this oath of allegiance, and the law, which commandeth it, be lawfull, and containe no in­iustice, whereof there is now a controuersie, and the contrarie hath not hitherto been sufficiently proued, the feare of incurring the penaltie appointed by the law against the infringers thereof, is not a sufficient cause, for which the Pope may dispense euen in the sa­cred obligation thereof. For otherwise euery oath of allegiance, though it be in all mens opinion neuer so iust and lawfull, if it be commanded by the Prince his law, and a seuere punishment imposed vpon the refu­sers thereof, may be said to be extorted through feare, and that the Pope in regard of this feare may absolue [Page 110] the subiects from such an oath, which no Catholikes, no not our aduersaries themselues, dare, as I suppose, pre­sume to auerre.

12 Lastly, to those three texts of the Canon law, mentioned in the obiection, which seeme to proue, that the Pope hath power to absolue subiects from their oath of allegiance, we answere, that the first canon, Nos sanctorum, is a decree of Pope Gregorie the 7, wherein by Apostolicall authoritie he absolueth those, who either by allegiance, or oath, are obliged to excommunicated per­sons, and most streightly commandeth, that they doe them no loialtie, vntill they make satisfaction. The second ca­non, Iuratos milites, is of Pope Vrbanus the second, who was next Successor to Gregorie, after Victor the 3, who reigned but sixe moneths, wherein he commanded the Bishop Vapicensis to forbid the sworne souldiers to Count Hugo, to serue him so long, as he remained excom­municated. Who if they shall pretend their oathes, let them be admonished, that they ought rather to serue God, then men. For by no authority they are bound to performe their allegiance which they haue sworne to a Christian Prince, who is contrarie to God and his Saints, and contemneth their commandements. The third canon, Absolutos, is of Pope Gregorie the ninth, wherein he declareth, that all those, who are obliged to manifest heretikes, by any co­uenant strengthened with neuer so great securitie, are ab­solued from the bond of all allegiance, homage, and obe­dience.

13. But these Canons are not forcible to proue, that the Pope hath power to absolue subiects from their al­legiance, which by the law of God and nature they owe to Soueraigne Princes, who in temporals acknowledge no Superiour vpon earth. And first, if they were of suffi­cient force, they would euidently proue, that the Pope hath power to absolue, not only from the sacred bond of the oath of allegiance, but also from the natural ob­ligation thereof: and therefore they auaile nothing to [Page 111] confirme our countrimens obiection, who endeuour to proue, that the Pope hath power to absolue from the sacred bond of the oath of allegiance, without releasing the naturall obligation thereof.

14. Secondly, neither doe these Canons make any mention of absolute and Soueraigne Princes, who, vn­lesse they be specified by name are not to bee compre­hended in penall lawes: and therefore either they haue force onely to binde in the territories of the Church, whereof the Pope is Soueraigne Lord in temporals, who therefore hath authoritie to enioyne a temporall punishment, to which all Princes, who bee his Vassals, shall also be subiect: (For out of the temporall domi­nions of the Church the Pope hath not authoritie in meere temporall causes, as is the disposing, I doe not say, the directing of temporall things for the spirituall good, to enact lawes, which shall binde absolute and Soueraigne Princes, who are not subiect vnto him in temporals: as by the like reason may be euidently ga­thered out of the doctrine of Franciscus Suarez Lib. 3. de Le­gibus cap. 8.) or else, as Ioannes Parisiensis De potest. Regia, & Pa­pali cap. 10., out of Cardinall Hostiensis, doth answere to the Canon, ad abolendam Extra de hae­reticis., wherein the Pope ordained, that the goods of heretikes should bee confiscated, to wit, that he did not make this decree by his owne authoritie, but by the consent of the Emperour, who then was present at Padua, and consented thereun­to; So also it may bee answered to the aforesaid three Canons, that those Popes not only by their owne au­thoritie, but by the tacite, and vertuall at least wise con­sent of the Emperour, and other Soueraine Princes, did ordaine, that those subiects, who are obliged by any bond either sacred, or ciuill to inferiour, and not to So­ueraigne Princes, should forthwith be freed from the same, if those Princes should either reuolt from the Ca­tholike faith, or for any crime be excommunicated. For otherwise, if absolute and Soueraigne Princes be also according to our Aduersaries comprehended in these [Page 112] Canons, they must of necessitie acknowledge, which yet I thinke they dare scarcely affirme, that Kings and Emperours so soone as they either for heresie, or any other crime, doe incurre into the generall Censures of the Church, are presently without any particular de­claration, or sentence of depriuation depriued in very deede of their Regall authoritie, which is both against the continuall practise, which Popes do vse in deposing of Princes, and is also repugnant to the common vn­derstanding of all men.

15. Thirdly, although wee should grant, that those Canons doe also include Soueraigne Princes, yet they may be answered in the same manner, as Cardinall Bel­larmine Lib. 4 de Rom. pont. cap. 14. answereth the decree of Pope Celestine the 3, of which Canon Alphonsus de Castro Lib. 1. de hae­res. cap. 4. maketh men­tion, and withall affirmeth, that hee hath seene it in the ancient Decretals In Can. Lauda­bilem de con­uers. coniug., wherein the Pope did decree, and as the same Alphonsus relateth, did define, that the bond of Matrimonie is by heresie so dissolued, that it is lawfull for the woman, whose former husband became an heretike, to marrie another man; which doctrine now is flat hereticall, and condemned in the Councell of Trent Sess. 24. can. 5.: I answere, saith Cardinall Bellarmine, that Ce­lestine did determine nothing for certaine cōcerning that matter, but did answere, what seemed to him more pro­bable. It is true indeede, which Alphonsus affirmeth, that the epistle of Celestine was once among the Decretall E­pistles, but from thence it cannot be gathered, that Cele­stine made thereof a cleere Apostolicall decree, and out of the Chaire, seeing that it is manifest, that there be many other things in the Decretall Epistles, which do not make the thing to be of faith, but doe onely declare vnto vs the opinions of Popes concerning that matter. In like man­ner wee may also answere, that those three Decrees, o [...] Canons of the aforesaid Popes, doe either declare those Popes opinions, or are onely grounded vpon their pri­uate opinions. And truly vnlesse we answere thus, we [Page 113] must be enforced to affirme with Philopater, that So­ueraigne Princes as soone as they reuolt from the Ca­tholike faith, are presently, before any sentence of the Supreme Pastor denounced against them, depriued of their Dominions, and of all Regall dignitie and autho­ritie, and that all their subiects are by the law of God absolued from the bond both of their oath and also of allegiance, as out of the second decree of Vrbanus by euident consequence it may bee deduced, which ne­uerthelesse these our countrymen, who doe so vrge these Canons, will not, vnlesse I be deceiued, easily ad­mit.

16. Neither ought any man to meruaile, that Pope Gregorie the seuenth, who was the first Pope that euer deposed the Romane Emperour, as Godfridus In Chronico part. 17. ad an­num. 1047., Otho Fri­singensis Lib 6. cap. 35, Trithemius In Chron. Monast. Hir­saug ad annum 1106., and Onuphrius Lib. 4. de va­ria creat. Rom. Pont. doe write, should also be of opinion, that he had power to absolue subiects from the bond of their allegiance. Neuerthe­lesse from this fact, or decree of Pope Gregorie, as also from the two other decrees of his Successors, who fol­lowed his example, it cannot certainly be gathered, that they had indeede such authoritie to absolue sub­iects from their allegiance, but only that they were of opinion, and did suppose at leastwise for probable, that Christ had giuen them that authoritie. As also, although some Popes of this age following the examples of their predecessors, yea euen of S. Gregorie Lib. 3. epist. 26 & habetur in can. peruenit. dist. 95. the great, should by their Decrees, Breues, or Apostolical letters, registred also in the bodie of the Canon law, ordaine, that some eminent Priests, although they were not Bishops, should by the Apostolicall authoritie haue power to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation (as some such persons do in these daies by the speciall grant of Popes minister this Sacrament) neuerthelesse it could not from hence be certainly concluded, that the Pope hath au­thoritie to grant such licences, seeing that many lear­ned Diuines, notwithstanding the decrees of such [Page 114] Popes, doe defend, that Christ hath not giuen to the Pope that authoritie.

17. In like manner, although some Popes, follow­ing the examples of their Predecessors, haue dispensed in the solemne vow of chastitie; yet from hence there cannot bee drawne a firme and solid argument to proue, that in very deede such an authoritie hath been giuen them by Christ his institution, but at the most from hence it may bee gathered, that those Popes did perswade themselues, and at the least suppose as pro­bable, that Christ did grant them such authority: which neuerthelesse doth nothing hinder, but that other Di­uines, who moued with probable reasons doe hold the contrarie, may lawfully reiect the opinions of these Popes, and may, if neede require, with a safe conscience sweare, that they doe professe, testifie, beleeue, declare, and in their consciences are resolued, that by Christ his institution no such authoritie hath been giuen to the Pope. And therefore notwithstanding this obiection, which some of our countrimen do so vehemently vrge, I may with all dutifull reuerence to the holie Canons lawfully sweare, that I doe furthermore beleeue, and am resolued in my conscience, that the Pope hath not power to absolue me of this oath or any part thereof.

18. But because some of our countrimen doe wrongfully vpbraide vs with not bearing dutifull re­spect to the Canons of holy Church, in that wee denie that the Pope hath power to absolue the subiects of Soueraigne Princes from their allegiance, (from which imputation wee haue neuerthelesse both here, and else­where fully cleered our selues by answering sufficiently to all the decrees of Popes, and Councels) we thought it conuenient vpon so fit an occasion offered vs, to admo­nish briefly the learned Reader, that with all due ho­nour and respect wee doe reuerence the Canons of the holy Catholike Church. Yet we must needes confesse, that betwixt the Catholike Church, and the Pope, who [Page 115] is only the first and principall member thereof, betwixt some Chapters, or Decrees of the Canon law, and be­twixt others, wee make a great distinction; and neuer­thelesse to euery one in his degree and place wee giue dutifull but not equall credit. For in the vast corps or great volumes of the Canon law are contained either sayings, and assertions of the ancient Fathers; or senten­ces, and decrees of Popes, or Councels; and these are ei­ther doctrinall, and which are propounded as things to be beleeued by the faithfull, or else morall, and which in the externall discipline of the Church are comman­ded to be obserued.

19. And first, the doctrine, which the ancient holy Fathers either in expounding the holy Scriptures, or in questions belonging to faith, haue with vniforme con­sent deliuered, we also doe vndoubtedly beleeue, as be­ing certainly perswaded, that it was inspired by the holy Ghost; following herein the sage, & pious coun­sell of that renowned ancient writerFor he wrote his book three yeers after the Councell of E­phesus, the yeere 434. Vincentius Liri­nensis in that golden bookeAduersus pro­phanas noui­tates, cap. 4. of his, whatsoeuer not one, or two only, but all (the ancient Fathers) together haue with one, and the same consent plainly, frequently, con­stantly held, written, taught, that must wee without all doubt beleeue. Yet the authoritie of many holy Fathers, if others, although the fewer doe gainsay, we account to be no certaine, but onely a probable ground for Ca­tholikes in matters of faith safely to build vpon. For, as well writeth Melchior Canus Lib 7. de lo­cis cap. 3. nu. 7., as there is one brightnes of the Sunne, another brightnes of the Moone, and ano­ther brightnes of the Starres, for Starre differeth from Starre in brightnes, 1. Cor. 15. So Ecclesiasticall writers are approued, who hauing receiued light from the holie Ghost, haue giuen light vnto the Church. But yet there is one brightnes of Matthew, another of Hierome; one of Isaias, another of Ambrose. For Canonicall Authors, as high, celestiall, diuine, doe keepe a perpetuall, and perma­nent constancie: But other holy writers are inferiour, and [Page 116] humane, and now and then are defectiue, and sometimes they doe contrarie to the conuenient order and course of nature, bring forth a monster.

20. And in this sense is to be vnderstood S. Thomas of Aquine 1. Part. q. 1. art. 8. ad [...] ^m., when hee affirmeth, that the authoritie of holy Scripture is alleaged by Diuines, as a necessarie ar­gumēt, but the authoritie of other Doctors of the Church as a probable. For, I know, saith S. Hierome Epist. 62. ad Theophilum aduersus Ioan. Hierosolym., that I doe otherwise esteeme the Apostles, otherwise other writers, those as alwaies speaking truth, these as men in some things erring. And againe S. Austin Tom. 2. epist. 19. ad Hieron., I haue learned, saith he, to giue this reuerence and honour to those onely bookes of holy Scriptures, which are now called Canoni­call, that I doe most firmely beleeue, that no one of them hath by writing erred any whit. But others I do so reade, that, be they neuer so holy, and learned, I doe not thinke it to be true, because they thinke so, but because, either by those Canonicall Authors, or by probable reason, they haue been able to perswade me, that it doth agree with truth.

21. Secondly, although we make no doubt, but that the doctrine also of all the holy Fathers in things, which doe not appertaine to faith, may piously, and probably be beleeued by Catholikes, yet we are also of opinion with Melchior Canus Lib. 7. de lo­cis cap. 3. nu. 9., & other Diuines, that it ought not of necessitie to bee followed, as certaine, and infal­lible. For, as well writeth Vincentius Lirinensis Aduersus pro­phanas nouita­tes cap. 39., wee ought with great diligence to search out, and follow the ancient consent of holy Fathers not in all questions of the diuine law, but only in the rule of faith. Those things are said to appertaine to faith, which Christ, or his Apo­stles haue deliuered to the Church by word, or wri­ting, and which from thence by certaine, and euident consequence are deduced: But as the same Canus Lib. 7. cap. 2. ve­ry well affirmeth, those things, which wee neither haue receiued from Christ, or his Apostles, neither are cer­tainly and plainly inferred from those things, which [Page 117] wee hold from the authority of Christ, and his A­postles, doe not appertaine to faith; and therefore they may without preiudice to faith, or piety bee vnknowne not onely to the vnlearned, but also to the learned men, for that they are neither assertions of faith, nor manifestly deri­ued from them.

22. Among questions, which doe not belong to faith, Canus relateth these; whether the blessed Vir­gin was conceiued in originall sinne, or no. Whether habituall grace, and other vertues as well Morall, as Theologicall are infused by God into our soules, and some others. And I also am of opinion, that among them is to bee numbred this controuersie concer­ning the Popes power to depriue Princes, and to ab­solue Subiects from their allegiance. For although it bee plainely said to Saint Peter, Whatsoeuer thou shalt loose vpon earth &c. and feede my sheepe, yet cannot it from these places bee gathered by any necessary, but at the most by a probable consequence, that all manner of power to loose, and authority to chastize offenders with all kind of punishments is graunted to Saint Peter, neither that this is the true meaning of those words, hath it hitherto by any certaine de­finition bene declared by the Church, as I my selfe, and both the Barclaies haue heeeretofore aboundantly pro­ued.

23. Thirdly, we also doe professe, that the definiti­ons of generall Councels lawfully assembled, and confir­med by the Pope, wherein any doctrine is propounded to the whole Church to bee beleeued by all men as of faith, are to bee receiued by Catholikes as infallible rules of faith; most certainely perswading our selues with S. Austin, Lib. 1. de bap­tismo contra Donatistas. tom. 7. that the sentence of a Generall Councell, to wit, in things which it determineth to bee beleeued as of faith, is the consent of the vniuersall Church. Neuer­thelesse we do freely affirm, that those opinions, which in the saide Councells are defined or supposed onely as [Page 118] probable, and those assertions, which either incidentlie, and by the way are inserted, or for better declaration, & proofe of their decisions be produced, are subiect to er­rour, and may sometimes by Catholikes without any wrong to the Catholike faith be reiected. For the Fa­thers, saith Canus, Lib. 6. de lo­cis cap. 8. in a question of faith doe not alwaies bring necessary, but sometimes credible reasons, which if they be not necessary, not to say, apt, probable, conuenient, we must not greatly stand thereupon. For wee doe not striue to defend the reasons alleaged by Popes, and Councells, wherein sometimes they are deceiued, as a point belonging to Religion. In the Councells, saith Cardinall Bellarmine, Lib 2. de cōc. cap. 12. the greatest part of the Acts doe not appertaine to faith. For neither the disputations, which goe before, nor the rea­sons, which are adioyned nor those things, which are brought to explicate and illustrate the matter, are of faith, but onely the bare decrees, and those not all, but onely such as are pro­pounded as of faith: and sometimes the Councells doe define a thing, not as certaine, but as probable. Was it not defi­ned in the seuenth generall Councell, Tom. 3. Con­cil. part. 1. act. 5. that the Images of Angels might religiously be painted, and yet the rea­son of this decree, (which is there propounded by Tha­rasius, who tooke it from Iohn Bishop of Thessalonia, and which the whole Councell, saith Vasquez, 3. Part. disp. 103. cap. 5. seemeth to ap­proue) to wit, that the Catholike Church doth thinke that Angels haue bodies, and can be circumscribed, is now by the Scholastick Diuines iudged to be false; and Bannes, & Zumel 1. Part. q. 5. art. 1. are not afraide to censure it as teme­rarious, although they dare not reiect the decree it selfe and conclusion of the Councell, concerning the pain­ting of the Images of Angels?

24. This neuerthelesse I would haue thee to obserue, good Reader, which I haue oftentimes in other places signified, that although I, professing my selfe to bee a child of the Catholike Romane Church, do most willing­ly embrace whatsoeuer generall Councells confirmed by the Pope, which doe represent the Catholike Church, doe [Page 119] propound to the faithful as necessarily to be beleeued of faith, and which certainly, and euidently is knowne to be the true sense, and meaning of the Councells, yet I doe not vndoubtedly beleeue euery doctrine, which ei­ther Cardinall Bellarmine, (speaking with due reue­rence) or any other Doctour, seeing they are not ap­pointed by God to be an vndoubted rule of the Catho­like faith, doe cry out to be Catholike Doctrine, to be the voice of the Catholike Church, to be the meaning of the Scriptures, and Councells, especially if other Ca­tholike Doctours doe hould the contrary. Them truly, as it is meete, I doe reuerence with all dutifull respect, and I doe much attribute to their authority, but that all those collections, which they in their iudgements doe imagine, may be euidently concluded out of holy Scrip­tures, or Councells, (considering that oftentimes they are deceiued, and doe deceiue, and what they haue written, when they were younger, they may recal, when they grow elder) are to be accounted for vndoubted as­sertions of faith, and the contrary opinion of other Ca­tholikes to be rather esteemed an heresie, then an opini­on, this truely I cannot take in good part.

25. Fourthly, concerning the Canons or Decrees of Generall Councells belonging to manners, and the ex­ternall gouernment of the Church, wee are most ready, and willing to receiue all those decrees, which in the places where we liue are generally receiued. For these are properly called the Decrees or Canons of the Catho­like or vniuersall Church, which are by common consent admitted by the vniuersall Church. Neither doubtlesse is any Catholike bound to admit those lawes and pre­cepts, which in the country where he liueth, are not ob­serued by the people, according to that saying of Gra­tian Dist. 4 can. in ill [...] § leges. recorded in the Canon Law. Lawes are enacted, when they are proclaimed; they are established when by the practise of those, who vse them, they are approoued. And this opinion, saith Ioannes Az [...]rius Tom. 1. n­stit. lib 5. cap. [...] the Iesuite, with [Page 120] whomIn summa cap. 23. nu. 41. Nauarrus, Lib. 2. variar. Resolut. cap. 16 nu. 6. Couarrunias, Tom. 2. disp. 7 q. 5. punct [...]. q [...] Valentia, Lib. 3. The­sau [...]i cap. 5. nu. 24. Sayrus, Disp 13. de Leg. sect 1. Salas, Lib 4. de Leg. cap. 16. conclus. 3. Suarez and others doe accord, is agreeable to the Canon, and Ciuill law; to wit, that a Law both Eccle­siasticall, and Ciuill, although it be enacted by lawfull authority, and rightly proclaimed, is not of force vnlesse by custome it be receiued.

26. And so the Kingdome & Prelats of France would not receiue certaine decrees of the Councell of Trent, a­mong which was that beforeCap 3. sec. 3. nu. 13. rehearsed, wherin Kings and Princes were forbidden to permit single combate vnder paine of forfeiting the City, or place where by their sufferance it was fought. This article, say they, is a­gainst the authority of the King, who cannot be depriued of his temporal dominion, in regard whereof he acknowledgeth no Superiour at all.

27. And truly in my opinion those Prelats of France, who apprehended that the aforesaid decree of the Coun­cell did conteine not onely Princes, who were feuda­ries to the Church, but also absolute, and Soueraigne Princes, as is the King of France, (in which sense also many others vnderstand this place) would not for these causes receiue that decree, either for that they thought it was enacted not absolutely, but vpon presumption, and hope that Princes would ratifie the same, and so conditionally if Princes would giue their consent ther­unto; or which I iudge to be more probable, for that they supposed, that the Councell in making that decree, did relye onely vpon a probable opinion, concerning the authoritie of the spirituall power to dispose of tem­poralls for the spirituall good, which opinion, sith that it is onely probable, and might tend to the great preiu­dice of the King of France, and of other Princes, the Pre­lates of France were not bound to follow. But what cau­ses are to bee accounted iust, and lawfull for the which any Kingdome or Prouince is not bound to admit the Canons, or decrees of a Generall Councell, it is no fit time to examine at this present; it being now sufficient, [Page 121] that, according to all Diuines, and Lawyers, although their may perchance, some fault be committed by them who at the first doe not receiue the decree of a Councell after it bee lawfully proclaimed, yet afterwards it hath no force to bind, if either by sufferance or contrary cu­stome not punished it be not obserued.

28. Lastly, what wee haue said concerning the defi­nitions, and decrees of Generall Councells may with farre greater reason bee proportionably applyed to the definitions, and decrees of Popes, and Prouinciall Councells; especially considering that many learned Diuines, with almost the whole Vniuersity of Paris, as in the Preface to our Apologeticall answere,nu. 27. et seq. we haue already said, and beneathcap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 27. we will repeate again, are of opinion, that the Popes definitions, and decrees, if hee define without a Generall Councell, are subiect to er­rour; and that the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost was promised to S. Peter, and his successours, as he be­ing head, doth in defining matters of faith concur with the whole body of the Church, which a General Coun­sell doth represent. And thus much concerning the an­swer to the third obiection of our countrimen against this fifth branch of the oath.

Sect. IIII.

1. FOurthly, some obiect against those words, [nor a­ny person whatsoeuer hath power to absolue me of this oath, or any part thereof] which words beeing generall doe seeme to exclude all persons, and consequently the King himselfe. Wherefore according to these words I am bound to sweare, that neither the Pope, nor the Kings Maiesty hath power to absolue me from this oath, or any part there­of, which doubtlesse is altogether repugnant to truth, for that the same authority, which hath power to make a law, hath also power to dispense therein, or to absolue one from the obligation thereof: therefore this clause cannot bee ta­ken [Page 122] without manifest periurie.

2. To this obiection supposing that, according to the rules before related out of Suarez, the true and common meaning of the words of any law is to bee gathered from the circumstances,Cap. 1. sec. 2. et seq. the end of the Law, and especi­ally from the intention of the Lawmaker, it is answered first, that whensoeuer a Law doth bind in generall words all persons whatsoeuer to obserue the same, those words are in common speech to be vnderstood only of such persons, which are subiect to the Law-maker, and not of other persons, who are not subiect to him; nor of the Law-maker himselfe, for that, according to the most certaine, and approoued rule of all Diuines, and Lawyers, the power of commanding, or Lawmaking, is in a Superiour towards his inferiour, and consequently not towards himselfe, or his equall. In like manner also when any law in generall words affirmeth, that no per­son whatsoeuer hath power to dispense at any time in that Law, or to absolue any man from the bond therof, those words are in common speech onely to bee vnder­stood of those persons, who are inferiour to the Law-maker, and not of the Lawmaker himselfe, or his Suc­cessour, who is of equall authority with him. For both these, as they haue authority to make the Law, and also to repeale the same, so also according to the common vnderstanding of men they haue authority to dispense in the same, or to absolue any man from the obligation thereof. Whereupon very well said Salas beforecap. 1. sec. 3. nu. 4. rela­ted in a generall speech the person, who speaketh, is vnder­stood to be excepted.

3. Wherfore in this oath of allegiance, which is im­posed by his maiesties Law, those words [nor any person whatsoeuer hath power to absolue me of this oath] ought in common speech to bee vnderstood in this manner, that no person except the King himselfe hath power to ab­solue me frō this oath. For otherwise if those words [nor any person whatsoeuer] were to bee vnderstood in their [Page 123] whole generality without any exception, from thence it might rightly be inferred, that by vertue of this clause we are bound to sweare, that no person either humane, or deuine hath power to absolue me from this oath, or any part thereof; And yet, according to the approoued doctrine of all Lawyers, whensoeuer the words of a law doe sound in such sort that they may be taken in a good or euill sense, they ought to be applyed to that sense, (al­though otherwise it bee improper) wherein the Law containeth no iniustice, or absurdity; for this is presu­med to be the intention of the Lawmaker, whose mea­ning is to make a true Law, whereas an vniust, absurd, or vnreasonable Law is to bee accounted no true Law. Whereupon in a doubtfull word of the Law, saith the law:Leg. in ambi­gua F. de legi­bus. That sense is rather to be taken, which is not faulty, espe­cially seeing that thereby the meaning also of the Law may be gathered.

4. Secondly, if we will interpret all the words of this oath, in such rigorous a manner, as these seuere Cen­sours doe wrest them, it is also lawfull to sweare, that as the King alone without the Parliament hath not, accor­ding to the vsuall custome of this Realme, power to enact Lawes, so also neither hath he alone without the Parli­ament power to absolue from the Lawes, but this pow­er appertaineth onely to the Law-maker, who is the King & Parliament together. The penalty imposed by the Law doubtlesse he may remit, but the Law it selfe according to the custome of this Realme he cannot dis­anull. And so he hath power to absolue those, who re­fuse to take the Oath, from the punishment appoint­ted by the Law, but from the obligation to performe those things, which one hath promised by this Oath, he together with the Parliament, or rather neither hee, nor the Parliament, as shall appeare beneath,nu. 6. and. 7. hath power to absolue. Now by these words, nor any person whatsoeuer, are properly vnderstood onely singular per­sons, and not a community, or Parliament. As the anci­ent [Page 124] Diuines of Paris doe in this sort expound those words, The first See is iudged by no man, to wit, that no particular person hath power to iudge the first See, which neuerthelesse is no let, say they, but that a Gene­rall Councell hath authority to iudge the first See.

5. I said a little before [according to the vsuall custome of this Realme] because I doe not intend to affirme, or to deny any thing concerning his Maiesties absolute power, and prerogatiue, but only to satisfie this present obiection I thought good brieflie to insinuate what is the present custome of this kingdom in the establishing of lawes. But whether this custome did first proceede from the Kings free grant, or from the common wealth limiting the Regall authority, I leaue to others to dis­cusse. It may onely at this present suffice to rehearse, what Iohn Stow in his Chronicle hath written in this matter.In the life of K. Henry the first in the. 16. yeare of his Reigne, and of our Lord. 1116. This yeare, saith Stow, on the ninteenth day of Aprill K. Henry called a Councell of the States of this Realme, both of the Prelates, Nobles and Commons to Sa­lisbury, there to consult for the good gouernment of the Common Wealth, and the waighty affaires of the same, which Councell, taking the name, and Fame of the French, is called Parliament. And this doe the Historiographers note to bee the first Parliament in England, and that the Kings before that time were neuer wont to call any of their commons, or people to Councell, or Law-making, &c.

Thirdly, it is euident, that those, who doe so much insist vpon this obiection, do seeke rather to cauil, then really to except against this clause. For that according to the common opinion of them, who are so vehement against this Oath, an Oath being a sacred, and spirituall bond, it belongeth onely to the spirituall power, as to Bishops; to absolue or dispense therein, and to release directly the spiritual obligation, in which re­leasing these Doctors will haue dispensing, and absol­uing from Oaths properly to consist. Therefore if wee will speake properly and according to the common vn­derstanding [Page 125] of those, who doe vrge this obiection, nei­ther the King himselfe, according to their doctrine, hath power to absolue from this oath, that is, hath power to release directly the spirituall obligation therof. He may indeed release an oath made vnto him, by taking away the matter of the oath, as Parents may with the oaths of their Children, a Gardian with the oaths of his Ward, an Abbot with the oaths of his Monkes, and euery priuate man may remit an oath made vnto him; but to dispense in oaths, or to absolue from them (taking dispensation, and absolution in that sense, wherein these impugners of the oath doe take them) no temporall power hath authoritie. Wherefore the Diuines doe make a great distinction betwixt dispensing, and absoluing from an oath, and betwixt annulling, or releasing of the same, and doe affirme, that to annull, and release an oath, a temporall power may suffice, but to absolue, or dis­pense therein, a spirituall iurisdiction is of necessitie re­quired.

7. Fourthly, supposing that the common meaning of these words, [to absolue me from this oath] is not to dispense with me, that I shall not take this oath, but to absolue me from the obligation of performing those things, which I haue sworne to performe, it may also be answered, that although it were granted, that the King hath power to absolue me from the bond of taking this oath, yet neither the King nor Parliament hath power to absolue me from this oath once taken, or which is all one, can giue me leaue not to performe those things, which I haue by this oath promised to performe. And the reason is manifest, because there bee three only things, as I haue said beforeIn this chapt. sect. 1. nu. 9., contained in this oath, which the swearer promiseth to performe, to wit, to beare faith, and true allegiance to his Maiestie, to defend him from all Treasons, and to disclose them, when they come to his knowledge; but all these are by the law of God and nature commanded to subiects, therefore nei­ther [Page 126] the King nor Parliament hath power to absolue me from the performing of the aforesaid three things; or which is all one, can giue me leaue not to beare true allegiance to his Maiestie, not to defend him against treasons, and not to disclose them, when thereby great danger to his person or State may arise, seeing that they haue no power to absolue me from the obligation of the law of God and nature.

Sect. V.

1. THe fifth, and last obiection, which is insinua­ted by Antonius Capellus, is against those first words of this branch, I beleeue, and in conscience am re­solued, that neither the Pope, &c. which words do seeme to signifie a diuine, and supernaturall beliefe, with which beliefe nothing ought to be beleeued, but that, which is de­fined as most certaine by the Catholike Church; but that the Pope hath not power to absolue me from this oath, doth not appertaine to the Catholike faith, but rather the contrarie, (if we will giue credit to Cardinal Bellar­mine, Gretzer, and Lessius) doth belong to faith, there­fore I cannot without periurie sweare, that the Pope hath not power to absolue me from this oath.

2. To this obiection it is answered, by denying, that this word, I beleeue, is taken in this branch for superna­turall beliefe, but only for morall credulitie, and per­swasion, whereof in common speech it is vsually vnder­stood. And this partly may sufficiently appeare by the whole scope and tenour of the oath, wherein is onely exacted of vs a true and sincere testification, acknow­ledgement, and declaration, how in our consciences we are perswaded concerning the Popes authoritie to depose our King, to dispose of his dominions, to discharge his sub­iects of their obedience, and to absolue them from this oath, &c. partly it is manifest by the words following, [and in conscience I am resolued] which are a declara­tion [Page 127] of the former, and which were altogether super­fluously, and vainly added, if they should import lesse, then the word, I beleeue; euen as one should say, he is a man, and a sensible creature, I know it most certainly, and also I thinke it to be so. For as, according to our English phrase, not to be resolued in conscience to say, or doe any thing, doth at the most signifie an inclination of the minde to say, or doe that thing mixt with some waue­ring, or doubt of the contrarie, but not a full assent, or perswasion thereunto; so to be resolued in conscience to embrace such a doctrine, importeth onely a full assent, and approbation of that doctrine, which approbation only requireth a moral credulity, and not a supernatural beliefe, or a cleere demonstration of that doctrine.

3. Moreouer, whensoeuer any word contained in a law hath a doubtfull and ambiguous signification, to know in what sense it ought to bee taken, many rules are assigned by the Lawyers, concerning which, as wee haue said before,cap. 1. sec. 2. the end, and matter of the law, the circumstances precedent, and following, and the inten­tion of the Law-maker are to bee considered. The end of this oath, established by the Kings law, which is ex­pressed in the Preamble thereof, as the ends of all lawes are vsually expressed, is to make triall how his Maiesties subiects stand affected in point of their loyaltie, and due obedience, which their affectiō may sufficiently be made knowne by a morall credulitie, to wit, if they beleeue, and without any doubt perswade themselues, or, which is al one, are resolued in their consciences, and this their sincere credulitie, perswasion, and resolution they doe confirme by oath, that the Pope hath not power to de­pose the King, to discharge his subiects of their allegi­ance, and to absolue them of this oath, or any part ther­of, &c. The matter, or thing, which in this branch of the oath we are compelled to beleeue, to wit, that the Pope hath not power to absolue me from this oath, or any part thereof, doth not appertaine to the Catholike beliefe, [Page 128] but that among Catholikes there is a cōtrouersie here­of, the King and Parliament knew very well. And ther­fore according to the certaine, and approued rule of in­terpreting lawes, it is alwaies to be presumed, vnlesse the contrarie doe cleerely appeare, that the Law-maker did not intend to binde vs by oath, to beleeue that with supernaturall faith, which with that faith is not to bee beleeued, but that he only desired this, that hee might be assured of our sincere perswasion, and firme resolution concerning this clause of the oath. Which general rule, to wit, that wee must not, if it may bee, interprete the words of the law in an absurd, or vnlawfull sense, all Diuines and Lawyers doe so vnderstand, that if the words of the law, being taken in their proper significa­tion, do containe any vnlawfull, or inconuenient thing, they ought to be transferred to an improper, and meta­phoricall sense, because it ought alwaies to be presu­med, as much as may be, y^t the Lawmaker did not intēd to binde vs to any vnlawfull thing. And truly, if those, who so vehemently impugne the oath, had diligently, and dutifully considered this rule, they might doubt­lesse haue made a more fauourable construction of ma­ny words contained in this oath, against which it is too too manifest, that with more rigour, then is fitting, and with lesser soliditie, then beseemeth so excellently lear­ned men, they haue excepted.

Sect. I.

1. AGainst this branch many exceptions are vsual­ly made, al which may be reduced to fiue prin­cipall heads. The first is, that the King hath no good, and full authoritie to command his subiects to take an vnlaw­full and false oath; but this oath is vnlawfull, and doth containe in it many false propositions, as appeareth by the precedent obiections, and by those which follow, shall also be made more manifest.

2. To satisfie this obiection no other answere is re­quired, but by answering all the arguments, which may be obiected against any particular clause of the oath, to the greater part whereof we haue alreadie answered, and the residue, God willing, wee will in due order sa­tisfie.

Sect. II.

1. THe second is, that our King hath no good, and full authoritie in spirituall matters, vnlesse wee will grant, that hee is supreme head, and Gouernour of the English Church, as well in causes Ecclesiasticall, as in temporall, but in this oath many spirituall things are con­tained: Therefore, &c.

The Maior proposition needeth no proofe, but is supposed as certaine, and granted by all Catholikes. The Minor is by diuers men diuers waies confirmed. And first Cardinall Bellarmine proueth the Minor in this manner: Whosoeuer (saith he)In Respons. ad Apolog. pag. 11. affirmeth, that this oath is lawfully ministred vnto him by good, and full authori­tie, doth also affirme, that the King, by whom this oath is proposed, hath supreme power in spirituall things, seeing that he acknowledgeth in him full authority to command, that the Popes Excommunication, or declaration be con­temned. The same obiection Lessius doth insinuate, as [Page 130] we beforeCap 4 sect. 1. nu. 1. out of his English Recapitulator haue re­lated.

3. And to the same effect are those foure arguments of Gretzer In Comment. Exeget. cap. 6. pag. 102. & seq., whereby he endeuoureth to proue, that in this oath is included a manifest deniall of the Catho­like faith.

For his first argument is, that in this oath is denied, that the Pope hath any iurisdiction ouer the Churches of England, Scotland, Ireland.

The second is, that therein is affirmed, that King Iames, and not the Pope is the supreme head of the Chri­stians in great Britannie, euen in Ecclesiasticall, and spi­rituall causes.

The third is,Pag. 103. that therein is also denied, that the Ge­nerall Pastor of the Vniuersall Church hath power to re­straine, and punish wolues, who with rauening mouths doe assault, disperse, and destroy the flocke of Christ.

Lastly, his fourth argument is,Pag. 105. that in this oath is affirmed, that King Iames is vniuersally without any ex­ception to be obeyed in all things, which he attempteth, al­though they be ioyned with the ouerthrow of the Aposto­like and Catholike religion.

4. And truly if these assertions were contained in this oath, as Gretzer ouer confidently, to say no more, doth affirme, no man doubtlesse could denie, but that this oath, as impious, sacrilegious, and cleerely repug­nant to Catholike faith, ought to be condemned by all Catholikes. But, fie for shame, these his foure most false assertions he deduceth from principles partly cleerely false, and partly greatly controuerted, and which, if they were freely granted him, were not sufficient to in­ferre these his foure propositions. To wit, because in this oath (saith he) is affirmed, that the Pope hath no iurisdi­ction at all in any case ouer the king, or his subiects, so that he can neither depose, nor excommunicate the King, nor absolue his subiects from the bond of their allegiance, nor binde them to obey a iust Excommunication, whatsoeuer [Page 131] at all he doth to the preiudice, yea and ouerthrow of the Catholike, and truly Christian, and Apostolike faith. For this is the expresse intention of the oath, neither can it euer be so shadowed with any colourable shew of words, but that it may cleerely appeare.

5. Truly I cannot wonder enough at the wonder­full boldnes of this man, otherwise learned, who with such confidence, & with so great vehemencie of words is not afraid to auouch things, which are so euidently false. For this oath doth not affirme, as we haue shewed beforeCap. 4. sect. 1., that the Pope hath not power to excommuni­cate the King, or that the Subiects are not bound to o­bey a iust Excommunication, and much lesse, that they may lawfully contemne it, as Cardinal Bellarmine saith; betwixt which two, to wit, not to obey a iust excom­munication, and to contemne it, a great difference is to be made. But the oath doth onely affirme this, that al­though the King be excommunicated, yet hee is to bee obeyed in ciuill matters, for that Excommunication, be­ing only a spirituall Censure, hath not force to depriue Princes of their temporall kingdomes, and dominions, or, which is all one, of their Regall authoritie, and con­sequently not to take away the temporall obedience, which is due to Princes by the law of God and nature. Besides this it also affirmeth, that the Pope hath not po­wer to depriue Princes, and therefore neither to dis­charge Subiects of their allegiance, or to absolue any man from this oath; But this is not to denie the Catho­like faith, as wee haue partly here beforeCap. 3. & 6., partly in o­ther placesIn Apolog. & Respons Apo­log., and partly hereafterAgainst Do­ctor Schulcke­nius. will more abun­dantly shew.

6. Secondly, Gretzer in all his foure arguments doth cunningly ioyne deposition with Excommunication, as though whosoeuer denieth, that the Pope hath power to depose Kings, is consequently bound to denie, that he also hath power to excommunicate Kings, which Lessius, as wee haue seene beforeCap. 4. sect. 1. nu. 1. & 7., doth ouer boldly a­uouch, [Page 132] whereas many very learned Diuines, and two also very famous Iesuites, Suarez, and Becanus, doe in plaine words teach the contrarie, and moreouer many Catholikes, who, although they dare not deny the Popes power to excommunicate Kings, yet they are not afraid to deny his power to depose Princes, and to ab­solue subiects from their allegiance. And truly in my opinion it is greatly to be wondred at, that men, other­wise so excellently learned, in matters of so great im­portance as to establish new articles of faith, and to withdraw faithfull subiects from taking an oath of alle­giance, and that to the perpetuall temporall ouerthrow of themselues, and their whole posteritie, should not be fearefull to bring such exorbitant, paradoxicall, and so­phisticall arguments, which to euery man but meanely learned doe euidently seeme to bee most weake, in so much that our countrimen, who doe not disallow the oath, are thereby rather confirmed in their opinion, and those, who disallow it, and are very desirous to deuise some solid argument, which they may obiect against it, to see such childish collections, I speake with due re­spect, are greatly ashamed.

7. For what man is there of so meane vnderstan­ding, who at the first fight cannot perceiue the weake­nes of these inferences?

In this oath is denied the Popes power to excommuni­cate, and depose the King; therefore in this oath is denied, that the Pope hath no iurisdiction, euen spirituall, ouer the Churches of England, Scotland, Ireland.

Secondly, in this oath is affirmed, that the King cannot be excommunicated, that he cannot be deposed: therefore therein is affirmed, that King Iames, and not the Pope is the supreme head of the Christians in great Britannie, euen in Ecclesiasticall causes.

Thirdly, in this oath is denied, that the King can be ex­communicated, that he can be deposed: therefore therein is denied, that the vniuersall Pastor of the Church hath [Page 133] power to restraine, and punish hereticall Kings.

Fourthly, in this oath is affirmed, that the King can­not be excommunicated, that he cannot bee deposed, there­fore in this oath is affirmed that King Iames must vniuer­sally without exception be obeyed in all things, which he doth attempt, although they be ioyned with the ouerthrow of Ca­tholike Religion.

8. For all the antecedent propositions, forsomuch as appertaineth to the power of excommunicating, are eui­dently false, as we before against Card. Bellarmine haue manifestly proued. And if they were only vnderstood of the power of deposing (besides that this power of de­posing cannot be certainely confirmed with any solide proofe) it is also too too apparant, that the consequents are not rightly inferred from the antecedents. For in Gretzers first argument the consequent can no waies be deduced from the antecedent. For although one should auerre, that by the peculiar priuiledge of God Kings are exempted from the coerciue power of the Pope, yet from thence it would not follow, that the Pope had no spirituall iurisdiction ouer any of the Kings Sub­iects. For the Pope cannot excommunicate an infidell Prince, neuerthelesse he hath spirituall Iurisdiction o­uer the Christians, who are subiect to that Prince. How much the more will this inference be insufficient, if we speake onely of the Popes power to depose a Prince? Se­condly, the consequence also of the second argument is no lesse false, especially if the antecedent proposition be vnderstood of the power to depose. And although we should grant, that the antecedent proposition concer­ning also the Popes power to excōmunicate were true, yet it is not from thence rightly inferred, that y^e King, & not the Pope, is supream head of the Christians in great Britannie, euen in spirituall causes, as appeareth also in Heathen Princes, who cannot be excommunicated, and yet the Pope is the Supreame Pastour in spirituall causes of all the faithfull, who are subiects in their dominions.

[Page 134] Furthermore, in the third argument the antecedent proposition, for so much as concerneth the Popes power to depose, doth not rightly infer the consequent: for it is a fallacious arguing from a particular to an vniuersall. As, for example, the Pope cannot punish Kings with this punishment, therfore he cannot punish Kings. The Pope may indeede, according to Catholike doctrine, pu­nish hereticall Kings with spirituall punishments, but whether he hath power to punish them with temporall punishments is the very question which is now in con­trouersie. Lastly, the consequence of the fourth argu­ment, although wee should grant both parts of the an­tecedent propositions, is so euidently false, and absurd, that I am almost ashamed to repeat it, in so much that it is a wonder, how so learned a man did not greatlie blush to publish it to the whole Christian world for proouing a thing of so great importance. I would willingly also, that Gretzer would sincerely answere vs, whether the selfe-fame arguments, which hee hath framed against this oath, he might not alleage in the selfesame tearmes against that doctrine of the Kingdome of Fraunce aboueCap. 3. sect. 3. nu. 13. related out of Petrus Pithaeus, that the Pope hath not power to depriue the King of France of his Kingdome, and notwithstanding any excommunications, and so forth, to condemne it as flat hereticall, and containing a manifest denyall of the Catholicke faith,

10. Secondly, others proue the aforesaid Minor pro­position by this argument. To determine, and define what the Pope can do, or cannot do in spiritual causes, what power he hath to depose Princes, to discharge Subiects of their alle­giance, and to absolue from oaths, what force Excommuni­cation hath, and what effect it worketh, & to conclude, what position is hereticall, or not heretical, are all spirituall cau­ses, but the King doth in this oath determine, & define all the aforesaid things, therefore many spirituall matters are contained in this oath. This argument is insinuated by [Page 135] that namelesse Doctor, Nu. 25. of his letter. who falsly chargeth my Apolo­gie with heresie, and Ethnicisme, but it is somewhat more largely vrged by Lessius, Nu. 220. Pag. the last. § Sixthly. as appeareth by his English Recapitulator.

11. To this obiection it is answered, by denying also the Minor proposition. For the King, and Parliament doe not determine, and define, what spirituall power Christ our Lord hath granted to S. Peter, and his Succes­sours, but they knew right well, that there is a great controuersie among Catholikes concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, and to absolue Subiects from the oath of their alleageance: and that some do affirme, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and to dis­charge Subiects of their obedience, although it be con­firmed by oath, and that others doe vtterly denye the same: that some also doe affirme, that Excommunicati­on, if not directly, at the least indirectly, and by conse­quence, hath this effect, to depriue Princes of their tem­porall Iurisdiction, and that others, with the greater, and better part of Diuines, doe vtterly denye the same. and because the former opinion was neither in practise, nor speculation knowne to the Primitiue Church (as far as wee may coniecture by the histories of those times) and besides that it hath giuen no little occasion of great tumults both in this Kingdome, and in other parts of the Christian world, the King and Parliament, who re­present the whole body of the common-wealth, and e­uery member therof, thought it conuenient for preuen­ting of future tumults, and conspiracies, which they thought otherwise would probably ensue, that the la­ter opinion should be followed, and embraced of al the Kings Subiects, and that therof a publicke, and sincere profession, testification, and declaration should with a solemne oath be made by all men. As also the Doctors of Paris, although they knew right well, that there was a vehement controuersie among Catholikes, whether the most blessed Virgin Mary was conceiued in origi­nall [Page 136] sinne, neuerthelesse they bound all the professours of Diuinity vnder certain penalties proper to their com­munitie, that they should not publickely preach, nor teach, that shee had contracted originall sinne, and yet they did not intend thereby to decide, and define that controuersie, but onely to declare their great liking of the one opinion, and their great dislike of the other.

12. This yeare 1501. saith Surius, In Commēt. breui the year. 1501. the Theologicall facultie of the vniuersitie of Mentz, imitating the decree of the Councell of Basil, and also the Diuines of Paris, and of Colen, did make this decree & ordinance, that it should be altogether held, that the most blessed mother of God was con­ceiued without the spot of originall sinne, and that by a spe­ciall priuiledge; and did strictly ordaine, that none heereaf­ter should in that Vniuersity bee promoted in sacred Diui­nity, vnlesse hee did before by oath make promise, that hee would neither maintaine in his minde, nor in any wise ap­proue the contrary opinion. May we therefore from hence rightly conclude, that those Doctors intended to define that opinion as certaine, which Pope Sixtus the fourth not long before had by a particular Bull Dated the year. 1083. which is in the fourth to me of the Coun­cells after the life of Pope Sixtus the fourth. declared to be vncertaine, and controuerted, and that the contrary might be defended without mortal sinne, and which al­so innumerable Diuines of those times did thinke not to be so probable, as the contrary?

13. Secondly, these, who do vrge this argument, wil scarcely, as I thinke, denye, that the King and Parlia­ment may, to auoid probable dangers of future Conspi­racies, compell all his Maiesties subiects, to professe, te­stifie, acknowledge and declare by oath, that the Pope is not by Christ his institution the direct Lord of this Kingdome, nor that our King is the Popes Subiect, Vas­sall, and Vicar in temporalls, and neuerthelesse the Ca­nonists doe so vehemently defend this direct dominion of the Pope in temporalls not only ouer this kingdome, but also ouer the vniuersall Christian world, that some of themBartholus F. de requir. reis. leg. 1. §. 1. doe thinke it flat heresie to denye the same. [Page 137] Yet from hence it cannot rightly be gathered, that the King should arrogate to himselfe spiritual power to de­fine, what spirituall Iurisdiction is by Christ his institu­tion granted to the Pope. And from hence it doth eui­dently appeare, that the deniall of that Papall power, which is a sacred thing and giuen from aboue, and which no mortall man can take away or diminish is not denied in this oath, as Cardinal Bellarmine In Respons. ad Apolog. p. 8. doth vnworthily auerre; for this power is expresly found in the word of God ei­ther written or deliuered to the Church by tradition, or by euident consequence deduced from thence, & which therefore all Catholikes doe professe to appertaine to the Catholike faith; but that only power of the Pope is denied in this oath, which without any preiudice of faith may by Catholikes be lawfully denied. As also that power of the Pope, which the Canonists doe with might, and maine defend to be a sacred thing, and giuen from aboue, Cardinall Bellarmine Lib. 5. de Rō. Pont. cap. 1. et seq. is not afraid to dimi­nish, take away, and vtterly denie as a prophane thing, and not giuen from aboue, but inuented by man.

14 Now concerning the last part of this argument, we answere, that it is not determined, or defined in this oath, what proposition is hereticall, neither is this posi­tion, Princes which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed by their subiects, or any other whatso­uer, abiured as hereticall, but only by this oath we are compelled, as hath beene shewed before,Cap. 5. sect. 2. to abhorre, detest, and abiure this doctrine, and position as hereti­call, and heretofore defined, determined, and condem­ned by the Church, that it is in the free power of the sub­iects, or any other whatsoeuer, to depose, or, if they will to murther Princes, which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope.

15 And if any one reply, that it doth not belong to the ciuill power, to compell any man to abiure heresie, it being a spirituall offence, and therefore only belonging to the spiri­tuall power.

[Page 138]It is answered first, that although it doth not apper­taine to the ciuill power, to determine, and define what position is hereticall, or not hereticall, or to punish heretikes with spirituall punishments (because these are meerely spirituall causes) yet it can not be denied, but that it belongeth to Christian Princes, at least wise as they are appointed by God to be protectours23. q 5. can. Principes. et Concil. Tridēt sess. 25 can. 20. de Reformat of the Church, to roote out heresies by meanes of the tempo­rall sword, which is proper to the ciuill power, to pu­nish heretikes, to defend the Church from all manifest wrongs either temporall, or spirituall, and to command, and procure all those things, which are necessarie to hir preseruation, and neuerthelesse they shall not be saied therefore to vsurpe the iurisdiction of the Ecclesiasti­call power. The Pope saith, Cardinall Bellarmine Lib. 5. de Rō. Po [...]t cap. 7. in 5 ratione. may, and ought to command all Christians those things, to which euery man is bound according to his state, that is, to compell all men, to serue God, as they are bound according to their state, but Kings are bound to serue God, by defending the Church, by punishing heretikes, and schismatikes, as Saint Augustine teacheth in epist. so. ad Bonifacium, Le [...] epist. 75. ad Leonem Augustum, et Gregorius lib. 2. epist. 61. ad Mauritium. Therefore that saying, which Alphon­sus de Castro affirmeth of a Bishop, Colledge, or Pro­uinciall councell, may in like manner, obseruing the proportion of temporall punishments, be applied to temporall Princes. But although saith he,Lib: 1: aduer­sus haeres. cap: 8 a Bishop, Col­ledge, or Prouincial councell hath not power to define mat­ters of faith, in those things, which may worthily be doub­ted of, neuerthelesse in those things, which are already defi­ned, or which by most euident testimonies of holy Scripture may without any tergiuersation, or ouerthwarting be known, they may minister iustice, and punish the obstinate maintei­ners of that assertion: for that is not to giue sentence; but to execute the sentence before giuen.

16. Secondly, it is answered to the same Reply, that e­uery sinne, be it neuer so spirituall, yea and heresie it [Page 139] selfe, not as it is a spirituall thing, and against the spiri­tuall health of our soules, but as it is a temporall wrong hurtfull to the common peace of the citizens, and vsu­ally causeth great perturbations in the commonwealth, is subiect to the Iurisdiction of the temporall power, by whom it may be punished with temporall punish­ments: as also secular crimes, not as they are temporal, but as they are spirituall, and hurtfull to the spirituall health of soules, are subiect to the spirituall power, by whom they may be punished with spirituall punish­ments. And the reason heereof, I haue heeretoforeIn my Apolo­gie nu. 94. et seq. et nu. 153. et seq., where I handled the matter more at large, alleaged out of Victoria, and Ioannes Parisiensis, because the tem­porall common wealth is a perfect common wealth, and hath in her selfe sufficient power, therefore shee may by her own authority defend her selfe from the wrong of any what­soeuer, and by the materiall sword repell the abuse of the spirituall sword, especially when it tendeth to the hurt of the common wealth, whose charge is committed to the King.

17. Marriage, saith Dominicus Sotus, Nu. 4. dist. 29. 9. 1. ar. 4. beeing a Sa­crament in such sort, that it is also a ciuill contract, it nothing letteth, but that as in the former respect it belon­geth to the Ecclesiasticall Court, so in regard of the later it is subiect also in some sort to the ciuil. Not that Princes can alter those things, which are of the substance of Matrimo­ny, but that they may punish them, who contract Matrimo­ny, when by contracting they shall offend against the pub­licke good: for against those crimes, whose iudgement doth belong to the Ecclesiasticall Court, they may also ordaine punishments, as they disturbe the peace of the Common-wealth. Which saying of Sotus may in the very like man­ner be applyed to heresie, which beeing a spirituall offence in such sort, that also it disturbeth the temporall peace of the ciuill common-wealth, it nothing letteth, but that as in the former respect it belongeth to the Ecclesiasticall Court, so in regard of the later, it is subiect also in some sort to the Ciuill, not that Princes can determine, and define what is [Page 140] heresie, but that they may punish hereticks, when by defen­ding hereticall propositions, they shall offend against the pub­licke good. For against those crimes, whose iudgement doth belong to the Ecclesiasticall Court, they may also or­daine punishments, as they disturbe the peace of the Com­mon-wealth. And so the Christian Emperors haue ena­cted many lawes,They are to be seene in the end of the Di­rectory of the Inquisition a­mong the A­postolicall letters. pag. 18. 27. and 44. which containe greeuous punish­ments against heretikes, by vertue of which Lawes the holy office of the Inquisition euen at Rome doth pro­ceede against them with capitall punishments, as it may plainely be gathered by the Apostolicall letters of Pope Innocent the fourth, Alexander the fourth, and Clement the fourth.In the place last cited. For a King, saith Dominicus Bannes, 2ae 2ae. q. 11. ar 4. q. 1. in fine. doth punish heretikes, as most seditious enemies against the peace of his Kingdome, which without vnity of Religion cannot be preserued. And a little beneath, from whence, saith he, it followeth, that a Secular King hath power to pardon som­times the losse of their liues, and to punish heretikes in some other manner.

Sect. III.

1. THe third head of exception against this fixth branch of the oath is, for that no humane power hath good, and full authoritie ouer the internall actions of our minde, and therefore neither the King, nor Parlia­ment hath good, and full authoritie to compell the subiects to thinke inwardly this, or that, or to punish any man for defending, or not defending in his minde this, or that opi­nion: but this oath doth compell the subiects, to beleeue, acknowledge, professe, and to bee resolued in their consci­ence, that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes, to discharge subiects of their allegiance, and to absolue any man from this oath, and doth grieuously punish those, who doe not so acknowledge, professe, beleeue, and are so resol­ued in their conscience, therefore this oath is not lawfully ministred by good and full authoritie.

[Page 141]2. To this obiection it is answered, that although the internall actions of our minde, directly, and as they are internall, are not subiect to the command, and iurisdi­ction of humane authoritie, (whereof neuerthelesse there is a great controuersie betwixt the Diuines, and Lawyers, whose names are set downe by Ioannes Salas Disput. 9 de Legibus, sect, 1. the Iesuite) yet all Doctors doe agree in this, that in­ternall actions of the minde, as they doe cause externall disturbance in the common-wealth, and doe concurre to externall actions, whereof humane authoritie hath, for the externall good of humane gouernment, power to iudge, and determine, may by consequence, and in­directly be subiect to humane authoritie, although by it they are not punishable, vntill by some externall signe they bee sufficiently made knowne. Wherefore, although the Church, as well saith our learned countri­man Sayrus Lib 3. Thesau­ri cap. 6. in fine., whose words are in like manner verified also of the Ciuill common-wealth, hath not power ouer internal actions, if they be considered by themselues, with­out any reference to externall, yet she hath authority ouer internall actions, if they be considered as conditions of ex­ternall, and may be referred to externall actions, whereof the Church hath for the end of humane gouernment, full, and perfect power to know, and determine.

3. Whereupon in this kingdome a firme purpose to plot any treason against the Kings person, if it be made knowne by any externall signe, is punished with the v­suall punishment of high Treason: And deadly hatred among citizens, although internall, as it may probably breede outward seditions, tumults, and perturbations in the common-wealth, may bee forbidden by the Se­cular Prince, and if outwardly it be made knowne, may also be punished with temporall punishment: So like­wise in my opinion it is manifest, that the internall maintaining of this, or that opinion, as it may prudent­ly be iudged to bee either very necessarie to preserue the publike peace of the common-wealth, or to bee a [Page 142] probable cause of future sedition therein, may by a temporall Prince bee commanded, and forbidden vn­der temporall punishments. Now, that internall main­taining of these positions, to wit, that the Pope hath po­wer to depose Princes, to absolue Subiects from their al­legiance, and to giue them leaue, not to beare true faith, and obedience to his Maiestie, not to defend him against Treasons, and not to disclose them, when they shall come to their knowledge, and also that it is in the free power of the subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, to depose, or if they will, to murther Princes, which be excommunicated, or depri­ued by the Pope, will by all likelihood be a probable oc­casion of raising tumults in this kingdome and of plot­ting treasons, and traiterous conspiracies against his Maiesties person, Crowne, and dignitie, if the Pope should excommunicate, and depriue him, is so manifest to prudent men, who haue but cursorily read the Sto­ries of precedent times, that there can be alleaged no colourable reason to make any doubt thereof.

21. Seeing therefore that the King and Parliament doe not directly command in this oath the internall de­nying of the aforesaid positions, but doe only compell the Subiects to make an vnfained externall profession, acknowledgement, and declaration of their inward dislike, and detestation of the said positions, in regard that they cannot be inwardly maintained with the safe­tie of his Maiestie, and the quietnes of the weale pub­like, no longer then it shall please the Popes Holinesse; truly in my opinion it is euident, that the King and Parliament haue; according to the approued principles of Diuines and Lawyers, good, and full authoritie to command the Subiects, to make a true and sincere ex­ternall profession, acknowledgement, and declaration of their inward dislike, and detestation of the aforesaid positions, they being such, which may lawfully be dis­liked, and detested, and the dislike, and detestation ther­of, all things prudently considered, being morally ne­cessarie [Page 143] to the outward safetie of the King, and common wealth; considering that internall actions, as they are referred to externall, and are causes, and occasions of them, are subiect to the iurisdiction of the Ciuil power, although by it not punishable, vntill by some outward signe they be sufficiently made manifest.

Sect. IIII.

1. THe fourth head of exception against this sixth branch of the oath is, for that a Secular Magi­strate hath no good, and full authoritie ouer Clergie men, because they are exempted from the iurisdiction, and tri­bunals of Secular Magistrates, therefore, although it were granted, that this oath in it selfe is lawfull, and con­sequently may by the Kings authoritie be imposed vpon the Laitie, yet, by reason of Ecclesiasticall immunitie, the King hath no good, and full authoritie to compell Clergie men without the Popes license to take the same.

2. To this obiection it is answered first, that all Sub­iects whatsoeuer, whether they be Ecclesiasticall, or Se­cular persons, are bound to allegiance, and subiection in that degree of subiection, from which they are not exempted. Seeing therefore that Clergie men, although by the priuileges of Princes, and Ecclesiasticall Canons are in some degree exempted euen in temporall causes from the tribunals of Secular Magistrates, and cannot be conuented before them without the Bishops license, yet as they are true members, and parts of the Ciuill common-wealth, and also true Subiects, as well as Lay men, and are not exempted from true subiection, and allegiance due to the temporall Prince, and may as well as other subiects commit true treason against him, they are bound also to yeeld true allegiance to the Prince, and if iust cause require, they may also, as other mem­bers of the common-wealth, and other Subiects, bee compelled by the Prince, vnder temporall punishmēts, [Page 144] to make a sincere declaration of their allegiance, either by a bare promise, or by oath, as the Prince shall pru­dently iudge to be more expedient for his safetie. Nei­ther is it sufficient, that Subiects doe promise onely in generall words their allegiance; for so they should not be tyed to any certaine forme of swearing their alle­giance, but they might chuse, what forme, or manner of swearing should be most pleasing vnto them, which ne­uerthelesse reason it selfe, and the common practise of imposing such oaths of allegiance sheweth to be false, and inconuenient; but they are bound to giue such se­curitie of their allegiance, and to take such an oath for confirming the same, which, being in it selfe lawfull, the Prince shall with mature deliberation iudge to bee ne­cessarie for preseruing his owne safetie, and the quiet­nes of the Common-wealth.

3. Wherefore if the King, and State, being moued with truly prudent, and probable reasons, shall iudge it necessarie, for preseruing his owne safetie, and also the Common-wealths, to compell by oath all his Maie­sties Subiects, euen Ecclesiasticall persons, as they are subiects, to giue securitie to his Maiestie of their true and constant allegiance, and subiection, it is lawfull, yea and sometimes it may bee necessarie, vpon certaine incident occasions, to exact greater securitie of Clergie men, then of Laymen, if the Prince for reasons truly probable shall more vehemently suspect the fidelitie of Clergie men. Neither doth the King impose this oath of Allegiance vpon Clergie men, as they are Clergie men, but as they are Subiects, and true members, parts, and citizens of the temporall common-wealth.

4. As in like manner he compelleth Bishops to come to the Parliament, not as they are Bishops, but as by the King his priuilege they are made Barons, and Peeres of the kingdome. Because Bishops (saith Ioannes Azor Tom. 1. Instit. lib. 5. cap. 14. in fine. the Iesuite) are Peeres, and Princes of the kingdome, it be­longeth to Kings to command, that as they are such, and [Page 145] not, as they are Bishops, they meete together with others, for the common safety, and good of the Kingdome. Which if they refuse to doe, or if they deny to take that Oath of Allegiance, which other Barons are bound to take, the King hath full, and lawfull authority to depriue them, not doubtlesse of any spirituall Iurisdiction, which they haue receiued from Christ, but of that temporall digni­ty, which by his Princely Priuiledge they doe enioy. Whereupon we reade,Surius ad an­num. 1545. that the Emperour Charles the fifth commanded the Archbishop of Collen, being a Prince of the Empire, to appeare within thirty daies before him, to answer to those accusations, which should bee alleaged a­gainst him; which in like manner did Pope Paul the third commanding him, as he was a Bishop, to appeare before him within threescore daies.

5. Secondly, it is answered, that although it were granted, that Cleargy men are exempted in all causes whatsoeuer, not onely from the command, and power of inferiour Secular Magistrates, but also from the au­thority and Iurisdiction of Kings (who vnlesse they bee expressed by name, are not to be ranked in the number of Secular Magistrates, as may bee gathered by many texts of the Canon LawCap. Venera­bilem de excep­tionibus et c. ad abolendam de haereticis.) neuertheles when the Prince hath no fit commodity to meete with the Spirituall Iudge to demand licence of him, that hee may conuent Cleargy men before the Secular tribunall for treasons, or other enormious Secular crimes, or it is morally certaine, that he will not grant any such licence, then the Secular Prince in case of necessity hath ful, and suffi­cient authority granted him by the Law of God, and nature, to defend himselfe, and his kingdome from all present dangers, or which probably are like to ensue, and to procure not onely by the way of defence, but al­so by authority, to vse Ʋictoria his word, all lawfull meanes fitting the temporall power, which are necessa­ry to the preseruing of himselfe, and his Kingdome, and to preuent all probable dangers, which by meanes of [Page 146] any spirituall person may arise, as Ioannes Parisiensis, de potest. Re­gia, et papali cap. 21. ad. 37. Victoria, Relect. 1. de potest. Eccles. sect. 7. 6. Octa­ua propositio. Couarrunias, Pract quaest. cap. 35. and many others do plainely auerre.

Sect. V.

1. THe fifth and last head of exception against this sixth branch of the Oath, because it might bee somewhat dangerous to the obiectours, is only by some muttered in corners, who doe ground their obiection in this, that for many yeares together, to wit, since the putting down of Catholike Bishops, there hath not bin, as they imagine, any true, and lawful Parliament in this Realme: And they argue in this manner.

No lawes, which be of force in this Kingdome, can be en­acted but by the authority of a true, and lawfull Parlia­ment, but the Parliament, which enacted this law for the ministring of this Oath of Allegiance, was no true, and law­full Parliament, Therefore this oath is not lawfully mini­stred by good and full authority. The Maior proposition is granted by all the Lawyers of this Realme, The Minor is proued: because euery true, and lawfull Parliament must consist of these three States, to wit, the Bishops, the Nobles, and the Commons, but the Protestant Bishops are not true, and lawfull Bishops, therfore the Parliaments of these times are not true, and lawfull Parliaments. For by whom were you consecrated, saith Becanus M. Contro­uers. Anglica­na. c. 4. q. 9. nu. 6. pag. 170. speaking to the English Bishops? Whether by the King? But hee hath not power to consecrate. Whether by the Archbishop of Canterbury, or such like? Neither that truely. For Thomas Cranmer, who vnder K. Henry the eight obtained the Archbishoprick of Canturbury, was not consecrated by any Bishop, but thrust in violently, and designed onely by the King alone, Therefore as many as were afterwards consecrated by him, were not consecrated lawfully, but by presumption.

2. They that vrge this obiection, to proue thereby that this Oath containeth in it a flat deniall of the Ca­tholike [Page 147] faith, are very desirous to flye to this controuer­sie, to wit, whether the Protestant Bishops of this King­dome bee true, and Lawfull Bishops or no. For at the least by this way they thinke to demonstrate, that in this oath is euidendy contained not onely ciuill obe­dience, but also other things which appertaine to Ca­tholike Religion, to wit, to the lawfull ministring of the Sacrament of holy Order. But with this Controuer­sie, whether the Protestant Bishops of this Kingdome haue true Ordination, and consequently are true Bi­shops, or no; that is, whether from the beginning, and so successiuely from time to time, they were ordained by true Bishops, and whether those Bishops from time to time vsed that due forme, and matter, which by Christ his institution is necessarily required to impresse the E­piscopall Character, considering that it is, both a question of fact, wherof I haue not as yet any certain knowledge & also altogether impertinent for the satisfying of this present obiection, I will not at this time intermeddle.

3. Yet before I come to answere the obiection, I would haue the Reader to be forwarned of two things. The first is, that betwixt a true, and lawfull Bishop there is a great difference to be made. For that one be a true Bishop, it is onely required, that hee haue true Ordinati­on, whereby the Episcopall Character is impressed and which cannot be rased out, but alwaies remaineth, whe­ther he become a Turke, Iew, or hereticke. And so the Arrian Bishops, although they were hereticks, yet be­cause they were truely ordained, they were also true Bi­shops, neither were they reordained, when they retur­ned to the vnity of the Catholike Church. But that one be a lawfull Bishop, besides true Ordination is also neces­sary lawfull mission and Iurisdiction, which by Christ his institution is onely deriued from the true, and Ortho­doxall Church of Christ.

4. The second is, that Becanus very rashly and with­out any probable colour of reason, or authority, and [Page 148] against the plaine records of this Kingdome doth af­firm, that Cranmer was not consecrated by any true Bi­shop, but designed onely by the King. For (besides that King Henry at that time, when Cranmer was made Archbishop, to wit, the twenty fourth yeare of his raigne, had not altogether renounced the communion of the See Apostolicke, by whose authorite both the election of Cranmer to the Archbishopricke was confirmed, and to whom also he, when he was consecrated, swore o­bedience, which afterwards his aduersaries did cast in his teeth; and therefore there can bee made no doubt, that he was consecrated by other Bishops with all rites, and ceremonies according to the ancient Canons) this onely argument may suffice to conuince Becanus, that King Henry the very next yeare after, to wit, the twen­ty fifth yeare of his Raigne, made a Law in publick Par­liament, that euery Archbishop, and Bishop of this Realme should be presented and nominated by the Kings Maiesty, his heires, and successors, but that he should bee consecra­ted by one Archbishop, and two Bishops, or else by foure Bishops appointed by the King, with all benedictions, and ceremonies required thereunto; which custome in electing & consecrating Bishops is vsed euen at this present time. For first the King sendeth his letters to the Chapter of the vacant See, wherein hee granteth them leaue to choose a Bishop, and presenteth vnto them one, or more to be elected, who being elected the King confirmeth the election, and afterwards hee sendeth his letters to three Bishops at the least, requiring them to consecrate him Bishop. Wherefore I maruell from whom Beca­nus, a man otherwise very learned, hath taken this so manifest a fiction, seeing that it is not credible, that hee hath deuised it out of his owne braine.

5. These therefore beeing premonished, for satisfy­ing of this present obiection foure things are to bee sup­posed. The first is, that the custome, which any King­dome hath to enact no lawes without the counsell, and [Page 149] consent of the three States of the Realme, did originally proceede either from the King alone, who, to gouerne his Subiects more quietly, and peaceably, did freely, and of his owne accord grant them this Priuiledge, that hee would enact no lawes without the counsell, and con­sent of the three States of the Realme: or it had it first beginning from the whole common-wealth, which at the first, when it was subiect to no Soueraigne, and abso­lute Prince, but the Soueraignty, or supreame power to rule was in it selfe, did choose their King with this con­dition and limitation, that he should not haue authori­ty to make lawes, vnlesse the whole common-wealth, which the Parliament doth represent, should also con­curre with him: But then we must of necessity confesse, that King not to be altogether an absolute Prince, see­ing that he hath not power to make lawes, which all absolute Princes, according to the Doctrine of all Di­uines, and Lawyers doubtlesse haue: or lastly it was first deriued both from the King and Common-wealth to­gether, by reason of some couenant agreed on betwixt them.

6. The second Supposition is, that no humane law hath so strong force to binde, but that the Law-maker, or his Sucessor, who hath equall authoritie with him, hath power to repeale, and disanull the same. And al­though the Law-maker may perchance greatly offend by repealing without iust cause a good, and profitable law, yet all Doctors doe with vniforme consent agree in this, that the abrogating thereof is valide, and that the aforesaid law hath no longer any force to binde. And the reason hereof they alleage, for that euery thing is by the same causes dissolued, by which it is made, but the will of the Law-maker, intending to binde his Sub­iects by his law, being the principall cause, yea and the soule of the law it selfe, may bee altered, and reuoked at his pleasure: And so the law is so long, and no longer a law, then the Law-maker, or his Successor will haue it [Page 150] to be a law: Neither is it in the power of the Law-ma­ker so to tye his Successor, but that he hath alwaies free power, to abrogate the law, when he shall please, ac­cording to that no lesse true, then vulgar saying, Par in parem non habet imperium: No man hath authoritie o­uer his equall. For the Successor to the Prince hath not authoritie to make lawes from the person of the Prince, whom hee succeedeth, but from the office, wherein hee succeedeth him. And what wee haue said concerning the repealing of lawes, the same also is proportionably to bee vnderstood of the reuoking of couenants, and contracts, to wit, that euery couenant, or contract, may by the mutuall consent of both parties bee either in some part altered, or else wholly made voide, and to haue no effect at all.

7. The third Supposition is, that the very same ciuill power, and authoritie to enact lawes, doth now re­maine in this kingdome, which it had, before this cu­stome to enact lawes with the counsell and consent of the Parliament did first begin. Neither can any altera­tion of Religion depriue a kingdome, or Common-wealth of that supreme Ciuill authoritie, which it re­ceiued not from Religion, but from the law of nations, and nature. So that if any Christian kingdome should reuolt from the faith of Christ, fall into heresie, or also Ethnicisme, yet she should haue no lesse full, and suffi­cient authoritie to gouerne it selfe ciuilly, and to enact ciuill lawes, then if it neuer had receiued the faith, and religion of Christ. The reason is, because as a temporall Common-wealth doth by the faith of Christ obtaine no temporall dominion, kingdome, or iurisdiction, but only a right to attaine by due meanes to the kingdome of heauen; so by the want of faith it only loseth y^e spi­rituall right, and not that temporall iurisdiction, which by the law of nations and nature is granted to all abso­lute Common-wealths, what Religion soeuer they doe professe.

[Page 151]8. The fourth Supposition is, that in this kingdome two Houses, as wee call them, of Parliament are distin­guished, wherein all those, who haue suffrages, doe vse to sit. The one is called the Lower house, which contai­neth those persons, who are elected by the people, or Commons: the other is called the Higher house, which comprehendeth the Peeres and Barons of the king­dome, whether they bee Archbishops, Bishops, Dukes, Marquesses, Earles, Barons, or by what titles soeuer they be called; Neuerthelesse all, and euery one of the aforesaid Nobles haue their voyce in the Parliament by this onely title, that by the Kings priuilege they are made Barons of the kingdome, and not in regard that they are Archbishops, Bishops, Dukes, Marquesses, or Earles. From whence it commeth to passe, that in this Higher house, which is onely one composed of the Ba­rons of the kingdome, and not two houses composed of the Lords spirituall and temporall, to the enacting of a law the suffrages of the Barons are indifferently num­bred, without regard how many voyces there be of spi­rituall, and how many of temporall Lords. Wherefore it may fall out, and sometimes also it hath so happened, that a law may bee established by the authoritie of the King and Parliament, and by the whole kingdome be accounted a firme and forcible law, although euery one of the Bishops, and Lords spirituall doe repugne, so that the greater part of the Barons, whether they be Lords spirituall or temporall doe giue their consent.

9. From hence may easily bee gathered a perspicu­ous answere to the aforesaid obiection. For whether we grant, that this custome, priuilege, or couenant not to enact any lawes without the counsell and consent of the aforesaid three States of the Realme did first pro­ceede from the King alone, or from the Common-wealth, or from them both, yet it cannot be denied, but that by the mutual consent of the King, and Common-wealth, it may either in part be altered, or wholly reuo­ked. [Page 152] We grant therefore that no ciuill law, according to the present custome of this kingdome, hath force to binde, vnlesse by the authoritie of a true, and lawfull Parliament, (which doth consist of the Prelates, or Bi­shops, of the Nobles, and of the Commons) it bee esta­blished. Neuerthelesse wee also affirme, that as it is in the power of the King, and Common-wealth, which the Parliament doth represent, to ordaine, that ciuill lawes bee enacted either by the Kings sole authoritie, without the consent or suffrages of the Prelates, No­bles, and Commons, or with their consent, so also it is in the power of the King and Parliament to declare, what persons are to be vnderstood by the names of Prelates, Nobles, and Commons, whose voyces must bee required to enact lawes in the Parliament. And therefore as in times past Catholike Bishops, and also Abbots were by the Kings priuilege made Peeres and Barons of the kingdome, and gaue their voyces with other Barons in the vpper house of Parliament, so also the Kings Maiestie might in like manner giue the same dignitie, and authoritie to Deanes, Archdeacons, or to any o­ther his Maiestie Subiects.

10. Seeing therefore that the Protestant Bishops of this kingdome are by the authoritie of the King and Common-wealth made Lords spirituall, or Barons of the kingdome, and by the whole kingdom are accoun­ted for such, there can be made no doubt at all, but that they haue full authority with other Barons of the king­dome, to prescribe to the whole kingdome ciuill lawes being confirmed by the King: especially seeing that they haue not suffrages in the Parliament, as they are true Bishops in very deede, but as being by the King and Parliament esteemed for such, they are by the Kings priuilege made Barons, and haue their place, and digni­tie in the Parliament with the other Barons of the king­dome: And that the Protestant Bishops are by the au­thoritie of the King and Common-wealth made Ba­rons [Page 153] of the kingdome, it is manifest by an Act of Parlia­ment holden the first yeere of Queene Elizabeth (which cannot be denied to bee a true Parliament, seeing that the Catholike Bishops were presentAs D. Har­ding witnes­seth against Master Iuels Apologie part. 6. chap. 2. thereat, and gaue their voyces with the other Barons of the kingdome) wherein it was decreed, that whosoeuer hereafter shall by the Queenes Royall authoritie be preferred to the dig­nitie of an Archbishop, and Bishop, and bee consecrated according to the rites and ceremonies prescribed by the Act of Parliament in the fifth yeere of King Edward the sixth, shall haue authoritre to doe, and execute all those things, concerning the name, title, degree, & dignity of an Archbishop, and Bishop, which any Archbishops, and Bi­shops of this Realme did heretofore doe, and execute. And although one onely Bishop, as D. Harding In the place before cited. relateth, gaue his assent thereunto, yet this, as may appeare by that, which wee said a little beforeNu. 8., nothing letteth, but that the voyces of the other Barons being more in number, might, for the granting by the Kings speciall gift, a temporall priuilege, as is a temporall dignitie, ouersway, and preuaile. And by this it is manifest, that the Parliaments of these times are true, and proper Par­liaments, and consequently that the ciuill lawes enacted by them, and confirmed by the Kings Royall assent, are established by good, full, and lawfull authoritie. And this now with farre greater reason may be auerred, see­ing that at this day there are no Catholike Bishops, who can challenge any place, or suffrage in the Parliament house.

11. And this may suffice for the satisfying of all the arguments, which are vsually alleaged against the sixth branch of this oath. For against those last words [and I do renounce al pardons, and dispensations to the contrary] supposing, that the Pope hath no power to dispēse with me in this oath, or any part thereof, of which wee haue before abundantly disputed, I cannot deuise any thing of moment, which can bee obiected. For that, which [Page 154] some vnlearned persons, hearing this name of pardons, doe very vnlearnedly imagine, that in this clause is de­nied the Popes authoritie to grant Pardons, or Indul­gences, is plainly friuolous, and very ridiculous: For that by the name of pardons, no other thing is signified in this clause of the oath, then that the Pope hath not power to dispense with me in this oath, or any part thereof, or to absolue me from the same, and conse­quently to grant me any license, pardon, or dispensation, by vertue whereof I am not bound, to beare faith, and true obedience to his Maiestie, to defend him to the vt­termost of my power against all treasons, and traiterous conspiracies, and not to disclose them, when they shall come to my knowledge, which pardons, licenses, or dis­pensations that euery Subiect may lawfully renounce, supposing that which hath been said before, is too too manifest.

Sect. I.

1. AGainst this branch two obiections are vsuallie made. The first, which Lessius, Nu. 216. as his English Recapitulator Pag. 51. relateth, doth insinuate, is against that word [sweare] comprehended in the first words of this branch, [And all these things I doe plainly, and sincere­ly acknowledge, and sweare] from which words it is [Page 155] plainly deduced, that I doe not only acknowledge, but al­so sweare all the former clauses, and parcels of the oath, and consequently that I doe sweare, that the Pope hath not power to depose the King, or to absolue his Subiects from their allegiance. Seeing therefore that no Catho­like can without danger of periurie sweare that to bee true, whose truth is not manifest, but controuerted among Catholikes, and no Catholike can denie, but that at the least it is vncertaine, and controverted among Catholike Diuines, whether the aforesaid positions doe containe truth, or falsehood, doubtlesse no Catholike can without danger of periurie sweare, that the Pope hath not autho­ritie to depose the King, and to absolue his Subiects from their allegiance, although he, who is of that opinion may, without any danger of periurie, confirme by oath the ac­knowledgement, profession, and declaration of his opi­nion.

2. To this obiection it is answered first, that the true and proper meaning of those words, [I doe acknow­ledge, and sweare] is not, that I do not only acknowledge, but also immediatly sweare all the branches, clauses, parcels, and words, which are contained in this oath, for that the contrarie concerning certaine parts of the oath doth euidently appeare, wherein I doe immediatly con­firme by oath the true and sincere declaration of my o­pinion, as is manifest both by the former branch [which I acknowledge by good, &c.] and by the first words of the oath, [I A,B. doe truly, and sincerely acknowledge, pro­fesse, testifie, and declare, &c.] and by the fifth branch, [And I doe beleeue, and in conscience am resolued, that neither the Pope, &c.] and also by the last branch [And this recognition, and acknowledgement I doe make, &c.] For by these words it is euident, that the immediate ob­iect, or which is all one, that thing which is immediatly sworne in many assertions contained in this oath, and especially in those positions, which are mentioned in the obiection, to wit, that the Pope hath not power to [Page 156] depose the King, or to discharge his subiects of their alle­giance, onely a true and sincere profession, acknow­ledgement, and declaration of my opinion, so that I doe not in this oath immediatelie sweare the trueth of the aforesaid positions in themselues, but a true and sincere declaration of my opinion; or which is all one, what is my opinion concerning the trueth of them.

3. Wherefore the plaine and proper meaning of these words [And all these things I doe plainly, and sin­cerely acknowledge, and sweare according to these ex­presse words by me spoken, and according to the plaine and common sense, &c.] is, that all these things, which I doe acknowledge, I doe plainly, and sincerely acknowledge according to these expresse words by me spoken, &c. and all these things, which I doe sweare, I doe plainly, and sincerely sweare according to these expresse words, &c. so that these words [and sweare] are not to bee re­ferred to those words [and all these things] as though I should sweare all those things, which were before spo­ken by me, but to those words [plainly, and sincerely] signifying thereby, that all these things, which I doe sweare, I doe plainly and sincerely sweare according to the common vnderstanding of the words, without any equiuocation at all. And that this is the true and plaine meaning of these words, any man, that will sincerely compare this branch of the oath with the other parts thereof, will cleerely perceiue: for otherwise they should most euidently contradict both the first, and the last, and also the middle clauses of the oath. And what Diuine or Lawyer, I pray you, will, against the com­mon and approued rules of interpreting lawes, affirme, that if in any law, or decree enacted by publike autho­ritie, there bee contained any proposition, which hath two senses, whereof the one hath in it no absurditie or inconuenience, and the other is absurd, and euidently repugnant to other words, and sentences of the said [Page 157] law, the worser sense is to be prefered, and that, which containeth in it no absurdity is to be reiected? And this also is to be obserued for answering to the two next obiections.

Sect. II.

1. THe Second obiection is vsually made against those words [according to these expresse words by me spoken, and according to the plaine, and common sense of the same words, without any equiuocation, &c.] For it seemeth, that whosoeuer sweareth these words must of ne­cessity be forsworne; considering that in this Oath are con­tained many equiuocall words, and many common senses of the same words: as for example, to depose the King, doth signifie, to depriue him of his Regall authority, and also, to thrust him out of possession of his Kingdome; to absolue from this oath, doth signifie; to absolue either from the thing sworn, or onely, from the thing as sworn: A Successour doth signifie, both a lawfull, and also an vn­lawfull Successour: As hereticall, may be taken either for hereticall indeed, or for hereticall onely in similitude: and so of the like: Therefore he that taketh the oath accor­ding to these expresse words, and sweareth the aforesaid e­quiuocall speeches, must of necessity vse some equiuocation, and consequently be forsworne, seeing that hee sweareth to vse no equiuocation at all.

2. To this obiection it is answered first, that although in this Oath there be contained many equiuocal words, and many common senses of the same words, if they be taken barely, and by themselues alone; yet as in this Oath they are ioyned with other words, and with them doe compound a full and perfect sentence, they are not so equiuocall, that all circumstances duely considered according to the rules beforeCap. 1. sect. 2. et seq. assigned for the interpreting of the words of Lawes, they haue according to the common vnderstanding of men [Page 158] two senses equally proper, which properly is to be e­quiuocall.

3. Neither is it vnusual, that a word, taken by it selfe, be equiuocall, which being placed in a sentence or pro­position is not, all circumstances considered, equiuocal. As this word [Dog] being taken nakedly by it selfe, hath many significations, yet if one talking with an other, in the time of y^e Dog daies, of the intemperate season of the ayre, should say, I greatly feare the Dog, this worde by the circumstance of the time, & other precedent words would be sufficiently determined to signifie the celesti­all constellation, and not an earthly Dog. And although there were in this oath many common senses of the same sentence, or proposition, which neuerthelesse is not true, as by answering all the particular obiections we haue shewed before, yet we might lawfully accor­ding to the rules before assigned, if there bee no other let, chuse that common sense, which is more commodi­ous to vs, so that it containe no absurdity, nor is repug­nant to the mind, and will of the Law-maker.

4. Secondly it is answered, that these later words [with­out any equiuocation &c.] doe onely declare those for­mer [And all these things I doe plainely and sincerely ac­knowledge, and sweare according to these expresse words by me spoken, and according to the common sense, and vnder­standing of the same words] so that they only signifie, that I doe deale plainly, and sincerely without any fraud or guile, and that I doe not take the words in an other meaning, then the common sense, and vnderstading of the same words doe beare. And therefore although there bee some equiuocal words in this oath, if they bee taken by themselues without considering all cir­cumstances, as hath beene said in the obiection, yet it doth not therefore follow, that when I speake those words, I doe equiuocate, or vse equiuocation. For first it is one thing to vse equiuocall words, which may bee called a materiall equiuocation, and an other thing to [Page 159] equiuocate, or to vse formall equiuocation. For to equi­uocate properly, or to vse formall equiuocation, as it is commonly vnderstood in this Kingdome, is to vse equi­uocall words, or some secret reseruation, of purpose to delude the hearer, so that hee who heareth the words, vnderstandeth them in another sense, then he who vt­tereth them, and it doth import an vnsincere manner of dealing. And therefore if any man aske vs, tell mee truely doe you equiuocate, or no, all men by this doe v­sually so vnderstand, tell me truely, whether you deale with me sincerely, and doe not take your words in an other sense, then in common speech they are vsually ta­ken? And therefore it may be, that the King, and Par­liament did cheefly for this end adde those words [with­out any equiuocation, &c.] that if perchance in this oath there were many common senses of the same sentence, or proposition, we should take it in that common sense wherein we thought the Law-maker to vnderstand it: for this is the principall meaning, and intention of the Law-maker, that wee should deale with him plainely, and sincerelyAnd so his Maiesty vnder­standeth these words in his Apologie page. 51. nu. 14. without any fraud, guile, or secret reser­uation.

5. Moreouer, although wee should admit, that in this oath there were not onely many equiuocall words, but also many equiuocall sentences, yet it doth not fol­low therefore, that in taking this oath wee must of ne­cessity vse some equiuocation; but rather it might from hence be inferred, that, if perchance in his oath there be contained many equiuocall sentences according to the common vnderstanding of the words, by vertue of this clause wee are bound, to declare publickely before wee take the whole oath, in what common sense wee take that proposition, which wee apprehend to bee e­quiuocall, so that our sense bee not repugnant to the in­tention of the Law-maker, and this is the most that the aforesaid obiection can proue; wherefore if any one be perswaded that those words, to depose, Successors, as he­reticall, [Page 160] or any such like words bee equiuocall, hee may openly declare, in what sense hee taketh those words, and so hee shall easily auoid all equiuocation, and all danger of periurie, which otherwise by taking of this clause he may incurre.

Sect. I.

1. BVt against this branch some obiect in this man­ner. That oath cannot be said to be taken heartilie, and willingly, which one taketh against his will, and is wre­sted [Page 161] from him through feare, but this oath is taken by most men against their wills, and if it were in their free power, and election, they would not take it, but it is wrested from them for feare of loosing for euer all their temporall goods, lands, and liberty, therefore they cannot truly sweare, that they doe take it heartily and willingly. This obiection is greatly vrged by Father Parsons in his English booke intituled, The Iudgmēt of a Catholike Englishman liuing in banishment for his religion, concerning a late book set forth and intituled; Triplici nodo: &c. or, An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, in which booke hee much labou­rethPag. 13. nu. 21. to proue, that in this Oath besides ciuill obedience are couched, and craftily conioyned also certaine Ecclesia­sticall points, and which appertaine indeed to Catholike Re­ligion with no small preiudice to the same. And this impor­tant matter he confidently affirmeth, may easily be clea­red by foure seuerall and distinct wayes.

2. The first way, saith he, is taken from the plain expresse words, sense, and drift of the oath it selfe, for that besides ciuill obedience, and the acknowledgement of our Soueraign to be true, and rightfull Lord ouer all his Dominions, and other such like clauses, whereat no man maketh difficulty, the said oath containeth further, that I must sweare in like manner some points concerning the limitation of the Popes authority, to wit, what he cannot doe towards his Maiesty, or his Successours in any case whatsoeuer, and consequent­ly towards all Kings, for the like reason is also in others: that he would say, that the Pope hath not power to depose the King, and to absolue his Subiects from their allegiance, &c. Which question being brought from the particular Hy­pothesis, to the generall Thesis, concerning all Kings, tou­cheth a point of Doctrine, and Catholike beleefe concerning the sufficiency of Pastorall authority left by our Sauiour in his Church to S. Peter, & his Successours, for redressing of all inconueniences that may fall out, which I (being a Catho­like) cannot in my conscience forsweare without peril of euer­lasting dānation. And this is one way of cleering the questiō

[Page 162]4. But truely this way is not cleare enough but very intricate, and incumbred with many difficulties. For this question concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, and to absolue subiects from their allegeance, doth not appertaine to Catholike doctrine, or beliefe, as heretoforeIn my Apolo­gie. wee haue aboundantly shewed, (whereNu. 203. & seq. also wee haue more particularly answered those rea­sons, which Fa. Parsons his Mitigation hath brought to this purpose) & hereafter against D. Schulckenius, we will, God willing, more distinctly proue the same: but this power may with a safe conscience be denied by Catholikes without danger of denying the Catholike faith. All Catholikes doe indeede acknowledge that the Pope is the Pastour of the Catholike Church, and that he hath al sufficient, and necessarie spirituall power to gouerne the flock of Christ, but whether this his spi­ritual power is to be extended to the deposing of Kings, and to the absoluing of Subiects from their temporall allegeance, is a controuersie, saith Trithemius,In Chronico Monasterii Hirsang ad an­num 1106. amongst the Schoole-men, and as yet it is not decided by the Iudge, whether the Pope hath power to depose the Emperour, or no.

5. The second way, saith he, to cleere this question, is taken from the Popes words in his Breues, wherein he decla­reth, that this oath containeth many things, which are clearely repugnant to the Catholike faith, and the health of soules. And this way is indeede, in some part, cleere: for it is cleere and manifest, that the Pope in his Breues did so declare, but neuerthelesse it is as yet vnknowne, and hidden from vs, what in particular be those many things, which are cleerely repugnant to Catholike faith, and the health of soules: which point, if Fa. Par­sons had declared, and cleered, as English Catholikes did expect he would haue done, he had then doubtlesse somewhat cleerely explained this question. But con­cerning the Popes Breues we will beneathThe next chap. sect 2. treate more at large.

[Page 163]6 The third proofe, faith Fa. Parsons,Pag. 15. nu. 25. may be taken from Cardinall Bellarmines letter, who hauing diligently considered with other learned men the nature of this oath, doth therefore hould it to be vnlawfull, for that it is so compounded by artificiall ioyning together of temporall, and spirituall things, ciuill obedience, and forswearing the Popes authoritie. But this way is no whit cleerer, but rather more obscure, than the former: for although Cardinall Bellarmine doth indeede auerre thus much, yet, as it is euident by that, which hath beene said before, he pro­ueth it with such weake, and silly reasons, that those, who are of opinion, that the oath is lawfull, and that nothing is therein contained, which is repugnant to Catholike faith, are rather thereby confirmed in their opinion, than any whit auerted from the same. See al­so what concerning this point wee haue said before in the 7. Chapter, Sect. 2. Num. 15.

7 The fourth way, which Fa. Parsons hath deuised for a more full, and finall cleering of this matter, is the framing of an other oath, to wit, to make this reall offer on the behalfe of euery English Catholike for better satis­faction of his Maiestie in this point, so much vrged of their Ciuill, and Temporall obedience, that he will sweare, and acknowledge most willingly all those parts, and clauses of the Oath, that doe any way appertaine to the Ciuill, and Temporal obedience due to his Maiestie, whom he acknow­ledgeth for his true, and lawfull King, and Soueraigne ouer al his Dominions, and that he will sweare vnto him as much loyaltie, as euer any Catholike Subiect of England did vn­to their lawfull King in former times, and ages, before the change of King Henry the eighth: or, that any forraine Subiect oweth, or ought to sweare to any Catholike Prince whatsoeuer at this day.

8. But first this way doth no whit cleare this present question, whether the oath be vnlawfull, and contrarie to Catholike beleefe, or no. For what, I pray you, do h it auaile, to proue that in this particular Oath is contai­ned, [Page 164] or not contained any thing more then ciuill obe­dience, for that all Catholikes will sweare in generall words all those things, which appertaine to Ciuill obe­dience? Secondly, all Catholikes will forsooth sweare in generall words, that King Iames is their lawfull King, and Soueraigne Lord, and they will promise vnto him in generall words Obedience, but in particular, for how long a time he shall bee their Lawfull King, and Soue­raigne Lord, and for what time they will promise vnto him Obedience, to wit, whether for euer, or onely for a certain time, vntil the Pope depose him, and discharge his Subiects of their Obedience, all Catholike Subiects will not perchance aduenture to sweare.

9. Thirdly, the Kings Maiesty auoucheth, that in this particular Oath is contained nothing besides that ciuill Obedience, and temporall Allegiance, which euery for­raine Subiect, if his Prince vpon iust cause shall demand it at his hands, may with a good conscience, and also ought to sweare. Yea in very deed he in this oath requi­reth of his English Subiects no other thing, then which the Kingdome of France doth publickly professe to bee due vnto their most Christian King; to wit, that the Pope hath not power to depriue the King of France of his King­dome, and that notwithstanding any monitions, Excommu­nications, or Interdicts, which may be made by the Pope, yet his Subiects are bound to yeeld obedience due to him for temporalls, neither that they can therein be dispensed, or ab­solued by the Pope. Would Father Parsons, trow you, if he were now aliue, also affirme, that this assertion is re­pugnant to Catholike Doctrine, and beliefe, for that it containeth some things concerning the limitation of the Popes authority, or would he auerre with Cardinall Bel­larmine that this assertion is compounded of a spirituall thing to wit, of the deniall of the Popes authority?

10. Finally, the last argument, which Father Parsons doth as by the way bring to impugne this Oath of Al­legiance, is that obiection, which we haue set downe in [Page 165] the beginning of this Section, wherein he seemeth to please himselfe so much, that he thereupon, as you shall perceiue, taketh occasion to triumph against his Ma­iestie.

11. For the satisfying therefore of this obiection, we must first of all suppose out of S. Thomas 1. 2ae. q 6. ar 6, that ac­cording to Aristotle Lib. 3. Ethic. cap. 1., and Gregorie Nyssene Lib 5. de ho­mine cap. 1., Huius­modi quae per metum aguntur, &c. Those things which are done for feare, are mixt of voluntarie, or willing­nes, and inuoluntarie or vnwillingnes: for that, which is done for feare, if it be considered in it selfe, is not vo­luntarie, but it is voluntarie in some case, to wit, to auoid the euill, which is feared. But if one doe well consider, they are more voluntarie, then inuoluntarie; for they are sim­ply voluntarie, but inuoluntarie in some sort. For euery thing is said to haue it being simply, according as it is in deede, and according as it hath it being in imagination, it hath not being simply, but after some sort. But that which is done for feare, being a particular action, hath it being in deed, according as it is done in this place, in this time, and with other particular conditions required to a parti­cular action. And so willingnes is in that, which is done for feare, according as it hath being indeed in this place, and in this time; to wit, according as in this particular case it is an hindrance of a greater euill, which was fea­red; as the casting of merchandize into the Sea in the time of a tempest is made voluntarie for feare of danger: Whereupon it is manifest, that it is simply voluntarie, and therefore the definition of voluntarie doth agree vnto it, for that our inward will is cause thereof; But that the thing which is done for feare, be taken as hauing it being out of this case, as it is repugnant to the will, this hath on­ly it being in imagination, and therefore it is inuolunta­rie in some sort, to wit, as it is considered to haue it being out of this case. Thus farre S. Thomas.

12. From hence it is easie to answere the aforesaid obiection. For seeing that those things, which are done [Page 166] for feare, haue more of willingnes, then of vnwillingnes, and therefore simply they are to be called voluntarie, or willing, both for that they are actually chosen by our will, and also for that all actions take their names chief­ly from their end, but the end of these actions, which are done for feare, which is to auoid a greater euill, is more voluntarie, and to be desired: therfore the actions themselues are simply, and absolutely to be called volun­tarie, according to that vulgar axiome, Denomination, or imposing of names, is taken from the greater part, or from, that, which is predominant. And so a law, which is made by the greater part of a Councell, or Parliament, is absolutely said to be made by the whole Councell, or Parliament. From whence it followeth, that although we should grant, that some Catholikes, partly because they doe not throughly perceiue the lawfulnes of the oath, and partly for some other humane respect are for feare moued to take the same, and so in some sort are not willing to take it, to wit, conditionally, if the oath had not been imposed vpon them by Act of Parlia­ment, vnder such grieuous penalties, yet the law being now made, and the oath being tendred vnto them, which without great inconueniences they cannot re­fuse, they doe in very deede at this present time, for the reason alleaged by S. Thomas, take it heartily, and wil­lingly. Yea, as it will beneathNu. 20. & seq. most manifestly ap­peare, there is no man, who, if he please, may not take it most heartily, most willingly, and most freely, without any repugnance, displeasure, feare, or constraint at all.

13. Wherefore I cannot but greatly meruaile, for what cause Father Parsons, although he grant, that the casting out of ones goods into the Sea in the time of a tem­pest for feare of drowning, is according to the doctrine of Catholike Diuines inuoluntarie in part, and simply vo­luntarie, for that, all circumstances considered, he resol­ueth finally to be the best to cast out his goods, and saue himselfe, neuerthelesse to reprehend those words of his [Page 167] Maiestie, as hauing in themselues no great coherence, to wit, that very many of his Maiesties subiects, that were Popishly affected, as well Priests; as Laycks, did free­ly take the oath, dare presume to auerre so confidently, that all Diuines doe agree in this, that freedome is taken away by this constraint of the passion of feare. For that freedome requireth full libertie to both extreames, or obiects, that are proposed; which is not in our case. For that the displeasure of the Prince, the losse of goods, and liberty, the ruine of his familie, the terror, and perswasion of his friends, are heauie poyses, and doe mightily prepon­derate on the one side; and consequently the mention of this freedome might haue been pretermitted, for so much as no constraint of humane will can be greater, then this: And yet it is said in the Oath, that he must doe it, both willingly, and heartily, and as hee beleeueth in consci­ence. Let the discreete Reader consider, what coherence there is in their tale. Thus Father Parsons.

14. But first of all, vnlesse wee will grosly equiuo­cate, it is both euidently false, and repugnant to the do­ctrine of Catholike Diuines, and also erroneous in faith to affirme, that freedome is altogether taken away by the constraint of feare, for that, notwithstanding any feare, we haue full and perfect freedome, The Latine word is liber­tas, or perfectè voluntarium. and libertie, to chuse which part we will. For otherwise, he that for feare should commit any vnlawfull act, should be excu­sed from sinne, considering that, according to Father Parsons doctrine, he hath not full and perfect freedome, or libertie, without which no grieuous sinne can bee committed, as all Diuines with vniforme assent doe ac­knowledge.

15. Foure therefore kindes of freedome, or libertie, are commonly assigned by the DeuinesSee the Ma­ster of the Sen­tences in 2. dist. 25. & Ioan­nes Azorius tom. 1. Institut. lib. 1. cap. 2.. The first free­dome, or libertie is, whereby a man is free from sinne, of which the words of the Apostle2. Cor. 3. are to be vnderstood, Where the spirit of our Lord is their is freedome, or liber­tie. And those of our Sauiour Christ in the Gospell,Ioh. 8. If [Page 168] the Sonne make you free, you shall be free indeed. And this freedome doth free vs from the bondage of sinne, as contrariwise, the bondage of sinne doth make vs free to iustice, according to that of the Apostle,Rom. 6.18. And being made free from sinne, you were made seruants to iustice. And againe,vers. 20. When you were seruants to sinne, you were free to iustice. And this freedome man did loose by sin­ning. The second freedome is whereby a man is free from misery, and paine. Whereof the ApostleRom. 8. writeth, The creature also it selfe, shall be freed from the seruitude of corruption into the freedome of the glory of the children of God. And this freedome man had before he sinned, for that hee was then free from all misery, and was troub­led with no paine, or greefe, and he shall haue this free­dome more perfectly in the kingdome of heauen, where hee shall for euer be free from all misery. The third free­dome is, whereby a man is free from necessitie, which freedome doth consist in this, that he is said to doe any action freely, when supposing all conditions required to do that action, hee hath freedome to do it & not to do it: and this freedome is required to sinne, and to euery action, which deserueth blame, or commendation; pu­nishment, or reward, according to that saying of Saint Augustine, Tom. 1. de ve­ra religione. cap. 14. speaking of man being tempted by Luci­fer, If he had done that of necessitie, he had beene tyed with no bond of sin. And this freedome is in all men both good and bad; and, as the Master of the Sentences saith, Our will both before sinne, and after sinne is equally free from necessitie.

16. The fourth freedome is, whereby a man is free from violence, in regarde of which freedome no crea­ture either reasonable, or vnreasonable is said to suffer violence in any action, vnlesse that action doe proceed from some externall cause against the naturall inclina­tion of that creature: As, for example, the descending of a stone downeward is free from violence, because it proceedeth from the inward, and naturall waight of the [Page 169] stone: but the throwing of a stone vpwards, is alto­gether violent, because it proceedeth from the outward impression of the thrower, against the inward, and na­turall waight, and inclination of the stone.

17. So likewise man, according to the doctrine of al Diuines, and Philosophers, in all those actions depen­ding on our will, which doe not proceede from some externall cause against our will, is said to be free from violence, or constraint. And this kinde of violence, or constraint, seeing that it maketh the action not onely in part, but altogether inuoluntary, cannot be found in voluntary, or free actions. Neither can our will in her owne proper actions, as to will, or to nill any thing propounded vnto her, bee constrained with this vio­lence; because at the same time, when shee should bee constrained to will any thing against her wil, she should both will, and not will the same thing, which imply­eth a manifest contradiction. Neuerthelesse it is most certaine, as well obserueth Ioannes Azorius, Tom. 1. In­stit. lib. 1. cap. 9 ad finem. That mans will may be allured, enticed, or enclined by great prayers, perswasions, fearer, and threatnings, and then the will is vulgarly said to be drawen, and so also to be compelled, not because truely and properly she suffereth violence, but be­cause the will would not otherwise will, but for these, and such like motiues and impulsions. And these be the gene­rall acceptions of freedome, whereunto all other free­domes in particular, as to bee free from sicknesse, from bondage, from feare, and a hundred such like may bee reduced.

18. By this it may easily be perceiued, that Fa. Par­sons did without cause carpe at those words of his Maie­stie, That very many Catholicks had freely taken this oath, seeing that, although they had taken it only for feare of punishment, and incurring his Maiesties displeasure (in that manner as Merchants doe in tempestuous weather cast out their goods into the Sea, for feare of beeing drowned themselues) yet, as we haue shewed before, it [Page 166] [...] [Page 167] [...] [Page 168] [...] [Page 169] [...] [Page 170] may bee said most truely, that they did take it indeed heartily, willingly, and also freely (although this word [freely] be not in the oath at all) for that the feare doth not take away their freedome, and willingnesse, as free, willing, or voluntary is both by Diuines, and in common speech vsually taken.

19. And although in some actions to doe a thing freely, doth signifie all one, as not to doe it for feare, yet this is not common to all actions, but proper, and pe­culiar only to some, as to gifts, and donations, to whose substance this peculiar condition is required, that they be done freely, liberally, without feare, compulsion, or any inward displeasure at all, in which sense freely doth onely signifie liberally, and so this word liberally is deri­ued from the latine word libere, which in English wee call freely: but the proper, and vsuall acception of free­dome, as the Diuines, and Philosophers take freedome, is no other, then those foure which we haue rehearsed out of Azor. Which freedome both from necessitie, and violence or constraint (for the other two significations of freedome are impertinent to our purpose) although by feare it be somewhat diminished, yet it is not alto­gether taken away, nor so diminished, but that those actions, which are done for feare, haue more of willing­nesse, freedome, or libertie, then of the contrarie, and therefore, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, and the Diuines, as also Father Parsons himselfe doth wit­nesse, they are absolutely, and simply said to bee done hearttily, willingly, and freely. Whereby it is manifest, that this first answere doth abundantly satisfie the afore­said obiection.

But to satisfie this argument of Fa. Parsons super­abundantly, and to shew most euidently the weakenes thereof, wee will grant him for disputations sake, that the meaning of those words, [And this recognition I do make heartily, and willingly, let vs adde also, and freely] is that, which he desireth, to wit, that I do not take this [Page 171] oath for any feare of punishment; Neuerthelesse, se­condly and principally (supposing that all the precedent clauses of the oath may lawfully, and with a safe consci­ence be taken, which at this present must be supposed, and which by fully satisfying all the aforesaid obie­ctions, hath in my iudgement been sufficiently proued) it is answered, that there is no Catholike, that may not with a safe conscience take this branch of the oath, and consequently sweare most truly, that he doth make this recognition, and acknowledgement most heartily, most willingly, and most freely, without any feare, repug­nance, or displeasure at all, if he bee sincerely moued to make the same not for feare of any punishment, but for the lawfulnes, goodnesse, and honestie of the act it selfe.

21. May not any man, I pray you, obserue God his commandements most heartely, most willingly, and most freely meerely for his loue, and not for feare of punish­ment, although most grieuous punishments are ordai­ned by God against the breakers of his commande­ments? Are wee not bound by the law of God, to loue him with all our heart, with all our soule, and with all our strength, that is, most heartely, most willingly, and most freely, and neuerthelesse almightie God hath pre­pared for them, who doe not loue him, the euerlasting torments of hell fire, besides the losing of the kingdome of heauen? Is not the losse of a celestiall kingdome, and to be thrust together with the Diuels into the hor­rible prison of hell, there to be tormented euerlasting­ly, farre greater poyses, then to bee depriued for a little time of temporall lands, goods, or libertie? Why then cannot I take this oath, supposing it to be lawfull, hear­tely, willingly, and freely, although it be imposed vpon me by the Kings command vnder paine of bodily im­prisonment, and forfeiting all my temporall goods, as well, as, obseruing due proportion, I can loue God, and keepe his commandements most heartily, most willingly, [Page 172] and most freely, who neuerthelesse hath in the holie Scripture threatned farre bitter punishments to those, who doe not loue him with all their heart, and strictly obserue his commandements?

22. Wherefore there is no repugnance at all, what­soeuer Father Parsons saith, but rather great coherence betwixt these two, to wit, that great punishments are by Act of Parliament ordained for those, who shall re­fuse the oath, and yet that any man may take it not for feare of those punishments, if so be that he be moued to the taking thereof, not for feare of any punishment, but only in regard of the lawfulnes of the oath, not so much desiring to auoid, by taking the oath, those pu­nishments, as to obey the iust command of his lawfull Prince, in those things, wherein he hath full and lawfull power to command him. And this seemeth to be the chiefest end of the King and Parliament, in concluding the Oath with these words, heartely, and willingly, (the reason whereof wee will alleage beneathNu. 26.) that al­though very grieuous punishments be appointed for them, who doe refuse the oath (as it is vsuall in al lawes, which doe command, or forbid any thing of great im­portance) yet the Subiects should neuerthelesse take the said oath, not for feare of those punishments, but meerely, and sincerely for the lawfulnes of the oath it selfe, which his Maiestie by Act of Parliament hath commanded, which euery deuout subiect, and well af­fected to his Maiestie, who thinketh the oath to bee lawfull, may lawfully, and is also bound to doe.

23. For, as well obserueth Gabriel Vasquez 1. 2ae disp. 51. cap. 3. & disp. 73 cap. 7. & disp. 86. cap. 5., and other Diuines out of Aristotle 2. Ethic. cap. 4, to make an act of vertue, to be morally good, and vertuous, it is not onely required, that it haue a good, and vertuous obiect, but also it must be done directly for the goodnesse, and ho­nestie of the vertue it selfe, and not for any other end, or motiue. For otherwise if one doe acts of vertue, as of iustice, or temperance, not for iustice, or temperance [Page 173] sake, but for some other end, as for lucre, vainglorie, feare of punishment, or any other motiue whatsoeuer, he shall doe, saith Aristotle, iust, or temperate actions, but he shall not doe them iustly, or temperatly, neither shall he for doing those actions be reputed a iust, or tempe­rate man: which Aristotle declareth by this example. For it is one thing, saith he, to make a Grammaticall con­struction, and another thing to make it Grammatically; for if one hauing no skill in Grammer, doth either by chance, or another prompting him, make rightly a Gram­maticall construction, he maketh doubtlesse Grammati­call construction, but he maketh it not Grammatically; but if one make the same by art, he maketh both a Gramma­ticall construction, and also Grāmatically, because he ma­keth it by the art, and skill, which is in him. And as in arts the knowledge of the art is required, to doe a thing ar­tificiously, or according to art; so in vertues, according to Aristotle, a vertuous intention (for to vertues, saith he, knowledge doth little, or nothing auaile) to doe the act for vertues sake, is necessarie, that the act be done vertuously, or according to vertue.

24. Wherefore, as well saith S. Thomas 1. 2ae. q. 96. art. 5., as the na­ture of a law doth containe two things, first, to be a rule of humane actions: secondly, to haue power to compell; so may a man in two manner of waies be subiect to the law; first, as one, who is ruled, is subiect to the rule, and in this manner all men, who are subiect to authoritie, are subiect to the law, which is made by authoritie: secondly, as one, who is compelled, is subiect to him, who compelleth him, and in this manner only wicked men, and not the iust and vertuous are subiect to the law. As if hee should haue said, iust and vertuous men are subiect to the directiue power of the law, but not to the coactiue power; or, which is all one, the iust doe not obserue the law for feare of punishment, as the wicked doe, but for the loue of vertue, wherein by force of the law they are directed, and not to the obseruing whereof for feare of punish­ment [Page 174] they are compelled; so that they are said to be in the law, not vnder the law. For, it is one thing, saith S. Augustine Tom. 8. in il­lud Psal. 1. Sed in lege Domini &c., to be in the law, another thing to be vnder the law. He that is in the law, secundum legem agit, doth according to the law, he that is vnder the law, secundum legem agitur, is drawne according to the law; as if hee should say, is drawne, enforced, and constrained as a slaue to keepe the law. And this difference betwixt good men and bad men in obseruing lawes, is well de­clared by the Poet in those verses:

25. To conclude therefore this answere, it is false, which Father Parsons Nu. 29. before cited. affirmeth, that there is no other freedome in taking this, then which a Merchant hath in a tempest, either to cast out his goods into the sea, for lighte­ning his ship, or to be drowned himselfe: For the only mo­tiue, which causeth the Merchant to cast out his goods into the sea, is to escape that danger of drowning, which if it were not, he would be altogether vnwilling to cast away his goods: but the onely motiue, why a loyall subiect, and well affected to his Maiestie, ought to take this oath, is not the feare of punishments, but the loue and desire hee hath to obey the iust and lawfull command of his Prince, whom he is readie to obey, al­though he should impose no punishment on them, who should transgresse his law. The comparison of Father Parsons, betwixt the taking of this oath, and the casting of ones goods into the Sea, had been doubtlesse apt, and fit enough, if the Oath were in it selfe vnlawfull, for then the only feare of punishment, and of incurring his Maiesties displeasure, could moue the subiects to take the oath: but vnlesse this first be proued, which doubt­lesse [Page 175] the former obiections haue not yet conuinced, there can bee no great coherence in Father Parsons dis­course, neither doth the aforesaid obiection against this last branch of the oath in any wise conuince the oath to be vnlawfull. And if notwithstanding all this, which hath been said, there be any one, who doth not willingly take this oath, let he himselfe looke to that; it is sufficient, that, if with an attentiue eye he will reade, and with an indifferent iudgement consider what wee haue said, hee may most euidently perceiue, that this oath containeth in it no false, or vnlawfull thing, and consequently, that it may bee taken heartely, willingly, and freely, without any feare of punishment, or any con­straint at all.

26. Finally, the Kings Maiestie and Parliament had farre greater, and more vrgent reasons to command the subiects to take this oath heartely, and willingly, then to obserue heartely and willingly the other lawes of the Realme; because the principall end and inten­tion of his Maiestie in enacting other lawes is, that they be only outwardly obserued; neither doth he greatly care with what inward affection his subiects doe fulfill his outward precepts; for that to the outward conser­uation of publike peace and quietnes in his kingdome, he thinketh it sufficient, that his precepts and lawes bee outwardly and publikely obserued. But this Oath of Allegiance was principally deuised for this end, to make triall, how his Subiects were inwardly affected towards his Maiestie in those things, which appertaine to their loyaltie, that by that meanes he might haue good assu­rance of their constant fidelitie, and obedience, and, as much as may be, be made secure from danger of future conspiracies. For furious, and bloodie opinions, as very well said his Maiestie In Praefat. Monitoria non longe à prin­cipio., doe now and then bring foorth also bloodie conspiracies, as was that of the Powder-Treason. And therefore it was necessarie that he should compell all his Subiects to take all the clauses of this [Page 176] Oath of Allegiance not onely in outward words, but al­so sincerely, vnfaignedly, willingly, and truely with all their hearts.

And thus much concerning the principal obiections, which are vsually made against all the particular clauses of the Oath, it remaineth onely that in like manner we diligently examine all the chiefe obiections, which are commonly vrged against the Oath in generall.

Sect. I.

FIrst therefore Card. Bellarmine, In respons. ad Apolog. pag. 7. et 23. and Lessius, Nu. 2 15. as his English Recapitulator Pag. 47. relateth, doe obiect against the Oath in generall, that euen from the iudge­ment, and confession of the King, and Parliament, and from the end, for which this oath was deuised, it may bee concluded, that it doth not onely containe ciuill obedience, and temporall allegeance, as his Maiestie pretendeth, and vnder colour whereof he imposeth it vpon Catholikes. And this is the whole force, and substance of their argument.

2. That oath can not in the iudgement of those con­taine onely temporall allegeance, and ciuill obedience, which by them was only inuented for the discouering, and repressing of Popish Recusants, but this oath was by the King, and Parliament only inuented for the discouering, and repressing of Popish Recusants, therefore this oath can not in the iudgements of the King, and Parliament con­taine only temporall allegeance, and ciuill obedience.

The Maior proposition is euident: because that thing can not be iudged an apt meanes to discouer, or make known Popish Recusants, which is as well common to Protestants, as to Popish Recusants; for otherwise it were no fit meanes [Page 177] to discouer the one, more then the other; but to sweare temporall allegiance, and ciuill obedience, is as well common to Protestants, as to Popish Recusants, therefore to sweare temporall allegiance can not bee iudged by the King, and Parliament, to be an apt meanes for the discouering of Po­pish Recusants.

3 The Minor proposition is manifest, both by title of the Act it selfe, wherein this Oath is commanded, which is; An Act for the better discouering, and repressing of Popish Recusants; and also by the King himselfe, who in his Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, doth seeme, as shall appeare by Cardinall Bellarmine, to affirme the same. Wee prooue, saith Cardinall Bellarmine In the place before cited. that this oath doth not only containe the Ciuill Obedience of Subiects to­wards their Prince in causes meerely temporall, as the King in his Apologie affirmeth. First by the Kings Edict, where­in the forme of this Oath is contained, and prescribed. For the title of the Edict is this, An Act for the discouering, and repressing of Papists. Wherefore is it not saide, for the discouering, and repressing of Rebells? but for that the end, why this Oath was deuised, is not the dis­couering of those, who deny Ciuill Obedience, which is proper to Rebells, but the discouering of those, who deny the spirituall Supremacie of the King, and ac­knowledge the spirituall Supremacie of the Pope, which is knowne to be proper to Catholikes, whom you call Papists. I adde lastly a confirmation In the place before cited. pag. 12. hereof out of the words of this Author, to wit, the Kings Maiestie; for al­though he hath a thousand times repeated, that in this oath is only contained Ciuill Obedience, neuerthelesse in the 88. page It is in the English Editi­on pag. 84. it escaped him vnawares, that this Oath was de­uised to forbid the people to drinke so deepely in the cup of Antichristian fornications. For what doe our Ad­uersaries vsually call Antichristian fornicatians, but the reuerencing of the Popes authority? Therefore not only Ciuill Obedience, but also the detesting of spirituall obedi­ence is conteined in this Oath.

[Page 178]4 This obiection hath beene long since so largely and fully satisfied in Tortura Torti, By D. An­drews then Bi­shop of Ciche­ster, now of E­ly. p. 13. et seq. or in the Answeare to Cardinall Bellarmines booke against his Maiesties A­pologie for the Oath of Allegeance then published vnder the name of Matthaeus Tortus, that I meruaile, with what bouldnesse learned Lessius, if he did see the afore­said Answeare, and especially the English Recapitulator of Lessius, (who, at that time, when this Answeare came forth, liuing in this kingdome, did, as it is proba­ble, both see it, and reade it) durst presume to inculcate againe so nakedly the selfe same obiection.

5 The whole force therefore of this obiection is on­ly grounded on the bare title of the Act of Parliament, wherein the taking of this Oath is commanded. But if it had pleased Cardinall Bellarmine, and Lessius, to haue perused, not onely the title of the Act, but also the whole Act it selfe (which vndoubtedly, according to the receiued rule of the Ciuill Law related in the first Chapter,Sec. 2. nu. 2. they ought to haue done, before they had de­liuered their iudgement concerning the whole Oath, or any part therof, for that it is an vnciuill part, saith the Law,Leg. Inciuile F. de legibus. to giue an answere, or iudgement, concerning any one particular clause of the Law, vnlesse the whole law bee first perused) they might most euidently haue perceiued, what was the end, and intent of the Parliament in fra­ming this Oath of Allegiance, and that their obiection taken from the end, and reason of the Oath, is vaine, fri­uolous, and of no force at all.

6. For first it is manifest, that in this Act of Parlia­ment are enacted many lawes, and Cardinall Bellarmine himselfe numbreth fourteene, whereof the farre greater part doe not appertaine to the taking of this Oath, but onely to the discouering, and repressing of Popish Re­cusants for points of Religion; And therefore the Act might rightly bee so intituled, by reason of the greater part of the Lawes therein contained, according to that vulgar Maxime of the Philosophers, Denominatio fit ex [Page 179] maiori parte. Denomination, or the imposing of names is to be made from the greater part. Wherefore no forcible ar­gument can be drawn from the title of the Act to proue that the Oath, which is the least part of the lawes com­prehended in that Act, was either deuised to discouer, & represse popish Recusants, or that it containeth more then the profession of ciuill obedience.

7. But if Cardinall Bellarmine, and Lessius had dili­gently considered not onely the title of the whole Act, wherein, as we haue said, very many lawes are contai­ned, but also the Preamble to this particular Law for ta­king the Oath, which Preamble doth vertually imply the title thereof, they might easily haue perceiued, what was the end, for which the Parliamēt framed this Oath: For the Preamble to the Law for taking the Oath, is by the Parliament expressed in these words: And for the better triall, how his Maiesties Subiects stand affected in point of their Loyalty, and due obedience, Be it also enacted &c. This therefore was the true end, and meaning of the King and Parliament in framing this Oath, to make a triall what Catholikes were loyall Subiects, and who were disloyall. They had long before cleare and mani­fest means by many lawes established in this Kingdom, as by the Oath of the Kings Supremacy in causes Eccle­siasticall, by the Law for repairing to the Protestant Churches once euery month, and by many such like, to discouer Catholikes, whom they call Papists, and Po­pish Recusants in points of Religion, without deuising such an vnfit, and altogether insufficient meanes, as is the taking of this Oath of Allegiance.

8. Secondly, that it may clearely appeare how weake and vnsound is this argument, which is drawen from the bare title of the Act, to prooue that this Oath con­taineth in it more, then ciuil Obedience, be it so as these men say, that not onely the title of the Act in generall, wherein neuerthelesse many other lawes appertaining to Religion are, as we said before, contained, but also [Page 180] the title of the Oath it selfe in particular be, for the disco­uering, and repressing of popish Recusants, yet what from hence can bee rightly inferred to impugne the Oath, I cannot truly in any wise perceiue. And if Cardinal Bel­larmine do demand, if this Oath containe only ciuill Obe­dience, why then is the title thereof, an Act for the discoue­ring, & repressing of popish Recusants, & not rather for the discouering of Rebells, and of such as denie ciuill Obedience, which is proper to Rebels? To this question both the Par­liament it selfe, and also the Kings Maiestie haue fully answered, as any man may easily perceiue, who shall but sleightly read ouer his Maiesties Apologie, and the ve­ry next words of the Parliament, which doe immediatly follow the title of the aforesaid Act. And because the words of the Parliament are in effect al one with those which his Maiestie hath published to the whole Chri­stian world, it shall be sufficient at this time to rehearse his Maiesties words for the clearing of this matter.

9. And although, saith he,In his Apo­logie. pag. 2. num. 2. the onely reason these Traitours gaue for plotting so heinous an attempt, was the zeale they caried to the Romish Religion; yet were neuer any other of that Profession the worse vsed for that cause, as by our gracious Proclamation immediatly after the discouerie of the said fact doth plainly appeare: onely at the next sit­ting downe againe of the Parliament, were there lawes made setting downe some such orders, as were thought fit for preuenting the like mischiefe in time to come. Amongst which a forme of Oath was framed to be taken by all my Subeects, whereby they should make cleare profession of their resolution, faithfully to persist in obedience vnto me, according to their naturall Allegiance; to the end that I might hereby make a separation, not onely betweene all my good Subiects in generall, and vnfaithfull Traitors, that intended to withdraw themselues from my obedience; but specially to make a separation betweene so many of my Sub­iects, who although they were otherwise Popishly affected, yet retained in their hearts the print of their naturall due­tie [Page 181] to their Soueraigne; and those, who being caried away with the the like fanaticall zeale that the Powder Traitors were, could not conteine themselues within the bounds of their naturall Allegiance, but thought diuersitie of Reli­gion a safe pretext for all kinde of Treasons, and rebellions against their Soueraigne. And in his premonition to all Christian Princes, This Oath, saith he,Pag 9. was ordeined only for making of a true distinction, betweene Papists of quiet disposition, and in all other things good Subiects, and such other Papists, as in their hearts maintained the like violent bloodie Maximes, that the Powder traitors did.

10, Wherefore, wee may freely grant to Cardinall Bellarmine and Lessius, that the intent of the King and Parliament in framing this Oath was, to discouer Pa­pists, or Popish Recusants, but such Recusants, who refu­sed to giue assurance of their allegiance due to his Ma­iestie, such Popish Recusants, who maintained in their hearts those bloodie Maximes, and opinions, that those barbarous Powder-traitours did, to murther the Kings Maiestie for aduancement of Religion: such Popish Re­cusants, who doe holde it not repugnant to Catholicke faith, that it is in the free power of Subiects, or any o­ther whatsoeuer to depose, or if they will, to murther Princes, which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope; such Popish Recusants, who doe firmely beleeue, that Princes may by the Popes spirituall power be thrust out of their temporall kingdomes, which they lawfully possesse, and that this doctrine is so certaine, that no Catholicke can with a good conscience, and without denying the Catholicke faith defend the contrary opi­nion, and by oath, if neede require, confirme the same. And by this wee may cleerely perceiue the meaning of his Maiesties words, which Cardinall Bellarmine hath wrongfully (I speake with reuerence) retorted a­gainst his Maiestie, yea and hee hath shamefully con­trold his Maiesties sentence, cutting off half the words of the whole sentence, which doe euidently explaine [Page 182] the meaning of the rest. For thus writeth his Maiestie In his Apo­logie. pag. 84..

11. And this Oath giuen vpon so vrgent an occasion, for the apparant saftie of me, and my posteritie, forbidding my people to drinke so deepely Obserue those words of his Maiestie, drinke so deeply, but that, &c. in the bitter cup of Anti­christian fornications, Cardinall Bellarmine in his obiection leaueth out those words, but that they may keepe and so forth, which doe plainly de­clare the mea­ning of the for­mer. but that they may keepe so much honey in their hearts, as may argue them still espoused to me their Soueraigne, in the maine knot of true allegiance. For his Maiestie in these words doth not affirme any other thing, but what in other places he hath often repeated, neither did these words slip from him vnawares, but he spoke them aduisedly, and with mature deliberation, to wit, that this oath was deuised, not to forbid his Ca­tholicke Subiects, that they should not reuerence at all the Popes spirituall authoritie, but that they should not reuerence it so excessiuely, Obserue those words of his Maiestie, drinke so deeply, but that, &c. but that, they may argue them selues still espoused to his Maiestie in the maine knot of true Allegiance; that they should not reuerence it so ex­cessiuely, that they should beleeue, that the Pope had au­thoritie to giue them leaue to beare Armes, and raise tumults against his Maiestie, not to reueale treasons and traiterous Conspiracies against him, and finally to de­pose him, or if they will, to murther him, if hee should be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope: that they should not reuerence it so excessiuely, that they should imagine, that temporall obedience, and constant alle­giance due by the law of God and nature to euery law­full Prince, although he be an heretike, can not stand long together with Catholicke Religion, and with spi­rituall obedience due to the Pope by Christ his insti­tution.

12. To the obiection therefore in forme it is answe­red, by declaring the Maior proposition, whereby also the sense and meaning of the Minor will be very easily made manifest. For although this oath which is com­mon both to Protestants and Catholickes, or Popish Recusants, can not bee a fit meanes for the discouering of Popish Recusants in points of Religion, yet it may [Page 183] be a very fit meanes for the discouering and distingui­shing of Popish Recusants among themselues in points of their loyaltie, and how concerning their allegiance they are affected towards his Maiestie, which was the cheefest, yea and onely intent of the King and Parlia­ment in deuising this Oath, and not to distinguish Ca­tholikes from Protestants in points of Religion. And although to sweare true allegiāce to a temporal Prince, be as well common to Protestants as to Catholickes, as being commanded by the law of God, and nature to all Subiects towards their lawfull Prince, what Religi­gion soeuer hee doth professe; yet, as in those things, which are required to Ciuill obedience, and true alle­giance there may bee great disagreement in opinions, both among Catholikes themselues, and also among Protestants, as for example, whether ciuill obedience be due to a Prince, after hee be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope? Whether a spirituall power hath authoritie to depriue Princes not onely of their king­domes, but also of their liues? Whether the Pope bee supreame temporall King, and direct Lord in temporals of all the kingdomes of the Christian world, and such like? So also there may be a great disagreement among them concerning those thinges, which Princes may command their Subiects to sweare for confirming of their true Allegiance.

13 And vndoubtedly a tēporal Prince hath ful pow­er and authoritie, to require of his Subiects, an oath of allegiance, not onely in general words, but also such an oath in particular, which supposing that it bee in it selfe lawfull, the King and State for the preuenting of future conspiracies, and tumults in the Common-wealth, and for the discouering of those Subiects, who are not well affected in points of their loyaltie, shall prudently and probably iudge to bee necessary. And because at that time, when this oath was deuised, the King and State (by reason of that barbarous, and altogether inhu­mane [Page 184] conspiracie of the Powder-treason, but then new­ly discouered) had many, and strong reasons offered them, rather to suspect the loyaltie of Catholikes, who were the cheefe Captaines, Authors and Actors of that most detestable treason, then of the Protestants, there­fore the Act, wherein this oath is prescribed, might rightly be entituled, An Act for the discouering and re­pressing, not only of Rebels in generall, nor yet of Pro­testant rebels, but for the discouering, and after they be dsicouered for the repressing, with grieuous punishmēts, rebellious Catholikes, whom they call Popish Recusants, because their loyalty, as hath bin said, was then through out the whole Kingdome more suspected, then the loy­tie of Protestants.

Sect. II.

1. THe second Obiection against the oath in general, is taken especially from the authoritie of the Popes Holinesse, who by his Breues hath declared the oath to be altogether vnlawfull, which declaration the Kings Maiestie taking in euill part, did set forth an Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, at the first con­cealing his name, but afterwards hee put it forth in his owne name, adioyning thereunto a Premonition to all Christian Kings and Princes. Which his Apologie gaue occasion to Cardinall Bellarmine, and many other Di­uines to enueigh bitterly against the said Oath, and al­so the Kings Apologie, and to defend with might and maine the Popes Breues directed to the English Catho­likes. His Holinesse therefore that now is, Pope Paul the first in his two Breues directed to the English Ca­tholikes, doth expresly forbid them to take the said oath, for that, as he affirmeth, it must euidently appeare vnto them by the words themselues, that it can not be takē without preiudice to the Catholike faith, and the saluation of their soules, seeing that it conteines many things which [Page 185] are cleerely repugnant to faith, and Saluation. And in this third Breue directed to Master George Birket Archpraes­byter of the English Priests, he enioyneth, and comman­deth him, and for this he giueth him speciall faculty, that he obseruing certaine conditions in that Breue expressed, which we beneath Nu. 60. wil rehearse, do by the Authority of the Sea Apostolike depriue and declare to be depriued all those English Priests, and euery one of them, who haue taken the said Oath, or haue taught, and doe teach, that it may law­fully be taken, of all faculties, and priuiledges graunted to them, or to any of them from the said Sea Apostolike, or by her authority from any other whatsoeuer.

2. From hence therefore this argument may be fra­med.

In doubtfull, and disputable matters, especially such, as doe meerely concerne the Catholike Faith, and the eternall saluation of soules, euery Catholike is bound in conscience to follow the surer part, to wit, that part, wherein there is no danger of sinning at all, or wherein lesse danger of sinning can be feared: But whether this Oath of Allegiance may lawfully, and without danger of denying the Catholike faith be taken, is at the least wise a doubtfull and disputable mat­ter, and lesse danger of sinning can be feared by refusing it, then by taking it, therfore euery Catholike is bound in con­science rather to resuse it, then to take it.

3. The Maior proposition is euident out of that vulgar Maxime of the Canon Law,In cap. ad au­dientiam, et in cap. significati 1. et. 2. de ho­mocidio. et in cap. Juuenis de sponsalibus. & approued by all Diuines, and Lawyers, that in doubtfull matters the surer part is to be chosen. The Minor also is manifest enough to euery Ca­tholike. For first no Catholike can denye, but that at the least it is a doubtfull question, whether this Oath may law­fully, and without periury bee taken, seeing that not onely the most eminent Diuines of these daies, as Cardinall Bel­larmine, Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, and many others, haue in their publike writings condemned the same, as im­pious, sacrilegious, and cleerely repugnant to Catholike Faith, & the saluation of soules, but also the supreame Pa­stor [Page 186] of the Church, hath, as LessiusPag. vltima, & also his Eng­l sh Recapitu­lator p vltima., and some others affirm by his Breues expresly defined the same, and that which no man can denye, hath strictly commanded all Catholikes not to take the same, for that it conteines many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith and Saluation.

4. Secondly, that there is either no danger at all, or at least wise lesse danger of sinning by refusing it, then by taking it, is also euident out of the same Maxime, or principle. For according to all reason, that Catholike doth incurre lesse danger of sinning, who in spirituall matters, and which be­long to the eternall saluatiō of his soule, as what position is hereticall, or not hereticall, what Oath is lawfull, or sa­crilegious, when action deserueth Gods wrath, or doth not deserue it, doth follow not onely the direction and com­mand of him, whom God hath appointed to be the spirituall Guider, Directer, and Gouernour of his soule, but also the vniuersall consent of Catholike Diuines, who doe condemne this Oath, as impious, and contrary to Catholike faith, then he who followeth the counsell and command onely of a tem­porall Prince, and Parliament, (who especially are no Ca­tholikes, and to whom although they were Catholikes, the charge of soules is not committed by Christ, neither haue they any authority in spirituall affaires) and the singular o­pinion of one, or two Catholike Priests, who also rather for feare, as being detained in prison, or for some temporall respect, as to please the Prince, in whose kingdome they liue, or to deliuer themselues from the troubles of the time, then for any sufficient reason doe hould the Oath to be lawfull,

5 Moreouer, the danger of loosing for euer the eternall kingdome of Heaven, is farre greater, then the danger of loosing for a time all temporall goods; but in taking this Oath their is great danger of periurie, and of denying the Catholike faith, and consequently of loosing the Kingdome of Heauen, in refusing it there is only danger of loosing all temporall goods, and libertie for a short time, this statute for taking the Oath being meerely penall, therefore in ta­king [Page 187] the O th, there is farre greater danger; then in refu­sing it.

6 This obiection doth much trouble the consciences of the vnlearnedder sort of people, who for want of sufficient skill in Diuinitie, are not able to discerne, what opinion they may with a good conscience follow, when Catholike Diuines themselues doe not agree in their opinions. And therefore for the fully satisfying of timorous consciences, I thought it necessarie to exa­mine this obiection somewhat at large, and out of the Doctrine of Catholike Diuines to set downe certaine generall rules, by the which, if they be well obserued, any Catholike man as well vnlearned, as learned, may cleerely perceiue, how he may with a safe conscience, and without danger of temeritie, or any other crime fol­low both in speculation and in practise, this, or that opi­nion, whereof there is disagreement among Catholike Diuines. And in setting downe these rules, I haue for this especiall cause chosen to follow before others that most learned Diuine of the societie of Iesus Gabriel Vasquez, for that the chiefe impugners of this Oath, to wit, the Iesuites will not doubtlesse condemne the Do­ctrine of this famous Diuine concerning this point as improbable, both in regard of his singular learning, and also for that he is one of their owne societie.

7 First of all therefore Vasquez 1.2 disp. 62. c. 1. nu. 1. obserueth, that a­mong opinions, one is more secure, an other is lesse secure; it is called a more safe, or secure opinion, not for that it is more probable, but because he, that followeth it, can com­mit no sinne: As if there bee two contrary opinions concer­ning restitution, that, which saith that any thing is to bee restored, is called the more safe or secure opinion, because in restoring there can be no offence: and the contrary opi­nion is said to be the lesse secure, because in not restoring there may be some sinne committed, and so in other matters. Likewise disp. 66. c. 4. nu. 21. the more secure opinion is accounted that, wher­in there would be the lesser sinne, then in the contrary, when [Page 188] it is necessary to choose one of those two opinions, in both which there is sinne. For whensoeuer two euills doe so meet together, that of necessity one of them must be chosen, that doubtlesse is to be chosen, which otherwise would be the les­ser euill, and consequently in choosing that there can bee no sinne at all. And the reason thereof is manifest, for consi­dering that no man can in any case be so perplexed, but that he may choose one part without any sinne, and if of two euils the one must of necessity be chosen, there is great reason, that we should choose the lesse, it followeth that wee doe not sinne in the choosing thereof, and so that euill, which otherwise considered by it selfe, would be a sinne, is in that case no sinne, and therefore that part is the more secure, if it be cho­sen, when it occurreth with a greater euill, according to that vulgar Maxime, A lesser euil, in comparison of a grea­ter, is a kind of good. And of this case you may reade an example in Vasquez in the place last cited.

8. Furthermore, among opinions, one is more proba­ble, an other is lesse probable. That is more probable, which hath the better grounds; that is lesse probable, which al­though it hath not better grounds, yet the grounds thereof want not sufficient probabilitie. It may therefore fall out, that an opinion, which is lesse secure, to wit, wherein per­chance there may be sin, be more probable, and contrarywise, that part wherein there can be no sinne, to be lesse probable: as in the aforesaid example of making restitution, that part which saith that we ought not to make restitution, may be more probable, that is, may haue better grounds, and yet it is the lesse secure; and contrariwise that part, which saith, that we ought to make restitution, which is the more secure, may haue the weaker grounds, yea and sometimes it may be altogether improbable.

9 Secondly, he obserueth,Disp. 62. cap. 3. nu. 8. et disp. 79. cap. 3. nu. 13. 14. that to assent to any opi­nion, or proposition, is nothing else, then to perceiue that there is a greater connexion, betwixt the subiect and the predicate in one part of the contradiction, then in the other, or which is all one, to iudge that opinion, or propositi­on [Page 189] to be true: To dissent, is nohing else, then to perceiue, that there is a greater disconuenience betwixt the subiect, and the predicate in one part of the contradiction, then in the other; or which is all one, to iudge that opinion, or proposition to be false; To doubt, or to be doubtfull of ei­ther part, or opinion is neither to perceiue, that there is greater connexion, nor greater disconuenience in one part of the contradiction, then in the other, or which is all one, neither to iudge one part, or opiniō to be true, nor false, but to suspend his iudgement on both parts; which pro­ceedeth from this, that neither the reasons for the one part, nor for the other are sufficient to shew greater conuenience, then disconuenience, or to shew rather the truth, then the falshood of either part: for then the vnderstanding stay­eth, or staggereth, and doth not assent more to the one part ihen to the other. As if to one, who knoweth not the number of the starres, this question should be propounded, whether the starres bee odde, or euen, hee would stacker thereat, and remaine doubtfull, neither would hee giue his iudg­ment thereof, for that hee doth not perceiue the predi­cate to agree to the subiect or to disagree, or which is all one, hee doth not perceiue whether part is true or false.

10. Thirdly, he obserueth,Disp. 62. cap. 3. nu. 10. that he, who doth assent to an opinion by proper, and intrinsecal grounds, or, which is all one, iudgeth that opinion to be true, although his assent, or iudgement be only probable, (for sometimes the assent may be euident, when the proofes be euident, and sometimes only probable, when the proofes be only proba­ble) cannot also assent to the contrarie opinion by intrin­secall and proper grounds, but he may well by extrinsecall grounds iudge the contrarie opinion to be probable. Pro­per and intrinsecall grounds we call the cause of the thing, or the effect thereof, or the absurdities, and impossibilities, to which they are driuen, who hold the contrarie opinion. For all these, and euery one of them doe shew, that there is a proper connexion betwixt the subiect, and the predicate [Page 190] in themselues, or, which is all one, doe shew that propo­sition, or opinion to bee more true, then the contrarie. Extrinsecall grounds, are onely the authoritie of those men, who defend the contrarie opinion, by reason of which, we doe iudge the contrarie opinion to be probable. And as it is impossible for one at the same time to assent to two contrary opinions by intrinsecall grounds, for so he should at the same time haue two contradictorie iudgements of the same thing, which is impossible; so it is not impossible to assent to one opinion by intrinsecall grounds, and by ex­trinsecall grounds, to wit, by reason of the authoritie of those Doctors, who hold the contrary, to iudge that part to be probable. For these two assents, or iudgements, are not of the same thing, and therefore they are not contra­dictorie: because the former assent by intrinsecall grounds, is concerning the truth of the proposition in it selfe, or which is al one, concerning the absolute pro­position; as in this, The Pope hath not power to depose the King: but the other assent by extrinsecall grounds is concerning the probabilitie of the proposition, or which is all one, concerning the modall proposition, as in this, It is probable, that the Pope hath not power to de­pose the King. And as this later proposition is not contra­dictorie to the former, so also the assent to this later, is not contradictory to the assent of the former.

11. These rules being obserued, Vasquez Disp. 62. cap. 4. nu. 12. affir­meth first, that if a learned man, who hath taken no small paines in studies, and hath also throughly seene, and exa­mined the reasons of the contrary part, shall iudge against all other writers, who haue gone before him, that his opi­nion is the more probable, he may, although it b [...] the lesse secure opinion, lawfully embrace it, and practise follow it. And this his doctrine he gathereth, as he saith, from the common consent of Doctors. And the reason is mani­fest; For if one hath a sharpe wit, and a ripe iudgement, and hath throughly seene, and diligently examined all the reasons of the contrary part, and iudgeth them not to [Page 191] be sufficient, he doth not seeme to commit any imprudence by following in practise his owne opinion, because in mo­rall matters, which are not certaine, but exposed to opi­nions, he also iudgeth with maturitie. For we cannot de­nie, but that a companie of Doctors doe sometimes follow an opinion without any choyce of reasons, or at the least, not so exactly considering the reasons; against whom an other Doctor of great authoritie may afterwards bring into the Schooles an opinion, which is by him with matu­ritie inuented.

12. But if any man vpon some light reason, Vasquez cap. 4. nu. 13. and without due consideration doe against all other Doctors embrace an opinion, which is lesse secure, he sinneth doubt­lesse, not for that hee iudgeth against his conscience, as some do think, but for that he iudgeth rashly, and incon­sideratly of that matter, as Nauarre Cap. Si quis de poenitentia dist. 7. nu. 50. 51 52. doth well affirme: But when it is to be accounted a rash iudgement, and a light reason, it is left to the iudgement of a prudent man. Neither is the opinion of one Doctor against all others in a doubtfull and disputable matter to be accounted rash, or temerarious, if it be inuented vpon a mature ground, or reason. For as wel obserueth Corduba,Lib. 1. quaesti­on. 6. 17. q. 13. that opinion is ab­solutely to be accounted temerarious, not which is contrary to the common vnderstanding of Scholasticall Doctours, but which is inuented without sufficient ground and reason: for many opinions were in the beginning inuented, and brought into the Schooles, which then were not common. Neuerthelesse in this matter, to wit, in inuenting new o­pinions, great maturitie, or consideration must be ob­serued.

13. Secondly, he affirmeth and saith withall,Cap. 4. nu. 14. that it is now, and hath beene long since the common opinion in Schooles, that it is lawfull for a learned man to follow in practise against his owne opinion, which hee iudgeth to bee the more probable, the opinion of others, although there o­pinion be the more secure, and also in his iudgement the more probable, so that it be not void and destitute of all rea­son, [Page 192] and probability. Neuerthelesse, that one may lawfully follow in practise Cap. 13. nu. 11 another mans opinion against his owne, he must frame in his vnderstanding a particular, and deter­minate iudgement, or dictamen of conscience, by which de­terminate iudgement he doe beleeue, and perswade his con­science that it is lawful for him in that case to follow in pra­ctise the opinion of others; for otherwise if he should not haue this determinate iudgement, he should doe against his con­science, which in no case is lawfull. And this particular iudgment, or dictamen of conscience no man can frame, or deduce from proper, or intrinsicall grounds, if he perseuere in his owne opinion; because it is impossible, that with an v­niuersall iudgment, wherwith one by intrinsical grounds be­leeueth that such an action in vniuersall is vnlawfull, hee should also by intrinsecall grounds haue a particular iudge­ment, by which he may beleeue, that particular action com­prehended vnder that vniuersall to be lawful. Therfore this particular dictamen of conscience, by which hee perswadeth himselfe, that it is lawfull for him in his time & place to fol­low an other mans opinion against his owne opinion in vni­uersall, must of necessity bee had by extrinsecall grounds, to wit, for that he beleeueth the contrary opinion to be probable in regard of the authority of those men who doe follow it.

14. And this assertion Vasquez Cap. 4. nu. 14. proueth, because for this only cause that any opinion is probable, and defended by men skilfull in that Art, and grounded vpon probable rea­son, as we cannot iustly be reprehended for defending it in Schooles, so also with a safe conscience wee may follow it in practise. For as in speculatiue things any mā may Medina 1a. 2ae q 19. ar. 6. without any note of errour follow the opinion of other men, who are skilfull in that Art against his own opiniō, so also in morall, or practicall things any man may without any spot of sinne, or imprudencie, follow the opinion of prudent men against his owne opinion.

15. But to know, when the opinion of other men is pro­bable enough, that a learned man may in practise follow it against his owne (for if the opinion of other men be not pro­bable, [Page 193] no man saith, that any man may in practise follow it) it is here by the way to be obserued first, Cap. 4. nu. 17. that it must not be a singular opinion, and of one onely Doctour. For if I like not the proper, or intrinsecall grounds of that singular opi­nion of one onely Doctour, but of the contrarie, and see it to be grounded onely vpon the authoritie of one Doctour, I ought not to account it probable to this effect, that I may prudently follow it in practise against my owne, and the com­mon opinion of all others. He said [to this effect, &c] for although the contrary opinion may be probable to the Au­thor thereof according to that, which hath beene said be­fore,In this sect. nu. 11. yet to me, who beleeue the contrary opinion to be true, it ought not to be accounted probable, so that I may prudently follow it in practise. Secondly, it must be such an opinion, which a learned man may lawfully follow against his owne, that it be not commonly thought to con­taine in it any errour, but yet to haue in it probabilitie, and so that it be an opinion not vtterly reiected, and hissed out of Schooles. Thirdly, We may then at last with farre grea­ter reason follow the opinion of others against our owne, when we perceiue the Authors of the contrary opinion to haue seene and considered all the grounds and reasons for our opinion, and that they haue in some sort answered them, and that they were not conuinced by them. For then we may iustly thinke, that we may lawfully and prudently follow in practise the opinion of other men against our owne: neither ought we to suppose, that our reasons are euident demon­strations, and which doe make the contrarie opinion to be void of all probabilitie.

16. Neuerthelesse it is greatly to be obserued, saith Vasquez, Cap. 4. nu. 18. that it may sometimes fall out, that the ancient Writers, whose opinions are now in controuersie, did not consider some reason, law, or decree, which is of great force against their opinion, but contrariwise that the later Do­ctours, being conuinced with that reason, or law, doe now defend the contrary opinion. If therefore a learned man, seeing that law, or decree, or considering that new reason, [Page 194] doth defend the opinion of the later Writers against the ancient, he can not follow in practise the opinion of the an­cient writers against his owne opinion: because the opinion of the ancient, who haue not seene or considered that decree or reason, ought not now to be accounted probable. But if some later Writers haue obserued the obiection taken from that law, and decree against the opinion of the ancient, and haue endeauoured to answere it, we ought not to iudge the opinion of the ancient writers to be void of probabilitie, so that we may not lawfully follow it. In the same manner, if a learned man hath onely considered some peculiar argu­ment against the contrarie opinion, which seemeth to him to be altogether insoluble, he ought not therefore to iudge the contrarie opinion to be improbable, so that he may not lawfully follow it, because he ought not by his owne proper iudgement to thinke the opinion of other men to be impro­bable.

17. And for the same reason, a learned man may law­fully follow in practise Cap. 4. nu. 18. 19. the probable opinion of other men against his owne, not onely when he hath a determinate as­sent of his owne opinion, but also if by intrinsecall grounds he hath an assent of neither part, but remaineth doubtfull of both. Yea, in this case he may with farre better reason follow in practise the probable opinion of other men, on ei­ther part, as hee shall please, although it be the lesse secure, so that by extrinsecall grounds hee haue a determinate iudgement or dictamen of conscience, that it is lawfull for him to follow that opinion, because he seeth either part to haue his learned and prudent Authors and Patrons, who doe embrace it as probable. For if it be lawfull to follow in practise the opinion of other men, against our owne opi­nion, wherof we haue a determinate assent, because we think the contrary opinion, by reason of extrinsecall grounds to be probable, much more will it be lawfull, when by intrinsecal grounds we haue no contrary assent, to follow in practise the opinion of other men.

18. Thirdly he affirmeth,Cap. 5. nu. 25. that it is not necessary for a [Page 195] learned man to follow in practise his owne opinion against others, or the opinion of others against his owne, to haue no feare of the contrary part, but he may lawfully follow in practise an opinion, hauing onely a probable assent, although he hath some feare that the contrary part be true, and al­though he hath this feare not onely by intrinsecall grounds, but also by extrinsecall. I purposely said with feare of the contrary part, and I did not say with doubt or staggering, because if any man were doubtfull concerning any action, whether it were lawfull, or not, he could not doe that a­ction with a safe conscience, for that hee could not haue a particular, and determinate iudgement, and dictamen of conscience with an assent, but also he should haue a doubt concorning that particular action, whether it were law­full, or not, but no man can lawfully doe any thing with a doubtfull conscience, as Vasquez doth shew beneathDisp. 65., and all men doe confesse.

19. For the better vnderstanding whereof the same Vasquez doth obserue,Disp. 62. cap. 5. nu. 26. that it is one thing to feare, and another to stagger and doubt; for to doubt and stagger, as also hath beene said before,In this sect. num. 9. is to bee in suspense be­twixt both parts, and to giue to neither of them any deter­minate assent, for that neither part seemeth to be the tru­er, and with this staggering or doubtfull conscience, no man can lawfully doe any action, Vasquez disp. 65. cap. 1. & disp. 66. cap. 1. vnlesse he follow the su­rer part: for otherwise he should in his conscience expose himselfe to danger of offending God, and consequently he should in his conscience offend, according to that saying of the wise man, Ecclesiasticus cap. 3. who loueth danger, shall perish therein. For as he, who doth any action, doubting in his conscience, whether it displeaseth his friend, or no, doth offend against the law of friendship, and seemeth to loue more dearly that person, for whose sake he doth that action, then his friend, whom he doubteth it will offend; so also he that doth any thing doubting whether it be a sinne, and consequently dis­pleasing to God, offendeth against the law of friendship to­wards God, and seemeth to loue him more dearly, for whose [Page 196] sake he doth that action, then God, whom he doubteth it will offend.

20. But to feare one part to be true, doth not exclude a determinate assent to the contrary part, but to feare con­sisteth in this, that one reflecting in his minde vpon the reasons of that part, whereunto he assenteth, thinketh that they are not euident, but onely probable, and therefore he also thinketh, that the contrary part may in very deed be true, although the reasons thereof doe not yet shew the same, So that to doubt doth include no assent at all, but to feare implyeth two assents; the one, whereby he iudgeth, that the opinion which hee followeth is in very deed true; the other, where by he iudgeth that it may in very deed be false, for that the reasons thereof are not conuincing, but onely probable. Seeing therefore that this feare of one part, although it be expresse, doth not exclude a determi­nate assent to the other part, and with euery probable assent, which is not euident, there may be feare, it followeth, that any action may be lawfully done with this feare, conside­ring that, according to the doctrine of all Diuines, an e­uident assent, which in morall matters can hardly bee had, is not alwaies necessary to doe lawfully any a­ction.

21. And what hath beene said concerning a learned man, that he may with a safe conscience doe any action, although he feare it to be vnlawfull, the same also is for the same reason to be vnderstood of an vnlearned man, who perceiuing that there is diuersitie of opinions a­mong Doctours concerning the same matter, must of necessitie haue some feare, although hee doth by extrin­secall grounds determinately assent to one part with­out any doubt at all. Wherefore that vulgar Maxime of the Diuines and Canonists, In doubtfull matters the su­rer part is to be chosen, Vasquez doth vnderstand of true doubts, whereof we haue no determinate assent, or pro­bable dictamen of conscience, for in disputable matters, and which are in controuersie, which the vulgar sort [Page 197] doe sometimes call doubtfull, (taking doubtfull for all that, which is not certaine and euident) it sufficeth to follow that part, which is secure, or which is all one, a probable opinion, neither is it necessary to follow the surer part, or the more probable, or more common opi­nion, as out of the doctrine of Vasquez wee now haue shewed. For as no man is bound, as well saith Bartholo­maeus Fumus in his Aurea Armilla, Verbo opinio num. 2. to doe alwaies that, which is better, but it sufficeth to doe that which is good, so no man is bound to follow alwaies the better opinion, but it sufficeth to follow that opinion, which some skilfull doctors iudge to be true.

22. Fourthly, and lastly he affirmethDisp. 62. cap 8. nu. 42. (in which also assertion the Diuines doe commonly agree) that it is sufficient for an vnlearned man, who is not able of him­selfe to examine the reasons and grounds of those que­stions, which are in controuersie among Catholike Doctors, to follow that opinion, which he thinketh to be probable, and which he seeth is taught by vertuous and skil­full men in that art, although it be neither the more se­cure, nor the more common opinion. Hee purposely said, [by skilfull men in that art] for as well obserueth Mi­chael Salon 2^a. 2. q. 63. ar. 4. controuers. 2 conclus. 4., That mans opinion is not forthwith to be ac­counted probable, for that he hath taken Degree in Diuini­tie, or Canon law, because it happeneth sometimes, that also some of these are vnlearned. The reason which Vasquez bringeth to proue this assertion, is, Because if a learned and vertuous man may safely follow his owne opinion; al­though it be the lesse secure, against the opinion of others, why may not also an vnlearned man, who ought according to reason trust to the learning, and honestie of that learned and vertuous man, follow in practise his opinion? For euery man, although vnlearned, doth well perceiue that Doctour to be vertuous, and that with a safe conscience, he followeth that opinion in practise, and in giuing counsell to others, therefore also the vnlearned man may from thence frame a particular iudgment, or dictamen of conscience, where­by [Page 198] he may beleeue, that it is lawfull for him to doe that, which he iudgeth lawfull for a vertuous and learned man to doe. And from hence also Vasquez doth gather, That al­though that Doctour, whose counsell the vnlearned man de­mandeth, doth affirme, that the opinion which he followeth and which he propoundeth to the vnlearned man to follow, is against the common opinion, yet the vnlearned man may lawfully follow in practise his opinion: For the reason be­fore alleaged doth also in this case proue the very same. And therefore most learned Nauarre beforeCap 3. sect. 3. num. 14. cited, did very well affirme, That in the court of conscience to the effect of not sinning it sufficeth to choose for true, his opini­on, whom for iust cause we thinke to be a man of a good conscience, and of sufficient learning.

23. From this doctrine of Vasquez it followeth first, that if a learned man, and who hath for a long time stu­died Diuinitie, may lawfully, and with a safe consci­ence follow in practise his owne opinion against the o­pinion of all other Diuines, with farre greater reason may hee lawfully follow in practise his owne opinion, when diuers other learned men doe agree with him in the same opinion.

24. Secondly, it followeth, that it is one thing to de­fend an opinion, and to follow it in practise, thinking it to be true; and an other to defend an opinion, and to follow it in practise, thinking onely that it is probable. For it may happen, that one may bee truely doubtfull, and by intrinsecall grounds haue no determinate iudg­ment, or assent, that such an opinion is true, or false, and yet he may be morally certaine, that the same opi­nion is probable, for that he seeth it to be defended by vertuous and learned men.

25. Thirdly, it followeth, that those learned Catho­likes, and others not so learned, who trusting to the learning and honestie of them, doe follow in practise their opinion, are not forth-with to be censured of He­resie, errour, or temeritie, when they depart from the [Page 199] more common, the more probable, and the more se­cure opinion of other Catholik Doctours, yea although this common opinion seeme to be grounded vpon any Decree, Law, or Canon of Pope, or Generall Coun­cell; which Decree, Law, or Canon those learned Di­uines haue seene, examined, and answered thereunto, although their answere doth not satisfie the contrarie side.

26. Wherefore the same Vasquez a litle beneathDisp. 79. cap. 1. & disp. 86., conformably to the doctrine, which heere he teacheth, disputeth the controuersie of infused habites two man­ner of waies: First, of the absolute question, to wit, whe­ther according to his opinion there bee certaine habits infused in our soule by God alone; secondly, of the modal question, to wit, whether it bee certaine, or onely pro­bable, that such habits are infused in our soules by God alone, and he answereth, that it is a constant, without con­trouersie, and vndoubted opinion of the Schoole-mē, which also he himselfe alloweth, that there be certaine vertues which we cal Theological, to wit, Faith, Hope & Charitie, which of their own nature are infused by God alone; and ne­uerthelesse he affirmethDisp. 79. cap. 1. et disp. 86. c. 1, that this opinion is only the more probable, although some Doctours do hold it to be cer­taine, and of faith. And he in the same place disputing the same question concerning morall vertues affirmeth,Disp. 86. cap. 1. that it is the more probable, and the more common opini­on, and to which he also with the same Doctours doth subscribe, that there be also morall vertues, which of their owne nature are infused by God alone; and yet he blameth certaine Thomists, for condemning the contrary opi­nion as temerarious. But although, saith he,Disp. 86. cap. 2. I thinke this opinion to be the more probable, and thereunto with the a­foresaid Doctours I doe subscribe, yet the seueritie, not to say, rashnesse of certaine Thomists, doth much displease me, who doe so adhere to this opinion, that they are not afraide vpon sleight and weake grounds, to censure the contrarie opinion as temerarious. From whence it is cleerely infer­red, [Page 100] that, according to Vasquez Doctrine, the constant, common, without controuersie, and vndoubted opinion of Scholasticall Diuines may sometimes without any note of temeritie be impugned, seeing that the contrarie opi­nion may now, and then be probable.

27 To come therefore neerer to the proposed ob­iection, which doth consist of two principall parts, the first that his Holinesse hath by his Breues condemned this Oath, as cleerely repugnant to faith, and Saluation; the second, that also the chiefe learned men of these times haue in their publicke writings censured it in the same manner, it is to be supposed first, that although it bee in these daies the more common opinion a­mong Catholike writers, that the Pope is aboue a Gene­rall Councell, and that he can not erre in his definitions, when he prescribeth to the whole Church any thing to be necessarily belieued as of faith, for that in such defi­nitions he is directed by the infalliable assistance of the Holy Ghost, in so much that some Diuines, among whom is Cardinall Bellarmine Lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. cap. 2. in fine., doe ouer boldly a­uouch, that the contrarie opinion is altogether errone­ous, and most neare to heresie, and almost of faith, and that it can not be excused from great temeritie, and that they who defend it, do shew them selues, to be scarce Catholikes Li. 2. de Con­cil. cap 17., yet notwithstanding these too too seuere censures, the contrarie opinion is not void of all probabilitie, seeing that it is very vehemently maintained by most graue, most learned, most vertuous, and ancient Diuines, and Lawyers, to wit, by Pope Adrian the sixthIn quaest de Confirmat., by the Car­dinall of Cambray De authorit. Eccles., by the Cardinall of Cusa De Concord. Catholica lib. 2. cap. vltimo., by Car­dinall Panormitane In cap. signi­ficasti extra de electione., otherwise called Abbot Panor­mitane, by the Cardinall of Florence Ibidem. master to Panor­mitane, by Alphonsus Tostatus In cap. 18. Matth q 108. et in defenso­rio part 2. cap. 69. Bishop Abulensis, by Iohn Gerson In suis tractatibus de potest. Eccles., Iohn Maior In suis tractatibus de potest. Eccles., Ioannes Parisiensis In suis tractatibus de potest. Eccles., Ia­cobus Almainus In suis tractatibus de potest. Eccles., and others.

28 But if any one reply, as I haue heard one of our Countriemen answeare, that indeed in times past this [Page 201] second opinion for the reason alleadged was probable, yet now it being against the torrent of Scholasticall Diuines, it is altogether improbable, and can not be de­fended by any Catholike, without some note at the least of temeritie, Heare what Franciscus Victoria a religious man of the Order of Saint Dominicke, a most learned Diuine of this ageFor he dyed in the yeare of our Lord 1546, and as Posseuine Verbo Fran­ciscus Ʋictoria. the Iesuite calleth him, a publike, and indeede famous professour of Diuinitie in the Vniuersitie of Salamanca writeth concerning this matter: There are two opinions, saith Victoria Relect. 4. de potest. Papae, et Concilij propo­sitio 3^a., concer­ning the comparison of the Popes power; the one is of S. Thomas, and many his followers, and of other learned Do­ctours both Diuines, and Canonists, that the Pope is aboue a Councell; the other is the common opinion of the Diuines of Paris, and also of many Doctours, both Diuines, and Canonists, as of Panormitane, and others, contrarie to the former, that a Councell is aboue the Pope. It is no place at this present to dispute whether of them be the truer. I thinke that both of them is a probable opinion. See also what in the Preface of my Apologeticall answeare Nu. 28. I related to this purpose out of Nauarre a most famous Diuine of this age.

29 Yea also Cardinall Bellarmine, in my iudgement not much agreeable to himselfe heerein, although hee bringeth the Councell of Florence, & of Laterane vnder Pope Leo the tenth to proue, that the Pope is aboue a Generall Councell, which two Councels are in my opi­nion the strongest arguments, which hee bringeth to confirme this Doctrine, yet very cleerely confirmeth that, which we haue said, in these words: And although, saith heLib. 2. de Cō ­cil. cap. 13., this question seemeth to be afterwards defined in the Councell of Florence, and in the last Laterane Coun­cell, yet because the Councell of Florence, hath not, so expresly defined it, and concerning the Councell of Late­rane, which hath most expresly defined it, some make a doubt, whether it were truly a Generall Councell, therefore euen to this day it remaineth a question also among Catho­likes. [Page 202] Truly it is not agreeable to Christian charitie to impeach vpon sleight grounds, vertuous and learned Catholikes of manifest errour, great temeritie, and with this greiuous censure, to be scarce Catholikes. Our schoole, saith that most learned Melchior Canus, Lib 8. de lo cis cap. 4 out of Tully Lib. 3. de Officijs. giueth vs great libertie, that what soeuer seemeth to be most probable we may by our right defend, but it is not lawful for vs to cō ­demne rashly▪ and lightly those, who doe hold, against vs.

30 But this supposition we doe not therefore heere put downe; for that we thinke it necessarie to the full satisfying of this present obiection, but to represse the rashnesse of some few of our English Catholikes, who vpon indiscreete zeale towards the See Apostolike, are not affraid to the reproach of the See Apostolike, & con­tempt of Catholike Religion, publikely to affirme, that euery Popes Breue doth define that thing, which it pre­scribeth, to be belieued as of faith, & feare not to charge with inobedience, schisme, yea, and also with heresie those Catholikes, who for any cause, or for what pre­text soeuer doe not obey those Breues; and moreouer to shew, that from the authoritie of the Popes Breues no sufficient or demonstratiue argument, as also be­neath it shall more plainely appeare, can be brought to proue, that those things, which are therein declared, commanded, or forbidden, doe belong to Catholike faith; and consequently that this oath is not for that cause repugnant to Catholike faith, for that the Pope hath by his Breues expresly declared, that it is flat contrarie to faith, although wee should also freely grant, that his Holinesse did not only by his Breues declare his opinion, but also did out of the Chaire define the same; seeing that many learned, and vertuous Catholikes doe probably defend, that the Popes definitions are subiect to error, if he define without a Generall Councell; for that according to these Doctours, Christ hath not pro­mised him the spirit of truth to prescribe infallibly any thing to the vniuersall Church, vnlesse he as head of [Page 203] the vniuersall Church doth concurre with the mysti­call body of Christ, or with all the memhers there­of, which a Generall Councell doth represent, to pro­pound to the vniuersall Church any Doctrine to be ne­cessarily belieued as of faith: And that Christ praying for S. Peter, that his faith should not faile Luc. 22., did not pray for the person of Saint Peter, but for the vniuersall Church, whom Saint Peter did representPetrus de Ali­aco de Autho­ritate Eccles. part 3. ca. 1. Ma­ior de Author. Concilio parú a principio. Al­mainus de po­test. Eccles. q 1. cap 16., according to that say­ing of Saint Augustine Tract. 50. in Ioan. ad ca. 12. nō lōge a fine, et serm. 15 de Apost. Petro, et Paulo. recorded in the Canon law,23. q. 1. Can. quodcun (que). Peter, when hee receiued the keyes, represented the holy Church; And againe,In Psal. 108. Some things are said, which seeme to belong to the Apostle Saint Peter, and yet they haue not a plaine vnderstanding, but when they are referred to the Church, whose person he is acknowledged in figure to re­present, for the Primacie, which he had ouer the Disciples, as is that, I will giue to thee the keyes of the Kingdome of Heauen, and if there be any of this like sort.

31 Secondly, it is to be supposed that the Popes Bre­ues (which, as Hugolinus Part. 2. de Cē ­suris cap. 6. in principio. noteth, are nothing else, then the Popes letters, which are made only by his Secretaries, and are sealed by the Pope in red wax with the Fishers ring To wit, with a ring wherein is engrauen the picture of S^t Peter fish­ing., and they haue the same force, which the Popes letters haue which are written in answeare to other letters, and they are for that cause called Breues, because they are written brief­ly, and in few words; whereas the Popes Bulls are so called, for that they are signed with a round peece of lead hanged on the parchment, A round ta­blet hanged a­bout childrens necks for an ornament, is in Latin called Bulla. wherein the pictures of Saint Peter, Rebuf. in prax. benif. 3. part. nu. 4. et sec. Archidiac. et G [...]n minia. in cap. quis nes­ciat. dist. 11. and Saint Paul are impressed) can not containe in them a­ny thing of moment besides one of these three things. For first the Pope by his Breues doth either define some­thing to be necessarily beleiued as of faith by them, to whom he writeth, or secondly, he commandeth them some thing, which they must obserue; or thirdly, he on­ly by the way of counsell exhorteth, and admonisheth them, and declareth his opinion, that such a thing is to be belieued or obserued by them.

32 And to begin with the first Breue, which was da­ted [Page 204] the three and twentieth of October in the yeare 1606, Cardinall Bellarmine Li 4 de Rom. Pont. cap. 4. et 5. et lib 2 de Conc. l. ca. 12., Melchior Canus Lib. 5. de lo­cis cap. 5 q. 4., and the rest of those Diuines, who hold, that the Pope can not erre in his publike definitions, although he define without a General Councell, doe withall affirme, that to make the Popes definitions in points of Doctrine to be infallibly true, and not exposed to error, two things chiefely are required; first, that the Popes decrees, wher­in he prescribeth any thing to be belieued as of faith, be directed to the whole Church; the second, that he haue an intention to binde all Christians vndoubtedly to be­lieue it, as a most certaine doctrine of faith: and if ei­ther of these two be wanting▪ it is the constant opinion of all Diuines, that the Popes decrees or definitions are subiect to error, and doe not make the thing which he, decreeth, to be of faith. For in his particular iudgements opinions, and decrees, which doe not appertaine to the whole Church, but to some priuate persons, Bishops, or particular Churches all Diuines doe acknowledge that the Popes may erre.

33 Wee also grant, and that willingly, saith Canus In the place cited., that not forthwith, if any thing be contained in the vo­lumes of the Canon law, it is to be belieued as a doctrine of faith; But then especially when either the Iudges vse words which declare their opinion, or when there answeares are not directed to the vniuersall Church, but to priuate Chur­ches, and Bishops. For they are to be vnderstood only in this case to pronounce of faith, when the sentence belongeth to all Christians, when it bindeth all. For infallibilitie is pro­mised, and granted to them who are by God appointed to be iudges of faith, not for priuate Churches, whereof euery one may erre, but for the Vniuersall Church, which can not erre. Therefore the Doctrine of Popes, and Councels if it be propounded to the whole Church, if it be also pro­pounded with an obligation to be belieued, then doth their sentence concerne a point of faith. Wherefore also in Ge­nerall Councels, saith Cardinall Bellarmine Lib. 2. de Cō ­cil. cap. 12., the grea­test [Page 205] part of the Acts doe not appertaine to faith. For nei­ther are of faith the disputations which goe before, nor the reasons which are added, nor those things which are brought to explicate, and illustrate, but only the bare decreees, and those not all, but those only which are propounded as of faith.

34 For in the Decrees of Popes, saith CanusLib 6. De lo­cis cap. 8. ad 4., two things are to be distinguished, the first is the intention, and conclusion of the decree, the other is the reason, and cause which the Pope giueth of that thing which he hath decreed. And in the conclusion the Popes can not erre, if they define the question from the Apostolical tribunal. But if the Popes reasons be not necessarie, not to say, apt, probable, fitting, we must not make any regard thereof. For the Fathers doe not alwaies in a question of faith bring necessarie reasons, but sometimes probable. And it is easie to discerne (say the aforesaid AuthorsCanus lib. 5. q. 4. et Bellar­mine, lib. 2. de Ro. Pont. ca 12.) by the words of the Councell, or Pope, when any decree is propounded to all Christi­ans to be belieued as of faith: as if those who hold, or be­lieue I said, (Who [...] or belieue) for it may fall out, that as wel a Generall Councell, as the Pope, may to auoid scan­dals, and schismes excommunicate all persons what soeuer, who do teach, or preach such a Doctrine, and yet not there­for, that they intend there­by to define that Doctrine to be certaine­ly belieued as of faith, or that those, who obstinately doe teach, or preach the cō ­trarie be ac­counted here­tikes Whereof see Canus in the place be­fore cited con­cerning the Doctrine of Caietane about the preparation to the receiuing of the Eucharist and Suarez tom. 2. in 3. part disp. 3. sect. 6 in fine, cōcerning the Doctrine of those who shold obstinately affirme, that either of those two opinions, to wit, that the B. Mother of God was preserued from originall sinne or was conceiued therein, is of faith. the contrarie should be excommunicated, or iudged and reputed for heretikes, or if any thing be affirmed expres­ly, and properly to be firmely belieued by all the faithfull, or to be receiued as a doctrine of the Catholike faith, or in o­ther like words, to be contrarie to the Gospell, and doctrine of the Apostles. Be affirmed I say, saith Canus, not by o­pinion, but by a certaine, and firme decree: But when none of these things be affirmed, it is not certaine, that it is a point of faith.

35 Now by the expresse words of these Breues it is eui­dent, that it was not his Holinesse meaning in these Bre­ues to define, and determine by any publike decree, as an infallible doctrine, and to be firmely belieued by all Christians as a point of faith, that this Oath containeth [Page 206] in it many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith, and saluation; both because they are written only to the Catholikes of this Kingdome, for which cause they are by Ioannes Eudoemon the IesuiteIn praefatio­ne Paraleli To [...]ti. rightly called priuate letters, and therefore according to the Do­ctrine of Cardinall Bellarmine they are subiect to er­ror, although they should containe an expresse, and manifest definition; and also for that there is no one word comprehended in those Breues, which can signi­fie any such decree, or definition of faith.

36 And although in the first Breue, to which the o­ther two haue relation, the Pope forbiddeth all English Catholikes to take this oath, for that it containeth many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith, and Sal­uation; yet notwithstanding this prohibition, it being not any decree of faith, whereof now we treate, but a precept belonging to manners, whereof presently wee will speake, and moreouer those words, [for that it con­taineth many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith, and saluation] being only the reason of this decree, (which reason according to the aforesaid Doctrine of Cardinall Bellarmine, and Canus euen in those decrees of faith, which by a Generall Councell are propoun­ded to the whole Church, may be false, although the decree it selfe be certainely true, for that the Coun­cels may alleadge the reason of the decree according to their fallible opinion, but the decree it selfe of faith is grounded in their most certaine iudgement, and in the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost) it is most euident by the words of the Breue it selfe, that no infallible de­finition of faith is contained therein, although wee should grant it to bee most certaine, and not onely probable, that the Pope in his definitions can not erre, and also that this Breue was written not onely to the English Catholikes, but also to the vniuersall Church.

37. Concerning the second, to wit the Popes com­mand, [Page 207] whereby hee forbiddeth all Catholikes to take this Oath, for that it containeth many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith and Saluation, to know what force this precept hath to bind, it is also to be supposed first, that what wee haue already saide concerning the Popes definitions in determining matters of faith, and which are to be beleeued, is with like proportion to be vnderstood of his decrees concerning manners, or of his precepts, and lawes which hee commandeth to bee obserued. And▪ first, that it is not an improbable opini­on, which teacheth that the Pope may erre in his defi­nitions of Faith, or in those things, which he propoun­deth to the whole Church to be beleeued of Faith, if he define without the approbatiō of the vniuersal Church, or of a Generall Councell, which representeth the vni­uersall Church, seeing that it is maintained by most graue, most vertuous, and most learned Diuines: so also that is not an improbable opinion, which affirmeth, that the Pope can erre in his decrees, lawes and precepts of manners, which hee prescribeth to be necessarily ob­serued by the whole Church, if he enact lawes without the approbation of the Vniuersall Church, or of a Ge­nerall Councell, which representeth the vniuersall Church, seeing that most graue, most vertuous, & most learned Diuines do defend this opinion.

38. Secondly, we doe not therefore here put downe this supposition, for that we thinke it necessary for the full satisfying of this present obiection, but to represse the rashnesse of some fewe of our English Catholikes, who are not afraid to charge with inobedience, schism, yea and also with heresie those Catholikes, who do not obey euery Popes Breue, and moreouer to shew, that frō the authority of the Popes Breues, & from the Popes command no sufficient, or demonstratiue argument can be brought to proue, that those Catholikes, who either haue taken the Oath, or thinke that it may lawfully bee taken, are not to bee accounted Catholikes, although [Page 208] they should approue the Oath in that sense, wherein his Holines hath condemned it, which neuerthelesse they do not, as more clearly it shall appear beneath,Nu. 51. et seq seeing that many learned, graue, and vertuous Catholikes doe hold, and that not without probability, that the Pope may erre as well in prescribing to the whole Church precepts of manners, as in propounding definitions of faith, if he define, or prescribe Lawes without the ap­probation of the vniuersall Church, or of a generall Councell, which representeth the vniuersall Church.

39 But supposing for this present that this opinion for the Popes infallible iudgement, both in imposing to the whole Church precepts of manners, and also in defining matters of faith to be not onely the more com­mon, and the more probable opinion, but also to bee certaine, and most neer to faith, as Cardinall Bellarmine, without sufficient ground doth affirme, yet according to the former doctrine of the saide Cardinall Bellarmine, Canus, and other Catholike Diuines, this is to bee vn­derstood only in case he prescribe Lawes to the whole Church: For in his particular iudgements, and decrees of manners, which are imposed not vpon the whole Church, but vpon some priuate persons, or Churches, they grant that not onely the Pope, but also a generall Councell, or the Church may through ignorance erre, the Church may erre, I say, saith Canus, Lib. 5. de lo­cis cap. 5. q. 5. concl 3. not onely in her iudgement of Facts, (as whither such a one is to be pro­moted to a Bishopricke, or was rightly promoted, whither he committed such a sinne, whither hee hath lost his faculties, and such like) but also in her priuat pre­cepts, and lawes themselues. And the true and proper rea­son of this assertion is alleaged by Pope Innocentius the third in a decree of the Canon Law.Can. a nobis 2. de sent excom. The iudgmēt (saith he) of God is alwaies grounded vpon truth, which neither deceiueth, nor is deceiued, but the iudgement of the Church is now & then led by opinion, which oftentimes doth deceiue, and is deceiued, for which cause it hapneth sometimes, that [Page 209] he who is bound before God, is not bound before the Church and he that is free before the Church, is bound by an ecclesi­asticall Censure. Wherefore I doe not approue, saith Ca­nus q. 5. cit. cōcl. 2, all Church-lawes, I doe not commend all punish­ments, censures, excommunications, suspensions, Irregu­larities, Interdicts. I know that there be some such lawes, which if they want nothing else, yet doubtles they want pru­dence, and discretion.

40 This neuertheles is diligently to be obserued, that although it be most probable, that the Pope may erre in his priuate Iudgments, lawes, decrees and precepts, and both through ignorance and malice, saith Canus In fine con­cl. 1 ae., be decei­ued and abuse the power of the keyes, yet to affirme forth­with without very great, and sufficient reason, that hee hath erred in his priuate lawes, and decrees is temerari­ous, scandalous and irreligious: As also there can be made no doubt, but that Secular Princes may now and then erre in enacting temporall Lawes, yet he that without very great and sufficient reason should affirme, that the Prince hath erred in enacting this, or that law, should iustly be accounted a temerarious, scandalous, and sedi­tious person. But supposing that the Pope cannot erre in his definitions, lawes and decrees, which he prescribeth not to the whole Church, but onely to priuate persons, or Churches, if one moued with very great, and preg­nant reasons should affirme, that he in defining, com­manding, or forbidding this or that thing hath erred, and through ignorance, inconsideration, or euill infor­mation was deceiued, he ought not therefore to be con­demned of temerity, scandall, or any other crime.

41. Secondly, it is to be supposed out of the Doctrine of Suarez beforecap. 1. sect: 4. related, that euery decree of the Pope, or Councell belonging to manners, is either a meere con­stitutiue precept, to wit, which of it selfe maketh the act, which it forbiddeth, to be vnlawful for this only cause, for that it is forbidden by that precept, as is the eating of flesh in Lent, and the doing of Seruile works vpon [Page 210] Sundaies, which if they were not forbidden by the Church-lawes, they would not be vnlawfull, or else it is a declaratiue precept, which doth not induce a new ob­ligation, but onely confirmeth a former, neither doth it make, but suppose the act wich it forbiddeth to bee o­therwise vnlawful; as being forbid before by some other former Law. A constitutiue precept of humane power although it may sometimes bind with danger of some great temporall losse, as of goods, liberty, yea and now and then also of life; yet the Ecclesiasticall Law setting aside scandall, and contempt, which are forbidden by the Law of God, and nature, doth seldome, or neuer bind with very great temporall harme. And therefore we are not bound to abstaine from flesh in Lent, or not to doe seruile works vpon the Sunday, which are com­manded vs by the Church— Lawes, when wee are like to incurre any probable danger of some great temporal hurt thereby.

42. A declaratiue precept, as wel noteth Suarez In the place before cited., de­pendeth onely vpon the reason, for which the act is commanded, or forbidden, and vpon the obligation of the former precept: in somuch that if the reason for which the precept is imposed, be not true, and no for­mer Law, or obligation, as in the declaratiue precept is affirmed to bee, can bee found, the declaratiue precept hath no force to bind at all. As for example, his Holines forbiddeth al English Catholikes to take this Oath, for that it containeth many things, which are cleerely repug­nant to Faith and Saluation; If therefore in this oath no thing can be found, which is repugnant to faith, or sal­uation, this declaratiue prohibition of his Holinesse, which is founded in this reason, is according to the do­ctrine of Suarez of no force, neither doth it bind Eng­lish Catholikes to obserue the same.

43 Neuerthelesse it is to be obserued, that the Popes reason, or declaration may be either definitiue, whereby he intendeth to bind all English Catholikes to beleeue [Page 211] certainly as a point of faith, that his reason, or declarati­on is true, and then we are bound to beleeue with the same certainty that his reason, and declaration is true, wherewith we are bound to beleeue that he hath pow­er infallibly to define: or else it is onely opinatiue, to wit, grounded in his opiniō, for which he probably thinketh that the reason which he alleadgeth is true, and that in very deed there is such a former precept as he supposeth; and then his declaratiue precept, doth bind no more then his reason, & opinion can bind, & consequently we are more no bound to obey his declaratiue precept, then wee are bound to follow his opinion, whereon his decla­ratiue precept doth onely depend.

44. First therefore it is certaine, that this decree of the Pope, wherein he forbiddeth English Catholikes to take this Oath is a meere declaratiue precept, as it is ma­nifest by the words of the first Breue, to which the o­ther two haue relation. For after that his Holinesse had in his Breue related the whole Oath word by word, hee writeth thus: Which being so it ought to be manifest vnto you by the words themselues, that this Oath cannot be ta­ken without hurt to the Catholike faith, and to the saluati­on of your soules, seeing that it containeth manie things which are clearely repugnant to Faith, and saluation. Ther­fore we admonish you, that you altogether abstaine from ta­king this, and the like oaths, which truely wee doe the more earnestly demād of you, for that we hauing had triall of your constant faith. &c. So that it is euident that the onely cause for which his Holinesse forbiddeth the taking of this Oath, is for that he thinketh it to bee otherwise vn­lawfull, and to containe in it many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith, and saluation, and conse­quently that this is not a constitutiue, but a meere decla­ratiue prohibition.

45. Secondly, it is also certaine, that it is such a de­claratiue precept, which is founded not in any infal­lible definition of the Pope, whereby hee decreeth, that [Page 212] the reason which he alleadgeth is most certaine, and to bee beleeued as a point of faith, as hath beene shewed before,Nu, 32. & sect but it is onely grounded vpon his opinatiue iudgement, whereby he probably perswadeth himselfe, that his reason is true, and that the oath doth containe in it many things, which are flat contrary to faith and saluation. Which being so, it is most manifest, that wee are no farther bound to obserue this command of his Holinesse, then wee are bound to follow his opinion, whereon his Declaratiue precept doth onely depend. Wherefore, if this oath be not of it selfe vnlawfull, nor doth conteine any thing which is repugnant to faith or saluation, especially in that sense, wherein the English Catholikes doe take it, and wherein the words of the oath, according to their proper and vsuall signification are commonly vnderstood, but onely temporall alle­giance, which euery temporall Prince may, if neede re­quire, lawfully demand of his subiects, as by examining euery clause of the oath I haue, as I thinke, sufficiently proued, truly there can be made no doubt, but that e­uery English Catholike▪ notwithstanding the Popes prohibition, may with a safe conscience, and without any preiudice to the Catholike faith take the same. And this may suffice concerning the particular precept or command of his Holinesse.

46. Now concerning that third thing, to wit, the Popes iudgement, opinion and aduise, which besides his definition and command may, as we haue said, be con­teined in a Breue, it is most certaine, that no man is bound to follow his opinions, admonitions, counsels or exhortations. Euery man may, if he will, follow his admonition and aduise, so that he counsaile him no vn­iust, or vnlawfull thing, but that wee are bound to fol­low his counsell in lawfull things, is against all reason, as euidently appeareth by the Euangelicall counsels, which are much superiour to the Popes counsels. The Popes iudgement, and opinion when it is contrary to [Page 213] the opinion of other learned Catholikes, any man may lawfully reiect; and especially if to follow his opinion, should bee very preiudiciall to himselfe, or others; and also if it be grounded vpon sleight reasons and false in­formations, as partly wee haue shewed before how weake those arguments bee, which are commonly ob­iected against this Oath, and partly we wil beneathNu. 51. & sect. by Father Parsons letters make it manifest, that his Holines was not rightly informed concerning the true meaning of this Oath. And truly to dislike whatsoeuer the Popes Holinesse disliketh, and to approue whatsoeuer hee ap­proueth, and to grant him without due examination all that authoritie, which some Popes haue claimed or may claime, doth seeme to fauour rather of ouer much flat­tery, then of moderate discretion, whereof the exam­ples of many Popes doe yeeld sufficient testimonie; in so much that Cardinall Bellarmine in his Controuersies, hath much adoe to excuse many Popes, not onely from beleeuing, but also from teaching publickly flat here­sies; and neuerthelesse he doth freely acknowledge that some Popes did publickly teach & maintaine, although not manifest heresie, yet false doctrine.

47. Did not Pope Nicolas the first in a Decretal epistle, which is registred in the bookes of the Canon LawDe consecrat. dist. 4. can. à quodam Iudaeo., and in the Tomes of the Sacred Councels Tom. 3. con­cil in responsis Nicolai ad cō ­sulta Bulgauo­rum. cap. 104., publickly teach, that Baptisme giuen onely in the name of Christ, without expressing the three Persons of the Trinitie is valide and sufficient? Which doctrine Cardinall Bel­larmine Lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. cap. 12. affirmeth to bee false, and therefore to excuse Pope Nicolas he affirmeth, that he did not by defining the question to be of faith, affirme that proposition, but onely as a particular Doctor, declare by the way his opinion. Did not Pope Celestine the third, in a Decretall Epistle, which was once extant in the body of the Canon Law, among the Popes Decretal Epistles, In cap laudi­bilem de con­uers. coniugat. publikely teach, and ac­cording to Alphonsus de Castro Lib. 1. de hae­res. cap. 4. did also declare as Pope, that Marriage was so dissolued by heresie, that the [Page 214] partie, whose consort was fallen into heresie, might lawfully marry an other? Which doctrine is now flatly condemned in the Councell of Trent Sess. 24. de re­format can. 5.. And Cardinall Bellarmine to excuse Celestine doth affirme, That he did not define anything for certainty concerning that point, but did onely answere what seemed to him more probable. And although, saith Cardinall Bellarmine In the place before cited., it is doubtlesse true, that this Epistle of Celestine was once among the De­cretall Epistles, yet from thence it can not be gathered, that Celestine made a decree plainly Apostolicall, and out of the Chaire, seeing that it is manifest, that there be many other things in the Decretall Epistles, which doe not make the thing to be of faith, but doe onely declare vnto vs the Popes opinions concerning that matter.

48. Did not Pope Iohn the 22. publikly teach, and if hee had not beene preuented by death, was resoluedAdrianus Papa in quaest. de confirm. circa finem, &c. Alphons. de Ca­stro lib. 3. cōtra haeres. verbo Beatitudo. hae­res. 6. & Bellarm. lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. cap. 14. to define, that the soules of the Blessed should not see God before the Resurrection? Did not Pope Boniface the eighth, writing to Philip the faire King of France af­firme,Nicolaus Vigne­rius ad annum 1300. that he doth account them for heretikes, who doe beleeue that the said King is not subiect to him in spiri­tuals and temporals? in so much that Ioannes Tilius Bi­shoppe of Meldime in his Chronicle of the Kings of France doth boldly affirme, that the impudencie of Boni­face was so wonderfully great, that he durst auerre, that the Kingdome of France was a benefit of the Pontificall Ma­iestie. I omit to rehearse certaine later examples, for that they are not as yet so publikely knowne, neither would I, being desirous with Sem and Iaphet, to hide the im­perfections of our parents, for reuerence to the See Apostolike haue put in remēbrance the aforesaid exam­ples, although they be most publike, if certaine Catho­likes with ouer much bitter zeale, censuring both wrongfully, vnchristianly, and inconsideratly their christian brethren, for such enormous crimes of disobe­dience, errour, and deniall of their faith, had not for their defence compelled me thereunto.

[Page 215]49. Now tell vs, we pray you, would our Aduersa­ries, if they had liued in those Popes times, haue so ve­hemently enueighed against all those Catholikes, and haue exclaimed against them, as being scarce Catho­likes and good beleeuers, who had not approued the opinions, decretall letters, or Apostolicall Breues of the aforesaid Popes? What they would haue done, God hee knoweth, that they ought not so to haue done, it is too too manifest. Why then are they now so void of Chri­stian charitie that they are not afraide to persecute lear­ned and vertuous Catholikes, and to condemne them of heresie, and of abiuring their faith, who vpon forci­ble and sufficient grounds, and which their most learned Aduersaries are not able with solide arguments to con­uince (and if they bee able, wee humbly request them, and by the tender passion of our Sauiour Christ Iesus, we coniure them, that they will endeauour rather with sound reasons to satisfie timorous consciences, then to enforce them with threatning, and reproachfull speach­es) in a matter of so great moment, belonging to their Allegiance, and tending to the temporall ouerthrow of themselues and their whole posteritie, doe not obey the Popes letters, which are not founded in his publike de­finition, but onely grounded vpon his priuate opinion, which therefore hereafter (as the aforesaid opinions of Pope Nicolas, Celestine, Iohn and Boniface are now re­iected) will peraduenture be impugned, especially see­ing that they labour by all probable meanes to excuse him with all dutifull reuerence, and doe not presume malapartly and vnseemely to oppose against him? If they would haue all Catholikes to affirme without due exa­mination whatsoeuer he denyeth, let them heare, I beseech them, attentiuely (for the words doe nearely concerne them­selues) what writeth Melchior Canus a religious man of the Order of Saint Dominick, a most learned writer of these times, Bishop of the Canaries, and not long [Page 214] sinceFor he wrote his booke in the yeare 1562 chiefe Professour of Diuinitie in the Vniuersity of Salamanca. Those, saith he,Lib. 5. de locis cap 5. prope finem. who rashly and without e­lection doe defend euery iudgement of the Pope concerning euery thing, doe weaken, not strengthen, doe ouerthrowe, not establish the authoritie of the See Apostolike. For what will he in the end gaine by disputing against heretikes, when they perceiue that he taketh vpon him to defend the Popes authoritie, not by iudgement, but by affection, neither that he endeauoureth to find out the truth by force of his dispu­tation, but to apply himselfe to an other mans will and plea­sure? Peter hath no need of our lying; he hath no need of our flattering.

50. To make therefore now at the last a compendi­ous Answere to all the three Breues, and so also to the whole obiection. To the first Breue, whereon the other two doe depend, It is answered first, that although his Holinesse thinking, and in his opinion supposing the oath to bee of it selfe vnlawfull, and to containe many things which are contrary to faith and saluation, doth therefore by his letters or Breue forbid English Catho­likes to take it, yet seeing that this his prohibition is on­ly a declaratiue precept, and founded in the priuate iudg­ment and opinion of his Holinesse, as beforeNu. 44. et sect. we haue shewed, as wee are not bound to follow the Popes opi­nion against the probable opinion of other Catholike Diuines (then especially when by following it, very great preiudice is like to come to our selues, and many others; and when the reasons and grounds for his opi­nion, are for the most part by all men accounted to bee very vnsound, as are almost all those arguments, which our learned Aduersaries haue obiected against the oath) so also we are not bound to obey the Popes declaratiue precept, which is founded in his opinion, and in the rea­son, which he alleageth, which precept, according to the aforesaid doctrine of Franciscus Suarez, hath no greater force to bind, then hath his reason and opinion whereon this declaratiue precept doth wholy depend.

[Page 219]51. Secondly it is answered, that there is no English Catholike, who, if hee be well instructed, will take the Oath, or approue it to be lawful in that sense where­in his Holinesse, as wee probably coniecture, hath con­demned it. For it is probable, and in my iudgement morally certaine, that his Holinesse did vnderstand the words of the Oath in that sense, wherein the Diuines of Rome did conceiue them, and especially Cardinall Bellarmine, whose aduice and opinion in this so weigh­tie a Theological controuersie, which must needs bring great good or harme to this Kingdome, his Holines, as it is very probable, both demanded and followed, who therefore, according to his Holinesse minde, and by his permission wrote in defence of his Breues against his Maiesties Apologie for the Oath. But Cardinall Bellar­mine vnderstood the Oath in that sense, as though it de­nyed the Popes Primacie in spirituals, his power to excom­municate, to bind and loose, and also to dispense in oathes, in which sense, doubtlesse it can not be denied, but that it conteines many thinges, which are flat contrary to faith and saluation: but no Catholike doth in this sense either take the Oath, or defend it to be lawfull.

52. Moreouer, that his Holinesse did thinke, that in this Oath is denyed his spirituall authoritie to inflict Censures, is plainly gathered by a letter of Father Par­sons, who did greatly vrge and sollicite his Holinesse to send hither his Breues, as both some Iesuites here with vs doe freely confesse, and also no man, who knoweth, how our English affaires at Rome were carried in his daies, can make any doubt hereof. This therefore is the true coppie of a letter, which Father Parsons, before a­ny Breue was sent hither, wrote to one here in England, which letter hee presently shewed to diuers, and gaue them leaue to take a copy thereof, and to impart it to other Catholikes.

53. About some foure or fiue months agoe, it was consul­ted by seauen or eight of the learneddest Diuines that could [Page 218] be chosen, who gaue their iudgement of it. Their reasons are many, but all deduced to this, that the Popes authority in chastising Princes vpon a iust cause, is de fide, and con­sequently can not be denyed when it is called into contro­uersie without denying of our faith, nor that the Pope, or a­ny other authority can dispense in this.

54. For if the question were de facto, and not de iure, to wit, whether the Pope might iustly in this or that occa­sion excommunicate or depose this or that Prince, vpon these or these causes, or whether precedent Popes haue don [...] well therein or no, then might some of those reasons, which you say your friends doe alleage, be admitted into conside­ration; to wit, whether it could be in aedificationem, or destructionem, doe hurt or good, be profitable or improfi­table; or whether the causes be sufficient or no, for without cause none holdeth that the Pope may depose; or whether the due forme of admonition touched in your letters were obserued. But forsomuch as the question is de potestate of the See Apostolike power, what it may doe vpon any cause▪ or against any Catholike Prince whatsoeuer, these conside­rations of temporall hurt can not enter.

55 Besides these I haue conferred the matter with Car­dinall Bellarmine, and sundry others of great learning and conscience, and all are of one opinion in this case, that the forme of the Oath as it lyeth, is hereticall, and no way may be admitted by him that will not deny the Catholike faith.

56. I had occasion twice to speake with his Holines, the first in company of M. Thomas Fitzherbert, where we pro­posed certaine manners of mitigation suggested by friends, &c. Whereto his Holinesse answered, that as for any actu­all vsing Censures against his Maiestie, he meant not, but rather all curtesie, but as for the Authoritie of the See A­postolike (to wit, for vsing of Censures) he was resolued, and would rather loose his head then yeeld one iot. The se­cond, he being informed that some Priests did seeme to in­cline to the taking of the Oath, he answered, he could not hold them for Catholikes, &c.

[Page 219]57. By which it is manifest first, that all the reasons why the Diuines of Rome did hold the Oath to be vn­lawfull, were deduced to this, that it is de fide, and con­sequently can not be denyed without denying the Catholike faith, that the Pope hath authoritie to chastise Princes vp­on a iust cause, and that neither the Pope, nor any other authoritie can dispense in this. Secondly, also it is manifest, that his Holinesse did thinke that in this oath is denyed his authority to vse Censures, and that therefore he could not holde those Priests for Catholikes, who is c [...]ed to the taking of the Oath. As though forsooth, the English Ca­tholikes who take the Oath doe deny the Popes power to vse Censures, or to chastise Princes vpon a iust cause; whereas it is most cleare that no such thing is denyed in this Oath, as in my opinion I haue plainly shewed by answering Cardinall Bellarmines arguments, vnlesse perchance hee would haue vs to approue for good and lawfull, against the receiued rules of the Logicians, this manner of arguing from a particular to inferre an v­niuersal; as for example, The Pope can not chastise Prin­ces by depriuing them of their temporall dominions, or of their life, Therefore the Pope can not chastise Princes. Wee grant that the Pope may chastise Princes by vsing Ecclesiasticall Censures, which truly in this Oath is not denyed, but we vtterly deny, that to depriue Princes of their dominions, or of their life, are to bee ranked a­mong spirituall or Ecclesiasticall Censures.

58 Wherefore Cardinall Bellarmine, Father Par­sons, and those other Romane Diuines vsing such sophi­sticall collections to proue, that in this oath are contai­ned many things which are flat contrarie to faith, and saluation, were very grossely mistaken. And if his Ho­linesse trusting to the learning and conscience of these men, was therefore emboldened to send hither his Bre­ues for the condemning vpon that cause the taking of this Oath, how greatly he was deluded to no small re­proch of the See Apostolike, to the great scandall of [Page 220] Protestants, and to the vtter temporall ouerthrow of very many Catholikes, it is, alas I speake it with griefe, too too manifest. For, to omit that protestation of those thirteene English PriestsAboue chap. 3. sec. 3. nu 10., who perceiueth not that from that position, which Petrus Pithaeus Aboue chap. 3 sec. 3. nu. 13. affirmeth to be the approued Doctrine of the Kingdome of France, to wit, that the Pope hath not Power to depriue the King of France of his Kingdome, and that the Subiects, notwith­standing any Excommunications whatsoeuer which can bee made by the Pope, are bound to yeeld obedience due to the King for temporalls, neither that in this they can be dispen­ced, or absolued by the Pope, Cardinall Bellarmine, Father Parsons, and those other Romane Diuines might in the very like manner inferre, that therein is denyed the Popes Primacie in spirituals, his power to excommunicate, to bind and loose, to dispense, and absolue? And neuerthe­lesse they will doubtlesse be affraid to condemne there­fore the Kingdome of France of heresie, and of denying their faith for constantly maintaining that the Pope hath not power to depriue the King of France of his King­dome. Why then are they not afraid to censure Eng­lish Catholikes of heresie, and denyall of there faith for acknowledging the very same concerning the not de­priuing the King of England of his Kingdome by the Popes authoritie, which French Catholikes without any danger of heresie, or error doe constantly auouch con­cerning the not depriuing of their King by the said au­thority of the Pope? And thus much concerning his Holinesse first Breue.

59 In the Second Breue, which was dated the first of September in the yeare 1607, it is only declared, that the former letters of his Holinesse concerning the for­bidding Catholikes to take the oath, (wherein, saith his Holinesse, hee strictly commanded the English Catholikes that they should in no wise take the said oath) were not false and surreptitious, but written not only vpon his certaine knowledge, and by his owne proper motion, and will (by [Page 221] which words neuerthelesse he doth not intend to deny that he in writing of them vsed the aduise, & opiniō of others) but also after long, & great deliberation had con­cerning all the things which are contained in them, and that therefore they were bound to obserue them exactly, setting aside all interpretation which may perswade to the contra­rie. Which last words are so to be vnderstood, that there must be made no friuolous interpretation of those letters, or no such interpretations, which should make any man to think, or make any doubt, that they were not written of his Holinesse owne knowledge, and by his proper will. For as Ioannes Salas Disp 21. de leg. sec. 2. and Emanuell Sa Verbo Inter­pretatio. nu. 5., both of them Diuines of the Societie of Iesus, doe well obserue, It is lawfull for Doctours so inteprete all lawes not indeed by a necessary, publike or iuridicall interpretation, but by a priuate, and not binding interpretation, although the Prince should say, It shall be lawfull for no man to other­wise interprete this our writing, for then he onely for­biddeth friuolous interpretations, and which are expresly contrary to his minde. Which there Doctrine is with farre greater reason to be vnderstood of the Popes de­claratiue precept, which is only grounded vpon pre­sumption, and vpon his own opinion, & priuate iudge­ment, whereby he perswadeth himselfe, that the thing which he forbiddeth, is otherwise vnlawfull, as being forbidden by some former law: Whose opinion, and also command founded only in his opinion, when it is against the probable opinion of other Catholike Di­uines, may not only be interpreted, but also contra­dicted. Seeing therefore that this Second Breue is only an approuing, and confirming of the former, it can haue no more force to binde then the former hath, for con­firming whereof it was written by his Holinesse.

60 The third Breue being dated the first of Februa­rie in the yeare 1608, was sent to M^r. George Birket, wherein his Holinesse doth ordaine, and substitute him Archpresbyter of the English Priests of the Popes Semi­naries [Page 222] in the place of Master George Blackwel; and doth i [...] ­ [...]e, & command him, & for this giueth him special facul­tie, that by authoritie of his Holinesse hee doe admonish all, and euery one of those English Priests, who haue taken a certaine Oath (wherein many things are contained, which are cleerely repugnant to faith and the saluation of soules) or haue taught, and doe teach that it may lawfully be ta­ken, to repent them, and to abstaine from such an error. And if within the time (extraiudicialiter notwithstan­ding) at his arbitrement to be prefixed vnto them, they shall not doe accordingly, that by the same authoritie he depriue, and declare depri [...]ed them, or him of all faculties, and pri­viledges granted to them, or to any of them from the See A­postolicke; or by hir authoritie from any other whatso­euer.

61 Concerning this third Breue fiue things are to be obserued. The first is, that this Breue containeth partly a constitutiue, and partly a declaratiue precept, or rather a declaration of a former precept. The declara­tiue precept, or rather the declaration of a former pre­cept doth consist in this, that his Holinesse by this pre­cept doth not make, but suppose, and declare the oath to be of it selfe vnlawfull. And although this declara­tion of his Holinesse should vertually containe in it a precept, it is for that it supposeth, and presumeth that many things are contained in this Oath, which are cleer­ly repugnant to faith and saluation. Which declaration, or vertuall prohibition being onely grounded on pre­sumption, and on his Holinesse opinion hath no more force to binde Catholikes to belieue that this Oath is of it selfe vnlawfull, and that it containeth many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith & saluation, then bindeth his opinion, when it is against the probable o­pinion of other Catholikes, who can not perceiue, that in this Oath is contained any thing, which so much as obscurely is against faith or saluation; especially in that sense, wherein they take the Oath, and thinke it to bee [Page 223] lawfull, and which sense they perswade themselues to be agreeable to the proper and vsuall signification of the words, and to the meaning of the Lawmaker. And therefore as we are not bound, according to that which hath been said before, to follow the opinion of his Ho­linesse, when other learned Catholikes do disagree from him, so neither are wee bound to obey his Declaratiue precept, and much lesse a bare declaration thereof, when it dependeth only vpon his opinion.

62 The constitutiue precept of his Holinesse doth consist in this, that he commandeth Master Archpriest, that he obseruing certaine conditions, do depriue, and declare depriued of all faculties those Priests, who ei­ther haue taken the Oath, or haue taught, and do teach that it may lawfully be taken. And this precept being a meere penall constitution in respect of the Priests who haue taken the Oath or haue taught, and doe teach that it may lawfully be taken, doth not of it selfe forbid the taking of the Oath, but supposeth that it is before other­wise forbidden. And therefore no stronger, but rather a far weaker argument can be drawne from this Breue, then from the former to proue, that this Oath is vnlaw­full, and containeth in it many things, which are cleere­ly repugnant to faith, and saluation. But in respect of Master Archpriest it is not a meere penall constitution, but a true, and proper constitutiue precept, and binding him (as it is manifest by those words, and we enioine, and command thee) to obserue all that which in this Breue is commanded him; so that he may as easily transgresse his Holinesse command by exceeding his commission, to wit, if he depriue of faculties those Priests, whom he hath no authoritie to depriue, as by neglecting to de­priue them, whom by his Holinesse command hee is bound to depriue.

63 Secondly, it is to be obserued, that although some of the vnlearneder sort may perchance from this Breue take some occasion to imagine, that his Holinesse did by [Page 224] a firme decree define, that this Oath containeth in it many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith and saluation, for that, if according to the rules beforeNu. 34. rela­ted out of Melchior Canus, & Card. Bellarmine the Popes Holinesse had excommunicated all those, who should teach that the Oath may lawfully be taken, it had bene doubtlesse a manifest signe,See there in the marginall note how ma­nifest a signe it had beene. that his Holinesse intended to make a firm decree, and definition of faith, why then may we not now rightly inferre, that in this Breue hee hath defined the same, seeing that he inflicteth so grie­uous an Ecclesiastical Censure, and which is most neere to excommunication, to wit, Suspension from iurisdic­tion or depriuing of all faculties, vpon all those English Priests, who doe teach that the Oath may lawfully bee taken.

64. But this obiection is altogether friuolous. For first, there is a great disparity betwixt Excommunicati­on, and Suspension, or taking away of faculties, for being a signe to know when any thing is by the Pope, or Councells firmely decreed to bee a point of faith. For when the Pope or Councells doe define any thing to bee of Faith, they intend to account all those, who presume to beleeue the contrary, for heretikes, and to exclude them from the company of the faithful and right belee­uers, which separation from the Society of the faithfull is very well expressed by Excommunication, but not by Suspension, for that one may be depriued of all faculties, and suspended from all Iurisdiction, and neuerthelesse be partaker with the rest of the faithfull in all those Di­uine rites, ceremonies, and spirituall graces, which are common to all Christians, and right beleeuers. Where­fore no Diuine, that I haue read, did euer affirme, that depriuing of faculties, or Suspension are sufficient signes to discerne when the Pope or Councel defineth any thing to be of Faith.

65. Besides although the Pope had not onely taken away their faculties, but also had excōmunicated those [Page 225] English Priests, who taught that the Oath may lawful­ly bee taken, yet from thence it could not bee rightly concluded, that he had by a firme, and infallible defini­tion of Faith condemned the Oath, seeing that accor­ding to the Doctrine of Melchior Canus, and Cardinal Bellarmine beforeNu. 32. related, to make the Popes definiti­ons to bee infallible, and to bee beleeued as a point of Faith, it is necessary that they bee propounded to the v­niuersall Church, and not to priuate Bishops, or Chur­ches; for they are to be vnderstood saith Canus, Nu. 33. onely in this case to pronounce of faith, when the sentence belongeth to all Christians, when it bindeth all. But this Breue is dire­cted to one onely Arch-Priest with an expresse com­mand, not to excommunicate, or otherwise to punish all the Catholikes euen of one kingdome, but to de­priue onely those Priests, who haue taken the Oath, or haue taught, and doe teach that it may lawfully be ta­ken, of all those faculties, and priuiledges, which they haue receiued from the See-Apostolike. And therefore to gather from this third Breue that his Holinesse hath defined the Oath to bee vnlawfull it is vaine, friuolous, and altogether ridiculous. Wherefore his Holinesse did not intend to bind English Catholikes more by this Breue, but rather lesse then by the former not to take the Oath: for that in his former Breues he doth by a de­claratiue precept expresly forbid Catholikes to take the Oath, but in this Breue no expresse prohibition is con­tained, but rather supposed, and a punishment inflicted not vpon all English Catholikes, but vpon those Priests only, who haue taken the Oath, or haue taught, and do teach that it may lawfully bee taken: therefore a farre weaker argument to prooue this Oath to bee vnlaw­full can bee drawne from this Breue, then from the for­mer.

66 Thirdly, it is to be obserued, that it is not all one to depriue a Priest of his Faculties, and to forbid him to say Masse, and others to be present with him at Diuine [Page 226] Seruice, as some of the vulgar sort through ignorance doe imagine, who thinke that if a Priest be depriued of his faculties, he is forthwith suspended from the Altar. For as there be many Priests beyond the Seas, who dai­ly say Masse, and others are present thereat, and yet they haue no faculties at al, nor authority to hear confessions, so also the taking away of their faculties doth not de­barre them from saying Masse, nor others to be present at it. But considering that no Priest by vertue of his or­dination hath full authority to minister the Sacrament of Penance, or to exercise any other act of spirituall Iu­risdiction, as to excommunicate, to dispense in vowes, or oaths, and such like, although he hath full authority to say Masse, no Iurisdiction being required therunto, as the giuing of faculties doth consist in this, that ful pow­er, license, and faculty is giuen to a Priest to mini­ster lawfully, and with effect the Sacrament of Penance, or to exercise any other spirituall Iurisdiction, accor­ding as he hath more or fewer, greater or lesser faculties granted him, so the taking away his faculties doth con­sist in this, that hee is depriued of that spirituall Iurisdi­ction, which by the priuiledge of the Pope or Church, he hath receiued; so that the depriuing a Priest of facul­ties is a certaine partiall Suspension, as the Diuines doe speake, not from Order, and from exercising those fun­ctions which belong to Order, but from Iurisdicti­on, and from exercising those functions which depend thereon.

67 Fourthly it is to bee obserued, that the Church doth not vsually, and perchance cannot suspend, or ex­communicate any man with Maior suspension, or ex­communication but for some mortall sin; for that these kind of censures are punishments, and medicines, which alwaies suppose some precedent sinne, and spiritual ma­ladie. And therfore it is a generall, and certaine principle, saith Suarez, De Censuris disp. 4. sec. 4. that the fault for which the censure, is to be imposed, ought to bee proportionable to the censure, be­cause, [Page 227] according to Naturall reason, the punishment ought to haue equall proportion to the fault, and contrariwise. For it is against commutatiue iustice to inflict a great punish­ment for a small fault. Wherefore it is certain, that a great censure, that is, which depriueth of goods of great moment and of it selfe causeth great harme: and therefore may aptly be called a greater, or Maior censure, doth at the least sup­pose a mortall sinne, that it may iustly be inflicted. Seeing therefore that the iudgements and opinions of Popes, as well said Pope Innocentius Aboue cited nu. 39., are not alwaies grounded vpon truth, and therefore they may sometimes iudge that to be a sinne, which is no sinne indeede, and one to haue committed that crime, which in very deed he hath not committed, it may also somtimes fall out, that one is excommunicated or suspended in the outward face of the Church, who before God, whose iudgement is not grounded on presumption, but vpon truth, is not in very deede either excommunicated, or suspended.

68 Seeing therefore that the depriuing one of facul­ties which is inflicted for a fault committed, and which truly, and properly is a punishment (for concerning an absolute reuoking of a priuiledge, faculty, or Iurisdicti­on granted there is not the same reason) is a certaine Maior suspension not from the vse of his Order, but from the exercising of his Iurisdiction, we may well suppose, that his Holinesse had no intention to punish with so great punishment, as is the taking away of faculties, those Priests who haue taken the Oath, or haue taught, and doe teach that it may lawfully be taken, but for that he certainly perswaded himselfe that they had commit­ted periurie, so that if in very deede they haue commit­ted no such crime, we may iustly presume, that his Ho­lines did not intend to depriue them of their faculties, and consequently that they are not in very deed depri­ued of them: although by reason of scandall they ought not (supposing that M^r. Arch-Priest hath lawfully, and according to his commission proceeded against them) [Page 228] to vse their faculties publickely, and before them to whom their innocencie is not yet sufficiently knowne, least they should seeme to contemne the keyes of the Church; yet doubtlesse no man, who will confesse that this taking away of faculties is inflicted vppon those Priests properly as a punishment for some fault by them committed, can make any doubt, but that in very deede their Sacramentall absolutions, their dispensations, and such like acts of Iurisdiction are valide & effectuall.

69 For, as Suarez Disp 4. de cē ­suris sec. 7. nu. 2. 4. 23. et seq. doth well affirme, a Censure, which in the onely externall Court, or in the face of the Church is iust, (to wit, for that the crime, for which the Censure is inflicted, is probably presumed, and is in iudge­ment sufficiently proued) hath no force in the court of con­science, or to take away or suspend in very deed his Iurisdi­ction, who in very deed hath cōmitted no such crime. Ther­fore Sacramentall absolution giuen by such an Excommu­nicated, or suspended person is in this respect valide, and of force; and the same is to be vnderstood of absolution from a censure, of dispensation in vowes, and the like. Wherefore according to the common opinion of Doctours he may secretly, and without scandal, or in the presence of them to whom his innocency is knowne, exercise all the acts of his Iurisdiction;Suarez in the place cited. and therefore well saide Nauarre, In Manuali cap. 27. nu. 3. that such a Censure, which in very deede is vniust, is of force a little more then nothing, vnlesse in the externall court, and to auoid scandall.

70 Fifthly it is to bee obserued, that the authority which his Holinesse hath delegated to M^r. Arch-Priest to depriue the English Priests of their faculties, is not absolutely, and simply granted vnto him, but with cer­taine limited conditions, which if he neglect to obserue hee, doubtlesse exceedeth his commission, doth great wrong to these Priests, against whom hee proceedeth, and all his sentences, or declarations, whereby he de­priueth them, or declareth them depriued of their fa­culties, are for want of Iurisdiction inualide, and of no [Page 229] force at all. Because a delegate Iudge, as well saith Sua­rez, Disp. 3. de cē ­sures sect. 12. nu. 6. must not exceede the forme, and commission granted him, otherwise he doth nothing, seeing that he hath no au­thority, but from the delegante, that is from him who doth delegate it vnto him. Cap. dilecta de Rescriptis et cap. Pisanis de restitut. spoliat.

71 These beeing obserued it is certaine first, that M^r. Arch-Priest by vertue of this Breue hath only authori­ty granted him, as also he himselfe hath acknowledged, to take away faculties onely from Secular Priests, ouer whom hee hath Iurisdiction, and not from religious Priests, who are exempted from the Iurisdiction of the Ordinaries, (that is the Bishops of the Dioces, or those who haue Episcopall Iurisdiction) and are immediately subiect to the See Apostolicke, and their owne Superi­ours. For besides that in their priuiledges of exempti­on granted them by the Popes Holinesse it is vsually spe­cified, that hee intendeth not to take away their Priui­ledges, and to subiect them to the Ordinaries by gene­rall words, it is also the common and approued custome of all Catholicke countries, that whensoeuer the Popes Holinesse enioyneth the Ordinaries to punish with any extraordinary punishment by him appointed all those Priests, which shall commit such, or such a crime, Reli­gious Priests, vnlesse they bee expresly named, are not comprehended, for that the punishment of them, vn­lesse he declare the contrary, hee leaueth to their owne Superiours. And this also is for the most part obserued in Generall Councells, that whensoeuer in any decree of Reformation they intend, that all Priests as well Religi­ous, as Secular shall bee comprehended, they doe vse these expresse words, Euery Priest as well Religious as Se­cular, &c. And although the name Priest doth signifie in generall euery Priest as well Regular, as Secular, and the Monke bee common both to Abbots, and priuate Monkes, and the name Deacon, and also Bishop may be taken for all Deacons, or Bishops as well Cardi­nalls, [Page 230] as not Cardinalls, neuertheles as in penall lawes a Deacon and Bishop Cardinall are not vsually compre­hended vnder the bare name of a Deacon, and of a Bi­shop, nor an Abbot vnder the name of a Monke, so also in the same penall lawes, especially in those whose ex­ecution is committed to the Ordinaries, from whose iu­risdictiō Religious men are exempted, Regular or Religi­ous Priests are not signified by the bare name of a Priest.

72. Secondly, it is also certaine, that by vertue of this Breue M^r. Archpriest hath authority granted him to take away faculties onely from those Secular Priests, who haue taken the Oath, or haue taught, and doe teach that it may lawfully be taken. So that two onely sorts of Priests are comprehended in this Oath, first the takers of the Oath, and of these not al, but only those who haue ta­ken it, secondly, the teachers that the Oath may lawful­ly be taken, and of these not only who haue taught, but also who doe teach that it may lawfully be taken. Where­by it is manifest that his Holinesse did more seuerely proceede against the teachers, that the Oath may law­fully be taken, then against the takers thereof. And truely supposing that his Holinesse was fully perswaded that this Oath can not lawfully be taken, there want not probable reasons, whereby hee might be prudently moued to punish more seuerely the teachers, then the takers of this Oath, and to giue authoritie to M^r. Arch­priest to take away all faculties from those Priests who haue alreadie taken the Oath [and do not repent them thereof] reseruing the punishing of those who heere­after shall take it to himselfe, as heereafter in his wis­dome he shall iudge it to be most expedient.

73. And from hence thirdly it may also certainely be gathered, that, supposing in penall lawes the words are not to be extended, but to bee restrained, which is a most certaine rule, and approued by all Lawyers, if any Secular Priest hath neither taken the Oath, neither hath taught, nor doth teach that it may lawfully be taken, [Page 231] although hee should inwardly in his minde thinke it very probable, that the Oath may lawfully be taken, and for that cause hee should outwardly carry himselfe ne­gatiuely, and neither positiuely defend it, nor posi­tiuely condemne it, M^r. Archpriest by vertue of this Breue hath no authority granted him to depriue this Priest of his faculties. The reason is euident, for that to teach the Oath to be lawfull is positiuely to defend it, and outwardly to approue it, but this Priest doth outwardly neither defend it, nor condemne it, but outwardly hee carrieth himselfe negatiuely, and therefore hee doth not teach that it may lawfully, or may not lawfully bee taken.

74. From whence also it followeth, that although such a Priest hauing diligently examined all the argu­ments, which are brought against the lawfull taking of the Oath, and cleerely in his owne iudgement percei­uing the weakenesse of them dare not condemne of mortall sin those Catholikes, who haue taken the Oath, or doe teach that it may lawfully bee taken, and there­fore in the Sacrament of Penance he absolueth them from all their other sinnes which they haue confessed, and whereof they are contrite, not examining them whether they haue taken the Oath, or taught it to bee lawfull (if he suppose they haue no scruple thereof) but leauing them in this point to their owne consciences, M^r. Archpriest by vertue of this Breue hath not authori­tie granted him to depriue this Priest of his Faculties. For in propertie of speech beyond which words in pe­nall lawes are not to be extended it can not rightly be said, that this Priest doth teach that the Oath may law­fully be taken, considering that in this point he carrieth himselfe meere negatiuely, and doth not exercise any positiue act of teaching, or maintaining. Wherefore betwixt preachers, teachers and beleeuers of heresie, al­though this their inward opinion or beleefe bee out­wardly made manifest, there is a great distinction, as is [Page 232] euident by the Bulla Caenae, and the Expositor thereof: neither will any Diuine or Lawyer affirme, that, if there bee any punishment appointed against preachers or teachers of heresie, only beleeuers, although they should expresse their minde by some outward signe, are also comprehended. Neither by any word at all of this Breue can it be gathered, that English Priests vnder paine of loosing their faculties, are bound to condemne posi­tiuely the taking of this Oath, although his Holinesse in this Breue doth bind them not to teach, that it may law­fully be taken.

75. Fourthly, it is certaine that M^r. Archpriest by vertue of this Breue hath not authoritie granted him to take away faculties from those Secular Priests, who haue taken the Oath, or who haue taught, and doe teach, that it may lawfully be taken, vnlesse he doe be­fore admonish al, and euery one of them to repent them and abstaine from this errour, for these are the expresse words of the Breue. So that hee must admonish not onely all those Priests who haue taken the Oath, or haue taught, and do teach that it may lawfully bee taken, but also e­uery one of them. Wherefore it is the opinion of learned Lawyers, whose iudgement hath beene demanded of this point, that it is not sufficient for M^r. Archpriest to admonish all those Priests who haue taken the Oath, or haue taught, & do teach that it may lawfully be taken by a general admonition, but also he must admonish euery one of them particularly, otherwise he goeth beyond his commission, and doth them very great wrong, and his sentence and declaration is inualide, and of no effect at all, if hee depriue or declare them depriue of their fa­culties, beeing onely in generall and not in particular admonished.

76. Fifthly, to conclude; it seemeth to me also to be certaine, that those Secular Priests, who haue taken the Oath, or haue taught, and doe teach that it may law­fully be taken, are not by the sentence of M^r. Archpriest [Page 233] denounced against them by authoritie granted him by vertue of this Breue, depriued of their faculties, if hee onely declare them depriued, and doe not in very deed depriue them of their faculties. For (as it is manifest by the command of his Holinesse imposed vpon M^r. Archpriest, and by the authoritie giuen him in this Breue, for that purpose) he must both depriue such Priests of their fa­culties, and also declare that they are depriued. Where­fore, considering that in penall lawes, as hath been said beforeCap. 1. sect. 3., words are not to bee extended, but rather to be restrained, neither can a delegate Iudge, as well said Suarez Aboue nu. 70, exceede the forme and commission granted him, otherwise he doth nothing, if M^r. Archpriest should only denounce or declare those Priests who haue taken the Oath, to be depriued of their faculties, and should not in very deed depriue them of their faculties, he should both exceed the commission, which by his Holinesse was delegated vnto him, and those Priest [...] should not by vertue of such a declaration, either in the externall Court, or in the Court of conscience bee depriued of their faculties. And this is a maine ground why certaine Priests, who although they are thought by many to be depriued of their faculties by the sentence of M^r. Arch­priest, yet they are not afraide to vse them publikely, for that M^r. Archpriest, as they doe auouchSee Master Warmington in his moderate defence of the Oath of Allegi­ance. pag. 159. & seq., did neuer in very deed depriue them of their faculties, but onely did publickly denounce or declare, that they wer to be depri­ued, or at the most, y^t they were depriued of their faculties.

77. I omit to examine at this present what kinde of publishing and notice either of his Holinesse Breues, or of any declaration of his Holines concerning any dif­ficultie in the same Breues is necessary, that those Secu­lar Priests, who haue taken the Oath, or haue taught, and doe teach that it may lawfully be taken, are bound to giue credit to such Breues, or to such declarations of them, wherein is granted a speciall authoritie and com­mission to any man to depriue them, or to declare them [Page 234] depriued of their faculties: to wit, whether it be neces­sary that some authenticall copie, both of the Breues, and also of the declaration of the said Breues be shewed vnto them (for that as well the words of the Breues, as also of the Popes declaration of them, may sometimes haue difficulties, and may by diuers men bee diuersely vnderstood) or whether in such an odious matter, and of so great moment, as is the depriuing of all faculties by a iuridicall sentence for some crime committed, ei­ther the aforesaid Priests, or M^r. Archpriest himselfe, or any other person are, to such great preiudice of Re­uerend Priests, bound to giue vndoubted credit to the bare word, or letter of some one or other Priest, either Secular or Religious liuing beyond the Seas, who write that there is such a Breue, or such a delaration of the said Breue, without seeing any authenticall copie both of the Breues it selfe, and also of the declaration thereof. And thus much concerning the former part of the ob­obiection, which was taken from the authoritie of his Holinesse Breues.

78. To the second part of the obiection, which is drawen from the testimony of the most learned writers of this age, it is very easily answered. For as beforeNu. 11. we haue shewed out of the doctrine of Gabriell Vasquez, Nu. 11. and others, the multitude of Diuines doth not make the opinion, which they follow to bee vndoubtedly true, and the contrary opinion of other Catholikes, al­though they be farre fewer in number, to be void of all probabilitie, vnlesse the reasons and grounds, which they bring to confirme their doctrine, be so strong and conuincing, that they make the contrary opinion to be altogether improbable. Now that the reasons and grounds, which these most learned Diuines haue brought to proue this Oath to be vnlawfull, and clearly repugnant to the Catholike faith, as his Holinesse hath declared, and for which onely cause he hath forbid Ca­tholikes to take this Oath, are very weake, and in my [Page 235] opinion not beseeming the learning of such famous Di­uines, is manifest enough, both by the Answers which we haue made vnto them, & also by the Confessions of almost all our countrey men, euen of those who doe fauour Cardinal Bellarmines opinion, who do acknow­ledge not without a litle blushng that his arguments are very weake and vnsound.

79. Wherfore, euen from the authoritie of the most learned Diuines of these daies may also on the contrary be drawen a probable argument to proue, that this Oath is not vnlawfull, and that it doth not containe many things, which are clearely repugnant to faith. For if in this Oath many things are contained which are flat contrary to faith, as his Holinesse in his Breues hath affirmed, and these most learned Diuines haue in their bookes endeauoured to confirme, without doubtsome one among so many most learned men would haue brought at the least one thing among so many which are clearely repugnant to faith, but none of them hath as yet brought one onely proposition contained in this Oath which is flat contrary to faith. Theresore it is a most euident signe, that these Diuines did not right­ly vnderstand the true sense of the Oath, and did pub­lish to the world their vncertaine, not to say false col­lections for an vndoubted doctrine of faith, and that some of them did both wrongfully informe his Holines (who trusted to their learning and conscience) of the true and plaine meaning of the Oath, and also did take vpon them to impugne the Oath, rather vpon affection, then moued with any sound reason, perswading them­selues perchance at the first, as a certaine Iesuite heere with vs hath freely affirmed, that no Catholike either was able, or surely durst aduenture to gaine say, and write against men of such singular learning, who were also armed with the supreame authority of the Popes Holinesse. But great is the truth, and it doth (in the end) preuaile, it may for a time bee assaulted, but it can ne­uer [Page 236] be ouercome.

80. The Catholikes therefore of England, who haue taken the Oath, were moued from the beginning to take it, both for intrinsecall and extrinsecall grounds, that is, both for sufficient reason, and also probable au­thority, Their reason was, for that they were assuredly perswaded, that they were bound by the law of God to obey the iust command of their lawfull Prince, so long as they could not perceiue that hee commanded them any thing that was vnlawfull. But those Catho­likes could neuer perceiue, that in this Oath is contai­ned any hereticall, erroneous, or improbable position, and afterwards seriously considering how sillily and in­sufficiently men of such excellent learning had impug­ned it, they were more strongly confirmed in their opi­nion. The authoritie was, for that very many, if not the greater part of the learned Priests of this Realme, and also M. Archpriest himselfe did then either approue the taking of the Oath, or durst not condemne it as vnlaw­full. And although some of those learned Priests, who at the beginning before any Breue was sent hither for condemning the oath, did with all their might defend the lawfulnesse thereof, yet afterwards, when they saw it was forbidden by his Holinesse, they seemed to draw back, neuerthelesse that very many Priests, not onely who were prisoners, but also who were at libertie, did still continue in their former opinion, which for feare of incurring his Holinesse displeasure they durst not o­penly defend, is so manifest heere with vs, that if neede were, wee could proue it by many witnesses, (where­vpon a certaine very learned Priest did aptly say, that his Holinesse by his Breues had tyed their tongues, but not satisfied their vnderstanding) yet notwithstanding the Breues very many both vertuous and learned Priests, e­uen now are not afraide either to defend publike [...]y the lawfulnesse of the oath, or else although for feare of en­dangering their faculties, they dare not outwardly [Page 237] teach, that the Oath may lawfully be taken, howsoeuer in their hearts they are perswaded, yet they are nothing afraid openly to confesse, that they will not positiuely condemne the Oa [...]h, & therfore they carrie themselues in such sort, that they wil neither positiuely perswade a­ny man to take it, nor to refuse it, least they should seem either to cōtradict his Holines Breues, or els to be a cause that Catholikes should for so vncertaine, & disputable a question be vtterly ouerthrown in their temporall state.

81 Furthermore, that which is auouched in the ob­iection, that one only, or two Priests doe approue the taking of the oath, & that rather for feare, then from their heart, as to please the Prince, and to free them selues from the troubles of the time, then for any sufficient reason, partly is most false, seeing that it is manifest by that which hath beene said, that they were moued thereunto for strong and sufficient reasons, partly it belongeth rather to reprochfull words, then to solide reasoning: and with the very same facilitie it may be retorted backe against themselues. For to vse the words of Ioannes Parisien­sis De potest. Regia et Papa­li ca. 21. ad 41., to say that so worthy men did write or speake against their conscience in fauour of Princes, or for feare of them, is to stretch forth his mouth into Heauen. For contrari­wise it might be said more probably, that those Doctors, who do so vnmeasurably aduāce the Popes authority do speak for feare, or fauour of him, seeing that they are Ecclesiasticall persons, who may by him get greater preferment. And especi­ally sith that they say (although not wel) that the Pope doth graciously embrace them, who do amplifie his authoritie, and depresseth them, who doe speake against the same.

82 To make an end therefore now at the last of this Solution, and to answeare in forme to the foresaid obiection, it is answeared first, that the Maior proposition, to wit, In doubtfull, and disputahle matters the surer part is to be chosen, is equiuocall. For if by a doubtfull matter be vn­derstood that, to which our vnderstanding giueth no assent, or dissent at all, or which is all one, which wee [Page 238] neither iudge to be true, nor false, we grant the Maior, for in such doubtfull matters the surer part is to be cho­sen, as hath beene shewed beforeNu. 21.. But if by a doubt­full matter be vnderstood a disputable matter, to wit, which is not certain, but is by Catholikes disputed pro­bably on both sides, in which sense the vulgar sort do v­sually take doubtfull, then we deny the Maior: For in such doubtfull matters, whose truth, although it be not certaine, yet is probable, the surer part is not of necessi­tie to he chosen, but, as we haue shewed, it is sufficient to follow a secure, or probable opinion, to wit, which prudent, and learned men doe follow, although the greater part of Diuines, and also the Popes Holinesse himselfe doe defend the contrarie: neither doth he, that followeth such a probable opinion against the more common, and the more probable opinion euen of the Pope himselfe, expose himselfe to any danger of im­prudence, temeritie, or any other crime.

83 Secondly, the Minor also is easily answeared; for the authoritie of the learned Diuines of these daies, who thinke that the Oath is vnlawfull, and that it containeth in it many things flat contrarie to faith, and saluation, doth not make their opinion to be certaine, or doubt­full, but only to be disputable, & at the most to be more probable, then the contrarie, if we regard only extrin­secall and not intrinsecall grounds, that is, if we do not regard reason, but only authoritie. Neither hath his Holinesse defined by his Breues, but only declaring his opinion hath affirmed, that the oath can not lawfully be taken, for that it containeth many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith and saluation: for which cause he forbade Catholikes to take it. But it is manifest by that which hath beene said before, that the Popes de­claratiue precept, which is grounded on his owne, or the probable opinion of others, is subiect to error, and that it hath no more force to bind, then hath the reason, or his opinion, whereupon only it doth depend. Neither [Page 239] are Catholikes bound to follow the Popes opinion, al­though it be farre the more probable, or to obey his de­claratiue command, which is founded in his opinion, when it is repugnant to the opinion of other Catho­likes, although it be the lesse probable: and then espe­cially, when to follow his opinion is very preiudiciall to himselfe, or others as it happeneth in this Oath, see­ing that the refusing, thereof, supposing that it contai­neth no vnlawfull thing, is very hurtfull to Catholikes, and greatly iniurious to his Maiestie.

84 The other parts of the obiection, which seeme to proue, that there is greater danger of sinning by ta­king the oath, then by refusing it, are of small moment: for greater, or lesse danger supposeth a danger, but, as before we haue proued, there is no danger at all of incurring periurie, or any other crime by taking the Oath, it being commanded by the authority of our lawfull King, and probably thought by vertuous and learned men to containe no vnlawfull assertion. And so this Statute for taking the Oath, is not a meere penall law binding only to punishment, and not to sinne, but also a commanding precept, and which also bindeth in con­science the Subiects to fulfill the lawfull command of their Prince, especially in those things, which are pro­bably thought to appertaine to temporall allegiance, which is due to all lawfull Princes by the law of God, and nature. Neither doe Catholikes for that cause take the oath, or thinke it to be lawfull, because Protestants doe command it, and thinke it to be lawfull, as though the Catholikes, who take the Oath, doe preferre the opinion of Protestants before the iudgement of Ca­tholikes, and of the supreme Pastor ouer all the faith­full, in things, which in some sort do belong to Re­ligion, as is the Religious taking of an oath; But because the Kings Maiestie being our lawfull Prince, and Soue­raigne Lord in temporals what Religion soeuer he be of, hath commanded al his Subiects to take this Oath of al­legiance, [Page 240] which vertuous, and learned Catholikes for probable reasons are of opinion that it is truly an oath of Allegiance, and that it containeth nothing, which is contrarie to Catholike faith, or Saluation, therefore Ca­tholikes to obey the lawfull command of their Prince doe take this oath of Allegiance.

85 And doubtlesse, if the King and Parliament should command the Subiects, to acknowledge by oath, that the Pope is not direct Lord of this kingdome in temporalls, and that he hath no direct power to depose our King, which (neuerthelesse according to the doctrine of the Canonists doth belong to the Popes Primacie) and that notwithstanding any sentence of depriuation denoun­ced or to be denounced by the Pope by vertue of this direct power against our King, they will beare faith and true alle­giance to his Maiestie &c. and that the Pope by vertue of this direct power in temporals hath no authoritie to absolue him from this oath or any part thereof, and so of the rest, and his Holinesse following the Canonists opinion (who doe with such vehemency defend this his direct power in temporals ouer the whole Christian world, that the contrarie opinion they thinke to be hereticall) should forbid by his Breues this manner of oath, and de­clare that it containeth (as the Canonists doe imagine) many things flat contrarie to faith, and moreouer the learned Diuines of these daies should for the same rea­sons condemne the aforesaid oath, The very same ob­iection in the very same words, to wit, in doubtfull and disputable matters &c. which we haue alleadged against the oath of Allegiance commanded by the King and Parliament, might also be brought against this oath, if the King and Parliament should command it to be ta­ken. And neuerthelesse without doubt Cardinall Bel­larmine, and those other learned Diuines, who doe vt­turly reiect the Canonists opinion, would easily in the same manner, as we haue now answered to this obiecti­on, satisfie also the other. Wherefore this present ob­iection [Page 241] taken from the authoritie of his Holinesse, and the other learned Diuines of these daies in a disputable matter, which is probably disputed by Catholikes on both sides, can not euen in the iudgement of Card. Bel­larmine be accounted a forcible, & conuincing proofe.

And thus much concerning this second obiection, in examing whereof I haue beene somewhat long, being desirous to giue full satisfaction to timorous conscien­ces, and also for that the vnlearneder sort of persons might easily discerne, how farre the Popes Breues, which are founded in his opinion, and also in the probable o­pinion of other Diuines, can binde Catholikes to ob­serue them.

Sect. III.

1 THe third obiection against the oath in generall. which is made by Leonard Lessius Nu. 214. et seq. as also his English Recapitulator Pag 46. & seq. doth reherse, is taken from the great scādal, which may iustly arise by the taking of this Oath. And although Lessius vrgeth this obiection in such sort, that he rather supposeth, then thereby proueth, the oath to be vnlawfull according to the common vn­derstanding of the words, and that the swearer doth by some mentall reseruation take the words in some true, and lawfull sense, yet because, as we haue said, this ob­iection doth not proue, but suppose the Oath to be of it selfe vnlawfull, and sacrilegious, it may be further vrged in this manner.

2 According to the doctrine of Saint Paul 1. Thes. 5. we must refraine ab omni specie mala, that is, according to the English translation, from all shew or apearance of euill: but no prudent man can make any doubt, but that the ta­king of this oath, the former obiections being duly conside­red, hath some shew, and appearance of euill, and of deny­ing the Catholike faith, therefore wee must refraine from the taking thereof.

[Page 242]3 To the first part of the obiection, which Lessius vrgeth, it is easily answered. For he supposeth, the Oath, according to the cōmon vnderstanding of the outward words to be vnlawful, and to contain in it other things besides ciuill obedience, and that the swearer either by mentall reseruation, or publicke protestation doth take it so farre forth as it containeth onely ciuill obedience: Euen as, saith Lessius In the places before cited. and his English Recapitulatour In the places before cited., if to obey an Heathen Magistrate a Catholike should put incense before an Idoll, although he did it not with the in­tent to worship the Idol, but to honour God, who is euerie where present, yet should this externall action be accounted Idolatry, for that the circumstances of place, and time, and the person, that commandeth, being considered, it would bee iudged a worship done to the Idoll, notwithstanding that he who offered the incense intended thereby some other matter.

4 But this example, and diuerse others brought by Lessius to the same purpose doe suppose the outward action of taking this Oath to be, all circumstances duly considered, of it selfe vnlawfull, and to containe in it some other thing then ciuill Obedience; and neuer­thelesse it is euident by that which hath beene said, that this externall oath, whereof wee treate, is not by any circumstances of wordes, time, place or per­sons made vnlawfull, or that it containeth any thing which is contrary to faith or saluation: and therefore this obiection taken from this kinde of scandall is al­together friuolous. Yea supposing that this Oath doth not containe in it any thing, which may not apper­taine to ciuill obedience, and that moreouer it is vnder great penalties commanded by good authority of our lawfull Prince, no man can make any question but that to refuse it, were very scandalous to Catholike Religion very iniurious to the Kings Maiesty, and very pernicious both to the temporal, and spiritual safety of the refusers.

5 To the Second part of the obiection taken from the authority of S. Paul it is answered first, that if those [Page 243] words be vnderstood in that sense, wherein they seeme to be taken in the obiection, we might out of them eui­dently conuince, that no man can lawfully follow in practise the more common, and the more probable o­pinion of Doctours, if the contrary opinion, which is lesse probable, be more secure, which notwithstanding, as we haue seene out of Vasquez, is against the common opinion of Diuines. The reason is manifest: for suppo­sing that the opinion, which is lesse probable, but more secure, be not void of all probability, it must needs be, that the Authors, who doe follow it, haue some proba­ble reasons, which doe shew some appearance of euill to be in that part lesse secure which the common opini­on of Catholike Doctours doth follow; and conse­quently, if this obiection were of force, we must accor­ding to Saint Paul restraine from that part which is the more probable, but lesse secure, as hauing in it some shew, and appearance of euill. As for example it is now the more common, and the more probable opinion o [...] Diuines, although many Doctours especiall Canonists doe follow the contrary opinion, that it is not mentall vsurie to lend money with hope and expectation to re­ceiue some profit, or gratuity thereby, so that this profit be expected not as due by iustice, or by vertue of any ciuill contract or obligation, but as a free, and liberall gift vpon meere beneuolence, for that one good turne deserueth another, and yet according to this obiection it were altogether vnlawfull to expect any such gratui+:ty, or beneuolence, seeing that therein is some shew, and appearance of euill, as is manifest both by the reasons which are brought to impugne this common opinion, and also by those words of our Sauiour,Luc 6. Mutuum date nihil inde sperantes. Lend hoping for nothing thereby.

6 Besides, as the arguments which are brought a­gainst the Oath doe shew that there is some appearance of euill, and of denying the Catholike faith in taking thereof, so also the answeres which haue bene made vn­to [Page 244] them doe euidently shew, that there is greate ap­pearance of euill, and of ciuill disobedience in refusing thereof, considering that the taking of the Oath is com­manded by the iust law of our lawfull Prince, and ther­fore this text of holy Scripture may bee alleadged to proue the refusing of the Oath as wel as the taking ther­of to be vnlawfull.

7 Wherefore the aforesaid words of S. Paul, Refraine your selues, ab omni specie mala, are to be vnderstood one of these two waies; first, that wee must refraine ab omni specie mala, that is, from all kinde or sort of euill, as the latine word [species] is taken by the Logicians, and in which sense also it is sometimes vsed in ho­ly Scripture, as in the first Chapter of GenesisVers. 12.21.24 25. And God made the beasts of the earth, iuxta species suas accor­ding to their kind. And the 28. of Ecclesiasticus. Tres spe­cies, &c. Three things, or three sorts of men my soul hateth, a poore man that is proud, a rich man that is a lyar, a foo­lish, and senslesse olde man; fo that the meaning of the words of S. Paul may be this, Omnia probate, Proue, or try all things, to wit, which are doubtfull, as S. Thomas expoundeth, for things that are manifest, need no triall: quod bonum est tenete, hold, or keepe that which is good, Ab omni specie mala, abstinete vos, from all kinde of euill, both in words, deeds, and writings, as well in things that belong to doctrine, as to manners refraine your selues. And this exposition seemeth agreeable to that, which some of the ancient Fathers doe write vpon this place, Probate, saith S. Hierome, Try whether that which is said bee against the Law, if there, be any such thing re­fraine from it. And Theophylactus, neque enim hoc, &c. Neither doth the Apostle bid vs to refraine from this, or that thing, but vtterly from euery thing, both from euerie false Prophet, and from all wicked deeds.

8 Or Secondly, the meaning of those words of the Apostle is, that for the auoiding of scandall wee must refraine not onely from all kind of euill, or from euerie [Page 245] euill thing, but also from all shew, and appearance of euill, as S. Anselme, S. Thomas, the Glosse of Nicolas de Lyra, and other later writers doe commonly inter­pret, and in our English Testament it is translated. And then the aforesaid counsell, or command of the Apostle is either so to be vnderstood, that we must refraine from all shew of euill, when in refraining there also appea­reth no shew of euill, and so by refraining no scandall can arise: for otherwise this text might bee alleadged both against the taking of the oath, and also the refu­sing thereof, for that not onely in taking it, but also in refusing it there is, as we haue said before, no little shew or appearance of euill: or else that we must refraine not onely from all euill, but also from all that wherein ap­peareth some shew of euill, vntill it be declared that it is in very deede lawfull, as the Glosse vpon that place doth interpret these words. But that this Oath may lawfully be taken hath now bene sufficiently declared to Catho­likes, both for that there bee now verie few lay Catho­licks, who if it be tendred them by the Magistrate, doe refuse it, and where one refuseth to take it, almost twen­tie doe take it, and doe thinke that with a safe consci­ence they may lawfully take it: and especially because there can be alleadged no one particular clause of this Oath, which containeth any thing which is cleerely re­pugnant to faith, and saluation, as wee haue shewed by examining euery particular clause. As for Protestants, those friuolous exceptions, which Cardinal Bellarmine, Gretzer, and others doe take against the Oath, do giue exceeding great scandall vnto them, who therefore are perswaded, that the doctrine which Cardinall Bellar­mine maintaineth to be Catholicke is a Seminary of trea­son, and that according to it no euill Prince, or who is not a Catholicke, can be secure of the true, and constant allegiance of their Catholicke Subiects, which whether this giue iust occasion of scandall, & be a cause that the Catholike faith doth not so much increase as otherwise [Page 246] it would, I remit to y^e iudgement of the prudent Reader.

9 Lastly, and principally it is answered, that the afore­said, and such like texts of holy Scripture, wherein wee are forbid to giue any scandall either by word or deed which is euil, or hath in it shew and appearance of euil, they are to bee vnderstood, as also wee haue insinua­ted elsewhere,In my Apo­loget. Answer nu. 87. and in the Preface to the same nu. 21. not of passiue, as the Diuines do speake or receiued scandall, but of actiue, and giuen scandal: to wit, that neither by word, nor deed we giue our neigh­bour any cause of offending: but if any one by our good deed wil take scandal where it is not giuen, not we but himselfe is to be blamed therfore. Yet in this al do agree that no action at al either belonging to doctrine or man­ners, which is commanded by a iust Law, can bee a true & sufficient occasion of scandal; & if any one perchance be thereby scandalized, it is accounted by the Diuines to be a passiue, not actiue, a taken not giuen scandall.

10 Wherefore Alphonsus Salmeron a very learned Iesuite, and one of the first ten by whose helpe that So­ciety was instituted, vpon that place of the Gospell Matth. 15. Let them alone, they are blind, &c. writeth thus: By these words we are instructed, that scandals taken by proper malice, (which we call passiue) are not to be regar­ded, and scandall is rather permitted to arise, then the truth of Faith, or of life, or of iustice to be forsaken. For these sorts of scandalls are, as we haue said, called passiue, which another man through his owne frailty taketh by my good life, or by the faith and iustice which I embrace. But the scandall of the weake, or of the little ones is to be auoided, as our Sauiour Christ commanded, when he said, Whosoeuer shall scandalize one of these little ones &c. Hee also by his owne example taught the same in this place; because by these words he taught that the scandall of the Pharisees is not to bee regarded. Otherwise Christ should neuer haue preached, nor the Catholike truth against heretikes, who were scandalized, haue beene defined. But the multitude he called vnto him, and instructed, and taught them that they [Page 247] should not bee scandalized. But if now and then there be some, who are not so capable of the truth, then if the doctrine or action which doth scandalize be not necessary, or very conuenient and profitable, we must yeeld somewhat to the weakenesse of the lttle ones. But if the great ones take this scandall, they are not to be regarded, for they are incurable, because they are blind, that is, they will not see, and vnderstand what God inspireth in them, &c.

11. According therefore to this doctrine of Salme­ron, which also is the common of other Diuines, to make this argument, which is drawne from the nature of scandall, to haue any force, (to wit, that although this Oath of it selfe be not euill, yet there is in it no litle shew and appearance of euill, and therefore according to the doctrine of the Apostle, we must refraine from the ta­king thereof) it must first bee proued that the taking of this Oath, and the acknowledging of the doctrine therein contained, is neither necessary, nor very profi­table to Catholikes, which doubtlesse, supposing this Oath to be of it selfe lawfull, and that it is imposed vp­on the Subiects by the command of the Prince, vnder very great penalties, our Aduersaries will neuer be able to demonstrate. For what exceeding great dangers Catholikes doe incurre if they refuse it, and what great scandall so weake a confuting thereof doth giue to the Protestants, we haue sufficiently shewed before.

12. And truely, if we once suppose that this Oath, is not vnlawfull, nor doth containe in it any thing flat contrary to faith and saluation, I doe not see with what shew of probability this argument which is taken from the scandall, can be vrged, seeing that now the greater part of Catholikes doe take it, neither can the taking thereof giue to Catholikes any other iust cause of of­fending, then that other Catholikes by the example of these who haue taken the Oath, should also do the like, which if it be once granted to be lawfull, can giue to others no occasion of offending. But if any great ones [Page 248] interpreting the Oath in an euill sense, doe take occasion of offending by their detractions, reproachful speach­es and rash iudgements, whiles they Iudge rashly, and are not afraide openly to auoch, and doe with all their might endeauour to perswade the common people, that those Catholikes, who haue taken the Oath, haue de­nyed their faith, are reuolted from their Religion, and are not to be accounted true Catholikes, but Apostates, the cause of their offending in this sort, is not the taking of the Oath, but either their owne ignorance, or malice, and therefore as Salmeron did very well say, as beeing blinde, and incurable, they are not to bee regarded. They hurt in deed greatly the good name, and credit of other men, but their owne consciences they do wound more greeuously, and they are to remember, that the sin is not forgiuen vnlesse restitution be made: and that acor­ding to the most certaine rule of charity, and approued by all Diuines, doubtfull matters, and which may haue a good interpretation, are not to be interpreted in the worser sense, and much lesse to be wrested to that sense which is most bad; which is now, I speake it with grief, very frequent among some of our countrey men, who as soone as they doe perceiue any man to oppose him­selfe against their opinions or actions, and not to fa­uour their proceedings, they are not afraide to assault him with all their power, to speake of him reproach­fully, to charge him with any wicked crimes, and to diuulge them among the commong people, although they haue their first beginning from some idle rumour, or from their owne meere suspicion. These be the scan­dals, from which the Apostle warneth vs to refraine, wherein there is not onely a shew or appearance of e­uill, but which in deed are most wicked euils, and clear­ly against the lawes of charity and iustice, whereby the Catholike Religion is laughed to scorne, and by our ad­uersaries is greatly disgraced.

Sect. IIII.

1. THe fourth obiection against the Oath in general is taken from the ill hap, and badde successe which chanced to those Priests who tooke the Oath, & defended it to be lawfull. For the first Captaine of them Master Blackwell was taken away vpon the sodaine and vnawares, and did also at the houre of his death, as some giue out, recall his former errour. An other also died so­dainly: two others reuolted from their faith; and the fifth liueth now in the house of the Bishoppe of Winchester, and what in the end will become of him, may with iust cause be greatly feared, therefore by these examples other men may be forewarned, that they take heed how they take the Oath, or to defend that it may lawfully be taken.

2. To this obiection it is answered first, that as it is not a sufficient argument to proue such a doctrine to be false, or such an action to be vnlawfull, for that it is de­fended by heretickes, when especially true beleeuers do also defend the same, seeing that no hereticke doth in all points of faith dissent from true beleeuers: So also it is not a sufficient argument to proue, that this Oath, or any other action is vnlawfull, for that it was main­tained by certaine Priests, who then were Catholikes, but now are reuolted from the Catholike faith, especi­ally if other Catholikes who still persist in the Ca­tholike faith, doe with all their might defend the same.

3. Secondly, if the bad successe of some few Priests who haue defended the Oath bee a sufficient reason to condemne it as vnlawfull, by an argument from the contrary, as the Logicians tearme it, also the bad successe of some Priests, who haue beene vehement against the Oath, is a sufficient cause to proue it to be lawfull, but not onely some few Priests who haue taught that the Oath is lawfull, but also who haue exceedingly exclai­med [Page 250] against the oath, haue had somewhat bad successes; as may appeare by three Priests, to say nothing of Lay men, who liued in the North parts of this Realme: Whereof one being a man otherwise very healthie, was so sodainlie stricken with a deadly disease, that scarce sixteene howres before his death hee feared any sick­nesse at all; an other falling downe a paire of staires, was brused in such sort that hee liued not long afterAnother lea­ping in haste ouer an hedge fel into a pit, which was on the other side the hedge, and o was cast a­way.: the third, who did the most vehemently of them all enueigh against the Oath, as soone as hee was taken by the officers, and brought before the Magistrate to be examined, did not onely refuse to take euen the Oath of the Kings Supremacie in Ecclesiasticall causes, but also as it were in an instant before hee was commit­ted to prison, hee did to the great admiration of all those who were present, vtterly reuolt from that Ca­tholike faith, which for many yeares before hee had professed.

4. Thirdly, if the euill successe of some few Priests, who haue defended the lawfulnesse of the Oath, bee a sufficient reason to proue it to be vnlawfull, by an argu­ment also from the contrary the good successe of cer­taine Priests, who haue taught it to bee lawfull, is also a sufficient reason to proue that it may lawfully be taken. But our Aduersaries will not, as I suppose, deny, but that Master Drury and Father Roberts the first a Se­cular Priest, and the other a Religious of the Order of Saint Bennet, made both of them happy ends; and ne­uerthelesse it is knowne to all men, that Master Drury as soone as the Oath was published, did euen to the last gaspe openly maintaine the same, and this hee did pub­likely protest at his Arraignement before the Iudge and all the standers by, whereof there was a very great multitude: And neuerthelesse he being desirous to dye for that cause, for which hee was condemned by the Iudge, did himselfe refuse to take the Oath, euen to saue his owne life, which was freely offered him by the [Page 251] Iudge, if hee would take the same, beeing assuredly perswaded by the aduise of some whom I could name, that neither hee, nor any other Priest, (for concer­ning Lay-men hee was of an other opinion) by reason of the diuersitie of opinions which were then freshly begunne among Catholikes, concerning the lawful­nesse of the Oath, was bound in conscience to take the same, although he thought vndoubtedly and also auou­ched the same, that any man whatsoeuer might law­fully take it.

5. Likewise it is also certaine, that although Father Roberts, did not publikely teach that the Oath was law­full, for that his Holinesse by his Breues, had declared the contrary, and had commanded the English Priests, not to teach that it might lawfully bee taken, neuerthe­lesse euen vntill death, hee perseuered in this opinion, that there was nothing contained in the Oath, which was contrary to faith or saluation, neither would hee put any scruple into the mindes of his ghostly children concerning the refusing of the same. For two principall reasons (as hee hath oftentimes acknowledged to my selfe and others) he was perswaded that the Oath might lawfully be taken; the first was, for that hee could not yet perceiue, that those learned men, who had written against it, had hitherto sufficiently proued, that it con­tained any thing, which was contrary to faith or salua­tion. The other was, that when he was at Paris, he cra­ued the opinions of two most learned Diuines of that nation, concerning the lawfulnesse of the Oath, and at length through his great intreatie, they gaue him this answere, that they for their owne parts had not hither­to obserued in it any thing which might not be taken, and that scarce any subiect of the King of France, as they thought, would stagger to take the like Oath, if it were by publike authority, commanded them vnder so great penalties: And that this is most true, hee hath di­uers times protested to me, and many others, and his [Page 252] owne hand writing, which is kept euen vntill this day, can, if need require, yeeld sufficient testimonie heereof.

6. Fourthly, and lastly, to say somewhat in particu­lar concerning those persons, who are touched in the obiection, first of all it is false, that Master Blakwell did euer recall his opinion concerning the lawfull taking of the oath; but, as it shall presently appeare, did euen to his last houre persist therein. His death may doubtlesse in some sort be called sodaine, for that very few houres he lay sick in bed, neither did hee expect any certaine day or moneth when he should dye, before almost the very last houre of his departure. Yet because both in regarde of his olde age, his spirits almost exhausted, the vnsound constitution of his body, and especially of an extraordinary shortnesse of breath, and diuerse obstru­ctions wherewith hee was continually oppressed, hee oftentimes and seriously auouched to mee and others, that hee should for the aforesaid causes be taken away sodainly, and therefore hauing death in continuall ex­pectation, his death although it may be called sodaine, yet doubtlesse it came not vnawares and vnexpected. In this manner therefore he departed this life. Vpon a Sat­terdayBeing the 25. of Ianuary. 1612. in the after noone hee went downe from his chamber to make his confession, as vsually he was wont to doe, which after hee had ended, and departing from the chamber of his ghostly Father, he perceiued a great faintnesse, and a disposition to sowneing to grow vpon him, but a litle after hee came into a more pure and o­pen aire, hee found himselfe farre better. After hee was come to his owne chamber, he fel into a sodaine sowne, but by the diligence of those Priests, who incontinent­ly were present, he was brought to himselfe againe, and after he had put off his cloathes, and was laid in bed, he humbly craued those Ecclesiasticall rites, which vsually are giuen to those who are extremely sick, if they should iudge it requisite. And being demanded by a certaine [Page 253] Priest, what his opinion was now concerning the Oath, he answered, that he did that which seemed to him more probable, that he had done nothing against his conscience, and that euen now he continued in the same opinion con­cerning the lawfulnesse of the Oath, which he had heereto­fore mantained. Afterwards diuers Priests hearing of his sodaine sicknes came to his chamber, and then hee earnestly requested the whole world and all them who were present, and especially one by name, with whom in for­mer times he was in great controuersie, to pardon him, if he had offended them in any thing, and protested, that he was a child of the Catholike Romane Church, and that he so intended to dye. And as for opinions, that he followed his conscience, and that which seemed to him iust, and pro­bable, yet if he had offended God in any thing, that he hum­bly askt him forgiuenesse. Which speech being ended, he falling into a sowne againe, so departed this life. By which asking God forgiuenesse can not be gathered, that he had any doubtfull, but rather a pious and timo­rous conscience, it being the part of pious mindes, as wit­nesseth Saint Gregorie the great, there also in some sort to acknowledge a fault where there is no fault, and yet hee did not absolutely acknowledge this fault, for that hee found not himselfe guiltie thereof, but conditionally if peraduenture hee had offended, he humbly requested God to clense him from his hidden sinnes. I omit to speake how religious, and without blame his conuer­sation was after hee had taken the Oath, for of this all those who haue liued with him in prison, can giue suffi­cient testimonie.

6. Concerning Master Iackson, it is true doubtlesse, as it is thought, that hee dyed of the plague. But haue not also very many holy men, as Saint Lewes King of France dyed of the same disease? But what if he did get that infection by doing some good and charitable worke, as Saint Lewes did in that warre against the Sa­racines, may wee rightly from hence conclude, that a­ction [Page 254] by reason of the ill successe which followed, if it ought to bee called euill, to be vnlawfull? He dyed in­deed, as it is credibly thought, of that infection, but his death was not vnexpected, for day by day hee looked when hee should depart this world, and being streng­thened with all the Sacraments of holy Church, he pre­pared himselfe euery minute of an houre to dye.

7. Concerning M^r. Warmington, so the case stands. After he had written a booke in defence of the Oath, he was wholy depriued of that common Almes, which from the beneuolence of some good persons, is some­times sent to those, who are detained in prison: where­of he being depriued, and hauing no other thing to prouide him necessaries for his sustenance besides the beneuolence of pious men, hee most clearly perceiued, that if hee should remaine any long time in prison, hee should be in danger to perish of famine; neither did he thinke it safe for him to goe beyond the Seas (although perchance he might haue obtained leaue of his Maie­stie to depart the Realme) for that he was accounted by these vehement impugners of the Oath to be a schisma­tike, an heretike and an Apostata. He being therefore in this distresse, and withall perswading himselfe, that by taking or defending the Oath he had committed no of­fence, he thought hee had no other remedy to deliuer him from extreme beggery, then to make humble pe­tition to his Maiestie, that out of his Princely commise­ration, he would be pleased to bestow vpon him some­thing, whereby his extreme want might be relieued: especially, seeing that the chiefest cause of his misery and pouertie was, for that he had publikely by word & writing professed himselfe to be a faithful and constant subiect vnto his Maiestie. Whose petition his Maiestie mercifully granting, wrote his letters to the Bishop of Winchester, that he would prouide him in his owne house those things which were necessary for his reliefe. Which answere Master Warmington hauing receiued, [Page 255] was exceedingly troubled, as he protested to all the Priests who were in that prison, doubting that his abode in the Bishop of Winchester his house, would giue some scandall to weake Catholikes. But after he had dili­gently considered the matter, and calling to his minde that ancient prouerbe, that beggers must be no choosers, least that not being contented with that which is offe­red them, they get nothing at all, he thought it his best course of two euils to choose the lesser, and to accept of the condition which was offered him by his Maiestie, and the Bishop, and by that meanes to preserue his life, which by lawfull waies the law of nature doth giue vs leaue to doe, then by miserable famine, which is a con­tinuall dying, to pine away in prison, Assuredly per­swading his conscience with the common opinion of Diuines, that a thing of it selfe lawfull, if it be necessa­ry, yea and also according to Salmeron if it be very pro­fitable, can be a iust occasion of any scandall giuen.

8. Wherefore although that sentence of Saint Chry­sostome, no man is hurt, but by himselfe, be most true, and euery man ought rather to suffer whatsoeuer calami­ties, then to forsake his faith; neuerthelesse, if any mis­hap, either spirituall or temporall, hath afterwards fal­len to them who haue taken the Oath, it ought not to be imputed to the taking of the Oath, which being of it selfe lawfull, can be no iust cause of any spirituall ru­ine, but rather it is to be attributed to the immoderate detractions, backbytings, persecutions, and vnchristi­anlike proceedings of some, who are so vehement a­gainst those Priests, who haue taken the oath, or taught it to be lawfull, as to a more immediate cause. And truly if this argument drawne from the bad successe of some Priests, be sufficient to proue the Oath vnlawfull, in the like manner it might be proued, that any iust a­ction whatsoeuer is euill and vniust, if one for it should be persecuted and brought into great miseries, and so at the length thereby to forsake his Religion, and become [Page 256] an Apostata. As for example, if a Catholike Priest, being wrongfully oppressed by his Bishop, should lawfully appeale to the Metropolitan, and comming to his court for redresse, should not onely finde there no succour, and easing of his vexation, but also by reason of the po­tencie of his Bishop, and the euill information which he hath giuen against him, should there be vsed farre more hardly then before, should be cast into prison, be suspended from vsing his Orders, and enjoying his be­nefice, and at the last should be confined into some cor­ner of the Land, and he seeing such bad dealing, should desperatly forsake the Catholike faith, and become a runnagate to the aduersaries thereof, were it lawfull, I pray you, to conclude from hence, that the appeale of this Catholike Priest, by reason of the bad successe, was vniust, or that his reuolting from his faith, is to be im­puted to his iust appeale, or rather to the iniquitie of his Bishop vniustly oppressing him? The chiefest cause doubtlesse of his Apostacie, was either his owne infir­mitie, or malice, but no small occasion also of his fall is to be ascribed to his vniust vexation, neither is his law­full appeale to be accounted any cause or occasion at all of reuolting from his faith. And this very same may in some sort be applyed to those Priests, who after they had taken the Oath, and taught it to be lawfull, beeing exceedingly enueighed against, accounted no others then Apostates, and depriued of the common beneuo­lence which relieued their wants, did at the length re­uolt from their faith.

9. Finally, all that which at the most can be gathe­red, from the bad successe of some few Priests, who haue taken the Oath, is this, that euery one who hath, any doubt concerning the lawfull taking of the Oath ought diligently to examine all, and euery clause thereof, but doubtlesse no sufficient argument can be drawen from the bad successe, and euill euent to con­clude the Oath to bee vnlawfull, and that with a [Page 257] safe conscience it cannot bee taken.

Sect. V.

1 THe fifth, and last obiection against the Oath in generall is, that it hath beene sufficiently prooued that the Oath is vnlawfull, not onely by the aforesaid rea­sons and authorities, but also the same hath beene confir­med by diuine reuelations. For to omit some vncertaine rumours, and which are scarse credible, of certaine visi­ons and apparitions, it is knowne to most Catholikes, and it is also published abroad, that a Catholike yong man, called Thomas Newton doth constantly relate, (which his rela­tion he hath both oftentimes confirmed by word of mouth, & also for a perpetuall memorie therof, put it down in writing) that the most blessed Virgin S. Mary did vpon a certaine nightTo wit the fourth of Sep­temb. 1612. a little before midnight. appeare vnto him lying in his bed with a Protestant yong man called Edward Sutton, & did expresly command him that he should not take the Oath. And that this appa­rition is very true it is proued also by the testimony of this Protestant yong man, who with his lowd crying out did a­wake the said Newton being a sleepe, and did foretell him of the vision which was presently to appeare vnto him, & with all cryed out pittifully, that he was damned onely for that he had already taken the Oath. Seeing therefore that this doctrine, which defendeth the Oath to be lawfull, hath been confuted by so many inuincible reasons, impugned by so ma­ny most learned men of these daies, condemned by his Holi­nesse in his Breues, and now at the last expresly forbidden by the most blessed Mother of God, what Catholicke, vnlesse he be starke mad dare auouch, that notwithstanding all this it may with a safe conscience be taken by Catholikes.

Before I answere this obiection, I thought it expedi­ent to set downe in this English Edition the true copie of the Relation word by word as it lyeth, which is as followeth.

2 This vision may perchance somewhat moue the ignorant people, and some other ouer credulous per­sons, who do vse to make great reckoning of euery idle rumour which may serue their owne turne: but to pru­dent and learned men, who know right well what a hard matter it is to discerne when any spirit com­meth from God, and which apparition, although it be true, and not feigned, proceedeth from a good or euill spirit, who sometime transfigureth himselfe into an An­gell of light, it is a very friuoulous proofe. For concer­ning visions, and apparitions, as it doth not belong to all men, saith GersonIn tract. de probatione spiri­tuum versus principium., to prophecie, nor to all men to Euange­lize, nor to all men to interpret speeches, but to some by of­fice vntill the end of the world, so it doth not be long to all men to try or proue the spirits if they be of God, but to whom it is giuen, as are spirituall persons, whom the vnction teach­eth of all things, also doe iudge of all things euen betweene day, and who day.

3 First therefore although we grant an apparition to be true, not forged, reall, not imaginarie (for now and then they also that be awake, doe through a vehement imagination thinke that to haue happened in very deede, which was only done in imagination) yet by reason of the daily illusions also of spirituall persons Martinus Del­rius lib. 4. Dis­quit. Magi. cap 1. q 3. in princi­pio., it is a hard matter for him, that hath a reuelation to know certainely whe­ther it come from God, or the Diuell, seeing that often­times the wicked spirit, when he intendeth vnder pre­tence of good to draw a man to euill, doth appeare in the [Page 263] forme of an Angell, or of an other Saint, yea, and some­times which the eares doe abhorre to heare, also of Christ our Lord crucified, whereof many examples are rela­ted by Martinus Delrius In the Booke aboue cited ca. 1. q. 3. sec. 5. a Diuine of the Societie of Iesus, of which three only at this present I will re­hearse.

4 The first is of Secundellus a Deacon, of whom Gre­gorius Turonensis Lib. de Vitis Patrum cap 10. writeth thus: Saint Friardus with Se­cundellus the Deacon did remaine in the Iland Vinduni­ta without euer departing from thence; yet both of them had there peculiar cels, but a goodwaie distant one from the other: And being feruent at their praiers the tempter ap­peared in the night to Secundellus the Deacon in the shape of our Sauiour, saying, I am Christ whom thou doest continually pray vnto: Thou art now a Saint, and I haue written thy name in the booke of life with the rest of my Saints: Depart now from this Iland, and goe doe cures among the people. And he being inticed with these deceits departed from the Iland, neither did he acquaint his companion therewith; neuerthelesse when in the name of Christ he did put his hands vpon sick persons they were cured: neither did hee perceiue that hee was deluded by the tempter vntill after a longtime when he was returned back to the Iland, by the praiers, and admonitions of Saint Fri­ardus he certainely knew the same.

5 The second example he relateth out of Iacobus Vi­triacus Lib. 1. vitae B. Mariae Oenia­cens. cap. 9. who writeth thus: One of her chiefe friends (to wit of B. Marie Oeniacenae) was one time by so much the more dangerously by how much the more craftily mole­sted with a noone daie Diuell walking in the darke. For the craftie enemie transfiguring himselfe into an Angell of light did vnder shew of godlinesse appeare vnto him famili­arly in his sleepe some times reprehending some faults of his, and also guilefully exhorting him to doe some good deedes, that hauing first offered him a false shew of godlinesse as a certaine preseruatiue against poyson, he might afterwards more secretly by little and little pouer in his poison, and ha­uing [Page 264] flatteringly put forth his tongue ointed with hony, he might afterwards fasten in his tooth, and at the last stretch forth his taile as a Cedar tree. For when now he was belee­ued as one who telleth truth, then this traitor like a cosener, and deceiuer did mixe falshoods with some truths, preten­ding trecherously by his mingling of good things some colour to his falshoods. And at the last by his deceiptfull shifts, he drew that brother so farre, that his proceedings had come to a most wicked end, vnlesse the handmaid of Christ, the holy Ghost reuealing it vnto her, had learned the deceipts of this crafty beguiler, &c.

Ex annuis li­teris Iesuitarū prouinciae Me­diolanensis anno. 1590.6 The third example hee relateth out of Franciscus Beucius, who writeth, that in a village neere to Arona the Deuill appeared in the night to a certaine maide in the likenesse of Saint Vrsula carrying before the banner of the crosse with a troupe of many Virgins, and thus spake vnto her: God seeth and loueth this thy purpose to keep thy virginity, but because it is a very hard matter to keepe thy minde altogether vndefiled in thy Fathers house among so many dangers, which are oftentimes cast before thy eyes, he hath sent vs to guide thee to a mo­nastery of sacred Virgins, who hauing left all cares do serue him deuoutly. Here the maid, God inspiring her, when fearing the deceits of the Deuill she had made the signe of the crosse drawing her right hand from her head to her breast, and presently from her left hand to her right, acknowledgeth her selfe to be most vnworthy of such visions, and of so great an honour. Neither truely, saith she, doe I greatly beleeue you, and I doe feare faigned guile in your faire speeches. But if you are sent by God, do hum­ble reuerence to these Saints reliques (for she had reliques hanging about her necke.) It is wonderfull to speake the euill spirits fell down vpon their knees worshipping the Reliques, and so much the more they vrge her to hasten her departure. But it is not lawfull for mee, (saith she) to doe any thing of importance without my Ghostly Fathers leaue, neither is it fitting for me to goe vnto him at [Page 265] this vnseasonable time of night, goe you vnto him, and de­clare the commandement of God, when it is day I will goe vnto him and follow his aduise. With this answere the De­uils setting aside all dissembling did hide themselues in their darkenesse, raging against the maid, crying earnestly out a­gainst her with reproachfull words, shee laughing them to scorne that they did onely fight with their tongues, & hum­bly giuing thanks to almighty God. Hitherto Bencius. By which it is plainely gathered, how hard a matter it is e­uen for spirituall persons, and much more for them who are little or nothing practised in spirituall life, to dis­cern, whether an apparition be a reuelatiō from God, or an illusion of the Deuill, especially in these times: For in times past, as Delrius saith,q. 3. cit. sec. 1. Diuine visions were more fre­quent, because they were more necessary, now a daies being not so necessary, they are lesse frequent, and therfore more to be suspected, that for iust cause they ought both to be exami­ned by the Ecclesiasticall Magistrate, and also shunned by priuate men. Of w^c visions Iohn Gerson Loc. cit. et in tract de distinct verarum visio­num a falsis., Delrius Lib. 4. c. 1. q. 3. and o­thers cited by Delrius doe largely treat, and do assigne many rules to try spirits, if they be of God, of which I will set down some which are more cheefly to be obserued.

7. One therefore, as saith Delrius, q. 3. cit. sec. 1. eyther iudgeth of his owne apparition, or of an other mans, and there is more danger in the former case, in both he must be a spirituall & deuout person, for the sensuall man perceiueth not those things that are of the spirit of God 1. Cor. 2.. And to discerne ones owne apparition there may bee considered as it were two manner of waies: the one is experimentall, which together with his owne reuelation is infused in him who hath the re­uelation; [which manner, as Gerson saith, is done by an in­ward inspiration, or an inward feeling and delight [...], or by an experimentall sweetnesse, or by an enlightning from the hea­uenly mountaines putting away all darkenesse of any doubt.] And this manner is rare, and granted to few, and they, to whom it is not granted, may not in their owne reuelations stand to their owne iudgements, and these to whom it is [Page 266] granted by God, may not vse it to discerne the reuelations of other men; For as no man knoweth the things of the spi­rit, but the spirit himselfe, 1. Cor. 2. so no man knoweth with an in­fallible certainty by this experimental feeling those things which are in an other mans mind.

8 The other way to discerne spirits, which they call do­ctrinall, which also is in some part common to the dis­cerning of other mens visions, is by a diligent, and pious vsing of the holy Scripture, which prescribeth rules to dis­cerne false Prophets from true, Also the reading of the holy Fathers, and Ecclesiastical Histories are very profitable to distinguish by peculiar signes, and markes illusions from re­uelations. To these if the obseruation of spirituall men, and experience be added, and in doubtfull, and obscure things be asked the counsell of learned, and godly men, and who haue made great progresse in the way of the spirit, and haue beene long practised in fighting against the trecheries of the Deuill, there is hope that deceipts will that way bee percei­ued and auoided. Without doubt to this second manner of giuing ones iudgement onely doctrine doth not suf­fice, but there must be added vnto it ones owne experi­ence, that he be learned and contemplatiue, and that he hath not sleightly learned the holy Scripture, and the rest of Diuinity, and that he hath had experience in him selfe, saith Gerson, of the strife and combat of spirituall afflictions, as though now hee ascended vp to the heauens, and now descended into bottomlesse gulfes, and saw the wonders of God in the depth. For they that saile vpon this mysticall sea of diuerse affections, as wauesbeating together, doe declare the wonders thereof. But hee that hath not had experience of such things, what knoweth he of them?] And to this there is not found a more necessary disposition then of solide humility, for as Moses doth say, as we read in Ces­sianus, this knowledge is giuen by God only to humble men.

9 Finally, we must not be too rash in giuing our iudge­ment, but we must first diligently commend the matter to God, and make many examinations in our minde, which [Page 267] Delrius confirmeth by the testimonies of many Saints, and especially of the most Blessed Mother of God, who before she made answere to the Archangell Gabriell, salu­ting her, thought what manner of salutation this should be, and that not lightly, but [...] with mature and long deliberation she considered in her minde, whether that sa­lutation was an illusion or no, & proceeded from God, or the Diaell, as Euthymius very well doth note. Verily when the thing is doubtfull, it is farre more safe to reiect it with a godlie humilitie, then greedily and confidently to admit it, and assent vnto it, as the examples of holy Fathers doe wit­nesse, who shunned this curiositie of visions and miracles, as a thing most pernicious and deceitfull. As one Saint when the Diuell transfiguring himselfe into the shape of Christ, said vnto him, I am Christ come to visit thee per­sonally, for that thou art worthie, presently with both his hands closed his eies crying out, I will not here see Christ, it sufficeth if I shall see him in glory, and forth-with he vanished away. An other did with other words obserue the like humilitie in the like illusion, Looke, saith he, to whom thou art sent, I vndoubtedly am not such a one, that am worthy heere to see Christ. And the blessed Virgin Coleta answered euen God himselfe, who was willing to reueale vnto her many secrets, My Lord God it is suffici­ent for me to know onely thee and my sinnes, and to obtaine pardon for them from thee. Stephanus Iuliacus in her life. ca. 5. See also many other things which the aforesaid Doctours doe obserue for one to examine his owne visions.

10. Concerning the examining of other mens appa­ritions, whether they come from a good or an euill spirit, many rules are prescribed by the same Doctours. If there come vnto thee, saith GersonIn tractat. de distinct. verarū visionum à falsis parum à prin­cipio., any one who ear­nestly affirmeth that he hath had a reuelation, as we know by the sacred history, that Zacharias, and other Prophets haue had, what shall we doe, in what manner shall we behaue our selues? If presently we deny or scorne, or reproue all, we shall seeme to weaken the authority of diuine regulation, [Page 268] which is now, as wel as heretofore potent, for his hand is not shortened that he can not reueale. We shall also scandalize the simple who may say, that so we might calumniate or slander all I think the word [nostris ours] is an er­rour in Ger­son, it is to be read [uniuersis all] or [diuinis diuine.] reuelations and prophecies, and account them to be idle phantasies or illusions. Therefore wee will keepe a meane betwixt both, and according to the admonition of the Apostle Saint Iohn1. Iohn. 4. 1. Thess. 5., We will not beleeue euery spirit, but we will proue and try the spirits if they be of God, and being obedient to the Apostle ^f Saint Paul, Let vs hold that which is good.

11. First therefore the examiner of these visions ought to be a Diuine, skilfull in knowledge, and also in experi­ence, not like to those, who alwaies learning, neuer come to the knowledge of truth, as are bablers, men full of words, arrogant, contentious, &c. For to such persons euery new diuine reuelation is so vnknowne and barbarous, that as soone as it is related vnto them, with great laughter and derision they reiect it, scorne it and reproue it. Others there be, I confesse, that on the other side runne headlong into the contrary vice, who doe attribute to reuelations euen the su­perstitious, vaine, and deceitfull facts and dreames of mad­doting men, and the idle phantasies of sick and melancholie persons. And perceiuing that these haue too light and cre­dulous a heart to beleeue, and the other too vntractable and harsh, I know that to be most certaine which Ouid writeth, Thou shalt go most safe by keeping the meane.

12. And because there be very many signes and to­kens, whereby a diuine reuelation may bee discerned from a diabolicall illusion, Iohn Gerson In tract. de probatione spiri­tuum. (whose autho­ritie in such like things doubtlesse is great, saith Delrius q. 3. cit. sec. 1.) to auoid confusion, doth reduce them, as it were, to fix heads

What is he who hath the reuelation, what it containeth and affirmeth: for what end it is said to be: to whom it is disclosed for counsell: in what manner he is knowne to liue: and from whence it is found to proceed.

13. First therefore he that will examine spirits, must [Page 269] haue consideration of the person who hath visions, if he haue a good & discrete iudgement of naturall reason, for that the braine being crased, the iudgement of his naturall reason is disturbed. If for want of good health, abundance of melan­cholie humours, for ouer great want of foode or lacke of sleepe, Delrius sect. 2 cit. nu. 4. or by reason of a disordered imagination he be troub­led with phantasies, there need no great inquiry to be made, from what spirit these melancholie phantasies and illusions doe proceed, as appeareth in frantick and diuerse sicke per­sons, who being awake, think that they do see, heare, & tast, &c. that which those that be in a dreame imagine they doe. Besides euery extreme passion hath her crasinesse, her drun­kennesse, and as Origen saith, her Diuell. This is seene in those that be ouercome with extreme loue, in iealous, an­grie, enuious and couetous persons, according to that of the Poet, They that be in loue, faine dreames to them selues. For the Diuell doth easilie delude these kinde of persons who haue a crasie braine, and are too apprehensiue and of a troubled, Delrius loc. cit. and ouer vehement imagination, for that they doe stifly adhere and assent to the present repre­sentations of false things.

14 There must also be inquirie made Gerson loc. cit. et Delrius nu. 7., whither the person that hath the vision be a nouice in the zeale of faith, and spirituall exercise, for that yong feruour is easily decei­ued, if it want a gouernour, especially in yong men, and wo­men, whose feruour is ouer vehement, greedie, variable, vn­bridled, and therefore to be suspected. By this token Francis­cus PicusSec. 2. nu. 7. saith Delrius, did at the first discouer the fals­hood of a certain reuelation, & vision; and afterwards other signes did appeare, as that the Deuill in the shape of our Sa­uiour Christ did counsaile him certaine vaine things mixt with good. Also it behooueth much to consider of what qualitie the person is, and hath been, what learning he hath, to what things he is accustomed, with what things he is delighted, with whom he hath conuersed, if he be rich or poore, in the first pride, or secret delight, in the second ficti­on is to be feared. Neither is the distinction of ages, and [Page 270] sexes be neglected. For if it be a falling, and decaying age, there is danger of dotage, if yong, there is danger of le­uitie, and some fantasticall infirmitie, for that boies haue a more moist braine then is fitting, and doe abound with va­pours, which are easily mooued. And therefore in times past the Deuils were desirous to vtter their oracles by them as more fit persons for their purposes, and also now a daies they vse to doe the same in their apparitions in water, and Cristall. Concerning the feminine sexe it is manifest that it is more to be suspected.

15 Aboue all things it is conuenient to obserue Gerson loc. cit., that there lye hidden no inward spirituall pride, which S. Bernard calleth, and that truly, a subtile euill: for that this doth arise from the humbling of ones selfe, from base ap­parell, and haire cloth, from fasting, and virginitie, yea, and taketh beginning from his owne death, and from his contrarie, what therefore will be safe from pride, seeing that vertue it selfe is not safe from it? And there is a certaine pride in the vnderstanding when it will not be subiect to an other mans iudgement, but relyeth only on his owne, and a certaine pride in the will, while it refuseth to obey, and this is sooner perceiued then the first, and therefore more easily amended.

16 Secondly, in the examining of spirits, we must not only regard the person who hath visions, but also the quali­tie of the visions; if all things euen to the least proposition be true, for that falshood is not in the spirit of truth, but in the spirit of lying there be sometimes a thousand manifest truths, that in one only hidden falshood he may deceiue. For this cause Christ forbade those that were possessed with De­uils, and Paul the wench that had a Pythonicall spirit to testifie the truth. Moreouer if in the visions there be that wisedome, which is from aboue, with those titles which Iames rehearseth, first, saith he, it is chast, then peaceable, modest &c.

17 Thirdly, the examining of spirits requireth, that the person to whom these visions are disclosed, behaue him­selfe [Page 271] very prudently; and circumspectly: and especially in the beginning let him consider diligently for what end this person is mooued to make known his secret: whereupon this consideration may be made. Be warie therefore whosoeuer thou be that art a hearer, or counsailer, that thou doe not applaude such a person, nor commend him, or admire him as a holie man, and worthy of such reuelations, and mira­cles; gainssay him rather, rebuke him sharpely, reuile him whose heart is so haughtie, and eies so loftie, that he walketh in great and wonderfull matters aboue himselfe, that he see­meth to himselfe worthie not to worke his saluation as other men do, to wit, by the doctrine of holy Scriptures and Saints, with the dictamen or iudgement of naturall reason. Ad­monish such a one not to be high minded, but to be wise vnto sobrietie, for that he spake most truly that said, Pride deser­ueth to be deluded, and the Holy Ghost, who giueth himselfe to the humble, will not withdraw himselfe from any for vsing an act of humilitie.

18 Fourthly, in the examining of spirits we must consi­der the end for the which visions are said to be, and not only the immediate and manifest end, but also the remote and hidden end. The first end therefore may appeare good and wholsome, deuout, and to the edification of others, which at the length will grow to a plaine scandall, whiles either the last shall not be answerable to the first, or else any other false or faigned thing shall be found to haue beene in those persons which was thought to haue proceeded from sancti­tie and deuotion. Moreouer if a thing be done by humane diligence, whether it be in manners or in doctrine, why is it needfull either to seeke or to expect, that God should speake from heauen? This truely is more like to the tempting then to the honouring of God. Wherefore if without any reuela­tion, one may by humane vnderstanding attaine to that, which is said to haue beene reuealed, that reuelation is to be suspected and superfluous, and not necessary Delrius sect. 5. Sect. 3. ^a consi­deratio.. Further­more, we must also consider the end for which these visions are disclosed to an other person, whether for ostentation, or [Page 272] necessitie, whether to giue or to receiue counsell, whether to one that is skilfull or vnskilfull in such things. And if this person doth seeme onely to demand counsell for feare of be­ing deceiued, it must be considered whether hee shew him­selfe to be readie to follow counsell, otherwise there will bee scarce any hope of curing him, because, as Iohn Climachus saith hee needeth now no Diuell to tempt him, for that he is become a Diuell to himselfe. And doubtlesse if the vision came from God, it will not come to naught in one who humbleth himselfe for God vnder the iudgement of an other, but it will be more strengthened and preuaile.

19. Fifthly, in the examining of spirits we must consi­der of what manner of conuersation the person is who saith he hath had visons, whether he conuerseth in secret, or in publike, in an actiue or contemplatiue life, whether in ouer much deuotion, which causeth a singularitie in apparell and such like, or if his common conuersation be conformable to those with whom he liueth. This especially is needfull to consider if she be a woman, how she conuerseth with her Ghostly Fathers, and instructours, if she be giuen to conti­nuall talking, vnder pretence now of often confessing, o­ther times of a long rehearsing of her visions, or of any o­ther tatling. Beleeue them that haue had experience, e­specially S. Austine and S. Bonauenture, there is scarce a­ny contagion either of greater force to hurt, or more incu­rable. And if it had no other hurt then this so great a wa­sting of such precious time, it were abundantly enough for the Diuell.

20. Sixthly, in the examining of spirits we must consi­der from whence the spirite doth come, or whether it doth goe, and how he doth insinuate himselfe. For the euill spirit doth insinuate himselfe to them who goe forward in vertue, harshly, vnpleasantly, and violently, Detrius sect. 6. as it were with a cer­taine vehemency as a shower of raine falling vpon stones: but the good spirit doth insinuate himselfe to the same per­sons, softly, pleasantly, and sweetly, as water doth wet a spunge. But with them who goe backward, experience teach­eth [Page 273] that it falleth out quite contrarie. Therefore S. Ber­nard doth witnesse, Gerson. loc. cit. that he had not this gift giuen him to know this in himselfe, to wit, from whence the spirit com­meth, or whether it goeth, who neuerthelesse humbly con­fesseth that he often times perceiued the presence of the ho­ly spirit by an inward motion of the hart or mind. Therefore perchance one will wonder, how a person of an inferiour state can say, that he oftentimes doth discerne, from whenee the spirit commeth, especially seeing that Christ said to Nicodemus,Ioan. 3. Thou hearest his voice, but thou knowest not whence he commeth, and whether he goeth. And moreouer in diuers spirits there is to be seene a great simi­litude in inspirations. For God is a spirit, a good Angell is a spirit, a bad Angell is a spirit, there is also a humane spirit, both reasonable and sensuall. And the like vision may be inspired by euery one of these spirits, although in a different manner, but by reason of some similitude the difference can not easily be perceiued by them, who are not skilfull in such things, who neither of themselues by their sharpnesse of wit, neither by their learning in Diuinitie, or naturall Philo­sophy, nor by the instruction from others doe know how to distinguish them. Neither doubtlesse is it to be meruailed at, seeing that we find very few men, who doe perfectly know how to discerne the cogitations and affections of their rea­sonable soule as it is reasonable, from those which are sen­suall, to wit, which are in the common sense, or in the or­gane of the phantasie. Whom, I pray you, will you finde of those men who feare God, and fley from sinne, who alwaies and in all things doth clearly perceiue, when temptations doe abound, whether he hath onely some sensualitie in his imagination, or also some consent in his reason? So hard a matter it is to discerne sensualitie, or a sensuall delight from consent. How much more difficult a matter is it to ex­amine those foure spirits before mentioned, to wit, when a vehement instinct, or inspiration commeth to our minde, whether it be from God, from a good Angell, or a bad, or from our owne proper humane spirit, of which also there are [Page 274] two parts or portions the superiour, or reasonable, and the inferiour or sensuall part? The distinction of which two to discerne perfectly, is onely granted by that word of God which doth pearce euen to the diuiding of the spirit & soule, which deuision she found in her selfe, who cryed out, My soule doth magnifie the Lord, and then deuiding the spi­rit from the soule, she added, and my spirit hath reioyced in God my Sauiour.

21. Lastly, to make triall whether this spirit commeth from God, Delrius sect. 6 Sect. secundo. we must examine the cogitations, which went before, or followed the reuelation. For from the imagi­nation of former things may easily proceed a phantasti­call illusion. To one who is troubled and tossed with euill thoughts, the holy spirit or a true reuelation doth neuer come: and neuerthelesse a true and diuine reuelation doth not alwaies follow a good and holy thought. For in the very feruour of praier, the Diuell many times doth endeauour to creepe in. After a true reuelation good desires, and good effects doe alwaies follow, and sometimes accidentally, and for a time also good effects do follow an illusion, which neuer­thelesse are by the Diuell referred to a greater euill. That hath beene obserued before by Hucbaldus, who when he had related the visions of Saint Aldegundis, he addeth In vita sua cap. 2., In all these reuelations the prudent Virgin did more, and more humble her selfe, she came nearer the kingdome of God, she did more feruently adhere to her heauenly spouse. This doubtlesse is the proper effect of true reuela­tions, those effects which are contrary to this, doe plainly shew that it was an illusion, which went before. He that de­sireth to know more concerning this matter, may read Martinus Delrius, and Iohn Gerson In the places aboue cited., who very well comparethIn tract. de di­stinct. verarum visionū a falsis. a diuine reuelation to a golden peece of money, and describeth fiue vertues which are like to the properties of gold, whereby this coine of diuine re­uelation may bee distinguished from the counterfeit money of a diabolicall apparition: to wit, if it haue the waight of humilitie, without curiositie, and vaine loftinesse: [Page 275] if it haue the flexibilitie of discretion, without a supersti­tious esteeming, or reiecting of counsell: if it haue the dura­bilitie of patience in aduersities, without grudging and fained emulation; if it haue the configuration of truth, with­out any false or vaine assertion; and finally, if it haue the liuely and pure colour of diuine charity, without any drosse of carnall sensualitie.

22. By this which hath been said, it is manifest, that very great diligence is to be vsed, and much examining is to be made both by him, who is said to haue had an apparition, and also by others who are to iudge there­of, before we publish any vision as a diuine reuelation, especially if it be alleadged to confirme any doctrine, least that otherwise wee broach a false or vncertaine doctrine for an vndoubted truth; for the precious coine of a heauenly vision, we fell hay, straw, and dia­bolicall illusions, and vnder a faire shew and colour of godlinesse, wee throw headlong into dangerous er­rours deuout people, who are ouer much giuen to be­leeue pretended visions and miracles. Now what great diligence, and what meanes both Master Newton, who saith, that he saw this vision, and also those to whom he did disclose it, haue vsed in examining thereof, to wit, whether it was a true apparition or a phantasticall ima­gination, a diuine reuelation, or a diabolicall illusion, it is not as yet knowen to me. But verily if that bee true which is reported, they were too headlong in pub­lishing thereof, seeing that both Master Newton, as himselfe affirmeth, did by the perswasion of his com­panion Master Sutton a Protestant, presently put it downe in writing, and shewed it to others, and also those to whom hee did disclose it, doubted not forth­with, and without any more examing, to publish it as a true reuelation. But how seeuer it was, there are diuers strong arguments drawne from the aforesaid rules, which doe probably shew, that it was not a heauenly reuelation.

[Page 276]23. And first of all, although it may fall out, that one for lucre, vaine glory, or for some other priuate, or in his iudgement also publike commoditie may of set purpose forge false miracles and reuelations, as it hap­pened at Berna in Swizerland Surius ad an­num. 1509., where certaine chiefe Priests of a Religious Order were burnt for faigning of reuelations to impugne the immaculate Conception of the blessed Mother of God, yet God forbid, that I should haue but the least suspicion, that Master Newton being a Catholike man, would haue committed so hei­nous a crime. Neuerthelesse I am vndoubtedly perswa­ded, that according to the aforesaid doctrine many cleare signes may be alleadged, whereby we may make a probable coniecture, that this vision is either to be a­scribed to the vehement imagination of a troubled braine, or else to bee accounted a meere illusion of the Diuell.

24. For first it is sufficiently knowen, that both of them were very young men, and that in prison, as in the relation we read, they were hardly vsed, and therefore both for want of foode, and lacke of sleepe, they (ha­uing not eaten for twentie foure houres any meate at all, nor sleept in any bed for many dayes) might easily suffer some harme and crasinesse in their imaginationM^r. Newton himselfe in his relation, attri­buteth the phrensie of Master Sutton to his hard v­sage, want of sleepe, &c. Why then might not also M^r. Newton for the same cau­ses be some­what distem­pered in his imagination at the time of that pretended visi­on?. Secondly, the relation affirmeth that Master Newton was sodainly awaked out of his sleepe by the outcries of his companion Master Sutton a Protestant, who cry­ed out, that he was a damned wicked wretch, only for ta­king the Oath, and who also had before a weake, not to say, a crasie braine, (for not long after hee was cleane distracted of his wits, as Master Newton himselfe con­fesseth) and therefore it was a very easie matter for Master Newton, through a vehement apprehension of the vision, which Master Sutton did foretell him, being yet scarce fully awake, should instantly appeare vnto him, to imagine that hee saw, and heard that, which in very deed he neither saw nor heard, which oftentimes [Page 271] happeneth also to them that be awake, as wee before haue noted. And doubtlesse it is euident by the relation it selfe, that the apparition was onely imaginary, for as much as concerneth the words, which Master Newton affirmeth he did heare. For although he saith, that he saw the blessed Virgin, with an infinite number of Angels about her, and that there appeared vnto him a multitude of holy Saints, yet when hee repeateth the words that they spake vnto him, hee doth not absolutely say, that they spake this or that vnto him, But I thought, saith he, the blessed Virgin spake to me in this manner, Behold, see and beleeue my Assumption in body, and withall said, take not the Oath, but rather endure all torments, &c. And a litle after, Me thought, saith he, the Saints said vnto me, Double thy deuotion vnto the Saints, for nothing is more acceptable vnto almightie God. So that all the certaintie of this reuelation dependeth vpon the sole cogitation and imagination of a young man, who is neither a Saint nor learned, nor exercised in contemplatiue life; which kind of testimonie, to knowe what authoritie it can beare for giuing credit to a vision, I remit the Reader to that, which wee haue before related out of Gerson and Delrius.

25. But be it as it will, let this vision be reall, let it be imaginary (for vndoubtedly both wayes Almightie God may appeare to men, either immediately by him­selfe, or by his Angels and Saints) neuerthelesse there be many probable signes, which according to the rules before set downe, doe plainly shew, partly that this re­uelation may bee iustly suspected, and partly that it was no diuine apparition, but a meere illusion. For first it is knowen that Master Sutton, who foretold Master Newton, that he should haue an apparition, and so was the first man to whom the vision was reuealed, was not onely no Catholike, but also, as is gathered by Master Newtons relation, was much giuen to swearing, and o­ther disorderly behauiour. It is also manifest that Ma­ster [Page 278] Newton was not onely a Nouice in the course of spirituall life, but also not well confirmed in the Catho­like faith, seeing that, as appeareth by his relation, hee doubted of the Assumption of the blessed Virgin, and also of the lawfull praying to Saints.

26. Besides, many things are in Master Newtons re­lation, which doe not seeme to bee agreeable to truth. And first those things doe not hang well together, which are said of Master Sutton, to wit, that he was to be a witnesse of the fauour which God vouchsafed to doe far Master Newton, considering that Master Sutton did neither heare, nor see almost any thing of that appari­tion, whereof he could be either an eare or an eie-wit­nesse. For Master Sutton, as Master Newton in his rela­tion affirmeth, crept downe into the bed, saying, that he durst not looke vp to behold the vision, which was for me to looke vpon, but desired me to pray for him, saying that hee was onely to be a witnesse of the fauour, which God vouch­safed to doe for me, and so lifting vp my eies, I saw the roome shining, &c. Now those things, which were spoken by the Blessed Virgin, and the holy Saints, vnto Master Newton, hee did not heare with his corporall eare, but with his inward imagination. I thought, saith hee, that the blessed Virgin spake vnto me, Take not the Oath, &c. Mee thought the Saints said vnto mee, Double thy de­uotion, &c.

27. Secondly, that also is false, which in this reuela­tion Master Sutton affirmed, to wit, that he was a damned wretch only for taking the Oath, seeing that, as appeareth by the relation, hee had committed many other youth­full sinnes, for the which he deserued damnation. And although in some later copies that word [onely] is now rased out, yet for certaintie in the first copies, whereof many are yet extant, that word [onely] is expresly con­tained. Thirdly, those words, Double thy deuotion to the Saints, for there is nothing more acceptable to almightie God, spoken generally are not also agreeable to truth, [Page 279] for that it is euident, that charitie, which is a Theologi­call vertue, to speake nothing of other vertues, is more acceptable to God, then deuotion vnto the Saints.

28. Fourthly, that this apparition was not a diuine reuelation, but an illusion, is also proued by the effect thereof. For, besides that madnesse and phrensinesse do seldome follow diuine consolations and reuelations, as it happened to Master Sutton, (vnlesse that one wil say, that before that reuelation hee was distracted of his wits, from whence a farre stronger argument may bee drawen to disproue this reuelation) Master Newton himselfe against the expresse prohibition of the Blessed Virgin did take the Oath, as the Bishop of Peterborow, who did tender it vnto him, and many others, who were present, doe constantly affirme. Neither is it pro­bable, that the aforesaid Bishop either would, or durst release Master Newton, whom the Earle of Excester had committed to prison for that he refused to take the Oath, before he had taken the same. And doubtlesse the great silence, which Master Newton vseth in passing o­uer so sleightly the manner, and conditions, vpon which he was set at libertie, onely affirming, that he was by the Earle of Excester deliuered ouer to the Sheriffe, and by him brought to the Bishop, and by him set at liberty, seeing that he is not negligent in rehearsing diuerse o­ther things of lesser moment, is no small argument, that some frailtie lay hidden, which Master Newton was not willing should be knowen.

29. Lastly, that other miracle, which Master New­ton related of himselfe, doth not seeme to be very pro­bable, to wit, that hee before the Earle of Excester to confirme the Assumption of our Blessed Ladie in bodie alleaged the place in the Apocalips cap. 12. Signum mag­num in coelo, the which place, as he saith, he had neither seene nor heard in all his life, but at that time he vttered it as readily, as if he had seene it before his eies. For conside­ring that the miraculous works of God are alwaies per­fect, [Page 280] it is not credible, that the holy Ghost would by the mouth of Master Newton, to proue the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin alleage such a place of Scripture, which according to the doctrine of Catholike Diuines is no conuincing proofe, but according to the com­mon doctrine of Diuines, the literall sense of that place is not to be vnderstood of the Blessed Virgin, but of the holy Church, and no text of holy Scripture according to the mysticall or allegoricall sense thereof, vnlesse by some other place of Scripture it bee declared to be that sense, but onely according to the literall sense, is a suf­ficient argument to proue a position or doctrine of faith. I omit, that in this relation of Master Newton, there doth not appeare to be in him so perfect humilitie, as, according to the rules before set downe, ought to be in one, vnto whom almightie God doth truly re­ueale himselfe. as euery one, who readeth the relation, may clearly perceiue.

30, Wherefore if Bartholomaens Medina ^z a most learned Diuine of the Order of Saint Dominicke, and diuerse other Diuines, in answering to those arguments which are drawne from the reuelations of holy wo­men, and Saints, and famous for working miracles, (commonly cited in Schooles, and by the Popes per­mission printed and published) to confirme the doctrine of the immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, are not afraide to say, that those reuelations are not authen­ticke, and haue not waight of authoritie, how much the more may one for the causes and arguments before re­hearsed iustly, and boldly answere, that this apparition is not authenticke and of waight, it being founded in the sole authoritie of one young man, who neither is a Saint, nor a learned man, nor exercised in a contempla­tiue life?

31. These bee the answeres which the defenders of the Oath doe commonly bring to Master Newtons pre­tended reuelation, which truely, for that it concerneth [Page 281] the facts of particular persons yet liuing, I was very loath to haue examined, had not Master Newton him­selfe by his owne hand writing making it knowne pub­likely to all men, altogether compelled me to shew the weakenesse of this argument, which is drawen from his reuelation, which neuerthelesse many haue greatly vrged to impugne the Oath, and haue exceedingly glo­ried therein. From all which it may very well be con­cluded, that no sufficient argument at all can be taken, either from diuine reuelation, or from any other rea­son or authoritie whatsoeuer, which certainly and eui­dently is able to conuince and demonstrate, that the afore­said Oath of Allegiance can not be taken by any Ca­tholike with a probable, and consequently with a safe conscience, or that those Catholikes, who doe take it are therefore to be excluded from the Societie of the faith­full, and right beleeuers, or not to be admitted to the participation of the holy Sacraments.