Reasons monarchie. Set forth by Robert Mason of Lincolnes Inne Gent Mason, Robert, 1571-1635. 1602 Approx. 129 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 78 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. Text Creation Partnership, Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2011-12 (EEBO-TCP Phase 2). A07224 STC 17621 ESTC S101429 99837243 99837243 1558

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Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 2, no. A07224) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 1558) Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1475-1640 ; 1387:07) Reasons monarchie. Set forth by Robert Mason of Lincolnes Inne Gent Mason, Robert, 1571-1635. [14], 136, [4] p. Printed by Valentine Sims, dwelling on Adling hill at the signe of the white Swanne, London : 1602. The two final leaves contain a poem, "The minds priuiledge". Some print faded, some pages stained, and some print show-through. Reproduction of the original in the Cambridge University Library .

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REASONS Monarchie.

Set forth by Robert Maſon of Lincolnes Inne Gent.

3. Tuſcul.

Munus animi est ratione vti.

LONDON Printed by Valentine Sims, dwelling on Adling hill at the ſigne of the white Swanne. 1602.

To the right Honorable ſir Iohn Popham knight, Lord chiefe Iuſtice of England, one of her Maieſties moſt honorable priuie Counſell: and to the reſt of the Iuſtices of Aſſiſe.

RIght Honorable, as Aeneas, in his moſt distreſsed eſtate, ſought ſuccour of Queene Dido; So doth reaſon, in her more than halfe exiled condition implore your Honors aſſistance. If there be charitable duetie to defend the Jnnocent from oppreſsion, there is no leſſe, to ayde Reaſon against the deprauers of her ſinceritie, and obſcurers of her worthineſſe. Ʋnder God, our most gratious Queene, Defendreſſe of the Faith; vnder them both, you are vpholders of Reaſons Monarchie.

To your religious, honourable, and vertuous protectiōs therfore haue J aduentured to preſent her Dignitie, knowing you regard her excellencie no leſſe, thogh it want glorious ornamēts, than Darius did the friendſhip of Zopirus, in his mangled and miſerable ſeeming diſaster. Patronize, J beſeech you, his labour, and pardon his boldeneſse, that most humbly praieth continuance and increaſe of honour and happineſse to your Lordſhip.

Your Lordſhips in all duetie, Ro: M:
To the Reader.

THe farre traueller by Sea, vſeth his Carde and Inſtruments, & all his indeuoure, to finde out the courſe of a long and dangerous voiage. Wherein, the vncertaintie of the thing hee ſeeketh, cauſeth him often to faile his purpoſe. But in this courſe which I direct, the Reader ſhall not haue occaſion to aduenture any ſuch hazard, albeit the matter ſought, be as precious, as whatſoeuer. Reaſon, which euerie man ſhould lodge in his owne boſome, is it which I aduiſe to be enquired; whereof, as men, by their originall natures doo participate, ſo ought they, by their reaſonable Diſcretions, gouerne the whole courſe of their liues. Her excellencie can not in wordes bee expreſſed, which cauſeth her rudiments to bee ſo ſlenderly followed: Reaſon is in the ſon of God, perfect, pure, & true: But in men, corrupted: what is there that ſhe doeth not in ſome meaſure ſearch into? Her viewe pearceth into the earth, and all the Elements. The powers of heauen and Angels, into all things that may be comprehended with vnderſtanding; And farther, euen into things that are myſticall, & aboue the compaſſe of her ſelfe: For though ſhee cannot reach into the depth of eternitie, and the ſauing of ſoules: yet ſhe bringeth to the knowledge of God, and beliefe in his mercies (whereby this ſaluation is wrought) being a myſterie farre aboue the capacitie of men. Whatſoeuer concerneth vs, either in regard of this preſent world, or otherwiſe, Reaſon ſheweth, that it was poſsible to Gods power, agreeable to his Iuſtice, and mercie, anſwerable to his will and promiſes, and beſeeming his glory, behouefull to manifeſt our baſeneſſe, & neceſſarie for our welfare. By her powerfull argument, ſhe is able to put vngodlines it ſelfe to ſilence; wherupon it is fitly concluded, that credit is not to be giuen to the outward perſon, but to the diuine thing within the perſon: whereby is meant, Reaſon, whoſe originall purenes, is in ſome meaſure hereafter diſcouered.

That this right Reaſon is corrupted in men, none can doubt, if they behold themſelues truely what they are, in reſpect of what they ſhould be. Wherfore, if Salomon therby found out the imperfections of his life, and hath not ſpared to leaue to the publike view of the worlde, his errors manifeſted, and the ſtriuing hee had to reforme the ſame, no man hath Reaſon to be aſhamed, ſecretly, and priuately, in the cloſet of his owne hart, to view his digreſsions and ſlidings from reaſon; and indeuor the compoſing of his actions to the rule and order of Reaſon. Intreating of theſe things, I haue rather bent my ſelfe, to ſatisfie the Reader out of the opinion of the learned, & Reaſon her ſelfe, then vpon any imaginations of mine owne. I pray thee therefore take in good part my labor, & good will, & giue the ſubiect wherof I intreate, thy furtherance, howſoeuer thou mayeſt bee pleaſed with the maner of handling. And let me deſire (as Iuſtus Lipſius in his booke of Conſtancie) that thou wilt reade twiſe before thou once cenſure it; and I ſhall be beholding for thy paines, and wiſh part of all Gods good bleſsings towards thee. Farewell.

Thy euer wel willing friend, R. M.
Hexaſticon amici cuiuſdam. Dent alij mentis vanae deliria vana, Tu Maſone tuis, vtile dulce dabis. Lumine tu coecos, moestos ſolamine vero Imbuis, errantes turatione regis, Viue, ſtudeto, vale, rationis diuite vena, Et dote ingenij perge beare tuos.
REASONS Monarchie.
Sect. I. The dignitie of right Reaſon.

AS I intend not in this Diſcourſe, to meddle with matters of State, and gouernement of Countries and Kingdomes, being farre aboue my iudgement. Yet am I bolde to make ſome diſcouerie of the vnderſtanding of right and vncorrupt reaſon; and of her excellent qualitie, place, and condition; and the dominion and authoritie ſhee ought to haue ouer the affections, paſſions, and actions of euerie particular man, which being truely knowne, men may the better containe themſelues in obedience and duety to authoritie and commaunde. This labour I hold my ſelfe bound to vndergo, by the lawes of God, of nature, and of my countrie, leſt I ſhould otherwiſe charge my ſelfe with an idle imploying of my leyſure. Becauſe Reaſon is a qualitie, which euery man challengeth to inioy, by a proper and peculiar fruition in himſelfe, ſolely by the courſe of his originall deduced nature from the beginning of all antiquities, echone holding an vnremouable opinion, that the courſes and directiōs which they take in hand, proceede of Reaſon, and are warranted thereby. Yet for that it is moſt apparant, that corruption is entered into the nature of man, and their mindes, and reaſon, are impaired from that ancient primarie perfection, wherewith the firſt created man was endued; it ſhall be very neceſſary, that all men, very aduiſedly, and with deepe conſideration, ſearch, and examine themſelues concerning this point, that finding their errours, they may the better, and more aduiſedly, reforme their faultes.

Right and true Reaſon, as it ought to haue a gouernment generall, ſo doth it teach how to gouerne particulars: and by teaching gouernment, it inſtructs howe to obey, which is one ſpeciall marke I aime at. For if ſhe, as the true Princes and Queene, beare the Regall, and Monarcall place, and onely ſhe ought to raigne ouer all paſſions, and affections; then no doubt but ſhe hath, or ſhould haue, many Subiects that ought to be diſciplined, gouerned, and kept in order by her authoritie: the repugning whereof is a kinde of rebellion.

If this be a true poſition, Regnum est parcere ſubiectis, & debellare ſuperbos: This coucluſion muſt rightly follow, that all thoſe, either affections, paſſions, or fancies, which ſtubbornly oppoſe themſelues againſt their Prince, or reuolt from their dutie, ought to be corrected as rebellious, or at leaſt, as diſturbers of the peace of their Queene, leſt their outragious intemprature turn to their own ſubuerſion; for it is a moſt cleare & reſolued conſequent, that take away order and gouernment, there preſently follows horror and confuſion: which ruine, as it often falleth out in great kingdomes, among multitudes of men, ſo yet originally do theſe defects commence in the particular errors of ſom ſpeciall priuate men, for from ſome ſmall beginning the greatnes thereof muſt needes proceede: therefore, obſtare principijs maximè iuuat. It is very behoofefull to withſtand the beginnings.

Such is the dignitie and maieſtie of right and true reaſon, that ſhe hath a place aboue all earthly, corruptible, and mortall things; aboue the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, and Firmament of heauen, aboue the Angels themſelues, euen in the Sonne of God, in the preſence of God himſelf, as by this enſuing diſcourſe ſhall be made manifeſt.

Sect. II. The Soule is the ſubstance, and Reaſon a qualitie thereof.

BEfore I can fittely enter into the definition of Reaſon, being a qualitie in a ſubſtance of higher valewe, I muſt borrow leaue, for a fewe words, concerning that ſubſtance whereof reaſon is this qualitie, for out of that wil be found, a way, how to diſcouer the trueth of all that enſueth, and ought to be vnderſtood.

The Immortall Soule of man is this ſubſtance, which among Chriſtians is not doubted, and being learnedly handled by writers, taught by diuines, and conceiued and vnderſtood by all, I will leaue to ſpeake therof in any manner of perſwading others to giue credence therevnto, and onelie touch the ſame, ſo farre forth as may diſcouer the excellencie of reaſon.

Hermes treating of the ſoule, ſaith; Hermes in his Poemā der cha. 10 It is the garment of the minde, and the garment of the Soule is a certaine Spirite, wherby it is vnited to the body: and this thing is that which wee properly call Man, that is, a heauenly creature, not to be compared to beaſtes, but rather with the Gods of heauen.

Plato ſaith, Plato in li. 11. de Legib. epist. 2. that the ancient and holie Oracles are to be beleeued, which affirme mens ſoules to bee immortall.

Pithagoras held opinion, that the Soule is a bodileſſe and immortal ſubſtance, put into this bodie as into a priſon for ſin.

Architus ſaith, that God breathed reaſon and vnderſtanding into man.

Plato ſaith, Plat. in his Timens, & third book de Republ. that God created man by himſelfe, yea and his liuer, and his braine, and his ſenſes, which is vnderſtood to be the ſoule, endued as well with ſence, as reaſon.

But ſpeaking onely of the reaſonable Soule, Plato in Phoedon li. 10. de Repub. in matter of ſtate in his Alcibiades. he ſaith, that the Soule of man is very like the Godhead, immortall, reaſonable, vniforme, vndiſſoluble, and euermore of one ſort, which are conditions that can not agree, but in things moſt diuine: And therfore at his departing out of the world, he willed his ſoule to returne home to her firſt originall. Plat. in his firſt booke of Lawes. And in an other place, he maketh bold, to terme it to be kinne vnto God, that is to ſay, euerlaſting, and of one ſelfe name with the immortall ones.

Aristotle ſaith, Aristot. lib. 3. de Anim. that the ſoule of man commeth from without, and not of the ſeede of man, as the body doth, and that the ſoule is the onely part in vs that is diuine, which is as much, as if he had ſaid, immortall.

Cicero hath two excellent ſayings in this behalfe, Li. 1. quaest. Tuſe. The originall of our ſoules and mindes (ſaith he) can not be found in this lowe earth: for there is not any mixture in them, or any compounding that may ſeeme to be made, or bred, of the earth; neither is there any moyſture, winde, or any fiery matter in them. And his reaſon in that place is, that no ſuch thing could retaine in it, the power of memorie, vnderſtanding, or conceipt, to beare in mind things paſt, to foreſee things to come, & to conſider things preſent, which (ſaith he) are matters altogether diuine; concluding, that becauſe it conſiſted not of any elementall matter, it muſt needes be immortall.

In another place he ſaith, Cic. lib. 2. de nat. Deor. that beetweene God and man, there is a kindred of Reaſon, as there is betweene man and man, a kindred of blood. That the fellowſhip betweene man and man commeth of the bodie, but the fellowſhip betweene God and man commeth of God himſelfe, who created the ſoule in vs. By reaſon whereof (ſaith he) we may ſay, wee haue aliance with the heauenly ſort, as folkes that haue diſcended of the ſame race and roote.

Seneca in his booke of Comfort, Seneca in lib. Conſolationis &c writing of the death of the Ladie Marcia hir ſon, ſaith, he is now euerlaſting, and in the beſt ſtate, bereft of this earthly baggage, &c. which he inferred for the moſt excellent comfort of all, to be, when the ſoule is departed from the body.

Out of the learning which it ſeemeth Hierocles had from Pithagoras, Hierocl. ca. 10. he very conſideratelie, and deepelie entering into the mindes of the wicked, ſaieth, that the wicked would not haue their ſoules to be immortall, to thintent they might not be puniſhed for their faultes: But yet (ſaith hee) they preuent the ſentence of their Iudge, by condempning themſelues vnto death before hand.

Plotinus, Plotinus of the being of the ſoul lib. 1. Enead 4. who wrote many excellent treatiſes concerning the Soule, and tooke great paines therein, ſaith, mens Soules proceede not of their bodies, nor of the ſeede of their parents, but are as ye would ſay, grafted into our bodies by the hand of God.

The Soule (ſaith hee) hath had company with the Gods, Plotinus in his booke of doubtes concerning the ſoule cha. 26.27. and is immortall, and ſo would we ſay of it (as Plato affirmeth) if we ſaw it faire and cleere. But for as much as we ſee it commonly troubled, we thinke it not to be, either diuine, or immortall. Neuertheleſſe (ſaith he) he which will diſcerne the nature of any thing perfectly, muſt conſider it in the very owne ſubſtance, or being, vtterly vnmingled with any other thing; for whatſoeuer is added elſe vnto it, doth hinder the perfect diſcerning therof. Therfore let euery man behold himſelfe naked without any thing, ſaue himſelfe, ſo as he looke vpon nothing elſe, ſaue his bare ſoule: and ſurely, when he hath viewed himſelfe in his owne nature, merely, as he is in reſpect of his minde, he ſhall beleeue himſelfe to be immortall; for he ſhall ſee, that his minde aymeth not properly at the ſenſible and mortall things, but that, by a certaine euerlaſting power, it taketh hold of things that are euerlaſting, and of whatſoeuer is poſſible to be conceiued in vnderſtanding. Inſomuch, that euen it ſelfe becommeth, after a ſort, a very world of vnderſtanding and light.

Galen, Galen in his booke of Maners of the ſoul after hee had moſt curiouſly ſearched into the nature of Elements, & as much as he could, fathered the cauſes of all things vppon the Elements: yet is inforced to confeſſe in his booke of the doctrine of Hippocrates and Plato, that the Soule is a bodileſſe ſubſtance, whereof the body is onely the chariot, making a difference betweene the corruptible and immortall part of man.

The Turkes, Arabians, In the Alcaron Azo 25, & 42. and Perſians holde firmely, that the Soule of man was breathed vnto him of God, and ſo conſequentiy, incorruptible, and immortall. Beſides, many other ſtrong reſolutions amongſt the Philoſophers; the very Caribies and Caniballes acknowledge the immortalitie of the Soule.

I omit to mention what is contained in the holy and ſacred Booke of God, and writers of diuinitie, becauſe I would haue the moſt abſurd that liue, repaire to learne of ſuch as were altogether prophane: if they ſcorne (as many doe) to peruſe the Booke of God.

What mooued all theſe, and many millions beſides; nay, in a manner, the whole world, to acknowledge the excellent immortalitie of the Soule, but this reaſonable vnderſtanding and apprehenſion of the Soule, which being in it ſelfe immortall, ſearcheth out the knowledge of thinges that are euerlaſting, and neyther can finiſh, nor abide corruption in their ſubſtaunce? and ſo much for the ſubſtance whereof Reaſon is the qualitie.

Sect. III. Reaſon aduaunced aboue things that are inferior to her.

IN comparing of things for their woorthineſſe, or excellencie, it is alway to be vnderſtood, that there muſt be other, and more things obiected, ouer and beſides that which is aduaunced and commended aboue the reſt, wherby the compariſon or aduancement may be proued and diſcerned. In this matter I haue vndertaken, to aduance and ſet vp Reaſon aboue other things. The better therefore to diſcouer the trueth thereof, I will manifeſt thoſe things that are inferiour, and ought to be ſubiect vnto Reaſon.

In the firſt Creation, God made many creatures, whereof the world doth conſiſt in the whole, which being truely conſidered, doe yeelde foure degrees, and each more excellent than other. The firſt ſorte haue onely being. The ſecond haue being and life. The third haue being, life, and ſence. The fourth haue being, life, ſence, and reaſon.

It was fitly ſaid by a great learned man, that the earth, the ſea, and the aire, are of great largeneſſe, they beare vp and ſuſtaine all things that haue life, all that haue ſence, and all things that haue reaſon, and yet themſelues haue no more but a bare being, without life, ſence, or reaſon: as they are the firſt things that were made of nothing, ſo are they neereſt vnto nothing, and of meaner conſideration then the reſt. The plants and hearbes are the next, which beſides their being, haue a kinde of life, as it is to be ſeene by their growing, ſucking, or drawing their nouriſhment from the earth, and their refreſhing from the aire.

The Beaſtes haue being, life, and ſence, and haue their nouriſhment and feeding from the elements, and from the plants. Theſe things did God behold when he had made them, and they were all good.

Then did he make man, who had being, life, ſence, and reaſon, this excellent qualitie which I wiſh euery man deepely to conſider: for God breathed into man the breath of life, and made him a liuing ſoule, he made him after his owne Image, by beſtowing this liuing, reaſonable, and immortall ſoule.

Marke wel, how by degrees God made theſe things, the earth, the water, and the aire, of nothing, that it might bud and bring forth the trees, and euery greene herbe.

Then the trees and graſſe of the earth for the feeding of the beaſts.

Then the beaſts of the field, and the foules, and euery creeping thing.

And laſtly, he made man his materiall bodie of the duſt of the earth, but his reaſonable ſoule, by diuine inſpiration, who is properly vaid to enioy the Elements, line of the plants, and commaund the beaſts, to conſider and diſcourſe of all things, and to be a little world in himſelfe. Superioritie was giuen to him, as hauing the dominion and propertie of the reſt of the creatures whom God brought to man, to receiue their names, for they had notvnderſtanding to name one an other: but the reaſon of man did diſtinguiſh betweene them, and gaue them proper and ſeuerall additions, which his memory, endued with reaſon, did continually retaine, he gouerned them, were they neuer ſo ſtrong, and employed them to what ſeruice it pleaſed him. And to this day man hunts the wild beaſts, & lawfully challengeth the propertie of them. So much as the diuine and euerlaſting things are more excellent then corruptible, is the qualitie of right reaſon of the immortall ſoule, aboue the reſt of the creatures ſubiect to corruption.

An ancient Philoſopher, Iamblicius concerning Miſteries ch. 8.7 out of the very inſtinct of nature, in the deep cō ſideration of reaſon ſaid, that the firſt vſe of reaſon is employed in conceiuing the Godhead, not properly by knowing it, but as it were, by feeling. By which feeling he meaneth not a palpable, bodily, or materiall feeling, but a ſpirituall feeling, according to the nature, both of God, and the Soule, and the qualitie of reaſon, which reacheth much further into cauſes then the bodily eye can diſcerne.

At the time of the creation of man, God (who in himſelfe is all goodneſſe and excellencie) breathed into man, a ſpirit which muſt be perfect, pure, and good, becauſe nothing proceedes from God but that which is good, perfect, and pure: this ſpirit was his immortall ſoule, which had no partaking of any earthly ſubſtance, but abſolutely of it ſelfe immateriall. This Soule was endued with perfect, pure, and true reaſon, knowledge, and vnderſtanding, will and mind, being qualities, ſpecially appropriate to the ſoule, as it was immortall: So that by the nature of the ſoule, and not of the bodie, man was firſt poſſeſſed of this Reaſon.

Man then conſiſteth of Body and Soule, and in reſpect thereof, is deſſcribed by the auntient Philoſophers and Writers, to containe in him, their liues, the liuing as plants, the ſenſitiue as beaſts, and the laſt, the reaſonable life.

Ariſtotle putting the difference between man and beaſt, ſaith, The difference betvvixt man and beaſt. Man and beaſt agree in this, that both of them haue one ſenſitiue power, and one ſelfe ſame imagination of things perceiued by the ſenſes: and that they differ, onely in this, that man hath yet further, a reaſon and minde aboue the beaſt, which the beaſt hath not.

In man is, as it were, an abridgement of God, and the worlde: of God, in reſpect of ſpirite, and of the worlde, in compoſition of the body. As if God in his diuine purpoſe, out of his aboundant wiſedome, woulde ſet foorth a Mirrour of his woorkes, by reducing into a little compaſſe, both the infinitneſſe of his owne nature, and the hugeneſſe of the whole world together.

A great learned man endeuoring to expreſſe the ſame, Dupleiſis c. 14 the trunes of chriſtian Religion. ſaith: We ſee in mans body, a wonderfull mixture of the foure Elements, the veines ſpreading foorth like riuers, to the vttermoſt members, as many inſtruments of ſenſe, as there be ſenſible natures in the worlde: a great number of ſinnewes, fleſhſtrings, and knitters, a head, by ſpeciall priuiledge directed vp to heauen, handes ſeruing to all maner of ſeruices: whatſoeuer hee is that ſhall conſider no more, but onely this inſtrument, without life, without ſence, and without mouing, cannot but thinke verily, that it is made to very great purpoſe, & hee muſt needes crie out, that man is a miracle, which farre ſurmounteth, not onely thoſe lower Elements, but alſo the very heauen, and all the ornaments thereof. But if he could out of himſelfe beholde his owne body receiuing life, and enter into the vſe of al his motions, hee woulde bee rauiſhed with the conſideration thereof. But if hee enter into conſideration of his immortall and reaſonable ſoule, it woulde drawe him from the earth to the heauenly creatures; and aboue them, to the preſence of god, from things ſubiect to mortallitie, to the excellencie of all eternitie.

As there is a contrarietie of the Elementes among themſelues directly one againſt the other: yet theſe, by equall mixture make a temperament; ſo betwixt the ſoule and body, the one beeing an immortall ſpirite, the other corrupt and tranſitorie: yet they put together, make a perfect man. Man, by his reaſonable ſoule, and yet no man without the body. So the reaſonable man conſiſteth of bodie and ſoule: for without the Spirite and ſoule, it were but a lumpe of earth, and without the materiall body, it were onely an immortall ſpirite.

This is the miraculous woorke of God, as it were, to ioyne mortalitie and immortalitie together in marriage: the immortall ſpirite as the head and husband, and the mortall body as the ſpouſe, to obey. Theſe two in the firſt creation, made perfect man; and this perfect man, which is properly vnderſtoode by the inwarde man, was indued with perfect, right, and true Reaſon.

Sect. IIII. The definition of Reaſon.

FEaring to exceede the boundes of Reaſon, wherof I haue had care to conſider, becauſe I finde the depth thereof to be without the comprehenſion of men: I ſay, for my ſelfe, as Cyprianus Leonitius ſpake concerning his ſtudy of Aſtronomy, though he could not attaine the fulneſſe thereof, yet, Est aliquod prodire tenus, ſi nō datur vltra: there is a proceeding to ſome good purpoſe, though all cannot be knowen. And as Lactantius ſaide of the Labours of Hercules, that they were Opera viri fortis, viri tamen, the works of a ſtrong man, yet of a man: ſhewing there were imperfections in them: ſo may it bee ſaide of the beſt Labours of menne, that they come ſhorte of perfection. In like I may ſay of this thing which I deſire to explane by definition, and am driuen to confeſſe as Beza ſaieth of theſe wordes, 1. Cor. 11 10. Propter Angelos. Quid hoc ſit, nondum mihi constat, what this worde Reaſon meaneth, I yet thorowly knowe not. But, ſubmitting my vnderſtanding vnto her worthineſſe, I make bolde to explane her in the moſt woorthy ſorte I can attaine vnto.

The Latine woorde is Ratio, It is Engliſhed by diuerſe Authours, and called by diuerſe Titles which allude towardes a definition. It is ſayde to be, Reaſon, Counſel, Purpoſe, Care, Reſpect, Conſideration, Regarde, the Cauſe, the Matter, the State, the Meanes, the Way, the Faſhion, the Forme, the Proportion, a Rule, the Feate, the Manner and ſort, a Mind, a Counſell, Aduiſe, an Accompt, or reckoning, Buſineſſe, Valew, Affaires; And laſtly, the Quantitie, wherein is to be obſerued, that out of the ſeuerall cauſes, wherevnto the ſcope of the Authors tended, theyr writings haue affoorded theſe ſeuerall names or titles, deſcribing in parte, by them, the nature and qualitie of Reaſon.

Others haue gone further, ſaying, Reaſon is the eie of the Soule, whereby ſhee looketh into things, paſt, preſent, and to come.

She is ſaide to be, The Empreſſe of the Senſes, The Queene of Will, An Apprehenſion of Heauenly and Diuine things, The daughter of Ʋnderstanding.

Reaſon is, by ſome, termed, A worde of diuine inspiration, agreeing with that ſpeach of Architus, where hee ſaieth, God breathed Reaſon into Man.

Reaſon is ſaide to be, Aprudent guide of the Soule in her actions: Shee is ſaide to be, The Medicine of the Soule.

Heſiodus comming very neere the marke, ſaith, Reaſon is a diuine guide and wiſedome inspired from aboue.

Ratio est quaedam tacita facultas inſita mentibus hominum, August. apud Iuriſc. Reaſon is a certaine ſecret faculty ingrafted in the mindes of men.

Ratio est rerum humanarum & diuinarum indagatrix, According to the ſchoolemen. quoad cauſas. Reaſon is a ſearcher out of humane and diuine things, in reſpect of the cauſes thereof.

Ratio est rerum omnium ſcrutinum & moderamen, quoad modos, Reaſon is a finder out, and gouernour of all thinges, as concerning the manner thereof.

So haue theſe men with great indeuour expreſſed their mindes and vnderſtandings, which I reuerently accompt of.

But Reaſon being not defineable, Ʋt illud quod conſistit ex materia, as material things are, muſt needs be an immortall qualitie or facultie of the Soule, if not eſſentiall (which I haue reaſon to conceiue) yet at the leaſt vnſeparable, exerciſing many offices as inſtruments, or intelligencers of Cauſes, according to hir emploiment.

Out of which Conſiderations, theſe ſayings haue proceeded.

Domina & Regina omnium est ratio, quae connexa per ſe, et progreſſa, longiùs fit perfecta virtus haec, vt imperet illi parti animi quae obedire debet: Id videndum eſt viro: quonam modo inquies? velut ſeruo Dominus, velut Imperator militi, velut parens filio: Reaſon is the Lady and Queene of all thinges, which firſt vnited by it ſelfe, and proceeding further, is made a perfect virtue: and how ſhe ought to rule that parte of the minde which ought to obey, euery man muſt conſider. But you wil aske, in what maner ſhe ſhoulde rule? Surely euen as a maiſter ruleth his ſeruants, an emperour his ſouldier, and as a father his ſonne.

Nihil eſt, Cic. de legibus. non dicam, in homine, ſed in omni ſolo, at que terra, ratione diuinius, quae cum adoleuit, atque perfecta eſt, nominatur ritè ſapientia: There is nothing, I will not ſay in man, but in all the world, more diuine than Reaſon; the which, when it is growne ripe, and come to perfection, is truly called Wiſedome.

Vt patrimonium homini ab homine Cic. de nat. Deorum. relinquitur, ſic ratio homini à Deo. As a patrimony is beſtowed from man to man, ſo is Reaſon giuen as a portion from God to man. 2. Tnſc.

Cùm praecipitur vt nobiſmet ipſis imperemus, hoc praecipitur, vt ratio coerciat temeritatem: When this is commaunded, that wee ſhould rule our ſelues, this is intended, that Reaſon ſhould bridle Raſhneſſe.

Sect. V. The diuiſion of Reaſon, and the errour in vnderſtanding thinges to proceede of Reaſon that doe not.

REaſon is of two ſorts; ſimple, right, and true.

Subtile, corrupt, and falſe, as by the maner of Schoole diſtinctions is manifeſt.

The manner of reaſoning with right and true Reaſon, they call, Logicke.

The arguing with falſe and corrupt Reaſon, they call, Sophiſtrie.

But before we enter into this diuiſion, it ſhal be very neceſſarie, firſt to diſcouer the cōmon error of men, who vnderſtand many things to proceed of Reaſon, that in truth do not; which being manifeſted, will bee an eaſier way to take knowledge of the reſt.

And for the better vnderſtanding hereof let vs take them as they offer themſelues to be diſcouered.

Firſt, things that haue being only, attaine not to Reaſon, for ſo haue ſtones. Things that haue being and life only, reach not neere Reaſon, for ſo haue trees. To haue being, life, & ſence only comprehend things ſeeming to proceed of Reaſon, as beaſts who yet faile thereof. And becauſe beaſtes in many things haue a neerenes vnto Reaſon, being creatures in degree next vnto men. Let vs peruſe ſomethings in them which doe deceiue men, and wherein moſt men do erre. To mooue, to feed, to ſleepe, to wake, to ſee, ſmell or ſence any thing, commeth not to Reaſon: to feare, to eſchew, to deſire, to diſcerne, to imagine, to generate, nor to preſerue the young, commeth not to right Reaſon. Barely to preuent iminent dangers proceedeth not of Reaſon, for the beaſts enioy all theſe, and will flee from their purſuers and eſchew to caſt themſelues headlong from any high place. Bare knowledge proceedeth not of Reaſons, for the birdes know their mates, be they neuer ſo like to others of their plume, they know the paſſage to and from their breeding places, and prouide for, and feed their young, they build curious neſts to preſerue their egges, they ſit and hatch their young, and know the times of the yeare for that purpoſe, and the ſtrength of their broode to make ſhift for themſelues before they will leaue to feede them. In theſe matchings and keeping to their mated Companions without change, though they proceed not of right Reaſon, according to the qualitie of the ſoules Reaſon, yet may they teach many that come ſhort of that dutie, and yet hold themſelues to be poſſeſſed of Reaſon.

Barely to make prouiſion for a future time, to put in ſtore, or to hide from waſting and deſtruction, commeth not to that which is called right Reaſon; for ſo doth the field mouſe, who makes her way into the ground, and chuſing the beſt graines that are in the eare ſhe there placeth it in great abundance for her winter prouiſion, and ſo ordereth the matter, that ſhe keepeth them drie, as they may not growe with the moiſture.

The wood-bucke hordeth vp his nettes, and the Ante her prouiſion againſt winter. But enter duely into conſideration of the Bee, (with whō I will conclude) her continuall labor, cunning working, preſeruing her food, and their knowledge and gouernment, and obedience: And therin may a man, euen with ſhame behold his owne faultes, that ſuch excellent matters ſhould proceed from ſo ſmall creatures voide of Reaſon, & only pertakers of ſence. Spare your patience to peruſe the order of their employments a little at large.

Firſt, beeing ſmall and puiſill creatures, they gather themſelues together into multitudes without confuſion. They inhabite and dwell together without diſcord, they continue in one houſe together without alteration, they ioyne in working together without larre, they giue roome one to another without annoy, the vnburdened to the laden without reſiſtance, they ioyne to defend themſelues againſt ſtrangers, they rob not one anothers houſe, be they neuer ſo many. And in their neighbourhood they haue a kind of regard and knowledge one of another; and like a common wealth, as it were, they ioyne to ſuppreſſe others that are of another garden, they diſpoſe of their dead out of the hiue, leaſt they ſhould annoy, and ſuffer their young to grow and come to maturitie. And as they ſuffer their young to feede on their labour, ſo doe they expell and chace away the idle drones and ſluggardes. In their labour they prouide for two things, hony for their food and waxe to make them welles to put the ſame in: the moſt skillfull workman in the world cannot frame a more artificiall worke then they, who ioyne together in their framing the waxen veſſels in an admirable forme, that the walles of one worke ſerueth ten ſeuerall vſes, it is a ſquare, it ſelfe ſeruing for foure ſides in that worke, & for foure other ſides to the foure conioyning neighboures, either botom ſerueth for two veſſelles, euery place after it is full is ſo faſt walled, that nothing can fall out, and ſo wel couered, that nothing can come in: the whole worke is ſo ſtrongly wrought together, that it falleth not off from the place where it is firſt faſtened, that after a kind of artificiall & geometricall proportion of ponderoſitie, it rather ſeemeth to be pendent, than ſupported by any thing. And marke it well, you ſhall finde the hollow places, where the hony is ſetled, in ſuch ſort and order, as it may be come at, without harming, or marring any other veſſell. They labour all together, and they feede all together, and if they want, they periſh all together. They obey their king, to depart from their habitation vpon warning. As they were bred all together, ſo they depart all together, and it is holden, that they chuſe a place where to repoſe themſelues, before they leaue their former home: but at the leaſt, it is very euident they continue and keepe together, as it were, a ſworne, vnited, and incorporate houſholde, to partake good or euill, as it befalleth. They make their way thorow the ayre, and knowe how to returne. Their painful trauell in ſummer, manifeſts they haue knowledge winter will come.

If any company of men did ioyne themſelues together, and performe this kinde of ſeruice for the mutuall good one of another, woulde it not bee holden for the miracle of the world? or if any man woulde ſo order himſelfe after that ſort, in the gouernement of himſelfe, his paſſions, actions, and affections, in his little worlde, woulde he not be eſteemed, the rareſt of al that liue? Conſider theſe thinges well, and marke what excellent partes of nature there are herein perfourmed, by theſe ſeely ſenſitiue creatures.

Howe many men liue that will iudge otherwiſe, than that the doing of theſe things proceede from right and true Reaſon, and yet in very trueth they doe not? They are onely thoſe benefites of Nature which God hath beſtowed on theſe kinde of creatures, and tend onely, and no further than to a temporary, a dying, finiſhing, corruptible, and ending ſcope: for the creatures themſelues, and their liues being corruptible, their actions and dooings can tend no further than to the extreame and vttermoſt of their liues, which Nature taught them to preſerue by theſe meanes.

Sect. VI. Vnto what things right Reaſon reacheth.

BVt, right and true reaſon duely conſidered, is of a farre higher, and more excellent qualitie, it extendeth it ſelfe into thinges corruptible and incorruptible, and it reacheth into the things paſt, things preſent, & thinges to come.

Firſt let vs looke howe it extendeth it ſelfe into the ſolide and maſſie parte of the earth. Reaſon diſcouereth both the matter and forme thereof. The ſuperficies, and the Chaos, or Cuball partes, it vnderſtandeth, that in her intrailes are many veines for water to paſſe, concaue places for the ayre, mettalls of gold, ſiluer, copper, yron, tinne, lead, ſtone, and other excellent things. Reaſon hath ſearched into the refining of things into a perfection, which Nature it ſelfe hath not yet brought to maturity and ripenes: Reaſon hath put a diſtinction betwene thoſe mettalls, either for their worthines, or baſenes. And out of the conſideration of the matter and forme thereof, by the whole, and by their partes, Reaſon taketh knowledge of God their firſt Creator. All which, the onely ſenſitiue parte of beaſts, or men, doe not conceiue nor vnderſtand.

Reaſon entreth into the conſideration of the diuerſitie of creatures, and their creation.

What other thing than the reaſon of man hath found out, the virtues & operations of trees, plants, & herbes? or diſcouered, that ſome one thing ſhall haue diuers powers, virtues, and workings, in diuerſe partes thereof, colde without, hote within, of one colour in the outſide, of an other in the ſubſtance, colde in the leafe, hote in the roote, and of an other operation in the rhinde. Reaſon informeth to appoynt ſome hearbes to bee eaten, ſome for Phyſicke, ſome to be vſed in hote cauſes, others in cold; nay more, Reaſon hath ſearched into the very ſolide bodies and ſubſtance of things, as to vnderſtand what ſpeciall vertue is in golde, ſiluer, copper, yron, and other mettalles: in trees, plants, and hearbes, and to extract and drawe from them their principal and beſt vertues, and to make vſe of them for his owne purpoſe, deſcending, as it were, into the very nature, and condition of Nature it ſelfe, to help the imperfections of Nature in ſome part. And ſuch other rare and excellent things (as being truly conſidered) muſt needes bee adiudged to proceede from a nature of deeper vnderſtanding than all the others, that are meerely ſenſitiue.

Of beaſts and birds, Reaſon chuſeth, ſome for meate, and others for other vſes, as our common experience doth teach vs.

If we conſider the workes that are written by prophane men, of Geometrie, Geographie, Arithmeticke, Aſtronomy, Aſtrologie, Muſicke, the liberall Sciences, the Menſuration of the earth, the Altitude, Longitude, Craſſitude, Magnitude, Oppoſitions, Coniunctions, Aſpects, Motions, Progreſſions, Retrogradations, Courſes, and Spheres of the celeſtiall bodies of the Zodiake, the Climates, Horizons, Tropiks, Poles, & Zones of the mouing ſtarres, and how they finiſh their courſes, of the Orbes, & their ſpaciouſneſſe, of their conuex partes, and their abſides, of their natures and gouernement they haue ouer mortall creatures, of the Compoſition of Elements: who can iudge otherwiſe than that theſe things are wrought into men, by the excellent part of Reaſon?

If in mechanicall Trades, we obſerue the curious building of houſes, the mollifying of harde things to bee wrought by fire, to make ſollide things fuſible, & liquide things hard, the forging of yron, and other mettalles, the curious ſpinning, and exquiſite needle-worke, the faſhioning of things fitte for mens bodies, the Arte of Printing, and a thouſand other things which we ſee daily in our view. And among all the reſt, theſe ordinary things, the vſe of our ſpeach and diſcourſing, our reading, and writing, and vnderſtanding of languages, which being properly ours, by Reaſon, ought to bee contained within the bounds of Reaſon.

As the reaſonable ſoule hath both contemplated, and made vſe of all theſe things, ſo hath ſhe repaire, euen to the preſence of God himſelfe; and though ſhe be neuer abſent from the bodie during life, yet is ſhe not ſo included in the bodie, as that ſhee is not at one ſelfe ſame inſtant in other places wee ſee by theſe examples aforeſaid, that ſhe maketh her paſſage into things that cannot be touched, nor compaſſed otherwiſe, then by vnderſtanding and Reaſon.

Obſerue it in thy ſelfe, and thou ſhalt find thou maiſt ſend thy minde, reaſon, and vnderſtanding, into the furtheſt part of the world, and call it backe in a moment, though thy bodie ſtirre not.

If any man be of opinion, that his ſoule and Reaſon are ſhut faſt in his bodie, and that the bodie carrieth the Soule, the minde, and Reaſon, at his pleaſure, he is much deceiued; for if he looke truly into his owne actions, he ſhal rather find, that the ſoule doth carrie, and moue the body from place to place as the mind and Reaſon liketh.

For conſider the poſſibilitie of the one, and impoſſibilitie of the other: the Soule may liue and moue without the body, but the body cannot poſſibly moue without the ſoule. Therefore, as life conſiſteth in the Soule, ſo do the moouings or ſtirrings of the body proceed of the power and working of the ſoule.

Therfore, as the ſoule is in the bodie, and in euery part thereof, by all, and by the whole, ſo is the bodie conueyed and mooued by the Soule, in all, and euery part of the body, the actiue part of man is the Soule, and the paſſiue part is his body.

Marke thine owne actions, and and thou ſhalt ſee and plainely diſcouer it to be true: haſt thou a iourney in hand? thy vnderſtanding, mind, & Reaſon doth firſt determine and appoint, before thou mooue to vndertake the labour; nay, when thy body lieth ſtill, thy mind and Reaſon worketh. Be thou in priſon, thy mind is buſie abroade, and Reaſon ſetteth her ſelfe aworke, how to procure the enlargement of that bodie of thine, that cannot ſtirre a foote out of the doore, and if thy bodie were as eaſely conueied, as thy minde and Reaſon, thou ſhouldeſt not long remaine in durance: But they may not depart abſolutely from thee, & leaue thee a liuing creature. Thus is it plaine that the Soule, the mind, and Reaſon, do carry, & cauſe the bodies motions, and it is not the bodie that carrieth the Soule.

What cauſed Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the Greekes to repaire to the ſchollers of Treſmegistes, the Egiptians to the Caldeans and Hebrues, for the learning of Philoſophie, but Reaſon, and the Motion of the mind, for the worthines of that worthie ſcience? The like may be ſaid of Archimides, Sulpitius, Gallus, Thales, Iupiter, Belus, Socrates, and others concerning Astrologie.

Whoſoeuer ſhall looke curiouſly into the admirable works of Arithmeticke, and Geometrie, and proportions therof, done by Pithagoras, Eudoxus, Euclides, Archimedes and Treſmegistes, ſhall be driuen of neceſſitie, to confeſſe, verie rare, curious, and profitable helpes by them to bee effected and publiſhed, to the good of the world. And who can but wonder at the worke of Archimedes, who by thoſe reaſons, found out, what ſeuerall mettalls were in the Kings Crowne, and how much there was of euery mettall, without either melting, or taking it in ſunder. Plutarch in the life of Solon and Lycurgus.

If it be demaunded what cauſed Solon and Lycurgus to trauell into Egypt, to learne rudiments and lawes to bring their people into a reaſonable gouernment, It will be anſwered that the inclination they had to draw rude and confuſed matters to ſome reaſonable head and order, moued them to take that paines. The lawes of dominion and propertie of things, both reall and perſonal, of mixt and entire, are drawne out of Reaſon, and all their braunches ought to bee tied faſt thereunto. The law of ſeueritie and puniſhment, are in the nature of keeping the guiltleſſe from receiuing wrong, and are as a protection for the well gouerned, not drawne out of an vnreaſonable deſire of puniſhment, without cauſe, or tormenting the offender in reſpect of his perſon, but to take off the offence.

In the orderly or fit doing of any thing, the mind and Reaſon beginne their work at the latter end, and at the effect; as in building a houſe, Reaſon hath laid the whole plot, and the cauſe to what end it is built, before any ſtone be laid.

In any iourny, Reaſon, either hath, or ſhould ſet downe the probabilitie of good to enſue therof.

What cauſed the men of auncient time to enter into conſideration of eternitie, and to ſearch into the difference of things immortall, and things tranſitorie, ſubiect to corruption, of the beginning & ending of time, and of the world, and that time is not in reſpect of God and eternitie, but of things that had beginnings, and paſſe with time: and whoſoeuer ſhall looke into the workes of Homer, Heſiodus, Parminides, Mercurius, Sophocles, Aeſchylus, Euripides, and others, ſhall finde that this Soules qualitie of Reaſon, euen out of nature it ſelfe, had ſearched farre into theſe deepe matters.

It is amongſt the Philoſophers agreed, that there is in man a double ſpeach, the one, in the mind before we vtter it, and the other is called, the ſpeach of the voyce, vttered with the mouth; the one priuate, the other ſerueth to publiſh that which the minde and vnderſtanding haue conceiued and determined to manifeſt.

The learned tranſlatours of the Greeke word, Logos, ſomtimes call it ſpeach, ſomtimes, word, and ſometimes, Reaſon, and it alludeth to this, Ʋox praefert, animus ratiocinatur mentis verbum ipſa ratio est. The voice vttereth the mind, reaſoneth, and debateth, & ſo Reaſon is the very word or ſpeach of the mind. And as it is fitlie ſaid, that what proportion is between the voyce or ſpeach of the mind; the like is betweene the ſpeach of the mind, and the ſpeach of vnderſtanding, the voyce hath neede of aire, and is diuided into partes, and requireth leaſure, the minde is indiuiſible, but yet hath neede to paſſe from one concluſion or Reaſon to another. But vnderſtanding accompliſheth his action or working in leſſe then a moment, & with one only act filleth the Reaſon and minde that it is conſtrayned to make many acts of one: ſo that there is ſuch an indiuiſible vniting and putting together of vnderſtanding, mind, and reaſon, in the Soule, that they may not be parted, nor be one without the other. For which cauſe, Reaſon is properly ſaid to bee the daughter, ſpeach, or word of our vnderſtanding. That nature and abilitie of working of the Soule, which the Latines call Mens, the French tranſlators vnderſtand to be the reaſonable Soule. And as there is deſcribed to bee in the reaſonable Soule, working, vnderſtanding, and willing, ſo are not theſe, three liues, nor three ſoules in vs, but one life, & one ſoule. And theſe are three powers, which the reaſonable and immortall ſoule cannot want. The like is ſaid of the memorie of vnderſtanding, or of mindefull vnderſtanding, to be an aboundance of reaſon, and as it were a hoorder vp of the continuall influences of the minde, which minde Auerhos and Alexander tearme, the workefull minde, which is, a power, or force, that can skill to extend reaſon from one thing to an other, which they alſo conclude to be vncorruptible, euerlaſting, and diuine: and by this Minde, is vnderſtoode, the immortall reaſonable ſoule of man. And, as a great learned man, writing of the corruption of mans nature, ſheweth, that the worlde, and all the creatures were made for the vſe of man, and commending the vnderſtanding and reaſon of man; Hee firſt ſpeaking of the other creatures, ſayth, To what purpoſe are all their virtues, and excellent properties, if themſelues know them not?

The Sunne, ſaith he, excelleth among the Coeleſtiall bodies, and the Roſe among the flowers: The beaſt is a degree aboue the trees: But what skilles it, what thou arte, or what thou haſt, if thou know it not, nor vnderſtand it. For what auaileth the light to the blinde, meate to him that cannot taſte, ſweete odours to him that ſmelleth not? Or, what auaileth the excellencie of thy Creation, or thy reaſonable and immortall Soule, if thou diſcerne not the woorthineſſe thereof?

By the meanes of Reaſon, onely man of all the things in this inferior world, can skill of theſe things, and how to enioy them, and ſo of force it may rightly and truely be concluded, that they were made for none, but for him. That is, to ſpeake more properly, God hath giuen vnto man, al, and whatſoeuer al other creatures, either haue, or be, and hath not dealt with him, barely, as with a creature, but rather, as with his owne childe: for whome he hath expreſly created this world, and giuen it him to poſſeſſe; and beſides, gaue him an vnderſtanding mind and reaſon (which I ſo much labour to aduance) to enioy, gouerne, and order the ſame.

Yet to drawe Reaſon a little higher: this excellent qualitie in the ſoule of man, by ſome is vnderſtoode to be a religious regard, and vnderſtanding of God, and to walke in his ſeruice, and a continuall obſeruation of good things that tend to immortalitie. For as death ſeparateth the body and ſoule for a time, ſo doth the ſoule carry with it ſo much of his ſubſtāce, power, & quality, as it firſt brought, that is, ſpirite, life, reaſon, and will: which it ſhall bring to the bodie againe, at the time of their ſecond vniting. Agayne, if Reaſon bee the Daughter, & Vnderſtanding, which is a chiefe power of the ſoule, be the Mother, then are theſe co-relatiues, and the one can not be without the other. The ſoule cannot be without vnderſtanding, and vnderſtanding cannot be without reaſon; therefore, as the ſoule is an immortall ſubſtāce, ſo is vnderſtanding an immortal power, and reaſon an immortall quality of the ſoule.

The word Logos which the tranſlators of the Greeke many times call Reaſon or word, is ſaid by the diuines to be incarnate by the holy ghoſt, to make the ſonne of God, the ſecond perſon in the Trinity, whome we acknowledge and beleeue to bee ſubſiſting of a reaſonable Soule, and humane fleſh. To whome the Philoſophers giue the names of the Be-er or hee that is, Wit, or Vnderſtanding, the beautiful, and ſometimes, ſpeach, word, reaſon, wiſedome, Son, and the begotten, which Reaſon they affirme to be engendered of the vnderſtanding, and to be as the light of the vnderſtanding, and dependeth thereupon.

This is the Image of God which we beare about vs, our immortall reaſonable Soule, as if wee behold with the eyes of our vnderſtanding, how the Sonne of God vouchſafeth vs a brotherhoode, we cannot be ignorant of.

Right Reaſon therefore out of all theſe collections hath a place aboue al the vegitatiue & ſenſitiue creaturs, and aboue all materiall things whatſoeuer, yea, the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, and firmament of heauen, & is that which Salomō deſired at the hands of God, when he prayed to haue that vnderſtanding which ſate next vnto the Throne of God.

So is Reaſon placed next vnto God himſelfe, the worthineſſe wherof is ſeene in this, that in the diuine conſideration of Gods eternitie, his prouidence and purpoſe of creation of things for his owne honour. One man, through his reaſonable and immortal ſoule, was more precious, and of greater value, than all the whole mould of the Earth, and all the creatures thereupon creeping, mouing and being. Beſides this, it is moſt apparant, that in the time of Innocency and perfection of man. Reaſon was not attainted, infected, incombred, nor auoided with inordinate luſt, deſires, affections, nor paſſions, which now are crept in, and haue incorporated themſelues in him, no, the very free will of man had not originally place aboue Reaſon, but was at her commaund, and ſubiect vnto reaſon. An example whereof no man ſhall need go farre to ſeeke, for if hee truly ſuruey the corners of his owne heart, and contemplate what perfectiōs he deſireth to haue which he wanteth, hee ſhall finde what man had, and are nowe impayred. And conſidder well with thy ſelfe, what thon arte without reaſon, and thou ſhalt finde thy condition worſe than the ſtate of a bruite beaſt.

Thus haue I made bolde, and that rightly, and truely, to drawe Reaſon, and her immortall Soule, from theſe baſe and earthly things, and place her in her owne throne, euen next vnto God, aboue all corruptible things, among the immortall ones, and neereſt vnto Eternitie it ſelfe, whoſe pallace, ſeate, and gouernement we may behold, onely with the eies of our vnderſtanding, for thereby wee are vnited vnto the God of heauen, and ſelected from corruptible thinges, and thereby our mortall bodies ſhall put on immortalitie.

As the Sunne in his ſphere taketh his courſe, betweene the firmament, and the lower Elementes, extending his beames to the remoteſt places of them both: ſo doth reaſon in the immortal ſoule of man, during this naturall life, wait betweene heauen and earth, and by no meanes can be encloſed in the earths body, as by theſe twoo reaſons may appeare. If the ſoule leaue the body, and departe into heauen, ſhe caries reaſon with hir, and the body becommeth earth againe: or if the body carry the ſoule, and reaſon, into the depth of thearth, or offer to include her in the maſſie lump thereof, preſently, the ſoule flieth from the body, and reaſon abſolutely departeth: reaſon is a thing of more excellencie, than that ſenceleſſe parte of the worlde can containe, or whereto ſhee ought to be made ſubiect.

This is truely her Monarchie, if ſhee haue her owne, and due birthright; a power, a commaund, and authority ouer al the actions, paſſions, imaginations, and fantaſies of menne: and her feate ought to be aboue the thoughts and conceits of the wiſeſt. Who can meaſure her territories, or poſſeſſions? when the mind and reaſon of man extendeth both generally and particularly into all cauſes on the earth, the aire, the powers, of heauen, the firmament it ſelfe, nay into heauen it ſelfe, and to the very Sonne of God, who in excellencie far ſurmounteth the Angels, & ſitteth at his right hand, poſſeſſed with the reaſonable ſoule of man, and in him ſitteth right reaſon, next vnto the throne of God?

If any haue knowledge by what means to augmēt the vnderſtanding thereof, let him put his helping hand for this Empreſſe is hardly beſett in hir Monarchie, & almoſt pulled frō her throne, and her Scepter troden vnder foote: And ſo leauing to ſpeake further of that excellent, true, and perfect quality, I make her place knowne, and leaue her to maintaine her title as ſhe may, being much diſtreſſed in her gouernment.

Sect. VII. Of Reaſon corrupted.

IT needeth no more proof to maintaine the argument of innocencie and perfection in the reaſonable ſoule of man, but that God was the Creator thereof, from whom could proceede nothing but good. There needeth no further proofe to diſcouer, that this perfection and innocencie is corrupted and impaired, but euery particular mans examination of his owne actions, thoughts, and wordes, that daily and hourely paſſe from him. For if any man wil take any one day, a note of all the words hee hath ſpoken, and examine the next day, how inſufficient and vaine the moſt of them haue beene, he ſhall neede no other Iudge but his owne conſcience. If he ſhall an other day record all his thoughts, and after trie their conſonancie with reaſon, I leaue to him that ſhall make proofe thereof, what he will cenſure in that behalfe.

And if any will peruſe his acts & deeds, euen in ſome things that are now lawfull and honeſt, he ſhal finde nature ſimply aſhamed of them to be diſcouered, bicauſe they were not originally in partes of nature, but are ſithence crept in by corruption. Any that will duly looke into theſe cauſes, ſhall plainely find himſelfe depriued of all perfection and innocencie, and his owne ſoule to be polluted with wickednes, and all the powers and qualities thereof; yea his vnderſtanding, reaſon, and will, to be peruerted, and nature it ſelfe preuaricated.

In the firſt creation, mans vnderſtanding, wit, and reaſon, extended only to the knowledge of good: his will was then tied to obey reaſon: And in that time was not his nature, Soule, nor reaſon polluted with fond luſt, wicked deſires, inordinate affections, intemperate paſſions, nor vaine and idle fancies. But this perfection and innocencie remained not long, before the cunning Sophiſter, enticed by perſwaſions, the will, mind, Soule, and reaſon of man, to vndertake a worke that wrought his confuſion, and corrupted all theſe good partes. To dilate therof, I forbeare, becauſe none can doubt of the trueth of that generall ouerthrow of mans eſtate, life, ſoule, reaſon and will; and concluding that with an affirmatiue, that corruption came in by ſinne, I will proceed to the reſt as the cauſe offereth.

Since, and in the inſtant time of this ouerthrow, there are growne into the very nature of man, and of his Soule and Reaſon, pride, lust, ſelf-will, ennie, hatred, anger, ſorrow, deceipt, falſhoode, partialitie, and infinite other paſſions and affections, (which for breuity I omit to ſpeake of) haue thruſt themſelues into this Monarchie, and wonderfully and vniuerſally oppoſed themſelues, and rebelled againſt their Empreſſe, and her eſtate, and kingdome, and grieuouſly and ſorely rebelled againſt her iuſt gouernment, ſetting vp new courſes and orders; inſomuch as Seneca in his time complained, Ceſſero publicaiura priuatis, & cepit licitim eſſe quod publicum est. Plotinus. 1. lib. 4. ca. 1 And Plotinus entring into conſideration hereof, doth as it were, wonder thereat, ſaying, what ſhould be the cauſe, that our ſoules, being of a diuine nature, ſhuld ſo farre forget God their father, and their kindred, and themſelues? And making the anſwere thereto himſelfehe ſaith. The beginning of this miſchiefe, was acertaine raſhneſſe, and ouer boldneſſe, throgh which they would needes plucke their necks out of the Coller, and bee at their owne commaundement. By which abuſe, turning their libertie into licentiouſneſſe, they went cleane backe, and are ſo farre gone away from God, that like children being newly weyned, are by and by conueyed from their parents, & know, neither whoſe, nor what they be, nor from whence they come. Plotin. 1. li. 8. cap. 4. And in another place beewailing this corruption, hee ſaith; The ſoule which was bredd for heauenly things, hath plunged it ſelfe in theſe materiall things, and matter of it ſelfe euill, that not onlie all that is of matter, or matched with matter, but alſo euen that which hath reſpect vnto matter, is filled with euill, as the eye that beholds darknes is filld with darknes

Hierocles the ſtoicke against Atheists ſaith, that man is of his owne motion enclined to follow the euill, and to leaue the good: there is, ſaith he, a certain ſtrife bred in his affectiōs, which ſtepping vp againſt the will of nature, hath made it to tumble from heauen to hell.

The Auncient Philoſophers, taking conſideration of the number of affections, and paſſions, wherewith the Soule and Reaſon of man is infected and corrupted, which Plutark affirmeth to be much more ſorrowful, and grieuous then the bodily diſeaſes, endeuouring to reduce and bring thoſe intemperate affections, and paſſions, to ſome reaſonable order, haue made diuers books of Moral vertues and lawes, and giuen ſundry rules, ordinances, and precepts, to bring them to obediēce. In which their exceeding painefull works, they poſitiuely inueigh againſt the rebelliouſnes that is naturally in vs, againſt Reaſon, that is, the rebelliouſnes that is crept in by this corruption of nature. Theſe rebellious affections & paſſions are not as ſpottes or ſtaynes, that may be waſhed, or clenſed out of nature, but a deepe impreſſion in nature, with much ado to be reſtrained and held ſhort, but neuer vtterly to be ſubdued or ouercome; whervpon it is very fitly ſaid by a man of great learning. Seeing that reaſon is ſomuch more excelēt then paſſion or affection, as the formes, ſhape, or faſhion is more excellent then the matter, or ſtuffe, wherein it is.

Whence commeth this infection in vs, that maketh the matter to ouermaiſter the forme, and cauſeth the form, as it were, to receiue ſhape and faſhion of the matter, that is to ſay, which putteth Reaſon in ſubiection to paſſions, and to the impreſſion which affection yeeldeth, contrary to the order which is in al the world beſide?

What elſe is this intemperance of man but Reaſon, as it now remaineth inwrought or ingrauen with luſt & concupiſcence? what is anger, but Reaſon, attainted with choſer, &c. Nō ſic ſuit ab initie. It was not ſo in the firſt creation. The motions of luſt, anger, and intemperance which now rule men againſt Reaſon, were not in the originall nature of man, neither proceed they of the firſt creation: for then would not nature be aſhamed of them as you ſee it now is. Theſe motions are crept in ſince by corruption. And therefore the grieuing that happeneth to men by thoſe paſſions, is a working of nature, which is aſhamed to play the bruit beaſt.

There are deſcribed to be in the reaſonable ſoule of man foure powers or abilities, firſt, Witte ſecondly, Will, thirdly, an abilitie of being angrie, fourthly, an Abillitie of Lusting. In thoſe foure abilities the Philoſophers haue entended to place foure vertues. In wit, wiſdome, in will, righteouſneſſe; in the abilitie of being angrie valor; in the abilitie of luſt Staidneſſe. Theſe powers, abilities, & vertues are maymed. And thoſe abilities haue not thoſe vertues, Wit is maymed with ignorance; Wil, with doing wrong; Valor, with cowardice Staidenes, with licentiouſnes.

Beſides the outward fences, imagination, and appetite, which are cō mon to beaſtes, man had wit or reaſon, and will, of the gift of the creator peculiar to man only; by which wee eſteeme our ſelues better then the beaſts, and in regard therof, we look to haue them in ſubiection vnder vs. And al this Reaſon leadeth vs to vnderſtand. But obſerue the ſequell, and we ſhall find, as the corrupt cō dition of mans nature is now, that whereas imagination ought to rule the fences, will, to rule the appetite, and Reaſon to rule the imagination, it fareth farre otherwiſe, for imagination giueth way to the outward ſenſe: Appetite ruleth will, and imaginatiō carrieth Reaſon at her pleaſure; inſomuch, that the very ſenſuall parte which is the meaneſt, carrieth all the reſt, and maketh Reaſon an vnderling; nay, oft times leaueth Reaſon quite out, and rebelleth againſt her, and ſo this ſpirit and reaſon of ours is forward to nothing but euill, nor enclined to any thing ſaue baſe, and tranſitorie matters. It faſtneth it ſelf to the earth, and is bondſlaue to the bodie.

To diſcouer how farre the auncient Philoſophers (out of ſuch reaſons as they had) waded into theſe cauſes, would require a long worke, therfore a worde or two. Philoſophie it ſelfe is ſaid to be an art of healing the ſoule of the infirmities whereinto it was fallen from hir firſt perfection.

The firſt ſtep thereunto, or precept is, Noſce teipſum, begin to know thy ſelfe.

Aristotle coulde not chuſe but knowe, that the vnderſtanding and minde of man was out of tune, when in his Moralls, he declareth, that the affections ought to be ruled by reaſon, and our mind brought from extreames into the meane, and from iarring into the right tune.

Theophrastus ſaith, that the ſoule payed well for her dwelling in the bodie, conſidering how much it ſuffred by the bodies meanes: ſhewing that he conſidered that corruption was entered into man, euen into his ſoule, mind, and reaſon.

Zoriastres the grand-child of Noa, and auncienteſt of Philoſophers, bewayleth this laps, fall, and digreſſion of the race of mankinde, crying, alas, alas, the whole earth mourneth euen vnto children.

And Hermes in his Poemander giueth it a moſt abſolute concluſion, where he ſaith, God created mā after his owne likeneſſe, and gaue him all things to vſe, but man, in ſteed of ſtaying vpon the beholding of his father, would needes bee medling and doing ſomewhat of himſelfe, and ſo fell from the heauenly contemplation, into the ſphere of elements or generation. And becauſe he had power ouer all things, he began to fall in loue with himſelfe. And gazing and wondring at himſelfe, he was ſo intangled, that he became a bondſlaue to his body, being before at libertie. Which bondage, and abaſing hee intendeth to be in the ſoule, mind, and reaſon of man.

If we ſhall grow a little neerer to this matter, and peruſe an example or two in the holy Booke of God; conſider whether it were corrupt, falſe, and ſophiſticated perſwaſions and Reaſons that the ſerpent vſed to Eue, what Reaſon was that, that led Caine to kill Abell, or the Children of God to be bewitched with the beautie of the daughters of men, or the Caldeans to erect the tower of Babel.

The effect and iſſue will ſhewe what kinde of reaſon it was. By the firſt came the deſtruction and ouerthrowe of all the perfection of man. By the ſecond, a perpetuall curſe to the murtherer, and a continuall anguiſh, ſorrow, and griefe to his heart and ſoule. By the third, an vniuerſall deluge vppon the face of the whole earth: And by the fourth, an vtter confuſion of languages.

God in the creation made al things in order: and Order would that our wit ſhould obey God, and our ſenſes and appetites obey Reaſon. But we ſee apparantly, that for breaking this order, theſe confuſions haue enſued.

If we deſire a plaine demonſtration, let vs looke into our ſelues, by the rule afore preſcribed into things inferior to vs, and into what is aboue, and greater then our ſelues. As the inferior creatures, whereof the ſenſitiue are the chiefeſt, come not neere man in excellency, vnderſtanding, capacitie, nor Reaſon, neither do they ſtriue therein, but abide in their firſt ſtate.

So hath God left in himſelfe, a fulneſſe of perfect and abſolute power, wiſedome, and vnderſtanding, not to be conceiued, nor comprehended by the wit nor reaſon of man, in a farre greater meaſure then mans vnderſtanding and reaſon can attaine vnto, as mans vnderſtanding or reaſon was at any time aboue the beaſts of the earth.

Theſe things he kept abſolutely to himſelfe, to be a Creator, to be obeyed, and to haue none equall, and to keepe all his creatures vnder his ſubiection.

This order muſt man needes be doing withall, it was not inough for him to enioy, and know the good: but he muſt know euill alſo. And in truth, and no doubt, but he extended his reaſon and will to a good end, for he got ſuch a knowledge of euill, and ſo entangled himſelfe therewith, that he abandoned all that was good, and became himſelfe a very maſſe of euill.

Cōſider this reaſon; what would a man think if his horſe ſhuld turne his maſter to eate graſſe, and lodge in the field, & he to feed of the beſt meats, and ſtay in the houſe? Nay come neerer, what if a mans feruant, nay his friend; or to be ſhort, his owne ſonne, would participate in worthineſſe with the father, & take dignity from him, and become the abſolute owner of the fathers poſſeſſion in his life, and make him liue like a ſeruant? I referre the cenſure to the reader, becauſe I know not how neere it may touch him, being matters ſo rife in practiſe.

To drawe towards the concluſion of this parte, it is greatly to be conſidered, that in the eſtimation of the Creator, the reaſonable ſoule of one man is of more value and price then all the territories of the world, euen then the whole earth, and whatſoeuer is in the bowels thereof: Reaſon will compell thee to confeſſe this whether thou wilt or no, in regard of the immortalitie of the one, and corruption and finiſhing of the other.

The earth was the thing giuen; and man the donee, the poſſeſſor is more worth then the thing poſſeſſed, man is much better then money, in that money was made for the vſe of man, and not man for the vſe of mony: but ſee how the vſage thereof agreeth with right and true Reaſon, which is the marke we ſhoote at.

Looke into ſome particulars, and obſerue how many men thou knoweſt, that for ſome ſmall parte of the earth (in compariſon of the whole but a crumme) that had rather ſee the deſtruction of many chriſtian ſoules, then to looſe any part therof, making more of a penny then of the life of his brother. Nay, looke into the will of men, and obſerue therein, whether they regard the ſhedding of blood & murther, ſo much as the ſatisfying their will? What hath bene the cauſe of warres and ſlaughters of men, whereof there remaine ſo many hiſtories: but the breach of Order, and making a fraction of Reaſon.

In the ciuill gouernment of countries, what hath beene the cauſe of iniuries, wrongs, violence, & oppreſſions, peruerting, and corruption of Iuſtice, vntrue ſuggeſtion, periuries, ſubordinations, theftes, robberies, and cruelties, but that men exceede the bounds of right and true Reaſon?

Aske the great man, and the rich, to haue cōmiſeration of the needy, and his hart will be rather enclined to crueltie then pitty, he had rather haue his poore debtors bones to make dice, then become pittifull. Aske the needie, and him that is in diſtreſſe how he findeth it, and hee will ſay, and truely, that the world hath forſaken him, friends fall off, & thoſe of his owne houſe will vſe him, not much better then poore Iob was vſed. But by the way, poore man, take this for thy comfort: thy reaſonable ſoule is better then all the rich mans treaſure, yea then all the earth beſide if thou haue patience for a ſeaſon. To conclude, let euery man repaire home to his conſcience and cloſet of his owne heart, and examine himſelfe before the ſeate of this Empreſſe: Reaſon how much hee eſteemeth and valeweth the landes, riches, and tranſitorie things of the world, aboue the price of his poore brothers Soule and life: nay, to end in a word, then his owne Soule: examine thy ſelfe well, how farre thou wouldeſt extend, thy mind, thy word, thy trauell, thy othe, and thy very Soule, to procure and get a ſmall part of this baſe, tranſitorie, and corrupt world; thou ſhalt need no other ſatisfaction, but that right and true Reaſon is corrupted, impaired, and become ſubiect to that which it ought to gouerne.

Sect. VIII. Reaſons particular gouernement.

HAuing furniſhed the former arguments with ſome matters, the more liuely to expreſſe what they are, namely, the Soule of man immortall, the excellent quallitie of right and true Reaſon, and the corruption thereof: It ſhal agree with Reaſon, to reremember, that man is ſaid to bee an abridgement, as it were, of God, and the world, and as a mirror of the whole worke of God, reduced into a little compaſſe. For which cauſe he is called a little world of himſelfe. Now, if by obſeruation we finde an orderly kind of gouernment, obedience, and diſpoſition, in diuers parts of the other creatures, how neceſſarie it is for euery particular and priuate man, that wil chalenge himſelfe to be endued with Reaſon, to deſcend into himſelfe, and examine how this little world of his ſoule, his reaſon, his ſenſes, and his body, is ordered: And how, and in what maner reaſon doth gouerne, and will, appetite, affections, and paſſions do obey. Let a man pervſe himſelfe, and he ſhall finde in his body, a part of thoſe creatures, that want ſenſe and Reaſon: As his haire, and finger nailes; he ſhall find diuers paſſions and perturbations, that are voide of Reaſon. A body which we cal the fleſh of the earth, a vegitatiue part of growing, as the plants, a ſenſitiue part of moouing, ſeeing, ſmelling &c: as the beaſtes, a reaſonable part in an immortall ſoule, and all thoſe in ſo ſmall compaſſe. And diuers learned writers reaſon, that man, and the courſe and motions of his life, and being reaſemble, the very courſe of the celeſtiall bodies; in ſtudying whereof they haue taken great paynes. And Reaſon it ſelfe concludeth this point of diuinitie, that in mā there is immortality and mortality, the one of the ſoule, and the other of the body. The one, as matter ſubiect to corruption and waſting; and the Soule, a ſubſtance, that neuer ſhall leaue to haue being, and life. There is no thing, nor nature whatſoeuer, that is either knowne, or can be conceiued, but is either immortal or mortall: part of both theſe, is man, therefore is he a true patterne of al the reſt, and ſo conſequently of the whole world.

If a man would enter into conſideration, what a wonderfull thing in nature, the coniunction, and knitting together of the body and ſoule is, ſeeing the ſoule, which is light, to bee within the heauy body, that which is of coeleſtiall fire, within that which is earthie and cold, inuiſible, and immortall, in palpable and corruptible earth, what an admirable creature was man if he knew himſelf? The definition & diuiſion of whoſe ſoul & body, with this ſhort touch, I leaue the reader, to ſearch further the learned writings of ſuch as haue treated thereof, and fearing to be tedious, I retire to my former purpoſe, that euery man in his priuate ſtate ought to conſider what he was, from which he is fallen, what he is by corruption, whereof is already treated, what he would bee, and what he ſhal be, which done, he ſhal find, that there is non but would be happy. But the corrupt will and affections tend to miſerie, calamity, and infelicitie, vnleſſe there be the greater care and gouernment thereof had. Now as wee began in order, to take things in their worthines, wherby man is placed aboue the reſt, ſo in mā, that which is moſt worthy, ought to be preferred aboue the reſt, as his Soule aboue the body. And Reaſon aboue paſſions, and affections. Reaſon the Queene, and the reſt ſubiect. Take a view of thine owne ſelfe, thy ſoule, thy conſcience, thy mind, thy reaſon, thy body, thy ſences, theſe affections, paſſions, perturbations, and imperfectiōs; the determinatiō of the heart, the ſpeech of the mind, and the ſpeech of thy mouth, & thou ſhalt be driuen to ſhift hard for help to excuſe thee. There is deſcribed to be in man a ſenſuall appetite, which the Schoole men diuided into two partes the luſtfull appetite, and the irefull or wrathfull appetite. There are alſo deſcribed to be in theſe two appetites twelue principall paſſions, whereof ſix, which are loue, and hatred, longing, and loathing, gladneſſe, and ſadneſſe, doe folow the luſtful appetite. The other ſixe, that is, hope, and diſpaire, fearfulnes, and foole-hardines, Cholericknes, & coldnes, do follow the irefull part.

That theſe are al ſenſual, is plaine, in that they finiſh, and end, when life leaueth the body. Beſides, the very bruite beaſts haue their parts in them as well as men. Theſe are the ſubiects which in euery particular body, and gouernement of euery perſon ought to be kept in obedience vnto reaſon: and not to iſſue or proceed any further, than they can ſhew their warrant, authoritie, and commiſſion for.

Nowe ſeeing the imperfection of all theſe things is crept into the corruption of the nature, as well of the bodies, as ſoules of men, it behooueth euery one therfore to ſummon a parliament, and to aſſemble all theſe paſſions and affections, to receiue direction, howe to bee diſpoſed, in what cauſes, & how farre. And to receiue reprehenſion and diſcipline for their cōtempt or diſobediēce. For the diſcouerie whereof, obſerue this in al the things wherein thou employeſt thy minde. And therein firſt conſider, and conclude, that by the reaſonable ſoule and life, is vnderſtoode, ſuch a ſoule and life, as hath counſell, iudgement, and reaſon, which was created to this ende, that knowing God her Creator, and louing him, in regarde thereof, ſhe might honor and ſerue him. & finally, by degrees, attaine to immortal life & happines, which is appoynted for her end, and is the marke ſhe ſhould labour to attaine.

For, as nothing in man is more excellent then Reaſon, whereof God hath made thee partaker, ſo is there nothing ſo well beſeeming thy Reaſon, then that thou know, loue, and honour God, as whom nothing is ſo excellent, nor vnto whom nothing may bee compared, and without whom, thou hadſt not obtained, neither being, life, ſenſe, nor reaſon; for God is aboue thee, God is beneath thee, God is without thee, God is within thee, God is round about thee, God is euery where elſe, thou waſt no where. Nowe when thou ſendeſt thy mind and reaſon into the bowelles of the earth, to ſearch there, for things of much virtue, as golde, and other mettalles, weigh by the rule of right reaſon, to what vſe thou intendeſt the employment thereof, whether to the glorie of the Giuer, or thine owne priuate appetite or deſire, whether thou eſteemeſt not more, a few Flemmiſh angells, than the blood and life of a thouſand bleſſed Saints? If thou growe affected to the garment of the earth, the graſſe of the field, and their ſtately branches, conſider whether thou putte true difference betweene them and immortallitie, and how much leſſe thou arte inquiſitiue after Eternitie, than thoſe corruptible matters. Examine thy ſelfe, whether thou be thy monies maiſter, or his vaſſall. If thy liking be carried after the moouing things, conſider how the delight and pleaſure in them ouer-ruleth thy affections, and taketh vppe thy minde from contemplating their right vſe, and the end whereto they were appoynted.

If in keeping company with thoſe of thine owne kinde, there are two Sexes; The firſt betwixt man & woman, in which is ingendred man and woman. And therein conſider that Reaſon ſhewes thee, that God made one woman for one man, and but one man for one woman: which the more ſheweth the excellencie of his creation, in that hee made ſo large a worlde for ſo ſmall a company. That this is a true concluſion, not to be violated by Reaſon, the very rule of euen-hoode, and right, dooth ſhew. For whoſoeuer would breake wedlock, would not haue the ſame meaſure requited to himſelf: neither doth the father like it in the ſonne, nor the mother in the daughter, and rather than confeſſe it, Nature her ſelfe, in reſpect of her originall pureneſſe, is ſo aſhamed thereof, that ſhe will rather commit periurie, than acknowledge it: which agreeth well with the wordes of Gods owne ſpirite, pronounced by Malachi, that God had abundance of ſpirite, which ſheweth that he might haue made diuers women for one man, or diuerſe men for one woman; but his purpoſe was otherwiſe, howſoeuer men regarde it.

If thy purpoſe be, in accompanying with men, and hauing ſocietie with them, reſpice finem, to what end it is, whether for thy preſent pleaſure, or profit, or the endleſſe happineſſe of immortalitie. In theſe matters there are three ſpeciall things to bee conſidered. Firſt, the intent and purpoſe of thy minde, and the conference and concluſion there, before any words vttred. The ſecond is the words which are the minds meſſengers, to make knowne hir intent. The third is the actions & practicke parts thereof. Conſider therefore, whether thy mind, and thy wordes agree, and whether thy words & actions agree. And in them all, haue regarde, that thy purpoſe be honeſt, for nothing is agreeing with right reaſon that is not truely honeſt: and nothing truly honeſt which a man deſireth to an other, and would not haue the ſame befall to himſelfe.

Now if in thy mind thou conceiue miſchiefe, fraude, and deceit, and thy mouth pronounceth ſmoothe and pleaſing wordes, ſend Reaſon to inquire, who it is that ſitteth betweene thy minde, and thy mouth, that cauſeth this iarre betweene thy heartes intent, and thy voyced ſpeech: and ſhe will finde there placed that ſubtil ſophiſter that beguiled Eue with an Apple, neuer intending more miſchiefe than vnder ſmoothe wordes, Mel in ore, verba lactis: fel in corde, fraus in factis.

If thy actions and performance accompliſh not thy promiſes, thy reaſon will ſhew, there was corruption in thy minde, or weakeneſſe in thy vnderſtanding, that wouldeſt a duenture to promiſe matters aboue thy abilitie.

If thy mind be diſcontēted (which is a generall thing among men) ſome in wiſhing to chāge their ſex, as men to be women, & women to be men: old men to be yong, children to bee of ripe age, the ſingle to be married, the coupled to bee aſunder, the ſeruant to be Maſter, the Maiſter to be ſeruant, the rich to be more rich, the poore to be as rich, the needy to haue the wealth of his neighbour, the man ſubiect to obediēce to rule the gouernor oft times, to be freed of his great burthen. And this which is a generall fault in euery man of aduancement and preferment, to excel, and to beare Rule, inſomuch, that oft times the ſubiect vniuſtly contendeth for the kingdome. A thouſand other things there are in ſeeking of nouelty, exchange of trades, and courſes of life, of health, and libertie, and ſuch like; which I leaue to rehearſe and ſend thee to thy ſelfe for reſolution.

Peruſe thy whole body, and thou ſhalt finde diuers neceſſary parts and members, as the feete, the legges, the hands, the armes, the head, the eyes, the teeth, the liuer, ſtomake, lungs, yeines, ſinewes, arteries, & ſuch like; Al which tend to the performance of ſeueral duties and offices to the heart, and the life therein placed. And as none of theſe can be wanting, to make a perfect bodie, ſo none of thē enuy another, nor deſire to change; & being made for theſe ſeueral vſes, cannot exchange places nor offices. So is it thy caſe to be a part or member of another world. And as thou wouldeſt not bee a ſtone, to bee the richeſt Iewell: nor a tree, to bee the greateſt Cedar; a beaſt, to bee the great Behemoth; a fiſh, to bee the great Leuiathan; nor a Diuell, to be Belſabub himſelfe: So Reaſon teacheth, that thou canſt not be Moſes nor Elias, Salomon nor Dauid; not borne of the roote of Ioſſe, no Romane, Itulian, nor German; thou canſt haue no other Father nor Mother then thine owne. If thou be not borne of the blood Royall, it is not Gods fault: But if thou raſhly aſpire to that wherto thou art not borne, it is thy fault. And the ſame reaſon whereby thou requireſt to haue dominion ouer thy inferior, requireth thou ſhouldeſt obey thy ſuperior. For the powers that are ordained of God, among whom the king is the moſt excellent, carrying repreſentation of the maieſtie, iuſtice, and mercie of God.

If thou ſend forth, (as thou muſt of neceſſity) any of thy appetites, affections, or paſſions. Then giue them their Commiſſion, for feare of offending: and omitting the reſt, I will particularly touch theſe. And firſt, concerning neceſſarie things, if thou ſuffer thy affection, or paſſion of thirſt at libertie, let her not riott ſo farre as to ouer-maiſter thy Reaſon, be as carefull in thy greateſt drought to keepe moderation therein, as thou art fearefull, to burne thy ſelfe with fier, when thou art moſt colde; be as wary in that point as thou woldeſt be to put a ſword into a madde mans hand.

If thy paſſion of hunger craue libertie, ſet her boundes that ſhe ſurfett not, nor waſte as much in one day, as would ſatisfie thee a moneth: If the affectiō of cold require clothes, giue her a law, that ſhe exceede not hir bounds, by putting on thy whole wealth in a ſute of apparrell.

If thy affection of Loue, or rather Luſt, be extraordinarily buſie, take order in time that ſhee ouer-runne not her compaſſe. And as Loue is properly ſaid to be a deſire of things faire, goodly, and beautifull; ſo lett her not extend them further then to things honeſt, profitable, and poſſible. For if the thing thou loue bee not honeſt, it will be a clogge to thy conſcience; if not profitable, it wil be weariſome to thy life; if not poſſible, it will turne into griefe, and ſo either into a deſperate or mad humor. For if Plato conclude rightly, that all things in this world are engendered by loue, thou haſt Reaſon, to take heede thou abuſe it not, and it become thine owne confuſion. If thou hate, ſee it bee vice, & not vertue, for there is none ſo impudent, but will confeſſe that vertue is a good of the ſoule; and vice beeing the contrary, is an euill. If Reaſon be thy medicine, the contrary muſt needs be the ſicknes of the Soule.

If thou feele ſadnes or ſorrow cō ming faſt towards thee, ſet Reaſon ſtoutly and valiantly to defend thee from it, remembring Salomons concluſion, that a ſorrowfull hart drieth vp a mans bones: yet miſtake not my meaning, for godlie ſorrow for thy miſdeedes, is a good protection againſt the other.

In the caſe of friendſhip, take Ariſtotles Moral for thy direction, perfect friendſhip is among good men that loue vertue, and in all things avoide raſhneſſe: out of this Reaſon Darius acknowledged, he had rather haue one Zopirus, then the conqueſt of twentie Babilons.

If the thing thou hope for, bee grounded vpon Reaſon, and depend vpon a poſſible; attaining the ſame, it will in it ſelfe protect thee from deſpaire. And if thy hope be rightly in God, Reaſon will teach thee to depend on his prouidence, and not to hope for vain or impoſſible matters. And ſeeing that hope is the fountain & trade of al ſortes of mens employment in this life, there is great cauſe it ſhould depend vpon Reaſon, & not raſhly conſume that a man hath, and fooliſhly hope for more.

Many vaine things follow vaine hope, which commonly worke confuſion. As the hope and expectatiō of vaine glory is vaine: ſo is the exceſſiue charge of building, of apparrel, of diet, prodigalitie, and popularity, which foloweth the ſame as vaine, & conſumeth the affected thervnto, alluding to this ſaying: Hee that striueth to bee friend to many: can hardlie be friend to any.

Vain hope of riches, honor, dignitie, and things not like to be obtained by the rule of reaſon hath broght many to diſtracted wittes, and wilful deſtroying of themſelues.

In the attempting of things ſomething vncertaine, examine theſe two paſſions, by the rule of reaſon, fearefulneſſe, & hardines: for as they are two extreams, ſo yet is the meane of them, a good temper. As cowardly fearefullnes is to be abandoned, ſo is fool-hardines vtterly to be reiected. The temper wherof Salomon ſheweth, where he ſaith: Bleſſed is the man that alwayes ſtandeth in feare. But he that hardeneth his heart, ſhall fall into miſchiefe. Which meane is fully deſcribed by Eſay in 66. chapter, ſaying: whom ſhall I regard ſaith the Lord, but him that is milde and gentle, and ſtandeth in feare of my wordes? And God himſelfe ſaide, that Moſes was a mylde man aboue all that liued, accompting mildeneſſe for the height of vertue.

And bicauſe in the ireful appetite, heate, choler, and fury, beare a great ſway, which like the raging fire conſumeth without meaſure. Thou hadſt neede ride ſuch a colt with a ſtrong muſ-roll, and muſle it as thou woldeſt a biting maſtiffe, leſt in thy rage they ouercome thy Reaſon, and rebell againſt their Queene, and by treaſon, they bring thy life to confuſion.

Cicero in his fourth booke of his Tuſculane queſtions ſaith: The fountaine of incombrance, is, intempeperance, which draweth, and eſtrangeth vs from true Reaſon, and is ſo contrary vnto it, that it is vnpoſſible to gouerne and reſtraine the luſts & deſires of the heart: Selfe-will, raſh vowes, outragious othes, intemperate furie, and franticke madneſſe, do commonly follow this wilfull appetite, if it be not very moderately tē pered with reſpectiue conſideration. Al theſe paſſiōs, if they be inordinate, are the daughters of pride, frō whēce commeth whatſoeuer is euill, of whom beware & take heed, as of the Crocadile, or the ſword of thy malitious enemy. If thou wilt be carefull and curious in framing thy timber for the building of a houſe, that euery thing be fitt and proportionable: ſo haſt thou need to take as great care in reforming and keeping thy paſſions and affections, ſubiect within the rule of Reaſon. And for concluſion take this, that the performance hereof requireth, as much paines, dilligence, & labour, as any mecanicall art: for of all miſchiefes, idlenes is the moſt daungerous, which right Reaſon cannot abide, nor endure in hir Court; which cheriſheth and aduaunceth the labor of the mind, which I commend vnto thee aboue all riches.

Sect. IX. Reaſons publike gouernment.

IN euery gouernment and order, the beginning is taken from the leaſt, & vnworthieſt partes, as Gramer beginneth at letters, Geometrie from the point. Arithmeticke from the vnitie, Muſicke from the note, and ſo proceedeth to the better parts. He that runneth moſt ſwiftly, began to creepe, then to ſtand, after to paſe, and ſo by degrees to the facilitie of his ſpeede: So in the caſes of gouernmēt of a publicke eſtate, the beginning is at one perſon, ſingularly by himſelfe: Which is euery mans caſe, and therfore did I indeuoure to handle that matter; firſt, that euery man gouerning himſelfe rightly, might the more fitly and ſufficiently become a member of a well gouerned commonwealth: for Reaſon ſheweth that it is well or ill, with the publike ſtate, as all her partes are particularly gouerned, euen from the leaſt to the greateſt.

As the Magiſtrate is ſaid to be the head; and the people, the body of the cōmon-wealth: So hath Reaſon added a third matter to giue life vnto this body, and to be, as it were, the ſoule of this head and body, which is the law wherby al the parts therof are kept in order.

This law ought to allow ſoueraintie in one, and obediēce in al the reſt. The miniſters and officers of the Lawe are her mouth, whoſe wiſedome, vnderſtanding, iudgement, integritie, conſtancie, indifferencie, and fidelitie, ſhould be as iuſt & equall as the beame that beareth the ballance, wherewith Gold is weighed: and the ſtandard meaſure that alloweth to euery one alike. As the Soule and mind of man walketh betweene heauen and earth, and conſidereth of thē both: So doth the right miniſter of the law deſcend into the Soule of the law, and walketh betweene the head and the lower parts of the commonwealth, and conſidereth them both, giuing to each his euen meaſure; not a dramme to him that ought to haue a gallon, nor a buſhell to him that ought to haue no more then a pinte, but to euery man according to his right. I mind not to diſcourſe of the diuerſitie of gouernments, and what they are, and how the vſe of them haue bin in other countries: as the Ariſtocracie, Democracie, Monarchie, Oligarchy, or, Duarchie, and diuers other gouernments.

But purſuing my purpoſe, to diſcouer to the weake, and meaner ſort of men, their places, duties, and offices, hold my ſelfe happie, that I am a poore ſubiect and member, vnder this moſt naturall and moſt auncient gouernment of a Monarchie, the head and guide whereof God long continue with great comfort and ioy, which would be much the more increaſed, if her ſubiects, the members of this body, would, according to tru and right Reaſon, do their duties, and performe their obedience towardes God, their countrie, and her ſacred Maieſtie.

Many men haue trauelled in other countries, to gaine experience of vſages abroad, wherein they oftentimes ſo much delight, that they forget their owne true and naturall countries vſe; others learne languages, when ſtriuing to attaine the accent of the french, forgot to ſpeake their countries language, and ſo haue no fit ſpeech at all. Some men follow others ſo long, that they loſe themſelues. Some are ſo eagre to ſearch into the faults of others, that forgetting themſelues, they runne into vnrecouerable errors. The prodigal man commendeth expenſe, delighting in a vaine praiſe, til he haue waſted all his eſtate, vtterly contemning frugalitie. The churle exceedeth as much in miſery, and deſpiſeth liberalitie. The vaine-glorious is rauiſhed with kinde words of the flatterer, reiecting true aduiſe. The prowde is inſolent and outragious, neuer ſatisfied with reaſon. The kinde-hearted, rather than he will ſit out of the company of fooles, will make a foole of himſelfe. The Gentlemans ſon muſt take no paines, it is againſt his reputation. The Scholler oftentimes inſteade of proceeding in virtue and honeſt cauſes, ſtudieth and practiſeth miſchiefe and falſhoode. He that hath once waited at his Maiſters Table, thincketh it a diſgrace, at anie time after, to take the plough in hand. And if the poore father hath brought vp his ſonne to ſome place of preferment, it is hard if the ſonne be not aſhamed of his father. The friend (for the moſt part) is in ſhew: and to ſerue his owne turne, wil not ſticke to ſupplant him, whome he ought moſt to regarde. The countrieman is neuer quiet vntill hee haue the marchants money: and the marchant commonly maketh his match ſo, as he will not looſe by the bargaine. But whoſoeuer obſerueth what others, proteſtations, vntruths, deceits, cunnings, crafts, and colluſions are vſed amongſt all ſorts, ſhall well find, that Reaſon hath not her right gouernement. If anie man looke but into the Comoedy that treateth of the Humors of men, and the booke of Cony-catching, he ſhall ſee thoſe errors very liuely, and at full diſcouered.

Now, as the beginning of gouernment, is at a priuate man, ſo the firſt that followeth, is the gouernement of a priuate family, in which the maiſter of the houſe hath authority to impoſe domeſticall Lawes. The next is betweene the Lord and Tenants, ouer whome the Lord hath authoritie to appoynt ordinaunces, and to receiue an othe of fidelitie. Then followeth the gouernement of Tithings, of Towneſhips, of Citties, of Counties, & ſo concludingly of the whole ſtate, whereof to dilate, would be ouer tedious. The collegiate and eccleſiaſticall gouernements, and al priuileged places, ought to haue repaire to one head. At one is the beginning of obedience: and at one, is both the beginning and end of gouernement. And whatſoeuer is meane betweene thoſe buttols or boundes, is the publique ſtate, which by reaſons rule and law, are to be ordered and diſpoſed, like as the ſtuffe and ſeuerall matters that goe to the building of an houſe, which, as they are to be at the direction of the principall woorkeman, yet are they not to be loſt, nor ſpoiled: ſo is it in the caſe of gouernment, for the ordering of cauſes, and ſuppreſſing of diſorder in a publique conſideration, without confuſion of any. In which publike ſtate many ancient, laudable, and godly Lawes haue beene made, which of themſelues, are in the common-wealth, as the ſoule is in the body of a man, when hee either ſleepeth or waketh. The life of the law is the miniſter and officer thereof, who ſhould diſtribute the ſame to the indifferent and equall good of all. It is as the line or plumbe rule, whereby the workeman guideth his building vpright.

Gentle Reader, conſider with thy ſelfe, which part of this building thou art, wherof this maine ſtate conſiſtes, and reaſon with thy ſelfe, if thou bee contented or diſcontented with thine eſtate, and the cauſe that mooneth thee thereunto: and likewiſe conſider whether that cauſe be reaſonable, or not, if thou finde, no, ſuppreſſe it, ſet the queene of thy paſſions and affections to iudge thereof, and reforme thine errour: which, if euery man in this Land would performe, her Maieſties gouernment would farre paſſe the gouernement of Numa Pompilus, or any that euer liued.

If we enter into conſideration, of the ſeuerall kindes of liuing things, how the bond of nature dooth make them affect the company and fellowſhip of creatures, of their owne ſorte, to liue together in aſſemblies with a kinde of pleaſure and contentment. The beaſts, on the earth, in the ayre, the birds, and in the water, the fiſhes, wherein they holde themſelues ſtrongeſt, and moſt ſafe, as they are gathered together into greateſt companies, in a kinde of agreement, as their natures are expreſſed by Aristotle, and others of like learning. It will enforce men to wonder at their owne intemperate gouernment, conſidering that againſt one beaſt, or bird that killeth one an other of his owne kinde, there are thouſands of men murthered, and vnnaturally ſlaine by their compares; ſo that among men, reaſon ſo litle preuaileth, that the very ſenſuall partes rebell againſt their owne nature. Inſomuch, that men, through their vnreaſonable actions, committe that which the vnreaſonable beaſts do eſchew to performe.

Had not Reaſon neede to impoſe laws, to ſuppreſſe theſe diſorders? In the priuate body of a man, if the gangrina take any member, which is like to bring the whole bodie to death, & deſtruction, will not the head, the heart, and all the reſt of the members conſent to the ſeuering that member from the body to ſaue the reſt? So in the ſtate of a common-wealth, to preſerue the principall and generall parts, Reaſon hath made lawes, not to reſpect any particular that ſhall grow daungerous to the whole, and ſpecially, to the head, which is the life & honor of the reſt.

As the priuate man that hath his legge cut off, to ſaue his body, hath no pleaſure, but paine and griefe in loſing the ſame: So the good Magiſtrate, hath no pleaſure in the death or puniſhment of the ſubiect, but is rather grieued that any ſuch member ſhould be ſo corrupted as he may not be abidden to remaine.

The law is ſaid to be the blood, & bond of the commonwealth, the ſpirit therof.

The law is ſaid to be a ſingular reaſon imprinted in nature, commāding thoſe things that are to be done, and forbidding the contrary: by which the men of the firſt world liued without any written law at all.

Beſides the written law, the law of nature is a ſence and feeling, which euery man hath in himſelfe, and in his conſcience, wherby he diſcerneth betweene good and euill.

The lawe is as the medicine, the miniſter and diſtributer therof, as the Phiſition, & the offender, the patient. As in ſome cauſes, though the Phiſition do not giue the potion rightly, nor the patient haue a ſtomake to endure the taking; yet is not the fault in the ſimple medicine, but in the giuer and receiuer, or one of them. The wrong is not in the law, if thou bee corrected for thy offence, but in thy ſelfe for thine error.

Many a man being ſicke of an ague, ſindeth fault with his drinke, where in truth the fault is in his taſte: the like may be ſaid of thoſe that cō plaine of the iniuſtice of the law, whē alas, it is a dombe thing of it ſelfe, and intēdeth no harme to any, but the wel vſing or abuſing thereof is the matter that is to be conſidered.

The euill diſpoſed, wiſheth there were no law, that he might vſurpe ouer the good, or at leaſt, he holdeth the law, to be ouer-ſeuere, to puniſh his fault; on the other ſide, the honeſt minded man, findeth that the offences againſt the law, are notfully, and ſpeedily reformed.

To treate of the diuers kindes of lawes, of diuers Countries, and the ſeueral vſes of them, I intend not, but to leaue a note to men of ordinary vnderſtanding, that the gouernment of men, vſed by the diſcipline of lawes, is as neceſſary as the life, to preſerue the body from putrifaction.

He that thinketh it an eaſie, or ſleight matter, to put his hand into medling, or dealing with ſtate matters, making of new lawes, or, abrogating the old, as if they were to bee put off and on, like a garment, or fantaſtically changed, as the wild humor of ſome few affect, let them conſider what Demosthenes ſaid of the decrees among the Locrians, that euery Citizen that was to bring in a new lawe, ſhoulde come and declare it publikely with a halter about his necke, to the intent, if his law were for the vnworthineſſe thereof reiected, hee ſhould preſently be ſtrangled.

Such conſideration muſt be takē of the law, ſaith Iſiodore, that we muſt not iudge of it, but according to it, nor (ſaith Cliton) the people muſt not hearken ſo much to the orator or aduocates of the law, as to the truth of the law it ſelfe. Pauſanias Reaſon, wherfore the lawes among the Lacedemonians ought not to be altred, was, for that the lawes ought to bee rulers ouer men, and not men maiſters ouer the law.

If Mercurius Treſmegistes tooke great paines and labor, to compoſe lawes for the ordering & gouerning of the Egiptians; Phoroneus, among the Greetians; Solon among the Athenians; Lycurgus among the Sithians; Numa Pompilus among the Romans; Pharomond among the Frenchmen; Charles the great amōg the Almans; Iulius Caeſar and others, among the Engliſh, that were as lightes to their feuerall gouernments. wherby their ſubiects might liue in obedience, to the ſtate, and haue Iuſtice, miniſtred & diſtributed among them according to their equall rights, which to their immortall honor, haue continued in thoſe countries, for the reaſonable guiding of the people? what do the infringers, violaters, corrupters, or contempners, of thoſe lawes, whereof there are many, deſerue?

Ignorance, ignorantly, is holden, to be the Mother of Deuotion, which opinion, hath bred a wonderful confuſion in the world: for if it bee the Mother, and Deuotion, the childe, they know not one another; and for want of knowledge muſt needs erre. Concerning thēſelues, Partus ſequiturventrem, the Danghter followeth the Mother. Ignorance hath no acquaintance, much leſſe alliance with Reaſon, and therefore cannot apprehend nor embrace things grounded on Reaſon. Ignorance is the oppoſed enemy of Reaſon, and leadeth to all outragious and vnlawful attempts: Blind Deuotion her Daughter inciteth and ſtirreth vp the minds of men to ſenſualitie, ſelfe-will, raſhnes, intemperance, foole-hardineſſe, ſtubbornnes, contempt, and the vtter ſubuerſion of the lawes, ordinances, and directions that Reaſon hath prouided.

This Ignorance, and her brood, hath ſpred abroad many ſeditious and ſlāderous reproches of indignitie, inſufficiencie and groſſe defects to bee in the Lawes, whereby this countrie wherein we liue is gouerned. And this Ignorant and foule error, hath diſperſed it ſelfe into many quarters; and gotten ſtrong hold in the world. To ſet downe the particular errors in that behalfe, and to anſwer them fully, woulde require a great volume, woorth the writing, and woorthy the reading, wherein I will not now inſiſt. The like may I ſay of the continuall and daily euaſions and ſlidings from the true tuch and period whervnto the practiſe and execution of the Lawe ſhould tend. Which fault, in the abuſiue practiſers of the lawe, hath beene a great cauſe that the burthen of that reproach, although vntruely, is layd ſo heauy vpon the lawe it ſelfe. I may not giue way to the ſcope of this Diſcourſe at large. And therfore, to ſatisfie the ignorant hereof, in ſome meaſure, I ſend him to behold and view theſe ſpeciall poyntes, concerning the courſe of gouernement eſtabliſhed, and ſet downe by reaſon and law.

The Maiſter of a houſe ordereth his houſholde, agreeing with the conditions thereof; as the Babe newely borne is nouriſhed with the mothers milke; the elder children at ſchoole, to learne rudiments, how to be diſpoſed at riper age; thoſe grown to mans ſtate, are employed in other buſines; the ſeruaunts labour for all, and the maiſter careth and prouideth for all; The apprentice is bound for yeares, which hee muſt ſerue out before hee can haue his freedome.

The Schoole maiſter hath ordinaunces not to be broken; and hee dealeth with thoſe whome hee teacheth, according to their capacities; firſt he teacheth letters, then ſillables, then wordes, and after languages, and the congruitie of them; and after, the knowledge of the tongues, he teacheth Artes: and thus by degrees proceedeth in a reaſonable and a temperate manner to the furniſhing of that which belongeth to his place.

The Vniuerſities haue lawes and ordinances, to approoue, trie and examine, the woorthineſſe, ſufficiencie, and honeſty of thoſe, whom they intend to grace with Titles or Dignities of learning, as the ſeuerall profeſſions whereunto they bend themſelues leade: out of which proceede our reuerend Diuines, learned Ciuilians, and neceſſary Phyſitions; beſides the woorthy ſtorage of the famous Innes of Court, royall court, and other places.

In Citties and Townes corporate, they haue orders for the election and choyſe of men from office to office, and by degrees to loke into the ſufficiencies, abilities, diſcretions, and vnderſtandings of men before they be admitted to beare the principall gouernment. And therein is likewiſe to be obſerued, that Reaſon hath impoſed a fit ordinance, that by a common and generall election the chiefe officer is to be choſen. In which corporations, as there are many Companies, whereof theſe gouernments doe conſiſt: So hath each of theſe Fraternities, ſpeciall orders and ordinances, in their peculiar and particular offices. In this behalfe there are many orders ordinate and ſubordinate, and which were ouer-tedious to recite: to be ſhort therfore in that point, Reaſon hath giuen them abilities and powers to make ordinances and conſtitutions within themſelues, but limited with within bonds. That they be not contrarie to the lawes of the land.

The Innes of Court haue orders, both to conſtraine ſtudy, and to trie and examine the ſtudients, as well for the ſufficiencie of learning, as congruitie of manners, and to commend and giue grace to the well deſeruing, and ſtoppe the courſe of peruerſe and diſordered perſons. Out of this courtly Academie, what good this Commonwealth hath receiued, appeareth, in that the Kings and Queenes that raigned ouer the ſame, haue alwayes choſen their ſeruants and miniſters of iuſtice and authoritie from thoſe places. Of the Lawe it ſelfe it is worthily ſaid, Lex Regi, quod Rex legi, The lawe is to the King, as the King is to the lawe.

As the King vpholdeth and maintaineth the lawes priuiledges, and rights of the Land, ſo the lawe keepeth men in ſubiection and obedience to the King: and thereby giueth glorie and ſafetie to the King, with peace and dignitie to the kingdome.

That in the deſciding of controuerſies and queſtions growne among men, the lawe hath a moſt equall and indifferent courſe drawne downe by reaſon, appears in this. Firſt, the ſmaller matters are to be tried before the Lord of a manor, where the cauſe is between thoſe of his homage, wherein, as in the cauſes of greater moment in higher Courts, the triall is appoynted, per probos & legales homines, by a Iurie of approoued and lawfull men: per testes fide dignos, by witneſſes, not attainted of notorious crimes, but deſeruing credite. In which behalfe is to be obſerued, what care the Lawe hath of indifferencie, in that it hath admitted many challenges for kindred, aliance, affection, fauour, or diſpleaſure, and ſuch like, leſt by corruption, iniuſtice might bee miniſtred.

And as the cauſe may require, ſo that it goeth to the Iudges thēſelues: For like as by the verdict of Twelue men, euery cauſe of ſome nature muſt be tried: So by the Direction of the Law, cauſes of ſome other nature are to be deſcided, and adiudged by the ſentence of the twelue Iudges of the Land.

Is it not of worthie conſideration, & a very reſonable courſe, that reaſon hath ſet downe, that the trial of Land ſhalbe by men of the ſame neighborhood: that they, knowing the right, may execute the worke of the Law? Lex ſuum cuique tribuit, the Law giueth to euery man his owne. Then the common opinion of them that ſay the fault is in the law, is erronious, by condemning the Law, for the peruerters of the Law, and Iuſtice, of whom there are too great a number.

Looke further into the true ſinceritie of the Law, and you ſhal finde, that Reaſon hath made Lawes, to reforme thoſe errors: and to puniſh the offenders: according to the qualitie of their tranſgreſſions. What can ſhe do, poore dumbe thing? ſhe is not able to ſpeake in her own behalfe, and few wil do her right, either in woorde or action.

Comes ſhee not neere the Court when ſhe puniſheth treaſon, to preſerue the Kinges perſon? Embrace her, and vſe her worthily, for ſhe is of great honor, and the principall worke that euer Reaſon brought to effect in cauſes of this world.

The Souldier and man at Armes will confeſſe, that without the Lawes of warres and martiall Diſcipline, there is no poſſibillitie of keeping things in order.

The diuines and profeſſors of holy Writ in all countries, and in all ages, haue made alowance hereof, & muth endeuoured the performaunce of ſome things in that behalfe.

All the Emperors, Monarks, and Kings of the world, depend hereupon, and hereby their gouernments are preſerued and kept from confuſion: the leaſt fraction whereof worketh great anoy, as appeareth by the ſtories written by Cornelius Tacitus of the liues of Nero, Galba, Vetellius, and others in the Romane Empire.

This conſideration offereth it ſelfe (though ſomething abruptly,) that if the offences, errors, and tranſgreſſions of men in theſe points did conſiſt of ſubſtantial matter, as the bodies of the offenders do, and were, for their vnworthines, appointed to bee conſumed with fire; All the water in the great Ocean would not extinguiſh the flame. This being true, it ſhall agree well with Reaſon, and bee very conuenient, that men looke into themſelues before it be too late, & correct their errors whileſt they haue time, leſt in the end, for the faults of their materiall bodies, and ſenſuall, and looſe diſpoſitions: their Soules which conſiſt of immateriall and vncorruptible ſubſtance, bee ſett on fire, and burne in hel with vnquenchable fire, that no water, of what abundance ſoeuer can put out.

And ſo hauing drawne to thy remembrance, theſe ſhort notes, I ſend thee to conſider (for the worthines of the law) that Moſes, from whom the grounds of all lawes are receiued did (in his time) publiſh the law to the people himſelfe, vntill the people grew to great numbers, and infinite diſorders, and then by the perſwaſion of Iethro his Father in lawe, hee appointed miniſters, and officers vnder him. The law put in execution by thoſe officers, was not the law of the officers, but the law of Moſes. And the law vttered by Moſes, was not Moſes own law, but the law of God. Such is our caſe, the multitude of offences and euills committed amongſt vs, are too great, and ouer many for our Queene, to order in her perſon: therefore, Reaſon hath ſet downe meane authoritie vnder her. The lawes they put in execution, are not the lawes of the Iudges, but the lawes of our Queene, and countrie. The ſentence they pronounce, is her Maieſties; they only giue it a voyce, and the maine point is this, both the lawes, and determination thereupon, if they be truly executed, and obeyed, are the lawes, and ſentence of God himſelfe. Was there not in Moſes time, a chiefe head aboue men? was there not a mongſt mē one aboue the reſt? were there not vnder him others that took paines to ſit in Iudgement, to heare the peoples cauſes? was there not thē a chiefe Magiſtrate, and inferior Magiſtrates, ſome in authoritie to order, and gouerne, others vnder them to obey? were there not men that ſuſtained wrong, and others that did the iniurie? was not Miriam that gallant Lady puniſhed with leproſie, for murmuring againſt the authoritie of Moſes? And is not this the antienteſt gouernment in the world? And was not this a kind of Monarchie?

Doth not our ſtate and gouernement reſemble this? we haue the ſame GOD they had, a ſole gouernor as they, lawes as they had, Liuetenants, Deputies, Officers, and Magiſtrates as they, people to be kept in obedience as they, murmurers againſt the head as they. If they had Corah and his company that rebelled, this land hath not bin free from ſuch: but God haue the honor, they haue had their puniſhment as well as Miriam and Abiram. If the Magiſtrates in that gouernment found ſtore of buſines, to puniſh offences, and right the oppreſſed; our countrie is not altogether vnlike them therein; If Moſes had Aron for Church matters, our head hath, vnder her, mē authorized for that purpoſe.

Behold all theſe things which cō taine within them a thouſand other branches, and conſider whether Reaſon hath not preuailed far in this our country, and God bin very fauorable to the ſucceſſe thereof: what impiety, inhumanitie, and beſtialitie were it, to peruert the good that hath bin attained vnto in theſe pointes? And what doe the contemners, reſiſters, diſobeyers, peruerters, and abuſers of this ſo ſacred and holy an ordinance of God deſerue leſſe then thoſe that were puniſhed in Moſes time?

Non minor eſt virtus quam quaerere parta tueri: quibus acquiruntur ijſdem praeſeruantur modis: by diligence, labor, ſtudie, endeuour and obedience, haue theſe bin brought to order, and by the like muſt bee preſerued. In which office, euery member hath a ſhare, the chiefe head in gouerning, and the reſt in obeying, which is a dutie to be performed by euery ſubiect: And wherevnto right and true Reaſon will leade euery man, if he carefully obſerue his duetie. The omitting wherof, was a fault in the time of Saint Paul, and Saint Peter. The one, writing to Titus, willed him to put men in remembraunce, that they be ſubiect to principalities and powers. The other requireth that men ſhould ſubmitt themſelues, vnto all maner of ordinances of man, for the Lords ſake, whether it be to the king as to the ſuperior, or vnto gouernors as vnto them that are ſent of him for the puniſhment of euill dooers, and for the praiſe of them that do well. Beſides, Saint Paul ſaith in an other place, be ſubiect to the higher powers for who ſo reſiſteth the power, Rom. 13.1, 2. reſiſteth the ordinance of God. With which ſayings I conclude, deſiring that euery man will put himſelf in remembrance of his dutie in thoſe points, and according to his calling, beare a faithfull and true heart to his Queene and Country, and obedience to authoritie, as the key that openeth to all happines; and is the cloſing vp of Reaſons gouernement in theſe worldly cauſes: and a great inducement to eternitie.

Finis.
The Minds priuiledge. Who can reſtraine the freedom of the mind, Or baniſh thoughts from grieued harts perplex? Or who can ſhew what limits are aſſignde To Sorrowes griefes, which do poore ſoules ſore vex? Mind, keepe thee free from euer being bound, Faſt from 'Despaire, and feast on good Content: Yet ſurfet not on too ſecure a ground, Leſt Time let paſſe, Remiſſeneſſe make repent. Seeme not to be, but be as thou doſt ſeeme, Thy conſcience ſaue, what euer thee befall, It forc'th not much what other men do deeme, Thy guilt or guiltleſſe conſcience ſwayeth all. In things that taſte of good, is good delight, Thou manſion for thy God to take repoſe: Keepe pretious things wherein he may delight, Then ſecrets all he will to thee diſcloſe. In all restraints, yet thou art ſtill at large, In all exiles, thou ſtill remainst at home: The ſecret matters thou dost take in churge, Seruant like thee diuine Virtue knows none. The polliſht Temple of Dianaes ſhrine Did not delight the viewers halfe ſo much: As counſels good layd vp in ſtorch-houſe thine, Which will abide the hammer, deft, and tuch. Keepe farre from thee the praue and euil things, The ſanctimonies for thy turne are fit: Thou harbour hast among the Peers and Kings, Thy Chaire was made, thy maker there to ſit. Thou cloth of gold, of ſtate, and richest price, To clad thy God the high and mightest one: In thee therefore, beware, let raigne no vice, An equall mate thy King abideth none. Let none come in, keepe fast the vtter gate, Deceipt is rife, and thou art in great danger: Take heede, beware, there is a ſubtile mate That preſſeth in, yet ought to be a ſtranger. Sheele offer faire, both words and deeds of gaine, She ſaies ſhe will be gone, and will but view: But keepe her out, it will be to thy paine, The words ſhe ſpeakes, is neither of them true. The Bridebed once defilde, the Bridegroom leaues, It is a place he doth deteſt and hate: See to thy ſelfe, when once ſhe thee deceaues, Thy Glorie's gone, thy Honor's out of date. Friend to thy ſelfe be thou, for to be frended Needs curious choiſe, I ſpeake as reaſon bindeth. Faire ſhews of loue, with faint effects are ended, When fruitles words ſhew what the ſpeaker mindeth. The matter meant, the mind muſt needs containe, That ſecret is to him that dooh intend: Al pleaſing words and ſpeeches that are vaine, Gainſt truths ſupports by no means may contend. That ample walke within ſo large a field, Would well permit my pen a ranging ſcope: But yet my will to Reaſon now muſt yeelde, To end this cauſe my Muſe doth ſtand in hope. In feweſt words, but words of great reſpect, The minding well, and well affecting ſpirit, Eternizd Ioyes with Angels ſhall amplect, And endleſſe bliſſe by promiſe ſhall inherit. That bliſſed place, and place of highest bliſſe, Without cōpare: Compare! what needs that word? God hath ordained for ſeruants that are his, Bleſſed are they that euer ſerue the Lord. Finis.