Sect. 1.

ELL ouertaken Syr.

You are wel­come Gentle­man.

No great Gen­tleman sir, but one that wisheth well to all that meane well: I pray you, how farre doo you trauell this way?

As farre as Yorke.

I should be glad, if I might haue your company thither.

And I, if my company might stand you in any steed: but howsoeuer it be, you may command it: and by vouchsafing me the benefit of your company, maketh me much beholden to you.

Not so sir: but without question, the company of men of your profession, is both pleasant and profitable, & much to be desired for the attaining of knowledge & wisdome.

I pray you sir, whō do you take me to be?

Surely, it should seeme by your appa­rell, that you are a Scholer, or some Minister.

Indeed, if you call a learner a Scholler, I do confesse my selfe to be of that professi­on: but if (as I suppose) you meane by a Schol­ler, not a learner, but a teacher, or Doctor, one able to instruct, and direct others, you take your markes amisse: for (as we s [...]y in the Schooles) Cucullus nonfacit monac huum.

I meane by a Scholler, not one that learnes his ABC, or his Accidens, but a Stu­dent, one that hath bene brought vp in lear­ning in some Vniuersitie: able with a little labour, and in a short time, to do much good to vs that are ignorant. In this sence I am per­swaded, that you are, and may be both called and accounted a Scholler.

It pleaseth you sir, of your gentlenesse, to thinke and speake of me, farre better then I do deserue: but if it were, as you do weene, and wish, yet I know no cause, but that I both may and ought, looke for profit and encrease of knowledge, as well at your hands as you at mine.

Why that cānot be: you giue your selues continually to reading, and all other meanes of attaining knowledge: whereas we follow other matters, and spend our dayes a­bout worldly profits or pleasures, as our cal­lings, places and degrees do require.

The more is the pittie if it be so: you (for the most part) haue leisure inough to seek knowledge: yea you are of abilitie to prouide for your selues, all things belonging vnto stu­die, the which Schollers do often wāt, to their great grief and hinderāce. And surely (in my mind) it were far more commendable and ho­norable, for men of wealth, place, & accoūt, to pursue and huntafter knowledge and wise­dome, by the which they might benefit much their countrey, both Church, and Common­wealth, then to spend their time and goods, in vaine and vnprofitable pleasures.

You say true sir, in the opinion of the wisest: but for this time, we will rather take it as we find it, thē dispute how it oght to be: if you looke for any great learning at my hands, [Page 4] you are deceiued, and will in the ende be dis­appoynted. Yet I pray you, let vs passe the time and way in some good conference, and giue me leaue to aske your opinion and he [...]p in some poynts of diuinitie, whereof I either am altogither ignorant, or else doo greatly doubt, and would gladly be resolued. It wold without question bee a great ease, and make that wee should neither fee [...]e the wearisome­nesse of our tedious trauell, nor yet complain or crie out of the length of these Northum­berland myles: yea I do not doubt, but it wil be profitable to vs both: for I shall be instruc­ted, and you by calling to remembrance your former reading, shall imprint it more deeply into your minde, and haue it more readie a­gainst an other time.

Indeed conference is alwaies good, and especially in trauell: yea, and for the mat­ter of our conference, you haue chosen the better part, in that you had rather bestow the time in some poynts of diuinitie, whereby we may be edified in religion, and in the know­ledge of God, then spend it in other matters, which are either vaine & needlesse, or at the least, not comparable vnto it, either in vse or excellencie. Yet I must needs tell you plain­ly, that you are too careful of your owne ease, [Page 5] in that you would laye the whole burthen of answering all questions, and resoluing all doubts vpon my shoulders, and shift it whol­ly from your se [...]f. You know, that it is the cu­stome, and as it were, a lawe among trauel­lers, not to put any one continually to the trouble of seeking and leading the way, but to do it by course. And therefore I may not agree to this motion which you haue made, vnlesse it please you to accept these two con­ditions: first, that you giue me the like liber­tie, in propoūding to you those doubts which trouble me, and be content to shewe mee the like fauour, in helping mee out of the briers wherein I shall stick. Secondly, that in hard and intricate questions, that answere bee ac­cepted for the time which may bee had: for it is a plain case, that any one mā may moue moe questions in an houre, then all the learned men in the world can aunswere and resolue, all the daies of their liues.

Your conditions are very reasona­ble, & althogh my answering of your doubts wil be, as the prouerbe is, Sus mineruam, (in the which respect, and not in any partiall fa­uour of my self, as you do charge me, I refer­red the matter wholly to your dispositiō) yet for so much as you giue others beside Schol­lers, [Page 6] leaue to haue knowledge, I will doo my best to satisfie your desire, and rather shewe my ignorance and follie, then seeme iniuri­ous and vnthankfull.

You may speake your pleasure: but by all liklihood you are a Scholler, according to your owne acception, howsoeuer it plea­seth you to make your selfe for the time, one in my sence: and it may be you are so by your calling and kinde of life, howsoeuer your out­ward state seemeth better then vsually Schol­lers attaine vnto: yea, I am perswaded, by this great desire to increase in knowledge, which appeareth in you, that you haue alrea­die attained to a great measure of it, and know what belongs vnto it, as wee see that vsually the richest are most couetous.

Sect. 2.

VVEll, well: let vs leaue these things, and come to the purpose: yet for all this hast, one thing I must needs desire of you, and it is this. That you would not bee offended, nor yet thinke scorne to aunswere and resolue me, euē in those questions, which are most certaine, manifest, and without all question, as if I should desire to bee resolued of this poynt, that there is a God, that made and ruleth, and gouerneth al things. Not that I doubt of this, or any other maine poynt of Christian religion, but that I may knowe and hold that more firmly, which I doo alreadie both beleeue, and also know in part.

Wee cannot, if wee speake properly, call this a poynt of Christian religion, for all the heathenish religions that euer were, or that are at this day in the world, agree in this, as in the foundation and ground wheron they rest, that there is a God, for otherwise there could be no religion. Yet you say verie true, that our knowledge both in this, and in all o­ther poynts concerning God, is vnperfect: and therefore we may lawfully, yea we must [Page 8] necessarily labour for an increase of it, and for that Pleerophoria, that is, a ful knowledge and certaine perswasion, mentioned in Scripture. Yea, if you please, we will beginne with this poynt, for that (if it must needs be handled, as it is seldome, it beeing seldome called into question) it ought to haue the first place assig­ned vnto it.

Indeede it is straunge, that this bloc­kish Atheisme should bee in any that hath a reasonable soule: yet hee that doth consider the liues of many, led without any knowledge, feare, loue, care, or any regard whatsoeuer had vnto God, may see that verified, which is spoken Psal. 14. 1. The foole hath said in his heart there is no God. yea I haue heard of such as would openly professe themselues to be of that iudg [...]ment, and as farre as they might without daunger, defend it by argument a­gainst any whosoeuer. The which shamelesse impietie, although I doo from my heart de­test, and shall (I trust) while I liue, yet (to tell you plainly) there haue often such doubts risen and [...]unne in my minde, as I should bee ashamed, and therefore would be loth to vt­ter.

Nay, it is a shame to conceale & che­rish, not to declare and abandon them: but [Page 9] what I pray you, hath at any time made you doubt of God?

Surely, to deale plainly with you, me thought there was no order of gon [...]rne­ment, but rather extreame confusion in the world, that things came to passe not by any prouidence or power of God, but partly by the force and efficacie of naturall causes, wor­king according to the ordinarie and set course of nature, and partly by the inclinations, de­uises, consultations and purposes of men, pro­ceeding from the free motion of their owne minds and wils: that foolish and superstiti­ous people did ascribe many things, as warre, dearth, famine, plague, sicknesse, pouertie, and many other casualtie [...], to some extra­ordinarie worke of God, which the wise did plainly see to come by the ordinarie con­nexion and consequence of naturall cau­ses: that as touching those fewe who did wholly depend and relye themselues vp­pon God, and did daily and hourely call vppon him for such things as they stood in neede of, it happened to them no bet­ter: yea, for the most part, farre woorse then to the wicked: that for all their faith and prayers, they must either be­take [Page 16] themselues to the ordinarie course of the world, or else vtterly perish and miscarrie: that many who most outragiously blas­pheme, yea openly both denie & defie God, (as wee read of a certaine Pope, who said that hee would haue and eate of a meate that hee fancied, in despite of God, and so he did) pro­sper and fare as well, yea much better, then they that serue him most deuoutly: that there were not to be seene in the world, any argu­ments of Gods power and presence, nor any thing which might make a wise man won­der: whereas in all reason, it should seeme more possible to hide the sunne, being aboue our horizon, so that it should not either by heate, beames, light, or anie other meanes, shewe it selfe to bee present, then that God should be in the world, and yet no way appa­rant.

As for the Scripture out of the which we vse so plainly to teach, proue, and demon­strate the beeing of God, as out of his onely euidences, that there was no certanitie could bee had of anie thing contained in it: that euerie Kingdome, Countrie, and Cit­tie, yea almost euerie priuate man, did gather out of it a diuers and different [...]orme of religion and seruing GOD: [Page 11] that many things in it might bee prooued to be false and fabulous, as of the flames of Pur­gatorie, the fire of Hell, and the light of hea­uen, prepared and appoynted for the soules of men departing from their bodies, according as they had liued in this world, either well or else wickedly: that all these doctrines, and in­finit others of the same kinde, were but coun­terfeit, and both deuised and vsed to keepe people in some awe and order: yea (which see­med woorst of all) that the Scripture was contradicted not onely by others, but also by it selfe in many poynts and places, whereas in truth, there is not any discord or harsh iarring, but a most sweete and full consort and harmo­nie. So that for these reasons and diuers other, that I will not trouble you with, me thought I might say of God, as Elias saith of Baal, that in all likelihood hee was either a sleepe, or in bat tell, or about some waightie affaires, or (as he thought and mentindeed) no where exi­sting, yet these doubts were but as flying cloudes in my minde, which the glorie, maie­stie, and truth of God, shining both in his word and worke, as clearely as the sunne doth at noone day, did soone dissolue, yet not so, that you should thinke it lost labour to speake somewhat to that effect,

I may for fashions sake, but I am per­swaded, that it is in a manner needlesse, and that you are not now to learne, how that God, hauing reuealed himselfe sufficiently by diuers euident meanes, doth now in a manner hide and absent himselfe from the world, yea euen from his church and chosen people, and that vpon good ground, in respect both of the elect, and of the reprobate. First for the elect, we knowe that in the first ages of the world, God did reueale himselfe vnto them by many meanes, which now he hath laid aside, as first in sensible apparitions, visions, voyces, and dreames, yea sometimes in as plaine and fami­liar manner, as men vse to talke and conuerse with their frends, face to face, without any co­lours, shewes or vizards. Secondly, God did vsually bestow vpon his seruants many tempo­rall blessings, and powre foorth vpon the wic­ked, greeuous plagues and punishments. This was done in respect of the infancie and weake estate of the Church and the godly, who being as yet indued but with a small measure of know­ledge and faith, (the time beeing not come, wherein the misterie of eternall saluation in Christ, was to be vnfolded) would soone haue fallen into distrust and forgetfulnesse of God, if that he had beene straunge with them: and [Page 13] therfore it pleased him in mercie to visit them often in this sencible manner of bodily appa­ritions, and of temporall blessings, that so he might (as it were) keep his acquaintance with thē, the which otherwise wold soon, by reason of that small measure of spirituall graces which they had, haue beene forgotten and come to nought. But now in this time of the Gospell, wherein spirituall graces are plenti­fully giuen, and eternall glorie so certainely promised to the faithfull, yea euen poynted at with the finger, as being hard at hand, and al­most in sight, should God still dandle them in in his lap with temporall blessings, as with lakings to toy and playe with? and still ap­peare in visible maner, as if the Gospell could not be, either for doubtfulnesse beleeued, or for obscuritie vnderstood? We see that when as children are growne vp to any stature and strength, they are not onely ashamed, once to thinke of sucking the dug againe, but also are by painfull toyle & labor continually ex­ercised, for the increase both of strength in their bodies, and of patience in their minds, howsoeuer it bee greeuous vnto them, and make them doubt of the loue of their parents, by whom they are tied to so vnwelcome a taske.

[Page 14] In like manner it pleased God to deale with his children, not only in withdrawing frō thē these temporall toies, (yet not leauing them comfortlesse, who haue both plentie of spiri­tuall graces in present fruition & the instant hope of eternall glorie, wherewith to solace themselues) but also in exercising their faith, hope, patience, and loue, by continuall trials and temptations, crosses and afflictions, as if he had clean forgotten thē, and cast them off for euer. Wheras indeed he doth it onely for the triall and commendation of their faith; which by this meanes is found to be firme and sound, euen as gold is tried by the fire. For if whensouer wee are pinched with any griefe, miserie, or want, God were straightway at our elbowes, with comfort and with such things as wee desire, either for necessitie or pleasure, what great matter were it to depend vppon him, and to loue him. The most blockish sot in the world, would trust that which he seeth with his eies: and there is no brute beast in the world of so sauage a nature, but would beare good affection to him, that did daily ply him with good and pleasant things, one in the necke of another, neither is it possible for a man to hope for that which hee alreadie hath.

[Page 15] But when as by faith and hope, we take such hold of God and the promises of eternall life, that no temptations can make vs let our hold go: when as in the most bitter afflictions we feele the sweet taste and rellish of the loue of God, when as wee doo steadfastly beholde that which is far out of sight, then is our faith found to be not baggage drosse, but pure and precious gold, fit for the seruice of the king of heauen. Thus Christ speaketh vnto Thomas, Ioh 2. 20. 29. Thou hast seene, felt, and therevpon doest beleeue, that I am risen from the dead, but blessed are they that do notsee, or feele, and yet be­leeue: that is, their faith is more strong and ex­cellent, and therefore their saluation and blessednesse more certaine. Likewise in re­spect of the wicked, it is needfull, that God should by deferring those plagues, that their blasphemies and other outragious sinnes, do deserue, suffer thē to go on in hardning their hearts, and in filling vp the measure of their sinne. For if they sawe God present in the world in temporall plagues, giuing to euery sinne the dese [...]ued punishment, as hee did in olde times, & so standing ouer them with the whip and sword of vengeance, they would then haue some conscience of sinne, and by feare, be restrained from that outrage where­vnto [Page 16] now they rush headlong: yea, the nea­rer that the vniuersal iudgement wherin eue­rie one shall rec [...]iue according to his workes, is at hand, the more doth God surcease from temporall rewards and punishments, pu [...]po­sing by [...]ternall retribution, to pay euery one home and to the full. And therefore we can­not impute the confusion and abundance of sin which ou [...]floweth the world, to the want of goue [...]nment in God, but to the iust iudge­ment, who suffereth the wicked to [...]un on in their seu [...]rall courses of wickednesse, to their finall dest [...]uction: yet not so, but that he doth plainly shew his power and prouidence in re­straining these floods of wickednesse, that they shall not so ouerslow the earth, but that alwaies there is a place left to serue and praise him in, euen as we see, that he keepeth by vio­lence the sea within the appoynted limits, which by nature should and if it were not re­strained, very quickly would couer the face of the whole earth. As for the multitude of false religions, and the great diuersitie of opi­nions among those that prosesse the trueth, what is that to the purpose? The pathway of trueth is one and the same, by-wares are infi­nit: the ignorance, errors, and heresies of men, cannot preiudice the substance & foun­dation [Page 17] of it) safe and sound in the Church, Lastly, for the contradictions and vntrueths wherewith the holy Scripture is charged, if the spirit of God had vsed in penning the Scripture, we [...]ke men, who might erre in some circumstance of the storie, or some mat­ter of no momēt, as he doth daily vse the mini­strie of men, who no doubt, togither with the trueth of religion. haue errors and ignorance: should that make the doctrine and substance of religion it selfe, to bee suspected or reiec­ted? But we know that there is nothing false in the Scripture if be rightly vnderstood, and that all the parts of it haue a most perfect a­greement & consonancie with the other, the Lawe with the Gospell, the ceremonies of Moses, with the substance in Christ: the Pro­phets with the Apostles, and each one with o­ther. But I maruell why you ioyne the fire of Purgatorie, whereat now the whole world doth laugh; as at a most ridiculous toy, with hell and heauen, wherby in Scripture is ment the miserie of the wicked, and the happinesse of the godly in the life to come: both which wee cannot doubt, but that God that hath spoken it, will accomplish and make manifest vnto vs.

Sect. 4.

I Was alwaies (I thanke God) of that minde, & yet you haue resolued me of diuers poynts whereof before I doubted. Now that you haue taken away these doubtes and scruples, and weeded out these bitter rootes of vnbeleefe, which make many depart away from the liuing God, it is meete that you should sowe some new seeds of faith in the minde, by setting downe some manifest proofes, demonstrations, and eui­dences of God, by the which he may be cer­tainly knowne, yea in a manner seene and felt.

That is no hard mater to doo, for so­much as there is nothing in the world, which doth not affoord vs an euident testimonie of God, who euen in the least things, much more in those which are by nature excellent, is most wonderfull and most apparant. But to auoyde confusion as welin my speech, as in your me­morie, we wil reduce the infinit testimonies of God to these fiue heads: the first are the crea­tures: the second is the light of nature: the third is the word of God: the fourth is his spi­rit: and the last are his miracles or extra­ordinarie workes. All these togither, will be [Page 19] vnto vs a cloude of witnesses, euen an infinit number compassing vs round about, and so by their huge multitude in a manner darke­ning the sunne, or rather so inlightning our mindes, that there cannot any darke cloudes of doubting or distrust remaine. First then to beginne with the creatures in the which God did first manifest himselfe, who can either de­nie or doubt, but that the heauens declare the glorie of God, & the firmament sheweth his handie worke: and that if God made not them, yet they made their maker whosoeuer he were, to be most iustly and woorthily cal­led and accounted God, in that they most plainly witnesse his surpassing power, wise­dome, and maiestie.

If the creatures themselues, as namely the sunne, moone, and starres (yea many earth­ly creatures, which in respect of these are base and contemptible, yet haue been taken and worshipped for gods) are in thēselues so glorious, that they haue extorted from many nations, the names, titles, and worshippe of God, it cannot be but that they should euen lead vs by the hand, to acknowledge the glorie and God head of him, who was their de­uiser and maker, and doth still continue their preseruer.

Nowe if wee descend into this lower [Page 20] worlde, wherein wee dwell, and there beginne with our selues, called by the Philosophers not without cause, litle worlds, we shall finde both without in our bodies, in the most cunning and curious forme and frame of them, and within in our mindes and soules, in their manifold faculties and effects, so plain and pregnant arguments of so great wisedome and power, that wee shall cease to maruell, how Alexander the great, and Na­buchadnezar the proude, came to that passe, to suppose thēselues to be not men but Gods, and shall beginne to maruell why all the men in the world are not of their opinion, vntill we be thinke our selues, that men see plainely both in themselues and in others, that they did not make themselues, but were made by an other. Yet may not man boast or brag, that this prerogatiue of bringing in euidence for the deitie of his maker, is peculiar to himself: he must be faine to admit into the participa­tion of this praise, all the other creatures in the world: not onely those which excel him­selfe in greatnes, strength, swistnes, sharpnes of sence, and in many other respects, but euen the basest & silliest worme that scrawleth vp­pon the ground: yea (which may make him lay downe his peacocke taile, and bee quite out of conceit with himselfe) hee must in this [Page 21] respect giue place euen to sencelesse things, as to hearbs, trees, and stones: the vertues and operations whereof (hidden in the cau­ses, to the sharpest wittes of the most subtile Philosophers, yet manifest in the effects, to the bluntest sences of the most simple ide­ots) if they bee as duly considered as they are daily seene, will in a manner turne men into stones: so amazing them, that they will bee constrained to re­nounce all naturall reasons, and to acknow­ledge that it is the finger of GOD.

And so for conclusion of this poynt, not onely they that go downe into the deepe secrets of naturall Philosophie, but euen such also as do onely swimme and floate aloft in the superficiall consideration of the frame of the whole world, and of the particular creatures therein contai­ned, doo manifestly beholde, and must of necessitie acknowledge the wonderfull power and wisedome of God.

And no maruell, when as the very heathen who are purblinde, if not stone-blinde in respect of God, haue in this cleare Christall glasse of the creatures ea­sily descried, and plainely discerned the portrature and image of God. Against whose testimonie, which now in the se­cond [Page 22] place is to bee produced) although there might exception be takē, in respect of the particulars, for that in matters of re­ligion, heathen men are of no credit or ac­count, both deceiuing others, and beeing deceiued themselues, by following lies and illusions, yet in respect of the vniue [...]salitie of it, it hath some waight, and may well bee admitted.

I am sure you haue often heard and read, that Ʋox populi (much more then Vox mun­di) est vox Dei: many may bee deceiued, but that is taken for trueth, wherein all gene­rally do agree: for such things are not deui­sed by this or that man, but ingrauen in the minde of man by nature her selfe, and there­fore are to bee accounted true and certaine, especially by Atheists, who make Nature their God.

Yea besides the ordinarie meanes of the light of nature, by the which all men naturally and generally attaine the vndoub­ted perswasion of this trueth, it hath pleased God in all ages and places to maintaine it, and put it out of all doubt by extraordinarie workes, of the which all prophane stories af­foord plentifull examples.

But wee haue a clearer light to direct vs in this, and in all other ca­ses [Page 23] of controuersie, then is the dimme light of nature, to wit, the word of God con­tained in the bookes of holy scripture, so full of diuine wisedome, that wee cannot once imagine it to haue beene hatched by the braine of man, angell, or other creature whatsoeuer.

To let all other arguments passe, which the scripture doth affoord vs for this purpose, let vs but consider in it how God hath dealt with his Church from time to time, alwaies preseruing it in some one corner or other, y [...]t neuer suffering it to bee generally recei­ued throughout the world, yet bringing it into euerie part of it at one time or other, e­uen as he suffreth his sunne to shine vpon all the parts of the earth, not at once, but successiuely and by peece-meale, one part beeing inlightned after another: howe God hath trained vppe his Church from one estate to another, from the first infancie to the childhood, and so on for­ward to mans estate, instructing it in his will, and as it were instilling his pre­cepts into it by little and little, and line af­ter line: as the [...]apacitie of it would admit, (not regarding the time of their ignorance) first by temporall blessings, then by eternal promises: first by sencible appatitions, [Page 24] then by inward assurance, more certaine then sence: first by ceremonies, then by the sub­stance of his worship: first by tipes, then by the trueth: first by the shadow, then by the bodie it selfe: first by prophecies, then by ac­complishments: and lastly, first by the image and counterfeit, and then by the very perso­nall presence of Christ himselfe, bringing vn­to vs in his Gospel, that consummatum est, that yea and amen, euen all in all, and all at once. For who knoweth not, that in the doctrine of the Gospell, we haue vnfolded vnto vs such endlesse treasures of diuine wisedome, that (euen by the iudgement of those who are not affected with any loue towards it, and there­fore cannot be suspected of partiallitie) all the religions of the heathen are in comparison of it most childish, ridiculous, and trifling toies. The fourth meanes by the which God is re­uealed and made knowne to man, is proper to the faithfull, to wit, the inward and secret operation of his spirit, renewing their minds and hearts to know and loue the trueth.

This light farre passeth all the other, for that it not onely shineth in the eyes, as the other do, but also openeth them, that they may see and beholde the trueth, which thing, the other are not able to effect.

[Page 25] For although wee cannot imagine any more plaine and euident proofes of the deitie, then the three aforesaid meanes: namely the crea­tion and preseruation of the world, the gene­rall assent and voice of all the Nations vnder heauen in al ages, especially of the lewes, who doo generally abhorre this opinion of A­theisme: and lastly, the doctrine of the Gospell, wherein the whole will and counsell of God is fully and finally re­uealed, by some or all whereof, many are broght to acknowledge God, and to haue al­though not a full sight, yet a glimmering of him: yet notwithstanding all these meanes, wee see that many remaine in the palpable blindnesse of Atheisme, neither knowing in minde, nor acknowledging by word, any o­ther God, then the ordinarie and set course of nature, because as yet their eyes are fast shut and sealed vp: so that they cannot see the light, although it be most cleare. But the spirit of God is that oyntment, Ioh. 2. 20. which o­peneth our eyes, and maketh vs cleare sigh­ted: so that now it fareth with vs, as with that man, Ioh. 9. 1. that hauing beene borne blinde (had no doubt) often heard men speak of the Sunne, and the light thereof, and did beleeue it to bee so, yet not without some doubting, & not at all knowing what to make [Page 26] of it, or wherunto to resemble it. But assoone as his eyes being opened, he did plainly be­holde the Sunne, with the light and beames thereof, he did no more doubt of the Sunne, then he did of himselfe, and of his owne bee­ing: so men before they bee enlightned by Gods spirit, they see little or nothing of the glory of God, which after regeneration, is as cleare vnto them as the Sunne at mid-day, e­uen as we read, 2. Kin. 6. 17. that Eliseus his seruant could not see the huge armie of hors­men and chariots, which was hard at hand, till such time, as God, at the prayer of the Pro­phet opened his eyes. The fift and last means, by the which God is made knowne, are his extraordinary and miraculous works, by the which he hath reuealed himself, not onely to some fewe of his seruāts, who haue bin the in­struments by whom they haue bin wrought, but also in the eyes of the world, beholding them. And without question, when these are added to the former, they bring with them, to the true beleeuers, euen a huge heape of faith, and assurance, howsoeuer to carnall vnbeleeuers, they are often vaine and of no effect. For if vnto that knowledge of God which we haue by the creatures and the light of nature, by his word and spirit, God should adde such immediate reuelations, familiar [Page 27] conferences, visible apparitions, & sencible visions, such signes & wonders as he wroght in olde times in and by his seruants, we could not but by these meanes bee much more vn­doubtedly perswaded of the power, pre­sence, and prouidence of God, then now we are, howsoeuer the wicked did still continue in their vnbeleefe, yea though one should rise from rhe dead and preach vnto them. To speake any more of this matter to you, were no otherwise then if I should light a candle to shew you who are sound and cleare sigh­ted, the sunne shining heere before vs. You see that the creatures and light of nature to the heathen, the scripture and word of God to the Church, the sanctifying and illumina­ting spirit of God to the faithfull, the gifts of prophecie, reuelation, and other miraculous actions (the which are not now needfull in the Church, as they were before the com­ming of Christ, and in the first publishing of the Gospell) to all that either haue thē them­selues, or behold them in others, are infalli­ble demonstrations of the Godhead, & such against the which no exceptiō can be made: yet not withanding al this, it is a wonder (but that it is so cōmon) to cōsider how Atheisme doth daily preuaile among men, yea far more then it did amongst eyther the superstitious papists, or the idolatrous heathen, of whom [Page 28] there were very fewe, which had not their religion and Gods in great reuerence, and most high estimation, whereas now a dayes, fewe do make any account of religion or of the worship of God, but as of a formall and ordinarie matter of course, which for order and fashions sake, is to be performed. And ac­cordingly, it pleaseth God to deale with them in his iust iudgement, for the hardening of their hearts, that for so much as they haue so wilfully reiected so many meanes of know­ledge, he doth wholely abstain from any fur­ther reuealing of himselfe by any extraordi­nary meanes, but suffereth euery one to go on and to prosper in their owne deuises and wicked wayes, that so their impunitie may confirme them in their ignorance and con­tempt of God: the which is more to be won­dred at, and to be lamented, many of them that haue had some knowledge and sence of religion reuealed vnto them, and haue made conscience of it in their liues, yet seeing no great matters or effects to come of it, but the ordinary course & fashion of the world, they faint in faith by little and little, till at length they become if not open, yet secret contem­ners of God & all religion. And so is fulfilled the prophecie of Christ, Math. 24. 12. 24. That in the last ages of the world, iniquitie [Page 29] shall so abound, that it shall coole the luke­warme loue of many, in so much, that if it were possible, the very elect should fall away from the faith, and be deceiued: but I doubt not but that you are farre from that fearefull estate. Gen. That which you haue said, as tou­ching the existence of God, dothfully satisfie me and may content any reasonable man: yet because I do sometimes meete with men that are euen rooted and confirmed in Atheisme, and will not sticke to denie that there is a God, I pray you furnish mee with some fewe arguments, wherwith to conuince and to con­found them.

Indeed there are many, which are to be accounted Atheists, for that they denie the doctrine of Gods prouidence, and the truth of his word and promises, made to his Church of eternall glory (the proofe and declaration whereof must bee referred to theyr proper places) wherein we did both agree: but sure I thinke, you meete with fewe or none, that are either so brutish in mind, or so shameles in face, as to denie that there is a God, neither to my remembrance haue I euer either heard or read of any such. The Epicurean Philosophers among the heathen, were counted Atheists, as they might wel be, for they exempted God from the care of hu­mane [Page 30] things, and from the the gouernment of the world, but they neither denied nor doubted but that there was a God. And so I thinke of our epicures and Atheists in these dayes, that howsoeuer they might as well de­nie God to exist, as to contemne and reiect his word, threatnings, and promises, as meere fables, and to be altogither voyd of any care or regard of him, yet if they were examined, I thinke they would confesse, that they think there is a God, tho they haue neither know­ledge nor care of him.

You may in fauor & gentlenes make the best of their Atheisme, tho to say the truth, the best be bad inogh) but I can assure you of my owne experience, that there are such, that denie not onely the proui­dence, but euen the very nature and existence of God.

They are not mē, but beasts in the likenesse of men, altogither vnworthy of any fauour, neither (if I met with any such) should I either beare o [...] shewe them any, but rather extream, & yet not sufficient hatred: for how­soeuer I vse to be (I know not how) too easie and indifferent in iudging and condemning those that hold euen grosse heresies, as thin­king, that either there may be some truth and grace with great errors, or at the least that they may be reclaimed from them: yet when I think of such monsters as you speake of, I feele my heart to rise against them so, that I [Page 31] could more willingly teare them in peeces with my teeth, then teach thē with my toong. Yea to tell you plainly, I think that such ha­uing liued in the Church, and in the light of the Gospell and word of God, are not to bee disputed with, or perswaded by reasons, but rather as men giuen vp to a reprobate sence, and branded with the most fearefull marke of the wrath and vengeance of God, to bee lest to his iust iudgement. For if an Hereticke be to be auoided and left after a fewe admoniti­ons, as being wilfull and obstinate, what then should be done to these, that haue reiected a thousand admonitions giuen them, not one­ly by the testimonie of the whole world in all ages, but also by the creatures, word, and ex­traordinary workes of God. And therefore I pray you, let vs not trouble our selues any fur­ther with thē, but rather go on to som matter, the consideration whereof, may be profitable vnto vs: for as you know, Contra principia ne­gantē, non est disputandū.

I confesse that they are in a most fearful case, & deserue to be abhorred both of god & mā, yet whē as I am by some necessarie occasion in company with thē, and heare thē protest thēselues to be, not wilfull in gainsaying, but willing to learn the truth, I wish they might be reclaimed, or at y^e least, that their mouths were so stopped, that they did no harm to others: & therfore I pray you shew me, how I shuld deale with them?

It is impossible to shewe or prooue the existence of God, by any other argumēts then haue bin brought, for that God hath re­uealed himselfe by those onely, and by no o­ther meanes: to wit, by his word and spirit to his Church, and by his workes to the world. Now the first kind of these arguments is to be vsed against the temptations and doubtes arising in the mindes of beleeuing Christians, but not against the horrible blasphemies of these shamelesse Atheists, and therefore you must insist in the workes of God, the which being sensible, cannot be denied by them. By these you may shew the existence of God, both by the ordinary workes of the creation and preseruation of the world (the which in truth, are most miraculous) as also by the mira­culous and extraordinary workes and iudge­mēts of God. For the first, you must aske him if he see not in the creatures, to wit, in their greatnesse and number, proportion and bew­tie, force and efficacie, cerraine signes and ar­guments, of some great wit, cunning, wise­dome, goodnesse and power: would he con­fesse this thinke you?

Surely if hee denied it, I would leaue him as being not a man endued with reason, but a brute beast, or rather a sencelesse stocke.

Well then, if these things appeare in the creatures, they must be confessed to be in some subiect or person, and that either in the creatures themselues, or in some other, but that is all one, for whatsoeuer thing is endued with so great wisdome and power as is neces­sarely required to the making and preseruing of the world, that without question, is to be [...] magnified and worshipped as God, and to be accounted God. This demonstration of the Godhead is plaine, as plaine need be, to any that will consider it, and yet the extraordina­ry works of God do more affect men, althogh in themselues they be nothing so miraculous: euen as we see, that men do more gaze on and admire a stately house, which they neuer saw before, and think that there is more cunning workemanship and brauery in it, then in the frame of the whole world, which is continu­ally in their eyes. And therfore, you must lay before the eyes of your Atheists, the strange & miraculous things, which haue bin done in all ages of the world (more or lesse) contrary to the course of nature: and if hee reiect all stories, both diuine and prophane, yet God doth neuer leaue himselfe without some of of these extraordinary witnesses. Not that he doth now send his Angels visibly to good mē with blessings, for they beleeuing his word, [Page 34] need no extraordinarie proofes, but for that he suffereth Satan to shew himself to the wic­ked and vnbeleeuers, not only in strange il­lusions, but also by searful plagues & punish­ments, the which I warrant you hee will con­fesse to come, not by the ordinarie course of his goddesse nature, but from some super­naturall power, whereof we haue of late had euident examples, to the astonishment of all men. And if your Atheist wil not beleeue his owne eyes, beholding the strange iudgemēts of God in others, but will rather giue his owne sences the lye, then acknowledge the truth of the Godhead, let him but by some iniurious deed, or cōtumelious word, prouoke some witch of Endor, that hath the temporary power ouer some spirit, vpon condition, that he shall haue eternall power ouer her, and it is like inough he being voyd of all faith and sence of God, & so out of his protection) that he shall feele to his cost, and confesse to his shame, that there is a power ouer and beside the ordinary course of nature.

Indeed these Atheists that denie God, do also denie that there is eyther diuel or Angel, & I think will confesse them all assoone as any one.

And they that will not bee taught by God, must, will they, nill they, learne of the diuel, who in my mind, is the fittest schoole-maister for such schollers.

Sect. 1.

YOu haue so fully resolued me, and setled my minde in this poynt, that [...] trust neuer here­after to bee trou­bled with the ob­iections which A­thists make against the diuine essence: espe­cially, if that I might by any meanes, haue the nature of God declared and described as it is indeed. For this is the cause, why men are so easily brought to doubt of the being and ex­istence of God, because they cannot conceiue or comprehend the manner or forme of his essence, nor haue any true notion of it setled and fixed in their mindes: whereby it com­meth to passe, that the imagination of mā, ca­sting god in a thousād moules, & turning him into as many diuerse formes, as Proteus is fai­ned to haue, neuer resting contēted with any, as neuer finding any garment that will sit close on his backe, or any forme agreeing [Page 36] to the infinitnesse & subtilitie of his essence, reiecteth all, and with all, euen the diuine na­ture it selfe: supposing it not at all to exist, which they cannot suppose how it doth exist. And therefore, if I may entreate you to take the like paines in shewing the manner and forme of Gods essence, which you haue done in proouing the truth and certaintie of his ex­istence, you shall make me much beholden and indebted to you.

Indeed it is impossible, as for you to keepe that, which you neuer had, so for me, either to declare that to you in words, which I my selfe did neuer conceiue in minde, or to comprehend that within the compasse of my narrow and shallow braine, which is in nature infinit and incomprehen­sible: for so we are to thinke of God, that his nature and essence being euery way infinit, cannot possibly be comprehended by any fi­nite creature: no not by the heauenly An­gels themselues, whose nature being subtile and spiritual, doth easily pierce into the depth of knowledge: how much lesse then by men, who in comparison of Angels, are but dolts and dul-pates, groueling here on earth in the mudde and myre of error and grosse igno­rance: vnable by any art or industrie, to finde out the true nature, forme and vertue [Page 37] of the meanest creatures, no not of the least Flie or Gnat, how much lesse then of the mightie Iehoua, whose seate is in the heauen, and whose footestoole is the earth. But what need I alledge the impossibilitie of com­prehending fully in our finit mindes and me­mories, the infinit essence of God, it bee­ing impossible for vs, to commence or begin this action, by receiuing into our imagi­nations or fancies, any true conceit of him. Things subiect to sense, are conceited in the minde, by a resemblance or similitude of them, which the sense doth draw from the things themselues. But as for things not sub­iect to sense (of the which nature, all men confesse God to be) how shall they conuey and send to the imagination, their picture and resemblance? surely they cannot doo it themselues, but must substitute in their roomes, that sensible thing, which is likest vnto them, to represent their person, as if a man that is far absent, should will the Painter to draw his picture and counterfait, by behol­ding the visage of his sonne or brother, being not much vnlike vnto him. But what crea­ture shall [...]it in Gods chayre of estate, and re­present his person to our imaginations and mindes?

Whereunto shall wee compare or liken [Page 38] Whereunto shall we compare or liken God? or how can we not thinke it to be vnlawfull, and flatly forbidden by the law of God, to re­semble him to any thing, eyther in, or within heauen? or to frame any Image or similitude of him, eyther by outward action in deed, or by inward imaginatiōn in our mindes? Thus God perswadeth the people of Israel from making any Image, wherein to worship him, because they had not seene him in any forme, and therefore could not tell after what fashion the Image should bee made: Deut. 4. 15.

Besides, it may be doubted, whether it be lawfull or not, to attempt the searching and finding out of the nature and essence of God, which wee haue not in the scriptures reuea­led vnto vs. We know that God in reuealing himselfe to men, hath reserued some things secret to himselfe, the which it is his glory to conceale, Prou. 25. 2. and therefore his dis­honour to haue them knowne. Deuter. 29. 29. Let the hidden things be with the Lord our GOD, and the reuealed things to vs, and to our children for euer. But what can bee hidden or secret in GOD, if his very forme and essence bee reuea­led?

And therefore we ought to bee rather [Page 39] sober and modest, then hotte and hastie in pursuing the knowledge of the diuine es­sence.

It is sufficient for vs, that we may enter into the Temple and Church of God, and there behold his mercie and goodnesse, yea his power and iustice toward the wicked: what need we be so presumptuous, as with the mēe of Bethsemes, to look into the a [...]ke of the Lord, 1. Sam. 6. 19. or to enter into the holy of holiest? or how dare we set eyther foot or face into that place, which the Lord hath inclosed with glory, and made seuerall for his owne abode, and there to behold, or rather to outface the Maiestie of God, sitting in his Cherubin chaire of estate, the which the An­gels themselues neither can not yet dare be­hold, and therefore with their wings couer their faces, least that they seeing it, should be confounded, as ouerwhelmed with the great­nesse of his glory? And therfore for this m [...]t­ter, I must desire you to hold me excused, if I do not take vpon me to declare vnto you the essence of God, the knowledge whereof I am sure it is impossible to attaine, and I doubt whether it be lawfull to attempt.

You put me into a straunge maze and quandary, in that you would ma [...]e me beleeue, that I [Page 40] had committed som hainous offence in desi­ring to comprehend the infinit, and know the secret essence of God. But by your patience a litle: is it now become a fault to seeke the knowledge of God, in the knowledge and contemplation of whom not only the scrip­ture and (as I haue heard) all diuines with one assent, but euen Plato an heathē Philosopher, although somewhat smelling of the truth of religion, do make our whole happinesse to cō ­sist? the infinitnesse of the nature of God doth hinder the full comprehension, but not the true knowledge of it selfe to be in the minde of man: the sight of the eye, no not the whole eye, is able to containe the body of the Sun, and yet by it, we do plainly beholde, and truly know the Sun, Moone, & Starres, yea the whole heauen. What thogh it be not lawfull, evher to make any Image, or to ima­gine any similitude of God? yet we may con­sider of the nature of God, by cōparing it to the nature of the creature, though there bee neuer so great inequalitie betwixt them. Yea the infinitenesse of Gods nature, is most plainly seene, when it is compared to a finite and meane creature, as wee knowe that the chearefull lightsomnesse, and fairenesse of white, is best perceiued, [Page 41] when a darke and sad backe is laid by it: that the hugenesse of an Eliphant is most admi­red, when wee thinke of he smalnesse of a flie: and a crooked building is best knowne by the straight line. The whole bodie and compasse of the sun and moone may bee be­helde in a little dishfull of wate [...], and why not God in his creatures, especially in those which hee hath made according to his owne image, and that as I am perswaded, for this very end and purpose? But although the na­ture of god might be by some means in some measure conceiued and knowne, yet you doubt of the lawfulnesse of the attempt: but your doubting is without cause, or rather as I am perswaded, without trueth, and in shewe onely. The propitiatorie is now remooued, and the Arke vncouered, so that we may be bolde to looke into it: the vaile of the Tem­ple is rent a sunder, yea quite broken downe, and therefore wee need not any longer stand aloofe, but may with confidence enter into the holy place, & approach vnto the throne of grace. It is not with God as it is with mor­tall and sinfull men, who of set purpose, and in good pollicie doo (in many cases) with­draw themselues from the sight and view of others, least that by bewraying their infirmi­ties, they shuld bring their persons into con­tempt: [Page 42] but God is not ashamed of himselfe, neither afraid of being knowne, seene and censured. Men, the further they are off from vs, the greater they seeme, and the lesse they are known, th [...] more they are esteemed: the more familia [...]ly that they are acquainted, the more likely to bee contemned: but it is not so with God, who the more he is known, the more he is admired, the nearer he approcheth to vs, the more he amazeth & astonieth with his [...]urpassing glorie and maiestie: so that he may not vnfitly be compared to the cloude, which the Prophet Elias, or rather God him­selfe raised out of the sea, 1. King. 18. 14. which a farre off seemed no bigger then the palme of a mans hand, but when it came neare, it couered the whole face of heauen. I confesse indeed, that the essence of God cannot be fully comprehended by any crea­ture, and that if God should shine vppon vs with the bright beames of his glorie, wee could not but bee confounded, as we see our eyes to be dazeled, and our sight dimmed by gazing on the bright shining sunne. For this, the word of God is plaine, Exod. 33. 20. where God saith to Moses, My face, that is, my full glorie and maiestie, no man can see and liue, but as for my hinder partes, that is, some part or shadow of my glorie, that I will [Page 43] shew vnto thee. Yet the doth not proue, that this great and greedie, yea insatiable desire, which this holy man of God had, of seeing and knowing still more and more of God, yea after that God had many waies reuealed himselfe more fully to Moses, then euer hee had done, or did since to any man liuing, should bee condemned as rash and pre [...]ump­tuous, which rather is to be commended and imitated of vs, by hauing a most earnest care and desire to know so much of Gods essence as may bee knowne, yea much more, and e­uen the whole nature of God, if so it stood with his good pleasure. For this is the one­ly happinesse which we aspire vnto, & hope for in the life to tome, that whereas now we see God but darkly in part, and as it were his image in a glasse, thē, we shall see him face to face, 1. Cor. 13. that is, in farre more ample manner then now wee doo, although not so fully and amply as hee is indeede, vnto the which absolute perfection of the knowledge of Gods essence, I doo easily graunt you, that neither the Saints nor the Angels in heauen can possibly attaine. And therefore, seeing that my request is no other, then both I may wel and lawfully make, and you easily performe, I pray you doo not shift mee off with this excuse, which I am perswa­ded you made, thinking as it is indeed, [Page 44] that you Schollers [...]an by your logick and schoole-tricks, perswadevs simple people to think what you list, & make vs beleeue that, as the prouerb is. The moon is made of green cheese: but rather at my request take in hand the explication of this poynt, which of all o­ther is most needfull to be knowne, and most woorthie to bee sought out with all care and diligence, as beeing that wherevnto all our knowledge, yea our whole life is to be refer­red.

I am glad sir, that I haue by this means ferreted you out of this deepe dissimulation, wheerin you haue hitherto so closely lurked: although indeed I did thinke so much, whē I first heard you speake, & did suspect you to be the man, whō now I finde you to be. I am perswaded, that you who are so cunning in crauing, could if you list bee as bountifull in giuing: but seeing the bargaine is made, it is now no going backe: neither will I looke backe vnto the speech which you haue made of the lawfulnesse of attempting, and the pos­sibilitie of attaining the knowledge of Gods nature in some sort: It was true, and there­fore cannot be confuted, yet was full and suf­ficient, and therefore need not bee enlarged. You doo well to confesse that the infinit es­sence of god cannot be fully comprehended, [Page 45] no not by the Angels in heauen, & yet that it may in some sort be knowne euen by men here on earth. For euen as when a traueller desirous to see straunge countries and fashi­ons, arriueth in some coast towne of any for­raine kingdome, hee may euen there gather some coniectures, and get some knowledge of the condition, state and power of that Prince: but when he commeth to the chiefe and mother-citie of the land, where the kings Court is kept, and where there is greatest concourse of people, abundance of wealth, and store of all things, seruing either for the necessitie and vse of warre, or the pl [...]sure of peace, then he saith thus vnto himselfe: Sure­ly now I see and knowe the very state and power of this Prince, as well as I doo that man, whose face I doo fully and stedfastly behold: and yet all this while, he neither is, nor can bee admitted to see the very person of the Prince. Euen so it fareth with vs in respect of nod: for here on earth, as it were in Dan or Bersheba, or some other border-town of the land of Promise, the happie kingdome of Chanaan, wee haue a glimmering of the king. But when wee come to the heauenly Ierusalem, the Cittie of the great king, there we see a thousand times mote then we did be­fore, and yet all that we see, is but the riches, [Page 46] power, and glorie of the king: as for his per­son and verie essence, that is kept secret, and shut vp in his priuie chamber, or closet, into the which none may or can enter, for none but god knoweth God, 1. Tim. 6. 16. the king of kings, who onely hath immortalitie and dwelleth in light, that none can haue accesse vnto, whom neuer man saw, neither can see: yet although the nature of god be vnsearch­able, & as a bottomlesse gulfe, into the mid­dest whereof whosoeuer plungeth himselfe, in hope of sounding the depth of it, wil with­out question be soon swallowed vp by it, and confounded in al his imaginations yea thogh hee were indued with the wit of all the men and Angels in the world: yet I confesse, that as you say, we may safely wade and swimme in the shallowe brinke of this great Ocean: hauing the one hand on the shore or banke, as a sure anchor to hold vs fast, that wee bee not carried too farre into it, by the violent blastes of presumption and curiositie: and the other in the water, wherewith to mooue our minds vp and down, in a sober and modest contemplation of it.

Sect. 2.

LEt vs therefore let loose into this deepe and bottomlesse sea of the nature of God, not in any fond hope of attaining the perfect knowledge of it, yet trusting in God, that we shall not loose our labour, and fish all night without catching any thing, (as on the other side, it were madnesse to thinke of catching al the fish in the sea) but rather returne to land with our vessels not emptie, although not so full lade, that they be readie to sinke, by reason of the heauinesse of their burthen. The knowledge (therefore) of the the natures of things, is attained two waies, to wit, by sense, and by imagination: sense ap­prehendeth the qualities of things sensible, by the which the minde is led to thenature and substance of the thing. But as for those things which are not sensible, wee must sup­pose & imagine thē to be thus & thus, and so coine in our minds, a forme and phantastical idea of them, resembling them to some­thing, which wee haue sometime apprehen­ded by sence, and especially to that which is likest, and commeth nearest vnto them.

That to the searching out, and the knowing of the nature of any insencible thing, these three things belong & must con­curre. First, the obseruation of the effects or actions proceeding from it, the which being sensible, will giue vs some light to know the nature of the thing it selfe, from the which they did proceed, as we see the nature of the father to appeare in the sonne, of the roote in the fruite, and of the fountaine in the streams issuing from it. Secondly, when as by this and whatsoeuer other meanes we haue, wee haue gotten some knowledge of the nature of it, and to what kinde of things it i [...] to bee referred, we must then as it were, comming nearer to the purpose, and bringing foorth into act the conceit of the minde, resemble it to that thing, the which of all other things in the world commeth nearest, and is likest vn­to it. Yet wee haue not attained to that which we desire, for we haue not the thing it selfe, but onely a patterne or example, a likenesse or resemblance of it: and therefore in the third and last place, we must adde to this ex­ample or patterne, that which is wanting: squaring it in all respects to the idea and con­ceit which we first had of the nature of the thing. For example, a man hearing much speech of y^e Angels, wold gladly know, what, [Page 49] and of what nature and essence they are: to the effecting whereof, he is desirous to see, heare or feele one of them, hoping by thi [...] meanes to know what they are, as he vseth to bee by his sences taught the nature of other things. But in the triall he findeth, there can no good bee done by this meanes, the An­gel [...] being spirituall and insensible creatures, [...]nd that therefore hee must go some other way to worke, and search out their nature, by the eyes not of his bodie, but of his mind, and gesse at their natures, by that which he hath heard and read of their effects, functions and actions. As touching the which, hee findeth in scripture that they are Gods seruants, con­tinually attending his pleasure, and praising him, and readily performing whatsoeuer hee commaundeth. Wherevpon hee inferreth, surely the Angels liue, for they mooue: and they are not brute beastes, but reasonable creatures: yea, not simple ideots, but of great vnderstanding and wisedome, without the which they could neuer dispatch those affairs aright, about the which God imployeth them: and further, that they are not weak­lings, but of great strength, for otherwise one of them could not haue destroyed in one night, an hundreth fourescore and fiue thou­sand of the Assyrians, as we read 2. Ki. 19. 35. [Page 50] and lastly, that they are not base or contemti­ble, but most glorious creatures, fit to stand and serue in the presence of God. Thus he conceiuing and imagining them, to bee most mightie, wise, and glorious creatures, to what thing in the world can hee resemble them more fitly, then to the most excellent men in the world, endued with the greatest measure of power, glory, authoritie, knowledge and wisdome?

Now we are come as neare them as wee can in any one thing, for there is nothing more like to an Angell, then is an excellent man, whereof it commeth, that the name of an Angel, is often giuen to men: yet we haue not attained our purpose, for there is yet great difference and oddes betwixt them, therefore to make them euen, wee must take from this excellent man, this grosse body of clay and earth, and giue vnto him a pure and spirituall body, voyd of all mixture of ele­ments and moysture, the which debaseth and keepeth him downe beneathe the Angels, who being not clogged and pressed downe with such heauie lumppes of clay, nor hauing their cleare vnderstandings dimmed with soggie mystes of moysture, excell him farre in nimblenesse, quicknesse of wit, [Page 51] and in all other respects. But what need we suppose this Angelicall man, whom we haue truly existing? for we know that in heauen the bodies of the Saints shall bee pure and spirituall, free from all heauie lumpishnesse: yet the faithfull being glorified, shall not be­come Angels, but still be men, for neither in subtilitie of body, nor yet in excellencie of in­ward gifts, shall they bee made equall to the Angels.

Thus we haue with much ado, make the humane and the Angelical nature meet togi­ther, and vsed the one as a Glasse, to repre­sent and make knowne the other vnto vs.

Now then to apply all this to our purpose, for the finding out of Gods nature, wee must doo these three things: first, we must get an idea, or conceit of it into our mindes, by searching what manner of thing God is, and so to what kinde his nature doth belong, and is to bee referred: in the second place, we must get a patterne, example, or resemblance of it in some thing really existing: and lastly, we must by adding and detracting, make them euen or equall. For the first, see­ing that the nature of God cannot bee knowne, eyther by any essentiall causes or [Page 52] by sensible qualities, we must imagin it by the effects, actions and workes, whether they be ordinarie, or extraordinarie: Rom. 1. 20. The inuisible things of God, that is, his eternall power and Godhead, are seene by the creati­on of the world, beeing considered in his works. For so it hath pleased God (to the end he might make himselfe knowne to man, and man happie by knowing him) after a sort to take vnto this his inuisible and insensible na­ture, this visible and sensible shape, and to co­uer himselfe with the creatures, as with a gar­ment, that so he might discouer and reueale his hidden nature to man, as we know, that both he himselfe, as also his Angels, haue shewed themselues to men, by putting on the nature and shape of man. Not that we ima­gine, as some haue done, that God is the soule or life of the world, and the world the body of God: for God is not in the creatures, ey­ther as their matter, or as their forme, but onely is to them the efficient: but because the creatures make Gods inuisible nature to be knowne, therfore we call them, the shape or forme of God. For by this meanes it is broght to passe, that althogh God Iehoua, as he existeth in himselfe, and as he did exist be­fore the creation, be inuisible, yet God the Creator of heauen and earth, is as visible, as [Page 53] are the Starres by night, or the Sunne at mid­day in the heauen, and as palpable, as is the grosse earth whereon we tread: as it is, Act. 17. 27. God hath made the world, that in it men might seeke him, yea grope after him and feele him. Thus both the creatures, and also the extraordinary workes of God, done both within and also without the Church, and recorded both in holy Scripture, as also in other true Records and. Histories, teach vs what God is: yea thus they preach to the whole world, as touching God their maker & Author, that he is a liuing and working, yea a mightie and wise nature, excellent, yea infi­nit in all goodnesse: to wit, in knowledge and wisdome, in truth and iustice, in loue and mercie, in power and strength, in glorie and maiestie. Thus hauing conceiued in our mindes an idea or imagination of Gods na­ture, we are in the next place, to bring it forth into the world, by getting an example or re­semblance of it, in some thing not vnlike vn­to it. But against this patterne or resemblance it will bee obiected (the which you touched before) that both it is impossible to finde any thing in the world, that is like to God, or fit to be a resemblance, and also, that if there could any such thing be found, yet it were Idolatrie, to resemble God to any creature. [Page 54] Whereunto we answere, first to the former part of the obiection, that although the vn­likenesse to God, be farre greater in the crea­tures, then the likenesse, yet that there is no creature, which is not more or lesse in one re­spect or other, like vnto him: for whatsoeuer is good, commendable, or excellent in any creature (as all the creatures are good, yea e­uery one of them endued with a proper and peculiar goodnesse) that commeth from God, who is the fountaine of all goodnesse, and maketh the creature to bee like to God. So then if the meanest and basest creatures haue some likenesse to God, without doubt the excellent creatures cannot but haue a great likenesse and resemblance vnto him: the which wee knowe, that GOD him­selfe in the Scripture doth graunt vnto them, calling man his owne similitude, God made man in the likenesse of GOD. Genes. 5. 1. Yea, although there were no man­ner of likenesse or resemblance betwixt GOD and the creatures, but rather all contrarietie and flat repugnancie, yet they might profitably bee vsed for the illustra­tion of his nature, as wee knowe that all contraries doo argue and illustrate each other. The which way of teaching, al­though it bee not the readiest to attaine [Page 55] the truth: for that doctrine and knowledge are positiue not priuatiue, consisting not in the negation of that which is not, or is not true, but in the affirmation of that, which doth truly and really exist, yet it is alwaies an helpe, and sometimes the onely meanes.

To the other parte of the obiection, wee aunswere, confessing that it were flat Idolatry, and vtterly vnlawfull, to make or suppose God to be simply like or equall to any creature, for that were to pul him downe from his Throne of maiestie, and to place him among the creatures: yet affirming it to be very lawfull, to resemble him to any crea­ture, the difference which is betwixt them, being obserued and mentioned. Thus Act. 17. 29. the Apostle Paul resembleth the diuine nature to the humane, proouing a­gainst the Idolatrons Athenians, that God is not like to those stocks and stones, wherin the heathen did worship him, because hee is like vnto man, who is of a cōtrary nature to sence­lesse things. We men (saith he) being the kind of God, it cannot be, that God being like vn­to vs, that he shuld be like to siluer, gold, or to any sencelesse thing: where tho he make these two natures of God & man like to each other, yet he maketh them not equall, but putteth [Page 56] the difference, in that hee maketh man to come and flowe from God, as a little arme or creeke of the sea, from the great Ocean. Yea thus God hath throughout the whole Scrip­ture reuealed himselfe vnto vs in the forme and shape of a man, ascribing to himselfe the parts of his body, as his eyes and eares, his hands and feete, yea all the faculties, affecti­ons and passions of his minde and will, and that both seuerally, sometimes one and some­times an other, and also al togither, assuming to himselfe, the whole shape and forme of a man, as namely, Ezech. 1. 26. vpon the simi­litude of the Throne, there was as it were a si­militude of a man vpon it: whereof is said, Vers. 26. This was the appearance of the simi­litude of the glory of the Lord: and when I saw it, I fell vpon my face: so Dan. 7. 9. I be­held till the thrones were set, and the ancient of dayes did sit, whose garment was white as snowe, and the hayre of his head like the pure woll. Likewise, Es. 6. 1. the Pro­phet saith: I sawe the Lord sitting vppon a high throne. By the which sitting vpon a Throne, althogh signifying royall glorie and maiestie, God doth not exalt or aduance, but rather debase himselfe, and that for our sakes, that we by this meanes might get some conceit and knowledge of him into our [Page 57] mindes: yet if we should continue and rest in these formes, without adding the diffe­rence vnto them, wee should not helpe, but hurt and hinder our selues, and get not the knowledge, but the ignorance of God.

Sect. 3.

NOw let vs go on, and see what creature in all the world is to be accounted likest vnto God, and fittest to resemble his na­ture vnto vs, as wee gathered it to bee by the consideration of his workes. The question is not hard to be answered: for this being taken for granted, that God hauing made al things, is far more excellent then any or all of them, it will follow, that that creature, which of all other, is most excellent, is the likest, and com­meth nearest to the nature of God, and doth more fitly resemble him, then any of the o­ther: as we know that among men, not any of the raskall sort, but some great Noble man or Prince of the blood, is most fit, in the ab­sence or nonage of the king, to hold his place, and represent his person. For although euery creature bee good in his owne kind, as (wee reade in Genes. 1. 31.) yet looke how many diuers kindes of creatures there are, so many diuers degrees of goodnesse there are, the [Page 58] highest whereof are to bee accounted excel­lent, as we see all the starres to be bright and glorious, yet the sunne, moone, and some o­ther, to be the most excellent in light & glo­rie; as they were in the beginning, called by God himselfe by the name of great lights. Thus no man will denie but a common pee­ble stone, is better then a raw lumpe of clay, or a handfull of earth: that a tree is more glo­rious then a stone, that a liuing beast excel­leth a tree, that a reasonable man is better thē a brute beast, an Angell then a man, and an Archangell then one of lower degree: and so will any man consesse that God, whose in­finit knowledge and wisedome, appeareth in the creation of the world, is not to be placed among the sencelesse and brutish creatures, but to be referred to the kinde of reasonable things. And so indeed throughout the whole scripture, we see that God is content to take a place among his reasonable creatures, to be accounted to be of their nature and kind, as hath beene shewed out of Act. 17. 26. to call them, to wit, both men and Angels, his image and simililtude, and in that respect, his of­spring, sonnes and children, yea to appeare and shewe himself, in the forme and shape, somtimes of the one, & somtimes of y^e other. But to come as neare the marke, we ayme at, [Page 59] as we can, although both the humane & the angelicall nature, be notable images, simili­tudes, and resemblances of God, yet as the Angels are farre more excellent then men, so they are (in themselues) farre more fit tipes and examples of the diuine nature, then men are, for that they haue many properties of the diuine nature which man wanteth. For man is mortall and corruptible, but both the An­gels and God are immortall and incorrupti­ble: hee consisteth of a medley of contrarie qualities, continually iarting and fighting togither, vntil at length one destroy another: but their nature and substance is vniforme, not wasting it selfe, or wearing away, but stedfast permanent, and the same for euer: he is visible, yea grosse and palpable, but they are inuisible, insensible, subtile, pure and spirituall: hee hath litle strength with much weaknesse, they haue great power and might without impotencie or infirmitie: hee hath knowledge with ignorance: truth with error: wisedome, with folly: will with peruersenesse and obstinacie: affection with passion and perturbation, loue with lust: abundance with many wants, contentment with complaint: day with night: ioy with sorrow: glorie with shame: and happinesse with miserie: but they are perfectly wise, vertuous, mightie, glorious and happie.

[Page 60] Yea, by this excellencie aboue man, the Angelical nature is prooued (against those who will not beleeue the word of God, vn­lesse their owne sences say amen) to exist as a meane betwixt man and god, although farre nearer the lower, then the vpper extreame. For if there were no nature existing betwixt God and man, the distance and downfall would be greater then is meete, in respect of that dependance & cohaerence, which should be betwixt the creature & the creator, close­ly combined togither without any such wide and abrupt gappe, in order and due propor­tion. The which wide gap betwixt God and man, the angelical nature doth fill vp, parti­cipating somewhat of each nature, as it were hanging and houering in the middle region betwixt heauen and earth, hauing had a be­ginning with man, and n [...]w being immortall with God: voyde of all mixture as is God, and yet consisting of matter & forme, as doth man: subsisting in some matter, subiect and substance as doth man, yet being incorporeal as is God: able in a moment to bee any where, as God alwaies is euery where, yet lo­call, and circumscribed by place as is a man: being of wonderful capacitie & knowledge, as is God, yet ignorant of some things, (as namely of the essence of God) as is mā: & in [Page 61] one word, being euerie way finit as is man, yet perfect in al respects as is God. Thus we haue by the degrees of the creatures, as it were by the staires and steppes of Iacobs ladder, clim­bed vp to heauen, and leauing men with the rest of the earthly creatures, groueling heere in the dust belowe, by the wings of Angels soared aloft to the diuine nature, or rather (to speake more properly) toward it. Neither is it possible for vs to goe any higher, or to finde more of God in any thing, then wee haue al­readie found in the angelical nature. Where­vpon our Sauiour Christ doubteth not to put on Gods backe, this glorious robe of the an­gelical naure, hauing amongst all the formes and shapes in the world, none more excel­lent wherewith to inuest him, and therefore he saith, Ioh 4. 24. God is a spirit, as he is else­where in scripture called an Angell, and an Archangell. But this saying is warely to be taken, and wisely vnderstood, least that in stead of true doctrine, wee gather out of it a blasphemous heresie. For in trueth, God is no more a spirit, or an angell, (the which two words, are in diuinitie to be accounted of the same signification and compasse) then he is a soule or a bodie: what then may you say, is the signification of these words? Surely, they are not positiue, but priuatiue: they shew not [Page 62] what God is, but what he is not, namely, that hee is not a formall, visible, and sensible bo­die. For so they containe in them, a refuta­tion of that grosse opinion of the carnall and hypocriticall Iewes, who thought that an outward and bodily worship, voyde of the spirituall sinceritie of the heart, would well ynough fit and please God: as if a man ha­uing to deale with those heathenish idola­tors, that thinke brute beastes or sencelesse stockes to bee Gods, should say vnto them, you are fouly deceiued in this point, for God is not a dead stocke, or a brute beast, but ra­ther to be resembled to a liuing man. So then, the meaning of Christes words is this, God although in trueth hee bee not a spirit or an angell, yet because that nature commeth nearer him, and doth more resemble him then any other, therefore hee may fitly for your capacitie be so called.

Sect. 4.

YOu remember I doubt not, that it was said, that there are three things required to the searching out of Gods nature: first, a conceite of it in the minde, gathered by the effects of it: secondly a reall example or patterne, wherein that conceit doth exist, and may bee seene: and thirdly, the diffe­rence betwixt the conceite & the example the one being in abstracto, the other in con­creto: the one existing onely in the imagina­tion of the minde, the other in some creature and reall subiect. The two first wee haue al­readie gotten, the one out of the creatures, which haue taught vs the nature of God in generall, the other we haue found in the an­gels, who are a liuely resemblance of the said diuine nature: the third remaineth, to wit, the difference betwixt the patterne and the thing it selfe. For although we haue alreadie ascended, and come to the highest steppe of Iacobs ladder, for that it is impossible to find any more of the diuine essence in any crea­ture, then wee ha [...]e alreadie seene in the angelicall nature, yet wee are not at our iourneyes ende, nor yet halfe waye: [Page 64] for although there be as great difference be­twixt Angels and men, as there is distance betwixt the heauen and the earth, yet there is tenne times, yea ten thousand times grea­ter oddes betwixt the Angels and God, and the space is infinitly greater from the heauen of the Angels and saints, to the heauen of heauens, where God dwelleth. And there­fore we are now in the last place, to seeke out the difference, which exalteth the nature of God thus farre, or rather thus infinitly aboue the Angels: this is the verie true essentiall forme of God, the which if it could bee once named, the matter were at an ende, the case cleare, & much labor might be saued, which must be spent, or rather most profitably and happily bestowed, in gessing, coniecturing, & imagining that, by many properties, attri­butes, actions, and effects, which by this meanes might be fully knowne all at once. But it is not the will of God, neither were it profitable for vs, that so inestimable a iewell should bee so easily gotten: who would e­steeme the most precious pearles, if so be that they lay in the streetes for the vptaking? and if the nature of God were once fully known, how could it afterwardes bee so earnestly sought and desired as is m [...]ete? Yet we are not to thinke that this impossibilitie of fin­ding [Page 65] out the true forme of God, commeth of God, as making daintie and daungerous of the knowledge of his nature, to make vs ea­ger & earnest in desiring to know it, although i [...] bee true that hath beene said, that it is bet­ter to haue our appetite whetted and sharp­ned, by the hardnesse and impossibilitie of attaining it, then our stomackes cloyed with the full fruition of it: neither are we to think that God doth enuie and grudge vs so great a good, and so sweete a pleasure, or that in pollicie hee keepeth himselfe close, not da­ring to shew himselfe for feare of being cen­sured or contemned by vs: But this commeth of the shallownesse of our braines, and the the weaknesse of out capacitie, the which making it impossible for vs to conceiue it, maketh it impossible for God to reueale it.

I was in good hope to haue heard at the next word, the very true essential forme of God declared, and indeed that had beene woorth the hearing: but now I perceiue you will reserue that for another time, or rather giue it ouer for euer: wherin you deale wise­ly in my minde, for what follie were it for a man to beate his braines in pursuing that, which it were more then madnesse once to hope to attaine. But I pray you, how wil you [Page 66] do, to make your proude Lucifer a God.

We will doo as we may sir: and if all should faile, I hope that you will helpe at a dead lift, according to your promise: but to proceed. Seeing that the true forme of gods nature cannot be had, we must take in stead of it, some essentiall propertie flowing from the forme, the which will make those things which are attributed to God, differ from the same things as they are in the Angels. For example, knowledge, wisedome, might and maiestie, haue place both in God, and also in the Angels, yet they are not alike in both: for in the Angels they are, although great and perfect, yet finit, but in god they are ab­solute and infinit. So then, if we adde this difference of infinitnesse to the Angelicall nature, there will come forth a diuine nature, which may not vnfitly be described an ange­lical nature euery way infinit: and so God be defined an infinit Angell, as an Angell may be said to be a spiritual man. For as surpassing excellencie doth distinguish the Angelicall nature from the humane (for although they bee both of one kinde, to wit, reasonable, in­dued with wit, knowledge, wisedome, and will, yet they differ, in that the Angelicall nature hath all these in farre greater measur [...] then hath the humane) in like manner infi­nitnesse [Page 67] doth distinguish the diuine nature from the angelicall, for they both being rea­sonable or vnderstanding natures, indued with wit and will, and with all things belong­ing there vnto, differ in this respect, that the one is excellent in vnderstāding, knowledge, wisedome, will, power, puritie, and glorie, but the other is infinit in all these respects: the one hath all these things in an excellent measure, the other hath them without mea­sure: the one hath much, the other hath all. And thus by gathering the nature of God out of his workes and word, by finding out a patterne of it in the Angelicall nature, and lastly, by adding vnto this angelicall nature that wherein it commeth short of God, we haue in some sort made vp the diuine na­ture, or rather indeuoured to do that, which it is impossible to performe: for in this case, the least glimse of the truth is to be esteemed knowledge.

Sect. 5.

I Thanke you for this paines which you haue taken, in vnfolding this deepe and darke poynt of religion, the ground of all the rest: Indeede I con­fesse, that as hee that goeth vppe to the toppe of the highest mountain in the world, [Page 68] may farre better see and consider the whole course and order of the starres and heauens, then hee that lieth in the low valley, hauing his sight hindered by trees, hils, cloudes, and other impediments: so he that hath his cogi­tations fixed on the celestiall Angels, the highest and excellentest of all creatures, may in them behold the diuine nature more clear­ly, then he that looketh onely vpon man, and other earthly creatures, in whom, although there bee some resemblance of God, yet the grossenesse, corruption, and mortalitie of their bodies, beeing betweene our sight and the image of God in them, doth hinder vs from the cleare and plaine beholding of it. Yet for so much as fewe can clime vp to the toppe of this high hil, for that fewe off vs that are vnlearned, are so well acquainted with the angelicall nature, as to haue any certaine idea or notion of it setled in our mindes, I doubt that his demonstration of the diuine nature by the angelicall, which indeed, and to those that are learned, is the most fit and direct that can be imagined, will to vs (who for the most part either doubt whether there bee any such thing as an Angel in the world, or if we beleeue the scripture, telling vs that there are such spiritual creatures, yet we know no further of them, thē as we haue seen them [Page 69] painted on signes with a paire of wings) will seem obscurum per obscurum, if not per obscu­rius: for that it will be as hard for thē to sup­pose what an Angell is, as what God is. And therefore mee thinkes I could wish, that the diuine nature could be declared and shadow­ed out vnto vs, by some other nature better known & more familiar vnto vs. Sch. It were dangerous, as that which might be an occasi­on of idolatrie vnto vs, to take so great liber­tie in imagining the nature of God, as to re­semble him to any visible thing: neither were it agreeable to the nature of God, who is in­uisible: & we know, that of all bodely crea­tures, there is none by nature inuisible, saue onely the ayre. And surely if we must needs in respect of the vulgar capacitie, or rather dulnesse & want of vnderstanding haue some familiar and easie example & resemblance of the diuine nature, in my mind there is no e­lementarie creature so fit for this purpose, as is this, which wee haue light on. For first, as no man doubteth but that this element of y^e ayre doth truly & substantially exist, although it cannot possibly be seene, no more are we to doubt, but that God doth most certainly ex­ist, al though he cānot possibly be visibly seen. Thus doth Christ Ioh. 3. 8. by the inuisibilitie of the winde, teach Nicodemus the secrecie of the spirit of God.

[Page 70] The wind bloweth whither it listeth, thou hearest the sound of it, but knowest not whence it com­meth, nor whither it goeth: euen so is euery one that is borne of the spirit, or so secret is the o­peration of Gods spirit in reneuing men. And without question, it is the safer and the better course, whensoeuer we thinke of God, and therfore must of necessitie coin in our minds some idea or forme of him, to resemble him to this inuisible bodie, then to any beast or man, to the sunne, moone, starres, or any o­ther visible creature. Againe, this element doth, (the which neither Angell, man, beast, nor any other creature can) very notably re­present vnto vs the vbiquitie of God? for it is euery where, in euery open place & secret corner, in the towne, in the fields, and in the widest deserts: in the bowels of the earth, and in the bottome of the sea: within & without vs, yea inseparably closing and compassing vs about. So that if we doo but stretch this ele­ment vp to the heauens, supposing them to be made of this matter, (as sure the matter of thē is not much vnlike, neither can we more pro­bably compare it to any thing, then to a pure and firme kind of ayre) & so in imagination a­boue the highest heauens (although in truth, there be there neither ayre, bodie, nor place) we shall truly & plainly conceiue of the vbi­quitie of god. A point of doctrine very need­needfull [Page 73] to be plainly declared & truly lear­ned, for that most men doo greatly and in truth very grossely erre in it, by tying god to one certaine place, and shutting him vp in heauen, as it were a Bee in a Box, for that the Scripture doth often assigne vnto him that place: not meaning that he in essence is there, more thē in this inferior world, but that there his glorie and maiestie do mote clearly shine▪ From this foule error, another farre woorse doth spring, for by this meanes they exclude both God and his prouidence out of the world, & cast off all feare [...]offending him, whom they thinke to be fa [...] [...]sent, & by the wals, doores, and windowes of their closets and chambers, kept from seeing or knowing their doings: whereas on the other side, if they were perswaded of his vbiquitie & pre­sence in all places, that he doth immediately compasse them about, as doth the aire, & sit­teth as closely to them, as their shirts doo to their backes: yea that he hath place euen in their minds and hearts, as certainly as they do continually drawe the ayre into their brains, and bodies, it could not bee but that they should continually stand in awe of him.

So then, (to let passe without any in­larging,) diuers other respects, in the which this Element doth not vnfitly represent [Page 72] vnto vs some properties and attributes of the diuine nature, as that it is most mightie, ma­king the verie earth to shake, and rocking it too and fro like a little childe in a cradle, that it is most subtile, pearcing into euery place, and passing through the least cracke and nar­rowest crannie or chinke: that it is the be­ginning of things, if we thinke as some Phi­losophers haue done, that it is the first mat­ter whereof being thickned and compacted togither, the water and other things were made: that it is the preseruer of our life, for that without it we cānot continue any space, but do presently perish: so that we may truly say of it, as the Apostle saith of the diuine nature, Act. 17. 28. In it we liue, we mooue, and haue our beeing. But to let these things passe thus briefly▪ if wee suppose a thousand worlds one aboue another, all of them reple­nished, with thi [...] primarie, pure, simple, sub­tile, pearching, inuisible, yea insensible, (for of it selfe, not affected or distempered by any accidentall qualitie, it is neither seene, heard, tasted, smelt, nor felt) this mightie, large, & v­niuersal creature, we shall haue a pretie pat­terne and resemblance of the infinitnesse, v­biquitie, inuisibilitie, pure simplicitie, and pearcing subtiltie of the diuine nature: for as I haue often told you, we doo not make any [Page 73] comparison betweene this or any other crea­ture, and God the Creator, but onely a re­semblance, which may bee, where there is no shewe of equalitie. As in this instance the ayre is to our sence and capacitie, and in re­spect of other creatures, subtile, simple, pear­ching, insensible, mightie, large, and vniuer­sall: but in comparison of the diuine nature, it is more grosse, confused, blunt, palpable, weake, narrowe, and wanting, then can bee said. And therefore in resembling God in word or in imagination, either to Angels, or to the ayre, wee must remember to adde the difference, for otherwise wee commit grosse and hainous idolatrie. For there is no creature in the world, which howsoeuer it be perfect in the owne nature, yet if it be vsed as a resemblance of God, will not bee found wanting in many respects. Man is indeed the image of God, yet he is too little and weak, to fill his chaire of estate, yea indeede too grosse for that purpose, how soeuer it hath pleased Gnd sometimes to reueale himselfe to Moses, Daniell, Esay, Exechiell, and other of his Prophets, in the likenesse of a man, for some respect and signification. The Angels are not litle, weake, and grosse as man is, yet before we can make them a fit type of God, me must stretch them far beyond their owne [Page 74] compasse, euen throughout the whole world. The aire is large and vniuersal, but it wanteth life, sence, and an internall beginning of moti­on: howsoeuer it moue as nimbly as if it had a thousand liues: annd therefore to make it a fit resemblance of God, wee must inspire it with life, or rather (if we thinke that life is not properly attributed to God) with reason and vnderstanding, the which without que­stion doth most properly and essentially be­long to God. And so we may for the weake capacitie of the vnlearned, describe God, sup­posing him to bee a reasonable element of aire, as before to the vnderstanding of the learned, wee made him to bee an infinit An­gell. Thus to make vp and finish this patterne and picture of God, we are constrained to imitate Apelles that famous Painter, who going about and enterprising by the curiosi­tie of his art and cunning, to counterfaite, yea to surpasse the perfection of naturall bewtie, would not insist in any one particular, but out of diuerse persons, made choise of that, which in each one of them seemed most excellent: taking from one the complection and colour of the eye and haire, from an other the forme and straightnesse of the nose: from the third the breadth and largenesse of the forehead, & so forth, in all the other parts of the visage, vntill at length, with much ado, he got togi­ther [Page 75] into one face or countenance an exquisit and absolute, idea of bewtie. In like manner we are not to thinke that any one creature is able to affoord sufficient matter, whereof to make this infinite Image, that doth fill both heauen and earth, or that the shop of any crea­ture (how excellent so euer) hath sufficient varietie of colours, wherewith to set it forth, as the dignitie of it doth require: it is well, if that all the perfections of all the creatures in the world, brought togither into one picture, do make but a resonable resemblance of him.

Indeed, I must needs confesse, that you haue now fitted me a penney worth, & serued me in my kinde: and as I cannot truly call my selfe either learned or altogithe vnlear­ned (for I went long to the Grammer schoole and I was a yeare or two at the Vniuersitie, before I went to the Innes of Court) but ra­ther a mungrell betwixt both, so now I may chuse, of whether side and sect I wll be: and so worship, either the ayre with the common people, or with the learned your asspiring Lu­cifer, climbing vp to the throne of god. Yet by your patiēce, as touching your ayerie god, although I confesse that element to bee fitter then any other of these elementarie bodies, yet me thinks, y^e the element of the fire wold haue serued your turne better: considering that it is both far larger, as beeing higher, as [Page 76] also farre more subtile and simple, more pier­cing and forceable, then is the misty and fog­ayre, as all men know and confesse. Neither can you take exception against the visibilitie of it, as you make it very dangerous, and a great occasion of Idolatry, to resemble God to any visible thing: for although our fyre here below, being composed of all the other elements, bee visible and sensible, yet the element of fire as it is in the proper place and sphere, we see to be inuisible.

The same reason that would not suf­fer you to rest contented in the similitude of the Angels, because as you say truly, their na­ture is greatly doubted of among the ignorant people, and in a manner vnknowne to the wisest, and therefore, it being darke and ob­scure in it selfe, is not fit to giue light to any other thing: so I say of your fierie element, that although the Philosophers prooue by good reasons, that howsoeuer it wete neuer seene, yet there is some such thing truly ex­isting: for that otherwise there cannot bee that perfect quaternitie and correspondency of primarie qualities, which is needfull in the mixture of these inferiour bodies: yet for as much as it is not so certain, but that some who thought themselues to be Philosophers, haue doubted of it, and much more the common [Page 77] people, who do not weigh reasons, nor admit any other euidences for the proofe of the true and lawfull tytles of assertions, saue onely their owne sences, I thought, that I should fit your humour, and fulfill your request: which was, to haue a plaine and popular demonstra­tion of the nature of God, not so well by this vnknowne and insensible element of fire, as with that other of the aire, with the which, as with a daily companion and friend, that will not be kept out a dores, nor yet out from our hearts, we are so familiarly and so entirely ac­quainted.

Sect. 6.

THere I confesse, you haue aunswered me to the full, and giuen me as good as I brought: yet seeing I haue begun to picke a quarrell with these discourses and de­finitions of the diuine nature, so litle learning as I haue, I doubt not but that I could find a fault in them, that you should not wipe away so easily as you haue done this, but I dare not be so bold with you.

I will be so far from thinking it bold­nesse, that I shall thinke my selfe much be­holden to you for so doing: yea it is a thing which both I may and do challenge of you, [Page 78] and you are bound by promise to performe: for I did not take vppon mee to deliuer the whole truth of this doctrine as it were to speake vndoubted oracles, but rather in hope that by our mutuall helping one an­other, where eyther of vs should chaunc [...] to go astray from the truth, to [...]ifte out some part of the truth of this vnsearchable mistery by our familiar reasoning too and fro of matters: and therefore, I can bee well content, to bee admonished, where I go astray.

Then to tell you plainly, me thinkes that although these definitions which you bring, may haue in them some substance of trueth, and also some plausible shewe of po­pular facilitie, which I wil not denie, yet they haue no Art in the world in them, and for that cause are not onely not curious, but e­uen confused and obscure, and want that e­uidencie, which you seemed in framing them wholly to affect.

I haue heard and read many discourses of this matter, yet neuer knew I any take such a course, as to define one thing by another, and to inmble vp into one definition, things of diuers natures, as you do in defining god, to bee an infinit Angell, or a reasonable aire: for thus you make a mōster of him, as it were [Page 79] an Hermaphrodite, halfe of one nature, and halfe of another, halfe reasonable, and halfe vnreasonable. You deale with me as men do with naturall fooles, when they cannot make them conceiue that three and foure make se­uen, but by a mathematicall demonstration, setting seuen leauen horse loanes one vppon another: so you heap vp diuers particulars in stead of one generall. It had beene a better course, if according to the olde and ordina­rie manner of handling and defining, in the first place you had sought out the generall kinde or nature: (which you in the Schooler call the Genus in definition) to the which the diuine nature doth belōg, & is to be reserred, & thē to haue added either the proper form, or (if that could not be found, as I think that in this case it cannot) som formal proopertie, pointing as it were with the finger at the vn­knowne forme. As in this example, you haue found out of Act. 17. 29. the Genus or kind of God, to wit, that hee is of the same kinde and nature that man is, in respect not of his bodie, but of his soule: and indeede so hee is, God is of a reasonable nature, for [...]ee hath knowledge, wisedome, and will, [...] which cannot haue place but in a reaso­ [...]able nature.

[Page 80] Now thisis but the genus of the definitiō, for both men and Angels are reasonable natures, and therefore you must adde the difference, which distinguisheth God from al other rea­sonable natures: but how can you make this infinitnesse to containe in it, all the attributes of Gods nature I see not as yet: and so you define God infinit reason, or the infinit reaso­ble nature. But I pray you proceed in decla­ring it, and pardon my boldnesse in telling you my foolish opinion thus plainely.

It is not so easie for a man to doo right himselfe, as it is to finde fault with an other, as it may bee you will confesse anon, when we chaunge places, and you become the speaker, and I the censurer. I know that definitions should consist of one generall no­tion, not of diuers particular instances, yea I could haue done thus much my selfe, for it is nothing: but vpon yourmotion and request I tooke that other course, which if it be rude and voyd of art, blame your selfe, who were the procurer of it: yea I did meane to bring at length, the proper and true definition, void of all metaphoricall similitudes, as namely that God is as you say, infinit reason, or r [...] ther an infinit vnderstanding, the which is t [...] fittest definition of him, that I can now think of. Yet surely for my owne part, I doo not so [Page 81] much trust my owne wit in conceiuing aright of the nature of God, but that I should bee glad in learning it, to haue the helpe of a type or particular example to direct me. But in one thing, you do me manifest wrong, in that you say, that I make a monster of the diuine nature, compounding it of the Angelical, hu­mane, and elementarie natures. I dare war­rant you, that the differēce which was broght, to wit, infinitenesse, being put to the definiti­ons, or to the aforesaid natures, will so purge them, that there shall not be one dramme of the drosse of any created nature left in them. Yea, try it when you will, and you shall finde it to bee the right Philosophers stone, which turneth all mettalles into golde, and that one dramme of it being put, not onely to an An­gell, or to a whole element, but euen to the least flye in the world, or the least mote in the Sunne, is of force to make it true and very god.

For first it maketh it to bee the primary and authenticall nature, or (if this word import generatiō to the eare of a curious grammatist) the first essence deriued from none other, for then it was contained in that other, and then it was finite, for the thing containing, is the limit and bounds of that which is contai­ned.

[Page 82] Secondly, this infinitnesse maketh it to be but one, because there cannot be two infinits: for wher there are two, there is diuision of y^e one frō the other: & where there is diuision, there is the end of the one, and the beginning of an other, and so no infinit. Thirdly, infinitnes maketh the subiect to be immateriall, and in­corporeall, for no matter or bodie can be in­finit, for a bodie is of necessitie contained and circumscribed by a place, but if it be con­tained, then it is not infinit: whereof it fol­loweth, that the infinit thing being without matter, is also without passion, for sola mate­ria patitur: and so it be commeth also immu­table, for there can be no change without passion. Fourthly, infinitnesse maketh a thing to bee immooueable, for whatsoeuer mooueth, hath terminos, a quo & ad que [...], that is, it mooueth hither and thither, but in infini­ [...]o non sunt termini. And lastly, the infinite thing is simple, voyde of all manner of com­position: for in composition there is diuision and qualitie, and so by consequent, there are limits. And thus we are to thinke of the di­uine nature, that although it be of the kind of reasonable natures as some creatures are, yet in that it onely is infinit, it is sufficiently di­stinguished from them all: and is made first primarie or authenticall, without cause or be­ginning, but existing absolutely in himselfe, [Page 83] and of himselfe. Yea as he is himselfe without cause, or beginning, so hee is to all the other things, the cause and beginning: hee is the roote and fountaine, from the which all na­tures and beings, do spring and proceed: com­ming from him, yet not diminishing him, ha­uing all their essence, but no part of his es­sence from him. For this also is a proper ef­fect of the infinite, to be the originall of all things, the which if they came from any fi­nite thing, they should at length draw it drie, and so the nature or beeing of all the things in the world should perish, or beeing preser­ued by mutuall transinutation, yet they want an omnipotent agent to begin them. For (by the confession of all men) the first creation of the world, requireth a power not limi­ted, but infinit, for that it is impossible to any finite power, to create: that is, to make some­thing of nothing: & if the power be infinit, the subiect wherein it is, must be of the same na­ture. Again, God is one and but one, because he is God, to wit, that infint nature, which is sufficient of it self, to occupie, & fill ten thou­sand wordls: neither can abide to be iustled by a pewfellow, but must sit and raigne alone: this point of doctrine the whole world, euen the Iewes and Turkes do hold, abhorring all sound or shew of any pluralitie of Gods.

[Page 84] Again, God is immateriall and incorporeall, not existing as we do in earthly and corrup­tible bodies, or as the Angels doo in some more pure, solide and firme subiects, which may in some sense bee called bodies, or in the most subtile and pure matter that can be imagined, but as a pure actuall and substantiall forme, subsisting of it selfe. And therefore we are (interpreting euery doubt­full thing, in the best sense) to thinke that Tertullian giuing a body not onely to the Angels, but euen to God himselfe, ment him to be not a phantasticall imagination, or an accidentall qualitie of some other thing, but a true, real, substantiall, and essentiall nature, subsisting as truly and really as doth a body which we see and feele. Otherwise, by giuing God a body, we take from him his infinit­nesse, & so his diuine nature, making him lo­call, mutable and mooueable. The which are in no case to bee admitted: for God is not contained in any place, but containeth in himselfe all places, bodies and natures what­soeuer, 1, King. 8. 27. How shall God dwell in this house, when as the heauen of heauens cannot containe and comprehend him? Nei­ther is he subiect to mutation, passion or alte­ration, as he should of necessitie bee, if hee were materiall, but is the same this day, and [Page 85] yesterday, now and for euer.

Lastly, we are not to admit motion in the diuine nature, for that in motion, there is a possibilitie of good, or some degree of per­fection, which is not yet in act, nor attained vnto, and so there would be imperfection in God: but the diuine nature is not in any mo­uing possibilitie tending to any other state, but is euer in complete act and in abso­lute perfection, and resteth and remaineth in it selfe without motion, far more firme, and stedfast, then is any Rocke in the sea, or the earth or whatsoeuer can be imagined most immooueable: moouing all things, yet hee himselfe resting, for all things tend to him, but he to nothing. Lastly, the diuine nature is most simple and vniforme, all alike throughout all: voyde of all mixture, composition, combination, diuision or dissi­militude.

It is not compounded of matter and forme, for it is a forme needing no matter, where­with to be vpheld, or wherein to exist, but vpholdeth it selfe, and subsisteth in it selfe: In it there is not cause and effect, for it is an efficient without an effect, and of that which is no effect, euen of it selfe: It is a totum, a whole without parts, for it is euery where [Page 86] the same, and like it self, or rather it selfe, and therefore cannot bee diuersely diuided, or distinguished into parts: and if our finite co­gitations must needs make him haue parts, & conceiue him by peecemeale and parts, be­cause wee cannot take the whole, then must wee needes make euery part to bee the whole: and lastly, it is a substance without accidents, for nothing can either accidere or accedere to that which alrea­dy is all and infinit, neither doth it, as other substances do, extenuate it selfe into accidentall qualities, but whatsoeuer it sen­deth foorth from it selfe (or rather to it selfe, for from it selfe it cannot go) that is it selfe, not any way extenuated, but re­maining in the same plight, which it had before.

Sect. 1.

HItherto you had my cōpany, and I was glad of yours, but since you entered into the handling of this infinitnes, which you make the difference of the diuine nature, distinguishing it from o­ther reasonable natures, you haue flowen so cleane out of my sight, that I haue no hope of ourtaking you. For if you thus exempt Gods nature from all logicall relation of substance and accident, of subiect & adiunct, of essence and attributes, by the which distinction, it is (as you know) vsually declared and laid opē, you will take away all meanes, eyther of teaching, or of learning and conceiuing it.

You mistake my meaning, which was not to exempt God from all logi­call relation, and the groundes and rules of reason, without the which, I confesse, that [Page 88] neither the diuine, nor any other nature, can bee either declared or learned, or in truth ex­ist in it selfe. For reason and logicke, which is the act and operation of reason, stretch themselues ouer all things that exist, howso­euer they exist whether finitely or infinitely, although (in vs) it cannot fully compre­hend, that which is infinite, yea and a little further too, euen to those things, which doo not exist. As for the diuine nature, it is as hath bene said, an essentiall and infinite rea­son, or vnderstanding, euen the fonndation and fountaine of all reason: and therefore, wee cannot thinke that it should abolish or destroy reason, for so it should destroy it self: but rather are to acknowledge that it doth establish it, and agree vnto it. Indeede the grounds and principles of naturall Philoso­phie, as they haue bene laid downe by heathen Philosophers (who hauing little or no know­ledge of God, had the more leisure to looke into naturall things) doo fight with the grounds of diuinitie, and by not admitting any actuall infinite, do destroy the nature of god, as in other points we know, that the best Philosopher that euer was, was but a sory di­uine, yet we may not in any wise thinke, that reason and diuinitie doo iarre or crosse each one the other, the which indeede are [Page 89] both one in effect: and therefore neither I, nor any other (vnlesse he be voyde both of naturall & also of artificial logick) can doubt or denie that God hath substance, essence, nature, forme, yea his proper attributes and effects: and the distinction of essence and attributes, which all Diuines make in hand­ling the nature of god, is good & true. They deny indeed, that there are any accidents in God, and say that whatsoeuer is in God, is the essence of God, but then they meane by accidents, separable and mutable qualities, and by essence, essentiall and inseparable properties.

So there are no accidents in God, as in a man or an Angell are knowledge, wisedome, puritie, holinesse, strength, and happinesse, which are no part of their nature or essence, nor yet essentiall properties, for they may be remoued and separated from their subiects, as we know that many both men and angels are ignorant, foolish, wicked, vile, weak and miserable: but nothing that is in god, or doth belong vnto him, can be augmented, dimini­shed, or any way altered, for as hee is once at any time, so is he alwaies at all times. Yet it cānot be denied, but that god hath his essen­tiall properties or attributes, and that they are and may be truly and really distinguished [Page 90] from his substance, essence, or forme, and some things (I confesse) are attributed to God, in respect of our weaknesse, which are not proper, but rather contrarie vnto the na­ture of God, as namely, the parts and sences of mans bodie, as hands, eyes, feete, going, seeing, and likewise the passions and pertur­bations of men, as anger, furie, hatred, re­uenge, repenting, forgetfulnesse, and diuers other: all which are as farre discrepant from the nature of god, as darknesse is from light: and therefore they are to bee vnderstood as improper, and metaphoricall speeches, bor­rowed from our nature, to represent & make knowne vnto vs, the diuers actions of God. Againe, God is the Creator, Preseruer and Redeemer of the world: these attributes and many others of the same kind, are truly giuen to him, yet they are not to bee accounted his essential attributes, because they are not coe­ternall with God: therefore not inseparable, although creation import omnipotencie, and so an essentiall attribute. Besides, there are diuers other things attributed to God, but the true and essentiall attributes of God, are those which arise and spring from his essence and forme, as naturally, necessarely, directly, continually, and immediately as the beames, light and heate issue from the sun, [Page 91] yea as do the streams from a fountain, & the twigges and branches, from the roote and bodie of the tree: as namely, vbiquitie, eter­nitie, vnitie, simplicitie, & omnipo [...]ēcie, these are y^• essential attributes of god, arising neces­sarely from his essentiall forme: to wit, from an infinit vnderstanding and reason, (the which we are constrained to make the substi­tute and vicegerent of the essentiall forme of God) the which must of necessitie (as hath been said and shewed) bee eternall, illocall, one, simple and omnipotent, yea omniscient and infinit in many other respects: yet these attributes are not the essence and forme of God, for they are diuers one from each o­ther, as vbiquitie is not vnitie, nor vnitie e­ternitie, but the essence of God is not di­uers.

The difference which you make betwixt the essence and essentiall properties of God, as I take it, is this: that the essence is as it were the foundation, fountaine, sub­stance, head, beginning, and roote, and the attributes, the top, streames, existence, infe­rior members, end, fruite and in briefe, they come from the essence of God: is not this your meaning?

You say true, and I thanke you for explaining it more fully then I could haue done: but what of that?

Then I pray you let me aske you this question, why may you not make some or all of the atttributes, the essence and forme of God, as well as the infinit vnderstanding of God, or at the least, why doo you not make the vnderstanding of God one of his attri­butes, as I am sure that vsually Diuines doo, who put the knowledge and wisedome of God in the forefront of his attributes? I might trouble you with other obiections, for by this distinction of Gods essence from his attributes, you seeme to make prius and poste­rius, one thing before an other in God: and also to take away the vniformitie and equa­litie of Gods essence, for that the beginning, roote, and head, is more essentiall, then the progresse, fruites and members: but I knowe you would say, that I doo but cauill and trifle with you: for that it is no absurditie to say, that in God one thing is before another, in order, though not in time, as the vnderstan­ding is to the will: and to the other you may say, that y^e head is no more essential to a man then is the foote, nor the roote, then a little twig, and therefore I pray you, resolue mee for that other matter, and let these passe.

You might haue let that passe too, for any great hardnesse that is in it: as wil plain­ly appeare, if you consider the same distincti­on [Page 93] in men, or rather in Angels, fo [...] they haue essentiall attributes proportionable (though not comparable) to these in God: for they haue successiue vbiquitie (for they can be a­ny where in a small space of time: and for the eternitie, or rather sempiternitie of god, they haue immortalitie: for his simplicitie, they haue great subtiltie: and for his omnipoten­cie, great power and might: yet the begin­ning and foundation of their essence is in none of these, but in their reason or vnder­standing, the which onely giueth the deno­minatiō of a persō to the subiect in the which it is, whether it be in the creatures or in god. Yea, it doth more properly make the subiect excellent, then doth any other respect: as namely, a man indued with vnderstanding, hath more of the image and similitude of God, and is in that respect more excellent then is the whole earth, being but a dead and sencelesse lumpe of clay, as it is said Eccles. 9. 4. That a quick dog is better thē a dead Ly­on, and as wee know, that the least bird that flyeth in the ayre, is more admired, & coun­ted more excellent, then the hugest moun­taine in the world that standeth stone-sti [...]. So that liuing things excel those which wāt life, as reasonable men excell brute beasts, as wise men excell fooles, as much as light doth dark­nesse, [Page 94] Eccles. 2. 13. as Angels surpasse men, as farre as the heauen doth the earth, in puri­tie and subtilitie, so doth the infinitnesse of Gods vnderstanding, (not of his quantitie, time or power) extoll God aboue all things, and in the first place makes him God. As for the methode which diuers Diuines vse, in putting the knowledge and wisedome of God among his attributes, in that they put them in the forefront of them, as you saye truly, it is plaine that they make them the beginning and foundation of the rest: yea, I could shewe you some of the latest of them, which make the knowledge and wisedome of God to be his life: and by life wee knowe that all things are saide to exist. And there­fore, howsoeuer it bee impossible for vs to sound the depth of the diuine essence, and to shew fully and plainly, wherin the form of it doth consist, yet forsomuch as wee need not doubt, but that of all that is in scripture attri­buted to God, and said to be in him, his in­finit vnderstanding hath the first place, both in excellencie, and also in order of nature, we may be bold to make it the roote, fountaine, and foundation of his essence, and the rest of his attributes the branches, streames, and progresse of it. For in the first place God is a substance, nature or essence, truely sub­sisting: [Page 95] then he is to be accounted, not a dead and vnreasonable, but a reasonable and vn­derstanding nature: thirdly, not a finit, but an infinit vnderstanding, whereof it follow­eth, that he is eternall, illocall, simple, one and omnipotent.

Now I do perceiue your meaning, neither will I gainesay it, or deny but that God is to be thought to be an vnderstanding nature or essence, and that infinit, hauing the aforesaid attributes belonging vnto it: But whether shall the vnderstanding or the infi­nitnesse of God haue the first place assigned vnto it?

These two can no more be seuered, then can the fire and heate, neither is the one before the other in time, nature, or beeing, both existing togither eternally: yet in the order of logicall relations and respects, as god is an essence before hee is an vnderstanding essence, so is he an vnderstanding or reaso­nable nature, before he is infinit. Neither are we to thinke, that the essence of God consi­steth simply in infinitnesse, but in an vnder­standing, or (if any other thing can bee na­med, which commeth nearer to the essence of God) in some other thing, that is infinit: for the essence of God is not priuatiue onely, but most truly and properly positiue.

Sect. 2.

YOu haue satisfied me fully, and I thanke you heartily for your paines, in explaining vnto mee that poynt of religion, which of all other I haue alwaies desired to hauesom insight into: nether do I know what now to desire of you, vnlesse it please you to go on in the particu­lar explication of these attributes of the di­uine nature, and to beginne with the vnder­standing which you make not an attribute, bur rather the very essence of God, or at the least, that which commeth nearer vnto it, then any other thing doth that we know.

Indeed the first place in the treatise of Gods nature, is woorthily assigned to his knowledge, or rather to his essentiall vnder­standing, the which must either bee made Gods essence, or else wee must confesse that we knowe not what itis, or wherein it doth consist: but to declare the true nature & man­ner of it, is as farre aboue my reach, as the heauen is aboue my head. Yet some little knowledge of it, the scripture doth affoord vs, to this effect, that the knowledge, reason, or vnderstāding of god, is his infinit essence, knowing all things actually alwaies.

Doo you make the knowledge and the vnderstanding of God, to be all one, or is there some difference betwixt them?

I doo meane but one thing by them both, to wit, that part (for so I may speak tho improperly) of Gods essence, which in or­der hath the first place: and I thought it best to vse diuers words, to signifie one thing for plainesse, and the greater euidence of the matter: for the one, to wit, knowledge, is the more vsuall terme, and yet the other seemeth to be the more proper and significant. For as in a man or Angel, knowledge is one thing, euen a separable or accidental qualitie, which is often wanting, as wee see in many men, who are (in a manner) altogither destitute of knowledge: and the minde, vnderstanding, or reasonable soule, another thing, to wit, the very essentiall forme: so in God we may say that the same thing is both his vnderstāding, as it subsisteth in it selfe, and also his know­ledge, as it hath relation to other things, namely to the creatures: and so knoledge as it is in the creature a separable or accidentall qualitie, so in God (in whom there is no mu­tation) it is an essentiall attribute arising from his vnderstanding, which is his essence. For if the world had neuer beene made, nor to haue beene made, wee could not in proper [Page 98] speech haue saide that God had the knowe­ledge of it, for so he shuld haue known that which was not: but that cannot be: for things which neuer exist, are neuer knowne in particular, howsoeuer they might and should haue beene knowne in abstract and generall notions. So that the knowledge of God pro­perly taken, & precisely distinguished from his vnderstanding, is his vnderstāding actua­ted or broght into act, yet not so large as is his vnderstanding, which is infinit, wheras gods knowledge of the world or of the creatures, neyther is nor can bee infinit, for that God neyther hath alreadie created infinite parti­culars, neyther yet in trueth can doo it, be­cause so there should bee two infinits, one created or made, and the other the maker of it: for howsoeuer to our weake vnderstan­standings, not onely all the particulars which haue happened or shall happen in the world, but euen a asmall part or portion of them, seeme infinit, yet to God, they altogither are finite and numerable.

You seem to make the knowledge of God to be his vnderstanding, not as it is subsisteth in it selfe, but as it is actuated and hath relation to the things that are knowne.

[Page 99] But by this meanes you incurre two great inconueniences: first in making it finite, the which you confesse, although in my minde it is not to bee admitted, for all Diuines make the knowledge of God infinit: and second­ly, in making it to bee accidentall, and not of absolute necessit [...] in God. This will plainly followe, if the knowledge of God be limitted to the things in the world which are knowne: for although it was necessary that the world should be created, God ha­uing so decreed, yet this necessitie is not ab­solute, because God might haue existed, though hee had neuer made the world, and then hee should haue wanted this knowledge of things, because the thinges themselues were wanting.

This supposall is not altogither vain [...] and friuilous, for God as hee did exist with­out the world, before the creation of it, so wee cannot doubt, but that hee might haue done so still and for euer: otherwise wee should fall into that grosse absurditie of some Philosophers: who to make the world eter­nall, make it essentiall to God, and to follow him as necessarely, inseparably, and as wee say, as hard at heeles, as the shadow doth the body, the which I doubt not, but you con­demne as most absurd.

[Page 100] We are rather (in my mind) & so others also thinke and write) to acknowledge not one [...]y the vnderstanding, but euen the knowledge of God to be infinit, in that it stretcheth it selfe not onely to the creatures, but euen to God himselfe: whereof it will followe, that it is both infinit, (for whatsoeuer knoweth and comprehendeth that which is infinit, is it selfe infinite) and also essentiall to God, because it is not onely eternall, as is the knowledge of the creatures in God (al­though it bee not of absolute necessitie) but also absolutely necessary, because it cannot bee supposed, that God could exist without the knowledge of himselfe. Yet I will not wholly reiect or deny this destinction which you make of the vnderstanding of God from his knowledge: for although of all Gods at­tributes, his knowledge doth most proper­ly and immediately flow from his vnderstan­ding, yet me thinkes that there is a difference to bee put betwixt God and his knowledge, as well as betwixt God and his power: yet for so much as through ignorance of Gods true forme, wee are not able to declare the nature of his essentiall vnderstanding, (the which we are constrained to put in the place of his forme) heereof it cōmeth, that we are not able to distinguish this essentiall vnder­standing [Page 101] of god from his actuall knowledge. And therefore leauing the knowledg of gods forme; essence, and (as wee make it) of his essential vnderstanding to himselfe, who on­ly eyther doth or can knowe it, let vs I pray you, proceed in considering this his actuall knowledge.

I like well of that you haue said, and do thinke you for shewing me wherin I erre: yet this I may say for my self, that vnlesse you had in a manner compelled me to imagine or coyne this or some such distinction, I should not haue mentioned it: but to proceed. It was said of God, that he knoweth all things actuallly, alwaies. For the first, it is plain and not greatly doubted of by any, that all the actions of the creatures, and whatsoeuer doth any way happen vnto them, is as manifest vnto God, as is the sunne at noone: he doth see with eyes, which need no light, for dark­nesse and light are all one to him: the heart of man is deepe and deceitfull aboue all things, yet hee soundeth the depth of it, see­ing and perceiuing his most secret thoughts, as plainly as if they were things done in the sight of the whole world: the which thing, although it seeme most impossible, and bee incredible to many, yet wee knowe [...]ssuredly [...] [...]r [...]h of it, both by the word of God, and [Page 102] also by manifolde experience: and no mar­uell, seeing that he hath framed and fashioned them, hee hath made the eye and care, and therfore must of necessitie both see & heare. Neither doth the infinitnesse (as it seemeth to vs) of the particulars which happen in the world, hinder this vniuersall knowledge of God: for they all are to him, not onely not infinit, but a fewe in comparison of those which he might & should know if they were to be knowne, that is, if they did exist. It hath be ene admired in some great men, that they haue bin of such capacitie & readinesse of wit, as to be able at one instant to mind di­uers matters, and to endite to two or three Secretaries as fast as they could write: for why? as we, our outward sences and inward faculties, are not many, but one particular, so they cannot well stretch themselues at once to many diuers obiects, for then Pluri­bus intent us minor ad singula sensus.

But it is not so with God, who although in trueth he be but one particular nature and essence, not many or diuers, yet hee is more large & vniuersall, then the whole, yea then a thousand worlds. And so if we consider the proportion of his infinitnesse to all things ex­isting, wee shall finde, that it is farre easier for God to know and minde at once, all the [Page 103] particulars which eyther haue beene, are, or are to bee, then for one of vs to thinke on a­ny one particular thing or matter. As if (that wee may vse the similitude of the di­uine essence which was brought before) wee should suppose a man or an Angell to bee of so large a braine and vnderstanding as is the whole element of the ayre, the which we know to be euery where, if it be not kept out by some more solide bodie, and that euery part of it were of sufficient vertue to conceiue and knowe: we then should not mauell, if at one instant hee did know and consider of all the things in the world, and that without a­ny confusion of wit: how much more then shall we graune this vniuersall knowledge to God, who is far more vniuersall thē the ayre, he being not onely about things, but euen in the middest also of the most hard and solide stone, and not excluded by it, or by any bo­die out of any place: yea hee being wholly euery where with euery man, yea with euery pi [...]e of grasse on the earth, and with euery corne of sand on the sea: and how then can wee maruell, that hee should bee able to know all things at once? In the second place we are to consider, that God knoweth him­selfe, and also the whole course of all things actually, that is, hee doeth not [Page 104] attaine to the knowledge of it by doubtfull reasoning, discourse and consequence of one thing frō another, but seeth it existing as cer­tainly as if it were actually existing and pre­sent with him. Otherwise, if God did at­taine to the knowledge of things, by way of vncertaine discourse, it would follow, that his knowledge is sometimes potentiall and imperfect, not hauing as yet attained to the thing it aymeth, but beeing onely in the way towards it: whereas we are to thinke, and hold for a most certaine trueth, that the whole course, order, beginning, progresse and end of the world, is and h [...]th beene alwaies from euerlasting, seene and knowne by him, and that without successiue discourse, & by one perfect and comp [...]e [...]e act of knowledge: the which we say in the third place, to be eternall in God, not that he needed so long a time for premeditation, how to deuise and dispose things, so as they should all agree togither in tending to one & the same end for the which he decreed them: for in this respect, y^e whole frame and c [...]u [...]se of the world, may be said to be extēporall, & as we vse to say, nasci sub stilo: that is, to be penned and made without any premeditation: [...]or to him, the least time is as good as a thousand yeares for deuise: yet we are to thinke, that the frame of the world [Page 105] was not deuised when it was made, nor a litle before, but that the idea and patterne of it, hath plainly & fully existed in God from all eternitie, as the spitit of God witnesseth al­most euery where in the scripture, speaking of the eternall loue and purpose of God to­ward his elect.

You say, that god know­e [...]h all things actually alwaies, and I thinke you say true: yet I am sure you know the olde exception & obiection, which hath been al­waies made against this doctrine, not onely by heathen Philosophers, but also by Chri­stian Diuines, who graunt this to bee true in all those actions which God worketh, ey­ther immediately by himself, or by the means of those creatures which are not indued with libertie of will: in all which they graunt that there may be an appoynted order & course, wich shal certainly come to passe, because the things thus disposed are not at their own dis­position, so as they might break the order set by God, but are wholly gouerned by God, who neuer changeth his purpose or determi­nation in any thing which he hath apponted: but as for the will of man, the which they say, is in it selfe most free, yea as free as the will of God himselfe, because otherwise it is not wil, that they say must be exēpted from the fore­knowledge, (at least from the necessarie fore­knowledge) & fore appoyntment of god, for [Page 106] that it is wholly at the owne disposition, and not controlable by any other, howsoeuer it may be hindered by a superior power from bringing it selfe into perfect act, yea or from existing also: yet as long as it doth exist in his place and subiect, that it cannot be barred of free choyse in any thing that is propoun­ded vnto it. And that for this cause it wil not stand, and therefore cannot be placed in any set and constant order, it beeing so slipperie, vncertaine, yea as it were altog [...]ther lawlesse, vnruly and exorbitant: what thinke you of this poynt?

Surely I haue alwaies thought it to be very hard and intricate, and that it was no maruell to see many so troubled and grauel­led in it, that they could not possibly see how the will of man could be yoaked by any ne­cessitie of God [...] decree, and yet left in the naturall freedome. But that wh [...]ch is impossi­ble with man, is possible with God, who hath taught vs in his word, as touching the foreknowledge of things contingent, as are the issues and elections of mans free will, that not onely the sencelesse, but euen the reaso­nable creatures with all their actions are or­dered by him: and that for that end and pur­pose, not onely the persons, wordes, and deeds, but euen the most secret thoughts of [Page 107] their mindes and inclinations of their willes, are both seen and also foreseene of God, who doth accordingly direct and dispose of them, as seemeth best vnto him: yet the freedome of the will remaineth (as indeed it cannot bee taken away vnlesse the will it selfe, yea the creature it selfe, wherein the will resteth, bee abolished) not hauing any kinde of violence offered vnto it, but moouing it selfe of it self, which way it pleaseth: euen as we see a man sitting on his horse, doth not carrie the horse, hither & thither, but is carried by the horse, who goeth on by his own free wil, yet guided and ruled by the rider, and directed to that place which hee hath appointed. As wee plainely see in Adam, transgressing Gods commaundement giuen as touching the for­bidden frute: the action was voluntarye and contingent in respect of Adam, who might haue abstained if hee hadde would, for GOD did no way compell him or impell his will to eate the forbidden frute, but did both by promises and by threatnings disswade him from it. Yet there is no question to bee made of it, but that GOD hadde as certainely foreseene and foreappointed it, as if hee hadde resolued to compell Adam [Page 108] by outward violence, or by inward compul­tion of his minde and will, to eate it. And so we are to thinke of all other the like cases, that God doth plainly foresee, that this or that without faile will be the issue and effect, though the causes be ambiguous, cōtingent, and as like in our eyes to bring forth the con­trary effect: for he seeth easily, what motiues are in the minde to moue the will, and what force each of them hath to sway it hither or thither.

Yet you haue not so fully resolued this doubt, as I do desire. For euen Cicero himselfe, or whosoeuer other is most perēp­toric in exempting mans will from Gods prouidence, will confesse, that contingent things may bee foreseene in the causes (thogh not in the effects themselues) when they doo plainely preuaile, and ouersway the one side the other: yet they affirme, that the will of man, setting it selfe of purpose to the full vse of the naturall freedome & nimblenesse, may dispose it selfe to a me [...]e contingencie, which cannot possibly be foreseene, because it will chuse and worke, not by the meanes or in­ducement of any motiue whatsoeuer, which would bewray the intent and issue, but free­ly of it selfe, and to no other intent, but to shew the absolute soueraig [...]tie of it owne [Page 109] power.

I haue already tolde you, what I haue gathered out of Gods word, as touching this point of his foresight of contingent things. I for my part, doo rest heerein, and so I wishe that you would doo without any curious in­quisition into their needlesse questiōs, wher­of it is best to let them dispute, while they list, and to determine when they can: In the meane time we wil proceed, and speake some­what of the wisedome of God, the which is, besides his knowledge, vsually attributed vn­to him.

Sect. 3.

INdeed, I haue often heard, that in men knowledge and wisdome may be not onely distinguished, but euen quite separated the one from the other, as it is vsually said of you schollers, that the greatest Clarkes are not the wisest men: yet I thoght that in God, knowledge and wisedome were all one, and not to be distinguished.

I haue heard as much my selfe, but I neuer thought him of whom I heard it, ey­the more learned, or the more wise for saying so if he spake as he thought: and yet I know that they are diuerse, and different things, as [Page 110] are speculation and practise. But (to come to the matter) in God they are not two diuerse things, but one and the same thing diuerse­ly considered: for knowledge is a generall notion and speculation, which when it com­meth to bee put in practise in the making, ordering and disposing of the creatures, is cal­led wisedome, to the which the counsels and decrees of God (whereof hereafter) are to be referred: and so knowledge is of simple, but wisedome of compound things, ioyning togi­ther in perfect order and agreement those things, the natures wherof, were before fully knowne. Gent. You fall againe into the same error you did before, in limiting and restrai­ning the knowledge of God to the creatures, which doth infinitly stretch it selfe abroad e­uen to God himselfe, and so sheweth it selse to be infinit: so now also you tie his wisdome, which in my minde, you may more rightly extend, so as it may belong also to God him­selfe. For howsoeuer as he existeth eternally himselfe alone, he needeth not to be ordered by any wisedome, neither can properly bee said to be ordered by his owne wisedome: for that order hath place, not in one simple na­ture existing in it selfe, both immutably and also immoueably, without any possibilitie of variance, discord, or confusion, but rather in diuerse things, whose natures being different, [Page 111] are by wisdome conioyned togither in good agreement: yet in that it pleaseth God of his goodnesse so to debase himself, as to haue any dealings with hi [...] creatures, in this respect euē God himselfe and his actions are to bee ordered disposed and guided: that as the crea­tures are made to agree among themselues, so they may agree with God also their Creator, to their owne happinesse and his glory.

You are too curious to be pleased, & too cunning to be taught: I speake of things after the common and vsuall maner, according to the which, the obiect of Gods wisdome, are his creatures, and not himselfe: yet I confesse that this distinction which you bring, is true and not to be reiected. But as touching this wisdome of God, shining euery where in the world, it is highly extolled in the scripture, as being most wonderfull and pleasant to be­hold. And no doubt, but that it is a great hap­pinesse, that a man hath this grace giuen him of God, and his eyes opened to consider and acknowledge it in any measure. For if the Queene of Saba were so rauished with the re­port, and much more with the sight of Salo­mons wisedome, appearing in his fit & sound answeres, sayings, sentences, and prouerbes, containing in thē great depth of knowledge, and also in the practise of his life (whereby hee turned his speculatiue knowledge into [Page 112] practicall wisdome) in the orderly constituti­on of his house and kingdome, and the right contriuing of al matters belonging therunto, that shee thought her trauell in comming to heare, see and behold it, well bestowed, and the seruants of Salomon, most happie men, for that they making their daily attendance in his Court and presence, had singular oppor­tunitie of knowing and considering it: how much more happie a thing are we to esteeme it to haue the wisdome of God reuealed vn­to vs: from the which, as from the sunne shining in the firmament, this dimme can­dle of Salomons wisedome receiued light. If Salomons house and kingdome were so well appointed and so wisely ordered, that it wrought in the beholders admiration, yea astonishment and vnspeakeable pleasure, how much more excellent shall we think the orders of Gods house to be, whether we con­sider the world in generall, which is the out­ward court, into the which, all both holy & prophane are admitted: but much more, if we consider the Temple it selfe, to wit, his Church, wherin he is serued and worshipped, and wherein hee doth reueale his glory in Christ & his Gospell, after a speciall maner: but most of all, if we consider his glory in the holy of holiest, to wit, in y^e heauens, & in the [Page 113] heauen of heauēs, where the Apostle heard, and we may imagin, things not to be vttered. First then, when as wee come into the out­ward Court of his Pallace, and consider ey­ther the whole frame of the world, or the particular creatures therein contained: how euery thing is so curiously contriued in it self, so correspondent to the rest, we shall see how truly wise Salomon doth acknowledge the in­comparable wisedome of God, in the creati­on of the world. Prou. 3. Iy. 20. The Lord through wisedome, hath laid the foundations of the earth, and hath established the heauēs throgh vnderstanding: by his knowledge the depthes are broken vp, and the Cloudes drop downe the deawe. If wee should enter into particulars where should wee beginne, or how should wee euer make an ende? what profession is there in the world, which would not thinke it great madnesse, not to mention that about the which it is conuetsant, as a most pregnant witnesse of the infinit wisdome of God? how doth the Astronomer with endlesseadmiratiō and astonishment, gaze vpon the starres, and is neuer satisfied with beholding their bright­nesse, counting their number, demonstrating their greatnesse, obseruing their vertues and influence not to speake of those, as not wor­thy to be mentioned, who with the heathen [Page 111] worship the Sunne, Moone and Starres, by ascribing all operations and effects vnto thē: neither yet to roue abroade in these large fieldes, which yeeld as many arguments of Gods wisedome, as the earth doth piles of grasse, but to keep at home in our owne hou­ses: how infinitly, and yet how worthely do Phisitians extoll the frame of mans body, how euery part is so wisely and warely deui­sed to auoide all harmes and inconueniences, which might happen: neither do our bodies, alone that, but euen the lowest flower, that groweth out of the earth, (the which if it can be but rudely counterfeited in wood, stone or colour, workmen think their cunning, and Princes their Pallaces highly aduanced) yea the silliest worme that creepeth on the groūd and the least flie that floteth in the ayre,, de­clare the same. For the which purpose the studie of naturall Philosophie is to bee ac­counted, as pleasant so also very profitable, and worthy tobe followed by Christians, as their gifts and callings do permit: for with­out question, they that go downe into the depth of it, see the wonderfull wisedome of God. But if we enter into the inner Court of Gods Pallace, to wit, into his Church, and there consider his dealings with it from time to time, the small begin­nings, [Page 117] the slowe progresse, the meane know­ledge which it had in the first ages, as it were in the infancie of it, and how in these latter ages, it hath so mightely preuailed & so stret­ched it selfe so far abroad into the world, still fleeting and moouing as doth the Sunne in the outward Court) from the Easterne to the Westerne countries and kingdomes: But if we step a little further into it, and there consi­sider the deepe misteries of knowledge, and wisedome, contained in the bowels of the scripture, the vnsearchable obscuritie of ae­nigmaticall Oracles mocking the sharpnesse of all humane wit, the agreement of ceremo­nies with the body, of the types, with the things signified, of punishments with sinnes: but especially, if wee consider in the three folde state of man himselfe, first the stately building of this Pallace, begun in Adam, then the miserable ruine of it in his fall and lastly, the glorious repairing of it'm Christ the se­cond Adam [...], it cannot bee but that we shall burst forth with the Apostle into admiration of it, and say O the depth of the knowledge and wisdome of God, how vnsearchable are his iudge­ments, and his waies past finding out? and agree to the truth of that, Eph. 3. 10. that the wis­dome of god, shewed in the church is so great, that the Angels in heauen do & may well admire it: [Page 116] and as it is Col. 1. 3. that in Christ and in the matter and mistery of the Gospell, the very treasures of Gods wisedome are both hid and re­uealed. Lastly, if we should draw a litle nearer, and with confidence enter into the glorious presence of God in heauen, where there are no cloudes or mystes, to keepe from vs the cleare sunshine of his wisedome, all his coun­sels, decrees, deuises and dealings, beeing vn­folded, and fully accomplished, we should thē say as the Queene of Saba said of Salomons wisedome, and the vnspeakable pleasure con­ceiued by the beholding it, that the report which goeth on earth and in the church of the wisedome of God, yea the conceit which we haue in our mindes of it, how great soeuer it be, is as nothing to the thing it selfe. But I wil not be so presumptuous, as to take in hand this argument, or to attempt to set forth the wisedome of God, as it shineth in the world, and in the Church, and much more fully, (al­though as yet not so plainly to vs) in heauen: It were an argument fitter for the tongues or pennes of Angels then of men, and where­of we may say, that if all should bee written, that might bee brought to that purpose, the whole world would scarce suffice to hold the bookes which would be written.

Sect. 4.

VVHat followeth to bee con­sidered in the nature of God?

Surely euen that, that followeth the vnderstanding in the nature of man, from the which we borrow al these attributes, as types and similitudes of the nature of God, and so we do after a sort put our own coat on Gods backe, or rather put our whole nature both the body and especially the soule vppon his diuine nature, as he himselfe did in the incar­nation of Christ, that so we may see & know that, which otherwise and of it selfe, is inuisi­ble, and not to be knowen, and therefore as in the humane, so also in the diuine nature, we must to the vnderstanding, ioyne the facultie of will, the which cannot possibly be seuered from an vnderstanding, for that there is no vnderstanding, which if it be not actuall, or in complete act of it owne nature and eter­nally, as is the vnderstanding of God, yet it is potentially actual, that is, it tendeth to action, whereof this facultie of will is the fountaine and beginning.

Nay surely, you need go no further in declaring what is the wil, or any other thing [Page 118] in the essence of God, if it bee so as you say, that these attributes are not truly in God, but onely resemblances and shadowes of his nature. Belike we haue al this while bin con­serring about moonshine in water, & striuing about shadowes, altog [...]ther voide of the sub­stance of trueth. I did verely thinke, that the vnderstanding, knowledge and wisedome, whereof you haue spoken, had beene truly & really in god, and not only shadowes of his vnknowne nature. I may well vse the simili­tude of the Prophet, and compare my selfe to a man, who beeing hungrie and thirstie, dreameth that he eateth and drinketh accor­ding to his owne appetite, but awaking on a suddaine, hee findeth himselfe drie and emptie: so I did all this while imagine that you did feed, and in trueth euen fill my hun­grie and thirstie soule with the knowledge of God, the which I do farre more earnestly and greedely desire thē euer I did meat or drinke, and behold, on a suddaine you awaken mee out of this pleasant dreame, and tell me that all is nothing but mere imaginations.

You take mee at the worst, and farre woorse then you should do: I haue not fedde you with winde or vaine dreames, as you in­ferre of my words, but the trueth is this. The nature of God is so vnsearchable, and so faare [Page 119] aboue the reache of any created wit, that when we haue come as neare it as we can, and haue to our thinking, gotten some hold of it, yet the very remembrance of ourowne weak­nesse in comparison of the infinitnesse of it makes to vs to distrust and suspect our selues as beeing deceiued with a false con­ceit of that which cannot possibly bee truly conceiued & comprehended: here of it com­meth, that although we be verily perswaded that understanding, knowledge & wisdome are in God, not onely truly and really, but al­so most properly as in the naturall subiect or rather substantially without any subiect, but being to themselues an vpholding subiect, yet we doubting the worst, and thinking that the diuine nature, is something more, and more excellent then an infinit vnderstanding, al­though in truth there cannot bee any nature more excellent then an vnderstanding, or a resonable nature, nor any thing more then that which is infinit: and also thinking that for so much as these things to wit, vnderstan­ding, knowledge and wisedome haue place in the nature of man, whom we see and feele to be a most weake and silly creature, that therefore they cannot be truly in the nature of God, hereof it commeth, that wee ra­ther call them the attributes or resemblances [Page 120] of his nature, then his very essence or nature it selfe, the which in trueth they are.

That is an other matter, but then we must not foster in our selues this vaine feare and doubting to affirmi him to bee that which we learne and know out of his word, that he is indeed, but rather boldly without any wauering or doubting, affirme him to be that he is, knowing most certainly that wee are not deceiued: and if we be deceiued, that then God himselfe hath deceiued vs, with whom it is better to erre, then to holde the trueth in our owne conceits. But I cannot but laugh to my selfe, when I thinke of one thing that you said, that wee doubted, least that vnderstanding, knowledge and wise­dome, were not truly in God, because they are truly in the nature of man, whereas you should haue inferred the cleane contrarie: to wit, that wee know assuredly, that God is an vnderstanding or reasonable nature, because man who is reasonable, is the image of simi­litude of God, yea, and made for this end, to shew & represent to vs the nature of god: but how I pray you, can a reasonable nature bee an image or similitude of that which is not reasonable? Now proceed I pray you, and shewe me, how and what you make will to be in God?

Will is very fitly and truly, yea essen­tially giuen to God: for as in the soule of man, will is not an accidentall qualitie, which may be spared without the diminishing or a­bolishing of the subiect, as may knowledge or wisedome, but an essentiall facultie issuing properly and immediately out of the vnder­standing, and cleaning inseparably vnto it (for that it is impossible that the conceits re­ceiued into the mind, should rest ydly there, and not tebound backe againe into action, e­uen as the beames of the sunne lighting vp­pon a solide bodie, cannot but reflect, and so make heate): so we are to thinke, that the es­sentiall vnderstanding of God doth natural­ly, necessarely and eternally, bring foorth the essentiall will of God, the which may bee de­fined, the essential act of his vnderstanding, the fountaine and beginning of all his acti­ons which are simply good.

Sect. 5.

HOw doo you make the will of God to bee the beginning of all the actions of God?

Euen as it is in all other things which haue will, the which is of this nature, that in what subiect soeuer it be, it will there domi­nere, [Page 123] and haue the sole and supreme authori­tie of doing all things: and therefore may truly be called Primus motor, the first mouer and beginning of all actions, for euery thing that hath wil, doth that onely (or at the least tendeth to the doing of it, wich it willeth. As for the vnderstanding, althogh it be in order & nature before y^t will, yet it is not said to be the beginning of actiō, because it onely mo­ueth, perswadeth, and directeth, but doth not inforce or compell: for as wee vsually say, counsel is no commaund: whereof it com­meth, that although in God there be no such disagreement, yet in y^e creatures it doth of [...]ē come to passe. that the will reiecteth the counsell and direction which the minde gi­ueth, and worketh without or against reason, according to the owne inclination. But the will is followed and obeyed by the actions in all things possible, euen as the commaunde­ments of a soueraigne Monarche within the compasse of his kingdome, are put in execu­tion by loyal subiects, without any resistance. And indeed will may very fitly be it compa­red to an absolute & mightie Monarche, for that it cannot either be controled, cōmanded, or compelled by any superior power with­out it selfe, or yet resisted by any inferiour within his owne dominions: it being impos­sible [Page 123] euen to God himself, to inforce or con­straine the will of the least of his creatures. He may indeed abolish & destroy al the wils and all the creatures in the world, or enforce thē by outward violence to whatsoeuer plea­seth him: yea he may (as hee doth in regene­ration) by changing & inlightning y^e minde, make that the will shall incline it selfe to that which it did before abhor: yet he cānot com­pel any thing to be willing, it being of it selfe vnwilling. Wherof it cōmeth, that this soue­raigne monarche harh place in those creaturs only, which are intire & absolute in thēselues, not depending vpō any other without it self-whatsoeuer, for abilitie of motion & action. And therfore trees, which haue not in them­selues sufficient power of natural heat, wher­by to mooue thēselues at their own pleasure, but do depēd vpō the sun, by whose heat they are helped, cānot be said to haue will. But as for those things which do perfectly liue and mooue, as do all things which haue life and soule, for they do as freely mooue or rest, and performe any naturall action, as any man or gell.

I like wel, that youmake the wil of god the first beginning of al his actios: but to make this cōmon vnto the creaturs, as if they wer so absolute, that they did not, nor neded to depēd on god, me thinks it is harsh, [Page 124] and soundeth somewhat to the disgrace of God, to whom (me thinkes) you should not deny this royall prerogatiue, that his will should bee the first moouer and beginning, not onely of his owne actions, but also of all the actions of all the creatures, rather then to make euery liuing creature, as it were a priui­ledged place, exempted frō his iurisdiction.

Wee are rather to account it to bee a great praise and glorie to God, that as hee himselfe is most perfect, so he is able to make other things also, not onely imperfect (as some of the creatures, to wit, those which wāt sence, may bee called, although they also be perfect in their kindes) but also perfect and absolute in themselues, able to mooue them­selues (within the compasse of their naturall power) when and as it pleaseth themselues, without any outward helpe whatsoeuer. Let vs suppose (for wee may reade of such a mat­ter) that some cunning Mathematican made a doue of wood, or some such matter, which could flie out, and returne to him home a­gaine: should hee thinke it a disgrace vnto him, that this doue needed not his helpe, or that hee should carrie it abroad, when as it could flie of it selfe: and not rather thinke it a matter of incomparable praise, that hee could make such an absolute and admirable [Page 125] peece of worke? yes surely, for the perfecti­on and absolutenesse of the worke, doth not detract, but addeth to the praise of the work­man: as no doubt but that it is a great glorie to God, that all the creatures in the world mooue, preserue, and increase themselues, by the sole means of that vertue & strength which hee put into them in the beginning, without any other supply or strēgth, althogh without question, they do many waies both need & feele his helping hand. Yet hath not the creature hence any matter of boasting a­gainst god, for that all that absolutenesse and perfection, which it hath, came not of it self, but from God: who as hee gaue it, so hee is able to take it way, and as hee made all the creatures of nothing, so also to consume them all to nothing, if it were his will. Besides, if wee did make the will of God the beginning and fountaine, not onely of his own actions, but also of the actions of the creatures, wee should admit many inconueniences and ab­surdities: for then all the enormities, mon­strous confusions & sinnes, which are in the world, should bee ascribed and referred to God, as to the fountain from the which they sprang. Yea, wee should fall into their here­sie, or rather extreame madnesse, who ima­gine the whole world, and all the creatures [Page 126] cōtained in it, to be the bodie of god, & god to be the soule of euery liuing thing, thē the which nothing can be imagined more grosse and impious. So then in this comparison of the will of God with the will of the creature, we see in the first place, that as God, so also the perfect, that is, all liuing and moouing creatures, haue their proper wils, not onely distinct and diuers from the will of God, but also free and absolute in themselues, and ex­empted from being constrained or enforced by the authoritie or power of God, yea it may be said truly, if it can bee so [...]aken and vnderstood, that the will of the creature is no lesse free in the own kinde, then is the wil of God, for nothing can bee added to that which is in the highest degree. Whereof it commeth, that this freedome of will is alike in all things, in the brute beast as in the rea­sonable man, in men as in angels, in the crea­ture as in the creator, yea (si paruis componero magna liceret) in the least flie or weakest worme, as in the mightie God of heauen and earth. Not that any creature hath so effec­tuall a will as God hath for there is no comparison between the power of God, and of all the creatures in the world ioyned to­gither in one: as a poore mā is not of so great abilitie as is a great Lord, yet his freedome [Page 127] may bee as great, The creature can doo no­thing, but it may will any thing against the will of god: the mightiest creature is not free to doo what it list yet the weakest is free to do whatit list, as can be imagined, euen as the prisoner that lieth bound in chaines in the corner of a straight prison, is as free in will, as the king that sitteth on his throne. Freedome therefore is so inseparable and es­sentiall a propertie of the will, that it cannot possibly by any meanes or power whatso­soeuer, be taken away eyther from the bru­tish, the reasonable, or the diuine will. Will may be taken from the creature, & the crea­ture out of the nature of things; yet cannot freedome be taken frō the will, for it wil fol­low it, either existing or at the least desisting with it. Lastly herein agree the wils of y^e crea­ture with the wil of God, rhat all of thē, whi­ther created or vncreated, tend & incline to good, not all to that which is in trueth good, yet al to y^• which is in appearance good. For as it is the nature of euery thing to preserue, & to delight it selfe, so for that purpose it es­cheweth whatsoeuer seemeth euil, and incli­neth it self towards y^• wich it iudgeth good & pleasant. And as euery nature is diuers from all other, so euery one hath a particular good to the attaining wherof itmoueth it self, and also the subiect which it hath in subiection, [Page 128] and in the fruition whereof, it resteth and pleaseth it selfe, as in happinesse & the chiefe good. Thus the nature of God hath a pro­per kinde of good belonging to it, the which is simply and chiefly good: to wit, his owne glorie, wherevnto the will of God in all the actions of God doth ayme and incline: for in it, rising out of it selfe before the creation, & since gotten, or rather continued by meanes of the creatures, it doth rest and please it selfe for euer.

Sect. 5.

THus farre the will of God agreeth with the will of the creature: now followeth the difference, the which cannot but be great. First they differ in that respect, which hath alreadie beene named, to wit, that the will of God is alwaies effectuall and actuall, alwaies bringing it selfe into act without faile, or any difficultie, and therefore is neuer in vaine, whereas the creature doth often in­cline and mooue it selfe inwardly towarde some obiect, but cannot goe forward in ac­complishing and bringing foorth into act that inward motion: being hindred either by the impotencie of the subiect wherein it is, or by some greater power, but nothing can [Page 129] resist the will of God, or make his purpose frustate. This is the first difference, and yet to speake properly, and to say the truth, this is not a difference of the wils, but of the per­sons and their power: For the wil being hin­dered from putting it self into executiō, may be as strong, yea vsually is more strong then when it hath outward power ioyned vnto it. Secondly, the will of God is immutable and the same for euer, that which he willeth once, hee willeth alwaies, but the will of the crea­ture is more variable then is the winde neuer constant, but continually altering it self from one obiect to another, yea often to that which is cleane contrary to the other: & that not onely in particular obiects, but euen in regard of the general kinds of good, [...]eiecting the true good for a false appearance, & with all true happinesse, for a vaine and transito­rie shadow of pleasure. Neyther is it any mar­uell, that the will of the creature is so varia­ble, when as it is so easily deceiued, and ledde out of the way by error and ignorance, or else ouerruled by headstrong affections, frō both which the nature of God being free, admit­teth no manner of alteration in will. The reasons which may seeme to inferre altera­tion of will in God, are drawne out of those places of scripture in the which it is said, that [Page 136] God hath not performed, that which hee hath spoken and purposed: as when he being mooued either with the sinnes and vnthank­fulnesse of the wicked, or by the prayers and repentance of the godly, doth confesse him­selfe to repent of that good which hee hath done to the one, or of those afflictions which he had threatned to the other. But the trueth is, that God neuer repenteth himselfe eyther of the one or of the other but taketh to him­selfe the person and manner of men, who not foreseeing what will follow, do often repent themselues, and are sorrie both for benefites bestowed on vnthankfull & vnworthie per­sons, and also for too great seueritie and rash anger vpon those whom they loue.

You haue made one obiection against the immutabilitie of the will of God, & haue also fully satisfied it: I pray you do as much to one that I will make.

I know not whither I can or no, but I will do my indeuour.

You need not feare it, for I knowe you haue often both mooued and aunswered it ere now: it is this. If the will of god cannot be altered in any thing that he hath determi­ned, and that he hath determined all things whatsoeuer, what need wee vse any meanes for the attaining of any good, or what will it [Page 131] auaile to labor to eschew euill, when the de­terminate will and purpose of God, cannot be by prayer, or by any other meanes auoy­ded, but must of necessitie stand and take place.

The answere is as you say, easie & ordinarie, for God willeth and worketh (or­dinarily) nothing but by the ordinarie means effectuall for that purpose, the which he hath commanded vs to vse: and therefore we are to thinke & hope that our endeuours are the meanes which hee hath appoynted for our good. If our endeuors take not effect, we are to acknowledge those wants & harmes to be sent from God, the which (otherwise) we could not haue denied to haue happened through our owne default: and therefore we are to be carefull in vsing all good means ef­fectuall for any good purpose, and especially of prayer, which you bring for an instaunce: for to imagine that God hath so tied him­selfe to a stoicall fate and necessarie course of things that hee can not, though hee would, grant our desires, is most fond & foolish, cō ­trary to the whole course of scripture, and in truth, the vtter subuersion of all godlinesse. You might in like maner obiect, that it must needs be graunted, that God doth sometimes change his wil, seeing that he willeth contrary things, wich cānot come to passe: for exāple, [Page 132] God would haue all men to be saued, and come to the knowledge of his trueth. This is true, for it is the word, yea the very words of god, 1. Tim. 3. 4. Againe, it is his wil that som should pe­rish, for it is certaine that some do perish, and that neyther without nor against the will of God, but by his will & purpose, as the scrip­ture doth plainly teach vs euery where. Like­wise it was the will of God, that Adam should not eyther taste or touch the forbid­den fruite, for hee forebad him: and yet wee cannot doubt, but that God had foreappoyn­ted, that Adam should fall by eating the for­bidden fruit, and so in infinit other instances: for answere of all which, wee are to distin­guish the commaundements of God giuen to vs from his will, which hee keepeth, to him­selfe: he commaunds things impossible, to shew vs what we ought to doo and to ende­uor, as is the fulfilling of the lawe, and the conuerting of all men, as farre as we can, to the obedience of the Gospell: both which are good, and to be endeuored by vs, and there­fore commanded by him, but both of them impossible, and therefore not to be thought to be willed by him. Againe, God cōmandeth sometimes to this end, to giue occasion of sin, for the which end he forebad Adam to eate of the fruite of the tree of good and euill, and so [Page 133] the Apostle saith, that the law was giuen to make sin abound: yea God sometimes com­mādeth that he wold not haue done, to make triall of our faith, as he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne Isaac. But these com­mandements are not to be accounted the wil of God: yea if hee command any thing con­trary to his written word, this argueth no change or contrarietie in his will, but onely, that God is not nor will bee bound to any law. Lastly, the wil of God differeth from the will of the creature, in that it onely inclineth it self naturally and necessarely to that onely that is good: whereas the willes of the crea­tures although they do incline to good only as we see in the elect angels, yet it is not of na­ture & necessitie, but of grace, & so of con­tingencie. For naturally their wil is free as wel to euill as to good, neyther is it possible, that the wil of any creature should be other­wise, howsoeuer by grace & the assistance of God it continue, in affecting only that which is good. But the wil of God doth necessarely mooue to good onely, because whatsoeuer God willeth, it is therfore good, because he willeth it, his wil being the square & rule of good, so that whatsoeuer agreeth to it, that is good as contrariwise, if it dissent from it, it is to be accounted euill. Hence it cōmeth that [Page 134] God when he willeth and commandeth any thing contrary to the morall law, as when hee did bid Abraham kill his sonne, the Prophet Hose to company with a harlot, and the He­brewes to spoyle the Egyptians, or in that he decreeth that their shall be sin in the world, yet in so doing, he willeth nothing but that which is good, for by willing it, he maketh it good. Yet in proper speech, these actions of men, although commaunded by God, are not to be accounted the proper obiect of the will of God, the which we must needs thinke to haue a larger scope and obiect, yea a more excellent obiect then are a fewe particular actions of mē. For the proper obiect of gods will, is that wherevnto it doth totally, eter­nally, and naturally incline and tend as wee knowe the obiect of mans will, to bee appa­rant good and pleasure, this beeing the scope wherat our nature doth wholly ayme, to pre­serue it selfe in a good and pleasant estate. In like manner the good whereat Gods will doth wholly ayme, is his owne glorie, the maintaining, aduancing and inlarging of it is that which he doth desire aboue all things, to this end and purpose are all his counselles, creatures and actions to be referred, & in this being obtained, as in his chiefe good, pleasure & happinesse he doth delight and rest con­tented.

Sect. 1:

WHat is therebesides in the faculties of the soule attribu­ted to God, fit to expresse & resem­ble his nature vnto vs, or what other faculties of y^e soule haue wee in common with God? for so you will needs haue vnderstanding, knowledge, wisedome and will, to be not typically attri­buted, but truly and essentially belonging to God.

I am so perswaded, and I hope you are so too by this: there is not any thing in our soules, that is so truly in God, as are the vnderstanding and will, which make the sub­stance of them: but there remaine yet many things to be considered in the nature of god, the types whereof wee fetch from our selues, as namely from our affections, the which are diuers motions of the will, [Page 136] arising of the diuersitie of particular obiects, making an impression into the wil according to their seuerall natures, and stirring it vp to desire.

Secondly, our morall vertues arising of the duc moderation of the said affections: and lastly, diuers morall duties, comming from these vertues as from their rootes are at­tributed to God.

Haue all these things place in the na­ture of God?

Some of them are truly in God, the rest are onely attributed to him, as types and similitudes borrowed from our humane na­ture, fit to declare the manner of Gods wor­king, and the diuersitie of his actions, by the which we must ascend to his nature, as neare as we can.

What affections are attributed to God?

Loue, hatred, lenitie, anger, pleasance, ioy, sorrow and pittie: all which, the scripture doth vsually giue vnto him.

What morall vertues or duties?

Iustice, bountie, magnificence, care of credit and honour, truth, fidelitie, thank [...]fulnesse, friendship, indulgence, pati­ence and such other, euen whatsoeuer is good, and commendable in the nature, [Page 137] manners, behauiour, life and actions of men.

I pray you thinke it not yrke some to make a particular declaration of them: for I do not see, how these things & especially the affections that you speake of, will eyther bee truly found in God, or can fitly be attributed to him.

If you meane by affections, sudden and vehement perturbations, such as we see vsually in men rising and ceasing as occasions and obiects are offered, then there are no af­fections in God, for thers is nothing in him at any time, that is not alwaies in him, and that hath not bene in him from all eternitie. But if (as we may) we meane by affections, constant continuall yea eternall acts, moti­ons, and inclinations (for euen these two lat­ter termes (although improper) must for wāt of better be vsed) of his will, not stirred vp on a sudden like a tempest, by this or that particu­lar obiect, but setled & permament, arising of the diuerse natures of things and agreeable thereunto, in this sense wee may truly' say, that there are affections in GOD, for hee doth truly loue and embrace good and likewise hate and abhorre whatsoeuer is euill.

You make a strange distinction of [Page 138] affections, some sudden and momentanie, others permanent and eternall: thus you make them no affections but habituall dis­positions, and morall vertues.

You neede not meruell so much at this distinction, for it hath place euen in humane affections, as wee know that ha­tred is an habituall and inueterate anger, and loue also may bee setled and fixed for euer: but it must of necessitie be ad­mitted in GOD, for that his will being eternall and immutable, sendeth foorth affections of the same nature, as the little twigges and braunches of a Tree are of the same nature with the great boughes and bodie of it, and the streames with the fountaine from whence they flowe: yea, in truth they are so setled and constant in God, that wee cannot distinguish them from his will, moouing it selfe without any alteration, too or fro the obiect, as the na­ture of it is good or euill.

In men they are like to the flames of fire, blowne vp by the impression of the obiects, as by a great blast of winde, and make such straunge alterations in them that you would scarce say, they were the same men which they seemed before. But no obiect of what nature or force so euer it bee [Page 139] can make the least alteration or impression into the will of GOD, whose nature is immutable, yea impassible. For hee is not materiall as are the creatures, yea euen the Angels themselues who must needs be gran­ted to consist of, and in some matter, which may suffer and bee altered, whereof it com­meth that not onely men, but euen the spi­rituall Angels, are subiect to affection, passion and perturbation: but God is a pure and mere forme, and therefore altogither actuall, hee is immateriall, and therefore im­passible.

Belike you make all affections to be acts, motions and inclinations of the will, but with this difference, that in God they are e­ternall, generall, constant and quiet (and in­deed, acts of the will, but neither motions nor inclinations) but in man, momentanie, variable, euident, raging & particular, stirred vp not by the generall consideration of the diuerse natures of things as they are in God, (whose affections in that respect must needs be constant, because the generall natures and notions of things, are eternall, and im­mutable) but with this or that particu­lar obiect, and therefore variable and vncer­taine.

I perceiue your meaning, saue only [Page 140] that I doo not see, why Gods will should be said to be mooued with generall obiects one­ly, and not also with particular persons & ac­cions: for we know, that he is diuersely affec­ted towards particular men and hateth euill not onely in abstracto and in the vniuersall idea of it, but also in particular men, in whom soeuer he findeth it.

Affections and will in God are not blinde, nor yet pe [...]uerse and rebellious to reason, as they are in men, but whole­ly agreeing vnto it, and therfore they follow the generall grounds of it euer in particular obiects, whereas in men they follow the im­pression of the particular obiect without, yea contrary to the grounds of reason.

Sect. 2.

VVEll, I pray you shew mee the particular poynts of doctrine in the loue of God: for as I remember, you put that first of the affections which you say are attributed to God.

Loue is most fitly and truly attribu­ted to God, who for that he excelleth in this affection, is defined by it as if it were his ve­ry essential form, for so we read, 1. Iohn. 4. 16. God is loue.

[Page 141] But that wee may knowe the particulars of this loue of God, it is needfull that wee first search out, and consider the nature of loue in generall, the which may thus after a sort bee described. Loue is an inclination of the will to a pleasan [...] obiect for the fruition of the pleasure of it: the which breedeth a de­sire of doing good vnto it, if it be capable of it.

This description is to be explained by al­leadging the seuerall obiects of loue, or of those things which men do vsually loue, in all which it will appeare that the cause why they are loued and sought vnto, is some sweetnesse or pleasure, which may be sucked out of them, & that nothing is loued, which doth not bring with it some delight and plea­sure: thus Iohn reasoneth, 1. Ioh. 4. 20. How can he that loueth not his brother whom he hath seene, that is, with whom hee hath conuer­sed, and so might haue taken delight & plea­sure by him, loue God whom hee hath not seen? and wee read Gen. 25. 28. that Isaac loued Esau because his venison tasted sweete in his mouth, and Leah saith, Gen. 29 32. Now my husband will loue mee, hauing borne him a son. By these and infinite other examples it ap­peareth, that all men incline to that wherein they finde and feele some pleasure and sweet­nesse, [Page 142] and this inclination is called the loue of that thing. Yet this is not all in loue, and ther­fore we must adde the second part of the de­scriptiō, which saith, that the pleasure in true loue procureth a desire in him that loueth, and enioyeth the pleasure, to return pleasure, delight and any good whatsoeuer can bee done vnto it, to the thing loued. For without this mutual relation of pleasure, it is not to be called loue but rather lust: as the inclination which men haue to those meates, drinks, and such other things, the which they loue, is not true loue but rather lust, and those things are properly said to be loued, to the which wee may returne that pleasure and delight, which wee receiued from and by them, and procure their good, as well as they procured our pleasure. For example, the inclination which a man hath to an harlot, and to the pleasure that may bee hadde by her, is not true loue, but onely lust, because heerein a man hath respect onely to himselfe, and to his owne pleasure, not caring what become of her, when his lust is satisfied. But the affection which a man beareth to his wife, is of an other kinde, and is true loue, because he doth not rest in that pleasure which hee enioy­eth by her meanes, bu [...] addeth thereunto [Page 143] an earnest desire and indeuour, by all meanes possible to procure her good, beeing farre more desirous to please and profit her, then to please himselfe by her: other­wise it is not true loue, but selfe loue, for true loue hath a hand to giue, as ready yea more ready then one for to take.

And therefore meates and drinkes, and such other pleasant things, although they doo greatly delight vs, yet they cannot bee said to bee loued, because they perish with the vse, and though they did [...]emaine, they are not capable of any pleasure or good to bee done in way of requitall, which is the cheefe part of loue. But men are truly said to loue theyr friends, wiues and children because as they doo many wayes receiue pleasure, comfort, ioy, delight and profit by them, so theyr whole desire is, to returne all that good backe a­gaine into theyr bosomes with double inte­rest.

You say that it is not true loue, but lust to take pleasure in any thing, with­out returning, and as it were repaying the said pleasure to him from whom it was ta­ken, and, as it were, borrowed.

Indeed this is good honest dealing, and [Page 144] to be commended, but if I be not deceiued, I can shew you a more true and excellent loue, then this which you haue propounded, to wit that which Christ preferreth farre before this your loue, the which may be called a kind of traffiquing and exchanging of one good turne, or benefit for an other. But the loue which he commendeth vnto vs, is not procu­red, and as it were bought or hired by prece­dent pleasure, but commeth from a mere de­sire of dooing good vnto them which haue not onely not deserued it at our hands, by lo­uing vs, but contrarely, haue by hating and harming vs, prouoked vs to requite and repay them with the like hard measure: Math. 6. 43. You haue heard that it hath bene said, loue thy neighbour, and hate thine enemie: but I say vnto you loue your enemies: for if you loue your friends onely, what great matter is that? do not the Pub­licans so? And as this loue is farre more ex­cellent then yours, so it doth farre better a­gree to your purpose and serue for the expli­cation of the loue of God: for if wee should make the ground of his loue towards vs to bee the fruition of some pleasure in vs, or by our meanes, we should make a faire peece of work of it, or rather marre all the ground of our sal­uation, which relyeth it selfe vpon the mere loue of God, not procured by any desert, or [Page 145] any occasion whatsoeuer on our owne be­halfe.

If you thinke that our Sauiour Christ meaneth, that wee should beare as great loue to strāgers & to our enemies, as to our friends, you are farre deceiued: for so he should de­stroy nature it selfe, which hath with her owne fingerwritten in our hearts this descrip­tion of loue, which I haue brought: to wit, that our loue shuld be greater towards them, at whose hands we haue receiued pleasure and comfort, then to them who are strangers or enemies vnto vs. But his meaning is, that to our enemies wee should not bee full of anger and reuenge, but patient, gentle, yea louing and helpful, labouring by good to ouercome their ill: and that by doing good to straun­gers, from whom, or from any in their name, we are neuer like to receiue any retribution, we should shewe the faith and loue which we beare vnto God, in obedience of whose com­maundement we do that, which of it selfe is hurtfull vnto vs. But that a man should loue a malitious enemie as earnestly as a louing and faithfull friend, a strange and vnknowne woman as well as his owne wife, other mens children as well as his owne, it is not onely not commendable, but euen monstrous, and contrary both to the light of nature, & to the [Page 146] law of God. For so we should be vniust and iniurious to our owne friends, to whom our loue and the duties of it do belong, in bestow­ing it vpon others, and in suffering them to to reape the croppe where they did not sowe any seed. yea then Christians should endeuour to procure to themselues, the good will of their brethren, not by duties of loue, but by iniuries, then the which what can bee said or supposed more absurd. Now as touching the loue of God towards vs, the which you affirme to come of the free mo­tion of his will, not proucked, caused, or occasioned by any good or pleasure, which he getteth by vs, I confesse that GOD electeth to saluation without any motiue of goodnesse foreseene in vs, euen of hi [...] mere will and good pleasure: and that it were mere madnesse to imagine, that there is any thing in vs or in any creature, by the which we might eyther pleasure or pro­fit God: yet I answere you, first that we are to distinguish betwixt the election, and the loue of God, for God chuseth and predestina­nateth to loue of his owne mere will, but hee loueth not, but for some cause. For as his loue is in the generall notion inclined to good, & not to euill, so he loueth nothing but that which is good, yea and hee loueth it be­cause [Page 147] it is good, and for the goodnesse sake. If you say what is our goodnesse to God, that he should loue vs for it, what doth it profit or pleasure him: indeed he standeth in no need of it: yet he taketh pleasure in it, the Lord de­lighteth in the righteousnesse of his Saints, their sins are as eyesores, & vnpleasant sights vnto him. For why God delighteth in him­selfe, and euery thing in that which is like it selfe: he taketh pleasure to behold his own Image in vs euen as the greatest ioy & plea­sure that a mā can haue in any worldly thing, is to behold his owne fauour and fashions, his owne countenance and conditions, in his son. And therefore the more that a man in holi­nesse resembleth god, the more he is beloued of him, as being so much, liker to him, as it is said of Dauid, that he was a man according to the heart of God.

This doctrine soundeth very harsh to me, and so I think it wold do to others, if they should heare it, as that which giueth a great blowe to Gods free election: I am sure you haue read, that Christ loued vs being his enemies. Rom. 5. and that you do not doubt, but that God loued the Apostle Paule, euen in his in­fidelitie, and when he in great furie did perse­cute the Church.

It may bee, that it would seeme [Page 148] strange to them that haue not considered of it: but the doctrine is, as I thinke, good and sound, that God neither hateth any but for sin, neither loueth any but as they are holy. Yet our foreseen holines is not the cause why God doth elect vs to saluation: for first he e­lecteth vs to loue & to life, & then afterward by sanctifying vs, he maketh vs capable of his loue and of eternal life. The proper obiect of Gods loue, is the holinesse of the reasonable creature, vnto the which, as being agreeable to his owne nature, God doth encline himself by dooing good vnto it, as hee receiueth a kind of contentation in it, and from it. As for the estate of the elect before they bee called and sanctified, we know that whom God lo­ueth once, he loueth alwaies: and Paul euen in the heate of his furie against Christ, was belo­ued of God, as one whom hee had chosen and predestinate to beare at the appointed time his owne Image of holinesse, and so the fore­sight of holinesse in him may be said to be the the cause of Gods loue, though not of his e­lection, For God may chuse to loue whom he list, but hee cannot loue, but according to his owne nature, neither any thing, but that which is in some sort agreeable to his nature: for he cannot loue or like, but must of ne­cessitie hate and abhorre euill, as well in [Page 149] concreto, as in abstracto: in parricular sub­iects, as well as in generall notions: that so hee may be alwaies like himselfe.

Sect. 3.

I Will not contend with you about it at this time, because I will not hin­der you from other matters: now that you haue laid the foundation of the de­scription of Gods loue, I pray you go on with the rest of the building.

We will: and first, we may out of that, that hath bene said to this purpose, define the loue of God to be, the motion, or rather the act of his will, enclining it selfe by dooing good, to good preuailing in the reasonable creature. In this discription wee are to ob­serue these three things: first, that the loue of God belongeth onely to the reasonable crea­ture: secondly, that the motiue or induce­ment stirring vp in God this loue, is good­nesse preuailing in the creature: and lastly, that the manner, or rather a proper and neces­sary effect of this loue or inclination of God to the creature, is by dooing good vnto it.

The first point being plain inough of it selfe, needeth no further explanation: for al­though all the creatures in theyr seuerall [Page 150] kindes and degrees, haue in them a speciall goodnesse, in respect whereof, God may bee said to loue, and fauour them, as we read. Gen. 1. 31. that God hauing finished all the creatures, looked vpon them: and seeing them all to be good, blessed them: and still to extend his gracious prouidence ouer them al, preseruing and vp­holding them, not onely by the ordinarie force of their natures, but euen by extraordi­nary meanes vnknowne to vs, as hee is said to feed the young rau [...]ns, when they call vpon him (although this may be ascribed to natu­rall meanes) yet in proper speech hee is said to loue the reasonable creatures onely, whom hee hath picked out of the whole bunch, whereon to set his heart, wherein to delight and take pleasure.

This choise of his loue, it hath pleased God to make for two causes: first in respect of the excellent goodnesse, as it were the sur­passing bewtie of the reasonable creature, the which beeing framed according to the like­nesse of God, maketh a kinde of sympathie and naturall agreement betwixt God and it: whereof it commeth, that God taketh excee­ding delight and pleasure in the soule of mā, the faculties of it being orderly disposed and endued with that bewtie of holinesse, which God created in it, and therefore may [Page 151] iustly require of it) as in a most pleasant gar­den and paradise, shining with all varietie of the most faire flowers and colours. The o­ther respect, which appropriateth the loue of God to the reasonable creature, is, for that as it onely hath in it matter of exceeding pleasure and delight to God, so it onely is capable of the rebound, recourse, and reci­procation of the said pleasure from God, in the which as hath beene said the chiefe part of loue doth consist. For howsoeuer God may doo, and doth many waies good to the other creatures, in that hee feedeth and pre­serueth them in their seuerall kindes, yet they not knowing GOD, cannot acknowledge those good things, which they receiue from him, to come from him, and to proceed of that fauour which hee beareth vnto them: whereas the soule of the reasonable creature, being as it were filled with the sweete bles­sings of God, taketh greater pleasure in the gi­uer then in the gift, and reioyceth yea glori­eth more herein, that God the great King of heauen and earth, vouchsafeth to set his heart vpon it, and to take pleasure in dooing it good, then in any other thing whatsoeuer. This sense of the goodnesse of GOD, as it is to them the most sweete happinesse that can be imagined, so it stirres vp in them a [Page 152] mutuall loue towards God, whom although they cannot by any meanes eyther profit or pleasure, yet they endeuour with all care to glorifie him by their holy obedience, and so to testifie that vnfained loue which they beare vnto him. But the vnreasonable creatures wanting this sence of the loue and goodnesse of GOD, and so the reciprocation of loue which should bee in them, wherein the force of loue consisteth, are for this cause not to bee admitted into the participation of the loue of God.

Besides, the loue of God as it is eternal, so it hath this vertue, that on what subiect so­euer it seazeth, it maketh it eternall, pre­seruing it from perishing: but this can­not bee done in the other creatures, the which must bee dissolued and come to nought: onely the reasonable soule, being possessed and as it were filled with the loue of GOD, i [...] by preserued for euer. For these causes it hath pleased GOD of his goodnesse to make choise of the reasonable nature of man, whereunto to ioyne him­selfe in the bonde of perfect loue: and in this respect to compare himselfe to a carnall louer, enamoured of the bewtie of some fayre young woman, delighting himselfe exceedingly in the fruition of her, [Page 135] and desiring nothing more then to please & pleasure her, yea by all meanes possible to procure her good: as wee may see in the song of songs, in the Prophet Ez [...]chiel, & in diuers other places of scripture. In the second place wee are to consider, that not any measure of goodnesse in the reasonable creature, will serue to procure the loue of God, for then God should loue the wicked, in whom wee knowe that there are diuers reliques of his image, yea euen the diuell himselfe and all his wicked spirits, whose nature and natu­rall faculties are good, and not corrupted with sinne in respect of their substance, but God doth not loue and embrace these with this affection of loue: for what fellowship or agreement, much lesse intire loue, can God haue with Beliall, or light with darknesse? Nay rather wee knowe, that God doth most iustly hate and abhorre them, for that their persons are not in regard of these reliques of goodnesse to bee accounted good, because it doth not preuaile in them, but is ouercome and captiuated, or rather abolished by the contrarie corruption of sinne, the which ha­uing the possession and commaund of them, ought of right to haue the title and name of them. But God loueth the godly and their persons, yea though they bee in part defiled [Page 154] with sinne, because not sinne and euill, but holinesse and good preuaileth and beareth sway in them, sinne beeing captiuated and kept vnder. So that in man good and euill do in a manner contend for God, the one labo­ring to procure his loue, and the other his ha­tred, in the which conflict the stronger and the predominant qualitie preuaileth, and pul­leth to the person in the which it is, the af­fection of God, eyther of loue, or else of ha­tred.

I had thoght that one, and that the least corruption or sinne in a man, had beene of sufficient force to make the whole person hatefull & abhominable in the sight of God, as a little leuen sowreth the whole lumpe, according to that of the Apostle Iames, hee that breaketh any one poynt of the lawe, is guiltie of transgressing the whole, notwith­standing there bee in him many good parts of holinesse: euen as wee see in ciuill iudge­ments, that one single crime condemneth a man, yea though in other respects his life bee neuer so iust and vnreprooueable.

That is true you say, according to the exact rule of Gods iustice, the which requi­reth the full perfection of holinesse without any exception, and reiecteth the whole, if neuer so litle of it be wanting: but the loue of God taketh another course, for it looketh on [Page 155] men with an amiable and fauourable coun­tenance, and (what maruell is it that the loue of God doth that which the loue of men is enioyned to performe) couereth the multi­tude of sinnes. Lastly, the loue of God neuer commeth emptie, but as God is the fountain and full treasure of all pleasure, so he bringeth with him whither soeuer hee commeth, all good, pleasure and happinesse, by the which his loue and affection towardes any person is known and felt. Yea hereof it followeth, that as any nature or person is indued with a lesse or greater measure of this goodnesse which is so pleasing to the wil, and so agreeable to the nature of God, so it procureth to it selfe a lesse or greater measure of the loue of God, and so consequently of that pleasant and hap­pie good which doth continually accompa­nie it: yea that as God himself is the best and most excellent nature of all other, without any comparison, so hee lou [...]th himselfe farre more then he doth any other thing whatsoe­uer, and procureth to himselfe more pleasure & happines, thē he doth to any creature. Yea it is his will, that according to this rule, this affection of loue in the godly be squared, to wit, that they loue those most, in whom they see a greater measure of goodnesse and godli­nesse, and bee more inclined towards them, to doo any manner of good vnto them, [Page 156] then to any other, as it is Psal. 16. 3. All my delight is in the saints on earth, euen to those that are excellent. And so Gal. 6. 10.

Sect. 4.

BY this doctrine of the loue of God, wee may easily gather, what hatred the con­trary affection is, to wit, a motion or act of Gods will, declining and abhorring the person wherein euill doth preuaile. And first, for the cause or ground of Gods hatred, wee must hold, that God doth not hate or abhor any creature, vpon the meere motion of his owne will, for his will neither doth nor can mooue eyther towards or from any creature, but vpon good and iust cause taken euen from his owne nature. Wee know that God of himselfe loueth all his creatures, euen be­cause they are his owne workmanship, and therefore good and woorthie to bee both li­ked and loued, as immediately after the crea­tion, hee behelde them, and seeing them to be good and excellent, euery one in his pro­per kinde, he powred downe his fauourable blessing vpon them, euen as the deawe and raine falleth vppon the hearbes and flowers of the fielde, whereby they waxe faire and flou [...]ish. Neither did God eyther play the [Page 157] dissembler, in pretending loue to all his crea­tures, whereas hee hated many of them, or yet is he a changling, to turne his loue into hatred, but as once hee did, so alwaies hee doth both loue and blesse the creature which hee seeth to bee good. Yet if the creature at any time become euill, and bee not as it was made by him, but as it hath beene marred by it selfe, not bearing any longer his excellent and glorious image, but some other mōstrous shape, then it cannot bee loued any longer, but must incontinently be hated of God. Yet God is the same that hee was, and not a whit altered, but the creature hath chaunged his place and condition, and is remooued, and as it were transplanted out of Gods pleasant paradice, in the which it did flourish amidst the foure riuers of the blessings of God, into a wide & wilde desert, where it being schor­ched with the burning beames of gods curse, withereth for want of water, and beeing cleane dried vppe, is become most defor­med.

I could well agree, that loue should haue place in God, both in his nature and in his actions, for as hee is the chiefe, and the very fountaine of all goodnesse, so it seemeth very meet, that hee should extend his good­nesse to all his creatures, by doing good vn­to [Page 158] them all according to their seuerall kinds: but for this affection of hatred, I do not see how it can so well agree to the nature of God, it being by nature euill, and contrarie to the lou [...] of God, for the which he is so re­nowm [...]d. And therefore mee thi [...]kes it were better for you, to passe ouer in [...] this head of doctrine, & as it were to [...] it cut as a foule blemish, which in my [...] dis­graceth this faire picture of Gods nature, which you haue so carefully drawne.

If you graunt the one, you cannot de­ny the other, for as God is good, so hee must maintaine and vphold his goodnesse against euill, by hating and abhorring it, yea by con­founding all the maintainers and vpholders of it. For it is as necessarie & naturall to God, to abhorre euill generall, and to hate it in the particula [...] subiects, as it is to him to inclin to good, and to loue it in his creatures.

You will haue much ado to perswade me, that God hateth any, although I con­fesse you make a show of argument to proue it: but before we argue the matter, I would knowe whom, and how God hateth.

Indeed the state of the question would bee agreed vpon before disputation, and it may easily be known if you call to mind that which hath been said of the loue of God: for [Page 159] first the reasonable creature onely is the sub­iect, as of the loue, so also of the hatred of God, for of all the creatures in the world, the reasonable onely can be and is euil. The rea­son hereof is, because all other things as they were created good, so they continue in that state of goodnesse (and in respect of it, are in some sort loued of God) although not in that degree of perfection and excellencie, God hauing (for the sin of man) withdrawne from them some part of it: But man hath cleane forsaken that state and standing wher­in he was placed by God, and lost that good­nesse for the which hee was so beloued of God. Yea not onely so, but also hee hath made an exchange of the said goodnesse, for the contrarie naughtinesse, of knowledge & obedience, for ignorance, errour, rebellion and contempt, yea of the whole image of God, for the vgly shape of Sathan, and so is iustly become odious to God, to whom be­fore he was dearely beloued.

Belike man was created in a woorse estate then the rest of the creatures, for they were sure to continue in the state of the loue of God, and in happinesse) from the which we see that man is most miserably fallen, and that into y^e hatred of god, as you wold haue it.

I cōfesse, y^• (as now y^e case stādeth with him) man [Page 160] is in a farre woorse esta [...]e, then any vnreaso­nable creature. And that it were farre better to be a brute beast, or a sencelesse stone, then a man out of the fauour of God: for who had not rather (without any comparison) with thē want the sweete sense of the loue of God (as all the reasonable creatures do, which eyther haue no sence at all, or at the least no sence of God) then to feele the hea [...]ie burthen of the wrath of God, and would not chuse, not to bee happie with them, rather then to bee miserable with man. Yet if we compare their first estates togither, we shall find that mans estate was farre more excellent then theirs, in that hee was created in the fruition of all pleasure and happinesse, of the which their nature is not capable. And what though hee were created in the possibilitie of being mi­serable, from the which the other creatures are exempted? Who would refuse the offer of riches, honour, fauour and loue, made by his Prince vpon this condition, that if hee were found to bee traiterous, rebellious and disloyall, hee should not onely bee depriued of all the aforesaid benefits, but also be most shamefully and miserably to [...]tured and tor­mented to death?

That is it I lookt for, you haue mad [...] a very good reason against your selfe: for [Page 161] protest vnto you, I haue alwaies carried this minde, that I had rather liue in a meane and lowe estate, from the which one cannot fall, then in the highest toppe of flattering For­tunes wheele, in the which there is no likli­hood that I should continue. And this I may be bold to say, beeing so well backt with the authoritie of wise Salomon himselfe, saying: That a dinner of hearbs with quietnesse, is better then a stal-fat oxe with feare and trouble.

I am of your minde for that, that he is vnwise, that will aduenture where hee is like to miscarrie, or that will accept an offer of all the pleasure and happinesse that can be ima­gined, with a forfaiture of extreame paines and miserie, if hee breake such and such con­ [...]itions, which hee knoweth himselfe vnlike to keepe. But I pray you, were the conditi­ons of mans felicitie so many to bee remem­bred, or so hard to be performed, that in re­spect of the great danger of falling into eter­nall miserie (which was the forfaiture if hee failed) you would refuse the fruition of Gods presence, (& in it of eternall happinesse) and chuse to be a dead and sencelesse stone, which hath neyther the possession of pleasure, nor the possibilitie of paine, rather then an happy man in so tickle an estate? who is so weake or intemperate, that would not for a small com­moditie [Page 162] aduenture the suffering of a thou­sand deaths and paines, vpon the abstaining from any one kinde of fruite, hee hauing plenty besides, both for necessitie, and also for pleasure?

Indeed I must needes confesse that the condition of mans happinesse in the be­ginning was so easie to be kept, that his con­ditionall estate of happinesse may be accoun­ted as good & sure, as if it had been absolute without any condition: and therefore I will yeeld vnto you, that the impossibilitie of happinesse in the vnreasonable creatures, was a farre woorse estate then the possibilite of miserie in man, the which (but that wee see & fee [...]e it to be alreadie come to passe) might well haue beene account [...]d impossible. Bu [...] now to bring you backe againe to the matter in hand, from the which I haue made you by my doubting, or rather by obiecting those doubtes which came into my minde, some­what to digresse: I do easily graunt that no sencelesse thing can bee the subiect of Gods hatred, for that they wanting the power of moouing or changing themselues, do persist (for they could not leaue it) in their naturall estate of goodnesse and of the loue of God: yet mee thinkes that the brute beastes (the which, as I noted before, you graunt to haue [Page 163] freewill in their kindes) are as deep in naugh­tinesse and peruersenesse of nature, and so in the hatred of God, as man himselfe. For I cannot thinke that they were created so vio­lent, rauenous and bloodthirstie as wee see & feel them, being more like hellish feends, then earthly creatures. Yea, wee read Gen. 9. 5. that God will require the bloud of man at the hands of the beasts which shedde it, as we know that in many cases beasts were by the Iudiciall lawe of Moses condemned and put to death.

Sometimes you obiect in good ear­nest, as I easily perceiue by you, but now I see you sport and dally: for I am sure you do not thinke that brute beasts do sinne against God, whom they cannot know. I doo not think but that rauenous beastes were created with the same weapons, both for offence and defence, the which now they vse in pursuing their pray, and also in the same complexions and conditions which now they haue: but man in his innocencie was protected from them, not by the tamenesse of their natures, but by a maiestie inherent in his person, the which was of sufficient force to amaze and controle the vnruliest of them. But wee will leaue the brute beasts to their praies, & come to mē, whō this doctrine of gods hatred doth [Page 164] concerne in respect of the sinfulnesse of their natures, into the which they haue transfor­med themselues from that image of Gods holinesse, wherein they were created. Yet not any measure of euill is sufficient to procure this personall hatred, for then God should hate the godly, in whom there are reliques of euill, as there are in the wicked of good, but onely raigning and preuailing euill. It is true indeed, that God hateth the least sinne that can be cōmitted or imagined, yea almost the shew of it, and euen the garment spotted with the flesh, yet hee hateth not the person in regard of it, it beeing suppressed and kept vnder, for godlinesse is stronger in them that are sanctified (thogh imperfectly) & hauing ouercome sinne, hath wonne the full interest of God and his loue. The other thing which you desired to know before you would come to the question it selfe, was the manner of Gods hatred, the which is two folde, inward, and outward. The sirst is the true maner of it: the other is the sencible declaration of the inward, & is indeed the effect of it, as amōgst men, outward harme is asigne and also an ef­fect of inward hatred. Now for this inward maner of fau [...]r in God, we are not to imagine any boyling affections of anger, or any inue­ [...]erate ill will towards any creature, but must [Page 165] know it to be the generall and eternall anti­pathie and contrarietie of his nature, which is absolute puritie, goodnesse and holinesse, to the pollution and naughtinesse of sinne pre­uailing in man: for as God doth approoue, loue and embrace his owne nature, as the ab­solute perfection of goodnesse, yea and the very image or likenes of the said goodnesse, eyther created or restored in man, so he can­not but mislike and abhorre whatsoeuer is contrarie vnto it. Then followeth the out­ward manner, which is the effect and decla­ration of the inward hatred by bringing or doing euill to the person thus polluted with sinne, from whom God hauing once turned away his face and fauour, it cannot bee, but that all maner of euils, as it were whole legi­ons of diuels should inuade him, as finding him not onely out of Gods protection, as a traitor & rebell, but also by gods iust iudge­ment appointed to many kinds of most fear­full iudgements.

Now I pray you let me aske you a question: are we according to Gods example, to hate wicked persons, or ra­ther (if it be vnmeete to make our selues pre­sidents for god to follow) is it not most true, y^e he doth not hate y^e wicked, but doth rather as he willeth vs to do, loue their persons, and hate onely the sinnes of men. For although [Page 166] our duties do not belong to God, yet by that which he commaundeth, wee may gather what his nature is, for that all his commande­ments are iust, pure and agreeable to his na­ture. Yea to vrge this reason a little further, wee haue the expresse commaundement of Christ, Math. 5. 44. 45, To loue and to do good to our enemies, euen as God doth both to the iust and to the vniust.

Wee are not yet come to speake of humane affections, yet this I say, that by this question you do plainly shewe, what maketh this doctrine of Gods hatred seem so strange and bee so harsh in your eares, namely be­cause hatred amongst men is so corrupt a thing, bringing with it so many euils & mis­chiefes. But we must not measure God by man, nor the one kinde of hatred by the o­ther: for God hateth first by detesting sinne, and then by punishing the rebellion of him that hath committed it.

Belike you make this hatred onely the execution of iustice done by God, as by a righteous iudge vpon malefactors, or as by a soueraigne king vpon open rebelles, and so a supposed hatred, for that hee that inflic­teth punishment, seemeth to hate, as it is 1. Cor. 4. 21. Shall I come to you with a rod, or in loue? and if it bee so, me thinkes it were bet­ter [Page 167] to call it iustice then hatred, the one word signifying a most corrupt, the other a most commendable thing.

The outward and actuall manner of Gods hatred, which is by doing euill to the sinfull person, being in nothing disagreeing from the rule of iustice, may not vnfitly bee so called, yet we need not feare to ascribe ha­tred and detestation both of sin in generall, and also of the particular persons polluted with it, vnto God, hee hauing so often in scripture taken them vnto himselfe. Other­wise if wee take hatred as it is vsually in and among men, then man is freed from all ha­tred of God, both by the goodnesse of Gods nature, the which can neyther will nor doo euill to his creatures, but onely so farre forth as is needfull for the satisfying of his iustice, and manifesting of his glorie, and also by the basenesse of his owne nature and estate, for what is man (a worme rather then a man) that god should hate: the least spark of whose an­ger is of force to consume to nothing a thou­sand worlds?

Sect. 5

LIke vnto the aforesaid affectiōs, are plea­sance & anger, the which also are often in scripture atributed to god, yet in truth thee [Page 168] they haue no place in his nature, but onely are as resemblances borrowed from man to declare the actions of God. The former doth better agree, and may more fitly bee attri­buted to God then the other, for it is an es­sentiall thing in God, to like or mislike as things are good or euill. But as it is vsually taken for a suddaine & temporarie content­ment or rest of Gods will, hauing beene be­fore stirred vp and mooued to anger, in this sense, God cannot be properly said to be ey­ther pleased or appeased, for hee was neuer displeased, it being impossible that any thing proceeding frō any creature (or indeed from himself) shuld worke any change or alterati­on in him. Likewise for anger, thogh it be in infinit places of scripture a [...]tributed to God, yet that he cannot by any meanes be prouo­ked vnto it. Onely hereby is ment, first, for the nature of God, that as he liketh and ap­prooueth the obedience and puritie of the godly, so hee misliketh the impuritie of the wicked as greatly, as men doo those things whereat they are inflamed to anger, which is a certaine signe of discontentment. And se­condly, for the outward and sensible actions of God, that hee vseth as great seueritie (yet not passing y^e limits of iustice) as mē do being angrie, who vsually are rather too rigorous, [Page 169] and passe the boundes of moderation in this behalfe: yea if we suppose (the which wee need not, it beeing so common a thing) the most outragious blasphemies and horrible villanies which can be imagined, to bee com­mitted by men, yet God is not thereby pro­uoked to anger, or any whit chaunged other­wise then he was before. He doth indeed ab­horre sinne, and punish sinners as they do de­serue, but not in choller, or any violent passi­on, but by the essentiall and eternall motion, or rather immoueable act of his will, so affec­ted to these obiects, as they doo eyther agree or disagree from his diuine nature: and ther­fore this affection in God may more fitly be termed hatred, it being so constant and inuete­rate: to wit, eternall, not a sudden and mo­mentanie anger. Thus God saith, Exod. 23. 10. Let me alone and I will be angry at this peo­ple and consume them: that is, I will consume them as if I were angry: but if this affection of anger had bene truly stirred vp in God, he would haue said I am angry, not, I will be an­gry. Likewise for ioy & sorrow these affecti­ons also are attributed to God in scripture: yet no man is so simple, as to thinke that they do belong to God in truth: for nothing can happen to him eyther profitable or vnprofi­table, nothing eyther pleasant or vnpleasant: [Page 170] or rather nothing, but that which is not plea­sant vnto him, because nothing can bee done against his will. But as for pittie and compas­sion, which is a sorrow and greeuous sense of the miserie of an other, that the scripture doth so earnestly ascribe to God, and God in scripture so carefully challenge to himselfe, as that wherein his cheefe glory doth consist, that it may seeme very hard and not to bee admitted, that such great matters should bee turned into shadowes and resemblances. For so we reade, Exod. 33. 19. That when as God would at the earnest sute of Moyses set forth himselfe and his nature in his greatest glory, hee desineth himselfe by thi [...] one attribute, saying, I will make all my good to go before thee, and I will proclame the name of the Lord before thee, to wit, I will haue mercie on whom I will haue mercie, and I will shew compassion, to whom I will shew compassion. And without question, if any humane affection may bee truly said to bee in God, it is this of pittie, the which of all other is most excellent and commendable, proper to gentle, noble and royall mindes, as nothing is so base and sauage, as is vnmercifulnesse and cru­eltie.

But the truth is, that there are no man­ner of passions in God, his nature beeing im­passible: [Page 171] onely by the pittie of God in scrip­ture is ment, that God as hee is infinitly and onely good, yea the fountaine of all good­nesse, so he is most prone and ready to impart and extend the same to all his creatures, espe­cially vnto those which being miserable, doo stand in greatest need of his helpe and com­fort.

This may be plainely seene in those iu­diciall lawes, which hee gaue to his people by Moses, wherein it may worthely bee noted how carefull the Lord is for the helping and releeuing of all those which are any way distressed, as namely the poore, the wi­dowe, the orphane, and the straunger, that men should not onely take heede of iniury­ing them any way, (for saith he, Exod. 22. 27 although thou bee cruell in oppressing thy poore brother, yet I am pittifull and cannot abide it, but will punish thee for it) but also be carefull to releeue them with the crop and vintage of the seuenth yeare, and by leauing them some gleanings in the yearely haruest, by setting them free out of bondage at the se­uenth yeare. Yea this compassion of the Lord extendeth it selfe euen to the brute beast, and therefore he commanded, that they shuld not be ouerwrought, but be suffered to rest the 7 [Page 172] day, that the seuenth yeares crop should bee left for them in part, that the young Kid should not be sod in the mothers milke, nor the damme taken in the neast with the yong birdes: and so in many other particulars, we cannot but see in reading these lawes, what great care and compassion God had ouer all his creatures, which were in miserie, or any way distressed.

Sect. 1.

YOu will not, mee thinkes, admit in­to the nature of God any sudden and momentanie motions, & ther­fore no affectiōs: but what say you to constant habits of good, as iustice, good­nesse, and such other excellent vertues? will you exclude these also out of the nature of God, or admit them onely in name and in shew as you do the affections?

These things, and whatsoeuer else, is not onely indifferent as are the affections, but euen simply good, haue place in the na­ture of god, not onely truly, but also primare­ly, as in their roote and first fountaine, from the which, they are deriued to the crea­tures.

I pray you declare them in parti­cular.

It is more meete if not needfull, to breake off our conference for this time: I dare say, I haue wearied you with speaking so long of one matter.

Of one matter? cal you this one matter? nay it is all in all. Alas god helpe vs if one af­ternoones cōference of God do make vs wea­rie: this being the onely lesson, in the lear­ning whereof, all that hope to bee in Gods kingdome, must make account to spend, not houres, daies, years or ages, but eternities, that is, time which is endlesse, and will neuer bee spent.

It is true that you say, yet you see our weakenesse to be such, that wee are soone wearied and cloyed with hearing still of one matter, although it concerne vs neuer so much, especially if it be thus rudely and rawly hand­led.

Well, well, I can assure you, there is [Page 174] no such matter, and (but that I hope to haue your company to morrowe and the next day also) I should wish (the which I thinke fewe trauellers do) to haue the way lengthe­ned, and that we had many houres riding to our lodging, as now we haue not aboue one. But if your selfe be wearie of speaking and of my vnskilfull questioning with you of this, and that, you may be the shorter: and I will promise you not to trouble you with any moe questions, but to suffer you to speake and to holde your peace at your owne plea­sure,

Your questioning hath bene no trou­ble but a great ease and profit to me. I will (if there be no remedie) shew you breefely the nature of someof this kind of attributes, which may not vnfitly bee called the vertues of God. You may by them gather the nature of the rest.

I pray you do so: I would be loath we shuld leaue this daies conference imperfect: but make an end of it once in, & thē I wil say, that we haue made, a good daies worke of it.

I wish wee had many Gentlemen of your minde, so desirous of knowledge, espe­cially of the knowledge of God: wee may well wish it, but it were folly to think it, and in vaine to hope it: but to the matter.

[Page 175] You know that those good and commenda­ble dispositions of the minde, which are com­monly called morall vertues, are of two sortes, whereof the one looketh inwardly to­ward our selues, the other outwardly toward others.

The first kinde consisteth in the mode­ration of the desire and vse of worldly plea­sures, as of meate, drinke, ease, pastime, riches, honour, and whatsoeuer else is pleasant in the life of man.

These vertues are not to bee attributed to GOD, because his nature is not capable of these pleasures. He indeed liueth or rather existeth in the perfection of pleasure, for hee doth continually and eternally delight and reioyce in himselfe and in no other thing (in comparison, as no other thing is to bee compared to him in goodnesse) for al­though hee take pleasure in the goodnesse of his creatures, whereby they resemble him, as in their knowledge wisdome, puritie, bew­ty, and whatsoeuer else is good in them, yet all this is nothing to that infinit goodnesse which is resident in himselfe, affoording vnto him matter of vnspeakeable pleasure, the whieth is not to be limitted within the bounds of any vertues, for it cannot haue either defect, mo­deration or excesse, and al, for that it is infinit. [Page 176] And what maruell is it, if God be exempted from these vertues, and the pleasures which are the obiects of them, when as the Angels, which are creatures, are not subiect vnto thē? for they cannot be said to bee eyther tempe­rate in regard of meate and drinke, or conti­nent in respect of bodely pleasures, for that their nature is not capable of those pleasures, no more then are trees or sencelesse stones. Yet theit nature is capable both of vertue and also of vice: for as by vertue some of them stand in happinesse, so by vice many of them fell into miserie: to wit, through ambi­tion, as it is thought, for desiring to be higher, they became lower then they were created. This vice (as also the vertue of it, which being but the moderation of it, must needs be of the same kinde with the vice) is incident into all excellent natures: as wee knowe that euery nature doth desire to increase in that good, wherewith it is already endued: yea the more it hath of it, the more it doth desire, because it feeleth so much the more the sweetnesse of it, and so we see it to come to passe, that none are so desirous of riches, as is the richest, of knowledge, as are the best learned: and of ex­cellencie: as those that are alreadie most ex­cellent, euen as the fire, the purest of all the e­lements, doth neuer rest, till it be aboue all [Page 177] the rest, and in the highest place of dignitie Yea as the vertue which is care of credit and honour, and also the exceeding extreame, which is ambition, so also humilitie (which may seeme to be the lower extreame, but is in truth, the highest and most excellent vertue) may be most plainely shewed, and fully ex­ercised in that nature which is most excel­lent. For as none can haue so great a fall, as he that hath the highest place, so none can shewe so great humilitie, as he that is most ex­cellent, because none can debase himselfe so far, as he that is highest in excellencie. Where­by it may be gathered, that although God cannot be said to bee ambitious in desiring greater honour then is due vnto him for that he hath by right, all honour that can bee ey­ther had or desired, yet we may truly say that he may haue both the greatest humilitie in laying aside the greatest excellencie, and also a due care of credit and of maintaining his iust honour against al vniust vsurpers whatso­euer.

Thus the scripture teacheth vs, that God is not onely carefull, but euen curious, as wee may say, and as it selfe saith, iealous of his ho­nour, the which he cannot abide that it shuld bee any touched or impared, as hee doth openly professe of himselfe, Es. 48. 11. My [Page 178] glory I will not giue to any other. Neither in­deed will he suffer any to take it, or any por­tion of it, but doth straightway confound them all with all their deuices, whosoeuer do any way obscure it, much more such as haue most impiously, yet more foolishly sought to vsurpe or participate it.

Thus were the aspyring spiri [...]s throwne from heauen into the place and pit of darke­nesse to the which man also (treading in the same steps of sacrilegious pride) was sent out of paradise to beare them cōpany. Thus were the vaineglorious builders of the Tower of Babel confounded in al their deuises, and thus the Lord slewe 50000. of the presumptuous Bethsemites, who by looking into the A [...]ke brought the name and presence of God into contempt. Thus he made proude Nabuchad­nesar, who thought that hee might with the maiestie of his person and Pallace outface the sunne in heauen, yea God himself, whose glory filleth both heauen & earth, to become as a silly and miserable beast: and thus he con­founded Herode by a filthy disease that tooke to himselfe the glorious tytle of God, which the flattering people ascribed vnto him. Nei­ther need we maruell, that God is so carefull in maintaining his honour and glory, it being the last and chiefe end of the creation of all [Page 879] things, all which tend to this one end, and e­uen bend their whole forces to maintaine & vphold the glory of God as of the highest and greatest good, euen as we see loyall sub­iects to endeauor nothing so much as to main­taine the maiestie and honor of their Prince: as we read, Rom. 11. 36. Of him, by him and for him are all things, to him be praise for euer. For if God should suffer any false or fained God, any man or Angell to vsurpe any royall pre­rogatiue belonging to the godhead, and so himselfe to be disgraced, and his maiestie di­minished, the confusion of all things (as of the streames the fountaine being troubled) must of necessitie follow. And yet god is not so de­sirous of aduancing his name and glory, but that he can on the other side debase himselfe, when hee thinketh meete as beeing endued with humilitie in as great, or rather in grea­ter measure.

me thinks, that humilitie doth not well agree with the nature of God, and that there is small vse of humiliation in his doings.

As God doth aduance others beeing humble, so he doth by his humilitie, not de­base, but honour and magnifie himselfe: for as wee see it to come to passe in Princes and other great personages, that nothing doth make them to bee loued, honoured and [Page 180] extolled, so much as doth their gentle and fa­miliar behauiour with their subiects and infe­riours: so God is exalted in his humilitie, and made most glorious in it. Psal. 113. The Lord is aboue all Nations, and his glory aboue the heauens, who is like vnto our God, that ha­uing his habitation in the highest heauen, doth debase himselfe to behold things on earth? Yea not onely to behold them a farre off, but also to haue a hand and a part in them. Princes do not vse to conuerse much with their sub­iects, but that any of them should so farre de­base himselfe, as to take vpon him the condi­tion of a subiect, and to suffer his owne sub­iects, to rule and insult ouer him, yea to vse him despightefully and contumeliously, that is a thing neuer heard of neither supposed to be possible to be brought to passe, but that they wold rather loose both their kingdomes and their liues, then suffer such a disgrace e­specially at the hands of their subiects. But God the King of Kings did leaue his Throne of maiestie in heauen, and made one litle Caue or hole of the earth (all which before was but his footestoole) his chayre of estate: yea he tooke to himselfe the forme of weake and fraile man, not of a Lord or King, but of a base seruant, yea of a vile and loathsome sin­ner: hee suffered himselfe to be taunted and [Page 181] reuiled, yea which is the greatest disgrace in the world) to bee spit on, as a most vile and filthy thing: who can imagine, must lesse al­leadge an example of so great humilitie? yet herein God is most glorious.

This one instance of his extreame humi­liation, maketh it needlesse to alleadge his fa­miliar conuersing with men heere one earth, his familiar conferring with Moses face to face, as one friend doth with another: his an­swering them to all their demaunds, as it were comming at their call, whereof wee haue ma­ny examples in the scripture, as namely in A­braham, pleading so hard for Sodome and in the story of Dauid, 1. Sam. 29. 8, who there as­keth one question after an other of God a­bout his worldly affaires, as if he had bene ad­uising with some familiar friend: but that one example of his vnspeakeable humilitie shewed in his incarnation, and in suffering all the miseries of our life, and in the ende, that most shamefull death, is so nota­ble, that it can neuer bee sufficiently admi­red.

Sect. 2.

THese two onely which haue bene de­clared, of all those vertues which con­cerne our selues, are attributed to god: but of those which tend and reach to others, many may very fitly and truly be ascribed vn­to him, to shew the manner of his dealing with men, as namely iustice in recompēcing, indulgence in forbearing, faithfulnesse in per­forming promises, and goodnesse in dooing good to men. For the first, namely iustice, it doth belong vnto God, in respect of that so­ueraigne authoritie, which he hath ouer al the creatures in the world, as well Princes as sub­iects, as well men as Angels, hee beeing by vertue of the creation, wherein hee made them all of nought, their most naturall King, and the onely absolute Monarch of the world: all other Kings and Rulers whatsoe­uer, being but his substitutes and vicegerents, holding their Crownes and Kingdomes of him, as uassalles of their liege Lord and mai­ster: and ruling by him, from him, and in his name and steed, yea and by his lawes. For howsoeuer God haue permitted the ordering of their subiects in great part to their will and discretion, yet he hath giuen and publi­shed [Page 183] to the whole world, his owne supreme and vniuersall lawes, to the obseruing where­of, all without any exception are bound by his commaundement and the violating whereof he doth most seuerely punish. But as no state or Common-wealth can stand by penal lawes onely, which restraine vice by threat­nings, and punish offences committed by due paines, because it is needefull that there should also be rewards appointed, whereby the vertuous endeauours of good subiects may be recompenced and encouraged, in the right disposing and distributing whereof iu­stice hath place as well as in inflicting the de­serued punishment vpon offenders: so is the iustice of God, whereby he administ [...]eth the Kingdome or Common-wealth of the world, of two sortes, the one in Paenâ, the o­ther in Praemio, the one in due punishment, the other in meete rewards. For the first kind, the lawes which concerne the punishing of sin are not many, for they are but one, giuen to all mankind in the person of Adam, Gen. 2. 17. In the day that thou shalt eate, thou shalt die: And Rom. 6. 23. The wages of sin is death: The which is the onely punishment (yet diuersly inflicted according to the diuersitie of sins) appointed for al sins and offences committed against God, as well for the least, as for the greatest,

[Page 184] This death beginneth with our life, during y^• which God layeth vpon the sinner, many e­uilles and miseries, all which are forerunners of that eternall death and miserie, which abi­deth in the world to come. And that mē shuld know and acknowledge, that these temporal euilles come from God as punishments of their sinnes, hee doth vsually punish them in the same kind wherein they haue sinned, that so the likenesse which the punishment hath vnto the sinne, may shew it to bee the sonne of that father, and the frute of that tree, Gen. 2 17. Because thou hast eaten of the forbidden frute, thou shalt all the dayes of thy life eate in toile, and in the sweat of thy browes. And Gen. 20. 8. The Lord had shut vp all the wombes in the house of Abimelec, because of Sarah Abra­hams wife. And Iud. 1. 7. And Adombezek said, seuentie Kings hauing the thumbes of their hands and of their feete cut off, gathered vnder my table, as I haue done so God hath rewarded me. And 1. Cor. 1. 21. After that the world wold not by the wisedome of God knowe God, it pleased God (as a iust punishment) by the foolish­nesse of preaching, to saue the beleeuers. All which actions of God, as wel in his temporal, as in eternal punishmēts we are not to doubt, but that they are squared according to y^t rules of iustice, from the which it is impossible that God would swarue.

It were impietie to thinke and blas­phemie to speake the contrarie: and yet to tel you plainly, I haue been more troubled with doubts about this point of Gods iustice, then in any other: and but for troubling and hin­dering you in your course, I would declare them vnto you, in hope to bee more fully re­solued in this.

You shall not hinder but further mee, I will willingly doo my best to satisfie you.

I haue often thought vpon occasion of heating this doctrine, that the punishment due vnto the least sinne, is by the iustice of god eternal death, that some Atheists might say of Gods lawes, as it was saide of Dracos laws giuē to the Athenians, y^t they were writ­ten with blood, & wold accuse God of cruel­tie, for infflicting so great or rather so endles and infinite a punishmen vpon small sinnes, yea vpon those which may be doubted whi­ther they be sins or no, as namely to let passe the inward thoughts and desires, (the which although they bee actuall, yet they are in the lowest degree of act that can bee) originall sinne in infants, the which is eyther alienum, another mans, and therefore not iustly impu­ted to thē, or if you take it as it is inherent in themselues, it is but an inclination to sinne, [Page 186] not sinne indeed and in act. Besides how should wee thinke that so greeuous a punish­ment as is eternall death, can without ex­treame rigor bee inflicted vpon many thou­sands of men, that did neuer heare tell of god or of his word, eyther in the lawe or in the gospell, as are those poore Indians, which haue in this last age beene discouered, whom in all reason ineuitable ignorance should ex­cuse, howsoeuer wilfull ignorance bee made damnable. These doubts and diuers other, wherewith I will not trouble you, haue often runne in my minde, yet I doubt not but that God is iust in all actions, or rather I doubt whither God can bee said to be vuiust, what­soeuer hee doth to his creatures, yea though he should inflict extreame punishment vpon the most righteous man in the world, for hee hath absolute power ouer thē all, as the pot­ter hath of his claye to dispose of it as hee list himselfe, and wee know, that it is lawfull for a man to do to his owne what he will.

I am not of your opinion, or rather that opinion which you name, that it were not in­iustice in God, to punish a righteous man al­togither voy de of sin: for not to alleadge the promise and couenant of life, which god hath made to man beeing righteous, but to sup­pose that God had not bound himselfe by a­ny [Page 187] such promise, the absolute power of God ouer his creatures, will indeed bee a warrant vnto him, not onely to dispose of them ac­cording to his own pleasure, but euen to con­sume thē al to naught, as in the beginning he made them all of naught, but yet not to in­flict extream punishments where there is no sinne: for so God should doo that which is contrarie to his owne nature, the which doth necessarely incline it selfe towards the good­nesse of the creature, by doing to it not euill but good, and therefore hee should doo euill and that which is vniust, or rather hee should do that, which it is impossible for him to do. But as touching your obiectiōs against the iustice of God, I answere, that wee must not thinke sinnes committed against God to be so small, as they seeme in themselues and when they are committed against men: for the greatnesse of the maiestie of god make [...]h the least sinne to bee most hainous, euen as wee knowe that the least indecent behauiour towards a Prince, is thought woorthie to bee punished with death: and not onely outward & actuall rebelliōs, but also the very thoghts and purposes of the mind tending to treason, are accounted most hainous crimes, yea so hainous, as for them not onely the offendant himselfe, but also all his posteritie for euer are thought worthie to be depriued of all those [Page 188] dignities and commodities, whatsoeuer they did enioy by the liberalitie of the Prince, or yet within his dominions. Yet wee need not say, that God doth punish infants for Adams sinne, for they haue in themselues sufficient matter of damnation, their whole nature be­ing actually corrupted in respect of y^• image of God, for the which cause it is woorthely loathed and abhorred of God. As for the in­fidels which haue not the word of God, whereby to learne and know God, you may remember how the Apostle Rom. 1. in the latter part or half of the chapter, doth plain­ly prooue that they do wilfully sinne against the light of nature shining in the creatures, yea that they do obstinately contemne god, whom they might learn out of the creatutes, to be most maiesticall & woorthie, to whom all obedience, honor and thankfulnes should be performed. And lastly, I say that as none in this world can charge God with crueltie, so in the world to come, the wicked them­selues shal cōfesse al their punishments to be most iust.

What say you thē, to thē that accuse god of iniustice, in respect of his parti­al dealing with men, in that he reiecteth and condemneth some to eternall death, and yet electeth and spareth others, who are euery way as sinfull, and as vnworthie of fauour?

I am sure you will not call that Prince partiall or vniust, that sheweth fauor and gi­ueth life to some malefactors, for a testimo­nie of his goodnesse and clemencie, although hee suffer others to bee put to death for the same offence: no more is God vniust in sa­uing some from eternall death, the which the rest are to suffer, and which all of vs do most iustly deserue. Yea if we do consider the ma­ner and the meanes, by the which God doth saue these his elect from the death which they deserue, we shall bee farre ynough off, from imagining any partiall dealing in him. For howsoeuer hee did fully determine, and most earnestly desire, to saue some from eter­nall death, yet his iustice would not in any case suffer that to be done, vnlesse and vntill the death and punishment due vnto their sinnes, were fully suffered by some other in their behalfe. Wherof it came, that (no crea­ture beeing able to sustaine it) God him­selfe was faine to do it, and so did debase him­self to a shamefull death, the which what was it else but the confusion of all things, that God should lay aside his glorie & maiestie, to suffer shame & ignon inie? and yet al this hee did because his infinit iustice would ad­mit no partiall dealing. Yea so great is the iustice of God, that it cannot bee peruerted [Page 190] by that most tender loue which he beareth to his elect, beeing now both redeemed by the death of Christ, & also sanctified by his own spirit, but that hee doth still lay vpon them grecuous punishments for those sins, where­by they do displease and dishonour him. 1. Pet. 4. 17. The time is come that iudgement shall beginne at the house of God, and if it do be­ginne with vs, where shall the wicked appeare, that is, he will be farre lesse partiall and more seuere with them. For sin is as seed cast into the ground, which multiplyeth it selfe, and commeth foorth with aduantage to the so­wer, yea although hee bee otherwise a godly and iust man. Thus God dealt with Dauid, a man according to his owne heart, repaying him the iniuries done to Vriah, from whom hee tooke both his wife, and also his life, in full yea in ouerrunning measure, making his owne son to take from him his wiues, crown, kingdome, children, and well nigh his life also. Yea this aduantage or ouerplus, which Dauid receiued at the hands of Godbesides the principal, is noted 2. Sam. 12. 12. Thou diddest sinne secretly, but I will pay the before all Israell, euen in the face of the sunne.

Doo you call this iustice, or is it not rather iniustice, to make the faithfull beare in their own persons the punishment of their [Page 191] sinnes, which Christ hath already borne to the full.

It is without question that God brin­geth euen vpon the godly, for those sinnes whereby they dishonour him, most bitter and fearefull euils, yea (as I haue heard that a godly man vseth to say) that God neuer suf­fereth any great sinne committed by any of them, to scape vnpunished: and that not on­ly for their chastisement and amendement, which is the vsuall end of their afflictions, but also euen for this end, to make them te­stimonies and examples of his seueritie, iu­stice, and vnpartiall dealing, for hee doth of­ten punish them in their posteritie after their death, as he did Eli his negligence in not cor­recting the misdemeanor of his sonnes, & the idolatrie of Salomon, by taking away ten of the twelue tribes from his successours. Yet there is a difference betwixt their suffering, and the suffering of Christ, who did suffer for this end, to satisfie Gods iustice for the sins of the elect, the which they cannot do either in whole or in part: for if they were put to satisfie Gods iustice but for the least of their sinnes, they should suffer not onely tempo­rally, but also eternally, and so should perish: but Christ onely suffereth for the satisfaction, and they for the declaration of Gods iustice.

Sect. 3.

BVt wee may not stay any longer in this part of his iustice, wee must now briefly consider the other, to wit, the remuner a­tiue iustice, by the which hee rewardeth the goodnesse of his reasonable creatures.

You need not be long in this point, for I thinke there is small vse of it: not but that God is most bountifull in rewarding those that do deserue, but for that none (ex­cept the Angels) doo or can deserue any re­ward at the hands of god, for their obedience and good, being imperfect and polluted with sinne, are so farre from deseruing rewardes, that they cannot possibly stand before the seate of Gods iustice and iudgement, but are reiected as silthie menstruous clou [...]es, as the scripture speaketh.

You say true, that according to the strickt rigor of Gods law and iustice, our best works are so far from deseruing reward, that they deserue eternall death. But there is a time and vse as for the rigor, so also [...]or the mitigation of Gods iustice, in the which it pleaseth God of his mercie and goodnesse to passe ouer & ouer see the imperfections and sinfulnesse of mans obedience and workes, [Page 193] and both to promise in word, & to performe in deed competent rewards, as he seeth most meete, and that not onely to the godly, but euen to the wicked. For the first, the retribu­tion of good to the godly, hath place both in this life and also in the life to come. Not that God doth alwaies reward the godly with tē ­porall benefits, for that is not alwaies good for them for their eternall saluation, in re­spect whereof god seeth it often to be need­full that they should liue, yea and end their daies also vnder the crosse in greeuous afflic­tions: yet this temporall retribution is neuer wholly wanting, but is found if not at one time, yet at another: if not in their life time, and in their owne persons, yet in their graues, and in their childers children, euen to the thousant generation: if not so fully as flesh and blood desire, yet so that they may plain­ly acknowledge the goodnesse & rewarding hand of God. Thus God promiseth at large, Deut. 29. that they which feare and obey him, shall euen be compassed about with all maner of blessings, that euery thing y^• belon­geth vnto them, and that they take in hand, shall prosper and haue good successe, as the Apostle witnesseth, 1. Tim. 4. 1. That godli­nesse is profitable in all respects, hauing the pro­mise both of this life, and of the life to come: and [Page 194] Christ himselfe Math. 19. 29. Hee that for­saketh any worldly thing for my sake and the gos­pels, shall both inherit eternall life, and also re­ceiue an hundred folde euen in this life. Thus God did from one generation to another, & thus hee will doo euen vnto the ende of the world, both remember and also recompence the godlinesse of his seruants, Abraham, Da­uid and others: and thus he made a couenant with Phinees, in regard of that hi [...] zealous loue of his glorie, to blesse and honour both him and his posteritie from age to age. Thus God hath done, and thus he will do in all ages: yet with this difference, that the greater measure of spiritual graces the godly haue, the lesse need they haue of temporal blessings to con­firme and cherish their faith: and the nearer they come to the fruitiō of eternal glorie the more they may & ought to contemne world­ly pleasures: whence it is that this temporall retribution is not so plentifull, and so appa­rant in these ages of the gospell, which flow in abundance of spirituall graces, as it was before when they were scant.

But that which is wanting and doubtfull in this life, shall without doubt bee fully per­formed in the life to come, where the obe­dience and good workes, the afflictions and patience of the godly, shall be rewarded, not [Page 195] only with iust praise & commendation, (the which reward is deserued, and agreeable to the nature of their workes, and is mentioned 1. Cor. 3. 14. 15. If any mans worke stand, hee shall haue wages or recompence, but if it faile, he shall want that recompence, and yet be saued) but also with eternall happinesse: the which al­thogh it passe by a thousand degrees, the de­sert, or rather although it cannot in any part or respect bee deserued by any obedience of the faithfull in this life, because all their obe­dience is imperfect, yet it pleaseth God in mercie to call it a reward, yea to bee content that they looke for it in that name, as wee see that the Apostle doth, 2. Tim. 4. 7. 8. I haue fought a good fight, and haue kept the faith: from hence foorth I am to expect that crowne of right­teousnesse, which the Lord that righteous iudge shall giue me. And so Rom. 8. 8. although the afflictions of this life bee not worthy to haue such a reward, as is the glorie of the life to come, yet hee maketh the one to depend on the other.

Mee thought you saide, that the rewarding iustice of God is so great, that it extendeth it selfe euen to the re­probate, recompencing their good deedes (if they may be called good) with blessings: [Page 170] but what fruite can bee looked for from the roote of infidelitie, but corrupt, the which if God should reward, what should he do else, but bolster and maintaine them in their sin?

God doth reward with good, not the wicked deedes of vngodly and vniust men, but the honest & vpright actions of such as are ciuilly and morally vertuous, yea & per­haps affected with some blind zeal of religi­on: the which although they cannot merit before Gods iudgement seat, being not one­ly imperfect and in part sinfull, as are the ac­tions of the godly, but also wholly sinfull, in that they come from an euill roote, yet they haue respects of good, the which God re­wardeth with temporall blessings, as hee did Achabs outward repentance and humilation, with immunitie frō those temporall plagues, which belonged to his sinnes. And thus did God reward Iehu Achabs successor, for exe­cuting his anger & vengenace vpon Achabs house, with the honour of the kingdome to the fourth generation. Thus you haue heard somewhat of Gods iustice, the which althogh it shall without doubt haue the full sway at length in punishing and confounding the wicked, yet for the time of this life, it is sus­pended and kept frō executing the full force vpon them, that so there may be place, vse, [Page 197] and declaration for another vertue of God, called patience and long suffering, the which who cannot but admire, that considereth the horrible outrages, blasphemies, cursings, and all manner of contemptuous and spiteful im­pietie, which the vngodly do daily spew out against God & his holy trueth, and yet they go not onely vnpunished, but also prosper and flourish as if they were blessed of God, who doth by this patience onely harden them to their eternall destruction.

Sect. 4.

THere remaineth now to be considered in a word or two, the last knot of diuine vertues consisting in Gods naturall in­clination to do good vnto his creatures: they may be called by the generall name of good­nesse, to the which his general fauour to all, his particular friendshippe with some fewe and his fidelitie or faithfulnesse both to the one and to the other, may bee referred. For as hee is onely good, that is, the first foun­taine and ful treasure of all good things, so he doth not enuiously keep it wholy to himself, but doth graciously impart it to others, euen to all liuing things, base and excellent, good and euill, reasonable and vnreasonable, one [Page 198] and other, all of them doo eyther drinke or taste of this sweet cuppe of Gods goodnesse and blessings. Hee suffereth his raine to fall vpon the iust and vpon the vniust, hee feedeth and filleth all thinges liuing with a plentifull hand, there is no ende or measure of his goodnesse. For why, he hath a fauour vnto them, as a father hath to his children, and as a skilfull workeman to the workes of his owne handes, wherein his nature and I­mage, or his skill and cunning do plainly ap­peare.

Yea, so great is his goodnesse towardes them, that hee vouchsafeth to enter into bondes and couenants with them, binding himselfe to them by promises and oathes, for the performance of that good vnto them, which commeth from him, not as of neces­sitie and by constraint, or yet by their de­sert, but onely of meer fauour and his natu­rall goodnesse. In the performance where­of hee is so sure, yea so carefull as wee see honest men to bee in keeping their pro­mises, that the whole worlde shall sooner faile, then any iot of that which hee hath promised. Whereof we may gather, how odious to God is the impietie of those men or rather blasphemous monsters, that are [Page 199] not ashamed to call into question, if not flatly to denie, the trueth of that which God hath from time to time promised to his Church, as touching eternall happinesse in the world to come: yea, and that the faithfull themselues, while they often doubt within themselues of the trueth and fideli­tie of GOD, in making good whatsoeuer hee hath spoken, doo no doubt greatly both displease and dishonour God.

But most of all in this kinde, wee are to admire the friendshippe and familiaritie which it pleaseth God to haue with men, yea with sinfull and mortall men, to some of whom hee vouchsafeth not onely this generall fauour, whereof all the creatures in the world are partakers, and that eter­nall loue which bringeth with it eternall saluation, but also a more speciall fauour, admitting them into his secret counsell and acquaintance, as men doo some speciall and approoued friends.

Thus wee reade that Enoch walked with GOD, that Moses did ordinare­ly talke and conferre with him face to face, as one friende doth with an o­ther: thus he did (as it were in sporte) fami­liarly wrastle with Iacob, and continually [Page 200] both accompany and assist him: thus he was to Dauid as a Counseller, to direct him in all his affaires, and thus hee tooke Paul vppe to heauen, and shewed him things not to be vttered. But of all other, most notable in this respect was Abraham, called often in Scrip­ture by the name or rather by the most ho­nourable and glorious title of Gods friend, as 2: Chro. 20. 7. Es. 41. 8. Iames 2. 23. And in trueth so might hee well bee called, for God did both make and keepe with him very so­lemnely, all the lawes of true friendship. For first hee made a couenant of perpetualloue, with him and with his seed for euer, calling Abraham Gods friend. and himselfe Abra­hams God. Secondly, hee did bestowe vp­on him all his blessings both temporall and spirituall, yea the greatest honour that could bee, namely to bee as it were the foundati­on of his Church and chosen people, and the first of the progenitours of Christ. And last­ly, hee did impart to him his purposes and counsels in all things that did any way con­cerne him, or might make for his good.

Yea, wee reade that God was so care­full in the performance of this dutie (for so it pleaseth God to binde himselfe in duties to men) of friendshippe, that beeing [Page 175] about to destroy those wicked Citties of So­dome and Gomorra, he thought it needfull to impart the matter to his friend Abraham, yea to haue his assent for the doing of it. Thus it pleaseth God of his mercie and goodnesse to exalt wretched men to this highest degree of honour, which indeed is so high, as that the Angels in heauen do seldome attaine vnto it. So that in this respect, and in many other heretofore mentioned, wee may well burst forth with the Prophet. Psal. 8. 5. And say, what is man that thou that art the great God of heauen and earth shuldest remember him, or the sonne of man that thou shouldest thus visit him.

Sect. 5.

I Am thinking with my selfe, what facultie there is in the soule of man not yet mentioned: for if there bee any, I doubt not (considering the great like­nesse betwixt the soule of man & the nature of God, in those faculties common to them both, which you haue already handled) but that it is ether truly belonging to God, or at the least, will giue occasion to consider some­thing in his nature. You know that men con­ceiue things by imagination and retaine them [Page 202] by memory, are these faculties in God? like­wise, conscience in man is a distinct facultie, or rather an act of the mind, and there are in him diuers affections, as ioy and greefe, and diuers vertues not as yet mentioned, what are we to thinke of these things?

I hope you do not looke to heare at this time, whatsoeuer might be said of the na­ture of God: you are not now so desirous, but if that were taken in hand, you would bee as wearie of hearing, ere it were halfe done: if the cheefe matters be declared, they will giue sufficient light, whereby the rest may be per­ceiued, and so by those which haue beene handled, you may easely vnderstand the na­ture of the rest of those good affections, and vertuous dispositions, which are in scripture attributed to God. So for the essentiall facul­ties of the soule, you say very truly, that they are most like to the diuine nature, and euen a plaine and expresse Image of it: yet this dif­ference must be noted, that whatsoeuer thing is in them that argueth weakenesse or suture possibilitie, that hath not truly place in the diuine nature, which is a perfect and complete act. As in these particulars which you haue named, imagination is but a possibilitie or meanes of knowledge, but the knowledge of God hath beene said to bee eternall and ac­tuall.

[Page 203] It is hard, I confesse, and euen impossi­ble for vs to see or imagine how all the parti­culars in the world should exist actually in a­ny vnderstanding from all eternitie, but wee must not measure the infinitnesse of Gods vnderstanding by our shallow braines. But as touching the question which you mooue of imagination and the meanes and manner of knowledge in God, how the ideae or no­tions of things enter into his mind, or rather how they exist eternally in it without any entering in or beginning, first it must bee helde, that although they exist eternally in GOD, yet they are not essentiall to him, that is, so naturall and necessary as that without them he could nor exist, as is the knowledge of himselfe and the idea of his owne nature, yea all the rest of Gods essentiall attributes, of all which if wee should detract but one from God, wee shuld quite destroy and ouerthrow his whole nature and essence.

But the knowledge of the creatures is not of that kinde, for God beeing in him­selfe absolute and all sufficient, might haue (if it hadde so seemed good vnto him) existed without euer eyther making or knowing any creature, and therefore the [Page 162] knowledge of them in God, must be thought to arise not from the absolute necessitie of his nature, but from the free libertie of his will, moouing (yet eternally) his vnderstanding to this actuall knowledge of the creatures. Yea that as the knowledge oridea of his own nature is (according to y^• order of nature, not any difference of time) first in the essentiall vnderstanding of God, and then in his will, so the knowledge or idea of the creatures hath his beginning not in the vnderstanding but in the will of God. This difference we haue and see more plainely in our selues, for as we haue some general notions engrauen in our mindes by nature it selfe, and so in a ma­ner both bred and borne with vs without a­ny helpe of our wils, so the knowledge of o­ther things hath the beginning in the will, dis­posing and inclining the minde to this or that knowledge, as it seemeth best vnto it. Secondly as touching this (in a manner acci­dentall) knowledge of God, it must bee held that God hath it of himselfe and not by the means, or from the creatures, as we haue, that by sence and imagination get the resemblan­ces of things into our mindes, the which way of knowledge if it were admitted to bee in God, it would follow, that his knowledge of the creature doth not go before, but follow­eth [Page 205] after it and so is not the cause but rather an effect of it, and not eternall but temporall, whereas wee holde that the will and e­ternall foreknowledge of God are the cause of all things.

I haue heard it said, that the diuine nature is as it were a Glasse, wherein al things that do at any time exist in the world, may be seene and knowne, and that by the Saints and Angels in heauen, much more then by God himselfe, who knoweth all things by his owne essence, it being the similitude of all things.

Some haue thought as you say, but it is a mere fable to say that eyther the Saints or the Angels do or can see the essence of God, much lesse all things in it. It is true that God knoweth all things, and that by his essence, if thereby we meane his essentiall vnderstan­ding, and that by the similitude which his es­sentiall vnderstanding hath to the creatures, if thereby wee meane the similitude which is betwixt the generall idea or notion and the particular instance. For as it is essentiall and naturall to God to know himselfe, so it is es­sentiall and natural to him to know the gene­rall differences of things, without the know­ledge whereof he could not knowe himselfe. As namely it is essentiall to God to know [Page 162] [...] [Page 205] [...] [Page 206] what is reasonable, infinit, knowledge, wise­dome, good and eternall, for otherwise hee could not know his owne nature, which consistesh in these differences. By the same meanes also hee knoweth what is vn­reasonable, finite, errour, folly, euill and time, which are contrary to the other, for one contrary cannot bee knowne without the knowledge of the other.

This is the essentiall knowledge engra­uen in the very nature of GOD, and as wee saye of our naturall notions, both borne and bred with him, but it doth not extend it selfe any further or descend into particulars: for it is not essentiall to GOD, to know Peter, Paule, or any other man, nor yet to know the nature of man, nor yet to knowe this worlde wherein wee liue, for GOD might haue existed though none of these hadde euer beene. But the knowledge of these par­ticulars, is by the free will of GOD deducted from those generall notions, which are essentiall to God: who hath thought good to make by the creation a particular instance, example, and as it were an experiment of his essentiall and vniuersall knowledge.

You seeme to bee of their opinion, [Page 207] that thinke that God knoweth no particu­lars, because there is no medium, no means or way by the which the similitudes of them should bee carried from the things to the na­ture of God, for that there must be a conue­nience betwixt the things knowne and the minde: which is not betwixt the creatures and the vnderstanding of God.

I am far from that absurd error, and I hope from any such: I do not doubt but that God knoweth euery particular thing in the world seuerally and distinctly from all other, yea, that hee hath in his eternall counsell di­stinguished them, as namely men, of whom he hath appointed some to glory and others to confusion: yea, that he knoweth euery par­ticular thing farre more distinctly and truly then we do, that see and feele them: for hee knoweth them in their causes, and essentiall formes, the which only is the true knowledge, whereas we do but gesse at their natures by their qualities and effects.

Yet perhaps you doo thinke that God knoweth the parti­culars of this world which now existeth, more then he doth a 1000. other worlds, which ne­uer did nor shal exist indeed, altho they exist in the vniuersal notions of Gods vnderstan­ding, and so may be as wel knowne to God as this particular world, which is brought forth into act.

We cannot say, if we speake proper­ly, that God knoweth any particulars, but those which do sometime exist. He knoweth himselfe able to make such particulars, if it were his will, but they are not particulars, vntill his will do bring them into act: for as vniuersall notions are in Gods vnderstan­standing as in their first fountaine, or rather in their proper place, so particulars come from the will of God: And therefore wee must needs thinke that God knoweth those parti­culars which do or shal exist, or haue existed otherwise then those which doo neuer exist, for hee knoweth the one and not the other.

Let me trouble you once more, and no more, for this is a poynt that I could ne­uer vnderstand, to wit how God getteth the knowledge of these things: doo you thinke that he knoweth those things which hee hath decreed to exist no otherwise, when and while they doo exist, then he doth before, and after: or that the existance of them ma­keth some kinde of impression, or altera­tion in his minde, which was not be­fore?

No surely, the existence of things doth no way alter or affect God: obiects do worke vpon our sences and minde, but Gods [Page 209] vnderstanding is merely actiue not passiue: yet wee cannot doubt, but that as God ma­keth vs to perceiue things by sence, and the Angels by some other meanes, so hee is able by meanes to make himselfe capable of the qualities of particular obiects, but of himselfe and in his owne nature, hee is altogither vn­capable of them, or of any knowledge by them.

You haue no list to answere me di­rectly to the question: I do not thinke that God doth suffer from the obiects, but that is all one, I would know whether that hee doth not know and see vs, as we go here other­wise then he did, when we were in the loines of our first father Adam, and whether that he doo not plainely see vs two particularly and distinctly, whether he do it intromittendo, as we doo, or which is more agreeable to his na­ture being impassible) extramittendo, that is not the question: but I cannot be perswaded but that although hee knoweth vs fully and certainely before we exist, yet when once we do exist in nature, he then doth see & behold vs after an other manner.

You say true, I haue no minde to wade farre into this matter, for it is very hard, yea impossible for vs to know the manner of the actual knowledge of God: and therfore I did [Page 210] passe it ouer in the proper place, neither wold I haue mentioned it but that you vrge mee so hard: for I thinke it sufficient for vs to know that God knoweth all things, euen the most secret thoughts of our mindes, although wee be ignorant how he commeth to that know­ledge. But for your question I haue told you my opinion, that howsoeuer you seeme to thinke that God knoweth things not existing and seeth thē as it were with eyes, when they do exist, yet it seemeth more consonant to the truth to say, y^• the creatures whither existing or desisting, are all alike knowne to God, and I pray you rest in this answere, for this time. Now as touching memorie, as God hath no vse of imagination, because he hath nothing to learne, so he hath no need of memorie, for that he cannot loose any thing by forgetful­nesse, all things being present vnto him both past & future. Likewise for conscience, which is the testimonie giuen by the minde in the presence of God of the innocencie and inte­gritie or of the guiltinesse of this or that rea­sonable creature, and so eyther of the want or of the desert of blame, it may in some sort bee attributed to God, and that in respect both of himselfe as also of the creature: for first, God as he is in all respects most pure and in­nocent, yea most holy and good, so before [Page 211] himselfe and in his owne presence, hee both knoweth and acknowledgeth himselfe so to be, and for that cause not onely to be free fiō all desert of blame, but also to deserue most worthely al praise and glory. But more plain­ly this facultie hath vse in respect of men, who do often charge God with euill, iniurie, iniustice, crueltie, and many other grecuous crimes, in the which plea this facultie of con­science doth cleare and absolue God, from all those blasphemous reproches which wret­ched men spew out against him. Rom. 3. 4. Let God be true and euery man a lyer that thou mayest be iustified in thy sayings, and ouercome when thou art iudged. Thus much of the fa­culties of the minde, which you thought o­mitted in the former discourse: as for the af­fections and vertues, as ioy greefe, and diuers other, which in scripture ate often attributed to God, their nature may be knowne by those which haue bene handled.

Sect. 4.

NExt to the eternitie of GOD, commeth to bee considered his v­biquitie which concerneth the sta­ture and greatnesse of GOD, as the other did his age and continuance. For as in time, so also in greatnesse God must bee knowne and acknowledged to bee infi­nite, not inclosed or comprehended within any creature or place eyther in heauen or in earth, but silling all creatures, and all places both in heauen and earth, [Page 220] yea stretching and extending himselfe be­yond the compasse of the world by infinite degrees, and that not onely by his power (his essence beeing in some set particular place) as wee knowe that Princes sitting and being contained in a little chaire, stretch their po­wer & authoritie ouer whole countries and kingdomes farre distant from them: but it is not so with God, who as in power, so also in his substance and essence is euery where, in al things and in all places, for hee is not by any thing either kept or put and as it were iusled out and dispossessed of his place, but is in all places euen where the grossest bodies are, as well as where is neyther place nor bodie. We see how the ayre (to the which wee haue be­fore compared the vbiquitie of God) is desi­rous to inlarge his dominions, and therefore assoone as euer it findeth any place emptie, it straightway taketh possession: but if there be any bodie in it to keepe possession, it is kept out a doores, and can haue no title to it: and so in all other bodies wee see that the weaker giueth place to the stronger, for it is impossi­ble that two bodies should bee togither in one place. But it is not so with God, for no creature is able to put him out of any place: hee doth suffer the creatures to haue their se­uerall places, but not to vsurpe his place, the [Page 221] which is euery place, as well where the crea­tures are, as where nothing is. For their be­ing in place doth not hinder him from being there, for he is there as well as they, and euen where they are. Hee is where the earth is, for hee is in the earth, and both heauen and earth are in him, and subsist in him as in their subiect and foundation, vpholding and con­taining them. And therefore his title is better to that place which they haue, then is theirs, for hee was there in peaceable posses­sion of it, before they were any where exi­sting, and so he will bee there when they are consumed to ashes and gone.

I do easely beleeue that God is eue­ry where, and that his exceeding greatnesse is more then sufficient to fill a thousande worlds: but I pray you shewe mee how God is present euery where, whither he bee partly in one place, and partly in another, or rather as I haue heard them say, wholly in euery place, as it is said of the soule, that it is tota in toto corpore, and tota in qualibet parte, wholly both in the whole bodie, and also in euery part or member of it.

That is indeed the vsuall saying and si­militude, according to the which god is to bee thought to be wholly in euery Church & house, yea in the least thing that is, as well as [Page 222] in the greatest. It is sure, that the essence of God is most simple and vniforme without a­ny distinction of partes, but the very same euery where: yet that common saying is hard to bee vnderstood, and therefore may easely by the simple bee peruerted to their own de­struction: who hearing God to bee wholly in euery place, will readely suppose him to bee contained in that place, and so to bee fi­nite, yea to bee diuided into infinit Gods, as the Heathen imagined euery house and per­son to haue his proper god attending on him. And therefore wee may more [...]asely and truely imagine God to bee one whole vn­diuided and vniforme essence, containing and inclosing in it selfe all bodies as doth the ayre, yet not excluded out of any place where any body is, as the ayre is out of all such places, and that God is not in this or that place, Church, or house, but that all places, houses, churches, yea the earth, ayre, & heauē it selfare in God, & that in quanti­tie euen as a pins poynt is in respect of the whole compasse of heauen, and that in him the whole world mooueth and hath his bee­ing. Yea, his essence extendeth it selfe in­finitly without the compasse of the world, and aboue the highest heauens, and so is to [Page 223] bee thought to bee totally or wholly in any one place, and that equally, as much in one place as in another.

I pray you shewe mee that, for I haue alwaies thought God to be after a spe­ciall manner there, where hee professed him­selfe to bee, as namely to bee present with the Arke and the propitiatorie seate, more then in the Idoles of the heathen, in the tem­ple of Ierusalem, more then in any other: so likewise to bee in the godly more then in the wicked, in heauen, the which the scripture doth vsually make the place of Gods dwel­ling and residencie, more then in hell, or on the earth: and most of all, to bee in the hu­manitie of Christ, wherein the Apostle saith. Col. 2. 9. That the fulnesse of the Godhead doth dwell bode [...]y.

If you thinke the essence of God to be in any one place more then in another, you are greatly deceiued: it is euery where alike, neither can it possibly bee otherwise, for it cannot be gathered or compacted togither into any other forme, then is that infinite greatnesse, which filleth all places,

God may indeede shewe his pre­sence by outwarde actions, more in one place then in another, and so saye and [Page 224] professe himselfe to bee there onely, and no where else, speaking according to the errone­ous conceit of men, that thinke him to be no where present in essence, but where he shew­eth himselfe and his power by some outward signe. Thus God was present in the Temple of Ierusalem, and more specially in the holy of holiest, and in the propitiatorie seate more then in other places, not by his essence but by his mercie and goodnesse, the which hee did there reueale and shew to the Iewes more then to any other people. Thus God is pre­sent in his spirit in the faithfull, more then in the carnall man, not by the essence, but by the effectuall operation of it, reneuing in thē his owne image of holinesse and trueth, the which thing hee doth not in the other. Thus God is present in heauen more then in hell or heere on earth not in essence, but in glo­rie and maiestie, the which shineth more in heauen, then any where else. For euen as a man hauing been kept all his life in a darke dungeon from the light of the sunne, and the sight of the creatures in the world, if he were on a suddaine brought vppe into the open ayre, and suffered to behold all these glorious creatures, would not sticke to say and affirme, this world to bee the very dwelling place and pallace of God: so doth [Page 225] heauen seeme in respect of this inferiour world wherein wee liue. But the greatest doubt is of the humanitie of Christ, with the which (without doubt) the Godheade is present farre otherwise, yea farre more ex­cellently then euer it was with any creature, or in any place eyther in heauen or earth: yea so, that if it were possible for the diuine es­sēce to be in any one thing or place more thē in another, it would without question bee more in the humanitie of Christ, then e­uer it was any where. For God did neuer be­fore vouchsafe such vnspeakeable honour to any creature, as to take it into his own per­son and to himselfe, yea to bee himselfe. Yet for all this, the essence of God is no more in the humanitie of Christ, then in other pla­ces and creatures, and yet it is ioyned, yea v­nited to it, so as it neuer was to any crea­ture.

How is that straunge coniunction of the humanitie of Christ to the diuine es­sence?

For that I must craue pardon of you, it is not so soone done as desired: it is well if I can get done the taske which you exact of mee, thogh I do not meddle with other mat­ters, especially with such as being very hard and intricate, require seuerall and large trea­treatises: [Page 226] it is better that wee hold our selues to the matter in hande, and so seeing in part the trueth of this poynt, to proceede to the rest of the externall attributes of god, as namely to the omnipotencie of God.

Sect. 3.

I did not thinke it to haue beene a matter requiring either long time, or any greate labour, and then I am sure you would not haue stucke with me, but I pray you hold on your course, seeing you will not bee intreated to digresse.

The omnipotencie of God is resem­bled in man by the strength of his bodie, or the power of his person, yet there is as great difference, as is betwixt the age of man and the eternitie of God, or the stature of man, and the incomprehensible greatnesse of god. For as God is, so is his power, by the which hee is able and sufficient to doo whatsoeuer pleaseth him, as it is defined Psal. 135. 6. The Lord is great aboue all Gods, and hath done whatsoeuer hee woulde in heauen and in the earth, in the sea and in the deeps: & what neede there to bee more power then will, or to what purpose is that power, which is with­out the will. So that the obiect of Gods po­wer, [Page 227] is the whole world, in the which, and o­uer the which, God hath so ample and abso­lute authoritie, that neither the greatnesse, strength, nor multitude of the creatur is able to resist his wil and power, who is able (if hee were willing) to turne all things vpside down, to make the heauen & the earth change pla­ces the one with the other, so that the heauen should rest in the middest, & the earth turne about in the circle.

Yea as hee made both heauen and earth, and all things in them contained of nothing, so hee is able to turne them all to nothing, and that without any labour or difficultie, e­uen by the breath of his mouth, and the meer inclination of his will.

But howsoeuer this power of God cannot bee matched by any creature, yet it doth both match and ouermatch it selfe, restrai­ning it selfe so, that it is not able to doo any thing against it selfe, for that which God by his power doth at any time, hee cannot by his power make it to be not done or vndone at the same time, for so the power of God should bee contrarie to it selfe. And there­fore if God by his power make the sunne to shine at any time, hee cannot by his power make that it shall not shine at the very same time.

[Page 228] If he make mā free, he cānot make him boūd, if hee giue him will, he cannot compell him to be willing, for so hee should not giue, but take away will from him: and so in all other instances, it is impossible to God to make contradictories to bee true, because he being perfect vnitie, cannot bee contrarie to him­selfe. And if God cannot make any repug­nancie in the nature of the creatures, much lesse can hee doo it in his owne nature, and therfore he cannot do any thing cōtrarie vnto it, as namely to iustifie a wicked man, or to condemne the righteous, to loue one that is sinfull, or to hate him that is indued with his owne image of holinesse, to diminish, destroy, or any way to alter himself, who is vnchange­able. These things God cannot do, beeing hindered not by any creature but by himself, and therefore the impossibilitie of dooing them, is not to bee accounted weaknesse or impotencie, but strength and power: other­wise nothing is impossible to bee done by God, that can possibly be imagined by man. How then can we sufficiently wonder at the grosse errour and sottish ignorance of those men, who in respect of the difficultie or ra­ther impossibilitie (as they thinke) of perfor­ming them, call into question the trueth of those promises which God hath made to his [Page 229] Church of the resurection of the bodie, al­though consumed to nothing, and of eternall glorie. But as they erre, not knowing the scriptures nor the power of God, so we see­ing these things to bee most easie to God, are to bee confirmed in faith and in the resolute perswasion of the trueth of them.

I am I thanke God fully perswaded, that God both can easely, and will vndoubt­tedly restore vs to life, though we were con­sumed to nothing, by burning a thousande yeares in the hotest fire that can bee made or imagined. Yet I pray you tell me one thing, doo you thinke it possible that the very same indiuiduum, and as you say in the Schooles, i­dem numero, hauing beene consumed to no­thing, can bee restored, as namely the same candle after that it is consumed?

I perceiue you meaning: it is certaine that God both can and will raise vs to life a­gaine, not in any other, but in these very same persons, which now we are: but what the Schoolemen meane by that quidditie of idem numero, & many other of the same kind, as I neuer did, so I do not now mean to trou­ble my selfe with them.

Sect. 4.

WEe will rather come to the rest of these external attributes, the which (as I am of my selfe not vnwilling) so you see that we must of necessitie knit vp in very fewe words. First for the similitude of the diuine essence, the which must be graun­ted to bee a most simple and pure forme, al­togither voyde not onely of all mixsture of diuers matters or contrarie qualities, as wee knowe the elements to bee, but euen of all manner of composition whatsoeuer, euen of that which is the simplest, to wit, of matter and forme, whereof all creatures do necessa­rely subsist, for that neyther matter nor form can in them exist the one without the other. But there can no kinde of matter bee admit­ted into the diuine essence, no not that wher­of as being most pure, subtile and simple, the heauens, or the Angelles themselues (more subtile then the heauens, if more may bee) do consist. For so wee should pull downe all that wee haue built vp, and gainesay all that hath hithertoo beene affirmed of the nature of God. For we cannot make him both eter­nall, and also compounded of matter and forme, for in composition there is motion, & in motion time, and time taketh away eter­nitie, yea wee must graunt the matter wher­of [Page 231] hee is compounded, to haue beene before him, the which must subsist in simple, before it bee brought into composition. Againe if hee bee materiall, he is locall, for all matter is in place, and so hee is not infinite, but finite and circumscribed. Yea thus wee shall take from him his omnipotencie, which ariseth of the puritie of his simple forme beeing mere actuall, because it is inmateriall, whereas if it were compounded of matter and forme, it should be compounded of impotencie and of power, of passion as well as of action, for it must participate the nature of both the pa­rents, taking from the one operatiue power, and from the other passible impotencie, and so bee not a pure act, but clogged and blun­ted with the grossenesse of matter, and by it made vnable to worke, yea as like and readie to suffer it selfe, as to worke in others. And therefore in the building of this pallace for the great God of heauen, wee must reiect all corruptible matter, yea all matter whatsoe­uer, because al matter is corruptible, and so make the diuine nature to bee a pure forme, wholly actiue and in no respect or part pas­siue.

I haue ofte heard men speak, & haue red mens writings of these pure abstract formes, of the which kind many do hold not only god, but euē the angels, which are meer creatures to bee: yet it cou [...]d neuer sinke [Page 232] into my head, how a forme should subsist of it selfe without some matter to vphold it: and as I remember, you said before, that some an­cient diuines (I thinke you named Tertullian) were of the same opinion, or rather dulnesse of conceit, and did therefore allowe bodies wherein to subsist, not onely to the Angels, but euen to God himselfe.

It is ha [...]d for vs, who consisting of grosse bodies and braines, esteeme other na­tures by our own, to imagine how any forme should subsist without some materiall subiect to vphold it. As touching the Angels, if you cannot thinke, or will not beleeue them to be pure and abstract formes, altogither voyde of materiall composition, you shall (for mee) continue in your error or opinion: but if you will not admit God to subsist in this manner, to wit, as a substantial forme vpholding both it selfe, and also all things whatsoeuer do a­ny way exist, you will marre all. Neyther ought the difficultie of supposing it, breede in vs any doubting of the trueth of it, it ha­uing beene often alreadie saide, that the ma­ner of Gods subsisting in his essentiall forme, is altogither vnsearchable and incom­prehensible. Let it bee sufficient that wee haue it prooued by most neces­sarie demonstrations, that God is a most [Page 233] pure, substantiall, immateriall & actiue forme without any cōposition of matter & form or distinction of parts, but euery where alike and the very same. Yea I do not see but that this praerogatiue of being a mere and pure forme must be reserued to God, and in no case cō ­municated to any creature as the grossenesse of matter must be left to the creature and in no wise ascribed to God. And so matter, or mate­riall subsisting (the which bringeth with it motion and time, passion, alteration, limitati­on and impotencie) shall bee the badge or cognizance, which the creature shall weare that so it may appeare, that he is not his owne man, or maker, but that he serueth and depē ­deth on an other, by whom he was made and is maintained. And on the other side, mere simplicitie and pure formalitie (to the which eternitie, rest, identitie, operation, infinitnesse and omnipotencie are annexed) is to bee ac­counted the royall diademe, which aduan­ceth God in his Throne of glory aboue all creatures whatsoeuer. With this simplicitie of the diuine essence we may ioyne the vnitie of it, for as it is simple without partes, so it is one without kindes, neither can we imagin it to be moe then one for many causes. For if we suppose two infinits, wee make no insinit, for each of the two is the limit of the other, for it [Page 234] keepeth the other from comming into it selfe (otherwise it becommeth one with it, and is no longer two but onely one) and so from extending it selfe into infinite. Besides, wee know that the diuine essence beeing the first fountaine from the which all things flowe, and the last end to the which they tend, must bee the absolute perfection of rest altogither voyd of motion: for otherwise things should moue not to rest but to motion, and the termini à quo and ad quem, should be not fixt, but moueable, and so vncertaine: but if the diuine essence bee many or moe then one, there is not absolute perfection, which is onely in vnitie as motion is in number.

So that as it is in ciuil states, the which are neuer counted sure and setled in the absolute perfection of gouernment, till the whole authoritie be deuolued from the peo­ple to many, from many to a fewe, from a few to one, because where there are moe then one in autho [...]itie, there is matter of con­tinuall discord and disorder, but in vnitie there is perfect concord, for no man disa­greeth with himselfe: so much more we are to thinke that the soueraigne Monarchie of the world is not in motion or possibili­tie tending to perfection, but already and euen for euer established in perfect vnitie: [Page 235] but we neede not insist any longer in proo­uing the vnitie of the god-head, which of it selfe is manifest, and therefore we will now shut vp this conference, with the last of these external attributes, which is the immoueabili­tie, if we may so speake, of God.

Sect. 5.

THis attribute giueth vs to vnderstand, that god is not subiect to motiō, which is the mutation of state or place, but is in all respects immutable and immoue­able: he doth not shift his dwelling place, wan­dring vp and downe like a Pilgrime, this day in one countrey and to morrow in an o­other, at one time in heauen, and at an other time on earth, but continueth where hee is and where hee hath bene alwaies, more firme and steadfast then the hugest mountaine, or the whole earth, like to a Rocke in the sea, a­gainst the which though the waues do beate, and so breake themselues, yet they cannot either moue it in or remoue it out of the place where it is: euen so it is with the creatures in the world, the which doo continually tosse and tumble themselues from one estate to an other, but the Lord remaineth the same for euer.

[Page 236] For why, as we our selues must not sit downe, but go on till we come to the end of our iour­ney, euen so the creatures, when they are in their best estate, are not there to rest in thē ­selues, as if they had made themselues for themselues, but they must moue and go on towards God and his glory by performing those duties, which do naturally belong vnto them, and so continually better their estate. But it is not so with God, whose perfection is and euer was in complete act, not in hope & possibilitie, and therefore hauing all the per­fection, that he can haue, he need not stir for the obtaining of any more, or mooue for any mans pleasure: his last ende and cheefe good is in himselfe, and in no other thing whatsoeuer, and therefore hee need not by motion pursue that, which he enioyeth al­ready in rest, or seeke that from an other which he hath in himselfe. Yea it is needefull that God should be immoueable, hee beeing the foundation, whereon all things whatsoe­uer do any way exist, do stand and rely: so that if it did moue and were fickle and waue­ring, there must necessarely ensue vniuersall confusion & disorder in nature: in the which respect (as was noted in the former attribute) God being both terminus a quo, and terminus ad quem, all naturall motion motion is made, [Page 237] must needs be supposed to bee vnmoueable. for otherwise both disorder would ensue, and also motion should be made to motion, as it were in an endlesse iourney, and with boote­lesse labour.

Lastly how should wee suppose God to moue, whom we know to haue no place whi­ther to moue: for hee himselfe is euery where and therefore whither soeuer he moueth, hee moueth to himselfe, or rather he moueth not at all, because he is still where he was, euen in himselfe. Now sir, I haue as I could, endea­uoured to satisfie your request, neither can you require any more of me, saue only thanks for your gentlenesse and curtesie in atten­ding so patiently these simple and rude dis­courses: your wisedome is such, that I am perswaded, you did not expect any perfect declaration of the nature of God, especially at my hands, and at this time: in the which re­spect I hope that you will take in good part, that which hath bene said, how rudely and rawly soeuer.

If I should tell you how much I thinke my selfe beholden to you for this days worke, you would thinke that I did but flat­ter you: I know not when I learned so much good diuinitie in one day, but I hope to haue ere we part, better occasion and cause too of thanking [Page 238] you.

There is no such cause sir, these are but ordinary matters.

Well I would giue any good I might haue had your company vp to London: I would thinke to bee by your meanes a good diuine ere I came thither.

So you are already, otherwise it were strange, that I should make you a good diuine in halfe a score of dayes, that could not make my selfe one in a whole score of yeares: but to deale plainely with you, my purpose is to trauell as farre as London, though I tolde you not so much at first: but I doubt that my litle weak nag wil not hold out, and I am sure, that hee cannot hold foote with your strong gel­ding.

I am right glad of it, take no thought for your nagge, I will assure him to London for the paines that you haue already taken in instructing mee: and when wee come to our iournies ende, if I might entreate you to go with mee to my house, which is not farre off, you should be as weleome as your seife could wish, and command any thing I haue.

You may soone haue a bolde guest of me, but we will talk of that sixe or seuen dayes hence. In the meane time for that I perceiue y^e you are a stranger in this countrey, I will be so [Page 239] bold, as to bid you welcome to this Northern Towne.

I thanke you heartely, but doo you know of any good lodging in it?

No doubt sir, but that we may in many places here in New-castle bee both heartely welcome, and honestly vsed for our money: but you know that the countrey is plaine and rude, and therefore your entertainment will bee but course and homely in respect of that curious ciuilitie that is besouth: yet their meaning is good and better then it see­meth.

You speake worse of your countrey, then there is cause, I like plaine dea­ling best, let vs get on, and I pray you lead vs to some honest house where you are knowne or ac­quainted.