A CLEARE, SINCERE, AND MODEST confutation of the vnsound, fraudulent, and intemperate Reply of T. F. who is knowne to be Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English IESVITE.
Wherein ALSO ARE CONFVTED THE chiefest obiections which D. Schulckenius, who is commonly said to be Card. Bellarmine, hath made against WIDDRINTONS Apologie for the right, or Soueraigntie of temporall PRINCES.
BY Roger Widdrington an English Catholike.
Benedicite maledicentibus vobis, & orate pro calumniantibus vos.
Blesse them that curse you, and pray for them that calumniate you.
Permissu Superiorum 1616.
THE CONTENTS of this Treatise.
The Epistle to English Catholikes.
Wherein
1. IT is shewed first, that it is not safe for the consciences of Catholikes to adhere alwaies to the Pope, and neglect the command of their temporall Prince.
2 That if the Pope should exact from Catholikes, that obedience, which is due onely to their temporall Prince, they should by obeying the Pope disobey the command of Christ, and be truly traitours to their Prince.
3 That it is possible for Popes to challenge such an obedience, and that de facto Pope Boniface did challenge it of the King, and inhabitants of France.
4 That it is probable, that the Pope that now is, in condemning the late Oath of Allegeance, and in challenging a power to depose temporall Princes, demaundeth of English Catholikes the foresaid temporall Allegiance, and vsurpeth that authoritie, which Christ hath not giuen him.
5 That although it should be granted, that it is probable, that the Pope hath such an authoritie, yet so long as it is but probable, it is titulus sine re, a title, which can neuer be put in execution without manifest disobedience to God, and iniustice to temporall Princes.
6 That the Pope neither is the Iudge of temporall Princes in temporall causes, nor as yet by any authenticall instrument hath defined, that he hath power to depose temporall Princes, and that therefore it is probable, that he hath no such power.
[Page] 7 That the manner of his Holinesse proceeding in condemning my bookes, and commanding me to purge my selfe, and the fallacious dealing of my Aduersaries, doth clearely shew, that they in their consciences are not perswaded, that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, is a point of faith.
8 The causes of the beginning and increase of this doctrine are briefely insinuated, and that if all temporall Princes would vse the like meanes to defend their Soueraigntie, this controuersie would be quickly at an end.
9 That Catholikes are bound to read, and examine this question, otherwise their ignorance will be willfull, damnable, and inexcusable.
10 That they may lawfully read my bookes, notwithstanding the Popes, or rather Card. Bellarmines prohibition to the contrary, and that I deserued not at their hands such vncharitable words and deeds, for the loue and paines I haue taken for their sakes.
The Preface to the Reader.
Wherein M.r Fitzherberts Preface is confuted, the matter, which Widdrington handleth, and the manner how he proceedeth therein is declared, and his doctrine proued to be truly probable, and to be neither preiudiciall to his Maiesties seruice, nor to the consciences of Catholikes, and the exceptions of D. Schulckenius against that rule of the Law brought by Widdrington, In dubijs melior est conditio possidentis, In doubts, or disputable causes, the condition of him who hath possession, is to be preferred, are confuted.
The first Part.
wherein The authorities, and testimonies of those learned Catholikes, [Page] which Widdrington in his Theologicall Disputation brought against the Popes power to depose Princes, (and which M.r Fitzherbert cunningly passeth ouer, and for answer to them remitteth his English Reader to D. Schulckenius a Latine writer) are briefely and perspicuously examined, and the Replyes, which Doctor Schulckenius maketh against them, are confuted.
Chap. 1.
Wherein the authoritie of Iohn Trithemius an Abbot, and famous writer of the order of S. Benedict, is examined, and the exceptions, which D. Schulckenius taketh against it, are ouerthrowne.
Chap. 2.
Wherein the authoritie of Albericus Roxiatus, a famous Lawyer, and Classicall Doctor, is examined, and the exceptions of D. Schulckenius, against it, are confuted.
Chap. 3.
Wherein the authoritie of Ioannes Parisiensis, a famous Doctor of Paris, is examined, and the exceptions of D. Schulckenius against him are proued to be insufficient.
Chap. 4.
Wherein the authoritie of M.r Doctor Barclay, a famous and learned Catholike, is briefely examined.
Chap. 5.
Wherein are set downe the authorities of many English Catholikes, who haue publikely declared their opinions, as M.r George Blackwell, M.r William Warmington, M.r Iohn Barclay, M.r William Barret, Bishop Watson, Abbot Fecknam, Doctor Cole, both the Harpesfields, Mr Edward Rishton, M.r Henry Orton, M.r Iames Bosgraue, M.r Iohn Hart, M. Iames Bishop related by Mr. Camden, and those thirteene learned, and vertuous Priests, and most of them, as yet liuing, whose names I related in my Theologicall Disputation, and whose protestation, which I set downe verbatim [Page] in my Appendix to Suarez, must needes suppose, that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes, as out of Suarez I conuince in this chapter.
Chap. 6.
Wherein the authority of the Kingdome and State of France is largely debated, the exceptions which D. Schulckenius taketh against Petrus Pithaeus and Bochellus are confuted, and Sigebert is defended from Schisme, of which he is wrongfully taxed by Card. Baronius and D. Schulckenius.
The second part.
wherein All the principall arguments, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to prooue the vnion and subordination of the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, wheron Mr. Fitzherbert, and all the other vehement maintainers of the Popes power to depose Princes, doe chiefely ground that doctrine, together with the Replies, which are brought by D. Schulckenius to confirme the same vnion and subordination, are exactly examined.
Chap. 1.
Wherein the true state of the question concerning the vnion of the temporall and spirituall power among Christians is declared.
Chap. 2.
Wherein the argument of Card. Bellarmine taken from those words of S. Paul, Wee being many are one body in Christ, to prooue, that the temporall & spirituall power among Christians doe make one totall body, or commonwealth, whereof the Pope is head, is answered, and Card. Bellarmine conuinced of manifest contradiction.
Chap. 3.
Wherein the authoritie of S. Gregory Nazianzene comparing the temporall and spirituall power among Christians to the body and soule in man (which is so often vrged [Page] by Card. Bellarmine to prooue, that the temporall and spirituall power among Christians doe make one totall body, as the body and soule doe make one man) is declared, and cleerely prooued by Card. Bellarmines owne grounds to make nothing for his purpose.
Chap. 4.
Wherein the true state of the question concerning the subiection and subordination of the temporall power among Christians to the spirituall is propounded, and the different opinions of Catholikes concerning this poynt are rehearsed.
Chap. 5.
Wherein the first argument of Card. Bellarmine taken from the ends of the temporall and spirituall power, to prooue, that the temporall power among Christians, as it is temporall, is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, as it is Ecclesiasticall, is propounded, Widdringtons answer to the same related, and D. Schulckenius Reply therunto cleerly confuted.
Chap. 6.
Wherein Card. Bellarmines second argument to proue the same, taken from the vnion of Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes in one Church is rehearsed, the Answer of Widdrington, of Mr. D. Barclay, and of Mr. Iohn Barclay thereunto is related, and Card. Bellarmines Reply to the same is most cleerely ouerthrowen.
Chap. 7.
Wherein Card. Bellarmines third argument, to prooue the same, taken from the obligation, by which Christian Princes are bound to change their temporall gouernment, if it hinder the spirituall good, is related, Widdringtons answer to the same rehearsed, and D. Schulckenius Reply threunto prooued to be vnsound, fraudulent and repugnant to his owne grounds.
Chap. 8.
Wherein Card. Bellarmines fourth argument, taken from the authority of S. Gregory Nazianzene comparing [Page] the temporall and spirituall power among Christians to the body and soule in man, is cleerely conuinced to bee no fit similitude to prooue, that the temporall power among Christians is per se subiect to the spirituall, and that tht Pope hath power to dispose of temporals, and to depose temporall Princes, but that is rather a fit similitude to prooue the flat contrary.
Chap. 9.
Wherein the fift argument of Card. Bellarmine taken from the authority of S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface the eight, affirming that in the Church are two swords, and that the sword is vnder the sword, is rehearsed, Widdringtons answer thereunto related, D. Schulckenius Reply confuted, and cleerely prooued that S. Bernard doth nothing fauour, but expressely impugne the Popes power to vse the temporall sword; and that Pope Boniface did challenge a direct temporall Monarchie ouer the whole world, and that Extrauagant vnam Sanctam, was reuersed by Pope Clement the next Successour but one to Boniface; and withall that Pope Boniface his words may be vnderstood in a true sense.
Chap. 10.
Wherein Card. Bellarmines sixt and last argument, taken from the authoritie of Pope Innocent the third, comparing the spirituall and temporall power to the Sunne and Moone, is answered.
Secondly Card. Bellarmines reasons, which moued him to recall his opinion touching the subiection of S. Paul to Caesar, and of Cleargie men to temporall Princes, are confuted, and some of them by his own grounds; whereby it is cleerely proued, that without iust cause he hath departed from his ancient, and the common doctrine of the Schoole Diuines to follow the Canonists, and also that not without some note of temeritie hee hath condemned as improbable the common opinion of the Schoole Diuines, who also follow therein the Ancient Fathers.
Thirdly, the true state of the question concerning the [Page] power of spirituall Pastors to exempt Cleargie-men from the authoritie of temporall Princes, is declared, whereby it is made apparant, how weake or strong an argument can be drawne from the Popes power to exempt Cleargie men from all subiection to temporall Princes, to proue his power to depriue temporall Princes of their Regall authoritie.
The Adioynder.
Wherein first it is cleerely shewed, that Widdrington hath truely charged Mr. Fitzherbert with falsitie in two respects.
2 Widdringtons first exposition of that clause of the oath [Also I doe from my heart abhorre, detest and abiure as impious & hereticall, this damnable doctrine and position, That Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects or any other whatsoeuer] is proued to be sound and sufficient, and to be voide of all absurditie, or contradiction, as is conuinced by those foure examples of propositions, which Mr. Fitzherbert bringeth to confute the same.
3 Mr. Fitsherberts fraude and ignorance are discouered, and the causes of his errour are declared.
4 The two vsuall significations of the word hereticall among Catholikes are laid open, whereby it is made manifest, that not onely the doctrine of murthering, but also of deposing Princes may bee truely abiured for hereticall.
5 Widdringtons second exposition of the aforesaid clause is proued to be sound, and agreeable to the common sense and vnderstanding of the words, and Mr. Fitzherberts exceptions against the same are proued to be insufficient, and not agreeable to the approued rules assigned by Diuines and Lawiers for the interpreting of the words of euery Law.
[Page] 6 Lastly, Widdrington from the premises draweth foure conclusions cleane opposite to the foure conclusions, which Mr. Fitzherbert from his premises collecteth: and finally he concludeth, that neither this clause, nor any other is sufficient to make the oath vnlawfull, or to moue any Catholike to refuse the same, adding withall, what little hope of sinceritie, and sufficiencie the Reader may expect from the rest of Mr Fitzherberts Replyes, seeing that in this (of which neuerthelesse hee and his fauourers doe so greatly bragge) hee hath shewed such great want of learning, and sinceritie.
TO ALL ENGLISH CATHOLIKES, who are of opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose temporal PRINCES, ROGER WIDDRINGTON their Brother and Seruant in CHRIST wisheth true zeale, knovvledge, and felicitie.
1 I Haue written here a Treatise in answere to Mr. Fitzherberts Reply, touching the POPES power to depose PRINCES, and the new oath of Allegiance, which I thought fit to Dedicate to you, Deare Countrimen, those especially, who haue taken vpon you a charge to teach, and instruct others, for that the matter, which here is handled, doth as much concerne your soules, and consciences, or rather much more, then my owne. Doe not you imagine, that when there is a controuersie betwixt his Holinesse, and your Soueraigne, concerning your spirituall, and temporall allegiance, you may safely, and without danger of deadly sinne adhere to [Page] his Holinesse, and forsake your Soueraigne, vnlesse you duly examine the right, and title which either haue: for that by the law of GOD, and Nature you are bound to giue to GOD, and Caesar that which is their due; that is, spirituall obedience to your spirituall Pastours, and temporall allegiance to your temporall Prince. Wherefore if the Pope should challenge, and exact from you not onely spirituall obedience, which is due to him, but vnder colour of spirituall obedience, should demand also temporall allegiance, which is not due to him, but onely to your temporall Prince, you should in obeying the Pope therein yeeld him that obedience, which is due only to your temporall Prince, and so transgresse the law of GOD and nature, and consequently it being a matter of so great moment, you should, according to the approued doctrine of all Diuines, by yeelding such obedience incurre a most heinous deadly sinne.
2. For as there are but two only supreme powers on earth, to which all Christian subiects doe owe obedience and subiection, to wit, spirituall, which doth reside speciallie in the chiefe spirituall Pastour, who in things spirituall is supreme, and temporall power, which doth reside in temporall Princes, who in things temporal are supreme, and subiect to none but God; So also there be only two subiections, and obediences answerable thereunto, to wit, spirituall and temporall: So that if such a power, or obedience be not spirituall, it must of necessitie be temporall, and with the same certaintie or probabilitie, that one is perswaded such an authoritie not to be spirituall, he must be perswaded that it is temporall. That authoritie is spirituall, [Page] and due onely to the Pope, which Christ hath giuen to his Church, and the spirituall Pastours thereof; All other supreme authoritie is temporall, and due only to temporall Princes. And therefore if it be probable, as in very deede it is, and as you may see it in this Treatise clearely conuinced so to be, that the Pope hath no authority giuen him by Christ to depose Princes, it is consequently probable, that the aforesaid authoritie (if there be any such authoritie on earth to depose Princes) is not spirituall but temporall, and that therfore, whosoeuer granteth it to the Pope, doth giue to him that obedience, which is due to temporall Princes, and consequently he doth against the expresse command of Christ, not render to God and Caesar, that which is their due.
3. Well then thus you see, that if the Pope should challenge that obedience as due to him by the institution of Christ, which Christ hath not giuen him, and which consequently is due only to temporall Princes, he should vsurpe that authority, which he hath not, & in so doing he should transgresse the law of God and Nature, and those subiects, who should adhere to him, and yeeld him that pretended spirituall obedience, should also transgresse the law of Christ, and be not only pretended, but true Traitors both to God and their Prince, in not acknowledging their Prince to be their true Soueraigne, by yeelding that obedience, which is due to him to an other, and so by taking from him his supreme power, or soueraingtie, and giuing it to an other Prince, which in very deed is to take the Diademe, which doth signifie his supreme authoritie, off from his head, and place it vpon the head of an other.
[Page] 4. Now there is none of you, as I suppose, of so meane vnderstanding, that can imagine, that the Pope is so infallible in his opinion, iudgement, or any declaratiue command grounded thereon, as that he can not possibly erre therein, and challenge that authority as due to him by the institution of Christ, which neuerthelesse Christ hath not giuen him, but it belongeth only to temporall Princes. This you may see by experience in Pope Boniface the eight, who pretended, that Philip the faire the most Christian KING of France, was subiect to him in spiritualls and temporalls, and declared them to be heretikes, who should beleeue the contrarie: and that he was a temporall Monarch of the Christians world, and therefore that the kingdome of France by reason of the disobedience, and rebellion of Philip their King, was falne into the handes of the See Apostolike: for which cause Pope Boniface was taxed by many learned Catholikes of great impudencie, pride, and arrogancie: and his extrauagant, Vnam Sanctam, which he made to curbe the said King of France, declaring that the temporall sword is subiect to the spirituall, and temporall power to spirituall authoritie, was reuersed by Pope Clement the fift, the next Successour but one to Pope Boniface, who declared, that by the definition, and declaration of Pope Boniface in his extrauagant, Vnam Sanctā, no preiudice should arise to the King, and kingdome of France: and that by it neither the King, kingdom, or inhabitants of France should be more subiect to the Church of Rome, then they were before, but that all things should be vnderstood [Page] to be in the same state, wherin they were before the said definition, as well concerning the Church, as concerning the King, Kingdome, and Inhabitants of France. The like temporall authoritie Pope Sixtus the fift, if he had liued, would also haue challenged, for that as I haue been credibly informed by diuers Iesuites of good account, who then liued at Rome, hee did intend to suppresse Card. Bellarmines first Tome of Controuersies, because he did not with the Canonists grant to the Pope this direct temporall Monarchie ouer the whole Christian world.
5 So that the onely controuersie now is, whether the Pope hath de facto erred or no, in declaring the oath of allegiance to be vnlawful, and to containe in it many things flat contrarie to faith and saluation, vpon this supposall, that it is a point of Faith, that the Pope hath authoritie giuen him by Christ, to depose Princes, which is the substance of the oath, as Fa: Suarez Lib 6 Defens. Fidei fere [...]er totum. acknowledgeth, and the maine question betwixt my Aduersaries and mee, as M.r. Fitzherbert In the end of his Preface. in expresse words confesseth. Now you may see, if you please to reade, that I haue cleerely proued in this Treatise, that it is probable, that the authoritie, which the Pope claimeth to depose Princes, is not true, but vsurped, not granted him by Christ, but giuen him by men contrarie to those expresse words of CHRIST, Math. 22. Render the things that are Caesars to Caesar, and the things that are Gods, to God. And therefore consider, I pray you, in what danger you stand, of doing great iniury to your Soueraigne, and committing flat [Page] treason against his Royall person and Crowne, if you rashly, and without due examination follow the Popes opinion, iudgement, or also declaratiue command grounded thereon, who, vnder pretence of demanding of you a profession of his spirituall authoritie, and your spirituall obedience, exacteth in very deede not spirituall allegiance, but that obedience which is probably thought by many learned Catholikes to be a meere temporal allegiance, and due onely to your temporall Prince.
6 But obserue, deare Countrimen, a more manifest, and dangerous gulfe, into which for want of due consideration you may easily cast your selues. For if once you grant, that it is probable, that it is a controuersie, that it is a disputable question, as in very deed it is, and as I thinke very few of you, who haue studied this question, are perswaded to the contrarie, that the right, title, power, and authoritie, which the Pope challengeth to depose Princes, is no true title, but pretended, a meere temporall, and not a true spirituall authoritie, although I should grant you also for Disputation sake, of which as yet I doe not dispute, that it is also probable, that the said title is good, and that the Pope hath such an authoritie to depose Princes giuen him by Christ, yet there is none of you so simple, but if you will duely consider, will presently perceiue, that this title, so long as it is in controuersie, is titulus sinere, a meere title, which so long as it is disputable, and debated on either side, can neuer be put in practise by any man; what opinion so euer he follow in speculation, without doing the Prince, who is deposed by the Pope, manifest wrong, [Page] and if he be a subiect, by committing that detestable crime of treason in a most high degree.
7 For if any one of you should be inlawfull possession of a house, iewell, or any other thing, wherevnto an other man pretendeth a title, and claimeth a power to dispose thereof, and perchance it is also probable, that his title is in very deede the better, and his Lawiers doe bring strong reasons, and euidences to confirme the same, would not you thinke, that it were a manifest wrong, as in deed it were, and against the knowne rules of iustice grounded vpon the light of reason, that your Aduersarie, or any other in his behalfe, notwithstanding the probabilitie of his title, should put you out of possession, and take it away from you by violence, before the Iudge had decided the controuersie?
8 And if any one should Reply and say, that the Pope is our Soueraignes Iudge; to whom also all Christian Princes are subiect, and that hee hath decided this controuersie betwixt him and our Prince, and defined, that this his title to depose our Prince and all other Christian Princes, is a true and not onely pretended, a spirituall, and not a temporall title, he is manifestly deceiued. For neither is the Pope the Iudge of temporall Princes in temporall causes, wherin they are supreme, and subiect to none but God; neither hath the Pope as yet decided this controuersie, or defined by any Generall Councell, or any other authenticall instrument (for I will not at this time contend what authority the Pope hath to define matters of faith without a Generall Councell) that this title, and authoritie which hee challengeth to depose [Page] Princes, is a true spirituall title, and an authoritie granted him by the institution of Christ. For concerning this point Popes, and Emperours haue euer beene at great variance, as well said Fa: Azor, Tom. 2. lib. 11 cap q. 5.8. and it is in controuersie among Catholike Doctors, as I haue conuinced in this Treatise, and as yet the controuersie is not decided by the Iudge, as Abbot Trithemius See beneath part. 1. cap. 1. doth well affirme.
9 And if any one should perchance imagine, that his Holinesse that now is, hath by his late Breues decided the controuersie, and defined, that hee hath authoritie to depose Princes, hee is also most grosely mistaken; both for that there is not so much as one word mentioned in any of his Breues concerning his authoritie to depose Princes, but onely in generall words he declareth, that Catholikes ought not to take the oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrarie to faith and saluation, but what those many things be he doth not expresse (and perchance he might imagine at the first sight, as Card. Bellarmine did, that the Popes power to excommunicate, to binde and loose, to dispence in oathes is denyed in the oath, and that it was framed to make a distinction betwixt Protestants and Catholikes touching points of Religion, al which how vntrue they are I haue cleerely shewed in my Theologicall Disputation) but especially for this reason hee is fowly mistaken, because there is not in the Breues any one of those words, which, according to the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, and other Diuines related by me in the aforesaid Disputation Cap. 10. sec. 2. nu. 32. & seq. are required to make an infallible definition, and finall decision of a point of faith. [Page] Neither is euery Breue, or Apostolicall letter of the Pope, although it be registred in the body of the Canon Law among the Popes Decretall letters, a sufficient instrument to define matters of faith, for that in them is commonly contained onely the Popes opinion concerning some doubtfull case, or question, and not a finall decision or definition, which all Catholikes are bound to follow. Otherwise it must needes be granted, that Popes haue defined in their Breues false doctrine, and also heresie, as may bee seene in the Decretall letters, and Breues of Pope Celestine the first, Pope Nicolas the third, and Pope Boniface the eight, as also I obserued in the aforesaid Disputation Cap. 10. sec. 2 nu. 47.48.
10. Yea both the very manner of his Holinesse proceeding in condemning the oath in such generall words, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and saluation, not declaring any one of those many things, although he hath been in some sort vrged therunto by his Maiesty, In his Apologie pag. 7. num. 5. & we also his Catholike subiects, whom it most concernes, haue most humbly and most earnestly requested it at his hands,Disput. The olog. in the Epistle to his Holinesse. and the forbidding of my bookes also in such generall words, not declaring whether they are forbidden, for the matter which they handle, or for the manner, or in respect of the persons against whom they are written, or for some other cause, but especially, and which is more strange, and contrary to the practise of all tribunals, the commanding of mee to purge my selfe forthwith, and that vnder paine of Ecclesiasticall Censures, without signifying any crime at all, either in generall or particular, whereof [Page] I should purge my selfe, are manifest signes to a prudent man, that latet anguis in herba, and that they themselues doe distrust their owne cause. Can any prudent man imagine, that if his Holinesse, or the most Illustrious Cardinals of the Inquisition, were fully perswaded, that the Popes power to depose Princes is a point of faith, & defined by the Church so to be, as Card. Bellarmine, and some few other especially Iesuits would enforce the Christian world to beleeue, and that they were able to conuince the same either by holy Scriptures, Apostolicall traditions, decrees of sacred Councels, or any other conuincing reason, they would forbeare to signifie the same, especially being so greatly vrged thereunto?
11. Besides the manner also of my Aduersaries handling this cōtrouersie, in corrupting my words, peruerting my meaning, concealing my answers, altering the true state of the question, confounding the Readers vnderstanding with ambiguous words and sentences, and being requested to insist vpon any one place of holy Scripture, authoritie of sacred Councell, or any other Theologicall reason, which they shall thinke to be most conuincing, that thereby the controuersie may quickly bee at an end, their flying from one place of holy Scripture to another, from one Councell to another, from one Theologicall reason to another, their fallacious arguing from the facts of the Apostles, yea also and of those Prophets, who were no Priests, which were done miraculouslie, and by an extraordinarie power, or by the speciall command of Almightie God, to prooue the like ordinarie power to be in spirituall Pastours, from the practises [Page] of certaine Popes, who were resisted therein both by Christian Princes and people to inferre the practise of the Church, which is a congregation of all the faithfull &c. from the opinion of very many Doctours, or also of the Church onelie probably iudging or thinking, to conclude the faith of the Church firmely beleeuing or defining, from the Popes power to command temporals, to gather the Popes power to dispose of temporals, from the Popes power to impose temporall punishments to deduce a power in the Pope to inflict or vse temporall punishments, or which is all one, to constraine with temporall punishments, & from a power which is granted to the Church, as the Church is taken for the Christian world consisting both of temporall and spirituall power, to conclude the said power to be in the Church, as the Church is taken for the spiritual Kingdome of Christ, which consisteth only of spirituall power, and such like pittifull shifts to confound therby their Readers vnderstanding, & at the last, in regard either of their presence or preheminēce in the Court of Rome, to cause by their euill information his Holinesse to consent to the forbidding of their Aduersaries bookes, that thereby neither their legerdemaine and fraudulent dealing may bee laid open to the view of the world, nor the Reader may see what we alledge against them, or in defence of our selues, but in that lame and corrupt manner, as they shal please to deliuer it, doth euidently shew, that they are not desirous to satisfie mens vnderstandings, and to search and finde out the truth by a sincere debating of this dangerous and difficult controuersie, [Page] but rather that they themselues doe suspect their owne cause, which because they haue once taken in hand to defend, they will per fas & nefas, by fraud and violence seeke still to maintaine. But truth will neuer be ouerthrowen, it may for a time by fraud and violence be suppressed, but maugre all the sleights of the impugners thereof, it will in the end preuaile.
Whereas my plaine, sincere, and perspicuous handling this question, and requesting my Aduersaries, that they will insist vpon any one text of holy Scripture, which shall seeme to them to be the most pregnant place, whether it be, whatsoeuer thou shalt loose, &c. Feed my sheepe. If you shall haue Secular iudgments &c. or any other; or vpon any one decree of Popes, or generall Councells, whether it be, can: Nos Sanctorum, Iuratos, Absolutos, or any other, whether it be the Councell of Trent, of Lyons, of Laterane, (which now of late is so greatly vrged by some, whereof in former times was made so small account for the proofe of this point,) or vpon any one Theologicall reason, which shall seeme to them to be the most vnanswerable, whether it be taken from the subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, or from the necessitie of defending the Church, repressing haeresies, punishing wicked Princes, defending innocent people, or from the promise which Christian Princes make to the Church, either in Baptisme, or at their Coronation, or any other which shall like them best, protesting withall,In Resp: Apologet. nu [...] 1. that if any man shall shew by any convincing reason [Page] that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is a point of faith, and consequently the contrary not probable; I will presently yeeld, neither shall any hope of gaine, or feare of punishment withdraw me from embracing forthwith and publishing also the truth, doe sufficiently demonstrate, that my only desire is to finde out, and follow the truth in this controuersie, which doth so neerely touch our soules and saluation and our obedience due by the law of Christ to God, and our temporall Prince.
13 Wherefore my earnest request at this time, and vehement desire onely is, Deare Countrymen, that you will be pleased to examine diligently your spirituall, and temporall obedience, your dutie to GOD & CAESAR, and that you will be led and guided by true reason, and not caried away by blinde affection, hope of preferment and credit, or feare of disgrace and want, and not to be desirous so to please the Pope, as to neglect your dutie, and obedience, which by the command of Christ, and vnder paine of eternall damnation you owe to your temporall Prince. Be not deceiued, God is not mocked. Coeca obedientia, blinde obedience in this case is dangerous, and damnable, and your ignorance herein, you hauing now so iust cause to doubt, and therefore, according to the doctrine of all Diuines, are bound to examine the truth, will be affected, grosse, wilfull, and culpable, like to that, whereof the Prophet spake,Psal: 35. Noluit intelligere vt bene ageret, hee would not vnderstand that he might doe well. For although it be lawfull, [Page] and also very commendable to obey your Superiours command, without examining what authoritie he hath to impose vpon you such a command, when by obeying, you incurre no danger of disobeying God, of wronging your neighbour, whom by the law of God you are bound not to wrong, or of disobeying another Superiour, whom by the law of God you are bound also to obey, yet this is also certaine, that when there is a controuersie, that your obeying an earthly Superiour is a disobedience to God, or a rebellion against another supreme Superiour, whom God hath commanded you to obey, vnlesse you duely examine the matter, and in what manner by obeying that earthly Superiour, although it be the Pope, you doe not disobey God, nor commit rebellion against your Prince, whom God commandeth you to obey, no pretence of aduancing Catholike Religion, of deuotion to the See Apostolike, or of any other good end whatsoeuer can excuse you from committing a mortall sinne.
14 The pretence of furthering the common good, of aduancing Catholike Religion, of depressing haeresies, of punishing wicked Princes, of defending innocent people, and such like, may be colourable clokes to excuse many damnable and deuilish attempts, many wicked backbytings, slāderings, and other wrongs both by words and deeds, as by late experience may be seene in the execrable murthers of the two most Christian Kings of France, in the abhominable Conspiracie of the Powder Traitours, in the vncharitable proceedings against the Appellants, and those who fauoured them, and [Page] and now against those Catholikes, who do any waies fauour the Oath, (to omit many other exorbitant dealings vnder this pretence of furthering the common good, which if it were needfull I could make manifest) but assure your selues that neither good ends are sufficient to excuse bad practises, nor the zeale of the person is a sufficient warrant to iustifie all his actions, nor iniustice is to be done to any man be he neuer so wicked.
15 Call to minde, I beseech you, the doctrine of the ancient Fathers, and the practise of the primitiue Church, obserue the causes of the beginning and increase of this practise, and doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, and the continuall contradiction thereof, and you shall finde, that no man of any learning can perswade his conscience, that this doctrine is certaine, and of faith. For the zeale of Pope Gregorie the seuenth, the wickednesse of Henry the fourth Emperour, the discord of the German Princes, the riches of the Countesse Mathildis, the warlike forces of the Nortmans, and the desire of all men that the Emperour might be restrained from doing such euills, were the first occasions,See beneath part: 1. cap: 6. nu: 24. that this doctrine began first to bee practised by the said Pope Gregorie, and afterwards, it being in regard of the strangenesse thereof, so greatly contradicted, iustified by him to bee lawfull, for which cause it was by Onuphrius See in the place aboue c [...]ted. called, a thing not heard of before that age, and by Sigebert a learned, and vertuous Catholike, and no Schismatike, as I will proue beneathPart: 1. cap. 6. num. 20. & seq., it was taxed of noueltie, not to say of heresie, and confuted [Page] by him at large.
16 Secondly, the aduancing of them, who did maintaine this doctrine, the depressing of those, who did impugne it, the suppressing of Bookes, and the threatning of Ecclesiasticall Censures, which neuerthelesse if they be vniust, are not of force in theSuarez de Censuris Disp. 4. sec. 7. nu. 2. 4. 23. & seq. Court of Conscience, and the indiligence of temporall Princes to maintaine their Soueraigntie (the causes whereof I dare not presume to examine) besides the former reasons, and pretence of aduancing Catholike religion &c. were the chiefe causes, why the defenders of this doctrine, did so increase in number from the time of Pope Gregorie the 7. in comparison of those who did impugne it. But if temporall Princes would yet be pleased, to vse hereafter those meanes to defend their right, and Soueraigntie, which Popes haue heretofore, and doe continually vse to maintaine their pretended temporall authoritie ouer Kings and Princes, to depose them, to dispose of their temporalls &c. in order to spirituall good, I do not doubt, but that the streame of Doctors would quickly turne backward, and my Aduersaries would haue small cause to brag (considering especially the weaknesse of their grounds, and that their doctrine is ouerswaied by authoritie, and not by reason) that so many Authors fauour the Popes power to depose Princes, and so few the right of Princes not to bee deposed by the Pope.
17 Neuerthelesse it is also manifest, that it hath euer been contradicted by Christian Princes and people, and notwithstanding the foresaid motiues, [Page] and also the feare that some might haue, lest wicked Princes might be in some sort incouraged to perseuere in euill by impugning that doctrine, which seemed to be a bridle to restraine their bad purposes) it hath continually been impugned, disproued, and confuted by learned Catholikes, as I haue cleerely proued in this Treatise. And therefore remember, into what danger of soule, bodie, and temporall fortunes, you (for want of reading and due examining,) doe throw headlong your selues, and many innocent men, who doe follow your example and counsell, for the which at the day of iudgement you are to make a most strict account, where no fauour of Man can helpe you, and willfull ignorance will not excuse you, but condemne you, and it will be too late to say then Non putaram, vnlesse you doe now, abstracting from all humane affection & respects, examine duely what dutie you beare God and Caesar, what obedience you owe to the Pope, and your temporall Prince.
18 But perhaps some of you will demand, how can you by reading examine this controuersie, seeing that the Bookes, which treate thereof are forbidden by the Pope? In answer to this I will onely propound at this time to your prudent considerations, whether if there should arise a controuersie betwixt the Pope, and a temporall Prince concerning the title to any kingdome, especially which that temporall Prince hath in his possession (as there is betwixt the Pope, and the King of Spaine touching the Kingdomes of Naples, and Sicilie) the Pope hath authoritie to command that temporall Prince, and his Subiects not to read, and pervse those euidences, [Page] which doe make in fauour of his owne title, but onely those euidences, which doe proue the Popes title?
19 Now if the reason, why my bookes are forbidden by the Pope, (or rather by the euill information, importunitie, and iudiciall sentence of Card. Bellarmine, against whom, as my principall Aduersarie in this cause, I did write both my Apologie for the right of Princes, and also my Theologicall Disputation concerning the oath of Allegiance, which two bookes are onely forbidden, and who therfore was pleased to bee an Accuser, Witnesse, and Iudge, in his owne cause) be, for that they doe fauor the oath of Allegiance, and impugne the Popes power to depose Princes, (as all my Aduersaries confesse, that for this cause they are forbidden to bee read) then you may cleerely perceiue, that therefore my bookes are forbidden, for that they doe shew, and declare the euidences, which doe make for the right and title of temporall Princes, and their right not to be depriued, or thrust out of their kingdomes by the Popes pretended authoritie, but especially of our Soueraigne, whose case concerning this point is more singular, and concerneth him more neerely, considering the opposition betwixt him, and the Popes Holinesse, with whom he is not linked in vnitie of religion and friendship, then it doth concerne other Christian Princes, who haue not the like reason to feare tumults, rebellions, and Powder-treasons, vnder pretence of restoring Catholike religion in their Countrey, and of hauing the Popes expresse or virtuall licence for the same; which prohibition of the Pope [Page] to forbid such kinde of bookes, how far it can binde either those Princes, to whom it belongeth by the law of God and nature to defend their Soueraigntie, or else their Subiects, who also by the same Lawe of God and nature are bound to examine the reasons and euidences of their Princes title, authoritie, and Soueraigntie, least that for want of due examination they should deny to God, or Caesar, that which is their due, I remit to the prudent consideration of any iudicious Catholike man.
20 Lastly, consider, I pray you, the manifold wrongs, which for the loue and paines I haue taken for your sakes, I haue receiued from diuerse of you, whom I could name, if it were needfull, both in reprochfull words, and vncharitable deeds, not beseeming, I will not say, Religious Priests, but morall honest men. For long before I did put pen to paper, I had throughly examined this controuersie, and all which in my iudgement could bee obiected on either side, and for my owne part I was fully settled in my opinion; but perceiuing all men to bee silent in a matter of such importance, and necessitie as this is, and which also concerneth vs all, the zeale, affection, and dutie, which I bare to Catholike Religion, to the See Apostolike, and to my Prince and Countrey, with a vehement desire, that the truth in this important controuersie, which concerneth our obedience, which by the command of Christ, wee owe to GOD and Caesar, to the Popes Holinesse, and to our temporall Soueraigne, compelled mee first to write, and now also to continue, for which [Page] although I shall hereafter suffer, as hitherto I haue done, reproch, infamie, disgrace, losse of friends, and other euils, yet I will still pray for my persecutors, and remit my cause to GOD aboue, assuring my selfe, that in time conuenient he will in this world, or the next, or both, be a iust Iudge reuenger, Protector, and rewarder of the Innocent.
THE PREFACE TO the Reader. Wherein Mr. FITZHERBERTS PREFACE is confuted, the matter which WIDDRINGTON handleth, and the manner how he proceedeth therein, is declared, and his doctrine proued to be truely probable, and neither preiudiciall to his MAIESTIES seruice, nor to the Consciences of Catholikes.
1. IT is not vnknowne to thee, Courteous Reader, the great controuersie hath been of late yeares, especially among vs English Catholikes, concerning the new oath of Allegiance, which his Maiestie by Act of Parliament hath ordained to make triall how his Catholike Subiects stand affected towards him in point of there loyaltie, and due obedience. For although his Holinesse, by the instigation and importunitie no doubt of others, hath by three seuerall Breues declared the said oath to be vnlawfull, [Page 2] and to containe in it many things cleerely repugnant to faith and saluation, and many learned men, especially Iesuites, as Card. Bellarmine Fa: Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, and now lastly Suarez, haue by publike writings endeauoured to conuince the same, neuerthelesse since that Mr. George Blackwell then Archpraesbiter, and many other learned Priests did from the very first publishing of this oath defend it to bee lawfull, and not to containe in it any thing, which either expressely, or couertly is contrarie to Catholike faith or saluation, the said oath hath been maintained as lawfull by many learned Catholike Priests, and hath been taken by the most part of those Lay-Catholikes, to whom it hath been tendered; assuring themselues that his Holinesse command for the refusing thereof, being onely a declaratiue precept, and not grounded vpon any infallible definition, but at the most vpon a probable opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes (which is the maine substance of the oath, as my Aduersarie hereIn the end of his Preface. confesseth, and Fa: Suarez, Lib. 6. defens. a cap. 2. also before him expressely acknowledgeth, is not, according to Suarez doctrine, of force to binde them, especially with so great preiudice to his Maiestie and themselues, to embrace an vncertaine and doubtfull opinion, or to obey the Popes declaratiue precept grounded therevpon.
2 I therefore with other Catholikes considering how greatly this oath doth concerne our allegiance, and obedience due to God and Caesar, and the great harme both spirituall and temporall, which may ensue by breach thereof, thought it our best course, to set downe sincerely all the chiefest arguments, which haue been hitherto by any Author, or which might in our iudgements be obiected by any against the said oath, together with the answers, which haue been, or might be brought to the same Obiections, and withall dutifull submission to propound them to his Holinesse, [Page 3] humbly requesting him, that he would be pleased diligently to peruse them, and in regard of his Pastorall Office would vouchsafe to instruct vs in the Catholike faith, satisfie the difficulties, which doe perplex our consciences, & to make knowne vnto vs, what clauses of the oath are, I doe not say, according to the opinion of Card. Bellarmine, or some other Catholike Doctors, who are no necessarie rule of the Catholike faith, but according to Catholike doctrine necessarily to be beleeued by all men, repugnant to faith and saluation, as his Holinesse affirmeth in his Breues. And this I performed in my Theologicall Disputation, partly at the request of many Catholikes, whose case I greatly pittied, but chiefely for the duty I owed to God, Religion, my Prince and Countrey: Neither did I intend in that Disputation to affirme any thing of my selfe, but as representing the persons of those, who were perswaded, that the oath may, or may not be lawfully taken. And because when the said Disputation was in the presse, & almost finished, there came to my hands an English booke composed by F.T. and entituled a Supplement to the Discussion &c. wherein this Authour endeauoured to proue the said oath to bee repugnant to all lawes both humane and diuine, and therefore iustly condemned by his Holinesse, in that it doth exempt temporall Princes from Excommunication and deposition by the Pope, I thought good to touch briefely in an Admonition to the Reader, both the substance of this Authors discourse, and of the chiefest arguments which hee brought against the oath, and also the answers, which might bee made to them; to the end his Holinesse, might be fully informed of all the reasons, which are alledged as well against as for the taking of the oath. And this was the cause, that I writing in Latin, did to informe his Holinesse briefely set downe what hee had written in English against the aforesaid oath.
[Page 4]3 But the said Authour F. T. who now hath turned backward the first letters of his name into T. F. and is knowne, acknowledged, yea and boasted of by his fauourers to be Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert now an English Iesuite (for which cause I was the more bold to expresse his name) hath of late set forth a Reply in English in defence of his arguments,In the Praeface nu. 2. which I briefely answered in Latine, to the end, saith he, that our Countreymen, whom it most importeth to vnderstand well the qualitie, and state of this controuersie, may discouer my weakenesse, and auoide the danger of their soules, whereto they may be drawne by the false fame, and opinion, that many haue conceiued of my sufficiency. But howsoeuer my Aduersarie, or any other bee conceited of my weakenesse or sufficiencie (for time will make knowne the weakenesse or sufficiencie of vs both) I doe not doubt (God willing,) but notwithstanding all his vaunting bragges, to discouer cleerely the weakenesse and insufficiencie of his Reply, albeit hee hath beene furthered with the former writings of many learned men, especially Card. Bellarmine, Fa: Lessius, & now lastly of Suarez (from whom he borroweth the chiefest Replyes he bringeth to my answeres, yet concealing their names) to omit the many other helpes I want, which he may haue in the place where hee liueth, both by the conference of learned men, & the commoditie of all sorts of books, wherewith that place is furnished. And although hee vseth very spiteful, and slanderous speeches against me (for the which I pray God to forgiue him) thinking thereby to magnifie himselfe, disgrace me and promote his owne cause, but in the end hee will finde that such exorbitant and irreligious courses will tend to his owne disgrace and not mine, and hee greatly preiudiciall both to his cause and conscience, yet I wil abstaine from such vncharitable and vniust proceedings, and with all modestie I will defend my owne [Page 5] innocencie, by answering all his obiections, and by clearing my selfe of all those imputations, which hee hath falsly laid to my charge: and if in defending my selfe I lay open his fraude, and ignorance, and returne his slanders backe vpon himselfe, I ought not therefore to be taxed of calumniation, seeing that, to detect the slanders of the Aduersarie is not, Cap. 5. Apologiae. to vse Card. Bellarmines owne words, to be accounted a defaming. Now to draw neere vnto the matter.
4. Before my Aduersarie come to examine my Answere to his arguments, he thinketh it not amisse to say somewhat concerning me, the matter which I handle, and the manner how I proceede therein. First then touching me he affirmeth,In his Preface num. 3. that whereas I call my selfe by the name of Widdrington, it is well knowne to many, that M. Roger Widdrington, vnder whose shaddow I shroude my selfe, is farre different from me in qualitie, habit, and profession. And albeit Num. 3. he is not ignorant what my true name, and qualitie is, yet he forbeareth to declare it for iust respects, and will only say of me for the present, that whereas our Aduersaries haue heretofore leuied, and Prest many souldiers of their owne profession to maintaine their quarrells against vs, they haue now in this late quarrell of the oath Prest one of ours (I meane saith he, this Authour) who so much presumeth of his owne skill and strength, that albeit the prouerbe saith, Ne Hercules contra duos, yet he feareth not to encounter tenne at once, yea hopeth, as it seemeth, to wrest the club out of Hercules his hand, and to beate him with his owne weapon. For he taketh vpon him to ouerthrow Card. Bellarmine with his owne arguments, to batter the fortresse of the Catholike Church with her owne Canons, and constitutions &c.
5. But first, whether Roger Widdrington be the true or supposed, the sole, or ioint Authour of that Disputation, it little auaileth to the matter, which is now in controuersie: and when my Aduersarie shall name more plainely that person, whom he forbearing, as he [Page 6] saith, to name, yet cunningly nameth, I doubt not, but that hee will not be afraid to answere him more fully; neither will all my Aduersaries clamours, and threatnings discourage him from defending the truth, his Prince, and Countrey, for the loue wherof, & not for any hope of temporall lucre or preferment, or for to shew his wit as my Aduersary falsly affirmeth, he will not be ashamed to be Prest on to write against Mr. Fitzherbert, or any other such like Authour, who liuing in other Countries, and out of danger to loose any thing, but rather in hope to obtaine preferment by their writings, would presse English Catholikes to defend with danger of loosing all they haue, and of incurring his Maiesties high displeasuer that doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes to be of faith, which the State of France hath accounted scandalous, seditious, damnable, and pernicious. In the meane time let this suffice, that he is a childe of the Catholike Romane Church, and as good a Catholike, if not better then Mr. Fitzherbert is, if we will dulie consider the true nature and definition of a Catholike, and that he is no true Catholike, who with true Catholike and supernaturall faith beleeueth doubtfull, disputable, and vncertaine opinions, and which consequently are subiect to errour, to which true Catholike faith cannot in any wise be exposed.
6. Secondly, it is vntrue, that I doe presume so much of my owne skill and strength, that I dare aduenture to wrest out the club of Hercules his hand, as my Aduersarie affirmeth or to encounter vpon equall tearmes with Card. Bellarmine, or any one of those learned writers, whom I named in my Disputation, accounting my selfe to be farre inferior to euery one of them in skill and strength (only excepting this my Aduersarie, whose skill and strength I doe not greatly feare, it being well knowne of what sufficiencie he is, and that his skill in Philosophie, or Schoole Diuinitie [Page 7] is not great, although he hath prettie skill in making vse of other mens labours, and answering in English, what other men haue before replied in Latine) but if Hercules will leaue his club, and fight with a bulrush, it is no great maistrie for a weaker man to withstand him; if Card. Bellarmine insteed of the expresse words of holy Scripture, and the true meaning thereof so declared to be by the ancient Fathers, or the vniuersall Church, or vndoubted definitions of Generall Councels, or necessarie inferences deducted from them (which are the only weapons wherewith Catholike doctrine can be conuinced) will flie to ouer wrested similitudes, false, or at the most probable suppositions, doubtfull and vncertaine collections, to proue an infallible doctrine of the Catholike faith, as he, and the rest, who follow him in this controuersie for the Popes power to depose Princes haue done, it is an easie matter for one, who hath lesse skill and strength then they haue, to withstand them, yea and to vanquish them, and a hundred such others being so weakely armed.
7. And therefore very false, and friuolous is that, which my Aduersarie affirmethNum 4. and 5. that Widdrington (for so still I will call my selfe) taketh vpon him to batter the fortresse of the Catholike Church with her owne Canons, and constitutions, and to vndermine the immoueable rocke of S. Peter with his owne instruments, and all this he doth with such art and sleight, that whiles he fighteth against the Church, he pretendeth to be a friend and childe of the Church, and albeit he impugne the Popes authority, yet he dedicateth his booke to the Pope, laughing vpon him, whiles he woundeth him, and betraying Christ with a kisse, as Iudas did. But how vainely he laboureth in all this, he may easily see, if he call to minde, what he hath learned in the Catholike Chucrch, to wit, how inexpugnable is the rocke, and seate of Peter, which the proud gates of hell cannot ouercome. For I doe not batter the fortresse of [Page 8] the Catholike Church whom I reuerence and loue as my deare mother (and to whose Censure I euer haue and do also now most humbly submit my selfe and all my writings) but the priuate opinions of some few Catholikes, especially Iesuites, who will needes enforce vpon the Christian world, doubtfull, disputable and vncertaine opinions, for infallible grounds of supernaturall faith, which onely is the fortresse of the Catholike Church. Neither doe I vndermine that immoueable rocke of S. Peter, whereon Christ hath built his Church, but those scandalous, seditious, damnable and pernitious positions (for so the State of France doth call them) of murthering Princes, and thrusting them out, contrarie to the rules of law and reason, of the lawfull possession of their kingdomes, by an authority which is only doubfull and questionable: Neither do I impugne that authoritie of the Pope, which is certainely knowne to be granted him by Christ, but that new doctrine of some few writers, which doth attribute to the Pope that authoritie, as certainly giuen him by Christ, which at the most is disputable, whether Christ hath giuen it him or no.
8. I do honour and reuerence in good truth Card. Bellarmine, as also many other learned men of his Society, and their singular learning I doe greatly admire, but that their learning or authoritie ought to be so greatly esteemed of by Catholikes, that whatsoeuer they thinke to be a point of faith, it is presently to bee taken for a diuine Oracle, and the contrarie opinion of other learned Catholikes, who haue seene and examined all their grounds, reasons, and authorities, is not to be accounted an opinion, but an heresie, and that in a matter of such importance, which concerneth the dutifull obedience of euery Christian to God and Caesar, this is that which I cannot take in good part. And might not, I pray you, the Canonists, who do vehemently defend the Popes direct power [Page 9] to dispose of all temporalls against Card. Bellarmine and others, whom they are not afraide to call impios politicos wicked politicians, Alexander Carerius. pretending thereby to strengthen the fortresse of the Catholike Church, to confirme the immoueable rocke of S. Peter, and to maintaine the Popes authoritie, retort the very same inuectiue, which my Aduersarie hath borrowed of Card. Bellarmine, Against Barclay cap. 1. and in the Epistle Dedicatory of his Schulckenius against me. vpon Card. Bellarmine himselfe, who doth vehemently impugne the aforesaid direct authoritie, which the Canonists do yeelde vnto the Pope, and with the same facilitie crie out with my Aduersary, that he taketh vpon him to batter the fortresse of the Catholike Church with her owne Canons, and constitutions, and to vndermine the immoueable rocke of S. Peter with his owne instruments, and all this he doth with such Art and sleigth, that whiles he fighteth against the Church, hee pretendeth to be a friend and childe of the Church; and albeit he impugne the Popes authoritie, yet he dedicateth his booke to Pope Sixtus the fift, laughing vpon him whiles he woundeth him, and betraying Christ with a kisse, as Iudas did &c. And thus much concerning me.
9. Now as touching the matter which I handle, and the manner of my proceeding therein,Num. 6. Widdringtons speciall purpose (saith my Aduersarie) in this his late worke is to defend the new oath of allegiance, and to confute all the chiefe arguments, that haue beene made by any against the seuerall clauses thereof; which neuerthelesse he meaneth no other waies to performe (as he himselfe often protesteth) but only by shewing probably, that the said Oath may be taken by Catholikes, and that nothing hath beene hitherto, or can be obiected against it, which hath not been or cannot be probably answered. And from hence my Aduersary gathereth certaine admonitions to the Reader, which, as he saith, are worthy to be noted.
10. But before I come to set downe his worthy admonitions, I thinke it fit, to put thee in remembrance [Page 10] (Curteous Reader) what is the true state of the question betwixt vs concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, and what was my chiefe intent in making that disputation of the Oath. The maine question therefore betwixt me, and these my Aduersaries, as my Aduersarie T. F. also confesseth,In the end of his Preface. is touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which specially is denied in this new oath: to wit, whether it be a point of faith, and not to be denied by any Catholike without note of heresie, or errour, that the Pope hath by Christ his institution power to depriue temporall Princes of their Kingdomes for any crime whatsoeuer. For whereas some very few late writers especially Card. Bellarmine and other Iesuites, could not bee content to defend this doctrine for the Popes power (call it temporall, or spirituall as you will) to depose Princes in a moderate manner, but would needes take vpon them to make it a point of the Catholike faith, and cleerely to demonstrate by the testimonie of holy Scriptures, of sacred Councells, and by inuincible reasons, that Christ hath giuen to S. Peter, and his Successors such a temporall power ouer Soueraigne Kings and Princes (a doctrine neither practised, nor knowne by the Fathers of the Primitiue Church, and which hath beene a chiefe occasion, why this Kingdome is departed from the obedience to the See Apostolike) and to condemne all those Catholikes of heresie, who do not runne with them in this their violent course, when I seriously considered with my selfe, what scandall this new doctrine maintained with such violence brought to Catholike Religion, what danger to our Prince and Countrey, and what great calamities and disgrace English Catholikes do daily suffer thereby, as not being accounted true, and loyall Subiects to their Prince, euen according to the doctrine of those, who are esteemed to bee the chiefe pillars of the Catholike Church, but so long only as it shall please the Pope, I [Page 11] thought my selfe bound by the duty which I do owe to the Catholike Religion, & to my Prince & Country, to take away as much as lieth in mee (notwithstanding the manifold slaunders, which I fore-saw some persons would therefore raise against mee) the aforesaid scandals, dangers and disgraces, and to answer probably all the arguments which Card. Bellarmine hath from the chiefest Authors, who haue handled this question collected, to demonstrate that it is a certaine and infallible doctrine, and the contrary, not so much an opinion, as an heresie, that the Pope hath by Christ his institution authority to depriue Soueraigne Princes of their temporall Kingdomes and dominions.
11 Wherefore the present controuersie betwixt me and my Aduersaries is not at this time concerning the absolute proposition, to wit, whether the Pope hath or hath not power to depose, (the reason why I doe not dispute of this absolute proposition I will declare beneathNum. 78.79) but concerning the modall, whether it be certaine, without controuersie, and a poynt of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose, as this Author T. F. following Card. Bellarmine and some few Iesuites, will needes haue it to be, and I with other Catholikes, and the Kingdome of France, as Petrus Pithaeus witnessethIn Cod. libert. Eccles. Galli [...]., doe vtterly deny the same, And from hence it euidently followeth, that although Card. Bellarmine should alledge an hundred Catholike Authors, who doe affirme, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, yet if they doe not also affirme that it is certaine, and to be beleeued as a point of faith, that the Pope hath such a power, they neither confirme his opinion, nor gaine-say mine concerning the present controuersie, which is now in hand. And thus much concerning the matter and manner of my Apologie for the right of Princes. Now touching my Theologicall Disputation concerning the oath of Allegeance, [Page 12] although in very deede hitherto I haue not seene any sufficient reason to condemne the sayd oath as vnlawfull, and from the doctrine which I taught in my Apologie it doth necessarily follow, that with a probable and safe conscience it may bee taken by any Catholike, considering that the Popes power to depose Princes, as my Aduersarie heere confesseth, is the maine question betwixt him and me, and which is specially denied in this oath, neuerthelesse I did not intend in that Disputation positiuely to defend the sayd oath, but sincerely to propound vnto his Holinesse, who as I am fully perswaded, was neither truely, nor throughly informed of the reasons, why English Catholikes thought the sayd oath to bee lawfull, all the arguments on both sides, which might be vrged against or for the oath, affirming nothing of my selfe, but as representing the persons of those, who either impugned or approoued the sayd oath; humbly requesting his Holinesse, that after he had diligently examined the reasons on both sides, he would bee pleased to satisfie those difficulties, which wee propounded, and to make knowne to vs English Catholickes, those many things, which he in his Breues had affirmed to be in this oath cleerely repugnant to faith and saluation.
12 Now let vs see those worthy admonitions, and those things, which my Aduersary sayth, are worthy to be noted. First therefore, sayth he,num. 10. Widdrington doth not account his owne opinion and doctrine in this point to be certaine and assured, but only probable, neither yet condemneth our doctrine as manifestly false, or repugnant to faith, or to the saluation of soules: besides that he confesseth also elsewhere, In Epist. De [...]icat. & in Disp. Theolog. cap. 3. num. 1. that his Holinesse in three seuerall Breues declared the contrary doctrine contained in the oath to be repugnant to the Catholike faith Num. 11. whereupon I inferre, that it were no lesse then most dangerous temeritie, and extreme folly to reiect our doctrine, and to adhere to [Page 13] his; for if it be wisdome in doubtfull matters to take the surest way, it cannot with reason be denied, but that albeit his opinion seeme probable to him, yet the contrary is much more to be imbraced, seeing that by his owne confession it is at least probable, and therefore may be imbraced without danger, whereas his is not onelie doubted of, but also declared to be contrarie to the Catholike faith, both by his Holines, & also by very many learned Catholikes (as he himselfe also confesseth: Vbi supra.) besides that he acknowledgeth also afterwards, that there are very few Authors extant, Cap. 3 s [...] 3. num. 15. which doe deny our doctrine in comparison of those that teach and defend it; whereto I also adde, that it is altogether conforme to the practise of the Church, confirmed by diuerse generall Councels, as I haue showed particularly in my Supplement; so as no man, that hath care of his soule, Supplem. cap. 2. [...]o. 76. [...] can haue any reason to venter it vpon his opinion, impugned and condemned by so great authority, when our doctrine may by his owne confession be securely followed without doubt or danger.
13. But marke (Courteous Reader) how many frauds, and falshoods my Aduersarie hath here committed. And first how cunningly hee would deceiue thee by not distinguishing the absolute proposition concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, which is not now in question, from the modall, which onely is now in controuersie. For although I do not take vpon me at this present to condemne that opion for the Popes power to depose Princes as manifestly false, or to defend the contrary as certaine and without controuersie, yet it is vntrue, that I doe not assuredly account that opinion and doctrine, which affirmeth it to bee a point of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and the contrary to be hereticall, to be absolutely false, and to vse the words of the Parliament of Paris against Suarez doctrine, to be scandalous, seditious, damnable and pernicious.
14. Secondly, it is also vntrue, that I doe acknowledge [Page 14] that there are very few Authors extant, which doe deny their doctrine concerning the modall proposition, in comparison of those, that doe teach and defend it: for although I affirmed, that very few Authors, whose writings are now extant, in comparison of others, who defend this temporall power of the Pope, are to be found that deny his authority to depose Princes, (the reasons whereof which I alledged in that place and before in my Apologie, because they clean ouerthrow the common argument taken from the multitude of Authors, who doe cleaue to their opinion touching the absolute proposition, both my Aduersarie, and D. Schulckenius also do altogether conceale,) yet touching the modall proposition I confidently auerred, that there were very few writers, and those for the most part Iesuites, who doe hold this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes to be a poynt of faith. For behold my expresse words.In Pres. Resp. Ap [...]log. nu. 10. And frō hence any man may plainly perceiue, that Widdrington doth not oppose himselfe either against all Diuines, or against the common opinion of the Church, or Doctours, but onely against very few writers, considering that among those seuentie Authors related by Card. Bellarmine very few are to be found, who (although they are perchance of opinion, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath authoritie to depose Princes for enormious crimes) doe so peremptorily adhere to that opinion, as to taxe them with heresie, who doe maintaine the contrary. And if Card. Bellarmine in the later Editions of his bookes, yet bringing no new reason to confirme his former opinion, had not condemned the contrarie opinion of Catholikes as hereticall, but had suffred euery man to perseuere without note of heresy, in his owne opinion, which he should thinke to be the truer, he should not doubtlesse haue had Widdrington to be his Aduersarie, or to haue attempted to ouerthrow his reasons as insufficient to demōstrate an vndoubted point of faith.
15 Thirdly, it is also vntrue, that confesse the [Page 15] Popes Holinesse to haue declared in his Br [...]ues, that the doctrine, which denyeth his power to depose Princes, is contrary to the Catholike faith: I onely confesse, that in his Breues he hath declared the Oath to be vnlawfull, for that it containeth in it many things flat contrary to faith and saluation; but what these many things be, his Holinesse doth not expresse in his Breues, neither as yet hath he been pleased to signifie it vnto vs, although we haue both by priuate letters, and also publike writings most humbly and instantly requested it at his hands. I did indeede confesse, that his Holinesse was by all likelyhood misinformed of those many things, which he thought in this oath to be flat contrary to faith and saluation, by Card: Bellarmine, who hath publikely in his bookes declared, that the Popes spirituall Primacie, his power to excommunicate, and to binde and loose are plainely denied in this Oath, and the Kings spirituall Supremacie is therein acknowledged, but how vntrue this is, I haue sufficiently shewed in my Theologicall Disputation, and beneath I shall haue occasion to repeat againe. And albeit his Holinesse had in his Breues particularly declared the doctrine for his power to depose Princes to be of faith, and the contrary to be haereticall, (as likewise Pope Celestine the 3. did in a Breue, or Decretall letter of his, which was in times past for almost two hundred yeeres together extant in the Canon Law, declare, that Marriage was so dissolued by heresie, that the partie, whose consort was fallen into heresie, might lawfully marry another, which doctrine is now flatly condemned in the Councell of Trent) yet this declaration of the Pope being no infallible definition, but onely a signification of his opinion, as I proued abundantly in the foresaid booke, no Catholike is bound in conscience to follow it neither to obey his declaratiue precept grounded thereon as out of Suarez doctrine I shewed in that placeDisp▪ Theolog. c [...]p: 10. s [...]. [...]..
[Page 16]16 Fourthly, it is also vntrue, that I confesse the contrary doctrine of theirs touching the absolute proposition to be at least probable, and that it may be securely followed without doubt or danger; for touching practise I doe vtterly condemne that doctrine as absolutely false, impious, dānable, seditious, yea & in some sort hereticall, as shall appeare beneathIn the Adioinder num: 106. & seq., and for speculation, I doe neither approue it as probable, nor condemne it as improbable, because with the probabilitie or improbabilitie of the affirmatiue part of this question, I do not at this time intermeddle. That only, which I affirme, is touching the negatiue part of the question, to wit, that it is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes, but whether it be probable, that he hath power to depose Princes I neither confes nor deny, but only for Disputation sake I doe grant, that although it be probable, that the Pope hath such a power, yet it doth not therefore follow, that it is certaine and of faith, and the contrarie hereticall, improbable, and not to be imbraced by any Catholike without note of heresie, errour, or temeritie.
And by this you may also easily perceiue, another fraude, and cunning of my Aduersarie. For whereas he affirmeth, that my speciall purpose is to shew probably, that the said oath may lawfully be taken by Catholikes, he doth heere turne cunningly the question an other way, affirming, that it is also probable, yea & the more probable opinion, that the oath may lawfully be refused by Catholikes, with which question I doe not intend at this present to intermeddle, but only to proue by true probable arguments, that the oath may lawfully be taken by Catholikes. For be it so for Disputation sake, that it is probable, yea and the more probable opinion, that Catholikes may lawfully refuse the oath, (by reason that so many learned men, yea and the Pope himselfe, doe thinke it to be vnlawfull) which neuerthelesse I will not at this time either affirme, [Page 17] or denie, for the reason I will alledge beneathNum: 7 [...], yet can it not from thence be rightly concluded, that therefore it is not probable, that the oath may lawfully be taken, or that it is a most dangerous temeritie and extreme folly, as my Aduersarie seemeth to insinuate, to follow an opinion which is truly probable against the more probable opinion of the Pope, and other Diuines, as out of the doctrine of Ʋasquez affirming it also to be the more opinion of Diuines, I did in my Theologicall Disputation Cap. 10 s [...]. cleerely convince. It is sufficient for my purpose at this present, that Catholikes may lawfully take the oath, but whether they may also refuse it, I at this time will neither affirme nor denie. This onely I will say, that if Catholikes may lawfully take the oath, and so auoide his Maiesties indignation against them, and also their owne temporall ouerthrow, and will not, they may thanke themselues, & such like violent spirits, as my Aduersarie is, who by sleight and cunning endeauoureth to perplexe their consciences, & guilefully to perswade them, that it is the more safe and the more probable way to suffer all temporall miseries and disgraces, which he himselfe in my opinion, if hee were in their case would not suffer, then to do that which with a safe and probable conscience they may doe.
18 Fiftly, it is also vntrue, that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is conforme to the practise of the Church, although it be indeed conforme to the practise of diuers Popes since the time of Gregorie the seuenth, who was the first Pope, that trusting to the power and riches of other men, contrary to the custome of his Ancestours, contemning the Emperours authoritie, depriued him of his Empire, a thing before those times not heard of, saith Onuphrius De varia [...] [...] Rom: Pont: lib. 4. which practise neuertheles was then, and hath been euer since contradicted by Catholike Princes and subiects. As also it is vntrue, that this doctrine is confirmed by any one Generall Councell, [Page 18] that it is a point of faith, or the contrary doctrine hereticall, or improbable, as I haue partly shewed in the Preface of my Apologeticall Answer, where I answered all those nine Councells, which Card: Bellarmine in his Answer to D. Barclay brought to proue his doctrine in this point to be of faith, and the contrary not Catholike, and partly I will shew beneath, when I shall answer to the Replies, which haue been made by Fa: Lessius, masked vnder D. Singletons name, (from whom my Aduersarie borroweth the third part of his booke, to wit, eight whole Chapters which he consumeth in defence of the Councell of Lateran) to the answers I made to that Decree of the said Lateran Councell, whereon this new doctrine of faith according to these men is chiefely grounded.
19 Wherefore vnlesse my Aduersarie be able to convince, as without doubt he is not, that the opinion, which denieth the Popes power to depose Princes, is altogether improbable, and the State of France, besides many other Doctors, as thou shalt see beneath, to be extreame fooles, he will neuer be able to demonstrate, that it is most dangerous temeritie, and extreme folly to adhere to that opinion, (which my Aduersarie to perswade his Reader, that it is a singular opinion of one onely Authour, and as he vntruly saith, of no one Catholike, euer calleth it my opinion) considering that according to Ʋasquez doctrine, which is, as he saith1 [...].2 [...]. disp. 62. cap: 4., the common doctrine of the Schoole men, it is neither follie nor temeritie, to follow a probable opinion against the more probable, the more common, and the more sure opinion of the Pope and other learned men, although they should pretend to convince their opinion by the authoritie of holy Scriptures, declarations of Generall Councells, the practise of the Church, and other Theologicall reasons, which seeme to them invincible. For it is vsuall in a controuersie among Catholike Doctors, to alledge [Page 19] for confirmation of both opinions the aforesaid authorities and proofes, which neuerthelesse doth not discourage either part from maintayning their opinions, as it is manifest in the question concerning the superioritie of the Pope and Generall Councells, the conception of our B. Lady in originall sinne, and many questions concerning the Popes authoritie to dispence, and now of late in the question touching grace, and freewill, betwixt the Dominicans, and the Iesuites.
20 Therefore it is rather great temeritie, and extreme folly, that you, my Catholike Countrymen, should venter your soules and whole estates vpon this my Aduersaries writings, whose knowledge in Diuinitie, is knowne to be but small, and his desire to ease your griefes, as you shall perceiue beneathNum: 81. 82., is also no whit lesse: besides he handleth this controuersie, which doth so greatly concerne your spirituall, and temporall good or harme, and your obedience due to GOD and CAESAR, so vnsincerely, and corruptly, that either he concealeth my answers, or peruerteth the true meaning of my words, rather thereby to disgrace me with the Reader, and to make him to haue a preiudicate conceipt of what I wrote, then really and sincerely to finde out the truth, and by a cleere and moderate debating of the controuersie to satisfie his Readers vnderstanding. And this very argument taken chiefly from the Popes Breues, which this man to terrifie, and perplexe the timorous conscience of the deuout Catholike Reader vrgeth here, I haue so largely answered in my Theologicall Disputation Cap. 10 sec. 2., wherein I fully satisfied this obiection taken from the authoritie of the Popes Breues, and of so many learned men, who condemne the oath as contayning in it many things cleerely repugnant to faith and saluation, that I thought he would haue blushed to repeat the same argument here againe [Page 20] so nakedly, which I my selfe vrged there more plainly and strongly, without making any Reply, or taking any notice of the answers I made in that place thervnto. For there I shewed the difference according to Ʋasquez doctrine between a doubtfull and disputable question, and that there is neither doubt nor danger of any imprudence, temeritie, disobedience, or of any other sinne not to obey the Popes declaratiue command, when it is grounded vpon an opinion, or doctrine which is not certaine, but disputable, for that diuers Popes haue in their Breues, or Decretall letters declared and taught false and also hereticall doctrine, and that the Popes declaratiue command hath no greater force to binde, then hath the doctrine or opinion whereon it is grounded, as Suarez, whom I related in that place, doth expresly affirme. And thus much concerning my Aduersaries first Admonition.
21 Secondly, whereas Widdrington, saith my Aduersarie Num. 12. professeth not to giue for his opinion any assured, and certaine proofes, which may breed in the hearers, or Readers a firme and doubtlesse assent, but onely probable reason drawne from credible principles, which may induce a probable perswasion, hee sheweth euidently, that his meaning is not to seeke out the truth, but rather to obscure it by wrangling and cauilling, to shew his wit, labouring to maintaine paradoxes with some shew of probabilitie, knowing right well, that as Cicero saith, there is nothing so incredible, but it may bee made probable by discourse &c. And what else may this man be thought to intend, but to shew his wit, seeing that hee pretendeth to produce no other proofe of his opinion, but onely probabilitie, and withall acknowledgeth, that the contrarie doctrine is, and hath been professed, and held by almost all the learned Catholikes that euer haue written, at least whose workes are now extant. Is it likely then, that hee meaneth to establish the truth, or to quiet mens consciences by the discussion thereof? [Page 21] No truely. But rather that he seeketh, as I haue said, to obscure it, and make it doubtfull, when he can not ouerthrow it, which is the most diuellish deuise, that any man could inuent to impugne any point of the Catholike faith; to wit, not to doe it all at once, but by degrees, seeking to shake the foundation of it, first calling it in question, and then teaching it to bee but probable, and consequently doubtfull, to the end that the mindes of men hanging in suspence, may be disposed to admit, as well the errour, as the truth.
22 But whether I or my Aduersarie doth intend to establish the truth, or rather to obscure it by wrangling and cauilling, seeing that hee still persisteth in misinterpreting the meaning of my words, and in dissembling the true state of the question concerning the modall proposition, which is the maine controuersie betwixt him, and me, (wherein although hee sheweth in deede in some part his wit, yet verily he sheweth no sincere and vpright dealing) I leaue to the iudgement of the indifferent Reader. For first it is vntrue, that I professe, (as my Aduersarie affirmeth) to giue for my opinion no assured and certaine proofes which may breed a firme and vndoubted assent, which the Reader would quickly haue perceiued, if my Aduersarie had been pleased to haue entirely related my words, which are these: wherefore the present controuersie betweene me, and Card. Bellarmine is not concerning this absolute question, or proposition, whether the Pope hath, or hath not power to depose Princes for heresie or no, but concerning the modall proposition, whether it bee so certaine, that the Pope by Christ his institution hath such a power to depose Princes, as that those, who defend the contrarie opinion, doe expose themselues to manifest danger of heresie, errour, or of any other mortall sinne. Wherefore although in my Apologie I brought certaine arguments drawne from inconueniences, which the Logicians call, ad impossibile, to proue that Christ our Lord did not grant such an authoritie to the Pope, which is the [...] [Page 24] son then can my Aduersarie haue to taxe me, for not bringing any assured or certaine proofes, but onely probable, to proue that it is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes.
26 Wherefore to establish and confirme this doctrine, that it is not a point of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, or that it is not improbable, that he hath no such power, it is sufficient to answere probably all the reasons and authorities to the contrarie, and to bring probable proofes, which may cause a probable perswasion, that he hath no such authoritie: considering that according to the approued ground of all Philosophers, and Diuines, certaintie of one part of the contradiction cannot stand with probabilitie of the other, taking probable in that sense, as the Diuines doe take it, and not for that, which hath onely a shew of probabilitie, and is not truely probable; for if it bee certainely true, that the Pope hath power to depose, it is certainely false, and therefore not probable, that hee hath not power to depose. And therefore my Aduersarie rather, seeketh to obscure the truth, and to intangle mens consciences by wrangling and cauilling, whiles first he requireth euident demonstrations, to proue a probable doctrine, and secondly dissembleth the true state of the question, confounding the absolute proposition and the proofes thereof with the modall, which distinction doth expresse the true state of the question, and discouereth both his fraude and weakenesse, not onely in this, but almost in all the rest of his Replyes, and thirdly he concealeth the answere, which I gaue to this argument taken from the authoritie of the Popes Breues and of other learned men, and also the reasons, why so many learned Catholikes whose bookes are now extant, haue from the time of Pope Gregorie the seuenth defended this opinion for the Popes power to depose Princes. And thus much concerning my [Page 25] Aduersaries second admonition, the weakenesse whereof will also presently more cleerely appeare by my answere to his third and fourth admonition.
27 Therefore it is to be considered for the third point, saith my Aduersarie, Nu. 15. what Widdrington meaneth by a probable opinion, or a probable answere, which no doubt, he vnderstandeth so, that whatsoeuer he saith, must be held for probable, how absurd so euer it be; for otherwise he could not challenge to himselfe such a priuiledge of probabilitie as he doth, his arguments and answers being so weake and impertinent, as you shall finde them to be; in which respect he is faine to dissemble the answeres already made by some to his former arguments, and authorities in his Apologie, whereto he now remitteth his Reader very often, without taking so much as any knowledge of the confutation thereof, as though the same had neuer been answered, or that euery assertion or position of his, being once laid downe, must needs stand for an eternall law, or were a decree of the Medes and Persians, Dan 6. quod non licet immutari.
28 But not to returne these bitter speeches of my Aduersarie backe vpon himselfe, which with the same facilitie, and with farre better reason I might doe, first, It is very vntrue, that I take probable for whatsoeuer I doe say how absurd so euer it be, as this man, if it were lawfull for mee to vse his absurd word, very absurdly affirmeth, that without doubt I doe; Neither doe I take probable for that, which hath onely a shew of probabilitie, as Cicero tooke probable in his Paradoxes, but I take probable, as Philosophers and Diuines doe take it, as it is distinguished from demonstratiue and fallacious, to wit, for that, which is approued by wise and learned men in the art, which they professe, which therefore as in speculation may be embraced without any imputation of errour or folly, so in practise it may bee followed without any note of imprudence, or [Page 26] sinne: As in a matter of Physicke, that is accounted probable, which is approued by learned Physitions, of Law by learned Lawiers, and of Diuinitie by learned Catholike Diuines. Secondly, it is also vntrue, that I haue in my Theologicall Disputation dissembled the answeres made by some to my former arguments and authorities in my Apologie, whereto I remit my Reader oftentimes, considering that my Theologicall Disputation was wholly finished, and in the presse, before the Replyes of D. Schulkenius, and of D. Weston, and also my Aduersaries Supplement were published, so that I could take no notice of them in my Disputation; for which cause I was constrained to touch them briefely onely in an Admonition to the Reader. But my Aduersarie himselfe to make his owne Replyes to seeme the more probable, and my answeres absurd, foolish, impertinent, ridiculous (for so hee is pleased to call them) is not ashamed to dissemble in many points the true state of the question, and also the answeres, which in my Theological Disputation I made to his chiefest Replyes, especially those whereby hee laboureth to terrifie the timerous consciences of vnlearned Catholikes, with the pretence of his new Catholike faith, with the authoritie of the Popes Breues, and the testimonies of so many learned men, who haue condemned the oath, as containing in it many things flat contrarie to faith and saluation.
29. Now let vs see his fourth consideration, by which the Reader may perceiue, how insufficiently he declareth what is a probable argument, or opinion, and how little he satisfieth the vnderstanding of vnlearned Catholikes, who by his obscure, and confuse description of a probable argument, cannot perceiue, what argument or opinion is probable. Num. 17. Fourthly, saith he, it is to be considered, that to make an argument, or proofe probable, it sufficeth not that it seeme good and true in it [Page 27] selfe, but it must also be able in some sort to counterpoyse the arguments and proofes of the contrary opinion: for often it falleth out that the reasons of one part are so pregnant, that they seeme to conuince, and yet when they are weighed with the reasons of the other part, they are neither pregnant, nor so much as probable: for according to the old prouerbe, one tale is good vntill an other be heard.
30. To which purpose it is to be considered, that many heretikes, and namely the Arians (of whom there are many euen at this day) both doe, and may well pretend a farre greater probabilitie for their opinion, than Widdrington doth or can for his, considering their aboundant allegation of Scriptures, their subtill shifts in answering the arguments and obiections of the Catholikes, the great multitude of learned men of their Sect in times past, and their dignitie in the Church, the Conuenticles assembled, and held in their fauour, and finally the ample propagation of their opinion and Sect, especially in the time of Constantius the Emperour. For which respects their followers, at this day, doe hold their doctrine not only for probable, but also for infallibly true, and condemne the contrary for pernicious heresie: whereas Widdringtons grounds and proofes of his opinion seeme to himselfe so weake, that he dare not affirme them to be more then probable.
31. Therefore as there is no good Christian that doth now hold the arguments of the Arrians to be so much as probable, considering the potent reasons, and proofes of the Catholike doctrine in that point, so albeit the arguments and authorities, which Widdrington produceth, were they farre more plausible and pregnant then they are, yet no Catholike could esteeme them to be any way probable, being compared and ballanced with the irrefregable proofes of the other part; I meane the arguments, and necessarie consequences drawne from the holy Scriptures, the authoritie of almost all the learned Doctors and Diuines that haue written of that point, and the practise of the Church for some hundreths of yeares confirmed by nine or ten Councells, [Page 28] S [...]e Supplem. chap. 2. num. 76. 77. whereof some haue been the greatest that euer were in Gods Church; and therefore I say that all this being well weighed, no Catholike man of sound wit, or iudgment can imagine this mans arguments (which he himselfe houldeth but for probable) to haue any probabilitie in the world, or to proue any thing else but his weakenesse, wilfulnesse, and folly in propounding and mainteining them.
32. For albeit he teacheth out of VasquezDisput. Theolog. cap. 10. sec. 2. num. 7. vsque ad num. 21., and others, that of two opinions the lesse probable and lesse safe may securely be followed, and that the opinion of a few, yea of one approued Doctor, sufficeth sometimes to make an opinion probable, though many hold the contrary to that one Doctor (to which purpose he filleth aboue a dozen pages of his booke with Vasquez his doctrine and text) yet he is absurd in applying the same to this our case; for although Vasquez doe teach 1a. 2a. disp. 62. cap. 1. nu. 1. that a man may in doubtfull cases or questions securely follow the opinion of a few learned Doctours, though the same be lesse safe, and probable, then the contrarie opinion held by many, yet he is to be vnderstood to speake only of such disputable questions, as my Aduersary Widdrington himselfe alleageth Ibidem num. 26. for example sake out of Vasquez, to wit, whether there are any habits infused by God alone, concerning which question Vasquez saith, Vbi supra disp. 79 cap. 1. & disp. 86. that albeit Pope Clement the fift did determine expressely in a Councell held at Vienna, that there opinion who held that there are such habits, is more probable, then the negatiue, yet it was neuer either by that decree, or any other of Pope, or Councell determined to be more then probable, in which respect he doth not condemne the contrarie doctrine for heresie, notwithstanding that he, and the farre greater part of learned men do hold the other to be certainely true.
33. So as Vasquez is to be vnderstood to speake of questions and opinions altogether vndecided, and not of such a doctrine as ours, touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which, as I haue said, hath not onely beene taught by the learnedst men of many ages, but also is grounded vpon [Page 29] the holy Scriptures, and confirmed by the practise and decrees of diuers Popes and Councells, as well Generall as Prouinciall, as (to omit the other mentioned in my Supplement Cap. 2. num. 76. 77.) it is euident by the decree of the famous Councell of Lateran, which expressely ordained the practise of it in some cases, and did therefore necessarily suppose, and firmely beleeue the verity of the doctrine, as I will clearely prooue Cap. 15. nu. 6. 7. 8. hereafter in this Reply, and withall shew the ridiculous absurditie of Widdringtons arguments and instances against the same, yea and conuince him Ibidem num. 9. 11. 12. euen by his owne testimonie to be falne (to vse his owne words) into errour or heresie, for not beleiuing this doctrine, which that famous Generall Councell beleiued, and ordained to be practised.
34. In the meane time he is to vnderstand, that whereas to shew the probabilitie of his doctrine, he bringeth many Authors, partly in his Theologicall Disputation, and partly in his Apologie, I remit him to D. Schulckenius; who hath answered particularly to euery one of them, and proued clearely, that diuerse of them doe make flatly against him, and many nothing at all for him (being truely vnderstood) and that some others are worthily reiected, being either so absurd, that they are easily confuted by the circumstances of the places alledged, or else Heretikes (as it appeareth by their doctrine in other things) or knowne Schismatikes, who liuing in the time of the Emperors or Kings that were deposed, wrote partially in their fauour, of which sort neuerthelesse there are very few; so as of all the Authours, that he hath scraped together to make some shew of probability in his doctrine, he hath no one cleare and sufficient witnesse to iustifie the same.
35. And therefore seeing that all his pretended, probabilitie consisteth partly in the authoritie of the Authors, and partly in the sufficiencie (as he supposeth) of his answeres to our grounds, arguments, and authorities, which answeres I shall haue occasion to confute in this Treatise, and to shew them to be so farre from probabilitie, that [Page 30] they are wholly impertinent, and sometimes ridiculous for their absurdity; therefore I conclude, that he cannot any way cleere or excuse himselfe from the note of great temerity and grosse errour (yea flat heresie if he bee obstinate) in impugning our doctrine grounded vpon such assured and solid foundations as I haue here signified, and will more particularly and manifestly declare heereafter; as also I will put thee in minde (good Reader) oftentimes by the way to note how probably or rather (to say truely) how absurdly he argueth and answereth, to the end thou maiest the better iudge, how dangerous it will be for thee to venter thy soule vpon his pretence of probability, which is no other but such as any heretike may haue for his doctrine.
36. For all Heretikes doe thinke themselues and their followes as good and sufficient Doctors to make an opinion probable, as he either is, or esteemeth his Authors to be; and they neuer want Scriptures and Fathers that seeme to them to confirme their opinions, and doe make as probable answers to our obiections out of Scriptures and Fathers as hee doth, and many times much more probable, then he, yea and they may either with his arguments and instances, or other as probable as they, impugne the authoritie of any decree of a General Councel, be it neuer so expresse against them, saying that the fathers who made it followed, but a probable opinion, and so might erre, as you shal heare Infra chap. 13. num. 1. he answereth to the decree of the Councell of Lateran.
37. And so you see, that if is pretended probability be admitted against the common doctrine, practise and decrees of the Church, any heretike will not onely easily defend, but also establish his heresie: and any point of Catholike faith may easily be called in question & made only probable, and consequently doubtfull, obnoxious to error, and to be reiected by any man that list to embrace the contrary: which truely I leaue (good Reader) to thy consideration, whether it bee not the right way to ouerthrow Catholike Religion, and to introduce all Heresie and Atheisme.
38. This is my Aduersaries fourth admonition, the [Page 31] substance whereof although I could haue comprised in few lines, yet I thought good to set it downe entirely word by word as it lieth, to the end the Reader may more plainely perceiue his fraudulent, vncharitable, and insufficient proceeding therein. And first he declareth, what is requisite to a probable argument. Secondly, he affirmeth, that Vasquez doctrine, which I related in my Theologicall Disputation, for following of probable opinions is to be vnderstood to speak only of questions & opinions altogether vndecided, & not of such a doctrine as theirs is touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which hath beene taught by the learnedst men of many ages, is grounded vpon the holy Scriptures &c. Thirdly, he inferreth, that any heretike, and namely the Arrians may pretend as great, yea and farre greater probability to prooue their heresie, then I doe, or can doe to prooue my doctrine. Fourthly, he auerreth, that all my pretended probability consisteth partly in the authoritie of those Authors, which I bring in my Theologicall Disputation and also in my Apologie, and partly in the sufficiencie, as I suppose, of my answers to their grounds, arguments and authorities; for confutation of the first my Aduersarie remitteth his Reader to D. Schulckenius, and for the second he himself promiseth to shew them to be so far from probabilitie, that they are wholly impertinent, and sometimes ridiculous for their absurditie, and that therefore I cannot any way cleere or excuse my selfe from the note of great temerity and grosse errour, yea, flat heresie, into which he will, forsooth, conuince me euen by mine owne testimonie to be falne, for not beleeuing this doctrine touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which that famous Generall Councell of Lateran beleeued, and ordained to be practised. But how vaine are the brags of this glorious boasting man, and who in very deede is the impertinent, ridiculous and absurd, thou shalt haue (good Reader) a taste by my answer to this his admonition, [Page 32] and by my answers to the rest of his Replies thou shalt more fully perceiue, as also that I am free from all note of temerity, errour or heresie, and how dangerous it is for thee to venter thy soule and whole estate vpon the credit of this vnlearned and vncharitable man, who as hee is knowen to bee a man of no great learning, so also both heere and in the greatest part of his Replies sheweth great want not onely of learning, but also of charity, sinceritie, and also of Christian modestie, as partly thou hast seene already and heereafter shalt most cleerely vnderstand.
39. First therefore consider (Courteous Reader) whether Mr. Fitzherbert by his description of a probable argument intendeth to quiet and satisfie, or rather to disturbe and perplexe the timorous consciences of vnlearned Catholikes, who cannot vnderstand what he meaneth by those words, in some sort, and how an argument, which is far the lesse probable, can by those words be distinguished from an argument, of the contrarie opinion, which is by much, the more probable. For although it be true, that probable arguments for one opinion must be able in some sort to counterpoise the arguments of the contrary opinion in the iudgement of those, who thinke that opinion to bee probable, and are able to weigh and ballance the intrinsecall grounds, or arguments on both sides, yet vnlearned men, who are not able to iudge & examin the intrinsecall grounds of any opinion, but are onely led by authority, can not easily discerne, how farre this, in some part, which hath so great a latitude, is to bee extended. Neither is my Aduersarie, as I suppose, so ignorant in philosophy, although perchance he hath spent smal time in the studie therof, as to imagin, that probability, is in the thing it selfe, as truth and falshood are, according to that saying of the philosophers, ex eo quod res est vel non est, propositio dicitur vera vel falsa: a proposition is sayd to bee true or false, for that the [Page 33] thing it selfe, which is affirmed or denyed is, or is not.
40 For probabilitie is not in the thing it selfe, but in the vnderstanding of him, who approueth the opinion or doctrine, in so much that although an opinion, which once is true, can afterwards neuer be false, nor which once is false, be afterwards euer true, yet an opinion, which once was probable, may afterwards be improbable, and contrariwise, which was once improbable, may afterwards proue probable, according as it shall be approued or disproued by men skilfull in the arte which they professe: yea an opinion, which to some Doctors is improbable, and also hereticall, to others may be probable, yea and approued as the more true opinion: And this proceedeth from the diuersitie of mens iudgements and opinions, where oftentimes are seene, according to the vulgar saying, quot capita tot sententiae, as many heads so many opinions. That is probable, say the Philosophers, taking it from Aristotle 1. Top: cap. 1., which is approued by wise and skilfull men in the arte, which they professe: so that what argument or opinion learned men doe approue, is a probable argument or opinion. And this description of probable is not obscure and intricate, but cleare and perspicuous euen to ignorant men, who can easily discerne, what opinion or argument learned men do approue. And therefore well said Armilla Verbo opinio nu: 2., whom I cited in my Theologicall Disputation cap: 10. sec. 2. nu: 21., that a man is not bound alwaies to follow the better opinion, but it sufficeth that he follow that, which some skilfull Doctors iudge to be true: and learned Nauarra, whom I also related in that bookecap: 3. sec: 3. nu: 14., for the quieting of scrupulous consciences affirmeth,in Manuali cap: 27. num. 288. that in the Court of Conscience, to the effect of not sinning, it sufficeth to choose for true his opinion, whom for iust cause we thinke to be a man of a good conscience, and of sufficient learning.
41 Wherefore when my Aduersarie affirmeth, [Page 34] that to make an argument probable, it sufficeth not, that it seeme good and true in it selfe, but it must also be able in some sort to counterpoyse the arguments of the contrary opinion, if he meane, that it must alwaies be able in some sort to counterpoyse the arguments of the contrarie opinion, in the iudgements of those who are not of the contrary opinion, and doe not approue the argument for good, this, if it were lawfull for me to vse my Aduersaries vndecent words, is absurd and ridiculous, for that oftentimes it falleth out, that some Doctours doe thinke an opinion to be improbable and hereticall, which other Doctours of the contrary opinion doe thinke not onely to bee probable, but also to bee the more true opinion, as it is euident in the question touching the superioritie of the Pope and Councells. For the ancient Doctors of Paris, as Ioannes Maior, & Iacobus Almainus, Maior de auctorit: Ecclesiae circa finem. Almainus de authorit: Ecclesiae cap: 7. Card: Camerac. de authorit. Eccles. part. 3. cap: 4. Gerson in libello contra Petrum de Luna. artic: 22. & alibi. who wrote against Cardinall Caietane concerning this question, thought the opinion, which held the Pope to be aboue a Generall Councell, to be improbable, yea and other Doctors, as Cardinalis Cameracensis, and Iohn Gerson, thought it to be erroneous and hereticall, which neuerthelesse Cardinall Caietan defended to be the more true opinion.
42 But if my Aduersarie meane, as needs he must, if he will speake with reason, that to make an argument probable, it must alwaies be able in some sort to counterpoyse the arguments of the contrary opinion, in the iudgements of those, who either are not of that contrary opinion, or else doe not reiect the argument as improbable, this is most true: for in the iudgments of those, who do not onely reiect the argument as improbable, but doe absolutely approue it for good, and for the more probable, it doth not only in some sort counterpoyse, but it doth also in some sort overpoyse the arguments of the contrarie opinion, as any man may plainely perceiue by Vasquez doctrine, which because it fully cleareth this present difficultie, and is able to [Page 35] quiet the conscience of any man, be he neuer so ignorant, I related word by word in my Theologicall Disputation, Cap: 10. sec: 2. which doctrine because my Aduersarie knew right well, that it did amply declare what is a probable opinion, and how farre forth both vnlearned, and learned men may follow a probable opinion against the more common, the more probable, and the more secure opinion of Catholike Diuines, he cunningly concealeth, as you shall see, the chiefe and principall point thereof, and yet he carpeth at me for filling aboue a dozen pages of my booke with Vasquez doctrine and text, affirming withall, that I am absurd in applying Ʋasquez doctrine to this our case, but who is the absurd, you shall forthwith perceiue.
43 For whereas Ʋasquez doth teach, that if a learned and skilfull man, who hath taken no small paines in studies, and hath also throughly seene and examined all the reasons of the contrarie opinion, shall iudge against all other writers, who haue gone before him, that his opinion is the more probable, he may although it be the lesse secure opinion, lawfully embrace it, and in practise follow it, whose opinion also an vnlearned man, who ought according to reason, saith Vasquez, giue credit to the learning and honestie of a learned and vertuous man, may lawfully follow, my Aduersarie affirmeth, that Ʋasquez is to be vnderstood to speake of questions and opinions altogether vndecided, as is that, which I cited there out of Vasquez, concerning the infusing of habits by God alone, and not of such a doctrine, as is this concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, which hath not onely been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, but also is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, and confirmed by the practise, and decrees of diuers Popes and Counsells &c. But whether I be absurd in accounting that doctrine to be probable, vndecided, and questionable among Catholikes, about which the Schoolemen are at strife, and as yet the controuersie is not decided by the Iudge, saith Trithemius In Chron: monast: Hirsaug: ad annum 1106., and [Page 36] which very many Doctors doe defend, saith Almainus De dominio nat: civ: & Eccles. in proba [...]: 2. concl., and which the Kingdome of France hath alwaies approued for certaine saith Pithaeus in Cod. libert. Eccles. Gallic., and which the late proceeding of the Parliament of Paris against the contrarie doctrine taught by Suarez, Card: Bellarmine, and others hath cleerely confirmed (to omit the forme of oath lately propounded by the tiers Estates,) and that Card: Peron himselfe doth not reiect it as improbable, I remit to the iudgement of the indifferent Reader.
44. Yea my Aduersarie himselfe, although hee vntruly and vnlearnedly, as you shall perceiue beneath, chargeth me with heresie, for defending the aforesaid doctrine as probable, or to vse Cardinall Perons word, as problematique, dare not auouch, that the doctrine is defined by any Generall Councell, which neuerthelesse, as I shewed in my Theologicall Disputation Cap: 10. sec. 2. num. 32. out of Card: Bellarmine, and Canus, is necessarie that a decree of a Generall Councell can make a point of faith, and the contrarie doctrine to be hereticall, but with mincing tearmes onely affirmeth, that it hath been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, and confirmed by the practise and decrees of diuers Popes and Councells, especially of the great Councell of Lateran, which expresly ordained the practise of it in some Cases, and did therefore necessarily suppose, and firmely beleeue the veritie of the said doctrine. But besides that here is no speech of any definition, which onely can make any doctrine to be of faith, and the contrarie to be hereticall, and also it is vsuall among Diuines to affirme, that their doctrine hath been taught by the learnedst men of many ages, is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, is not onely confirmed by the practise, but is also expressely defined by the decrees of Generall Councells, which neuerthelesse doth not terrifie other learned men from impugning their doctrine and opinions, I will [Page 37] shew beneathIn the third part, chap. 9. and the rest., that the Councell of Lateran did neither ordaine the practise of that doctrine, nor necessarilie suppose or firmely beleeue, especially with diuine and supernaturall beleefe, the veritie thereof; and I will answer all the Replyes, which my Aduersarie hath taken out of Fa: Lessius (masked vnder D. Singletons name) against my answers, and hath filled not only a dozen pages, but well neere foure dozen pages of his booke with Fa: Lessius his doctrine & text, yet concealing his name, belike to make his Reader beleeue what a learned Diuine he is now become, and that those Replyes were not the fruits of other mens witts, but the subtle inventions of his owne fertile braine, whereas it is well knowne, what small skill Mr. Thomas Fitzherbert hath in Theologicall learning.
45 But if my Aduersarie had been resolued sincerely to handle this question, and really to finde out the truth, he might easily haue gathered out of Ʋasquez doctrine, the answer to this his Reply. For when Ʋasquez affirmeth, that if a learned man, who hath throughly seene, and examined all the reasons of the contrary part, shall iudge against all other writers, who haue gone before him, that his opinion is the more probable, he may although it be the lesse secure opinion, embrace it, and in practise follow it, his assertion is generall, whether it be concerning any doctrinal point, which is thought to belong to faith, or any text of holy Scripture, or any decree or definition of Pope or Generall Councell, which are in controuersie among Catholikes. Yea according to Ʋasquez doctrine, it is lawfull for other men, who hold the contrarie opinion to be the more probable, without any note of temeritie, to embrace it, and in practise follow it, vnlesse it be a singular opinion and of one onely Doctour (as this doctrine which denieth the Popes power to depose Princes is not singular and of one only, but of many, as I will [Page 38] shew beneath:) for then, saith Vasquez, if it be a singular opinion, and of one onely Doctor, although it may be probable to that Doctour (who is not therefore so easily to be condemned of temeritie) yet to him, who liketh not the proper and intrinsecall grounds of that singular opinion, and of one onely Doctor, and seeth it to bee grounded vpon the authoritie of one onely Doctor, hee ought not to account it probable to this effect, that he may prudently follow it in practise against his owne, and the common opinion of all others.
46 But if it be not a singular opinion and of one onely Doctour, although the learned men of the contrarie opinion doe vrge for their doctrine some law, decree, or definition, which the contrarie part hath seene and examined, and hath in some sort answered therevnto, it is lawfull for any learned man according to Ʋasquez, to follow in practise that other lesse secure and lesse common opinion, against his owne opinion, albeit it be the more secure and common opinion. For when we perceiue, saith Vasquez, that the Authors of the contrarie opinion haue seene, and considered all the grounds and reasons for our opinion, and haue obserued that obiection taken from that law or decree, and haue endeauoured to answer them, and that they were not convinced by them, we may iustly thinke, that we may prudently and lawfully follow in practise the opinion of those other men against our owne, neither ought wee to suppose that our reasons are euident demonstrations, and which doe make the contrarie opinion to be voide of all probabilitie.
47 And this doctrine of Vasquez is euident in the question concerning the superioritie of the Pope aboue a Generall Councell, which hath been so long debated betwixt the Doctors of Rome and Paris. For both of them affirme, that their opinion is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, is confirmed by the practise and decrees, yea and definitions of Generall Councels, and yet both of [Page 39] thē, because they are approued by learned Catholike Diuines, are probable, although, as Nauarra, In cap. Nouit de Iudicijs notab. 3. nu. 84. out of Ioannes Maior a learned Diuine of Paris relateth, that the opinion of the Parishioners is not permitted to bee defended at Rome, nor the opinion of the Romanes to bee defended at Paris. And therefore into what fowle tearmes, trow you, would my Aduersarie breake, if the Doctors of Paris, who doe resolutely hold, that the Pope is inferiour to a Generall Councell, should argue against Card. Bellarmine and others of his opinion, in the same manner, as this fowle mouthed man, who hath still in his mouth absurd, ridiculous, impertinent, foolish, impudent, temerarious, impious, hereticall, or erroneous, that their doctrine hath not onely beene taught by the learnedst men of many ages, but also it is grounded vpon holy Scriptures, confirmed by the practise and decrees of diuers Counsels, but especially of the famous Councell of Constance, which did not onely ordaine the practise of it in some cases, and therefore necessarily suppose and firmely beleeue, but did also expressely define, and consequently command all Christians to beleeue the verity of that doctrine, and that therefore Card. Bellarmine is falne into heresie, for not beleeuing that doctrine, which that famous Generall Councell, beleeued, defined, and ordained to be practised and also to be beleeued.
48 By this it is apparant, that Vasquez doctrine is to be vnderstood generally of all cases, questions, and opinions, which are in controuersie among learned Catholikes, although one or both parts doe pretend their doctrine to be of faith, and to be grounded vpon the authoritie of holy Scripture, or some decree of Pope, or Generall Councell, and that learned Catholikes ought not, according to Vasquez, to bee easily condemned of temeritie, and much lesse of errour or heresie, who doe not follow the more common, the more probable, and the more secure opinion of other Catholike Doctors, although this common opinion [Page 40] seeme to some followers thereof to be an vndoubted doctrine, and to be confirmed by some Decree, Law, or Canon of Pope, or Generall Counsell, which Decree, Law, or Canon those learned Catholikes haue seene, examined, and answered, although their answeres doe not satisfie the contrarie side. And conformably to this doctrine did Vasquez, as I obserued in my Theologicall Disputation, dispute that question, whether there be any habits, which are infused by God alone. For although he expressely affirmeth, that it is the constant, without controuersie, and vndoubted opinion of the Schoole-Diuines, that there bee certaine vertues called Theologicall, Faith, Hope, and Charitie, which of their owne nature are infused by God alone, and that some Doctors, as Andreas Vega, doe hold this doctrine to bee of faith, and the contrarie to be hereticall, or erroneous, endeauouring to proue the same, not out of the Councell of Vienna, which did onely declare it to be the more probable opinion, but out of the Councell of Trent, yet Ʋasquez would not condemne the contrarie opinion not onely of heresie, as my Aduersarie would cunningly perswade the Reader, but not so much as of temeritie. From whence I inferred, that, according to Ʋasquez doctrine, which my Aduersarie fraudulently concealeth, the constant, without controuersie, and vndoubted opinion of Schoole-Diuines, and which some of them thinke to be a point of faith, may sometimes bee reiected without any note, not onely of heresie or errour, but also of temeritie, which doctrine doth cleerely satisfie the common argument drawne from the authoritie of learned men, who hold the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes to bee a point of faith, and consequently the oath to bee repugnant to faith and saluation. And thus much concerning the first and second point of my Aduersaries fourth Admonition.
49 As touching the third point it is apparantly [Page 41] vntrue, and very iniurious to Catholikes, and to Catholike Religion to affirme, that the Arrians, or any other heretikes may well pretend a farre greater probabilitie for the establishing of their heresies, then may I and those other Catholikes, who hold it probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes. For (besides that the Arrian heresie was expressely condemned in the first eight Generall Counsels, and afterwards in many others, and the Arrians haue euer been accounted heretikes by ancient Fathers and all other Catholikes, wheras there cannot be alledged so much as any shew or colour of any one definition of a Generall Councell, wherein the doctrine which denyeth the Popes power to depose Princes is condemned for hereticall, but all the proofes that my Aduersaries alledge, that the Pope hath such a power, are onely ouer-wrested similitudes, facts, examples, inferences, and supposisitions of their owne, drawne from the authoritie of holy Scriptures, Popes, or Councels) when the Philosophers and Diuines doe affirme, that the authoritie of learned and skilfull men sufficeth to make the doctrine or opinion probable, which they approue, they vnderstand of learned and skilfull men approuing a doctrine belonging to the art, which they professe, according to that vulgar maxime, vnicuique in sua arte perito credendum est, we must giue credit to euery man skilfull in his art.
50 So that in a point of Law, the authoritie of skilfull Lawiers, and not of skilfull Physitions, in a point of Physike the authoritie of skilfull Physitions and not of Lawiers, and in a point of Catholike Religion, the authoritie of learned Catholikes, and who are skilfull in points of Catholike Religion which they professe, and not of heretikes, and who doe not professe Catholike Religion, doth make the opinion, or doctrine which they approue to bee probable. And therefore my Aduersarie very insufficiently (not to [Page 42] vse those fowle words absurdly & ridiculously, which hee so often vseth against mee) argueth from the authoritie of learned Catholikes to the authoritie of heretikes, whose doctrine according to the definition of probable, can neuer make the opinions, which they approue in points of Catholike Religion, which they doe not professe, to be probable. Neither by this can any point of Catholike faith, which is knowne to all learned Catholikes to bee a point of Catholike faith, be easily called in question, and made onely probable, for that no learned Catholike will cal in question any doctrine, which is cleerely knowne to be the Catholike faith, and as for heretikes their authoritie can neuer make any doctrine belonging any way to Catholike Religion, which they doe not professe, to be probable.
51 But if there should arise any controuersie among learned Catholikes, whether this or that doctrine be of faith, and in what sense the words of such a text of holy Scripture, or of such a Canon, or Decree of Pope or Councell are to be vnderstood, there is no doubt, but that the authoritie of learned Catholikes may in those cases make their opinion probable although other Catholikes would be so stiffe in their owne opinion, as to condemne the contrarie part of heresie, errour, or temeritie. A manifest example hereof we haue in the Councell of Constance, wherein according to Iohn Gerson and other learned men, who were present at that Councell, it was expressely defined, that the Pope is inferiour and subiect to a Generall Councell lawfully assembled, and therefore the contrarie to be flat hereticall, but since that other Catholikes, especially Romane Diuines haue called that Decree in question, and haue endeauoured to answer therevnto, affirming that it was only meant of Popes in time of Schisme, or that the aforesaid Decree was not confirmed by Pope Martin in the end of the [Page 43] Councell, which answeres neuerthelesse doe not satisfie the Doctors of the contrarie opinion, I doe not thinke, but that my Aduersarie will confesse, that the opinion of the Romans may bee accounted probable, and that the calling of that Decree in question was not the right way to ouerthrow Catholike Religion, and to introduce all heresie and Atheisme.
52. But if it should perchance fall out, that some Catholikes would be so selfe opinatiue, as to affirme without any definition at all of the Church, although vnder pretext of zeale and deuotion to the See Apostolike, any doctrine to be of faith and the contrarie to be hereticall, and other Catholikes although the farre fewer in number should deny the same, especially in a matter which concerneth our obedience due to God and Caesar, if the first part only should be permitted to write freely what they please, and to taxe the other part of heresie, to omit errour, temeritie, folly, ridiculous absurditie and such like, and this other part should be forbidden to defend their good names, and to answere for themselues, I leaue (good Reader) to thy consideration, whether this be not the right way to ouerthrow Catholike Religion and the vndoubted grounds thereof, and to introduce vncertaine opinions for an infallible doctrine of the Catholike faith, which is to open a wide gap to heresie, Atheisme, and euident iniustice, and to make among Christians a perpetuall dissention betwixt the Cleargie, and Laity, the temporall and spirituall power. Now that this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is not by any definition at all of the Church declared to bee true, my Aduersary cannot denie, and that it euer hath been and is impugned by learned Catholikes, and the contrarie hath euer beene, and is by them approued, and therefore it is truly probable, and not only hath a pretence of probabilitie I will shew beneath, where I will both relate the Catholike Authours, who [Page 44] deny this authoritie of the Pope to depose Princes, which only is sufficient to make their doctrine probable, and also I will discouer the insufficiencie of those Replies, which my Aduersary hath made against my answeres. And thus much concerning the third point.
53. For the fourth and last point, consider, Catholike Countreimen, whether Mr. Fizherbert intendeth to declare vnto you plainly and sincerely this present controuersie, and by a cleare explayning of the question to quiet your consciences, or rather by wrangling and cauilling to obscure the difficultie, and blind your vnderstandings. The question betwixt him and mee at this present is, whether it be a probable doctrine, that the Pope hath not any power by the institution of Christ to depriue Soueraigne Princes of their temporall power, and Regall authoritie: And there are two only grounds to perswade any man, that this or that doctrine or opinion is truely probable. The one are called intrinsecall groundes, to wit, the arguments and reasons, which are drawne from holy Scriptures, sacred Canons, Theologicall reasons and such like, to proue that doctrine or opinion: and these groundes are proper only to learned men, who are able to weigh and examine the arguments on both sides; [...]e other are called extrinsecall grounds, which doe onely consist in the authority of those learned men, who doe hold that doctrine or opinion, because according to that which hath been said before, that doctrine is trulie probable, which is approued by wise and skilfull men in the art which they professe; and by these onely grounds vnlearned men can be perswaded, that any doctrine or opinion is truly probable.
54. Now my Aduersarie seeing, as he saith, that all my pretended probabilitie consisteth partly in the authority of those Authours, which I haue brought in my Theologicall Disputation, and in my Apologie, and partly in the [Page 45] sufficiencie, as I suppose, of my answeres to their groundes, arguments and authorities, yet he taketh vpon him in this Reply only to confute some of my answers to their intrinsecall grounds, and for the confutation of the authorities which I bring, hee remitteth his Reader, to D. Schulckenius, who, as he saith, hath answered particularly to euery one of them. Seeing therefore that there is no sufficient way to satisfie the vnderstandings of vnlearned men, that the doctrine, which holdeth the Pope to haue no authoritie to depose Princes, is not truely probable, but by shewing that no learned Catholikes do approue the same, for that vnlearned men are not able to examine the intrinsecall grounds of any Theologicall question, but are only led by authoritie, and extrinsecall grounds, and if they once perceiue, that learned Catholikes doe approue any doctrine they will presently also perceiue that doctrine to bee truly probable, is there any likelihood, that Mr. Fitzherbert intended to giue satisfaction to his vnlearned Countreimen, by replying to some of the answeres, which I made to their arguments, and intrinsecall grounds of their doctrine, which intrinsecall grounds vnlearned men cannot examine, and for an answere to the authorities and extrinsecall grounds which I brought, which only grounds vnlearned men can vnderstand, to remit his English Readers, and who for the most part vnderstand not Latine to D. Schulckenius a Latine writer.
55. Besides, from my Aduersaries own wordes the Reader may easily perceiue a great fraude of his. For my Aduersarie confesseth, that I haue brought many Authours partly in my Theologicall Disputation, and partly in my Apologie, which is very true; for in my Theologicall Disputation of set purpose I chose out certaine Authours named in my Apologie, which I thought did speake more plainly, and against which no iust exception could be taken; whereunto also I added certaine [Page 46] other Authours which in my Apologie were not named at all: And yet my Aduersarie remitteth his Reader for an answere to them all, to D. Schulckenius, who hath only answered (but how insufficiently you shall see beneath) those authorities which I brought in my Apologie: for my Theologicall Disputation he could not at that time see, it being then but in the PRINTERS hands. But the plaine truth is, that vnlesse my Aduersarie would haue shewed apparantly to wrangle and cauill, hee could take no iust exception whereby his Reader might be fully satisfied, against those Authours, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation, and therfore he thought it his best course cunningly to shift them of, and not to meddle with the answering of them at all, least the Reader perceiuing so many learned Catholikes to ioyne with Widdrington in denying this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes especially to be a point of faith, should presently obserue both the fraudulent proceeding of my Aduersarie, who laboureth to perswade his Reader, that only Widdrington doth impugne this authoritie of the Pope to depose Princes, and also that the contrarie doctrine being approued not only by Widdrington, but also by so many learned Catholikes is, and ought to be accounted truly probable, and therefore may according to Vasquez doctrine without any note of temeritie be embraced by any Catholike. But of these authorities I will treat more at large beneath. And thus much concerning my Aduersaries fourth Admonition, and all the foure points thereof.
56. Now to come to my Aduersaries fift and last admonition, which indeede, as he truely saith, is worthie to be noted, but not for any truth therein to be obserued, but for the manifest fraud and falshood therin contained: The first and last consideration shall be, saith my Aduersarie, Num. 25. & seq. that Widdringtons doctrine is dangerous and pernicious not onely to the consciences of Catholikes, [Page 47] (as I haue shewed) but also to his Maiesties seruice, which he pretendeth to further and aduance thereby; for he cannot denie, but that the contrary opinion being probable (as he confesseth it to be) may bee lawfully imbraced by all men; whereupon it followeth, that any man may not only refuse the oath lawfully, but also hold, that his Maiestie may be deposed by his owne subiects vpon a sentence of Excommunication and Deposition, and that consequently they may lawfully take armes against his Maiesty in that case; and this being so, what security hath his Maiesty, or aduancement of his seruice by this mans doctrine? For albeit many doe now take the Oath, and sweare that they thinke in their conscience, that the Pope cannot depose the King; yet for as much as it is, and alwaies will be probable, in the opinion of some learned men, that they haue sworne a thing, which is false, and consequently that their Oath is inualide, it followeth (according to the grounds of his doctrine) that they may breake their Oath, seeing that they may alwaies probably perswade themselues, that they promised and swore a thing false and vnlawfull, and that therfore they are not bound to obserue it.
57. Furthermore, if his Holinesse should at any time dispence with them particularly for their Oath, or excommunicate and depose his Maiestie, discharging his Subiects of their bond of fidelitie, and all others of Allegeance, this man cannot deny, but that it is probable at least, that then they are free from the Oath, and consequently that they may (euen according to his doctrine of probabilitie) concurre to the deposition of his Maiestie: and therfore seeing that his doctrine doth not giue any security to his Maiestie, and that according to his opinion any man may as lawfully condemne and refuse the Oath, as approoue and take it, it is euident, that his sayd doctrine is not onely vaine and fruitlesse to his Maiestie, but also dangerous and pernicious, no lesse impugning the authoritie of his Maiestie commanding it to be taken, then of his Holinesse forbidding it.
[Page 48]58. Whereupon I inferre three things; the first, that he is neither so good a subiect to his Maiesty, as he pretendeth, nor such an obedient childe to the Church as he professeth to be. The second is, that his bookes deserue to be prohibited no lesse in England then Rome; and therefore truely wise men in these parts doe greatly maruel how it can stand with the wisdome of his Maiesties Councell to permit them to be printed and published in England as we see they are. The third is, that he is one of those, whom God threatneth in the Apocalyps,Apoc. 3. to spit out of his mouth, saying of such indifferent men as he, Vtinam esses aut calidus, aut frigidus &c. I would thou wert either hot or cold, but because thou art luke-warme, I will beginne to vomit thee out of my mouth.
59. And this shall suffice, good Reader, for the present, touching those aduertisements and considerations, which I meant to giue thee concerning Widdringtons doctrine in generall: and therfore I will now passe to the examination of his answers to me in particular, and lay downe in order as much of the text of his Admonition, as concerneth me, to the end that he shall not haue occasion to say, that I haue concealed or dissembled any thing that he hath said against me; as also that thou maiest see, how probably he hath answered me, and thereby the better iudge of the probability, as well of his answers to other men, as of his whole doctrine in his Theologicall Disputation, which as I vnderstand, thou shalt shortly see fully confuted in Latine to his confusion, Besides that, I doubt not, but thou shalt also, euen in this my Reply, see a cleere confutation of the chiefe grounds of his doctrine, and of his principall arguments and answers touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which is the maine question betwixt him and vs, and specially impugned, and abiured in the new oath.
60. But what strange paradoxes and positions void of all probabilitie Mr. Fitzherbert dare aduenture to maintaine, yea and to perswade his Maiestie, and the wisdomes of his most honourable priuie Councell, [Page 49] that it is dangerous to his Maiesties safetie, to haue this doctrine for the Popes power to depose his Maiesty, to be so much as called in question in his Dominions, thou maiest, good Reader, cleerely perceiue by this his last Admonition, wherein thou shalt obserue the manifest fraud and falshood of this man. For if Mr. Fitzherbert had either sincerely, or entirely related my opinion and doctrine, or else had put in mind his Reader against what kind of Aduersaries I do oppose, any man of meane vnderstanding would presently haue perceiued (as I obserued elsewhere,In the Admonition to the Reader before my English Purgation sent to his Holinesse. which my words I thinke it not amisse to set downe heere againe) that it is too too apparantly and shamefully vntrue, that my manner of handling this question probably can be dangerous or pernicious to his Maiestie, as my Aduersarie endeauoureth to perswade his Maiestie, not for any loue that he is knowen to beare vnto the State, but to the end by all likely-hood, that he and such like violent spirits may write more freely of this subiect, and without being controlled or contradicted by Catholikes, who, as he is perswaded, do little regard the writings and opinions of Protestants concerning this or any other doctrine.
61. For it may bee dangerous to his Maiesty to handle a question probably against one Aduersary, which will be nothing dangerous to handle it probably against another. As for example, if it wer agreed vpon by all Catholikes, that the Pope hath no power to depose his Maiestie, then it would bee dangerous to his Maiestie, that any Catholike should call this in question, and dispute it probably: but if on the contrary side all Catholikes should agree in this, that it were certaine, vnquestionable, and a poynt of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose his Maiestie, and to absolue his Subiects of their Allegeance, to command them to take armes against him &c. then if a Catholike should call this in question, or which is all one, dispute it probably, [Page 50] and maintaine, that it is not certaine, that the Pope hath such an authoritie, but that it is questionable, and probable that he hath it not, no man of any sense or vnderstanding can affirme, that such a manner of disputing this question probably against those Aduersaries, who hold it for certaine and vnquestionable, can bee any way dangerous or pernicious to his Maiestie.
62 Now behold the manner, which I haue taken in handling this controuersie. Card: Bellarmine, Fa: Gretzer, Lessius, Becanus, Suarez, and some other Diuines, especially of the Societie of Iesus, whom Mr. T. F. in euery step, as though he were their creature, (as now he is become one of their companie,) doth follow, haue laid this for a sure and vndoubted ground, that it is a point of faith, and to be beleeued as certaine, and vnder paine of eternall damnation by Catholikes, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, to absolue Subiects from their allegiance, and therevpon to command them to take armes, and raise tumults against their Prince so deposed. So that you see, that these men haue already laid the danger and vndoubted ouerthrow to his Maiesties Person and Crowne, if the Pope should perchance depose him, in that they affirme, that all Catholikes are in that case bound in conscience to forsake him, and to fulfill the Popes command to the destruction of his Maiesties Person and State. This doctrine, to wit, that it is a point of faith, and an vndoubted principle of Catholike Religion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and to inflict all temporall punishments by way of coercion, and that all Catholikes are bound in conscience to forsake his Maiestie, and to take armes against him, I haue taken vpon me for two principall reasons to impugne, and doe not doubt clearely to maintaine the same, against the clamours of Mr. T. F. or any other whatsoeuer.
[Page 51]63 My first reason was, for that it is against the truth and puritie of the Catholike Church, Shee being a pillar and ground of truth, that doubtfull opinions, and which among Catholikes are onely in controuersie, and by the Parliament of Paris haue been condemned as scandalous, seditious, damnable, and pernicious, should be enforced vpon English Catholikes, as an vndoubted doctrine of the Catholike faith, to the vtter ouerthrow of themselues, and their whole posteritie, by men who are in no danger to loose, but rather to gaine temporall aduancement by their writings. My second reason was to assure his Maiestie, that all English Catholikes may, if they will, according to the grounds of Catholike Religion be true and constant Subiects to his Maiestie, and that notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication or depriuation denounced, or to be denounced against his Maiestie by the Pope, whereby his Subiects should be absolued from their Allegiance, or commanded not to obey him in temporall causes, they may with a safe conscience, & also in practise (marke well what I say) they are bound to adhere to his Maiestie, to obey him in temporall causes, as still remayning their true and lawfull Soueraigne, and to resist any such sentence of Excommunication or depriuation.
64 The reason wherefore I affirmed, that Catholikes may with a safe conscience adhere to his Maiestie, and resist the Popes sentence of depriuation, was, for that it is a probable opinion, and which with a safe conscience, and without danger of heresie, error, or temeritie may be embraced by Catholikes, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose Princes, nor to inflict any temporall punishments by way of coercion, but that the last punishment, to which the coerciue power of the Church doth extend, are onely Ecclesiasticall and spirituall Censures. Wherefore that which my Aduersarie affirmeth, that I confesse, it to be [Page 52] probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that the oath cannot lawfully be taken, is very vntrue, vnles he meane that I confes it for Disputation sake, or, as we vsually say, Dato, sed non concesso, it being admitted, not granted, for that it maketh nothing for, or against the question which is in hand. Therefore positiuely I neither confesse it, nor deny it, approue it, or condemne it, nor with that part of the contradiction, whether it be probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and whether it be probable, that the Oath may not be taken, doe I at this time intermeddle, but whereas my Aduersaries doe so violently maintaine, that it is certaine, and an vndoubted doctrine of faith, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that the oath is repugnant to faith and saluation, and therefore can not lawfully be taken, I at this present doe affirme the contrarie, to wit, that it is probable, that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes, and that the oath may lawfully be taken.
65 But the principall reason, which I brought for the securing of his Maiestie (which Mr. Fitzherbert fraudulently concealeth) that English Catholikes not onely may for the reason aforesaid, but also in practise are bound to adhere to his Maiestie, and to resist the Popes sentence of depriuation, was, for that supposing it to be speculatiuely vncertaine, whether the Pope hath any such power to depose a King or no, it is an vndoubted ruleDe regulis Iuris in 6 [...]. among the Lawyers, and grounded vpon the light of nature and principles of Diuinitie, that in causa dubia siue incerta melior est conditio possidentis, In a doubtfull or disputable case, the state of him that hath possession is the better. And againe, Cum sunt iura partium obscura, fauendum est Reo, potiùs quàm Actori, when it is vnknowne whether of the parties who are in suite, hath right, the defendant is to be preferred or fauoured before the plaintiffe. Seeing therefore that from the very first beginning of this [Page 53] controuersie, concerning the authoritie of Popes, and Soueraigntie of Kings, that is, from the time of Pope Gregorie the seuenth, who was the first Pope, that challenged vnto him this temporall power ouer Kings (call it temporall or spirituall as you please, for sure it is that the effect is temporall) hath been vncertaine, disputable, and euer contradicted by Catholikes both Kings and Subiects, and therefore it can not bee said, that the Pope was euer in possession of this authoritie (although wee should grant, that power, right, or authoritie may be said to bee possessed) it consequently followeth, that what opinion soeuer any Catholike follow in speculation, concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, yet in practise, vntill this Controuersie concerning the Popes power to depose Kings, and the right of Kings not to be deposed, shall be decided, as yet it is not, hee can not with a good conscience endeauour to thrust out a King so deposed from the Kingdome or Dominions which hee lawfully possesseth.
66 Wherevpon in the end of my Apologie I inferred this conclusion, whereof also in my Epistle Dedicatorie to his Holinesse I made mention: And therefore if either Pope, Prince, or any other of a forraine countrey should attempt to thrust an hereticall Prince out of the kingdome, which he possesseth, this controuersie concerning the deposition of Princes being vndecided, hee should contrarie to the rules of iustice doe that Prince most manifest wrong. And much more a Subiect can not be excused from manifest treason, what soeuer opinion in speculation he doth maintaine concerning the Popes temporal power, who should in practise, vnder pretence perchance of deuotion to the See Apostolike, not duely also considering the bond of his Allegiance towards his Soueraigne, endeauour to thrust his lawfull Prince out of his kingdome, which he possesseth, notwithstanding any Excommunication or sentence of depriuation denounced against him by the Pope.
[Page 54]67 But because D. Schulkenius, hath endeauoured to confute that reason, which I out of the aforesaid rule of the Law, In causa dubia melior est conditio possidentis, I brought to proue, that no man in practise can with a safe conscience obey the Popes sentence of depriuation, so long as this controuersie concerning the Popes power to depose Princes remaineth vndecided, I will briefely declare, how insufficiently he obiecteth against that reason. First therefore he affirmethCap. 15. ad nu. 468. pag. 629. & pag. 633. ad nu. 470., that this doctrine to depose Princes is not doubtfull or in controuersie among Catholikes, but it is certaine and of faith, and none but heretikes and schismatikes doe defend the contrarie, and therefore that rule In causa dubia &c. In a doubtfull or disputable cause the condition of the possessour is the bettter, can not bee applyed to the Popes power to depose Princes, But how vntrue this is, and also how slanderous and iniurious it is to many learned Catholikes especially to the most Christian Kingdom of France, I will cleerely shew beneath, in so much that for this cause onely if there had been no other, his book was deseruedly burnt publikly at Paris.
68 Secondly, D. Schulkenius would seeme to affirme that the aforesaid rule, In causa dubia, &c. In a doubtfull, or disputable cause the state of him, who hath possessions is the better, is not a rule of the Law, for that saith he, I finde not in the rules of the Law, In a doubtfull, or disputable cause, but, In a like or equall case the state or condition of him, who hath possession is the better. But it D. Schulkenius will cauill about the words, and not regard the sense, I may likewise say, that hee findeth not in the rules of the Law, In an equall or like case but in an equall and like cause the state of him, who hath possession is the better. But because cause and case, like, equall doubtfull, vncertaine, and disputable haue all one sense, for that if two causes or cases be doubtfull, vncertaine, or disputable, they are like or equall in that, therefore I regarding the sense, and [Page 55] not the words, did rather vse the words, doubtfull, vncertaine and disputable, then like, or equall, both for that the former words doe declare the sense of the rule more plainely, and also because Diuines in alledging that rule of the Law do commonly vse the word doubtfull, as it may be seene in Dominicus Sotus, Lib. 7. de instit. q. 3. ar. 2. Ioannes Azor, Tom. 1. lib 2. Instit. cap. 18. Ioannes Salas, Dis. 1. sec. 9. de Legibus. and Gabriel Vasquez, Prima secundae disp. 65. cap. and therefore Vasquez citing the aforesaid rule taketh like and doubtfull for all one, The aforesaid rule, saith hee,Disp. 66. ca. 7 In dubijs, seu in pari causa &c. In doubts, or in a like cause the state of the possessor is the better &c.
69 Wherefore D. Sculckenius perceiuing, that this exception of his against the aforesaid rule is only verball, will not absolutely deny the rule, but answereth thirdly, that if there be such a rule of the Law (as without doubt in sense there is both in the Canon, De Regulis Iuris in sexto. and Ciuill Law, and in expresse words the Diuines and Lawiers doe cite it so) it doth make for the Pope, ff. De regulis Iuris regula 170. In pari causa &c. who hath beene for many hundred yeares in possession to iudge and depose Seclar Princes, especially in a cause belonging to faith. But this answere of D. Sculckenius is very insufficient. For first, although we should grant, that right, power, or authoritie may bee said to be possessed, in that sense, as Possession is taken in Law, (whereas according to the Lawiers, as Molina the Iesuite obserueth,De Iustitia tract. 2. Disp. 12. possession properly is onely of corporall things, and right, power, and such like spirituall things are onely said to bee as it were possessed, yet supposing that it is a doubtfull, vncertaine, and disputable question, whether the Pope hath power to depose Princes or no, as the Pope is said to be in possession of his right to depose Princes, so Princes may be said to bee in possession of their right not to be deposed by the Pope; and therefore in this cause is like, or equall, doubtfull or disputable, as well for Princes right not to be deposed, as for the Popes right to depose them; and on the other side Princes are not onely in possession of their [Page 56] right not to bee deposed by the Pope, but also in quiet, peaceable, and lawfull possession of their Kingdomes and temporall Dominions, which onely are properly said to be possessed, in respect whereof this rule fauoureth onely Princes, and not the Pope, and therefore in this doubtfull and disputable case of the Popes power to depose Princes, the state and condition of Princes, who are in lawfull possession, not onely of their right not to be deposed by the Pope, but also of their Kingdomes and Dominions which they possesse, is, according to the aforesaid rule, to be preferred.
70. Moreouer, that the Popes right, power, or authoritie to depose Princes may be said to be possessed, (if possession properly be of rights) it is necessarie, that hee exercise that power to depose Kings, they knowing thereof, and bearing it patiently and without contradiction, as may clearely be gathered out ofTract. 2. de Instit. disp. 14. Molina, andLib. 2. cap. 3. dub. 11. Lessius: And the reason is euident, for otherwise if any man should challenge a right, bee it good or bad, and should exercise that pretended right, the contrarie part contradicting, he may neuerthelesse be said to be in lawfull possession of that right. And so if temporall Lords should pretend to haue a spirituall Iurisdiction ouer temporall and spirituall persons, and should exercise that pretended spirituall Iurisdiction ouer them, they contradicting and excepting against the same, they might neuerthelesse be said to be in possession of that spirituall Iurisdiction. But Christian Kings from the time of Henry the fourth Emperour, who was the first Emperour, that euer was deposed by the Pope, vntill the time of Henry the fourth most Christian King of France, who was the last King, whom the Pope deposed, haue euer resisted and contradicted this authoritie of the Pope to depose them. And therefore although Popes haue for as many hundreds of yeares, as haue beene since the [Page 57] time of Pope Gregorie the seuenth, challenged this authoritie to depose Kings, yet they cannot be said to haue been for one yeare, or one day in possession of that authoritie ouer Kings, seeing that Kings haue euer gainsaid and contradicted it. And although there should perchance haue beene some one, or other Christian King, who for some priuate, or publicke respect hath not resisted the Popes sentence of depriuation denounced against him, but rather yeelded thereunto, yet this cannot be a sufficient warrant to preiudice his Successours, or that the Pope may bee said to be in possession of his pretended authoritie to depose Kings in generall, but at the most to depose that King in particular, who did not resist or gainsay, but rather acknowledged the authoritie, which the Pope claimed to depose him.
71. Fourthly, and lastly D. Schulckenius answereth, that the aforesaid rule is to be vnderstood, when the controuersie is betwixt two inferiour parties who are in suite, and not betwixt the Iudge, and the partie accused, or if wee will apply it to the Iudge, and the partie accused, the Iudge is to be preferred before the partie accused, but the Pope is Iudge ouer all Christian Kings and Princes, and therefore this rule, saith he, is in fauour of the Pope. But how vnsound and insufficient is also this Reply of D. Schulckenius, it is very apparant. For First, although the Pope be Iudge ouer all Christian Kings and Princes in spirituall causes and punishments, yet in temporall causes and punishments they haue no Iudge, or Superiour besides God, the supreme Iudge of all both Kings and Popes; and therefore well said our learned Countreiman Alexander of Hales, 3 part. q. 40. mem. 5. q. 4. expound those words, A King is to be punished by God alone, with materiall punishment: And againe, A King hath no man, who may iudge his facts to wit, to inflict corporall punishment: And againe, A king doth excell, as it is written 1. Pet. 2. it is true, in his degree, to wit, to exercise corporall punishment, with which [Page 58] punishment, if he offend, he hath none to punish him but God alone.
72. Yea rather contrariwise the Roman Emperors were in times past Iudges in temporall causes of all the Romane Empire and of euery member thereof both Cleargie and Laitie: but the deposition of Kings is a temporall cause and punishment, for what crime soeuer whether temporall or spirituall a King be deposed: and therefore the controuersie about deposing Kings betwixt the Pope challenging to himselfe that authoritie, and Kings, who are supreme Iudges in temporalls denying it, is not betwixt the Iudge and the party accused, but at the least betwixt two equalls in temporall causes, whereof the Pope, who first challenged this power to make Kings no Kings is the plaintiffe, and Kings who defend their ancient right, and prerogatiue not to be deposed by the Pope, are the defendant: and so also that second rule of the Law, Cum sunt iura partium obscura &c. When [...] is not cleare whether of the parties, who are in suite, haue right, the defendant is to be preferred before the plaintiffe, fauoureth, Kings, and not the Pope, who only from the time of Gregorie the seuenth claimed this authoritie to make Kings no Kings.
73. Secondly, I doe not thinke, that any Lawyer will affirme, that if a Iudge, who is onely knowne to haue authoritie in ciuill matters, as ciuill is opposed to criminall, should challenge a Iurisdiction in criminall causes, and condemne a man to death, before he shewed that hee had sufficient warrant from the Prince so to doe, the partie condemned is bound to obey that Iudge, or that the aforesaid rule, In a like or doubtfull cause hee that hath possession it to be preferred, should fauour the aforesaid Iudge, and not the party condemned, who is not onely in possession of his life, but also hath right to defend his life, vntill the Iudge shew sufficient warrant, or it is otherwise publikely [Page 59] knowne, that he hath authoritie to take it away. Neither is it a sufficient warrant for the Iudge, that it is knowne, that he is a Iudge in ciuill matters, vnlesse it be also knowne that he is a Iudge also in criminall causes, as likewise it is not a sufficient warrant for the Pope to depriue Kings of their temporall kingdomes, that it is cleare that he is a Iudge in all spirituall matters, vnlesse also it be cleare, as yet it is not, that he is also a Iudge in temporall causes, and to inflict temporall punishments by way of coercion, as without doubt are the taking away of temporall kingdomes, for what crime soeuer they be taken away.
74. Wherefore that Dialogue, which D. Schulckenius maketh betwixt the Pope, and a conuicted heretike, whose goods are without any controuersie confiscated both by the Ciuill and Canon Law, is vnaptly applyed to the deposing of Kings, which hath beene, and is at this present in controuersie among Catholikes. Besides, that this Dialogue also supposeth, that the Pope is in possession of his authoritie to depose Kings, and that Kings are not in possession of their right not to bee deposed by the Pope; and that the Pope is a Iudge of temporall Kings in temporall causes, and to punish them with temporall punishments by way of coercion: and also, that the aforesayd rule fauoureth the Iudge, and not the person conuented before the Iudge, when the authority of the Iudge ouer the person conuented is not sufficiently knowen, all which, as I haue shewed before, are very vntrue. And by this thou maiest perceiue, good Reader, how insufficient are the exceptions, which D. Schuclkenius bringeth against my argument grounded in the aforsaid rule of the Law, as in very deed are al the rest of his Replies against my Apology, as God willing ere long, (for I cannot answer fully and exactly as I intend all my Aduersaries at once) I will most cleerely shew.
[Page 60]75. Consider now (do are Country-men) first, the vnsincere dealing of this my Aduersarie T. F. who concealeth the chiefest part of opinion and doctrine for the securing of his Maiesty of the constant loyaltie and allegeance, wherein all his Catholike Subiects are in conscience bound vnto him, that thereby he may cause his Maiestie to bee iealous of my fidelity, and to account me no good Subiect, as this man slanderously affirmeth, that I am neither a good Subiect, nor a good Catholike, or child of the Church, as I professe my selfe to be, but that I am falne into flat heresie, from which I cannot any way cleere or excuse my selfe, for impugning that doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, which is grounded vpon such assured and solid foundation, as this man (forsooth) heere hath signified but how guilfully and vnsoundly you haue partly seene) and he will more particularly and manifestly declare heereafter, where also his particular frauds and falsehoods I will more particularly and manifestly lay open to his owne shame and confusion. But for all his slanderous words, I trust in God, that it wil appear to all men, that insurrexerunt in me testes iniqui, Psal. 26. & mentita est iniquit as sibi; that false witnesses haue risen vp against me, and that wickednesse hath be lied her selfe: and that I will euer prooue my selfe to bee both a good Subiect to his Maiestie, and also a good Catholike, and a dutifull childe of the Catholike Church, as partly I haue prooued heere already, and will more particularly and manifestly declare heereafter. In the meane time let Mr. Fitzherbert examine well his Catholike faith, and consider what a kinde of Catholike hee is, who so stiffely maintaineth vncertaine opinions for the Catholike faith, which, if it bee truely Catholike, cannot be exposed to any falshood or vncertainty, as this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, which with Catholike faith hee pretendeth truely to beleeue, may in very deede bee false, and without all [Page 61] doubt is vncertaine and questionable among Catholikes.
76. Secondly consider, how vntruely Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that my manner of disputing this question probably concerning the Popes power not to depose Princes, and the lawfull taking of the Oath, doth not onely giue no security to his Maiestie, but is also dangerous and pernicious to his Maiesties safety, and how vnlearnedly hee argueth from speculation to practise. For although I should admit not onely for Disputation sake, as onely I doe, but also positiuely confesse, that in speculation it is probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes (whereas with that affirmatiue part of the question, to wit, whether it bee probable that the Pope hath power to depose Princes I do not intermeddle, but I do only handle the negatiue part, and doe affirme, that it is probable he hath no such power, which manner of disputing against such Aduersaries, who hold it not onely probable, but certaine, that he hath such a power, can in no sort be dangerous or pernicious to his Maiesties safetie, as I cleerely shewed before) neuerthelesse this my Aduersarie very vnsoundly from hence inferreth, that because in speculation it is probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, therefore in practise it is lawfull to concurre to: the actuall deposing or thrusting them out of the possession of their Kingdomes, or for Subiects notwithstanding any sentence of deposition to beare armes against them, so long as this question concerning the Popes power to depose Princes remaineth disputable and vndecided. Wherfore my firme, resolute and constant opinion is, that the Pope hath not power to dispēce or absolue any of his Maiesties Subiects what opinion soeuer in speculation they follow concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, from anie promissorie parts of the Oath, which onely doe belong to practise, and as for the assertory [Page 62] parts of the Oath, which belong to speculation, they are not subiect to the Popes power of dispencing, as I shewed at large in my Theologicall Disputation Cap. 6. sec. 3..
77. Now whether this my doctrine doth not onely giue no securitie to his Maiestie, but is also dangerous and pernicious to his Maiesties safetie (as this my Aduersarie to procure his Maiesties displeasure against me falsely and vnlearnedly affirmeth) if the Pope should denounce any sentence of depriuation against him, I leaue to the iudgement of any sensible man. Neither is it vnusuall that an opinion or doctrine may in speculation bee probable, which yet in practise it is not lawfull to follow, as may bee seene in the ministring of corporall physicke, and of those Sacraments which are necessarie to saluation. For although it bee probable, that such a medicine will cure such a dangerous disease, for that learned Physicians are of that opinion, although other learned Physicians thinke the contrarie to be true, or that such a matter or forme be sufficient to the validitie of the Sacrament, for example sake of Baptisme, because learned Diuines hold it to bee sufficient, although other learned Diuines bee of the contrarie opinion, and so in speculation both opinions be probable, yet in practise wee are bound by the law of charitie to apply to our neighbour those remedies either spirituall or corporall, which are out of question and controuersie, and to leaue those that are questionable, if certaine and vndoubted remedies can be had: So likewise althogh it be probable, that such a house or land doth not by a lawfull title belong to him who is in lawfull possession thereof, for that learned Lawyers are of that opinion, although other learned Lawyers thinke the contrarie to bee true, and so in speculation both opinions bee probable, yet in practise wee are bound by the rules of Iustice not to dispossesse him by violence [Page 63] of that howse or land, before the Iudge hath decided the controuersie.
78 Thirdly, consider the reason, why this my Aduersarie T. F. is so greatly offended, that I for this present doe onely take in hand (by answering probably all the arguments which are obiected on the contrarie side) to shew, that it is probable, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose Princes; and consequently that any man may with a safe and probable conscience take the Oath; for that the doctrine concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, is by this my Aduersaries owne confession, the maine question betwixt him & me, and the chiefe ground wherefore the Oath is iudged to be vnlawfull. His reason therfore is, for that he saw right well, what great aduantage I had against him, and what little aduantage hee had against me in arguing or rather answering in this manner; and therefore he calleth it in heate of his zeale, as you haue heard, The most deuilish deuice that any man could invent. And truly if I should at this first beginning haue treated of this controuersie in any other manner, then by handling it probably in that sense as I haue declared, I might worthily haue been taxed of great imprudencie in giuing my Aduersarie more aduantage against me then was needfull. For this is the state of the question, whether it can bee clearely convinced by the authoritie of holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, Generall Councells, or by necessarie inferences from any of them, as my Aduersaries pretend to convince, that it is an vndoubted doctrine of faith, and the contrarie not to be maintained by any Catholike, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and consequently that the Oath can not lawfully be taken. This is the question.
79 Marke now the aduantage I haue. For first I am not to proue, but only to answer, to defend, not to oppose. Secondly, it is sufficient for me, that my [Page 64] Answers be onely probable, but their Replyes must not be onely probable, but also convincing, and which can not with any probabilitie be answered. So that if I should goe about at the first to proue my opinion to be most true, which my Aduersaries contend not to be questionable, I should, as it is euident, greatly disaduantage my selfe. For in such controuersies as are so violently maintained by the Aduersarie, that hee will not grant the contrarie part to be questionable, it is necessarie to proceed by degrees; first, to make the thing questionable and disputable, which the aduerse part will not haue to be called in question; and after this is once agreed vpon, then to examine whether opinion be the truest. For perchance it may fall out, that as the opinion for the immaculate conception of the Blessed Ʋirgin, before Scotus did oppose himselfe herein against S. Thomas and his followers, was scarse accounted probable, yet afterwards it was daily more and more embraced, so that it is now esteemed to be by farre the more true opinion, and as Alphonsus, Salmeron in Rom: 5. Disp: 51. § deinde., and Franciscus Tom. 2. Disp: 3. sec. 5. Suarez doe affirme, agreed vpon by the consent almost of the vninuersall Church, and of all Ecclesiasticall writers, Bishops, Religious Orders, and Ʋniuersities: And as that opinion, which holdeth, that the Pope can not dispence in the solemne vow of Religious chastitie, neither in any lawfull marriage before it bee consummate, is accounted by very many learned men to be the truer opinion, notwithstanding the practise of many Popes to the contrarie; So it may fall out, that in processe of time, this opinion, which denyeth the Popes power to depose Princes, may be accounted by the greatest number of learned men to be by farre the more true opinion, and may be agreed vpon by the consent almost of the Vniuersall Church, and of all Ecclesiasticall writers, Bishops, Religious Orders, and Vniuersities, notwithstanding the practise of many [Page 65] Popes, and the vehement opposition of the Iesuits at this present time to the contrarie.
80 Fourthly consider, how little beholding are English Catholikes to this my Aduersarie T. F., who will needs inforce them euen with the temporall ouerthrow of themselues, and of their whole posteritie, to defend that doctrine to be of faith, which the State of France accounteth scandalous, seditious, damnable and pernicious, and also endeauoureth to perswade his Maiestie, that no Catholike can, according to the grounds of Catholike Religion, be a true and loyall Subiect to his Maiestie, but at the Popes pleasure, or which is all one, so long onely as the Pope shall not depose him, which he may doe at his pleasure. But we haue great affiance in his Maiesties singular wisdome, and element disposition, whereof we haue had both by his Maiesties gracious Proclamation, publike bookes, and effectuall deeds, sufficient tryall, that he will not be drawne by the false suggestion of this my Aduersarie (who would haue all his Catholike Subiects to be of the same violent spirit as he is) to haue all his Catholike Subiects in the same degree of iealousie, but that he will euer make a distinction betwixt them, who are his true hearted Subiects, and most loyall in all temporall affaires, and will aduenture all that they haue, and are, in defence of his Maiesties Royall Person and dignitie, against any sentence of depriuation whatsoeuer, which shall be denounced against him by the Pope (assuring themselues that it is conformable to the grounds of Catholike Religion which they professe, and not repugnant to that spirituall obedience wherein they stand bound to the supreme Pastour of the Catholike Church) and those other Catholikes, who thinking it to be a point of faith, that the Pope hath authoritie to dethrone Soueraigne Princes, and to make temporall Kings priuate men, will only defend his Maiestie, [Page 66] and yeeld him temporall obedience, vntill the Pope after his sentence of depriuation shall command them the contrarie.
81 But what small reliefe are English Catholikes to expect from Mr. Fitzherberts hands, if it were in his power to relieue them, you may (Catholike Countrymen) coniecture by this, that towards the end of Queene Elizabeth hir raigne (when those foure Reuerend Priests were at Rome to seeke redresse of Pope Clement the eight, to whom they and other of their brethren had appealed, for the manifold wrongs and slaunders wherewith they were charged both at home and abroad, at which time this my Aduersarie running from Cardinall to Cardinall to informe against them, made no scruple of conscience to disgrace and slaunder them, as Schismatikes, Spies, Rebells, and disobedient persons to the See Apostolike &c. as now in his publike writings he handleth me) hee and some others vpon whom he depended, fearing lest that hir Maiestie should shew some fauour, and giue some sort of toleration to such hir Catholike Subiects, whom for their constant loyaltie she might securely trust (for out of hir Princely and mercifull disposition Shee had already shewed ouer great fauour to those oppressed Priests, considering the present lawes of the Realme made against them) had so little commiseration of the continuall calamities of distressed Catholikes, that he was not ashamed to aduise then his Holinesse in a little Treatise, or Pamphlet written in Italian, that it was not good, or profitable to the Catholike cause, that any libertie or toleration of Religion should be granted by the State to the Catholikes of England.
82 And that this is most true hee can not for shame deny, and I haue also heard diuerse vertuous Priests, and Laymen, who were then at Rome, protest vpon their saluation, that they [Page 67] did both see and reade the aforesaid Italian Pamphlet, affirming withall, that it was thought then by diuerse at Rome, that this my Aduersarie T. F. was in that businesse onely an agent and instrument for others, vpon whose command and becke hee wholly depended, who feared, least that if her Maiestie should haue granted vvhich they then greatly suspected, any toleration or mitigation of the Law to those hir Catholike Subiects, who would giue sufficient securitie of their true, vnfaigned, and constant loyaltie, it would haue beene the ready way to haue thrust all the Iesuites quite out of England. Now vvhat designements this my Aduersarie can haue, and what construction you may make of such his proceedings, and whether hee sincerely intendeth so much your good, as his priuate ends, and of those vpon whom hee now dependeth, and how diligently you are to examine his words, deeds, and writings, who dare aduenture with such palpable fraude to delude his Holinesse, his Maiestie, and your selues, as partly you haue seene in this his Preface, and more fully you shall see beneath, I leaue, Catholike Countreymen, to your prudent considerations.
83 Lastly, the applying of those words of the Apocalyps, I would thou wert either hot or cold, &c. to mee being but a slanderous calumnie affirmed without proofe, needeth no confutation. And with the same facilitie might Carerius, and the Canonists apply them to Cardinall Bellarmine and others of his Societie, for which cause hee calleth them wicked polititians, who are so luke warme, that they will not grant with the Canonists, that the Pope is not onely a spirituall, but also a temporall Lord of the whole Christian world. True it is that I am not of so fierie a spirit, as vnder pretence of zeale [Page 68] to approue Gunpowder plots, or that desperate doctrine, from whence such furious attempts doe proceede, neither vnder colour of feruent deuotion to attribute to the Pope an authoritie ouer the Kingdomes, bodies, and liues of temporall Princes, which is not knowne to bee granted him by Christ, and which is more scalding, to brand those Catholikes with heresie that haue not the like feruour: Neither am I so cold as to deny either to Pope or Prince, that authoritie which is knowne to be due to them, all extremities I hate, virtue consisteth in a meane, neither to take from Caesar, and giue it to God, nor to take from God, and giue it to Caesar, but to render to God and Caesar, that which is their due.
84 And this shall suffice (Deare Countrimen) touching those aduertisement & considerations, which Mr. Fitzherbert hath giuen you concerning my doctrine in generall, and therefore I will now passe by degrees to the examination of his Replyes to mee in particular, and I doubt not to discouer also herein so plainly his manifold frauds & falshods, that you haue iust cause not to hazard your consciences and whole estates vpon such his fraudulent words and writings, as partly you haue already seene in this his Preface, how vnsincerely and guilefully in euery one of his aduertisement and considerations hee hath proceeded, and more cleerely you shall see beneath in this Treatise, which Treatise to the end you may more plainely vnderstand the chiefe grounds of this controuersie touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which is the maine question, as my Aduersarie confesseth, betwixt him and me and specially impugned in the new oath of allegiance, I will deuide into three principall parts.
In the first I will set downe those Authors, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation to proue, that any Catholike might by reason of extrinsecall grounds, [Page 69] and the authoritie of learned Catholikes probably perswade themselues, that the Pope hath not by Christ his institution any power to depose Princes, together with a confutation of the Replyes, which Card. Bellarmine masked vnder D. Schulkenius his name, to whom my Aduersarie here remitteth his English Reader, hath made against them.
In the second I will examine all the principall arguments which Card. Bellarmine hath brought to proue the vnion and subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, which subordination my Aduersarie here supposeth to be a chiefe foundation, whereon the doctrine for the Popes Power to depose Princes doth depend, and also the Replyes which D. Sculckenius hath made to confirme the said pretended vnion and subordination.
In the third and last part I will discouer in particular the insufficiencie or Mr. Fitzherberts whole Reply, in the same manner, order, and number of Chapters, which hee hath obserued in replying to my Answeres.
The first part,
Wherein THOSE AVTHORITIES AND testimonies of learned CATHOLIKES, which Mr. FITZHERBERT cunningly passeth ouer, and for answere to them remitteth his English Reader to D. SCHVLCKENIVS a Latine writer, are briefely, and perspicuously examined.
BEfore I come to examine the particular points of my Aduersaries Reply, and to make manifest his immodest, insufficient, and also vnsincere proceeding therein, I thinke it not amisse, first to set downe the testimonies of those Catholike Authours, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation to proue, that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is not a point of faith, and the contrarie hereticall (as Mr. Fitzherbert following the steps of Card. Bellarmine, and some few others of his Society would gladly enforce English Catholikes euen with incurring their Soueraignes high displeasure, and with [Page 72] the vtter ouerthrow of their temporall estates to beleeue) to the end the Reader may thereby clearely perceiue both the silly and shuffling answeres of D. Schulckenius, and also the insufficient and craftie dealing of Mr. Fitzherbert, who taking vpon him in this his Reply to satisfie English Catholiks, those especially that vnderstand not the Latine tongue (for otherwise he would doubtlesse haue replyed in Latine, as he by me was answered in Latine) and to make them see, as he saith,In the Preface, num. 28. a cleare confutation of the grounds of my doctrin, and of my principall arguments and answeres touching the Popes power to depose Princes, which is the maine question betwixt him and me, and specially impugned and abiured in the new oath, neuerthelesse he cleane omitteth to answere my chiefe, principall, yea and only grounds, which I brought to perswade vnlearned men, that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is not a point of faith to wit, extrinsecall grounds, drawne from the testimonie of learned Catholikes, who maintaine the contrarie doctrine, by which vnlearned men are chiefely, if not only, lead, and for confutation of these grounds he remitteth his English Reader to D. Schulckenius a Latine writer, and wrangleth onely about intrinsecall grounds, the strength, or weakenesse whereof vnlearned men cannot comprehend, as though, forsooth, M. Fitzherbert, who hath taken out of Fa. Lessius masked vnder the name of D. Singleton, a whole Treatise touching the decree of the Councell of Lateran, and put it here in his english Reply, as though it were the inuention of his owne wit, would haue spared to haue borrowed also of D. Schulckenius the answeres, which he made to those Catholike Authors by me alledged, if he had thought that those answeres would by English Catholikes haue beene so greatly applauded.
The first CHAPTER,
Wherein the authoritie of Iohn Trithemius a famous man of the Order of S. Benedict, is examined.
1. THe first authoritie, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation, and also in my Apologie, was of Iohn Trithemius a famous Abbot of the Order of S. Bennet, and a man of singular learning and piety, who writeth, that in his time, to wit in this present age, wherein nothing hath been newly defined either by Popes, or Councells concerning the Popes power to depose Princes (for all the Decrees of Popes or Councells, which by Card Bellarmine and others are vsually alledged to confirme the aforesaid authoritie, were long before Trithemius his time) this question touching the Popes power to depose the Emperour was in controuersie among the Schoolemen, and as yet not decided by the Iudge. His words are these:In Chronico monast. Hirsaug. ad annum 1106. He indeed (Henry the fourth) was the first of all the Emperours, who was deposed by the Pope. The Schoolemen, or Scholastikes Scholastici. are at strife concerning this point, and as yet the controuersie is not decided by the Iudge, whether the Pope hath power to [Page 74] depose the Emperour, or no, which question for that it belongeth not to vs let vs leaue vndiscussed.
Pag. 127. ad num. 33.2. To this authoritie D. Schulckenius answereth in this manner. If Trithemius by Schoolemen, or Scholastikes vnderstand those, who treate of Diuinitie scholastically, as S. Thomas, S. Bonauenture, Aegidius, Durandus, and others, he is manifestly deceiued, neither is it any maruell if he be deceiued, seeing that he was not skilfull in that learning. But if he call Scholemen, Grammarians, Historiographers, Poets, he saith something. For truely this point is in controuersie among Grammarians, as Valla, Historiographers, as Sigebert, Poets, as Dantes. But although it be in controuersie among them, and in their opinions the Iudge hath not as yet decided the question, yet it is not in controuersie among learned Diuines, and Lawyers, who are not ignorant in holy Scriptures, and in the venerable Councells of the holy Church. For although among these there be a controuersie about the manner, how the Pope can do it, yet there is no question whether he hath power to doe it. And what need is there to aske aduise of Trithemius, who oftentimes hath erred in the historie, which he professeth, as Antonius Posseuine hath noted in his Apparatus, seeing that we haue the common opinion of Doctours, and decrees of Councells, which doe make the matter cleare. Thus answereth D. Schulckenius.
3. Marke now how many shifts, and shufflings be in this answere. If Trithemius, saith he, by Scholastickes, or Scholemen vnderstand those, who treate of Diunitie scholastically, as S. Thomas &c. he is manifestly deceiued: As though forsooth only scholasticall Diuines and scholasticall Diuinitie were to be had in estimation, and positiue Diuines, who do not handle those subtile Schoole-quirks, but do treat of holy Scriptures and other questions of Diuinitie after a plaine and positiue manner, as they were wont to be handled by the ancient Fathers, before Peter Lombard, the Master of the sentences his time, were not to be regarded. True [Page 75] it is, that Trithemius by the word, Scholasticke, doth commonly vnderstand, not onely those, who professe Scholasticall, or School-Diuinity, as it is now adaies distinguished from positiue Diuinity, but by Scholastikes he vnderstood Schoolemen and Students in generall, whether they professed Positiue or Scholasticall Diuinity, as it may euidently appeare by his Treatises de Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis, and de viris Illustribus, where he hath this word, Scholastike, aboue an hundred times, and vseth it for a Schooleman, student, scholler, or scholler like in generall.
4. And although Trithemius by the word, Scholastikes or Schoolemen, had vnderstood not onely Students in Diuinity in generall, but particularly those, that professe Scholasticall Diuinity, as it is distinguished from positiue, yet that he had beene therein manifestly deceiued, as D. Schulckenius so boldly affirmeth, is manifestly vntrue. For Iacobus Almainus, a famous Doctour, and Schoole-Diuine of Paris, and according to Fa. Azor the IesuiteLib. 2. Instit. cap. 14., a Classicall Doctour, who flourished in Trithemius his time, doth also affirmeIn Lib. de Dom. nat, ciu. & Eccl. in pro. 2 ae. concl. as I obserued in my Apologie, Num. 122. that very many, or most Doctours, among which some no doubt were Schoole-Diuines, are of opinion, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath not power to inflict any temporall punishment, as death, banishment, priuation of goods, much lesse of Kingdomes, nay nor so much as to imprison, but that the power, which hee hath by the institution of Christ, is onely extended to Excommunication, or some such spirituall punishment, and that his vsing of other punishments doth proceede meerely from the positiue Law, and priuiledges of Princes. It belongeth, saith hee, to the nature of the Laike power, to haue authority to inflict (he meaneth by way of coercion and constraint) temporall punishment, as are death, exile, priuation of goods &c. but the Ecclesiasticall power by the institution of God can inflict no such punishment, yea cannot so much as imprison, [Page 76] vt plerisque Doctoribus place [...], as very many or most Doctours (for so much the word, plerique, doth signifie) are of opinion, but it is extended onely to spirituall punishment, as Excommunication, and the other punishments which it vseth, are from the pure positiue Law. And a little before he affirmed, that the Ecclesiasticall and Lay power of Iurisdiction in the externall Court are so distinguished in respect of the punishments, which can bee inflicted by either of them, that by one onely a corporall punishment, and by the other precisely a spirituall can bee inflicted. Now what words can bee more cleere then these, to which neuerthelesse D. Schulckenius giueth no answer, and yet my Aduersary after his vsuall manner very boldly affirmeth, that D. Schulckenius hath answered particularly to euery one of the authorities; which I brought either in my Apologie, or Theologicall Disputation.
5. The like words hath Iohn Gerson, another famous Classicall Doctour, and Schoole-Diuine of Paris, who liued before Trithemius, & Almaines time. There are, saith Gerson,De potest. Eccles. consider. 4. who doe affirme, that this punishment of Excommunication is the last which the Ecclesiasticall power of Iurisdiction by the onely first institution of Christ can inflict; so that it is not extended to imprisonment, or that any man bee adiudged to death or corporall whipping, but when the Ecclesiasticall Iudge doth this, he doth it by the grant of Princes, as the Cleargie by the de [...]otion of Princes hath receiued much authoritie of temporall Iurisdiction, which Iurisdiction or Censure is neuerthelesse called spirituall, as also the temporall goods of Ecclesiastical persons are called spiritual, because they are dedicated & applyed to thē, who serue the Church, as also the breads of propositiō, the first fruits, the tithes, alse the vessels of the Temple, and such like were in the olde Law called sacred or holy, so also the new Law doth obserue the same.
6. Secondly, it is no maruell, saith D. Schulckenius, that Trithemius be deceiued, if by Schoole-men he vnderstand [Page 77] Scholasticall Diuines, seeing that he himselfe was not skilfull in that science. As though, forsooth, none can know, when men of any profession be at variance touching any difficult question belonging to that Science, but those onely, that be skilfull in the same profession. Physicians may easily know, when learned Lawyers are at strife concerning a point of Law, and so both of them may easily know, when learned Diuines are at contention about a Theologicall question; and writers of histories may also know, when Diuines or Lawyers are at debate about any point of Diuinity or Law, and may also, without passing the bounds of their profession relate the same to others. And therefore it is no maruell, that Trithemius being not onely a meere Historiographer, but also a learned positiue Diuine, as by his manifold workes it doth cleerely appeare, might easily perceiue, that it was at that time a controuersie among Scholasticall Diuines, whether the Pope had authoritie to depose the Emperour or no. Neither is it necessarie, that the controuersie should be made knowen by printed books, but it sufficeth that it bee made manifest by word of mouth, and publike opposition and contradiction in Schooles, as all men, who frequent the Schools, may by daily experience most cleerely perceiue.
7. Thirdly, but if Trithemius, saith D. Schulckenius call Schoolemen, Gramarians, Poets, Historiographers, he saith something. For truely this point is in controuersie among Grammarians as Valla, Historiographers as Sigebert, Poets as Dantes, and in their opinions the Iudge hath not as yet decided the question. Marke now the fraud and cunning of this man. For who would not by this his answer imagine, but that those three Authours were meere Grammarians, Historiographers, Poets, and not Diuines? where as it is manifest, that although for Grammar, Histories, and Poetry they were singular, and inferiour to none of their times, yet [Page 78] they were all of them also learned Diuines, as Trithemius in his book de Ecclesiasticis Scriptoribus doth sufficiently witnesse. Laurentius Valla, saith hee,In verbo Laurentius Valla. a noble man of Rome, the Prince by farre of Grammarians of this age, a Philosopher, Rhetorician, and a most excellent Diuine &c. Dantes, saith he,In verbo Dantes. by Country a Florentine, a most great student in his time of all men, as well in Diuine Scriptures as Secular learning, and very learned, a Philosopher, and a Poet inferiour to none of that age. Sigebert, saith he,In verbo Sigebertus. a monke of the order of S. Benedict, a most great student from his youth in Diuine Scriptures, and very learned, and in secular learning inferiour i [...]none of his time. And yet D. Schulckenius would cunningly perswade his Reader, that Valla was a meere Grammarian, Dantes a meere Poet, and Sigebert a meere Historiographer. Moreouer, Trithemius could not by Schoolemen only vnderstand Valla, Dantes and Sigebert; for that his words are of the present tence and time; He doth not say, It hath beene a controuersie among the Schoole-men, but it is a controuersie among the School-men, & adhuc, and as yet, till now, hitherto, to this present time, the question is not decided by the Iudge. Therefore Trithemius his words are not so to bee vnderstood, as D. Schulckenius expoundeth them, that in the opinion of Valla, Dantes and Sigebert, who all liued aboue a hundredFor Sigebert liued in the yere 1111 Dantes in the yeere 1321. Valla in the yeere 1420. and Trithemius in the yeere 1519. yeeres before Trithemius his time, but according to his owne opinion the question is not at this present decided by the Iudge.
8 Fourthly, But what neede is there, saith D. Schulckenius, to aske aduise of Trithemius, who oftentimes hath erred in the historie, which he professeth, as Antonie Posseuine hath noted in his Apparatus; But first, be it so, that Trithemius giuing credit to the relation of others, hath erred sometimes in his historie (for all those oftentimes Posseuine doth in particular reduce onely to three) must therefore no credit be giuen to other his relations; especially, when other [Page 79] Doctours of the same age doe relate the same? And doth not Card: Bellarmine himselfe confesse, as appeareth by his Recognitions, that he hath oftentimes erred in points of Diuinitie, which depend not so much vpon relation, as vpon iudgement? must therefore no credit be giuen hereafter to his judgement in other points of Diuinitie? or will he like it well, that his own words, which he vseth here against Trithemius, be retorted backe vpon himselfe, what neede is there to aske the aduise of Card: Bellarmine, who, as he himselfe confesseth, hath oftentimes erred in points of Diuinitie, which he professeth.
9 Secondly, obserue good Reader, how palpably and grossely, not to say shamefully, both Posseuine, and D. Schulckenius also, giuing credit to Posseuine, haue themselues erred, in reprehending vnworthily Trithemius his errours. For three particular things Posseuine relatethIn verbo Ioannes Trithemius., wherein he affirmeth Trithemius to haue erred in his historie. The first is, in that Trithemius affirmethIn verbo Laurentius Iustin. Laurentius Iustinianus to haue been of the Order of the Celestines. And neuerthelesse Posseuine himselfe a little after in the word Laurentius Iustinianus doth in expresse words affirme, that he was of that Order. Laurentius Iustinianus, saith Posseuine, a Ʋenetian, of the Order of the Celestines, the first Patriarch of Venice &c. The second is, in that Trithemius affirmeth one Hugo a Dominican and Cardinall to be Barchionensis, and doth not make mention whether he was of Barcilona in France or in Spaine. But although Trithemius was not so exact in distinguishing those two places, yet considering that euery errour includeth a falshood, and Trithemius in the aforesaid relation affirmed no falshood or vntruth, hee can not iustly by Posseuine be therefore taxed of errour.
10 The third errour, wherewith Posseuine chargeth them, is, in that hee affirmeth Abbot Ioachim to haue beene condemned in a generall Councell, where [Page 80] as the Councell, saith Posseuine, did not condemne the man, but the doctrine, which was against the Master of the Sentences. But truly I can not but greatly maruell, how Posseuine could be so grossely mistaken, vnlesse he would of set purpose forge something, whereby he might disgrace Trithemius. For if he had but briefely runne ouer that place of Trithemius, which he citeth, he could not but haue seene, that Trithemius did only affirme Ioachims doctrine, and not his person to be condemned in the Councell. Tractatus autem quem scripsit &c. But the Treatise (saith Trithemius In verbo Ioachim Abbas. in the place cited by Posseuine) which Abbot Ioachim wrote against Peter Lombard Bishop of Paris, is condemned in a Generall Councell, as appeareth in the beginning of the Decretalls, Damnamus.
11 Wherefore to returne backe D. Schulckenius his words, what neede had D. Schulckenius to aske aduice of Posseuine touching Trithemius his errours, seeing that Posseuine himselfe hath therein not onely grossely erred, but also in other his relations, as in affirming Iohn Gerson Chancelour of Paris to be of the Order of the Celestines (wherein also Card: Bellarmine in his late treatise of Ecclesiasticall writers hath erred with him) yea and sometimes which is lesse excusable, when of set purpose he pretendeth to recall and amend his former errour; as in verbo Durandus à S. Porciano, whom in his former Edition, as he saith (for I neuer saw it) he affirmed to be Bishop of Melda, as truly he was, and of the Order of S. Dominike: and now, forsooth, in his corrected Edition he will needs haue him to be Bishop of Liege, and to haue liued in the yeare 1035. and that Hermannus Contractus, who liued in the yeare 1054. maketh mention of him, and yet he will also haue him to be of the Order of Dominike: And neuerthelesse Posseuine himselfe a little beforeIn verbo Dominicus Guzmannus. affirmed, that S. Dominike dyed in the yeare 1221. which was two hundred fourteene yeares after [Page 81] Durandus flourished. Now let D. Schulckenius, or any other, who maketh so great account of Posseuines Apparatus, either accord these two, that Durandus à S. Porciano was according to Posseuine of the Order of S. Dominike, and yet that according to the same Posseuine he liued well neere 200. yeares before S. Dominike did institute his Order, or else not to giue hereafter so great credit to all that Posseuine affirmeth, seeing that he hath so grossely erred both in falsly taxing Trithemius of those errours, and also (which is more grosse) when purposely he endeauoured to amend his owne errour.
12 Lastly, we haue, saith D Schulckenius, the common opinion of Doctours, and decrees of Councells, which doe make the matter cleare. And therefore although among learned Diuines and Lawyers there be a controuersie concerning the manner how the Pope may doe it, yet there is no question whether he hath power to doe it. But first we haue the authoritie of Trithemius, that it is a controuersie among the Schoolemen, and as yet not decided by the Iudge, not onely in what manner the Pope may depose the Emperour, but whether he hath any power at all to depose him. Then we haue the authoritie of Almaine a learned Schoole-Diuine, and a Classicall Doctour, that it is the opinion of very many Doctours, that the Ecclesiasticall power by the institution of Christ can onely inflict spirituall Censures, and not any temporall punishment, as death, exile, priuation of goods, much lesse of kingdomes, nay nor so much as imprisonment. And therefore although it be the more common opinion of Doctours, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, especially of Lawyers, who as Pope Pius the fift did plainely confesse to that famous Lawyer Nauarre in Comment. super cap: Non liceat Papae. 12. q. 2. § 3. num: 6., doe attribute more authoritie to the Pope then is sufficient (for that the greatest part of those Authours cited by Card: Bellarmine, who in expresse words affirme, that the Pope hath such a power, are Lawyers, [Page 82] men also for the most part vnskilfull in Diuine Scriptures, and the law of God, as Dominicus Sotus affirmethJn 4o. dist. 18. q. 1. ar. 1.) yet it is not the more common opinion of Doctours, that it is a cleare and certaine doctrine not to be called in question by any Catholike, that the Pope hath such a power.
13. Few only Diuines there are, & for the most part Iesuites who of late yeares haue by might and maine endeauoured without sufficient grounds to make the matter cleare, and to be an vndoubted point of faith. But vntill they bring more cleare decrees of Councells, or more pregnant proofes from holy Scriptures, then hitherto they haue brought, they will neuer make the matter cleare, but still it will remaine a controuersie among Catholikes, not only in what maner the Pope may, but whether he hath any power at all to depose the Emperour or no, as it was in Trithemius and Almaines time, since which time no cleare decree of any Councell hath been made to that purpose, for all the decrees of Councells, which by Card. Bellarmine are vrged to proue that doctrine, and haue been answered by me and others, and shall beneath be answered more at large, were long before their time. And thus much concerning the first authoritie of Trithemius, and Almaine.
Chap. 2.
Wherein the authoritie of Albericus Roxiatus a famous Lawyer is briefly debated.
1. THe second testimonie, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation, and also in my Apologie to proue this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes not to be certaine,Jn verbo Albericus Roxiatus. without controuersie, or a point of faith, was of Albericus Roxiatus, a most famous Professour, as Trithemius writeth, of the Canon [Page 83] and Ciuill Law, and a man excellently learned, and according to Fa. Azor Lib. 2. Iust. cap. 14., a Classical Doctour, who liued in the yeare 1340. aboue a hundred yeares since the Councell of Lateran, which is now so greatly vrged. For this Authour calleth in question foure of the most principall Canons or Decrees of Popes registred in the Canon Law, which do seeme most to fauour their authoritie to depose Princes, and to dispose of the temporalls, especially of the Romane Emperour (among which one is that famous, and so often inculcated by my Aduersaries, sentence of deposition denounced against Fredericke the Emperour by Pope Innocent the fourth in the presence of the Councell of Lyons) and he affirmeth that none of them are in his opinion agreeable to law, or right, but that they were made by Popes, against the rights, and libertie of the Empire.
2. The Pastours of the Church, saith he,In Dictionario verbo Electio. putting their sickle into others haruest, haue made foure Decrees, or Decretalls. The one concerning the election of the Emperour, which beginneth, Venerabilem, and of this it is there noted by all men. An other is about the deposing of Friderike the Emperour, extra de sententia & re iudicata cap. Ad Apostolicae in sexto, where also of this it is noted by all men. An other is concerning the discord betwixt Henry the Emperour, and Robert King of Sicily, and the sentence of treason published by the Emperour against him: which Decree is in Clementina de sententia & re iudicata cap. Pastoralis. Another is in Clementina prima de Iureiurando, that the Emperour is bound to sweare allegiance to the Pope, and concerning some authoritie of the Pope ouer the Emperour. Which Decretalls, whether they be iust or no, God he knoweth. For I without preiudice to sounder aduice do beleeue (and if it should be erroneous I recall it) that none of them be agreeable to right. Yea I beleeue that they are published against the rights and libertie of the Empire, and I doe thinke that by God they were instituted distinct powers, whereof I haue noted sufficiently [Page 84] lege prima Cod. de Summa Trinitate & Fide Catholica. Thus Albericus.
3 Obserue now, good Reader, how sleightly D. Sculckenius would shift of this authoritie, which is so plaine and manifest. Albericus, saith he, speaketh wauering and altogether doubtfull, and he addeth, and if it should be erroneous I recall it: and he is conuinced of errour by Azor lib. 10. cap. 6. q. 3. These be all the exceptions that D. Schulckenius taketh against this authority. But first this word doubtfull or wauering, as out of Vasquez I obserued in my Theologicall Disputation Cap. 10. sec. 2. nu: 18. 19. 20. & 81., may be taken two manner of waies, either when one is so doubtfull, that he hath no determinate assent of either part, but remaineth perplex betwixt both, iudging neither part to be either true or false, in which sense that word, altogether doubtfull, which D. Schulkenius vseth here, if he will not speake improperly, can only be taken; and when we are thus doubtfull concerning any matter, we are alwaies bound to chuse the surer part; neither is it lawfull to do any thing with a doubtfull conscience, taking doubtfull in this sense: Or else the word, doubtfull, may be taken, when wee haue a determinate assent or iudgement that one part is true or false, but yet we are not certaine, and therefore haue some feare of the contrarie, which feare doth not exclude a determinate assent and iudgement that one part is true, for euery assent, iudgement or opinion, which is only probable, doth alwaies imply a feare; but feare consisteth in this, that he who is fearefull, or iudgeth with feare, hath two assents or iudgements, the one direct, whereby he iudgeth determinately, that one part is true, the other reflexe, whereby he iudgeth, that although he thinketh it true, yet in very deede it may be false, for that it is not certaine, but Disputable and in controuersie among Doctours, and therefore only probable: and when we are thus doubtfull or fearefull concerning any matter, we are not bound to chuse [Page 85] the surer part, but it is sufficient to chuse that which is probable, neither is it vnlawfull to doe any thing with such a doubtfull, or fearefull conscience, as in that place I declared out of Vasquez.
4. Now if D. Schulckenius by those wordes, wauering and altogether doubtfull, vnderstand, as of necessitie he must, if he will speake properly, that Albericus had no determinate assent, iudgement, or opinion concerning the vniustice of those Decretalls, this is manifestly false, and those words, I doe beleeue that they are not agreeable to right, and I doe beleeue that they are published against the rights and libertie of the Empire &c. doe clearely conuince D. Schulkenius of apparant vntruth. But if D. Schulckenius by those words wauering and altogether doubtfull, doe onely meane, that Albericus was indeed of opinion, that those Decretalls were vniust, yet he did not hold his opinion for certaine, and without all controuersie, and therefore was not obstinate in his owne opinion, but was readie to recall it, if it should proue to be erroneous, and that hee would not condemne other men, that should thinke the contrarie, (as now adaies it is too frequent to condemne other men) this is very true; for so much only doe import those his wordes, and I do beleeue vnder correction, or without preiudice to sounder aduise, and if it should be erroneous I recall it; this neuerthelesse doth not hinder, but that we haue the opinion of a man excellently learned, and of a Classicall Doctour, that the sentence of deposition denounced against Frederike the Emperour by Pope Innocent the fourth in the presence of the Councell of Lyons, and three other famous Decrees of Popes registred in the Canon Law touching the Popes power to dispose of temporalls, were vniust, and made against the rights and libertie of the Empire.
5. Secondly, but Albericus is conuinced, saith D. Schulckenius, of error by Azor. But besides that this [Page 86] letteth not, but that Albericus is of opinion, that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes, this also is euen as true, as that which D. Schulckenius said before concerning the errours, which he said Posseuine had obserued in Trithemius his historie. For besides that all the arguments, which Azor bringeth to proue in generall, the Popes authoritie ouer the Emperour in temporalls, are but triuiall, and haue been alreadie answered partly by D. Barclay, partly by my selfe, and now of late very exactly by Mr. Iohn Barclay, to whom as yet no answere hath beene made, one only argument in particular Azor vrgeth against Albericus, which is this, that the Romane Emperour was instituted by the authoritie of the Church, by whose grant also the Romane Empire was translated from the Grecians to the Germanes or Frenchmen, and that he is created as a Patron, defendour, Protector, and Tutour of the Church, from whence he inferreth, that the Pope did not put his sickle into another mans haruest, but did vse his owne right, when hee made that Canon concerning the election of the Emperour, and when he exacteth an oath of the Emperour.
6. But that this is no conuincing proofe, I shewed clearely in my Apologie Num 404. & seq.. For the Romane Empire was not instituted by the authoritie of the Romane Church, seeing that he was instituted before there was any Romane Church at all, and continued for a long time together the Soueraigne Lord in temporalls of the Romane Church. Neither was the Romane Empire translated from the Grecians to the Germans or French men by the grant of the Romane Church, if by the Romane Church be meant onely the Cleargie of Rome, but it was translated by the grant, suffrages, and authoritie also of the Laitie, who in the west parts were subiect to the Romane Empire. True also it is, that all Catholike Princes ought to be Patrons, defenders, and protectours of the Romane Church (but the Romane Emperour more specially) they being children [Page 87] and members of the Catholike Romane Church, and euery member is bound to defend eath other, but especially to defend the head. And therefore I will easily grant, that the Pope may exact, if need require, not only of the Romane Emperour, but also of all other Catholike Princes an oath of spirituall allegiance, but that Catholike Princes are subiect to the Pope in temporalls, and that the Pope may exact of them an oath of temporall allegiance, this is that I vtterly deny, neither will Card. Bellarmine, or any other be able by any sufficient argument to conuince the contrary; wherefore it cannot with any shew of probabilitie be denied, but that we haue the testimonie of Albericus, a man excellently learned, and a Classicall Doctour, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose Soueraigne Princes, and to dispose of their temporall dominions.
Chap. 3.
Wherein the authoritie of Ioannes Parisiensis, a famous Doctour of Paris, is examined, and the exceptions of D. Schulckenius against it are proued to be insufficient.
1. THe third authoritie, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation Cap. 3. sec. 3. num. 7. and also in my Apologie Num. 121., was of Ioannes Parisiensis. a famous Diuine of the Order of S. Dominike, and as Trithemius relatethIn verbo Ioannes Parisiensis., most learned in the holy Scriptures, and who in the Vniuersitie of Paris was for a long time together a publike Professour, and left behind him many Disciples. He flourished about the yeare 1280. which was 65. yeares after the great Councell of Lateran, which is now adaies so greatly vrged by our Aduersaries. This Doctour therefore although he be of opinion, that if a King should become an heretike, and incorrigible, and a contemner of Ecclesiasticall Censures, the Pope may do somewhat with the people, [Page 88] whereby the King may be depriued of his Secular dignitie, and be deposed by the people, to wit, he may excommunicate all those, to whom it belongeth to depose the king, who should obey him as their Soueraigne: Neuerthelesse he is cleerely of this opinion, that it belongeth not to the Pope, to depose iuridically Kings or Emperours for any crime whatsoeuer although it be spirituall, or which is all one to depriue themAlmainus de potest. Eccl. q. 2. cap. 8. of their kingdomes by a definitiue sentence, in such sort, that after the sentence be published they shall haue no more regall power and authoritie. For he affirmeth,De potest. Regia & Papali cap. 14. ad. 20. that excommunication, or such like spirituall punishment is the last, which may be inflicted by a spirituall Iudge. For although, saith he, it belong to an Ecclesiasticall Iudge to recall men to God, and to withdraw them from sinne, yet he hath not power to doe this, but by vsing those meanes, which be giuen him by God, which is by excluding them from the Sacraments, and participation of the faithfull. Wherefore although Parisiensis be of opinion, that the temporall common-wealth hath in some causes of great moment authoritie to depose their Prince (with which question I doe not intend at this time to intermeddle) yet concerning the principall controuersie, which is betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine, to wit, whether it be hereticall erroneous, or temerarious to affirme, that the Pope hath no power to depriue Princes of their Royall right and authoritie, Ioannes Parisiensis doth most plainely, as I haue now shewed, contradict the opinion of Card. Bellarmine. Thus I wrote in my Theologicall Disputation.
2 Marke now, good Reader, with what fraude and falshood D. Schulckenius endeauoureth to passe ouer this authoritie. Ioannes Parisiensis, saith hePag. 64. 65. 66. ad num: 4., is not for the contrarie opinion. For although he giueth lesse to the Pope, then he ought, yet he giueth as much as sufficeth for our purpose. For what doth it appertaine to the question which is in hand, whether the Pope doe depose immediately [Page 89] by his sentence, or that he may by his right withdraw his subiects from their obedience and cause them to depose? But who would not admire the wonderfull boldnes of this man? For the onely question betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine is, and euer hath been, whether the Pope hath authoritie to depriue Princes of their Kingdomes immediately by his sentence, in such sort, that after his sentence of depriuation be denounced, they, who before were Kings and had true Regall authoritie, are then no more Kings, and haue no true and lawfull right to reigne; and yet now he being pressed with the authoritie of Ioannes Parisiensis, blusheth not to affirme, that it doth not appertaine to the present question, whether the Pope may depose immediately by his sentence, which neuerthelesse is the onely question betwixt him and me, or by commanding and causing the temporall Common-wealth to depose their Prince, with which question I haue sundry times in my Apologie affirmed that I would not intermeddle. For most certaine it is, euen according to Card: Bellarmines owne doctrinein Tract: contra Barcl. cap. 21. pag. 202., that the Pope can not withdraw, discharge, or absolue subiects from their obedience immediatly by his sentence, vnles he haue authoritie to depriue immediately & by his sentence their Prince of his Princely power and authoritie, for that authoritie in a Prince, and obedience in subiects are correlatiues, and one dependeth on the other, and the obligation of obedience doth so long endure in the Subiect, as the dignitie, power, or Iurisdiction doth endure in the Superiour, saith Suarezin Defensione fides &c. lib. 6. cap: 3. nu. 6., and to deny obedience to a Prince so long as he remaineth Prince, and is not depriued of his Princely power, is clearely repugnant, saith Card: Bellarminein Tract: contra Barcl: cap. 21. p. 202., to the law of God, and nature.
3 This therfore is the opinion of Parisiensis touching the Popes authoritie to dispose of the temporall goods, or dominions either of Kings, or priuate men. And first concerning the goods of priuate men hee [Page 90] affirmethDe potest. Regia & Pap. cap: 6. 7., that the Pope is not a Lord, to whom the propertie of Church liuings doth belong, but onely a dispencer of them, but of the goods of Laymen he is not so much as a dispencer; vnlesse perchance in extreame necessitie of the Church, in which necessitie also he is not a dispencer, but a declarer of the law. And because in extreame necessitie of faith and manners, all the goods of the faithfull, yea and Chalices of Churches are to be communicated, the Pope, who is supreme not onely of the Cleargie, but of all the faithfull, as they are faithfull, hath authoritie, as he is generall informer of faith and manners, in case of extreame necessitie of faith and manners to dispence in this case the goods of the faithfull, & to ordaine them to be exposed, as it is expedient for the cōmon necessitie of faith, which other wise would be ouerthrown by the invasion of Pagās, or other such like accident. And this ordination of the Pope is only a declaration of the law, to which he may by Ecclesiasticall Censures compell the faithfull. But in cases not of necessitie, but of some speciall vtilitie, or when it is not apparant, that the goods of Lay-men doe helpe such vtilitie, or necessitie, the Pope hath not authoritie to compell any man, but concerning this hee may giue indulgences for giuing aide to the faithfull, and no other thing is granted him in my opinion. Thus writeth Parisiensis. wherefore in his opinion the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue a Lay-man of his goods, or any part thereof, euen in necessitie of faith and manners, but onely to declare, that he is bound by the law of God to giue such part of his goods, as the necessitie of the Church shall require; which if he neglect to doe, the Pope hath no other authoritie to compell him therevnto, then by Ecclesiasticall Censures, which are the last punishments, which the Ecclesiasticall power by the institution of Christ can inflict.
4 In the very like manner Parisiensis discourseth of the disposing of Kingdomes, and of deposing temporall Princes, as I before related out of him. [Page 91] For first he affirmeth, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose a King iuridically, or, which is all one, to depriue him by a iuridicall sentence of his right to reigne; and secondly, that the people, or temporall common-wealth may, and in some exorbitant cases are bound to depose their Prince; and so the Pope not by a iuridicall sentence of depriuation, but by declaring what the people are by the law of God bound to doe, and by Ecclesiasticall Censures compelling them therevnto, may according to Parisiensis, concurre to the deposing of a Prince by meanes of the people, which if the people, notwithstanding the Popes Censures neglect to doe, the Pope hath no further power to depose him, for that Ecclesiasticall Censures are, according to him, the last punishment, which the Ecclesiasticall power can inflict.
5 Wherefore two things are affirmed by Parisiensis, the one, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue Princes immediately by his sentence of their Princely power, and this is that only, which is in controuersie betwixt mee and Card: Bellarmine: the other, that the people, or temporall common-wealth haue that authoritie in some exorbitant cases: and this is only a philosophicall question, and wherewith I would neuer intermeddle, as being impertinent to the question concerning the Popes authoritie to depriue him. And although many Catholike Doctors doe agree with Parisiensis in this point, yet many other learned Catholikes, whom I cited in my Apologie Num. 411., doe dissent from him herein, to which opinion doe incline very many of the ancient Fathers, who expounding those words of the King and Prophet,Psal: 50. I haue sinned to thee alone, doe affirme, that Soueraigne Princes, for that they are inferiour to God alone, to wit, in temporalls, can be punished with temporall punishments by God alone. And therefore D. Schulckenius may be greatly ashamed to affirme so boldly, that [Page 92] Parisiensis doth not make for my opinion, and that it doth not appertaine to the question which is in hand, whether the Pope may depose Princes immediately by his sentence, or by meanes of the people, seeing that the onely question betwixt vs is, whether the Pope hath power to depriue Princes of their Royall power immediately by his sentence, and not what authoritie the common-wealth hath to depriue them.
6 But D. Schulckenius perceiuing, that this his answer to the authoritie of Parisiensis was but a meere shift and euasion, hath reserued but not in this place another answer, whereby he imagined to cleane ouerthrow the authority of this famous Doctour and Schoole-Diuine. For hee beneathPag. 394. ad num. 201. replying to the answer, which I made to those words of S. Bernard vrged by Card. Bellarmine to prooue the Popes power to depose Princes, Quid tu denuo vsurpare gladium tentas &c. wherof beneathPart. 2. ca. 9. I will treate more at large, in confirmation of which my answer I cited the authoritie of Ioannes Parisiensis, D. Schulckenius writeth thus: There is no great regard to bee had of the authoritie of Ioannes Parisiensis whatsoeuer he saith, for that other his errours are condemned by the Church in the common Extrauagant Vas electionis: and also in the 14. chapter of the same Treatise hee mingleth many errours. The like answer, but more biting maketh Fa: Lessius in his Singleton. It is to little purpose, saith he,Pag. 29. what Ioannes Parisiensis doth say, because he alledgeth very many other false citations and histories, as being a Schismatike. Another censure but more temperate Card. Bellarmine giueth of him in his booke of Ecclesiasticall writers. Ioannnes Parisiensis, saith he,Pag. 380. of the Order of the Preachers, was famous about the yeere 1296. Hee wrote vpon the foure bookes of the sentences, and diuerse Quodlibets: but especially of Kingly and Papall power, and because it was his happe to liue in trouble sometimes by reason of the [Page 93] discord betweene Pope Boniface the eight, and Philip the faire, King of France, and hee liued and taught at Paris, hee seemeth to be more inclined towards the King, then the Pope.
5 But truely it is strange, that men of such singular learning, and religious profession should so rashly and without sufficient grounds be so transported, as, contrarie to the rules of Christian Charitie and Iustice, to defame and slaunder learned and vertuous men, and those especially, who beeing dead cannot defend themselues. For first it is an apparant and too too manifest slander, which Fa: Lessius, speaking with all dutifull respect to his reuerence, doth affirme that Ioannes Parisiensis was a Schismatike; neither can he out of any approoued Authour, or by any probable reason prooue any such thing: and therfore what great account hee hath to make at the dreadfull day of iudgement, for vniustly taking away, as much as lieth in him, the good name of so famous a man, and in so fowle and hainous a crime as Schisme is, I remit to the examination of his owne conscience. Besides, that Parisiensis mingleth many errours in the 14. chapter of his Kingly and Papall power, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, and that he alledgeth many false citations and histories, as Fa: Lessius saith, is also vntrue, and it had beene fitting for them to haue alledged some one of them, that thereby some credit might haue beene giuen them for the rest. Vnlesse whatsoeuer is not agreeable to D. Schulckenius his doctrine, which he thinketh to be certaine must bee accounted an errour, and whatsoeuer Fa. Lessius hath not seeene. or read must be esteemed a false citation or historie. True it is, that Parisiensis in that 14. chapter doth teach, that the Pope cannot iudge of temporall causes, but in regard of the sinne, and that hee cannot depose Princes by his sentence, and that the last punishment, which an Ecclesiasticall Iudge can inflict, are spirituall and Ecclesiasticall Censures [Page 94] which indeede are no errours, whatsoeuer these seuere Censours say to the contrary. True also it is, that Parisiensis citeth a place out of Hostiensis, at which Fa. Lessius doth indiscreetly carp,Pag. 30. affirming, that he findeth no such thing in Hostiensis, yea & that Hostiensis hath not written vpon the chapter Ad Abolendam tit. de Haereticis, as Widdrington iudgeth, as neither vpon other texis. But neuerthelesse I found in Ostiensis vpon the chapter Ad abolendam that which Ioannes Parisiensis cited out of him; and to say that Hostiensis did not write vpon that chapter Ad abolendam, is so manifest an vntruth as I obserued in another placeIn my Latin Appendix against Fa: Suarez part. 1. sec. 7 num. 14., that I wonder how F. Lessius, who is reputed to be a man of so great reading, could be ignorant thereof.
6 Moreouer, that Parisiensis seemeth to bee more enclined to the King then to the Pope, he then liuing and teaching at Paris, is indeede affirmed, but not prooued by Card. Bellarmine. And if this manner of censuring learned men and excepting against their authority, as men partiall, may be approoued, it is the readie way to ouerthrow the testimony almost of all the Authours on both sides. For it may in the same manner be answered, that as such Authours wrote partially in fauour of Kings, so others wrote partially in fauour of Popes; And therefore Parisiensis himselfe foreseeing this obiection replieth thus: For to say, saith he,De potest. Regia & Papali c. 21. ad 41. that so woorthie men, among whom some also were Popes, did write against their conscience in fauour of Princes, or for feare of them, is to stretch foorth his mouth against heauen. For contrariwise it might be sayd more probably, that those Doctours, who doe so vnmeasurably aduance the Popes authority, doe speake for feare or fauour of him, seeing that they are Ecclesiasticall persons, who may by him get greater preferment. And especially sith that they say (although not well) that the Pope doth graciously embrace them, who do amplifie his authority, & depresseth them, who doe say the contrarie.
[Page 95]7 Furthermore, neither can D. Schulckenius in my opinion sufficientlie prooue, that Ioannes de Poliaco, whose errours were condemned by Pope Iohn the 22. in that Extrauagant Vas electionis, was this Ioannes Parisiensis, who made the Treatise of Kingly and Papall power, but some other Doctour of Paris, who was called by that name, and liued about that time. And my coniectures are these. First, for that the errours, which Ioannes de Poliaco maintained concerning confessions made to the mendicant Friers, were against the priuiledges which were granted to the mendicant Friers, and therefore it is not like that he who wrote the Treatise of Kingly and Papall power, and was himselfe of the order of the preaching Friers, would preach and teach against the priuiledges granted to his Order. Secondly, if this Ioannes de Poliaco had been of the Order of the preaching Friers, as all Authours affirme that Ioannes Parisiensis, who wrote the Treatise of Kingly and Papall power, was, it is very like, that Pope Iohn the 22. who condemned his errors, would haue named him so to be in his Extrauagant as he did, in his other Extrauagants name of what Order those Authours were, whose errours he condemned, as Michael of Cesena, William Occam, Henricus of Cena, and others: who neuerthelesse are in some sort excused from errour by D. Sanders De visib. monarch lib. 7. num 161..
8. Thirdly, there is no Authour that I haue read, who saith, that Ioannes de Poliaco, whose errours were condemned, was of the Order of the preaching Fryars, neither doth Prateolus, who vsually setteth down, of what Order those Authours whom he relateth, are, affirme, that this Ioannes de Poliaco was of that Order, whereas most Authors, who speake of Ioannes Parisiensis, that wrote the Treatise of Kingly and Papall power, doe affirme, that hee was a Dominican Fryar. Fourthly, neither is, there any Authour that I haue read, who doth affirme, that Ioannes Parisiensis, [Page 96] who made the Treatise of Kingly and Papall power, was called Ioannes de Poliaco. Lastly Ioannes Parisiensis was famous in the yeare 1280. according to Trithemius, and Kisengremus, and according to Card. Bellarmine in the yeare 1296. both which may very well be true, for that it may very well fall out, that the same man may be a famous Teacher and Preacher for sixteene yeares together, but it is very vnlike, that one man should for one and fortie yeares together at the least be a famous Reader and Preacher, which wee must grant to be true, if Ioannes de Poliaco, whose errours were condemned, and he in person recalled them before the Pope and Cardinalls in publike Consistorie at Auinion in the yeare 1321. and was commanded to teach and preach in the Schooles, and pulpit the contrarie doctrine, was our Ioannes Parisiensis, who wrote the Treatise of Kingly and papall power, and was famous in the yeare 1280.
9. But to conclude this point, be it so, that our Ioannes Parisiensis, and Ioannes de Poliaco were one and the selfe same man, which yet, as I haue shewed, hath no great likelihood, neuerthelesse the maintaining of those errors doth little repaire the authoritie of Ioānes Parisiensis in this point, but rather from hence a forcible argument may bee drawne to proue, that it is no erroneous doctrine, to hould, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose Princes by his sentence. For besides that it was no great blemish either to the learning or vertue of Ioannes de Poliaco, to hold that doctrine concerning confessions, which was condemned in that Extrauagant, seeing that both many other learned men at that time as Henricus de Ga [...]dano quodl. 2. q. 26. & quodl. 10. q. 1. a famous Doctour of Paris, Durandus a S. P [...]rtiano In 4. dist. 17. q. 1. a great Schoole-Diuine, yea and the whole Ʋniuersitie of Paris, as witnesseth Ioannes Maior In 4. dist. 17. q. 6., a famous Doctour of the same Vniuersitie, did maintaine the same; and also that he was readie at the first condemnation [Page 97] thereof to recall it, and to preach the contrary; if at that time the Pope and Cardinalls had also beene perswaded, that it was an erroneous doctrine to affirme, that the Pope hath no power to depose Princes by his sentence, and that it belongeth to the Pope to recall men to God, and to withdraw them from sinne by no other coerciue meanes, then by excluding them from the Sacraments and participation of the faithfull, and that Excommunication, or such like spirituall punishment is the last, which may bee inflicted by the spirituall Iudge, all which Ioannes Parisiensis in his treatise of Kingly and papall power did publikely maintaine, without doubt the Pope, if hee had thought this doctrine to be erroneous, would also haue compelled him to recall it, it being so greatly preiudiciall to his owne Pontificall authoritie. And therefore notwithstanding all the exceptions, which Card. Bellarmine and Fa. Lessius do take against Ioannes Parisiensis, we haue the testimonie of this learned Catholike, and famous Schole-Diuine, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes by his sentence, which is the only question at this time betweene me, and Card. Bellarmine.
Chap. 4.
Wherein the authoritie of M. Doctour Barclay a famous and learned Catholike is breifly examined.
1. THe fourth testimony, which I broght both in my Theologicall Disputation Cap. 3. sec. 3. num. 28., and also in my Apologieb, was of Mr. Doctour Barclay a most learned man, and yet no more learned then religious, (howsoeuer some falsly and vnchristianly do slaunder him) in his booke de Regno printed at Paris in the yeare 1600. with priueledge of the most Christian King of France, where he affirmeth, that Kings, who doe omit, or are negligent, to keepe Gods commandements, to worship him religiously, [Page 98] and to vse all care and diligence, that their subiects do not reuolt from true Religion, and fall into Idolatrie, Iudaisme, or heresie, are to be iudged by God alone, because only to God they are subiect, speaking of temporall iudgement and subiection, although the Pope, being the supreme Prince, and vniuersall Pastour of the Chuch, hath power to condemn with spirituall iudgement all kings and Princes, offending against Gods law, as they are Christians, and children of the Church, and to deliuer them to inuisible tormentours to be punished with the rod of the inuisible spirit, and with the two edged sword of Excommunication.
2. But Card. Bellarmine in his booke against D. Barclay Per totum. little regardeth his authority; and now in his Sculckenius he affirmeth,Pag. 110. ad num. 28. that Catholikes will make no more account of Barclay, then they do of Marsilius de Padua, and of my selfe (an easie answer to shift off the authoritie of any learned Catholike) And againe, who doth not maruaile, saith D. Schulckenius, that seeing Card. Bellarmine hath in this point clearely and soundly after his accustomed manner confuted Barclay, Widdrington durst not only aduenture to write against him without sufficient ground, but also to oppose the said Barclay, as a testimonie of truth against Card. Bellarmine.
3. But notwithstanding this glorious brag of D. Schulckenius so highly commending himselfe, and his cleare and sound confuting of Barclay after his accustomed manner, it cannot be denied, but that Doctour Barclay was a very learned man, and liued and died like a vertuous Catholike, and [...] hee was in times past, as Posseuine also relateth,In verbo Gulielmus Barclaius. a Counseller to the Duke of Lorraine, and Master of Requests, and in the vniuersity of Mussepont a Professour of the Canon and Ciuill Law, and also Deane, and that his booke was printed at Paris with a speciall priueledge of the most Christian King of France, and is by Posseuine related among other approued bookes, and no exception taken by him against it. And therefore who doth not maruell, that [Page 99] D. Schulckenius durst aduenture so bouldly to affirme,Part. 1. cap. 2. num: 2. that Catholikes will make no more account of D. Barclay, a famous and learned Catholike, then of Marsilius of Padua, a known and condemned heretike, although not for this point touching the Popes power to depose Princes, but for other his assertions which I related in my Appendix against Fa. Suarez Wherefore although perchance some Catholikes doe with Card. Bellarmine make small account of Doctour Barclaies authoritie, as also they would make of the authoritie of any other Catholike, were he neuer so vertuous or learned, that should write against them in this point, neuerthelesse other Catholikes doe greatly regard his authoritie for the aforesaid cause, and they are also perswaded, that they haue as probable reasons to thinke, that he did not write partially in fauour of Princes or any other person, as that Card. Bellarmine did not write partially in fauour of the Pope, and some other of his followers in fauour of him, and their Order.
4 Neither hath D. Schulckenius in very truth any great cause so greatly to vaunt of his cleare and sound confuting of D. Barclay, for that both his sonne Mr. Iohn Barclay a learned Catholike hath most clearely shewed the said confutation to be very vnsound, to whom as yet no Reply hath been made, and yet his booke was printed at Paris by the Kings Printer three yeeres since; and also the Bishop of Rochester, a learned Protestant, hath out of Catholike grounds conuinced D. Schulckenius his brag, of the cleare and sound confuting of D. Barclay, to be but vaine. wherefore let Card: Bellarmine first make a cleare and sound Reply to the aforesaid Answers, and then he may haue some cause to boast, that he hath clearely and soundly confuted D. Barclay. In the meane time it can not be denyed, but that notwithstanding all the clamours of our Aduersaries, this doctrine, which doth now so [Page 100] vehemently maintaine the Popes power to depose Princes is, and hath euer been impugned by vertuous and learned Catholikes.
Chap. 5.
Wherein the authorities of Mr George Blackwell, and of many other English Priests are at large debated.
1. THe first testimonie, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation Cap. 3. sec. 3. num. 9., (to which D. Schulckenius doth not answer) was of Mr. George Blackwell a vertuous and learned Catholike Priest, and once the Archipraesbyter of the English Seminarie Priests, who maintayned euen vntill death (for not halfe a quarter of an howre before hee dyed he confirmed the same) the oath to be lawfull, and that the Pope hath not power to depose Princes to which also (besides Mr. William Warmington in his moderate defence of the Oath, Mr. Iohn Barclay in his booke against Card: Bellarmine in defence of his Father, printed at Paris by the Kings Printer; and Mr. William Barres in his booke de Iure Regio, and many other learned Catholikes of this Kingdome both Priests and Lay-men, whose names for iust causes I forbare to set downe, for that they had not shewed themselues by publike writings) I added the testimonie of those thirteene Reuerend and learned English Priests (with whom twice thirtie others would haue ioyned, if their protestation had not been made so suddenly) who, to giue assurance of their loyaltie to the late Queene Elizabeth, did by a publike instrument, written in parchment, professe, and made it knowne to all the Christian world, that Shee, being at that time excommunicated by name, and depriued by the sentence of Pope Pius the fifth, of hir Regall power and authoritie) had neuertheles as full authoritie, power, and Soueraigntie ouer them, [Page 101] and ouer all the Subiects of the Realme, as any hir Highnesse Predecessours euer had. And that notwithstanding any authoritie, or any Excommunication whatsoeuer, either denounced, or to be denounced by the Pope against hir Maiestie, or any borne within hir Maiesties Dominions, which would not forsake the defence of Hir, and Hir Dominions, they thought themselues not onely bound in c [...]cience not to obey this, or any such like Censure, but also did promise to yeeld vnto hir Maiestie all obedience in temporalls.
2 Now it is euident, that this their protestation, which I did at large set downe in my Appendix to Suarez Part. 2. sec. 1., can no way be iustified, but vpon supposall, that the Pope had no authoritie to depose the Queene. For if hee had authoritie to depose Hir, Shee being then by the Popes sentence depriued of all hir Regall authoritie, power, and Soueraigntie, could not haue, as they professed, as full authoritie, power, and Soueraigntie ouer thē, and all the Subiects of the Realme, as any of hir Predecessours euer had before: Neither also could they (although Shee had not been then deposed) lawfully promise, as out of Suarez I will convince beneathNum: 7. 8., that notwithstanding any authoritie, or any Excommunication whatsoeuer, either denounced, or to be denounced against hir Maiestie, or any borne within hir Maiesties Dominions, they would neuerthelesse yeeld vnto hir Maiestie all obedience in temporalls, thinking themselues bound in conscience not to obey this, or any such like Censure, vnlesse they did suppose, that the Pope had no power to depose hir Maiestie, or to absolue hir Subiects from their obedience.
3 And if perchance any of those Priests should now be of opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and to excuse his former protestation, should answer, that hee onely intended to acknowledge hir Maiestie to be at that time Queene, and to reigne de facto, but not de iure (besides that he should [Page 102] shew himselfe to be an egregious dissembler, equiuocatour, and deluder both of hir Maiestie, and also of his Holinesse, and should therefore deserue to be greatly punished, both for deluding the State in a matter of so great weight, and also for bringing Catholike Religion in obloquie among Protestants by such detestable dissimulation, not to call it flat lying and cosoning, which ought to be abhorred of all men, [...]t especially Catholike Priests, who both by their words and deeds ought to be a patterne to others of Christian sinceritie) this Answer can not stand with the words which he protested.
4 For first marke the Preamble to their Protestation, which clearely confuteth the aforesaid answere. Whereas (say they) it hath pleased our dread Soueraigne Lady to take some notice of the faith and loyaltie of vs, her naturall borne Subiects Secular Priests (as it appeareth in the late Proclamation) and of her Prince-like clemencie, hath giuen a sufficient earnest of some mercifull fauour toward vs (being all subiect by the lawes of the Realme to death by our returne into the Country after our taking the Order of Priesthood since the first yeere of hir Maiesties reigne) and onely demandeth of vs a true profession of our Allegiance, thereby to be assured of our fidelitie to hir Maiesties Person, Crowne, Estate, and dignitie, Wee, whose names are vnderwritten, in most humble wise prostrate at hir Maiesties feete, doe acknowledge our selues infinitely bound vnto hir Maiestie therefore, and are most willing to giue such assurance, and satisfaction in this point, as any Catholike Priests can, or ought to giue vnto their Soueraignes. First therefore we acknowledge the Queenes Maiestie to haue as full authoritie, power, and Soueraigntie ouer vs, and ouer all the Subiects of the Realme, as any hir Highnesse Predecessors euer had; and further we protest &c.
5 Now were it not an intollerable deluding and mockerie, for any of those Priests (this Preamble considered) [Page 103] to affirme, that by the aforesaid words, hee did onely intend to acknowledge her Maiesty to bee Queene, and to raigne de facto, but not de iure? was this the notice, that her Maiesty tooke of the faith of Secular Priests, rather then of Iesuites? and did her Maiesty by those words (and onely demandeth of vs a true profession of our Allegeance, thereby to bee assured of our fidelitie to her Maiesties person, Crowne, Estate and Dignitie) demand of them, that thay should acknowledge her to be Queene onely de facto, but not de iure? And can Catholike Priests of other Countries giue to their Soueraignes no other assurance of their loyalty, then onely to acknowledge them to bee their Kings, and to raigne ouer them de facto, but not de iure, as these Priests did acknowledge themselues to bee most willing to giue such assurance and satisfaction in this point vnto her Maiesty, as any Catholike Priests can or ought to giue vnto their Soueraignes? No man could make doubt, but that shee was Queene, and did raigne de facto, and so much the whole Christian world, and her sworne enemies could not but acknowledge. So that, according to this shamelesse answer, those Priests did giue no other assurance of their loyaltie to Queene Elizabeth, then any man might giue to a knowen and manifest vsurper, and by those words to haue as full authoritie, power and Soueraignty as any her Predecessours euer had) did acknowledge her to haue no other power and authoritie, then any knowen vsurper hath, and which her knowen enemies, and who accounted her no lawfull Queene, would also acknowledge her to haue, that is to be Queene, and to raigne de facto, but not de iure.
6. Secondly, although one may truely acknowledge an vsurper to be King, and to raigne de facto, for that this doth onely imply an act, fact, or possession, which may bee without any right at all, yet no man can truely acknowledge, that an vsurper, or who is [Page 104] King de facto onely, and not de iure, hath authority, which doth import a rightfull and lawfull power, to raigne, and much lesse, to haue as full authoritie and power, as euer any his Predecessours euer had, who were Kings, and raigned not onely de facto but also de iure, or, which is all one, did both actually raigne, and also had full power and authority to raigne.
5 Thirdly, not onely the aforesayd acknowledgement, that her Maiestie, being at that time depriued by the Pope, had neuerthelesse as full power and authoritie, as any her Predecessours euer had before, doth necessarily suppose, that the Pope had no authoritie to depriue her, but also, although shee had not beene at that time depriued by the Pope, the other clause of their protestation, which contained a promise to obey her in all temporal causes, and to defend her &c. accounting it their dutie so to doe, notwithstanding any authoritie, or any Excommunication whatsoeuer denounced or to be denounced against her Maiestie, or euerie one borne within her Maiesties Dominions that would not forsake the aforesayd defence of her Maiestie &c. thinking themselues not bound in conscience to obey this or any such like Censure, doth necessarily suppose and imply the same, to wit, that the Pope had no authoritie to depose her, which Fa. Suarez arguing against the like clause contained in the new Oath of Allegeance doth most cleerely conuince, whose argument therfore I will set downe word by word, only turning his speech to the Priests, which he applieth to the Kings Maiestie.
‘8 For to take away all manner of euasion, saith Suarez, In Desens. lib. 6. cap. 3. I demand, whether those Priests doe vnderstand, that the sentence of the Pope deposing a baptized Queene for crimes may be iust, or they beleeue that it is alwaies vniust. The first they will not in my opinion affirme, for otherwise they should promise a most wicked thing, to wit, not to [Page 105] obey a iust sentence, which implieth in it a iust command. For if the sentence bee iust, the command also, which enioyneth subiects to obserue it, must also be iust, seeing that otherwise it cannot be put in execution. Also if the sentence of deposition denounced against a Queene may bee iust, it will also be effectuall, therefore it hath the effect of that punishment which it imposeth. Wherefore seeing that the punishment imposed by the sentence of deposition from her Kingdome, is to depriue her actually, or effectually of her dominion and propertie to her Kingdome, a iust sentence doth effectually depriue her of her Kingdome, therefore it is against iustice and obedience due vnto the Pope to resist that sentence, and to defend the Queenes person against the execution of that sentence, therefore hee that beleeueth the first, and neuerthelesse promiseth this second, doth promise a thing cleerly vniust and wicked.’
‘9 And besides it implieth a contradiction to be willing to yeeld obedience and allegeance, as thinking thy selfe bound so to doe, to one whom thou knowest to be by a iust declaration and sentence effectually deposed from her Kingdome. As if the Pope himselfe should exact of Christians a promise, that notwithstanding any sentence or declaration of deposing him for any crime euen for heresie denounced by whatsoeuer generall Councell, they will defend him in his See, and will yeelde him the same obedience and allegeance, their promise were wicked, for that it were a wicked thing, and against the Church & Faith. Such therfore is the promise of those Priests, if the aforesaid sentence against the Queene bee supposed to bee iust. This therefore those Priests without doubt will not admit, neither also are they, as I thinke, so inconsiderate of their affaires, that if they grant the Popes sentence denounced [Page 106] against a Queene may be iust, neuerthelesse they will deny that against the Queene of England it may haue the same iustice. For what greater immunitie or innocencie can they alledge in the Queene of England, then in other Princes, who haue beene rebells to the Romane Church, or forsakers and impugners of the faith. Or although they do not acknowledge, that the Queene for that time had not committed any thing worthy of deposition, how doe they know, that for the time to come she cannot? and yet their promise is absolute, notwithstanding any authoritie, or any sentence of Excommunication denounced or to be denounced against the Queene, or euery one borne within her Maiesties Dominions. &c. Wherefore there is no doubt, but that the ground of this promise and profession is, that such a sentence cannot bee iust. Wherefore from hence we euidently conclude, that those Priests by the aforesaid words do professe, that the sentence of deposition against the Queene can neither be valid nor iust. For in very deede this they doe professe, when they promise not to obey, nor to obserue such a sentence.’
‘10. Whereupon we do moreouer conclude, that those Priests doe professe, that the Pope hath not power to denounce such a sentence, seeing that for no other cause they doe beleiue the sentence to be vniust, but for that it is giuen without power and Iurisdiction in the Pope to depose a Queene. Neither can those Priests alledge in such a sentence any other cause of iniustice, which is perpetuall, and may be a ground of this part of their profession. for their profession doth not speake of a sentence alreadie denounced, but absolutely of a sentence denounced or to be denounced against the Queene: therfore it doth comprehend euery sentence, whether it bee giuen the partie being heard, or not heard, [Page 107] whether for disagreement in religion, or for any other crime, or cause whatsoeuer. Wherefore the iniustice which those Priests do suppose to bee in that sentence and wherupon they ground their profession is no other, but for that they beleeue, that it cannot proceede from a lawfull power and Iurisdiction. And therefore I conclude that they professe, that the Pope hath not power and Iurisdiction to giue a sentence of deposition against the Queene for any cause.’ Thus argueth Father Suarez. So that it is euident, that those thirteene reuerend Priests must of necessitie suppose, if they will haue their protestation and promise to be iust and lawfull, that the Pope hath no power to depriued Princes of their Regall right and authoritie.
11. And by this fift testimonie it is also apparant, that not only M. Doctour Barclay, and Widdrington, as Card. Bellarmine in his booke against Barclay, and now in his Sculckenius against me, vntruely affirmeth, but many other English Catholikes (to omit those other learned Catholikes of other Countries, of whom I haue spoken before, and the Kingdome and State of France, of which I will speake beneath)In the next Chapter. are of opinion, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue Soueraigne Princes of their temporall Kingdomes and dominions. Which also may moreouer be confirmed by the petition, which some English Catholikes did exhibite to Queene Elizabeth deceased after the discouerie of Parries conspiracie, wherein these expresse wordes are contained: In consideration of all which necessarie points, we doe protest before the true liuing God, that all and euery Priest and Priests, who haue at any time conuersed with vs, haue recognized your Maiestie their vndoubted and lawfull Queene tam de iure, quam de facto. who neuerthelesse was at that time and long before depriued of her Princely power, right and dignitie by the publike sentence of Pope Pius the fift.
[Page 108]12. And to these authorities we may add the testimonies set downe in the end of Mr. Blackwells Latine examination, of Bishop Watson, Abbot Fernam, Doctor, Cole, Iohn Harpesfield, and Nicolas Harpesfield) all of them very famous and learned Catholikes) who vpon the publishing of the Bull of Pius Quintus against Queene Elizabeth, being examined by the Magistrate in the yeare 1578. and demanded, whether notwithstanding the aforesaid Bull, or any other sentence of the Pope denounced or hereafter to be denounced against the said Queene, they did thinke, that shee was their true and lawfull Queene, and that they, and all other English and Irish men did as Subiects owe to her Maiesty obedience, faith, and loyaltie, as to their lawfull and true Queene, and Soueraigne Prince, they did all with vniforme consent acknowledge, and confesse, that notwithstanding the aforesaid Bull, or any other sentence or declaration of the Pope already denounced, or hereafter to be denounced against the said Queene, she was their true, and lawfull Queene, and that they did owe vnto her obedience and allegiance as to their lawfull Prince. And Nicholas Harpesfield answered more plainly and distinctly, that notwithstanding the aforesaid Bull, sentence and declaration of the Pope, or any other already denounced, or hereafter to be denounced by the Popes authority, he did acknowledge her to be his true Queene, and was to be obeyed, as a true Queene, and had as ample and full Regall authoritie in all ciuill and temporall causes, as either other Princes haue, or her most noble Progenitours euer had. The like also M. Edward Rishton, and M. Henry Orton both learned Priests did answere.
13. But M. Iames Bosgraue a learned Iesuite in his declaration made in the yeare 1582. did more plainly and fully set downe his opinion concerning the power it selfe to depose, that he did thinke and that before God, that the Pope hath no authoritie, neither de facto, nor de iure, to discharge the Subiects of the [Page 109] Queenes Maiestie, or of any other Christian Prince of their allegiance for any cause whatsoeuer, and that he was inwardly perswaded, in his conscience, that the Queenes Maiestie both is his lawfull Queene, and is also so to be accounted, notwithstanding any Bull or sentence, which the Pope hath giuen, shall giue, or may hereafter giue, and that he is readie to testifie this by Oath, if neede require. Mr. Iohn Hart also a learned Iesuite in his conference with M. Rainolds in the tower in the yeare 1584. and in his Epistle to the indifferent Reader did answere as effectually: As for that, saith he, which M. Rainolds affirmeth in one place, Chap. 7. diuis. 7. that I haue tould him, that my opinion is, the Pope may not depose Princes, indeede I tould him so much. And in truth I thinke, that although the spirituall power be more excellent and worthy then the temporall, yet they are both of God, neither doth the one depend on the other. Whereupon I gather as a certaine conclusion, that the opinion of them, who hold the Pope to be a temporall Lord ouer Kings and Princes, is vnreasonable, and vnprobable altogether. For he hath not to meddle with them or theirs ciuilly, much lesse to depose them, or giue away their Kingdomes: that is no part of his commission. Hee hath in my iudgement the Fatherhood of the Church, not a Princehood of the world: Christ himselfe taking no such title vpon him, nor giuing it to Peter, or any other of his disciples. And that is it which I meant to defend in him, and no other soueraigntie.
14 Mr. Camden also relatethIn Annalibus rerum Anglic. &c. pag. 327. ad ann. 1581., that when Fa: Campian, and diuers other Priests were demanded by the Magistrate, whether by the authoritie of the Bull of Pius Quintus hir Maiesties Subiects were absolued from their oath of allegiance in such sort, that they might take armes against hir Maiestie? whether they did thinke hir to be a lawfull Queene? whether they would subscribe to the opinion of D. Sanders, and Bristow touching the authoritie of that Bull? whether if the Pope should make warre against the Queene, they would take his or hir [Page 110] part? Some answered so ambiguously, some so headily, others by wrangling [...]rgiuersando, or by silence did shift off the questions so that diuers plaine dealing Catholikes began to suspect, that they harboured some treachery: and one Iames Bishop a man deuoted to the Pope of Rome did write against these men, and did soundly shew, that Constitution, which is obtruded in the name of the Councell of Lateran, (whereon all the authoritie to absolue Subiects from their Allegiance, and to depose Princes is grounded) was no other then a decree of Pope Innocent the third, and neuer receiued in England: yea and that Councell to be none at all, nor any thing there decreed at all by the Fathers. By all which it is euident, that few English Catholikes were of opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose Soueraigne Princes, vntill these later Iesuites, and such as adhered to their opinions, began to defend so eagerly the Bull of Pius Quintus, and to maintaine with such vehemencie his aforesaid authoritie to depose Princes, as a point of faith, which doctrine how preiudiciall it hath been, and is at this present to Catholikes, and Catholike Religion, I leaue, Catholike Reader, to thy prudent consideration.
Chap. 6.
Wherein the authoritie of the Kingdom, and State of France is at large discussed.
1. THe sixt and last testimonie which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation Cap. 3. sec. 3. num: 12., and also in my Apologie Num: 30. & seq. and which onely, if there were no other, would suffice to proue that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is not a point of faith, was taken from the authoritie of the most noble, and most Christian Kingdom and State of France, which euer held the contrarie to be the more true, sound, and assured doctrine. And first to omit the authoritie [Page 111] of Iacobus Almaine, a famous Schoole-Diuine of Paris, whereof I spake before, who affirmed, that very many, or most Doctors were of opinion, that the Pope hath not by the institution of Christ authoritie to inflict temporall punishments, no, nor so much as to imprison, much lesse to depriue Princes of their Kingdomes or liues) in a generall Parliament, or assembly of all the States of France held at Paris in the yeare 1593. the Cardinall de Pelleue, and other Prelates, who then were present, tooke exceptions against certaine decrees of the Councell of Trent, which Laurentius Bochellus relateth, among which that of the 25. session, chap: 19. wherein the Councell forbiddeth Kings to permit single combats, was one. The Councell of Trent, say they, doth excommunicate and depriue a King of the Cittie or place, wherein he permitteth to fight a single combate. This article is against the authoritie of the King, who can not be depriued of his temporall Dominion, in regard whereof he acknowledgeth no Superiour at all.
2 Secondly, Petrus Pithaeus, a man, as Posseuine the Iesuite relateth, truly learned, and a diligent searcher of antiquitie, in his booke, of the liberties of the Church of France, printed at Paris by authoritie of the Parliament in the yeare 1594, doth out of a generall maxime, which France, as he saith, hath euer approued as certaine, deduce this particular position: That the Pope can not giue as a prey the Kingdome of France, nor any thing appertayning therevnto, neither that he can depriue the King thereof, nor in any other manner dispose thereof. And notwithstanding any admonitions, Excommunications, or Interdicts, which by the Pope may be made, yet the subiects are bound to yeeld obedience due to his Maiestie for temporalls, neither therein can they be dispenced, or absolued by the Pope.
3 Mark now, good Reader, what silly shifts D. Schulckenius hath found out to repell the aforesaid authorities. To the first hee answereth,Pag. 121. ad num: 31. that it is not [Page 112] credible, that the Cardinall of Pelleue, and the other Prelates should affirme that, which Bochellus relateth. For the Councell of Trent, saith he, doth not decree, that Princes are absolutely depriued of the Cittie and place, wherein they shall permit single combat, but with a restriction, that they are depriued of the Cittie, fort, or place, which they hold of the Church, or which they hold in fee farme. Therfore the Councell doth not speake of the King of France, or other absolute Kings, vnlesse Bochellus will haue the Kingdome of France to be giuen to the Kings by the Church, or that the King is not a direct Lord, but a feudarie. Therefore it had been great imprudence and malignitie, to depraue so spitefully the words of the sacred Councell, as Bochellus hath depraued, which ought not to be presumed of the Cardinall of Pelleue, and of the other Prelates.
4 But truly it is not credible, that Bochellus durst presume to commit so great, and publike a forgerie, as to falsifie the Records of the highest Court of Parliament, and assembly of the three States of the Land, especially printing his booke at Paris, where without doubt he should not want men both to finde out easily, and also to punish seuerely so great a forgerie, and withall affirming, that those articles were extracted out of the Register of the assembly held at Paris in the yeare 1593, and putting downe such particular circumstances, as naming not only the day of the yeare, but also of the moneth, to wit, the 19. of Aprill, when the Lord Abbot of Orbais did on the behalfe of the Lord Cardinall of Pelleue bring a coppie of them &c. and setting downe all the articles in French, whereas the maine corps of his booke was Latin.
5 Neither is the reason, which D. Schulckenius bringeth, to make this testimonie seeme incredible, of any great moment. For first it is vntrue, which he saith, that the Councell did not speake of the King of France, and other absolute Kings. The words of the [Page 113] Councell are cleare to the contrarie. The Emperour, saith the Councell, Kings, Dukes, Princes, Marquesses, Earles, and temporall Lords by what other name soeuer they be called, who shall grant a place for single combat in their Countries among Christians, let them be excommunicated, and vnderstood depriued of the Iurisdiction and Dominion of the Cittie, fort, or place, which they hold from the Church, wherein, or whereat they shall permit single combat, and if they be held in fee farme, let them forthwith be taken for the direct Lords: but they that shall fight the combat, and they that are called their Patrimi, let them incurre ipso facto the punishment of Excommunication, and forfeiture of all their goods &c. So that it is plaine, that the Councell speaketh of Emperours, and of other absolute Kings and Princes.
6. Secondly, although it bee cleere, that those words [let them bee depriued of the Citty, Fort, or place which they hold from the Church] be spoken with a restriction and limitation onely to those Citties, Forts, or places, which bee held from the Church, yet the words following [and if they be held in fee farme, let them foorthwith be taken for the direct Lords] may absolutely, and without the aforesaid restriction bee vnderstood of those Citties, Forts or places, which be held in fee farme either from the Church, or from some other Soueraigne Prince, as from the direct Lord of them. So likewise the punishment of the confiscation of goods may be vnderstood as well without the territories of the Church, as within the Popes dominions, and may also bee vnderstood to comprehend absolute Princes, if perchance they should either bee Patrimi, or fight themselues in single combat. And so by consequence it might bee inferred, that, if the Councell hath authoritie to depriue absolute Kings of those dominions, which thy hold in fee farme from other absolute Princes, or to confiscate their goods, or else the goods of their subiects without their consent, [Page 114] the Councell also hath authoritie to depriue for the same cause absolute Princes of their Citties, Forts and places, whereof they are absolute Lords. And so the Cardinall of Pelleue, and other Prelates of France might vnderstand the Councell in that sense, as also D. Weston in his Sanctuarieq. 28. doth vnderstand them, and thereupon vrgeth those words of the Councell of Trent as a principall argument to prooue, that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is a poynt of faith, and decreed by the Councell of Trent, who little thought, that he should therefore haue beene censured of imprudencie and malignitie, as D. Schulckenius censureth the Prelates and Parliament of France, if they should vnderstand in that manner the Councell of Trent, as Bochellus relateth, and D. Weston expoundeth it.
6. To the second testimony of Petrus Pithaus, D. Schulckenius answereth in as shuffling a manner. First, I answer, saith he,Pag. [...] 24. that Antonie Posseuine commendeth Petrus Pithaeus for a learned man, and a diligent searcher of antiquity, and relateth all his workes, and also his death, and yet he maketh no mention of this booke, and I confesse I neuer saw it. But although neither Posseuine, nor D. Schulckenius euer saw that booke, yet I haue seene it, and read it, and it was printed at Paris by the authoritie of the Parliament in the yeere 1594. and it hath those maximes and positions which I related in my Apologie. And therefore we haue the testimony of a very learned Catholike, and a diligent searcher of antiquitie, by Posseuines confession, that France hath euer held this position for vndoubted, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue the King of France of his Kingdome, and that notwithstanding any admonitions, Excommunications &c. his subiects are bound to obey him in temporals.
7. His second answer is, that whosoeuer is the Authour of that booke, it is cleerely false, that France hath alwaies [Page 115] approoued that doctrine for certaine. Marke now the reasons, which D. Schulckenius bringeth to conuince this very learned man, and diligent searcher of antiquity of manifest falshood. For first it is repugnant, saith he, to the Councell of Claramont, wherein Philip the first was excommunicated and depriued of his Regall Honour and Crowne by Pope Vrbanus the second, whereof see Iuo Carnotensis in his 28. epistle to Vrbanus. But it is most cleerely false, that Philip was in that Councell depriued of his Regall Honour and Crowne, as both IIn Prefat. ad Resp. Apol. nu. 36. & seq., and Mr. Iohn Barclay In Prolegom. num. 75. haue cleerely shewed heeretofore, for that no Historiographer writeth, that he was deposed in that Councell, but at the most onely excommunicated, for that hee had forsaken his lawfull wife Berta, and had married Bertrada, who was also wife to another man. For Sigebert, Aimonius, Matthew Paris, Nauclerus, Paulus Aemilius, Robertus Gaguinus, Papirius Massonius, the Authour of the fragment of the historie of France published by Petrus Pithaeus with Glaber, Genebrard, and Vignerius doe relate that Philip was excommunicated by Vrbanus, and as some of them say, in the Councell of Claramont, but none of them make mention, that hee was deposed or depriued of his Royall honour and Crowne.
8. Neither can it any way be prooued out of Iuo, that Philip was depriued by Pope Vrbanus of his Royall Honour and Crowne, for that Iuo at that very time, when Philip was excommunicated, did in expresse words account him his Lord and King, and offered him his faithfull seruice, as to his Lord and King: This onely can be gathered out of Iuo, that King Philip was desirous to honour his new Queene, or rather Concubine Bertrada, by putting the Royall Crowne or Diademe on both their heads in a publike solemnity, which for that it was a religious ceremony, and vsually done in the Church at the time of Masse, by the Primate of the Land, and Philip was at that time excommunicated [Page 116] and depriued of all holy rites and ceremonies of the Church, Pope Vrbanus fo [...] bad all the Bishops of France to crowne in that sort the King, and his new supposed Queene, for Philip himselfe was long before crowned King of France, and this solemnitie, which Pope Vrbanus forbade, or the want thereof did not giue or take away from King Philip any iot of his Royall power and authoritie.
9. Secondly, it is repugnant, saith D. Schulckenius, to the examples of Gregorie the great, of Zachary, and of other Popes. But to those examples both I haue answered at large in my Apology,Num. 382. & seq. & num. 404. & seq. and also since that Mr. Iohn Barclay Ca. 40. & 42., to whom as yet no Reply hath beene made, and first, that those words of S. Gregorie, Lib. 2. epist. post. epist. 38. honore suo priuetur, let him be depriued, or I would to God he may be depriued of his honour (for both wayes it may be Englished, as that the verbe priuetur may be of the Imperatiue, or of the Optatiue moode) doe not contain a iuridicall sentence, command or decree, as likewise neither those words, which are spoken in the like manner by S. Gregory, & cum Iuda traditore in inferno damnetur, and let him be damned in hell, or, I wish he may be damned in hell with Iudas the traitour, but onely either a zealous imprecationSee Baronius ad annum 1097. num 51. against them, who should infringe his priuiledge, if they did not repent, or else a declaration, that they were worthie for their contempt, to bee depriued of their honour, and to bee condemned to hell fire with Iudas the traitour: from whence it cannot be inferred, that the Pope hath authoritie to depriue by a iuridical sentence those Kings who infringe his priuiledge of their Regall Honour, or to condemne them by a iuridicall sentence to hell fire.
10. So likewise to that example of Pope Zacharie I answered,Num. 404. & seq. that he did not by any iuridicall sentence of depriuation depriue Childerike of his Kingdome, and create Pipin King, but onely gaue his aduise, [Page 117] counsell, and consent, or at the most command to the Peeres of France, that they ought, or might lawfully (the circumstances which they propounded to Zacharie being considered) depriue Childerike of his kingdome, and create Pipin king: but this argueth no authoritie in the Pope to depose Princes by any iuridicall sentence of depriuation, but at the most an authority in the common wealth to depose their King in some cases of great moment, which is not the question, which we haue now in hand. And therefore the Glosse In cap. Alius 15. q. 6. with other graue and learned Authours cited by me in my Apologie Num. 404. & seq. doe expound those wordes of Pope Gregorie the seueth: Zacharie deposed Childerike, thus, Zacharie gaue his aduise and consent to those who deposed him: and those words, which some Chronicles haue, Childerike was deposed by the authoritie of Pope Zacharie, Lupolbus Bambergensis, Ioannes Parisiensis, and Michael Coccineus doe expound in the like maner, that Childerike was deposed by the authoritie of Pope Zacharie not deposing Childerike, and creating Pipin King, but only declaring, that he might be lawfully deposed by the Peeres of France, whereof they were in some doubt, for that they had sworne to him allegiance, and therefore they craued the opinion, and aduise of Pope Zacharie to be resolued by him of that doubt, for that the Ʋniuersitie of Paris did not flourish at that time, saith Ioannes Maior, Jn 4. dist. 24. q. 3. circa sinē. de potest. Regia & Papal. c. 15. and so Pipin was annointed King by the election of the Barons, saith Ioannes Parisiensis, and by the authoritie of the Pope declaring the doubt of the Barons, which also they might haue done without the Popes consent vpon a reasonable cause.
11. But because Card. Bellarmine will neuer cease to inculcate still the same authorities, which by mee, and others haue beene so often answered, I thinke it not amisse to add something here concerning that, which I did in generall words insinuate in my Apologie, Num. 382. and is more expresly touched by Nicholas Vingerius [Page 118] in his Historie of the Church of France, and more particularly vrged by the Bishop of Rochester in his answere to Card. Bellarmines Treatise against Barclay; to wit, that the priueledge which is said to be granted by S. Gregorie to the Monasterie of S. Medard, and which is so greatly vrged by Card. Bellarmine, and others, is not so authenticall, as Card. Bellarmine, and others suppose it to be, which may be proued by many probable coniectures; as by the stile, and phrase, which is not agreeable to S. Gregories, and also by the date of the yeare of our Lord, which is not agreeable to the manner of dating of those daies, but principally by the persons, who are subscribed for witnesses to that priueledge. For S. Austin Bishop of Canterbury, and Mellitus Bishop of London, and Theodorike King of France, are subscribed for witnesses to that priueledge, and yet neither S. Austin, nor Mellitus, were Bishops, nor Theodorike King at that time, which Card. Baronius also doth in expresse words affirmeAd annum 893. num. 85.. But I confesse, saith he, that the subscriptions of the Bishops, and of Theodorike King of France do not agree to these times: for many Bishops, who are found subscribed, are knowne to be created some certaine yeares after, as to speake nothing of the rest, Augustin Bishop of Canterbury, and Mellitus of London, who, as it is manifest, were neither at this time Bishops, nor gone for England; neither at this time did Theodorike reigne in France, but Childebert, and Gunthramn. Wherefore my opinion is, that the subscription was afterwards adioyned. Thus Baronius. But considering that Theodorike not only in the subscription, but also in the priueledge it selfe is named King, at whose instance S. Gregorie saith he granted that priueledge, Baronius might with the same reason haue affirmed, that not only the subscription, but also the priueledge it selfe was afterwards made, and adioyned to S. Gregories Epistles, which without doubt Baronius would quickly haue acknowledged, if it had not beene for [Page 119] those words honore suo priuetur, which hee thought made greatly for the Popes power to depose Princes, seeing that vpon far weaker grounds hee sticketh not to deny oftentimes priueledges, and antiquities, which neuer before were called in question.
12. And although Pope Gregorie the seuenth in his Epistle to the Bishop of Metz doth not cite this priueledge, of S. Gregorie granted to the Monasterie of S. Me [...]ard (which is no small coniecture, that this priueledge was not extant in those daies among the Epistles of S. Gregorie, for otherwise it bearing so great a shew of being authenticall by the subscription of 30 Bishops, and the King and Queene of France, who were witnesses thereunto, it would by all likelihood haue beene cited by Pope Gregorie the seuenth) but an other priueledge granted to an other Monasterie by S, Gregorie in his Epistle to one Senator Abbot Lib. 11. epist. epist. 10. wherin S. Gregorie did not say honore suo priuetur, let him be depriued of his honour, but potestatis, honorisque sui dignitate careat, let him want, or, I desire he may want, not his honour, but the worthinesse of his power and honour, which words are not so forcible to prooue the Popes authoritie to depriue Kings of their princely honour and power, but at the most to declare them to bee vnworthy of it for some crime committed by them, and to be worthy also to be damned in hell with Iudas the Traitor, for that many a one may be a true King, and haue princely power and honour who is vnworthy thereof. Neuerthelesse, (besides that the aforesaid words do containe no sentence of depriuation, but onely a curse, or imprecation, which kinde of imprecations euen containing anathema was frequent in the priueledges granted by Lay-men, yea and vpon sepulchres, that men should be fearefull to violate them, as Baronius Ad an. 1097. Num. 51. relateth) also this priueledge mentioned in S. Gregories epistle to Senator, is not so authenticall, both for that it hath neither date of any yeare, or day when [Page 120] it was written, nor subscription of any witnesse, which by likelihood it would haue had, if there had beene any authenticall copie thereof, and also for that the Authour of the booke intituled de vnitate Ecclesiae who is thought to be Venericus Bishop of Vercellis, and liued in Pope Gregorie the seuenth his time, answering that epistle of Pope Gregorie the seuenth to the Bishop of Metz doth bouldly affirme, that those words, potestatis honorisque sui dignitate careat, let him want the worthinesse of his power and honour, were not in those daies extant among the workes of S. Gregorie. Whereby the Reader may easily perceiue, what weake demonstrations and authorities Card. Bellarmine doth so often inculcate to conuince this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Painces to be a point of faith.
13 Thirdly, it is also repugnant, saith D. Schulckenius, to those most famous French writers, whom I related before. But although it be true, that the most part of those seuenteene French writers related by Card: Bellarmine in his booke against Barclay, and now in his Schulckenius against me, are of opinion, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, this neuerthelesse may also be true, which Petrus Pithaeus affirmeth, to wit, that France, vnderstanding thereby the State of France, hath euer held, the the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue the King of France of his Kingdom. May it not truly be said, that the Kingdome, and State of England hath from the first yeere of Queene Elizabeths reigne, euen to this present time, held, that the Catholike Romane Religion is not the true Religion, notwithstanding that not onely seuenteene, but seuenteene thousands there haue been of English Catholikes, since the first beginning of hir reigne, till now, who haue held the contrarie. wherefore when Petrus Pithaeus affirmed, that France hath euer held, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose their King, by France hee did not vnderstand euery particular [Page 121] French-man, but the State and temporall Gouernours of the Kingdome of France, which his assertion is also confirmed by the State and Parliament of Paris, first in the censuring of Card: Bellarmines booke against D. Barclay, then in burning his Schulckenius written against me, afterwards in condemning Suarez booke against his Maiesties Apologie for maintayning so stifly this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all their temporalls, which they call a scandalous, and seditious, a damnable, and pernicious doctrine, and now lastly, by the decree of the Parliament of Paris the second of Ianuarie of this present yeere 1615, wherein it is ordained, that it shall not bee held for problematique; and also by the new oath of allegiance like vnto that of ours, (but that ours is more sweete, and more modest, as the Cardinall du Peron Pag. 100. affirmeth) which those of the lower house of the generall assembly of all the States of France, (whom the same Cardinall du Peron, in his speech to them, confesseth to be CatholikesPag. 96.,) endeauoured to haue made for a fundamentall Law.
14 Lastly, it is also repugnant, saith D. Schulckenius, to reason, it is repugnant to the principles of the Catholike faith. For if the Subiects of the King of France be bound to obey their King being excommunicated, and that they can not be absolued from this obedience by the Pope, it followeth that either the King of France can not be bound by Christ his Vicar with the bond of Excōmunication, or that his Subiects can not be loosed from the bond of their allegiance and obedience. Both are repugnant to the words of Christ, who said to his Ʋicar, whatsoeuer thou shalt binde vpon earth, shall be bound also in heauen, and whatsoeuer thou shalt loose vpon earth shall be loosed also in heauen. Neither did Christ except the King of France, or his Subiects, and who hath excepted them I can not tell. This I know, that no man could by right except them. and whosoeuer will not be subiect [Page 122] to the keyes of the Church, I know, and with a cleare voice I doe pronounce, that hee will neither bee a Christian, nor can [...]e appertaine to the kingdome of Christ.
15 Great words to small purpose. For although it be true, that Card: Bellarmine, Suarez, and some few others are, or seeme to be of opinion, that it is against reason, and against the principles of the Catholike faith, to hold, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose Princes, yet it is also true, that other learned Catholikes are of opinion, that it is neither against reason, nor against the principles of the Catholike faith to hold, that the Pope hath no such authoritie. Must the opinion of Card: Bellarmine, or of Suarez, or of any other learned Catholike, be a rule of reason to all other learned Catholikes, or to bee accounted by all Catholikes the principles of the Catholike faith? All Catholikes doe confesse, that the Pope hath authoritie to excommunicate a Christian King, and that Subiects are not bound to obey an excommunicated King in those things, which the Censure of Excommunication of it owne nature, and by the institution of Christ doth forbid; but to absolue Subiects from their temporall allegiance either by vertue of Excommunication (which being a spirituall Censure hath neither of it owne nature, nor by the institution of Christ such a temporall effect) or by the sentence of depriuation, this many learned Catholikes, with the State of France doe affirme not to belong to the Popes spirituall authoritie to binde, or loose.
16 True also it is, that all Christians are subiect to the keyes of the Church, but these keyes are spirituall, not temporall, of the kingdome of heauen, and not of earthly kingdomes; neither is any Christian excepted from that authoritie, which Christ gaue to S. Peter by those words, whatsoeuer thou shalt loose &c. But those words are not to be vnderstood of temporall, [Page 123] but onely of spirituall bindings and loosings, as I haue often shewed; neither did any of the ancient Fathers euer extend the keyes of the Church, to the absoluing of Subiects from their temporall allegiance, or to the depriuing of Kings and Princes of their temporall liues, libertie, kingdomes or goods, as by some Catholikes of these latter ages, contrarie to the true meaning and institution of Christ, and to the vnderstanding and practise of the primitiue Church, they haue been violently wrested. To that whatsoeuer thou shalt loose &c. I answer, saith Ioannes Parisiensis, according to S. Chrysostome & Rabanus, that by this is not vnderstood any power to be giuen but spirituall, to wit, to absolue from the bond of sinnes. For it were foolish to vnderstand, that by this is giuen a power to absolue from the bond of debts, and much lesse from that great and high debt of temporall allegiance.
16. These be all the exceptions which D. Schulckenius taketh against those authorities, which I broght in my Theologicall Disputation: Now let any indifferent Reader iudge, whether he hath sufficiently answered those authorities, or rather by cauilling and shuffling laboured cunningly to shift them off, and whether Mr. Fitzherbert might not blush to affirme so boldly, that D. Schulckenius, to whom he cunningly also, as you haue seene, remitteth his English Reader, for his answer to those authorities, hath answered particularly to euerie one of them, and prooued cleerely, that diuerse of them make flat against Widdrington, and many nothing at all for him (being truely vnderstood) and that some others are worthily reiected, being either so absurd, that they are easily confuted by the circumstances of the places alledged, or else heretikes (as appeareth by their doctrine in other things) or knowen Schismatikes, who liuing in the times of the Emperours or Kings that were deposed, wrote partially in their fauours, of which sort neuerthelesse there are very few, so that of all the Authours, [Page 124] that Widdrington hath scraped together to make some shew of probabilitie in his doctrine, hee hath no one cleere and sufficient witnesse to iustifie the same, which how true it is, or rather most cleerely false, I remit to the consideration of the indifferent and iudicious Reader.
17. For the testimony of Iohn Trithemius, a learned and vertuous Catholike, who expressely affirmeth, that it is a controuersie among Schoolmen, & as yet not decided by the Iudge, whether the Pope hath power to depose the Emperour or no, partly hee reiecteth, partly that word Schoolemen hee ridiculously expoundeth to be Historiographers, Grammarians, Poets, as Sigebert, Valla, Dantes, who neuerthelesse are by Trithemius himselfe related to be also excellent Diuines, and partly to repell his testimonie he falsely, grossely, and vnaduisedly taxeth him with errours committed in his historie, and for proofe thereof he remitteth his Reader to Posseuine, who, as you haue seene, both in that, and also other points of historie hath shamefully erred himselfe: and neuerthelesse, that which Trithemius affirmeth, Iacobus Almaine a famous Schoole-Diuine, and classicall Doctour of Paris, who liued also in those daies, confirmeth to be true, whose words D. Schulckenius doth cunningly passe ouer without any answer at all. Albericus, a Classicall Doctour of the canon and ciuill Law, for that hee deliuereth his opinion with submission, & is ready to recal it, if it should prooue erroneous, as euery good Catholike ought to doe, he will haue to speake wauering, and altogether doubtfull. Ioannes Parisiensis, a most learned Schoole-Diuine partly he will haue to make nothing for my opinion, and yet he confesseth that Parisiensis is of opinion, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue a Prince of his Kingdome by a iuridicall sentence of depriuation, which neuerthelesse is the maine and sole point, which I contend to prooue: and partly to cleane ouerthrow his testimony he taxeth him without [Page 125] sufficient ground of many errours, which errours neuerthelesse although he should haue maintained, doe cleerely confirme this doctrine against the Popes power to depose Princes. The testimony of Mr. D. Barclay a famous, learned and vertuous Catholike he no more regardeth then of an heretike. To M. Blackwell and those other English Priests he answereth nothing. The Records of the generall assembly of the States of France related by Bochellus with such particular circumstances, that no man can misdoubt of them, for a friuolous reason hee accounteth incredible, The testimonie of Petrus Pithaeus, a very learned Catholike, and a diligent searcher of antiquity by Posseuines confession, affirming that France hath euer held for certaine, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose their King, also for friuolous reasons hee vtterly reieiecteth, which neuerthelesse the late proceeding of the Court of Parliament against his, and such like bookes hath sufficiently confirmed. And if this manner of answering authorities is to bee admitted, who may not easily shift off any authorities whatsoeuer, especially when they shall haue their trumpetters to extoll all their writings and answers to the skie, and to depresse their aduersaries, and who shall seeme to make against them, whether they be liuing or dead, euen to the pit of hell, appeaching them of heresie, errour, schisme, and such like hainous crimes?
18. Many other authorities I brought in my Apologie, which doe cleerely contradict Card. Bellarmines doctrine (which onely I tooke vpon mee to confute) whereof some of them doe expressely affirme, that the Church of Christ hath onely a spirituall, and not a temporall sword; Others, that temporall Princes are in temporall affaires next vnder God, and to bee punished with temporall punishments by God alone, and that the temporall power is independant of the spirituall: Others, that neither Childerike was deposed, [Page 126] nor the Romane Empire translated from the Graecians to the Germans, or French, by the Popes sole authoritie, but by the consent, suffrages, and authoritie also of the people, which neuerthelesse are principall authorities, which by Card. Bellarmine and others are brought to prooue the Popes power to depose Princes: Finally others, although they be of opinion, that the Pope hath authoritie to depose Princes for heresie, or, which is a farre different question, to declare them to be deposed (for so writeth Antonius de Rosellis) yet they deny that for other temporall crimes or for insufficiency in gouernment a Christian Prince can be deposed by the Pope, whereas Card. Bellarmine doth not limit his authoritie to any crime or cause, but doth absolutely, in ordine ad bonum spirituale, in order to spirituall good extend this pretended authoritie.
19. Neither is it true, that I brought the authority of anie heretike for proofe of my opinion, as M. Fitzherbert without anie shame or cōscience vntruly affirmeth: I omitted of set purpose to name Marsilius of Padua, for that not onely his booke, but also himselfe is placed among heretikes in the Catalogue of forbidden bookes. And although I had vrged his authority in that sort, as I did vrge it in my Appendix against Fa. Suarez, yet it had beene in my iudgement a forcible proofe; not for that I thinke the authority of an heretike, barely considered by it selfe, to be of anie force to prooue affirmatiuely any doctrine to belong to faith, but for that Marsilius, writing a booke of purpose to defend the right and Soueraigntie of Emperours and Kings against the Popes power to depose them, wherin here and there he scattereth many heresies, he should by Catholike Authours, who write of heresies, as Castro, Prateolus, D. Sanders and others, bee particularly taxed of those heresies, and yet his doctrine against the Popes power to depose Princes, which was [Page 127] the principall subiect of his booke, should not bee censured by them as hereticall or erroneous, for this is a forcible argument, that those Catholike writers did not account his doctrine in that point to be hereticall or erroneus, although they thought it perchance to be the lesse probable doctrine.
20. True also it is, that in my Apologie I alledged Sigebert for my opinion, for that hee vehemently impugned this pretended doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, both against Pope Gregorie the seuenth, and also Paschalis the second, calling it a noueltie, not to say an heresie, and answering, as he saith, with strong arguments of the Fathers the Epistle, which the said Gregorie wrote to Hermannus Bishop of Metz in reproach of Kingly power. But Sigebert, saith D. Schulckenius, was a Schismatike, and his bookes against Gregorie the seuenth, and Paschalis the second are condemned by the Catholike Romane Church. But truly it is strange, and greatly to be lamented, to see some Catholikes now adaies, especially who professe sanctitie of life, and pretend to haue a tender and timorous conscience so easily to defame, and slander other Catholikes, who dislike their opinions or proceedings, with such enormious crimes, as are Schisme, heresie, and Apostacie. What reason had Card. Baronius, of whom D. Schulckenius hath taken the same, to call Sigebert a Schismatike (he being by no other Authour, that I haue read, before Baronius, charged with that heinous crime, but was euer reputed a learned, vertuous, and religious Catholike) truely I cannot in any wise perceiue. Schisme is a rebellious seperation from the vnitie of the Church, or a refusing to obey the Pope, as he is the visible head of the Church, and Christ his Ʋicegerent on earth.
21: For obserue diligently, saith Card. Caietane2a. 2a. q. 39. ar. 2. in resp. ad 2m. that to refuse to obey the Popes commaund may happen three manner of waies. First, in regard of the thing commanded. [Page 128] Secondly, in regard of the person commanding; and thirdly in regard of the office of the Iudge, or commander. For if one doth euen with obstinacie contemne the Popes sentence, to wit, for that he will not fulfill that, which the Pope hath commanded, as to abstaine from such a warre, to restore such a State &c. although hee should most greiuously sinne, yet he is not for this a Schismatike. For it falleth out and that often, that one will not fulfill the command of his Superiour acknowledging him neuerthelesse to be his Superior. For if one vpon a reasonable cause hath the Pope for a person suspected, and therefore doth not only refuse the Popes presence, but also his immediate iudgement or sentence, being readie to receiue from him not suspected Iudges, hee neither incurreth the crime of Schisme, nor any other crime. For it is naturall to shunne hurtfull things, and to be warie of dangers. And the Popes person may gouern tyrānically, & so much the easier, by how much he is more potent, and feareth no reuenger on earth. But when one refuseth to obey the Popes command or sentence in regard of his office, not acknowledging him to be his Superiour, although he do beleiue he is, then properly he is a Schismatike. And according to this sense are to be vnderstood the words of S. Thomas and such like, for euen obstinate disobedience doth not make Schisme, vnlesse it be a rebellion to the office of the Pope, or of the Church, so that he refuse to subiect himselfe vnto him, to acknowledge him for Superiour &c. Thus Card. Caietane.
22. Now what Authour euer said, that Sigebert refused to obey in this sort Pope Gregories command, or that he acknowledged Guibert the Antipape, and not Gregorie, to be the true and lawful Pope. True it is that Sigebert was blamed by some, as Trithemius In verbo Sigebertus. relateth, for that he adhering to the Emperour Henry being a persecutour and rebell to the Romane Church, wrote letters and treatises against Pope Gregorie the seuenth, whih did not become his profession, but that Sigebert did depart from the vnitie of the Church, or that he refused [Page 129] to obey and subiect himselfe to Pope Gregorie, as not acknowledging him to be his Superiour, which is necessarily required to make one a Schismatike, or that he adhered to the Emperour Henry in his rebellion to the Romane Church, and in deposing Gregorie, and creating Guibert Pope, neither D. Schulckenius, nor any other is able to prooue out of any ancient or moderne writer.
23. True also it is, that Sigebert was of this opinion, that the Pope had no authoritie to depose the Emperour, and therein he opposed himselfe to Pope Gregorie, and answered, as hee saith, all his arguments with strong testimonies of the Fathers, and vpon this ground he adhered to the Emperour, acknowledging him to still remaine the true and lawfull Emperour, and refused to obey Pope Gregories command, wherein hee strictly ordained, that no man should account Henry the fourth to be true and lawfull Emperour: But considering that the doctrine for the Popes power to dethrone temporall Princes, and the practise thereof, was then new in the Church of God, and neuer heard of before, for which cause it was called by Sigebert a noueltie, not to say an heresie, and since that time there hath euer beene a great controuersie, saith Azor Tom. 2. lib. 11. cap. 5. q. 8., concerning this point, betwixt Emperours and Kings on the one side, and the Bishops or Popes of Rome on the other, and the Schoolemen are at variance about the same, and as yet the Iudge hath not decided it, saith Trithemius, and very many Doctours are of opinion that the Pope hath no such authoritie, saith Almainus, and the State of France hath euer maintained the same for certaine, saith Pithaeus, and the late practise of the Parliament of Paris (to omit all the authorities of our learned Countreymen) doth most clearely confirme the same, it is neither reason, nor conscience to charge Sigebert with Schisme, for impugning that new doctrine and practise, which was neuer heard of before in the Church of God. And [Page 130] therefore many complained, saith Az [...] in the same place, that Gregorie the seuenth did depri [...]e Henry the fourth of the administration of the Empire.
24 For although the Bishops of Rome, (saith Onuphrius, a man, as Posseuine confesseth, of exceeding great reading, and whom Paulus Manutius calleth a deuourer of Histories) were before honoured, as the heads of Christian Religion, and the Ʋicars of Christ, and the Successours of Peter, yet their authoritie was not extended any farther, then either in declaring or maintayning positions of faith. But yet they were subiect to the Emperours, all things were done at the Emperours backe, they were created by them, and the Pope of Rome durst not presume to iudge, or decree any thing concerning them. Gregorie the seuenth, the first of all the Bishops of Rome, being aided with the forces of the Nortmans, trusting in the riches of Countesse Mathildis, a woman most potent in Italie, and being encouraged with the discord of the German Princes, who were at ciuill warre among them selues, contrarie to the custome of his ancestours, contemning the authoritie and power of the Emperour, when hee had gotten the Popedome, did presume, I doe not say, to excommunicate, but also to depriue the Emperour, by whom, if he was not chosen, he was at the least confirmed, of his Kingdome and Empire. A thing not heard of before that age. For the fables which are carried abroad of Arcadius, Anastasius, & Leo Iconomachus, I do nothing regard. Thus Onuphrius Lib: 4. de varia creat. Rom: Pont..
25 Lastly, it is also true, that Sigeberts bookes in answer to the letters of Pope Gregorie, and Pope Paschalis are put in the Catalogue of forbidden bookes, but that they are forbidden or condemned by the Catholike Church, or the Catholike Romane Church, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, vnlesse by the Catholike Church, or Catholike Romane Church hee vnderstand those few Cardinalls, and Diuines of Rome, who are appointed by the Pope for the examining, permitting [Page 131] and forbidding of bookes, (which were a very strange and ouer-strict description of the Catholike Church) is altogether vntrue. Neither is it knowne, for what cause those bookes of Sigebert are put in the Catalogue of forbidden bookes; as likewise two bookes of mine written especially against Card: Bellarmine, haue of late by a speciall decree of the aforesaid Cardinalls, and especially of Card: Bellarmine, who hath been pleased to be a Iudge, witnesse, and accuser in his owne cause, been prohibited, and I vnder paine of Ecclesiasticall Censures commanded to purge my selfe forthwith, but the cause wherefore they are forbidden is not therein expressed, neither as yet haue they giuen me to vnderstand, of what crime either in particular, or in generall, I am to purge my selfe, although in my purgation written to his Holinesse long agoeThe 24. of Iune 1614., I haue most humbly and instantly desired it, and haue protested to bee most ready to purge my selfe of any crime whatsoeuer I shall know to haue committed, which their strange proceeding doth clearely argue, that they haue no small distrust in their cause, and that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is not so cleare a point of faith, as Card: Bellarmine, and his followers would haue the Popes Holinesse and the Christian world with out sufficient grounds to beleeue.
26 Seeing therefore that there be many causes, wherefore bookes may be forbidden, and which in generall are reduced to these two heads, either that they are repugnant to faith, or else to good manners, which the late instructions for the correcting of bookes published by the commandement of Pope Clement the eight, do in so large, yet doubtfull a manner extend, that scarse any booke can be found which treateth of the Popes authoritie, but some Correctour or other may easily except against it, (as those bookes are to be corrected, which are against Ecclesiasticall [Page 132] libertie, immunitie, and Iurisdiction, so that if a Canonist be the Corrector, he will haue that blotted ou [...], which denyeth the Popes direct power in temporalls, and that Cleargie are not exempted by the law of God and nature from the coerciue power of Princes &c.) vnlesse it can be proued, that Sigebert bookes were put in the Catalogue of prohibited bookes, for that they impugned the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, no good argument can be drawne from that Catalogue, to impeach Sigeberts credit for the impugning of that doctrine. Neither can Card: Baronius, nor Card: Bellarmine be excused from greeuous detraction, in charging Sigebert, who both in his life and after his death was accounted a learned, vertuous, and religious Catholike, with that execrable crime of schisme, for which at the day of iudgement they shall render an exact account, vnlesse they can proue, that he did separate himselfe from the vnitie of the Church, or disobey the Popes command, as not acknowledging him to be the true visible head of the Church, and the Successour of S. Peter.
27 I omit now to declare how Catholikes ought to carry themselues in times of Schisme, when more then one pretend to be the true and rightfull Pope, and whether those, who adhere to a false Pope, perswading themselues for probable reasons, that hee is the true and lawfull Pope, are to be condemned of Schisme, and to bee accounted formall Schismatikes; concerning which question read Iohn Gerson in his Treatise therof. This only at this present I will demand, that if to reiect the testimonie of Sigebert, or any such like Authour, it be sufficient without any other proofe, to say, as Mr Fitzherbert answereth, that they liuing in the time of the Emperours and Kings that were deposed, wrote partially in their fauour, why may it not with the same facilitie bee answered to the authorities of many others of the contrarie side, that they liuing in the time [Page 133] of the Popes, who tooke vpon them to depose Kings and Emperours (for this hath euer been a great controuersie, saith Azor, betwixt Kings and Emperours on the one side, and the Bishops of Rome on the other) wrote partially in their fauour? May not Popes haue their flatterers, and who doe attribute vnto them more ample authoritie, then is fitting, as of the Canonists Pope Pius the fift affirmed to that learned Nauarre in cap. Non liceat. 12. q. 2. § nu: 6., as well as Kings and Emperours? See aboue cap: 3. nu. 6. what Parisiensis saith of this flattering.
20 Wherefore to make an end of these Authorities, I will onely request the iudicious Reader, that he will be pleased to consider these two things: first, the reasons which I brought both in my Apologie Num. 449., and also in myCap. 3. sec. 3. nu. 15. & seq. Theologicall Disputation, which D. Schulckenius passeth ouer with silence, why there are to be found so few Authours at this present, whose writings are now extant, who deny the Popes authoritie to depose Princes in comparison of those, who doe maintaine the same, which being duely considered, the Reader will easily perceiue, that it is a great maruaile to finde in any Catholike booke any one sentence or clause, which seemeth any way to call in question this temporall authoritie of the Pope: and neuerthelesse there are at this present, and euer haue been, as I haue clearely shewed before, many vertuous and learned Catholikes, who notwithstanding all the clamours, and threatnings of our ouer-violent Aduersaries, are of this opinion, that the Pope hath no such authoritie to depriue Kings and Princes of their temporall dominions.
21 The second is, that if the doctrine of that learned Nauarre, an excellent Diuine, and most skilfull in the Law, (sayth Posseuine) of Bartholomaeus Fumus in his Aurea armilla, of Gabriel Ʋasquez See the Preface. nu. 40. 43. and of other Diuines be true, that in the Court of conscience it be sufficient to this effect, that we shall commit no sinne, to choose [Page 134] his opinion for true, whom for good cause we thinke to be a man sufficiently learned, end of a good conscience, and that no man is bound to follow alwayes the better opinion, but it sufficeth to follow that opinion, which some skilfull Doctors thinke to be true: how much the more may our Catholike Countrimen prudently perswade themselues, that the Pope hath no authority to depose Princes, which doctrine not onely one learned, and vertuous man, but very many with the State of France do approue, and who also haue diligently read, examined, and abundantly answered all the reasons, arguments, and authorities, which their learned Aduersaries haue obiected to the contrarie? And this I hope may suffice for the first part, and for clearing all those authorities, which I brought in my Theologicall Disputation from all the exceptions, which D. Schulckenius hath taken against them. Now wee will examine the reasons, and intrinsecall grounds of this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes.
THE SECOND PART
Wherein ALL THE PRINCIPALL ARGVments, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to proue the vnion and subordination of the temporall and spirituall power, together with the Replyes, which are brought, by D. Schulckenius to confirme the same, are exactly examined.
Chap. 1.
The true state of the question concerning the vnion of the temporall and spirituall power is declared.
1. BEcause my Aduersarie Mr. Fitzherbert, and all the rest, who doe so vehemently maintaine the Popes power to depose Princes, doe much rely vpon the vnion, and subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, as vpon a principall proofe grounded vpon the light of reason, before I come to examine the particular points of his Reply, I thinke it not amisse for the better vnderstanding of what shall be said hereafter by either of vs concerning this subordination, or vnion, to declare, in what sort these two powers are among [Page 136] Christians united and subordained, and what a weake ground this subordination is to proue, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, to dispose of temporalls, and to punish temporally by way of coercion or constraint. And to proceede orderly herein, and that the Reader may clearely perceiue, what is the true state of the question, betwixt me and Card. Bellarmine and not be caried away with a confuse concept of I know not what kinde of vnion and subordination, I will first set downe that which is certain, and out of question, and then what is in controuersie betweene vs concerning this vnion and subordination.
2. First therefore I agree with Card. Bellarmine in this, that the ciuill or temporall power of it owne nature, and being considered precisely by it selfe, is a distinct power from the spirituall, and no way subiect or subordained to it (as in my Apologie Num. 132. & seq. & nu. 150. 153. 154. I affirmed out of Card. Bellarmine) but they are two seuerall, distinct, and disunited powers, and not depending one of the other, and haue distinct ends, distinct functions, distinct lawes, distinct punishments, distinct, Magistrates and Princes. And this is very apparant partly in infidell Countries, where there is true ciuill or temporall power (saith Card. Bellarmine Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 6.) without any order or reference to any true Ecclesiasticall or spirit all power: and partly in the time of the Apostles, who had true and perfect spirituall power without [...] true supreme temporall or ciuill authoritie. And from hence it followeth, that as the supreme spirituall Prince, or Pastour is subiect to none in spirituall [...]o also the supreme temporall Prince is subiect to none in temporalls.
3. Secondly, we do also agree in this, that although among Christians the temporall, and spirituall power do still remaine two distinct supreme powers, for that the Mediatour betwixt God and men Christ Iesus hath also by proper actions, and distinct dignities distinguished [Page 137] either power, as Pope Nicholas the first doth well affirmeIn epst. ad Micha [...]lem Imp. Cum ad verum dist. 96., yet they are so vnited, and conioyned together among Christians, that temporall authoritie and spirituall authoritie, temporall authoritie, and spirituall subiection, temporall subiection and spirituall subiection (to omit spirituall authoritie and temporall subiection) may be vnited and conioined, at one or diuerse times, in one and the selfe same Christian man: by reason of which vnion and coniunction the same Christian man may be both a temporall, and also a spirituall Prince, as we see in the Pope, who by the institution of Christ is the supreme spirituall Pastour of the Church, and by the consent of Christian Princes and people is become also a temporall Prince: the same Christian man may be both a temporall Prince, and also a spirituall subiect, as are all Christian Princes, who, as Princes, are supreme in temporalls, and as Christians, are subiect in spirituals to the spirituall Pastour of Christs Church; the same Christian man may bee both a temporall, and also a spirituall subiect, as are other Christians whatsoeuer; and whether the same man may be a spirituall Prince, and yet a temporall subiect, dependeth on that question, whether and in what manner our Sauiour Christ hath exempted Cleargie men, and especially the Pope from subiection to temporall Princes. But the question betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine is, whether this manner of vnion and coniunction of these two powers, or subiections in the same Christian man, be sufficient to make the whole Christian world to be formally one complete and totall body, or common wealth, consisting of spirituall and temporall power, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, or else, notwithstanding the aforesaid vnion and coniunction, the temporall and spirituall common wealth among Christians doe still remaine formally two totall and complete bodies or common wealths, the one [Page 138] consisting onely of spirituall, and the other only of temporall power, although materially, and accidentally vnited in one subiect, in that manner as I haue now declared.
4. Thirdly, I doe also make no question, but that, as the world containing both Christians and infidels, and therefore consisting of spirituall and temporall power, may be called one complete, and totall body or kingdome, whereof God onely is the chiefe head and King, although in the same totall body or kingdome, but not of the same totall body or Kingdome, there be many supreme visible heads and Gouernours, and consequently being supreme, they doe not depend one of the other, in so much that neither the temporall power of Infidell Princes is subiect to the spirituall power of the Pope, nor the spirituall power of the Pope is subiect to the temporall power of Infidell Princes, but both of them are subiect immediately to God alone the inuisible head and King of them both, in regard of whom they make one totall body or kingdome, although the temporall power alone being compared to the uisible heads on earth, doth actually make diuerse totall and complete earthly kingdomes: So also I make no question, but that the whole Christian world, consisting of temporall and spirituall power, being compared to Christ the invisible head thereof, who, at least wise as he is God, is King of Kings, and Lord of Lords both temporall and spirituall, doth make one totall bodie, Kingdom, or Common-wealth, contayning in it both the earthly kingdomes of Christians, and the spirituall kingdome of Christ; neither of this can there in my iudgement be made any question.
5 But the question betwixt me and Card: Bellarmine is, whether the temporall & spirituall power among Christians, or the Christian world consisting of both powers, not as they are referred to Christ, [Page 139] who, at least wise as he is God, is the invisible head of both powers (I say at least wise as he is God, for that it is a controuersie betwixt the Diuines and Canonists, whether Christ as man be only a spirituall, or also a temporall King) but as they haue relation to their visible heads here on earth, doe make one totall and compleat bodie, or common-wealth, consisting of temporall and spirituall power, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, and Christian Kings are not supreme, but depending on him not onely in spiritualls, but also in temporalls; or whether the temporall and spirituall power among Christians doe truly, properly, and formally make two entire and complete bodies, Kingdoms, or Common-wealths, to wit, the earthly kingdoms of this Christian world, consisting only of temporall power, whereof temporall Princes are the supreme visible heads, and therefore in temporalls subiect to no other visible head here on earth, and the spirituall kingdom and mysticall body of Christ, consisting onely of spirituall power, whereof the Pope onely is the supreme visible head, Prince, and Pastour, and consequently in spiritualls subiect to no other visible head or Superiour on earth. This is the true state of the question.
6 Concerning which question there is a great controuersie betwixt the Canonists, and Diuines. For the Canonists supposing Christ our Sauiour to bee, not onely a spirituall, but also a temporall King, and to haue directly and properly both temporall and spirituall power, ouer the whole world, and that hee gaue this power to his Generall Vicar here on earth S. Peter and his Successors, doe consequently affirme, that the whole world, but especially which is Christian, consisting of spirituall and temporall power doth make one entire or totall body, whereof the Pope, being by the institution of Christ not onely a spirituall, but also a temporall Monarch, is the supreme [Page 140] visible head, to whom all Princes, especially who are Christians, are subiect not only in spiritualls, but also in temporalls. But contrariwise the Diuines, who doe hold, that Christ as man, was not a temporall, but only a spirituall King, and although hee had directly both temporall and spirituall power, yet that he gaue to S. Peter and his Successors onely the keyes of the kingdome of heauen, and not of earthly kingdomes, and only spirituall not temporall authoritie, are consequently bound to maintaine that the temporall and spirituall power, as they are referred to the visible heads here on earth, doe not truly, properly, and formally make one totall and entire body, or kingdome, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, but two totall and entire bodies or kingdomes but vnited in subiect, as I declared before, to wit, earthly kingdomes, consisting only of temporall authoritie, whereof temporall Princes only are the supreme visible heads, and the spirituall kingdome, the mysticall body, or the Church of Christ, consisting only of spirituall power, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, Prince, and Pastour.
7 Now what is the opinion of Card: Bellarmine touching this point, for that he speaketh so contrarie to his owne principles, truly I can not tell. For although he adhereth to the Diuines, and impugneth the Canonists, in that they hold the Pope to be not only a spirituall, but also a temporall Monarch of the world, and to haue directly power in temporalls, yet contrarie to this his doctrine, as you shall see in the next chapter, he doth in expresse words, whatsoeuer his meaning is, affirme, that the temporall and spirituall power doe make one totall and entire bodie, Familie, Cittie, Kingdome, or Common-wealth, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head: yea he is so confident in this his assertion, that he feareth not to auerre,in his Schulckenius cap. 5. pag. 195. that it is against the Catholike faith to [Page 141] say, that the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power are not parts of one and the same Common-wealth, but that they make altogether two common-wealths, vnlesse this distinction and explication be added, to wit, that the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power doe make one totall common-wealth (whichCap. 7. p. 287. & pag. 340. afterwards he calleth, the familie, cittie, Kingdome, mysticall bodie, and Church of Christ) and two partiall, which are indeed distinct by acts, offices, dignities, and ends, but connected betweene themselues, and one subordained to the other. But how weakely and contrarie to his owne principles Card: Bellarmine proueth this vnion and subordination of the temporall and spirituall power, you shall forthwith perceiue.
Chap. 2.
Wherein the argument of Card. Bellarmine taken from the authoritie of S. Paul Rom. 12. wee being many are one body in Christ, is examined.
1. ANd to begin first with the vnion; Card. Bellarmine bringeth two arguments to proue, that the ciuill and spirituall power doe make one bodie or common-wealth among Christians. The first is taken from the authoritie of S. Paul Rom: 12. and 1 Cor: 12. where hee affirmeth, that wee being many are one body in Christ: from whence Card: Bellarmine concludeth,Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont: cap. 7. that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes doe not make two common-wealths, but one, to wit, the Church.
2 To this argument I answered in myNum: 83. 89. 165. Apologie, that the meaning of S. Paul in those places is, that all Christians, both Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes, as they are by Baptisme regenerate in Christ, doe truly, properly, and formally make one bodie, one house, one cittie, one communitie or common-wealth, [Page 142] to wit, the spirituall kingdome, the mysticall body, or the Church of Christ, which Card. Bellarmine definethLib. 3. de Ecclesia cap 2. to be, a companie of men vnited together by the profession of the same Christian faith and Communion of the same Sacraments vnder the gouernment of lawfull Pastours, and especially of one Romane Bishop Christ his Vicar in earth. But S. Paul doth not say, that the temporall and spirituall power doe make one onely bodie, communitie or common-wealth, and not also two, or that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes, not considered as Christians or regenerate in Christ by baptisme, but as by their naturall birth or ciuil conuersation they are subiect to temporal Princes, which subiection Baptisme doth not take away, doe not also truely, properly and formally make also another politike bodie, another citie, another communitie or common-wealth, to wit, the earthly Kingdomes of the Christian world.
3. Wherefore it is not true, that Kings and Bishops, Clearkes and Laikes considered diuerse waies do not make diuerse kingdoms or common-wealths, but one onely, as Card. Bellarmine concludeth out of S. Paul? for as by Baptisme they are regenerate in Christ, and subiect in spirituals to Christ his vicegerent in earth, they make one body, or common-wealth, which is the spirituall kingdome and Church of Christ, and this onely doth signifie S. Paul by those words, we being many are one body in Christ, but S. Paul doth not denie, that all Christians, as by their naturall birth or ciuill conuersation they are subiect to Secular Princes in temporall causes, which subiection Baptisme doth not take away, doe also truely, properly and formally make another body or common-wealth, which are the earthly kingdomes of the Christian world. Cleargie men, saith Card. Bellarmine himselfe,Lib. de Clericis cap. 28. besides that they are Cleargie men; are also citizens and certaine parts of the ciuill common-wealth, and [Page 143] againe,Ibid. cap. 30. if one, saith he, consider the companie of Laymen, not as they are Christians, but as they are Citizens, or after any other manner, that companie cannot bee called the Church, and consequently they must bee another common-wealth, and therefore the ciuill and Ecclesiasticall power, or Clerkes or Laikes, in whom the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power doe reside, being considered diuerse waies, doe not truely, properly and formally make one only body, but two distinct & seuerall bodies or common-wealths, although materially and accidentally vnited in that maner as I declared before,Cap. 1. nu. 3. and presently will declare more at large.
4. And whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that although the temporall and spirituall power doe make two partiall common-wealths, yet they doe also make one entire and totall common-wealth, which is the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, and to affirme the contrary, is, saith he, against the Catholike faith, hee doth heerein both speake contrarie to his owne principles, and to that which hee knoweth to bee the Catholike faith, and hee must also of necessitie fall into the Canonists opinion, which he beforeLib. 5. de Ro. Pont. a cap. 2. pretended to confute concerning the Popes spirituall and temporall Monarchie ouer the whole Christian world. For if the Church of Christ be one totall body or common-wealth compounded of Ecclesiastical and ciuill power, as a man is compounded of soule and body (for this is that similitude which so much pleaseth Card. Bellarmine, and is therefore so often inculcated by him) it must necessarily follow, that the Pope as Pope, in whom, according to his other grounds, all the power of the Church doth reside, must haue truly, properly, and formally both temporall and Ecclesiasticall power, as a man who is compounded of soule and bodie, hath truely, properly and formally in him both the soule and bodie, and all the powers and faculties [Page 144] of them both: And what else is this, I pray you, then to maintaine with the Canonists, that the Pope as Pope is both a temporall and spirituall Monarch, and that hee hath truely, properly and formally both ciuill and spirituall authority: And yet Card. Bellarmine in other places doth expressely affirme, that the Pope as Pope hath onely spirituall and not temporall power.
5 The Diuines, saith he,In his book against D. Barclay ca. 12. pag. 137. doe giue to the Pope temporall and spirituall power onely in the Dominions of the Church, which power in the patrimonie of S. Peter Pope Innocent in cap. per venerabilem doth call a full power; ouer other Christian Prouinces they doe giue to the Pope onely a spirituall power, which of it selfe and properly doth regard spirituall things, but temporall things it doth regard as they are subordained to spirituall. And therefore when we speake properly, we say that the Pope hath power in temporals, but not that he hath temporall power, as he is Pope. Now how these two can stand together, that the spirituall and temporall power among Christians doe make one entire and totall body, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, as the body and soule doe make one man, and yet that the Pope, as Pope, shall haue no temporall power, which in it selfe is temporall, but onely spirituall, athough in some cases extended to temporall things, seeing that these two powers doe truely compose the Church of Christ, and consequently both of them are truly and really in the Church which they compound, and so likewise in the Pope, in whom all the power of the Church doth reside, I remit to the iudgement of any sensible man.
5. Besides what a more flat contradiction can there be, then this, to say, that the ciuill and spirituall power among Christians doe compound indeede two partiall, but one entire and totall common-wealth, which is the Church of Christ, or Christian common-wealth, as hee heere affirmeth,In his Schulckenius cap. 5. pag. 195. and withall, that the Church of Christ [Page 145] or the Christian common-wealth is compounded onely of spirituall authoritie, as a little beneath hee affirmeth in these words:In his Schulckenius cap 5. p. 203. That which my Aduersarie Widdrington saith, that the mysticall bodie, Church, or Christian common-wealth is compounded of spirituall authority alone, is true in this sense, that to compound the Christian common-wealth there is not necessary a power, which is formally ciuill, but yet there is necessarie a power, which is so formally spirituall, that it is also vertually ciuill &c. For how can the Church of Christ be compounded of ciuill and spirituall power, which are formally two distinct powers, and yet the Church not haue power which is formally ciuill, but onely spirituall? Neuerthelesse I doe not intend to denie, that the spirituall or Ecclesiasticall power among Christians may in this sense be called vertually ciuill or temporall, because it may for the spirituall good command, and compell spiritually temporall Princes to vse their temporall power, for this were onely to contend about words, but that the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, is truely, properly and formally compounded of ciuil and spiritualll power, this I say is both vntrue, and also flat contrarie to Card. Bellarmines own grounds; but whether the spiritual power of the church may be called vertually ciuill or temporal, for that it may also constraine and punish temporall Princes temporally, or vse temporall and ciuill authoritie, in case the temporall Prince for the spirituall good will not vse it, this is the maine question betwixt mee and Card. Bellarmine.
7. To conclude therefore, this answere I doe freely grant: that Kings and Bishops, Clearks and Laicks, as by baptisme they are regenerate in Christ, doe truely, properly, and formally, make one entire and totall body, which is the spirituall kingdome, and Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head: but I vtterly deny, that this spirituall [Page 146] kingdome, or Church of Christ is compounded of spirituall and temporall, but onely of spirituall, or Ecclesiasticall power: or that Clearks and Laicks, as they are citizens, or by their naturall birth are subiect in temporall affaires to temporall Princes doe compound this Church of Christ, but onely the earthly kingdomes of the Christian world, which are onely compounded of ciuill and temporall authority. In which Christian world, or Christian common-wealth, (taking them for an aggregatum per accidens, including both the spirituall kingdome of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, and also earthly kingdomes, whereof Christian Princes are the onely visible heads, for the Church of Christ is seldome times taken in this sense) there is but one totall or intire Catholike Church: yet there be many intire temporall kingdomes or common-wealths, as of English, French, Spanish, which haue their seuerall Princes, Lawes, and gouernments, and haue no other communion then in friendship and amitie: Yea, & the Catholike Church is one totall body, or common-wealth in Christian and Infidell kingdomes. And also in one particular Christian kingdome there be two distinct totall bodies, or common-wealths, to wit, the temporall, consisting of ciuill power, and the Ecclesiasticall, consisting of spirituall: wherein as there bee two distinct communions, the one spirituall in things belonging to grace, and the other temporall in things belonging to nature. So also their be two excommunications, the one in spirituals; wherein those that be excommunicated by the Church, doe not participate, and the other in temporalls; whereof those, who be excommunicated, or made out-lawes by temporall Princes, are not partakers; in so much that they, who are depriued of one of these communions, are not thereby depriued of the other, for an out-law may be a member of the Church, and be partaker of spirituall communion: [Page 147] and he, who by Excommunication is depriued of Ecclesiasticall communion, may bee a member of the ciuill common-wealth, as Heathens and Publicans were, and not therefore to be excluded from ciuill societie and conuersation.
8. Wherefore although the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, as they are referred to the visible heads thereof, doe truely, properly, and formally make diuerse totall bodies, or common-wealths, which neuerthelesse ought both to conspire in league & friendship, to bring both Princes and subiects to life euerlasting: yet they are not like to two confederate Cities or Kingdomes, which are onely vnited in league and amity, and haue no ciuill communion one with the other, neither is the same man a citizen of both Cities, or a subiect of both Kingdomes; but the temporall and spirituall power are so vnited among Christians, that the same man, who by ciuill conuersation, or naturall birth is a citizen, part, and member of the temporall City, Kingdome, or Common-wealth, and consequently subiect to her Lawes, is also by baptisme or spirituall regeneration made a citizen, part, or member of the spirituall Citie, Kingdome, or Cōmon-wealth, which is the Church of Christ, and consequently is also subiect to her Lawes. So that although the vnion, and communion of earthly Kingdomes, and the spirituall kingdome of Christ bee greater among Christians, then of two confederate Cities or temporall kingdomes, yet this vnion and communion being onely material, accidentall, and in subiect (as Musicke and Physicke are vnited in one man, by reason whereof the same man is both a Musician and a Physician, and consequently subiect to the precepts and directions of either art) is not sufficient to cause them to make truely properly, and formally one totall body, kingdome, or common-wealth, whereof the Pope [Page 148] is head: as neither the vnion of two accidents in one subiect is sufficient to cause them to make truely, properly, and formally, one entire & totall accidentall cōpound. Neuerthelesse I do not deny, as I obserued before but that the temporal & spiritual power, earthly kingdomes, and the spiritual kingdome of Christ, as they are referred to Christ: who, at leastwise as God, is the head of them both, doe make one totall body, whereof Christ onely is the head, which may be called the Christian world, consisting of ciuill and spirituall power: but in this manner neither the Pope nor temporall Princes are the head, but onely parts and members of this totall body, as beneathCap. 1. nu. 4. I will declare more at large.
Chap. 3.
Wherein the authoritie of S. Gregorie Nazianzen, comparing the temporall and spirituall power to the body and soule in man, is declared.
1. THe second argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to proue, that the ciuill and spirituall power among Christians doe make one totall body, or common-wealth, is taken from the authority of S. Gregory Nazianzene, who compareth the spirituall and temporall power among Christians to the soule and body of man. From which similitude Card. Bellarmine argueth in this mannerLib. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 6.. These two powers in the Church, saith hee, are like to the spirit and body in a man. For the body & the spirit are as it were two common-wealths, which may be found diuided and vnited. The body is found without the spirit in beasts, the spirit is found without the body in Angels, the body and spirit are both vnited in man, and doe make one person. So likewise, the ciuill and spirituall power are somtimes found diuided, as long since in the Apostles time, somtimes vnited as now, [Page 149] and when they are vnited they make one body, or common wealth.
2. To this argument I answered in my Apologie num. 139. 140., that from the words of S. Gregorie Nazianzene onely these two things can be gathered. The first, that the spirituall power is more worthy, and more noble then the temporall, and that therefore the temporall must in worthinesse yeeld and giue place to the spirituall. The second is, that Christian Princes, although in temporalls, and in things belonging to ciuill gouernment they are supreme on earth, and therefore subiect to none, yet in that they are Christians, they are subiect in spirituals, and in things belonging to Christian Religion to the command of spirituall Pastours of the flocke of Christ. For these bee the expresse wordes, which he vsed to the Christian President: For the law of Christ doth make you also subiect to my power and authoritie, for we also haue authoritie to command, I add also, a more noble, and more perfect, vnlesse it be meete, that the spirit do submit her power to the flesh, and heauenly things doe giue place to earthly. From which words this onely can be inferred, that the spirituall power is more noble, then the temporall, and that all Christian Princes and Magistrates, as they are the sheepe of Christ, are in spirituall things subiect to the spirituall Pastours of the Church, which all Catholikes will freely grant. But that the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, as they are referred to the supreme visible heads here on earth, do make one totall body or common wealth, as the soule and body do make one man, or that the temporall power among Christians, as it is temporall (for this much doth signifie the temporall and spirituall power taking them in abstracto) or which is all one, that temporall Princes are in meere temporall causes subiect to spirituall Pastours, cannot with any shew of probabilitie bee gathered out of those words of S. Gregorie Nazianzene.
[Page 150]3. Wherefore the vnion of the temporall and spirituall power among Christians is nothing like to the vnion of the body and soule in man, for that the body is a substantiall matter, and the soule a substantiall forme, and therefore being vnited they make one substantiall compound, which is called man; who therefore hath in him actually, properly, and formally both body and soule, as euery compound hath in him the parts, whereof it is compounded, but the ciuill and spirituall power are not among Christians vnited, as two parts, compounding really and actually one totall body, which is the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, for that, according to Card. Bellarmines owne doctrine, the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, is compounded only of spirituall power, and not of ciuill power, as ciuill is distinguished from spirituall, but ciuill and spirituall power, ciuill power and spirituall subiection, ciuill subiection and spirituall subiection, (to omit now spirituall power and ciuill subiection) are only vnited among Christians, as two accidents, for example, Musike and Phisike, are vnited in one man, which vnion, being only accidentall, and in subiect, is not sufficient to cause the temporall and spirituall power to make truely, properly and formally one body, whereof the Pope is bead, but only to make the same man, either to haue in him both temporall and spirituall power, or temporall power, and spirituall subiection, or both temporall subiection and spirituall subiection, (to omit now spirituall power and temporall subiection) and consequently, the same man to bee guided, directed, and gouerned in temporall things by the lawes, precepts and directions of the temporall power, and in spirituall things by the lawes, precepts, and directions of the spirituall power: As the vnion of Musike and Phisike in one man, although it be only materiall, accidentall, and in subiect, yet it maketh the same man to be [Page 151] both a Musician, and a Physitian, and as he is a Musitian, to be guided and directed by the lawes and precepts of Musicke, and as a Phisitian by the rules & precepts of phisike, but it doth not make Musike to be guided and directed by Physike, or a Musicion, as he is a Musician, to be guided and directed by a Physition, as he is a Physitian: So likewise the aforesaid vnion of temporall and spirituall power, of temporall power and spirituall subiection &c. in one man, doth not make the temporall power to be subiect to the spirituall, or a temporall Prince, as hee is a temporall Prince, or which is all one, in temporall causes, to bee guided, directed, and gouerned by the spirituall power, as it is spirituall: But of this similitude of the soule and body wee shall haue occasion to treat againe beneathCap. 8..
4. Pardon me, good Reader, that sometimes I repeate the same things somewhat often; it is not to make my booke the bigger, and to fill it vp with idle repetitions of the same things, as my Aduersaries, to disgrace me, are pleased to lay to my charge, not considering that they themselues do often times commit the like, but it is onely to cleere thy vnderstanding, and to make thee throughly comprehend the difficultie, and in what manner the temporall and spirituall power are vnited and subordained among Christians, considering that my Aduersaries, to prooue the Popes power to depose Princes, to dispose of all temporalls, and to punish temporally by way of constraint, doe so often inculcate this vnion and subordination, as a principall ground, whereon the Popes power in temporalls doth depend. And thus you haue seene, how weakely Card. Bellarmine, and disagreeably to his owne principles, hath laboured to proue, that the temporall and spirituall power among Christians doe make one totall body, or common wealth, whereof the Pope is head: now you shall see, [Page 152] how weakely also, and not conformably to his owne doctrine, he endeauoureth to proue, that the temporall power among Christians is subiect and subordained to the spirituall.
Chap. 4.
Wherein the true state of the question, concerning the subiection and subordination of the temporall power among Christians to the spirituall is propounded, and the different opinions of Catholikes touching this point are rehearsed.
1. FIrst therefore, that you may perceiue the true state of the question, and wherein I doe agree with Card: Bellarmine, and wherein we differ, I doe agree with him in this, that Christian Princes, in whom the supreme temporall power doth reside, being the sheepe of Christ, no lesse then inferiour persons, are subiect to the supreme visible Pastour of the Church of Christ: but the question is, in what things, and also in what manner they are subiect. Secondly, we also agree in this, that Christian Princes are in spirituall things, or which doe belong to Christian faith and Religion, subiect not onely to the directiue, or commanding power, but also in spirituall punishments to the coerciue or punishing power of spirituall Pastors, in such sort, that Christian Princes are not onely bound to obey the command of their spirituall Pastors, in things which doe concerne Christian faith and religion, but also, if they be disobedient, they may with spirituall punishments he punished and compelled therevnto. Thirdly, we doe also agree in this, that Christian Princes are bound to obey the commanding power of spirituall Pastours, not only in those things, which of their owne nature are [Page 153] Ecclesiasticall or spirituall, but also in things temporall, when by accident they become spirituall; in so much that a spirituall Pastor hath authoritie to command a temporall Prince to vse or not vse his temporall power, when it is necessarie or hurtfull to Catholike faith and religion, but this is nothing else, then that temporall Princes in things spirituall (for whether they be per se, and of their owne nature, or onely by accident spirituall, it little importeth) are subiect to the commanding power of spirituall Pastors, as likewise all temporall causes and crimes, whether of their owne nature, or onely by accident they become temporall, are subiect to the commanding and coerciue power of temporall Princes.
2 But the controuersie betwixt me and Card: Bellarmine is concerning two things; the first is, concerning the commanding power, to wit, whether temporall Princes are subiect to the commanding power of spirituall Pastors, not onely in things spirituall, and in temporall, when they become spirituall, but also in meere temporall things; for this is properly temporall power (taking temporall power in abstracto) to be subiect to the spirituall For as a Musician can not truly be said to be subiect, as he is a Musician, and in all things belonging to Musicke, to a Physition as he is a Physition, for that Musicke is not per se, and of it owne nature referred to Physicke, and if Musicke were per se, and of it owne nature subiect to Physicke, a Musician, as he is a Musician, and in all things belonging to Musicke, should be subiect to a Physician, as he is a Physician: for which cause a Shipwright, as he is a Shipwright, hath intrinsecall reference to a Nauigator, for that the Art of making ships is per se, and of it owne nature ordayned for nauigation; So also if the temporall power among Christians be per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall power, it must follow, that temporall [Page 154] Princes, who are Christians, are, as they are temporall Princes, and in all things belonging to temporall power, subiect to spirituall Pastours, as they are spirituall Pastours: And if temporall Princes, who be Christians, are not subiect, as they are temporall Princes, to spirituall Pastors, as they are spirituall Pastors, the temporall power among Christians is not per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall power.
3 The second thing, which is in controuersie betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine, is concerning the coerciue power of spirituall Pastors, to wit, whether temporall Princes are subiect to the coerciue power of spirituall Pastors in such sort, that spirituall Pastors, (especially the Pope, who is the supreme Pastour of all Christians) haue by the institution of Christ authoritie, to depriue temporall Princes of their Kingdomes, to dispose of all their temporalls, and to punish them temporally, or with all kinde of temporall punishments, in case they will not obey their iust command. And this is the maine point, and principall scope, at which both the Canonists, who hold that the Pope hath directly power in temporals in habit, although the vse they haue committed to temporall Princes, and also the Diuines, who hold that hee hath onely indirectly, that is, in order to spirituall good, power in temporalls, doe chiefly aime. Now concerning these two points, there be three different opinions of Catholikes.
4 The first opinion is of the Canonists, who holding, that the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head, doth consist both of temporall and spirituall power, doe consequently hold, that all Christian Princes, not only as they are Christians, but also as they are temporall Princes, are in all temporall causes subiect to the commanding power, and in all temporall punishments subiect also to the [Page 155] coerciue power of the Pope, whom they make the supreme, both temporall and spirituall Monarch of the world, and to haue directly both temporall and spirituall power, although the vse, exercise, and execution of his temporall power, he hath out of the territories of the Church, committed to Secular Princes, as to his Ʋice-Royes, Vicegerents, or Deputies: and this doctrine some Lawyers held to be so certaine, that they were not afraid to condemne the contrarie as hereticall, for which they are worthily taxed by Coverruvias In Regula, peccatū. 2. part. Relect. §. 9. num. 7. of great temeritie; But with this opinion, for that it is commonly reiected by all Diuines, and confuted also by Card: Bellarmine himselfeLib. 5. de Rom. Pont. a cap. 2., I will not at this time intermeddle.
5 The second opinion is of many Schoole-Diuines especially of these later times, who although they seeme greatly to mislike the Canonists opinion, in that the Canonists hold the Pope, as Pope, to haue directly, not only spirituall, but also temporall power, and to be both a temporall Monarch, and also a spirituall Prince and Pastour of the whole Christian world, yet in effect they doe giue as full and ample authoritie to the Pope ouer Christian Princes, as the Canonists do; for whatsoeuer the Canonists affirme, that the Pope can directly effect by his temporall power, the same doe the Diuines affirme, that he can effect indirectly, and in order to spirituall good by his spirituall power: And therefore, although they will not grant, that the Pope hath formally temporall power, but only spirituall, yet they grant, that this spirituall power of the Pope is virtually, and in effect temporall; and that therefore the Pope by his spirituall power can in order to spirituall good depriue temporall Princes of their kingdomes, dispose of all their temporalls, punish them with all kinde of temporall punishments, and finally whatsoeuer temporall Princes can by their temporall power doe for the [Page 156] temporall good, they affirme that the Pope by his spirituall power can doe for the spirituall good. Yea some of them doe so extend this spirituall good and spirituall harme, taking spirituall harme, not only for spirituall crimes, as heresie, Apostacie, and such like, but also for all temporall crimes, as are drunkennesse, fornication, and the like, that they giue a more ample power to the Pope, to depriue Princes of their kingdomes, then by temporall lawes is vsually granted to temporall Princes to depriue their subiects of their lands, who for whoredome, drunkennesse, and many other temporall crimes, can not vsually by the lawes of any Christian kingdome bee depriued of their lands and possessions.
6. The third opinion is of many other learned Catholikes both Diuines and Lawyers whom I cited before,Part. 1. per totum. who although they agree with the second opinion in this, that the Pope hath power to command temporall Princes in spirituals, but not in meere temporals, and to punish them with spirituall punishments, when they refuse to obey his iust command, yet that the Pope hath any coerciue power (call it spirituall or temporall, for in effect it is truely temporall) to inflict temporall punishments, to dispose of temporals for the spirituall good, or to depriue temporall Princes of their temporall dominions, they vtterly denie, affirming, that onely Excommunication, or some such like spirituall punishment, is the last, to which the Popes coerciue power can extend: And this their doctrine, which Card. Bellarmine, and some few others of his Society, haue presumed to condeme as altogether improbable, yea and wholly repugnant to Catholike faith, I haue taken vpon me to maintaine, as neither repugnant to Catholike faith or religion, nor preiudiciall to eternall saluation, and that therefore it may be defended by any Catholike without any note of heresie, errour or temerity.
[Page 157]7. These bee the different opinions of Catholikes concerning the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, wherby you see, that althogh all Catholikes doe grant, that temporall Princes, who are somtimes called temporall powers, are subiect to the spirituall Pastour in things spirituall, and in temporall when they become spirituall, yet all doe not grant, that the temporall power it selfe, euen among Christians, is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall, nor that the Pope, as Pope, hath any coerciue power to constraine and punish with temporall punishments, but onely with spirituall; Neither doth it follow, that because Christian Princes are subiect to the Pope, therefore they are subiect in all things, and in all manner of subiection, but onely in that sort, as Christ hath giuen him power both to command & punish: As children are subiect to their Parents, seruants to their Masters, wiues to their husbands, yet they are not bound to obey them, but in those things, wherein they haue power to command, nor to be punished by them, but in that sort, as the temporall common-wealth, whereof they are members, hath expressely or couertly giuen them leaue to punish; and the reason is, for that they are not Superiours in an absolute and indefinite, but onely in a limited and determinate manner.
8. Now what opinion Card. Bellarmine doth follow, whether of the Diuines, or of the Canonists, truly I cannot as yet well vnderstand. For although he seeme to disallow the Canonists doctrine, which at large he confuteth in his controuersies, yet to prooue the Popes power to depose Princes, and to dispose of temporals in order to spirituall good, hee laieth such grounds, concerning the vnion and subordination of the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, which doe cleerely confirme the Canonists doctrine. For concerning the vnion of these two powers, hee [Page 158] affirmeth, as you haue seene, that the temporall and spirituall power, the kingdome of Christ, and the kingdomes of this world, when they are Christian, doe make one totall body, which is the Christian common-wealth and Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head; from whence it necessarily followeth, that the Pope, in whom all the power of the Church doth reside, must haue truely, properly and formally both ciuill and spirituall power, which is the Canonists opinion, and not onely spirituall power, which is not formally, but onely vertually ciuill, which the Diuines, and also Card. Bellarmine in places doe affirme. And now concerning the subiection and subordination of these two powers, he affirmeth, that the temporall power among Christians, not onely as it is Christian, but also as it is temporall, is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, as it is Ecclesiasticall, or which is all one, that the temporall power it selfe among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall: from whence it cleerely followeth as before I shewed by the examples of Musike and Physike, Christian Princes not onely in spirituals and in temporals, when they become spirituals, which is in order to spirituall good, but also in meere temporall causes, are subiect to spirituall Pastours, which is the Canonists opinion, and which Card. Bellarmine in other places doth disprooue.
9. But how vnsoundly Card. Bellarmine, and not conformably to his owne grounds laboreth to proue, that the temporall power it selfe among Christians, as it is temporall, is subiect to the spirituall, as it is spirituall, you shall anone perceiue. For six principall arguments I doe finde in Card. Bellarmine, by which he endeauoureth to conuince, that the temporal power it selfe among Christians, as it is temporall, is subiect and subordained to the spirituall, as it is spirituall, or, which I take for all one, that the temporall power [Page 159] among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature, supposing the institution of Christ, subiect and subordained to the spirituall; which arguments of Card. Bellarmine I thinke it fit to examine in this place, together with the Replyes, which he either in his booke against D. Barclay, or in his Schulckenius against mee hath brought to confirme the same, that thereby the Reader may fully vnderstand, in what manner the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, and how strong or weake a proofe is the subiection or subordination of these two powers, which is by Mr. Fitzherbert supposed to be so inuinsible a ground, to conclude from thence, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power, in order to spirituall good, to dispose of all temporalls, to depose temporall Princes, and to punish by way of coercion with all kinde of temporall punishments.
Chap. 5.
Wherein is examined Card. Bellarmines first argument taken from the ends of the temporall and spirituall power.
1. THe first argument, which Card. Bellarmine affirmethLib. 5. de Rom Pont. c. 7. to demonstrate, that the temporall power among Christians, not only as it is Christian, but also as it is ciuill, or temporall, is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, as it is Ecclesiasticall, is taken from the ends of both the powers. For a temporall end, saith he, is subordained to a spirituall end, as it is manifest, because temporall felicitie is not absolutely the last end, and therefore it ought to bee referred to eternall felicitie: but it is apparant out of Aristotle, 1 Ethic. cap. 1. that faculties, or powers are so subordained, as their ends are subordained.
2. To this argument I answered in my Apologie Num. 162. & seq., ‘that not euery temporall end is per se, and of it owne nature ordained, or subordained to a spirituall end [Page 160] (speaking of create ends, and not of God almighty, who is the beginning and end of all things) but it is only by accident, or accidentally by man, who worketh for an end, ordained to a spirituall end. And therefore although temporall good, or felicity be not absolutely the last end of man, yet it is the last end of the temporall power it selfe, which is in man. For euery power, as it is a power, hath for her last end, her act or worke, as euery science hath of it owne nature for her last end the knowledge of her obiect, and euery art the effecting of her work, (as the last end of naturall philosophie is to know the secrets of nature, and of Phisike to cure and preserue the body from diseases) although man himselfe, in whom that power, art, or science doth reside, doth intend a farther end. Whereupon S. Austin doth well affirme, that the will to see hath no other end then seeing: The will, saith he,Lib. 11. de Trin. cap. 6. to see hath seeing for her end, and the will to see this thing hath for her end the seeing of this thing: The will therefore to see a skarre doth desire her end, that is, the seeing of a skarre, and no further doth appertaine to her. Wherefore, as the Philosophers do distinguish betwixt the last end of any art or worke, and the last end of the artificer, or worker, so we also ought to distinguish betwixt the last end of the power it selfe, and of him, in whom the power doth reside. It is called the last end of the worke, for that the worke is in that lastly ended, and not the last end of the worker, for that the worker doth not referre all that is his to that end, as a thing to be desired and loued aboue all things.’
‘3. I grant therefore that the end of a Christian Prince, who hath temporall power, is spirituall and eternall felicitie, to which Christians ought to refer all their actions, and the vse not only of the Ecclesiasticall, but also of the ciuill power, but withall I affirme, that the last end, which the ciuill power hath [Page 161] per se, and of it owne nature, is only temporall peace and quietnesse, in the getting and conseruing wherof of it owne nature it doth lastly rest. And therefore for this reason it is not necessary, that the ciuill power it selfe be per se, and of it owne nature subordained to the Ecclesiasticall, but onely accidentally and by the intention of him, who referreth temporall peace to eternall felicitie in that maner as I haue declared. To that assertion of Aristotle, powers are so subordained as their ends are subordained (although in that place hee rather saith, that [...]ds are subordained, as powers are subordained) I answered, that it is to be vnderstood of those ends, which powers haue of their owne nature, and not of the ends of the men, in whom the powers doe reside.’ Thus I answered in my Apologie.
4. Now you shall see how insufficiently Card. Bellarmine in his Schulckenius replyeth to this answere. I answere saith he,Pag. 329. ad num. 162. that not euery temporall or corporall end is subordained per se, and of it owne nature to a spirituall end, my Aduersary Widdrington doth say, but hee doth not proue. But first, who knoweth not, that it doth not appertaine to the Answerer to proue, for to this the opponent only is tyed, and for the Answearer it sufficeth by granting, denying, or distinguishing for him to answere.
5. Secondly, I did not conceiue, that this assertion, being so cleere and manifest of it selfe, needed any proofe at all, and therefore I little thought, that any learned man would euer deny the same: for that, according to the knowne principles of Philosophy and Diuinitie, no naturall thing can intrinsically, and of it own nature be referred to a thing, which is supernaturall and aboue the course of nature; and therefore betwixt naturall and supernaturall things, there can be no naturall subordination. Now that temporall peace in a temporall common-wealth is a naturall [Page 162] thing, and eternall felicitie, which consisteth in the cleere vision and fruition of almighty God, is supernaturall, and goeth beyond the bounds, limits, and order of nature, no man can make any doubt; and therefore temporall peace cannot of it owne nature be referred to eternall felicity; but onely by the will and intention of man, who by the helpe of supernaturall light and grace doth referre it, direct it, and eleuate it to that supernaturall end.
6. And for this cause also it is very cleere, that temporall power cannot of it owne nature bee referred to true spirituall and Ecclesiasticall power, for that it is supernatural, and giuen onely by God, as he is the Author, not of nature, but of supernaturall grace. Yea out of Card. Bellarmines owne grounds it may be cleerely conuinced, that the temporall power among Christians is not of it own nature subiect, and subordained to the spirituall power, and consequently, that temporall peace, which is the end of temporall power, is not of it own nature referred or ordained to eternal felicity, which is the last create end of the spiritual power, for that according to Aristotle Lib. 1. Ethic. cap. 1., ends are so subordained, as their powers are subordained. His first ground is, for that in his Controuersies he affirmethLib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 6., that in Infidels there is true ciuill power without any order, or relation to any true spirituall, or Ecclesiasticall power, and consequently in Infidels the ciuill power is not subiect or subordained to the spirituall, for where there is no order, or relation, there can be no subiection, or subordination, for that subiection and subordidation doth necessarily imply an order, relation, or reference to that, to which any thing is subordained.
7. Seeing therefore that Christian Religion doth not take away true ciuill power, as Card. Bellarmine himselfe also in another place affirmethLib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29., neither is the true nature, or any intrinsecall propertie of the ciuil power changed or altered, for that it is in a Christian, [Page 163] or an Infidell, in this subiect, or in that, it necessarily followeth, that if true ciuill power bee not of it own nature subiect, or subordained in Infidels to true spirituall, or Ecclesiastical power, it is not also in Christians per se, and of it own nature subiect or subordained to true spirituall or Ecclesiasticall power. This onely alteration hath ciuill power for being in this subiect, or in that, in Infidels, or in Christians, that Christians ought, according to the true grounds of Christian Religion, referre it by the aide of true supernaturall faith to a true supernaturall end, to which Infidels, who want true supernaturall faith, cannot referre it: but this alteration is extrinsecall or accidentall, not intrinsecall or essentiall, neither doth it proceed from the nature of the ciuill power it selfe, but from the wil & intention of him, in whom true ciuill power doth reside. As likewise the nature or intrinsecall properties of other accidents, as of Musick, Physick, and such like, are not altered, or changed by the changing or altering of their subiects, & for that they are in Christians, or in Infidels, although a Christian Musician will refer & ordaine his Musick to the true worship of God, & an Infidel to the honor of his Idol.
8. The second ground, which Card. Bellarmine layeth to prooue, that the temporall power among Christians is not per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall power, is, for that in his Schulckenius he affirmethPag. 276. ad nu. 140., That among the Heathen Romanes, the ciuill power was subiect to the spiritual power of a false religion: and a little beneath, if the ciuill power, saith he, be ioyned with a false Ecclesiasticall power, that is of a false Religion, as it was in the Heathen Romane Common-wealth, then it is actually subordained to a false Ecclesiasticall power, and if it bee ioyned with a true Ecclesiasticall power, as in the Christian and Catholike Church, then it is actually subordained to a true Ecclesiasticall power. Now what Philosopher, or Diuine [Page 164] will affirme that a true ciuill power is per se, and of it owne nature actually ordained, subordained, or referred to a false Ecclesiasticall power, that is of a false Religion, or to the worshipping of false Gods. Therfore this subiection, subordination, or relation of true ciuill power to the spirituall, proceedeth from the intention of him, in whom the ciuill power doth reside, who according to his faith and religion (bee it true or false) referreth his true ciuill power to a true or false Religion, to a true or false worshipping of God, and not from the nature, or any intrinsecal propertie of the true ciuill power it selfe which, as it is the same in Infidels and Christians, or in whatsoeuer subiect it be so also of it own nature hath the same end as well in Infidels as in Christians, to wit, temporall peace, to which of it owne nature it is alwaies referred. And therefore I doe not onely say: but also I doe cleerely prooue, and that out of Card. Bellarmines owne grounds, to which neuerthelesse I being only an answerer, and not an opponent, was not tied, that neither the ciuil power, being only a naturall power, nor the end of ciuill power, which is temporal peace, being onely a naturall end, is per se, and of it owne nature subiect, or subordained to a true supernaturall power or end, but onely by the intension of him, in whom the ciuill power doth reside.
9. Now you shal see how wel D. Schulckenius proueth the contrarie. But wee prooue the contrary, saith he,Pag. 329. ad nu. 162. because the end of the spirituall common-wealth is euerlasting saluation, which is the last end; the end of the temporall common-wealth is the peace of the Citie, or Kingdome, which is not the last end, but a mediate end. But all ends are subordained per se, and of their owne nature to the last end, and in vertue of it they doe mooue, as all efficient causes are subordained per se, and of their owne nature to the first efficient cause, and in vertue of it they worke whatsoeuer they doe worke. See S. Thomas 1 [...]. 2 [...]. q. 1. ar. 6.
[Page 165]10. But to this argument I answered before, that the last create end of the spirituall common-wealth, which is a companie of men vnited by Baptisme, in that manner as I declared before, is eternal saluation, to which they ought to referre all their powers both temporall and spirituall, and all their actions both in generall and particular: but I denied, that the last end of the temporall power it selfe, although it bee conioyned in one & the selfe same subiect with true spirituall power, is eternall saluation, but onely temporall peace in the common-wealth, to which of it owne nature it is onely referred, as to her last end, although by the intention of him, in whom true ciuill and spirituall power doth reside, it ought to bee referred to eternall saluation, as to the last end of a Christian man, but not as to the last end, which the temporall power it selfe hath per se, and of it owne nature. Neither hath D. Schulckenius proued the contrary, but rather in his Reply to my answere hee in expresse words confirmeth what I haue said. For in his answere to the authority, which I brought out of S. Augustine, hee affirmeth, That the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act or operation, and therefore it cannot of it owne nature be referred to eternall saluation, as to the last end, vnlesse D. Schulckenius will admit, that the same particular power hath of it owne nature two last ends, or a later end then the last, which implieth a manifest contradiction; but it must onely be referred extrinsecally to eternall saluation by the intention of him, in whom the particular power doth reside.
11 True it is, That all create ends are subordained per se, and of their nature to that end, which is simply and absolutely the last end, and doe moue in vertue thereof, as all efficient causes are subordained per se, and of their owne nature to that, which is simply and absolutely the first efficient cause, and in vertue thereof they doe worke whatsoeuer [Page 166] they do worke: But this efficient and finall cause of all created things is not the eternall saluation of men, but God a mighty, who is Alpha & Omega, principium & finis, the beginning and end of all created things, both naturall and supernaturall, both vnreasonable and reasonable, of accidents and substances, of all powers and of all things wherein powers doe reside, and who is glorified not onely by the eternall saluation, but also by the eternall damnation of men. God alone is simply and absolutely the last end of all created things, to whome all naturall things are of their owne nature lastly referred, as to the first Authour and last end of nature, and supernaturall things, as to the first Authour and last end of grace and glory: Neither can naturall things of their owne nature be referred to any supernaturall create end, as is eternall saluation, but onely by the will and intention of him: who by the helpe of supernatural grace shall referre and eleuate them aboue their nature to a supernaturall end. Neither doth S. Thomas in that place affirme the contrary, but rather most cleerely confirmeth, what I haue said: for there he only disputeth, how euery man by his wil, intention, and desire, referreth all good things, which hee desireth to the last end.
12. Marke now, I beseech you, D. Schulckenius his second proofe, which is no whit better then the former. Moreouer is not the body, saith hePag. 330., per se, or of it owne nature for the soule? why then are not corporall things, per se, or of their owne nature for spirituall things? And whereas my Aduersarie Widdrington seemeth to say, that euery temporall end is per accidens, or accidentally referred to a spiritual end: as by man, who worketh for an end, it is ordained to a spirituall end, it is altogether false. For oftentimes wicked men doe ordaine spirituall things to temporall, of whom the Apostle saith, whose God is their belly: and by this a temporall end is [Page 167] per se, and of it owne nature alwaies ordained to a spirituall end, but by accident and against nature by the wickednesse of humane intention sometimes a spirituall end is ordained to a temporall.
13. The reason why the body is per se, and of it owne nature for the soule or spirit, and yet the temporall power, or the end thereof, is not per se, and of it owne nature referred to the spirituall power, or the end thereof, I did declare in my Apologie Num: 140., which D. Schulckenius also did relate a little before,Pag. 275. because the bodie and soule doe compound one substantiall thing consisting of two essentiall parts, whereof the bodie is the matter, as the Philosophers doe call it, and the soule the forme; and this is the reason, why the body is per se, and of it owne nature, for the soule and subiect are subordained to it; for that all Philosophers doe grant, that euery matter is per se, and of it owne nature for the substantiall forme, wherewith it maketh one essentiall compound; but the temporall and spirituall powers doe not make one totall bodie or common-wealth, whereof the temporall power is insteed of the matter, and the spirituall insteede of the forme. And therefore D. Schulckenius had small reason to make that interrogation, seeing that hee himselfe did a little before set downe this my reason, which doth fully satisfie the aforesaid demand.
14 Neither did I say, as D. Schulckenius here affirmeth me to say, although a little before, as you haue seeneNum. 4., he related my words otherwise, that euery temporall end is per accidens, or accidentally referred to a spirituall end, but I only affirmed, that not euery temporall end, and in particular temporall peace among Christians, which is the last end of the ciuill power it selfe, is not per se, and of it owne nature ordained to eternall saluation, which is the last end of the spirituall power, but onely per accidens, or accidentally, as by the will and intention of a Christian man, [Page 168] it is ordained to eternall saluation, which is a supernaturall end, and therefore not proportionate to the nature of any ciuill or naturall power. And although I had said, that euery temporall end is per accidens referred to a spirituall end, yet D: Schulckenius could not but perceiue by the whole scope of my words, that my meaning was to say, that euery temporall end, which is referred to a spirituall end, is not per se, and of it owne nature referred to that spirituall end, but per accidens, and extrinsecally by the will and intention of man, who referreth it to that spirituall end, for no man can bee so ignorant as to imagine, that Christians doe alwaies referre and ordaine all temporall ends to the eternall saluation of their soules.
15 True it is, that all naturall things belonging to man are of such a nature, as that by the intention of man they may be ordained to good or bad ends, and temporall peace, which is a naturall end, may by the will of man, being aided with supernaturall grace, be referred and eleuated to eternall felicitie, which is a supernaturall end; and this is agreeable to reason, and to the nature of man, as he is a reasonable creature, or led by reason, to ordaine, referre, and eleuate all naturall things, which are in his power, when by the helpe of grace he is able so to doe, to true supernaturall ends, and to eternall felicitie, for which hee was created, and to doe otherwise were against reason, and against the nature of man, as hee is endued with reason: But that naturall powers, or ends, should be per se, and of their owne nature actually referred, and eleuated to supernaturall powers or ends, much lesse supernaturall powers or ends, should be referred and depressed to naturall powers or vicious ends, but only by the good or wicked intention of a man, in whose power it is to ordaine a good thing to a bad end, a naturall power to a supernaturall, and contrariwise, [Page 169] this truly I thinke no man of any learning can conceiue, and before I haue clearely proued, that it is altogether false.
16 Lastly, to those words, which I alledged out of S. Austin, and to the rest which follow in my Answer, D. Shulckenius replyeth in this manner: I answer first, saith hePag. 332., It is true, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act, but it is not true, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is not referred per se and of their owne nature to that end, which is simply the last end, but onely by accident by the intention of him, who hath that will, power, or science. And this not only S. Thomas in the place cited doth teach, but also S. Austin in the place alledged by Widdrington, to wit, lib. 11. de Trinit. cap. 6. All these, saith S. Austin, and such like wills haue first their ends, which are referred to the end of that will, whereby we are willing to liue happily. Thus S. Austin, who, when he subioyneth, the will therefore to see a skar doth desire hir end, to wit, the seeing of a skar, and farther doth not appertaine to hir, he signifieth indeed, that the seeing of a skar is the last end of the will to see a skar, but hee doth not deny, that the seeing of a skar is per se, and of it owne nature referred to a higher end of a higher will, and that to an other, vntill we come to that end, which is simply the last end. For all good ends are of their owne nature referred to that end, which is simply the last end, and as ends are of their owne nature subordained one to an other, so also it is necessarie, that wills, powers, or sciences be subordained. As for example, (to persist in S. Austins example) a man hath many wills, one to see a skar, an other, by seeing the skar to finde the wound; the third, by finding the wound, to convince and correct him, who did inflict the wound; the fourth, by correcting him to heale the wound of his soule; the fift, by this act of charitie to merit life euerlasting; it is certaine, that euery one of these wills haue their proper end, neither any thing farther doth [Page 170] appertaine to them, but it is also certaine, that the end of the first will is referred to the end of the second will, and the first will it selfe subordained to the second, and so in order. Thus D. Schulckenius.
17 But truly in my opinion D. Schulckenius doth in this Reply both plainly contradict himselfe, and also clearely confirme my Answer. And first no man can make any doubt, but that all wills, powers, sciences, ends, and things whatsoeuer are per se, and of their owne nature referred to that, which is simply the last end; but that, which is simply the last end of all things, is not the eternall felicitie of any creature, but God almightie, who alone is simply the efficient and finall cause of all things, and made all things, both heauen and hell, for himselfe, Prouerb. 16. and who is glorified not only in the eternall saluation, but also in the eternall damnation both of Men and Angells: And this D. Schulckenius can not deny, and he might haue seene the same confirmed by S. Thomas in the same question cited by him ar. 8. but more expressely 1a, part. q. 44. ar. 4. where he proueth, that because God almightie is the first efficient cause of all things, he must of necessitie be also the last end of all things: and by S. Austin also in infinite places.
18. Secondly, whereas D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that the last end of one particular will, power, or science is their act, and withall, that this last end is per se, and of it owne nature referred to a further create end, (whereof only he speaketh) and consequently that particular will or power must also be referred to that farther end, and so it must be referred to a farther end then to the last, he cleerely contradicteth himselfe. For how can any act be per se, and of it owne nature be the last end of one particular will, power or science, and yet this last end bee per se, and of it owne nature referred to a farther end, seeing that according to the approoued grounds of philosophie, which kinde of arguing the [Page 171] Logicians call Sorites, or à primo ad vltimum, an argument from the first to the last, euery particular will, power or science, which is per se, and of it owne nature referred to any particular end, is also referred to all those ends, to which that particular end is per se, and of it owne nature referred? As for example, if any particular will be per se, and of it owne nature referred to the seeing of a skar, and the seeing of a skarre bee per se, and of it owne nature referred to the finding out of the wound, and the finding out of the wound be per se, and of it owne nature referred to the correcting of him who did inflict the wound &c. then à primo ad vltimum, from the first to the last, the will to see a skarre must per se, and and of it owne nature bee referred to the correcting of him, who did inflict the wound &c. Wherefore if the seeing of a skarre bee the last end of the will to see a skarre, as D. Schulckenius heere affirmeth, it cannot per se, and of it owne nature bee referred to a farther end, vnlesse hee will grant, that the same will shall haue per se a farther end, then the last, which is a flat contradiction; but if it be referred to a farther end, it is onely by accident, and extrinsecally by the intention of the seer, who referreth the seeing of a skarre to a farther end, then it hath of it owne nature. Neither doth S. Thomas, or S. Austin affirme the contrary, but confirme what I haue sayd.
19. For although S. Austin doth affirme, that all these & such like wils haue their proper ends, which are referred to the end of that will, wherby we desire to liue happily, and to come to that life, which is not referred to any other thing, but it doth of it selfe satisfie the Louer, yet he doth not say, that these proper ends, are per se, and of their owne nature referred to euerlasting happinesse, but he doth rather in expresse words say, that they are by some particular will, or intention of man referred to euerlasting happinesse. And therefore he concludeth, [Page 172] that all wils are well connected together, if that will be good, whereunto all the rest be referred, but if that bee bad, all the other wils are bad. So that S. Austin cannot be so vnderstood, that all those wils are per se, and of their owne nature referred to a good, or to a bad will, for that a will, which of it owne nature is good can not of it owne nature be referred to a bad will, or to a bad end. And therefore when S. Austin saith, that the will to see a skarre hath for her proper end the seeing of a skarre, and no farther appertaineth to her, hee vnderstandeth of the last end, which the will to see a skar hath per se, and of it owne nature, and when he saith, that it may be referred to a farther end, good or bad, he vnderstandeth of a farther end, not which it hath of it owne nature, but which it hath by some other will or intention, which may be good or bad, according as it referreth all the other wils to a good or bad end.
20. Moreouer those examples, which D. Schulckenius bringeth in the end of his Reply, doe most cleerly confirme my answer, and confute his owne Reply. For if a man haue many wils, one to see a skarre, another by seeing the skar to prooue the wound, the third by prouing the wound to correct him who inflicted the wound and so foorth, it is certaine, that the seeing of the skarre is not per se, and of it owne nature referred and ordained to prooue the wound, and to correct him, who did inflict the wound, but onely by the will and intention of the seer, who referreth it to those ends, in whose choice it is to refer the seeing of a skar to other ends: neither is their any naturall or necessary connexion betwixt the seeing of the skar, the proouing of the wound, and the correcting of him, who did inflict it: for that a skar may be seene for many other ends, and not at all for those. Besides, it is repugnant to the course of nature, that the seeing of a skar, which is a naturall thing, should be per se, and of it own nature referred & ordained to the euerlasting [Page 173] happinesse of man, which is a thing aboue nature, and beyond the course of naturall things, and therefore it is only by accident, and extrinsecally by the intention and will of man referred and ordained to that supernaturall end. And thus you see, that I haue not only clearely answered to this first argument of Card. Bellarmine, which had been sufficient for me, who tooke vpon mee only to answere, and not to proue, but also haue clearely prooued, that although eternall felicitie, be the last create end of man, yet temporall peace, and not eternall felicitie is the last create end, to which temporall power euen among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature referred.
21. Neuerthelesse, I will go a little farther with Card. Bellarmine, and grant him for Disputation sake, which hitherto he hath not in my iudgement so much as probably proued, that thereby the weakenesse also of this his first pretended demonstration may the more easily appeare; to wit, that not only the Ecclesiasticall, but also the ciuill power among Christians is per se; and of it owne nature, and not only by the will and intention of Christian men referred to the true eternall saluation of man, as to the last end not only of man, but of the ciuill power it selfe, yet it can not therefore from hence by any necessarie consequence bee inferred, that the ciuill power among Christians is per se; and of it owne nature subiect and subordained to the spirituall power, or that the end of the ciuill power is subordained to the end of the spirituall power, but at the most, that both of them haue one & the selfe same last end, to wit, the eternall felicitie of man, to which the spirituall power leadeth Christian men by spirituall meanes, to wit, by spirituall directions, lawes, and punishments, and the ciuill power by ciuill meanes, directions, lawes, and punishments: And therefore there is no subordination of ends, betwixt the ends of the spirituall and temporall power, and consequently no [Page 174] subordination of powers, but they haue both one last end, to wit, euerlasting happinesse, although diuerse waies, or meanes to attaine thereunto, not much vnlike diuerse lines in a circle, which doe end all in one center, and yet one line is not subordained to another, although all of them [...]e tend by diuerse waies to the same center. And therefore by this first argument Card. Bellarmine hath not sufficiently proued, that the ciuill power among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature subordained to the spirituall, or the proper end of the ciuil power, which is her act tending to tēporall peace, subordained to the proper end of the spirituall power, which is also her act tending lastly to euerlasting happinesse; although I should grant him, that both of them haue per se, and of their owne nature one and the selfe same last end, which is the eternall saluation of man, in whom those powers doe reside. And therefore D. Schulckenius perceiuing belike the sufficiencie of my answere, and the weaknesse of his owne Reply, flieth to a second Reply, which neuerthelesse is as insufficient as the former.
22. But although we should grant, saith hePag. 333., to Widdrington, that the end of the ciuill power is not referred per se, and of it owne nature to the end of the spirituall, but onely by the intention of the Prince, in whom the ciuill power doth reside, yet the argument which Card. Bellarmine brought from the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, to proue that the spirituall Prince could not onely command temporall Princes, but also dispose of temporalls in order to spirituall good, would be most strong and good. For a Christian temporall Prince ought to referre the publike peace, which is the end of ciuill power, to the eternall peace and felicitie of himselfe and of his people, which is the end of the spirituall power. And therefore hee ought to subiect and subordaine the end of his power to the end of the power of the spirituall Prince. But as he ought to subiect and subordaine end to end, so also power to power. Wherefore hee ought not [Page 175] to take it in ill part, if he be truly a Christian Prince, that the Pope by his spirituall power direct, and correct the ciuill power, and that so the sword be vnder the sword, and in the Christian common wealth there be order, peace, and quietnesse, whiles Superiours do rule inferiours, and inferiours be subiect to Superiours.
23. But in this Reply there lie hidden some cunning equiuocations, and the most that it proueth, as oftentimes heretofore I haue signified, is, that the temporall power or sword, or rather temporall Princes who haue temporall power, and beare the temporall sword, are in spirituall causes) whether of their owne nature, or by some accidentall circumstance they become spirituall) to the spirituall or Ecclesiasticall power, by which they are to be directed & corrected, not in meere temporals, but only in spirituals, not by temporall lawes, or with temporall punishments, which doe belong onely to the temporall power, but only by Ecclesiasticall lawes or directions, and with Ecclesiasticall or spirituall punishments or corrections, which onely do appertaine to the Ecclesiasticall or spirituall power.
24. True it is, that eternall saluation is the last create end not only of the spirituall, but also of the temporall power among Christians, seeing that all Christian Princes are bound by the law of Christ to referre their temporall power, and the vse thereof, not onely to temporall peace in the common weath, which is the last end, which temporall power hath per se, and of it owne nature, but also to the eternall peace and felicity of themselues, and of their people; And therefore there is here no subordination of ends betwixt the temporall power and the spirituall, and consequently in this respect no subordination of powers, as D. Schulckenius doth here from thence inferre, but aswell the ciuill power among Christians, as the spirituall, haue one and the selfe same last end (whether it bee intrinsecall [Page 176] to one power, and extrinsecall to the other, or intrinsecall to both as I declared before) to which the temporall power by temporall lawes, directions, and corrections, and the spirituall power by spirituall lawes, directions, and corrections or punishments are by the law of Christ bound to direct, and lead all Christians.
25. Whereupon S. Thomas, or whosoeuer bee the Authour of that booke de Regimine Principum doth well affirme,Lib. 1 c. 14. that the end which a King ought principally to intend in himselfe, and in his subiects, is eternall happinesse, which doth consist in the seeing of God, and because this seeing of God is the most perfect good of all, it ought to moue exceedingly a King and euery Lord, that their subiects may attaine to this end. Therefore, when Kings, saith S. Austin, Tom. 2. epist. 50. in the time of the Apostles did not serue our Lord, then impieties could not be forbidden by lawes, but rather exercised. But afterwards, when that began to be fulfilled which is written, Psal. 71. And all the Kinges of the earth shall adore him, all nations shall serue him, What sober minded man can say to Kings, Doe not you regard by whom the Church of your Lord is defended or impugned in your kingdome, that it doth not appertaine to you, who will be religious or sacrilegious in your kingdome, to whom it can not be said, that it doth not appertaine to you, who will bee chast, or wanton in your kingdome.
27. Wherefore if a Christian Prince should by his lawes, or otherwise, withdraw his subiects from the attaining to eternall saluation, should impugne not defend the Church, command not forbid impieties, hee should greatly offend God and the Church, and ought not to take it in ill part, that hee should be therefore corrected by the chiefe Pastour of the Church, to whom he is subiect in spiritualls, with Ecclesiasticall and spirituall punishments, which only doe belong to the spirituall power. But if the Pastour of the Church should take vpon him to correct such a Prince by [Page 179] way of coercion and constraint with temporall punishments, which kinde of correction doth passe the limits of his spirituall power, then the Prince may iustly take it in ill part, for this were to vsurpe temporall Iurisdiction, which is proper only to a temporall Prince, and not to obserue due order, but to make a confusion betwixt sword and sword, betwixt the spirituall and temporall power, which temporall power is only in spirituall corrections, and not in temporall punishments subiect to the constraint of the temporall power.
28 And therefore well said our most learned Countryman Alexander of Hales3. part. q. 40. memb. 5. q. 4. cited by me before, that the subiection of Kings and Emperours to the Pope is in spirituall not corporall punishment, according as it is said 2a. q. 7. that it belongeth to Kings to exercise corporall punishment, and to Priests to vse spirituall correction. Wherevpon S. Ambrose did excommunicate the Emperour Arcadius, and did forbid him to enter into the Church. For as an earthly Iudge not without cause beareth the sword, as it is said Rom: 13. so Priests doe not without cause receiue the keyes of the Church; he beareth the sword to the punishment of malefactors and commendation of the good, these haue keyes to the excluding of excommunicated persons, and reconciling of them who are penitent. Expound therefore; A King is to be punished only by God, that is, with materiall punishment, and againe, A King hath no man to iudge his doings, that is, to inflict corporall punishment▪ and a little beneath, A King, saith Alexander, doth excell, 1. Pet: 2. true it is in his order, to wit, to inflict corporall punishment, with which punishment, if he offend, he hath none to punish him but only God▪ what can be spoken more plainly.
29 And by this you easily see the weaknes of D. Schulckenius his argument, and how cunningly with generall and ambiguous words he would delude his Reader. A temporall Prince, saith he, ought to refer [Page 180] publike peace to the eternall peace and fol [...]estie of him selfe and of his people, which is the end of the spirituall power. And what then? And as hee ought to subiect temporall peace to eternall peace, so he ought to subiect his temporall power to the spirituall power. But how, in what manner, in what causes, in what punishments temporall power ought to bee subiect to spirituall power D. Schulc. cunningly concealeth. Temporall power to be subiect to spirituall, if wee will speake properly, and in abstracto, doth signifie, that a temporall Prince is in all temporall affaires subiect to the spirituall power of spirituall Pastors. And if by those generall words D. Schulckenius meaneth this, he falleth into the Canonists opinion, whose doctrine in this point learned Ʋictoria in Relect. 1. de potest. Eccles. num. 2. & 3. is not afraid to condemn as manifestly false, and who being poore themselues in learning and riches to flatter the Pope gaue him this direct power and dominion in temporalls. For the truth is, that temporall Princes in temporall affaires are not subiect to any besides God alone, which is the receiued doctrine of the ancient Fathers. The sense therefore of that proposition must be, that temporall Princes are in spiritualls, but not in temporalls subiect to the spirituall power of the Pope. But what then? wherefore he ought not to take it in ill part, if he be truly a Christian Prince, that the Pope by his spirituall power direct, and correct the ciuill power &c. Still you see he speaketh ambiguously, and in generall words, the sense whereof if hee had declared, you would presently haue perceiued the weaknesse of his argument: for if he meane, that therefore a temporall Prince ought to be directed in spiritualls, and in things belonging to Christian Religion, and corrected with spirituall punishments by the Pope, this I easily grant him, and so he proueth nothing against me, but if hee meane, that therefore a temporall Prince ought to be directed by the Pope in temporalls, and corrected by him [Page 179] with temporall punishments, this consequence I vtterly denie, for this were to confound all good order, and to vsurpe temporall Iurisdiction, as I declared before. And thus much concerning Card: Bellarmines first argument, my answer, and D. Schulckenius his Reply to the same.
Chap. 6.
Wherein is examined the second argugument taken from the vnion of Kings, and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes in one Church.
1. THe second argument, which Card: Bellarmine bringethLib. 5. de Rom. Pont. cap. 7. to proue, that the ciuill power among Christians not onely as it is Christian, but also as it is ciuill, is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, as it is Ecclesiasticall, is this: Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes doe not make two common-wealths but one, to wit, one Church. Rom: 12. & 1. Cor. 12. but in euery bodie the members are connected, and one dependeth on the other, but it can not rightly be said, that spirituall things doe depend vpon temporall, therefore temporall things doe depend vpon spirituall, and are subiect to them.
2 To the Maior proposition of this argument I answered beforeCap. 2., that Kings and Bishops, Clearkes and Laikes, being diuerse waies considered, doe make two totall, and not onely one totall body or common-wealth. For as they are referred to the Ecclesiasticall or spirituall power of the chiefe visible Pastour, to whom all Christians are subiect in spirituals, they make one totall body or common-wealth, to wit, the Catholike Church, which is the spirituall Kingdome and mysticall body of Christ, but as they are referred to the ciuill power of temporall Princes, to whom all inferiour Clerkes and Laikes are subiect in temporals, as all members are subiect to the head, [Page 180] they make another body or common-wealth, to wit, earthly kingdomes, as before I declared more at large. And this is sufficient to shew the weaknesse of this second argument, the Maior proposition thereof being cleerely false.
3. But to declare more fully the insufficiencie thereof, and to shew most plainely, that not onely his Maior proposition, as I haue prooued before, but also his Minor is apparantly false, I answer secondly with D. Barclay to his Minor, ‘that although in euery body the members are vnited and connected either immediately, or mediately to the head, vpon whom they all depend, yet that in euery body all the members doe depend one vpon the other, there is no man so ignorant that will affirme: for neither one foote doth depend vpon the other, nor one arme vpon the other, nor one shoulder vpon the other, but they are connected to some third either immediately by themselues, or to other members, to which they adhere. May it not, I pray you, by the same manner of arguing, and by the very same argument be concluded thus: The armes or euery man are members of one body, but in euery bodie the members are connected, and depending one vpon the other, but it cannot rightly bee said that the right arme doth depend vpon the left, therfore the left arme of euerie man doth depend vpon the right, and is subiect vnto it. Who would not skorn such foolish arguments?’
4. To this answer Card. Bellarmine In Tract. contra B [...]rcl. cap. 14. replieth in this manner. That which I sayd, that the members of the same body are connected, and that one doth depend vpon another, I vnderstood of members of a diuerse kinde, as is a finger, a hand, an arme, a shoulder and a head, and not of members of the same kinde, as are two hands, two feet, two eyes, two eares. For the ciuill and Ecclesiasticall power, whereof we speake, are of a diuerse kinde, as it is manifest, [Page 181] and words are to bee vnderstood according to the matter, which is treated of, otherwise there could not bee any demonstration so certaine, against which there could not bee brought some cauill. Therefore Kingly power, which is principall in his kinde, if it compound one body with the Ecclesiasticall power, which also in his kinde is principall, must of necessitie be either subiect, or superiour, least that in one bodie there be two heads; and seeing that it is manifest enough, that the Pope is head of the Church in steede of Christ, it doth plainely follow, that a King must either bee no member of this body, or else hee must bee subiect to the Pope, and in the same manner the ciuill power, which doth chiefely reside in the King, must either bee subiect to the spirituall, which doth chiefely reside in the Pope, or else it must remaine out of the Church; in that manner as a finger cannot be in the body, which doth not depend vpon the hand, nor a hand, which doth not depend vpon the arme, nor an arme, which doth not depend vpon the shoulder, nor a shoulder, which doth not depend vpon the head.
5. But that, which Barclay saith a little after, that the spirituall and ciuill power are as two shoulders in a body, whereof neither is subiect to the other, but both of them are subiect to one head, which is Christ, is not onely false, because those powers are not of the same kinde; that they may be compared to two shoulders, but also it appertaines to the heresie of this time. For what doe the heretikes of this time more endeauour to perswade the people, then that the Pope is not the visible head of the body of the Church, vnto whom all Christians, if they will be saued, must bee subiect? But this Barclay of his owne accord doth grant them, who neuerthelesse in all his booke doth make himselfe a Catholike: Therefore the spirituall and ciuill power are not well compared to two shoulders, but they ought either to bee compared to the spirit and flesh, as did S. Gregorie Nazianzene in the place often cited compare them, or else to the shoulder and head, to wit, principall members, wherof neuerthelesse the one, although of it selfe very strong and [Page 182] potent, ought to bee directed and gouerned by the other, which is superiour.
6 But this Reply of Card: Bellarmine, although at the first sight may seeme especially to the vnlearned to haue in it some shew of probabilitie, yet to the iudicious Reader, who will be pleased to examine it more exactly, it will clearely appeare, to be in very deede very vnsound and fallacious, to D. Barclay very iniurious, to Catholike religion very scandalous, and in very truth to haue in it no probabilitie at all,Cap. 14. §. 2o. as Mr. Iohn Barclay in his answer to Card. Bellarmine hath most clearely convinced. And first, whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that when he said, that members of the same body are depending one vpon the other, he vnderstood of member [...] of a diuers kinde, as is a finger, a hand, an arme, a shoulder, a head, and not of members of the same kind, as are two hands, two feet &c. ‘Mr. Barclay replyeth, that it is vntrue, that members of a diuerse kind are depending one vpon the other, as the hand doth not depend vpon the foot, the liuer vpon the lights, the splene vpon the shoulders, &c.’
‘7 And as for those examples, which Card. Bellarmine doth bring, hee vseth therein great deceipt, for neither doth the finger for that cause depend vpon the hand, nor the hand vpon the arme, nor the arme vpon the shoulder, for that they are members of one body, but for that by order of nature the finger cannot consist, or bee of it selfe without the hand, nor the hand without the arme, nor the arme without the shoulder; Neuerthelesse many members of the same body also of a diuerse kinde can well consist one without the other, as the eye without the eare, the shoulder without the foot, the nose without the eie &c as likewise these two members, whereof we now treate of the Christian common-wealth, not onely may, but also did actually, [Page 183] as Card. Bellarmine himselfe confesseth,Lib. 5. de Rom. Pont. c. 6. in the AApostles time consist one without the other.’ And if this proposition of Card. Bellarmine be true, that the members of one body, if they bee of a diuerse kinde must depend one vpon the other, hee must acknowledge, that in one kingdome the Musician must depend vpon the Physician, or the Physician vpon the Musician, the Shooe-maker vpon the Taylor, or the Taylor vpon the Shooe-maker, the Lord Chamberlaine vpon the Lord Treasurer, or the Lord Treasurer vpon the Lord Chamberlaine, to omit infinite other such like trades and dignitie [...], all which are members of the same bodie or Kingdome, whereas it is too too manifest, that they are not subiect, or depend one vpon the other, but either immediately vpon the King, or vpon those Magistrates, whom the King shall appoint.
8. Secondly, whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that it is manifest enough, that the Pope is head of the Church in place of Christ, from whence it doth clearely follow, that a King must either be no member of this body, ‘or else he must be subiect to the Pope, Mr. Barclay replyeth, that Card. Bellarmine doth cunningly equiuocate in that word, [Church]. For the Pope indeed is head of the Church, that is of Ecclesiasticall things, or of Christians, as they are Christians, in so much that a King cannot be a member of the Church being taken in this manner, but hee must be sub [...]ect to the Pope. But if by the Church hee vnderstand both powers, ciuill and Ecclesiasticall, which are among Christians, both Lay-men and Cleargiemen, who are ioyned by one linke of faith, he i [...] altogether deceiued. For the Pope is not the head of ciuill things: and therfore in vaine doth Card. Bellarmine affirme, that Kingly power must of necessitie be either subiect or superiour, least that there be two heades in one bodie. For taking the Church in that sense, as it comprehendeth [Page 184] ciuill and spirituall power, the Church hath Christ only for the head, and the Pope and Kings for chiefe members, who also in an other respect are ministeriall heades vnder Christ, the King of ciuill gouernment, and the Pope of spirituall. Besides, Card. Bellarmine doth now change his medium, as the Logicians call it: His argument, which he tooke vpon him to defend, was this: They are members of one body, therefore one dependeth vpon the other; now his argument proceedeth thus; Members doe depend vpon the head, the Pope is head of the Church, therefore Kings, who are members of the Church, doe depend vpon the Pope,’ which are two distinct arguments, yet both of them fallacious, and insufficient to proue, that the temporall power it selfe, or which is all one, that temporall Kings in temporall causes are subiect to the Pope, as you haue seene before.
9. Thirdly, whereas Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that the assertion of D. Barclay comparing these two powers to two shoulders of the Church, which are connected to one head, who is Christ, doth appertaine to the heresie of this time, which affirmeth, that the Pope is not the visible head of the Church, and that D. Barclay doth of his owne accord grant thus much, ‘M. Iohn Barclay answereth, that Card. Bellarmine doth in this both slander D. Barclay, and also maketh the Church and Pope odious to Princes. For what Protestant reading this may not with very good reason conclude, that Catholikes, according to Card. Bellarmines doctrin, when they say, that the Pope is the visible head of the Church, and that this is a point of Catholike-faith, doe vnderstand, that he is head and Gouernour not onely in Ecclesiasticall, but also in ciuill causes? what wise men of this world will not relate these sayings to Princes? and what Prince can without indignation here them. Neither did D. Barclay euer make any doubt, but that the Pope Christs Vicar in [Page 185] earth was head in Ecclesiasticall causes, neither did Catholike faith euer teach, that he was head in ciuill causes. Only Christ is head of Popes and Kings, the chiefe head I say of the Church. Whereupon S. Austin doth affirme,In serm. de remiss pec. & refertur 1. q. 1. can. Vt eui denter. that an excommunicated person is out of the Church, and out of the body, whereof Christ is the head.’
10. And therefore that similitude betweene the soule and body compounding one man, and the spirituall and ciuill power compounding one Church, or rather one Christian common wealth, or Christian world, is no fit similitude, and it is wrongfully ascribed to S. Gregorie Nazianzene by Card. Bellarmine, as I shewed beforeCap. 3., for that the soule is as the forme, and the body as the matter, compounding one essentiall thing, which is man, but the ciuill power is not as the matter, nor the spirituall as the forme compounding one essentiall body, which is the Church of Christ: but if we will haue them to compound one totall body, which is the Church, taking the Church for the Christian world consisting both of the temporal and spirituall power, which are in Christians, whereof Christ or God, and not the Pope is the head, they are onely integrall, to vse the termes of Philosophers, and not essentiall parts, neither doe they compound one essentiall; but only one integrall compound, in which kinde of compound it is not necessary, that one part doth depend vpon the other, as hath beene now conuinced; but all must of necessitie depend vpon the head, although in an essentiall compound one part must of necessitie depend vpon the other, for that in such a compound one part must bee as the matter and the other as the forme, as I declared before.
11. Wherefore the spirituall and ciuill power in the Church, taking the Church for the Christian world containing in it both powers, or which is all one, for the company of all Christians, in whome are both [Page 184] [...] [Page 185] [...] [Page 168] powers, or both subiections, are not like to the soule and body, which are essentiall parts of man: but they are as two shoulders, or two sides, which are only integrall parts of mans body: both which powers, although each of them in their kinde bee a visible head, the one of temporals, the other of spirituals, and in that respect doe formally make two totall bodies, to wit, earthly kingdomes, whereof temporall Princes are the head, and the spirituall kingdome, or Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the chiefe visible head, yet they are connected to one celestiall and inuisible head which is Christ, in which respect they make one totall body, whereof Christ onely and not the Pope is head, which may bee called the Christian world, consisting of earthly kingdomes, and the spirituall kingdome, or Church of Christ.
‘12. Neither is it true, that these two powers be of so diuerse a kinde, that they cannot be well compared to two shoulders, for both of them are powers, and in that respect of the same kinde, and as powers they are compared to two shoulders. And why may they not bee aptly compared to two shoulders, seeing that there is nothing more strong and more neere to the head in the Christian common-wealth? Neither is it materiall, that one is a more strong shoulder then the other; for in mans body the right arme is stronger then the left, and yet one is not more an arme then the other.’ May not, I pray you, two pillars of a diuerse kinde, one of brasse, the other of marble, bee aptly compared one with the other, in that both of them are pillars. The temporall and the ciuill power, or Kings as Kings, and hauing temporall authoritie, and Bishops as Bishops, and hauing spirituall power, are as two visible pillars which doe sustaine the edifice of the Christian world, or common-wealth, the one in temporalls, the other in spirituals, they are as two shoulders, [Page 187] which as in mans body are next vnder the head, and all the other inferiour members doe depend vpon them; so also they are next vnder God the head of both, and all other inferiour members of the Christian world doe depend vpon them; nay being compared to the inferiour members of the Christian world, they are also as two visible and ministeriall heads; from whence, as from the head of mans body, which is the roote, beginning, and foundation of all sense and motion in all the inferiour parts, all spirituall and temporall directions, Lawes, and punishments doe proceed.
13. And truely if D. Barclay must bee taxed of heresie, for comparing the temporall and spirituall power in the Church, or Christian world (for now the Church and Christian world which consisteth of both powers, is taken for all one) to two shoulders, and for affirming, that Christ only is the chiefe celestial and invisible head of both these powers, and that Kings and Popes are two ministeriall heads thereof (although both of them are also principall in their owne kinde, and in the nature of a visible head) then must Hugo de S. Ʋictore be taxed of heresie, when he comparethLib. 2. de Sa [...]ram. p. 2. ca. 3. these two powers to two sides, affirming, that Lay-men, who haue care of earthly things are the left side of this body, and Clergie men, who do minister spirituall things are the right, and that earthly power hath the King for the head, and the spirituall hath the Pope for head: Lo heere two sides (and consequently two shoulders) and two visible heads, wherof Christ is the principal and inuisible head.
14. Then must Thomas Waldensis our learned Country-man be taxed of heresie, when after hee had related the aforesaid words of Hugo, hee concludeth thusLib. 2. doctr. fid. art. 3. ca. 78: Behold two powers, and two heads of power: and beneath Likewise, saith he, neither Kingly power, which by the ring of faith or fidelitie is espoused to the kingdome, [Page 188] is reduced to any man authoritatiuely aboue the King besides Christ: and therefore the Pope is not head of the King, or Kingdome in temporalls. Then must S. Fulgentius be taxed of heresie, when he affirmethIn lib. de veritate praedest. & gratiae., that in the Church none is more principall then a Bishop, and in the Christian world none more eminent then the Emperour. Then must S. Ignatius be taxed of heresie, when hee affirmethIn Epist. ad Smyrnenses., That no man is more excellent then a King, nor any man is like to him in all created things, neither any one is greater then a Bishoppe in the Church. Then must S. Chrysostome, Theophylact, and Oecumenius bee taxed of heresie, when they affirmeAd Rom. 13., That whosoeuer hee bee, whether he be a Monke, a Priest, or an Apostle, he is according to S. Paul subiect to temporall Princes; as likewise Pope Pelagius the first, who affirmethApud. Bininum tom. 2. Concil. pag. 633, That Popes also according to the command of holy Scriptures were subiect to Kings.
15. Then must the ancient Glosse of the Canon Law In cap. Adrianus dist. 63., related and approued by Cardinall Cusanus Lib. 3. de Concord. Cath. cap. 3., (which Glosse Card. Bellarmine In Tract. cōtr. Barcl. ca. 13. 16, with small respect to antiquity, doth shamefully call a doting old woman, and which perchance is abolished for ouermuch old age) be taxed of heresie, affirming, That as the Pope is Father of the Emperour in spirituall [...]; so the Emperour is the Popes Father in temporalls. Then must Pope Innocent the fourth bee taxed of heresie, when hee affirmethSuper ca. Nouerit de sent excom., That the Emperour is Superiour to all both Church-men and Lay-men in temporalls. Then must Hugo Cardinall related by Lupoldus of Babenberg be taxed of heresie, when he affirmethDe iure regni & Imperij cap. 9. in principio., That the Emperour hath power in temporalls from God alone, and that in them he is not subiect to the Pope. Then must Ioannes Driedo be taxed of heresie, when hee affirmethLib. 2. de libert. Christiana cap. 2., That the Pope, and the Emperour are not in the Church as two subordinate Iudges, so that one receiueth his iurisdiction from the other: but they are as two Gouernours, who are the Ministers of one God deputed to diuerse offices, so that the [Page 189] Emperour is chiefe ouer Secular causes, and persons for the peaceable liuing in this world, and the Pope ouer spiritualls for the aduantage of Christian faith and charitie. Then must many of the ancient Fathers be taxed of heresie, when they affirme,Expounding those words of the 50. Psalme. Tibi soli peccaui. that Kings and Emperors are next vnder God, and inferiour to God alone; as likewise infinite other Catholike writers, who with Hector Pintus doe affirme,In cap: 45. Ezech. that Kings in temporalls haue no Superiour, although in spiritualls they are subiect to Priests.
16 But to these and such like pittifull shifts and extremities are sometimes driuen men otherwise very learned, when they are not afraid by clamours, slanders, and threatnings, rather then by force of reason, to thrust vpon the Christian world their owne vncertaine opinions for infallible grounds of the Catholike faith, and rather then they will seeme to haue been too rash in their Censures, or not so sound in their iudgements, they care not, although with palpable sophismes, so that they may in regard of their authoritie any way blinde the eyes of the vnlearned Reader with their cunning and ambiguous speeches, to maintaine what they haue once begun, and with no small scandall to Catholike religion, and great hurt to their owne soules, and which also in the end will turne to their owne discredit, to impeach those Catholikes of disobedience, heresie, or errour, who shall impugne their new pretended faith and doctrine, as being no point of the true, ancient, Catholike, and Apostolike faith, nor grounded vpon any one certaine authoritie or argument taken either from the testimonie of holy Scriptures, ancient Fathers, decrees of Councells, practise of the primitiue Church, or any one Theologicall reason, wherevpon any one of the most learnedst of them all dare rely.
17 For which cause they are so often enforced to vse so great equiuocation and ambiguitie of words [Page 190] in their arguments and answers, not declaring in what sense they take such ambiguous words: as in this question, concerning the temporall power compounding the Church, and being subiect therevnto, in one proposition they will seeme to take temporall power formally and in abstracto, signifying temporall Princes formally, as they haue temporall power, and in an other they will take it materially, and in concreto, for temporall Princes, who indeed haue temporall power, but not as they haue temporall power; In one proposition they will seeme to take the Church formally, as it signifieth the spirituall kingdome of Christ, and consisteth only of spirituall power, and in an other they will take it materially for all Christian men, or for the Christian world, as it is compounded both of temporall and spirituall power, and contayneth both the spirituall kingdome of Christ, and the earthly kingdomes of the Christian world. So likewise they will not insist vpon any one authoritie of holy Scriptures, any one decree of Pope or Councell, or any one Theologicall reason, as vpon a firme, sure, and infallible ground of their new pretended faith, which if they would doe, this controuersie would be quickly at end, but from one place of holy Scripture they flie to an other, from the new Testament to the ould, from one Councell to an other, and from one Theologicall reason to an other, and when all their arguments be answered, then with clamours, slanders, and forbidding of the bookes which are written against them, but not declaring why, or for what cause they are forbidden, or what erroneous doctrine is contayned in them, they will make the matter cleare. But truth and plaine dealing in the end will preuaile, neither will violence, but reason satisfie mens vnderstandings, and this their violent, shuffling, and vnsincere proceeding doth plainly shew, that they distrust their cause. And thus much concerning the second argument.
Chap. 7.
Wherein the third argument, which is taken from the changing of temporall gouernment, when it hindereth the spirituall good, is examined.
1. THe third argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to proue, that the ciuill power among Christians, not only as it is Christian, but also as it is ciuill, is subiect, and subordained to the Ecclesiasticall as it is Ecclesiasticall, is this: Thirdly, saith he,Lib. 5. de Rom: Pont. cap: 7. if the temporall gouernment hinder the spirituall good, the Prince, according to the opinion of all men, is bound to change that manner of gouernment, euen with the hinderance of temporall good, therefore it is a signe that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall.
2 Neither doth he satisfie, that should answer, that a Prince is bound to change that manner of his gouernment, not for the subordination to the spirituall power, but onely for order of charitie, by which wee are bound to preferre greater goods before losser. For in regard of the order of charitie, one common-wealth is not bound to suffer detriment, that an other common-wealth more noble doe not suffer the like detriment. And one priuate man, who is bound to giue all his goods for the conseruation of his owne common-wealth, is not bound to doe the like for an other common-wealth, although the more noble. Seeing therefore that the temporall common-wealth is bound to suffer detriment for the spiritual common-weatlh, it is a signe that they are not two diuerse common-wealths, but parts of one and the same common-wealth, and one subiect to the other.
3. Neither also is it of force, if one should say, that a temporall Prince is bound to suffer detriment for the spirituall good, not in regard of any subiection of the temporall commonwealth to the spirituall common wealth, but because [Page 192] otherwise he should hurt his subiects, to whom it is hurtfull to loose spiritualls for temporalls. For although those men, who are not his subiects, but are of an other kingdome, should suffer any notable hurt in spiritualls, for the gouernment in temporalls of some Christian King, he is bound to change his manner of gouernment, whereof no other reason can be giuen, but that they are members of the same body, and one subiect to the other.
4. By this argument Card. Bellarmine, as you see, laboureth to proue two things, the one is, that not only Lay-men, and Cleargie-men doe make one totall body, which is the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is head, for of this no Catholike maketh any doubt, but also that the temporall & spirituall power themselues, or which is all one, the temporall and spirituall common wealth, as they consist of temporall and spirituall power, are parts or this totall body called the Church of Christ, whereof the Pope is the supreme visible head. The second is, that not only temporall Princes are in spirituals subiect to the supreme spirituall Pastour, but also, that the temporall power itselfe, as it is temporall, is among Christians subiect to the spirituall power, as it is spirituall, and consequently, that temporall Princes not onely in spiritualls, but also in all temporalls are subiect to the spirituall power. ‘But neither of these can bee rightly concluded from this argument, as I shewed in my Apologie Num. 160. & seq., where I denied the consequence of this third argument, speaking of subiection and subordination per se, and of it owne nature. For if temporall gouernment doe hinder spirituall good, the temporall Prince is bound to change that manner of gouernment euen with detriment of temporall good, not for that the temporall power is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall, as though of the temporall and spirituall power were made formally one politike body, but for both the reasons alledged by [Page 193] Card. Bellarmine, which he did not sufficiently confute in his Replyes.’
‘5. The first reason is for the order of charitie, by which we are bound to prefer greater goods before lesser. To the Reply, which Card. Bellarmine made to the contrarie, I answered thus, that although for the order of charity one common wealth is not bound to suffer detriment, that an other common wealth more noble doe not suffer the like detriment, yet in case that both common wealths bee subiect to one Prince, or that the Prince of the lesse noble cōmon wealth be also a subiect of the more noble, then that Prince is bound for order of charitie, all other things being alike, to preferre the more noble common-wealth before the lesse noble. And although one priuate man, who is bound to giue all his goods for the conseruation of his owne common-wealth, bee not bound to doe the like for an other common-wealth, although the more noble, yet in case that the same priuate man should at the same time bee a Citizen of both common-wealths, if he be bound to giue all his goods for the conseruation of the lesse noble common wealth, whereof he is a Citizen, he is much more bound for the same order of charitie, to giue all his goods for the conseruation of the more noble common wealth, to which also he is subiect. And this is the very case in this present question. For the spirituall and ciuill power, and the common wealths which they compound, are so vnited and connected among Christians, that euery Christian is a Citizen of both common wealths, and both common wealths may be subiect to the same Prince, as appeareth in the Pope, who is the spirituall Prince or Pastour of the whole Christian world, and also a temporall Prince of some Prouinces thereof.’
‘6. The second reason, for which a temporall Prince is bound to change the manner of his gouernment [Page 194] in the aforesaid case, is, for that otherwise he should hurt his subiects, to whom it is hurtfull to loose greater goods for the lesser, that is spirituall goods for temporall. To the Reply, which Card. Bellarmine made to the contrary, I answered, that the reason wherefore a temporall Prince is bound to change his manner of gouernment, if it be greatly hurtfull to the spirituall good not only of his owne subiects, but also of the subiects of another Kingdome, is not for that the temporall power is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall, or for that both of them are parts of one, and the same totall common wealth, but because both the King, and also those subiects of an other temporall kingdome, are also members of the same mysticall body of Christ, and Cittizens of the same spirituall Kingdome, and therefore that King least that he should greatly preiudice in spiritualls the kingdome of Christ, whereof he is a Citizen, by his temporall gouernment, is bound to change that manner of gouernment. Thus I answered in my Apologie.’
7. Now you shall see how cunningly D. Schulckenius would shift of this answere. To the first part of my answere he replyeth thus:Pag. 339. H [...]ere I see nothing that needeth any answere sauing that [as though of the temporall and spirituall power were formally made one politike body] For my Aduersary Widdrington doth grant the antecedent▪ of Card. Bellarmines argument, and denieth the consequence, and for this cause he doth deny it, for that of the temporall and spirituall power is not made formally one politike body, and therefore one power is not per se subiect to the other. But what man that is well in his wits did euer say, that of the temporall and spirituall power is made formally one politike body? For although Cleargie men are Cittizens of the ciuill common wealth, as they liue together with the Citizens of that common wealth, and do buy, sell, and doe other things according [Page 195] to the lawes of that common-wealth, yet because they are exempted from the power of the politike Prince, and doe obserue his lawes not by force of the law, but by force of reason, they cannot properly and formally, but onely materially be called parts of the ciuill common-wealth.
8. Adde also that if the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power should make one politike body, the Ecclesiasticall should either be superiour, or subiect to the ciuill, superiour it could not be, for that the King is head of the politike body, neither could it be subiect, for that a superiour power ought not to be subiect to an inferiour. And besides (as it hath beene sayd) Cleargie men are exempted from the power of a politike Prince, and therefore the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power doe not make properly and formally one politike body. But my Aduersarie doth faine absurd opinions, which hee may refell. That which Card. Bellarmine saith, is, that the spirituall and temporall power, that is, Bishops, Kings, and their subiects, Clerkes and Laikes doe make one Church, one Christian common-wealth, one people, one kingdome, or mysticall body of Christ, wherein all things are well ordered and disposed, and therefore superiour things doe rule inferiour things, and inferiour things are subiect to superiour things. Let my Aduersarie Widdrington ouerthrow this, and then let him deny the consequence of Card. Bellarmines argument. Thus D. Schulckenius.
9. But how vnsound, cunning, and insufficient, is this Reply of D. Schulckenius, and also repugnant to his owne grounds, you shall presently perceiue. And first when I denied, that the spirituall and temporall power doe make formally one politike body, by a politike body I did not vnderstand, as it distinguished and contra-diuided to a spirituall body, but as it is distinguished from a naturall body, and comprehendeth in generall all politike gouernments, whether they be temporall, spirituall, or mixt, in which sense not onely earthly kingdomes compounded of temporall power, but [Page 196] also the spirituall kingdome, mysticall body or Church of Christ consisting onely of spirituall power is a politike body. Wherefore by the name of a politike body I vnderstood a common-wealth in generall, whether it were temporall, spirituall, or mixt of both, as any man, who is not desirous to cauill, may easily perceiue by all those answers and assertions, which I did so often inculcate concerning the vnion and coniunction of these two powers. So that my meaning in that place onely was to deny, that the temporall and spirituall power, as they are referred to the visible heads and subiects of both powers, doe make formally one totall common-wealth, but onely materially, for that the same Christian men, who haue temporall power or temporall subiection, doe make one spirituall Kingdome or Church of Christ, but not formally, as they haue temporall power, or temporall subiection, for so they make onely temporall and earthly kingdomes, but formally as they haue temporall and spirituall power, temporall and spirituall subiection, and are referred to the visible heads thereof, they make two totall bodies or common-wealths, as before I haue declared more at large.
10. Secondly, although it be true, that temporall and spirituall power, that is, Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes, as D. Schulckenius expoundeth those words (which neuerthelesse is a very improper acception of those words, for that temporall and spirituall power in abstracto doth signifie Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes as they haue temporall and spirituall power) doe make one Church, one Christian common-wealth, one people, one kingdome or mysticall body of Christ, yet this was not all that, which Card. Bellarmine affirmed, for Card. Bellarmine affirmed another thing, which I pretended to impugne, and which D. Schulckenius cunningly concealeth, to wit, that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes doe not make two common-wealths, [Page 197] but one; This was that which I impugned, [not two common-wealths, but one] I neuer denied that they did make one common-wealth, to wit, the Church of Christ, but withall I affirmed, that they did make also two, to wit the earthly kingdomes also of this Christian world: So that I did not inuent, or faine absurd opinions to confute them, as D. Schulckenius vntruely affirmeth, but I haue cleerely shewed, and that out of Card. Bellarmines, or D. Schulckenius his owne grounds, as before you haue seene more at large,Cap. 1. 2. 3. that the temporall and spirituall power doe make formally two totall bodies or common-wealths, and that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes diuerse wayes considered are parts and members of them both.
11. Thirdly, although I had taken a politike bodie for a temporall common-wealth, as in very truth I did not, but onely for a common-wealth in generall, as a politike bodie is distinguished from a naturall bodie, yet I might be very well in my wits, and neuerthelesse haue affirmed, that the temporall and spirituall power doe in the like manner, and for the same cause make formally one temporal common-wealth, for the which D. Schulckenius doth heere affirme, that temporall and spirituall power doe make formally one spirituall bodie or common-wealth. For the reason why he affirmeth, that the temporall and spirituall power doe make formally one Ecclesiasticall or spirituall common-wealth, is, for that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes are members of the spirituall kingdome of Christ, and subiect to the spirituall power of the supreme spirituall Pastor, which reason, if it be of force, doth also conclude, that the temporall and spirituall power may in like manner [...]e sayd to make formally one temporal common-wealth, for that Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes, are also true members and parts of the temporall common-wealth, and therfore they are either temporall Princes themselues, [Page 198] or subiect in temporals, to the temporal power of temporal Princes. And therfore the reason, why D. Schulckenius doth here affirm, That the temporall and spiritual power do not make formally one politicke or temporal body, is, as you haue seen, for that the Clergie are exempted from the power of a politicke Prince, and do obserue his Lawes not by force of the Law; but by force of reason, and therefore, saith he, they cannot properly and formally, but onely materially be called a part of the politicke common-wealth. From whence it cleerly followeth, that if a man may be well in his wits, and yet affirme, that Cleargie men are true parts, members, and subiects of the temporall common wealth, and consequently are not exempted from temporall subiection; but doe owe true fidelitie and allegiance to temporall Princes, hee may also bee well in his wits, and yet affirme according to D. Shulckenius his reason, that of the temporall and spirituall power, that is, of Kings and Bishops, Clerkes and Laikes is made properly and formally one politike body, or temporall common-wealth.
12. And dare D. Schulckenius, trow you, presume to say that S. Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Ad Rom. 13. and those others whom partly I did cite beforeCap. 6., and partly I will beneathCap. 12., were not well in their wits, when they affirmed, That whether he be a Monke, or a Priest, or an Apostle, he is according to S. Paul, subiect to temporall Princes. Or dare he presume to say, that Dominicus Sotus, Franciscus Ʋictoria, Medina, Sayrus, Valentia, and innumerable other Diuines cited by Sayrus Lib. 3. Thesaurie. 4. [...]. 16, and also by Salas Disp. 14. de Legibus sect. 8. the Iesuite, whose opinion hee approoueth and withall affirmeth, That some few moderne Diuines doe hold the contrary, were not well in their wits; when they taught, that Cleargie men are directly subiect to the ciuill Lawes, which are not repugnant to their state, nor to Ecclesiasticall Lawes, or Canons, and that Kings are Lords of Cleargie men, and that Cleargie men are bound to come at their call, and as Subiects to sweare allegeance [Page 199] and obedience to them, as Salas in expresse words affirmeth; and that Cleargie men are not exempted from secular power concerning the directiue, or commanding force thereof, in ciuill Lawes, which are profitable to the good state of the common wealth, which are the expresse words of Gregorius de Ʋalentia, tom. 3. disp. 9. q. 5. punc. 3.
13 And to conclude, dare D. Schulckenius presume to say, that Cardinall Bellarmine was not well in his wits, when hee wrote,Lib. 1. de Clericis c [...]p. 28. propos. 2a. That Cleargie men are not in any manner exempted from the obligation of ciuill Lawes, which are not repugnant to holy Canons, or to the office of their Clergie, although in the last Editions of his Booke, he hath left out those words [in any manner] not alleaging any cause wherefore. And therefore although Cleargie men are by the Ecclesiastical Lawes, and priuiledges of temporall Princes, exempted f [...]om the tribunalls of secular Magistrates, and from paying of certaine tributes, and personall seruices: yet to say that they are exempted wholly from temporall subiection, and that they are not subiect to the directiue power of the ciuil Lawes, nor can truely and properly commit treasons against any temporall Prince, for that they owe not true fidelitie, allegiance, and ciuill subiection to any temporall Prince (as some few Iesuites of these latter times haue not feared to a uerre, whose opinion Card. Bellarmine now, contrarie to his ancient doctrine, which for many yeeres together he publikely maintained, doth now seeme to follow) is repugnant in my iudgement both to holy Scriptures so expounded by the ancient Fathers, to the common opinion of the Schoole Diuines, and once also of Card. Bellarmine himselfe, at which time I thinke D. Schulckenius will not say, that he was not wel in his wits, and also to the practise both of the primitiue Church, and of all Christian Kingdomes euen to these dayes, and it is a doctrine newly broached [Page 200] in the Christian world without sufficient proofe, scandalous to Catholike Religion, iniurious to Chrian Princes, and odious to the pious eares of all faithfull and well affected Subiects.
14. The other reason, which D. Schulckenius allegeth, why Kings and Bishops, Clearkes and Laicks doe not make properly and formally one politike body or temporall common-wealth, (for to say that temporall and spirituall power in abstracto doe make formally either one temporal, or one spiritual cōmon-wealth, is very vntrue and repugnant to his owne grounds, as I haue shewed before, vnlesse we will speake very improperly) to wit, for that Cleargie men are superiour and not subiect, is as insufficient as the former; for that temporall Princes are in temporalls superiour, and haue preheminence not onely ouer Lay-men, but also ouer Cleargy men. And therefore the temporall, and spirituall power, or Kings and Bishops, Clearkes and Laikes, as they are referred to the visible heads heere on earth, doe neither make one politike or temporall body, nor one spirituall or Ecclesiasticall body, nor one total common-wealth consisting of both powers, whereof the Pope is head, but they doe make formally, and properly two totall bodies or common-wealths, to wit, the spirituall kingdome of Christ, which consisteth onely of spirituall power, and the earthly kingdomes of this Christian world, which consisteth onely of temporall and ciuill authority, both which bodies are commonly signified by the name of the Christian world, or Christian common-wealth, wherin all things are well ordered, and rightly disposed, and therefore superiours are aboue inferiours, and inferiours are subiect to superiours; but in temporall causes temporall power, whereof temporall Princes are the head, hath the preheminence not onely ouer Lay-men, but also ouer Cleargy-men, and in spirituall causes the spirituall power, whereof the Pope is [Page 201] head, is superiour, and to confound these two powers, were to breake all good order, as before I also declared. And therfore for good reason I granted the antecedent proposition of Card. Bellarmines argument, and denied his consequence.
15. But fourthly obserue, good Reader, another palpable vntruth, which D. Schulckenius in this place affirmeth. Card. Bellarmine, as you haue seene, endeuoured by his third argument to proue, that the temporall power as it is temporall, is among Christians subiect to the spirituall power, as it is spirituall; and his argument was this: If the temporall gouernment hinder the spirituall good, the Prince is bound to change that manner of gouernment, euen with the hinderance of the temporall good, therefore it is a signe that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall.. The antecedent proposition I did grant, and I denied his consequence. Now D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that for this cause I denyed his consequence, for that of the temporall and spirituall power is not made formally one politike body, which is very vntrue. For although I should acknowledge, as in very deede I doe, that the temporall and spirituall power, as they are referred to Christ the invisible and celestiall head, doe make properly and formally one totall body, or common-wealth, consisting of both powers, which may be called the Christian common wealth, but more properly the Christian world, yet I would and doe denie his consequence: and the reason hereof I alledged before, for that they are not essentiall parts of this totall bodie, as the bodie & soule are of man, but integrall parts, as two shoulders, two sides, hands, feete, eyes, eares, &c. are integrall parts of mans bodie, and doe not make an essentiall, but an integrall compound, in which kinde of compound it is not necessarie, as I shewed beforeCap. 6. nu. 6. 10., that one part bee subiect to an other, but it sufficeth that both be subiect to the head. And although I should also grant, [Page 202] as I doe, that temporall and spirituall power doe make formally one politike bodie, or temporall common wealth, taking temporall and spirituall power in that improper sense, as is declared by D. Schulckenius, to wit, for Kings and Bishops, Clerks and Laikes, who diuerse waies considered, doe make properly, and formally not onely a spirituall, but also a politike bodie or temporall common-wealth: yet I should and do notwithstanding denie his consequence, for those two causes, which Card. Bellarmine did in his Replyes alledge, but, as you haue seene, not sufficiently confute.
16 And truly if this argument of Card. Bellarmine were of force, it would in my opinion convince, that not only the temporall power among Christians is subiect to the spirituall power of the Pope, but also that the temporall power among infidell Princes is also subiect to the Popes spirituall authoritie, which neuerthelesse Card. Bellarmine doth denie; for if the temporall gouernment of an infidell Prince doe hurt and hinder the spirituall good of Christian Religion, he is bound to change that manner of gouernment euen with the hinderance of temporall good, therefore I might conclude with Card. Bellarmine, that it is a signe that the temporall power of an heathen Prince is subiect to the spirituall power of Christian religion. And therefore as the changing of temporall gouernment among infidells, when it hindereth the spirituall good of Christian religion, is no probable signe of any subiection per se of their temporall power to the Popes spirituall authoritie, but onely of a bond of charitie, whereby all men are by the law of God and nature bound not to hinder true spirituall good for a temporall commoditie, so also among Christians it is no probable signe of any subiection or subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, but at the most of a greater bond of charitie, whereby Christians not only by the law of God and [Page 203] nature, but also by the bond of Christian religion, which they professe, are obliged not to hinder the spirituall good thereof for a temporall commoditie.
17 Now you shall see, how insufficiently also D. Schulckenius replyeth to those two answers, which I made to Card. Bellarmines Replyes, wherein are alledged the causes, why I denyed the consequence of his argument, and why a temporall Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporall gouernment, when it hindereth the spirituall good. And first to my first answer D. Schulckenius replyeth thus:Pag. 341. that by my answer it is clearely gathered, that I say nothing in this place, which maketh to the ouerthrowing of Card. Bellarmines argument. For I confesse, saith he, that a Prince of a lesse noble common-wealth is not bound to suffer any detriment onely for the order of charitie, that an other common-wealth more noble doe not suffer the like, vnlesse either hee bee subiect to the Prince of that noble common-wealth, or vnlesse one hath both the common wealths subiect to him. Therefore I am constrained, saith he, to confesse, that the principall reason, why a temporall Prince ought to suffer detriment in temporalls, lest that the spirituall good be hindered, is not the order of charitie, but the subiection of the temporall common wealth to the spirituall, when they concurre to make one Christian common-wealth, or one mysticall bodie of Christ. Therefore I haue not, saith hee, confuted Card: Bellarmines argument, but haue yeelded vp the bucklers, yea and also haue confirmed it.
18 But truly it is strange to see, with what boldnesse, men otherwise learned, dare aduenture to auouch such grosse and palpable vntruths, and when their answers are cleane ouerthrowne, to brag not only of the victorie, but also that their Aduersarie hath granted, and confirmed their answers. For obserue, good Reader, how vntrue and fraudulent this answer is. I affirmed, as you haue seene, that the reason, why a [Page 204] temporall Christian Prince is bound to change his manner of gouernment, if it hinder the spirituall good, is not, for that the temporall power is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall, as Card. Bellarmine pretended, but because he being a Christian Prince, to whom especially, more then to a Heathen, it doth belong to haue care of true spirituall good, which Christian Religion ought chiefly to intend, is by the order of charitie, and not for any intrinsecall subiection, or subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, bound to preferre, caeteris paribus, the spirituall good before the temporall. And whereas Card. Bellarmine replyed, that for the order of charitie one common wealth, although the lesse noble, is not bound to suffer detriment, that an other common wealth more noble do not suffer the like detriment; and one priuate man, who is bound to giue all his goods for the preseruation of his owne common wealth, is not likewise bound to doe the like for an other common wealth although more noble; Seeing therefore that a temporall common-wealth is bound to suffer damage for the spirituall, it is a signe, that they are not two diuerse common-wealths, but parts of one and the selfe same common wealth, and one subiect to another.
12. To this Reply I answered, by shewing the disparitie betwixt one temporall common-wealth compared to an other, and a temporall common-wealth compared to the spirituall common wealth: because the same Prince, or subiect of one temporall common wealth is seldome, or neuer, a Prince or subiect of the other, and therefore the order of charitie requireth, that both the Prince and subiect ought to prefer the temporall good of their owne common wealth, before the temporall good of an other more noble common wealth: As also a man lesse noble ought in charitie to prefer, if other things be alike, his own temporall good before the temporall good of an other man more noble. But if it should so fall out, that the same [Page 205] man were Prince of both common wealths, or the same priuate man were a part and member of both common wealths, in this case the order of charitie would require, that he, who is member, or hath charge of both common-wealths, should preferre, if other things be alike, the temporall good of the more noble common wealth before the temporal good of the lesse noble, not by reason of any subiection of one common wealth to the other, but because both common-wealths are subiect to the same Prince, or the same priuate man is subiect to both common wealths, and therefore they ought with due respect and order of charitie to haue care of both, and to preferre the more worthy common wealth before the lesse worthy.
20. As likewise if one man hath diuerse trades, one more noble, an other lesse noble, one more profitable, and other lesse profitable, if in case he should bee compelled to loose, or preiudice one of his trades, the order of charitie would require, that hee should rather loose, or preiudice the lesse noble, then the more noble, the lesse profitable, then the more profitable trade, neither from hence could it bee gathered, that one trade were subiect, or subordained to another, but only that both trades were subiect to one man. So likwise if a man were constrained to loose either his eye or his finger, the order of charitie would require that hee should preferre the eye before the finger, for that the eye is a more noble, a more necessarie, a more profitable part of the body then the finger, and yet from hence we cannot well conclude, that therefore the finger is subiect or subordained to the eye, but that both are parts and members of the body of the same man, who therefore by order of charitie ought with due order and respect to haue a care of the whole body and euery part thereof, and to preferre the more worthy, necessary or profitable before the lesse worthy, necessarie or profitable member. And this I said was the [Page 206] plaine case of the temporall power among Christians compared to the spirituall, for that the Ecclesiasticall and ciuill power, temporall power and spirituall subiection &c. are among Christians so vnited in one subiect, that the same Christian man is a part, member, and Citizen both of the temporall, and also of the spirituall common wealth, and both common wealths may be subiect to the same Prince, as appeareth in the Pope, and therefore the order of charitie doth require, that euery Christian man ought to preferre the spirituall good, and spirituall common wealth, before the temporall good and the temporall common-wealth, not for that the temporall power, or common wealth is subiect to the spirituall, but for that all Christian Princes and people are parts, members, and Citizens of both common wealths, and the spirituall is farre more noble, and worthy, and therefore if other things be alike, to bee preferred before the temporall, by them who are parts and members of them both.
21. Now D. Schulckenius would cunningly forsooth make the Reader beleeue, that I say the very same that Card. Bellarmine doth, and that I doe not by my answere ouerthrow, but confirme Card. Bellarmines Reply: for that I am enforced, saith he, to confesse that the chiefe cause, why a temporall Prince ought to suffer damage in temporalls, least the spirituall good should be hindered, is not the order of charitie, but the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, when they make one spirituall common wealth, or mysticall body of Christ, which neuerthelesse, as you haue seene, is apparantly vntrue. For although I doe indeed alledge subiection for a cause, why the order of charitie doth require, that a temporall Christian Prince ought to preferre the spirituall good before the temporall, by which word [subiection] D. Schulckenius taketh occasion to delude his Reader, yet I doe not alledge that manner of subiection, [Page 207] which Card. Bellarmine doth, as D. Schulckenius vntruly affirmeth, to wit, the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, or of the temporall common wealth to the spirituall, taking temporall common-wealth properly as it consisteth of temporall power and temporall subiection, but the subiection of both common-wealths to one Prince, or the subiection of all Christians to both common wealths, to bee the cause, why the order of charitie requireth, that a Christian Prince is bound to change his manner of gouernment, when it hindereth the spirituall good.
22. Belike D. Schulckenius would inferre, that because the Pope is Lord of Ancona, and Ferrara, and ought to prefer caeteris paribus the good of the one before the other, therefore the State of Ancona is subiect to the State of Ferrara, or contrariwise, or because the King of Spaine is King of Naples and Duke of Millan, therefore the State of Millan is subiect to Naples, or because a man hath two trades, and ought to preferre the one before the other, therefore the one is subiect to the other, or because one man is a Cittizen of two cities, therefore one of those cities is subiect to the other, or because the eyes and eares are parts and members of the same body of man, who ought therefore by order of charity to preferre the good of the more worthy and necessary member before the good of the lesse worthie and lesse necessarie, therefore the eares are subiect to the eyes or contrariwise. I euer affirmed, that the temporall power among Christians is not per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall, and that they doe not properly and formally, as they are referred to the visible heads heere on earth, make one totall, but two totall common-wealths, although the same Christian man being considered diuerse waies, is a part and member of both common-wealths, and as in spirituall causes he is subiect to the Ecclesiasticall power, which onely doth properly and [Page 208] formally make the spirituall, or Ecclesiasticall common-wealth, so in temporall causes hee is subiect to the ciuill power, which onely doth properly and formally make the remporall or earthly kingdomes of this Christian world, and because the spirituall common-wealth and good thereof is the more noble and more worthy, therefore the same Christian man, being a member and citizen of both common-wealths, ought to preferre, if other things be alike, the spirituall good before temporall, and not for any subiection of the temporall power, or commonwealth to the spirituall. But when men are not disposed to deale sincerely for truthes sake, but are resolued to defend per fas & nefas, what they haue once taken in hand to maintaine, and doe not fight for truth, but for credit, they little regard what they say, so that with cunning & smooth words they may colour their sayings in such sort, as that they may blind, dazel or confound the vnderstanding of the Reader. And thus much concerning Card. Bellarmines first Reply.
23. Now to the answer, which I made to Card. Bellarmines second Reply, by which hee pretended to prooue the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, D. Schulckenius Pag. 343. replieth in this manner. I answer that my Aduersary Widdrington saith nothing, which doth weaken Card. Bellarmines argument. That which Card. Bellarmine did assume, to wit, that a temporall Prince is bound to change his manner of gouernment, not onely, least that hee should hurt in spirituals his owne subiects, but also least that he should hurt other Christians, my Aduersarie Widdrington doth grant. And in this assumption, or antecedent proposition all the force of Card. Bellarmines argument doth consist. Besides, when Widdrington denyeth, that the temporall power is per se subiect to the spirituall, or that both of them bee parts of one, and the selfe same Christian common-wealth, and afterwards granteth, that a temporall King, and those, who are [Page 209] ciuilly subiect vnto him, are members of the mysticall body, and Citizens of the same spirituall Kingdome, he doth manifestly contradict himselfe. For what else is this, that Christian Kings and their Subiects are members of the same mysticall body of Christ, and Citizens of the same spirituall Kingdome, I say, what else is this, then that Christian Kings, and their Lay-Subiects are parts of the Christian common-wealth? For the Christian common-wealth, and the mysticall bodie of Christ, and the spirituall Kingdome of Christ are altogether the same: of which common-wealth Kings with Laikes, Bishops with Clerks are parts, as oftentimes hath beene sayd. In which Christian com-wealth, and mysticall body, and Kingdome of Christ all things are so well disposed and ordered, that temporall things doe serue spirituall, and ciuill power is subiect to Ecclesiasticall, which conclusion my Aduersarie Widdrington hath many waies attempted to ouerthrow, but he was not able. And he was not able not onely to ouerthrow the conclusion, but also he hath not beene able to weaken at all with any probable answer the first argument which Card. Bellarmine brought to prooue this conclusion, which the Readers will easily perceiue, if without perturbation of minde they will consider that which hath beene sayd by vs.
24 But this Reply of D. Schulckenius is as fraudulent, and insufficient, as the former: for in effect it is only a repetition of his former Reply, to which I haue already answered, besides some fraudulent dealing, which he hath vsed herein. And first it is very true, that I granted the antecedent proposition of this second Reply of Card. Bellarmine, but that all the force of Card. Bellarmines argument doth consist in the antecedent proposition, or assumption, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, is very vntrue, and I wonder, that D. Schulckenius is not ashamed with such boldnesse to affirme the same. The Antecedent proposition was, that a Christian Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporal [Page 210] gouernment, if it hurt the spirituall good, not onely of his owne Subiects, but also of the Subiects of other Christian Princes, and this proposition I did willingly grant him, but the force of his argument did not consist only in this antecedent proposition, as D. Schulckenius vntruly affirmeth, but in the consequence, which hee inferred from this antecedent proposition, or if wee will reduce his argument to a syllogisticall forme, in his Minor proposition, or assumption, which was this, but of this, to wit, that a Christian Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporall gouernment in the case aforesaid, no other reason can be giuen, but that both powers are members of the same body, and one power or body subiect to the other. And this consequence, assumption, or Minor proposition, wherein the whole force of his argument did consist, I vtterly denyed, and I alledged, as you haue seene, an other plaine and perspicuous reason, why a Christian Prince in the case aforesaid is bound to change the manner of his temporall gouernment, to wit, not for that temporall power is per se subiect to the spirituall, or for that they make one totall bodie, or common-wealth, consisting of temporall and spirituall power, but for that all Christians, both Princes and subiects, are parts and members not onely of the temporall, but also of the spiritual common-wealth, for which cause a Christian Prince is bound to change the manner of his temporall gouernment, when it is hurtfull to the spirituall good of the Church, or spirituall kingdome of Christ, whereof he is a true part and member, as I declared before.
25. Secondly, it is very vntrue, that I doe any waie contradict my selfe, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, first in denying that temporall power is per se subiect to the spirituall, or that both of them are parts of one and the selfe-same Christian common-wealth or Church of Christ, and afterwards in granting, that temporall Kings, and their [Page 211] subiects, are members of the same spirituall kingdome or Church of Christ. For these propositions, temporall power is not per se, subiect to spirituall power, and temporall Princes are subiect to spirituall power, are not repugnant or contradictorie one to the other, as neither these propositions are contradictory, Temporall power and spirituall power, are not parts of the spirituall kingdome or Church of Christ, and temporall Princes are parts of the spirituall kingdome or Church of Christ. For contradiction according to Aristotle Lib. 1. de Interp. cap. 4., is an affirming and denying of the same thing, and in the same manner: But there is no man so ignorant that will affirme that the same thing, and in the same manner is affirmed and denied in the aforesaid propositions: for the subiect of the first propositions, is temporall power in abstracto, and it is taken formally, and in the second propositions it is temporall power in concreto, and it is taken onely materially, and hath this sense, that temporall Princes, who haue both temporall power, and also spirituall subiection, are indeed subiect to the spirituall power, and are parts and members of the spirituall kingdome of Christ, but not formally, as they haue temporall power, but onely materially, who haue temporall power, but formally as they haue spiritual subiection. But D. Schulckenius doth manifestly contradict himselfe, as I plainely shewed beforeCap. 2., first affirming, That the Church of Christ is compounded of temporall and spirituall power, which are formally two distinct powers, as he himselfe also confesseth, and afterwards in denying, that it is compounded of temporall, or ciuill power, which is formally ciuill.
26. But marke now good Reader, what fraude D. Schulckenius vseth in prouing, that I doe manifestly contradict my selfe. He would seeme to his Reader to proue, that I affirme and deny one and the selfe same thing: for this he taketh vpon him to proue, and yet he proueth nothing else, but that which I haue alwaies [Page 212] affirmed, and neuer denied, to wit, that Christian Kings, and their subiects are parts and members of the Church, and subiect to the spirituall power thereof, but the contradiction, which hee pretended to proue, he doth not proue at all, nor make any shew of proofe thereof, to wit, that it is all one to say, that Christian Princes and their subiects are parts and members of the Church, and subiect to her spirituall power, which I alwaies granted, and that the temporall and spirituall power doe compound the Church, or that the temporall power it selfe is per se, subiect to the spirituall power of the Church, which I euer denied, and out of Card. Bellarmines owne grounds haue cleerely proued the contrary, and haue plainely shewed, that temporall power doth only compound a temporall or ciuill body or common-wealth, whereof the King is head, as D. Schulckenius doth heere expresly affirme, and that the Church of Christ his mysticall body, and spirituall Kingdome, or Christian common-wealth (taking the Christian common-wealth for the Church onely, and not for the Christian world, as it containeth temporall and spirituall power) is compounded onely of spirituall, and not of temporall power. In which Church of Christ, and also Christian world, all things are so well ordered and disposed, that temporall things ought by the intention of good Christians, to serue spirituall things, and temporall Princes, although in spiritualls they are subiect to the spirituall power of the Church, yet in temporalls, or as they haue temporall power, they are not subiect but supreame, and consequently the temporall power it selfe speaking properly and formally, is not subiect to the spirituall, nor dooth compound the spirituall kingdome or Church of Christ. And therefore I haue not onely weakened, but also quite ouerthrowne, and that out of his owne grounds this conclusion of Card. Bellarmine, and all [Page 213] those three arguments, which he brought to confirme the same, as any iudicious Reader, who will duly examine both our writings, will easily perceiue.
Chap. 8.
Wherein is examined the fourth argument, taken from the authoritie of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, comparing the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, to the body and soule in man.
1. THE fourth argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringeth to prooue this subiection of of the temporall power among Christians, to the spirituall power of the Church, is taken from the authoritie of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, who compareth the temporall and spirituall power among Christians to the body and soule in man: yea, and also affirmeth, that temporall Magistrates are subiect to spirituall Pastors. And this similitude doth so greatly please Card. Bellarmines conceit, that when hee hath any fit occasion, he spareth not to inculcate it, as a very strong argument, and fit similitude to proue, that the temporall power among Christians is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the spirituall, as the body in man is per se, subiect to the soule. For as the spirit and flesh, saith heLib. 5. de Rō. pont. cap. 6., are in man, so are the spirituall and temporall power in the Church. For the spirit and flesh are as it were two common-wealths, which may be found separated, and also vnited. The flesh hath sense and appetite, to which are answerable their acts and proper obiects, and of all which the immediate end is the health & good constitution of the body. The spirit hath vnderstanding and wil, and acts and proportionate obiects, and for her end the health and perfection of the soule. The flesh is found without the spirit in beasts, the spirit is found without the flesh in Angels.
[Page 214]2 Whereby it is manifest, that neither of them is precisely for the other. The fl [...]sh also is found vnited to the spirit in man, where because they make one person, they haue necessarily subordination and connexion. For the flesh is subiect, the spirit is superiour, and although the spirit doth not intermeddle hir selfe with the actions of the flesh, but doth suffer the flesh to exercise all hir actions, as shee doth exercise in beasts, yet when they doe hurt the end of the spirit, the spirit doth command the flesh, and doth punish hir, and if it be needfull, doth appoint fastings, and also other afflictions, euen with some detriment, and weakning of the bodie, and doth compell the tongue not to speake, the eyes not to see, &c. In like manner if any action of the flesh, yea and death it selfe, be necessarie to obtaine the end of the spirit, the spirit hath power to command the flesh to expose hir selfe and all hirs, as wee see in Martyrs.
3 Euen so the ciuill power hath hir Princes, lawes, iudgements &c. and likewise the Ecclesiasticall hath hir Bishops, Canons, iudgements. The ciuill hath for hir end temporall peace, the spirituall euerlasting saluation. They are sometimes found separated, as long since in the time of the Apostles, sometimes vnited as now. And when they are vnited, they make one bodie, and therefore they ought to be connected, and the inferiour subiect, and subordained to the superiour. Therefore the spirituall power doth not intermeddle hir selfe with temporall affaires, but doth suffer all things to proceed, as before they were vnited, so that they be not hurtfull to the spirituall end, or not necessarie to the attayning therevnto. But if any such thing doe happen, the spirituall power may and ought to compell the temporall by all manner, and waies, which shall seeme necessarie therevnto.
4 Thus you see, that Card: Bellarmine hath made here a plausible discourse, but truly more beseeming, as I will most clearely convince, a cunning oratour, who with fine, and wittie conceipts seeketh [Page 215] rather to please curious eares, then a sound Diuine, who with substantial arguments, and forcible proofes should endeauour to convince the vnderstanding of iudicious men, especially in such points, as are pretended to belong to Catholike faith, and eternall saluation. For neither is the temporall and spirituall power among Christians well compared to the body, and soule of man, either in vnion, or in subiection, and besides, although it were in all things a fit similitude, yet it doth not any way proue that, which Card. Bellarmine pretendeth to proue thereby, but it doth clearely and directly, as you shall see, convince the flat contrarie.
5 For first, as I shewed beforeCap. 2. 3. out of Card Bellarmines owne grounds, the temporall and spirituall power, as they are referred to their visible heads here on earth, doe not make properly and formally one totall bodie, or common-wealth, which is the spirituall kingdome, or Church of Christ, but they doe make properly, and formally two totall bodies, or common wealths, to wit, earthly kingdomes, or a temporall, and ciuill bodie, whereof the King is head, as D. Schulckenius expressely affirmethPag. 339., and the spirituall kingdome, mysticall bodie, or Church of CHRIST, whereof the Pope is head, and which as D. Schulckenius also affirmeth,Pag. 203. is onely compounded of spirituall power. Seeing therefore, that the reason why Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that temporall power among Christians is subiect to the spirituall, is for that they do make one totall bodie, or common-wealth, as the bodie and soule doe make one man, and consequently the temporall power must be subiect to the spirituall, as the bodie is subiect to the soule of man, and as I haue clearely proued, there is no such vnion of the temporall and spirituall power to make one totall bodie consisting of both powers, which is the spirituall kingdome or Church of CHRIST, it is manifest, that [Page 216] Card Bellarmines argument drawne from this similitude of the soule and bodie, being grounded vpon this vnion of the temporall and spirituall power, compounding one totall bodie, hath no sure ground, or foundation at all.
6 Secondly, although I doe willingly grant, as you haue seene beforeCap. 1., that not onely the temporall and spirituall power among Christians, as they are referred not to their visible heads here on earth, but to CHRIST the invisible head of them both, doe make one totall bodie, or common-wealth, consisting actually of both powers, which may bee called the Christian world (in which sense the Christian common wealth is vsually taken, but the Church of CHRIST, and especially the spirituall kingdome of CHRIST is seldome taken in that sense) but also the whole world, consisting of Christians, and Infidells, may in that manner be called one totall bodie, whereof CHRIST, at least wise, as he is GOD, is the invisible, and celestiall head, neuerthelesse this similitude of the soule and bodie vnited in one man doth nothing auaile to proue the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, both vnited in one totall bodie, whereof CHRIST onely, and no earthly creature is the head. For the reason, why the bodie in man is subiect to the soule, is because the bodie and soule doe make one essentiall compound, as the Philosophers doe call it, whereof the bodie is the matter, and the soule is the forme, and consequently the bodie must of necessitie, and by a naturall sequele, be subiect to the soule, as euery matter is per se and of it own nature subiect to the form, with which it maketh one essentiall compound, but the temporal & spiritual power or earthly Kingdomes, and the spirituall kingdome of Christ, as they make one totall body, wherof Christ onely is the head, doe not make one essentiall compound, whereof one is as the matter, and the other [Page 217] as the forme, but they doe make one integrall compound, as the Philosophers doe call it, in that manner as the bodie of man is compounded of eyes, eares, tongue, hands, feete, which are called by the Philosophers integrall, and not essentiall parts of mans bodie; but in an integrall compound, it is not necessary, as I shewed beforeCap. 6. nu: 10., that one part be subiect to another, although all must be subiect to the head, as it is apparant in the eyes, eares, tongue, hands, and feet of mans bodie, whereof none is subiect one to the other, although all be subiect to the head. Seeing therefore that the temporall and spirituall power are onely integrall parts of the totall body, whereof Christ onely is the head, it is euident that from hence no probable argument can be drawne to proue, that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, but that both of them are vnited and subiect to Christ the inuisible head of them both.
7. Thirdly, although I should also grant, that this were a fit similitude in all things, and that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall in that manner as the body is subiect to the soule of man, yet this manner of subiection would nothing auaile to proue, that the spirituall power could either directly, or indirectly dispose of temporalls, depriue temporall Princes of their temporall liues or dominions, vse temporall punishments, or exercise any temporall action, but it is rather a very fit similitude to conuince the flat contrary. For as I will easily grant, that the soule hath power to command, or forbid the body to exercise any corporall action, when it is necessarie or hurtfull to the end not onely of the soule but also of the body, (which last clause Card. Bellarmine cunningly omitteth, for that it fauoureth, as you shall see, the Popes direct power to command temporalls) as to see, to heare, to speake, and such like actions, which are subiect to the command of mans will, I say, which are subiect [Page 218] to the command of mans will, for that there be many corporall actions, which are not in the power of mans will to command, as are all the actions of the nutritiue, vegetatiue and generatiue powers; But if the body by any let, or hinderance can not, or (if it were possible) would not doe that corporall action, which the soule would willingly haue the body to doe, as to see, to heare, to speake, or to goe, the soule hath no power of her selfe either directly, or indirectly, that is, either for the good of the body, or for the good of the soule, to do that corporall action, as to see, heare, speake, or goe, without the concurrence of the body it selfe.
8. Neither hath the soule any power to inflict any corporal punishment by way of coercion or constraint, that is, to punish actually with corporall punishment any member of the body without the concurrence of some one or other member thereof, but onely by the way of command, that is, to command some one member to punish it selfe; or an other member, as the hands, feete, or head, to put themselues into fire or water, or the hands, to whip the shoulders, to close thy eye-lids, to stop the eares, not to put meate into the mouth, and such like, which if the bodily member by any let, or hinderance can not, or, if it were possible, would not doe, the soule hath done all that is in her power to doe, for that she cannot of her selfe doe any corporall action, without the concurrence of some corporall member, but the most that she can doe concerning any corporall action or punishment, is to command the body to concurre with her to the doing of that corporall action, or punishment. I said [if it were possible] for that there is such a naturall, necessarie, and intrinsecall subiection of the body to the soule, that the body cannot resist the effectuall command of the soule in those things which are subiect to her command, and therefore I said, that if it were possible, [Page 219] that the body could resist the command of the soule, yet the soule of her selfe hath not power to exercise any corporall action without the concurrance of a corporall organ; which manner of subiection is not betweene the temporall and spirituall power, for that this subiection being in diuerse persons hauing free will, is free and voluntarie, and therefore the command may be resisted, but the former being of the body to the soule, making one only person, who hath free will, is necessarie and naturall, and therefore can not be resisted.
9. In the like manner I will easily grant, that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, or rather that temporall Princes, who haue temporall power, but not as they haue temporall power, are subiect to spirituall Pastours, who haue spirituall power, in such sort, that the spirituall Pastour hath power to command the temporall Prince to do those temporal actions belonging to his temporall power, which are necessarie to the end of the spirituall power, and to forbid him those actions belonging to his temporall power, which are repugnant to the end of the spirituall power, which is eternall saluation, which if hee refuse to doe, and will not obey the command of the spirituall Pastour, the spirituall Pastour can not by vertue only of his spirituall power exercise any temporall; or ciuill action, belonging to the temporall, or ciuill power, without the consent, or concurrance of the temporall power: Neither can the spirituall Pastor inflict any temporall, or ciuill punishment by way of coercion, constraint, or compulsion, that is, punish actually with any temporall, or ciuill punishment without the consent, & concurrance of the temporall, or ciuill power, but only by the way of command, that is, he hath power to command the temporall Prince, who only hath supreme temporall authoritie, to punish himselfe, or his subiects with temporall, or ciuill [Page 220] punishments, if they vse their temporals to the hurt? and preiudice of the spirituall power, or the end therof? although I doe willingly grant, that the spirituall Pastour hath power to punish the temporall Prince, or his subiects, with spirituall punishments, not onely by the way of command, but also of coercion and constraint that is, to punish them actually, whether they will or no, with spirituall punishments, when they shall refuse to obey his iust command, for that this manner of punishing by way of coercion doth not exceede the limits of the spirituall coerciue power.
10. Now if my Aduersaries demand or mee, why the spirituall power may of her selfe command temporall actions, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly, that is, neither for temporall, nor spirituall good, exercise temporall actions, may command ciuill punishments, when they are necessarie to the end of the spirituall power, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly punish actually with ciuill punishments without the concurrance of the spirituall power, I answer them by their owne similitude, which pleaseth them so much; for the same reason, that the soule hath power of her selfe to command bodily actions, and yet neither directly, nor indirectly, that is, neither for the good of the body, nor of the soule, to doe of her selfe alone any bodily action, hath power to command bodily punishments, and yet of her selfe hath not power to inflict any bodily punishment, without the concurrance of the bodie it selfe. And thus you see, that this similitude, of which Card. Bellarmine, and his followers doe make so great account, is no fit similitude to prooue their doctrine, but rather to confirme ours, and that from this similitude no probable argument can be drawen to prooue, that the spirituall Pastour hath power either directly or indirectly to dispose of temporals, to depose temporall Princes, or to punish temporally by way of coercion or constraint.
[Page 221]11. But fourthly, although the temporall and spirituall power were aptly compared by Card. Bellarmine to the bodie and soule, yet it would prooue two things more then he, as I suppose, would willingly admit; The first is, that: the temporall power can exercise no temporall action without the concurrance and assistance of the spirituall power, as the body can doe no corporall action, vnlesse the soule also, as an efficient cause thereof, doe concurre thereunto; For this is a cleere and approoued principle in philosophie, that the soule is cause of all motions in the body, according to that common definition or description of the soule assigned by Aristotle 2. De Anima tex. 24.; Animaid est, quo vinimus, & sentimus, & mouemur, & intelligimus primò. The soule is that, whereby we first or principally liue, and haue sense, and are mooued, and doe vnderstand.
12. The second is, that the spirituall power may command or forbid the ciuill power to exercise ciuill actions, not onely when they are necessarie, or hurtfull to the end of the spirituall power, which is the health of the soule, but also when they are necessarie or hurtfull to the end of the temporall power, which is temporall peace, as the soule hath power to command or forbid the bodie to exercise bodily actions, as to see, heare, speake &c. not onely when they are necessary, or hurtfull to the end, and good of the soule, which is spirituall life and health, but also when they are necessarie or hurtfull to the good of the body, which is bodily health and life. And therefore Card. Bellarmine declaring this similitude of the spirit and flesh doth only affirme, that the spirit doth command the flesh, when her actions are hurtfull to the end of the spirit, but cunningly omitteth, that the spirit also dorh command the flesh, when her actions are necessarie, or hurtfull to the end of the flesh, least the Reader should presently perceiue therby the disparity of this similitude, or else from thence inferre, that in [Page 222] the same manner the spirituall power may command the temporall power not onely in order to spirituall good, but also in order to temporall good, which is the Canonist, doctrine, and which Card. Bellarmine doth at large impugne.
13. Lastly, in what manner S. Gregory Nazianzene did compare the temporall and spirituall power, or rather temporall and spirituall Princes to the bodie and soule, I haue sufficiently declared beforeCap. 3. to wit, not in the manner of their vnion or subiection, but onely in nobility, and in that temporall Princes are in as excellent and worthy manner subiect to temporall Princes, as spirituall things are more excellent and worthy then temporall. So that neither from the authority of S. Gregorie Nazianzene, nor from the similitude it selfe of the bodie and soule, as it is declared and vrged by Card, Bellarmine, can it with any probabilitie be gathered, that the spirituall power can of her selfe exercise any temporall action belonging to the ciuill power, without the concurrance of the ciuill power, although it be necessarie to the end of the spirituall power, as the soule cannot of her selfe without the concurrance of the bodie exercise any bodily action, although it be necessarie to the end, not onely of the body, but also of the soule. And therefore I maruell, that Card. Bellarmine could bee so much ouerseene, as to vrge and repeat so often this similitude of the soule and body to prooue the Popes power to depose, and to dispose of all temporals, which is so flat against him, and which, if it were a fit similitude, doth rather confirme the doctrine of the Canonists, whom Card. Bellarmine taketh vpon him to confute, then his owne opinon. But the truth is, that it confirmeth neither, for that, as I declared before,Cap. 2.3. the temporall and spirituall power, or the temporall and spirituall Common-wealth are not parts compounding one totall Body or Common-wealth, [Page 223] as the bodie and soule doe compound a perfect man.
Chap 9.
Wherein the fift argument to proue the subiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, taken from the authoritie of S. Bernard and Pope Boniface the eight, is examined.
1. THe fift argument, which Car. Bellarmine bringethLib. 5. de R [...]m Pont. c. 7. to proue the subiection of the temporall power among Christians to the spirituall, is taken from the authoritie of S. Bernard Lib. 4. de considerat and Pope Boniface the eight, in the Extrauagant, Ʋ nam Sanctam, who doth imitate, saith Card. Bellarmine, S. Bernards words. The words of S. Bernard to Pope Eugenius are these. Why dost thou againe attempt to vsurpe, or vse Vsurpare. the sword, which once thou wast commanded to put vp into the scabbard? which neuerthelesse hee that denieth to be thine, doth seeme to me not sufficiently to haue considered the speech of our Lord saying, Returne thy sword into the scabbard. Therefore it is also thine, to be drawne forth perchance at thy becke Nutu tuo., or direction, although not with thy hand. Otherwise if also it doth in no maner appertaine to thee, when the Apostles said, Behold to swords heere, our Lord had not answered, It is enough, but it is too much. Therefore both the spirituall, and the materiall sword doe belong to the Church, but the materiall is indeed to bee exercised, or drawne forth for the Church; but the spirituall also by the Church: the spirituall with the hand of the Priest, the materiall with the hand of the Souldier, but indeed at the booke, or direction, of the Priest, and at the command of the Emperour.
2. The pricipall words of Pope Boniface, besides those which hee doth imitate out of S Bernard are, That in the Catholicke, and Apostolike Church, whereof [Page 224] Christ is the head, and S. Peter his Ʋicar, and in her power there be two swords, the spirituall, and the temporall, as we are instructed by those words of the Gospell, Behold heere; that is in the Church, two swords, &c. And that the sword must be vnder the sword, the temporall authoritie subiect to the spirituall power. For the spirituall, the truth so witnessing, hath to instruct the earthly power, and to iudge if it be not good. So of the Church, and of the Ecclesiastical power, the prophesie of Ieremy is verified, behold I haue appointed thee this day ouer nations and Kingdomes, and the rest which follow. Therefore if the earthly power goeth out of the way, shee shall be iudged by the spirituall power, but if the inferiour spirituall power goeth out of the way, shee shall be iudged by her superiour, but if the supreme goeth out of the way, shee can be iudged by God alone, and not by man, according to the testimony of the Apostle, That the spiritual man iudgeth all things, and he is iudged by none. From all which Card. Bellarmine, who only relateth S. Bernards words, and affirmeth, that Pope Boniface doth imitate the same, doth conclude, that the meaning of S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface was to affirme, that both the temporall and spiritual sword are in the power of the Pope, & that the Pope hath per se, and properly the spirituall sword, and because the temporall sword is subiect to the spirituall, therefore the Pope may command, or forbid a King the vse of the temporall sword, when the necessitie of the Church doth require it.
3. Thus you see what S. Bernard and Pope Boniface doe affirme, and also that Card. Bellarmine inferreth, and concludeth from their words. And although to this, which Card. Bellarmine inferreth from their words, there needeth no answere at all, for that I doe willingly grant all that, which he doth inferre, to wit, that the temporall sword is subiect in some cases to the commanding power of the Pope, and that the Pope may command, or forbid a King the vse of the temporall [Page 225] sword, when the necessitie of the Church shall require it: seeing that the question betweene mee and Card. Bellarmine is not concerning the Popes commanding power, and whether the Pope may command a King to vse the temporal sword in the necessitie of the Church, as I haue oftentimes in all my Bookes expresly affirmed, but concerning the Popes coerciue power, and whether if a King will not vse the temporall sword at the Popes command, the Pope hath power to vse it himselfe, and may constraine a King not only with spirituall, but also with temporal compulsion, and punishment to fulfill his iust command; Neuerthelesse, because Card. Bellarmine hath now in his Schulckenius, taken some exceptions against the answere, which I made in my Apologie to the authortie of S. Bernard, and consequently of Pope Boniface, who, as hee saith, doth imitate S. Bernards words, I thinke it not amisse to set downe my answere, and also his Reply, that so the Reader may cleerely perceiue, whether S. Bernard doth fauour, or disfauour Card. Bellarmines opinion concerning the Popes power to vse the temporall sword, in case a temporall King will not vse it at the Popes command, and whether D. Schulckenius hath sufficiently confuted the answere, which I did make to the aforesaid authoritie of S. Bernard.
4 Thus therefore I answered in my Apologie Nu. 196. & seq., ‘that the words of S. Bernard doe only signifie, that both the materiall, and the spirituall sword doe belong in some sort to the Church, and are subiect vnto hir, not for that the ciuill power is per se, and of it owne nature subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, or that the Church, hath by the law of God any power to vse the materiall sword euen in order to spirituall good, but because Christian Princes, being children of the Church, are bound (and consequently the Church may command them, and by Ecclesiasticall Censures compell them therevnto) in defence [Page 226] of their holy mother the Church, to vse the temporall sword. Wherfore although the Church, when she hath present need, hath power to command, or forbid the vse of the materiall sword, or rather without any positiue, or constitutiue command of the Church Secular Princes are bound in that case to vse it, yet it doth not therefore follow, that the Church hir selfe hath dominion, right, or power to vse the corporall sword, seeing that to command the vse thereof, and to vse it hir selfe are farre different things, as I haue shewed beforeNum. 99. yea and the very words of S. Bernard doe plainly shew as much. For otherwise if the Church, that is, as shee consisteth of Ecclesiasticall power, should haue the dominion of the materiall sword, and might vse it in order to spirituall good, it might by the law of God be drawne forth and vsed, not only for the Church but also by the Church, not onely with the hand of the souldier, but also of the Priest, which neuerthelesse S. Bernard doth affirme to be against our Sauiours command, who commanded S. Peter to put vp his sworde into the scabberd.’
‘5 Wherefore I doe not mislike that very exposition (if it be rightly vnderstood) which Card: Bellarmine him selfe gathereth from those words of S. Bernard, who in this very place, as you haue seen, doth affirme, that S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface did by those words signifie, that the Pope hath per se, and properly the spirituall sword, (as a temporall Prince hath per se, and properly the materiall sword) and because the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall (not per se, but per accidens to command temporall things in order to spirituall good, but not to punish temporally by way of coercion, but only spiritually as I haue often declared) therefore the Pop-hath power to command or forbid a King the vse of the temporall sword, when the necessitie of the Church doth require it.’
[Page 227] ‘6 Therefore the temporall sword according to the opinion of S. Bernard doth belong to the Pope, and is called his sword, for that, when the necessitie of the Church doth require, it is to bee drawne forth for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the souldier, but not of the Priest, at the becke indeede, or direction, of the Priest, but at the command of the Emperour. By which last words S. Bernard doth signifie, that the Emperour in vsing the temporall sword for the necessitie of the Church is indeed to bee directed by the Pope (for that the Pope ought to declare, when the Church hath necessitie, but the vse it selfe of the sword doth immediately depend vpon the Emperors command, to whose command the souldiers in vsing the temporall sword are immediately subiect.’
‘7 But what if the Emperour shall refuse to vse the temporall sword at the Popes becke, or direction? Hath therefore the Pope, according to S. Bernards opinion, power to draw it forth himselfe, or can the Emperour by the Popes authoritie be depriued of the dominion thereof? No truly. But because he doth not keepe that promise, which he hath giuen to the Church, and contrarie to the law of God hee doth not relieue the necessities of the Church, the Church hath power to punish him with Ecclesiasticall and spirituall punishments, as I haue often said. Wherefore these words of S. Bernard doe nothing fauour the Popes temporall power, or his power to vse the temporall sword, but rather do directly concontradict it. And this very answer hath Ioannes Parisiensis in Tract. de potest Regia, & Papali cap. 1 [...]. in expresse words &c.’ Thus I answered in my Apologie.
8 Now you shall see, how well D. Schulckenius replyeth to this my answer. I answer, saith hePag. 386. ad num. 196., that which my Aduersarie Widdrington first doth say, that both the swords doe belong to the Church, hee saith well, but [Page 228] that which hee addeth, that both the swords are subiect to the Church, he saith not well. For the spirituall sword to bee subiect to the Church, doth signifie no other thing, then that the Popes power is subiect to the Church, which is manifestly false, whereas contrariwise it is to bee said, that the Church is subiect to the spirituall sword, or to the power of the Pope, vnlesse perchance Widdrington be of opinion, that the Sheepheard is subiect to his sheepe, and not the sheepe to the Sheepheard.
9 Marke now, good Reader, the cunning, not to say, fraudulent proceeding of this man. Hitherto he hath, as you haue seene, taken the Church, the Christian common-wealth, the mysticall bodie, or spirituall kingdom of Christ to be all one, and to be one totall bodie, consisting both of temporall, and spirituall power, and compareth hir to a man compounded of bodie and soule; And may it not, I pray you, be rightly said, that all the powers both of bodie and soule are subiect to man? and why then may it not also be rightly said, that the spirituall sword or power is subiect to the Church? But now forsooth this Doctor, that hee might take an occasion to charge me with a manifest falshood, will not take the Church, as hee tooke it before for the whole mysticall bodie of Christ, which totall bodie includeth both the Pope, and all other inferiour members thereof, in which sense I did take the Church, when I affirmed, that not onely the spirituall, but also the temporall sword is in some sort subiect to the Church, but hee will take the Church for one part onely of this mysticall bodie, to wit, for all the members of the Church besides the Pope, in which sense the Church is indeed sometimes taken, as when the Church is compared with the Pope, and it is said, that the Pope is head of the Church; but when the Church is compared with Christ, and is said to be the mysticall bodie and spirituall kingdome of Christ, the Church doth include [Page 229] both the Pope, and all other inferiour members thereof, who iointly make one totall bodie, whereof Christ is the head. And the very like is seene in the bodie of man; for when the bodie is compared with the head, the bodie doth not include the head, but when the bodie is compared with the soule, & said to be subiect to the soule, & that of the bodie & soule is made one man, then the bodie doth also include the head.
10. Wherefore taking the Church, as it doth signifie the whole mysticall body of Christ, in which sense both Card. Bellarmine himselfe, and also S. Bernard in this very place doe take it, when they affirme, that the materiall sword is to be drawne foorth for the Church, and the spirituall by the Church, it is truly said, that the spirituall sword is subiect to the Church: Neither doth this signifie, that the Popes spirituall power, is subiect to the Church, for now the Church is taken, as it excludeth the Pope, but rather that all spirituall power, which is in any member of the Church, is subiect to the whole body of the Church, and consequently to the Pope, in whom all the power of the Church according to Cardinall Bellarmines opinion, doth reside. And would not D. Schulckenius thinke, that I did cauill, if I should say of him, as hee saith of mee, that he spake not rightly, when in this very place hee affirmeth, that Christ gaue to the Church both the swords. For the spirituall sword to be giuen to the Church doth signifie no other thing, to vse his owne words, then that the Popes power was by Christ our Sauiour giuen to the Church, which in Card. Bellarmines opinion is not only manifestly false, but also an erroneous doctrine.
11. I omit now, that the ancient Doctours of Paris, (who hould, that the whole body of the Church taken collectiue, and not including the Pope, which a generall Councell lawfully assembled doth represent, is superiour to the Pope) would not thinke to speake any falshood at all, if they should say, that Christ gaue all [Page 230] the power, which the Pope hath, also to the Church, and that the Popes power is subiect to the Church, and that it doth not therefore follow, that the Pastour is subiect to the sheepe, or the superiour to the inferiour, but rather contrariwise. But in very truth this was not my meaning, when I affirmed, that both swords are in some sort subiect to the Church, for by the name of Church I vnderstood also the Pope, as I declared before
12. Secondly, when Widdrington affirmeth, saith D. Schulckenius, that the ciuill power is not per se subiect to the Ecclesiasticall, he doth corrupt the text of S. Bernard, and of Pope Boniface the eight. For when S. Bernard saith, that the materiall sword is the Popes, and is to bee drawne forth at his becke, and direction, he clearely confesseth, that the materiall sword is subiect to the spirituall sword, which Pope Boniface doth declare more plainely, when he saith, that the sword must be vnder the sword, and temporall authoritie subiect to spirituall power.
13. But how shamefully D. Schulckenius accuseth me of corrupting the text of S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface, let the Reader iudge; seeing that I neither add, nor diminish, nor alter any one word of their text, but doe say the very same words which they doe say. For S. Bernard doth say, that the materiall sword is the Popes, and doth belong to the Pope, but with this limitation, in some sort, to bee drawne foorth for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the Souldier, not of the Priest, at the becke, or direction, of the Priest, but at the command of the Emperour: and I also say the very same. But S. Bernard doth not say, that the materiall sword is subiect to the spirituall sword per se, but only in some sort, to be drawne forth for the Church, not by the Church &c. From which words it is plainely gathered, that the materiall sword, or temporall power is, according to S. Bernard, subiect to the spirituall, not per se, but per accidons, in spiritualls, not in temporalls, to be commanded in some case by the Priest, as he is a [Page 231] Priest, but not to be drawne forth, or vsed by a Priest as he is a Priest, but as he is a temporall Prince, or a publike, or priuate souldier. In like manner I say with Pope Boniface, that the sword is vnder the sword, and the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, but Pope Boniface doth not say, that the sword is per se vnder the sword, and the temporall power is per se subiect to spirituall authoritie, and therefore, seeing that hee doth imitate S. Bernards words, as Card. Bellarmine here affirmeth, he is to be vnderstood in that sense, as S. Bernard vnderstood them, to wit, that the sword is vnder the sword, in some sort, and the temporall power subiect to the spirituall in some sort, to be drawne foorth, or vsed for the Church, but not by the Church &c. as I now declared.
14. Thirdly, when Widdrington, affirmeth, saith D. Schulckenius, that the Church hath not by the law of God power to vse the materiall sword euen in order to spirituall good, he speaketh too ambiguously. For the law of God doth not command Ecclesiasticall men to vse with their own hand the materiall sword, neither doth it so forbid them, but that his lawfull for them in some cases to vse it also with their owne hand: But neuerthelesse according to S. Bernards opinion Christ gaue both the swordes to the Church, and by this he gaue her power to vse the materiall sword in that manner, as doth beseem her, to wit, by the seruice, or hands of others, in directing Secular Princes, that they draw it forth, or put it in the scabard, as it is expedient to the honour of God, and the saluation of Christian people.
15. But my words are very plaine, and no whit ambiguous I say, that the Church, taking the Church, not materially, for all the members of the Church, but for Churchmen, formally as they are Churchmen, or which is all one, for the Church, as it consisteth of Ecclesiasticall power, are according to S. Bernards doctrine commanded not to draw forth, or vse with their owne hands the materiall sword euen in order to spirituall [Page 232] good. For S. Bernards words are plaine, why dost thou againe attempt to vse the sword, which thou wast once, not only counselled, but cōmanded to put vp into the scabard &c. But if the Pope becom a temporall Prince or a Priest do lawfully becom a Soldier, to fight either in his own defence, or in the defence of others, which Christ did not forbid, although the Church in some cases hath forbidden it, neither I, nor S. Bernard doe denie, that the Pope, as he is a temporall Prince, or a Priest, as he is a lawfull Souldier, hath power to vse with their owne hands the materiall sword. Neither did S. Bernard euer grant, that the Pope, as he is Pope, or a Priest as he is a Priest, or, which is all one, by his spirituall, or Priestly authority, hath power to draw foorth, or to vse with his owne hands the materiall sword, although the Pope by his spirituall power may direct and command a temporall Prince to draw it foorth, and vse it, when the necessitie of the Church shall require, which onely D. Schulckenius in this paragraph doth affirme.
16. Fourthly, that is false, saith D. Schulckenius, Pag. 387. which Widdrington affirmeth, that the materiall sword in that onely sense doth belong to the Church, because Secular Princes being children of the Church are bound to fight in defence of the Church their mother. For S. Bernard doth grant much more to the Ecclesiasticall Prince, when he saith, Therefore it is also thine, to wit, the materiall sword. And beneath, Therefore both the spirituall and the materiall sword are the Churches, but the materiall sword is to bee drawen foorth for the Church, and the spirituall also by the Church, the spirituall with the hand of the Priest, the materiall with the hand of the Souldier, but truly at the becke, or direction of the Priest, and at the command of the Emperour. Where S. Bernard doth not only signifie, that Souldiers or Princes are bound to draw foorth the sword for the Church, but also at the becke, or direction of the [Page 233] Priest, that is, with subordination to the Ecclesiasticall power, as Souldiers ought to vse the sword with subordination to the command of the Emperour.
17. But anie man who readeth ouer but sleightly my answer in that place, will easily perceiue, that this is a meere cauill, and also a plaine vntruth; for that in expresse words I doe affirme, that Secular Princes and Souldiers are, according to S. Bernard, to draw foorth, and vse the materiall sword for the necessity of the Church, at the becke, counsell, direction, yea, and command of the Priest, which is as much, as D. Schulckenius heere affirmeth S. Bernard to say; although S. Bernard did expressely distinguish betwixt becke and command, at the becke, saith he, of the Priest, but at the command of the Emperour; whereby it is manifest, that S. Bernard did not account becke and command to be all one, and consequently, hee did not approoue the same subordination to be betwixt Secular Princes, and the Priest in vsing the materiall sword, as is betwixt Souldiers, and the Emperour. For albeit S. Bernard by the name of becke did not onely vnderstand aduise and counsell, which Christian Princes in all their weightie affaires concerning the Law of God and Christian Religion ought to demand of learned Priests, and who are skilfull in the Law of God, and Christian Religion, but also a command to fight, and vse the materiall sword in defence of the Church and Christian Religion, & to the obseruing of which command, Christian Princes may, as also I sayd, by Ecclesiasticall censures bee compelled, yet this command being a declaratiue command, which doth onely declare a former command of God, and nature, and doth not make a new bond, but onely declare and signifie a former obligation, may rather be called a beckening, and signifying, that Christian Princes are by the Law of God bound in that case to draw foorth, fight, and vse the materiall sword, then a true, proper, and [Page 234] constitutiue command, which doth not onely signifie. but also induce a new bond or obligation.
18. And in this sense not onely Ioannes Parisiensis, whom I cited before,Num. 8. doth vnderstand those words of S. Bernard (at the becke indeede of the Priest) but also our learned Countri-man Alexander of Hales, There is, saith he,3. Par. q. 34. memb. 2. ar. 3. an authority to command, and an authority to beckon; in the authority to command it doth follow, he doth that thing by whose authority it is done, but in the authority to beckon this doth not follow. The authoritie to command wicked men to be slaine is in the Emperour, but the authoritie to beckon is in the Pope and Priests. And this beckoning as hath beene sayd, is a preaching of the Law of God, and an exhorting, that Princes will obey the Law of God, Wherupon S. Bernard sheweth how both the materiall and spirituall sword are the Churches, and doe belong to the Church, not for as much as concerneth vse or command, but for as much as concerneth beckoning: whereupon he speaketh in this manner to Eugenius, hee that denieth the materiall sword to be thine, seemeth to me not to regard sufficiently the word of our Lord saying, Returne thy sword into thy scabard, and so foorth as it followeth in S. Bernard.
19. Wherefore, according to S. Bernard, the materiall sword is subiect to the spirituall, not absolutely, but in some sort to be beckoned, but not to bee vsed or commanded, as beckoning is distinguished from command, by the Priest, as he is a Priest. And therefore that Glosse, which D. Schulckenius maketh of those words [at the becke indeede of the Priest] that is, saith he, with subordination to the Ecclesiasticall power, as Souldiers ought to vse the sword with subordination to the command of the Emperor, is verie vntrue, & expresly against S. Bernards words; both because the Emperour hath power to command the souldier to vse the materiall sword, but the Priest according to S. Bernard hath onely power to beckon, but not to command the [Page 235] vse thereof, and also because if the Souldier will not vse the materiall sword at the Emperours command; the Emperour, as Emperour, may vse it himselfe, and with his owne hand, which the Priest, as Priest, or, which is all one, the Ecclesiasticall power, according to S. Bernard, cannot doe; and moreouer because the Emperour, as Emperour, may compell the souldier with temporall punishments to vse the materiall sword, and not onely depriue him of his power and right to vse the same; but also of his temporall life, which the Priest, as Priest, or the Ecclesiastical power, cannot doe.
20. And therefore who would not maruaile to see D. Schulckenius so boldly, and in such publike writings to affirme, That the question is not, whether the spirituall Prince hath dominion, right, or power to vse the materiall sword: but onely, whether the sword be vnder the sword, and whether the temporall power bee subiect to the spirituall. And whereas Widdrington, saith he, in this place confesseth, that the Church hath power to command, or forbid in time of necessitie the vse of the materiall sword, from thence we doe gather that the sword is vnder the sword, and the temporall power is subiect to the command, and prohibition of the spirituall power, which onely Card. Bellarmine in that his second argument did intend. Wherefore Widdrington doth seeme to decline of set purpose the principall question. For, as wee haue often said, the question is not concerning the dominion, or vse of the materiall sword, but concerning the power to direct it, and concerning the subiection of the materiall sword to the spirituall. But these in the option of S. Bernard are most manifest. And for as much as appertaineth to the vse of the materiall sword, wee assent altogether to S. Bernard, that it doth not beseeme Ecclesiasticall men to vse the materiall sword, but onely the spirituall, and thus much onely those words of our Sauiour doe signifie, Put vp thy sword into thy scabbard, and those of S. Bernard, [Page 236] Why doest thou againe attempt to vse the sword, which once thou wast commanded to put into the scabbard? For heere it is not meant of the Law of God, by which Ecclesiasticall men are absolutely forbidden to vse the materiall sword; seeing that it is manifest, that in some cases, and especially in defence of themselues, and of their Countrey: this is lawfull, but of the command of God, by which Cleargie men are instructed, and taught, that their vocation is not to fight with the materiall, but with the spirituall sword. Thus D. Schulckenius.
21. But it is strange to see, how farre affection will carry the pens of learned men; In very truth I should neuer haue imagined, that D. Schulckenius, or any other learned man, who hath read my Apologie, would euer haue beene so bold, as to affirme, That the question betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine is not, whether the Pope hath power to vse the materiall sword, but onely whether the sword be vnder the sword, and the temporall power subiect to the command, and prohibition of the spispirituall power, and that this only was intended by Card. Bellarmine in his second argument. For first concerning the question betwixt mee, and Card. Bellarmine it is euident, that I haue oftentimes declared in my Apologie, and D. Schulckenius also setteth downe my words, that the true state of the question betwixt mee and Card. Bellarmine, is not concerning the Popes power to command, but to dispose of temporalls, nor whether the sword be in any manner whatsoeuer vnder the sword, or the temporal power in any sort subiect to the spirituall, but in what manner the sword is vnder the sword, and after what sort the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall. For I haue often granted, that the spirituall power, or the Pope as Pope, may command temporalls, and the vse of the materiall sword, and punish disobedient Princes with Ecclesiacall censures: but what, which I vtterly denied, was, that the spirituall power, or the Pope as Pope may dispose [Page 237] of temporalls, vse the materiall sword, or punish disobedient Princes by taking away their liues, kingdomes, or goods.
22. Secondly, it is also manifest, that Card. Bellarmine in his second argument did not onely intend to proue, that the temporal power is subiect to the command, and prohibition of the spirituall power, as D. Schulckenius affirmeth, but also, that the spirituall power may vse, and dispose of temporalls, depose temporal Princes, and institute others, and constraine or punish with temporall punishments. For marke, I pray you, his second argument: In the first part thereof he argueth thus. The power to vse and dispose of temporalls (and consequently of the materiall sword which is a temporall thing) is necessary to the spirituall end, because otherwise wicked Princes might without punishment fauour Heretickes, and overthrow Religion, therefore the Church hath also, this power. And yet D. Schulckenius doth not blush to affirme, that Card. Bellarmine in his second argument did onely intend to proue, that the temporall power is subiect to the command, and prohibition of the spirituall power. And in the second part of his argument hee concludeth thus: Therefore much more the spirituall common-wealth, hath power to command the temporall common-wealth, which is subiect vnto her, and to constraine her to change her gouernment, and to depose Princes, and to institute others, when she can not otherwise defend her spirituall good. And in this manner are to bee vnderstood the words of S. Bernard, and Pope Boniface, &c. Thus Card. Bellarmine. So that according to Card. Bellarmine, S. Bernards words doe proue, that the Pope hath power not onely to command the materiall sword, but also to vse it, vnlesse the materiall sword is not to be comprehended vnder the name of temporalls. And therefore not I, but D. Schulckenius doth of set purpose decline the difficultie, and also [Page 238] vntruly affirmeth, that Card: Bellarmine did not intend to proue in his second argument, that the Pope hath power to vse the materiall sword, but onely that the materiall sword is subiect to the command and prohibition of the spirituall power, seeing that Card: Bellarmines second argument doth most clearely shew the contrarie.
23 But marke now how clearely D. Schulckenius doth either contradict S. Bernards words and him selfe, or else fowly equiuocate, and confirme the answer which I gaue to the authoritie of S. Bernard. I affirmed, that S. Bernards words are so to be vnderstood, that it is lawfull for Ecclesiasticall men, as they are Ecclesiasticall men, to command in some cases the vse of the materiall sword, but that to vse the materiall sword themselues, as they are Ecclesiasticall men, they are forbidden by the expresse command of Christ. Now D. Schulckenius affirmethPag. 390., that for as much at appertaineth to the vse of the materiall sword, he assenteth altogether to S. Bernard, that it doth not beseeme Ecclesiasticall men to vse the materiall sword, but onely the spirituall; and thus much onely those words of our Sauiour doe signifie, Returne thy sword into the scabbard; and those of S. Bernard, why dost thou againe attempt to vse the sword, which once thou wast commanded to put into the scabard? For here it is not meant of the law of God, by which Ecclesiasticall men are absolutely forbidden to vse the materiall sword, seeing that it is manifest, that in some cases, and especially in defence of themselues and of their countrey, this is lawfull, but of the command of God, by which Cleargie men are instructed, and taught, that their vocation is not to fight with the materiall, but with the spirituall sword. Thus D. Schulckenius.
24 But if D. Schulckenius meane that Ecclesiasticall men are onely for decencie, which implyeth no command, not to vse the materiall sword, he plainly [Page 239] contradicteth S. Bernard, to whom neuerthelesse hee affirmeth altogether to assent, who expressely auerreth, that the Pope in S. Peter was not only counsailed, but commanded not to vse the materiall sword. And therefore S. Bernards words can not otherwise be vnderstood, but that Ecclesiasticall men, as they are Ecclesiasticall men, and the Pope, as Pope, are by the command of Christ absolutely forbidden to vse the materiall sword; for S. Bernard did not intend to affirme, that Ecclesiasticall men, if they become temporall Princes, or being considered, as they are priuate men, or citizens, and parts, or members of the temporall common-wealth, are by the command of Christ forbidden to vse the materiall sword, and to fight in defence of their owne persons, or of their Countrey.
25 Wherefore those last words of D. Schulckenius, to wit, that S. Bernards saying is to be vnderstood of the command of God, by which Cleargie men are instructed, and taught, that their vocation is not to fight with the materiall, but with the spirituall sword, are somewhat equivocall. For if D. Schulckenius doe onely vnderstand of such an instruction, which implyeth no command of Christ, but onely a certaine decencie, counsell, and aduise, for that it doth not beseeme the perfection of those men, who haue a spirituall vocation, to fight with the materiall sword, hee plainly contradicteth himselfe, and also S. Bernard himselfe, for that hee acknowledgeth a command of God, whereby Cleargie men are instructed &c. but this instruction supposeth no command of God; S. Bernard also he contradicteth, who expressely speaketh of a command, whereby Ecclesiasticall men are by the law of Christ, and not only of the Church forbidden to vse the materiall sword, which command of Christ, as I said before, can bee no other, then that Ecclesiasticall men can not, as they are Ecclesiasticall men, vse the materiall [Page 240] sword; for that although the Ecclesiasticall power doth according to S. Bernard and the truth, extend to the beckoning, or declaratiue commanding of the materiall sword in some cases, yet it doth not extend to the vsing thereof, but this power to vse the materiall sword doth proceed from the law of nature, or the ciuill power, who doe giue authoritie to euery man, whether he be a Clerke, or Laike in case at least wise of necessitie, to vse the materiall sword in defence of his owne person, or of his countrey. And if D. Schulckenius only intend to signifie thus much by those last words of his, which in very deede can not be otherwise vnderstood, vnlesse wee will make them repugnant to themselues, hee doth fauour, not contradict, confirme and not impugne my answer.
26 Fiftly, obserue, good Reader, how cunningly D. Schulckenius would shift off the last, and principall Answer, which I made to the authoritie of S. Bernard. I granted, as you haue seene before, that the Pope, as Pope, hath, according to S. Bernard, power to beckon, or command the Emperour to vse the materiall sword, when the necessitie of the Church shall require and to punish him with Ecclesiasticall punishments, if he shall refuse to obey his iust command, or becke, and I affirmed, that this is the most, that can be gathered from those words of S. Bernard. But if the Emperour should refuse to vse the materiall sword at the Popes command, or becke, I affirmed, that it could not be inferred from that authoritie of S. Bernard, that the Pope, as Pope, could vse it himselfe, or depriue the Emperour of his temporall dominion, or power to vse the materiall sword, for this were to vse, and to dispose of temporalls, and implyeth a power to vse, and draw forth the materiall sword it selfe, which S. Bernard expressely denyeth to the Pope: and that therefore S. Bernards authoritie doth nothing fauour, but clearely contradict the Popes power, I doe not say, to [Page 241] command temporalls, but to dispose of temporalls, and to vse temporalls, as Ioannes Parisiensis, and Alexander of Hales, Num. 18. did before affirme. Now to this my answere D. Schulckenius replyethPag. 393. in this manner.
27. Thou didst runne well, who hath hindered thee so soone not to obey the truth? For now thou dost not follow S. Bernard, but William Barclay, as thy Master. If that the Emperour shall refuse to vse the sword at the becke of the Pope in great necessitie of the Church, it is not indeed fitting for the Pope to vse the materiall sword, but hee hath power to constraine the Emperour, first with Ecclesiasticall punishments, and afterwards also by depriuing him of the sword, as in the like case the Councell of Lateran often cited doth teach, which one Councell is to be preferred before all the Barclaies, or Iohns of Paris, all men doe thinke, who are not mad.
28. Is not this thinke you a trim answere? The question betwixt me, and Card. Bellarmine in this place was not concerning the Councell of Lateran, wherof I will treat beneath,Part. 3. cap. 9. & seq. and plainely shew, that, notwithstanding all the clamours of my Aduersaries, the said Councell hath neither defined, or supposed for certaine, nay or supposed at all, that the Pope hath power to depose Soueraigne Princes, as D. Schulckenius doth here collect from thence, but the question was onely concerning the authoritie of S. Bernard. And I prooued clearely out of S. Bernards wordes, that although the Pope, as Pope hath power to command, or forbid in some cases the vse of the materiall sworde, yet that he hath power, as he is Pope, to vse it himselfe, or to depriue the Emperour of the vse thereof, which implyeth a power to vse it himselfe, this I said could not be proued, but rather the contrarie out of those words of S. Bernard, who doth not only say, that it is not fitting for the Pope to vse the materiall sword, as D. Schulckenius would mince his words, but that it is forbidden the Pope to draw foorth, or vse the materiall [Page 242] sword. Now D. Schulckenius passeth ouer S. Bernard, and flyeth to the Councell of Lateran to proue, that if the Emperour refuse at the Popes command to vse the materiall sword, he may by the Popes authoritie bee depriued of the vse thereof, whereas the present question was only concerning the opinion of S. Bernard, and not what was the doctrine of the Councell of Lateran in this point, whose authoritie I doe asmuch respect either as Card. Bellarmine, or any other Catholike is bound to doe. But it is an easie matter to wrest the words of the Councell of Lateran, or any other to their purpose, contrary to the true meaning of the Councell, and then to crie out ô the Councell of Lateran, which is to be preferred before all Barclaies, and Widdringtons &c. whereas we doe asmuch respect the authoritie of the Councell of Lateran, or any other, as they do, although we doe not so much respect their ouer wrested collections, which they to serue their owne turnes, doe gather from any Councel, or text of holy Scripture, contrarie to the plaine, proper, and true sense and meaning of the words. But to such shiftings, and windings euen learned men are sometimes brought, when they will make their vncertaine opinions, and priuate expositions of holy Scriptures, or Councells to be infallible grounds of the Catholike faith.
29. Lastly but the foundation, saith D. Schulckenius, of Widdringtons errour is, for that he thinketh, that the Pope hath authoritie to constraine the Emperour by reason of the faith, and free promise, which the Emperour gaue, and made to the Pope, according to the similitude, which a little before he put concerning one, who promised an other to spend his life, and all his goods in defence of him. But this foundation is false, because the authoritie of the Pope ouer Christian Princes doth not proceed from their onely promise, or faith, which they haue giuen, but from the law of God, by which law the Pope is made by Christ the Pastour of all his stocke, the chiefe of all his familie, the head. [Page 243] of all his body, and the Rectour of all his Church, Wherefore it is no maruaile, if from false foundation he conclude a falshood to wit, that S. Bernards words do not onely, not fauour the Popes temporal power, but are flat contrarie to it. What I beseech you, could be spoken more cleerely for the Popes temporall power, then that which S. Bernard said, that the temporall sword is the Popes, and that both swords are the Churches, and that the temporall sword ought to be drawne foorth at the Popes becke? And as for Ioannes Parisiensis there is no great reckoning to be made of him whatsoeuer he saith, both for that he is repugnant to the Councell of Lateran, and many others, and also that other his errours are condemned by the Church in the common Extrauagant, Vas electionis, and lastly, for that either he denieth only the Popes direct power in temporalls, or else he doth plainly contradict himselfe.
30. But truely it is strange, that learned men, and who pretend to maintaine nothing but truth, dare aduenture to auouch so bouldly, and in such publike writings so manifest vntruths, and which they themselues in their consciences can not but see to be plain, and palpable vntruths. I very often, and that of set purpose did affirme in my Apologie, and D. Schulckenius doth also set downe my words, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power to command temporall Princes in temporals in order to spirituall good, and yet this man to make his Reader beleeue, that I doe teach flat heresie, blusheth not to affirme in an other place,Pag. 256. that I deny, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power to commaund temporall Princes in temporalls in order to spirituall good. So likewise, I did oftentimes in my Apologie affirme,Num. 90.91.181.223.341. and D. Schulckenius doth also set downe my words, that the Pope, as Pope hath power by the law of God, and for that he is appointed by Christ to be the supreme spirituall Pastour of the Catholike Church, to constraine and punish all disobedient Christians both Princes and people, with spirituall and Ecclesiasticall punishments; [Page 244] and yet now this man to perswade his Reader, that I teach heere a manifest errour, is not ashamed to affirme, that I am of opinion, that the Pope hath authoritie to constraine the Emperour in regard onely of the free promise, which the Emperour hath made to the Pope. And therefore D. Schulckenius neither dealeth truely nor sincerely, and both deludeth his Reader, and also wrongeth mee, in affirming, that to bee my doctrine, which I expressely impugne, and that to be the foundation of my opinion (which hee is pleased to call an errour) which I in expresse words, and that oftentimes haue denied.
21. For as I doe willingly grant, that although a temporall Prince hath power to command, and with temporall punishments to compell, if neede require, his temporall subiects to make, and sweare an expresse promise of that true faith, loyaltie and temporall allegeance, which by the Law of God and nature they doe owe to their lawfull Prince, yet I doe not affirme, that a temporalll Prince hath power to constraine his rebellious subiects by vertue onely of the promise, which they haue made, but by vertue of his supreme temporall power which hee hath, as hee is a supreme temporall Prince by the Law of God and nature; So also I do willingly grant, that although the Pope hath power to command, and with spirituall punishments to compell, if neede require, all Christian Princes and people to make and sweare an expresse promise of that the true faith, loyalty and spirituall allegeance, which as they are Christians and members of the mysticall body of Christ, they doe owe by the Law of God to the supreme spirituall Pastour and visible head of this mysticall bodie and Church of Christ, and the Emperour at his coronation taketh such an oath, neuerthelesse I doe not affirme, that the Pope hath power to constraine and punish disobedient Princes, and people by vertue onely of the promise, which they haue [Page 245] made to the Pope of their spirituall obedience, but by vertue of his supreme spirituall power, which he hath by the Law of God, and his Pastorall authority giuen to him by our Sauiour Christ Iesus.
32. True it is, that the Reader might the better vnderstand, that to command one to vse a temporall thing, and to vse it himselfe, to command one to dispose of temporals, and to dispose of them himselfe, are very different things, and that the one doth not necessarily follow from the other, I brought a familiar example of one, who either, by promise, or by some other obligation (and yet D. Schulckenius taketh hold onely of the promise, and cleane omitteth the other obligation) is bound to dispose, and giue his goods, or life at anthers command, who notwithstanding this promise, or other obligation, doth still keepe the property, dominion and right ouer his goods and life, in such sort, that the other cannot be vertue of his commanding power, which he hath ouer him and them, take them away and dispose of them without his consent, but if hee will not dispose of his goods at the others command, according as by vertue either of his promise, or of some other obligation he is bound to doe, the other may complaine to the Magistrate, that hee will punish him for his offence, or cause him to performe his promise, so far forth as the coerciue power of the Magistrate doth extend. From which I concluded, that considering to haue the power to command the vse of the temporall sword, and to haue a power to vse it, or to depriue of the vse thereof, are two different things, neither doth one necessarily follow from the other, although the Pope, as Pope, hath according to S. Bernard, power to command the Emperour to vse the temporall sword, yet it doth not therefore follow that if the Emperour will not vse the temporall sword at the Popes command, the Pope, as Pope, can vse it himselfe, or depriue the Emperour of the vse [Page 246] thereof, which implieth a power to vse the same, but onely, that the Pope, being a spirituall Prince or Pstour, may punish the Emperor for his contempt with spirituall punishments, which only doe belong to the coercive power of the supreme spirituall Prince & Pastor of the spirituall kingdome & Church of Christ.
33. Thus therefore you haue seen, that S. Bernard doth nothing fauour, but it is rather flat contrarie to the Popes power to vse the temporall sword, neither could he scarse speake more cleerely against the same, then he hath done. For although it be cleere, that the temporall sword is, according to S. Bernard, the Popes in some sort, and doth belong to the Church in some sort (which words [in some sort] D. Schulckenius heere cunningly omitteth) and that in some cases it must be vsed at the becke, direction or declaratiue command of the Pope, yet the aforesayd limitations of S. Bernard that it is the Popes, and belongeth to the Pope in some sort, that it is to be vsed for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the Souldier, and not of the Priest, at the becke indeede of the Pope, but at the command of the Emperour, and that our Sauiour commanded, and not only counselled S. Peter to put vp his sword into the scabard, do plainly shew, that, according to S. Bernard, the Pope as Pope, cannot vse the temporal sword, nor constrain a temporall Prince by, vsing temporall punishments, which doth imply a power to vse the temporal sword.
34. And for D. Barclay, and Iohn of Paris (to omit our learned Country-man, Alexander of Hales, whose words I related before)Num. 18. who doe giue the very same answere, which I haue giuen to the aforesaid words of S. Bernard, of whose authoritie although Card. Bellarmine, heere doth make very small reckoning, yet I do plainly confesse, that in this controuersie concerning the Popes authoritie to vse the temporall sword, and to dispose of all temporals in order to spirituall good, I doe more regard their authoritie, then [Page 247] I doe Card. Bellarmines, speaking with all dutifull respect, for that in my opinion they haue handled this question more soundly, more cleerely, and more sincerely then he hath done. Neither is their doctrine repugnant to the Councell of Laterane, but onely to the particular exposition, which som few especially of late yeeres (who haue scraped together all the authorities of Fathers, Councells, Scriptures, facts, and decrees of Popes which may seeme any way to fauour the Popes temporall authoritie) haue wrested out the words of the said Councel, contrarie to the plaine sense of the words, and the common vnderstanding of all ancient Diuines, who neuer vrged this authoritie of the Councell of Laterane, although it hath beene so long publikely extant in the body of the Canon Law. But it is now adaies a common fault euen among Catholike Diuines, and those also, who, not perceiuing their owne errour, doe accuse others of the same, to alleadge, in confirmation of their opinions, the holy Scriptures, and sacred Councels vnderstood according to their owne priuate spirit and meaning, and then to cry out against their brethren, who mislike their opinions, that they haue the holy Sriptures, and sacred Councels on their side, and that therefore their doctrine is of faith, and the contrary hereticall, and that their Aduersaries doe oppose themselues against the holy Scriptures, and decrees of the Catholike Church, whereas wee doe regard, with all dutifull respect the holy Scriptures, sacred Councels, and decrees of the Catholik Church (the authority of which consisteth in the true and authenticall sense, & not in the letter, or in the expositiō of any priuate Catholike Doctour, which exposition others doe contradict) and do oppose our selues only against their vncertaine opinions, and expositions of holy Scriptures, or sacred Councells, grounded vpon their priuate spirit and vnderstanding, contrary to the true, [Page 248] proper, and plaine meaning of the words.
35. And although this Ioannes Parisiensis, or rather another Iohn of Paris liuing at the same time, and surnamed de Poliaco, as I said beforePart. 1. ca. 3. nu. 7. & seq., was cōpelled to recall in open Consistory, at Auinion before Pope Iohn the 22. certain errors, which he maintained cōcerning confession, and absolution (of whose authoritie neuerthelesse Card. Bellarmine in the latter Editions of his controuersies; notwithstanding those his errours, maketh some rekoning, seeing he citeth him as a Classicall Doctour in fauour of his opinionLib. 5. de Rō. Pont. cap. 1.) yet this rather confirmeth mee in my opinion. For if his doctrine, which denieth that the Pope, as Pope, hath power to depriue iuridically, and by way of sentence, temporall Princes of their dominions, and to vse the temporall sword, had beene thought in those daies to haue beene hereticall, or erronious, as now Card. Bellarmine, and some few other Iesuites will needes haue it to be, it is like, that he should also haue beene compelled to recall that doctrine, and that those learned Authors, who write of heresies, as Alphonsus de Castro, Prateolus Genebrard, D. Sanders, and others would for the same haue taxed him, and Marsilius of Padua (as also Albericus, and those many Schoolemen and Doctours, related by Trithemius and Almaine, who did defend the same doctrine) with some note of heresie, or errour, which seeing they haue not done, it is a manifest signe, that they did not account that doctrine for hereticall, or erronious, & that the decree of the Councel of Lateran, which was long before any of these mens daies, and which was also so publike and registred in the corps of the Canon Law, was not in those times vnderstood in that sense, as Card. Bellarmine now of late (for before in his controuersies he made small reckoning of that authority, for that he cleane omitteth that decree: yet bringing many particular facts of Popes, yea & of Pope Innocēt [Page 249] the third, in whose time, and by whose authoritie that Councell was held) and some few others without sufficient proofe, as I will shew beneathPart. 3. ca. 9. & seq., will needes haue that decree to be vnderstood.
36. Neither is that true, which D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that Ioannes Parisiensis (in acknowledging. That when the Pope doth becken, the Emperour ought to exercise the iurisdiction of the secular power for the spirituall good. But if hee will not, or if it doth not seeme to him expedient, the Pope hath no other thing to do, because he hath not the materiall sword in command, but onely the Emperour, according to S. Bernard) dooth either speake of the direct power of the Pope to vse them materiall sword, or else contradict himselfe, when afterwards hee writeth, that the Pope may per accidens, depose the Emperour, by causing the people to depose him. For Ioannes Parisiensis in that his Treatise, de potestate Regia & Papali, doth expresly impugne both the direct, and indirect coerciue power of the Pope to punish by way of sentence, and iuridically with temporall punishments, affirming, as D. Schulckenius also himselfe heere relateth, that Excommunication, or some such like spirituall punishment is the last, which an Ecclesiasticall Iudge can inflict. For although it belongeth to an Ecclesiasticall Iudge, to bring men backe to God, and to withdraw them from sinne, yet he hath not this, but according to the way or meanes giuen him by God, which is by excluding from the Sacraments and the participation of the faithfull.
37 Neither doth Ioannes Parisiensis therefore contradict himselfe in affirming, that the Pope may depose per accidens by meanes of the people. For although he be of opinion, as I shewed beforePart. 1. ca. 2., that the people haue in some cases a coerciue power ouer their Prince and in some cases may depose him, and consequently the Pope may in those cases, if it be necessarie to the good of the Church, command the people, and with spirituall punishments compell them to vse their coerciue [Page 250] power, and so the Pope may be said to depose a Prince per accidens by meanes of the people, with which philosophicall question I will not at this time, as I often said, intermeddle, yet concerning the Popes coerciue power to vse him selfe the temporall sword, or to depose the Emperour by way of iuridicall sentence, (which is not repugnant to his authoritie to depose by meanes of the people, if the people haue any such authoritie to depose, which many learned Diuines, to whose opinion the ancient Fathers seeme to assent as I haue signified heretofore doe denie,)in my Apologie nu. 411. and here part: 1. cap. 3. nu. 5. Ioannes Parisiensis is cleane opposite to Card. Bellarmines opinion, and expressely affirmeth, that the Pope hath no power to depriue iuridically, or by way of sentence, temporall Princes of their kingdomes, but only to inflict by way of coercion or constraint Ecclesiasticall or spirituall Censures. And thus much both concerning my answer to S. Bernards authoritie, and also the Reply, which D. Schulckenius hath made therevnto.
38 Now to the authoritie of Pope Boniface the 8. I answer first that his words are to be vnderstood in that sense, as I expounded S. Bernard, whom hee, as Card: Bellarmine affirmeth, did imitate, to wit, that the temporall power is in order to spirituall good, or, which is all one, in spirituall things subiect to the command of the spirituall power, and that shee is to be instructed by the spirituall, not absolutely in temporall gouernment, but in Christian faith and religion, and that if shee goe out of the way, or erre in things belonging to Christian faith and religion, shee is to bee iudged by the spiritual, but with spirituall not temporall punishments. And in this sense it is very true, that the sword is vnder the sword, and the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, but by this it is onely signified, that temporall Princes are in spiritualls, but not in meere temporals, subiect to the spirituall command, [Page 251] and spirituall correction of spirituall Pastours.
39 Secondly, although Pope Boniface should vnderstand those words in this sense, that temporall Princes are, not onely in spiritualls, but also in temporalls subiect to the Popes power both to command, and also to punish temporally, yet his authoritie herein, as he is Pope, (for as he is a priuate Doctor, it is no greater then of other Doctors) is not of any great weight; considering first, that, as well obserueth D. Duvall De suprema Rom. Pont. potest. part. 2. q. 4. pag. 262.263. a learned Schoole-Diuine, & one of the Kings Readers in the Colledge of Sorbon, although Pope Boniface doth make mention both of the spirituall, and temporall sword, and in the progresse of his Constition doth say, that the temporall sword is vnder the spirituall yet in the definition or conclusion (which chiefely as in the decrees of Councells is to be regarded, seeing that this onely bindeth to beleeue) this onely hee pronounceth in generall, but we declare, say, define, and pronounce, that it is necessarie to the saluation of euery humane creature to be subiect to the Bishop of Rome. But in what manner all men must be subiect, it is not expressed in this definition; and therefore not to contradict this definition it is sufficient to affirme, that all men must in spiritualls bee subiect to the Popes power to command, and to punish s;piritually.
40 Secondly, for that this Extrauagant was recalled by his Successour Pope Clement the fift, in cap. meruit, de privilegijs, wherein hee declareth, that no preiudice shall arise to the King of France by that Extrauagant of Pope Boniface, but that all things shall be vnderstood to be in the same state, as they were before that definition, as well concerning the Church, as concerning the King, and Kingdome of France, Thirdly, for that all the authorities, which hee bringeth from holy Scriptures to proue, that the Pope hath both the temporall and spirituall sword, doe proue only, that the Pope is the spirituall Pastour of the Church, and hath [Page 252] spirituall power to binde, and loose, to iudge and punish spiritually, as, whatsoeuer thou shalt binde on earth &c. and a spirituall man doth iudge all things, and he is iudged by none, which place some Catholike writers expound of publike and authenticall iudgments: For all the other places of holy Scripture, which Pope Boniface alledgeth, are either taken in the mysticall, and not in the literall sense, as those behold two swords here, and put vp thy sword into the scabard, but from the mysticall sense no forcible argument can bee drawne, as all Diuines doe grant, to proue any doctrine, vnlesse to haue that mysticall sense it be declared in other places of holy Scripture, or else they make nothing to the purpose, as are those words, which God spake to the Prophet Ieremie, Behold I haue appointed thee this day ouer the Gentiles, and ouer Kingdomes, that thou maiest plucke vp and destroy, and waste and dissipate, and build and plant, not to destroy nations, and kingdomes, and raise vp others, but by his preaching to plant virtues, and destroy vices, as S. Hierome expoundeth, and by foretelling the destruction of Kingdomes and Nations, if they doe not repent, and their increase and saluation if they will bee converted. Neither is the Pope S. Ieremies Successour in the spirit of prophesie, neither doe wee read, that Ieremie destroyed any kingdom, although he fulfilled all that, which he was appointed to do by Alm: God.
41. It is the same, saith Andreas Capella vpon this place, to appoint him ouer the Gentiles, and to giue him a Prophet in the Gentiles; as he said before. I giue thee power and authoritie, saith God, to declare and foretell in my name, as my Prophet, the ruines and wastings of the Gentiles and of Kingdomes. That thou threaten my enemies, whom in their Countries I haue planted, placed, confirmed, erected that I will abolish them with captiuities, vnlesse they will repent. And contrariwise, that I will build them, and plant them againe, that is, restore to their ancient state, [Page 253] them whom I shall destroy and abollish if they will acknowledge their sinnes. And in these words all the charge of Ieremie is comprehended, and the matter of this whole booke is declared. For it is a prophecie of the destruction of the City, and temple, and of the captiuitie of the people, and of their returne from captiuity, and of the reedifying of the temple and City, and of the ouerthrow of other nations, and kingdomes. Thus Capella. And the same exposition of these words hath the Glosse vpon this place Besides Pope Boniface in this Extrauagant alledgeth for Scripture that, which is no Scripture, to wit, for the truth testifying the spirituall power hath to institute or instruct the earthly power, and to iudge it if it shall not be good, which words are not to be found in the holy Scripture.
42. Lastly, there is no more account to be made of the authoritie of Pope Boniface the eight for this his doctrine in this point, touching the Popes temporal authoritie ouer temporall Princes, if we take him, as a priuate Doctour deliuering his opinion, then of an other Doctour, as well learned as he was, who holdeth with the Canonists, that the Pope is direct Lord & King of the world not only spirituall, but also temporall; for that Pope Boniface was of this opinion, that the Pope hath direct power not only in spiritualls, but also in temporalls. Whereupon he wrote to Philip the faire, King of France, that he was subiect to him in spirituals and temporalls, and that all those, who should hold the contrary he reputed for heretikes: and that the kingdome of France by reason of the Kings disobedience was falne to the Church For which words Pope Boniface is taxed by Ioannes Tilius In Chron. ad annum 1302. Bishop of Meldune, by Robertus Guaguinus Lib. 7. in Philippo Pulch., by Platina In vita Bonifaci [...] octaui., and others, of great pride, impudencie and arrogancie. Whereupon Paulus Aemilius (who doth otherwise greatly fauour Pope Boniface) writeth thus:In Philippo Pulchro. Pope Boniface did add, at which all men did marmaile, that the King of France ought to reuerence the Pope not only in sacred manner, and by Episcopall right, as a Father [Page 254] of our soules, but he ought also to acknowledge him, as his Prince by ciuill Iurisdiction, and in prophane matters and dominion. All this being considered, as also, that all the words of that Extrauagant are so generall, that they may be vnderstood as well, if not better, of the Popes direct dominion in temporalls, as of his indirect power to dispose of temporals, which is only in order to spirituall good, what great reckoning is to be made of this cōstitution of P. Boniface, it being withal reuersed by P. Clemens the 5. who next but one succeeded him, I remit to the cōsideration of the iudicious Reader
Chap. 10.
Wherein the similitude of Pope Innocent the third, who compareth the spirituall and temporall power to the Sun & Moone, is examined.
1. THe sixt, and last argument, which Card. Bellarmine bringth to proue the sbiection of the temporall power to the spirituall, is taken from the authority of Pope Innocent the third, who in cap. Solitae de maioritate & obedientia doth wel, saith he,In tract. contra Barcl: c. 13. in fine. compare the spirituall & temporall power to the Sun & Moone. Therefore as the moone is subiect to the Sun, for that she receiueth light from the Sun, & the Sun is not subiect to the Moone, for that the Sun receiueth nothing from the Moon, so also a king is subiect to the Pope, & the Pope is not subiect to a king
2. But first this similitude doth not proue, that the temporall power it selfe is subiect to the spirituall, or, which is all one, that a temporall King is subiect to the Pope in respect of his temporall power, which he doth not receiue from the Pope, but in respect of the light of faith, which a temporall King receiueth from the spirituall power. And therefore as the Moone, when she is eclypsed, & in opposition to the Sun, doth not loose that little light, which, according to the doctrin of the Philosophers and astronomers, she hath of her owne nature, and not deriued from the Sunne, so temporall Princes, when of Catholikes or Christians they become [Page 255] heretikes, or infidells, and are in opposition to the Pope, do not loose their temporall power, and the light of naturall reason, which they receiue not from the Pope, but only the light of faith and grace, which they did receiue from the spirituall power.
3. Secondly, that, which Card. Bellarmine affirmeth, that the Pope receiueth nothing from temporall Princes is very vntrue, and therefore in this point also that part of the similitude is not fitly applyed. For the Pope hath receiued from temporall Princes all his temporall dominion, iurisdiction, and temporall sword, and the whole patrimonie of S. Peter, wherein, as the same Pope Innocent affirmeth,In cap. per venerabilem qui filij sint legitimi. he doth now exercise the power of a supreme temporall Prince. Neither is it only true, that temporall Princes are in spiritualls subiect to the spirituall power of spirituall Pastours, from whom they receiue spirituall light, and supernaturall directions by the holy Scriptures & Ecclesiasticall lawes, by which they may see how to liue like good Christians, and to attaine to life euerlasting, but it is also true, that spirituall Pastours, as inferiour Bishops and Cleargie men are in temporals subiect to the temporall power of temporall Princes, from whom they receiue the increase of naturall light, and ciuill directions by ciuill and temporall Lawes, by which they may see, how to conuerse ciuilly among themselues and other men, and to attaine to temporall peace and quietnesse in the ciuill common-wealth.
4. Whereupon well sayd S. Ambrose, Lib. 10. in Lucā. cap. 20. If thou wilt not be subiect to Caesar, doe not haue wordly things, but if thou hast riches, thou art subiect to Caesar. For all men, saith Astensis, In summa. lib. 2. tit. 39. are subiect to the Emperour, Lay-men in temporals, and Cleargie men, who doe receiue from him temporals. And Gratian the Compiler of the first and most ancient part of the Canon Law, called the Decree, writeth thus:Causa 11. q. 1. cap. 11. Cleargie men by their office are subiect to the Bishop, by the possessions of farmes or mannours [Page 256] they are subiect to the Emperour. From the Bishop they receiue vnction, tithes and first fruits, from the Emperour they receiue possessions of farmes or mannours. Therfore because by the Emperiall Law it is made, as he prooueth out of S. Austin, that farmes be possessed, it is manifest that Cleargie men by the possessions of farmes are subiect to the Emperour. See also aboueCap. 6. nu. 13. 14. 15. & cap. 7. nu. 12. 13. many other Catholike Authours who doe affirme that Cleargy men are subiect to the directiue power of temporall Princes. Neither doth Pope Innocent in the aforesayd Chapter denie, but in expresse words affirme, that the Emperour is superiour to those, who doe receiue from him temporals; And therefore this similitude of the Sunne and Moone doth not prooue, that the temporall power is subiect to the spirituall, or, which is all one, that temporall Princes are in temporals, or as they haue temporall power, subiect to spirituall Pastours, but it rather prooueth the flat contrarie.
5. Yea and Card. Bellarmine himselfe,Lib. 2. de Ro. Pont. cap. 29. did for many years together hold with Albertus Pighius, Lib. 5. hierach. Eccles. cap. 7. that it is the more probable opinion, that S. Paul, (& consequently the rest of the Apostles) was subiect in temporals to Caesar, not only de facto, but also de iure: from whence supposing another true & vndoubted principle granted also by Card. Bellarmine, Lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29. & lib. 5. cap. 3. that the Law of Christ doth depriue no man of any his right or dominion, it necessarily followeth, that if infidell Princes haue rightfull power and dominion, or iurisdiction ouer Cleargy men, there is no repugnance, but that they may keepe the same power, and iurisdiction ouer Cleargy men, although they become Christians. But Card. Bellarmine hath now forsooth in his Recognitions recalled that opinion. I doe not now approoue, saith he,Pag. 16. that which I said with Albertus Pighius, that S. Paul did appeale to Caesar, as to his lawfull Prince. And therefore I do persist in the former answer, that S. Paul was subiect to Caesar de facto, not de iure, and did appeale to him, not as his owne [Page 257] Superiour, but as to the Superiour of the President of Iewry and of the Iewes, by whom he was wronged. For otherwise he could not free himselfe from that vniust iudgement and danger of a most vniust death, but by hauing recourse to their Prince and Iudge, which hee himselfe did signifie Acts 28. when he saith, I am constrained to appeale to Caesar.
6 If Card. Bellarmine hath vpon sufficient ground recalled either this, or any other of his former opinions, he is truly therefore much to be commended, as likewise is S. Austin, for making his booke of Retractations. But if she should without sufficient ground not onely recall this opinion, which he for aboue twentie yeeres together in publike print, and for many yeeres before in publike writings had defended for the more probable, but also condemne it for improbable, it being also the common opinion of Diuines, any man might iustly imagine, that affection, not reason moued him thereunto. I doe not approue, saith he,Pag. 16. in his Recognitions, that which I said in that place with Albertus Pighius, that S. Paul did appeale to Caesar as to his lawfull Prince. But in his booke against D. Barclay hee goeth much farther. I haue admonished, saith he,Cap. 21. pag. 206. in the Recognition of my writings, that the opinion of Pighius, which in times past I did follow, is improbable, and that with better Doctours it is to be affirmed, that the Apostles were exempted de iure from all subiection to earthly Princes.
7. But truly I cannot but maruell, that Card. Bell. could be so much ouerseen, as to affirm, that he did admonish in his Recognitions, that the opinion of Pighius is improbable, seeing that he only saith there, I doe not approue the opinion of Pighius, &c. But he doth not say, that it is improbable, vnlesse, forsooth, what opinion C Bellarmine doth not approue, although it be approued by other learned Catholikes, must forth with be accounted improbable. Besides I wold gladly know, who be those better Doctours, whom Card. Bellarmine saith [Page 258] are to be followed against the opinion of Phighius. For my owne part I doe not know what better Doctours there be (abstracting from the ancient Fathers, and Doctors of the Church) if we speake only of the Doctours themselues, and not of the doctrine which they teach; then among the Thomists, Iohn of Paris, Dominicus Sotus, Victoria, Bartholomaeus, Medina, Bannes; among the Scotists, Richardus de Media villa, Ioannes, Medina, Ioseph Angles; and among the Iesuites, Salmeron, Molina, Valentia, Richeome, Salas, and many other Diuines, whom Salas citeth, who doe hold, that Clergie men are not by the law of God & nature, but only by the Ecclesiasticall Canons and priuileges of Princes exempted from the coactiue power of Secular Magistrates, and not at all from their directiue power, but that they are subiect to the directiue power of Secular Princes in those things, which doe not repugne to the Ecclesiasticall Canons, and their state, and consequently, that Cleargie men in the time of the Apostles, and long after were subiect to the coactiue power of temporall Princes. Yea and the ancient Fathers, especially S. Chrysostome, Theophylact, and Oecumenius doe in expresse words affirme,Ad Rom. 13. that whether hee be a Monke, a Priest, or an Apostle, hee is according to the doctrine of S. Paul subiect to Secular powers. Only the Canonists (& yet not all of them, as Pope Innoc: Nauar, and Coverruvias) whom now Card: Bellarm: leauing the Diuines, & his ancient opinion vpon very weake grounds, as you shall see, doth follow, do vehemently defend, that Cleargie men are by the law of God and nature, exempted from all subiection to Secular Princes.
8 Now you shall see, for what reasons Card: Bellarmine was moued to recall his former opinion, and to condemne it as improbable. For if the reason, saith heIn his Recognitions, pag. 16., of the exemption of Clergie men be for that they are ministers of Christ, who is the Prince of the Kings [Page 271] of the Earth, and King of Kinges, truely they are exempted de iure not onely from the power of Christian Kinges, but also of Heathen Princes. If Card. Bellarmine meane, that the reason, wherefore the Ecclesiasticall Canons, and Christian Princes haue exempted Cleargie men (I doe not say from all subiection, for notwithstanding their exemption they still remaine subiects to temporall Princes, but from paying of tributes, from the tribunall of Secular Magistrates and such like) be, for that they are Ministers of Christ in spirituall, but not in Secular matters, I will not contradict this reason, but from hence it doth not follow that therefore Cleargie men in the time of the Apostles, when there were no such positiue lawes of their exemption, were not in temporall causes subiect de iure to infidell Princes.
9. But if Card. Bellarmine meane, that the reason, why Cleargie men are not onely by the Ecclesiasticall Canons and lawes of Princes, but also by the law of GOD and nature exempted from all subiection to temporall Princes, is, for that they are Ministers of Christ, who is the King of Kings, this reason doth not proue, but suppose, that which is in question, to wit, that Cleargie men are by the law of GOD, and nature, exempted from all subjection to temporall Princes, which the common opinion of Diuines doth constantly deny, whose opinion to account improbable, or temerarious for such a weake reason, which doth not proue, but suppose the question, were in my iudgement to exceede the limits of Christian prudence, and modesty. Neither is there any repugnance in naturall reason, but that the Ministers of Christ, who, as it is probable, was, according to his humanity, onely a spirituall, and not a temporall King, (and although he was also a temporall King, yet Secular Princes are his Ministers in temporalls, and the Apostles & their Successors are his Ministers in spiritualls) might in temporall causes [Page 272] be truely, and de iure subject to temporall Princes, as the Apostles them-selues, who are Christ his chiefe Ministers in his spirituall kingdome, and Church, were, according to the expresse doctrine of the ancient Fathers, as they are parts, members and cittizens of the temporall common-wealth subiect to temporall Princes, in their temporal kingdomes, and in temporall affaires. Neither doe those words of Saint Paul Act. 28. I am constrained to appeale to Caesar, signifie, that hee was subject to Caesar onely de facto, and not de iure, more, then if a Priest, being vniustly oppressed by his Ordinary, should appeale to the Pope, and say, that he was constrained, for that hee had small hope to finde iustice at his Ordinaries hands, to appeale to the Pope, signifie thereby, that hee was not subject de iure, but onely de facto to the Pope.
10. An other reason, which mooued Card. Bellarmine to recall his former opinion, and to affirme, that Saint Paul did not appeale to Caesar, as to his owne lawfull Iudge but as to the Iudge of the president of Iewrie and of the Iewes, who did vniustly oppresse him, was saith heIn tract. contra Bard. cap. 3 pag. 51., for that the cause of which they did accuse him being spirituall, to wit, concerning the resurrection of Christ, and the ceremonies of the law of Moyses, could not by right appertaine to a Heathen Prince. See the Acts of the Apostles chap. 21. 22. 23. 24. & 25.
11. But truely it is strange, that Card. Bellarmine durst so confidently remit his Reader to those chapters of the Acts of the Apostles, to proue, that the cause, whereof Saint Paul was accused by the Iewes to the Tribune, and President of Iewrie, and wherefore he appealed to Caesar, was spirituall, and not appertaining by right to a Heathen Prince, vnlesse hee will haue the raising of sedition, and tumults, and the committing of a crime worthy of death, not to belong to a Heathen Prince. For it is cleere by those chapters, that the Iewes accused him of sedition, and that he had offended [Page 273] Caesar, and endeauoured to haue him therefore put to death. We haue found, saith one Tertullus Act. 24., who went to accuse S. Paul before the President Felix, this man pestiferous, and raising seditions to all the Iewes in th [...] world, &c. And afterwards,Act. 25. the Iewes before the President Festus obiected against S. Paul many, and gre [...] uous crimes, which they could not proue, but they might easily haue proued, that S. Paul did preach the Resurrection of Christ, for that hee confessed the same before both the Presidents, and King Agrippa: Wherevpon King Agrippa said to S. Paul Act. 26, A little thou perswadest me to become a Christian. And beforeAct. 25. S. Paul made answere to the President Festus, that neither against the law of the Iewes, nor against the Temple, nor against Caesar, haue I any thing offended; which signifieth, that he was accused that he had offended against Caesar. And a little after saith S. Paul to Festus, The Iewes I haue not hurt as thou very well knowest. For if I haue hurt them, or done any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to dye, but if none of those thinges be, whereof they accuse me, no man can giue me to them, I appeale to Caesar.
12▪ By all which it is very cleare, that the Iewes sought to haue S. Paul put to death, and that all the crimes which they obiected against him, were false, and consequently that he was not accused merely for preaching the resurrection of Christ, which S. Paul would neuer haue denied, but for raising sedition and tumults in the people, and for doing wrong to Caesar. Whereupon S. Chrysostome Hem. 51. in Act. commendeth S. Paul, that he would be iudged before him whom he was accused to haue wronged. And Card. Bellarmine himselfe, not agreable to this his reason, did before in his Controuersies affirmeLib. 2. de Rom. Pon [...]. cap. 19., which as yet he hath not recalled, that S Paul did for good and iust cause appeale to Caesar, when he was accused for raising sedition and tumults in the people. And in that very place of his Recognitions, where [Page 274] he recalleth his opinion, he doth very plainely insinuate, as you haue seene, that the cause whereof he was accused, was criminall, for which he was in danger saith Card. Bellarmine, of a most vniust death.
13 True it is that S. Paul did preach to the Iewes the resurrection of Christ, according to the predictions of the holy Prophets, and for this cause they accused him of sedition, and to be a man worthy of death, and therefore he appealed to the tribunall of Caesar, not that Caesar should iudge, whether Christ was risen from death to life, for this indeed had been a spirituall cause, but whether to preach to the Iewes the resurrection of Christ, according to the predictions of the holy Prophets, were sedition, and a crime worthy to be punished with death by the Secular Magistrate. Wherefore Festus the President of Iewrie, and King Agrippa, after that S. Paul had discoursed about the resurrection of Christ Act. 26., and King Agrippa had said to S. Paul, A little thou dost perswade me to become a Christian, they all rose vp, and going aside they spake among themselues, saying, that this man hath done nothing worthy of death, or bonds; which answere also made Lycias the Tribune to the President Foelix before in the 23. Chapter.
14 A third reason, which moued Card. Bellarmine to recall his former opinion, and that S Paul did not appeale to Caesar, as to his lawfull Iudge, is, for that, saith heIn tract. contra Barclaium. cap. 3. pag. 49., it doth seeme to be altogether repugnant to the Gospell, that Christ did not free expresly, and by name S. Peter, and the Apostles from the obligation, wherein they stood bound to Heathen Princes. For Christ Mat. 17. did pay the didrachmes for himselfe and Peter, to auoide scandall. For that otherwise neither himselfe, nor Peter were bound to pay that tribute, he did demonstrate by those words: The Kinges of the earth, of whom doe they receiue tribute or cense? of their children, or of strangers? And Peter answering, of strangers, Iesus [Page 275] said vnto him, therefore the sonnes are free: by which words he declared, that he was free from all tribute & cense, for that he was the sonne of the King of all Kings, and because when the sonne of a King is free, also his familie is reputed free, therefore Peter, and the Apostles, who by the gracious fauour of Christ did appertaine to his familie, ought also to be free.
15 But this reason is neither sufficient, nor agreable to Card. Bellarmines owne principles. For first Card. Baronius affirmethAd ann. Christi 33. nu. 31., that this didrachme, which was exacted from our Sauiour in this place, was not a tribute due to Caesar, but onely to God for the vse of the Temple, according to the law of God decreed in the 30. chapter of Exodus: And therefore from this place no sufficient argument can be drawne, according to Card. Baronius doctrine, that the Apostes were exempted from paying of tributes, or any other temporall subiection, due to temporall Princes. Yea, and which is more, Card. Bellarmine himselfe in the latter Editions of his Controuersies approueth this Exposition for most true. There be two interpretations, saith heLib. 1 de Clericis cap. 28. in propos. 4., of this place: Therefore sonnes are free. The former is of S. Hillarie, who affirmeth, that this place is onely meant of the tribute, which God did impose vpon the Children of Israell, Exodus 30. to the vse of the temple, which tribute was properly called a didrachme; and according to this Exposition, which seemeth to vs to be most true, this is the force of the argument. The Kings of the earth, do not exact tribute of their sonnes but of strangers, therefore the King of heauen will not exact tribute of mee, who am his proper and naturall sonne. The second interpretation, which is of S. Hierome, who expoundeth those wordes of the tribute which was to bee paid to Caesar, seemeth to bee the lesse probable, because the tribute which was to be paid to Caesar, was not a Didrachme, but a penny, as it is plaine by Math. 22. Shew me the tribute coyne: and they offered him a [Page 276] penny. Neither can it be demonstrated by any found reason, that the tribute of the Didrachme was wont to be paid to Caesar, but after the Ascension of Christ into heauen. For Iosephus lib. 7. de bello Iudaico cap. 26. doth write that the tribute of the Didrachme, which all the Iewes did pay to the temple euery yeare, should afterwards be brought into the Capitole. Thus Card. Bellarmine.
16 Wherefore it is strange, that hee should now be so forgetfull, as to bring this text of holy Scripture for a reason, why hee changed his former opinion, and which reason also hee saith doth demonstrate, that Christ our Sauiour did expresly, and by name free S. Peter and the Apostles from the obligation wherein they stood bound to Caesar, whereas Card. Bellarmine himselfe, as you haue seene, expoundeth this place not of any tribute to bee paid to Caesar, but onely due to God for the vse of the temple. And therefore small reason had Card. Bellarmine for the aforesaid reasons, which are so weake, and repugnant to his owne doctrine, as you haue seene, to recall his former opinion, which for so long time hee had in publike Schooles, and writings, with the common opinion of Diuines, taught and maintained against the Canonists: but truely he had no reason to condemne for such weak reasons the contrary opinion of the Schoole Diuines, of whose profession he himselfe also is, as improbable.
17 Far more agreeable to reason, and also to Card. Bellarmines profession, hee being a Schoole Diuine, were it for him in my iudgement to returne to his ancient opinion, which the Schoole Diuines doe generally maintaine, and rather to recall some other his opinions, wherein hee plainely contradicteth his owne doctrine, as I haue shewed before: As that our Sauiour by those wordes, therefore sonnes are free &c. Math. 17. did expresly, and by name free S. Peter and the Apostles from the obligation, wherein they stood bound to Heathen Princes, which is flatly repugnant to that, which hee [Page 277] taught in another place, that these wordes are not meant of any tribute, which was to be paid to Caesar, but onely of the tribute, which God did impose Exod. 30. vpon the children of Israell to the vse of the Temple. And besides that, the cause whereof the Iewes did accuse S. Paul, and for which hee appealed to Caesar, was spirituall, In tract. contra Barcl. cap. 3 pag. 51. which is cleerely repugnant to that, which hee taught in another place,Lib 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 29. that S. Paul did for good and iust cause appeale to Caesar, and did acknowledge him for his Iudge, when he was accused of raysing sedition, and tumults in the people. And moreouer, (to omit sundry other his contradictions) that the Church of Christ is compounded See aboue cap. 2. of spirituall and temporall power, as a man is compounded of soule and body, and that the temporall and spirituall Common-wealth doe make one totall body whereof the Pope is head, as a man is compounded of b [...]dy and soule, which is cleerely repugnant to that which hee taught in other places, that the Church of Christ is compounded onely of spirituall power, and that the Pope, if wee will speake properly, hath onely spirituall and not temporall power.
18 But secondly although wee should grant, that those words of our Sauiour, therefore sonnes are free &c. were meant of the tribute which was to bee paid to Caesar and not to the temple, yet Card. Bellarmine himselfe did in the former Editions of his Controuersies giue therevnto a very sufficient answer, and which in his latter Editions he hath not confuted. For thus he writethlib. 1. de Clericis Cap. 28.: I answer first that this place doth not conuince: for otherwise he should exempt from tributes all Christians, who are regenerate by Baptisme. Secondly I answer, that our Sauiour doth speake onely of himselfe. For he maketh this Argument: The sonnes of Kinges are free from tributes, because they neither pay tribute to their fathers, for that the goods of the parents and children are common, nor to other Kings, because they are not subiect to them, but I am the sonne of the first and chiefest King, therefore I owe [Page 278] tribute to no man. Wherfore when our Sauiour saith, therefore Sonnes are free, from thence hee meant onely to gather this, that he himselfe was not bound to pay tribute: of other men hee affirmed nothing.
19 Thus answered Card. Bellarmine in times past, when he followed the opinion of the Diuines, concerning the exemption of Clergy men against the Canonists, who vrged this place of holy Scriptue to proue, that Clergy men are exempted from paying of tributes by the law of God. But now, forsooth, he forsaketh the Diuines, and this very text, therefore sonnes are free, which then hee brought for an obiection against his opinion, and cleerely answered the same, he bringeth now for a chiefe ground to proue his new opinion, and (which is very remarkable) hee concealeth the answer which he then made to the said obiection: onely hee addeth this: that when the sonnes of Kings are exempted from tribute, not onely their owne persons, but also their seruants and Ministers, and so their families are exempted from tributes. But it is certaine that all Clergie men do properly appertaine to the family of Christ, who is the sonne of the King of Kings. And this our Lord did seeme to signifie when hee said to S. Peter, But that wee may not scandalize them, finding the stater take it, and giue it for me and thee. As though he should say, that both hee, and his family, whereof S. Peter was a chiefe gouernour, ought to bee free from tributes. Which also S. Hierome doth seeme to haue vnderstood in his Commentary of that place, when hee saith, that Clergy men doe not pay tributes for the honour of our Lord, and are as Kings children free from tributes: and S. Austin lib. 1. qq. Euang. q. 23. where he writeth, that in euery earthly Kingdome, the children of that Kingdome vnder which are all the Kingdomes of the earth, ought to be free, (not are free, as Card. Bellarmine affirmeth S. Austin to say,) from tributes.
20 Thus you see, how Card. Bellarmine runneth [Page 279] vp and downe from the words of holy Scripture, by which it is demonstrated, saith he, that S. Peter was not bound to pay tribute to Caesar, to the sense which he himselfe disproueth, and then from the sense to his priuate collections, and inferences, that if S. Peter was free, all the Apostles were free, and if all the Apostles, all Cleargie men. But if it had pleased him to haue also set downe the answere, which in the former Editions of his bookes he made to this obiection, the Reader would easily haue perceiued, that from this place of holy Scripture no sufficient reason could be gathered to cause him to recall his former opinion, although wee should grant, that those words of our Sauiour were meant of the tribute, which was to be paide to Caesar, of which neuerthelesse Card. Bellarmine will not haue them to be vnderstood, but onely of the tribute which the children of Israell were by the law of God, Exod. 30. commanded to pay for their soules vnto the vse of the tabernacle of testimonie, for at that time the temple was not built. For first, saith he, if this argument did conuince, not onely Cleargie men, but also all Christians, who being regenerate by baptisme are the children of Christ, and also doe properly appertaine to his spirituall familie, or Church, of which, S. Peter and the rest of the Apostles vnder him were chiefe gouernours, should be exempted from paying tributes. Secondly, our Sauiour, saith he, doth speake onely of himselfe, who was the sonne of the first and chiefest King, and that he himselfe was not bound to pay tribute: of other men he affirmeth nothing.
21 Thirdly, to the authority of S. Hierome, he answereth, that S. Hierome did not intend in that place, to proue out of the Gospell, that Cleargie men are free from tribute, but onely he doth bring a certaine congruence, wherefore they are freed by the decrees of Pri [...]ces: for therefore he saith, that they doe not pay tributes as the children of the Kingdome, and he addeth an other [Page 280] cause, to wit, the honor of Christ: for he saith, that for his honour Cleargie men doe not pay tributs. Therfore not the law of God, but the decrees of Princes made for the honour of Christ, haue exempted Cleargy men. Thus Card. Bellarmine.
22 Fourthly, to the authority of S. Augustine he answereth, that although Iansenius (whom Salmeron and Suarez doe follow) doth affirme, that S. Austen by the children of the supreme kingdome did vnderstand the naturall children of God, and that he spake in the plurall number to obserue the manner of our Sauiours spech, so that the meaning of S. Austen was, that all the naturall sonnes of God if it were possible that God could haue more naturall sonnes then one, should be exempted from paying of earthly tributes: yet Card. Bellarmine doth not like well of this answere, and therefore he thinketh the answere of Abulensis to be the more probable, that S. Austen did not vnderstand naturall children, but Clergie men and Monkes, who, as also S. Hierome affirmeth, in Cap. 17 Mat., were and are free from tributes, as those who appertaine to the familie of Christ. Neither doth it therefore from hence follow, that Cleargie men are by the law of God free from tributes. For first, that which S. Austen saith, is not in the words of our Sauiour, but it is onely gathered by a probable consequence, For our Sauiour doth onely speake of the true and naturall children of Kinges, as S. Chrysostome doth expound that place. Secondly, our Sauiour himselfe doth allso properly command nothing in this place, that it may be called the law of God, but doth onely shew by the vse and custome of men, that the children of Kinges are free from tributes. Thus Card. Bellarmine answered in his former Editions, which answere in his later editions he altogether concealeth, but for what cause I remit to the iudgement of the prudent Reader.
23 By all which it is apparant that our Sauiour did onely speake of himselfe, and of the naturall children [Page 281] of Kings, when hee vsed those words, therefore sonnes are free; and of the seruants, or familie, either of Kings, or of the children of Kinges he saith nothing at all; and therefore from an other consequence drawne from the vse, and custome of men, and not from the words of our Sauiour, can it be gathered, that those who are seruants, or of the familie of the children of Kings, are exempted either from subiection to the inferiour magistrates of the kingdome, or from the paying of tributs. But by no probable consequence it can be deduced, that those who are either seruants, and of the familie of Kinges children, or also seruants, and of the familie of the King himselfe, are by the custome of any nation either exempted from subiection to inferiour Magistrates, and much lesse to the King himselfe, or also from paying tributes, vnlesse the King vpon some other speciall consideration doth grant to any of them such a priuiledge.
24 To those words of our Sauiour, But that wee may not scandalize them &c. it is easily answered according to the first exposition of that didrachme, which Card. Bellarmine thinketh to be most true, that it was a tribute due to the temple or tabernacle, and not to Caesar: For I doe willingly grant, that S. Peter, who was appointed by Christ to be the chiefe gouernour of his Church and temple, was exempted from paying tribute to the temple. But although we should admit, that the aforesaide didrachme was a tribute due to Caesar, and not to the temple, yet from those words of our Sauiour, no sufficient argument can be drawne to proue, that S. Peter, and especially the rest of the Apostles, were by the law of God exempted from paying tributes, and much lesse from temporall subiection to Heathen Princes.
25 First, for that we may probably answere with Iansenius, and Abulensis, that Christ did speake to S. Peter in the plurall number, [but that wee may not scandalize [Page 282] them] not for that S. Peter was bound to pay tribute onely by reason of scandall, but either because our Sauiour did speake of his owne person, vsing the plurall number for the singular, as it is vsuall, especially among great persons; we are wont, saith S. Epiphanius In the heresie of the Manichies., to speake singular thinges plurall, and plurall singular. For wee say, wee haue tould you, and we haue seene you, and we come to you, and yet there be not two who speake, but one who is present: or else because the scandall, which Christ should haue giuen, would in some sort haue redounded to S. Peter, as being a mediatour in that businesse. And therefore, as well affirmeth Iansenius In C [...]ncord. Euang. cap. 69. in Mat. 17., our Sauiour did pay tribute for himselfe onely to auoid scandall & for S. Peter to honour him as with a certaine reward for his faith, obedience, and diligence, as a mediatour of this busines, and an executor of the Miracle of finding the stater in the fishes mouth, or as Barradius the Iesuite, and others doe affirmeIn cap 17. Mat. [...]om. 2. Lib. 10. cap. 32., to honour him aboue the rest, as the Prince of the Apostles, and the head of the Church. See Abulensis, q. 198. 199. and 200. in cap. 17. Mat. and Barradius vpon this place.
26 Secondly, although wee should grant, that our Sauiour did for some speciall cause exempt S. Peter from paying tribute to Caesar, either by a personall priuiledge, or else reall, and descending to his successors, it doth not therefore follow, that he did exempt him from all ciuil subiection to temporal Princes, as neither doth it follow, that because the Children of Kinges, for that their goodes and their fathers are common, or any of the Kinges seruants are by speciall priuiledge exempted from paying tributes, they are therefore exempted from all ciuil subiection and alleagiance to the King.
27 Thirdly, for that there is no probabilitie in my iudgment, that either Christ did by those words intend to exempt the rest of the Apostles, seeing that there is no mention at all made of them in that place, [Page 283] or also that this priuiledg of exemption is extended to S. Peter, and the rest of the Apostles, in regard onely that they were of the spirituall familie, or Church of Christ (I say of the spirituall familie, for that I will not deny, but that as they were of his corporall familie, and liued with him here on earth, and had no corporall goods but such as belonged to Christ, they were exempted from paying tributes, but not from ciuill subiection to Heathen Princes) because the exemption of seruants with their Maister, or of those, who are of the familie of Kinges Children with the Kinges Children themselues, is not grounded in the law of nature, but onely in a certaine congruity, and custome of men, from which custome this argument to exempt the Apostles, for that they were of Christs familie, is drawne: but there is no such custome among nations, that the seruants or familie of Kinges Children or of the King himselfe, are exempted from paying tributes, although the children of Kinges hauing no other goodes, then which are their fathers, be exempted, as Card. Bellarmine a little aboue affirmed. But howsoeuer, neither the seruants to Kinges children, nor the kinges children themselues, are exempted from ciuill subiection, or from the directiue, or coerciue power of the King.
28 And therefore neither Fa. Suarez, who handleth this question at large, dare affirme, that from those words of our Sauiour it can certainely, but onely probably be gathered, that this exemption was extended to the rest of the Apostles. I answere, saith heeIn defens. fid [...] Ca [...]o & [...] lib. 4 cap. 8. in sine., that it is true, that Christ did not say plainly, that the familie is exempted with the children, neither doth it follow by any euident, or necessary consequence, and therefore the aforesaid opinion, for as much as belongeth to this part, is neither of faith, nor altogether certaine. Neuerthelesse it is most likely, that this extention to the rest of the Apostles is according to the intention of Christ,
[Page 284]29. But truely, although there may be alleadged some probable congruities, wherefore our Sauiour might grant some speciall prerogatiue, and priuiledge of exemption to S. Peter, whom he had chosen to be the first and principall head and gouernour of his Church, rather then to the rest of the Apostles, as likewise the Diuines doe yeeld probable congruities, wherefore God almighty might giue to the B. Virgin Mary, whom he had chosen to be the mother of his immaculate Sonne, a speciall prerogatiue and priuiledge of exemption from originall sinne, but whether he did grant that priuiledge or no, it cannot certainely be proued, neuerthelesse for my owne part I doe not see any probable likelihood, that our Sauiour should giue to the rest of the Apostles, and much lesse to all Cleargie men, any speciall priuiledge of exemption from all ciuill subiection to temporall Princes. And therefore the most part of the Schoole Diuines, yea also and of the Iesuites themselues doe hould, that Cleargie men are directly subiect to the ciuill lawes of temporall Princes, in all those thinges, which are not repugnant to their state, nor to the Ecclesiasticall Canons, and consequently that they are not exempted from all subiection and obedience, and from the directiue or commanding power of Secular Princes, but that they are bound not onely by force of reason, but also by vertue of the law, and of their due obedience, to obserue such ciuill lawes.
30 A fourth reason which Card. Bellarmine bringethIn tract. contra Barcl. cap. 3. pag. 50 wherefore he recalled his former opinion, and why the Apostles were not de iure subiect to temporall Princes, is because they are appointed by God Princes ouer all the earth, as wee read in the 44. Psalme. For although that principality was spirituall, not temporall, yet it was true principallity, and farre more noble then temporall principallitie. But this reason is not sufficient, for as I obserued in my Apologie, nu. 68. & seq the same man being [Page 285] considered diuerse waies may be subiect, and superiour; subiect in temporalls, and supreame in spirituals, and contrariwise; neither is temporall subiection repugnant to spirituall authority, nor temporall authority repugnant to spiritual subiection: neither from hence doth it follow, that either temporall authority it selfe, is subiect to spirituall power, or spirituall power subiect to temporall authority, but onely that the same man, who is superiour in temporalls, is subiect in spiritualls, and who is superiour in spiritualls is subiect in temporalls, as the same man who is a Musition may be subiect and seruant to a Physition, or contrariwise, and yet it doth not from hence follow, that Musicke it selfe is subiect to Physicke, or contrariwise.
31 And if Card. Bellarmine doe answere, as he doth in his Schulckenius Pag. 172., that when the powers are equall, it may perchance fall out, that the same compared diuerse waies may be subiect and superiour, but if the powers be vnequall, and one subordained to an other, as are spirituall and ciuill power, it cannot fall out, that the same man be subiect to him who is his superiour, this answere is also as insufficient as the former. First, for that the temporall power it selfe is not subordained to the spirituall, as I haue shewed before: for otherwise temporall Princes should not onely in spiritualls, but also in mere temporalls be subiect to spirituall Pastours, as if Musicke it selfe be subiect to Physicke, a Musition, as he is a Musition, and in all thinges belonging to Musicke, should be subiect to Physicke, and consequently to a Physition, as he is a Physition. Secondly, for that it is the common opinion of the Schoole Diuines, and also of the Iesuites, that Cleargie men are subiect to the directiue temporall power, or command of temporall Princes.
32 Thirdly, for that there is no repugnance, but rather a necessary consequence, that spirituall Princes, not as they are spirituall Princes, but as they are true [Page 286] parts and members of the temporall common wealth, should be subiect in temporall affaires to temporall Princes, for euery member, sai [...]h Card. Bellarmine, Li [...] de Monachis. cap. 19. ought to be subiect to the head, and Cleargie men, besides that they are Cleargie men, are also citizens and parts of the ciuill common wealth, as Card. Bellarmine affirmeth in an other placeLib. de Clericis. cap. 28., and the King is head of the politike or ciuill body, as also in his Schulckenius, he expresly affirmethPag. 339.. Fourthly, for that Card. Bellarmine is also now of opinion, at least wise he was when he wrote against D. Barckley, that it is probable, that the Priests of the old law, who had true spirituall power, and were true spirituall Princes, were subiect to Kinges, and therfore for this reason to recall his former opinion, and especially to condemne it as improbable, were both to contradict himselfe, and also to condemne of temeritie the learnedst Schoole Diuines of this age, and also of his Societie.
33 These be all the principall reasons, which I can finde in Card. Bellarmine, for which he was moued to recall his former opinion, and to condemne it as improbable, which how probable they be, or rather very insufficient to moue such a learned man, as Card. Bellarmine is, to forsake the Schole Diuines, and to fly to the Canonists, who as pope Pius the fift sincerely confessed,Nauar. super cap. non liceat Papa [...] 12. q. 2 55. 3 [...]. nu. 6 doe attribute to the Pope more authoritie then is fitting, and to censure so rigorously, and rashly the learnedst Catholikes of this age, and also of his owne Societie, of temeritie, I remit to the iudgement of the discreete Reader, as also to consider, whether reason, or affection to aduance the Popes authoritie moued him not onely to recall his former opinion, but also to condemne it as improbable.
33 Lastly, that the Reader may haue some knowledge of the true state of the question concerning the authority of spirituall Pastors to exempt Clergy men from the power of Secular Princes, for that some Diuines [Page 287] are of opinion, that from the exemption of Clergy men a strong Argument may bee drawne to p [...]oue that a spirituall Prince or Pastor hath power to depose or depriue a temporall Prince, who is subiect to him in spiritualls, of his temporall Kingdome and Dominions. First therefore the true state of the question betwixt mee and my Aduersaries is, not concerning the exemption of Cleargie men by way of command, for I doe willingly grant, that a spirituall Prince, or Pastor as hee is a spirituall Pastor, hath power to command a Christian Prince, who is subiect to him in spiritualls, not to exercise his temporall power in some cases, if the necessity of the Church, or Christian Religion doth require it, ouer the persons of Clergy men, who are his temporall Subiects: so that if a secular Prince should disobey the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastor, hee should offend against the vertue of Religion, for the which offence his spirituall Pastor might punish him with Ecclesiasticall censures: and of this manner of exemption by way of command, and spirituall coercion, all the Canons and Decrees of Popes and Councells. which doe signifie. imply, or suppose that Clergy men may by the authority of the Church without the consent of temporall Princes bee exempted from secular powers, either touching their persons or their goods, may bee very well vnderstood: I said if the necessity of the Church doth require it; for at this present I will not enter into particulars, what manner of necessity is required, that a spirituall Pastor may impose such a command vpon his temporall Prince.
34 But the controuersie betwixt mee and my Aduersaries betwixt those Catholikes who are so vehement for the Popes power to depose Princes, and those on the contrary side is, whether spirituall Pastors, as they are spirituall Pastors, or by vertue of their spirituall power, haue not onely by way of command, and spirituall coercion, but also by way of sentence authority [Page 288] to exempt without the consent of Princes Clergy men, who before were subiect to them in temporalls, from the directiue, and coerciue power of secular Princes, in such sort, that after the sentence of such exemption bee giuen, Clergy men are no more the subiects of that secular Prince, for that his spirituall Pastor doth depriue him of that ciuill power, which before the sentence hee had ouer Clergy men: And what is said of particular Bishops, in respect of Princes who are their spirituall children, is to bee vnderstood of the Supreme spirituall Pastor in respect of all Christian Princes, who are subiect to him in spiritualls. This is the true state of the question.
35 So that the Reader may clearely perceiue, that although from the first manner of exemption, by way of command, and spirituall coercion, no good argument can be drawne, to proue, that the spirituall power can depose Princes, and depriue them of their Regall authoritie, by way of sentence, yet there is great coherence betwixt these two questions concerning the power of spirituall Pastors to depose Princes by way of sentence, and their power to exempt by way of sentence Cleargie men from all subiection to Secular Princes. For the first question is whether the spirituall power can by way of sentence depriue temporall Princes of all their temporall power, and absolue all their Subiects from their temporall alleagiance: and the second is, whether it can depriue them of some part of their temporall power, and absolue some of their subiects from their temporall allegiance. And therefore those Catholikes who doe grant the second, will easily grant the first, and who doe grant the first, must of necessity grant the second, for that there can be no sufficient reason alleadged, why the spirituall power can in order to spirituall good depriue Princes of some part of their Regall authoritie, and not of all, and absolue some subiects from their temporall allegiance, [Page 289] and not all; and if it can depriue o [...] all, i [...] must needes follow that it can also of some part. And contrariwise those Catholikes, who affirme, that the spirituall power cannot exempt, ot absolue Cleargie men from their temporall allegiance and subiection to temporall Princes, must consequenily affirme, that it can not exempt or absolue all subiects from their temporall allegiance: and who affirme, that it can not absolue, or exempt all subiects from their temporall allegiance, nor depriue a temporal [...] Prince of all his Regall authority, will easily affirme, that it cannot exempt or absolue Cleargie men from their temporall alleagiance and subiection, nor depriue a temporall Prince of any part of his Regall authority.
36 But some doe greatly vrge this obiection: If the spirituall power can command temporall Princes not to exercise their temporall power ouer the persons or goods of Cleargie men, without the consent of their Ecclesiasticall superiour, it doth consequently follow, that a temporall Prince doth offend, if he transgresse the iust and lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour, and therefore it seemeth, that a temporall Prince hath no power ouer the persons or goods of Cleargie men after such a command, supposing it to be lawfull, vnlesse wee will grant, that a temporall Prince hath power to commit sinne, and to transgresse the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour.
37 To this obiection (wherewith I haue knowne diuers men of learning to bee somewhat perplexed) those Catholikes, who deny that the spirituall power can depriue by way of sentence, a temporall Prince of his Regall Authority, either wholly or in part, may easily answer in this manner: that if a temporall Prince doth excercise his temporall power ouer the persons or goods of Clergy men against the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour, hee sinneth indeed against Religion, and the generall vertue of obedience, in [Page 290] that hee vseth his power contrary to the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour, but hee doth not sinne against the speciall vertue of legall, or morall iustice, in vsing his authority ouer them, who are not his subiects, and ouer whom hee hath no temporall power and Authority, in that manner as another man, who is not their Prince, should offend. Neither is it vnvsuall for a man to commit a sinne in doing that which in respect of iustice hee hath power and authority to doe.
38 As for example, it is a sinne against the vertue of liberality for one to giue away his goods prodigally, although if wee respect iustice hee hath true and full power to giue them away, for that he giueth nothing but that, which is his owne: and therefore that prodigall guift, although it be vnlawfull, yet is not vniust, as iustice is taken, not as it comprehendeth all vertues in generall, but in particular for a speciall vertue, and one of the foure Cardinall vertues. So also it is a sin against the vertue of temperance to giue money to commit an vnhonest act, and yet the gift is not vniust for that hee giueth nothing but his owne, and which according to iustice hee hath power to giue. So likewise if a Ghostly father command his penitent to giue a certaine part of his goods to the poore in satisfaction of his sinnes, if the penitent doe bestow them otherwise then hee was commanded, hee sinneth against the vertue of Religion and Sacrament of pennance, in transgressing his Ghostly fathers lawful command, but he committeth no iniustice, because hee giueth that which is his owne, and which, if wee regard the vertue of iustice, hee hath power to giue: neither doth the command of his Ghostly father depriue him of the right, dominion, property and power, which he had before ouer those goods.
39 Lastly, if the Pope should vpon iust cause suspend a Priest from the Altar, or a Bishop from his Episcopall [Page 291] function, and consequently forbid the Priest to consecrate, and the Bishop to giue orders, if they should disobey the Popes lawfull command, they should sinne against the vertue of Religion, in vsing their power vnlawfully, but they should not sinne for doing that which they haue no power to doe, as hee who is no Priest or Bishop should in consecrating or giuing orders offend, for that the power of a Priest to consecrate and of a Bishop to giue orders, cannot either wholly or in part bee taken away from them by the Pope. So likewise although a spirituall Pastor should for iust cause forbid a temporall Prince, who is his spirituall child, and subiect, to excercise his Regall power and authority ouer Clergy men, if that temporall Prince should heerein transgresse the command of his spirituall Pastor, supposing it to bee lawfull, hee should indeed offend against religion, in vsing his Regall power and authority contrary to the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastor, which command was imposed for the motiue of Religion, neuerthelesse hee should not offend against iustice, in doing that which hee hath no power and authority to doe, in that manner as another man, who is not their Prince, should by depriuing them of their goods, or punishing their persons if they transgresse the lawes, offend. For that it is not in the power of a spirituall Pastor to depriue a temporall Prince either wholly or in part of his Regall power, and temporall Soueraignty.
40 Wherefore if wee respect the power it selfe, and the vertue of legall or morall iustice, a temporall Prince hath full, ample, and supreme royall power and authority ouer Clergy men, notwithstanding that his spirituall Pastor should for iust cause command him not to exercise his Regall power vpon the persons of Clergie men, who doe offend his lawes: but if wee respect rhe vse and execution of the power, and the vertue of religion, the vse indeed of his power in the [Page 292] aforesaid case is so limited by the lawfull command of the spirituall Pastor, that the Prince vsing his power ouer Clergy men, sinneth against Religion, for that hee disobeyeth the lawfull command of his spirituall Superiour, which was imposed for the motiue of religion, but not against iustice for that hee doth not excercise his Regall power but vpon those who are his Subiects, and doe owe vnto him true loyalty and temporall obedience.
41 And truely if the aforesaid obiection were of force, that the temporall Prince hath no power or authority ouer Clergie men, who are subiect to him in temporalls, against the lawfull command of his spirituall Pastour, because he hath no power to sinne, it would likewise follow, that a suspended Bishop, or Priest, haue no power to giue orders, or to consecrate, because they haue no power to sinne; and a penitent hath no lawfull right, or power to sell, or giue away his goods against the lawfull command of his Ghostly Father, because he hath no power to sinne; and a man hath no power, or right to giue money to a dishonest end, or to giue away his goods prodigally, and consequently they should be restored back againe, because he hath no power to sinne. I will say nothing at this time, how farre Cleargie men, either by the priuiledges of Christan Princes, or by the Ecclesiasticall Canons are de facto exempted both in their goods, and in their persons from ciuill powers, but onely I thought good at this time to set downe the true state of the question among Catholikes concerning the authority of spirituall Pastours to exempt Cleargie men from the temporall power of Christian Princes, that thereby they may clearely perceiue, what kinde of argument may be drawne from the exemption of Cleargie men, to proue the Popes power to depose Princes, and by way of sentence to depriue them wholy of their Regall authoritie.
[Page 293]42 Thus you haue seene in what manner temporall thinges are subiect to spirituall, temporall endes to spirituall endes, temporall power to the spirituall power, the temporall sword to the spirituall sword, the flesh to the spirit, the Moone to the Sunne, and temporall Princes to spirituall Pastors; and that from the subiection and subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, no good argument can be brought to proue, that the Pope, by vertue of his spirituall power can dispose of temporalls, depose temporall Princes, or punish temporally by way of coercion, but onely that in order to spirituall good he can command temporalls, and punish temporally by way of command, but by way of coercion onely with spirituall, and not with temporall punishments. And by this which hath bene saide, the Reader may easily vnderstand the true sense and meaning of a certaine proposition, which Card. Bellarmine in his Schulckenius doth often inculcate (as though there were some great mystery lye hidden therein) to proue the Popes power to depose temporall Princes, to wit, that a Christian Prince is a child of the Church, and subiect to the Pope, not onely as he is a Christian man, but also as he is a Christian Prince; and the same he affirmeth of a Christian [...]awyer, of a Christian Souldier, of a Christian Physitian, and so of the rest.
43 For all these three propositions, A Christian Prince, as he is a Christian Prince, is a child of the Church, and subiect to spirituall Pastours: A Christian Prince as he is a Christian is a Child of the Church, and subiect to spirituall Pastours: and a Prince as he is a Christian, is a Childe of the Church and subiect to spirituall Pastours; haue one and the selfe same sense; and so likewise of a Christian Lawier, of a Christian Soldier, of a Christian Physitian &c. For the true meaning of them all is, that Christianitie, and not Regall authority, or the knowledge of lawe, warfare, or [Page 294] Physicke, is the cause why a Prince, a Lawier, a Soldier, a Physitian, and all other men of what trade soeuer they be, are Children of the Church, and subiect to spirituall Pastours; and that therefore they are to be directed and instructed by spirituall Pastours, not precisely in the rules of ciuill gouernment, in the rules of lawe, warfare, or Physicke, but onely in the rules and principles of Christian doctrine, and how they ought to gouerne ciuilly, and vse their knowledge and trades according to the rules and precepts of Christian Religion: which if they refuse to doe, they may be corrected and punished by spirituall Pastours, with spirituall or Ecclesiasticall punishments.
44 But from hence it doth not follow, that either temporall power, the knowledge of the lawe, warfare, or physicke, are among Christians per se subiect to the spirituall power, but onely per accidens, as I haue often declared, and in those thinges, which doe concerne or belong to Christian Religion, or that spirituall Pastours can by vertue of their spirituall power correct, or punish Christian Princes, Lawiers, Soldiers, Physitians &c. by depriuing them by way of sentence of their Regall authoritie, of their skill and knowledge in the lawes, in warfare, or Physicke, which they did not receiue from the spirituall power, but onely by depriuing them of the Sacraments, and such like spirituall benifites, of which they are made partakers by being Christians, and by meanes of the spirituall power and authority of spirituall Pastours. And thus much concerning the vnion and subiection of the temporall and spirituall power, and also of the second part.
AN ADJOJNDER to the first and second Part, wherein Widdringtons Interpretation of that Clause of the Oath, wherein the Doctrine (that Princes, who are excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may bee deposed or murthered by their Subiects) is abiured as impious and hereticall, is proued to be sound, and sufficient, and is cleared from all absurdity or contradiction, euen by Mr. FITZHERBERTS examples, and that it may without any Periury be sworne by any CATHOLIKE.
PErceiuing, Courteous Reader, that this my Answer to Mr. Fitzherberts Reply doth arise to a greater bignesse, then at the first I imagined: for that I am compelled not onely to answer him, but also D. Schulckenius, to whom he remitteth his Reader for the confutation of many of my Answers: I thought good for diuers reasons to diuide it into two Bookes, and to conclude the first Booke with the first and second Part; onely [Page 2] adioyning, by way of an Appendix, for thy better satisfaction, the Answer which I made to Mr. Fitzherberts fourth Chapter, wherein hee excepteth against those words of the Oath (as impious and hereticall Doctrine) for against no other clause of the Oath doth hee make any particular obiection, besides his generall discourse in fauour of the Popes power to depose Princes, and to dispose of all temporalls. Which his Doctrine, seeing that I haue already by extrinsecall grounds, and the authority of learned Catholikes (for to all the intrinsecall grounds which my Aduersary bringeth, I will answer in the next booke, which, God willing, ere it be long thou shalt receiue) proued not to bee so certaine, but that the contrary hath euer beene, and is at this present approued by learned Catholikes, and consequently may without any danger of heresie, error, or temerity, be maintained by any Catholike: and considering also that Mr. Fitzherbert taketh no particular exception against any clause of the Oath, but onely against those words (as impious and hereticall Doctrine) it is euident that any man of iudgement may from that which I haue already said and proued, easily conclude, that the Oath may lawfully, and with a safe Conscience bee taken, if my Aduersaries obiections against those words of the Oath (as impious and hereticall Doctrine) bee once cleerely confuted.
2 First therefore Mr. Fitzherbert in the beginning of his fourth Chapter, seemeth to take it very ill, for that I fall, saith he, vppon him very foule, charging h [...]m with flat falsity at the first word. But truely hee doth in this exaggerate the matter somwhat more then is needfull, as also in that he saith, that for a while I made my selfe merry with Fa. Lessius. For besides that the word flat is added by himselfe, I did neither cogge, scoffe, gibe, or make my selfe merry with Fa. Lessius: but after I had brought those foure instances to confute Fa. Lessius his antecedent proposition, whereon hee [Page 3] grounded his consequence, I onely demanded, not by way of scoffing, cogging, gibing, or making my selfe merry, as this man in this, and his former Chapter vntruely affirmeth, but rather out of pitty, compassion, and complaint, whether those, and such like were not trim Arguments to moue English Catholicks prodigally to cast away their goods, and to deny their allegiance to their Prince. And as for charging my Aduersary with flat falsity, my wordes were onely these: Thirdly it is false which this Author F. T. affirmeth, to wit, that the Doctrine concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, is plainely abiured in [...]his Oath, as impious and hereticall, for this doctrine onely is abiured in this Oath as impious and hereticall, that Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may bee deposed or murthered by their subiects or any other whatsoeuer: which position, as I will declare beneath, hath this sense, that it is in the free power of Subiects to depose, or (if they will) to murther their Prince, beeing excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope.
3 In the very first beginning I affirmed, and Mr. Fitzherbert in his first Chapter related my words, that the supposition, which hee made, to wit, that the Popes power to excommunicate Princes is denyed in this Oath, is most false and then he took no exception against this word, most false: and now after he hath so often fallen very foule vpon mee, with charging mee with being absurd, ridiculous, foolish, malicious, impudent, impious, with cogging, scoffing gibing, heretike, and being no good Child of the Catholike Church, and vsing many such like slanderous, and disgracefull termes against mee, hee taketh it very ill for that I onely affirme his assertion to bee false, which word neuerthelesse is vsuall in Schooles among Disputers and Answerers, and is not taken for any disgracefull tearme, being in sense all one with vntrue, or I deny the assertion or position. But because I perceiue Mr. Fitzherberts patience cannot [Page 4] brooke the very least of those so many foule, disgracefull, and slanderous nicknames hee is pleased to bestow vpon me, and doth so easily see a little mote in my eye, not perceiuing the great beame in his owne: I will heereafter abstaine from that word false, and in stead thereof vse vntrue, as in the English Edition I did translate it: neither can he haue any colour to bee distasted with this word vntrue, vnlesse hee doe take it ill that I doe not forsooth approue all his opinions, and applaud whatsoeuer he shall say to be true.
4 But to the matter. Mr. Fitzherbert in his fourth Chapter endeauoreth to proue two things: the one that I haue falsly charged him with affirming, that the Doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, is manifestly abiured in the Oath, as impious and hereticall, which hee denyeth to haue affirmed, although hee granteth withall, [...]hat it is true if hee had affirmed it. The second is, that my interpretation of that clause of the Oath, wherein the aforesaid Doctrine and Position, That Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, is abiured as impious and hereticall, is absurd according to my owne grounds.
5. As touching the first. Mr. Fitzherbert affirmeth,Cap. 4. nu. 1. that he saith nothing at all touching his owne opinion, whether the doctrine of deposing Princes be abiured in the Oath as impious and hereticall (and much lesse that it is manifestly abiured as I say he doth) but he affirmeth onely, that the Oath is wholy repugnant to a Canon of the great Councell of Lateran by reason of two clauses therein. And for proofe thereof, he repeatethNu. 2. the words of his Supplement, which are these? Fourthly, it appeareth also hereby, and by all the premises, that this Oath of pretended allegiance is an vnlawfull Oath, and not to be taken by any Christian man, seeing that it flatly contradicteth the said Councell, and Canon, not onely because it denieth that the Pope hath any power or authority to depose his Maiestie, [Page 5] or to discharge any of his Subiects of their allegiance, and obedience to his Maiesty, but also because it bindeth the takers of it in expresse words to sweare thus. And I do further sweare, that from my hart I doe abhorre, detest, & abiure, as impious and heretical, this damnable doctrin, and position, that princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed, which position was by that Canon expresly ordained to be practised in some cases, yea and executed by the Councells order vpon Reymond Earle of Tolosa. Thus say I in my Suppliment.
6. Now I report Nu. 3. me to the indifferent Reader, whether I affirme any more, then that these two clauses of the Oath are flatly against the Councell of Lateran, because the Popes power to depose Princes (which the said Councell acknowledgeth and approueth by an expresse Canon) is denied therein; and this is manifest as well by all my precedent discourse, as by that which followeth; for all that which I amply debated before, touching the Councell of Lateran, concerned onely the Popes power to depose Princes, without any one word whether the abiuration or deniall thereof be hereticall; and my conclusion of the later clause confirmeth the same: for I add immediately these words, which position, (to wit, that Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed) was by that Canon expresly ordained to be practised in some cases; yea and was executed by the Councels order, vpon Reymond Earle of Tolosa.
7. Whereby it appeareth, Nu. 4. that whereas the clause mentioneth two thinges; the one the doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope may be deposed; and the other, that the said doctrine is abiured, as impious and hereticall; I treat onely of the former, and speake not one word of the later. So as my Aduersary Widdrington charging me to haue falsly affirmed, that the Popes power to depose Princes is manifestly abiured in this Oath, hath charged me falsely, and therefore may take his imputation of falsity to himselfe. Thus M. Fitzherbert.
[Page 6]8. But in truth I cannot but wonder, where Mr. Fitzherberts memory was, when he wrote these words, that he could not perceiue, that he himselfe here saith as much as I affirmed him to say: and therefore if he can finde no better a shift and euasion, then to deny with so bould a face that very same thinge, which he himselfe in this very place doth so plainly affirme, the vntruth, I dare not say falsity, wherewith I charged him, will still remaine with him, and will not be taken from him by me, besides the disgrace for a man of his fashion, quality, and profession, to deny so bouldly that he affirmeth that thing, which euery Child who vnderstandeth English, may perceiue that he doth affirme. For marke his words. The Oath, saith he, bindeth the takers of it in expresse words to sweare thus: And I doe further sweare, that I doe from my heart abhorre, detest, and abiure, as impious and hereticall, this damnable doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed. Now let any man iudge, whether he that affirmeth, that the Oath bindeth the takers of it in expresse words to sweare, that he doth abiure as impious and hereticall this doctrine, that Prince [...] excommunicated or depriued by the Pope m y be deposed, doth not affirme, that the doctrine concerning the Popes power to depose Princes is plainely, manifestly, or in expresse words abiured in this oath as impious and hereticall.
9. But obserue how cunningly M. Fitzherbert, belike to returne the imputation of falsity vpon mee would delude his Reader. Whereas the clause of the oath, saith he, mentioneth two things; the one the doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed; and the other, that the sai [...] doctrine is abiured as impious and hereticall, (Loe here againe hee granteth as much, as I said hee did affirme, to wit, that the doctrine, which holdeth that Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed, is abiured in this oath as impious and hereticall) [Page 7] I treate onely of the former, and speake not one word of the later; and all that which I amply debated before touching the Councell of Lateran concerned onely the Popes power to depose Princes, without any one word, whether the abiuration, or deniall thereof be hereticall.
10. Belike this man would make his Reader beleeue, that I did say, that he had amply debated, treated, or made some discourse of this point, and that he had endeauoured to proue, that the oath is vnlawfull, and against the Councell of Lateran, in regard it bindeth the takers of it to sweare, that they doe from their heart abhorre, detest, and abiure as impious and hereticall this doctrine and position, that Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed; whereas I say no such thing, but onely that Master Fitzherbert doth barely affirme, that the oath bindeth the takers to abiure, or, which is all one in sense, that in this oath is abiured as impious and hereticall this doctrine, and categoricall proposition, ex parte praedicati, that Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed. And thus much hee himselfe, as you haue seene in this very place, doth twice affirm: which his assertion I said is not true, for that it onely bindeth the takers to abiure a impious, and hereticall, this doctrine and hypotheticall proposition ex parte praedicati, that Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, which hath a farre different sense from the former, as I will shew beneath. So that he may still take to himselfe that imputation of falsity, or vntruth, wherewith I did truely charge him, and hereafter be more warie, if hee haue any care of his credit, not to maintaine such palpable vntruths, which euery Schoole-boy may easily perceiue so to be. And thus much for the first point. Now you shall see how learnedly he proueth the second.
11. Neuerthelesse I would not, saith he,Nu. 5. haue Widdrington [Page 8] to thinke, that because I deny, that I haue said so in my Supplement, therefore I doe, or will deny, that it is so: for it is euident in that clause, that the taker of the oath abiureth this doctrine as impious and hereticall, to wit, that Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed, or murthered by their subiects, or any other, whereby not onely the Popes power to depose Princes is denyed, but also the doctrine thereof is abiured as impious and hereticall: And this, I say, is euident, notwithstanding the friuolous euasion, which my Aduersary Widdrington seketh by his extrauagant interpretation of that clause, when hee saith, as you haue heard, that the sense and meaning thereof is no other, but that it is hereticall to affirme it to be in the free power of subiects or any other to depose, or (if they list) to kill Princes that are excommunicated or depriued by the Pope.
12. Whereby Nu. 6. hee giueth to vnderstand, that the doctrine, and position abiured in that clause, containeth two members, the one concerning the deposition of Princes, and the other concerning the murther of them; and that it is abiured as hereticall in respect of the later onely: as who would say, that it is an hereticall doctrine to teach, or affirme, that Princes excommunicated by the Pope may be murthered. So that albeit there be mention also of the deposition of Princes (as that they may be deposed or murthered) yet the doctrine of deposition is not abiured in that clause as hereticall, except it be ioyned with the murther of them; in such sort, that a man may freely choose whether he will depose, or murther them.
13. But that the Reader may more fully vnderstand, whether Master Fitzherberts Reply be a meere shift, or my answere an absurd friuolous, and extrauagant euasion, and contention de lana caprina (such foule termes, and farre worse it is not foule for him to vse against mee, and yet if I doe onely say, that hee affirmeth that which is false, or not true, I fall very foule vpon him) I will set downe entirely, what I answered in my Theologicall [Page 9] Disputation, and not in that lame manner, as he relateth my answer. It was obiected by the Author of the English Dialogue betweene the two sisters Protestancie and Puritanisme, that this clause of the oath. (And I do further sweare, that I do from my hart abhorre, detest and abiure, as impiuos and hereticall, this damnable doctrine and position, That Princes which be excommuicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed or murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer) cannot be taken without periurie: And this was his argument.
14. Whensoeuer an affirmatiue proposition is hereticall, of necessity it must be either against faith, and consequently against the expresse word of God, or else the contradictorie negatiue must be a position of faith, and contained in the expresse word of God.
But neither this affirmatiue position, That Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, or any other what soeuer, is against the expresse word of God, neither the contradictorie negatiue, to wit, that Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may not be deposed or murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, is contained in the expresse word of God.
Therefore the former position, that Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, is not hereticall.
15 And if perchance it should be answered, that whereas it is written in the 20. Chapter of Exod. Thou shalt not kill, and 1. Reg. 26. Destroy him not, for who shall lay the hands on the Lords annointed, and be guiltlesse? One part of the aforesaid position, to wit, that Princes may be murthered, is hereticall and against the expresse Word of God, and therefore the whole position, in regard of this one part, may be abiured as hereticall; yet this answer is not sufficient: For the position in hand, to wit, That Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the [Page 10] Pope may be deposed, or murthered by their Subiects or any other, doth not absolutely affirme, that Princes, after they be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be murthered by their subiects, or any other, but with a disiuction, to wit, may be deposed, or murthered. And therefore although the position were hereticall, if it did onely affirme they might be murthered, yet not affirming this, but onely that they may be deposed, or murdered, there is no shewe of heresie in it, in regard of being contrary to the aforesaid texts of Scripture, to which it is nothing contrary at all.
16. For, according to the most true and approued rule of the Logicians, to make a disiunctiue proposition, or any thing affirmed vnder a disiunction to be false and hereticall, it is necessary, that both parts of the disiunction be also false and hereticall; neither is it sufficient, that one onely part be hereticall. And therefore although that the second part of the disiunction, to wit, That Princes, being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be murthered, be hereticall and against the expresse word of God; yet because the first part of the disiunction, to wit, that such Princes may be deposed by their Subiects, or any other, is not hereticall, nor contrary to the expresse word of God, the whole disiunctiue position cannot be in very deed hereticall, and therefore neither can it be abiured as hereticall.
17. To this obiection I gaue two answers. The first and principall answer was,Cap. 5. sec. 2. nu. 8. et seq. ‘that albeit the aforesaid proposition, Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects &c. doth seeme by reason of that later coniunction [or] to be a disiunctiue proposition, or rather a Categoricall proposition of such a disiunct predicate, as the Logicians tearme it, which vertually doth imply, or may be resolued into a disiunctiue proposition (to the verity of which disiunctiue proposition, it is onely required, as it was said in the obiection; that [Page 11] one part of the disiunction be true: and to make the whole disiunction false and hereticall, both parts of the disiunction must be false and hereticall: neither doth it suffice, that one only part be false and hereticall) Neuerthelesse according to the common sense and meaning of the words, it is in very deed, and according to our English phrase, equiualent to a copulatiue proposition, or rather to a Categorical proposition of such a Copulate predicate, which may be resolued into a copulatiue proposition, to the ve ity whereof, according to the Logicians rule, it is contrariwise required, that both parts of the copulation be true; and to make the whole proposition false and hereticall, it is not required that both parts of the copulation be false and hereticall, but it sufficeth that one onely part thereof be false and hereticall. Neither is it vnusuall, that a coniunction disiunctiue be sometimes taken for a copulatiue, and a copulatiue for a disiunctiue, as we may see in Leg. saepe. F. de verb [...]rum significat. Whereof read Felinus in Cap. inter caeteras de rescriptis. Ioannes Azorius tom. 1. Instit. Lib. 5 Cap. 25. and Salas, disp. 21. de Legibus, sect. 3. regula 26.’
‘18. But if any one will needes contend, that the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which are excommunicated or depriued by the Pope &c. by reason o [...] that disiunct [...]ue coniunction [or] is altogither a disiunctiue proposition; this notwithstanding being granted, the obiection may easily be answered. For albeit we admit it to be a disiunctiue proposition, neuerthelesse wee affirme, that it is not an absolute disiunctiue, whereof the aforesaid rule of the Logicians, to wit, that both parts of the disiunction must be hereticall, to make the whole disiunction to be heretical, is to be vnderstood, but it is a conditional disiunctiue, which importeth a free choice, or election of the will, or which is all one, a free power to chose whether part [Page 12] of the disiunction we please, to the verity of which conditionall disiunctiue is required, that you may choose whether part of the disiunction you please; and if it be hereticall to affirme, that it is in the free power of the will to choose whether part of the disiunction we please, the whole disiunction, or disiunctiue proposition implying such a condition, or free election, without doubt is hereticall.’
‘19. Now that this disiunction [or] being placed in the aforesaid proposition is in common sense, according to our English phrase, equivalent toThe Latine word aequi-pollet in this place of my Theolog. Disputation is not well translated into English it doth import, it should be, it is equiualent. a copulation, or such a disiunction, which leaueth a free power in the Subjects to choose whether part they will, that is to depose the King, or if they please, to murther him, will most euidently appeare, if both in common speech, and also in the lawes of the Realme, we diligently consider the proper, and vsuall signification of this word [may] when there followeth the coniunction disiunctiue [or]. And this may be shewed by almost innumerable examples, whereof some of them wee will here set downe. As for example: you may stay here, or depart. You may eate or drinke. You may buy wine or oyle. You may goe to such a place by land, or by water. You may buy that land in fee-farme, or by lease. The King by vertue of an Act of Parliament may take of conuicted Popish Recusants twenty pounds for euery moneth, or the third part of all their lands. The Sheriefe may presently hang a theife condemned to die, or delay his death for some small time. If any person hold any lands of an other Lord, then of the King, by Knights seruice, hee may giue, dispose, or assure by his last will, and testament, two parts of the said lands holden by Knights seruice, or of as much thereof as shall amount to the full yearely valew of two parts. If a man by his last will and testament ordaine, that his Executors may bestow twenty pounds vpon the poore, or repaire such a bridge, it is in the free power of the Executors, [Page 13] to choose whether of those two they please. Finally in clauses of reuocation, where the words are, that one may by any deed in his life time, or by his last will and testament reuoke the said vses, and limit new, it is in his power and choice to doe it by the one, or by the other, as he shall please. And in infinite such like examples the verb [may] implieth a free power to choose either part of the disiunction one pleaseth, neither can there scarcely be alledged any one example, wherein the coniunction disiunctiue [or] immediately following the verbe [may] is not so taken.’
‘20. Wherefore the plaine and vsuall meaning of the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Prpe, may be deposed, or murthered by their Subiects, or, which is all one, Subiects may depose, or murther their Princes being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope (for that in this last onely the verbe passiue is changed into the actiue) is, that it is in the free choice of the Subjects to depose, or if they will, to murther such Princes. So that if it be hereticall to affirme, as without doubt it is, that it is in the free power of Subjects to depose, or murther such Princes, because it is hereticall and against the expresse word of God to affirme, that they may murther them, the aforesaid position consisting of that disiunction is herepicall, and therefore it may without any danger at all of periurie be abiured as hereticall.’
‘21. From hence it may be gathered first, that according to the common, and vsuall vnderstanding of our English phrase, there is a great distinction betwixt these two verbs [may] and [can]. For [can] doth vsually signifie a power in generall, whether it be naturall, or morall, but [may] for the most part importeth a morall power, to wit, if it be vsed alone without any coniunction following it, most commonly it signifieth a lawfullnes to do the thing [Page 14] proposed: As, I may doe this, signifieth, that it is lawfull for mee to doe this: but if there follow it a a coniunction copulatiue, or disiunctiue, it implyeth a choice, or free power, to choose whether part of the disiunction, or copulation one will.’
‘Seeing therefore that the Latine verbe [possum] implyeth a power in generall, whether it bee naturall, or morall, and according to the thing affirmed or denyed, it is limited to a naturall or morall power: as in this proposition, Ignis potest comburere, The fire hath power to burne, it signifieth a naturall and necessary power in the fire to burne: and in this, potest homo eligo [...]e bonum, aut m [...]lum; A man hath power to choose good or euill, it signifieth a morall and free power: from hence it followeth, that this proposition, Subiects may depose or murther their Prince, being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, is not so properly and significantly translated into Latine by the verbe [possum] Sabditi possunt deponere aut occidere suum Principem excommunicatum &c. as by the substantiue of [possum] or by the verbe [permittitur] to wit, in potestate est subditorum, or permittitur subditis Principem suum excommunicatum, vel depriuatum per Pontificem, deponere aut occidere. It is in the power of Subiects, or it is permitted to Subiects, to depose or murther their Prince being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope. And therefore the Latine translation of this Oath, doth not by the verbe [possum] significantly expresse the proper and vsuall signification of the verbe [may] contained in the aforesaid Position, vnlesse either the coniunction copulatiue [and] be put in place of [or] to wit, Principes per Papam excommunicati vel depriuati possum per suos Subditos deponi & occidi, deposed and murthered, as Cardinall Bellarmine, and Antonius Capellus haue it in their bookes translated, or else there bee vnderstood a condition of the free-will to choose [Page 15] whether part of the disiunction they please, to wit, possunt deponi per suos Subditos, aut (si velint,) occidi, bee deposed, or (if the Subiects will) be murthered.’
‘23 Secondly from hence it is also gathered, that in a disiunctiue proposition, wherein is implyed a condition of the will to choose freely either part of the disiunction, it maketh all one sense, whether the coniunction copulatiue [and] or the disiunctiue [or] bee vsed: For both of them doe signifie a free power to choose which part one pleaseth: and so the coniunction disiunctiue hath in sense the vertue and force of a copulatiue, & the copulatiue of a disiunctiue. Wherfore when the ancient Fathers speak of our free-will, and doe affirme, that it is in our power to choose good or euill, they vse indifferently the coniunction disiunctiue [or] and the copulatiue [and] sometimes affirming that it is in our power to choose good or euill; other times that it is in our power to choose goood and euill. Yea Card. Bellarmine himselfe propounding in his Controuersies the question concerning free-will, doth confound [or] with [and], and taketh them for all one. There is a controuersie, 1 Tom. 4. Lib. 5, Chap, 13, in principio. saith he betwixt Catholikes and heretikes, whether a man in the state of corrupt nature hath free-will to choose morall good, [and] to auoid euill, or which is all one, to obserue [or] breake morall precepts.’
‘24. Seeing therefore that in this proposition, Princes being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, or, which is all one, Subiects may depose or murther their Prince beeing excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, the verbe [may] doth import a free power in the Subiects to choose which part of the disiunction they please, that is, to depose such Princes, or, if they please, to murder them, it maketh all one sense, whether it bee said, Princes may be deposed or murthered, by their subiects, or Princes may bee deposed and murthered [Page 16] by their Subiects, as Card. Bellarmine, and Antonius Cappellus, putting the Coniunction copulatiue [and] do seeme to haue well obserued, and to be of opinion, that the aforesaid disiunctiue proposition is in very deed equiualent to a copulatiue, or such a conditionall disiunctiue, which vertually doth containe a copulatiue. And truely, if this pretended demonstration of this Author were so euident an argument, as hee imagineth it to be, to condemne this oath as sacrilegious, without doubt it could not haue escaped the most quick vnderstanding of Card. Bellarmine, who also would not haue neglected to produce any reason, which might clearly haue conuinced the oath to be apparantly vnlawfull.’
‘Now from this which hath bene said, it is easie to answer in forme to the aforesaid obiection, whose whole strength dependeth vpon the nature and quality of a disiunctiue proposition.’
‘Wherefore to the minor proposition it is answered, that it is hereticall and against the expresse word of God contayned in the aforesaid two texts of holy Scripture, to affirme, That Princes, which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, or any other, or, which is all one, that Subiects, or any other may depose or murther such Princes. For the plaine and common meaning of this proposition is, as I haue shewed before, that it is in the free power of subiects, or of any other, to depose such Princes, or, if they will, to murther them, which proposition is flat hereticall.’
‘26. And whereas it is obiected, that the aforesaid proposition, Princes which be excommunicated &c. is a disiunctiue, but to the veritie of a disiunctiue proposition, it is sufficient, that one part of the disiunction be true, and to make the whole disiunctiue proposition to be false and hereticall, it is necessary according to the most certaine rule of the Logicians, [Page 17] that both parts of the disiunction be false and hereticall.’
‘It is answered first to the Minor, that although in externall sound the aforesaid proposition, Princes which be excommunicated &c. seeme to be a disiunctiue, yet in very deede, and according to the plaine and common vnderstanding of our English phrase, it is, as I haue already shewed, equiualent to a copulatiue, to the veritie of which it is necessary, that both parts of the copulation be true, and to make the whole copulatiue proposition to be false and hereticall, it sufficeth, that one onely part of the copulalation be false and hereticall. Now that one part of the aforesaid proposition, to wit, that Princes which bee excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be murthered by their Subiects, or any other, is flat hereticall, it is too too manifest.’
‘27 But least we should seeme to contend about bare words, I answer secondly, and grant, that the aforesaid proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated, &c. is a disiunctiue; But then the Minor proposition is to bee distinguished. For when the Logicians affirme, that to the verity of a disiunctiue proposition it is sufficient, that one part of the disiunction be true, and to make the whole disiunctiue to be hereticall, it is necessary that both parts of the disiunction be hereticall, that approued rule of the Logicians is to be vnderstood of an absolute disiunctiue, to wit, which doth not vertually containe in it a condition, or free power in the will to choose whether part one pleaseth: For to the verity of this conditionall disiunctiue it is necessary, that both parts of the disiunction may be chosen, and if it be hereticall to affirme, that it is in the free choise of any man to chuse whether part of the disiunction he pleaseth, the whole disiunctiue proposition is hereticall. Now that it is hereticall to affirme, that it is in the free power [Page 18] of Subiects to depose, or if they will, to murther Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, no man can call in question.’
‘Neuerthelesse the Author of this Dialogue doth seeme to deale somewhat cunningly, and endeauoureth not so much to impugne directly the affirmatiue proposition, which is expresly contained in the Oath, and to proue directly, that the aforesaid position, Princes being excommunicated &c. may be deposed or murthered, not to be hereticall, as the oath affirmeth it to be; but he flyeth from the affirmatiue to the negatiue, and indeauoureth to shew, that the contradictorie proposition, to wit, Princes being excommunicated &c. cannot be deposed or murdered &c. is not certaine of faith, nor contained in the expresse word of God; from whence he concludeth, that therefore the former affirmatiue proposition, which is in expresse words contayned in the Oath, is not hereticall, because in what degree of falshood any position is false, in the opposite degree of truth the contradictory must be true.’
‘29. But this Author by his manner of arguing seemeth desirous to shun the difficulty, and to impugne a proposition, which is more cleare and manifest, by an other more obscure and equiuocall, which among Logicians is accounted a great defect in arguing; whose nature is to proue one thing lesse manifest by an other more apparant. For the falshood of this affirmatiue proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, or which is all one, Subiects may depose or murther such Princes, who be excommunicated &c. is more cleare and manifest in the common vnderstanding of our English phrase, then is the truth of this negatiue, Subiects may not depose or murther such Princes, who be excommunicated &c. by reason of the negatiue aduerb [not] which as the Logicians say, is [Page 19] of a malignant nature; for that it destroyeth, or denyeth whatsoeuer followeth after it, making an affirmatiue to be a negatiue, and a negatiue to be an affirmatiue, an vniuersall to be a particular, and a particular to be an vniuersall.As this vniuersall affirmatiue proposition, all men are sensible, is by putting not in the begining, not all men are sensible, made, a particular negatiue. So that the meaning of the aforesaid negatiue proposition, is by reason of that negatiue aduerbe [not] made ambiguous, and may haue this sense, that Subiects may neither depose nor murther such Princes, who be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope: which proposition so vnderstood, is not of faith,, neither in very deed contradictory to the proper and vsuall meaning of the former affirmatiue, which is abiured in the Oath. And therefore no meruaile that this Author was desirous to fly from the affirmatiue to the negatiue.’
‘30. Supposing therefore, that contradiction, according to the approued doctrine of Aristotle, Lib. 1. de interpretat. Cap. 4. is an affirming and denying of the selfe same thing, in the selfe same manner, I answere, that this negatiue position, Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may not be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, is contradictory to that affirmatiue position, which is abiured in the Oath, if the verbe [may] be taken in the same manner, or sense in the negatiue, as it is taken in the affirmatiue: And then as the affirmatiue is hereticall, so the negatiue is of Faith. For as the sense of the affirmatiue is, as I haue shewed before, that it is in the free choise of Subiects either to depose such Princes who be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, or if they will, to murther them, which is false, hereticall, and against those expresse words of Scripture, Thou shalt not kill, Kill him not &c. So the sense of the negatiue contradictory must be, that it is not in the free choice of Subiects to depose such Princes, or if they please, to murther them; which proposition is most true, and contained in the expresse word of God, because it is not in their free power [Page 20] to murther them, as is manifest by the former places of holy Scripture.’
31. And thus much concerning the first and principall Answer, which I thought good to set downe at large, both for that the Reader may the better iudge of my Answer, and also of M. Fitzherberts Reply, who taketh no other particular exception against the Oath, besides the generall Doctrine concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, which he will needs haue to bee a poynt of faith, and therefore not to bee denyed by any Catholike, and also for that there be some Catholikes, who although they be of opinion, as was the Author of that English Dialogue, that there is nothing against faith contained in the oath, and that the Doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is not a poynt of faith, but in Controuersie among Catholikes, notwithstanding the Popes Breues, or any other decree of Pope or Councell, which are vrged to the contrary, yet they can hardly be perswaded, but that by reason of that word [hereticall] that clause of the Oath is vnlawfull and cannot bee taken without periury, as the Author of that Dialogue did by the aforesaid Argument pretend to demonstrate.
32 Now you shall see what exceptions M. Fitzherbert taketh against this my Answer. First hee saith,nu. 10. that I contend de lana caprina, and labour in vaine to proue, that the English word [may] in a disiunctiue proposition implyeth a freedome to choose whether part we list of the disiunction, wherein also by the way he saith, that I abuse strangers in seeking to perswade them, that the Latine verbe [possunt] in the Latine Translation of the Oath, doth not sufficiently expresse the nature of the English word [may] in this clause, Principes per Papam excommunicati vel depriuati possunt per suos subditos, vel alios quoscunque, deponi aut occidi: Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, or any other whatsoeuer.
[Page 13]33 But first who seeth not, that this question, to wit whether this proposition, Princes which are excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may bee deposed or murthered by their Subiects, or any other, be such a disiunctiue proposition which implyeth a free election in the Subiects or others, to choose whether they will depose or murther such Princes, is both a question of great moment, and not de lana caprina, & also that I haue not laboured in vaine to proue, but by the common vnderstanding of the words in vsuall speech and in the lawes of our Realme, sufficiently proued that the verbe [may] in an affirmatiue disiunctiue proposition, when there followeth the coniunction disiunctiue [or] implyeth a freedome to choose whether part of the disiunction wee list, as by many examples both in common speech, and by the lawes of our Realme I haue cleerely conuinced; neither can there scarcely be alleadged any one example, wherein the coniunction disiunctiue [or] immediatly following the verbe [may] in an affirmatiue proposition doth not imply a free election to choose which part of the disiunction we please.
34. Secondly, it is not true, that I haue abused the Latine Reader in seeking to perswade him, that the Latine verbe [possunt] in the Latine Translation of the Oath, doth not sufficiently expresse the proper and vsuall signification of the verbe [may] contained in the aforesaid position, vnlesse either the coniunction copulatiue [et] bee put in place of [aut], as Card. Bellarmine, Anton. Capellus, & now lastly F. Suarez haue it in their bookes translated, or else there be vnderstood a condition of the free will to choose in that clause [deposed or murthered by their Subiects] which part of the disiunction the Subiects please: But M. Fitzherbert rather abuseth his English Readers, who vnderstand not Latine in affirming the contrary. For the Latine verbe [possum] doth by his proper signification, as I haue said, import a power in generall, whether it bee naturall [Page 22] or morall, and according to the matter it is limited to a naturall or morall power: but the verbe [may] is by his proper signification limited onely to a morall or free power: free I meane, not as free is all one with morall, but if there follow the coniunction copulatiue or disiunctiue, to choose whether part of the disiunction wee please: and if the verbe [may] doe sometimes signifie a naturall power, as in this, the fire may burne wood or straw, it is by reason of the matter, or of the thing affirmed, or denyed, and not by vertue of the proper and vsuall signification of the verbe [may]: And howsoeuer, when the verbe [may] goeth before the coniunction disiunctiue [or] it doth properly and vsually signifie a choice, freedome, or indifferency to take either part of the disiunction.
35. But marke here the cunning (I dare not say fraude, and falsehood of my Aduersary, for that hee checked mee before for falling very foule vpon him in saying that he affirmed that which was false, as though forsooth all that hee affirmeth, I must take for true) in abusing both me and his Reader. For whereas, saith he, the great mysterie of [may] is no other, as Widdrington himselfe expoundeth it, but that it signifieth in that clause a morall or lawfull, and not a physicall, or naturall power, who is so senslesse, if he be a Latinist, that doth not vnderstand so much by the word [possunt] in the Latine translation of that clause, I meane that it signifieth a morall and not a naturall power? Yea and that according to the axiome of the law, Hoc possumus quod iure possumus, wee may doe that, which wee may lawfully doe? To what purpose then doth hee abuse his Latine Reader with such a long, and impertinent discourse, as he maketh here, touching the difference betwixt [possunt] in Latine, and [may] in English, as if in this case and question there were some great diuersitie.
36. See now his sleight: For when I did affirme, that the difference betwixt the English word [may] [Page 23] and the Latine [possum] was, that [possum] doth properly signifie a power in generall, whether it be naturall or morall, and [may] doth properly signifie a morall and free power, I spake of a morall power in generall, and that briefly without any such long discourse, as you haue seene, but when I spake of this clause of the oath, [may be deposed or murthered] I did not speake of a morall or lawfull power in generall, but in particular of such a morall or lawfull power, which implieth a freedome to choose which part of the disiunction we please. And therefore Master Fitzherbert saith vntruly abusing therein both me and his Reader, that I doe make no other mysterie of [may] in this clause of the oath, but that it signifieth a morall or lawfull, and not a physicall or naturall power. For I make this mysterie of [may] that whensoeuer there followeth it the coniunction [or] as it doth in this clause of the oath, it doth signifie not onely a morall, or lawfull power in generall, but in particular such a morall, or lawfull power, which implieth a free choice to take which part of the disiunction wee list. Which if my Aduersary will likewise grant of the Latine verbe [possum] we shall quickly be at an agreement concerning this clause of the oath, to wit, that I may truely and lawfully abiure as hereticall this damnable doctrine, and conditionall disiunctiue position, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed, or murthered by their Subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, although one part onely of the disiunction be hereticall.
37. But the truth is, that Master Fitzherbert will not seeme directly, and in expresse words to admit, (although by those examples of propositions which hee himselfe beneath doth bring it may cleerely be gathered) that the word [may] doth in this clause of the oath signifie such a morall, or free power, which implyeth a free choice to take which part of the disiunction we please: and therefore hee maketh a long discourse [Page 24] (I dare not say impertinent) and which hath bin already answeared by mee in my Theologicall Disputation, whereby hee would seeme to ouerthrow my answeare; and therevpon hee called that disiunction, which I made betwixt a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which implieth a freedome and condition of the will to choose which part of the disiunction we list, and an absolute disiunctiue, which implieth no such choice, a friuolous euasion, and an extrauagant interpretation.
38, Obserue now, good Reader, how insufficiently this man doth impugne my answeare. But let vs see, saith hee,Nu. 11. What Widdrington proueth by all this. Hee hath tould vs, that the coniunction [or] is sometimes taken for the copulatiue [and] especially when it followeth the verbe [may] because then the proposition is not absolutely disiunctiue, but conditionall, including a free election of either part of the disiunction, whereof hee alledgeth some examples out of the Fathers, yea out of Card. Bellarmine himselfe. But what is this to the purpose? Will hee say, that because [or] is vsed in those places for [and] ergo it is alwaies so vsed? me thinkes hee should be ashamed so to argue; for besides that his argument would be most vicious, hee might be conuinced by infinite examples of propositions, wherein the disiunctiue coniunction [or] is not taken for the copulatiue [and] although the verbe [may] goeth before it, yea though there be also freedome of election to choose either part of the disiunction, as if wee should say, It is impious and hereticall to hold, that God may be denied, or blasphemed by his creatures. It is not lawfull to teach, that a Priest may eate or drinke before he say Masse. It is folly for a man to thinke, that he may trauell by Sea or Land, without money. It is a shame for a Souldier to say, that hee may yeeld or flie vpon small occasion.
39 In these and infinite other such propositions Nu. 12. (which might be added if it were needfull) [or] is not taken for [and] but is an absolute disiunctiue coniunction, notwithstanding [Page 25] that [may] goeth before it, and that there is also free election to choose whether part of the disiunction a man will; yea (which is specially to be obserued for our purpose) whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part, is also affirmed of the other; as for example, It is impious and hereticall, whethersoeuer a man hold that God may be denyed, or blasphemed; It is as vnlawfull to teach, that a Priest may drinke, as that he may eate before hee say Masse; it is no lesse folly to thinke, that a man may trauell by Sea, then by land without money; It is no lesse shame for a Souldier to say, that he may yeeld, then that hee may fly vpon small occasion: And the very like wee say also of the proposition now in question, to wit, that [or] in the words deposed or murthered, is no copulatiue, but a meere disiunctiue coniunction, and that the doctrine of deposing Princes is abiured therein as impious and hereticall, no lesse then the doctrine of murthering them, notwithstanding that the word [may] doth goe before [or] and that a man may choose whether part he will of the disiunction.
40. So as you see, nu. 13. that neither his examples of propositions, wherein the disiunctiue is taken for the copulatiue, nor his distinction of absolute disiunctiues, and conditionall doe proue any more, but that sometimes [or] is taken for [and] and that in some disiunctiue propositions, wherein the word [may] goeth before [or] the affirmation is not referred alike to both parts of the disiunction: and therefore against vs he hath proued nothing at all, vnlesse hee can make good this inference, It is sometimes so, ergo it is alwaies so, which I am sure hee will not say for shame. And as for the Latine translation of the oath in Card. Bellarmine and Capellus, in the which wee reade deponi et occidi, where the coniunction copulatiue [and] is vsed for the disiunctiue [or] it little importeth, for that it was an error of him, that translated the same out of the English, which they vnderstood not, and therefore must needs take it, as it was giuen them. Thus M Fitzherbert.
[Page 26]41. But what sincerity can the Reader expect from this mans hands, when in a controuersie of such great moment, as is this concerning our obedience due to God and Caesar, hee dealeth so corruptly? For first hee would make his Reader beleeue, that I affirme, the coniunction disiunctiue [or] in this clause of the oath not to be a meere, and absolute disiunctiue coniunction, but a copulatiue, and that the coniunction [or] is taken for [and] as though I should affirme, that the proposition is not in very deede a disiunctiue, but a pure copulatiue proposition; and that vnlesse [or] be taken for [and] the said proposition, Princes, which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects or any other, would not be hereticall: Whereas I meane no such thing; neither did I euer say, that [or] in this proposition is taken for [and] or that this proposition is not a true, and proper disiunctiue proposition.
42. But that which I affirmed was, that [or] in this proposition is equivalent to [and,] and that although the proposition by reason of that coniunction [or] may seeme to be such a pure and absolute disiunctiue proposition, to the verity whereof, according to the Logicians rule, is onely required, that one part of the disiunction be true, and to make the whole proposition false and hereticall both parts of the disiunction must be false and hereticall, yet according to the common sense and meaning of the words it is not in very deed, and according to our English phrase such a pure and absolute disiunctiue proposition, but it is a conditionall disiunctiue, which importeth a free choice to take which part of the disiunction we please, which conditionall disiunctiue proposition is equiualent to a copulatiue, or which is all one, followeth the nature and conditions not of an absolute and common disiunctiue proposition, whereof the Logicians treate, but of a copulatiue proposition, to the verity whereof according to the Logicians rule, it is contrariwise required, that both parts of the copulatiue, or conditionall disiunction, be true, and [Page 27] to make the whole proposition false and hereticall it sufficeth that one onely part be false and hereticall: And that therefore in this conditionall disiunctiue proposition it maketh all one sense, for as much as concerneth the truth or falsehood of the proposition, whether the coniunction copulatiue [and] or the disiunctiue [or] be vsed, although the force of the proposition be by the vulgar sort more easily perceiued, if the coniunction copulatiue [and] then if the disiunctiue [or] be vsed.
43. Wherefore I doe not affirme, that the coniunction disiunctiue [or] in this clause of the oath is not an absolute disiunctiue coniunction (for I doe not make two sorts of disiunctiue coniunctions, to wit, absolute and conditionall) or that [or] in this clause is taken for [and] as my Aduersary would perswade his Reader; but that which I say is, that the proposition is not an absolute disiunctiue proposition, but a conditionall disunctiue, and which implieth a free power to take which part of the disiunction we please, and that therefore, for as much as concerneth the truth or falshood of the proposition, it is equiualent to a copulatiue proposition, and followeth the nature and condition of a copulatiue, and that it hath the same sense, whether the coniunction copulatiue [and] or the disiunctiue [or] be vsed.
44. Secondly, it is too too cleare, that I did not argue in that absurd & childish manner, as my Adversary would make his Reader belieue I doe, It is sometimes so, therefore it is alwaies so; or thus, the coniunction disiunctiue [or] is sometime taken for the copulatiue [and] therefore in this clause of the Oath it is taken so. But I argued thus: The coniunction disiunctiue [or] when it followeth the verbe [may] is not onely sometimes, but vsually and commonly (I did not say taken) but equiualent to the coniunction copulatiue [and] for that then the proposition according to the common sense and vnderstanding of the words is not an absolute disiunctiue, but a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which includeth a [Page 28] free condition of the will to choose either part of the disiunction, and therefore hath the same sense, whether the coniunction disiunctiue, or the copulatiue be vsed: therefore in this clause of the oath, Princes may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, it ought so to be taken, for that by an expresse clause wee are bound to take the Oath and euery part thereof plainly and sincerely, according to the common sense and vnderstanding of the words. That it is in common sense a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, implying a free election to take either part of the disiunction, and consequently equiualent to a copulatiue proposition, I proued by very many examples both in common speech, and in the lawes of this Realme: and in the end I added, that in infinite such like examples the verb [may] implyeth a free power to chuse either part of the disiunction we please: neither can there be scarcely alleaged any one example (speaking of affirmatiue propositions) wherein the coniunction [or] immediately following the verbe [may] is not so taken.
45 From whence I inferred, that in a disiunctiue proposition, wherein is implied a condition of the will to choose freely either part of the disiunction, it maketh the same sense, whether the coniunction copulatiue, [and] or the disiunctiue [or] be vsed: for both of them doe import a free election to take which part one pleaseth, and so the coniunction disiunctiue hath in sense the vertue of a copulatiue, and the copulatiue the vertue of a disiunctiue. And this I confirmed both by the authority of the ancient Fathers, and also of Card. Bellarmine himselfe, who doe confound [and] with [or] and [or] with [and] in propositions which doe imply a free election to choose which part they will. What good dealing then is this of my Aduersaries to frame my argument in that absurd, and ridiculous manner, it is sometimes so, ergo it is alwaies so, and also to corrupt my words and meaning, as you haue seene he hath done?
[Page 29]46. And albeit I doe remit the Reader to Felinus Azor, and Salas, where they may see some examples, that a coniunction disiunctiue, euen in absolute disiunctiue propositions is sometimes taken for a copulatiue, and a copulatiue for a disiunctiue, it was not to draw an argument from thence, that therefore either alwaies, or in this clause of the Oath, it was so to be taken, but it was onely to shewe, that seeing it is not strange, euen in absolute disiunctiue propositions, whereof those Authors did chiefely treat, that [and] should not onely be equiualent, but be also taken for [or] and [or] for [and] therefore they ought not to meruaile, that in conditionall disiunctiues [or] should be, I doe not say taken, but equiualent to [and] and [and] to [or]. But the argument, which I brought to prooue, that in this clause of the Oath, the coniunction disiunctiue [or] is equiualent to the copulatiue [and] was taken from the plaine and vsuall sense of our English phrase, and from the common vnderstanding of our English lawes, wherin the coniunction disiunctiue [or] following the verbe [may] doth commonly imply a free election to take which part of the disiunction we please, and which consequently is equiualent to a copulatiue, therefore in this clause of the Oath, which I am bound to take according to the common sense of the words, it ought so to be taken: This was my argument.
47 Thirdly, obserue how inconsiderately M. Fitzherbert bringeth here foure examples of propositions to confute my answere, which neuerthelesse doe most clearely confirme the same. For in all of them the coniunction [or] is equiualent to the copulatiue [and] and it maketh all one sense whether [and] or [or] be vsed. As for example, God may be denyed or blasphemed by his Creatures. A Priest may eat or drinke before hee say Masse. A man may trauell by Sea or by land without mony. A Soldier may yeeld or fly vpon small occasion. In all these foure examples, wherein my Aduersary himselfe [Page 24] granteth a freedome of election to choose whether part of the disiunction a man will, to be implyed, the coniunction disiunctiue [or] for as much as concerneth the truth or falshood of the Propositions, is equiualent to the copulatiue [and], and the propositions haue all one sense: whether the coniunction [and], or the coniunction [or] be vsed: And so it is all one sense whether we say that God may bee denyed or blasphemed by his Creatures, or that God may be denyed and blasphemed by his Creatures, that a Priest may eat or drinke before hee say Masse, or that a Priest may eat and drinke before hee say Masse, and so of the rest: For the sense of them all is, that they may choose this part or that part of the disiunction, or this part and that part of the disiunction, as they will: And so the sense of the first proposition is, that it is in the free power and choice of Creatures to denie, or blaspheme God, or to denie God and also to blaspheme him if they will: and of the second that it is in the free power of a Priest to eat or to drinke, or to eat, and, if he please, to drinke before he say Masse, and so of the rest. By which it is euident, that in all of them it maketh the same sense, whether the coniunction [and] or the coniunction [or] bee vsed: and so in all of them the coniunction disiunctiue is equiualent to a copulatiue, and the copulatiue to a disiunctiue.
48 Lastly albeit that which M. Fitzherbert doth specially obserue for his purpose, be true, to wit, that in all those foure examples, which he hath brought, whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction is also affirmed of the other, notwithstanding that there be also free election to choose which part of the disiunction a man will: as for example, it is impious and hereticall whether soeuer a man hold that God may bee denyed, or that hee may bee blasphemed by his Creatures, it is as vnlawfull to teach that a Priest may drinke as that he may eat before hee say Masse, and so of the rest: from whence he would inferre the like, that also in this clause of the Oath, the [Page 31] doctrine of deposing Princes is no lesse abiured as hereticall then the doctrine of murthering them: neuerthelesse this his obseruation maketh nothing at all for his purpose, vnlesse it be to bewray his owne ignorance, and want of Logick, whiles hee doth not perceiue what is truely affirmed of both parts of an hypotheticall proposition by vertue of the forme, and what by vertue onely of the matter. For although in all those foure propositions, which he hath brought, it bee true that the same impiety, heresie, vnlawfulnes, folly or shame, which is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction, be also affirmed of the other, yet this is not true by vertue of the forme of the proposition consisting of a disiunctiue coniunction, which implyeth a choice to take which part of the disiunction a man will; but it is true by reason onely of the matter, for that the same thing which is affirmed of the whole or entire disiunctiue proposition, may bee also affirmed seuerally of either part of the disiunction: For it is hereticall to hold, that God may be denyed by his Creatures, and likewise it is also hereticall to hold, that God may be blasphemed by his Creatures, and so or the rest. But let him alter the matter, and keepe the same forme, that is the same disiunctiue coniunction, which implyeth a free choice to take which part of the disiunction a man will, and then hee will quickly perceiue how fowly hee is mistaken, and how insufficiently he hath confuted my Answer.
49 As for example, let vs alter the matter of his foure propositions, and keepe the same forme, that is keep the same disiunctiue coniunction implying a choice to take which part of the disiunction one wil, & say, that it is impious and hereticall to hold, that God may be honoured or blasphemed by his creatures. It is not lawfull to teach that a Priest may sleepe or eat before hee say Masse. It is folly for a man to thinke that hee may trauell by Sea or by Land with the like danger. It is a shame for a Captaine to say, that hee may fight or flye, when his Band is assaulted [Page 32] by the Enemy. All these and infinite other such propositions (which might bee added if it were needfull) are true by reason of one onely part of the disiunction: And the reason is generall and common to all conditionall disiunctiue propositions: for that a disiunctiue proposition which implyeth a free election to take which part of the disiunction one pleaseth, is, I doe not say sometimes, but alwaies equiualent to a copulatiue, and followeth the nature of a copulatiue, to the verity whereof, as I haue shewed before, it is required that both parts be true, and to make the whole or entire proposition to bee false and hereticall, it sufficeth, that one onely part bee false and hereticall: and that therefore it doth not follow by force of the forme, nature, and conditions of a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, but onely by reason of the matter, that whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction is also affirmed of the other.
50 Seeing therefore that this proposition, Subiects may depose or murther their Prince being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, implieth a free election to choose which part of the disiunction we please, and it is hereticall to affirme, that Subiects may murther such a Prince, I may truely, lawfully, and without any periurie abiure that proposition as hereticall, although the doctrine onely of murthering such Princes should be hereticall, and not the doctrine of deposing them, whereof neuerthelesse wee will treat beneathNu. 106. & seq.. So as you see, that none of all M. Fitzherberts examples maketh for him, but all are flat against him, and that it is not true, that I doe argue in this ridiculous manner, It is sometimes so, therefore it is alwaies so, or therefore it is now so, which were to argue ex puris particularibus, from pure particular propositions, which kind of arguing all Logicians account to be very vicious: But I argue thus: The words are commonly taken so, therefore I, who am bound to take the oath, and euery clause thereof according to the common sense of the words, am bound to take [Page 33] this clause of the oath so, which manner of arguing to be good, I am sure he will not deny for shame.
51. But my Aduersary little perceiueth, how hee himselfe falleth into that vice of arguing, whereof he vntruely accuseth me to wit, It is sometimes so, therefore it is alwaies so, or therefore it is now so. For he pretendeth to proue, that because in those foure conditionall disiunctiue propositions, and many such like, whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction, is also affirmed of the other, notwithstanding that there be also free election to choose whether part of the disiunction a man will, which is onely true in some particular propositions, and that onely by reason of the matter and not by vertue of the forme and quality of the conditionall disiunctiue proposition, therefore in this clause of the oath, because hereticall is affirmed of the doctrine to murther Princes, it must also be affirmed of the doctrine to depose them, which is to argue ex puris particularibus, from pure particular propositions, and is all one to say, it is sometimes so, therefore it is now so. But my manner of arguing is from a vniuersall proposition to inferre a particular, to wit, that because in euery conditionall disiunctiue proposition implying a choice, &c, by vertue of the forme, it is sufficient to make the whole proposition false and hereticall, that one onely part of the disiunction be false and hereticall, and consequently it is sufficient, that hereticall be affirmed of the one part, and not of the other, although sometimes by reason of the matter it may be affirmed of both, therefore in this particular disiunctiue proposition, Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects or any other, it is sufficient to make the whole proposition hereticall, that one onely part of the disiunction be hereticall, and that therefore the doctrine to murther such Princes may be abiured as hereticall, without abiuring as hereticall the doctrine to depose them.
[Page 34]52. And what man is there so simple, who may not presently perceiue, that in the very same manner, and by the same foure examples which my Aduersary bringeth to impugne my interpretation of those words [deposed or murthered] hee might argue, if the words were, [deposed and murthered] and in those his foure examples of propositions [or] were changed into [and] wherby they would be made copulatiue, and not disiunctiue propositions? For then also whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part, would also be affirmed of the other: As it is impious and hereticall to hold, that God may be denied and blasphemed by his creatures. It is vnlawfull to teach, that a Priest may eate, and drinke before hee say Masse, and so of the rest: And yet if he haue any skill in Logike, as in truth I thinke hee hath but little, hee will be ashamed to inferre from thence, that therefore in copulatiue propositions, whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part is also affirmed of the other: for that in a false and hereticall copulatiue proposition, it sufficeth, according to the Logicians rule, that one onely part be false and hereticall: which plainly sheweth how viciously he confuteth my interpretation of those words [deposed or murthered] ex puris particularibus, from some particular examples of propositions, which are onely true by reason of the matter, not regarding what is generally, and alwaies required by vertue of the forme, and nature of the conditionall disiunctiue proposition to make the whole proposition true, or false, of faith or hereticall, howsoeuer truth, falshood, or heresie may be affirmed seuerally of one only, or of both parts of the disiunction.
53. And whereas M. Fitzherbert affirmeth, that Card. Bellarmine, and Capellus were in the translation of those words [deposed and murthered] deceiued by the error of him, who translated the Oath out of English into Latin, I am content to take it at this time for an answere, for that I doe not relie vpon their authority in this poynt, but vpon the common vnderstanding [Page 35] of all men, who in a conditionall disiunctiue proposition make [or] equiualent to [and] and [and] to [or]. Neuerthelesse this I must needs say, that it might be perchance an error of the Printer, which also if it had bene, me thinkes that Card. Bellarmine, Capellus, or Fa. Suarez would haue noted it among the errors, if they had accounted it for any great errour, or to haue cleane altered the sense of the proposition, as this man would make it; but that it should be an error of the Translator I can hardly be perswaded. And my reason is, because it seemeth, that there was but one onely translation of the Oath out of English, which is extant in publike writings, from which all those writers, who haue set downe the oath in Latin, haue taken it, as first the Pope in his Breue, then Card. Bellarmine, Fa. Gretzer, Capellus, and now lastly Suarez. For that in none of all these Writers the translation of the Oath is in any point different, either so much as in any one word, or the placing of a word, except in those words [deposed or murthered] which is morally impossible, if there had bene diuers translations. Now in the Popes Breue, and likewise in Gretzer, and in one Edition of Card. Bellarmines booke against his Maiesties Apologie, we read [deposed or murthered] but in other Editions of the same booke, in Capellus, and now lastly in Suarez, we read [deposed and murthered] which is a signe, that is was an error rather of the Printer, then of the Translator, & also that the error was not great, & much regarded by them, for that the sense of the proposition is all one whether wee read [deposed or murthered] or [deposed and murthered] it being a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, implying a free choise to take both parts of the disiunction, which therefore for as much as concerneth the truth or falshood of the proposition, hath the same sense, whether the coniunction copulatiue [and] or the disiunctiue [or] be vsed, as I haue shewed before.
[Page 36]54 But now forsooth M. Fitzherbert will cleare all this difficulty, and make it manifest out of my owne grounds, that the doctrine of the d [...]position of Princes, is abiured in the Oath as impious and hereticall, no lesse then the doctrine of murthering them; for hitherto he hath so cleared the difficulty, as you haue seene, that I could not haue desired more cleare and fit examples of propositions, to confirme my interpretation of those words [deposed or murthered] then which he himselfe hath brought to impugne it. Thus therefore he writeth.Nu. 14. 15 16.
55. But to cleare all this difficulty, and to make it manifest, that the doctrine of the deposition of Princes is abiured in the Oath as impious and hereticall, no lesse then the supposed doctrine of murthering them, I shall need no other testimony or proofe thereof, then such as may be taken from the Oath it selfe, considered euen according to those rules, which Widdrington himselfe hath laid downe for the interpretation of it in the very first chapter of his Theological disputation,Nu 7. where he professeth to approue, & follow the doctrine of SuarezLib. 6. de leg. cap. 1. in that point, as being conforme to the common opinion of Lawyers and Diuines. Now then he teacheth there out of Suarez, that if there be any doubt or question concerning the sense of a law, or any part thereof, three thinges are specially to be pondered for the exposition of it, to wit, the words of the Law, the minde or intention of the Law-maker, and the reason or end of the Law; and the same he saith are also to be considered for the clearing of any difficulty or doubt in the Oath.
56. As for the words of the Law (and consequently of the Oath) he saith, that they are to be vnderstood according to their proper, and vsuall signification; and the reason is, saith Suarez, because words are so to be vsed in common speech, and much more in Lawes, which ought to be cleare; but it is euident, that the words of the clause now in question, being taken in their vsuall and proper [Page 37] signification, doe make clearely for vs, wherein I dare bouldly ap [...]eale to the iudgement of any discreet Reader; for albeit such a sense, as Widdrington imagineth, may be picked or rather wringed out of th [...]se words, yet no man at the first sight will, or can reasonably conceiue any thing else thereby, but that either part of the disiunctiue clause is abiured alike.
57. For although the coniunction [or] is sometimes taken for a copulatiue, yet it is commonly a disiunctiue, and hath that signification diuers times euen in this oath; as any man may see, that list to obserue it: As for example (to omit all the rest which might be vrged to this purpose) the very next words before deposed or murthered, are excōmunicated or depriued, wherein it is cleare, that [or] hath the ordinarie and proper signification of a disiunctiue, giuing to vnderstand, that whether Princes be onely excommunicated, or depriued also of their right to their States by the Pope, it is impious and hereticall doctrine to teach, that they may be either deposed or murthered. Also the same is to be noted in the words immediatly following, to wit, by their Subiects or any other, wherein it is signified, that neither Subiects, nor yet any other may depose or murther Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope: and the like may bee exemplified in the other clauses of the Oath, at least thirty times, for so often I doe find the coniunction [or] therein, and alwaies vsed properly for a disiunctiue, as also I dare say it is vsed in like maner, and in the same sense, aboue a hundred times in the same Statute. Thus M. Fitzherbert.
58 Now you shall see how well he hath cleered this difficulty. His Argument if it bee reduced to a syllogisticall forme is this. The words of euery law (and consequently of this Oath) are according to Suarez, whose doctrine I approue heerein, to bee taken in their proper and vsuall signification, but those words, [deposed or murthered, &c.] according to their proper and vsuall signification doe signifie, that the supposed Doctrine of murthering [Page 38] Princes, and of deposing them, is abiured alike, therefore in the aforesaid clause, I abhorre, detest and abiure, &c. the doctrine of deposing, and of murthering Princes which bee excommunicated, &c. are both abiured as hereticall. The Minor hee proueth two wayes, first by appealing to the iudgement of euery discreet man, who at the first sight can reasonably conceiue nothing else, but that either part of that disiunctiue clause is abiured alike. Secondly for that although the Coniunction [or] bee sometimes taken for a copulatiue, yet it is commonly a disiunctiue, and hath the ordinary and proper signification of a disiunctiue, and in this oath; wherein it is found at least thirty times, and in the same statute aboue a hundred times, it is alwaies vsed properly for a disiunctiue coniunction.
59 But first obserue, good Reader, those words of my Aduersary, [the suppos [...]d doctrine of murthering Princes:] For a little beneath u hee affirmeth, that murder implyeth alwaies an vnlawfull act, yea and a mortall sinne, whereby hee doth seeme to insinuate, that the Oath speaketh onely of murther in this sense, and supposeth that some Catholikes doe teach, that it is lawfull to murther Princes, as murther implyeth an vnlawfull act, whereas no Catholike can bee so ignorant as to imagine, much lesse to teach, that it is lawfull to doe an vnlawfull act, or to commit a mortall sinne, seeing that God himselfe cannot giue authority to murther any man, as murther implyeth an vnlawfull act, or a mortall sinne: Neither did his Maiesty, and the Parliament take murther only in this sense; but by the word [murthered] they vnderstood, that all killing of Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, was directly and absolutely an vnlawfull act, and they did suppose, that some Catholikes taught this doctrine, that the Pope, in order to spirituall good, might giue leaue to take away the liues of wicked and hereticall Princes by all those waies either publike; or secret and vnawares, by which [Page 39] temporall Princes, in order to temporall good, haue authority to take away the liues of rebellious subiects, who either cannot at all, or at least cannot without great preiudice to the publike good of the State, bee publikely apprehended or condemned.
60 And I would to God that this doctrine, were onely a supposed doctrine, and had neuer beene taught or approued by any Catholike. But alas it cleerely followeth from the doctrine and grounds for the Popes power to depriue Princes of all their temporall right and authority, as I most euidently did demonstrate in my Apologie nu. 43. & seq., to which my Argument D. Schulckenius Pag. 144 I answer (saith hee) that so many wordes are needlesse, for whither al these doe tend euery man seeth, neither is it hard to solue the Arguments, let them passe as not making to the matter. onely answereth with a transeat, or let it passe as impertinent to the matter; and the same is sufficiently confirmed by the same D. Schulckenius Pag. 413. 4 [...]0. in other places of his booke, and before him by Gregorius de Valentia Secunda secundae Disp. 1. q 12. [...]unc. 2. assertio secūda., Schioppius In his Ecclesiasticus cap. 42. pag 140., and now lately by Suarez, In d [...]f [...]es. fidei lib. 6. cap. 4. nu. 18. 20., for which cause principally his book was by a sollemne decree of the Parliament publikely condemned and burnt at Paris by the hangman, as containing damnable, pernicious, scandalous and seditious propositions, tending to the subuersion of States, and to induce the subiects of Kings and Soueraigne Princes, and others, to attempt against their sacred persons; neither is that Decree which was publ [...]shed and printed by the Kings authority, as yet recalled, or Suarez booke permitted by authority to be sold at Paris, howsoeuer some fauourers of the Iesuits doe not sticke to affirme heere among the common people. Yea and M. Fitzherbert himselfe, although hee will not (forsooth) meddle with the liues of Princes, yet boldly affirmeth,Cap. [...]. nu. 15. 16. 17. that the Pope hath power to take away my life, and hath power ouer the goods and liues of all Christians, which wordes beeing generall, and including all Christians, and consequently Christian Princes, according to his doctrine, as you shall see beneath,Part. 3. cap. 9. 10. doe cleerely shew what his opin on and iudgement is in this poynt, touching the killing [Page 40] also, or murdering of Christian Princes.
61. Now to his argument. First therefore his Maior proposition I doe willingly grant, to wit, that if there be any doubt or question concerning the sense of any law, or any part thereof, (and consequently for the cleering of any difficulty, or doubt in this oath) three things are specially to be pondered for the exposition of it, the words of the law, the mind or intention of the law-maker, and the reason or end of the law; and that the words of the law, and consequently of this oath, are to be vnderstood in their proper and vsuall signification, as also by a peculiar clause it is expressly ordained therein; And of this his Maior proposition no man maketh doubt.
62. But his Minor proposition I vtterly deny: and to his first proofe thereof, I answere as easily, but more fully with the like words, which hee himselfe vseth. For I affirme, that the contrary is euident, and that the words of this clause now in question do make clearely for vs, wherein I dare boldly appeale to the iudgement of any learned and discreet Reader, for that no man of any learning or iudgement, who knoweth the difference betwixt an absolute and conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which implieth a free choice to take either part of the disiunction, I doe not say, at the first sight, but after mature diliberation, and a diligent examination of all the words of this clause, and of the natures of an absolute and conditionall disiunctiue proposition, will, or can reasonably conceiue, that in a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which implyeth a freedome to choose which part of the disiunction one will, as is the proposition which is now in question, both parts of the disiunction must be abiured alike, for that to make the whole conditionall disiunctiue proposition to be hereticall, or to be abiured as hereticall, it sufficeth that one onely part of the disiunction be hereticall: as I may truly and lawfully abiure this proposition as hereticall, [Page 41] God may be honoured or blasphemed by his creatures, or, which is all one, it is in the free choice of creatures, to honour or to blaspheme God, wherein one onely part of the disiunction is hereticall, and the other of faith, and so both parts of the disiunction are not abiured as hereticall, although the whole, and entire proposition be hereticall, and may therefore be truely abiured as hereticall.
63. What any learned man, but especially the vulgar sort of Catholikes (considering the different grounds of Catholikes, and Protestants in points of Religion, and that the oath was made by a Protestant Parliament, and that the title of the Act, wherein the taking thereof is commanded, is for the better discouering and repressing of Popish Recusants, and such like reasons) may at the first sight conceiue of the lawfulnesse thereof, as also what they may at the first sight conceiue of the sense of this clause, which is now in question (considering that the coniunction disiunctiue [or] doth more vsually make an absolute disiunctiue, then a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, for that where once it followeth the verbe [may] and consequently maketh a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which is equiualent to a copulatiue, aboue a hundred times at least it doth not follow the verbe [may] but maketh an absolute disiunctiue proposition, and withall not examining the difference betwixt an absolute and a conditionall disiunctiue proposition) may, I say, at the first sight conceiue of the esens and meaning of this clause of the Oath, is no sufficient Argument to proue that this clause or any other of the Oath, is, according to the true, proper, and vsuall vnderstanding of the wordes in very deed vnlawfull. For many things may seeme to bee so at the first sight, which after a second reuiew, and a more diligent examination of the matter do seeme to be far otherwise.
64 My Aduersary following therein Card, Bellarmine, [Page 42] Gretzer, Lessius & Suarez, did at the first sight conceiue, that the Popes power to excommunicate the King was denyed in this Oath, but at the second sight, and vpon better consideration, hee hath, as it seemes, perceiued his error and ouer sight, for that being charged therewith by me, hee hath passed it ouer altogether with silence. Many also of our English Catholikes did at the first sight conceiue, that the Popes power to absolue from sinnes, to grant Pardons and indulgences, and to dispense in oathes, was denyed in this oath, taking some colour or pretence from those words, absolue, pardons and dispensations, but after the second sight they saw that there was no such thing, as at the first sight they conceiued. Many such like exceptions I could alleadge, which at the first sight some conceiued against the Oath, which vpon the second review, and after a more diligent consideration appeared to haue no firme ground to rely vpon.
65 But if any learned or discreet Catholick man will make a second review, and a more diligent examination of the Oath, and of all the clauses and wordes contained therein, and wil also duly consider (which I obserued in my Theologicall disputation Cap. 4. sec. 3) the difference betwixt the opinion, and the intention of his Maiesty, and that although his Maiesty, and the Parliament be of opinion, that the Pope hath no power to excommunicate his Maiesty, ye [...] they did not intend to binde Catholiks to acknowledge so much in this Oath, and that although the title of that Act, wherein many lawes were enacted against Catholiques touching points of Religion, for the which it might well be called an Act for the better discouering and repressing of Popish Recusants, euen for points of Religion, yet the Preamble or Title to the particular Act, wherein the Oath is established, is, to make a better triall how his Maiesties Subiects stand affected towards his Maiestie concerning points of their loyalty, and [Page 43] due obedience: And that his Maiesty and the Parliam [...]nt did also publikly declare, that they onely intended to exact of Catholiques by this oath a profession of that temporall allegiance, and ciuill obedience, which all Subiects doe by the Law of God and nature owe to their temporall Prince: And to make a distinction, not betwixt Catholiques, and Protestants, touching points of Religion, but betwixt Catholiques & Catholiques touching points of opinion; and betwixt ciuilly obedient Catholikes and of quiet disposition, and in all other thinges good Subiects, and such other Catholikes, as in their hearts maintained the like bloody maximes, that the Powder Traitors did: And that therefore the particular Act concerning the Oath it selfe, might very well haue beene intituled, although it was not, An Act for the better discouering and repressing of Popish Recusants, not in generall, but of such, as were caried away with the like fanaticall zeale, and bloody maximes that the powder Troitors were. If any man, I say, will duely consider these thinges, and the other obiections and answers, which I propounded in my Theologicall disputation, and in my Appendix to Suarez, I dare boldly appeale to his iudgment herein, for that no man will, or can reasonably (the premises considered) conceiue any forcible or conuincing reason, for which English Catholiques are bound in conscience to refuse the Oath.
66 And as for this clause which is now in question, it is euident (the difference betwixt an absolute disiunctiue, and a conditionall disiunctiue proposition being duely considered) that the words being taken in their proper and vsuall signification, doe make clearly for me, wherein I dare bouldly appeale to the iudgement of any discreet Reader. For albeit such a sense as this man imagineth, may be conceiued at the first sight, for the reason aforesaid, yet no man after due consideration, and who obserueth the difference betwixt an absolute, and a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, [Page 44] and perceiueth, that to make a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which followeth the nature of a copulatiue, to be hereticall, and to be abiured as hereticall, it is sufficient that one onely part thereof be hereticall, and that therefore both parts of the disiunction are not of necessity to be abiured alike, will or can reasonably conceiue, that both parts of that conditionall disiunctiue clause [may be deposed or murthered] are by vertue of the disiunctiue coniunction [or] to be abiured alike.
57 To the second proofe of his Minor proposition I answere, that he contendeth, to vse his owne words, de lana caprina, and laboureth in vaine to prooue that, which I doe not deny. For I make no question, but that [or] in this clause of the Oath [deposed or murthered] is a disiunctiue coniunction, and hath the ordinary and proper signification of a disiunctiue coniunction, But that which I affirme is, that although in this clause of the oath it be truely and properly a disiunctiue coniunction, yet because it immediately followeth the verbe [may] it maketh such a disiunctiue proposition, which implyeth a free choice to take either part of the disiunction, and which consequently being not an absolute, but a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, is equiualent to a copulatiue, and not to an ordinary, or absolute disiunctiue proposition.
68 And although the coniunction disiunctiue [or] doth also more commonly, as I obserued before, make an absolute disiunctiue, then a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, for that where you shall finde it once to follow the verbe [may] and so to make a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, you shall finde it aboue a hundred times not to follow the verbe [may] and so not to make a conditionall, but an absolute disiunctiue proposition, and in this very Oath, where the coniunction [or] is found to be taken affirmatiuely about sixeteene times, and not to follow the verbe [may] (for almost in [Page 45] all other places of the oath it is taken negatiuely, and is all one with [nor] or [neither] yet once onely or twice at the most it followeth the verbe [may] and maketh a conditionall disiunctiue proposition: Neuerthelesse this I say is certaine and not to be called in question, that whensoeuer the coniunction disiunctiue [or] doth make a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which implyeth a free choise to take which part of the disiunction we please, as it doth in this clause of the oath, neither doth my Aduersarie deny, but rather as you haue seene, supposeth the same, it is equiualent to a copulatiue proposition, and followeth the nature of a copulatiue, to the verity whereof, according to the approued rule of the Logicians, it is required that both parts be true, and to make the whole proposition to be false and hereticall, it sufficeth that one onely part be false and hereticall, which contrariwise falleth out in an absolute, or ordinarie disiunctiue proposition.
69, Vnlesse therefore my Aduersary can proue, either that the coniunction [or] when it immediatly followeth the verbe [may] doth not commonly and vsually make a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, implying a free choise to take which part of the distunction one please, which hitherto he hath not proued, but rather supposed both by those foure examples of propositions, and also in this clause of the oath, as you haue seene, that the coniunction [or] implyeth such a choise, or else that a conditionall disiunctiue proposition which implieth such a choise, doth not alwaies follow the nature and condition of a copulatiue proposition, for as much as concerneth the truth or falshood thereof, which he will neuer be able to proue, for that a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, implyeth a free choise to take, if we please, both parts of the disiunction, and euery Logician knoweth, that the word [vterque, both] supposeth di [...]tributiuely, and is resolued by the coniunction copulatiue, as, to take both, signifieth [Page 36] [...] [Page 37] [...] [Page 38] [...] [Page 39] [...] [Page 40] [...] [Page 41] [...] [Page 42] [...] [Page 43] [...] [Page 44] [...] [Page 45] [...] [Page 46] to take this and that, and not onely this or that; it is euident that he saith nothing to the purpose, neither doth he impugne my answere, but fighteth in vaine with his owne shadow.
70. Wherefore M. Fitzherbert perceiuing at last, that this second proofe of his Minor proposition was little to the purpose, and did not confute my answere concerning the conditionall disiunctiue proposition, he would now seeme to say something to the purpose, (but in very deed saith nothing as you shall see) and to cleane ouerthrowe that distinction, which before he called a friuolous euasion, and an extrauagant interpretation, and now he calleth it a shift, which neuerthelesse by his former discourse, and examples of propositions, as you haue seene, and now againe he doth clearly confirme. For thus he writeth.Nu. 17. And if Widdrington doth flye here to his former shift, and say, that in the other clauses [or] is an absolute disiunctiue, and that in the words [deposed or murthered] it is a conditionall, because the verbe [may] going before it, doth denote or signifie a free election to choose either part, he is to vnderstand, that the same may also be said of other clauses in the Oath, wherein neuerthelesse it is manifest, that [or] is a pure disiunctiue, and that whatsoeuer is affirmed of one part of the disiunction, is also affirmed of the other: As for example &c.
71. But obserue good Reader, first how this man still harpeth vpon the same string, to make thee belieue that I affirme the coniunction disiunctiue [or] in the words [may be deposed or murthered] not to be a pure, or absolute, but a conditionall disiunctiue coniunction, whereas I doe make no such distinction of an absolute, and conditionall disiunctiue coniunction, but onely of an absolute, and conditionall disiunctiue proposition. For that which I affirme is, that although the coniunction [or] in those words [may be deposed or murthered] be a pure, true, and if we may call it so, an absolute disiunctiue [Page 47] coniunction, yet in them, and whensoeuer else it immediately followeth the verbe [may] it maketh, as I haue often said, according to the common and vsuall signification of our English phrase, such a disiunctiue proposition, which implyeth a free choise to take both parts, or either part of the disiunction if we please, for which cause I call it a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which in very deede, for as much as concerneth the truth or falshood of the proposition, followeth the nature of a copulatiue proposition, and not of the common disiunctiue proposition, whereof the Logicians treate, which therefore I call an absolute disiunctiue proposition, for that it implyeth no such freedome of election, or condition of the will, to choose, if we please, either part of the disiunction: the nature and condition of which absolute, or common disiunctiue proposition, is such, that to the truth thereof, according to the receiued doctrine of the Logicians, it is sufficient, that one onely part of the disiunction be true, although the other be most false and hereticall, and to make such an absolute disiunctiue proposition to be false and hereticall, it is necessarie that both parts be false and hereticall: As for example, this disiunctiue proposition, God is iust, or vniust, is a most true and certaine proposition, although the former part of the disiunction only be true, and of faith, and the second part be false and hereticall.
72 But contrarywise it hapneth in a copulatiue proposition, for to make it true, both parts must be true, but to make it false and hereticall, it sufficeth that one onely part be false and hereticall; and therefore this proposition, God is iust, and vniust, is a most false and hereticall proposition, although the former part of the proposition be most true, and of faith. And if perchance both parts of the copulatiue proposition be false and hereticall, as in this, God is vniust, and vnmercifull, this is not by reason of the forme, or by vertue of the coniunction, vniting both parts in one entire proposition, [Page 48] but by reason onely of the matter, for that both parts of the proposition being taken seuerally by themselues in two entyre propositions are false and hereticall, as this proposition being taken it by it selfe, God is vniust, is an hereticall proposition, and so likewise is this, God is vnmercifull.
73 Now, as I haue often said, a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, whch implyeth a free choice to take both parts of the disiunction, if wee please, although it be a true disiunctiue proposition, by reason of the disiunctiue coniunction [or] yet, for as much as concerneth the truth or falshood of the proposition, it followeth the nature & quality of a copulatiue, and not of a common disiunctiue proposition, for which reason, I affirmed that although it was a disiunctiue proposition, yet by reason of the choice, freedome, or indifferency to take either part of the disiunction, it was equiualent to a copulatiue proposition. And therefore this proposition, God may be iust or vniust, speaking of externall iustice, or iniustice, or which is all one, it is in the power of God, or God hath free power to doe externall acts of iustice or iniustice, is a most false and hereticall proposition, although the former part of the disiunction bee true. And if perchance it happen that both parts of the disiunction be false and hereticall, as in this, God may be vniust or vnmercifull, this is not by vertue of the forme, and by force of the disiunctiue coniunction implying an indifferency to both parts of the disiunction, but by vertue of the matter, for that both parts of the disiunction beeing taken seuerally by themselues in two entire propositions, are false and hereticall. So that you may see a manifest difference betwixt an absolute, and conditionall disiunctiue proposition, and betwixt these two disiunctiue propositions, God doth workes of iustice or iniustice, and God may doe workes of iustice or iniustice: for the first is true, and the second false, the first is an absolute disiunctiue, and the second a conditionall, and [Page 49] followeth the nature and condition of a copulatiue, and not of a pure or common disiunctiue poposition.
74 Secondly obserue how vnlearnedly M. Fitzherbert doth insinuate, that in a pure disiunctiue proposition whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction is also affirmed of the other. For if hee had but any small skill in Logicke, he would quickly haue perceiued how grossely he is mistaken, and that according to the common and approued rule of the Logicians, the most true and necessary disiunctiue proposition is, when the one part of the disiunction is contradictory to the other, as this proposition, God is iust, or not iust, is a most true and necessary proposition, and yet the first part of the disiunction is of faith, and the second hereticall. And if perchance hee doe say, that hee meant onely of such disiunctiue propositions, in which both parts of the disiunction are false, and consequently the whole disiunctiue proposition is false, this also is manifestly vntrue.
75 For although to make a pure, absolute, and ordinary disiunctiue proposition to be false, it is necessary, that both parts of the disiunction bee false, yet it is not necessary, that both parts bee false in the same degree, or with the same kind of falshood; as in these examples, either God is vniust, or Card. Bellarmine is vnlearned, both parts of the disiunction are false, and yet the first is hereticall and impossible, the second not hereticall, nor impossible, but contingent: either London is not, or Hierusalem was not, both be false, yet the first is onely repugnant to humane truth, and the second also to diuine. Likewise either S. Peter was not head of the Apostles, or hee was a direct temporall King of the whole Christian world, both are false, but not in the same degree of falshood. So that in these, and infinite others which might bee alleadged, it is not true, that whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction, is also affirmed of the other. And therefore no meruaile, that [Page 50] in conditionall disiunctiue propositions, which follow the nature of copulatiues, and not of pure, or absolute disiunctiue propositions, whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part, is not by vertue of the coniunction affirmed of the other; I say by vertue of the coniunction, for that both in absolute, and also in conditionall disiunctiues, as likewise in copulatiue propositions, it may fall out, that by reason of the matter or of the thing affirmed or denyed, the same falshood which is affirmed of the one part, is affirmed also of the other: but this is not, to vse the Logicians phrase, vi forma, or vi coniunctionis, by vertue of the forme, or by force of the coniunction, but vi materiae, by reason or vertue of the matter, as I declared before. So that you see the more M. Fitzherbert meddleth with these Dialecticall questions, which are cleane out of the spheare of his knowledge, the more hee discouereth his vnskilfulnes.
76 But yet hee will still goe on to bewray his ignorance, and want of Logike. For marke how vnlearnedly hee goeth about to proue, that what I said of that clause of the Oath, [deposed or murthered] to wit, that it is a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, and did signifie a free election to take either part of the disiunction, may also bee said of other clauses of the Oath, wherein neuerthelesse it is manifest, that [or] is a pure disiunctiue, and that whatsoeuer is affirmed of the one part of the disiunction, is also affirmed of the other: As for example, the Oath bindeth the takers thereof to sweare, that the Pope hath no power or authority to depose the King, which is as much in effect, as that the Pope may not lawfully doe it: Therefore let vs make the proposition so, and lay it downe with the other disiunctiue clauses, which follow immediately; and to make the whole like to that clause that is now in question, let vs conceiue it thus.
77. I abiurenu. 18. this doctrine as false, that the Pope may depose the King, or dispose of any his Maiesties kingdomes, or dominions; Or authorize any forraigne [Page 51] Prince to inuade, or annoy him; Or discharge any of his subjects of their allegiance to his Maiestie; Or giue licence to any of them to beare armes, raise tumults, or to offer any violence to his Maiesties Royall person, &c.
78. Here now Nu. 19. it cannot be denyed that [or] is disiunctiue in all these seuerall sentences in such sort, that which of them soeuer any man doth teach, hee teacheth (according to the intent of this oath) a false doctrine, notwithstanding that the word [may] goeth before [or] and mplieth a free election to choose any one of them; in so much that if a man should say onely, that the Pope may authorize a forraine Prince to inuade his Maiestie, he is condemned by the oath, to speake no lesse vntruely, then if hee should say, that the Pope may depose his Maiestie; or giue licence to any to offer violence to his person.
79. Therefore Nu 20. if Widdrington apply the words [impious and hereticall] in the other clause to the doctrine of murthering onely, and not also to the doctrine of deposing Princes, why may not he, or any man else doe the like in the foresaid example, and offirme, that the last member, and part thereof (which denieth the Popes power to giue licence to offer violence to his Maiesties person) is onely abiured as false, whereby the former parts, or clauses concerning the Popes power to depose his Maiestie, or, to dispose of his kingdomes, or to giue licence to forraigne Princes to inuade, or annoy him (which are principall points of the oath) would be superfluous, and to no purpose. So as it is manifest, that the words of the oath [deposed, or murthered] being considered according to their proper, and vsuall signification in the clause where they are, and compared also with the other clauses, parts, and circumstances of the oath, cannot admit Widdringtons interpretation, who applieth the note of heresie to the Murther, and not also to the deposition of Princes. Thus much concerning the words of the law, or oath.
80. Behold now, how vnlearnedly Mr. Fitzherbert (and yet his ignorance is the lesse excusable, for that [Page 52] he might haue seene the weakenesse of his argument in my Theologicall Disputation, where the Authour of the aforesaid English Dialogue obiecteth the like argument, but in a contrary manner) argueth from the truth of a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which is negatiue de dicto, to the falshood of a conditionall disiunctiue, which is affirmatiue de modo, and frameth an oath of his owne inuention far different in sense from the oath prescribed by his Maiestie, which neuerthelesse hee pretendeth to haue the same sense and signification with his new deuised oath. For the oath prescribed by his Maiesty is a negatiue proposition de dicto, to wit, that the Pope hath not any power or authoritie to depose the King, or to dispose of any his Maiesties Kingdomes or Dominions, or to authorize any forraine Prince to inuade or annoy him, or to discharge any of his Subiects of their allegiance and obedience to his Maiestie, or to giue licence to any of them to beare armes, raise tumults, or to offer any violence to his Maiesties Royall person, &c. And all this I must acknowledge to be true, and therefore I called this whole proposition, negatiue de dicto, and affirmatiue de modo. And the sense of this oath is cleere, to wit, that the Pope hath not any lawfull power to doe any one of these things, so that if the Pope hath power to doe any one of them, the whole, and entire disiunctiue proposition consisting of those particular clauses is by vertue of the forme of words, and of the coniunction disiunctiue [or] or rather [nor] not true, but false, I say by vertue of the forme of words, for that the negation [not] going before, and hauing a power to distribute, to vse the Logicians phrase, or to deny all that followeth it, maketh all those disiunctiue coniunctions [or] which follow, to be equiualent to [nor] or [neither,] which, as I say, being a distributiue signe, is to be resolued, as euery Logician knoweth, by the coniunction copulatiue [and] and not by the disiunctiue [or] for which cause some Grammarians doe also [Page 53] hould, that the coniunction [nor] or [neither] is not a disiunctiue, but a copulatiue coniunction.
81. But the oath, which Mr. Fitzherbert hath framed, is a proposition negatiue de modo, and affirmatiue de dicto, to wit, that the Pope may, or, which according to his owne exposition, is all one, that it is in the Popes free and lawfull power to depose the King, or to dispose any of his Maiesties Kingdomes, or dominions, or to authorize any forraine Prince to inuade or annoy him; or to discharge any of his subiects of their allegiance and obedience to his Maiestie; or to giue licence to any of them to beare armes, raise tumults, or to offer any violence to his Maiesties Royall person, &c. and this whole, or entire disiunctiue proposition consisting of all these particular branches M. Fitzherbert will haue to be abiured as false. Now hee that hath but any small skill in Logicke may easily perceiue a great difference betwixt the sense and meaning of these two oaths, or propositions. For in the oath prescribed by his Maiestie wee may by vertue of the words, and from the force and signification of the disiunctiue coniunction [or] which, as I haue shewed before, is by reason of the precedent negation [not] equiualent to [nor] necessarily inferre, that the Pope hath neither power to depose the King, nor to dispose of any his Maiesties Kingdomes or Dominions, nor to doe any other of those things there mentioned; and therefore he that granteth, that the Pope hath power to doe any one of those things there mentioned, must consequently graunt, that the whole, or entire oath, or proposition consisting of all those particular clauses is false.
82 But in the oath inuented by my Aduersary, although indeed by vertue of the matter, we may well conclude, that the Pope hath neither power to depose the Kinge, nor to dispose of any his Maiesties kingdomes or dominions, nor to doe any other of those thinges there mentioned, for that all and euery one of those thinges which are denied to the Pope in that totall [Page 54] oath, or proposition, may also be denied to him in seuerall oaths, or propositions, yet hy vertue of the words, and from the force and signification of the disiunctiue coniunction [or] which, as M. Fitzherbert himselfe doth grant, maketh there a conditionall disiumctiue proposition, implying a free choise to take which part of the disiunction we please, we cannot rightly conclude, that the Pope hath neither power to depose the King, nor to dispose of any his Maiesties kingdomes or dominions &c.
83 For what man can be so ignorant, as to imagine, that these two propositions make the same sense, or that the first doth rightly inferre the second. It is false, that it is in my free and lawfull power to doe this or that, therefore it is true, that I may lawfully neither doe this nor that. My Aduersary can not deny, but that it is false▪ that he had lawfull freedome to deale sincerely, or corruptly in this his Reply, therefore by his owne manner of arguing he must grant, that it is true, that he had lawfull freedome neither to deale sincerely nor corruptly in his Reply. Likewise he cannot deny, but that it is false, that it is in the free and lawfull power of creatures to honour or blaspheme God, of Priests to eate or sleepe before they say Masse, of Souldiers to fight or fly when their Country is inuaded by the enemie, and (to exemplifie in our owne matter) of the Pope to depose or murther Princes, as murther is taken for an vnlawfull Act: Will he therefore inferre from thence in that manner as he argueth here, that it is therefore true, that creatures may lawfully neither honour nor blaspheme God, that Priests may lawfully neither eate nor sleepe before they say Masse, that Soldiers may lawfully neither fight nor flye, when their Country is inuaded, and that the Pope may lawfully neither depose Princes nor murther them, as murther is taken for an vnlawful act? Wherfore if my Aduersary will but keepe still the same forme, and the same [Page 55] disiunctiue coniunction [or] and alter but a little the matter, by adding onely to the end of the affirmatiue oath, framed by himselfe, this clause, [or to murther his Maiesty] he will quickly perceiue his error, and he will not deny, but that the oath with that addition is very false; and neuerthelesse he dare not from thence conclude the truth of the negatiue, or that therefore it is true, that the Pope hath not any power neither to depose the King, nor to dispose &c. for that he granteth, that the Pope hath lawfull power to depose the King, and to dispose &c. onely he denyeth, that the Pope hath power to murther him, as murther is taken for an vnlawfull act.
84. But the causes of M. Fitzherberts errour are manifest. First, for that he for want of Logike doth not, as it seemes, consider the difference betwixt the forme, and the matter of an hypothiticall proposition, and what is required to the truth or falshood of a disiunctiue, or copulatiue proposition, as well by vertue of the forme, as of the matter. For to make a pure, or absolute disiunctiue proposition to be true, it is sufficient, by vertue of the forme, that one part of the disiunction be true, but to make it false, both parts must be false. Contrariwise it falleth out in a copulatiue proposition, for to make it true, both parts of the copulation must be true, and to make it false, it s [...]fficeth by vertue of the forme, or by force of the copulatiue coniunction, that one onely part be false, although by reason of the matter both parts also may be false, but this is impertinent to the forme. Secondly, he doth not consider, that a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which implyeth a free choise to take which part of the disiunction we please, followeth the nature of a copulatiue, and not of a pure, common, or absolute disiunctiue proposition. Thirdly, he doth not consider, that whatsoeuer is taken, or to vse the Logicians phrase, supposeth distributiuely, as euery negation doth distribute, and deny whatsoeuer [Page 56] followeth that negation, is to be resolued by a copulatiue, and not by a disiunctiue coniunction.
85. Fourthly, he doth not consider, that to make a copulatiue proposition, or such a disiunctiue, which is equiualent to a copulatiue to be hereticall, it sufficeth that one onely part be hereticall. Fiftly, he doth not consider, that although to make a pure, common, or absolute disiunctiue proposition to be false, it is necessary that both parts of the disiunction be false, yet it is not necessary that both parts be false in the same degree of falshood, for that the one part may be impossible, the other not, the one part hereticall, and the other not, and that therefore the same kinde of falshood which is affirmed of the one part, is not necessarily affirmed of the other. Lastly, he doth not consider, how vicious a kinde of arguing it is, from the falshood of an affirmatiue conditionall disiunctiue proposition to conclude the truth of a negatiue, whereby he would make his affirmatiue oath, inuented by himselfe, to haue the same sense with the negatiue oath prescribed by his Maiesty. And his ignorance herein is the lesse excusable, for that the insufficiencie of this his argument he might haue seene declared in my Theologicall disputation, where I clearely shewed, as you haue seene before, how vnsoundly the Author of that English Dialogue vrged the like argument, which my answere to that argument is also here altogether concealed by M. Fitzherbert. And therefore I will giue him this charitable aduise, that if he haue any care of his credit and reputation, he doe not hereafter so bouldly aduenture to meddle with these questions belonging to Logike, except he haue the helpe and furtherance of some of his company more skilfull herein then himselfe, least that by granting one inconuenience, he fall, according to the ancient prouerbe, into a thousand absurdities.
86. By this it is euident first, that although the [Page 57] Oath ordained by his Maiesty, and the Oath framed by M. Fitzherbert containe the same disiunctiue clauses, and so they doe both agree in the matter, yet they differ greatly in the forme, and in the sense and vnderstanding of the disiunctiue coniunction [or.] For in the Oath, prescribed by his Maiestie, that which by vertue of the forme, and by force of the coniunction [or] which in all those particular sentences is equiualent to [nor] I doe acknowledge to be true, is, that the Pope hath not power to doe any one of all those thinges mentioned in those disiunctiue clauses, and that which I acknowledge to be false, is, that the Pope hath power to doe any one of all those thinges, as either to depose the King or to dispose of his Dominions, and so forth: And therefore although to those clauses were added also this clause [or to murther his Maiesty] yet my Aduersary cannot affirme, that it would change at all the truth, or falshood of the whole oath, or entyre proposition, but if the oath were true before, it would also be true now, and if it were false before, it would also be false now.
87 But if the oath, which M. Fitzherbert hath framed, that which by vertue of the forme, and by force of the coniunction [or] which as he himselfe confesseth, implyeth a free election to chose any one of those seuerall sentences or clauses, I acknowledge to be true, is, that the Pope hath not power to doe all those thinges mentioned in those clauses, or, which is all one, to doe which of all those thinges he shall please, and that which I acknowledge to be false, is, that the Pope hath power to doe all those thinges mentioned in those clauses or which is all one, to doe which of all those thinges he shall please. And therefore if to those clauses of M. Fitzherberts new deuised oath, should be added also this clause [or to murther his Maiesty] he cannot denie, but that his oath, or entyre disiunctiue proposition, which before in his opinion was false, is now by adding that clause made true, and [Page 58] therefore that it is false, that the Pope hath power to murther his M [...]iestie. The adding of which clause doth clearely shew the manifest difference betwixt the forme of these two oaths, and the different signification of the coniunction [or] in both of them, albeit in the matter of all the particular clauses, and propositions, they doe both agree.
88 Secondly, by this also it is easie to answere the demand, which M. Fitzherbert propoundeth, to wit, wherefore the word [hereticall] in the doctrine and position of his Maiesties oath, may be referred to the doctrine of murthering Princes, and not of deposing them, and the word [false] may not with the like reason in the oath or intire disiunctiue proposition, which my Aduersary hath framed, be referred to the last member, and part thereof, which denyeth the Popes power to offer violence to his Maiesties person, and not to the former concerning the Popes power to depose his Maiesty. For if wee regard the forme of both propositions, and the vertue, or force of the disiunctiue coniunction [or] which implyeth a free choise to take which part of the disiunction we please, and therefore to make the whole disiunctiue proposition to be false and hereticall, it sufficeth, that one onely part thereof be false and hereticall, as they both agree in the forme, and in the sense of the disiunctiue coniunction [or] as it is sufficient by vertue of the forme, to make that affirmatiue position, Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, or any other, to be hereticall, so also to make this affirmatiue proposition, which my Aduersary hath framed, The Pope may, or which is all one, it is in the Popes free and lawfull power to depose the Kinges Maiesty, or to offer violence to his Royall person, to be false, it sufficeth, by vertue of the forme, and by force of the disiunctiue coniunction [or] that one onely part of the disiunction be false: But the onely difference is in the matter. And [Page 59] therefore if the doctrine of deposing Princes, be not so clearely and properly hereticall, as is the doctrine of murthering them, the word [hereticall] may with better reason be referred to the doctrine of murthering, then of deposing: But because the doctrine which teacheth, that the Pope may depose his Maiesty, as also that he may offer violence to his Royall person, are false, (although perchance the latter be false in a more high and manifest degree of falshood, then is the fotmer) therefore the word [false] may, by vertue of the matter, but not by force of the coniunction disiunctiue [or] in the oath, framed by my Aduersary, be referred to both.
89. I say, in the oath framed by my Aduersary, for as these two particular propositions are set downe in the oath ordained by his Maiestie, both of them are, not onely, by vertue of the matter, but also by reason of the forme, and by force of the coniunction [or] which is equiualent to [nor] affirmed to be false, as I declared before. So that it is manifest, that these words of the oath [may be deposed, or murthered] being considered according to their proper and vsuall signification in the conditionall disiunctiue clause where they are, and compared also with the other clauses, parts, and circumstances of the oath, may very well admit the interpretation, which I haue made; and the application of heresie (taking heresie in a strict sense) may be applyed onely to the murther, and not also to the deposition of Princes, although it may also in a proper sense, and wherein many learned Catholikes doe take the word heresie, be applyed to both, as I will shewe beneath.Nu. 106. et seq. And thus much concerning the wordes of the law, and oath.
90 Now for his Maiesties meaning, or intention in that clause (which was the second rule assigned for the interpretation of the oath) the same, saith M. Fitzherbert, Nu 12. according to the doctrine of Suarez, which [Page 60] Widdrington approueth, is to be gathered principally by the words, and which, as you haue seene, being to be taken in their proper and common sense, doe shew, that his Maiesties meaning was no other, but to ordaine the abiuration of both parts of that clause alike, that is to say, as truely impious and hereticall.
91 But contrariwise I haue cleerely shewed before, that according to the proper and vsuall signification of the words, the common vnderstanding of men, and the receiued doctrine of the Logicians, to make a copulatiue proposition, or a conditionall disiunctiue, which followeth the nature of a copulatiue, to bee hereticall, it sufficeth that one onely part thereof bee hereticall. Seeing therefore that his Maiesties meaning onely was to bind his Catholike Subiects, to take this clause of the Oath in that sense, which the words according to their true, proper, and vsuall signification doe beare, and that according to the true and common sense of the wordes, it sufficeth to abiure this clause of the Oath, as hereticall, if one onely part thereof bee hereticall, it is manifest that his Maiesties meaning was not to ordaine that both parts of this clause should bee abiured alike, vnlesse from the common sense and vnderstanding of the wordes it can be rightly gathered, as I haue proued it cannot, that both parts must of necessity be abiured alike.
92 But if it be wel considered, saith M. Fitzherbert nu. 21., what reason Widdrington hath to condemne the aforesaid doctrine, as truely hereticall, in respect of one part of the clause (to wit, that part which concerneth violent attempts vpon the persons of Princes) it will easily appeare, that his Maiesty pretendeth as much, if not more reason, to condemne it in like maner in regard of the other part, which concerneth the deposition of Princes. For whereas Widdrington hath no other reason for his conceipt, but because hee thinketh that all doctrine preiudiciall to the liues of Princes is repugnant to the holy Scriptures (whereby hee [Page 61] consequently holdeth it for hereticall) his Maiesty is perswaded also that he hath the same reason to condemne the doctrine of the Popes power to depose Princes for hereticall, as it may euidently appeare by the manifold places, and texts of Scripture, which hee alleadgeth for the proofe of his owne Ecclesiasticall Primacy, and the obligation of his Subiects to yeeld him ciuil obedience, whereon he groundeth the lawfulnes of the Oath, and the abiuration of the doctrine condemned therein.
93. And therefore omitting Nu. 23. to examine, how well the Scriptures alledged by his Maiestie, serue for the proofe of the matter in question, as also to note, how impertinently Widdrington applyeth the precept, non Occides, to his purpose, by occasion of the word murther in the oath (which precept being indeed vnderstood of murther, and consequently implying alwaies an vnlawfull act, yea a mortall sinne, was neuer held by any to be lawfull, and therefore doth not in that sort and sense belong to our question, as Widdrington knoweth well enough) but omitting, I say, to speake further of this, that which here I affirme is, that his Maiestie alledgeth much more Scripture to condemne the doctrine touching the deposition of Princes, then Widdrington doth for the condemnation of violent attempts against their persons; Whereby it is manifest, that hee hath no reason to say, that his Maiestie meant, that the latter part of that clause should be abiured, as hereticall, and not the form [...]r, especially seeing that the expresse words of the oath, (according to their most vsuall, and proper signification) together with the circumstances thereof, doe proue both alike, as it appeareth by the premisses. And this I hope may suffice for the confutation of his first, and best answeare.
94. But first, as it appeareth also by the premisses, the expresse words of this clause (according to their most vsuall, and proper signification) together with all other circumstances, doe cleerely proue, that both parts of that disiunctiue proposition are not of necessitie [Page 62] to be abiured alike, for that to make a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, as is the doctrine, and position abiured in this clause, to be hereticall, it is sufficient, that one part of the disiunction be hereticall, and that therefore both parts of the disiunction are not of necessity to bee abiured alike, as by the forme of my Aduersaries owne examples I haue euidently conuinced: and therefore his premisses doe no way proue his conclusion in this point.
94 Secondly, that his Maiesty had far greater reason to bee more vehement against the practise of murthering Princes being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, then of deposing, or thrusting them out of the possession of their kingdomes, and to haue the former being the more heinous, impious, damnable and detestable crime, and more plainely and expresly forbidden in holy Scriptures, to bee abiured in a more high and eminent degree, then the latter, it is plainely conuinced by the great and manifest inequality of the crimes, by the irrecuperable, and not recompensable damage, which proceedeth from the former, and not from the later, and yet the former being the more easily and suddainely to bee performed then the latter, (for that the latter cannot bee accomplished but by a mighty power, which also may faile, the euent of warre being vncertaine, but the former by the aduenturous boldnesse onely of one villaine may bee effected) together with the knowne practises of the late murthers of the most Christian Kings of France, and the execrable conspiracy of the Pouder-Traytors, which was the chiefe occasion of the ordaining of this Oath. And therefore his Maiesty hath neither more reason, nor as much reason to condemne that part of this clause, which concerneth the deposing of Princes being excommunicated, or depriued by the Pope, for hereticall, taking hereticall for that which importeth a plaine, manifest, and confessed heresie, or falshood cleerely repugnant [Page 63] to holy Scriptures, as either he himselfe, or I, or any man else may haue to condemne that part for hereticall, which concerneth the murthering of such Princes.
95. But to reduce Mr. Fitzherberts whole discourse to a compendious forme of arguing; That, which hee chiefely laboureth to proue against me in this chapter▪ is, that this position, Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects or any other whatsoeuer, [...]s by the oath condemned for hereticall, in regard as well of the deposition of such Princes, as of the murthering of them. And this hee endeauoureth to proue by two waies: first by the common sense, and vnderstanding of the words, which doe signifie, saith hee, that both parts a [...]e abiured alike, to which purpose hee bringeth foure examples of propositions, which, as you haue seene, make nothing for him, but are flat against him, and hee frameth an oath of his owne inuention, to paralell it with the oath ordained by his Maiestie, which neuerthelesse is far different from it in sense, as I haue shewed before.
96. Secondly, hee pretendeth to proue the same by his Maiesties meaning, or intention, which was, saith hee, that both parts should be abiured as hereticall. And this also hee pretendeth to prove by two waies. First, by the proper and common sense of the words, by which his Maiesties intention is principally to be gathered. But this proofe is all one with the former, and therefore with the same facility it is denied, as it is affirmed; for that the proper and vsuall sense of the words doe not import, that both parts of the disiunction are of necessity to be abiured alike, by reason of the conditionall disiunctiue proposition, as I haue often repeated before. Secondly, hee would seeme to proue the same by this argument. His Maiestie is perswaded, [...]hat the doctrine, not only which alloweth the practise of deposing Princes being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, but also which speculatiuely maintaineth, that the Pope hath power to depose [Page 64] Princes, is hereticall, and repugnant to the holy Scriptures, as may euidently appeare by the manifold places, and texts of Scripture, which he alledgeth, &c. yea, and hee talledgeth much more Scripture, to condemne the doctrine touching the deposition of Princes, then Widdrington doth for violent attempts against their persons, therefore it is manifest that according to his Maiesties intention both parts of that clause should be abiured as hereticall.
97 But first, this consequence of my Aduersary: (His Maiestie is perswaded, that not onely the doctrine which teacheth, that the Pope hath power to murther Princes, but also to depose them, is hereticall, therefore his Maiesties meaning, or intention was, that in the aforesaid clause of the oath, both parts should be abiured, as hereticall, taking hereticall in that strict sense, whereof I will speake beneathNu. 106. et seq.) M. Fitzherbert might haue seene, if it had pleased him, in my Theologicall disputation Cap. 4. sec. 3., to be very insufficient; where I did clearly shewe, that there is a great difference to be made betwixt his Maiesties perswasion or opinion, and his meaning or intention. For his Maiesty doth, according to the grounds of the Protestant Religion, defend diuers opinions, which neuerthelesse he doth not intend to binde his Catholike Subiects by this oath to defend and professe.
98 As for example. His Maiesty is perswaded, that he is the supreame Lord and Gouernour, in all causes, as well Ecclesiasticall, as temporall, and yet he doth not intend that his Catholike Subiects shall by those words of this oath [our Soueraigne Lord King Iames] professe and maintaine the same. Neither doth he ground the lawfulnes of this oath, and the abiuration of the doctrine condemned therein, vpon his Ecclesiasticall Primacie, as my Aduersary here seemeth to insinuate, for that the Oath of his Ecclesiasticall Supremacie, as his Maiesty himselfe affirmeth,In his Apologie pag. 46. was deuised for putting a difference betwene Papists, and Protestants, but this oath was ordained [Page 65] for making a difference betweene the ciuilly obedient Papists, and the peruerse disciples of the Powder-treason.
99 Also his Maiesty is perswaded, that the Pope hath not power to excommunicate his Maiesty, and yet he doth intend by those words of the oath [notwithstanding any sentence of excommunication &c.] to binde English Catholikes to professe the same;See my Th. Disp. cap. 4. sec. 1. howsoeuer Card. Bellarmine, Gretzer, Lessius, and Suarez without sufficient proofe, and M. Fitzherbert without any proofe at all, doe affirme, that the Popes power to excommunicate is denied in this oath. For although the lower house of Parliament, as his Maiesty also affirmethIn his Premonition pag 9., at the first framing of this oath made it to containe, that the Pope had no power to excommunicate his Maiesty, yet his Maiestie did purposely decline that poi [...]t, In the Catalogue of the lyes of Tortus. nu. 1. and forced them to reforme it, onely making it to conclude, that no excommunication of the Popes can warrant his Subiects to practise against his person, or state, as indeed taking any such temporall violence to be farre without the limits of such a spirituall Censure, as Excommunication is.
100 Likewise his Maiesty is perswaded, that all reconcilings of his Subiects to the Pope, and all returnings of English Priests made by the Popes authority, into this Realme &c, are truely and properly treasons, although not naturally, and forbidden by the lawe of nature, vnlesse they be repugnant to true, naturall, and ciuill alleagiance, yet positiue and forbidden by the lawes of the Realme, neuerthelesse by those words of the oath [to disclose all treasons &c.] he did not intend to binde his Catholike Subiects to reueale and disclose such kinde of treasons, vnlesse they be truely and properly vnnaturall treasons, and repugnant to naturall alleagiance. For that his Maiesty was carefull, as he himselfe also writethIn his Premonition pag. 9. naturall., that nothing should be contained in this oath, except the profession of naturall allegiance, [Page 66] and ciuill, and temporall obediednce, with a promise to resist all contrarie, vnnaturall, and vnciuill violence.
101 Wherefore seeing that his Maiestie doth binde the swearer to take this oath according to the plaine and common sense and vnderstanding of the words, although his Maiesty be perswaded, that it is hereticall to hould, that the Pope hath power to depose princes, yet from thence it cannot rightly be concluded, that therfore by this oath he intended to bind his Catholike Subiects to acknowledge and professe the same, vnlesse the words of the oath, according to their proper and vsuall signification doe imply the same. Considering therefore, that as I haue clearly conuinced, to make that proposition, Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects, or any other, to be hereticall, it is sufficient, according to the common sense of the words, and the approued doctrine of Logicians, that one onely part of the disiunction be hereticall, as without doubt the latter part of this disiunction is, it is euident, that his Maiesties mtaning was no other, then to binde the swearer to that sense, to which the words being taken in their proper and vsuall signification doe binde. And thus much concerning the consequence.
102 Now touching the antecedent proposition, although it be true, that his Maiesty is perswaded, that not onely the doctrine, which alloweth the practise of deposing Princes, which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, but also the speculatiue doctrine, which teacheth, that the Pope hath power to depriue Princes, is a false doctrine, and repugnant to holy Scriptures, and consequently hereticall, taking hereticall for that which implyeth an vntruth, contrary to the word of God reuealed in holy Scriptures, in which sense also all those Catholikes, who doe hould this doctrine of the Popes power to depriue Princes of their kingdomes, to be false, doe hould also, that it is contrary to the [Page 67] word of God, and consequently also hereticall; yet if hereticall be taken for that which importeth a knowne and manifest vntruth repugnant to holy Scriptures, and so acknowledged also to be by the common consent also of Catholikes, my Aduersarie will hardly proue, that his Maiesty is perswaded, that the speculatiue doctrine, which holdeth, that the Pope hath power to depriue Princes, or to depose them by a iuridicall sentence, is hereticall in this sense, or repugnant to holy Scriptures in the opinion of all, or of the most part of Catholikes, albeit he be perswaded that the speculatiue doctrine, which approueth the Popes power to murther or to take away the liues of Princes, be in this sense hereticall, as in very deed it is: And therfore all those Priests, who then were Prisoners in Newgate, and the Gate-house, and now are in Wisbeech, being examined by his Maiestses Commissioners vpon certaine articles, and did directly answere to the questions which were propounded, did agree in this, that it was directly and absolutely murther for any man to take away the life of his Maiesty, and that the Church could not define it to be lawfull for any man to kill his Maiesty, although for the point of deposing, some of them answered otherwise, some others declined the question, and many of them did insinuate, that as yet this point touching the Popes power to dedose Princes is not defined by the Church.
103 And although his Maiesty doth alleage much more Scripture to condemn the doctrine touching the deposition of Princes, then I doe for the condemnation of violent attempts against their persons, yet it cannot be denied, both that his Maiesty might haue brought more plaine and pregnant places, against the doctrine of murthering Princes, if he had thought it needefull, and not supposed it to be a manifest vntruth, and condemned by the common coesent also of Catholikes, and also that all those places, which his Maiesty [Page 68] bringeth to proue, that Subiects owe ciuill obedience to temporall Princes, and against the Popes Ecclesiasticall power to depriue Princes of their temporall kingdomes, doe more forcibly conclude against violent attempts against their sacred persons, and against the Popes Ecclesiasticall or spirituall power to murther kill, or depriue them of their liues, which bloody punishments Ecclesiasticall mildnes doth so much abhorre.
104 Neither doe I take the word [murthered] in that clause of the oath, as it doth formally signifie an vnlawfull act, and a mortall sinne, and in that sense apply the precept, Thou shalt not kill, to this clause of the oath, as my Aduersary would perswade the Reader, but I take murthered in that clause, as it doth denote materially the killing of Princes, which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope: And I affirme, that the killing of such Princes is directly and absolutely a mortall sinne, and is that murther, or killing, which is forbidden by the law of God, and nature, reuealed to vs in the holy Scriptures, and especially in those two places which the Author of the English Dialogue, whose obiection against that clause of the oath I tooke vpon mee to answere, did alleadge. The first place 1, Reg. 26. Kill him not, for who shall extend his hand against the Lords annointed, and be innocent? doth more particularly belong to Princes. The second place Exod. 20. Thou shalt not kill, is common also to priuate men, and therefore much more to be ayplyed to the killing of Princes.
105. Neither is it necessary as I obserued in my Appendix part 2. sec. 5. nu. 4. against Suarez, to make that position contained in the Oath to be hereticall, and repugnant to Gods commandement, that the Scripture should haue added, Thou shalt not kill Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope. It is sufficient that all killing both of priuate men, and much more also of [Page 69] temporall Princes, (who haue in their handes the materiall sword it selfe, and supreme power to kill or saue) is vnlawfull and forbidden by this precept, which is not warrantable either by other places of holy Scripture, or declared by the Church to bee lawfull, and to haue sufficient warrant. Now it is manifest, that neither the Church, nor any one Catholike Doctour euer taught, that the Popes sentence of excommunication or depriuation, although wee should grant, that the Pope hath power to depriue Princes by way of sentence, doth giue sufficient warrant or authority to Subiects to kill their Prince, for that the Popes sentence of depriuation doth at the most by the consent of all Catholicks, depriue a Prince of his right to reigne, but not of his corporall life, or of his right to liue. And thus much concerning the antecedent proposition.
106 Lastly to say something also concerning the consequent, although as you haue seene, I do vtterly deny, that to abiure this doctrine and position as hereticall, That Princes which bee excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects or any other, it is necessary by vertue of the forme of words being taken in their proper and vsuall signification, and by force of the coniunction disiunctiue [or], that both parts of the disiunction bee abiured as hereticall, neuerthelesse I doe willingly grant, that by vertue of the matter both parts of that disiunctiue proposition may bee truely abiured as hereticall, if wee take the word hereticall, as by many learned Catholickes it is taken in a true, proper, and vsuall signification. For the better vnderstanding whereof wee must obserue out of Alphonsus de Castro Lib 1. aduershaereses cap 8., Didaecus Couerruuias Lib. 4. varia [...]. resolut. cap. 14., and others, that although the Catholike Church can determine of heresie, yet an assertion is not therefore heresie, because the Church hath defined it, but because it is repugnant to Catholike faith, or which is all one, to that which is reuealed by God. For the Church by her definition [Page 70] doth not make such a position to be heresie, seeing that it would be heresie, although she should not define it; but the Church causeth this, that by her censure she maketh knowne, and manifest to vs, that to bee heresie, which before was not certainly knowne, whether it might iustly be called heresie, or no.
107. For the whole Church (excluding Christ her principall head) hath not power to make a new Ariicle of faith which neuerthelesse shee might doe if she could make an assertion to be hereticall: But that the Church hath not power to make a new Article of faith, it is conuinced by manifest reason. For euery assertion is therefore called Catholike, for that it is reuealed by God: Seing therefore that diuine reu [...]lation doth not depend vpon the approbation, or declaration of the Church, the declaration of the Church doth not make that Catholike, which is reuealed by God. The Church therefore doth determine that this is reuea [...]ed by God, but shee doth not make that which is reuealed by God to be true: for if such a verity be called Catholike, for that it is contained in holy Scriptures, seeing that such a verity to bee contained in holy Scriptures, doth not depend vpon any humane will, but vpon God alone, the Author of those Scriptures, it is manifest by this reason, that the Church can doe nothing at all, that such a truth doth belong to faith: For the holy Scriptures haue this of themselues that wee are bound to beleeue them in all things. Wherefore the Church defining any thing to be of faith, although she doth certainly define, and cannot erre, yet by her definition she doth not make that truth to bee Catholike faith. For shee did therefore define that truth to be Catholike, because that truth was Catholike, and if it had not beene Catholike, the Church defining it to bee Catholike should haue erred, therefore it was Catholike and reuealed by God before the Church defined it. Wherefore the Church cannot make a new Article of faith, but that which before was true faith, but not certainely knowne to vs, the Church by her definition maketh [Page 67] it knowne to vs.
108 In like maner wee haue this from the Church, to know certainly which is diuine Scripture, and we are bound to account that to be diuine Scripture, which the Church hath defined to be diuine. And although shee doth certainely define, and cannot erre, yet shee doth not make by her definition, that Scripture to bee diuine: for therefore shee hath declared it to be diuine, because it was truely diuine, and if it had not beene before diuine Scripture, the Church would not haue declared it to be diuine. Wherefore although that assertion which is condemned by the Catholike Church to be contrary to Catholike faith, and to b [...]e accounted heresie, was also heresie before the definition of the Church, yet before the Church did define it, the maintainers of that opinion were not called heretickes, because it was not knowne, whether that opinion was contrary to Catholike faith: but now after the definition of the Church they shall bee called hereticks, whosoeuer shall approue and maintaine that opinion, not for that their opinion was not before false, contrary to Catholike faith, and heresie, but because this name of heretickes beeing infamous, and appertaining to that most heinous crime, doth require a certaine pertinacy, and rebellion departing from the definitions of the Catholike Church, which could not truely be accounted at that time, when it was doubtfull and disputable, and the Church had not defined, whether that opinion was repugnant to Religion and faith.
109. In this sense therefore it may be said, that the Church hath power to declare an assertion to be Catholike, and to appertaine to Catholike faith, to this effect, that after the definition of the Church, the said assertion is so manifestly of faith, that he is to be accounted an obstinate hereticke, who defending the contrary shall depart from that definition, although before the definition of the Church, the said assertion albeit was most true and Catholike, yet by reason of the doubt, and controuersie touching that point [Page 72] hee could not iustly be called an heretick, who should allow, and follow the contrary position. And what hath bene said, if there be any doubt, or controuersie touching any text of holy Scripture, and the true sense thereof, is proportionally to be vnderstood, if there be any doubt, or controruersie touching any definition of the Church, and the true sense thereof; as wee see there is now a controuersie betwixt the Diuines of Rome, and Paris, touching the definition of the Councell of Constance concerning the Superiority of the Church, or a Generall Councell aboue the Pope, and among many other Catholikes touching the decrees and declarations of diuerse other Generall Councells, and now lately touching the sense of those words of the Councell of Lateran, Si vero Dominus temporalis, &c. But if the temporall Lord, &c. Which some Catholikes of late haue greatly vrged to proue the Popes power to depose Princes, whereof beneath Part. 3. cap. 9. & seq. we will discourse at large.
110. From this doctrine, which neither Mr. Fitzherbert, nor any other can proue to be improbable, it cleerely followeth, that heresie being a falshood repugnant to holy Scriptures, or diuine reuelation, with the same certainty, or probability, wherewith one is perswaded, that such a doctrine, or position, is false, and repugnant to holy Scriptures, or diuine reuelation, with the same certainty, or probabilitie hee may abhorre, detest, and abiure that doctrine for hereticall; And consequently it followeth, that if it be lawfull to abhorre, detest, and abiure for impious, damnable, and false doctrine repugnant to truth contained in the word of God, this Doctrine and position, That Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may be deposed or murthered by their Subiects or any other, (which position for that it concerneth practise, and not onely speculation, is in very deed false, impious, damnable, and repugnant to truth contained in holy Scriptures, and ought so to be accounted, not onely by those, who are of opinion [Page 73] that the Pope hath not power to depriue Princes, but also, so long as this question remaineth vndecided and in controuersie, by those who doe speculatiuely thinke that hee hath authority to depriue them) it is lawfull also to abiure it for hereticall. And this I hope may suffice for the defence of my first, and principall answeare, and for the confutation of M. Fitzherberts Reply therevnto.
111. The Second answere, which I haue heard many Catholikes giue to the aforesaid obiection of the Authour of that English Dialogue against the word [hereticall] contained in this clause of the oath, and which Answeare Mr. Fitzherbert laboureth in vaine to ouerthrow, I relatedCap. 5. Sec. 2. nu. 28. 29 in these words. The second principall answeare, which some of our Countrimen doe make to the aforesaid obiection, is gathered from the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, who expoundingLib. 2. de Concil. cap. 12. that sentence of Pope Gregory the firstLib. 1. epist. 24. I confesse, that I doe receiue the foure first Councells, as the foure bookes of the Gospell, affirmeth, that the aduerbe [as] doth import a similitude, and not an equality, as that of Matth. 5. Be you perfect, as your heauenly Father is perfect. For in like manner these Catholiks doe answeare, that those words, I doe abhorre, detest, and abiure as heretical, &c. doe not import an equality, but a similitude, and that in common speech they doe onely signifie, that I doe exceedingly detest that doctrine. And so wee vsually say, I hate him as the diuel, I loue him as my brother, not intending thereby to affirme, that the one is in truth a Diuel, or the other my brother.
112 Now to omit the word [murthered] as though there were no mention at all made in the oath, concerning the murthering of Princes, and to speake onely of deposing them; these men affirme, that the aforesaid position, Princes, which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed by their Subiects, or any other, supposing that this question concerning [Page 74] the Popes power to depose Princes, is not yet decided, is in their iudgments a false, and seditious proposition, and that it hath some similitude with heresie, not for that they thinke it to be in very deed hereticall (taking hereticall in that strict sense, as some Catholikes doe take it) but for that they doe constantly hold it to be of such a nature, that it may be condemned by the Church for an hereticall proposition (and then the maintainers thereof to be p [...]operly heretikes) if deposing be taken in that sense, as it is in this branch of the oath distinguished from depriuing. For to depriue a Prince, is to take away by lawfull sentence his Regall authority, and in this branch is referred to the Pope, but to depose a Prince is to thrust him out of the possession of his kingdome, and in this branch is referred to Subiects, or any other whatsoeuer.
113. The falshood therefore of the aforesaid position, may be gathered partly from holy Scripture,Mat. 22. Render to Caesar the thinges which are Caesars: which precept is plainly vnderstood, not onely of rendring to Caesar that which is Caesars, but also of not taking away from him that which is his, and which he lawfully possesseth: as also contrary wise the plaine meaning of that precept of the Decalogue, Thou shalt not steale, Exod. 20. is not onely that wee must not take away vniustly, that thing which is our neighbours, but also that we must render to him that which is his owne. And partly it may be gathered from the most true principles of the Diuines, and Lawyers, to wit, that no man is to be put out of his lawfull possessions, vntill the right of the aduerse part be sufficiently decided.
114 Seeing therefore that this question concerning the Popes power to depriue Princes is not as yet sufficiently decided, for that as yet the Iudge hath not determined the controuersie, as Trithemius In Chron. Mon [...]st. H [...]rsa. ad annum 1106. well affirmed, and we also aboueCap. 3. sec. 3 haue shewed, so long as it is in question among Catholikes, and probably disputed [Page 75] on both sides, whether the Pope hath such authority to depriue Princes or no, they cannot by vertue of any Excommunication, or sentence of depriuation, made by the Pope against them, be deposed by their Subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, or, which is all one, be violently by their Subiects, or any other, thrust out from their Kingdomes which they doe rightfully possesse. By this therefore which hath bene said it is manifest enough, that according to both these answers, although many doe like best the former, that the aforesaid position, Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed by their Subiects, or any other whatsoeuer, may truely, lawfully, and without any danger of periury be abiured as impious and hereticall doctrine. Thus I answered in my Theol. Disputation.
115 Now against this Answere M. Fitzherbert obiecteth thus: Th [...]s second answere saith heCap. 4. nu. 25., is sufficiently confuted by the words of the law or oath, which as I haue signified ought to be taken, & vnderstood in th [...]ir most proper & cleare sense; in which respect the aduerbe [as] being ioyned to impious and hereticall, must needs denote and signifie, not a similitude, nor yet an equalitie, (by the way of comparison) but a realitie of impiety, and heresie in that doctrine, for so, no doubt, doth euery man take it that readeth the said clause.
116. But to this it is answered, first, that M. Fitzherbert abuseth his Reader in corrupting and concealing those rules, which I related out of Suarez, and others, for the vnderstanding of the words of euery law, and consequently of this oath. For neither did those Authors affirme, that the words of euery law ought to be taken, and vnderstood in their most proper, and most vsuall sense, but onely in their proper and vsuall sense, taking proper, as it is opposed to improper, or metaphoricall, and not to that which is somewhat the lesse proper, and vsuall, as it is opposed to vnusuall, and not to that which is somewhat the lesse vsuall: [Page 76] Neither did they also affirme, that the words of euery law, are alwaies to be vnderstood in their proper and vsuall signification: but the matter also of the law, the will of the law-maker, and other circumstances are to be regarded. Wherefore if at any time, saith SuarezLib. 6. de Leg. cap. 1. nu. 17., the words taken in their proper signification should argue any iniustice, or like absurditie in the minde of the Law-maker, they must be drawne to a sense although improper, wherein the law may be iust and reasonable, because this is presumed to be the will of the Law-maker, as it hath bene declared by many lawes in ff. tit. de legibus. For in a doubtfull word of the Law, saith the Law, that sense is rather to be chosen, which is void of all default, especially seeing that by this the will also of the Law-maker may be gathered. For it ought not to be presumed, that the Law-maker did intend to commaund any absurd or inconuenient thing, vnlesse the contrarie doe euidently appeare.
117 But if it chance, saith Suarez Cap. 1. nu. 11., that a [...]y words of the Law haue together many proper and vsuall significations, then we must obserue that rule, which in all ambiguous and equiuocall speeches, is wont prudently to be obserued, to wit that the matter of the Law with other circumstances be diligently considered, for by them the meaning of the words will be easily determined. For the words must especially be agreable to the matter, according to that rule of the law, Leg. Quoties ff. de regulis Iuris. whensoeuer the same spech hath two senses, let that especially be taken, which is more agreable to the matter. And therefore if the words be ambiguous or doubtfull, they must be drawne to that sense, as I said before, which containeth no iniustice or absurdity: And a benigne and fauourable interpretation, if there be no other let, is alwaies to be preferred, according to that approued rule of the law, Leg. Benignius ff. de legibus. Lawes are to be interpreted in the more fauourable sense, that thereby their will and meaning might be conserued: and doubtfull speeches, as Emanuell Sa. affirmeth,Verbo Interpretatio nu. 17. are to be taken in the better sense, and which is more profitable to the speaker. [Page 77] This, and much more to the same purpose did I there at large relate, which my Aduersary here concealeth, and which if he had set downe, would plainly haue satisfied his chiefest exception, by which, contrary to the aforesaid rule, he laboureth to drawe the wordes of this oath, which hee may fauorably, and commodiously expound, to containe in his opinion, an vnlawfull, and inconuenient sense.
118. And from this, which I haue now related, it is answered secondly, that the Aduerbe [as] being an Aduerbe of similitude, doth most properly, most commonly, and most vsually denote a similitude, or some equality by way of comparison, and not an identitie, or reality: and it sometimes it doth signifie an identitie, or reality, as many times it doth, although seldome in comparison of the other, this is by reason of the matter, & not by vertue of the word, or by force of the Aduerbe of similitude [as.]. Wherefore to know, when the Aduerbe [as] doth signifie a similitude, and when a reality, or identity, we must regard the matter, to which it is applied. Seing therfore that this doctri [...]e or position, That Princes which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed, or thrust out of the possession of their kingdomes by their subiects or any other, so long as this doctrine concerning the Popes power to depriue Princes remaineth questionable, and not decided, is truely impious, and although it be not truely hereticall, taking hereticall for that, which to maintaine maketh one a formall hereticke, yet it hath a great affinity, and similitude with this heretical, for that it is a false, impious, and damnable doctrine, repugnant to morall iustice, iniurious to Soueraigne Princes in a most high degree, and contrary also to the word of GOD reuealed in holy Scriptures, which therefore may by an authenticall definition of the Church be declared to be properly and strictly heretical, for this cause it may well be said, that according to the aforesaid rule, that doubtfull or ambiguous words of a law [Page 78] are to be taken in the more fauorable sense and wherein they containe no iniustice, or vntruth, the Aduerbe [as] being, according to his most proper, and most vsual signification, an Aduerbe of similitude, may in the word [impious] by reason of the matter, and not by force of the word, denote, and signifie an identitie, or reality of impiety, and in the word [heretical] onely a similitude, or some equality of heresie by the way of comparison, taking heresie in the aforesaid rigorous manner: Neither ought any man that readeth the said clause, the aforesaid rules being obserued, vnderstand the Aduerbe [as] in any other sense, especially which is thought to be false, or inconuenient.
119. But besides that this difference may be noted, saith Mr. Fitzherbert 1 Nu. 6., betwixt the examples, which Widdrington giueth, and this clause of the oath, that in the examples, to wit, I loue him as my brother, and, I hate him as the Diuell, and such like, the word [As] hath relation to two diuerse subiects, and therefore must neede [...] be vnderstood comparatiuely, whereas in the clause of the oath, there is speech onely of one subiect, to wit, of the doctrine, and heretical being an adiectiue is affirmed also of the said doctrine, as praedicatum de subjecto, and therefore the word [as] being referred to hereticall, which is affirmed of the doctrine onely, cannot be vnderstood comparatiuely (as it is in the examples where there are two different subiects) but must needs denote a reality of heresie in the doctrine.
120. But first it is vntrue, that in the examples, which I brought, the Aduerbe [as] must of necessity haue relation to two diuerse subiects, or persons? for it may be referred to one and the same subiect or person; as if one should be blamed for not louing his brother, or for not hating the Diuell, hee might very well answeare, and say, in truth I loue him as my brother, or I hate him as the Diuell: where the Aduerbe [as] by reason of the matter doth signifie a reality of brotherhood, [Page 79] and a true Diuel, and not onely a similitude, or an equality by the way of comparison. And therefore to know when the Aduerbe [as] doth denote a real [...]ty, and not a similitude, wee must regard the matter, to which it hath relation, for that most commonly, and according to the most proper signification, and force of the word, it being an Aduerbe of similitude, doth denote onely a similitude, and if perchance it doth signifie a reality, it is not by force of the word, and by the most common signification thereof, but by reason of the matter, to which it is applyed.
121. Secondly, it is also vntrue, that the Aduerbe [as] when it connecteth the predicate with the subiect, or the adiectiue with the substantiue, doth alwaies deuote a realitie, and not onely a similitude, or an equality by the way of comparison, as by infinite examples contained in the holy Scriptures I could conuince. As Psal. 37. Ego autem tanquam surdus non audiebam, &c. and I as deafe did not heare, and as dum be opened not my mouth. Isa. 53. Et nos putauimus eum quasi leprosum. And we accounted him as leprous. Isa. 57. quia tacens et quasi non videns. For I houlding my peace, said almighty GOD, and as not seeing. Isa. 59. palpauimus sicut c [...]i parietem. Wee as blind groped the will. Iob. 12. errare eos faciet quasi [...]brios, hee will cause them to erre as b [...]ing drunken. Mat. 28. Et facti sunt velut mortui. And they became as dead. Mar. 9. Factus est sicut mortuus. He became as dead. 1 Cor. 15. tanquam abortiuo visus est et mihi. And hee appeared to me also as an abortiue. 2 Cor. 11. ne quis me putet insipientem, alioquin velut insipientem accipite me, Let no man thinke mee to be foolish, otherwise take mee as foolish. Apocalyp. 1. Cecidi adpedes eius tanqu [...]m mortuus. I fell at his feet as dead.
122. In these, and infinite other examples, which might bee alleadged, there is speech onely of one subiect, and the Aduerbe [as] doth connect the adiectiue or predicate, with the substantiue or subiect, and yet it [Page 80] doth not denote a reality, but onely a similitude. And if perchance any one should reply, and say, that in those examples, although one onely substantiue or subiect bee expressed, yet there may bee vnderstood not the same substantiue or subiect, but an other: as I fell at his feet as a dead man, take me as a foolish man, and so of the rest: so likewise we may say that in this clause of the Oath there may bee also vnderstood an other substantiue or subiect, as, I abhorre, detest and abiure as impious and hereticall doctrine, this doctrine and position &c. Wherefore whether there bee one subiect or two, whether the adiectiue bee affirmed of the substantiue, as predicatum de subiecte, or no, the Aduerbe [as] by the proper signification, and force of the word being an Aduerbe of similitude, doth most commonly, and vsually denote a similitude, and if at any time it signifie a reality, or identitie, it is not so much by force of the word, as by vertue of the matter, to which it is referred.
123 And this is the reason, why the Aduerbe [as] being referred to impious in this clause of the Oath, doth denote a reality, and truth of impiety, and being referred to hereticall doth onely denote a similitude of heresie, taking heresie in that strict sense before declared: because although it being an Aduerbe of similitude, doth by vertue and force of the word onely denote a similitude, both in the word hereticall, and also in the word impious, yet by reason of the matter, to which it is referred, for that the doctrine contained in this clause is truely impious, and it is hereticall onely by simili ude and comparison, taking hereticall in that rigorous sense before mentioned, therefore according to the aforesaid rule, that the sense of the wordes of euery law is to bee vnderstood according to the matter, and that the sense and meaning of the wordes of euery law, (and consequently of this oath established by a publike law) ought to bee drawne to that sense, if there be no other let, [Page 81] which containeth no vntruth, iniustice, or absurdity, and that the Aduerbe [as] in common sense, and vnderstanding of men, to which common and vsuall sense his Maiesty doth in expresse wordes bind the takers of this oath, doth onely denote a similitude and not a reality, vnlesse the matter which is treated of doth enforce vs therevnto, there is great reason, that the Aduerbe [as] should in the word impious, by vertue of the matter, and not by force of the word, being taken in his most proper and vsuall signification, signifie a reality, and in the word hereticall, taking hereticall in that rigorous manner so often repeated, should denote onely a similitude, or some equality by the way of comparison.
124 And by this which hath beene said, that also which M. Fitzherbert lastly addeth, is easily answered. Furthermore, saith heenu. 27. 28., it is euident, that the Aduerbe [as] being considered as it is ioyned with the word [impious] doth clerely imply the reality whereof I speake, signifying that the said doctrine is truely impious, and wicked, and not onely to be esteemed so by the way of similitude, or comparison, as it is manifest by the wordes before and after, which are, I doe from my heart abhorre, detest, and abiure, as impious and hereticall, this damnable doctrine, &c. Whereby it is cleare, that his Maiesties meaning was to cause the takers of this oath to condemne that doctrine to bee truely impious, seeing that hee will haue them to sweare, that they abhorre and detest it from their heart, and calleth it also a damnable doctrine.
125 And this being so, I would gladly know of Widdrington, what reason hee can haue to take the Aduerbe [as] in one sense as it is referred to hereticall, and in an other, as it is ioyned with impious, seeing that is referred to both alike with a copulatiue coniunction, the one immediately following the other: will hee say that it is to bee taken properly in the one, and improperly in the other? How [Page 82] can that stand with his former rules out of Suarez touching the cleare and perspicuous sense, which is required in Lawes and Oaths (especially in this oath, wherein there is an expresse clause afterwards to exclude all equinocatio [...]?) therefore hee must needs grant, that if the doctrine be abiured as truely impious, it is also abiured as truely he [...]eticall, or else hee must make such a Gallimaufrey, as was neuer made in any law or oath, within the compasse of foure wordes onely.
126. But this is easily answered by that which I haue already saide. For first, if the word [hereticall] be taken in that sense, as Alphonsus de Castro, Couerrnuias, and many other learned Catholikes doe take it, for euery false doctrine, which is repugnant to the word of God, or diuine reuelation, which is a proper, and vsuall signification of the word [hereticall] and in which sense also, as I conceiue, his Maiesty, and other Protestants doe take that word, and not for that doctrine which is made hereticall by the definition or declaration of the Catholike Romane Church, then the aduerbe [as] both in the word impious, and also in the word hereticall doth by vertue of the matter, and other circumstances, denote a reality of impiety, and heresie, although not by force of the word being taken in the most proper and vsuall signification, which being an aduerbe of similitude, would onely denote a similitude both of heresie, and also impiety, vnlesse the matter, with other circumstances, did imply the contrary.
127. But if the word [hereticall] be taken for that doctrine, which is made hereticall by the Church, and which before the declaration; or definition of the Church is not accounted hereticall, although it be in very deede a false doctrine, and contrary to the word of God, reuealed to vs in the holy Scriptures (which signification of the word, hereticall, whether it be the more proper, and the more vsuall then the former, or no, I will not now contend, it being sufficient, and ouer [Page 83] sufficient for my purpose, that the former sense is proper and vsuall among Catholikes, and not metaphoricall and vnusuall) then the reason, which a little aboue I alleaged, is very sufficient, and my Aduersarie's demaund is clearly satisfied, to wit, why the aduerbe [as] should by vertue of the matter, and by the approued rules of Diuines and Lawyers, for the interpretation of the words of euery Law, being referred to impious, signifie a realitie of impiety, and being referred to hereticall, should onely denote a similitude of heresie, taking heresie in that rigorous sense (although by vertue of the word, and proper signification of the aduerbe [as] it being an aduerbe of similitude, both in the word impious, and also in the word hereticall, doth onely signifie, as I haue saide, a similitude of impiety, and heresie) Neither then should the aduerbe [as] be taken properly in one, and improperly in the other, as my Aduersary would seeme to inferre, but it is taken properly in both, for that the aduerbe [as] doth properly, and vsually, by reason of the matter sometimes denote a realitie, and sometimes a similitude, although most properly and most vsually, it being an aduerbe of similitude, doth by force of the word denote onely a similitude.
128 Secondly, to that which M. Fitzherbert obiecteth touching equinocatiō, which by an expresse clause is excluded in this oath, I answered also in my Theological Disputation Cap. 8. Sec 2., that his Maiesty by those words [without any equiuocation] did not vnderstand and meane, that in the oath, no equiuocall word, or sentence was contained, for this is almost impossible, seeing that most words are equiuo [...]all, and haue diuerse, yea and sometimes also proper and vsuall significations: But his Maiesties meaning was, that the swearer should not equiuocate, that is, deale vnsincerely, but he should deale plainely, and sincerely, without any fraude or guile, nor take the words in an other sense, then the [Page 84] common meaning and vnderstanding of them doe beare. And so those words [without any equiuocation &c.] are onely a declaration of those former words [And all these thinges I doe plainely and sincerely acknowledge and sweare &c.] For it is one thing to vse equiuocall words, which may be called a materiall equiuocation, and an other thing to equiuocate, or to vse formall equiuocation. For to equiuocate properly, or to vse formall equiuocation, as it is commonly vnderstood in this Kingdome, is to vse equiuocall words, or some secret reseruation of purpose to delude the hearer, so that he, who heareth the words, vnderstandeth them in an other sense, then he who vttereth them; and it importeth an vnsincere manner of dealing. If therefore in this oath there be perchance many common senses of the same word, sentence, or proposition, all circumstances duely considered, we ought to take it in that common sense, wherein we are perswaded his Maiestie would haue vs to take it, for this is his principall meaning and intention, that we should deale plainely and sincerely with him, without any fraude, guile, mentall euasion, or secret reseruation whatsoeuer.
129 And if it should so fall out that we cannot be assured of his Maiesties meaning and intention, when any difficulty concerning the sense of any word or sentence contained in the oath shall arise, then we must recurre to those generall rules, which Diuines & Lawiers assigne for the interpreting of the wordes of euery law, for this wee may with iust reason presume to bee the generall intention of his Maiesty, as also of euery lawmaker. And if perchance there bee any Catholike so scrupulous, that by applying the aforesaid generall rules to any ambiguous and doubtfull word, or sentence in the oath, he cannot yet quiet his conscience, yet he may auoid all danger of equiuocating, by publikely declaring in what sense he taketh that word or [Page 85] sentence, which hath diuers proper and vsuall significations: as by declaring in what sense hee taketh the Aduerbe [as] both in the word impious and also in the word hereticall, and likewise in what sense he taketh the word hereticall, and so of others, and this declaration will both auoid all danger of equiuocating, and also without doubt satisfie the Magistrate, so that his declaration be not knowne to be against his Maiesties meaning and intention.
130 And truely it is strange, that whereas the oath is by his Maiesty, and the Parliament propounded, and expressed in such maner of wordes, that according to the approued rules assigned by Catholike Diuines and Lawyers for the interpreting of lawes, it may bee expounded in a true, lawfull, and commodious sense to the swearer, which sense also is agreeable to the proper and vsuall signification of the words, yet M. Fitzherbert, and other impugners of the oath, (for which English Catholikes are to giue them little thankes) will needs haue them, contrary to the aforesaid rules, vnderstand in that sense, which they account to be false, vnlawfull, and to bee an vtter ruine to the refusers of the oath, whereas, according to the aforesaid rules, they ought to draw the wordes, to a metaphoricall and improper sense, if the proper sense should argue in the law, (and consequently in the oath ordained by a publike law) any falshood, iniustice, absurdity, or other inconuenience.
131 Seeing therefore it cannot be denyed, that the proper and vsuall signification of the Aduerbe [as] it being an Aduerbe of similitude, is to signifie a similitude, and often times also by reason of the matter, but not by force of the word, being taken in the most proper and most vsuall signification, a reality: and of the word [hereticall] as it is taken by many Catholike Diuines, for euery falshood repugnant to diuine reuelation, it is manifest, that whether we affirme, that the Aduerbe [Page 86] [as] doth signifie onely a similitude, or also a reality both in the word impious, and also in the word, hereticall, or a reality in the first, and a similitude in the second in the maner before declared, it is no gallimaufre, but a true, and plaine declaring of the common sense, and vnderstanding of the wordes according to the approued rules prescribed by Catholike Diuines and Lawyers for the interpreting of doubtfull and ambiguous wordes in euery Law. And thus much concerning the second Answer, and M. Fitzherberts Reply against the same.
132 Now then to make an end of this Chapter, vpon these premises I will draw foure conclusions contrary to those which M. Fitzherbert heere collecteth. First, saith heenu. 29., whereas Widdrington chargeth mee to haue affirmed falsly, that the doctrine of the Popes power to depose Princes, is manifestly abiured in the oath, as impious and hereticall, hee chargeth me falsly in two respects, the one because I affirmed no such thing, and the other for that albeit I had said so, yet I had said truely, as it euidently appeareth, not onely by the plaine wordes, substance and circumstances of the oath, but also by his Maiesties meaning and intention therein.
133 But contrariwise I conclude, that whereas I charged him to haue falsly or vntruely affirmed, that the doctrine of the Popes power to depose Princes is manifestly abiured in this oath, as impious & hereticall, I charged him truly in two respects: the one because it is true, that he affirmeth so much as I haue cleerly conuinced by his owne wordes, and I wonder that hee is not ashamed to affirme such a palpable vntruth: the other for that this assertion of his is false, as euidently appeareth both by the plaine words, substance, and circumstances of the oath, and also by his Maiesties meaning and intention therein, which is to bee gathered principally by the words, which, as you haue seene, being taken in their proper and common sense, doe cleerely [Page 87] shew that both parts of that disiunctiue proposition, Princes which bee excommunicated or depriued by the Pope may bee deposed or murthered by their subiects, are not of necessity to bee abiured as hereticall, although by vertue of the matter, if hereticall bee taken for euery false doctrine which is repugnant to truth, containe [...] in holy Scriptures, whether the Church haue declared, or not declared it to bee so, both parts of that posi [...]ition, which alloweth the practise of deposing or murthering Princes which bee excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may bee truely abiured as hereticall, as I haue aboundantly shewed before.
134 Secondly, it appeareth, saith M. Fitzherbert nu. 30., how different Widdringtons doctrine & belief concerning the Popes power to depose Princes, is from his Maiesties, yea from the whole substance of the oath, seeing that according to Widdringtons opinion, the said doctrine is probable, (and consequently may bee held, taught, and sworne) whereas his Maiesty by this oath condemneth it for detestable, damnable, impious, and hereticall, whereby it may appeare also what good seruice he doth to his Maiesty with this his probable doctrine, See Preface nu. 25. 26. & 27. as I haue noted before in the Preface.
135. But whether my doctrine, and beleife concerning the Popes power to depose Princes be different from his Maiesties, or no, (which my Aduersary, if hee had beene pleased to haue diligently perused my writings, might quickly haue perceiued) it is impertinent to the present question conncerning the lawfulnesse, or vnlawfulnesse of the oath; and therefore I neede not at this time to speake more expressely thereof, for not giuing my Aduersary occasion to wrangle about impertinent questions, and to decline the chiefe point, which is controuersie about the lawfulnesse of the oath. For to proue the oath to be lawfull, or vnlawfull, wee must not so much regard what his Maiesties beliefe, or opinion is, touching any point of controuersie, which may [Page 88] seeme to be any way insinuated in the oath as it appeareth by his opinion concerning his Primacie in spiritualls, and the Popes power to excommunicate him, and such like, which neuerthelesse he doth not intend, that his Subjects shall be bound to affirme or deny in this oath; wee must not I say, so much regard his opinion, as his intention, and what is the true sense, and meaning of the oath according to the plain and common vnderstanding of the words, to which his Maiesty doth bind the taker, and what by vertue of the words we must acknowledge, professe, detest, and abiure in this oath: Now it is euident, as I haue shewed before, that my opinion is not different from the substance of the oath, nor from that which his Maiesty intendeth to bind the swearer to acknowledge, or abiure in this oath.
136. For I affirme two things, which are the whole substance of the oath; The first, is that any Catholike may lawfully, and with a safe conscience declare, testifie, and acknowledge, before God, and in his conscience, that the Pope hath no power to depose his Maiesty, nor to dispose of any his king [...]omes, or Dominions, and so of the other clauses, which doe follow from this doctrine. And my reason is, for that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, I will not say at this present, is a false doctrine, and repugnant to the holy Scriptures, and to the ancient Fathers, but it is not certaine, and a point of faith, (as Maister Fitzherbert, and some others of his companie will needs haue it to be) and the contrary is probable and consequently may with a safe and probable conscience be acknowledged and maintained by any Catholike. But whether it be probable, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes or no, I doe not at this present dispute, neither doe I either grant it, or deny it, or meddle at all therewith, as being vnnecessary to proue the oath to be lawfull. That which I affirme at this time is, that it is probable, that the Pope hath no such power. Let vs first agree [Page 89] about this point, that it is probable, that the Pope hath no such power, and then we will dispute, how probable it is, that he hath such a power. In the meane time all Mr. Fitzherberts cunning, turning, and winding shall not draw mee to so great a disaduantage, as to take vpon mee to proue that to be certaine, which he, and the rest of my Aduersaries will not grant to be so much as probable.
137. The second thing, which touching practise I doe affirme, is, that this doctrine and position, That Princes, which be excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be deposed by their Subiects or any other, to omit now the word [murthered] is an impious and damnable doctrine, and in what sense it may be called hereticall, as also whether by vertue of the words both parts of that disiunctiue position contained in the oath are abiured alike, and whether there be the same reason, that the deposing, and murthering of Princes should be abiured alike, I haue sufficiently declared before. Whereby it may also appeare, that my doctrine bringeth no danger at all to his Maiestie, as that of my Aduersaries doth, but giueth great security both to his Maiesties person and State, as also I haue noted before in the Prefacenu. 61. & seq., which the Reader would quickly haue perceaued, if Mr. Fitzherbert had not guilfully, to disgrace mee with his Maiestie, concealed the chiefest part of my answeare and doctrine touching the security, which it gaue to his Maiestie, for which cause hee hath laboured so much to haue my bookes forbidden, that the Reader may not see my answeares and doctrine, but after that mangled, and lame manner, as hee is pleased to curtoll and disfigure them.
138. Thirdly, it is euident, saith Mr. Fitzherbert,nu. 31. that neither Widdrington, nor any man that followeth his doctrine, can lawfully sweare this clause of the oath, whereof wee treat: for no man can with safe conscience abiure, as impious and hereticall, any opinion, which [Page 90] hee houldeth to be probable, as Widdrington granteth our opinion to be.
139. But on the contrary part I say, that it is euident, that any man who followeth my doctrine, may lawfully sweare this clause of the oath, whereof wee treat: for any man may with safe conscience abiure, as impious and hereticall, that doctrine and position, which is truely as impious and hereticall: Neither doe I grant, that the doctrine and position contained in this clause of the oath, which, as you see, belongeth to practise, is probable, as my Aduersary vntruely affirmeth, but I acknowledge, that it is a false, damnable, impious, and hereticall doctrine, and that therefore it ought by all Catholikes to be abhorred, detested, and abiured so from their hearts, as I haue cleerely proued before: and as for the speculatiue doctrine of deposing Princes. I neither grant, nor deny it to be probable, nor medle at all therewith, as being impertinent, as I haue often said, to proue that the oath may lawfully be taken.
140 Lastly, I conclude, saith M. Fitzherbert nu. 32., that albeit there were no other thing in the oath to make it vnlawfull, yet this onely clause might suffice to doe it yea and ought to moue all Catholikes to refuse it. For surely he must be a Catholike of a strange conscience, that can perswade himselfe to detest, abiure, and abhorre from his heart, a doctrine that is taught by the best Catholike wri [...]ers, ancient and moderne, and confirmed by the practise of the Catholike Church, and the authority of diuers Generall and Prouinciall Councells, as experience hath shewed for many hundreds of yeares. So as thou seest, good Reader, what Widdrington gaineth by his wrangling, seeing that the further he goeth, the further he intangleth himselfe still in an inextricable labyrinth of absurdities, whiles he seeketh to intangle the consciences of Catholikes in the snares of his pretended probabilities. And this shall suffice for this point.
141. But contrariwise I conclude, that this clause [Page 91] is not sufficient to make the oath vnlawfull, or to moue any Catholike to refuse the same. For surely he must be a Catholike of a strange conscience, and caried away with the like fanaticall zeale and bloody maximes that the Powder-Traitors were, that can perswade himselfe, that the murthering of Princes, being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, and the doctrine thereof, which is a part of that conditionall disiunctiue proposition, abiured in this clause of the oath, ought not to be detested, abhorred and abiured from his heart: Neither was this doctrine euer taught before in the Church of God by any Catholike writer, ancient or moderne, or confirmed by the practise of the Catholike Church, or authority of any Generall or Prouinciall Councell.
142. And although the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes by way of sentence hath bene taught by many Catholike writers, and also practised by diuers Popes, onely since the time of Pope Gregory the seauenth, who was the first Pope, saith Onuphrius, that contrary to the custome of his ancestors, durst, I doe not say excommunicate, but also depriue Caesar himselfe (by whom if he was not chosen, he was at least confirmed) of his Kingdome and Empire: A thing not heard of before those times See aboue part 1. cap. 6. nu. 24., yet considering that this doctrine hath not as yet bene defined by the Church, and consequently is not a certaine and decided point of faith, but hath euer bene, and is euen to this day vehemently impugned by many learned Catholikes, truely that Catholike must be a man either of a strange conscience, or of a weake vnderstanding, who considering the question touching the Popes power to depose Princes, to be disputable, and as yet not decided by the Church, for that there hath euer bene, saith Azor Azor., a great controuersie betwixt Emperours and Kinges on the one part, and the Bishops of Rome on the other, touching this point) can perswade himselfe, that it is lawfull to depose, or [Page 92] thrust a King out of his Kingdome, which he lawfully possesseth, so long as the controuersie betwixt the Pope, and temporall Princes, touching this point remaineth vndecided.
143. For it is manifest, according to the knowne, and approued rule of the law, which is also grounded vpon the light of reason, that no man can lawfully be thrust out from the possession of that thing, which he rightfully and lawfully possesseth, vntill the controuersie betwixt him and his Aduersary touching that thing be decided by the Iudge. And for this reason, as I coniecture, Card. Bellarmine, and some fewe others of his Society haue of late yeares bene so vehement to make this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes to be a Point of faith, and not to be called in question by any Catholike, foreseing belike that if they granted it to be disputable, and a thing in controuersie among Catholikes, they must consequently grant, that the Popes power to depose Princes, is onely titulus sinere, and can neuer be lawfully put in practise, much like to the title which one hath to a faire Pallace, whereof an other man is in possession, which neuerthelesse he shall neuer by dispossessing the other lawfully enioy, vntill the Iudge hath decided his title. And therefore the practise not onely touching the murthering of Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, but also touching the deposing them, or thrusting them out of the possession of their kingdomes, and the doctrine thereof, may and ought by all good Catholikes to be detested, abhorred, and abiured from their hearts, although by vertue of the words, and by force of the disiunctiue coniunction [or] following the verbe [may] it sufficeth, as I shewed before, to abiure the whole disiunctiue position, as hereticall, that one onely part of the disiunction be abiured as hereticall.
144. So as thou seest, good Reader, both that the probabilitie, which I mainetaine, is not onely pretended, [Page 93] but true and reall, and also to render backe Mr. Fitzherberts words, what he gaineth by his wrangling, and concealing the chiefe points of my opinion and doctrine, seeing that the further hee goeth, the further hee bewrayeth his want both of learning and sincerity, & intangleth himselfe still in an inextricable labyrinth of absurdities, whiles hee seeketh to intangle the consciences of Catholikes in the snares of his pretended new Catholike faith; which for that it is, end euer hath beene euen from the very first broaching thereof, impugned by learned Catholikes, as a new inuented doctrine, preiudiciall to the Soueraigntie of temporal Princes, and not acknowledged by any one of the ancient Fathers, cleerely conuinceth, that it is not Catholike. Neither can that man be accounted a true Catholike, who with Catholike faith, which cannot be subiect to errour, beleeueth that doctrine, which is doubtfull, disputable, vncertaine, and not Catholike, as is this, which teacheth that the Pope hath power to depose Princes. And truely if I should perceiue my Catholike faith to rely and depend vpon so weak a ground and foundation, as is the Popes authority to depose Princes, or any other such like disputable question, I should scarce thinke my selfe to be a true Catholike, and to haue a true Catholike and supernaturall, but onely a pretended Catholike, and supernaturall faith.
145. By which also the iudicious Reader may easily coniecture, what manner of exceptions Mr. Fitzherbert can take against the other clauses of the oath, seeing that these obiections, which he hath made against this clause, which he only impugneth, notwithstanding that he vaunted in the beginning of this chapter, that he would proue my explication of this clause, to be a friuolous euasion, an extrauagant interpretation, and also absurd euen by my own grounds, I haue euidently conuinced to be weake and vnsound, and himselfe by handling the matter so insufficiently, guilfully, & bitterly, as he hath [Page 94] done (but farre more spitefully itself former chapters, charging me with [...]cogging, scoffing, [...] gibing, for being absurd ridiculous, foolish, malicious [...]pious, impudent, heretike and no good child of the Catholike Church, and vsing such like slaunderous and disgracefull tearmes) to be void of learning, sincerity, charity, and also Christian modesty. And this may suffice also for this point.
Faults escaped.
IN the Epistle, num. 9. l. 20. there. p. 14. l. 37. I confessè p. 19. l. 24. write. p. 20. l. 23. reasons. p. 39. l. 4. Parisioners, p. 55. l. 20. Secular. & l. 34. the cause. p. 67. l. 9, lawes. p. 78. l. 12. to none. p 80. l. 34. S. Dominick. p. 90. l. 4. Eisengrenius. p. 100. l. fift. p. 140. l, 5, had had. p, 144, l, 25, although. p. 145. l. 31. put out the comma. p. 148. l. 13. adde in the margent m cap. 6. p. 158. l. 22. that Christian. p. 164. l. 25. intention. p. 175. l, 14. subiect to the. p. 179. lin. 10. 11. the spirituall power.
In the Adioynder p. 13. l. 26. hereticall. p. 38. against the 18. line, adde in the margent. n num. 23. p. 41. l. 29. sense. p. 57. l. 21. but in the. p. 76. l. 35. may bee.
COurteous Reader, In the Appendix to my Supplication to the Popes Holinesse. Pag. 123. L. 15. I affirmed M. Wilson, who made the English Martyrologe, wherein Fa. Garnet, and Fa. Holdcorne, are put for Martyrs, to bee a Iesuit: for that I was so informed by two credible persons. But because I haue heard since that one confidently auerre, that although he doth wholly depend vpon the Iesuits, and is directed by them, yet he is not as yet a Iesuite in habit, I desire that the word [Iesuite] in that place thou wilt account for not written, and I haue caused it to be blotted out in the Booke which I sent to his Holinesse. But wherefore the Iesuites are desirous to haue certaine persons, who either by vow, or promise doe wholly depend on them, and are at their dispose, not to take their habit for a time, but to liue in the world like Lay-men, or Secular Priests, I shall perchance haue occasion to declare hereafter.