THE PRACTICE, PRO­CEEDINGS, AND Lawes of armes, described out of the doings of most valiant and ex­pert Captaines, and confirmed both by ancient, and moderne exam­ples, and praecedents,


Luke 14.31.


What king going to make warre with a forreine prince, sitteth not downe first, and taketh counsell, whether he be able with ten thousand, to meete him that commeth against him with twen­tie thousand?

Cicer. offic. lib. 1. In rep. maximè conservanda sunt iura belli.
Ibidem. Sunt qui quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen inuidiae metu non audent dicere.

IMPRINTED AT LON­don by the Deputies of CHRISTOPHER BARKER Printer to the Queenes most ex­cellent Maiestie. 1593

The excellencie of military prowesse.
REi militaris virtus praestat ceteris omnibus; haec nomen populo Romano, haec huic vrbi aeternam gloriam peperit; haec orbem terrarum parere huic imperio coëgit. Omnes vr­banae res, omnia haec nostra praeclara studia, & haec forensis laus, & industria latent in tu­tela, & praesidio bellicae virtutis. Cic. pro Murena.
The necessity, & vse of armes.
Magna imperia armis non ignauia tenentur. Tacit. Annal. 15.
[...].Pericles. Thucid. 1.
Without warres we cannot escape the malice of our enemies: and the more willing and readie we are to beginne, the lesse courage will our enemies haue to assaile vs, saith Pericles.
Inermes prouinciae cuicun (que) seruitio expositae, at (que) in pretium belli cessurae erant. Ta­cit. Annal. 17.
Such countries as are disarmed are exposed to bondage, and giuen as a spoile into the hands of the Conquerour.
[...].Xenophon. exped. Cyr. 3.
They that by skill and practise of armes ouercome their enemies, not only as­sure their owne estate, but also purchase that which the vanquished possesse.
Vae victis, sayde Brennus to the vanquished Romanes that went about to re­deeme themselues with money, for all calamities accompanie those that are o­uercome. Plutarch. in Camillo.
Liu. 5. What account is to be made of va­liant captaines and souldiers.
virorum fortium sunt. All things yeeld to valiant men.
Si omnes qui reip. consulunt, cari nobis esse debent: certè inprimis imperatores, quorum consilijs, virtute, periculis, retinemus & nostram salutem, & imperij dignitatem. Cic. de orat. lib. 2. If all those that care and haue the charge of the common wealth ought to be deare vnto vs: then especially ought our noble Captaines, by whose counsell, prowesse and perill, we mainteine the estate and honour of our coun­trey.
Salus publica in militibus. Lamprid. in vit. Alexand. Seuer.
The safetie of the state is committed to the hands of Souldiers.
Against such as for hope and de­sire of present peace, bring vpon the state a dan­gerous warre.
Si Barbarorum est in diem viuere: nostra consilia sempiternum tempus spectare de­bent. Cic. de orat. lib. 2.
If barbarous nations onely respect the time present, it behoueth vs in our counsels to foresee, that by delayes we incurie no danger in time to come.


ALthough (my good Lord) discour­ses of armes in this time of peace and securitie may seeme vnseaso­nable to some kinde of men, that mislike nothing more, then to haue their eares grated with the sound of drummes, & rumors of warres: yet to such as foresee those stormes that hang ouer our heads, and see that there is no other sheltre, but in the practise of armes: I doubt not, but they will be both pleasant and acceptable. The beginning of all good successe, is good counsell and direction: the ac­complishment is expedition. in counsell nothing auay­leth more, then to followe good examples of expert and wise men. If then we would eyther reforme the disorders of our proceedings in warres, or settle the discipline of armes among our souldiers which is slenderly knowen, or practised by them; what course is better then to viewe, consider, and followe the doings of most famous war­riours both of former, and late times? this argument therefore I haue chosen as most worthy my labour, and most necessarie, and profitable for this state; and as I could haue finished the same.

We heare of our enemies preparatiues against vs, and know their pride and malice, nay we haue seene and felt their attempts. admit the warres are not at our doores, yet wee may easily perceiue, that they are very neere vs: and howe neere we knowe not. why then doe we not a­wake? nay why doe we not prouide and arme, seeing the [Page]Spaniard by sending ouer such swarmes of trayterous and seditious priestes and Iesuites among vs, hath giuen vs such cause of an alarme? already he is come into Britaine, that confronteth all the westerne coaste of England: and shall we doubt whether he meaneth to come neerer vs? and not doubting, why are we so slowe in taking armes?

What prouision is to be made, and how it is to be em­ployed, howe warres may be for causes enterprised, and howe with honour and good successe prosecuted and at­chieued, so that neither the enemie shal haue cause to re­ioyce or hope, nor we cause to lament or feare: finally how we may reforme disorders, and auoide future dan­gers, of compassion of my louing countreymen, and fel­lowes, whereof some still followe the warres, and mere loue to my deare countrey, and no respect of gaine or glory (God is my witnesse) I haue in this discourse ensu­ing done my best endeuour to declare: and I trust not al­together out of season. for if we haue warres, what more conuenient, then to reason and talke of warres? and if we are in expectation of warres, yet do I not see what reason we haue to keepe silence in such doubt and expectation of warres. but were it, that neither we had warres with the Spaniard, nor others, nor stood in doubt of their at­temptes or forces: yet can we not continue many yeeres without warres. Great Nulla magna ciuitas diu qui­escere potest. si foris hostem non habet, domi inue­nit: saith Annibal Liu. 30. countries and states cannot rest. if they haue no enemies abroade, yet restles heades seeke worke at home. therefore can no time be thought vnseasonable, for to discourse of these matters. if we enioyed peace, yet can we not assure vs of it without armes: if we doubt our ene­mies practises, there is no safer course then to arme. He qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum. Veget. lib. 3. cap. 1. that desireth peace, he must prepare for warres. and long longa belli prae­paratio celerem facit victoriam. Publius. pre­paratiues of warre made in time of peace, giue speedy victorie in time of warres. men doe not easily prouoke or attempt warres [Page]againct a Nemo bello l [...] ­cessere, aut face [...] audet iniuriam regnovel populo, quem expedicū, [...] promptum ad re­sistendum, vindi­candum (que) agnos. cit. Cassiod. va [...]. 3. nation or countrey, that is ready to resist, & prouided to prosecute iniuries. contrariwise the peaceable and in­consideratiue are a spoile, and praye to their neighbors. The careles and peaceable people ofJudges 18. Laish were easily oppressed by the children of Dan. so seely foules are a praye vnto the egles and rauening birdes. suppose we should yeeld vnto ouer enemies any thing, which in rea­son they can desire: yet is that no meanes for vs to ob­teine peace. for those that veterem s [...]ren­do iniuriam inui­tas nouā. Lin. l [...]b. endure one iniurie, doe but giue courage vnto their enemies to offer an other. and oftentimes thehostes sibi ali­quid dedi postu­lant, vt illud sit ad reliqua agenda gradus. Tacit. annal. enemie desireth somewhat to be yelden to him, that the same may be a steppe to further matters. the bitch that desired of the shepheard (as it is in the apologue) a couch where to litter; when her whelpes were growen great, began not onely to defend that place as her owne, but also to en­croche more, and to offer diuers iniuries vnto the shep­heard. the best therefore is to resist betime, and though we doe not resist, yet it is wisedome to be prouided: for no time ought to be spent of wise gouernours in delights of peace, before that matters be setled for the execution of warres. It was one of the greatest commendations that Liuy giueth to Philopoemen, that riding by the way, Liui. 35. and in common talke, his most common argument was vpon matters of warre: which made him so skilfull in those matters. much more therefore ought wee to consult and prouide for wars, being heretofore openly defied & inuaded, & now very hardly threatned by the Spaniard. his nauie came in hostile maner vpon our coast; his commissions giuen to his captaines declare, that he holdeth vs for enemies: his subiectes haue exercised diuers actes of hostilitie in taking our goodes, imprisoning, and ransomming our persons. neither doth any Spaniard thinke, but that such, as are by the Popes bull excommunicat for heretikes, are [Page]open enemies, and may be inuaded without other defi­ance. And if we did not likewise account the Spaniards to bee our enemies, why haue wee sent our shippes to spoyle their countrey? why haue we taken their persons and their goodes? why doe wee assiste the enemies of Spaine, and withstand the Kings proceedings wherein we may?

That warres are not proclaimed, it skilleth not. For warres (saithBellum aut in­dicitur, aut geri­tur. Cic. offic. 1. Tullie) are eyther proclaymed, or made without proclamation. Neither can it passe for payment, that some distinguish assistance from confederacie, and colour all our doings at sea vnder the name of reprisals. if the king of Spaine shall euer bee able to requite vs, hee will well let vs vnderstand, how litle our distinctions will helpe vs, and will vse vs as enemies.

Perdicca King ofThucid. 2. Macedonia, although associate with the Athenians, yet for that vnder hand hee ayded their enemies, bought it deare, as soone as his doubling came to be e­spied. neither doe I thinke, that wee shall escape better cheape, if (which God forbid) the Spaniard shoulde at any time be iudge. Wherefore seeing there is no other way to escape his malice, but by force and armes, let vs consider what course is best for the enterprising, and pro­secuting of warres. which being helde of the Romanes at the first by Disciplina mi­litaris, iam inde ab initiis vrbis tradita per ma­nus, in artis per­petuis praeceptis ordinatae modum venerat. Liu. lib. 9. custome, at length grew to Art, & was administred by certaine precepts: by which they grew victorious not only ouer their neighbors, but also ouer the greatest part of the worlde. by obseruance whereof diuers ancient, and later Captaines haue wonne to themselues perpetuall fame; and which if it might be recalled, would nowe also worke the same effectes.

Some percase will mislike this treatise, as all other of like argument, for that they suppose, that skill in armes [Page]is rather to be learned by practise, then rule; and that all such discourses, are vaine conceites and supposalles, of men more able to speake, then performe. and true it is, that as in all other things: so in this especially, specula­tion is nothing worth without practise. among the Ro­manes, the Iuuentus in castris per labo­rem vsu militia [...]. discebat. Salust. coniur. Catil. youth did learne the Arte of warre by practise, and labour in the field. but what notorious follie is it to condemne Arte and reason, because practise doth manie things oft times without reason, or Arte? and what man that liketh the effectes, can iustly condemne the causes? now then seeing as practise dependeth vpon certaine reasons, and rules, and is often vncertaine, by reason that the same hath not the same groundes at all times: let no man condemne rules and the reasons of warrelike proceedings in respect of his owne experience, and knowledge. for although a man shoulde be trayned vp in warres from his infancie; yet can hee not knowe all the reasons of warre by his owne experience.

Wherefore admit a mans experience bee neuer so great, yet shall hee learne much by reading of Military discourses, more then euer his owne experience could teach him. therefore did Scipio, and Caesar, and other famous captaines spend much time in reading of anci­ent deedes of Armes. and Tully reporteth ofCum totum iter & nauigatio­nem consumpsis­set partim in per­cunctando à pe­ritis, partim in re­bus gestis legen­dis, in Asiam fa­ctus imperator venit, cum esse [...] Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. Cic. Academ. 4. Lucullus, that albeit his practise in Armes was not great, yet by rea­ding and questioning with those that had skill, he grew in short time to be most skilfull. if Xenophon had not learned more by reading then practise, hee coulde neuer haue per­fourmed so many duties of an excellent Captaine, as hee shewed in leading of the Greekes so long a iourney, and deliuering them from so many assaultes of their ad­uersaries, in their returne from their voyage with Cy­rus.

a Alphonsus a king of Spaine confessed, de reb. Alph. that by bookes he lear­ned both the practise, and lawes of armes. Yea Selim the bar­barous Emperour of Turkes (as their histories witnesse) was much conuersant, and skilfull in Caesars commenta­ries translated into Arabicke; and read diligently the hi­stories conteyning the famous deedes of his ancestours. he must be very arrogant that would say, that the reading of Frontinus, Vegetius, Liuy, Caesar, Xenophon, and other an­cient histories and discourses of deedes of armes, both of Greekes and Romanes could profite nothing, nor adde any thing to his owne experience. and meere follie it is, where men may haue rules to followe, there to rush in at all aduentures. La Noue his discourses are much estee­med of men well experimented in armes. but double commendation had he deserued, if as he hath set downe certeine pointes of his knowledge, so he had deliuered all the orders and proceedings of warres, and confirmed the same with examples of famous captaines and rea­sons of art, rather then with such [...] examples, as he vseth.

Neither is it reason, that the labours of all shoulde be measured by the presumption of some, which write of matters, of which they neuer had experience, as Nicholas Machiauell, and Robert Valturius a certaine Italian pedant, which neuer had seene the field; and some others, which spend whole bookes in talking of the diuers formes of battels, some like starres, some like sheares, some like sawes, and some like winde-mill sailes, which neuer haue vse but in mosters; and leaue the most necessary points of warre, in preparing for the warres, choice of souldiors, marching, encamping, fighting, retiring, besieging, or defending of townes, ambuscades, stratagemes, and such like necessary factions of armes. Wherfore, seeing I nei­ther [Page]commend speculation, without practise; nor tread in the steppes of others, but therein make supply where they are defectiue; I trust my labours shall haue fauoura­ble reading. the rather for that they are not gathered by vaine speculation, but proceede from him, that hath had but too much experience in the disorderly warres of our time: and hath no other respect, then the redresse of disorders, and the honour of his country.

It may be these rules should haue had more weight, if they had proceeded from some great commaunder, or man of auctoritie. for of all men they deserue most cre­dite that are both writers, and doers themselues. in which respect I do aboue all honor Caesar among the Romanes, and Xenophon among the Greekes; and of late writers Francis Guicciardin, a man employed in great matters. as for Iouius, and Sabellicus, and some others, that I will not name, for that they were al ignorant of matters of warre, they make many very improbable & ridiculous reports, which no man of iudgement coulde allowe. but what if men of authoritie haue not, or will not, or percase for their manifold distractions, and busines cannot: will not those that knowe not things themselues heare the same reported by others? great wise men in time past haue not disdained to followe the aduise of simple men.Salust. bel. Iugurth. Marius by the aduertisement of a common souldiour wanne a strong ca­stle in Numidia. [...]. Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 4. Xenophon did not except the time of his re­fection, or when he tooke his rest, but admitted euery man, that could giue him any important intelligēce, to his speech. Charles the last Duke of Burgundy refusing to heare a prisoner that craued audience,Phil. Comin. lib. 7. fell into the traps of Campobacho his treason; and doing all things vpon his owne head, without admitting any relation, or councell of others, was defeated by the Switzers, and by them miserably slaine at Nancy. And if the [Page]chambers of some great commaunders in our time had not beene so straitly kept; they could not haue beene so ignorant of the state of the enemy and of their owne for­ces, and all addresses of warres, as they were. wherefore seeing I doe neither speake by speculation or heare-say, nor rest vpon mine owne opinion, nor desire any thing of mine to be beleeued, further then the same is confir­med by the example of those, against whom no excepti­on can iustly be taken; I trust that these either rules or ad­uertisements of mine, shall not lightly be regarded.

But (may some reply) what do the examples of the an­cient Romanes, and Greekes, and their proceedings in wars cōcerne vs, whose practise, & stile in wars is so farre different? these men imagine by reason of the vse of ar­tillery lately inuented, that the reasons & rules of armes are changed, and that the Romanes if they liued in our times, would be new to seeke. but they are much abused. for the generall rules are alwayes the same. there is, and alwayes hath beene but one order of prouiding, procee­ding, marching, fighting, retiring, encamping, besieging and defending of places. and I doe not thinke but if any could recall, or woulde practise the reasons, and rules which the ancient Romans vsed, hee should greatly pre­uaile. if there be any speciall difference, the same shal be noted in his proper place. if then the ancientagitatū in con­cilio est, ut si quā ­do seuero imperio vllum bellum ad­ministratū esset: tunc vti discipli­na militaris ad priscos redigere­tur mores. Liui. 8. Romanes thought it their best course in their most dangerous warres, to returne to their old discipline of armes; and if Flor. 58. Scipio coulde not ouercome the Numantins; nor Salust. bel. Iug. Metellus Iugurtha; nor Tacit. Corbulo the Parthians, before they had setled their gouerne­ment according to the ancient practise of armes: let vs not dis­daine to follow the examples of such great captaines, and wise men in reforming of present errours, and disorders according to the true and loyall practise of armes.

Hard, I know, it will be to returne backe. for customes inueterate are not easily rooted out; and desire of money hath corrupted many mens mindes. without pay & pro­uision the souldier is starued, the warre is slacked, and what hope haue souldiers either of better prouision, or pay? without these things how can the souldier march, fight, or keepe other orders of warre? who wil aduenture, without praise, or reward? who will serue his countrey when he seeth in most countries those aduāced soonest, that spoile their country most to enrich themselues? for this cause some vnworthy the name of Captaines make gaine of their places, and souldiers refuse all extraordi­nary labour, and valiant captains and souldiers are slen­derly considered, and lawes of armes lie silent, for that there is none to execute them, and few that know them. for this cause and such like, I had almost beene discoura­ged from writing this discourse, and among others, that keepe themselues for better times, and liue an obscure life determined to settle my selfe. for what hope could I haue of better, seeing in all places all things bend to worse? many seeke to enioy the pleasures of peace. none maketh any prouision for warre, souldiers neglect discipline of armes, no reckoning is made in any place of braue souldi­ers, captaines are employed onely for necessitie, rewards come slowly, & only those are esteemed that haue mony.

The only hope that susteineth me, and hath thus farre in these my endeuours auanced mee, is grounded vpon that expectation, which all this nation hath of your he­roical actions. God hath placed your Lordship as it were on a high stage in this estate. neuer man had greater fa­uour of the beholders, nor was more likely to obtaine a singular applause of the people. all mens eyes are fixed vpon you, to see what effectes will follow those vertues, [Page]and noble partes, the which already haue made your name honourable. as others choose ease, so your Lord­ship hath folowed the wearisome trauailes of warres. by your owne experience in the seruice of the Low Coun­tries, of Portugall, and France, you both vnderstand the practise of armes, and the wants of the souldiors. the ge­nerall hope of al souldiors, nay of al that loue their coun­trey is, that your Lordship which so wel vnderstandeth the common disorders of the warres, and the great im­portance of them, and hath so great fauour and meanes by reason of your auctoritie to correct them; wil one day be a meane to see them in some part redressed. all those parts which are required of a sufficient generall, do seeme to florish, and shew forth themselues in your doings, and promise these things in your behalfe.

Through disorder of some, & ignorance in others, to speake nothing of pinching & false reckonings, hitherto her Maiestie hath not bene resolued to bring into the field a sufficient armie: and those small forces, if I may so call such smal troupes, that haue bene employed in diuers ser­uices, haue wanted much of their necessary prouisions: not that the charge is so great that it could not be borne, nor for that her care was lesse then is conuenient. (for if the same order were abroad that is at home, why may not this countrey mainteine thirty or fourty thousand a­broad, that mainteineth so many millions at home? men do not spend more, nor eate more abroad, then at home:) but the reason why a sufficient army is hardly maintei­ned, is because there wanteth good directions, and or­ders, and punishment of bad dealing. some impute the fault to griedy mens insatiable couetousnes, which like a goulfe wil neuer be filled: but that is not all, nor the grea­test disorder. others thinke it impossible for this Realme [Page]to beare the infinite charge of an army. but why should not this whole kingdome be able to mainteine 30. thou­sand in pay, when as the citie of Rome, the territory being not past ten miles in breadth, in that warre which the same had with theLiui. lib. 8. & 9. Latins sent forth ten legions which being full at that time, amounted to 40000. foote beside horsmen? but what should I speake of Rome the mistres of the world for warlike discipline, when as the Cities of Athens, and Sparta, nay the townes of Thebes, Corinth, Argos, and diuers other in Greece, & Italy, mainteined great armies, both at home & abroad vpon their owne charges? who seeth not then, that the cause of these calamities and disor­ders is want of militarie knowledge, and not want of meanes; and that as disorder, want of reward, and punish­ment is cause, that our enterprises are so easily dissolued, and vanish of themselues; so order and gouernement in ancient times were causes of their happy successe, and would also make our affaires succeede the better? I neede not seeke farre to finde examples for proofe of this mat­ter: seeing the good gouernment of Edward the first, that so long warred in Scotland, of Edward the third, and Hen­ry the fift, and eight, that were so victorious in France, a­forde vs such store. if then the griedines of some were re­streined with sharpe punishment, & men of heroical spi­rits, not tainted with the base desire of gaine, were allured with honor, & preferment to take vpon them the charge of matters; if such were chosen for commanders, as haue nothing before their eyes, but honor and the enlarge­ment of the commonwealth; and all men were resolued to bestow more in iron and steele, then in silkes and vel­uets and golden coates: and most things were gouerned by lawe and order of warre, and not by fauour and parti­alitie, or (which is worse) by money; in summe, if true and [Page]ancient discipline of armes were either restored, or setled among souldiers; I would not doubt but that this Coun­trey would be able not onely to mainteine a sufficient strength of men, but that we should also recouer the an­cient glory of the English nation spread farre abroad in France, Spaine, and other countreys in time past, & now blemished only with some mens misgouernment.

Wherefore seeing it hath pleased God, not only to make your Lordship acquainted, but also partaker of the common calamities of souldiers, and giuen you fauour and accesse to her Maiestie in whom it lyeth to reforme these abuses; as you haue hitherto employed your person and goods in the seruice of her, and your countrey, so I beseech you cease not, vntill such time, as you haue ac­complished the redresse of these disorders. these are they that without any one stroke of the enemie, haue broken our enterprises. it is not the courage of the Spaniard, nor force of the Dutch, nor brauerie of the French, that hath frustrated our late attemptes; neither doeth force so often ouerthrow armies in fielde, as daliance, irresolution, and delay; then through niggardise, and good husbandry, want of pay, and necessarie furniture; thirdly, presumpti­on, and want of strength and sufficient force; and lastly, those abuses which through want haue crept into armies of late time, & for pitie could not be corrected. for what conscience is it to punish those that spoyle and wander abroad, when if they should not thus doe, they should sterue for hunger? if a Generall haue sufficient force and prouision, it is his fault, if he doe nothing: if he want ei­ther force, or pay, then it is their fault that should haue sent him foorth better prouided. many doe great wrong to our Generals in the Portugall expedition, when they impute the fault to them. God knoweth that with such [Page]slender prouision, nothing could be done more. others that are more deepely to be charged for breaking that enterprise, yea and famishing of many poore soules lye hid, and I thinke meane not to answere, vntill such time as God shall call them before his tribunall seate, there to answere once for all.

If any meanes could bee deuised, that abuses of im­prests, and false musters and accounts taken away, loyall captaines might be chosen, and poore souldiers be well furnished, and that matters might proceed with speede, and resolution, and more force bee ioyned together: I would then hope, there would be some seruice done. without forces cōuenient, what reason hath any to hope for better? for as a little water sprinkled on the fire doth make the same more to flame, and sparkle; so small sup­plies doe rather kindle, and nourish warres, then ende them, or exstinguish them. The onely meanes to redresse both these, and all other disorders consisteth in the resto­ring, and by sharpe punishment mainteining of true mi­litarie discipline, and orders. Without this, as a discra­zied body is easily dissolued without outward force; so an armie though neuer so great, without one blow of the e­nemie is broken, and scattered without doing any effect. With exercise of armes and obseruance of true disci­pline of war great enterprises most happily are atchieued.

The Romani sibi or­bem subegerunt armorum exerci­tatione, disciplina castrorum, vsu (que) militiae. Veget. de re mil. Romanes did subdue the world by the exercise of armes, and their orders of encamping, and practise of warre. Neither did they excell the Quintilian, in milit. Mar. Germanes and Danes in multitude; nor the Carthaginians, nor kings of Macedonia and Asia in wealth, but in strict obseruance of the discipline of armes. Nor could the Spaniards haue done such things as they haue of late, but that they excell others in the obseruance of militarie discipline. Neither were it possible that the Turkes should [Page]haue preuailed so much against Christians; but that they reward vertue highly, and punish disorders seuerely, and keepe a strict order in the gouernment of their campe, & armie. If then we either desire, or will hope for good suc­cesse in martiall affaires, nay if wee meane to mainteine our state, and our reputation; of force we must obserue mi­litarie and martiall orders: Which if once by your Lord­ships meanes, I might see restored, which I doe hope; then would I not feare either the malice, or power, or riches of the Spaniard, or other forreine enemie of this state. This therefore is the thing which especially I commend to your care: which indeede is the cause of the whole coun­trey, and ought to be the care of all that loue the honour, peace, and prosperitie of the same.

For confirmation of your Lordships iudgement, that well knoweth more then I can say, and for direction to such as be ignorant: I haue, as neere as I could, described the right course & true discipline of armes confirmed by ancient & later precedents of most expert warriors: and because it so pleased your Lordship, published the same: I haue likewise set downe not only the proceedings, but al­so the causes and necessary prouisions of warres, without which all order is vaine, and all proceeding without ef­fect. The same I haue consecrated to my countries ho­nour vnder the fauour of your honourable name. Vouch­safe therefore (my good Lord) to accept this my simple goodwil, not worthy the name of a gift. Yet is it all which I haue wonne not onely by long obseruation, but also by dangerous experience both in France, Italy, Flanders, and Portugall. It grieued me not a litle being in her Ma­iesties seruice, to see such confusion among vs, but much more that our wants were such, that wee could not exe­cute lawes. The causes I haue declared before. The re­dresse [Page]I haue set downe in the discourse following after. The which, for that your L. seemed to like the same, and for that I doe thinke it may be profitable to my countrie­men, and fellowes in armes that stil continue that profes­sion; I thought it good vnder the shadow of your hono­rable fauour to communicate to others.

Partly delayes and presumption, and partly disorder and misgouernment, and partly want of necessary proui­sions doth more hurt oftentimes, then the enemies open force. Of all disorders the onely remedie and medicine is, as I haue saide, true discipline of armes, which I haue here to my vttermost skill and endeuour declared, and with diuers examples of most renowmed Captaines confir­med. against whose doings many may percase repugne, but none can take iust exceptions.

I would once I might see the same put in execution vnder your Lordships gouernance: (for what auayleth knowledge of law without execution & practise?) if not, yet shall I wish all honour and good to those that shal en­deuour to put orders in execution. If any good come of my labours, the same is wholly to be ascribed to your Lordship, whose singular fauour towards me both at home and abroade, gaue me first occasion, leisure, and meanes to write these discourses; if none, yet I trust in­different men will accept my good meaning. My purpose was, if my experience, hauing nowe almost ceassed from all such wearisome trauailes, could doe others good, to affoord them all the helpe I could, and also to giue my countrey aduertisements, concerning such matters as are very important, & requisite to be generally knowen: that order may be taken in time.

The successe I commit to God, the care to your Lord­ship, and others whom it concerneth: beseeching the Al­mightie, [Page]that is Lord of armies, and gouern our of all our actions, so to direct the affaires of state vnder the gouer­nance of our gracious Soueraigne, & to giue that fauour to your endeuours, that the glory of the English nation by your noble deedes may be increased, the blemishes of our proceedings in warres washed away, and all good or­ders restored.

Your Lordships most bounden and willing Matth. Sutcliffe.

❧ To the Reader.

MAny doe wonder, some complaine, and those that haue least interest, if so bee they haue any loue to their Countrey, they cannot chuse but lament, that in those warlike actions which of late yeeres haue bene attempted publikely, the successe hath beene so slender, the losse of men so great, the charge so bur­densome, and the proceedings and effects so contrary to antiqui­tie: and as naturall affection leadeth them, I doubt not, but ma­ny are inquisitiue and desirous to know the causes. And to say trueth, good it were that the true causes of disorders were pub­likely knowne, that not onely those that are wrongfully charged may be cleared, but that those that laugh in others griefes, and rise out of the common ruines might be knowen, and rewarded: at least that the causes of former disorders may bee remoued, and that such prouision and order as hath beene hitherto wanting, may in time to come, and in time also be better supplied. For this cause I haue framed this discourse. Wherein when thou shalt see what is required in the orderly proceeding and managing of warres; thou maiest easily see what we wanted, and (I feare me) shal want, vnlesse it please God to touch mens hearts with a more zelous care of their countries honour hereafter. I doe not meane any one speciall man more then others, God is my witnesse. What soeuer he is that by delayes, irresolution, niggardise, rapine, cow­ardise, trechery, and other villeny abuseth his prince, and coun­try: let him not thinke that I aime particularly at his person; but at delayes, irresolution, niggardise, rapine, briberie, cowardise, trechery, want of skill, and such other abuses. I haue no meaning to touch any thing that may sound to any mans hurt or disgrace. And therefore although I haue store of domesticall examples, [Page]yet haue I chosen rather to exemplifie abuses by forreine histo­ries. My purpose is to doe good to all without hurt to any particu­lars, vnlesse percase those that liue vpon pillage, doe account the common good to be their priuate hurt, when the meanes of their gaine shall be taken from them. If then thou desirest to see the causes of former losses, or els wishest to know how breaches of for­mer time may be repayred; behold but this treatise, wherein as thou shalt see the good successe of all those that proceeded orderly, and like men of warre: so thou mayest also see, that those that haue neglected discipline of armes, and warlike proceeding, haue had euents and successe according to their deseruing.

Now to the intent thou maiest the better both addresse thy affaires, if thou hast any charge in warres, and vnderstand the proceeding and continuance of warres, and warlike actions; I haue followed in this discourse the order of time, setting downe those things first, which are first to bee considered, prouided, and executed; and so prosecuting euery action of warre seuerally by it selfe. Those that haue done otherwise, I see they haue trifled a­way many words without any small profite. They talke of rankes and arayes at large, others of building of fortresses: (that belon­ging to a good Serieant properly, this to a good mason.) But howe souldiers shalbe prouided, and how they shall proceede, and howe souldiers and fortresses are to be gouerned, they scarce mention; sure few of them know, or can declare. Besides these they omit manie other necessarie poyntes of warre, wherein the safetie of an armie, and a state consisteth. Wherefore omitting, or slen­derly handling those sleight poyntes; I haue chosen other matters more important to dilate, beginning first with the cau­ses of warres: then with the prouision, that is made before warres be attemted. For although souldiers are the principall actors in these tragicall matters: yet before wee drawe an army into the fielde, or make leuie of souldiers, manie things are to be considered, and prouided. First wee are to consider, that our [Page]cause be good, and iust. For warres without cause are nothing, but robbery and violence contrary to humanitie, and reason: se­condly all things necessary for the warres are to be prouided: thē are souldiers to be leuied, and exercised, and so brought into the field to prosecute all other necessary faits of armes.

1 First therefore I will (God willing) declare, what causes make warres iust, or vniust, and what are the effects of lawfull warres, and therein also what solemnities, or circumstances are to be considered in defiance of our enemies, or first attempts of warre.

2 Secondly, what prouision is to be made of treasure, armes, munition, victuals, ships by sea, and carriages and tents by land.

3 Thirdly, that wee are to strengthen our selues with the helpe of confederates, and associates, so much as we can, and to draw what friends, or strength wee can from the enemie, both before we attempt warres, and after.

4 Fourthly, what partes, and qualities are required in a General, and what counsell he is to adioyne to himselfe, and whe­ther it is better to giue souereigne authoritie in warres to one a­lone, or to more: likewise what authority and commission the Generall ought to haue: further what is to bee respected in the choyce of Colonels, of Captaines of companies, and other officers of the army: and what in the choyce of common souldiers: what othe they are to take, and how much the souldiers of our owne na­tion, are to be preferred before strangers: what inconueniences ensue of want of pay: what numbers of souldiers are required in warres, and finally, how souldiers are to be exercised, that they may be made ready for the warres.

5 Fiftly, what things are to be considered of those that are to transport an army by sea, or by land into an other countrey: and whether it is better for the English nation to inuade the Spani­ard, or any other forreine enemie in his owne countrey, then to receiue his assault at home, or to stay vntil he come on our coast, [Page]or within our countrey: and lastly what cautions souldiers sent abroade in succour and ayde of other nations are to vse.

6 Sixtly, what order and aray an army is to obserue in mar­ching, and how the same may march safely in the enemies coun­trey, surmounting all difficulties, whereby either in champion, or wooddy countries, or els in the passage of riuers, or hilles, and straites it may be disordred, stopped, or hindred.

7 And for that we are not onely to offend, but also some­times to defend, we are also to shewe what oppositions, and tra­uerses the defendants are to make, thereby to stoppe the progres­sion, and marche of the enemie: and how to send our men safely forth on forraging, and howe to stoppe, and cut off the enemies forragers.

8 For that oft times, time is vainely spent in deliberations, daliances and delayes, to the impouerishing of many states, and ouerthrow of many good actions; we will shew by many proofes, that nothing is more aduantageous then expedition, and celerity in preparing, marching, executing, fighting, and all enterprises of warre; nor any thing more hurtfull or dangerous, then delaies.

9 What orders are to be obserued, in the fortifying, defen­ding and gouerning of our campe and lodging, that we be not ei­ther charged a l'improuista, or easily forced to fight.

10 We will also shewe, that as the assaylants in the enemies countrey are to seeke that the matter may be soone tried by bat­tell: so the defendants without great aduantage are to auoyde it: and further by what meanes the enemie may be brought to fight, and how those that feare to fight, may auoyde the encounter with least losse.

11 Before the Generall doeth bring foorth his armie into the fielde, many things are to be considered, all which shalbe de­clared in the eleuenth Chapter.

12 In the twelfth we are to discourse of the aray, and charge of an armie encountring the enemie in open fielde: and therein [Page]of the vse of horsemen, of pikes, halberds, targets, small shot, ar­cherie, and great ordonance.

13 In the thirteenth shall follow a briefe treatise of strata­gemes, ambushes, and whatsoeuer deuises serue for the more rea­dy atchieuing of our purpose.

14 After the victorie once obteined, and the enemie van­quished, in the next Chapter we are to shew, how the victorie is to be vsed, and the conquest may best be mainteined.

15 And because the hazard of warre is doubtfull, in the fif­teenth Chapter we purpose to declare, by what meanes an army that is foyled, or feareth to fight, may most safely, or with least danger, or losse retire, and howe the enemie in following the course of his victorie may be stopped.

16 The sixteenth Chapter shall conteine precepts, and orders for the gouernment of a camp that besiegeth a citie or fort, and what course is best in besieging, battering, assaulting, or en­tring the same.

17 For the behoofe of the defendants, the 17. shall declare what proceeding is best in the defence and gouernment of a towne or place assayled, besieged, battered, assaulted, or demy­forced.

18 And for that sea townes are not easily defended, nor be­sieged without a nauie at sea; in the next place followeth a dis­course concerning the vse of ships of warre, and how they are to be prouided, ranged, and managed in sea-fightes.

19 Next vnto the execution of warres followeth the treaty of peace, truce, and confederacies, of which we are in the 19. Chapter to intreate, and also of the assurance of articles of peace, truce, and confederacie, and likewise of the priuiledges of am­bassadors, and messengers by which such matters are treated and brought to passe.

20 After warres ensue rewardes of such, as haue behaued themselues valiantly in the seruice of their countrey: and there­fore [Page]in the 20. Chapter we are to entreat of the rewards of va­liant souldiers, & punishment of cowards and disorderly persons.

21 In the last Chapter, for that our souldiers are for the most part raw and ignorant, and would haue things expressed and taught them plainely, I haue gathered together certaine milita­rie orders, some concerning religion & manners; others concer­ning & especially tending to the common safetie of the state, ar­mie, or garrison, or els concerning the speciall dueties of captains or common souldiers; others respecting the campe, or towne of garrison; others specially belonging to sea causes, and aduentures at sea; others to the Officers of the army, or fleete; others concer­ning booties, spoyles, and prisoners; and some concerning the ex­ecution of lawes and administration of iustice. out of which I would haue so many as are fitting for the seruice in hand to be chosen out, and put in writing, and proclaymed openly and deli­uered vnto euery captaine or colonell, that euery man may vn­derstand some part of his duetie, and what punishment is due for his offences.

These things I haue for thy sake not without great labour brought together, and layde foorth in this forme which I haue declared. Reade them therefore with indifferencie, and weigh them with iudgement, and say not this can not be so, for I neuer sawe it. the authoritie is drawen from those which haue seene more then thy selfe; and standeth vpon better reason, then with­out experience thou canst imagine. if thou allowest and likest my reasons, followe them, and vse them: if not, yet proceede not a­gainst reason. my only desire was to profit my countrey, and to content and profit thee▪ other boone or reward I craue none, but that I doe not receiue at thy hands disgrace, for my diligence; nor reproofe or scorne for my good will. which because common humanitie forbiddeth me to feare, I will bid thee a dieu, and be­gin to addresse me to my purpose.

¶ The right practice, proceedings, and lawes of Armes.

CHAP. I. What causes make warres iust or vniust, and what are the effectes of lawfull warres, and what solemnities or circumstances are to be considered in defiance of our enemies, and first attempts of warres.

IT is needelesse (as I suppose) to dispute, whether it be lawfull, either for Christian Princes to make warres, or for christians to serue in warres. Those that thinke it vnlaw­full, as men deuoyd of iudgement in religion and state, are declared long since to be both heretical, and phrenetical persons. The law­fulnes there of is apparent, for that most godly and religious princes, as Iosuah, Dauid, Iehosaphat, Iudas Macabeus were great warriers, & their warres so allowed, that the spirit of God calleth them the warres, or battels of the Lord, neither was the same altered by Christes comming, as the Anabaptists dreame. The holyRom. 13. Apostle sheweth, that the Magistrate carrieth not the sword in vaine. But he should carry it in vaine, if hee might not as lawfully repell publike force, as he may punish therewith priuate wrongs. Iohn Baptist when the souldiers came vnto him, he exhorted them not to giue ouer their manner of liuing, but to con­tent themselues with their wages, & to do wrong to no mau,Act. 9. Cor­nelius the Centurion notwithstanding his souldiers profession, hath a notable testimony of the holie Ghost, to be a man that feared God: and if he had not beene such; hee had not receiued the holie Ghost. The true seruants of God (sayth S. Ad Bonifac. Augustine) make warres, that the wicked may be restrained, and goodmen be relieued. Beside this, what state in this notable corruption, & malice of mens nature could endure any time, if warres against violent persons were vn­lawfull? [Page 2]without warres who can warrant vs against spoyle and iniury? it is the law of nature, and nations that putteth weapons in our hands for our defence; without warres ciuill lawes against rebellious subiects cannot be executed; and so should remaine with­out edge. S. Ambr. de of­fic. Ambrose saith, that it is the office and parte of iustice by warre to defend our country from the enemy, our confederates, and such as by reason of their weakenes neede our aide, from spoy­lers, and oppressors. Wherefore taking this as granted, that some warres are lawfull: let vs proceede to examine, what those things are that giue vs iust cause of warres, which is a matter much to be regarded, vnlesse we will be accompted among those tyrants that rage and vexe men without cause.

If the cause of him that warreth be good, the issue cannot be e­uill, saith Bern. de nou. mil. Bernard. the Frangit & at­tollit vires in mi­lite causa. Ouid. cause, as it is good or euill, so either aba­teth and breaketh, or whetteth the souldiors courage. causa iubet su­peros melior spe­rare secundos. Lucan. and good and iust causes make men hope ro receiue fauour of God in the is­sue, and triall. Euentus belli velut aequus iu­dex, vnde ius sta­bat, ei victoriam dabat. Liui. 21. the euent oftentimes is according to the iustice, and qualitie of the cause; and [...]. Eu­rip. Electr. seldome do they returne in safety, that go forth to draw their swordes in euill quarrels. Dionysius ofLib. 2. antiq. Ha­licarnassus sayth, that the Romanes therefore preuayled for the most part, for that they enterprised no warres without iust causes. contrariwise theIus in armis ferebant. Liu. 5. Gaules which accompted that iustly gotten, which they could winne with their sworde, though otherwise very valiant, receiued many great foiles. for this cause (as sayth Philip ofPhil. Com. li. 4. Commines) Princes when they list to quarrel with their neighbors, pretend honest causes, although oft times vntrue. The French that with some colour they might receiue such as in Gas­coigne, or Guienne rebelled against the kings of this realme, subor­ned certaine Gascoignes, and Poicteuins to complaine of vniust ta­xations made by the English in the dayes of Edward the third, and Richard the second. And Lewis the eleueuth of France instigated certaine rebelles to complaine ofPhilip of Com­mines. Charles duke of Burgundie, that vnder colour of doing iustice, he might with more reason inuade his territories. These pretenses & shewes make great disputes betwixt princes, and states, while euery man will seeme to make his cause good, and to do nothing without iust causes. Let vs therefore now consider, what causes are sufficient to iustifie the taking of armes, what are counterfeit, and insufficient.

First it is lawfull to vse [...]orce, and take armes in defence of our country, true religion, our goodes or liberty.Hoc & ratiodo­ctis, & mos genti­bus, & feris na­tura ipsa praescri­psit, vt omnem semper vim a corpore, a capi­te, a vita iua pro­pulsarent. Cic. pro Mil. Reason teacheth the learned, and custome instructeth all nations thus much, which euen the instinct of nature printeth in wilde and sauage beastes, that it is lawfull to repell force offered to our life, to our person, and the state with force, and by what other meanes wee can. Most iust cause therefore had the Romanes to make warres vpon the Gaules, vpon Annibal, vpon the Daues, and other barbarous nations, that came to take away their country from them; & like cause had the Greeks to withstand the Persians, & other barbarous people, that by armes would haue conquered them, and depriued them of their country and liberty. the same cause did the ancient Britons defend against the Romanes, Saxons, Danes, and Normans, though not with like successe. And seeing of late time the Spaniard came vpon our coast with fire and sword, menacing the English nation with all the cala­mities that follow such inuasions, I thinke no man will deny, but we haue iust cause to put on armes in defence of our countrey, reli­gion, liues, liberties, and lawes. in this case not onely our cause is iust, but the warre is of necessity to be vndertaken, which greatly hel­peth the iustice of our cause. for as the captaine ofIustum bellum quibus necessa­rium, & pia arma, quibus nulla, nisi in armis relinqui­tur salus. Liu. 9. Samnites said in like case, that warre is iust, whereto we are inforced, and with good cons [...]nce may we take armes, when there is no safety for vs, but in armes.

It is likewise lawfull to represse pirats, and publique robbers by force of armes, if they will not yeeld themselues to be tried by order of common iustice. They are enemies of peace, & ciuil gouernment, and by the lawes defyed, and proclaimed as publike enemies of states. their bodies may be taken, and their goodes spoiled as in warres with other nations. The warres made by the Romanes a­gainst Spartacus, who, assembling a mutinous route of rebelles and hindred al trade, was iust and necessary. in thisff. de iust. & iure L. furē. & ad L. Corn. de sicar. L. itaque. case, because such do rise and assaile vs vpon a sodaine, the law of nature giueth war­rant of defence without publike commandement or commission. neither is it onely lawful, to cleare the sea of pyrates, but also hono­rable.Thucid. Minos made his name famous, for that he cleared the sea of pyrats, and opened the way for marchants. which fact also procured [Page 4]great commendation to Pompey the Great. Moreouer, if our coun­try be wasted and spoiled, and our goods taken away by forreiners: it is lawful by force and armes to seeke for restitution, if otherwise it cannot be obtained. Tully Quod rebus repetitis geritur. offic. 1. accompteth that warre iust, that is made after demand of things wrongfully taken, & vniustly deteined. these quarrels often fal out betwixt borderers, theRomulus Al­banis bellum in tulit, quod eorum dictator nollet res raptas redde­te. Dion. Hal. lib. antiq. 3. Romans for this cause made diuers roades vpon the Sabins, Volscians, Albans and others their neighbors. Tullus Hostilius had no other causes of his warres against the same people. This hath bene the beginning of many con­tentions betwixt vs and the Scots. of the warres betwixt theLiu. 1. Ro­mans and Sabins there was no other cause, but the spoile of the Ro­man marchants. among other causes of the third warres of theFlor. Epir. Ro­manes against the Carthaginians, the taking of certaine shippes, and spoiling of certaine Marchants is alledged as principall. The Switzers beganne their braules with the Duke ofPhil. Commin. Burgundy for a loade of skinnes taken away by the Countie of Romont. likewise it is, where at a sodaine roade our goodes are spoyled, or driuen a­way, and deteined from vs. for which cause the Romanes warred vpon the Tarquiniēsibus rebus nequicquā repetitis, quod agrum Rom. po­pulati essent, bel­lum indictum. Liu. 7. Hetruscians & diuers of their neighbors. Iust cause there­fore haue wee also in this respect to make warres vpon the Spani­ard, that without destance of warre, stayed our shippes, and our marchants, and spoiled their goodes. were not mens minds [...]oled, and almost frozen with feare and age, these iniuries would inflame them. howsoeuer it is, men ought not to stay vntill the flames of our country enflame them.

In this case those that first offend do giue iust cause of warres, not those that seeke restitution by armes; as is euidentLiu. 1. by the example of the Romanes, and Albans, where the first iniury being offered by the Albans, made inst the cause of the Romanes. Yet if things taken away be offered againe, and satisfaction be promised to bee made for wrongs done; it is not iustice nor reason, further to prosecute the quarrel begunne. it seemeth not reason (saieth [...]. Thu­cid. 1. Archidamus) to prosecute him by force, that submitteth himselfe to order of lawe. and commonly those that refuse reason when it is offered, come af­terward to wish they had taken it, when they can not haue it. The French disdaining and scorning the great offers made by the blacke Prince, were shamefully by him ouerthrowne at the fielde of Poytiers. TheNon suae reddi­tae res, non alie­nae accumulatae satis erant. Liu. 9. Romanes refusing the satisfaction made by the [Page 5] Samnites, receiued a notable disgrace being by composition disar­med to saue their liues at the streites of Caudium: and Philip of Commines conceiueth, that Charles duke of Burgundy prospered neuer the better, for that he refused the humble submission, and satis­faction of the Switzers, desiring peace at his hands.

The iniurie that is done to the subiects redoundeth to the Prince, and reproches and contumelies done to ambassadours, and messen­gers returne vpon those that send them. both these things minister lawfull cause for Princes, & states to take armes in hand. The Ro­manes with sharpe wars prosecuted Appian. Alex­andr. Mithridates, for that by one generall proclamation he had caused diuers of their people to be massacred in Asia. the same cause armed them against the Latines and Volscians. The Volscians againe inuaded the Romans, for that reprochfully their people were commaunded out of the Citie at the time of their Liui. 3. publike games. The Heduans rebelled against Caesar vpon Caes. bel. Gal. 7. conceit of some wrong offred to their people in ye campe of the Romanes. And among al causes of warres betwixt Princes, this is commonly inserted for one, that either their subiects are slaine, or wronged: as appeareth both in the beginnings of the Romane warres against the kings of Macedonia, and also against the people of Carthage: and the same was ye common pretense of theFroissart. French, to inuade vs when we held Gascoigne, Guienne, and Normandy.

Yet more neere doth it touch a Prince when his ambassadours are violated, forasmuch as that iniurie is thought to be offered to his owne person. Therefore did Dauid warre vpon the children of Am­mon for the villeny they offered his ambassadors. The shamefull re­proche which the Corinthians offered the Romane ambassadours, was the cause of the warre betwixt the Romanes and them, and of the sacke of Corinth. Friderick Barbarosse for a scorne offered him by them of Milan, besieged and tooke their Citie. the first quarrell betweene theLiu. Romanes, and Veians grewe vpon a proud answere which the Veian Senate made. And deare it cost the Rhodians, that taking part with Perseus, they abused the Romanes in their inso­lent termes. The slaughter of the Romane ambassadours, was the first cause that moued them to warre vpon Gentius-king of Illyrium, and aggrauated the wrath of the Romanes against the Veians: and caused Caesar to sacke diuers cities of theBel. Gal. 6. Armoricans.

The rebellion of subiects against their lawfull Princes, is also a [Page 6]sufficient cause to arme the prince against them. he carieth not the sword for other purpose, but to represse the wicked and rebellious. king Dauid prosecuted not onely the rebell Ziba, but also his owne sonne Absalo [...] that rose against him. the Romanes suppressed the se­ditious Gracchi, Saturninus and Catiline. and iust cause had our Prin­ces to subdue by armes the seditious route, that vnder the leading of Iacke Cade, Iacke Strawe, Kette, and other rebels rose against their liege and soueraigne Princes. for although rebels and pyrats, and robbers are not accompted among the number of lawfull enemies, which the Romans called hostes legitimos, nor did enioy the ff. De captiu. L. hostes. right, nor were to be vsed as enemies in lawfull warres; yet is the force vsed against them most lawfull.

Moreouer it is a lawfull, and iust cause for a prince or nation to arme their people in defence of their associates, or such as flie vnto them for succour being vniustly oppressed. Deliuer those (sayth the wise man) that are drawne to death. those that are wronged (sayth [...]. Arist. rhet. ad A­lexandr. Aristotle) not onely may, but ought for their honors sake, to arme in defence of themselues, their allyes, and friends, and to helpe their associates being oppressed. Cicero in his bookes de rep. alloweth those warres to be lawfull that are made aut pro fide, aut pro salute. that is, eyther for our owne defence, or for defence of our friendes, whome wee are bound by promise to helpe. and as well doeth heOffic. 1. charge them with iniustice, that repell not iniurie, when they are able; as those that doe wrong themselues. And if we giue credit to SaintFortitudo quae per bella tuetur à Barbaris patriam, vel defendit infir­mos, vel à latro­nibus socios, ple­na iustitia est. Ambros. de offic. Ambrose, valiant men, that defend their countrey from barbarous people, and protect the weake, and shielde their associ­ates from such as would spoyle them, doe the office of true iustice. for defence of their Populus Rom. sociis defendendis terrarum omnium potitus est. Cic. de rep. 3. confederates, the Romanes receiued this re­ward, that they became the lordes of the world. the Romanes had no other cause to enterprise the warre against the Visum est Cam­panos deditos nō prodi. Liu. 7. Samnites, but for the defence of the Campanians, which were vniustly vexed, & had yeelded themselues into their protection. The first Cartha­ginian warres had no other originall, but for the defence of the Ma­mertines. for the same cause likewise did they send defiance to PhilipRomani infen­si Philippo ob in­fidam erga soci­os pacem. Liu. 31. ob iniurias & ar­ma illata sociis populi Rom. bellū indictum. Liu. 31. king of Macedonia, for that he vexed, and iniuried their confede­rates in Greece. Iosua protected the Gibeonites requiring his ayde, from the conspiracie of the kings of the Cananites. the forsaking of our associates & friends, [...]. Thucid. 1. Sthenelaidas the Spartian calleth treason, [Page 7]and disuadeth the Spartans from committing any such offence. the Romanes were Saguntinos crules us quam Poenus hostis pro­didit, vos soci, prodidistis. L. 1.25. accused of treason, for that they abandoned their confederates the Saguntines being besieged by Annibal. for which fault they endured the penance of sixteene yeeres warres in Italy. neither was any thing more infamous in Charles of Bur­gundy his actions, then his colde defence of his associat the duke of Britaine. Philip of Commines accuseth Lewes the 11. for abando­ning his confederats of Liege. Caesar, Verebarut (Cae­sar) ne Gall [...]ota deliceret, (h Ger­gouia capta) nul­lum in annor praesid [...]m elle [...]. Caes. 7. bel. Gal. least all his associates in France should forsake him, was driuen with great hazard to suc­cour his friends besieged in Gergouia. the duke of Normandy, yon­ger brother to Lewes the 11. ouerthrewe his owne estate departing from the association of Charles duke of Burgundy. wherefore we haue not onely iust cause to warrant our proceedings against the Spaniard in defence of our confederates of France, and the lowe Countries; but also necessarie reasons to moue vs to prosecute mat­ters more forcibly, vnlesse we meane to engage our honour, and neg­lect our owne estate. what wisdome or honour it was to refuse them, that yeelded themselues before the surrender of Antwerpe vnto the duke of Parma, I report me to those that know those mysteries. sure nowe that we haue begunne to assist them of Holland and Zeland; it is neither honour, nor safetie so to mince at the matter, or to go backe. whatsoeuer we call our doings, it wilbe as the king of Spaine will take it, if euer be haue power to be iudge. the onely meanes to marre and crosse his sentence, is with great forces to withstand so mightie a Prince, and not longer to dally.

Breach of couenants likewise is numbred among the iust causes of warres. we put on armes (saithPlat. in Al­cibiad. one) eyther being deceiued by our enemies, that performe not promise, or being constreyned. the Romanes began their warres with Perseus king ofLiu. 42. Macedonia, vpon occasion of breach of the articles of peace made before, be­twixt his father, and them: and for the like cause also renewed their warres with them of Carthage. and for the same cause warres haue bene opened betwixt vs, and the Scots, as at Muscleborough fielde vpon the deniall of the Scottish Queene promised to king Edward; and betweene the French, and vs.

Many wise princes haue an eye to their neighbours greatnesse, and perceiuing how preiudiciall their encrochments may proue vn­to thē, haue iust cause to withstand them. Lewis the 11. sent ayde to [Page 8]the Switzers, & Duke of Lorreine against Charles Duke of Bur­gundy hauing no other cause, then the suspicion and feare of his greatnes. The true [...] Thucid. 1. cause of the Peloponesian warre against them of Athens was the suspicion and feare, that their neighbours had of their power and greatnes. And yet that cause was not once menti­oned. The Princes and States of Italy of long time haue had a se­cret league amongst them to moderate the excessiue power of the king of Spaine in that coūtrey, if at any time he should go about to encroche vpon any one of them. Herein consisted the speciall Guicciard. hist. lib. 1. com­mendation of the great wisedome of Laurence Medici the elder, that during his time, he kept all the states of Italy, as it were in equall ballance, not suffering any to passe their ancient limits. And I doubt not but our gouernours in the defence of the lowe Coun­tries haue a speciall regard, that the king of Spaine settle not him­selfe in the quiet possession of Holland, Zeland, and the rest: least that enioying so many commodious portes, ships, mariners, and commo­dities, he might percase afterward make that a steppe to stride ouer, or at least to looke ouer into England. As Vt quisque ab oppresso proxi­mus sit, per om­nes velut conti­nens incendium peruadet. Liu. 37. euery nation is neere to those that are subdued, so will the fire once enflamed embrace it, and so passe ouer to the rest, as Antiochus said to Prusias, perswa­ding him in time to withstand the Romanes. The Romanes percei­uing that the Samnites, after they had subdued theLiu. 7. Sidicins, in­tended to warre vpon their next neighbours the Campanians; they delayed the matter no longer, nor suffered them to proceede further. time it is therefore for Christian Princes to awake, and iust cause they haue to withstand the encrochments of the king of Spaine, that vnder pretence of the Romish religion eniambeth vpon al his neigh­bours, vnlesse they will be swallowed vp in the vnsatiable gulfe of the ambitions tyrannie of the Spanish nation.

Last of all, whosoeuer adhereth to our enemies, and aideth them with men, munitions, and victuals against vs, they are also our ene­mies, and giue vs iust cause of warre against them. this cause moued the Romanes to defie theLatinis quod e­orum iuuentus hostibus mixta populata esset Rom. agros, bellā indictum. Liu. lib. 6. & 7. Latines, that ayded their enemies; and the same is reckened among the causes of their warres against Phi­lip kingLiu. 31. of Macedonia. for he did not only aide the Carthaginians with men, but also ioyned with Annibal in league against the Ro­manes. No iust cause therefore haue our neighbours to complaine, that we haue stayed their shippes, that caried victuals, munitions, [Page 9]and other commodities to the Spaniard. There is no fault but one, that as we haue stayed some, so we haue dismissed others, and haue not made prise of al by Publike authoritie, and that those of the lowe Countries do commonly trade into Spaine, for whose sake the quar­rell is vndertaken with Spaine. The Romanes as in the treatise of peace they comprised their owne confederates; so in denouncing of warres they defied their enemies, and their associates. as is eui­dent in that forme of defiance, which they published againstcum Antiocho rege, qui (que) eiu, sectā secuti sunr, bellum initum. Liui. 36. Antio­chus. Which ye Greekes also obserued in the Peloponnesian warres made not onely against the principals, but also all their adherents. And it is the Memoires de Fr. common forme of defiances vsed at this day.

As for warres vndertaken through Libido domi­nandi causa belli. Salust. coniur. Catil. ambition, and anger, and such like affections, they are vniust, and the causes vnlawfull. nei­ther are they to be excused, that forced by strong hand out of their owne countrey, doe seeke by violence to possesse that, which belon­geth to others. For this cause ye Romanes resisted with such force the Gaules, Germanes, Danes, Gothes, and others that came to dwell in Italy. And although such wanderers haue had good successe in diuers countreys by reason of the sinnes of the inhabitants, as the Saxons, Picts, Danes, and Normans in this land, the Franks, Bur­guignions, and Normans in Gaule, the Lombards, & Gothes, in I­taly, and Spaine: yet was not the cause of their warres iust. for euery one is to holde him to his owne lot, vnlesse the countrey be waste, and dispeopled; which countrey God giueth to these that can possesse it. and therefore did the Sueuians iniuriously forbid any to dwell in their waste borders: and the Spaniards haue no reason by force and lawe to keepe other nations out of the Indies, which not­withstanding themselues are not able to people.

Yet to make iustWhat beside the cause is to be respected in law­full warres. warres, it is not sufficient only, that the cause be iust; but that they be enterprised first, by those that haue soue­raigne authoritie; secondly, that they be not begun especially by those that inuade others, without demaund of restitution or satisfaction, or denunciation; and last of all, that they be not prosecuted with barba­rous crueltie. The first point is expresly set downe in termes in the Romane lawes, & allowed by consent of all nations. TheC. quid culpa­tur. 23. qu. 1. Canons doe also confirme the same. And if it were in others power, great in­conueniences would ensue. It is a speciall marke of soueraintie to haue power of warre & peace. In Liuy these formes are very vsuall: [Page 10] Praenestinis ex S.C. populi iussu bellū indictum est. And againe, ex aucto­ritate patrum populus Palaepolitanis bellum fieri iussit. The wars of the Romans against theLiu. 21.31.41. Carthaginians, Philip, Antiochus, Perseus, and others, were not enterprised but by auctoritie of the people, which in that state had soueraigne commandement in those times. Him that beganne any braules, or made peace with forreine nations of his owne priuate head, [...]. Plato 12. delegib. Plato in his common wealth adiudgeth wor­thie of death. And therefore did Hanno giue counsell to the Cartha­ginians, that they should deliuer vp Annibal to the Romanes, for that he had begunne the warres against them without publike au­thoritie. Those that offended in this case, by the ff. Ad L. Iul. ma­iest. & L. vnic. C. vt armorum vsus. lawes of the Ro­manes were in case of treason. Marcellus vpon that ground buil­ding his reasons, would haue perswaded the Senate to deliuerCaes. de bel. ciu. 1. Caesar to the Gaules. And so scrupulous haue some men beene in this Realme in stirring without commission, that they doubted, whe­ther without commaundement they might leuy forces to represse re­bels. This percase might seeme too scrupulous, but they thought it better to be too slowe, then too forward. For they Hostes sunt qui­bus publicè bellū indicitur, reliqui sunt latrunculi & praedones L. ho­stes. ff. de captiu. are onely to be accompted publike enemies in warre, who by those that haue su­preme auctoritie, are declared enemies. If any vpon priuate moti­on fall on spoyling, they are but theeues and robbers, sayth Vlpian. And this (saithcont. Faust. Manich. Augustine) is the order of nature best agreeing with the peace of states, that the councill and auctoritie to make warres should rest in Princes. That warres are to be denounced on the assaylants side, diuers reasons perswade vs.Nullum bellum est iustum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geritur, aut antè denunci­arum est, & indi­ctum. Cic. of­fic. 1. There is a iustice in warres to be obserued, sayth Tully, which iustice requireth, that warres be eyther denounced, or made after deniall of things de­maunded, that haue beene vniustly taken from vs. He speaketh of warres made by those, that inuade others. For to defend our selues without more wordes, is lawfull by the lawes both of nature, and na­tions: and very ridiculous it were, to threaten those that haue begun to strike vs already. Those therefore that thinke we haue no warres with the Spaniard, because they haue not heard them proclaimed, are like to those that will not ward, or strike an enemie that commeth vpon them without saying, beware. Caesar minding to assayle Ario­uistus, sent a Caesar perlega­tos bellum indi­xit Ariouisto. de bel. gal. L. 1. defiance to him before hand. When Annibal came with an huge army into Italy, the Romanes defended themselues, without spending time about denouncing, or threatning of warres. Otherwise those that first begin warres, doe vse first to speake before [Page 11]they strike, which was not only ye course of antiquitie, but also of later times. Onely ye king of Spaine hath thought it lawfull vnder colour of treatie of peace, without any defiance to cut our throtes, if he could. It may be, he taketh ye Popes excōmunicatiō against yt Prince & peo­ple of this land for a sufficient denuntiation, or warrant to inuade vs without other circumstance. This he learned of Alphonsus a Castro, that determineth warres Li. 2. de iust hae­ret. puniend. against heretikes to be lawfull, which he taketh to be defied by auctoritie of the Canon. And in his determi­nationAial, de iur, bel. lib. 1. Baltazar Aiala, a great man among ye Spaniards resteth: & no maruell, if they obserue no solemnities in warres against vs, whō they hold for heretikes, hauing already determined, that faith Concil. con­stant. and promise is not to be performed vnto heretikes. I neede not to de­scribe ye forme & wordes vsed in defiances. He that will reade ye forme in time past vsed by ye Romanes, let him peruseLib. 16. c. 4. Aulus Gellius. Later formes are reported in later histories, & much talked of by Heralds, that claime yt to be part of their office. But litle seemeth it materiall to know yt formes of defiances, seeing in these times neither forme, nor substance is strictly in this behalfe obserued. Onely thus much Prin­ces messengers yt goe vpon this arrand of defiance are to take heede: first, that they passe not ye words of their cōmission, secondly that they vse no words of reproch, or scorne. It is reported yt Frācis the 1. king of France, would not heare the Herald sent him from Charles the 5. with defiance, before he had caused a gibet to be erected to put him in mind what he should haue, if he kept not himselfe within compasse.

In executing of wars, this precept must diligently be had in remem­brance, yt there be no crueltie vsed. There is moderation euen in the executiō of iustice, not onely in other actions of warre. And Caesar in his victory against Pompei, cōmanded his souldiers to spare the Ro­manes. to delight in blood, is signe of a sauage nature.Con. Faust. The desire of doing hurt, and crueltie in execution: a mind also implacable and sauage is iustly blamed in warres saith S. Augustine. those that yeeld themselues, are not to be slaine. Galba for that he slewe the Lusitani­ans, after that he had taken them vpon composition, was iustly there­fore accused by Cato. It is no victory to kil an enemie disarmed, nor iustice to kill our prisoners in colde blood. The execution done in the Generals chamber vpon the prisoners after the battel of Cognac, an. 1569. did greatly blemish his honor. Who doth not detest ye Histoire de trou­bl. de Fr. executi­ons that haue bin done vpon men disarmed after cōpositiō at Mailè, Mucidan, & diuers other places during these late troubles of Frāce? [Page 12]yet may not prisoners vpon this libertie presume to abuse, or attempt any matter against those that haue taken them. for then they deserue no fauour. Caesars souldiers at Hirt de bel. Hisp. Munda in Spaine vnderstanding, that if the Townesmen sallyed out vpō them, their prisoners would charge them vpon their backes, were forced to massacre them. likewise were the English forced to kill their prisoners after the bat­tell of Poytiers, fearing least they should vse some trechecie, when the enemie made shewe to assayle them.Que ningun soldado mate mu­ger ninno vieio ni person inhabil aunque sea en la furia del vincer so pena de la vida, ni ponga la mano in tales personas. Sancho de Lon­dono. Women, children, and old folkes, by the orders of warre obserued nowe in the Spanish campe are exempted from the souldiers furie, in the sacke of Townes. The present French king deserueth great prayse, for suffering the poore, and impotent people of Paris to passe through his armie, although it were much to his preiudice, practice of armes required percase other rigour, as appeareth by the crueltie executed by Caesars souldiers at Auaricum, and the Sea townes of France on such kind of people, thereby to make the besieged eyther sooner to yeelde, or to spend their victuals: but this best beseemed a Christian king. The Turkes saue such for slaues. Christians therefore ought to doe that for conscience, which Turkes doe for gaine.

Of this discourse, this is the summe, that those What warres are lawfull. warres are iust and lawfull, which are made by the soueraigne Magistrate, for law­full and iust causes, being both orderly denounced in cas [...] requi­site, & moderatly prosecuted, to the end that iustice may be done, and an assured peace obteined. In which case it is lawfull for any man with good conscience to serue in warres: but if the warres be notoriously vniust, let euery man take heede howe hee embrewe his handes in innocent blood. The Christian souldiers that serued Iulian the Apostat, would not drawe their swordes against Christians, al­though they willingly serued him against all others. Yet doe I not make priuate men iudges of Princes factes. but what neede any iudgment where the facte is euident? and who shall answere for men that execute Princes wicked commaundements, before Christes tri­bunall seate? if the iniustice of warres be not notorious, the subiect is bound to pay and serue, and the guilt shall be laide to his charge that commaundeth him to serue. A good man may serue (saythAugust. lib. 22. con. Faust. Man. c. 7. Saint Augustine) vnder a sacrilegious Prince, where the iniustice of the commandement shall bind the Prince, as the duetie of obedience doth make the souldier innocent.

Iust warres hath these effectes. whatsoeuer § Item ea, instia [...] ­de rerū diuision. we take or winne from the enemie, that is iustly ours, and the same by the lawes of nations is accompted lawfull purchase. Sunt autē pri­uata nulla natu­ra, sed aut veteri occupatione, aut victoria. Cic. off. 3 nothing is proper by na­ture, but either by ancient possession, and seisine, or victorie, sayth Tully. Whatsoeuer Citie therfore, or Territorie is by vs taken in iust warres, the same is ours: likewise whatsoeuer moueable goods commeth to our handes. Yet is there great difference in this case be­twixt landes and goodes. the landes come to the Prince, or State that beareth the charge, to dispose at their pleasures, eyther among Dion. Halic. ant. lib. 2. those souldiers by whose blood they were wonne, or els after they be rewarded, among others for the benefite of the State. Alexan­der Lamprid. in vit. Alexand. Seuer. Seuerus the Emperour diuided the Countrey bordering on the enemie on the souldiers that best deserued, and their children also, so long as they should continue in seruice there. The spoiles of the enemie are sometime giuen to the souldiers, certeine things one­ly excepted.Liui. lib. 7. & 9. Valerius Coruinus making a roade into Samnium, gaue all the praye to his souldiers; likewise did C. Iunius at the ta­king of Bouian. The whole Senate of Rome gaue the sacke of Veij to the souldiers. The Spanish souldiers vse seldome to march to an assalt, but they will couenant to haue the spoyle. But if it might be obteined, the best course is, that all the spoyle brought to one place, the Generall should deuide it all, or most part among his souldiers, hauing regard to the most valiant, and hurt men which cannot be par­takers of the spoyle, which they procured with their blood, and this was the most common practise of the Romanes. And if there should be any other course taken, these inconueniences would fall out: the Generall should haue no meanes to reward those that best deserue. for howe can he, the spoyle being not in his power to dispose: the hurt should be depriued of their part; for that they are not able to runne about to spoyle: nay the most valiant shoulde haue least part. for commonly Ita segnior est quis (que) praedator, vt laboris pericu­lique praecipuam partem petere so­le [...]. Liui. 5. the most valiant souldier is the last that putteth vp his sword to goe to spoile. and contrariwise the most cowardly and disorderly companion, may percase light vpon the greatest and ri­chest spoyles: for winning whereof he scarse drewe out his sworde. furthermore by greedinesse of spoyle, many braue occasions are let slippe out of our handes, and many disorders fall out. Alexamenes hauing slaine Liuy. Nabis, and being entred Sparta, while he minded nothing but spoyle, suffered the enemies to gather head, and waxe [Page 14]so strong, that they cut him and his companie in pieces. Last of all, diuers contentions and braules fall out about the diuision of spoiles, especially where there are diuers nations in one armie. All this cannot be remedied, vnlesse there be some better order then vsuall in preseruing the spoyle.

In time past the Romanes disposed of their prisoners, as of the rest of the spoile, and he that was taken in lawfull warres, was slaue to him that tooke him. But nowe that captiuitie is abolished among Christians, ransomes succeede in lieu of slaues, so that a prisoner taken in warres, is not made a slaue, but is ransommed according to that reasonable agreement which is made betwixt the prisoner, and his taker. The lawes of Spaine and France doe yet more particularly diuide the spoyle takē in wars. Not only the countrey, but also ships of warre taken from the enemie, belong to the Prince by the Aial. lib. 1. Leg. Reg. 19. Tit. 26. Par. 2. cu­stomes of Spaine. By the same Reg. 29. & 30. customes the King hath the fifth, the captaine the seuenth part, the souldiers the rest. Sancho de Lond. compriseth their orders in certaine rimes:

Al'ausança de Francia & Castilla (saith he) el Reyno, la prouincia, & sennorio, el rey captiuo, la ciudad, ô villa es del rey, que ha exoe­dido empoderio. Del Generall que gana, es el que pierde, el puede res­catarle à su aluedrio. &c.

The summe of his long rimes is this: that by the customes of France and Castile, the Prince ought to haue the Kingdome, Pro­uince, Seignorie, or Citie, and the King likewise that is taken in warres. Other prisoners belong to them that take them, except the Generall, and men of marke and qualitie. which being taken by o­thers, are notwithstanding to be vsed to the benefite of the Prince. prouided alwayes, that he that taketh them, be honourably rewar­ded. All the ensignes, great artillerie, munitions of warre, and trea­sure, are likewise the Generals due. small pieces without wheeles, and pieces of small bollet belong to the master of the Ordinance. all broken pieces fall to the Gunners share. the rest of the spoyle is giuen to euery one that taketh it. This is the vse when a battell is ioyned, or a Citie is wonne. but in a roade they that loose their hor­ses in seruice, are first to be mounted eyther on horses taken, or on the common charge. the rest is to be diuided among the souldiers; yet so, that consideration be alwayes had of those that deserue best.

If our goods be taken away by the enemie, and presently reco­uered [Page 15]againe, then they returne to the owners propertie. The Volseis ad de [...] ­tionem compulsis castris (que) captis praedae pars sua cognoscentibus Latinis, & Herni­cis reddita sunt. Liu. 4. Vol­scians being forced to yeeld, so soone as their campe was taken, so much of the spoyles as belonged to the Latines, or Hernicans, was restored to them againe by the Romanes.

Sutrinis sociis vrbs corum codē die Camillo duce recepta, integra reddita est. Liu. 6. Camillus hauing recouered Sutrium out of the handes of the Hetruscians the same day that it was taken, restored the same a­gaine to the Citizens. The Praeda militi concessa, pecus exceptum quod intra dies 30. do­mini cognouis­sent. Liu. 24. goods belonging to their confederats, the Romanes did commonly except out of the spoyle. The Ro­manes after diuers yeres recouering the Territorie ofLiu. 24. Saguntum, restored the same to the ancient possessors thereof. And Liu. 30. Scipio re­stored diuers things to the Sicilians, which he found in the sacke of Carthage, and had beene taken from them. This right by which things lost returne to their owners, the Romanes called ius postli­minij. which belonged to Postliminio re­deunt haec, ho­mo, nauis, mulus clitellarius, equus, equa. Cic. Topic. & ff. de capt. leg. 2. prisoners in warre, ships, mules, carriage horses, or mares. Slaues ff. codem l. ab hostibus. returning or recouered, are to be restored to their olde masters. All ff. eodem l. Postliminium. captiues returning from the enemie, re­couer their auncient libertie and right. ff. Eodem. L. si captiuus, §. ex­pulsis. Paulus the lawyer sayth, that when a Territory is recouered from the enemie, the landes re­turne to their proper owners: and so the Romanes practised in the restoring of Verrugo, Sutrium, and diuers other Townes to the La­tines, Sabines, Campanians and others, hauing recouered them out of the enemies hands. Yet lands lost by cowardise, or trecherie of the owners, and recouered againe without their helpe and charge, are without this case, vnlesse the Prince restore them of fauour. Those that runne to theTranssugae. enemie, and traytors, were seldome receiued to mercie among the Romanes. Armes and horses of seruice lost in warres by cowardise, returne not to the owner.

These rules although by couenants and some circumstances they receiue alteration; yet for the most part they are obserued: which men of iudgement can easily discerne. And therefore leauing of further to discourse of the causes, let vs nowe discende to discourse what things are to be prouided, before warres be opened, that in our ne­cessitie, we be not to seeke for things needefull.

CHAP. II. That before we beginne the warres, prouision is first to be made of treasure, armes, munition, shippes, cariages, victuals, and all necessarie furniture, and instruments of warre.

THe sequell and effectes of warres being so dange­rous and pernicious, and the causes so many, and so easily offered: it behoueth al Princes and States to make sufficient prouision for warres, and al­wayes to be ready; but especially then, when the enemie is at hand, and threatneth to inuade vs; which is now the case of England. He ostendite bellū pacem habebitis: videant vos para­tos ad vim ius ipsi remittent. Liui. 6. that desireth peace, must be armed for the warres, and prepared, and those obteine their right soonest, that are prouided to winne it with force, as said a certaine captaine of the Latines. The Diu apparandū est bellū, utvincas celeriùs. Publius. prouision of things necessarie is to be made long before, if thou meanest to obteine the victorie quickly. Vegetius Antequam in­choetur bellum, de copiis expen­sisque solicitus fiat tractatus. Veget. lib. 3. c. 3. exhorteth those that purpose to beginne warres, carefully to weigh and consider their store and charges. When we are in action, and stand in neede of such things, it will be then too late to wish, to stirre, to send. Warres succeede not where such loose counsels goe before.

The things that are especially to be prouided before the leuie of men are these: first mony, then armes, horses, cariages, shippes, all munitions, and furniture of warre, thirdly victuals and clothes, lastly the helpe of confederates and friends. With money braue cap­taiues and souldiers are allured to serue, and mainteined and payed in seruice: all necessarie furniture of warre is bought, victuals and clothes prouided, intelligences with the enemie dressed, and main­teined, & many cōmodities procured; which otherwise cannot be had. so yt [...]. Demost. wise men doubt not to call treasure the sinewes of warre, with­out which they neither proceede, nor mooue, vnlesse it be backward. Tit. Liui. 35. Quintius merily noted Philopoemens want of money, when he compared his army to a body, that had strong armes & legs, but no belly; much like vnto Philopoemen himselfe, yt was so made. for as ye armes, legs, & outward partes receiue nourishment from the belly, & pine away if ye belly be euil affected & discrasied: so an Immensa pecu­nia inter ciuiles discordias ferro validior. Tacit. 18 army that is not mainteined with mony, is easily broken, & dissolued of it selfe. [Page 17]Contrariwise (as Archidamus the Spartan king said) [...]. Thucid. 1. store doth as much oft times sustaine the warres, as force. Pericles persuading the Athenians not to yeelde to the Lacedemonians, whose army could not long keep the field, or continue together for want of mony, sheweth thē, that the [...]. Thucid. 2. victory is furthered in warres, more by coūsel and store of mony, then violent inuasion. Archidamus further saith, that [...]. Thu­cid. 1. warres are as wel administred by cost & expense, as by armes, and that armes by expenses are made more availeable. The Lace­demonians in the Peloponnesian warre increasing the pay of their marriners a small trifle a day, drewe from the Athenians their best men. What the Spanish duckats, & French crowns haue wrought of late times, both Dutch, French, Italian, & English giue testimo­ny. Philip of Macedonia cōsulting with the Oracle by what means he might soonest onercome a certaine towne in most mens opinions impregnable, receiued this answere; If he fought with [...]. siluer lan­ces. Tacius the Liu. 1. Captaine of the Sabins for gold bought the Capi­toll of Rome. Liu. 25. Asdrubal with mony corrupted the Celtiberians, & made them shamefully abandon the Romane army, which first had hired them, and afterward was ruinated by them. With a litle mo­ney thePhil. Commi. English army was persuaded by Lewis the eleuenth to re­turne backe into England to our great disgrace. Money, saith [...]. Olynth. 1. De­mosthenes, must be prouided, and without it nothing can be atchi­ued in warres in order. The Spartans that vsed no money a long time, were at length taught, that warre could not be managed with­out mony. the manifold effects whereof our owne experience teach­eth vs both at home, and abroad. for want whereof many disorders haue fallen among our forces, which haue endured much through the enemies abundance.

Yet do I not yeeld so much to treasure, as if treasure could doe all things. We read that the naked Iustin. Scythian ouercame Cyrus and Da­rius, notwithstanding all their riches, and the poore Greekes in the Xenoph. exp. Cyr. expedition of Cyrus preuailed against the rich Persians. The army of Arr. Alexand. Alexander well fenced with yron ouercame the huge Persian army, that was so rich in gold and siluer. and likewise theLiu. 9. & 43. Romans armed with yron & steele vanquished the armies of the Samnites, and of Antiochus, that glistered in gold and siluer. Neither could the Carthaginian or Macedonian kings that farre surpassed the Ro­manes in wealth, match them with force. The rich man is com­monly [Page 18]a spoyle to the well armed souldier, and Caesars poore fami­shed troupes did driue the gallants of Pompey out of the field. The poore army of the English at the field of Poytiers, ouercame the braue caualiers of France, and a few poore nakedPhilip. Com. Switzers ouer­threw Charles Duke of Burgundy notwithstanding his riches and greatnes. They confessed that all their wealth would not buy the spurres of Charles his horsemen. The Spaniard is rich in golde, yet doth not the English souldiers feare him in the field. It is yron, not gold, that killeth in the encounter. Gold can doe much, but not all. and therefore were it to be wished, that wee had more contended with the Spaniard with the sword, wherwith we are able to match him, then with gold, wherein though we spend all, we cannot come neere him.

Wherefore let mony be prouided before hand, if not in such abun­dance as others haue it; yet so much as may prouide armes, victuals, munition, horses, for a competent army. If any man aske how much, I answere withPlutarch. A­popth▪ Cleobulus, that warres in this case haue no stint, nor set bounds: this onely may suffice to shew you, that if good or­ders were set downe and executed, it would neither be infinit, nor the charge so burdensome, as now it is.

The meanes whereby mony may be raised are diuers; either it ri­seth vpon lands belonging to the crowne, and that either by inheri­tance, or confiscation, or conquest; or vpon rents, or penalties, or im­posts, or other duties belonging to the Prince; or of subsidies, taxes, contributions and loanes of subiects, or vpon our confederates, and associats, or else vpon ransoms of our enemies persons, or countries. By which means seing su large reuenues come vnto the Princes of this realme, who seeth not that this realme wanteth nothing but good order in dispensing of the treasure, and sharpe punishment a­gainst those that purloine it: Nay if vayne expenses in apparel, ie­wels, silkes, golden coats, and other vanities were cut off, or employ­ed in armes, and necessary furniture of warre: there would be not onely sufficiencie, but also abundance.

The Romanes for maintenance of their publike stock had diuers inuentions and practices. Vpon Agripro pecu­nia dati, & in iu­gera [...]sses vectiga­l [...]s impo [...]ti. Li. 31. euery acre of ground of a country subdued, they imposed an annuall rent. The same might haue beene done in Ireland, if it had pleased the gouernours, to conuert it to publike vses, rather then to serue priuate mens desires, which [Page 19]notwithstanding by reason of their great disorders reape small com­moditie.

They looked strictly to their impostes. Annibal Annibal vecti­galia negligentia dilapsa restituit. Liu. 33. after peace made with the Romanes, to encounter with the couetousnes of of­ficers, restored the impostes at Carthage to their olde order. Philip the King of Macedonia purposing to make warres vpon the Ro­manes, did not onely increase his Vec [...]igalia auxit & noua instituit. Liu. 39. customes, but deuised new, for the maintenance of the warres. which is to be done onely in case of necessity, lest these new deuises of Italian impostes, make the Prin­ces odious to their subiects.

Where the ordinary reuenues were not sufficient, there wise go­uernors haue had recourse to equall contributions, taxes, and loanes. Asdrubal Pecunias impe­rat populis omni­bus suae d [...]tionis. Liu. 23. purposing to go into Italy with a supply to Annibals army, laide a taxe vpon all the people of his gouernement. The Duke of Alua in his time, and of late yeeres the Prince of Parma knew well how to put this in practise in the low Countries. When the city of Rome wanted money in the second warre with them of Carthage, Priuatis in ino­pia aerarii pecuni­as conferentibus, ita vt Scribae non sufficerent, nec remige in supple­mentum, nec sti­pendio [...]esp. egui [...]. Liu. 26. priuate men voluntarily lent mony so fast, that the de­puties appoynted to receiue it, could not dispatch them▪ so that by this meanes the Romanes neyther wanted marriners, nor pay for souldiers. For continuance of the publike treasury they had their lands and goodes rated equally, and euery man payed according▪ which equall proportion, if it were now obserued; I dare say it would greene no good subiect to pay, albeit it were twise so much, as now they do. Euery man brought in the quantitie of his lād, and the value of it vpon his credit; likewise the summe of his rentes and money. they that onely liued vpon traffike brought in the summe of their mony, and cleare gaines yearely, with this promise, that what was left out was confiscat and forfeit, and euery false summe giuen in, was punished with double. They that were not rated or at the least nūbred, were banished, or sold for slaues. Such as had nothing, were onely numbred in the rolle. The most of this is expressely set down in their bookes of law. Forma censuali (saithff. de censibus. Vlpian) cauetur, vt agri sic in censum referantur. nomen fundi cuiusque, & in qua ciuitate, & in quo pagosit, & quos duos vicinos proximos habeat, & aruum quod in decem annos proximos satum erit, quot esse iugera videatur. Vinea quot vites habeat, oliuetum quot iugerum, & quot arbores habeat: pratum quoque quod intra decem annos proximos sectum [Page 20]erit, quot iugerum pascua esse videantur, item sylua caedua. om­nia ipse qui defert aestimet. illam enim aequitatem debet admittere cen­sitor, vt officio eius congruat releuare cum, qui & in publicis tabulis delato modo ex certis causis vti non possit. Likewise Liuy where he mentioneth the taxing of the colonies by Nero and Salinator, hath these words:Colonies were such townes as the citizens of Rome repleni­shed with their owne people, and depended on the mother citie. duodecim coloniarum, quod nunquam antea factum erat, deferentibus coloniarum censoribus, censum receperunt, vt quantū nu­mero mil [...]ū, quantū pecuniâ valerent, in publicis tabulis monumēta ex­tarent. If the like rate and proportion were obserued among vs, that euery man might be rated according to his lands, farmes, rents and goods equally: the burthen would be more easily borne, & lesse com­plaint made, & more mony would come to the payment of her maie­sties souldiers.

So many countries as were vnder the protectiō of the Romans, or confederate with thē, did contribute to the common charge. where­in such equall taxation, and good order was vsed, that the countrey where the army was maintained, did defray the most of the charge. & good reason, seing it was for their defence. it would seeme strange to those that know not their proceedings, how Caesar did not onely maintaine his army 9. yeres in France at the charge of the country, but also enriched himselfe, and his army. The Athenians likewise after that the Greekes had driuen out theThucid. 1. Persians out of their country, for maintenance of their warres against them made an asso­ciation, appointing what euery Iland or city, or territory should pay toward the charge.

Somtimes the enemies being subdued or straited, were not only driuen to pay the charge of the army, but also great summes of mo­ny into the tresury. theS [...]ipendium ex­ercitui Rom. ab hoste in cum an­num pensum, & binae tunicae in militem exactae. Liu. 9. Hetruscians subdued by Decius did not only pay the souldiers stipend for one yeere; but were constrained to furnish euery souldier with two sutes of apparel. The same Liuy te­stisteth to haue beene performed of the Samnites, and Aequians. The Volscians had truce giuen them with these conditions, that they should pay the Liu. 9. Roman army for a yere, & restore that which they had taken away. Cornificius in Illyrio (now a part of Sclauony) although the country was not able to maintaine an army, yet kept ye same in order by his prudence saith Hirtius. Beside all this the Ro­mans after the warres ended brought infinit sums into the treasury.

Liu. 30. Scipio after the victorie obteined against Annibal, brought into [Page 21]it 123. thousand pouud weight of siluer. Quintius brought 18270. pounde in siluer bullion, 84000. pounde in coyned siluer, 3714. pounds of gold, beside a shield all of golde. Aemilius Paulus after his victorie against Perseus brought in much more. I forbeare to re­hearse lesser summes brought into the treasurie byLiu. 34. & 35. Furius, Heluius, Minutius, Cato, and others. And the rather, for that it was an vsuall matter, after the warres in any countrey ended, to bring great sūmes of money into the publike treasurie. If then, beside the maintenance of the armie, such store of money could be leuied of the spoyles; it is no such infinite matter, as is supposed to maintine an armie, in case the same be orderly gouerned, and well employed.

The reason that our small companies in France, and Flanders haue cost so much is, for that the same not being able to encounter the enemie in open fielde, are shut vp in some towne, and liue all vpon charge, without doing good to themselues, or hurt to the enemie. If there be [...]. Xenoph. paed. Cyr. 1. a mightie army in the fielde, what towne or countrey is not willing to redeeme the fauour of it? or what is stirring, that such power will want? if the army be a sufficient body of it selfe, and well furnished, there is no doubt, but if wise men haue the managing thereof, warres asRedemptori­bus vetitis fru­mentum parare, bellum (inquit Cato) scipsum alet. Liu. 34. Cato sayd will mainteine themselues, and if not all, yet sure defray the greatest part of the charge.

The Romanes in their extremities, to furnish their souldiers in warres, diminished and cut off a great part of their priuate charge. By the lawNe qua mulie [...] plus semunica au­ri haberet, neu vestimento ver­si colori vteretur. Liu. 34. Oppia made in the second war with Carthage for this purpose, women were prohibited to weare diuers coloured gar­ments, or to possesse more then halfe an ounce of gold. TheLiu 39. Cen­sors caused the ornaments of women, their coches, apparell & iewels to be valued in their taxe books▪ afterward whē disorders grew grea­ter, the pretorNe vasa aurea ministrandis ci­bis, ne vestis seri­ca v [...]ros foe daret. Tacir▪ annal. 2. Fronto published a decree, that no mā should vse gol­den vessel about his meate, nor that men should be defiled (I vse his word) with silken apparell. But now if gentlemen be not all be­raied with silks, they thinke themselues defiled, & disgraced. If any such law were now enacted, who seeth not what abundance of mony might be spared? if the accōpts be iustly taken, it wil be found that the veluets, and silkes, and forraine stuffe that commeth yerely into Eng­land would richly maintaine an army, and to spare, so that boldly I may say there wāteth rather order, then treasure for the maintenāce of our souldiers, thogh ye number were quadruple to yt, which now is.

To restraine the greedines of officers, both Romanes and other nations haue put diuers lawes in execution. Suchff. Ad l. Iul. re­petund. lex Iu. lia. fraudulent dea­ling the Romanes punished with banishment. which in ancient time was the greatest penaltie that they inflicted vpon their citizens, cer­tain heinous cases except.ff. Ad l. Iul. pe­cula [...]. leg. pecula­tus. Afterward such faultes were punished extraordinarily. and not onely the principals were punished, but al­so their seruants, and ministers. Xenoph. exp. Cyr. lib. 5. Philesius and Xanticles in the voy­age of the Greekes with Cyrus were seuerely dealt withall for dea­ling fraudulently, and stealing the common mony. Gylippus for the same cause wasPlutarch. banished Sparta, notwithstanding his great seruice done to the common-wealth in the warres against the Athenians in Sicile. Onely of late times, and in some places the most compendi­ous & assured way to grow rich is for men boldely to steale, & falsly to accōpt for such mony as passeth through their fingers. Therfore had they Aerarium opu­l [...]tum [...]enues res priuatas. Plutar. in vit▪ Demosth. a rich treasury in the greatest pouerty of priuate men: where­as in our times while certaine grow great and wealthy, the publike estate seemeth to grow euery day more then other poore and beggar­ly. When the tribute due to the Romanes could not be found in the publike treasury of Carthage,Peculatum quo­rundam accusans Annibal, pecuni­am ad stipendium Romanis inuenit. Liu▪ 33. Annibal by calling the fraudulent dealing of the officers in question, found more then sufficient to satisfie them. And if some od fellowes were in our time seased by the gorge, might they not thinke you be made to regorge that which they haue fraudulently, and closely swallowed?

It cannot be denied, but that these are compendious waies to find mony for paimēt of souldiers. but I feare me, we shal ue [...]er find out, or at least neuer vse these waies. and no maruell: seeing men doe so much delite to walk in bywaies. If Cato in his time Auaritia & lu­xuria ciuitatem la­borare conque­stus est. Liu. 34. cōplained that the commonwealth suffered much by the couetousnes of some, & riotousnes of others: much may princes of our time more iustly cō ­plaine when by couetise & extortion mē only purchase, and by vanity braue it out in riot▪ Impetrare ab a­nimo non potuit Perseus, vt impen­sam in rem maxi­mi monumenti saceret. Liu. 42. Perseus (as Liuy reporteth) for niggardise could not find in his hart to bestow any mony vpon his souldiers, though nothing imported him more. I pray God some in the end cōplaine not, that all their riches and wealth is reserued for them that seeke their ruine and ouerthrow.

Mony therfore howsoeuer it be, must be prouided in time. for with­out it, as fire without matter, wars wax cold & cānot long be maintei­ned▪ the same is to be deliuered to the General before hād, & to be pla­ced [Page 23]where it may best serue for the armies vse. The Cartha giniās had treasure ready at newe hic pecunia ho­stium sine qua il­li gerere beilum non possunt, quip­pe qui mercenari­os exercitus alant. Liu. Carthage in Spaine to serue them in their warres in Spaine. Caesar had his store at Caes. bel. gal. 7. Nouiodunum in the territo­ry of the Heduans, to serue him in his warres in France.

If so much cannot be prouided, as is requisit, then must men that possesse lands either serue vpon their owne charge, as the Romanes did at the first, and the Spartans did alwayes: or else those that stay at home must maintaine those that serue abroad, and a rate be laide vpon euerie shire and city, how many souldiers they shal maintaine paid. (TheSueui 100. mil­lia armatorum bellandi causa su­is ex finibus edu­cunt, reliqui qui domi remanse­runt, se at (que) illos alunt. Caes. bel. gal. 4. Sueuians by this means mainteined a hundred thousand men which euery yeere went out of the country to seeke aduen­tures.) Or else like slaues and pesants vnworthy the name of En­glish, must they serue strangers. I will not say more, for that it would be too great a shame, if this whole country coulde not main­taine an army as well as Athens, Sparta, Argos, Thebes, Me­gara, Locri, Tarentum, Syracusae, and other cities, and small states in Greece, Italy, Sicily, & other places. Therefore leauing these supposals, let good orders be set down, & strictly obserued; & if we be not so wise as to find the way our selues, let vs yet learn of our ene­mies among which men of value bee aduanced to honor, and fraudu­lent dealers be drawen vp to the gibbet.

The next care is to be had ofOf armes and furniture of warre. armes, & all maner of furniture for the warre: of al sorts of weapons; as pikes, halberds, black bils, mus­quets, caliuers, pedrinals, pistoies, lances, bowes & arrows, swords, and daggers: of al armes defensiue, as corsalets of proofe, & others, morions, targets of proofe, and lighter, iackets of male, and plated doublets, and other necessary peeces: of great artillery both for bat­tery, and for the field, of horses and their furniture; of shippes, mastes, tacle, artillerie, and al prouision necessary for the sea: of carria­ges both for ordonance, munition, and victuals, as also for other ne­cessarie vses: of tents for encamping: of powder and bullets and all things necessary both for great and smal shot: of bridges, and boats: of spades, mattocks, axes, wimbles, baskets, & finally al other engins or prouisiō for wars. al which is to be prouided & laid vp in places neere to the enemy, & where we meane to go foorth against him. Wherein wee shall not much erre, if we follow the precedents of such as haue shewed themselues most obseruant of the lawes of Armes. TheLily beum tent­batur ad appara­tum belli. Liu. 21. Romanes intending to passe into Affrike against them of Carthage, [Page 24]made their prouision at Lilybeum, a port of Sicile, looking toward Affrike. Before thatCirea arma­mentatia & hor­rea, alium (que) belli apparatum visen­dū praetor, lega­ti (que) ducti. Liu. 29. Scipio transported his army into Affrike, hee made exceeding great prouision of armes, and all warrelike furni­ture in Sicile, which the messengers that were sent to view his pro­ceeding could not behold without admiration. landing in Affrike he had there like wise his workhouses, & storehouses of prouision. The towne of New Carthage in Spaine serued the Carthaginians for a storehouse of al maner of prouision of armes, & warlike furniture for their warres in Spaine. Liuy Apparatus in­gens belli opisi­ces 2000. Liu. 26. saith there was infinit prouision, and 2000. workmen that wrought continually. The same towne being taken from the Carthaginians, serued Scipio for the same vse, who Vibs strepebat apparatu belli. ib. employed them in making of armes, and engins of warre most diligently. The Gaules reuolting from Caesar vsed wonderfull dili­gence in making of armes, & prouiding of horses, & furniture of war, in euery Caes. bel. Gal. 7. armorum quantū quae (que) ciuitas do­mi, quod (que) ante tempus efficiat constituit. city appointing what nūber of armes & weapons should be made. The kings of Macedonia had diuers armories both within & without their realme; so that althoughChalcis hor­teum & arma­mentarium Phi. lippi. Liu. Chalcis Philips storehouse for armes were burnt, yet did he not want. Philip & his son Perseus had infinit store hereof, so that they contemned the Romans in respect of thēselues. Antiochus dressed his armoiries & workhouses in Lysi­machia, in his expeditiō against the Romans. The Romans not only had publike storehouses of armes, butArma habent Romani quae sibi quisque paraue­rit pauper miles. Liu. 42. also priuate men had armes of their owne. In this land, although I doubt not, but there is far more prouision of armes, & munition then hath bin in time past; yet might there be an amends made if monopolies of pouder, & armes were ta­ken away: and if that which is in one place too much, were placed in diuers conuenient storehouses, in euery place sufficeint; and finally, if there were so much armes in priuate mens hands, as the mosters pretend.

I neede not speake much of the prouision of shipping. it were suf­ficient, if that we haue, were wel ordered and employed. Of the vse of ships I shall haue occasion to speake more hereafter. This may now suffice, that if the shipping of this land, and of our confederates were ioyned together, and well furnished and vsed, it woulde not be long ere peace should be offered by those, which now braue vs with threats of warre, because they see vs desirous of peace.

Cariages also & cariage horses would be prouided, not only for the drawing of ordonance & arms, but also of victuals, munitiōs, spades, [Page 25]axes, mattocks, & al other neccessaries of an armie. The further ye ar­mie goeth from home, the more care the generall ought to haue of car­riages to take things necessary with him.Caesar bel. gal. 1. The Heluetians before they began to march into France, prouided store of carts, and hor­ses, and draught oxen for the purpose. The Romanes in theirLiu. 42. ex­pedition against Antiochus had carriages sufficient of the Macedo­nians. Without a Comitabatur Corbulonē prae­ter assueta belli, magna vis came­lorum onusta frumento, Tacit. annal. 15. number of Camels that followed the armie la­den with all prouision, and other carriages; Corbulo coulde not haue preuailed against the Parthians. Beside other ordinary cartes [...] &c. Xeno­phon exp. Cyr. c. Cyrus in his expedition against his brother, had 400. wagons laden with victuals, which were not to be distributed, but in time of ne­cessitie. What losses and trauaile our men haue endured in Flan­ders, Portugall, France, for want hereof, without my report, it is sufficiently knowne to souldiers.

There ought no lesse care to be had of tents, that souldiers may lie drie, and more warme then commonly they doe. For villages are not euery where to be found: nor is it fitte that souldiers should be disper­sed in villages, when the enemie is at hande: and cabines are not so soone built, nor is stuffe in all places to bee founde to builde them with.

The Romanes to euery hundred, had both cariages, and tents as­signed. For want whereof our souldiers are seldome well lodged, e­specially in marching; and yet are they long about it. And where they lye, by reason of their cutting downe of woods, they leaue marks of their being there many yeeres after.

Without spades, mattocks, axes, baskets, and such like instru­ments the souldier can neither enclose his enemie, nor fortifie him­selfe: and therefore as very necessary things, are such instruments to be prouided, as also whatsoeuer is necessary for passing of riuers, as­salting of townes, and other faites of armes.

I neede not make mention of horses of seruice, seeing euery man knoweth what difficulties an armie destitute of horsemen susteineth. That which shalbe sufficient shalbe spoken, when we come to speake of horsemen. Onely now I will admonish Gentlemen to haue more care of keeping races of horses, because in case of present necessi­tie they that haue them not of their owne, shall hardly obteine them of others.

The last thing that I am here to speake of, is first to bee thought [Page 26]of, I meane prouision of victuals, without which men can neither liue in warres, nor in peace. It is a faint fight that hungersterued soul­diers doe make. In [...] Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 1. warres without things necessary, there is nei­ther vse of souldier, nor captaine. He that Qui frumentū neçessarium (que) cô­meatum non pa­rat, vincitur sine ferro. Veget. lib. 3. c. 26. prouideth not victuals beforehand is ouercome without drawing of a sword. Against other mischiefes, there are remedies; but there is no wrastling a­gainst hunger. Want driueth men to their wittes end. When the La­cedemonian souldiers were straited, their Generall writ thus to the Magistrates: the [...] Xenoph. [...]. 1. souldiers are sterued for hunger, what shall we do? The twoLiui. 23. Scipioes writ to the Romane Senate, that without supply of victuals, their army must needes dissolue. And Caesar Caes. bel. Gal. 7. told his souldiers, that were determined to retrayte, that without their cariages where their victuals were, they could no furth [...]r doe ser­uice against the enemie. And therefore victuals must be had ready. it is too late to seeke for them in Villages, when the hungry soul­dier is ready to sterue. Caesar Re frumentaria comparata castra mouet. bel. gal. 2. would not once moue towarde the enemie, before he had his prouision with him. De obsessione non priùs agen­dum consticuit, quam rem fru­mentariam expe­disset. Caes. com. bel. gal. lib. 7. Nor would he re­solue to besiege any towne, before he had taken order for suffici­ent victuals for his army. His vse Vbi instabat dies quo die fru­mentum militi­bus metiri opor­ceret. Caes. com. 1. & 6. bel. gal. was to deuide victuals to euery company for certaine dayes beforehand. The garrison townes of the Romanes were furnished with wheat, vineger, bacon, barley, and straw, for a yeere beforehand, as Capitolinus sheweth in the life of Gordian. The reason is laide downe by Tacitus, that Vtaduersus mo­ras obsidionis an­nuis copiis fir­mentur. Tacit. an­nal. they might be stored with prouision against long sieges. The Colonies which were peopled with Romanes, and placed as gardes, and propugna­cles against their enemies were stored with all things necessary. How our souldiers were furnished in Flanders and Portugall, I report me to their knowledge that endured those seruices. Beeing no better furnished, it is not to be marueiled [...]hough they kept no better order.Disciplinam seruare non po­test ieiunus exer­citus. Cassiod. 4. Var. lect. c. 13. Hungry souldiers are hardly kept within the compasse of lawes. The belly (as is commonly sayde) in this case hath no eares. The cause of all such miseries, in warres are diuers: first want of care, and good proceeding, then niggardise and miserie, thirdly fraude and deceite; last of all impunitie. Which are not to be redressed, but with contrary proceeding, and folowing the precedents of ancient warriers.

The Romanes gaue to their Generall both treasure, and authori­tie sufficient, to prouide things necessary for the army. They brought [Page 27]victuals into the army sufficient, and for feare of want layde vp a­bundance in garners, and storehouses in strong places neere to the countrey, where their army soiourned. Opposing their for­ces against Annibal, they chose Liu. 21. Clastidium for their storehouse. Caesar in the wars against thē of Auuergne brought all his prouisi­on to Caes bel. gal. 7. Nouiodune, because it lay neere. The Romanes caused their ships of victuals to discharge at Eo omnes ex Italia one [...]ariae naues dirigebant cursum. Liu. l. 37. Chios in their warres against An­tiochus: He chose Lysimachia for the place of his store. For the warres of Liu. l. 44. Macedonia they made their prouision in Thessaly. Caesar c [...]rtis lo­cis horrea consti­tuit, frumentum conquir [...] iussit. de bel. ciu. 3. Caesar had his garners in conuenient places to supply his army in his warres against Pompey. Pompey brought all his prouision to Dyrrha­chium.

Asdrubal entring Fines hostium ingrediens fru­mentum comme­atus (que) in vrbem Asenam conue­xit. Liu. 23. Spaine caried all the victuals, and store of the countrey into Asena: and Scipio likewise landingHorrea noua aedificata vete [...]a á Scipione repleta & frumento ex population: bus & commeatu Si­culo. Liui. Afrike made newe storehouses, and filled both new and olde partly with victu­als sent out of Sicile, and partly with those which hee got by the spoile of ye countrey. When a strong army commeth into any coun­trey, it is no masterie for the same to findeFormidine po­pulationis obsides frumentum & a­alia quae vsui fo­rent affatim prae­bita. Salust. bel. Iugurth. victuals & forrage either by feare, or force. But the companies sent into France and Flanders, being so weake, it was no marnell if they pined being pend vp or confined within some garrison, the enemie being alwayes stronger without. For the assurance of our victuals that come vnto vs, ga­risons would be placed in conuenient distances. Caesar in the warres with the Peditū 10000. sibi celeriter mit­ti voluit, quò ex­peditiore re fru­mentaria vtere­tur. Caes. bel. Gal. 7. Auuergnacs vsed 10. thousand Heduans to this purpose. Neither would he suffer anyVellaunodu­num ne quem post se hostem re­linqueret, quo expeditiore refru­mentaria vtere­tur, oppugnare instituit. ibidem. towne to remaine vntaken betwixt him and his victuals. For the fetching in of victuals, a conueni­ent power of horsemen would be sent forth seconded with footemen, to forrage, and range the countrey.

Besides this the army would haue diuers cariages laden with victuals to be assigned to euery regiment, and to follow the ar­my; as it was in the expedition of Cyrus into Persia. Such as dwell neere where our army goeth, would be summoned to bring victuals into the army, vnlesse they would haue their countrey ruinated. And as the Romanes had ayde of victuals in the warres of Liu. 21. Carthage out of Sicile, in the warres of Liu. 31. Macedonia out of A­frike: and Caesar in his warres of Belgium was furnished from Caes. bel. gal. 2. Rheims, in his warres with the Caes. bel. gal. 1. Heluetians, from the Hedu­ans: so our associates, such especially as dwell neere, are to be [Page 28]prayed to ayde vs with corne, and other prouision. But yet so that we doe not altogether depend vpon their pleasures, as we doe in the low countries, where our souldiers receiue from hand to mouth. Honest menC. Cotta Ge­nabi rei frumen­tariae iussu Caesa­ris praeerat. Caes. bel. gal 7. would haue commission and money giuen vnto them to buy prouision in places where it may be had. Finally, such as buy corrupt victuals, or vse other fraude, woulde seuerely be punished.

Further, order would be taken alwayes before hand, that supplies of victuals may follow the armie in time, least that, as in the Por­tugall voyage, the armie be forced to returne for want, before the prouision come at it. If this be not, then ought not the armie to pro­ceede further, then it may be assured of victuals.

Lastly, both such victuals as may bee found in the countrey, and such as are in the armie, are to be dispensed warely, at least without waste.Le soldat vi­nant a discretion en peu de iours af­fame tout un pais. Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 8. Souldiers (as the French saying is) liuing, or rather spoy­ling at their owne discretion, in few dayes doe famish a countrey. The Romanes vsed to giue the souldiers certaine dayes prouision before hande, which they might not spende in fewer, as is euident both by example of Scipio sayling into Affrike in the seconde warres with Carthage, end also of Caesar in his warres in France, and by examples of diuers others.

To conclude, all those that looke for good successe in warres, must prouide both victuals, and armes, and all prouision for the warres before hand, as the precedents of the preparations made by theThucid. 1. A­thenians, and Spartanes before the Peloponesian warre; ofLiu. 29. Sci­pio, before his expedition into Affrike; ofXenoph. exp. Cy. 1. Cyrus, into Persia; ofSalust. bell. Iug. Metellus and Marius against Iugurtha; of the Spaniardes a­gainst vs, when they came against vs with their Nauie; & in summe, of all wise people and states, that knew what perteyned to the wars, do teach vs. Charles ofPhil. Commin. Burgundie sitting downe before Nancy without sufficient munitions, was forced to rise with a scorne. The same happened to the French beforeHist. de troubl. Sancerre anno 1569. and must needes happen to all, that without sufficient prouision attempt matters rashly. Wise kings therefore doe forecast before hand what force, or prouision will be sufficient; fooles say, Oh had I wist; or, I neuer thought vpon it.

CHAP. III. That before we beginne warres, we are to procure what strength, or helpe wee can of our neighbours, or others: and to draw the same, as much as is possible for vs, from our enemies.

AS in priuate affaires particulars receiue mutu­all helpe eche of other, of whom it is verified, that [...]. Homer. two ioyning together doe more easily at­chieue matters, then ech man single by himselfe; so in publike executions, where manie are linked together, they more easily execute, and are hard­lier broken. Insomuch as friends and Non exerc [...]tus, neque thesauri praesidia regui sunt, verùm ami­ci. Salust. bel. Iu­gurth. confederates are no lesse the strength of states, then forces and treasure. Therefore did theCircumspicie­bant ipsi externa auxilia. Liu. 1. Sabines hearing of the preparatiues that Seruius Tullius made a­gainst them, looke out what forreine ayde they mightadioyne vn­to themselues. The AtheniansThucid. 2. and Spartanes in the Pelopo­nesian warre did not so much stande vpon their owne strength, as the aydes, and succours of their confederates. TheThucid. 5. & Diodor. Sicul. Syracu­sans by the helpe of the Spartanes withstoode the inuasion of the Athenians made vpon them, and foyled them in diuers incounters. I neede not vse anie long discourse in this matter: it hath beene the continuall vse of the Kings of this Ilande to vse the helpe of the Burguygnions, and low Countries against France. And like­wise haue the French relyed much vpon the ayde of the Scots a­gainst vs.

Neither ought anie Prince, or nation so to presume of their owne strength, as that they refuse the ayde of friends. The Ro­manes although after their victories against Annibal, at what time they beganne the Macedonian warre, they were in their prime of strength, and most flourishing estate; yet required they ayde of the Carthaginians, of Masinissa, and of the Aetolians, and others against Philip King of Macedonia. And deare it cost Perseus the King of Macedonia, that for sparing of money refu­sed the ayde of thirtie thousand Gaules offering to serue him a­gainst the Romanes. What hinderance it hath beene to vs, and what it may bee that the Towne of Antwerpe, and other partes of the lowe Countreyes were not receiued when they were of­fered [Page 30]vnto vs in these brawles against Philip of Spaine, I knowe not, some doubt. It may be sayd, they would not yeelde without conditions. But what purpose is it, to talke of conditions, see­ing they would haue yeelded themselues into any princes handes, if they might haue bene receiued?

Further as we are to require ayde of our friends; so we are to with­drawe what ayde we can from the enemie. Many reasons teach vs so to doe, which common practise doeth teach vs to be true. as the body in the distemper of the partes: so the state in the disagree­ment of the members, is greatly weakened, and easily dissolued. The Romanes therefore as they were masters in other militarie documents, so did they diligently practice intelligence with the ene­mies friendes, and subiectes. Before they transported their forces into Afrike, they dealt with Syphax, and assured themselues of Ma­sinissa kings of Numidia. Before they charged Philippe king of Ma­cedonia, they caused most of his partisans in Greece to reuolt from him. And Caesar by the helpe of part of the Gaules, which he drewe to his side, did subdue the rest, and them also afterward.

Pompey purposing to abase the power of Caesar, did first drawe from him two legions or regiments, and afterward Labienus one of Caesars chiefe friendes, and commaunders. Of this onely practice great effectes are wont to ensue. Caesar by disioyning and separa­ting the forces and causes of the Gaules, ouercame them all. By his intelligence with the ancient Britons, hee vnderstoode the estate of the countrey, and had great helpe to atchieue his purpose a­gainst it.

While they of the citie ofPhil. Comin. Dinant suffered themselues to be dis­ioyned from their associates of Liege, Charles Duke of Burgundy did easily ouercome them. If Lewis the xi. of France had not sepa­rated, and broken the league, first betweene the Duke of Burgun­dy and the Dukes of Britaine, and Normandy, and afterward be­twixt king Edward the fourth, and the Duke of Burgundy: he could not haue escaped with so litle losse, nor vanquished his ene­mies with so great gaine. We haue also domesticall examples of the same but too many, and which I cannot without some griefe remember. not with dint of sword, nor open force, but with secret practices with our associates and friendes in France, the French tooke not onely Normandy, but also Gascoyne and Guienne from [Page 31]the English nation. And neuer omitting any opportunitie to trou­ble vs, they wrought much woe vnto this land, in the dayes of King Iohn, by furthering and procuring the reuolt of the No­bilitie.

Neither can any estate continue, that hath his partes deuided. For (as one sayth) it falleth out, that while euery man looking to his owne present safetie Dum pugnant singuli, vincuntur omnes. Tacit. suffereth his friendes to fight single, all are ouercome. By this means the Spaniard hath so much preuailed in the Low countreys, and the people haue hurt themselues. For dis­ioyning their counsailes and forces, and refusing the Resusans le se­cours des estran­gers. Hist de trou­bl. de Fran. lib. 1. ayde of stran­gers, they are for the most part a spoyle vnto the enemie. And if we would haue vsed greater force, and more diligence in with­drawing from the Spaniard his associates, and subiects of Portu­gall, of the Ilands, and of the Low countreys; hee would haue bene long ere this very gentle to deale withall. But some wise men, as they say, haue not onely not sought to cause his subiects to re­uolt, but haue refused, and still refuse to receiue them, that holde out their hands, crauing helpe of friends and long since are weary of the Spanish tyranny.

As for those, that suppose the Spaniards to haue such holde of all the countreys which nowe they possesse, and of the inhabitants thereof, that we should but loose labour in attempting their reuolt, they seeme to be ignorant not onely of the state of his countreys, and of the Spanish gouernement, but also of the nature of things. It is well knowen with what discontentment, and grudge both the Portugals, and those of the Lowe countreys doe serue the Spa­niard. The Portugals were ready to receiue vs at our last expedi­tion thither, and would haue declared themselues further, if they had perceiued, that wee had bene able to defend them against the Spaniard.

The state of Milan is holden more by force, then by loue, or good title. They of Naples and Sicile haue by many signes decla­red their great discontentment of the Spanish yoke. The Indians would reuolt, if they knewe which way. In all countreys there are euer some, that either for hope; or hatred desire change of state.

Annibal after that hee had once, or twise beaten the Ro­manes in Italy: did afterwarde mainteine the warres for the most [Page 32]part with the aydes of that countrey. And Caesar vsed the strength of the Gaules, against the rest of the nation. Vpon the first ouerthrow which Scipio gaue to the Carthaginians in Affrike, he caused most of the countrey to turne enemie against them.

Neither may we thinke that the state of Spaine is in this point, better then other nations, especially seeing the stirres in Aragon, and Grenade beside many other offers in Castile, doe declare, that there are among them many mal-contents. The Spaniard doubteth not to finde many such among vs, but it were to be wished, that we would rather make triall first, whether there were any such to be found in Spaine. When the French made their expeditions intoGuicciard. Hist. Naples, they found great aydes in the countrey, some al­so beside exspectation. Why then should Spaine differ from I­taly?

But while we seeke to augment our forces with the succours of our associates and friendes; we are not so to rely vpon them, but that we prepare sufficient forces of our owne nation, both to resist the enemie, and if neede be to commaund our associates. therein fo­lowing the wise proceedings of the Romanes, that neuer would ad­mit a greater number of associates, then they had of their citizens in their army; and had alwayes an eye, that they practised not with the enemie. In this as in [...]. Epicharm. other points, to distrust, is a great point of wisedome. The Scipioes did trust but too much to the aydes of the Celtiberians in Spaine. For being abandoned by them, they were exposed naked and vnprouided to the mercy of their enemies.Liu. 1. Tullius Hostilius did deale more wisely. For although hee had the succours of the Albans with him, yet had hee force sufficient to vanquish his enemis without them. If not; he had farre worse spee­ded. For in the middes of the battell, he was forsaken by them. TheGuicciard. Hift. Switzers that came in ayde of Lewis Sforza solde him into the handes of Lewis the xij, at Nouara, and did not onely forsake him. And of late yeres, the Protestants that eame out of Germany vn­der the guidance of the Dukes of Bouillion, were in their greatest neede forsaken of the Lansknights, that came to ayde them. I neede not labour inueh to prooue this, seeing the great expen­ses, that by the French and others hane beene wasted vpon the Almains of late time, doe teach vs howe little vse, or hope there is of the ayde of that nation. Of all those that folowe our en­signes, [Page 33]and ioyne together with vs those are least to be trusted, that are lately reuolted. Good it were to trie such, and then to trust them. TwoGuicciardio. Spaniards feining them selues fugitiues in the warres be­twixt the Spaniards and the Venetians attempted to kill Aluian the Venetian Generall. The like was attempted by certaine Turks against Scanderbeg. The Numidians that reuolted to the Ro­mans, a litle before their battel with Annibal at Cannae, made a great flaughter among the Romanes, after the battell ioyued. Maureuell that runagate pretending to forsake the enemie vpon some displea­sure, would haue slaine the Admirall: but when he sawe howe that could not be done without euident danger, he slew Mouy a valiant gentleman, and so returned againe to the enemie. Neuer any did wholy rely vpon his associates, especially such as were newly come vnto him, without losse, or danger. Good it had, bene for vs not to haue looked for so much at the Portugales hands, as we did, it may be they would haue assisted vs, if we had bene the stronger, but euery one treadeth on those, that are throwen vnder foote, and thrusteth forward those that are falling.

To assure vs therefore of our associates, the safest way is to stand vpon our owne strength, and to trust more to our selues then to them: the next is by hostages, such as are well accompted of: another means is by gages of towns. King Froissart. Edward the third by seasing of Cherburg for pawne, assured himselfe of the king of Nauarres loy­all dealing. The like course is taken in assuring the contract made betweene vs and the lowe countreys. I would we were in like sort assured of the townes we hold there, as he was. The reasons we haue to feare are diuers: but these in shew open; that the town [...] men of Vlishing and Briel, and the rest being armed, and in number passing our [...]arrison, and giuing them victuals and munitions from hand to mouth, may force the same eyther to yeelde, or de [...]rs [...]t pleasure. That they haue not yet attempted it, the feare of the Spaniard [...] cause. If that scruple were remoued, I feare what will full [...], without extraordinary diligence, and better order, and more force: but to assure our selues of our associates there is no be [...] course then to doe them iustice. The same Amici officio & fide partuntur. Salust. bel. Iug. both procureth friendes, & [...]inrei­neth them in deuotion. For who will adhere [...] them, which wrong them, and oppress them?Thucid. 1. & Cic. offic. lib. 1. Pausanias and [...] by ruling their associates with rigour, and extremitie, caused them to [...]e part [Page 34]the Lacedemonian armie discontent. The like effect did the coue­tousnesse of the Athenians, that respected onely their owne profite, worke in their partisans in the Peleponesian warre. They must al­so be defended against their enemies, if we looke to haue their helpe against our enemies. This reason mouedCaes. bel. gal. 7. Caesar to hazard him­selfe in the succouring of the Boians at Gergouia: and Iosua to come in ayde to the Gibeonites, although fraudulently they had caused him to enter into league with them. The Romanes not sending ayde to the Sag [...]ntines besieged by Annibal in time, lost not onely them, but the fauour of all Spaine. And vainely did wee looke for the helpe of Portugall, being not prouided to defend the Countrey against the Spaniard. To stand Haec ratio nec amicos parit nec inimicos tollit. Liu. aloofe when our neighbours require ayde, is a course neither to helpe our friendes nor hurt our enemies. Besides the same is most dishonorable (for who doeth not despise those, in whome they see no helpe) yea and vnprofitable. for the enemie is thereby strengthened, and wee weakened.

Of the conditions and contractes of association, I shall haue oc­casion to speake in the treatise of peace. For the endes of warres, are not onely the beginning of peace, but also of associations, and friend­ships for the most part. Thus much onely may serue in this place, that some are onely offensiue, some offensiue, some with equall con­ditions on both sides, some with respect to one side. and as great di­uersities there are, as of diuers states, and conditions of things. Anniball and Philip of Macedonia, ioyned in league vpon these conditions, that Liui. 23. Philip should waste the coast of Italy with his Na [...]i [...], and make warre vpon the Romanes by sea and land, vntill such [...] [...]s they had brought Italy in subiection, which should then belong to the Carthaginians: that the warres being there ended, An­nibal [...] passe ouer with his army into Greece, and helpe him to subdue that Countrey, and the Lands adioyning, which shoulde re­ [...] [...] [...]o Philip. They of Locrensibus iussu Annibalis data pax. Socie­tas eo iure sta­bat, vt Poenus Lo­crensem, Poenum Locrensis pace, ac bello i [...]ret. Liu. 24. Locres conditioned with Annibal, that [...] helpe other both in warre, and peace. Many spe­ciall m [...]er [...] [...] knowe, [...] and comprised in articles con [...] ­med on both [...]des by [...], and sometime by othe. And therefore whatsoeuer articles are agreed vpon, they are diligently, and loyally to [...] [...]erforme [...]. It is a sure course to winne vs credite among our neighbours, and to linke them in [...]ine good wi [...] to­ward vs.


Part 1. Of the Generall, and the partes and qualities required in him.

HItherto wee haue spoken of such preparatiues as are to bee made oft times in time of peace, but al­wayes before the warres: nowe we are to speake of that which is the beginning, and first care, or at least act of warres. I meane the musters, and choise of captaines and souldiers. This among the Ro­manes belonged to the Generals, which vpon the first Prima belli cu­ra agere delectus, reuocare vetera­nos. Tacit. 18. mouing of warres, called all the people according to the tribes or diuisions, into a place appointed, out of them to take such numbers, and such men, as were most fitting. And most reasonable it is, that the Gene­rall that should leade men, should haue the ouersight, and chiefe, if not onely direction in the choise of them. For who can better make choise of instruments, then such artificers as vse them in their workes? When the Generals thēselues were otherwise busied, yet didCoss. dum ipsi quaestionibus im­pedicbantur, T. Maenium dele­ctui habēdo prae­fecerunt. Liu. 39. they commit the matter to men of great authoritie and wisdome. Caesar Caesar per lega­tos M. Silanum, C. Antistium, C, Sextium dele­ctum habere in­stituit. Caes. com. bel. gal. 6 employed therein his counsell of warres, which also in his absence were his lieutenants. First therefore wee are to speake of the Generall, then of inferiour commaunders, and thirdly of com­mon souldiers. In the discourse concerning the Generall, wee are to consider, first, what qualities and partes and sufficent Generall ought to haue: secondly, what instructions or councell he is to vse: and lastly, with what commission and power he ought to be furni­shed wichall.

The principall care that a Prince or State that entreth into warres is to haue is, that there be choyse made of a sufficient Gene­rall. I knowe that the place is for the most part graunted eyther for respect of Nobilitie, or kinred, or fauour. The Kings of this land in time past employed their children and vncles, which notwithstan­ding prooued not the worst. Richard the 2. Froissart. in the warres against the Nobilitie, made ye Duke of Ireland a fauourit of his, Generall; but he was not followed. The French kings may impute most part of their had successe in their warres to ye insufficiēcie of their Generals. [Page 36]In the warres of Naples Charles the 8. named Montpensier f [...]tto luego tonen­ge delre, piu sti­mato per la gran­dozza sua, & per esser del sangue reale, che per pro­prio valore. Guic­ciard. lib. 1. Montpensier his lieutenant in respect of nobilitie, rather then sufficiencie: Lewis the 12. in his warres of Guicciar. hist. Lombardy, made Chaumont his minion Ge­nerall of his forces. But nothing did more hasten the ouerthrowe of the French causes there, thē their insufficiencie. Lewis Sforsa passing ouer diuers men of accompt, reposed all his trust inGuicciar. lib. 4. Galeaz San­seuerin, a man of small desert. Leo the 10. for kinred sake woulde needes employe Lorence Medici in his warres with the Duke of Vrbin, both which spedde alike. Which examples with diuers other of our time, which I will not mention, least any man might thinke himselfe interessed thereby, may moue vs to haue more care what Generals we doe employe in such seruices. In other matters, albeit fauour may take place: yet sure least ought it to swaye in choyse of the General. Nothing is more dangerous, then the euill successe of warres. What reason therefore haue Princes to chuse Summo pericu­lo summus quae­rendus impera­tor, vt summo periculo summus gubernator. Liu. lib. 24. weake men Gouernours of greatest matters in warres, seeing as in Sea causes men in greatest dangers are woont to make choyse of most skilfull Masters and Pilots? Or what impudencie is it for a man to take charge of a Shippe, that cannot see, but by others eyes, nor iudge, but by others direction? And why not likewise may they be Impudentem & gubernatorem & imperatorem esse, qui cum alie­nis oculis ei om­nia agenda sint, postulet sibi alio­rum capita ac for­tunas committi. Liu. 26. accompted shamelesse, that take vpon them the charge of mens liues, and goodes, which haue no iudgement, but by others report and direction? Of the weakenesse of Gene­rals, proceede contentions betwixt the chiefe commaunders, de­layes, needelesse expenses, disorders, disgraces, and the ouer­throwe of Armies and States. And more shall an armie of Harts doe, guided by a Plutarch. Lyon, then an armie of Lyons ledde by a feare­full Hart. Caesars Caes. comment. bel. gal. 5. inuincible olde souldiers were ouercome by the cowardise of Sabinus their leader. yet such was the skill of Caesar, that he could vse young souldiers, and obteine great victories by small forces. Marcellus with the reliques of the Romane armie, ouerthrowne at Canne, gaue vnto Annibal a great repulse. The Ro­manes vnder the leading of C. Martius Coriolanus Volsci duce Martio Coriola­no, vincentes o­stenderunt duci­bus potiùs, quàm exercitu rem Rom. supetiorem [...]sse. Liu. ouercame the Volscians, when the same man exiled vpon displeasure against his Countrey, tooke on him to leade the Volscians, they diuers times preuailed against the Romanes. Which sheweth what moment a skilfull captaine bringeth towarde the obteyning of victorie. And in the warres which the Romanes had against the Latines, the forces [Page 37]being equall, yet the Romanes preuailed by the good direction of their Generall Fabius, whose gouernment was such, that all men confessed (as Liu. 9. Liuy reporteth) that what side soeuer should haue had him for their leader, the same must needes haue preuailed. In the battell of the Romanes againstPyrrhus, non Epirotae, tomanos vicit. Fabritius Plutar. apophth. Pyrrhus king of Epeirus (nowe Albany) Fabritius acknowledged, that they were ouercome onely by the skill of Pyrrhus, more then by the force of his armie. And contrariwise, little accompt is to be made of an armie, that wanteth direction. Caesar feared not, as himselfeDe bel. ciu. lib. 1. reporteth, the olde compa­nies of Spaine, although otherwise much to be esteemed, because he knewe their Generals Petreius & Afranius, to be men of no me­rite, nor skill. I haue my self heard some Spaniards greatly complain of the defectes of the Duke of Medina Sidonia the Generall of their Nauy, when they came vpon our coast. And although God was the authour, yet I doubt not, but that was some good meanes of their euill successe. Wherefore if Princes looke for good successe in their warres, let them without affection, and partialitie, make choise of a sufficient Generall, religious, skilfull, couragious, and adorned with such vertues, both for warre and peace, as the importance of the mat­ters which he manageth requireth.

In a Generall, first I require religion: for if the Gentiles did sup­pose that those affaires succeeded best vnto them, which they Ab Ioue prin­cipium. Arat. Phaenom. be­gan in Gods name; shame it were for Christians to haue a worse conceit of that matter. And if all other matters, sure the hazardes of warre require religion in the chiefe directors. God he is Lord of Hostes, and giuer of victories; and sure it is not probable, he will giue it to those, that aske it not at his handes. God prescribed certaine exercises of religiō to his people in their wars; before them he would haue the Priestes to sound certaine siluer Trumpets. Constantine had all exercises of religion in his campe, and so proued most victo­rious. The Spaniards in their warres assigne to euery Tertio, or Re­giment certaine Priestes. What should I speake of those that make profession of religion, seeing the Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1. Greekes did seldome attempt any dangerous seruice, but their captaines first consulted with their gods? Cic. de Natur. deor. Cicero doeth attribute the good successe which the Ro­manes had in their warres, to the religious care they had of the obseruance of holy ceremonies, and religion. Whatsoeuer mis­hap came vnto their State, or Armie, they ascribed the same like­wise [Page 38]to the neglect, or contempt of religion. They esteemed that to be the cause of their ouerthrowe atLiu. 5. Allia by the Gaules, atLiu. 2.2. Thrasimene by Annibal, and in diuers other vnfortunate incoun­ters, Machiauels diuinitie, that thinketh religion in men of warre foolerie, and proposeth that impious Atheist Caesar Borgia for a pa­terne to a Prince, that aspireth to be great to be followed, was de­tested euen of the barbarous nations, which in warres attempted nothing, but with religious ceremonies, as Tacitus and Caesar declare in the Gaules and Germanes, and Herodotus and Thu­cidides in the Thracians and barbarous people. Wherefore let the Generall be religious, and a mainteiner of religion, and for­bid blasphemies, and other impieties too too common in the com­mon sort, if hee expect the fauour of God, and good successe in his affaires.

The Generall ought further to haue knowledge, and iudgement in matters of warre. The same is the speciall and most proper or­nament of a General, in [...]. Arist. polit. li. 5. c. 9. whom the same is more respected, then all other morall vertues. C. Fabritus in the dangerous warres the Romanes had against Pyrrhus, in labouring that Aul. gel. l. 4. c. 8. Cornelius a man rauinous, but very expert in warre, might be chosen Con­sull, or Generall, declareth that the skill and experience of a va­liant Captaine couereth other faultes. This knowledge and iudge­ment hath many branches: the Generall ought to vnderstand as well the enemies estate, as his owne: he ought to knowe what forces, and what prouision of armes, horses, carriages, victuals, and other furniture, and munition will be sufficient, and howe he is to haue the same: he ought to take heede of the enemies trappes; to knowe howe to marche, or Imperatorij muneris est castris locum capere, cō ­meatus expedire, ab insidijs praeca­nere, tempus pug­nae eligere, aciem instruere, subsidijs firmare. Liu. 9. lodge safely; howe to fight with aduantage, where to employe horsemen, where shotte, where other sortes of weapons, and to vnderstand the aduanta­ges of all sortes of groundes: he hought to vnderstand the times when to fight, and advantages of weather, and Sunne: he ought not to be ignorant of any stratageme of warre, nor of treaties and conditions of truce, or peace: least as our auncesters in time past did, he loose by sleight that which before he had wonne by force: finally, in defending or besieging of Townes, in assaultes, esca­ladaes, drawing of trenches, mines, making of batteries, for­cing or defending of passages of riuers, or straytes: he may not [Page 39]be ignorant of any point of warre; proposing to him selfe the example of Iulius Caesar, a man in all faites of armes most skifull. Whose iudgement was such, that Hirt. de bel. African. sitting still in his Tent in his campe at Ruspina, hee knewe what the enemie would doe, or could doe, and prescribed what was to be done against him: And deigned not to looke out, when Scipio made shewe to assault his campe. This knowledge bringeth with it consideration, and foresight. Both which ought to bee in the General: that, least hee want things necessarie; this, least he runne into the snares layd for him by the enemie. Of Aemilus Aemilius dies noctes (que) intentus ea sola quae adid bellum pertine­rent animo agita­bat. Liu. 4.4. Paulus it is reported, that be­ing chosen General for the warres in Macedonia, his minde was wholy bent on that seruice, so that he gaue himselfe no rest, nei­ther night nor day. Captaines in [...]. Diodor. Si cal. warres must looke both for­ward and backward, and euery way whence any danger, or ad­uantage is toward. For in warres Non licetin bello bis peccare. euery error in mortall. Many doe more matters by sleight, then by force. Charles the fifthFroissart. of France did more represse the force of the English nation by practice, then by force. The Lacedemonians when their leaders preuailedPlutarch. gainst their enemies by counsell and stratagemes, sacrificed an oxe; when by open force, a cocke onley.

The next vertue required in a Generall, is Virtutes impe­ratoris praecipuae, labor in negotiis, fortitudo in peri­culis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in pro­uidendo. Cic. pro leg. Manil. courage, and speede to execute that which is wisely determined. For vented counsels, and vented wine, doe foorthwith loose all good tasle. And cowardly captaines discourage valiant men, that suppose the danger to be as great, as their leaders, take it.Caes. bel. ciu. 1. Domitius had no sooner determi­ned with himselfe to flie away from Corfinium, but the souldiers lost courage. The cowardise of Crassus the Appain. bel. Parth. rich, gaue occasion to the great ouerthrowe, which the Romanes had giuen them by the Parthians. The faint heart of Titurius Sabinus, charged by Cas. bel. gal. 5. Am­biorix, made his souldiers faint. Contrariwise, resolute men giue courage to their souldiers, and restore battels almost lost . Caesars couragious heart occasioned the victorie against Pompeyes sonnes at Munda. King Richard the third, had almost hazarded the matter at the iourney of Bosworth: if hee had but had three hundred men like him selfe, the field had beene his. But because his cause was not good, it pleased not God to giue him the meanes.Iugurtha & praelio strenuus erat, & bonus cō ­silio, quod diffi­cile est. nam alte­rum ex prouiden­tia t [...]morem, alt [...] ­rum ex audacia plerum (que) teme­ritatem efficit. Salust. bel. Iugu [...]. Iugurtha is by Salust commended both for prowesse, and counsell. No­thing doeth more auaile in warres, then the example of the General. [Page 40]He is a cowardly companion, that dareth not to doe, as he seeth his Generall doe. Valerius Coruinus vsed no other incouragement to his souldiers then this, that they should Facta mea non dicta sequi volo, nec disciplinam, sed exemplum à me petere. Liu. 7. imitate not his wordes, but his deedes, and do as they sawe him to giue them an example. Not that the Generall ought lightly to hazard his person, (for that were great temeritie) or vexe himselfe with labour, (for that were vaine) but that hee ought to shewe himselfe alwayes couragious in dan­gers, and forwarde in labours. No lawes, nor precepts can doe herein more, then the Generals example. The Romanes folo­wed Lucan. Cato through the drye and hotte sandes of Barbary, and shame made Xenophons souldiers march vp the hill, seeing him goe before them. Neither hath any thing more animated the French Kings souldiers of late, then the example of so valiant a Prince lea­ding them.

They that haue skill and resolution in matters of warre, cannot chuse (if God be pleased) but haue good successe, and authoritie. For what man wisely laying his plot, and resolutely executing the same, can fayle of his expectation, or want an honourable reputa­tion both with his owne men, and with the enemie.Foelicitas rerum gestarum exerci­tus beneuolentiā imperatoribus, & res aduersae odi­um conciliant. Caes. de bel. ciu. lib. 7. And therefore what neede precepts of these matters, which is deede are rather in the power of others, then of our selues, and followe of those vertues which before I haue spoken of?

There are also other vertues required in a Generall, which al­though they be not so necessarie as the former; yet for the execu­tion of matters, are very requisite and profitable; as namely iu­stice, liberalitie, courtesie, clemencie, temperance, and loyaltie. Iustice is an ornament both in warre and peace, well beseeming all Gouernours, but especially the Gouernours of armies. It is profitable to reteine the good willes of our associates, necessary for the winning of the good will of our owne souldiers. The same hath vse as well in respect of enemies, as friendes. The Faliscians besieged by Camillus, moued rather with the opinion of his iu­stice, that sent backe vnto them the Schoolemaster, that deliue­red into his handes the youth of the Citie, then by force, yeelded their Citie vnto him. Pyrrhus did neuer offer to treate of peace, before the Romanes had sent him backe that traytour, that offe­red for a certaine summe of money to empoyson him.Iustè non mi­nus, quàm forti­ter bella gerimus. Liu. lib. 5. Warres are to bee gouerned not by crueltie, but by iustice. When [Page 41] Cic. offic. 1. Pausanias in the Peloponnesian warre dealt rigorously with his associats, they al forsooke him. Which also happened to the Athe­nians in the same warre for like cause. And who doth not hate the Spaniard that seldome suffereth men of qualitie, that come in his power to escape, and hath deuised a kind of proscription, by which he offereth wages and rewards to such as will kill or empoison prin­ces, or others whom he maligneth and proscribeth? without iustice the discipline of warre cannot be maintained: neither hath the vali­ant reward without it, nor the coward punishment. Therefore had the Romans especial regard of iustice. And iustice had in their camps a speciall That place was called Principia. Ius dicebat in principiis. Liu. 28. place, where it was administred.

Little needeth it, that I declare how necessary liberalitie is in warres, that both in peace, and at all times hath such efficacie to at­tract mens fauours. The souldiers dare aduenture any thing, where there is large reward.Magni animi magnis honori­bus fiunt. Liu. 4. Nothing doth more stirre vp valiant minds, then great honors. Eo impenditur labor & periculū, vnde emolumen­tum & honos spe­ratur. Liu. 4. Euery man bestoweth labor where he looketh for profit, and reward. Therefore had the Romanes most valiant souldiers, for that they were most liberall in their rewardes. Among them, as their Generall Decius said, the highest places and Non generis, sed virtutis est praemium. Liu. 7. ho­nors were giuen to valiant men for their vertue and prowesse, not to cowards for their nobilitie, or gentry. TheyMilitem iis ar­tibus fecerat & periculi, & labo­ris auidum. viz. By liberalitie. Liu. 9. by their liberalitie made their souldiers forward in labour and danger. The Captains of the Romanes although poore themselues, yet enriched their soul­diers. Publicola, Valerius, and Menenius Agrippa were in their time great cōmanders, yet did they not leaue behind them so much, as to discharge their funerals. But they enriched the state, and left behind them a fame of vertue, that will neuer decay. Caesar Caes. bel. ciu. 3. with his great liberality had his souldiers so obsequent, that in those ciuill warres, which he had against Pompey and others, few or none could be allured by any promises to forsake him, whereas infinite of the enemies did daily reuolt, and flie vnto him. The Turks in warres are most venturous, for that they know they shall haue great recom­pense for well doing. He that first mounted the walles of Constan­tinople, was afterward made Bascha. And Ochiali of a poore ma­riner for his valiant seruice was made Admirall of the Turkes nauy, and one of his counsell.

The hope that the Spaniards haue of their increase of pay, which they call Ventaias, and of preferment to higher places doth much [Page 42]encourage them to aduenture. And what is the reason, that so few doe hazard themselues in these dayes but this, that the reward of hurts and long seruice is, for the most part, disgrace and beggarie? the Generall hath no means to reward the valiant: pillers and spoi­lers waxe rich, and purchase: valiant souldiers die naked, and are v­sed as abiects. If a pot of golde were offered vnto them, they would not refuse it, as didCic. offic. 1. Fabritius the Romane captaine, but some would rather sell their father, their countrey, yea and soule, rather then forgo it.

Nothing is more hurtefull to the proceedings of warres then miserable niggardise. Although a captaine were endued with all o­ther vertues, yet this one fault would either suppresse them, or dis­grace them. They woulde but [...]. Thu­cid. 2. serue him to make all things more saleable, as said Pericles. Praeceps Anni­balis in auaritiam animus ad spoli­anda inclinans quae non poterat tueri foedum con­silium dedit cum inceptu, tum exi­tu. Liu. 26. Annibal, for that through couetousnes he fell to spoile his associats, did alienate al their good willes. Per­seus the king of Macedonia sparing of his monyLiu. 44. lost himselfe, and his kingdome, where if he would haue beene at any charge, he might haue had the ayde of thirtie thousand Gaules most valiant men to serue him against the Romanes.Phi. Commin. 5 Frederike the emperour the last of that name was of euery one contemned, and abused, for that they knew that he would rather incurre any disgrace, then spend any mo­ny.Constat potu­isse conciliari ani­mos militum quantulacunque parci senis libera­litate. Tacit. lib. Hist. 17. Galba the emperour might haue reteined the good wil of his souldiers with any small cost, or expense bestowed vpon them: but it was a death to him to spend mony. Therefore was he forsaken of his souldiers, and slaine of his enemy. While men either haue not mony, or will not spend it vpon necessary prouision before hand: cap­taines want souldies, souldiers want armes, victuals, munitions of warre, and all things necessary. Nay they want will, and courage. For what courage can men haue when there is no hope of rewarde? By thisAuaritia fidem, probitatem, cete­ras (que) bonas artes subuertit, pro his superbiam, crude­litatem, does neg­ligere, omnia ve­nalia habere do­cuit. Salust. con­iur. Cat. meanes all military discipline is disordered, souldiers fa­mished, forward men impouerished, the honor of military profession stained, and vnworthy persons and greedy gulles that lie fatting and purchasing at home, enriched with the spoiles of their countrey. This was the first occasion of the ruine of Rome, that all thinges were there set to sale: it was the ouerthrow of the state of theLargitionis, praedae (que) & dul­cedine priuati cō ­modi, sensus ma­lorum publicorū adimebatur. Liu. 1. de Gabiis. Gabi­ans, and I feare will be the bane of England, if it be lawfull here al­so to do as others did, without controlment.

The Generall would likewise be courteous, clement, and gentle. [Page 43]Nothing doth more please the common souldier. This was a special commendation of Charles the fift, but borrowed from antiquity. Cae­sar Cic. pro Marcel. among other his vertues had this commendation singular of affability and courtesie to his souldiers, of clemency to ward his ene­mies.Veste habitu (que) vix a gregario mi­li [...]e discrepans. Tacit. 18. Vespasian by this meanes obtained the fauor of his souldiers, and Titus Tacit. 21. his sonne was their speciall delite.Germanicus circumire sauci­os, vulnera intu­ens, alium spe, asi­um gloria, cun­ctos alloquio, & cura sibi (que) & prae­lio [...]irmabat. Ta­cit. annal. 1. Germanicus with his care for his souldiers, and his courteous speech bound them to loue him. The sauage mindes of mutins are Obsequio miti­gantur animi. Liu. oftentimes mitiga­ted with faire wordes, when no rigour could otherwise tame, or pa­cifie them. Contrariwise, nothing doth more hurt sometimes, then the vntimely rigour, and austerity of the Generall. Charles Duke of Burgundy in his latter time grew so austere, and peremptory, that no man durst councell him any thing, or contrary him. The same as Philip Phil. Com. li. 7. Commines testifieth was his vtter ruine.Liu. 4. Posthu­mius for his rigour was stoned to death of his owne souldiers: which also happened to Cinna, whose vntimely austerity was the ruine of their affaires. Alexander if to his great valiantnesse hee had ioyned affabilitie and clemency, he had not in the end growen odious to his owne souldiers. Who doth not detest Annibal for his great cru­eltie?

Temperance is a vertue that shineth in peace especially, yet hath it no small vse in the middest of warres, and being wanting in a cap­taine doth make him want so much of perfection. For how is it like, that hee can gouerne others well, that cannot rule himselfe, nor his affection? or who can looke for modestie and sobrietie in the souldiers, where the Captaine is giuen to wine or wo­men, and spendeth his time in riot, and excesse? let this vertue therefore be added to the garland of an absolute Captaines perfecti­ons.

Liu. 25. Scipio by restoring a faire woman to her husband Allucius, wonne to himselfe the heart not onely of that man, but also of the womans friends, and diuers Spaniardes. AndXenoph. paed. Cyr. Cyrus bound Abra­data vnto him, for sparing his wife Panthea. Quint. Curt. Alexander is renow­med among posterity for his continency toward the wife, and daugh­ters of Darius.

Like cōmendation, though in another subiect, dothPlutarch. in Epaminond. Epaminondas deserue, who whē his citizēs did feast, & riot, walked soberly about the wall of Thebes, to see that the enemy made no attempt against [Page 44]the city. Nothing doth more hurt or hinder the proceedings of wars, then riot and intemperancy. Annibals souldiers were ouercome with the delights of Capua, whom the Romanes with force could not sub­due. Antiochus in the midst of his preparatiues falling in loue, spent a winter in making of a match, & so lost time, and opportunitie to trans­port his army into Italy, as Annibal aduised him. The French grew odious to them of Sicilia by reason of their insolencies, which gaue them cause to rebell, and to murder them al in one euening. The in­temperance of the enemy giueth many opportunities to those that be watchful.Liu. 8. Cales was taken while the citizens lay drunken in a so­lemne feast. The same was the destruction of Troy. Marcellus per­ceiuing the negligent gard which the Syracusans made on a feast day at night, surprised the towne by escalade. TheAlphons. de Vlloa. Turkes took Zere­sana a strong town in Sclauony vpon Shrouetuesday at night, when the townesmen after their maner of their carneuall being drunke, were carelesse and secure. Much more therefore behoueth it the Ge­neral to watch, to be sober, temperate and careful. These vertues are singularly commended in a Generall; yet may I not forget desire of true honor, loue of the countrey, and loyalty toward the Prince and Which vnlesse a Generall haue, al other excellencies do rather make him suspected, then commend him. For who can trust him that hath intelligence with the enemy, or receiueth pensiō from him: The French men do merily scoffe at some great men of our nation, that haue beene pensioners of the French Kings,Philip Comin. and whose acquit­tances are extant in their Eschequer. I would to God the guise were now euery where left. C. Fabritius dwelling in a smoky house refu­sed a great masse of gold presented vnto him by the Samnites. How much more then ought they to haue care of their honor, that dwell in the sight of the world in gorgeous houses? that great men for a paltry pension, should sell their honor, it is intollerable. For the loue of their country diuers in time past deuoted themselues to death, as the two Decii, as Curtius, as Mutius Sceuola, as Codrus, as Leonidas, and infinit others. Is the race of them now extinct, that so fewe of that sort are in our age and country to be found?

If we consider ancient times, we shall finde that those great men, whose memories continue vnto our times, were endued both with these, and many other vertues.Sueton. in vit. Caes. & Plutarch. C. Caesar in his actions was most consideratiue, in hazard and danger most resolute, in executions [Page 45]speedy, oppressing his enemies oft times before the newes of his comming were heard, painfull in labour, in dangers watchfull, in diet sober, a liberall rewarder of valiant men, a good iusticer where neede required: if al his vertues were in a Generall, what should be wanting beside religion? This Generall I propose to all those that desire honor to imitate, so neere as they can. The honorable parts of Camillus, Valer. Coruinus, [...] Scipio, are no lesse to be set before the eies of Capteins. Annibal among ye Africans deserueth special price. He was in his time subtil, cautelous, skilfull in al faits of armes. He was very skilful that could escape his snares. Laborious he was and watchfull, and speedy, and a strict obseruer of military orders. OfCato parsimo­nia, & vigiliis & labore, cum vlti­mis militum cer­tabat. Liu. 34. Cato it is reported, that in parsimony, watching and labours hee contended to passe the common [...]ouldiers. Of the yonger Cato Monstrabat to­lerare labores. Lucan. Lucan giueth this testimony, that in the painfull march tho­row the desarts of Affrike he by his patience, and example shewed what others were to do. These things were in the old Romane cap­tains, and as I suppose in those that succeeded them.Acer militae, anteire agmen, lo­cum castris cape­re, noctu diu (que) consilio, ac si res posceret, manu hostibus obniti, &c. Tacit. annal. 18. Vespasian is commended for a man of courage in fight, skil in incamping, and ta­king the aduantage of the ground. Night and day he broke the e­nemies purposes, oft by counsel, sometime by force, in diet & ap­parel he was moderate, & scarce could you know him from a com­mon souldier, comparable with antiquitie, if couetousnes had not blemished or rather defaced his other vertues. By such men the Romane empire grew great: by wants, and vice of the Generals the same receiued many ouerthrowes. Claudius, Polyb. who being captaine the Romanes were ouercome at sea in the first wars with Carthage, was a contemner of religion, ignorant of matters of warre, simple and cowardly. Flaminius that was slaine with his army by Annibal at the lake Thrasymene was irreligious, rash, vnskilful, impetuous, vnprouident. Varro that occasioned the great slaughter of the Ro­manes at Cannae, was a man of no merit, nor iudgement, wilful, and vnexpert in matters of warre. Crassus the rich seeking too greedily after spoyle, was not aware in what country he marched, before bee saw himselfe inclosed by the enemies. Looke the latter emperours, you shal not find in many of them any thing worthy commendation. Maximinus a cruell tirant, in matters of warre and state was vnskil­full. Such were most of the rest.E cubiculo & lectulo iubebat quicquid hosti conduceret. Ta­cit. 20. Such cap­taines he calleth Ignaua animalia. Ordeonius that was ouerthrowne by the Germans, being in danger, like a sluggish beast took his bed, [Page 46]and (as Tacitus saith) did thence giue foorth such direction, as made most for the enemy. Wherefore seeing so many vertues are requi­red in a captaine, and so small faultes lay him open to the enemy: it is no maruell, if perfect Generals be so rare, and hard to finde. Phi­lip king of Macedonia wondred, that the Athenians changed their leaders so often, as hauing great choice, seeing that he in al his time, could not find anie more then one that was excellent, or answerable to his minde; and that was Parmenio. The more rare they are, the more care all wise Princes, and states ought to haue, that vnto such as they commit their armies vnto, they adioyne for a supply wise and experimented counsellers. Yea, though the Generall be neuer so wise, yet may hee not want his counsell of warres. Of this the order of our discourse leadeth vs now to speake.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 2. Of the Generalles counsell of warres.

IT were a principall point of wisedome for Princes, and states, that take warres in hand, to make choice of such a Generall, as hath such partes and vertues, as before are described: if they will not be persuaded, but will needes for fauour, or kinred, or nobi­litie commit their affaires to men young in yeares, and greene in experience, and de­stitute of merite, the next remedy is to ioyne with them Captaines wise, and experimented in matters of warre. If they will doe ney­ther, then shall the wofull euents of warres teach them, which no counsell nor reason could perswade them, that warres are mana­ged by wisedome, value, and experience, and not by fauour, no­bilitie, nor great countenance. In the late troubles of France,Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 3. when Charles the ninth made his brother Henry de Valois his lieu­tenant generall, to supply his want of yeares, and experience, hee assigned vnto him for his counsell the Dukes of Nemours, and Longueuille, the Marshall Cossè, Tauanes, Martigues, Car­naualet, Losses, and others which were men of wisedome and va­lue.

King Edward the third sending his sonne gouernor of his army into France, ioyned with him diuers experimented heades to assist him. Yea,Consilio cum legatis, & quaesto­re communicato &c. Caesar omnes copias castris e­duxit. Cas. bel. gal. 4. although the Generals themselues were men of worth, and great experience: yet both among the Romanes and other nati­ons had they their counsels with them. Many eyes see more then one, and souldiers do more willingly execute that, which they see by wise counsell to haue beene determined wisely before.Priùs quàm incipias consulto, & vbi consulueris maturè facto o­pus est. Salust. de coniur. Catil. Before any en­terprise be begunne, it is wisedome to consult, and after consulta­tion speedily to execute. [...] Thucid. 1. It is neuer good to presume vpon the e­nemies disorders, as if they would take an euil course, but wee ought to consider and foresee in counsell, all that may happen, as if they did all that which they ought to doe, saith Archidamus. But this cannot be doone sufficiently, nor orderly without a coun­sell of warres. Therefore had the Romanes their Legatos, i. bel­lici consilij aucto­res, & muneris prouincialis mi­nistros. Cic. in Vatin. legates, lieu­tenants, or counsellors assistant vnto them, to giue counsell and to speede such matters, as were committed vnto them, more or lesse according to the importance of affaires in hand. L. Furius in his warres against the Gaules had fiue: Caesar in his warres in France had tenne: Pompey in the warres against the pyrates had fifteene legates. These serued the Generall for counsell, in his ab­sence they supplied his place: in any seruice they had the charge ey­ther of some part of the army, or some wing, or some regiment.

The Lacedemonians sentThucid. Brasidas, and others to assist their ad­mirall. Cnemus in the gouernement of sea causes. When Commi­us, Iis delecti ex ciuitatibus attri­buuntur, quorum consilio bellum administraretur. Caes. bel. gal. li. 7. Virdumarus, Eporedorix, and Vergasillaunus were made Generalles of that army which the Gaules sent against Caesar, they had also certaine wise men assigned to them out of euery state, by whose counsell they were to proceede in the administration of the warres. Where there is no set counsell, yet is it not good to doe matters without counsell. The Romanes vsed commonly to call a counsell of their chiefe officers, colonelles, and others about them. Camillus beforeOmnia ibi sum­mo consilio & ratione acta sunt. Fortuna etiam vt fit, secuta est. Liu. 5. hee charged the Gaules, he set downe in counsell howe euery thing shoulde bee perfourmed. And there­fore no maruell (saith Liuy) if good successe ensued, seeing all thing were doone by order, and deliberation. Ser. Galba being beset by the people comming downe from the mountaines on euery side, called a counsell of his chiefe men, andConcilio cele­riter conuocato, sententias exqui­rere caepit Galba. Caes bel. gal. 3. asked aduise, what euery man thought best to be done in that case. The same didCaes. bel. gal. 5. Cotta [Page 48]and Titurius besieged by Ambiorix, though not with like successe. Curio Concilio con­uocato de summa rerum deliberare caepit. Caes. de bel. ciu. 2. calling his counsell about him after his comming into Af­frike, deliberated how to proceed in his matters. Good it had bene for him if he had vsed like deliberation in all his affaires. But if at a­ny time, sure before the ioyning of battell counsell is necessary. Be­fore thatLiu. 27. Scipio brought foorth his army to fight with Asdrubal, he called his chiefe men to counsell. [...]. Xenoph. ex­ped. Cyr. Cyrus before hee began the bat­tell with his brother Artaxerxes, called the colenels, and chiefe com­manders of the Greeks to counsel. There they set down by common cōsent what course they were to take for the obtaining of the victory. And so pretious a thing is good counsell, that not onely chiefe com­manders, & men of authority, but also euery one that speaketh reason is to be heard. [...]. Xenoph. ex­ped. Cyr. 3. Xenophon, to heare those that brought good intelli­gēce, gaue order, that his familiars should awake him if he were on sleepe. He refused not to heare the counsel of any priuate souldier.

Let vs now see into what calamities they haue fallen, which refu­sing to heare counsel did al things rashly, and vpon their owne head. Charles the Duke of Burgundy deserueth the first place, who presu­ming of his owne wisedome, and refusing to heare all counsell, ouer­threw himselfe and his state. He refused to heare one that came to dis­couer vnto him the treason of Campobacho. The presumption ofGuicciar. li. 19. Lautrecke that would heare no counsell, nor followe any deuise but his owne, brought the forces of France before Naples to ruine. It had beene good if Richard the 2. would haue folowed the aduise of his vncle. It is reported that Charles the 5. was opinionatiue and did many things of his owne head; and the rather, for that he would seeme to imitate Caesar. But the matter I thinke is mistaken. for neither did Caesar, nor Charles the 5. things without counsell, nor can any prosper, that do proceede without aduise.

Those things standing thus: yet I know not how it commeth to passe, that in great enterprises taken in hand in these times, there is seldome any sound, or set counsell appointed. If any be: yet are they the Generals familiars, or men of no great merite, or iudgement. And which is very odious, & greatly offendeth braue men, Princes &Difficultà grā ­dissima d'entrar' nelle camere & nudientie del rè fe ce i Francesi o­diosi. Guicciard. lib. 1. Generals chambers are close shut, & hard it is for a man to come to their speech whatsoeuer they haue to say. Oft times the counsell is diuided, which causeth slow resolution, weak expedition, and venteth al good counsels: a matter much to be auoyded.Lib. 16. Guicciardin saith, [Page 49]that the contrariety of Clement the 7. his two counsellers made him ridiculous, slowe, and vnhappy in all his enterprises. yet was hee otherwise subtill, and worldly wise. Where there is emulation, and contention betwixt those of the counsel, there is nothing agreed vp­on, vntill all opportunities be passed. Nowe and then the Generall, although good counsell be giuen, yet least heNe alienae sen­tentiae indigens videretur, in di­uersa ac deterioca transibat. Tac. 15. might seeme to want or neede counsell, hee will rather take a worse course. Which was the case of the Romane captaine, through whose folly the Romanes were ouerthrowen by Vologeses. Some men also there are which mislike all counsels, but such as themselues deuise: of which nature wasConsilii quam­uis egregii, quod non ipse afferret inimicus. Tac. 17. Laco the gouernour of Galba the Emperours garde. which was his owne ouerthrow, and the ouerthrow of his Prince. Such are to be excluded frō all counsel. Some there are that in counsel resolue vpon euery light rumour, and report. which causeth them oft times ridiculously to reuoke their decrees, and determinations. This light­nes Caesar noteth in the Rumoribus & auditionibus per­moti, de summis saepè rebus consi­lia ineunt. Caes. bel. gal. 4. Gaules; & the Negauit sena­tus ad rumores à priuatis consictos Senatusconsulta facienda. Liu. 35. Senate of Rome with great grauitie reprooued, where they shew, that the Senate might not determine matters vpon rumours of priuate men, that lightly proue counterfeit. Of all othersLiu. 44. Aemilius Paulus most hated those, that would talke and prate, and busy themselues with matters, which they vnderstood not. And in deede it is an odious sort of men, that doeth forge false rumours, and take vpon them to prescribe the Ge­nerals what to doe. But most dangerous counsellers are those, which are hired of the enemie. A matter not newe nor rare, but sure very scandalous. Guicciardine noteth it in the counsell Sono venali spesso i consigli di principi. Guicci­ard. lib. 1. of Charles the 8. of France. The same man declareth whatJn molti pote­uano assai i dona­tiui & le promes­se de Francesi. Guicciar. lib. 16. sway French Crownes did also beare among the counsellers of Charles the 5. Philip of Co­mines reporteth that Lewis the xj. of France bestowed 16. thousand Duckets in pension vpon the English that followed Edward the 4. into France, which brake the force of that iourney. When the treaty of association was made betwixt Spaine and England, against France in the dayes of Henry the 8. the Cardinal and others would not agree, before that the Emperour Charles had giuen them cau­tion for the Guicciar. li. 15. paiment of 20. thousand Duckets pension, which they receiued of the French king, and were loth to loose, howsoeuer the common wealth might gaine by it. These men call themselues Pensioners, but their true name is Traitors, hired for a litle golde to betray their Prince and Countrey. These doe ruinate all enter­prises [Page 50]against those that hire them, and therefore deserue not on ely to be thrust out of the counsell of warres, but also out of their coun­trey. These doe make many good counsels knowen to the enemie, and therefore are no way to be trusted. Last of all through feare, or delay of resolution, or execution, many occasions of seruice passe, which are not alwayes offered vnto vs, and when they come, not easi­ly to be pretermitted. It is not wisedome to resolue rashly, true: no more is it wisedome to consult so long, that the occasion passeth. rash men therefore, and slowe proceeders are fitter for other places, then places of counsell in warres.

The remedie of these disorders is easy, where the Generall is a man of iudgement, and execution; where otherwise, it is a matter difficult, and almost not possible. In which case it is necessary, that one be appointed with special authority next to the Generall. Men of iudgement can soone discouer trecherous counsels, and will easi­ly correct their contentions, and whatsoeuer other faultes are com­mon in their proceeding.

Wherefore seeing nothing auaileth more in warres, then coun­fell: next vnto the choyse of the Generall, regarde is to be had of the choyse of a sufficient counsell of men of knowledge, experience, se­crecy, loyaltie and other good partes fit for that place; that, as it was among the Romanes, may both aduise, and helpe the Generall. And if by the lawe of armes, no souldier may reueale any counsell to the enemie, much lesse ought such abuse to proceede from the counsel. I neede not declare how they should proceede, nor how they should couer their enterprises by contrary pretenses, asExped. Cyr. 1. Cyrus did going against his brother Artaxerxes, and as the Spaniards doe dayly; nor how they should speedily resolue, and presently execute. They doe not deserue to be named counsellers, that in those poynts want counsell. Nowe least contrariety of opinions which hindereth both counsell, and execution, should arise of the diuersitie of coun­sellers affections, I wil shew that the soueraine authoritie in warres, is to be committed to one alone.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 3. Wherein is declared, that the soueraigne commaundement in matters of warres, is to be committed to one alone.

AS in a state well ordeined, so in an army well gouerned there may not be any contrariety in the chiefe commaunders. The army by Iphicra­tes the Athenian is compared to a body, where­of the Generall is the head. Wherefore, as it is vnnaturall and Resp. benè con­stituta quod vnū tantum est cor­pus plura capita habere non po­test. Tyberius a­pud Tacit. monstrous for one body to haue two heads, so it is inconuenient, for an army to be encumbred with diuers heads of contrary disposition. Which mischiefe, seeing it can be no otherwise remedied, then by gi­uing the soueraintie to one: the Prince is diligently to see, that the soueraintie in the army be not diuided amongst many. The Romanes albeit they had ordinarily two consuls: yet in their greatest dangers they appointed one Dictator, or Generall with absolute authoritie. The soueraine commandement of one is a helpe and meanes to di­spatch matters quickly, to take opportunities, and vse the time of warre. [...]. Olinth. 1. Demosthene doeth playnely declare the same by the exam­ple of Philip king of Macedonia. While one commaundeth, he both vnderstandeth better what is wanting, and howe it is to be had: his care is greater; his proceeding more formall, and equall: his counsel more speedy, and secret. Therefore did the Romanes send but one Gouernour into their Prouinces, and employed for the most part but one Consull in the gouerument of their armies. If both: yet where they proceeded orderly, the one gaue In exercitu Rom. cum duo essent Coss. pote­state pari, quod saluberrimum est in rerum magna­rum administra­tione, summa im­perii concedente Agrippa penes Quintium erat. Liu. 3. place to the other. A matter most requisite for the dispatch of weighty matters; as it is eui­dent in the fact of Agrippa yeelding the chieftie to his felow Quinti­us. The Athenians for that their state was popular vsed yeerely to chuse many captaines, yet in their greatest dangers all the rest yeel­ded to be gouerned by one. In the Marathonian fielde against Da­rius, the supreme commandement was in Miltiades, in the battell of Salamine against Xerxes inHerodot. Themistocles, all the rest submitting themselues to be commanded by him. Seldome hath any wise nation done otherwise: if they did they payde for the most part the full price of their folly. The Romanes were ruinated by the Gaules [Page 52]at the encounter ofLiu. 5. Allia, partly by the disorder of the chiefe com­manders being diners, and hauing equall authoritie. Those three Tres duces de­lectu habito pro­fecti sunt Veios, documento (que) fu­ere, quam pluri­um imperium bello inutile esset. Tendendo enim ad sua quis (que) con­silia, cum aliud a­lii videretur, ape­ruerūt ad occasio­nem locum hosti. Liu. 4. captaines that besieged Veij hauing all equal power may be a do­cument vnto vs, how vnprofitable the commandement of diuers Generals is, for the gouernment of warres. For euery man driuing all matters to his owne endes, while one man thought one way, an other otherwise, they gaue occasion to their enemies to hurt them. By the discorde Liu. lib. 5. of the captaines while one refused to succour an other, the Romanes were foyled before Veij. The Aequians obser­uing the disagreement betweene theLiu. 4. Romane captaines, although in force inferiour to the Romanes, yet preuailed against them. Nei­ther was there any greater cause of the ruine of theThucid. 6. Athenian army in Sicile, then the contrarietie of opinions, and discorde of the three captaines sent thither with soueraigne commandement. The origi­nall of all the disorders that fell out in the army of the Protestants in Germany, and of the victorie of Sleidan. Charles the fift, was the diuers opinions of the Duke of Saxony, and Lantgraue of Hesse. When the Lantgraue woulde haue foughten, the Duke was of another minde, or percase was not ready. What the one did profitably de­termine, that the other did frustrate. From the time of this discorde the affaires of the Protestants went to wracke. The French were driuen out of the kingdome of Discordia di ca­pitani fa perdere Napoli a France­si. Guicciar. lib. 3. Naples by a small force, by reason of the dissention of the captaines Montpensier and Percy. The enuie and contention, that fell out betwixt the French, and Hungarian cap­taines gaue an easy victorie to Amurathes the Turke at Nicopolis. It had not bene possible for Caesar Guicciard. li. 5. Borgia to escape the hands of so many Princes confederate against him, but that the captaines of the aduerse army did weaken their force by their owne disagree­ment. The Venetians were ouerthrown at Ghiaradadda only by the pluralitie of commanders. For while Guicciard. lib. 8. Bartholomew Aluian which was one of their Generals determined to fight, and the Count Pit­tiglian which was the other, commanded the army to marche, the enemie charging them in this instant of their irresolution, obteined a great victorie.

The soueraigne authoritie both of matters by land, and by sea is to be giuen only to one. otherwise there can be no good correspon­dence in both places. While Lantreck Guicciard. commanded by land, and Philippin Doria by sea: the siege of Naples was discontinued, & the [Page 53]towne victualled, which happened by reason of the dissention of the Generals. It hath bene no small hinderance to our affaires in the Low countreys, that those that haue commanded at land, haue not likewsie had the gouernment at sea. For by this meanes the ene­mie hath had greater store of victuals, and our owne men greater want, when the shippes and passages were in others keeping. Nay, where the commandement is part in the Generall, and part in the States, things are yet more confused. For the States oft times victuall the enemie, yea and coutinually trade into Spaine, while our souldiers fight against the Spaniard. I will not say what inconue­niences come of this one point neglected otherwayes, for that it would couch some men more particularly, then my meaning is. For remedy of this mischiefe the Romanes gaue to their captains power both in matters by land, and sea. Scipio as he had an army by land, so he had a Nauie by sea both in the expedition of Spaine, and Afrike. Neither could Marcellus euer haue preuailed against the citie of Sy­racusae, if he had not besieged the towne, both by sea, and land. Caesar was enforced to goe to sea before he could subdue the sea townes of France. But what neede I vse more wordes in a matter so playne? both reason, and experience teacheth vs that many [...]. commanders in matters of warre are not good. And therefore let there be but one soueraigne commander both by land, and sea: with what authoritie he ought to be furnished, resteth now to be discussed.

CHAP. IIII. Part.4. Of the authoritie, and Commission of the Generall.

ACcording to that opinion which Princes and States haue of their Captaines, and sometimes respect had to the danger of the times: their vse is to giue vnto them more ample, or more straite commission. But if they purpose, that their affaires shal succeed wel, of two things one is necessarie: to wit, that either they furnish them with meanes sufficient, or giue them commission to furnish and helpe themselues: and that either they doe direct them sufficiently, which is scarce possible: or els giue them leaue to take order according to the occasions offered vpon pre­sent viewe, and varietie of times, or things. For neither can he doe [Page 54]seruice vpon the enemie, that wanteth either conuenient force or meanes; nor may he, or dare he take the aduantage of time, and other circumstances, that is brideled and bound by his instructions. The Romanes although most expert in deedes of armes, whose Senate consisted for the most part of such as in their time had bene comman­ders, and altogether of men exercised in armes; yet did not at any time prescribe their Generals what to doe; and what they should not doe; much lesse howe they should doe, or when they should doe it. Much more absurd therefore it is, that men that neuer sawe enemie, nor know the traine of warres, should take vpon them to direct Ge­nerals what they should doe at land, or sea: and very strange it see­meth to me, that Generals to whome armies are committed should like schooleboyes take forth such lessons, as these ignorant pedants and scriuanoes should prescribe. Warres are not made by indenture, neither can any couenant with his enemie to doe this, or not to doe it. Nor can any man conceiue, what is best to be done, but such as are present. And therefore the ordinary limitations of some commissi­ons, doe nothing els, but binde the hands of our captaines, that they shall not vse opportunitie, or percase further and helpe the enemie. Herein therefore it is good to imitate olde warriers, at least to come so neere them, as difference of times will permit. The Romane cap­taines had authoritie most large, and meanes sufficient. Their forces were great, their furniture and prouision plentifull. least they should exact any thing of their associats, they were furnished with all things Liu. 25.26. necessary, euen to their Magistratus mulis tabernacu­lis (que), & omni a­lio instrumento militari ornaban­tur, ne quid tale imperarent sociis. Liu. 42. & 44. mules, tentes, and carriages. That which was wanting, or might more easily be had otherwhere, they had au­thority to supply. All which consisted, & was giuen them in one word. Now captains haue many words in their commission, & litle scope, or authority. Vnder this one word imperium, they cōprised al authority necessary for the gouernement of the warres. By the same they had power to leuy men, to leade them, to employ them, as appeareth by the Demus imperi­um Caesari sine quo exercitus ha­beri, res militaris administrari non potest. Cic. Phi­lip. Decreui impe­rium exercitum habenti. Quid est enim sine im­perio exercitus? Cic. Philip. commission giuen to Octauius Caesar, that afterward was called Augustus In the Prouince where they made warres, they might be­side the number they brought with them, leuy other souldiers, & im­pose vpon the people necessary charges for the defence of the coutry. Caesar Prouinciae quā maximum potest militum numerū imperat. Caes. bel. [...]al. 8. to resist the attempts of the Heluetians, which threatned to passe through the Prouince of France subiect to the Romanes, le­uied as many men, as he could, in his gouernement. Fuluius vnder­standing [Page 55]that theFuluius quia armare inuentu­tem Celliberos andiret, & ipse quanta poterat a sociis auxilia cō ­traxerat. Liu. 40. Celtiberians gathered newe forces, he also in his gouernement, procured what helpe hee could of his subiectes, and associates. From their associates and subiects in their gouern­ment, they had power to take victuals, carriages, shippes, and ne­cessarie furniture of warre, as is euident in the warres that Scipio made in Spaine and Afrike, Caesar in France, Sylla and Pompey in Asia, and other Countreys. They had also power to doe iustice as well to their associates, and subiects, as to their owue souldi­ers: otherwise they could neither haue encountred with trechery of men euill affected, nor defended their fauourers, and friendes. The defence of the Prouince, and their M. Messala & L. Pisone Coss. Senatus censuit, vti quicunque Galliam prouin­ciam obtineret, quod commodo reip. facere pos­set, Aeduos ecte­rós (que) amicos po­puli Rom. defen­deret. Caes. bel. gal. 1. friendes both against se­ditious mutins, and foreine inuasion was likewise committed vn­to them, and per consequent, power giuen them to leuy power, and vse all meanes for the maintenance of their associats, and for the gouernment and execution of warres, without which they could not be defended.

Good it had bene for our Generals likewise in the Lowe coun­treys, and other where, that their authoritie had bene also enlar­ged. For while they had neither victuals, nor lodging, nor shippes, nor cariages, nor artillery, nor munition, nor other furniture of warre, but at the pleasure of the States, some whereof were too respectiue of their owne profite, nor could execute any man of those Countreys for treason, without their consent, it is no maruaile, if their proceedings were slowe, their executions slender, their wantes great.

Further the Romanes gaue their Generals power both to make warres by sea, and land. Do doubt they had also sufficient meanes, without which all power is frustratory. Our Captains in the Low countreys, as they haue bene weake by land, so they depended on others pleasures, for matters at sea.

In later times also the same course hath bene taken. When Corbuloni re­ges praefecti prae­tores parere iussi; potestas data qualis Pom­pelo bello Pyrati­co, Tacit. annal, 15. Corbulo was sent by Nero against the Parthians, hee had power equall to that which Pompey had graunted vnto him in the warres against the Pirats. Kings, Gouernours of Prouinces, and the Offi­cers of the Romanes were enioyned to obey him. It is the vse of all Nations both to furnish their Generals, and to authorize them sufficiently. What authoritie Annibal had, it is partly eui­dent by his actions (for it is not to be presumed that he did matters [Page 56]without authority) and partly by the wordes of Fabius perswading the Romanes to chuse a captaine equall to Annibal, a leader (sayth hee) of great authoritie by reason of his continuance, and not restrained by any limitation of times, or lawes so, but that he might doe all things, according as opportunites of warre should require. Herein Demosthenes Olynth. 1. declareth, what great aduantage Philip king of Macedonia had aboue the captaines of the Atheni­ans: for he was not limited by any Superiors commandement, nor restrained by termes, or time, as were they. Which thing (sayth he) is very effectuall for dispatch of matters. Those captaines (saythDuces summi liberi impedimē ­tis omnibus, do­mini (que) rerum tē ­porum (que) trahunt consilijs cuncta. Liu. 9. Liuy) that haue absolute authoritie, and are free from impedi­ments, and haue power ouer things and times, doe worke great effectes with their counsels.

Whosoeuer therefore for enuy, or feare, or other cause goeth a­bout to perswade Princes to pare their Generals authoritie, and to binde them with strait conditions, hath an euill minde himselfe, and as much [...] in him lyeth, ruinateth the affaires of his Prince. For what seruice can they doe that are not onely pinched in their proui­sions, but also bound fast by their commissions? TheLe commissioni di Caesare, haue­uane espressa o ta­cita conditione, di gonuernarhi secō ­do la varietà di tempi. Guicciard. lib. 17. commissions which Charles the fift gaue to his captaines, had this condition either expressed, or implyed, that they should proceede according to the varietie of times, and occasions notwithstanding any thing in them conteined. And some very expert, and wise men haue not doubted, seeing a manifest aduantage to goe against their Princes commissi­on.Il Triuultio an­chora che la com­messione del rèfus­se che prima s' at­tendesse alle cose de Genoa, prese il Bosco nel contado d' Alexandria. Guicciard. lib. 3. Triuultio although by his directions, he was first to haue care of the affaires of Genoa: yet doubted not to take Bosco, a fit place in the territory of Alexandira. And albeit that Lewis the 12. gaue his Captaines expresse charge, that they should not fight with the Spaniards: yet seeing their weakenes, and their owne manifest ad­uantage, they fought with them, and foyled them at Cirignola. Where for their defence is alleaged, that the commaundements of the King being farre off, and not seeing the state of things, were ra­ther I commanda­menti delrè essen­do lontano, erano più ricords, che precetti. Guicci. ard. lib. 5. remembrances, then precepts to be followed. Trimoille see­ing the danger of the state of France assaulted by diuers enemies, and also by the Switzers, made Accordà co i zuitzeri senza commessione, & salue la Francia. Guicciar. lib. 5. peace & compounded with them, although he had no commssion so to doe. Of which act Guicci­ardin guieth this testimonie, that by that accorde he saued the realme of France out of a mauifest danger. And very absurd it were, if a mā [Page 57]might not doe his countrey seruice without commission. TheSalus reip. [...] ­prema lex. safe­tie of the state, and honor of the Prince are warrants, and exceptions of a most high nature. And for a man to doubt, to take the enemie at aduantage for feare of violating his commission, as the Spaniards say that the Duke of Medina did in his voyage for England, is nothing but to spreade a cloke to couer his owne cowardise, or insufficiencie.

Yet may not the Generall doe against his commission rashly, or without apparant cause, or sufficient order: neither may he doe all things without commission. He may not proclaime warres, or inuade any nation that is out of commission: onely if his enemie flie into an other Countrey, he may followe him. For in that caseLiuy. Manlius auoweth his warres against the Gallo-grecians, andLiuy. Fabius his voyage through the wood Ciminia. Also all such as inuade his go­uernement, or his friends, or associats, he may prosecute without his gouernement. He may not make peace, or treate of peace with the enemie: for he is sent to make warres. He may not dimisse his armie without commandement: nay he may not proceede against the lawes of Armes. The Dictator opti­ma lege creatus, summum imperi­um belli, pacis, paenarum, sine prouocatione ha­bebat. Pompon. in l. 2. §. popul. ff. de orig. iuris. Romane Dictator, although he had great auctho­ritie, and could determine matters of life and death without ap­peale: yet did not hee execute or iudge any, but by the lawes of Armes. That which in commō termes some cal executing by martial lawe, when innocent men are hanged without for me of lawe, or cause, may better be called martiall force, then martiall lawe. For this hath only place in warres, and redresseth disorders against militarie pro­ceedings.Si quid frau­dulenter dux se­cerit, de eo tene­bitur. L. in perso­nam. § genera­bile. ff. de reg. iur. Finally the General, whatsoeuer his commission is, may not deale fraudulently in his charge, nor proceede contrary to mi­litarie profession, and practise: in which case euery Generall is sub­iect ff. ad leg. Iul. maiest. l. 1. & 2. to the lawe.

Very necessarie therefore it is, that Generals should haue their commissions large, both in respect of their prouision, which by this meanes may in some sort be supplied, and in respect of the expedition and Imperator li­berè ad summam imperri consulere debet. Caes. bel. ciu. 3. execution of warres, which ought not to be hindred, nor can conueniently be prescribed. And without large aucthoritie, neither can our owne souldiers, nor associats be well gouerned. The experi­ence of the seruice in the Lowe Countries, and disorders at sea, which for want of power haue not bene redressed, doe minister vnto vs suffi­cient proofe of this matter. Some will say, that it is dangerous to [Page 58]commit so large power into any mans hands, especially if he should deale disloyally. But what a reason is this, because men may abuse their power, not to giue them sufficient power for those matters which are committed to their charge? Those that meane disloyally to­ward the State, although they should haue neuer so strait limitations in their commissions, would not stand vpon termes, and wordes of lawe. And rather it giueth them occasion of discontentment, when they see themselues distrusted, then bridleth any euill purpose, if they should doe against their allegiance. And why should any man without cause suspect any noble man, that he will deale against his Countrey, hauing so many pledges of his loyaltie? but if any should be so euill disposed, yet may we not thinke, that all his army would follow him, rebelling against his Countrey. And if they should, yet is it not the force of one armie, that can preuaile against a whole king­dome that is well gouerned. And therefore for feare of disloyaltie of some; let no man feare, or omitte to make sufficient prouision; and ra­ther let loyall men be sought out with diligence, and disloyall men remoued, then that the necessarie prouisions of warre should be neg­lected, or the proceeding hindred for want of aucthoritie.

CHAP. IIII. Part 5. Of the choice of Colonels, and Captaines of companies, and other officers of the armie, and their qualities and office.

DIuers other pointes concerning the place, charge, and office of the Generall, deserue also to be parti­cularly handled; as namely, who hath authoritie to appoint Generals, in what case the Prince himselfe is to come in person into the field, how farre the Ge­neral ought to hazard himselfe, and generally what belongeth to his office: but ye same may partly be vnderstood, by that which hath bin spoken already, & shal more euidently be declared in this treatise, (for ye executiō of al these matters appertaineth especially to ye direction of ye General.) And now we haste to speake of such mat­ters, as cōcerne rathe the managing of warre, then questiōs of right.

It is sufficiently knowen, yt the power to make warre or peace, is a marke of souerainty, & belongeth to the soueraine magistrat, and to those to whō he shal Quintio libe­rum arbitrium pa­cis, ac belli per­missum, Liu. 32. cōmit it. The nomination likewise of the Ge­neral belongeth to those yt haue soueraine power in the State. As is euident by the histories of the Romanes, Greekes, Persians, & all na­tions, [Page 59] L. Martius was chosen General by ye reliques of Scipios armie in Spaine, but that was in case of necessitie, & endured no longer, then vnto such time, as they had other captaines sent them frō Rome. To take vpon him a charge without cōmission, is within case of treason, & sauoureth of rebellion. The Prince is not to hazard his person, nor his honor vpon euery light occasion. King Henry the 3. of France, re­turning out of Poland, receiued a scorne at the siege of Liuron, a pal­try Hamlet in Dauphinè, for yt being present in person, & that being his first attempt after his returne into his kingdome, he could not at­chieue it. The French since their King was taken by the English, do not easily suffer their kings to come in person into ye field. But if the Si status impe­rij, aut salus pro­uinciarum in dis­crimine vertatur, princeps debet in acie stare. Tacit. lib. 4. state or crowne come in question, as in the warres betwixt Henry the 7. and Richard the 3. betwixt Otho, and Vitellius: Vitellius and Vespasian, then is the Princes presence required in the armie.

The third point, by yt which hath bin spoken already may be resol­ued. For in a General, wisdome & courage would be so tempered, that neither he hazard his person further then reason, nor doubt to execute good counsel for feare. The taking of Francis the French king by the Spaniards, & king Iohn by the English, put the Realme of France in great hazard. The death of Gaston de Fois at Rauenna, of Cyrus in the expeditiō against Artaxerxes, who died by their rashnes in ye midst of their victories, turned to ye losse of both their armies. Yet may not a General hide himselfe frō danger, as did ye cowardTacitus. Vitellius. The whole office of ye General consisteth in the speeding, & direction of all matters of warre; of which we haue occasiō to intreate in this whole discourse. And therefore for these points this may be sufficient.

Nowe for that the Generall cannot doe all himselfe, but must vse colonels, captaines, and officers, for the execution of his commande­ments; we are to shew what paines, & care he is to haue, that they be well chosen, & doe their duety sufficiently. Colonels would be chosen of such noblemen, knights, & gentlemen, as for their yeeres, seruice, experience, discretion, manhood, and other vertues doe best deserue those places. The place of a colonel doth very well answere vnto the tribunes office in the Romane army. whose orders also we might do well to obserue in ours. By an olde custome saithVeteri instituto ad tribunatum nemo admitteba­tur nisi qui alam duxisset. Veget. Vegetius, none was made tribune, or colonel, but such as had lead a companie of olde souldiers before. Hadrian the Emperour expresly forbade In vita Adriani Lamprid. beardles youthes to aspire to that charge. Arian. Alex, exped. Alexander in his ex­pedition [Page 60]against Darius, made choise of such for captaines of thou­sands, as for their continuance in his fathers seruice, had their haire graye, and their iudgement ripe. These are employed oft times in some speciall seruice, as in the keeping of a Straite, or of a Fort, or conducting of victuals, or munition: and therefore would haue great skill in all proceedings of warre; especially in the gouernement of such things, as are committed vnto their charge. Among the Ro­manes the Tribunorum munus fuit ca­strorum & exer­citus curam ge­rere, ne sine mu­nimento, aut cu­stodiis sint, per vi­giles excubias iu­bere, milites di­cto audientes ha­bere, ad exercita­tiones ducere, vi­gilias circumire, frumentationibus interesse, quere­las militum audi­re, frumentum probare, delicta leuiora coërce­re, valetudinario­rum & sauciorum curam gerere, mi­lites iuramento adigere. L. officiū §. officium ff. de re milit. Tribune office was, in seeing to the defences of the campe, placing of gards, setting the watch, keeping the souldiers in order, exercising them, going the round, leading forth the souldiers to fetch in prouision, seeing the souldiers victuals to be holsom, hea­ring of the complaints of souldiers, correcting smaller faultes, loo­king to th sicke & hurt, prouiding for them, & taking their othes at their first entrance. Now these offices belong partly to ye L. Marshal, or masters of the campe, partly to the serieant maior, partly to such inferiour captaines and officers, as haue that special charge imposed vpon them, and partly as other good orders, so these offices of colo­nels also are eyther omitted, or slenderly exercised. Nowe this onely belongeth vnto colonels, that they haue their regiment and the cap­taines and souldiers thereof in order, that they leade the same in ser­uice, and doe such speciall seruices, as are committed vnto them.

Centurions, or captaines of companies, would be chosen of ye most strong, valiant, discreete, and actiue souldiers: such especially as both know the traine of warres, & are of body able to endure labour. Their office is to leade, and gouerne their men, to looke that their bodies, armes, and clothes be in order: that they haue victuals, and things necessary, & execute such special commandements as are giuen them. There is no certaine rule of their office to be prescribed. For as there are more or fewer companies together; so they doe more or lesse. Where there are but 2. or 3. companies together, the captains do all, as chiefe cōmanders in an army: where an army standeth together, they should be the first men of their companies: out of aray they are to attend ye generall officers commandemēts. One had custonie some haue, yt they finger their souldiers pay, & some of thē hardly refinger it, or deliuer it where it is due. But ye worst of all is, that vnder colour of bad dealing of some, neither captaines nor souldiers are well paid. The custome was borowed first from the Italians: and is corrected by the Spaniards, as many things els in the captaines office, which [Page 61]we might do well likewise to reforme, especially ye confusion of wea­pons, & marshalling of ye captaines, & their officers: which if it be not otherwise then now it is, in great armies would breede great cōfusiō.

These Honoris aug­mentum non am­bitione, sed labo­re, ad vnumquē (que) conuenit perue­nire. Nee debet quis ad dignitatē suffragio, sed la­boribus at (que) or­dine numerorum prouehi. L. con­tra Pub. C. de re milit. lib. 12. & l. 1. & 2. Cod. de offic. magist. of­fic. honors are to be departed according vnto mens deserts, not wonne by ambitious suite; by labour, not by letters, & request: but this may rather seem a wish, then a precept in these times, when as places haue bin solde at the pleasure of barbers, & scriuenoes, and some giuen for ye loue of ladies. The abuse is but too auncient, yet ne­uer so farre inured as now. Tully at theCic. ad Attic. request of Brutus, bestowed a colonels place vpon Scaptius which he refused. And writing to Cae­sar in the fauour of Huic ego ne (que) tribunatum, ne (que) praefecturam pe­to. Cic. ad Caes. ep. fam. Trebatius, he sheweth, ye such places were some­times graunted of fauour but seldome without desert. He obiecteth againstCenturiatus palàm vendidit, ordines per seruū assignauit. Cic. in Pison. Piso as a great reproch, that he sold the places of captains, and other romes, and inferiour offices, at the request of his scribes, and slaues. Caesar inHirt. de bel. A­fric. Affrike dismissed certaine of his colonels & cap­taines, with this speach to disgrace them, that they had gotten those places for fauour without desert. Afterward when the centurion be­gan to take money of the common souldier for absence, and redemp­tion of other disorders, of which Tacitus Per sordes & a­uaritiam Fontei­us Capito adi­mebat, & assig­nabat militiae or­dines. Tacit. 17. complaineth; the centuri­ons place began to be also set to sale: which was a great cause of the corruption of militarie discipline among the Romanes, and cannot chuse, but also worke bad effects among vs, if it be continued. There is none that buyeth his place, that willingly doth hazard his carkasse, or hath other respect then of gaine. And no maruel if ye common soul­diers be pilled, where ye captaines at their entrance are so pinched.

The places of Populus tribu­nos ad 4. primas legiones dixit, re­liquos coss. Liu. 27. colonels were sometime giuen by the people of Rome, but most cōmonly, & with greatest reason, by the Generals. For otherwise if it were, how could they reward those that best deser­ued? Therefore did Aemilius Liu. 42. Paulus make request, that he might bestow those places vpon men of greatest worth and merite: which said he, is for the honour also, and profite of the common wealth.

Centurions were alwayes chosen by the Generals, and by them aduanced for their Virtutis causa in superiores e­rant ordines hu­ius legionis tra­ducti. Caes. bel. gal. 6. vertue. Caesar preferred Scaeua to ye highest cen­turions roome in in the legion, for his noble seruice at Dyrrachium. AmongExped. Cyr. 2. the Greekes, those that were next in degree, succeeded in their places that were next about them, if any thing came at them.

The officers of companies, namely lieutenants, ensignes, sergi­ants, corporals, are chosen by the captaines of companies. But much [Page 62]better it were, if as some doe, so all did chuse them of their most able and valiant souldiers, without respect, or fauour.

Other officers, are chosen some for the gouernment, others for the prouision of the army. Of ye sort are the campmasters or marshals with their serieant maior, & field coporals, colonel general, lieutenant general of the horse, scoutemasters, trenchmasters, quartermasters, and such like. Which all tend one way, & are but partes of the Gene­rals duety, which in time past he executed by his legates, or lieute­nants & tribunes. The master of the Ordonance, & captaine of Pio­ners are likewise but of a late inuention, since ye vse of artillerie came in, and souldiers through slouth began to refuse the labours of warre. The iudge and prouost marshall succeede also in a part of the Gene­rals care for deciding and executing matters of iustice. The muster­master likewise is of a late stampe, namely since captaines began to pay the souldiers, and Princes began to be defrauded of their num­bers, and their treasure. Of the second sort are all Commissaries for the pay of souldiers, for victuals, armes, munition, carriages, and whatsoeuer other prouision necessary. For good choice whereof there is but one generall rule to be obserued, to wit, that all partiality and affection laid aside, such be placed in gouernment as be skilfull, loyal, valiant, diligent, and haue respect of honour, not of profite, and in offi­ces of prouision, such as haue knowledge in such matters, & will deale faithfully. Such as ambitiously, or greedily sue for such places, are not lightly to be heard: and although they be once placed; yet if they be conuicted of insufficiencie, or negligence, or fraude, they are exem­plarly to be punished, or at the least remoued.

CHAP. IIII. Part 6. Of musters, and choice of common souldiers.

THe Generals chiefe care, is about the choice of his chiefe officers, colonels, & captaines of companies: yet may he not neglect ye choice euen of cōmon soul­diers. A matter in our times either not at al, or very litle regarded. For when occasion is offered of ser­uice: then for the most part order is giuen either to the officers of euery Parish, to take vp roges, or masterles men, or in­habitants of prisons, such as if they had their deserts, they were to be sent rather to ye gallowes, then to the warres for the most part: or if a greater number must be taken; to the officers in the Countrey, men [Page 63]for the most part ignorant of warlike actions, and such as haue no o­ther respect most commonly, then to disburthen ye Parish of rogues, loyterers, pikars, & drunkards, and such as no other way can liue. A­mong yt which there is no honest man, but would be loth to be num­bred. If any other be chosen, it is for some priuate respect or grudge. And of those yt are chosen, if they haue either friendes, fauour, or mo­ney, most of thē are dismissed. And sure when I cōsider how in forrein nations men are sent to ye slaughter, few in nūber, vnprouided, vnfur­nished, vnpaid, and pilled of their gouernours, contrary to all order of seruice; I must needes say, these men are the fittest to be sent. But if Princes meane to haue their honour and countrey defended, or their estate mainteined, or seruice done vpon the enemie, they must haue more regard to chuse men of more strength, honestie, and abilitie; such as haue reason to fight for their Countrey, and haue care of their ho­nest reputation, and are ashamed of villeny, and lewde doing. For how can captaines encourage those to fight for their countrey, lands, goods, and honor, that haue neither house nor home, nor respect of ho­nesty or shame, nor care though all were fired, so they might hooke somewhat? and yet forsooth the Generals & commanders, that of late time haue bin emploied haue bin blamed, that they haue not obserued the rules of militarie discipline among these men. As if it were possi­ble to keepe famished men from snatching of victuals, or drunkardes from drinke, or to master men that are masterles, or to keepe rogues in order, or to make loyterours to worke, or pilferors to march in aray and keepe order, or to preserue them aliue that haue neither paye, nor prouision in time, nor one peny to helpe themselues in their neede. If they will therefore haue order kept, let them choose out men capable of gouernment, & souldiers, not rascals. With great care this abuse ought to be reformed: for it is a point very material.Lib. 1. de re milit. c. 7. Vegetius doub­ted not to place both the strēgth of the Romane army, & the foun­dation of the Romane Empire, in the first choise and triall of their souldiers. Therefore were the Generals either present themselues at the musters, or els did they employ men of knowledge, grauitie, and honesty, as hath bin already declared. Those yt through couetousnesse or fauour did corrupt their orders for musters, were detested and punished.Motus senatu Pedius Blaesus ob delectum milita­rem pretio & ambitione cor­ruptum. Pedius Blaesus for this cause was ignominiously put out of the Senate. Such as sought gaine by this shamefull practise, are taxed by Delectum Ba­tauorum onera­bant ministri a­uaritia ac luxu, senes autinuali­dos conquirēdo, quos pretio di­mitterent. Tac. 20. Tacitus, as doing a thing rare, and not tollerable.

When this disorder grewe great, they forbad by expresse lawe, all men to take money, eyther for Neque ob mili­tem legendum dimittendúmue aes accipiat. ff. ad leg. Iul. repetund. l. choosing, or dismissing of souldi­ers. They that answered not to their names at musters among the Romanes, were taken and imprisoned, and their goods sold, as Liuy witnesseth. In the time ofVal. Max. li. 6. ca. 3. Traianus the Emperour, one that made his sonne vnable to serue in the warres, was banished his countrey. So were it to be wished, that men of honour and skill, deputed by the Generall, were present at the musters, and that all able men would offer themselues to doe their countrey seruice: that such as choose men vnable to excuse others, or else doe dimisse sufficient men for money, were themselues dimissed and seuerely punished: and finally, that such were chosen that haue somewhat in their countrey to loose, and to carry with them for maintenance of themselues, if neede be. But this is onely to be wished, in such seruice as for good order, and sufficient number is like to prooue honourable, and when men shall be better prouided and paid, and more accompt made of them. [...]. Pericl. Thucid. 1. Now some make accompt of money, & no accōpt of men, like to the Athe­nians, that lamented the losse of their goods, and not of mens per­sons, which are infinitely more in value. In these disorders it is not fit, that others should be imployed in warres, then such as now are. which some cal pressed men, for that they go as willingly to seruice, as to hanging or pressing; and money imprested cōmeth eyther rare­ly, or is taken from them. My onely hope is, that one day there wilbe better prouision, and proceeding in warres, at what time these rules may better be put in execution. In the meane time wee may learne what hath bene the practice of times past in the choyse of souldiers, and what rules ought nowe to be practised.

In the choice of souldiers, we are especially to respect three things: first, the strength of the body: secondly, the vigour and vertues of the mind: and thirdly, the maner and trade of the parties liuing. Vege­tius, and certaine idle Italians, giue precepts concerning the climate, countrey, and diuers situations of regions, which they would haue in the choise of souldiers to be respected: but experience teacheth vs, that oft times valiant men are found in Cities, and fruitfull Coun­tries, yea vnder hotte climates which they condemne, and cowardes in hilles and rockes, and Northren Regions, which they commend. True it is, that Northren people are commonly more valiant and venturous, then those of Asia & Afrike, that are from vs farre East, [Page 65]and south. But what doth that consideration help vs, that make our leuies of souldiers not in Asia nor Affrike; but here in England, and Ireland, and thereabout? whether therefore souldiers be brought vp in the citie or country, or bred in hilles or valleis, or champaine coun­try, in the north or south of England, I respect not: but if they haue strength of body to endure labours, and a mind vigorous and coura­gious, and an honest disposition, and haue liued such a life, as hath beene tried somtimes in labour, I refuse them not wheresoeuer they haue beene bred. Nay I wish to haue such. Contrariwise cowards and weake persons, and men of lewd conditions, or which haue bene tenderly brought vp, I would refuse although they come from the north or hilly countries.

Pyrrhus gaue orders to his commissioners for mosters to chuse bigge and corpulent men. Marius made choise of men of great sta­ture. But if I might be heard, I woulde neither wish such men to be sought for: (for seldome are great and bigge men able to endure trauel) nor men of a meane or short stature to be refused, if they haue strong and actiue bodies. Men of meane stature are for the most part more vigorous and couragious; they do more easily endure labors, and commonly excell great bodied men in swiftnesse and running, which is a matter in a souldier verie requisite and commendable. [...]. Achilles was much commended for that hee was swift of foote, andHe was called Cursor. Papirius tooke his name and commendation of running.Vtilius est for­tes esse milites, quàm grandes. Veget. lib. 1. c. 6. Ve­getius saith, it is bettet to haue stout and strong, then huge and big souldiers. Such Caesar commonly did chuse. and experience sheweth vs, that men burdened with flesh can neither endure labour, nor hurts, whereas the meane stature and habite of bodie endureth both.

For trial of the strength of a mans body, we are not only to looke vpon the lineaments, and outward proportion of the parts, but rather what the party can do in running, leaping, wrastling, & such like ex­ercises. For oftentimes an euill-fauoured body may haue a quicke strength, and tall & big persons may prooue weake, dainty, & sickly. By the outward apparance, we may notwithstanding make a proba­ble coniecture of a mans strength. For they that haue a likely body, and a sharp countenance, and hard flesh & sinowy armes and legs, ra­ther then ful or fleshy, are likely to proue strong men. Yet do not or­ders of warre admit old men past 46. vnles they be old souldiers, for that their strength is decaying, and their bodies lesse apt to labor: nor [Page 66]youths vnder 20. vnlesse it be some that by triall declareth himselfe to haue strength, for that as yet they are not come to their full pitch and strength.

But that which specially commendeth souldiers, is the vigor of the mind, and good conditions, coniectured by the visage & outward behauior, but knowen only by their conuersation; which is to be lear­ned of others. If the man be a knowen coward, or of a dull dispositi­on, or mutinous, or giuen to drinke, or theeuery, or other disorders, howsoeuer his body seeme answerable, yet for his lewd maners hee proueth for the most part vnprofitable: and is therfore to be repelled, or blotted out of the rolle. In a souldier therefore I require first,Vt audaces sint & animum habe­ant & considen­tiam militarem. Veget. lib. 1. c. 8. a vigorous and present mind, and that he be not afraide of danger, nor drawen swordes: nor that hee despaire in trouble, or thinke of death before it commeth, nor yeeld though cast downe, so long as by any possibilitie he may hope to rise againe.

Constancie also and resolution is much byDe bel. ciu. 3. Caesar commended, and the only thing that atchieueth great enterprises. For many are the hazards of warre, and things succeede not alwayes at the first. Without obedience and obseruance of military orders, all other ver­tues are without effect. Let the souldier therefore be obedient, and quiet. Those that [...]. Plutar. in Agid. & Cleo. are most obedient to lawes, prooue for the most part most valiant against the enemy. It is a principall marke of a valiant souldier, if he dare do what he is commanded by his superi­ors. Contrariwise they that are mutinous against their gouernours, and are euer bragging, as if warres consisted in words only, are sel­dome good souldiers, or braue men in triall. Souldiers would like­wise be of quiet behauior, and temperate in their diet. There is no vse said [...]. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 2. Clearchus of an army that is riotous, and out of order.

I would likewise wish that souldiers were religious, and thinke it very requisite, if it might be obtained. The very Pagans did no­thing before they had consulted with oracles, or sought to knowe the pleasure of God byNil nisi auspi­catò gerebant. Xenop. exp. Cyr. 2. Cic. de natur. deor. 3. birdes, or entrals of beastes (for that was their ignorance) and beleeued that al euil successe in their warres came to them for neglect of religion, & Gods worship. How much more then ought Christians to be religious? There is nothing that more con­firmeth the souldiers mind, then when he is perswaded that God fa­uoreth him, & the goodnes of his cause. nor worketh more assured re­solution to die, then when men vnderstand they go to a better life. [Page 67]Contrariwise men of a bad conscience are alwayes timorous and doubtful. I know blasphemers, swearers, and Atheists, wil laugh at this rule. But what wonder when they laugh also at God and reli­gion? these men will one day weepe for their laughter. I pray God that others suffer not for their Atheisme, and contempt of religion.

Finally, souldiers would be more desirous of praise thē of gaine. Such doth Xenophon report Cyrus his [...]. Xenop. exped. Cyr. 1. souldiers that followed him against Artaxerxes to haue beene. And no small commendation is it in souldiers, to be afraide of reproofe, and desirous of honest report. Men of honest condition & shamefast, while they Honestas ido­neum reddit mili­tem, & verecun­dia dum prohi­bet fugere, facit esse victorem. Veget. lib. 1. are ashamed to fly, win the victory, & win to thēselues the reputatiō of good souldiers. Swearers, the eues, rogues, whoremongers, drunkards, do better be­come the gaole then the campe. And ourNon ca con­stantia gladiato­ribus ad praelia, quae militibus. Tacit. 18. great cutters & hackers, in the streets of London, are seldome great hackers of the enemy.

The third point which we are to respect in the choice of souldiers, is the trade of their liuing, although not in equall degree with the o­ther two. For many to win themselues a liuing, are oftentimes dri­uen to follow base occupations, that otherwise are couragious, & of a liberall dispositiō, & haue bodies fit for labor. So that although the Spartans and Opificum vul­gus & sellularii minimè militiae idoneum genus. Liu. 8. Romanes refused such for souldiers, as exercised ma­nuall occupations, and kept shops, yet do I not thinke they deserue generally to be refused, but onely such of them as be weake, tender, and effeminate. All those that are hardened with labour; asEx agricolis viri fortissimi. Cato de re rust. Veget. lib. 1. hus­bandmen for the most part, and those that can sufferraine, heate, and cold, and vse to fare hard, and lie hard, and sleepe little prooue braue men. Our yong gentlemen & seruingmen, are easily trained, & made fit for the warres. But of al others the old souldier, if such may be had, of what trade soeuer he is, deserueth the first place. They are so farre to bee praised aboue young souldiers, as artificers excell their apprentises. A handful of tried souldiers hath oftē put to flight multitudes of men not exercised in warres: & contrariwise seldome do yong souldiors abide the chamaillis, & hammering of armes. Cae­sars old souldiers were inuincible. And Annibals tried souldiers of Affrike, of which nation now no reckoning is made, did giue diuers foiles to the Romans; these being vnexercised, those hauing bin long indurat in wars. It were therefore to be wished, yt more accōpt were made of valiant men, yt haue long serued their prince, & country: in ye choise of yōg souldiers it is sufficiēt, if the former rules be obserued.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 7. Of the Othe of a souldier.

SOuldiers enrolled, armed, and furnished, would in case orders of warre were obserued, bee charged with an othe, that they should come to the place & at time assigned, and faithfully serue their Prince and country, liuing in obedience to their gouernours and superiour officers, and those military lawes which are by the General and his counsel, or the estates of the realm ordained for the good gouernement of the army. This was vsed by the Romanes, Athenians, and other warrelike nations in time past, and is not now in our times thought inconuenient. TheLicurg. in orat. aduersus Leocrit. Athenians when they came to military yeares, and were enrolled in the mo­ster rolles, did sweare that they would neither dishonour the pro­fession of armes, nor forsake their array, but woulde defend their country and enlarge the honour of it to their vttermost power. The same is reported yet more particularly byIn Demost. ora. [...]. Vlpian, who sheweth the place, the manner, and effect of their othe, and that in the temple of Agraulos they came and swore hauing their armes on, that they would fight for their country. The wordes as Pollux hath them are in effect thus much: I will not (said he that swore) dishonour the profession of armes, I wil not forsake my Captaine, I will fight for the religion, and lawes of my countrey, in array and alone: I will saile whither I shall be appoynted; I will obey lawes and not suffer them to be abrogated: I will obserue the religion of my countrey, and so let God helpe me and defend me. Gellius out of Cincius his bookes of warre describeth the forme of the oth of the Romane soul­diers in these wordes: Cum delectus fieret & milites scriberentur, in iusiurandum eos tribunus militaris adigebat hoc modo: in magistratu C. Laelij C. F. Cos. L. Cornelij C. F. Cos. in exercitu, decem (que) millia prope furtum nō facies dolo malo, solus ne (que) cum pluribus: pluris nūmi argentei in dies singulos, extra hastam, hastile, ligna, pabulum, vtrem, follem, facu­lam, si quid ibi inueneris, sustuleris quod tuum non erit, quod pluris nummi argentei erit, vti tu ad C. Laelium C. F. Cos. L. Cornelium. P. F. Cos. siue ad quem eorum alter iusserit proferas, aut profitebere in triduo proximo quicquid inueneris sustulerísue dolo malo, aut domino suo cuium id cen­sebis esse, vti quòd rectè factum esse voles, &c. The summe and effect [Page 69]of which oth is, that no souldier should steale, or take any thing from any other souldier, & that whatsoeuer they found, except it were for ye vse of warres, as weapons, or prouision for themselues, or their hor­ses or such like, they should bring it to the Generall or to the officer thereto deputed if it were more worth Nummus ar­genteus Rom. was a piece of coyne somewhat more then our vi. pence. thē 6. d. Finally they swore that they should come at the day appointed, vnlesse lawfull causes did stay them, & not depart without licence. Liuy also mentioneth a forme of oth, which the Romans at first did voluntarily sweare, afterward they were driuen to do it of duety. The effect of it was,Vbi ad decu [...]i­atum aut centuri­atum conuenis­sent, sua volunta­te ipsi inter se e­quites decuriau, centuriati pedites iurabāt, sese fugae aut formidinis ergô non abitu­ros, ne (que) ex ordi­ne recessuros, nisi teli sumendi aut petendi, aut ho­stis feriendi, aut ciuis seruandi causa. Liu. 22. that they should not fly away for feare, nor go out of their aray, vnles it were to take vp a weapon, or to strike the enemy, or to saue their compa­nion. Beside this othe which cōmonly they took when they were first enrolled, they sometimes swore, that they would not returne to their tents without victory. This othe Marc. Flauolenus took, as the Ro­manes were to ioyne battel with the Liu. 2. Hetruscians. AndCaes. de bel. ciu. 3. Labienus, & Pompeys souldiers in the encounter betwixt Pompey and Caesar in ye fields of Pharsalia swore likewise: but al did not performe it. Some fearing the reuolt of their souldiers haue vsed to binde them by speci­all othe not to abandon their leaders, which as Caesar reporteth, was practised by Petreius, & Afranius Caes. de bel. ciu. 3. in Spaine.Samnitium mi­lites adigebantur iuramento, diro carmine in exe­crationem capitis familiae & stirpis composito, nisi issent in praelium, quo imperatores duxissent, & si aut ipse ex acie fugis­set, aut si quem fugientem vi dis­set, non extemplo occidisset. Liu. lib. 10. The Samnites being oftentimes foyled by the Romanes, did sweare, that they would fo­low wheresoeuer their captains did leade them, and that neyther themselues would flie out of the field, nor suffer others to flie, but would kill them presently: if otherwise they did, they cursed them­selues, their family, and linage. The Romans placed such religion in the oth of a souldier, that some of thē thought it not lawful for others to fight with the enemy, then such as had taken the solemne othe of a souldier. Cato desired Aemilius Paulus General of the Romane army in Macedonia, that eyther he would send away his son, which toge­ther with the regiment wherein he serued was cassed, or else woulde minister a new othe vnto him.Negabat ius esse, qui miles nō sit, pugnare cum hoste. Cic offic [...] For that he thought it not lawful for him that was no sworne souldier, to fight with the enemy. The effect of this othe howsoeuer men make now accompt of othes, yet to them must needes be great, that esteemedFamae ac sidei maiora sunt dam­na, quàm quae ae­stimari possunt. the breach of promise, and losse of their good name irreparable. When the Duke of Sancho de Lond, Alua went about to reforme diuers disorders in the Spanish souldiers, among other points it was ordained that euery souldier should at their en­trance take a solemne oth, to serue the king faithfully, & to be obe­dient [Page 70]to their captains and officers, and not to depart the army nor from their colours without licence in writing. The words of the or­donance are these: Que todos los soldados despues de ser elegidos por sus capitanes, con las circūstantias que en tal'election se requiere al tiem­po de ser admitidos por los officiales del sueldo con iuramento solenne se obliguen a seruir bien y fielmente a su magd, y a sus capitanes generales, a obedescer a todos sus superiores, a no partir se del'exercito, ni de sus com­pannias sin licencia en escrito de quien se la pudiere dar. This othe is now also most necessary, when all bondes of military orders are litle enough. But vnles the souldier haue his pay, and things be gouerned according to the due practise of warre: to minister an othe to euerie poore souldier, were nothing else, but among other miseries, to bind poore mens consciences with plaine periury.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 8. Wherein is proued, that souldiers chosen of our owne nation are farre to be preferred before strangers, and hired men.

THe great dangers that haue befallen diuers Prin­ces, and states by forraine forces, that haue come in their aide, haue giuen me occasion, as before I haue shewed, what other qualities I thought requisite in souldiers; so now to declare of what natiō I would haue them chosen; least vsing forraine forces, wee might incurre like danger. The souldiers therefore that are to be employed in defence of this realme, I would haue chosen out of the naturall subiectts of this realme. Be they English, or Welch, or Irish, so they be subiects, it skilleth not. When I compare the peo­ple of this land with other nations, I see no reason, why I shoulde preferre any before them. And although my testimony may seeme partiall: yet the steppes of our ancestors prowesse, as yet remaining in France, Flanders, Spaine, Portugal, Scotland, and other coun­tries cannot lie. If then those orders by which our ancestors obtai­ned such glory, or els the rules of warre were restored; who seeth not that this nation would match any other? neither ought any man to e­steeme the forces of this countrey, by that which hath passed of late in France, Portugal, or the Low countries, where our souldiers haue beene for the most part on the weakest side, destitute of horse, vnpro­uided of carriages, & wanted victuals, and armes, and munitions, & [Page 71]many things necessary. But seeing they haue done such things at such disaduantage, they may thinke, our men would haue done much more, if the party had bin equall, or our men better prouided and fur­nished. Beside this, souldiers chosen of this nation, are bound with a straiter bond to their prince & country, then any stranger. They haue more reason to fight, hauing not only the defence of their prince and country, but also their religion, lawes, liberty, wiues and children cō ­mitted to their hands, they are more patient in aduersity, & haue lesse cause to reuolt. Wanting of pay or part of their pay (which God wot they may percase do oft times) they notwithstanding continue con­stant, and loyal. If they offend hauing their wiues, children, landes, goods, and friends behinde them, they are more easily corrected. Fi­nally, lesse pay doth content our souldiers, then any forreine natiō. I doubt not, but if that mony which hath bin cast away vpō the Dutch, and French had bene emploied vpon our poore country souldiers, the country had beene better stored with mony, and the people better pro­uided for warres, and greater seruice done vpon the enemy.

Let vs now compare strangers vnto the subiects of this land. There is at all no trust in them.Infidas ven [...] ­lés (que) manus, ibi fas vbi maxima merces. Their handes are saleable, their heartes faithlesse. They accompt that cause best, where they may haue most hire. It is follie (saithPolyb. lib. 2. Polybius) and want of iudgement to put trust in strangers beeing more in number, and strength then our owne nation. The first time that euer the Romanes vsed mercenary souldiers was, when the two Scipioes were gouernours of their forces in Spaine. Those two being together with their army betrayed, and ruinated by the Celtiberians, that forsooke them in their neede, may be an euidentLiu. 24. document neuer to trust strangers, vnlesse wee haue force to commaund them, and constraine them. Annibal Liu. 23. abandoned by the Spanish and Numidian horsemen was greatly weakened. Liu. 23. Mutines forsaking the Carthaginians, in whose succour hee came out of Numidia, disordered all their affaires in Sicile. The Romanes giuing themselues to pleasures and ease, and vsing forraine forces of Germanes, and Gaules, ruinated that huge Empire, which was left them by their ancestors. Which (as Tacitus saith) were inuincible so long as they vsed their owne souldiers. The Gaules Qua nihil in exercitu Rom. firmum nisi ex­ternum. Tacit. 3. reuolted from the Romanes, because they saw no strength in the Romane army, but that which was of strāgers. Of whom they presumed, that they would not ioyne with the Romans against them. [Page 72]The Thessalian horsemen forsaking the Athenians in the bat­tel ofThucid. 1. Tanagra, occasioned the victory to the Lacedemonians their enemies. The same had hapned to theThucid. 4. Lacedemonians by the trea­chery of the Macedonians, that forsooke them when the Thracians charged them, had not the resolution of Brasidas remedied the disor­der. The departure ofGuicciar. 15. 6000. Grisons, that left Francis the first of France before Pauy, was the beginning of his weakenesse. 2000. mercenary men leauing Maximilian the Emperor, broke his enter­prise against the Venetians. Guicciar. 2. Fabritio & Prospero Colōna although highly aduanced by Charles the 8. of France, yet in the end reuolted to Ferdinand. In the days of Ed. the 3. Rich. the 2. Hen. the 5. and 6; the greatestFroissart. losses we had in France, happened by the reuolt of the French, which our men without cause trusted. When al was lost, yet did wée retaine Caleis, vntil it was taken from vs by force, for that it was kept, & peopled by the English nation. Yet the same was al­most betrayed by an Italian, to whom Edw. the 3. gaue it in guard. How the Germans that came into France of late in aide of the Pro­testants, vnder the Dukes of Bouillion, & the baron Donaw behaued themselues, I report me to the memory of those poore gentlemē, that by their disloyaltie and treason, were left as a spoyle to the enemie.

Oft times strangers not only forsake their friends, but also ioyne with the enemy, & oppugne them. TheLiu. 21. Gaules in the 2. wars with Carthage, flew the watch of the Romanes by night, & fled, & ioyned themselues with Annibal. The Dutchmen that Charles the 8. of France, left in the kingdome ofGuicciar. lib. 3. Naples for the defence thereof, cor­rupted with mony tooke part with the enemy. The Tacit. 20. Romans betray­ed by their associats, at one time were slain both by them, & by the enemy. The ancient Britons vsing in time past the help of the Sax­ons, were by them driuen out of their natiue country. The like hap­ned to theCaes. bel. gal. 1. Sequanians long before. For requiring aide of the Ger­manes against the Heduans their neighbors, they were driuen out of their owne possessions by those that came to succour them.Salust. bel. Iu­gurth. Iugurtha by the trechery of certaine Thracians, that serued the Romanes in Affrike, entred the Romane campe in the night, and made a great slaughter therein. The Turkes are now in possession of Constanti­nople, in aide whereof they first came out of Asia. Strangers are neuer satisfied with any pay, & yet seldome do they any seruice. TheDimissi Galli pecuniam ingen­tem sine labore ac periculo par­tam retulerunt. Liu. 10. Gaules hired by the Hetruscians, carried away their mony without [Page 73]doing anie seruice against the Romanes. When the French had foyled the enemy, then the hired Switzers, and Dutchmen crying for mony hindered their victory. They tooke mony (saithGuicciar. lib. 2. & 12. Guicciardin) of al hands, & did seruice to none. It is not possible (saith he) to ma­nage the Impossible a manegiar li Suizzerisenza denari infiniti. Guicciar. lib 9. Switzers without infinit treasure. It is long to report al ye discourses of their insatiable couetousnes, & treasons. Of king Edw. the 3. purposing to recouer his right in France Froissart sayth, that with great summes of mony he hired the Dutch to ioyne with him, but he got no ayde of them, nor other aduancement, but a vaine title of Lieutenant to ye Emperor. Not long since the Hie duitch, or Germanes. Dutch calling for mony when they should fight, gaue the victorie to the Duke of Al­ua their enemie, and betrayed their Generall the Prince of Orenge.

There is nothing more cowardly then strangers, when they come to seruice. They are Non fide, non affectu tenentur. Sine pudore fla­gitii fugiunt. Tacit. in vit. A­gric. not reteined by affection nor regard promise, and shame not to flye to saue their skinnes.

Nothing can bee deuised more disorderly, nor rauinous. The Switzers tooke their owne Captains prisoners in Lombardy, and kept them as pledges vntill they had money. They rebelde against Lewis Sforza, and solde the Guicciar. li. 13. poore Duke for Crownes. The mer­cenary souldiers of Laurence Medici, and Frances Maria did spoyle the Marquisat of Ancona worse, then if they had bene enemies. For these causes the French kingGuicciardin. Lewis the xii. said, it was better to be without Switzers, then to haue them. And in the ende Francis the first trayning 7. legions, or regiments of his owne people, determi­ned to vse no other souldiers, then of his owne nation. the troubles of that kingdome, I thinke, are cause that the order was left off.

Those therfore that would employ mony vpon French or Dutch, rather thē vpon their own souldiers, should but dishonor their natiō, hurt the state, or affeeble their people, & bring [...]. Arist. po­lit. the Prince in distrust with his subiects without cause. Such mē in time past were thought to haue tyrannical conceirs, & wish that neither the natiue souldier should rise in honour, nor wealth, nor any subiect become better pra­ctised in warres: and all to the ende that they may growe rich them selues and swallow downe the spoyles of their Countrey, without feare of accompts, or controlement. And many do thinke, that if the English had but had that treasure and fauour, that the Hie Dutch haue had, this State had bene better assured, and the enemie better cooled, and more honorable seruice performed.

CHAP. IIII Part. 9. Of the souldiers pay.

BVt forasuiuch as neither strangers, nor subiects can be long mainteined without pay, & because it wil a­uayle vs nothing to leuy souldiers, vnlesse wee pay them, & mainteine them: therefore before we passe a­ny further, let vs put those, that haue ye gouernmēt of warres cōmitted vnto them, in minde, that some order be taken for the paiment of the souldiers. For want of pay ma­ny disorders be committed, many opportunities pretermitted. It is not possible, considering first the pouerty of the common souldier, and then their small number, that eyther they can liue of themselues, or winne any thing from the enemy. For want of pay they spoyle their friends, and associates, yea their companions, and commit many out­rages. and who can execute iustice vpon them, that eyther must fa­mish, or liue vpon spoyle. For want of pay they sell their armes, their clothes, they growe sicke, weake, and vnprofitabe.

Contrariwise, if they had their pay, iustice might with more rea­son bee executed, and their persons, armes, and clothes be kept in bet­ter estate, and many enterprises executed, that by weakenesse & want of the souldiers are broken. Lautreck riding post, came in good time himselfe to haue setled the affaires ofGuicciar. li. 14. Milan, if the 300. thousande Crownes, which were promised by the French king to bee sent pre­sently after him, had likewise come in poste. For want of pay the souldiers disbanded▪ for want of pay, occasioned by I know not what friuolous delay, the Dutchie of Milan was lost by the French. Souldiers are not payd with promises, nor wordes. The slow pro­uision of money was the cause likewise of the rashe enterprise, and ouerthrow of the French at the Tardità di pro­ueder denari, causa de larotta de Francesi à la Bic [...]cca. Guiccia. 14. Bicock in Lombardy. The mi­serable niggardise, and slow dispatch of the Cardinall Guicciar. 3. San. Malo Treasurer to Charles the 8. of France, which deferd necessary pay­mentes beyond all reason, set all the affaires of the French in the kingdome of Naples in disorder, as Guicciardin testifieth, and the very things themselues declared. A very slowe Gente d'arme [...]ardi di pagamen­ti caminauon [...] lentamente. Guic­ciar. li. 3. marche it is, that souldiers without pay doe make. Guicciardin speaking of the enter­prise of Naples by Lautreck sayth, that the same was hindered by nothing more, then by delayes of pay; while such summes as should haue bene deliuered before hand were payde him by piecemeale and out of time. A man cannot in this kind vse too great expedition and [Page 75]diligence. nothing can be more hurtful herein then auarice and delay.

Further many mutinies & disorders proceede of this only cause. I neede not confirme it by examples, seeing there is none that hath followed the profession of armes any time, but knoweth it by his owne experience. Contrariwise due pay doeth binde the souldiers hearts to the Generall, as Liuy declareth in the example Annibal largè partiendo praedā, stipendia praete­rita cum fide ex­oluendo, cunctos ciuium suorum, sociorum (que) ani­mos in se sirmat. Liu. 21. of An­nibal.

Without pay souldiers can neither do seruice, nor mainteine them selues in strength, nor scarce liue. With their Hinc vestes, ar­ma, tentoria. Ta­cit. 1. & in Po­lyb. 6. pay they finde them selues victuals, clothes, armes: with the same they succour them selues in sickenes, and when they are hurt. This was the vse in anci­ent time, and is now practised also.

For this cause all warlike Nations haue had due care that their souldiers might be orderly payd.Liu. 2. Porsena when the pay day came, sate by, while all his souldiers one by one receiued their pay. For that end they appointed Tacit. annal. 11. Tresurers to attend on the Generall, and to pay the army. That Generals should then attend the pleasure of Tresurers was as a thing monstrous in nature. When the Romanes could not otherwise prouide for their souldiers, the Senate decreed, that the Aurea & ar­gentea templotū ornamenta quae Numa consecra­uerat, ne militi­bus stipendium deesset, conflata sunt. Val. Max. l. 7. c. 6. ornaments of gold, and siluer which Numa Pompilius had consecrate, should be made into money, that they might be payd. This was iu the time of Marius. When the common wealth of Rome had no mony, the charge was layd vpon rich men Liu. 24. propor­tionally. The Nobilitie and Gentry brought in, and lent sufficient. Some of the wealthiest in the neede of the State serued without pay. TheHirt. de bel. Alexandr. Alexandrians in the warres against Caesar, by assigning to euery man of abilitie certaine souldiers to be kept, mainteined the warres against him. And generally such order was takē among all nations for pay of the souldiers, that in all stories Greeke and La­tin I scarce read of any one mutiny for want of pay.

Some will percase reply and say, that there is no comparison be­twixt the people of Rome, and vs. And that it was an easie matter for that great Empire to pay their souldiers, which to vs is so hard and grieuous: some conceiue that their souldiers were content with lesse pay, and others deeme that the charge of warres is nowe greater then in those times: matters vtterly mistaken. For not onely the Romanes, but also the Athenians, Thebans, Sam­nites, Aequians, Volscians, Hernicans, Sabines, and many other [Page 76]small States in comparison of this kingdome, mainteined, and paid great armies many yeeres. Yea when theLiu. li. 9. & 10. State and Territory of Rome was not the third part of England in bignesse, yet did the same mainteine one army against the Samnites, another in a con­trary quarter against the Hetruscians, and the third at home against such of their neighbours, as were not perfectly to be trusted. The pay, all things considered, was then rather bigger then lesser in re­spect of our times. The Decem in dies assibus anima & corpus aestimatur. Tacit. 1. It is a Roman souldiers speech there. pay of the Romanes was for euery day a piece of money which they called Denarium, for that it conteined decemasses. Although I confesse that afterward the value of that Coyne, was enhaunced. that wayeth of our money vii.d. or therea­boutes, as both Budey testifieth and I haue tried, by waying diuers of the Coynes, which I haue seene in Italy, and other where.

The pay of the Athenian souldiers amounted to a piece of mo­ney which they called [...], for euery day. So that both the pay of the Greekes and Romanes came to one reckoning. for Denarius Romanus, and the Athenian Drachma, byAlciat. de pon­derib. & mensur. accompt both of Mar­chants, and Physitions weyed alike, and was of one value. That the Athenian pay amounted to so much, as I haue sayd, Thucidides shal witnesse, who saith, that the garrison of [...]. Thucid. 3.88. Steph. Potidaea had euery man one Drachma for himselfe, and another for his esquire, that waited on him, dayly. Consider the prices of things nowe, you shall finde that their pay was greater then either ours which giue commonly viii.d. a day, or the Spanish pay, which is iii Duckats a moneth for a man, beside their Ventajas, as they call them.

That the charge of warres is now greater, then in time past; is but an improbable surmise. For wherein ariseth the charge of an army nowe, but in victuals, armes, clothes, horses, cariages and such like, which were no lesse chargeable in time past, then now? powder wee haue nowe, and artillerie, which in time past was not found out, but the charge of their engins, and the things about them, which nowe we neede not, nor vse, was no lesse chargeable to them. So that if we had that order and proceeding, which they had: there is no doubt but wee are as well able to mainteine an armie, as they.

Why a sufficient armie should not bee mainteined and paid, I see no reason but want of military discipline. For seeing this land main­teineth so many millions at home, there is no reason, but the same [Page 77]should mainteine 30. or 40. thousand of the same number abroad, if right discipline of armes were practised. The charge of an army is most in meate, and apperell. But in these things men spend no lesse at home, then abroad. I doe thinke that albeit this land wanted mo­ney, yet if the army were well supplyed with victuals and clothes by ye Princes Officers, that a great armie might sufficiently be payd. For that money that should be deliuered to the souldier, would most of it come backe for victuals and clothes, of which this land (God be thanked) hath no want. The expenses of munitions, and armes, and other matters are in respect of this charge, nothing. But what should I talke of this course, when there wanteth neither money, nor other thing, but good orders well executed? The reuenues of the Crowne, the contributions of the subiects, and ayde of our friendes, are not so simple, but that there may be found maintenance sufficient, if mens good willes and loyal dealing were not wanting. Besides these if our armie were sufficient to fight with the enemie, I would thinke, there were want of skill, or good order, if the same did not aswell liue vpon the enemies spoyles, as the Princes pay.

Clearchus [...]. Xe­noph. exped. Cyr. 1. mainteined his souldiers, by the contribution of the cities of Hellespont, where they lay. The Romanes transporting an army into Asia, so wisely did the Generall proceede, that he main­teined the same with the spoyles of the Countrey, and writ backe to the Senate, that for that yeere he needed neither Liu. 40. prouision, nor pay. for the victorie gaue his armie sufficient. But before Princes bring such a matter to passe, many disorders are to be redressed: men desirous of honour are to be appointed Officers: the rapines and filcheries of former times, and hereafter to, by strict Auditors and Commissioners are to be sifted out, and seuerely punished, as mat­ters that disorder all armies.Auaritia di commessarij regij fraudando il re, ne pagamenti di soldati cagione della rotta di Ga­rigliano. Guicci­ar. lib. 6. Guicciardin shewerh it by the confu­sion that was in the French army at Gariglian, by the default and fraude of the kings Officers for pay. If those that kill a woman or a child of no great reckoning deserue death, what doe they deserue that are the cause of the death of many valiant souldiers, and betray the Realme and their Prince into the handes of the enemie through their fraude, filcherie, and delayes? the abuses in musters must also be redressed. Wherein I vnderstand that Gouernours of late haue bene carefull, and set downe many good orders, but all commeth to this passe, that the Captaines shall pay their souldiers: which doeth [Page 78]promise no good effect in this matter. It is a notorious abuse to giue the pay of the common souldier to the Centurion, or Captaine of euery band; neuer vsed by the Romanes, nor other nation. It first came in among the Italians about two hundred and fiftie, or two hun­dred yeeres agone in their scambling warres among themselues. The reason was, for that the Prince that had warres hired the Cap­taine out of some other State, and the Captaine he hired such souldi­ers, as he could get. So that the Prince dealing with the Capatine must pay him, and the Captaine must pay his souldiers. Which rea­son now ceasing, there is no cause why the abuse should continue. Further there are certaine dead payes allowed to the captaine, vn­der colour whereof I doubt not but they will passe many dead men, or such as neuer were in mosters. It is asmuch as if he should be a­lowed to defraude a Prince a litle, so it be but in sixe dead payes. But better it were and more honorable, if the Prince did allowe the Cap­taine an honourable and sufficient pay, and make others the payma­sters. It is not possible nowe that matters should in these cases be re­dressed, seeing such as haue interest in the gaine, are made control­lers of the offence.

Were it not better to pay euery souldier by the poll? better I say for the Prince. For if the souldiers acquitance, moster booke, pay­masters and controllers accounts agree, he cannot lightly be defrau­ded, either of his money, or of his numbers: better for the common souldier: for he shall haue his due. Yea better for the Captaines, for they should not be so condemned, as they are of the countrey, nor of their souldiers, and some very wrongfully: and who would for so small gaine, incurre the losse of his honour, or reputation? but thus they shall neither liue themselues, nor be able to rewarde their souldi­ers: As if I wished them not larger pay, and w ih honester conditi­ons. And as if they did vse to reward their men, or that belonged to them. it is the General, that should do it vpon their report, & not they.

WhenCitati milites nominatim, sti­pendium ad no­men singulis per­solutum. Liu. 28. Scipio paide his souldiers in Spaine, euery man receiued himselfe his due paye, man by man. Which was the continual prac­tise of theStipendium praesens omnibus militibus daba­tur. Liu. 23. Romanes. That I likewise confirmed by the example of Porsena the captaine of the Hetruscians, who stoode by Liu. 2. while euery man receiued his stipend. Guicciardin disputing and weying the causes why the Frenchmen in the expedition of Charles the 8. in­to the kingdome of Naples so easily preuailed, alleageth this for prin­cipall: [Page 79] that the Kings souldiers were payed by the kings Officers, and not as the Italian vse was, by the Captaines. For which cause now at length also the Spaniard weary of this abuse, appointeth cer­taine Officers to pay euery souldier according to the They call them Pagadores. moster roll; and diuers controllers of these paymasters.

This I thinke to be the best meanes to remedy the want of pay, the fraude of Officers, the disorders of souldiers, and coruption of false mosters: whereby many Princes haue bene greatly abused, & are like to be further, if order be not taken. Before Pauy the Guicciar. li. 15 French king Francis had not halfe the number of souldiers that were vpon his moster bookes, which was the principall cause of the ruine of the army, and of the taking of the king, as Guicciardin affirmeth. The same was the ruine of the army of Iulio the 2. beforeGuicciar. lib. 9. Gemuolo, and causeth many to presume further then reason, thinking their strength greater, & diuers to detest warres; the disorders are so great. This I thought necessary to speake concerning pay: more perhaps then some will like. But the commiseration I haue of poore souldi­ers, and detestation I had of disorders, that haue happened vpon this cause in the seruice where I haue bene, and feare of worse haue ex­torted these complaints from me, yet not to hurt any particular (God is my witnes) but generally to do my countrey good, if I could; & to admonish those whom it concerneth, to looke better vnto it hereafter.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 10. Wherein is declared, that there is no hope of good successe in warres, without a full army, and force sufficient.

THose that know with what difficultie, & miserie Officers are wont to pay 4. or 5. M. men, haue good cause to thinke it a matter very difficult to mainteine 30. or 40. M. and many percase will wonder, what I meane, to perswade the leuy of a full army, seeing the vnwillingnes, and vnreadines of this age in sending forth, and furnishing any small number of men. But notwithstanding the imagination of the first, or wonderment of the second; both the lawes and practise of armes, doeth teach vs that to obteine victorie, and to subdue our enemies a iust and full army must be employed; and that small numbers of men doe rather feede the warres, then end them, & rather anger the enemy, then hurt him. The Lacedemonians before the Peloponnensian warre consulting with ye oracle, by what meanes they might best preuaile against their [Page 80]enemies, receiued this answere, that the meanes to ouercome, was to vse [...]. Thucid. 1. their full strength. For if an army be a perfect body, as the Athenian captaine Iphicrates was wont to say, it must haue the iust proportion of partes, and iust complement, or els it will be mon­strous, and not able to doe the actions exspected of such a body. The Romanes therefore as in other things, so in this excelled, that they neuer dealt with any enemie, but with a full army. If the power of the enemie were great, they employed a Consulare army consisting of 4. legions of citizens, beside the aide of their associates, if lesse they vsed but two legions, with the ayde of their friendes. The greatest force that they vsually employed were two Consular armies ioyned together. The number was diuers, as the legions were greater or lesser, full or imperfect: but their greatest force amounted not past to 50. thousand, their middle to 24. thousand, their least to 12, or 15. thousand, or thereaboutes. Lesse number I doe not reade that they vsed in any seruice, and therefore proceeding with sufficient force, I maruell not, if their successe were according.

It is the vse of all nations, neither the French in their expediti­ous into Italy, nor the Spaniard into France, or Italy vseth to send lesse then a iust army. The Duke of Alua beside 12. or 13. M. Al­maines and those of the Low countries, brought with him 9000. Spaniards and Italians when first he came into that countrey. It is no good nor profitable course, to send 4. or 5. thousand against what soe­uer enemie. If to famish, they are too many: if to fight, too fewe. Double that number is neither able to keepe the field, nor to besiege any citie, nor almost able to doe any enterprise of warre, vnlesse it be to defend some place for some fewe dayes, & in the end to giue it ouer being in despaire of succour. Our proceedings in France & Flanders, if mother reason wil pes wade vs, may teach vs, that this number is too little the effectes doe declare my speach to be true. The Thucid. 1. Lacedae­monians so long as they sent small numbers of men against the A­thenians, could doe no good against them, but did hurt to them­selues. Small force doeth rather nourish and kindle the warres, then extinguish them; euen as a fewe drops sprinckled on the fixe, doeth make the same to burne more bright. and as much water powred on the fire doeth quench the same, so a sufficient army maketh an end of brawles, or at least bringeth them to triall. Nay further, a sufficient force doeth not only worke greater effect, but also is lesse charge­able, [Page 81]then warres made by these slender supplies. It may percase seem a paradoxe to some, but reason & experience doth proue it true.

These warres of our times, they haue no ende; but where a suffi­cient armie goeth, there is an end, eyther one way or other. There is no end of charge in lingring warres: in these, if the armie preuaile, the victorie mainteineth the same; if it be ouercome, then is there an end of that armie and charge. The burthen is onely in the setting of the same out, and mainteyning of it in the meane while. But will some say, the hazard were great. Let them therefore fight valiantly, and not suffer themselues to bee skinned. They that forecast what windes will blowe, seldome sowe, or set sayle in time.

Further, a small force must needes lye in Townes, and hide their heads, where the enemie is stronger. Against ye enemie they haue nei­ther strength to fight, nor meanes to enterprise, & stil the Prince is at a continuall charge: and without pay ye souldiers famish: but where a full and sufficient force arriueth in any Countrey, they commaund the same, vnlesse an armie be presently opposed against thē. They en­rich themselues with spoiles. the fruites they lay vp for their owne store. Many confederates, some for feare, others for other causes ioyne with them, and either yeeld money, or victuals, or munitions. Whatsoeuer corne, forage, or other prouision is without walled Townes, that is theirs. It must be a Towne of some strength that dare resist them. When the armie is great, the warres mainteyne themselues, as said Cato. Scipio with the profite that he drewe out of the Countrey of Spaine, mainteined his armie there diuers yeres. Sixteene yeres did Annibal maintaine warres in Italy, at the charge of that Countrey almost without supplie of men, or money from Carthage. With the riches of France, Caesar mainteined his armie 9. yeeres in France, & enriched himself, and his countrey. Besides the charge of the army defraied, many Romane captains haue brought in great summes of money into the publike treasurie. These are the fruits of victorie: but victorie cannot be obteined without an armie.

If therefore any man hope for the end of warres, or good successe in France, Flanders, or other Countrey; let him wish that sufficient meanes were employed. There is neither honor, safetie, profite, nor hope of good hap in the course of warres commonly taken. If you will not beleeue me: then examine the proceedings of the smal companies that haue bin employed in seruice of late time: examine [Page 82]the ancient and latter histories of forreigne nations, that haue had good successe in their warres. If you see nothing but disorder in the one, and reason in the other: then let captaines neuer for shame on this sort loose their men, expend their money, trifle the time, dally with the enemie, contrary to reason, and all good proceeding; but let them as in other points, so in this also returne to the true discipline, and practice of warre.

CHAP. IIII. Part. 11. Of the exercise and trayning of young souldiers, whereby they are made apte, and ready for the warres.

A Wise Generall hauing once enrolled his souldi­ers, will not loose any one houre of time, but will either exercise them, or employ them in seruice. There is nothing in warres more pretious then time, which once passed, cannot be recalled. And whether the army be idle, or well employed, the pay and charge stil runneth on. But because it is dangerous to bring yong souldiers into the face of the enemie, before they be both fashio­ned by exercise, & also fleshed by light encounters with the enemie: he ought both diligently to exercise them at such times, as ye enemie gi­ueth him leysure, & also to harden them by skirmishes and other light enterprises against the enemie, before he hazard to fight with his full forces. Therein what example can I set before him better to follow then that of Scipio, that ouercame Annibal, and in al deedes of armes shewed himselfe most vigilant and skilfull. He before he drew foorth his army out of new Carthage into the fielde, when as yet the time of the yeere was not proper for seruice, did continually diuers dayes exercise his men, aswell in fight at sea, as at land. The first day he caused all his regiments to runne in array and order of battell 4. miles: the second day he appointed euery man to make his armes cleane and fit: the Tertio die in modum iustae pugnae sudibus interse concur­rerunt. Liu. 26. third day he caused them to diuide themselues into two partes, and in order of battel to fight the one against the other with cudgels, and blunt dartes. The same course hee tooke in Sicile, before he transported hisLiu. 29. army into Afrike. He caused his souldiers in order of battel to march and runne armed, and set his ships in aray within ye harbour in such good order, as if hee were pre­sently [Page 83]to fight. The Intentior quā vnquam [...]nte a muniendi, exer­cendi (que) militem cura ducibus Volscorum erat. Liu. 4. Volscians hauing bin oftentimes foyled by the Romanes, and determining to set vp their rest, tooke great care in arming and exercising their men, as if that were the onely meanes to harten and harden their souldiers. And sure much good doth exer­cise and teaching, as well in warre as other artes, where the leaders are skilfull. Tit. Liu. 23. Sempronius by exercising his young souldiers, taught them to followe their ensignes, and keepe rankes both stan­ding, and fighting in array of battell, and obteined by them diuers victories against the enemie. Liu. 34. Cato likewise in his voyage into Spaine, tooke no small paines in exercising of his men, before hee brought them to see the enemie; whereby he so fashioned them, that he gaue diuers repulses to the enemie. Tullus Hostilius, when the mindes of the Romanes were mollified ky long peace, in the dayes of his predecessor Numa, yet by exercise obteined so much, that they durst encounter, and were not inferiour to olde souldiers.

Epaminondas by framing and excercising the Thebanes, made them of a base nation, the most warlike people of Greece, and with them ouerthrewe the Lacedemonians, which from their youth vp were trayned vp in the exercise of armes. In the first warres with Car­thage, the Romanes perceiuing that for want of skill in Sea causes, they were inferiour to the Carthaginians, practised their men in imaginarie Sea fightes, and so long exercised them therein, that at lenghth they ouercame them aswell by sea, as by land.Liu. 24. Statorius the Romane teaching the souldiers of Syphax to followe their leaders, and to keeperankes, and other orders of warres, in short time made them of nouices so expert, that after that Syphax doubted not to encoūter the Carthaginians. This caused Tissaphernes the Persian, to make such reckoning of Phalinus, a Grecian, for that hee was [...]. exped. Cyr. 2. Xenoph. skilfull in ordering of men, and teaching them to fight in armes. Of English men Philip of Comines giueth this testimonie, tha al­though when they first come into France they haue small skill, yet with exercise they first come into France they haue small skill, yet with exercise they become good souldiers: and therefore seeing most of our souldiers are yong, and of small experience in warres, by reason of our long peace, they are diligently to be exercised before that they see the enemie.Cassius quan­tum sine bello dabatur, reuocat priscum morem, exercet legio­nes. Tacit. 12, Cassius the Romane according to the olde guise of the Romanes, exercised his souldiers at all idle times, albeit many of them were expert in warres.

Much more therefore ought we to exercise our young souldiers, [Page 84]and that first in fat̄tes of actiuities, as running, leaping, throwing, wrastling; secondly in the vse of their weapon, & that both singly by themselues euery man, & also in company: thirdly in marching and keeping of rankes, and other exercises of warre.

By these exercises, the souldiers obteine three commidities: the body is first made actiue, and strong, and fit for labour; souldiers also learne to march in their armes, to carry some weight, to run, to work in trenches, and other necessary fortification; without which neither can the souldier rest safely in his campe, nor so easily preuaile against the enemie in the fielde. Caesar did no lesse preuaile against ye Gaules with the mattocke and spade, then with the sword. In a short time he made huge trenches and mountes, such as the Cae. bel. gal. 2. enemie wondred at. Now because we haue forgotten the true practise of warre, our soul­diers refuse to worke, and Princes vse the helpe of pioners, insomuch that hardly we see that brought to passe in a moneth, which Caesar could effect in fewe houres. The Romanes from their youth exerci­sed their bodies in running, leaping, wrastling, swimming. Coruinus the Romane captaine in his youth, in these exercises was In ludo mili­tari cum veloci­tatis & viriū cer­tamen esset, cete­ris par. Liu. 7. equall to the best. By this Ferebant dimi­diati mensis ci­baria & vallum. Cic, Tuscul. qu. 2. exercise they were made able to carry beside their armes, halfe a moneths victuals, and certaine stakes.

Secondly, euery souldier is made acquainted and cunning with the weapon, wherewith he serueth. The shot learneth to charge and discharge redily, and at marke. The piquier how to vse his pike, both against footemen and borsemen: the halbardier vnderstandeth the vse of his halberd both to defend, & to strike his enemie: the targetter how to manage his sword and target; and euery one learneth ye vse of sword and dagger, for that they are common weapons. Without skill men oft times wearie themselues, breake their weapons hurt not their enemie. The Discebant Ro­mani tractarescu­tum, & obliquis ictibus venientia tela deflectere. Veget. l. 1. c.4. Romane youthes learned first to vse the tar­get, or shield and sword, (for that was their most cōmon armes,) and howe with slent blowes to breake the force of their enemies weapons, or dartes.

Afterward they practised ye vse of all other sortes of weapons. And as absurd it is for a souldier to take on him yt name, not knowing the vse of his armes, as for an ignorant person, to call himselfe an artifi­cer, and yet not to know the vse of the tooles of his occupation.

Lastly by learning & vnderstanding the arrayes, & iust distances of horsemen, & footemen, & the standings of all sortes of weapons, and [Page 85]the differences in marching, fighting, retiring, according to diuers sortes of groundes, & how to march to ye assalt or defence of a Towne or place, (which may be shewed them by those that are good leaders,) Souldiers may learne howe to place themselues vpon an instant, and not as I haue seene done, runne away, or runne vp & downe like men amazed; they may also vnderstand how to cake aduantage of the enemie, howe to rally themselues being disordered, and in what place euery kind of weapon is to be sorted, & employed with most aduan­tage. In summe, array & order may both better be kept, & more easily repayred; without which [...]. Arist. polit. armes haue no vse. And as well can an armie march or fight being out of array, as a body doe the functions of the body, hauing the partes out of frame. There is certainely nothing [...]. Xenoph. oecono­mic. more beautifull in the eyes of friendes, then an armie set in order, neither is any thing more fearefull to the enemie. But this cannot be done without instruction and exercise: of which I hope our gouernours will haue more care hereafter. But (may some say) what neede so many wordes in these matters: especially if we consi­der both the charge, & labour that hath bin spent in trayning of soul­diers within our Realme of late time? men able (as some thinke) to encounter the most florshing armie in Christendome? against whom I haue no purpose to speake. Nay I wish with al my heart, they were so strong, and ready as is imagined. Onely I thought good to shewe first the defectes in our trayning, which I would wish were supplied, and our men better instructed; and next howe little trust there is to be put in trayned men, that neuer sawe enemie, vnlesse there be many olde souldiers mingled among them. In trayning of souldiers there­fore in places where I haue bin, these wants I haue obserued. First, the souldiers are not alwayes best chosen: secondly, their bodies are not exercised as they should be: thirdly, they are not taught the vse of their seuerall weapons. Fewe teach souldiers the right vse of the piece, and none the vse of the pike, halberd, and sworde, and target. Fourthly, the men are rather wearied in marching vp and downe, and wheeling in ringes, and filing of rankes, which are to no vse in fighting, then instructed howe to take their places in marching, in fighting, assalting, retiring, or other deede of armes. Fifthly, there is seldome or neuer sufficient companie brought together, so that men may conceiue the reasons of the places of euery sort of weapons: horsemen are seldome seene in traynings of souldiers. So yt hardly [Page 86]can any conceiue howe things should stand, by any thing yt is shewed. Lastly such for the most part vpon some cōmendation of some great mans letters, are employed in teaching our souldiers, as either neuer went to the schoole of armes, or know very little themselues. So that I see no other effect of training men, then expense of time & powder. And for mine owne part, I wish rather to haue men neuer exercised, then in this sort trayned. But were they better trained then they are, yet are we not to put too great trust in them. The Venetians making reckoning of the trayned men of their state (which are such like, as ours are) were abused (saith Guicciar. lib. 8. Guicciardin) and ouerthrowen. And Confidauano Piu Chenon si do­ueua, ne fanti d'ordonnanza del su [...] dominio i Fio­rentini. Però non si prouedeuan di soldadi e sercitati. Guicciar. lib. 11. euill were the Florentines apaid, trusting in their trayned souldi­ers. The same being appointed to the garde of Prato, a Towne of their dominion, seeing but two Spaniards to mount vpō a litle breach, threwe downe their weapons, and ranne as fast as they might out of the Towne.

Generally there is no trust in yong souldiers. A small Pluris facienda est parua vetera­norum manus, quàm indocta, & expers belli mul­titudo. Veget. l. 1. c. 1. companie of olde beaten souldiers, is better then a multitude of people with­out knowledge, and experience of warres. Yong souldiers that haue not heard the noyse of battell, nor seene the slaughter of men, nor felt knockes, will hardly abide them at the first. If not in trayned souldi­ers, much lesse in tumultuarie forces ought we to put any confidence. The Liu. 8 & 9. Latines and Hetruscians seeing the Romanes range their countrey in no great number, came foorth by multitudes against them, thinking to swallowe them vp. But the first were no sooner slaine, then the rest fled. 500. olde souldiers put all the rascall route of Tacit. 3. Tacfarinas in Affrike to flight. AtLiu. 21. Annibals first comming into Italy the countrey people seeing the spoiles he made, had thought to haue cut a certaine out wing in pieces. But in be ginning the execu­tion, 35. thousand were put to flight by a very sew. The Spaniards at Puente de Butgos in Galicia, assembled together in great num­bers, fledde from vs vpon the first approche of our men. And so it is commonly in all yong souldiers. Wherefore the best is to vse olde souldiers, the next to mingle newe, and olde together, and diligently to teache them, and trayne them, before we hazard our whole state vpon them. For albeit much is in mans naturall courage, yet the same is much encreased by skill and exercise, and that not feyned, but in fight with the enemie.


Part. 1. Wherein is declared, what things are especially to be considered of those, that leade an army by land, or by sea, into a forreine countrey.

VNcertainty, and irresolution, as in other actions, so in the proceeding of warres, worketh no good effect. Time may not be spent, nor money wasted vainely. A wise captaine therefore purposing a iourney into an other countrey, wil before hand resolue, first what time is fittest to set forward, secondly what things be necessary for his seruice, that he may haue them ready against that time; and thirdly what place is fittest both to make his prouision, and to assemble his troupes in. The consideration of the time is very materiall: for neither is it conuenient to enter in the depth of Win­ter, for that at that time forage for horses is very hard to come by; nor in the heate of Sommer, for that the time is hurtfull for mens bodyes to trauell in, Caesar entring into France in the middest of Winter, was driuen to great extremities, and albeit hee had good helpe of friendes to relieue him with victuals, and other nacessaries: yet were his souldiers and horses almost famished. Then it is hard to lye without doores: the wayes then also are very troublesome. The duke of Lancasters army arriuing in Froistart. Portugal, in the dayes of king Richard the 2. in the heate of Sommer, suffered no lesse through heate, then the other through cold. Much also did the He himselfe in that iourney tooke that sick­nesse, whereof he died. blacke Prin­ces army suffer in Spaine through the heate of Sommer. Neither did the heate of the Countrey in our late voyage of Portugal further our enterprise. The most conuenient time to enter any Countrey with an army is, when the same may finde greatest store of victuals for men, of forrage for horses, and is most temperate: so that men may endure trauaile best, without endangering their health. Of this Caes. bel. gal. 2. & 3. Caesar had respect both in his warres in France, and Affrike, and other places. And euill did it befall those, yt without consideration of time rashly aduentured to goe in foreine seruices. He that conside­reth not the time, must make his prouision the greater.

The place also woulde be chosen, and certainely resolued vpon, where both our prouision is to be made, & our souldiers are to be ap­pointed to meete. The Romanes in their warres in Greece, assēbled their forces at ye port of Vti omnes [...] ­uenirent Brundu­sium idibus Mai­js, Liu. 36. Brundusiū, sayling into Affrike against the [Page 88]Carthaginians, they made their prouision & rendeuouz at Lilibaeum, which say right ouer against Afrike, as the other port was commo­dious for those yt sailed into Greece. Cato in his iourney into Cato ad Lunae portum conue­nire iustit. Liu. 34. Spaine chose the port of Luna, as lying directly against Spaine. Annibal Liu. 21. purposing a voyage into Italy, assigned newe Carthage for his men to meete at. When Caes. bel. gal. 5. Caesar entended the inuasion of this Iland, he appointed his men to meete, and his prouision to bee brought to Caleis and Bollein. For that neither the time, nor place of meeting, was appointed certaine, I report mee what hinderance it was to vs, in the enterprise of Portugal. But greatest care would be had, first that we cary with vs force of our owne, sufficient: and secondly, that we haue prouision of armes, victuals, munitions, and all instruments of warre with vs. For in vayne looketh he for helpe of others, or of the countrey where he goeth, that is not strong of himselfe.Machiauel. discors. Banished men doe make those that goe in their succour beleeue, that they haue great parties in the countrey, and that the enterprise is easie; but there is no wisedome to giue them futher credite, then such men deserue. In Portugall we may remember, how we were abused, or rather abused our selues to thinke that the countrey would reuolt be­fore we had beaten the Spaniard, that kept the people in subiection: and too late it is to looke for supplie from home of men or victuals, when we are presently to vse them. The Romanes although they sent diuers times succours to other natiōs, as to the Greekes oppres­sed by the kings of Macedonia: to the Sicilians inuaded by the Car­thaginians: yet neuer sent they lesse then a sufficient armie, furnished with all things necessarie. Caesar for that hee was driuen to leaue a great part of his armie, and prouision behinde him, both in his De bel. ciu. 3. voyage against Pompey, and against Scipio in Hirt. de bel. A­fric. Afrike, was dri­uen to great extremities, and omitted many opportunities before the rest of his armie came at him. Hee that hath his men, and all things ready with him, oppresseth the Countrey, before prouision can be made against him.

Yet may not the Prince that inuadeth others, so prouide against the enemie, that hee forget to couer and defende his owne Coun­trey and Coast, and frontier Townes against all sudden enterpri­ses. Annibal marching towardes Italy, before hand prouided one Partiens curas inferendi & ar­cendi belli. Liu. 2 armie for the garde of Afrike, another for the garde of Spaine. And Caesar pursuing Pompey into Greece, committed [Page 89]the Caes. bel. ciu. 3. guarde of Italy, and the port townes thereof vnto Antony If Liu. 29. Syphax going out of his countrey to warre against the Romanes,had had like care, his country had not beene taken from him in his absence by Masinissa and Laelius. Hee is not wise that seeking to strike his enemy, lieth open himselfe.

But because warres spend both men, and victuals, and other prouisions, especially where there is made great resistance: wee must not onely thinke to send sufficient at the first; but also cause the same to be supplied in time. Nothing did cause Anniball to Negando sup­plementum vos retraxistis; saide Annibal to the Senate of Car­thage. Liu. 30. leaue his hold in Italy, but want of succour, and supplie. The slownesse of Hist. de bel. Afric. Caesars supplies after his army transported into Afrike made him loose many aduantages, and sustaine diuers losses. I will not say what hurt want of supplie did vs in the Portugall action, whhen it may be imputed rather to presumption, that wee went foorth vn­furnished; then to want of care, that wee had no supply in time. For wher to could supply haue serued, where the whole was through want disordered before? for guarde of shippes of carriage, and assu­rance of the army, the whole nauy where the passage is by sea, is to be furnished, and to saile in warrelike sort.Caes. de bel. ciu. lib. 3. Caesar for that hee was driuen to passe his army in certaine Marchant shippes without guard of shippes of warre, lost diuers of his souldiers sayling into Greece.

King Edward the third passing his army into France sailed in that warrelike sorte, that encountring the French nauy at Scluce hee ob­tained a famous victory. If the passage be not cleared by shippes of warre keeping the seas, it is to be feared least the enemy lying in wait intercept diuers of our shippes and men passing betweene; as hath often happened in the passage betweene England, and the Low countries within these few yeares. And as at sea, so by land like­wise the waie is to be cleared, that no enemy bee lefte vpon our backes.

The Generrall being ready to set saile with all his company; ei­ther by ticket sealed, or else word of mouth, hee is to declare to what port he will haue his company to bend their course; to the ende that such as by tempest are seuered at sea, may yet afterwarde meete at a port.Caesar tabellis signatis solebat dicere quem in lo [...]m petiturus esset. Hirt. de bel. Afric. Caesar vsed tickets. Liu. 29. Scipio sailing into Afrike calling two of euery ship, declared what he would haue them do, and whither to set their course. Cato hauing all his ships and men together, & [Page 90]being ready to set saile for Cato nauibus contractis edixit, ad portum Pyre­nei sequerentur. Liu. 34. Spaine caused proclamation to bee made, that all his shippes should direct their course to the porte neere the Pyreneies which I suppose was Emporia. Because Caesar gaue not like direction in his voiages into Albany against Pompey, and Afrike against Scipio, he sustained diuers losses. And in the voy­age of Portugal such as lost sight of the fleet either returned, or went to Rochel, being vncertaine whither to go. That the nauy faile not of the port, euery ship is to haue a good pilot.

The better and more certainely the Generall vnderstandeth the state of the enemies country, & the ports, and defences thereof, and proceedings of the enemy: the more certaine direction he shal be able to giue. And therefore as at all times hee ought by his espialles to vnderstand what the enemy doth, and what hee prepareth: so in this time especially when hee goeth about to transporte an armie into his countrey. For this causeCaesar antequā in Britanniam traijceret, Volu­senum qui omnia exploraret prae­mittit. Caes. bel. gal. 4. Caesar sent Commius, and Volusenus into this Iland, the one to vnderstand the state of the people, the other to view the coast, and sound the Ports. Ca­to before hee went against the enemie in Spaine, sent his espialles to vnderstand the number, the place, and proceeding of his armie.

After the arriuall of the nauy in the enemies countrey, the first care of the Generall ought to be, to seize vpon some commodious port towne, or harbour, and to fortifie the same, that both his ship­ping may be safe there, and that both succours, and victualles may safely come thither: and last of all, that both from thence hee may safely proceede in his action, and haue a safe retraite in a storme. Caesar landing his men in Afrike fortified Hirt. de bel. Afric. Ruspina, and by tren­ches and bankes made it both a good harbour for shippes, and a safe lodging for his army. The same was practised before of Scipio, who landing neere a point of land in Afrike, did first make fortificati­ons in that place. But afterward perceiuing that Vtica thereby was more commodious, hee tooke the towne, and made that aEandem sedem ad cetera exe­quenda habitu­ [...]us erat. Liu. 29. castle of retrait from the land, and an accesse for his shippes from sea; and a place commodious for dispatch of other marters. The reasons that moued Scipio to take newe Carthage in Spaine were these, that hee might haue a conueient porte for accesse of his shippes, and a commodious storehouse for his prouisions of warre.

Annibal made many attempts againstLiu. lib. 23. Naples and Nola, that he might vse them for the same purposes lying commodiously for those that come out of his countrey. Neither had Edward the third other respect in his long siege of Caleis, but that he might haue a commo­dious port for his shipping on that side. These causes at this present haue moued the Spaniardes that lately haue set foote in Brytaine, to fortifie Hannebon and Bluet. Little did the Macedonians vnder­stand the practise of warre, that taking Liu. 31. Chalcis a very opportune port for their warres in Greece, left the same without fortification, or garrison.

That the nauy be not idle, the Generall after he hath landed his men, is to employ the same in ranging the coast, fetching in of vic­tualles, and annoying the enemy both by land and sea. Unlesse the same be at sea, the enemy wil depriue him of succours, and victualles. Therein let him follow the precedent of Scipio in Spaine, of Caesar in Afrike.

Those that inuade the enemy by land, likewise are to seize some towne neere the enemy which may serue them for a fortresse whither to retire, and whence to sally out. The [...] Thucid. 1. Persians inuading Greece, vsed the towne of Thebes as a retraite, and propugnacle against the Greekes.

The Lacedemonians to straite the Athenians fortified Eleu­sis a bourgh in the territorie of the Athenians. Oringis arx fuit Asdrubalis ad excursiones circa in mediter­raneos populos faciendas. Liu. Asdrubal vsed the towne of Oringis in Spaine, as a fortresse, from whence hee made roades into the midland countrey thereabout. Sulpitius the Romane Consul in the Macedonian warre seizing aPraesidium ibi imposuit. Nam e­rat oppidum op­portunum ad im­petus in Mace­doniam facien­dos. Liu. 31. towne that lay fitly against Macedonia, did put garrison in it, and from thence made diuers attempts against the Macedonians. Antiochus Liu. 45. pur­posing to inuade Aegypt furnished Pelusium, which is the kay of that countrey, with sufficient garrison.

Yet before the army be brought in sight of the enemy, the same is to bee refreshed certaine dayes, whether it bee of their tra­uailes by land in their march, or iactation and disease at sea.Liu. 21. Annibal before hee brought foorth his army to fight with the Romanes in Italy caused the same to refresh, and rest it selfe di­uers dayes after his wearisome iourney through the Alpes. And likewise returning out of Italie into Afrike to defend his Coun­trey against Scipio, hee Paucos dies ad reficiendum mili­tem ex iactatione maritima sump­sit. Liu. 30. refreshed his men certayne dayes [Page 92]of their trauaile at sea, before he marched against the enemy.

Whether the country be knowen to the General or not, yet ought be not to march without diligēt discouerers sent before, at any time: least of all when hee commeth into a strange country all enemy. Wherefore after hee hath setled his matters in the towne, or port which hee hath seased, and refreshed his men, let him then send forth espials and discouerers, to vnderstand the site of the countrey, and proceedings of the enemy.Annibal con­sulis consilia at (que) animum, & sitū regionum, itine­ra (que) explorauit. Liu 22. Annibal before he incountred with Fla­minius the Romane Generall, sent before him certaine men to espy his purposes, and to view the situation of the countrey, and the wayes which he was to trauaile. It is the practise of all wise Ge­neralles. The Romanes neglecting to make this discouery were enclosed at Caudium by the Samnites, and shamefully ouercome, and Annibal himselfe trusting an ignorant guide, was almost intrap­ped at Cales by Fabius. Curio Caes. de bel. ciu. l. 2. marching in the sandes of Afrike without knowledge of the enemies power, or the disaduantage of the country being drie, and plaine, was ouerthrowen together with his whole army by the Numidian horsemen of Iuba. Appius Appius Boio­rum agros popu­lans inexplorato, riullis (que) stationi­bus sirmatis, cae­sus cum legioni­bus. Liu. 31. spoy­ling the country of the Boyans without espiall sent before, & guards placed in conuenient distances; was himselfe slaine, together with his company. The meanes to escape these trappes, and ambushes is viligent espiall, and discouery.

If our army do march farre vp into the countrey; then is diligent heede to be taken, that the enemy do not cut betweene vs, and our succours or victuallers. For fauour whereof wee are to assure our selues of the passages, and to place garrisons in conuenient distances. Caesar distributed tenne thousand Caes. bel. gal. 7. quo expeditiore re frumen [...]rià vteretur. Heduans in diuers townes, and fortes vpon the way, that his victualles might come to his army with safety. He tooke Vellaunodunum that lay upon the way, lest the enemy might stop the passage. The towne of Liu. 28. Astapa in Spaine was taken and ruinated by L. Martius, for that the garrison of the enemies there, did spoyle the confederates of the Romanes, and in­tercept the victuallers that came to the army. The same course didCaes. de bel. ciu. lib. 3. Caesar take for the brideling of the enemy, and assurance of his vi­ctualles in his warres against Pompey.

But because nothing is more to be feared of an army transported into a strange country, then want of victuals: therfore must the Ge­nerals mind be intentiue, and carefull, not only for the [...]. Xenoph. Cyr. paed. 1. present, but [Page 93]also for the future time. He may not thinke that hee shall alwayes finde corne and prouision in the country, especially if the enemy vn­derstand the traine of warres. Caesar found the same by experience in his warres in France, when the enemy burned the country before him. When the Persian king vnderstood the intention of Cyrus, to be to depriue him of his crowne: he sent [...]. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1. horsemen before to burne all things, that might profitably serue the enemy. And in the inuasi­on which Annibal made in Italy Fabius caused all the prouision that might serue for an army to be either spoyled, or brought into strong townes in all places neere where Annibal, and his company passed. Therefore is it requisite, that store of horses, and carriages go along with the army for carriage of victualles, munitions, and other neces­saries.

Cyrus Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 1. had foure hundred wagons laden with prouision, beside those that belonged to particulars. When in the country nothing is to be found, then may this serue. Further for fetching in of vi­ctualles, the army ought to haue a sufficient strength of horsemen seconded with troupes of footemen for their retraite. Annibal at one roade in Italy beside infinite cattell tooke foure thousand hor­ses, notwithstanding the strict commaundement of the Romanes, that all things should be brought into strong holdes. Whatsoeuer prouision may be found, the same is to be saued, and conueyed into those places, that best may be defended and serue fittest for the pro­uision of our army.Salapiarn fru­mentum ex a­gris Metaponti­no & Heracleens [...] comportat Anni­bal. Liu. 24. Annibal brought all the corne and proui­sion, which he found in the territorie of Metapontus, and Heraclea into Salapia. After thatLiu. 29. Scipio in his expedition in Afrike, had taken Vtica, he caused all the prouision, and corne that could be found in the country to be carried thither, and to be laid vp in store. The same course did Quintius take in his warres against Nabis the tyrant, and Caesar in his inuasion of this Caef. bel gal. 4. frumentum com­portat. Iland.

If the country where our army passeth doe not furnish vs with victualles, the same is vtterly to be ruinated, and burned. Which if the countrey people do perceiue, either for feare or for hope, they will succour vs.Liu 38. Manlius inuading the Gallogrecians, forced all those countries where hee passed to compound for feare of spoyle, For like dreade the Frenchmen where the English army Froissart. passed in the dayes of Edward the third did supplie the same with necessarie prouision. It is a shame (saiethCyr. paed. 1. Xenophon) for him that hath a [Page 94]sufficient army not to bee able to get victualles, and things neces­sarie for the same. If the enemie shall spoyle one countrey as loo­king for our forces that way, yet shall it be hard for him to spoile the whole, vnlesse hee meane to famish his owne people also. The Ro­manes against the Quò expeditio­res commeatus essent, & incerti­or hostis quà venturum bellū foret, Fabius per Soranum agrum, Decius per Sidi­cinum legiones duxit. Liu. 10. Samnites led foorth their armies diuers wayes, whereby the enemy being made vncertain of their comming, could not preuent them, nor depriue them of prouision.

Finally, it is not possible for an army to enter any countrey, but the same shall finde some weary of the present gouernement, and de­sirous of innouation, which may bee induced to helpe to furnish it with necessary prouision. Caesar in his warres against the Helueti­ans, and Ariouistus, had his prouision from the Heduans, in his iour­ney into Belgium from those of Rheimes. Arriuing here in Britaine he found both partisans, and prouision sufficient. Neither are the times nowe changed. In all estates there are some malcontents, and many desirous of alterations. If desire of innouation worke nothing, yet if our army haue good successe, the same shall procure vs friendes and meanes. After Annibals victory at Cannae most of the subiectes of the Romanes reuolted, and tooke part with him. When the Frenchmen inuaded theGuicciar. lib. [...]. & 15. kingdome of Naples, the coun­trey either folowed them, or tooke against them, as they had pros­perous or bad successe. And if that our successe in Portugalll had bene good, there is no doubt, but that all the country would haue re­uolted from the Spaniardes.

The Generall aboue all things is to haue regarde, that hee spend no time vainely. Opportunitie to doe great matters seldome offe­reth it selfe the second time. By all meanes the enemy is to be prouo­ked to fight, while our army is strong, and his souldiers yong and vnexercised. Annibal had more paine at the first to bring the Romans to fight, then to ouercome them. If the enemy refuse to fight, he is to be pursued into some towne or straite, or else by besieging of some strong place driuen to come to succour the same. All the countrey doth followe the successe of the chiefe citie. yet forasmuch as it is not sufficient to take, vnlesse we keepe the same: there is no lesse care to bee taken in fortifying and furnishing a towne taken, then in ta­king the same. Unlesse wee meane to loose our prize, as theGuicciard. French did Nouara in the dayes of Lewis the twelth for want of prouision, and good order.

Those that haue followed this course, haue done great matters, as is euident by the examples of Caesar, Scipio, Annibal: the rest ey­ther failed of victory, or could not maintaine their conquest. I will not specifie it by our expeditions into France, Portugal, Flanders. For that might be odious. Although those that are wise, by that which we wanted, may see what we ought to haue had, and done. But I will rather vse forraine examples. The enterprise of Guicciard, Lau­trecke in the kingdome of Naples was broken by niggardly ex­penses, slender preparatiues, slowe proceeding, couetousnesse of officers, disorder, and want of care about victualles, and other prouisions. The like disorder in the times of Charles the eight of France, made the French to loose the kingdome of Naples, which but lately before they had wonne. Some of the chiefe gouernours spent their time in pleasures, others minded nothing but spoyle: they furnished not their townes with victualles, nor with souldi­ers, they pursued not the enemy so, but that they suffered him to gather strength againe. Neither may we impute the losse of Nor­mandy, Gascoigne, and Guienne to other causes, then to disorders in warres, want of succour and supply, and too much credulitie in trusting the French, and presumption, in hoping for successe with­out meanes.

But, may some say, to what end tendeth al this discourse, seing mē now a daies are so farre from inuading their enemies: that some can be content to leaue their friends languishing for want of help, which are ioyned neere vnto them both by bond of religion, and couenant? and what hope is there that such shall giue the charge on others, see­ing they suffer the fire so neere their owne doores? true it is, that go­uernours haue not beene so forward, as some would haue wished, and percase as some thinke their honour and the profite of their state re­quired: yet haue not matters beene so carelesly neglected, as is sur­mised. But suppose they had; yet I hope the same course will not alwayes be continued, nor that the discipline of armes shall fore­uer be neglected of commanders.

There are yet a number left of the posteritie of those, that haue made the name of the English nation famous in France, Flanders, Spaine, and other countries: and many do now beginne to mislike, and condemne former disorders. If at anie time such men may be heard, or folowed, I doubt not, but that this [Page 96]discourse may be put in practise, and such aduertisements heard, and accepted more gratefully. To annoy our enemies, and procure our own safetie, there is no better course, then to translate warres frō our own doores into the enemies countrie. Whatsoeuer wil be per­formed, I thought it myduety not to conceale, that which I thought not onely profitable, but necessary for my countries honour: as, God willing, by many reasons I shall shew vnto you.

CHAP. V. Part. 2. Wherein is prooued, that it is farre better for the English nation, things standing as now they do, to inuade the Spaniard, or any other enemy in his owne country, then to receiue their assault, and invasion here at home, or to stay vntill we do see the enemy on our owne coast.

MAny there are, I doubt not, of a contrary minde; but especially those that enioy honour, wealth, and ease. These commonly vesire peace, and detest warres, and against such enterprises alleadge these reasons: they say wee haue neither towne, nor port in Spaine to receiue vs: that the way thither is long, and vncertaine by reason of contrarietie of windes, and that it will be hard to remedie anie disorder that shall fall out in our army by reason of the distance of the place: they alleadge further that we haue no friendes nor confederates in the countrey: and that it will be more difficult to subdue the Spaniard in his countrey, then abroad, for euery man doeth Ante ora patrū ante alta moenia Troiae, The Tro­ians were most venturous. Virg. fight most valiantly when his wife and children, and his owne landes and goodes are in his sight. Lastly, they suppose that the number of the enemies will be such, as that an armie shall bee wearied with killing them. On the other side, if wee attend the Spaniardes comming hither (say they) they shall haue all obese things to make against them; and wee all things fauorable for vs; men, municious, and victuals sufficient; our wines, children, & country in our sight, safe places to retrait vnto. As Anteus wrastling with Hercules, so oft as he touched the earth receiued new strength after his fall: so they that in their owne countrey do [...] fall, [Page 4]rise againe very easily. A Tit. Quintius vsed this simili­tude to dissuade the Achaeans frō forreine warres. Liu. snayle so long as hee keepeth himselfe within his shell, is defensed; when he putteth out his head, he lyeth open to danger. So they that in their owne countrey may liue safe, by making enterprises abroad oft times receiue blowes, and al­wayes lie open to danger. The Thucid. Athenians were vtterly ouerthrow­en in Sicile, that before that were well able to defend them selues at home. And diuers great armies of Germans and Gaules, inuin­cible if they had bene in their owne countreys, were ruinated at­tempting to inuade forreine countreys.

Which reasons howsoeuer they seeme plausible in the eares of those that in matters of warres proceede like snayles, and care not for any disgrace or future danger, so they may enioy present ease; yet are built on false grounds, and matters mistaken. For if we might safely rest at home, I thinke him not wise, nor sober that would seeke trouble abroad. But seeing we can not haue peace the Spaniard ha­uing begun warres, and threatning the destruction of our state: the question is, whether is better for vs to stay vntill he come vpon vs, or to begin with him and seeke him in his owne countrey? I say this is best: my reasons are these.

He that first chargeth his enemie, hath many aduantages, it is his great foly, if hee be not well prouided of souldiers, mariners, armes, shippes, horses, and all prouisions for the warres: hee may make choyce where to charge the enemy, and proceedeth simply if he doe not there beginne, where hee findeth his enemy weakest, and most vnprouided. He may make likewise choyce of his times, & take opportunities.Con le preuen­tioni & diuersio­ni, si vincono le guerre. Guicciar. lib. 1. Victorie is obteined by preuention, and by the same warres are oft times diuerted, as Alphonsus king of Naples sayd, but practiced not. For if hee had not lingred matters, and had met the enemie in the way; he had not so easily bene driuen out of his state.

No man obteineth better conditions of peace, then he that first stri­keth. Contrariwise dangerous it is to let the enemie come vpon vs. as Malum nas­cens facilè op­primitur. Inuere­ratum fit plerun­que robustius. Cic. Philip. diseases, so the attempts and proceedings of the enemy at the first are easily stopped, and both in time are strengthened and con­firmed. And oft times of light beginnings asTacit. annal. 4. Tacitus sayth, great troubles arise. If thou Veterem fe [...]ē ­do iniuriam inui­tas nouam, Liu. suffer one iniurie, thou doest but giue thy enemy courage to offer thee another. The enemy doeth oft times trie our patience, and seeing vs patiently to endure iniuries (as [Page 11] Liu. 1. Ancus Martius sayd) doeth contemne vs. And to Latinos quasi­nihil non conce­dentibus Roma­nis ferociores fe­cit. Liu. 6. [...]. Thu­cid. 1. yeelde in one thing doeth giue the enemy courage, to aske more. Nothing doeth procure more enemies, then patience andLiu. 6. contempt. Warre is like a fire: if it proceede, it embraceth whatsoeuer is neere, as the Cam­pamans sayd. IfLiu. 7. Alexander king of Epeirus comming in succour of the Lucanians, had had good successe: the Romanes should haue felt his force, therefore did they vse at the first to preuent matters. Vn­destanding that Philip king of Macedonia made preparations to come ouer into Italy, they tooke paynes to meete him in his owne Countrey.

Likewise did they preuent the attemptes of Antiochus. Which course if they had taken when Annibal first besieged Cunctati Sa­guntinis opem ferre de Italia di­micauimus, sayd a certaine Ro­mane Senator. Saguntum, they had deriued the warres into Spaine, and escaped the storme, which Annibals army brought into Italy. Those that feare to assayle the enemy vpon Cauete ne spe pacis perpetuam pacem amittatis. Cic. Philip. 7. hope of peace, loose oft times peace for euer. Tully feared it seeing the Romanes proceede so coldly against Antony; and the issue prooued it true.

The obiect ons that are made are of no moment. for admit we neither haue Port, nor towne, nor friende in the Spanish Domi­nions: yet armes and victory procure all these. The coast can ne­uer be so well garded, but that an army may alwayes haue accesse to some Port, or landing place or other.

The Romanes landed diuers times in Afrike during the warres with Carthage, and spoyled their townes and countrey: nay Caesar landed his army in Epeirus, when the enemy with an army prepared helde all the Port townes.

The Athenians made diuers descentes into Peloponesus, not­withstanding the diligent garde, that the enemy made. Who seeth not then howe easy it is to sease a Port, or to land in Spaine the coun­trey being almost without garde of souldiers? if any man doubted before, yet since the voyage into Portugal, I thinke there is none will make question of that matter. Neither did Scipio doubt for want of Portes, or friendes to sayle into Afrike, or the Persians into Greece, or other to inuade his enemy. For armes procure friendes, and winne Portes. so that had we no friends in Spaine, yet what resoluce man would refuse to goe against such enemies? much more therefore nowe, seeing the Portugals are discontent with the Spanish gouernment, and Spaine is so stored with men of [Page 18]foreine nations, and diuers malcontents.

As for the distance, it is nothing, where there is no resistance by the way. And what reason haue we to accompt Spaine farre, when the Romanes doubted not to transport their armies not one­ly into Afrike and Spaine, but also into Asia which is a farre lon­ger cut. If winde and weather serue, in three dayes and three dightes the voyage may be perforified.

The difficulty of supplyes may easily be holpen with prouisi­on made beforehand. If the army goe into Spaine well stored, there is no such haste of supply, but that it may come in good time. Why not into Spaine from England as well as from Rome into Spaine, Afrike, Asia, yea and Britein?

But the Spaniards are valiant at home, and will not giue ground fighting for their Countrey, wiues, and children. As if the Romanes a more warrelike and valiant people, did not giue ground to Annibals army in Italy; and as if the Gaules were not vanquished in diuers battels by Caesar, and the Spaniards in time past by the Carthaginians, and Romanes, and since that by the Gothes and Mores, yea and by the Portugales also their neighbours. And not onely our ancesters in the dayes of Edward the third, and Ri­chard the second, but wee our selues also haue had triall of that ene­mie both in Galicia, and Portugal. Hee that Maior spes est maior (que) animus inferentis vim, quám arcencis. Liu. 21. commeth to inuade others fighteth with greater courage, then those that are inuaded, by the testimonie of Annibal, and proofe of experience. Illis ignauis es­selicet qui re­ceptum habent, vobis necesse est fortibus viris es­se. Liu. 21. They that haue no hope of life, nor escape but in victory, can not chuse, but fight valiantly. Contrariwise they that haue refuge, and hope another time to fight more happily, which is the case of euery man in his owne countrey, will not fight so resolutely.

The Gaules in their owne countrey gaue ground, and fledde before Caesar, and other Romane Captaines, that in Italy had oft foyled the Romanes. And those Africans that in Italy were vic­torious, coulde not withstande Scipio in Afrike. Alexander en­tring into the middest of the Persian Empire, ouerthrewe the same vtterly.

Further it standeth with the Spaniard now, as sometime it did with the Carthaginians, & doth with al that vse mercenary souldiers. For so long as they may enioy their countrey & reuenues, & therewith hire most valiant souldiers of other nations, so long they are strong. but if [Page 21]they be inuaded in their owne countrey both their reuenues will fayle, and their owne people not being exercised in warres, wil make but slender resistance. So that suppose the Spanish army in the Low countreys be strong, which notwithstanding hath bene dealt with­all by our people, yet are wee not to looke for such souldiers in Spaine.

The Athenians inuading Sicile were ouerthrowen by the disa­greement and insufficiencie of the Captaines, the disorders of the souldiers, and want of things necessary. which may be remedied by diligent foresight, prouision, and gouernement. But suppose some did miscary in foreine warres, shall we therefore condemne that course? there is no reason, seeing as warres at home are not condem­ned because many nations haue bene subdued and vanquished in their owne countrey. Betwixt the Athenians or the Achaeans, & this kingdome there is no comparison in force or greatnesse. But if the citie of Athens could subdue all Sicile except one onely citie: it is no such difficult matter to inuade the Spaniard, as is supposed.

Finally some in trembling maner demaund, what if such an ar­mie so farre caried away should miscary? which is a very ridicu­lous point, for men to care more for those mens liues that dee wil­lingly offer themselues to the aduenture, then they doe themselues: Seeing they dare venture nothing themselues, yet let them not en­uie, and hinder others that will. But suppose the army should mis­cary: yet would the losse be farre lesse, then if so many should be lost at home. For here the sequele would be great, there would be only losse of men: which God be thanked this countrey may well spare. But what simplicity is it to talke of loosing, where men goe with a resolution rather to winne then loose? neither Anni­bal going in Italy, nor Scipio into Afrike cast any such doubt.

Suppose nowe on the other side, that the Spaniard should doe, that which hee once attempted, and God, more then our owne force would not suffer him to doe; and that an army of Spaniards were prouided to inuade vs: these things would fall out: not know­ing where the enemie will land, all the coast must be furnished with souldiers. For to thinke, that our trayned men would be trayned together in time to make resistance, is simplicitie. And if any port be left open, as good all should be disarmed. But this would be double the charge of leuying and furnishing an army for Spaine. and the [Page 22]longer the enemy holdeth vs in breath, the greater would the charge arise. and all this for any thing that I can see without ef­fect, seeing it is neither possible to keepe an army from landing, nor safety to fight without great aduantage immediatly vpon the enemies landing.

If the enemy should land, as well he may comming with great force, we neither haue strong townes, nor many great riuers to stoppe his proceedings, nor any way to resist, but by force of men in open fielde, and howe dangerous it is to oppose yong souldiers and almost tumultuary forces against a puissant army of olde soul­diers, the victories of Annibal in Italy, of Scipio in Afrike, of the Greekes in Persia, of the English in Spaine, and infinite Histo­ries declare.

If the enemy be suffered to take breath, who seeth not howe hee will fortifie him selfe? if hee be suffered to range without fight, who considereth not the wracke and spoyles of the countrey that will folowe?

When the countrey is all in trouble, the reuenues both of the Prince, and priuate men either will cease, or at least be greatly di­minished. Ferdinando king of Naples in the inuasion of his State made by the French, found itS'annihila­uan, l'entrate. Guicciar. lib. 1. true. And reason may teach vs, that where the husbandmen part by the rapines of the enemy, and part by the spoyles of our owne souldiers can not enioy the fruites of their ground, their rentes can not be payde. and if rentes bee not payd, howe will our souldiers be payd? suppose then, that the charge of an army in a foreine countrey be great: yet may it well be borne, being equally diuided, so long as men enioy their liuings peaceably: if that may not be; howe shall we mainteine twise so ma­ny souldiers at home?

If when the enemies inuade vs, malcontent persons should dis­couer themselues, then as the number of our enemies, so the heape of our troubles would increase.

But suppose (for what danger in such a case is not to be fore­cast?) that our army should receiue some checke: what townes haue wee, or straits to arrest the enemy? the countrey people be­ing vnacquainted with warres, what lawes cankeepe thē in order? helpe can wee looke for none, our friendes being either not able, or not willing to helpe vs, for some seeme offended with the spoyles [Page 24]of their shippes, others beare vs in hand, they will remember our slender helpe aforded to them, which notwithstanding is more then they deserued.

Other secret wounds may not be opened, neither needeth it, see­ing as euery man may perceiue by these reasons, which already I haue brought, how easy, safe, profitable, and honourable it is to in­uade the Spaniard, and how disaduatageous it wil be to this land, if either we stay with our hands folded together, or els deferre to charge the Spaniard with full force vntill such time, as he shall come to cut our throtes at home.

Hiero Liu. 21. king of Sicile, when the Romanes were inuaded by Annibal, gaue them counsaile to transport an army ouer into A­frike, the happy successe of Scipio doing the same fifteene yeeres af­terward, and by that meanes making an end of the warres, doeth confirme that counsell to haue bene most excellent. If when Philip Liu. 24. king of Macedonia ioyned in league with Annibal, they had not sent an army into Greece to finde him occupied at home; hardly could they haue made resistance against the force of two so mightie ene­mies vnited together. The experience of the warres with Annibal in Italy made them more wise afterward, and speedy. For hearing of Philips of Macedonia, and Antiochus his preparatiues to transport their armies into Italy: they eased them of the paine, and met them in more then halfe way. But what neede examples of foreine nati­ons, seeing it hath bene the vse of our ancesters to seeke their enemies alwayes abroade in their owne countreys? this course is most honorable, most safe, yea and (that which is nowe most accompted of by some) most profitable, and least chargeable for vs also. Nothing can be more honorable then to defend our religion, lawes, and coun­trey against those that seeke to oppresse vs: no course more safe, then so to hazard, that the losse doe not endanger our state: no way more profitable then by keeping the enemy farre off, to mainteine the reuenues of the Crowne, and euery mans priuate liuing, and trade at home.

Wherefore refusing the pernicious counsell of those, that babble of I knowe not what peace; let the Spaniard rather feele the effects of warre in Spaine, then bee suffered be to drawe his vnsatiable sword in England. his malice is not lesse then it was. But hither. to God hath broken his purposes, and crossed his designements. But [Page 27]if he be suffered quietly to possesse Britein; the longer wee differre our warres, the more dangerous we shall finde them, and our selues more vnable to resist. Nowe that hee hath a strong party against him in France, and that the Low countreys either stand against him, or are weary of his gouernement, and that Portugal is mal­content with his newe tyranny, is the time to hurt him, and pre­uaile against him. If we suffer him to settle his owne affaires, and this good opportunitie to passe, I feare, we shall often wish for the like, and hardly finde it.

CHAP. V. Part. 3. Wherein certaine aduertisements are giuen to our souldiers, that are sent in ayde of foreine nations.

THe best counsell that I can giue my countrey­men, is to assayle the enemy in his owne coun­trey: but seeing that I cannot (I feare) perswade them to that is best, and safest; the next good that I can doe them, is to admonish them, that being sent in small numbers to succour our friendes oppugned by our common enemy, they proceede not rashly.

First therefore wisedome requireth, that they goe strong. for that in foreine countreys they are no lesse to feare the practices of double hearted friends, then the force of open enemies. The Ro­manes when they sent ayde to their friendes, neuer sent lesse then a full army, sufficient to encounter the enemy. In sending lesse, either they should not haue pleasured their friends, or els haue en­dangerd their owne men. Besides this, it would haue bene dishonor to the name of the Romanes, if either they had not bene able to ouer­come the enemy, or willing to see their friendes long languish in feare, or their souldiers ouermatched, and not able to looke out into the fielde. For this cause being required ayde of the Campanians a­gainst the Samnites, of the Latins against the Volscians, they sent their Consuls & Generals forth with a mighty force, not only to driue [Page 104]the enemie from the townes, but also to fight with him in the fielde. And taking vpon them the protection of the Sicilians against them of Carthage, they sent thither sufficient strength both by sea, and land.

Caesar going in ayde of the Heduans, and other the confederates of the Romanes in France, oppressed by the Heluetians, & Germans led with him a most braue army furnished with all things necessary. Neither was it the vse of the Romanes only, but of all nations that vnderstood the practise of armes, yea and of ours also.

The Blacke Prince in the dayes of Edward the third going into Spaine in succour of Don Pedro de Castile, led thither a most flo­rishing army, where with he ouerthrew the power of Spaine, and re­stored the Ring to his seate. Likewise the Duke of Lancaster in his expedition into Portugall, did not rely vpon the ayde of that nation, but caried with him a gallant army of English men. And when Ed­ward the fourth went into France to ayde the Duke of Burgundy, be caried with him such a power, as the heartes of the French trem­bled to see it, and the king rather by money and rewardes, then by force sought to cause them to returne. If the Romanes had sent three or foure thousand in ayde of their friendes in Sicile, or Greece, or A­sia, and so supplyed them by litle and litle: the opinion of their wis­dome and forces would neuer haue growen so glorious. Neither could the Prince of Parma of late times, if he had gone into France with a small force haue deliuered his confederates from danger, or els broken the purposes of his enemies in that sort hee hath. If then wee will not followe the ancient rules of warre, yet let vs not shewe lesse iudgement and value in our proceedings, then our enemie.

Whosoeuer therefore meaneth to winne honor in succour of his friends abroad, let him as much as he can endeuour to cary with him a sufficient force. Small numbers are neither esteemed of enemies, nor friends. Into the field they dare not come, for they are too fewe and too weake, being penned vp in cities they famish. If our friends be stronger then our ayde, then are they commaunded by them. If any of their leaders want gouernement, our men that are put to all hard seruices, pay the prise of their folly. If any ca­lamitie happen to their army, our people first feele it. They shift for them selues being in their owne countrey; ours are slayne [Page 105]both of enemies and friendes, and if victuals waxe scant they sterue first. I neede not shewe this by other examples, then by our procee­dings in France, and the Lowe countries.

But suppose that by our aide, our friendes should be able to ouer­come, or make peace with the enemy, yet are not our people more assu­red then before. When the Protestants in the first ciuil warres by the meanes of our forces had obteined that they would, or at least tolle­rable conditions of peace, they ioyned with our enemies, to besiege vs in Newhauen, and sent vs away without reward or thankes. The Spaniards that had restored Guicciar. li. 16. Maximilian Sforza to the Duchie of Millan, the warres being ended for their reward, had like to haue had their throates cut. But they stood so much vpon their gard, that the practise of Hierome Moron, and the Marquis of Pescara could take no effect. In ancient time howe often haue our people bene delu­ded by the Dukes of Britaine, and Burgundy, in whose aide they went to venture their liues? and doe we thinke that the people of the Lowe countries, if once they be deliuered from the feare of the Spaniard, will not turne out our garrisons, and vse vs in like sort? they will be able to doe it, and others haue done so before. Why then should we thinke our selues priuiledged?

To assure our selues therefore of our friendes, the onely meanes is to haue a force sufficient to master them, and correct their disloyaltie. The same is the only course to preuaile against our enemies, to helpe our friendes, and mainteine our selues.

If that may not be obteined, I see not how our people can main­teine their honor: but the next course to assure them selues, is to haue cautionary townes, or hostages, or both deliuered into their handes. townes, that they may assure them selues of retraite, in case of bad dealing; hostages, that they may be assured of their good dealing. Without townes their case is desperate, if the enemie preuaile. The Fro [...]ssart. French that came to aide Galeazzo Duke of Millain, vnder the leading of the Countie of Armignac, being scattered in the siege of Alexandria, were slaine by the Pesants of the Countrey. The like happened to those poore Lanceknights, that were defeated atAnno 1569. Mon­contour. Neither were the Spaniards better vsed, that came in aide of the Leaguers, being defeated by the present french king neere Dreux, anno 1589. This towne that is giuen in caution, is to be garded with a sufficient force of English, furnished with victuals and muni­tions, [Page 106]in the garde of the garrison, and not as in Vlissingen, in the kee­ping of the townesmen, vnto whom whosoeuer trusteth, shall assured­ly be deceiued.

Thirly, let those that haue the gouernment of our men, see that they both march, and lodge vnited, and strong, that they be not either disturbed in the night, nor betraied vnder colour of friēdship. Stran­gers that stragle are a spoile not onely to the pesants, but to their se­crete euil-willers. And those that lodge without defence, or suffer any to come within them in the night, are open to euery enterprise of their enemies.

That they may both lodge, and march hard together, order is to be taken, that they may haue victuals deliuered them alwaies before hand; and that they be not driuen to seeke abroad for them. To con­clude, the onely meanes of safetie is, neither to trust enemy, nor friend: for none are abused, but they that trust dissoyall people.

If that our men can neither haue townes, nor hostages, nor victu­als, nor good vsage, what should they be sent among such people? or why should they trust others, being not themselues trusted? or why should any succour be sent, but such as may command, and punish the dissoyall, and haue strength to stand vpon themselues?

Those therefore that are gouernours (I trust) they will maturely consider of this point. if not, let them looke for this issue: if the enemy be stronger, then are our men either to be slaine, or famished by the e­nemie: if by our forces our friendes preuaile, then for their rewarde shall they either be turned out of the countrey with disgrace, or be fa­mished, or cut in peeces, by their friendes.

These things considered, let vs nowe consequently proceede to de­clare, howe an army, after that it is exercised and furnished, and that the Generals haue all due considerations both therein, and in all o­ther prouision, and proceeding required before the marche of the ar­my, may march orderly, and safely.


Part. I. Of the order and aray of an army marching toward the enemy.

THe first care of him that meaneth to march safely in the enemies countrey, or where an enemie is neere, ought to be, that his troupes obserue good order, and aray: and the neerer that he approcheth to the enemy, the greater [Page 107]ought his care to be. The neglect of this point onely, hath bene the o­uerthrow of many armies. It giueth opportunitie to the enemy to as­saile vs, and confoundeth yong souldiers, when they are ignorant how to come in order to defend themselues. Easie it is to be obserued of men that are willing, and vnderstand reason: and sharpe effects and correction it worketh on the stubborne, and wilfull. That the Ge­neral, or his officers may put the armie in good order of march, first they are to vnderstand what is the aray of the whole armie, considered together as one whole body. Secondly, the places of euery part, as of horsemen, footemen, and of footemen, of the diuers sortes of weapons. Thirdly, the iust distances of souldier from souldier, according to eue­ry mans qualitie and weapon. Fourthly, the places of the Generall, and other chiefe Commanders. Fiftly, of the great Ordonance, and munition. Lastly, of the cariages and baggage, and boyes and ser­uants that attend vpon it, and likewise of marchants, and victualers, and others that followe the army for other causes, then to fight.

The armie consisteth of three partes commonly, considered especi­ally as it marcheth. for in fighting, the orders, and parts doe much dif­fer. The first part that marcheth wee call vantgard; the second the battell; the third, the arier ward. Euery one of these ought to be a per­fect body of it selfe, hauing both his smal shot, and great ordonnance, and his horsemen, and his pikes, targets, and halberds placed in good order. Oft times, I know, it is otherwise, and that either horsemen, or pikes, or targets are wanting in some part, or other. But howe much of these they want, so much they want of perfection, and due proporti­on in a iust army. For we speake not of 6 or 7 thousand (which cannot obserue this order, but had better to march vnited) but of a ful army of 24 or 30 thousand, which number marching in this order, so that one part may succour an other, I accompt, doth march orderly, and strong­ly. If one part goe farre before an other, it may fall out, as it happe­ned to the Protestants in the plaines of S. Clere anno 1569, that one part shall be in route, before the other can come to succour. The Romanes marched distinguished by legions, whose numbers were di­uers, and which seldome were complete: but in effect the aray was one; saue that the Romanes commonly made but two partes of their armie, and placed their baggage in the midst, as did Caesar marching against the Neruians. In the order of the partes, and placing of horse­men, and footemen, and sorting of weapons, the same reasons haue [Page 108]place for the most part among all nations.

Before the auantgard, light horsemen by ancient prescription may challenge the first place. If they be seconded with some shot and tar­getters lightly armed, they may be the bolder to come neere the ene­my, and to abide his charge. These are called auantcoureurs, and serue for discouery of the enemies proceedings, and of the situation of the Countrey, and intercepting of the enemies espials, and diuers o­ther vses. Vpon the front of the auantgard march small shot and mus­quetiers, after them follow the armed men with the ensignes in the midst, or rather somewhat toward the first rankes. On either hand, and behind the armed men, are other companies of shot to be ranged; and without the shot somewhat auanced forward argoletiers, and then launces take their place. If the enemie make countenance, as if he would charge some part of our army with his horse; they are to be drawne toward the side where the enemie threatneth to giue the charge. but if the enemie doe flie before vs, and shunne to fight, the horsemen of the whole armie would be ioyned together, and sent to charge him on the sides or backe, and to stay his marche: as Caesar practised first against theCaes. bel. Gal. 1. Heluetians, then against theCaes. bel. Gal. 2. Aduati­cans, and lastly, against Petreius hisCaes. bel. ciu. 1. armie in Spaine. By which meanes he ouertooke those that were farre before him. But this hath vse where we are stronger then the enemie in horse. Howe many horsemen, or shot, or pikes, or targets, and other weapons shall march in a ranke, I referre to the iudgement of a good Sergiant maior, ac­cording to the bredth of the waies, and approches of the enemie. The more doe march in a ranke, the lesse paine he shall haue to set them in order, when he would place them in order of battell, and the stronger the aray is.Guicciar. lib. 9. Ten thousand Switzers in Lombardy, in the warres betwixt the Spaniards and French, marched foure score in a ranke harde by the French armie, which seeing their resolution, durst not charge them.

The same course is to be taken in the aray of the battell, and arier­ward marching, saue that these two partes following without any great distance betweene, neede not light horsemen or auantcoureurs, especially where the enemie is before. Neither haue they such vse of shot or horsemen, as the auantgard, where they are vsed for supplies, rather then to fight in front.

In the placing of horsemen & footemen, & in sorting and employ­ing [Page 109]of diuers weapons, so that euery sort may doe best seruice, consi­steth the speciall iudgement of a wise leader. For therein are infinite differences, according to the diuers strength of the enemie, and our owne forces; and likewise according to the diuersities of grounds, and times. Yet commonly in marching this order is obserued: first the light-horse seconded if need be, with shot and targetters, especial­ly where the country is rough and wooddie, serue for auantcoureurs. Caliuers and musquetiers are not onely to march on the front, but also on the sides and backe of the armed men. Lances and men of armes are ranged, the outmost on the sides for the most part. Next to the shot march the pikes of that part of the armie; these would bee rāged rather in battaillions according to the fashion of the Romans, that the shot and other light armed men might saue themselues, and againe make head within the distances, then all in one front ioyned togither. But this is where the plainnesse of the ground will giue leaue. In euery battaillion the ensignes are to bee placed somewhat toward the first rankes, garded with good store of targetters and halberds well armed.

In placing and sorting of weapons, the Generall is to consider, that the charge of horsemen against shot and targetters is mortall, if they be not either garded with pikes, or haue the vantage of ditches, or hedges, or woods where they cannot reach them. In which case the shot gauleth the horse, if they come within the leuell of the piece. Shot and targetters against pikes worke good effects: pikes ioined close, and standing firme togither, doe breake the carriere of horse­men: especially where they haue their musquetiers, placed neere by them. Archers, where they haue a defense before them, doe good ser­uice in the field against horsemen. These things let the General haue so in mind, that he may rather take the aduantage of weapons in the encounter, then giue it to the enemie.

In marching, the distances of euery ranke from ranke, and of e­uery souldier from his companion by him, are greater then whē they stand ranged in battell readie to fight. It skilleth not much what the distance be, so they may beare their weapons commodiously, & march seemelie: yet that euery man might know what distance is suffici­ent, & what is most seemly, it were good that one rule were obserued. Shot, although in fighting they obserue rather a course then aray, and are to stirre vp and downe to espie where they may hit the ene­mie: [Page 110]yet that they may with more ease and speed bee drawen to ser­uice, are to march in distance from ranke to ranke fiue or sixe foote, from shoulder to shoulder one foote, or a foote and a halfe. Argo­letiers or Pistoliers, in march from horse to horse on the side, are distant two foote, from ranke to ranke a yarde and a halfe, or thereabout. The Lancier without bardes rideth in the same di­stance.

Pikemen from their fellowes side by them, are distant a foote and a halfe, or two foote, from the pikemen behind and before, by reason of the length of their pikes twelue foote. Their march to their corps de gard, when they hold their pikes vpright, which the Italian calleth inalborar, is out of this rule. Of their distances in charging, or recei­uing the charge of horse or foote, wee shall speake when we come to the place.

Halbardiers march a foote and a halfe from shoulder to shoulder, and seuen foote from ranke to ranke. The targetter may obserue the same distance from shoulder to shoulder, but hee needeth not such di­stance from ranke to ranke.

The Generall, as he hath the commandement, so he ought to haue the care of all, and therefore ought to be in all places. But because he cannot bee in all places at one time, therefore doeth the practise of warre require, that he assigne the guiding of his three battaillions, to three of his chiefe officers and commaunders, that are men of iudgement and experience, to see and commaund in his absence all men in their battaillion to march in order. Himselfe may march with the battell, vnlesse for some cause it shall please him to march in the vantgard, or arierward. The Romanes ouer euery legion or re­giment of fiue or sixe thousand, placed a principall commaunder, they called him Legatum: the same was of the Generals counsell, and in his absence one of his lieutenants. Euerie seuerall troupe of horsemen are to haue their seuerall commaunders, and euery com­paine of shot likewise. All which ought to be obedient to the Gene­rall of the horse, or Colonell of the footemen, which know the Ge­nerals counsell. The seuerall troupes also of armed men, are to haue their seuerall commaunders: prouided alwayes that no one compa­nie haue more then one commaunder for auoiding of confusion, and that euery of these hearken to their superiours, which vnder the Ge­nerall haue the chiefe gouernement of euery battaillion. The Ser­ieant [Page 111]maior, and corporals of the field his officers are to acquaint e­uery commaunder with the Generals direction, which the same is to execute.

These are therefore suffered to goe vp and downe to see things in order. For others it is not good they should leaue their a­raie, unlesse it bee for necessarie causes, as sickenesse, the necessities of nature, and such like. The commaunders of euery troupe are to march in the head of their troupes, their lieutenants behind the same. All other colonels, captaines, lieutenants and serieants, are to keepe their ranke and araie wherein they shall be placed. For although ouer their priuate companies when they are single they commaund; yet in the armie vnited togither, they are commaunded, and onely to see those that follow them where they march to do their dueties. which consent vnlesse it be obserued, these inconueniences will ensue. By contrarie commaundements, there will fall out con­fusion and contention: and many captaines, lieutenants, and ser­ieants will walke out of order, and much time will be spent in set­ting of men in their places, which euery souldier ought to doe of himselfe.

The great ordonance being parted betwixt the vantgard, bat­tell, and rereward, sometime is drawen in head of theSo was it at the battell of Mon­contour, and in the battell be­twixt the Conte Egmont and Thermes by Graueling. pikes of eue­rie battell: but for that it must needes trouble those that would march on to fight with the enemie, farre better it were, if all the great ordonance were drawen on the sides of the vantgard, as oft as the enemie made shew of charge, and then drawen vpon some hill, or some other place of aduauntage. In the field it doeth more trouble then seruice: the effectes of it, is but noyse and foo­lerie, onelie that small townes should not make resistance, it is drawen along, and also for the vse that it hath in sieges, and bat­teries.

Concerning the baggage, and those seruants and boyes that at­tend vpon the same, and such as follow the armie, as merchants or vic­tualers, rather to gaine then to fight: this rule is generally to be ob­serued, that the same be placed betweene the bataillions, so that in a charge the same may best be defended, and yet not trouble the araie of the armie. The same is to be placed where there is least danger. The Greekes returning from the battell betwixt Cyrus [...]. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 2. and Artaxer­xes, being coasted and pursued by the enemie, placed their cariages [Page 112]neere the riuer along which they marched, and their armed men toward the enemie. Caesar marchingCaes. bel. gal. 2. against the Neruians, after three partes of foure of his whole forces placed his baggage, be­ing garded with the other fourth part following behind. At other times when there was lesse suspition of the enemie, euery legion marched by it selfe, and the baggage thereof after.Praecedunt co­hortes, sequitur prima legio, & medijs impedi­mentis sinistrum latus, 19. legio &c. Tacit. 2. Germanicus after certaine chosen troupes, placed the first regiment or legi­on, and after that hee caused the baggage to follow garded on ei­ther side, and behind with the rest of the armie. If our bag­gage and impediments be great, so much as may be spared is to be left in some strong towne. Or if the enemie bee behind, The Caes. de bel. ciu. 3. baggage togither with our hurt men is to bee sent before into some place of safetie, as Caesar practised in his retraite from Dyr­rhachium.

This is the common course, which is I thinke also best, for an armie to vse in marching. But if the enemie make countenance, or rather doe begin to charge any part of the same: then that part which is neerest him, is to be made the head or vantgard, the other two parts of the armie are to be drawen, the one on the right hand, the other on the left. If the enemie come on front, then the rankes of the auantgard are to bee doubled, or multiplied according to the capacitie of the ground. The battell and rierward are to be drawen vp, the one toward the left hand, the other toward the right, or els one part is to bee drawen vp vntill the same bee equall of front with the auantgard, and the other beyng deuided into battaillions, to serue for supplie where neede is. The shot is to bee placed part in front, and the rest on the sides, and without them ought horsemen to take their standing expecting their aduauntage, and the commaunde­ment of their leaders. But if our horsemen bee few, and not able to match the enemies cauallerie; let them not bee to farre aduaunced, vnlesse they bee seconded, with shot and halfe pikes armed àle le­giere: but rather let them bee reserued to chase the enemie beyng foyled by the footemen, and placed betweene either ground of ad­uauntage, or battaillions of pikes. And this if it be done of those that haue skill, ye shall neither heare noise, nor see confusion, nor time spent about it. The souldiers of Caesar beyng suddenly charged by theCaes. de bel. gal. 2. Neruians, as they were newlie come to their lodging, did e­uerie man presently set himselfe in aray to fight. And Annibal had [Page 113]so taught his souldiers, that euery one issuing out of his lodging, coulde fall in aray of himselfe, either being ready to fight or to marche. And why might not our souldiers also be so instructed, and exercised, that they might doe the like? but some want care, some skill, and some both.

Some percase will aske, Who gaue me auctoritie to prescribe? which are very simple not to see, that I prescribe nothing of mine owne, but onely declare the auncient practise of warre, and procee­ding of most famous warriers. The Romanes vsed this course, and so did the Greekes and Carthaginians. First marched the light horse, then the light armed, after them the armed men. The baggage was placed in the midst of the armie. This order did Caesar oserue in his marche against theCaes. bel. gal. 1. Heluetians, Caes. Bel. gal. 2. Belgians, and inCaes. bel. Ciu. 1. Spaine a­gainst Afranius, and Petreius. The same didLiui. 21. Annibal practise in his marching all along Italy. The same course for the most part is obser­ued of those that haue skill in our times, but that the differences of groundes, and diuers conditions of mens armies make them alter some circumstances. Metellus Metellus cum expeditis cohor­tibus, item fun­ditorum & sa­gitta [...]iorum lecta manu apud pri­mos erat. in po­stremo C. Marius cum equitibus curabat. in vtrū (que) latus auxiliarios equites, & permi­stos velites dis­pertiuerat. Sa­lust. bel. Iugurth. marching against Iugurtha, placed first certaine choise companies of slingers and archers, and after them troupes of armed men, without impediments or baggage: there him­selfe commaunded. C. Marius folowed with the horsemen, vpon both sides he placed horsemen, and light armed of his associats mingled among them, guided by certaine captaines of horse, the legions mar­ched in the midst. Xenophon, for that a square battaile in straites is easily disordered, did deuide the square into [...] Xe­noph exped. Cyr. 3. companies (which knowing their places in the square, marched few in a ranke in straits: and in open ground, came into their aray againe.) His horse and slin­gers he cast out on the front, and sides. Corbulo soCorbulo viae pariter & pugnae composuerat exer­citum, latere dextro 3 legio, sinistro, 6 incedebat, medijs decumanorum delectis: re­cepta inter ordines impedi­menta: te [...]gum mille equi­tes tuebantur: in co [...]nibus pedes sagitta [...]ius & c [...]tera manus equitum ibat. Ta­cit. 13. marched in his voyage against the Parthians, as was both for the marche, and fight most safe and fit: in the right side marched the thirde Regiment, the sixth on the left, and the tenth in the midst, the carriages were placed betweene the Regiments, a thousande horse followed for garde of the Rierwarde, vpon the winges were the rest of the horse placed, and by them the archers and light armed footemen, When the blackeFroissart. Prince marched into Spaine, his armie was deuided into three partes, vpon the winges marched the horse, the archerie being then wel armed made the body of the battaillions.

The weakenesse of the armies of our time proceede of contempt of military arayes, and orders. The French among their footemen, haue fewe or none armed. Before the encountre at Rocheabeille Anno 1569, Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 7. the Protestants marched thus: the horsemen made the Auantgarde, on either side marched certaine troupes of shot, seconded by horsemen: after the vantgarde followed a battaillion of lansquenets, and in front of them were drawne eight field pie­ces: after them followed diuers Regiments of shot representing the battell, and on the side thereof another battaillion of lansquenets with some other pieces. That which was the strength of the army, that is pikes, and halberds, and targets armed was wanting, and shot placed, where if they had bene charged, they could haue done no seruice. Oft times the Vantgarde marcheth, and lodgeth so farre from the rest of the partes of the army, that it is no hard matter for a vigilant man of warre to cut one in pieces, before the other can come to succour. This Hist. de troubl. de Fr. was the death of the Prince of Condè, and ouer­throw of his auantgarde at the battell of Cognac. And the same was the ouerthrow of Appian. de bel. Parth. Crassus by the Parthians, for his sonne was so farre auanced before the rest of the army, that before he could be relieued, he and his troupes were defeated. And in our times some great commaunders, albeit they had but fiue or sixe thou­sand; yet would they needes make three partes forsooth, which is the cause of the weakenesse of the whole: the Captaines, lieuetenants, and sergiants, which are a good part of the strength of the army, stand for the most part out of ranke, and will all take vpon them to be leaders: because of contrary commaundements no man can tell where to goe: while commaunders striue together, there is great contention and noyse made. And finally a great matter made of no­thing: and nothing made of all their seruice, and matters very easie made difficult. For if the army be a body, then euery souldier ought to be taught, that he may knowe howe to stand in his place, as euery member is placed in the body. But we haue saide ynough of the aray, now therefore let vs talke of the proceeding of an army.

CHAP. VI. Part. 2. Wherein is declared by what meanes an Army may march safely in the enemies countrey, and ouercome all difficulties, whereby either in champion, or wooddie grounds, or els in the passage of riuers, or hils and straites, the same may be disordered, or hindered.

BEside the common aray of the army in marching, which we are as nere as we can to endeuour to vn­derstand, and keepe: if we meane to marche assured, we are also to learne the estate of the enemie, the site of the countrey, where we do marche, and how the ordinary aray is to be changed, according to the diuersitie of the grounds, to the ende that wee may both in champion, and in wooddy grounds, and also ouer riuers, and hils passe safely.

Chabrias the Athenian captaine,Plutarch. Apopth. said he deserued not the name of a General, that vnderstood not the estate of the enemies. And ofLiuy 22. Annibal Liuy giueth report, that he vnderstood what was done in the enemies campe, as well as themselues. The enemies purposes and estate we vnderstand partly by the examination of prisoners ta­ken: partly by the report of such as flie from the enemie vnto vs: but most assuredly by our owne espials, and discouerers, which either goe disguised among the enemies, or els in warrelike sort approche his lodging, or army to see what countenance he hath. The situation of the countrey is vnderstoode, partly by cardes truely representing the hils, straits, and riuers, and partly by report of the countrey people examined seuerally, but most exactly, by men of iudgement frō some hie place viewing it.Xenoph. ex­ped. Cyr. 1. Xenophon enquired, and learned of such pri­soners as he had taken, both the estate of the enemies, and the diuers wayes wherby he might returne into Greece: by the same also he vn­derstood the situation of the countreys, and maners of the people, by which he was to passe with his company. Ring Edward theFroisart. thirde being in paine to passe the riuer of Some in France, by the instru­ction giuen him by one of his prisoners vnderstood of a foord. The Romanes by the examination of diuers prisoners taken in Afrike, vn­derstood all the proceedings of the enemies. Yet must not we giue too great credite to such: for subtil persons do often dissemble, and de­sperat villeines wil not sticke to lead vs into trappes. Diuers of them therefore are to be examined seuerally & streitly, and not to be beleeued [Page 116]vnlesse they consent, and speake probably.Caes. de bel. ciu. 2. Curio lightly examining a prisoner concerning the force of the enemie, was greatly abused, and pursuing the enemie vpon his report, was himselfe, and his com­panie ouerthrowne.

Many things are likewise vnderstood by relation of those that flie vnto vs from the enemie. By such kinde of men thePer transfugas cognitum est, quos leuitas in­geniorum ad co­gnoscendas hosti­um res in omni­bus bellis praebet. Liui. 31. Romanes disco­uered the preparatiues of the king of Macedonia against them. Anni­bal partly by such, and Annibalem nihil eorum quae apud hostes ge­rebantur fallebat & perfugis mul­ta indicantibus, & per suos explo­rantem. Liui. 22. partly by his owne diligence, searching out matters continually by his espials, vnderstood whatsoeuer the Ro­manes did. King Edward the 3. by Robert of Artois, that vpon some displeasure was driuen out of the Court of France, vnderstood diuers secrets of that state, as also by Godefry d'Harecourt, & the erle Mom­fort that fled to him out of Britaine. Yet may we not giue light cre­dence to all their words. Percase they vnderstand not matters well, or els deale doubly.Transfugis non fidens Syllanus, speculatores ad hoftem misit. Syllanus therefore in Spaine beside the report of those that fled from the enemie, sent his espials to see what the ene­mie did. And Annibal vsed to keepe them diligently that reported any thing, that if the reports were found vntrue, they might be punished. TheLiui. 6. Romane Consul hauing receiued newes, that some of his company would be defeated without present succour, and not re­teining the messenger, fell into an ambush layde for him.

The most assured way of intelligence is by espials secretly sent, or discouerers approching the enemie. Annibal Liuy. 30. returning out of Italy to defend his owne countrey against Scipio, sent diuers espials into his campe. Pro perfugis speculandi gratia in Caesaris castra mittit. Hirt. de bel. Afric. Scipio in the warres of Caesar in Afrike, sent two Getu­lians to espie Caesars campe disguised as fugitiues. But because such persons cannot long stay there without being discouered: therefore sometimes vnder colour of parley, and sometime vnder colour of buy­ing, or selling, or other busines, souldiers disguised like marchants espie out the enemies proceeding. Scipio while the treatie of peace continued betwixt him and Liui. 29. Syphax, sent diuers captaines in slaues apparel, which wandering about the enemies campe discouered the accesses, and issues of it, which being reported to Scipio, gaue him the meanes to charge Syphax in the night, being quiet and safe (as he conceiued) in his lodging.Scipio cum equitatu iacula­toribúsque expe­ditis profectus ad castra hostium, ex (que) propinquo copias quantae & cuius generis essēt speculandas, ob­uius fit Annibali & ipsi cum equi­tibus ad explo­randa circa loca progresso. Liui. 21. Scipio, this mans father, before the bat­tel with Annibal at Trebia, drew foorth his horsemen and light ar­med, to view Annibals campe: Annibal for the same purpose came a­gainst him with other horsmen. But because this maner of discouery [Page 117]cannot be made without force, therefore did Equitatum omnem ad nume­rum 4000 prae­mittit, qui vide­ant, quas in par­tes hostes iter fa­ciant. Caes. bel. Gal. 1. Caesar pursuing the Heluetians, send all his horsemen in number 4000, to see what wayes the enemies marched. TheHistoir. de trou. de Franc. lib. 9. Admirall of France hauing re­ceiued some losse in the plaines of S. Clere, anno 1569 for want of good espiall, sent certeine horsemen to the number of sixteene, which going nere and taking some prisoners, might vnderstand the enemies resolution. but because they were so few, they were beaten backe be­fore they could see any thing, and returned without effect. Yet we thinke we doe much when we send foorth sixe or seuen horsemen badly mounted. for some do rashly proceed without them: but both courses are contrary to the practise of warre.

The view of the countrey well described in cards both teach a wise Generall many thinges. for there he may see the tract of riuers, the distances of places, the rising of hilles, and many such opportunities. TheMouerat sena­tum maximè ma­ris terrarum (que) re­gionis eius situm demonstrando. Liu. 32. Romanes in ancient time vsed, when they consulted of any action, to view the situation of the countrey layed before them. The Counte of Purlitia, in his aduertisements to Ferdinand the Emperour, and Don Sancho de Londonno stand vpon the same as a necessary point. for by view of regions described, many thinges ap­peare, that otherwise cannot be conceiued. But much better may the countrey be discouered, if men of iudgement go before with the horse­men to view the same, and to follow the traces of the enemies. those that obserue this course both go, & returne safely. Marcellus Exploratò cun­firmis (que) praesidijs tuto receptu prae­datum ierat. Liu. 23. sear­ching out the lurking holes of the enemy, and placing strong gards in places conuenient, returned safely from forraging the countrey.

They that march forward blindely without either view of the countrey, or knowledge of the enemies proceedinges, are subiect to many mishaps. The Romane armie at the straits of Caudium com­passed in by the enemy on euery side, complaineth, that like Non ducem lo­corum fuisse, non exploratorem, belluarum modo caecos in foueam missos. Liu. 9. brute beastes, going on without guide or espiall, they were carried head­long, as it were, into a pit. Liu. 31. Appius spoiling the countrey of the Bo­ians, without either discouery, or standes of men well placed, was drawen into an ambush, and slaine together with his army. This one point neglected, cost many of the Romanes their liues, in the warres with Annibal. Marcus Marcellus going himselfe with a small company to view the countrey, was himselfe drawne into am­bush, and slaine.Vocula nec ad­uentum hostium explorauit, eo (que) simul egressus, vi­ctus (que) Tacit. 20. Ʋocula charging the enemy without knowledge of his forces, was assoone slaine, as he went fast out of his lodging [Page 118]to fight with him. The Counte of Aremberge, by the brauery of the Spaniard forced to passe the Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 1. riuer, before he knew the strength of the enemy which seemed not great, was defeated with his com­pany by the Counte Lodwike. The Admirals vantgard was bro­ken in the plaines of S. Clere, an. 1569, Ibidem lib. 9. for that the same did blunt­ly charge the enemy, of whose forces and number the same was ignorant. The carelesse march of Mouuans and Pierregourde, that were charged before they vnderstood of the enemies approch, was cause of their ouerthrow: and hath also both vnto the enemy and to vs wrought many calamities in the Low countries, which those that escaped narrowly may remember, and can report. Dangerous therefore it is to march by night, especially in countries vnknowen, and where the enemies proceedinges are vnknowen. Asdrubal Liu. 27. in the night lost his guide, & his way, and wearied himselfe: and being the next day forced to fight, was ouercome by the Romanes at the ri­uer of Metaurus. Puygalliard in these late troubles of France, mar­ching all night, most of his troupes lost their way: the rest the day following were defeated at S. Gemme, by a very few Protestants. Those that escape by policy out of straits as Annibal did at Cales, and Asdrubal in Spaine, he driuing away the corps de gard by feare of fire, the other escaping during parley of yeelding; and likewise they that haue had good successe charging the enemy at all aduen­tures, haue bene more happy then wise.

Those therefore that march against their enemies are to discouer the countrey and affaires of the enemy diligently, and to shun night marches. but if necessity force them thereunto, yet wisedome admo­nisheth them to vnderstand the enemies doings perfectly, to procure sure guides, and to keepe them fast: to march close together, now and then to make alta, that those that lagge, may come vp, by sure marks to know frends frō enemies, and to giue certeine & perfect directions. Which course whileLiu. 25. Martius did holde in Spaine, & Scipio in Afrike, he ouercame the Carthaginians, and dislodged them twise,Liu. 29. Scipio foiled Syphax and burnt his campe, and slew his people in the night.

The countrey, and proceeding of the enemy discouered, let vs next consider the differences of groundes. The plaine champion country is to be chosen of those that desire to fight, and are stronger then the enemy. Those that are vnwilling to fight, let them shunne such ground, so much as they can. therein there is no feare of ambushes, [Page 119]nor impediment to breake the aray of the army, which in this ground is no lesse to be obserued in marching, then in fighting. The cham­pion countrey being without hedges, or ditches, is aduantageous for horsemen, whose force in that ground, without a hedge of resolute pikes, of no number of other armes can well be susteined. Two thousand Cohortes 4 c [...] ­tratorum à Caesa­ris equitibus in planitie deprehē ­sae, concisae sunt. Caes. bel. Ciu. 1. targetters, ouertaken by Caesars horsemen vpon a plaine, were all cut in pieces; neither could Afranius their Generall succor them. Curio ex locis superioribus co­pias deducens, à Iubae equitatu cir­cumfusus occidi­tur. Caes. de bel. Ciu. 2. Curio Caesars lieutenant in Afrike, leauing the aduantages of the hilles, and descending downe into the plaines, being com­passed about with Iubaes caualery, was slaine together with his ar­my. Caesar hauing great aduantage against Afranius and Petreius in his horsemen, did force them for their safegard to forsake the plaines. For how can can an army Eques leuis (que) armatura nunc ab tergo, nunc ab la­teribus occurren­do fatigabat mo­rabatur (que). Liu. 28. march in the plaines, so long as the ene­my with his horsemen, and light armed, chargeth the same now on the sides, and then on the backe? Caesar marching in Afrike where he was inferior to the enemy in horse, was much by their char­ges encombred and hindred in his march. The Romanes Equitatu me­lior erat Poenus & ob id campi patentes quales sunt inter Padum Alpes (que) bello gerendo Romanis apti non erant. Liu. 21. percei­uing Annibals strength in horse, yeelded to him the plaines, and kept themselues vpon the higher grounds.

If therefore we desire to keepe the plaines, we must prouide a com­petent force of horsemen to match the enemies: if we be weake in horse, let vs keepe our places of aduantages. but if necessity force vs to march through plaine and open countries, then must wee make head against the horsemen with our pikes, and mosquets, disposing our army so, that not onely the footmen, but the horsemen also may haue succour of. the battaillions of pikes, and shotte. Caesar by this meanes repulsed the enemies horse in the plaines of Afrike, and charging them with some few horse seconded with halfe pikes, put them to the gallop. If our horsemen be not too much inferiour to the enemy: then if wee mingle some shotte and halfe pikes lightly ar­med with doublets plated, or other light armour among them, and second them with some battaillions of pikes, wee need not greatly feare to encounter the enemies horsemen. By thisLiu. 26. mix­ture and aray the Romanes ouerthrew the Capuan horsemen in the siege of Capua, which before that they durst not vpon euen hand encounter. Afranius had no other meanes to breake the charge of Caesars Caesaris equita­tu Afranianos premente, expe­ditae cohortes extremum agmen claudebant. Caes. bel. Ciu. 1. horsemen pursuing him in Spaine, but by opposing against them in the rierward certeine companies of halfe pikes [Page 120]lightly armed, and ready, not being laden with baggage. By this onely deuice Caesar with 2000 horse all weried and faint, put 7000 ofCaes. de bel. Ciuil. lib. 3. Pompeyes horsemen to flight. for no horsemen will endure the point of the halberd or halfe pike. The PrinceHistoire de trou­bl. de France. of Condey in the encounter at S. Denis, in these late troubles of France, assigning to euery company of horse a company of shot, which should dis­charge when the enemy came to charge the Princes horse; by this deuice preuailed against the enemy, which otherwise he was not a­ble to encounter.

Wooddy countries, and thicke bushes are not to be passed either with our horse, or pikes before we haue cleared them with our shot, and targetters, and short weapons. for as in those groundes, horse for that they cannot there fetch their carreire, and pikes by reason of their length are vnseruiceable: so they are exposed to the shot of the e­nemy, which in such places commonly lie hidden. The Tacit. Annal. Romanes ta­king the Germanes with their long pikes in a certein wooddy coū ­trey, taught them that such groundes were not for them. Caesar pursuing his enemies into Caes. bel. gal. 2. the wooddes, would not follow them, before the wayes were made, and the woods cut downe.

Hilles and straits are yet more difficult to passe then woods: for in woods short weapons and shot may do seruice. in hilles and straits possessed by the enemy, neither horsemen, nor pikes, nor any sort of weapons can do seruice, but with great disaduantage. In surmoun­ting whereof, these cautions are to be vsed: first that we do not enter a strait, before we haue assured our selues of an issue either before, or behinde, or at least on the sides. The Liu. 9. Romanes not vsing this cauti­on, entring the strait at Caudium, were so compassed in by the ene­my on euery side, that they could neither goe forward, nor backe­ward, but must there compound for their liues. Cornelius the Liu. 7. con­sul had likewise bene entrapped and compassed about in a valley by the Samnites, if that Decius a valiant man with certeine troupes had not taken the hill aboue their heades, and driuen them from thence, by his owne danger, opening a passage to the rest of the army. If we be not assured to force the enemy before vs, yet let vs assure our selues of the highest groundes, both behinde and vpon the sides of the army, and keepe them vntill the passage before be ope­ned. Which course Annibal taught vs by his example, passing the Alpes, and the Pyrenean mountaines. Being Liu. 22. brought into a strait [Page 121]by the mistaking of his guide, he forced the passage in the night, and deliuered his armie safe out. Cyrus perceiuing the danger of his armie in passing the straites and hils of Cilicia taken and kept by the enemie, remooued him thence by sending certaine troupes farre about another way to charge him on the backe.

In passing of mountaines garded by the enemie, we are further to take heed that our companies doe not march vp to the hill direct­ly, before that our shot and light armed, haue either taken the higher ground (if any be) or els some euen ground either vpon the sides, or the backes of the enemie. Annibal Liu. 21. perceiuing that the inhabitants of the Alpes had seased the passages: in the night time marching vp with the lustiest yong men hee had, tooke the ground aboue their heads, and so draue them from the places, which otherwise by rolling downe of stones might haue hurt his men, and stopped their passage. When Philip the king of Macedonia had lodged his armie by the banke of the riuer Aous, and at the foote of certaine mightie mountains; the Romane Generall by the direction of a shepeheard, vnderstanding the site of theDeleri exerci­tus Philippi po­tuit, sed equitem angustiae▪ [...]oco­rúm (que) asperitas, peditem a [...]mo­rum grauitas im­pedijt. Liu. 32. ground, sent foure thou­sand targetters about the hils, and comming vpon his backe draue him from his ground, and had vtterly defeated his armie, had not the roughnesse, and straightnesse of the ground hindered the carri­ere of his horsmen, and the weight of their armes, the speed of the footemen. The Persians did driue Leonidas from the straites of Thermopylae by comming vpon his backe, and taking the vpper ground. which likewise was done by the Romane Generall Acilius, when Antiochus kept the same straites, to stop the proceeding of the Romane armie. In all their expeditions through the mountaines ofLiu. 32. & 46. Thessalie, and Athamanie, the Romanes passed without any losse into Macedonie, for that they alwayes tooke the tops of the hils with their light armed, before they suffered their armie to descend in­to the valleis. Xenophon returning into his countrey through the hils of the Carduchians, to passe them safely tooke this course. [...]. Xenoph. exped. Cyr. 4. His companie he deuided equallie into two partes, whereof if the first were stopped, the second auancing it selfe forward another way wanne the hill, and draue the enemies from their ground: if the enemie made head against the second, then did the first compasse the hill while that part held the enemies in breath. The araie of the armie in passing of hils and straites, is diuers from the common [Page 122]order of marching: for here not the horsemen, but shot and light ar­med targetters, and short weapons march first, and serue to discouer the enemie: they also gard both the sides and backe of the armie: next them march the horsemen and pikes, with the baggage and great ordonance in the midst.

Diuers are the dangers and difficulties, which an armie is sub­iect vnto passing of great riuers where there is no bridge, nor easie foord, no lesse to be considered, then other impediments opposed a­gainst an armie marching: for here the enemie commonly maketh head against vs: here he lieth in waite either to charge vs in front, or on the backe, our forces being diuided, and one part not able to succour the other. If we bee driuen to fight in the riuer, or as so [...]ne as we come on the other side, our armes and clothes being wet, doe hinder vs and tyre vs. If our armie passe by boates, it is to bee fea­red least the enemie comming downe the riuer with greater vessels and boates then wee haue, doe diuide our companie likewise, and take away our meanes to passe: bridges are broken with great waters, yea with great barges, and pieces of timber sent downe the riuer, and falling ouerthwart them.Belgas nostri in flumine ag­gressi magnam corum partem conciderunt. Caes. bel. Gal. 2. Caesar charging the Bel­gians as they passed a riuer, cut a number of them in pieces. The Spaniards that forced to passe a riuer in the pursuite ofLiu. 21. An­nibal, were likewise slayne in the midst of it by his horsemen re­turning backe vpon them, and finding them in disorder. When theInopinantes & impeditos ag­gressus magnam eorum partem concidit. Caes. bel. Gal. 1. Heluetians were all passed the riuer of Soane saue a fourth part, Caesar setting vpon them that remained, and looked for no such thing, discomfited and killed the most of them. Caes. bel. Gal. 7. Labienus suffe­ring them of Treuers to passe the riuer betwixt him and them, be­fore they were halfe passed, set vpon them, and ouerthrew them, before the rest could passe. Those Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 9. Protestants likewise, which for want of meanes could not passe so soone as their fellowes, were defeated at the passage of Dordonne, anno 1569. Hard it is and dangerous to passe a riuer, where there is an armie on the other side readie to debate, and denie the passage. TheHeluetij naui­bus iunctis, rati­bús (que) compluri­bus factis, alij va­dis Rodani per­rūpere conati, o­peris munitione, & militum con­cursu & [...]elis re­pulsi. Caes. bel. Gal. 1. Heluetians at foordes, and by boates, often attempted to passe the riuer of Rone, but what with the height of the bankes, and trenches made, and force of men, they were repulsed. Therefore in passing of great riuers, the Generals had need to proceed discreetly: and to looke both forward and backward, that whether he passe by foords or by bridges [Page 123]made for the purpose, or by boates, or peeces of timber bound toge­ther, or skinnes blowne full of winde, or howsoeuer, he loose none of his companie, nor be troubled, as men are, that are taken vnproui­ded. King Edward the third passed the riuer of Some at a foord, not­withstanding the resistance made by the French: but if withall he had passed ouer some thousand, or two thousand archers, which by ap­pointment might haue come vpon the backe of the enemie, the pas­sage of the riuer had bene more easie, and the defence of the enemie, and escape more difficult: for by that meanes Annibal defeated the Gaules in the passage of Rone. For making she we to passe by force, those companies that he had sent about an other way, came vpon their backes, and cut many of them in peeces. The Admirall of France anno 1569, when he could not force the garde at Port de Pile, by reason of the Gabions, and Barriquadals, vnder which the enemies shot lay couered: sought, and found a passage a litle aboue the place: which the enemie had no sooner espied, but he left his stand without any great intreatie. The Prince of Orenge anno 1568, breaking the force of the streame of the riuer of Mosa, by placing horses ouerthwart, founde meanes to passe his armie ouer, before the enemie knewe where he would passe. There is no riuer, but lightly higher or lower it may be foorded.Xenoph. exp. cyr. 3. Xenophon with his companie, not being able otherwise to passe the riuer of Ty­gris, yet marching vp towards the head of it, founde a foorde.Fossis Caesar Sycorim auer­tens vadum fecit. Caes. bel. ciu. l. 1. Cae­sar by deepe trenches deriuing part of the riuer of Sycoris in Spaine, made the rest so shallowe, that the souldiers might wade ouer it. Where the enemie doeth fortifie the bankes on the other side, and deny vs passage; there some part of the armie is to be sent about some other way, to come vpon the enemies backes, and to open the passage for the rest.

Annibal, when the Gaules stopped him the passage of Rone, in the night sent Hanno away with part of his armie, which mar­ching that night fiue and twentie miles vp the riuer, and finding no resistance, vpon boates brought with him, and timber bound together passed his men; which making a signe to Annibal, that they were passed, came vpon the backes of the enemie at such time, as Annibal was ready to passe in front.Caes. bel. Gal. 7. Caesar when by force he could not passe the riuer of Allier in France, the enemie still coasting him on the other side: cunningly leauing two legions [Page 124]behinde a wood, and marching away with the rest of his army, when the enemy followed him, those that remained behinde, ha­uing boates, and things ready, passed suddenly and made a bridge ouer the riuer, so that the rest of Caesars army returning, passed also at ease. Neither could the enemie remedy it, being drawne so farre from the place.Labienus mag­no tumultu ad­uersa Sequana partem copiarum ducens, naues ali­quot nactus in a­lio loco exerci­tum t [...]a luxit. Caes. bel. Gal. 7. Labienus by like practise passed the riuer of Seyne, notwithstanding the enemies gard, and opposition. part of his army he led vp against the riuer of Seyne in the night with great noise: which the enemy hearing, followed, thinking that all his army had bene there. In the meane while certeine chosen companies left be­hinde, passed the riuer in great silence in boates made of purpose, which taking the banke, gaue passage to their fellowes returning. Aemilius Paulus with a skirmish busying the mindes of the Mace­donians, at the same time sent certeine companies about the hils to passe there the riuer of Enipeus, which comming on the enemies backes, caused them speedily to dissodge, and leaue the passage. Caesar at Nauibus ex le­ui materia & vi­minibus corio contextis 22. mil­lia denectis legione traducta col­lem occupat & munit, pontém­que facit. Caes. bel. ciu. 1. another time when he could not passe the riuer of Sycoris at a foord, made certeine boates of twigs and light timber, and couered them with leather. In those boates caried 22 miles off, in one night he passed a regiment, tooke a hill, and fortified it, and there made a bridge for the passing of the rest of the armie. In the warres of Charles the 5, against the Protestants in Germany, theSleidan. Spaniards pursuing the Duke of Saxony, passed with their horsemen at a foord, and diuers of the rest swimming ouer the Elbe with their swords in their mouthes, seased the boates that were tied on the other side, and by that meanes passed ouer their fellowes. The Lusitani sine vtribus ad exerci­tus non eunt. Caes. bel. ciu 1. Lusitanians in time past did seldome goe into the warres without girdles of skinnes, which being blowne full of wind, they easily passed any riuer. The Germanes when no way they could forceCaes. bel. Gal. 4. a passage ouer the riuer of Rhein, feined as if they returned into their owne countrey: but ha­uing marched three daies iourney, they ridde backe so farre in one night, and comming backe vpon a sudden, found the countrey peo­ples boates tied at the riuer side, in which they passed themselues, and sent backe the boates to passe the rest of the company. Where the enemy maketh no resistance, there it is easie to passe by boate, yet the practise of warre requireth, that either for quicke dispatch a bridge be made, or els yt trenches be made vpon the riuer side both for defence of those that passe first, and for those that stay last, and also that boates [Page 125]may passe, and repasse safely vnder the fauour of some pieces placed on the bankes. How a bridge may be made Caes. Bel gal. 4. Caesar hath taught vs by the example of that, which he made ouer Rhein. Take two posts long or short according to the depth of the riuer, and couple them two foote asunder, and so driue them downe with a rammer, leaning somewhat towards two other such posts so ioyned and driuen downe 30 or 40 foote aboue them in the riuer, which fastened together with other timber below, & couered with square beames are the foundation of the bridge. Vpon diuers such couples laying timber and couering the same, with planks, and hurdles, and straw the armie hath meanes to passe. I thinke there is no carpenter, but he knoweth this kinde of worke. and therefore the rest I referre to his occupation, and worke­manship. The bridge being made, great care is to be taken that the same be not broken; as it happened to the bridge made by the Prote­stants ouer Garonne Anno 1569, caried away by timber & wooden milles sent downe against it. Which had not happened, if either de­fences had bene made aboue, or els a broade place left in the bridge for such things to passe. Sometimes bridges are made of boats fastened with cables, and stayed with ancres. Such a bridge was made by the Prince of Parma ouer the riuer of Scald, and also by the Protestants ouer the riuer of Garronne 1569. At the siege of Poytiers the same yere the Protestants made a bridge ouer the water vpon emptie pipes bound fast together with ropes. Mouuans to assure his passage ouer the riuer of Rone, dressed there a litle fort on the banke; where some artillery being placed, beat the fregates that would haue hindered the passage, and defended the fort against such as would haue distur­bed them in passing, from the land. The same course was also prac­tised by Montbrune, and diuers others.

But as the Generall is to haue care to passe toward the enemie, so he is to haue care that he may repasse againe. Therefore did Caesar passing ouer Rhine build two forts, at either ende of the bridge one, to assure himselfe a passage. The Romane Emperour Crassus passing the riuer of Euphrates; if hee had had the like care, more of his armie percase might haue returned, then did. It was likewise a great error in the Counte Aremberge, that passing the riuer, he had no regard to assure himselfe of the bridge, which being taken frō him by the ene­mie, he was slaine with most of his company, and depriued of retrait.

The aray of an army passing of riuers, is much according to the [Page 126]opposition made by the enemie: if none be made, the common order is sufficient. If the enemie she we himselfe, the great ordonance is to be drawne to the banke on the sides of the army, & other shot likewise if they will reach so farre, to the entent the enemie may be forced to giue place. If the riuer be gueable, let the shot marche on the sides, the tar­gets in front seconded with pikes: the horsemen may follow in the midst. And when the other side is assured: then are the impediments, and great ordonance to be passed, the rest of the army following after­ward, the backe being armed, as the front. If the riuer be not to be pas­sed at a forde, then a part of our army being sent about to winne some more easie passage, when that is ready to come on the enemies backs, certaine boates with some small pieces in the noses of them, and fur­nished with shot, and targets are first to set forward with equall front, and after them other boates laden with piquiers, are to folow: the or­donance and impediments must come in the midst, and the rest of the army afterward.

But in passing of plaines, woods, straites, mountaines, or riuers there is no course more effectual, then to vse expedition & celeritie. In all practises of warre the same is most auaileable. For by this meanes the danger is often passed, before the enemie be ready to withstande vs.Caes. bel. gal. 7. Caesar by his expedition had wōderful successe in al his affaires. He passed the hils of Auuergne, before the enemy had any suspition of his cōming. He passed his army in one day ouer the riuer of Soan, which the Heluetians could not do in many. By the same he preuen­ted Caes. bel. ciu. 1. al Pompeyes preparatiues, and draue his enemies out of Italy, before they had any respit giuen them to take breath. [...]. Xenoph. ex­ped. Cyr. 3. Xenophon taking the tops of the hils before the enemie looked for him, passed great dangers with great ease. Montgomery in his iourney into Bearne vsed that speede, that before the enemies were assembled to re­sist him, he had passed all the riuers, straites, and mountaines which were in his way. No marueile therefore, if they do nothing, that make such intollerable delayes in all things. Loyterers are taken in trappe, and made often to flye, because they will not runne. The army of A­franius in Spaine, being nere to the hils, where they might haue esca­ped Caesars hands, and marched safely; delayed time, and suffred Cae­sars army to come betwixt them, and their safetie; which was the ruine of that company. Yet if the heauens should be ruinated, some as it should seeme, would not mend their pace.


Part. 1. Wherein is declared what trauerses, and oppositions the defendants are to make, that thereby they may stoppe or hinder the progresse, and march of the enemy.

THis may be vnderstood in part by that, which hath bene said already. For seeing the difficulties that hinder the proceeding of an army, are either wants and weaknesse in it selfe, or oppositions made by the enemy, that taking the aduantages of hilles, or wooddes, or straits, or riuers, is alwayes ready to hurt, or hinder it: who seeth not that the stronger our oppositions are, the slower will the army be able to proceed?

The principall meanes to breake the course of an army ranging vp and downe the countrey, is want of prouision. This was the course that Fabius vsed against Annibal in Italy. To effect this, strait order is to be taken, that the Edictum pro­ponebatur, vt qui­oꝰ oppida, castel­la (que) immunita es­sent, in loca tuta commigrarent, ex agris quoque vti demigrarent om­nes regionis eius qua Annibal itu­rus esset, tectis pri­ùs incensis, ac fru­gibus corruptis, ne cuius rei copia esset. Liu. 22. people saue themselues in places of strength, and that thither also they conuey their corne, prouision and cattell. whatsoeuer cannot be carried away, the same is to be burned, and spoiled all along where the enemy commeth. Which order Fabius caused to be proclamed, and obserued in the warres in Italy with Annibal. Liu. Philip king of Macedonia not being able to defend the townes, & countrey of Thessalia, transported the people into other places, the townes & villages he burnt, the corne he laid vp safe, the cattell he caused to be driuen into places of strength. Pabulatione & commeatu Ver­cing etorix equi­tatu abūdans Cae­sarem prohibere conatus est. Caes. bel. Gal. 7. Vercingetorix the captain of the Gaules seeing himselfe no way a­ble to match Caesars army in open field, yet by spoiling the country, & burning whatsoeuer might be cōmodious for the enemy, draue him to great extremities. and percase had done more, if that the neces­sity of poore people, & hope to defend townes of no strength had not spared much, that should haue bene spoiled. The Greeks yt returned frō the voyage of Cyrus into Persia, were by nothing hurt more, then by the wilfulnesse of the people through whose countries they passed, which burning their prouision, which they coulde not saue, made them go far about, & suffer great want. The duke of Alua had not bene so easily rid of the army which the prince of Orenge brought into ye Low countries, if he had not without compassion spoiled the country, & for­ced him to returne for feare of hunger. The duke of Aumale likewise [Page 128]did spoile the country where the Almaines that came to ayd the Pro­testauts anno 1569 passed. If pitie of the poore, and fauor of friends will permit vs to execute this without respect, there is nothing more au [...]lable against a strong enemy, for whatsoeuer prouision the eue­my bringeth with him; yet if he finde no supply in the countrey, he cannot long cōtinue there.Adeo (que) inopia est coactus Anni­bal▪ vt nisi tum fu­g [...] speciem abe­ [...]ndo tim [...]isset, Galliam repetitu­ [...]us suerit. Liu. 22. Fabius by following this course brought Annibal with his victorious army into those straits; that had it not bene for shame and danger, that would haue followed him by fly­ing, he would haue returned backe into France.

Lest the enemy range too farre abroad, he is to be restreined with strong garrisons placed in cownes defensible, and with a power of horsemen, these will intercept straglers, and garrisons sallying vp­on outriders will keepe them in order. It is not the point of a wise Generall to leaue the enemy vpon his backe.Repressus & remotus Lucte­rius quod intrare intra praesidia pe­riculosum puta­bat. Caes. Bel. Gal. 7. Lucterius the French capteine would willingly haue spoiled the countrey of the Romans in France, but he stayed himselfe, fearing to enter among the garri­son townes; which hee could not doe without apparant danger. Caesar Vellaunodunū ne quem post se hostem relinque­ret oppugnare instituit. Caes. Bel. Gal. 7. besieged Vellaunodunum that lay in his way, for feare the garrison of the enemy left there, might doe him some annoyance. The army of the Protestants, anno 1569, retiring out of Poitou into Gascoigne, & thence into Dauphinè, receiued many algarades of the enemies garrisons in the countrey where they passed. but no­thing doth keepe the enemy straiter, nor more hinder his march, then a power of horsemen galling him continually on the sides, and wat­ching all opportunities. By themCaes. Bel. Gal. 7. Vercingetorix kept Caesars forragers very short. Cassiuellanus with hisPabulatores es­sedarijs aggressus, ne latiùs vagaren­tur, continuit. Caes. Bel. Gal. 5. essedarians that fought in charets, kept the Romanes from going farre on forraging the countrey. andFrumentatum exeunti Annibali diuersis locis op­portunè aderat. Liu. 22. Fabius with his horsemen meeting at euery turne with such as Annibal had sent out to fetch in corne, and other proui­sion, made them returne many times short home. So long as horse­men do hang vpon the sides and taile of an army, they make but a slow march. Caesar sending his horsemen before to charge the ene­mies last troups, did so trouble them, that he ouertooke ye Caes. Bel. Gal. 1. Heluetians and Omnem equi­tatum qui nouis­simū agmen mo­raretur praemisit. Caes. Bel. Gal. 2. Belgians in France, & Afranius his army in Spaine, although they had gotten farre before him. himselfe and his army were so molested by the horsemen ofHirti. de bel. Afric. Scipio in Afrike, that in foure houres he could not march much aboue an hundred paces, being driuen to stay and receiue euery charge, and stirre. as also befell the Romans [Page 129]an other time Ad crebros [...] ­quitum & veli­tum tumultus signa consiste­bant. Liu. 28. encountring the enemie in his marche. The French horsemen that coasted the Almaines, that anno 1569. came in aide of the Protestants of France, kept them from stragling: but if they had bin more, and durst haue charged them; they had staied them lon­ger in their iourney. For if the first marche, while those that are be­hinde fight, then are these left to the butcherie, as it happened to the Caes. de bel. gal. 2. Belgians pursued by Caesar.

Further, such straites and hilles, as the enemie is to passe, if he meane to enter further into the Countrey are to be garded, and the wayes to be trenched, that both our men may haue a couer, and the enemie more difficultie in forcing the passage. Leonidas to stoppe the Persian army, kept the straites of Thermopylae: which was also practised by Antiochus against the Romanes. Philip Liu. 32. purposing to stop the Romane army at the straite of Aous trenched the passage, and on the higher ground placed archers, and slingers, and the rest of his army in conuenient places. But it succeeded not, for that he suffered the enemie, not onely to take the higher ground, but also to come on his backe. Which also was the ruine of Leonidas, and An­tiochus. Those therefore that keepe hilles, and passages, are to take heede of three dangers: the first, that they suffer not the enemie to take the higher ground: the second, that they doe not so lye open, that the enemie may come on their backes: and thirdly, that their company be not vnable to abide the enemies force, or to defende the grounde committed to their charge. For in this case those that seeke to stoppe other, are often taken in trappe themselues: especially if they lye not strong, nor looke well to their garde.

If the enemie enter into a strayte, which hath but two or three is­sues, take those issues, and garde them strongly, and thou hast the enemie enclosed, as it were in a nette. So were the Romanes enclo­sed at Caudium, and compassed in before and behinde, & on the sides. But take heede, that thy garde be strong, and watchfull, least ye same be forced, and all thy labour frustrated, as happened to Fabius ha­uing enclosed Annibal at Cales, by the weakenesse of the corps de garde placed on the hill Calicula.

If the king of Macedonia had placed strong garisons in ye straites of Athamany, and Thessaly, and shewed himselfe in head of the Ro­manes, they could Ne Romani abnuunt se mag­na clade pugna­turos. Liu. 42. neuer haue issued thence without great slaugh­ter, and losse. There is no greater tryall of a captaine, then in the [Page 130]taking of the aduantage of grounds. And therefore let him proceede wisely; and cause his men to worke diligently, that his trenches be sufficient and well furnished with stones and shotte, and all things necessarie. And especially that he be not enclosed, nor beaten from the higher ground.

Woods are a good couer for any enterprise: and therefore wise cap­taines therein doe place such companies of souldiers, as may eyther charge the enemie passing through, or by them. Yet let them take heede that they haue a place of retrait there, that going about to hurt others, they be not cutte in pieces themselues.

The surest defence against the enemies proceeding, is a riuer not to be forded ouer: but the bridges are to be broken, and the botes to be taken from the other side, and ye bankes where they are most lowe and easy to be raysed with earth, and fensed with stakes, and the same to be garded with a competent force both of horsemen, and footemen with their sconces in cōuenient places. By this meanesCaes. bel. gal. 1. Caesar kept the Heluetians at a baye, and stopped them from passing the riuer of Rone, notwithstanding their diuers attemptes both by night, & day: & thePraesidia dispo­nebant quibus locis videbatur pontes (que) rescin­debant fluminū. Liu. 22. Romanes stopped the outcourses of Annibal. Which course if the French king had taken, the Protestants had not so easely reti­red from the battell of S. Dennis, Hist. de troubl. [...]e Fr. l. 3. anno 1567, nor had they passed so many Riuers, nor taken so many Townes so easely. But neither were the Townes garded with souldiers, nor the bridges broken, nor the bankes garded. In garding of Fordes, great care is to be taken, first that the enemie passe not ouer some other way, and so come on our backes, secondly that he force not our garde. This is preuented by good fortification, and that by diligent watch, and sufficient num­ber of men. He that looketh not to these things, is fitter to keepe go­slings, then the passages of Riuers.

By these meanes an army is slopped, or at least hurt, and hindred. But for that men are hardely induced to fire their owne goods, and fewe men can endure ye lamentable flames of his countrey: and with­out a sufficient force of men, all other meanes to stoppe an enemie are nothing; let there first be a sufficient armie leuied, and opposed against the enemie, not that I would haue the same to hazard lightly, or come to the triall: but for that he that hath an army ready, may take all ad­uantages of Hilles, Straites, Woods, and Riuers, and cut off such as wander abroade, and execute that which priuate men will not [Page 131]doe in spoyling where the enemie is to passe, as the practice of Armes requireth.L. Portius Li­cinius per loc [...] alta ducendo ex­ercitum, cum modò insideret angustos saltus, vt transitū clau­deret, modo ab latere aut tergo carperet agmen, ludificatus est Asdrubalem om­nibus belli arti­bus. Liu. 27. L. Licinius though inferiour in force to Asdrubal in Spaine, yet taking the aduantage of hilles and straytes, and nowe charging the enemie on the sides, then on the backes, practised on him all the precepts of warre: for which he deserued great commen­dation. The proceeding of Monsieur the French kings brother and lieutenant, that disbanded his souldiers, and sent them into garrison, when he should haue resisted the Almaines that came to succour the Protestants anno 1569. and kept the fielde, doeth contrariwise de­serue reproofe, as contrary to the practice of warre, and profite of his Prince. For if that Poytiers had not arrested the Protestants, and susteined the siege contrary to expectation, there had ensued great losse to his partie. In the meane while what reason had he to suffer the enemie to spoyle the countrey at his pleasure?

CHAP. VII. Part. 2. Wherein he speaketh of forraging, and stopping the enemies forragers.

HOwe the whole armie may marche assured, and what the same is to feare in marching; I haue al­ready spoken sufficient. The same rules may also serue for direction to those that are sent foorth to spoyle the Countrey, and to fetche in corne and forrage. For whatsoeuer the Generall is eyther to obserue, or to feare in his whole armie: the same is he that leadeth a part thereof out to forrage, to obserue, and to feare. He must see, that his companie keepe good arraye, that they straggle not from the grosse of his troupes. He is further to haue good intelligence, and espiall vpon the enemies proceeding. In passing of Plaines, Woods, Hilles, Straytes, and Riuers, he is to vse more diligence, for that his strength is the lesse. Likewise he is to consider, that as he goeth safely forward; so he may also haue a sure retraite, if necessitie force him, to returne backward.

Further he is to make appointment where to meete with the rest of the army, that the same be not diuided, when the enemie is ready to charge.Caes. bel. gal. 4. Caesar charging the Germanes, while their horsemen, and some troupes of footemen were gone abroade vpon spoyle, [Page 132]found them farre more easie to bee dealt withal. Caes. bel. ciu. 3. Domitius sent by Caesar vpon forrage, if he had not mette with the rest of the army vp­on an instant could not so wel haue escaped out of a manifest danger, the whole enemies power being at hand ready to charge him.

That he may doe that wherefore he goeth, he is to carry with him sithes, sicles, hookes, axes, and all necessary instruments, and to bring that he findeth safe away: he is also to haue with him store of horses and carriages. For what auaileth it to finde corne and prouision, vn­lesse the same be carried away to our vses? And little deserue they to haue things necessarie, that will not fetche them. The Socordia & negligētia Cam­panorum in ve­hiculis contra­hendis ad frumē ­rum comportan­dum, rem ab Hā ­none composi­tam turbauit, fa­mem (que) quae secu­ta est fecit. Liu. 25. Capuans be­ing in distresse for want of victuals, and being willed by Annibal, to send carriages to fetche sufficient, did send so fewe, that it was nothing to relieue their neede. Afterward they wished like oppor­tunitie to be offered againe, but in vaine. For within short time after, they were forced by famine to yeelde vp their Citie.

That his men be not disturbed in their worke by the sudden as­saults of the enemie, let him place gardes in places conuenient for befence of those that goe abroade and worke. In this respect the pro­ceeding of Marcellus ex­plorato, cùm fir­mis (que) praesidijs tu­to receptu prae­datum ierat. Liu. 23. Marcellus that wise leader deserueth well to be follo­wed: For in no place did he goe before he had diligently discoue­red the same, and assured his retraite, and those that wrought by standes of men fitly placed. Appius Appius cum subitarijs legioni­bus ad popu [...]an­dum Boiorum a­grum, nec explo­ra [...]ò, nec statio­nibus firmis pro­fectus cum legio­nibus caesus est. Liu. 31. ruinated himselfe and his ar­mie, for that without search of the countrey, and order vsed in such cases, he suffered his men to wander vp and downe more mindfull of spoile, then of their owne safety. The Liu. 42. forragers of the Romanes marching without suspicion, or order, or sufficient defence, were ea­sely ouerthrowen by Perseus king of Macedonia. This hath beene the ruine of many armies, not onely of small companies, and wil be, if better order be not taken. It is a common course of the enemie with hope of spoile, to bring the army into distresse. Therefore let no man be so greedy of spoile, but that he see before into the danger; and albeit there appeare no danger, yet let him keepe most of his troupes in armes, that he be not ouerwhelmed with sudden danger.

The prouision that is to be founde, is diligently to be saued, and laide vp in those Townes that we doe holde; as in part before hath bin declared. By this meanes Annibal mainteyned his army by o­thers labours. And much more we might haue done then we did, if in our iourney into Portugal, we could haue saued that we found in [Page 133] Galicia. The cattell may he driuen along with the armie, and ought to be distributed frugally, as our neede requireth.

But as he is to spoile his enemie, so he is diligently to take heede, that he couche not his friendes, and associates; which wrought An­nibal much woe. But what lawe against necessitie?

Seeing then that those that marche in the enemies countrey, if they proceede wisely, may not onely hurt their enemies, but also main­teine themselues at the countries charge: it behoueth the Generall to be watchfull, to keepe order, and neuer to say, had I wist. For he that is entrapped, hardly breaketh the snares. To auoide danger, no­thing is better then celeritie, and expedition: of which I will nowe speake more particularly.

CHAP. VIII. Wherein is prooued, that nothing in warres is more aduantageous, then expedition; or any thing more hurtfull, then delayes.

I Haue shewed this in part already. But the detesta­tion that I haue of the delayes of our times, and da­liance commonly vsed in martiall affaires by those that want skill, together with the exceeding losses and dangers, that Princes haue incurred, and shall further incurre thereby, it there be no redresse, hath so affected me, that although I haue spoken much, and often thereof, yet I suppose I can neuer say ynough. To number all the commo­dities of expedition, or the hurtes of delayes in matters of warre, it is not possible, though I shoulde speake of them continually: those which come to my minde presently, I thought good to lay downe in this place.

Through expedition, the enemie is taken vnprouided: those pla­ces that are opportune for vs, are seased: where the enemie is most o­pen, there haue we commoditie to charge him: the malice of the ene­mie is preuented, our speede giueth vs all leysure to prouide: our confederates and friendes, that stand in feare of inuasion are assured: matters are spedde with little charge, and good successe. Caesar Caes. bel. gal. 2. hearing of the conspiracie of the Belgians, by suddein cōming vpon them, disordered all their counsels, and remedied the mis­chiefe, before it was ripe. Another great conspiracie of all Caes. bel. gal. 7. France he dissolued, by his speede in taking the heads single, before their forces were ioyned. Neither the deapth of Winter, nor height of the [Page 134]mountaines, nor colde of ye weather did stop him. Vnlesse he had vsed incredible celerity, he coulde not so easely haue driuen Pompey & his faction out of Italy, hauing the power of the Romane Empire in his hands. But he tooke him all vnprouided, & came vpon him before he looked for him: and would not suffer him in any place to gather head. Annibal Magnis itineri­bus ita vt famam praeueniret ad Herdoneam con­tendit. Liu. 26. with great iourneys, and speedy marching cōming vpon Flaccus, vpon the sudden ouerthrewe him at Herdonea. Claudius Nero inLiu. 27. 6. daies marched frō Canusium to Sena with 6000. foote­men, which distance our armies marche not in 16. By which expedi­tion he holpe his companion Liuius to ouerthrowe Asdrubal, & tooke from Annibal all hope of succour.Celeritate sua hostem imparatū aggressus est. Liu. 28. Syllanus by no other meanes vanquished his enemies in Spaine, then by inuading them vnpro­uided, which opportunitie his quicke speede did yeelde him. If the Romanes had succoured Saguntum in time, they had kept Annibal occupied in Spaine & auoided the waste of Italy. The smart whereof made them more quicke in the warres against Philip of Macedonia, against Antiochus & Perseus. For they no sooner heard of their pre­paratiues, but they caused an army to be transported into their coun­tries, to meete with them in the beginning. Warres, as Guicciar. 1. Alphonsus king of Naples was wont to say, haue good successe where we pre­uent the enemie. In a small Puncto saepè temporis maxi­marum rerum momenta vertun­tur. Liu. 3. time there happeneth great alte­ration of things, and therefore it is not safe to loose any moment of time. Oftentimes also In co victoria vertitur, si & loca opportuna & so­cij praeoccupa­rentur. Liu. 35. victories are made more easy, by seasing of opportune places, & ioyning of confederates vnto vs to helpe our cause. The Romanes for their expedition in martiall affaires, deserue eternal honor aboue al others. A certaine Ptolomeus in Aegypt was surnamed [...] or lightning, for his quicke dispatch. Another was surnamed [...] or eagle, for his swiftnes. But they were but words of vaine flattery. This praise it was deserued in the Romanes. Scripio in one yere subduedal Afrike to ye walles of Carthage: Paulus Aemi­lius in a fewe moneths subuerted the Empire of the Macedonians. Quintius hosti­bus caesis 9. oppi­dis captis vicesi­mo die quam cre­atus erat dictatu­ra se abdicauit. Liu 6. Quintius leuied an army, ouercame his enemies in opē field, took 9. walled towns, & all this in one 20. dayes. In the second warres of Carthage the Senators of Rome were continually in ye Senate to heare the desires & reports of their Generals, & to graunt dispatches. When Scipio heard ye cowardly determination of Metellus, and his cōpanions to forsake their countrey after their ouerthrow at Cannae, he drew hisAgendum, non consultandum es­se dixit. Liu. 22. sword, & entring among them, forced them to sweare, [Page 135]that they would not forsake their countrey. Which quick resolution saued his countrey. And true it is, yt Consilium tu­tum celeritas, te­merarium saepè mora facit. Liu. 27. Claudius Nero said, that expe­dition doth make our counsels prooue safe & sure, when as delaies make thē proue rash and dangerous. The Maturauit Ro­manus ne praelio vno cum Latino, Volsco (que) contē. deret. Liu. 2. Romanes hauing diuers enemies, making haste fought with them one after another singly, and so ouercame them: and I would to God the longer we differre to fight with the Spaniard, we doe not finde him the stronger. A Malum nascens facilê opprimitur, inueteratum sit plerun (que) robusti­us. Cic. Philip. 5. mis­chiefe in the beginning is easily remedied; in time it getteth strēgth. That which comonly is obiected, that speedy Celer poenitē ­tia sequitur prae­cipitata consilia. Liu. 31. repentance foloweth rash counsell, maketh nothing against our purpose. For great diffe­rence there is betwixt speede, and temeritie. Temeritie is in counsell rashly followed, speede is in quicke execution after mature counsell. My meaning therfore is not, that any should proceede without ma­ture counsael: but that after resolution there should follow Primùm cōsul­to, posteà maturè facto opus est. Salust. speedy executiō. Cōtrariwise both cōsultation without resolutiō, and Tardae & lentoe deliberationes perniciosae. Tacit. re­solutiō without speedy execution are pernitious in martiall causes. Counsels Cunctando se­nescunt consilia, Liu. 35. drawē in length by delay, waxe nought in the end. And being vented are no better then (as I said before) wine yt hath taken vent.Belli necessita­tes non expectat humana consilia. Liu. 4. Sometimes the necessities of warre so vrge vs, that they will not suffer vs to attend mens counsels. When the enemie is cōming vpon vs, & the Dilationē pati bellum vicinum non potest. Li. 1. warres are at our doores, nothing is more pernicious thē delay. The Romanes delaying to meete with Annibal in Spaine, were afterwards forced to fight for their owne home, & countrey. The delay of Mora eius diei satis creditur fuis­se saluti vrbi & imperio. Liu. 22. Annibal that after his victory at Cannae brought not pre­sently his army before Rome, was the ruine of his cause, & first be­ginning of his decay. Likewise the delaies & slow proceeding of the Carthaginian Senate in sending money & supplies to Post victoriam Cannensē cuncta segniter, & otiosè gerebat senatus Carthaginen­sis. Liu. 23. Annibal af­ter his victory at Cannae, gaue heart & leisure to the Romanes to re­paire their strength. Flaccus primos hostis conatus per dissimulatio­nem aluit. Tac. 20 Delaies & dissembling after yt once we vnder­stand ye enemies practices, doth helpe thē, & minister fauour to their proceedings, as Tacitus declareth by ye example of Flaccus. Bellum aluere quum si institis­sent, egregium ti­tulum per se li­beratae Graeciae habere potuere. Liu. 32. Attalus and the Rhodians hauing some vantage against Philip of Macedo­nia folowed it not: which delay gaue him leysure to repaire his forces, & made them to be accōpted the nourishers of those warres, which if they had vrged, they might haue had the title of deliuerers of Greece themselues. Asdrubali quod celeritate intineris profectum erat, id mora ad Placentiam, dum frustra obsidet magis quàm op­pugnat corrupit. Liu. 27. Asdrubal by staying about Placentia, lost whatsoeuer commoditie hee had before wonne by his speedy [Page 136]marche. I will not say what harme our stay both here in England, and at Coronna, did vnto vs in the voyage of Portugal.

The Lauinians proceeding flowly in sending succours to their as­sociates, were scarce out of their citie gates, when they heard newes that the Romanes had ouerthrowen them. For which small iourney one of ye company told them, that the Pro paulula via magnā mer­cedem. Liu. 8. Romanes would make them pay deare. Delayes of times vsed by Cecinna, Tacitus Per varias mo­ras prima prodi­dit hostibu [...] tem­pora belli. Tac. 18. calleth be­craying of opportunitie. Inutil i cuncta­tione agendi tē ­pora consultan­do consumpsit. Tacit. 19. Fabius Valens going against Vespasians army, with hurtfull delayes spent times of seruice in vnprofitable consultations. The Athenians not stopping the proceedings of Phi­lip of Macedonia at the first, suffered him to grow so strong, that all Greece could not in the end withstand his force. I pray God that de­layes of Christian Princes to resist Philip of Spaine, doe not worke like effect in our times. Delaies are not good in any time of seruice. The times of Non expectant belli tempora moras & dilatio­nes imperatorū. Liu. 31. warre doe not attend vpon the captaines, or counsels pleasures. Occasion Si in occasionis momento cuius praeteruolat op­portunitas cun­ctatus fueris, ne­quicquam mox amissam querà­ris. Liu. 25. presenteth it selfe vnto them vpon a sudden, but if thou embracest it not, it passeth without returning, though oft thou wish for it againe. All which notwithstanding, in our times de­liberations in matters of warre are flowe, the arrestes vncertaine, the executions vaine. They are like the globe of Saturne that finisheth his course but once in 30. yeeres. That which others in time past called loosing of time, some call winning of time: and yt which proceedeth ei­ther frō feare, or couetousnes, that they begin nothing: that will they haue to proceede frō wisdome, and maturity. Fabius complained that the yeere passed, while the Nobis in appa­ratu ipso, ac tan­tùm inchoanti­bus res annus circumagitur. Liu. 24. Romanes were in their preparatiues a­gainst Annibal, what would he say now if he liued to see some men neither prepare, nor beginne any thing? To excuse themselues they beare men in hand, that they stay to see how matters will fall out, and when the king of Spaine will die. Vnto whom I say for answere as one of ye Atheniās said sometime, that they that looke for the Qui euentus expectamus, prae­da victoris eri­mus. Liu. 32. euēts of warre, are cōmonly a spoile to the conqueror. This course is that which as Pontius the Samnite said, neither winneth friendship, nor doth hurt to the enemie. Those yt are slowe to helpe others, must looke for slowe friendship at others hands in their neede. But say they still, stay. It is not good to be too rash.Vnus homo no­bis cunctando restituit rem. Enni­us. Fabius by his staied proceeding, restored the Romane Empire to the auncient estate, that was sha­ken by others hastie, & heady rashnesse. Then which example there is nothing can worse fit them. Fabius in his time was a wise, and reso­lute [Page 137]cōmander, ripe in counsell, speedy in execution. Annibal could turne nowhere, but he was by him, al his deuises he speedily preuēted. Onely for this he was accompted flow, that hee woulde not rashly venture the Romane Empire vpon one battell. Yet when his col­legue Minutius was in danger, hee was ready to succour him. He differred not to prouide an army, nor to furnish it, he would not suf­fer the enemy to do what he list. What these men are, and what they do; I list not to report: neither is it necessary being so wel knowen. I pray God, that as in other things: so in this also, they be not vnlike Fabius. For he restored that which was shaken; these are rather like to shake that which is sound by their cold delayes.

CHAP. IX. Of orders to be obserued for the good gouernement, and assurance of the campe or lodgings of the army.

AS in diuers other pointes, so in the lodging of our army wee are farre declined from the true practice of armes. The name of Campe remay­neth, but the thing is quite decayed, and gone. Seldome doth the army lie in the field, vnlesse it be in the sieges of townes. Wherein notwith­standing we bestow so many as we can in houses, and villages. In marching for the most part, the companies are distributed in diuers villages, and that three or foure miles asunder; if not more. The lodgings are seldome fenced, vnlesse it be with a barriquade, or bar­rier, or small trench ouerthwart the wayes. The watch is not so strong, nor so diligent as it shoulde bee: the confusion and noise is great: the prouision of things necessary very small, and seldome other then the souldiers can finde. The which disorders make the army to lie open to camisadoes, and many enterprises, if the enemy be strong and iudicious. For auoiding whereof the practise of warre requireth, that the army do rest in no place but vnited, nor without sufficient defence, and garde. Before that the practice of armes was brought to perfection, the army lodged, as nowe it doeth, without trenches or defenses. Pyrrhus seeing the default therein, beganne first to fortifie his campe by entrenchment. Which the Romanes receiuing from him did in short time excell their master. Onely bar­barous [Page 138]people commonly lay as before, open and without defence: which gaue the Romanes such aduantage against them. And I doubt not, but if the right order of encamping were recalled by anie man of iudgement, that he should haue like aduantage against these of our times. Many are the commondities that an army receiueth by their lodging well fortified. They fight not, but when they list, and see their aduantage: they sleepe soundly without feare, and rest safely without danger, such Casta victori receptaculum, victo persugium. multi exercitus victi eruptione pugnantes hostē pepulerunt, Liu. 44. defenses are a receite to the conquerour, a refuge to the vanquished, and a porte and harbour to returne vn­to in a storme. Many armies (saith Paulus Aemilius, he that vanqui­shed Perseus) being foyled in open field, haue retired into their campe, and saued themselues, and afterward fallying out vpon their enemies, haue preuailed, and vanquished them. Therefore would hee no: fight with the enemy before he had entrenched his campe. Caesar albeit the was charged vpon the way by the Helueti­ans returning backe vpon him; yet had no lesse care to fortifie his campe, then to sustaine the enemies charge. And therefore hauing set his army in order, Sarcinas in v­num locum con­ferri, & cum ab ijs qui in superi­ore acie constite­rant, muniri ius­sit. Caes. bel. gal. 1. he commanded the baggage to be brought into one place, and the same to be entrenched by those that stoode last, and on the highest ground while the vantgarde, and the rest fought with the enemy. And such was Caesars care therein, that where the enemy was neere, he would not suffer his chiefe Ab opere sin­gulis (que) legioni­bus, singulos le­gatos Caesar dis­cedere, nisi muni­ [...]is castris vetue­rat. bel. gal. 2. com­manders, and counsell to depart from legions or regiments before the worke, & fortification of the camp was finished. Neither could the countenance of Afranius his army in Spaine, making shew as if the same would sight, deterre him, but that he Cas. bel. ciu. 1. fortified his lodging, keeping the rest in armes to receiue the enemies charge. The bar­barous Gaules by their many losses perceiuing the aduantages that the Romans had vpon them in this point, at length by the counsel of Vercingetorix their leader, began to Caes. bel. gal. 7. fortifie their camp, as they saw the Romandes do. He that doth not so lie entrenched, goeth often­times out of his may to seeke ease for his souldiers, lodgeth with his army disioyned, looseth time and labour: and lastly may not, if hee be wise, lodge neere an enemy as strong as himselfe, that hath the vantage of ground and trenches. He that chargeth an army that ly­eth wel entrenched, receiueth seldome honour of his rashnesse. The Frenchmen because they vnderstoode not so much before, were taught it of Prospero Colonna at the Bicocke in Lombardy. For ad­uenturing [Page 139]rashly to fight withGuicelardin.Prospero and his company, that lay strongly fortified within certaine bankes made for the keeping of the riuer within the channell, they were tumbled into the ditch as fast as they came vp the bankes, and many of them slaine. That such fortification may be made orderly, and strongly, diuers rules are to be obserued, and some prouision like wise is to be made more then ordinarie. First a conuenient place in the way where the ar­my marcheth is to be marked and staked out by the Quarter-master generall, which woulde bee a man of iudgement: with him also may bee sent other men of iudgement. All these with a garde ought to goeCenturiones, exploratores (que) praetermittit Cae­sar, qui locum ca­stris idoneum de­ligant. Caes, bel. gal. 2.before, that at the comming of the army to the place euery man may knowe the gates, and the sides, and the pla­ces of the campe. Within that presently they may begin to worke, & euerie man may know where to pitch his tent, or make his caban, & to discharge the impediments and baggage, and where the ordonance is to be placed. This may seeme intricat at the first, but with practice it may be made most easie.

Further to the end, that our men be not disturbed when they are at their worke; good espialles, and discouerers would be sent before, to see that the enemy lie not in ambush neere that place, where wee meane to lodge. Which happening to Caesar in the expeditiō against the Belgians, did more endanger him, then the enemies, open force. For his men Caes. bel. gal. 2. hauing laide downe their burthens, and being scar­ [...]e [...]ed to fetch stakes, earth and stones, [...]odainly the enemy appea­reth out from vnder a hil there by and chargeth him. The same was the ruineLiu. 10. of Fabius his [...]ieutenant. For going to take a hil alreadie possessed by the enemy without espial; he was there slaine in the place with al his comany. For defence of those that worke, one good part of the army woulde be kept in armes; especially where the enemy is neere. And those that worke are to haue euery man his sword and dagger girded to him, and his other armes fast by him. Which not only Caesar, a master in these matters, but al the Romanes generally obserued. There is no time, more p [...]oper for the enemies assault, nor more da [...]gerous for vs, then when wee are newly, come to our lodg­ing. For then most are secure, and put off their armes, and either rest themselues or runne about to seeke things necessarie.

TheCastra ponen­tes Romanos Poeni aggressi sunt, turbassent (que) munientes, ni ab­diti post tumulū opportunè ad id positi à Scipione equites in effusos incurrissent. Liu. 28. Romanes as they were pitching their tentes were char­ged by the Carthaginians in their warres in Spaine: and had beene [Page 140]soyled, had not Scipio fearing such a matter, run through thē with his horsemen, which very opportunely hee had couered vnder a hill in the way as they came to the charge. At that time also Cae­sar was set vpon by the Neruians, and lost diuers braue men. The Venetians were no sooner arriued in theirConte de Pur­lilia ad Ferdi­nand. lodgings at Trent, and disarmed, but the enemy obseruing his time commeth vpon them, and forced them to seeke an other lodging. Yet not all: for ma­ny were lefte behinde to take vp their lodging in that place for euer.

The place most commodious for lodging, is where our companie may not onely haue wood, water, good ayre, and for horses forrage, and if it may be some reliefe of victualles for our men: but also ad­uantage of the ground fit to be wrought, and hardly to be taken from vs by the enemy. Wood may not be wanting for fire, stakes, and [...]abans; and lesse, water for our men and cattell. A riuer also doeth oftentimes ease our men of trauell. Especially if it be deepe: For that the campe is well fensed on that quarter. Good ayre is necessa­rie for the health our souldiers, especially when me lie long in a place. The aduantage of ground, is requisite for the defending of our lodging. Which opportunities, those that haue wanted haue beene driuen to great extremities.Caes. bel. ciu. 1. Afranius his army was driuen to yeeld to Caesar in Spaine for want of water. And by like neces­sitie Caesar forced the reliques of Pompeys army which hee Caes. bel. ciu. 3. besie­ged on a hill, and excluded by trenches from the water, to flie to his mercie. Himselfe inHirt. de bel. A­lexandr. Alexandria had beene driuen to great extre­mity for want of fresh water, had hee not by digging of pits found store.

In hie and drie countries water is hard to be found, vnlesse it be in valle is and deepe botcomes that shewe signes of moisture. Lau­trecke in the fiege of Naples lodging his army in the lowe grounds brought great contagion among his people: and of New hauen and other places want of water, and the filthy keeping of our lodgings, which cannot be kept too cleane, bred the pestilence among our men, and wrought the victory to out enemies. The disaduantage of the ground at Landresie not considered by the French, had sike to haue taught them a lamentable lesson. For being lodged in the lower ground, they were continually amoyed by the artillery of the imperiall [...]s placed vpon a hill, that comnt [...]ed the French campe, [Page 141]and almost forced them to fight with great disaduantage. The Italians and Spaniardes were by the French forced to fight a­gainst their willes at Guicciard. Rauenna, in Lewis the twelft his time, for that being lodged in the lower, and open ground they were beaten with the enemies great ordonance, that continual­ly stroke among their horsemen. Which inconuenience coulde not be remedied so, but that is was the occasion of their ouer­throw.

But howsoeuer the place be chosen aduantageous, yet there is al­wayes some part that lieth open, which is to bee assured with tren­ches and palissadaes. The lesse aduantage that the nature of the ground yeeldeth: the more labour our souldiers are to take in wor­king, and trenching the same. And that with a trench and banke sufficient, if not such as the Romanes vsed, yet such as may couer the defendants, and hinder the ascent of the assailants without lad­ders. Caesar in the Castra in alti­tudinem pedum 12. vallo, fossa (que) 18. pedum muni­uit. Caesar. bel. gal. 2. warres against the Belgians enuironed his campe neere Soissons, with a banke twelue foote high, and a ditch eighteene foote broade. If the danger were great the Ro­manes vsed to make their bankes higher, and trenches deeper. It would be incredible, if I should report, all those bankes, trenches, and workes which Caesar made about Alexia in France, and at Dyr­rhachium in the warres against Pompey, and other places, and howe hee cast trenches of great depth tenne or eleuen miles compasse. Which was also the vse of all the Romanes: Whose workes yet remaining in England in diuers places, because it seemeth incre­dible they should be doone by men, are called diuelles ditches, and supposed by them to be cast.

That this fortification may be made with more ease, and greater speed: euery man is to worke eyther with mattock, or spade. I know our men will at first refuse it, and discharge themselues vpon pi­onniers: but why should they disdaine to doe that which the Ro­manes did, and why shoulde anie refuse to worke to saue his life, and the liues of their company: Let them consider howe such idle fellowes, that woulde not fortifie their lodgings haue beene vsed.

Castra procos▪ habebat nee loco satis tuto posita, ne [...] praesidiis fir­mata. hac negli­gentia fretus cum incautum Anni­bal opressit. Liu. 27. Fuluis the Romane Proconsul neither for place, nor defence, nor garde lay strongly enough with his army, which was no soo­ner brought to Annibal, but marching thither with his army, he [Page 142]tooke him at vnawres, and ouerthre we him, and all his compa­nie. La Loüe and his companie lying secure, and carelesse with­out trench, or barriquade, had their throates cut by the garrison of Montpellier in the night being asleepe in their lodging, Anno one thousand fiue hundred sixtie and nine. Neither did the compa­nie that vnder Napoleon Vrsini Guicciard. came to the succor of Florence be­sieged by the Prince of Orenge in the daies of Charles the fift escape better cheape; to teach others percase to make better barriquades, and trenches, and to keepe better watch. If the Protestantes durst haue charged Charles the fift before his campe was fortified at Englestat, they hadNatal. com. l. 1. no doubt foyled him. Neither is it suffici­ent to trench the wayes, if wee lie open on the sides. Euerie waie must haue some defence. Strossi Hist. de troubl. de Er. li. 7. stiffely defending a certaine val­ley by Rocheabeille Anno one thousand fiue hundred sixtie and nine, fensed onely in front with a weake palissade was inuested on the sides, and forced by the Protestantes. In which disastre himselfe was taken, and most of his troupes distrouped, and slaine. If his defence had beene strong in all places, hee had saued himselfe, and foyled his enemy.

Q. Cicero Caes. bel. gal. 5. one of Caesars lieutenants, by the fortifications of his campe, abode diuers assaults of the whole power of France, and held out vntill such time as Caesar succoured him. And well befell it Prospero Colonna that his lodging was strong at the Bicocke. For otherwise he and his companie had beene drawen out thence not by the eares, but by the legges. There is none so small a fortification, but it may doe vs fauour in such a case. The Spa­niardes making a trench betweene themselues and the French atGuicciard. li. 5. Cirignola, and bordering the same with their shot, made them to this day remember what daunger it is to passe a trench resolutely defended.

In these late braules of France captaine Granry Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 6. lodging in Esse a village vpon the riuer of Vienne, gaue the enemy a rude wel­come comming to see him in his lodging in the night. His safe­tie was in a double barrier, and trench made by him at the endes of the streetes. Yet let euery man take heede howe hee presume vp­on euery small defence, and rather let him cause his men to take more paines.

It is no base labour that is vndertaken for the defence of our [Page 143]liues: and little doth he deserue his life, that will not digge a few turfes to saue it.

Ludouike of Nassau the brother to the Prince of Orenge presu­med too much vpon a little bad ditch betwixt him, and the Duke of Aluaes army. If it had beene but sixe foote deeper hee had repulsed the enemy with great slaughter.This happe­ued anno 1568. For idlenesse and want of skill, he and his company were ouerthrowen and driuen to take Embden for their succour. And yet not warned herewith when hee brought a supplie out of Germanie to aide his brother,Mich. ab Islael [...]. lying in a village without sufficient defence hee was charged by the enemie, and there slaine, and with him Christopher the Prince Palatins sonne, a Prince vnworthy that disastrous death, and with them most of the company,

That the campe may with more ease be trenched and fortified, the worke is equally to be diuided amongst the company. That equitie the Romanes taught vs, andSingula latera castrotū singulis attribuit legioni­bus munienda. Caes. bel. gal. 1. Caesar practiced, diuiding the ground among his regiments to be wrought. And shame it is among vs, seeing as the vse of warres teacheth vs the great profite of labour in banking and trenching, that wee put it ouer to a sort of men called Pionniers, vnknowen among the Romanes, whose workes were alwayes They are com­monly termed Opera militum. done by souldiers. This is the cause of the great charge of Princes, and slow proceeding and slender effects of warres. Ther­fore they that will not worke and take paines; rather then die shame­fully: let them die. But let not the idlenesse of such preiudice the state or the safety of braue men. But let such defend themselues, as well with bankes, as with weapons, and not follow the slouthful pride of athers.

The forme of the campe is much according to the site and lying of the ground. Among the Romanes it was made for the most part foure square. But it skilleth not though it bee three or fiue square. So the bankes woulde bee made tenneLesse depth & bredth wil serue, but this maketh the bankes suffi­cient. or twelue foote hie, the ditch sixeteene or eighteene foote broade. The deeper the ditch, and higher the banke is, the more assured is the defence. At euerie corner especially towardes the enemy there woulde bee made a li­tle bulwarke or platforme somewhat auanced from the cortine of the campe for the placing of the great ordonance, for defence of the ditch and cortaine, and clearing of the grounde wythout the campe. In the sides there woulde bee lefte two great [Page 144]passages, or issues for the army to enter and issue; and two lesser on the outsides for the necessarie vses of the campe.

The compasse is according to the number of the armie, allow­ing tenne foote square for euery horseman, and foure foote square for euery footeman or thereabouts. There are to be left foure broade streetes in the place, for the passing and repassing of souldiers; and for the commoditie of victuallers, and Marchantes a market place.

The Generall ought to pitch his tent in the middest of the camp, about him are his Gentlemen and garde to bee placed, if there bee not place sufficient for them in his tents. The horsemen are to be quartered in the middest of the camp, for that they are most vnreadie if any sodaine assault should happen; but in some conuenient square for the beauty of the campe. The shot and archerie are to haue their tentes next to the ring of the campe round about the same: within them are the halbardiers, targettiers, and other short wea­pons to haue their quarter assigned: and betwixt them and the horse­men the pikes. So that euery man may know both where to lodge directly, and what place to goe vnto, if the enemy doe charge vs. The waste places remayning are to bee assigned to the carriages, and the boyes, and seruants that followe the campe. For flaughter of beasts and necessities of nature there are two places to bee assig­ned, eyther in some out place of the campe, or without the campe. The whole distance and compasse is rather with the iudgement of the eye, then with Geometricall instruments to bee cast out. Yet must the quarter-master take heede, both that his compasse be not too great (for that is hardly defended) and that it be not too litle. For in that case the army shall be straited.

That souldiers may bee commodioussy lodged in the field with­out going out of the way to finde townes or villages, it is necessarie, that euery company haue their [...]. Xenoph. paed. Cyr. 2. tentes assigned to them of pub­like charge, and carried with them in cartes. For to lodge with­out couer in colde, raine, or heate is verie intollerable, and wood to make cabbanes sufficient in fewe places can bee found: and if it could, yet were it a matter long, for one nightes lodging to make a cabbane of boughes. Contrariwise tentes are easilie pitched, and not heauie to bee carried, nor verie chargeable to bee bought.

That the souldiers may finish their work with more speed, it were necessary likewise, that euery company had their spades, mattocks, axes, and other tooles caried along with their tentes, and baggage, that euery man presently vpon view of his lodging staked out, might know where to worke.

For ease of the souldiers a iudicious Quartermaster will chuse some place neere a wood or a riuer, or some hill, that with the natu­rall situation of the place a small fortification may serue.

If the Quartermaster do chuse some Villages to lodge in, yet f [...] greedines of couer for his men, let him take heed how he do diuide separate the army farre a sunder. And further let euery part forti [...] the quarter where they are lodged. The cause of the ouerthrow of the Prince of Conde at Cognac, in which encounter hee lost also his life, was the distance of the lodging of the auantgarde and battell: which was so great, that the one part being charged by the enemy the other could not come to succour it, before it was too late.Histoir. de [...] bl. lib. 4. Dandelot dispersing his companies in Villages, was surprised on the sudden by Martigues and put to flight: himselfe hardly escaped, most of his company were defeated: which, if his troupes had bene together could not haue happened. For his forces were foure times greater then those that ouercame them. La Louè might haue bene succoured when the enemy charged him, but that he Hist. de troubl. lib. 12. lodged so far from helpe, yt before the same could come, he & his men were dispatched. The cause of ye ouerthrow of ye Baron Donaw, & his Almains was for that they lay dispersed, & without defence.Xenoph. ex­ped. Cyr. 3. & 4. Xenophon, although necessity forced him in his return from the battel against Artaxerxes to lodge his company in diuers Villages: yet whensoeuer the enemy made shew to approch, hee drew them all together into one place. If so be that necessitie driue vs likewise to lodge our armie in Villages: let vs know first how vpon neede we may bring them together; and next how euery part may susteine the enemies assault, vntil helpe come to it. This I say is wrought, first by trauersing the waies, then by tren­ching places of easy accesse. The wayes are to be trauersed by deepe ditches & banks for defence of our shot, next by palissadaes, & barres placed ouerthwart: the sides are to be viewed, and either with tren­ches, or walles to be fortified. Those wayes that leade vs into the Village on the backside are to be dammed vp, & where there is grea­test shew yt the enimy wil assault vs, there gretest store of shot are to be [Page 146]placed in the chambers looking that way. The carts & baggage con­ueniently placed, may breake the force of the enemies horse, & make the accesse for footemen also more difficult. The Heluetians Caes. bel. gal. 1. had no other defences of their lodging: neither do the Germans at this day vse any other defence or encamping, vnlesse the place naturally a­forde it. But nothing is more weake nor vaine, where the enemy com­meth resolutely to the charge. Scipio, his father that ouercame Anni­bal, being foyled by the Carthaginians in Spaine through the treche­rie of the Celtiberians that forsooke him, thought to shroude him selfe and his Liu. 25. company vnder the carts, & packs, and such things as he could bring together to make a defence on. But it serued for no­thing, but to linger the enemies victory a litle. For in such defences there is no strength. If therefore we wil neither fortifie our campe, as did the Romans; nor barre the Villages where we lodge strongly, as is the vse of wise Captaines in these dayes: I will neither warrant our troupes, nor by my wil keepe among them lying so open. The Philip. Com. French king & Duke of Burgundy lying in the suburbes of Liege without trenche or barriquade, escaped very narowly in a certaine sally of the townesmen by them besieged. Besides the fortification of the campe, or lodging; it is requisite for the assurance of our com­pany, that we place not only sentinels and scoutes within, but also good gardes at all the gates. For there is no defence nor fortification such, but it may be passed, where there is none to defend it, and garde it. Before our souldiers disarme and euery man goe to his lodging, both gardes and sentinels would be placed, and not as some vse af­terward. those that offend in either of these pointes doe for the most part receiue sharp penance. The Ardeates Ca­millo duce ca­stra Gallor [...]m in­tuta neglecta (que) ab omni parte na­cti inuadunt, nus­quam praelium, vbi (que) caedes. Liu. 5. Ardeatians led by Camillus, & fin­ding the campe of the Gaules, that a litle before had sacked Rome, without either watch, or sufficient defence, slew them downe right, without any resistance. Philip king of Macedonia lying before A­pollonia, without either watch or good garde, was forced to raise hisLiu. 24. fiege, and had diuers of his men slaine by a very few sallying out of the towne in the night. The negligent watch and garde of Syphax gaue opportunitie toLiu. 29. Scipio in the night to enter his campe and fire the same, and to make a great slaughter of his men. The like security in Nabis his campe gaue entrance to Philopoemen captaine of, the Achaeans, who fired the tentes, and slew his men, before they could make head, or wel vnderstood their danger. TheLiu. 41. Romanes that lay [Page 147]in campe in Istria without feare, & therefore neither kept good watch, nor garde, were suddenly surprised by certaine Gaules, and driuen to runne for their liues. The army of the Capuans resting in their lodg­ings quietly, were slaine by the Liu. 23. Romanes that inuaded them in the night, and tooke them without trenche, sentinel, or corps de garde. The like aduantage Curio vsing against theCaes. bel. ciu. 2. Numidians that lay dispersed without defence or watch, fell vpon them in the night, and slew them. Neither is it now lesse dangerous then in time past. Don Pedro el cruel king of Spaine was slaine with his company by his base brother Froissate. Henriques taking him in the night vnprouided, and lying without watch, or defence. The same negligence was the ru­ine of the Protestants at Donzerre An. 1569. and of the Spaniards at Corbueil An. 1590. and hath occasioned and brought to passe many surprises, which otherwise could neuer haue taken effect. TheGuicciar. lib. [...]. Mar­ques of Mantoua, and other gentlemen for want of good sentinels were taken by the Venetian stradiots at Scala, where they went to refresh them selues. It is an easy marter to shewe this also by our owne harmes, but that I would we should rather reforme our disor­ders by calamities of others, then shame to heare our selues reproo­ued, and therefore defend them. TheWhat is re­quired in assu­ring our lodging meanes to assure our selues, and to deterre our enemies from these enterprises, are these: first good banks, trenches, barriquades, palissadaes, and such like defences: se­condly strong gardes wel placed, thirdly good sentinels in conueni­ent distances within the ring of the campe, & good scoutes on horse­backe & foote without, fourthly good orders of the campe, yt no stran­ger nor person vnknowen lurke in any lodging, or other place to dis­couer our secrets: nor that our company lodge disioyned farre asun­der: the prouision that is to be made, is of tentes, and all instruments that serue vs for such fortification. Where the Captaine is carefull to see these things done, and the souldiers willing to labour and take paynes, & to doe them: it is not possible to hurt the army especially [...]ere the same is strong and in good estate. But if the enemy be very [...]ong, and our company weake for number, or otherwise, and no helpe can come vnto vs: then if the enemy doe assault vs in our lodgings so violently, that wee are not able long to defende them, our last remedy is to drawe our men together towarde the issues of our lodging, and so to sally out, and to charge the enemy vpon the backe, & in all places where he maketh resistance. The suddennes of [Page 148]this execution if it be done resolutely, cannot but worke great effects.

Ser. Subitò cruptio­ne omnibus por­tis facta, neque cognoscendi, ne­que sui colligen­di hostibus facul­tatē relinquunt. Caes. bel. gal. 3. Sulpitius being not able to defend his campe any longer a­gainst the multitude of the mountaine people, that assaulted it: sal­lied forth vpon a sudden at all the gates thereof, and surprising his enemies on a sudden made a great carnage of them, & put the rest to flight. The same course did Caesar put in practice at the siege of Alexia. where not being able to defend his trenches and workes a­gainst the multitude of the enemies, that in all partes assaulted him, at length Caes. bel. gal. 7. gathering his men together, fallied foorth vpon them, not giuing them so much as any time to take breath, much lesse to gather their forces together, and slew infinite multitudes of them being euery where dispersed, and seeking rather to enter in, then to defend them selues without. But this is not but in time of necessi­tie to be executed, and when we haue no other meanes of defence. otherwise it is good safe fighting behinde a banke, or other defence.

Wherefore as at all times, so especially in the nightes, and care­lesse times of others, it behoueth the Generall to bee [...]. Ho­mer. carefull for his people. With care, watchfulnesse, and labour great enterprises may be atchieued, if want hurt vs not; and without care and labour, neither great nor litle can be done with commendation, nor can any army either marche safely, or rest safely.

CHAP. X. Wherein is shewed, that as the assaylants being entred into the enemies countrey, are to seeke that the matter may be tryed by battell in open fielde: so the defendants without great aduantage, are to auoyde the Generall tryall: and by what meanes eche of them, may effect their seuerall purposes.

HE that entreth the enemies countrey without pur­pose to fight, and hazard, let him henceforth keepe his head [...] Ho­mer. I [...]ad. warme at home, and interteine Ladies. Such aduentures are for resolute and hardy men, as courage doeth pricke such valiant men forward: so their owne profit requireth, and necessitie for­ceth them, so soone as they can, to come to triall. The sooner, the bet­ter it wil be for them, at the first their men are strong, their muniti­ons, and armes whole and good: of victualles and all things ne­cessary they haue sufficient, if they haue not; the greater is their error. Further their men are couragious, and full of stomacke: and contra­riwise [Page 149]the enemy is neither prouided sufficiently of souldiers, nor fur­niture of warre, especially if he looke not for it: neither is he so reso­lute to fight. And what courage can he haue, seeing his countrey fla­ming round about him? that this ought to be the purpose of such as inuade others, not only the example of Annibal, who by all meanes prouoked the Romanes to come to fight with him, but also of the Ro­manes inuading the Macedonians, of Caesar warring in France, and folowing of Pompey into Epeirus, and of our Kings transporting their forces into France, and generally of all that euer knewe the trade of warre doeth teach vs.

To force the enemy to accept that, which willingly hee would shun, the meanes are these: first to pursue him, with all conuenient speed. If thy horsmen doe once ouertake any part of his army, either he must stay to succor his men, or els must he leaue them to thy mercy: if hee haue so many Eques carpe [...] do nouis [...]imos premendo (que) in­iquis ad transi­tum locis agmen detinuit. Liu. 8. stayes, thou canst not chuse, but ouertake him. To depart farre away from thee, is to yeelde the countrey into thy hands: then which it were better to hazard many mens liues. Caesar byCaes. bel. gal. 1. this meanes drew the Heluetians backe to fight with him, which they would gladly haue passed. and by theCaes. bel. gal. 2. same he so galled the Bel­gians, that they were constreined to fight with disaduantage.Caes. bel. [...]iu. [...]. Afra­nius would gladly haue recouered the hie countreys with his army, but Caesar did so trouble his marche with his horse men, that vnlesse he meant to flye; he could not runne from him without fighting. He that flyeth long before thee without fighting, he abandoneth a great countrey without fighting, to be spoyled of thee.

Secondly, if the enemy hath any courage: by ranging, and spoyling, and firing whatsoeuer thou canst not saue for thine owne vse, thou shalt either drawe him foorth into the fielde, or breake his heart. By that meanes the Cos. vastand [...] maximè ag [...]is ho­stem ad conferō ­da propius castra, dimicandum (que) a­cie exciuir. Liu. 2. Romanes forced the Volscians and o­thers, to come downe from the hilles into euen ground, and to de­fend their countrey from rauage and spoyle. And although another time the force, and prouision of the Romane army made the enemies to shut them selues vp within their walles, as most safe for them: yet when they sawe the spoyles andPopulatione agrorum & incē ­d [...]js villarum coe­git eos eg [...]edi v [...] ­be. Liu 5. flames of their countrey; they coulde not continue their former deliberation, but were forced to come forth and fight. When Villages populando at­que vrendo rec [...] hostium sata (que) in aciem extra [...]. Liu. 8. are fired, and the corne, and the countrey spoyled, he must be either very cowardly, or very hard hearted, that is not drawen foorth to fight. Flaminius the Ro­mane [Page 150]Consull could not endure to see the fires which Annibal kind­led in Hetruria, but would needes succour the countrey, and fight with the enemy, whatsoeuer it cost him. Who can endure to see the enemy to rage, & spoyle without restraint: or who can restreine him without fight: The Frenchmen although alwayes vnwilling to deale with the English nation vpon euen hand, yet haue bene diuers times forced thereto by vs, what with indignitie to see their coun­trey spoyled, and what with feare of further losse, and what with necessitie to defend their country. Albeit Fabius could in his time endure to see the rauage, and spoyle of his countrey: yet all haue not that singular patience.

If neither by celeritie thou canst ouertake the enemy, nor by spoyles of the countrey moue him to defend the same: yet will hee neuer endure, vntill thou hast taken some of his principall cities. Shame and necessitie wil in the end force him to come to their suc­cour. When the Post quam Ro­mulum castra po­nere, & ad vrbem necedere Veiētes accepere, egressi sunt obuiàm, vt potiùs acie de­cernerent, quàm inclusi de tectis moenibus (que) di­micarent. Liu. 1. Veians being beaten before, refused to encounter the Romanes in the fielde any more: yet when they perceiued that the Romanes made toward their citie, they came foorth chusing rather to trye it in playne fielde, then to be pend vp, and fight for their houses, and walles. Metellus vbi se dolis fatigari vi­det, ne (que) ab ho­ste copiam pug­nandi fieri, Za­mam statuit op­pugnate, ratus Iugurtham subsi­dio suis ventu­rum. Salust. bel. Iugurth. Metellus forced Iugurtha to come into the fielde by besieging Zama a citie which he specially fauoured, albeit hee knew him selfe inferior in strength to the Romanes. By like meanes Caesar in Afrike forcedScipio ad ne­cessitatem addu­ctus dimicandi, ne per summum dedecus Thapsi­tanos rebus suis fidissimos, & Vir­gilium amitteret. Hirt. de bel. Afric. Scipio to bring his forces into euen ground, least loosing a citie of importance that fauoured him, and a Captaine of name, hee should dishonor himselfe. Philip de Va­loys to raise the siege of Calais brought with him the power of France. King Edward the third might haue fought with him if hee had would, but hee would not fight with him, but vpon aduantage. The Protestants Anno 1567. by straiting the citie of Paris of victu­als forced the king to send a power against them to fight with them. Vnwise were they, that not vnderstanding this, had sent away a great part of their forces, which might in that battell which was fought at Saint Denys, had greatly ayded them to obteine the victo­rie. If the siege of Poytiers An. 1569. had continued any longer, then it did: the King should haue bene forced to fight with the Prote­stants that besieged it. But there was no neede that a Kings power should beat them, whom want, & so many disorders had beaten before.

But if the Generall of the enemies forces, be enforced to take a [Page 151]towne for his safegarde: much more behoueth it them to come forth into the fielde, to relieve him if he be besieged. The whole power of France came before Caes. bel. gal. 7. Alexia to disengage Vercingetorix their Ge­nerall there besieged by Caesar. Whosoeuer hee is that can be con­tent to loose a citie, and refuseth to come to fight with his enemy, cannot long endure. The reason that the Prince of Orenge so long helde out against the Spaniard, was the tyranny of the enemy, whom the people could not endure, certaine small supplyes yt came out of England, and the Princes good will to helpe such townes as were distressed the best he could: and last of all the libertie of the sea, which the enemy could not take from him.

On the other side the defendants taking a contrary course for the safety of them selues and their countrey, ought as much, as they can, to linger and weary the enemy, and not to fight without manifest aduantage. This course the Romanes tooke, and found to be best, not only against Annibal; but also against other Barbarous nations, that came to inuade them. The same did experience teach the Gaules, and Briteins to be best against Caesar. And the generall practice of warre hath nowe confirmed it for a precept to be folowed in such cases. When [...] Thucid. 2. Sitacles King of Thracia inuaded the Macedoni­ans, the countrey people not being able to resist fled into strong cities, and holdes: and as occasion, & aduantage was offered, from thence issued to fight with him as they could. Many Multa bella impetu valida pe [...] taedia & mo [...]as e­uanuerunt, prae­sertim vbi non est prouisum fru­mentum, nec ma­iores expecta [...]a copiae. Tacit. an­nal. 18. warres that haue bene violent at the first brunt, by delayes and tedious lin­gering haue come to nothing, sayth Tacitus. And therefore neuer is it good to fight with those that want prouision, and looke for no further supply. When the Gaules with great forces came into Ita­ly, some would haue had the Romane Generall to fight with them foorthwith: but the Dictatori neu­tiquam placebat cum nulla coge­ret res, fortunae [...]o committere ad­versus hostem quem tempus de­ [...]eriorem indies, & locus alien [...]s faceret, sine prae­parato comm [...]a­tu, sine si [...]mo mu­nimento moran­tem: ad hoc [...]js animis corpori­bus (que), quorum omnis in impet [...] vis esset parua e­adem languesce­ret mora. his cō ­siliis dictator bel­lum trahebat. Liu. 7. Generall thought it more wisedome to pro­tract time. His reasons were, for that he dealt with an enemy, which euery day waxed weaker, & by reason he was in another coūtrey, had dayly more and more hinderances comming vpon him: further neither had hee prouision, nor towne of retraite, & therefore must needs be wearied with delayes, and decay of himselfe: and great folly, sayd he, were it to fight with men when they are strōg, when they may deale with them, when they are weake & feeble. When Caesar sent Crassus into Aquitany with part of his army to subdue the countrey; the enemy being taught by experience would not come [Page 152]into open field, but Duces consu­etudine populi Romani, loca ca­pere, castra muni­re, commeatibus nostros interclu­dere instit [...]unt, Romanos se rei frumentar [...]ae ino­pia recipientes, impeditos agmi­mine & sub sar­cinis insirmiore animo adoriri co­gitant Caes. bel. gal. 3. began to take places of aduantage, to fortifie his campe, to keepe Crassus from victuals; when the army for want should retire, then he meant to charge the same being laden with baggage, and out of aray in the marche. That which Liuy sayth of theBoij gens ad morae taedium minimè patiens dilapsi sunt. Boyans, we finde it true in many Northren nations: they are impatient of delayes, and if they be not fought withall, doe scatter of them selues. Those that fight with such enemies, are like to those, that hope to quench fire by throwing on of wood; when as if the fire be not supplyed with wood, it will goe out of it selfe. And there­fore our ancesters, that haue fought with the Scots haue done vali­antly, but wisdome would haue perswaded them, to let them dis­solue of them selues. The Romanes by their haste in fighting with Annibal, receiued three great ouerthrowes, and brought them selues within very litle of their ruine. Pompey when he might haue ruina­ted Caesars army for want of victuals, aduenturing to fight at the re­quest of his army ouerthrew himselfe.

The way to weary the enemy without fight is, first with an army consisting most of horsemen, shot, targets, and halberdiers lightly armed, to coast him a farre off: next to spoyle the countrey where hee passeth, and to bring all the cattell, corne, and prouision that may any way serue his turne into strong townes: thirdly to store the townes of warre with prouision, and assure them with strong garri­sons; fourthly to cut the bridges ouer great riuers, and to sease all narow and straite passages. The army that coasteth the enemy, al­though it may not ioyne battell with him in euen ground, yet hath many necessary vses; and without it all other impediments are easily passed: the same doth bridle ye enemies courses, that he dare not diuide his army to send the same on foraging: It keepeth victuals from him, and him from victuals: it defendeth the straits, and passages of riuers: it succoureth such townes as are besieged: it is ready to charge the enemy vpon all aduantages. The Athenians Thucid. 3. not being able to fight with the army of the Lacedemonians that came against them, tooke this course for their defence, they brought their people and all that they had into the citie; placed gardes at passages, and cut of the straglers with their horsemen. Which courseCaes. bel. gal. 7. Vercinge­torix also vsed against Caesar in France. hee burned the countrey, droue away all the cattell, kept the passages of riuers. TheCustodias ad ripas Ligeris dis­ponere, equita­tum (que) omnibus locis ostentare caeperunt. Caes. bel. gal. 7. He­duans reuolting from Caesar kept the banks of Loyre with gardes, [Page 153]and in all places where the Romanes came, charged them with their horsemen. But of this matter I haue spoken sufficient, where I shewed what trauerses made against the enemie are most effectuall. Now I am to shew how the enemie is to be wearied without fight: the meanes I haue set downe. But this caution thou must vse fur­ther, that thou keepe thy selfe, and thy companie alwayes on the higher ground, and take heede that the enemie doe not entrap thee, nor compasse thee about. Fabius in the warres of the Romanes a­gainst Annibal in Italie, and Licinius in the warres against Asdru­bal in Spaine, haue by their example shewed thee what thou art to doe, and how warilie thou art to garde thy selfe, and to watch thy enemie.

These precepts haue vse in all countreys, with whatsoeuer e­nemie thou dealest: but especiallie where the countrey is full of hils, woodes, straites, and great riuers; and also where by force is neere equall to the enemie. But if thy power be slender, or if thy countrey bee playne and open; then presume not to come neere the enemie: for thou canst not auoyd, but either thou must flie or fight. The Fuga se lon­ginqua ab hosse tutati sunt Galli. Liu. 6. Gaules pursued by Camillus, seeing themselues vnable to fight with him, had no other meanes to auoyd fight, but to flie farre from him. Neither could Asdrubal haue escaped fromLiu. 27. Scipio, but that he fled with his armie from him into the vtmost coast of Spaine. After thatVercingetorix ne contra suam voluntatem di­micare cogere­tur, magnis i [...]i­neribus anteces­sit. Caes. bel. Gal. 7 Caesar had once passed the riuer of Allier, which was betweene him & the enemie, Vercingetorix was cōstrained to go farre before, least he might be constrained to fight agaynst his will. For where the armies come neere each to other in eauen ground, it is hard for the one to auoyd fight where the other seeketh it. Antonie forced Cas­sius to fight at Philippi; albeit he auoided it what he could, and had the vantage both of ground and trenches. The Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 9. Admiral at Mon­contour would willinglie haue passed the day without fight: but being neere the enemie, hee could neither passe the riuer with­out disordering his armie, nor retire without manifest danger of being vtterly broken, and ruinated.

Philip of Macedonia albeit hee was encamped vpon the banke of the riuer Aous very strongly, and had most high mountaines for his defence vpon his backe: yet being charged suddenly from the vpper ground, he was both driuen to fight against his will, and foy­led by Tit. Quintius.

Wherefore considering the losse and calamities, that come of suf­fering the country to be burned and spoyled, the hazard that to wnes besieged by the enemie without hope of succour stand in: the discou­ragement of our people, that see and enemie in the countrey whom they dare not encounter: I hold it a rule most certaine, that no coun­trey nor state can well be defended against a strong enemie any long time, vnlesse the same either haue, or can procure an armie to come into the field able to encounter him, and not vnwilling also, if the same may haue any good aduantage to fight with him. And therefore all valiant men that loue their countrey, are rather to endeuour to o­uercome the enemie by force, then dull him and wearie him by pati­ence and delaies, which bring with them contempt of those that want an edge and force. That wee may fight with aduantage, and proceed with reason; let vs now examine and see what things are to be foreseene and considered before that the General do bring foorth his armie into the field to fight.

CHAP. XI. Conteining speciall matters to be well considered, before the Generall bring foorth his armie to fight with the enemie in open field.

MAnie things in warre are executed by force and strength of men; but seldome doeth force pre­uaile much without counsell and direction. Counsell in all deedes of armes chalengeth a principall place, but especially in ioyning bat­tell with the enemie. To refuse good counsell therefore in this case, is a brutish follie oftentimes seuerely punished. The Constable of France peeuishly refusing the good counsell of Coucy, that dissuaded him at that time to fight with the Turkes, was the cause of the miserable slaughter of Chri­stians at Nicopolis.

The Frenchmen detest in their histories the pride and insolencie of a certaine Duke of Bourbon, who Froissart. being Generall in a certaine enterprise against the Saracens in Afrike, ouerthrew the action by disdaining to heare any man speake, and refusing all counsell, but his owne; A man wise inough to ruinate any enterprise. Wise cap­tains [Page 155]therefore, as they will consider many things themselues: so I trust they will not disdaine to vnderstand the experience and aduise of others. Before a Generall doeth resolue to fight with the ene­mie with all his force, hee is first diligently to vnderstand both the strength of the enemie, and the numbers and strength of his owne men, least presuming too much of his owne power, or contemning the enemie, he doe that which afterward hee may repent.Guicciandin. Francis the first of France not knowing how much hee was abused by his moster rolles, and supposing his strength to bee greater then it was, accepted of the battell of Pauie, where himselfe was taken and his armie discomfited.Caes. bel. ciu. [...]. Curio not knowing the great strength of the enemies horsemen, did rashly leaue the aduantage of the ground, and fight with him, that in the plaines was to strong for him, which was his ruine.

Cassius in the battell of Philippi not vnderstanding the victorie of Brutus his companion, desperately slew himselfe, and was the cause of the discouragement of his side, and the victorie of the enemie. If therefore he shall vnderstand that his enemie is too strong for him: let him keepe his aduantage of ground, and auoyd fight: if his owne power be greater, let him not delay it: for it is no lesse dishonour to let slip an opportunitie, then to aduenture rashly.

Yong souldiers are not rashly to be brought into the field against an armie exercised and beaten with long practise of warre. The Ro­manes found this true by their owne practise in the warres with theirVeterani exer­citus tobore rex Rom. vicit. Liu. 1. neighbours, and with Annibal. Where their armie was well trained, they preuailed, their fresh souldiers could not endure the force of Annibals beaten men. Caesars old souldiers were inuinci­ble.

With the men that Philip of Macedonia had exercised in many warres, Alexander ouerthrew the Persian empire. For it is not Veteres non tam numerosos exercitus habere voluerunt, quàm eruditos. Veget. l. 3. c. 1. number that preuaileth, but experience and skill. ThePhilip. Comin. gal­lants of Charles Duke of Burgundie, bragged that they would doe and venture; but when they sawe their enemie, they forgot their wordes, and ranne away in the encounter with Lewis the ele­uenth at Mont le herie. Therefore did Caesar wisely, that cary­ing ouer with him diuers yong souldiers into Afrike, Noluit conuul­ncrari exercitum tyronmen. Hirt, de bel. Afric. would not put them to the triall, before he had made them better acquainted with warres.

Souldiers likewise when they are faint, wearie, hungry, or thir­stie, fight but faintly. And therefore as there is no trust in young soul­diers, so there is no strength in souldiers that are faint with labour, or want of victuals. Doe not therefore rashly encounter the enemie, when they men are either wearied with long marching or watching, or faint for want of meate or drinke. The Inde cibo cor­pora firmare iussi, vt si longior esset pugna, viribus sufficerent. Liu. 27. Romanes before they en­tred the battell, refreshed their men with victuals and rest, that if the same continued long, yet their strength might continue. Syllanus ante pugnam militem cibum capere iu­bet. Liu. 28. Syl­lanus being readie to charge the enemie, commaunded his souldiers to dine first. The principall cause of the ouerthrow of the Romanes at Trebia was, that Annibal brought foorth his men to fight, fresh, hauing well dined, warmed themselues, and rested: where as the Romane Liu. 21. Generall brought foorth his armie fasting, and cold, by reason they passed a riuer; and wearie, for that they stoode many howers in armes before the battell began. Aemilius in the warres against Perseus in Macedonia, albeit his souldiers desired to fight with theStatuit Aemi­lius lassitudinem & sitim sentien­tes milites inte­gro hostinon ob­ijcere. Liu. 44.214. enemie so soone as they saw him, yet considering, that by their long march they were wearie, thirstie and faint, would not fight with the enemie that was fresh and lustie; but deferred it to the next day. Yea, although aduantage be offered: yet if our Furius lassitu­dini militum ti­mens, occasio­nem rei praeclarè gerendae omisit. Liu. 31. soul­diers be faint and wearie, it is more safe to passe it. [...] Xenoph. Clearchus see­ing his souldiers faint and hungrie, would not charge the enemie, albeit good occasion was offered. The prince of Conde bringing his men that had watched for the most part all the night, into the field be­fore Saint Denis, anno 1567. found what faintnesse watching wor­keth.

Asdrubal being charged at Metaurus, when his owne souldiers were wearie and sleepie by the reason of his nights march, and his e­nemies fresh and lustie, was ouerthrowen with a mightie slaugh­ter. The Sitis & calor hiantes caeden­dos capiendós (que) Gallos praebebat. Liu. 27. Gaules gaping for thirst and heate, and being wearied with trauell and watching, were slaine or taken. Puigalliard in these late troubles of France, causing his troupes to march continu­ally two dayes and two nights, thinking by his speed to surprise the Protestants at S.Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 13. Gemme, was himselfe the cause that his men were cut in pieces by la None, not being able for want of sleepe and rest, to doe any seruice.

But least cause hath he to venture, whose souldiers stand in feare of the enemies forces. Caesar therefore would not begin his iourney [Page 157]against Caes. bel. Gal. [...]. Ariouistus, and the Germanes, before he had resolued his men that stoode in feare of them, to fight. And hauing had euill suc­cesse in one or two encounters at Dyrrhachium, which much dismat­ed his souldiers, he remooued from thence, and would not fight vntill such time, as his souldiers were confirmed. He that doubteth any such thing in his men, is first to confirme them with hope, and report of their former valiant actions, and with declaration of the enemies wantes, and weakenes, and disaduantages: he is to encourage them with promises, and hope of rewarde, to feare them with shame, and plainely to declare vnto them, that there in no hope but in vic­torie, and therefore, that if not for their honour, yet for Virture pares, necessi [...]ate supe­riores. Liu. 21. sauing of themselues, they ought to fight valiantly. NecessitieNusquam nisi in virtute spes est milites, Liu. 34. enfor­ceth men to fight, and the example of their Commanders ready to abide with them in all danger, maketh them ashamed to flie. Much did it encourage Caesars souldiers, when they sawe him in the bat­tell against the Heluetians, put his horse from him, ready to take the common hazard with them: and a very coward he is, that nei­ther with persuasion, nor example will be encouraged.

The souldiers for their persons, strength, and courage being such as they should be, the next consideration of a Generall, that purpo­seth to fight, is, that they haue their armes fitted, and all baggage and impediments, that may hinder them remooued. Alexander be­fore he fought withPlutarch. Darius, forgat not so much as to giue order that the haire of his souldiers heades, and beardes should be cut, lest the enemie might take holde by it. Small matters you will say: but in this, not the smallest matters are to be contemned.

But yet nothing is more to be respected, then the ground, where thou purposest to abide the enemie. There is great aduantages in hedges, ditches, and the higher ground. Caesars Milites e loco superiore pilis missis facile ho­stium phalangem perfregerunt. Caes. bel. Gal. 1. souldiers throw­ing their iauelins from the higher ground, and following the same, did easily breake the rankes of their enemies troupes. Pharnaces ad­uersus collem subiens detrudi­tur, & vincitur. Hirt. de bel. A­lexandr. Pharnaces leading his men against the hill where Caesars armie stoode ranged, was presently thrust downe, and vanquished. Cae­sar wondered at his rashnes. The enemie hauing seased a hill by Rome, the ConsulTemerè aduer­so Ianiculo Ser­uilius ad castra hostium aciem e­rexit, soedéque inde pulsus est. sed interuentu colle­gae ipse exerci­tusque seruatus est. Liu. 2. Seruilius mooued with the indignitie of it, did rashly cause his troupes to march vp the hill against him, which ad­uantage the enemie taking, had ouerthrowne him, and his armie; had not his Collegue come in the instant, and fauoured his re­traite, [Page 158]Marius Plutarch. in vita Marij. ouerthrewe the Germanes and Danes more easily, taking them mounting vp the higher ground. Certeine of the Ad­mirall of France his companies foolishly striuing to winne the hill, neere the plaines of S.Hist de troubl. de Fr. l. 9. Clere, were driuen backe with losse, and had vtterly bene defeated, if the Almanes belowe had not kept their ground, and arrested the formost of the enemies, that pursued them. A smal Exiguum loci ad decliuitatem fastigium, mag­num habet mo­mentum. Caes. bel. Gal. 7. aduantage in the vneauennes of the ground, is much (saith Caesar) in the furthering of the victorie. At Auaricum, albeit he had the victorie in his handes, and had foiled the enemie: yet would he not followe them up the hill for feare of the discommoditie of the ground. At Gergouia he lost many braue souldiers, that contrary to his commandement would needes pursue the enemie vp the hill. him selfe was neuer in greater danger to loose the fielde, then at Munda in Spaine: which happened by the forwardnes of his men, that needes would Hirt. de bel. Hispanic. charge the enemie, standing on the higher ground. That care that a Generall hath in the first charge of the ene­mie, the same he ought also to continue in the pursuite of his victorie, that his men descend not downe into the lower ground, nor be too eger following them vp the hill. The Romanus ce­dentem hostem effuse sequendo in locum ini­quum pertractus acie fusus. Liu. 6. Romanes following the e­nemie without order, and being drawne into a lowe valley, were discomfited and slaine, the enemie turning backe vpon them. The Corinthians not looking before them in their retraite, fell in­to a [...]. hollowe bottome of ground: which the Athenians percei­uing, and that there was no issue out, compassed them round a­bout with their light armed, and slingers, and stoned them all to death. The Romanes entring the straite of Caudium, were en­trapped by the Samnites. Annibal Liu. 21. susteined many losses by the people of the mountaines, that tooke the toppes of the hilles, and rolled downe stones vpon his souldiers, marching along the sides of the hilles. Which difficulties.Xenoph. ex­ped. Cyr. 4. Xenophon also prooued in passing the mountaines of the Carduchians. All difficulties which hinder the armie in marching, as woods, hilles, straites, riuers, and such like, are farre more dangerous, if they be obiected against vs in fighting. And therefore let the Generall take heede, that he be not charged in passing of riuers, or straites, or at any like disad­uantage.

Further, let him diligently view, and search the Countrey, that the enemy haue not bestowed some part of his army in some wood, or be­yond [Page 159]some hil behinde, or on the sides of the place, to charge him with aduantage, when the battell is begun. By which meanes Annibal ouerthre we the Romanes at Trebia, and the Thrasimene lake.

Neither is it sufficient for him onely to prouide, that the enemie haue no aduantage, nor his owne souldiers any disaduantage: but he must consider also, if he may take the enemie either in trap or at any disaduantage: and that either in vneauen ground, or in straites, or pas­sing of riuers, or any place where his army is disordered, either in lodging, or marching, or fighting. If the enemy be beaten out of the fielde by force, it is in part the souldiers praise, if he be entrapped by the Captaines pollicie, that is his hondur.

In the ioyning of the battell, the Generall is likewise to ende­uour to take the winde, and to haue the Sunne (and Moone, if the fight be in the night) vpon his backe. The winde being fauourable driueth our darts, arrowes, and whatsoeuer we throwe against the enemie with greater force forward; and being contrarie doeth dimi­nish their force, and stoppeth the souldiers breath, and filleth their eies full of dust. In the battell betwixt Theodosius, and Maximus the tyrant, nothing holpe the Histor. Ecclese ast. Theodoret. side of Theodosius, more, then the winde that draue backe the darts, arrowes, and stones of Maxi­mus his souldiers. The Poeni auersi­terga tantùm af­flante vento, in occaecatum pul­uere à Vulturno vento hostem pugnabant. Liu. 22. Romane souldiers in the battell at Cannae, hauing the winde against them, had their eies and throates filled with dust, which fauoured the Carthaginians blowing vpon their backs. The Sunne with great heate frying the bodies of the Gaules, made them Sol ingenti ar­dore torrebat mi­nimè patientia aestus corpora Gallorum. Liu. 35. very faint, fighting on a certeine time with the Ro­manes. Vespasians souldiers hauing the Tacit. l. 19. Moone on their backe, when they fought in the night with Vitellius his army, seemed greater then they were, and did see to strike more directly. The same aduantage had the Sicilians against ye Athenians, in that nights encounter, wherein they ouerthrewe them neere Syracusae.

The season of the yeere also, and the weather is to be considered, be­fore we range our army to fight. Northren people endure colde better then heate. And therefore as they are to auoide fighting in the heate of the day, and summer season, so they are to chuse the coole mor­ning or euening, and of the times of the yeere the Spring, or drie Winter, which Southren people can not brooke. The Ro­manes protracting time vntill the heate of the day, did then charge the Liu. 9. Gaules, when with heate and thirst, they were of themselues [Page 160]ready to faint: which occasioned vnto them a great victorie. In rai­nie weather shot cannot doe almost any seruice: that tyme there­fore is fittest for armed men, targetters, and such like, to charge them.

Finally, whatsoeuer maketh for the encouragement of our soul­diers, or discouragement of the enemie, the same ought a wise Gene­rall to deuise, and practise. The strength of the enemy is in wordes to be diminished, the goodnes of our cause, and strength of our army to be amplified. Whatsoeuer Fama bellum conficit, & parua momenta in spem metúmque impellunt ani­mos. Liu. 27. reportes may hurt the enemy, or helpe vs, are to be spread abroad. Reportes oft times preuaile as much as truth, & small matters make men in that case both feare, and hope, as said Claudius Nero. The report of a succour comming did daunt Tacit. 19. Vitellius his army, and confirmed the enemy. Which also happe­ned in a certeine incounter betwixt the Romanes, and Samnites. Wordes also cast out in the time of the battell, as that their Generall is slaine, or that part of the army flieth, and such like, profite much. Therefore if at any time, heere especially the skill, and iudgement of a Capteine is to shewe it selfe in taking aduantages, auoiding disad­uantages, preuenting of mischiefes, laying ambushes for the enemy, and vsing all maner of stratagems, and deuises of warre.

Nowe hauing spent thus much time in considerations, and prepa­ratiues of a battell, let vs come to the ranging of our battels, and to the action it selfe, in encountring, and vanquishing the enemy.


Wherein is discoursed what aray, and course is best in charging the enemie.

THe aray of an army placed, and prepared to fight, is diuers, according to the number and qualities both of the enemies, and our owne forces; likewise ac­cording to our strength in horsemen, or footemen, in shot or armed men; and last of all, according to the difference of groundes, and places. To part a small number into so many partes, as we doe a full armie, were rather to breake it, then orderly to part it; and a matter in shewe ridiculous. If the enemies force be greater on the corners then in the midst, we must haue consideration of that in framing and ranging our army. Horse­men [Page 161]in rough ground, in woods, straits, and hilles are vnprofitable. If the enemy be stronger then wee in horse, wee are to change the place of our horsemen, & to auance our footmen. Where the wayes are strait, we cannot spread our army, as in open field. This and o­ther circumstances being referred to the iudgement of the Generall; let vs now consider what aray is best in open field, our army being full, and hauing all the partes thereto required. This I haue tou­ched already where I shewed before how an army marching is sud­denly to be drawen into order; by what rules the same may be exact­ly performed, remaineth now to be declared.

The whole army considered without horsemen, or shot, consisteth of three partes in the front: I call them theThat word cō ­meth neerest to the sence, though not to the proper signification of the word. right corner, the mid­dle battell, and the left corner: (the Romanes called them Dextrum cornu, mediam aciem, & sinistrum cornu) and of two or three partes from front to the backe. The first I call the front, the second the supply: the third, if there be a third, the last hope. The Romanes diuided their aray, as it was considered in depth, or from front to backe in hastatos, principes, & triarios. The shot I would haue placed both before, and on the sides, and behinde euery of these partes diui­ded into seuerall troupes, and guided by seuerall leaders. Without the shot, the horsemen would be placed on the winges, vnlesse some speciall cause mooue vs to the contrary.

The three partes of the front may either stand ioyned together, or with some distance separated: and either may they be framed, as one body with rankes continued, or els euery of these partes may con­sist of diuers battaillions or squares of armed men; very commodi­ous for the seuerall vse of them, and also for the retrait of shot within the distances. The breadth and depth may be greater, or lesser ac­cording to our number, and the ground where they stand. As the front is diuided: so likewise is the supply, and last hope in like sort. The supply would be neere so many, as the front. but it is suffici­ent, if the last hope be halfe so many. The distances of the supply would be greater, then of the battaillions in front, which charging the enemy, are to ioyne close together, and being wearied may re­tire within the distances of the supply. which two partes ioyned to­gether, do then make one front. if both be foiled, then are they to be receiued within the distances of the last hope, which are largest, and all the partes to vnite their whole forces together. If any doubt of [Page 162]the confusion that may arise in the retiring of the first and second bat­tell backe to the third, then may the supply, and last hope be drawen vp vpon the sides: which will worke the very same effects.

In the midst of euery battaillion or square, somewhat toward the first rankes, would the ensignes be placed with their garders well ar­med, and furnished with short weapons.

Euery battaillion would haue his seuerall leader, which would be the first man of the right hand in the first ranke of the square. for that the inferior leaders in a maine battell should stand out of ranke, is contrary to practise of warres. If in euery battaillion there were some part targetters contrary to the moderne vse, there might be good vse made of them, when the armies come to ioyne, both against shot and pikes.

Ante signa mo­dico interuallo velites eunt. Liu. 38.Before the front of the battell are certeine troupes of shot to take their standing, which may not onely defend the head of our army: but also anoy whosoeuer offereth himselfe to the charge. If they be pres­sed with horsemen or targetters, their retreit is within the distances of the battaillions, if the ground affoord them no other defence. From thence they are to be drawen eftsoone againe, and employed where theyr leaders shall perceiue they may doe most seruice. A ranke of mosquetiers vnder the first ranke of pikes may doe good seruice, if they be drawen into the distances when the enemy commeth to the charge.

The horsemen, if they be not strong enough to encounter the ene­mies horse, would be seconded with certeine troupes of shot and halfe pikes. but diligently are they to take heed, that they goe not directly before the front of their owne footmen, lest retiring thence, they fall vpon their owne pikes. The great ordonance, if there be any hill in the place, either on the right hand or left hand of the army, is there best placed, both for seeing of the enemy, and for feare of disordering our men, either going to the charge, or retiring backe. If the ground be euen, it is placed in the head of our army a little before our troupes of shot. which after the same is discharged, auance themselues, while that is drawen within the distances either of the battaillions, or of the midbattell and corners. For defence of the artillery there are good gardes to be appointed, wheresoeuer it standeth.

If this order cannot be obserued: yet this rule is generally to be respected, that euery weapon, and souldier is there to be placed, where [Page 163]he may most anoy the enemy, and best defend himselfe. The partes are so to be placed, that one may succour another, and one retire to an­other. Horsemen may not come within the ground of the footmen, nor shot within the rankes of pikes, but both either on the sides, or be­hinde the battaillions. He is most iudicious, that can bring most men to fight, and stop the way to the enemy, that he can not extend his men to hurt him. There is no company to be sent forth to ioyne with the enemy, but with some to relieue them againe, and againe, and to re­ceiue them retiring, and stop the enemies pursute. Horsemen may not charge pikes, nor come in ground where they cannot fetch their carriere. Other rules in their speciall places shall be prescribed.

Shot in marching and standing obserue order. The distances be­fore I haue shewed. In fighting they obserue no order, but euery man marking his enemy right before him, and shooting at him ta­keth his best aduantage. yet if they obserue not a certeine course where the shot are many, they soone fall in disorder. Archers for that they shoot and fight standing in ranke, obserue better aray. their di­stance from shoulder to shoulder is one foot, from ranke to ranke foure foot. Some now a dayes doe little esteeme this weapon: yet if our archers were armed with plated iackes as in time past, neither shotte could abide them in euen ground, nor pikes without shotte. Against horsemen, where they may finde defence of hedges, or ditches, or stakes, or rough ground they do very good seruice.

Pikemen against a charge of horsemen ought to stand close with the blunt end of the pike in the ground, the poynt bent vpon the horse brest. Ranke from ranke standeth not more then three foot asunder, that many endes of pikes may garde the first ranke. That the pikes may be commodiously bent and crossed, the first rankes are to bow theyr bodies. that they may the better breake the charge of the ene­mies horse: before them they are to haue a ranke of mosquetiers, as hath bene said already.

Where the pikemen go to charge other pikes, betweene shoulder and shoulder, there would be a foot distance; betwixt ranke and ranke so much, as charging with the pikes aboue hand, and breaking the same they may vse theyr swordes, and daggers, and either in stri­king auance forward theyr right legges, or els receiuing the enemies blowes draw backe the same. Sixe foot I thinke for that purpose to be sufficient.

The halberdieres, bilmen, and targetters would haue likewise betwixt shoulder and shoulder one foot, betwixt ranke and ranke fiue foot. In pikes and short weapons this is generally to be obserued, that they stand as close together as may be, so they may haue roome to manage themselues, and their weapons. the lesse roome may serue, considering that I would haue all souldiers to strike with the point of their weapon: and euery man to succour his fellowes before him, and on the sides.

The horsemen go to the shocke with equall front so neere as they can, and runne so close side by side as they may without hurt ech to o­ther. If horse be distant from horse two foot, and ranke from ranke seuen foot, when horsemen goe trotting to the charge, the proportion is good. The aray of the Frenchmen that charge with single rankes is of no strength: neither the orders of the Reiters that goe to the charge in a ring. for so soone as they are inuested with lances, they are broken. and therefore I thinke the former aray better, as vsed both by antiquity, and the Italian and English caualery, which gi­ueth ground at this day to no other.

The ancient leaders of time past, which for their skill in armes are famous to posterity, howsoeuer in some circumstances they de­parted from these rules; yet neuer did they neglect the Generall rea­sons of them. neither ought they to be neglected of any, as I will make manifest by particulars.

Scipio in the encounter betwixt him and Annibal in Afrike accor­ding to the Romane guise diuided his army from front to backe into three parts placing first those which they called hastatos, next princi­pes, last triarios. All these albeit at the first their armes were diffe­rent, yet when the Romane empire was come to the height, were armed much after one sort with plated iackes, which they called Lo­ricas, morions on their heads, a shield on their left arme, a sword well poynted, and sharpe by their side, and a iaueline which they cal­led pilum in their right hand which they threw at the enemy when they ioyned battell, and then fought with their sword and target. Some had also defences for theyr thighes, and legges, and shooes plated in the soles, that they might not be pearced with nayles. The light armed by them called Velites which stood not among the armed men had onely a head piece and a target, and sword, or els if they were slingers onely a head piece, a sting, and a sword. The Triarij [Page 165]that stoode last were the oldest, and most tried, and best armed soul­diers, and next them Principes that stood before them, the hastati were yongest and of least experience, first in place, but last in accompt. The front where the hastati were placed, Scipio made not of Regiments ioyned together and placed before the ensignes, but of companies of two hundred made into litle battaillions or squares distant one from another some space, that the Elephants of the enemie receiued with­in these distances might not disorder the aray. He placed Laelius with the Italian horsemen without on the left corner, Masinissa and the Nu­midian horsemen on the right corner. The distances betweene the battaillions, he filled with the first troupes of the light armed which were arches and slingers, commanding them, when the Elephants came forwarde on them, either to retire behinde the first battaillions, or standing fast to the sides of them, to giue the Elephants way, and to throw their iauelins at them as they passed. Liuyes words I haue set downe for the satisfaction of those that vnderstande the tongue: which course I haue also in other examples out of him, and other au­thors obserued. If my translation answere not worde for worde, yet doeth it answere the Romane vse of warre. The wordes I could not translate precisely, if I meant that any should vnderstand mee. the termes of warre then, and now being so different.

Liu. 30. Instruit deinde primos hastatos, post cos principes, triarijs postremam aciem clausit. Non confertas autem cohortes ante sua quámque signa in­struebat, sed manipulos aliquantum inter se distantes, vt esset spatium, quò Elephanti hostium accepti nihil ordines turbarent: Laelium cum equi­tatu Italico ab sinistro cornu, Masinissam, Numidásque ab dextro oppo­suit. Ʋias patentes inter manipulos antesignanorum velitibus comple­uit, dato praecepto vt ad impetum Elephantorum, aut post rectos refuge­rent ordines, aut in dextram laeuámque discursu applicantes se antesig­nanis, viam qua irruerent in ancipitia tela belluis darent.

Annibal placed first his Elephants: then the Ligurians, & Gaules hired to ayde the Carthaginians. Among their troupes and before them he placed slingers, and archers which were Mores, and of the Ilands of Maiorca, and Minorca. In the second battel he set the Car­thaginians, and Africans, and Macedonian Regiment ioyned in one aray. and after them a litle way distant, he placed his last hope, or third battell consisting of Italians. The Carthaginian horsemen were placed on the right wing, the Numidians on the left. His error [Page 166](if any error may be thought to haue bene in such an expert Cap­taine, and not rather in the execution of his directions) was this, that not making any distances in his second battell, for the first to retrayte into, the first battell being repulsed was for the most part slaine, and returning backe vpon the Carthaginians standing in the second bat­tell, had almost disordered them. Percase he thought that seeing no place of retraite, they would haue fought more desperatly. But what can wearied, and hurt men doe? or who can animate men altogether discouraged? Scipio contrarywise drawing backe the hurt, and wea­ried men of his first battaillions, auanced the second battel where those stoode which the Romanes called Principes on the one hande, and the thirde battell, which they termed Triarios on the other hande, and so ioyntly charging the enemie on front with his footemen, and on the backe with his horsemen, he foyled Annibal and his army, which be­fore that had alwayes bene victorious.

Liui. 30. Annibal primum Elephantos instruxit: deinde auxilia Ligurum, Gallorum (que), Balearibus, Mauris (que) adiunctis: in 2 acie Carthaginenses, Afrósque, & Macedonum legionem: modico interuallo relecto sub­sidiariam aciem Italicorum militum instruxit: equitatum circumdedit cornibus, dextrum Carthaginenses, sinistrum Numidae tenuerunt.

At Trebia Annibal brought into the field first his archery, and slin­gers of the Ilands of Maiorca, and Minorca, about 8000. men: then his armed men: ten thousand horsemen hee disposed by the right, and left corners of the first battell, and without them his Elephants diui­ded equally into two partes. When the Romane legions vrged the light armed, he drew them backe lightly into the spaces, betwixt the midbattell, and the right and left corner. Afterwards, hauing foyled and put to flight the Romane horsemen, the archers & slingers came forward, & charged the Romanes vpon the flanks of the armed men.

Liui. 21. Annibal Baleares leuem armaturam, 8 ferme millia hominum erant, locat ante signa, deinde grauiorem armis peditem: in cornibus circumfundit decem millia equitum: ab cornibus in vtrámque partem diuisos Elephantos statuit: Balearibus cum maiore robore resisterent le­giones, diductae properè in cornua leues armaturae sunt: Baleares pulso equite iaculabantur in latera.

The army of the Romanes and Carthaginians at the famous en­coūter of Cannae by Liuie is thus described. On the right corner stood the Romane horsemen, and within them footemen: the horsemen of [Page 167]their associats were ranged on the left corner, & within them foote­men: in the midst were placed the Romane legiōs diuided after their vsual maner into three parts: hard before them & ioyning with them were archers and slingers placed, and before them other archers, and slingers and other light armed souldiers, of which consisted the first range of the battel. Annibal set his slingers, archers, and light armed foremost on the front of the battell, the Spanish, and French horse he placed on the left wing against the Romane horsemen, the Numidi­an horsemen on the right. The midbattel he strengthened with foote­men, placing the Africans equally diuided in the right, and left cor­ner, the Gaules and Spaniards with their aray in forme of a wedge auanced somewhat forward being in the midst. The charge was be­gunne by the archery and light armed, afterward did the left wing of the Gaules and Spanish horsemen meete with the right wing of the Romanes: then followed the encountre of the armed men.

Liui. 22. In dextro cornu Romanos equites locauit, deinde pedites: laeuum cor­nu extremi equites sociorum, intra pedites; ad medium iuncti legionibus Romanis tenuerunt iaculatores. Ex caeteris leuium armorum auxilijs prima acies facta. Annibal Balearibus aliáque leui armatura praemissa, Gallos, Hispanos (que) equites laeua in cornu aduersus Romanum equitatum, dextrum cornu Numidis equitibus datum media acie peditibus firmata, ita vt Afrorum, vtra (que) cornua essent, interponerentur his cuneo aliquan­tum prominente medij Galli, at (que) Hispani. Pugna leuibus primum armis commissa: deinde equitum Gallorum, Hispanorum (que) laeuum cornu cum dextro Romano concurrit, deinde peditum coorta pugna.

Scipio fighting against Asdrubal in Spaine, did thus dispose his army: he strengthened both the corners of his battell (diuided from front to backe after the vsual maner) with Romane souldiers, his associats he bestowed in the midst, his horsemen and light armed hee sent out against the corps de garde of the Carthaginians placed in the gates of their campe, and in conuenient places neere. When the Carthaginians came foorth against them, hee receiued his horse­men and light armed within his battaillions, and diuiding them in­to two partes, placed them behinde the corners of the battell. Per­ceiuing where the enemie was weakest, hee there beganne the charge, with that part of his army that was strongest. The first bat­tell of the enemies being discomfited, he chargeth the midbattell with his Regiments of Romanes on the sides, with his associats that were [Page 168] Spaniards in front, and on the backes with his horsmen, and so put the same to flight.

Scipio cornua firmat Liu. 28. Romano milite, socijs in mediam aciem acceptis: equites & leuem armaturam in stationes Punicas immisit: egredientibus Poenis equitatum, & leuem armaturam in medium acceptam, diuisam (que) in partes duas in subsidijs post cornua locat. Cum cornibus vbi firma eius erat acies, Poenorum infirma pugnam incipit, ea acie fugata mediam Poenorum aciem ipse a latere, equites à tergo, Hispani à fronte adorti fuderunt.

Scipioes father encountring the same man, their armies were then thus ordered: the front of the Romane army stoode vpon three parts: the footemen after the maner of the Romanes, were part before the ensignes and part behinde: the horsemen stoode beyond both the cor­ners of the Auantgard or first battell: Asdrubal placed the Spaniards in the midst, in the right corner hee ordered the Carthaginians, the Africans and other mercenary souldiers in the left, his Numidian horsemen hee placed fast by the Carthaginians on that wing where they stoode, the rest of his horsemen in the other corner.

Triplex stetit Liu. 23. Romana acies, peditum pars ante signa locata, pars post signa accepta, equites cornua cinxere. Asdrubal mediam aciem Hispanis firmat, in cornibus dextro Poenos locat, laeuo Afros mercena­riorúmque auxilia: equitum Numidas Poenorum peditibus, caeteros A­fros pro cornibus opponit.

Scipio, he that subdued Annibal encountring with Syphax, vsed the vsual aray of the Romanes making his army triple in breadth, and in length; the Italian horsemen he placed by the right corner of the first squadrons, the Numidians ledde by Masinissa by the left. Syphax and Asdrubal opposed the Numidian or Barbary horse a­gainst the Italian horse, the Carthaginians against Masinissa. The Celtiberian footemen they placed in the midst opposite against the squadrons of the Romane Regiments.

Liu. 30. Romanus hast atorum prima signa, post principes, in subsidijs tria­rios constituit. Equitatum. Italicum ab dextro cornu, ab laeuo Numidas, Masinissam (que) opposuit. Syphax Asdrubal (que) Numidis, aduersus Italicum equitatum, Carthaginensibus contra Masinissam locatis, Celtiberos in mediam aciem in aduersa signa legionum accepere.

In a certaine encounter in Spaine theLiu. 29. Romans perceiuing that the enemy had left spaces betweene the midbattel, & those squadrons that [Page 169]made the corners, purposing to send out his horsemen by those spa­ces, preuenting him, filled those spaces first with their horsmen, which both made the enemies horse vnseruiceable, and holpe to disorder his footemen. Their other aray was ordinary, saue that the horsemen made not the outmost wings, but the footemen: as appeareth by these wordes of Liuy following.

Cornua, dextrum Ilergetes, laeuum alij Hispani, mediam aciem Au­setani tenuere. Inter cornua, & mediam aciem interualla patentia fece­runt satis lata, qua equitatum vbi tempus esset, emitterent. Romani cùm inter cornua loca etiam patentia fecissent, hoc vicerunt, quod primi equi­tes inter interualla miserint, quod hostium equites inutiles fecit, & tur­bauit hostium pedites.

Yet was not the aray of the Romanes alwaies the same, as appea­reth by that encounter which ye Romane Proconsul & Pretor had with Mago in Liguria. The Pretors legions made the front of the armie & first squadrons, the Proconsul placed his legions behind for supply. The twelfth legion being almost cut all in peeces, the thirteenth was auanced forward to relieue it. Mago against this legion opposed fresh men, reserued behinde for supply: the Elephants comming ouer­thwart, the first rankes of the eleuenth legion being drawen foorth, fought with them with their iauelins.

Liu. 30. Praetoris legiones in prima acie fuerunt: procos. suas in subsidij te­nuit. Duodecima legione magna ex parte caesa, decimatertia legio in pri­mam aciem inducta, Mago ex subsidijs Gallos integros legioni opposuit. hastati legionis vndecimae pila in Elephantos conijciunt.

Furius fighting with the Gaules in Liguria, placed his army in this sort. The souldiers of his associats, he diuided intoWings were so called, for that they were placed on the sides of the battell, yet were they not so alwaies. wings, and of them made the front of the battell. Two regiments he placed be­hinde for a supply. When the right wing was almost oppressed, brin­ging vp the two regiments on either side of it, he garded the same, and with his horsemen he charged the enemy vpon the side of his battell.

Liu. 31. In alas Furius diuidens socialem exercitum eum in prima acie loca­uit, in subsidijs duas legiones, oppressae dextrae posteà alae duas illas legio­nes circumduxit, equites in latus hostium emisit.

When afterward the Romane Empire was enlarged, & that the Romanes began to haue diuers nations in their armies, although the generall order was still obserued, yet there happened in their armies by reason of this mixture more varietie. In the battel betwixt L. Sci­pio, [Page 170]and Antiochus in Asia, there were two legions of Romanes, two other of Latines their associats. The Romanes were ordered in the midst, the Latines in the corners of the battell. Those partes of the le­gions which they called hastatos, Principes, & Triarios, made the front, the supply, and last hope. On the right side of this armie, the Consul ranged in squadrons 3000 footemen of other nations, that came to the aide of the Romanes, and without them somewhat lesse then 3000 horsemen. Vpon the left side which was garded with a ri­uer running along, he placed onely foure troupes of horsemen. Two thousand Macedonians & Thracians were left behinde in the campe to garde the baggage. Antiochus his army stoode in this order: first, 16000 of the kings ordinarie souldiers, calledThey were ar­med men, so cal­led of their aray, which was a squadron contei­ning sometime 8000, sometime more, sometime lesse. Phalangitae, diuided into x squadrons, tooke their place: betweene euery squadron two E­lephants were placed. From the front backeward, the battell contei­ned 32 rankes of armed men. By the right side of these were placed first 1500 Gallograecians: next to them 3000 men completely ar­med, they call them [...]: thirdly, a wing of a thousand horse­men, and certeine Elephants behinde to second them. In the fourth place, the kings Garde, and by the same 1200 archers on horsebacke Dahians: And fiftly, 3000 light armed men: in the vttermost corner were 4000 slingers, and archers placed. By the left side of the kings ordinarie souldiers, were likewise 1500 Gallograecian footemen ranged, and 2000 Cappadocians, hauing like armes, and beyond them 2700 others, all sent in aide of the king. After them 3000 hors­men all armed, and one thousand other horsemen were ranged. Be­fore these horsemen were placed charets with hookes, and Arabians vpon Camels. And lastly, like number of horsemen, targetters, ar­chers, and Elephants, as was on the right corner.

Liu. 37. Romanorum duae legiones, duae sociûm & Latini nominis erant. Ro­mani mediam aciem, cornua Latini tenuêre. hastatorum prima signa, deinde Principum erant, triarij postremos claudebant. extra hanc iustam aciem à parte dextra auxiliarium tria millia peditum Consul instruxit. vlira eos equitum minùs 3000 opposuit: à laeua qua flumen claudebat, quatuor tantùm turmae oppositae: 2000 Macedonum & Thracum praesi­dio castris relinquebantur. regia acies erat primò 16000 phalangitae in partes decem diuisa, inter singulas partes bini erant elephanti, à fronte introrsus in 32 ordines armatorum acies patebat. ad latus dextrum phalangitarum 1500 pedites Gallograecos posuit, his 3000 peditum lori­catorum [Page 171](cataphractos appelant) adiunxit: addita his ala mille equitū: continens his grex elephantorum positus est in subsidijs. ab eadem parte paulùm producto cornu regia cohors erat: Dahae deinde equites sagitta­rij 1200: tum leuis armatura 3000: extremum cornu claudebant 4000 funditores, & sagittarij. ab laeuo cornu phalangitis adiuncti erant Gal­lograeci pedites 1500, & similiter his armati 2000 Cappadocum, inde auxiliares 2700, & 3000 cataphractorum equitum, & mille alij equi­tes: ante hunc equitatum falcatae quadrigae, & cameli quibus Arabes insidebant sagittarij. inde alia multitudo par ei quae in dextro cornu erat equites, cetrati, sagittarij, elephanti.

Cerealis in his araie did somewhat digresse from the ancient or­ders of the Romanes. The squadrons which were sent from the as­sociates in his aide, were placed in front, and by them on each side his horsmen: in the second battell hee placed the legions: and last of all kept by himselfe certaine choise men to supply where sudden need re­quired.

Tacit. 21. Cerealis equite & auxiliarijs cohortibus frontem explet: in secunda acie legiones locatae, dux sibi delectos retinuerat ad improuisa.

The armie of Caesar ranged readie to fight with Afranius, was di­uided into three battaillions. The first consisted of 4 squadrons of the 5 legion, which was seconded by the other squadrons of the same le­gion, the three squadrons remaining were placed for the last hope in the third battaillion. Other legions were ranged in like sort. The ar­chers and slingers were placed before the front in the midst, the hors­men were placed in wings on the sides.

Caes. bel. Ciu. 1 Caesaris acies triplex, primo 4 cohortes ex 5 legione, has subsidiariae ternae, & rursus aliae totidem, suae cuius (que) legionis sequebantur. sagittarij & funditores media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat.

I may not forget the order of Caesar, and Pompeies armies in that famous encounter in the Pharsalian fields. In the left corner of Pompeies armie were two legions placed: Scipio had the middest with his regiments that hee brought out of Syria: the regiment of Cilicia and squadrons made of the reliques of Afranius his armie in Spayne, were ranged together in the right corner: certaine other squadrons hee placed in the distances betwixt the corners and mid­battell. All his horsemen, archers, and slingers hee placed side by the left corner of his armie. SeuenWhen the le­gion conteined 6000 foote, eue­rie companie consisted ordina­rily of 600, but seldome were they complete▪ companies hee left to garde his campe. Caesar ordered his armie in three battels, [Page 172]and according to the custome of the Romanes; strengthened euery battell with three supplies (the front accounted for one which is not properly a supplie, but the front or first araie.) He made a fourth bat­tell of Iustie yong men well armed and furnished with halfe pikes a­gainst Pompeies horsmen. Finally, two companies he left behind for gard of the campe.

Caes. de bel. Ciu. 3. Erant in sinistro cornu (Pompeij) legiones duae, mediam aciem Sci­pio tenebat cum legionibus Syriacis, Ciliciensis legio & cohortes Afra­nianae in dextro cornu erant. reliquas cohortes inter aciem mediam, & cornua interiecerat: cunctum equitatum, sagittarios, & funditores in si­nistro cornu obiecerat, 7 cohortes castris praesidio reliquit. Caesar tripli­cem aciem instruit, & tribus promore Romano firmatam subsidijs: quar­tam aciem instituit contra equites Pompeij: duas cohortes castris praesidio reliquit.

Neither is the victorie of Caesar against Scipio in Afrike, lesse famous, or the araie of their armies lesse remarkable. Scipio in the front of his armie, placed his legions, the Numidians he ranged be­hind them for supplies. On the right and left corner in equal distances be ordered his elephants, after which he marrialled the light armed, and aide sent him out of Numidia: all his horsemen he placed on the right corner of the battell, and beside them an infinite number of soul­diers light armed (as archers, slingers, targetters without corslets) all this in the space of a mile: the left side of his armie was close ioy­ned to the towne of Vzita. Caesar in the left side of his armie, set the 9 and 7 regiment: the 30, 29, 13, 14, 28, and 26. in the midbattell: cer­taine companies of those legions togither with certaine regiments of yong souldiers in the right corner: certaine other regiments new­ly leuied, he placed in squadrons behind for a supplie. The last hope or third supplie or battell, he translated into the left corner of his bat­tell, where also he placed his horsemen, and the fift legion which se­conded his horsemen. His light armed disposed in squadrons, hee ran­ged among the troupes of his horsemen.

Hirt. de bel. Afric. Scipio collocabat in fronte legiones. Numidas in subsidiaria acie, elephantos dextro, sinistró (que) cornu aequalibus interuallis: post illos arma­turas leues, & Numidas auxiliares substituerat, equitatū vniuersum in dextro cornu disposuit, & iuxta leuis armaturae infinitam multitudinem mille passuum spatio, sinistrum cornu oppido Vzita claudebatur. Caesar ha­buit legionem 9 & 7 in sinistro cornu, tricesimam, vicesimam nonam, [Page 173]decimam tertiam, 14, 28, 26, in media acie, aliquot cohortes earum le­gionum, & vnà tyronum legiones in dextro cornu, tyronum legiones in subsidijs, tertiam aciem in sinistrum suum cornu transtulit, ibi equitatum collocauer at, & quintam legionem quae equitatui subsidio esset, leuem ar­maturam inter equites interposuit.

And thus inough of the Romanes and perchance (as some will say) too much, seeing the orders of warres are now so diuers (as they thinke) from antiquitie. But these men must consider, that the rea­sons remaine alwayes the same, and that the vse of horsemen, and footemen is now the same that was in times past, and that our shot answere to their light armed, and that alwayes one part is to succour another, and that the army must take heede, that it be not compassed round. The Greekes, yea and barbarous nations mooued with the same reasons haue in effect kept the same aray. WhenXenoph. ex­ped. Cyr. 1. Clearchus was to fight with Artaxerxes, he placed his owne souldiers in the right corner, and those of Meno in the left, the rest were ranged in the midst. Without the corners stood the light armed, and then the horsemen equally diuided vtmost.

In the encounter of the Greekes Arrian. exped. Alex. lib. 3. and Persians at Arbela, Darius on the wings placed his horsemen of diuers nations, and some pretie distance before them his charets with hookes: within them his ar­chers and light armed: and in the midst the Greekes and Persians, which were the strength of the army. The same aray did Alexander also obserue in the front of his army: but fearing least hee should be compassed about by Darius his horsemen, he also prouided another battaillion, which if neede be might make head that way also. I need not bring many examples, seeing in all these matters there is one ge­nerall course. Let vs therefore now compare the arayes of late time, and you shall then perceiue, that either they are like to former procee­dings in former time, or els farre worse.

TheFrois [...]art. blacke Prince in the fight with Henry the vsurper of Castil, diuided his army into three partes, himselfe ledde the battell, the duke of Lancaster the Vantgarde, and the king of Maiorca the rest, the horsemen were sorted on the sides: the same aray was obserued by the enemie.

When the duke of Burgundie was to fight with Lewis the 11, at Montlehery, hee placed his archers first: but because his caualery was not placed on the sides, but behinde: the same, going to the [Page 174]charge, ouerranne his owne men, and killed diuers of them, and fewe or none of the enemies. In which disorder if Lewis had charged him, he could not haue failed of the victorie.

The Prince of Condè Anno 1567 remayning at S. Denys, and vnderstanding the Kings determination to driue him thence: re­solued in the fieldes betwene Paris and S. Denys to receiue the charge in this order: he diuided his horsemen into three partes, and did se­cond euery part with shot: with the rest of the shot Ienlis beganne the charge. Footemen armed which are the strength of the army he had none. The partes were so farre sundred, that one part could not succour another. So that if the armed men of the aduerse party had come on: both the horsemen, and footemen of the Prince had bene driuen to a poore retraite. The Constable hauing 16000 foote­men, brought fewe or none to the encountre. Of this number 6000 Suitzers were there planted in the fielde, like so many stakes, without giuing any one blow that day.

At Moncontour the Admiral placed first hisThey are the most part Pisto­leers on horse­backe. Reyters, and side by them certaine lances: both these hee fensed on the sides with shot: behinde these he placed a squadron of Lansquenets flanked likewise with shot, and seconded with some fewe horsemen, all which made the Auantgard. The battell consisted of shot which was likewise flanked, and seconded with shot. In the head both of the battell, and Auantgard were certaine shot placed, as enfans perdus (wee call them the forlorne hope) in which aray there was neither order, beau­tie, nor strength. There wanted armed men in the battell. Horsemen coulde not, being so placed come to the charge, but they should runne ouer their owne men. In some they were so placed, that not the hun­dred person could come to fight. But percase the Admirall either coulde not doe as hee would, or else carried away with the errour of the French, that put all in shot, had more of that weapon, then coulde doe seruice.

The enemies Auantgard at the same time stood vpon 4000 Suit­zers, flanked with certaine Regiments of shot: before the Suitzers were 8 fielde pieces placed, and before the pieces the forlorne hope: beyonde the shot were ranged certaine lances. The battell being drawne vp, and ranged in equal front with the Auantgard, in fashion differed little, or nothing from the same. Much like course, sure no better hath bene vsed in all the battels that haue bene fought since [Page 175]the inuention of artillery. So that we see how all wise captaines, do goe about in their arayes to resemble the proceeding of ancient time, but there is not now the like vnion of the parts, nor the like strength of the whole body, nor that orderly proceeding, that euery weapon may doe his office, nor that proportion of the front, nor order of sup­plies, that were among ancient warriers. And by reason of vnifor­mity in proceeding now wanting, hard it is to set men in order: hard to bring many to fight, and hardest of all to restore an array once bro­ken. this is the cause of the weaknesse of the armies of ourtime: in disorder no army can fight, nor resist.

Wherefore of two things in this point considerable, let vs doubt neither. If the enemy be in disorder, neither let vs doubt to charge him; nor if our army be in order, let vs feare to susteine his charge.Auxilia Iubae impedita ac per­turbata, quòd nul­lo ordine essent, & sine timore i­ter fecerant, in fu­gam se conjiciūt. Caes. bel. Ciu. 2. Iubaes men being without order, were no sooner charged, but they fled. Cato in his expedition into Dum Hispani trepidant acie in­struenda: Cos. iam paratis, ordi­natis (que) omnibus incompositos ag­greditur. Liu. 34. Spaine taking the enemy at like aduantage, and charging him as he ranne vp and downe to set his forces in array, did easily driue him out of the field. If theLiu. 22. Romanes as they passed the riuer before the battell of Trebia, had not bene charged by Annibal, they could not so easily haue receiued so great an ouerthrow. Annibal himselfe albeit a most expert leader, and of an army most expert in warre, yet receiued losse being char­ged by Marcellus, in that instant when he drew his men out of the campe, to set them in order. and if by long practise his men could not haue taken their standings themselues, they had that day quite bene ouerthrowen by their Toto passim campo pecorum modo incompo­sitos se fuderunt. Liu. 27. disorder. The like had also happened vnto Caesars army charged by theCaes. bel. Gal. 2. Neruians, when it was dispersed, and disordered about the fortification of the campe, but that the skill of the souldiers, that could euery man fall in array of himselfe, reme­died the disorder. The Germanes a long time vsing to charge their enemies with more Dirigūtur acies pari vtrin (que); spe, nec vt olim apud Germanos vagis incursibus, aut disiectas per ca­teruas, quippe longa aduersus nos militia insue­uerant signa se­qui, subsidijs fir­mari, dicta impe­ratorum accipe­ic. Tacit. annal. 2. violence then order, & assailing them by squa­drons seuerally, rather then with an ordered army; were ouerthro­wen by the Romanes oft times: but when by long vse they had learned the Romane array, and obserued it, they preuailed against them. Those that come rather furiously then orderly to the charge, as did the French at Cressy, and Poitiers, and both French and Spani­ards at Aliubarota in the confines of Portogall, where our ancesters of the English natiō obteined great victories, are easily ouerthrowen. Susteine the first brunt, and presently they are cooled.

Those therefore that goe to charge the enemy, let them obserue thisWhat is to be especially consi­dered and perfor­med before our army begin the charge. course: first let them set their men in order, that euery man may know his place: secondly, let them giue certeine direction, that euery commander may know both what to doe, and in case he cannot performe so much, where to retire. Annibal not thinking of this, when he fought with Scipio in Afrike, occasionned his owne ouer­throw. for when his first battell being wearied, would haue retired to the succor, there was no place left to retrait into: so that the same not being receiued into the second battell, began to fight with their owne fellowes, and what by the enemy and by friends was most part slaine. The French horse at the battell of Poitiers, not knowing where to retire, fell among their footmen, and holpe to set them in disorder.

Thirdly in giuing directions, let the Generall take heed, that he employ all sorts of weapons, where they may doe most seruice (this I meane particularly to declare in the chapter following.) if he send horse against pikes standing fast, or against shot being fenced with a trench; he ruinateth his horse. if he send shot against horse in open field, or pikes against shot, he vseth the matter with no iudgement.

Fourthly, let him neuer order either his whole army, or part of it without supply. Many casualties may at the first discourage our men; which being opportunely succored, may take courage againe, and begin a fresh charge vpon the enemy.Ex secunda acie subsidiarijs co­hortibus in pug­nam inductis su­os accendit, ho­stē fudit. Liu. 34. Cato in his warres against the Spaniards, relieuing his wearied men with a few fresh com­panies encouraged them, and ouerthrew the enemies. When Cae­sars men began to giue groūd in their battell against the Germanes, Crassus tertiam aciem laboranti­bus nostris subsi­dio misit, ita prae­lium restitutum est, atque omnes hostes terga ver­terunt. Caes. bel. Gal. 1. Crassus by supplying them with a fresh company, not onely re­stored the battell, but made all the enemies to runne. Where all the force of the army is employed at the first brunt, and no order is taken for supplies, as in a certeine battell betwixt the Romaines and Volscians: the successe Primo praelio non subsidijs fir­mata acie &c. concursum est. ideò Romani à Volscis premun­tur. Liu. 2. seldome is good. Among other mat­ters obiected against Fuluius accused as principall causer of the ouer­throw of the Romaine army by Annibal at Herdonea; this was chiefe, that he did not well order his army, nor strengthen the same with supplies, nor succours.

Fiftly, looke with what part of the army himselfe is strongest, let him there begin to charge the enemy, where either by good intelli­gence, or view of the aray, or disaduantage of the ground, or quality [Page 177]of the weapons, he shall perceiue that the enemie is weakest. Caesar in the Caesar à dextro cornu, quod eam partem minimè firmam hostium esse animaduer­terat, praelium commisit. Caes. bel. gal. 1. encounter he had with the Germanes, beganne to charge them with that part of his armie, that was ordered in the right cor­ner, for that hee sawe, that the enemies were there weakest. The same as Liuy testifieth, was obserued in a certaine battell, which the Romanes had with the Carthaginians in Spaine. He is not wise, that when he may charge the enemie on the side, will goe directly to the front, where his greatest force consisteth.

Sixtly, after that hee hath set his men in order, let him not stand long in armes, before he goeth to the charge, if he meane at all to fight. By long standing, the souldiers waxe wearie, faint, hun­grie, and a great part of their courage is thereby abated.Liu. 27. Asdru­bal coulde not haue done his men greater wrong, then to make them stand so long in armes before the battell begunne at Me­taurus. Thereof proceeded their faintnesse, and contrariwise the courage, and strenth of the Romanes: for those being faint, these came fresh to the battell.Liu. 22. Annibal at the battell of Trebia would not bring foorth his men to fight, before hee perceiued the Ro­manes to be hungrie, and almost tyred with long standing. Which encreased his owne force, and abated much of the courage, and force of the enemie.

Further, by no meanes let him suffer the enemie to preuent him in giuing the first charge. As in the beginning of warres, so in the Verti in co res videbatur vtri prius arma infer­rent. Liu. 2. beginning of the battell there is great aduantage. And as Pinarius saide to his men lying in garrison in Aenna a Citie of Qui prior strin­xerit ferrum, cius victoria erit. Liu. 24. Sicile, so it falleth out very often, that hee that draweth the sworde soonest, first obteineth the victorie. They that first be­ginne, seeme to haue greater courage then those that stand still, as it were to warde their blowes. There is many aduantages in beginning the battell. They may more easely take the aduan­tage of the winde, and Sunne, of the grounde, and of the sort of weapons wherewith they fight, then those that stand still, which are forced to turne, which way soeuer the enemie commeth. They may there beginne where the enemie is weakest, and themselues strongest, and therefore the vse of the Romanes was first to begin the charge, as appeareth both in the warres of Scipio in Spaine, and Caesar in France. A certaineLez consederez remanquet, qu'en touts lez combus passez, ils ont mi­eulx fait charge­ans lez premiers, que quand ils, en [...] attendu la des­marcke catho­lique. Hist, de troubl, de Fr. Frenchman, albeit he vnderstood not the reason, yet by obseruation vnderstoode this poynt. For [Page 178]sayth he, in the warres of France, it hath beene noted, that the Protestants did alwayes preuaile more charging the enemies first, then attending the enemies demarche and charge. It appeareth both in the braule at Moncontour, anno 1569. and diuers other skirmishes which they call battels. Those that charge first, take the aduantage of any disorder committed by the enemie, which others let slippe.

Whatsoeuer can be deuised to encourage our owne souldiers, or to discourage the enemie, as at all times: so especially in the hazard of battell, is to be practised by cryes, reportes, shewes, wordes spo­ken in the hearing of the enemie, and whatsoeuer else can be ima­gined. If there lye any wood, or hollowe grounde neere the enemie, the same is to be seased, that in the heate of the fight our men sud­denly arising thence, may more amaze, and hurt the enemie. But of this point we shall haue better occasion to speake at large in the trea­tise of stratagemes, and ambushes.

Least by flying of some cowardly companions, the rest might be discouraged, order is to be taken, that whosoeuer in the fight begin­neth to turne his backe, bee presently slaine. The Cohorti suae dictator dat sig­num, vt quem su­orum fugientem viderint, pro hoste habeant. Liu. 2. Romane Ge­nerall by this strict commaundement and execution, appointing certaine troupes to execute it, made his armie stand resolutely. Of Attilius it is reported, that when his army beganne to giue ground by Liu. 10. killing the first with his owne hands, he made the rest to make head against the enemie: which Annibal likewise practised in his battel with Scipio in Afrike, albeit he had not like successe. This is the case, wherein Clearchus the Lacedemonian Plutarch. saide, that soul­diers ought more to feare their owne Generall, then the enemie.

Finally, when by his good direction, and the valiantnesse of his souldiers, the Generall shall perceiue the enemie to beginne to shrinke, and giue ground, then must he be most carefull first, that he giue him no time to recouer himselfe, or to supplie that which is broken: secondly, that hee keepe his souldirs from spoyle, vntill such time as he hath assured himselfe of the victorie. When the ene­mie beginneth to shrinke, and to be dismaide, any little force more maketh him to runne: in a small time he recouereth himselfe againe. Therefore Orant vt per­culsos inuadant, nec restitui aciem sinant. Liu. 29. then is he to bee vrged with the rest of our strength that remaineth entire, and not to be suffered to escape. Scipio in the battell with Asdrubal in Spaine, when the Liu. 28. Carthaginians disli­king [Page 179]the party would haue retyred wholly together, did so presse them on all sides, that before they could recouer any place of safe­tie, they were forced to change their pace, and euery man to flye for his life.

In the Caes. de bel. ciu. 3. battell betwixt Caesar and Pompey, when Pompeyes horsemen were driuen out of the fielde, by those halfe pikes that hee had ordeined for succour of his owne horse, with the same men he cut in pieces Pompeyes archers, and light armed men. That done, with the same troupes he charged Pompeies battell, that yet stoode firme, vpon the backe. And after he had driuen the enemie out of the fielde, yet rested he not, vntill such time as hee had taken his campe, and dispersed the reliques of his armie. Yet may some say, it is not good to presse the enemie too farre, and that a bridge of golde is to bee made to those that flie away. Gaston de fois was ouerthro­wen and slaine pursuing the Spaniards, that retired after the bat­tell of Rauenna. And diuers others driuing the enemie to dispaire, that otherwise would haue fledde, haue hurt themselues. But this is to be vnderstoode of an enemie that would so flye, as he would al­so yeelde the victorie and contende no more, in which case Themi­stocles perswaded the Greekes that meant to dissolue Xerxes his bridge, to suffer the same to continue, that thereby he might runne away. Others that meane to fight againe, are to be pursued dili­gently with all our forces. Gaston de fois had not beene slaine, but that hee was badly followed, and too farre auaunced. Neither coulde the Spaniards haue escaped, if they had beene charged with shotte, or taken at aduantage, and kept from victuals. The Ro­manes had so certaine an order in this point, that they doubt not to accuse theirEx subsidiis quòd tardiùs successissent, & signum equitibus tardiùs datum, Cos. accusatus. Liu 35. General of trecherie, for that when the enemie stagge­red, hee gaue not the worde to the horsemen to charge, nor aduaun­ced his footemen in time to supplie those yt were wearie.Victor equestri praelio rex paruo momento si ad­iuuisset, debellare potuit. Liu. 42. Perseus, for that hauing foyled the Romanes with his horse, and hauing the victorie in his hand, he did not pursue the rest of their troupes, and breake them, but suffered them to passe a Riuer quietly; is condemned for a man of no iudgement in warres.

The same errour was committed by the Carthaginians in Spaine, who hauing slain the two Scipioes & foyled their armie gaue them selues to rest, while the Romanes gathering head againe, were able afterwarde to matche them, and foyle them. Those that [Page 180]cannot thrust the enemie downe that is already falling, will be lesse able to doe it, when he standeth vpright. And therefore let wise cap­taines pursue their enemie to the vtmost, and not suffer him when hee once beginneth to looke backe, to turne head againe, and take breath. And in any case let him take heede, that his souldiers runne not to spoyle, before the victorie be assured, and the enemie wholly vanquished.

Turbasset vti­que nouissimum agmen. Liu. 22. Annibal pursuing the Romanes after his victorie at Trebia, had sure ouertaken them, and disordered their rierward, had not the Numidian horsemen turned aside to spoyle the campe of the Romanes. And in the time of the Emperours of Rome, the Ger­manes had giuen the Obstitit vin­centibus prauum inter ipsos certa­men, hoste omis­so spolia conse­ctandi. Tacit. 20. Romanes a mightie ouerthrowe, if leauing them, they had not contended among themselues who shoulde first goe to spoyle. But howe so euer it was in auncient time, the disorder of souldiers in this point is such, that with no lawes, nor penalties they canne bee kept from following the spoyle, which oftentimes maketh them a spoyle to their enemies.

The French at Guingast had put the Dutch to flight, and were almost in possession of the victorie: but while they ranne after the spoyle, the enemie rallied himselfe, and charging them afresh, did extorce the victorie out of their handes, and put them to flight. At Guicciar. li. 2. Taro the Italians had foyled the French, returning out of the kingdome of Naples, but that in the beginning of the vi­ctorie they fell to spoyle the baggage, which was the cause of their owne spoyle and ruine. The same was the cause of the escape of the Guicciar. lib. 8. French, and losse of the Venetians at Treui. Gaston de fois at the taking of Brescia made proclamation, that vpon paine of death, no man shoulde fall to spoyle before li­cence giuen: yet coulde hee not keepe his souldiers fingers in temper. The more dangerous effectes doe ensue of this disorder, the greater care ought the Generall to haue, to preuent it.

CHAP. XII. Part. 2. Wherein the vse of horsemen, pikes, halberdes, and other such wea­pons, also of targets, small shotte, archers, and great ordonance is declared.

THat which before I promised concerning the vse of horsemen, and diuers weapons, that is nowe to be performed. A matter of great importance, and ad­uantage, if it be well considered: and therefore not to be omitted. You that knowe the traine of armes, yeelde here the testimonie of your experience to this discourse, and if you heare any cauill against it, yet let not such as neuer marched further, then out of the kitchin, or from the dresser into the hall, or parlour, censure that which they vnderstand not.

Horsemen among the Romanes were al of one sort: barded horses with men all armed mounted on them they vsed not. If they vsed any archers on horsebacke, they were beholding to other natiōs for them. Nowe vse of late times hath brought in diuers sortes of them, which according to their armes and furniture haue diuers names. Some horse are barded, others without bardes. The Frenchmen of armes in time past vsed barded horses for feare of our arrowes. Nowe since archerie is not so much reckoned of, and bardes are but a weake de­fence against shotte, lanciers leauing their bardes, are armed much like to the Albanian stradiots. Vpon the borders betwixt vs, and the Scots, horsemen haue staues for ye purpose, and for their armes iackes of male. The Dutch Reitres although well armed for the most part, yet seldome vse lances, or staues, or other weapon, then pistoles, and mazes at their saddle bowe. Beside these, there is an other sort of horsemen lately come in vse. We call them carbines, pedrinals, or ar­goletiers, which vse firelocke peeces on horsebacke, and are cōmonly armed to the proofe of their piece.

Horsemen in warres are most necessary in diuers respects. With them we range and spoile the enemies countrey: with them we fetch in victuals for our selues: with them we discouer ye enemies procee­dings: with them we bridle his courses, and stop his forragers: with them we both helpe to foyle him in open fielde, and pursue him flying from vs.Caes. bel. gal. 7. Caesar by the enemies horse alwayes coasting him, and ready to charge his forragers, was driuen to great extremitie for want of victuals. In Hirt. de bel. Afric. Afrike likewise being a plaine countrey, he [Page 182]suffered many algaradaes by the enemies horsemen, often char­ging him and cutting off his victuals. If Pompey had not rashly ad­uentured to fight with Caesar: by his horsemen, wherein he farre pas­sed him, he had famished his armie. The Greekes in their returne frō their voyage with Cyrus, by experience learned what incommodities followe them, that march without horse in ye enemies countrey. And this is the vse of horsemen out of fight, to witte, to cut off the enemie from victuals, to keepe him short, to discouer his proceedings, to cut off straglers; and to fetche in victuals, and prouision for our owne ar­mie. Which he that is strong in horsemen cannot want.

In fighting with the enemie, there are diuers vses of horsemen. If we charge him on the sides, or backe: we stop his march, as before I haue shewed. With a fewe horsemen any number of shotte taken in open fielde may be disordered. The Protestants in the encounter at S. Gemme in Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 13. Poitou, with a few horsemen, defeated diuers olde companies of shotte led by Puigalliard. That was the ruine of the Prince of Parmaes ayde sent to the Duke of Mayne, by the horsemen of the present French king by Dreux an. 1589. No number of short weapons can resist the carriere of horse in a plaine ground. The Sa­bines, saith Ab equitibus repentè inuectis turbati sunt ordi­nes Sabinorum. Liu. 1. Liuy, were put out of their araie being suddenly char­ged by the Romane horsemen. The Volscians and In media pri­mùm acie vinci coepti, qua prae­missus equitatus turbauerat ordi­nes. Liu. 3. Aequians after long fight, beganne to giue ground after that the horesemen had broken their array by charging them in the midbattell. The force of horesemen for their violence is called a Procella eque­stris. Liu. 30. tempest. The Romane Dictator im­misso equitatu cùm antesigna­nos hostium tur­baffet legionum signa properè in­ferri iussit. Liu. 4. Generall perceiuing the weakenes of the enemies battel, by char­ging them with his horsemen, did disorder all to the ensignes, after which entrance made, he cut the rest in pieces with his armed men. The Corinthians in a certaine battell, hauing put the Thucid. 3. Athenian footemen to flight, were accoyled, and ouerthrowen by a fewe horsemen. The reason that the horsemen preuailed so much in time past were two: first they seldome vsed any long weapons, but targets and iauelins for the most part: secondly they did then vse to charge with their horsemen, when they sawe the footemen out of array, and not otherwise, if they did wisely,Reliquos om­nes equites no­stri consecuti in­terfecerunt. Caes. bel. gal. 1. This is therefore an other vse of horsemen in the battel, to charge those that are already disordred. The fourth and last vse of them is to execute, and Maxima pars ab equitibus in flumen acti sunt. Liu. 1. pursue those that are put to flight. But those yt leade horsemen are to proceede with great caution: they may not charge pikemen standing resolutely together. [Page 183]The price of their folly that did otherwise, our men did somewhat vn­derstand at Muscleborough field. Neither may they charge shot, or archers that haue a defence, either of a trench, or a hedge, or a wall, or certaine rankes of pikes before them. For in ye case they make them selues markes to the enemie, whom they cannot come at. Further, they had better charge the enemie disarrayed by shotte, or other wea­pons, then when the armie standeth close together. For against an armie well empaled with pikes, yea with halberds close set, and well backed with shotte, horse cannot preuaile, whatsoeuer a certaine Histoire de troubl. de Fr. l. 2. French man in his glorious stile vaunteth of the strength of the French men of armes. Against men out of order in open fielde horse­men worke great effectes, and so no doubt they haue done in these late disorderly braules of France, and did alwayes among Arist. polit. barba­rous nations, which fought out of order. But against an army well ordered, they can do but little. And any small impediment doth make them vnseruiceable. The Romanes although their pikes were not halfe so long as ours: yet did they not feare any numbers of horse. Against the Macedonian pikes, the Persian horse could doe no ser­uice. Neither will the French horsemen looke vpon our pikes well backed with musquets, if they be wise, notwithstanding their great crakes. Nay our archers at Agincourt fielde, founde them not so rough in handling as they would seeme. Horsemen therefore in all expeditions I accompt very requisite for the causes aboue rehearsed, and for that without them, albeit we could foyle the enemie, yet we cannot kill many, nor preuaile against him, that is swifter of foote then we, as Xenoph. ex­ped. Cy. 2. Clearchus both said, and proued by experience in the warres against Artaxerxes. At ye bridge of Burgos in Galicia, where the Spaniards ranne so lightly before vs, we felt what want we had of horse. Of horsemen I thinke it requisite also to haue some part lan­ces, some light armed like to our borderers, and some carbines. The barded horsemē both for their heauines, & great charge, I thinke not very needefull. When Lucullus his men were much afraide of Ty­granes his barded Plutarch. in Lucullo. horses, he willed them to be of good cheere, for that there was more labour in spoyling them being so armed, then in foyling thē: they were so vnweldy. And so it came to passe. For I neuer read yt euer they did any seruice: but in diuers places, that they were foiled.Xenoph. ex­ped. Cyr. 1. Cyrus had diuers barded horses in his iourney against his brother, but there is not any mentiō of any seruice that they did. [Page 184]Darius had multitudes of them in the encounter betwixt him and Alexander Arrian. exped. Alex. 3. at Arbela, and Antiochus in the battell againstLiu. Scipio: but scarce did they giue one blowe to hinder the course of the ene­mies victorie. The armour of the Cataphracti in­habiles ad resur­gendum humi di­labentes cadun­tur. Tac. annal. 17 man and the horse is so heauie, and so boisterous, that if they fall, there they lye, stopping the way to those that come after. Neither can they auoide it, but many shall lye vpon the ground, especially if the pikes stand close, and be well flanked, or backed with mosquettiers shooting ouer their heades.

If we haue fewe horsemen, or not so many, that wee may there­with match the enemie: we are then to followe the prudent deuise of Caesar, both here in Briteine, and in Afrike, and Greece, shewed him by valiant men before him. Before Capua, the Romanes not being able to match the enemie with horse, seconded their men with certeine lusty young men armed lightly, and weaponed with short pikes. Which while their men were at the charge, did so gall the enemie with their pikes, that presently they turned visage. Caesar by reason that his shippes wherein his horse were, helde not their course, com­ming into this Iland had onely 30. horse, yet foyling the enemie with his footemen, with those fewe horses, and the lustiest of his young men he so pursued them, that many remained behinde their company. In Afrike likewise he susteined the charge of the enemies horsemen with his footemen, and after that he had made them turne their backes, did so charge them with some fewe horsemen which he had, that they had no desire to returne thither againe. Secon­ding his horsemen with certaine halfe pikes lightly armed, he not only repelled Pompeis horsemen in Albany, and Scipioes in Afrike; but also vanquished their forces. By the same Caes. bel. gal. 7. deuise before time, he foyled 7000. Gaules well horsed, with a very fewe of his owne ayded and seconded by his footemen. Xenoph. exped. Eyr. 3. Xenophon charging the enemie that would haue fled from him with a few carriage horses, shewed vnto vs, that bad horses serue for a shift to follow ye chace, and run better then good footemen. In the warres of Naples, 12. Italian horsemen fighting in steccato, as they call it, with so many Frenchmen: ye Italians Guicciard. 1. preuailed by this meanes: In the place where they met, the Italians let fal certain iauelins, which those that were first vnhorsed, by the French tooke vp, & ioyning with their com­panions, & striking the French in the faces, preuailed against them. The Admirall of France, at ye encounter of S. Denis by Paris, being [Page 185]ouermatched by the enemy in horsemen, placed behinde euery com­pany, a company of shot, which following the horsemen going an easy trot to the charge, vpon the approch of the enemy auanced them­selues forward, and discharged so thicke and full vpon him: that all his companie came not to the charge, and those that came, were more gentle in handling, then otherwise they would haue beene. This may serue those that are inferior to the enemy, in horsemen. For this nation I trust this discourse is needelesse. For albeit we haue hi­therto had great want of horsemen in our expeditions in France, Flanders, and Portugal: yet there is no reason, that this land should want hereafter, hauing such meanes. There onely wanteth liberall mindes, and good order, that some part of that is now spent in sur­fet, silkes, golden laces, and other vanities, may be employed in kee­ping horses for seruice.

Lances, and Carbines haue like vse in following the victory, and chase. But while the enemy standeth, lances are best employed a­gainst shot, and carbines against pikes. But yet must they take heed, how they do inuest them. In discouering the enemy, and fetching in of victualles, and brideling the enemies forragers, both lances, and carbins, and archebuziers on horsebacke would be ioyned toge­ther. But carbins, and argoletiers are to take heede that they come not neere the lances of the enemy, lest they make holes in their hor­ses sides, if no worse. Where the enemy is in disorder there al sorts of horsemen may do seruice. At Cerisoles after that the shot had made way in the enemies battell, the French entred with their horse a­mong them, and ouerthrew them.

Pikes are the onely defence of footemen against horsemen, if they be taken in plaine ground. Yet doe I not thinke it good, that there should be such numbers of pikes in our armies, as is vsed. For that vse excepted, which I spake of, I see no other great profite they haue. For execution is seldome doone by pikes. Sometime I grant pikes do charge other pikes, but it is not the piquier, that maketh the slaughter. In woodes and shrubbie or brushie groundes, these kinde of long weapons are vnprofitable, and vnweldie. The Germanes by the disaduantage of their long pikes, d being taken in such ground were ouerthrowen by Germanicus, and the Romane targettiers. In straites likewise when souldiers come to lay handes, and haue prize ech on other, long pikes can­nota Longae hast [...] in syluis & inter virgulta, non tam aptae quam pila & haerentia cor­pori tegmina & gladij. Tacit. 2. [Page 186]not beNec minor Germanis ani­mus, sed genere pugnae, & armo­rum superaban­tur, cum ingens multitudo arctis locis praelongas hastas non pro­tenderet, nō col­ligeret. Tacit. an­nal. 2. managed; as the experience of the Romanes fighting a­gainst the Germanes, and Macedonians armed with long weapons teacheth vs. Further the assailants in assaults of townes, and forts haue small vse of them. For there is no vse of horsemen there great­ly; against which pikes are good: neither do the defendants great­ly vse them, saue in the breach. Pikemen are too heauie armed to pursue others, and without shot they cannot well garde themselues, either against shot, or targets. At Muscleborough field a fewe shot opened the Scottish squadrons of pikes, for those that folowing af­ter inuested them. And likewise did the French arquebuziers at Cerisoles deale with the lancequenets, among whose battelles ma­king lanes, they gaue entrance to the horsemen, that presently charged them. And so little defence there is in that weapon, that not onely the Biscaine buckelers entred within them at the battaile of In the dayes of Lewis the 12. of France. Rauenna, where they made a foule tailliada and slaughter, but also the Counte of Carmignola, dismounting himselfe and his company, entred among the squadrons of the Switzers pikes, and cut them in peeces in an other encounter in Lombardie. The Romanes dealing with theSarissae Mace­donicae. Macedonian pikes both in the warres with Philip, and Perseus kings of Macedonia, and of Antiochus king of a great part of Asia, neuer feared to enter vpon them with their targets, nor made reckoning of that weapon. And not with­out cause. For who seeth not, the strength and effect of the pike being in the point, that as soone as targettiers, or other armed men enter among pikes; the piquiers throwe downe their pikes, and take them to their other weapons? the Portugalles did perceiue by the experience of that fight with the Moores where Sebastian their king was slaine, that fewer pikes would haue serued, and o­ther weapons done better effects.

The Switzers that are for the most part piquiers, will not march anie whither without their companies of shot attending on them, for their garde. At Moncontour the Almaine piquiers abando­ned of their shot, were miserably shot to death most of them. For this cause I would haue onely so many pikes as woulde serue for the defence of the army against the enemies horse. The French­men haue but ten pikes to euery companie of shot, which is too lit­tle; yea and sometimes they haue no pikes at all. But he is abused that maketh the French precedentes, and examples to followe [Page 187]in any practice of warre.

The first rankes of pikes woulde bee armed with corsalets of caliuer proofe on the breast: from the twelfth ranke backeward and inward it is sufficient, if they haue anie armes or iackes of male. Brassats, and other peeces of armes, except the head-peece, gor­geron, and corsalet, I thinke to be more, then they can eyther wel march with, or fight with. The Frenchmen in time past had some (calledCruppellarii cō ­tinuo ferri teg. mine inferendis ictibus inhabiles dolabtis & secu­ribus à Romani [...] caeduntur. Tac. 3. Cruppellarii by Tacitus) that were armed, as they saie, de cap en pied. at which the Romane souldiers laughed. For that they were vnable by reason of the weight of their armes, eyther to strike the enemie, or to defend themselues. Therefore did they hew them downe with billes, and pollaxes. The pike I would haue, if it might be, of Spanish Ash, and betwixt twentie and two and twentie foote long, and by his side euerie piquier would haue sword and dagger, and a dagge at his girdle, especially in the vtmost ranks.

The number of targettiers I woulde haue encreased. Not one­ly of such as haue targets of proofe, which are vsed of those that stand in the first rankes, but also of those that haue light targets. These would be made of wood either hooped, or barred with yron. It would be three foote and a halfe in length, (for that was the measure of the Romane shield) & two foot & a half in breadth, in forme ouall. A kinde of armes now disused, but most excellent, in all seruices, saue against horsemen in the plaine field. Against archers targets are a sure defence, and dangerous to the enemy, after that men come to close.

Liu. 27. Scipio with his targetters cut the Carthaginian archers, and slingars in peeces. Romani tela densatis excipi­unt scutis. Liu. 28. Targets are a good defence against stones in an assault, and whatsoeuer is throwen from hand. The same are very effectuall against shot. A small number of targetters if once they come to reach shot with their swordes, put great numbers of them out of the field. Put case that some come shorte; yet sure not manie, considering that onely the first rankes of shot can discharge, and that all doe not hit, and few mortally, especially if the first tar­gets be of proofe, and the men march resolutely to the charge. Nei­ther can shot retire where many of them are in the field, nor saue thē ­selues in any place, but targetters wil come to them. Targetters also are mortall to the pikemen, as not onely the Romanes dealing with the Macodonian and Germane pikes, but also the Biskaines [Page 188]with their bucklers in the battell of Rauenna, and Cirignola de­clared.

Targettiers in execution are singular, and ready, and light, if their targets be light, in following the chase. They may be vsed in all seruices and all groundes. In assaults of townes, and in sal­lies: in fighting in open field, and in streites, in woodes and in hils: in retraites, and in chases there is vse of them. Pikes and horse­men of which the French make such reckoning, are but for plaine ground, and for some few vses: shot can doe nothing in the crowde; for that they want defensiue armes, onely targettiers armed haue this priuiledge, that in all places, and at all times they may be em­ployed of iudicious leaders. The Romanes with their great tar­gets, and swordes, and iauelins which they called Pila subdued the worlde. Other armes as corsalets, and iackets plated, and morions were common to others, these were proper to the Ro­manes, and those that folowed their vse of warres.Germani gene­re pugnae & ar­morum supera­bantur. Tac. 2. The aduantage of their armes experience prooueth to haue beene great. The Ger­manes excelled them in strength of bodie and stature, theBritanni ingē ­tibus gladiis, & breuibus cetris, à scutatis Agricolae caeduntur. Tacit. in vit. Agric. Brytaines, Gaules and Spaniards, were superior to them in number, and equall in courage: but in their furniture, and armes, and manner of fight they were inferior. All Romane souldiers both on horse, and foote for the most part vsed a kinde of targets. But the light armed wanted maled iackets, and had lighter targets; as not onely ap­peareth by their images in marble yet to be seene at Rome: but also in theirHic miles tri­pedalem parmā habet, & in dex­tra hastas, qui­bus eminus vti­tur, Hispaniensi gladio est cin­ctus, quod si pe­de collato pug­nandum est, tran­slatis in laeuam hastis gladium stringit, Liu. 38. & 31. histories. So would I haue our targetters, some armed with light corsalets, and morions, & heauy targets, other onelie with light targets & plated doublets sufficiēt to beare ye thrust of a sword. And if thereto some had short halfe pikes also, the same woulde bee effectuall to throwe at footemen, and good to stand against horse­men.

Halberds and blacke billes, pertisans, borespeares, and pollaxes, and all such like weapons to be vsed in hand, haue one and the same vse with swordes and targets. But neither are the men that vse them so well defended against shot and pikes, nor is that sort of wea­pon so effectuall. If the enemy giue ground they are proper for exe­cution; and may be employed in open field, in straites, in woodes, in assaultes, sallies, and many seruices. Their armes are eyther corsalets, and gorgerons, or plated doublets, or iackes with skirts [Page 189]for defence of the thighes, and morrions on their heades. The Ro­manes vsed few of these weapons. The Dutch place diuers rankes of them among their pikes, and commonly they are planted by the ensignes.

The shot is diuided into mosquetters, caliuers, and archers. The vse of shot is diuers. In open field therewith wee defend our pikes, and with the same offend the enemies pikes. Where the same hath a defence against the force of horsemen, it is verie profitably em­ployed against them. In the defence of a towne, forte, or passage, it is excellent. Likewise for the assailantes therewith to cleare the walles while their armed men mount by breach, or by scale. But the same must take heede of the force of the horse, and charge of ar­med men, which without defence of pikes, or other naturall wall, or banke, the same cannot sustaine. The force of shot is greater in skirmish, then in set battelles. For shot if they bee driuen to stand thicke haue no vse. As the vnprofitable number of shot at the battell of Moncontour, and Dreux: and other incounters in the late warres of France, declare sufficiently. As oft as the enemies shot make coūtenance to charge our armed men, so oft must our shot encounter them: and driuing away the enemies shot, are mortall, if they strike right & thicke, among the enemies pikes. For pikes against shot & arrowes, being heauy armed haue no defence. As the disastre of the Thucid. 4. Lacedemonians at Pylos, of the Romanes at Liu. 24. Trebia, of the Thucid. 3. A­thenians compassed by the light armed Aetolians, of Titurius Sa­binus and his Caes. bel. gal. 5. company at Vatuca of the Almanes at Histoir. de trou­bl. de Fr. Moncon­tour, where heauie armed men destitute of shot and light armed were compassed about and slaine by shot, archers, and slingars, doth declare. In rainie weather they cannot doe almost anie ser­uice. Yet some say, that at Rocheabeille firelockes did I know not what seruice in the raine. But neither in raine nor out of raine are shot assured against horse, or targets, or armed men, but where they haue a defence and retrait. So that I maruell what the French meane to bring into the field so many shot, and so few armed men. At the incounter of Rocheabeille the Protestants had 14000. shot, and De long bois peu ou point. Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 7. scarce anie pikes. But percase they could not otherwise do.

Archers in assaults, and defence of townes cannot do like seruice to mosquetiers, and caliuers. For neyther can they hit so right, nor so mortally. In pight fields I thinke them nothing inferiour to them. [Page 190]For being armed with iackes, as they shoulde bee, when they come to gripes, they driue the shot to his feete: and shooting ma­nie rankes one ouer an others head twelue arrowes shall fall be­fore one boullet. For onely the first rankes of shot discharge vn­lesse they meane to pierce their fellowes. Nowe then that the shot are disarmed, and archers armed: who seeth not that two thousand archers in open field may preuaile against three thousand shot? espe­cially seeing as archers may keepe ranke, and not shot, and archers may fight standing thicke, but shot cannot file their rankes, if they stand thick. Archers therefore in open field may be employed against shot, and likewise against horsemen, and pikes. But if against horsemen; they must haue a defence of stakes, or trenches, or pikes. And likewise dealing against armed men, they had neede to haue a front of armed men.

The archers at Agincourt field, and at manie other battelles haue made the name of this nation famous for the seruice they did a­gainst the enemie. But then they had a defence of stakes and tren­ches.Xenoph. Cyr. paed. 2. Cyrus in his array placed behinde euerie dozen rankes of armed men certaine archers: by which deuise when his enemies came to ioyne battell with him hee preuailed against them, not being able to abide the arrowes that comming ouer the formost rankes light in their faces, and other bare places. And therefore whatsoeuer some say of the vse of bowes and arrowes, which they haue not seene tried, I woulde that among others, our Gene­ralles that goe in seruice into other countries woulde also employ some archers.

Great artillery against troupes standing thicke and in euen ground worketh great effectes. But in other places, and against men ranged otherwise, the sound is greater then the hurte. At Moncontour the Kings ordonance beating among the horsemen ranged hedge-wise, did not in twentie shot hit once. Neither did it anie hurte to the footemen by reason of the vneuenesse of the ground. For eyther it fell lowe, or high. If the same be placed in the front of our armie, yet can not the same be employed past one or two volies. For at the ioyning of the battell, it ceaseth. And if our men march forward it breaketh their arrayes. If the same be placed vpon some hill, yet lying out of leuell and shooting downe­ward, it doth no great hurt.

But let it doe the vtmost that it may, being employed by iudici­ous gunners: yet neuer was victorie obtained by great ordonance in open field, nor the force of the enemy comming resolutely to the charge thereby stopped.Guicciard. lib. 10. Gaston de Fois sallying out of the Ca­stell, tooke the towne of Brescia notwithstanding the number of great peeces that in euery streete were bracked against him. And little did the Spaniardes that sacked Antwerpe Anno 1576. sally­ing out of the cittadell esteeme the peeces, that barked against them at their first sally. The Frenchmen although they had two and twen­tie peeces of ordonance in their campe at Nouara, wherewith they thought themselues safely garded, all the wayes and accesses be­ing by them flanked and beaten: yet Guicciar. lib. 11. were they broken and put out of their lodging by the Suitzers which came against them with­out eyther ordonance, of shot. If then in streetes, and waies where artillery hath greatest force, the same notwithstanding cannot re­pel the force of a resolute enemy, much lesse vse hath it in open field. The Admirall after the vnhappy encounter at Moncontour with the reliques of his army, Hist. de troubl. de Fr. trauersed the greatest part of France, without any one peece of great ordonance. Neither did his com­pany being diuers times encountred by the way, therefore lesse ser­uice. Very troublesome it is in carriage, and no lesse chargeable. Guicciardin reporteth that the breach of the wheele of a canon did so long incomber the whole army, that it lost a good opportunitie, by that delay. The vse of great ordonance therefore is first in garde­ing of towns, or passages: some litle vse it hath in flanking the sides of our campe, or defending the streets, if we lodge in villages: se­condly in battering of walles, or opening of passages. For without ordonance sufficient euery petit castle or town wil scorne vs, or braue vs. In our battery at Coronna wee felt the want of it, but more at Lisbon. The last vse is in the field either in the front of the battell, or vpon some hill vpon the sides. Where if we can see the enemies troupes, & hit amongst them, we shal make them change the ground. The great artillery of the French beating amōg the Italian horse in their campe at Rauenna, made thē come to fight with disaduantage. The which paine the French themselues suffered in their campe at Landresie being beaten by the imperials from a hill, where they had placed their great ordonance, as before I haue shewed.

Thus you may see, how as al weapons may be profitably imploied [Page 190] [...] [Page 191] [...] [Page 192]with good iudgement: so without iudgement they serue for no­thing, but to make a shewe. Now forasmuch as Stratagemes doe worke as much as weapons, and make weapons more effectuall, and because the enemy maketh least resistance, when he is most so­dainly surprised: let vs speake of Stratagems, and ambushes, which tend also to the obtaining of victorie.

CHAP. XIII. Of Stratagemes and Ambushes.

STratagems I call those deuises, whereby the Ge­nerall doeth eyther hurte, or discourage the ene­my, or helpe and incourage his owne men: so called because they proceede from the Generalles head and pollicie, whom the Greekes call [...]. Ambushes the Italians call emboscate, from whence both French and wee borrowe the worde. The reason whereof is, for that in woodes for the most part such trappes are laide. The Romanes doe better terme them insidias, and the Greekes [...], for that wee doe not onely lay snares for our enemies in woodes, but also in hollow groundes, and also beyond hilles, and in val­leis and villages, and townes, and behind walles, and wheresoe­uer we can couer our men, in such sort that we be not espied vntil we come vpon the enemie vpon a sodayne. Stratagemes are infinite, and can not bee comprised within any certaine rules. For what can be so exactly saide, but that the wit of man is able to deuise more, and saie more? some I will set downe practised by famous captains in former time, that by them our Generalles of themselues may learne how to inuent others, and not alwayes kill the enemy with downe-right blowes.

One speciall and yet common Stratageme it is, to couer our counsels and enterprises by contrary pretenses. For by this meanes the enemy looking, or warding one way, is often taken and stri­ken mortally in an other place, and by other meanes. Annibal taking his bedde, and giuing out, that hee was verie Liu. 25. sicke, which rumour flying to the Romanes made them secure, in the night time led out tenne thousand men, and comming on a [Page 193]sudden surprised Tarentum. To the intent that his enterprise might not be discouered, before it tooke effect, he vsed diuers other pollicies. First he sent out diuers light horsemen to range ye countrey, & to kill such as they met, least any should escape, and giue notice of his com­ming, and that the enemy seeing them might suppose, that they were only certaine outriders. hauing an intention to surprise Puteoli, he gaue out, that he went forth with his army to sacrifice at the lake of Ad lacum A [...] uerni per specie [...] sacrificandi, re [...] ­sa vt tentaret Pu­teolos, qui (que) ibi in praesid o erant descendit. Liu. 24 Aruerne. But in the night hee turned toward Puteoli. Consul in Lu­canos ostendir iter cum peteret Gall. am. Liu. 27. Claudius Nero caused a fame to flee abroade, that he went to the countrey of the Lucanians, when in deede hee went into the part of Gallia Togata, that is now called la Marca.

Vnder colour of treaty of peace, many practices of hostility are wrought. Scipio sending men to intreat with Syphax of peace, cau­sed some to espy his campe. Liu. 29. Which gaue entrance to that enter­price, which afterward he executed in the night vpon the same. Me­tellus Salust. bel. Iu­gurth. treating of peace with Iugurtha, did by fayre promises cor­rupt most of his folowers. Both which practices the Spaniards of late time haue vsed against vs. When they entend any dangerous en­terprise, then it is bruted, that either the king of Spaine or their chiefe Leader is dead, or sicke. Vnder pretence of warres against the Turke, An. 1588. he gathered great forces against vs, and nowe I vnderstand that newes is come of great preparatiues in Spaine a­gainst the Turke: that our eyes may be bleared, and not see his pre­paration against France, or vs. By the same deuise hee surprised the realme of Portugal after the death of the Cardinal king. Vnder co­lour of parley of peace at Dunkirke hee brought his Nauy vpon our coast before we looked for it; and I may say before some were well prouided for it. These pretenses though false, yet make shewe, and are beleeued of some, and take simple people, before they be prepared. For when Scipio had put men aborde, and prouided many things, as for a siege: Vt ab eo quod parabat, in alteri­us rei curam cō ­uerteret animo [...]. Liu. 29. Syphax beleeued, that as the brute went, he meant in deede to besiege Vtica, but being in the night inuaded, and see­ing his campe all fired; hee learned with the losse of his army one point of warre, neuer to trust the enemy, when hee giueth out such reportes.

Some vnder colour, and during the treaty of composition haue wound them selues out of danger. Asdrubal being taken by the Ro­manes at an aduantage promised, that if he might be assured to depart [Page 194]out of that place, hee would cary his army out of Spaine: but while the Romanes were secure, thinking that he would not stirre during the treaty of composition, the man by litle and litle had gotten out of the snare into a safe ground. The king of Macedonia sending messengers to treate with the Romanes for the buriall of his souldi­ers, that lay slayne by their campe, in the meane time of the parley remoued his campe out of a strayt, and so escaped. The Massilians be­sieged by Caesars souldiers began to treat of composition. But when by diuers dayes vaine talke they perceiued their negligence, and se­curitie, they sallied vpon the sudden, and burnt their engins, & works, which cost them much labour.

Vnder colour of treaty of peaceLiu. Marcellus espied the walles of Syracusae: and another time entred the towne of Salapia, seasing a gate. Nothing is more commodious for dressing of enterprises a­gainst a towne besieged. The L.In the dayes of Q. Marie. Grey by the trechery of the French entring the trenches, and ditches of Guines during the parley escaped narowly a great danger.

Rumours of succours comming encourage our souldiers, discou­rage the enemy. The Liu. l. 9. & 10. Romane Consull giuing out a report at the time of the beginning of the battell, that another army was com­ming to charge the enemy vpon the backe, made the enemy hea­ring it to doubt, and his own souldiers to fight more courageously.

Vaine shewes doe often deceiue the enemy. Caesar mounting cer­taine slaues, and horse boyes vpon cariage horses, and mules at Ger­gouia, and causing them to shewe them selues a farre off, made the Caes. bel. gal. 7. enemy feare least a company of horsemen were comming vpon them to charge them vpon the backe. Which being practiced long before against the Samnites, Sp. Nautius mulos detractis clitellis, alarijs impositis circum­duxit, quod Sam­nitibus terrorem attulit. Liu. made them feare, & looke about. An­nibal not being able to force the garde that kept ye passage of Calicu­la, binding fagots on the heads of oxen & setting them on fire, driuing them toward ye place, what through wonderment, what through feare, made them to giue way. Martigues seeing the inconuenience of his lodging neere Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 5. Pampron An. 1568. at the shutting of the euening caused all his company to displace, & went away safely, abusing the enemy with fires made, and peeces of matches tyed among bushes. which made the enemy suppose hee had bene there still. The which practice he seemeth to haue learned of Annibal, who fearing least he shoulde bee charged as hee remoued his campe, left diuers tentes [Page 195]standing toward the enemy, & some souldiers & armes, as if the rest had bin stil there, which long before had gained ground, & were gone.

Wordes making for vs comming to the enemies eares doe often strike a terror in them. Quintius the Quintius di­cens Volscotum alterum cornu fugere pepulit Volscos. Liu. 1. Romane Generall crying out aloud, that the other corner of the battel of the Volscians fled, made that where he stood to flie in deede. Valerius Leuinus speaking a­loud, & saying that he had slaine Pyrrhus with his owne hands, holpe to discourage ye enemy. Annibal causing one of his owne men in the Romane Generals name to command the Romanes to flee to ye hils next adioyning, had done them some hurt, but that the guile was per­ceiued. I haue heard some say, that a certaine voyce raised in the eares of the Scots at Muscleborough field, how their company fled, made them both feare, and flie. False sounds also & signes doe often abuse those that are credulous. Annibal hauing slaine ye Romane Consul, with his ring scaled diuers forged letters, whereby he had deceiued some, if ye other Consul had not giuen ye cities round about warning of it. Hauing taken Tarentū, he caused one to sound an alarme after ye Romane note, which caused diuers Romanes to fal into his hands, and the Tarentines to imagine yt the Romanes meant to betray them. more harme it had done, but that the trumpet sounded vnskilfully.

Suborned messengers are dangerous, if credit be giuen vnto them. A certaine Lucanian while Annibal warred wt the Romanes in Ita­ly, led Sempronius a famous leader among them into an ambush, promising him to bring him to ye speech of his countrymē, of whom he feined himself to be sent vnto him. Liu. Annibal causing them of Me­tapontus to write letters to Fabius, as if they were purposed to deli­uer vp their citie into his hands, had almost drawne him into an am­bush, where with his army he lay ready to welcome him to the towne.

Men disguised like women, or like countrey people, or Danaûm insig­nia nobis apte­mus. Chorabus apud Virgil. armed like the enemies entring within their strength doe now and then a­buse them, and giue their felowes meanes of entrance. InHist. de troubl, de Fr. l. 12. these late troubles of France diuers negligent Gouernors haue by these practises bene surprised.

Enemies pretending friendship play many odious partes, & there­fore not lightly to be credited. Before the battell of Cannae certaine Numidians suborned by Annibal, pretending discontentment, and seeming to reuolt from him, in the middest of the hurly burly char­ged the Romanes vpon the backe, and greatly preiudiced them.

Ambiorix vnder colour of friendly counsell trayned Titurius Sabi­nus out of his strength, and taking him at aduantage flew him, and most of his company. Such was Metuo Danaos & dona ferentes. Virg. Sinons counsell, who as Poets feigne betrayed Troy. To auoyde these traps, these rules are to be obserued: first noInimicorum [...]. counsell is to be trusted that proceedeth from the enemy: for who can beleeue that he will counsell vs well, that see­keth onely to doe vs hurt? secondly if any reuolt from the enemy, yet is he not to be trusted, nor suffered to remaine among vs armed, especially if he may hurt vs.

Sometime the enemy by a feined retrayt is drawen into blinde trenches set with sharp stakes, and couered with earth, boughs, & hur­dles, or vnder walles, or banks where our shot lieth ready for him, or els into any place of disaduantage, which was the ruine of Cyrus his army by Tomyris Queene of Scithia, and diuers others, that like blinde men folow where their enemies leade them.

In summe, whatsoeuer tendeth to deceiue, and abuse the enemy, or to incourage, & giue aduantage to our own souldiers; the same ought wise leaders to deuise, & practice. Prouided alway, that they neither breake othe, nor promise nor offend against piety, or the lawes of nati­ons. Let such vile facts be practiced of Turks, & Spaniards, that hire wicked men to kill Princes, and mainteine no othe or promise fur­ther then their profit requireth. Such, Histories doe feine Persidia plus­quam Punica. Annibal to haue bene; and diuers of the Carthaginians; and Plutarch. Ly­sander. Lysander a­mong the Greekes, that tooke pleasure in deceiuing of men with great othes, as some take ioy to deceiue children with small toyes. The proceedings of the Romanes were farre otherwise. They dis­alowed his fact, that would haue betrayed Falisci, and sent him bound to Pyrrhus, yt for money promised to empoyson him. Neither didVal. max. lib. 8. c. 9. Cepio the Romane winne any credit, by hyring the Lusitani­ans to kill their Captaine Viriat. This practice of killing, the Spa­niards learn of certaine bastardly Italians, a degenerate ofspring and race issuing of ye vagrant natiōs of Lombards, Gothes, & Vandales, and ofLiu. 41. Perseus, that had murtherers hyred for wages to kil whom he should appoint, & would haue practiced his trechery vpon ye Romans: a man of a base disposition, and vnworthy so noble a kingdome.

Those stragegemes commonly take effect, that are practiced in matters least feared. That which no man careth for, is neglected, and least can that be Ad id quod ne timeatur fortuna facit, minimè turi sunt homines, quia quod neg­lexeris incautum, atque apertum habeas. Liu. 25. auoyded, which is least feared, as [Page 197]sayth. Cyrus by diuerting the riuer, entred Babylon a way that no mā looked for him: & Scipio passing the lake, tooke new Carthage.

Great are the effects that are wrought by deuises and surprises, but they are discreetly to be gouerned, least going about to deceiue the enemy, we be our selues abused, & intrapped by double practice, as theTratato dop. pio. Italians cal it. So was Anno 1569. Guerchy, and his company ouertaken in the practice about the towne of Bourges, where diuers braue men lost their liues, while the enemy that knew the practice, was ready to receiue them to their losse. King Edward the 3. vnderstanding of a plot layd by the captaine of S.Froissart. Omar, for ye recouery of Calais new­ly by him wonne, turned ye same vpon the heads of those, that should haue executed it, & surprised those that would haue surprised others.

Those therefore that in stratagemes & politike surprises folow the example of others, let them see that their case be like, & their strength equall, & that the matter be handled cunningly, & executed presently. And that ye times be wel measured, that they come neither too soone, nor too late; in which case their enterprise vanisheth to nothing.

Of ambushes.Ambushes likewise well placed, and managed woorke the enemie great displeasures, not onely in cutting off straglers, and such as go on forraging, but also in troubling an army marching or fighting. Annibal in passing the Alpes lost diuers of his souldiers by the incursions of the people of the Mountaines rising out of their holes, & charging his army vpon aduantages. Sempronius as hath bene shewed drawne into an ambush was slaine with his company. The like happened to Marcellus the Consull going to view the side of a hill not farre off. But of this point I haue already brought ex­amples sufficient, where I discoursed of the danger of those that marche in the enemies countrey, without diligent discouery.

Ambushes wel layd, that our souldiers may rise out of them, & sud­denly charge the enemy on the back, or sides as he is fighting, are yee more dangerous, then those wherein he is charged marching, By ye same Romulus ouerthrew ye Fidenians: for placing part of his men in ambush in certaine thickets, and vnder certain hilles neere the town, & prouoking ye enemy to come forth of the towne; he drew him along after him vntill such time, as hee was against the ambush:Trahuntur ad locum insidiarū: inde subito exor­ti Romani trans­uersam inuadunt bostium aciem. Liu. 7. Where turning backe vpon him, and causing those that lay in ambush to charge him on the sides, hee cutte many of the Fidenians in peeces. Annibal before he encountred the Romanes at Trebia, hid [Page 198]certaine Mago Numi­dae (que) simul late­bras eorum im­prouida prouida praeter­lata acies est, ex­orti à tergo, in­gentem tumul­tum, ac terrorem fecere, Liu. 21. horsemen in the marishes, and bushes neere to the places where the armies were to ioyne. Whence rising vpon a sudden, as the army of the Romanes passed by them, they made a great tu­mult, and slaughter, and were in part cause of the victory. With the like practice he entrapped the Romane army at the lake Thrasimene. Behind the hilles vpon the side of the place, where he saw the encoun­ter would be, he placed diuers light armed: and beyond the playne he caused his horsemen to lurke in the valleyes. So that Flaminius was no sooner come to the charge, but he saw his enemy in front, on his sides, and on his backe.Liu. 35. Philopoemen charging the enemy with his light armed, and afterwarde causing his men to flie backe, while the enemyranne disorderly after the chase, hee receiued his owne men within the distances of his armed men, and with them cut in peeces those that folowed. Demosthenes (not the Orator, but a Captaine that liued during the Peloponnesian warre) fearing lest the enemy, that in number farre passed him would compasse him round about, and charge him on the backe; in a certaine valley, and bushy ground nere the place where the enemy made shew to giue the charge, ranged both armed men, and [...]. Thucid. 3. archers, which in the ioy­ning of the battel rising out of their places should charge the ene­my vpon the backe. Caes. bel. gal. 1. Caesar by taking the top of the hill where the Heluetians lay encamped with part of his force, had giuen them a greater ouerthrow, then hee did; but that the mistaking of his men, made him loose that aduantage.

It is the part of a wise leader when hee pursueth, or coasteth the enemy to take the aduantage of woods, valleys, hils, strayts, riuers, and in all places to lay traps for him, that hee may neither marche, nor fight, nor lodge without danger.

But yet in dressing of Ambushes he is to take great heede, first that ye enemy haue no notice of his purpose, & so prouide against him. For by this means traps thēselues are oft entrapped.Caes. bel. gal. 8. Corbey of Beauois lying in waite, where he supposed Caesars souldiers would come to seeke prouision, was himselfe and his company cut in peeces by a greater number then he looked for, which Caesar sent thither ha­uing intelligence of the matter before hand.

Secondly those that lie in ambush must rise suddenly, and execute speedily and courageously, least the enemy putting himselfe in order, and gathering courage giue them more then they came for. Labie­nus [Page 199]had placed certaine felowes in ambush, that should haue char­ged Hi [...]t, de bel. Afric. Caesars army, as the same passed by: but they came foorth so faintly, & irresolutely, that Caesars horsemen before they could doe any thing, had hewen them in peeces.

Thirdly let them beware least while they thinke to doe the feat, the rest of the enemies come on their backes, before they can dispatch. The Liu. 41. Dardanians had well hoped to haue executed a part of the Macedonian army which they charged vpon the backe, as it pas­sed through the countrey; but before they were aware, they were them selues charged by them that folowed after, and were taken as they say betweene the hammer and anuill, and well beaten.

Fourthly when a part of the army is sent to lie in ambush, the rest of the army ought to haue correspondence with it: that as those yt rise vp in ambush doe charge the enemy one way, so the rest of the army may charge him another way, and alwayes be ready to succour their men. Which if they ofCaes. bel. gal. 8. Beauois had considered; they had not suffered their best men to haue bene cut in peeces without reliefe.

The reason that Ambushes doe preuaile so much are diuers: first the terrour that the same strike the enemies minde withall, comming vpon them vpon the sudden: secondly the disorder, and confusion that is in the enemies army surprised suddenly: and thirdly the vantage of ground, which they chuse, and the weaknes of the enemy where they charge him.

Therefore let all valiant souldiers to whom such executions are committed beware, how they protract time, or loose their aduantage, or by vntimely noyse, or stirre giue notice of their purpose to the ene­my, or by stirring before the time cause the enemy to retire before he come within danger. By reason whereof I haue seen some my selfe, but haue heard of many more enterprises that haue come to nothing.

CHAP. XIIII. Wherein is shewed, how the enemy being vanquished, the victory is to be vsed, and the conquest mainteined.

HI therto we haue declared, by what meanes the enemy may be vanquished in open fielde: a marke whereat all valiant Captaines aime, and whereunto they addresse all their actions, and [...]ounsels. Yet all consisteth not so in [Page 200]victory, but that they deserue farre more commendation, that can vse it to purpose, and mainteine that which they winne.Vincere scis Annibal victoria v [...]i nescis. sa [...]de Maherbal vnto him. Liu. 22. Annibal had the happe to ouercome the Romanes in diuers battels, but he had not the wisdome, or happe to vse the victory. And diuers great victories hath God giuen to our nation against the Frenchmen, and many partes of France haue our ancesters possessed, but we could not vse our time, nor Gods graces: nor at this day haue we so much grounde in France, as to builde a fishers cabane in. Therefore seeing it is a miserable thing to say we haue had, when wee haue not, andNon minor est virtus, quàm quae­tere, parta tueri. wise men no lesse consider how they may keepe, them winne: let vs see, if God would so much fauour vs as to suffer vs to winne any thing hereafter, how the victory may be vsed, and our purchase as­sured. Least as the Spaniard foyled by sea, An. 1588. escaped with­out pursuite, or memorable losse, saue of some shippes: so hee or any other might escape againe, so good cheape, and continually returne to inuade vs with hope of victory; at the least without feare of pur­suite, or great losse.

Either the enemies army is altogether vanquished and dispersed; or els some good part there of is retyred entire, and whole. In both these cases what course the Generall is to take let vs nowe consider, beginning with the latter. If the enemy be not so vanquished, but that some part of his army remaineth sound, or at least vnbroken, then is the Generall to follow him, and vrge him while the terrour of the late affright is not yet out of his minde.

Caesar hauing obteined a great victory against the Heluetians, Caes. debel. gal. 1. ceased not to pursue the remaynder so long, vntill all yeelded. And afterward hauing foyled Vercingetorix in the fielde, and cau­sed him to retire with the rest of his army; hee did not Caes. debel. gal. 7. leaue him vntill hee had forced him to take Alexia for his defence; nor then neither, vntill such time, as he had the towne and all within it yeel­ded to his mercy.Caes. debel. ciu. [...]. Vanquishing Pompey in open fielde he would not suffer him to take Sanctuary in his campe, but droue him thence, and rested not, vntill he had taken his flight, nor before the reliques of his army that fledde to the hilles thereby, had yeel­ded, being cut from water. Gaston de Fois hauing foyled the Spa­niards at Rauenna did like a man of iudgement follow the reliques of the enemies army, the reason hee had no successe was, for that hee charged the pikes with his horsemen, which should haue bene [Page 201]done with shot, and with small forces auanced himselfe too farre for­ward, being so euill followed; which cost him his life. If he had char­ged them with shot, and taken the way before them with his horse, or staied vntill he had taken them at aduantage in some straite, where they could not haue kept their rankes, or cut betweene them, and their victuals: without many blowes they had bene forced to yeelde. Scipio after he had vanquished Asdrubal in Spaine, and driuen him to retraite, he so followed him with his horsemen, that the man could finde no rest, vntill he came vnto the vtmost coast of Spaine. Those that after they haue victorie, giue themselues, either to plea­sures, or to rest; for a small rest purchase to themselues great labour, and sometime losse. If Caes, de bel. cin. 3. Pompey, after he had giuen Caesar two re­pulses at Dyrrhachium, had vrged the reliques of his armie, not yet being recouered from their late affright, his successe had bene farre better. The Carthaginians not pursuing their victorie inLiu. 24. Spaine, after the death of the two Scipioes, but suffering the reli­ques of their armies not onely to breath, but also to gather head, were themselues ouercome not long after by those, whome before they had vanquished. When such men erred, it is not maruell, if diuers errors were committed in these late French braules. After the battell of S. Denys, both Protestants, and the kings side departed quietly each from other: and at Moncontour, albeit the kings brother gaue the Protestants a great ouerthrowe, yet he suffered the Admirall to de­part with a great part of his army, and to gather newe forces to re­turne againe the next spring to fight againe.

But may some say, it is not good to driue the enemy to vtter de­spaire, for that constraineth men to aduenture, and to try all meanes to escape.Desperatio vl­tima audere & experiri cogebàt Aequos. Liu. 3. Desperation (saith Liuy) caused the Aequians to aduen­ture, and try their last refuge. The Hetruscians being entered the campe of the Romanes, and being compassed about without way to winde out, fought so desperately, that they slewe one of the Consuls, and many braue men, and had done much more Maiorem cla­dem nisi data via fuisset dedissent. Liu. 2. harme, had not some wiser then the rest, giuen them way to depart out of ye campe quietly. Afterward of themselues they fell into disorder, and were ea­sily vanquished by the horsemen, that pursued them. For this cause, Themistocles said, that a bridge of golde was to be made, for an ene­mie that flieth, that he might depart quietly. All which I yeelde to be true, in such an enemie as flieth without purpose to returne, and [Page 202]which cannot be broken without great danger. But if he purpose to returne, no danger is to be refused, nor labour to be shunned, that he may be broken: which in deede is no difficultie. For he that cannot re­sist whole, can euill resist broken. And therefore this is a controuersie, without firme reason of the contrary cause. Yet in pursuing the ene­mie, I would not haue him so stopped, but that he may flie, nor would I haue desperate men fought withall: but I would haue them with hunger, and disease, forced to accept of their liues, and so yeelding their armes to depart. Which if the French had practised in the con­quest of Naples, they had not so ignominiously bene driuen out thence, by 3 or 4 thousand Bisognos, that they suffered to nestle in 2 or 3 out townes of the Countrey.

But if the enemies forces be vtterly dispersed, and dare not looke vpon vs in the fielde, then the next labour is to besiege their chiefe ci­ties, and that presently while the smart of their woundes is yet fresh. Aswell in Tam secundis quàm aduersis rebus non datur spatium ad ces­sandum, si se Lae­lius cum equitatu victóque Syphace Cirtham praece­dere sinat, trepida omnia se metu oppressurum. Liu. 30. good successe, as in bad, a prudent Capteine may not giue himselfe to rest. Masinissa by shewing himselfe, and his victo­rious companie, before Cirtha, so terrified the same, especially vp­on view of their king, that was taken prisoner, that the same yeel­ded vnto him presently. Great is the terrour of a victorious armie, and sufficient to make any towne to yeelde. The Romanes by the terrour of their victorious troupes led by Quintius Cincinnatus, ob­teined nine townes of the enemies in short space. The Antium pau­cos dies circum­fessum deditur nulla oppugnan­tium noua vi, sed quòd iam inde ab infoelici pugna, castrisque amissis ceciderant animi. Liu. 2. courage of the Volscians was so cooled, after their ouerthrowe by the Ro­manes, that they yeelded their citie for feare, without any force. Therefore Scipio, after the ouerthrowe of Annibals army, brought his forces presently before Carthage, which he draue to accept of composition. If Annibal vpon his victorie at Cannae, had brought his victorious army before Rome, he had proceeded with more iudge­ment. The Rhodians Stratoniceam recepissent Rho­dij post victori­am, nisi tempus in castellis recipien­dis triuissent. Liu. 33. hauing vanquished the enemy in open fielde, spent time in taking of certeine paltry hamlets, and castles: where­as if they had vrged the enemy, as they might haue done, they had taken Stratonicea the head citie of the countrey. There is no towne that dare holde out, without hope of succour.

But may some say, it is a hard labour, to take townes well forti­fied, and manned, and stored with victuals. I grant, if armies that besiege them be such as ours, and so furnished, and the townes haue hope of reliefe. otherwise, as Scipio vidit dissipatum bel­lum: & circum­ferre ad singulas vrbes arma, diuti­ni magis quàm magni esse operis. Liu. 28. Scipio said, it is a matter of more time, [Page 203]then labour. For where the Countrey is spoiled, no townes can long holde out. But that may be done easily, where an army goeth vp and downe victorious without stoppe, or encounter. The reason that the townes of Holland and Zeland, haue so long holden out against the Spaniard is, that they haue both the sea open, and many good friends and fauours in England.

A victorious army not only taketh whatsoeuer towne it besiegeth, but also seaseth the whole countrey. Annibal after the victory at Can­nae, possessed a good part of Italy. After the ouerthrow of their forces by Scipio in Afrike, the Carthaginians could not say, that they had any one towne remaining in obedience. After Caesars victorie at A­lexia, almost all France yeelded it selfe vnto him: so well did he fol­lowe the victorie against Pompey in Epeirus, against Scipio in A­frike, against Afranius and Pompeyes sonnes in Spaine, that with one victorie he assured himselfe of the whole Countrey, and with one enemie fought no more, but once. The French by one victorie recouered all the kingdome of Naples, and by one ouerthrowe at Gariglian, lost it againe. Francis the first, by his victorie at Marig­nan, came in possession of most of the Duchie of Millain, being o­uerthrowne and taken at Pauy, he lost the same againe. The Earle of Warwike, after one victorie in the daies of Henrie the sixt, assured all England to his Prince. Edward the fourth, by one victorie recoue­red the same againe: and if that our ancestors had well followed the victories at Cressy, Poytiers, and Agincourt, the French had not so easily dispossessed them of their holde in France. But what can­not delaies, want of supply, and diuision worke in such cases? First therefore, the armie that is victorious, ought not to suffer the enemie to gather head, but to scatter his forces. Secondly, the same ought to besiege the chiefe Citie, and to sease the Countrey into their handes, not suffering the enemie in any place to rest. The French king after his victorie at Moncontour, besieging S. Iean d'Angeli, lost there the vigour of his armie, which might better haue bene emploied about Rochel. Thirdly, the Generals care ought to be, howe to take away the enemies subiects from them, and to depriue them of the aide of their confederats. A matter not difficult, if he proceede wisely in warre, and iustly after the victorie. for as good successe procureth to the Conquerour friends, so euery one abandoneth, and contemneth the vanquished. The [Page 204] Capuans, and a great part of Italy, reuolted from the Romanes after the infortunate encounter at Cannae. Philip king of Macedonia, be­ing ouercome by Titus Quintius, not onely sawe the departure of his confederates, and friendes; but also the rebellion of his owne subiects. After that the Carthaginians side began to decline in their warres with the Romanes; all their friendes forsooke them. The same disloyall dealing of subiects and friendes, Charles last Duke of Burgundy felt after his disastrous iourney against the Switzers at Granson. Hereupon Philip of Comines taketh occasion to tell a long tale, howe dangerous it is for a Prince to be ouercome in a pight fielde: at which if he had knowne ancient histories, he would not haue made such wonderment. For there neuer was, nor can be other successe looked for in such cases. Wherefore after the victorie, the Ge­nerall is to practise with the friendes, and confederates of the van­quished, and with good conditions to vnite them vnto him selfe. Heerein the opinion of the iustice, and good dealing of the Gene­rall shall greatly further his desire; as is euident by the example of Scipio, and Annibal. For Scipio sending vnto euery Citie in Spaine, those pledges which the enemie had from them, and which he had taken from the enemie; he gotte him selfe much friendshippe: and Annibal after his victorie, dismissing such of the associats of the Romanes, as he had taken without ransome, and vsing them courteously, procured him selfe amongest them great credite of good dealing; so that many did adhere vnto him, and forsake the Ro­manes.

Thus we see howe the victorie is to be pursued. Nowe therefore let vs see howe our conquest may be mainteined, and assured. For want of which consideration, we see whereto the victories of this na­tion in France, and otherwhere are come, and how hardly and charge­ably that which we haue remaining in Ireland, is kept in deuotion, and what is there to be feared, if euer any enemy with resolution and strength, doe there assaile vs. To keepe our conquest, there are two principall meanes both necessarie; Force, and Iustice: for neither without force can those that are rebellious, and desirous of innoua­tion be repressed, nor without iustice can the peaceable be defended, or contented. That Empire (saythId firmissimum longèimperiū est quo obedientes gaudent. Liu. 9. Camillus) is most firme and durable, which the subiects do willingly embrace, and gladly con­tinue. And hard it is to keepe men discontent long in subiection by [Page 205]force. A countrey Imp [...]rium s [...] ­cilè [...]js artibus r [...] ­tinetur, quibus initio partum est. Sal [...]st. coniur. Catilin. subdued, is kept by the same meanes that it was subdued; that is (saieth Salust) by fortitude, industrie, iustice. The vse of force is diuers: First, to repell the enemie if hee come a­gaine, and to keepe him downe that hee looke not vp. Caesar vsed this course in the subduing of France, being alwayes readie to re­presse the disobedient, and the same was vsed both in the subduing of Spayne and Afrike, and other countreys by the ancient Romanes. The French not hauing force readie in Naples and Milan, to encoun­ter the Spaniards that came to molest them in their possession, soone lost prise. Secondly, force is necessarie to subdue rebels and muti­nous persons, that may procure the trouble of the state. The Ro­manes vntill the countrey was quiet which they had vanquished, and vntill euery husbandman and other fell to labour, kept an armie there continually: when the same was pacified, they brought away their maine force, and placed some of their souldiers inhabitants in some strong places in the countrey, which liued vpon the profites thereof, and yet kept the same in obedience. These townes they cal­led Colonies. The Romanes hauing diuers times vanquished the Ea clade con­territis hostium animis, vt etiam vbi ea remisissee terrore aliquo te­nerentur, & Veli­tris auxere nu­merum Colono­rum Romani, & Norbae in mon­tes nouam Colo­niam, quae arx in pomptino esset miserunt. Liu. 2. Volscians and Sabines, and yet seeing them readie to rebell, for to keepe them in order, placed Romanes in the towne of Velitri, and in the mountaines in Norba, to serue as castles among them. Afterward when they had vanquished theTum de praesi­dio regionis de­populatae agitari coeptum. itaque placuit vt duae coloniae circa Vestinum & Fa­lernum agrum deducerentur. Liu. 10. Vestinians, and spoyled their countrey, consulting by what gardes they might best keepe the countrey in deuotion: They resolued to send two Colonies in­to the countrey of the Vestinians, and the territorie neere the hill Falernum.

These townes being peopled with Romanes, and placed in countreys of new conquest, Tullie calleth propugnacles of the Ro­mane empire. Tacitus calleth Cremona a fortresse and Propugnacu­lum aduersus Gallos trans Padum agente [...]. Tacit. 9. propug­nacle against the Gaules beyond Padus. This meanes also other nations haue thought fittest to keepe countreys in subiection. And therefore nothing among them was more vsuall, then to translate in­habitants from one place into another. The kings of Syria hauing vanquished the Israelites, placed a Colonie in Samaria. The Athe­nians taking the IslandThucid. 4. Cythera from the Lacedemonians, re­mooued the old inhabitants, and peopled it with their friends. And against the [...]. Thu­cid. 1. Thracians in defence of their conquest, they sent ten thousand inhabitants into Strymon.

The kings of this realme peopling Caleis with English, kept the same long in their possession, which they lost not, but by force. If they had likewise peopled Rochel, Poitiers, Limoges, Burdeaux, and other townes with this nation; they would not haue bene so hard to keepe, nor readie to reuolt. not doing that, they did soone loose the same by treason. And if Colonies had now of late bene sent in­to Ireland, not as now scattering and disunited, and few in number, but in good strength and vnited by lawes, and dwelling in townes as the Romanes did, I doubt not, but the countrey would bee better assured, and the charge farre lesser then now it is. For the charge of garrisons is great, the insolencie of garrison souldiers greater. And if an enemie come against them, their strength is nothing. If any man say, that it is hard to dispossesse the ancient inhabitants of the countrey out of their dwellings: he considereth not that rebels, and enemies are so to bee vsed; and that if they bee placed other where, it is of mercie rather then desert, which notwithstanding in all cases may not bee vsed. Hard it is, saydPlutarch. apopth. Agesilaus, to be mercifull and wise both together. Yet if inhabitants when the time was, had bene sent into Ireland being voyde in some places, diuers English might haue bene placed without iniurie to any.

To maintaine a force therfore without great charge, the meane is to send Colonies of the English nations into the country conquered. But forasmuch as both garrisons, and sometimes greater forces are required for defence of it; the rentes of diuers cities, countreys and grounds are that way to bee imploied. And to this end the fruits of the roialties are to be conuerted, and corne and prouision to be laid vp in storehouses.

The Romanes taking that course, did in all places where they commaunded, finde meanes to maintaine their armies without a­nie great exactions, yea oftentimes the fruites of the countrey were so great, that beside that charge there came much to the pub­like treasurie.

Charles Guicciard. lib. 1. the eight of France, hauing conquered the king­dome of Naples, and diuided the roialties, yea and the publike store among his Fauorites: when neede required, had almost no­thing to maintaine his armie; and therefore as vnwoorthie of so good happe, presently lost the same agayne. Xenophon in the con­sultation ofXenoph. Cyr. paed. 2. Cyrus and Cyaxaris, sheweth that for maintenance [Page 207]of the warres, and of countreys vanquishe: an armie must bee maintained, and that an armie cannot bee maintained, vnlesse the reuenues that maintaine it be certaine, and continuall.

That lesse force may serue; such as giue suspicion of reuolt, are to bee disarmed: soHerodot. Cyrus vsed the Lydians. The Romanes likewise would not suffer such as were their subiects to Liu. 8. arme with­out their commandemēt. Futhermore, those that are like to prooue heads of factions, are to bee remooued out of the countrey: for sel­dome doe the common people mooue, vnlesse they be stirred by facti­ous heads. The Romanes hauing conquered the countrey of Mace­donia, and conuerted it into a prouince, for more assurance of peace, brought away with them the last Regis amicos. purpuratos, du­cés (que) exe [...]cituu [...] praefectós (que) na­uium. Liu. 45. kings friends and Fauorites, and all his captaines, both of his armie and nauie, and likewise men of apparence and qualitie.

If so be time or sicknesse doe decaie our forces; the same are to bee supplied in time, that the rebellious take not occasion by our weakenesse to make stirres. For want of this consideration, in time past we lost our conquest in France, and all that want it, cannot chuse but loose.

For the rest, if the gouernours of countreys newlie conquered, be carefull and watchfull, & trust no man without cause, & vse equalitie in taxations, and do good iustice against raueuours, bribetakers, and rebels, they need not feare rebellion: if they doe not, all force that may bee vsed, will not long serue to keepe them in subiection. The Liu. Priuernatians desiring peace of the Romanes, and offering to yeeld themselues: being demanded how long they would keepe it, answered plainelie, that if the conditions were reasona­ble, long; if vnreasonable and vniust, no longer then they were forced. For no people can long like of a gouernement, wherein they are spoyled, vexed, iniuried, and to say all in one worde, pilled, and ty­rannised.

CHAP. XV. Containing a discourse concerning the meanes, whereby an armie that is foiled, or feareth to fight may most safely retire: and how the enemie in folowing the course of his victorie, may be stopped.

HOw an armie that is strong in the field, may safely march, fight with aduantage, and vse the victorie, I haue spoken sufficient. But because the successe of [...]. warres is doubtfull, and Mars (as Poets faine) fauoureth [...]. now one, then an another: To perfite this discourse, it remaineth that Ialso declare, how when blastes of winde blow contrary, wee may either retire from the enemie, that seemeth to haue prise, and fast hold on vs in marching or fighting; or els stop his course that hee proceed no further, or els our selues gather new forces.

It is a matter very difficult for an armie that is broken to rallie it selfe, and depart without vtter discomfiture where the enemie know­eth it, and vseth his aduantage. For nothing can be more hardly re­medied, then feare and disorder of the multitude, if once it enter throughly, or the enemie followeth speedilie. If the enemie giueth vs respite, or our forces be not altogether broken, the meanes to saue the rest, and succour those that retire, are these. First, if there be any ground of aduantage in the place, the same is to bee taken with that part of the armie that remaineth intire, which diuided into squa­brons, may receiue their owne people flying within the distances, and repell the enemie from the higher ground. In the meane while, those that are in disorder, are to be brought into order agayne behinde those squadrons.

TheVulneribus de­festi, & pedem referre, & quod mons suberat circiter mille passuum eò sere­cipere coeperunt. Caes. bel. Gal. 1. Heluetians beyng wearried and foyled in the fight with Caesar, retyred to a hill hath by, and there making head, saued the rest. The forragers sent out by Cicero at Vatuca, being charged by the Germanes retired, and defended themselues well, as long as they kept on the higher ground. AtCaes. bel. Gal. 7. Gergouia when Caesars men pressed by the enemie, and briuen from the higher ground began to flie, hee succoured them, and staied the enemies pursuite by pla­cing other squadrous at the foote at the hill, with whom they had [Page 209]no courage to encounter. Neither did Antonius cum cohortibus 12 descendens exlo­co superiore cer­nebatur, cuius aduentus Pom­peianos compies­sit, nostróque firmauit. Cael de bel. Ciu. 3. Pompeyes men that chased Caesars souldiers at Dyrrhachium pursue them, after that they once saw Antony comming with succour from the higher ground. If there be no higher ground neere to retrait vnto; the next course is for those companies that are pressed, to retire within the distances of those squadrons, that stand firme. For this cause the Romanes did alwayes so range their battels, that the squadrons of the first battell might re­tire within the squadrons of the next, and both be releeued within the squadrons of their last. In the encounter at S. Clere Anno 1569, where the Kings Auantgard fled, the same was succored by the bat­tell that followed, which so charged the Protestants, that pursued it, and draue them downe the hill, that if the Lansquenets that stoode at the foote of the hill had not stoode firme, many of them had there bene cut in pieces.

That aduantage which the higher ground giueth, the same a deepe trenche, or thicke hedge, or a straite like wise affordeth: so that if our squadrons, that stande firme be there placed, the rest that are discoura­ged may runne behinde them, and take breath. The Romanes retiring oft times within the fortifications of their campe, haue there againe made head against the enemy, and saued themselues.

If neither the place where the army is ordered, nor the ranging of our battels do admit any such retraite: the last remedy is to auance forward either our horsmen, or some firme squadron of footemen, espe­cially shot and targetters, vpon the flanke of the enemy that chaseth our men: and if hee stay not, then resolutely to charge him. In the meane time those that flie are to be rallyed againe. Annibal in that last battell which hee fought with the Romanes in Afrike, thrise ral­lyed his forces, and so many fresh charges gaue he vnto them. If his souldiers had bene answerable vnto him, or els if the Romanes had not followed very orderly, he might percase haue broken them.Liui. 35. Phi­lopoemen charging the enemy, that followed the chase of his men too egerly; did ouerthrow him. At Rauenna the Guicciat [...]. Spaniards that re­mained after the battel vnbroken, retiring in good order, and vsing the aduantage of the ground, did so receiue the enemy that char­ged them, that they slew the General, and diuers of his company.

Those therefore that retire, Iet them marche resolutely, and or­derly: the shot let them approch neere to the flanks of the squadrons of pikes. There also is the defence of targetters against horse. The [Page 210]pikes let them not disdeine the helpe of shot, and short weapons. The horse are to bee ranged behinde the squadrons, or on the flankes. Which if they be vnited in one body are not easily broken, nor rashly to be charged.

If being neere the enemy thou desirest to depart without fight, at least without Iosse, thy best course is to make him vncertaine of thy purpose, by pretending that which thou meanest not. By making of fires, hauging of matches in bushes, and standing of tentes, the enemy is oftentimes abused, especially in the night. That thy com­panies may make more speede, thou art before thou beginnest to dis­lodge, to sende thy hurt and sicke, together with the baggage and great ordonance before thee, and then to followe with the rest.Sauciorum & aegrorum habita ratione impedi­menta omnia si­lentio prima no­cte ex castris A­polloniam prae­mittit, Ac con­quiescere ante iter confectum vetuit, his vna le­gio praesidio missa est. Caes. de bel. Ciu. 3. Cae­sar departing from Pompey at Dyrrhachium, that he might not be charged at disaduantage in his marche, tooke this course. The sicke, hurt, and baggage of the campe hee sent away first garded with one Regiment. Other Regiments he caused to marche after them some good distance: with two legions that remained hee followed last. And hauing marched so much as he meant to doe that day, and making shewe to lodge there, when the enemy, that fol­lowed was not aware, and vnreaby, hee departed presently, and that day got so much ground, that after ward hee ould neuer be ouertaken, before hee came whither hee meant to goe. If the enemy be ready in armes to follow, it is hard to goe from him, vnlesse the neerenesse of hils, or straites doe fauour thy retraite.

Lest thou be charged in retiring, with the enemies horse or shot, or disordered in some straite; great care must be vses. To represse the force of horsemen, vse either thy horsemen entermingled with some shot, or squadrons of pikes flanked with musquetiers: against shot, vse horsemen in the plaine, and shot and targetters in straites. If thou fearest to be charged in some straite, take the vpper ground with thy shot, and targets, and seeke those aduantages which before I haue shewed thee in the discourse of the vse of diuers weapons, and aduantages of ground.

To stoppe the enemies pursuite, where he must passe a straite be­fore be come at thee, it is a good course to cut downe trees and woods, and to set them on fire. For horse will hardly passe through the fire, nor can lightly passe, but in hye wayes or made wayes. By this meanes Xenophon retired safe with his men from Xenoph. exp. Cyr. 5. Dryla, and [Page 211]the [...]. Bellouacians escaped the handes of Caesar, in the warr [...]s of France.

Pompey being to take shippe at Brundusium, and fearing least if he abandoned the walles, Caesar would enter the towne, and charge his men, as they went on boord,Pottas obstruit, vias platealque inaedificat, s [...]s [...]ar transuersas vijs perducir, ibique sodes, stipiésque praeacutos defi­gir, haec ciatibus teria (que) ina quat, aditus ad portus maximis trabibus praesepit. Milites silentio naues conscendunt. ex­pediti ex euocati [...] & sagittarijs in muro collocan­tur, quibus certo loco actuarias na­ues relinquens signo dato reno­cat. Caes. de bel. Ciu. 1. stopped and dammed vp all the gates and wayes saue one, and in the streetes made blinde trenches, staked them, and couered them; on the walles he placed his archery, and light armed for defence of them, vntill the rest were all shipped: when all the rest were on boord, then did these runne toward the porte, where there were boates and fregates readie to receiue them.

That there may be some ende of flying, either thou art to direct thy course to the hils, and there to make head, as aduantage is of­fered vnto thee, or els to take some strong towne for thy safegard. The Romanes keeping with their army in the higher ground, wea­ried Annibals victorious army, and cut betweene the same, and pro­uision, So long as the Caes. bel. Gal. 7. Gaules kept on the higher ground, and straited Caesars victuals, hee coulde not hurt them. D. Brutus in ta­king of Mutina arrested Antonies army, that was going into France. The retraite of Vercingetorix into Alexia, stayed Caesar a great time in that siege, in which meane time the Gaules leuied newe forces. The siege of townes doe oftentimes, breake the force of an army. The Protestants finding no resistance in open fielde, were har­rassed, and tyred out in the siege ofHist. de troubl. de Fr. Poytiers: and like hap had the aduerse party. For being victorious at Moncontour, they lost all vi­gour, and strength at the siege of S. Iean d'Angeli.

That thou doe not receiue dishonour by retiring; two things thou art especially to haue regard vnto: first, that thou doe not leaue be­hinde thee, thy sicke and hurt men; secondly, that thou doe not loose thy carriages, and baggage, nor leaue them. For without them, thou canst neither commodiously cary armes, nor victuals with thee, nor mainteine thy company.

To do whatsoeuer in this case is requisite, nothing is more auaile­able, then expedition. By that thou dispatchest all impediments, thou winnest ground, thou preuentest the enemy, thou sanest thy selfe, and thy friends. And therefore if in good successe: much more in calamitie, ought we to vse all celeritie. Afranius being almost past all danger, yet for idlenesse suffered the enemy to come betweene him, and his retraite, which Caes. de Bel. Ciuil. lib. 1. was his ruine.

These things they hinder and stoppe the enemies proceeding for sometime. But if thou meanest to driue him out of the countrey, or to hinder him for winning any more ground; newe forces must be le­uied, and an army sent into the fielde, if not to fight with him vpon eauen grounde: yet to watche all aduantages, and to succour where neede shall require. Further thou must fortifie all townes neere, where the enemy lyeth. This was the proceeding of the Romanes against Annibal, and of the Gaules against Caesar. Philip the KingPhilippus in­tra Tempe stati­uis positis, vt quisque locus ab hoste tentabatur, praesidia per oc­casiones summit­tebat. Liui. 31. of Ma­cedonia after his ouerthrow by the Riuer of Aous, encamped with his forces in tempe a place of very hard accesse; put gardes in the cities rounde about; and as any citie or castle was assailed by the enemy; so hee succourd the same with men, and other necessary prouision. But in this course two things we are to take heede of, first that we doe not take vpon vs to defend townes either weake by situation, or want of defence, or els that want things necessary for to susteine a siege. Secondly that we doe not suffer the townes that are besieged to languish without hope of supply, or succour.

For mainteyning of our credite with our friends and confederats, which commonly yeeld to follow the current of good, or bad successe: if in the fielde we receiue some checke, yet are wee as much as wee can to couer our hurtes, and diminish the credite of the enemies vic­torie. Caesar hauing receiued some losses atCaes. de bel. Ciu. 3. Dyrrachium, yet would hee not acknowledge them to his souldiers, but ascribed the slen­der successe of his enterprise to errour, rather then to the enemies force. Vercingetorix after the losse of Auaricum, where a few one­ly of many escaped, and that in pitifull plight;Caes. bel. Gal. 7. apparelled them, and hid their deformitie, and diminished with the best wordes hee could the losse of the towne. The Heluetians likewise being foyled by Caesar at the passage of the riuer of Sone, did diminish the nomber of those, that were ouerthrowne, and assigned it rather to casualtie, then vertue. Nothing doeth more Charles duke of Burgundy by ambassadors sent to Lewis the 11 of France, coue­red the losse re­ceiued at Morat. Phil. comm. discourage souldiers, then when they see the Generall himselfe by the greatnesse of the cala­mitie discouraged. This caused the souldiers of Domitius to for­sake him at Corfinium, and to yeelde the towne to Caesar. Liu. 23. Var­ro the Romane Consul, discouering vnto the Capuans the wants of the Romanes, and the great calamitie they had receiued at Cannae, thereby thinking to mooue pity, mooued them rather to reuolt, as despairing that the Romanes could euer recouer themselues after [Page 213]such an ouerthrow. TheLiu. 31. vgly sight of the Macedonians slaine and mangled by the Romanes, which in wisedome the king should haue couered, did greatly terrify the army, when to praise them, he shewed them openly.

Finally, as all calamities, ouerthrowes, and mishaps do proceed from contempt of religion, iustice, and military discipline; so there is no hope to repaire our losses, but by restoring the worship of God, by administring of good iustice, and strict obseruance of military or­ders. The Romanes as they lost their city, and were ouerthrowen by the Gaules at Allia for their contempt of these things; so restoring matters to their ancient forme recouered the same againe, and after­ward had great good successe in all their enterprises. Againe, when in the times of the latter emperours, that state was giuen ouer to all impiety, and iniustice, and vtterly neglected the lawes of armes, by which that empire had growen so great; the same fell into vtter ru­ine. For who can expect good successe in warres, that neglect the worship of the Lord of hostes the supreme moderator of all warres? As long therefore as religion and iustice is troden vnder foot, and hy­pocrisy, and shewes of ceremoniall reformation, and Iewish toyes goe for good religion, and the goods destinate to the seruice of God, main­teinance of vertue, and learning, and reliefe of the poore, are made a spoile of harpyes and rauiners, and Gods ministers made a scorne of euery leud railing companion, and honors are solde for mony, and dis­loyalty, and treason, and all villeiny redeemed with bribery, and glo­ry is placed in stones, silkes, and strange fashions; and men of value contemned for pouerty, and vertue despised as dust, and wealth e­steemed as felicity, and learning rewarded with almes, and valiant souldiers cast of with proud and disdainfull words, and base rascals command, and ouerrule vertue, and law with wealth and fauor; and mens skinnes are not valued at the price of dogges skinnes; and no man may do his countrey seruice, but he shall therein endanger his honor, state, and life, and no man careth for the common cause; but euery man abuseth his honor, and authority, either to enrich himselfe and his brats, or to winne money, and wealth, to spende the same a­gaine in surfet, leachery, and excesse: so long neither can any nation haue victory, nor loosing can e­uer recouer their losse

CHAP. XVI. Wherein is shewed how martiall men proceed in the sieges of cities or fortes.

THus hauing declared what practise of armes requi­reth in accoiling the enemy that hasteth forward to the obteining of a full victory: I am now to returne to speake of him, that hauing driuen his enemy out of the field, maketh him to take sanctuary within some fort or city. for that is rather the beginning of victory, then the end of warres, and therefore may he not so suffer him to escape, nor lay downe armes, before he command as well in the townes, as in open field. Wherein that he may proceed orderly, and loose no labor, nor cost, which of all other actions of warre is greatest in sieges: (Thucidides reporteth that the Athenians in the siege of Potideaa spent aboueThucid. 2. Two thousand talents of Athens passe that summe. 350000 pounds sterling) first he is to consider what townes are first to be besieged, and assaulted: secondly by what meanes he may preuaile against them, and winne them.

Of townes therefore that do make resistance against vs, those are first to be besieged, where the General of the enemies is retired with his forces: if he be gone farre away: then we are next to beset those townes, which for their authority, or conuenient situation do cary with them the rest of the countrey: and if warres be so managed, that our forces will not serue both to besiege the capitall city of the coun­trey, and to represse the courses of our enemies intercepting our vit­tualles, then are we to go on forward orderly in the countrey, and to leaue no towne behinde vs, that may stop the conueyance of our victu­alles. Caesar pursuing Vercingetorix made him take Alexia for his retrait, and there besieged him. Annibal to terrify the Spaniards, and to enforce them to submit themselues to the empire of the Carthagi­nians, assaulted, tooke, and sackt Carteiam vrbē opulentam caput gētis eius expug­nat, diripit (que). quo metu perculsae mi­nores ciuitates sti­pendio imposito imperium acce­pere. Liu. 21. Carteia the principall city of the countrey, wherewith other small cities were so dismaid, that they submitted themselues, & paid such tribute, as he imposed on them. and translating the warres into Italy, he beset, and tooke Taurinum ca­put gentis expug­nat. Liu. 21. Taurinum the head city of all the countrey at the foot of the Alpes, which made all the townes thereabout to yeeld themselues. The Athe­nians inuading the Iland of Sicile, made the attempt against Syra­cusae, being the head city of the countrey, first: which course both the [Page 215] Carthaginians, and Romanes in the Sicilian warres pursued. The prince of Parma in the siege of of Antwerpe had like respect, and rea­sons to make him begin there. for commonly all the countrey doth fol­low the condition and proceeding of the capitall city. Lautrec in the enterprise of Naples, spending time in taking paltry townes by the way, when his purpose was to go directly to the siege of Naples, did tire his army, spend his men, and loose time, which the enemy spent better in arming himselfe. In our iourney to Portugall, many do likewise mislike, that setting our course for Lisbone, we turned aside to Coronna, which was no small hindrance to vs, and helpe to the e­nemy. In besieging of small townes, there is often as much labour and cost, as in greater; and little or no gaine. Those therefore, that when they may goe to the head, are paltring about small townes, or castles, are like vnskilfull souldiers, that whē the hart lieth open with­out defence, are still striking at the hand or foot. but if our force serue not to besiege the strongest towne of the enemies countrey, yet before we sit downe before any towne, let vs see what commodity we may get by taking it. Scipio considering that new Carthage in Spaine was a fit port for ships, and the store house of the enemy, and a place where his treasure and hostages lay, did begin the warres with the siege of that towne. Annibal made many attempts against Nola, and Naples, for the desire he had to haue a port in Italy, that lay com­modiously against Afrike. failing of these, at length he got Taren­tum, and Locri. For the same cause he made reckoning of Salapia. for it lay conueniently in the midst of the country, and was very com­modious for the conueyance of victuals to his army. King Edward the third, after his victory at Cressi, sat downe before Caleis, for that it was a commodious port for his enterprises against France. Those that spend great labour in winning paltry hamlets, as did the French king that was also king of Poland, in the winning of Liuron in Dauphinè, although they winne the place, yet winne nothing but re­pentance: and if they faile; scorne and losse.

Townes are taken diuers wayes: viz. either by siege, or by assault, or surprise, or by all, or two of these ioyned together. in euery of which, the proceeding is diuers, as the endes are diuers. The end of a siege is to strait the towne, so that either for want of victualles, water, mu­nition, souldiers, hope of succour, health, or other commodity, the same be driuen to yeeld. The end of a surprise is slily to enter the [Page 216]towne without knowledge of the enemy. The end of an assault, is to force the enemy to giue vs entrance. This diuersity of endes may teach vs both what to do, and what to auoyd.

The end of sieges being to force the enemy to yeeld for want: we are to vse all deuices and meanes to make him spend his store, and to increase his want. Alexander king of Liu. 7. Epeirus, hauing a purpose to besiege Leucadia, suffered all the countrey people that would, to enter the towne, that they within might sooner spend their vi­ctualls. When they ofCaes. de bel. Gal. 7. Alexia besieged by Caesar began to send out women, and children, and aged persons, such as onely serued to spend victualles; they could not be suffered to passe. The French king that now is, did otherwise in the siege of Paris, an. 1590, moo­ued with Christianity, and pity. but the practice of warre required rather rigour in that case. In Non facile est simul misereri, & sapere. which hard it is, both to shew mer­cy, and wisedome together. Where the defendants are not more po­litike then ordinary; there the assailants may also by false shewes, and fained escaladaes make them spend their powder in vaine. In these late troubles of France, while the braue souldiers within a cer­teine place, shotte all the night at certeine matches conueyed from place to place, and at an asse, or two, that made a stirre in the towne ditch, in the morning they began to yeeld for want of powder. Caesar by a Caes. bel. Gal. 8. mine comming to the vaines of the spring that serued Vxel­lodunum, tooke away the water from the towne, and so forced the same to yeeld. Thucid. 1. Megabazus besieging the Athenians in the Iland Prosopis in Aegypt, by a deuice turning away the water that ran in­to the hauen, where their ships lay, set their ships drie, and gaue en­trance to his men, & tooke away all escape from the enemy, whose ships were on ground. The towne of Chartres in France had like­wise for want of water, and other necessities bene driuen to great straits in the siege, an. 1568, the Protestants turning away the ri­uer out of the channell; but that by conclusion of peace, the siege was broken vp shortly after. Caesar by keeping Pompey in a short com­passe of ground, by his entrenchments had almost famisht all his horse, in which consisted his speciall strength. Which gard and dili­gence if the Protestants, anno 1569, had vsed in the siege of Poi­tiers, they had not onely famisht all the horse of the enemy, but other­wise hurt him. but they did not so much as barre the wayes, much lesse other ground so, but that he sallied at pleasure.

There are two meanes principall to stoppe the towne besieged from victuals, and things necessarie, the one of which must necessari­lie be vsed, if wee meane to atchieue our purpose: the first is to en­trench the towne round about, if it be a land towne; if it stand vpon the water, then to cast a banke about it on that part that is toward the land, and with ships or boates, to garde and stop the way to the sea, or water. The second is to barre the wayes, and vpon all places of ea­sie accesse to make in conuenient distances, sconces or fortes. The first is more laborious, but very effectuall: the second is easie, but seldome taketh effect, vnlesse time & the weaknesse of the enemie doe helpe vs. Therefore was that course alwayes vsed of antiquitie, this seldome, vnlesse it were of such as either knew not what to doe, or had not means to doe more. The Lacedemonians besieging [...] &c. Thucid. 2. Platea, cast vp a banke round about the towne, the same they garded with turrets built vpon it in equal distances, and least any might climbe ouer it, they made a strong Palissade vpon it, and did sticke it ful of stakes. TheThucid. 1. Athenians vsed the same circumuallation about Potidaea, which they compassed round with a strong banke & deepe ditch. Be­sieging [...] Thucid. 1. Miletū, that part that was toward the land, they compas­sed with three bankes and so many ditches, and with their ships so crossed the hauen that none could enter or issue that way. Caesar v­sed yet more labour in besieging of townes in France. Before Alexia first he made a trench 20 foote broad round about the towne. This trench was neerer to the towne then his campe by 400 pases. Be­side that he made two other trenches without that, each of them was 15 foote broad, and behind the vtmost of the two, Caes. bel. Gal. 7. a banke of 12 foote hie with a parapet, and crenels vpon it. For garde whereof he caused sharpe forked stakes to be made fast in them. Vpon the banke he built turrets round about, one of them in distance from an other 80 foote: in the ditches he pitched sharpe stakes, and them couered with hurdles, and earth. The ground betwixt the trenches he set full of sharpe stakes, and boords full of sharpe nailes with the points vpward: and all this frō his campe inward to the towne. The like trenches and banks, and turrets, he made round about his campe without, for defence against those that should come to relieue ye towns­mē without. Things now incredible to be reported but then cōmonly vsed. In few daies he compassed the citie Vallo pe [...]um 12 in circuitu 15 millium, crebris­cum castellis cir­cummuniti erant Aduatici. Caes. bel. Gal. 2. of the Aduaticans, with a banke in circuit 15 miles, in height 12 foote: vpon the same he [Page 218]made turrets, & without it a deepe trench. The same proceeding he vsed in the siege of Vtica in Afrike, & long before him Scipio, besie­ging the same towne.Fossa & vallo vrbem circum­dat, castella ex­citat modicis in­teruallis. Liu. 25. Fuluius in the siege of Capua, toward the towne did make a ditch of a great breadth, and vpon it hee raised an high banke with turrets vpon the same round about the towne, and the like defences he made against the enemie without, so that not so much as a messenger could goe out, nor any succour come in for to helpe ye townsmen. The same course another Fuluius vsed in the siege of Ambracia, as Liuie testifieth. The Gaules at length percei­uing the great commodity that these works brought with thē in effec­ting their purposes in sieges, albeit vnacquainted with labor, yet be­siegingCaes. bel. Gal. 5. Quintus Cicero his campe, cōpassed him in with hie banks, and deepe trenches, imitating all such works, as they had seene the Romanes to make before them. Annibal perceiuing that the castle of Tarentum which he besieged, had the sea open, perswaded the Taren­tines to goe to sea, and to stop the passage that way, which if they could haue done, in the end percase they might haue preuailed. But the Ro­manes were too vigilant, and sent them within succour in time. If Lautrecke likewise had compassed them of Naples round about with banks and trenches, and stopped the hauen so, that no victuals had bene brought into the towne by sea or by land, hee had not fai­led of his enterprise in taking the citie. But now adayes our great commaunders thinke euery litle thing much, and our souldiers are so idle and proude, that they will not worke. If with certaine Pioners they cut the high wayes, and make certaine Barriquades vpon them, and erect fiue or sixe weake sconces which are euill ter­med fortes being of no strength nor value, they thinke they haue done much, yea more then ordinarie, either by water or by land they leaue the towne open, so that seldome they come to the ende of their desires.

The French kings brother that was afterward king of Poland besieging Rochell, an. 1573. did not so much as cut the wayes so, but that the townsmen diuers times sallied out vpō him both with horse, and foote. Long was it ere his ships were come to barre the hauen, and when they were come, yet did they not so well gard it, but that both ships with munitions & victuals, and messengers entred & issued diuers times. At Poitiers besieged by the Protestants, an. 1569. mat­ters passed farre worse. They neither barred the plaine, nor the waies [Page 219]with any sufficient trenches: succours entred, horsemen and foote­men sallied diuers times. To this passe idlenes hath brought sieges, that few take effect. But let not our souldiers be ashamed to doe that which the Romanes did, and practise of warre requireth. Nay that va­liant prince R. Edward the 3, hath shewed them by his example, what they should doe. for besieging Caleis, he compassed it with a sufficient ditche, and banke, so that none could sally out, and for defence of him­selfe, against such as should come with succour from without, he made the like workes outward, and in the ende preuailed. So likewise townes besieged are to be enuironed with bankes, and trenches, and with the same our campe is likewise to be fenced. The vse of the sea is to be taken from them with shippes, as Marcellus did in the siege of Syracusae, and Scipio in the siege of newe Carthage, and Vtica. If the same stand vpon riuers, the same are to be barred with bridges, asLiu. 2. Porsena practised in the siege of Rome, and not long since the Prince of Parma in the siege of Antwarpe.

If men will not take the paines to enuirone the towne with bankes and trenches round about, yet must all hie waies and streetes, and easie accesses, at the least, be well trenched and defended with bankes; and sconces built in diuers places for the hinderance of succours, and stopping of sallies. The Duke of Alua did so in the siege of Arlem, The Prince of Parma in the siege of Maestricht, and in diuers other places. Those which take diuers castles, or els newe builde them two or three leagues distant from the Towne which they besiege, thin­king thereby to famish the Townesmen besieged, seldome effect their purpose. The Protestants, anno 1567, seasing Pont Charenton, Pont S. Clou, Busenual, S. Denis, & other places neere Paris, thought to keepe it from victuals, but the distances from Paris, and of one place to another, were so great, that euen the Countrey people pas­sed out and in betweene, almost at pleasure. The practise of the Earle ofFroissart. Flanders, that tooke like course in famishing of Gant, in the dayes of Edward the thirde, was likewise made frustrate.

First therefore the townes besieged are to be enuironed either with a banke, and trenches, or els with sconces very neere to the walles. Secondly, the same are to be kept with strong gardes, and diligent watches, that none enter in, or passe out: for defence whereof, ye banks are to be made high, and well flanked; & the ditches deepe, that they [Page 220]be not easily filled.Duae legiones semper pro ca­stris excubabant. Caes. bel. Gal. 7. Caesar lying before Auaricum, kept two legi­ons alwaies ready in armes to defend his works against the sudden sallies of the Townesmen. And such was his garde and watchfulnes in his sieges, that albeit theCaes. bel. Gal. 2. Aduaticans that were another time by him besieged, presuming vpon his securitie, had thought, during the treatie of peace, to force him to breake vp his siege by a sally: yet he had men sufficient ready to repel them. The Romanes neither in time of warre, nor truce, day nor night, were so secure or negligent, but that alwaies they kept good garde, and watch. Those that there in procee­ded weakely, or negligently, haue endangered themselues, & bene oft times forced to rise without doing any thing. Lewis ye Philip Comi­nes. 11 of France, and Charles of Burgundy, lying in the suburbes of Liege, a towne by them besieged, without either good watch, or stronge garde, or defence, escaped very narrowly taking, by them that sallied in the night out of the towne. Amilcar Polyb. besieging a towne in Sicily, was taken in his campe by those that sallied out vpon him in the night: which if his fortification had bene good, or his watch diligent, could not haue happened. The Thucid. 5. Athenians besieging Amphipolis, & lying without sufficient defence, or watch, were defeated by Brasidas the Spartan. By like negligence, succour, & victuals entred into Naples besieged by Lautreck; into Poytiers besieged by ye Protestants; in­to Rochel, besieged by the French king after ye massacre, anno 1573. Philip of Macedonia, lying before Apollonia without suspicion, or de­fence, against the enemies sallies, was forced to rise, yea and to runne, forced by the Townesmen aided by certeine Romanes. Francis the French king was taken, and his army defeated before Pauy, by those that came to the succour of the towne, which could not haue happened, if he had laien within any sufficient trenches, or had but well garded the waies, and passages. Trebonius lying before Massilia, hauing his workes and engins almost destroied and fired by the Townesmen, during the treatie of composition, teacheth vs not so to trust the ene­mie at any time, but that we haue a sure garde, and diligent watch. That is the onely remedie against sallies from within, and succours from without.

Further, as we are by this meanes to proceede against the enemy besieged, so are we to take heede that by want, or disorder among our selues, we be not forced to depart with scorne. Caesar sate downe be­fore no towne, but he knewe howe, and where to haue victuals, and [Page 221]all prouision necessary for a siege. TheCapua obsideri caepta, quae (que)ue in eam rem opus erant, compor­tabantur. Casili­num frumentum conuectū, ad vul­turni ostium ca­stellum commu­nitum, vt & mare, & flumen in po­testate essent. Liui 25. Romanes going to besiege Capua, prouided corne and all things necessary, and tooke such order that both by sea and land they had supplies cōming to them. Caesar at the siege of Massilia, caused al stuffe necessary to be brought into his campe: neither victuals nor engins, nor instruments to worke withall, nor any thing was wanting. In all sieges the Romanes pro­ceeded very orderly both in their prouision and gouernment. Their men lay dry in tents, strong within defenses, they had meate and vic­tuals, the sicke and hurt had reliefe. But in our times, and also in an­cient time for want of gouernement in these cases, many calamities haue happened, and many sieges haue bene broken. In the late siege of Rochel the kings souldiers for want of victuals were famished, for want of things necessary, and good gouernement, sickenes grewe a­mong them. The same was the cause of the ruine of the army of Pro­testants before Poytiers, of Lautrecks enterprise against Naples. Charles duke of Burgundy lying before Nancey, discontinued his battry for want of pouder: in the meane while succours came that raysed his siege. The siege of Charitè Anno 1569, was raysed be­cause the Kings souldiers sate downe before it, before they had suffi­cient prouision with them.Qu. Cur. lib. 4. Amyntas lying before Memphis was discomfited, and driuen to raise his siege, for that his men were ran­ging about the countrey, when they should haue bene ready to de­fend their campe, and repell the enemie. The same error was com­mitted by Francis ye first of France before Pauy, who suffring his men to disband and straggle abroade, diminished his forces, so that he was not able to resist the enemy that came vpon him. In winter if that souldiers do not lye drie in their trenches, and lodgings, and haue fire: the weather and season forceth them to rayse their siege. This broke the enterprise of the English against Zutphan anno 1567. The same incommodities forced Guicciard. lib. 5. Caesar Borgia to rise from before Faenza well beaten with winter, raine, and foule weather.

Therefore ought wise Generals before they sit downe to besiege any towne, to consider the time, and to examine whether he hath suf­ficient force and prouision to effect such a matter.Multa magnis ducibus, vt non aggredienda, sic non deserenda. Liui. 24. Many things are not to be attempted of wise leaders, yet being once begunne are not lightly to be giuen ouer, as Marcellus said. The towne of Secca in the kingdome of Naples being besieged and not taken by the French, assured that whole state vnto Cōsaluo, as saithGuicciard. lib. 6. Guicciardine. [Page 222]The checke we had at Coronna in our voyage of Portugall did not a litle discourage vs.Perseuerantia in omni genere militiae maximè tamen in obsi­dendis vrbibus necessaria est, quatum pleras (que) munitionibus ac naturali situ inex­pugnabiles, fame sitique ipsum tempus vincit, ex­pugnat (que). Veget. Perseuerance, and constancie in euery action of warre preuaileth much, but most in the sieges of cities, as is eui­dent by the great patience, and constancie of Caesars souldiers in the siege of Auaricum, and Alexia. For many townes that by natu­rall situation are inexpugnable, by hunger and thirst, and want of things necessary, are taken in continuance of time.

That the Generall may both prouide sufficiently, and know perfit­ly how to encounter the enemy; it is requisite that hee not onely haue intelligence of his proceedings within the towne, but also of his suc­cours comming without. For that cause hee is not onely to haue his espials and discouerers abroade, but also (if hee can) his in­telligences within. TheGuicciard. succours that came to Florence were by this meanes defeated, or euer they came neere. The Generall ought alwayes to be watchfull, yet shall these intelligences hurt him nothing.

That his victuals and prouision may come to him safely, the Gene­rall that besiegeth any place, is to place garrisons in conuenient di­stances from his campe, and to haue his horsemen to encounter such as lye at receite in the way. Thus by labour, and foresight he shall be able not ouely to keepe the enemy short; but also to prouide suffici­ent for his owne people, so that hee may mainteine them in heath, strength, and good order.

Those that haue no firme hope to obteine the citie besieged but by famine, and want, ought notwithstanding, as occasion shall bee offered, to attempt the same by surprise also, yea and by assault. By surprise townes may be taken diuers wayes, sometime by meanes of intelligence with some friendes within the townes, sometime by Mine, sometime by escalade, and sometime by some priuie entrance. Intelligence is sometime procured by money, sometime by friend­ship. Philip of Spaine hath no lesse of late time preuailed by money, then by force. Belike he hath learned of Philip king of Macedonia, that no castle is impregnable, where an asse laden with golde can be admitted to enter. Tarentum was taken by Annibal in the night, and againe recouered by Fabius by meanes of intelligence, which either of them had within the towne. The castle of Rome was bought by the Sabins in the time of Romulus. Byzantium was bought of certaine traytors by Philip king of Macedonia, But what neede [Page 223]I bring examples of this, seeing now adayes the the practise of buy­ing and selling of townes is a matter so common?

But let those that buy and sell, and likewise those that go about to surprise others, take heed first ofTrattato Do [...] ­pio. double dealing, next that the ene­my be not made of the party, and get notice of our enterprise. By double dealing many thinking to surprise others, haue themselues bene surprised, as before I haue declared by the example of the cap­t [...]ine of S. Omar, that would haue bought Caleis of the Italian, to whom King Edward the third had committed it to be garded, and by the enterprise against Bourges, anno 1569, and diuers enterpri­ses against Rochell, and Montauban, in these late warres of France. The surprise that Annibal entended against Salapia, was vented, and his men slaine that went about to execute it.Liu. 43. Appius Claudius thinking to surprise Vscana a towne in Illyrium (now Sclauony, while he neither kept pledges of the men that offered the towne, nor scut any espialles before, to vnderstand how matters went) fell into a trappe layd for him by the way, and lost 8000 souldiers. The Guicciard. lib. 3. Spaniards that thought to surprise Gifona a towne in the king­dome of Naples, were no sooner entred, then they were cut in pie­ces 500 of them: so were some of the prince of Parmaes souldiers vsed not long since at Berghenopsome.

The way to auoyd double dealing, is first to assure our selues by pledges of the wiues, or children, or friendes of those that deale with vs; secondly by examining those straitly, that seeme to make offer to giue vs entrance; thirdly by fending espialles before both into the place, and about the place, to consider if they can see, or heare any thing, that is suspicious. Fabius by strict examination of the messenger, vnderstood the treachery of them of Metapontus, that vnder colour of deliuering vp the towne, would haue drawen him into a trappe.

That our enterprise be not discouered, great celerity, and cau­tion is to be vsed, when wee goe about to take a towne by surprise. Matters long in hammering, seldome take effect. While Marcel­lus lingred in making his preparatiues to surprise Syracusae, in the meane time his partisans were discouered and slaine, which also happened in a certeine enterprise of the Protestants against Lyon; and of the Kinges side against Rochell in these late brabbles of France. Further wee are to chuse such a time of the night, and [Page 224]such weather, as may best couer our desseins. Those that take our part within the towne are to be admonished, that they doe not be­wray themselues by meetings, or words, or signes, that may be suspi­cious. we must also take heed, that our company that are employed in the enterprise, do not giue any signe, or make any vntimely noyse, whereby the enemy may haue notice of our purpose. The Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 5. towne of Diepe had bene surprised by the Protestants, an. 1569, had not one witlesse companion discharged a pistole, the sound whereof gaue the alarme in the towne before thinges were ready. Another time by fiering a chapell, the Protestants going to surprise a place, gaue the enemy notice of their comming, and leasure to prouide to enter­teine them. Finally, appointment is iustly to be kept with our par­tisans in the towne: we may neither come too soone, lest we be espied; nor stay too long, lest the matter be marred for want of correspon­dence. At Lusignen, an. 1569, the faction of the Protestants disco­uering themselues before their companions without were come, lost themselues, and marred the matter, that otherwise could not, but haue taken effect. Those that surprised the castle of Sancerre presently af­ter the massacre of the Protestants in France, not being succoured at the time appointed, were glad to lay off holde, and to runne away.

The towne of Liu. 5. Veij was surprised by Camillus conueying his souldiers into the towne vnder the ground through a mine. Liu. 4. Ser­uilius likewise by a mine entred the castle of Fidene. Chelar a towne in Viuaretz, in these late troubles of France, was taken by a caue that went out of the towne vnder ground to a place a prety way off. How we make mines for the most part to ruinate walles by force of powder: yet may mines be well employed to enter the towne by surprise, for conducting whereof, those that are skilfull are to be em­ployed, that it may be digged deepe enough to go vnder the ditch, and foundation of the wall, that it be opened in the towne where there is least suspect, that the same be well vnderpropped, that the earth fall not, that the earth be conueyed away within some trench or hollow place, and that by some other worke the worke in the mine may be concealed & couered. Mines made to ouerthrow the walles ought to be made crooked, but this may be made strait, and either with one or two entrances▪ but if it be well made, if it serue not to enter the towne, it may yet serue to ouerthrow the walles. Before thou beginnest to mine, consider whether the ground be such as may be wrought. if it [Page 225]be a rocke, it cannot be wrought for hardnes; if it be full of springes, then water will marre thy woorke. In both these cases, thou loo­sest thy labour. But more shalbe said of mines, when we shall come to intreate of ruines of walles, and breaches.

Where the enemie is secure, or negligent, the Towne may percase be surprised by Escalade. Which, yt it may take effect, diuers things before hand are to be prouided, and considered. Ladders are to be first prouided both for number, length, forme and strength sufficient: the want of ladders, cost the present French King, the losse of an opportunitie in taking Paris. Next, such places as seeme to giue most easie accesse, are to be viewed, & chosen: the ditche also is to be soun­ded, if there be water in it, least it be too deepe: against that time of the night, when men are most quiet, our things are to be made ready: the season that is most troublesome, and darke, is fittest for our en­terprise: sometime the state of the Townesmen giueth vs opportu­nitie to enter. Syracusae was taken by Marcellus, while the soul­diers and Citizens lay drunke in one of their solemne feastes. The Towne of Cales likewise was surprised by Liu 8. Escalade vpon a feast day at night, when the Citizens were most secure. The Turkes vn­derstanding the disorder of Christians in their carneuall (we call it shrofetide) chose that time to Alphonso d' [...] ­loa. scale a strong Towne in Sclauony, and while the Citizens lay sleepy, and drunke, entred the same. Of all the times of the night, and houre before the dawning of the day, is most fit for surprises. At that time of the night Fabius scaled Liu. 24. Arpi. Argentueil a Town in France, a little before the dawning of the day, was scaled, and entred by the Protestants anno 1568. and by like surprise, and about the same time they tooke also Vezelay. For when men haue watched a great part of the night, and looke presently to be relieued, then are they most sleepie, and negligent: and after that the Towne is seased in the night, the day presently appearing, giueth vs meanes to assure it, and settle matters.

Diuers not measuring of times, nor duely considering these mat­ters, haue lost great opportunities. Charles Duke of Burgūdy by the Philip. Com. shortnes of his ladders fayled of the taking of Beauuois. The like ouersight, as some say, hurt our men in the scaling of Lieth, in the be­ginning of the Queenes reigne. The Thucid. Thebans entring Platea in the night, not being succoured according to their appointment, were cut in pieces by the Townesmen in the morning. Whether a [Page 226]man come too soone, or too late, all is one; for if that in such cases there be not good direction, execution, and correspondence; such en­terprises commonly come to nothing. A small error in this matter, was the cause of the death of that valiant knight syr Martin Skinke, and of the breaking of the enterprise against Neumegen.

Some haue had good hap to enter Townes by wayes not suspect, as Cyrus entred Babylon by the riuer, Scipio entred new Carthage by the lake; which the Townesmen thought a matter impossible. The Venetians tooke Guicciar. li. 10. Brescia from the French, entring by a grate through which the riuer issued. The Protestāts by a grate Hist. de troubl. de Fr. li. 10. likewise entred Nismes an. 1569. But they that followe their examples, had need to vse like diligence & speed. They chose a blustring season, & a darke night: those that entred by the grate, slewe the watch, and recei­ued their companions in at the gate: other companies were ready to assure the Towne, which they had seased. There was good correspon­dence betweene all parties, secrecie in proceeding, resolution in exe­cuting. Of late time posterne gates haue beene broken open, some by gunpowder, conueyed betweene boordes and the gate; others by pe­tars; and so diuers Townes haue bin entred, and surprised: but the Townesmen must be very weake, and negligent, and the execution very speedy, and secrete: or else such executions seldome take effect.

After that the Towne is entred by surprise; let them that are en­tred vse diligence, and good order, that they be not themselues ei­ther presently driuen out, or soone after surprised. Their course is first to assure themselues of the gates, walles, and rampars by pla­cing sufficient gardes there, and next to sease the market place, and other open places with strong squadrons: the rest of the companies are to beate the streetes, and to sease such as canne make resistance against them. Hauing beaten the Townesmen, that themselues bee not beaten out, they are to prouide both men, victuals, and mu­nitions; that which is in the Towne they are to saue, and make store of it; and lastly, to set good order for the defence and gouerne­ment of the place surprised. Whosoeuer fayleth in any one of these pointes, encurreth oft times no small danger.

The Thebans entering into Plataea, and not assuring themselues of the gates, or of the principall Townesmen before their weake­nesse was espied, were most of them slaine, and the rest forced to leape the walles. Alexamenus Liu. 35. hauing slaine the tyrant Nabis, and [Page 227]taken the Towne of Sparta, while he should haue seased the walles and chiefe places, and set order for the defence of the Towne, him selfe spent time in searching out the tyrants treasures, his souldiers in seeking pillage, in which meane time the enemie gathering together some force, charged him in this disorder, and in a short space cut him and his companie in pieces. In the late braules of France, Histoire de troubl. de Fr. l. 5. Colombel hauing surprised Esscilles, a strong Castle in the frontiers of Dauphinè, lost the same within fewe dayes after, for that hee had no care to furnish it with souldiers, and victuals. Bou­ley Hist. de troubl. de Fr. l. 10. hauing after a long caualcade, spoyled the Towne and Faire of Milly, stayed too long in his returne, which gaue the enemie ley­sure to sease vpon him, and make him paye his life for that he had taken. The Duke of Orleance hauing surprised Guicciar. li. 2. Nouara, soone lost the same againe, for that hee neither prouided more victuals, nor saued those that hee found in the Towne, nor set order for the go­uernment of the place. Which ouersight was the cause of the losse of Naples vnto the French king Charles Guicciar. lib. 1. the 8. for giuing away all the victuals that were in the newe Castle, vnto one of his courtly beggars, afterward when the Towne was besieged by the enemie, his souldiers albeit they begged apace, could not tell where to haue a bisket cake, or other victuals.

By diuers other meanes Townes may be surprised, as by men dis­guised in womens apparell, or by souldiers disguised like clownes, or by men hid vnder strawe in cartes. Demetrias was surprised vnder colour of bringing home of a chief Citizen Liu. 35. from banishment. For while his friends welcommed him home, some of his traine seased the gate, which hee together with his company defended, vntill certaine troupes of horse placed not farre off, came to them. But hee that knoweth these, and howe to proceede therein, can deuise more, and may therein see howe to proceede.

If the Towne be strong, and hard to be forced, the safest way is to proceede by siege, and surprise: if in iudgement of men experiemented the Towne be weake, and easie to be forced, he looseth time that sit­teth about it, that by force may enter it. Those Townes I accompt hard to bee forced, whereunto eyther for height, or for water, or o­ther inconuenience the souldier canne hardly come. A Towne si­tuate vpon a rocke which is well walled, and flanked, can hardly be assaulted. For such grounde can neither bee mined, nor trenched.

Other Townes that are placed in eauen ground and good soyle, al­though they be strongly fortified, yet either by breache, or scale, or mine may be entred, especially where the souldiers are neither ma­ny, nor skilfull, nor resolute. Of such Townes that are neither well flanked, nor well manned, there is no doubt to be made, but that by a resolute charge they may be wonne.

The course that is commonly and best to be vsed in assaulting of Townes is this: after that the Generall commeth in viewe of the Town, that he determineth to assault, let him send his campe-master, or some other speciall mea of iudgement before with his horsemen, se­conded with shot, and targets, to viewe the walles of the Towne, and the ground without the Towne, where the batterie may most com­modiously be made, by reason of the weakenes of the walles, or ea­uennes of the ground. If he cannot approche with his horse, he may then vse his shot, and targets, to beate those that wil offer themselues to hinder the discouery. That he faile not in iudgement, he is to vn­derstand, that where the walles are hie, or weake, or destitute of bul­workes, or flankers, and the ditche is narrowe, and drie, and ye ground within and without plaine and eauen; there is a good place to make a batterie. Yea albeit the wall be strong and well flanked, yet if there be no weaker place, I would not haue him doubt to chuse that place to plant his artillery in. If by espials we vnderstād where ye ground, and the defenses of the Towne giue vs best commoditie to make a breache, then there needeth no great viewe, but onely to see whether it be as is reported. The quality of the ground would also be consi­dered, whether it be hard, or soft; plaine, or hilly; dry, or miry; and such like, that after the batterie once begunne, we be not driuen to re­moue our pieces.

This being reported to the General, he is to cause the great ordo­nance to be drawen toward the place; so that about the shutting of the euening the same may be within mosquet shot, yet couered from the Townesmens viewe, if it may be. With the same are two strong squadrons of shot to march, seconded with halberds, and targets, and supplied with some horsemen. The rest of ye army diuided into foure partes, are to take their lodgings in foure partes rounde about the Towne. Somewhat farre from the walles, vnlesse they may couer themselues with some hill, from their shotte, or that there be Sub­urbes about the Towne. That night euery part is to fortifie their [Page 229]lodgings with trenches, palissadaes, barriquades, or such meanes as they haue.

When the day is gone, let all the souldiers that may bee spared, and for default of them, let pioners carry baskets and earth to the place chosen to plant the artillery in, that may not be aboue sixtie, or seuentie pases from the wall. There diuiding their baskets into so many partes as the master of the Ordonance purposeth to di­uide his piecies into: let them beginne to fill their baskets ran­ged in order as fast as they can. That they bee not molested in their worke, the squadrons of shotte sliding along by their sides, and shoo­ting against such as shewe themselues from the walles, are to pro­uide: against sallyes the targetters, and halberdes, are to defende them. When the baskettes are filled: then they may range their pieces behinde them. But if the baskets bee not defence suffici­ent, as seldome they are against great shotte: then vnder couer of the baskets they are to beginne a trenche, casting the earth inwarde towarde the pieces to serue for a banke. The same trench would bee made along the curteine of the wall, the endes of the banke bending inwarde, that there the artillery may bee placed, that shooteth on slope to the curteine, and direct against the bul­workes, or flankers.

For defence of the artillery, and those that are placed there to garde it on both sides, reason requireth, that the banke bee made with diuers corners, and that the whole compasse of grounde where the artillerie standeth, bee intrenched: but so, that there bee issues left for those within to goe within the tren­ches, and without them. Vpon the banke, there woulde a suffici­ent parapet bee made all alongst where the canon is ranged: fifteene or sixteene foote in newe earth is little ynough: in that the holes for the canons are to be left. In other places if the parapet bee three or foure foote thicke, it is sufficient. All along this banke, and along the trenche, are mosquetiers, and other shotte to bee ranged. The broader the trenche is, the better it will serue to co­uer our men.

To effect this speedily, many handes are to bee employed. If there be conuenient speede vsed, the ordonance woulde bee ready to speake the next morning. But for that it is not possible, that men shoulde worke all the night, neither conueniently watche all [Page 230]night: therefore both shotte, and targetters, and such as worke the first part of the night, would be relieued at midnight, and others sent in their places both to worke, and to watch.

The artillerie is to be ranged in three places. Two fourth partes woulde bee placed direct before the cortine of the wall; of the other two partes, one woulde be ranged some pretie distance off, with the noses of the pieces pointed towarde the flankers, if any be of the one hand, the other toward the bulwarks, or flankers on the other hand. Yet sometimes they may hit slope wise in the cortine of the wall, and those that are pointed against the cortine nay be discharged against the shoulders of the flankers.

If with thy pieces thou canst not see the foote of the wall, then before thou beginnest the batterie, thou must cause the counter­scarpe, or grounde betwixt thee and the wall to bee opened, and the earth cast into the ditche of the Towne. That is to be done both before the cortine, and before the flankers. If thou doest not hitte within two foote of the bottome of the wall, thou doest but waste time, and powder. That the canon may bee mana­ged with more ease: if the soyle bee soft, thou art to make a sole of plankes, somewhat encliuing toward the wall, for the same to runne vpon.

This being done, which is principall, wee are to dresse a mount, or caualier, as they call it, some hundred paces from the wall, or neerer, directly looking along the wall where the breach is to bee made, there placing foure or fiue pieces of artillerie, wee may beate those that present them selues to the breache to defend it, or repaire it. By the same we may discouer those that are vpon the bulwarkes, or goe in the streetes, or within worke a­bout the breache. And therefore where the grounde afoordeth vs commoditie we may not forget to rayse such a mount, and make it formall for height, breadth, and length, with his stayres, parapets, and places for the corps de garde, that defendeth it.

So soone as the artillery is placed, and fitted, so soone the same ought to beginne to speake, and that without intermission day, or night, vntill the breach bee made reasonable, and the defences and flankers bee broken. The continuance of the batterie, and the artil­lerie that beateth in flanke together, with the mosquetiers being placed where they may discouer the breach, doeth hinder not onely [Page 231]the repayring of the breach, but also the retrenchement behinde. If thy batterie once cease, thy labour and charge increaseth. Nothing hurt Monluc more in the siege of Nyort, nor la Chatre in the siege of Sancerre, then the discontinuance of the batterie which happe­ned by reason of want of powder. Sausar remouing his batterie at Vezelay, confirmed the Townesmen to holde out, whose heartes before fainted. Nothing did more helpe them of Rochel in the last siege, then the frequent intermission of ye batterie. By which meanes they made defences stronger, then the walles were before.

The more artillerie is employed, the more speedy and forcible, and lesse chargeable will the battery be. The Turke in the battery of Vienna, employed aboue threescore canons, culuerins, and other pieces. At Rochel the king had fourtie, and the prince of Parma litle lesse in the siege of Scluse. He that employeth lesse then twenty can­nons, and other pieces, cannot looke for any good effect. That some hoped with foure small pieces to batter the walles of Coronna, was without reason. Yet I will not deny, that in these late troubles of France, the Protestants with three or foure pieces tooke diuers Townes. For where the walles are bad, and within them no defen­dants; it is not hard to take Townes either with a fewe pieces, or without pieces. But where there are men within, and walles suffici­ent, it is better to make no battery, then a battery not sufficient.

The great artillery being placed: the canoniers are to place their pouder in safe places, and to make their bollets, rammers, waddes, charges, matches, and al these instruments fit, and ready before they begin their worke. What is the leuell, randon, charge, and effect of euery piece, euery canonier either knoweth, or ought to knowe. And therefore I neede not spend time about the declaring thereof.

While the canon is in placing, and the batterie in making, al those souldiers that are not employed about that worke, are to fortifie their quarters with bankes, trenches, and barriquades, and to barre and trenche the wayes, and to keepe good garde, or watche, that none en­ter, or sally out: that if not with assault, yet for feare of want, the Towne may be forced to come to reason.

That against the breach bee made, all things may proceede or­derly, ladders, mantellets, and targets, and all things requisite for the assault are to be made ready; and to bee deliuered to the com­panies, that are to vse them.

If there be any time remayning, the same is to be employed in making of trenches, and parapets, along the enemies counterscarpe, likewise in stopping all the auenues, and wayes, whereby any may come to the succour of the Towne.

The horsemen and footemen, that may be spared from the campe, are to range the countrey, to discouer, to represse the enemie, to con­uey victuals to the campe. All which may be done easely, if there be no time lost, nor any disorder in proceeding.

If the ground be fit to be wrought; from the trenche behinde the counterscarpe, it is no hard matter to carry a mine into the Towne, or vnder the walles. The earth, that cōmeth out of the mine, being cast into the ditch, or vp to ye banke, shall seeme to come out of the trench, especially where there is continuall working. In making of mines, obserue these rules: first worke not, if the ground be full of springs, or rockes. The Liu. 36. Macedonians going about to vndermine Lamia, were frustrated of their purpose, encountring with rockes. Second­ly beginning to digge, make the mine crooked, that the force of the powder be not broken hauing vent backward. Thirdly see that the distance from the entrance to the wall be well measured, least the powder be placed either short of the wall, or beyond it. Arri­uing to the foundation of the wall, the miners are first to make a broade place along the foundation of it, and to vnderproppe the earth well, that it fall not: secondly they are to place their barrels of powder, with their heads knocked of, and bored through with di­uers holes, and to strawe powder vpon the bordes where the bar­rels stand. Thirdly they are to conuey a match well boyled in gun­powder in a pipe of wood, or betweene boordes, and therein also to make a traine of gunpowder from the place where fire is to be giuen to the barrels: their next care is to see the mine well stop­ped and rammed, that the fire breake not out backward. Lastly, when men stand ready to goe to the assault, yet without danger of the mine, and when the defendants approche the breach, the fire is to be giuen. Any of these points neglected, doeth frustrate or hinder the effectes of the mine. At Rochel the place where the powder was placed being too narrow, and ye entrance not wel stopped, ye mine did no great effect. In ye same siege the souldiers not being retired, when fire was giuē, many men lost their liues by their owne mine. At Co­ronna the mine being direct, & not well stopped, ye force of it brake out backward.

Before the assault be giuen, the breach is to be viewed, whether it be reasonable; likewise some men of iudgement are to consider, whe­ther the flankers be ruinated sufficiently. These things appearing, and the ditch made passable; the assailantes are to march to the breach in this sorte: first certaine targetters, well armed, and with them the ensignes: after them halberdes, and pikes. On the flankes of the targetters, and somewhat before them all along the counterscarpe are shot to be placed, to beate them that offer them­selues to the defence of the breach and wall. These are to be secon­ded with other targetters, halberdes, and pikes; with shot like­wise on their flankes. At the same time, if there be other breaches in the bulworkes some are to march to them also ranged in like sorte. The distances of men marching to the breach are small, for they are to march so thicke, as they can one by an other, being first to enter, & then to fight. The thinner they go, the more open they are to the e­nemies force. In these late warres of France commonly shot hath beene placed in the first rankes of those that went to the assault, and therefore no maruell, if they neuer preuayled, where there was anie resistance. But they could not do otherwise hauing so few armed men. At that instant when the assault is to be giuen at the breach, other companies are to be appointed to scale in all places of easie ac­cesse. The same wil trouble the enemy much, and diuert his forces. In scaling this rule is to be obserued, that while the targettiers goe to the walles, the shot beate them that stand vpon the walles.

That there may be supply where neede is, the whole army at the time of the assault is to be brought into armes, and euerie man to haue his charge assigned. Some to defend the lodgings, against a­nie sodaine stirres: some to discouer: others to stand in their places appointed, eyther to pursue the victorie, or to fauour the retraite of their fellowes, or to go where they shalbe appointed. The more force is employed, the weaker will be the enemies resistance.

Those that purpose to preuaile by assault, are to cōsider further both time, & place, & other circūstances. To giue ye assault, that time is most proper, whē the enemy is least prouided, which cōmonly is at ye daw­ning of the day, or at noone time. In theLiu. siege of Heraclea the assai­lants making fained shews 2. or 3. days of cōming to ye assalt, & yet doing nothing, made the defendants so secure, that whē they came indeed with al their forces, they found them vnready, & so entred. [Page 234]In the place where wee purpose to shew out vtmost force, there least noise and shew is to be made, and contrariwise greatest stirre where we meane to do least.Hirt. de bel. A­lexand. Caesar making shewe to enter at the place of easiest accesse, tooke the campe of the Alexandrians, sca­ling it where they least looked for any such matter.

That the enemy haue no time to consider, our men are to go reso­lutely to the assault, not as Monlucs men did at the siege of Hist. de troubl. de Fr. Niort, who going to the breach, paused being entred the ditch. Likewise there ought to be good correspondence, that the towne may be sca­led, and assaulted at the breach, both together, and that euery parte may be well seconded, and supplied. If eyther the breach or walles be wonne, there let them that enter stay, vntil so many be entred as may serue to force the towne; and so placing others to garde the entrance, and to receiue the rest of their company let them march in good order, some to the market place, others to the bulworkes, and not seuer themselues before their whole companie, or so many as is requisite, be within the towne.Caes. de bel. gal. 7. Caesar taking Auaricum by scale would not suffer his men to descend into the towne before hee had filled the walles with men.

If the enemy make resistance in the streetes, the houses are to bee fired neere them. By this meanes Liu. 2. Coriolanus made way for his men in the taking of Corioli, and the Spaniards cleared the streets in the sacke of Antwerpe. If they shewe themselues obstinate, they are to be compassed round about, and so dealt withall vpon aduan­tage.Liu. Camillus making proclamation that no man shoulde bee slaine, that laide downe his armes, tooke a certaine towne which he had entred quietly: which otherwise without great slaughter he could not haue obtained.

Before that euery man in the towne hath laid downe his armes, & the towne be possessed quietly, no man is to be suffered to disband, or enter houses, or to seeke pillage.

The last care of the General is, how to make vse of the towne, that is wonne. If he meane to keepe it: then ought hee diligently to re­paire the breaches, and to saue the victuals, & lay them vp in store, & with the rest of the spoile to reward those, that best deserue. If hee meane not to keepe it, yet ought he to saue that which may be for the vse of the army, & to ruinate the walles, & to fire the towne, that the fame serue no more for a nest for the enemy to rest in. The Guicciar. hist. Duke of [Page 235]Orleance neglecting this care, no sooner had taken Nouara, but he lost it againe for want of victuals. Corbueil in France of late taken by the Prince of Parma, not hauing the breach repaired was shortlie after recouered by surprise by the kings side.

Small townes, such especially as haue no great ordonance, or no places where to employ it, are taken by zapping, or digging downe the walles, especially if they be hie and without terrasses behind. By this Sub musculo milites vectibus infima saxa turris hostium conuel­lunt. Caes. de bel. ciu. 2. meanes Caesars souldiers ruinated the walles of Massilia: and Annibal 500. Afros cum dola­bris ad subruen­dum ab imo mu­rum mittit. Liu. 21. Annibal made a way into Saguntum. But before they approch the walles lest the enemy dig their sides with shot, or throwe downe stones vpon them, the enemy is to be beaten from the wall with shot, and the souldiers to be couered with mantellets of wood, on the sides, & ouer the head. Then with crows of iron they are al along the wall to pul out the lowest stones, & lest the same fal on them to vnderprop it with wood. The same when al is finished, is by gunpouder to be fi­red. By this meanes the townesmen of Sancerre An. 1572. recouered the castle from certaine traitors that were there entred: &Hist. de troubl. de Fr. Bordet in the siege of Chartres, An. 1568. wan a corner of a raueline. That the breach be not repaired by them within, the assailants are to make thēselues ready to go to the assault in that order, which before I haue prescribed. That this course in sieges, surprises, and assaults, is ac­cording to the true practise of armes, although in part hath bene she­wed, yet now shall it further be confirmed, and those that haue done otherwise by their euill successe, and euill proceeding refuted, and their course reprooued.

Liu. 24. Annibal pretending to goe to sacrifice at the lake of Auerne, did presently go to assault Puteoli: and in our times the Prince of Parma, making a faire shew as if he meant to besiege Ostend, did sodainely sit downe before Scluse. This practise is good in this and in all enterprises of warre. For thereby the enemy being made vncer­taine, his forces are deriued an other way, and his care diuerted from that which should principally be cared for.

The Protestants of France, Anno 1568. purposing to besiege Hist. de troubl. de Fr. An golesme sent Montgomery before with certaine troupes of horsemen to hinder the accesse of victuals to the towne. But farre better they had done, if before they came with their whole forces, they had not discouered their purpose. For in the meane time the townesmen prepared, and strengthned themselues.

in the siege, and taking of Saguntum Annibal proceeded in this sort.Liu. 21. He enuironed the towne round with trenches: by zapping and diuers engins he made a breach: in the assault fresh men succeeded them that were hurt and wearied, vntill such time as his men for­ced the breach. From the breach his men marched and tooke a place of aduantage: others scoured the streetes, and hauing assu­red himselfe of the towne, in the ende he tooke the castell.

Scipio hauing enuironed the towne of new b Carthage in Spaine, Liu. 25. and shaken the walles, at noone time when the enemy was at rest, sent part of his men by the lake, and scaling the towne at one in­stant in diuers places both from the water, and the land, entred with part of his men, which gaue accesse to their fellows: which marching in order cut in peeces such as resisted, and in the end tooke the castle.

TheCorona cinxit vrbem omnibus copiis admotis. Liu. 10. Romane Consull besieging and assaulting the towne of Comimium, first compassed the same round with all his forces: a­gainst the gates hee opposed certaine troupes to repell those that should offer to sally out. Couering his men with mantellets of wood, he broke open the gates, with others he scaled the walles, marching into the towne with his men in order, beat those that had seized the market place: and assured himselfe of the walles, and streetes. In the assault ofRomani signo dato pars eminùs glande aut lapi­dibus pugnare, a­lii succedere aut murum suffodere, & scalis aggredi. Salust. bel. Iu­gurth. Zama; the Romanes hauing a signe gi­uen them by the generall at one instant some presented the scale, o­thers with slings, & stones beat the defendants, others zapped the walles. In the assault giuen toLiu. 32. [...]latia a towne in Greece they made shew to make all their force to enter in at the breach. But when they perceiued the townesmen to drawthither, they scaled the walles in an other place, and so entred the towne.

The common course which antiquitie vsed in sieges and assaults, as I haue declared, was to compasse the towne besieged, with banks and trenches. The hauens or riuers they dammed with ships filled ful of stones, and sunken. If the same were broad, they garded the issues with Caes. de bel. ciu. 1. towers built in the straitest places, vpon which they placed their engins: which Caesar practiced at Brundusium. Some­times they crossed the riuer with boats, as Liu. 29. Scipio did the hauen whē he besieged Vtica: and asLiu. 2. Porsena did in the riuer of Tyber when he besieged Rome. Before they went to assault the Agger ab vni­uersis coniectus, & ascensum dat Gallis, & quae in terram occulta­nerant Romani, contegit. Caes. bel. gal. 7. walles, they fil­led the ditches with earth. The men that laboured, they couered with mantellets made of square timber, and fensed with occum [Page 237]made of olde ropes; these planed the earth, these beganne the trenches and bankes. In working at their trenches, bankes, and mounts, no man was exempted. They neuer assaulted towne but with their whole forces, and that in all places together. Taking the towne, first they assured themselues of the walles, and gates, and from thence in good order they went to take the open Vt quis (que) in­trauerat eques, ad forum occupan­dum citato equo pergebat, addi­tum erat & tria­riorum equiti praesidium. Liu. places of the towne. No man might depart from his Inde signo da­to milites discur­runt ad praedam. Liu. 25. ensigne, nor run to spoile, but after a signe giuen. And therefore no maruell if they pre­uailed for the most part, as now men faile of their purpose for the most part, being so far departed from the lawes of armes. What is now the common proceeding in sieges, batteries, and assaults, shall now appeare by the examples following.

The Protestants going about to besiege and win Poitiers, 1569. first made their approches, & quartered their souldiers in the suburbs which they took at their first arriual, for ye most part. Next they made their trenches, mounts, & gabions for to accommodate their great ordonance. Part was placed to batter the walles, & part to beate the enemy in flanke behind the cortine. Certaine small peeces they le­uelled against the parapet and certaine defenses made by the enemie vpon the walles. Of these peeces some were placed in houses neere the walles, others were ranged on the plaine behinde gabions, or baskets of earth, which they filled there in the night. The breach be­ing made 20 pases wide, and very plaine, the Admirall disposed his men to go to the assault in this order: first 700. shot marched, after them 300. gentlemen marched with targets on their armes: after them followed halberds, & pikes: the rest of the army was ready in armes to succor where neede should be. But their errors were so ma­ny, that these good orders auailed litle: first they spent time about Lusignen, and other small matters, and made not their approch, so soone as they might. In which meane time, the D. of Guise entred with his troupes, fortified diuers weake places, and prouided diuers thinges necessary: secondly, their auantgard going before the towne without direction, did nothing, but giue the enemy warning, & so re­turned: thirdly, they neither trenched, nor barred the wayes, nor kept such ward, or gard, but that both succors entred guided by O­noux, and diuers times the enemy sallied both on horsebacke, and on foote: fourthly, they did not take the suburbs, nor bridge of Rochere­uill, but suffered the enemy to possesse it: yet by reason that it flanked [Page 238]the breach, & stopped the water, was it most necessary to be taken. For the water being there stopped regorged vpward, & the enemy being there lodged had a ful marke at those that went along to the breach: fiftly they made their breach beyond the riuer, which by reason of the depth of it made them, to their great preiudice, differ the assalt al other things being ready, and broke their arrayes as they went ouer the bridge. They might haue done better to haue passed their troupes be­fore & had them on the other side before they went to the breach: fur­ther they considered not that the ground behinde the breach being hie was not to be mounted, albeit there had beene no wall. And therefore a place euil chosen to make breach in. For albeit they wan the breach yet could they not go forward vp the hill: lastly, they did neither di­uert the enemies forces by escalades, nor went to the assault with all their forces. Of the simple prouision of victuals, and bad gouerne­ment in matters of iustice, & discipline of armes. I wil say nothing, because such disorders are inseparable companions of ciuil warres. Yet was there not much better proceeding in the Kings campe be­sieging Rochell, Anno 1573. which was in this sort.

The king before he sent his forces before the towne, caused two enginers to goe thither about other matters, but their purpose was to sound the hauen, & harbor, and to marke the walles, & places of the towne, & to draw a plot of it. Not lōg after he sent Biron thither with some forces, which he lodged in villages round about Rochel. Who first fortified his lodgings with trēches, terrasses, & barriquades: nee­rer to the towne he built certain sorts at diuers corners of it. His ar­tillery being about 40. peeces he ranged in 3. places crossing one an other. A fourth rank he planted vpon a mount to beate the cortine in flanke. For the gard of the peeces, and canoniers he caused not onely gabions of earth, but also deepe trenches, and good bankes to be made, with two pieces brought into the ditches he beat the casemates. To depriue the townsmen of fresh water he caused the condu it pipes to be cut. Monsieur with his ships that ankored in the harbor went a­bout to depriue them of the commodity of the sea. Hauing with batte­ry, and mines made a breach: the kings lieutenant caused diuers as­saults to be made, in the order vsed commonly. Beside that which is common, he made diuers mantellets to couer his men, and for their easier approch, framed a bridge of wood, which from the counter­scarpe reached to the bulworke neere the breach, But all this in vaine. [Page 239]For neither were the townesmen so straited by sea or land, but that some entred and issued both the wayes. Yea sometimes they entred the trenches, and cut diuers men in peeces: the mine was euill con­ducted. For most of the force broke out backeward vpon the assai­lants. The assault was not generall, nor did the cōpanies march with one consent at one time: the escalade was but at one place, and that weakely performed. What for want of victualles, and good order, and what by reason of winter season the souldiers grew sicke and weake: and for want of iustice many bad examples escaped vnpuni­shed: finally things were long delayed, and disorderly executed.

The siege, battery, and assault of Sancerre Anno 1573. passed in this sort. The enemy making his approches first planted his artillery some part about 60. pases off, and some part neerer: 6. peeces beat them in flanke being placed on a hil halfe a mile off. On the counter­scarpe he placed diuers shot in a trench which he made there. From that trench he entred the ground comming vnder the walles with a mine: Vnder a frame of wood he brought some to zappe the point of the raueline. When the breach was made almost 80. pases wide, and the defenses euery where beaten downe, hee caused his men to march to the assault in this order: first marched the ensigne colonell of Sarrieu garded with targetters, and others well armed; behinde them and vpon their flankes marched certaine companies of shot: these being repulsed the second charge was giuen by the gentlemen of the country thereabout, which were likewise seconded by diuers troupes of shot: the escalade at the time of the assault was likewise attempted: but nothing succeeded. The causes were diuers. First the shot dragging behind left the armed men almost naked on ye front, and sides, to the shot of the townesmen, which they shoulde haue kept occupied. Secondly the escalade was faintly executed by one poore company, that went naked to the walles. What might haue beene done by diuers cōpanies well armed, if they hoped to preuaile with one alone? Thirdly, those that marched to the breach went thinne, & dispersed, which was the cause that the shot so marked them, that all returned not to complaine. Fourthly, the breach was repayred by reason of the discontinuance of the battery, for want of pouder. Fi­nally, the mine could not worke any effect, by reason the traine tooke not fire, as it should haue doone.

In no place do I heare of more resolution and expedition then in [Page 240]the siege and assault of Chateleraud, Anno 1569. The first day that the enemy approched vnder colour of a skirmish hee caused the walles, ditches, and defences of the towne to be viewed. The ar­tillery arriuing about midnight, he had placed, and gabionned the same in the night in two diuers rankes, and so fitted it, that by seuen of the clocke the next morning the same beganne to batter the foote of the wall. Wherein such was the diligence of the canoniers, and force of the peeces, the bullets entercrossing one another in the breach, that by two of the clocke in the afternoone in the same day the breach was 60. pases wide, and the souldiers readie to march to the assault. Wherein if the souldiers within had not bene very resolute, and the Frenchmen without very slacke in seconding the Italians that had the point of the assault, or if the escalade had withall beene presented at two or three other places: they had percase preuailed. At Xaintes, Scipio the enginer purposing to make a breach discharged a peece where he meant not to batter. Which caused the townesmen to spend their earth, labour, and prouision, where no neede was. ThenHistoir. de trou­bl. de Fr. l. 13. changing the place of his peeces brought them hard to the ditch of the towne, where he made a breach threescore pases wide. To hinder the reparation thereof, he had placed foure coluerins, and diuers small peeces vpon a mount to beate them in flanke behind the breach. After that there marched to the assault first certaine shot, then fortie cuyraces of proofe, and last of all certaine other shot.

The county of Lude did thus dresse the preparatiues to the assault of Niort, Anno a thousand fiue hundred sixtie and eight. after hee had with his canons placed in two houses neere the walles, made a breach thirtie pases wide, and had raised two coluerins so high, that they might beate the defendants in flanke all along the cortine of the wall: three ensignes marched to the breach, others presented the escalade. These being easily repulsed, to the second charge marched first one principall commander, and after him twentie targettiers: then certain shot: after them folowed the ensigne colonell, and after it diuers other ensignes with a strong garde of halberdes and pikes. The rest of the army stoode ready in squadrons. The horsemen were also in armes to represse the townesmen, if they should dare to sallie. But all this serued not. For in the first charge there wanted cou­rage, and resolution: in the second, execution. For hauing wet them­selues in passing a little riuer, most stayed, the rest went faintly for­ward: [Page 241]in summe all the brauery which they shewed at the first, in the end prooued nothing but a brag.

If the Protestants had not proceeded more resolutely in the bat­tery and assault of Brouage Anno 1570. they had not so soone pre­uailed. Scipio by trenches made his approches, and within thirteene paces of the ditch placed his peeces within a certaine defence for the canoniers made of sacks of wooll, and earth. With the canon he beat the cortine, and bastion towards Oleron. With the artillery, and shot of the Venetian Carrake which hee caused to be brought along the Hauen, and to be placed hard to the Fort or Castle of the towne, he so beat them that were within, that none could come to the walles or looke out without danger. Which expedition, and resolution of the assaylants did so amaze the townsmen, that presently they be­gan to fall to composition.

Thus wee see howe those that proceede carefully, diligently, re­solutely, and according to the practice of warre doe seldome fayle of their purpose, but either by siege, surprise, or assault they take the townes, which they beset. Townes that cannot be taken neither by sleight, nor force at the first; yet by continuance and perseuerance, may be taken at the last by one meanes, or other, especially if they be weakened in one or two sallyes. Annibal by a deuise causing the Locrians to sally out of their towne, cut betweene them and their safety, and by taking them, made the rest to yeelde. Hee would haue trained out those that garded the Castle of Tarentum, by laying a bayt for them, but they were too wise. Romulus by a feined retrayt drawing the Fidenians some prety distance from the towne, cut most of them in peeces, and pursuing the rest entred Pelle Melle with them into the towne.

Many other stratagemes may be deuised, whereby townes may be forced, or surprised: but seeing the generall reasons are apparent by this which I haue sayd, now I will turne my speech to those that aduerse euents driue to defend them selues within townes. For prac­tice of warre doeth teach vs not only to force others, but also where the enemy pursueth vs, to defend our selues.

CHAP. XVII. Wherein certaine obseruations are set downe good to be practiced for the defence, and good gouernment of a towne or place besieged, battered, or assaulted.

SEeing as places are taken either by want through long siege, or by intelligence, and trechery, or els by force: those to whom Princes commit their garde, are diligently to encounter these things with pro­uision of things necessary first, then with watchful­nes & care, and lastly by strength of men, & walles. They that take on them to defend townes neither well prouided nor fenced, howsoeuer they shew therein courage, yet doe they shewe no iote of wisedome in it; for oft times they cast away themselues, and hurt their Prince, and countrey both in the losse of so many men, & in giuing courage to the enemy. And better it were for them to conuey them selues into some place of safety, or to yeelde; then to holde out without reason. In which case the Prince cannot blame them, if they prouide for them selues. The Romanes not being able to defend cer­taine townes of Apulia, and Lucania against Annibal, gaue them li­cence to prouide for them selues by composition. Which also the French kings in the victories of the English nation in France per­mitted to their people.Cas. de bel. ciu. 1. Domitius was blamed by Pompey for that he rashly engaged himselfe and his company in Corfinium, with­out his commandement. It was the losse of many braue men, and a great preiudice to ye cause. Dandelot hanged vp a certain cōpanion, that refused to deliuer vp a paltry castle without view of the canon, albeit he saw the army of the Protestants. And in deede lesse fauour doeth the practice of armes yeeld to those, that vnable to defend them selues wil notwithstanding holde out, vntill they be forced.Se ipsos con­seruaturum dixit Caesar, si prius­quam aries mu­rum tetigisset, se dedissent. Caes. de bel. gal. 2. Caesar did not easily spare them that helde out vntill hee had shaken their walles: those that otherwise yeelded, he vsed with all clemency.

The first consideration therefore of him that hath a town commit­ted to his gouernment ought to be, whether the same may possibly be defended against the force that cōmeth against it or no. For Nec temerè suscipienda eotū defensio est, quae tueri non potes, nec temerè dese­renda, quae tueri potes. Liu. 34. as we are not rashly to abandon a town that may be defended: so we are not ignorantly to take vpon vs the defence of towns not tenable. The Romans while Annibal ranged vp & down Italy, burnt those townes which they could not defend: the like did Philip of Macedonia. The [Page 243] Cetera pra [...]l­diis firmâ [...]unt. Liu. 34. rest they kept with strong garrisons. Liu. Antiochus did foolishly in abandoning Lysimachia which for the prouision, & strength that was in the place, might haue holden the army of the Romans at bay one whole yere. The like error did Trans [...]untib [...] Romanis clau­stra à fronte & tergo deseruit. Liu. 44. & 45. Perseus king of Macedonia cō ­mit, who seeing the Romans approch forsooke those strayts which if he had kept he might haue shut them in both behinde & before. Likewise are the Gaules taxed byCaes. bel. gal. 7. Vercingetorix, for that contrary to his opinion & commandement, they would needes defend Auaricū a­gainst Caesar. Some do commend ye French that in the defence of pal­try townes of late yeeres haue willingly hazarded them selues; as they did in the defence of Dorat in Limages, Lusignen in Poitou, Bray vpon Seyne, Nogent & such like, which haue bene taken diuers of them by assault only of shot: but they had deserued more commen­dation, if they had not lost them selues in the end. Let those therefore that purpose to winne honor by their actions consider what townes may be garded, what not, what are difficult to garde, before they take on them to garde them.

Great cities are hardly defended against a great force, that is able to strayt them, & keep them from victuals, & other necessaries. That Paris hath holden out of late time, the weaknes of their aduersaries, & their great succours are cause. Gant likewise in the dayes of Edward the 3. held out against the Earles of Flanders a long time. But the reason was because he could not besiege so great a city: but if that such cities may be kept from victuals, they can not long endure it. When the Protestants in An. 1567. did but hinder the repayre of the coun­trey people to Paris, the city was in extremity, & farre greater it was in being besieged by this King. For such infinite numbers of people no prouision can serue any long time. The Caes. bel. gal. 7. Gaules and Caes. bel. gal. [...]. Belgians thought to oppresse Caesar with multitude. But when they were come together, they saw that such numbers could not be maintei­ned with victuals, & therfore not being fought withal were forced to scatter of thēselues. But against a smal force, great cities are most strong. For neither can they be straited of victuals by reason of their multitude of men, nor can they be takē by assault, being so wel able to defend the breach and repaire it. So that to a great force great cities are easy to be taken, to a small army that can not without danger compasse the same about, they are impregnable.

Contrariwise small piles or castles hardly resist a great force. [Page 244]First for that there is no roome within to make retrenchments, or de­fences against the enemies canons; secondly for that a small number of men cannot continue their resistance against a great army, where one cōpany succeedeth another: lastly for yt the men being kept with­in a short compasse, the ayre must needes be corrupted, & their health empayred. Q. Cicero albeit his campe was of good compasse & well fenced, and had in it 4000. men & vpward, yet he had not bene able to resist the multitude of Gaules that assaulted the same, any long time, had not Caesar succoured him. The Spaniards, presuming of the strength of La goleta besieged by the Turks were notwithstanding by the force of the canon, and multitude of men oppressed, about six­teene yeeres agone.

Furthermore towns that are commanded by hils, or whose Terri­torie may be drowned with water, or which haue no water within thē, or which lye so situate, that the enemy may come betweene them and succours, are hardly defended against great forces.

Other townes that are neither too great, nor too litle, nor euil situ­ate, may be defended, so that the walles be strong & wel flanked, & the prouision of victuals, munitions, armes, souldiers and whatsoeuer is necessary, be sufficient. Prouided alwayes, that ye Gouernor be a man of iudgement and courage, and proceede orderly. Without which all other prouision is nothing: and with which he may do much, although his other meanes be slender. But because no man can see all things himselfe, let him first adioyne vnto him a counsell of men experimen­ted, of whose loyall dealing hee may assure himselfe. With them let him consult both of the fortifications of the towne, & of all things ne­cessary, and see that all things be in good state before the comming of the enemy before the towne. And first that there be victuals prouided sufficient for the company, for a long siege. for whatsoeuer strong pla­ces yeeld to hunger. The Liu. lib. 2. Romans vnderstanding of the cōming of Porsena to besiege their city, sent round about among their neigh­bors to prouide corne, & victuals. In their Tacit. Castles, & garrisons they had alwayes a yeeres prouision before hand. The Thucid. 1. Athenians vnder­stāding the desseins of their enemies to besiege thē, stored their citie with prouision for many yeeres, & so furnished themselues at sea, that what they could not haue from the land, they might haue a­bundantly from the sea. Besides prouision of victuals to be made, or­der must be set, that they be wel kept in storehouses, & orderly dispen­sed [Page 245]by measure.Caes. bel. gal. [...]. Vercingetorix practicing this at Alexia, did cause his victuals to serue him long. At Caes. bel. ciu. 8. Massilia vnderstanding, that the towne would be besieged, they prouided corne & layd it vp in gar­ners. In free townes in Hie Dutchland the citizens haue alwayes a yeeres prouision of victuals beforehand layd vp in publike storehou­ses, and a strict order for the dispensing of them. Without Paucis diebu­per licentiam ab­sumpta sunt, quae aduersus necessi­tates in longa suffecissient. Ta­cit. annal. 20. which that which otherwise might haue serued for many moneths, wil be spent in fewe dayes.

The towne ought to be discharged before hand of aged persons, women, & children, such except as haue for their company sufficient: when the enemy commeth before the town, it wilbe too late to do it, as the Gaules tried in the siege of Alexia, & the Florentins also besieged by the Prince of Orenge at the request of Clement the 7.

All the victuals that are in the countrey neere about are to be brought into the citie. for thereby the townsmen may be relieued, and the enemy depriued of helpe of the countrey.

Further because corne without cornemils cannot conueniently be vsed: handmils are to be prouided where the enemy may take other milles from vs. Lignieres in the siege of Chartres without his hand­mils, had bene driuen to eate corne euil ground.

Last of all prouision is to be made of water where the towne is dry, and of whatsoeuer either for nourishment, or health is necessary.

With prouision of victuals, ye Gouernor ought also to ioyne a care, that he haue armes, munitions, & all instruments requisit for warres ready in the towne: and stuffe also to make more. Workehouses are to be erected of armes, of powder, of weapons, & other engins: artil­lery is to bee mounted ready; bullets, & all instruments about it are to bee prouided. Neither may hee forget store of mattocks, spades, axes, baskets, crowes of iron, ropes, timber, nor such like stuffe: nor saltpeter, brimstone, or coles to make powder withall, nor in summe, any thing necessary. want of smal things may hinder great matters.

But principally ought he to haue care, that he haue with him suf­ficient numbers of valiant souldiers, without which all other prouisi­on is vaine. Walles reared to the skyes are easily taken, where there are not valiant defendants within to garde them.

As other things are doing, & prouiding, he ought also to haue con­sideration, that his walles be good, that his ditches be deepe, & broad, that his bulwarks, and defences be sufficient to flank the walles, and [Page 146]defend both ditches and conterscarpe. In which workes let him not spare his friends, nor himselfe. It is a shamefull matter when men refuse to labour to defend their countrey, them selues, and their liues. When Themistocles walled [...]. Thucid. [...]. Athens, so willing the people were, that men, women, & children laboured, & euery man was content that the stones of his owne house, yea of publike houses should go to the walling and fortifying of the towne. Among the Romanes euery souldier did as well set hand to his worke, as to his weapons. we forsooth are so deinty fingered, and our souldiers so peruers, that so soone as they are enrolled, yea long before they are good souldiers, they thinke they ought to worke no more, and therefore they must haue Pionniers to doe their worke: A kinde of men which the Ro­manes knew not, nor can be expressed in the Latin tongue. Hereup­on it commeth, that our proceedings are so slow, and so vnsufficient. Neither can it otherwise be, where so few men set hand to the worke. Likewise so sparing some are in their expenses, yt their Port townes for the most part lye open without defence to the spoyle of any ene­my that shall come suddenly vpon them with any force. And no man will ruinate the corner of his garden wall to saue himselfe, and his company, and friends. But if we knewe how necessary such la­bours were, and how as many braue actions are done with worke as with weapon, and that nothing doeth more apperteine to souldiers, then to worke fortheir owne defence, & safety; mē would neuer shew them selues so niggardly and illiberall in their expenses, nor so dain­tie in labouring, and thereby fortifying them selues.

Further the Gouernor ought to haue a watchfull eye, that he be nei­ther entrapped in ye practices of dissembling friends, nor surprises of the open enemy. his best course is to trust neither. If he doubt of the townsmen, he is not only to assure himselfe by pledges, but by strong garde, hauing the gates & walles in his possession. Popilius was no sooner placed in garrison at Popilius Strati positus in praesi­dio claues porta­rum, custodiam (que) murorum suae ex­templo potestatis fecit. Liu. 43. Stratus a towne of the Aetolians, but he seased the custody of the gates, and walles into his owne hands. He is like wise to see, yt he haue the victuals of the towne in his owne custody. The Garrison of Thucid. 4. Megara that kept in the castle hauing vi­ctuals from day to day out of ye town, when the same reuolted were driuen also to yeelde to the enemy. I neede not exemplify this by antiquity. for it is the case of Vlissing, & some other places where our men lie in garrison. Where if the townsmen at any time quarrel [Page 247]with them, they shalbe constrained to yeeld for want of victuals, and other prouisions, which are in the power of others. There can be no good assurance, where the to wnsmen are able to master thee, specially if ye enemy be without, as trecherous friends are within. And there­fore a wise Gouernor will prouide that such In eo spem po­ne nihil moturos Hetruscos, si ne quid mouere pos­sint praecaueris. Liu. 27. can not hurt him, though they would. So a certaine Romane perswaded his friend to deale with the Hetruscians. Against such, a prouident Gouernor must alwayes keepe one eye waking, and appoint strong gardes, and con­tinuall rounds, both on horsebacke and foote, and no lesse without the towne, then within. Which are to see that euery sentinel doe his du­tie. He that doubteth yt cownsmen must not suffer them to come nere the gates, not to talke with the enemy.Nolani muros portas (que) adire ve­titi. Liu. 23. Marcellus would not suffer them of Nola to come neere the walles, or gates, the enemy being without. Neither would the Transfugae ne [...] adire muros, nee alloqui quem­quam passi sunt. Liu. 25. garrison of Syracusae, that consisted of fugitiues suffer the men of the towne to come to the walles, or talke with the enemy that besieged them, or whisper together. All whis­perings & secret meetings in such cases are suspicious. The Gouer­nor must further take heede how he come in place, where the towns­men may lay hands on him. The Salust. bel. Iu­gurth. Vaccians in Afrike inuiting ye Go­uernor of the towne, and certaine of his chiefe commaunders, and Captains to banquets, did there first cut their throtes & afterward setting vpon the common souldiers destitute of heads did kil them also, & so yeelded them selues to the enemy. They of Rochel did not so euilentreat the English that were there in garrison in ye castle: but inuiting Captaine Mancell then Gouernor there to a banquet, first layd handes on him, then drawing out the souldiers vnder colour to moster them, did fayre turne them and their simple Captaine with scorne out of the towne. All parleys with the enemy, are dange­rous, vnlesse they be managed by those that haue skill, and be loyall, and in such place where the enemy may not come neere the walles. While they of Syracusae did parley about the redemption of certaine prisouers, a certaine Romane marked the height and accesses of the walles, which gaue the Romanes meanes to enter the citie by sur­prise. Eretria was taken by L. Liu. 32. Quintius while during the par­ley of peace, his souldiers espying the negligent garde of the townsmen scaled the walles. Casilinum inter colloquia cun­ctationem (que) pe­tentium fidem per occasionem captum est Mar­cello portam oc­cupante. Liu. 24.Casilinum was likewise taken by Marcellus his souldiers during the parley seasing a gate, and so giuing entrance to their companions.

The like happened to the towne of Charitè in France Ann. 1569. where the Protestants in the time of parley espying their opportu­nity entred the towne through the breach, that was euil garded. In time of parleys therefore, & of feastes, & of times of greatest security, then the Gouernor is to haue greatest care.Liu. 25. Syracusae was taken on a night when the souldiers had kept Holiday before, and lay drunke without feare or care. Nismes was surprised in a stormy night, when a man would haue thought that none would haue looked abroad.

And if no wise Gouernor will commit any man of worth into the hands of his enemies, least if they should breake promise they might preiudice him; much lesse ought he to parley with the enemy where he may come in danger himselfe.Caes. bel. gal. 5. Titurius Sabinus going to parley with Ambrorix was by him perfidiously slaine. Paches the Thucid. 3. Athe­nian deteined Hippias the Gouernour of Notium that came vpon assurāce of his word to treat with him of peace, & forced him to de­liuer vp ye town. This was also ye ruine ofGuicciardin. Liuerotto da Fermo & the Duke of Grauina & others, whom Caesar Borgia inducing by faire words to come to treat wt him of peace, put to death at Senogallia.

Those that haue diuers nations together in defence of one towne, must also take heede, that there arise no grudge or discontentment a­mong them, to make them reuolt to the enemy.Liu. 26. Mutines the Numi­dian vpon some discontentment offered him by the Carthaginians whom he serued, by the helpe of his countrymen seased a gate of A­grigentum, & gaue entrance to the Romanes. The like cause toge­ther with some corruption in the souldiers caused some English to deliuer vp Alost to the enemy. Which practices he that meaneth to a­uoyd, must neuer trust men yt are suspect, nor suffer strangers to watch vnited without some of such as he dare trust ioyned with them, nor let any man know his quarter before he goeth to the watch. During the siege he may not suffer bel to ring or clocke to strike, and further must keepe good watch, & make rounds diligently, & at times vncertaine.

To content all men the Gouernor is to administer iustice equally: that God may be pleased, hee is to see that God be serued religiously: and that lawes concerning religion, iustice, and military matters be strictly executed.

Sallyes are not to be made vpon the enemy rashly, nor without good cause, especialy, where ye townsmen are not to be trusted. They of Rochel serued our countrymen an odious touch vpō such an occa­sion [Page 249]in ye dayes of Richard ye 2. Charles duke of Phil. Comines. Burgundy defeating 500. archers yt sallied vpō him out of Piquigni, made the towne to yeeld vnto him soone after for want of men. They of Liege sallying out vpon ye same Duke, lost their best men, which after ward they sore rued. And such was the wisedome and direction of some in the go­uernement of Caleis besieged by the duke of Guise, that albeit they had very few men to defend such a towne, yet they would needs loose some of them going out to s [...]irmish with the enemie. Oftentimes sub­till enemies drawing out the townesmen by deuises, doe make them come short home, as I declared by the practise of Romulus against the Fidenians, of Annibal against the Locrians. At Nola Liu. 23. drawing out the townesmen, he circumuented a braue troupe of horsemen in an ambush laid for them. Sallies therefore are to be made onely when we haue men sufficient, and doe see the enemies negligence, or other aduantage.Diaphanes A­chaeus stationem Antiochi regis ad Pergamum inuadens semi­somnem nullis stratis equis aut peditibus paratis fudit. Liu. 37. Diaphanes sallying out of Pergamus vpon a corps de gard placed by Antiochus before the towne, at such time as the same was negligent, cut the same in pieces. By opportune sallies many sieges haue bene raised, as I declared by the example of Philip lying before Apollonia. Souldiers that sallie vpon aduantage, doe hinder the approches of the enemie, so that he is to win inch after inch. but whēthey sallie, let them take heed first that they go not too farre, least they be drawen into ambush; and secondly, that they haue some behind to fauour their retrait, as Aluarus Sandze obserued in his sal­lies vpon the Mores, in defending a fort in Zerbe.

Before that the enemie approcheth, the Gouernour is to cause all houses and villages neere the towne to be ruinated and fired, and all the wood and timber as neere as may be, either to be brought into the towne, or spoyled. Lamentable (I confesse) it will be to the country, but who would not rather spoyle such things, then suffer the enemie to vse them against himselfe?

In stopping of the enemies approches, let him vse this course: first if there be any narow wayes which the enemie must passe, before hee can come before the towne, let them bee well trenched and garded: when the same cannot longer be garded for feare least the enemie cut betwixt the corps de gard and the towne, let them then retire & make head in theThe Italians call it Via co­perta. couert way behind the counterscarpe, not onely for the defence thereof, but also for defence of the playne before the towne, especiallie of that place, where the enemie meaneth to range his [Page 250]pieces for the batterie. For defence whereof likewise, both the great ordonance from the bulwarkes, and other shot from the walles are to be imploied. In case the enemie by his negligence giue occasion, ei­ther in the euening, or in the night, hee may make a sallie vpon those that labour about the plāting of the ordonance, & the gabions. If the enemie be so strong that hee is able to take away theThe counter­scarpe is the banke that is made all along without the ditch of the fortresse. counterscarpe, then by traines andCasemates are defences of earth within ditches or trenches, where the souldiers lie couered, to shoote at those that present themselues vnto them. casemates in the ditch, by sallies and shot from the bulwarkes and wals, he is to defend his ditch so long as hee can. And last of all being beaten out of the ditch, his last hope is in the de­fence of his wals and bulwarkes, sustaining them with good terras­ses of earth, and when they are beaten downe, repairing them, and when no longer they can be defended by making retrenchments be­hind them.

For defence of a breach, this course is good, and commonly vsed. First all along where the enemie maketh his batterie, let there bee presently vpon the first shot a retrenchment made; the deeper the ditch is, and the higher the banke is raysed, the better the worke proo­ueth: vpon the banke, or els behind the banke, let some pieces be pla­ced in counterbatterie. In houses neere adioyning, and vpon the banke, let the small shot be disposed chicke. Against the enemies ar­tillerie that beateth in flanke, let there be an high terrasse of earth rai­sed. On both sides of the breach in places conuenient, the armed men are to be placed to repell such as escape the shot. If the place haue bulwarkes or towers that looke along the ditch, from thence the e­nemie is to be galled vpon the flankes as they enter the ditch: if there be none, then mounts or terrasses are to be raysed in such places, as most commodiouslie wee may looke into the ditch, and toward the breach. Walles or bankes are to be cast vp beneath the breach in the ditch. Lastly, if store of men will permit it, a sallie of targetters and other armed men is to bee made out of the towne vpon the sides of those that are vpon the counterscarpe, or within the ditch: which no doubt will make the enemie make more speed to returne.

This or the like proceeding, both ancient and later practise of warre hath taught vs in the defence of townes besieged, and assaul­ted. The Plataeans besieged, hauing set order for their prouision and the gouernement of their people, to repell the enemies force, raysed their walles higher in that part where the enemie made shew to assaile them. All along the mount which the enemie built without, [Page 251]they made a new wall within their olde. When the Thucid. 2. enemie went about to smother them, and to burne their engines vpon the wall, they defended themselues with their archerie and slingers, and quenched the fire with water and earth, and when they could no longer defend the towne, in a tempestuous night they passed ouer the banke which the enemie raysed against them.

The Massilians when they perceiued Caesars intention to be­siege them:Frumenti quod inuentum est in publicum con­ferunt. Caes. bel. Ciu. 1. prouided souldiers, brought corne out of the coun­trey into the citie, erected workehouses for armes, brought their prouision into the publike store, repaired their walles, trimmed vp their ships. When the enemie began to force them, they defen­ded themselues by diuers sallies, and engines fitted on the wals.

The like diligence did the Gaules vse agaynst Caesar besieging Auaricum: they frustrated his engines with hookes Laqueis falces auet tebant. Caes. bel. Gal. 7. and other en­gines, they caused his mount to sinke by vndermining. Vpon the wals they made diuers towers; by diuers sallies they hindered his workes, his mines they opened with crosse mines, and filled with great stones. The like did the Prenestins Transuersis cu­niculis hostium cuniculos exci­piebant. Liu. 23. against Annibal.

Against escalades the Caes. bel. Gal. 2. Aduaticans besieged by Caesar, placed great stones and pieces of timber vpon the walles, and likewise they ofZamenses saxa voluere, sudes, pi­la, picem, & sul­phure taedam mixtamardenti mittebant. Salust. bel. Iugurth. Zama to resist the enemies assault, Vpon those that set the ladders to the walles tumbled downe stones, and pieces of tim­ber, and cast vpon them pitch & brimstone, and shot and cast dartes at them.

In the defence of new Carthage in Spaine assailed by Scipio, all things being prouided, Mago assigned to euery man his quarter & his charge, and both with engines from the wall beat the scalers, and with archerie and armed men defended the breach. The Romanes hearing of the approch of Porsena to besiege their citie, sent into o­ther countreys to buy victuals, fortified their citie, assigned to euerie man his seuerall charge, delt well with the common sort. The same reasons alwayes continuing, the same course for the most part hath bene vsed also of late time.

Lignieres deputed gouernour of Chartres, an. 1568. which then was threatened by the Protestants to be besieged, first encouraged the people with good words, then together with ye principal mē of the towne going about to marke the weakest places of the walles, cau­sed rampiers and trenches to be made presently. In that worke hee [Page 252]caused all the inhabitants to labour. Afterward being bet in flanke, he raised vp a terrasse neere the breach, spreading sheetes and clothes before it for to couer the workemen: for grinding of corne he caused handmils to be made, and finally set good order for the administring of matters of warre, and iustice. But if he had burnt the suburbes, and beaten downe the houses neere the wals, and defended the Rauelin by the gate Drouaize more carefully and strongly, hee had done farre better. These things being neglected, the enemie placed his ord­nance neere to the wall in houses, from whence he discouerd ye breach, and diuers places of the towne, and hurt diuers. He lodged his men ve­ry commodiously in the suburbes, and taking that Rauelin, had entred the citie, if he had folowed his good hap, or kept the place.

The duke of Guise Gouernour of Poitiers, entring a litle before the siege which the Protestants laid before the town, anno 1569. spent first one day in viewing the walles, and appointing fortifications and defences to be made, which was also executed with great expedition. He tooke the next day the moster of all the souldiers, and inhabitants able to beare armes, to see what strength hee had. Afterward hee ap­pointed officers, & orders for the storehouses of victuals. Further he set some on worke to make pouder, others to burne ye houses nere the gates. The light horsemen he sent out to take some prisoners, & of thē to vnderstand the disseins of the enemie, & for auoiding of surprises, would not suffer bell to ring, nor clocke to strike during the siege. For defence of the breach he caused a retrenchment to be made behind the wall: against the pieces that bet his men in flanke, he opposed a tra­uerse of earth: and directly against the breach placed certaine pie­ces in countrebatterie. For sustaining ye assault, he assigned to euerie man his quarter, disposed his shot vpon the wals, & in certain houses neere to beat the enemie approching both in front, & in flanke. Neere the wals he had his armed men readie, his horsemen he sent about the streetes to keepe men in order, and to send those that were there to the breach; onely this was omitted, hee burnt not the suburbes, nor spoiled the countrey round about, nor prouided cornemils, nor dischar­ged the towne of such as were vnfit for seruice, nor of asses and iades that spent the haie so fast, that in the ende there wanted for the main­tenance of his horse of seruice.

They of Rochel against the siege that folowed an. 1573. first forti­fied their towne, and then set order for their gouernement: withall [Page 253]they made the best prouision of victuals and munitions, they could: they sent to their friendes for succour: they hindered the approches of the enemy by diuers sallies: for defence of the breach, they made a re­trenchment behinde, and filled the breach vp with sackes of earth, and other things. For couering those that wrought, they made a thicke smoke before the breach. Against the breach they ranged diuers pee­ces in contrebatterie. To susteine the assalt, they placed the shot on the flankes, and walles, placed squadrons of armed men both by the breach, and in other places: with traines of powder in the ditche, they scorched the enemie that came to the breache. Vpon the formost they cast stones, fire, scalding water, hot tarre, and pitch: yet might they haue done better, if they had made better prouision of thinges necessarie: next, if they had not made so many vaine and weake sallies. If in one sallie those that went out first, had bene well seconded, they had surely raysed the siege: while they spa­red the houses, and villages, and woods neere the Towne, they ministred many commodities to the enemie, without which hee coulde not as hee did, haue continued his siege the whole winter long.

In the siege of S. Iean d'Angeli, anno 1569, capteine Piles wan to himselfe great commendation. The towne was not strong, yet did he holde it long. The enemy wanne no ground vpon him, but it cost him deare. Vpon his first approch he made so couragious a sally, that he made the enemy to giue ground. In the place of the breach, he made a wall in the ditch before it, and a retrenchment within be­hinde it, and casting the earth inward, raised a banke vpon it, where­vpon he placed diuers pipes of earth, for defence of his souldiers. Vp­on the side of the breach, he raised vp a platforme of earth, with a parapet, for sauing his men. By this meanes he susteined diuers as­saults, and at diuers sallies cut diuers of the enemies in peeces, and cloyed and dismounted diuers Canons. If his prouision of victu­als and munitions, and the strength of men had bene greater, he had no doubt kept the Towne still: but wanting all thinges, and his platforme being newe, and but fifteene foote thicke, and pierced by euery Canon shotte, and not able long to stand; force it was for him to accept of an honourable composition offered him by the king.

And although the Towne of Sancerre was yeelded in the ende to [Page 254]the enemy, yet doe the defendants deserue to be remembred for their resolute defense, and reasonable good gouerment. When they heard that the enemy determined to besiege them, they chose a Go­uernour, and ioyned with him a Counsell of Capteines, and the most apparent Citizens. Next, they mostred their people, enrolled them in bands, and assigned to euery man his charge and quarter, & appointed orders such as the time required. For defence of the breach, they made a retrenchment, and defended the same with gabions on the front, and sides, where they placed their shotte, to serue at the time of the assault. To susteine the assault, they ranged their shot there, and on the wals, and in a certein gallery, and other houses neere the breach. Vpon the sides of the breach, and in other places conuenient, they placed their halberds, pikes, and armed men: but wanting victuals, mu­nitions, and men requisite for defence of such a place, they were dri­uen to accept of a harde composition. Whereunto, if they had not spared their money in the beginning, or had sent out such as for age, and impotencie were not fit for seruice, they could not haue bene so easily forced.

The assault of Chateleraud, anno 1569, as it was forcible, so was it valiantly susteined by diuers braue men directed by Scipio the En­giner. The breach being 80 paces wide, was so great, and the ene­mies comming so speedy, that they could not make any retrenchment behinde it. Therefore leauing that course, vpon each side of the breach they made gabions and barriquadaes, behinde which they placed di­uers valiant men, armed with cuyraces, and targets. The front be­fore the breach, was sufficiently fenced with houses. In the win­dowes of the houses, and in certeine holes made for the purpose, they placed their best shot, other shot they placed vpon the walles behinde the parapet, and in a certeine gallery that ouerlooked the breach. When the Italians that had the point, came to the assault, and had en­tred the breach; they that were couered vnder the gabions, sallied vp­on the first, the shot from the houses, gallery, and walles, dispatched a number of the rest.

In defence of townes besieged by the enemy, no time is to be lost, no cost, nor labour to be spared. By negligence, delaies, sparing, and want of skill of the Gouernors, many townes are lost. It grieueth me to thinke howe Caleis, Bullein, Rochel, and other Townes, which sometime this nation possessed in France, were lost by negli­gence, [Page 255]and misgouernment. But that it is the lot of all townes that that are committed to such weake persons, as beside the name haue nothing of nobility. Alcida Thueyd. 1. that was sent to succour Miletum, by forslowing the time, suffered the Athenians to take the Towne. Montegue a strong castle in Poitou, was lost by the negligence, igno­rance, and couetousnes of theHistor. de troubl. de Fr. li. 5. Capteine, that for two hundred soul­diers which he should haue mainteined there, kept but twenty, and sought nothing, but spoile without regarde, or knowledge of the keeping of the place. The Protestants lost Bronage, a towne of great importance, for want of garrison, munitions, and victuals sent in time. What we haue lost, and are like to loose by this meanes, I had rather we should learne by others examples, and reforme it, then to blush to heare it reported, and confirmed by the examples of those that were actors.

Thus we see what is to be done in the defence b gouernment of a place assaulted or besieged, and also what is to be auoyded. But be­cause al this serueth to small purpose, vnlesse the siege in time be rai­sed, let vs nowe shewe howe that may be effected.

The siege is raised sometime through want, or missgouernment in the campe, when for want of victuals, or other disorder the ene­my of his owne accord departeth. Sometime through sickenes, some­time through the distemper of the weather, sometime through dis­sention of souldiers; sometime he remooueth to succour his owne people, straited in some other place: sometime by sallies of the towns­men, or succour of their friendes, he is driuen away. All those wants therfore that may mooue him to depart, are to be increased, and all those meanes that may hasten his departure, to be vsed. He is to be streited for victuals by our friendes without. Some Towne which he fauoreth is to be besieged, his waters are to be corrupted, the place where he lyeth, if it may be, is to be drowned. If he may be taken in disorder, with all our force he is to be charged, and all meanes v­sed to call him home, or to tyre him lying before vs. The Prince of Orenge succoured Leyden, and anoyed the Spaniards, by cutting of the bankes of the riuers.

Fabius Hetruscos ca­stra circumdan­tes vigilia quarta erumpens in stra­tis sternit, reli­quos fudit, Liu. 9. being besieged in his campe by the Hetruscians, in­uading them vpon a sudden a little before day, killed many, & put the rest to flight. The French kings brother anno 1569, besieging [Page 256] Chateleraud, caused the Protestants to raise their siege from before Poytiers, to succour their friendes there. The Aetolians entring in­to the Citie of the Liu. Thaumacians besieged by Philip king of Ma­cedonia, by their often sallies caused him to raise his siege. Liu. 24. Crispus Naeuius sallying out of Apollonia in the night, put all the Macedo­nian armie that lay before the towne in disarray, and caused the same to dislodge. Scipio Liu. 24. going to succour his friendes besieged, passed through the enemies campe in the night, and presently sally­ing out vpon them, forced them to relinquish their holde. The ru­mor of Liu. 34. Catoes approches with succours, caused the Celtiberians to depart from a towne which they besieged. Likewise in the yeere of our Lorde, 1569, the towne of Charitè in France was disenga­ged, the enemie departing for feare of a bruite of great succours com­ming to the towne, both of horse and foote, which God wot was no­thing so.

At such time as the army riseth, the defendants haue commonly good opportunitie to cut those that lagge behinde in peeces. When Appius Liu. 43. departed from the siege of Phanotis, the Capteine of the towne following after him, and charging him in streite & trouble­some waies, at the foote of certeine hils, cut a thousand of his men in peeces. Therefore as at other times, so then also the Generall ought to haue care, that the sicke, and hurt be sent before with a good garde, and with them the baggage of the army. then may he followe safely with the rest. By this course Caesar departed safely from before Dyr­rachium, and in our times the Admirall from the siege of Poytiers. The French kings brother rising from Chateleraud, when his men were at the assault, as soone as he sawe they could not preuaile, he be­gan to send away his great ordonance before, and at midnight follow­ed with all his army.

Resteth nowe for the finishing of this discourse, concerning the defence of places, that I shewe howe any place may with labour be fortified, and what rules are to be obserued in the making of bulworkes, walles, ditches, bankes, and all sortes of fortificati­on, not in such curious sorte, as doe the Italians, which can nei­ther be well vnderstoode of souldiers vnacquainted with Geome­tricall termes, nor practised in time of warres, by reason of the time required in the raysing of them: which notwithstanding may serue them in tyme of necessitie, as well as the artificiall worke­manship [Page 257]of Italians that costeth millions, and alwayes helpeth not. Yet would I not haue thinges made either rudely without propor­tion, nor hastily without perfection, nor niggardly without thinges conuenient.

In ancient time, before the vse of gunnes was found out, the dan­ger of walled townes was, lest they might be taken with scaling, or their walles ruinated with shaking or zapping, their defence against scaling, was the height of the walles; against shaking, the mixture of wood, and stone, and thicknesse. Caesar sheweth that the Gaules in his time fashioned their walles checker wise, filling a frame of timber with square stones. so that for euery piece of timbers head there was a square stone of that bignesse layed in the wall. To en­crease the height of their walles, they made high towers vpon them, in distance fourescore, or an hundred paces one from another. Their defence was stones, pieces of timber, iauelines, dartes, arrowes, and whatsoeuer coulde hurt the enemy throwen from the wall. These thinges for that their force was increased by the height of the walles, therefore did they builde them high, as also to hinder the escaladaes of the enemy. Now for that great ordonance doth hurt more in flanke then forward, and shaketh any wall though ne­uer so thicke, and those most easily that are highest; therefore the vse is to builde walles lowe, that they may the better be susteined by the terrasse behinde, and more hardly discouered by reason of the counterscarpe. for defence whereof, there are bulwarkes builded out from the wall into the ditch, that the great ordonance being there placed, may not onely shoote forward into the field, but in flanke along the ditch, and the wall.

Those townes therefore, and castles, I account to be well forti­field, that first are strongly walled, or banked round, with bulwarkes in conuenient distances to flanke the walles, or banke; secondly, that behinde the walles haue a good rampare or terrasse, and be­fore them a deepe and broad ditch: and last of all a sufficient coun­terscarpe, with his couert way, with all the partes, and measures of the wall, terrasse, bulwarkes, ditch, and counterscarpe proportion­able. Where there is either part or proportion wanting, there wan­teth so much of the perfection, and strength, that is in such workes required. Whosoeuer therefore purposeth to fortifie a place, must haue respect first to the wall, and rampare, or to the banke, next [Page 258]to the bulwarkes, thirdly, to the ditch, and lastly, to the counter­scarpe.

The partes of the wall are these, first the foundation, then the wall to the cordon, and lastly, that aboue the cordon. Cordon I call that rowe of stones that diuideth that part of the wall that is lowest, and couered with the counter scarpe from the enemies shot, and leaneth much inward to the towne, from that which is for the most part open, and higher then the counterscarpe, and leaneth lesse inward then the lower part of the wall.

The whole height of the wall from the ditch to the top, is more or lesse according to the iudgement of the Enginer, and meanes, and time hee hath to builde it in. Prouided that it be not easily reached with ladders. it is sufficient if it be betwixt fiue and fortie or fortie foot high. of which albeit the parapet be beaten downe, yet few sca­ling ladders will reach so high.

The foundation of the wall would be made firme, and euen, lea­ning a little inward. if the soile be soft and moist, it must be holpen with piles of wood driuen downe thicke into the ground, and stones rammed fast betweene them. if the soile be rocky, then must the same be made plain, or at least with degrees be aten out with the picke, and made leuell, that the stones may lie orderly, saue that toward the towne as the rest of the foundation it ought to be a little lower.

The foundation of theThe cortine of the wall is that distance or part of the wall that is betwixt bul­warke and bul­warke, turret & turret, for that it is spred for the couering of the towne. cortine of the wall being laid, the first stone of the wall would be layd one foot from the boord of the foundation, if no more. That part of the foundation that is without the wall the Italians call relasciato, which is nothing els in English, then that which is left of the foundation.

The wall the Italians would haue made so thicke at the foot, that in the middest there may be left a space for a man to goe along in round about the walles. this they call contramina. But it is cost to no purpose: for to vent a mine, the countermine is to be made as lowe as the foundation of the wall and lower, and rather in the ditch, if it be drie, then in the wall. The wall would be made so thicke at the foundation, that albeit in euery fiue foot of height it leane inward, and loose one foot of breadth or thickenesse, yet at the cordon it may be twelue or fifteene foot thicke. From the cordon vpward the wall is to leane inward, and to loose of his thickenesse in euery fiue one halfe foot.

The rampar or terrasse behinde the walles would be raised vntill you come within foure or fiue foot of the toppe of the wall. This vp­permost part for that it gardeth the souldiers that are behinde it, when they turne their breasts to shoot, or strike the enemy is called parapet. If the same be not raised so high, but that the wall is seuen or eight foot higher, as it is at Luca in Italy, & in the bourg at Rome, and di­ners places, which I haue seene: then must there be made a bancke or way vpon the inside of the wall foure foot within the toppe of it, and degrees to mount from the rampar vnto it, in diuers places.

The rampar cannot be too broad, but nine or ten pases it would be, if it be made sufficient. if it be lesse, hardly can you fit the cannon or coluerin vpon it. The height is proportionable to the wall, as be­fore I haue shewed. Toward the towne the rampar would be made somewhat stope and pendant, that the souldiers may go vp and downe the same in all places, when need requires; in the same like wise are staires to be made in diuers places, that those that haue occasion may go vp vnto it with carriages. The side of it would be set with trees, for thereby the earth will be holden vp more firme, and the same may in time serue to many good vses.

Within euery two hundred pases or thereabout, there would be a bulwarke erected, the outward walles made in the same sort, that the walles of the cortine are made, but more thicke and high by two or three foot. These are made for gard both of the great ordonance that beat along the ditch and cortine, and that which is pointed into the fieldes. These are sometime made with two stages, or places for the ordonance, the one aboue, the other beneath; sometime with one one­ly place, sometimes all solide without any places at all, as in Hol­land and Zeland, for the most part. the which are rather to be called terrasses then bulwarkes, for that they onely serue to place great or­donance vpon them to flanke the walles or bankes somewhat, but e­specially to scoure the plaines without.

The forme of them commeth nerest to fiue square, the base where­of is the rampar behinde that part of the walles that goeth to the ma­king of the bulwarke, and is behinde it. If thou wouldest make a bul­warke at any corner of a wall, measure out from the point thereof fortie pases, and draw a line of that length equally distant from the cortine of the wall on either hand. From the cortine take of ech hand 25 pases, and from that point that is 25 pases from the corner, [Page 260] draw a line Ad aequales an­gulos, or ad per­pendiculum. direct from the wall long two & twenty pases. From this line of two and twentie pases take tenne to serue for the ditch be­tweene the towne wall and theThe Italians call it Orecchion or Spalla del Bel­nardio. shoulder of the bulwarke. the rest serueth to make the shoulder it selfe. From this point draw a line to to that point that is fortie pases from the corner of the wall. and so thou hast the delineation of the one part or face of the bulwarke. doe the like on the other hand, and so thou hast thy bulwarke delineated in good proportion. which not being obserued in the bulwarkes of Berwike, maketh them shew crooked and deformed: but that is one of their least faults.

From the line that is fiue and twentie pases long take twelue pa­ses on either side toward the point of the corner of the wall, and thence drawing a direct line directly to the shoulder of the bulwarke, vpon that line worke a wall all of massiue stone, and when thou art come tenne or twelue foot high, make there foure loope holes for the can­non, and within the wall a sole for the ordonance to runne on, well planed, but somewhat inclining to the ditch. The loope holes would be a yard broad, and foure foot high. The first loope hole that is nee­rest to the cortine, would be made foure foot distant from the said cor­tine, that the connon placed there may serue to scoure the front of the next bulwarke that is vnto it, and the ditch and counterscarpe there­of, being more then two hundred pases off. The other three loope holes would be made in equall distance one from another, and so farre asunder, that both the cannon may recoile without touching any thing, and that in the middest there may be made a pillar to beare the floure of the place aboue. The vse of the three pieces placed in these three loope holes, is to defend the cortine of the wall, and the ditch. and therefore the sole where they runne, is to be made so high, that with their noses they may looke somewhat downward into the ditch. In the middest of the lower place thou art to make a pillar all of massiue stone, neither so bigge that it hinder the recoiling of the can­non, nor so little, but that it may beare the vault, and the cannon there placed aboue. In this vpper place thou art likewise to make foure loope holes, as in the place beneath: but if the same be vnco­uered, a good parapet well crenelled will serue for the loope holes. Within the bulwarke also there would be a place made for the kee­ping drie of the munition, and instruments occupied about the ordo­nance, and also for keeping of armes for the souldiers. The entrance [Page 261]into this place and vnto the places of the canon would be from with­in. And that the souldiers or Canoniers may sally or goe out into the ditch there would be made a doore in the cortine of the wall neere to the first loope hoole. The like places, loope holes, and doore is to be made on the other hand of the bulwarke.

All the bulwarke saue the places for the artillery, and munition, and except, if you wil, the countermine going to the point of the bul­warke, would be filled with earth beaten small, and wel rammed to­gether. The wall of the bulwarke would bee made like the wall of the towne vnlesse it please them that bestowe the charge to haue it thicker: and either may it be made with cordon, or without. The pa­rapet of the bulwarke would be more firme, then that of the wall. And in diuers places would there bee made soles for the canon to runne vpon aboue the bulwarke. The shoulder of the bulwarke being made for defence of the canon placed in the loope holes woulde bee made strong. And likewise would the point of the bulwarke be for that the enemy vseth there to make entrance with his mattocke, or zappe.

I know fewe bulwarkes are so large, or halfe so large as this that I haue described, but ye lesser they are the more they want of strength and of perfection; and deserue in deede to be called rather terrasses, then otherwise. Those therefore that doe meane to make them strong, let them make them also large, and if they make not their terrasses with such places as I haue described, yet let them leaue some places, where to bestow the canon for defence of the ditch and cortine.

Where the wall is round, or crooked, or so long that one bulwarke cannot succour another, or that the same is so vneauen, that the cortine cannot be made proportionable for distance: there the remedy is in the midst of the cortine to make platformes, and caualiers, or mounts. The platforme is made of the same matter, and almost in the same forme that the bulwarke hath; likewise it commeth out from the wall as doeth the bulwarke. But the difference is, that it is pla­ced in the midst of the plaine cortine, and is nothing so large as the bulwarke, nor hath those places, and loope hooles that the bulwarke hath, and serueth onely to place the ordonance vpon it aboue.

Sometimes that which platformes doe being ioyned to the wall, that doe rauelins, or terrasses deuided from the wall, which forme la Nouè commendeth, and I do not mistike: For both the charge and la­bour is lesse, and well they may serue to strengthen some weake [Page 262]place, that otherwise is not fortified. And the same being beaten, yet the wall remaineth safe.

These Caua­liers are terrasses of earth built without, or with­in the walles. So called because they looke ouer the walles. Caualiers or mountes are made within the walles some two or three paces, & are employed to the same purpose that platformes are. From them they differ, that the platformes are raysed in the ditche, and ioyne to the wall, where as mounts are made within. They are to be made higher then the walles to looke into the ditch to scoure the plaine or vppermost superficies of the bulwarkes on either hand, and to discouer the plaine. The forme is foure square, yet oft times broa­der, then long. The stuffe is earth, and fagots for the most part, hol­den vp with bordes and pieces of timber. The length is more or lesse according to the necessitie of the place, and time that is giuen vs to make it in. Some make them 180 foote broade, and long 150 the pa­rapet would be 20 foote thicke on front and on the sides. The staires that are made to ascend the caualier, are made behinde.

The place being thus walled round with walles direct, and well flanked with bulwarkes at euery corner, either in conuenient distan­ces, or els succorde with platformes or mounts in the midst of the cor­tine, cannot easily beforced, if it be wel defended.

Whether it be better to haue fiue, or sixe, or more bulwarkes, a­bout one towne, or forteresse it is hard to determine: for if the cortine be made right, and of a reasonable length, and the bulwarkes bee so placed that one may entresuccour another, how many corners soeuer the forteresse is, the same is good. Onely forteresses of foure corners and bulwarks, and much more those of three, because the bulwarkes cannot one defend another vnlesse they be made very sharpe & weake, of men of experience haue bene found defectiue. The forteresse of Porto Hercole in the territorie of Siena is of three corners, but it was so built either by reason of the ground that would admit no other forme, or for that the insufficiencie of those smal bulwarkes with three corners was not knowne when that was made.

Those that either haue not time or meanes to make walles, and bulwarkes of stone, if they will obserue the same measures and pro­portions, may make the same very wel and strongly of earth, clay and small rubble mingled together, and either made in morter stiffened with straw, or els borne vp with small and straight sticks layd thinne in the workes. In Holland, Zeland, and other places of the low Countrie, there are diuers good fortifications made onely of turffes [Page 263]of earth well layde and fastened together on the out sides, and within stuffed with earth and rubble. Onely the places for the canon which are made in bulwarkes of stone, in these kindes of fortifications are wanting, and the pointes of the bulwarkes made very weake and subiect to zapping. Yet with timber I would not doubt to make one sufficient place on either side of the bulwarke to range the canon in to beate low along the ditch and cortine; and with fagots also to make both the shoulder and point of the bulwarke as stiffe, as if were made with stone.

Those that fortifie their places only with turffes, or earth of which both the walles and bulwarkes are to consist, are thus to proceede in their worke. First the ground is to bee plained so broade as they meane to make their banke, or rampar, or bulwarke, and that would I not haue lesse then 14 pases at the bottome. Some what lower in the midst then in the outsides. The ground being plained, a ranke of turffes is to be layde outwarde, euery one a yarde or three quarters long if the earth be tough, and likewise a ranke of turffes of a worser sort inwarde to the towne. They are to be made thinne to the inside and thicke to the outside: vpon the endes of these turffes, are other wor­ser turffes to bee layde, and the space within to be filled with small earth well rammed together. Vpon these rankes of turffes other rankes of turffes are to be layde and to be fastened together, and to be filled in the midst vntill the same come to a sufficient height. The banke is to be made leaning inwarde, the better to holde vp the earth. The earth must be digged out of the ditch al along the banke, leaning a yarde or more from the foundation of the banke, which the worke be­ing finished, may be plained and fashioned to the banke, and may serue to make the banke seeme hie.

To make a banke of earth and hasell rods, or other brush mingled together, this is the course. First the earth is to be plained, where the foundation is to be made, then small earth well sifted and ram­med to bee layde halfe a foote thicke, and aboue that small rods with their heads layde as eauen as may be: and to the endes of those, other rods are to be layde, and earth ouer them, this is to be done both on the outside, and inside, and so to be mingled and rammed together vntill the banke come to the full height. The banke is to be made slope for the better lying of the earth, and to bee filled with earth digged out of the ditch for ease of the labourers.

If neither turffes of earth, nor sticks may be had sufficient, then the outward crust on both sides of the ramper, would be made of morter well mingled with hay and straw, or els if the ground be stony, of stones layde in morter. The inmost part, if it be filled with earth and rubble, and well rammed; wil stand when the stones ruse downe, and beare many canon shot, if it be of sufficient thickenesse. This maner of fortification requiring no great cost, and being perfited onely with labour: greatly were it to be wished, that Plimmouth, Falmouth, and other Port townes in England were so banked, and fortified. For al­beit in continuance of time such bankes are beaten flat, yet would they beare off any suddeine force.

When the worke is come to the height, then is the parapet to bee made 4 pases broade, if thy banke will beare it. And to mount vp the rampar, staires would be cast out in diuers places. The broader the banke is, the better the earth will lye, and the better resistance it will make. But if the same be weake in any place, then is the same to be defended with mounts from within, and rauelins without.

The measures of the bulwarkes of earth with al their parts would be either equal to those that are made of stone, or larger, because other­wise the ditch would soone be filled with ye rusing downe of the earth.

In making the walles and bulwarkes, the breadth also and fashion of the ditch is to be cast: for if they be done both together, the earth that is digged out of the ditch may serue to make the rampar. The ditch where it is narrowest would be 15 pases broade. If it be made narrower, it may the more easily bee filled vp by the enemy, and by the ruines of the bankes and walles. In France the ditches made in olde time are either a dos de l'asue, that is, deepe and narrow in the midst, and rising on both sides, as the ditches about Amiens, and Pa­ris; or els a fond de cuue, that is, equally deepe in the bottome, and steepe vpon the sides. In both which the foote of the wall is open to the view, and easily battred. Neither doe the defenses made vpon the rampar on which the wal is built, which they cal fausses brayes helpe the matter. Now the wall being raysed out of the ditch, the bottome of the same would be leuell, but broade and deepe; And in the midst of it a deepe trench, which in dry ditches serueth to discouer the enemies Mines, in watry places to conuey away the water. Some for defence of their ditch haue built a wall in the midst of it, as in the ditches of Caleis: but it is to no purpose, seeing for the lownesse of it, either [Page 265]with the ruines of the wall, or with earth and faggots cast into the ditches, it is soone couered.

Whether the ditch be drie or full of water, it skilleth not greatly. For as both haue their discommodities; so they haue also their com­modities. A fortresse enuironed with a deepe water, is lesse subiect to sudden enterprises, except it be in time of hard frost. The same is more incommodious to passe, or to fill to the enemie: but the same is hurtfull to the retraite of the souldiers that sally, and keepeth them vp as it were in mue, and seldome is any ground so leuell, but that in some place or other, the water may be let out of the ditches: contrary­wise dry ditches make fortresses more subiect to surprises, but yet they are more commodious for souldiers to sally out, and to fauour the retraite of those that come backe. If there be heapes of stones in them, the canon doeth more hurt to the enemy beating among them. Finally, the dry ditch giueth the souldiers meanes to defend their contrescarpe, which those that are enuironed with water, doe as it were yeeld vp to the enemy. There fore where the fortresse is strong, and well flanked, and manned, it is better to haue a dry ditch: where it is weake, and euill furnished with souldiers, it is better to haue dit­ches deepe, and full of water.

The last defence which is thought of, but first lost, or wonne, is the coutrescarpe, or banke without the ditch. The same is to be fashioned according to the ditch. In the making of it, we are to respect three pointes, according to the three parts of it. First, that the same be made so plaine on the toppe, that the enemy doe not hide himselfe behinde it, and vse it for a parapet. Secondly, that toward the ditch there be made a couert or close way, foure foote broad, and foure foote and a halfe high. Wherein the souldiers lying, may hinder the appro­ches of those, that come to viewe the walles, or full the ditch, or place their artillery; and sallying, may retire thither safely, being pur­sued by the enemy. Thirdly, that the pendant or banke of the con­trescarpe be made so slope, that the souldiers may goe downe in all places without breaking their armes or their legges, although they cannot come vp vpon it, but at the staires.

These are the common defences of Townes or Castles, accor­ding to which, by the same rules others may be deuised. Of late there is an Italian, that hath deuised by certeine terrasses of earth be­fore the walles, to keepe the enemy from battering the cortine of [Page 266]the wall: and therefore he calleth them contraguardie. the same are thus to be fashioned.

The cortine of the wall is to bee made bending inwarde some eight or tenne pases from the right line in the middest. eight pases from this is a rampar of earth to bee raised all along the cortine betweene bulwarke, and bulwarke, higher then the contrescarpe, but lower then the parapet of the wall. this rampar is to haue a co­uert way like to the contrescarpe inward, & being made low towards the ditch is there likewise to haue a parapet. the same at the endes is to be made small, so that it doe not hinder the artillery of the bulwarke to scoure the ditch. the artillery of the towne that is placed at the in­ward angle of the cortine is to beate all along the ditch, and flanke of this contregard.

This manner of fortification hauing so many parapets and flankers, and such a thickenesse of earth, hee supposeth that no batte­rie shall be able to force: but on the otherside hee considereth not, that the forces of the castle or towne being not great are not sufficient to furnish so many places, nor conuenient that they shoulde into so many partes bee deuided: neither doth hee thinke, that it is more easie to fortifie two townes or castles, then to builde these double de­fenses: nor that the charge would be infinite.

It is reported, that the Castle of And warp cost a hundreth thou­sand duckats building. what then woulde a citadel cost, that hath double the defenses, and workes, and requireth twise so many men, and twise so much ordonance? if fewe goe to the cost of fortification with stone, and content themselues with bankes of earth, it is not likely that any beside the worke of stone will make so many ter­rasses of earth, as by the rules of this kinde of Italian fortification is required.

The Prince of Orenge in his time traced diuers bankes about such places as hee thought necessarie to bee defended; as about William stat, and others, where there is scarce any bulwarke, ca­ualier, or good platforme. but the walles being made in and out, the inward angle of one part is made with great ordonance and mos­quets to flanke the other. besides this, the Rampar is so large, that the artillerie placed thereon, may bee made to serue to many purposes.

He that vnderstandeth these rules, and withall the vse of the ca­non, and all lesser pieces together with their effects: in what ground soeuer he is, may vnderstand how to defend himselfe and his compa­nie so long as his victuals and munitions last. For example, if he be taken in plaine ground, and would there lie safelie; let him trace his bankes and trenches either fiue square, or sixe square with bulwarkes or terrasses at euerie corner like vnto a castle or towne fortified: hee may make it big, or lesse according to his number. If he be appointed to gard the passage of a riuer, hee may vnderstand how to couer his companie, that hee bee neither forced in front, nor on the banke. Such places as are aduantageous by nature as hils and straites, he knoweth how to make stronger by labour. TheGuicciard. Bicocke in Lom­bardie resolutelie defended by Prospero Colonna agaynst the French, teacheth vs how hard it is to passe a banke, that is well de­fended.

The Spaniards in their warres in the kingdom of Naples against the French hauing made betwixt themselues and the enemie a banke and ditch of no great strength, yet by that small aduantage obtained a great victorie.

These rules may also teach vs how to strengthen such townes as are alreadie walled and ditched, though weakelie, and for the vse of the canon vnprofitablie. The defences of walles made inartificial­lie, are diuers. First, rampiers cast vp behinde the walles. Second­lie, retrenchments with bankes made toward the towne with a strong parapet, such as before I haue described. Thirdly, plat­formes made at the corners or on the cortine of the walles, made in such places, as our artillerie may best serue to flanke our walles and ditches.

The like effect haue mountes, raysed behinde the wall vp­on the rampar. Fourthlie, rauelins placed from the wall forward, where the same is most straight, and the ground most euen. The same are to be made fiue square, or at least three square, and raised of earth and roddes mingled and rammed close together, about the which a broad and deepe ditch is to bee wrought. The last defence is in the depth of the ditches, and strength of the counterscarpe, which is to be wrought artificiallie all along where wee thinke the enemie will assayle vs.

When the gouernour of the towne hath vsed all possible means for [Page 268]defence of himselfe and his companie, and yet through either long siege, or want of supplie, or succour can hold the place no longer, let him before hee attempt extremities, declare his estate to those that gaue him the place to gard. After that, if he neither receiue succour, nor answere, let him call the colonels, captains and chiefe citizens to counsell, and resolue in time what to doe. The first point to be resol­ued, is, whether by any possibilitie the place may bee defended any longer, consideration had of the number of seruiceable men, of the want of victuals and munitions, and weakenesse of the place that li­eth almost open to the enemie; likewise of the resolution of the ene­mie, and despaire of succour. And if it appeare that the same cannot longer be defended, the next point to bee considered is, whether the same be to be yeelded vpon honourable composition, or to be destroy­ed and forsaken. In this case the qualities of the enemie are to bee respected. For better it is, to runne into any hazard, yea and to die fighting, then to yeeld to him that perfourmeth no promise, and kil­leth and massacreth men after yeelding. If it bee resolued, that it is best to attempt to escape by breaking through the campe, the next point to bee considered is, by what meanes, and at what time and place the same is to bee perfourmed. The Ala equitum Numidarum prae sidio Salapiae re­licta eruptionem tentauit. Liu. 26. Numidians that were left in garrison at Salapia, when the towne was betrayed, and en­tred by the enemie, attempted to breake through the enemie. A course commendable although it succeeded not. They of Plataea dri­uen to great extremitie by the Thucid. 3. Lacedemonians that besieged thē, when they could doe no more for want of victuals, in a darke and tempestuous night went ouer the enemies trenches and banks, and so escaped. They of Acerrani de­sperata tutela vr­bis, vbi circum­uallari vrbis moenia vide­runt, priusquam continuarentur hostium opera, per inte [...]missa munimenta, neglectás (que) custodias silentio noctis di­lapsi sunt. Liu. 23 Acerrae despairing the defence of their citie, when they sawe the enemie to begin to compasse them round a­bout, before that his workes were continued and perfited, in the silent night passing through where least resistance was made, esca­ped. The same was likewise attempted by the Caes. bel. Gal. 7. Gaules besieged by Caesar in Auaricum. The people neere the sea coast of France, de­fended themselues so long as they were able against Caesar, & when they sawe the case desperate, conueied themselues and their goods into their ships, and so fled away. Attilius when he could no longer de­fend the towne of Locri agaynst Annibal, counselling the townes­men to compound with the enemie, conueied himself and the garrison away by water. Such as had meanes to escape, & chose rather to com­pound [Page 269]with the enemy, the Romanes in time past did so vtterly mis­like, that they refused to redeeme those that had yeelded themselues after the ouerthrow of Cannae, albeit they might haue ransomed them with very little money. Yet those that purpose to breake through the enemies campe, are to resolue vpon many things before they put it in execution: first of the time, secondly of the place where they purpose to passe, that they may fill the ditch of his campe if any be, and prouide things necessary for that purpose, thirdly of the place where to re­traite. Lastly in what order, that both they may force those that resist, and escape them that folow after.

When there appeareth no hope either to holde out, or to escape by flight, then are we to try what composition we can haue, and that inPublius Sitius ciuitatum obses­sarum quae con­ditiones oblatas recusarant ciues interficit. Hirt. de bel. Afric. time. So did the Romanes besieged by the Samnites in the strait at Caudium. Neither did the Romanes dislike with the garrison at Ca­silinum that compounded with Annibal. Nay they Liui. 23. rewarded them for holding out so long hauing no other victuals but nuts and rootes. Nicolas Serin refusing necessary conditions of peace of­fered him by Soliman that besieged him in Sigeth, lost himselfe and many other braue men that were with him. The fact of Liui. 32. Aeneside­mus gouernour of Argos, who when he might haue escaped, the citie being surrendred, chose rather to die armed himselfe alone in the place, then to depart, is rather to be lamented, then commen­ded, or followed.

Necessarie composition therefore, so it be in extremitie, is not to be refused. But yet while we talke of composition, we are to vse great circumspection and care; first that the garrison be not discouraged; secondly that the same growe not more secure, and carelesse; thirdly that vnder colour of parley the enemy doe not view the walles, or ditches or breach, or attempt to sease the breach or the gate, or els en­terteine some intelligence with some within: which things how dan­gerous they are, I haue heretofore declared. To auoyd these dangers this course is best; the necessitie of the towne, and other secrets are to be kept from the knowledge of the souldiers, who by good wordes are to be encouraged, and made acquainted with so much onely, as is necessary: secondly such men onely are to be deputed to parley, as are well knowne for their sufficiencie, and loyaltie: thirdly the place of parley is to be appointed farre from the towne, that the souldiers within heare nothing. Which was practised in diuers parleyes du­ring [Page 270]the last siege of Rochel.

In capitulations two things are especially to be respected, first that the conditions be honourable, and fauourable: secondly that the same be performed. The most reasonable composition that may be, is when they within keepe the place still, paying onely certaine money, or loosing onely some other commoditie. So Rome was redeemed from Porsena that besieged it; and so they that were besieged by the Gaules in the Capitol redeemed themselues. And Rochel escaped the more easily ye hands of them that beesiegd the towne, by compoun­ding for money. Contrarywise of all pointes it is most extreeme, to yeeld vp the place to the enemie. If the Saguntins would haue yeelded vp their towne to Annibal, and consented to haue dwelt some other where: they might haue saued themselues, and their goods; but they would not. There is yet a meane betwixt these two, when those that yeeld to the enemy do promise him to become his subiects, and to pay him certaine tribute, and so keepe the place vnder his dominion.

If then by any summe of money we may redeeme our selues, and our citie driuen to such extremitie, let vs not prise golde aboue safetie: on the other side if we be not in extremitie, let vs not sell our aduan­tages for money. When I reade former histories, I cannot but won­der at the basenesse of many of our nation, that in times past haue bene bought out of their places for money: and lament, that some accomp­ted of, wel otherwise, should therein deale more dishonourably, & foo­lishly then other nations. For what could be more dishonorable, then the surrender of Terwin, Torney, Bollein, & other places, or the losse of Caleis? and what more ridiculous, then that our army going to fight, should with a few French crownes be bought out, and perswa­ded to returne?

But if the enemy will heare of no composition without surrender of the place, the next consideration is, that we may be assured of our liues, and depart with our horses, and armes without disgrace. By the capitulation of S. Hist. de troubl. lib. 10. Iean d'Angeli the captaines and souldiers departed with their armes, horses, and baggage. Onely they were driuen to rolle vp their ensignes, and to make promise that they would not beare armes in the cause of Religion for the space of foure moneths. The garrison of Somieres surrendring the towne to the enemy were suffered to depart with their armes and goods, and had seuen dayes respit giuen them to conuey away their goods in. [Page 271]Like honourable composition had our men in the late surrender of Scluce. The more resolute the garrison sheweth it selfe in standing vpon points, the more honourable their composition doth commonly prooue. And contrarywise those that will needes compound, loose both life and honor. The Romanes for the most part would not com­pound without surrender made of the defendants armes: but the an­cient faith and loyalty of the Romanes being now lost and gone, let it be iudged, what wisedome it is for men to put themselues into dissoy­all mens handes all naked.

The greatest difficulty is in procuring of good assurance of the ca­pitulation of surrender made. which is most of all to be stood vpon. For what auaileth it to haue good words without performance? In these late brabbles of France the garrisons of Mucidam, and Mailè, and diuers other places haue bene cut in pieces contrary to compo­sition. And howsoeuer the prince of Parma dealt with our men, yet the poore townesmen of Scluce, and some of the Dutch complaine, that all points were not performed. The Protestants of France, con­trary to the articles of peace, were shamefully massacred during the mirth and solemnities of the kinges sisters marriage. And now it beginneth to be a rule, that no faith, nor lawes of warre are to be ob­serued to heretikes. In which rolle, seeing the Romanists doe mo­ster all that are not of the Papall faction, it behooueth vs to looke a­bout, how wee doe trust them. especially giuing vs such warning by the feined treaty of Dunkirke. Beside all this, a certeine Spaniard, a great man of law in the Lowe countries, affirmeth, that all Baltazar Ayala de iure belli. capi­tulations wherein any thing that belongeth to the state is aliena­ted, are voide and of no force. Which if it were true, then coulde hardly any composition of surrender be good, further then they that haue the same surrendred, keepe the same by force.

Wherefore, that wee be not heerein abused by treacherous ene­mies, let vs see by what meanes we may assure our selues. In times past wee might trust mens wordes. if they performed not wordes, yet had they regard to writinges and seales.Hist de troubl. de Franc. Captaine Piles for the assurance of the composition of S. Iean d' Angeli, required only the kinges hand and seale. But now such disloyalty is entred into the world, that neither with words, nor writings, nor seales, nor yet othes men can stand assured. And therefore beside wordes and writing, wise men now require sureties, pledges, and hostages. The house of [Page 272] Guicciard. Bentiuogli in Bologna would not capitulate with Caesar Borgia, vnlesse the French king, and Florentines would giue their words, and binde themselues for performance. The Phil. Comines. constable of France would not trust Lewis the eleuenth his othe without pledge. Both of Lysander in olde time, and of Lewis the eleuenth in latter times, stories affirme, that they had small regard of promise, or othe, further then their profit required. Therefore both in time past the Romanes, and of late time others haue required, and had other assurance. The garrison of Brouage Anno 1577. capitulating with the enemy about the surren­der of Brouage, doubting of the performance of couenants; demanded, and obteined hostages, which were conueyed to Rochell before they gaue vp the place. they of Somieres had likewise hostages deliuered vnto them, such as they did nominate, before they did deliuer vp the towne. Without this assurance, it is not safe for any to commit their heads into their enemies handes. and farre more honorable it is to die like braue men in the field with our armes in our handes, then like sheepe to haue our throates cut in the handes of perfidious butchers. Tit. Liu. 24. Sempronius seeing himselfe betrayed, and that he must needs die, exhorted his men to die rather fighting and doing somewhat, in which case men haue lesse apprehension of death, then vnder the kniues of executioners.

To auoid all cauilles about wordes, the sentence is to be concei­ued plainely, and all circumstances to be expressed, as nere as may be. and the redresse of all contrauentions, if it may be, either by some meanes to be kept in our owne handes, or in the determination of ho­norable persons. TheSleidan. Lantgraue that yeelded himselfe, and came to the presence of Charles the fift, Maurice of Saxony being media­tor betwixt them, vpon cauill about one word, was contrary to his meaning, deteined prisoner, and had bene longer, if that Maurice had not conceiued indignation, that vpon his word the good prince should be abused. All we can do in this case, is too litle. For whē princes wil quarrell, they can picke occasion, and ground themselues vpon euery small point, and make many faire pretenses: as in the dealings that passed betwixtGuicciard. Lewis Sforza