Sect. I. The dignitie of right Reason.

AS I intend not in this Discourse, to meddle with matters of State, and gouernement of Countries and King­domes, being farre aboue my iudge­ment. Yet am I bolde to make some discouerie of the vnderstanding of right and vncorrupt reason; and of her excellent qualitie, place, and con­dition; and the dominion and autho­ritie shee ought to haue ouer the affe­ctions, [Page 2]passions, and actions of euerie particular man, which being truely knowne, men may the better con­taine themselues in obedience and duety to authoritie and commaunde. This labour I hold my selfe bound to vndergo, by the lawes of God, of na­ture, and of my countrie, lest I should otherwise charge my selfe with an idle imploying of my leysure. Because Reason is a qualitie, which euery man challengeth to inioy, by a proper and peculiar fruition in himselfe, solely by the course of his originall deduced nature from the beginning of all anti­quities, echone holding an vnremou­able opinion, that the courses and di­rectiōs which they take in hand, pro­ceede of Reason, and are warranted thereby. Yet for that it is most appa­rant, that corruption is entered into the nature of man, and their mindes, and reason, are impaired from that [Page 3]ancient primarie perfection, where­with the first created man was endu­ed; it shall be very necessary, that all men, very aduisedly, and with deepe consideration, search, and examine themselues concerning this point, that finding their errours, they may the better, and more aduisedly, reforme their faultes.

Right and true Reason, as it ought to haue a gouernment generall, so doth it teach how to gouerne particu­lars: and by teaching gouernment, it instructs howe to obey, which is one speciall marke I aime at. For if she, as the true Princes and Queene, beare the Regall, and Monarcall place, and onely she ought to raigne ouer all passions, and affections; then no doubt but she hath, or should haue, many Subiects that ought to be disci­plined, gouerned, and kept in order by her authoritie: the repugning [Page 4]whereof is a kinde of rebellion.

If this be a true position, Regnum est parcere subiectis, & debellare super­bos: This couclusion must rightly fol­low, that all those, either affections, passions, or fancies, which stubbornly oppose themselues against their Prince, or reuolt from their dutie, ought to be corrected as rebellious, or at least, as disturbers of the peace of their Queene, lest their outragious in­temprature turn to their own subuer­sion; for it is a most cleare & resolued consequent, that take away order and gouernment, there presently follows horror and confusion: which ruine, as it often falleth out in great king­domes, among multitudes of men, so yet originally do these defects com­mence in the particular errors of som speciall priuate men, for from some small beginning the greatnes thereof must needes proceede: therefore, ob­stare [Page 5]principijs maximè iuuat. It is very behoofefull to withstand the begin­nings.

Such is the dignitie and maiestie of right and true reason, that she hath a place aboue all earthly, corruptible, and mortall things; aboue the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, and Firma­ment of heauen, aboue the Angels themselues, euen in the Sonne of God, in the presence of God himself, as by this ensuing discourse shall be made ma­nifest.

Sect. II. The Soule is the substance, and Rea­son a qualitie thereof.

BEfore I can fittely enter into the definition of Reason, being a quali­tie in a substance of higher valewe, I must borrow leaue, for a fewe words, con­cerning that substance whereof rea­son is this qualitie, for out of that wil be found, a way, how to discouer the trueth of all that ensueth, and ought to be vnderstood.

The Immortall Soule of man is this substance, which among Chris­tians is not doubted, and being learn­edly handled by writers, taught by di­uines, and conceiued and vnderstood by all, I will leaue to speake therof in [Page 7]any manner of perswading others to giue credence therevnto, and onelie touch the same, so farre forth as may discouer the excellencie of reason.

Hermes treating of the soule, saith; Hermes in his Poemā der cha. 10 It is the garment of the minde, and the garment of the Soule is a certaine Spirite, wherby it is vnited to the bo­dy: and this thing is that which wee properly call Man, that is, a heauenly creature, not to be compared to beastes, but rather with the Gods of heauen.

Plato saith, Plato in li. 11. de Le­gib. epist. 2. that the ancient and holie Oracles are to be beleeued, which affirme mens soules to bee im­mortall.

Pithagoras held opinion, that the Soule is a bodilesse and immortal substance, put into this bodie as into a prison for sin.

Architus saith, that God breathed reason and vnderstanding into man.

Plato saith, Plat. in his Timens, & third book de Republ. that God created man by himselfe, yea and his liuer, and his braine, and his senses, which is vn­derstood to be the soule, endued as well with sence, as reason.

But speaking onely of the reasona­ble Soule, Plato in Phoedon li. 10. de Re­pub. in matter of state in his Al­cibiades. he saith, that the Soule of man is very like the Godhead, im­mortall, reasonable, vniforme, vndis­soluble, and euermore of one sort, which are conditions that can not a­gree, but in things most diuine: And therfore at his departing out of the world, he willed his soule to returne home to her first originall. Plat. in his first booke of Lawes. And in an other place, he maketh bold, to terme it to be kinne vnto God, that is to say, euerlasting, and of one selfe name with the immortall ones.

Aristotle saith, Aristot. lib. 3. de Anim. that the soule of man commeth from without, and not of the seede of man, as the body doth, and that the soule is the onely part in [Page 9]vs that is diuine, which is as much, as if he had said, immortall.

Cicero hath two excellent sayings in this behalfe, Li. 1. quaest. Tuse. The originall of our soules and mindes (saith he) can not be found in this lowe earth: for there is not any mixture in them, or any compounding that may seeme to be made, or bred, of the earth; neither is there any moysture, winde, or any fiery matter in them. And his reason in that place is, that no such thing could retaine in it, the power of me­morie, vnderstanding, or conceipt, to beare in mind things past, to foresee things to come, & to consider things present, which (saith he) are matters al­together diuine; concluding, that be­cause it consisted not of any elemen­tall matter, it must needes be immor­tall.

In another place he saith, Cic. lib. 2. de nat. Deor. that bee­tweene God and man, there is a kind­red [Page 10]of Reason, as there is betweene man and man, a kindred of blood. That the fellowship betweene man and man commeth of the bodie, but the fellowship betweene God and man commeth of God himselfe, who created the soule in vs. By reason whereof (saith he) we may say, wee haue aliance with the heauenly sort, as folkes that haue discended of the same race and roote.

Seneca in his booke of Comfort, Seneca in lib. Conso­lationis &c writing of the death of the Ladie Marcia hir son, saith, he is now euer­lasting, and in the best state, bereft of this earthly baggage, &c. which he inferred for the most excellent com­fort of all, to be, when the soule is de­parted from the body.

Out of the learning which it see­meth Hierocles had from Pithagoras, Hierocl. ca. 10. he very consideratelie, and deepelie entering into the mindes of the wic­ked, [Page 11]saieth, that the wicked would not haue their soules to be immortall, to thintent they might not be punished for their faultes: But yet (saith hee) they preuent the sentence of their Iudge, by condempning themselues vnto death before hand.

Plotinus, Plotinus of the being of the soul lib. 1. Enead 4. who wrote many excel­lent treatises concerning the Soule, and tooke great paines therein, saith, mens Soules proceede not of their bodies, nor of the seede of their pa­rents, but are as ye would say, grafted into our bodies by the hand of God.

The Soule (saith hee) hath had company with the Gods, Plotinus in his booke of doubtes concern­ing the soule cha. 26.27. and is im­mortall, and so would we say of it (as Plato affirmeth) if we saw it faire and cleere. But for as much as we see it commonly troubled, we thinke it not to be, either diuine, or immortall. Neuerthelesse (saith he) he which will discerne the nature of any thing per­fectly, [Page 12]must consider it in the very owne substance, or being, vtterly vn­mingled with any other thing; for whatsoeuer is added else vnto it, doth hinder the perfect discerning therof. Therfore let euery man behold him­selfe naked without any thing, saue himselfe, so as he looke vpon no­thing else, saue his bare soule: and sure­ly, when he hath viewed himselfe in his owne nature, merely, as he is in re­spect of his minde, he shall beleeue himselfe to be immortall; for he shall see, that his minde aymeth not pro­perly at the sensible and mortall things, but that, by a certaine euerla­sting power, it taketh hold of things that are euerlasting, and of whatsoe­uer is possible to be conceiued in vn­derstanding. Insomuch, that euen it selfe becommeth, after a sort, a very world of vnderstanding and light.

Galen, Galen in his booke of Maners of the soul after hee had most curiou­sly [Page 13]searched into the nature of Ele­ments, & as much as he could, fathe­red the causes of all things vppon the Elements: yet is inforced to confesse in his booke of the doctrine of Hip­pocrates and Plato, that the Soule is a bodilesse substance, whereof the bo­dy is onely the chariot, making a dif­ference betweene the corruptible and immortall part of man.

The Turkes, Arabians, In the Al­caron Azo 25, & 42. and Per­sians holde firmely, that the Soule of man was breathed vnto him of God, and so consequentiy, incorruptible, and immortall. Besides, many other strong resolutions amongst the Phi­losophers; the very Caribies and Ca­niballes acknowledge the immortali­tie of the Soule.

I omit to mention what is contai­ned in the holy and sacred Booke of God, and writers of diuinitie, be­cause I would haue the most absurd [Page 14]that liue, repaire to learne of such as were altogether prophane: if they scorne (as many doe) to peruse the Booke of God.

What mooued all these, and ma­ny millions besides; nay, in a man­ner, the whole world, to acknow­ledge the excellent immortalitie of the Soule, but this reasonable vnder­standing and apprehension of the Soule, which being in it selfe im­mortall, searcheth out the know­ledge of thinges that are euerlasting, and neyther can finish, nor abide corruption in their substaunce? and so much for the substance where­of Reason is the qua­litie.

Sect. III. Reason aduaunced aboue things that are inferior to her.

IN comparing of things for their woorthinesse, or excellencie, it is al­way to be vnderstood, that there must be o­ther, and more things obiected, ouer and besides that which is aduaunced and commended aboue the rest, wherby the comparison or aduance­ment may be proued and discerned. In this matter I haue vndertaken, to aduance and set vp Reason aboue o­ther things. The better therefore to discouer the trueth thereof, I will manifest those things that are inferi­our, and ought to be subiect vnto Reason.

In the first Creation, God made many creatures, whereof the world doth consist in the whole, which be­ing truely considered, doe yeelde foure degrees, and each more excel­lent than other. The first sorte haue onely being. The second haue be­ing and life. The third haue being, life, and sence. The fourth haue be­ing, life, sence, and reason.

It was fitly said by a great learned man, that the earth, the sea, and the aire, are of great largenesse, they beare vp and sustaine all things that haue life, all that haue sence, and all things that haue reason, and yet themselues haue no more but a bare being, with­out life, sence, or reason: as they are the first things that were made of no­thing, so are they neerest vnto no­thing, and of meaner consideration then the rest. The plants and hearbes are the next, which besides their be­ing, [Page 17]haue a kinde of life, as it is to be seene by their growing, sucking, or drawing their nourishment from the earth, and their refreshing from the aire.

The Beastes haue being, life, and sence, and haue their nourishment and feeding from the elements, and from the plants. These things did God behold when he had made them, and they were all good.

Then did he make man, who had being, life, sence, and reason, this ex­cellent qualitie which I wish euery man deepely to consider: for God breathed into man the breath of life, and made him a liuing soule, he made him after his owne Image, by bestow­ing this liuing, reasonable, and im­mortall soule.

Marke wel, how by degrees God made these things, the earth, the wa­ter, and the aire, of nothing, that it [Page 18]might bud and bring forth the trees, and euery greene herbe.

Then the trees and grasse of the earth for the feeding of the beasts.

Then the beasts of the field, and the foules, and euery creeping thing.

And lastly, he made man his ma­teriall bodie of the dust of the earth, but his reasonable soule, by diuine in­spiration, who is properly vaid to en­ioy the Elements, line of the plants, and commaund the beasts, to consi­der and discourse of all things, and to be a little world in himselfe. Superi­oritie was giuen to him, as hauing the dominion and propertie of the rest of the creatures whom God brought to man, to receiue their names, for they had notvnderstanding to name one an other: but the reason of man did distinguish betweene them, and gaue them proper and seuerall additions, which his memory, endued with rea­son, [Page 19]did continually retaine, he go­uerned them, were they neuer so strong, and employed them to what seruice it pleased him. And to this day man hunts the wild beasts, & lawful­ly challengeth the propertie of them. So much as the diuine and euerlast­ing things are more excellent then corruptible, is the qualitie of right reason of the immortall soule, aboue the rest of the creatures subiect to cor­ruption.

An ancient Philosopher, Iamblicius concern­ing Miste­ries ch. 8.7 out of the very instinct of nature, in the deep cō sideration of reason said, that the first vse of reason is employed in concei­uing the Godhead, not properly by knowing it, but as it were, by feeling. By which feeling he meaneth not a palpable, bodily, or materiall feeling, but a spirituall feeling, according to the nature, both of God, and the Soule, and the qualitie of reason, [Page 20]which reacheth much further into causes then the bodily eye can dis­cerne.

At the time of the creation of man, God (who in himselfe is all goodnesse and excellencie) breathed into man, a spirit which must be per­fect, pure, and good, because nothing proceedes from God but that which is good, perfect, and pure: this spirit was his immortall soule, which had no partaking of any earthly sub­stance, but absolutely of it selfe im­materiall. This Soule was endued with perfect, pure, and true reason, knowledge, and vnderstanding, will and mind, being qualities, specially appropriate to the soule, as it was im­mortall: So that by the nature of the soule, and not of the bodie, man was first possessed of this Reason.

Man then consisteth of Body and Soule, and in respect thereof, is des­scribed [Page 21]by the auntient Philosophers and Writers, to containe in him, their liues, the liuing as plants, the sensi­tiue as beasts, and the last, the reaso­nable life.

‘Aristotle putting the difference between man and beast, saith, The diffe­rence be­tvvixt man and beast. Man and beast agree in this, that both of them haue one sensitiue power, and one selfe same imagination of things perceiued by the senses: and that they differ, onely in this, that man hath yet further, a reason and minde aboue the beast, which the beast hath not.’

In man is, as it were, an abridge­ment of God, and the worlde: of God, in respect of spirite, and of the worlde, in composition of the body. As if God in his diuine purpose, out of his aboundant wisedome, woulde set foorth a Mirrour of his woorkes, by reducing into a little compasse, [Page 22]both the infinitnesse of his owne na­ture, and the hugenesse of the whole world together.

This is the miraculous woorke of God, as it were, to ioyne mortalitie and immortalitie together in marri­age: the immortall spirite as the head and husband, and the mortall body as the spouse, to obey. These two in the first creation, made perfect man; and this perfect man, which is pro­perly vnderstoode by the inwarde man, was indued with perfect, right, and true Rea­son.

Sect. IIII. The definition of Reason.

FEaring to exceede the boundes of Reason, wherof I haue had care to consider, because I finde the depth thereof to be without the comprehension of men: I say, for my selfe, as Cyprianus Leonitius spake concerning his study of Astronomy, though he could not attaine the fulnesse thereof, yet, Est aliquod prodire tenus, si nō datur vltra: there is a proceeding to some good purpose, though all cannot be kno­wen. And as Lactantius saide of the Labours of Hercules, that they were Opera viri fortis, viri tamen, the works of a strong man, yet of a man: shew­ing [Page 24]there were imperfections in them: so may it bee saide of the best Labours of menne, that they come shorte of perfection. In like I may say of this thing which I desire to ex­plane by definition, and am driuen to confesse as Beza saieth of these wordes, 1. Cor. 11 10. Propter Angelos. Quid hoc sit, nondum mihi constat, what this worde Reason meaneth, I yet tho­rowly knowe not. But, submitting my vnderstanding vnto her worthi­nesse, I make bolde to explane her in the most woorthy sorte I can at­taine vnto.

The Latine woorde is Ratio, It is Englished by diuerse Authours, and called by diuerse Titles which allude towardes a definition. It is sayde to be, Reason, Counsel, Purpose, Care, Respect, Consideration, Regarde, the Cause, the Matter, the State, the [Page 25]Meanes, the Way, the Fashion, the Forme, the Proportion, a Rule, the Feate, the Manner and sort, a Mind, a Counsell, Aduise, an Accompt, or reckoning, Businesse, Valew, Af­faires; And lastly, the Quantitie, wherein is to be obserued, that out of the seuerall causes, wherevnto the scope of the Authors tended, theyr writings haue affoorded these seue­rall names or titles, describing in parte, by them, the nature and quali­tie of Reason.

Others haue gone further, saying, Reason is the eie of the Soule, where­by shee looketh into things, past, present, and to come.

She is saide to be, The Empresse of the Senses, The Queene of Will, An Apprehension of Heauenly and Diuine things, The daughter of Ʋnderstan­ding.

Reason is, by some, termed, A [Page 28]worde of diuine inspiration, agreeing with that speach of Architus, where hee saieth, God breathed Reason into Man.

Reason is saide to be, Aprudent guide of the Soule in her actions: Shee is saide to be, The Medicine of the Soule.

Hesiodus comming very neere the marke, saith, Reason is a diuine guide and wisedome inspired from aboue.

Ratio est quaedam tacita facultas in­sita mentibus hominum, August. a­pud Iurisc. Reason is a certaine secret faculty ingrafted in the mindes of men.

Ratio est rerum humanarum & di­uinarum indagatrix,Accord­ing to the schoole­men.quoad causas. Rea­son is a searcher out of humane and diuine things, in respect of the causes thereof.

Ratio est rerum omnium scrutinum & moderamen, quoad modos, Reason is a finder out, and gouernour of all [Page 29]thinges, as concerning the manner thereof.

So haue these men with great in­deuour expressed their mindes and vnderstandings, which I reuerently accompt of.

But Reason being not defineable, Ʋt illud quod consistit ex materia, as material things are, must needs be an immortall qualitie or facultie of the Soule, if not essentiall (which I haue reason to conceiue) yet at the least vnseparable, exercising many offi­ces as instruments, or intelligencers of Causes, according to hir emploi­ment.

Out of which Considerations, these sayings haue proceeded.

Domina & Regina omnium est ra­tio, quae connexa per se, et progressa, lon­giùs fit perfecta virtus haec, vt imperet illi parti animi quae obedire debet: Id videndum est viro: quonam modo in­quies? [Page 28]velut seruo Dominus, velut Imperator militi, velut parens filio: Reason is the Lady and Queene of all thinges, which first vnited by it selfe, and proceeding further, is made a perfect virtue: and how she ought to rule that parte of the minde which ought to obey, euery man must con­sider. But you wil aske, in what ma­ner she shoulde rule? Surely euen as a maister ruleth his seruants, an em­perour his souldier, and as a father his sonne.

Nihil est, Cic. de legi­bus.non dicam, in homine, sed in omni solo, at (que) terra, ratione diuinius, quae cum adoleuit, atque perfecta est, no­minatur ritè sapientia: There is no­thing, I will not say in man, but in all the world, more diuine than Reason; the which, when it is growne ripe, and come to perfection, is truly cal­led Wisedome.

Vt patrimonium homini ab homine Cic. de nat. Deorum.[Page 29]relinquitur, sic ratio homini à Deo. As a patrimony is bestowed from man to man, so is Reason giuen as a por­tion from God to man. 2. Tnsc.

Cùm praecipitur vt nobismet ipsis im­peremus, hoc praecipitur, vt ratio coerci­at temeritatem: When this is com­maunded, that wee should rule our selues, this is intended, that Reason should bridle Rashnesse.

Sect. V. The diuision of Reason, and the er­rour in vnderstanding thinges to proceede of Reason that doe not.

REason is of two sorts; sim­ple, right, and true.

Subtile, corrupt, and false, as by the maner of [Page 32]Schoole distinctions is manifest.

The manner of reasoning with right and true Reason, they call, Lo­gicke.

The arguing with false and cor­rupt Reason, they call, Sophistrie.

But before we enter into this di­uision, it shal be very necessarie, first to discouer the cōmon error of men, who vnderstand many things to pro­ceed of Reason, that in truth do not; which being manifested, will bee an easier way to take knowledge of the rest.

And for the better vnderstanding hereof let vs take them as they offer themselues to be discouered.

First, things that haue being only, at­taine not to Reason, for so haue stones. Things that haue being and life only, reach not neere Reason, for so haue trees. To haue being, life, & [Page 33]sence only comprehend things see­ming to proceed of Reason, as beasts who yet faile thereof. And because beastes in many things haue a neere­nes vnto Reason, being creatures in degree next vnto men. Let vs peruse somethings in them which doe de­ceiue men, and wherein most men do erre. To mooue, to feed, to sleepe, to wake, to see, smell or sence any thing, commeth not to Reason: to feare, to eschew, to desire, to discerne, to imagine, to generate, nor to pre­serue the young, commeth not to right Reason. Barely to preuent imi­nent dangers proceedeth not of Rea­son, for the beasts enioy all these, and will flee from their pursuers and es­chew to cast themselues headlong from any high place. Bare know­ledge proceedeth not of Reasons, for the birdes know their mates, be they neuer so like to others of their plume, [Page 34]they know the passage to and from their breeding places, and prouide for, and feed their young, they build curious nests to preserue their egges, they sit and hatch their young, and know the times of the yeare for that purpose, and the strength of their broode to make shift for themselues before they will leaue to feede them. In these matchings and keeping to their mated Companions without change, though they proceed not of right Reason, according to the quali­tie of the soules Reason, yet may they teach many that come short of that dutie, and yet hold themselues to be possessed of Reason.

Barely to make prouision for a future time, to put in store, or to hide from wasting and destruction, com­meth not to that which is called right Reason; for so doth the field mouse, who makes her way into the ground, [Page 35]and chusing the best graines that are in the eare she there placeth it in great abundance for her winter prouision, and so ordereth the matter, that she keepeth them drie, as they may not growe with the moisture.

The wood-bucke hordeth vp his nettes, and the Ante her prouision a­gainst winter. But enter duely into consideration of the Bee, (with whō I will conclude) her continuall labor, cunning working, preseruing her food, and their knowledge and go­uernment, and obedience: And ther­in may a man, euen with shame be­hold his owne faultes, that such ex­cellent matters should proceed from so small creatures voide of Reason, & only pertakers of sence. Spare your patience to peruse the order of their employments a little at large.

First, beeing small and puisill creatures, they gather themselues to­gether [Page 36]into multitudes without con­fusion. They inhabite and dwell to­gether without discord, they conti­nue in one house together without alteration, they ioyne in working to­gether without larre, they giue roome one to another without annoy, the vnburdened to the laden without re­sistance, they ioyne to defend them­selues against strangers, they rob not one anothers house, be they neuer so many. And in their neighbourhood they haue a kind of regard and know­ledge one of another; and like a com­mon wealth, as it were, they ioyne to suppresse others that are of another garden, they dispose of their dead out of the hiue, least they should an­noy, and suffer their young to grow and come to maturitie. And as they suffer their young to feede on their labour, so doe they expell and chace away the idle drones and sluggardes. [Page 37]In their labour they prouide for two things, hony for their food and waxe to make them welles to put the same in: the most skillfull workman in the world cannot frame a more artificiall worke then they, who ioyne together in their framing the waxen vessels in an admirable forme, that the walles of one worke serueth ten seuerall vses, it is a square, it selfe seruing for foure sides in that worke, & for foure other sides to the foure conioyning neigh­boures, either botom serueth for two vesselles, euery place after it is full is so fast walled, that nothing can fall out, and so wel couered, that nothing can come in: the whole worke is so strongly wrought together, that it falleth not off from the place where it is first fastened, that after a kind of artificiall & geometricall proportion of ponderositie, it rather seemeth to be pendent, than supported by any [Page 38]thing. And marke it well, you shall finde the hollow places, where the hony is setled, in such sort and order, as it may be come at, without harm­ing, or marring any other vessell. They labour all together, and they feede all together, and if they want, they perish all together. They obey their king, to depart from their habi­tation vpon warning. As they were bred all together, so they depart all together, and it is holden, that they chuse a place where to repose them­selues, before they leaue their former home: but at the least, it is very eui­dent they continue and keepe toge­ther, as it were, a sworne, vnited, and incorporate housholde, to partake good or euill, as it befalleth. They make their way thorow the ayre, and knowe how to returne. Their pain­ful trauell in summer, manifests they haue knowledge winter will come.

If any company of men did ioyne themselues together, and performe this kinde of seruice for the mutuall good one of another, woulde it not bee holden for the miracle of the world? or if any man woulde so or­der himselfe after that sort, in the go­uernement of himselfe, his passions, actions, and affections, in his little worlde, woulde he not be esteem­ed, the rarest of al that liue? Consi­der these thinges well, and marke what excellent partes of nature there are herein perfourmed, by these see­ly sensitiue creatures.

Howe many men liue that will iudge otherwise, than that the doing of these things proceede from right and true Reason, and yet in very trueth they doe not? They are one­ly those benefites of Nature which God hath bestowed on these kinde of creatures, and tend onely, and [Page 40]no further than to a temporary, a dy­ing, finishing, corruptible, and end­ing scope: for the creatures them­selues, and their liues being corrup­tible, their actions and dooings can tend no further than to the extreame and vttermost of their liues, which Nature taught them to preserue by these meanes.

Sect. VI. Vnto what things right Reason reacheth.

BVt, right and true rea­son duely considered, is of a farre higher, and more excellent quali­tie, it extendeth it selfe [Page 41]into thinges corruptible and incor­ruptible, and it reacheth into the things past, things present, & thinges to come.

First let vs looke howe it extend­eth it selfe into the solide and massie parte of the earth. Reason discouer­eth both the matter and forme there­of. The superficies, and the Chaos, or Cuball partes, it vnderstandeth, that in her intrailes are many veines for water to passe, concaue places for the ayre, mettalls of gold, siluer, copper, yron, tinne, lead, stone, and other excellent things. Reason hath searched into the refining of things into a perfection, which Nature it selfe hath not yet brought to maturi­ty and ripenes: Reason hath put a di­stinction betwene those mettalls, ei­ther for their worthines, or basenes. And out of the consideration of the matter and forme thereof, by the [Page 42]whole, and by their partes, Reason taketh knowledge of God their first Creator. All which, the onely sensi­tiue parte of beasts, or men, doe not conceiue nor vnderstand.

Reason entreth into the conside­ration of the diuersitie of creatures, and their creation.

What other thing than the reason of man hath found out, the virtues & operations of trees, plants, & herbes? or discouered, that some one thing shall haue diuers powers, virtues, and workings, in diuerse partes thereof, colde without, hote within, of one colour in the outside, of an other in the substance, colde in the leafe, hote in the roote, and of an other opera­tion in the rhinde. Reason inform­eth to appoynt some hearbes to bee eaten, some for Physicke, some to be vsed in hote causes, others in cold; nay more, Reason hath searched into [Page 43]the very solide bodies and substance of things, as to vnderstand what spe­ciall vertue is in golde, siluer, copper, yron, and other mettalles: in trees, plants, and hearbes, and to extract and drawe from them their principal and best vertues, and to make vse of them for his owne purpose, descen­ding, as it were, into the very nature, and condition of Nature it selfe, to help the imperfections of Nature in some part. And such other rare and excellent things (as being truly con­sidered) must needes bee adiudged to proceede from a nature of deeper vnderstanding than all the others, that are meerely sensitiue.

Of beasts and birds, Reason chu­seth, some for meate, and others for other vses, as our common experi­ence doth teach vs.

If we consider the workes that are written by prophane men, of Geo­metrie, [Page 44]Geographie, Arithmeticke, Astronomy, Astrologie, Musicke, the liberall Sciences, the Mensurati­on of the earth, the Altitude, Longi­tude, Crassitude, Magnitude, Oppo­sitions, Coniunctions, Aspects, Mo­tions, Progressions, Retrogradations, Courses, and Spheres of the celestiall bodies of the Zodiake, the Climates, Horizons, Tropiks, Poles, & Zones of the mouing starres, and how they finish their courses, of the Orbes, & their spaciousnesse, of their conuex partes, and their absides, of their na­tures and gouernement they haue o­uer mortall creatures, of the Com­position of Elements: who can iudge otherwise than that these things are wrought into men, by the excellent part of Reason?

If in mechanicall Trades, we ob­serue the curious building of houses, the mollifying of harde things to bee [Page 45]wrought by fire, to make sollide things fusible, & liquide things hard, the forging of yron, and other met­talles, the curious spinning, and ex­quisite needle-worke, the fashioning of things fitte for mens bodies, the Arte of Printing, and a thousand o­ther things which we see daily in our view. And among all the rest, these ordinary things, the vse of our speach and discoursing, our reading, and writing, and vnderstanding of lan­guages, which being properly ours, by Reason, ought to bee contained within the bounds of Reason.

As the reasonable soule hath both contemplated, and made vse of all these things, so hath she repaire, euen to the presence of God himselfe; and though she be neuer absent from the bodie during life, yet is she not so in­cluded in the bodie, as that shee is not at one selfe same instant in other pla­ces [Page 46]wee see by these examples afore­said, that she maketh her passage in­to things that cannot be touched, nor compassed otherwise, then by vnder­standing and Reason.

Obserue it in thy selfe, and thou shalt find thou maist send thy minde, reason, and vnderstanding, into the furthest part of the world, and call it backe in a moment, though thy bodie stirre not.

If any man be of opinion, that his soule and Reason are shut fast in his bodie, and that the bodie carrieth the Soule, the minde, and Reason, at his pleasure, he is much deceiued; for if he looke truly into his owne actions, he shal rather find, that the soule doth carrie, and moue the body from place to place as the mind and Reason li­keth.

For consider the possibilitie of the one, and impossibilitie of the other: [Page 47]the Soule may liue and moue without the body, but the body cannot possi­bly moue without the soule. There­fore, as life consisteth in the Soule, so do the moouings or stirrings of the body proceed of the power and wor­king of the soule.

Therfore, as the soule is in the bo­die, and in euery part thereof, by all, and by the whole, so is the bodie conueyed and mooued by the Soule, in all, and euery part of the body, the actiue part of man is the Soule, and the passiue part is his body.

Marke thine owne actions, and and thou shalt see and plainely disco­uer it to be true: hast thou a iourney in hand? thy vnderstanding, mind, & Reason doth first determine and ap­point, before thou mooue to vnder­take the labour; nay, when thy bo­dy lieth still, thy mind and Reason worketh. Be thou in prison, thy [Page 48]mind is busie abroade, and Reason setteth her selfe aworke, how to pro­cure the enlargement of that bodie of thine, that cannot stirre a foote out of the doore, and if thy bodie were as easely conueied, as thy minde and Reason, thou shouldest not long re­maine in durance: But they may not depart absolutely from thee, & leaue thee a liuing creature. Thus is it plaine that the Soule, the mind, and Reason, do carry, & cause the bodies motions, and it is not the bodie that carrieth the Soule.

What caused Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the Greekes to repaire to the schollers of Tresmegistes, the E­giptians to the Caldeans and Hebrues, for the learning of Philosophie, but Reason, and the Motion of the mind, for the worthines of that worthie sci­ence? The like may be said of Archi­mides, Sulpitius, Gallus, Thales, [Page 49]Iupiter, Belus, Socrates, and o­thers concerning Astrologie.

Whosoeuer shall looke curiously into the admirable works of Arith­meticke, and Geometrie, and pro­portions therof, done by Pithagoras, Eudoxus, Euclides, Archimedes and Tresmegistes, shall be driuen of ne­cessitie, to confesse, verie rare, curious, and profitable helpes by them to bee effected and published, to the good of the world. And who can but won­der at the worke of Archimedes, who by those reasons, found out, what se­uerall mettalls were in the Kings Crowne, and how much there was of euery mettall, without either mel­ting, or taking it in sunder. Plutarch in the life of Solon and Lycurgus.

If it be demaunded what caused Solon and Lycurgus to trauell into E­gypt, to learne rudiments and lawes to bring their people into a reasonable gouernment, It will be answered that [Page 50]the inclination they had to draw rude and confused matters to some rea­sonable head and order, moued them to take that paines. The lawes of do­minion and propertie of things, both reall and personal, of mixt and entire, are drawne out of Reason, and all their braunches ought to bee tied fast thereunto. The law of seueritie and punishment, are in the nature of kee­ping the guiltlesse from receiuing wrong, and are as a protection for the well gouerned, not drawne out of an vnreasonable desire of punish­ment, without cause, or tormenting the offender in respect of his person, but to take off the offence.

In the orderly or fit doing of any thing, the mind and Reason beginne their work at the latter end, and at the effect; as in building a house, Rea­son hath laid the whole plot, and the cause to what end it is built, before a­ny [Page 51]stone be laid.

In any iourny, Reason, either hath, or should set downe the probabilitie of good to ensue therof.

What caused the men of auncient time to enter into consideration of e­ternitie, and to search into the diffe­rence of things immortall, and things transitorie, subiect to corruption, of the beginning & ending of time, and of the world, and that time is not in respect of God and eternitie, but of things that had beginnings, and passe with time: and whosoeuer shall looke into the workes of Homer, Hesiodus, Parminides, Mercurius, Sophocles, Aeschylus, Euripides, and others, shall finde that this Soules qualitie of Rea­son, euen out of nature it selfe, had searched farre into these deepe mat­ters.

It is amongst the Philosophers a­greed, that there is in man a double [Page 52]speach, the one, in the mind before we vtter it, and the other is called, the speach of the voyce, vttered with the mouth; the one priuate, the other ser­ueth to publish that which the minde and vnderstanding haue conceiued and determined to manifest.

The learned translatours of the Greeke word, Logos, somtimes call it speach, somtimes, word, and some­times, Reason, and it alludeth to this, Ʋox praefert, animus ratiocinatur men­tis verbum ipsa ratio est. The voice vt­tereth the mind, reasoneth, and deba­teth, & so Reason is the very word or speach of the mind. And as it is fitlie said, that what proportion is between the voyce or speach of the mind; the like is betweene the speach of the mind, and the speach of vnderstan­ding, the voyce hath neede of aire, and is diuided into partes, and requi­reth leasure, the minde is indiuisible, [Page 53]but yet hath neede to passe from one conclusion or Reason to another. But vnderstanding accomplisheth his a­ction or working in lesse then a mo­ment, & with one only act filleth the Reason and minde that it is constray­ned to make many acts of one: so that there is such an indiuisible vniting and putting together of vnderstand­ing, mind, and reason, in the Soule, that they may not be parted, nor be one without the other. For which cause, Reason is properly said to bee the daughter, speach, or word of our vnderstanding. That nature and a­bilitie of working of the Soule, which the Latines call Mens, the French translators vnderstand to be the rea­sonable Soule. And as there is des­cribed to bee in the reasonable Soule, working, vnderstanding, and willing, so are not these, three liues, nor three soules in vs, but one life, & one soule. [Page 54]And these are three powers, which the reasonable and immortall soule cannot want. The like is said of the memorie of vnderstanding, or of mindefull vnderstanding, to be an aboundance of reason, and as it were a hoorder vp of the continuall influ­ences of the minde, which minde A­uerhos and Alexander tearme, the workefull minde, which is, a power, or force, that can skill to extend rea­son from one thing to an other, which they also conclude to be vn­corruptible, euerlasting, and diuine: and by this Minde, is vnderstoode, the immortall reasonable soule of man. And, as a great learned man, writing of the corruption of mans nature, sheweth, that the worlde, and all the creatures were made for the vse of man, and commending the vnderstanding and reason of man; Hee first speaking of the other crea­tures, [Page 55]sayth, To what purpose are all their virtues, and excellent proper­ties, if themselues know them not?

The Sunne, saith he, excelleth a­mong the Coelestiall bodies, and the Rose among the flowers: The beast is a degree aboue the trees: But what skilles it, what thou arte, or what thou hast, if thou know it not, nor vnder­stand it. For what auaileth the light to the blinde, meate to him that can­not taste, sweete odours to him that smelleth not? Or, what auaileth the excellencie of thy Creation, or thy reasonable and immortall Soule, if thou discerne not the woorthinesse thereof?

By the meanes of Reason, onely man of all the things in this inferior world, can skill of these things, and how to enioy them, and so of force it may rightly and truely be conclu­ded, that they were made for none, [Page 56]but for him. That is, to speake more properly, God hath giuen vnto man, al, and whatsoeuer al other creatures, either haue, or be, and hath not dealt with him, barely, as with a creature, but rather, as with his owne childe: for whome he hath expresly created this world, and giuen it him to pos­sesse; and besides, gaue him an vn­derstanding mind and reason (which I so much labour to aduance) to en­ioy, gouerne, and order the same.

Yet to drawe Reason a little high­er: this excellent qualitie in the soule of man, by some is vnderstoode to be a religious regard, and vnderstan­ding of God, and to walke in his ser­uice, and a continuall obseruation of good things that tend to immortali­tie. For as death separateth the body and soule for a time, so doth the soule carry with it so much of his substāce, power, & quality, as it first brought, [Page 57]that is, spirite, life, reason, and will: which it shall bring to the bodie a­gaine, at the time of their second v­niting. Agayne, if Reason bee the Daughter, & Vnderstanding, which is a chiefe power of the soule, be the Mother, then are these co-relatiues, and the one can not be without the other. The soule cannot be without vnderstanding, and vnderstanding cannot be without reason; therefore, as the soule is an immortall substāce, so is vnderstanding an immortal po­wer, and reason an immortall quality of the soule.

The word Logos which the tran­slators of the Greeke many times call Reason or word, is said by the diuines to be incarnate by the holy ghost, to make the sonne of God, the second person in the Trinity, whome we ac­knowledge and beleeue to bee sub­sisting of a reasonable Soule, and hu­mane [Page 58]flesh. To whome the Philo­sophers giue the names of the Be-er or hee that is, Wit, or Vnderstan­ding, the beautiful, and sometimes, speach, word, reason, wisedome, Son, and the begotten, which Reason they affirme to be engendered of the vn­derstanding, and to be as the light of the vnderstanding, and dependeth thereupon.

This is the Image of God which we beare about vs, our immortall reasonable Soule, as if wee behold with the eyes of our vnderstanding, how the Sonne of God vouchsafeth vs a brotherhoode, we cannot be ig­norant of.

Right Reason therefore out of all these collections hath a place aboue al the vegitatiue & sensitiue creaturs, and aboue all materiall things what­soeuer, yea, the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, and firmament of hea­uen, [Page 59]& is that which Salomō desired at the hands of God, when he prayed to haue that vnderstanding which sate next vnto the Throne of God.

So is Reason placed next vnto God himselfe, the worthinesse wher­of is seene in this, that in the diuine consideration of Gods eternitie, his prouidence and purpose of creation of things for his owne honour. One man, through his reasonable and im­mortal soule, was more precious, and of greater value, than all the whole mould of the Earth, and all the crea­tures thereupon creeping, mouing and being. Besides this, it is most ap­parant, that in the time of Innocency and perfection of man. Reason was not attainted, infected, incombred, nor auoided with inordinate lust, desires, affections, nor passions, which now are crept in, and haue incorporated themselues in him, no, [Page 60]the very free will of man had not ori­ginally place aboue Reason, but was at her commaund, and subiect vnto reason. An example whereof no man shall need go farre to seeke, for if hee truly suruey the corners of his owne heart, and contemplate what perfectiōs he desireth to haue which he wanteth, hee shall finde what man had, and are nowe impayred. And considder well with thy selfe, what thon arte without reason, and thou shalt finde thy condition worse than the state of a bruite beast.

Thus haue I made bolde, and that rightly, and truely, to drawe Reason, and her immortall Soule, from these base and earthly things, and place her in her owne throne, euen next vnto God, aboue all corruptible things, among the immortall ones, and neerest vnto Eternitie it selfe, whose pallace, seate, and gouerne­ment [Page 61]we may behold, onely with the eies of our vnderstanding, for there­by wee are vnited vnto the God of heauen, and selected from corrupti­ble thinges, and thereby our mortall bodies shall put on immortalitie.

As the Sunne in his sphere taketh his course, betweene the firmament, and the lower Elementes, extending his beames to the remotest places of them both: so doth reason in the im­mortal soule of man, during this na­turall life, wait betweene heauen and earth, and by no meanes can be en­closed in the earths body, as by these twoo reasons may appeare. If the soule leaue the body, and departe in­to heauen, she caries reason with hir, and the body becommeth earth a­gaine: or if the body carry the soule, and reason, into the depth of thearth, or offer to include her in the massie lump thereof, presently, the soule fli­eth [Page 62]from the body, and reason abso­lutely departeth: reason is a thing of more excellencie, than that sencelesse parte of the worlde can containe, or whereto shee ought to be made sub­iect.

This is truely her Monarchie, if shee haue her owne, and due birth­right; a power, a commaund, and au­thority ouer al the actions, passions, i­maginations, and fantasies of menne: and her feate ought to be aboue the thoughts and conceits of the wisest. Who can measure her territories, or possessions? when the mind and rea­son of man extendeth both general­ly and particularly into all causes on the earth, the aire, the powers, of hea­uen, the firmament it selfe, nay into heauen it selfe, and to the very Sonne of God, who in excellencie far sur­mounteth the Angels, & sitteth at his right hand, possessed with the reaso­nable [Page 63]soule of man, and in him sit­teth right reason, next vnto the throne of God?

If any haue knowledge by what means to augmēt the vnderstanding thereof, let him put his helping hand for this Empresse is hardly besett in hir Monarchie, & almost pulled frō her throne, and her Scepter troden vnder foote: And so leauing to speake further of that excellent, true, and perfect quality, I make her place knowne, and leaue her to maintaine her title as she may, being much di­stressed in her gouernment.

Sect. VII. Of Reason corrupted.

IT needeth no more proof to maintaine the argument of innocencie and perfe­ction [Page 64]in the reasonable soule of man, but that God was the Creator there­of, from whom could proceede no­thing but good. There needeth no further proofe to discouer, that this perfection and innocencie is corrup­ted and impaired, but euery particu­lar mans examination of his owne actions, thoughts, and wordes, that daily and hourely passe from him. For if any man wil take any one day, a note of all the words hee hath spo­ken, and examine the next day, how insufficient and vaine the most of them haue beene, he shall neede no other Iudge but his owne consci­ence. If he shall an other day record all his thoughts, and after trie their consonancie with reason, I leaue to him that shall make proofe thereof, what he will censure in that behalfe.

And if any will peruse his acts & deeds, euen in some things that are [Page 65]now lawfull and honest, he shal finde nature simply ashamed of them to be discouered, bicause they were not originally in partes of nature, but are sithence crept in by corruption. Any that will duly looke into these causes, shall plainely find himselfe depriued of all perfection and innocencie, and his owne soule to be polluted with wickednes, and all the powers and qualities thereof; yea his vnderstan­ding, reason, and will, to be peruer­ted, and nature it selfe preuaricated.

In the first creation, mans vnder­standing, wit, and reason, extended only to the knowledge of good: his will was then tied to obey reason: And in that time was not his nature, Soule, nor reason polluted with fond lust, wicked desires, inordinate affe­ctions, intemperate passions, nor vaine and idle fancies. But this perfe­ction and innocencie remained not [Page 66]long, before the cunning Sophister, enticed by perswasions, the will, mind, Soule, and reason of man, to vndertake a worke that wrought his confusion, and corrupted all these good partes. To dilate therof, I for­beare, because none can doubt of the trueth of that generall ouerthrow of mans estate, life, soule, reason and will; and concluding that with an af­firmatiue, that corruption came in by sinne, I will proceed to the rest as the cause offereth.

Since, and in the instant time of this ouerthrow, there are growne in­to the very nature of man, and of his Soule and Reason, pride, lust, self-will, ennie, hatred, anger, sorrow, deceipt, falshoode, partialitie, and infinite o­ther passions and affections, (which for breuity I omit to speake of) haue thrust themselues into this Monar­chie, and wonderfully and vniuer­sally [Page 67]opposed themselues, and rebel­led against their Empresse, and her estate, and kingdome, and grieuou­sly and sorely rebelled against her iust gouernment, setting vp new courses and orders; insomuch as Se­neca in his time complained, Cessero publicaiura priuatis, & cepit licitim esse quod publicum est. Plotinus. 1. lib. 4. ca. 1 And Plotinus en­tring into consideration hereof, doth as it were, wonder thereat, saying, what should be the cause, that our soules, being of a diuine nature, shuld so farre forget God their father, and their kindred, and themselues? And making the answere thereto himselfehe saith. ‘The beginning of this mischiefe, was acertaine rashnesse, and ouer boldnesse, throgh which they would needes plucke their necks out of the Coller, and bee at their owne commaundement. By which abuse, turning their libertie [Page 68]into licentiousnesse, they went cleane backe, and are so farre gone away from God, that like children being newly weyned, are by and by conueyed from their parents, & know, neither whose, nor what they be, nor from whence they come. Plotin. 1. li. 8. cap. 4. And in another place bee­wailing this corruption, hee saith; The soule which was bredd for heauenly things, hath plunged it selfe in these materiall things, and matter of it selfe euill, that not onlie all that is of matter, or matched with matter, but also euen that which hath respect vnto matter, is filled with euill, as the eye that be­holds darknes is filld with darknes’

Hierocles the stoicke against Atheists saith, that man is of his owne motion enclined to follow the euill, and to leaue the good: there is, saith he, a cer­tain strife bred in his affectiōs, which [Page 69]stepping vp against the will of na­ture, hath made it to tumble from heauen to hell.

The Auncient Philosophers, ta­king consideration of the number of affections, and passions, wherewith the Soule and Reason of man is in­fected and corrupted, which Plutark affirmeth to be much more sorrow­ful, and grieuous then the bodily dis­eases, endeuouring to reduce and bring those intemperate affections, and passions, to some reasonable or­der, haue made diuers books of Mo­ral vertues and lawes, and giuen sun­dry rules, ordinances, and precepts, to bring them to obediēce. In which their exceeding painefull works, they positiuely inueigh against the rebel­liousnes that is naturally in vs, against Reason, that is, the rebelliousnes that is crept in by this corruption of na­ture. These rebellious affections & [Page 70]passions are not as spottes or staynes, that may be washed, or clensed out of nature, but a deepe impression in nature, with much ado to be restrai­ned and held short, but neuer vtter­ly to be subdued or ouercome; wher­vpon it is very fitly said by a man of great learning. ‘Seeing that reason is somuch more excelēt then passion or affection, as the formes, shape, or fashion is more excellent then the matter, or stuffe, wherein it is.’

Whence commeth this infection in vs, that maketh the matter to ouer­maister the forme, and causeth the form, as it were, to receiue shape and fashion of the matter, that is to say, which putteth Reason in subiection to passions, and to the impression which affection yeeldeth, contrary to the order which is in al the world be­side?

What else is this intemperance of [Page 71]man but Reason, as it now remaineth inwrought or ingrauen with lust & concupiscence? what is anger, but Reason, attainted with choser, &c. Nō sic suit ab initie. It was not so in the first creation. The motions of lust, anger, and intemperance which now rule men against Reason, were not in the originall nature of man, neither proceed they of the first creation: for then would not nature be ashamed of them as you see it now is. These motions are crept in since by corrup­tion. And therefore the grieuing that happeneth to men by those pas­sions, is a working of nature, which is ashamed to play the bruit beast.

There are described to be in the reasonable soule of man foure pow­ers or abilities, first, Witte secondly, Will, thirdly, an abilitie of being angrie, fourthly, an Abillitie of Lusting. In those foure abilities the Philo­sophers [Page 72]haue entended to place foure vertues. In wit, wisdome, in will, righ­teousnesse; in the abilitie of being angrie valor; in the abilitie of lust Staidnesse. These powers, abilities, & vertues are maymed. And those a­bilities haue not those vertues, Wit is maymed with ignorance; Wil, with doing wrong; Valor, with cowardice Staidenes, with licentiousnes.

Besides the outward fences, ima­gination, and appetite, which are cō ­mon to beastes, man had wit or rea­son, and will, of the gift of the creator peculiar to man only; by which wee esteeme our selues better then the beasts, and in regard therof, we look to haue them in subiection vnder vs. And al this Reason leadeth vs to vn­derstand. But obserue the sequell, and we shall find, as the corrupt cō ­dition of mans nature is now, that whereas imagination ought to rule [Page 73]the fences, will, to rule the appetite, and Reason to rule the imagination, it fareth farre otherwise, for imagina­tion giueth way to the outward sense: Appetite ruleth will, and imaginatiō carrieth Reason at her pleasure; in­somuch, that the very sensuall parte which is the meanest, carrieth all the rest, and maketh Reason an vnder­ling; nay, oft times leaueth Reason quite out, and rebelleth against her, and so this spirit and reason of ours is forward to nothing but euill, nor enclined to any thing saue base, and transitorie matters. It fastneth it self to the earth, and is bondslaue to the bodie.

To discouer how farre the aunci­ent Philosophers (out of such reasons as they had) waded into these causes, would require a long worke, ther­fore a worde or two. Philosophie it selfe is said to be an art of healing the [Page 74]soule of the infirmities whereinto it was fallen from hir first perfection.

The first step thereunto, or pre­cept is, Nosce teipsum, begin to know thy selfe.

Aristotle coulde not chuse but knowe, that the vnderstanding and minde of man was out of tune, when in his Moralls, he declareth, that the affections ought to be ruled by rea­son, and our mind brought from ex­treames into the meane, and from iarring into the right tune.

Theophrastus saith, that the soule payed well for her dwelling in the bodie, considering how much it suf­fred by the bodies meanes: shewing that he considered that corruption was entered into man, euen into his soule, mind, and reason.

Zoriastres the grand-child of Noa, and auncientest of Philosophers, bewayleth this laps, fall, and digres­sion [Page 75]of the race of mankinde, crying, alas, alas, the whole earth mourneth euen vnto children.

And Hermes in his Poemander giueth it a most absolute conclusion, where he saith, God created mā after his owne likenesse, and gaue him all things to vse, but man, in steed of staying vpon the beholding of his fa­ther, would needes bee medling and doing somewhat of himselfe, and so fell from the heauenly contemplati­on, into the sphere of elements or ge­neration. And because he had pow­er ouer all things, he began to fall in loue with himselfe. And gazing and wondring at himselfe, he was so in­tangled, that he became a bondslaue to his body, being before at libertie. Which bondage, and abasing hee in­tendeth to be in the soule, mind, and reason of man.

If we shall grow a little neerer [Page 76]to this matter, and peruse an ex­ample or two in the holy Booke of God; consider whether it were cor­rupt, false, and sophisticated perswa­sions and Reasons that the serpent v­sed to Eue, what Reason was that, that led Caine to kill Abell, or the Children of God to be bewitched with the beautie of the daughters of men, or the Caldeans to erect the tow­er of Babel.

The effect and issue will shewe what kinde of reason it was. By the first came the destruction and ouer­throwe of all the perfection of man. By the second, a perpetuall curse to the murtherer, and a continuall an­guish, sorrow, and griefe to his heart and soule. By the third, an vniuersall deluge vppon the face of the whole earth: And by the fourth, an vtter confusion of languages.

God in the creation made al things [Page 77]in order: and Order would that our wit should obey God, and our sen­ses and appetites obey Reason. But we see apparantly, that for breaking this order, these confusions haue en­sued.

If we desire a plaine demonstrati­on, let vs looke into our selues, by the rule afore prescribed into things in­ferior to vs, and into what is aboue, and greater then our selues. As the in­ferior creatures, whereof the sensitiue are the chiefest, come not neere man in excellency, vnderstanding, capaci­tie, nor Reason, neither do they striue therein, but abide in their first state.

So hath God left in himselfe, a fulnesse of perfect and absolute po­wer, wisedome, and vnderstanding, not to be conceiued, nor comprehen­ded by the wit nor reason of man, in a farre greater measure then mans vn­derstanding and reason can attaine [Page 78]vnto, as mans vnderstanding or rea­son was at any time aboue the beasts of the earth.

These things he kept absolutely to himselfe, to be a Creator, to be o­beyed, and to haue none equall, and to keepe all his creatures vnder his subiection.

This order must man needes be doing withall, it was not inough for him to enioy, and know the good: but he must know euill also. And in truth, and no doubt, but he exten­ded his reason and will to a good end, for he got such a knowledge of euill, and so entangled himselfe there­with, that he abandoned all that was good, and became himselfe a very masse of euill.

Cōsider this reason; what would a man think if his horse shuld turne his master to eate grasse, and lodge in the field, & he to feed of the best meats, [Page 79]and stay in the house? Nay come neerer, what if a mans feruant, nay his friend; or to be short, his owne sonne, would participate in worthinesse with the father, & take dignity from him, and become the absolute ow­ner of the fathers possession in his life, and make him liue like a seruant? I referre the censure to the reader, be­cause I know not how neere it may touch him, being matters so rife in practise.

To drawe towards the conclusion of this parte, it is greatly to be consi­dered, that in the estimation of the Creator, the reasonable soule of one man is of more value and price then all the territories of the world, euen then the whole earth, and whatsoeuer is in the bowels thereof: Reason will compell thee to confesse this whe­ther thou wilt or no, in regard of the immortalitie of the one, and corrupti­on [Page 80]and finishing of the other.

The earth was the thing giuen; and man the donee, the possessor is more worth then the thing posses­sed, man is much better then money, in that money was made for the vse of man, and not man for the vse of mony: but see how the vsage there­of agreeth with right and true Rea­son, which is the marke we shoote at.

Looke into some particulars, and obserue how many men thou know­est, that for some small parte of the earth (in comparison of the whole but a crumme) that had rather see the destruction of many christian soules, then to loose any part therof, making more of a penny then of the life of his brother. Nay, looke into the will of men, and obserue therein, whether they regard the shedding of blood & murther, so much as the satisfying their will? What hath bene the cause [Page 81]of warres and slaughters of men, whereof there remaine so many hi­stories: but the breach of Order, and making a fraction of Reason.

In the ciuill gouernment of coun­tries, what hath beene the cause of iniuries, wrongs, violence, & oppres­sions, peruerting, and corruption of Iustice, vntrue suggestion, periuries, subordinations, theftes, robberies, and cruelties, but that men exceede the bounds of right and true Reason?

Aske the great man, and the rich, to haue cōmiseration of the needy, and his hart will be rather enclined to crueltie then pitty, he had rather haue his poore debtors bones to make dice, then become pittifull. Aske the needie, and him that is in distresse how he findeth it, and hee will say, and truely, that the world hath forsaken him, friends fall off, & those of his owne house will vse him, [Page 82]not much better then poore Iob was vsed. But by the way, poore man, take this for thy comfort: thy reaso­nable soule is better then all the rich mans treasure, yea then all the earth beside if thou haue patience for a sea­son. To conclude, let euery man re­paire home to his conscience and clo­set of his owne heart, and examine himselfe before the seate of this Em­presse: Reason how much hee estee­meth and valeweth the landes, riches, and transitorie things of the world, aboue the price of his poore brothers Soule and life: nay, to end in a word, then his owne Soule: examine thy selfe well, how farre thou wouldest extend, thy mind, thy word, thy tra­uell, thy othe, and thy very Soule, to procure and get a small part of this base, transitorie, and corrupt world; thou shalt need no other satisfaction, but that right and true Reason is cor­rupted, [Page 83]impaired, and become sub­iect to that which it ought to go­uerne.

Sect. VIII. Reasons particular gouernement.

HAuing furnished the former arguments with some matters, the more liuely to expresse what they are, namely, the Soule of man immortall, the ex­cellent quallitie of right and true Reason, and the corruption there­of: It shal agree with Reason, to re­remember, that man is said to bee an abridgement, as it were, of God, and the world, and as a mirror of the whole worke of God, reduced into a little compasse. For which cause he is called a little world of himselfe. [Page 84]Now, if by obseruation we finde an orderly kind of gouernment, obedi­ence, and disposition, in diuers parts of the other creatures, how necessarie it is for euery particular and priuate man, that wil chalenge himselfe to be endued with Reason, to descend into himselfe, and examine how this little world of his soule, his reason, his sen­ses, and his body, is ordered: And how, and in what maner reason doth gouerne, and will, appetite, affections, and passions do obey. Let a man per­vse himselfe, and he shall finde in his body, a part of those creatures, that want sense and Reason: As his haire, and finger nailes; he shall find diuers passions and perturbations, that are voide of Reason. A body which we cal the flesh of the earth, a vegitatiue part of growing, as the plants, a sen­sitiue part of moouing, seeing, smel­ling &c: as the beastes, a reasonable [Page 85]part in an immortall soule, and all those in so small compasse. And di­uers learned writers reason, that man, and the course and motions of his life, and being reasemble, the very course of the celestiall bodies; in stu­dying whereof they haue taken great paynes. And Reason it selfe conclu­deth this point of diuinitie, that in mā there is immortality and mortality, the one of the soule, and the other of the body. The one, as matter subiect to corruption and wasting; and the Soule, a substance, that neuer shall leaue to haue being, and life. There is no thing, nor nature whatsoeuer, that is either knowne, or can be con­ceiued, but is either immortal or mor­tall: part of both these, is man, there­fore is he a true patterne of al the rest, and so consequently of the whole world.

If a man would enter into consi­deration, [Page 86]what a wonderfull thing in nature, the coniunction, and knitting together of the body and soule is, see­ing the soule, which is light, to bee within the heauy body, that which is of coelestiall fire, within that which is earthie and cold, inuisible, and im­mortall, in palpable and corruptible earth, what an admirable creature was man if he knew himself? The definiti­on & diuision of whose soul & body, with this short touch, I leaue the rea­der, to search further the learned wri­tings of such as haue treated thereof, and fearing to be tedious, I retire to my former purpose, that euery man in his priuate state ought to consider what he was, from which he is fallen, what he is by corruption, whereof is already treated, what he would bee, and what he shal be, which done, he shal find, that there is non but would be happy. But the corrupt will and affections tend to miserie, calamity, [Page 87]and infelicitie, vnlesse there be the greater care and gouernment thereof had. Now as wee began in order, to take things in their worthines, wher­by man is placed aboue the rest, so in mā, that which is most worthy, ought to be preferred aboue the rest, as his Soule aboue the body. And Reason aboue passions, and affections. Rea­son the Queene, and the rest subiect. Take a view of thine owne selfe, thy soule, thy conscience, thy mind, thy reason, thy body, thy sences, these af­fections, passions, perturbations, and imperfectiōs; the determinatiō of the heart, the speech of the mind, and the speech of thy mouth, & thou shalt be driuen to shift hard for help to excuse thee. There is described to be in man a sensuall appetite, which the Schoole men diuided into two partes the lust­full appetite, and the irefull or wrath­full appetite. There are also de­scribed [Page 88]to be in these two appetites twelue principall passions, whereof six, which are loue, and hatred, long­ing, and loathing, gladnesse, and sad­nesse, doe folow the lustful appetite. The other sixe, that is, hope, and dis­paire, fearfulnes, and foole-hardines, Cholericknes, & coldnes, do follow the irefull part.

That these are al sensual, is plaine, in that they finish, and end, when life leaueth the body. Besides, the very bruite beasts haue their parts in them as well as men. These are the sub­iects which in euery particular body, and gouernement of euery person ought to be kept in obedience vnto reason: and not to issue or proceed any further, than they can shew their warrant, authoritie, and commission for.

Nowe seeing the imperfection of all these things is crept into the cor­ruption [Page 89]of the nature, as well of the bodies, as soules of men, it behoou­eth euery one therfore to summon a parliament, and to assemble all these passions and affections, to receiue direction, howe to bee disposed, in what causes, & how farre. And to re­ceiue reprehension and discipline for their cōtempt or disobediēce. For the discouerie whereof, obserue this in al the things wherein thou employest thy minde. And therein first consi­der, and conclude, that by the reaso­nable soule and life, is vnderstoode, such a soule and life, as hath counsell, iudgement, and reason, which was created to this ende, that knowing God her Creator, and louing him, in regarde thereof, she might honor and serue him. & finally, by degrees, attaine to immortal life & happines, which is appoynted for her end, and is the marke she should labour to at­taine.

For, as nothing in man is more ex­cellent then Reason, whereof God hath made thee partaker, so is there nothing so well beseeming thy Rea­son, then that thou know, loue, and honour God, as whom nothing is so excellent, nor vnto whom nothing may bee compared, and without whom, thou hadst not obtained, nei­ther being, life, sense, nor reason; for God is aboue thee, God is beneath thee, God is without thee, God is within thee, God is round about thee, God is euery where else, thou wast no where. Nowe when thou sendest thy mind and reason into the bowelles of the earth, to search there, for things of much virtue, as golde, and other mettalles, weigh by the rule of right reason, to what vse thou intendest the employment thereof, whether to the glorie of the Giuer, or thine owne priuate appetite or de­sire, [Page 91]whether thou esteemest not more, a few Flemmish angells, than the blood and life of a thousand bles­sed Saints? If thou growe affected to the garment of the earth, the grasse of the field, and their stately bran­ches, consider whether thou putte true difference betweene them and immortallitie, and how much lesse thou arte inquisitiue after Eternitie, than those corruptible matters. Ex­amine thy selfe, whether thou be thy monies maister, or his vassall. If thy liking be carried after the moouing things, consider how the delight and pleasure in them ouer-ruleth thy af­fections, and taketh vppe thy minde from contemplating their right vse, and the end whereto they were ap­poynted.

If in keeping company with those of thine owne kinde, there are two Sexes; The first betwixt man & wo­man, [Page 92]in which is ingendred man and woman. And therein consider that Reason shewes thee, that God made one woman for one man, and but one man for one woman: which the more sheweth the excellencie of his creation, in that hee made so large a worlde for so small a company. That this is a true conclusion, not to be vi­olated by Reason, the very rule of euen-hoode, and right, dooth shew. For whosoeuer would breake wed­lock, would not haue the same mea­sure requited to himself: neither doth the father like it in the sonne, nor the mother in the daughter, and rather than confesse it, Nature her selfe, in respect of her originall purenesse, is so ashamed thereof, that she will ra­ther commit periurie, than acknow­ledge it: which agreeth well with the wordes of Gods owne spirite, pro­nounced by Malachi, that God had [Page 93]abundance of spirite, which sheweth that he might haue made diuers wo­men for one man, or diuerse men for one woman; but his purpose was o­therwise, howsoeuer men regarde it.

If thy purpose be, in accompany­ing with men, and hauing societie with them, respice finem, to what end it is, whether for thy present pleasure, or profit, or the endlesse happinesse of immortalitie. In these matters there are three speciall things to bee considered. First, the intent and pur­pose of thy minde, and the confe­rence and conclusion there, before any words vttred. The second is the words which are the minds messen­gers, to make knowne hir intent. The third is the actions & practicke parts thereof. Consider therefore, whether thy mind, and thy wordes agree, and whether thy words & actions agree. And in them all, haue regarde, that [Page 94]thy purpose be honest, for nothing is agreeing with right reason that is not truely honest: and nothing truly ho­nest which a man desireth to an o­ther, and would not haue the same befall to himselfe.

Now if in thy mind thou conceiue mischiefe, fraude, and deceit, and thy mouth pronounceth smoothe and pleasing wordes, send Reason to in­quire, who it is that sitteth betweene thy minde, and thy mouth, that cau­seth this iarre betweene thy heartes intent, and thy voyced speech: and she will finde there placed that subtil sophister that beguiled Eue with an Apple, neuer intending more mis­chiefe than vnder smoothe wordes, Mel in ore, verba lactis: fel in corde, fraus in factis.

If thy actions and performance accomplish not thy promises, thy reason will shew, there was corruption [Page 95]in thy minde, or weakenesse in thy vnderstanding, that wouldest a duen­ture to promise matters aboue thy a­bilitie.

If thy mind be discontēted (which is a generall thing among men) some in wishing to chāge their sex, as men to be women, & women to be men: old men to be yong, children to bee of ripe age, the single to be married, the coupled to bee asunder, the ser­uant to be Master, the Maister to be seruant, the rich to be more rich, the poore to be as rich, the needy to haue the wealth of his neighbour, the man subiect to obediēce to rule the gouer­nor oft times, to be freed of his great burthen. And this which is a gene­rall fault in euery man of aduance­ment and preferment, to excel, and to beare Rule, insomuch, that oft times the subiect vniustly contendeth for the kingdome. A thousand other [Page 96]things there are in seeking of nouel­ty, exchange of trades, and courses of life, of health, and libertie, and such like; which I leaue to rehearse and send thee to thy selfe for resolution.

Peruse thy whole body, and thou shalt finde diuers necessary parts and members, as the feete, the legges, the hands, the armes, the head, the eyes, the teeth, the liuer, stomake, lungs, yeines, sinewes, arteries, & such like; Al which tend to the performance of seueral duties and offices to the heart, and the life therein placed. And as none of these can be wanting, to make a perfect bodie, so none of thē enuy another, nor desire to change; & being made for these seueral vses, cannot exchange places nor offices. So is it thy case to be a part or mem­ber of another world. And as thou wouldest not bee a stone, to bee the richest Iewell: nor a tree, to bee the [Page 97]greatest Cedar; a beast, to bee the great Behemoth; a fish, to bee the great Leuiathan; nor a Diuell, to be Belsabub himselfe: So Reason teach­eth, that thou canst not be Moses nor Elias, Salomon nor Dauid; not borne of the roote of Iosse, no Romane, Itu­lian, nor German; thou canst haue no other Father nor Mother then thine owne. If thou be not borne of the blood Royall, it is not Gods fault: But if thou rashly aspire to that wher­to thou art not borne, it is thy fault. And the same reason whereby thou requirest to haue dominion ouer thy inferior, requireth thou shouldest o­bey thy superior. For the powers that are ordained of God, among whom the king is the most excellent, carry­ing representation of the maiestie, iustice, and mercie of God.

If thou send forth, (as thou must of necessity) any of thy appetites, af­fections, [Page 98]or passions. Then giue them their Commission, for feare of offending: and omitting the rest, I will particularly touch these. And first, concerning necessarie things, if thou suffer thy affection, or passion of thirst at libertie, let her not riott so farre as to ouer-maister thy Reason, be as carefull in thy greatest drought to keepe moderation therein, as thou art fearefull, to burne thy selfe with fier, when thou art most colde; be as wary in that point as thou woldest be to put a sword into a madde mans hand.

If thy passion of hunger craue li­bertie, set her boundes that she sur­fett not, nor waste as much in one day, as would satisfie thee a moneth: If the affectiō of cold require clothes, giue her a law, that she exceede not hir bounds, by putting on thy whole wealth in a sute of apparrell.

If thy affection of Loue, or rather Lust, be extraordinarily busie, take order in time that shee ouer-runne not her compasse. And as Loue is properly said to be a desire of things faire, goodly, and beautifull; so lett her not extend them further then to things honest, profitable, and possi­ble. For if the thing thou loue bee not honest, it will be a clogge to thy conscience; if not profitable, it wil be wearisome to thy life; if not possible, it will turne into griefe, and so either into a desperate or mad humor. For if Plato conclude rightly, that all things in this world are engendered by loue, thou hast Reason, to take heede thou abuse it not, and it be­come thine owne confusion. If thou hate, see it bee vice, & not vertue, for there is none so impudent, but will confesse that vertue is a good of the soule; and vice beeing the contrary, is [Page 100]an euill. If Reason be thy medicine, the contrary must needs be the sick­nes of the Soule.

If thou feele sadnes or sorrow cō ­ming fast towards thee, set Reason stoutly and valiantly to defend thee from it, remembring Salomons con­clusion, that a sorrowfull hart drieth vp a mans bones: yet mistake not my meaning, for godlie sorrow for thy misdeedes, is a good protection against the other.

In the case of friendship, take A­ristotles Moral for thy direction, per­fect friendship is among good men that loue vertue, and in all things a­voide rashnesse: out of this Reason Darius acknowledged, he had rather haue one Zopirus, then the conquest of twentie Babilons.

If the thing thou hope for, bee grounded vpon Reason, and depend vpon a possible; attaining the same, it [Page 101]will in it selfe protect thee from des­paire. And if thy hope be rightly in God, Reason will teach thee to de­pend on his prouidence, and not to hope for vain or impossible matters. And seeing that hope is the fountain & trade of al sortes of mens employ­ment in this life, there is great cause it should depend vpon Reason, & not rashly consume that a man hath, and foolishly hope for more.

Many vaine things follow vaine hope, which commonly worke con­fusion. As the hope and expectatiō of vaine glory is vaine: so is the exces­siue charge of building, of apparrel, of diet, prodigalitie, and popularity, which foloweth the same as vaine, & consumeth the affected thervnto, al­luding to this saying: Hee that stri­ueth to bee friend to many: can hardlie be friend to any.

Vain hope of riches, honor, dig­nitie, [Page 102]and things not like to be obtai­ned by the rule of reason hath broght many to distracted wittes, and wilful destroying of themselues.

In the attempting of things some­thing vncertaine, examine these two passions, by the rule of reason, feare­fulnesse, & hardines: for as they are two extreams, so yet is the meane of them, a good temper. As cowardly fearefullnes is to be abandoned, so is fool-hardines vtterly to be reiected. The temper wherof Salomon shew­eth, where he saith: Blessed is the man that alwayes standeth in feare. But he that hardeneth his heart, shall fall into mischiefe. Which meane is fully described by Esay in 66. chap­ter, saying: whom shall I regard saith the Lord, but him that is milde and gentle, and standeth in feare of my wordes? And God himselfe saide, that Moses was a mylde man aboue [Page 103]all that liued, accompting mildenesse for the height of vertue.

And bicause in the ireful appetite, heate, choler, and fury, beare a great sway, which like the raging fire con­sumeth without measure. Thou hadst neede ride such a colt with a strong mus-roll, and musle it as thou woldest a biting mastiffe, lest in thy rage they ouercome thy Reason, and rebell against their Queene, and by treason, they bring thy life to confu­sion.

Cicero in his fourth booke of his Tusculane questions saith: The foun­taine of incombrance, is, intempe­perance, which draweth, and estran­geth vs from true Reason, and is so contrary vnto it, that it is vnpossible to gouerne and restraine the lusts & desires of the heart: Selfe-will, rash vowes, outragious othes, intempe­rate furie, and franticke madnesse, do [Page 104]commonly follow this wilfull appe­tite, if it be not very moderately tē ­pered with respectiue consideration. Al these passiōs, if they be inordinate, are the daughters of pride, frō whēce commeth whatsoeuer is euill, of whom beware & take heed, as of the Crocadile, or the sword of thy maliti­ous enemy. If thou wilt be carefull and curious in framing thy timber for the building of a house, that euery thing be fitt and proportionable: so hast thou need to take as great care in reforming and keeping thy passions and affections, subiect within the rule of Reason. And for conclusion take this, that the performance hereof re­quireth, as much paines, dilligence, & labour, as any mecanicall art: for of all mischiefes, idlenes is the most daun­gerous, which right Reason cannot abide, nor endure in hir Court; which cherisheth and aduaunceth the labor [Page 105]of the mind, which I commend vnto thee aboue all riches.

Sect. IX. Reasons publike gouernment.

IN euery gouernment and order, the beginning is ta­ken from the least, & vn­worthiest partes, as Gra­mer beginneth at letters, Geometrie from the point. Arithmeticke from the vnitie, Musicke from the note, and so proceedeth to the better parts. He that runneth most swiftly, began to creepe, then to stand, after to pase, and so by degrees to the facilitie of his speede: So in the cases of gouernmēt of a publicke estate, the beginning is at one person, singularly by himselfe: Which is euery mans case, and ther­fore did I indeuoure to handle that [Page 106]matter; first, that euery man gouer­ning himselfe rightly, might the more fitly and sufficiently become a mem­ber of a well gouerned common­wealth: for Reason sheweth that it is well or ill, with the publike state, as all her partes are particularly gouer­ned, euen from the least to the great­est.

As the Magistrate is said to be the head; and the people, the body of the cōmon-wealth: So hath Reason added a third matter to giue life vnto this body, and to be, as it were, the soule of this head and body, which is the law wherby al the parts therof are kept in order.

This law ought to allow souerain­tie in one, and obediēce in al the rest. The ministers and officers of the Lawe are her mouth, whose wise­dome, vnderstanding, iudgement, in­tegritie, constancie, indifferencie, and [Page 107]fidelitie, should be as iust & equall as the beame that beareth the ballance, wherewith Gold is weighed: and the standard measure that alloweth to e­uery one alike. As the Soule and mind of man walketh betweene hea­uen and earth, and considereth of thē both: So doth the right minister of the law descend into the Soule of the law, and walketh betweene the head and the lower parts of the common­wealth, and considereth them both, giuing to each his euen measure; not a dramme to him that ought to haue a gallon, nor a bushell to him that ought to haue no more then a pinte, but to euery man according to his right. I mind not to discourse of the diuersitie of gouernments, and what they are, and how the vse of them haue bin in other countries: as the Aristocracie, Democracie, Monar­chie, Oligarchy, or, Duarchie, and di­uers [Page 108]other gouernments.

But pursuing my purpose, to dis­couer to the weake, and meaner sort of men, their places, duties, and offi­ces, hold my selfe happie, that I am a poore subiect and member, vnder this most naturall and most auncient gouernment of a Monarchie, the head and guide whereof God long continue with great comfort and ioy, which would be much the more in­creased, if her subiects, the members of this body, would, according to tru and right Reason, do their duties, and performe their obedience towardes God, their countrie, and her sacred Maiestie.

Many men haue trauelled in other countries, to gaine experience of vsa­ges abroad, wherein they oftentimes so much delight, that they forget their owne true and naturall countries vse; others learne languages, when striu­ing [Page 109]to attaine the accent of the french, forgot to speake their countries lan­guage, and so haue no fit speech at all. Some men follow others so long, that they lose themselues. Some are so eagre to search into the faults of o­thers, that forgetting themselues, they runne into vnrecouerable errors. The prodigal man commendeth expense, delighting in a vaine praise, til he haue wasted all his estate, vtterly contemn­ing frugalitie. The churle exceedeth as much in misery, and despiseth libe­ralitie. The vaine-glorious is rauish­ed with kinde words of the flatterer, reiecting true aduise. The prowde is insolent and outragious, neuer satisfi­ed with reason. The kinde-hearted, rather than he will sit out of the com­pany of fooles, will make a foole of himselfe. The Gentlemans son must take no paines, it is against his repu­tation. The Scholler oftentimes in­steade [Page 110]of proceeding in virtue and honest causes, studieth and pra­ctiseth mischiefe and falshoode. He that hath once waited at his Maisters Table, thincketh it a disgrace, at anie time after, to take the plough in hand. And if the poore father hath brought vp his sonne to some place of prefer­ment, it is hard if the sonne be not a­shamed of his father. The friend (for the most part) is in shew: and to serue his owne turne, wil not sticke to sup­plant him, whome he ought most to regarde. The countrieman is neuer quiet vntill hee haue the marchants money: and the marchant common­ly maketh his match so, as he will not loose by the bargaine. But whosoe­uer obserueth what others, protestati­ons, vntruths, deceits, cunnings, crafts, and collusions are vsed amongst all sorts, shall well find, that Reason hath not her right gouernement. If anie [Page 111]man looke but into the Comoedy that treateth of the Humors of men, and the booke of Cony-catching, he shall see those errors very liuely, and at full discouered.

Now, as the beginning of gouern­ment, is at a priuate man, so the first that followeth, is the gouernement of a priuate family, in which the maister of the house hath authority to impose domesticall Lawes. The next is be­tweene the Lord and Tenants, ouer whome the Lord hath authoritie to appoynt ordinaunces, and to receiue an othe of fidelitie. Then followeth the gouernement of Tithings, of Towneships, of Citties, of Coun­ties, & so concludingly of the whole state, whereof to dilate, would be o­uer tedious. The collegiate and ec­clesiasticall gouernements, and al pri­uileged places, ought to haue repaire to one head. At one is the beginning [Page 112]of obedience: and at one, is both the beginning and end of gouernement. And whatsoeuer is meane betweene those buttols or boundes, is the pub­lique state, which by reasons rule and law, are to be ordered and disposed, like as the stuffe and seuerall matters that goe to the building of an house, which, as they are to be at the directi­on of the principall woorkeman, yet are they not to be lost, nor spoiled: so is it in the case of gouernment, for the ordering of causes, and suppressing of disorder in a publique consideration, without confusion of any. In which publike state many ancient, laudable, and godly Lawes haue beene made, which of themselues, are in the com­mon-wealth, as the soule is in the bo­dy of a man, when hee either sleepeth or waketh. The life of the law is the minister and officer thereof, who should distribute the same to the in­different [Page 113]and equall good of all. It is as the line or plumbe rule, where­by the workeman guideth his build­ing vpright.

Gentle Reader, consider with thy selfe, which part of this building thou art, wherof this maine state consistes, and reason with thy selfe, if thou bee contented or discontented with thine estate, and the cause that mooneth thee thereunto: and likewise consider whether that cause be reasonable, or not, if thou finde, no, suppresse it, set the queene of thy passions and af­fections to iudge thereof, and reforme thine errour: which, if euery man in this Land would performe, her Ma­iesties gouernment would farre passe the gouernement of Numa Pompilus, or any that euer liued.

If we enter into consideration, of the seuerall kindes of liuing things, how the bond of nature dooth make [Page 114]them affect the company and fellow­ship of creatures, of their owne sorte, to liue together in assemblies with a kinde of pleasure and contentment. The beasts, on the earth, in the ayre, the birds, and in the water, the fishes, wherein they holde themselues stron­gest, and most safe, as they are gathe­red together into greatest companies, in a kinde of agreement, as their na­tures are expressed by Aristotle, and others of like learning. It will enforce men to wonder at their owne intem­perate gouernment, considering that against one beast, or bird that killeth one an other of his owne kinde, there are thousands of men murthered, and vnnaturally slaine by their compares; so that among men, reason so litle pre­uaileth, that the very sensuall partes rebell against their owne nature. In­somuch, that men, through their vn­reasonable actions, committe that [Page 115]which the vnreasonable beasts do es­chew to performe.

Had not Reason neede to impose laws, to suppresse these disorders? In the priuate body of a man, if the gan­grina take any member, which is like to bring the whole bodie to death, & destruction, will not the head, the heart, and all the rest of the members consent to the seuering that member from the body to saue the rest? So in the state of a common-wealth, to preserue the principall and generall parts, Reason hath made lawes, not to respect any particular that shall grow daungerous to the whole, and special­ly, to the head, which is the life & ho­nor of the rest.

As the priuate man that hath his legge cut off, to saue his body, hath no pleasure, but paine and griefe in losing the same: So the good Magi­strate, hath no pleasure in the death or [Page 116]punishment of the subiect, but is ra­ther grieued that any such member should be so corrupted as he may not be abidden to remaine.

The law is said to be the blood, & bond of the commonwealth, the spi­rit therof.

The law is said to be a singular rea­son imprinted in nature, commāding those things that are to be done, and forbidding the contrary: by which the men of the first world liued with­out any written law at all.

Besides the written law, the law of nature is a sence and feeling, which e­uery man hath in himselfe, and in his conscience, wherby he discerneth be­tweene good and euill.

The lawe is as the medicine, the minister and distributer therof, as the Phisition, & the offender, the patient. As in some causes, though the Phisi­tion do not giue the potion rightly, [Page 117]nor the patient haue a stomake to en­dure the taking; yet is not the fault in the simple medicine, but in the gi­uer and receiuer, or one of them. The wrong is not in the law, if thou bee corrected for thy offence, but in thy selfe for thine error.

Many a man being sicke of an a­gue, sindeth fault with his drinke, where in truth the fault is in his taste: the like may be said of those that cō ­plaine of the iniustice of the law, whē alas, it is a dombe thing of it selfe, and intēdeth no harme to any, but the wel vsing or abusing thereof is the matter that is to be considered.

The euill disposed, wisheth there were no law, that he might vsurpe o­uer the good, or at least, he holdeth the law, to be ouer-seuere, to punish his fault; on the other side, the honest minded man, findeth that the offen­ces against the law, are notfully, and [Page 118]speedily reformed.

To treate of the diuers kindes of lawes, of diuers Countries, and the se­ueral vses of them, I intend not, but to leaue a note to men of ordinary vn­derstanding, that the gouernment of men, vsed by the discipline of lawes, is as necessary as the life, to preserue the body from putrifaction.

He that thinketh it an easie, or sleight matter, to put his hand into medling, or dealing with state mat­ters, making of new lawes, or, abro­gating the old, as if they were to bee put off and on, like a garment, or fan­tastically changed, as the wild humor of some few affect, let them consider what Demosthenes said of the decrees among the Locrians, that euery Citi­zen that was to bring in a new lawe, shoulde come and declare it publike­ly with a halter about his necke, to the intent, if his law were for the vnwor­thinesse [Page 119]thereof reiected, hee should presently be strangled.

Such consideration must be takē of the law, saith Isiodore, that we must not iudge of it, but according to it, nor (saith Cliton) the people must not hearken so much to the orator or ad­uocates of the law, as to the truth of the law it selfe. Pausanias Reason, wherfore the lawes among the Lace­demonians ought not to be altred, was, for that the lawes ought to bee rulers ouer men, and not men maisters ouer the law.

If Mercurius Tresmegistes tooke great paines and labor, to compose lawes for the ordering & gouerning of the Egiptians; Phoroneus, among the Greetians; Solon among the A­thenians; Lycurgus among the Sithi­ans; Numa Pompilus among the Romans; Pharomond among the Frenchmen; Charles the great amōg [Page 120]the Almans; Iulius Caesar and others, among the English, that were as lightes to their feuerall gouernments. wherby their subiects might liue in o­bedience, to the state, and haue Iu­stice, ministred & distributed among them according to their equall rights, which to their immortall honor, haue continued in those countries, for the reasonable guiding of the people? what do the infringers, violaters, cor­rupters, or contempners, of those lawes, whereof there are many, de­serue?

Ignorance, ignorantly, is holden, to be the Mother of Deuotion, which opinion, hath bred a wonderful con­fusion in the world: for if it bee the Mother, and Deuotion, the childe, they know not one another; and for want of knowledge must needs erre. Concerning thēselues, Partus sequi­turventrem, the Danghter followeth [Page 121]the Mother. Ignorance hath no ac­quaintance, much lesse alliance with Reason, and therefore cannot appre­hend nor embrace things grounded on Reason. Ignorance is the oppo­sed enemy of Reason, and leadeth to all outragious and vnlawful attempts: Blind Deuotion her Daughter inci­teth and stirreth vp the minds of men to sensualitie, selfe-will, rashnes, in­temperance, foole-hardinesse, stub­bornnes, contempt, and the vtter sub­uersion of the lawes, ordinances, and directions that Reason hath proui­ded.

This Ignorance, and her brood, hath spred abroad many seditious and slāderous reproches of indignitie, in­sufficiencie and grosse defects to bee in the Lawes, whereby this countrie wherein we liue is gouerned. And this Ignorant and foule error, hath dispersed it selfe into many quarters; [Page 122]and gotten strong hold in the world. To set downe the particular errors in that behalfe, and to answer them ful­ly, woulde require a great volume, woorth the writing, and woorthy the reading, wherein I will not now in­sist. The like may I say of the conti­nuall and daily euasions and slidings from the true tuch and period wher­vnto the practise and execution of the Lawe should tend. Which fault, in the abusiue practisers of the lawe, hath beene a great cause that the bur­then of that reproach, although vn­truely, is layd so heauy vpon the lawe it selfe. I may not giue way to the scope of this Discourse at large. And therfore, to satisfie the ignorant here­of, in some measure, I send him to be­hold and view these speciall poyntes, concerning the course of gouerne­ment established, and set downe by reason and law.

The Maister of a house ordereth his housholde, agreeing with the con­ditions thereof; as the Babe newely borne is nourished with the mothers milke; the elder children at schoole, to learne rudiments, how to be dispo­sed at riper age; those grown to mans state, are employed in other busines; the seruaunts labour for all, and the maister careth and prouideth for all; The apprentice is bound for yeares, which hee must serue out before hee can haue his freedome.

The Schoole maister hath ordi­naunces not to be broken; and hee dealeth with those whome hee teach­eth, according to their capacities; first he teacheth letters, then sillables, then wordes, and after languages, and the congruitie of them; and after, the knowledge of the tongues, he teach­eth Artes: and thus by degrees pro­ceedeth in a reasonable and a tempe­rate [Page 124]manner to the furnishing of that which belongeth to his place.

The Vniuersities haue lawes and ordinances, to approoue, trie and ex­amine, the woorthinesse, sufficiencie, and honesty of those, whom they in­tend to grace with Titles or Digni­ties of learning, as the seuerall pro­fessions whereunto they bend them­selues leade: out of which proceede our reuerend Diuines, learned Ciuili­ans, and necessary Physitions; besides the woorthy storage of the famous Innes of Court, royall court, and o­ther places.

In Citties and Townes corporate, they haue orders for the election and choyse of men from office to office, and by degrees to loke into the suffici­encies, abilities, discretions, and vnder­standings of men before they be ad­mitted to beare the principall go­uernment. And therein is likewise to [Page 125]be obserued, that Reason hath impo­sed a fit ordinance, that by a common and generall election the chiefe offi­cer is to be chosen. In which corpo­rations, as there are many Compa­nies, whereof these gouernments doe consist: So hath each of these Fra­ternities, speciall orders and ordinan­ces, in their peculiar and particular offices. In this behalfe there are ma­ny orders ordinate and subordinate, and which were ouer-tedious to re­cite: to be short therfore in that point, Reason hath giuen them abilities and powers to make ordinances and con­stitutions within themselues, but limi­ted with within bonds. That they be not contrarie to the lawes of the land.

The Innes of Court haue orders, both to constraine study, and to trie and examine the studients, as well for the sufficiencie of learning, as con­gruitie of manners, and to commend [Page 126]and giue grace to the well deseruing, and stoppe the course of peruerse and disordered persons. Out of this court­ly Academie, what good this Com­monwealth hath receiued, appeareth, in that the Kings and Queenes that raigned ouer the same, haue alwayes chosen their seruants and ministers of iustice and authoritie from those pla­ces. Of the Lawe it selfe it is worthi­ly said, Lex Regi, quod Rex legi, The lawe is to the King, as the King is to the lawe.

As the King vpholdeth and main­taineth the lawes priuiledges, and rights of the Land, so the lawe keep­eth men in subiection and obedience to the King: and thereby giueth glo­rie and safetie to the King, with peace and dignitie to the kingdome.

That in the desciding of contro­uersies and questions growne among men, the lawe hath a most equall and [Page 127]indifferent course drawne downe by reason, appears in this. First, the smal­ler matters are to be tried before the Lord of a manor, where the cause is between those of his homage, where­in, as in the causes of greater moment in higher Courts, the triall is appoyn­ted, per probos & legales homines, by a Iurie of approoued and lawfull men: per testes fide dignos, by witnesses, not attainted of notorious crimes, but de­seruing credite. In which behalfe is to be obserued, what care the Lawe hath of indifferencie, in that it hath admitted many challenges for kind­red, aliance, affection, fauour, or dis­pleasure, and such like, lest by cor­ruption, iniustice might bee mini­stred.

And as the cause may require, so that it goeth to the Iudges thēselues: For like as by the verdict of Twelue men, euery cause of some nature must [Page 128]be tried: So by the Direction of the Law, causes of some other nature are to be descided, and adiudged by the sentence of the twelue Iudges of the Land.

Is it not of worthie consideration, & a very resonable course, that reason hath set downe, that the trial of Land shalbe by men of the same neighbor­hood: that they, knowing the right, may execute the worke of the Law? Lex suum cuique tribuit, the Law gi­ueth to euery man his owne. Then the common opinion of them that say the fault is in the law, is erronious, by condemning the Law, for the per­uerters of the Law, and Iustice, of whom there are too great a number.

Looke further into the true since­ritie of the Law, and you shal finde, that Reason hath made Lawes, to re­forme those errors: and to punish the offenders: according to the qualitie [Page 129]of their transgressions. What can she do, poore dumbe thing? she is not a­ble to speake in her own behalfe, and few wil do her right, either in woorde or action.

Comes shee not neere the Court when she punisheth treason, to pre­serue the Kinges person? Embrace her, and vse her worthily, for she is of great honor, and the principall worke that euer Reason brought to effect in causes of this world.

The Souldier and man at Armes will confesse, that without the Lawes of warres and martiall Discipline, there is no possibillitie of keeping things in order.

The diuines and professors of ho­ly Writ in all countries, and in all ages, haue made alowance hereof, & muth endeuoured the performaunce of some things in that behalfe.

All the Emperors, Monarks, and [Page 130]Kings of the world, depend hereup­on, and hereby their gouernments are preserued and kept from confusion: the least fraction whereof worketh great anoy, as appeareth by the stories written by Cornelius Tacitus of the liues of Nero, Galba, Vetellius, and others in the Romane Empire.

This consideration offereth it selfe (though something abruptly,) that if the offences, errors, and transgres­sions of men in these points did con­sist of substantial matter, as the bodies of the offenders do, and were, for their vnworthines, appointed to bee consumed with fire; All the water in the great Ocean would not extin­guish the flame. This being true, it shall agree well with Reason, and bee very conuenient, that men looke in­to themselues before it be too late, & correct their errors whilest they haue time, lest in the end, for the faults of [Page 131]their materiall bodies, and sensuall, and loose dispositions: their Soules which consist of immateriall and vncorruptible substance, bee sett on fire, and burne in hel with vnquench­able fire, that no water, of what abun­dance soeuer can put out.

And so hauing drawne to thy re­membrance, these short notes, I send thee to consider (for the worthines of the law) that Moses, from whom the grounds of all lawes are receiued did (in his time) publish the law to the people himselfe, vntill the people grew to great numbers, and infinite disorders, and then by the perswasion of Iethro his Father in lawe, hee ap­pointed ministers, and officers vnder him. The law put in execution by those officers, was not the law of the officers, but the law of Moses. And the law vttered by Moses, was not Moses own law, but the law of God. [Page 132]Such is our case, the multitude of of­fences and euills committed amongst vs, are too great, and ouer many for our Queene, to order in her person: therefore, Reason hath set downe meane authoritie vnder her. The lawes they put in execution, are not the lawes of the Iudges, but the lawes of our Queene, and countrie. The sentence they pronounce, is her Ma­iesties; they only giue it a voyce, and the maine point is this, both the lawes, and determination thereupon, if they be truly executed, and obeyed, are the lawes, and sentence of God himselfe. Was there not in Moses time, a chiefe head aboue men? was there not a mongst mē one aboue the rest? were there not vnder him others that took paines to sit in Iudgement, to heare the peoples causes? was there not thē a chiefe Magistrate, and inferior Ma­gistrates, some in authoritie to order, [Page 133]and gouerne, others vnder them to obey? were there not men that sustai­ned wrong, and others that did the in­iurie? was not Miriam that gallant Lady punished with leprosie, for murmuring against the authoritie of Moses? And is not this the antient­est gouernment in the world? And was not this a kind of Monarchie?

Doth not our state and gouerne­ment resemble this? we haue the same GOD they had, a sole gouernor as they, lawes as they had, Liuetenants, Deputies, Officers, and Magistrates as they, people to be kept in obedi­ence as they, murmurers against the head as they. If they had Corah and his company that rebelled, this land hath not bin free from such: but God haue the honor, they haue had their punishment as well as Miriam and Abiram. If the Magistrates in that gouernment found store of busines, [Page 134]to punish offences, and right the op­pressed; our countrie is not altoge­ther vnlike them therein; If Moses had Aron for Church matters, our head hath, vnder her, mē authorized for that purpose.

Behold all these things which cō ­taine within them a thousand other branches, and consider whether Rea­son hath not preuailed far in this our country, and God bin very fauorable to the successe thereof: what impiety, inhumanitie, and bestialitie were it, to peruert the good that hath bin at­tained vnto in these pointes? And what doe the contemners, resisters, disobeyers, peruerters, and abusers of this so sacred and holy an ordinance of God deserue lesse then those that were punished in Moses time?

Non minor est virtus quam quaerere parta tueri: quibus acquiruntur ijsdem praeseruantur modis: by diligence, la­bor, [Page 135]studie, endeuour and obedience, haue these bin brought to order, and by the like must bee preserued. In which office, euery member hath a share, the chiefe head in gouerning, and the rest in obeying, which is a dutie to be performed by euery sub­iect: And wherevnto right and true Reason will leade euery man, if he carefully obserue his duetie. The o­mitting wherof, was a fault in the time of Saint Paul, and Saint Peter. The one, writing to Titus, willed him to put men in remembraunce, that they be subiect to principalities and pow­ers. The other requireth that men should submitt themselues, vnto all maner of ordinances of man, for the Lords sake, whether it be to the king as to the superior, or vnto gouernors as vnto them that are sent of him for the punishment of euill dooers, and for the praise of them that do well. [Page 136]Besides, Saint Paul saith in an other place, be subiect to the higher powers for who so resisteth the power, Rom. 13.1, 2. resi­steth the ordinance of God. With which sayings I conclude, desiring that euery man will put himself in re­membrance of his dutie in those points, and according to his calling, beare a faithfull and true heart to his Queene and Country, and obedience to authoritie, as the key that openeth to all happines; and is the closing vp of Reasons gouernement in these worldly causes: and a great in­ducement to eterni­tie.